DIGITAL FAITH:
SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE ENACTMENT OF RELIGIOUS
IDENTITY IN PAKISTAN

Submitted in Fulfilment of the Full Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, August 2016

EMRYS SCOEMAKER
DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.

I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

.................................................................
Signature: Emrys Schoemaker

I declare that my thesis consists of 81,295 words.

I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Maheen Pracha
Photo 1 Muslim women in mobile phone repair shop, Gujrat. Credit: Author

Photo 2 Young barber using Facebook, Mandi Bahauddin. Credit: Author
Acknowledgements

There are a great many people who have contributed to the emergence of this thesis. I am immensely grateful to my supervisors, Dr Shirin Madon and Prof. Tim Allen. Shirin has been a source of guidance and encouragement throughout this research, and her support through dark days has been a continued source of motivation. I will always be indebted to her. Tim opened the door to academia and whose encouragement to ‘just go to the field’ kept me moving. This thesis would not have been possible without either of them.

This research would not have been possible without the willingness of the people who gave up their time to participate in interviews and discussions, and I am very grateful to all for their generosity, trust and friendship. I am especially grateful to members of the Ahmadi community for allowing me access despite real security concerns, and particularly wish to thank SU, TI and NS (who I reference only by initial for their safety) for their time, trust and tolerance. It is especially important to acknowledge the contribution of my research assistants, particularly Omaid Malik, Umer Karim and Alena Karim. They were of inestimable value in facilitating the research process and participating in my learning, particularly around the everyday practices of religion and Facebook usage. I am particularly grateful to Umer Karim and his family for opening up their home and offering such warm hospitality. I am immensely grateful.

There also a number of institutions that have contributed to making this research possible. In Pakistan Quaid-i-Azam University, and specifically Dr. Andrea Fleschenberg provided support and guidance in the formative stages of this research, as well as introducing me to my research assistants. The team at Gallup Pakistan, particularly Bilal Gilani and Murad Javed provided guidance and support in the conduct of the telephone survey. The data team and CEO of the mobile phone network operator were incredibly supportive and full of advice. In the UK the Pakistan High Commission was supportive in facilitating visas and endorsing the research. I am particularly grateful to the ESRC, who through the Department of International Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science generously awarded the ESRC Doctoral Studentship that made the research financially possible.

There are also many individuals whose contribution has helped make this research possible. These include Susan Hoult, who went far beyond her role as PhD Programme Manager at the LSE and for whose support and friendship I am immensely grateful. She saw me through many dark days. Rose Harris was very supportive in facilitating and managing the financial support from the ESRC. Maheen Pracha provided invaluable copy editing services. Gordon Adam and Nicola Harford were supportive of my research and tolerant of my absence from iMedia Associates, and
I am grateful to Chris Locke of Caribou Associates for stimulating conversations and always ensuring that the PhD was a choice. I am thankful to Jonathon Donner and Savita Bailur for discussions that have greatly contributed to my thinking and analysis. I am also grateful to fellow PhD travellers on the research journey, including LSE PhD colleagues Benjamin Chemouni, Laura Munro, Georgina Pearson and Yi Fan for the conversations and contributions that helped this research emerge. I have been glad to have Tom Kirk as a fellow PhD traveller, and am grateful for the support and the companionship in our travels up and down the GT Road. Particular thanks to Naysan Adlparvar for helping develop my thinking on identity and being a source of encouragement throughout the PhD.

Friends and family have also been sources of support, encouragement and patience on this long journey. I am particularly grateful to Azeema Cheema, whose guidance, friendship and support has been of such value. To my brothers and sisters, I am grateful for your tolerance of my absence and continued friendship. I am indebted beyond words to my parents, who have sacrificed so much to create the opportunities that have allowed me to reach this point. Thank you.
Abstract

This thesis is a theoretically framed and historically informed sociological analysis of how digital technology usage shapes religious identity in Pakistan. The development literature is dominated by assumptions of technologically driven progress towards secularisation and studies of technology projects, yet there are few empirical studies of everyday ICT day use, and religion remains significant in Pakistan. To explain this, I draw on theoretical literature, the Pakistan religious identity literature and twelve months of fieldwork (2014-2015) to present an analysis of how Facebook shapes the enactment of religious identity by young people in three cities in the Punjab, Pakistan.

I conceptualise identity as the *performative enactment* of subject positions constituted by discursive regimes of knowledge and power, and technologies as *assemblages* of discursive and material elements that in their arrangement create possibilities for action. The *entanglement* of actors and assemblages in performative enactment produces phenomena, such as religious identity. Methodologically I adopt an *agential realist* perspective and utilise a mixed methods approach that includes a survey, document collection and in-depth interviews and observation of young Facebook users.

My empirical findings show that the new technologies of social media, mobile phones and mobile internet interact with public discourse and everyday practice to shape religious identity. First, I show this by describing how Facebook’s construction as a blasphemous technology strengthens existing discourses of religious nationalism. Second, I show how Facebook’s technological discourses of singular authenticity shape the enactment of religious identity with implications for religious minorities. My final analysis theorises how the use of Facebook shapes religious identity through the emergence of what I call ‘digital secularisation’.

Together this thesis makes the following contributions. First, it provides a much-needed empirical account of the adoption of a new communication technology being rapidly adopted. Second, it makes a theoretical contribution through showing how conceptualising identity as performative and technology as assemblage helps explain the resurgence of religion in processes of development and social change. This explanation is presented as a theory of ‘digital secularisation’.
Table of Contents

DECLARATION................................................................................................................. 2
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 4
Abstract............................................................................................................................ 6
Table of Contents............................................................................................................... 7
Glossary.............................................................................................................................. 10
Acronyms .......................................................................................................................... 13
Figures and Tables ............................................................................................................. 14

1  Introduction .................................................................................................................. 15
   1.1  Research Motivation ............................................................................................... 15
   1.2  Personal Motivation ............................................................................................... 20
   1.3  Research Goals, Questions and Objectives ........................................................... 21
   1.4  Thesis Argument ..................................................................................................... 21
   1.5  Research Methods ................................................................................................. 22
   1.6  Expected Contribution ......................................................................................... 23
   1.7  Thesis Outline ........................................................................................................ 23

2.  Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 27
   2.1  Situating Technology and Social Change .............................................................. 27
   2.2  Development Models ............................................................................................ 28
   2.2  Development and Secularisation ......................................................................... 31
   2.3  The Individual in Models of Development and ICTD .......................................... 35
   2.4  Conceptualising Religious Identity ....................................................................... 39
   2.5  ICTs and Religion .................................................................................................. 42
   2.6  ICTs and Religious Identity .................................................................................. 46
   2.7  Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 48

3.  Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................ 50
   3.1  Theorising Religious Identity .............................................................................. 50
      3.1.1  Religious Identity as the Discursive Subject .................................................... 51
      3.1.2  Religious Identity as the Performative Subject ............................................... 53
      3.1.3  Religious Identity as Material Performativity .................................................. 55
      3.1.4  Summary ......................................................................................................... 56
   3.2  Theorising Technology ......................................................................................... 57
      3.2.1  Beyond Duality: Sociomateriality ................................................................... 58
      3.2.2  Agential Realism ............................................................................................. 61
      3.2.3  Technology, Domestication and Affordance .................................................... 64
      3.2.4  Facebooks Affordances for Subject Enactment .............................................. 65
   3.3  Theoretical Framework Summary ......................................................................... 67

4.  Methodological Framework .......................................................................................... 69
   4.1  Philosophical Standpoint: Agential Realism ......................................................... 69
   4.2  Research Design and Strategy ............................................................................. 71
   4.3  Research Location .................................................................................................. 75
   4.4  Data Collection ...................................................................................................... 77
   4.5  Data Coding and Analysis .................................................................................... 81
      4.5.1  Quantitative Data Analysis .............................................................................. 81
      4.5.2  Qualitative Data Analysis .............................................................................. 82
4.6 Conclusion: ........................................................................................................... 87

5. Survey Results: Mobile Usage Practices ..................................................................... 88
   5.1 Mobile Internet in Pakistan ................................................................................... 88
   5.2 The Field Sites ........................................................................................................ 88
   5.3 Survey Findings: Device and Application Usage - Religion and Gender .......... 90
   5.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 94

6. Mediating ICTs – Facebook in Practice ................................................................. 96
   6.1 Gujranwala: The Mobile Market – movies, music and porn ............................... 96
   6.1.1 Hassan: “the porn business is good business” ............................................. 97
   6.1.2 Summary .......................................................................................................... 99
   6.2 Gujrat: The Mobile Mediator – Faith in Facebook ............................................ 99
   6.2.1 Kamran: “My responsibility is hidayat” ...................................................... 100
   6.2.2 Summary ........................................................................................................ 101
   6.3 Mandi Bahauddin: The Content King – Faith and the profane ......................... 102
   6.3.1 Tahir: “we are closed in Ramadan completely” ......................................... 102
   6.3.2 Summary ........................................................................................................ 104
   6.4 Translating Discourses into Practice .................................................................. 104
   6.4.1 Translating Discourse into Practice: Intermediaries and Mediators .......... 105
   6.4.2 Summary: Problematising Technological Discourse in Pakistan .............. 107

7. Performing Faith on Facebook .............................................................................. 108
   7.1 Ahmadi ................................................................................................................ 109
   7.1.1 The survivor – or how ‘if it causes anarchy we prefer silence’ ..................... 111
   7.1.2 The Pretender – or how I stopped posting because I’m an Ahmadi .......... 114
   7.1.3 Discussion and Analysis: Authenticity and Hegemony .......................... 118
   7.2 Shia ....................................................................................................................... 121
   7.2.1 The Prince – or how a Shia youth preacher enacts faith on Facebook .... 121
   7.2.2 The Eagle – or enacting Shia patriotism ...................................................... 124
   7.2.3 The group leader – or how Shia users navigate new friends and old enemies ... 126
   7.2.4 Discussion and Analysis: Authenticity and Hegemony .......................... 128
   7.3 Sunni ..................................................................................................................... 130
   7.3.1 The assertive majority – or how a Deobandi perceives the external ‘other’ .... 130
   7.3.2 The silent majority – or how a ‘moderate’ Wahhabi avoids debate ............ 133
   7.3.3 Algorithmic sectarianism ................................................................................. 136
   7.3.4 Analysis: Authenticity, Hegemony and Algorithmic Individualism .......... 139
   7.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 143

8. Performing Gender on Facebook ........................................................................... 144
   8.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 144
   8.2 Faking Authenticity – male and female fake Facebook accounts .................. 145
   8.3 Family and Friends – enactments of multiple authentic identities ............... 147
   8.3.1 Digital Freedom – or how male Facebook user’s separate family and friends .... 148
   8.3.2 Digital Freedom – or how female Facebook user’s separate family life ....... 151
   8.3.3 Digital Defence – or how female Facebook users negotiate context collapse .... 153
   8.3.4 Digital Izzat – or how male users protect honour ........................................ 155
   8.3.5 Digital Purdah – or how female users practice digital seclusion ............... 157
   8.4 Analysis: Diffractions of Authenticity - Segregation and Digital Purdah ........ 162

9. Religious Identity as Digital Secularisation: Diffraction in Pakistan ............... 166
   9.1 Digital Secularisation ......................................................................................... 167
   9.1.1 Choice and Religious Identity .................................................................... 168
## Glossary

**Ahle Hadith** Reformist Muslim sect who reject jurisprudence in favour of the hadith

**Adab** Refinement or 'correct practice' of Islam

**Ahle Sunnah** Term for Sunni Muslims who don't subscribe to a specific sect

**Ahle Tashi** Urdu term for Shia

**Ahmadi** Minority Islamic sect founded in 1889 who believe their founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet.

**Ashura** Shia commemoration ritual, held during *Muharram*

**Barelvi** Islamic reform movement originating in Bareilly, India. Commonly regarded as syncretic for belief in intercession.

**Betak** Guest sitting room for male visitors

**Bid’ah** Innovation in religious thought

**Biraderi** Kinship group

**Burqa** Enveloping outer garment worn by women to cover their bodies, including their face, in public

**Chador** Shawl worn by women

**Chador** A large piece of cloth worn to cover the upper body and head, especially by Muslim women

**Chappals** Sandals

**Deobandi** Sunni Islamic revivalist movement, originating in Deoband, India. Follows *Hanafi* jurisprudence. Commonly regarded as conservative for their strict interpretation of Islamic texts.

**Dupatta** A length of material worn to cover the chest by women in South Asia

**Eid** The festival that marks the end of *Ramadan*

**Fatwa** A religious decree

**Fiqh** Arabic for Islamic jurisprudence; there four Sunni *fiqh* and two Shia

**Ghar** Urdu for home

**Gupshup** Urdu for chatting, gossiping

**Hadith** Commentary on the *Quran*

**Hajj** The pilgrimage to Mecca, regarded as one of the five obligations for Muslims

**Hanafi** A Sunni school of Islamic jurisprudence

**Hidayat** Religious guidance
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hijab</td>
<td>Veil worn by Muslim women in public to cover their head and chest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudood</td>
<td>Literally means limits of acceptable behaviour in Islamic law. Refers to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Zia’s restrictive Hudood Ordinances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ijtihād</td>
<td>Independent reasoning and thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam</td>
<td>A religious leader of Islam, descended from the Prophet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Bargah</td>
<td>Shia congregation hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inshalla</td>
<td>‘If God wills it’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izzat</td>
<td>Honour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffri</td>
<td>A Shia school of Islamic jurisprudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahil</td>
<td>Religious ignorance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat</td>
<td>Muslim gathering or congregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat Islami</td>
<td>Islamic revivalist political and social conservative movement formed in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1941 by Abul Ala Maududi in India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juma</td>
<td>Urdu for Friday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabah</td>
<td>The building at the centre of Islam’s most sacred mosque Al-Masjid al Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in Mecca.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafir</td>
<td>Infidel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khilafat</td>
<td>A pan-Islamic protest movement against British colonial rule in India, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a key part of the movement for Islamic Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrassah</td>
<td>Islamic school for religious education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahram</td>
<td>Allowable Muslim woman’s escort, defined as unmarriageable kin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majalis</td>
<td>Shia gathering to commemorate Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malang</td>
<td>A wandering Sufi ascetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjid</td>
<td>Mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matam</td>
<td>Shia practice of self-flagellation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maulvi</td>
<td>Religious teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maulvi</td>
<td>Honorary title accorded to venerated Ulema</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millatfacebook</td>
<td>A social network site for Muslims set up to fill the gap left when</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facebook was banned in 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirzai</td>
<td>Derogatory term for Ahmadis (implies they are followers of Ghulam Ahmad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirza, not Allah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohajir</td>
<td>Urdu speaking Muslim immigrants who emigrated to Pakistan after Partition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohalla</td>
<td>An area or community in a town or village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mosque</strong></td>
<td>Islamic place of worship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muharram</strong></td>
<td>The second holiest month of the Muslim year, and marked by Shia to commemorate the death of Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mujra</strong></td>
<td>A form of exotic dance with Mughal genealogy, commonly associated with prostitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mullah</strong></td>
<td>Islamic clergyman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Namaz</strong></td>
<td>The prayers Muslims perform five times a day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Niqab</strong></td>
<td>Veil worn by female Muslims that covers the face apart from the eyes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paindu</strong></td>
<td>Derogatory Urdu / Punjabi word meaning ‘villager’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paloo</strong></td>
<td>Veil worn by women over the upper part of the body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pir</strong></td>
<td>Saint, particularly Sufi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purdah</strong></td>
<td>Practice of female seclusion, including covering body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qari</strong></td>
<td>Someone who recites the Quran according to the proper rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quran</strong></td>
<td>Islam's holy book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ramadan</strong></td>
<td>The ninth and holiest month of the Muslim year, during which most people fast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sawab</strong></td>
<td>Religious merit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shalwar Kameez</strong></td>
<td>The traditional trousers and shirt of the Indian sub-continent, refers to both male and female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shariah</strong></td>
<td>Islamic law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sipahe Sahaba</strong></td>
<td>Anti-Shia Sunni sectarian militant organisation, formerly a political party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sufi</strong></td>
<td>Follower of the mystical, esoteric dimension of Islam. Sufis come from many different Islamic schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sunnah</strong></td>
<td>The way of life prescribed for Muslims based on the teachings and practices of Muhammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thota</strong></td>
<td>Urdu for porn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ummah</strong></td>
<td>The community of all Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urdu</strong></td>
<td>National language of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wahhabi</strong></td>
<td>Conservative sect of Sunni Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zina</strong></td>
<td>Islamic law concerning unlawful sexual relations. The Zina Ordinance was part of General Zia’s broader Hudood Ordinances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3G</td>
<td>Third Generation Mobile Data Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2G</td>
<td>Second Generation Mobile Data Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France Presse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANT</td>
<td>Actor Network Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department For International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOID</td>
<td>LSE's Department Of International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Gigabyte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoP</td>
<td>Government Of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GT Road</td>
<td>Grand Trunk Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information And Communication Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTD</td>
<td>Information And Communication Technology For Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSE</td>
<td>London School Of Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Ministry Of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Pakistan's National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBS</td>
<td>Pakistan Bureau Of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Personal Computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PECB</td>
<td>Prevention Of Electronic Crimes Bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEMRA</td>
<td>Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHC</td>
<td>Pakistan High Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Doctorate Of Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML-N</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Pakistan Telecommunication Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTI</td>
<td>Pakistan Tehreek Insaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTV</td>
<td>Pakistan Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QAU</td>
<td>Quaid-E-Azam University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Short Message Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>Sipah Sahaba Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Theoretical Framework .................................................................................. 67
Figure 2: Explanatory Sequential Mixed Methods Design (adapted Creswell, 2013) ........ 72
Figure 3: Map of Research Locations ........................................................................... 76
Figure 4: Applied Conceptual Framework .................................................................... 239

Table 1: Linking Conceptual Framework to Interview Questions ................................. 78
Table 2: Respondents by location, gender & sect ......................................................... 79
Table 3: Thematic / Theory Codes .................................................................................. 80
Table 4: Practice / Usage Codes: .................................................................................. 80
Table 5: Interview Guide ............................................................................................... 266
Table 6: Respondents by location, gender & sect ......................................................... 267

Photo 1: Muslim women in mobile phone repair shop, Gujrat. Credit: Author ............. 3
Photo 2: Young barber using Facebook, Mandi Bahauddin. Credit: Author ................. 3
Photo 3: Facebook user, Shahanalog. Credit: Author ..................................................... 15
Photo 4: Crowds protest against Facebook. Credit: Getty Images .................................. 16
1 Introduction

“People sharing more – even if just with their close friends or families – creates a more open culture and leads to a better understanding of the lives and perspectives of others.”

(Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook 2012, 67–70)

“It all started because of Facebook. They said our boy posted this blasphemous picture on Facebook. So we had a fight and after 15 minutes the mosques announced on loudspeakers, ‘Come on, we have to kill them.’ They should not be spared today.”

(Male Ahmadi, Gujranwala, 02.04.2015)

1.1 Research Motivation

This thesis is motivated by a concern to further understand the social changes linked to the use of new social media, and specifically the use of Facebook in Pakistan. Facebook is being rapidly adopted, particularly by young people, and is linked to debates about religion and vulnerable minority groups.

Social media in Pakistan have been the subject of widespread controversy for the access they provide to content that many find offensive, particularly on religious grounds of blasphemy – a crime that, in Pakistan, is punishable by death. In 2008, public protests over the presence of blasphemous videos on YouTube led to the government regulator, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), introducing a ban that lasted until the site removed the videos a few days later (Reporters Without Borders 2008; BBC 2008). In 2010, the regulator banned Wikipedia, YouTube, Flickr and Facebook, following public protests against a competition called ‘Everybody Draw Muhammad Day’ in a bid to prevent access to blasphemous material (Walsh 2010; I. Ahmed 2010). Although Facebook initially resisted, citing a commitment to the principle of free speech, it relented a week later and removed the offending
In 2012, the regulator banned YouTube once again for hosting the film *The Innocence of Muslims*, which mocked the Prophet Mohammad; the ban lasted until January 2016 when YouTube implemented a Pakistani version of the site (Tsukayama 2012).

Controversies about Facebook are not limited to concerns about blasphemous material originating in the United States or principles of free speech, but are also linked to the plight of vulnerable groups. In 2014, three Ahmadi women were killed in Gujranwala when an Ahmadi youth was accused of posting blasphemous content on Facebook. An NGO report on digital blasphemy concluded that ‘false accusations about a subject as evocative and sensitive as blasphemy can be spread within seconds – leaving the accused deeply vulnerable’ (Digital Rights Foundation 2015).

In addition to issues relating to blasphemy and religious minorities, Facebook is also linked increasingly to the role of women in Pakistani society. In July 2016, Qandeel Baloch, a young Punjabi woman who was described as Pakistan’s Kim Kardashian for her rise to fame through posting raunchy photos and provocative music videos on Facebook, was killed by her brother, ostensibly for ‘ruining’ the family’s ‘honour’ (Mohsin 2016). Indeed, online attacks against women are described as a growing problem, and the targeting women on social media is increasingly described as translating into offline harassment and violence (Bukhari 2014).

These controversies are situated within a context of changing religious identities. Pakistan’s history of religious identity and the role of the media and middle-class populations are key to understanding these phenomena. The dominant groups that have shaped Islamic identity in Pakistan are the reformist movements of Barelvis, Deobandis and Ahle Hadith that responded to questions of modernity and secularism, and are characterised by two modernising traditions (Metcalf 1982; Robinson 2008). The first, characterised by the Barelvi movement trace their origins to Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilly (1856–1921) and are commonly known as the country’s ‘folk’ or Sufi Muslims for having maintained historical Islamic intercessionary beliefs such as the importance of *pirs* (spiritual leader) and shrine worship (Metcalf 2002). The other reformist movement rejects the belief in intercession in favour of a direct relationship with God through the text of the Quran and Hadith (commentary on the Quran), and is most commonly represented by the Deobandi and Ahle Hadith schools of thought (Metcalf 1982). Inspired by the influential Islamist reformist Shah Waliullah (1703–62) the Deobandi were founded in India in 1867 and sought to purify Islam of *bid‘ah* – corruptions of, or innovations from, the original text of the Quran and Hadith – through *hidayat* (teaching the right way) (Metcalf 1982) and ‘a strict

---

1 Sufi Islam consists of four orders: the Qadiriyya, the Suhrwardia, the Naqshbandia and the Chishtia. Importantly, followers of the Sufi orders are also found among Deobandi as well as Shia followers.

2 Although modernist in approach, Shah Waliullah’s *ijtihad* was directed not towards secular rationalism, but towards the return of a pure form of Islam based on the words in the Quran, which would form the basis of an Islamic resurgence.
adherence to the classical texts of Islam’ (Waseem 2004, 31). The Deobandis’ closest rivals were the Ahle Hadith, an interpretive reformist tradition that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century in Bhopal, India and challenged the *bid’ah* of other Islamic movements. The Deobandi and Ahle Hadith commitment to *ijtihad, adab* and *hidayat* led them to view other Muslims, particularly the Barelvus but also the Shia, as being *jahil* (ignorant). While the Deobandi and Ahle Hadith movements viewed the Barelvus as ignorant, all three movements dismissed the other significant reformist movement, the Ahmadis as not being Muslims at all. The Ahmadiyya are a reformist movement founded in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (1835–1908) who claimed to be the promised Mehdi or Messiah, thus breaking with established Islamic orthodoxy that holds Muhammad to be the last prophet. Like other reform movements, Mirza Ghulam Ahmed sought to rescue Muslims from moral deficiency through the reformation of society along Islamic lines (A. H. Khan 2015), and thus the Ahmadis uphold a conservative reviver doctrine and strict norms of piety, family and gender codes (Gualtieri 1989, viii).

The assertion of a singular Pakistani identity has been through the ‘othering’ of competing identity groups that has furthered sectarian tension between religious sects. Although the Barelvus have historically been more tolerant of the Shia (Metcalf 1982) there has long been an increase in anti-Shia unanimity among the Sunni sects and intermittent calls to ban all Shia public rituals (ICG 2005). Indeed, the more fundamentalist groups, such as the Deobandi anti-Shia militant group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, have called for a constitutional amendment to define Shias as non-Muslims, framing them with the Ahmadis, perhaps the most persecuted minority in Pakistan. Most Sunni and Shia religious groups view Ghulam Ahmed’s claims as heresy and while efforts to classify Ahmadis as non-Muslims date back to before Partition it was under Bhutto that Ahmadis were non-Muslims (A. A. Ahmed 2010; Qasmi 2014) and under General Zia in 1983 that an amendment to the blasphemy laws prohibited Ahmadis’ use of Islamic terminology and practice of Islamic rituals (A. A. Ahmed 2010, 296). In other words, the Islamisation reforms structured religious identities along sectarian lines by forcing to the fore questions about what constituted an Islamic identity and who got to determine the answer (A. A. Ahmed 2010; Zaman 1998).

Pakistan’s conservatism and sectarian divisions have continued to, as Islamist movements have found a receptive audience for their modernist, reformist message amongst Pakistan’s middle class, traditionally early adopters of new technology. Contrary to popular accounts of progress and modernisation that assume a decline in religiosity, there is increasing evidence of middle class, urban support for conservative, reformist Islam. Studies of elite universities have found high levels of support for conservatism, Islamism and an ‘us vs them’ othering of other religious groups (Siddiqa 2010), whilst many describe how middle and upper class women are drawn to
piety movements such as Al-Huda (Ahmad 2008; Babar 2008; Dorsey 2017). Finally, some studies have argued that the poor are less likely to support militant groups than middle class Pakistani, concluding that ‘The negative relationship between poverty and support for militancy is three times stronger in urban Pakistan than in the country as a whole.’ (Blair et al. 2013)

The debates about Facebook’s role in public life, and the charges of blasphemy are part of a history in which the media have played a significant role in shaping religious and national identity. At the time of independence in 1947, the only independent news media in the country were newspapers owned by political parties or figures linked to the various Muslim nationalist movements (Michaelsen 2011; Mezzera and Sial 2010), while broadcast media were owned by the state. State control over television and radio was important in maintaining institutional authority as well as building a national identity; the military would commonly seize control of broadcast stations in the several coups that occurred between 1958 and 1999. Indeed, the broadcast media were an instrumental mechanism through which General Zia-ul-Haq advanced his Islamisation programme in the 1980s (Talbot 2012; Jaffrelot 2015). Under his regime, newsreaders on Pakistan Television (PTV) were forced to don headscarves and the national broadcaster’s famed drama serials have long helped define gender roles in the country (Kothari 2005).

Perhaps the most significant shift in Pakistan’s media came in 2002 when General Pervez Musharraf liberalised the satellite media and telecommunications of a post-9/11 turn towards the West and against conservatism, in what he termed an attempt at ‘enlightened moderation’ (Musharraf 2004). This liberalisation opened up Pakistan’s public sphere, at least to the liberal elite that Musharraf believed would help further an agenda of political, economic and social modernisation (Naqvi 2011). In the years that followed, the number of television channels and radio stations mushroomed, while mobile phones and the Internet were gradually adopted as networks were slowly rolled out beyond the main urban areas. According to the PTA, in 2004/05 there were just under 12 million mobile subscribers, 26,000 broadband subscribers and no mobile Internet users. By 2013/14, there were 139 million mobile subscribers and 1.3 million broadband subscribers. Mobile broadband or 3G Internet services were only launched in 2014 and grew from 13 million to just under 30 million subscribers the following year.

These changes in Pakistan’s media and communications environment have been linked to a variety of changes in the country, with the most widely debated to date being the implications for politics. Although the political implications of the mass media’s liberalisation are already widely

---

recognised (Jaffrelot 2015; Lieven 2012; Talbot 2012), mobile phones and the Internet have also been linked to accounts of political change. They were described as being critical to enabling public protest and mobilising lawyers against the sacking of the chief justice during Pakistan’s state of emergency in 2009, when President Musharraf shut down the broadcast media (Yusuf 2009). In 2012, they were also described as being critical to catalysing the youth to turn out and vote for Imran Khan (Khan 2012). Analysts suggest that the potential for these new technologies to act as catalysts for change is limited only by their low levels of penetration (Kugelman 2012). Yet the adoption of social media in Pakistan is growing rapidly, with Facebook users growing from only 6 million Pakistanis in 2012 (Kugelman 2012) to just under 13 million active monthly users in 2014 (Pakistani Advertising Society 2014).

These new social media are different from the established mass media in several important ways. First, where Pakistan’s national media represent, like all print and broadcast media, a top-down, one-way information process, social media are horizontal and allow many people to send information to many other people. Where the mass media granted the state and institutions of authority control over public discourse, social media allow individual users to participate in public debate, granting groups such as religious minorities and women the opportunity to express themselves in ways they could not before. A second implication for control is that, where journalists, editors and owners of newspapers and television channels are vulnerable to the influence of the state and public opinion, social media sites such as Facebook are owned and managed in countries far outside the jurisdiction of Pakistan’s legal system and court of public opinion. Social media, then, present the promise of a challenge to national, legal and cultural structures of control, empowering individuals and platforms of personal expression.

While it is the political challenge that attracts the greatest attention and is where the process of individual empowerment is most apparent, the role of social media in social and cultural change is far more complex. Despite the apparent promise of political liberation, in 2015 only 20 percent of Pakistanis polled said they felt the Internet was a ‘good’ thing (Pew Research Centre 2015). In August 2016, the highly controversial Prevention of Electronic Crimes Bill (PECB) was approved by the National Assembly despite concerns that it could be used to curb freedom of expression. The first arrest under the bill was of a young man accused of using Facebook to harass and blackmail women (The Express Tribune 2016). The backlash against vulnerable groups, such as religious minorities and women, challenges the conventional notion that social media empower individuals in processes of social change. Although social media provide a new means for expression, this is often met with harsh response and violence.
These complexities and contradictions cloud an understanding of the role that social media play in processes of social change in Pakistan. Too often, they are described in terms of binary relations where individuals are pitted against political, social or cultural structures. Yet these accounts do not adequately explain the complex and contradictory experiences of young people using Facebook, particularly among minority and vulnerable groups. These experiences appear to be embedded in the everyday practices of individual identity and social interaction.

There is a need for scholarly input into these debates to understand such everyday practices and develop appropriate policy and practice responses. This thesis, then, aims to address this need and contribute to constructive engagements with technology in everyday life.

1.2 Personal Motivation

It is these contradictions that frame the personal motivation for this research, as they reflect questions that emerged from years of practice in the field of information and communication technology (ICT) and development. In 2004, I went to Pakistan for two years with Voluntary Services Overseas as a volunteer communications advisor with a gender and HIV NGO. My experience of working with newly independent media and religious leaders to promote changes in gender and social norms was fascinating: with the liberalisation of the media at the time, it seemed it could become an integral part of social change. I became a passionate advocate for the role of media and communications in development and for the next five years advised development institutions on the use of media and communications, often in Pakistan and predominantly in South Asia.

This passion turned to concern following two experiences in 2009 and 2010. The first was the establishment of a mobile phone-based news service in Afghanistan that failed because users would not pay for it. What concerned me most, however, was that, despite the huge investment and efforts to offer news that people said they needed, we had no idea who used it and why or what changes it brought about (if any). The second experience was advising a UK government-run counter-extremism campaign in Pakistan and discovering the implications of its support to an Ahmadi magazine to counter Sunni militants. The programme team’s lack of knowledge was shocking and stimulated a desire to better understand the relationship between everyday technology use and user identities. This led to the pursuit of further studies in the form of this thesis as an attempt to resolve some of these contradictions and, in so doing, to contribute to a better understanding of, and engagement with, the role of ICT in processes of social change.

My research, therefore, is motivated by the following considerations. It responds to the social and cultural complexities emerging from the use of mobile Internet in Pakistan and the use of social
media in particular. It also responds to the personal experience of a policy deficit in understanding the realities of social media and religion in people’s everyday lives and the need to address this through substantive empirical research.

1.3 Research Goals, Questions and Objectives

In line with the empirical and analytical considerations outlined above, this research project addresses the following research question and objectives. The central question of this thesis is: ‘in what ways does the use of Facebook shape the enactment of religious identity in Pakistan?’.

The purpose of this study is, therefore, to produce an historically situated, theoretically informed account of the relationship between religious identity and the use of social media in Pakistan in order to contribute to the theory surrounding the relationship between identity and ICT and thus to the development sector’s engagements with processes of social change.

These questions are answered by analysing data gathered in Pakistan in three research locations in northern Punjab. The largest is Gujranwala, Pakistan’s seventh-largest city with 1.1 million people and situated approximately 70 km from Lahore on the Grand Trunk Road. The second is Gujrat, approximately 50 km north of Gujranwala, with a population of just over 251,000. The third is Mandi Bahauddin, a small town of just under 100,000 people about 70 km west of Gujrat. Gujrat was the smallest town to be included in the first wave of 3G mobile rollout in 2014.

The timing of the study was fortuitous: one month after my fieldwork began, the long-delayed 3G services were started, allowing me to identify people who were not using and were just beginning to use fast mobile Internet services. Furthermore, there was a general sense of excitement about the technology and people were thus willing to talk about their use of the Internet, Facebook and the role these media played in people’s everyday lives.

1.4 Thesis Argument

The underlying argument of this thesis is that theorising social change in both development and the Information and Communication Technologies for Development (ICTD) literature benefits from acknowledging that human beings are not autonomous, rational individuals who can be liberated from their social context. Indeed, to assume that they are, and to build practices based on this assumption, is to instil a process of alienation that, as this research demonstrates, can be emotionally traumatic and even physically dangerous. Instead, it argues that theorising human

---

4 Pakistan has not held a census since 1998. As such, this thesis uses figures from that time, but with the caveat that they are certainly higher now. The alternative figure from the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics for 2010 for Gujranwala is 1.67 million.
beings as subjects constructed in discourse reveals the operation of power through which the discourse is constructed and thus allows an understanding of forces that constitute the individual.

The thesis also argues that theorising technologies as possessing inherent qualities, such as the capacity to liberate, blinds analysis of the actors, interests and discourses that are embodied in the material form of the technology. Instead, theorising technologies as sociomaterial assemblages allows us to trace the actors and interests represented in the technology. Specifically, this allows a recognition of the interests, ideas and ideologies that are embodied in the materiality of Facebook as a technology that, when it intra-acts with users, demands the enactment of particular forms of subjects.

1.5 Research Methods

This research project adopts a mixed-methods design based on a cumulative 12 months of fieldwork conducted over 18 months between March 2014 and September 2015. A mixed-methods design is helpful when exploring a phenomenon for which extant research is fragmented or inconclusive (Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala 2013, 36). This research, therefore, adopts a sequential explanatory design (Creswell 2014; Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006, 11) consisting of a telephone survey in order to explore and generate hypotheses about the relationship between identity and ICT use and to identify participants for further qualitative research. The second phase had two concurrent components. The first consisted of individual interviews with ICT users and the second, an analysis of the media coverage of a specific ICT incident – the banning of Facebook for hosting blasphemous content in 2010. The rationale for this approach is that quantitative data provides a general description of the relationship between mobile Internet use and identity performativity, whereas qualitative data explains this relationship and the discursive construction of Facebook in discourse.

The research design privileges qualitative research because this reflects the most substantial data collection and analysis. It adopts a narrative analysis approach that treats interviews as stories that reveal themes, understood as discourses (Taylor and Littleton 2006). Newspaper accounts are also treated as stories that are analysed for discourses (Bauer and Aarts 2000). The design is thus intended to analyse the construction of technologies in discourse and the enactment of identity in discursive accounts of practice.
1.6 **Expected Contribution**

Given the background, motivation and questions discussed above, this thesis makes the following empirical and conceptual contributions to the literature on development, ICTD and Pakistan studies.

First, it presents an empirical account of an emerging phenomenon, namely, the use of mobile phones to access social media in the Global South. While there are some accounts of mobile Internet and social media use in Global South (Donner and Gitau 2009; Rangaswamy and Arora 2015; Kumar 2014) and one study of mobile phone use in Pakistan (Rollier 2010), to my knowledge, there have been no studies of social media and religious identity in Pakistan. This research, therefore, presents a series of case studies of young Muslim men and women’s use of Facebook to enact and negotiate religious identity in Pakistan’s Punjab province.

Second, the study makes two conceptual contributions. The first is a theorisation of identity in general and of religious identity in particular and how this contributes to the development and ICTD literature. It does so by demonstrating the value of theorising identity as performative enactments to understand the relationship between individuals and technologies in processes of social change. The second is a contribution to the ICTD literature in demonstrating the value of conceptualising technology as a sociomaterial assemblage – a contribution that has implications for the study and theorisation of the relationship between technologies and processes of social change.

1.7 **Thesis Outline**

This thesis consists of 11 chapters.

Chapter 2 focuses on the dominant development models and how they address culture, religion and secularisation. This is followed by a review of the literature on ICTs and religion, showing how, as the field has developed, it has adopted a more sociological approach that considers identity to be performative and sees the role of technology as being more nuanced than as an assault on religious authority. The classical sociological conceptualisations of religious identity, modernity and reflexivity are juxtaposed with alternative views that describe religious identity as performative and material.
Chapter 3 develops a theoretical framework that integrates religious identity and technology. It draws on feminist theories to develop a concept of identity as performative enactments of hegemonic discourse and helps to extend this discursive account by conceptualising religious identity as constituted in both discursive and material form. The chapter then turns to a theorisation of technology, outlining technological determinist and social constructionist perspectives to highlight the impasse they present. It explores the potential of resolving this impasse through a common framework of structuration, but finds that this leads back to earlier accounts of modernity and echoes of modernisation theory. Instead, a sociomaterial conceptualisation of technology is developed that draws on actor–network theory and agential realism, locating these concepts and their ontological commitments in the technology, media and communication studies literature. This is followed by an outline of affordance as a midrange theory to operationalise a sociomaterial conception of technology, illustrating how, when applied, this shows Facebook to be a technology that enacts a singular, authentic and archival subject that is always framed as a liberal, secular subject of value.

Chapter 4 describes the methodological framework, which defines the ontological and epistemological positions adopted as agential realist with a narrative discourse analytic approach. The multi-stage and multi-method nature of the research design is outlined and explained as a process that supports hypothesis testing and theory development. The narrative analytic approach is also outlined and justified. The complexities and challenges of the fieldwork are described, particularly the challenges of multi-site research, of working with research assistants, gender barriers and the problem of respondents who respond the way they think they are expected to.

Chapters 5 and 6 are two shorter chapters that link the hegemonic discourses in Chapter 5 to the practices of everyday technology use. Chapter 5 is the first quantitative empirical chapter and explores the link between discourses of religious identity with mobile Internet use practices in the field sites of Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin. It presents descriptive statistics that show differences between religious and gender identities in terms of mobile and social media use patterns. These differences are presented as themes that are further explored in the subsequent qualitative empirical chapters. Chapter 6 describes how discourses of religion are translated by mobile phone retailers as part of attempts to shape how people use social media and the content they consume, presenting them as intermediaries as they teach people how to use technologies and services. Based on interviews with shopkeepers from the three field sites who sell content and teach users, it describes the different ways in which they shape the audio and visual content people buy and how they use their devices.
Chapter 7 presents case studies of Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni Facebook users in the three field sites. It describes how the design and features of Facebook mean that Ahmadis are marginalised from social media, Shia users negotiate identity enactments while Sunnis occupy a position of authority. It also describes how Facebook’s algorithm structures religious debate for Sunnis in such a way that discourses of singular authenticity interact with practices of hidayat (guidance) and bid’ah (religious innovation) to increase sectarian tension.

Chapter 8 presents case studies of male and female Facebook users, focusing on the practice of creating fake and multiple accounts. It describes how users break Facebook’s demand for authenticity by creating fake accounts in order to play tricks on each other and find romance. It also describes how users create multiple authentic accounts to manage the boundaries of social context and how this can support the separation of female relatives from male friends in a way that echoes the practice of purdah (female seclusion). In describing the experience of female users who willingly submit to this contraction of their digital space, the chapter opens up questions about the nature of subject formation through submission to religious practice.

Chapter 9 presents an analysis of the empirical chapters by applying the theoretical framework. It draws on a framework of secularisation used to describe how the Jamaat Islami shape religious practice to argue that Facebook shapes religious identity in Pakistan through a process of ‘digital secularisation’. The chapter explains how Facebook’s discourse of singular authenticity interacts with discourses of religious nationalism to diffract religious identity such that it reinforce a hegemonic religious nationalism as well as emergent forms of religious identity. It explores through analysis of female Facebook and piety practices how individual agency and religious identity can constitute modern subjects.

Chapter 10 discusses the findings of the analysis in the context of the questions raised in the discussion of ICTD and development literature. The chapter argues that Facebook’s demand for singular authenticity reinforces normative identities and that, therefore, religion remains significant in users’ lives. It discusses the implications of these findings for theories of ICTD and development, and suggests that adopting a performative and sociomaterial perspective of identity and technology leads to a critique of development as a discourse of domination, and instead outlines a contribution towards a sociomaterial theory of development.

This chapter has outlined the background, motivation and questions that provide the foundation for this thesis. It has described the core argument advanced in the thesis, followed by a description of the methodology adopted and an overview of the chapters as they appear in the thesis. The chapter that follows starts the journey with a review of the literature.
2. Literature Review

2.1 Situating Technology and Social Change

The spread of mobile phones and the Internet over the last decade has been linked to some of the most fundamental social changes, from the economic transformation of resource-poor environments and the populist uprisings of the Arab Spring to the empowerment of women and the rise of fundamentalist religious movements. The claims made for these personal digital technologies are based on their affordances for new forms of access to information and communications – affordances that place the power of information and communication in the palm of someone’s hand. Being able to access the Internet through a mobile phone means that individuals are constantly connected to networks of people and data in ways that are historically unprecedented.

These affordances form the basis for descriptions of the role of technology as enabling new forms of culture, social organisation, and change (Giddens 1991; Castells 2010; Shirky 2008). For example, Giddens links individual access to information and communication to affordances for ‘the “lifting out” of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space’ (Giddens 1990, 21). Similarly, Castells argues that the Internet’s network structure affords a new form of abstract, universal social formation that he terms the ‘network society’ (Castells 2000). These affordances are commonly used to explain the role of technology in these processes of social change as enablers of individual liberation and freedom (Diamond, 2010). These explanations are grounded in the belief that technologies such as the Internet and mobile phones can empower individuals and liberate them from oppressive forms of culture and authoritarian regimes (Giddens 1991; Castells 2010; Shirky 2008; Diamond 2010).

These accounts of social change reflect the dominant narrative in the literature on processes of development, modernisation and social change. This normative account argues that industrialisation, globalisation and access to new forms of communication together disrupt traditional sources of meaning and stability to create a sense of Marxist alienation and Durkheimian anomie. From this dislocation, individuals are presumed to be set free, or forced, to exercise choice over who they are, who they affiliate with and the political movements they support (Giddens, 1986; 1991). Many theorists assume that these choices will be for social arrangements and political movements that support freedom of choice, democracy and, in many cases, open political economies (Diamond, 2010).

At the heart of this thesis of modernisation and individual choice lies an implicit conceptualisation
of the individual as a ‘rational actor’. This is at the heart of classical economic theory, which underpins the dominant narrative in the literature on development and social change (Cowen and Shenton 1996). This standard model of the individual in part derives its ability to make large predictions about behaviour by simplifying the ‘messy and mysterious internal workings of actors’ (Freese 2009, 98). This simplification is the essence of the utility-maximising actor of classical economic theory (Friedman 1953) – conceptualised as an individual who makes decisions based on a universal rationalism motivated by the pursuit of needs and self-interest maximisation. In large part then, theories and explanations of the relationship between technology and processes of social change depend on the existence of a universal way of thinking, of approaching decisions and of the values that underpin those decisions.

Yet, there is increasing evidence from mainstream development policy and practice that this utility-maximising, rational actor does not exist and that, instead, context and culture play an important role in individual identity and behaviour (World Bank 2015; Banerjee and Duflo 2012; Kahneman 2013). These findings reflect a decentring in accounts of human behaviour from an inner universal rationalism outwards to the role of what sociologists and anthropologists describe as cultural explanations for individual behaviour (Bourdieu 1977; Swidler 1986). ‘Culture’ here is understood not as a set of individually held values (Hofstede 2001), but as a ‘repertoire for social action’ (Swidler 1986).

Studies of the role of new media and technologies in processes of change and development are situated at the intersection of diverse academic communities. Two recent books, *New Media, Development and Globalisation* (Slater 2013) and *After Access* (Donner 2015) are indicative of this cross-disciplinary field. Slater addresses the broad implications of changing technological and social worlds: while rooted in sociological debates, his study engages with and contributes to media and cultural studies, studies of digital culture, development, geography and anthropology. Donner examines the specific implications of a more mobile Internet and situates his work within academic communities researching ICTD and the broader community of mobile communication studies. Following this cross-disciplinary example, this literature review covers studies from the fields of international development, sociology and sociology of religion to information systems (IS), communication studies and science and technology studies.

### 2.2 Development Models

This section reviews the dominant models in the international development literature, namely, modernisation theory, dependency theory, neoliberalism, human development and the critical post-development perspective. It concludes that many dominant accounts share the assumptions
that development means the decline of tradition in the face of modernisation and that individuals are universally rational, thus seeing social change as a process of secularisation. This reflects a limited view of the role that context and technology play in individual behaviour. Therefore, we make an argument for the field of development to look beyond instrumental technology use and widen its conception of the individual to include the role of culture and, specifically, religion in shaping individual identity and behaviour.

**Modernisation Theory**
The optimistic post-war development theorist’s view was akin to the paradigm of modernisation that has influenced much of development and theories of social change. The success of post-war European reconstruction led to the belief that, if the newly independent postcolonial nations followed the same patterns of social change, they too would end up with the same kind of society and levels of development as Western countries. Theorists emphasised a technologically driven, Schumpeterian process of linear, path-dependent social change in which communication technologies were key to diffusing the information, ideas and values of modern society (Rostow 1960; Lerner 1958; Schramm 1964; Rogers 1962). Modernisation theory thus argued that industrial technology produces not only economic growth, but also broader institutional and cultural changes (Hoogvelt 1978). These changes are characterised as being increasingly differentiated and individualistic, such that they would lead traditional societies to emulate industrialised Western nations (Eisenstadt 1966; Lerner 1958).

Critics of modernisation theory argued that it under-theorised ‘tradition’ and that, fundamentally, modernisation theory is characterised by ethnocentric Enlightenment dichotomies such as between nature as tradition and technology as modern, and between men and women (Randall and Theobald 1985, 35; C. V. Scott 1996, 24). Because of its emphasis on social and cultural change, modernisation theory is regarded as one of the more sociologically informed theories of development (Viterna and Robertson 2015).

**Dependency Theory**
By the 1970s, in contrast to optimists who viewed technology as driving processes of development and social change, dependency theorists argued that development was impeded by resource flows from poor to wealthy nations and sustained by neo-colonial inequalities, inappropriate paradigm transfers and socioeconomic dualisms (Prebisch 1949; Dos Santos 1973). They rejected the neoclassical and structural change theories of economic development, instead emphasising power imbalances as impediments to development. Nonetheless, dependency theorists maintained an understanding of modernisation through economic development as the path to progress. Technology was viewed as an integral part of patterns of inequality and power
relationships. Attempts to address digital inequalities might serve to maintain inequitable relationships between poor and rich countries (Wade 2002), while the former tried to resist the direction, control and ownership of rich countries over mass media content in order to protect their (poor countries’) national identity, culture and economies (MacBride Commission 1980).

**Neoliberal Economics**
By the 1980s, theorists in industrialised countries recognised that linear growth and structural change models had failed, but countered Marxist dependency by arguing that development failures were the result of corrupt and inefficient governments (Krueger 1974; Lal 2000). Development institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund thus focused on policies understood as the ‘Washington Consensus’, which promotes competitive free markets and curtails the distorting involvement of the state (Chang 2003; Venugopal 2015; Todaro and Smith 2014). Because free markets function through price information asymmetries (Akerlof, Spence, and Stiglitz 2001), ICTs are viewed as drivers of GDP (Waverman, Meschi, and Fuss 2005), efficiencies in fish and grain markets (Jensen 2007; Aker 2010) and political processes (Aker, Collier, and Vicente 2013). The Washington Consensus continues to be the dominant model through which most development interventions are conceptualised.

**Human Development**
Towards the end of the 1980s, there was a growing sense that neoliberal market fundamentalism was not enhancing the quality of life for the poorest and most vulnerable. The most influential alternative to the Washington Consensus has been the human development and capability approach, which conceptualises development as freedom of choice and the ability to exercise those choices (Sen 1999; Haq 1994). While some scholars suggest that moving beyond economic outcomes explicitly counters the dominant neoliberal paradigm (McNeill 2007, 13), others argue that it is easily accommodated within growth development strategies such as neoliberal approaches (Hart 2001; Jolly 2005). ICTs are central to the capability approach as they help inform individuals’ ability to make judgements and exercise the informed choices that reflect their quality of freedom (Gigler 2011; Kleine 2013; Madon 2005; Sen 1999; Zheng 2009).

**Post-Development**
A further critique of development emerged during the 1980s. Like dependency critiques, post-development theorists viewed development in terms of structural inequalities, but unlike the dependency perspective, they drew on postcolonial and subaltern studies and postmodern theory – particularly Foucauldian discourse and genealogical analysis – to challenge the very concept of development (Zai, 2007). Concepts such as poverty and progress are viewed as being socially constructed and used as a vehicle for capitalist imperialism (Sachs 2010; Escobar 1995).
Furthermore, as a social construction, the idea of development as a project is arguably based on the same ideological commitments as modernisation theory in that it holds Western economic and social structures to be a universal goal. Post-development theorists, therefore, reject the idea of development ‘not merely on account of its results but because of its intentions, its world-view and mind-set’ (Pieterse 2000, 175). The post-development perspective explains development as a macro-systemic formation of Western knowledge and ideology, and not just a function of resource inequality. As such, development is viewed as a continuation of Western colonialism through epistemic hegemony (Donovan, 2014).

Summary
This section has reviewed the development models of modernisation, dependency theory, neoliberalism, human development and post-development. It has shown that the development literature on development and technology is dominated by assumptions of a process of modernisation and is underpinned by the conception of the individual as a voluntary sovereign actor. As a result, the role of culture and context in the formation of identity has received limited attention. The common thread running through these development perspectives is the belief that, as societies modernise and individuals achieve greater ability to exercise choices, religion will decline and societies will undergo a process of secularisation (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011). The next section, therefore, outlines theories of secularisation and contemporary accounts of modernity.

2.2 Development and Secularisation
Development theories largely assume a process of social change that relies on the existence of a rational actor and is characterised by a process of secularisation that, in the development literature, is under-theorised (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011). Secularisation theory has its roots in sociologies of religion (Casanova 2007), but it is within the broader sociological conceptualisation of modernity that contemporary accounts of the decline of religion have received the greatest attention.

2.2.1 Secularisation Theory
The post-Enlightenment concept of the secular as a set of conditions characterised by a binary between ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’ has characterised 20th century theorising of social progress. Early accounts of secularisation characterised secularisation as a process in which ‘modern’ life replaced religion (Berger, 1969; Luckmann, 1967). However, these theories of secularisation, which have informed the models of social change that characterise international development theory (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011) have suffered critique in the face of continuing religiosity in Western and non-Western societies as well as accounts of the inherently related and
dialogical relationship of the religious and the secular. A key part of accounts that unpack normative accounts of the secular is the distinction between secularisation as a process of social change and secularism as a state policy of separating religious institutions from the state.

Theories of secularisation have faced critique, with scholars proposing further refinement of the processes and problematising of the concept. Although some scholars rejected commitments to secularisation (Berger 1999, 2012), others argued instead for further development of the theory. Casanova (1995, 2003) critiqued the classical theories of secularisation to propose instead three varieties of secularisation. First, secularisation as a process of general religious decline, secondly secularisation as the privatisation of religion and thirdly secularisation as the structural differentiation as the social and scientific spheres liberate themselves from religious authority. As Casanova (1995) notes, in this account religion does not necessarily privatise and may retain authority over public life. Scholars such as Habermas (2008), initially a proponent of the secularisation thesis, acknowledged the continuing relevance of religious experience, but argued it needed to be understood in secular terms. Taylor (2007) argued against secularisation as a ‘subtraction’ that revealed authentic secularism, but instead that secularisation and faith were simply examples of ‘self-understandings and human potentialities’ (Taylor, 2007:3). The concept of ‘the secular’ has also been problematized, and shown to have been shaped by specific social and historical circumstances. Asad (1993, 2003) argued that European concepts of the secular reflected particular interests through their prescribing of particular modes of being as legitimate and others illegitimate. Furthermore, Asad also showed how, contrary to classical accounts of secularisation (and implicit in much development theory) ‘the secular’ cannot be understood separately from ‘the religious’, as both are inherently intertwined and are dialectically related.

The concept of the secular has also been problematized through its relation to Islam, particularly since 9/11 and the war on terror which pitted radical Islam against the liberal, democratic West. Roy (2007) for example argues against the dichotomisation of radical Islam and Western liberalism, showing how radical Islamist movements emerge out of global processes and thrive because they are detached from specific any cultural background. In this way Islamist movements are secularising forces because they “individualise(s) and de-socialises religious practice(s)” (2007: 76). Mahmood (2011, 2015, 2006) draws on Asad to argue that the normative conception of secularisation demands a religious identity that ‘is compatible with the rationality...of liberal political rule’ (2006, 344). She counters this secular-religious dichotomy that characterises the secular subject as liberated and autonomous through an account of Islamic women finding agency in the practice of religious norms and piety. These counters to the normative understanding of
secularisation illustrate how it structures specific modes of being as progressive and delegitimise others as backward and regressive.

2.2.2 Secularisation in South Asia and Pakistan

South Asian engagement with the concept and theory of secularisation has largely been to critique and problematize it, particularly from a post-colonial perspective. In India, scholars such as Madan (1987), Chatterjee (1994) and Nandy (1998) rejected the legitimacy of secularism because of its Western origins and inability to explain the Indian context. Others, such as Barghava (2011) have argued for a ‘rehabilitation’ of the concept of secularisation through a recasting of the concept to reflect ‘contextual’ specificities. Bhargava suggests that the concepts utility can be retained by recognising that secularism can take diverse forms, such as the Indian case in which the state takes a stance of ‘principled distance’ that is determined by whether intervention is compatible with religious freedom and civic equality. Bhargava thus rehabilitates the concept of secularism by expanding it beyond the limits of liberalism. Other scholars have problematized the term through highlighting distinctive characteristics of the Indian experience, emphasising for example the relational nature of the religious and the secular in India (Bilgrami 2012; Chakrabarty 2009). Others such as Pandey (2007) have engaged with the progressive values associated with secularism, highlighting the relationship between secularism and the totalising, homogenising state that marginalises difference and asserts a uniform, majoritarian culture.

