The London School of Economics and Political Science

*Nationhood, Visibility and the Media: The Struggles for and over the Image of Brazil during the June 2013 Demonstrations*

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A thesis submitted to the Department of Media and Communications of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the Degree of Doctor in Philosophy, London, March 2017
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Abstract

In June 2013, the largest series of protests that Brazil had experienced in more than twenty years erupted in cities across the country. News from Brazil and abroad reported that people protested against the money that local authorities spent on hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, rather than on the provision of basic public services. The demonstrations, which journalists and academics called the June Journeys, challenged the Brazilian authorities’ efforts to construct and project an image of Brazil as a harmonious and modern nation.

This thesis focusses on the reasons and conditions underpinning the media coverage of the June Journeys in relation to the image of Brazil. The study explores the tensions for and over the symbolic construction, projection and contestation of the nation in the current interrelated, transnational and content-intensive media environment. Theoretically, the thesis draws on scholarship on nationalism, media and nationhood, media and social movements, and mediated visibility. Empirically, the study analyses two datasets: (1) 797 newspaper articles, television reports, online videos and photos produced by Brazil’s main newspapers and television newscasts, alternative media collectives, and a selection of foreign media from the United States and Western Europe; (2) sixty-three interviews with Brazilian journalists, foreign correspondents, activists and government officials, who participated in the media coverage of the protests.

The analysis of these two datasets suggests that the current media environment is a space of constraint rather than pluralism, in which traditional power imbalances are reproduced. The authorities, activists and journalists constructed competing images of Brazil and then employed strikingly similar strategies to make these images visible. The research also underlines how norms, routines, market imperatives and technologies shape and limit the type of images of the nation shown by these various individuals and organisations through the media.
Acknowledgements

It has been more than four years since I set out on this journey, which has taken me to new and unexpected intellectual, emotional and geographical lands. Before I embarked on it, several people warned me that writing a PhD thesis would most likely be a lonely and slow endeavour. While they were right to some extent, I would not have been able to reach this stage without the help of many people, who offered me their unconditional guidance and support.

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I gratefully acknowledge the help of all those people who were so gracious to consent to be interviewed for my thesis. Many of them have asked to remain anonymous, but I would like to thank them all for their generosity, time, memories and insights. On many occasions, their perspectives on the issues explored in this thesis were starkly contrasting. However, they all shared a deep love for Brazil and a strong desire to make the lives of Brazilians better, even though what they understood as ‘better’ usually differed. Some of them may not agree with the arguments I present in these pages, but I hope nevertheless to do justice to the love of Brazil they expressed during the interviews.

I would also like to thank all the old and new friends I met in Brazil during my fieldwork in Sao Paulo, Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro. They took me into their homes, helped me contact people for my interviews and listened for hours to the avalanche of new things that this gringo was seeing and hearing every day,
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‘The first rule for understanding the human condition is that men [sic] live in second-hand worlds. They are aware of much more than they have personally experienced; and their own experience is always indirect. No man [sic] stands alone directly confronting a world of solid facts […] Their images of the world, and of themselves, are given to them by crowds of witnesses they have never met and never will meet. Yet for every man [sic] these images – provided by strangers and dead men [sic]– are their very basis of his [sic] life as a human being’
(Wright Mills, referenced in Summers, 2008, p. 203)

‘The [Brazilian] authorities became aware of the risk that the World Cup – which had been envisioned as a great moment for Brazil to showcase a positive image – would ultimately become an image of bombs, a war climate’
(Gilberto Carvalho, former Chief Minister of General Secretariat of the Presidency of Brazil under Dilma Rousseff, interviewed in 2015)

‘Brazil is not for beginners’
(sentence attributed to Brazilian songwriter, Antônio Carlos Jobim, in Montero, 2014, p. 1)
Map of Brazil

Figure 1 – Map of Brazil, showing the cities of Brasilia, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.¹

¹ Original image: Free SVG Maps, URL: https://www.amcharts.com/svg-maps/?map=brazil. Used according to License Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. I have added to the map the names of the cities of Brasilia, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The map is only for reference purposes and it offers a geographical approximation of where these cities are located.
1. Setting the Scene: The June Journeys and Brazil’s Image in the Media

1.1 An Unexpected Twist

In June 2013, the largest series of protests that Brazil had experienced in over twenty years erupted in cities across the country. Brazilian and international news broadcasts reported that people were demonstrating against the amount of money spent on hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, to the detriment of health, education and public transportation. Thousands of people were taking to the streets in cities all over the country, setting up barricades, occupying streets and squares, and violently clashing with police.

The demonstrations amounted to the largest period of social unrest in Brazil since 1992, when people demanded the impeachment of the then President Fernando Collor de Mello (de Sousa, 2017; Gohn, 2014b; Goldblatt, 2014; Sweet, 2014; Tatagiba, 2014).² 20th June 2013 alone saw one million people protesting in 353 cities, including state capitals Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, and the federal capital Brasilia (Conde & Jazeel, 2013; Gohn, 2014a; Porto & Brant, 2015; Zibechi, 2014). It is estimated that one in every 20 Brazilians took part at some point in the demonstrations (Branford & Rocha, 2015, p. 33).

The June 2013 protests coincided with the FIFA Confederations Cup, an international two-week football tournament that served as a dress rehearsal for the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Newspaper photos and television newscasts showed demonstrators protesting against FIFA and that football tournament.

² Brazil has a rich history of active social movements, such as the Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST, Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra), as well as organisations focussed on women’s rights, indigenous people, environmental issues and against corruption (Bringel, 2014; Conde & Jazeel, 2013; Montero, 2014; Nederveen Pieterse & Cardoso, 2014a; Peruzzo, 2013; Scherer-Warren, 2014b; Smith & Vinhosa, 2002; Zibechi, 2014). Whilst there were some public protests between 1992 and 2013, they were not as unpredictable or on the same scale as the June Journeys.
They were carrying banners with slogans in English such as ‘We don’t need the World Cup’ or ‘We need money for hospitals and education’ (Figure 2).

Contrary to the authorities' wishes and domestic and foreign expectations, the demonstrations turned out to be a highly mediated disruption. Brazilian and international academics and journalists were puzzled by the sheer magnitude and potential implications of the protests. Observers and commentators gave the protests different names, including ‘The 20 Cent Demonstrations’, ‘The Demonstrations Cup’ or ‘The V-for-Vinegar Movement’. Ultimately, various analyses converged on the name ‘June Journeys’, or ‘Jornadas de Junho’ in Portuguese (e.g. Amaral, 2016; d'Andrea & Ziller, 2015; de Sousa, 2017; Figueiredo, 2014b; Kischinhevsky, 2013; Mendonça & Ercan, 2015; Secco, 2013).

The Protests as Contestations for and over the Meaning of Brazil

The June Journeys are not merely an example of the challenges that authorities face when hosting global sporting mega events, or when they carry
out promotional initiatives to position their nation abroad. Protesters did not simply react against a particular brand or public diplomacy campaign. The disruption caused by the June Journeys to the Brazilian authorities’ efforts to construct a specific image of Brazil points to a deeper issue: the tensions and contestations over the symbolic construction, maintenance and contestation of the nation in a transnational, content-intensive and increasingly hard to control media environment.

Examining the June Journeys *exclusively* through the lenses of sporting mega events, as well as nation branding or public diplomacy –disciplines discussed later in this chapter– is insufficient. Alternative theoretical and methodological approaches may provide nuance and insight to the analysis of the mediation of an extraordinary moment in the history of Brazil. Furthermore, debates about the mediation of Brazil during the June Journeys are relevant because what is *seen* in the media is often unquestionably received and equated with reality. Silverstone states that the media provide 'on and through the screen a version of the world which increasingly constitutes the world' (2007, p. 54). One task of researchers is to question this version of the world that is often taken for granted or seen as ‘normal’. Hence, the following questions drive this study:

1. What images and accounts of Brazil did mainstream and alternative Brazilian and international media organisations construct during the June Journeys?
2. How and why did different actors construct and project these images and accounts and not others in the media environment?

My aim is to contribute not only to discussions about the significance of the June Journeys within Brazil, but also to broader theoretical debates within the field of media and communications through the examination of these questions. My interest responds to a call made by Argentinian scholar Silvio Waisbord (2014). He observed that, despite the important contributions made by scholarship from Latin America in the past –particularly to debates about cultural or media imperialism–, in the last few decades, researchers from this region have remained focussed on empirical questions that specifically concern
Latin America. At most, scholars have approached the region as a source for case studies to test theories elaborated in the West, rather than to develop new ideas.

Waisbord contends that the challenge that Latin American scholars face is elaborating theoretical and empirical questions and ideas that may have resonance beyond Latin America, in order to make substantial contributions to current debates in this and other disciplines (see also Gohn, 2014a).³ Hence, it is my hope that the ideas I discuss throughout this thesis will be of relevance not only to those interested in Brazil or the June Journeys, but to anyone concerned with issues about media and nationhood, social movements, as well as media production.

This introductory chapter sets the scene for the study. The chapter has three sections. Firstly, it contextualises and summarises the main events of the series of demonstrations known as the June Journeys. Secondly, it examines the June Journeys as part of a struggle for and over the image of Brazil in the current media environment. Thirdly, it provides an overview of the media environment in relation to the coverage of the June Journeys. At the end of the chapter, I outline the structure of the thesis, summing up the main themes to be discussed.

1.2 Protests in the ‘New’ Brazil

The ‘New’ and ‘Rising’ Brazil

In order to understand the significance of the mediation of the June Journeys, it is necessary to put the protests in historical context. This section describes the prevailing climate of optimism in Brazil at the beginning of the 21st century and how the June Journeys undermined this optimism.

³ For instance, as Miller (2006, p. 212) holds, several authors within Anglo-American academia have recently discussed the importance of examining the concrete conditions that may foster or constrain the production of particular national representations or discourses, partly as a reaction against postmodernism (e.g. Mihelj, 2011; Skey, 2014). However, this is an argument that Latin American scholars addressed earlier (e.g. Appelbaum, Macpherson, & Rosemblatt, 2003; García Canclini, 2001).
Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world, with 8.5 million square kilometres that cover almost half of South America. Seventy per cent of the Amazon forest is located within Brazil. More than two hundred million people live there. Democracy was re-established in Brazil in 1985, after two decades of military dictatorship. In fact, measured by population, Brazil is the fourth largest democracy in the world. It is the third-largest food exporter, the sixth-biggest global manufacturer, and during the last decade has been at different times the sixth, seventh or eighth largest economy measured by Gross Domestic Product. It is also a highly inequitable country. It is estimated that 1.6 per cent of farms control more than forty per cent of the land used for agriculture, and, depending on the methodologies used, experts calculate that between twenty per cent and sixty per cent of Brazilians live in poverty (Bergman & Yellin, 2017; Montero, 2014; Nederveen Pieterse & Cardoso, 2014a; Rego, 2014; Reid, 2014).

From the mid-1990s until 2011, Brazil experienced a remarkable period of political stability and economic growth, which contrasted with the volatility that characterised the end of the military dictatorship, the transition to civilian rule, and the democratically elected government of Fernando Collor de Mello. A series of reforms that began during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who held office between 1995 and 2003, and were continued by his successor Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva, positioned Brazil internationally as a booming and reliable nation in the eyes of foreign investors. The acronym BRICs, coined by the investment banking firm Goldman Sachs to tag Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa, as the economies that were going to presumably dominate the 21st century (Antunes, 2014; Buarque, 2013; Nederveen Pieterse & Cardoso, 2014a; Reid, 2014; Rohter, 2012; Soares e Castro, 2013; Thussu & Nordenstreng, 2015), served both to recognise and reinforce the idea that Brazil was ‘on the rise’.

4 Fernando Collor de Mello was the first Brazilian president directly voted by people after the end of the military dictatorship. He took office in 1990, but resigned in 1992 accused of corruption charges. Vice-president Itamar Franco completed Collor de Mello’s term (Montero, 2014; Reid, 2014; Rohter, 2012).

5 Although Goldman Sachs coined the term BRICs in 2001, the group only became a concrete form in the late-2000s, particularly after the first BRIC summit in Ekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009. South Africa joined the group in 2010, which from then onwards has been known as BRICS.
This was particularly true for the two administrations of Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva, a charismatic former steel worker and trade unionist whose rise to the Presidency had become a captivating story of social mobility. Lula only learned to read aged ten, and after various personal and professional hardships, became one of the founding members of Brazil’s left-wing Worker’s Party (PT, *Partido dos Trabalhadores*) (Bellos, 2014). After three consecutive unsuccessful attempts, Lula was elected President in 2002. During his government, Brazil had a strong currency and inflation was under control. It weathered the financial crisis of 2007-2008 relatively well, and became temporarily the seventh largest economy in the world. A series of social programmes, such as ‘*Bolsa Familia*’ (Family Allowance), successfully brought around forty million people out of poverty and expanded the middle-class (Antunes, 2014; Bellos, 2014; Buarque, 2013; Medeiros, Soares, Souza, & Osorio, 2014; Montero, 2014; Nederveen Pieterse & Cardoso, 2014a; Rego, 2014; Reid, 2014; Rohter, 2012; Sweet, 2014).

Lula aspired to turn Brazil into a major global power, an aspiration that goes back to earlier times in Brazil’s history. Since the 19th century, Brazilian political and economic elites have claimed that, due to its size, natural resources and perceived economic potential, Brazil should become a *modern* nation. They see modernity as achieving the same political and economic standards and stature as Western Europe and in particular the United States (Cesarino, 2012; see also Larraín, 2000; Martin-Barbero, 2010 [1993]; Mignolo, 2007; Mihelj, 2011; Quijano, 2000; Wallerstein, 2004). However, despite countless promises

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Various authors have criticised this acronym, arguing that the BRICS nations have actually very little in common (for more about the BRICS group, see Rohter, 2012; Sparks, 2015; Thussu & Nordenstreng, 2015).

*Bolsa Familia* (Family Allowance) is a social welfare programme that started in 2005. Families with a monthly income of under £46 per capita receive money in cash, when meeting conditions such as sending their children to school or having them vaccinated. It is estimated that this programme has assisted a quarter of the Brazilian population. It has played an important role in moving millions out of poverty, particularly women, people of African descent, as well as those living in favelas in North East Brazil (Medeiros et al., 2014; Montero, 2014; Rego, 2014).

Whilst modernity was born in Europe, it has manifested itself in different ways across the world. Modernisation began later in Latin America than in Europe and North America. It has been characterised by several episodes of crisis, with oligarchies struggling to stay in power, various periods of populism and fragile political institutions. Significantly, the different
made by different Brazilian rulers, the expectations of becoming modern—as traditionally understood by the Brazilian elites—and a global power have remained unfulfilled (Bethell, 2010; Buarque, 2013, 2015a; Carvalho, 2003; Rocha, 2014; Rohter, 2012; Sento-Sé, 2007). In fact, the June 2013 protests were partly driven by demands to have first-world public services in Brazil (de Sousa, 2017).

The PT proposed the first explicit political project of alternative modernity for Brazil (Miller, 2008). Among other aims, the PT, in government during the Lula administration, sought to disentangle Brazil from American and Western European influence. Although Lula’s foreign policy was ambivalent about Brazil taking on a leadership position within Latin America, he sought to enhance Brazil’s role in global affairs. During his administration Brazil increased its participation in multilateral forums and institutions as well as South-South cooperation, particularly with the other BRICS nations (Bethell, 2010; Montero, 2014; Reid, 2014; Rohter, 2012; Soares e Castro, 2013; Thussu & Nordenstreng, 2015).

Whilst Fernando Henrique Cardoso contributed to the positioning of Brazil as a stable and democratic nation abroad, foreign media organisations only started to pay consistent attention to Brazil during the government of Lula (Nogueira & Burity, 2014). Brazil has historically been the subject of foreign attention, as temporary residence of the Portuguese crown, host of carnivals, football and beaches, as well as home to authoritarianism, political turmoil and social conflict (for more details, see, for instance, Amancio, 2000; Buarque, 2013, 2015a; De Rosa, 2013; Paganotti, 2009; Wood, 2014). The 21st century brought a renewed interest in Brazil, due to its political stability and especially its economic prowess. As I learnt when I was in Brazil, various foreign

trajectories of modernity across the world have started to converge with the intensification of globalisation (for a detailed account of modernity in Latin America, see Larraín, 2000).

As the largest South American country, Brazil has aspired to hold a leadership role in the region. However, the insistence of various Brazilian administrations on seeking multilateralism and cooperation with other South American nations has diluted Brazil’s leadership ambitions. Brazil has continuously depended on the willingness of neighbouring nations to effectively carry out specific regional policies. Significantly, other South American countries have opposed Brazil’s attempts to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Lafer, 2001; Montero, 2014).
correspondents moved there in the 2000s, drawn by the country’s political, social and economic achievements.

National and international commentators discussed the rise of a ‘new’ Brazil, claiming that ‘the land of the future’—a term used by Austrian writer Stefan Zweig (1942) to describe Brazil in the 1940s—had finally become ‘the land of the present’ (Buarque, 2013; see also Antunes, 2014). This was in stark contrast with the common joke among locals that Brazil will always remain a ‘land of the future’. This joke underscored how in various episodes in the history of Brazil hopes that the country was going to make political and economic progress were brutally shattered (Reid, 2014). Several academic and non-academic books looked at Brazil’s economic success and political and social challenges through a moderately optimistic prism (Figure 3).⁹

![Figure 3](image)

**Figure 3** – Selection of book covers about Brazil published in the last decade (Photo composition: César Jiménez-Martínez).

Brazilian authorities hoped to capitalise on this attention, in order to boost exports, entice tourists, increase political influence and enable Brazil to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, among other aims (Athias & Etcheagaray, 2006; Marsh, 2016; Nogueira & Burity, 2014; Soares e Castro, 2013). Hence, various publicly and privately funded initiatives attempted to

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coordinate the construction and projection of a version of Brazil aimed at foreigners.

As part of these efforts, in 2007 and 2009 respectively, Brazil successfully bid to host the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro in 2016. Governments, branding practitioners, media professionals as well as the general public have regarded both the World Cup and the Olympics as two of the most important global mega media events. Advocates for these events promise financial benefits, global media coverage, and a positive boost for the image of the host nation (Grix, Brannagan, & Houlihan, 2015; Rivenburgh, 2010; Da Silva, Ziviani, & Madeira, 2014; Tomlinson & Young, 2006).

Both events were intended as platforms from which to announce the alleged 'rise' of Brazil as a global power, or, as some authors argued, its move 'from the periphery to the core' (Grix, Brannagan, & Houlihan, 2015, p. 474; see also Bellos, 2014; Sebastião, Lemos, & Soares, 2016; Soares e Castro, 2013). The speeches given by Lula da Silva on both occasions that Brazil was confirmed as organiser of one of these events are illustrative:

Here, we are assuming a responsibility as a nation, as the Brazilian state, to prove to the world that we have a growing, stable economy, that we are one of those countries that has achieved stability (World Cup host confirmation speech, in Da Silva, 2007).

I think this is a day to celebrate, because Brazil has left behind the level of second-class countries. Today, we earned respect. The world has finally recognised that this is Brazil's time. We've proven to the world that we are citizens, too (2016 Olympic Games confirmation speech, referenced in Rohter, 2012, p. 223).

Lula’s speeches do not contradict the political project of the PT to attain an alternative trajectory of modernity for Brazil. They instead highlight how, all paths of modernity have the idea of progress in common (Mihelj, 2011). Lula

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10 Brazil hosted the FIFA World Cup for the first time in 1950. Brazil was experiencing then a period of political and economic optimism. The Brazilian authorities built the famous Maracanã Stadium for that tournament. In the final match, Brazil was unexpectedly beaten 2-1 by Uruguay, an event that supposedly had a deep effect on shaping Brazil's national consciousness (for more about the 1950 FIFA World Cup, see Bellos, 2014; Buarque, 2015a; Goldblatt, 2014; Smith & Vinhosa, 2002).
portrays the world as stratified into core and peripheral nations—or first and second-class countries—, echoing world systems theory (Wallerstein, 2004). There is also a significant confidence boost in the time between the two speeches. In the first Lula claims that Brazil has a responsibility ‘to prove’ its aspiring status, holding that hosting sporting events will be a test for the aspiration of joining the core countries. In the second, he states that such a status has already been attained—‘we’ve proven’—, hence leaving behind the role of ‘second-class country’.

Lula finished his second term of office in 2011, with eighty-seven per cent approval ratings. Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s former Chief of Staff, succeeded him directly, becoming the first female President in the history of Brazil. Due to internal and external micro and macroeconomic issues, including low investment, high public debt levels and economic deceleration in China, at the beginning of her administration the Brazilian economy started to slow down (Reid, 2014; Sweet, 2014). Despite signs of economic stagnation, a March 2013 survey showed that seventy-nine per cent of Brazilians supported Dilma and that sixty-three per cent thought the government was doing a good job (Figueiredo, 2014a). Furthermore, Forbes magazine ranked Rousseff as the second most powerful woman in the world, after German Chancellor Angela Merkel (Antunes, 2014). A climate of relative optimism prevailed in Brazil. Nobody foresaw that, only three months later, that optimism was going to be brutally shattered.

The June Journeys

The series of protests that became known as the June Journeys in fact started before June 2013. Some authors suggest that it was the demonstrations against an increase in public transportation fares in the city of Natal, in Northeast Brazil, during August and September 2012, which marked the beginning. These protests successfully forced local authorities to reduce bus fares (“CMN revoga reajuste das passagens de ônibus,” 2012). Others (e.g. Cardoso, Lapa, & Fátima, 2016) propose February 2013 as the starting point, when the activist group ‘Fight for Public Transportation Block’ mobilised people
to protest against an increase in public transportation fares in Porto Alegre. Whilst local or regional media covered these earlier demonstrations, they were barely acknowledged by the national or international media.

The demonstrations became a national concern only in June 2013, when the Movimento Passe Livre (MPL, Free Fare Movement), a non-partisan activist collective founded in 2005 which demands free public transportation (Branford & Rocha, 2015; de Sousa, 2017; Gohn, 2014b; Judensnaider, Lima, Pomar, & Ortellado, 2013; Movimento Passe Livre, 2013; Zibechi, 2014), called for protests in Sao Paulo. The objective was to demonstrate against a 7% increase in public transportation fares, and specifically against a rise of twenty Brazilian reais cents (approximately £0.06 at that time), in Sao Paulo. In Brazil, state and municipal governments usually increase fares in January. At the request of Dilma Rousseff, who wanted to contain inflation, local authorities agreed to postpone the rise until May. Whilst in January the majority of workers and students are on summer holidays, May is a particularly busy month. Hence, Rousseff’s request ended up facilitating the coordination of protests against the fares (Gohn, 2014a; Porto & Brant, 2015).

The MPL convened successive demonstrations in the centre of Sao Paulo on 6th, 7th and 11th June, attracting around two thousand participants to the first protest and reaching between five and eleven thousand for the third one (Gohn, 2014a; Judensnaider et al., 2013; Porto & Brant, 2015). The fourth protest held on 13th June drew in between five and twenty thousand people (Gohn, 2014b). The Sao Paulo State military police were particularly violent. Around 200 people were arrested and an unknown number were injured, including journalist Guiliana Vallone from the newspaper Folha, who was hit in the eye by a rubber bullet shot by a military policeman (Gohn, 2014b; Judensnaider et al., 2013; “Protestos contra aumento das passagens abalam São Paulo e Rio,” 2013; Secco, 2013; Stochero & Passarinho, 2014; Zanchetta, 2013).
The demonstration of 13th June proved to be a turning point in the development of the June Journeys.\footnote{Whilst there is general agreement that the demonstration of 13th June 2013 was a turning point, authors have proposed different stages in the development of the June Journeys. Gohn (2014b) argues that the protests can be divided in three phases: the first consisting of the first three demonstrations, which were severely criticised by authorities and the national media, a second referring to the increase in violence and geographical spread of the protests, and a third encompassing the reduction in public transportation fares by authorities. Amaral (2016) also holds that there were three stages, but she stresses that the last was characterised by the violence between the military police and protesters employing the ‘Black Block’ tactic.} The violence used by the military police against protesters and journalists made the general public and the media more supportive of the demonstrations. A survey published at the time held that fifty-five per cent of inhabitants of Sao Paulo were said to be in favour of the protests. Organisations like Amnesty International and Reporters Without Borders condemned the actions of the military police. Significantly, as Chapter 4 details, Brazilian newspapers and television stations became more sympathetic toward the demonstrators (Conde & Jazeel, 2013; Gohn, 2014b; Judensnaider et al., 2013).

Simultaneously, in the city of Brasilia, the non-partisan activist network Comitê Popular da Copa (Popular Committee for the World Cup) called for a protest outside the national stadium in Brasilia on 15th June, to coincide with the inaugural match of the FIFA Confederations Cup. The Committee was set up in 2007 to raise awareness of the forced evictions that the authorities had carried out, particularly in favelas, in preparation for the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics (Branford & Rocha, 2015; Zibechi, 2014).

Only 500 participants took part in that demonstration, but the clashes with the military police outside the stadium successfully put the disenchantment of many Brazilians with the astronomical costs of organising sporting mega events into the spotlight (Bellos, 2014; Cammaerts & Jiménez-Martínez, 2014; Conde & Jazeel, 2013; Goldblatt, 2014; Sweet, 2014; Zirin, 2014). Furthermore, complaints about the vast sums of money spent on the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games rather than on public social services became one of the signature characteristics of the June Journeys, for Brazilian
and international observers and commentators (Bellos, 2014; Branford & Rocha, 2015; Conde & Jazeel, 2013; Goldblatt, 2014; Sweet, 2014).

On 17th June, protests returned to Sao Paulo. This time, they were not only about public transportation fares. The MPL lost their relative control over the demonstrations and participants’ demands went in different and sometimes contradictory directions. People protested for or against a whole array of causes, including gay rights, the costs of the stadia for the World Cup and the Olympics, deficiencies in public health and education, as well as against corruption among the political class (Becker & Machado, 2014; Conde & Jazeel, 2013; Figueiredo, 2014b; Gohn, 2014a; Guedes, 2014; Sweet, 2014; Tatagiba, 2014).

Participants emphasised that they did not belong to political parties and, in fact, they often expelled people carrying political parties' banners or flags (Branford & Rocha, 2015; de Sousa, 2017; Gohn, 2014b). Whilst a whole array of non-partisan organisations were taking part in the protests, young demonstrators employing the ‘Black Block’ tactic12 became notorious (Scherer-Warren, 2014a). In response, the police increased their belligerence and the number of arrests (Branford & Rocha, 2015). Hence, the protests became more violent.

A few days later, authorities all over Brazil agreed to freeze or reduce public transport fares (Branford & Rocha, 2015). As a consequence, on 21st June the MPL stopped calling for more demonstrations (Jornal Nacional, 2013e). However, the protests continued and became practically a daily event, particularly in those cities hosting the matches of the FIFA Confederations Cup, such as Belo Horizonte, Fortaleza, Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro (Gohn, 2014b; Krepp, 2013).

12 The Black Bloc is a protest tactic that emerged in West Germany in the 1980’s. It gained global notoriety after activists employed it in 1999 in Seattle, during the demonstrations surrounding the World Trade Organisation Ministerial Conference. Traditionally, people who use this tactic wear black clothes that hide their faces, making their identification difficult (Gohn, 2014b). They usually attack what they call ‘symbols of capitalism’, such as banks, food chains or multinational retailers (for a detailed account of the Black Blocks in Brazil, see Solano, Manso, & Novaes, 2014).
During the second half of June, the Brazilian authorities and FIFA expressed their concerns about the possible implications of the protests not only for the Confederations Cup, but most importantly for the 2014 World Cup (Goldblatt, 2014). Foreign media organisations also began covering the demonstrations. Although protests continued throughout the year, they effectively started to wane with the end of the Confederations Cup on 30th June 2013 (Gohn, 2014a; Goldblatt, 2014; Porto & Brant, 2015). By then, more than 700 demonstrations had taken place throughout Brazil in June, in which more than one thousand three hundred people had been arrested, six had died, and hundreds had been injured (Figueiredo, 2014b; Gohn, 2014b).

1.3 The June Journeys disrupting the Image of Brazil

The Image of the Nation

Academics, journalists and politicians have discussed the implications of the June Journeys for political, cultural and social movements and the media within Brazil (e.g. Amaral, 2016; Branford & Rocha, 2015; Gohn, 2014a; Judensnaider et al., 2013; Porto & Brant, 2015; Solano, Manso, & Novaes, 2014; Sweet, 2014; Tatagiba, 2014; Vainer et al., 2013; Zibechi, 2014). One area that has received limited academic attention is the impact of the protests on the symbolic construction and projection of Brazil in the domestic and international media. This is a significant omission.13 During the coverage of the demonstrations, some Brazilian and international journalists claimed that the June Journeys disrupted the image of Brazil.

An article in the edition of 23 June 2013 of the Brazilian newspaper *O Estado de Sao Paulo* bore the headline ‘Protests ruin Brazil’s image and worry FIFA’ (Chade, 2013, italics mine). Another piece published on the same day by the British newspaper *The Sunday Times* read ‘Brazil’s samba smile perishes in the flames; the speed with which protests have exploded a nation’s fun-loving image has left cities asking who might be next’ (Phillips, 2013, italics mine). Likewise, a *BBC News* journalist stated in one of her reports that the protests

13 However, authors such as Kühn (2014) and de Sousa (2017) have examined the expression of nationalist feelings throughout the protests.
were ‘not the image’ that Brazil wanted to present to the world during the Confederations Cup (Rainsford, 2013, emphasis added).

A report by Brazilian Public Relations agency *Imagem Corporativa* provides an insight into these concerns within Brazil. It argued that the majority of stories published by foreign media organisations about the June Journeys were ‘negative’, because they emphasised police violence as well as the troubled preparations for the World Cup. Significantly, the report stated that these stories *questioned the image of Brazil* as an emerging power (“Número de notícias sobre o Brasil cresce 9,16% no segundo trimestre de 2013,” 2013). Furthermore, a survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2014 stated that Brazilians had ambivalent feelings towards the June Journeys. Forty-seven per cent saw the protests through a positive lens, arguing that the demonstrations had contributed to an increased awareness of the hardships that Brazilians experience on a daily basis. However, forty-nine per cent held that the June Journeys were bad because ‘they damaged the country’s image around the world’ (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 10, italics mine).

In the articles and reports discussed above, the word ‘image’ does not exclusively refer to visual representations. It has a broader meaning. While semiotics and visual culture approaches emphasise the association of images with visual representations (e.g. Barthes, 1977; Lacey, 2009; Mirzoeff, 2011; Mitchell, 2002; Wodak, 2006), other viewpoints hold that images are ‘constructs infused with meanings, attributes and projected perceptions’ (Khatib, 2013, p. 3), which can include ideas, ideologies, comprehensions, opinions or reputations (Lagerkvist, 2003). In the area of political and corporate communications, researchers and practitioners often employ the term ‘image’ to refer to the reputation of politicians or private companies (e.g. Dowling, 2001; Fombrun, 1996; Mateus, 2014). Similarly, in the nation branding, public diplomacy and international public relations literature, the ‘image of a nation’ often denotes ‘foreign perception’ or ‘reputation’ (Anholt, 2013; Giffard & Rivenburgh, 2000; Kunczik, 2002; van Ham, 2001; Villanueva Rivas, 2011).
The etymology of ‘image’ is related to that of ‘imitate’ (Barthes, 1977; Brighenti, 2010b, p. 30). Images are sometimes understood as ‘false’ or ‘distorted’ portrayals of an objective ‘reality’. Various scholars adopt this perspective, as shown by studies looking at how Hollywood movies or news reports allegedly misrepresent the ‘real’ Brazil (e.g. de Almeida, 2004, p. 184; Amancio, 2000; Buarque, 2015a). This critique is underpinned by the assumption that people can easily access ‘reality’ and mirror it (Lagerkvist, 2003; Shohat & Stam, 1996). Hence, these studies often point out a supposed ‘gap’ between images and ‘reality’ that reveals how well or poorly the ‘authentic’ Brazil has been represented.

In my investigation of the mediation of Brazil during the June Journeys, I use the concept of image in its broadest sense, rather than in the narrower sense of its visual form. Concerns about how the protests impacted the image of Brazil mostly referred to how the demonstrations had apparently effected the general impression that people had of this South American nation. Sources for that general impression were visual forms, but also texts and audios, all of which combined constituted ‘cumulative pictures of the social totality’ (Frosh & Wolfsfeld, 2007, p. 126) of Brazil during the June Journeys.

Hence, when discussing in this thesis the image of Brazil or the image of the nation, I mean the diverse depictions, points of view or opinions about a particular subject that various individuals and organisations construct and circulate in and through a variety of platforms, in visual, textual or audio formats.\(^{14}\) In addition, rather than judging images according to their supposed fidelity to a pre-existing reality, I examine how people construct images of the nation to advance political, economic or cultural agendas as well as to reinforce, negotiate or challenge power relations (Shohat & Stam, 1996; Sturken & Cartwright, 2001).\(^{15}\)

\(^{14}\) This is only a working definition of image. I do not to seek to end any theoretical discussions about it. Disciplines such as semiotics, history of art, photography, sociology and many others have had productive debates about the nature of images and their implications (see, for instance Barthes, 1977; Brighenti, 2010b; Evans & Hall, 2007; Frosh, 2003; Mirzoeff, 2011; Mitchell, 2002; Sontag, 1979; Sturken & Cartwright, 2001; Urry, 2001; Wodak, 2006).

\(^{15}\) Latham (2009) adopts a similar perspective in his analysis of the coverage of Chinese and foreign media in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.
The Image of Brazil

In the last two decades, governments from all over the world have expressed renewed interest in the task of constructing and projecting a specific image of the nations they claim to represent. They have spent hefty sums of money engaging in various efforts which promise to re-build and project versions of national identity, in order to achieve political, economic or cultural goals (Aronczyk, 2013; Castelló & Mihelj, 2017; Kaneva, 2011, 2016; Mains, 2015; Moor, 2007; Surowiec, 2012).16

Nation branding and public diplomacy are some of the most recent incarnations of initiatives intended to construct and project a positive national image both for nationals and foreigners (Aronczyk, 2013; Castelló & Mihelj, 2017; Comor & Bean, 2012; Kaneva, 2011, 2016; Pamment, 2013; Surowiec, 2017).17 Using the globalisation of capitalism and the development of new communication technologies as justification, nation branding and public diplomacy advocates claim that the positive image of a nation is as important as natural resources, military or economic power, in a global order supposedly characterised by natural competition among nation-states (e.g. Anholt, 2007; Olins, 2002; van Ham, 2001). Both disciplines are thus manifestations of what has been called the competition state, that is, the fact that states are increasingly driven by the aim of 'maintaining and promoting competitiveness in a world marketplace and multi-level political system' (Cerny, 2010, p. 6).

Whilst the discussions about nation branding and public diplomacy go beyond the scope and interest of this thesis, suffice to say that various authors have criticised these initiatives. They argue that nation branding and public diplomacy initiatives craft a fairly homogenous version of national identity,

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16 Along with developing national brands, local authorities have also engaged in the task of crafting brands on a sub-national level, such as in cities or regions (see, for instance, Moor, 2007).

17 There are competing definitions of nation branding and public diplomacy. Generally speaking, nation branding refers to the use of marketing and advertising techniques to enhance the reputation of a nation. Public diplomacy is understood as the attempts to influence or engage foreign publics in order to advance foreign policy goals. Theorists and practitioners dispute what the boundaries are between these two practices (for more details, see Aronczyk, 2013; Castelló & Mihelj, 2017; Comor & Bean, 2012; Cull, 2008a; Kaneva, 2011, 2016; Pamment, 2013; Surowiec, 2017).
which masks diversity and potential internal conflicts (Aronczyk, 2013; Comor & Bean, 2012; Kaneva, 2011, 2016; see also Moor, 2007, for an examination of how state agencies have embraced branding techniques).

So-called ‘emerging’ or ‘developing’ nations have enthusiastically followed the advice of nation branding and public diplomacy advocates, in an attempt to leave behind perceptions of exoticism, dictatorial governments, failed economies, or pre-modernity (Turner, 2016). Latin American governments such as those of Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico have enthusiastically put in practice both nation branding and public diplomacy initiatives (Jiménez-Martínez, 2013; Lossio Chávez, 2014; Sanin, 2016; Villanueva Rivas, 2011). For these governments, these initiatives represent a relatively cheap way to project abroad a positive image of their nation in order to attain mostly economic, but also political and cultural goals.

The Brazilian authorities have failed to develop one specific ‘brand’ or a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy for their nation (Chagas de Moura, 2013). Due to its geographically vast territory and multi-ethnic population, efforts—carried out by authorities or intellectuals—to summarise and project Brazil as a single nation have historically proved difficult (Lessa, 2008; Sento-Sé, 2007). However, successive Brazilian governments have engaged in various tasks that seek to create an image of Brazil for foreigners, even though these initiatives do not completely fit within the parameters of a brand or a public diplomacy strategy. During the second Lula administration in the mid-2000s, the Brazilian Secretary of Presidency signed a R$15 million (around £3,000,000) annual contract with CDN, a local public relations company, to manage the image of Brazil abroad, albeit only in relation to the activities of the Presidency (Nogueira & Burity, 2014; see also Mello, n.d.). Most significantly, the Brazilian authorities embraced the hosting of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games with the intention of projecting Brazil as an open,  

18 The definition of Brazil has a single nation—rather than as a multi-national state—has been a traditional concern amongst Brazilian and foreign intellectuals. Historians and sociologies have largely debated about the characteristics that supposedly unite the millions of people who live in the vast territory of Brazil (for a summary of some of these debates, see Lessa, 2008; Sento-Sé, 2007)

Mega sports events such as the FIFA World Cup or the Olympic Games do not simply celebrate the beliefs and values of a pre-existing national community, as Dayan and Katz (1992) suggested in their influential original media events theory (both authors did substantially revise their arguments in Dayan, 2008; Katz & Liebes, 2007). Mega and media events act ‘as rejuvenators of attention centres, where centralized dominant forces concentrate their efforts to re-stabilise hegemonic regimes of power’ (Glynn, 2015, p. 308). Hence, the World Cup and the Olympics are enactments or performances that governments, organisations such as FIFA and the International Olympic Committee, as well as private corporations carry out to construct the nation as a concrete and visible entity, both for insiders and foreigners (Dayan, 2008; Giffard & Rivenburgh, 2000b; Mihelj, 2008; Price, 2008; Rivenburgh, 2010; Rossol, 2010; Skey, 2006; Tomlinson & Young, 2006; Tzanelli, 2008; Urry, 2001).

Social movements often construct images that aim to challenge those created by authorities (Gitlin, 2003; Tarrow, 2011). Hence, they may try to ‘hijack’ mega sporting events in order to direct attention to specific agendas (Dayan, 2008; Price, 2008). In the case of the June Journeys, the protests risked upsetting the Brazilian authorities’ attempts to construct and project a specific image of Brazil. Challenging official images was not the main explicit objective of those taking part in the demonstrations. Generally speaking, protesters held that they

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19 Contrary to what some contemporary media reports stated, Brazil was the second Latin American nation –although the first South American one– to host the World Cup and the Olympics back-to-back. Mexico organised the Olympic Games of 1968 and the World Cup of 1970. The authorities of both countries decided to host mega sports events following periods of economic boom. Mexico was the first Latin American nation to host the Olympics, while Brazil was the first South American country to do so. In both cases, the organisers emphasised that they were representing a whole continent rather than a city or a single nation. Both governments attempted to use these events to project images of modernity and progress to undermine perceptions of exoticism, poverty, and laziness among audiences and governments in Western Europe and the United States. Significantly, before the 1968 Olympic Games, a series of protests took place in Mexico City, with demonstrators demanding social justice, precisely when the authorities were focussing on projecting a positive image to foreigners. These demonstrations culminated in the massacre of up to 500 people by government forces only ten days before the opening ceremony. These remarkable parallels have barely been explored in the literature (for a more detailed account of the aspirations of the Mexican authorities when hosting these two events, see Brewster & Brewster, 2006).
took to the streets to complain about the state of politics, the economy and public services in Brazil. Hence, some authors contend that the June Journeys were not a 'nationalist' movement (Gohn, 2014b, p. 9).

However, various accounts of the protests observe that most demonstrators increasingly claimed to be acting on behalf of the nation and framed their demands in nationalistic terms. They sang the national anthem, waved or carried national flags and posters, and some of them made viral internet memes with messages such as 'The people united, do not need a party' (‘O povo unido não precisa de partido’) or ‘We don’t have a party. We are Brazil!’ (‘Não temos partido. Nós somos Brasil’) (de Sousa, 2017; Jornal Nacional, 2013; Kühn, 2014; Mische, 2013; Whewell, 2013). In fact, a study conducted among people who took part in the protests argued that the June Journeys were underpinned by beliefs in Brazil’s ‘own strength as a nation, and, at least, potential power’ (Kühn, 2014, p. 167). According to the same study, an example was the statement voiced by various demonstrators that, during the protests, ‘the giant had awoken’ (‘o gigante acordou’). That statement implied that the Brazilian nation was a sleeping giant, whose anger and dissatisfaction against those in power was finally expressed during June 2013.

Brazil’s Significant Others

Diplomats, communication strategists, journalists and some academics often describe national images as if they were objects that can easily circulate around the globe (e.g. de Almeida, 2004; Anholt, 2007; Dinnie, 2008; Olins, 2002). Whilst images have a material component, in photographs, movies, newspaper articles, television reports or public relation campaigns (Sturken & Cartwright, 2001), they are relational (Brighenti, 2010b; Delhey & Graf, 2013; Wodak, 2006). Images come into existence only when there is an ‘other’ looking. Hence, speaking about the image of Brazil does not mean speaking about a unique or objective image. It refers to an image constituted by visual, textual or audio fragments, formed in and through the relationship with a specific other in a particular context (see Frosh & Wolfsfeld, 2007; Silverstone,
2007, p. 6; Urry, 2001). In this thesis, I focus on the image of Brazil as seen from the United States and the United Kingdom.

Various communication strategists and academics implicitly recognise the relational character of images, when admitting that images vary depending on who is looking at them (e.g. Athias & Etcheagaray, 2006; Guina & Giraldi, 2012). Concerns about the image of Brazil often refer to how people from Western Europe and the United States perceive this South American nation. Brazilian political, economic and intellectual elites have historically tried to maintain friendly ties with big international powers, particularly Britain and the United States. Reasons have included feelings of insecurity or isolation within South America, the search for markets and trade beyond that region, and the relevance that Brazil has had for the commercial interests of the United Kingdom and the United States (de Albuquerque, 2016; Montero, 2014; Smith & Vinhosa, 2002).

Brazilian intellectuals have also claimed that their nation is culturally and politically closer to these global powers than to its South American neighbours (de Albuquerque, 2016; Bethell, 2010; Buarque, 2013; Dalpiaz, 2013a; Manchester, 1964; Montero, 2014; Rasia, 2014; Sarnaglia, 2012; Sento-Sé, 2007; Smith & Vinhosa, 2002). Hence, both the United States and the United Kingdom have become over time the ‘significant others’ for Brazil, namely the gazes that, whilst viewed with suspicion, provide recognition but also sanction what is shown or masked (based on Brighenti, 2010b, p. 46; de Sousa, 2017; see also Larraín, 2000).

Analyses by academics and practitioners of how Brazil is ‘seen from abroad’ also consider the United States and Western Europe – particularly the United Kingdom – as ‘significant others’. Studies often focus on how American or European people perceive – or claim to perceive – Brazil. This is true for studies examining the work of foreign correspondents during the administrations of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva (Brasil, 2012; Dalpiaz, 2013b; Gobbi, Flora, Geres, & Gluchowski, 2006; Paganotti, 2009). Communication strategies devised to create and project a specific image of Brazil abroad, such
as those done by public relations company CDN for the Brazilian Secretary of Presidency, have also been pitched primarily at individuals from the United States and Britain, along with some other Western European countries (Mello, n.d.; Niesing, 2013; Ocke, 2013).

In fact, whilst media organisations from all over the world covered the June Journeys, the main concern of authorities, journalists and academics within Brazil was often how individuals and organisations from the United States and Western Europe, particularly the United Kingdom, perceived and described the protests. Boletim Brasil [Brazil Report], a quarterly report published by Brazilian communications agency Imagem Corporativa about how Brazil ‘is seen abroad’, held that the international coverage of Brazil had increased during the protests. When looking at it in detail, the report equates ‘international coverage’ with articles published by media organisations from the United States and Western Europe (“Número de notícias sobre o Brasil cresce 9,16% no segundo trimestre de 2013,” 2013).

Discussions about ‘how others see us’ have become part of continuous debates about national identity within Brazil. As in other ‘peripheral’, ‘developing’ or ‘emerging’ countries, such as those from Latin America (Larraín, 2000; see also Wallerstein, 2004), various authors claim that a national characteristic is the importance attached by Brazilians to foreigners’ opinions of their country. Some of these authors highlight as evidence everyday expressions used by Brazilians, such as ‘for the English to see’ (para inglês ver), which means that something is done exclusively to keep up appearances (Buarque, 2013). In fact, commentators who criticised the hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics employed the same expression to stress the differences between the positive façade of Brazil shown to foreigners vis-à-vis the everyday hardships of Brazilians (e.g. Ashcroft, 2015; McMahon, 2014).

