The London School of Economics and Political Science

Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974

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Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the making of West German policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship during the governments led by Willy Brandt and Marcelo Caetano, from 1968 until the dictatorship’s downfall on 25 April 1974. This case study sheds new light on the interaction between the Cold War and colonial politics, particularly on the multilateral dimension of the process of Portuguese resistance to decolonisation.

Although the starting point is the bilateral relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal, this thesis takes a multifaceted approach to the topic. It examines the role of various external and internal forces pushing for change and continuity in Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon. Research demonstrates that not only did that policy become a contentious issue internationally, it also polarised West Germany’s society, parliament and different sections of Bonn’s social-liberal coalition government. Taking this into account, my work covers the diplomatic, economic and military areas of the relations between the two states. It also addresses the parallel ties between the German Social-Democratic Party and the opposition to the dictatorship, including the Portuguese socialists and the African liberation movements.

The thesis argues that, despite many impulses and pressures to assertively confront the Portuguese dictatorship’s refusal to decolonise and democratise, West German policy towards the Caetano regime remained essentially cooperative, even if becoming increasingly ambiguous over time. That option reflected the geopolitical and conceptual contradictions between adopting a more aggressive policy towards Portugal and defending Bonn’s contemporary policy of rapprochement with Eastern Europe (neue Ostpolitik). Thus this thesis illustrates the interconnectedness between the global Cold War framework and the perpetuation of colonialism in Africa.
“Whoever uses the term ‘colony’ in front of the Portuguese to refer to their overseas provinces commits a serious and potentially insulting error of form. It is not appropriate to describe Portugal as a dictatorship and it is offensive to voice it in front of the Portuguese. The Portuguese form of government is adapted to fit the needs of the country and it gives personal freedom and legal security to the individual citizen. Portugal’s standard of living is substantially more modest than that of the Federal Republic. The wages and salaries of the Portuguese are far lower than the corresponding German ones; nevertheless the people in Portugal are generally content and happy.”

Pamphlet handed out by the ZdVP to the German troops stationed in Portugal (quoted from “Gewisse traditionelle Eigentümlichkeiten”, Der Spiegel, 05.10.1970, Nr.41, p.26)
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**Abbreviations**

AA – *Auswärtiges Amt* (Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

*AGM-Komitee – Deutsches Komitee für Angola, Guinea-Bissau und Mozambik* (German Committee for Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique)

AIP – *Associação Industrial Portuguesa* (Portuguese Industrial Association)

AKAFRIK – *Aktionskomitee Afrika*

ASP – *Acção Socialista Portuguesa* (Portuguese Socialist Action)

BDI – *Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie* (Federation of German Industries)

BfV – *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)

BGA - *Bundesverband des deutschen Gross- und Aussenhandels* (Federation of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade)

BMI – *Bundesministerium des Innern* (Federal Ministry of the Interior)

BMVg – *Bundesministerium der Verteidigung* (Federal Ministry for Defence)

BMWi – *Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft* (Federal Ministry for Economics)

BMZ – *Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit* (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation)

BND – *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (FRG’s Intelligence Agency)

BSR – *Bundessicherheitsrat* (Federal Security Council)

CCILA – *Câmara de Comércio e Indústria Luso-Alemã* (Portuguese-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry)

CDU – *Christlich Demokratische Union* (Christian Democratic Union)

COREMO – *Comité Revolucionário de Mocambique* (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique)

CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CSU – *Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern* (Christian Social Union of Bavaria)

DAC – OECD’s Development Assistance Committee

DED – *Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst* (German Development Service)

DGB – *Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund* (German Trade Union Federation)

DGS – *Direcção Geral de Segurança* (Portuguese Political Police)

DIHT – *Deutschen Industrie- und Handelstages* (German Chambers of Industry and Commerce)

DKP – *Deutsche Kommunistische Partei* (German Communist Party)

EEC – European Economic Community

EFTA – European Free Trade Organization

EKD – *Evangelische Kirche Deutschland* (Protestant Church of Germany)
FAP – Força Aérea Portuguesa (Portuguese Air Force)
FAZ – Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (a national German newspaper)
FCO – British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDP – Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FES – Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Friedrich Ebert Foundation)
FNMAL – Fábrica Nacional de Munições para Armas Ligeiras (Portugal’s National Light-Weapons Munition Factory)
FRELIMO – Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)
FCO – British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GDR – German Democratic Republic
GPMMC – German-Portuguese Military Mixed Commission
GRAE – Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile)
KDSE – Katholische Deutsche Studenten-Einigung (Catholic German Student Association)
KeiZ – Komitee für europäische und internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Parliamentary Committee for Economic and International Cooperation)
KIW – Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (FRG’s state-owned development bank)
MBFR – Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MFPZ – Missão de Fomento e Povoamento do Zambeze (Mission for the Development and Populating of the Zambezi)
MPLA – Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
NAM – Non-Aligned Movement
NATO – North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAU – Organization of African Unity
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECE – Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OGMA – Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronáutico (Portuguese aeronautical plant)
PAIGC – Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PvdA – Partij van de Arbeid (Dutch Labour Party)
RAF – Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction)
SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SDS – Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (Socialist German Student League)
SI – Socialist International
SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations Organisation
USA – United States of America
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WCC – World Council of Churches
ZdVP – Zentrale deutsche Verbindungsstelle in Portugal (Central German Representation in Portugal)
INTRODUCTION

Setting the stage

1. Background: The dynamics of transformation
2. Literature Review
3. Primary Sources
4. Conceptual approach
Behind the making of West German policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship between 1968 and 1974 lies the story of how the emblematic social-democratic governments led by Chancellor Willy Brandt came to deal with Western Europe’s oldest authoritarian state and most persistent colonial empire. This story reflects a key intersection of contemporary history: while acknowledging that decolonisation was the defining event of international relations during the second half of the twentieth century, we cannot ignore the role of the Cold War in shaping these relations, including the decolonising process itself. The competition between the Western and Eastern geo-ideological blocs provided the framework for the African emancipation from colonial rule, but also for European quests to perpetuate colonialism. This thesis addresses the interaction between these phenomena by examining the policy of a regime whose very being was inextricably linked to the Cold War, the Federal Republic Germany (FRG), towards a regime whose existence was grounded on the principle of resistance to decolonisation, the Portuguese Estado Novo dictatorship.

This introductory chapter outlines the framework and methodology of the thesis. The first section briefly sketches out the FRG’s and Portugal’s policy orientations during the early Cold War years in order to set up the specific political landscape behind their relationship. The chapter then situates my research within the relevant historiography and discusses the available primary sources used to examine that relationship, before clarifying the thesis’ rationale and structure.

1. Background: The dynamics of transformation

The years from 1968 to 1974 were marked by a widespread pursuit of new approaches to old conflicts. In 1968, just as the ‘Prague Spring’ and the Vietnamese Tet Offensive defied the international hegemony of the superpowers, a wave of domestic challenges to the established order swept both sides of the ‘iron curtain’, as well as the ‘Third World’. The rise of mass media facilitated an outburst of protest movements against local and global manifestations of capitalism, imperialism and colonialism. Images of the Nigerian-Biafran war shocked public opinion in Western societies and

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gave rise to a surge of humanitarian activism.² In Africa, the frustration over the shortcomings of a non-aligned approach to eliminating the colonial residues in the continent encouraged the increasing appropriation of Cold War rivalries.³ By contrast, during this period the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) sought to bring relief to decades of escalating tension between them through détente – an array of negotiations and treaties recognising each other’s ‘interests’. Initiatives such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks (MBFR) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) raised hopes for a more peaceful future. In turn, the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971 and the oil price shock of 1973 ushered the end of almost thirty years of Western European economic prosperity. By 1974, the Zeitgeist was consumed by a pervasive atmosphere of ‘crisis’.⁴ In this context, the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal underwent their own processes of transformation. In order to understand that transformation, it is necessary to track their evolution in the previous decades.

Since the foundation of the FRG, in 1949, its foreign policy was firmly oriented towards Western integration. This option reflected the wish for Western European cohesion and the rigid anticommunist stance of the first governments in Bonn, headed by the conservative Christian sister parties CDU/CSU under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (CDU), who stayed in power until 1963, often in coalition with the liberal party FDP. Adenauer’s governments embraced international projects such as the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later OECD) and the European Economic Community (EEC) in their quest for regaining external credibility and greater political sovereignty. Having been granted from the victor powers the right to remilitarise, in 1955 Bonn joined the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).⁵ The path of multilateralism allowed the federal authorities to expand their restricted


political range of action by incorporating the FRG’s interests into the Western Bloc so that its allies could accept them as their own. Westernisation, however, was not consensual domestically, as in the 1950s the social-democratic opposition party SPD regarded this move as an obstacle to German reunification.