In Pakistan debates around secularisation have been dominated by discussion of Islamisation, with scholars such as Talbot (2012) describing how Jinnah’s conception of a secular nation has been taken over by forces of Islamisation that have divided the nation along religious lines. This dominant perspective on Pakistan has been challenged by scholars who argue that it fails to acknowledge the historical complexity and diversity of religion in Pakistan, and that it sets up a false dichotomy between Islamisation and secularisation. Historians have emphasised the ambiguity and lack of specificity in Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan, and highlighted the important roles that religious movements played in Pakistan’s struggle for independence (Jalal 1985; Gilmartin 1998). Others have emphasised the diversity of religious life in Pakistan to explore the complex relationship between Islamism, secularism and secularisation (Iqtidar 2011), creativity in religious life (Marsden 2005) and challenges secularisation’s unique claim to individual sovereignty (Chaudhry 2013; Jamal 2009; Babar 2008a; Ahmad 2008).

Iqtidar’s account is particularly important in exploring secularisation as a process of social change. She unpacks the relationship between secularism and secularisation, showing how theories that argue secularisation leads inevitably to secularism fail to explain the Pakistan experience, where she demonstrates that religious institutions, such as the Islamist Jamaat Islami,
can be a force for secularisation even whilst they reject secularism as a policy. An important part of Iqtidar’s work involves showing how processes of secularisation do not necessarily lead to state policies of secularism. She demonstrates this by showing how Islamist movements such as the JI are secularising but not towards the ideology or vision of secularism: ‘My attempt here is not to suggest that the Islamists are secular in the sense of consciously identifying with the ideology of secularism--in fact it is very much the reverse of that--but that they are secularizing, that is, they are facilitating a process of secularization as rationalization of religion’ (2011, 22).

Iqtidar’s argument that the JI is secularising force rests on the claim that it is a modern institution that produces modern subjects, and that the concept of secularisation describes a process of rationalism and modernity. Iqtidar shows this through three characteristics that constitute JI's modernity. Firstly, Muslims in Pakistan can exercise religious choice, as they live in a competitive religious marketplace, and can choose to affiliate to one of the many Islamic groups such as one of the ulama-led maslaks (Deobandi, Barelwi, Ahl-e Hadis, or Tablighi Jama’at), one of the Islamist groups such as JI. Secondly, the JI has 'rationalised' religion through the exercise of conscious and rational thought to the application of faith to contexts outside the private sphere. Third and finally, this process reflects the “objectification” of religion - the conscious rationalisation of questions of individual religious identity, questions that historically were unproblematised and taken for granted. These characteristics make the JI a secularising organisation because they demands the enactment of modern forms of subjectivity, transforming religious practice “into a largely individualized decision that must be justified internally, that is, within a subject, and externally, to others around the subject” (2011, 157).

Scholars have also shown how the established secular – religious and modern-traditional dichotomy fails to reflect the lived experience of everyday life in Pakistan. Ewing (1997) for example looks at Sufi pirs and their followers, describing how religious belief accommodates ‘modern’ practices in ways that are meaningful and coherent for individuals. Similarly, Marsden (2005) counters the secularist claim that Islam is a homogenous force and Pakistani’s have submitted to a singular, authoritarian form of belief. He describes how individuals exercise creativity and dialogue in relation to faith and particularly in relation to Islamist groups, and that they “do not think that it is only formally educated Islamic purists or ‘modern’ secular people who have the capacity to live rational, discerning, intellectually acute and morally sophisticated lives” (2005, 10).

The claim that secularisation is a path that leads away from faith to individual freedom is also challenged by a number of scholars, particularly through accounts of female
participation in religious groups and practices. Jamal (2009) describes how female members of the Jamaat-e-Islami party simultaneously construct pious identities and claim to be modern subjects (Jamal 2009, 9). Many of the women that Jamal describes explain how they ‘understood the place of modernity in their lives which was not necessarily oppositional to Islam’ (Jamal 2009, 10). The conscious adoption of submissive piety practices both outward (such as the veil and purdah) as well as inward (such as practising patience and tolerance) are described as being compatible with a notion of modernity. Similarly, Babar (2008b) and Ahmad’s (2008) describe how female participation in religious revival movements are experienced as empowering and enabling. Both accounts describe how membership in the movement strengthens a sense of identity, revealing ‘nuanced, in-depth understandings of women’s negotiations of power relations’ (Chaudhry 2013, 246).

Despite these challenges to the theory of secularisation, there remains only limited enquiry into religion and secularism in non-Western contexts. Even though detailed work of religious life in non-Western contexts has generated significant insights, a review of the American sociology of religion literature finds that studies of religion have not diversified as one might expect, while the sociology of religion does not reflect increased attention to Islam, following September 11 (Smilde and May 2015). It concludes by arguing that the literature on the sociology of religion needs more non-Western accounts of the changing relationship between religion and secularity and its attendant processes of social change.

This section has reviewed the literature on development, secularisation and secularisation in South Asia. It shows that the role of religion and secularisation has not received a great deal of attention in the development literature, and that this literature is characterised by an assumed process of secularisation. The secularisation literature shows how secularisation as understood in the West leads teleologically towards secularism and a dichotomy between religion and non-religious life, but that studies of religious practices in non-Western context reveal secularisation as a process of rationalism that leads towards a form of modernity in which religion maintains a significant and meaningful role in everyday life. Finally, it shows that there has been limited study of religion and secularisation outside of Western contexts.

2.3 The Individual in Models of Development and ICTD

The dominant development models and theories of secularisation share a common conceptualisation of social change as the transition from traditional to modern societies, with
modern societies defined by the characteristics of Western modernity. These perspectives on development and social change also share conceptualisations of the individual, as this section illustrates by reviewing accounts of the individual in models of development and ICTD. It shows that they conceptualise the individual as a rational, utilitarian and reflexive agent.

The Rational Individual in Development
While modernisation theory assumes that individuals will adopt rationalism and the pursuit of self-interest as part of development progress, the neoliberal and human development approaches share the belief that individuals are already rational, self-interest-maximising agents. The voluntary, self-interest-maximising agent of Adam Smith’s classical economics is a prerequisite for the effective functioning of free markets. Similarly, although the human development approach makes an explicit departure from the singular focus on economic growth, it retains a shared conception of the individual as a rational, reasoning agent. For example, in order to know which functioning’s they value and what life they wish to lead, individuals must have access to information and the capacity to reason (Sen 1999, 190). As Gasper notes, ‘central to Sen’s view is the choosing, reasoning individual’ (Gasper 2002, 451).

Thus, the individual is conceptualised as a rational individual whose purpose is, through the expansion of his or her capabilities, the pursuit of individual freedom. At the heart of both the neoliberal and human development approaches is a belief in the self-governing individual who is empowered through liberation from communal and social ties (Hopgood 2000) to exercise autonomy, calculation and reflexivity in the market (Shani 2012, 108; Jolly 2005). In contrast, Foucauldian-inspired post-development critiques largely render the individual as a passive ‘subject’ under discursive and structural hegemony (Lie 2008).

These accounts of a rational, sovereign individual have been increasingly challenged, including from the bastions of orthodox development policy. The micro and behavioural economic study of development interventions finds that beneficiaries do not act as predicted and are not universally rational (Rodrik 2008; Banerjee and Duflo 2012; Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2011; Bertrand et al. 2005). Building on these findings and others, in 2015 the World Bank’s annual flagship publication on development theory, the World Development Report, titled ‘Mind, Society and Behaviour’ (World Bank 2015), explicitly critiqued the assumptions of universal rationalism and the self-interest-maximising individual as culturally contingent. As a result, the report rejects the assumption of a voluntaristic, self-interest-maximising rational actor. It concludes that the source of individual choices and behaviour is far more external and, as such, development theory and practice should pay more attention to ‘social practices and institutions’ (World Bank 2015, 12).
This recognition has long been made by development sociologists who highlight the role of states (Evans 1995), institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff 2008) and gender (Moser 1989; Moghadam 1992) in processes of development. Indeed, there is growing recognition within mainstream development theory of what sociologists and anthropologists have long argued, that the cultural context in which people live plays an important part in how they behave and understand the world (Bourdieu 1977; Swidler 1986). The World Bank report therefore concludes that this conceptualisation of individual decision-making implies that, to really understand human behaviour, there needs to be greater engagement with the culture in which people live and its role in shaping individuals themselves.

The rational, sovereign actor that underpins mainstream development models is increasingly challenged and the role of culture in human identity and behaviour recognised. In order to explore the relationship between technology and identity, the following section considers how the individual is conceptualised in the ICTD literature.

**The Instrumental Individual in ICTD Studies**

Studies of ICTD have long been characterised by assumptions of the individual as a voluntaristic, self-interest-maximising agent at the expense of paying attention to the role of local contexts and cultures in shaping individual behaviour (2012). Similarly, ICTD studies tend to either assume a universal set of values leading to universally generalizable conclusions or focus on situated studies that do not explore the roots of cognitive or emotional bearings on behaviour (Avgerou 2010; Madon and Avgerou 2004, 163). As a result, there is a long-standing call for greater attention to the role of context, culture and development in the relationship between ICTs and individual behaviour. Madon and Avgerou call for greater focus on the ‘contextual origins of the meanings, emotional dispositions, and competencies of actors’ (2004, 176) and Walsham and Sahay call specifically for greater attention to ‘individuals and issues such as identity’ in future IS research (Walsham and Sahay 2006, 20).

The assumption of the individual as a voluntary agent is also linked to a predominantly instrumentalist view of ICTs in development, where ICTs are exclusively linked to specific transformations such as public service delivery or narrowly defined sectors such as agriculture or health (World Bank 2012a, 12, 2012b). This emphasis on instrumental outcomes has led to a narrow definition of ICT success in which non-instrumental use outside predefined goals is regarded as a failure (Chirumamilla and Pal 2013; Ratan and Bailur 2007). Yet, it is argued that attention to the non-instrumental use of communication is important for the following reasons. First, the nature of the device affords the consumption of entertainment over productive use, as small screens and keypads limit the productivity claims of optimistic development arguments.
(Napoli and Obar 2013; Napoli et al. 2014). Second, emerging research highlights the value of non-instrumental use such as in developing digital skills (Donner and Gitau 2009; Rangaswamy and Arora 2015; Rangaswamy and Cutrell 2013; Kumar 2014) and introducing wider conceptions of development that include non-instrumental aspects such as play (Chirumamilla and Pal 2013; Sey and Ortoleva 2014).

While the historic focus on instrumental technology use was perhaps understandable in an age when communication technologies were more directly controlled by agents of development such as the state, the adoption of technologies by individuals demands a broader focus. Assumptions of rationality are not enough to explain non-instrumental use, which plays an important part in everyday ICT use and thus in processes of social change.

The Reflexive Individual
An underlying conceptualisation of the individual that the development and ICTD literatures draw on is the idea of the reflexive individual. Sociologists such as Giddens and Castells describe the idea of ‘individual reflexivity’ (Adams 2003) as an underlying account of the modernity to which most development theories attend. Adams argues that common to these accounts of modernity is a theorisation of modern society as one in which individuals are free to exercise greater choice about their identity, leading to changing allegiances and social networks, the transfer of risk from institutions to the individual and greater self-awareness. Thus, Giddens describes identity as fluid and malleable, with the self as a project in which individuals must construct biographical narratives that are coherent to themselves and to others (Giddens 1991). For Castells, globalisation and networked technology lead to ‘the dissolution of shared identities’ (Castells 1997, 355). To deal with this fluidity and dissolution, individuals have to develop ‘self-reflexive beliefs’ (Giddens 1991, 53) as ‘social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character’ (Giddens 1990, 39).

The concept of reflexivity is also present in alternative theorisations of modernity. Eisenstadt, for example, argues that a ‘high degree of reflexivity’ enables modernity’s ‘potential for self-correction, its ability to confront problems not even imagined in its original program’ (Eisenstadt 2000, 25). Indeed, according to Weber, there is ‘no substance and no other core to modernity than a shared lineage to the idea of reflexivity’ (R. Weber 2015, 33). In other words, intrinsic to accounts of the decline of traditional institutions such as religion and the conditions of modernity is the idea of individuals making reflexive choices.

The idea of the reflexive, expressive self is subject to a number of critiques. Alexander argues
that the self-reflexive thesis invokes a traditional/post-traditional dichotomy that reflects ‘the same simplistic set of binary oppositions as did modernisation in its most banal form’ (Alexander 1996, 44). The self-reflexivity thesis holds that Western individuals were constrained by tradition and culture, that they ‘were once naive cultural dupes’ (Adams 2003, 225), but were liberated through the conditions of modernity. The parallels with modernisation theory and its thesis of a liberating ideology are clear, leading Alexander to argue that the self-reflexivity thesis offers an ‘historically arbitrary, Western-centred, and theoretically tendentious approach to tradition’ (Alexander 1996, 45).

Summary
This section has argued that normative theories of development assume a process of modernisation that rests on the idea of a universal, rational and reflexive agent. This has been challenged by emerging insights into human behaviour and patterns of technology and for being Western-centric. These critiques are not simply philosophical or ontological ivory-tower debates removed from the challenges and injustices of the world. Theorising identity as being autonomously and self-reflexively produced masks the power and ideological formations in which individuals are situated (Lodziak 2002; Zizek 1997). Furthermore, universalising this self-reflexive sovereign subject ignores its historical origins in Western, Christian modernity and marginalises the possibility of alternative forms of identity and subjectivity (Adams 2003, 235).

In other words, this section has argued that non-instrumental, everyday technology use and religious identity are important areas of study to inform our understanding of the relationship between technology and development, with the latter conceptualised as a broader process of social change. In order to take this forward, the next section reviews the literature on religion and religious identity as a prelude to exploring the literature on ICTs and religion.

2.4 Conceptualising Religious Identity
The literature on religious identity is both diverse and diffuse, covered from a range of different disciplines and perspectives. This section provides a thumbnail sketch of this story, outlining the conceptual diversity that religious identity has taken in the sociology of religion literature. It outlines the conceptualisation of religion in the main sociological schools, namely, religion as illusion, as a source of integration, as a social structure, as functionalist and as socially constructed. It concludes with an outline of contemporary theorisations of religion as a lived, material phenomenon.

A common view of religion is that it is an illusion, that the content and meaning of faith are false and mask a true materialist, secular reality. In this Marxist analysis, while religion may serve as
an opiate to mask the experience of alienation, it is also described as a construct used by specific groups to advance their own interest. Religion as a balm is commonly described as ‘deprivation theory’ and has informed studies of working-class religion and social movements (Furseth and Repstad 2006). Others describe religion as a set of resources exploited by elites, including in patterns of patriarchy (Halliday 2003; Shaheed 2010). This reductionist view of religion is criticised for failing to acknowledge its role in emancipatory movements (Collins 1998) and as a source of meaning and expression, such as the wearing of hijab (Woodhead 2002) or piety practices (Mahmood 2011; Jamal 2011).

In contrast to the idea of religion as illusion in Marx’s conflict theory, religion is also explained as a mechanism for social order and integration. Durkheimian accounts of religion describe it as the totem or embodiment of society in symbolic form. Like Marx, Durkheim assumes an underlying materialism on which broader collective representations and culture rest, leading towards a group rather than individualist account (Giddens 1976; Durkheim 1978). However, the assumption of an a priori role for religion is criticised for failing to account for the historical processes through which religions rise or fall (Emirbayer 2004, 13). Indeed, sociologists in the 1960s and 1980s turned away from Durkheim’s emphasis on social stability towards the sociology of Weber, Marx and de Tocqueville (Emirbayer, 1996) to develop ‘conflict sociology’ (Collins 1994) and theories of ‘resource mobilisation’ and ‘political process’ (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978, 1981; McAdam 1996).

While Marx and Durkheim’s account explains religion in terms of social structures, Weberian perspectives emphasise its role in the individual’s need for meaning. Thus, for Weber, religion can only be understood from the viewpoint of the meaning of religious behaviours (M. Weber 1920, 1). In this sense, religion serves as a source of cultural identity and an explanation of social change, such as the emergence of capitalism from Protestantism. Weber’s thesis has been criticised for failing to recognise the significance of rationalism – adopted by Protestants in favour of Catholicism’s traditionalism – as a driving force of capitalism and modernity (Robertson 1959; Fanfani, Campanini, and Clark 1935; Tawney 1926). One of Weber’s great contributions though was to separate the truth claims of religion so that, unlike Marx, Freud and Durkheim, religion can be understood as a meaningful force in the lives of individuals.

While structuralist and individualist accounts of religion focus on society or the individual, functionalist accounts aim to integrate the two (Christiano, Swatos, and Kivisto 2015, 39). Functionalist accounts of religion challenge the idea that rational self-interest is the main driver of progress and, instead, argue that culture and particularly religion are central drivers of change. This argument implies a rejection of the idea of secularisation as a universal process, seeing it
instead as an outcome of Western and Christian values (Parsons 1951, 1964, 1971). One of the important dimensions of this Christian modernity is the idea of self-built, ‘achieved’ identities in contrast to given, ascriptive identities in the pre-modern societies that served to legitimise and maintain social hierarchy (Parsons 1951, 111). Similarly, Geertz’s (1973) anthropological account of religion – one of the most influential in sociology and anthropology (Furseth and Repstad 2006) – draws on both Weber and Parsons to emphasise the meaning that individuals ascribe to their experiences. This functionalist account conceptualises religion as a way for human beings to interpret and be in the world, bringing meaning to chaos and disorder. For Geertz, religion is a cultural phenomenon with an existential function.

The 1970s saw a shift in the social sciences as the certainties of before were reconceptualised as social constructions. The ‘social constructionist turn’ (P. L. Berger and Luckmann 1966) also introduced new conceptualisations of religion (P. L. Berger and Luckmann 1981; P. L. Berger 1967; P. L. Berger 2009; Luckmann 1967). Although Berger and Luckmann (1966) share the dichotomy between traditional and modern societies, in contrast to Parsons’ functionalist account of religion, they understand it from the perspective of the individual as a resource or ‘sacred canopy’ that provides order and legitimates the vulnerable social structure that individuals recognise as reality (P. L. Berger and Luckmann 1981, 113). This account of religion has been critiqued for assuming a universal desire for meaning and intolerance for inconsistency (McGuire 2008) and for failing to account for the manipulative use of religion and thus veiling the operation of power (Horrell 2001).

The period since the 1980s has seen enormous diversity in emerging theories of religion. These reflect the growing influence of the natural and behavioural sciences (Stausberg 2009) as well as genealogical approaches that emphasise history and power (Asad 1993), an ethnographic turn towards the study of ‘vernacular religions’ and ‘lived religions’ (Mathews 1998; Orsi 1985) and a material turn towards ‘objects, practices, spaces, bodies, sensations, affects and so on’ (Hazard 2013). These latter areas of attention reflect a shift away from the study of religion as belief and instead as a phenomenon that is historically situated and enacted through practice and material entities.

One of the most influential has been the work of anthropologist Talal Asad (1993). Asad argued that any attempt at a universal definition of religion and indeed the secular must inevitably fail because religion as a concept is a product of a specifically Western modern discourse, and that any definition of religion is always a product of a political struggle to determine modes of thought and power on society. Asad thus rejects the concept of religion as symbolic activity that is separate from instrumental, everyday life argues that religion is constituted by practices and discourses
that are often not religious in nature. Religion, in other words, is not always religious – but rather part of everyday life. The implications of this are, as Asad argues “If anything is agreed upon, it is that a straightforward narrative progress from the religious to the secular is no longer acceptable” (2003, 1). Asad (2003) makes the same argument to reframe an understanding of the secular, firstly distinguishing the concepts of the secular from secularism, arguing that “over time a variety of concepts, practices, and sensibilities have come together to form the ‘the secular’ [which is] conceptually prior to the political doctrine of ‘secularism’ (2003,16). The concept of religion, and indeed of the secular, are not universal ideas or representations of phenomena with some core ‘essence’, but rather constituted by multiple concepts that are manifest through diverse practices that evolve and change over time.

For Vasquez, the study of religion is ‘to study how embodiment and embeddedness in time and place enable and constrain diverse, flexible, yet patterned subjective experiences that come to be understood as religion’ (2010, 7). This account of religion, while controversial and at the margins of the study of religion (Hazard 2013; Stausberg 2012), presents a substantial alternative to the Western-centric study of religion.

Classical sociological accounts of religion are characterised by their focus on the nature and function of religion as belief in the form of texts, ideas and structure. This emphasis is dominated by accounts of changes in religious belief that are characterised by the decline of religion in public life and the assumption of progress towards a secular modernity. This account of secularisation is also acknowledged in later and more contemporary accounts as a particular product of Western – and specifically Christian – social and political histories. In this sense, in classical sociological accounts of religion is the common assumption that individuals are progressing towards greater individualisation and autonomy, and away from being defined by religion and tradition. Indeed, these accounts of religion echo the theories of development and modernity in which individuals are rational, choice-making subjects.

2.5 ICTs and Religion

The small but growing body of literature on ICTs and religion has developed particularly since the emergence of the Internet. This section describes three historical ‘phases’ of research, concluding that the field has become more theoretically nuanced and complex in its approach to the relationship between the Internet and specific aspects of religious practice.

---

5 Asad of course argues that there is no ‘the secular’ as the ‘the’ implies calcification, and similarly there is no absolute form of religion, or of Islam, Christianity or other faith. Instead there are only genealogical formations that emerge out of historically contingent situations and manifest in particular practices.
The first phase of research reflects the modernisation thesis – that the technology would introduce entirely new forms of social organisation. Højsgaard and Warburg (2005) describe how the literature of the 1980s examined the innovative nature of the Internet and the idea that religion ‘could (and probably would do almost anything’ (2005, 8). Thus, scholars introduced terms such as ‘cyber-religion’ to describe new forms of religious practice and communities that existed solely online (Dawson 2000) or to describe the online presence of existing religious groups (Brasher 2004). Common to most is the argument that cyber-religion represents ‘a solid opposition to traditionally structured religious institutions’ (Højsgaard and Warburg 2005, 30). The early literature on the Internet thus imagined that the Internet would disrupt established social institutions.

The second wave of research sought to find ‘a more realistic perspective’ (Højsgaard and Warburg, 2005), recognising the importance of people as well as technologies in religious practice. This wave of research sought to establish a structure to the field, with a number of edited collections seeking to identity common questions and methodology (Hadden and Cowan 2000; Dawson and Cowan 2004; Højsgaard and Warburg 2005). While Højsgaard and Warburg’s edited volume examines how the Internet was used by established religious groups, a ‘distinctive issue’ explored in the volume is the construction of religious identity and community online by new religious movements such as Branch Dravidians, Scientologists, Wiccans and new cyber-religions (Højsgaard and Warburg 2005, 8).

This early literature on the relationship between technology and religion explores both how the technology is incorporated into the practices of existing religious movements as well as how it enables new religious movements to emerge. Campbell (2013b) argues that this wave of research represents ‘disparate collections of studies… rather than cohesive commentaries on how religious groups and practices as a whole are being shaped by Internet technology and culture’ (2013b, 9).

Like early accounts of the use of technologies by social movements, this work is descriptive rather than analytical, mapping the empirical rather than theoretical terrain. The few forays into linking the study of ICTs and religion with broader theoretical debates in the literature on technology and social change explored how the Internet might strengthen or weaken established religious authority. Piff and Warburg’s (2005) study of Internet use in the Baha’i tradition explores the nature of authority in official and unofficial online spaces. They emphasise the tension this raises in terms of its implication for the way religious authorities maintain credibility through ‘plausibility alignment’.

Significantly, even these early studies of the relationship between the Internet and religion...
engaged critically with questions about the relationship between online and offline communities. Studies of the Internet and religion explored whether online relationships were as authentic as offline relationships, and the implications for community (Campbell 2005), hierarchy and authority (Introvingne 2005). Thus, studies of the relationship between technology and culturally located social practices engaged critically and in a nuanced way with the role of communications technology in social change.

The third wave of research reflects a substantial development of the field and includes studies that explore religious rituals and practices online; how the Internet influences definitions and understandings of religion; the relationship between online and offline forms of religion; and the study of religious community, identity and authority (Campbell 2013, 682). Campbell argues that the field is developed enough to be defined as a subfield of ‘Internet studies’ and that this positioning is possible by structuring the field as five research areas that reflect concerns within Internet studies, namely, convergent social practice, embedded reality, networked community, shifting authority and identity as performance (Campbell 2013b, 682).

The idea of convergent social practice addresses the enduring engagement with the difference between online and offline social interaction. Helland (2000), for example, distinguishes between the presence of established religious groups online as ‘religion online’ and new religious groups that emerge from online spaces as ‘online religion’. For example, many of these studies find that online religious practices challenge established authority, much in the same way as arguments for the transformative power of the Internet in processes of modernisation. Yet, this literature also shows how the Internet is part of transformations of religious practice rather than a marginalisation or replacement, as argued by the secularisation thesis. These transformations generally reflect the ‘individualisation’ argument, as Campbell concludes from studies of rituals and practices online, arguing that ‘spirituality online is highly individualized and self-directed’ (Campbell 2013b, 682).

The view that the Internet transforms rather than replaces religion is explored in the literature that describes religious practice as ‘embedded’ and reflects a particular strand of the secularisation school of thought. Campbell (2013) argues that this distinction between online and offline reflects the idea that ‘online religious practice is intertwined with rather than divorced from traditional religious frameworks’ (Campbell 2013, 684). Here, the literature recognises and explores how religious practice, history and narratives inform decisions about, and thus shape, Internet use. The Internet is understood as being embedded within users’ own reality, even as users embed their reality within online practices. This move reflects a rejection of the idea that the Internet is a ‘separate’ space, as scholars of social movements and modernity have argued. Campbell links this
move to a rejection of the dualism between online and offline that is increasingly common in Internet studies (for an in-depth look at the ontology of what Jurgenson terms ‘digital dualism’, see Jurgenson 2011).

The field of religion and the Internet has, in particular, explored the dynamics of religious communities’ practices and behaviours online. This research shows that online religious communities often operate differently from traditional religious institutions and structures (Campbell 2013b, 685). This literature has evolved from simple descriptions of religious groups – such as Islamic cyber-communities or Buddhist cyber-sanghas – to detailed studies of how and why people join these communities and the implications of online communities for offline communities Campbell suggests that much of this research finds that online communities complement, rather than substitute for, existing communities – a finding the author links to similar debates in Internet studies that explore community through the ‘network’ metaphor. This literature on religion and the Internet reflects broader accounts in Internet studies of how technologically enabled networks result in the decline of geographic and inherited social ties to communities with shared interests and values. Thus, this literature reflects the argument that computer-supported social networks foster ‘global connectivity, the fragmentation of solidarities, the de-emphasis of local organizations’ (Wellman et al. 1996, 213).

The literature on the Internet and religion also examines how the use of new ICTs affects traditional and new sources of authority. This describes how the Internet allows new forms of religious authority, from default gatekeepers such as webmasters to individuals who bypass traditional institutions to become influential figures. These new forms of authority can also translate offline, as Herring (2005) shows in a description of how leaders of a Christian newsgroup found their offline authority enhanced. At the same time, established religious groups also use the Internet to shore up their authority, for example, by monitoring followers in user groups and establishing policies to constrain debate. Religious groups also seek to exercise control over the use of new technologies, as shown by studies of how the Orthodox Jewish community sought to introduce a ‘kosher cell phone’ to limit access to technologies that threatened their authority by enabling users to share images and participate in debates (Campbell 2007; Rashi 2012). Rashi (2012) shows how the Orthodox leadership was able to ban access to 3G Internet-enabled phones in order to reaffirm and enhance their authority in the community. As the study of ICTs and religion has developed, the literature has increasingly adopted a sociological perspective. This sociological turn is outlined in more detail in the following section.
2.6 ICTs and Religious Identity

The relationship between the Internet and religious identity has drawn substantial attention from scholars. As Campbell (2013b) says, it reflects a common line of enquiry with Internet studies and common concerns with the broader literature on technology, modernisation and processes of social change.

Lövheim (2013) characterises the trajectory of research into the relationship between ICTs and religious identity as moving from utopian disruption and empirical mapping to a more nuanced theorisation. Lövheim argues that the first phase – like early research into the Internet and identity more broadly (see Turkle 1995) – theorised the Internet as a place where people could shrug off the constraints of traditional religious authority and exercise greater freedom in the emerging spiritual marketplace ‘where users might pick and mix their spiritual identities’ (Lövheim 2013, 45). This includes research such as Lövheim and Linderman’s (2005) study of how young Wiccan practitioners found forms of freedom by creating identities outside the supervision of their coven. Brasher (2004) concludes that online religious practice ‘could become the dominant form of religion and religious experience in the next century’ (2004, 19). Yet, as Lövheim (2013) subsequently notes, the empirical grounding for these studies was ‘thin’ and based on a few case studies, such as that of online neo-pagans.

The second phase sought to critically interrogate these claims through empirical research on online religious practices. This largely challenged the utopian claims of early studies of the Internet and religion. Dawson, for example, concludes that ‘the influence of alternative identity formations on the practice of religion is minimal and speculative at present’ (Dawson 2000, 37). Cowan, on the other hand, argues that the construction and performance of identity online is a process of co-construction (2005, 155) and should not be theorised as an individualistic process that is only online or offline. This reflects the ICT and social movement literature that explores the relationship between online and offline mobilisation. Crucially, however, the ICT and religion literature tends to conclude that technology is less significant for, or more co-constitutive of, practice and identities. As Lövheim (2013) argues, this phase of research tends to conclude that ‘online contexts generate discursive and social infrastructures for religious identity formation’ (2013, 48).

The third phase described by Lövheim (2013) explores how online identities are integrated into everyday life; it recognises the continuity and connection between individuals’ online and offline identity enactments. Thus, studies explore how personal blogs and podcasts constitute religious practice or religious behaviour in computer games (Feltmate 2010). Lövheim suggests that this
research explores the way individuals use technology to construct and scrutinise religious narratives, and the meaning and function of technology in religious life and practice.

This literature, then, explores how the relationship between ICTs and religion leads to changes in religious practice and which technological characteristics are implicated in how specific practices change. For example, Teusner’s (2013) study of Australian Christian bloggers shows how ‘lay’ adherents who attempt to challenge established religious authority had to conform to normative discourses to maintain visibility on Internet search engines. Because search engine algorithms privilege popular search terms that reflect dominant discourses, to be successful the bloggers had to conform to the very discourse they aimed to counter. This last theme situates research into the Internet and religion in the context of late modernity. In this context, it shows how all forms of identity, including religious identity, are understood as being characterised by individual choice and what Giddens terms ‘intrinsic reflexivity’ (1991, 20).

There remains a tension between this framing of religious identity as individual choice and Lövheim's argument that ‘religious identity in modern society is still a social thing, deeply anchored in the social situations and relations individuals want and need to stay connected to in order to find meaning and act in everyday life’ (Lövheim 2013, 52). This argument counters the assumptions of technologically driven individualism and context-free behaviours, and is characteristic of the normative view in the literature on technology in processes of modernisation. It also competes with the presumption of a universal form of rationalism and marginalises the possibility of allowing other forms of being, in other places, into theorisation.

The study of the Internet and religion thus explores how identity construction challenges established authoritative sources of identity, fragments group identity and creates a space for minority identities to flourish. Campbell argues that the literature also shows how technology should be understood as supplementing, and not replacing, traditional sources of identity (Campbell 2013b, 688). These themes and perspectives reflect debates that are more nuanced than their equivalent in the development and ICTD literature, where the dominant literature conceives of identity as singular and liberated. As Campbell notes, the nuance of debates about the Internet and religion reflect the debates about identity in Internet studies. She points to an evolution from earlier studies, which considered online identity as liberated, ‘virtual’ selves (Turkle 1995), to later debates that find close relationships between online and offline identities, but emphasise the performative nature of online identity. She suggests that studies of the Internet and religion and of the broader Internet studies field are characterised by approaches to identity informed by Erving Goffman view of identity as ‘performative’ (Goffman 1959), and that ‘the Internet is seen as one of a number of tools within modernity empowering individuals to act out their identity in
unique ways’ (Campbell 2013b, 688).

The theorisation of technology and religious identity thus appears to offer research trajectories that counter the Western-centric ontological conception of the individual, which presumes a rational reflexivity. Yet, while there is an acknowledgement of the social context in the literature on technology and religious identity, theorisation of the nature of the individual and the self remains limited.

The literature on the Internet and religion follows a similar theoretical trajectory to the literature on ICTs and modernisation, but has ended up in a more sociological theoretical position. Like early accounts of how the Internet would transform processes of development, the first wave of Internet and religion research anticipated the emergence of new forms of religious organisation and the disruption of the old. The second wave of research mapped the terrain of ICT use in actual religious practice, opening the door to more critical accounts of the complex relationship between technology and social practice. The third wave established new domains of enquiry in this nuanced terrain – highlighting themes of convergent social practice, embedded reality, networked community, shifting authority and identity as performance – to reflect concerns in the Internet studies literature with notions of ‘networked society’. Like the technology and modernisation literature, these themes theorise increasingly individualistic and expressive social practices, countering modernity’s secularisation thesis.

The literature on ICTs and religious identity explores questions of individual identity construction and the notion of identity as performance, positioning these debates within discourses of modernity and the associated process of individualisation. Yet although the literature on ICTs and religion has made significant theoretical advances in conceptualising the role of identity, the nature of religious identity itself has been under-theorised. Other studies demonstrate that sociological analysis and theorisation of the functioning of technology and the conceptualisation of identity can generate important insights into the nature and possibilities of social change, but the same nuanced analysis has not been carried out into the relationship between technology and religious identity – particularly not in non-Western countries and contexts.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter began with a review of the main development models and found that the dominant ones can be broadly described as characterising social change in terms of a process of secularisation towards the conditions of modernity. The review of the literature on secularisation and modernity found that these theories of social change are generalisations of the Western
experience – a critique also made by the post-development perspective. The conceptualisation of
the individual in theories of development, ICTD studies and modernity show that, broadly
speaking, they share a view of the individual as rational, instrumental and reflexive. Critiques of
this conceptualisation highlight its empirical limitations and location within Western discourse.
The assumptions and lack of theorisation about the role of identity in the ICTD literature
prompted a long-standing call for further theorisation of the relationship between identity and
technology use.

The literature review has shown that the development and ICTD literatures are dominated by
assumptions of change as a process of secularisation and the individual as a sovereign, rational
actor; this has led to a focus on economic growth and the instrumental use of technologies. As a
result, these accounts struggle to explain why religion continues to be significant in people’s lives,
despite their use of supposedly secularising and individualising technologies. In a related fashion,
the emphasis on instrumental technology use fails to account for non-instrumental use or explain
its role in processes of social change.

Accounts of social change in the development and ICTD literatures need theorisations about the
implications of why religion remains significant. An important part of this is developing
alternative theorisations of the individual and identity to overcome the problematic implications
of assuming that individuals are universally rational and eventually secular. An important way to
do this is to expand the ICTD framework by paying attention to non-instrumental technology use
in processes of social change.

To respond to this call, the literature on the relationship between ICTs and religion was reviewed
to identify ways in which it explains the relationship between ICTs and religious identity. This
nascent field was shown to have developed increasingly sociologically sophisticated accounts of
technology and religion. In theorising identity as performative, it points towards concepts of
identity that go beyond the assumptions of a sovereign, rational subject. In theorising technology
as socially constructed, studies have shown how it is possible to move beyond the instrumental
determinism that characterises the dominant accounts of technology in development. While
performative accounts of identity provide an alternative that overcomes the problematic nature of
the rational actor, the literature on ICTs and religion has only paid cursory attention to theorising
technologies themselves. It is to a fuller theoretical account of identity and technology that the
next chapter turns.
3. Theoretical Framework

This chapter establishes a theoretical framework to help explain the issues identified in Chapter 2. The literature review found that the discourse on development modernity had been dominated by conceptualisations of the individual as a liberal, reflexive self, leading to a problematic account of social change as a dichotomy between tradition and modernity. In these accounts of social change, the dominant perspectives assumed a technological determinism that lacked sensitivity to context, while contextually sensitive accounts paid inadequate attention to the role and theorisation of individual identity.

The theorisation draws on the idea of religious identity as performance, as referred to by Lövheim (2013), and extends this through postmodern theories of Foucauldian discourse (1970, 1977, 1978) and performativity proposed by gender theorist Judith Butler (1990, 1993). This allows an alternative conceptualisation of identity to the problematic liberal agent of the dominant development models and accounts of modernity. It also draws on Teusner’s (2013) description of how a search engine’s design shaped the enactment of Christian activists’ identity to theorise technology. Thus, the theoretical framework adopts a socially embedded approach that understands the design of technologies to be significant and the design itself to be a socially embedded phenomenon. It adopts a sociomaterial perspective that draws on concepts from technology sociologists Callon (1986) and Latour (2005) and feminist technology theorist Barad (2003, 2007) to theorise technologies as entanglements of both social meaning and material elements.

3.1 Theorising Religious Identity

As an alternative to the liberal, sovereign subject of modernity, this section draws on a postmodern conceptualisation of identity constituted through three conceptual elements. The first conceptual element theorises religious identity as a discursive subject, drawing on Foucault’s notion of discourse and the discursively constituted subject. It explores the implications of a Foucauldian account of religious identity, highlighting its conceptualisation as a cultural construct that exists within and functions as part of discursive regimes of power. The second conceptual element draws on Butler’s account of performativity to expand Foucault’s passive subject, showing how religion as a discursive regime produces subject positions that are enacted to ‘perform’ identity and thus constitute the self. The third element extends Butler’s emphasis on language to accommodate the material through Barad’s (2003; 2007) account of material performativity and Vasquez’s (2010) materialist account of religious identity. The section
concludes with a summary of the conceptualisation of identity that lays the foundation for the subsequent theorisation of technology.

Studies of identity took a distinctive turn in the 1980s, heralding paradigmatic changes that offered new theoretical lenses challenging individualist accounts of identity. Social and economic changes, such as the emergence of neoliberal democracy and ensuing claims of ‘the end of history’, were accompanied by new developments and critiques variously termed poststructuralism, postmodernism, performativity and queer theory, the discursive or cultural turn and ‘the moment of postcolonial theory’ (Wetherell 2010, 13). These theoretical lenses helped shift the focus from what identity was to how identity was established. Departing from the ‘modern’ individual, they sought to ‘de-centre’ the location of identity from the ‘essential’ qualities of a sovereign individual outwards to the cultural and linguistic context in which the individual was located. In doing so, these perspectives offered an alternative to the individualism that was liberated by technology and to the underlying idea of the reflexive, expressive and choice-making self. Identity, instead, was found not in the individual but in the context in which individuals lived. These perspectives helped overcome the constraints of modernisation theory and of rational, reflexive individualism.

3.1.1 Religious Identity as the Discursive Subject

Foucault (1970, 1977, 1978) describes the operation of discourse as the mechanism through which power is exerted over the human body, and knowledge as one of the discursive structures through which power is enacted. Although Foucault did not conduct a systematic examination of religion, it features throughout his work as one of the discursive structures through which power is exercised (Carrette 1999). Foucault’s work examines both how discourse is structured and how it operates in processes of social change. He describes how the dominant discourse since the eighteenth century has concerned the modern, autonomous and rational subject, and emphasises how specific knowledge forms such as myths and religion serve to uphold this discourse. In this, Foucault differs from the functionalist school of thought in that religion does not serve a specific social function, but rather is functional in maintaining a discursive regime.

Carrette (1999, 2000), a scholar of Foucault and his work on religion, argues that there are five dominant themes within Foucault’s conceptualisation of religion. First, argues Carrette, although Foucault did not examine religion directly, he considered it a part of broader culture. Second, religion exists within the human processes of power and knowledge and, as such, is socially constructed. Third, religion, for Foucault, is embodied – in line with his belief that discourse is the operation of power over the human body. Fourth, as part of wider culture, religion functions as a system of power. Finally, Carrette points to Foucault’s account of the role religion plays in
the government of the self. Foucault argues that practices such as confession constitute the form and transformation of the self. In this way, the individual is governed by a religious self at an individual level as well as at an institutional level. In this way, through ‘technologies of the self’, discipline is no longer simply an external process of surveillance, but is internalised and self-enacted. Individuals thus police their own actions in order to conform to expectations of good behaviour. This also implies a significant difference from Marxist or even Freudian conceptions of religion: while Foucault shares their belief in the oppressive and constructed nature of religion, he does not foresee liberation through the rejection of religion. For Foucault, religion is but one knowledge regime and its absence would only be filled by another.

The post-structuralist perspective on the self that Foucault advances, and that emerges through the genealogy of discourses on religion, sexuality and discipline, is in direct contrast to the rational, reflexive and autonomous self of Giddens’ modernity. Foucault (1970, 1977) argues that there is no ‘transcendental self’ but that, instead, the self is the site of an exercise of power over the individual. For Foucault, this power is exercised through language and ‘discursive practice’, leading to a concept of identity as ‘discursive acts’ performed through ‘technologies of the self’. Foucault’s technologies of the self are described by Redman as the means through which individuals ‘perform’ identity and self-police under the disciplinary gaze of discourse (Redman 2000). Foucault illustrates this disciplinary function of discourse by referring to Bentham’s Panopticon – a circular prison in which inmates, unsure if they are being watched by invisible but all-seeing guards, self-police themselves by exercising practices and technologies that allow them to perform as ‘good prisoners’ (Foucault 1977).

Foucault’s significant move is to ‘evacuate’ the subject of the interiority and ‘reflexivity’ of the Enlightenment-inspired notion of the self on which Giddens’ ‘self-reflexivity’ thesis is built. As Hall puts it, ‘the subject is produced as an effect… and has no existence, and certainly no transcendental continuity or identity from one subject position to another’ (Hall 1996, 23). While this is the theoretical challenge to the focus on the individual and refocuses attention on the operation of power, Hall outlines how Foucault’s theorisation of identity as subject positions created by discourse has been challenged for ‘revealing little about why it is that certain individuals occupy some subject positions rather than others’ (Hall 1996, 23). This creation of subjects as ‘docile bodies’ is addressed in Judith Butler’s further theorisation of the individual as a ‘desiring subject’.

Others argue that the post-structuralist conception of a totalising domination by pervasive power diminishes power conceptually; without introducing normative grounds for resistance to submission, Foucault is unable to argue why anyone would choose to resist in the first place.
(Fraser 1981). The post-structuralist perspective, and Foucault in particular, is also criticised for being located in its own cultural context. Foucault’s conception of history and religion has been critiqued as being grounded in the European history and discourses of Christianity (Said 2001, 196; Carrette 1999, 113).

### 3.1.2 Religious Identity as the Performative Subject

Poststructuralist philosopher and queer theorist Butler (1990, 1993) provides a theorisation of identity as ‘performativity’. This also challenges the ontological foundation of the liberal, sovereign subject. Butler builds on Foucault’s notion of discourse, but expands the theorisation of his evacuated subject by drawing on theories of ‘speech-acts’ and ‘desire’ to develop a more comprehensive conception of individual identity.

Like Foucault, Butler theorises identity not as something pre-existing, innate and essential, but rather created ‘through language, gesture, and all manner of symbolic social sign’ (Butler 1988, 519). Butler draws on speech-act theory and particularly the work of language philosopher J. L. Austin to argue for the individual’s role in (re)constructing discourse through speech-acts that produce, rather than represent, meaning. In Butler’s words, performativity is ‘that discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it names’ (Butler 1993, 13). Importantly, these speech-acts are not singular utterances, but rather gain power through repetition and consistency (Hall and Du Gay 1996). Through this repetition, ‘the illusion of the “doer”/subject is created and maintained by a series of performed deeds’ (Morison and Macleod 2013, 568). Butler explains identity as a performance acted out to identify with – and in so doing, to reproduce – aspirational social norms. Thus, rather than a constrained expressive self, identity ‘is always a doing’, though not ‘a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed’ (Butler 1990, 33).

Butler provides Foucault’s ‘docile subjects’ with interiority by drawing on psychoanalyst Lacan’s theory of the ‘desiring subject’ (Lacan 1981). A key figure in post-structural postmodernism, Lacan argued that identity formation was driven by the individual’s search for a coherent sense of self; this came about by identifying with idealised ‘images’ that constituted a patriarchal Symbolic Order to which one could aspire but never attain (Lacan 1977). Unlike Giddens’ self-reflexive self, Butler’s desiring subject identifies with, and aspires to, the idealised subject positions constituted by the hegemonic order. In other words, individual behaviour and choices are motivated by the desire to conform to established social norms and thus be recognised and accepted by the social order in which individuals are located.

In contrast to Foucault’s totalising discourse, Butler introduces the possibility of change through failure to successfully enact the regulatory regime to which one aspires – failures that can ‘trouble’
the seeming naturalness of hegemonic regimes (Butler 1990). She describes how, through these performative failures, which are created by incorrect or parodic performances (such as men dressed in drag), ‘gaps and fissures are opened up’ (Butler 1993, 10). Trouble is, of course, contextual and ‘must be considered contextually in relation to where and when it occurs and how it is interpreted’ (Bordo 1992). In other words, not all ‘trouble’ troubles hegemonic regimes.

The performative account of individual identity and the challenge it presents to notions of the liberal subject have been applied by Butler and others to religion and religious identity. Butler’s approach to religion is grounded in her work on subjectivity, ethics and bodies, language and cultural norms. Her work is of significance for religion ‘given the role of bodily practices (including linguistic ones) in the production of religious identities’ (Armour and Ville 2006, 10). In this sense, then, her submission of the subject is linked to individuals’ submission to the sacred and to religious discipline. While Butler’s work addresses the issues of individual subjectivity, divine sovereignty and the use of religion in politics, it is grounded in her experience of religion as textual interpretation. Religion and religious identity are, for her, rooted in the formation of the discursive subject and the ethics introduced through the discourse that constitutes the subject. Mahmood (2006) extends Butler’s notion of performativity beyond simply citation to active subject formation. In her study of Muslim women’s piety practices in Egypt, Mahmood emphasises the potential for subject formation in piety practices that go beyond ‘subversion or resignification of hegemonic norms’ (Mahmood 2006, 180). In other words, she emphasises the importance of allowing a form of subject enactment through submission to practices of modesty such as veiling and purdah.

Butler’s psychoanalytic model is critiqued for advancing a universalism that is redolent of the totalising claims of modernisation and modernity. Social anthropologist Ewing argues that Lacan’s theorisation of a universal hegemonic order as the object of the subject’s desire presents a challenge when transported to a postcolonial setting: ‘it becomes difficult to locate a single Symbolic Order without presuming the total hegemony of Western colonial discourse’ (Ewing 1997, 30). In her theorisation of identity to support an analysis of Sufism and modernity in Lahore, Pakistan, Ewing draws on Deleuze and Guatarri’s theorisation of desire and Gramsci’s notion of hegemony in place of Lacan’s desiring subject. Where Lacan argued that identification was motivated by a desire to reconnect with a universal symbolic order, Deleuze and Guattari argue that identification is motivated by the desire for available, not universal, ideological formations (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 24).

This is an important departure from Lacan’s desiring subject because it avoids the totalising universality of modernism and allows other forms of modernism to act as symbolic orders (Ewing
1997, 30). Ewing also draws on the Gramscian notion of fragmentary hegemonic orders to counter Lacan’s universalist tendencies, describing the subject as ‘a complex site of conflict desires and multiple subjective modalities’ (Ewing 1997, 35). This subtle, but significant, adaptation of Butler’s theorisation of the desiring subject is important because it accommodates the multiple and fragmentary nature of hegemonic discourse and the subject while retaining the theory of performative enactment.

Butler’s theory of performative enactment is also critiqued for being exclusively linguistic and reducing identity solely to language (Barad 2007; Bordo 2004, 291; Vasquez 2010). Scholars argue that her notion of performativity renders the material a passive subject that signifies discourse and fails to account for its active role in the enactment of subjects. Bordo argues that, for Butler, ‘language swallows everything up’ and instead urges attention to everyday practices of ‘real bodies (Bordo 2004, 291). Barad argues that Butler’s grounding of performativity in linguistic discourse fails to account for the role of matter ‘as an active agent participating in the very process of materialization’ (Barad 2003, 822). To this end, Hollywood emphasises the importance of understanding ritual not just as citation, but also as constitutive without being representative (Hollywood 2006, 253).

3.1.3 Religious Identity as Material Performativity

Sociologist of religion Manuel A. Vasquez (2010) draws on both Bordo and Barad, and argues for a ‘materialist’ reading of religion. His account of religion emerges from his study of religious practices among American immigrants, responding to acknowledgements that religion continues to be significant in conditions of modernity and the globalised nature of religious discourse, practice and mediation. As such, this account of religion recognises the interplay between multiple forms of materiality (Vasquez 2010, 155). Eradicating the subject-object divide favours a sense of agency that ‘allows matter its due as an active participant in the world’s becoming’ and in which ‘Agency is not aligned with human intentionality or subjectivity’ (Barad 2007, 235). Vasquez also draws on philosopher Margolis’ notion of ‘cultural realism’, which recognises that ‘the emergent world in which our cognising competence takes form… is quite real, as real as the physical world from which it “must” have evolved’ (Margolis, 2003, 3 in Vasquez 2010, 6). For Vasquez, individuals and culture – including religion – are material and emerge from the social practices that mediate the experience of the world.

The materialist account of religion that Vasquez describes is thus a ‘fully somatocentric theory of religion’ (Vasquez 2010, 157) that goes beyond a genealogical analysis of the textual, discursive, cultural and social components of religion. The task that follows from this perspective
is, first, to recover the evolutionary, ecological and psycho-cognitive conditions for religious life and, second, to understand the complex and diverse ways in which these conditions interact with sociocultural dimensions (Vasquez 2010, 157). He argues that traditional perspectives of religion – the dynamics of human solidarity, put forward by Durkheim, or the view of culture as symbols, presented by Geertz, or as Marxist economic conflict – all locate religion firmly on the human side of the human-material divide, thus reinscribing the problematic Cartesian dualism.

Instead, Vasquez’s account of ‘non-reductive’ materialist religion opens up the analytic framework to ‘natural-cultural zones of contact’ (Vasquez 2010, 171). In this materialist account, the primary task is ‘to study the logics of religious ways of being in the world and to elucidate how these logics are inextricably connected with other (nonreligious) ways of being in the world’ (Vasquez 2010, 8). This perspective emphasises the everyday practices of individuals and recognises the possibility of ‘seeing religion everywhere, in everyday life’ (Vasquez 2010, 8). Vasquez also emphasises the potential of applying this materialist account of religion to the role of the Internet. He asks, for example, ‘does cyberspace engender its own form of materiality, its own forms of being-in-the-world’ that interact with age-old practices of subjectivation and panoptical control? (Vasquez 2010, 327). As such, this materialist account is a way of engaging with the role of ICTs in everyday life. It further theorises phenomena such as Teusner’s (2013) observation of the way the Internet structures and organises so as to demand that users enact particular forms of identity. This performative account, incorporating both discursive and material aspects, conceptualises religious identity as the performative enactment of fragmentary hegemonic discourse through discursive and material means.

3.1.4 Summary

This section has described how Butler’s Foucauldian notion of performativity reveals the operation of hegemonic discourse articulated through language and imprinted as subject positions on the body. The analysis of discourse through the content of mass media reveals the operation of power and the constitution of subject positions that individuals desire to perform. Incorporating Gramsci’s notion of fragmentary hegemonic orders avoids the universalising tendency of Butler’s Lacanian desire; it allows the subject’s desire to be contextual rather than normative. Similarly, drawing on Barad to incorporate the ‘materiality’ of discourse helps address the limitations of conceptualising discourse in purely linguistic forms. Although Butler’s notion of identity creates a space for analysing religious identity that departs from processes of secularisation driven by individual, sovereign subjects, her conceptualisation of the material renders materiality and technology passive and neutral. Drawing on Barad’s account of performativity, Vasquez’s material conceptualisation of religious identity offers a theoretically rich approach to alternatives.
to the problematic hegemony of the liberal, sovereign subject.

Accounts of religion and identity that reject the underlying Cartesian dualism of individuals and the social world in which they live describe how the operation of power through discourse serves to constitute the subject; these accounts dismiss the idea of the rationalist, sovereign subject. Materialist accounts counter the linguistic emphasis of social constructionist accounts of performativity to further dissolve the dualism between the human and material. The materialist account of performativity shows how the material is always an entanglement of the social and material – an assemblage of agencies that, together, constitute particular phenomena.

3.2 Theorising Technology
This section develops a conceptualisation of ICT that complements the non-dualistic ontology of a performative conception of identity. This is achieved by outlining a ‘sociomaterial’ account of technology that moves beyond social and material dualism; it is operationalised through the mid-level theory of affordances and concluded by a theorisation of Facebook as a sociomaterial technology. The section ends with a summary of the value of this approach for addressing the study’s central questions.

In Chapter 2, the review of the development and ICTD literature illustrated the commonality of determinist stances in which technologies were viewed in instrumental, causal terms, leading to changes in economic development as well as cultural values (Lerner 1958; Lerner and Schramm 1967). These ideas also characterised the early media and communications literature, emphasising how particular effects were achieved (Lasswell 1948; Shannon and Weaver 1949). The technological determinist perspective was critiqued for its ontological dualism, which views technology as an independent variable linked to society through uni-directional, deterministic causal relationships and deeply rooted in the philosophy of modernity (Orlikowski 1992).

Like the social constructionist movement in the religion and identity literature, studies of technology – particularly in the field of science and technology studies – explore how shared interpretations shape how technologies are developed and used (Bijker 1987; Pinch and Bijker 1987; Law and Bijker 1992). Similarly, in media studies, scholars emphasise the active role of audiences in appropriating content for their own needs and gratification (Orlikowski and Scott 2008; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). The social constructionist turn in media studies has been critiqued for conflating channel and content, and blurring ‘the relationship among the technological devices and the messages and meanings they convey’ (Lievrouw 2014, 35). In the study of technology, social constructionist perspectives are critiqued for advancing an implicit
‘social determinism’ (Barley 1988) and failing to theorise the technological artefact, rendering it one-dimensional as the technological determinist’s portrayal of the user (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001).

3.2.1 Beyond Duality: Sociomateriality

The attempt to resolve the dualities of agency versus structure, individual versus social and human versus non-human has come to be at the cutting edge of social theory. Giddens’ structuration theory explicitly sets out to address this, but maintains the duality through the centrality of the self-reflexive individual and the duality of structure. A growing number of perspectives offer theoretical frameworks and conceptual tools to help resolve the original Cartesian sin of separating man from nature and the sovereign subject from their social and material context.

The media and communications literature has long theorised a separation between the material and the social, characterising the media as ‘the intervening variable that explains a measurable change, the historical catalyst that explains a social shift, or the tool with which passive audiences can finally succumb to or resist the tyranny of mass culture’ (Gillespie 2014, 3). Recently, however, communications scholars have drawn increasingly on the insights generated by the materialist turn in sociology, anthropology and the philosophy of science to focus on the entanglement of the material, practice and politics and to conceptualise ‘sociomaterial ensembles as situated historically and in specific social and political contexts’ (Gillespie 2014, 4).