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20 In 2014, the report was renamed I see Brazil (Imagem Corporativa, 2017).
21 The exact origin of this expression is unclear, but the assumption is that it entered the vernacular in the 19th century, when under pressure from the British Empire, Brazil passed laws against the traffic of African slaves. These laws were however never enacted and were accordingly passed only to keep up appearances (Buarque, 2013, p. 12; Rodrigues, 2014).
Foreigners’ perceptions are often criticised by Brazilians. Politicians, diplomats, academics and journalists have claimed that individuals and organisations from Western Europe and the United States traditionally construct a ‘wrong’ or ‘distorted’ image of Brazil. This image associates Brazil with carnival, sensual women, beaches, football, favelas and violence, rather than political, economic or technological achievements (de Almeida, 2004; Brasil, 2012; Buarque, 2013, 2015a; Dota, 2010; Paganotti, 2009). The emphasis on exoticism, eroticism, poverty and violence is not exclusive to foreigners. During the 1960s, Brazil’s military dictatorship launched a series of tourism advertising campaigns emphasising the beauty of the beaches and the sensuality of Brazilian women, in order to divert attention away from human rights abuses (De Rosa, 2013; see other examples in Antunes, 2014; Frey, 2014). However, public and private efforts to project the image of Brazil abroad often claim that one of their main aims is to correct ‘wrong’ or ‘distorted’ perceptions of foreigners in order to show the authentic Brazil (Buarque, 2013; Niesing, 2013; Ocke, 2013; Wood, 2014b).

1.4 News Media and the Image of the Nation

News as a Source of National Images

National images are fragmented, continuously created, re-created and contested in and through a whole array of mediated and non-mediated activities and sources. In preparation for the World Cup and the Olympics, the Brazilian Embassy in London organised for three consecutive years –2014, 2015 and 2016– a ‘Brazil Day’ in Trafalgar Square (Figure 4), with music, dance, food, as well as sports, such as beach volleyball. Events like the ‘Brazil Day’ are small versions of what governments have done at World Fairs since the 19th century, seeking to deliver a particular image of their nation with a display of supposedly representative technology, culture and fine arts (Bolin, 2006; Tenorio-Trillo, 1996; Urry, 2001; Welch, 2013).

Private companies are also important players in shaping the image of a nation. Before and during the World Cup, pubs and restaurants all over London displayed Brazilian flags, and many of them offered food or drinks associated
with Brazil, such as caipirinhas or Brazilian barbecues. Various food companies launched special editions of their products, including Lucozade, M&M and Pot Noodle, promising their consumers to experience the flavours of Brazil (“The profusion of temporarily Brazilian-themed products,” 2014).

Figure 4 – Brazil Day, 8th August 2015, Trafalgar Square, London (Photo: César Jiménez-Martínez)

Whilst the staging of politicised or commercial events is important (see, for instance, the discussion about branded spaces in Moor, 2007), the construction and projection of national images increasingly take place in and through the media. Thanks to the media, events such as the ‘Brazil Day’ – as well as the FIFA Confederations Cup or the World Cup – can achieve a greater reach and scale, seen not only by people who directly participate. Chapter 2 will further explore the relationship between nationhood and the media. Suffice to say now that domestic and international media are a prime source to communicate and uphold ‘our own’ nation, see distant nations, as well as how others see ‘us’ (Frosh & Wolfsfeld, 2007; Kunczik, 2002; Orgad, 2012; Urry, 2001).

Being ‘seen from abroad’ is often understood as being covered by international media organisations (e.g. Amancio, 2000; Buarque, 2013, 2015a; Dalpiaz, 2013b; Gobbi et al., 2006; Rasia, 2014; Sarnaglia, 2012). Hence, governments from all over the world try to create and show in and through the media specific images of the nations they claim to represent. Activities such as nation
branding and public diplomacy have in fact become increasingly dependent on the media (Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Kaneva, 2011). Protesters also employ the media to coordinate and communicate their activities and demands, responding in turn to the images constructed by governments or other groups (Cammaerts, Mattoni, & McCurdy, 2013; Cottle, 2011a; Mattoni, 2012).

Individuals and organisations may produce fictional or factual mediated content when shaping the image of the nation. Fictional works include novels, films, television series, songs or soap operas, among many others. Various studies have criticised fictional works for supposedly reinforcing stereotypes about Brazil, such as the depiction of women as being hyper-sexualised, or the portrayal of favela inhabitants as either criminals or people in need of rescue. Examples include American movies and television series such as *Blame it on Rio* or *The Simpsons*—whose unflattering depiction of Brazil in the episode ‘Blame it on Lisa’ in 2002 prompted a complaint by the then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso—, as well as local films such as *City of God* or *The Elite Squad* (for more details about how fictional works portray Brazil, see Amancio, 2000; Antunes, 2014; Buarque, 2013; Frey, 2014; Rego, 2014; Rocha, 2014; Shaw & Dennison, 2007; Stam, 2006).

The significance of fictional representations notwithstanding, this thesis focusses on how news media portrayed Brazil at the time of the June Journeys. News is the primary non-fiction mediated genre. Unlike movies, songs or literature, news supposedly *shows the truth*, even though people are often sceptical about the truthfulness of news (Cottle, 2006; Gitlin, 2003; Lacey, 2009; Roosvall, 2010, 2014). Hence, rather than showing artistic *interpretations* of the nation, those who produce news state that they show how the nation *really* is (see for example the discussion of news coverage of China before and during the 2008 Olympics in Latham, 2009).

22 The differentiation between fiction and non-fiction mediated contents has been simplified for explanatory purposes. Various works of fiction, including soap operas, movies or novels, have claimed to be ‘realistic’ representations of the world (for more details about “realism” in fiction, see Lacey, 2009). At the same time, authors such as Susan Sontag have focussed on the complicated relationship between reality and photography, a medium whose advocates claim that it shows the ‘real’. Sontag famously stated that “[i]t is not reality that photographs make immediately accessible, but images” (1979, p. 165, italics mine).
Professional journalists working for established media organisations largely produce news. However, individuals outside these media organisations are also increasingly crafting news, or content which is claimed to be news (Cottle, 2006; Couldry, 2015a; Phillips, 2014). Governments have set up news media companies or news agencies, often in an attempt to maintain control over the image of their nation (Cull, 2008a; Orgad, 2012, p. 106). Activists try to communicate their messages through established media organisations, but they also set up their own news channels, particularly through the employment of digital media (Cammaerts et al., 2013; Couldry, 2015a; Dayan, 2013; Mattoni, 2012). Such activists’ news channels are often called ‘alternative media’, in contrast to established or ‘mainstream’ media. Alternative media are usually understood as media coordinated and produced by non-media professionals, ‘whose operations challenge the concentration of resources (particularly the symbolic resource of making and circulating images and information) in large media institutions’ (Couldry, 2015a, p. 43, brackets in the original, italics mine; see also Cammaerts & Jiménez-Martínez, 2014; Cammaerts et al., 2013; Dayan, 2013; Sahin, 2014).

The distinction between ‘mainstream’ and ‘alternative’ media is useful for explanatory purposes, but it should be noted that they are analytical concepts. In practice, their boundaries are blurred. In his work about hybrid media systems, Chadwick observes that ‘[o]lder media, primarily television, radio, and newspapers are still, given the size of their audiences and their centrality to public life, rightly referred to as “mainstream”, but the very nature of the mainstream is itself changing’ (2013, p. 59; see also Cottle, 2011b). People accordingly construct, project, contest and re-appropriate news through various interrelated media platforms and organisations, such as newspapers, television, radio, Twitter, YouTube or Facebook (Cammaerts et al., 2013; Chadwick, 2013; Mattoni, 2012, 2013; McCurdy, 2013; Orgad, 2012; Treré & Mattoni, 2016). These interrelated platforms, technologies and organisations constitute the media environment, within which individuals and organisations ‘live with, live in and live through’ (Cammaerts et al., 2013, p. 6; see also
The contemporary media environment has different levels – the local, the national, the regional, the international and the global – as well as multiple communication channels that create an interconnected and networked landscape in which content, such as images of nations, circulate (Cottle, 2011b; Gitlin, 2003; Mattoni, 2012; Orgad, 2012; Thompson, 2005). Significantly, people employ different media to achieve diverse aims at different times. Hence, categories that media scholars have often employed, such as ‘producers’, ‘audience’ or ‘source’, are increasingly elastic. Government officials may often act as sources for news media organisations, but they can also become media producers when setting up their own media. Journalists are often news producers, but they are sometimes also sources for other media as well as audiences of foreign or alternative media. Activists may be audiences of national or foreign media, but they can also act as sources for these very same media, and increasingly as producers of their own alternative media (Mattoni, 2012; see also McCurdy, 2013).

The June Journeys and the News Media

Research into the June Journeys has often focussed on a single media organisation or technology, or has sought to highlight the apparently clear-cut differences between mainstream and alternative media in Brazil (one exception being Porto & Brant, 2015). This concern arises from the protests themselves. Among the many agendas driving the June Journeys,

23 This is not the only possible metaphor to describe the interrelationship between various media organisations and platforms on a local, national, international and global level. Other authors have spoken of a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013) or a media ecology (Fuller, 2005). Authors interpret the conceptual relationship and differences between media ecology and media environment in different ways. While Postman held that media ecology was ‘the study of media as environments’ (1970, p. 161), Fuller stated that media ecology depicts a dynamic system. He criticised the metaphor of environment, arguing that it assumes ‘a state of equilibrium’ (2005, p. 4). Silverstone conversely holds that the media are environmental ‘[n]ot in the Baudrillardian sense of the media as generating a distinct sphere’, but rather in the ‘sense of the media as tightly and dialectically intertwined with the everyday’ (2007, p. 5).

24 Various studies of social movements and the media have similar shortcomings. They portray the media as fragmentary camps, rather than as an interrelated whole (Cammaerts et al., 2013; Mattoni, 2013; McCurdy, 2013).

demonstrators criticised the coverage of the protests by Brazilian national media organisations, such as newspapers Folha and O Estado de Sao Paulo, and particularly Globo TV’s Jornal Nacional. Various protestors carried banners with messages critical of the national media, while others attacked journalists and their equipment during the demonstrations (Becker & Machado, 2014; Gohn, 2014a; de Jesus, 2014).

The source of these criticisms predates the June Journeys. Since the early 20th century, the most popular and influential newspapers, radio stations and television companies within Brazil have been in the hands of a few family-owned and commercially oriented media conglomerates, such as Grupo Bandeirantes, Grupo Estado, Grupo Folha and particularly Grupo Globo (Globo Group), which has become one of the biggest media conglomerates in the world (de Albuquerque, 2016; Hanson, 2008; Matos, 2008; Paiva, Sodré, & Custódio, 2015; Rego, 2014). Globo and other Brazilian media organisations have historically been more inclined to support the interests of the upper classes, the economic elites and the Brazilian right-wing (de Albuquerque, 2016; Fonsêca, 2013; Goldstein, 2014; de Lima, 2013; Matos, 2014; Montero, 2014). National media organisations developed a tense relationship with the centre-left administrations of Lula and Dilma Rousseff. Newspapers, radio and television newscasts emphasised accusations of corruption, propaganda and populism against the governing Workers Party (de Albuquerque, 2016; Goldstein, 2014; Paiva et al., 2015).

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25 The conglomerates that dominate the Brazilian media have accumulated considerable economic power and developed close ties to political elites, switching political allegiances depending on perceived potential commercial benefits. Globo used its newspapers, radio stations and television channels to publish biased news in support of the military dictatorship governing Brazil between 1964 and 1985, and in turn benefitted from some concessions and laws that created a virtual monopoly for Globo in the Brazilian television arena. However, Globo favoured a transition to democracy towards the end of the military regime (de Albuquerque, 2016; Matos, 2008; Porto, 2007). Despite an observed increasing pluralism in Brazilian national media, driven by market interests (Matos, 2008; Porto, 2007; Rosas-Moreno & Straubhaar, 2015), various authors have raised concerns about the dominance of privately owned conglomerates and the absence of regulation. Hence, researchers often call for a democratisation of the media in Brazil. Democratisation is understood to mean both increasing plurality and quality of information in the media, as well as facilitating traditionally marginalised groups to set up their own means of communication (de Albuquerque, 2016; Matos, 2008, 2012, 2014; Paiva et al., 2015; Porto, 2007).
The dominance of the aforementioned conglomerates has driven the Brazilian authorities to try to communicate directly with audiences through what has been called ‘source media’ (*media das fontes*) (de Barros, Bernardes, & Macedo, 2015, p. 209). At the same time, from the 1960s onwards, various social movements, community organisations and religious associations have tried to communicate their interests and agendas using small-scale radio stations, and more recently blogs, digital radio stations and online live streaming (Paiva et al., 2015; Peruzzo, 2013).

The prime example of an alternative media organisation that sought to counteract the narratives constructed by Brazil’s mainstream media during the June Journeys is *Mídia NINJA*.26 *Mídia NINJA* is a network of activists and alternative journalists established in 2011 as part of the network of cultural circuits *Fora de Eixo* (Out of the Axis), which live streamed and disseminated photos and information about the June Journeys through social media. *Mídia NINJA* has been praised as a phenomenon that challenged the dominance of mainstream television newscasts, such as Globo TV’s *Jornal Nacional* (e.g. Amaral, 2016; Ávila, 2013; Becker & Machado, 2014; Bittencourt, 2014; Conde & Jazeel, 2013; d’Andrea & Ziller, 2015; Fonsêca, 2013; de Lima, 2013; Soares, 2013).

Analyses of *Mídia NINJA* and other media collectives have contributed to the understanding of the role that digital technologies and alternative media played in the June Journeys. However, three shortcomings are apparent in these analyses. First, they portray mainstream and alternative media as two parallel and isolated camps. They therefore fail to acknowledge that in the current media environment, content circulates through interconnected media technologies and organisations. Furthermore, mainstream and alternative media do not always oppose each other. They may actually perform ‘in tandem’, re-appropriating and amplifying contents that these different media construct and show (Cottle, 2011a, p. 652).

26 NINJA is an acronym for *Narrativas Independentes Jornalismo e Ação*, which means Independent Journalist Narratives, and Action.
Secondly, analyses often focus on whether Brazil was represented ‘well’ or ‘poorly’, signalling an apparent gap between ‘reality’ and what was shown by the media. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this perspective assumes that people can easily access ‘reality’ and mirror it (Lagerkvist, 2003; Shohat & Stam, 1996). This approach also risks simplifying the June Journeys, depicting the mainstream media as distorters of what really happened and the alternative media as exposers of the truth. However, the assumption that the mainstream media always protect the establishment and dismiss social movements overlooks the agency of journalists, the changing agendas of the media, and idealises the alternative media (Cottle, 2008, 2011a; Gitlin, 2003).

Third, most of the accounts examining the role of various media technologies and organisations during the June Journeys focus exclusively on what happened within Brazil. Hence, whilst the media coverage by the foreign media has been signalled as evidence of the relevance of the June Journeys (e.g. Conde & Jazeel, 2013; Figueiredo, 2014a; Kühn, 2014), most studies neglect how the protests were shown abroad. They fail to acknowledge the significance of the foreign media coverage in relation to the accounts produced within Brazil. As discussed earlier, the media environment is constituted by several media technologies and organisations that can be located within or outside national boundaries (Orgad, 2012). In fact, the intensification of globalisation has made national boundaries more porous and has increased the number of people producing images of the nation.

1.5 Thesis Structure

This chapter has set the scene for this study, summarising the main events and significance of the series of demonstrations that became known as the June Journeys. I have stated that my focus is on the role of the June Journeys as part of a struggle for and over the image of Brazil in the current media environment. More specifically, I examine how various individuals and organisations, from Brazil and abroad, constructed, projected and contested different versions of what Brazil is at the time of the demonstrations.
Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical basis for this thesis. It outlines some theories of nationalism pertinent to this study, which stress that conflict and mutation are essential characteristics of the nation, particularly in an age when the intensification of globalisation has amplified these struggles. This chapter also examines the relationship between nationhood and the media, stressing how theorists have traditionally emphasised how the media fosters and communicates national consensus rather than conflict. Drawing on the concept of mediated visibility, I propose a model to analyse the struggles for and over the mediated visibility of the nation focussing on three dimensions: the visible nation, strategies of mediated visibility, and conditions of mediated visibility.

Chapter 3 details the methodological choices and the study design supporting my thesis. Some of the challenges posed by the study of the June Journeys, such as their unpredictability and their constitution across various symbolic and geographical locations, informed the choice of research strategy. Drawing on multi-sited research and grounded theory, I empirically applied the model proposed in Chapter 2 to two datasets: (1) 797 newspaper articles, television reports, and online videos and photos produced by Brazil's main newspapers and television newscasts, alternative media collectives, and a selection of foreign media from the United States and the United Kingdom; (2) sixty-three interviews with Brazilian journalists, foreign correspondents, activists and government officials, who participated in the media coverage of the protests.

Chapter 4 focusses on the examination of the first dimension of analysis: the visible nation, that is, the version of Brazil that is constructed and shown in the environment of national, alternative, but also foreign media. As stated earlier, analyses of the June Journeys have often stressed the role of a very specific set of actors, such as the national media or alternative media collectives. This chapter goes one step further, examining the frames constructed not only by the national and alternative media, but also by the Brazilian authorities and, significantly, the foreign media. Rather than examining how ‘accurate’ these different images are compared to an alleged ‘real’ Brazil, this chapter addresses them as part of the struggles for and over the mediated visibility of the nation during the June Journeys.
Chapter 5 examines the second dimension of analysis: the *strategies of mediated visibility*. In recent years, a somewhat reductionist narrative of the role played by the media during the June Journeys has crystallised. Some scholars contend that, while the authorities and the Brazilian media manipulated or hid information during the protests, alternative media collectives—and sometimes, foreign media organisations—exposed different and more ‘genuine’ viewpoints. The analysis of the interviews challenges that perspective. Authorities, national and foreign media, as well as alternative media collectives, employed, at different times and to different degrees, three strategies of mediated visibility: *replacement*, *adjustment* and *re-appropriation*. Although some of these strategies challenged power relations, others relied on the reinforcement of the status quo, even when used by those who claimed to confront the Brazilian elites.

Chapter 6 examines four *conditions of mediated visibility* within which the actors that constructed the frames and employed the strategies discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 operated. These are *normative conditions*, *institutional routines*, *market imperatives* and *technological influences*. The conditions show that the study of mediated visibility should not be limited to examining images and accounts shown by the media, as well as the strategies that actors and organisations employ. Instead, both images and strategies should be seen in relation to the sociocultural environment, institutions, expressions and practices within which visibility is sought, materialised and embedded. This approach highlights that various professional practices, working environments, technological developments, as well as commercial and institutional aims may facilitate or constrain the visibility of particular images and accounts.

Finally, in Chapter 7 I summarise the main arguments of this thesis, examining how nationhood is constructed and projected in the current media environment. Whilst the spread of digital media has increased the complexity of the media environment, facilitating more actors to take part in shaping images of the nation, it is still a highly unequal environment. Power imbalances between actors remain, not only within the nation, but also between nationals and
individuals and organisations from the West. I also argue that images of the nation are crafted in a *highly reactive* media environment, with actors continuously contesting what has been shown *before* about a particular nation. This state of never-ending reaction makes images of nation particularly *fleeting*. Such fleetingness runs the risk of making visible the most superficial aspects of the protests of the June Journeys, emptying the demonstrations of their meanings, as well as masking the reasons that drove people on to the streets during those surprising and unpredictable weeks of June 2013.
2. National Cohesiveness and Contestation: Nations, Media and Visibility

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I outline some theoretical debates relevant to the development of a framework for this thesis. My argument is that the concept of ‘mediated visibility’ is a particularly rich approach through which to analyse the mediation of Brazil during the June Journeys. The chapter has three sections. The first explores some pertinent theories of nationalism, stressing that conflict and transformation are essential characteristics of the nation, particularly in an age when globalisation has amplified external and internal struggles over meanings of the nation. The thesis follows Craig Calhoun’s (1997, 2007) argument that nationalism is a discursive formation that various groups use as a legitimation principle, complemented by Mihelj’s (2011) observation that approaching nations only as discourses may neglect the concrete social, political and economic conditions in which the nation is built and shown. The second explores how scholars have addressed the contradictory nature of the nation, which swings between cohesiveness and contestation, through the prism of the media. In the final section, following Brighenti’s discussion of ‘mediated visibility’, Thompson’s notion of ‘new visibility’ and Dayan’s ‘paradigm of visibility’, I propose a three-dimensional model with which to analyse the June Journeys as struggles for and over the mediated visibility of Brazil.

2.2 Nations as Sites of Contestation

Moving from ‘what a Nation is’ towards ‘what a Nation is used for’

What is a nation? Since the emergence of the modern nation-state, historians, sociologists, anthropologists and media scholars, among many others, have attempted to answer this question. Debates across disciplines reveal that, although people use the term ‘nation’ on a daily basis, there is little agreement on what a ‘nation’ is, what its historical origins are, and what distinguishes it from other concepts such as ‘state’ or ‘country’ (Anderson, 2006; Aronczyk,
2013; Calhoun, 1997, 2007; Geisler, 2005; Gellner, 2006; Madianou, 2005; Mihelj, 2011; Roosvall & Salovaara-Moring, 2010a; Surowiec, 2017). whilst the discussion about the exact meaning of the term ‘nation’ is beyond the scope of this thesis, I focus on debates that stress conflict and transformation as constitutive characteristics of the nation, particularly in the current period of globalisation. This theme is central to the investigation of this thesis.

A substantial amount of research has examined the origin of nations. Theorists of the nation and nationalism can be situated in a continuum between perennialism and modernism, depending on whether they portray nations as products of dispersion or concentrations of power. Broadly speaking, the set of theories classified as perennial or primordial assumes that power has been dispersed among people. They argue that a ‘nation’ is a historically and ethnically rooted natural human formation and basic social necessity, which precedes the formation of the state. According to this viewpoint, people’s identities are determined by being born into a particular community with a specific language, set of beliefs, social practices and/or family ties (e.g. Geertz, 1973).

On the other side of the continuum, there are theories termed modernist, constructivist or instrumentalist, which argue chiefly that nations are neither purely historical nor ethnic formations. Rather, nations are a relatively recent phenomenon, which emerged sometime between the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and the 19th Century (Geisler, 2005; Roosvall & Salovaara-Moring, 2010b; Thompson, 1995).

27 Several authors use indistinguishably the terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’ (Calhoun, 2007), to which I add ‘country’. I have personally had the same experience in the Spanish and Portuguese languages. This is an unresolved debate that, due to its scale and scope, I will not examine in this thesis. I try here to keep these terms separate, however, as Calhoun admits, this is not always possible.

28 I use the term continuum because there is no agreement on the number of categories covering the diverse theories about nations and nationalism. Just to mention one example, Smith argues that there are four paradigms in nationalism studies –primordialist, perennialist, ethnosymbolist and modernist (2001)–, Madianou agglutinates all of them into primordialism and modernism (2005), and Muro (2015) categorises them into primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism.
Scholars holding this viewpoint include Eric Hobsbawm, whose account of the ‘invention of tradition’ holds that elites often purportedly create traditions that appear to be ancient, with the aim of legitimising cultural practices, institutions, as well as fostering national unity (Ranger & Hobsbawm, 1983). Another influential scholar is Benedict Anderson, who argues that the spread of novels through print capitalism and acts such as reading the same newspaper contribute to the creation of a national ‘imagined community’, among geographically dispersed people (2006).

Modernist theories stress that nations are products of groups of individuals attempting to concentrate power. They hold that urban elites have constructed various myths that indicate the supposed ethnic, historical and/or cultural features of a given nation. These myths are naturalised and reinforced through conditions such as print capitalism, institutions like educational systems, and symbols such as flags or anthems (for further discussion about these theories, see Aronczyk, 2013; Beissinger, 2002; Calhoun, 1997, 2007; Geisler, 2005; Madianou, 2005; Waisbord, 2004).

The various debates about the origin of nations have produced key theoretical and empirical insights, but they have largely focussed on the processes leading to the formation of a nation. They fail to consider what happens once the nation is built and risk portraying the nation as a durable and stable formation (Smith, 2001). Hence, they often overlook how the nation is continuously re-created either on extraordinary occasions or in everyday life (a significant exception is Billig, 1995; see also Geisler, 2005; Itzigsohn & Hau, 2006).29

There has been a recent move away from exploring the origin of nations to interrogating what the nation is used for. A key scholar is Craig Calhoun. He argues that nations are units of political organisation that serve to recognise the self and the other, structure social bonds, build and understand solidarity and conflict, and develop a sense of belonging (Calhoun, 1997, 2007a; see also Aronczyk, 2013; Itzigsohn & Hau, 2006; Mihelj, 2011; Skey, 2011). Nations are

29 However, Skey (2015) observes that in the last decade there has been increasing academic interest in how national identity materialises and is re-enhanced in already established nations.
often structured and integrated through political formations called states.\textsuperscript{30} States coordinate the apparatus of a government and institutionalise the relationships between different nations (Calhoun, 2007). Whilst states often allege they are the sole representatives of a particular nation (Surowiec, 2017), the relationship between nations and states is blurred. Some nations are not integrated into the form of a state, and there are states that claim to be multinational (Calhoun, 1997, 2007; Guibernau, 2001; Muro, 2015).

Calhoun argues that nationalism is a \textit{discursive formation} that helps people to structure and imagine the world, as well as a \textit{legitimation principle} used to justify the quest for power and its exercise (Calhoun, 1997, 2007). This argument, which has been supported by other authors (e.g. Aronczyk, 2013; Frosh & Wolfsfeld, 2007; Madianou, 2005; Mihelj, 2011; Skey, 2011), is particularly relevant for this study, since it underlines the structured and contested nature of the nation and shows that nationalism, as a discourse and principle of legitimation, is essentially agnostic. Hence, rather than understanding the nation as a product of pure emancipation or centralised control, nations are spaces of continuous contestation (Calhoun, 1997, 2007; see also García Canclini, 2001; Mihelj, 2011; Verdery, 1993). As Beissinger observes, ‘nationalism is not simply about imagined communities; it is much more fundamentally about a struggle for control over defining communities, and in particular, for control over the imagination about community’ (Beissinger, 2002, p. 18).

Individuals and organisations rely on discourses about the nation and nationalism to advance and justify diametrically opposed positions. For example, left-wing social movements in Ecuador, Bolivia or Guatemala have relied on nationalism to expand the civil rights of minorities. Right-wing dictatorships have counted on nationalist discourses to justify human rights abuses and/or protectionist policies, such as in Argentina, Chile and Brazil (Martin-Barbero, 2010 [1993]; Miller, 2006; de Sousa, 2017; see also Billig, 30 Scholars have discussed at length the differences and relationship between the nation and the state. Authors such as Breuilly (2001), Guibernau (2001), and Johnston (2011), have produced summaries of relevant discussions about this subject.
1995; Calhoun, 1997, 2007; Chatterjee, 1986; Hall, 1993a; Laclau, 1977; Mihelj, 2011). As stated in Chapter 1, studies about the image of Brazil often focus on an apparent gap between the image and the ‘real’ nation. However, the concern of this thesis is with ‘nation as a “form”, and not merely on the “content” of various national identities’ (Calhoun, 1997, p. 11).

**Nations Performed in the Global Age**

Focussing on the nation as a ‘form’ entails recognising that nations and nation-states are never solely political units (Calhoun, 1997). They are crucially symbolic formations seeking to produce a specific idea of a community and the identity of its members in a particular context (Hall, 1993a). Nations require representations and performances to acquire meaning and become tangibles as if they were objective entities (Frosh & Wolfsfeld, 2007; Geisler, 2005; Handelman, 2004; Mihelj, 2008; Parry, 2015; Rossol, 2010; Skey, 2011, 2014; Smith, 1991; Tenorio-Trillo, 1996; Urry, 2001; Welch, 2013).

Traditionally, members of the state have fused statecraft with stagecraft, employing several tools or initiatives such as flags, anthems, mass gatherings, the media, or monuments, to legitimise themselves as the main source of power and representativeness of a given nation. The fusion of statecraft and stagecraft aims to strengthen internal cohesiveness and project an orderly portrayal of the nation for outsiders (Banet-Weiser, 1999; Geisler, 2005; Handelman, 2004; Martin-Barbero, 2010 [1993]; Moor, 2007, 2009; Ranger & Hobsbawm, 1983; Rossol, 2010; Tenorio-Trillo, 1996; Welch, 2013). As previously mentioned, the growing interest in practices such as nation branding and public diplomacy reveals the continuous aspiration of the state to develop controlled portrayals of the nation (Aronczyk, 2013; Kaneva, 2011; Pamment, 2013; Surowiec, 2017; see also Moor, 2007, 2009).

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31 Scholars writing from an ‘ethno-symbolic’ approach often highlight the importance of symbols in the construction and maintenance of the nation. Although some studies include ‘ethno-symbolism’ as another manifestation of primordialism or perennialism (Madianou, 2005), authors such as Anthony Smith (1991) emphasise that it is a distinct category.
The importance that people within the nation attach to foreigners’ perceptions shows that nations are essentially an international project, that is to say, a ‘token of global type’ whose existence presupposes other comparable and equivalent nations (Calhoun, 1997, p. 93). Significantly, since the end of the 20th century, the intensification of globalisation32 has exacerbated pre-existing connections between nations, intensified old hurdles, and created new challenges (Mihelj, 2011).

Despite their similar basic organisational structures, there are substantial power inequalities between nations (Billig, 1995; Calhoun, 1997, 2007; Guibernau, 2001; Mihelj, 2011). Globalisation has deepened some of these inequalities, at a time when people are more aware of how others live. Hence, peripheral nation-states, such as those in Latin America, have intensified emulating or rejecting models of how things are done elsewhere, often seeking recognition from powerful or ‘core’ nation-states (see Foster, 2002; Larrain, 2000; Martin-Barbero, 2010 [1993]; Quijano, 2000; Tenorio-Trillo, 1996; Wallerstein, 2004). In turn, ‘core’ nation-states evaluate other nations according to supposedly universal behaviours and values (Anderson, 2006; Billig, 1995; Guibernau, 2001; Kantola, 2010; Kunczik, 2002). Hence, rather than being a natural, egalitarian place, the world is ‘a construct, a social imaginary that confers legitimacy on certain common practices and thoughts and embeds them in a normative scheme’ (Orgad, 2012, p. 134).

In current times, nations, and particularly nation-states, struggle to cope with financial interconnectedness, migration, terrorism, environmental threats and transnational communication networks, all of which may operate on a sub-national, national and transnational level (Calhoun, 2007; Cottle, 2006; Guibernau, 2001; Hall, 1993a; Waisbord, 2004). After the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, debates on globalisation claimed that different units of

32 Scholars have debated the exact meaning of the term globalisation (Guibernau, 2001; Rantanen, 2005). Due to space and time limitations, I will not engage in those discussions. I will, however, point out that globalisation cannot be understood without the media. The interconnection of politics, economy and cultural manifestations happens in and through media technologies and organisations (Rantanen, 2005; Roosvall, 2016; Silverstone, 2007). Significantly, it is through the media that people observe and communicate with distant others (Lagerkvist, 2003; Orgad, 2012).
political organisation and identity attachment, underpinned by global, cosmopolitan, post-national, as well as sub-national ideals were going to replace the nation. According to these perspectives, the conditions that facilitated the emergence of the modern nation-state had radically changed, due to the growing porosity of national boundaries, the alleged obsolescence of states, the emergence of regional economies, and the supposed rise of cosmopolitanism as a source of personal and collective identity (e.g. Beck, 2000; Habermas, 2000; Ohmae, 1995; Sassen, 2002; Tambini, 2001).

To date this has not happened. People sometimes perceive nationalism as an antidote to the pitfalls of globalisation, for instance, as a reaction against the spread of the United States’ neoliberalism in Latin America (Miller, 2006). Furthermore, forecasts about the impending demise of the nation are founded on a spurious opposition between the national and the global. Nations act as mediators between the local and the global, and globalisation is in fact structured through the prism of nations (Calhoun, 2007; Hutchinson, 2011; Mihelj, 2011). At the same time, economic globalisation does not undermine national or subnational differences, but actually relies on –and intensifies– them to exploit them as sources of profit (Aronczyk, 2013; Calhoun, 1997; Castelló & Mihelj, 2017; Hall, 1993a; Mihelj, 2011; Sklair, 1997).

Nations remain the grammar that people use to understand the world. Individuals continue to employ them as principles of legitimation to advance causes such as wars, social justice or the development of welfare states (Aronczyk, 2013; Calhoun, 2007; Curran, 2002; Guibernau, 2001; Malešević, 2013; Mihelj, 2011; Orgad, 2012; Skey, 2011, 2014; Ubiria, 2014; Waisbord, 2004). In Latin America, people primarily draw on national identity to frame their personal and collective identities, rather than on race, religion, or ethnicity. For instance, indigenous social movements often try to negotiate their position within, rather than reject, the nation-state (Miller, 2006; Ortiz, 2003). Hence, unlike in post Second World War Europe, nations and nationalisms continued to be depicted within Latin America as sources of emancipation and protection of ‘the people’ –as demonstrated by the cultural imperialism critique of the
1970s—, rather than as facilitators of racism and xenophobia (Miller, 2006; see also Waisbord, 2014).

**Nationhood and Protests: Unfinished Imagined Communities**

As the discussion above shows, to say that the intensification of globalisation challenges nations is not to say that nations will disappear or that they have ceased to have relevance. However, it should be acknowledged that globalisation has weakened the relative monopoly enjoyed by national rulers and political elites to construct and project the nation as a homogeneous whole through the state apparatus. As Appadurai observes, ‘the hyphen that links them [the nation and the state] is now less an icon of conjuncture than an index of disjuncture’ (1990, p. 304).

Nationalists often downplay the fact that nations are elastic formations that undergo constant renegotiation and transformation (Aronczyk, 2013; Calhoun, 2007; Chernilo, 2006; Cohen, 1985; Hall, 1993a; Laclau, 1977; Mihelj, 2011; Waisbord, 2004). Indeed, protests are a significant part of the renegotiation and transformation of nations and nation-states. Individuals not only communicate their demands through political parties or the official channels within the state apparatus, but also through demonstrations, strikes, marches and various types of non-state organisations (Cottle, 2006, 2011b; Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Johnston, 2011). Significantly, protesters often claim to act on behalf of the nation, seeking to contest the national order proposed by the state. They demand new or *adjusted* national accounts that expand or contract political, economic, and symbolic boundaries of who belongs and who does not belong to a nation (Beissinger, 2002; Calhoun, 1994, 2007; Dufour & Traisnel, 2008; Itzigsohn & Hau, 2006; Miller, 2006; Muro, 2015; Vladisavljević, 2002).

Protests introduce a higher degree of uncertainty as to the form that the nation and the nation-state takes (Beissinger, 2002; Johnston, 2011; Kühn, 2014). Hence, governments and rulers traditionally seek to impose stability and relative closure on the nation. They develop a façade of unity that conceals potential internal conflicts and try to downplay alternative accounts that
challenge the ‘official’ image of a nation (Beissinger, 2002; Calhoun, 1997, 2007; Geisler, 2005; Itzigsohn & Hau, 2006; Johnston, 2011; Laclau, 1977; Rosie, Petersoo, MacInnes, Condor, & Kennedy, 2006; Rossol, 2010; Tzanelli, 2008; Verdery, 1993).

Contestations about what the nation is and what it should become, rarely reach closure. Different circumstances may encourage or constrain these contestations. Episodes of internal crisis and turmoil, such as protests, push to the fore different interpretations of what the nation is or should be (Beissinger, 2002; Mihelj, 2008; Parry, 2015). Internal struggles are often narrowed during periods of perceived external threat, such as war or natural disasters. Controversies and contestations are temporarily replaced by agreement, and images and accounts constructed or supported by the state usually take centre stage (Frosh & Wolfsfeld, 2007; Jiménez-Martínez, 2014; Madianou, 2005; Mihelj, 2011; Pankov, Mihelj, & Bajt, 2011; Zhang, 2015).

The contestations discussed above are especially significant in Latin America. Protests and social movements have played a key role in the continuous transformation of ideas of nationalism, as well as nation-states, in the region.33 Human rights organisations, indigenous associations, as well as social movements have challenged the images that authoritarian but also democratically elected regimes construct and project of their respective nations (Itzigsohn & Hau, 2006; Miller, 2006; Muro, 2015; for examples in the former Soviet Union, see Beissinger, 2002). Additionally, elite members who feel excluded from the state apparatus have pushed forward competing ideas about the form that the state should take, justifying their efforts with statements about what the nation should be (Miller, 2006).

Benedict Anderson famously argues (2006) that the origin of the modern nations—the ‘imagined communities’ he refers to in his work—lie in the wars of

33 Most scholars of nationalism have overlooked Latin America (Miller, 2006). Latin America has historically represented a substantial challenge for them, not so much because it radically contradicts their frameworks, but because all frameworks are only partially applicable (see Miller, 2006, p. 203). Along with Benedict Anderson (2006), another significant exception is Eric Hobsbawm, who briefly wrote about the distinctiveness of Latin America in his studies about nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1995).
independence of Latin American creoles against Spain.\textsuperscript{34} However, Anderson neglects deep racial and economic inequalities and categories of exclusion that, characterised Latin America from the outset (Itzigsohn & Hau, 2006; Miller, 2006; authors such as Chatterjee, 1986; Dirlik, 2002; and Johnston, 2011, have examined intra-national contestations in other regions).\textsuperscript{35} In consequence, some authors claim that Latin American nations are actually ‘unfinished imagined communities’ (Itzigsohn & Hau, 2006, p. 196; see also Lomnitz, 2000; Martin-Barbero, 2010; Miller, 2006), far from Anderson’s idea of horizontal comradeship (2006).\textsuperscript{36}

The intensification of globalisation has introduced a higher degree of disruption to states’ efforts to construct orderly portrayals of the nation. Social movements and excluded elites currently have new symbolic and material tools that encourage and amplify their struggles against those in power (Guibernau, 2001; Hanson, 2008). Furthermore, protests have intensified their transnational character, addressing global issues, as well as being staged for and witnessed by international audiences (Cottle, 2011b; Cottle & Lester, 2011). For example, Latin American social movements have increasingly taken part in transnational networks aimed at denouncing crimes and abuses committed by states within the region (Keck & Sikkink, 1997).

Such transnational characteristics do not mean that protests no longer target local or national issues (Cottle, 2011b; Cottle & Lester, 2011). Rather, another layer of complexity is added to the contestations for and over the meaning of the nation. They corroborate that a greater number of individuals and organisations outside the state and outside the boundaries of the nation

\textsuperscript{34} As Anderson admits, the case of Brazil differs from Spanish-speaking Latin America. In 1808, the Portuguese king fled to Brazil to escape from Napoleon. In 1822, Pedro I, son of the King of Portugal, declared an independent Empire of Brazil, after winning a war against Portugal (Lessa, 2008). The Empire of Brazil lasted until 1889, when a coup d’état took place. Military leaders then declared Brazil a republic (Smith & Vinhosa, 2002; de Sousa, 2017). Despite these differences with Spanish-speaking Latin America, Anderson holds that his argument about imagination is valid for Brazil (2006, p. 51).

\textsuperscript{35} Despite Anderson’s highly inaccurate historical claims, scholars from Latin America embraced his ideas, partly to examine the spread of nationalism in a continent with historically weak states (Miller, 2006).

\textsuperscript{36} Anderson, however, acknowledges that nations are imagined as communities ‘regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each’ (Anderson, 2006, p. 7).
engage in the production of symbols, performances or initiatives that aim to make the nation a concrete entity (Guibernau, 2001; Hanson, 2008; Kühn, 2014; Latham, 2009; Orgad, 2008, 2012; Price, 2002; Saunders, 2012, 2015; Sklair, 1997; Surowiec, 2017; Urry, 2001).

Transnational corporations, supra-national bodies, ranking agencies, NGOs, branding consultants, the media, terrorist groups, and many other individuals and organisations may encourage affiliations on a sub-national, pan-national or transnational level (Hanson, 2008; Price, 2002; Price, 2016; Sklair, 1997). However, they often express their objectives and agendas in nationalistic terms (Banet-Weiser, 1999; Castelló & Mihelj, 2017; Hanson, 2008; Moor, 2007; Orgad, 2008, 2012, Saunders, 2012, 2015; Sikkink, 1993). Hence, individuals negotiate or confront the image that they have of their own nation with the perceived or real opinion of foreigners or significant others (Rusciano, 2003, p. 361; see also Tzanelli, 2008).

2.3 Nations and the Media

The Relationship between the Media and the Nation

Although the media remain a relatively marginal topic in nationalism studies (Surowiec, 2017), the histories of the media and the nation have run in parallel. Modern nation-states and the mass media emerged almost simultaneously, and their development has been intertwined (Calhoun, 1997, 2007, Mihelj, 2007, 2011; Roosvall, 2016; Thompson, 1995; Waisbord, 2004). Indeed, one of the early agendas that drove the expansion of the field of mass communications in the United States was the study of national propaganda, particularly after the Second World War (Aronczyk, 2007; Kaneva, 2011;

37 Foreigners producing images of the nation is not an entirely new phenomenon. In Brazil, as in other Latin American nations, the process of nation building meant balancing symbolic, historical and ethnic references that signalled a rupture with former colonial powers –Portugal, in this case–, while at the same time indicating a willingness to be accepted as a valid actor by Europe and the rest of the nation-states (Chatterjee, 1986; Costa, 2006; García Canclini, 1995). Chronicles about Brazil written by European travellers from the 16th century onwards were important sources for the process of nation building, shaping how Western Europe perceived this nation and how the Brazilian elites depicted themselves. Local authorities attached great importance to these chronicles, with officers of the Brazilian Crown attempting to influence how these portrayals were disseminated (Costa, 2006; Rasia, 2014; Sento-Sé, 2007).
Rantanen, 2010; Welch, 2013). These early works brought to light the importance of the mass media—newspapers, radio and television—in the dissemination of a common culture and the production of national images.

Two perspectives, which echo some of the debates examined earlier in this chapter about the origin of nations, have dominated the scholarship about the media and the nation (Madianou, 2005; see also Skey, 2014; Surowiec, 2017). The first perspective can be described as a ‘top-down’ approach.38 It encompasses accounts that depict the media as powerful institutions and tools that contribute to instilling and maintaining a sense of national identity among people (e.g. Anderson, 2006; Billig, 1995; Deutsch, 1966; Martin-Barbero, 2010[1993]). Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined community’ in particular, has become particularly popular within media studies (Mihelj, 2011). These works hold that the media, especially mass media, contribute to the formation of a sense of belonging among geographically separated individuals.

Research on propaganda, nation branding or public diplomacy has also adopted a ‘top-down’ approach. While some of these works encourage governments to use the media for the advancement of foreign policy goals (e.g. Anholt, 2007; Cull, 2008b; Dinnie, 2008; Golan & Viatchaninova, 2014; Leonard, 1997; Pamment, 2013), others have warned that authoritarian, as well as democratically elected regimes, may abusively exploit the media in order to achieve political or commercial purposes (e.g. Comor & Bean, 2012; Jansen, 2008). Significantly, these studies portray the media as powerful enough players to shape the form of a nation and its perception among foreigners.

The second perspective can be described as ‘bottom-up’. According to this viewpoint, national identities are fixed and can explain how audiences all over the world engage with the media. Hence, the different responses that people have toward the same media content are underpinned by whether they are American, Japanese, Russian or Peruvian (e.g. Liebes & Katz, 1993; see also

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38 For the sake of clarity, I have simplified the main arguments of these paradigms. More details about the nuances and different strands within each paradigm can be found in Madianou (2005).
Lossio Chávez, 2014). Whilst some of these studies are not directly related to the study of the nation (e.g. Liebes & Katz, 1993), they risk falling into a kind of essentialist description of nationhood. Despite highlighting the agency of audiences, they end up portraying nations as relatively homogeneous entities (for further criticisms, see Madianou, 2005; Price, 2002, p. 229; Skey, 2014).

The two perspectives largely coincide in adopting a relatively functionalist perspective towards the role of the media in relation to the formation and maintenance of nations. For the former perspective, the media impose cohesiveness and a sense of belonging from the top. For the latter, the media are articulators of supposed commonalities among people. Despite these differences, works belonging to both perspectives often under-theorise the nation. They depict the nation as a stable and relatively homogenous formation, which governments may exploit or that nationals must protect to the extent of even being willing to die for it, rather than as an entity characterised by potential conflict and dissent (see also Waisbord, 2004).

Scholars’ emphasis on national cohesiveness is founded on the assumption that the media are one of the main sources of nation building. As Schlesinger (2000) and Mihelj (2007) observe, scholarship on media and nationhood has often followed the work of Karl Deutsch (1966). Deutsch argued that social communication—not limited to the media, but understood in a broad sense—was essential to sustain ‘the relatively coherent and stable structure of memories, habits and values’ (1966, p. 75, italics mine). According to Deutsch, ‘peoples are held together “from within” by this communicative efficiency, the complementary of the communicative facilities acquired by their members’ (1966, p. 98).

_National Contestation in the Media_

The intensification of globalisation has attracted more interest in the relationship between nations and the media, making it a ‘hot’ topic in the field of media and communications (Madianou, 2005; Mihelj, 2007; Skey, 2014; Surowiec, 2017; Waisbord, 2004). The last two decades have seen new
scholarship that has complemented and challenged the two perspectives previously discussed. Whilst earlier literature presupposed that the national media were a coherent whole that represented a specific nation (Rantanen, 2010), recent scholarship has critically examined what the national media are. Analyses of media texts have demonstrated that national media rarely produce monolithic accounts of the same nation (Higgins, 2004; Madianou, 2005; Mihelj, 2008; Rosie et al., 2006).