Bonn’s foreign policy then could not be dissociated from the fact that Cold War geopolitics had not just led to the partitioning of Europe, but of Germany itself. Claiming to be the sole representative of the German nation, under Adenauer the FRG assertively sought to isolate its Eastern counterpart, the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR). This tactic took shape under the ‘Hallstein doctrine’, which stipulated that Bonn would not establish and maintain diplomatic ties with any state that recognised de jure East Germany, with the exception of the USSR. Tension reached a peak with the diplomatic crisis of 1958-1962, when Moscow demanded the withdrawal of Western troops from Berlin and East German forces erected the wall which cemented the division of that city. Concerned, the federal authorities began to feel the need to adopt a more flexible strategy towards the Soviet Bloc. This tendency evolved during the chancellorship of Ludwig Erhard (CDU), from 1963 until 1966, and particularly during the subsequent CDU/CSU-SPD coalition government. The latter, known as the ‘Grand Coalition’, was led by Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) and had the SPD’s Chairman Willy Brandt as Vice-Chancellor and Minister at the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt – AA). While not yet formally abandoning the Hallstein doctrine, the Grand Coalition nonetheless established diplomatic relations with Romania and Yugoslavia and began to lay the groundwork for a more engaged relationship with the Eastern Bloc.

Just as the FRG’s foreign policy was tied to the concept of a divided nation, Portugal saw itself as a nation under threat of amputation. The identity of the right-wing Estado Novo dictatorship, in place since 1933, relied heavily on the idea of a pluricontinental empire. More than mere economic necessity, the governments in Lisbon portrayed colonialism as a historical imperative by invoking Portugal’s ‘civilising mission’. They also argued that the geopolitical presence projected by the

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11 This notion of empire included the Indian colonies Goa, Daman and Diu (all of them annexed by India in 1961), the Eastern colonies East-Timor and Macao and the African colonies Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe.
empire served to secure the independence of the small Portuguese metropolis from the larger European states, particularly Spain. In the aftermath of World War II, the regime’s founder and leader, the President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) António de Oliveira Salazar, perceived colonial rule as threatened by the new world order, namely by the rhetoric of the USA and USSR, as well as the UN Charter. After a constitutional amendment in 1951, Salazar’s regime no longer officially acknowledged that it possessed colonies, but merely ‘overseas provinces’, which were considered to be part of Portugal’s ‘single and indivisible state’. Lisbon claimed that Portugal’s relationship with its empire contained an element of ‘originality’, rooted in 500 years of shared history and a vocation for inter-racial harmony (luso-tropicalismo), which set it apart from other European powers. As liberation wars broke out, first in Angola (1961) and later also in Guinea-Bissau (1963) and Mozambique (1964), the regime framed the conflicts as part of the global Cold War. Because the main liberation movements displayed Marxist leanings and connections – namely Angola’s MPLA, Mozambique’s FRELIMO and Guinea-Bissau’s and Cape Verde’s PAIGC – Lisbon portrayed Portuguese military actions as defensive responses to attacks perpetrated by Soviet-backed ‘terrorists’.

Regardless of Salazar’s distrust of the USA and of the contentious status of Portuguese colonialism, the dictatorship successfully integrated into the Western Bloc. Portugal emerged from World War II in a more positive light than Spain’s similar regime, due to Lisbon’s collaboration with the allied forces during the war, despite Portugal’s neutral status. Moreover, in its reluctance to decolonise Lisbon did not differ significantly from the behaviour of other colonial powers. Thus, although Portugal’s first application for membership in the UN, endorsed by the West, was

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vetoed by Moscow in 1946\textsuperscript{15}, the dictatorship managed to enter the organisation in 1955 as part of a pack of countries brought in by the USA. Washington also recruited Portugal to be an original member of NATO in 1949 due to its strategic location in Europe and, especially, because of the Lajes airbase on the Portuguese Azores archipelago situated in mid-Atlantic.\textsuperscript{16} Portugal’s integration was not only political and military, but also economic, as the country joined Western multilateral markets and institutions, including the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).\textsuperscript{17} Even in the 1960s, when Lisbon’s resistance to decolonisation eventually became a counter-cyclical phenomenon, Portugal – unlike what Salazar claimed in his famous 1965 speech – did not stand “proudly alone”.\textsuperscript{18} Lisbon notably maintained solid, if careful, relations with three permanent members of the UN Security Council – USA, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) – which regularly vetoed or abstained in UN resolutions directed against the dictatorship.\textsuperscript{19}

The development of diplomatic ties between West Germany and Portugal was a gradual process, with the initial steps dating back to the FRG’s earliest years. One of the most significant aspects in bringing the two states closer together was the geo-strategic disposition of the Cold War. The FRG, on the north-eastern front of Western Europe, and Portugal, in the southwest, occupied symmetrical and therefore complementary positions in the Western defence strategy.\textsuperscript{20} This connection grew stronger as the Bonn regime joined NATO, a move which had found in Portugal one of its first great supporters, with Lisbon highlighting the importance of a strong West Germany to block the possibility of Soviet expansion. In turn, Konrad Adenauer openly stated his own admiration for the leadership skills of António Salazar, who, like him, was a devout catholic and staunch anticommunist. The relations between the two states

\textsuperscript{16} Pinto (2001), pp.14-15; During the Cold War, an estimated 75% of all military air traffic between the United States, Europe and the Middle East went through the Lajes airbase – Schneidman, Witney W. 2004. Washington and the Fall of Portugal’s Colonial Empire, Dallas: University Press of America, p.30.
\textsuperscript{17} Besides being a founding member of OEEC and OECD, Portugal also became a member of the International Monetary Fund (1960) and of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1962). – Neves, João César das. 1996. «Portuguese Post-war Growth: a Global Approach». In Economic Growth in Europe since 1945, Crafts, Nicholas and Toniolo, Gianni (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.340.
\textsuperscript{19} Macqueen (1997), p.56.
grew friendlier, and in 1956 West German and Portuguese authorities upgraded their respective legations to embassies.21

Yet it was only in the late 1950s/early 1960s that a sharp shift in Lisbon’s foreign strategy and Bonn’s reconstruction of the FRG’s military might brought about a serious strengthening of their relationship. By then Portugal’s two most powerful allies – the UK and the USA – were progressively distancing themselves from the Portuguese imperial project. This led the dictatorship to seek alternative alliances that would secure its colonial designs at a time when the winds of decolonisation were blowing through Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, quietly but surely, Lisbon reinforced its relations with France and West Germany. Bonn quickly proved itself a valuable partner, providing Lisbon with military materiel used in the colonial wars in exchange for a fall-back rearguard in Portugal in case of an attack from the East.22 For the CDU/CSU-led governments of the time, this was an acceptable strategic position, if not an unproblematic one. In general Bonn looked at the colonies’ path to autonomy with sympathy, not least because the notion of self-determination lay at the heart of the ‘German unification question’ itself. Nevertheless, the FRG also placed great importance on cooperation with its European allies, including the colonial powers. During the French-Algerian colonial war (1954-1962), for example, Bonn had reiterated its loyalty to France; thus by the time the first conflicts broke out in Angola, the precedent had already been set.23 The FRG worried that if Portugal felt a lack of support from its Western allies, it might leave the Atlantic Alliance, costing NATO the crucial Lajes air base. Moreover, Bonn, fitting with its CDU/CSU pragmatic hard-line worldview, feared that Portugal’s loss of the empire would mean the downfall of Salazar’s dictatorship. This might allow for Communism to rise in Portugal and to spread to Spain, which would mean a pro-Soviet Iberian Peninsula.24 Bonn’s classic ‘adenerauerite’ outlook of foreign affairs was however soon to be taken by the transformative thrust of the late 1960s.