Similarly, in the field of IS, Orlikowski and Scott (2008) argue that focusing on the causal function of technologies limits attention to specific instances of technology use and obscures how all forms of organising are always technologically mediated. This results in a search for uni-linear (such as social or technological determinism) or mutually interacting (such as structuration) causal effects (Orlikowski and Scott 2008, 454). The authors argue that a ‘sociomateriality’ approach ‘moves away from focusing on how technologies influence humans, to examining how materiality is intrinsic to everyday activities and relations’ (Orlikowski and Scott 2008, 454). Like a materialist religious identity, this approach makes no ontological distinction between the social and the material; it ‘does not presume independent or even interdependent entities with distinct and inherent characteristics’ (Orlikowski and Scott 2008, 455–56).

There is growing interest in sociomateriality within the IS and organisational literature (Orlikowski and Scott 2008; Leonardi 2012; Thompson 2011). Orlikowski and Scott, for example, demonstrate how the sociomaterial lens of agential realism reveals anonymity in social media travel review sites such as TripAdvisor, where anonymity is ‘dynamic and materially enacted and thus dependent on specific practices’ (Orlikowski and Scott 2014, 29). This
challenges the ‘taken-for-granted assumptions of separation, independence, and essentialism’ (Orlikowski and Scott 2014, 36).

Within the field of ICTD, an emerging body of work draws on the sociomaterial lens of actor–network theory (ANT) to examine ICTs in developing countries (Barrett and Walsham 1999; Stanforth 2007; Heeks and Seo-Zindy 2016). These studies of development programmes show how ‘Technology is just one of a number of heterogeneous sociotechnical elements that must be considered and managed in the design and implementation of a successful information systems project’ (Stanforth 2007, 57).

Although ANT has had limited application in media studies (Gillespie, Boczkowski, and Foot 2014), a growing number of studies have applied it successfully to analyses of the political economy of the media (Couldry 2008). This has produced alternative theorisations to the traditional ‘transmission’ function of the media (Teurlings 2013, 105). Despite these insights into the political economy of the media, there is a need ‘to think about how people’s cognitive and emotive frameworks are shaped by the underlying features of the networks in which they are situated’ (Couldry 2008, 103). In other words, the individual must be theorised further.

As Gillespie et al. note, most media and communications research has adopted a deterministic understanding of technology. Ignoring the design of communication technologies, particularly those such as interactive social network sites, marginalises the role of the structure, the ideas behind it and the operation of ideology that exists in the design of technologies. In other words, viewing media technologies as ‘the residue of societal ambitions’ leads us to view technologies as ‘social relations by other means, an engagement of people through information and through things, that happens to use words, sounds, and images as social currency’ (Gillespie 2014, 1). While the analysis of discursive formations in mass media content has helped reveal the operation of authority, there is a need for greater attention to the materiality of the media as an actor in the functioning of hegemonic discursive regimes.

Communications scholars have drawn effectively on the sociomaterial lens, particularly ANT, to develop innovative ways of accounting for technology, social practice and their inter-relationship. ANT is employed by communication theorists to describe the interrelated nature of the global and local: Chesher (2007) gives the example of the network relations involved in the use of mobile phones at a U2 concert that create local attachments to global networks. Mobile phones themselves have been described as assemblages of handset technologies, intellectual properties, cultural norms and human actors that help reshape publics, communities and collectives (Goggin 2010).
The ANT lens has also been used to show ‘how teenagers, cell phones, socio-spatial relations and discourses exist within a hybrid and interdependent network’ (Thompson 2008). Similarly, Burrell (2012) draws on ANT to describe the use of the Internet in Ghana. Among the insights that emerge as she traces the network of relationships revealed in exploring this, is the manner in which the immaterial, such as rumours, are made material through their circulation in legible artefacts. As Burrell says, the use of ANT entails distinguishing between a rumour’s material aspect and material effect, and ‘a notion of the material that extends beyond the manmade or technological, including the natural world and the corporeal as material domains’ (2012, 2).

While early research described the Internet as a space for individual exploration and liberation (Turkle 1995, 2004), studies that employ post-structuralist Foucauldian and Butlerian perspectives emphasise a more nuanced account of the Internet and, particularly, of social media. Cover (2012), for example, presents a theorisation of performatively enacted identity on social media. He draws on Butler’s theories of performative identity to describe how identity is enacted through the construction of narrative and through social interaction. Specifically, Cover describes how the use of social networking profiles – including information pages, taste selections and biographies – serves as a tool for performing, developing and stabilising identity to achieve coherence, intelligibility and recognition. He also emphasises the importance of performative enactment in interaction, highlighting why communication is key to elements such as wall posts, tagging and commentary in order to describe ‘how identity is reconfigured within a network morphology’ (Cover 2012, 177).

While Cover describes the expressive possibilities afforded by social media, others emphasise how mobile technologies and the Internet can act to enforce specific behaviours and circumscribe particular actions. Licoppe (2012) describes how technologies such as electronic notifications can ‘demand’ the performative enactment of particular identities. He gives the example of a telephone ring tone, which results in a ‘crisis of the summons’ emerging from the technological mediation of the tension between the desire for interaction on the one hand and the desire for privacy on the other. The event of the summons is one that is distinctly ‘material’ and he notes the ‘hybrid network of humans and artefacts bound by conventions and “translations”’ (Licoppe 2012, 1089). Importantly, Licoppe’s framework illustrates how a material performative framework is able to counter the limitations of a purely linguistic approach to discourse and performativity, that ‘such events are treated as performative even though they are not strictly linguistic’ (Licoppe 2012, 1089).

Doron’s (2012) account of mobile technology use among low-income users in India also employs
a Foucauldian and Butlerian perspective to counter the narrative of new technologies as inherently empowering. Doron draws on the Foucauldian notion of ‘technologies of the self’ to describe how the mobile phone is understood as a threat to the household because it destabilises traditional authority and social roles by challenging the household division of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. He draws on this conception of the mobile phone as a technology through which identity can be enacted to show how it is used to perpetuate established subject positions, such as a women reinforcing control over her daughter-in-law by replacing a parental visit with a phone call. Doron concludes that studying technologies such as the mobile phone provides insight into notions of identity by highlighting various aspects such as age, class, caste, gender and place. He notes that these are ‘influencing everyday practices and destabilising social structures’ and through them can be revealed ‘the dilemmas and anxieties arising from the tensions between the promises and challenges of modernity’ (Doron 2012, 431).

The following section outlines two theories in the literature that ‘move away from focusing on how technologies influence humans, to examining how materiality is intrinsic to everyday activities and relations’ (Orlikowski and Scott 2008, 455). The section outlines ANT and agential realism as theoretical frameworks that reflect this line of enquiry. This is followed by an outline of how the concept of affordances is formulated in light of this reworking of the relationship between humans and technologies. The section concludes by showing how these literatures have been applied in the research and analysis of communication technologies.

3.2.2 Agential Realism

The theory of agential realism and its associated conceptual toolbox, although drawn on by Vasquez (2010) in his materialist theory of religion, is less well known in the media and communications field, but is the subject of growing attention in IS (Leonardi 2013; Mutch 2013; S. V. Scott and Orlikowski 2013). The theory was developed by feminist theorist Barad who draws on her training as a theoretical physicist to integrate theories of matter with social theory. The theory is based on a similar ontology to ANT, in that it collapses the distinction between the social and material and, instead, describes reality as the ‘entanglement of matter and meaning’ that is enacted through practice within specific phenomena (Barad 2007).

As Orlikowski and Scott (2014) describe, this means that, rather than a separate bounded entity, the primary ontological unit is the phenomenon, thus resolving the Cartesian subject–object split. Rather than the interaction of two objects, Barad proposes the neologism ‘intra-action’, arguing that ‘Individuals do not pre-exist their interactions; rather, individuals emerge through and as part of their entangled intra-relating’ (Barad 2007, ix). This emphasis on intra-action also highlights the importance of understanding how lines of difference are enacted to cut through processes of
intra-action. In other words, the constantly entangled nature of things achieves definition through cuts made by the kinds of relations between entities. The following sections outline three aspects of Barad’s work that are important for this project: her idea of performativity, apparatus and diffraction.

**Technology as Performative**

Barad’s concept of performativity is a materialist account of how certain lines of differences come to be (Barad 2003). It is distinct from Goffman (1959) and Butler’s (1993) account of performativity because it expands this to include material actors in processes of enactment. One of the implications of this is to expand the realm of actors that possess agency. Indeed, for Barad, everything possesses agency, as one can only distinguish between human and material agencies if one assumes the existence of qualities prior to their interaction – a notion the concept of intra-action rejects.

Agency for Barad is thus enacted inter-subjectively rather than being located in technology or in humans as argued by technological or social determinists. In her words, ‘Agency is a matter of intra-acting, that is, agency is an enactment, it is not something someone has’ (Barad 1996, 182). In this way, social practice and the categories through which practice is understood, such as identities, are ‘performatively enacted’. The equal weighting granted to the human and material in the intra-action of agencies in Barad’s theory reflects a significant departure from the discursive nature of Butler’s conception of performative enactment.

Like Butler, Barad challenges the representationalism that accompanies descriptions of pre-existing entities, rejecting ‘the representationalist belief in the power of words to represent pre-existing things’ and ‘shifts the focus from questions of correspondence between descriptions and reality (e.g., do they mirror nature or culture?) to matters of practices/doings/actions’ (Barad 2003, 802). However, unlike Butler’s account of the material as passive recipients of enacted inscription, the material is understood as ‘a doing, a congealing of agency. Matter is a stabilising and destabilising process of iterative intra-activity’ (Barad 2003, 822). In Butler’s account of performative enactment, matter plays as important a role as language in the constitutive formation of phenomena, including the subject positions that constitute identity.

**Technology as Apparatus of Diffraction**

Conceptualising technologies as apparatus allows an acknowledgement of their active role in producing phenomena and as active agents in diffracting change. That is, the apparatus through which scientific facts are ‘discovered’ are directly implicated in the production, rather than discovery, of the facts. The concept of apparatus as entities that produce phenomena reflects
Foucault’s notion of the ‘dispositif’ (1979), which describes the network of relations through which what can be said, what is taken for granted and what is real is established. The dispositif is the ‘various institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and knowledge structures, which enhance and maintain the exercise of power within the social body’ (O’Farrell 2005, 129). While Foucault’s account of the dispositif is largely discursive, Butler’s notion of apparatus explicitly addresses the ‘relationship between discursive practices and material phenomena’ (Barad 2007, 73). In other words, Barad’s notion of apparatus expands Foucault’s notion of dispositif beyond the discursive to incorporate the material.

Apparatus are not just entities that generate phenomena but are, like Silverstone’s (1994) notion of ‘double articulated’ media, both a method and an object of study. As Barad puts it, ‘diffraction phenomena will be an object of investigation and at other times it will serve as an apparatus of investigation’ (Barad 2007, 73). They can be both objects of enquiry in their own right as well as tools of scientific discovery. This is particularly evident in the account Barad gives of the ‘light slit’ apparatus through which the wave-particle duality of light is revealed. It is instructive to quote her description of the two-slit experiment:

‘This result is nothing less than astonishing. What this experiment tells us is that whether or not an entity goes through the apparatus as a wave or a particle can be determined after it has already gone through the apparatus, that is, after it has already gone through as either a wave (through both slits at once) or a particle (through one slit or the other)! In other words, it is not merely that the past behaviour of some given entity has been changed, as it were, but that the entities’ very identity has been changed! Its past identity, its ontology, is never fixed, it is always open to future reworkings!’ (Barad 2010, 260).

Technologies can thus be transformative of identity and fundamental of ontology as well as providing insight into phenomena. Approaching technologies as apparatus reveals how specific entanglements of matter and meaning, of technologies and discursive formations, can enact particular (re)-configurations of intra-acting agencies.

**Technology as Diffraction**

As apparatus of diffraction, technologies are understood to play an active role in change. Diffraction is Barad’s term for phenomena that make differences evident or, as she argues, ‘a material-discursive phenomena that makes the effects of different differences evident’ (Barad 2007, 88). Barad draws on feminist technology theorist Haraway’s idea of diffraction, quoting: ‘Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not about originals. Unlike reflections, diffractions
do not displace the same elsewhere, in more or less distorted form’ (1997, 273). In other words, diffractions are ways of describing change without relying singular causal entities with specific, deterministic qualities. The principle of diffraction is rooted in the phenomenon revealed in the ‘two-slit experiment’, which demonstrates that light can be simultaneously a particle and a wave (the phenomenon at the heart of quantum mechanics).

The value of diffraction as a way of understanding change is that it allows matter a proper place in reconfiguring performative enactments and thus processes of change (Barad 2007); it accommodates multiple differences to be diffracted through the use of apparatus. In other words, theorising the implications of Facebook for the performative enactment of subject positions allows for multiple enactments, and thus in principle the simultaneous existence of change and continuity, of liberation and tradition. Thus, in this research, Facebook is considered a diffraction apparatus through which the effect and implication of the entanglement of different conceptions of identity are revealed. Facebook is analysed as an apparatus in which different conceptions of identity intra-act and are diffracted in the enactment of identity through use of the site. The ways in which identity is diffracted through Facebook will reveal the implications of entangling different approaches to being in the world.

3.2.3 Technology, Domestication and Affordance

The sociomaterial perspectives of Barad’s performativity are high-level theories that describe the ontological foundations of phenomena and can be challenging to apply (Mutch 2013; Leonardi 2013). To mitigate this, we draw on the mid-level theory of affordances to bridge the theoretical gap between abstract theory and technology in use. Although the theory of affordances has its roots in different ontological traditions, its alignment with a non-dualist sociomaterial ontology is demonstrated below.

In the study of technology, the concept of affordances describes how the interaction of technological features and user characteristics shapes user practices. It was developed by ecological psychologist Gibson (1977) to describe all the action possibilities in a particular environment, independent of individuals but dependent on their capability to be realised. This emphasis on the environment or artefacts was countered by human–computer interaction designer Norman (1990) to focus only on the action possibilities perceived by users. This shift emphasised not all the possibilities for action, but rather those perceived by users, based on their own physical and cognitive capabilities.

This relational, rather than intrinsic, formulation of affordance reflects the turn towards the user in media studies. It was further developed by Gaver (1991), who describes false, hidden and
perceptible affordances as a way to bridge the intrinsic and subjective account of the relationship between technological design and use. This bridging effort is explicitly addressed by sociologist Hutchby (2001), whose notion of affordances aims to reconcile ‘the view that worldly objects have inherent properties that act as constraints on observational accounts’ and constructivism, ‘the view that the very “reality” of objects is itself an outcome of discursive practices in relation to the object’ (Hutchby 2001, 443). Thus, Hutchby describes affordances as ‘functional and relational aspects which frame, while not determining, the possibilities for agentic action in relation to an object’ (Hutchby 2001, 444).

Although the concept of affordances has been hugely significant in the study of technology in multiple disciplines, it has historically struggled to support new analytic insights. Sociologist of technology Ling (2004) notes that the use of affordances in many studies of technology has often seemed more descriptive than analytical, focusing on the features of technology and less on users and their social context. IS theorists Azad and Faraj (2012), for example, argue that many applications have struggled to deploy the concept such that it offers ‘a qualitatively different representation than a product/features in use’.

### 3.2.4 Theorising Facebook’s Affordances for Subject Enactment

A sociomaterial theorisation of social media affordances for the enactment of identity must consider the kind of subject that is embodied in the design of social media technologies. In other words, to understand the ways in which the use of Facebook shapes the enactment of religious identity in Pakistan requires an understanding of the kinds of enactment that Facebook, as a sociomaterial apparatus, affords. To this end, this section describes three forms of subject afforded by Facebook: the singular and authentic subject, the archival subject and the subject of value.

Facebook constitutes a ‘singular, authentic’ subject by stipulating in its terms of service that users must use their real name, through statements by company representatives and official documentation. Haimson and Hoffmann (2016)analyse the rhetoric and design of Facebook and show that the site affords and demands a particular form of ‘singular authentic’ identity, which reflects specific, Western conceptions of identity while marginalising others. For example, the site’s policies and design emphasise the use of real names as ‘authentic’ names and do not allow unusual names, such as those with unusual combinations of numbers, capital letters or multiple words (such as Native American names). The discourse of singular authenticity is justified by framing anonymity as a security threat, thus also marginalising those who might find value or
safety in privacy, such as transgender people or victims of abuse (Haimson and Hoffmann 2016, 7). The authors conclude that Facebook’s emphasis on and affordances for authenticity are paradoxical because the demand for authenticity forces those for whom authentic identities are problematic to be inauthentic. As Haimson and Hoffmann conclude, ‘On Facebook, users are asked to present themselves authentically, but for some this requires modifying their “authentic self” to fit the demands of Facebook’s real name policies and restrictions’ (Haimson and Hoffmann 2016, 7).

Facebook also affords an ‘archival subject’ through its automatic ordering of a user’s activity into a curated timeline. Facebook’s timeline reflects a belief in the world that being transparent and sharing more makes the world a better place. As Zuckerberg puts it: ‘People sharing more – even if just with their close friends or families – creates a more open culture and leads to a better understanding of the lives and perspectives of others’ (Facebook 2012, 67–70). Facebook’s timeline is constructed through a selection of the items that are posted, shared or otherwise interacted with by the user. Thus, the newsfeed, and by extension the timeline, exists ‘along a sort of spatial axis’ (Mitchell 2014). Importantly though, only a limited amount of the information that Facebook tracks is selected for inclusion on a user’s archival timeline, as Facebook selects items that its algorithms determine to be most relevant or important to the user. Although users can select to view further information on their activity log, even this is a small selection of the information Facebook holds about a user.

The significance of this is that Facebook plays an active role in the construction of the archival subject that is built on a user’s timeline and is the visible identity of the user. Facebook’s timeline affords a browseable archive of the user, creating narrative coherence based on an automatic ordering of the items that users post and share. Facebook’s subject is thus a transparent, archival self. This sense of a transparent, archival subject reflects a particular view of the individual as a single, enduring entity that connects to other single entities. As such, Mitchell concludes, it is a version of ‘the classical liberal, economic subject, atomistic, rational, and self-interested’ (Mitchell 2014). One of the consequences of this is to fix the subject as a static, or at least accountable, entity, as past activity can be turned to in the present. For the archival subject afforded by Facebook, the past is always in the present and users are always accountable for their past.

In addition to the subject as singular, authentic and archival, Facebook affords the enactment of the ‘subject of value’. This recognises the aspects in which Facebook structures a user and his or her experience according to metrics of value. Skeggs and Yuill (2016) explore how Facebook, as a business, consolidates users as data points to constitute subjects of value that are then sold to
advertisers. They describe how Facebook encourages sharing as much authentic information as possible, and carefully selects the content to which individuals are exposed to stimulate further sharing. In constructing users as ‘subjects of value’, Facebook influences ‘how your network is shaped over time, shapes how you interact – with whom, when, how’ (Skeggs and Yuill 2016, 383). They show how the algorithms that select the content that appears in a user’s newsfeed respond to the nature of the user, with more active engagement and structuring of content for more active, ‘high-value’ users. Thus, Facebook rewards subjects of value with greater amounts of new information, more regularly updated newsfeeds and further opportunities for interaction. These processes of algorithmic newsfeed manipulation therefore affect what content – what issues, causes, people and politics – people are exposed to, and thus the online social life that users experience on Facebook.

3.3 Theoretical Framework Summary

This section summarises the theoretical framework built out of the conceptual scaffolding of the preceding chapters. The theoretical framework includes conceptualisations of identity and technology that are ontologically congruent and theoretically robust alternatives to the essentialist accounts of the liberal, sovereign subject and deterministic accounts of technology.

Figure 1: Theoretical Framework
Religious identity is conceptualised as the performative enactment (Butler, 1990) of the discourses that are hegemonic in the context of the user, and are always both discursive and material. ICTs are conceptualised as sociomaterial entanglements of matter and meaning (Barad, 2007), with particular material discourses that structure specific formations of the subject.

Reading the theoretical framework in diagram form clarifies the structure and process through which it explains how Facebook shapes the enactment of religious identity in Pakistan. Hegemonic discourses such as Pakistan’s religious nationalism are understood to be constituted through the operation of power and to be always contingent, contested and fragmentary (Asad, 1993, 2003). These multiple, competing discourses produce subject positions (Butler, 1990) such as religious identity, which in Pakistan is characterised by a Deobandi form of Sunni Islam that ‘others’ Shia, Ahmadis and other religious groups (Metcalf, 2002; Iqtidar, 2012). Individuals, desiring recognition as authentic, legitimate subjects (Butle, 1990), attempt to enact these subject positions through everyday practices, including the use of material and technological artefacts (Vasquez, 2010). These material artefacts are themselves constituted by discourses that shape their design and use. Facebook’s design is shaped by Zuckerbergs discourse of singular authenticity and the platform affords the enactment of a singular, authentic and archival subject of value (Haimson and Hoffman, 2016; Mitchell, 2014; Skeggs and Yuill, 2016).

The performative enactment of religious identity through Facebook’s affordances is diffracted (Barad, 2007) through the intra-action of artefact and subject from which emerge multiple patterns of practice; these include practices that conform to the dominant, hegemonic discourse while other transgressive practices ‘trouble’ the hegemonic discourse and present new possibilities. In other words, enacting religious and gender identity through the interaction between Facebook and its users in Pakistan yields multiple practices, which constitute identities that constantly try to conform to – but are always at risk of transgressing against – what is considered acceptable and ‘correct’.

Although the diagram appears circular, the discourse–subject interaction is not one of iterative, linear circularity, as in the subject–structure relationship of structuration. Rather, the discourse–subject relationship is one of constant emergence. In other words, people are constantly enacting and ‘emerging’ rather than constantly trying out what works, reflecting and recalibrating, as that reintroduces the black box of reflexivity.
4. Methodological Framework

This chapter presents the ontology, epistemology, research design and methods used to explore the relationship between the use of Facebook and the enactment of religious identity in Pakistan. To do so, I first present the ontological perspective of agential realism adopted by this thesis, and situate it within the positivist and interpretivist perspectives. I then present the mixed methods approach and sequential explanatory research design as a strategy to collect and analyse data in order to answer the research question. I then introduce the three research locations, namely Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin. This is followed by a description of the research methods, namely a survey followed by focus groups, interviews and document collection, and an account of the challenges involved in the conduct of fieldwork and data collection. This is followed by a description of the analytical strategy, followed by the considerations of the researchers own position and the ethics of research. The chapter concludes with a restatement of the research objectives, scholarly contribution and limitations of the research.

4.1 Philosophical Standpoint: Agential Realism

This thesis adopts an agential realist perspective that informs the research methodology and design. Chapter Two highlighted the issues associated with the assumptions in the development and ICTD literatures that technologies are self-contained entities and hold inherent, causal properties and identities as independent, sovereign and rational actors. It was argued that this positivist account leads to problematic assumptions about the relationship between the two, assumptions that when unpacked can be found to have roots in problematic theorisations of social change as modernization and concepts such as modernity.

Positivist or realist accounts rest on an ontology that assumes there is an objective, knowable physical and social world. It assumes that this world exists separately from what is known about it by human beings and that it can be known about through sufficiently objective research (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Creswell 2014). As such, sufficiently objective and impartial research can reveal insights that form the basis of theories that transcend time and context. However, positivist accounts are critiqued for distinguishing between facts and beliefs and a reductionism (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991) and a dualistic ontology that artificially separates subjects from objects, man from nature (Barad 1996, 2007). This positivist approach dominates the quantitative economics research tradition that characterizes much of the research on the relationship between technology and economic growth in the development literature.
By contrast, interpretivist or constructivist perspectives assume an ontology in which there is no world external to that created by human beings. Thus interpretivist studies focus on ‘subjective meanings and social-political as well as symbolic action in the process through which humans construct and reconstruct their reality’ (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, 13). This hermeneutic approach thus emphasizes a focus on the interpretation of texts, in which texts are all manner of language, practices and technologies (Crotty 1998). Interpretivists also reject the positivist notion of cause and effect in favour of subject descriptions, leading some interpretivists to argue that it is ‘naïve’ to believe it is possible for researchers to theorise using technologies for ‘potential impact’ through ‘informing correct choices of action’ (Avgerou, Ciborra, and Land 2004, 4). Instead of universal claims, interpretivists thus emphasise a focus on context. This emphasis on interpretation and context forms the object of criticism as it leaves researchers in a relativist position that some describe as a ‘paralysing ‘anything goes’ attitude’ (Avgerou 2002, 65). In the information systems field the focusing on the social at the expense of the material has been critiqued for failing to theorise the technological artefact (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001).

A critical perspective addresses the relativist position by acknowledging the historical and political forces in play in a specific context (Crotty 1998). Informed by the Marxist thought and critics of development (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994), a critical perspective is attendant to the forces the inhibit and control with a view towards addressing oppression and exploitation. As Crotty puts it, the difference between the interpretivist and critical perspectives is the ‘contrast between a research that seeks merely to understand and a research that challenges... between a research that reads the situation in terms of interaction and community and a research that reads it in terms of conflict and oppression... between a research that accepts the status quo and a research that seeks to bring about change’ (Crotty 1998, 113). Critical perspectives are of course limited by the perspective and interpretation of the researcher, who if insufficiently reflexive of their norms can introduce their interpretation of oppression and liberation (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991), a characteristic that critics make of Western notions of development as ‘liberation’ (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994).

A sociomaterial perspective offers a way of resolving the polar positions of positivism and interpretivism. It suggests that ontologically there is a material world but that epistemologically our knowledge of it is inevitably interpretive and provisional rather than representational (Barad 2003, 2007). Although the sociomaterial perspective has a number of forms (Orlikowski and Scott 2008; S. Scott and Orlikowski 2014), this thesis follows Orlikowski and Scott’s adoption of a relational ontology. A relational ontology assumes that ‘relations are more fundamental than entities’ and that entities are ‘not first self-contained entities and then interactive. Each thing,
including each person, is first and always a nexus of relations’ (Slife, 2004:159 in S. Scott and Orlikowski 2014). Relations exist and are constituted through enactment and practices, with practices understood as ‘recurrent, situated activities informed by shared meanings’ (S. Scott and Orlikowski 2014, 10). As discussed in the theoretical framework, these practices are understood as performat ive enactments which become durable through repetition. Importantly, the relational ontology responds to the interpretivist’s emphasis on the social by considering the relation between social and material entities as together constituting specific phenomena. For Barad then, ‘reality is composed not of things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena but of things-in-phenomena. The world is a dynamic process of intra-activity’ (Barad 2007, 140). Thus agential realism rejects the objectivism of realism, but does not renounce objectivity, transforming it from a measure of an external reality to instead a particular act of measurement under specific conditions. It also rejects the pure subjectivity of constructivism, replacing the argument that there is no reality independent of cognition with the case that observing subjects are part of the reality they observe.

A final note on the issue of criticality in social material perspectives. Sociomaterial perspectives have been charged, like interpretivist perspectives, with being descriptive, relativist and lacking the resources to make moral or political judgements (Winner 1993; Whittle and Spicer 2008). The response to this, and the position taken by this thesis, is that before one can take a moral position one must first understand the network. As Latour notes, ‘In order to make a diagnosis or a decision about the absurdity, the danger, the immorality, or the unrealism of an innovation, one must first describe the network’ (Latour 1991, 130).

4.2 Research Design and Strategy
This research adopts a sequential explanatory mixed methods design (Creswell et al. 2003; Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006, 11) that consists of two distinct phases of data collection, namely a quantitative survey followed by interviews, focus groups and document collection (see Figure 1). The sequential explanatory design was selected because it supports identification of both the types of participants to be purposefully selected for the qualitative research and also the types of questions and areas of investigation. In other words, the qualitative data explains the quantitative results. This allows the identification of mobile phone and social media usage patterns as they relate to religious identity and attitudes, relationships that can be explained through the qualitative research.
To respond to the research question a multiple case study research strategy was adopted (Gerring 2004; Yin 2003). Mobile data users from three locations were selected, specifically people who had used mobile data within the last month in Mandi Bahauddin, Gujrat and Gujranwala.

The priority in this research design is on the qualitative research because this reflects the most substantial data collection and analysis, focusing on in-depth explanation of sixteen maximal variation cases. The role of qualitative methods in this project is thus more profound than the quantitative methods, as within subtle realist approaches such methods are 'epistemologically valid' (Tsoukas 1989, 556) and 'more capable of describing a phenomenon, constructing propositions and identifying structures and interactions between complex mechanisms'
The implementation strategy that was adopted was to conduct a telephone survey first to identity patterns followed by qualitative data to explain those patterns and explore further the practice enacting religious identity through Facebook. The purpose of the survey was to identify patterns of mobile phone and social media use patterns linked to various demographic user data, and also identify respondents for further qualitative research. The subsequent qualitative phase consisted of two concurrent components. The first component is a discursive analytical approach based on the collection of textual data from newspaper accounts that describe the banning of Facebook in May 2010 for hosting blasphemous cartoons related to the Everybody Draw Muhammad Day event. This component forms the basis for an account in Chapter Six of the hegemonic discourses that constitute both religious identity and Facebook in Pakistan. The second component was a multiple case study approach that collected data through individual interviews and participant observation notes of mobile internet usage. This second component forms the body of empirical data in Chapter Seven and Eight the analysis of which contributes to explaining the relationship between the enactment of religious identity and Facebook.

The quantitative and qualitative methods are integrated at two points. Firstly, as part of the implementation strategy the findings helped to produce interview guides and also were intended to select participants for case study research – though this was less successful in practice than had been anticipated, as is outlined in more detail below. The second point of integration was at the end of data collection when the findings from the survey formed part of the analysis and discussion of research findings.

Finally, the case selection describes the individuals selected from the survey to be part of ongoing, in-depth qualitative research. The initial plan was to recruit sixteen young mobile internet and social media users to establish a balanced mix of users according to gender and religious identity. This plan was less successful in practice as few people were willing to be interviewed after the survey. This is explained further below.

**Data Collection Process**

The field work consisted of eighteen months in three phases conducted between March 2014 and September 2015. This included a first phase between March 2014 and August 2014 in which the survey was conducted; a second phase between September 2014 and May 2015 in which field
research was conducted in Mandibahudin, Gujrat and Gujranwala followed two months of reflection and a third phase between August 2015 and September 2015.

The first phase began in March 2014 and included an initial field visit to Karachi, which resulted relocating the field site to the Punjab due to security concerns. This was followed by a period of negotiation with a mobile operator to obtain its support for a telephone survey conducted through their database. This was followed by the design, piloting and implementation of the survey and subsequent initial analysis. The results of the analysis and limited respondent identification necessitated a visit to the Ahmadi headquarters in London in August 2014 followed by a visit to their Pakistan headquarters in Rabwa in order to obtain support in facilitating interviews with Ahmadi social media users.

The second phase between September 2015 and May 2015 saw the qualitative field work begin in earnest, with focus groups and interviews conducted every week in Gujrat, Gujranwala and Mandibahudin, followed by a week of reflection and planning for the next field visit. Further fieldwork in June 2015 was prevented by a heatwave made respondents hard to access and research difficult to conduct. This led to two months of reflection and initial analysis.

The third and final phase was two months of intense fieldwork between August and September 2015. This involved focus groups and interviews in Gujrat, Gujranwala and Mandibahudin, motivated in party by the questions, themes and gaps identified in the reflection and initial analysis. For example, the initial analysis of the survey and interview data highlighted the significance of gender in social media usage practices, and led to a focus on interviewing female respondents.

Table 1 Respondents by location, gender & sect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mandibahudin</th>
<th>Gujrat</th>
<th>Gujranwala</th>
<th>Other locations</th>
<th>Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadi</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The individuals and locations were selected on the basis of a combination of pragmatic and theoretical reasons. Pragmatically, the individuals were users of a mobile operator that had agreed to facilitate the conduct of a survey, thus enabling initial access to research respondents who it was known used mobile data. Furthermore, limiting the selection of subjects to the three locations limited travel time between research locations and made the fieldwork manageable. Theoretically, limiting the survey to users from the three locations strengthened diversity between cases in terms of mobile data penetration and adoption, demographics and urban development (as a marker of modernisation). This allowed the study of the use of Facebook and enactment of religious identity in three similar yet diverse locations.

A multiple case study strategy was selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, one of the values of case study research is the ability to generate new knowledge and theory, and thus whilst not statistically generalizable may be analytically generalizable (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Yin 2003; Flyvbjerg 2011). Thus the purpose of the case study research is not to establish the frequency or prevalence of phenomena, such as particular mobile internet practices that relate to religious identity formation, but rather the mechanisms by which it is brought into being, sustained or changed (Yin 2003). As Flyvbjerg states, ‘social science may be strengthened by the execution of a greater number of good case studies’ (Flyvbjerg 2011, 316). Given the still developing nature of the technology, there are only a few studies of the relationship between Facebook and religious identity, and none of the relationship between Facebook and religious identity in Pakistan, thus strengthening the case for case study approach.

4.3 Research Location
This section outlines the rationale for the selection of Gujranwala, Gujrat, and Mandi Bahauddin as the three research locations (field sites) and presents a brief description of each. The location for this research could arguably have been anywhere in Pakistan with mobile signal coverage, as the use of mobile phones to access the internet and social media was growing rapidly. Indeed, the strategy of conducting the telephone survey through the mobile phone operator meant that an absolutely random selection could have been possible. Although random selection could have contributed to generalizability (Creswell 2014), this research is focused on exploring the nature of the relationship, not proving the universality of insights gathered. Furthermore, at a more
pragmatic level, a truly random selection through the mobile network operator would have led to a selection of respondents located across the country, presenting a logistic challenge for subsequent qualitative research. A selection had to be made, and criteria for the selection developed. The criteria that informed the selection was informed by the phenomena of the relationship between religious identity and mobile internet use and the use of 3G mobile internet.

Gujranwala was selected as a primary research location because it met the two criteria in specific ways. It had been the location of the 2010 attack against Ahmadis linked to the posting of blasphemous content on Facebook, and it was part of the first wave of locations where 3G internet services were rolled out. A second location was also identified in order to explore the adoption of mobile internet services in a smaller urban location. In consultation with a mobile network operator, the location of Mandi Bahauddin was selected because it was the smallest urban area where 3G networks were being rolled out. The third location of Gujarat was selected in order to avoid a polarized comparison between two poles and thus expand the diversity of data of gathered. The detail of these locations in terms of location, population and internet access is outlined in Chapter Seven where the results from the survey are presented.

Figure 3: Map of Research Locations
4.4 Data Collection

This project adopts a mixed methods approach to data collection (Creswell 2014; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003; Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala 2013). Venkatesh et al. argue that a mixed methods approach is particularly appropriate when exploring 'a phenomenon for which extant research is fragmented, inconclusive, and equivocal (Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala 2013, 36). The mix of quantitative and qualitative methods in a mixed methods approach is often adopted for its ability to bridge the positivist and constructivist ontological positions. As such, Venkatesh et al (Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala 2013) note that mixed methods approaches are suitable for use by studies that take subtle realist perspectives, while Zachariadis et al (2013) emphasise that quantitative correlations alone are unable to uncover the causal mechanisms of the phenomena at hand (Zachariadis, Scott, and Barrett 2013, 862).

The data collection methods included, in sequential order, surveys; focus groups, semi-structured interviews and observation; document collection. The survey targeted seven hundred and fifty respondents from the three locations to explore patterns of mobile phone use; patterns of social media use; experiences of social media use; and demographic information including age, gender, religious identity. The focus groups and semi-structured interviews interviewed a total of one hundred and seven individuals in the three locations exploring the experience of using social media and specifically Facebook in relation to the enactment and practices of religious identity (See Table 1 Interview Guide). The interviews and focus groups lasted between 15 minutes and one and a half hours. The document collection involved the identification of one hundred and seventy-eight news articles, editorials, opinion pieces and letters to the newspaper.

Table 2 Interview Guide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Guide:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction – research context, purpose, consent, rights, process. Who I am.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Introductions – interviewee introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mobile use: explore mobile internet usage: where, how long, devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social media usage: explore which sites, why – especially Facebook</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Facebook usage:

| 5. Explore Facebook usage: where, how often, what for |
| 6. Explore social network: friends (how many, who, closest); chatting |
| 7. Explore interaction: status updating, share, comments, liking |

---

6 See Appendix 1 for full details of methods, data collection challenges and the process of data analysis, and Appendix II for a full list of interviews carried out for this research, and documents collected.
8. Explore consumption: Newsfeed, updates, groups, pages
9. Explore personal expression: feelings, emotion, boundaries of expression
10. Explore context management: different parts of life (family, friends etc.)
11. Explore audiences: imagined audience, expectations
12. Explore controversies: politics, religion, personal
13. Probe on fake / multiple accounts, sectarianism,
14. Explore religion: what content, practices, importance, debates?
15. Is there anything else you want to tell me?

The interviews, focus groups and observation notes provided empirical accounts of the relationship between the use of Facebook and the practices of performatively enacting religious identity. Remember though that identity, including religious identity, was conceptualised as subject positions in discourse, and that technologies were conceptualised as sociomaterial entities, assemblages of matter and meaning. Data about the construction of Facebook in discourses of religious identity is thus collected in the second qualitative component in the form of newspaper accounts of the banning of Facebook in 2010 and documentation of the design of Millatfacebook.

Table 3 Linking Conceptual Framework to Interview Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual Framework</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic discourse:</td>
<td>- What can you (not) talk about on social media / Facebook?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What are controversial topics on social media / Facebook?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What kind of / how much religious content do you see on Facebook?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What do other people expect you share?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What do other people criticise other people for on Facebook?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Have you ever been criticised for your Facebook activity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enactment of identity:</td>
<td>- How often do you use Facebook?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Who are you friends with on Facebook (family, religious, gender)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- How would you describe how you use Facebook?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Why do you use Facebook, what do you get from it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What things do you like, share, post?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What kind of religious content do you share?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What kind of religious debate do you have on Facebook?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- How is religious practice on Facebook different to everyday life?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apparatus / Facebook:</td>
<td>- What do people learn about you from your profile? Is it the ‘real you’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordances:</td>
<td>- Do you share all of yourself? What do you not share, why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What are the implications of only having one account?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Do you review your own or other people’s profiles? Why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Who sees your profile / posts / activity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What happens if the wrong person sees it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- How do people manage privacy?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data Collection Process
The field work consisted of eighteen months in three phases conducted between March 2014 and September 2015. This included a first phase between March 2014 and August 2014 in which the survey was conducted; a second phase between September 2014 and May 2015 in which field research was conducted in Mandibahudin, Gujrat and Gujranwala followed two months of reflection and a third phase between August 2015 and September 2015.

The first phase began in March 2014 and included an initial field visit to Karachi, which resulted relocating the field site to the Punjab due to security concerns. This was followed by a period of negotiation with a mobile operator to obtain its support for a telephone survey conducted through their database. This was followed by the design, piloting and implementation of the survey and subsequent initial analysis. The results of the analysis and limited respondent identification necessitated a visit to the Ahmadi headquarters in London in August 2014 followed by a visit to their Pakistan headquarters in Rabwa in order to obtain support in facilitating interviews with Ahmadi social media users.

The second phase between September 2015 and May 2015 saw the qualitative field work begin in earnest, with focus groups and interviews conducted every week in Gujrat, Gujranwala and Mandibahudin, followed by a week of reflection and planning for the next field visit. Further fieldwork in June 2015 was prevented by a heatwave made respondents hard to access and research difficult to conduct. This led to two months of reflection and initial analysis.

The third and final phase was two months of intense fieldwork between August and September 2015. This involved focus groups and interviews in Gujrat, Gujranwala and Mandibahudin, motivated in party by the questions, themes and gaps identified in the reflection and initial analysis. For example, the initial analysis of the survey and interview data highlighted the significance of gender in social media usage practices, and led to a focus on interviewing female respondents.

Sampling and Respondents:
The selection of research respondents derives from the research approach, questions and design and plays an important part in research outcomes (Creswell 2014; Flick 2014). The mixed method sequential nature of the research design was selected because it allowed both quantitative as well as in-depth qualitative research but also because it allowed the identification of research respondents through the conduct of the survey.
The selection of respondents from the sample of mobile data users was purposive and pragmatic (Creswell 2014). The selection of respondents was intended to select a maximal variation (Creswell and Clark 2006) in terms of the central phenomena (Miles and Huberman 1994), with maximal variation determined by religious identity, time spent online and attitudes towards talking about religious identity online. It was intended to be pragmatic in the acknowledgement that there might be a limited variety of respondents who agreed to take part.

In total, thirty respondents agreed to be part of further research, a number that was felt to be sufficiently strong to allow for the anticipated number of people who would drop out. In the event however, subsequent to initial agreement only five people agreed again to be part of further research, with the rest saying they weren’t interested, didn't have time or didn't want their telephone number to be shared outside the mobile operator. From those five, only two people actually agreed and eventually met. In other words, the survey as a tool to identify respondents failed in its purpose. Furthermore, from the completed surveys no respondents had identified as Ahmadis. Whilst this was not statistically significant, given the number of Ahmadis in the country, it meant that this also had to be addressed.

Instead of purposive sampling, a snowball sample strategy was employed (Flick 2014). This snowball approach started out from multiple entry points, including those survey respondents who did agree to meet and through research assistants from each of the three research locations. Through these entry points we sought out people who used mobile phones to access Facebook, as well as people who might have something interesting to say about religion and Facebook. This process usually involved a focus group of three to eight people from which individuals were purposively selected and requested to participate in further interviews and discussion. Reaching Ahmadis was harder, and involved having to contact their headquarters in London who facilitated a meeting in Rabwa with their community leader who in turn arranged introductions to their district youth leaders in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandibahudin. These three individuals became critical entry points as they arranged meetings with both male and female Ahmadis. Furthermore, the snowball strategy was guided by the focus on lower and middle class respondents, with key contacts guided to include those respondents from families headed by those employed in professional occupations, service sector or salaried occupations (Durr-e-Nayab 2011), who had at least completed college, and who at most owned the home they lived in, but not more than one home.

---

7 The discussion of class is a complex one, and of middle class especially so – particularly in terms of it as an absolute or relative measure, See Nayab, 2011 for a useful review of the literature and of its application to Pakistan.
In total, seven hundred and fifty respondents were interviewed through the telephone survey and one hundred and seven were interviewed through focus groups and interviews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Gujrat</th>
<th>Gujranwala</th>
<th>Other locations</th>
<th>Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.5 Data Coding and Analysis

4.5.1 Quantitative Data Analysis

In sequential explanatory mixed methods designs, the quantitative data is analysed prior to the qualitative data collection, indeed the results of the quantitative informs the direction of enquiry (Creswell 2014). In other words, the findings from the quantitative data inform the kinds of questions that are explored in the qualitative data collection. Analysis was conducted using simple descriptive statistics to explore responses according to specific demographic categories, with particular attention being paid to religious identity, gender and location.

In this case, the analysis of the survey findings was focused on identifying patterns in the relationship between mobile internet use and religious identity and practices. In this sense the results of the survey help plan who to speak to as well as what themes to explore in more detail.
For example, the survey found no respondent who identified as Ahmadi and thus emphasised the potential in focusing on exploring how Ahmadis experienced the relationship between social media and religious identity.

In addition to informing the questions and demographics that the qualitative research phase would explore in greater depth, the quantitative phase was also intended to identify specific individuals to participate in the qualitative research. In practice however this proved to be problematic. Despite increasing the sample size, only thirty respondents agreed to take part in further research, and as the section below on data access outlines, few of these were either actually from the research locations or in the event actually willing to meet.

4.5.2 Qualitative Data Analysis

This research is exploratory and thus the analysis was inductive and iterative, with several rounds of turning from the data to the literature and back to the data. This ‘constant comparison’ of the emerging data emphasises the contrasting of new, notable observations with previous ones for similarities and differences (Corbin and Strauss, 1990:9). The process and practices of data analysis are understood to be as much about method as they are about art (Flick 2014) and indeed the intra-action between literature, theory, findings and researcher was experienced as an entanglement (Barad 2003) from which findings are performatively enacted. For this reason, then it is important to be explicit about the process and practice through which analysis is conducted.

It is also important to note that whilst many studies of social interaction in electronically mediated spaces follow a grounded theory approach (Vaast and Walsham, 2013), this research project drew on the grounded theory approach but rejected a strict interpretation of the methodology because it relies on an existing ‘paradigm model’ of causality (Sarker et al, 2001) that was felt to be at odds with the emergent nature of an Agential Realism ontology.

The process of qualitative analysis began in the field and continued on return to London. The analysis of the survey findings informed the initial interview and focus group guides, and the processes of reflection in the research diary and the step-wise analysis of newspaper accounts laid the foundations for identification of emerging themes that were further explored through the coding of the interview data.

Analysis of interview data

The transcriptions of the interviews and focus groups were uploaded to the data analysis software NVivo, allowing flexible manipulation of the data. The interviews and focus groups were then coded through an iterative process of inductive open coding and deductive theoretical coding based on the theoretical framework and motivated by the research goals. As the data was coded,
it was analysed and related back to the survey findings, to the theoretical and empirical literature to identify themes that helped explain the relationship between Facebook and religious identity.

The transcriptions were analysed individually and then comparatively for common themes, understood in narrative analysis as discourses (Taylor and Littleton 2006), that were identified through common elements that occur across several interviews as well as at different times within a single interview. Within these narratives close attention was paid to accounts of religious practices, moments of trouble and themes related to the concepts of liberation and conformity discussed in the literature review and theoretical framework.

Analysing narrative from a Butlerian performative perspective (Morison and Macleod 2013; Peterson and Langellier 2006) involves exploring how individuals 'position' themselves in relation to the discourse, and their accounts of moments of 'trouble', attempts to 'repair'. Analysing performativity from a material perspective involved drawing on Barad’s (Barad 2007) notions of entanglement, material-discursive practices and performativity, and allowed the move from conceptualising phenomena such as religious identity as a social attribute, and instead view it as a material doing (S. Scott and Orlikowski 2014, 889). The form of subject that the structure of Facebook allows emerged as one of the most significant aspects in this analysis. This points towards the practices that make phenomena work (S. V. Scott and Orlikowski 2014a, 890) part of an acknowledgement of the sociomaterial intra-action of Facebook and religious identity. The analysis concluded with accounts of how these practices of subject formation have implications for religious identity in Pakistan, as well as for the broader themes of development theory and modernity.

Data Coding
The development of analytic codes built upon the iterative nature of the research process, developing a theoretical sensitivity throughout, as recommended in inductive theory building approaches such as grounded theory (Straus and Corbin, 1990). This phase also involved the identification of theory and approaches that could be drawn on to theorise about the relationship between social media and religious identity in Pakistan. Yet as others have noted, this process also requires care to avoid becoming ‘captive to any literature’ (Sarket et al, 2001: 42). As such, the identification of these theories and approaches helped direct the further research and enquiry, and were noted down as tentative ‘selective’ codes to be drawn on in the analytic phase.

Open, axial and selective coding
The initial codes were developed through reading of the data in NVIVO and the noting down of emergent codes, informed by a combination of the theoretical framework and the insights gained from the conduct of the interviews that were noted down in fieldwork diaries.

Table 5 Illustration of Open Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Sample Open Codes (underlined) and Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| None of my family members (were on Facebook) and they said don’t accept any Ahmad friend request. So I just keep my friends in the Facebook and no family members in it. They know that I do have a Facebook account but they also knew at the same time that I don’t want any friend or family member on Facebook. I don’t want to communicate with them over there. I would rather communicate over WhatsApp or simple message. | Saad, 10/092014 Male, Ahmadi, Mandibahudin | 1. Religious identity – silence / submission and conformity  
2. Managing different social contexts and maintaining separation.  
3. Facebook’s affordances for visibility over Whatsapp’s affordances for privacy  
4. Facebooks demands for authenticity and having to separate friendship groups in order to conform. |
| Because on Facebook my brothers have their mostly male friends. So personal life gets shared from brothers’ timeline to others’. So one feels insecure therefore WhatsApp, Viber gives a kind of homely feel. On Facebook one feels insecure and the personal life gets leaked. I neither add nor answer any unknown person because I know it’s positive and negative points. | Zehra, 09/03/2015 Female, Ahmadi, Rabwa | 1. Limiting Facebook use because design affords visibility and exposure to unrelated men.  
2. Choosing to limit interaction in order to conform to gender expectations.  
3. Choosing WhatsApp because of (perceived?) lack of control over Facebook privacy.  
4. Maintenance of purdah norms through active choosing of WhatsApp over Facebook, and resulting social constrain. |

Table 3 illustrates the process of open coding and how initial codes were developed. The two interview excerpts are from two Ahmadi respondents in Mandibahudin and Rabwa respectively. Open coding was initially done on a line by line basis, followed by open sampling and open coding at the level of transcription section. Over one hundred codes were generated during the initial open coding phase (see Table 4). Furthermore, a number of these codes were also linked to form axial codes.
The purpose of axial coding is to create links between sub-categories and their related categories. For Straus and Corbin this process was structured according to a causal ‘paradigm’ model of a chain from causal conditions to consequences (Straus and Corbin, 1990:99). Like Sarker at al (2001), the strict process of fitting sub-categories into the paradigm model was both too mechanistic in practice, as many sub-categories didn’t fit into one component of the causal chain, but the cause-consequence paradigm was also felt to be incompatible with the ‘emergent’ Agential Realist ontology. Instead, open codes, categories and sub-categories were linked and grouped

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3g</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Profile photos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adoption</td>
<td>Generational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadi</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Purdah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algorithm</td>
<td>Group minority as majority</td>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archival</td>
<td>Gujranwala</td>
<td>Relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authenticity</td>
<td>Gujrat</td>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bid’at</td>
<td>Hidayat</td>
<td>Religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Browser</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>Safety &amp; securit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Sawab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chat</td>
<td>Internet access 3g &amp; WiFi</td>
<td>Sectorian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Internet usage bad</td>
<td>Secularism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Internet usage good</td>
<td>Selfies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection</td>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>Separate friend &amp; family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Separate male &amp; female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controversy</td>
<td>Management Identity</td>
<td>Shame &amp; Honour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate</td>
<td>Mandibahudin</td>
<td>Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Shia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Device functions</td>
<td>Money</td>
<td>Singular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social media types</td>
<td>Multiple accounts female</td>
<td>Social change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disconnected</td>
<td>Multiple profiles</td>
<td>Submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echo chamber</td>
<td>Munāzarā</td>
<td>Subversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Time using</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressive</td>
<td>Newsfeed</td>
<td>Tradition &amp; Modernity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fake accounts</td>
<td>Official use</td>
<td>Trouble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Parental authority</td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced use</td>
<td>Password</td>
<td>Urban and rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign connection</td>
<td>Password parents</td>
<td>Usage affordance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free expression</td>
<td>Photos</td>
<td>Passwords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Religious merit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends group</td>
<td>Posting</td>
<td>Wahhabi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Games &amp; entertainment</td>
<td>Privacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
together through a process that involved revisiting and refining the open codes, drawing on extant knowledge of concepts and theory. These categories formed the basis for subsequent selective coding that formed the basis for the theoretical framework and analysis.

The categories that emerged through this process included the following, and formed the basis for subsequent selective coding. These categories were established through the linking of sub-categories created from the open codes and formed the core components of the story that was developed through the process of selective coding.

Table 7 Categories developed through axial coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>- Religious Identity</th>
<th>- Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Norms</td>
<td>- Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Facebook usage practice</td>
<td>- Mobile usage practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Diffraction</td>
<td>- Digital Purdah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Digital Secularisation</td>
<td>- Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Algorighmic Sectarianism</td>
<td>- Desiring Subject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selective coding is a part of the grounded theory approach in which an emerging story is developed through the identification of a core category and the linking of other categories to it. This is a complex process that involves the careful assessment of emerging themes and extant conceptual and theoretical knowledge to allow for a coherent story to emerge. While Straus and Corbin’s (1990) grounded theory approach to this is through their paradigm model, following Sarker et al (2001), this research drew on broader, meta-theories to support the development of a coherent narrative. In this research, the meta-theories of Butler and Barad’s theory of performativity (Butler, 1990; Barad, 2003). This meta-theory provided the means through which an account of the relationship between Facebook use and religious identity in Pakistan was developed.

This provided a helpful framework against which to reference the initial analysis of the respondent accounts of enacting religious identity. Comparing and contrasting the accounts by Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni highlighted how discourses of religious identity and technological discourses of singular authenticity intra-acted to structure and shape the relationship between Facebook and specific forms of religious identity. Expanding out beyond specific religious identity to explore the intra-action of social media practices and broader discursive formations highlighted the implications of these intra-actions for the performative enactment of religious as
well as gender identity. Indeed, the significance of gender as an aspect of the relationship between Facebook and social practice in Pakistan is one of the significant findings of this thesis.

4.6 Conclusion:
This research contributes to the existing literature through the presentation of a case study that explains the relationship between the use of Facebook and the enactment of religious identity in Pakistan. A mixed methods approach using a sequential explanatory research design was selected as a way to explain the relationship between practices of Facebook use and the enactment of religious identity by young people in three locations in Pakistan’s Punjab province. A survey was used to identify patterns of Facebook use, followed by the conduct of interviews, focus groups and document collection to explain the patterns and thus how the use of Facebook shapes the enactment of religious identity on Facebook. The nature of the approach means that these findings are contextually specific and not generalizable beyond the individual instances and phenomena that are described and analysed. As Flyvbjerg (2011) indicated, developing a body of case studies can contribute to developing insight in social science. It will be for further researchers to identify any empirical and theoretical generalisations that can be drawn from this research. It is to a contribution of further understanding of how technology and social entities intra-act in the processes of the world becoming, and of recognising the importance of how ‘matter matters’ (Barad 2007).
5. Survey Results: Mobile Usage Practices

This first empirical chapter describes mobile phone and social media usages practices in the three field sites. This chapter draws on survey data to describe the results from a telephone survey of 901 mobile internet users in Gujranwala, Gujrat, and Mandi Bahauddin. The results describe mobile device, internet and application usage practices, identifying significant differences in the usage practices of people who identify with specific religious categories, as well as between men and women. It concludes by exploring the implications of these practices for the normative claims that link ICT usage to processes of social change characterised by the liberation of individuals from traditional social norms and institutions.

5.1 Mobile Internet in Pakistan

Fast mobile internet arrived in 2014, years later than planned as a result of internal political debates between Pakistan’s bureaucracy and the courts (Symington 2016). Pakistan's Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) conducted an electronic auction on 23rd April in 2014 for the licensing of 3G and 4G spectrum, with four of the five incumbent operators - Russian-owned Mobilink, Norwegian-owned Telenor, Pakistan Government and United Arab Emirates jointly owned Ufone and Chinese owned Zong - winning licenses for the launch of 3G data spectrum and only Zong bidding on the 4G license, raising a total of $1.1 billion, significantly below the $2 billion (Bhatti 2014, 1) predicted by the Finance Minister Ishaq Dar.