Furthermore, transnational ownership, flows of media content and formats, as well as international work forces, all processes that globalisation has exacerbated, have prompted some authors to question where the ‘national’ is in the conceptualisation of national media (Waisbord, 2004). Hence, rather than looking at nations in isolation or as purely inward-looking entities, scholars have examined how technological developments, the deepening of privatisation and deregulation, as well as geopolitical shifts, have augmented the number of sources that may construct and project the nation from abroad (Hanson, 2008; Mihelj, 2011; Orgad, 2008, 2012; Price, 2002; Saunders, 2015).

Other works have addressed some serious shortcomings of the influential but relatively dated work of Anderson, Billig and Hobsbawm (Mihelj, 2008, 2011). Classic works about the media and the nation imply that there is a causal relationship between media representations and identity (Herzfeld, 1996; Schlesinger, 2000). However, audience studies have shown that people engage in problematic and contested ways with the images and accounts of the nation produced and shown by the media (e.g. Madianou, 2005; Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2014). Furthermore, Mihelj (2007, 2011) argues that media scholars have often partially read Anderson, focussing mostly on his ideas about the importance of imagination, rather than on the role played by print capitalism in the construction and spread of nationalism.39

39 Scholars from other fields have not fallen into the same trap. Latin American historians have productively examined the role of print capitalism in the dissemination of national ideas in the region (Miller, 2006).
Significantly, the literature has highlighted that the media are at the core of the coordination, performance and communication of protest and dissent. The media are an arena in which different groups—authorities, protesters, as well as media professionals and media owners—struggle to produce their own versions about the aims and legitimacy of demonstrations, as well as capture attention from audiences (Cammaerts et al., 2013; Cottle, 2006, 2011b; Cottle & Lester, 2011; Johnston, 2011; Mattoni, 2012; Orgad, 2008, 2012; Saunders, 2015).

Earlier research portrayed mainstream media as producers of biased coverage against social movements (Gitlin, 2003). However, recent scholarship has observed that the mainstream media have changing agendas, which may occasionally be more sympathetic towards social movements (Cottle, 2008). In addition, whilst activists often rely on alternative media to coordinate and communicate dissent, they also rely on exploiting potential opportunities that mainstream media may offer (Cammaerts, 2012). Furthermore, media professionals also use alternative media as communication channels, and authorities employ alternative media to communicate their own account of demonstrations as well as tools to watch over activists (Cammaerts et al., 2013; Cottle, 2011b; Mattoni, 2012). Hence, there is a greater number of people and organisations taking part in building and showcasing particular versions of the nation in and through the media (Boudana, 2014; Hanson, 2008; Orgad, 2008, 2012; Saunders, 2015). Significantly, the increasing contestations among these actors corroborate early research, which argued that a higher intensity in the forms and contents of communication may heighten conflict and disruption, rather than cohesion, within the nation (Breuilly, 1993).

*The Media as Upholders of the Nation*

Despite the substantial contributions of the studies previously discussed, there are still various unanswered questions concerning the relationship between the media and the nation. First, it is unclear why the media have succeeded in strengthening a sense of national belonging on some occasions, but not on
others. For instance, governmental efforts to create a common national culture through public broadcasting have proved relatively successful in Western Europe, but have largely failed in Asia and Africa (Waisbord, 2004). Second, there is no satisfactory explanation for why the communities that people ‘imagine’ or ‘routinely reinforce’ in and through the media take a national shape and not a regional or global one (Mihelj, 2007, 2008, 2011; Rosie et al., 2006; Schlesinger, 1991).

The variety of actors constructing and projecting images of the nation, and the porosity of communicational national boundaries, have diluted the perception that one nation equalled not only one state, but also one relatively homogeneous communicative space, closed to external interference (Hanson, 2008; Mihelj, 2007; Price, 2002; Schlesinger, 2000). However, domestic and international mainstream news media organisations continue to frame the world as naturally constructed into nations, rather than into post-national, cosmopolitan or global political units or sources of identification (Mihelj, 2007, 2011, Roosvall, 2014, 2016; Schlesinger, 2000; Shavit, 2009; Skey, 2014; Waisbord, 2004). This is particularly evident in the genre of foreign news, which often stresses nationhood and the exoticism of ‘the other’ (Lee, Chan, Pan, & So, 2005; Nossek, 2004; Roosvall, 2014). National newspapers and television stations report ethnic minorities and migrants as strangers that do not belong to a supposedly homogeneous nation (Costelloe, 2014; Lueck, Due, & Augoustinos, 2015).

Media organisations continue to operate within national legal frameworks, which delineate boundaries for issues such as language, ownership or content availability (Hanson, 2008; Price, 2002; Roosvall, 2016a). The influence of these legal frameworks is important, because the media facilitate the coordination and maintenance of a sense of national culture, making languages or accents acceptable, as well as structuring schedules. People may not watch the same television shows at the same time (see, for instance Scannell, 1996), but they can still follow the new releases through the different national versions of Netflix, hence perpetuating the viewing of media content as an act of national communion.
Whilst technological developments in media and communications have challenged the state’s attempt to construct façades of national uniformity, governments use these very same technologies to conceal internal and external contestations (Guibernau, 2001; Krasner, 2009; Lester & Hutchins, 2012; Orgad, 2012; Price, 2002). The staging of national media events, which attempt to promote feelings of unity among people as members of the same nation, persists. Governments from all over the world still invest in constructing extraordinary celebratory situations, even if the trigger was originally a disaster, in order to communicate internally and externally supposedly representative national values (Cui, 2013; Jiménez-Martínez, 2014; Sonnevend, 2016).

Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, over the last two decades, political authorities around the world have employed the media to manage the image of the nations they claim to represent, through practices such as place branding, nation branding or public diplomacy (Aronczyk, 2013; Castelló & Mihelj, 2017; Entman, 2008; Moor, 2007, 2009; Pamment, 2013; Saunders, 2015; Surowiec, 2017). Hence, states have pursued, with varying degrees of success, different ways to maintain their prevalence and control over images of their nation.

The challenge that media scholars face, now more than ever, is to find ways to explore how these different actors—from inside and outside the state, as well as from within and outside national boundaries—construct, articulate, uphold and challenge in and through the media, the continuity and contingency that constitute national formations (Price, 2002; Skey, 2014). Some notable efforts to address this challenge have been made in recent years. Focussing on audiences, Madianou (2005) has demonstrated that people actively contest the meanings and forms of national identities shown by the media. Furthermore, Mihelj (2011) has argued that there has been limited dialogue between studies that focus on the nation as discourses or texts and those centred on the examination of the conditions that may foster or restrict the images of the nation. Addressing Madianou and Mihelj’s arguments, Skey (2014) has sought ways to address the contestations for and over particular nations, while
acknowledging that these struggles occur within a media environment whose meanings and practices further the continuity of national forms.

Significantly, although there is a rich tradition in scholarship about media production and specifically news production (e.g. Altheide & Snow, 1979; Benson, 2013; Hannerz, 2004; Landerer, 2013; McQuail, 2010; Schudson, 1989; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), studies about the relationship between the media and the nation have usually relied on analyses of texts or visual images, and audience research (Madianou, 2005; Mihelj, 2011; Skey, 2009). Examination of the beliefs and experiences of those producing images and accounts of the nation, particularly during protest episodes, remains limited (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2014). At the same time, while recent literature on the media and social movements has examined how activists use the media to communicate disruption and construct alternative identities, it has often emphasised the transnational or global character of these movements, rather than explicitly framing these struggles as contestations for and over the image of the nation (some exceptions are Mihelj, 2008; Saunders, 2015; Yüksel & Yüksel, 2011).

Recent studies on nation branding and public diplomacy are an exception. Some have scrutinised accounts of politicians, diplomats or branding executives who construct and project images of nations (e.g. Aronczyk, 2013; Kaneva, 2012b; Surowiec, 2012; Valaskivi, 2013; Volcic, 2012; Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). These works have shown that nation branding and public diplomacy initiatives try to craft a relatively homogenous version of national identity, which conceals diversity and potential internal conflicts. However, these studies suffer from two major shortcomings. Firstly, they often look at the actors in isolation, failing to take into account the interactions, potential commonalities and differences with other individuals who also produce images and accounts of the nation. Secondly, they tend to portray the media as neutral organisations and technologies, exploited by different groups wishing to

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40 Scholars outside media studies have however examined the relationship between social movements and nationalism (e.g. Beissinger, 2002; Calhoun, 1993; Dufour & Traisnel, 2008; Itzigsohn & Hau, 2006; Muro, 2015; Vladisavljević, 2002).
advance their own agendas (Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; see also Mihelj, 2011; Silverstone, 1994).

The media are however not abstract institutions or a neutral space separated from individuals. People constitute the media. Hence, considering those who produce the images and accounts of the nation is crucial to gain a fuller understanding of the relationship between the media and the nation in the early 21st century. This thesis attempts to undertake this task by examining the role that different actors played in constructing and contesting images and accounts of Brazil in and through the media during the June Journeys. The study draws on aspects of the previously discussed literature, particularly the fact that an exclusive focus on content, discourses, or form of a nation may neglect to take into account the specific normative, technological or financial conditions that underpin or constrain the construction and projection of national images and accounts. I suggest complementing the literature with the concept of visibility, as explored in the following section.

2.4 Nations in the Age of New Mediated Visibility

Visibility: Between Recognition and Control

Scholars from fields such as sociology, urban studies, gender studies, and media and communications, have increasingly employed the term ‘visibility’. According to some thinkers, visibility is a dynamic concept better suited to address ‘unstable and ambivalent processes, which unfold during times of intense social and cultural change’ (Kaneva, 2015, p. 3). Studies about social movements and the media also stress that activists seek visibility in order to achieve recognition and communicate their agendas (Cammaerts et al., 2013, p. 10). Analyses of the June Journeys stress that the visibility attained by collectives such as Mídia NINJA was essential to legitimate the protests in the eyes of most Brazilians (Bittencourt, 2014).

Despite the increasing usage of the term, visibility has often been under-theorised. It is only in the last decade that theorists and researchers have more forcefully engaged in the task of unpacking what visibility is and what its
implications are. Sociologist Andrea Brighenti is one the leading scholars in the field. He argues that visibility goes beyond the merely visual. It is an essential component of social relations, situated at the crossroads of aesthetics and politics, which encompasses ‘perceptual forms of noticing, managing attention and determining the significance of events and subjects’ (Brighenti, 2010a, p. 52 italics mine). Individuals employ visibility to establish boundaries and relationships that may reinforce hierarchies, coordinate acts of resistance or synchronise attention, among other goals (Brighenti, 2007, 2010b).

Brighenti outlines three features of visibility. It is relational, requiring at least two parties to exist, between which frictional power relations are established. It is strategic, because people try to manage visibility in order to reach particular goals. Being seen is not enough; what really matters is being seen in particular terms (see also Dayan, 2013). It is processual, that is to say, the desired effects of visibility cannot be determined in advance. Significantly, people continuously engage in struggles for visibility, which seek to reshape previous images as well as to determine what is appropriate and possible to see (Brighenti, 2010b; see also Shohat & Stam, 1996).

Brighenti observes that two strands have dominated the study of visibility. The first stresses visibility as a form of recognition. Echoing the works of authors such as Hannah Arendt or more recently Axel Honneth, scholars argue that a lack of visibility results in the deprivation of social and political recognition and representation. Hence, visibility is an essential requisite not only for political participation, but also for acknowledgement as an equal human being (Blatterer, 2010; Borren, 2008; Thompson, 1995, 2005). This is particularly evident in studies of identity politics, such as those focussed on issues of gender, ethnic or sexual minorities, as well as nationalistic groups (e.g. Banet-Weiser, 2015; Brady, 2011; Ross, 2008; Ruitenberg, 2010; Taylor, 1994; Tuchman, 1978). As Dayan holds, ‘being anonymous has become a stigma,
and visibility has become a right frequently and sometimes violently claimed; a right that all sorts of people feel entitled to obtain’ (2013, p. 139).

In associating visibility with recognition, it becomes interwoven with transparency, honesty and integrity. Individuals, corporations and governments seek to enhance their visibility or voluntarily disclose information as evidence of rectitude, as a statement that they have nothing to hide (Blatterer, 2010; Flyverbom, Leonardi, Stohl, & Stohl, 2016; Thompson, 2005, 2011). However, too much visibility —or hypervisibility— may transform individuals into prisoners of pre-defined categories or stereotypes (Brighenti, 2010a, p. 47; Hall, 1997; Hayes, 2005; Pickering, 2001; Shohat & Stam, 1996; Taylor, 1994, p. 25). Hence, people and organisations seek to acquire and manage the ‘right type’ of visibility (Brighenti, 2007; Dayan, 2013).

The second strand of research focusses on visibility as a weapon of surveillance, exercised by an invisible power. The majority of these studies draw on the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault famously states that visibility is ‘a trap’ (1979, p. 200) when writing about the Panopticon, a prison model42 in which inmates are incapable of knowing whether or not they are being observed by guards. Inmates consequently control their behaviour at all times, assuming that they might be permanently watched over (Brighenti, 2010b; Foucault, 1979; Gordon, 2002; Mathiesen, 1997).

Unlike the first strand, the exercise and strengthening of power relies on invisibility. Visibility in this strand ‘means deprivation of power’ (Brighenti, 2010b, p. 48). Hence, being seen is not so much a matter of recognition, but rather a way of being policed and being subject to forms of discipline (Ganesh, 2016; Lyon, 2007; Staples, 2014; Trottier, 2012). Significantly, surveillance is not the exclusive prerogative of the state. Private corporations may also

41 It is interesting to note that a sense of invisibility was one of the reasons given by protesters to justify the 2011 London riots (Newburn, Lewis, Taylor, & Mcgillivray, 2012). The theoretical strand of visibility as a form of recognition has also been influential for studies of social movements within Brazil (Gohn, 2014a; for examples, see the edited collection by Maia, 2014).
42 The Panopticon was proposed by English philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the 18th century (Brighenti, 2010b; Foucault, 1979; Gordon, 2002).
engage in surveillance practices, in order to maximise profits and protect their interests (Uldam, 2016).

Despite their differences, these two strands are not in direct opposition to each other and in fact may overlap. For instance, hosting mega sports events such as the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics increases visibility, drawing attention to the host city or nation, while at the same time intensifying the scrutiny and expectations about how the host will behave before and during these events (Bellos, 2014; Latham, 2009; Rivenburgh, 2010). Those in power, as Foucault argues, may employ visibility to exercise control over people, but people can use visibility to resist and change these structures of power. Hence, visibility is a double edged-sword, a dialectic relational field that moves in a continuum between recognition and control (Brighenti, 2007, 2010b; Gordon, 2002; Mathiesen, 1997; Thompson, 2005). As Brighenti observes, ‘a way of seeing is a way of recognising and, at the same time, controlling’ (2010b, p. 58).

**A New Mediated Visibility**

Visibility in its most primal form occurs in the encounter between two human beings who look at each other in the same time and space. Hannah Arendt famously said that the world of political participation was a space of appearance, where ‘I appear to others as others appear to me’ (Arendt, 1998, p. 198). The development of the media, starting from the printing press and continuing with radio, television and internet, disentangled visibility from the constraints of the here and now. Drawing on Arendt, Silverstone (2007) argues that the media have become ‘the space of appearance’. Thanks to the media, people can currently see not only what occurs in distant spaces, occasionally in real time, but also what has happened in the past. Thompson (1995, 2005) calls this new type of visibility, unconstrained from sharing the same time and space, **mediated visibility**. Mediated visibility has not replaced situated visibility: both forms coexist and complement each other (Thompson, 2005).

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43 For a detailed comparison and complementary view of Foucault’s and Arendt’s understanding of visibility, see Gordon (2002).
Although the processes that facilitated the emergence of this new visibility started centuries ago, mediated visibility has gained increasing social prominence during the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} centuries. The main political and social struggles currently take place in and through a highly interconnected media environment, with a greater number of individuals and organisations attempting to use the media to \textit{monstrate}, that is to say, construct, circulate as well as direct attention to –or conceal– social representations (Dayan, 2013; see also Castells, 2009; Chadwick, 2013; Cottle, 2006, 2011b; Gitlin, 2003; Orgad, 2012; Shohat & Stam, 1996; Thompson, 2005; Voirol, 2005). These struggles are between asymmetrical actors, with some having more resources available to them than others (Brighenti, 2010b; Thompson, 2005). At the same time, the media construct specific ‘gazes’ through the synchronisation of geographically dispersed audiences (Brighenti, 2010b, pp. 74–75; Dayan, 2013; Thompson, 2005). Given that the attention of these gazes remains a scarce resource (Brighenti, 2007; Davenport & Beck, 2001), what is ‘in’ the media is often considered worthy of attention (Couldry, 2004).

The development of digital media has furthered at least three characteristics of mediated visibility. Firstly, mediated visibility has become more \textit{intense}, due to the quantity of contents circulating in and through the media. Secondly, it is more \textit{extensive}, because actors can potentially produce content that may achieve an unprecedented geographical reach. Thirdly, visibility is more \textit{uncontrollable} than ever before, due to the impossibility of containing or predicting the consequences of the images circulating in the media (Thompson, 2005). The images that circulate in the media are continuously contested, negotiated and/or re-appropriated due to the uncontrollability and paucity of attention. Thompson describes the management of mediated visibility as compulsory, particularly for those who wish to protect positions of power (Thompson, 1995, 2005). Hence, the transformation of visibility is never purely technological but also of political and sociocultural concern (Brighenti, 2007).

Dayan (2013) has also addressed the increasing social significance of mediated visibility when observing a shift in media studies: the change from a \textit{paradigm of effects} towards a \textit{paradigm of visibility}. He argues that the
paradigm of effects was born as a reaction to the employment of the media by fascist and communist regimes, and reached its peak in the 1950s. This paradigm understands the media—particularly mass media—to be powerful players that easily manipulate people through the employment of commercial and/or political propaganda. Thus, earlier studies portrayed people as potential victims that had to be warned, protected and taught to resist the potentially powerful effects of the media (Dayan, 2013; see also Rantanen, 2010).

Studies such as *How Nations See Each Other*, published in the mid-1950s (Buchanan & Cantril, 1953), illustrate the paradigm of effects. This research aimed to raise awareness of the prevalence of stereotypes among people surveyed in nine nations. Significantly, it calls to improve communication facilities to promote peace and understanding among nations (Buchanan & Cantril, 1953; for further insights about this and other similar studies, see Rantanen, 2010), due to the perceived power of the media in shaping people’s perceptions.

According to Dayan, the paradigm of visibility became more notorious towards the end of the 20th century. Ordinary people did not perceive visibility as the privilege of those in power but as a right that every human being should be able to demand and enjoy (Dayan, 2013; Voirol, 2005). Rather than being perceived as threatening, scholarship depicted the media as tools and institutions that various individuals and organisations may employ to synchronise and coordinate collective attention towards the issues that they wish to make visible.

The growing literature on nation branding and public diplomacy is a sound example of the paradigm of visibility. It argues that in the age of globalisation, nations—particularly those from outside the West—must be visible to attract capital, tourists and enhance their political influence. From this perspective, visibility is not only a right, but a necessity. Lacking a well-defined national image means being left behind in the race towards modernity (e.g. Anholt, 2007; Dinnie, 2008; Niesing, 2013; Olins, 2002; Rivenburgh, 2010; Szondi, 2008). The interest in nation branding and public diplomacy also reveals that
being visible is insufficient. The key to success is controlling the terms of visibility, that is to say, managing how images of the nation are shown or concealed (based on Dayan, 2013; Thompson, 1995, 2005).

The concept of mediated visibility has important implications for the understanding of the construction and projection of images and accounts of the nation. As discussed earlier, individuals and organisations currently have more resources to project images of the nation towards audiences throughout the world. Nationalism scholars have also observed this phenomenon, holding that globalisation has amplified the visibility of nations and nation-states (Guibernau, 2001). Significantly, the new visibility highlights that images of the nation are particularly fragile, due to the impossibility of having complete control over them or being able to predict their consequences (Thompson, 2005). Other actors can contest, vandalise or re-appropriate these images, once they are available in the media environment (Dayan, 2013; Khatib, 2013).

**A Three-dimensional Analytical Model of Visibility**

Brighenti, Thompson and Dayan provide extremely valuable insights into visibility. However, their approaches are primarily theoretical. Drawing on their arguments, I wish to take the debate a step further. I propose a three-dimensional analytical model to unpack the construction and projection of images of the nation in and through the media in the age of new visibility. This analytical model is inspired by Couldry’s (2004) suggestion to study the media as practice.44

Studying the media as practice aims to answer questions such as ‘what types of things do people do in relation to media? And what types of things do people say in relation to media?’ (Couldry, 2004, p. 121). This focus on practices does not mean dismissing insights from political economy, cultural studies, semiotics or journalism studies. In fact, all these approaches inform this thesis at different stages. Rather, it aims to complement these viewpoints seeking more precise

44 In recent years, various studies on media and social movements have also suggested focussing on media practices (see, for instance Cammaerts et al., 2013; Mattoni, 2012; McCurdy, 2013).
answers, to examine what people and organisations do in concrete and contextualised settings (Couldry, 2004). Dayan has made a similar point, arguing that the study of visibility should pay attention to ‘actual media practices apart from a democratic theory whose relation to such practices is sometimes that of an alibi’ (2013, p. 146). A focus on practices also acknowledges that people have agency, but that such agency is enacted within specific conditions (Cammaerts et al., 2013, p. 5).

The proposed model examines not only what the media showed during the June Journeys, but also how and why various individuals and organisations produced and projected these contents during this particular episode. When writing about mediation, Silverstone similarly states that attention should be paid not only to ‘what appears on the screen’, but also to ‘the practices of those who produce the sounds and images, the narratives and the spectacles’ (2007, p. 42). Hence, I suggest focusing on three specific dimensions: visible nation, strategies of mediated visibility and conditions of mediated visibility (Figure 5).

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**Figure 5** – Illustration of the three-dimensional analytical model of mediated visibility.
In the first dimension the focus is on what I call the visible nation, namely, how the nation is constructed and shown in the media environment of national, alternative, and also foreign media. This dimension is underpinned by the observation that the examination of visibility must take into account the visible, namely, what is shown in the media. As Waisbord remarks, ‘if nationalism is a discursive formation, then media discourses and representations of the nation need to be considered’ (Waisbord, 2004, p. 386).

Although the visible nation possesses a ‘central symbolic function’ (based on Brighenti, 2007, p. 334), it is neither a homogeneous nor completely cohesive entity. As previously discussed, various individuals and organisations act on behalf of the nation to advance different goals. Significantly, examining the visible nation shows up not only the different media contents that people construct and project, but also the relationships between these individuals and organisations.

The relational character of visibility is crucial to understand questions of power. As Brighenti observes, ‘the relational aspect of visibility points precisely to the fact that asymmetries and distortions of visibility are the norm, vis-à-vis the exception of perfect intervisibility’ (Brighenti, 2007, p. 326; Mattoni, 2013 similarly examines the relational character of activists’ media practices). The asymmetries between these different actors make visibility a competitive and strategic field. Hence, people and organisations take an active role, continuously seeking to reinforce, alter or disrupt what is possible and proper to show and see (Brighenti, 2007; Khatib, 2013; Thompson, 2005).

The second dimension draws on the previous observation. It examines how actors made the accounts of the nation visible through various strategies of mediated visibility. As discussed earlier, due to the uncontrollability of the media environment, managing the visibility of the images that actors construct and project has become a more urgent task (Chouliaraki, 2008; Mawby, 2012;

45 There has not yet been a thorough conceptual or theoretical discussion about what a visible nation is. However, the idea of a ‘visible nation’ has been mentioned in different studies, from areas such as film studies, mass media and visual sociology (see, for example Himpele, 2008; Kozol, 2005; Monsiváis, 1996).
Thompson, 1995, 2005). I accordingly understand management of visibility as the attempt to control, correct, respond, underplay, or hide symbolic content, as well as establishing boundaries about what is possible and appropriate to see (Brighenti, 2010b; Orgad, 2012; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2014; Thompson, 1995, 2005; Uldam, 2016; Urry, 2001).

Actors put into practice the management of visibility through a series of strategies of mediated visibility (following Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2013; Uldam, 2016). Drawing on Heller’s reading of Foucault (1996), I propose a working definition of these strategies as the employment of different tactics to conceal, make visible or provide hyper-visibility for individuals, events or narratives, in order to achieve specific goals.46 Significantly, individuals and organisations are often oblivious to their own use of strategies. Tactics, on the other hand, are observable. They are the actions intentionally carried out in specific political contexts (Foucault, 2002; Heller, 1996).

The third dimension constitutes the conditions of mediated visibility. Actors do not employ the aforementioned strategies in a vacuum. Actors struggle to shape visibility within specific conditions that may foster or constrain particular images of the nation. Hence, while visibility is neither determined by nor completely subjected to these conditions, it cannot be separated from the tangible institutions, routines and sociocultural contexts in which it is manifested and embedded (Brighenti, 2007, 2010b; Voirol, 2005).

Building on one of the definitions of the word condition provided by the Oxford English Dictionary,47 I propose a working definition of conditions of mediated visibility as the circumstances or factors influencing the way in which the

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46 The concept of strategy is widely contested. De Certeau famously argued that ‘strategies’ were employed by structures of power and institutions to define environments, which were resisted by individuals through a series of everyday ‘tactics’ (1984). In this thesis, I prefer to follow Kevin Jon Heller’s interpretation of Foucault. He argues that strategies are ‘the unintentional—but institutionally and socially regulated—effects produced by the non-subjective articulation of different individual and group tactics’ (Heller, 1996, pp. 87–88).

47 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, conditions are ‘the circumstances or factors affecting the way in which people live or work, especially with regard to their well-being’ as well as ‘the factors or prevailing situation influencing the performance or outcome of a process’ (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2015a).
mediated visibility of certain images or accounts in the media is facilitated or blocked.\(^{48}\) The term ‘conditions of mediated visibility’ deliberately avoids the hegemonic pretensions of concepts such as ‘media logic’,\(^{49}\) recognising that both micro and macro level factors may influence the construction and projection of images and accounts. Additionally, unlike the Bourdesian concept of journalistic field, where market and political pressures enter into conflict with cultural capital (Benson, 2013; Benson & Neveu, 2005; Bourdieu, 2005; Champagne, 2005), conditions of mediated visibility can address a broader array of factors that go beyond economic and cultural issues.\(^{50}\)

People and organisations operate within conditions of mediated visibility. These may vary depending on time and space, with some being more powerful than others at different moments and locations (comparative studies between national media systems, such as Benson, 2013, illustrate this point; see also Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Bourdieu, 2005; Chouliaraki, 2008; Harcup, 2015). Moreover, individuals and organisations may shape, negotiate, resist and change the constraints and influences of these conditions (following Bourdieu, 2005; Giddens, 1979; Harcup, 2015).

Hence, any analysis of visibility will pay attention to the strategies that various actors employ, as well as to the conditions within which they seek to achieve –

\(^{48}\) Different authors use the terms ‘conditions’, ‘conditions of visibility’ or ‘conditions of mediated visibility’, to describe a series of forces that influence what is actually shown in the media (e.g. Champagne, 2005; Chouliaraki, 2008; Chouliaraki & Morsing, 2010; Corner & Pels, 2003; Lester & Hutchins, 2012). In most cases, however, these are just passing references that do not add meaning to this specific term.

\(^{49}\) Political communication theorists and researchers often use the concept of media logic to describe the reasoning that determines the selection, portrayal, categorisation and presentation of what the media show (Altheide, 2013; Altheide & Snow, 1979; Cottle & Nolan, 2007; Hjarvard, 2008; Landerer, 2013). However, the meaning of media logic is unclear and the suggestion of a single, hegemonic logic shaping the actions of individuals and organisations with and through the media, overlooks the historical, social and institutional particularities of practices and social interactions (Benson, 2013; Couldry, 2012; Hepp, 2009; Landerer, 2013; Lundby, 2009; Waisbord, 2012).

\(^{50}\) While the concept of a journalistic field provides a nuanced interpretation of the changing relationships and conflicts between the actors producing news and other media content, its emphasis on two forms of capital—cultural and economic—risks ignoring the ‘types of things […] people say in relation to media’ (Couldry, 2004, p. 121). As detailed later in this thesis, interviewees described technological influences to be of equal importance as normative conditions and market imperatives. Some authors have however proposed more complex conceptualizations of field to analyse practices such as journalism or nation branding (see, for instance, Benson, 2005, 2013; Surowiec, 2017).
or fail to achieve—visibility, such as institutions, working conditions, and/or technologies (Brighenti, 2007, 2010b; Dayan, 2013; Voirol, 2005). This approach includes examining issues such as the beliefs, motivations and practices of actors, which, as Voirol observes, are ways of seeing (2005, p. 102). As the literature on gender and the media has observed, focussing purely on the visible may result in neglect of questioning the political, economic or cultural conditions delimiting what becomes visible and what remains invisible (Gill, 2007; Butler, in Olson & Worsham, 2000). Brighenti similarly observes that, although media platforms and organisations may provide visibility, ‘they make the structures of such visibility invisible’ (Brighenti, 2010b, p. 77).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter outlined the theoretical framework for this thesis, stressing that nations are sites of continuous contestation and mutation. This thesis focuses on how different individuals and organisations use the idea of the nation as a legitimation principle to justify the quest and maintenance of power. This perspective highlights that tension, competition and contestation are not exceptions, but rather constitutive elements of nationhood (Aronczyk, 2013; Chernilo, 2006; Coser, 1956; Laclau, 1977; Madianou, 2005).

Nations are abstract; they require the use of symbols, discourses and performances to acquire meaning and concrete form. The symbols, discourses and performances that contribute to forming the image of the nation are increasingly mediated. Various individuals and organisations construct, project and contest in and through the media competing versions of what the nation is and what it should stand for. These contestations are rooted, shaped and embedded in and through concrete social, political and economic conditions. With the intensification of globalisation, states face increasing challenges in terms of the speed and scale of available information, which prevent them constructing and projecting orderly portrayals of the nation (Hanson, 2008; Orgad, 2012; Thompson, 2005). Actors from outside the state, and outside national boundaries, also take part and compete in the construction and projection of images of the nation (Orgad, 2012).
The main social and political struggles, such as the construction and projection of national images, are nowadays carried on in and through the media (Thompson, 2005). However, the dynamics underpinning the construction and projection of the nation in the media often remain out of sight (Brighenti, 2010b; Dayan, 2013; Voirol, 2005). Hence, this thesis aims at shedding light on that blind spot, focussing on how and in what terms specific images of Brazil were constructed and shown during the June Journeys.

The analytical model proposed here serves as a bridge to narrow the gap between research examining nations from a discursive and textual point of view, and scholarship centred on the conditions in which nations are constructed and projected in the media. This model has the potential to acknowledge the greater number of actors, from inside and outside the state taking part in the construction, projection and contestation of national images. Crucially, it pushes to the fore accounts of those producing images of the nation, an aspect largely overlooked in media studies to date. In the next chapter I examine how the proposed three-dimensional analytical model will be used to understand the June Journeys as struggles for and over the mediated visibility of Brazil.
3. Methodology and Research Design: A Multi-sited and Grounded Approach to Studying the June Journeys

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodological choices underpinning this thesis. It describes the operationalization of the three-dimensional analytical model proposed in Chapter 2. The model seeks to examine what is visible in the media, the practices of the individuals producing media contents and the conditions in which such content is created. The operationalization of the proposed model requires the collection and analysis of different datasets that have been made visible across multiple sites in the media environment. Significantly, the different data sources are not treated as isolated camps. Rather, the model attempts to show how the different data relate to and complement each other, giving a more complex view of the struggles for and over the mediated visibility of the nation in the current media environment. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines the two main challenges faced during the early stages of this study and how both challenges informed various research strategies. The second describes the data collection process for the two main datasets – mediated content and interviews –, and the steps taken to analyse the content. Finally, the third discusses some of the limitations of the selected strategies, as well as some personal reflections on the research experience.

3.2 Challenges and Research Strategies

In June 2013, I was about to finish my first year as a PhD researcher within the Department of Media and Communications at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Up to that point, my research proposal, based on secondary sources, focussed on how the Brazilian authorities and business elites used nation branding and public diplomacy initiatives to create and make visible a positive image of their nation to achieve political and or financial goals.
Just two weeks prior to my examination, the June Journeys erupted. The protests surprised me. They pushed me to rethink my original research project and to try to understand, from the perspective of media and communications, what was going on in Brazil at the time. Two challenges arose when re-focussing this study on the June Journeys: the need to study the image of Brazil across a *multiplicity of sites and platforms*, and the difficulty of *studying an event in progress*. As I detail below, both challenges are significant because they affected the subsequent choice of research strategies for this study.

*Studying National Images across Multiple Sites and Platforms*

The first challenge refers to the difficulty of studying the image of the nation across multiple sites and mediated platforms. Chapter 1 proposed a working definition of the image of the nation as the ‘diverse depictions, points of view or opinions about a particular subject that various individuals and organisations construct and circulate *in and through* a variety of platforms, in visual, textual or audio formats’ (page 28).

The definition acknowledges the construction and projection of national images across several media technologies, formats, genres and platforms. This approach avoids falling into the trap of methodological nationalism, that is, the assumption that the nation, most particularly the nation-state, is the *natural* starting point for research (Beck, 2003; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2009; Wimmer & Schiller, 2003). Methodological nationalism understands nations to be homogenous and clearly bounded. Hence, critiquing methodological nationalism means acknowledging the greater complexity of the nation in the current period of globalisation. Significantly, such a critique does not mean abandoning the study of the nation altogether. As Chernillo states, ‘[w]e need a deeper appreciation of the nation state’s key features so that we can theorize it rather than naturalize or reify it’ (2006, p. 112; see also Mihelj, 2014; Roosvall & Salovaara-Moring, 2010b).

51 For example, Latin American historians and political scientists have employed the critique of methodological nationalism to introduce more complexity to the study of the nation, rather than to preach about the supposed benefits of cosmopolitanism or transnationalism (e.g. Dosek, 2014; de Medeiros, 2010).
For this study, the critique of methodological nationalism means confronting the fact that ‘Brazil’ does not refer to an internal homogeneous group. Indeed, the construction and projection of Brazil in the media occurs across several mediated platforms, genres and technologies, which are not necessarily restricted by national boundaries. In the case of the June Journeys, the protests were covered by an array of news media organisations from Brazil, Latin America, the United States and Western Europe (“Número de notícias sobre o Brasil cresce 9,16% no segundo trimestre de 2013,” 2013). Hence, a thorough analysis of the mediated visibility of the June Journeys requires looking at accounts produced in and through mainstream and alternative, Brazilian and international, news media.

Studies about the role of the media during the June Journeys have often focussed on only one specific set of media organisations. At best, they have compared examples from mainstream and alternative media in order to stress the apparently different practices, aims and technologies between such media (e.g. Amaral, 2016; Ávila, 2013; Becker & Machado, 2014; Conde & Jazeel, 2013; d’Andrea & Ziller, 2015; Fonsêca, 2013; de Lima, 2013; Soares, 2013).

Whilst the previous approach gives researchers a clearly bounded object to study, it risks portraying mainstream and alternative media as parallel and unconnected camps. It fails to acknowledge that mainstream and alternative media do not always oppose each other and may actually work in tandem (Cottle, 2011a; see also Mattoni, 2013; McCurdy, 2013). It additionally overlooks the role of foreign news media, at a time when the intensification of globalisation has made national boundaries more porous. Hence, the challenge I faced was to find a research strategy that facilitated ‘putting together’ the different elements constituting the image of the nation in the media.

A multi-sited methodological approach facilitated this goal. Multi-sited research refers to a type of research that traces things, people, metaphors or conflicts in a multiplicity of locations, connecting them with a specific argument. It addresses the transnational circulation of people, ideas, identities, signs,
meanings and processes (Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995). When doing multi-sited research, the researcher can make use of different modes of participation and observation at each location, depending on the nature of the phenomenon to be examined (Marcus, 1995). Marcus observes that media scholars have been particularly receptive to multi-sited research (1995, p. 103). One example is Ulf Hannerz’s work on foreign correspondents (2003, 2004), which has been a source of inspiration for this thesis. That study examines ‘globalisation at work’ through the perspective of people constructing and projecting mediated images and accounts (Hannerz, 2003, p. 203).

The choice of multi-sited research as a strategy for this study is underpinned by the fact that, due to its elasticity, multi-sited research may allow an examination of the different elements that constituted the image of Brazil during the June Journeys. Multi-sited research facilitates tracing images and accounts of the protests through national, international as well as alternative media. Furthermore, multi-sited research permits looking beyond the epidermis of the visible, given that, as an extension of classic ethnography, it aims to examine people’s accounts of a specific phenomenon.

Analyses of mediated ‘texts’ may produce rich insights into the image of the nation (e.g. Latham, 2009; Orgad, 2012). However, issues essential to understanding mediated visibility, such as professional practices, working conditions, technological developments as well as commercial and institutional imperatives (Voirol, 2005), cannot be grasped by just looking at mediated content. Hence, a multi-sited research approach to study the June Journeys offers the possibility of having a holistic understanding not only of what the media showed about Brazil at that time, but also of how and why particular individuals produced media content about the protests.

**Studying an Event in Progress**

The second challenge refers to the difficulties I faced when studying an event in progress. When I started looking at the protests in Brazil, they were not a

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52 Although he does not explicitly talk about multi-sited research, Chadwick (2013) arguably employs a similar research approach in his work about hybrid media systems.
clearly bounded phenomenon, but rather one still in progress. The June Journeys –which had not been named as such then– were a moving target. It was unclear how long the protests were going to last as well as their potential implications for Brazil.

In addition, I was unsure which theories would be more suitable to use to understand the demonstrations. Works on nation branding and public diplomacy, which had influenced the early stages of this study, have warned convincingly how branding experts and authorities may try to flatten national diversity to construct and project a specific image of the nation (Aronczyk, 2013; Kaneva, 2011). Yet they were insufficient to examine the June Journeys. Whilst protesters had broad and contradictory demands and they claimed to speak on behalf of the nation (de Sousa, 2017; Kühn, 2014), they were not reacting against a particular brand or public diplomacy campaign. Focussing only on the tensions between protesters and authorities also risked overlooking the political agendas of media organisations, which is a usual shortcoming in the literature on nation branding (Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015). Hence, portraying the June Journeys merely as a clash of elites vis-à-vis ‘the Brazilian people’, without addressing media organisations as another important set of actors, would have been an extreme over-simplification.

Constructivist grounded theory proved to be a particularly helpful strategy. Grounded theory departs from positive traditions, because it does not aim to use the data to test pre-existing hypotheses. Instead, it looks at an empirical phenomena and tries to answer the question ‘what is going on?’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 42). Unlike more traditional approaches of grounded theory, constructivist grounded theory does not presuppose the abandoning of theoretical models, but rather entering into a dialogue between data and theories (Allan, 2003; Charmaz, 2012; Gibson & Hartman, 2013). Grounded theory advocates propose a continuous adjustment of theories and research questions (Gibson & Hartman, 2013; Willig, 2001). This approach was therefore suitable for studying the June Journeys while they were still in progress.
Following Charmaz’s (1990) suggestion, I put theories temporarily on hold and I exclusively focussed on collecting data at random. In this initial data exploration, I paid attention to some of the demands and anxieties expressed by authorities, activists and journalists at the time of the protests, and which mainstream and alternative media covered. That is how I came across the fascinating but under-studied concern, mentioned in Chapter 1, that the June Journeys could have an impact on the image of Brazil, particularly in relation to the hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games.

My choice of terms and concepts for this thesis was made possible by this initial data exploration. Constructivist grounded theory proposes examining people’s own accounts of their experiences during specific situations (following Gibson & Hartman, 2013). Over the last two decades, discussions about ‘images of nations’ have been re-framed as debates about nation branding or public diplomacy. Terms such as ‘image of the nation’ or ‘national image’ have become relatively unfashionable. However, when looking at preliminary data, most people did not speak about ‘brands’ or ‘public diplomacy’. They talked about the ‘image of the nation’ or the ‘image of Brazil’, a choice of terms that I decided to respect in this study.

Constructivist grounded theory also fits with this thesis’ aspiration of not simply using a case study from Latin America to support theories produced in the West (see Waisbord, 2014). As discussed in Chapter 1, this study seeks both to engage in debates about the nature and implications of the June Journeys within Brazil, as well as to contribute to wider theoretical debates about media and nationhood, media and social movements, and mediated visibility. Hence, I did not seek to make the protests fit within pre-existing theories. The analytical model proposed in Chapter 2 was not a theoretical imposition over the data. It

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53 I am particularly grateful to Don Slater, who suggested to me that I put theories temporarily on hold at a time when I was not sure which models would be useful to understand the June Journeys. I am also grateful to Nick Anstead for suggesting to me that I employ grounded theory.

54 Although scholarship on nation branding or public diplomacy also tends to use terms such as ‘images of the nation’, when using academic search engines such as Google Scholar and library university catalogues, I found that most articles employing the term ‘image of the nation’ or ‘national images’ were from the 1980’s and 1990’s. A significant exception is a recently edited collection about the image of Africa in the media (Bunce, Franks, & Paterson, 2017).
was a conceptual map, continuously refined throughout this study, to guide the research and analysis of the June Journeys.

### 3.3 Data Collection and Analysis

#### Mediated Content: Timeframe and Sample Strategy

The starting point of the analytical model proposed in Chapter 2 is the need to examine what is shown in the media, namely the visible nation. The visible nation was defined as the nation ‘constructed and shown in the media environment of national, alternative, and also foreign media’ (page 72). This is a clear-cut definition conceptually speaking, but in practice refers to a fairly complex collage of mediated content. That collage includes news articles, television reports, blog posts, and YouTube videos, produced both inside and outside of Brazil (following Frosh & Wolfsfeld, 2007; Orgad, 2012).

Given the huge scale and diversity of news media organisations covering the June Journeys (“Número de notícias sobre o Brasil cresce 9,16% no segundo trimestre de 2013,” 2013), the operationalization of the multi-sited research strategy required sampling from Brazilian and foreign mainstream and alternative media. In addition, it was necessary to choose a specific timeframe. The decisions about sampling and timeframe for each type of media follow:

**Brazilian media:** I chose two national newspapers and one television newscast to analyse the coverage of the June Journeys in the national news media: national newspapers *Folha de Sao Paulo* and *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, as well as Globo TV’s newscast *Jornal Nacional*. I focussed on them due to their national reach and popularity within Brazil. This is significant as there have been academic studies arguing that the news media selected for this study have played a significant role in instilling amongst Brazilians a sense of belonging to their nation (Coutinho & Musse, 2010; Rego, 2014). According to Brazil’s National Association of Newspapers (*Associação Nacional de Jornais*, ANJ), *Folha* and *O Estado* are the second and fourth most popular newspapers by circulation in Brazil (*Associação Nacional de Jornais*, 2016). Whilst tabloid
Super Notícia was Brazil’s leading newspaper in 2013,\(^5\) that newspaper focusses mostly on sensationalist stories. Hence, it lacks the national political influence and relevance of broadsheets Folha and O Estado de Sao Paulo.

Brazil’s media landscape is dominated by television. Brazil is home to Globo Group, the largest media conglomerate in Latin America and one of the most important worldwide. Globo produces and distributes content across a variety of media, including television networks, radio stations and newspapers. It is famous for its telenovelas, which have been distributed all over the world (Hanson, 2008; Rego, 2014). Globo TV’s Jornal Nacional is Brazil’s most popular television primetime news programme. It is estimated that it had an average audience of 4.8 million people –26% of the Brazilian population – every evening in 2013 (Becker & Alves, 2015, p. 99).

Content of O Estado is available on the Nexis Database, whilst Folha and Jornal Nacional have their own online archives.\(^5\) In each case, I searched for the term protestos (protests) or demonstrações (demonstrations). The timeframe of analysis was between 6th June 2013, which was when the first large protest occurred in Sao Paulo, and 1st July 2013, which corresponds to the day after the end of the FIFA Confederations Cup. Although protests continued throughout Brazil in the following months, the strength of the demonstrations faded away once the Confederations Cup was over (Gohn, 2014a; Judensnaider et al., 2013; Porto & Brant, 2015).

After discarding articles or videos not related to the June Journeys –for instance, those referring to protests occurring in Turkey at that time– 439 articles and 231 videos were obtained (Table 1).

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\(^5\) According to data published by Brazil’s National Association of Newspapers (ANJ), in 2013, the top 5 leading newspapers in Brazil were Super Notícia, from Belo Horizonte, with an average daily circulation of 302,472; Folha de Sao Paulo, from Sao Paulo, with 294,811; O Globo, from Rio de Janeiro, with 267,542; O Estado de Sao Paulo, from Sao Paulo, with 234,863; and Extra, from Rio de Janeiro, with 225,622.