Although building on the work of its predecessor, the FRG government which came to power as a result of the 28 September 1969 elections brought a new approach to

24 Fonseca (2007), pp.142-156.
the Cold War in general and to the ‘German question’ in particular.\(^{25}\) The SPD and FDP – holding a majority in parliament (Bundestag) together – formed a coalition government on 21 October, with Willy Brandt as chancellor and the FDP’s Chairman Walter Scheel as vice-chancellor and foreign minister. The basis for their agreement was the pursuit of a new Eastern policy (neue Ostpolitik).\(^{26}\) Its conceptual origins stretched back at least to the Berlin Crisis, which had been witnessed first-hand by neue Ostpolitik’s main architects: then-Mayor of West Berlin Willy Brandt and his press officer Egon Bahr. They presented peaceful coexistence as the first step for settling divergences with the FRG’s Eastern counterpart. According to the stated principle of ‘change through rapprochement’ (Wandel durch Annäherung), West German political engagement with the East would influence the latter. Therefore, neue Ostpolitik appeared not as a mere acceptance of the status quo, but as an attempt to overcome it by promoting gradual transformation in the GDR and a stable security system in Europe where unification could eventually take place.\(^{27}\) The emphasis on stability has led critics to challenge the progressive character of this policy, accused of economically propping up East Germany\(^{28}\) and of reinforcing, rather than transcending, the structures of the Cold War.\(^{29}\) In practice, neue Ostpolitik translated into a series of treaties normalising Bonn’s relations with the USSR\(^{30}\), Poland\(^{31}\), Czechoslovakia\(^{32}\) and, notably, the GDR\(^{33}\), earning Willy Brandt the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971. The negotiations carried out by Walter Scheel and, above all, by Egon Bahr, whom Brandt brought in as undersecretary of state of the Chancellor, relied heavily on the goodwill of the FRG’s main Western allies USA, UK and France, not least because of their victor-power authority over the status of Berlin.\(^{34}\) Nevertheless, neue Ostpolitik

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\(^{30}\) Treaty of Moscow (12.08.1970).


remained an autonomous process with specific regional goals, even if coinciding with the evolution of superpower rapprochement and détente.35

As central and all encompassing as neue Ostpolitik appeared to be, the coalition’s multifaceted agenda embraced other dimensions. Bonn expanded its international development assistance programmes and participated in the North-South dialogue initiatives, where it stressed the role of aid in securing peace.36 Because the Third World countries formed the largest voting group in the UN General Assembly, relations with those countries were of great importance, particularly in terms of enabling both German states to join the UN on 18 September 1973. The FRG also remained an active member in NATO as well as in the EEC, the enlargement of which (to Denmark, Ireland and the UK) Bonn supported wholeheartedly. At home, the government had to contend with rising social unrest and political friction. During its first years, the coalition was in a precarious position in the Bundestag, as several MPs switched party and joined CDU, mostly in protest against neue Ostpolitik. The government barely defeated a vote of no-confidence in April 1972 and it agreed to face new elections on 19 November, which it won after a polarising campaign largely focused on Bonn’s foreign policy. The chancellor’s popularity plummeted in 1973 amid political scandals. Most prominently, Brandt’s personal assistant Günter Guillaume was uncovered as a spy for the GDR, leading Brandt to resign on 6 May 1974.37

In Portugal, the impulse for transformation bore the banner of ‘evolution within continuity’ (evolução na continuidade), articulated by Marcelo Caetano, who took over from a hospitalised Salazar on 27 September 1968. For decades, Caetano had informally headed a marginalised strand within the regime (marcelismo) which defended economic modernisation, federalisation of the colonial system and a loosening of the repressive state apparatus. Thus, the new prime minister brought forth widespread expectations of serious change in Lisbon. His first year in power, known as the ‘marcelist spring’, saw the softening, by the regime’s standards, of censorship and police despotism. The legislative elections on 26 October 1969 – less fraudulent than usual, but hardly free – allowed a ‘liberal wing’ into the parliament, with a progressive agenda, if not much

actual power. A technocratic faction within the government promoted industrialisation and a closer proximity to the EEC, ushering in a trade agreement with the Common Market in July 1972. However, Caetano did not truly part with the authoritarian structures and ideology set by his predecessor, as evident in his 1971 constitutional revision. Although considered too radical by the regime’s more conservative faction – the ‘ultras’ – the limits of Caetano’s reformism frustrated the hopes for Portugal’s democratisation, or at least meaningful liberalisation. Whether those limits derived from personal political conviction, from concern over social disorder due to popular discontent with the colonial wars, or simply from Caetano’s unwillingness to fully challenge the powerful ‘ultras’, remains the subject of academic dispute. Regardless, what became the dictatorship’s closing period was marked by the withdrawal of marcelismo’s most tolerant initiatives and by a massive wave of repression up to 1974.38

That marcelismo was fundamentally undermined by its inability to achieve a political solution for the colonial conflict is less contested, despite persistent debate over Caetano’s actual long-term intentions for the empire. He certainly rejected decolonisation in the foreseeable future, even if he shifted the official paradigm away from esoteric justifications and chose to emphasise practical arguments, i.e. Portugal’s alleged role in protecting and developing its colonised ‘multiracial’ societies. The constitutional revision introduced the principle of ‘participatory and progressive autonomy’ for the overseas provinces, which did not imply giving up the rule over those territories, just granting them more relative administrative power. The pro-colonial far-right saw this step as an opening up of a path towards eventual independence, while the anti-colonialist critics regarded it as a superficial adjustment designed to safeguard the imperial system.39 In the face of a growing international backlash, Portugal’s diplomatic strategy focused on traditional allies, including Brazil, Spain, France and West Germany, as well as the UK and USA, where conservative parties had just returned to power. Aware that these countries would not openly support Lisbon’s unpopular

38 For two key interpretations of the motivations and evolution of marcelismo, including Caetano’s rule, see Rosas, Fernando. 1999. «O Marcelismo ou a Falência da Política de Transição no Estado Novo». In Do Marcelismo ao Fim do Império, Brito, José Maria Brandão (ed.). Lisbon: Editorial Notícias, pp.15-59 and Valente, Vasco Pulido. 2002. Marcello Caetano: as Desventuras da Razão, Lisbon: Gótica. The former argues that Caetano sought to truly reform the regime, but was unable to go further because of his failure to solve the colonial conflict. The latter denies Caetano’s intention of taking the reforms much further than he did. For a detailed analysis of the implications of the constitutional revision, see also Carvalho, Rita Almeida de. 2004. «O Marcelismo à Luz da Revisão Constitucional de 1971 In A Transição Falhada. O Marcelismo e o Fim do Estado Novo (1968-1974), Rosas, Fernando and Oliveira, Pedro A (eds.). Lisbon: Editorial Notícias, pp.27-89.
39 ibid
position, the dictatorship tried to at least prevent them from acting directly against it, while simultaneously seeking discrete material assistance for its colonial warfare. The Portuguese suffered their harsher military defeats in Guinea-Bissau, which unilaterally declared independence in September 1973.\textsuperscript{40} The dissatisfaction with the regime, particularly with the African wars, reached sections of the Portuguese armed forces. On 25 April 1974, a left-wing military coup in Portugal spurred the Carnation Revolution, which brought down the \textit{Estado Novo} dictatorship and paved the way for decolonisation.\textsuperscript{41}

The faces of the diplomatic actors were themselves renewed during this period. Walter Scheel had no previous experience in the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}.\textsuperscript{42} In Portugal, the old-school ‘salazarist’ Alberto Franco Nogueira served as foreign minister under Caetano, but he left office after the 1969 elections, becoming one of the main voices of the ‘ultras’. Caetano took over foreign affairs until the end of the year and on 15 January he invited his 37-year old former student Rui Patrício to head the Foreign Ministry.\textsuperscript{43} At embassy level, the situation was more convoluted. The FRG had three ambassadors assigned to Lisbon during the Caetano years\textsuperscript{44}, namely Herbert Müller-Rorschach, who returned to Germany in February 1969 due to an investigation accusing him of involvement in the Holocaust\textsuperscript{45}, Hans Schmidt-Horix\textsuperscript{46}, who committed suicide on 30 November 1970\textsuperscript{47}, and lastly Ehrenfried von Holleben.\textsuperscript{48} The Portuguese

\textsuperscript{40} Oliveira, «\textit{A Política Externa}», in Rosas/Oliveira (2004), pp.301-337.
\textsuperscript{44} Plus consulates in Faro, Funchal, Ponta Delgada and Oporto, as well as Luanda and Lourenço Marques (Maputo).
\textsuperscript{45} The ambassador claimed he had in fact volunteered for the Army in order to escape the Holocaust’s “killing machine” and the accusation did appear to lack enough evidence. Nevertheless, Willy Brandt found it wiser to call him back to Bonn. – AHD-MNE, PEA, M337–A), Pr.332,30.
\textsuperscript{46} Schmidt-Horix had worked in Lisbon thirty years earlier and expressed great affection for the country. The new ambassador too was linked to the Nazi regime, having been part of the mounted units of the SS (\textit{Reiterkorps}). Before leaving to Lisbon, he informed his Portuguese counterpart that belonging to an organisation of the National-Socialist Party had been a requirement for the application for a diplomatic career. Schmidt-Horix explained that he had picked the \textit{Reiterkorps} because he enjoyed horse riding, adding that this experience had in fact been quite pleasant, as it had allowed him to ride on the beautiful outskirts of Berlin. (AHD-MNE,PEA,M595,Pr.321, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,24.03.1969) This suggests Bonn’s propensity for picking diplomats with a conservative profile to serve as liaison with the dictatorship. In fact, Müller-Rorschach’s predecessor, Herbert Schaffarczyk, had been reprimanded by the \textit{AA} for his pro-Portuguese bias. (Fonseca (2007), pp.142-144).
\textsuperscript{47} The most widely reported version stated that the ambassador’s wife, who had been gravely ill, overdosed and Schmidt-Horix, upon finding her, shot himself. – AHD-MNE,PEA,M641,Pr.331
\textsuperscript{48} Von Holleben had been ambassador in the Brazilian military dictatorship for the previous five years (\textit{Informações (CCILA)}, 15.02.1971), where he had recently been famously kidnapped by rebels and
Embassy in Bonn saw great rotation as well, but with less tragic undertones. The role of extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador belonged to Manuel Homem de Mello until his retirement in 1971, João de Freitas Cruz until his promotion to political director at the Foreign Ministry in September 1973 and subsequently to Vasco Futscher Pereira. This frantic circulation of diplomatic agents was counterbalanced by each country’s overall stable vision of foreign policy.