The market leaders, Mobilink with 28% of the market and Telenor with 26% of the market (The News International, Pakistan 2014, 1), adopted very different strategies in rolling out new telecommunication base stations to provide access to fast data services. Telenor purposefully pursued an 'ink-spot' strategy in which they placed one or two towers in as many cities as possible, in order to provide a 'taste' of fast mobile internet services, even whilst only a few would be able to access the services in each location. Mobilink on the other hand pursued a 'saturation' strategy in which they methodically covered target cities with full coverage, aiming to provide a quality and uniformity of service. Both companies initially offered free services as part of the network testing process and as a strategy to introduce people to the new service.

5.2 The Field Sites

This section provides a very brief description of the three field sites. It provides a brief description in order to present a context for the research, but avoids an in-depth description of each site as the focus of the study is the individual respondents who constitute the subject of this project. The descriptions are based on a combination of personal observation and sourced data. The description
focuses on the size, density, levels of migration and nature of mobile internet access. It focuses on these aspects because size and urban density reflect levels of urban development, whilst migration and internet access reflect potential exposure to social and cultural influences from the wider world.

Gujranwala is the seventh largest city by population, with 1.132 million residents according to the 1998 census. Situated approximately 70 kilometres from Lahore on the Grand Trunk (GT) Road, it is a heavily industrial city with light industry and garment factories characterised by brick, concrete and an urban sprawl that bleeds into the surrounding fields and countryside. Gujranwala has comparably lower numbers of emigration, with a total of 271,400 registered to work abroad with the Pakistan Bureau Of Emigration & Overseas Employment between 1981 and 2015. Gujranwala benefitted from almost immediate 3G internet coverage when services were launched in May 2014, giving the population access to fast mobile data services.

Gujrat is approximately 50 kilometres from Gujranwala on the GT Road, though it now benefits from a bypass that means the centre of town is much quieter as the traffic routes around it. Lying between the Chenab and Jhelum rivers, Gujrat has a population of 251,792, according to the 1998 census. Gujrat has a particularly high proportion of migrant labour, with a total of 302,404 registered to work abroad with the Pakistan Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment between 1981 and 2015. Although Gujrat has a significantly smaller population, it initially received first Telenor then Mobilink 3G internet services in May 2014, followed a month or so later by Mobilink and eventually Zong and Ufone.

Mandi Bahauddin lies approximately 70 kilometres to the west of Gujrat, closer to the river Jhelum. It is a small town, with the population of the main city in 1998 only 99,496, and its size, smaller population and distance of the GT Road make it feel far more provincial. Mandi Bahauddin has very high levels of migrant workers, with a total of 93,048 registered to work abroad with the Pakistan Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment between 1981 and 2015. Nearly every family has at least one person working abroad, particularly in the Gulf countries but also in Europe and the United States. Mandi Bahauddin has very limited industry, and perhaps the biggest industrial operation is a sugar mill owned by an Ahmadi family and run mainly by Ahmadis who live in a big, highly secured compound. Mandi Bahauddin was a beneficiary of Telenor's 'ink-spot' strategy, and one of the smallest towns to receive 3G services. In the centre

---


of the town there were approximately three or four masts that provided fast mobile internet services.

5.3 Survey Findings: Device and Application Usage - Religion and Gender

The survey found that internet usage in the three cities is relatively high, with over 66% of respondents saying they used mobile internet for an hour or more per day, with 25% saying they used it for between two to three hours, and 21% saying they were always connected. Mobile internet users in these three cities are comparably higher than in other developing countries. A 2014 PEW survey (Pew Research Centre 2014) of internet users in thirty-two emerging and developing nations found a median of 64% used the internet every day. Though Pakistani survey respondents were all mobile data users whilst the PEW respondents included both fixed and mobile internet users, Pakistan mobile internet use is marginally higher compared to regional figures, where 54% of Indian and 59% of Bangladeshi internet users say they use the internet daily. In other words, the average mobile internet use as reported by respondents from the three cities is relatively high.

In line with app usage in other developing countries, the most popular apps identified by respondents were Facebook, with 83% of respondents indicating it as the app they used the most often, followed by WhatsApp at 14%. Only 1% said they used other popularly used apps such as Twitter, Skype or messaging app Line. This reflects similar findings from the PEW survey, which found that 82% of internet users in emerging and developing nations say they use social networking sites.

Mobile internet users in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin also spend a significant amount of time on their favourite social media. 60% of respondents said they spent an hour or more on their favourite social media site, with 18% saying two to three hours and another 18% saying that they were always connected. However, a sizeable number, 35%, say they only use their favourite social media site for less than hour a day. Mobile devices are personal, and rarely shared with other people. In cities of Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin only 21% said they let someone else use their phone to access the internet.

The amount of time that respondents from Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin said they spend on mobile internet is quite diverse but most respondents said that the majority of the time they spent using mobile internet was spent accessing Facebook. And for more than three quarters, this usage is a personal experience with few others seeing what happens on their device. But these
broad findings become far more revealing when we break down responses by religious affiliation and by gender.

**Religious Identity and Usage Practices**

The survey asked questions about religious identity, experiences of talking about religion online and attitudes towards issues such as inter-sectarian marriage. When asked to choose between three statements that reflected how respondents felt about sharing religious views on social media, 47% of respondents who identified as Sunni said they felt free to post and share religious opinions and thoughts, compared to just 29% of Shia and 10% of Christian respondents. In contrast, only 28% of respondents who identified as Sunni said they hesitated in sharing their religious opinions on social media, compared to 54% of Shia respondents and 30% of Christian respondents and 80% of respondents who identified as ‘other’.

In other words, Sunni respondents were more likely to feel able to express themselves freely on social media, and less likely to feel restricted, than Shia, Christian or other respondents who were less likely to say they felt free to express themselves and more likely to hesitate in expressing themselves on social media.

In contrast, and also somewhat contradictory to the statements about expressing religious views on social media, respondents were more closely ranged on views of the inclusive nature of social media, with 49% of Sunni and 54% of Shia respondents saying they felt social media was an inclusive public space where they can say and post what they feel and think, compared to just 10% of Christian respondents. Significantly, relatively few respondents said they perceived social media to be a private space, with only 24% of Sunni respondents, 21% of Shia respondents and 20% of Christian respondents describing social media as a private space where they are free to say what they feel and think.

Approximately half of Sunni and Shia respondents described social media as an inclusive, expressive space and most also described social media as a public rather than private space, though significantly, not one single respondent identified as Ahmadi. Although the statistics of actual Ahmadis in Pakistan mean this is not statistically significant, it remains the case that no respondents who identified as Ahmadi are reported in the survey.

**Gendered Usage Practices**

Mobile internet use also varied between male and female respondents. Male respondents described significantly higher levels of usage than women, with 22% of male respondents saying they were 'always connected', compared to only 14% of female respondents.
Female respondents also described using the internet for shorter periods than men, with 29% of female respondents saying they only accessed the internet on their phones for one to two hours, compared to 21% of male respondents, whilst 25% of male respondents said they accessed the internet for two to three hours a day, compared to 19% of female respondents. In short, male respondents accessed the internet on their phones for longer periods of time than female respondents.

**Facebook for men, WhatsApp for women**

Social media preferences are also distinctly gendered. Although the headline statistics indicate a significant preference for Facebook, analysis of the responses reveals significant differences between male and female preferences.

When asked which social media platform they used the most, 85% of male respondents said Facebook was the most popular compared to only 45% of female respondents. In contrast, nearly half (47%) of female respondents said they used WhatsApp the most, compared to only 13% of male respondents. In other words, Facebook is particularly popular amongst male respondents whilst far more women than men prefer WhatsApp.

Like internet usage patterns, male respondents also described much higher social media usage than female respondents. Nearly half of all female respondents (47%) said they accessed their favourite social media service for less than an hour a day, compared to 34% of male respondents. By contrast, 19% of men said they accessed their favourite social media service two to three hours a day compared to 10% of female respondents.

**Gendered Social Spheres:**

These different social media preferences also mean that male and female respondents described very different social networks. For a start, male respondents described much larger social networks than women. 64% of male respondents described having more than 50 friends or followers, compared to just 20% of female respondents. In contrast, 69% of women said they had less than 25 friends or followers, compared just 22% of women. In other words, male respondents described a much larger social sphere than women.

It's not just size, but male and female respondents described social networks that were very different in their composition. Fewer male respondents have their parents or sisters in their social network but more have friends from school, college, university or work in their contact lists. Only 16% of male respondents reported having parents in their social network, and only 19% reported
having their sisters in their social network contact list. Nearly all (94%) of male respondents said their male friends were in their contact list, but only 48% of their female friends were. Most male respondents also said they were connected to friends from education (84%) and work (76%).

By contrast, female respondents described a family based social network with few connections to male friends or connections from education or work. Compared to the 16% of male respondents who said their parents were in their social network, just over a third (34%) of female respondents said they were connected to their parents on social media. Similarly, compared to the 19% of male respondents who said their sisters were in their social network, nearly three quarters of female respondents (72%) said their brothers were in their contact list. But comparatively few female respondents said they were connected to their male friends (33%) or friends from education (48%) or work (31%).

The picture portrayed by survey respondents is for male social spheres to be larger than female respondent social spheres, and for male social spheres to be characterised by more non-family friends than female respondent social spheres. Indeed, the social spheres described by female respondent appear to be more family oriented than their male counterparts, and for more female respondents to have their brother in their social network than for male respondents to have their sister.

**Multiple Profiles**

My exploratory research had revealed that many people described having multiple Facebook profiles. This had been revealed when discussing the spate of newspaper reports on the arrest of men who'd posed as female Facebook users in order to befriend and then blackmail other women. Asking about this in exploratory focus groups and interviews prompted many to say that the blackmail of women was wrong, and very worrying because the practice of ‘fake accounts’ was very common. In order to explore how prevalent this practice was, the telephone survey included a question to probe this. Given the sensitivity of the issues - the young men who I first discussed this with were initially hesitant to talk about it, smiling and laughing when I mentioned it - the survey question, I asked respondents to describe not their own but the number of their friends who had multiple Facebook accounts. The question asked:

*Question: Many people have multiple accounts on the same site (e.g. one person with multiple Facebook accounts). Approximately what percentage of your friends and family members on Facebook has more than one account/profile?*
When the question was asked in the survey, 34% of respondents said that at least one of their friends had multiple profiles, though 17% said none and nearly half (49%) gave no response or said they didn't know. Significantly, fewer female respondents said their friends had multiple accounts, with only 22% of female respondents compared to 35% of male respondents saying at least someone in their network had multiple accounts. Slightly higher number of female respondents also said that no-one in their network had multiple accounts (19% compared with 16% for male respondents) or gave no response or didn't know 59% compared to 48% of male respondents.

In focus groups and interviews the question of multiple accounts was often a sensitive topic and people were sometimes hesitant to talk about it. The reasons for that hesitancy might account for the high level of respondents who said they didn't know or want to answer the questions.

The practice of multiple Facebook accounts raises questions about the numbers, gender proportions of people who are actually using the social network, and also broader questions about the intent. The practice breaks Facebook's Terms of Service, that stipulate a real name policy and the use of only one account, as well as a broader set of questions about the practice of identity, privacy and authenticity of users on the social network.

5.4 Conclusion

Mobile internet and social media usage practices in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin suggest a 'mobile first' pattern of technology use. This usage is dominated by the use of social media that respondents characterised as entertainment and social networking.

The more detailed survey findings suggest that Pakistani Facebook have distinct religious and gender identity characteristics. Religious minorities and women describe lower internet and social media usage whilst female respondents also describe using Facebook less than men, and a stronger preference for the WhatsApp messaging service, suggesting a preference by female users to connect with close friends of the same gender.

The survey also suggested that religious minorities do not see social media as a new space for public expression. Instead, respondents who describe themselves as Shia report using social media less and feel less comfortable expressing beliefs freely, whilst Ahmadies are not represented in the survey. The lack of Ahmadies in the survey could either be because there are so few of them that the survey failed to pick them up. However, it could also be that even if the survey included Ahmadi respondents they had declined to identify themselves as Ahmadies.
The same is true for the gendered use of social media in Pakistan. Female respondents described using the internet far less than men and when they do, they describe practices that suggest a social network that is smaller, less public and more concerned with privacy than male respondents.

The survey provides a brief, tantalising description of how people use social media, but raises more questions than answers. It leaves us wondering why religious minorities and marginalised groups don't use technology to break free from cultural constraints and, through the sharing of authentic selves, challenge traditional, conservative social norms? Why are Shia and Ahmadi usage patterns so different from those of Sunni respondents? What accounts for the differences in responses to feelings about self-expression on social media, and why do no Ahmadi’s identify themselves as Ahmadi in surveys? We might wonder whether women are prevented from using social media, and forced to conform online to offline norms, or do female usage patterns reflect preferences particular to Pakistani women from the three cities? Similarly, why do male respondents use social media so much more than women? And what are the explanations for the high levels of multiple social media accounts?

In order to explain the meaning, purpose and implications of the social media usage patterns described by survey respondents, we first turn to the account of individuals who shape usage practices, namely mobile phone retailers in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin. This is followed by two subsequent chapters that present the findings from interviews and focus groups with respondents in the three field sites.
6. Mediating ICTs – Facebook in Practice

The previous chapter introduced the three field sites and presented the findings from the survey, describing basic mobile phone and social media usage practices. It described how these usage practices were characterised by distinct differences according to religious and gender identity, with religious minorities and women describing lower usage of mobile phones and social media and women preferring WhatsApp over Facebook and describing smaller, more domestic social networks than male users. In other words, this chapter described practices through which religious and gender identities are enacted. Although it establishes the first link between the macro hegemonic discourses and the practices through subject positions are enacted, this account doesn't explain the meaning of these practices, or the implications they hold for religious identity in Pakistan.

This chapter presents another link between macro discourses and everyday ICT practices. It describes intermediaries that link the supply of technology and the translation of policy and hegemonic discourses to individual, everyday users of mobile phones and social media. It describes this by presenting the accounts of mobile phone shop retailers; two mobile phone shop retailers in one of the main markets in Gujranwala, a retailer and devout scholar in Gujrat and a local media mogul in Shahanalag. These three locations are presented because they reflect a diversity of geographic location and technological adoption. Whilst Gujranwala has had broadband for over five years it has only just arrived in Gujrat, and is not available in Shahanalag. Presenting these three accounts from diverse locations highlights the importance of physical geography in the distribution of digital skills and content.

This chapter describes how intermediaries seek to shape the consumption of media content and the nature of individual media practices. These efforts to shape social media behaviours are efforts to translate discourse into practice, and sees those who have the opportunity to influence the consumption of content and the use of technologies such that they enrol users and consumers into broader hegemonic discourses. In other words, this chapter describes how intermediaries seek to shape the way new technologies are used so as uphold dominant discourse of religious identity.

6.1 Gujranwala: The Mobile Market – movies, music and porn

The mobile markets in Gujranwala are, as might be expected, larger and more established than the markets in smaller cities and towns. Ammara Mobile Market is one of the largest mobile markets in Gujranwala, a large multistory block on a what used to be the main Grand Trunk Road
before they built the flyover that towers above. Now the rush of traffic echoes off the concrete block that almost touches the concrete supports that hold the flyover up. Ammara market is not the most upmarket mobile phone market, but it is the one that people on the street direct you towards when you ask for directions to mobile phone repair and for downloading movies and music. Instead of car parking, in front of the market there is a sea of red Honda motorbikes and a forklift truck that picks up and removes any cars that risk being parked in front of the market or adjacent restaurants.

The market itself is on two floors. On the first floor, a few concrete steps up from the street, are stores selling mainly new phones, computers and other big box electrical items. The shops are quiet, dusty with few people in them. Their owners sit at the back, behind big desks under whirring fans. Downstairs, open to the front street, is the basement. Here there is loud Indian film music playing, despite it being Juma, Friday, which is the day of prayer and rest in Pakistan. The shops downstairs are open into the basement, and are dusty, with old posters of phones that are long obsolescent in the West. These stores don’t have the same polish as the ones upstairs – they are at the lower end of the market and consequently far busier. Each shop has a glass cabinet with second hand phones that also serves as a counter. At the back most have a workbench where phones are repaired. At the front of most is a computer and screen where software, movies, music and other kinds of ‘entertainment’ content can be bought and ‘side loaded’ to phones using cables or memory cards. The basement is thronged with young men in groups and individually, looking at the phones in the glass cases or clustered around the screens at the front of each shop.

6.1.1 Hassan: “the porn business is good business”

Hassan works in one of the shops halfway back in the basement, and is sitting at the computer screen at the front. The shop is open to the front, but is empty and Hassan is the only person there. Because it is empty, and the boss was away at prayers, he was happy to talk. He explained that he has been working in the shop for about eighteen months, before this he was fixing mobile phones in a smaller shop in another market. To be here in the Ammara market, selling content rather than repairing phones, is a promotion. Hassan reveals a lot about how people in his position shape the kind of content that people consume.

Hassan: “Maybe fifteen, maybe twenty come each day. I know most of them, they come one or two times every week. Most people who come are just wanting films and music. Mainly Bollywood or Hollywood. I charge fifty rupees for two gigabytes, and people want it put straight on the phone, but sometimes they have a memory card”
In addition to movies and film, Hassan explains that people also ask for pornography, and describes how in contrast to requests for particular films or music, people who request porn are much less specific. As he describes it, “Yaar, some people also ask for ‘thota’, which is porn in Punjabi. Maybe fifty per cent of them ask. They ask for porn and so I give them it. Sometimes they want Sunny Leone [a popular Canadian-Indian adult actress] but mostly they don’t ask. They ask for a high definition movie, maybe one or two. I give them what I have. I just download it from torrent sites. I don’t look at it or know what it is mostly.”

For Hassan, selling content is simply a business. Yet in his role as a content mediator, he reveals how he functions as both a ‘transparent’ mediator of peoples desires, and an intermediator with greater influence over specific kinds of content. Hassan wasn’t particularly interested in the content he sold, and took no moral position on what people chose to buy. Yet whilst he provided the specific movies and music that people asked for, functioning as an invisible agent in the mediation of their requests, customers had far less agency over the kind of porn that they purchased. Hassan explained that it was not like looking at a porn site with all the different kinds of porn available. Instead people “they just buy it, then they are happy”. Unlike the consumption of porn through websites that cater to diverse interests, Hassan’s’ customers had to make do with whatever content Hassan had downloaded for them.

In part, this mediator function reflects the geographic distance from or cost of accessing the internet. The further from or more expensive the cost of access, the greater power an intermediary has to shape the kind of content that people consume. Hassan described how other intermediaries bridge the distance between himself and customers in more remote areas. As he puts it, “Hassan: “one customer comes from the village and buys ten, twenty even one time thirty-two gigabytes of thota!! He buys it and sells it, just like he buys movies. He buys from me for twenty-five rupees for one gigabyte and sells it in the village for fifty rupees per gigabyte. Porn is good business!!

Hassan was also clearly aware of the content value chain, describing how the cost of content increased the further from the city one went. This value chain describes how intermediaries create links between different actors, and can serve to shape the kind of content that people consume. To the extent that the consumption of content has influence over the consumer’s attitudes and desires, Hassan’s account shows how his mediation of the consumption of pornography influences the sexual aspirations, preferences and desires of those who consume the porn he sells.
6.1.2 Summary:

Hassan’s account describes firstly how the geographic differences between speed and cost of internet access introduce a value chain in content distribution, and how actors in the value chain serve as mediators in the access to content. His description of the bulk purchase of content, including porn for resale points towards a value chain of digital content as it is purchased and resold by various agents. By his account this value chain is defined by the distance from fast and cheap internet access and scarcity of alternative content, downloaded in a large provincial city and transported by hand to a smaller village.

Hassan also describes the influence mediators in his position have over the content people consume. In Hassan’s account both his customers and also the customers of the reseller have a limited choice of content. For Hassan, customers can choose the movies that he has available but exercise very limited choice over the kind of porn they consume. For the resellers customers these choices are limited even further as he only buys a selection of movies and music for resale. Both Hassan and the reseller are thus active players in shaping the information and content that users have access to and consume.

6.2 Gujrat: The Mobile Mediator – Faith in Facebook

This account presents an insight into the ways in which mobile phone sellers serve as intermediaries between discursive regimes and practices. It shows how some individuals who teach others technological skills attempt to translate these according to religious norms and values. Yet whilst these norms are drawn on to rationalise particular ways of using technology, the emphasis is on individual responsibility for the enactment of these practices.

The mobile market in Gujrat runs along both sides of one of the main roads that runs into the centre of the town from the old Grand Trunk Road. Its less busy than it was before the bypass was built, but it’s still full of bicycles, three wheeled motor rickshaws and cars that push through traffic and people like slow moving boats. The road is lined with shops selling mobile phones and though many also sell other electronic items billboards, posters and cardboard cut-out mobile phones dominate. The shops are diverse and range from large, single brand show room stores – the newest one was a Chinese brand called Oppo, mid-sized shops selling a range of brands from Samsung to local brand Q-Mobile and finally to shops selling second hand phones. Although nearly all shops had a repair counter at the back with a self-taught engineer hunched over a pile of broken phones, it was only the smaller ones that also had a counter with a computer screen and, usually, a group of young men looking at a movie or music video. In one tiny shop I entered, the two buys behind the counter were so engrossed they didn't see me enter, but blushed and
rapidly minimized the window, hoping I hadn’t seen that they were watching popular Indian -
Canadian adult actress Sunny Leone in a movie the name of which they didn’t know.

6.2.1 Kamran: “My responsibility is hidayat”
Kamran runs a mid-sized mobile phone shop that sells mainly second hand phones as well as a
brisk trade in repairs and content for mobile phones. There are two or three people waiting at the
counter to speak to Kamran and his assistant, and a huddle of people waiting by the repair counter.
On the bench against the wall sit two women, both fully covered in black chadors (the shawl that
covers the entire body and head), waiting for their phone to be fixed.

After a while Kamran sat down and explained that he had been running the shop for ten years,
since he’d left being a Maulvi (religious teacher) when he was thirty to look after his family. He
explained that he continued to teach and saw no incompatibility between selling mobile phones
and content for mobile phones and his religious beliefs. Mostly, he said, people either wanted to
fix a broken screen or have new software installed on their phone. He explained that people rarely
asked for content like movies or music as they could tell from his beard and white lace skull-cap
that he was religious and therefore unlikely to sell that “haram” content. Although Kamran had
strong views about the relationship between technology and Islam he emphasised the importance
of taking individual responsibility for one’s actions.

Kamran explained that when people came to him to ask for new software they often requested
help in how to use set up Skype, WhatsApp or Facebook accounts. Although most people didn’t
have emails, he helped them set one up or sometimes used an account he set up specifically for
the purpose. He explained that he saw it as really important for people to understand technology,
and described how without understanding people could easily be misled. As Kamran put it, Here
no proper working is done on Islam and technology. The Maulvis and Islamic scholars have never
used this technology.

Kamran went on to describe a story in which a maulvi had pointed to a light in the sky as an
indicator of doomsday, to which Kamran asked the religious teacher to accompany him, and
showed them that the light in the sky was in fact a searchlight advertising a marriage hall. In this
account, Kamran reveals a belief in the importance of understanding technology and a common
Wahhabi disdain for the informal religious teachers common amongst the Barelv. For Kamran,
teaching the truth of technology, like teaching the truth of the Quran and the way of the prophet,
was a religious obligation. As he put it, “hidayat [guidance or instruction] is a duty, and the way
of the prophet is a whole life, not only reading or praying but everything. Technology also.”
When I asked Kamran how people who struggled to recognise a spotlight from a sign of
impending doomsday could cope with something as complicated as Facebook, he explained how most people viewed the technology in overly simplistic terms.

For Kamran, religious practice and the ‘correct’ way to engage with technology was to take individual responsibility. This became apparent in his discussion of both Facebook and the caricatures, as well as the association of Facebook with immoral use. Although Kamran immediately linked Facebook to the caricatures of the Prophet, unlike others he pointed to the importance of individual discipline rather than the imposition of a ban. As he said, “That ban on Facebook, ban on YouTube, ban this ban that. This is technology, you should simply use it in a positive manner. If they have uploaded caricatures over it, so you reply against it in a positive manner....we banned their products to damage them, but only we have damaged ourselves.”

Kamran’s translation of religious norms into individual use of technology was also apparent in his views on the claims that Facebook was immoral. As he said, “When people are asking about Facebook, I am saying that they need to be responsible. Yes, vulgar things are there. Yes, it is possible for boys and for girls. But they have their responsibility, to follow the path of the prophet, to do the right thing.” For Kamran, the correct location for understanding the relationship between technology and behaviour was in the individual. This extended to the belief that women should also be allowed to use technology.

Kamran described how he believed the principle of individual responsibility also applied to women’s use of technology, unlike those who argued they should be prohibited. As he said, “Yes. I don’t deny the right of women to use Facebook. They should use. Technology should be used but while doing so they should keep that thing in mind that I am a daughter of Islam. They should ask themselves ‘what is the need of posting your picture? Instead just write their name and then work on it.

Finally, it’s important to note that for Kamran, his own religious practice was understood in terms of how it shaped the beliefs and behaviours of others. He described how his position in the institute and ability to impart Islamic knowledge and how these could be manifest in the use of technology was ‘hidayat’ – religious instruction. As he said, “the imparting Islamic values and teachings to these students is my responsibility here given to me by Islam. My responsibility is hidayat, taking people to a higher level.”

6.2.2 Summary
Kamran describes his efforts to guide students and customers to use technology according to Islamic injunctions and norms. He emphasises the importance of personal responsibility over strict enforcement by others, in contrast to those who argue for the banning of technologies.
Kamran’s efforts to translate the discursive regime of religious norms and values into individual behaviour and practices reflect an attempt to enrol technology use into the dominant religious regime, yet to frame this as individual responsibility. For Kamran himself, the enactment of a good Muslim is manifest in the inculcation of religious norms into all walks of life, including the use of technology.

6.3 Mandi Bahauddin: The Content King – Faith and the profane

This account describes a similar case in which content access is intermediated. Although the intent of the disruption to the smooth flow of content is grounded in religious practice, it reflects personal religious observation rather than Kamran’s practice of hidayat. Shahanalog is a small village just outside Mandi Bahauddin. It was one of the smallest villages to get 3G to be part of Telenor’s ‘ink-spot’ network roll out strategy. This strategy of positioning one or two towers and offering a limited network was intended to stimulate demand before comprehensive network roll out. They targeted villages such as that Mandi Bahauddin that had high average revenue per user (ARPU), which in Shahanalog's case was a result of the high levels of manual labour migration to the Gulf states. Thus although small, rural and separated from Mandi Bahauddin by a thirty-minute drive, it is a relatively wealthy village.

The village sits alongside a colonial era canal, a red brick bridge spanning the slow moving water, and a large pipal tree overhanging the bridge and the road. The centre of Shahanalog itself clusters on both sides of a single road that joins the main canal-side highway that links Mandi Bahauddin and the Grand Trunk Road an hour and a half drive away. Although the canal road is busy with brightly painted buses, trucks, cars and motorbikes, the road through Shahanalog is a smaller road, flanked on both sides by a dusty collection of single story shops, tailors, food stalls and houses.

6.3.1 Tahir: “we are closed in Ramadan completely”

Tahir Shah’s account describes how in small towns the control over mobile phone shops and cable networks allows high levels of influence over the consumption of information content, and the important role that religion plays in the nature of this influence. Tahir is the Rupert Murdoch of Shahanalog, because his family have fingers in all the villages communications networks. They own the cable network, which includes about twenty national and international channels as well as private five channels streaming pirated movies, music videos and religious content. They own the DVD shop that rents and sells the latest pirated DVDs, as well as three brands of local cigarettes. They own the only mobile phone repair shop from which they also sell digital content.
And finally the only mobile phone mast is located on the backyard of the mobile phone shop. Tahir and his family control the digital communication in the village.

As the owner of the village’s only mobile phone shop, Tahir is able to describe in detail the kinds of services customers come for, and the kind of content they seek to buy. He describes how people come to seek help with using social media, to buy content on mobile data cards and the role of religion in the provision of services. Like the mobile phone shops in Gujrat and Gujranwala, Tahir’s also teaches people how to use the internet as well as selling movies and music. As Tahir describes, the most common requests for help are for the use of phones and social media. As he says, “Mostly they ask about settings, what button to press to call and this to end the call...Otherwise they come here, ask us to log in to their Facebook and then they see the uploaded pictures of their sons ... We are connected to the entire village, so we can see all their pictures. Maybe not all their pictures. Family pictures are private, so we can’t see them”.

Tahir describes how people in Shahanalog come to his shop for help and guidance about accessing the internet and accessing and using social media. He describes how parents commonly log into their or their sons account on Tahir’s phone, either because they don't own an internet enabled phone or they don't know how to use it. Tahir also reveals how close knit the village is, describing how he is connected to everyone.

In addition to helping people access social media, Tahir also provides customers with content, and like Hassan and Shahed, the content people watch is determined by what Tahir has available. As he notes, even if he doesn’t have the movie that people ask for, “They still take something. They just want to watch. Out of 100 only 5% ask for a specific movie otherwise mostly ask for anything we have.” In this account, Tahir describes how customers from the village come to the shop to buy movies, but don't usually have a particular movie in mind, they just want to be entertained.

Tahir’s faith as a Shia Muslim has a significant influence over the way he provides access to content, yet unlike Kamran’s practice of Hidayat, this is not the intent that shapes Tahir’s practice. Tahir describes how he marks the religious festivals of Ramadan and the Shia festival of Muharram, periods of time when most Muslims fast and Shia Muslims mourn the death of Ali, by limiting access to the content that forms the basis of his business. As he described it, our business is closed only on 9th and 10th days of Muharram but otherwise we even open on Eid as well. If someone asks us for something even at 3am we are supposed to provide them. Same as Ramadan. But we are closed in Ramadan completely ... even the cable network, the only thing is the na’ats [na’ats are religious songs that praise the prophet]. We stop selling the movies and the
music, stop the drama on the television. Only the religious things. It is our responsibility. It is like sawab. A prayer.” Tahir describes how during religious festivals he stops selling and broadcasting entertainment content as part of observing his religious beliefs. Importantly, for Tahir, not selling entertainment content is a form of religious observance that earns him religious merit, not an attempt to shape others’ behaviour.

6.3.2 Summary

Tahir’s account describes the role of a rural information and technology provider. It describes how low levels of digital literacy mean customers ask for greater help in accessing and using their phones and social media services. This leads at times to greater intimacy in the lives of his customers as they access their family Facebook accounts through his phone. Although Tahir’s account suggests that he doesn't take a moral position on the content that his customers ask for, and he is happy to provide entertainment and porn, his personal religious beliefs do impact on the content that his customers can access. His description of the way the family stops selling and broadcasting entertainment suggests that it is personal behaviour rather than a judgement on what others should or shouldn't be accessing or watching. In other words, Tahir doesn't stop selling music because he thinks people should stop listening to it during Ramadan and Muharram but because stopping selling it is a religious act that earns him and the family religious merit. In other words, stopping the selling of content is a practice of sawab, not hidayat. Nonetheless, the result is that Tahir’s enactment of religious belief and practice enrol his customers into the discursive regime of Shia Islam by marking certain forms of information and content outside of what is acceptable during religious festivals.

6.4 Translating Discourses into Practice

This chapter has described four accounts of people in three locations who provide access to technology, software and content. These individuals all play a role in enabling access for new and established users to get online and consume digital content. As such they play an important role in linking broader policy discourses to individual everyday practices. The shops thus serve as important sources of technology, skills and content, a place that has significant influence in customers means and ability of accessing the internet. This section analyses the discourses revealed in the interviews with mobile phone intermediaries. The analysis describes how hegemonic discourses of religious identity are translated into practice through the mediation of content and behaviours.

The analysis is conducted using the theory of translation advanced by Callon and Latour (Callon 1986; Latour 2005). Specifically, the concepts of mediators and intermediaries as outlined by
Latour (Latour 2005) are used to analyse the role of the mobile phone retailers in translating Facebook into user practices in Pakistan. It draws on ideas of intermediaries and mediation to analyse how discourses inform social media use in the everyday practices of ordinary Pakistanis. This section, therefore, analyses the role of mobile phone retailers as a bridge between the circulation of discourse in circuits of communication and the enactment of discourse in everyday practice. This is achieved through analysis of the discourse in the accounts of those who function as intermediaries or mediators who attempt to shape the use of Facebook in everyday practice, showing how use is linked to concerns about religious practice.

6.4.1 Translating Discourse into Practice: Intermediaries and Mediators

The actors who shape ICT use play an important role in translating discourse into practice through teaching people how to use mobile phones and social media translate discourse into use practices. This section analyses the role of mobile phone retailers in influencing how people use ICTs.

The theory of translation includes an important role for these entities, terming them intermediaries or mediators. The nature of networks is determined by the chain of associations, and the nature of these associations is determined by intermediaries and mediators (Latour 2005, 39–42). An intermediary serves to transport the meaning or interest of an actor without transforming it. Thus, ‘defining its inputs is enough to define its outputs’ (Latour 2005, 39), which is of little analytic interest. By contrast, mediators ‘transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry’ (Latour 2005, 40). Latour describes a well-functioning computer as an intermediary, but points out that, when it breaks, it may become a complex intermediary altering the outcome of the actor’s intent. Intermediaries are thus inscribed with meaning, faithful or otherwise, and as such both describe and constitute their networks by giving them form (Callon 1991).

The concept of intermediaries also plays an important role in the ICTD literature, where it describes individuals whose task it is to make ICTs such as internet centres accessible to the public (for a comprehensive review, see Bailur and Masiero 2012). A study of intermediaries in telecentres in India emphasises the importance of recognising that intermediaries exist within networks, and shows how their identities within a network shape their function as translators who ‘straddle networks’ and influence use practices (Bailur and Masiero 2012, 38).

The emerging literature on mobile Internet use also describes how friends and families play an important role in teaching people the technical skills required to go online (Donner, Gitau, and Marsden 2011; Rangaswamy and Cutrell 2013; Rangaswamy and Arora 2015). Rangaswamy and
Cutrell, for example, describe how friends ‘initiated … subjects to the features, usages and thrills of mobile internet’ (Rangaswamy and Cutrell 2013, 58). In other words, there are many actors who come between the way designers and owners intend a device to be used and the way users appropriate it into their own practice.

Reading Hassan, Shahed, Kamran and Tahir as intermediaries or mediators between discursive formations and sociomaterial practices reveals how Facebook is translated through discourse into practice. Both Shahed and Hassan see themselves as service providers, there to supply what their customers demand. Shahed describes his role as being an effective employee and keeping his customers happy. Similarly, Hassan has no interest in disrupting the desires of his customers and operates like a well-functioning computer in the operation of the market. He gives his customers the movies, the music and the porn they ask for.

As such, Hassan functions as an effective intermediary, almost as an invisible link between his customers’ desires and preferences and the world of available content. The one area in which he does play an influential role is the selection of porn that his customers get to watch. Although studies have explored the relationship between exposure to porn and sexual preferences (Nash et al. 2016; Marston and Lewis 2014), it is beyond the scope of this study to explore the implications of Hassan’s porn preferences for his customers’ lives. In the main though, Hassan functions as an effective intermediary for his customers and employers’ interests and desires.

In contrast, Kamran and Tahir function as mediators who seek to introduce religious values and attachments to the way mobile phones and the Internet are used in Pakistan. Kamran identifies the people who come to him as possible students as much as they are customers, and as an opportunity to practice *hidayat* and performatively enact his identity as a religious teacher. Kamran’s attachment to this identity means that he functions as a mediator between the discourses of purely capitalist relations and religious ethics. In seeking to transform the technological use practices of his customers/students, Kamran attempts to function as an intermediary for the discourses of religious ethics, such that they are transported through him to shape individual technological use. Yet, in emphasising individual autonomy and responsibility for use, Kamran demonstrates the alignment between discourses of singular individualism, as embodied in Facebook’s design, and the modernist individualism embodied in Sunni Wahhabism’s articulation of the individual’s relationship to God. In other words, Kamran’s attempt to mediate the way individuals use Facebook aligns with the way Facebook demands that its users behave.

Like Kamran, Tahir mediates the information consumption practices in the village outside Mandi Bahauddin. His control over the information consumed by the village means that, when he decides
to limit access to entertainment and porn, it affects the whole village. Unlike Kamran, this mediation is intermittent and only enacted during times of religious observance such as Ramadan and Muharram.

Tahir describes this mediation role as a function of attachment to his religious identity as a Shia Muslim. At these times, Tahir’s religious identity is stronger than his identity as a businessman, and he willingly forgoes profit for the sake of religious merit. Yet, unlike Kamran, Tahir’s role as an intermediary is not intentional; it is a function of his desire to performatively enact his identity as an observant Shia Muslim, rather than to shape other people’s ICT use. Tahir stops trading in entertainment and porn because dealing with this content conflicts with his identity as a Shia Muslim, not because he wants to mediate other people’s behaviour or their access to movies or porn.

This account of mobile phone retailers shows the role of identity in determining whether they function as mediators or intermediaries in the chain of associations that link hegemonic discourse and practice. I have shown how actors with a strong religious identity function as mediators and attempt to mediate how users incorporate technologies or content into their everyday practices. Of course, this account is the diffraction produced through the agential cut enacted by looking through the lens of religious identity. There are, no doubt, other forms of mediation taking place that would emerge if other agential cuts were enacted.

6.4.2 Summary: Problematising Technological Discourse in Pakistan

This section has shown how technological practices are shaped by mediators and intermediaries that translate hegemonic discourse in ways that shape both the consumption of content and ICT usage behaviours. In Pakistan this translation is commonly characterised by the reinforcing of hegemonic discourses of religious nationalism. Technologies do not simply arrive in a particular context, nor is their adoption a simple process of interaction between a user and a technology. Normative accounts of the way technologies shape identities and societies in conditions of modernity (Giddens 1991; Castells 2000) fail to incorporate these processes of translation and describe how technologies are constantly constructed and mediated. This section has shown how technologies are not simply introduced, but are entangled with discourse and material practice. Intermediaries enrol technologies into their own networks of interest and teach users to interact with technologies in particular ways. Technologies and practices are linked through chains of association – technological discourses of singular, authentic subjects of value that are embodied in the design and coding of Facebook in California, the entanglement of these technological discourses with those of religion and nationalism in Pakistan.
7. Performing Faith on Facebook

“I have never used Facebook for religious purpose. Never. I haven’t even shared a single religious status.”

Saad, Ahmadi, Mandi Bahauddin

“Yes, you know, Facebook I use it for publicity. If there is some special event related to Imam Bargah I posted it on Facebook.”

Hammad, Shia, Gujranwala

“Islamic pages are there. I like very much Islamic pages, Hadiths pages. After two or three hours they post a new Hadiths there with proper reference. So if you want to share, share it.”

Mustafa, Sunni, Gujranwala

In contrast to the previous chapter, which described the role of intermediaries in translating hegemonic discourses to technological practices, this chapter describes how Ahmadi, Shia and Sunnis enact religious identity on Facebook. While the previous chapter showed how individuals play either active or passive roles in the way content and technologies are incorporated into practice, this chapter highlights the role of technologies as actors. It highlights how the technological discourses, embodied in the design of Facebook, influence how religious identities are enacted in practice. It shows how these technologies reinforce dominant norms, rather than opening up space for minority groups as the ‘technological liberation’ thesis argues. Similarly, it also demonstrates how religious practice is incorporated into the use of technologies linked to processes of secularisation.

This chapter presents accounts of how different religious groups, namely Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni, use Facebook to enact religious identity. The three quotes reflect the very different relationships with Facebook that Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni respondents describe, and echo the discourses described in Chapter Five. Specifically, they reflect the positioning of Sunni conservative Islam as hegemonic discourse and Shia and Ahmadi as marginalised subjects. This chapter presents descriptions of individual practices that will help explain the findings from the survey results recounted in Chapter Six. It thus presents a further focusing down in the exploration of how the subject positions described in Chapter Five are enacted in practice, thus providing empirical data to help explain how the use of Facebook shapes the enactment of religious identity.
In order to achieve this it presents accounts of everyday usage practices given by young Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni Pakistani Facebook users. It shows how Facebook’s demand for authenticity, the way it allows traversing of social contexts and its push towards making information public complicates the enactment of authentic religious identity and the sharing of personal and religious views and information. It shows this through descriptive case studies of how young Pakistani individuals experience using Facebook and expressing religious beliefs and practices. It presents three sets of case studies for Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni Facebook users, with an extended introduction to the context of Ahmadis in Pakistan to illustrate the extent of their marginalisation. Each case describes the pattern of technology usage, showing the patterns and near ubiquity of mobile internet access and Facebook usage, followed by accounts of their experience of using Facebook and other social media platforms. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings and key themes to be picked up for detailed analysis.

7.1 Ahmadi

The Ahmadi’s are amongst the most persecuted minority in Pakistan, and as such show how Facebook reinforces hegemonic norms rather than providing a platform for marginalised voices. This section describes the context of Ahmadis in Pakistan through an account of researching an attack against Ahmadi’s that was claimed to be a response to a blasphemous post on Facebook. It then presents two case studies of young Ahmadi Facebook users. It describes how these young users negotiate the site’s tendency to share information and make it accessible to others, and how this complicates their ability to enact authentic Ahmadi identities. It first describes the difficult of engaging with the Ahmadi community in Pakistan through a narrative account of attempts to investigate an attack against Ahmadi’s blamed on an alleged Facebook post. It then presents the account of one young person caught up in the incident and how it has affected their Facebook usage. This is followed by the presentation of an Ahmadi’s experience of transitioning from college to university and how complicates his ability to manage this transition.

Trouble with Facebook

This section describes how a persecuted minority experiences threats and insecurity from the use of Facebook. It shows how Facebook is implicated in the deaths of innocent Ahmadis. Nearly a year after an attack that left three female Ahmadis dead, including a five month old baby and a seven year old girl (Gillani 2014; McCoy 2014), the second floor of the three story house is still blackened by soot, and a police barrier blocks the entry to the narrow lane and the row of houses on both sides. My research assistant explained that the attack took place on the 28th July 2014.
following the alleged posting of blasphemous content on Facebook. Reports suggested that a young Ahmadi had uploaded a picture of the Kaaba – the holy shrine in Mecca – that featured a naked woman on top (Gillani 2014). A friend of the Ahmadi youth discovered the picture, alerted people within the community and a crowd that included religious leaders gathered and urged the police to register a blasphemy case. Newspaper reports described how at the same time a larger mob gathered around the Ahmadi houses, and obstructed fire, police and ambulance services from attending the scene (Gillani 2014; McCoy 2014; Dearden 2014). The mob set eight houses on fire which led to a grandmother and her two granddaughters, who were locked in their home, burning to death. Although the police subsequently registered cases against four hundred people, representatives of the Ahmadi community were reported saying that they had done nothing to stop the mob, the looting and attacks against the Ahmadis. Zohra Yusuf, chairwoman of the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, was quoted as saying, “The people who were killed were not even indirectly accused of blasphemy charges. Their only fault was that they were Ahmadis,” (in Gillani 2014).

After the event, there were conflicting reports about the Facebook posts. Although there was consensus that someone had seen blasphemous content on the Ahmadi youths account, a spokesperson for the Ahmadi community said that someone had stolen his password and ‘someone had offensively edited the picture’ (in Gillani 2014). Others claimed that the event was tied up with a fight between the two former friends that had spiralled out of control. But all agreed that Facebook had played an important role.

Meeting with the Ahmadi community is complicated however, as they are cautious about allowing strangers into their community and wary of sharing information that might be used against them. They have a strict protocol of approvals based on a hierarchical structure that requires approval from the head of their community in Pakistan, who are based in a town called Rabwa, gave their permission. Without this approval the community members in Gujranwala refused to talk to me. In order to get this permission, I had to take an overnight trip to Rabwa, a four-hour drive from Islamabad, and be interviewed by the national head of external affairs, the media advisor and three representatives, one each from Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin. It was through these representatives that my entry into the Ahmadi community would be facilitated.

Troubling Practices
The process of arranging meetings with the Ahmadi community is rigidly controlled because of the threats against the Ahmadi community. But these threats, and the risks posed by social media and particularly Facebook had also changed the way the community communicated and coordinated internally. Shakir, the head of the Ahmadi youth wing for Gujranwala, explained that
following the attack in Gujranwala the head of their community, the current Caliph Mirza Masroor Ahmad had issued guidance that Ahmadis in Pakistan should stop using Facebook and instead rely on WhatsApp for communication. Indeed, the weekly religious message he sent out would now also be distributed via WhatsApp message, and Shakir and the other youth leaders set up WhatsApp groups to coordinate their community and provided guidance on how to best use social media. As he explained, “We have made a group and whatever information we are giving to him we will share to him through WhatsApp. I tell people the danger of Facebook, how it can be misused, and how to use WhatsApp instead. It’s what our Caliph has said. And it is what we should do”.

Shakir explained that although some people still used Facebook it was now much less, and much more carefully. This included one of the young people involved in the Gujranwala attack, who he promised he would introduce me to. Although the boy whose Facebook account had been implicated in the cause of the attack had emigrated and was now safely in another country. Shakir explained that Iftikhar, a good friend of his, had been very close to the whole story. This account shows how contexts shape the use of technology, and that the use of technologies, and indeed even their adoption, are not predictable. It suggests also that technologies are not necessarily liberating or platforms that enable marginalised views to be articulated.

7.1.1 The survivor – or how ‘if it causes anarchy we prefer silence’

The previous section described the context of the attacks against Ahmadis in Gujranwala as a way of illustrating the everyday environment in which Ahmadis live in Pakistan, and introducing some of the challenges that Facebook has presented for the community. The following section describes Iftikhar’s account of how he uses Facebook and the kind of religious debate that is possible, and his account of the attacks and the role of Facebook.

Iftikhar is one of the young boys from the mohalla that was burnt in the attacks on the Ahmadis in Gujranwala. The Ahmadi Jamaat arranged a meeting, but insisted that it take place in one of their mosques, though of course they emphasised that they couldn't call it a mosque, rather it was a community meeting place. The building was in the centre of Gujranwala down a side street, with closed circuit television cameras just visible on the edge of buildings, and plain clothes private security posted at the entrance to the lane. Behind the high metal gates was a large garden, with an undecorated brick building on the two sides. The room that we meet in is clearly the community meeting room, with chairs on the three sides, and on the wall images of the founder of the faith, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, dressed in his full ceremonial regalia and turban.
Iftikhar is twenty-one years old, articulate and keen to talk despite the presence of the Ahmadi Jamaat’s youth movement leader in the meeting. He is currently in the last year of a bachelor’s in finance, but after the attack on his home is waiting for a visa to Canada to come through. He will leave Pakistan before we are able to meet again. For Iftikhar, faith is important but he is not particularly devout, and even though his youth leader is present he says that he looks forward to being somewhere where he is not defined by his beliefs.

Iftikhar explains that he uses both a laptop and mobile phone to access the internet, but that the laptop is mainly for school work and watching movies whilst the phone is for everything else. He shows me his phone, a year-old Q Mobile 8552. Q Mobile is a Pakistani handset brand that sells cheap Chinese made sets to the mid and lower end of the smartphone market. Their branding is everywhere and for many, it is their first smartphone. For Iftikhar, it is a means of communication and a source of entertainment, as well as being a fashion or status symbol. He is proud of his phone. He describes how he uses Facebook, WhatsApp and plays games on his phone. He looks at his youth leader for permission, who nods and so Iftikhar continues. For him, WhatsApp is how he stays in touch with family, with the Jamaat and the youth movement whilst Facebook is for chatting with friends. With WhatsApp, he chats with his family, including brothers, sisters and both male and female cousins, though his parents don’t have smartphones. When I ask him why his sisters or female cousins aren’t on Facebook he says “because our Jamaat has prohibited girls from using Facebook”. His Facebook account is much more for his male friends, particularly friends from outside the Jamaat.

Iftikhar uses Facebook for around an hour a day, using it as part of his studies, “I share things regarding any project that has been given to me in my studies” but very rarely posts things about personal matters. He explained that there were some things that were safe to talk about, and other things that they had to be careful about, particularly religion. As he said, “You can easily talk about sports but if there is some picture which is related to Jamaat then we are very careful. Usually I make no likes and no comments on religion related things. I mean, as Ahmadis, we want, we want to tell our point of view but it is prohibited.

Iftikhar went on to describe how it was better to be silent than to speak out if it causes problems, “if it causes anarchy then we prefer silence” but that this was difficult as There are a lot of people who try to distort our faith distort the image of our respectable personalities. Mindful of the consequences, Iftikhar described how after the attack, his use of Facebook changed.
Iftikhar: “We kind of left Facebook. Like prior to that we updated things and posted things but after that if we did that 90% now we are reduced to 30% or even less than that. Now we just check that what is the update. It’s like that there are things that previously we liked and posted things but now we don’t. Now I have locked my profile.”

Iftikhar’s account describes how Facebook is a social space for interaction outside the family, particularly with friends from college outside his religious community. Yet despite this link to a wider social network, for Iftikhar this is not a space where he can speak freely, and especially not following the attacks against his family and other Ahmadis in Gujranwala. Because the attacks are associated with the sharing of information on Facebook Iftikhar has followed the advice from his community to be careful about the way he uses Facebook.

Although Iftikhar and the Ahmadi community describe Facebook as playing an important role in the attacks that took place, Facebook is linked to attacks against Ahmadis in other ways too. Iftikhar explains that there are many people who criticise and attack the Ahmadis, and that people even create fake Facebook accounts to cause problems and stir up trouble for the Ahmadis. As he said, “some people make a fake Facebook ID under the name of the Jamaat, and try to create anarchy within us. “Now we don’t hardly use Facebook. We use WhatsApp and Viber. I have Facebook on mobile but I am hardly not using it. Under the guidance of Jamaat now we not supposed to use it.”

For Iftikhar, like so many other Ahmadis, being online is fraught with difficulty and danger. The risk presented by people pretending to be Ahmadis is that if they make statements that appear to be blasphemous they can mobilise people to attack the community.

The Attack
Iftikhar explained how the attack had taken place. He described how there had been a cricket match between some of his friends and friends from another school. His friend had won and announced it on Facebook, but the captain of the other team, whose father was a Maulvi [religious leader] refused to accept their loss, and went online to challenge what the other captain had said. When he started looking at the Ahmadis Facebook page, he saw that a few weeks ago he had made a comment on a picture showing someone urinating on the Kabah at Mecca. He showed this picture to his father, who immediately declared it blasphemous and issued a fatwa [religious edict] against the Ahmadi’s family. What neither his son nor his father realised, or conceded, was that in fact the comment on the picture had been a statement of condemnation against the image.
Iftikhar described how, following the announcement of the fatwa, “we rushed home. We stayed indoors, closed our doors and switched off all the lights. And at 3.30 am in the night we were rescued from there by the police. Then the people set all the property on fire. There were about 17-18 of our houses in which 10 were burnt completely and in all this four of our people died.”

Iftikhar’s account shows how prevalent social media use is, particularly mobile. Yet despite its ubiquity it is carefully differentiated amongst the different social circles to which he belongs. He describes how for his close family and religious community, WhatsApp is preferred over Facebook, which is limited to friends outside the community, such as from college. On Facebook Iftikhar describes feeling stifled and unable to express himself freely for fear of being targeted, particularly after the attack on his family and neighbours. This sense of being silenced is particularly difficult given that there is so much online that he would want to correct, and also because whilst he doesn't comment, he can see Ahmadis from other countries where they don't face the same persecution commenting and debating freely. Indeed, in later meetings with Iftikhar’s friends some mentioned that they created fake accounts through which they were able to talk about and debate religious matters, including countering those that challenged and attacked Ahmadis. But it was difficult for them to describe these fake accounts because the meeting always took place under the watchful eye of the Ahmadi Jamaat youth leader, who watched over for the young people’s safety.

Iftikhar’s description of the attack and the role that Facebook played also highlighted it was not simply caused by Facebook, as there were conflicts that preceded the perception of the content. Furthermore, the understanding of the content itself as blasphemous was based on a misunderstanding that was, perhaps, willingly exploited. Yet Facebook’s design as a static platform that is presumed to be authentic meant old information was presented in a fixed manner and enabled the misinterpretation and helped provide material that justified an attack on an already persecuted and vulnerable minority.

7.1.2 The Pretender – or how I stopped posting because I’m an Ahmadi

The previous section described one young Ahmadis account of using Facebook, and his perspective on the role that Facebook had played in an attack against his community. This section presents the case of another young Ahmadi from Mandi Bahauddin that describes how Facebook challenges the ability to negotiate and manage social boundaries.

Saad lives in the walled off, guarded compound of an Ahmadi owned flour mill factory on the outskirts of Mandi Bahauddin. The compound, past the guards and double gates, is a haven of tall
palm trees, brightly coloured flowers and neatly manicured lawns. It is an oasis of tranquillity from the busyness of life outside. We sit drinking green tea in the guest house for visiting factory staff and dignitaries, and Saad explains the complications that Facebook has caused in his life.

Saad returned from Lahore where he graduated earlier this year with a degree in computer science, and is now waiting for his American visa application to come through so that he can go on to continue his studies in Boston. The separation of these different parts of his life are a central theme that runs through Saad’s description of his experience of Facebook. Saad is, of course, very computer literature, and owns a fast laptop, that is used for work, watching movies, sport and playing games as well as a new iPhone. He has an Apple iPad, but “it's a bit useless, except as a book”. In the compound, Saad explains that he mainly uses Wi-Fi, as 3G signals don't yet reach the factory compound and 2G “it’s too slow, it just makes you frustrated”. Despite this, Saad recounts how the internet has been an important part of how he negotiates a conservative father and restrictive family life.

Saad explained that at first, the internet had been a technology through which he had been able to find new spaces for expression. He described how his father ‘was always so much restrictive. He did not like music, so everything was silent. When I got my first computer in tenth grade it was a sudden change in life and now in my family there is like my small my younger brother only he and myself use Facebook, but I have used WhatsApp a lot.

When Saad describes his transition from school to college and then to University in Lahore, he reveals firstly the levels of persecution that the Ahmadi community experience, and secondly the way Facebook plays a role in silencing debate. Facebook is revealed as a threat to Saad’s well-being and indeed safety as a result of features that allow the traversing of friendship groups and collapse of social contexts. Saad explained that growing up, he had been fairly isolated in the factory compound and surrounded by close friends in the town. He explained that growing up, he hadn’t know about the persecution experienced by the Ahmadis, and that ‘most of my friends in the college knew that I was Ahmadi but they were my very very close friend, so they did not do anything. But it was in his description of moving to University that Saad revealed how Facebook complicated the management of different social contexts.