### Foreign media:

As stated in Chapter 1, both Britain and the United States are Brazil’s ‘significant others’, namely the gazes that, whilst viewed with suspicion, provide recognition but also sanction what is shown or concealed. Hence, I focussed on news media from the United States and the United Kingdom. I constructed a corpus based on articles and reports published or broadcast in three ‘quality’ newspapers,\(^{57}\) one magazine and one transnational television station from the United States and the United Kingdom. They include *The New York Times* (USA), *The Times* (and its Sunday version *The Sunday Times*) (UK), *The Guardian* (and its Sunday version *The Observer*) (UK), *The Economist* (UK) and *BBC World News* (UK). I chose these media because they are popular and politically influential within their locations of origin. *The New York Times* is consistently among the three leading American newspapers in terms of circulation (Pew Research Center, 2013); whilst *The Times* and *The Guardian* are among the leading broadsheets in the United Kingdom (Turvill, 2014). There is evidence that they also carry weight within Brazil. Several Brazilian scholars have examined the significance that the aforementioned foreign news media have in the construction and projection of the image of Brazil abroad (e.g. Brasil, 2012; Buarque, 2013, 2015a; Dalpiaz, 2013b; Dota, 2010; Gobbi et al., 2006; Paganotti, 2009).\(^{58}\)

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\(^{57}\) Within Brazil, foreign ‘quality’ newspapers have been described as those relying on the work of correspondents living in the country rather than reproducing information wired by news agencies, and which dedicate time and space to national debates and reports published by the Brazilian media. Conversely, tabloids are described as lacking foreign correspondents and having stories with a more sensational approach (Dalpiaz, 2013b).

\(^{58}\) The interest on how international news media depict Brazil has not been limited to academic circles. One of the foreign correspondents I interviewed, Larry Rohter, who worked as South American bureau chief for The New York Times from 1999 to 2007, was threatened by the Brazilian government with expulsion in 2004, after writing an article suggesting that then President, Lula da Silva was an alcoholic (Brasil, 2012).
I carried out a search in the databases Nexis and ProQuest for the newspapers and magazines, and Box of Broadcast and Google Advanced Search for *BBC World News*. I employed the search words ‘Brazil’, ‘protests’, ‘demonstrations’ and ‘Confederations Cup’. In the first instance, the search produced hundreds of reports. I narrowed the sample focussing exclusively on stories that were primarily located in Brazil.59 I discarded articles and television reports that, whilst they included several mentions of Brazil, were not related to the June Journeys. This was true for news centred exclusively on the teams competing in the Confederations Cup. Additionally, I excluded articles that were only published online, given that, in the sample, most of the matters covered were later included in their respective printed editions. Keeping the same timeframe I used for the national media, I formed a corpus of 87 articles and 36 videos (Table 2).

<table>
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<th>Publication</th>
<th>Sample date</th>
<th>Reports about the June Journeys</th>
<th>Search engine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>BBC World News</em></td>
<td>6th June – 1st July 2013</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Box of Broadcasts / Google Advanced Search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Guardian/The Observer</em></td>
<td>6th June – 1st July 2013</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Nexis UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Times/The Sunday Times</em></td>
<td>6th June – 1st July 2013</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Nexis UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Economist</em></td>
<td>6th June – 6th July 2013</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>ProQuest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 – Sample coverage of foreign media during the June Journeys.

**Alternative media:** I gathered data from the coverage of the June Journeys mostly by *Midia NINJA*, an alternative media collective that, as mentioned in Chapter 1, became the prime example of an alternative media during the protests. *Midia NINJA* became known in Brazil for live streaming the protests, but it rarely archived that content. It did not have a website during the June Journeys and its YouTube channel was created only after the

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59 Both NEXIS UK and ProQuest permit reducing the sample based on the location of the articles.
demonstrations. 60 Mídia NINJA’s available data from the June Journeys consists only of 4 videos61 and 8 photo albums on their Facebook page. 62 Mídia NINJA was not the only significant example of alternative media. Brazilian filmmaker Carla Dauden directed a YouTube video ‘No, I’m not going to the World Cup’ (Dauden, 2013a). The video went viral during the protests and influenced discussions among activists and the mainstream media (e.g. De Aquino, 2013). Hence, I decided to incorporate it into the sample.

The dataset of mediated content consists of 797 newspaper articles, television reports, and online videos and photos produced by Brazil’s mainstream and alternative media, as well as American and British media. Another dataset included were publicly available documents and advertising material published by the Brazilian government before the June Journeys. The latter dataset was chosen to provide context for the official efforts to construct and project the image of Brazil, as well as to facilitate comparison of the different accounts of the nation produced by diverse individuals and organisations.

Interviews: Meeting the News Producers

The second dataset consisted of 63 interviews that I carried out for this study between March 2014 and October 2015. 63 As discussed in Chapter 2, studies about media and nationhood have often relied on analyses of texts or visual images, and audience research. Hence, the examination of the beliefs and experiences of those producing images and accounts of the nation, particularly during episodes of protest, remains limited (Cushion, Thomas, Kilby, Morani, & Sambrook, 2016; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2014).

Whilst the analysis of media coverage may illustrate what is shown in the media, the visible nation, according to the terminology of this study– this is insufficient to examine the other two dimensions of the analytical model proposed, namely the strategies and the conditions of mediated visibility.

60 The first available videos in their YouTube channel are from August 2013 onwards. See https://www.youtube.com/user/7VHD/videos
61 Available at https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLmsK4TGR2BHjar2JziEdDLIVuUJrPCJP
62 Available at https://pt-br.facebook.com/MidiaNINJA/
63 For a full list of interviews, see Appendix A.
Various authors (Bruggemann, 2012; Dayan, 2013; Orgad, 2015; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2014) have recently highlighted the need to inspect the production of images and accounts that the media show, as well as the circumstances affecting such production. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Dayan holds that talking to those constructing and projecting news facilitates ‘a description of actual media practices apart from a democratic theory whose relation to such practices is sometimes that of an alibi’ (2013, p. 146).

Whilst this study adopts a multi-sited research strategy inspired by Marcus (1995), it is not ethnographic in the classic sense of the term. As Kuus (2013) observes, in recent years there has been an increasing amount of scholarship claiming to be ethnographic. Issues such as the difficulty of accessing traditionally closed environments like news media organisations, ministries of Foreign Affairs, embassies or activist groups; controls imposed by public relations managers and press officers, and the communicative skills of people who work in these environments –able to talk without revealing too much– provide these studies with an illusion of ethnography. That is to say, the information gathered could have been obtained using other methodologies, such as in-depth interviews (Kuus, 2013). Indeed, interviews are a useful tool for collecting data in areas of restricted access. They allow the exploration of beliefs and shared understandings, and also secure descriptions of specific social environments (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006; Gaskell, 2000).

In order to examine the beliefs, practices as well as conditions in which different individuals struggled for and over the image of Brazil at the time of the June Journeys, I decided to conduct qualitative semi-structured interviews with a single respondent.\(^{64}\) Semi-structured interviews are a type of interview that, while structured around a common set of research questions, are flexible enough to address in depth themes that had not been originally considered by the researcher (Gaskell, 2000). There were two main reasons for this choice. Firstly, semi-structured interviews are useful to recall facts concerning specific

\(^{64}\) The only exception was a group interview with members of alternative media collective *Carranca*. Whilst I had been in touch with only one of its members by email and phone, four of them turned up at the agreed location for the interview.
events in a multiplicity of sites. Secondly, semi-structured interviews are helpful to obtain accounts about beliefs, experiences, values and understandings of individuals in a particular situation (Gaskell, 2000). Significantly, the interviews were epistemologically underpinned on socio-constructionism. The aim was not to discover what *really* happened during the June Journeys, but rather to examine different accounts of this particular episode of social unrest (see Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008).

I began conducting interviews after I had started analysing the mediated content. I detail the steps taken for the analysis in the next section. However, it should be acknowledged that the analyses of mediated content informed the development of the interview topic guide. The more detailed the analyses of mediated content became, the more nuanced the questions asked during the interviews were (the full interview guide is in Appendix C). Whilst the questions centred on the two areas of enquiry shown below, the interviews were open to be taken in different directions. At the same time, given that the aim was to interview people with different relationships to the June Journeys –government officials, activists, journalists–, each interview was intended to emphasise different issues, depending on the role played by each individual during the demonstrations. Nonetheless, I kept in mind that interviews in grounded theory ‘are used to tell a collective story, not an individual tale given in a single interview’ (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2001, p. 361). The two main areas of enquiry were:

I. Perceived importance of the image of Brazil, including description of what that image supposedly is, how that image has been created, and how the June Journeys affected –or not– that image.

II. Specific experiences of the June Journeys, including personal involvement, process of covering the protests, intended audiences, role of different media technologies and organisations.

In March 2014 I conducted four interviews in London, which served as pilots to test the topic guide and adjust the theoretical focus. The four interviews proved difficult, given that I did not have a complete picture of the events constituting
the June Journeys at that time. Those interviews were significant because they not only supplied four personal accounts regarding the June Journeys but also made me aware of important episodes that I had originally neglected in the mediated content analysis. The pilot interviews highlighted the need to establish a dialectic relationship between mediated content and interviews, with both datasets in continual dialogue and adjusting each other.

After conducting the pilot interviews, I drew up a list of around two hundred potential interviewees. I chose a large number of individuals aware of the potential for rejection when people are asked for an interview. The list used the media coverage of the June Journeys I had collected as a base. It included Brazilian and foreign journalists who authored newspaper articles and television reports, government officials who had expressed their views about the June Journeys, as well as activists and members of alternative media collectives. The choice of potential interviewees did not intend to be statistically representative, but rather sought to examine a variety of viewpoints regarding the coverage of the protests (based on Gaskell, 2000). I started contacting the various individuals, who were mostly based in Brazil, through a variety of methods, including email or Twitter accounts. I received however, a very poor response. Two exceptions were a journalist and a blogger based in New York whom I contacted whilst I was attending a conference there. In both cases I received prompt responses. Hence, I planned a trip to Brazil.

Whilst I was preparing for my fieldwork trip, I conducted seventeen interviews in London. Subjects included one Brazilian diplomat, various Brazilian and international journalists, as well as some activists. Of those interviews, nine were conducted through Skype. While Skype does pose some challenges such as potential technological drawbacks during the interview and loss of intimacy (see, for instance, the discussion in Seitz, 2016), it allowed me to talk to key interviewees who either were unavailable in Brazil at the time of my planned fieldwork, or were in locations beyond my reach, such as California.

I wanted the main bulk of interviews to take place during my trip to Brazil. Whilst the response rate of potential interviewees was higher once I had
concrete dates for my trip, it was still relatively low. Nonetheless, drawing on the previously discussed multi-sited research strategy, and using as inspiration Ulf Hannerz’s work on foreign correspondents (2004), I “parachuted” during the Brazilian summer of 2015 into São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia. Most of the people I wanted to interview, which included Brazilian government representatives, journalists, branding executives, academics and activists, were based in these three cities.

The first interviews I conducted in Brazil altered my selection strategy. People started suggesting other people whom I should contact whilst I was in Brazil. Hence, interviewee selection became a ‘snowballing’ sample, that is, when people taking part in a study suggest and/or help the researcher to contact other potential future participants (Weiss, 1994). The snowballing sampling proved more successful. For example, prior to my arrival in Brasilia, only two people had agreed in advance to meet me. However, after talking to them, the two individuals provided me with seven additional interviewees during my time in the city.

Snowballing sampling facilitated contact with people not originally on my list of potential interviewees, including journalists working for media organisations that were not in the sampling of mediated content previously discussed. When I was in Brazil, I decided to incorporate the accounts of these individuals into my study because I could not interview representatives of all the media organisations and collectives that I had originally identified. These complementary accounts often compensated for those lacunae and enriched my perspective on the June Journeys (a summary of the interviewees and their organisations can be seen in Table 3).

Thirty-seven interviews were carried out in Brazil during January and February 2015. The multi-sited approach took me to three cities and to a variety of settings for the interviews. I met people in ministries, embassies, newsrooms, branding companies, universities, shopping centres, cafés and bars, cultural centres and communes. Two interviewees invited me to attend protests in São Paulo. I took part in them in order to have a better feel for what participating in
the June Journeys may have been like. I also walked the routes of the demonstrations that had taken place in the three cities I visited, in order to have a sense of scale of the June 2013 events. In one of the last interviews I conducted in Brazil, the individual took me to the location of a specific demonstration. Being there elicited much richer answers. Whilst most of my fieldwork had already been completed by then, that experience showed me potential interview strategies for future studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee type</th>
<th>Number of interviewees</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian media</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Folha de Sao Paulo, O Estado de Sao Paulo, Jornal Nacional, Terra, Radio CBN, Epoca Magazine, Rede TV, TV Brasil, Valor Económico, Rede Bandeirantes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activist and alternative media</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mídia NINJA, Coletivo Carranca, Popular Committee for the World Cup, Río Gringa blog, Amnesty International Brazil, independent activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Secretary of the Presidency of Brazil, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, APEX-Brasil, State of Sao Paulo Governance, Rio de Janeiro Town Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Consultant</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CDN Comunicação, FutureBrand, Branding Latin America, FSB Comunicação, Getúlio Vargas Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing, Sao Paulo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>63</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 – Summary of interviewees and their respective organisations.

Most interviewees were generous with their time. The interviews lasted between 20 minutes and 2 hours, and were conducted in Portuguese, English or Spanish, depending on the preferred language of the interviewee. My previous experience of working as a newspaper and television journalist for almost a decade helped me to build rapport with interviewees regardless of the different aims of journalistic and academic interviews (Gaskell, 2000; Kvale &
Brinkmann, 2008; Weiss, 1994). All the interviewees but two allowed me to record the interview. Those who agreed to be recorded requested that I keep the audio confidential. Two Brazilian journalists and one foreign correspondent also asked to see in advance the quotes I was going to use, to decide whether or not I could mention their names. Some interviews addressed issues about Brazilian social and political history, which proved useful to contextualise the protests.

Following the guidance on ethics of LSE,\textsuperscript{65} I ensured that the interviewees were aware of the nature and aims of this study. When contacting them for the first time, often by email, I explained the objective of my thesis. Although no personal topics were discussed, I offered interviewees the possibility of remaining anonymous (Appendix B). Some of them embraced this possibility, while several others explicitly told me that they had no problem in being quoted directly. Consent was provided and accepted by email. At the beginning and end of every interview I repeated the question about attribution and stated that they had the possibility of refraining from answering any question they found particularly sensitive.

I informed all interviewees that the thesis was going to be publicly available and its findings could be published across several formats. I stressed that the raw material was going to remain confidential and that details permitting the identification of interviewees who wanted to remain anonymous were not to be disclosed. Indeed, I often agreed by email the preferred way to refer to interviewees throughout the thesis, both in the cases of those who wanted to remain anonymous and those who were happy to be mentioned directly. At different stages of the thesis, interviewees were able to reach me by email or telephone. Additionally, I maintained contact with some of them, in order to share partial findings and offer them the possibility of clarifying or offering feedback on specific topics.

\textsuperscript{65}http://www.lse.ac.uk/intranet/researchAndDevelopment/researchDivision/policyAndEthics/ethicsGuidanceAndForms.aspx
I had been warned that conducting interviews with people whose job consists of interviewing could be difficult (see, for instance, Kuus, 2013). However, with very few exceptions, people were open and reflective about their experiences covering the June Journeys. In fact, some interviewees—particularly foreign correspondents—were openly grateful to have the chance of escaping from their daily routine to elaborate more sophisticated thoughts about a particularly complex episode in Brazil. Most of them emphasised how extraordinary those days were, and how, for a brief time, they thought that they were part of a historical moment.

Data Analysis: Code Generation and Multimodality

In grounded theory, the collection and analysis of the data run in parallel. Constructivist grounded theory does not prescribe in advance the methodologies to analyse data (Allan, 2003; Charmaz & Belgrave, 2001; Gibson & Hartman, 2013). Rather, methodologies are to be chosen in the light of the collected data. Looking at other studies in media and communications that have employed grounded theory (e.g. Mattoni, 2012), I decided to examine the datasets previously discussed using two types of coding: open coding—also called initial by some authors—and axial or focused coding (Charmaz, 2014; Charmaz & Belgrave, 2001; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Open coding identifies, describes, names and categorises the data, without referencing any theories, and seeks to understand the examined phenomena. Unlike content analysis’ codes, grounded theory open codes are sufficiently elastic to incorporate topics that had originally not been considered (Charmaz, 2014; Charmaz & Belgrave, 2001; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).

I carried out a pilot analysis, repeatedly reading a random selection of articles from one Brazilian and one foreign newspaper. I chose The New York Times and O Estado de Sao Paulo, due to their availability on the Nexis Database. News articles were the units of analysis. The pilot analysis aimed to find and test an initial set of codes, as well as to produce a rough narrative of the coverage of the June Journeys (drawing on Charmaz, 1990). I subsequently started a systematic analysis of the textual dataset of media coverage to
address code issues around lack of clarity. I carried out the analysis with the help of specialist software QDA Miner due to the volume of data collected. As suggested by grounded theory advocates, I kept seeking codes until reaching saturation (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2001). This phase produced 34 codes. Below is an example of how I applied open codes to the analysis of news articles using QDA Miner. It corresponds to an article published by The Guardian on 19th June 2013, headlined ‘Brazil’s leaders blindsided by protests’ (Figure 6).

![Figure 6 - Example of open coding for the analysis of news coverage. On the left, the text of the news article. On the right, the open codes.](image)

The example above refers only to textual mediated content. Significantly, the examination of the visible nation in the current media environment requires incorporating photos and images into the analysis. Hence, I complemented the work of QDA Miner with a multimodal approach (Parry, 2015), in order to examine videos produced by Jornal Nacional, BBC World News, Mídia NINJA and filmmaker Carla Dauden. For that data, I developed the open coding manually. The analysis of the dataset of texts and videos took me around four months. While exhausting, it gave me confidence that I had a complete and nuanced view of the coverage of the June Journeys.

I followed a similar approach with the interviews. Once all of them were transcribed, I uploaded them into QDA Miner and repeated the same process, establishing open codes. Below is an example of how I applied open coding. It corresponds to the transcript of the interview I conducted with foreign freelance journalist Anna (Figure 7).
The number of codes in both datasets was still too extensive for a clear application of the analytical model of mediated visibility proposed in Chapter 2. Following grounded theory strategy, I developed ‘axial’ or ‘focused’ codes, which established relationships between the open codes originally identified (Charmaz, 2014; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). These axial or focused codes made the data much more manageable. They were also the basis for the discussion in the remaining chapters of this study. However, these axial codes were approached differently for each dataset.

For the analysis of mediated content, I separated the axial codes according to media type: national mainstream, foreign mainstream and alternative, to which I added state-sponsored promotional material about Brazil. As mentioned in Chapter 1, I am aware that concepts such as ‘mainstream media’, ‘foreign media’ and ‘alternative media’ are not mutually exclusive and in fact, there is always nuance and a degree of overlap between them. However, I decided to keep them for the sake of clarity. Hence, I chose to examine in parallel the various accounts that news media organisations and collectives constructed of the visible nation. As Chapter 4 shows, that analysis strategy informed the theoretical nomenclature used to categorise the actors, as well as the decision to cluster the codes into dominant frames, according to each type of actor.

For the analysis of interviews, I employed different axial codes. I separated topics depending on whether they corresponded with the strategies and
conditions of mediated visibility. As stated in Chapter 2, the literature in media and nationhood often falls into the shortcoming of looking at the actors in isolation, failing to take into account the interactions, potential commonalities and differences with other individuals who also produce images and accounts of the nation. The axial codes chosen allowed me to see potential commonalities and differences amongst the beliefs, perceptions and practices of the different actors, which are detailed in Chapters 5 and 6. I kept examining continuously the links and tensions between what was shown in the media about the June Journeys, and the claims, beliefs and patterns of thought expressed by the interviewees.

3.4 Considerations and Limitations of the Research Strategy

Limitations of the Study

The continuous dialogue between theories and fieldwork raised various challenges during the research process for this thesis. Despite the advantages of multi-sited research and grounded theory, both approaches have limitations. The different methodological approaches towards grounded theory mean that there is no consensus about a consistent and systematic method of data collection and analysis (Gibson & Hartman, 2013; Hussein, Hirst, Salyers, & Osuji, 2014). Indeed, some studies have employed different approaches of grounded theory in one research project, hence undermining their methodological consistency (Hussein et al., 2014). Aware of the risks, I kept the methodology of this study within the boundaries of constructivist grounded theory, in order to maintain a systematic approach to the research.

Grounded theory requires large amounts of data (Allan, 2003; Hussein et al., 2014). As discussed earlier, the analyses of the datasets of both media coverage and interviews were a laborious, time consuming and exhausting process. They were only possible with the help of specialist software. The large amount of data also meant that the specificity and nuance of both the media coverage and the interviews had to be sacrificed for the sake of clarity. This a common limitation of studies employing multi-sited research (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2001; Nadai & Maeder, 2005). My choice to do so was based on the fact that most literature on the June Journeys has been based almost
exclusively on data from only one specific set of actors in one specific location. Conversely, my approach privileged a more generalised view, in order to explore the relationships of various actors and across different locations.

Adopting a more generalised view brought to the fore the tension between searching for patterns, trends and explanations within the data with the desire to account for acts of randomness, mistakes and emotions. The task of giving a voice to the interviewees proved challenging. The process of writing the empirical chapters has been a continuous rehearsal of communicating parts of the lives of those producing images of Brazil during the June Journeys, without drowning out their voices in academic jargon or making this study a mere collection of quotes.

A significant issue that research strategies relying on interviews face is representativeness. It is not only a question of how many interviews are needed, but also who is going to be interviewed. Whilst the choice of interviewees was underpinned by the media coverage analysed, there is an inherent bias arising from that decision. As mentioned earlier, most of the interviewees were located in the big urban centres of South East Brazil, specifically Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and the capital Brasilia. This was not just because the main state agencies and media organisations are based in the three cities. Studies have observed that even in the case of alternative media collectives, most of the content was produced in the wealthier cities of South East Brazil (Bastos, Recuero, & Zago, 2014). I could have potentially travelled to other cities to have a more comprehensive view of Brazil, but there were limitations of time and money (authors such as Bonifacio, 2012 have found similar limitations in their study of feminism and migration).

Whilst the focus of this thesis is on the image of Brazil in the media, the sample is skewed towards people who live in one specific area of the country. This is not only a geographical bias, but also a class bias. The concerns expressed by these individuals may accordingly differ from those who live, for instance, in poorer areas such as the North East of Brazil. Hence, the views of interviewees also represent the views of an elite. Indeed, Brazilian journalists belong mostly
to urban middle and upper classes, and they traditionally write for and represent the views of those segments of the Brazilian population (de Albuquerque, 2016). Furthermore, of all the people I met, only one was a black Brazilian. It also struck me that there were various personal and/or professional connections among interviewees, regardless of their different roles as journalists, activists or government officials. Hence, the 'Brazil' examined in this thesis and the concerns discussed throughout it do not necessarily reflect those of the majority of Brazilians. It is actually a narrow portrait of a highly visible phenomenon, albeit not necessarily representative of the general population.

*My Experience as Researcher: Affecting and Being Affected by the Data*

Constructivist grounded theory acknowledges that the collection and analysis of data are done from a specific point of view. Hence, the relationship between the researcher and the data is not unproblematic. Researchers bring to the data not only their theoretical interests, but also their own experiences (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2001; Willig, 2001). My experiences are situated in my identity as a left wing, Chilean national, former journalist and former nation branding executive, living in London. These experiences inevitably influenced my research process.

Building rapport with Brazilian and foreign journalists during the interviews was facilitated by my own experience of working in newspapers and television. I was able to understand their professional jargon and I could empathise with some of their experiences. Similarly, due to my experience working on nation branding projects for the Chilean government, various government officials were relatively open with me. In both cases, even though I stressed that my academic interests went beyond advertising and branding, when I explained that my thesis was about the image of Brazil during the June Journeys, most people thought that it was an exercise in branding, rather than on media and nationhood. That situation demonstrated how branding, and particularly nation branding, has become familiar to people from different fields (see also Moor, 2007).
Various interviews were facilitated by the fact that I am not Brazilian. When I interviewed foreigners interested in Brazil, I had the impression that, we were both complicit in talking in depth about a common ‘other’ that we both felt passionate about. Non-Brazilian interviewees felt that we shared a common culture, looking at Brazil ‘from the outside’. Furthermore, on various occasions foreign interviewees felt free to express generalisations or criticisms, sometimes very harsh, of Brazil. That closeness was sometimes problematic. Some foreigners wanted to know my own views about Brazil and tried to reverse the roles of interviewer and interviewee. Hence, I sometimes needed to keep some distance, in order to talk about their accounts and not mine.

In the case of Brazilian interviewees, several expressed curiosity about why, as a Chilean, I was interested in Brazil. That surprised me. I noticed that speaking to me was an exercise in reflection for Brazilians. They happily engaged in the task of explaining Brazil to a gringo, as all foreigners are referred in Brazilian Portuguese. They explained in detail, cultural, historical, political and idiosyncratic issues about Brazil. Furthermore, on several occasions they admitted that my questions pushed them to reflect for the first time about specific issues that, until then, they had perceived as natural. Yet, I was not a total stranger. Whilst I was a gringo, I was different: I was another Latin American, not one of their ‘significant others’ from the United States or Western Europe. Hence, Brazilians expressed complicity with me throughout the interviews. Whilst they sometimes had critical or defensive attitudes towards the things that they did not like about Brazil, they often assumed that Chile had similar problems.

Charmaz and Belgrave (2001) observe that the researcher is also affected by the data. My first approach to the June Journeys, at the end of the first year of my PhD, was through a very romantic prism. I did not engage critically with the articles and reports from foreign media organisations stating that ‘the people’ were revolting against the Brazilian elites. That viewpoint was reinforced by most of the academic articles about the protests that I read. The early drafts of this thesis accordingly reflected that perspective.
Over time, my perspective changed. The exhaustive revision of the media coverage of the June Journeys highlighted various nuances, which are part of the discussion of the following chapters. That viewpoint was emphasised during the interviews. I was struck by how similar the aspirations of activists, government officers, and journalists were. All of them seemed to want a more egalitarian society, where poverty had been overcome. They agreed that the June Journeys had been a historic and ‘beautiful’ episode, when people took to the streets to express themselves. It was sometimes discouraging to see that these individuals did not talk to each other. A couple of Brazilian journalists expressed disdain when I said that I had interviewed members of Midia NINJA. Some activists in turn showed contempt when I mentioned I had interviewed an editor of Jornal Nacional. I have often hoped that this study, with all its limitations, could act as a bridge between all those different points of view.

Hence, the original account of the June Journeys that I had was gradually replaced by a more sceptical and problematic view. The demonstrations were not simply a case of ‘the people’ vis-à-vis the elites, but much more about various groups acting on behalf of Brazil. Likewise, protests were not a pacifist exercise that was violently interrupted by the military police. The two protests that I attended were characterised by continuous tension. We were all wondering when the violence was going to start. In fact, when looking at some protesters, sometimes I had the impression that they were waiting for the police to become violent.

I would not have reached this new viewpoint without the interviews. Whilst the observation of media content played a key role in this study, it was only through talking to the people involved that I could gain a sense of the nuances that characterised the June Journeys. Nonetheless, it is not my aim to reify interviews. For this study, I have relied on the memories of these individuals whom I interviewed about the June Journeys. Only a more classic ethnography

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66 Significantly, a book by Spanish academic Esther Solano (Solano et al., 2014), who is based in Brazil, about the demonstrators employing the Black Block tactic observed the same phenomena.
could have shed light on what they did—or did not—at the time of the protests. Despite this shortcoming, the accounts provided remain a significant base from which to start more complex debates about nationhood, protests, visibility and the media.

### 3.5 Conclusion

This chapter described the methodological choices supporting my thesis and discussed some the challenges that the study of the June Journeys faced. It explained the steps taken to empirically apply the model of analysis proposed in Chapter 2 to the study of the image of Brazil during the June Journeys. The analytical model was operationalized through a multi-sited methodological approach, which combined the analysis of media coverage—in Brazilian and international, mainstream and alternative media—and interviews with the individuals who produced the coverage.

The combination of mediated content and interviews facilitated an examination of what is beyond the visible in the media (see also Bruggemann, 2012; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2014). The chosen methodological approach configures a more complex picture of how the struggles for and over the visible Brazil occurred throughout the June Journeys. It seeks to examine Brazil from a textual and visual point of view, while taking into account the perspectives of the individuals producing images of the nation. That aspect has been largely overlooked in media studies to date, particularly when referring to images of protest (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2014). Hence, both datasets are not isolated camps. They communicate with each other through the process of data collection and analysis.

Following the work of Hannerz (2004), it is important to point out that the goal of this study is not to criticise the work of the interviewees, nor to examine how ‘accurate’ or ‘truthful’ their accounts were in comparison to an alleged ‘real’ Brazil. The aim, instead, is to appraise how particular beliefs, perceptions, practices and working conditions, facilitated or constrained the visibility of a particular version of Brazil during those weeks of June 2013 as subsequent
chapters show. Prior to considering the viewpoints of interviewees, I look at what different media showed about Brazil during the June Journeys. That media content is the subject of the next chapter.
4. The Visible Nation: The June Journeys through the Prism of Four Frames

4.1 Introduction

12th June 2013 marked exactly a year before the start of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, the second to be celebrated in Brazil. During the months leading up to the event, the sports and international sections of Brazilian and international newspapers, magazines, television newscasts, and blogs, covered the concerns and hopes of Brazilians for the upcoming football tournament. A mixture of scepticism and enthusiasm could be found across these accounts in Brazilian, foreign and alternative media. Most articles and reports wondered whether or not the local authorities’ hopes of using this sporting event to showcase a modern, stable, prosperous Brazil to the rest of the world would actually be achieved.

Some journalists warned that the FIFA World Cup might not necessarily be the ‘coming out party’ intended by the Brazilian government, that is an event that would showcase Brazil as a modern, politically influential and economically developed nation. An article published by The Economist in early June 2013 is illustrative. It examined the troubled path that local authorities were taking in their efforts to complete the stadia within the required timeframes, whilst also attempting to comply with state-of-the-art technology and high standards of design and sustainability (“Into extra time: Football in Brazil,” 2013). Similarly, a few days later, The Guardian ran a story centred on how political corruption, social inequality and safety concerns could potentially have a negative effect on the tournament (Watts, 2013a).

Other media adopted a more positive tone. On 12th June, BBC News broadcast a report showing more than a dozen hotel workers in Rio de Janeiro attending free English lessons funded by the Brazilian government. BBC News Online headlined the story as ‘Brazil prepares for the 2014 World Cup’, and went on to say, ‘With one year to go until the Football World Cup, Brazilians are busy
preparing to host the event’ (Carneiro, 2013a). A day later, on 13th June, all positive views of Brazil and its preparations were brutally shattered. An estimated number of between 5,000 and 20,000 people (Gohn, 2014b) took to the streets of downtown Sao Paulo to demonstrate against an increase in public transportation fares, in a protest organised by the Movimento Passe Livre (MPL).

As discussed in Chapter 1, that evening proved memorable due to the violence inflicted by the military police (Judensnaider et al., 2013; “Protestos contra aumento das passagens abalam São Paulo e Rio,” 2013; Secco, 2013; Stochero & Passarinho, 2014). Two hundred people were arrested and an unknown number were injured, including journalists from Brazil’s main national newspapers (Gohn, 2014b; Zanchetta, 2013). After that evening, and following the kick off of the FIFA Confederations Cup two days later, the protests became the main topic on the national and foreign media coverage of Brazil ("Número de notícias sobre o Brasil cresce 9,16% no segundo trimestre de 2013," 2013). Julia Carneiro, the BBC journalist who had just two weeks earlier so enthusiastically broadcast about the free English lessons, now found herself reporting wearing a gas mask from the streets of Rio de Janeiro on a series of violent clashes between the police and demonstrators outside the Maracanã Stadium (Figure 8). This time, her report for BBC News described the South American nation as shaken by ‘a nationwide movement for better education, healthcare and transport’ rather than emphasising the supposed unity of Brazilians around the upcoming football tournament (Carneiro, 2013b).

Figure 8 – On the left, BBC News journalist Julia Carneiro shows a group of Brazilians taking English lessons in preparation for the 2014 World Cup. Two weeks later, the same journalist wore a gas mask to cover a series of protests in Rio de Janeiro (Carneiro, 2013a, 2013b).
In this chapter, I focus on the first dimension of analysis proposed in Chapter 2: the visible nation. I examine some of the tensions, differences and similarities between various accounts claiming to show what Brazil was at the time of the June Journeys. As discussed earlier, the visible nation is constructed and shown in the interconnected environment of national, alternative, as well as foreign media. The analysis examines the struggles for and over visibility that were manifested in the media during the June Journeys. Such struggles were for and over contradictory, but occasionally complementary, accounts of what was apparently happening in Brazil then.

4.2 Key Actors and Dominant Frames

Types of Actors: State, National Storytellers, Agents, Entrepreneurs

In order to shed light on these struggles, this chapter draws on some of the debates about mediated visibility outlined in Chapter 2. As previously discussed, visibility is relational, and a greater number of individuals and organisations take part in the struggles for and over the mediated visibility of the nation. For instance, Orgad (2008, 2012) observes that satellite and transnational media increasingly act as agents of the new visibility. They produce content that permeates communicational national boundaries and which, significantly, expands the frontiers of what people can see about their own nation. Dayan (2013) argues that technological developments have strengthened a group of actors called visibility entrepreneurs, who are those individuals and organisations creating and projecting images of the nation outside the state and mainstream media. Based on the concepts proposed by both authors, I classified the various individuals and organisations producing images of Brazil during the June Journeys into four types of actors:

1. State: The state is the primary actor attempting to exercise control over the construction and projection of images of the nation. The state is constituted by those individuals and entities in positions of political, cultural or economic power that have traditionally attempted to monopolise the construction of the image of the nation through symbols, narratives, songs, sporting or artistic events, among many others.
Following a top-down process, political rulers, government and state institutions attempt to legitimise their positions of power by proposing a particular state or leader as the legitimate representative of a nation (Geisler, 2005; Itzigsohn & Hau, 2006; Lessa, 2008; Thompson, 2000; Welch, 2013). In the last two decades, the global spread of practices such as nation branding and public diplomacy has revealed the continuous aspiration of the state to produce controlled portrayals of the nation (Aronczyk, 2013; Castelló & Mihelj, 2017; Kaneva, 2011; Moor, 2007; Pamment, 2013; Surowiec, 2017).

2. **Traditional National Storytellers:** This category describes national media organisations, as well as those addressing communities in the diaspora, which emphasise links to a specific national community. Regardless of its diversity, the national media are central to the symbolic construction and projection of the nation. They uphold the nation flagging national symbols, making visible rituals and events that apparently celebrate national common values, addressing audiences as members of the same nation, and playing a key role in the temporal organisation of national communities (Anderson, 2006; Billig, 1995; Dayan & Katz, 1992; Frosh & Wolfsfeld, 2007; Madianou, 2005; Mihelj, 2011; Scannell, 1996; Welch, 2013). Significantly, foreign observers often hold that mainstream media organisations are the legitimate representatives of a given nation (Rantanen, 2010).

3. **Agents of the New Visibility:** The symbolic construction of the nation has never been completely dominated by the state or national media (Geisler, 2005) and national communities have traditionally been the subject of coverage by foreign media organisations (Rantanen, 2010). However, with the intensification of globalisation in the late 20th century, technologies such as satellite and digital communications have facilitated the spread of international and transnational communication flows within what used to be relatively closed national boundaries. Consequently, foreign media organisations have become agents of the
new visibility (Orgad, 2008). They may expand the frontiers of what people can see within their nations and, significantly, provide people with the possibility of directly witnessing how they are seen by others (Orgad, 2008, 2012; for examples, see Boudana, 2014; Hayes & Guardino, 2013; Kantola, 2010; Latham, 2009; Rusciano et al., 1997). Examples of this category are transnational or international media, even if they are nationally grounded, such as The New York Times, The Economist, BBC World Service, CNN International and Al Jazeera.

4. Visibility Entrepreneurs: These are organisations and individuals that operate outside mainstream media, and who, drawing mostly on digital media, aim to counteract the images shown by mainstream national or transnational media. The entrepreneurs ‘wish to emulate what they perceive as the crucial power of journalists: the divine power of “conferring visibility”, a task which, in the view of these individuals, has traditionally remained in the hands of the elites (Dayan, 2013, p. 143). The literature of media and social movements has examined the role of various individuals and organisations that fit into this category, including bloggers, alternative media collectives, as well as hackers (e.g. Cammaerts et al., 2013; Castells, 2013; Chadwick, 2013; Cottle, 2006, 2011b; Couldry, 2015a; Mattoni, 2012). They may, or may not, show allegiance to a particular nation. One example of this category is alternative media collective Mídia NINJA (Figure 9).

Figure 9 – House of Mídia NINJA in Sao Paulo (Photo: César Jiménez-Martínez).
The four categories are only analytical; in practice, their boundaries are blurred. For instance, until early 2016, foreign correspondents contributed to an English-language blog in Brazilian newspaper *Folha de Sao Paulo* (“From Brazil,” n.d.). Journalists with experience in Brazilian national media were key to the consolidation of alternative media collective *Mídia NINJA* (Braighi, 2015; Glickhouse, 2013). Furthermore, the four categories do not encompass all the actors participating in the struggles for and over the mediated visibility of the nation. Transnational NGOs and foreign academics may also occasionally act as agents of the new visibility. That is true for ‘Brazilianists’, non-Brazilian academics specialising in Brazilian affairs (Massi, 1990). Private corporations also rely on associating their products –or not– with Brazil, depending on whether or not this is profitable for them (Lettieri, 2014).

The four categories provide a starting point for wider discussions about the complexity of the construction of the visible nation in the age of the new visibility. Whilst most of the actors did not aim to explicitly construct and project a specific image of Brazil in and through the media, their accounts contributed to the collage of ‘cumulative pictures of the social totality’ through which the nation is made visible (Frosh & Wolfsfeld, 2007, p. 126).

*Dominant Frames*

The data analysis described in Chapter 3 was carried out to elucidate what the four categories of actors made visible during the June Journeys. The resulting open and axial codes were clustered into dominant frames. Frames refer to how the media portray an event and framing is the process that leads to a specific mediated depiction. Frames are significant because they both create and reflect public discourses (Entman, 1993; Matthes & Kohring, 2008; McCurdy, 2012).

Scholars have observed that frames are particularly useful to examine episodes of social unrest (Cammaerts, 2012; Cammaerts et al., 2013; Cottle, 2008, 2011b; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; McCurdy, 2012; Vladisavljević, 2002). For instance, Tarrow (2011) holds that the state, the media and social
movements often enter into conflict due to the different frames they use to define a particular situation. Referencing an earlier study conducted by Gamson, Fireman and Rytina (1982), Tarrow states that ‘social movements attempt to replace “a dominant belief system that legitimizes the status quo with an alternative mobilizing belief system that supports collective action for change” (2011, p. 106).

Various authors (e.g. Boudana, 2014; Matthes & Kohring, 2008) have proposed ways to consistently operationalize Entman’s (1993) definition of framing. For instance, Boudana (2014, p. 57) states that Entman’s definition acknowledges four framing functions, which highlight the following issues in regards to the coverage of a specific event:

- **Problem definition**: what issue is raised?
- **Causal interpretation**: what is the reason for what is identified as a problem?
- **Moral evaluation**: how does the actor judge this episode?
- **Treatment recommendation**: what solution is proposed?

Based on the previously discussed studies, the analysis of the coverage of Brazil during the June Journeys identified four frames, produced by each category of actors: (1) A *harmonious Brazil*, produced by the state; (2) *Protection of social order*, produced by the national media; (3) *The people versus their rulers*, produced by the foreign media; and (4) *Unmasking Brazil*, produced by the alternative media (Table 4). Significantly, the frames address not only what supposedly happened on the streets during the demonstrations, but also the frames that other actors produced. The references amongst frames are examples of *metacoverage* or *self-reference*, with the media commenting on what has been previously shown by other media (Colapietro, 2007; Esser, 2009; Nöth, 2007; Nöth & Bishara, 2007). I describe in detail the four frames in the remainder of the chapter, using examples from the analysed dataset as illustrations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State (Brazilian Authorities)</td>
<td>A Harmonious Brazil</td>
<td>Distorted image of Brazil.</td>
<td>The media from Brazil and abroad have not shown enough of the recent political and economic development of Brazil.</td>
<td>There is an unknown country to discover, where people from different background coexist peacefully.</td>
<td>Hosting sporting mega events will contribute to the real image of a modern, stable Brazil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Traditional Storytellers (National Media)</td>
<td>Protection of social order (divided in two stages)</td>
<td>Thugs and vandals are disturbing the national social order (Stage 1). Protests without clear leaders and different goals are spreading across Brazil. (Stage 2).</td>
<td>Vandals use public transport fare rises as an excuse to cause destruction and disorder (Stage 1). Brazilians feel that authorities have neglected their demands. (Stage 2).</td>
<td>Vandals affect peaceful working people (Stage 1). Protesting is a democratic right and violence should always be condemned (Stage 2).</td>
<td>The federal and state governments should take a firmer stand against vandalism (Stage 1). People can take to the streets, albeit whilst respecting social order (Stage 2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agents of New Visibility (Foreign Media)</td>
<td>The people versus their rulers</td>
<td>The FIFA World Cup and the Olympics are being organised to the detriment of basic social needs.</td>
<td>After years of abuse and exploitation, Brazilians have finally decided to take to the streets and express their discontent.</td>
<td>The protests are a positive, because they reveal the real Brazil. They are also part of a global movement of middle class social unrest.</td>
<td>The authorities and elites should listen to the demands of the Brazilian people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility Entrepreneurs (Alternative Media)</td>
<td>Unmasking Brazil</td>
<td>National media and authorities fail to show what is really happening on the streets.</td>
<td>National media favours the ruling political and economic classes, and attempts to hide or discredit anything that may pose a threat to their power.</td>
<td>People have the right to protest against continuous years of exploitation and abuse by the ruling classes.</td>
<td>Showing the real Brazil during the protests, uncut and without agendas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 – Dominant frames that actors constructed during the June Journeys.
4.3 A Harmonious Brazil: State-constructed Frame

I have called the frame produced by the state *A Harmonious Brazil*. This frame portrayed Brazil as an amicable nation, in which people from different backgrounds peacefully coexist. The frame contests a supposed ‘distorted’ image of Brazil that has been predominant in the foreign media, which does not allegedly acknowledge recent political and economic developments in the South American nation. The frame was constructed through a series of promotional actions, mediated and non-mediated, surrounding the hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Brazilian government tried to capitalise on the attention paid to both events, in order to project a modern, market-friendly, and globally influential version of Brazil.

*Showing A ‘New’ Brazil Ready to Charm the World*

The frame was underpinned on a Promotional Plan of Brazil (*Plano de Promoção do Brasil*) elaborated by Brazil’s Ministry of Sports (Ministério do Esporte, 2011). The plan was the official strategy proposed by the Brazilian government and aimed to coordinate different promotional activities across the state apparatus. It sought to develop activities aimed at increasing internal popular support for the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games, as well as projecting a positive image of Brazil abroad. It should be acknowledged that the plan did not succeed completely in coordinating the different branches of the state apparatus. As some authors have observed, there have been at least four parallel and relatively unrelated attempts to project a version of Brazil abroad, carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Tourism Board *Embratur*, the

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67 As discussed earlier, the state is the primary actor attempting to exercise control over the construction and projection of images of the nation. This particularly significant in Brazil, where the creation of the state preceded the spread of a more generalised awareness of the idea of a nation (Dalpiaz, 2013a; see also Larraín, 2000; Lessa, 2008; Miller, 2006). Indeed, there have been various state-sponsored efforts trying to build a specific national image at different times in Brazil’s history (Buarque, 2013, 2015a; Dalpiaz, 2013a; de Sousa, 2017; Hobsbawm, 1995; Lafer, 2001; Rocha, 2014; Williams, 2001).

68 This plan was continuously updated in the years leading up to the World Cup and was complemented by a number of other promotional strategies (see Mello, n.d.; Ministério do Esporte, 2010, 2011; Niesing, 2013; Ocke, 2013; Da Silva et al., 2014).
The plan held that both the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games were primarily media events. It assessed that one of the main aims for the authorities was to use both events to project ‘a new country still mostly unknown by the world’ (Ministério do Esporte, 2011, p. 5, italics mine). The plan states that Brazil was already known for the joyfulness of its people, hospitality, and cultural diversity. Other ‘unknown’ national features, such as economic achievements, political stability and reductions in social inequality, could contribute to projecting a ‘new’ country, which was a ‘complex, modern, global protagonist’ (2011, p. 5).

The intended role of the plan was to be a corrector of visibility of a supposed gap between the ‘real’ Brazil and its ‘distorted’ mediated visibility. Accordingly, the treatment recommendation consisted of showing the ‘new’ Brazil through the successful preparation and hosting of both the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. The events were supposedly going to strengthen national unity and project a positive image of Brazil’s organisational skills (Ministério do Esporte, 2011).

The version of Brazil proposed by the plan was not gender-neutral. Notably, the ‘unknown’ features referenced above are associated with ‘masculine’ traits, such as coldness, rationality, and adventurousness. These traits are supposedly better suited to a global market that over the last centuries has also been portrayed as ‘rational’ and ‘masculine’ (Elias & Beasley, 2009; see also Richardson & Wearing, 2014). Significantly, government officials understood political stability to be key for investors; the reduction in inequality meant the spread of consumption, and the economic achievements were the main

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69 An underexplored theme in the literature about media and nationalism has been the gender regimes promoted by particular national projects (Mihelj, 2011). In the Brazilian case, the symbolic construction of the role of women in the national community has been highly problematic. Although there has been progress in the representation of women in a less stereotypical fashion, there is still a strong tendency to portray them as highly sexualised, intellectually inferior and as an asset for tourism (for more on this topic, see Banet-Weiser, 1999; De Rosa, 2013; Matos, 2017; Moreno, 2013; Ossman, 2011).
parameter by which to measure the role that a nation should occupy in the world.