The making of the FRG’s policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship during this period can only be understood in light of the key political projects in Bonn and Lisbon, although they should not confine the analysis. The leaderships of Willy Brandt and Marcelo Caetano were closely associated with long-running marginal strands within each regime, reflecting a yearning for transformation, tempered with a devotion to stability. The fact that both responded to concerns over the perceived integrity of their nations conditioned the interaction between the two states. However, just as Brandt’s vision did not limit itself to neue Ostpolitik and marcelismo did not limit itself to the ‘colonial question’, West German-Portuguese relations were not shaped merely by those two political designs, nor indeed merely by Brandt and Caetano. As this thesis demonstrates, those relations were tied into a much more complex tapestry of social and global forces of continuity and discontinuity.


49 Apart from the Embassy, Portugal was represented in the FRG through eight consulates: Bremen, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Munich, Neuss and Hamburg, with the latter in charge of the honorary consulates of Sweden and Denmark. In 1969, Lisbon replaced the consulate in Cologne with one in Berlin.

50 Homem de Mello had been an expert on German-Portuguese relations for decades, having been: secretary in the delegation that negotiated the Trade Agreement with Germany in March 1935, employee at the Legation in Berlin in 1940 and 1941, employee at the Consulate in Hamburg in 1950, head of the Portuguese delegation that negotiated the Trade and Navigation Agreement with the FRG in June 1950, sent to Bonn on a related economic mission in 1951, and head of the Portuguese delegation that negotiated the Additional Protocol to the Trade and Navigation Agreement with the FRG in 1952. He had also been awarded by the federal government the Great Cross of Merit with Star and Shoulder Ribbon. – Anuário Diplomático e Consular Português 1969, pp.291-293.

51 Freitas Cruz did not possess such an impressive résumé on German-Portuguese bilateral relations – he did not even speak German. (PAAA, B26/445, Memo from the AA, 02.09.1971) His experience had been connected with multilateral policy in NATO and OECD. (Anuário Diplomático e Consular Português 1972, p.209).

52 Futscher Pereira’s diplomatic field of expertise was mostly linked with African affairs. – Anuário Diplomático e Consular Português 1973, pp.346-347.
2. Literature review

Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime has received little attention from scholars so far; the literature is fragmented and insufficiently conceptualised. General works on German Cold War foreign policy have largely neglected this dimension of the FRG’s external relations. Similarly, the historiography of Portuguese international resistance to decolonisation has touched on West Germany’s role rather sparingly. There was very little academic dialogue among the scholars who did engage with it, particularly between those working in Germany and those working in Portugal. A number of them contributed decisively to shed light on this topic, but attempts to explore its significance beyond German and Portuguese politics were shallow and rare.

Portuguese research has tended to focus on the elements of discontinuity between Brandt’s governments and their predecessors. António José Telo’s noteworthy 1996 article on Germany’s historical role within Europe included four sections dedicated to the neue Ostpolitik era, one of which specifically dealt with Bonn’s relations with Portugal in that period. Telo discussed how under Brandt the FRG massively reduced German-Portuguese military cooperation and, crucially, its arms sales to Lisbon. He blamed this reduction chiefly on NATO’s shift of defence strategy, which rendered Portugal much less relevant for the FRG’s security designs. Ignoring the inner workings of the federal government, Telo perceived simultaneous erosion in the political relations between the two states, due to the SPD’s support for the Portuguese socialist opposition. In a later piece he claimed that Bonn found it more difficult to support Portugal during this period because the public’s condemnation of the colonial wars constrained the policy of the democratically elected German government and because neue Ostpolitik implied “an improvement in the [FRG’s] relations with the African movements or at least greater sensibility in that regard”. The notion that the FRG’s relationship with Portugal suffered a drastic setback fit into Telo’s systemic

54 Two key works which largely ignore the specificity of the Brandt governments are Macqueen (1997) and Pinto (2001).
55 Telo was under the mistaken impression that since 1969 Brandt headed single-party governments rather than coalitions, as explicitly stated on p.139.
interpretation, according to which the downfall of the Portuguese empire resulted from Portugal’s maladjustment to the surrounding international structure.58

This portrayal of the Caetano era as a time of intrinsic tension between Bonn and Lisbon has remained unchallenged in Portuguese historiography. Pedro Aires Oliveira, who wrote the most wide-ranging recent works on Caetano’s foreign policy, has suggested that under Brandt the West German authorities felt the need to claim a more ethical profile for the FRG’s foreign policy by keeping their distance from the Portuguese colonial system.59 Even Ana Mónica Fonseca’s 2005 Master’s dissertation about West German support for the Lisbon dictatorship, which was much more aware of German studies and sources than the previous examples, only addressed the period from 1958 until 1968, before Willy Brandt became chancellor.60 Her more recent work has focused on the period after the downfall of the Caetano regime.61 Because Portuguese research did not thoroughly scrutinise Bonn’s policy towards marcelismo, it tended towards a superficial interpretation of events, with no clear distinction either between different stages or between the various German players.

Conversely, West German research has emphasised the continuity of a friendly policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship during Brandt’s chancellorship, even if acknowledging a degree of ambiguity. Henning von Löwis of Menar, who as a scholar in 1971 had defended a Realpolitik-based approach towards the dictatorship62, became a specialist in this topic.63 His 1979 PhD thesis about Lisbon’s foreign policy from 1945 until 197364 devoted a sizeable section to Portugal’s relations with West Germany. Although recognising that during the Brandt era some in the SPD away from the ruling circle developed a “parallel foreign policy” in support of the opposition to the dictatorship65, Menar postulated that little changed in the official bilateral relationship

60 Fonseca (2007).
63 He wrote the entries concerning the FRG’s policy towards Portugal and southern Africa in Hans-Peter Schwarz’s classic compendium on West German foreign policy. – Menar, Henning von Löwis. 1975. «Die Beziehungen zu Spanien und Portugal» and «Die deutschen Interessen im südlichen Afrika». In Handbuch der Deutschen Außenpolitik, Schwarz, Hans-Peter (ed.). Munich: Unknown Publisher, pp.279-281 and pp.331-335.
Thomas Schroers, whose 1998 PhD thesis focused on the FRG’s relations with Portugal from 1949 until 1976, included a chapter about the Brandt years which touched upon a large number of important aspects, adding much detail to Menar’s findings. Schroers claimed that Brandt’s governments gradually sought to publicly dissociate Bonn from the Caetano regime, but that this remained an artificial process, because of Bonn’s reluctance to defy Portugal as a NATO ally. Schroers has undertaken the most extensive research so far on this topic and raised valid points. Yet he neither consulted Portuguese sources for the chapter, nor was he able to access the federal government’s papers of the Brandt era. Consequently, Schroers did not fully unravel the complexities of Bonn’s policy-making process during this period.

The FRG’s policy towards Portugal also caught the interest of the West German movement of solidarity with the African liberation struggle in the early 1970s. An influential author who substantially researched, theorised and published about the issue was Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, a Portuguese economist exiled in the FRG at the time. Ferreira’s Marxist analysis of the FRG’s economic interests in the Portuguese colonies provided a thought-provoking first draft of history about the link between colonialism and German-Portuguese economic relations. This critique proved particularly appealing to German scholars close to the dependency theory school, such as political scientist Rainer Tetzlaff, and that interest carried on into the early aftermath of decolonisation. Together with Helmut Bley, Tetzlaff edited in 1978 a seminal work on the development of Bonn’s African policy, which manifestly sought to promote a more progressive attitude towards African affairs. A chapter in that book written by Gerhard Grohs, who had himself participated in the solidarity movement, focused on past German-Portuguese relations as an example of a disastrous policy. Grohs’ essay