Saad explained that when he left for University he had cut contact with his friends from Mandi Bahudin because he was afraid that his friends from home might inadvertently reveal his Ahmadi identity to his University friends. And he had good reason to be afraid, as his brother had been hounded out of the same University when his religious identity was revealed. His father made
him promise not to tell anyone, and to keep that promise and protect himself he cut contact with
his childhood friends. As Saad described it, “I just like left this place and made friends over there.
Not one of them knows that I am an Ahmadi. I have to act like I am a Non-Ahmadi. And I never
talked about my religious life over there, I never talked about this. And whenever they say let’s
go to namaz [prayers] I will stay at home. I pretend I have an injury or something like that. And
I did not keep much communication with the Ahmadi Community at home because I knew that if
they commented or posted things, my friends in University would see, and ask if I am Ahmadi. So
I completely stopped communication with them.”

After describing how he attempted to separate his home and university life, Saad, went
on to describe how Facebook had made the effort to manage social contexts much harder,
and that the only way to cope was to stop communicating. “I always keep thinking should I
post that here, should I post that there? The difference is very much difficult you can’t make that
distinction between both the sects. You can’t say that ok this belongs to the Ahmadi community I
should post that on this profile and this belongs to this community I should post that on. I am
using a single Gmail account, a single Facebook account but I stopped communication that could
cut my life or stop that from happening. I stopped communication I stopped posting things. It’s
just a part of being an Ahmadi.”

Saad’s description highlights how the design of social networks sites and Facebook in particular
can pose real dangers to the safety of marginalised groups and identities like the Ahmadis in
Pakistan. Saad went on to describe how the implications of Facebooks design extended into
broader public debate, preventing him from participating in conversations about religion and even
forcing him to pretend to hate Ahmadis for fear of being killed as one.

Saad described how he avoided talking about religion on Facebook, even when his
community was attacked. Indeed, even when he posted a link to a story about the attack
in Gujranwala, his friends responded by asking him “why are you sad for them. They are
not Muslims, they are allowed to be killed, so why are you sad for them”. Saad described how
this silenced him completely. In fact, as he went on, he shared how he had to pretend he shared
the same feelings of his friends towards Ahmadis. As he said, “So if one of my friend talks like
they [Ahmadis] should be killed I will just say ok ok ok. I had to pretend to protect myself from
other students. But You get angry within yourself, you know, I am friendly to a person who has to
pretend to believe that I should be killed. Because he thinks that I should be killed.
Saad’s account of how he has to hold back from discussing religion and even pretending to hate and want to kill people from his own community emphasises both the level of persecution that Ahmadis experience on a day to day basis. It also highlights how technologies are entangled in this persecution. Saad’s account of how he is forced in person and on Facebook to make statements against his own community only highlight the extent to which he has to hide his own identity. As he went on to describe, he has particular strategies that he uses to avoid putting himself in the limelight and limit his visibility:

Saad described how he had to actively manage his use of technology, and be aware of how others used technology in order to avoid his identity being shared and religion revealed. He described how he untagged himself from events he was invited to on Facebook, and that “I remove any comment that says he was there, so people don’t know. In some cases, I block that person so the comment or update would not appear at all.” Saad describes conscious management strategies to limit public, visible sharing of his movements. Indeed, he went further to describe how he was conscious whenever anyone took a photo, as he had to avoid being seen and identified. As he said, “whenever they take pictures I will be the one holding the camera. I will say let me take the photo or I have to go to the bathroom or the like. Facebook is always watching!”. For Saad, the way Facebook affords the sharing of information caused him anxiety and forced him to be vigilant, watching every action and word he said. Indeed, he described how Facebook “I never post anything about my personal life, anything about my religious beliefs, anything about where I am at the moment and what I am doing with the friends because I know that it might harm me in some way or another”. For Saad, Facebook was active threat to his wellbeing and personal safety.

Saad describes the chilling effect of Facebook on his ability to speak freely, having to participate in denigrating his own community and constant fear of the surveillance of social media. This description highlights how social media and Facebook in particular far from disrupting social patterns of discrimination and oppression are entangled in and reconstitute the same norms and values. And they shape how individuals such as Saad see the world, and the see the future. Saad’s case presents a study in how Facebook’s demand for authenticity and the way it allows users to traverse friendship groups causes immense suffering and social difficulty. He described how although the internet presented a real opportunity to break free from a conservative family, it then caused problems when he needed to establish social barriers between his identity Ahmadi and his new life at university. Facebook’s demand for authenticity meant that he had to work hard to enact an authentic identity that included pretending to want to kill members of his own community.
This section has described how Facebook presents challenges to marginalised minorities for whom enacting authentic identities are complicated and present real dangers. It highlights the power of a hegemonic discourse that demands conformity, even to the extent that people pretend to hate that who they really are.

7.1.3 Discussion and Analysis: Authenticity and Hegemony

This section analyses the empirical findings that describe Ahmadis’ experience of using Facebook. It explains how Facebook’s demand for ‘authenticity’ translates into a demand for the enactment of Sunni Islam, which results in further marginalising and alienating the Ahmadis’ ‘authentic’ identity, placing them at greater risk.

It explains this by showing how, when Facebook collapses contexts and makes content available to invisible audiences (Davis and Jurgenson 2014; Marwick and boyd 2010), it is harder for Ahmadis to control who sees them. This forces them to moderate how they are perceived. In other words, Facebook’s affordance for authenticity makes it harder for Ahmadis to enact their own authentic identity, strengthening the hegemonic discourse of Sunni Islam and the definition of Ahmadis as non-Muslims and blasphemous. It thus shows how Facebook’s demand for authenticity reinforces the hegemonic discourse as the only legitimate form of authenticity. Paradoxically, this results in the enactment of ‘fake’ identity as a form of ‘authentic’ identity.

The attacks against Ahmadis in Gujranwala demonstrated the danger of enacting an authentic Ahmadi identity and led to instructions from the head of their community to stop or limit the use of Facebook and turn instead to WhatsApp. This demonstrates the fallacy of ‘digital dualism’ (Jurgenson 2011) and the idea of the Internet as a separate space to enact ‘second selves’ (Turkle 1984). The inseparability of online and offline identities means that, for Ahmadi Facebook users in general, and Iftikhar in particular, the risks associated with enacting an authentic Ahmadi subject on Facebook are the same as they are in real life. Indeed, Facebook’s technological discourse of the authentic (Haimson and Hoffmann 2016) and archival (Mitchell 2014) self includes a tendency towards sharing and storing information. This means that the audience for enactments that ‘trouble’ the hegemonic discourse in which Ahmadis are marginalised is potentially much larger and, therefore, the risks much greater.

Analysing Iftikhar’s narrative account through a performative lens reveals how Facebook’s technological discourse of authenticity serves to silence and further marginalise Ahmadi identity from public discourse in Pakistan. Iftikhar describes how, although he is technically proficient
and able to comprehend Facebook’s privacy settings, the potential risk of revealing his ‘authentic’ identity is so great that he chooses not to use the platform. Instead of feeling ‘liberated’, Iftikhar feels “frustrated” and that “it’s better to remain silent”. Thus, some users who face real threats if their authentic identity is revealed respond to Facebook’s demand for the enactment of authentic identity by simply holding back, resisting the desire to be known and recognised. As Iftikhar concludes, “if there is a danger of anarchy, then it’s better to control oneself.” If Ahmadi voices self-censor on Facebook because they are afraid of the consequences of revealing their authentic selves, then the site serves to further their marginalisation and to strengthen Sunni Islam as the hegemonic discourse of religious identity.

Facebook’s demand for singular authenticity means that marginalised users sometimes have to fake authentic subjects, even when this conflicts with, and serves to reconstitute, the marginalisation of their ‘authentic’ self. Saad’s account of having to disconnect from his college friends when moving from Mandi Bahauddin to Lahore, and then having to pretend to be an Ahmadi-hating Muslim, demonstrates how Facebook’s technological discourse of authenticity intra-acts with hegemonic discourses of context to discipline marginalised subjects.

Facebook’s demand for singular authenticity is exercised through its singular timeline and traversable friends’ list, and the resulting affordance for the collapse of social contexts. This demand forces Saad to go along with his friends when they post things on Facebook such as ‘They [Ahmadis] should be killed… so I will just say ok, ok. Yeah, I had to pretend to join him.’ Saad is forced to conform to the very hegemonic discourse of Pakistani religious nationalism that marginalises his own community and identity. As he puts it, ‘I have to develop an image. So I have to act that I am a non-Ahmadi.’ As with any performative enactment, the disciplinary power of hegemony demands conformity and sanctions deviation.

In Butler’s account, gender identity is ‘produced and destabilized in the course of reiteration’ (Butler 1993, 10) and destabilising deployments of gender identity, such as drag, are opportunities for change through the ‘bending of citations’ (Lenning 2004). Reading Saad’s narrative account through Butler’s (1990, 1993) notion of performative identity reveals the rhetorical (Morison and Macleod 2013; Bamberg 2004) work involved in enacting a ‘fake’ authentic identity. The disciplinary power of the hegemonic narrative forces Saad to enact the idealised normative form of identity – Sunni Islam. This disciplinary power is exercised through the surveillance technology of Facebook’s demand for authenticity and the public understanding that identity on Facebook is authentic. Like Foucault’s Panopticon, Facebook demands conformity.
Reading Saad’s account through a sociomaterial lens highlights how the discourse of authenticity is enacted through the site’s design. Saad’s enactment of religious identity is not ‘mediated’ through Facebook – this would imply an already existing religious practice, but rather it is a ‘process of materialisation that configures reality’ (S. V. Scott and Orlikowski 2014b, 885). The intra-action of Facebook’s technological discourse and performative enactment of religious practice enacts an agential cut that establishes a causal structure of the components of the phenomenon, diffracting through the apparatus (Barad 2003, 815). In other words, the discourse of authenticity intra-acts with the discourse of religious identity through the apparatus of Facebook, which diffracts the enactment of authentic religious identity in a specific form. Religious identity on Facebook is as real as it is in the mosque or on the street.

Religious identity on Facebook is as ‘real’ as it is in the mosque, and it is framed within the same hegemonic discourses. The agential cut (Barad 2007) enacted by Facebook’s demand for authenticity reinforces normative Islam as the only form of legitimate authentic identity. In this sense, the agential cut enacted by Facebook reinforces the hegemonic discourse of Sunni religious nationalism. Making an ‘agential cut’ (Barad 2007) from the perspective of Ahmadis through the entanglement of Facebook and religious identity in Pakistan reveals how the liberal secular conception of a singular, authentic individual is not a neutral thing, but the product of hegemonic discourse. The sovereign, ‘liberated’ individual is as much a product of context as the norative religious subject enacted in Pakistan.

As Butler argues, ‘there is no subject before the law’; rather, the law constitutes the subject as a means of justifying its legitimacy (Butler 1994, 9). Iqtidar points out that, in Pakistan, the state has appropriated ‘the right to declare not just who is a Pakistani citizen but also who is a Muslim’ (Iqtidar 2012, 1023). The law – quite literally in the case of Ahmadis in Pakistan’s constitution – defines Islam and the Ahmadis as illegitimate, inauthentic Muslims. The entanglement of Facebook with religious discourse in Pakistan has produced the non-Ahmadi, who against his/her will must enact that which oppresses him/her. Before Facebook, or without its ubiquity such that social and academic life demands he use it, Saad may have been able to avoid or limit situations where he had to hide his identity or assume a hegemonic one. Facebook, however, demands he enact that which marginalises himself and his people. Thus, Facebook’s demand for singular authenticity results in the demand for the dominant subject position – in this case, a Sunni Deobandi nationalism. As such, it reinforces the marginalisation of minority identities such as Ahmadis.

For Ahmadi Facebook users such as Iftikhar and Saad, Facebook’s demand for authenticity forces them to silence their own enactment of authentic identity or to enact fake authentic accounts. In
both cases, the function of Facebook’s demand for authenticity strengthens the hegemony of the normative discourse in which Ahmadis are an illegitimate Pakistani subject.

7.2 Shia
The previous chapter showed how far from liberation from persecution, Ahmadi’s experience further marginalisation through Facebook’s reinforcing of the hegemonic discourse of Sunni nationalism. The accounts highlighted how the prejudice, marginalisation and attacks that Ahmadis experience in their everyday life are mirrored in their online experience, and indeed how Facebook can exacerbate the difficulties they face navigating a hostile environment in which their authentic identity is deemed illegitimate. This next section presents three case studies of how Shia youth experience using Facebook.

The Shia community hold a legitimate, legally recognised Muslim identity in Pakistan unlike the Ahmadi whose identity as Muslims is denied. Yet the Shia also face discrimination, and it’s not uncommon to see the words ‘Shia Genocide’ graffitied on city walls. This next section therefore explores how a legitimate yet nonetheless persecuted minority practice religious the enactment of religious identity through social media. The first case is Hammad, a young Shia religious leader, who uses Facebook as part of his strategy to engage with his burgeoning audience. The second case is Ahsen, a young unemployed Shia in Gujrat who asserts his identity in a defensive manner as both Shia and also Pakistani. The third case describes Qasim, a young Shia in Mandi Bahauddin who uses Facebook groups to meet people from new areas and engage in sectarian debate that he wouldn't otherwise be able to. These cases describe some of the diversity of how Pakistan’s Shia Facebook users experience life online and navigate the demands of the country most popular social networking site.

7.2.1 The Prince – or how a Shia youth preacher enacts faith on Facebook
The way Hammad uses Facebook provides an insight into the way a young aspiring Shia preacher uses Facebook to enact a religious identity that has been the subject of abuse and attacks. It also shows how he uses Facebook to present a constructed identity for public consumption that masks his personal life. For Hammad, Facebook is a platform for his identity as a conscious project.

Hammad is the son of a prominent Gujranwala Shia family, a family who own and run a large Imam Bargah (congregation hall for Shia commemoration ceremonies), a mosque and two madrassahs, one for boys and one for girls. Getting to meet with the family is difficult, as they limit contact with outsiders to contact through trusted intermediaries and carefully vet all visitors.
Following a few days of tentative arrangements, one evening I’m finally sitting with the head of the household and his two elder sons under an idly turning fan in their betak in a narrow concrete house hidden away in a small backstreet. He explains that they have to be careful as their mosque has been attacked in the past and they continue to receive many threats.

When I explained my research project in earlier telephone calls, they had said that I needed to speak to his nephew, Hammad. But it was only after over an hour discussing the troubled situation of the Shia in Pakistan, and the responsibility that their family feels for upholding the Shia community and protecting them from harm, that his nephew Hammad enters. He is dressed in a pressed black shalwar kameez and plays with a string of sandalwood prayer beads. “Ahh, the prince, the prince” his cousins announce as they stand up and move to make space for him on the ubiquitous red velvet sofa.

They call Hammad the prince because he is an aspiring preacher with a gift for inspirational poetry and a growing reputation for his ability to hold a crowd with his recitals at majalis – Shia religious gatherings. They had earlier explained to me that an important part of Hammad’s work to establish his reputation is the way he uses Facebook as a platform to spread his profile and his message. Hammad explains that he has had a Facebook for the last four years, but it is only now, in the last year or so that he has really started to use it as an important part of his religious practice. The first part of this practice was building up a diverse friendship group on Facebook, as he explains, “I have added everyone, and I only have a single account, I don’t have any fake account. So all my friends, my family members, my university fellows, my school fellows, my street fellows”. Hammad’s Facebook integrates his many social contexts into one space.

Although diverse in terms of social context, Hammad’s Facebook friends are uniformly male. And in describing how he shares his account with this mother, Hammad reveals the degree to which for him Facebook is a public rather than private platform. He described how he shared his password with his mother, and that when she wanted to use his Facebook, he said “I say ok, but don’t message anyone (laughs). Yeah, they can use my account, there is no such thing personal in that. Facebook isn’t very personal”. Hammad shares his account with his mother – highlighting how his mother doesn’t have her own phone or Facebook account – and reveals that the platform for him is public, not personal.

Facebook plays an important role in Hammad’s effort to enact his religious identity and communicate with his growing fan base. When he showed me his account, the profile photo was of him at a majalis, dressed in black speaking on stage into microphones. His background photo
was of him kneeling to kiss the flower bedecked grave of his teacher, who had been killed in a car bomb just over a year ago. Hammad also explained that he changed his profile photo to reflect significant events, such as a blank black image to mark massacres of Shia and commemorative events such as Muharram. For Hammad, his Facebook profile is part of performing his identity as a Shia teacher, and communicating his beliefs. As he explained he desire famed as a means through which to communicate his beliefs, and Facebook was a tool to achieve that aim. As he said, “Fame is important to get people to attend majalis – to have a famous name on posters that advertise the event. It helps spread the knowledge and the more persons who know, it’s right na”. Hammad’s Facebook account is a tool that he uses to further his commitment to spreading his faith, not a reflection of an inner, authentic self.

In this sense Facebook serves as a means of religious practice, and through which religious merit may be accrued, yet it is also fraught with danger. Hammad described how “I am sharing something informative, and if you do it’s a Sawab”. Although Hammad acknowledges that prayer in a Imam Bargah or Mosque is “is 70 times more than if we are praying in Facebook in our home”, for him Facebook remains a medium through which the religious word can be spread, religious merit earned and religious practice upheld. But although Facebook creates this opportunity for Hammad to reach out achieve a greater audience, it also means that he has a higher profile and is the target for abuse. He describes how although he tries to have a very positive message, he gets messages that threaten and abuse him. As he says, “They inbox me and say don’t, you don’t preach. You speak openly and we will kill you”. For Hammad, being accessible and sharing his personal information is part of his identity, and the reason people call him directly is because he has put his telephone number on his Facebook profile. Yet for Hammad there is a tension between wanting to be accessible and protecting his safety.

For Hammad his Facebook profile is part of his public religious persona, a medium through which he enacts the religious preacher and teacher of the Shia faith. Hammad’s account describes an assertive enactment of Shia identity that draws support from his strong and powerful family. He uses Facebook to both for his religious practice and also the public nature of his religious path, enabling him to support his performance at majalis and have the confidence to put himself out there in the public eye. Despite threats and abuse, Hammad’s main concern around privacy is protecting his videos and photographs from the prying eyes of his mother. In other words, Hammad shows how a young Shia is able to resist the expectation of conformity to a dominant hegemonic discourse. It shows how despite many Shia facing attacks and criticism Hammad asserts a distinctly Shia identity. This reflects his offline identity and background, with a strong supportive family and a readily available platform from which he can assert his identity as a Shia preacher. By way of contrast, the next section describes a young Shia Facebook user who has
none of this supportive background and indeed is both unemployed undermined by his father. This serves to echo the situation that many young people find themselves in, searching for a job and personal affirmation.

7.2.2 The Eagle – or enacting Shia patriotism

The previous section presented an example of how Facebook was used by Hammad to assert his faith in a conscious intentional manner, articulating his beliefs as well as responding to and dealing with anti-Shia abuse. In contrast to Hammad’s use of Facebook as a self-conscious platform for his religious identity, this section describes how Ahsen, engages in less self-conscious and more personal performative enactments of identity.

Ahsen graduated from a college in Gujrat but like so many young people, he is currently unemployed. His father works in the local court and through his biraderi (kinship) network he has taken and successful passed an interview for a trainee position in the court (he doesn't know what he will be in training for). Unfortunately, the presiding judge who approves appointments has retired and they are currently waiting for a replacement. Ali has been waiting for nine months. He is frustrated, feels stuck and far from the person that he aspires to be. Ahsen lives with his parents, elder brother and his wife, his unmarried sister and cousin from a nearby village in a second floor three room apartment in a concrete block in the barricaded court complex. The grounds are overrun with marijuana plants and while the concrete is solid enough that it blocks out the noise of the street, without air conditioning the air is hot during the day. There is daily ‘load shedding’ (electricity cuts) and the generator only works intermittently.

Because he doesn't have a job, Ahsen can’t afford a smartphone and only uses Facebook on the laptop he shares with his brother. He has asked his father for money for many things, including a new phone, but his father has said his support only goes so far as opening the door, he can help his son get a job, but he won’t pay his way. Indeed, when his father enters in a subsequent meeting, he castigates his son for not being independent enough, to which Ali responds with a resigned, humiliated “Ji, Baba” [yes father]. In short, Ahsen feels stuck and demoralised.

Religion is an important part of Ahsen’s life, yet it doesn't define his identity in the way that it does Hammad’s. Ahsen, and his family, are all Shia. On the wall, in addition to the picture of the Kabah [the building at the centre of Islam’s most sacred mosque Al Masjid al-Haram] that is common in nearly all Muslim households regardless of sect, there are images of a horse, that signifies the animal that carried Ali from the battle of Karbala and of a sword, that signifies Zulfiqar, the sword of Hazrat Ali. Yet Ahsen is not particularly observant, doesn't pray five times
a day and by his own admission only rarely makes it through the full month of fasting during Ramadan. Yet although he proclaims an inner commitment to his faith, he describes how his father pushes him, saying “I should be more Muslim, I should pray more. He pushes me, always”. Ahsen describes a strong feeling of expectation, a sense that others demand he express his religious identity in a stronger manner.

In the face of these expectations, Ahsen describes Facebook as a place where he can exercise control and enact a sense of self that has meaning for him. Although he only uses Facebook three or four times a week, it is important to him, “I’m not an addict, but I’m myself”. He has been on the site for nearly two years, has nearly eighty friends, mostly family and college friends. All of them are male. When Ahsen first shows me his Facebook profile and describes his profile picture and the meaning behind it, religion is not really mentioned. Instead, he describes an image of the Pakistan Air Force eagle. “It’s a kind of patriotism and I am quite patriotic Pakistan. In Pakistan but we all are very aggressive about it”. For Ahsen, the first thing he describes in his Facebook profile is an image that articulates his patriotism and commitment to the Pakistan military. He also described the background image, an picture of Al Pacino as Scarface, and explained that he liked it because “He’s like a gangster. He started from nothing, just like a worker”. In this description, Ahsen links qualities that he feels he lacks to qualities embodied in Al Pacino, using Facebook as a platform to highlight the kind of qualities that he feels are lacking in his own life.

The second time we meet, his description includes an account of the religious aspects of his Facebook profile. I asked him to explain the profile photo that he had had before the Pakistan Airforce eagle and of Scarface, which he had mentioned was a plain back one. He said that it was “Black and a quote that said, ‘If I am not Muslim then what? Kill me?’. He went on to describe how he experienced many people saying that Shia are not Muslim, but that he was proud to be Shia, “I am not trying to hide myself, what I am. In Muharram or specific days, I have uploaded a few photos about religion, ‘Ya Hussain’ or something like that ‘matam’ [the Shia practice of self-flagellation to commemorate Hussain]”. For Ahsen, unlike Hammad, his experience of his religious identity was one of persecution and defense, coupled with the need to assert his patriotism as a Pakistani.

This account by Ahsen of the way he uses Facebook profiles as personal, national and religious expression highlights the performative aspect of the multiple identities that Ahsen holds. It also highlights how for Ahsen it’s important to emphasise his sense of being Pakistani as well as to defend his identity as a Shia Muslim. Ahsen struggles with his situation in life, and seeks to enact
a sense of self that reflects various aspirations that are articulated in the broader narrative of individual empowerment, national belonging and the defensive assertion of religious identity.

This section has described how difficult it can be for some Shia Facebook users to assert their identity and sense of ‘authentic’ self, as they look for affirmation and a sense of meaning and self-worth. For Ahsen this is in submitting to the forms of identity made available by dominant discourses, such as Pakistani nationalism and the masculine identities of Hollywood gangsters. In contrast, the next section describes a young Shia Facebook user who navigates the new social spaces created by Facebook and the sectarian debates he finds there.

7.2.3 The group leader – or how Shia users navigate new friends and old enemies

This section presents the case of Qasim, a young Shia Facebook user in Mandi Bahauddin. It describes how the way he uses the technology reveals clearly stratified gender divisions as well as the way Facebook groups connects him to people he wouldn't otherwise meet and to sectarian debates that he struggles to navigate.

I meet Qasim in his uncle’s house in a backstreet of a Mandi Bahauddin suburb. The street is too narrow for a car, paved with brick and has open sewers running along both sides. The corner plot is undeveloped, and filled with rubbish that a lone buffalo noses around in. The children kicking a football in the street point out his house, which is opposite a small shop with well-worn wooden counter. Qasim’s uncle was one of the few telephone survey respondents from Mandi Bahauddin who had identified as Shia, and although he didn't want to be interviewed he had agreed to arrange an interview with his nephew.

Qasim is 18 years old, and studying civil engineering in Mandi Bahauddin. He’s wearing the traditional shalwar kameez, but sports a baseball cap with ‘boom boom’ on it, a reference to ‘boom boom’ Shahid Afridi, Pakistan’s most famous cricketer. He is keen to talk, excited about his new phone – a Samsung Galaxy S3 that was a present from his brother who lives in Germany. Qasim explains that he is very happy with the phone, it’s very fast especially with the 3G that Telenor launched six months ago. He describes how when Telenor launched 3G services they had some weeks when data usage was free, and then he used to use the internet all the time, watching movies, streaming music and browsing the internet. Now he has a weekly package for Rs75 a week, that gives him one gigabyte of data, three hundred minutes and three hundred text messages. He doesn't normally use up his entire allowance.
Facebook groups are an important and revealing part of Qasim’s description of the way he uses the site. He describes how they have enabled him to meet people that he would never have been able to meet before, but also reveals the limits to the issues that are discussed on Facebook. Qasim first explained how the ability to add friends of friends allows groups to grow and thus to connect to people in completely different places. He described how he had joined a poetry group with over a thousand members, and allowed him to meet new people when he travelled to other parts of the country. As he said, *if we are travelling to Mirpur, we post ‘we are travelling to Mirpur’. People from Mirpur would ask you are coming to our city so welcome to you. So they somehow manage to meet us. Or if someone posts, ‘we are travelling to Mandi’, we ask which point if park, or canal point so we go and meet them.*” For Qasim, this meant that Facebook had enabled him to meet people he would not otherwise have met, expanding his social horizons and his social network. But though this expanded world offered new opportunities, Qasim also explained how the topics of conversation in these groups was limited to safe topics. As he said, *“we can’t be frank with Facebook friends; we are frank only with our real life friends.*

In contrast to the limited conversations that take place amongst Facebook only friends, Qasim also described how there were some specific Facebook groups that focused on controversial topics such as religion. In these groups, as Qasim explained, there were lots of very frank and controversial debates that take place. He described how he was part of nine or ten groups that were dedicated to discussing Shia related issues, including Sunni vs Shia issues. He explained that he never chose to be part of any Sunni groups, but that sometimes if one of his friends gets added or mentioned in a comment, he gets notified as do all his friends, drawing them into what can often turn into sectarian debates. As he put it:

> *“someone will get added like a Satan, post something wrong and then drop off. And so there if someone tags my friend I get a notification too. Whenever my friend posts something and others comment on it, then he tells something then he tells something, he comments and then he comments. Both side criticize each other.’*  

In this account, Qasim describes how Facebook’s design that affords the sharing of content and the interaction of users leads to boundaries between different identity groups being broken, leading to arguments and conflict. Yet Qasim described how participating in this sectarian debate was also understood as a religious practice. He said that *“by telling someone who is ignorant, It could be happening that he would agree and get benefit. It is like ‘hidayat’ [Arabic for ‘guidance’, used in the Quran to describe divine instruction], and we get ‘Sawab’ [religious merit] for this.”*
Qasim describes how ‘frank’ and controversial debated do take place on Facebook, but in his experience in specific Shia Facebook groups dedicated to Shia-Sunni debate. Importantly, he describes these as being Shia groups that are separate from Sunni groups, but the walls between them are easily overcome through Facebook’s affordance for content sharing and interaction. Qasim described how he gets involved in these debates because friends tag him, and thus enrolled he feels he has to correct what he understands as errors in other people’s thinking. This sectarian form of debate of course reflects the broader sectarian divisions in Pakistan, but I wanted to know the extent this kind of debate was part of his experience of Facebook. When I asked him to explain, he said to me that he only engaged a few times, but saw these kinds of debates every day.

The case of Qasim presents a description of how a young Shia navigates the new social spaces created by Facebook. It highlights how although it allows him to meet people he wouldn't otherwise meet, the kind of conversation that takes place between people online is superficial and avoids divisive issues. Substantive debate about issues such as religion rely on trusted relationships and in-person conversation, as conflict and division can be easily caused when people post content that aims to inflame tensions. Yet sharing religious content is viewed as a good thing, and one that earns religious merit.

This section has presented three cases of how young Shia Facebook users experience life online and specifically religious debate. It has shown how the offline context of users plays an important role in how they present themselves online, and the kind of debate they engage in. It has shown that sectarian debate is generally avoided though some users do respond to attacks against Shia beliefs. It has also shown how users experience outsiders deliberately inflaming sectarian tension by posting anonymous posts and content. Finally, it also showed how whilst Facebook opens new spaces for debate, debate about contentious issues relies on trust and established relationships.

7.2.4 Discussion and Analysis: Authenticity and Hegemony
Analysis of the experiences of Shia Facebook users shows how they are able to enact their ‘authentic’ identity as Pakistani Shia Muslims, yet these enactments reveal the workings of hegemonic discourse and the way debate is shaped by the structure of Facebook.

In Pakistan, the Shia are recognised as legal citizens, unlike the Ahmadis who are constitutionally defined as ‘minorities’ and non-Muslims. Yet, the growing anti-Shia rhetoric and violence (K. Ahmed 2012; Kalin and Siddiqui 2014; Nasr 2007) mean that being Shia in Pakistan is occupy a marginalised subject position. The survey results emphasise that Shia respondents are less
comfortable speaking out about religious matters: 29 percent of Shia respondents said they felt free to post and share religious opinions, compared to 47 percent of Sunni respondents; 54 percent of Shia respondents said they hesitated to share their religious opinions, compared to only 28 percent of Sunni respondents. Shia respondents have a very different relationship with social media compared to Sunni respondents.

The empirical accounts, however, demonstrate a diversity of experiences, from Hammad’s confident articulation of his identity as a Shia preacher to Ahsen’s more complex portrayal of multiple subject positions. Indeed, these two accounts highlight again the fallacy of digital dualist accounts of technology and the importance of recognising that performative enactments of identity on social media are sociomaterial entanglements of the social and the material.

A sociomaterial reading of Hammad’s account emphasises that online enactments are inextricably entangled with the offline context of identity and hegemonic discourse. Hammad is secure in his sense of self and supported by his family, who recognise and respect him as both an individual and an aspiring preacher. When he says, ‘I want to be famous and I want to preach’ and ‘Facebook, I use it for publicity’, he indicates that the recognition he seeks through his enactment of himself as a Shia preacher is consciously, narrowly defined. Hammad’s family grant him security in his religious identity and thus give him confidence to enact performatively.

It is thus a subject position that exists in an offline discursive framework as much as (if not more than) an online one. Arguably, it is the strength of his position offline, in terms of both personal and institutional support, that allows Hammad to enact his Shia identity with confidence. The ‘agential cut’ (Barad 2003) enacted through the intra-action of Facebook’s technological discourse of authenticity with Hammad’s articulation of the authentic preacher has a completely different diffraction to Saad’s enactment of authenticity. Where Saad’s enactment is diffracted as a ‘fake’ authenticity, Hammad’s enactment is diffracted as an authentic self that aligns with the authenticity demanded by Hammad’s family and allowed by the wider hegemonic discourse of religious nationalism.

In contrast to Hammad, Ahsen’s enactment of subject positions through Facebook can be read as the performative constitution of the nationalist, patriotic subject. Posting images of the Pakistan air force golden eagle is explained as ‘a kind of patriotism, and I am quite patriotic about it, about Pakistan.’ Analysed as a performative act, Ahsen’s citation of military references as patriotic nationalism produces himself as a patriotic subject, an ‘authentic’ Pakistani. Although it is beyond the scope of this project to make psychological assessments, one could speculate that, while Hammad is confident in articulating his religious identity because his family is so supportive,
Ahsen’s lack of support and confidence could explain his enactment of patriotism as a counter to marginalisation as a Shia.

What can be said is that Facebook’s demand for singular authenticity portrays Ahsen’s multiple identities as a single, coherent identity. In Barad’s (Barad 2003) terms, the agential cut enacted by the intra-action of Facebook’s technological discourse of singular authenticity with Ahsen’s multiple identities serves to structure or diffract these multiple, fragmentary identities into a single, coherent enactment.

Facebook’s discourse of authenticity intra-acts with discourses of religious identity to diffract the enactment of Shia identity in different ways. For some, such as Hammad, Facebook allows the enactment of curated authenticity and the presentation of an assertive Shia identity. Others, such as Ahsen, seek to emphasise their patriotism as Pakistani subjects in addition to their Shia identity. These accounts also serve to counter claims of digital dualism and highlight how online identity is intimately entangled with identity offline.

7.3 Sunni

In contrast to Ahmadi and Shia Facebook users, the majority Sunni Facebook users describe very different experiences of enacting religious identity through Facebook. This next section presents three cases studies of how Sunni Facebook users use Facebook and their experience of religious debate. It highlights how, as members of the dominant discourse of religious identity, they reveal latent sectarianism even by ‘moderate’ believers, and experience greater freedom in sharing information and engaging in religious and sectarian debate. It first presents the case of Hamid, a young scrap metal dealer who engage in sectarian debate, but only amongst Sunni Muslims. The second case describes how a young apparently moderate Sunni Wahhabi describes using Facebook, revealing latent sectarian views and an experience of Facebook that is guarded yet inflected with religious practice. The final case describes a young Wahhabi user whose use of Facebook is characterised by sectarian debate that is understood as a form of religious practice.

7.3.1 The assertive majority – or how a Deobandi perceives the external ‘other’

For Hamid, Facebook is a social place that reflects his offline social world, within which sectarian debate is common. Hamid is a scrap metal dealer from Gujranwala, and we are introduced in the second floor office of his friend, the manager of a sewer drain construction company and a respondent in the telephone survey who identified himself as a Deobandi, but hadn’t wanted to
be interviewed. Instead, he had suggested we speak to his friend, Hamid. The room that we meet in is the ‘resting room’, with foam mattresses on the floor and a muted television tuned to the news on the wall. The fan turns slowly as we talk.

Hamid is twenty-eight years old and was born in Gujranwala, though he has family in Mirpur. He wears a dirty and clearly well used shalwar kameez and his chappals (sandals) are well worn plastic ones. He explains that he only accesses the internet through his phone, a second hand Android smartphone that he constantly checks throughout our conversation. Both of the major mobile phone networks had launched 3G services in the country, and Hamid explained that used both mobile internet and Wi-Fi. He was on the internet “all the time”, mainly using WhatsApp and Facebook, with WhatsApp used mainly for work, “for sending snaps to clients, of metal and designs and things” and Facebook for fun. As he says this, his friend the manager interjects to say “he also gets sexy snaps, videos”. Hamid laughs in acknowledgement and goes on to explain that many people send him sexy videos, passing over his phone to show a video of a young woman doing an erotic dance in front of red velvet curtains.

Hamid went on to explain that whilst he used WhatsApp for work, many friends used it for chatting and kept inviting him to groups, but he wasn’t interested in using WhatsApp for chatting. For him WhatsApp was for work, and Facebook for fun. He described that although he had been on Facebook for about eighteen months and signed up when his brother had also joined, he only had about ninety friends on Facebook. He explained that all his Facebook contacts were “male, no females in my friends group, none of my sisters have mobile phones”. Hamid went on to explain that he spent many hours a day on Facebook, “We spend maybe three, four hours per day just looking at Facebook”.

For Hamid, Facebook is a social place where he has fun with his friends, but also one where there are limits to the kinds of things people share. This was particularly the case in the context of religious content, as Hamid explained that although there was a lot of religious material on Facebook, it was something that he was careful about how he engaged with. He explained that of the first ten items in his Newsfeed, religious posts and items made up between a third to two thirds the content he saw when he logged in.

Hamid described how the religious content in his Newsfeed was dominated by posts from the three major sects of Ahle Hadith, Deobandi and Barelvi. He explained that while he agreed with twenty percent the posts, there was more that he disagreed with, and when he disagreed with a post, he said, “if they are wrong then I tell them. I tell them straightly”. When I asked him to describe the kinds of things he would disagree with, he said:
Hamid: “For example I saw a video of Tahir-ul-Qadri, in which he says that no one has the jurisdiction over the dispute or rafa-yaden (to let your hands stay loose instead of tying them on your chest or abdomen). Tahir-ul-Qadri said that everyone used to offer prayers this way but I no longer do so. So to send this video to someone who is an opponent of such views and make him realize that look! The scholars of your own sect are saying so, he is saying that I do not perform rafa yaden but all my Imams (prominent scholars) had performed this while offering their prayers.

The issue of the correct posture for prayer is a divisive one amongst Pakistani Muslims, and this example demonstrates how pervasive it is within Hamid’s social circles. But as Hamid described, his social circle is almost entirely limited to Sunnis, as he said “I don't have any friends who are from Shia”. As a result of this social differentiation, Hamid revealed that he sees almost no content posted by Shia, and even when he does, “I don’t comment”. He contrasted this reluctance to engage in debate on Facebook with his willingness to debate face to face, saying “I am in a face to face argument then I surely will prove my point Inshallah”.

In this account Hamid describes how his experience of Facebook and the content of his Newsfeed has a significant amount of religious content in it, but that it is dominated by posts about Sunni Islam. Importantly, he describes how whilst he comments and engages with this content he refrains completely from engaging with any Shia related content. Although Hamid references the difference between the different sects, he made more of the tension between Muslims and non-Muslims, and against Pakistan as a nation. In this account of how he shares content, and the example that he gave, he reveals how for him the threatening ‘other’ is one that challenges all Muslims.

Hamid’s description of the references to Islam on Facebook characterised Muslims in general as victims and Pakistani Muslims as virtuous. Hamid’s account of the portrayal of Muslims as victims was particularly apparent in his description of a photograph of the body of Syrian child who had washed in Greece, a photograph that had achieved world wide exposure. He described how he believed that the child “was a Muslim from Burma, where there are atrocities against Islam; his family was subjected to a number of atrocities all of his family members drowned. They died because they were Muslim”.

132
This description of persecuted Muslims reflects way in which content can be appropriated to support existing narratives of threats against Islam. And for Hamid, this narrative was also part of a wider account of threats against Pakistan as well. As he talked about the growing number of violent militant attacks against other Muslims, he described this in a way that externalised the threat to be one that was threatening a unified form of Pakistani Islam. He described how “the militants hiding in Waziristan, Karachi and Quetta Balochistan are not Muslims. They have adopted our culture, our attire, they look like us. But they are not Muslims, as the blood of a Muslim is forbidden to be shed by another Muslim. It’s haram”. For Hamid, it was inconceivable that Muslims would kill other Muslims, and certainly not Pakistani Muslims.

In this section I described how a member of Pakistan’s influential Deobandi sect experiences engaging with religion on Facebook. I showed how common the usage of mobile phones to access the internet was, and how users divided up services into categories of use, in Hamid’s case into work and entertainment. Facebook as an entertainment platform was characterised by high levels of gender division, with Hamid casually referencing that no female members of his family had a mobile phone, let alone a Facebook account. His account also presented Facebook as highly divided along sectarian lines, and he only engaged with other sects from Sunni sects, ignoring comments and content about Shia Islam. For Hamid, the greatest threat was presented by those attacking Islam and Pakistan, with both being external and ‘other’, or in other words the threat came from non-Muslims and non-Pakistanis. This description of the threats against faith and country reflect the hegemonic discourse of Pakistani religious nationalism.

7.3.2 The silent majority – or how a ‘moderate’ Wahhabi avoids debate

Mustafa’s description of the way he uses Facebook shows how a member of Pakistan’s dominant religious community exercises restraint in avoiding online debate, yet simultaneously reveals how hegemonic discourses are upheld as normative religious identities. Mustafa teaches in Mandi Bahauddin ’s oldest college, a complex of old colonial buildings shaded by low hanging trees whose roots threaten to break their worn stones bases whilst their branches reach out to shade students from the sun. It is a public college and the electricity often fails. It is hot. We meet in a class room of worn benches and an intermittently slow turning fan. Mustafa is twenty two years old and has returned from Islamabad to Mandi Bahauddin to earn some money whilst he completes his masters in chemical engineering. He comes from a conservative Sunni family and follows the Ahle Hadith school of Islam, but is well educated and as my research assistant, who is a friend and introduced us, he is “a somewhat moderate Wahhabi”. Yet as this interview reveals, Mustafa’s views on religion and his description of religion and Facebook emphasise how different the experience of dominant religious groups.
Mustafa is very technologically adept, even though he has only had a smartphone for a year. Before buying an expensive Samsung Galaxy Note 1 he had a Nokia E71 that was internet enabled but had a much smaller screen, which he described as “better for writing, bad for looking”. He’d made the switch to the almost tablet sized Note 1 because he had come to read more than he was writing. Danish still keeps the old phone, but uses it mainly for emails as he likes the keyboard. Internet connection is mainly through Wi-Fi at college and home, and although Telenor has launched 3G in Mandi Bahauddin, he is on rival network Warid and hasn't yet switched. He explains that he is very comfortable with social media, using most of the common platforms:

Mustafa explained that he used social media a lot, mainly Facebook and WhatsApp but also with accounts on Viber, Tango and LinkedIn. He described how on social media, particularly Facebook, he felt ‘always connected’. Mustafa’s Facebook friendslist was also very big, with over a thousand friends, and very diverse, including friends from different University departments, college and school friends. He also explained that he had family members including female cousins in his list, but that this was acceptable because “I add people who are sensible, who are decent a bit. So there is nothing that that you feel uncomfortable for your family. I am careful about what I say”. This control over self-expression was articulated in terms of what was considered acceptable to express publicly, as he said “‘I don’t think we need to express our feelings on Facebook. If you put emotions maybe you want to get some sympathy”.

When Mustafa describes the religious use of Facebook, he reveals how the site enables sharing of religious quotations, as well as the earning of religious merit. The sharing of religious quotations, and the debates that take place are also linked to the prospect of sharing information that can help inform people and even persuade them to change their religious beliefs. Mustafa describes how although he he expresses prayers and good wishes through the use of Hadiths. These are usually in form of images, “painted pictures which we share, the kind of Hadiths or Quranic verses which are printed in pictures. You download that picture, you share that picture or you can say send a picture.”

The sharing of religious images and quotations is very common, and many described how they would download them from specific websites or Facebook pages. Mustafa explained that he really liked the Hadith pages, and the sharing of the quotations from the Koran. He described how he believed that sharing them was a good deed in which he earned religious merit, though he wasn’t sure how to measure the merit that was earned. As he
said. “There is sawaab but if you offer prayer at home then that sawaab is seventy times lesser than that at mosque. Facebook is public, but it's more like offering prayer at home.”

Mustafa describes the kinds of religious content that he shares, and the religious merit that is earned from this sharing. Importantly, the content that he shares is commonly in the form of pictures, rather than text that is copied out and written. This is important because it means that the shared quote is taken as a whole without the possibility of editing it, reinforcing the literal translation or perpetuating bad translations.

The importance of authentic religious knowledge is an issue that Mustafa emphasises in relation to the discussion of religion on Facebook. In particular, he argues that because people are not well educated, they shouldn't be involved in public debate. Mustafa describes the religious divide in Pakistan as one between Sunni and Shia Islam, saying “These sects are Sunni and Shias. So if there is anything like this and that if there is one statement from Sunni scholar or person there would be a sectarian fight. So we try to avoid it”.

Mustafa is a well educated and knowledgeable young man. He has travelled within Pakistan and studied with people from across the country. His friends, of whom my research assistant is one, view him as a moderate, tolerant Sunni Wahhabi. In this account Mustafa reveals a latent sectarianism that only revealed itself once trust had been established. In acknowledging the importance of trust and close relationships for the discussion of sensitive subjects such as sectarian differences, Mustafa also highlights how Facebook is not the place for discussion of these sensitive topics, both personal and religious.

This section has described how a member of Pakistan’s Wahhabi sect experiences faith, Facebook and religious debate. It described how Mustafa is viewed by others as religiously literate yet moderate and tolerant. Indeed, he reveals a high level of religious knowledge, particularly differences between sects. Mustafa’s account of the way he uses Facebook also reveals how for him the platform is not a space of ‘authentic’ revelation. He has a large number of friends from the different aspects of his life, though he concedes to knowing perhaps only half of them and thus for him Facebook is a particularly public space in which his audience is both known and imagined. Sharing religious content is a common practice, and is understood to earn religious merit. This practice is characterised by the sharing of reformatted religious greetings. This characteristic is particularly important in the context of the veracity of religious content, narrative and discourse as the those sharing this kind of content are not able to edit the content before sharing. They rely on its veracity. Despite the importance of sharing religious content, for Mustafa Facebook is not a place where personal feelings or sensitive topics such as religion and sectarianism are shared.
7.3.3 Algorithmic sectarianism

Hamid and Mustafa’s accounts of digital religious practice described how they enacted religious identities, but largely refrained from engaging in debate with people from other sects. This next account describes how the interaction of Umaid’s religious practice and Facebook’s design leads to intense sectarian interaction and debate.

Umaid is a student at a Lahore University campus in Mandi Bahauddin. The campus is on the edge of the town, with long lines of Chinese made Honda motorbikes lined up outside, high walls topped with barbed wire and two armed guards at the entrance who check everyone’s ID before opening the wall high reinforced gate to allow them to enter. Inside there are open grass lawns, a shop selling snacks and a crowds of young people clustered together in groups on the lawn and walking purposefully between the buildings. There crowd is diverse in appearance. Male students wear clothing from suits and ties to traditional shalwar kameez while female students wear clothing that ranges from traditional shalwar kameezes with a light dupatta over their shoulders and chest to the full niqab that covers their body, head and face in billowing black material. The student body is diverse and large – the campus is crowded, with makeshift building to add new class rooms. They are soon to move to a new, dedicated campus able to hold twice the number of students.

As a student of marketing and commerce, Umaid is dressed in a two-piece business suit and carries a briefcase, presenting an image as a serious, ambitious young man. He explains that his ambition is to work for a mobile phone company or a bank. As well as his professional ambition, Umaid impresses on me that he is also very committed to his faith. He explains that his father is very proud of him for his academic work but also for his attention to his religious studies and knowledge. He explains that he is a Sunni, but when I ask which sect he belongs to, he is very quick to correct me: \textit{No, no. No. My group is Ahle Sunnah. I have to follow the Sunnah (ways of the prophet of Islam) and hadith (sayings of the prophet of Islam). It is before the sects, before Ahle Hadith. The Ahle Hadiths, and the others...sometimes it is wrong. Sometimes they don't read it right. Or they have bid’ah, they go away from the Sunnah”}. Umaid embodies the aspiration for material success with a passionate observance of his conservative creed. Umaid explained that his particular form of Islam views the words and deeds of the prophet Muhammad as guidance, rejecting the hadiths and other interpretations of the words and deeds of the prophet as bid’ah or the introduction of ideas not based on the literal words and deeds of the prophet. In his embrace of both material aspiration and faith, Umaid embodies the modern, conservative Muslim and demonstrates that modernity and religion can flourish together.
The compatibility of material and religion was also apparent in Umaid’s use of technology. He explained that he had a mobile phone and a laptop and used both to connect to the internet, but.

He described how he used his laptop at home and at University for studying and researching things on the internet, and admitted that he sometimes watched movies, “but the good ones, not the bad ones. I like Salman Khan [an Indian actor known for playing gangsters], because he is a Muslim and a fighter”. He proudly showed his mobile phone, a new Samsung Galaxy that his cousin in Norway had sent to him. He explained that he used Telenors 3G services when he was in town “but mainly the Wi-Fi, because Wi-Fi, it is free.” For Umaid, his mobile phone was for socialising, and sometimes for work, for sending emails. He explained that he used his phone for Facebook, WhatsApp, Viber and Skype, and also had a LinkedIn account, because “it is for professionals. And when I am looking for a job, I must be professional”. But it was Facebook that he said he used the most, mainly at home and mainly in the evenings, for between twenty minutes and “sometimes for the whole night. Just gup-shupping [chatting]”. But it was not just chatting, as he revealed when he described how he discussed religion on Facebook.

As Umaid described his Facebook activity, the topics he talked about, and the content of his newsfeed, he revealed how significant religion was in his experience of using Facebook. Apart from breaking news, pictures from friends and “some quotations that are so much beautiful”, Umaid indicated that of the first ten items in his Newsfeed, “twenty five percent are related to religion, twenty five percent to the sports, twenty five percent to the news, breaking news etc”.

In Umaid’s mind, religious content constitutes a significant percentage of the overall content he engages with on his Newsfeed. But when I ask him how he engages with the different kinds of content that he sees on his Newsfeed, he reveals how his religious belief informs the way he uses Facebook.

Umaid’s religious beliefs influence both how he expresses religious views on Facebook, and who he expresses them to. He described how he “post things like prayers from the Quran. Sometimes I also post things about the prophet, what he did and what we must do”. Umaid at first described he only commented on positive things, saying thinking “nice’ or ‘very good’ or ‘mashalla’ [thanks to God]”. But when I pressed him on how he reacts to something that he disagrees with, he conceded that “If it is written something wrong, then I must comment also”. How Umaid responds to content that he disagrees with, and how his response and Facebook’s design interact reveal the nature of the relationship between Facebook and religious debate in Pakistan.
When Umaid encounters a post that he believes to be wrong, he describes how he feels it is his religious obligation to respond and provide what he believes is the correct response. As he put it, “If the post is wrong, like it is not what the Prophet said or did, or it is something bid’ah, then I have to comment. You see, it is ‘hidayat, it is teaching and to hidayat is like a prayer, as Muslims we must do it. We get sawab’”. For Umaid, responding to and correcting content that he believes to reflect false or wrong information is a religious duty that must undertake in order to earn religious merit. This means that correcting religious content, and in practice engaging in sectarian debate with people of different views, is viewed as a religious obligation.

The reason this is significant is because when Umaid engages in this practices, he described how it often becomes the main thing he does on Facebook, and that the more he engages in sectarian debate, the more sectarian content there is for him to engage with. As Umaid said, “Sometimes I am up till night, commenting and chatting. The longest I have chatted is two hundred comments in one night I think. He was Shia, and sometimes they don’t know the Sunnah”. Umaid went on to recount how this interaction triggered other people to comment, as “many people liked and said well done”. In addition to other peoples responses, Umaid described how in his Newsfeed “There were many more of those posts too, and I got very busy that day responding to all the posts. Not only Shia but Sunni too. I think I was a good teacher, but mostly the didn’t listen. Umaid described how when he engages in sectarian debate, and how when he does not only does it work to include his wider social network but he sees more of the same kind of content in his Newsfeed. In other words, the more he engages in sectarian debate, the more sectarian content Facebook seems to place in his Newsfeed.

For Umaid, like so many others, engaging with religious content is an important part of his experience of Facebook. He feels it is a duty to teach others, and particularly to correct those who have different views about religion, especially if they are what he understands to be ‘innovations’ from the original Sunnah. This inevitably leads him to engage with the ideas posted by people from other schools and sects, such as Shia and Barelvi. What was also revealing was that he described how the more he commented on this kind of content, the more of this kind of content appeared in his Newsfeed. He went on to explain that this was not just a continuing conversation or when people tagged him to invite him to comment, but the comments of friends who were responding to content from Muslims of different sects. The more he commented, the more content there was to comment on. Sometimes, he said, “it’s too much. So I ignore. It gets me tired and it’s just a fight. But it’s important to tell the truth. It’s difficult.”. He explained that when he stopped and ignored the content, then sometimes it seemed there was less of the content to correct, until a friend tagged him and it would start again. In other words, Umaid describes how his religious duty to teach – hidayat – leads him to
comment on sectarian content on Facebook. When he does, he sees more sectarian content, and he feels compelled to comment again.

This section has described the experience of a member of the Ahle Sunnah school of Islam experiences the using Facebook. It described how religion plays an important part of Umair’s experience of Facebook, and that this has a particular sectarian aspect. It showed how Umair’s strong commitment to his beliefs plays out in his sense of obligation to teach others, and to correct what he identifies as being new interpretations or errors in the practice of Islam. This echoes how Sunni Deobandis view the practices of Barelvis, Shia and other Sufi oriented sects who turn to interpretation or intercession. Umair’s account highlighted how this sense of injunction interacts with Facebook so that the more he conducts this practice, the more content to interact with appears on his Newsfeed. As such it points towards the interaction between religious beliefs and the way Facebook selects content that Facebook users are exposed to.

### 7.3.4 Analysis: Authenticity, Hegemony and Algorithmic Individualism

This analytic section analyses the experiences of Sunni Facebook users and shows that Sunni Facebook users feel free to talk about authentic religious beliefs, but that Facebook’s demand for authenticity results in sectarian divisions. It goes on to analyse the interaction of Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm with the religious practice of *hidayat* to show how the algorithmic discourse of individualism intra-acts with the practice of religious guidance to increase sectarian criticism. This analysis is significant because algorithms have already been linked to polarisation and extremism (Pariser 2011; Sunstein 2001, 2008), and thus this section analyses their implications for religious identity in Pakistan.

**Authenticity and Hegemony**

The survey found that more Sunni respondents felt free to post religious opinions online than other religious groups. Indeed, 43 percent of Sunni respondents also indicated that, in general, they felt free to express their feelings, compared to only 29 percent of Shia respondents. In other words, Sunni respondents felt better able to express their feelings both online and offline. This strengthens the identification in the literature review of Sunni Islam as the normative subject in the hegemonic discourse of religious nationalism. It also reinforces the notion of an entangled relationship between online and offline and the rejection of a digital dualism.

The hegemonic position of Sunni Islam is reinforced in the accounts of Sunni Facebook users that describe Islam as a monolithic, uniform group. This commonly took the form of a uniform Islam under threat. For example, a performative reading of Hamid’s description of an image of a Syrian
refugee circulating on Facebook echoes this common narrative of a uniform Islam under threat from an external other. When Hamid states, ‘They died because they were Muslim’, he is using the image of a refugee to cite the discourse that all Muslims are under threat. The appropriation of the image of the young Syrian refugee’s body within a discourse of a threatened Islam reflects a ‘picking up of the tools where they lie’ (Butler 1990). The work of sharing that enacts a subject that finds recognition by others is more important than the content of the information, object or image being shared. Enacting the authenticity demanded by Facebook is not an act of interrogation to investigate the truth of the image, but rather the performance of an authentic subject. It draws on the available props to enact as convincing a portrayal as possible of the individual who believes Muslims are being targeted.

Despite the willingness to talk about religion indicated in the survey and in many interviews, some respondents said they were reluctant to do so or rarely engaged in sectarian debate, with many saying a lack of religious knowledge fuelled misunderstanding. Mustafa, for example, expressed a desire to discuss sectarian matters, but was concerned that people who discussed religion lacked knowledge, saying, ‘I want to talk about it [religion] but I think their knowledge is limited about religion.’ Social media democratises the religious sphere (Campbell 2013a; Blondheim and Katz 2016) and can allow a new ‘technocrati’ (Teusner 2013) that challenges established religious authority. Facebook’s democratisation of access to the public sphere was described by many as problematic for the expression of religious beliefs amid concerns about sectarian tensions.