The promotional plan had two core –and inspirational– statements. The first was ‘we are going to show our conquests and celebrate our capacity’. This message was directed at national audiences. It encompassed Brazil’s political and economic achievements and relied again on ‘masculine’ features, such as ‘conquest’ and ‘capacity’. The second was ‘Brazil is ready to charm the world’. It was aimed at foreign audiences, mostly from the United States, China, Western Europe and neighbouring Latin American countries (Ministério do Esporte, 2011, p. 8). It projected a more ‘feminine’ Brazil, whose ‘charm’ made it a mere entertainer for potential visitors (based on Elias & Beasley, 2009; Richardson & Wearing, 2014). The word ‘ready’ also signalled a specific temporality and urgency to show Brazil’s achievements (for other cases of states employing inspirational and branded statements, see Moor, 2009).

State Sponsored Promotional Actions

The frame proposed was enacted through a series of promotional actions, which mostly relied on the media. Two notorious campaigns, aimed at people from the United States, Western Europe and South America were ‘Brazil is Calling you. Celebrate Life here’ and ‘The World Meets in Brazil’ (Niesing, 2013; Da Silva, Ziviani, & Madeira, 2014). The Brazilian Tourist Board, Embratur, developed both campaigns to attract more visitors. They were spread across different media platforms, including television, paid advertisements in newspapers and magazines, billboards, websites and YouTube videos (Niesing, 2013; Da Silva et al., 2014; Weska, 2011). ‘Brazil is Calling you. Celebrate Life Here’ was launched before the publication of the aforementioned promotional plan, during the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. ‘The World Meets in Brazil’ was introduced at the end of the Olympic Games in London in 2012 (“Brazil Sensational Experience has over 20,000 visitors from 102 countries,” 2010; Niesing, 2013).

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70 My translation. The original Portuguese reads “Vamos celebrar nossas conquistas e demonstrar nossas capacidades” and “O Brasil está pronto para encantar o mundo”.
The launch of both campaigns was marked by videos uploaded onto YouTube. It may be tempting to associate particular categories of actors with specific media. Some authors have related the state with an apparently dated mass media, in contrast to activists or alternative media collectives who supposedly rely on low cost and endless possibilities offered by digital media (Bennett, 2003; Dayan, 2013; Thompson, 2005). Such links are hard to prove. State agencies in Brazil have drawn heavily on digital platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and their own websites to disseminate content and engage more directly with potential tourists (Da Silva et al., 2014).

The videos that launched both campaigns illustrate the version of Brazil constructed by the authorities. The video of ‘Brazil is Calling you. Celebrate Life Here’ (Ministério do Turismo, 2010), opens with a board meeting of businessmen in New York. Suddenly, one of them starts hearing noises that come from Brazil: a man happily screaming while doing hang gliding, the sea, Brazil’s traditional music, people chanting in a football stadium. The footage then shows a collage of shots from cities, beaches, picturesque churches, and a series of mostly white individuals doing adventure sports, cycling, enjoying a stone massage and attending a dance performance. At the end of the video, a man on a cliff edge spreads out his arms and excitedly screams. Two businessmen in Paris hear the scream and smile. The last shot of the video is the silhouette of Rio de Janeiro’s statue of Christ the Redeemer at sunset, with a voiceover saying ‘Brazil is calling you. Celebrate life here’.

In the video of ‘The world meets in Brazil’ (Visit Brazil, 2012), tourists from Greece, Scotland, India, Asia, Africa, whose origins are made clear by clothes and ethnic features, are shown interacting with Brazilians while eating in restaurants, dancing capoeira or playing football. Towards the end of the video, Brazilians and foreigners gather at Copacabana beach in Rio de Janeiro, with a voiceover announcing: ‘The Brazilian way of life, a combination of diverse nature and extraordinarily rich culture, where people from different backgrounds live in harmony. You will be greeted by a modern, young, sensational country, from the second you arrive’ (Visit Brazil, 2012, emphasis added).
Images strongly associated with Brazil, particularly since the 1970s, such as dancing *mulatas* during the Rio Carnival or curvaceous women wearing tiny bikinis at the beach (De Rosa, 2013), are notably absent in both videos. Hence, the videos attempt to correct the ‘distorted’ visibility that fails to reflect the ‘new’, ‘unknown’ Brazil stated in the promotional plan discussed earlier. They mix tradition and modernity, hence engaging in the Janus-like face of nationhood described by Nairn (1997), in which ‘backward’ nations look for stability and comfort in their past, while at the same time embracing the benefits of modernity (García Canclini, 2001, has examined the tension between tradition and modernity in Latin America; see also Rocha, 2014).

The videos try to make visible a version of Brazil ‘coming out’ to the world: the sounds of Brazil are heard by businessmen in Paris and New York; Africans arrive at an airport; Asians travel in air balloons and Indians throw flowers to people on the street. While in the first video Brazilians are mostly absent, in the second they are there on the screen, happily welcoming but also serving foreigners. Significantly, as some authors have observed (Da Silva et al., 2014), foreign tourists are protagonists in both instances.

Whilst the videos are allegedly part of attempts to show a ‘new’ Brazil, they capitalise on the stereotype of Brazil as a land of entertainment, with beach parties and happy people. Racial differences among Brazilians are emphasised with the appearance of Brazilians of various ethnicities. However, these differences are sanitised, overlooking any social and economic inequalities.
The smiley Brazilians presented in ‘The World meets in Brazil’, happily welcome foreigners and other Brazilians on Copacabana beach. The images suggest a colour-blind, class-blind nation, which embodies what Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre calls ‘a racial democracy’. This is a supposed characteristic of Brazil according to which, as the narrator of the second video points out, people from different backgrounds all coexist peacefully and harmoniously, having the same social opportunities to fulfil their true potential (Freyre, 2003 [1933]).

In 2013 Brazil hosted the FIFA Confederations Cup, a two-week football tournament which was intended to be a dress rehearsal for some of the infrastructure and logistics ahead of the FIFA World Cup (Ocke, 2013). However, that tournament was disrupted by a series of unexpected events. Various protests against an increase in public transportation fares grew into the largest period of social unrest experienced by Brazil in two decades. The harmonious and peaceful coexistence shown by videos such as ‘The World Meets in Brazil’ was questioned by images of thousands of Brazilians protesting in the streets, demanding improvements to the healthcare and education systems, instead of spending on stadia for the upcoming FIFA World Cup and Olympics.

4.4 Protection of Social Order: Brazil’s Mainstream Media

Protection of Social Order was the frame produced by the Brazilian mainstream media, which acted as traditional storytellers of the nation. Classic studies in social movements have stressed how the mainstream media often seek to delegitimise demonstrations (e.g. Gitlin, 2003). This was true for the June

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71 The idea of Brazil as a ‘racial democracy’ has been criticised by authors in the last few decades, arguing that it is only a myth devised to conceal racism, discourage support for anti-racist actions and prevent a positive identification among sectors of the population with a black identity. In fact, evidence suggests that racism plays a pivotal role in the politics of Brazilian society (Bailey, 2004; Racusen, 2004; Wood, 2014).

72 Brazilian newspapers such as Folha, O Estado de Sao Paulo, and television networks like Globo TV, through its telenovelas and television newscast Jornal Nacional, have played a key role in the construction and reinforcement of the idea of Brazil as a single nation (Coutinho & Musse, 2010; Rego, 2014). Audiences do not however automatically embrace their proposed version of Brazil. Some studies of the reception of telenovelas show that people who live outside the big urban centres of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro do not necessarily identify themselves with the nation shown on screen (La Pastina, Straubhaar, & Sifuentes, 2014).
Journeys, with the most important newspapers and television newscasts portraying protesters as ‘thugs’ or ‘vandals’ disturbing the social order. However, media agendas can be subject to change (Cottle, 2008). As the discussion below shows, in mid-June, the national media adopted a more sympathetic view towards the demonstrations, albeit portraying themselves as ‘objective’ witnesses of the June Journeys.

‘Vandals’ and ‘Thugs’ Disrupting the Social Order

Brazil’s national media began covering the June Journeys on 6th June, after the first protest organised by Movimento Passe Livre (MPL) attracted around 2,000 people in downtown Sao Paulo (Gohn, 2014b). Some of the most widely-read newspapers and most-watched television newscasts in Brazil, such as Folha, O Estado de Sao Paulo, and particularly Globo TV’s Jornal Nacional, framed the demonstrations as violent, criminal acts that disrupted law and order, and in particular the lives of peaceful, hard-working ‘ordinary’ Brazilians.

The dominant frame presented by both newspapers and this television newscast highlighted the disturbances caused by the demonstrations, using words such as ‘chaos’, ‘confusion’, ‘destruction’ and ‘vandalism’. The front page headline of newspaper Folha for 7th June, read ‘Demonstration for cheaper transport in Sao Paulo is marked by vandalism’ (“Vandalismo marca ato por transporte mais barato em SP,” 2013, italics mine). O Estado de Sao Paulo headlined one of its stories as ‘Protest against fares increase ends in chaos, fire and destruction downtown’ (“Protesto contra tarifa acaba em caos, fogo e depredação no centro,” 2013, italics mine). A report by Jornal Nacional was entitled ‘Protest against transport fares price rise causes new confusion in Sao Paulo’ (Jornal Nacional, 2013d, italics mine).

Whilst most of Brazil’s mainstream media criticised the first demonstration, Jornal Nacional’s report adopted a harsher tone. It only briefly mentioned the reasons behind the protest. It emphasised instead the clashes with police, framing the protesters as responsible for the violence. The destruction was monetized, with numbers claiming how much it was going to cost to repair the
damage done to public infrastructure. This report introduced a waiter and a newsstand worker as representatives of 'common' Brazilians (based on Thumim, 2012). They were shown as ordinary people who were victims of fear, confusion and destruction caused by the demonstrations. At the end of the report, images of workers cleaning up the mess the following day were described as a 'return to normality' (Jornal Nacional, 2013d).

According to this and similar reports, the main problem consisted of a group of protestors, whose actions disturbed the normalcy of Sao Paulo and affected the lives of common, hard-working people. The causal interpretation dismissed the reasons behind the protests, because, as stated by journalists, demonstrators barely used public transportation. As mentioned earlier, this interpretation echoes previous studies, which show that diminishing the legitimacy of demonstrations is a common trait of protest coverage among the mainstream media (e.g. Gitlin, 2003).

The national media claimed to speak on behalf of the national community, complaining about the wrongdoings of those who were upsetting ‘our’ order and negatively affecting the lives of ‘our’ fellow nationals. It is a frame of war, between ‘us’ and ‘those’ within the community who are disturbing the status quo. In other words, the national media were not only flagging the nation (Billig, 1995), but also constructing themselves as legitimate visibilisers of the nation. They were reinforcing what has been called the myth of the mediated centre, that is to say, ‘the myth that the media “speak for us”’ (Couldry, 2003, p. 8).

During the days that followed, the protests increased in size as well as in violence with more clashes with the police. This was accompanied by a surge in media coverage, gradually dominating television news as well as newspaper front pages (Becker & Machado, 2014; Cammaerts & Jiménez-Martínez, 2014; Intervozes, 2014; Telles, 2013). The intensification of size, violence and media coverage led some media commentators to propose a harsher police

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Arguably, the peaks of Brazil’s mainstream media attention toward the June Journeys occurred on 20th June 2013. On that day, Globo TV schedules were interrupted at 17.50, with a special edition of Jornal Nacional that broadcast live demonstrations all over Brazil (Becker & Machado, 2014; Memoria Globo, 2013).
response, in order to restore social order. An editorial in *Folha* of 13\textsuperscript{th} June qualified the demonstrators as ‘young people predisposed to violence by a pseudo-revolutionary ideology’ ("Retomar a Paulista," 2013). An op-ed piece in *O Estado de Sao Paulo* called for a harsher response from the state governor to restore order to the city ("Chegou a hora do basta," 2013). Similarly, on the midnight newscast of Globo TV, journalist Arnaldo Jabor dismissed the demonstrations, stating that the protesters were politically ignorant and merely ‘the violent caricature of a 1950s socialism’ (*Jornal da Globo*, 2013).

Over time, various authors have criticised Brazil’s national media coverage of the protests (Ávila, 2013; Becker & Machado, 2014; Cammaerts & Jiménez-Martínez, 2014; Fraga, 2013; Gohn, 2014a; Guimarães & Soares, 2013; Intervozes, 2014; de Jesus, 2014; de Lima, 2013; Telles, 2013). The criticisms have been underpinned by the observation that, as stated in Chapter 1, despite increasing diversity in Brazil’s national media (Matos, 2008; Rosas-Moreno & Straubhaar, 2015), the latter are controlled by a handful of conglomerates supporting the interests of the upper classes, the economic elites and the Brazilian right-wing (de Albuquerque, 2016; Fonsêca, 2013; Goldstein, 2014; de Lima, 2013; Matos, 2014; Montero, 2014).

Significantly, media frames about protests are not fixed and can be subject to change (Cammaerts, 2011; Cottle, 2008). As mentioned in Chapter 1, the demonstration staged on the evening of 13\textsuperscript{th} June became notorious for the violence used by the military police against protesters, journalists and passers-by, which resulted in 192 arrests and dozens injured (Gohn, 2014b). The front pages of *Folha de Sao Paulo* on 13\textsuperscript{th} and 14\textsuperscript{th} June are a notable example (Figure 8). While the main headline of 13\textsuperscript{th} June read ‘Government of Sao Paulo says it will take a harsher stance against vandalism’ ("Governo de SP diz que será mais duro contra vandalismo," 2013), the one of 14\textsuperscript{th} June said ‘Police react with violence and Sao Paulo experiences a night of chaos’ ("Polícia reage com violência a protesto e SP vive a noite de caos," 2013).
The respective cover photos and accompanying texts are also revealing (Figure 11). The image on the edition of 13th June showed an injured policeman pointing his weapon at off-camera protesters in order to avoid being lynched by them. The following day, the main photo depicted a couple in a bar attacked by military police. A second image showed Folha journalist Giuliana Vallone with one of her eyes bleeding, after being shot by the military police with a rubber bullet. This time, ‘ordinary’ Brazilians were shown as victims of the police, rather than of protesters’ violence.

**The National Media as 'Neutral' Observers of the June Journeys**

In the second stage of the frame, the national media argued that the problem consisted of the spread of protests throughout Brazil, made more complex by the apparent lack of leaders amongst the protesters and their extremely diverse goals. The national media did not condemn the protests. They constructed themselves as mere observers that ‘objectively’ showed what had happened on the streets (Intervozes, 2014; de Lima, 2013). The Folha Ombudsman admitted on 16th June that newspapers Folha, O Estado de Sao Paulo and newscast
*Jornal Nacional* had overemphasised the violence and destruction. Significantly, she claimed that the main mistake of mainstream news organisations was stating that *all* demonstrators were violent, rather than specifying that only *some* of them were actually involved in vandalism. Furthermore, she held that *Folha* had provided balanced coverage of the demonstrations on 14th June (Singer, 2013).

Similarly, the *Jornal Nacional* edition of 17th June, had one of the anchors advising that the newscast had always covered the protests in a balanced manner, showing both the aims of the protesters and the violence of military police, while also stating that citizens had the right to protest ‘peacefully’ (*Jornal Nacional*, 2013f). Hence, national media organisations continued to position themselves as the legitimate *visibilisers* of the nation, able to discern the rightfulness of unrest, as well as emphasising their centrality as the facilitators of mediated visibility (Becker & Machado, 2014; de Lima, 2013).

Despite the statements mentioned above, the national media were subject to growing criticism. Protestors carried banners critical of journalists and media organisations, and some of them even physically attacked journalists and their equipment (Becker & Machado, 2014; Gohn, 2014a; de Jesus, 2014). Members of the MPL were however emphatic that they did not support violence against journalists (*Jornal Nacional*, 2013e).

The start of the FIFA Confederations Cup in Brasilia on 15th June facilitated the display of a wider array of concerns in the national media. In that city, around 500 demonstrators belonging to the local *Comitê Popular da Copa* (Popular Committee of the World Cup) gathered outside the Mané Garrincha stadium at the same time as the inaugural match was played. They protested against the government’s decision to spend on sports events rather than on social care. That evening, *Jornal Nacional* emphasised that only a few people took part in the demonstration and the game’s spectators were barely disturbed (*Jornal Nacional*, 2013c). Likewise, reports published on the following day by *Folha* and *O Estado de Sao Paulo* did not link this protest directly to the previous ones in Sao Paulo. The main headlines focussed on the jeering of Dilma
Rousseff during the inaugural match. Other reports centred on the spread of demonstrations to the cities where the Confederations Cup matches were due to be played, as well as expressing concerns regarding the potential impact of the protests on the World Cup (Falcão, Leitão, & Mello, 2013; Greco, 2013; “Paz, só em campo,” 2013).

However, both newspapers highlighted on their front pages the friction between the apparent unifying victory of the Brazilian national football team in Brasilia and the violence on the streets of Sao Paulo. They juxtaposed a photo of a football player celebrating with images of the protests (Figure 12). From then on, the protests in Sao Paulo, Brasilia and other cities started to be described as part of a whole movement. Furthermore, the protests stopped being the exclusive concern of Brazil’s national media. Another category of actors directed their gaze towards them: the agents of new visibility.

Figure 12 – The front pages of Folha and O Estado de Sao Paulo on 16th June 2013, the day after the start of the Confederations Cup.
4.5 The People versus Their Rulers: Foreign Media

I have called the frame constructed by the foreign media *The People versus their Rulers*. The frame stressed the connection between the protests and the hosting of both the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games. As the discussion below shows, it portrayed the June Journeys as a revolt by the ‘Brazilian people’ against their national elites. Significantly, the frame also emphasised the supposed transnational character of the June Journeys, depicting them as part of a global movement of middle class social unrest.

*The June Journeys become Foreign News*

It was only after the violent protest of 13th June 2013 that the foreign media paid attention to the June Journeys. Initial reports emphasised chaos and destruction. They highlighted how people took to the streets due to an increase in transportation fares and that local elites labelled protesters as vandals or thugs (e.g. “Brazil: Sao Paulo transport fare protest turns violent,” 2013, “Riots over fare rises,” 2013; Romero, 2013b). The foreign media consistently produced articles and reports of the June Journeys after 15th June, when the FIFA Confederations Cup kicked off in Brasilia. Whilst the protests in Brasilia were originally unrelated to those in Sao Paulo, the foreign media portrayed them as part of the same social movement and largely framed them as being against the organisation of the 2014 FIFA World Cup.

To put it crudely, the *problem* revealed by the June Journeys according to these reports, was the high costs involved in hosting sports events in a highly unequal society. The friction between images of people demonstrating outside stadiums at the same time as football matches were being played exposed a ‘gap’ between the happy, harmonious, peaceful and idyllic version of Brazil shown by the authorities, and the chaos, confusion, destruction and division that was ‘really’ visible on the streets.

The foreign media highlighted their apparent surprise at seeing Brazilians, known for their love of football, protesting against a football tournament. *The Sunday Times* held that ‘the nation that sometimes tops global polls as the
most optimistic in the world can no longer be viewed as a sunny paradise with football stars and beach balls’ (Phillips, 2013, italics mine). The New York Times claimed similarly that ‘the soccer-mad country, it turns out, has a lot more to be mad about than its favourite sport’ (Zinser, 2013, italics mine). A BBC News report about protests in Rio de Janeiro opened with the sentence ‘in a city more famous for its carnival, a different rhythm rules the street’ (Mirchandani, 2013, emphasis added).

Most articles and reports highlighted the destruction and violence, with images of foreign correspondents reporting in the midst of clashes between demonstrators and the police (for examples of the coverage of violence and demonstrations in other locations, see Cottle, 2006, 2012; Gitlin, 2003; Orgad, 2012). BBC News sent more reporters to cover the protests, joining the correspondents already based in Brazil to increase its coverage. In these reports journalists were always wearing helmets or gas masks, and they sometimes had to protect themselves from the gas or rubber bullets shot by the military police (Leithead, 2013; Rainsford, 2013). The violence and continuous clashes between protesters and the police resembled war (Figure 13).

Furthermore, the differences between authorities and ‘the people’ stressed national division.

![Figure 13 – Journalists recorded dispatches in the midst of the clashes between demonstrators and the police, wearing gas masks and helmets (Leithead, 2013; Rainsford, 2013).](image)

Some academics argued that the June Journeys both expressed and constituted, even if only temporarily, ‘common’ Brazilians as one people (Guedes, 2014). Following this line of thinking, the causal interpretation in this frame portrayed the protests as a product of Brazilians being fed up with
decades of abuse and sub-standard living conditions. Newly-built football stadia became embodiments of corruption as well as of a disconnected ruling class, sometimes described as ‘mandarins’, who were more concerned with impressing the world than tackling inequality (e.g. Cohen, 2013; Romero, 2013b).

The moral evaluation celebrated the protests as a democratic exercise. The demonstrations allegedly brought to the fore the daily struggles of Brazilians, which had been buried under years of apparent economic success. An editorial in *The New York Times* described the June Journeys as a ‘social awakening’ for Brazilians, who were finally expressing their discontent (“Social awakening in Brazil,” 2013). The protests, then, were constructed as the recommended treatment for exposing structural social inequalities and corruption.

In most articles and reports, foreign correspondents interviewed ‘common’ Brazilians (e.g. Watts, 2013c). Unlike Brazil’s national media, in which ‘common’ Brazilians were shown to be the main victims of the disruption caused by the demonstrations, here they were the heroes taking to the streets, representing the hopes, aspirations and frustrations of the Brazilian nation. This focus on interviewing ‘ordinary’ Brazilians rather than activists or representatives of the groups calling for the protests, arguably emphasised the idea that the June Journeys were leaderless and spontaneous. According to the accounts shown by foreign media, the ‘real’ Brazil had finally become visible during the June Journeys, after years of being hidden under official propaganda.

*Brazil as a Token of Global Discontent*

The coverage was not limited to showing domestic disputes. The foreign media depicted the world as a place of shared risk, inequality, but also hope and solidarity, with ‘ordinary’ citizens fighting to improve their living conditions. Articles in *The New York Times, The Economist, The Guardian, The Observer* and *The Times* related the protests in Brazil to social unrest occurring in other nations, such as the ones taking place in Turkey at the same time, the

Two articles are illustrative. On 23rd June, The Observer focussed on the urban character of the demonstrations, highlighting the squares that were allegedly the epicentres of unrest in Cairo, Madrid, Istanbul, New York, London, Tel Aviv and Sao Paulo. According to this article, the protests were part of a ‘global phenomenon’ of citizens losing ‘faith in politics and the state’ (Beaumont, 2013). Similarly, on 29th June The Economist highlighted the supposed ‘global’ character of the demonstrations, paying attention to the technological devices used by activists: ‘V’s face [the mask of the character V for Vendetta] turns up in both Sao Paulo and Istanbul because protest is organised through social networks, which spread information, encourage imitation and make causes fashionable’ (“The march of protest,” 2013).

In the articles above, economic, political and cultural differences were flattened. Brazil became a token of global, middle class discontent. Foreign journalists described those taking part in the June Journeys as part of a global generation of young, technologically savvy individuals, ready to take to the streets to demonstrate against the unfulfilled promises of their rulers, and whose actions could easily be imitated by people across the world. This account was not exclusive to the foreign media. Several academics, who may also play a role as agents of the new visibility, also framed the June Journeys as another example of supposed global discontent with capitalism (e.g. Becker & Machado, 2014; Castells, 2013; Gohn, 2014a; Tognozzi, 2014).

The different accounts and images did not go unnoticed by the national media. For the national media, foreign media coverage was newsworthy, displaying the relevance of metacoverage or self-referentiality during the June Journeys (Colapietro, 2007; Esser, 2009; Nöth, 2007). The Brazilian media highlighted

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74 Brazilian and some foreign interviewees partially disputed this view. According to them, along with squares such as Largo de Batata in Sao Paulo, streets such as Avenida Paulista or Rua da Consolação (also in Sao Paulo) were significant locations for the development of the protests (see also Gohn, 2014b).
the coverage and interpretations that the foreign media ascribed to the protests, particularly in relation to Brazil’s perception abroad. In fact, Brazilian journalists stressed that the demonstrations made the main headlines of *The New York Times* twice (e.g. *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 16th June 2013; *Folha* online, 18th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd June 2013; *Jornal Nacional*, 18th, 19th, 21st June 2013).

For example, on 19th June, the New York correspondent of *Jornal Nacional* advised that the foreign media viewed the protests ‘with surprise and even satisfaction, due to the participation of Brazilians after so long without demonstrations’, and stressed that the protests were one of the main stories on the *BBC* and *The New York Times* (*Jornal Nacional*, 2013a). Two days later, the same correspondent reported that the front page of *The New York Times* included a story about the June Journeys, observing that Brazil had been ‘seen as an example in economic and democratic terms, [but now] was struck by a leaderless, sometimes violent, unrest’. At the end of that report, one of the anchors of *Jornal Nacional* added that the Brazilian Presidency ‘did not comment on the opinion expressed by The New York Times’ (*Jornal Nacional*, 2013).

The remark by the anchor of *Jornal Nacional* illustrates the perceived relevance that state members and the national media give to the visibility of Brazil abroad. Foreign news coverage about ‘us’ is not only newsworthy, but also merits a response from ‘our’ authorities in order to keep control of ‘our’ image. Significantly, the Brazilian media focussed only on reports emanating from specific media organisations from the United States and Western Europe, such as *BBC*, *CNN*, *The New York Times*, *The Economist* and *The Guardian*. A hierarchy of foreign media organisations was at play, which echoes the perspective of core and peripheral nations (Wallerstein, 2004). Indeed, foreign correspondents very rarely covered accounts by the Brazilian media, and at most they referenced them as sources or criticised their reporting of the protests (e.g. Romero, 2013a).
4.6 Unmasking Brazil: Activists and Alternative Media Collectives

_Unmasking Brazil_ was the fourth and final frame from the analysis of the coverage of the June Journeys. This frame sought to reveal what was allegedly _really_ happening on the streets, exposing how both the national media and authorities were trying to discredit the demonstrations. Activists and alternative media collectives were behind this frame, promising to show the _real_ Brazil, uncut and without agendas. They operated outside mainstream media and employed digital media to counteract and even correct the ‘distorted’ accounts shown by the Brazilian or the foreign media. They were what Dayan calls _visibility entrepreneurs_, emulating ‘what they [the visibility entrepreneurs] perceive as the crucial power of journalists: the divine power of “conferring visibility”’ (2013, p. 143).

The literature on media and social movements often celebrates the visibility entrepreneurs. Activists and alternative media collectives supposedly show images and accounts that challenge authority and the powers that be (Bennett, 2003; Castells, 2009, 2013; Dayan, 2013). Similar claims were made in relation to the June Journeys, with scholars arguing that alternative media collectives were ‘far richer in information and lighter on sensationalism than the printed newspaper and static TV coverage’ (Conde & Jazeel, 2013, p. 445).

*Alternative Media during the June Journeys*

Various authors portrayed the visibility entrepreneurs as key actors behind the apparent spontaneity and horizontality of the protests. Reports in the Brazilian media held that Jimmy Lima, a 17-year-old student who created a Facebook event calling for a demonstration in Brasilia, was the main person responsible for ‘shaking’ the Brazilian capital, gathering in mid-June 15,000 people in front of the National Congress, in what was called the ‘Vinegar March’ (Lazzeri, 2013).

Similarly, 23-year-old filmmaker Carla Dauden achieved notoriety after she uploaded to her YouTube account a video called ‘No, I’m not going to the World Cup’ (Dauden, 2013a). In just over six minutes and in English, she
criticised Brazil for hosting the 2014 World Cup, highlighting issues such as public money being spent on the tournament rather than on healthcare or education. At the beginning of the video, Carla Dauden explicitly questioned the image of Brazil abroad, asking half a dozen Americans what comes to mind when they think about Brazil. Some of the replies were ‘women’, ‘football’, ‘big butts’, ‘beaches’ and ‘lots of parties, lots of dancing’ (Figure 14). Later in the video, she remarked that ‘we do not need Brazil to look better for the world, we need our people to have food and health’. Within a couple of hours, ‘No, I’m not going to the World Cup’ received more than 500,000 visits and in less than a week had 2.5 million visitors (Phillips, 2013; Tognozzi, 2014).

The most significant example of these visibility entrepreneurs was *Midia NINJA*, which was born in 2011 as part of the network of cultural circuits *Fora de Eixo* (Out of the Axis). With the help of journalists who had previously worked for mainstream media organisations, *Midia NINJA* started by streaming concerts organised by *Fora de Eixo*. Some of the first events that they covered were local elections, and specific demonstrations, such as a march organised in support of the legalisation of cannabis (Bittencourt, 2014; Braighi, 2015; Brasil & Frazão, 2013; Glickhouse, 2013). Members of *Midia NINJA* covered the June Journeys using smartphones or shopping trolleys carrying a computer, microphones and cameras. They relied mostly on visual images, rather than on written accounts. They live streamed the protests on Twitcasting and posted photos on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Flickr (Brasil & Frazão, 2013; d’Andrea & Ziller, 2015; de Jesus, 2014; Glickhouse, 2013; Gohn, 2014b; Mazotte, 2013; Peruzzo, 2013; Watts, 2013d).
Brazilian journalists followed the protests in helicopters or from afar, especially after some of them had been physically attacked. Conversely, members of NINJA were usually amidst the demonstrations (Figure 15), showing the protests live and uncut, placing themselves at ‘eye level’ with their audiences, claiming that ‘anybody can be a NINJA’ (Becker & Machado, 2014; Brasil & Frazão, 2013; d’Andrea & Ziller, 2015; de Jesus, 2014; Soares, 2013; Telles, 2013). Hence, members of Mídia NINJA portrayed themselves as the legitimate visibilisers of the nation, particularly in contrast to the Brazilian media. Their statement that ‘anybody can be a NINJA’, implied an aspiration to be a representative mediated manifestation of the collective Brazil. The supposed spontaneity and representativeness of Mídia NINJA, which allegedly showed the views of ‘ordinary people’ (d’Andrea & Ziller, 2015), exemplifies what Couldry calls ‘the myth of us’. Couldry argues that this myth is based on the belief that gatherings in social media are ‘a natural form of expressive collectivity’ (2015b, p. 608, italics mine).

Figure 15 – On the left, helicopter shot of a protest shown by Jornal Nacional. On the right, a screenshot of one of the videos recorded by Mídia NINJA (Source: Jornal Nacional archive and Mídia NINJA).⁷⁵

Academics and journalists described Mídia NINJA as one of the constituent features of the June Journeys, given that they supposedly challenged and undermined the credibility of the mainstream media, particularly Globo TV (Becker & Machado, 2014; d’Andrea & Ziller, 2015; Gohn, 2014a; de Jesus, 2014; Mazotte, 2013; Peruzzo, 2013; Soares, 2013; Spuldar, 2013; Viera, 2013). Mídia NINJA increased its number of followers on Facebook during the June Journeys from 2,000 to 160,000 (Becker & Machado, 2014; Spuldar, 2013).

⁷⁵ These videos do not show the same protest. They illustrate the different approaches taken by the actors when covering the June Journeys.
2013). Its profile was raised within Brazil when its own footage was shown by newscast *Jornal Nacional* as evidence of a demonstrator being unlawfully arrested (Spuldar, 2013; Viera, 2013; Watts, 2013d).

*Mídia NINJA* against Brazil’s Representational Crisis

*Mídia NINJA’s* members held that their images revealed what was being concealed by the mainstream Brazilian media (Glickhouse, 2013; Watts, 2013d). Thus, the main *problem* highlighted by them and other visibility entrepreneurs was a ‘representational crisis’. That is, the apparent ‘gap’ between the accounts shown by both the state and the national media, and what was ‘actually’ happening on the streets (de Jesus, 2014). According to the *moral evaluation* of members of *Mídia NINJA*, this ‘gap’ represented a threat to democracy in Brazil (Mazotte, 2013). As such, their preferred *treatment recommendation* was to use digital media as a corrector to show the ‘real’ Brazil, uncut and without hidden agendas.

Academics and journalists have emphasised the role of digital media in explaining the relevance gained by these visibility entrepreneurs during the June Journeys (Becker & Machado, 2014; de Jesus, 2014; Peruzzo, 2013; Soares, 2013; Viera, 2013). However, the role of digital media should not be overestimated. Part of their impact and popularity was also due to the *metacoverage* or *self-reference*. Whilst thousands did see the images produced by Carla Dauden and *Mídia NINJA*, such numbers did not come close to the almost five million spectators who followed the June Journeys on *Jornal Nacional* every day (Becker & Alves, 2015).

Significantly, the mainstream media helped to make *Mídia NINJA* known to a wider public. Some of the *Mídia NINJA* members participated in *Roda Viva*, a popular television talk show (Bittencourt, 2014; Gohn, 2014b). In addition, the collective was the focus of sympathetic reports published by the foreign media,

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76 At the peak of the June Journeys, NINJA had an average of 150,000 daily viewers (Cardoso et al., 2016). In June 2013, Carla Dauden’s video ‘No, I’m not going to the World Cup’ had been viewed by around 2.5 million people. In both cases, the viewer numbers are less than the daily audience of Globo TV’s newscast *Jornal Nacional*. 


which showed it to be an alternative to the oligopolies that have run the Brazilian media for decades (e.g. Watts, 2013d). The video ‘I’m not going to the World Cup’, was also mentioned by some of Brazil’s main national newspapers the day after it was uploaded (e.g. Salles, 2013; “Vídeos de protesto são divulgados em inglês,” 2013), and by United Kingdom and American media organisations (e.g. Phillips, 2013; Watts, 2013d). Furthermore, in September 2013, Carla Dauden took part in a live discussion on Britain’s Channel 4 News with the Head of Communications for the 2014 World Cup, as a representative of those critical of the hosting of the football tournament in Brazil (Channel 4 News, 2013).

The porous media environment heightened the profile of Mídia NINJA and other visibility entrepreneurs during the June Journeys. However, the fragility of mediated images not only affected those in power, but also those trying to disrupt them. Mídia NINJA was severely criticised by the Brazilian media and other bloggers after a live streamed interview with the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, in which they were supposedly too sympathetic toward the politician (Brasil & Frazão, 2013; Mazotte, 2013; Soares, 2013). In addition, the national media tried to reinforce their place as ‘the mediated centre’ of Brazil, by publishing reports and articles that undermined the apparent independence and political impartiality of Mídia NINJA, questioning the funding received through Fora de Eixo (Soares, 2013). Likewise, some bloggers accused ‘No, I’m not going to the World Cup’ of being fraudulent, due to its alleged inaccuracies regarding the preparations for the 2014 World Cup (e.g. “No, I’m not going to the world cup’ – A desconstrução de uma fraude,” 2013). In an interview given to Época Magazine around that time, Carla Dauden admitted to feeling ‘a mixture of surprise and fear because of what has been happening due to the video I posted on YouTube’ (De Aquino, 2013).

4.7 Conclusion

The discussion of the frames of the June Journeys shows that the nation remains a relevant framework employed by people and organisations to understand themselves, and situate themselves –and others– in the world.
Activists, alternative media collectives and, significantly, the international media produced their own version of what Brazil is or what Brazil should be (see also de Sousa, 2017; Kühn, 2014). The four examined frames also demonstrate that protests are sites of contestation. Not only diverse and sometimes contradictory agendas drove people on to the streets, but the demonstrations were understood differently by each group of actors. The June Journeys represented for authorities and particularly the national media an episode of national disturbance. The foreign media and activists, in contrast, saw the protests as an opportunity to reveal what was really happening in Brazil.

The discussion also highlights how satellite and digital media have challenged the relative monopoly held by the state and the national media over the image of the nation. Indeed, the national media can no longer be portrayed as the legitimate representatives of the nation. Other actors, on a sub-national and transnational level—for example, *Midia NINJA*, filmmaker Carla Dauden or *BBC News*—also take part in the construction and projection of the nation (Latham, 2009; Orgad, 2008, 2012; see also Dayan, 2013; Thompson, 2005). Hence, the image of the nation is not only constructed and projected by and for nationals, but also by and for foreigners.

However, the state and the national media are still prevalent actors (Cammaerts & Jiménez-Martínez, 2014; Coutinho & Musse, 2010; Frosh & Wolfsfeld, 2007; Madianou, 2005; McCurdy, 2013; Rego, 2014; Rucht, 2013). Indeed, during the June Journeys, the Brazilian media changed their frame to maintain their role as the ‘mediated centre’. They curated articles and reports of the foreign media and alternative media collectives considered newsworthy and facilitated the visibility of alternative media collectives (de Lima, 2013; see also Mihelj, 2007).

The greater number of actors behind the various frames show that the nation has the potential of becoming both more troubling and richer in the media environment (Orgad, 2012). However, such richness appears to limited, given that there were still topics around which most actors gathered at specific times (see also Couldry, 2010). During the June Journeys there were several
mediated discussions about the ‘image’ of Brazil. Whilst some Brazilian newspapers expressed concern that the demonstrations ‘ruined’ the image of Brazil (Chade, 2013), authorities hoped that ‘the real image [of Brazil] would remain the image of a democratic country, in which demonstrations can be organised and where order is guaranteed and secured’ (Chade & Maia, 2013 italics mine).

Conversely, the agents of the new visibility held that the protests were ‘not the image that Brazil wanted to present to the world’ (Rainsford, 2013, emphasis added). Furthermore, they stated that one of the reasons driving Brazilians on to the streets was their wish to denounce ‘their leaders for dedicating so many resources to cultivating Brazil’s global image’ (Romero, 2013a, italics mine). Some protesters made explicit their desire to contest what was, in their view, an inaccurate image of Brazil. In an interview with BBC News, they held that ‘the world sees us as a happy country, of carnival and all this common sense known [sic] […] but we are not happy’ (“Brazil protests: Student voices,” 2013, emphasis added).

The various frames, and their changes, show that the visible nation is an open-ended project. At most, actors can aspire to show a ‘phantom’ nation, an unattainable idealised community that only in theory –or at most, for only a brief period of time– can encompass both unity and difference (based on Robbins, 1993). Hence, as stated in Chapter 2, rather than examining how ‘well’ or ‘poorly’ a nation has been represented, attention should be paid to what the nation is used for. Significantly, the struggling frames discussed in this chapter did not spontaneously emerge. They were underpinned by particular strategies. These strategies are the subject of the next chapter.
5. Strategies of Mediated Visibility: Replacement, Adjustment and Re-appropriation

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the strategies of mediated visibility, the second dimension of the analytical model. As stated in Chapter 1, previous analyses have stressed the differences between mainstream and alternative media during the June Journeys. These analyses contend that accounts produced by the state and Brazil’s mainstream media tried to delegitimise or downplay the protests, whilst those of alternative media collectives, and occasionally the foreign media, exposed alternative, and allegedly more truthful, perspectives (e.g. Ávila, 2013; Becker & Machado, 2014; Conde & Jazeel, 2013; d’Andrea & Ziller, 2015; Fonsêca, 2013; de Lima, 2013; Soares, 2013).

Whilst these studies have contributed important empirical observations to the study of the June Journeys, they often have a simplistic perspective. Some of the works referenced above have portrayed mainstream and alternative media as two parallel and isolated camps. Furthermore, members of alternative media collectives, such as Mídia NINJA, have been depicted as responsible for devising a new kind of journalism, very different from mainstream news media practices (de Jesus, 2014).

This chapter argues conversely that authorities, activists and journalists employed strikingly similar strategies to make their competing frames visible. This significant observation challenges previous assumptions that authorities and mainstream media necessarily protect the status quo, while alternative media collectives –and sometimes the foreign media– necessarily challenge power relations. Actors at different times either protected or challenged the status quo, depending on what they perceived to be more beneficial to their agendas. Hence, the evidence gives a more nuanced account of how different individuals and organisations take part in struggles for visibility in the current media environment.
The chapter opens with an overview of three strategies of mediated visibility, which were outlined from the analysis of the interviews conducted for this study: replacement, adjustment and re-appropriation. Each strategy is then examined, drawing on the accounts of those producing the frames discussed in the previous chapter. Some of the limitations and challenges posed by the strategies are explored in the conclusion.

5.2 Strategies of Visibility during The June Journeys

In response to the difficult to control nature of the media environment, actors manage visibility to correct, respond, underplay, or hide symbolic content, as well as to establish boundaries around what is possible and proper to see. Such management is put into practice through strategies of mediated visibility.

In Chapter 2 I proposed a working definition of such strategies as ‘the employment of different tactics to conceal, make visible or provide hyper-visibility for individuals, events or narratives, in order to achieve specific goals’ (page 73). Tactics are the actions taken to conceal, make visible or provide hyper-visibility to specific mediated content. Whilst actions constituting tactics can be seen, strategies remain invisible (Heller, 1996).

Three strategies of mediated visibility were devised using the analysis of the interviews: replacement, adjustment and re-appropriation. Each strategy is underpinned by a different diagnosis of previous images or accounts. The strategies also correspond to the different approaches taken by actors toward power relations, namely contestation, negotiation and reinforcement (Figure 16). At a specific moment a particular group of actors may challenge power relations while at another time they may reinforce the same status quo that they had claimed to contest earlier.

The strategies echo Stuart Hall’s classic argument (1993b) about how audiences decode television messages. According to him, people take up three positions. The first one is dominant/hegemonic, when viewers decode the message as intended by the producer. The second one is negotiated, when
audiences adopt a mixture of adoption or rejection of the message. The final one is oppositional, when the viewer decodes the message in the contrary way to how the producer originally intended.\textsuperscript{77} Whilst this model has partially inspired the discussion here, the focus of this study remains on those producing the images of Brazil, even though, as stated in Chapter 1, the producer and audience categories have become increasingly elastic. Furthermore, as stated in the methodological chapter, this thesis does not seek to impose pre-existing models on the data, but rather engage in theoretical discussions using the data as the starting point.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{strategyDiagram.png}
\caption{Illustration of strategies of visibility and power relations.}
\end{figure}

Three caveats are relevant. Firstly, the strategies are not exhaustive. Some suggest that private companies engage in strategies of anticipation, indulgence and silence to deal with criticism in the media (Uldam, 2016). Others argue that journalists employ strategies of sustained visibility, delayed visibility and cyclical visibility to retain audience interest in a particular story (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2013). Secondly, the strategies are not mutually exclusive. They may overlap and be simultaneously implemented. Actors indeed can change strategy whenever (see, for instance, the case of the Zapatistas in Hanson, 2008). Thirdly, although some actors may employ one strategy more regularly

\textsuperscript{77} Whilst they do not draw on Hall’s work, scholars writing about social movements and the media have put forward similar arguments about the media practices of activists. Some authors have observed that people may reject, appropriate or adapt the mediated contents and technologies, in order to advance material and symbolic goals (e.g. Cammaerts et al., 2013).
than any other, each strategy cannot easily be mapped into a specific group of individuals or organisations.

5.3 Replacement: Confrontation and Rectification

The first strategy is replacement. It consists of the actors’ efforts to construct and project new images that contest, erase, invalidate or substitute ‘fake’ or ‘wrong’ images. Replacement is underpinned by the diagnosis that previous images are ‘false’ or ‘distorted’. As art critic Boris Groys argues, ‘[t]he desire to get rid of any image can be realized only through a new image – the image of a critique of the image’ (Groys, 2008, p. 9; see also Brighenti, 2010a; Cammaerts, 2007; Cammaerts et al., 2013; Khatib, 2013; McCurdy, 2012).

This section begins with an examination of two tactics employed by actors using the replacement strategy: confrontation and rectification. I then discuss how the desire to reconfigure power relations lies at the core of this strategy.

Contesting Previous Images through Confrontation and Rectification

Actors employed two tactics when adopting the replacement strategy: confrontation and rectification. The first consists of the actors’ efforts to show ‘new’ images or accounts supposedly ‘hidden’ by other actors. The second focusses on ‘setting straight’ matters that have already been shown by other actors. Activists and media collectives used both tactics when trying to contest and replace what Brazil’s news media or authorities had shown about the June Journeys. For instance, at the beginning of the protests, Mídia NINJA used confrontation tactics to contest and replace the frame constructed by Brazil’s mainstream media. They opposed what they called a ‘criminalisation’ of the protests in the national media, particularly in Globo TV’s newscast Jornal Nacional (Rafael Vilela, Mídia NINJA).

Members of NINJA and other alternative media collectives sought to reveal what other actors, particularly the national media, were not showing about the demonstrations. As previously discussed, alternative media collectives uploaded on to the internet photos that emphasised the brutality of the military police towards demonstrators and live streamed the protests. Significantly,
foreign correspondents I interviewed, praised *Midia NINJA*’s coverage, holding that it was probably the closest thing to actually being amidst the protests. They held that, unlike Brazil’s mainstream media, *Midia NINJA* made visible apparently un-intervened and un-edited accounts of the events on the streets (e.g. Larry Rohter, *The New York Times*).