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69 His main work in this regard was Ferreira, Eduardo de Sousa. 1975. *Estruturas de dependência: as Relações Económicas de Angola e Moçambique com a RFA*, Lisbon: Iniciativas Editoriais.
70 Tetzlaff, whose study trips to southern Africa included Mozambique, campaigned against the German involvement in the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam in that colony (“Cabora-Bassa Firmen unter Beschuß”, *Afrika heute*, 01.10.1971, p.218). For his views on the matter, see his critique of Menar’s cited article, in “Cabora Bassa”, *Afrika heute*, 15.11.1971, pp.468-471.
72 Grohs was a member of the Synod of the German Protestant Church and President of its Chamber for Development Aid (Grohs, Gerhard and Neyer, Harry (eds.). 1975. *Die Kirchen und die Portugiesische Präsenz in Afrika*, Munich: Kaiser, p.176), which, as explained in Chapter 2, supported the liberation movements. For an example of his long-standing critical position regarding Bonn’s policy towards Portugal, see “Deutsche Afrikapolitik in der Diskussion”, *Afrika heute*, October 1972, pp. 427-428.
reproduced the criticism articulated by the movement earlier in the decade, accusing the federal government of having cynically backed Lisbon’s colonial praxis in order to safeguard West German economic interests in the Portuguese territories, as well as military cooperation with Portugal and in NATO.\textsuperscript{73} Over the following years, this politicised current of scholarship neglected the Portuguese case in order to concentrate chiefly on Namibia\textsuperscript{74}, where the colonial conflict lasted until 1989. The neglect persisted well into the 1990s, even though the image of Bonn’s former role as backer of Portuguese colonialism retained resonance abroad, as illustrated by the work of Nigerian historian Bolade Eyinla.\textsuperscript{75} In 2000, Ulf Engel sought to move the study of Bonn’s African policy beyond structuralist interpretations through a historical analysis based on empirical constructivism. Less influenced by the early 1970s’ solidarity movement than by the recent evolution of the field, Engel seriously downplayed Portugal’s importance in the history of Bonn’s relations with Africa.\textsuperscript{76}

Ramifications of the FRG’s involvement with the Portuguese colonial crisis cropped up in related areas of research. Michael van Lay’s 1981 study about the Church’s role in conflicts of decolonisation, particularly in Mozambique, devoted a section to the actions of the West German clergy.\textsuperscript{77} In 2002, João Tavares published his thesis about the Portuguese military industry during the colonial wars, which examined at length the dictatorship’s cooperation with the German authorities, although saying remarkably little about the Willy Brandt period.\textsuperscript{78} Dalila Mateus’ 2004 book about the Portuguese political police in Africa during the colonial wars included a brief section on cases of cooperation between that police and the German secret services, most of them occurring in the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{74}Engel (2000), p.6.
\textsuperscript{75}Eyunla, Bolade Michael. 1996. The Foreign Policy of West Germany towards Africa, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
\textsuperscript{76}Engel (2000).
\textsuperscript{78}Tavares, João Moreira. 2005. Indústria Militar Portuguesa no Tempo de Guerra 1961 – 1974, Casal de Cambra: Caleidoscópio. XXth Century History Master’s dissertation from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2002; Naturally, mentions of the FRG’s military cooperation with the Portuguese dictatorship are common place in other literature about the colonial wars (for example, the collected articles in Afonso, Aniceto and Gomes, Carlos de Matos. 2000. Guerra Colonial, Lisbon: Editorial Notícias), but never as developed as in Tavares’ work.
\textsuperscript{79}Mateus, Dalila Cabrita. 2004. A PIDE/DGS na Guerra Colonial 1961-1974, Lisbon: Terramar, pp.369-
Finally, a few areas of German-Portuguese relations have benefited from in-depth research. In 1975, Keith Middlemas published a wide-ranging study about the Cahora Bassa dam, built in Mozambique between 1968 and 1975 with the participation of West German companies and state credit guarantees.\(^{80}\) Despite a few inaccuracies, Middlemas’ book remains the definitive work on the political, financial and logistical dimensions of that enterprise, complemented by more recent interesting contributions from Luis Alves\(^{81}\), Allen Isaacman and Chris Sneddon.\(^{82}\) Manuel de Matos’ 1977 PhD thesis – researched and submitted in the FRG – sought to assess how the West German public perceived Portugal from 1961 until 1975, based mostly on contemporary press and questionnaires.\(^{83}\) This topic was revisited in 1994 by Hans-Ulrich Thamer.\(^{84}\) In 2002, Artur Pais traced back the origins and evolution of the Beja airbase, in southern Portugal, which Lisbon began leasing to the FRG’s Air Force in the 1960s.\(^{85}\) The SPD’s parallel relations with the Portuguese socialists during the dictatorship were examined by Thomas Kreyssig in 1990\(^{86}\) and, with more critical insight, by Antonio Muñoz Sánchez in 2007.\(^{87}\)

This thesis brings together all the previous strands from the existing individual works. Not only does it re-contextualise the earlier findings and interpretations within my specific research, but it re-contextualises them within the broader historiography. Research on the final period of the Portuguese empire, which had traditionally been quite generalist,\(^{88}\) has over the last decade shifted its focus towards bilateral case studies.\(^{89}\) Although using a bilateral case study as a starting point, this thesis pushes

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88 For an assessment of the main historiography prior to the last decade, see Oliveira (2002), pp.93-97.

those thematic boundaries by carefully framing its subject in a multilateral context. In order to do this, it takes advantage of research done on the Caetano regime’s relations with other states, most notably with its main allies the USA\textsuperscript{90}, the UK\textsuperscript{91} and France\textsuperscript{92}. Similarly, this work contributes to the ever expanding scholarship on Willy Brandt’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{93} Specifically, it fits in with the recent shift to investigate the international ramifications of neue Ostpolitik beyond Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{94} and how that policy reflected into other areas of Bonn’s foreign affairs – as Sara Lorenzini has recently done in examining Bonn’s policy in Africa against the background of the new eastern approach.\textsuperscript{95}

Ultimately, this research aims to widen our understanding of the intersection between the Cold War and decolonisation politics. Historians have already established that the Cold War conflict compromised Washington’s initial disposition towards decolonisation in certain instances by creating a community of interests among the USA and the European colonial powers.\textsuperscript{96} This thesis demonstrates that a variation of that phenomenon is reflected in West Germany’s policy towards Portugal. Shifting these two states from secondary actors to protagonists, I explore how they perceived and manipulated the Cold War tensions beyond their direct interactions with the superpowers, namely in their dealings with each other. Although I concentrate on Bonn’s perspective, my analysis incorporates sources from different countries, acknowledges the agency on both sides and explores the mindset behind the various social and political forces involved. Through the adoption of a ‘multiarchival’, ‘multipolar’ and ‘multicultural’ approach, this research contributes to the expanding field of the ‘new Cold War history’.\textsuperscript{97} It answers Tony Smith’s call for ‘pericentrism’ in

\textsuperscript{90} Schneidman (2004), pp.105-149.
\textsuperscript{91} Oliveira (2007), pp.353-407.
\textsuperscript{95} Lorenzini (2009).
Cold War studies by assessing the role of seemingly peripheral players in containing and expanding wider international trends.98

3. Primary Sources

Besides delving into the relevant academic literature, this research made extensive use of primary sources. The bulk of my sources came from the archives of the German and Portuguese foreign ministries, situated in Berlin (PAAA)99 and Lisbon (AHD-MNE), which disclosed internal memos as well as press clippings and dispatches from their embassies. The military archives in Freiburg (BA-MA) and Lisbon (AHM) and the archive of the Portuguese Air Force in Alfragide (AHFA) in turn allowed access to the material from the Armed Forces and the ministries of defence, including treaties and minutes from the German military mission assigned to Portugal. The German federal archive in Koblenz (BAK) disclosed documents from several cabinets, including the Federal Ministry of Economics and the Chancellery. The Bundestag’s archive in Berlin (PA) provided reports from relevant parliamentary commissions. The Portuguese national archival centre in Lisbon granted me access to the files from the archive of the political police (IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS) and correspondence taken from the archive of Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano (IAN/TT/AMC), with specific authorisation from his family.

In order to determine the international and domestic context around Bonn’s foreign policy, thorough research was undertaken at a number of peripheral archives. Special attention was given to key allies of both the FRG and Portugal, which were particularly drawn in to the relationship between those states. Insight into the position of France, the UK and USA was gained from the following archives: presidential archives of France (CHAN/APR) and archive of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères (AD/MAE) in Paris, the British National Archives (TNA) in London, and the US National Archives (NARA-AAD), with significant material available online. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, in Bonn, disclosed material from the SPD party leadership (AdsD/SPD-PV) and from the Willy Brandt collection (AdsD/WBA), which included dispatches from the SPD’s

99 Besides intensive research at this archive, a valuable contribution was given by the collections of documents Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich (AAPD).
International Department. The Amílcar Cabral Information and Documentation Centre (CIDAC), in Lisbon, permitted access to material pertaining to the activities of the liberation movements, the Portuguese oppositionists and the German solidarity activists.