Yet in the main, Sunni Facebook users express greater confidence and freedom in expressing their views, including religious beliefs, than do Shia respondents. Their accounts also reflect a tendency to homogenise the Muslim community as a singular, Sunni community, and to characterise this community as one that is under threat from outsiders. Many Sunni respondents indicated that they were reluctant to engage in sectarian debate for fear of stirring up tensions, and that, in any case, their social network was dominated by other Sunnis. When they did see content from Shia Facebook users, many said they ignored it. The technological discourse of authenticity intra-acts with the hegemonic discourse that privileges Sunni Islam as the normative religious identity in Pakistan. Sunni Muslims are thus able to respond to Facebook’s demand for authenticity by articulating their beliefs, limiting this only out of concern for others. Thus, the agential cut enacted through the intra-action of Facebook’s technological discourse of authenticity with the hegemonic religious nationalism reinforces Sunni Islam as the normative religious identity in Pakistan.

Algorithmic Individualism and Religious Instruction
When Umaid describes his practice of *hidayat* in correcting *bid’ah sayyi’ah* (unacceptable religious innovation as opposed to *bid’ah hasanah* or acceptable religious innovation), he is enacting a particular form of religious discourse. While the concepts of *hidayat* and *bid’ah* are common to all Muslims, for Wahhabis and Salafists unacceptable *bid’ah* is anything not specifically performed or confirmed by the Prophet in the original texts of the Quran and Hadith (Metcalf, 1982). In Pakistan, the Deobandi and Ahle Hadith view the Barelvi and Shia as practicing forms of *bid’ah sayyi’ah*; in this, both are seen as *jahil*. As such, the enactment of *hidayat* as a response to the discourse of *bid’ah* has contributed to contemporary sectarian divisions in Pakistan. In this sense, Umaid’s accounts of *hidayat* and *bid’ah* are enactments of this discourse of sectarian division.

In order to understand Umaid’s description of how his Facebook newsfeed has more *bid’ah sayyi’ah* content the more he practices *hidayat* with people from other sects, it is important to understand how the Newsfeed algorithm works, and the technological discourse it embodies. Algorithms are designed to structure online life and everyday practice (Couldry 2012), but are largely invisible (Eslami et al. 2015) and believed to promise a ‘mechanical neutrality’ (Gillespie 2014, 181). Yet, as Gillespie argues, algorithms embody entanglements of values and should be considered part of a new logic of structuring public discourse; this situates algorithmic logic ‘as posed against, and perhaps supplanting, the editorial as a competing logic’ (Gillespie 2014, 193). DeVito’s analysis of the values entangled in Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm, based on a content analysis of Facebook documentation, concludes that the algorithm is based on a discourse of individualism and categorises content based on personal significance, such as the impact on oneself, one’s interests and friends (DeVito 2016, 15).

Analysing Umaid’s experience of Facebook through the lens of algorithmic values explains his exposure to content with which he disagrees. When his friends comment on sectarian content, the newsfeed algorithm predicts that Umaid will find it interesting – and so is more likely to place it in his newsfeed. Similarly, his history of engaging with content from particular users, forums or groups explains why, when he comments on sectarian content, the algorithm selects more sectarian content to go into his newsfeed. The algorithm discourse of individualism interacts with Umaid’s practice of *hidayat* to enact a feedback loop that amplifies sectarian debate.

Sectarian debate has an historic form and it is instructive to analyse this algorithmically driven sectarian feedback loop in the context of the *munāzarā*, the paradigmatic form of sectarian debate. *Munāzarā* is an Islamic term for theological dispute, with the form of *munāzarā* constituting a model for theological debate while actual *munāzarās* are circulated and used as reference materials (Rahman 2009). In South Asia, they can be traced at least as far back as the initial
debates between Muslims and Christian missionaries in 1857 (Powell 1993) and continued throughout the early 1900s (Metcalf 1982). These early debates were rancorous and conflictual, but as Metcalf notes, ‘the very competition helped create a familiarity with religious issues that was unprecedented in Indian history (Metcalf 1982, 234).

The purpose of the munāzarā was to persuade opponents their beliefs were false by appealing to sacred texts. This usually started out with courtesies and honorifics, but often descended into anger and insults, including charges of apostasy and heresy and personal attacks. Consequently, although the effects of munāzarā on sectarian division and antipathy towards the other have not been studied, ‘the possibility the munāzarā creates or increases sectarian antagonism cannot be denied’ (Rahman 2009, 137). Munāzarā, then, are important for a number of reasons. First, they serve as a model for and legitimation of sectarian critique – a model that, historically, was structured and (though often conflictual) contained within a formal process. Second, they serve as a process through which sectarian orthodoxy and division are established and a resource through which these are legitimised.

There are clear commonalities between munāzarā and sectarian debate on Facebook. Both involve a debate between individuals who present structured arguments. Both draw on theological knowledge, define sectarian boundaries and maintain sectarian orthodoxy. Both, in other words, serve as boundary-making exercises in establishing sectarian religious identity. Yet, Facebook debates are clearly not munāzarā. Indeed, a number of respondents stated that, ‘It’s not munāzarā because no one is trained.’

Facebook’s algorithmic discourse of individualism intra-acts with the discursive form of munāzarā. Both emphasise and orient around the discourse of individualism and promote the interaction of high-value subjects, with the value determined as theological knowledge in the context of munāzarā or a high-value social network in the case of Facebook. In the case of the munāzarā, the debate was organised, chaired and structured by an authoritative figure who could repair any damage done. In the case of Facebook, the debate is structured and organised in large part, as Umaid’s case demonstrates, by the algorithm. However, while the authoritative figure in the munāzarā can at least attempt to repair social tensions, the algorithm takes no responsibility for the outcome of the interaction it structures.

Facebook’s algorithmic discourse of individualism intra-acts with the discourse of religious debate such that it creates the structure of munāzarā but without any responsibility for its outcome. In other words, Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm interacts with the religious injunctions
of conservative Sunni Muslims such that, for some, it increases interactions that have the potential to raise sectarian tension.

7.4 Conclusion
This section analysed and compared accounts of Facebook use by Ahmadi, Shia and Sunni users. It focuses on these groups as representative of minority and majority groups to explore the interaction between Facebook’s discourse of authenticity (Haimson and Hoffmann 2016), hegemonic discourse and the enactment of marginalised and normative identities.

The conclusions from this analysis offer a critical interrogation of the liberatory and transformative claims made for new ICTs (Castells 2000; Giddens 1991; Kleine 2013). Specifically, findings from the analysis of the way social media shapes the enactment of minority identities leads to a questioning of the claim that new ICTs hold emancipatory qualities. It challenges the claims that social media and ICTs liberate users from the traditional constraints of their everyday lives to reveal their true, ‘authentic’ identity. Theorists who link these technologies to universal forms of social change suggest that minority identities should find online the opportunity to create second selves (Turkle 1984), form new network identities (Castells 2010) and fulfil modernity’s project of the ‘true self’ (Giddens 1991). Instead, this analysis showed how Facebook’s technological discourse reinforced hegemonic discourse, strengthening the normative position of Sunni Islam and further marginalising Ahmadis.

A performative, sociomaterial reading of these accounts shows how Facebook’s features and demand for authenticity silence Ahmadi enactments of religious identity or force the enactment of fake ‘authentic’ subjects. In contrast, Shia Facebook users resist the demand of hegemonic discourse and enact authentic subjects, though some emphasise nationalism to demonstrate their conformity to hegemonic discourses of religious nationalism. As dominant, normative subjects, Sunni Facebook users enact authentic subjects but limit debate to their own sect.
8. Performing Gender on Facebook

“It’s a famous joke in Pakistan that a hawker was passing from a street. He was selling the vegetables and he met a woman who was buying some vegetables, he said ‘O lady! I remember that I met you before’. The lady said ‘Are you in your senses?’ and he replied ‘Ah! I remember we are friends on Facebook’.”

(Sherazi, Gujranwala)

8.1 Introduction

The quote above reveals the extent to which Facebook has become a part of common discourse; it is now the subject of jokes and is commonly associated in the public imagination with the issue of gender roles and division. In the public imagination this association takes the form of violations of women’s rights and the position that women hold in Pakistani public discourse. Newspapers commonly tell stories in which women are harassed through the social network, frequently through featuring men gaining and exploiting women’s trust through the use of fake female accounts. Reports document how women experience online harassment (Haque 2014), and how that online harassment translates into offline violence (Parkin 2016), highlighting the contentious role that new ICTs play in public discourse and in everyday practice. This chapter explores these dynamics in the context of Facebook’s demand for authenticity and its affordances for context collapse.

The survey findings in Chapter Six described distinct differences between male and male accounts of how they used mobile phones and social media. Female users reported smaller social networks that were commonly constituted by domestic, family relationships, and with many respondents reporting a preference for WhatsApp over Facebook. Social networks that are limited to the family and to private over public means of communication reflect the description in Chapter Five of the production in religious discourse of submissive gender identities that embody both national and family honour. This chapter describes the gendered nature of social media practices in order to help explain the survey findings and the link between broader hegemonic discourse and everyday enactment of religious and gender identity.

This chapter therefore shows how Facebook’s demand for authenticity and its affordances for traversing friendship groups have implications for the gendered subject positions that are part of Pakistan hegemonic discourse of religious nationalism. It achieves this through descriptions of
specific Facebook usage practices that reveal how users negotiate two aspects of Facebook’s technological discourse; first, its demand for authenticity and second, its affordance for traversing friendship groups and the resulting implications for context collapse.

This chapter shows ways in which Facebook is used to both overcome traditional social boundaries as well as to reinforce established social norms, specifically in relation to the issue of gender divides and roles. A key aspect of this is how in order to overcome social boundaries between men and women, Facebook users, particularly but not only male users, commonly created fake Facebook accounts. These were created and used for a variety of reasons, but the common theme was the negotiation and management of traditional gender roles. By contrast, Facebook users who sought to maintain established gender boundaries and particularly the seclusion of women from public life did so through the creation and use of multiple ‘authentic’ Facebook accounts. In other words, to achieve the liberation and social progress that is linked to notions of ‘authentic individualism’ articulated by Zuckerberg and proponents of modernity, Facebook users had to create fake identities. In contrast, those wishing to maintain the traditional social norms supposedly replaced by technologies and modern individualistic society created multiple ‘authentic’ identities. These practices trouble the assumption that Facebook successfully ‘translates’ a discourse of authentic individualism, and that technologies predictably disrupt established social norms and structures.

This chapter reviews the accounts of Facebook users who create multiple Facebook accounts. It presents a summary overview of the practices associated with the creation of fake accounts that seek to overcome established social boundaries, followed by more indepth accounts of the ways in which users create multiple authentic Facebook accounts. This first describes how male and female users create new spaces where they can be free to enact new subjectivities and secondly how female users defend themselves against the consequences of context collapse. This is followed by examples of how multiple authentic accounts are used to sustain traditional practices of gender segregation and seclusion, and by describing female perspectives on this form of ‘digital purdah’. The chapter concludes with analysis of these findings as an example of how technologies can reinforce traditional social norms, providing a counter case to the claims of universal liberation and a teleologic path of progress towards modern individualism.

### 8.2 Faking Authenticity – male and female fake Facebook accounts

The most common reason given for creating fake female accounts was to play tricks on their male friends. In Mandi Bahauddin, Usman explained that “We make an account as a girl, in the name of Sana Mandi... like a real Pakistan girl.” Usman went on to explain that he and his friends
would together use the account to trick others. He described how he would to “go to my friend, and pretending to be Sana, on Facebook I say I like you, will you be my friend? So we trick him, and he is in love!! For Usman and his friends, creating fake female accounts was fun, a way of passing time and built on creating female accounts out of the content and signifiers of existing discourses of female identity. Creating fake accounts to for fun and to play tricks on their friends subverts the demand for authenticity not as an exercise in malicious deceit but as part of young men finding playful ways to exploit the gender divisions that characterize Pakistani social life.

Female Facebook users also described creating fake accounts, but described it as a way of interacting with men in ways that they couldn’t before, and that allowed the safety of anonymity. In Mandi Bahauddin, Mehreen explained that she came from a very conservative Sunni Deobandi family in a small village, and was the first girl in her family to be allowed to go to college. She explained how created fake accounts “to test how good men are. My profile is, it is secret, not my name and not my picture. And not any of my real friends on Facebook”. Mehreen’s description of her use of Facebook shows that although she uses it as a vehicle for real interaction, she hides behind anonymity through the use of a fake name and picture. This fake Facebook account allows her to interact with men in ways she wouldn’t otherwise be able to and in this way understand male behaviour.

This use of fake Facebook accounts for a new kind of interaction was described as taking place in bigger cities as well. Yet while many say it’s happening, few admitted to the practice themselves. For example, when I asked Farhana, a Masters student at a university in Gujranwala if she used fake accounts, she started laughing and said “I don’t, but at least 98% of my friends do”, and when they do, it’s just to meet men”.

In addition to creating fake female accounts to trick their friends, male Facebook users also described creating fake accounts to over come gender boundaries and establish real connections to female users. Anwar explained that since he had come to Gujarat he had started to play a lot with Facebook, as the internet was so much faster than the village he came from. Before, he could “couldn’t download a song, and could only look at simple websites”. Internet use changes when the speeds area faster, as Anwar went on to describe how “In Gujarat, I can do everything. Facebook is much more possible, I can watch videos, listen to music and I can make profiles also.” Anwar explained that he had ‘at least two’ other fake accounts in which he pretended to be a woman, and that he used these to reach out to female Facebook users. He explained that female Facebook users would only interact with other female users – he’d tried with his real, male account but was always rejected and blocked. So he created fake accounts to try and establish friendship. But successful contact required more than just a convincing account, you had to be
able read their personality and approach them appropriately. Anwar explained that he could usually tell what kind of person the girl was, ‘if they are looking for friendship, you can tell, and sometimes, maybe it becomes something else”. He went on to say that sometimes girls were very sexually explicit in their interaction, which he described as his ‘fantasy’. Indeed, the idea of this fantasy was something that Anwar was very animated about - although he was a little shy talking about it, he was very clear in describing it as the only place in his life that he could act out or imagine such experiences. Anwar didn’t seem surprised or curious about the fact that women would have explicit ‘sexy talk’ with him, it was simply something to be enjoyed. Indeed, it was as close to a relationship with a woman that Anwar had ever got.

This section has described how male and female Facebook users use fake and real Facebook accounts to play games and explore relationships, illustrating how some female Facebook users experience these ‘virtual’ relationships. It has highlighted how Facebook’s demand for authenticity must be thwarted in order to pursue these forms of play. Common to all of these is the desire of users to establish relations with members of the opposite sex, to pursue desire, even if only in virtual form. This desire remains one of the drivers of innovative Facebook practices, and in the next section the issue of desire and its management on the basis of social and religious norms is explored from the perspective of maintaining multiple authentic accounts.

8.3 Family and Friends – enactments of multiple authentic identities

“I have two Facebook profiles. I have 60-65 friends in my family account and about 700 in my friends account. And I don’t have any female friends in my friends account, all are male friends.”

Nadeem, Gujarat

In the previous section I showed how male and female Facebook users break the demand for a singular authentic identity and create multiple accounts as ‘fake female’ in order to play games with their friends or pursue ‘real’ relationships with other Facebook users. But creating fake female accounts is not the only reason that people create multiple accounts. In the exploration of how male and female Facebook users create fake accounts, respondents described how many users also create multiple ‘real’ accounts. This is to say that they created multiple accounts in which they used their real name to connect with real people they knew in ‘real’, offline life. Whilst fake female accounts enable users to bridge the often unsurmountable social divide between men and women, creating multiple ‘real’ accounts serve to negotiate new social divisions and maintain existing ones.
In this section I describe how Facebook users create multiple authentic accounts, that is accounts in which users connect to friends and family using their real names. I first show how male and female Facebook users describe this as a form of freedom from their family and traditional social norms, and illustrate how female users create multiple authentic accounts to navigate the digital gender divide. The chapter concludes with a description of how male and female Facebook users create multiple authentic accounts specifically to uphold traditional social structures and practices that are characterised by social norms of social status, honour and gender segregation.

8.3.1 Digital Freedom – or how male Facebook user’s separate family and friends

The first insight into the practice of creating multiple ‘authentic’ accounts emerged when a friend of Anwar’s cousin called Nadeem overheard his description of fake female accounts and mentioned that that he too had multiple accounts. As Nadeem went on to explain, he too had multiple accounts, but they served very different purposes and revealed very different insights into the interaction between Facebook and the discourses that structure Pakistani social life.

Nadeem described how he had two Facebook accounts, one which he used for family and one for friends, with “Islamic things in my family ID and everything related to entertainment in my friends ID”. Nadeem explained that it wasn’t that he was hiding from his family, “Basically my family know about me [laughing’] but that it was important to be a “a little bit reserve in the Facebook ID of family and more open in the ID of friends”. For Nadeem, maintaining a family and friends account allowed him to maintain the distinction between different social context online. As he described, on his friends account he could chat to women in ways that his family would disapprove of, saying things like “I used to give comments to girls in my university in Punjabi like ‘you use very rude, very silly words, so when you will be married you will give your husband a tough time, so that he will be very rude, very strict very tough.”

Like Anwar, Nadeem is in his mid-twenties but unlike Anwar he went to college, graduating with an MBA in marketing three years ago. Despite this, he has been unemployed since then and like many young people in Pakistan, still lives with his parents. He describes how amidst a general sense of failure in life, compounded by having twice failed the army entrance exams, social media is a lifeline through which he can be the person that he aspires to be. Yet Nadeem has very limited access to the internet, as the only computer in the house is in his bed-ridden paraplegic brothers room and though he cannot afford a smartphone, he occasionally uses his friends’ smartphones. This is complicated though, as there is a process of negotiation around his friend logging out of Facebook and Nadeem logging in, and then having to remember to log out again. On more than
one occasion he has forgotten, and he has had to get his friend to promise not to embarrass him or compromise his account by posting inappropriate, embarrassing updates or comments. But despite this limited access to the internet and social media, Nadeem described Facebook as an important space in which he can, intermittently, be free from the constraints and cares of his home life. But to realise that sense of freedom and to express an ‘authentic’ aspect of his own identity, Nadeem has to have one Facebook account for his family and one for his friends.

When Nadeem first describes the reason for having separate accounts, he emphasizes the distinction between having to conform to family expectations and also wanting to have a space where he can be free. He describes the family account as one where he is connected to his brothers, sister and female cousins as well as his father. In total he has around twenty-five friends in his family account, a mixture of male and female but all of whom he knows and has met. He describes how he enacts what he feels his family expects, saying that “Mostly as I said before that within my family I must to be a bit reserve. I always try to be a person, a decent person in the sight of my elders.” In contrast, Nadeem describes his friends account as one where he can be much freer, and where he can interact with female Facebook users. He described how when he uploads posts, “Many friends make comments even, the female friends, and most comments are in Punjabi, because fun is mostly enjoyed in Punjabi!!” As Nadeem explained, he and his friends characterise the use of Punjabi by it’s often salacious and explicit terminology, and enjoy the transgressive nature of reading words in Punjabi written by women.

When I asked Nadeem to explain what was important about this kind of interaction that takes place on his friends account, he described the importance of being able to speak freely, and also of interacting with female Facebook users. He described how on Facebook you can write “whatever you want, whatever is in your mind in your heart”. This freedom to express inner thoughts without being concerned about being judged by parents or elders was emphasised as being really important. Furthermore, the ability to interact with female users was described as being very significant, and providing a space where female users could interact openly with men. As he put it, “in Pakistani culture women feel a reluctance to have a face to face conversation, so when comments are made by them and then by male friends, then everything is open on Facebook. Where else can these boundaries be forgotten? Where else are the boundaries as negligible and you can interact freely as Facebook?” For Nadeem, Facebook is a space that allows new opportunities for self expression and for interaction with members of the opposite sex, opportunities denied in the established social norms that govern his offline life.
However, this description of a technological liberation from social norms and conformity are not the whole story of why Facebook users such as Nadeem create multiple accounts. In later conversations, it turned out that Nadeem’s motivation for creating separate accounts for family and for friends is more complex than simply a desire to talk about his interest in Indian adult actresses and Bollywood music. When I pressed him to explain how he had come to create separate accounts for family and for friends, he described how it was not to protect his privacy, but the privacy of the women in his family.

Nadeem described how Facebooks affordances for social interaction and emphasis on sharing had collapsed social contexts and complicated family relationships. He described how about four years ago he had commented on a cousins posts, which meant that a friend of his also saw her post and also commented on it, directly communicating with his female relative. As he said, “This was very shocking for me, I was afraid, and so I unfriended my female cousin and made an another Facebook ID”. For Nadeem, Facebook had allowed his male friends to transgress the social division between male friends and female relatives, forcing him to create a separate family account for his immediate and extended family. As he put it. “I made this family ID for the sake of privacy because of the shock of seeing my friend comments on my cousin’s post, then I thought that, yaar, some privacy should be made”.

In this account, Nadeem describes how Facebook’s design allows his male friends to traverse social contexts, and able to see the comments and photos of Nadeem’s female relatives. For Nadeem and his male relatives, it was this collapse of social context and impact on family privacy that was the impetus for the creation of a separate ‘authentic’ family account. This impact on social context and privacy is something that many of the respondents I spoke with emphasized, regardless of social position or technology access.

Nadeem’s story highlights two distinct lines of social boundary, between family and friends and between male and female. For Nadeem and many other male respondents who described having multiple ‘authentic’ Facebook accounts, the practice serves to maintain a space where they can be free from the restrictive social of family and female friends. Furthermore, female friends are commonly associated with family and domestic life, though there are of course exceptions, such as Nadeem’s description of the ‘frank’ relations with female friends from University. However, there are also descriptions of the purpose of multiple accounts that go beyond simply establishing spaces for users to be free from their family and associated social norms. The next section explores how the practice of multiple authentic accounts are understood in terms of their role in protecting
family privacy and maintaining social practices of gender segregation that are characterised by principles of honour and religious values.

8.3.2 Digital Freedom – or how female Facebook user’s separate family life

The practice of maintaining multiple Facebook accounts is particularly common amongst male social media users, though a small number of female Facebook users did describe having more than one account. For those that did report having more than one account the practice was described as a liberatory one. Like male users, they said that it enabled them to achieve a degree of freedom they could not experience if they had just one account, and indeed a greater degree of freedom than they were able to realise in their offline lives. Yet the practices have characteristics that are distinct from male user’s creation of multiple accounts.

Nadia is a nineteen-year-old student at a college in Gujarat and is in her second year of studying marketing and communications. She has two ‘real’ Facebook accounts, one for family and one for friends, yet her use is distinctive and reveals how the values of different social groups demand different forms of authenticity. Nadia’s parents and elder brother have been in Portugal for the last fifteen years, and because a visa is so expensive it is her two younger brothers were a priority and were going to join them before she did. Yet her parents have allowed Nadia freedoms that the rest of the family find uncomfortable, as she says, because they live abroad they have “given me liberty of every type”. Nadia described being comfortable with Skype, WhatsApp and other messaging programmes, as she uses them to stay in touch with her family. Yet although she uses these different messaging platforms, her mother wasn’t initially keen that her daughter used Facebook.

Nadia describes an interesting journey through different forms of Facebook authenticity. Initially when she set up her account she created a profile with a fake name, ‘Maha’, after her favourite Indian drama actress, but used her real details and posted real ‘selfie’ pictures of herself. Yet she described how this wasn't very satisfactory as people complimented her on her picture, but using a fake name, denying her the pleasure of directly attributed comments. As she put it, Nadia: “if people are saying “Maha you are looking nice” so it has no meaning, because who is Maha? I am not Maha, my name is Nadia”.

Faced with the unsatisfying likes, Nadia changed her profile back to her real name, and connected to both her family in Gujrat as well as her parents and in Portugal. However, as she continued to take ‘selfies’, she soon started running into problems as male relatives started to make inappropriate comments, causing rumours to circulate. She described how when a cousin posted
comments under a picture that revealed her arm, another cousin started asking what was going on, “wondering if I was having some sort of affair with him”. She explained how her mother had scolded her, and advised her “to create a friends account and fulfil your interests there.”

Nadia’s mother was also concerned that the side of her family in Gujrat were more conservative and would judge both Nadia and also the rest of their family for the way they lived abroad. As Nadia put it, “they have a different mentality than mine. My family mentality is different. Because my parents have given me liberty of every type and here in Pakistan”. As a result, Nadia described how she has one account for family, which only has modest photos and mainly used to share information and updates with family, and one account for friends. She only uses the family account every month or so, to maintain contact with her aunts and extended family, to comment on photographs that are shared and to show her family that she is still in touch and communicating with them.

But Nadia checks her ‘real’ account throughout the day on her phone, an expensive Samsung her mother sent from Portugal. She has mainly female friends in her account, with around four or five male friends, but has divided her friends into two separate groups, one ‘close friends’ group that is only girls and on which she shares everything, including full face ‘selfie’ pictures and another group that is not so close and on which she only shares ‘side poses’ (profile pictures). She describes herself as ‘the selfie queen’ but is careful to set the correct privacy settings for particular kinds of pictures, saying “if I have displayed a picture of half-face, arm or lips or eyes so that are for everyone in friends. But if I have shared a complete selfie then it is only shared with close friends”. Having divided up her social contexts into full face and ‘side pose’ selfie groups, Nadia is able to maintain the integrity of her social networks.

This real account is a place for expression and performative presentation. But this freedom is only possible when it is protected, and Nadia is also very careful about security especially after a scare when a friend of hers gave her boyfriend her password as a trust building practice and her boyfriend had started harassing her friends. So she now has two factor authorization, with text messages sent to her phone to authorise each new log in.

For Nadia, multiple accounts serve to separate her extended family from the rest of her life, and although she is exceptional in that her mother lives abroad and is very permissive, Nadia’s example serves to illustrate how for women, multiple accounts can also serve as a practice that allows a form of freedom, but that it must be carefully managed, such as in the formation of different friendship groups. Nadia’s example also shows how important peer recognition and
affirmation are for some Facebook users, to the extent that she risks changing her Facebook profile to her real name.

This section has described how male and female Facebook users create multiple authentic accounts in order to find a form of freedom from traditional constraints of family and social norms that are inhibiting and limit their ability to express themselves as they wish. For male users, this freedom was characterised as the ability to talk about and share references to films that their family wouldn't approve of or interact with female users that would similarly invite familial sanction. For female users such as Nadia the freedom from family constraints was described largely in terms of explicit and overt presentation of an idealised self in the form of ‘selfies’. The distinction between male and female conceptions of freedoms highlights how for female users this is associated with liberation from practices associated with shame, or in other words that for these female users the freedom they aspire to is to enact particular forms of self that are labelled as shameful by others. Importantly, these examples describe how users create multiple authentic accounts to enable forms enactment that they otherwise wouldn't be able to express. In the next section I describe how female Facebook users create multiple accounts as a defensive act to avoid the complications of the collapse of gendered social context.

### 8.3.3 Digital Defence – or how female Facebook users negotiate context collapse

Although many do describe using multiple Facebook accounts to manage the sites affordance for context collapse, others struggle to manage the integrity of their social lives. Farya’s story describes how she creates multiple authentic accounts as a defence against Facebook’s tendency to collapse social spheres, specifically the gendered spheres that divide men and women in Pakistan.

Faryal is a lecturer at the same Lahore University campus in Mandi Bahauddin where I met Umaid, the Ahle Sunnah student who engaged in sectarian debate. The university has strict security, with armed guards on the gates and strict security protocols. On the other side of the gate the campus is a quiet oasis from the dusty, bustling street outside, with boys and girls sitting and talking together on the lawn. Inside her office it is quiet and she explains that this is a separate world where “people are for learning, it is not like outside where people are always watching”. Faryal has been a lecturer to just over a year now, after graduating from the same university, and now teaches as well as living in and managing a girl’s hostel. Although her family live only an hour away, after her mother passed away a year ago she rarely goes home. Because she is a single female teacher living alone, Faryal is very concerned about her reputation, and indeed the protection of her reputation plays an important role in the way she uses social media.
Faryal described the difficulties she has experienced that resulted from Facebook’s affordances for traversing friend’s groups and that subsequently forced her to create multiple ‘authentic’ Facebook accounts. She described how when she started her MBA a friend had helped her create her Facebook account, setting up the username, password as well as adding some friends, but that when she had added her female classmates, they had all rejected her friends request. This led to her experiencing social anxiety, “I was thinking that they have some negative things about me and that’s why they’re not adding me”, and felt excluded throughout her time at University. She explained that “Because of my shame and self-respect, I didn’t ask them again and again. I thought they must not like me.”. As she finally finished her course, she asked her friends why they’d rejected her and excluded her from their Facebook discussions. As she said, “They told me that it was because I had male friends in my account and they were afraid they would see their updates and things like that”. Because Faryal was not aware of the way Facebook collapsed social contexts, she had endured years of social exclusion and anxiety.

The consequence of this experience was that she became very aware of managing privacy and security on Facebook, particularly in relation to the management of gender divides. She created two more accounts, also in her real name, one for her family and one for her new college life. Faryal described that this was important because she wanted to be able to share feelings and emotions, especially with her family and also needed to be able to communicate and manage her relationships with her students. She explained that she created separate accounts for family, friends and students because “If I am using the same account with my students, with my friends, with my family, they can know about.... I'm not doing wrong, this is the demand of my job, but some people think negatively.”

Faryal described that although she was careful to separate out the different social contexts of her lives through different accounts, privacy management and social norms had caused problems in the past. The importance of privacy is not just a personal one though, as Faryal also worries about her own role in creating problems for others, specifically for female students. She describes how she has both male and female students as friends on her students Facebook account, but is concerned about the implications this might have. Faryal uses Facebook to manage her students assignments and coordinate coursework, and so has a large number of students as friends. When she realised that some female students weren’t joining the discussions, they said “Madam you have lot of students in your account that’s why I am not adding you’. So I am facing some concern, thinking that my female students would get into relationships with my male students through my
account.” For Faryal, even a dedicated educational account fails to resolve the challenge of gendered social contexts and the platforms affordance for context collapse.

Faryal’s experience of using Facebook and negotiating the collapse of social contexts is shaped by gendered divides that through the concept of ‘purdah’ are understood as fundamentally cultural and religious in nature. Her lack of awareness of the site’s design and resulting affordances for traversing friendship groups caused high levels of social anxiety and a failure to establish new friends. To meet Facebook’s demand for authenticity Faryal had to create multiple accounts in order to avoid the consequences of transgressing the cultural and religious norms that are embodied in Pakistan’s patterns of religiously justified gender segregation. The next section explores efforts to mitigate the transformatory effects of Facebook through cases of male Facebook users who create multiple authentic accounts to maintain traditional social norms and female Facebook users who find a sense of meaning in submission to traditional gender positions.

**8.3.4 Digital Izzat – or how male users protect honour**

The previous sections have described different practices related to the use of Facebook in overcoming, negotiating or managing deeply entrenched gender divisions. These last two sections turn to practices that reveal underlying social norms of honour and social status that influence technological practices. First it looks at how male Facebook users create multiple authentic accounts to separate family and friends and then how female Facebook users find religious meaning in the digital seclusion created by male Facebook users use of multiple authentic accounts. This section shows that the practice of gender segregation described in the previous section is also characterised by the principles and practices of social status and honour.

I meet Shakir at the Gift University in Gujranwala, after being introduced to him through a respondent from the telephone survey. Shakir is 18 years old and the son of a policeman who moved here from the neighbouring village of Hafiz Abad when he was three years old. As the son of government employee Shakir is not wealthy but has the confidence and comforts of a family with a stable job. He proudly shows me his iPhone 5 but complains of the lack of battery life and the fact that he can’t use memory cards with the phone. He explains that the phone was a gift from a cousin in Norway, and because it came from abroad it has an Apple iTunes account that he can buy music from, which he described with both pride and also frustration, as although he could ‘real’ songs, he couldn’t ‘sideload’ music or movies through memory cards onto his phone.

Shakir said he has been on Facebook for at least two years now, and has at least five or six hundred friends, “who I have met face to face. I know them to an extent, because I belong to a village”. Shakir described himself as an ‘addict’ of Facebook, particular to putting up pictures of himself
‘selfies’ and the likes that he got, “more than 300”. Shakir was proud of his association with his village, describing how when he took selfies in the village whilst wearing traditional dress friends from the city would say “what you are wearing yaar? Are you a ‘paindu’ ['paindu is a derogatory word for villager], are you in your senses?” Yet Shakir expresses a great deal of pride in his background, asserting this aspect of his ‘authentic’ identity. Despite this openness, Shakir emphasised the importance of privacy, particularly in relation to gender divides, and to stop his friends contacting his female relatives. As he described it, “the whole privacy thing is because my female cousins are on Facebook, if there is any person who will send her [his female cousin] friend request my image would be broken”. For Shakir maintaining his social status and upholding the families honour was the reason for having strict privacy controls to ensure that his male friends were not able to break the social norm of gender segregation. Although Shakir described how he managed this through privacy settings, he also mentioned that “some people have two accounts to keep their friends and family separate and I think it’s beneficial. I am also thinking of making another account.”

This management of privacy and protection of status is a very common aspect of how people describe using Facebook in Pakistan, and it was explained to me by Sulaiman, a Facebook user in Gujrat, as a practice that has a distinctly religious dimension. Sulaiman is a chartered accountancy graduate, but like so many is unemployed and living at home. He has a South Korean smartphone, but only uses the internet through Wi-Fi, mostly at home as he cannot afford to use 3G data on his phone. He only has one account, but is friends with both male and female relatives as well as friends, in total about 60 friends. Although he uses Facebook for about 15 minutes every day to scroll through his newsfeed and see what his friends have been doing, he said that he rarely posts, preferring to communicate through WhatsApp messages and groups. In other words, Sulaiman is selective and careful about what he posts on Facebook, sensitive to the different audiences that exist for him on Facebook. Although he only has one account, he described how many of his friends have more than one, and that the reason for having more than one account was based on specific religious values:

For around a third of Sulaiman’s friends have more than one Facebook accounts, and most do so to keep their friends and family separate. The main reason for this, according to Sulaiman, is that they want to keep “they want to keep the women apart from their friends. It’s our culture here. Sulaiman explained this as a cultural and religious matter, saying that keeping men and women separate was ‘a Muslim issue’, that “For Muslims, women should be kept in houses. Women are not supposed to communicate with people outside their family. It is just like purdah.”This description emphasises the religious dimension of multiple account usage, and the importance that many male Facebook users place on maintaining the gender segregation that characterises
Pakistani social life. Importantly, Sulaiman emphasises that the main reason is not the ability to be free from the social constraints of family, but the desire to protect women from interaction with male friends and the maintenance of the social practice of female seclusion and purdah. These social and religious values are important part of people’s lives, and are entangled in how people use technologies in villages as much as in cities.

In the village of Shahanalog just outside Mandi Bahauddin, this religiously justified digital gender segregation is even more extreme, with respondents saying that women shouldn't even be allowed to use the internet at all. Sitting in a small, one room tailoring shop open to the road, Zain and his friends describe how the women in the village are not allowed to use the internet. Zain explains that “this is a village, women on the internet, it is not considered good. Islam does not allow them… it’s purdah! Zain described this as a difference between cities in and villages, saying that “urban people they don’t think about this… in them everything is open”. The main focus of his concern was the impact on the seclusion of women. As he put it. I have told you before that we don’t think it good that someone sees our sisters someone else or any non-Mahram (outside of family) sees them”. For Zain, and many others in rural contexts, the internet is regarded as a threat to the social norms of purdah and seclusion of women.

This section has shown how male Facebook users who create multiple ‘authentic’ accounts to separate their family and friends do so for a number of reasons. These include the creation of a space for the enactment of selves that can be free from the disciplinary gaze of family and wider community and allow them to explore both interests and relationships that transgress social norms. Another reason for the creation of separation of family and friends is to stop their male friends from accessing and interacting with their female relatives through Facebook, a separation that users linked to the injunctions of purdah, the common practice of secluding women that was discussed in Chapter Five Religious Identity in Pakistan. Whilst male Facebook users explained this as a religious obligation it was also linked to social norms of status and the principle of izzat or honour. These social practices are described from the perspective of male Facebook users, and it is to female Facebook user’s perspectives on the use multiple accounts that we now turn.

8.3.5 Digital Purdah – or how female users practice digital seclusion

This section explores the same practice digital seclusion from the perspective female Facebook users. It shows that although many women do use these technologies to circumvent long established control over who they interact with, for many female Facebook users, these digital constraints are voluntarily undertaken as part of existing social practices that limit women’s interaction outside the family and in public life. The most common explanation for the practice of having male and female accounts was that it reflected the practice of purdah.
In this section I describe how female Facebook users experience the gender segregation that results from the creation of multiple accounts and the limitation on sharing of personal information. In particular, I focus on how this limitation of self-expression is understood as a meaningful practice, and specifically understood as practice of religious piety. I describe in detail the accounts of two groups of Ahmadi women, focusing on their descriptions because as members of minority and conservative religious groups their religious practices provide insight into the complex interaction of hegemonic discourse and transformative communication technologies.

In Rabwa, the home of the Ahmadi community, I am introduced to two female Facebook users whose father has allowed them to speak with a foreign male. We meet in the betak – the meeting room for male visitors – and sit on overstuffed velvet sofas, with the father serving green tea whilst his daughters sit on a sofa opposite me, wearing a black niqab that covers them from head to toe, revealing only their eyes. Zehra is 19 and at university, studying software engineering whilst her sister Sofia is 22 and works in a local bank.

Sofia explains that she is married but her husband left three months ago for Mali where he is part of the Ahmadi evangelical mission. The Ahmadi place great importance on evangelism, and it is common for devout followers to volunteer for missionary work. Sofia explains that she uses WhatsApp, Viber and Skype to stay in touch with her husband, sending messages all day, mainly through Wi-Fi as no mobile operator had yet installed 3G signals in Rabwa. She didn't have a Facebook account “because I have no time, I don't like it and I am married now”.

Although Zehra also uses messaging applications like WhatsApp, unlike her sister she also uses Facebook. she explains that she uses it mainly for catching up with news and staying in touch with friends, but not close family, because this would result in unwanted connections to unrelated males. As Zehra puts it, “I personally like Facebook.. Like I have university fellows, hostel fellows, area fellows, college fellows and many of them have moved far away ...and we are not in contact with them anymore but a Facebook ID is the only thing that still remains”. Yet this function of Facebook as a link to the broader world remains very segregated along gender lines. As Zehra describes, her Facebook account is limited to female cousins while “For brothers I use WhatsApp and Viber”. She explains that this is “because on Facebook they have their male friends and then friends of friends. So on Facebook one feels insecure, but WhatsApp and Viber have a kind of homely feel”. This digital gender division serves to limit female users ability to reach out beyond the constraints imposed by religious and cultural norms.

Zehra went on to explain that she actually felt more comfortable with this gender seclusion, that
she used to be friends with her brother on Facebook, but had unfriended him herself because she felt it wasn't appropriate, and that she needed a ‘boundary line’. As she put it, “They speak something about girls or they joke with one another so you feel yourself that it is not for females, it is for males”. Instead she described how she felt it was better for her own wellbeing to be excluded from her brothers Facebook friends. She explained that “the trouble starts when it moves on to their friends …they send friend requests or messages even if they don’t know you”. For Zehra, the main concern was that if an unknown male contacted her, “it would create problems for my family – therefore I keep them at a distance”. Zahra’s account describes how she manages a boundary line between her brother’s male friends and herself, distancing herself from the kind of comments that male users make and her family from the consequences of unwanted communication. In this description Zahra reveals how she sacrifices the possibility of communicating with a wider social network because she finds their communication offensive and to protect the honour of her family.

While Zahra’s account describes how female Facebook users withdraw from Facebook’s wider social sphere in response to the possibilities it presents of traversing friends lists and social groups, other accounts emphasise how this social segregation and gender seclusion have religious meaning as well. Ahmad, the leader of the Mandi Bahauddin Ahmadi youth chapter that I met in Rabwa persuaded his father to let me interview his mother and aunt, and so we meet in one of the small dark rooms off the central courtyard of a traditional ‘Haveli’ townhouse. I sit in the main ‘betak’, the meeting room for male visitors, together with Ahmad’s father while in the adjoining room, the doorway covered in a curtain, are Farishta and Sheeba. It is unusual for the women of Ahmadi to be allowed to interact with strange men, but Ahmad’s family are more progressive than many as his father is an academic and they have spent some years living in Tokyo as part of his studies.

Farishta and Sheeba explain that they both use social media extensively, though only Farishta uses Facebook, as Sheeba says she doesn’t “because I don’t have any interest, because I think it’s, I think ahh! It’s a wastage of time”. Both have smartphones whilst Farishta also has a Samsung tablet and a laptop, and says that she accesses the internet, and Facebook specifically, through the tablet and her phone, using Wi-Fi and 3G “whatever is available”. Both Farishta and Sheeba explains that they prefer WhatsApp to Facebook because it is easier and more private, indeed they describe WhatsApp as ‘ghar ki bad’ [in the house]. They use WhatsApp for family messages, mainly within a family group that has about ten members with whom they share news, family updates and crucially, photographs of family events that also include female members. As Sheeba described it, “I like WhatsApp more as compared to Facebook, as I said before that image are, yeah more private and we can maintain our privacy. We can send our selfies and messages
quickly without delay, and I send too many selfies to my husband (all laugh again). He is in England.” While Sheeba emphasizes the important role that WhatsApp plays in maintaining privacy and thus ensuring a degree freedom amongst her family and with her husband, Farishta explains that she uses WhatsApp in a similar way, but also uses Facebook too.

Farishta describes how she uses Facebook maybe once a day for about half an hour, but only to catch up with friends, to look at other people’s status updates and make comments on things that they post. As she says, I only comment. I am not keen of updating statuses or anything else, just comments (laughs) and especially on the family people”. She explained that because she had both male and female friends in her network, she didn’t share any personal information or photographs. She explained that this was “because we are veiled women and we are not allowed to come in front of others. According to the teaching of the Jamaat (religious leadership), the females they don’t show their faces”. For Farishta, visibility on Facebook was considered in the same way as public visibility, and understood through the same religious norm of gender seclusion and purdah.

Farishta went on to explain how purdah was an important to them because of religious as well as social reasons. She described how there were three reasons for the practice of purdah, namely safety, community and God. Farishta explained that she hadn’t practiced purdah when she was in Japan, because it was safe, and people didn't stare, and so in Japan she felt safer and “more free, because people are educated”. But when she came back, she wore the veil again because she knew that people stared and that the community expected it, and if they didn’t practice purdah the family would lose its honour and be disrespected. In contrast to these descriptions of external sources of demand for the practice of purdah, when Farishta described what practicing purdah meant in terms of religion, she emphasized the meaning that it had for her and the feelings that the practice generated. She said that Purdah is because Allah has said it is a must thing. When I follow the command that God has given you I feel very relaxed, very happy.” Yet while Farishta expressed a sense of fulfilment in religious practice, she also said that she felt it was unfair that men got to share so much but women had to be more careful.

Farishta compared how men and women were able to share information and content on Facebook, and said that she thought she would like to share in the way that men do. As she put it “Yeah, I feel a bit jealous, because men have got more freedom than women. In general, and in Facebook. I want to share but I cannot.” She explained that she couldn’t post personal things, such as a picture with this myself, because of “the reaction from the community”. And in a recognition of the global nature of the internet and Facebook, she said that “even if we moved to Japan, I couldn't post things on Facebook. To post personal things on Facebook, my whole family has to be Japanese too (laughs).”
Farishta’s description of her desire to share personal information highlights the difference between male and female Facebook usage, and also the complex layers of meaning that constitute social practices such as purdah. These complex layers, which include the sedimented demands of community, safety and religious practice are entangled with the different affordances of technologies such as WhatsApp and Facebook. The personal nature of WhatsApp affords privacy, immediacy and a space that is limited to the family and those members of the WhatsApp group. Facebook meanwhile demands an authenticity and a sharing of personal details that Farishta and others describe as aspirational, practices they desire to perform. Yet the affordances of traversing friend’s groups and the resulting context collapse mitigate against this desire to limit the realization of the radical transparency of truly unfiltered ‘authenticity’. Instead careful management of the presentation of public selves’ structures what is shared, with whom and in what ways.

These accounts of female Facebook users limiting their social networks and practicing forms of gender seclusion are not limited to Ahmadi Facebook users. As Faryal, the teacher from Mandi Bahauddin, explained: ‘Purdah is important. In Islam it is prohibited for the female to come outside without Purdah, you know. We should follow those lines, and not come outside the house with a Paloo [veil] on your face. Don’t show your face or your body to others, what are you having or what you are not”. Similarly, in Gujrat Nadia emphasized that even though her freedom was important to her, she understood how important the practice of purdah and principles of honour were. As she said, “everyone thinks of purdah and honour. Because if somebody says something about me then the whole thing will be effecting my family even if nobody knows my father then people will use the name of my grandfather. So in this way this thing effects the whole family.” And even in Islamabad, as Fareeha explained, purdah is important, and something that she valued as a religious practice. As she described it, “I think that purdah is for women, it’s good for her. I feel very good observing purdah. I mean my brothers are not here, I observe it myself”.

This section has described how female Facebook users actively separate themselves from the wider social network that Facebook offers for reasons of safety, social conformity and religious practice. Facebooks affordances for traversing friendship lists and for authenticity create tensions between user’s desires to present aspirational aspects of themselves and the wider social norms of piety, submission and honour. In other words, female Facebook users in Pakistan welcome the gender segregation that is a result of male Facebook users creating multiple authentic accounts to separate their male friends from female relatives, and indeed undertake practices to achieve the same effect. Importantly, whilst all female respondents described these practices in terms of safety
and upholding honour in the face of external threats, others also described the practice of digital purdah as a form of religious piety that had intrinsic meaning of its own.

8.4 Analysis: Diffractions of Authenticity - Segregation and Digital Purdah

This section and the subsequent one analyse how the use of Facebook shapes gender and religious practices. While the previous section analysed how the use of Facebook shaped the enactment of minority and majority religious identities, this section turns the analytic gaze towards specific practices. The first section examines the practice of creating fake accounts among male and female Facebook users, comparing an analysis of the practice as technological liberation with an analysis of the same practice as the production of new subjectivities. The second section examines the practice of creating multiple authentic accounts by male Facebook users, analysing it as a form of ‘digital purdah’ from both modernist and postmodern perspectives. The section that follows examines the practice of religious debate and specifically how Facebook’s newsfeed discourse of algorithmic individualism shapes the practice of hidayat or religious instruction.

This section analyses the practice of creating multiple accounts as a strategy to segregate male and female Facebook users. It shows how analyses based on normative theories of development and modernity explain submission to digital purdah in binary terms of traditionalism and modernity. This is contrasted with performative sociomaterial accounts that reveal the complexity of submission as an act of subject formation.

The practice of creating multiple accounts to maintain gender segregation is explained as a response to Facebook’s affordance for the collapse of family and gender boundaries. The enactment of this practice serves to seclude female Facebook users from participation in the wider digital public sphere, much in the same way as the practice of purdah secludes women from public view. The practice is thus termed ‘digital purdah’ and is situated within the traditional practice of purdah and its function in maintaining practices of arranged marriage and family structure. As such, the practice of digital purdah, like traditional purdah, serves to maintain female and family honour (Papanek 1973) as part of upholding the traditional institutions of family and biraderi as core units of social organisation (Alavi 1995).

The practice of purdah is normatively described as a traditional practice of constraint that embodies religious conservatism. In Pakistan, the issue of purdah has historically divided those who see it as a religious practice and those who view it as limiting women’s freedoms (Ansari 2009). Feminist literatures link veiled women to religious orthopraxy in contrast to gender-equality activists who lack equivalent markers (Shaheed 2010). Purdah is also identified as a
barrier to development resources such as healthcare access (Grünenfelder 2013) and employment (Sultana, Jawan, and Hashim 2009). More generally, Sen describes headscarf-wearing women as ‘traditionalist’ (Sen 2007, 62), while Giddens argues that the *hijab* ‘in many Islamic cultural contexts [it] expresses the continuing subjugation of women’ (Giddens 2004, 10). The seclusion of women is thus part of a broader concern about gender equality and limitations on women’s freedom of choice.

From a male perspective, as Shakir explains, the purpose of digital *purdah* is to prevent the dishonour that would result if his male relatives were to see his female relatives. According to Shakir, if his friends were to send his female relatives a friend request, ‘*my image would be broken.*’ For Sulaiman, women ‘are not supposed to communicate with people outside their family. *It is just like purdah.*’ This is part of a wider set of practices that limit women from using the Internet. As Zain says, reflecting the views of many interviewees, ‘*Women on the Internet, it is not considered good. Islam does not allow them… it is purdah.*’ At the heart of these accounts is a concern for the protection of their female relatives’ reputation and marriageability and the family’s honour. Digital *purdah* thus serves the same function as the established practice of keeping women secluded from public life and the possibility of unsanctioned interaction with men.

Women’s accounts of digital *purdah* confirm that the practice limits their ability to interact with other men. Yet, they also describe a willingness to submit to this seclusion. Farishta, for example, says that, although she is jealous of men’s freedoms and wants to share pictures but cannot, she has chosen to limit her presence on Facebook. She emphasises how *purdah* is a religious practice that makes her happy. Faryal describes how she actively chose to unfriend her brother on Facebook to limit exposure to his male friends. Zehra says she prefers WhatsApp to Facebook, despite the latter’s promise of a wider public sphere, because ‘*one feels insecure therefore WhatsApp gives a kind of homely feel. On Facebook one feels insecure.*’ Indeed, women’s overwhelming preference for WhatsApp over Facebook could be understood as a reflection of their choice to minimise their exposure to a wider public sphere, secluding themselves within the confines of a social network that is socially acceptable.

**A Normative Analysis**

The normative perspective of mainstream development theory explains the individual’s choice to limit his or her choices – as in the case of submitting to the practice of *purdah* – as malformed and essentially ‘wrong’. For example, Sen’s capabilities framework explains decisions to limit choice as malformed or ‘adaptive’ preferences (Bruckner 2007; Khader 2011; Nussbaum 1998) – a response to external factors such as the contraction of feasible options (Bruckner 2007, 307).
or ignorance of alternative options (Khader 2011). Adaptive preferences have been used to explain why, for example, women choose to give up their mobile phone at home to maintain domestic harmony (Masika and Bailur 2015). Authentic preferences are always, according to Sen, for freedom and the maximising of choice (Sen 1999). Thus, the only authentic choice is to reject digital purdah and pursue possibility in the wider digital sphere.

According to this analysis, the practice of creating multiple Facebook accounts to seclude female relatives from male friends is a new form of the established practice of purdah. The practice of digital purdah thus constrains women’s freedom and limits their ability to realise the benefits of participating in the wider digital public sphere. Women who choose to submit to the practice of digital purdah do so because they are forced to (their choices are constrained) or because they are not aware of alternatives. Either way, submission as religious practice is always and only subjugation to traditional oppression.

The above analysis is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it rests on a conception of the individual as a ‘choosing, reasoning individual’ (Gasper 2002, 451) for whom the only form of empowerment is through liberation from communal and social ties (Hopgood 2000). This account of the individual was shown to be problematic in Chapter 4 because the idea of the rational sovereign subject was a product of Western Christian thought, which privileged secular modernity over other sociocultural ways of being in the world. In other words, the account of digital purdah echoes theories of modernisation that privilege an Enlightenment model of modernity.

A Sociomaterial Performative Analysis
This liberatory account is further complicated when read through a performative sociomaterial lens. A performative account of identity argues that there is ‘no doer before the deed’ and that identity is made up of pre-given identity categories, experiences and labels (Butler 1990, 40). Thus, for example, Nadia’s enactment of the selfie-taking feminine subject is not the expression of a repressed liberated self, but the performative enactment of an already existing subject. Among the fragmentary, hegemonic discursive regimes, the ‘selfie queen’ is one of the tools to be picked up, the script to enact (Butler 1990).

A performative analysis also allows an alternative reading of voluntary submission to digital purdah as religious practice. Drawing on Butler’s performative account of subjects in discourse, Mahmood describes how the piety practices of Egyptian women, such as wearing the veil, are subject-forming acts. She notes that ‘the very processes and conditions that secure a subject’s subordination are also the means by which she becomes a self-conscious identity and agent’ (Mahmood 2006, 188). Similarly, Jamal’s description of female members of the conservative
political party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, shows how they came to find themselves in the submissive practices of patience and tolerance as ‘more rational, disciplined and open-minded’ beings (Jamal 2009, 20).

Analysed in the same way, accounts of female submission to piety and *purdah* can be acknowledged as subject forming and not merely self-repressive, malformed preferences. When Farishta says of *purdah*, ‘When I follow the command that God has given you I feel very happy’, and when Fareeha says, ‘I feel very good observing *purdah*’, their account of the meaning their feelings have is the performative enactment of themselves as a subject.

This analysis of submission to digital *purdah* is not to conclude that submission is a form of empowerment or liberation, or the erasing of the politics of gender, power or ethics. Rather, it is to acknowledge that all subjects are produced by a discursive practice ‘that enacts or produces that which it names’ (Butler 1993, 13). Although Butler’s performative notion of citation and the submissive subject has been critiqued for its failure to allow the possibility of resistance and change (Nussbaum 1999; Bordo 1992), she argues that ‘there is no subverting of a norm without inhabiting the norm’ (Butler 2006, 285). The point is to acknowledge the possibility of subject formation in ways other than the liberation or detachment of the self, including through piety practices.

Thus, in contrast to the claims in the feminist literature that frame emancipation as the movement from traditional, oppressive religious practices towards modern, liberal freedoms, a performative account of religious practice offers alternative ways of conceptualising gender identity. In contrast to Pakistani feminists who describe Islam as inextricably bound up with the constitution of a subjugated female identity (Rouse 1986; Shaheed 2010), others argue for the possibility of conceptualising gender identity ‘through alternative formulations that question not only the liberal subject of freedom and autonomy but also the feminist subject of resistance and agency’ (Jamal 2009, 13). Instead of a binary polarity between submission and liberation or tradition and modernity, this performative account recognises both the constitutive nature of submission as well as the multi-dimensional nature of religious practice. To recognise that all identities are subjects produced by discursive regimes enables us to recognise the power and interests that are served in (re)citing hegemonic regimes.
9. Religious Identity as Digital Secularisation: Diffraction in Pakistan

This chapter draws on the preceding empirical chapters to present an outline of a theory of how Facebook shapes the enactment of religious identity in Pakistan. This chapter consolidates the insights from the analysis of empirical accounts of Facebook use to formulate a theory of religious identity as enacted through Facebook as ‘digital secularisation’. The previous empirical chapters outlined specific experiences and practices of different religious groups as well as male and female Facebook users, and described how they negotiated Facebook’s affordances for the enactment of religious identities. Analyses of these accounts showed how Facebook’s affordances for singular authenticity reinforced dominant discourses, further strengthening Sunni nationalism as the normative form of Pakistani Muslim identity and marginalising Ahmadi and Shia identities. It also showed how male and female users negotiated Facebook’s affordances for singular authenticity through the use of multiple accounts to enact the gendered subjects positions established in hegemonic discourses of religious nationalism.