When in the second half of June Brazil’s mainstream media adopted a less vilifying viewpoint towards the protests, *Midia NINJA* members implemented a tactic of *rectification*. They sought to correct supposed ‘distortions’ or ‘falsehoods’ by national television newscasts and newspapers rather than exposing what the mainstream media had allegedly hidden. *Midia NINJA* members stated that the mainstream media tried to frame the protests within a conservative agenda, in opposition to Dilma Rousseff’s administration:

> [The mainstream media] shifted from a discourse of vandals to a discourse of, “oh, the heroes of the streets must fight against the corruption and violence, because those are the biggest problems of Brazil” (Rafael Vilela, *Midia NINJA*).

Hence, when employing the rectification tactic, activists and alternative media collectives emphasised that the June Journeys were driven by a wider array of issues, not specifically corruption or criticisms of Rousseff’s government. They highlighted that people took to the streets to complain about the state of public services, an absence of civil rights, the privatisation of public space and, significantly, the accounts of the protests shown by the mainstream media.

Members of *Midia NINJA* and other alternative media collectives sought to clarify ‘distortions’ or ‘lies’ voiced by the mainstream media. They highlighted episodes when the military police had apparently started the violence, contradicting official accounts of the vandalism and destruction reeked by protesters. They also showed accounts of unlawful arrests of protesters to rectify reports by newscasts or newspapers about ‘vandals’ or ‘thugs’ taken into custody by the police. As photographer Leonardo Carrato (LC) and reporter
Raquel Boechat (RB), working for alternative media collective *Carranca* – founded in Rio de Janeiro by former collaborators of *Mídia NINJA*—, stated:

LC: Those images [shown by alternative media collectives] have the power to refute what the big media were asserting to be a 'big truth'.

RB: Because when the police randomly asked people to show their ID cards, twenty mobile phones were watching them. We were recording and showing live to elucidate and testify.

The quotes above corroborate how activists try to contest visibility *through* visibility. Social movements have increasingly monitored and documented police violence, as Raquel Boechat highlighted. Indeed, surveillance of the police has become a political act in itself, which resembles ‘the synopticon, the inverse of Foucault’s Panopticon, namely the many watching the few’ (Cammaerts et al., 2013, p. 13). Furthermore, the quotes hold that the surveillance of the powerful supposedly challenges the status quo, undermining attempts made by the mainstream media to delegitimise the protests.

The use of confrontation and rectification tactics was not exclusive to activists and alternative media collectives. Other actors also employed them. Brazil’s mainstream media used *confrontation* to delegitimise *Mídia NINJA*, questioning its supposed independence (Rodrigo, Brazilian journalist). Similarly, state members recalled that marketing campaigns such as *The World Meets in Brazil*, which was carried out before and after the June Journeys, tried to *confront* ‘fake’ or ‘wrong’ frames constructed by other actors. Most particularly, they tried to contest accounts constructed by national and international journalists, as well as by alternative media collectives, which were ‘too emphatic’ about the ‘mistakes’ of the Lula and Rousseff administrations, rather than their social, political and economic achievements (Marco Antonio Nakata, Brazilian diplomat).

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78 When questioned about their reasons for leaving *NINJA*, Leonardo Carrato, photographer for *Carranca*, held that *NINJA* was particularly reluctant to criticise the government: ‘*Mídia NINJA* had a discourse that it was a horizontal organisation: all collaborators were equal; they had an independent editorial line, with no links with political parties. However, we realised that it was not like that’.

79 Mathiesen proposes the synopticon in his article ‘The Viewer Society’ (1997).
Authorities also sought to rectify the perception among foreign journalists that the 2014 FIFA World Cup was not going to be successful. Officials at Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered ambassadors to give interviews, in order to correct ‘wrong’ accounts about Brazil’s un-readiness for the sporting event (Vinicius, Brazilian diplomat). Indeed, three weeks before the World Cup, Dilma Rousseff met a select group of foreign correspondents. This was significant, as the President rarely met journalists. Todd Benson, Brazil Bureau Chief for Reuters News who attended that meeting, held that Rousseff aimed to re-direct the frames constructed by foreign news media, assuring journalists that the football tournament was going to run smoothly.

*Projecting ‘Genuine’ Images*

The tactics of confrontation and rectification show that challenging and reconfiguring power relations is at the core of the strategy of replacement. When actors employ these tactics, they are not simply responding to previous images and accounts. They attempt to undermine the legitimacy of other actors, so as to establish themselves as the ‘right’ visibilisers of the nation.

Activists and members of alternative media collectives were especially vocal in a quest for legitimation, in opposition to the national mainstream media. As discussed in Chapter 4, the former framed the protests as an opportunity to unmask a ‘real’ Brazil, submerged under state propaganda and the ‘distortions’ of the national media. One of the goals of these media collectives was to weaken the mainstream media through both the projection of alternative images, and the proposal of alternative organisational models to construct and project images through the media.

Attempts to undermine the dominance of the mainstream media have been called within Brazil *midialivrismo*. Using digital technologies, *midialivrismo* aims to challenge national media conglomerates, making every citizen a potential producer of content (Malini & Antoun, 2013; Parente, 2014). Members of alternative media collectives often stressed the different organisational models
that these collectives had, labelling national media conglomerates as ‘big’ or ‘corporate’. Augusto Lima, a reporter for Carranca explained that their intention was:

[Showing what] has been hidden, exposing precisely the rest of the information that the corporate media tries to conceal (emphasis added).

Activists claimed that alternative media collectives were better able to respect the basic principles of journalism, such as fairness, independence and public service, because they lacked vertically structured newsrooms and commercial interests (Arant & Meyer, 1998). Members of both Mídia NINJA and Carranca contended that, unlike the ‘corporate’ media, they were ideologically and commercially free, so able to show ‘the truth’:

The big media cannot speak about what they may internally wish to say. Those paying for advertisements do not allow it; bosses do not allow it; a completely closed system does not allow it. And that is the big difference. We have a network of more than 150 collectives all over Brazil […] and they are completely free to say whatever they want to say. They often live stream events better than television, with better quality photos in real time that are published quicker than the press, spreading news through social media with virulence, and talking to many people (Rafael Vilela, Mídia NINJA, emphasis added).

Rafael Vilela depicts mainstream media organisations as being trapped within a ‘closed system’ dominated by commercial interests. According to him, professional journalists may actually want to show different images and accounts to those that they do make visible. However, endogenous and exogenous pressures from editors, owners and advertisers prevent them from doing so. Hence, Rafael argues that Mídia NINJA was capable of showing better images and accounts because it was outside a commercial system of construction and distribution of mediated content.

Other actors also justified their actions by stating that they simply aimed to show ‘the truth’ about the June Journeys. Such claims tried to legitimise diametrically opposing viewpoints. Government officials held that marketing
campaigns such as ‘The World Meets in Brazil’ or ‘Brazil is Calling You’ were not propaganda, but a way to help people to distinguish the ‘correct’ facts (Luiza). Similarly, activist and filmmaker Carla Dauden stated that the June Journeys put the ‘real’ Brazil under the spotlight:

The truth about Brazil came out, and now everyone knows that it’s not that perfect paradise with people just dancing samba every day (emphasis added).

Foreign journalists employed similar arguments. When questioned about the growing criticisms of Brazil’s economic and political situation in the foreign media, British freelancer Jamie held that they simply reflected ‘reality’:

There was a reason why people wrote good things about Brazil in the 2000’s. Because Brazil was doing well […] and now Brazil is not doing great and that’s why people are not writing such great things. You know, to me it’s really obvious.

The quotes above highlight the elasticity of the concept of ‘truth’ among interviewees, and how they employed it in a utilitarian manner, seeking to advance their agendas. Government officials stressed that the ‘correct’ facts about Brazil –such as a good economy, political stability, and social harmony– were precisely those that highlighted it as a sought-after destination for tourism or investment. For activists, the desire for social justice and change unmasked the ‘real’ Brazil. Carla Dauden’s quote above stated that the June Journeys revealed that Brazil was ‘not that perfect paradise’ constructed by official propaganda, in contrast to the harmonious, hospitable, happy, stunning nation shown, for instance, by ‘The World Meets in Brazil’.

Furthermore, the struggles between the different actors to show the ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ Brazil were not simply struggles about the image of the nation, but also struggles about contesting developmental paths to reach ‘modernity’. As Thiago Ávila, member of the Popular Committee for the World Cup, contended:

We don’t want the image of the country of the future developing at all costs. For us, the GDP is not the main way to measure how a society develops […] We prefer that the country will be known for its people, their freedom, their happiness.
The debates referenced by Thiago are not exclusive to Brazil. However, they are particularly relevant in the light of Brazil’s aspirations to become a global player. *Mídia NINJA* members took part in this debate, emphasising that the media collective was part of a wider project, which included cultural events and an alternative bank, and whose aim was to challenge the national political, economic and social order in Brazil. Hence, actors disagreed not only on what Brazil *is or has been*, but most fundamentally on what Brazil *will be*, confirming that ‘the spatial and temporal ontology of the nation is always in becoming rather than being’ (Roosvall & Salovaara-Moring, 2010b, p. 14).

All actors expressed ambivalence towards the institutional and technological nature of the media, in regards to the possibility of showing ‘the truth’. Media institutions, particularly mainstream organisations such as Globo TV or newspapers *Folha* and *O Estado*, were viewed with suspicion. Activists, government officials and foreign journalists accused them of advancing commercial and political aims. Conversely, mass media and particularly digital media technologies, were described as having the potential to show ‘the truth’, particularly if traditional gatekeepers, such as journalists, were bypassed. Despite decades of criticisms of the metaphor describing the media as ‘mirrors of reality’ (Curran, Gurevitch, & Woollacott, 1988; Schudson, 1989; Vos, 2011), such metaphor remains influential, not only among journalists, but also amongst those who claim to challenge the power of mainstream media.

### 5.4 Adjustment: More than Just Samba, Football and Carnival

The second strategy is *adjustment*. Unlike the replacement strategy, actors state that previous images are truthful or genuine. However, the visibility of previous images requires adjustment for greater precision. According to Brighenti, ‘there is a minimum and maximum of what we may call “correct visibility”’ (2010b, p. 47; see also Dayan, 2013, p. 143). Hence, when using the adjustment strategy, actors try to downplay visibility or illuminate the blind spots of a particular image. There are two tactics that actors employed when using this strategy: *normalisation* and *spotlighting*. I also examine how the negotiation
of power relations, which is at the core of the strategy of adjustment, has important implications for the association of Brazil with exotic, erotic and violent stereotypes.

**Normalisation and Spotlighting**

The adjustment strategy consists of two tactics: normalisation and spotlighting. Normalisation tries to downplay, rather than erase, the visibility of an image. According to Brighenti, ‘the normal is neither noticed nor thematised’ (2010b, p. 25); only the out of the ordinary grasps attention (see also Urry, 2001). Spotlighting aims to illuminate supposed blind spots of a previously shown image, highlighting that there is actually much more to see.

Brazilian journalists employed normalisation during early stages of the June Journeys. They dedicated very little time and space to the protests in their respective outlets. Cristina, a reporter for a national radio station, recalled that, due to the recurrence of protests in Brazil, various colleagues dismissed the June Journeys. They claimed that the June Journeys were just another protest, and that things were soon going to be back to normal. Natalia, a reporter who has covered protests in Sao Paulo since the late 2000’s, held a similar view. She stated that the June Journeys appeared to be normal protests, meaning with it that the demonstrations seemed predictable and similar to previous outbreaks of social unrest.

According to Stanley Cohen (2001), normalisation is a form of denial. Hence, when Brazilian journalists stated that the June Journeys were normal and unworthy of attention, they overlooked social, political and economic struggles as well as massive social inequalities that activists tried to make visible through the protests. Normalising also means making something standard (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2015b). Most Brazilian journalists manifested such standardisation when they admitted that they often use pre-established ‘scripts’ to cover protests. Such ‘scripts’ seek ways to make predictable the unexpected (Curran & Seaton, 1997, p. 276). According to the interviewees, when they follow a ‘script’ to cover a demonstration, they summarise the main events, interview the ‘different sides’ of the story –such as authorities, the police and
‘common’ people— and, when protests turn violent, they highlight how lives of ‘ordinary’ citizens are disrupted, as demonstrated by the examples given in Chapter 4.

However, attempts to normalise the June Journeys were short lived. Most Brazilian journalists interviewed, admitted that the scale, unpredictability and violence of the protests made the claim that the June Journeys were another normal episode of unrest impossible to sustain. Brazilian journalist Francisco recalled how the violence of the military police in Sao Paulo on the evening of 13th June radically changed the tone of the coverage:

I remembered seeing during five to six minutes, which is a lot of time on TV, people trying to hide and a bunch of police officers hitting them. This is news, right? But it is a different kind of news. The most important thing is not that some group blocked the city anymore, but that the state is abusing its power.

Similarly, Rodrigo, who was assignment editor for a national newspaper in Brazil, held that although journalists originally felt that the June Journeys were ‘no big deal’, they soon realised that previous scripts for demonstrations were unhelpful. Most Brazilian journalists admitted that they did not know how to cover and interpret the demonstrations so they experimented with formats, news order, as well as the time and space allocated to the demonstrations. Priscilla, one of the editors of Globo TV’s newscast Jornal Nacional, recalled that the coverage was particularly challenging for television journalists:

[The demonstrations] were a difficult moment, because you did not know what was right or what was wrong. In a newspaper you can have two articles, one about the ‘good’ things of a protest and another one about the ‘bad’ things. Of course you can have the same on television, but how do you choose which one goes first? We ordered the news chronologically rather than by relevance, because at that time it was really confusing distinguishing what was the most important thing. So we started with a peaceful report, because the demonstrations were peaceful at the beginning and the violence happened at the end. But that was a challenge for journalists. We reported in the most truthful way possible, but that also meant that we had a cold start, that we didn’t always start with the news.
The quotes above show that Brazilian journalists faced significant struggles with regards to how to cover the protests. As Rodrigo admitted, military police brutality made unsustainable the viewpoint undermining protests’ legitimacy often adopted by mainstream media (e.g. Gitlin, 2003). In addition, as Priscilla admits, to put out chronologically accurate television reports of the protests meant constructing ‘colder’ reports. This admission highlights the constructed nature of news and undermines previously discussed claims describing news media as ‘mirrors of truth’.

Brazilian journalists did not know whom to interview, because the demonstrations lacked clear leadership and there were contradictory demands. Hence, journalists gradually adopted a second tactic: spotlighting. The tactic seeks to illuminate supposed blind spots of a previous image, highlighting that there is actually much more to see. The tactic was evident when Brazilian newspapers and television newscasts dedicated more time and space to the protests. Camila Guimarães, former assignment editor for O Estado de Sao Paulo, recalled that stories about the protests moved upwards on the front page of the newspaper:

Many newsstands display the newspaper folded, so when you are walking down the street you can see all the headlines. If a story is really important, it’s above the fold, on top. I don’t think that the first protest even made it to the front page. It was just in the city section. The second one was at the bottom [of the front page]. And I remember quite clearly the third one, when people were burning garbage and police tyres and breaking some buses’ windows, one of the assistant editors, was like, “okay, there it goes, now it will go to the cover. Now this protest is above the fold”.

This quotation highlights the gradual journey made by the protests within newspapers until they became the main headlines. The increasing newsworthiness of the demonstrations was also propelled by violence, as evidenced by ‘people were burning garbage and police tyres and breaking some buses’ windows’. Such newsworthiness was not free of cynicism, as shown by the comment of the assistant editor.
Foreign journalists also employed the tactic of spotlighting, dedicating more time and space to news about the protests in Brazil. Most foreign journalists interviewed held that the June Journeys facilitated the coverage of topics that international news media do not usually consider newsworthy, such as public transport problems in Sao Paulo or the quality of public services in Brazil. American journalist Robert recalled that he was ‘fascinated’ that, for a short time, the protests drew attention to the everyday struggles of Brazilians. Similarly, Alessandra, foreign correspondent for a global news organisation, held that the June Journeys showed Brazil ‘in a lot more complex light’, with people demanding better services and more rights rather than just samba dancing:

That is really what the country is, all this inequality, all these problems that still haven’t being resolved and still weren’t being resolved in the boom years [of the Lula government].

Hence, for foreign journalists, spotlighting relatively ‘unknown’ or ‘obscure’ aspects of Brazil was an opportunity to unmask the social pitfalls buried under years of economic success and political stability. Despite these claims, stereotypes about Brazil were not completely abandoned. Foreign journalists admitted that they often had to find a balance between what audiences expect of Brazil, such as beaches, football, carnival and favelas, and ‘new’ or ‘unknown’ features, such as the discontent with the hosting of the FIFA World Cup (Regina, television producer).

The Problematic Relationship with Stereotypes

The above discussion highlighted that, when employing the strategy of adjustment, actors neither completely rejected previous images nor sought to undermine the perceived dominance of another group of actors. Rather, they negotiated power relations, looking for ways to accommodate a more ‘precise’ version of Brazil and partly accepting what has been shown previously. All actors stated that the coverage of the June Journeys was done against a backdrop of Brazilian stereotypes. Government officials told me that they were concerned not only about the possible ‘negative’ effects of the June Journeys
over the image of Brazil, but also about how the foreign media continuously reinforced the stereotypical image of Brazil as a nation of carnivals, football and favelas during the protests.

Stereotypes are simplistic, inflexible, exclusionary characterisations and evaluations (Herzfeld, 1996; Pickering, 2001; Shohat & Stam, 1996). However, they are not necessarily based on false information. They may even contain a ‘kernel of truth’ (Whitley & Kite, 2016, pp. 121–122). As Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie observes, ‘the problem with stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete’ (Adichie, 2009). Stereotypes are a case of hyper-visibility, that is, an excess of visibility which transforms individuals into prisoners of pre-defined categories, against which they feel measured or compelled to mould to (Brighenti, 2010b, p. 47; Hall, 1997; Pickering, 2001; Shohat & Stam, 1996; Taylor, 1994, p. 25).

All actors claimed that the love of football, the ostentatious carnival celebrations and the beauty of women were central components of Brazil’s national identity. However, they stressed that Brazil’s identity was not limited to these features. In the words of several interviewees, whilst Brazil had all that, it was much more than samba, football and carnival. Hence, all interviewees stated that the aim of their different media practices was showing the proper image of Brazil. As Dayan observes, being visible is not enough: what matters is acquiring the ‘right’ visibility (Dayan, 2013, p. 143).

Actors sought to advance different agendas using the claim of ‘correcting’ stereotypes. Filmmaker and activist Carla Dauden stated that she produced her video ‘No, I’m not going to the World Cup’ as a response to the stereotype ‘that Brazil sells’. Journalists such as Silvia Saiek, from BBC Brasil, assured that foreign journalists purportedly tried to make the image of Brazil more complex, focussing on topics that were not limited to football, samba or violence. Government officials held that they opposed the continuous association of Brazil with, as some of them put it, the four S’s –samba, sex, sand and soccer– because it curtailed potential business opportunities. As diplomat Liliam Chagas said:
Over time, Brazil has been identified with natural beauties, the happiness of its people, culture and carnival. *That becomes a heavy load to carry. The country still has all that, but it has more.* It became a modern country, a country that wants to take part in the international community with a democracy, a market economy, strong state institutions. So that is the dilemma of the image. Brazil remains a *prisoner* of those historical stereotypes, but it has a more complex reality (emphasis added).

Liliam Chagas’ quote is revealing. She corroborates the previous argument that actors tried to show that Brazil was *much more* than the stereotypes associated with it. Significantly, whilst activists such as Carla Dauden stressed that massive social inequalities should be put in the spotlight, Liliam held that a more ‘complete’ description should highlight that Brazil had become a market-friendly democracy. Hence, Liliam implied that stereotypes have fixed an exotic and ‘pre-modern’ image of Brazil, which obscures its political and economic achievements. Yet she also holds how difficult it is, even for members of the state, to manage the national image. According to her, Brazil is a ‘prisoner’ of its stereotypes, and those stereotypes have become a ‘heavy load to carry’, even for the authorities who claim to be the main representatives of the nation.

Brazilian interviewees argued that the persistence of stereotypes was evidence of extremely unbalanced power relations between Brazil and the West. Most Brazilian interviewees stated that international news media were prime feeders of stereotypes. Foreign journalists contested the argument, holding that they actually reported on a wider array of issues (Larry Rohter, *The New York Times*). According to Helen Joyce, former correspondent for *The Economist* in Brazil, locals were particularly sensitive to criticisms expressed by the international and transnational media.80

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80 Interviewees disagreed on how relevant the perception of foreigners was for Brazilians. While, Brazilian journalist and author Daniel Buarque, and American journalist Larry Rohter, claimed that it was an essential characteristic of Brazilian national identity, others argued that such interest was limited only to upper and middle classes. As Diego Vega, former editor of the newscast of *Rede TV!* held, ‘I think the lower classes don’t give a damn […] So maybe foreign correspondents are more impressed by this middle class that reads newspapers, to which newscasts are targeted, and which expresses itself through formal channels of discussion and institutions’.
There was a sort of fundamental misunderstanding about what my job was for a lot of people. They felt that I was doing my job well when I said good things about Brazil, and badly when I said bad things about Brazil.

Whilst concerns over stereotypes are not exclusive to Brazil (Latham, 2009; Skey, 2011), some foreign journalists described them as more likely to characterise pre-modern or developing nations. British journalist Jamie stated that developed nations did not pay attention to stereotypes. Indeed, he stated that Brazilians themselves were often responsible for the continuous reinforcement of stereotypes:

Wherever you see a Scotsman in a film he’s always wearing a kilt or he’s got his face painted or he’s drunk. Italy is always pizzas, it’s always Mediterranean and it’s mafiosos. Just in Scotland or Italy they don’t care anymore. The other thing is that a lot of the stereotypes that you see are the exact stereotypes that Brazilians have about Brazilians.

Some scholars agree with the second half of Jamie’s quote, arguing that various stereotypes have originated or been strengthened within Brazil. During the 1960’s, the military dictatorship launched a series of tourism campaigns emphasising the beauty of the beaches and the sensuality of Brazilian women, in order to divert attention away from human rights abuses (De Rosa, 2013). Furthermore, despite the apparent unanimous rejection of stereotypes, in practice, Brazilians have sometimes purportedly exploited them. An officer of APEX-Brasil, the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency, advised that the association of Brazil with carnival and football was often used to advance business opportunities, contradicting the view of Lillam Chagas. In fact, as communications consultant Rachel Pereira de Mello observed, government officials often relied on the stereotypes they claimed to criticise:

We are very schizophrenic. They [authorities] say, “oh, we are much more than samba, football, carnival” and things like that […] So they organise a press trip, and where do they bring foreign journalists? To a sunny beach. We are more than samba and football, and what do they have for an event during the World Cup? Mulatas. So the discourse that “we are much more” does not become real in public policies.
The disconnection between claims against stereotypes and public policies, highlighted above by Rachel Mello, shows that the mediated visibility of Brazil is adjusted depending on political, cultural or economic agendas. Indeed, Bruno, from APEX-Brasil, revealed that even Brazil is a symbolic disposable unit. Private companies may decide whether or not they associate their products or services with this nation, depending on potential economic benefits. The previous examples are manifestations of ‘commercial nationalism’, that is, the marketization of national identity as a brand and the exploitation of nationalism by the private sector (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2015).

5.5 Re-appropriation: ‘It made it to the New York Times’

The third and final strategy is re-appropriation. It consists of the reproduction of images or accounts previously constructed by another set of actors. Unlike replacement and adjustment, the re-appropriation strategy does not challenge or negotiate images shown beforehand. Instead, it aims to amplify and disseminate them, presuming that these previous images are ‘veracious’ or ‘objective’. The veracity emerges not only from the images, but also from the perceived legitimacy or credibility of those who produced them. This section begins with a discussion of the tactics employed by actors using this strategy. I then explore how the strategy of re-appropriation highlights the significance of the foreign gaze during the June Journeys.

‘Remonstration’ and ‘Premonstration’

The strategy of re-appropriation consists of two tactics: ‘remonstration’ and ‘premonstration’. Dayan states that news media are the major social institutions engaged in the task of ‘monstration’, that is to say, ‘calling attention to something by showing it’ (2013, p. 146; see also Gitlin, 2003, p. 3). According to him, ‘remonstration’ is showing again, sometimes under a new frame, images constructed and projected by another actor. ‘Premonstration’ is

81 Although related, credibility and legitimacy are not the same. Credibility is value neutral and emerges when audiences accept particular statements to be true. Legitimacy, on the other hand, has a normative basis and is related to the interests driving certain individuals or organisations. As summarised by Thaut et al, ‘[t]hugs, bullies and zombies may have credibility, to the extent that we believe their threats, but that hardly means they have legitimacy’ (2012, p. 138).
constructing and disseminating images in the hope that they will be picked up by another set of actors (Dayan, 2013, p. 143). Dayan argues that both tactics are the exclusive domain of visibility entrepreneurs. However, the interviews show that all actors employed them during the June Journeys.

Most Brazilian journalists interviewed admitted that, when a specific national episode is considered important, they report on how it is ‘seen abroad’. Indeed, the ‘remonstration’ of international media is so engrained in work routines that, when I asked Brazilian journalist Francisco why foreign media contents were sometimes newsworthy, he admitted that he had never reflected on it. Most Brazilian interviewees agreed that the international coverage of a story confirms the salience of a particular episode. Indeed, while doing my fieldwork, I learnt that a common Brazilian expression is ‘deu no New York Times’ (‘it made it to The New York Times’), which means that something is either true or especially relevant (Buarque, 2015b; Prideaux, 2014).

Activists and members of alternative media collectives also ‘remonstrated ‘contents produced by international media, for instance, by posting links to articles in their Facebook or Twitter accounts. Significantly, these episodes of ‘remonstration’ were underpinned by the belief that the foreign media were politically neutral and objective. That supposed neutrality and objectivity are especially relevant in Brazil, where, as discussed earlier, a handful of conglomerates control the national media (Fonsêca, 2013; Goldstein, 2014; Matos, 2014; Montero, 2014). Indeed, whilst Brazilian interviewees often criticised the foreign media when employing the adjustment strategy, they paradoxically praised them using the re-appropriation strategy. As activist André Bassáres held:

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82 That expression, for instance, can be found in the title of the movie ‘Tanga (Deu no New York Times?)’, by Henrique Fikho, as well as in the song ‘W/Brasil (Chama o Sindico)’ by Jorge Ben Jor. One of the books written by Larry Rohter, former Brazil correspondent for The New York Times, was called Deu no New York Times: O Brasil segundo a ótica de um repórter do jornal mais influente do mundo [It made it to the New York Times: Brazil seen by a reporter for the world’s most influential newspaper] (Rohter, 2008).
[The foreign media] provides other points of view. And sincerely, I don’t want to appear Manichaean, but points of view that are similar to the truth, that are closer to the truth, while our [national] media do not do that.

Such ‘other points of view’ have the potential to generate estrangement within Brazil, inviting ‘audiences to detach themselves from common-sense conceptions of their lives in the national context’ (Orgad, 2012, p. 87). Hence, the porosity of national boundaries in the media environment facilitated access to a different set of accounts of the June Journeys, which, as the quote above shows, potentially challenged those constructed by authorities and the national media (see Orgad, 2008, 2012).

Whilst estrangement offers the possibility of introducing more images and accounts of the nation to itself, opening ‘a space for critical reflection on common wisdoms, and for questioning of the nation as stable, coherent and taken-for-granted collective’ (Orgad, 2012, p. 88), in practice it is a highly selective process. Images and accounts constructed by foreign news media often became visible within Brazil only when national actors purportedly appropriated them to advance their agendas. Priscilla, one of the editors of Jornal Nacional, elaborated this point:

Very rarely, I would say never, I saw something from The New York Times that became news [in Brazil] […] Usually, it is a way of reinforcing what was already said here. So, it works like this: we are saying that something is critical. And when The New York Times says so, it is as if you have certification that that thing is really critical. It’s so serious that it even caught the attention of The New York Times […] That also happens with positive news. So, when Brazil wins something specific and a foreign newspaper highlights that, it is a way of countersigning that what you are saying is important.

Hence, the promise of openness of the nation offered by estrangement was rarely fulfilled. As Priscilla admits, the increasing accessibility of international media coverage does not necessarily enrich domestic debates. Indeed, actors within Brazil seek to exploit the perceived neutrality and objectivity of the foreign media in order to strengthen previously held positions in national
discussions. Brazilian journalists and civil servants told me that some government officials publicly congratulated themselves when *The Economist* published in 2009 a special report about Brazil, claiming that the country was ‘taking off’ (Prideaux, 2009). Indeed, Helen Joyce, former Brazil correspondent for *The Economist*, recalled that local authorities often referenced articles published by that magazine when the articles praised government policies. For the authorities, such publications were evidence that they were doing things right, because even ‘*The Economist* says so’.

Similarly, *Mídia NINJA* members stated that the validation of their outlet within Brazil was partly due to sympathetic reports published by the American and British press (see, for example Watts, 2013d). According to Rafael Vilela, from *Midia NINJA*, before the publication of these articles, the national media ignored *Mídia NINJA*. At most, they associated it with the ‘vandals’ disrupting the social order or they described it as a passing ‘phenomenon’. Hence, being praised abroad contributed to establishing the credibility of *Mídia NINJA* amongst Brazilians and being perceived nationally as a valid source of information.

In addition to ‘remonstration’, various actors within Brazil engaged in a tactic of ‘premonstration’. This tactic consists of the production of images and accounts for the purpose of facilitating their appropriation by a different set of actors (Dayan, 2013, p. 143). Activists tried to exploit the perceived legitimacy of the foreign media within Brazil to advance their agendas. Activists’ efforts to attract the attention of the foreign media are neither new nor exclusive to Brazil, as evidenced by social movements such as those of Tiananmen Square, the Zapatistas, or the Arab Spring (Altheide, 2013; Bob, 2001; Calhoun, 1994; Hanson, 2008; Khatib, 2013). During the June Journeys, people carried banners in English, and translated videos, manifestos or articles into that language. Their hope was that those messages could become newsworthy for

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83 Another significant episode was the participation of two members of *Mídia NINJA* in Brazil’s talk show *Roda Viva*. According to Rafael Vilela, they accepted that invitation because ‘we didn’t want to talk to the same ones, the already converted or the left wing. We wanted to make a more popular diffusion and talk to millions’.
international and transnational news media. As Brazilian reporter Natalia, who has covered demonstrations since the late 2000’s, reflected:

I don’t think that people wrote banners in English so they could change the image of Brazil in the rest of the world. I think they wanted to be heard outside Brazil so the Brazilian government would feel how strongly they were protesting. Being heard outside Brazil was a medium, not an aim.

Natalia corroborates that, for Brazilian activists, being ‘seen abroad’ matters insofar as foreign perception has effects within the nation. Scholarship has observed how Latin American social movements have relied on a boomerang pattern to advance their agendas, developing bonds with transnational networks, hoping that the latter may pressure the home nation authorities to change their policies (Keck & Sikkink, 1997). Hence, activists relied on the potential of a mediated boomerang pattern during the June Journeys in the hope that content in foreign publications would have repercussions within Brazil.

Attempts to employ the tactic of ‘premonstration’ during the June Journeys were not always successful. Thiago Ávila, member of the Popular Committee for the World Cup, admitted that the committee members were not prepared for the level of attention that the protests garnered abroad. They often lacked the time to monitor the coverage produced by the foreign news media, and, whilst they had databases with foreign journalist contact information, they were was at least four years out of date.

Government officials also used the tactic of ‘premonstration’. They constantly monitored the foreign media, seeking opportunities to disseminate and amplify their messages (Cammaerts & Jiménez-Martínez, 2014). Sometimes they contacted foreign journalists directly, in the hope that accounts published by foreign news media would reverberate within Brazil. Larry Rohter, former South American Bureau Chief for The New York Times, revealed that government officials also engaged in the boomerang pattern, seeking to increase the visibility of specific topics within their own government:
Certain people in the Brazilian government learnt how to establish contact with me to advance their own agenda or point of view within the government. They knew that maybe they weren’t getting attention from the president, so they thought, ‘oh, let’s talk to Rohter. We’ll put a story in The New York Times and we’ll get some attention’.

The examples above show that the tactics of ‘premonstration’ and ‘remonstration’ were apparently used, particularly by activists, to challenge power relations. However, the employment of both tactics was underpinned by the exploitation and reinforcement of the same unequal power relations that actors claimed to be challenging (Brighenti, 2010b). The previously discussed strategy of adjustment showed that government officials often dismissed the coverage by foreign media organisations, accusing them of perpetuating Brazilian stereotypes. However, any positive account emerging from the international and transnational media was met with joy, thus accepting their legitimacy and supposed objectivity.

Similarly, activists heavily criticised Brazil’s mainstream media. However, they ‘remonstrated’ their contents when they were perceived as favourable to the protests. Additionally, they ‘premonstrated’ messages, hoping that national television newscasts or newspapers would pick them up. Hence, despite their criticisms of the mainstream media, activists and media collectives implicitly consented to the legitimacy and role as upholders of the nation that newscasts and publications such as Jornal Nacional, Folha and O Estado de Sao Paulo claimed to have. As Brazilian journalist and academic Sylvia Debossan observed: ‘If we hate the corporate media, how is that we accept using them when they favour us?’ (quoted in Moretzsohn, 2013).

The Construction of the Foreign Gaze

The previous discussion showed that the foreign gaze was perceived as particularly relevant by Brazilian actors. Indeed, various authors argue that foreign attention was evidence of the political, social and historical relevance of the June Journeys (Conde & Jazeel, 2013; Figueiredo, 2014a). As stated in Chapter 1, being ‘seen from abroad’ is often equated with being covered by
foreign media organisations. The media synchronise the attention of geographically dispersed audiences (Brighenti, 2010b) and provide ‘a version of the world which increasingly constituted the world’ (Silverstone, 2007, p. 54). Hence, when interviewees claimed that ‘the world’ looked at Brazil during the June Journeys, they meant that a particular set of foreign news media constructed and disseminated accounts of the demonstrations.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the United States and Western Europe have historically been Brazil’s significant others, namely the gazes that, whilst viewed with suspicion, provide recognition but also sanction what is shown or masked. The continuing relevance of both significant others was patent across the interviews. When I asked Brazilian interviewees – government officials, journalists and activists – what they meant by ‘foreign media’, they consistently pointed to a narrow set of mostly Anglo-American television stations, newspapers and magazines, such as The New York Times, The Economist, BBC, The Guardian or CNN. As summarised by Gilberto Carvalho, former Chief Minister of General Secretariat of the Presidency of Brazil under Dilma Rousseff:

> Anything that makes it to The New York Times, The Guardian, The Economist or Le Monde, especially from Europe and the United States, has repercussions here.

Foreign journalists were aware that only a select group of foreign news media constituted what Brazilian authorities, journalists and even activists perceived as the foreign gaze. Helen Joyce, Sao Paulo bureau chief for The Economist at the time of the June Journeys, recalled how Brazilian political, economic and cultural elites scrupulously followed what The Economist published about their nation. Articles from the magazine were often reproduced ‘word for word’ by local newspapers, embraced or criticised by local politicians and businessmen, as well as discussed across numerous blogs and websites.84 Foreign

84 In December 2012, The Economist called for the dismissal of the then Finance Minister Guido Mantega (“A breakdown of trust,” 2012). That suggestion was widely reported by the Brazilian media and blogosphere. Even President Dilma Rousseff responded to the publication, holding that her government was not going to be influenced by ‘a magazine which was not Brazilian’ (Fellet, 2012). In early June 2013, The Economist agreed with claims that the earlier
journalists working for organisations less well known within Brazil conversely experienced difficulties in accessing sources, particularly from the government:

The amount of attention I receive [from Brazilian government officials] has been multiplied by thousands, since I work for a [European country] news agency. That did not happen when I worked for a regional newspaper from [a southern European country], even if it had a significant circulation (Oscar, foreign freelance journalist).

As Oscar quote’s reveals, contents published by news organisations such as *The New York Times* and *The Economist* are much more likely to be re-appropriated within Brazil rather than those produced, for instance, by a European regional newspaper. The quote also shows that the dichotomy between observers and those observed is much more complex than what is apparent. As Brighenti argues, ‘we should not be misled into believing that being watched is a passive behaviour […] Often, the relationship of visibility is controlled not by the one who looks, but by the one who is looked at’ (Brighenti, 2007, p. 331). Hence, the foreign gaze—as any other external gaze—is a selective *relational* construction that requires the participation and relative acceptance of all the actors involved, even though, as discussed in the previous strategy, that external gaze may also be a target for criticism (Wood, 2014a, makes a similar point when describing how Brazil’s national identity is articulated and contested in and through Brazilian and international movies and telenovelas).

The relational character of the foreign gaze does not imply that observers and those observed are equal. The foreign gaze is far from neutral. It evaluates nations and situates them in particular positions within the global order. It praises or criticises the actions of their inhabitants and authorities, and offers suggestions according to supposed global values (see also Guibernau, 2001; Kantola, 2010). For instance, *The Economist* praised Brazil when it was ‘doing things well’ during the Lula administration (Prideaux, 2009). Global NGOs, credit rating agencies or, more recently, surveys like the Anholt-GFX Nations article had made Mantega unsackable, asking Rousseff to keep him at all costs (“A fall from grace,” 2013). Mantega kept his position until January 2015.
Brand Index, which measures how nations are perceived abroad, play a similar role (Aronczyk, 2013; Kantola, 2010; Kunczik, 2002).

The power imbalance discussed above was also expressed in the supposed need of Brazilians to be recognised by their significant others. Most foreign journalists that I interviewed, claimed that they observed so much interest in the perception of foreigners in no other nation. Most Brazilian interviewees stated that the perceived authority of the foreign gaze within Brazil was due to what novelist Nelson Rodrigues called the ‘mongrel complex’ (complexo de vira-lata, in Portuguese), that is to say, the ‘position of inferiority in which Brazilians put themselves, voluntarily, vis à vis the rest of the world’ (Rodrigues, 1993, p. 62 my translation). Brazilian journalist Maite explained:

[Brazilians seek] The approval from the outside, the approval from the colonisers, and I’m not talking about Portugal, nobody cares about Portugal, but the cultural colonisation, the US, the UK, Europe in general. This really means to many people that the idea of development would be validated, that we are improving.

The need for approval and confirmation that ‘we are improving’ should not be understood simply as a result of being objects of the foreign gaze. As discussed previously, those observed may try to exploit this gaze in order to pursue their own agendas. Hence, when employing the strategy of re-appropriation, the unequal power relations between the observer and the observed, as well as those between developed and developing nations are neither disputed nor negotiated. They are exploited and reinforced, even by those who claim to challenge them.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter examined the efforts of different actors to control and mitigate the risks of the media environment in the age of new visibility. As the discussion has shown, the struggles for visibility during the June Journeys cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy between mainstream and alternative media, with the former spinning or concealing information and the latter unmasking alternative viewpoints. That perspective neglects the fact that actors from all
categories engaged in the task of managing visibility. While Thompson (1995) rightfully describes this management as an ancient art, he focuses mainly on how those in power employ it. The interviews I conducted highlight that the management concerns both those in power and those attempting to disrupt it.

Significantly, actors described this management not as a luxury, but as an obligation. They operationalized it during the June Journeys using three strategies: replacement, adjustment and re-appropriation. Although some actors, particularly activists and members of alternative media collectives, claimed to challenge power relations, they relied on the maintenance and reinforcement of the status quo when employing some of these strategies.

Both Brazilians and foreigners claimed that they intended to show the complexity of the ‘real’ Brazil. However, they often failed to do so, particularly when engaging in the strategies of replacement and adjustment. In their attempt to unmask and substitute ‘fake’, ‘wrong’ or ‘distorted’ images with more ‘genuine’ ones, they stepped into an essentialism and oversimplification of the nation. Their premise was that the ‘real’ Brazil was unproblematic, accessible, and containable within a specific image or account, which could be successfully imposed over ‘false’ or ‘inaccurate’ versions. A similar shortcoming has been highlighted by studies of media and gender, which have stated that calls for ‘genuine’ images ‘won’t solve the problem because reality is more complex […] than any ‘corrective’ image can hope to account for’ (Richardson & Wearing, 2014, p. 21; see also Shohat & Stam, 1996; van Zoonen, 1994; Waldman, 1978).

The quest for more veracious images or accounts of the nation lacks a historical perspective. It implies that it is possible to reach a static and definitive visible nation. This approach neglects the contested nature of the nation, its possible transformations over time, as well as the inherent fragility and uncontrollability of the images circulating in the media environment (Hall, 1997; Shohat & Stam, 1996; Thompson, 2005). At the same time, as seen in the strategy of re-appropriation, inequalities and dominant relationships may persist and even be reinforced, all the more so by those who claim to challenge
the status quo. Despite Brazilian’s critical descriptions of the foreign media as sources of stereotypical exotic and erotic accounts of Brazil, the same foreign media organisations were also described as more credible and legitimate than the national media, as long as this credibility and legitimacy could be exploited within the nation. Furthermore, stereotypes were sometimes accepted or rejected, not based on their supposed accuracy, but on the potential benefit that they may offer. As stated by Herzfeld, stereotyping ‘offers a basis for both contesting and reproducing power relations’ (1996, p. 160).

Focussing on the accuracy of images and accounts may neglect some of the wider power structures and ideological assumptions underlining these strategies (Gill, 2007; Hall, 1997; Shohat & Stam, 1996). Hence, a broader view is required, to address the conditions within which the struggles for and over the mediated visibility of Brazil occurred during the June Journeys. This is the subject of the next and final empirical chapter.
6. Conditions of Mediated Visibility: Norms, Routines, Market Imperatives and Technology

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the third analytical dimension: the conditions of mediated visibility. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the media are not a neutral space, separate from the actors; rather, the actors themselves constitute the media. Significantly, there is a vast literature in media studies, particularly concerning news production, that describes organisational, technological, financial and ideological conditions moulding mediated visibility (e.g. Altheide & Snow, 1979; Benson, 2005, 2013; Bourdieu, 2005; Champagne, 2005; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001; Hartley, 1993; Landerer, 2013; McChesney, 2004; McQuail, 2010; Preston, 2009; Schudson, 1989; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996).

Yet studies about the image of the nation are rarely to be found in this body of literature. Both practice-oriented scholars and those with a critical approach in regard to nation branding and public diplomacy have mostly focussed on a narrow group of individuals producing images of the nation. These studies have examined specific communication campaigns or have interviewed diplomats, government officials or branding experts. The examination of such a narrow set of actors has led to a portrayal of the media as mere disseminators of content rather than as agents in their own right (for further details, see Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015).

Drawing on Bolin & Ståhlberg’s call to study the media as technological, political and institutional agents, this chapter argues that during the June Journeys all the actors operated within specific normative, institutional, economic and technological conditions. These various conditions are relevant because they may encourage or obstruct the projection of specific contents that shape the image of the nation (drawing on Benson, 2013; Brighenti, 2010a; Cottle, 1995; McQuail, 2010; Mihelj, 2011; Nossek, 2004; Price, 2002; Voirol,
2005). Actors were not simply constrained by the conditions. They actively contributed to shaping, reinforcing or resisting them.

The discussion opens with a brief overview of four conditions of mediated visibility: *normative conditions, institutional routines, market imperatives, and technological influences*. The conditions were formed when grouping a number of factors mentioned by the interviewees that underpin the visibility—or lack of visibility—of the frames discussed in Chapter 4. Each of these conditions is then examined in detail drawing on insights from the interviews. In the conclusion, the relationships between these conditions are explored.

### 6.2 Conditions of Mediated Visibility during the June Journeys

In Chapter 2 I defined conditions of mediated visibility as the ‘circumstances or factors influencing the way in which the mediated visibility of certain images or accounts is facilitated or blocked’. Beliefs, perceptions, routines, experiences, values, technologies, as well as working environments, were some of these factors. Four conditions of visibility were formed from these factors: *normative conditions, institutional routines, market imperatives, and technological influences*.

Each condition is underpinned by a different understanding of what, according to the actors, the media are: entities with ethical, social and political purposes (*normative conditions*); organisations bounded by shared institutional routines (*institutional routines*); profit-oriented corporations (*market imperatives*); and technologies (*technological influences*) (Figure 17).

There are three caveats to these conditions. Firstly, the conditions are not always competitive or self-contained. In the accounts given by the actors, they often appear interrelated and/or working in tandem. The distinctiveness of these conditions is stressed for clarity purposes. Secondly, the conditions did not emerge arbitrarily. They are manifestations of broader sociocultural changes which contributed to the expansion of the media and the increasing relevance of mediated visibility, such as the intensification of globalisation,
market dominance and the changing boundaries of private and public life (for a detailed account of these sociocultural changes, see Thompson, 1995, 2011).

Third, the conditions correspond to those highlighted by the interviewees when recounting their experiences of the June Journeys. Other authors have highlighted different conditions, such as legal frameworks, race, class or political system, that they have perceived to be relevant when examining different events in other parts of the world (see, for instance, Benson, 2013; McQuail, 2010; Price, 2002; the discussion about media systems and nations in Mihelj, 2011; or the five clusters of influences on newsmaking in Preston, 2009). In the remainder of this chapter, I detail the four conditions of visibility that actors recalled in their accounts of the June Journeys.