Selective readings from contemporary books and periodicals supplied further data and, crucially, helped me gain an impression of the historical environment surrounding the events. For example, the newspaper of the activist group Aktion 3.Welt (iz3w), which was at the forefront of the solidarity movement, provided first-hand accounts of the activists’ strategies and internal conflicts. The German African Society’s magazine Afrika heute covered and fostered West German discussion on Portuguese colonialism. The Dutch Angola Comitê published Facts & Reports (F&R), a biweekly collection of reprinted articles about the West’s role in southern African affairs, taken from an impressive selection of international outlets, including several African newspapers. In a different field, a biweekly bulletin by the Portuguese-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Informações, listed the main ventures and commercial transactions between the FRG and Portugal, contained articles about Bonn’s and Lisbon’s economic strategies and followed the evolution of their foreign economic relations. The latter in particular is a rich and reliable source which surprisingly has not been used by historians of this topic before.

Memoirs helped fill in gaps in the documents and provided valuable insight into the perspectives of key actors involved in West German-Portuguese relations during this period. My use of these sources took into account that recollection-driven narratives tend to reformulate history retroactively to fit specific political and/or personal stories. For example, the SPD’s ties to the clandestine Portuguese socialist movement have been presented as much tighter by the movement’s historical leader Mário Soares100 than by the movement’s dissident Rui Mateus.101 A small number of interviews conducted by the author provided further first-person accounts. Given the abundance of written source material, the oral history component of my research was restricted to a minor complementary role. Rui Patrício102 and Mário Soares103 developed points from their published interviews and most other conversations essentially revolved around the

102 06.04.2011, via telephone.
103 15.09.2010.
alternative foreign policy of the SPD-linked Friedrich Ebert Foundation, thus complementing the limited material disclosed by the foundation itself.104

4. Conceptual approach

The starting point for the analysis of these various sources was the notion of ‘continuity/discontinuity’ in Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon during the Caetano governments. In this context, ‘continuity’ meant the maintenance of a friendly relationship with the Portuguese dictatorship. ‘Discontinuity’ meant the pursuit of a confrontational strategy, either by isolating Portugal or by actively pressuring Lisbon to change its colonial policy.

Historians are sharply divided in their views. German-based research has stressed the underlying continuity of Bonn’s goodwill towards the dictatorship. This applies both to the realist school, which has tended to emphasise the German pragmatic security rationale behind the amicable relations, and to the Africanists, who have emphasised – critically – the role of economic considerations. By contrast, Portuguese research has focused on perceived elements of discontinuity, conveying an image of decrease in Bonn’s goodwill, due to the German public’s pressure and that of the international community. Thus, while the former assumed that the international system was favourable to continuity, the latter assumed the opposite. When ideology was factored in at all, each side regarded it as a force of discontinuity, supposedly because of the SPD’s rapprochement with the Eastern Bloc and Third World, as well as its solidarity with the Portuguese socialists. For the German strand, however, the ideological aspect was not enough to counter the FRG’s interest-driven agenda.

This discrepancy derived from the reference points inherent in the terms ‘continuity/discontinuity’, which were not always made explicit. Portuguese scholars privileged a comparison with the period of strong military and diplomatic German-Portuguese cooperation of the early 1960s. They hence concluded that Bonn was comparatively less disposed to cooperate during the Brandt years than during a time when the federal government had leaned closer to Lisbon’s conservative values. For the

104 These included interviews with the foundation’s liaison to the Portuguese socialists Elke Sabiel de Esters (21.08.2010, via email), with founding member of the Portuguese Socialist Party Mário Mesquita (31.08.2008), and with three Portuguese beneficiaries of scholarships granted by the foundation at the time, namely Maria da Luz Moita (11.09.2010), Jorge Veludo (14.09.2010) and the already mentioned Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira (20.04.2010).
West German historians, the point of comparison was how far Bonn could have – or should have – caved in to the ideological pressure to confront Lisbon. This strand concluded that the position of Brandt’s governments was comparatively less confrontational than what the anti-colonialist movement, including the SPD’s left wing, demanded. While both perspectives have provided valuable insights, the latter allowed for a more historically nuanced interpretation by recognising that Bonn was subjected to contradictory impulses. Yet explaining the causes of policy simply as the triumph of materialist interests over ideology created a reductionist understanding of a multifaceted process.

With that in mind, the premise of this thesis is that Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano dictatorship was the result of the clash between multiple external and internal forces pushing for continuity and discontinuity. This work therefore analyses the impact of those forces and how each of them, whether materialist or ideological, varied in scale and timing. The timeframe begins in September 1968, when Marcelo Caetano became prime minister, and stops on 25 April 1974, when his regime was overturned. This allows us to cover the evolution of policy since the final year of the Grand Coalition, with Willy Brandt as foreign minister, and throughout the two subsequent Brandt-led governments.

In order to convey the significance of each specific facet of the topic, the chapters and sub-chapters that follow are organised thematically, and they progressively zoom into the core of Bonn’s policy. The interconnectedness of the various dimensions therefore becomes clearer as each section explores the consequences of the previous ones. The first two chapters address the international and domestic pressures which the Bonn government was faced with, i.e. the pressure from forces outside of the West German legislative and executive bodies. These chapters introduce the external discourse about West German-Portuguese relations and explain how far it translated into active forms of pressure. The following three chapters examine the responses to that pressure within the parliament and government, as well as its practical effect on the relations with Lisbon. Each of them focuses on a key area of the relations, respectively their economic, military and diplomatic elements. Finally, the last chapter explores the parallel relations between the SPD and the opposition to the Lisbon regime, which was the ultimate product of Bonn’s strategy. The conclusion puts these various aspects into perspective. Its purpose is not to measure mathematically whether more forces of
continuity or discontinuity prevailed, but to explain the historical meaning of their confrontation.

Specifically, this work argues that the West German policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship between 1968 and 1974 was ambiguous but unbalanced: it was essentially a policy of continuity, even if it contained elements of discontinuity. The main reason for this ambiguity was the tension between the policy that Bonn envisioned towards the Cold War in Europe and the policy that various forces envisioned towards Lisbon’s resistance to decolonisation in Africa.
CHAPTER 1

An “insult to Africa” and other offences: The International Front

I. THE AFRICAN WORLD

1. The origins of the Portuguese-African conundrum

2. The quest for a dialogue policy

3. The intensification of the critique

II. THE NORTHERN WORLD

1. The challenge of European anti-colonialism

   1.1. The eastern version

   1.2. The western version

2. In search of a partner among Portugal’s closest allies

   2.1. France

   2.2. The UK

   2.3. USA

Conclusion
Although greatly overshadowed by *neue Ostpolitik*, Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime was nonetheless subjected to considerable external scrutiny. In order to illustrate this phenomenon, this chapter assesses the ways in which Bonn saw its policy portrayed by various international agents. Following an order of increasing proximity to the FRG’s political sphere, the chapter demonstrates that those portrayals evolved into attempts to pressure, or at least steer, the West German course of action. The first part focuses on the postcolonial and resolutely anti-colonialist nations of Africa, which were by far the main outside force seeking to transform Bonn’s relationship with Portugal. This part contains three sections, each corresponding to a moment with a different predominant strand of discourse about Bonn’s policy, ordered chronologically. The second part focuses on the northern world, where considerations about West German policy were more strongly intertwined with the Cold War in Europe. This part is divided into two sections. One section considers the limited challenge posed to Bonn by the fact that states from different European geopolitical blocs echoed the African anti-colonialist cause. The other section tackles the role of the FRG’s closest common allies with Portugal – France, the UK and USA. Without yet fully exploring the West German strategy, the latter section examines these three allies’ reactions to Bonn’s attempt to develop a joint approach to the Portuguese issue. Thus this chapter analyses how the FRG’s policy fit into the global dynamics of the time and how, in turn, such dynamics expanded the policy’s significance much beyond the bilateral relations with Portugal.