The theory of religious identity as digital secularisation is grounded in the work of scholars who argue that the concepts of religion and the secular are historically contingent and embodied in everyday practices. Digital secularisation follows Asad to argue that the meaning of religion can be understood as the product of genealogical power, that ‘their possibility and their authoritative status are to be explained as products of historically distinctive disciplines and forces (1993, 10). Digital secularisation thus describes how religious identity emerges in the form of religious practices that are the product of genealogical power translated through social and technological discourse. Digital secularisation theorises how Facebook shapes religious identity as secularisation through incorporating the role of technology as agentic actors, translating specific discourses. The theory of digital secularisation describes a process and a form of religious identity, and distinguishes between ‘the secular’ as an epistemic concept and secularism - as a political project. As Asad argues, ‘the secular’ is conceptually prior to the political doctrine of ‘secularism’ (1993, 16) but is not a preceding or enabling state – ‘the secular’ is not a gateway to secularism. This means that digital secularisation is not a statement about the nature of religion prior to Facebook use – in other words, it is not arguing that Facebook secularises the sacred, or is disenchanting. Instead, digital secularisation argues that Facebook affords a religious identity that is of a particular nature, namely voluntaristic, rational and individualistic – forms of subjecthood that are commonly characterised as modern (Giddens, 1991; Castells, 2010).
This chapter draws on Asad’s reconceptualization of religion and secularity and operationalises it through drawing on Iqtidar’s (2011) framework of religious identity and secularisation to characterise Facebook’s shaping of religious identity as ‘digital secularisation’. The chapter then proceeds to outline the nature of agency in this process, drawing on Butler’s (1990) notion of the desiring subject to explain how the desire for recognition drives users to conform to expectations, and explains this through female users accounts of enacting pious religious identities. The chapter then proceeds to outline the implications of digital secularisation through drawing on Barad’s concept of diffraction. The chapter concludes with an outline of the implications of digital secularisation and diffraction for religious identity in Pakistan.

9.1 Digital Secularisation

The empirical chapters found that in many cases the use of Facebook to enact religious identity appeared to reinforce existing hegemonic discourses, whether they be in the form of entrenching Sunni Islam as the normative form of religious nationalism or the established positions of women as submissive embodiments of family and national honour. Yet the performative enactment of hegemonic discourse and the resulting ‘amplification’ of religious nationalism is not simply a faithful reproduction of hegemonic norms. Facebook shapes religious identity through the introduction of particular forms of subjecthood that change to the nature of the religious identity that is being performed. It is the nature of the process of enactment that points towards the kind of social change that is introduced through the way Facebook shapes religious identity in Pakistan. This emphasis on the process of enacting religious identity echoes Iqtidar’s (2011) account of the way the Jamaat Islami introduce new forms of religious practice that result in changes to the nature of religious practice and identity. In paying attention to religious identity in practice the argument follows Asad’s call for greater attention to understanding religion and secularity in practices, to look at ‘the occurrence of events (utterances, practices, dispositions) and the authorizing processes that give those events meaning and embody that meaning in concrete institutions.’ (1993, 43).

I argue that the process of enacting religious identity on Facebook is a secularising process because it transforms the nature of religious identity into a form that is individualist and voluntaristic, rationalist and performative. Iqtidar’s (2011) concept of secularisation as a process (distinct from secularism as a policy) consists of three core
attributes, and which allow her to argue that the Jamaat Islami are a secularising force and a modern institution that produces modern subjects. The first attribute is the exercise of choice over religious identity, the second is the rationalisation of religion through its application beyond the private sphere to everyday life and thirdly the conscious enactment of religious identity. I show how Facebook affords similar processes of enactment and therefore argue that Facebook introduces a process of social change that I describe as ‘digital secularisation’.

9.1.1 Choice and Religious Identity

Iqtidar argues that the Jamaat Islami exists in a context where individuals can exercise choice over their affiliation to a particular religious community, and specifically to one of the many Islamic groups such as one of the ulama-led maslaks (Deobandi, Barelwi, Ahl-e Hadis, or Tablighi Jama’at) or one of the Islamist groups such as Jamaat Islami. In other words, Muslims in Pakistan live in a competitive religious market place and can exercise voluntary, individual agency in their choice of religious affiliation. This reflects a shift from religious identity as historically defined by the community or tribe to one in which individuals exercise individual voluntary agency in their choice of religious identity. As Iqtidar describes it, this is ‘a trend toward individuals trying to define the right ‘religious package’ for themselves’ (2011, 6), and reflects the modernist conception of individual identity central to theorists of modernity (Giddens, 1991; Castells 2010).

Social media platforms such as Facebook offer new platforms for the exercise of choice over how individuals perform their identity. Firstly, social media platforms such as Facebook exist in a marketplace of platforms, and must compete with others for the attention and time of users. Though this competition is real, many respondents reported a sense that they had no choice but to join Facebook out of social pressure or logistical reasons such as the distribution of homework. The choice of platform also results in different forms of religious expression, as respondents described different patterns of Facebook and WhatsApp use. Male respondents described a preference for Facebook, and a degree of comfort in articulating religious identity in public whilst female respondents tended to prefer WhatsApp and to talk about religion in private and amongst known friends.
Social media platforms themselves also afford users choice in the nature of their identity performance. Although Turkle (1984) was wrong to categorise the internet and online forums as a separate, ‘second life’, she was right to identify them as a new medium affording particular forms of expression. A characteristic affordance is the possibility of interacting with people that users might not have met, and the finding of new opportunities for self-expression. Mark Zuckerberg describes the site as offering users ‘a way to say what they’re thinking and have their voice be heard’ (Zuckerberg, 2012). Although many respondents described ways in which self-expression was qualified or constrained, many also described how the platform provided new opportunities for self-expression. Nadia for example described how she embraced Facebook and Instagram for the possibility of being ‘a selfie queen’. As Nadia said, ‘there was this trend in Pakistan of having names like “attitude queen” or “stone heart”...so I used mermaid ...to specify how I am considering myself nowadays”. Here Nadia describes how she consciously exercises choice over how she articulates herself to a ‘public’ audience. Users can also exercise choice over their audiences through affiliating themselves to groups, interests and categories. Indeed, Facebook is designed to respond to those choices by selecting content it believes is relevant to that specific identity and audience. Many respondents described how they self-selected into sect specific groups in which the nature of religious debate was more open than in mixed-sect groups, and also how Facebook would populate their Newsfeed with content from friends in similar groups. In other words, Facebook affords users the opportunity to choose amongst many different religious identities and then responds to that choice by selecting content that is relevant to the identity a user has chosen.

Facebook shape religious identity through its affordances for individual choice in identity enactment, introducing a process of voluntary, conscious consideration about the nature of the identity being enacted. Iqtidar describes how the competing Islamist groups bring about a ‘critical engagement with the notion of Islam as cohesive religion and a deepening realisation that there is no single Islam’ (2011, 6). Similarly, Facebook’s introduction of new choices in how to perform and present oneself force users to exercise critical thinking about the form of Islam that they enact in their daily lives. Users compare their performative presentation of the self in relation to others and as conscious acts. This introduces an engagement with religious as a conscious practice that is distinct from historic practices in which religion was assumed, unquestioned part of everyday life.
9.1.2 Rationalisation and Religious Uniformity

Facebook also shapes religious identity through a ‘rationalising’ process in which users enact uniform, ‘authentic’ and ‘legitimate’ form of religious identity across all areas of their life. Because Facebook demands a singular, authentic self across all social contexts (Marwick and boyd, 2014), Facebook users must consciously enact a religious identity that meets the demands of the hegemonic social order. This process of rationalising religious identity is a similar secularisation of religious identity that reflects the organisational processes of the Jamaat Islami, as described by Iqtidar (2011). Iqtidar argues that that JI are a secularising force because they promote a ‘rationalising’ of religion through the conscious and rational application of religion to social contexts outside the private sphere (2011, 151-155). This extension of religion outside the private sphere goes against theories of modernisation and secularisation that predict a declining importance of faith as religious authority wanes (Chaves, 1994) or is differentiated from public life and relegated to the private sphere (Luckmann, 1967). Common to these accounts is the assumption that the ‘quantity’ of religion declines as it is diminished in peoples everyday life.

However, Iqtidar argues that focusing on the quantity of religion fails to explain the continuing role of religion in processes of social change and modern life. Iqtidar argues that we can better understand how religion retains it’s salience by paying attention to the quality of religious practice rather than assessments of the quantity of religion. Paying attention to the nature of religious practice reveals how Muslim men and women bring a modernist religious lens to all aspects of modern life that leads to a ‘refashioning of belief in Muslim societies’ (2011:150). Iqtidar argues that this refashioning of religion to all aspects of non-religious life involves a ‘rationalizing’ of religion that introduces a modern form of faith that is applied to all aspects of life. In other words, religion is rationalized as all life must conform to the ‘authentic’ form of rationalised faith, and all ‘non-religious’ life must be lived according to religious norms and values.

The assumption of a singular, universal identity that is uniform across social contexts reflects the conception of the individual afforded by Facebook’s design. Mark Zuckerbergs assertion that “Having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of
integrity. "(Zuckerberg in Zimmer 2015) reflects his belief in the principle of an authentic, singular self, a belief that underpins the modernist ideal of authentic, sovereign subject. Zuckerbergs’ belief is translated through Facebook affordances for the structuring of all spheres of life according to one ‘authentic’ set of norms. Facebooks affordance for collapsing contexts means that users are forced to maintain a coherence and integrity of subjectivity – that is, they must enact a single identity that conforms to the ‘lowest common denominator’ (Marwick and boyd, 2014) of audience expectation. This serves to reinforce a dominant, hegemonic discourse of religious nationalism because in Pakistan Sunni religious nationalism is the normative religious identity. Many of the Facebook users I spoke to described how religious content constituted a significant element of their social media activity, and how a significant number of the first ten items in their newsfeed consisted of religious content, in contrast to the prediction of a decline of religion that one might expect from the liberatory claims for ICTs. For example, Fareehad and Waheeda, Shia students at a University in Gujrat, described how they would often post “sayings of the Prophet (PBUH) as good wishes for a friend, or to share good wishes for the day’. Similarly, Nabeel, a young Sunni working at a mobile phone shop in Gujranwala, described how he would commonly post “hadiths and good things for others to follow. If there is a post or a good saying, then I will like, and if it is really good then also share. Sharing is like a prayer”. Respondents also described how a significant number of the first ten items their newsfeed, items selected by Facebook’s algorithm because it calculated that it would be content users would interact with, were religious in nature. Nabeel, for example, said that “now, the first and the last three items are like hadiths, or pics of the Kaaba or at least three, maybe four of the items. Many others described how on average at least three or four of the top ten items in their newsfeed, items that Facebook selects because it predicts users are most likely to interact with them (Skeggs and Yuill, 2016), were religious in nature. In other words, the Facebook algorithm knows that for the uses I spoke to religious content drives interaction, and so it includes this content in the items it selects for peoples Newsfeeds.

Religion continues to be salient because it is part of the subject that Facebook users seek to enact, as well as being a product of the context afforded by Facebooks singular subject. When users break Facebook’s terms of service and create multiple Facebook accounts they do not enact ‘authentic’ secular selves when they are free from the demanding gaze of parents or community. When users created separate family and friends accounts
religion remained a significant dimension in each of the identities they enacted. For example, although the Facebook users I spoke with described ‘family’ and ‘friends’ accounts in order to be different in different social contexts, common to both was the posting and engagement with religious content. Even in their ‘friends’ accounts, where users described how they felt free and able to talk about ‘modern’ subjects such as Bollywood music, Hollywood films and porn stars, they also described posting religious content too.

For many users, religious content was part of all their multiple profiles. For example, Nabeel described how he has two IDs, “One for family and the other for friends”. At first, he described how in his family account he makes a conscious effort to enact a religious identity as he knows that’s what his family expects. As he said, “Islamic pages are within my family ID and the other ones are within my friends ID. He went on to describe in a later conversation how when using his friends account he often came across sectarian related content, and claimed he would often participate in debates, defending users who were being attacked. As he said, “Yeah I have [got involved] many times. The person being attacked is also a human being...he also have rights and we should care about them as well as we care about ourselves”. For Nabeel, religious content is part of both his family and friends accounts.

Facebooks affordances for a singular, authentic subject interacts with the dominant hegemonic discourse of religious nationalism in such a way that it demands users enact a religious identity that is uniform and consistent across the multiple contexts and identities they enact. This rationalisation of religion into all aspects of life reflects Iqtidar’s (2011) description of how the Jamaat Islami encourages a ‘rationalisation’ of religion across all aspects of life and Weber’s (1950[1904]) account of the way in which the Calvinists urged a uniform whole life of good work, in contrast to the discrete ‘good works’ advocated by the Catholic church. This is not to argue that Facebook serves the same secularising function as the JI or the Catholic church, or that it leads towards the same outcomes. Rather, Facebook affords a process of rationalisation that is agnostic on the content of that rationalisation. Whilst religious institutions necessarily urge a rationalisation of their own beliefs, Facebook affords a rationalisation of whatever discourse holds a hegemonic position in the context of it’s users. Facebook shapes the quality of expression and shape of identity that emerges from the platform, yet is agnostic as to the content of this identity.
Facebook’s sociomaterial technological discourse of singular authenticity demands that users enact a uniform, coherent self that is the same across social contexts, forcing users to rationalise their performance so that it meets the lowest common denominator of conformity. Drawing on Barad’s idea of technology as an ‘apparatus’ allows us to see Facebook as a site in which religious identity is enacted as well as playing an active role in shaping the form of religious identity that is enacted. Like Barad’s account of the slit in the wave-particle experiment described in the beginning of this thesis, as religious identity is enacted through Facebook ‘it is not merely that the past behaviour of some given entity has been changed, as it were, but that the entities’ very identity has been changed!’ (Barad, 2010:260). Facebook changes the nature of subjectivity through its affordance for a singular, authentic identity leading to a rationalisation of whatever discourse dominates the users context. In Pakistan, enacting religious identity reinforces the hegemony of a Sunni nationalist identity.

9.1.3 Conscious Enactment of Religious Identity

Facebook also shapes religious identity is through a process of ‘objectification’, a process in which religious identity becomes a conscious, performative act differentiating the individual from others. Because Facebook affords the traversing of social contexts and friendship groups, it shapes religious identity through increasing the conscious exposure to people from different religious groups and sects. Users respond to this exposure of ‘others’ by consciously defining and enacting their religious identity. This objectification of religion is a similar process to the objectification that Iqtidar describes being afforded by the JI, a process she argues is secularising because it shapes how individuals define their beliefs and practices in a conscious, deliberate way (2011:25). Iqtidar draws on Eickelman and Piscatori’s (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996) concept of ‘objectification’ to describe the process in which people consciously define the meaning and role of religion in everyday life. Iqtidar describes how the JI exists in a competitive marketplace of religious groups, and in having to explain their positions the JI and other Islamists differentiate their practices and beliefs from others. This leads to an objectification of religion ‘in which religion is not emptied out of its transcendental value but is transformed into a more historically situated, critically analysed set of values and practices’ (Iqtidar, 2011: 36). One of the ways the JI and other Islamist parties shape religious identity is
through the way they encourage constant comparisons with *other* Islamist groups and related ways of being’ (Iqtidar, 2011:126).

This objectification is the conscious rationalisation of questions of individual religious identity, questions that historically were unproblematised and taken for granted. In the same way that religious identity was normally part of the milieu in which one lived and in which following a different faith would at the least be noticeable if not sanctioned, the conscious effort to think about identity and enact it in the ‘right’ way introduces a form of rational consideration of the self that makes religious identity a performative enactment. Facebook shapes religious identity through affording similar processes of objectification, as it demands that users consciously select and portray themselves in relationship to others and to other beliefs. Facebook’s affordances for sharing content and traversing friendship groups serves to strengthen a process of objectification. Many of the users I spoke with described how through Facebook they were exposed to people from different religious groups, and how that exposure led to an increased sense of self-definition. For example, Fahad, a young student in a private university in Gujarat, described how it was easy to tell which sect someone on Facebook belonged to, as he said “*We can guess it by their posts, the links which they have shared. If most of their posts are related to the Pious Caliphs of Islam then one can say that they belong to a Barelvi or Sunni sect. But if they have most of their posts regarding the Imams, the twelve Imams which is the belief of Shias*”. This assessment of users religious identity was something that nearly every respondent articulated.

Facebook’s affordances for traversing friendship groups increases exposure to Muslims from different sects, even as they self-select into broader silos, such as Sunni and Shia. Some users described how they self-selected into intra-sectarian groups, but that this process of self-selecting was also accompanied by exposure to inter-sectarian debate. Qasim for example described how in the dedicated Shia groups that he was part of there was lots of debate about sectarian issues because it was amongst people of the same faith and that he only got dragged into inter-sectarian debate when he was tagged by friends participating in other groups with Sunni and Shia members.

Facebook’s affordances for algorithmic individualism, and for giving users what it thinks they want also affords a process of objectification as some individuals described how
their newsfeed was populated by content they disagreed with the more they interacted with that content. Facebook’s affordances for religious objectification are most apparent in the descriptions of people who describe spending significant amounts of time engaging in sectarian debate. For example, Umaid’s account of engaging in what I termed ‘algorithmic sectarianism’ described how Facebook’s algorithm selected inter-sectarian content because it had learned that Umaid spent time interacting with it. For Umaid, this was understood as a practice of hidayat and part of his own religious identity that was enacted in relation to people of different beliefs. As Umaid put it, “If the post is wrong, like it is not what the Prophet said or did, or it is something bid’ah, then I have to comment”. That this differentiation was an important part of Usman’s identity was clear from the way he emphasised other peoples’ positive reactions, saying “many people liked and said well done”. Other respondents also described how their sense of religious identity was manifest in their interaction with people from different groups. One young female student from Islamabad who had converted from Sunni to Shia described how she responded to Facebook criticisms of the Shia faith, saying that she “became obsessed, it was all the time, it was so energising”. Later she told me that she had got so animated about responding to these attacks that her mother had begged her to stop, and so instead she started attacking people posting atheist quotes instead, saying “now it’s the secularists, I tell them that religion is important and we must protect Islam in Pakistan”. Facebook’s affordances for singular authenticity leads to Newsfeed algorithm populating users feeds with content that can provoke sectarian debate and lead to users further objectifying their faith as they seek to define their own religious identity in relation to others.

For many of the respondents I spoke to, their online religious practice was characterised by this distinguishing of their beliefs and practices against others from other branches or sects of Islam. Many described how these behaviours were part of practices through which religious merit was earned, and as such were important part of their religious life. In other words, change in the form of religious practice was linked to a process of conscious objectification of religious identity and experience. In this sense, the affordances of social media platforms enable religious experience in a form that is secularising but does not lead to the displacement or decline of religious belief. Iqtidar makes a similar argument in relation to the impact of the JI on religious practice. She argues that the change in religious practice is not the ‘disenchantment’ and loss of
religious experience but rather a transformation of experience of the transcendent. She argues that the religious practices that are afforded by the Islamists is characterised by ‘a largely individualised decision that must be justified internally, that is, within a subject, and externally, to others around the subject’ (Iqtidar, 2011:157).

Facebook also affords a religious practice that is individualistic yet comparative. The simultaneous siloing of public debate into echo chambers and the exposure to the publicly articulated views of other Muslims increases the objectification of religion as a conscious, performative act across all spheres of life. The incorporation of Facebook into religious practice, not least its function as a sphere in which religious practice can earn sawab, emphasises the practice of religion in modern form. This refusal to separate life into religious and non-religious spheres is characteristic of the secularising force of the Islamists as described by Iqtidar. She argues that the Islamists rejection of the public-private divide and the belief that religion cannot be modern means that ‘political and social entanglements cannot proceed along strictly linear formations’ (Iqtidar, 2011:158). There is no path from traditional, religious life to modern, secular life, but rather that religious practices take on new, diverse forms and qualities.

This account of the performative enactment and ‘objectification’ of religion reflects a change in the nature of religious practice, particularly a shift towards the individualism of modernity and away from the communalism typically associated with tradition. Facebook affords a form of religious practice that echoes Iqtidar’s description of the form of religious practice afforded by the JI, ‘a largely individualised decision that must be justified internally, that is, within a subject, and externally, to others around the subject’ (Iqtidar, 2011:157). Iqtidar describes the JI as an institution that is the product of it’s time - it’s political nature originating in the colonial, state oriented context, a context where identities were in a process of being formalised and defined through “codification of religious laws, political constituencies, and census activity” (p. 45). In much the same way, Facebook demands that users reflect and make internal decisions about the nature of their religious identity that must also be justified to the audience of their performance. Facebook’s conception of identity is a product of specific socio-historical contexts, embodying Silicon Valley’s belief in the singular, sovereign and authentic individual whose liberation is the greatest goal of all.
9.2 Facebook, Agency and the Desiring Subject

The previous section outlined the three ways in which the use of Facebook secularises religious identity, introducing processes of choice, rationalisation and conscious enactment. This section explains Facebook’s power for shaping religious identity through it’s ability to feed users desire for acknowledgement, drawing on Butler’s conception of the nature of individuals as ‘desiring subject’s that seek recognition. It shows how nuanced understandings of agency can explain female Facebook users accounts of making choices that limit their exposure can contribute to theories of ICTD, development and social change. Facebook has been described as affording a process of digital secularisation, but this is not to suggest a technological determinist stance. Individuals are motivated to engage with and use Facebook to achieve particular goals, interacting with the possibilities for action that Facebook affords in a particular context. Explaining individual agency in a theory of digital secularisation requires an outline of the desires that motivate individual users.

The question of individual choice and the agency to make those choices is a central concern in development and ICTD literatures, and indeed in the wider social science literatures that assume information technologies increase individual choice, and that individual choice is leads inevitably towards liberalism. The assumption that underpin the claim of technologies as somehow liberating is that people will always choose choice. This is particularly the case in the context of gender, where digital technologies have been described as offering particular potential for emancipation and liberation from patriarchy and oppression (Giddens 2004; Sen 2010). Indeed, a number of the female Facebook users I spoke with described how they used social media platforms like Facebook to interact with male users in ways that were not previously possible and to enact forms of self-representation that they could not in public. Nadia for example described how she presented an outspoken, feminine ‘selfie-queen’ identity on Facebook, an identity that she had to separate from her conservative extended by using multiple Facebook accounts. This account, like many others, reflects the liberatory, secularist account of individual freedom and choice. However, there were also others who described using the same technologies to limit choice and to conform to social and religious norms of pious modesty. I draw on Butler’s (1990, 2004) idea of ‘the desiring subject’ to explain these
self-limiting choices and the motivation that shapes individual practices of technology use.

In contrast to this liberatory account many female respondents described using information technologies and social media in ways designed to limit exposure and interaction with the wider world. The findings from the survey of mobile data users painted a picture in which female respondent’s digital lives were characterised by closed, family based social networks through a preference for Whatsapp over Facebook and the limiting of friendship groups to family members. Only 45% of female respondents identified Facebook as their preferred social media platform, compared to 85% of male respondents, whilst 34% of female respondents said the parents were in their social network, compared to 16% of male respondents. Only 33% of female respondents said they were connected on Facebook to their male friends, compared to 48% of male respondents who said their female friends were in their contact list. In other words, female respondents described a family oriented, gender segregated online social network, a picture of that reflected interview respondent’s descriptions of their offline social network. Far from using ICTs to liberate themselves from the restrictions of traditional norms and conservative religious values, female users actively chose to replicate their offline social works online.

Many female Facebook users explained this by describing how social media platforms could be a means through which established piety practices could be upheld, rather than a platform through their restraints can be escaped. Faryal, for example, the university teacher in Mandibahudin, described how she created multiple Facebook accounts as part of her attempts to negotiate the platforms affordances for visibility in a bid to maintain the offline practice of covering herself in her online social life, saying “it is like Purdah, we must cover”. Similarly, Farishta, one of the Ahmadi sisters in Rabwa, described how she preferred WhatsApp because it was “ghar ki bad” (in the house) and that she avoided showing pictures of herself because “we are veiled women, and according to the Jamaat, Muslim women don’t show their faces”. Many respondents emphasised that veiling was not simply a response to external pressure, and that they found a sense of fulfilment and meaning in practising purdah. Indeed, many of the female respondents described how they found a sense of identity and a feeling of wellbeing that came from submitting to
practices that are viewed by many secularist feminist as the product of false consciousness and inherently oppressive.

These practices of limitation and the question of agency is closely linked to the process of secularisation and secularism, as both are understood to be conditions in which individuals are free to exercise choice. In this sense, secularism is commonly linked to agency whilst religion is associated with submission, the giving up of individual choice and agency ‘to follow norms and traditions unthinkingly’ (Iqtidar, 2011:130). Islam particularly is, as Iqtidar (2011) notes, commonly associated with misogyny, and so there is a great deal of literature exploring the role of women in Islam, and particularly why women submit to oppressive religious practices. In contrast to secular feminists view of voluntary submission as ‘false consciousness’, a growing literature explores female religious practice in Islam and challenges this conceptualisation of religion, secularity and agency to describe how agency can be found within practices of submission. Some describe how women find a sense of subjecthood and agency through practices such as maintaining modesty and veiling, arguing that ‘the very processes and conditions that secure a subject’s subordination are also the means by which she becomes a self-conscious identity and agent’ (Mahmood 2006, 188). Other describe how female membership of conservative Islamist parties (Iqtidar, 2011) or religious revival movements (Babar 2008; Jamal 2006) provide real opportunities for women to exercise choice and agency despite subordination to apparently oppressive norms.

This conceptualisation of agency and subjecthood can also be drawn on to understand practices that appear to be liberatory, such as Nadia’s presentation of herself as a ‘selfie-queen’ can be understood not as liberation but as a similar practice of submission. Viewing subjecthood as being realised through submission can help show Nadia’s selfie queen not as the liberation of an ‘authentic’ subject, but rather as the enactment of a subject that is produced by other forms of oppressive, patriarchal power. Nadia’s poses, her calculation about whether to reveal a “side-pose with arms, lips and eyes or a full selfie”, her attention to make-up and flattering angles suggest a concern for the gaze of the viewer that reflects well established arguments about the nature of the female subject and the ‘male gaze’. Nadia’s presentation of herself could be read as an internalised ‘male gaze’ (Mulvey 1989), and thus the enactment of an identity also subject to forms of oppression and patriarchy. In the same way Warfield draws on Barad’s agential realism.
to explore agency in the enactment of selfie images that produce subjects contained in hegemonic discourse, so Nadia’s negotiation of selfies and contexts reflect ‘a kind of agency that emerges as the result of small shifts and reconfigurations of gendered apparatuses of bodily production’ (Warfield 2016, 6). Nadia’s enactment of a liberated subject can also be read as the enactment of a subject that exists in the patriarchal discourse of the Western male gaze.

Similarly, it is possible to read Nadia’s account of producing selfies that negotiate the competing demand of subjects demanded by conservative family and community, close friends and her imagined audiences as submission to externally produced subjects, yet still always with spaces of agency through the reconfigurations of body, self and technology. As she says, “in my close family account, if ever there is a photo I always present myself covered, but in my proper account I can be the selfie-queen”. Through these negotiations of social norms, contexts and technological affordances Nadia finds forms of agency even as she submits to the forms of identity demanded by religious conservatism or patriarchal male gaze of Western modernity. Nadia’s negotiation of the competing demands of different contexts is motivated by what Butler (2004) describes as a desire for recognition for it is ‘only through the recognition of the Other’ (2004, xviii) that individual identity comes to be. For Nadia, it is through recognition by family and a wider public that she simultaneously realises her identities as a good Muslim daughter and a free modern woman.

Facebook shapes religious identity through its affordances for strengthening the hegemonic Other at the same time as creating the possibility of recognition by marginal or distant others. Yet the common denominator of audience recognition, and Facebooks agnosticism on the nature of the subject, means the dominant discourse further strengthens it’s hegemonic position. In this way, Facebook reinforces the female subject position contained within Islamist discourses of female piety and seclusions. Yet this reinforcement is not simply an exact replication of the existing hegemonic order, but rather a remade ‘diffraction’ in what emerges from the intra-action of Facebooks technological discourse of singular authenticity and the hegemonic discourse in the context of its use is a refraction of both. This diffraction is the social change arising from the use of Facebook.
9.3 Diffraction and Change in Pakistan

Theorising Facebook’s shaping of religious identity in Pakistan as ‘digital secularisation’ has theorised a non-technologically determinist role for technology and a conception of human agency beyond Kantian sovereign subjechthood. In other words, the previous two sections have explained how the intra-action of technologies, bodies and discourse result in the emergence of new forms of religious identity. This final section brings these together to form an emergent sketch of a broader account of social change through an outline of a framework for theorising the changes that emerge from the process of digital secularisation.

Digital secularisation describes the amplification of hegemonic discourse and explains the continuing role of religion, yet it also describes how change can happen. Interrogating the normative discourse of modernisation within ICTD and development theory it rejects the linear conception of progress, following Asad to argue that “If anything is agreed upon, it is that a straightforward narrative progress from the religious to the secular is no longer acceptable” (2003, 1). Yet whilst a linear process of change from religious to the secular is rejected, it is important to outline a role for technology in processes of change that go beyond reinforcing the status quo. To do so I draw on the concept of ‘diffraction’, a central concept in Barad’s (2007) theory of agential realism and for which she draws heavily on Harraway’s account of the term. Haraway describes diffraction in the following manner: ‘Diffraction patterns record the history of interaction, interference, reinforcement, difference. Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not about originals. Unlike reflections, diffractions do not displace the same elsewhere, in more or less distorted form’ (1997, 273). Whilst Barad draws on the concept of diffraction as a methodological approach of ‘reading insights through one another’ (2007, 72), here I draw on it as a way of describing the kind of change that emerges from the interaction of Facebook, users and religious identity.

The term ‘amplification’ is a description some use to describe the role of technology in change that attempts to avoid the traps of social or technological determinism. On the one hand, theorists of modernisation and modernity have granted ICTs with the power to shape democratic outcomes (Diamond, 2010), and liberating individualism (Giddens,
1986, 1991) and network societies (Castells, 2000, 2010). On the other, critics of the development project have argued that technologies impose macro-systemic formations of Western knowledge ideology (Ferguson 1994; Mosse 2005). Instead, as ICTD theorist Toyama (2011) suggests, viewing technology as an amplifier rejects claims of technology alone as additive or transformative and instead recognises that it cannot substitute for institutional capacity or human intent, that it can amplify existing inequalities as well as positive intent (2011, 75). In other words, technology translates human action. Yet this account, whilst a useful departure from technological and social determinism, lacks a specific role for technology as an active agent in processes of change.

The idea of diffraction as a way of thinking about processes of change in which there is no singular, authentic ‘original’ but rather phenomena in socio-historical contexts that interact and from which emerge new reconfigurations of already existing phenomena. In other words, the impact of Facebook on religious identity in Pakistan is not an impact on but rather an interaction with existing discourses of identity from which emerge reconfigurations of technologies, discourses and practices. The process of enacting religious identity with Facebook introduces forms of subjecthood that reconfigure the elements of the religious identity that is being performed. Importantly, it is the changes in the form of enactment, the ‘quality of belief’ as Iqtidar (2011:150) puts it, that points towards the kind of social change that is introduced through the entanglement of Facebook and religious identity in Pakistan. Facebook shapes religious identity in Pakistan through a process of secularisation characterised by rationalisation, objectification and conscious enactment so that hegemonic discourses are reinforced as individualised assertions of authenticity and legitimacy.

This thesis argues that religious identity in Pakistan is the product of historically constituted discursive formations, and that the establishment of these subject positions through a diverse range of media material texts has served particular interests. This has led to the formation of discourses of religious identity characterised by increasingly assertive conservative religious nationalism. Importantly, this assertive nationalism is understood not as the authentic expression of individuals, but rather as hegemonic discourse and the enactment of subject positions. The analysis shows that Facebook is not neutral in these processes. Despite its commitment to the principle of free speech, the technological discourses embodied in Facebook’s design means that the site has specific
biases. These are not specific, but rather generic. That is, the technological discourse of singular authenticity serves to strengthen the already dominant definition of legitimate authenticity. Thus, Facebook is biased towards the reinforcement of normative identities and the consolidation of an already hegemonic discourse even as it affords particular forms for their enactment.

The implications for Pakistan are that the use of Facebook to enact religious identity reinforces—through the performative enactment of discursively constituted subject positions—the already hegemonic discourses of religious identity and a homogeneous, exclusive religious nationalism. In this sense, the use of Facebook to enact religious identity in Pakistan echoes, and indeed amplifies, the contradiction between the state’s efforts to establish a singular, homogenous authentic Muslim identity and the resulting diversity of subjects defined as inauthentic. As Facebook’s technological discourse of singular authenticity reinforces the demand for a singular, Sunni Muslim nationalism, it makes even more legible the sectarian differences within Sunni Islam as well as between the Sunni, Shia and Ahmadi sects. This reinforcing of sectarian identity functions as part of the Pakistani state’s efforts to establish a Pakistani subject that strives towards a singular authenticity by denunciating innumerable others. As Iqtidar notes, while the attainment of a singular, authentic Muslim identity remains elusive, ‘the possibility of that uniform, homogenous majority animates a specific kind of selfhood—one that is impatient with the idea of doctrinal difference even as it is increasingly confronted with the practice of it, of more choices given the proliferation of religious groups in contemporary Pakistan’ (Iqtidar 2012). Similarly, Facebook allows users to self-select into same-sect networks that disparage others, even as patterns of algorithmic sectarianism promote inter-sect interaction around principles of *hidayat* and *bid’ah*. Facebook amplifies the same selfhood as the state, on the one hand bolstering the idea of a homogenous, authentic majority and, on the other, reinforcing sectarian divisions through the creation of echo chambers.

The implications of using Facebook to enact religious identity are thus the hardening of a hegemonic religious nationalism and the boundaries of sectarian division. As the adoption of mobile phones grows and they are used increasingly to access fast mobile Internet services, these implications will only become more significant. Mobile phone use is growing rapidly. PTA reports that the number of mobile Internet users increased from
20 million in October 2015 (when this research was finished) to 31 million in July 2016. In August 2016, Facebook reported there were 27 million Facebook users, up from 20 million in December 2015. This rapid growth is increasingly linked by civil society organisation to concerns about the social impact of such technologies. Internet-based NGOs such as Bytes4All and the Digital Rights Foundation have published reports highlighting issues such as state control over the Internet (Bytes4All 2016), hate speech (Haque 2014), violence against women (Digital Rights Foundation 2015) and blasphemy (Digital Rights Foundation 2015). The new digital cybercrime bill passed in August 2016 has raised concerns about its potential for misuse, not least in terms of providing a legal mechanism to charge Internet users on blasphemy grounds. As noted in the introduction, the first arrest under the bill was for the use of Facebook to harass and blackmail women (The Express Tribune 2016).

While there is increased attention to the potential for the state to exercise control over freedom of speech and the risks to religious minorities and women, the implications of increased Internet and social media use, and specifically Facebook, for the nature of religious identity, remain under-examined. The sociomaterial perspective demonstrates how Facebook’s technological discourses structure individual subjects and the publics they interact with in such a way as to reinforce a dominant, exclusive religious nationalism that amplifies the marginalisation of minorities. The agential realist perspective rejects the ontology that would underpin causal claims for Facebook’s role, and instead shows how they arise out of the intra-action of Facebook’s technological discourses of singular authenticity and the hegemonic discourse of a singular, homogenous Pakistani Muslim subject.
9.4 Conclusion:
This chapter has analysed the empirical data to outline a theory of ‘digital secularisation’ as a way of conceptualising the way Facebook changes the enactment of religious identity. Figure 1 shows how desiring subjects seek recognition through the enactment of religious identity through Facebook, which affords choice, rationalisation and objectification of identity enactment. The diffractions of identities that emerge through their enactment through Facebook conform or trouble the hegemonic discourses that contain religious identity. Through diffractions that trouble hegemonic discourse change emerges in the form of enactments that reconfigure the dominance of hegemonic and marginal discourse formations. The chapter described how processes of rationalisation and objectification shape a modern, individualist practice of religious identity that sharpens the boundaries of difference between identity groups. In Pakistan this
simultaneously reinforces hegemonic discourses of Sunni nationalism whilst presenting new discourses of subjecthood to which users may submit and find recognition. This process of digital secularisation introduces familiar yet distinct logics of identity enactment that point towards an increasing emphasis on religion as a core discourse of identity and division between religious groups and sects. The process of digital secularisation has specific implications for change in Pakistan, as well as for theorisation within the fields of ICTD and development. It is to these that the next chapter turns.
10. Discussion and Conclusions

The preceding chapters have presented empirical accounts of the relationship between the use of Facebook and religious identity, and analysed these accounts through the theoretical framework to propose a theory of enacting religious identity through Facebook as ‘digital secularisation’. This chapter discusses the theoretical implications of these findings for the literatures on ICTD and development. This is followed by a discussion of the study’s methodological contributions and the implications for policy and practice. The chapter concludes with an outline of avenues for further research, the theoretical and methodological limitations of the study and some personal reflections on the process of working on this thesis.

10.1 Theoretical Contributions: ICTD Theory

This thesis makes the following contributions to theorisation in the ICTD literatures. Theorising identity as the sociomaterial performative enactment of hegemonic discourse makes the following contributions to the ICTD literature. It contributes to addressing the gap in the ICTD literature that is the lack of indepth explanations for how individuals interact with technology, particularly in relation to issues such as identity. This lack is compounded by a common assumption in the literature that human behaviour is determined by a universal rationalism (Madon and Avgerou 2004, 176; Walsham and Sahay 2006, 20).

In light of this, the thesis makes the following contributions. First, it shows that identity plays an important role in how individual actors use ICTs. The empirical research shows how individuals’ religious identity shapes their ICT use patterns. For example, it shows that marginalised identities are less likely to use a specific technology if it leads to exposure that causes harm, and if it reduces their ability to manage public visibility. The experience of Ahmadi respondents showed how marginalised groups experience involuntary exposure through Facebook’s affordances for public visibility. Importantly, it is the intra-action of the marginalised and persecuted nature of Ahmadi identity in Pakistan with Facebook’s affordances for collapsed contexts that shapes their use patterns. Understanding the nature of users identity and particularly vulnerability and the affordances for public visibility and context management can help explain the practices of ICT users.

This contribution is both a response to Walsham and Sahay’s call to theorise identity in ICT usage,
and an argument for theorising identity as performative enactment. Theorising identity as the performative enactment of hegemonic discourses helps make explicit the operation of power in constituting specific identity performances. For example, it showed how religious groups leveraged the power of the state to advance as the ‘authentic’ Pakistani identity a Sunni religious nationalism through ‘othering’ Shia, Ahmadi and other religious minorities. This thesis shows how the historically constituted nature of hegemonic discourses is characterised by the operation of power and competing stakeholders. Thus, while Walsham and Sahay (2006) call for theorising the individual, a performative account emphasises the broader operation of power through the discursive regimes that constitute the individual as a subject position (Butler 1990).

This thesis also argues that in theorising identity, in addition to attending to the broader discursive regimes, it is helpful to theorise the artefact (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001) in studies of identity in ICT use. In other words, explaining how identity shapes the use of ICTs also requires us to theorise how ICTs shape identity. As the analysis shows, Facebook’s demand for the enactment of singular, authentic subjects shapes the enactment of religious identity from which emerges a process of ‘digital secularisation’. The sociomaterial perspective provides a framework that highlights how theorising causal interaction between entities fails to account for the inherently entangled (Barad 2007) nature of social and material elements. This thesis thus argues for the value of theorising the social as well as material aspects of technology, describing how technologies embody discourses as materialisations of particular interests and values. Theorising how these interests and values are mediated and intermediated expands the empirical and analytic gaze beyond temporal and spatial instances of use. The sociomaterial account recognises that technologies have their own histories – that ‘matter is always already an ongoing historicity’ (Barad 2003, 822) – and that these histories play an important part in constituting technologies. Therefore, a sociomaterial perspective emphasises the importance of theorising the artefact’s material and social elements.

This thesis has demonstrated the value of a performative sociomaterial conceptualisation of identity and technology for the theorising the individual in accounts of ICT use. In addition to theorising ICT use, this conceptualisation has broader implications for development literature. Theorising the enactment of religious identity through Facebook as digital secularisation, and the ontology of conceptualising identity and ICTs as perpetual entanglements of matter and meaning, introduce implications for the theorisation of development.
10.2 Theoretical Contribution: Towards a Sociomaterial Theory of ICTD

This thesis contributes towards the theorisation of religion and secularisation in development literatures. It theorises the role of religion and secularisation in processes of social change through an account of non-instrumental, ‘everyday’ technology use and the broader sociomaterial theorisation of digital secularisation in processes of development. In doing so, it offers a way of theorising the continual relevance of religion in everyday life as well as the role of technology in broader theories of development.

Theories of development are characterised by assumptions of development and progress as secularisation, rational individuals and the normative value of choice (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011; Sen 1999; Kleine 2013). Theorising identity as the performative enactment of hegemonic discourse helps explain why, despite predictions of secularisation and the disembedding of individuals from social contexts, religion has an enduring role in individuals’ lives. Theorising religious identity as performative enactment explains that it is ‘more than belief’ (Vasquez 2010) or an individually determined phenomenon. Rather, it is a subject position within the broader context of the hegemonic discourses in which individuals are situated. Religious identity in Pakistan is shown to be the outcome of ‘a heterogeneous landscape of power’ (Asad 2003, 6) that has established religious nationalism as the hegemonic discourse to which all who desire recognition must submit. It is the enduring nature of this landscape of power that explains how religious identity continues to shape Pakistani citizens’ everyday lives.

Thus, conceptualising religious identity as the performative enactment of hegemonic discourse explains how it is inherently and ‘inextricably connected with other (nonreligious) ways of being in the world’ (Vasquez 2010, 8). Contrary to predictions of secularisation and social differentiation, and despite access to new information and means of communication, religion remains a source of meaning and subjectivity because it is the materialisation of hegemonic discursive regimes. The empirical findings show how individuals who live in both densely urban contexts, which development theory commonly associates with modernisation and secularisation (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011) and comparatively rural environments use technology to enact religious lives. This continuing significance of religion presents a challenge to models that assume religion will decline as people turn away from traditional sources of meaning to exercise individual, sovereign choices. At the same time, by theorising how enacting religious identity through Facebook shapes the form of religious identity as ‘digital secularisation’ explains how the modernisation that development theory describes can be modern in form yet religious in content.
The sociomaterial performative lens adopted by this thesis has substantial broader implications for theorising development. This section draws out the basis for these assumptions and points to a non-dualistic, flat ontological conceptualisation of development.

This studies performative approach helps explain the continuing relevance of religion. Theorising religion as the enactment of socially and historically situated discourses highlights religious practices and discourses within already existing power relationships and in the wider social context in which these communities exist. Theorising religion as performative enactment points to the role of power in particular contexts in shaping and determining legitimate subjects and behaviours. As such, religion is not ‘sets of private beliefs in the minds of individuals’, but rather is ‘subject to conflicts over their interpretation of their core teachings’ and their role in public and private life (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011, 51). Understanding religion as knowledge regimes of power and ideology (Asad, 2003) thus demands situating religion in contexts in which development interventions are also the enactment of discursive regimes. To understand religious identity, as well as technology, as situated in knowledge regimes introduces a conceptualisation of development itself as part of broader knowledge regimes.

Theorising development itself then as a political project of competing interests and power reflects the broader critique of development mounted by post-development theorists such as anthropologists Ferguson (1994) and Mosse (2005), who conceptualise the idea and practice of development as a macro-systemic formation of Western knowledge ideology (Ziai 2007). For them, development is viewed as a continuation of Western colonialism through epistemic hegemony (Donovan, 2014). Yet the post-development perspective is characterised by a deterministic conceptualisation of technology that is unable to incorporate technology as sociomaterial in nature.

A sociomaterial approach to development incorporates the post-development insight that development is a Western knowledge regime with its attendant notions of legitimate forms of subjecthood and identity, as religion too is a knowledge regime with its own set of norms and subjects. A sociomaterial account of development goes beyond the post-development perspective through a more nuanced account of technology in processes of social change.

Post-development perspectives on technology commonly assume a technological determinism synonymous with Western domination (Alvares 1992) or an agency-less machinic approach (Ferguson 1994). In this account technology is a tool for the extension of Western domination, and its users are largely viewed as passive subjects to be structured according to the will of the
machine (Donovan, 2014). This account fails to allow for resistance or for uses to exercise agency over the subjects demanded by the technology. Instead, a sociomaterial account of technology and development incorporates a view of technology as always ‘entangled’ (Barad, 2007) with social and material forces.

A sociomaterial account of technology and development thus rejects the totalising, deterministic view of technology and grants the social equal weight, yet maintaining a place for technology as actors in the process of change. This perspective, in the words of Barad, ‘allows matter its due as an active participant in the world’s becoming, in its ongoing intra-activity’ (2003, 803). As Donovan argues, ‘as mobile phones are increasingly relevant to the lives of marginalised populations, it would be quixotic to limit attention to humans alone’ (Donovan 2014, 11). Granting the social a role in development means a rejection the way modernisation, neoliberal and post-development theory conceptualises culture, where resistance to development is understood as protecting a static culture from change. Instead, a sociomaterial account of development sees culture as an always dynamic entanglement of social and material agencies, adapting through adoption as actors engage with new ideas, practices and discourses (Donovan 2014). This entanglement is apparent at the instance of use, through the agential cut enacted by an apparatus, but is entangled in the histories of matter and meaning that stretch through the chain of associations and attachments.

The sociomaterial performative perspective shows the mutually constitutive nature of ICT use practices and identity; development as an assemblage of actors, interests and discursive formations. These processes of change are both social and material. The new ICTs of social media contribute to processes of social change by structuring the formation of subjects and their publics. Describing their structuring role echoes the determinism of modernisation theory (Lerner 1958; Schramm 1964), but conceptualising it as intra-active performative enactment (Barad 2003; Butler 1990) shows the outcomes to be always contingent and unstable. The determinism is never predictable. A sociomaterial approach to development allows the possibility of introducing processes of change as diffractions. The emergent changes are not predictable outcomes, but rather always performed and thus subject to fail and change. As Barad says, this form of diffraction ‘is not a static relationality but a doing – the enactment of boundaries – that always entails constitutive exclusions (2007, 135). The intra-action of knowledge regimes translated through technologies with knowledge regimes in contexts of use results in the diffraction of the subject forms contained in each. These diffractions, such as the reinforcement and troubling of hegemonic norms allows change as a continual process that is always contingent and emergent rather than predictable and linear. As this thesis demonstrates, understanding the role of Facebook and religious identity in processes of social change in Pakistan requires tracing these discourse
from their instances of use to the contemporary interests of ICT owners in Palo Alto, California, as well as the historic formations of Islamic reformist movements. Their diffraction in Pakistan in the form of hegemonic and troubling subjects allows the possibility of religious identity in the form of ‘digital secularisation’.

10.3 Methodological Contributions

This thesis demonstrates how the sociomaterial agential realist methodological perspective contributes to theorising ICTD, development and modernity. This perspective leads to a deeper understanding of how technologies come to matter, and their history and politics, thus allowing a critical perspective on the role of technologies in social change.

A positivist approach would have allowed a description of usage practices, but with limited power to explain the significance and meaning of these practices. Thus, for example, the survey provided a useful description of the difference in usage practices between religious and gender identities, but no account of why, for example, women preferred WhatsApp and men preferred Facebook. Similarly, an interpretive perspective would have allowed an explanation of these practices in terms of what they mean for individuals and the role they play in social practices. Indeed, it would have allowed an analysis of the construction of discourse in texts and their symbolic meaning. An interpretive perspective would have allowed descriptions of how people use technology and what it means for them, but its emphasis on the account of individuals and their interpretation and construction of reality would not have led to a theorisation of the technology. This would have veiled the way Facebook’s technological discourses intra-act with hegemonic discourses.

The agential realist perspective allows us to see how instances of use are related through chains of association and attachment to discourses’ local contexts, which might be separated by miles but closely related in practice. This perspective helps recognise that ‘the world is a dynamic process of intra-activity’ (Barad 2007, 140). This methodological contribution is particularly significant for ICTD and development, both projects whose premise is furthering people’s wellbeing. The thesis argues that the dominant, normative perspective in both literatures is characterised by a limited conceptualisation of the individual and of technology. This sociomaterial perspective contributes a reminder and an epistemological approach that can help locate development activities in their broader social, political, cultural and historical contexts.

As Latour notes, ‘In order to make a diagnosis or a decision about the absurdity, the danger, the immorality, or the unrealism of an innovation, one must first describe the network’ (Latour 1991, 130). The study’s methodological contribution is that it demonstrates the utility and feasibility of
using a sociomaterial perspective to map the network and understand the processes of intra-activity that lead to particular innovations and phenomena. It is to the policy and practice implications of this that we now turn.

10.4 Policy and Practice Contributions

This thesis has conducted an historically situated, theoretically informed account of Facebook use in three locations in northern Punjab. The insights from this research are necessarily contextually specific, but the following practical contributions are made as suggestions to further policy and practice.

For Pakistan, the following contributions are based on the findings from this study. First, as indicated earlier, there is growing awareness of the challenges presented by the adoption of new ICTs, especially for women and increasingly for religious minorities. This is to be welcomed, and efforts to address these issues need further support from the Government of Pakistan, civil society organisations and the international development community. This support could take the form of increased research to understand the nuance of the implications of this research and to identify other potentially vulnerable communities. It could also involve further work to support vulnerable communities, in the form of support to increase digital literacy and the capability to manage issues around privacy and self-protection in ICT use.

As the research demonstrates, however, challenges emerge from the intra-action of technological discourse and the enactment of subject positions constituted in discourse. Given this, while focusing on individuals to strengthen their ability to manage the use of ICTs, the real focus of attention should be the broader hegemonic discourses that constitute specific groups as vulnerable subjects. It is only in the broader discourse in which Ahmadis are constructed as non-Muslims and women are positioned as bearers of honour that these challenges can be addressed.

Of course, as this thesis argues, this needs to go beyond the historical debate between Islam and secularism that has characterised the debate so far. Solutions to the challenges that vulnerable groups face can only be found within the hegemonic discourses themselves. In other words, addressing the challenges faced by Muslim subjects can be done best within Islam, not by turning instead to secularism. There may be value in a public debate about Islam, minorities and the kind of state that Pakistanis believe Pakistan should be.

This has broader implications for engagement with the wider Islamic world. As the section on modernities suggested, Islamic and Western societies are mutually constituted or rather, entangled
through the intra-activity of matter and meaning. The characterisation in the West of Islamic societies as backward – and particularly of fundamentalist Islamic movements such as ISIS as a throwback to the past – marginalises the space for understanding how the Muslim and Western worlds are phenomena that emerge from continual processes of reconstruction and reinterpretation (Jung and Sinclair 2015). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore this in greater depth, but this is one of the most pressing needs of our time.

There are contributions to development practice as well. The thesis argues that identity, and specifically religious identity, play an important role in processes of development and social change. There is clearly a need for greater attention to the role of religion in the uses of ICTs and processes of development more broadly. For ICTD interventions, the attention to identity is particularly important for issues related to minority or marginalised groups, such as Ahmadis or women. These shape questions of access and use and thus the implications of technology-based interventions.

The sociomaterial perspective also highlights the significance of understanding the technological discourses that are embodied in technologies. This has particular implications for the use of technologies that are part of everyday life, such as social media. The implications of these discourses for the enactment of identity, and indeed for broader social relations and structure, are only just beginning to garner attention. For example, there is a pressing need for greater attention to the role of algorithms in structuring social life. While this is beginning to be highlighted in relation to issues in the Global North (Gillespie 2014), these same issues as well as others are relevant to the Global South. There is need for development actors to pay attention to the role of technological discourses in all aspects of technology design, including but not limited to algorithms.

Finally, this thesis highlights the role of intermediaries in shaping usage practices. Although there has been attention paid to the role of intermediaries in the use of telecentres (Bailur and Masiero 2012), and the beginnings of attention to their role in the use of mobile Internet (Rangaswamy and Cutrell 2013; Donner and Gitau 2009), there would be value in exploring in more detail how these intermediaries could be enrolled into ICT interventions that seek to engage with the way people use ICTs.

10.5 Avenues for Further Research

A number of avenues for research emerge from the findings of this study. These are further investigations of the implications of social media for women, the implications of algorithms for
religious debate and comparative research on social media and honour practices. The first two reflect more applied concerns based out of concerns emerging from the critical reading of Facebook in Pakistan and its implications for women and the sectarian debate. The third area of research reflects an awareness of the value of comparative approaches.

Facebook and Gender
A further area of investigation concerns the implications for gender identity, and for women in particular. This research has focused on religious identity but, perhaps inevitably, the question of gender emerged as a significant one that could only be touched upon, given the scope of this study. It is clear that Facebook’s strengthening of hegemonic discourses of religious nationalism and patriarchy has grave implications for the position of women in Pakistan.

The issue of female safety, specifically that arising from the increasing adoption of Facebook, is a question that demands greater and urgent attention. During the fieldwork and also subsequently, the number of cases in which women have been attacked or harassed has continued to grow. Although there is growing awareness of the issue among the activist community (Digital Rights Foundation 2015; Haque 2014), further understanding the dynamics involved and ways to protect women would be of great value. As the numbers of people using Facebook increase, the need for this will only become greater.

Algorithms and Religious Debate
Research investigating the role of algorithms in shaping religious identity and practice in Pakistan would be of great value. As my research indicates, there appears to be a relationship between Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm and religious practices that has amplified sectarian debate. This finding is part of a growing recognition that algorithms play important yet under-examined roles in structuring social life (Berg 2014; Crawford 2015; Gillespie 2014). My research has only touched on this, but it warrants further investigation. This is not just for the sake of investigating novel relationships between technology and society, but because it has the potential to drive sectarian division and violence. The rates of sectarian violence are increasing and the numbers of people using Facebook are growing. If the findings from this research project are at all indicative of wider use practices, then this has the potential to be a significant issue.