Figure 17 – Conditions of mediated visibility during the June Journeys.
6.3 Normative Conditions: Personal, Professional and Organisational Norms

Injunctive and Descriptive Norms

The first condition highlights that actors operate within institutional, professional and personal norms, which actors can reinforce or resist. Norms are ‘a shared expectation of behaviour that denotes what is considered culturally desirable and appropriate’ (Marshall, 1998, pp. 453–454). Through the prism of this condition, actors and media organisations are entities with their own agency, driven by competing ethical, social and political norms (Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015). Norms can be injunctive or descriptive (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). Injunctive norms indicate ‘what ought to be done’ (Cialdini et al., 1990, p. 1015). They are standards and beliefs of desired behaviour underpinned in ethical, social, political and institutional purposes (for a similar point, see the discussion about ‘normative logics’ in Landerer, 2013). Descriptive norms point out what ‘most people do’. They indicate socially appropriate, typical or normal conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990, p. 1015; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). Significantly, descriptive norms are not a sub-product of injunctive norms: accepted or encouraged conduct may follow or contradict some of the ideals and beliefs discussed in the previous condition (Cialdini et al., 1990; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005).

Chapter 5 showed that actors from all categories claimed to be guided by an apparently simple injunctive norm: showing ‘the truth’. For most of the actors, including government officials and visibility entrepreneurs trying to distance themselves from ‘big’ or mainstream media, projecting the truth about the June Journeys meant aligning their actions with values associated with the practice of ‘good’ or ‘professional’ journalism, such as independence, objectivity, fairness and public service (Arant & Meyer, 1998; Hunter, 2015; Landerer, 2013; Palmer, 2002; Waisbord, 2012). Significantly, all the actors held that the injunctive norm of showing the truth was often in conflict with other personal, professional or organisational norms (see also Bunce, 2017; Landerer, 2013; Phillips, 2014; Schudson, 1989; Schultz, 2007; Waisbord, 2012).
As discussed in Chapter 4, most Brazilian mainstream news media labelled demonstrators taking part in the very first protest in Sao Paulo as ‘vandals’ or ‘thugs’ who disrupted the lives of ordinary citizens. Various authors hold that the Brazilian national media criticised both the federal government and protesters, in order to protect the interests of upper-class and conservative groups (Becker & Machado, 2014; Conde & Jazeel, 2013; Judensnaider et al., 2013; Vainer et al., 2013). This is an important critique of the political agendas of the conglomerates that dominate the media landscape in Brazil. However, it may lead to the assumption that all Brazilian journalists were merely puppets in an orchestrated effort to construct a frame centred on the protection of social order.

Most Brazilian journalists interviewed did accept some of the critiques of the political agendas of the Brazilian media, but they asserted that normative struggles occurred during the construction of the frame centred on the protection of social order. They claimed that there were tensions as shown by two types of struggles in the newsrooms: those amongst journalists with differing political or personal ideals, and those between journalists protecting personal and professional values and editors or media owners with their own agendas. Those tensions are detailed below.

*Struggles in the Newsrooms*

Interviewees held that there were almost daily discussions in the newsrooms about how to frame the June Journeys, especially in the early stages of the protests. These disagreements were often underpinned by political and/or personal values. The discussions echo findings of previous studies about news production (e.g. Schudson, 1989), which observe that personal views and ethics often shape how reporters approach the coverage of particular events.

Whilst some journalists contended that the Black Block tactic was a valid form of revolutionary expression against symbols of capitalism, others argued that it was purely destructive. These political views were often mixed with personal
viewpoints. Television reporter Bernardo recalled debating with colleagues on whether or not they should condemn the protesters’ violence:

The young ones [reporters] were very excited about all this. But from the beginning, I had a critical opinion [of the violence], because I am a pacifist, I am a Catholic.

Along with religious beliefs, there were reporters who saw the protests in relation to the effect they had on the newsroom workload. The following quote by Camila Guimarães, former assignment editor for O Estado de Sao Paulo, reveals that there were key tensions amongst journalists who complained about the extra work that the coverage of the June Journeys demanded, and those concerned with the social and political implications of the protests:

Some of the reporters and editors believed they [the protesters] were thugs. Some of the reporters and editors believed their demands [of protesters] were legitimate, that the police were exceeding their limits and were not playing by the rules, and that some very wrong things were going on. And the official position of the decision makers of the newspaper was that they [the protesters] were thugs. Some editors and reporters were like “these thugs, I hate them, they’re messing with my deadlines, they are messing with my life. I have to stay here working late or working more because of these stupid airheads”. And some others would say “no, they’re not airheads, they’re not thugs, something is very wrong”.

In addition to describing two opposing perspectives within newsrooms, the above quote highlights a second type of struggle: the tensions between journalists’ beliefs and the editorial policy or agendas of the media organisations for whom they work. During the June Journeys, most journalists interviewed stated that the official position of media organisations, represented by owners and editors-in-chief, often prevailed (see also Cottle, 2011b). This is a significant point. Journalists work for organisations that have their own hierarchies and agendas, often underpinned by descriptive norms pointing out what ‘most people do’ (see Bruggemann, 2012; Bunce, 2017; Phillips, 2014).

A majority of Brazilian journalists stated that descriptive norms often blocked their discussions and contested perspectives of the June Journeys, and thus,
the discussions could not be seen in the coverage of the June Journeys. As Paula explained, some of her colleagues, especially during the first half of June 2013, purportedly produced articles that met the expectations of their employers:

You have the journalist who self-censors herself beforehand, because she knows what the newspaper owners expect, and you have some media where the editor practically rewrites your whole text.

However, journalists did not always accept the agendas that editors-in-chief or media owners tried to impose on their articles and reports. For example, Cristina, a reporter who covered the demonstrations for a national radio station, recalled a conflict she had with her bosses, as she insisted on using the word ‘demonstrators’ in her reports, rather than ‘vandals’. Cristina looked for ways to compromise by displaying small acts of resistance:

I decided to use both terms in the scripts. I called people demonstrators, but I stated that acts of vandalism were happening.

Cristina did not always succeed. A later report, in which she argued that protesters did not directly target the Rousseff administration, but rather expressed a more generalised social discontent, was heavily edited before being broadcast, in order to ensure, according to her, that it fitted in with the frames that most of the mainstream media had constructed.

Effects of the Violent Protest of 13th June 2013

The internal struggles discussed above dwindled after the demonstration of 13th June 2013 in Sao Paulo. As mentioned earlier, the military police used violence indiscriminately against protesters, passers-by and –significantly– journalists. In some newsrooms, reporters and editors who had labelled protesters as thugs admitted having made a mistake. Furthermore, owners and editors-in-chief of some national newspapers agreed that the violence used by the military police had been excessive (Camila Guimarães). Journalists who were more supportive of the protests felt that this relative shift in the dominant
frame suited their personal values, putting them in a better position to tell ‘the truth’:

For progressive journalists, that change of coverage was very important. We were very happy that we could cover what was actually happening in the protests. That was a historical moment [...] It was beautiful to witness it. You had more than a million people taking to the streets of Sao Paulo. They were singing, they were asking for a better country. I was really moved covering it (Paula).

Despite the optimism recalled by Paula, editorial lines and agendas of media organisations still narrowed the visibility of more sympathetic viewpoints towards the June Journeys. As discussed in Chapter 4, newspapers and television newscasts portrayed themselves as neutral observers with the right to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ activists. Some of the most popular newspapers and newscasts – such as Folha, O Estado de Sao Paulo and Jornal Nacional – narrated the protests as events organised mostly by peaceful demonstrators, which were marred by the violence of the military police and some violent individuals. The national media used that apparent openness to position themselves as detached witnesses, able to discern the legitimacy of the protests (Becker & Machado, 2014; Intervozes, 2014; de Lima, 2013).

According to Rafael Vilela, from Mídia NINJA, Brazilian journalists envied the apparent freedom enjoyed by alternative media collectives, which sharply contrasted with the restrictive editorial lines imposed by mainstream media organisations. However, people collaborating with alternative media collectives also recalled tensions between injunctive norms and organisational agendas. A group of reporters and photographers in Rio de Janeiro left Mídia NINJA to form Coletivo Carranca, stating that, despite its claims of independence and freedom of speech, NINJA censored reports that criticised the governing Workers’ Party.

Likewise, foreign journalists admitted that the agendas of the media organisations they worked for repeatedly blocked the visibility of certain topics:
When I did my thing for [media organisation of Asian country], there were quite a lot of stories about rape in Brazil. That kind of thing wasn’t going to play in more conservative countries. And for the [Muslim country] agencies, sometimes they weren’t interested in covering the Sao Paulo gay pride or LBGT issues.

Tensions also characterised the efforts of government officials. Some of them admitted their frustration at their inability to develop more active communication strategies to mitigate the apparent damage that the June Journeys inflicted on the image of Brazil. State officials observed that both the Cardoso and Lula administrations were actively engaged in the task of constructing and projecting a positive image of Brazil abroad. As Brazilian diplomat Vinicius told me, during both governments Brazil enjoyed ‘presidential diplomacy’, with Cardoso and Lula travelling all over the world, meeting foreign leaders and talking to international journalists on a continuous basis. Conversely, Dilma Rousseff lacked the charisma of her predecessors. She visited less countries than the previous administrations, and had a personal distrust of journalists. Hence, government officials stated that it was more difficult for them to propose communication exercises to mitigate the effects of the June Journeys on the image of Brazil. When they conducted a specific communication initiative, the lack of involvement of Rousseff often meant the international news media did not pay attention to such efforts (Vinicius, Brazilian Diplomat; Luiza, communications officer).

6.4 Routines and Practices: News Criteria

Institutional Protocols or Routines

The second condition refers to the institutional protocols or routines that actors follow to construct and show images in the media. Whilst this condition may overlap with the descriptive norms discussed in the previous section, it refers to practices rather than norms. Typically, actors follow routines almost instinctively. Media professionals often struggle to give reasons to justify the coverage of an event. Many times they follow a ‘journalistic gut feeling’ (Schultz, 2007; see also Bruggemann, 2012; Shoemaker & Cohen, 2006). A few Brazilian and foreign journalists interviewed were adamant that they simply pursued ‘the story’ when covering the June Journeys:
I loathe leaving the newsroom with an idea in my head. The story is made on the street. Of course there are formulas, but journalists get into trouble when they shift into autopilot mode. For example, the June Journeys were something unprecedented in the history of Brazil. And if you tried to cover them like any other protest, you were wrong […] I confess that I had no idea that the June Journeys were going to reach such gigantic proportions. I had no idea that they would become part of the history of the country. I was witnessing history without realising that history was being made (Eduardo Goulart de Andrade, reporter for TV Brasil).

However, most of the Brazilian journalists I interviewed admitted to feeling anxious about not having a standardised script with which to cover the protests, as discussed previously. According to their testimony, images and accounts in the media hinge on institutional protocols and labour routines along with organisational, professional and personal beliefs. Earlier research states that these routines aim to make the unexpected predictable (Curran & Seaton, 1997). Indeed, studies suggest that routines play a more relevant role than personal or professional beliefs in moulding news. They argue that the naturalisation of these routines and protocols obscures alternative possibilities of constructing and projecting news (Gieber, 1999 [1964]; Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978). Hence, the significance of routines is that they play a fundamental role in the selection of what to show or what not to show in the media (Gitlin, 2003, p. 4).

To illustrate the importance of institutional protocols, I examine the one that interviewees highlighted most: the employment of news criteria. Examples were supplied by foreign freelance journalists and correspondents. Foreign journalists especially stressed news criteria throughout the interviews. The need to continuously pitch stories to their editors made foreign freelance journalists and correspondents more aware of the different criteria that their proposed stories had to fulfil in order to be published.

News Criteria

Most of the foreign media analysed in this thesis began covering the June Journeys only from mid-June 2013. Furthermore, as highlighted at the
beginning of Chapter 4, the night before the military police violently attacked protesters and journalists in downtown Sao Paulo, *BBC News* broadcast a report about Brazilians who had enthusiastically begun to take English lessons in preparation for the World Cup (Carneiro, 2013a). When I asked foreign correspondents why the June Journeys had become news at this point and not earlier, they listed a series of supposedly neutral criteria justifying the coverage of the protests at that precise moment.

News criteria—also called news values or news factors—are the underlying and subjective reasons that media professionals use to select what to make visible (Caple & Bednarek, 2013; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Golding & Elliott, 1979; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2016; Hartley, 1993; Lacey, 2009; McCurdy, 2013; Palmer, 2002). News criteria are inseparable from the routines and institutional protocols of media organisations (Allern, 2002; Golding & Elliott, 1979; Hall et al., 1978; Hartley, 1993; Jorge, 2008; O’Neill & Harcup, 2008; Palmer, 2002; Tunstall, 1971). The following quote by Todd Benson, Brazil Bureau Chief for *Reuters News*, illustrates how journalists perceived and applied news criteria during the June Journeys:

We [at *Reuters*] are writing for a global audience and there are protests everywhere, every day globally, so we only really get into it when we think it's significant enough in terms of size […] We started writing [about the June Journeys] when it got to about 10,000 people, but it was the violence that made us start writing about it more than the size. As soon as the police brutality happened, that's when it became politically sensitive with unforeseen implications […] But the world was interested at that moment because a big sporting event was starting and that's when they said, oh God, the sporting event being marred by protests, there’s our story. That's when everyone flocked to it.

In the first half of the quote, Todd Benson described news criteria as a neutral, deterministic checklist of what makes a story relevant or attractive. He lists elements such as violence or the number of protesters taking to the streets—*‘We started writing when it got to about 10,000 people’, ‘it was the violence that made us start writing’.* Similarly, other foreign correspondents justified the
relevance of the June Journeys by pointing out similar elements. For example, British freelance journalist Oliver said:

If you are an international broadcaster and there is a protest down the road with 300 people at it, you ignore it, right? Unless you know the police are going to be there and firing at people. I know this sounds very cynical but it’s the way it works.

In the above quote Oliver agrees that violence is the most relevant criterion to justify the newsworthiness of the June Journeys. Notwithstanding, he does not describe news criteria as neutral. In what he admits is a cynical perspective, he implies that violence prevails due to its spectacular character rather than because of its newsworthiness – ‘Unless you know the police are going to be there and firing at people’. Spectacular, in this case, refers to the creation of content whose visibility is underpinned by emotions such as fear and shock (based on Brighenti, 2010b, p. 49; see also Cottle, 2008). Hence, Oliver’s quote implies that these emotions determined the visibility or invisibility of specific spectacular content.

The supposed neutrality of news criteria is further put in doubt when acknowledging that the perceived importance of one criterion over another varies depending on the context (Palmer, 2000, 2002). Various foreign journalists admitted that the newsworthiness of the June Journeys was due not only to the particular characteristics of the protests, but also to their similarities and differences with other recent episodes of social unrest, such as the Arab Spring or the demonstrations happening in Turkey practically simultaneously (Larry Rohter, The New York Times). Foreign journalists compared, evaluated and related the June Journeys to other demonstrations, sometimes portraying them as tokens of global phenomena.

The second half of Todd Benson’s earlier quote highlights the relevance of a specific news criterion: the coincidence of the demonstrations with the Confederations Cup. According to him, the most decisive factor driving the coverage was not the violence, the number of people on the streets or the political consequences of the June Journeys, but the friction caused by people
taking to the streets when Brazil was hosting an international football tournament – ‘That’s when everyone flocked to it’. That coincidence was not a news criterion that foreign journalists merely witnessed and reported on. They amplified and reinforced it, as the next section shows.

Amplification of the Tension between Football and Protests

Originally, the protests in Sao Paulo against a public transport fare increase had no connection with those opposing the Confederations Cup in Brasilia. Thiago Ávila, a member of the Popular Committee of the World Cup, claimed that members of this activist network had followed the news of the violent protest in Sao Paulo on 13th June 2013. However, he admitted that they had no intention of linking the one in Sao Paulo to the demonstration that they organised two days later outside the National Stadium in Brasilia, which coincided with the inaugural match of the Confederations Cup. In fact, some of the first reports published by the Brazilian national media treated these protests as significant, although separate episodes (e.g. Falcão et al., 2013; Greco, 2013; “Paz, só em campo,” 2013).

Significantly, from mid-June onwards, the foreign media, followed later by the government, national media and activists, agglomerated these and subsequent protests as if they were part of a single coordinated whole. According to Vincent Bevins, foreign correspondent in Sao Paulo for The Los Angeles Times, only a fortuitous combination heightened the profile of the protests in Brasilia:

I went there [to the demonstration in Brasilia], and there were like 200 people, protesting against some of the issues around the World Cup. No one was going to care at all, but this happened two days after this huge protest in Sao Paulo. The fact that there was violence between the police and the protesters and another crackdown [in Brasilia], allowed the whole thing to be about soccer too. Now, these two [protests]  

As mentioned in Chapter 1, along with Brasilia, another five cities hosted matches during the Confederations Cup: Belo Horizonte, Recife, Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, Fortaleza and Salvador. Thiago Ávila told me that in each of those cities, activist networks such as the Popular Committee for the World Cup organised protests to increase awareness of the social cost of hosting mega sports events (interviewed in 2014). Movimento Passe Livre, an unrelated organisation with completely different objectives, was originally behind the demonstrations in Sao Paulo.
were joined together purely by an accident of timing. And then the Confederations Cup was marked by teargas and confrontations, because it happened right at that time. If they had raised the bus fares after the Confederations Cup, this scenario would not have happened.

Vincent Bevins argued that the two parallel but originally disconnected demonstrations coincided due to an ‘accident of timing’. The disconnection between the protests in Sao Paulo and Brasilia does not mean that there were no similarities between both demonstrations. Although their aims and agendas were different and often incompatible (Gohn, 2014b), these demonstrations and other similar protests were outside the control of political parties and militant organisations, and were usually coordinated through social media.

Various foreign media organisations emphasised the risk that these demonstrations posed for the organisation of the then-upcoming FIFA World Cup (e.g. Downie, 2013; Joyce, 2013; Watts, 2013c). That connection was not accidental. The FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games are among the most important – in terms of revenue and audiences – contemporary mega and media events (Tomlinson & Young, 2006). In recent years, different groups have attempted to exploit them as platforms to draw direct attention to different causes (Cottrell & Nelson, 2010; Price, 2008). Hence, both sporting events have become a sort of ‘conquest’ (using the typology of media events proposed by Dayan & Katz, 1992), given that their organisational success is put in question.

Todd Benson from Reuters confirmed this point observing that transnational media agencies usually probe whether or not countries and cities are ready to host sporting events:

Our job is to hold their feet [of the organisers] to the fire and say, wait a second, you [the authorities] promised this stadium would be ready in December and it’s not. There are serious doubts about it. So I think it’s legitimate; we’re not manufacturing that. We’re writing it based on real doubts about whether or not it’s going to be ready on time. And writing it based on a real debate amongst Brazilians, about whether Brazil should be spending money on that stuff, so, you know, we don’t make that up.
Other foreign journalists whom I interviewed admitted that the tension between demonstrations and a football tournament was heightened due to the common association of this sport with Brazilian national identity. As Larry Rother, former South America Bureau Chief for The New York Times, observed:

The idea that Brazilians would be demonstrating against the construction of soccer stadia is counterintuitive. [Foreign journalists think] Don’t they love soccer so much down there?

The friction between football and protests—visible in descriptions such as ‘the soccer-mad country, it turns out, has a lot more to be mad about than its favourite sport’, published in The New York Times (Zinser, 2013)—is based on a stereotypical portrayal of Brazil. News criteria are ideologically charged, even though journalists often describe them as neutral (Hall et al., 1978; Palmer, 2002). In this case, they reinforce a stereotype of Brazil and its place in the world as the ‘football nation’.

I am not arguing that foreign journalists either lied or miscommunicated the ‘authentic’ drivers behind the demonstrations. Rather, I wish to point out that routines and protocols, such as the employment of news criteria, guided and circumscribed the construction and projection of the June Journeys as if they were a single movement of people against the FIFA World Cup. Various foreign correspondents and Brazilian journalists told me that the costs involved in hosting the FIFA World Cup were not the spark for the June Journeys and, in fact, claimed that the hosting of these sports events on its own was not enough to start the protests (Robert, American journalist; Priscilla, editor of Jornal Nacional).

British foreign correspondent Oliver accordingly recalled that actors outside traditional media organisations exploited the tension between football and protests. He was often invited to attend demonstrations that were only superficially against the FIFA World Cup:
They [protestors] saw that the foreign media were going to turn up if they saw that the protest was something linked to the World Cup. Protesters would claim, this is a protest against the Cup, but everything would be about health or education or something like that. They would use a line like, how can you spend billions on the World Cup when we’ve got all these problems with hospitals? Of course, to some extent, one thing did not have so much to do with the other […] But they used it and they noticed that it got more coverage if it was called a World Cup protest rather than a health protest.

Hence, foreign journalists were not the only actors exploiting news criteria in their attempt to increase the visibility of a particular aspect of the June Journeys. Activists also exploited the tension between football and protests to grasp the attention of the mainstream media, thus showing how they seek to adapt their messages to fit within journalistic criteria, in order to increase the possibilities of making their agendas visible (Cammaerts & Jiménez-Martínez, 2014; Cammaerts et al., 2013; Mattoni, 2012).

6.5 Market Imperatives

Commercialisation of News

Market imperatives refer to the market pressures influencing the construction and projection of images in the media. The literature discusses these pressures at length, with authors often depicting them as opposed to the journalism ideals of objectivity, independence and fairness. This condition portrays the media —in particular mainstream media organisations— as organisations that aim to reach the widest possible audience in order to generate the greatest profits possible (Champagne, 2005; Hamilton, 2004; Landerer, 2013; McChesney, 2004; Strömback & Esser, 2009). Authors writing from the viewpoint of media logics hold that market imperatives are the dominant principle guiding normative and institutional conditions (Hamilton, 2004; Strömback & Esser, 2009). Although not every media organisation covering the June Journeys had the explicit aim of maximising profits, most of the Brazilian and foreign journalists whom I interviewed contended that consideration of commercial interests was essential to understand the way the protests were covered. British freelance journalist Julie stated:
Obviously, the media don’t care about Brazil. They don’t naturally care about anything. I mean, they care about selling newspapers and making more clicks, so, I don’t know. I’m kind of cynical. When something like that happens [the June Journeys], obviously the media have some wonderful people doing their stuff and there are people who think it is really important to report on it, [but there are] all kinds of reasons why these things get reported, and one of them is, of course, profit.

Although Julie admits that normative conditions drove some journalists during the coverage of the June Journeys, she contends that maximisation of profit was the dominant principle guiding media organisations. Notably, Julie portrays the media as a monolithic commercial entity driven mostly by profit maximisation, but she distances herself from it. Various interviewees adopted similar postures. They were highly critical of media organisations, but at the same time they depicted themselves in a both distant and defeatist way, as mere victims of unavoidable market imperatives.

Conversely, activists and alternative media collectives claimed that in comparison to what they called the ‘corporate’ media, the lack of commercial pressures allowed them to tell ‘the truth’. Despite these criticisms, the accounts of some of these actors were infused with market-driven worlds. When Carla Dauden described the limited impact of a second video she created—a point considered later in this chapter—, she said:

The Pope went to Brazil, and that was the day I released my second video, which was a bad marketing strategy (emphasis added).

Hence, it is not only journalists and the authorities who trade—literally and metaphorically—images and accounts of the nation, but also those who claim to be either outside or against the market (see also Phillips, 2014).

*Relations between Journalists and Editors*

The trading of images and accounts of the nation was clear when observing the relations between foreign journalists and their editors, as well as the fragile labour conditions of freelance journalists. Indeed, whilst the relations between journalists and editors are often understudied by media scholars (some
exceptions being Hannerz, 2004; McCurdy, 2013), such relations are crucial to comprehending the struggles for visibility that took place during the June Journeys.

Tensions between reporters and news editors were already at play in the two conditions previously examined: the vertical working division of newsrooms meant that the norms of media owners and editors-in-chief usually prevailed over those of reporters, and editors often had the final word on the news criterion to be used when narrating a story about Brazil. Notwithstanding, editors have increasingly acquired an entrepreneurial role, concerned with the maximisation of profits for media organisations (Tunstall, 1995). Indeed, British journalist Anna, who works as a freelance journalist for various news organisations, contended that revenue generation was one of the main factors underpinning editorial decisions:

> I think in any country, not just Brazil, there are certain aspects of the culture that newspaper editors are more willing to publish stories on [...] because they sell newspapers. Most of the time, people are more interested in football stories about Brazil than they are about social justice stories, so there are going to be a lot more stories about football.

In Anna’s account, market imperatives facilitated the visibility of football stories, while they obstructed those about social inequality. Notably, almost all foreign journalists whom I interviewed stated that editors often reinforced stereotypic portrayals of Brazil, in order to pursue commercial aims. For instance, Emma recalled how a crew she guided through Sao Paulo were disappointed when she took them to a favela that ‘wasn’t that poor’, because it did not resemble the one seen in the film *City of God*.

Notwithstanding, it would be a mistake to assume that news editors’ decisions always reinforced stereotypes of Brazil. The interests and agendas of media organisations are often subject to change (Cottle, 2008). Hence, guided by both institutional routines and market imperatives, editors sometimes moulded the contents provided by journalists, to ensure that they fitted with pre-
conceived ideas of what audiences supposedly wanted (see also McCurdy, 2013).

The international and transnational media framed the June Journeys as a revolt by ‘the Brazilian people’ against the authorities’ decision to host two mega sports events in a nation with inadequate basic public services (Cohen, 2013; “Social awakening in Brazil,” 2013, “The march of protest,” 2013). Conversely, only one year earlier, at the end of the London Olympic Games, newspaper articles focussed precisely on the supposed enthusiasm of Brazilians to host both the World Cup and the Olympics:

I was asked by an editor to write a story on how people in Rio were really, really excited about the Rio Olympics. And, I wrote the story, but most of the people I talked to weren’t that excited. They were saying, ‘well, you know, we’d rather have the money spent on other things. We’d rather that the investment goes on housing and education rather than new stadia […] And when it was published, the editor just cut out the negative stuff, just left the stuff about happy and excited people. So that was kind of interesting, because the editor in that instance had, and this happens a lot, a preconceived idea of the story that he wanted and the inputs that didn’t fit into that narrative, just got binned (Anna).

Anna’s quote implies that market imperatives blocked the visibility of the very same underlying tensions that, twelve months later, were under the spotlight. According to her, the dissatisfaction of Brazilians with the hosting of mega sporting events remained invisible in 2012, given that such questioning undermined the cheerful narrative about the Olympics intended by the foreign editor referenced above. Significantly, Anna admitted that she accepted the changes in her article to avoid compromising future work prospects. These pressures, along with the institutional routines discussed earlier, contributed to the projection of a version of the June Journeys shaped by what supposedly works in the media. As television producer Emma reflected:

Internationally speaking, the story [of the June Journeys] that was published wasn't necessarily accurate […] Although it did present some facts, it certainly left out the rest of the facts that would’ve made the story completely accurate. I feel that if it had added in all these extra facts, editors would've said ‘Well, that's not a story’.
Fragility of Freelance Journalists’ Working Conditions

Anna’s previous quote sheds light on the second manifestation of market imperatives: the fragile labour conditions of journalists, particularly those working as freelancers. It is unclear how many foreign journalists are actually in that position in Brazil. When I contacted ACIE, the Association of Foreign Correspondents in Brazil, I was told they did not hold such data (personal communication, 2015). It is worth mentioning that of the twenty foreign journalists and photographers I interviewed, thirteen were freelance. In recent years, budget cuts have forced media organisations, particularly from the United States and Western Europe, to dramatically reduce the number of foreign correspondents (Hannerz, 2004; Phillips, 2014; Sambrook, 2010; Utley, 1997).

Two foreign journalists claimed that being freelance allowed them to write about subjects they found more satisfying, rather than simply accepting the assignments of editors (Leanne and Kelsey, interviewed in 2015). That freedom is one of the supposed advantages of freelance journalism (Smith, 2009). However other freelancers and foreign correspondents held the opposing view. Todd Benson, Brazil Bureau Chief for Reuters News, stated:

I totally think that we’re in a better position than freelancers because we’re staff […] Freelancing is really tough; you have to sell a sexy story to get space […] I don’t say that as a criticism of freelancers. It is not an easy job. They’re always having to sell what they do, and you often deal with editors who don’t know anything about the country you’re covering.

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86 Foreign correspondents are those journalists hired by international and transnational media organisations. Conversely, freelance journalists stated that they can have different relationships with media organisations. Some of them put forward ideas for potential articles to various organisations, until one of those ideas is accepted. In that case, they are usually prevented from selling the same or a similar article to another news organisation. Other journalists are ‘stringers’, that is to say, they regularly contribute only to specific media organisations, although they are not staff members. Journalists may also act as ‘fixers’ of correspondents who are sent to Brazil by news organisations. Fixers contribute their knowledge of the local situation, and may be in charge of finding sources, translating interviews, or even arranging accommodation and transport. Some of the journalists I interviewed worked as fixers during the 2014 World Cup, when sports journalists from all over the world travelled to Brazil to cover that football tournament.
Earlier scholarship by Bourdieu states that a substantial proportion of media professionals are in precarious labour conditions. That uncertainty has important implications for what is made visible in the news media. According to Bourdieu, ‘[p]recarity of employment is a loss of liberty, through which censorship and the effect of economic constraints can more easily be expressed’ (2005, p. 43). Significantly, Todd Benson’s words shed light on the fact that, unlike the supposed freedom expressed by some journalists (e.g. Smith, 2009), freelance journalists appear to be the group most vulnerable to market imperatives, due to the instability of their working situation.

Anna’s case illustrates how freelance journalists depend on maintaining good relationships with editors. As a consequence, they often propose subjects that meet editors’ expectations, and are willing to approve changes to the published material. Some freelance journalists purportedly emphasised in their articles and reports the criterion that connected football and protests. As Brazilian journalist Mauricio Savarese revealed:

> My friends have told me, “if I sell them [to foreign editors] a story of how a protest to improve health and education in Brazil is important, people will not read it. But stories that Brazil will host the World Cup and people are against it, that sells much more” […] Many of those friends are freelancers, and have to sell stories to put food on the table.

Strikingly, most freelancers I interviewed portrayed themselves as almost devoid of agency, being prisoners of perverse commercial pressures that they reluctantly accepted. Other interviewees challenged that account, stating that, in practice, freelance journalists willingly consented to these pressures and chose stories based on their potential to generate profit. Such accounts echo previous research, which has observed how market imperatives drive media organisations to engage in struggles for and over the image of the nation, but without taking into account the contents or outcomes of these struggles (Turner, 2016, p. 26). Accordingly, even dissent and protests can become commodities. Vincent Bevins, a foreign correspondent for The Los Angeles Times, contended that some freelance journalists saw the coverage of the June Journeys as an opportunity to increase their earnings:
Freelancers that are just trying to make their name, and it’s all about their name, and they’re just trying to get that $600 for that big article, they’ll be like, Brazilians hate the World Cup, or something about sex and soccer and so on. All freelancers saw this [the June Journeys] as a huge opportunity to make more money, but to do that, to reach more publications, TV channels or websites, they were willing to simplify and reinforce stereotypes. They weren’t willing. They were forced to do so.

Vincent Bevins’ claim that freelancers ‘were forced to’ emphasise stereotypes about Brazil reveals a narrative of frustration and victimisation with the news media. Although foreign correspondents and freelance journalists described their relationships with their superiors as fraught with tensions and frustration, they stressed that neither reporters nor editors intended to manipulate or lie when altering or emphasising specific news criteria. British freelance journalist Julie told me:

> It is a *whole* kind of system that is probably guilty of that.

Thus, rather than pointing at particular individuals or organisations, foreign journalists criticised—but also took little direct responsibility for—the institutional and organisational internal workings of the media as if they were external factors with nothing to do with journalism.

Whilst actors outside mainstream media organisations did not have to deal with editors and were supposedly, free of market pressures, some of them explained the visibility—or lack of visibility—of the contents they constructed in a strikingly similar way to foreign journalists. On 22\(^{nd}\) July 2013, filmmaker Carla Dauden uploaded a second video to her YouTube account, called ‘Yes, you can still go to the World Cup — IF’ (Dauden, 2013b). In this video, Carla invites audiences to pressure the Brazilian government to reduce the negative impact of the World Cup on Brazil’s public services. That second video did not receive the same attention from viewers, as her first effort.\(^{87}\) In our interview,

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\(^{87}\) Up to October 2016, ‘No, I’m not going to the World Cup’ had reached almost 4,5 million views on YouTube, while ‘Yes, you can go to the World Cup — IF’ had less than 150,000 (Dauden, 2013a, 2013b).
Carla reflected that the first video was more popular due to its timing—it coincided with the peak of the June Journeys—and its focus on controversial issues surrounding the preparations for the World Cup:

The second one [video] is much more serious and much more real, and just, just, I guess, political. And people don't care so much about that. They want to be entertained all the time. That's kind of sad, but *that's how it works* (emphasis added).

Carla's explanation that *'that's how it works'* resembles the resignation and frustration expressed by foreign journalists. Only certain contents and formats work in the media, that is to say, can meet the demands of audiences. Furthermore, she—like the foreign journalist interviewees—described this state-of-affairs as almost impossible to challenge, namely, as if it was the *natural state* of the media environment.

### 6.6 Technological Influences

*Media Technologies as Facilitators of Visibility*

Technological influences refer to how different technologies shape, foster and/or block the mediated visibility of specific content. When seeing them through the prism of this condition, the media are technological tools or platforms. Some authors argue relatedly that technological development in media and communications is a key factor underpinning the new visibility (Dayan, 2013; Thompson, 2005). Various analyses highlight the use of new technologies as a constituent element of the June Journeys. Most of these analyses, particularly those written almost immediately after the demonstrations, celebrate how actors employed digital media as tools to coordinate the protests as well as platforms to communicate alternative viewpoints (e.g. Almeida & Evangelista, 2013; Amaral, 2016; Ávila, 2013; Cardoso et al., 2016; Conde & Jazeel, 2013; d'Andrea & Ziller, 2015; De Souza, 2014). Helen Joyce, former Brazil correspondent for *The Economist* supported this view, saying:
There were people who were marching beside each other who didn’t agree on anything at all, even why they were there, or what these protests were about. That couldn’t have happened without social media.

The opportunities provided by media technologies are clearly demonstrated by the case of Jimmy Lima, a 17-year-old secondary school student who organised the ‘Vinegar March’ in Brasilia. In June 2013, Jimmy followed news about the protests in Sao Paulo through his Facebook newsfeed, newspaper articles and television reports. Jimmy said that the violence of the military police at the protest of 13th June in Sao Paulo shocked him. After taking part in the protest that coincided with the inaugural match of the Confederations Cup in Brasilia, Jimmy created a Facebook event calling for a demonstration outside Brazil’s National Congress on 17th June. He called it the ‘Vinegar March’ (Figure 18), an allusion to an episode when protesters were arrested in Sao Paulo by the military police for carrying vinegar during a demonstration.

Fig 18 – Screenshot of Facebook event calling for the ‘Vinegar March’. It translates as ‘Vinegar march!! Let’s bring Brasilia to a halt!’ (Marcha do Vinagre!! Vamos parar Brasília!). The date corresponds to a second march that Jimmy Lima organised on 22nd June.88

Jimmy’s decision to use Facebook was not an isolated case. A survey carried out in eight Brazilian cities revealed that 62 per cent of protesters heard about the demonstrations through Facebook, and that 75 per cent used this platform

88 Available at https://www.facebook.com/events/645805775444538/
to invite their contacts to take to the streets (referenced in Porto & Brant, 2015, p. 190). To put these numbers in perspective, in 2013 Brazil was the third country in the world with most registered Facebook users –76 million– and the second one in terms of daily usage –47 million (Gomes, 2013).

Jimmy invited his contacts to attend that protest and asked them to spread the word. On 17th June, an estimated 15,000 people took part in the ‘Vinegar March’. Newspaper articles enthusiastically reported that Jimmy had ‘shaken’ the Brazilian capital (Lazzeri, 2013; see also Lima, 2013; “‘Marcha do Vinagre’ no DF reúne mais de 1.500 na Esplanada dos Ministérios,” 2013; de Sá, 2013).

Examples like the ‘Vinegar March’ have led authors to suggest that new technologies strengthened democracy in Brazil. The alternative media displayed temporarily a broader array of views and facilitated the spontaneous gathering of people to express their dissatisfaction (Amaral, 2016; Ávila, 2013; d’Andrea & Ziller, 2015; De Souza, 2014). The apparent spontaneity of these gatherings illustrates ‘the myth of us’, that is to say, the belief that ‘our gatherings on social media platforms are a natural form of expressive collectivity’ (Couldry, 2015b, p. 608).

Some authors argue that the use of digital media makes the June Journeys similar to other episodes of social unrest, such as the Arab Spring, the Occupy movement, as well as protests in Iceland and Tunisia (Cardoso et al., 2016; Castells, 2013). The significant employment of digital media marks a departure from previous demonstrations in Brazil. As communications consultant Rachel Mello observed:

89 Several of these studies have drawn on Castells’ concept of mass-self communication (2009). Furthermore, Manuel Castells himself referenced the June Journeys in a postscript especially written for the Brazilian edition of his book Networks of Outage and Hope (called Redes de Indignação e Esperança. Movimentos sociais na era da internet in Portuguese). That postscript gave the June Journeys as another example of a global revolution of techno-savvy, young, middle class activists. Castells’ essay begins with the words ‘It also happened in Brazil’ (Castells, 2013, p. 182), thus emphasising the apparent similarities of events in Brazil with other case studies in the book, such as the unrest in Tunisia and Iceland.
Up until then, we had seen protests convened by trade unions and political parties. Then suddenly you had a protest with 800 thousand people in Sao Paulo, organised by students using Facebook, Twitter and Whatsapp.

**Technological Drawbacks**

Actors admitted however that media technologies also entailed limitations and risks that facilitated or blocked the visibility of certain content. Activists and alternative journalists mentioned two technological drawbacks that enabled or impeded the projection of content during the June Journeys: fragility, and time and space availability.

Fragility is the first drawback. It is one of the key characteristics of the new visibility. It is currently impossible to ‘control completely the words and images that circulate in the public domain’ (Thompson, 2005, p. 49). In his research into visibility, Thompson (2000) has focussed on the effects of the uncontrollability of the images that politicians and other figures in power craft in the media. Significantly, not only those in power were affected by fragility during the June Journeys. Some of the visibility entrepreneurs whom I interviewed revealed that they were also distressed by this uncontrollability. For instance, several blogs accused Carla Dauden of being fraudulent and inaccurate in her observations despite the relative popularity of her video ‘No, I’m not going to the World Cup’, (e.g. “No, I’m not going to the world cup” – *A desconstrução de uma fraude,* 2013). Similarly, a Brazilian journalist I interviewed said that:

> [Dauden’s] video shows the typical concerns of a certain Brazilian middle class, urban, white, rich and disconnected from the rest of country.

These and other criticisms led Carla to delete all personal information from her website and social media accounts. In addition, she sent a note to a magazine dismissing alternative interpretations of her video, stating that she was only a filmmaker voicing her opinion, and that she did not support either an impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff or calls to alter the rule of law (De Aquino, 2013).
As this episode illustrates, media and communication technologies are a double-edged sword. On one hand, the internet represented a source of opportunities for people like Carla Dauden, Jimmy Lima and the members of Mídia NINJA, who were capable of constructing and projecting content that reached wider audiences and shaped the image of Brazil. On the other, the same technologies make the media contents, as well as those who produce them, particularly fragile (Thompson, 2005; see also Cammaerts et al., 2013). As Carla Dauden summarised:

> Once it [any content] is on the Internet, it is like a black hole and you cannot control it anymore […] Once it is out there, you are so vulnerable, so exposed. It is a good thing, but it is also scary.

The second drawback that actors described is time and space availability. Blogs, social media and other digital platforms are apparently less constrained, in terms of time and space, than newspapers, television or radio. Television journalist Alessandra held that the limited amount of time she had in news broadcasts forced her and other colleagues to summarise Brazil in a simplified way:

> I always joked that for a very long time, to everything that you reported about Brazil, you had to add the line, “Brazil, after significant growth rates and just years ahead of the World Cup and the Olympics” But then it had to go away because it wasn't happening any more.

Time and space limitations prevented constructing and projecting nuanced accounts of Brazil. New technologies should, therefore, facilitate a more detailed coverage of the June Journeys. In fact, some authors have praised the live streaming and lack of editing carried out by alternative media collectives such as Mídia NINJA precisely for those reasons (e.g. Conde & Jazeel, 2013). However, that impression can be deceptive. Alternative reporters held that having too much available time also contributed to simplifying accounts about the demonstrations. As Rui Harayama, anthropologist and collaborator of Coletivo Carranca, admitted:
I don’t like doing streaming, because there is a moment in which you have nothing else to say. You keep on talking about what is happening right at the moment, but you are incapable of doing any analysis.

Rui’s observations about the shortcomings of live coverage question how much new technologies have altered the nature of reporting. His experience is strikingly similar to an episode that television journalist Alessandra recalled. In late June 2013, she was taking part in a live broadcast during a protest outside a stadium where the Confederations Cup was being played. Alessandra was about a kilometre away from the venue, in an area under police surveillance. In her report, however, she said that she was just outside the stadium. In hindsight, she admitted that the technological limitations of live reporting prevented her from making visible a more nuanced account:

> Sometimes you’re not able to convey the whole context, because if I’m in the middle of tear gas I’m not going to explain, oh, you know, this started in the city square and there were thousands of people. You’re just explaining what’s happening and you’re trying not to get hurt.

*New Technologies vis-à-vis Old Technologies*

Several authors have portrayed the June Journeys not only as a clash between elites vis-à-vis ‘the people’, but also as a generational and technological conflict. According to this view, new ‘alternative’ technologies like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube struggled against ‘old’ ‘mainstream’ technologies such as newspapers, radio and television (e.g. Amaral, 2016; Ávila, 2013; d’Andrea & Ziller, 2015; de Jesus, 2014). It is true that the use of digital technologies challenged mainstream media, not only in terms of producing opposing content –as stated in the analysis of the strategy of replacement, in Chapter 5–, but also in altering *how* established journalists covered the demonstrations. Reporters from Brazil and abroad admitted that, in order to have a comprehensive view of the June Journeys, they had to pay attention both to the streets and to social media. Brazilian journalist Alessandra recalled:
[Social media] was like a thermometer. It was really important to monitor what people were saying, what was happening, what was being planned, because there was no central leadership; there wasn’t a group that you could talk to, to know what would be the next step, what is being planned after this big protest. We always had to resort to Facebook because that's where the events were created, and people started responding, accepting or declining them.

However, approaching the June Journeys as a clash between old versus new media technologies overlooks the fact that government officials, Brazilian and foreign journalists all embraced digital technologies. Todd Benson, from Reuters News, recalled that Brazilian and foreign reporters joined a Whatsapp Group Chat to share real-time information about meeting points and safety recommendations for the protests. Similarly, Brazilian journalist Paula recalled an episode in which a photo she took of one her colleagues being arrested during a protest went viral on Facebook and Twitter. Notably, the lawyers for that specific news organisation used that image to demand the release of the journalist. Thus, even actors working for ‘old’ media can benefit from the advantages of the ‘new’ ones (for discussion in other contexts, see Phillips, 2014).

The merger of ‘old’ and ‘new’ technologies also raised important challenges. I previously discussed how having too much available time increased the risk amongst actors of simplifying the contents that they show through different media platforms. Similarly, having too much available recorded material was also a problem, particularly for television stations. That was the case for Jornal Nacional, the most popular television newscast in Brazil. As Priscilla, one of the Jornal Nacional editors, recalled, several journalists of this newscast went to the streets to record images of the June Journeys. Some of them carried only a smartphone to avoid being recognised as working for Globo TV and therefore risking being attacked by protesters. The abundance of recorded material, however, increased the difficulty of choosing what to show or what not to show on television. Furthermore, according to Priscilla, some of the accusations that Jornal Nacional manipulated or concealed information were unjustified, because technology often influenced the editorial decisions of this newscast:
We had a huge quantity of material arriving, from different moments, different cities and in different formats, you know? And I had to see it all, because it could be that precisely in the material that you didn’t see, there was an image of the moment when the police were beating up people, an image that is going to go viral on social media, and people are going to say ‘Globo did not show that’ […] And you were seeing your colleagues bringing you that to the newsroom, some of them having been attacked, bleeding, because the press are biased, the press do not show everything.

Notions of a technological clash also obscure the fact that ‘old’ routines were still prevalent within ‘new’ media. One example serves to illustrate this point. In July 2013, Mídia NINJA live streamed an interview with Eduardo Paes, mayor of the city of Rio de Janeiro. The interview lasted approximately an hour and a half and he discussed topics such as protests, the World Cup and public transportation (“Eduardo Paes: Entrevista exclusiva Midia Ninja,” 2013). This interview backfired on Mídia NINJA, as several blogs and viewers criticised the interviewers for being unprepared and too uncritical of the politician (Mazotte, 2013).

According to Rafael Vilela, member of Mídia NINJA, the main mistake committed on that occasion was overlooking the fact that only certain interview styles can be projected through specific technologies. A more conciliatory style, with less drama and confrontation, did not apparently fit with the format of live streaming:

A girl was doing that interview and she knew how to do written interviews. Her strategy was allowing the mayor to speak and edit later. But this was a live interview.