**I. THE AFRICAN WORLD**

1. The origins of the Portuguese-African conundrum

Although international indignation over the Lisbon regime escalated during the late 1960s/early 1970s, it was hardly a new phenomenon. Even before Portuguese troops had begun fighting in the bush, the dictatorship had already been battling for its empire in the diplomatic arena, particularly since Portugal had joined the United Nations in 1955.\(^{105}\) In the recurrent debates, no-one would condemn Lisbon’s policy as passionately as those countries which had only recently attained their own

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\(^{105}\) Although a degree of controversy stretched even further back. – Telo, António José. 1994. As Guerras de África e a Mudança nos Apoios Internacionais de Portugal. *Revista História das Ideias*, vol.16, p.353.
independence. Criticism had thus been strongly reinforced in 1960, when the African nations had become the largest geographical group represented in the UN General Assembly. That December, the Assembly had adopted the ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, known as Resolution 1514. The outbreak of the colonial wars in the following years had made the issue all the more pertinent, leading to increasingly harsh resolutions directed against the Salazar dictatorship on the part of the Special Committee on Decolonisation, the General Assembly and even the Security Council.106 As explained, Lisbon had come to emphasise the alleged ‘multiracial’ sensibilities of its imperial project and to present the colonial conflict as a manifestation of the Cold War. Portuguese diplomacy had also furthered the relations with the white-ruled African regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, while attempting to influence or to overthrow the governments of African states supportive of the liberation movements.107

For West Germany, which had been supplying equipment used by the Portuguese troops from the start, the Afro-Portuguese friction represented a serious hazard.108 Throughout the 1960s, the FRG had relied on its positive image in Africa to promote both economic expansion and the isolation of East Germany. Bonn had successfully established widespread diplomatic ties with the postcolonial states and had heavily backed them with development aid. The federal governments had then employed the Hallstein doctrine as a type of ‘political blackmail’ by threatening to cut off economic assistance to any state which granted de jure recognition to the GDR. In turn, some African leaders had learned to take advantage of the inter-German competition: they would swing towards East and West Germany, or at least threaten to do so, in order to ensure better deals for their countries.109 By the end of the decade, then-Foreign Minister Willy Brandt had redefined the priority of the FRG’s African policy (Afrikapolitik) as that of gathering support behind neue Ostpolitik. He now argued that détente in Europe would free up German resources for use in development aid for African states and hence deserved those states’ endorsement.110

109 Most notably the Egyptian Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Ethiopian Haile Selassie
110 TNA, FCO65/1162, Dispatch from the British Embassy in Bonn (“West German relations with the
Crucially, Brandt’s new guidelines of *Afrikapolitik*, announced in the spring of 1968, failed to adequately respond to African concerns regarding the endurance of racism and colonial domination in southern Africa: namely in the Portuguese territories, in the unrecognised state of Rhodesia, and in the apartheid system of South Africa, including colonised Namibia. Although Brandt spoke of support for the Africans’ right to self-determination, he also explicitly claimed that the FRG had no intention of disturbing its trading relations either in the case of the Portuguese colonies or in the – much more lucrative – case of South Africa. Following a recommendation from the UN Security Council, Bonn agreed to officially implement sanctions against Rhodesia, but not very thoroughly. Furthermore, 1968 saw the adjudication to the international consortium *Zamco* of the construction of the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam in Mozambique, designed to supply most of its electricity to South Africa. *Zamco* included five West German companies operating with Bonn’s credit guarantees, as well as three French, one Swedish, one Italian and three South African firms, working together with several Portuguese groups. Even more than the mounting evidence of the FRG’s material contribution to the colonial wars, the Cahora Bassa project shook Bonn’s carefully constructed image in Africa. The dam came to represent Portugal’s commitment to its empire at a time when other imperial powers had largely completed their processes of decolonisation and soon became a global target of anti-colonialist criticism. The situation for the FRG was slightly aggravated by the role of

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113 See Chapter 3.
114 AEG-Telefunken, Brown Boveri & Cie (BBC), Hochtief, Siemens and J.M. Voith GmbH.
115 Alsthom, CCI and CGEE.
116 ASEA.
117 Societa Anonima Eletrificazione (SAE).
118 LTA, Shafter Sinkins and VPC.
119 CUF, Cometal, Cometna, SEPSA, Cimentos de Moçambique, Artop, José Bensaíde, Empresa Electro-Cerâmica, Cobre e Alumínio Comercial, Companhia Industrial de Cordoarias Têxteis e Metálicas Quintas & Quintas; most of these firms belonged to the conglomerate SARL. – Informações (CCILA), 15.03.1968.
West German banks and investors in financing a similar hydroelectric project in the Cunene River Basin in Angola.\textsuperscript{120}

West German increasingly high-profile entanglements with African regimes under white minority rule coincided with the outcry against those regimes by the members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Although hardly a novel cause\textsuperscript{121}, this outcry reached a peak during this period. It was famously expressed in the ‘Manifesto on Southern Africa’, issued by the leaders of thirteen east and central African states\textsuperscript{122} in Lusaka on 16 April 1969 and subsequently ratified by the OAU in September and by the UN on 20 November of the same year.\textsuperscript{123} The Manifesto rejected a racialist interpretation of the cause of African liberation, expressing a refusal to “accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any other group of sane adults, without their consent”. The signatories thus called for other countries to join in on the effort to convince the regimes under minority rule to commit to putting an end to apartheid and colonialism. The text read both as a pacifist plea and as an ultimatum, hinting that Africa, unless there was some positive change on this matter, would put all of its support behind a more violent approach to liberation. Despite the firm tone, however, the Lusaka Manifesto displayed important signs of openness, even stating that “if changed circumstances were to make [peaceful progress] possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change”.\textsuperscript{124}

The Manifesto addressed the issue of external support to Lisbon although without naming specific countries. It pointed out the contrast between the Portuguese actions in Africa and the democratic values which Lisbon’s main allies – such as the FRG – professed to defend. In this way, it sought to distance the colonial conflict from the Cold War connotation which the Portuguese dictatorship insisted on attaching to the liberation struggle:

\textsuperscript{120} Frankfurt’s Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank, the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft and the Deutsche Bank contributed with loans for the project. – Standard (Tanzania), 03.01.1972 in F&R, 22.01.1972


\textsuperscript{122} Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

\textsuperscript{123} Silva (1995), p.35.

\textsuperscript{124} The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa (1969).
“Portugal, as a European State, has naturally its own allies in the context of the ideological conflict between West and East. However, in our context, the effect of this is that Portugal is enabled to use her resources to pursue the most heinous war and degradation of man in Africa. The present Manifesto must therefore lay bare the fact that the inhuman commitment of Portugal in Africa and her ruthless subjugation of the people of Mozambique, Angola and the so-called Portuguese Guinea, is not only irrelevant to the ideological conflict of power-politics, but it is also diametrically opposed to the policies, the philosophies and the doctrines practised by her allies in the conduct of their own affairs at home. The peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea are not interested in communism or capitalism; they are interested in their freedom.” 125

The African appeal was as much directed to Portugal’s allies, as to Portugal itself. Encouraged by Marcelo Caetano’s reformist reputation, in early 1969 both the Senegalese leader Léopold Senghor and the Congolese leader Mobutu sent Lisbon friendly proposals for partial decolonisation. 126 Moreover, after talking to the OAU’s representative in the United Nations, an informer told the Portuguese Mission to the UN that the African group had decided to present the Lusaka Manifesto in the General Assembly in mid-October 1969 with the underlying goal of influencing the domestic situation in Portugal, where elections were looming on 26 October. According to this informer, the OAU, inspired by the news coverage of the campaign, believed that it could encourage those political forces in Portugal – even within the government – who supported the self-determination of the colonies. 127 Lisbon frustrated those expectations less than a month after the elections. The Portuguese delegate in the UN voted against the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto by the UN General Assembly in November, although he insisted that Portugal shared many of the stated pacifist and anti-racist views. 128

The aftermath of the Lusaka Manifesto was characterised by the coexistence of two different strands of African discourse on liberation: a moderate one, willing to engage in a constructive dialogue with Portugal – as well as with South Africa –, and a more militant one, emphasising the need for violent action. Such a distinction was

127 AHD-MNE, PEA M603 Pr.341,10, Telegram from the Portuguese Mission to the UNO, 13.10.1969
admittedly sometimes quite blurred, since even the more restrained faction directly supported the struggle of the liberation movements. Nevertheless, as will be shown, these two strands marked diverging approaches to conflict resolution in particular and to the Cold War dynamics in general. The two African positions also came to envisage distinct roles for West Germany in this matter: the first one accepted the FRG as a potentially useful ally and the second portrayed it exclusively as an enemy of the African cause.

2. The quest for a dialogue policy

Like Lisbon, Bonn was closely monitored by the African leaders. The governments of Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere – two emblematic figures of the moderate strand – were outspoken critics of the West German ties to Portuguese colonialism. Zambia, being geographically entrenched between Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia, was particularly sensitive to the FRG’s economic engagement in those territories. So much so, in fact, that when a West German undersecretary had visited copper-rich Zambia in 1968 with the purpose of arranging a guarantee of German investment, political issues had complicated the negotiations. Kaunda’s government had demanded that Bonn take back the financial cover for the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, as well as cease any remaining business with Rhodesia and South Africa.\textsuperscript{129} As for Nyerere, he had an uneasy relationship with the FRG since Bonn had temporarily cut off military and economic aid to his country in 1964, when the semi-autonomous government of Zanzibar (part of the United Nation of Tanzania) had recognised East Germany.\textsuperscript{130} Thus Tanzania – itself once a colony of Imperial Germany – became an acute observer of any further inconsistencies in Bonn’s supposedly aid-oriented African policy, including the FRG’s

\textsuperscript{129} Lorenzini (2009), p.234; A dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lusaka from 10 April 1970 (PAAA, B34/757) confirms that, given Zambia’s political and economic significance, as well as its appeal to other foreign investors, it benefitted from relatively little West German assistance during this period. The Embassy blamed mostly the lack of coordination of Zambian institutions.