The implications of widespread religious debate on Facebook are potentially of great concern if sectarian debate and violence is considered cause for concern. Therefore, I would suggest that further investigation of the nature of the relationship between algorithms and religious debate, as well as its frequency, would be highly informative and useful for efforts to engage with sectarianism in Pakistan.
Social Media and Honour Practices

Based on the study’s findings, a further area of research is the relationship between honour and social media use. This research found that honour practices were significant in shaping how people used Facebook, specifically the practice of creating multiple accounts to protect women as bearers of honour. This is also clearly linked to the questions of gender above. These honour practices are grounded in the arrangements of family, marriage and gender identity in Pakistan. Emerging research suggests that honour affects social media practices in other contexts too, such as Azerbaijan (Pearce and Vitak 2015) and Turkey (Costa 2016). This research would contribute to further understanding the relationship between cultural values and new ICTs.

10.6 Limitations

10.6.1 Theoretical Limitations

One of the main theoretical limitations of this thesis is the diversity of literatures and disciplines on which it draws. In Chapter 11, the analysis drew on debates and issues from a number of literatures to engage in an analysis that is rooted in fundamental challenges to the normative ontology of technologies and human beings. This has necessarily resulted in a decision to address a breadth of literature, from fields including the sociology of technology studies, media and communication studies, and IS to the sociology of religion, development and, of course, the sociology, political science and international relations literature on Pakistan. The limitation of this is that it has come at the expense of engaging deeply with one particular body of literature. This is justified on the basis that the concepts of identity and technology with which this thesis engages have diverse origins and applications. Therefore, insights to power the analysis have drawn on these literatures.

A further theoretical limitation is the implicit epistemological implication of a non-essentialist theoretical framework. Conceptualising religious identity as the enactment of discourse in everyday practice (Vasquez 2010), or technologies as assemblages of matter and meaning (Barad 2007) imply that the boundaries of these entities are entirely arbitrary. If religion is everywhere, in everyday life, then in principle the study of religious identity is the study of everyday life. Although this study focuses on specific religious identities, as constituted in hegemonic discourse in Pakistan, the implication of the theoretical framework is that these foci are arbitrary and the result of decisions made by the researcher as for any theoretical reason. Indeed, as Barad notes, in the agential realist perspective, it is not just technologies that are apparatus but researchers themselves.
Thus, a further theoretical limitation of this research is that the agential cut enacted by the practice of conducting this research is a product of the intra-action of the research and the context. To fully trace the relation of associations and attachments, a full biography of the researcher would have to be added in order to make transparent the full network out of which this thesis has emerged. While this is addressed through the statement on positionality in the Methodology Appendix, it is acknowledged that this a relatively superficial account of the researcher as apparatus.

10.6.2 Methodological Limitations

This thesis faced a number of methodological limitations. The most significant of these was access to research respondents. This limitation presented three specific challenges related to method, religion and gender.

First, the method of accessing respondents had to adapt as the original plan was not as effective as had been anticipated. The initial plan was to conduct exploratory interviews and observations with young people in the three locations, followed by a telephone survey through the mobile phone company to identify respondents as cases for longer, in-depth interviews and observation. In the event, only a limited number of telephone interview respondents were prepared to meet in person for further interviews. Resolving this took time and meant abandoning the attempt to achieve a completely random sample. Instead, the study used a snowball sampling technique through those telephone interview respondents who were prepared to meet and through research assistants from the area.

Second, the telephone interview failed to identify any Ahmadi respondents at all, as it had become clear fairly early on in the fieldwork that their experience was significant in understanding the nature of the relationship between religion and social media. In addressing the lack of access to Ahmadi communities through the telephone survey, it was necessary to build trust with significant community gatekeepers in their London headquarters and in Islamabad, and eventually meet their community leaders in Rabwa. This took very long and also resulted in very controlled access to Ahmadi respondents, who were all selected by their relevant district community leaders. This further constrained the diversity of the respondents.

Third, although I spoke enough Urdu to hold a basic conversation, it was insufficient to engage in the deeper discussions around the complex issues of social media use and religious practice. Working with a research assistant who came from one of the research sites and had basic field research training was both a constraint but also, in many ways, a benefit to the study. It meant that conversations with respondents were often more discussions than straight interviews, of
course mediated through a third person (although all interview transcriptions include both original and translated questions and answers to ensure accuracy). The benefit was the insight that being from the area and the culture brought to the research. As one example, it was my research assistant who was able to explain the implications of the practices of religious guidance and innovation for sectarian debate.

Fourth, my identity as a white male had implications for the research. It limited the possibility for interaction with female respondents and meant that, in most cases, the interaction I had was more structured than my interaction with male respondents. This was particularly the case with the female Ahmadi respondents who all practiced full *purdah* and were interviewed through a curtain. On the other hand, being an outsider also meant that some people felt more comfortable opening up to me, knowing that what they said wasn’t going to go back to their family or friends. Faryal in Mandi Bahauddin, for example, emphasised that she was upset a friend of hers had passed her number to my research assistant – not because she didn’t want to speak to me, but because it meant my research assistant had her phone number. Similarly, Nadia in Gujrat opened up to me in ways she said she hadn’t to anyone before, because she knew I was separate from her community.

This distance in terms of language and gender has a further implication for the nature of the research undertaken. I had hoped to spend significant amounts of time with individuals to really understand their inner, psychic life and how the experience of social media use shaped their inner world. This is, of course, the kind of experience that emerges from deep, ethnographic research and was beyond the scope of this project. Nonetheless, the extent to which people opened up, and their willingness to share their inner life, has hopefully allowed at least a glimpse of the worlds that exist within each individual.

**10.7 Conclusion: Personal Reflections**

This thesis was born out of a desire to improve my understanding of the relationship between technologies and identity in Pakistan in order to contribute to development practice, indeed to develop my own career. It was an attempt to go beyond the superficial engagement that had characterised my experience of working in international development, and instead to better understand the everyday lives of ordinary people. The journey that ensued has been both frustrating and transformatory.

I started the PhD motivated to develop my understanding of communication processes and social change in order to contribute better to development practice. This motivation was quickly
frustrated, however, as I came to see, through the reading and intellectual engagement prior to fieldwork, that the development sector was a project bound up in larger sociopolitical movements. This was a distressing experience, as I found that my reading had resulted in a loss of faith in the project I had set out to contribute to.

However, that sense of pessimism about the purpose of my work and the value of the PhD diminished through the experience of fieldwork and the subsequent analysis and findings. My experience of fieldwork was hugely stimulating. By escaping the bubble of the international community and getting slightly closer to the everyday lives of people, I developed a greater sense of how people used technology for fun, play and to negotiate their social lives. This was fascinating and hugely invigorating. These everyday experiences were far more interesting in their own right than the implications they had for any instrumental purpose – a view that only strengthened as I developed an increasingly critical view of the consequences of ICT use.

The outcomes of this research in the form of the analysis and findings have been hugely stimulating and very important to me. Working through the empirical findings has led to some semblance of understanding the nature of the relationship between the use of social media and religious identity for the people who shared their experiences with me. The processes that shape this relationship have significance for the role of technologies in people’s lives across Pakistan and, indeed, everywhere. It is the critical understanding of technologies as sociomaterial assemblages and of identity as a performative enactment that has shaped my understanding of the role of technologies in social change as a subject of critical importance today.

The great personal insight that has come from the work to produce this thesis is that our lives are increasingly framed by technologies that represent interests that are not always ours, and whose functioning we often have little control over. The task of understanding these functionings better and mitigating the negative outcomes they often lead to has come to motivate me far more than I would have believed possible.
Appendix I: Research Methodology

**Sampling and Respondents:**
The selection of research respondents derives from the research approach, questions and design and plays an important part in research outcomes (Creswell 2014; Flick 2014). The mixed method sequential nature of the research design had been selected because it allowed both quantitative as well as in-depth qualitative research but also because it allowed the identification of research respondents through the conduct of the survey.

The selection of respondents from the sample of mobile data users was purposive and pragmatic (Creswell 2014). The selection of respondents was intended to purposively select a maximal variation (Creswell and Clark 2006) in terms of the central phenomena (Miles and Huberman 1994), with maximal variation determined by religious identity, time spent online and attitudes towards talking about religious identity online. It was intended to be pragmatic in the acknowledgement that there might be a limited variety of respondents who agreed to take part.

In total, thirty respondents agreed to be part of further research, a number that was felt to be sufficiently strong to allow for the anticipated number of people who would drop out. In the event however, only five people agreed again to be part of further research, with most saying they weren’t interested, didn't have time or didn't want their telephone number to be shared outside the mobile operator. From those five, only two people actually agreed and eventually met. In other words, the survey as a tool to identify respondents failed in its purpose. Furthermore, from the completed surveys no respondents had identified as Ahmadis. Whilst this was not statistically significant, given the number of Ahmadis in the country, it meant that this also had to be addressed.

Instead of random sampling, a purposive sampling approach was used (Flick 2014). The purposive sampling involved seeking out people who used mobile phones to access Facebook, as well as people who might have something interesting to say about religion and Facebook. This was achieved through my research assistant, who came from Gujarat and knew people in all three locations. This process usually involved a focus group of three to eight people from which individuals were purposively selected and requested to participate in further interviews and discussion. Reaching Ahmadis was harder, and involved having to contact their headquarters in London who facilitated a meeting in Rabwa with their community leader who in turn arranged introductions to their district youth leaders in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandibahudin. These three individuals became critical entry points as they arranged meetings with both male and female
Ahmadis. In total, seven hundred and fifty respondents were interviewed through the telephone survey and one hundred and seven were interviewed through focus groups and interviews.

Quantitative Data Collection
The first phase of this research strategy involved carrying out a survey to identify mobile phone and social media usage patterns. Preliminary research to investigate potential patterns to explore was conducted in April 2014 and involved meeting and interviewing young mobile phone users at a local state university and in Gujrat. This preliminary research was used to get a general sense of usage patterns and to construct a survey design.

Survey Design and Implementation
The survey was therefore designed to explore the following five areas through specific questions (for the full survey see Appendix 2: Mobile and Social Media Survey), namely Internet and Mobile Phone Use, Social Media Use on Mobile Phones, Social Media Use – the impact and consequences, Social Media use – diversity, tolerance and values and finally Demographics.

These questions were first tested in English on students, and refined in order to reduce the number of questions. Then they were translated into Urdu, and back translated into English in order to ensure validity (Schwarz and Sudman 1995). Interviewees were then re-interviewed to ensure that they understood the questions being asked. A final series of revisions occurred when the questions were piloted with the telephone call centre. Although the interviewers were inducted into the survey by going through the questions, after a pilot run it became clear that a number of changes needed to made. These were:

- re-structuring the order of questions, so that the demographic questions came last, as people reported being reluctant to answer personal questions so soon in the interview.
- Introducing clarifying questions at the beginning about internet use as people said they weren’t using the internet on their phone but then indicated they used Facebook, WhatsApp and Skype.
- Reducing the number of questions again, mainly by removing a set of values questions that it was agreed were replicated

The survey was implemented by a dedicated call centre run by a research agency that had an existing contract with a mobile network operator. The mobile network operator provided the call centre with a random sample of thirty thousand telephone numbers that had used data services from their mobile towers within the last month.
The first stage involved inducting the call centre interviewers into the study and explaining the purpose and meaning behind the questions. As noted, this stage and the subsequent piloting led to revisions of the survey to make it more effective. This first stage was then followed by a full rollout of the survey, with the actual interviews conducted in the morning, lunchtime and evening over a staggered period of two weeks to reach people at different times. Because there was no known information about the respondents from the telephone numbers a simple random sampling strategy was followed (Dillman et al. 2009). The sample size required from the total population of thirty thousand mobile data users provided by the mobile operator in order to be ninety-five percent confident of the results within a five percent margin was calculated to be three hundred and eighty respondents. This number was increased to seven hundred and fifty respondents because in the pilot it emerged that few people were prepared to meet participate in further face to face research, citing issues around availability but also privacy. Increasing the number of respondents therefore increased the number respondents who would agree to further face to face interviews.

**Quantitative Data Analysis**

In sequential explanatory mixed methods designs, the quantitative data is analysed prior to the qualitative data collection, indeed the results of the quantitative informs the direction of enquiry (Creswell 2014). In other words, the findings from the quantitative data inform the kinds of questions that are explored in the qualitative data collection. Analysis was conducted using simple descriptive statistics to explore responses according to specific demographic categories, with particular attention being paid to religious identity, gender and location.

In this case, the analysis of the survey findings was focused on identifying patterns in the relationship between mobile internet use and religious identity and practices. In this sense the results of the survey help plan who to speak to as well as what themes to explore in more detail. For example, the survey found no respondent who identified as Ahmadi and thus emphasised the potential in focusing on exploring how Ahmadis experienced the relationship between social media and religious identity.

In addition to informing the questions and demographics that the qualitative research phase would explore in greater depth, the quantitative phase was also intended to identify specific individuals to participate in the qualitative research. In practice however this proved to be problematic. Despite increasing the sample size, only thirty respondents agreed to take part in further research,
and as the section below on data access outlines, few of these were either actually from the research locations or in the event actually willing to meet.

**Qualitative Data Collection 1: Interviews, Focus Groups, Research Diary**

**Interviews**

Interviews are data-gathering tools that an interviewer uses to gather information or beliefs from other people. According to Kvale, the purpose of interviews are ‘to obtain descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena’ (Kvale 2007, 6). Interviews were chosen as an appropriate method through which to explore the findings from survey, as they allow for greater explanatory detail than surveys. In-person, semi-structured interviews and open-ended questions allow for the interpreting of body language and flexibility in the investigation of meaning (Flick 2014; Silverman 2010).

The structure was based around an interview guide (Flick 2014; Kvale 2007) that was initial based on the themes of the survey, namely internet and mobile phone usage patterns, social media usage patterns, social media impact and consequences and issues of diversity, tolerance and values. In addition, the interviews also sought to allow users to describe their own sense of identity in relationship to their family, their faith and to Pakistan. However, this interview guide went through a number of iterative refinements as the research developed, perhaps the most notable being the circuitous route to asking questions about religious practice, as direct questions about religious practice were sometimes resisted. Instead, users were asked to describe the first ten items on their Facebook Newsfeed as an entry point to wider discussions about religion and religious practice on Facebook.

All interviews were recorded with the interviewees permission, apart from three who declined to be recorded (for privacy reasons). Although recording interviews can impact on interviewees willingness to speak freely (Esterberg 2002) this was mitigated by using a mobile phone as the recorder. The familiarity of a mobile phone usually meant that people were easily able to ignore the recording of the interview.

In total, one hundred and seven individuals were interviewed through a combination of interviews and focus groups. See Annex II for full detailed list of every interview.

**Focus Groups**

Interviews, like focus groups, are a way of gather data that can provide insight into the understanding and meaning held by individuals. Focus groups however help reveal how meaning and account are articulated or negotiated through social interaction, and can provide insight into
how this relates to ‘peer communication and group norms’ (Barbour and Kitzinger 1998). Given the performative perspective adopted, how people interact with each other provides an important insight into accounts of identity enactment performed to others as well as the opportunity to observe actual identity enactments. In this research, focus groups were used to support exploration of this performative enactment of discourse.

Focus groups also played a processual role, as they allowed the identification of subjects for further individual interviews and links to other subjects. This was particularly important given the limited success of the survey in finding further respondents.

In total twenty focus groups were conducted with young mobile internet users in the three locations. Each focus group consisted of between three and eight individuals, and lasted between fifteen minutes and two hours. Indeed, some focus groups blurred the line between more informal discussion and focused exploration. Yet whilst they departed from the semi-structured focus groups, these informal discussions were important in revealing issues that might not have emerged otherwise, such as the practice of creating female fake accounts. Although focus groups can be viewed as problematic because group dynamics can shape who speaks and what is said (Flick 2014), this shaping important as a process in and of itself. Nevertheless, efforts were made to ensure that all participants were invited to participate, without being pressured or placed under undue or unwelcome attention.

**Research Diary**

Notes and observations taken during interviews and focus groups were written up in the evening in a research diary. This research diary was an important part of initial reflection up on both the data being gathered as well as the experience of conducting research. As such, it played an important role in the iterative development of interview and focus group discussion guides as well as themes for further investigation. The research diary thus served as a place for the documentation and working through of ‘experiences, ideas, fears, mistakes, confusions, breakthroughs and problems’ (Spradley, 1980: 71 in Flick 2014).

The research diary also served as a place to document ongoing conversations with my research assistants. The insights and observations that emerged in discussion and reflection with my research assistants played an important role in unpacking themes, testing assumptions and exploring the implications of emerging findings. Having the research diary provided a useful place in which to capture this data. The combination of both personal thoughts and discussion
with others meant that the research diary played an important role in the reflection on fieldwork, analysis and writing up.

**Qualitative Data Collection 2: Textual Data – newspaper articles, Millatfacebook**

The analysis of documentation is often used in qualitative research together with other qualitative research methods as form of triangulation (Denzin 1970). In this case documentation is used as data from which to identify and analyse the construction of religious identity and Facebook in discourse (Fairclough 1995).

To this end, the second qualitative data component involved the building of a textual corpus (Bauer and Aarts 2000) through the collection of two sets of textual data to provide a corpus of data that could be analysed to identify the operation and function of discourses of religious identity and Facebook. A corpus consists of 'texts, utterances, or other specimens considered more or less representative of a language and usually stored as an electronic database' (McArthur, 1992 in Bauer and Aarts 2000). The corpus consists of two data sets, the first of which consists of newspaper articles that referred to the banning of Facebook in 2010 and the second data set consists of the documentation and design of Millatfacebook.

**Newspaper articles**

For Bauer and Arts, (200), the process of corpus construction is functionally equivalent to statistical sampling but structurally different, and involves the ‘systematic selection to some alternative rationale’ (Bauer and Aarts 2000, 21). The process of corpus construction follows four rules.

**Rule 1:** Proceed stepwise: select; analyse; select again. The systematic sampling is based on a stepwise process of identifying the variety of representations in texts. This means that unlike a survey, the corpus grows as the process unfolds and expands until it has achieved a saturated representation of the diversity of the subject. In this case it meant identifying newspaper articles that referred to the Facebook ban and then identifying the different ways in which Facebook was constructed in discourse, ways that the ban was justified and discourses of religious identity.

**Rule 2:** In qualitative research, strata and function variety precedes variety of representations.

The initial step to identifying diversity in representation is to identify and select the diversity of strata and function, which in interviews may be gender, age or education. In this case it was the English language newspapers The News, The Nation and Dawn and the Urdu newspapers The...
Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt. The reason for this diversity was outlined in Chapter Four explaining the ideological differences between the newspapers, particularly in their relation to religious identity.

Rule 3: Characterizing variety of representations has priority over anchoring them in existing categories of people. This is more of an analytical step, but involved characterising the variety of representations in the newspaper accounts of the Facebook ban, and paying less attention to locating these representations in specific newspapers.

Rule 4: Maximize the variety of representations by extending the range of strata / functions considered. The maximising representations by extending the diversity of newspapers was considered by examining other Urdu language newspapers such as the Daily Pakistan or Khabrain, but on initial assessment the representations of the Facebook ban were not significantly different from those in the Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt. Saturation had been reached.

The newspaper accounts were identified through their online archives, though in the case of the Nawa-i-Waqt their service was intermittent and resulted in having to visit the National Archives in Islamabad to identify and scan the relevant articles. The search was conducted together with an Urdu speaking research assistant, who also translated the articles into English. In total the corpus construction process identified one hundred and seventy-eight news articles, editorials, opinion pieces and letters to the newspaper. Through the process of analysis and corpus construction the number of articles that were analysed in depth was reduced to thirty articles in total (see Appendix II)

**Millatfacebook Documentation**

The data collected to establish the technological discourses of Millatfacebook included close reading of the website design and the content on the site. This was conducted by visiting the site and listing of the sites main design features, particularly guided by the design features of Facebook that were outlined in Chapter Three – theorizing Facebook. The content that was identified and noted on the site included terms of service, the selection of translations for hadiths and for the Koran.

Furthermore, these were supplemented by interviews with the sites designers and owners in order to contextualize the technological discourses and the intent behind the site. The value of having multiple data sources for approaches to material technologies is because meaning is shifts from words to ideas and interests embodied in design and material structure. As Scott and Orlikowski
put it, multiple data sources are important in sociomaterial studies ‘where language is decentred
in order to take account of historical reconfigurations in relational practice.(Scott and Orlikowski
2014a, 888).

The purpose of the second component of the qualitative research phase, the discourse analysis
approach, is to describe how gender and religious identity become part of the stabilisation of
mobile internet technologies. That is, it will explain how the regulatory regimes of gender and
religious identity come to be associated with mobile and internet technologies, and how this
association is stabilised.

A discourse analysis approach examines the codes, language and way of speaking about a topic.
From a critical discourse perspective, it aims to show how the objectification of peoples and
technologies establish and maintain systems of knowledge and power (Fairclough 1992). Given
the focus on language, discourse analysis examines a variety of texts to reveal the activity of
discourse (Bauer and Aarts 2000). The aim of this is to go beyond what is ‘in’ those texts and to
'trace some of the threads that connect that text to others' (MacLure 2003, 43). As Abdelnour and
Saeed (Abdelnour and Saeed 2014) demonstrate in their study of humanitarian NGO
documentation, discourses are constructed through the way fuel-efficient stoves came to be
construed as a tool to reduce sexual violence. In this project the focus is the discourse in which
mobile internet is associated with gender and religious identities.

The main research approach adopted in this second qualitative component is Bauer and Gaskell's
corpus construction approach, which is a principle of data collection that allows for a systematic
collection of data without following a statistical sampling rationale (Bauer and Aarts 2000). Bauer
and Gaskell's process of corpus construction consists of five rules (Bauer and Aarts 2000, 31–35).
The first is, once the topic has been selected, proceed step wise by selecting material,
analysing and the selecting again. The second is that strata and function variety precedes variety
of representations. Strata and function refer to categories that are known, such as age, gender,
religion and so on while representations are concepts such as opinions, attitudes, beliefs,
identities, discourses and practices. Although the selection of people and sources is according to
function and category, the purpose is to understand the variety of moral issues and their
argumentative structure. The second rule challenges norms of quantitative social research by
emphasising that the variety of representation has greater priority than anchoring them in existing
categories. The aim instead is to explore the representations, not anchor them to specific
demographics. The fourth rule is, explore the maximal variety of representations. One should
extend the range of strata and functions being considered. In principle this is endless. Bauer and
Gaskell's employ the principle of saturation as a stopping criterion, such that one stops the search for additional representations only when new strata add no new information.

**Qualitative Data Analysis**

**Analysis of interview data**

The transcriptions of the interviews and focus groups were uploaded to the data analysis software NVivo, allowing flexible manipulation of the data. The interviews and focus groups were then coded through an iterative process of inductive open coding and deductive theoretical coding based on the theoretical framework and motivated by the research goals. As the data was coded, it was analysed and related back to the survey findings, to the theoretical and empirical literature to identify themes that helped explain the relationship between Facebook and religious identity.

The transcriptions were analysed individually and then comparatively for common themes, understood in narrative analysis as discourses (Taylor and Littleton 2006), that were identified through common elements that occur across several interviews as well as at different times within a single interview. Within these narratives close attention was paid to accounts of religious practices, moments of trouble and themes related to the concepts of liberation and conformity discussed in the literature review and theoretical framework.

Analyzing narrative from a Butlerian performative perspective (Morison and Macleod 2013; Peterson and Langellier 2006) involves exploring how individuals 'position' themselves in relation to the discourse, and their accounts of moments of 'trouble', attempts to 'repair'. Analyzing performativity from a material perspective involved drawing on Barad's (Barad 2007) notions of entanglement, material-discursive practices and performativity, and allowed the move from conceptualizing phenomena such as religious identity as a social attribute, and instead view it as a material doing (S. Scott and Orlikowski 2014, 889). The form of subject that the structure of Facebook allows emerged as one of the most significant aspects in this analysis. This points towards the practices that make phenomena work (S. V. Scott and Orlikowski 2014a, 890) part of an acknowledgement of the sociomaterial intra-action of Facebook and religious identity. The analysis concluded with accounts of how these practices of subject formation have implications for religious identity in Pakistan, as well as for the broader themes of development theory and modernity.

**Discursive Analytical**
The process of analysing the corpus of newspaper accounts followed the same procedure as discussed above. In other words, materials were coded to identify connecting and interrelating themes related to the hegemonic discourses outlined in Chapter Four Religious Identity in Pakistan. This involved identifying the process of problematisation in which Facebook was constructed in discourse as a technology that was a problem for Islam in Pakistan, the solution to which was to ban it.

The construction of the corpus was intended to be concurrent with the case study research, to allow an interactive relationship between the two processes. This would have allowed processes of triangulation (Flick 2014) through referencing interviews with the designers and owners as well as the broader data set of respondents. In practice only the former was possible as the transcription of the interviews took much longer than anticipated, leading to the process of triangulation a static rather than dynamic process.

**Fieldwork Challenges**

The process of fieldwork and data collection always involves challenges, and part of successful research is resolving them without compromising the goal and objectives of the research. The challenges that emerged in the conduct of this research involved issues to do with security, methods, language and environment.

The first issue was the challenge of security that was resolved by relocating the field site. The initial research design as proposed at the time of the upgrade from MPhil to PhD had been to conduct research in the city of Karachi, but in the event a combination of factors led to the research being conducted in three locations in urban Punjab. Karachi had been selected for two reasons. Firstly, because according to sources working for mobile network operator’s mobile users in the city were relatively high mobile internet users. Secondly, the city is religiously diverse, allowing an exploration of the way people from different religious backgrounds experience enacting religious identity on Facebook.

In the event, two factors led to a decision to relocate the research. The first factor was safety, as in the first week of research I was mugged at gunpoint whilst at a traffic light and my neighbours were robbed by an armed gang, and as a result I no longer felt safe or confident about travelling to remote parts of the city. In consultation with my department and supervisor the decision was taken to relocate the research to the Punjab, which was both safer but also of interest in terms of being able to study emerging urban areas in contrast to the ‘exceptionalism’ that some have described Karachi (Verkaaik 2009). Additionally, the Punjab has been the site of increased
religious tensions, including the 2010 Facebook related attack against Ahmadis in Gujranwala. Relocating to the Punjab thus mitigated the risks without compromising the original goals of the research, although it introduced a month’s delay to the research schedule.

The second factor was the speed with which Telenor, one of the mobile operators, rolled out their 3G internet network, particularly to small rural areas in Punjab. The possibility of exploring this initial roll out, and the offer of research support from the mobile network operator, together with the prospect of conducting research without constantly worrying about my safety, led to a relocation to Islamabad.

The second challenge was unrealistic expectations of access and availability. The original plan had been to spend in-depth time over a long period with a few respondents. The aim for this had been to achieve the in-depth insight into the processes of desire and subject formation implicated in the psycho-analytic dimension to Butler’s (Butler 1990) notion of performativity. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the expectation that people would make long hours to accommodate a researcher was both unrealistic and reflective of a lack of understanding. Although people were unfailingly polite, tolerant and helpful, it was only with five individuals that anything close the kind of connection was feasible. The challenge this presented was not insurmountable, and has been dealt with by acknowledging that these insights are partial, and by privileging those accounts in the subsequent presentation of empirical data.

The third challenge was that of language, and the resulting reliance on research assistants for the conduct of interviews. Although I had had a term of language training, and a few words that I had retained from assignments to Pakistan over the years, my language skills were far below that required for in-depth interviews. This meant relying on researcher assistants, which introduced challenges as well as opportunities. The main challenge of relying on research assistants was that they were not always available, and indeed I ended up working with three research assistants over the eighteen months. My first research assistant was a trained researcher with experience of working with British academics, and preparing for his own PhD. This allowed for fast, efficient research work, as he required little training or guidance. Furthermore, he was from Gujrat and knew many people in the three cities. He opened many doors. Once is own PhD preparations took over however, I had to find another, and this involved initially working with a friend of my research assistant from the same town. Despite training in research skills and ethics, particularly around translation and interview practices, it was clear that responses were increasingly being summarised rather than translated. This was further complicated by an incident interviewing an Ahmadi respondent, when it became clear that my research assistant had underlying prejudices.
that, although discussed initially, were endangering the research, and potentially the research subjects. I was fortunate then with the third researcher, who came from the Ahmadi community himself and was experienced in working with journalists, particularly on religious matters. This transformed the research process as it allowed a dialogic and reflexivity in exploring religious identity. It was through this partnership that many of insights into religious practices and sectarian tensions were revealed.

A heatwave in the last quarter of the research also impacted on the schedule and access to respondents, as it came just before the academic summer break. As the heat edged up to forty degrees’ respondents increasingly cancelled and anyway, I was unable to think and navigate interviews in settings that usually had no air-conditioning. Although this provided an important insight into the everyday challenges that people face in dealing with heat and lack of electricity, it introduced a further two-month delay as respondents increasingly cancelled and many of the students were unavailable to meet. Nonetheless, this period allowed a process of reflection on the data gathering and the start to coding of the documents.

**Researcher Positionality**

The positionality of a researcher plays an important part of the entire research process, from conceptualisation to final conclusions. Indeed, according to Barad the researcher is a research instrument, an apparatus that intra-acts with phenomena to enact an agential cut (Barad 2007). As such, the goal is not to remove bias but rather to account for the inevitable biases that form part of the entire research process.

Positionality describes the ‘the relationship between knowledge and the ways whereby knowledge is produced’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2010) and requires the researcher to be reflexive about their own identity in the research process (Flick 2014). In the case of this research my own positionality was an important part of the conceptualisation, implementation and analysis of the research. I entered into the research process as white male with a history of working in Pakistan that was framed by the international development sector. This meant that I brought my own biases about gender, religion and the instrumental uses of technology. For example, organised religion has always seemed strange to me, and I believed that gender practices such as seclusion and piety practices such as the hijab were reflective of ‘traditional’, backward and oppressive values and social norms. That these have come to be challenged is a function of the literature I have read but most especially the people who have shared their experiences with me. Values such
as these framed the conceptualisation of the research agenda ways that I am aware of and also, inevitably, ways that I am not aware of.

In the implementation of the research, my positionality as a white foreign male introduced power dynamics that were both constraints and opportunities. Firstly, it was only possible to be in Pakistan conducting field research because I was in a position of relative privilege defined by my colour, my nationality and my socioeconomic position. Furthermore, my background of working for the British government in Pakistan granted me the confidence to approach and request help from senior figures from the Pakistan government, private sector such as mobile network operators and civil society organisations. Whilst these made many things possible, they also created an othering from my research participants. For some, this distance limited interaction whilst for others, the novelty and ‘outsider’ status meant they could open up to me more than others. Significantly, this was the case for interviews with female respondents, who although difficult to access, were often very surprisingly open and willing to share their experiences.

**Ethics**

The subject of religion in Pakistan is one of the most controversial, and the rise of sectarian violence attests to this. Therefore, the question of ethics is not just one for conformity to prescribed ethical requirements, such as the ones stipulated by the University of London, but also of considerations to avoid doing harm. The following ethical considerations were undertaken to ensure compliance with the relevant regulations but also to avoid being the cause of harm to research subjects, assistants and myself.

The ethics of working with research respondents was addressed through the maintenance of confidentiality and anonymity and ensuring informed consent (Davies 2008; Flick 2014). In order to ensuring confidentiality and anonymity respondents were anonymised through the use of pseudonyms and retaining respondent contact details as those pseudonyms on my personal telephone. All resulting information, from recordings to notes to transcriptions were kept on my personal computer and a backup hard drive, both protected by passwords. The importance of these procedures was reinforced regularly with my research assistants.

Ensuring meaningful informed consent involved informing respondents of the following aspects of the research. I explained who I was as a researcher, and my related associations and funding, namely London School of Economics and a mix of grant and personal funding; the purpose of the research in relation to working towards a PhD; the confidentiality and anonymity that all respondents would offered; the security of the data and its storage; and the nature of the final
products of the research (namely a thesis and related publications) and how they might be quoted (under pseudonyms). Respondents were always asked if they were willing to continue, if they had concerns about participating and any other matters that they wished to discuss. Once interviewees agreed, they were asked if they would consent to having the interview recorded, and assured that they had every right and freedom to deny the request, and instead have written or no notes of the interview taken at all. Importantly, for repeated interviews, this process of informed consent was revisited to ensure that their agreement still stood.
Appendix II: Survey Questionnaire – English & Urdu

Mobile and Social Media Survey

INTRODUCTION

Dear Respondent,

I am (INTERVIEWER’S NAME), and I am calling from Gallup Research conducting academic research for a PhD project at the London School of Economics in London, the UK. I thank you for your time in speaking with us and agreeing to providing responses to our questions. Your views, which you will share with us today, are of immense value to us. Let me assure you that your responses will be recorded in complete confidentiality, and that your anonymity is guaranteed in this interview.

PURPOSE OF THE INTERVIEW:
The purpose of this interview is to collect your views on your use of the internet, specifically your use of social media services, and some vital issues of social and cultural concern. We are looking to get an insight into how Pakistanis use their mobile phones and what kinds of activities they prefer to undertake online and on social media.
Section 1: INTERNET AND MOBILE USE

I would like to begin the survey by asking you a few questions about your internet and mobile usage.

Q 1(a): Do you use internet on your mobile phone? (If No, ask question 1b; if Yes, move to Question 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>☐</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q1 (b): Have you ever done any of these activities on your mobile phone? (If none of these, terminate interview).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>☐</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Downloaded music or videos</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used Facebook</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used Whatsapp</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searched Google</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Check Email</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q2: Do you use social media on your mobile phone? (If yes, move to Question 3; If No, terminate interview) [For the interviewer: social media includes Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp, Line, Instagram, Tumblr, etc;]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>☐</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q3: Thinking about your mobile internet usage on an average day, how frequently do you access the internet? For example, do you use it continuously, between two and three hours, between one and two hours, or less than an hour?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>☐</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than an hour</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One to two hours</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two to three hours</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuously – I am always connected</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not use internet every day</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q4 (a): If you use your mobile phone to access the internet, do you get anyone else to help you with it? (If yes, move to Question 4b; if No, move to Question 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>☐</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q4 (b): If someone else helps you access the internet on your mobile phone, which of the following activities do they most frequently help you do on the internet?

- Use Social Media Sites
- Watch music or videos
- Check Emails
- News and Information
- None of these

Q5: The mobile phone that you use to access the internet, does any other individual use that same device to access internet? (If Yes, move to Question 6; If No, move to Question 7)

- Yes
- No

Q6: If someone else uses your mobile phone device to access the internet, do they use it to access social media sites or services?

- Yes
- No
Section 2: SOCIAL MEDIA USE ON MOBILE PHONES

Now I will like to ask you a few questions about social media usage on your mobile phone.

Q7: Which social media sites/services do you use most often on your mobile phone? [For the interviewer: single response]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Media Site/Service</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whatsapp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instagram</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumblr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please list)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q8: Many people have multiple accounts on the same site (e.g. one person with multiple Facebook accounts). Approximately what percentage of your friends and family members on Facebook has more than one account/profile? {OPEN ENDED}

Q9: Thinking about your social media usage on an average day, how often do you access your favorite social media site/service? For example, do you use it continuously, between two and three hours, between one and two hours, or less than an hour?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than an hour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One to two hours</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two to three hours</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuously – I am always connected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not use internet every day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q10: I am going to read out a series of three statements. In each set of three, please tell us which of these statement you agree with the most? [For the interviewer: read out each statement carefully and record the degree of agreement/disagreement]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SET 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In general, I feel free to say whatever I am feeling, and do not feel restricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general, I feel free to say some things but not others – I feel somewhat restricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general, I only say what I think other people expect me to say i.e. what other think I should feel/say, not what I actually feel/want to say</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Only record one for each set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SET 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In general, I feel free to say whatever I am feeling, and do not feel restricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general, I feel free to say some things but not others – I feel somewhat restricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general, I only say what I think other people expect me to say i.e. what other think I should feel/say, not what I actually feel/want to say</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Only record one for each set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Social media is a public space that is inclusive (where I can say/post what I feel/think) □
Social media is a public space that is restrictive (where I only post/say what others expect me to say/think) □
Social media is a private and exclusive space (where I can post/say what I feel/think) □

SET 3
I feel free to post and share my religious opinions and thoughts on social media □
I hesitate in sharing my religious opinions on social media because I am concerned with how others might react □
I do not share my religious opinions on social media □

Q 11: Now let us talk about religion and self expression in our society. Which of the following statements do you agree with the most?? (For the interviewer: read each statement carefully and register which statement the respondent agrees with the most)

I want to publicly express my religious identity and beliefs, and feel free to do so □
I hesitate in expressing my religious identity and beliefs in public because I am concerned with how others might react (for example, friends, family, or the public at large) □
I do not want to publicly express my religious identity and beliefs because it is a private matter □

Q 12: Approximate how many friends/followers/contacts do you have on your favorite social media site/service?

More than 500 □
Between 300 and 500 □
Between 100 and 300 □
Between 50 and 100 □
Between 25 and 50 □
Less than 25 □
Not sure □

Q 13: Let us talk a little about your friend/contact list on ------ (insert name of favorite social media website). Are the following people a part of your contact list on (insert name of favorite social media website/service)?

Yes No
Q14: Have you ever adjusted or blocked your friends/followers/contacts on your favorite social media site/service so that you can post updates to specific people and groups? (For example, have you put someone on Limited Access on Facebook, or muted/blocking someone on Twitter?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know/No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Q15: Now I will state a few activities that people generally undertake on social media. Please tell us how frequently you do these activities on social media? Do you do them frequently, occasionally, rarely, or never?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Frequently</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post my thoughts and comments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read and watch what others post and share (e.g. status updates, pictures etc)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatting/sending messages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get news and information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have conversations on issues with other people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Like on what others post and share</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 3: SOCIAL MEDIA USE – IMPACT AND CONSEQUENCES

Q16: When was the last time you made an adjustment to your privacy settings?
In the last week  □
In the last month  □
In the last six months  □
In the last year  □
Never  □
I do not know about privacy settings  □

Q17 Have you ever got into trouble because of what you posted/shared/liked/sent on social media? (For example, did someone tell you that it was wrong or criticized you?) [If Yes, move to Question 18; If No, move to Question 21]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>□</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q18: What kind of an issue/content type caused you problems or criticism?

- Domestic Politics/Current Affairs  □
- International Affairs  □
- Religious issue  □
- Sectarian Issue  □
- Sports  □
- Entertainment (e.g. music, movies, dramas etc)  □
- Gender and/or Sexuality-related issue  □
- Private Post (e.g. picture)  □
- Other (please list)  □

Q19: You just told us that you faced problems/criticisms for posting something on ________ (insert option from Question 18). Did this online criticism cause you difficulty or harm offline? [For example, did this cause physical harm; did it cause emotional or psychological harm; were your social life and relationships negatively affected?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>□</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q20: How did you respond to this disagreement/criticism?

- Defended my position  □
- Accepted the criticism/disagreement and agreed that I was wrong  □
- Ignored the criticism  □
- Don’t Know/No Response  □
Section 4: SOCIAL MEDIA USE – DIVERSITY, TOLERANCE, SILENCE

Q21: Inter-sectarian marriages are an important issue in our society. Thinking about inter-sectarian marriages, do you favor or oppose such marriages?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Favor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Favor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat oppose</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly oppose</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know/No Response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q 22: If inter-sectarian marriages were being discussed would your _______ (fill in from the choice below) agree or disagree with your views on this issue?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close Family Members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Family Members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Friends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People on your favorite social media site/service (e.g. people in your Facebook network, or people who follow you on Twitter)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q 23: If the issue of inter-sectarian marriages comes up _______ (fill in from the choices below) would you be willing or unwilling to join the conversation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Setting</th>
<th>Willing</th>
<th>Unwilling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During Family Dinner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Restaurants with Friends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On your favorite social media site/service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q24: Now I will briefly describe some people. Would you please indicate for each description whether that person is like your or unlike you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Like me</th>
<th>Unlike me</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one’s own way.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life.  
1 2

It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.  
1 2

Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one’s religion or family.  
1 2

SECTION 5: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

Q25. What is your age?  
_________ Years

Q26. Gender  
_________

Q27. What religion do you most identify with?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Sunni</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Shia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismaili</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsi</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadi</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (please list)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q 28 (a). What is your occupation?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Worker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-scale trader</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Worker</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Executive Staff</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisory Level</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Retailer/Businessman</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower/Middle: executive, officer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed/Employed Professional</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-sized businessman</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Executive Officer</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Businessman/Factory Owner</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q28 (b). What is your educational level/qualification?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q29. Which of the following best describes your income bracket?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Bracket</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than or equal to Rs. 5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs. 5,001-11,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs.11,001-14,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs. 14,001-16,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs. 16,001-20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs. 20,001-37,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs.37,001 or more</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q30. Thank you very much for you cooperation so far. Your opinions have been very informative and interesting so far. Would you be willing to get involved in an in-person session, with your friends and relatives, where these issues are discussed further? (Your anonymity and privacy will be strictly preserved)

[FOR THE INTERVIEWER: PLEASE NOTE IF THE PERSON RESPONDING IN THE AFFIRMATIVE WILL BE THE ONE PARTICIPATING IN THE FOLLOW-UP STUDY]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q31: Thinking only about your mobile internet usage in the past week, what method did you use to access the internet most frequently? (SINGLE RESPONSE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wi-Fi service at home/school/office/or public places like restaurants, malls etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through mobile data package (Edge/GPRS/DATA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through 3G Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free data services provided by company (this includes company’s offers of free Twitter, Whatsapp, and Facebook use)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 4: نیکہ نہیں، بات کہیں

**Q1.** ایب، ایب، ایب

**Q2.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q3.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q4a.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q4b.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q5.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q6.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q7.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q8.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q9.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q10.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q11.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q12.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q13.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q14.** (کہا، کہا)

**Q15.** (کہا، کہا)
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
Siyasa: 5. ذات معلومات

D1. أي ما هي جمهورية؟
(خوارج دليل على معرفة)

جواب: دولة في نفس مناطق الحضارة القديمة.)

D2. أي ما هو دين الفيلسوف القديم؟
(خوارج دليل على معرفة)

جواب: دين التوحيد.)

D3. أي ما هو دين الفيلسوف القديم؟
(خوارج دليل على معرفة)

جواب: دين التوحيد.)

D4a. أي ما هي الإله؟
(خوارج دليل على معرفة)

جواب: دين التوحيد.)

D4b. أي ما هي الإله؟
(خوارج دليل على معرفة)

جواب: دين التوحيد.)

D5. أي ما هو وجود دين في العالم؟
(خوارج دليل على معرفة)

جواب: دين التوحيد.)

Mafakher: 4. سيتال: سيف الاستمرار، برنامج إعلامي تقني

Q21. تحليل التكنولوجيا: باستخدام أداة التكنولوجيا، كيمون ما يمكن استخدامه؟

جواب: نظام حكم مركزي.)

Q22. تحليل التكنولوجيا: باستخدام أداة التكنولوجيا، كيمون ما يمكن استخدامه؟

جواب: نظام حكم مركزي.)

Mafakher: 3. التكنولوجيا: استخدام التكنولوجيا، كيمون ما يمكن استخدامه؟

جواب: نظام حكم مركزي.)

Q23. التكنولوجيا: استخدام التكنولوجيا، كيمون ما يمكن استخدامه؟

جواب: نظام حكم مركزي.)

Mafakher: 2. التكنولوجيا: استخدام التكنولوجيا، كيمون ما يمكن استخدامه؟

جواب: نظام حكم مركزي.)

جواب: نظام حكم مركزي.)
Appendix III: Full List Of Interviews And FGDs

1. 01.09.2014. FGD. FGD #1, Male, Students, Sunni. Gujranwala. At home.
2. 02.09.2014. FGD. FGD #2, Male, Student/Teacher/Job holder, Sunni. Gujrat. At home.
3. 26.09.2014. FGD. FGD #3, Female, Teachers/Doctor, Sunni, Mandibahaudin. At local college
4. 18.10.2014. FGD. FGD #4, Male, Lawyer/Doctor/Student/Worker, Sunni, Gujrat. At community center.
5. 18.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #1, Male, Marketing Officer, Sunni, Gujrat. At home.
8. 19.10.2014. FGD. FGD #5, Male, Lawyer/Cable Operator/Telecom technician, Shia, Mandibahaudin. At Education Academy.
10. 27.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #5, Male, Agriculturist, Sunni, Gujrat. At home.
11. 27.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #6, Male, Agriculturist, Sunni, Gujrat. At home.
12. 27.10.2014. FGD. FGD #6, Male, Students, workers, Sunni, Gujrat. At village restaurant.
13. 28.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #7, Male, Mobile Shopkeeper, Not known, Mandibahaudin. At shop.
14. 28.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #8, Male, Mobile Shopkeeper, Not known, Mandibahaudin. At shop.
15. 28.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #9, Male, Student, Sunni, Mandibahaudin. At a friend’s office.
16. 28.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #10, Male, Medical Worker, Christian, Mandibahaudin. At a friend’s office.
17. 29.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #11, Male, A young man (probably student), Shia, Mandibahaudin. At a local home
18. 29.10.2014. Interview. Interviewee #12, Male, Renting car business, Shia, Mandibahaudin. At a local home.
21. 13.11.2014. Interview. Interviewee #14, Male, Deputy Registrar at University, Shia, Gujrat. At Office.
22. 13.11.2014. Interview. Interviewee #15, Male, Student, Shia, Gujrat. At home.
24. 25.11.2014. Interview. Interviewee #17, Male, Lawyer, Sunni, Lahore, At office.

27. 29.01.2015. Interview. Interviewee #20, Male, Mobile Retailer, Sunni, Gujrat. At office.
28. 29.01.2015. Interview. Interviewee #21, Male, Student, Shia, Gujrat. At home.
29. 30.01.2015. Interview. Interviewee #22, Female, College Professor, Sunni, Gujranwala. At home.
30. 30.01.2015. Interview. Interviewee #23, Male, Student, Shia, Gujranwala. At home.
31. 02.02.2015. Interview. Interviewee #24, Male, Student, Ahle-Hadees, Gujranwala. At home.
32. 02.02.2015. Interview. Interviewee #25, Male, Factory Worker, Shia, Gujranwala. At factory.
33. 03.02.2015. Interview. Interviewee #26, Male, Teacher, Ahle-Hadees, Mandibahaudin. At local college.
34. 03.02.2015. Interview. Interviewee #27, Male, Student, Shia, Mandibahaudin. At home.
35. 09.03.2015. Interview. Interviewee #28, Female, Not known, Ahmedi, Rabwa. Not known.
36. 17.03.2015. Interview. Interviewee #29, Male, Mobile Software Expert, Ahle-Hadees, Gujrat. At shop and institute.
37. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #30, Male, Taylor, Shia, Kotli Kohala Village, Gujrat.
38. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #31, Male, Mass-Communication Graduate, Sunni, Kotli Kohala Village, Gujrat.
40. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #33, Male, Architect, Shia, Gujrat.
41. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #34, Male, Student of Commerce, Shia, Gujrat.
42. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #35, Male, Medical Graduate, Sunni, Gujrat.
43. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #36, Male, Studying Commerce, Sunni, Gujrat.
44. 26.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #37, Male, Doing electrician course, Shia, Gujrat.
45. 27.03.2015. FGD, FGD #8, Male, Students/Workers, Ahmedi, Gujranwala.
46. 31.03.2015. Interview, Interviewee #38, Male, Lawyer, Sunni, Lahore. At office.
47. 01.04.2015. Interview, Interviewee #39, Male, Not known, Not known, Phalia-Mandibahaudin.
48. 02.04.2015. FGD. FGD #9, Male, Family (Family heads run Shia praying place (Imam Bargah), Shia, Gujranwala.
49. 08.04.2015. Interview. Interviewee #40, Aspiring preacher, Shia, Gujranwala.
50. 10.04.2015. FGD. FGD #10, Male, Workers/Business Manager, Ahmedi, Mandibahaudin. At factory.
51. 10.04.2015. Interview. Interviewee #41, Photographer, Ahmedi, Lahore.
52. 11.04.2015. FGD. FGD #11, Male, Students, Sunni/Shia, Mandibahaudin. At local college.
53. 13.04.2015. FGD. FGD #12, Male, Lawyers, Sunni, Lahore. At office.
54. 18.04.2015. FGD. FGD #13, Female, Administrator at local academy/Student, Sunni, Mandibahaudin.
55. 11.04.2015. Interview, Interviewee #42, Male, Student, Sunni, Mandibahaudin.
56. 11.04.2015. Interview, Interviewee #43, Female, Teacher, Sunni, Mandibahaudin.
57. 16.04.2015. FGD. FGD #14, Male, Shopkeeper/farmer, Shia, Village (exact location not known).
58. 18.04.2015. FGD. FGD #15, Male, RJ/Model/Telecomm Professional/Teacher/Wapda officer, Sunni/Shia, Mandibahaudin.
59. 19.04.2015. Interview, Interviewee #44, Female, Teacher, Sunni, Mandibahaudin.
60. 24.04.2015. Interview, Interviewee #45, Male, Martial Art instructor, Shia, Gujrat.
61. 24.04.2015. Interview, Interviewee #46, Male, Not known, Shia, Gujrat.
62. 25.04.2015. FGD. FGD #16, Male, Pharmacist, Ahmedi, Mandibahaudin.
63. 25.04.2015. Interview. Interviewee #47, Male, Student, Ahmedi, Mandibahaudin.
66. 26.04.2015. FGD. FGD #17, Male, Jobless/not known, Shia, Warabalian.
70. Not Known. Interview. Interviewee #53, Male, Professor in Girls College, Not expressed, Gujrat.
71. 27.04.2015. Interview. Interviewee #54, Male, Engineer, Shia, Shahana Log.
72. 11.05.2015. Interview. Interviewee #55, Female, Student, Ahle-Hadees, Islamabad.
73. 30.06.2015. Interview. Interviewee #56, Male, Businessman, Shia, Shahana Log.
74. 01.09.2015. FGD. FGD #18, Female, Family, Ahmedi, Mandibahaudin.
75. 30.08.2015. FGD. FGD #19, Male, Cricketers, Shia, Mandibahaudin.
76. 31.08.2015. FGD. FGD #20, Female, Teachers, Shia, Mandibahaudin.
77. 31.08.2015. Interview. Interviewee #57, Female, Aurat Foundation Staff member, Not asked, Mandibahaudin.
78. 31.08.2015. Interview. Interviewee #58, Male, Not known, Ahle Hadees, Mandibahaudin.
79. 31.08.2015. Interview. Interviewee #59, Male, Not known, Deobandi, Mandibahaudin.
80. 01.09.2015. FGD. FGD #21, Female, Students, Shia/Sunni, Gujranwala.
81. 01.09.2015. FGD. FGD #22, Female, Not Known, Ahmedi, Gujranwala.
82. 01.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #60, Male, Worker, Ahle Hadees, Gujranwala.
83. 08.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #61, Female, Teacher/Facebook political activist, Deobandi, Mandibahaudin.
84. 08.09.2015. FGD. FGD #23, Male, NGO Worker, Deobandi, Mandibahaudin. At school.
85. 08.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #62, Male, Not known, Ahle Hadees, Mandibahaudin.
86. 08.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #63, Male, Religious Preacher, Ahle Hadees, Mandibahaudin. At local education institute.
87. 08.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #64, Male, Active Defense groups in new areas, Shia, Mandibahaudin.
88. 09.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #65, Female, Lawyer, Deobandi, Gujranwala.
89. 09.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #66, Female, Lawyer, Deobandi, Gujranwala.
90. 09.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #67, Male, Scrap Dealer, Ahle Hadees, Gujranwala.
91. 10.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #68, Female, Teacher, Not asked, Mandibahaudin.
92. 10.09.2015. FGD. FGD #24, Female, Students, Sunni, Mandibahaudin.
93. 10.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #69, Male, Second Interview, Sunni, Mandibahaudin.
94. 16.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #70, Female, Main Transcriber, Muslim, Gujrat.
95. 16.09.2015. FGD. FGD #25, Female, Students, Sunni, Mandibahaudin. At local college.
96. 16.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #71, Female, Activist, Shia, Mandibahaudin.
97. 16.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #72, Male, Religious leader, Ahle Hadees, Mandibahaudin. At local college.
98. 16.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #73, Male, Religious Scholar, Deobandi, Mandibahaudin. At local education institute.
100. 17.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #75, Male, Not known, Ahle Hadees, Gujranwala. Interviewed at Sewerage Contract.
101. 17.09.2015. FGD. FGD #26, Female, Students, Shia/Sunni, Gujrat. At University (Large Group).
102. 17.09.2015. FGD. FGD #27, Female, Students, Shia/Sunni, Gujrat. At University (Small Group).
103. 21.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #76, Female, Students, Sunni, Mandibahaudin. At local college.
104. 22.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #77, Female, Student, Sunni, Gujrat. At University.
105. 22.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #78, Female, Student, Sunni, Gujrat. At University.
106. 22.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #79, Female, Not known, Sunni, Gujranwala. At home.
107. 22.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #80, Female, Not known, Sunni, Gujranwala. At insurance office.
108. 22.09.2015. Interview. Interviewee #81, Male, Not known, Sunni, Gujranwala. At insurance office.
Appendix III: Full List Of Facebook Ban Newspaper Articles

THE NEWS ARTICLES

THE NATION ARTICLES

DAWN ARTICLES

JANG ARTICLES

2. Liaqat, Dr Amir. 2010. "We are to Show Faces on Doomsday— Not Facebook." We are to Show Faces on Doomsday— Not Facebook. Karachi: Jang, May 28.


NAWA-I-WAQT ARTICLES


4. Nawa-i-waqt. 2010. "Blasphemers of holy prophet are called ignorant even if they are sages." Blasphemers of holy prophet are called ignorant even if they are sages. Lahore: Nawa-i-Waqt, June 9.


Flick, Uwe. 2014. *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*. Fifth edition. Los Angeles: SAGE.


Haimson, Oliver L., and Anna Lauren Hoffmann. 2016. ‘Constructing and Enforcing “authentic” identity Online: Facebook, Real Names, and Non-Normative Identities’. First Monday 21 (6).


Haque, Jahanzaib. 2014. ‘Hate Speech: A Study of Pakistan’s Cyberspace’. Islamabad, Pakistan: bytes4all.


Kalin, Michael, and Niloufer Siddiqui. 2014. ‘Religious Authority and the Promotion of Sectarian Tolerance in Pakistan’. Special Report, United States Institute of Peace.


Marston, Cicely, and Ruth Lewis. 2014. ‘Anal Heterosex among Young People and Implications for Health Promotion: A Qualitative Study in the UK’. BMJ Open 4 (8).


Miles, Matthew B., and A. Michael Huberman. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook. SAGE.

Mitchell, Liam. 2014. ‘Life on Automatic: Facebook’s Archival Subject’. First Monday 19 (2).


Mosse, David. 2005. ‘Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice (Anthropology, Culture and Society Series)’.


Walsh, Declan. 2010. ‘Pakistan Blocks Facebook in Row over Muhammad Drawings’.


Yusuf, Huma. 2009. ‘Old and New Media: Converging during the Pakistani Emergency’.