As mentioned earlier, various analyses argue that the use of new technologies is a constituent element of the June Journeys. Some of these approaches have praised the technologies for their ability to empower citizens and to broaden the spectrum of images shown in the media. However, some authors hold that the introduction and adoption of new communication technologies does not necessarily lead to more equal, democratic and participative societies (Waisbord, 2015). Indeed during the June Journeys, these technologies facilitated the construction and circulation of images produced by actors such
as *Midia NINJA*, Carla Dauden and Jimmy Lima, and sometimes replicated or even amplified some of the same drawbacks of ‘old’ technologies like newspapers, radio and television.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter examined four conditions of visibility within which the actors operated when constructing the frames and employing the strategies of visibility discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. These are (1) *normative conditions*, (2) *institutional routines*, (3) *market imperatives* and (4) *technological influences*. Actors were not merely subject to these conditions. Through various professional practices, working environments, technological developments, as well as commercial and institutional policies, actors shaped, reinforced, or resisted these conditions (Brighenti, 2007, 2010b; Voirol, 2005). The examination of these conditions shows that certain norms, practices, commercial imperatives and technologies facilitated or constrained visibility at particular moments. Hence, the frames and strategies discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 should be seen in relation to their sociocultural environment, actors’ practices as well as the institutions where the search for visibility is materialised (see also Voirol, 2005).

The salience of the four conditions of visibility varied depending on the actors’ category. Market imperatives exerted a more evident influence among foreign journalists, as shown by the commercial pressures dominating journalist-editor relations, as well as the impact that the fragile working conditions of freelance journalists had on the images and accounts of the June Journeys. Conversely, Brazilian journalists were more outspoken about normative conditions. As discussed earlier, they highlighted some of the normative struggles that occurred within newsrooms at the beginning of the June Journeys, either among peers or with their superiors.

Whilst I discussed these conditions separately in this chapter, they can and do work in tandem (see also Hanson, 2008). When British freelancer Anna revealed that newspaper editors request stories centred on football rather than
on social inequality in Brazil, normative, institutional and market conditions were at play. The injunctive norms of a media organisation prevailed over those of the reporter; particular criteria were emphasised to justify the visibility of a story; and market imperatives circumscribed the actions of both Anna and the editor. Likewise, the strength of normative conditions of media owners and editors-in-chief within Brazil is partly underpinned by the financial power of media conglomerates. This is true for Globo Group, which owns the most popular television stations in the country, along with radio stations, newspapers, magazines and websites (de Albuquerque, 2016; Goldstein, 2014; Matos, 2008; Santos, 2014).

While the variety of frames and strategies discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 may give the impression that the media coverage of the June Journeys offered a plurality of views, the conditions of mediated visibility narrowed the accounts that actors constructed and showed. Cases such as the one of British freelancer Oliver, who admitted that journalists sometimes give in to editors’ expectations, reveal that on occasion actors felt discouraged from showing alternative views of the protests. Indeed, even some apparently alternative views were actually guided by ‘old’ routines, thus calling into question the view that activists and media collectives gave birth to a new kind of journalism during the June Journeys, as has been suggested (de Jesus, 2014).

Hence, although the June Journeys constituted a moment when different national accounts became visible, these apparent alternatives were relatively constrained. The media environment of the new visibility is much more restricted than what has been assumed by some more celebratory approaches (Dayan, 2013; Thompson, 2005). In short, a greater number of images does not constitute evidence of a more democratic nation (Pankov et al., 2011). Significantly, actors’ portrayal of the media environment of the new visibility was particularly bleak. According to their testimonies, the tension between structure and agency was balanced in favour of the former. Whilst most of them claimed to be guided by the intent to show the truth during the June Journeys, their accounts show how this goal was often unachievable due to the agendas of the media organisations for whom they work, commercial pressures or
technological drawbacks. Journalists in particular did not describe themselves as exercising power, but rather as being subject to it (see also Phillips, 2014). They depicted themselves as victims of a perverse system, which emphasises spectacle over balance, profit-maximisation over ‘truth’, simplification over nuance. The media environment of the new visibility is not depicted as a space of liberation, where a variety of content can enrich the image of the nation. It is instead portrayed as a space of oppression, where individuals have limited chances of altering ‘how things work’.
7. Conclusion: Beyond the Visible, Beyond the June Journeys

7.1 Introduction

The final match of the FIFA Confederations Cup on 30th June 2013 coincided with a reduction in intensity of the protests that had stormed Brazil for a month. Demonstrations continued throughout the year, but not on the scale of the June Journeys. Brazilian authorities, journalists and activists expressed concern that further demonstrations would occur during the 2014 FIFA World Cup, when ‘the whole world’ would be watching Brazil. However, the authorities’ fears, journalists’ expectations, and activists’ hopes did not materialise. There were some minor demonstrations at the time of the opening ceremony of the FIFA World Cup on 12th June 2014. Some foreign journalists also expressed concern that demonstrations would follow Brazil’s defeat by Germany during the football tournament’s semi-finals. The World Cup proved however to be an organisational success and was relatively peaceful. Afterwards no political earthquakes erupted. Whilst Brazilians had expressed general dissatisfaction with their politicians during the June Journeys, in October 2014 Dilma Rousseff was re-elected as President and the most conservative congress was voted in since the return of democracy in Brazil in 1985.

The last chapter of this thesis looks both back at the June Journeys, as well as beyond them, acknowledging the aftermath of the demonstrations. The aim is to contribute to broader debates about media and nationhood, mediated visibility, as well as the media and social movements. The chapter has three sections. In the first, I summarise the main arguments of this thesis, highlighting the strengths of the analytical model employed, and the key findings concerning the restrictive character of the media environment, power imbalances amongst actors, and how visibility has become an end in itself. In the second section, I focus on an issue that has been implicit but significant in the thesis: the theoretical and methodological importance of time. In the final
section, I outline some limitations of this study and suggest possible avenues for future research.

7.2 Summary and Discussion of Findings

Strengths of the Analytical Model Employed

The discussion in this section begins with an examination of some of the strengths of the analytical model proposed for looking at the June Journeys. I suggested using the concept of mediated visibility to answer the two questions driving this study: (1) What images and accounts of Brazil did mainstream and alternative Brazilian and international media organisations construct during the June Journeys? (2) How and why did different actors construct and project these images and accounts and not others in the media environment? Mediated visibility proved a useful concept not only to highlight what is seen in the media but significantly, it highlighted the relationships and competing strategies of various individuals and organisations –from inside and outside the state, located within and outside national boundaries– producing media content. These various participants engaged in struggles for visibility, seeking to determine what was appropriate and possible to see of Brazil during the June Journeys.

I proposed an analytical model focussed on three dimensions to examine the mediated visibility of Brazil: (1) the visible nation, (2) the strategies of mediated visibility and (3) the conditions of mediated visibility. The visible nation refers to the nation that is shown in the media environment of national, alternative, and also foreign media. The strategies of mediated visibility are the different tactics employed by actors to conceal, make visible or provide hyper-visibility for individuals, events or narratives, in order to achieve specific goals. The conditions of mediated visibility are the circumstances or factors influencing the way in which the mediated visibility of certain images or accounts is facilitated or blocked (see a summary of the model in Figure 19).
The analytical model was operationalized through a multi-sited methodological approach, which combined the analysis of media coverage – in Brazilian and international, mainstream and alternative media – and interviews with the individuals who produced the coverage (Chapter 3). The strength of this methodological approach was that it prompted an examination of what was beyond the epidermis of the visible, shedding light on the role that practices, working environments, commercial imperatives, norms as well as technologies had in facilitating or obstructing the visibility of particular images. In addition, the model looked at the dynamics between different types of media, rather than at the various media in isolation (for more about this point, see Cottle, 2011a).

In relating the images seen in the media with the accounts of the people who produced these images, the analytical model links research examining nations from a discursive and textual point of view, and scholarship centred on the conditions in which nations are constructed and projected in the media (Mihelj,
Hence, it put under the spotlight the viewpoints and experiences of the individuals producing images of the nation, an aspect largely overlooked in media studies to date, particularly when referring to images of protest (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2014).

Such viewpoints and experiences highlighted the ambivalent nature of visibility, which promises the attainment of social and political recognition, while simultaneously stressing surveillance over people (Brighenti, 2010b). Brazilians and foreigners creating images of Brazil often claimed that the South American nation has been misrepresented in the media. For them, seeking visibility was a way of showing the ‘real’ Brazil. At the same time, all of these actors employed visibility as a surveillance tool—for instance, when using images to denounce the brutality of the military police—and/or highlighted the pitfalls of being in the spotlight, evidenced by the backlashes and accusations of political bias received by both alternative media collective Midia NINJA and filmmaker Carla Dauden (see Chapter 4).

Opportunities and Restrictions of the Media Environment

The first dimension of the analytical model was the visible nation. When examining this dimension, four competing frames of Brazil during the June Journeys were observed. Firstly, the state stressed an account of Brazil as a harmonious nation, with people from different backgrounds peacefully coexisting. Secondly, the Brazilian media emphasised the protection of social order, albeit while criticising different groups. They originally labelled the protesters as ‘thugs’ or ‘vandals’ who disrupted the lives of ordinary Brazilians, and later criticised the brutality of the military police. Thirdly, the international media constructed a relatively idealised version of the protests, according to which ‘the Brazilian people’ revolted against its elites. Finally, the alternative media claimed to show the ‘real’ Brazil, unmasking images and accounts concealed by authorities and the national media (Chapter 4). The different frames that the four groups of actors constructed show that the nation continues to be a salient framework, used by people and organisations to understand themselves and the world. They also highlight that technological
developments in media and communications have facilitated the construction and projection of an increasing number of competing images of *what the nation is* (Latham, 2009; Orgad, 2008, 2012; see also Dayan, 2013; Thompson, 2005).

The different frames showed that the relative monopoly of the state and the national media over the image of the nation has been challenged. Activists, alternative media collectives and, significantly, the international media produced their own versions of ‘*what Brazil is*’ during the June Journeys. In addition, the four different frames show that, just like the visible nation, protests are also sites of contestation. As discussed earlier, different and sometimes contradictory agendas drove people on to the streets. Significantly, the frames that all actors constructed were not distinct or isolated from each other. Rather, actors and the frames they used referenced each other at different moments through *metacoverage*, either to criticise or to reproduce previously shown content (Chapter 4).

The increasing number of actors producing images of the nation shows that the current media environment offers the opportunity to make the meaning of the nation ‘more difficult and more troubling, but also richer, more complex and inclusive’ (Orgad, 2012, p. 107). Such greater complexity acknowledges the blurred boundaries between the local, the national and the transnational. The empirical chapters have shown that the image of the nation is not only constructed and projected by and for nationals, but also by and for foreigners. However, the possibility of showing diversified images of the nation in the media environment seems to be more restricted when looking beyond the epidermis of the visible. The analysis of the *strategies of mediated visibility* (Chapter 5) demonstrates that all actors producing competing frames of Brazil employed at different times the same strategies of replacement, adjustment and re-appropriation, regardless as to their role as members of the state, activists or journalists.

The three strategies highlighted that individuals and organisations continuously react to previous images that circulate in the media environment. The fact that
all actors employed the same strategies challenges previous assumptions that authorities and the mainstream media *necessarily* protect the status quo, while alternative media collectives—and sometimes the foreign media—*necessarily* challenge power relationships. Actors either protected or challenged the status quo at different times, depending on what they perceived to be more beneficial to their own agendas (see also Brighenti, 2010b; Cottle, 2011a).

Both the production of frames and the employment of strategies were found to be restricted by four *conditions of mediated visibility*: (1) *norms*, (2) *routines*, (3) *market imperatives* and (4) *technologies*. These conditions effectively limited the actions of the individuals interviewed. Most interviewees claimed that their versions of Brazil were moulded through routines, technologies and norms, and were most likely to circulate through the media environment if they were aligned with market imperatives. Earlier research observed how similar conditions have shaped the contents produced by the mainstream media (Cottle, 2006; Gitlin, 2003). Significantly, the analysis of the June Journeys shows that alternative media collectives were also subject to similar restrictive conditions.

The interviewees’ accounts contradicted celebratory approaches that stress the apparent opportunities that mediated visibility, particularly with the development of digital media, offers ordinary people to communicate their demands and scrutinise those in power (Dayan, 2013; Thompson, 2005). While new technologies and a greater number of actors have made the visible nation messier and increasingly multi-vocal, the restrictions of the current media environment make such variability ‘accepted but only within limits’ (Dayan, 2008, p. 392). Hence, the introduction and adoption of new communication technologies do not necessarily lead to more equal, democratic and participative societies (Waisbord, 2015). In fact, ‘old’ conditions of visibility remain relevant in the age of ‘new’ visibility.

Previous studies have argued that whilst social movements have sometimes succeeded in communicating their agendas in and through the mainstream media, they have done so only within the boundaries imposed by the latter
(Castells, 2009; Gitlin, 2003). This is true for the June Journeys (Chapters 5 and 6). Significantly, most interviewees—activists, government officials, Brazilian and foreign journalists—portrayed themselves as actors lacking agency in an oppressive media environment. They identified the extreme difficulty or impossibility of changing ‘how things work’ in the media. Such statements portrayed people and the media as separated spheres—implying that ‘we are not the media’—and allowed interviewees to avoid taking any responsibility for what the media did or failed to do during the June Journeys.

Unequal Power Relations

The analysis of the June Journeys also took into account that visibility is relational. It requires at least of two parties, between which frictional power relations are established (Brighenti, 2007, 2010b). Hence, rather than looking at the actors separately, the model focused on their interactions, examining potential commonalities and differences in beliefs and behaviours. Dayan (2013) and particularly Thompson (1995, 2000, 2005) stress how changes in mediated visibility have increasingly disrupted those in power. The new visibility, Thompson argues, makes it harder to keep control over the images and accounts that rulers and political elites produce in the media. Ordinary people supposedly have more opportunities to engage in struggles for visibility that may challenge those in power. However, the analysis of the June Journeys showed that the distribution of power in the media environment remains highly unequal. Power imbalances amongst actors remain, not only between authorities and activists, mainstream and alternative media, but also between ‘emerging’ or ‘developing’ nations vis-à-vis governments, individuals and organisations from the West (see also Mihelj, 2011).

The state and the national media had far more financial and human resources at their disposal than alternative media collectives or activist networks to cover the June Journeys. Collectives such as Midia NINJA or networks such as the Popular Committee for the World Cup were run by volunteers, who used their own phones along with free Internet platforms to cover the demonstrations. Members of these collectives often described their reliance on mobile
technologies and unpaid individuals as strengths, given that they were supposedly free from commercial and organisational constraints.

However, members of alternative media collectives admitted lacking the human and material resources to effectively communicate their agendas to a wider public (Chapter 5). Whilst activists and alternative media collectives relied heavily on social media platforms to communicate their version of the protests, the mainstream media remained for them an important means through which to reach audiences (see also Cammaerts, 2012; Cottle, 2011a). Members of *Mídia NINJA* took part in well-known talk shows, and celebrated when the national or international media re-appropriated contents that they had created (Chapters 4 and 5).

In addition, the current media environment is characterised by the increasing porosity of national boundaries. Such porosity has diluted the association between one nation, one state and one communicative space (Hanson, 2008; Mihelj, 2007; Price, 2002; Schlesinger, 2000). Categories used to situate actors symbolically and geographically, such as the national and international, are blurred, introducing concrete challenges to the practices of various actors. As Larry Rohter, former South American bureau chief for *The New York Times*, reflected:

> Before the Internet, in the 70s, there wasn’t a question of whom I was writing for. It was obviously for an American audience and once in a blue moon somebody would see a story in Brazil […] But now, since the Internet, everybody has access and instantly, so that distinction gets blurred.

As the above quote shows, the increasing porosity of national boundaries allows those within the nation to potentially access more images and accounts of how the world is 'looking at us' (Orgad, 2008, 2012). Indeed, that access and interplay between images produced within and outside Brazil constituted an important characteristic of the media coverage during the June Journeys. Articles and reports about the protests in Brazil produced by media organisations such as *The New York Times* or *BBC News* were reproduced
within Brazil, and activists or alternative media collectives praised the international coverage for supposedly being more ‘objective’ or ‘truthful’, apparently widening discussions about the protests within Brazil (Chapters 4 and 5).

In a country like Brazil, where the national media are in hands of a few conglomerates inclined to support the interests of the upper classes, the economic elites and the right-wing, the foreign media may have the potential to enrich and disrupt local narratives and produce ‘estrangement’, that is, invite ‘audiences to detach themselves from common-sense conceptions of their lives in the national context’ (Orgad, 2012, p. 87; see also Boudana, 2014). However, the study has shown that such estrangement was limited. Authorities, journalists and activists sought to exploit the perceived authority of the foreign media, selecting those articles and reports that were useful to advance and reinforce agendas rather than necessarily enriching or disturbing familiar domestic narratives and points of view (Chapter 5).

The perceived legitimacy of the foreign media within Brazil points to continuous power imbalances between ‘emerging’ or ‘developing’ nations and those from the West. Within Brazil, a selected number of publications from the American and Western European media – particularly British – are perceived as ‘better’ or more ‘authoritative’ than the national media. Such legitimacy contributes to reinforcing the idea of the United States and Western Europe being the ‘centre’ of the world and providing models and ideas employed to evaluate ‘developing’ nations (Kantola, 2010; Larraín, 2000; Quijano, 2000). The asymmetrical relationship between Brazilian and international actors reinforces the portrayal of Brazil as an ‘incomplete’ version of the ‘properly modern’ nations from the West. Hence, whilst the media environment of new visibility has the potential to introduce new images, accounts and voices, ideas of nations as ‘peripheral’ or ‘core’ (Wallerstein, 2004) remain substantially unchallenged (see also Kaneva, 2011). Traditional power imbalances continue to be reproduced, sometimes by the very same actors who claim to challenge power inequalities (Chapter 5).
In addition to the asymmetries between actors, the study highlighted imbalances between the different images of Brazil. Despite the four different frames discussed in Chapter 4, throughout the interviews there was continuous debate about the projection of Brazil as an economic unit, either embracing or rejecting it. This was most evident in the state-sponsored efforts attempts to develop a ‘brand Brazil’ (Chapter 1), as well as marketing campaigns such as ‘The World Meets in Brazil’ or ‘Brazil is calling you. Celebrate life here’ (Chapter 4). State initiatives aimed to depict Brazil as a production unit of goods, including planes, football players and landscapes. The two discussed campaigns also portrayed Brazil as an attractive geographical location for tourists and investors. That image was reinforced by Brazilian and foreign journalists, who admitted that the newsworthiness of Brazil was primarily underpinned by economic reasons. As Helen Joyce, former bureau chief of The Economist in Sao Paulo, reflected:

> There are many, many interesting things about Brazil. It is very interesting to read about race relations, or about the arts. But if I had to choose one story about Brazil, it’s really about its macro economy.

Whilst similar accounts of Brazil can be found in the mid-20th century (Hobsbawm, 1995), in the last few decades there has been an increasing tendency globally to articulate nationhood in market-oriented ways (Aronczyk, 2013; Castelló & Mihelj, 2017; Kaneva, 2012a; Mihelj, 2011; Roosvall & Salovaara-Moring, 2010a). That phenomenon, called ‘commercial nationalism’ or ‘economic nationalism’, refers to the primacy of economic practices as markers of nationhood, as well as the adoption of an economic viewpoint to evaluate the legitimacy of any institution. Activists and some Brazilian and foreign journalists criticised the reduction of Brazil to an economic unit. For some of them, the June Journeys served to portray Brazil in a more complex light (Chapters 5 and 6). These efforts occurred however within a media environment restricted by market imperatives, in which even the media content
about the protests became a source of potential profit for freelance journalists (Chapter 6).

Debates about the construction and projection of Brazil as an economic unit in and through the national and international media have important implications for visibility. Media studies have traditionally focussed on researching the politics of visibility, namely the examination of how traditionally marginalised groups seek to achieve mediated visibility as a means to produce political changes (Banet-Weiser, 2015). Whilst visibility in itself has contributed to denunciating injustices committed by governments, that denunciation has not necessarily led to tangible changes (Guibernau, 2001; Hayes, 2005). As Silverstone states, ‘visibility is only just the beginning’ (2007, p. 26), and in order to become more than mere appearance, it has to be accompanied by concrete actions. The dominance of commercial approaches has resulted in a growing relevance for the economies of visibility. The economies of visibility (Banet-Weiser, 2015) highlight how visibility has become an end in itself, facilitating transactions of specific products—such as bodies, goods, dissent or nations—in a market, rather than contributing to a political project. Furthermore, the economies of visibility ‘assume that visibility itself has been absorbed into the economy’ (Banet-Weiser, 2015, p. 55). Hence, when visibility becomes an end itself, it runs the risks of being treated as self-evident by those claiming to seek it. Indeed, whilst images may be constructed to achieve political aims, their political impact may be neutralised or even denied when such images are bought and sold in the media environment (Kaneva, 2015).

The growing importance of the economies of visibility may help to explain why the June Journeys were not immediately followed by tangible political changes. All actors metaphorically and literally traded images and accounts of the protests. Whilst actors claimed to be driven by political goals, in practice, they were often much more concerned with the short-term objective of making a specific image visible. Furthermore, variations in the image of Brazil were possible, but often only within the limits imposed by the economies of visibility. Commercially appealing images—such as those related to stereotypes traditionally associated with Brazil—were more likely to be constructed,
projected and circulated in and through the media environment. According to Rui Harayama, anthropologist and collaborator with Coletivo Carranca:

Suffering people from the favelas are not news anymore. But now people in the streets are mostly white, with nice clothes, handsome and young. You have that thing of young revolutionaries, an image that can be sold.

Hence, actors preferred to construct and project images of protest that had the potential of being literally and metaphorically traded. Brazilian and international journalists, as well as activists, admitted that part of the appeal of the June Journeys was the fact that protesters were young, middle and upper class, white and technologically savvy. Such images were occasionally framed as if they were part of a transnational protest trend (Chapter 4). However, the continuous struggles of those on the cities’ peripheries, with limited access to social media, who were not white or articulate, were barely visible.

Whilst various analysts claimed that the June Journeys were a revolt of the ‘Brazilian people’, later evidence showed that protesters were predominantly young, middle-class, and well-educated Brazilians who lived in big cities, and were keen to use media platforms and technologies to coordinate demonstrations and access information (Figueiredo, 2014b; Gohn, 2014a; Macedo, 2014; Porto & Brant, 2015; Secco, 2013; Sweet, 2014). Furthermore, although not always reported at the time, the demonstrations took on a marked right-wing character in cities like Sao Paulo, with people demanding the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and a return to a military dictatorship.

The discussion above prompts several questions about the Brazil shown in the media, which deserve further exploration: Who constituted, and who was left out, of ‘the people’ who, according to some media accounts, revolted against the elites? Who was part –and who was not– of the alleged ‘real’ Brazil shown and contested by the different actors? Moreover, who remained invisible?
7.3 The Importance of Time

One unexpected finding was the theoretical and methodological importance of time. I decided to include this topic as part of the conclusion rather than within the empirical chapters as interviewees very rarely directly addressed the topic of time. However, when looking back at the empirical chapters, I could see that it was a significant, albeit implicit, issue throughout the three dimensions of the analytical model of visibility.

Media studies traditionally emphasise space to explain the changing relationships between media technologies, genres, formats and organisations. Using the work of Silverstone (2007) and other authors, I have often employed spatial metaphors in this thesis, such as the media as ‘space of appearance’ or the media as an ‘environment’. Evidently, Thompson’s concept of ‘new visibility’ (2005) is underpinned by the argument that developments in media and communications have shrunk space, with people capable of seeing geographically distant individuals and events. Media scholars have conversely not paid the same attention to time, often failing to address it as significant in its own right (Neiger & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2016; Stanyer & Mihelj, 2016).

However, time proved to be a significant dimension in the analysis of the mediation of the June Journeys. Time was considered when examining the perception held by the Brazilian authorities that the June Journeys disrupted Brazil’s evolutionary path to modernity (Chapter 1). Time also played a role in the discussion about nationhood, when stating that struggles for and over the meaning of the nation vary depending on when they occur. In situations of perceived external threat, in which contestations are temporarily replaced by agreements, and periods of internal crisis and turmoil –such as the June Journeys–, different interpretations of the nation may emerge (Chapter 2). The analysis of the June Journeys however highlights the need to acknowledge explicitly the theoretical and methodological importance of time. Two interrelated temporal facets are particularly relevant: (1) time in regards to timing, and (2) time in regards to acceleration.
Timing and Sequence of Events

The first facet of time in regards to timing refers to the importance that the sequence of particular events has in political and social developments. Whilst sociologists such as Andrew Abbott (2001) have described the need to pay attention to how particular episodes are shaped by the temporal order in which they occur, media and communications scholars have often failed to take a sensitive temporal approach (Stanyer & Mihelj, 2016). Taking into account timing facilitates distinguishing general patterns that may advance theoretical debates from the specific features of a case study (for more about the tensions between general theories and historical specificities of case studies, see Abbott, 2001).

The analytical model I employed throughout this thesis sought to highlight three dimensions of mediated visibility that can be useful in the analysis of other cases. However, it is important to acknowledge that the timing of events was significant in making the June Journeys an extraordinary, and hence impossible to exactly replicate, episode in the history of Brazil. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Brazilian authorities usually increase public transportation fares in January, when most students and workers are on holiday. Putting off the increase until May, when students and workers were particularly active, arguably facilitated the coordination of protests (Porto & Brant, 2015). As various foreign correspondents reflected in the interviews, the interest of the international media in covering the June Journeys was partly underpinned by the coincidence of the protests with the FIFA Confederations Cup. Equally important was the fact that the protests contradicted the Brazilian success narrative that had dominated the foreign media since the early 21st century, as well as the relative temporal proximity to the Occupy movement, the Arab Spring and the June 2013 protests in Turkey (Chapters 5 and 6).

Commentators and researchers – myself included, in a previous study (see Cammaerts & Jiménez-Martínez, 2014) –, demonstrated a lack of temporal sensitivity in their analyses of the June Journeys. Various newspapers articles, blogs and academic works (e.g. Glüsing, 2014; Zirin, 2014) assumed that, as
protests had occurred simultaneously with the FIFA Confederations Cup, they were also necessarily going to take place during the 2014 World Cup. Indeed, the media events and social movements literature argue that activists often try to use mega events as communicative platforms to direct attention to their causes (Cammaerts & Jiménez-Martínez, 2014; Dayan, 2008; Latham, 2009; Price, 2008; Rowe & McKay, 2012). However, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there were barely any protests during the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Hence, the June Journeys show that scholars must adopt a sensitive temporal perspective to understand why there were demonstrations alongside one sporting event but not the other, acknowledging context, sequence of events, as well as chance (see also Cottle, 2008).

*Acceleration and Hyper-Reactivity*

The second facet refers to time in relation to *acceleration*. Whilst Thompson’s account of a new visibility (2005) stresses the relevance of space, he also argues that the current media environment is more intensive, not only because of the *quantity* of information circulating, but also due to the *speed* with which this information circulates (see also Thompson, 2000). This is a significant observation, given that the globalisation literature argues that space has been shrunk and time has been shortened (Rantanen, 2005).

Most interviewees in this study implicitly referred to the acceleration of time when acknowledging that the employment of strategies of mediated visibility was based on a *continuous reaction* to previous images of Brazil, in order to contest, adjust or re-appropriate such images. Alternative media collectives and authorities *constantly* monitored domestic and international media in order to respond to or amplify contents that they thought should be rectified, adjusted or reproduced; Brazilian journalists paid incessant attention to the coverage by other actors in order to normalise or uncover different angles on the image of Brazil.

The state of continuous reaction amongst the actors during the June Journeys shows that, whilst Thompson (2005) is right that the media environment is
intensive, extensive and more difficult to control, it is also highly reactive. Such continuous reaction made images of the nation particularly fleeting (see also Orgad, 2012). Most images of the June Journeys –understood not in a purely visual sense– simply passed through the media, soon to be replaced by a new image. Very few of these images –such as the photographs of people on the roof of the National Congress in Brasilia, or Folha’s front page for 14th June 2013 edition, discussed in Chapter 4–, became iconic for the June Journeys, that is to say, re-appropriated by different actors.

The fleeting character of images risked making the most superficial aspects of the June Journeys visible. In the continuous act of replacing, adjusting or re-appropriating previous images with new ones, several interviewees held that the most spectacular visual or textual accounts usually prevailed over more thorough analyses of the protests. Studies of the 2011 London riots have similarly observed how the emphasis of mainstream media on images of violence emptied the demonstrations of their political meaning (Cottle, 2012).

Various interviewees held that in the case of the June Journeys both mainstream media and activists stressed violence –committed by either demonstrators or the military police– to the detriment of the drivers taking people on to the streets. The emphasis on violence also led to superficial comparisons between the protests in Brazil and other episodes of social unrest, such as those simultaneously happening in Turkey. As English blogger Brian observed:

You’ve got something that looks like a revolution on TV, with a lot of people on the streets, but it does not mean it’s a revolution. It doesn’t always mean the same thing […] You don’t know what those people’s [in Brazil and Turkey] messages are. Someone must tell us what the problem is, why they are there.

According to Brian and other interviewees, this focus on violence was based not only on the strategies of mediated visibility, but also on conditions such as news criteria and market imperatives. As discussed in Chapter 6, several interviewees stressed that both conditions –along with norms and
technologies—encouraged various actors to create and project images of ‘what works in the media’.

The fleetingness of images also points to what Mirzoeff (2005) has called the ‘banality of images’. Such banality refers to the fact that, despite the increasing quantity of images circulating in the media, images are easily forgotten and have little effect over time. Mirzoeff uses the photographs showing the abuse committed by American soldiers in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, leaked in 2004, as examples. For Thompson (2005), the photographs evidence how the uncontrollability of the media environment challenges those in positions of power. However, as Mirzoeff (2011) observes, despite the immediate controversy surrounding these images, the photos did not play a significant role in the subsequent American Presidential election and there were few sanctions against relevant military leaders or those involved.

![Figure 20](image)

**Figure 20** – Cover of *Der Spiegel*, from May 2014. The text reads ‘Death and Games’ (*Tod und Spiele*, in German) (Glüsing, 2014).

Despite claims by activists that the Brazilian ‘giant had awoken’ (Kühn, 2014), or that, as *The Sunday Times* held, Brazil’s ‘fun-loving image’ had exploded during the June Journeys (Phillips, 2013, italics mine), the consequences of the demonstrations in Brazil remain unclear. Although some publications such as *Der Spiegel* (Glüsing, 2014) predicted protests during the 2014 FIFA World
Cup (Figure 20), that football tournament was relatively peaceful and an organisational success. In fact, an article in British newspaper *The Telegraph* claimed that Brazil 2014 had been the ‘best World Cup ever’ (Burt, 2014). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Dilma Rousseff was re-elected in October 2014 and Brazilians voted in the most conservative congress.

### 7.4 Limitations of the Study and Potential Avenues for Future Research

The June Journeys have proved to be a rich opportunity to examine the tensions for and over the symbolic construction, projection and contestation of the nation in the current transnational, content-intensive and uncontrollable media environment. Through the analysis of media content about the June Journeys, and interviews with individuals who produced this content, I have sought to bring nuance and insight into the study of media and nationhood, media and social movements, and mediated visibility.

Some of the main findings discussed previously highlight that, whilst a greater number of actors construct and project competing images of the nation in the media, such images are produced by relatively similar practices in restrictive conditions. In addition, this thesis showed that looking at the different individuals producing images of protest in the media, sheds light on the frictional and unequal power relations between them. This study has also advanced the understanding of mediating visibility, examining people’s accounts of how the struggles for visibility happen in practice. These findings highlight the ambivalence of visibility, showing that ‘power does not rest univocally either with visibility or with invisibility’ (Brighenti, 2007, p. 340).

However, this study has three important limitations that need to be acknowledged: (1) *the lack of attention to audiences*, (2) the single focus on *an extraordinary episode*, and (3) *the role of the visual* with regard to visibility. Addressing the three limitations provides potential avenues for future research.

The first limitation concerns the lack of attention to audiences’ reception of the mediated events. As stated in Chapter 1, categories such as ‘producer’ and
‘audience’ are increasingly fuzzy in the current media environment. In fact, all the interviewees – members of the state, Brazilian and international journalists, activists – are audiences to some extent. However, the people interviewed for this thesis are part of a reduced group of individuals who had the time and resources to produce images of Brazil during the June Journeys. It remains unclear how people outside this small group understood, felt, and reacted to the different frames analysed in Chapter 4.

Audiences are not a homogeneous category. In fact, there are several areas for future research in regard to the June Journeys. It is unclear how foreigners – particularly people in the United States or Western Europe – perceived the demonstrations. What do they know about the June Journeys? What were their sources of information? Did the protests challenge their perceptions of Brazil? There has been some research about the perception of the June Journeys within Brazil (Kühn, 2014), albeit without directly addressing the role of the media. How people across Brazil interpreted the different frames produced by the actors? Did they rely on mainstream or alternative media? Considering that most of the digital content during the June Journeys was produced in the richer Southern Brazilian cities – such as Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro – (Bastos et al., 2014), how influential were the frames produced by alternative media collectives in the poorer cities of the North East?

The second limitation is that this thesis is a *case study of an extraordinary episode*. Whilst in this chapter I have explored possible implications of the study of the June Journeys for wider theoretical debates, further research is needed to confirm the generalizability of my arguments. The analysis of other sub-national, national and transnational cases, as well as a comparison of some of them, may support the arguments proposed throughout this thesis. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, the construction, projection and contestations for and over the meaning of the nation vary in moments of stability, internal turmoil or external conflict (see Mihelj, 2008, 2011). Hence, a time sensitive approach, which considers *variations across time*, may enrich the debate, paying attention to, for instance, the everyday rather than extraordinary episodes.
The third limitation concerns the role of the visual in regard to the study of mediated visibility. In this thesis, I chose to employ a broad definition of images as general impressions underpinned by visual, audio and textual representations. However, it remains to be seen which role images, understood strictly in their visual sense, played in the construction and projection of nationhood and protests during the June Journeys. The literature on media and nations, as well as on media protest, has traditionally focussed on the analysis of texts. Only in recent years, several authors—some of them using insights from visual culture studies—began to further address the role of the visual, paying attention to photos, television series, illustrations and slideshows (e.g. Becker, 2017; Cottle, 1998; Gabara, 2008; Lagerkvist, 2003; Mi, 2005; Mraz, 2009; Roosvall, 2010; Sadlier, 2008; Teune, 2013). Images are particularly appealing for audiences. They can travel more easily than text, have more immediate—and emotional—impact, and people sometimes interpret them as mirrors of reality. Such appeal prompts the oversight of the fact that the visual is constructed and guided by specific purposes (Cottle, 1998; Griffin, 2012; Mitchell, 2002; Teune, 2013). As Brighenti observes, ‘the visual itself needs to be visibilised’ (2010b, p. 3). Hence, there is a need for the role of visual representations during the June Journeys, and its implications for mediated visibility, to be examined. Which role did the visual play? Did it enrich debates about the demonstrations or did it reinforce some of the restrictive features of the media environment?

Almost four years have passed since the June Journeys began. The FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games are only a memory. Despite their relative organisational success, both sporting media events did not become the ‘coming out party’ to showcase Brazil as a modern, politically influential and economically developed nation. Furthermore, in early 2015, over a half million people took to the streets in cities all over the country, demanding an end to political corruption and, significantly, the impeachment of President Dilma.

In the field of film studies, however, several authors have already addressed the role of the visual in the construction, projection and contestation of Brazil (see, for example Amancio, 2000; Heise, 2012; Nagib, 2007; Shaw & Dennison, 2007; Wood, 2014).
Rousseff (Branford & Rocha, 2015). Conservative and right wing groups dominated those demonstrations. In stark contrast with the June Journeys, the Sao Paulo military police shared photos on their Twitter account of policemen hugging happy families or holding hands with smiley children (“Os protestos de 15 de março pelo Brasil,” 2015).

That new set of demonstrations signalled a deepening of Brazil’s economic, political, social and ethical crises throughout 2015 and 2016. At the time of my last interview, in October 2015 in London, a more pessimistic account of this South American nation seemed to be taking hold. Some interviewees expressed the idea of Brazil as an unfulfilled promise, a view which books and academic articles had abandoned at the beginning of the 21st century (Chapter 1). Helen Joyce, former Sao Paulo Bureau Head for The Economist, summarised that viewpoint, when telling me that ‘Brazil had its moment and they missed it’. Whilst the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro were relatively successful, they were partially overshadowed by events including the Zika virus outbreak, corruption scandals at the heart of giant oil company Petrobras and, overall, the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in August 2016, which ended the 13 year reign of Brazil’s Workers’ Party. Indeed, a quick look at Brazilian news in March 2017 shows that celebratory headlines about Brazil in domestic and international media have been replaced by stories about corruption scandals, economic recession and the lack of a proactive foreign policy.

The June Journeys remain a debatable episode in the history of Brazil. Only a historical perspective will elucidate in time whether they were a ‘social awakening’ of Brazilians tired of living in substandard conditions—as some contemporary observers put it—, or whether they amounted to the beginning of a crisis that crushed all hopes of consolidating political, economic and social development within Brazil. Despite the open-ended debates about the June Journeys, most of the interviewees expressed the view that they had witnessed something extraordinary in the history of Brazil. They told me that at the peak of the protests, in mid-June, Brazilians and some foreigners based in Brazil felt they were experiencing a different type of carnival, where they felt empowered
to change their nation for the better, even though individuals' definitions of what 'better' was were often different.

In addition, whilst most interviewees shared a critical view of ‘how the media work’, they still recalled moments of optimism, when improving the lives of millions of Brazilians *seemed possible*. Hence, I end this thesis with a quote from my interview with Helen Joyce, former Sao Paulo bureau chief for *The Economist*, in the hope that sooner rather than later, Brazilians will again have reason to be optimistic about their future:

Cutting the numbers of people living in abject poverty by such an enormous amount was an amazing story. It used to send shivers down my spine when I thought that somewhere had managed to do that. So exciting, and I wanted to write that over and over again, you know? Look, look how many children aren’t hungry anymore. Look how they managed to get children into primary school […] That was a lesson for the world, that you can get better, that you can improve lives in a big country, a big poor country.
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Appendices

A. List of Interviewees

Pseudonyms were assigned to interviewees who requested anonymity.

Organisational affiliations were those at the time of interview. The location and date of interview are cited.

5. “Cristina”, Brazilian journalist based in Brasilia, March 2014 (Skype).
6. Carla Dauden, Brazilian filmmaker and activist based in Los Angeles, March 2014 (Skype).
13. “Anna”, British freelance correspondent working in Brazil, August 2014 (Skype).


16. “Oscar”, Spanish freelance correspondent for several international outlets, based in Rio de Janeiro, September 2014 (Skype).


18. “Marcela”, Brazilian reporter for radio CBN, October 2014 (Skype).


20. Thiago Ávila, member of the Comité Popular da Copa based in Brasilia, November 2014, (Skype).


25. Rafael Vilela, photographer and member of Mídia NINJA, Sao Paulo, January 2015.


27. Mauricio Savarese, Brazilian freelance journalist who has written for both Brazilian and foreign media organisations. He also runs the blog ‘A Brazilian operating in this area’, Sao Paulo, January 2015.


30. Vincent Bevins, Brazil Correspondent for The Los Angeles Times, Sao Paulo, January 2015.

31. Camila Guimarães, former assignment editor for O Estado de Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, January 2015.
32. Vivian Iara Strehlau, Professor of Marketing at the Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing, Sao Paulo, January 2015.
33. “Paula”, Brazilian journalist, Sao Paulo, January 2015.
37. Sérgio Leo, journalist for the magazine Valor Económico, Brasilia, January 2015.
40. Gilberto Carvalho, Secretary General of the Presidency of Brazil 2011 - 2015, Brasilia, January 2015.
41. Georgiana Calimeris, Communications Officer for the protests organised in Brasilia during June 2013, Brasilia, January 2015.
42. “Luiza”, former member of the communications team of the Brazilian Presidency during the late 2000s and early 2010s, Brasilia, January 2015.
43. “Bruno”, member of the APEX-Brasil marketing team, Brasilia, January 2015.
44. Jimmy Lima, activist, organiser of one of the 2013 demonstrations in Brasilia, Brasilia, January 2015.
45. Germán Aranda, Spanish correspondent for several international newspapers, Rio de Janeiro, February 2015.
52. Thais Herdy, Communications Officer, Amnesty International Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, February 2015.
57. Givanildo da Silva, member of several social movements in Brazil, including the Comité Popular da Copa, Sao Paulo, February 2015.
60. Rui Harayama, anthropologist and photographer for Coletivo Carranca, Sao Paulo, February 2015.
B. Interviewee Recruitment Email

Dear [NAME],

I am a PhD student in Media and Communications at the London School of Economics and Political Science. My research focusses on the international image of Brazil in the media. I am particularly interested in high profile events, such as the upcoming World Cup, the 2016 Olympic Games as well the protests that have occurred in the country in the last few years.

Currently, I am in the process of interviewing people who took or have taken part or covered these events, particularly the June 2013 protests, in order to learn about their experiences and opinions. [PERSONALISED SENTENCE DETAILING RELATION OF POTENTIAL INFORMANT WITH THE PROTESTS]

The interview would last approximately one hour at a venue that works for you. All the information will be treated as strictly confidential and, if you prefer, will be anonymised.

I do hope this is of interest to you. I would be very grateful if you would be prepared to talk to me. If you have any doubts or require further information, please do feel free to ask.

Yours sincerely,

César Jiménez-Martínez
PhD Candidate in Media and Communications
London School of Economics and Political Science
Email: C.A.Jimenez@lse.ac.uk
The questions below were used as a thematic guide for the interviews carried out for this thesis. The interviews were semi-structured and as such, open to be taken in different directions. At the same time, the people interviewed had different relationships to the ‘June Journeys’ and accordingly, each interview emphasised different issues.

- Please describe yourself and what you do.
- Does the image of a country matter? If so, why?
- What do you think the image of Brazil is? Why so?
- How has that image been created?
- Do the media have any relation to this image?

- Could you tell me how the June 2013 protests started?
- How did you become involved in them?
- What did you do in relation to their communication?
- What was covering or informing about the protests like?
- Who was your intended audience?
- Did you have any competitors when you were covering the story?
- Could you tell me how the protests were covered in Brazil and abroad?
- From a communication perspective, what did the government do during the protests?
- What do you understand as foreign media? Did they play any role with regard to the protests?
- What do you understand as alternative media? Did they play any role in the protests?
- Did digital technologies play any role in relation to the protests?

- Did the June 2013 protests change the image of Brazil in any way? If so why?
D. Chronology of the June Journeys

(Based on Cardoso et al., 2016; Gohn, 2014a; Goldblatt, 2014; Judensnaider et al., 2013; Porto & Brant, 2015)

- **August-September 2012:** Protests against an increase in public transportation fares, named the *Revolta do Busão* [Bus Rebellion], happen in the city of Natal, North East of Brazil. Local authorities reduce the prices.
- **February and March 2013:** The Fight for Public Transportation Block uses Facebook to convene various protests against an increase in public transportation fares in the city of Porto Alegre. Local authorities end up reducing the price.
- **First half of 2013:** Protests against public transport fare increases erupt in states such as Bahia, Goiás and Amazonas. Patterns later seen during the June Journeys are already present in these demonstrations, such as protest coordination using social media and clashes between protestors and the police in city centres.
- **3rd June:** Activist collective *Movimento Passe Livre* (MPL, Free Fare Movement), calls for demonstrations in Sao Paulo against a 7% increase in public transportation fares, more specifically a rise of twenty cents of Brazilian reais (approximately £0.06 at that time),
- **6th June - 11th June:** The MPL convenes successive demonstrations in Sao Paulo on 6th, 7th and 11th June. Two thousand participants gather for the first protest and between five and eleven thousand for the third one. Protesters assemble on one of the main city boulevards, such as *Avenida Paulista* or *Avenida Nove de Julho*. Some of them set up barricades and destroy bus stops.
- **13th June:** An estimated number of between five and twenty thousand people protest in downtown Sao Paulo. Around 200 people are arrested and an unknown number are injured as a result of the military police brutality. Guiliana Vallone, journalist for the *Folha* newspaper, is hit in the eye by a rubber bullet shot by a military policeman. A photo of her bleeding is on *Folha*’s front page on the following day.
• **15th June**: The FIFA Confederations Cup kicks off at the National Stadium in Brasilia. While Brazil’s football national team faces Japan’s, around 500 people belonging to the Popular Committee for the World Cup protest outside the stadium.

• **17th June**: Protests occur in some of main cities of Brazil, including Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia and Belo Horizonte. The MPL lose their relative control over the demonstrations. Participants’ demands go in different and sometimes contradictory directions. People protest for or against a whole array of causes, including gay rights, the costs of the stadia for the World Cup and the Olympics, improved public health and education, as well as anti-corruption among the political class.

• **20th June**: The June Journeys reach their peak. One million people protest in 353 cities, including state capitals Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, and the federal capital Brasilia.

• **21st June**: President Dilma Rousseff gives a televised address, claiming to listen to protesters’ demands and proposing solutions to the issues raised during the demonstrations. Members of the MPL announce that they will stop calling for more demonstrations.

• **22nd June – 30th June**: Protests continue and become practically a daily occurrence all over Brazil, particularly in the cities hosting the matches of the FIFA Confederations Cup, such as Belo Horizonte, Fortaleza, Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro. The number of protesters starts to decline.

• **30th June**: Outside the Maracanã stadium in Rio de Janeiro, thousands of people clash with the military police during a demonstration. Inside the stadium, Brazil beats Spain in the final match of the FIFA Confederations Cup. The number of protests starts to decline.