\textsuperscript{130} After months of diplomatic squabbling, a compromise had been achieved whereupon the GDR Embassy in Zanzibar was downgraded to a Consulate General in Dar es Salaam – Engel (2000), pp.117-145.
role in supplying Portugal with military equipment which Lisbon used in the colonial
wars.131

Criticism of West Germany became increasingly widespread in early 1970, following the decision by Swedish firm ASEA to retreat from Zamco the previous September. That decision had ostensibly been motivated by the pressure exerted by Swedish public opinion and the Stockholm government, which had feared that Zamco might infringe sanctions against Rhodesia.132 Not only did this situation set a precedent which the African leaders were keen to see repeated, it pulled the FRG further into the spotlight because the West German firm Siemens agreed to take over ASEA’s part in the hydroelectric scheme. Verbal attacks against West German participation in the Cahora Bassa project multiplied across the African press, with Nigerian and Tanzanian newspapers at the forefront of the critique. Kenya’s Foreign Minister Njoroge Mungai authoritatively raised the issue with the West German Minister for Economic Cooperation Erhard Eppler during the latter’s trip to his country and the OAU’s Secretary-General Boubacar Diallo Telli confronted the West German Ambassador in Addis Ababa on 26 February, the eve of the fourteenth meeting of the OAU’s Council of Ministers. In an aggressive tone, Diallo Telli told the ambassador that Bonn had to choose between its friendship with the African states and its involvement in the Cahora Bassa project. At the OAU ministerial meeting (27 February-06 March), the participants approved a resolution against the dam, which – based on reports by the Mozambican liberation movement FRELIMO – included specific references to West Germany’s role in the enterprise.133

131 Speaking at the UN on 24 September 1969, Tanzania’s Foreign Minister highlighted the FRG’s involvement with the Portuguese colonial wars, explicitly referring Bonn’s supply of 10,000 rifles, jet bombers, communication devices and Mercedes-Benz trucks in exchange for military facilities in southern Portugal. Besides Cahora Bassa and the Cunene dam, he also criticised a big loan provided by German banks, among others, to the Angolan Companhia Mineira do Lobito. – AHD-MNE, PEM03 Pr.341,10, Telegram from the Portuguese Mission to the UNO, 25.09.1969.

132 According to historian Keith Middlemas, however, ASEA had actually been ordered out by its French and German partners, who were not prepared to concede the Swedish government’s demand for a promise not to deal in any capacity with Rhodesia. – Middlemas, Keith. 1975. CaboBass – Engineering and Politics in Southern Africa, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, pp.81-82; For the Swedish protests against ASEA, see also Kolodziej, Edward A. (eds.). London: Macmillan Press, pp.361-394.

Despite this harshening of the African critique, Willy Brandt’s reputation earned the FGR government some initial goodwill, just like Caetano’s had the previous year. FRELIMO reached out to the recently elected chancellor in the form of a letter handed to Minister Erhard Eppler during his trip to Tanzania in April 1970. Its authors claimed to “believe that if [men] act wrongly it may be because they do not know the truth” and therefore the letter sought to ‘inform’ Brandt of the FRG’s role in Portugal’s African policy. It vividly summed up its point:

“Mr. Chancellor, your country is in the forefront of the countries who [sic] support Portuguese colonialism. With weapons, soldiers, technical assistance, investments. And this, obviously, makes the relations between our people and your Government particularly distant and difficult. Distant – because, who can measure the distance from where the aircraft come that drop the bombs and the people upon whom they fall? Difficult – because it is that precisely – the marking or origins of the weapons, aircraft, ammunition – the only knowledge our people have of Western Germany. A more recent phase has shown us a less militaristic but equally repulsive aspect of your country, through the names of your companies which come to participate in the colonialist projects. Your Excellency, it is not by chance that your country is today condemned by the totality of the African countries represented by the OAU itself.”

FRELIMO’s letter went on to condemn in greater detail – if not always accurately135 – the participation of German firms in the Cahora Bassa enterprise, as well as West Germany’s material aid to the Portuguese military. The text, which accentuated the disparity between Bonn’s behaviour and the principles of social-democracy, strongly appealed to Willy Brandt to radically change the FRG’s friendly policy towards Portugal.136

The letter resonated within Brandt’s Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt). The Head of the Bundeskanzleramt’s Department for Foreign Affairs Per Fischer scrutinised FRELIMO’s accusations and reassessed the weaknesses of Bonn’s Afrikapolitik in a long memo of 8 May 1970. According to Per Fischer, serious damage to West Germany’s credibility in Africa was being caused by the discrepancy between Bonn’s

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134 A copy of the letter can be found, for example, in BAK, B136/2992.  
135 Contrary to stated, English Electric was not part of Zamco.  
136 Ibid.
stated convictions – right to self-determination, condemnation of racism – and the country’s economic praxis – trading with and investing in racist and colonialist regimes. Fischer lamented bitterly that this type of accusation was raised with greater severity against the democratic states than against the communist ones. Yet he acknowledged that Bonn’s official stance in favour of a “peaceful evolution towards race equality” in the region seemed unreliable given that the white minority governments were not taking any steps in that direction. Indeed, the African efforts to work out peaceful solutions, such as the Lusaka Manifesto, had been weakened by “a lukewarm reaction from our side and a tough “no” from the side of the [African white ruled] regimes”. Moreover, the issue of the FRG’s military assistance to Portugal could not be argued away. Fischer recognised that even though Bonn requested Lisbon not to use German military materiel overseas, both Germans and Africans were aware that the dictatorship was indeed fighting its colonial wars with equipment acquired from the FRG.137

An almost simultaneous sign of African openness to collaborate with Bonn resulted from Kenneth Kaunda’s visit to the FRG from 27 April to 6 May 1970. This visit marked the beginning of a rapprochement between Zambia and West Germany138 which translated into a closer dialogue about Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon. Although the Zambian and German leaders did not discuss that policy in their meeting, a week later Kaunda sent Willy Brandt a letter and a memorandum with his views on the subject. In this correspondence, written in a polite and tactful tone, the Zambian President complemented the idealism of the Lusaka Manifesto with a set of practical arguments and suggestions. He proposed that Bonn might stress “to the Portuguese authorities the futility of pursuing the present costly policy”, as well as “the dangers of being entangled with the [racial] problems of South Africa whose situation is entirely different from their own”. Regarding Cahora Bassa, Kaunda explained that the “considered view of the Zambian Government” was that the dam was an “excuse for [Portugal’s] continued and increased commitment of her troops in Mozambique” and an opportunity for South Africa “to extend her economic and military influence as far

137 BAK, B136/2992, Memo from the Bundeskanzleramt, 08.05.1970.
138 Kaunda and Brandt pledged “their resolve to deepen and expand co-operation between their two countries” – PAAA, B34/757, Joint Communiqué on the visit of the President of the Republic of Zambia to the Federal Republic of Germany.
north as possible”. Moreover, not only did Kaunda ask for the FRG to attempt to limit “the supply of arms available to Portugal for use in the liberation wars”, he also suggested “giving more political and moral support to the [African] nationalists” in the Portuguese colonies. His final request to Brandt was for the FRG to “consider impressing upon her western allies that Angola’s and Mozambique’s independence, and the unity and strength of the African Continent as a whole [were] all in the West’s economic, political and strategic interest”.

The African strategy, however, was not yet coordinated enough to effectively press the chancellor. A Bundeskanzleramt memo of 16 June 1970 downplayed the threat of Cahora Bassa for the FRG’s individual ties to Africa. It stated that, with the exception of Zambia, recently no other African government had addressed the matter in their bilateral relations with Bonn. Even the Tanzanian authorities had neglected to raise the issue during Minister Eppler’s visit in April. Furthermore, the Malawian regime had publicly declared its support for the dam project, claiming that its country could benefit from the import of cheaper energy. Willy Brandt thus chose to stay the course. He asked the Ministerpräsident of North Rhine-Westphalia Heinz Kühn, who was scheduled to make a trip to Zambia in late August, to personally deliver his reply to Kenneth Kaunda. Brandt’s letter included an aide mémoire with the federal government’s justifications for the FRG’s continuous involvement with Portugal and with Cahora Bassa. The document highlighted the importance for the FRG of separating between politics and economics, adding that Bonn had already committed itself to giving credit guarantees to Zamco – a commitment it could now not go back on. Regarding the military materiel supplied to Lisbon, the chancellor explained that an end-use clause supposedly ensured that the materiel could only be used in Europe. Heinz Kühn agreed to deliver the letter, but he almost did not hand over the aide mémoire, as he considered it a misstep: according to him, nobody would “fall for” the memorandum’s claim that the German weapons delivered to Portugal were restricted to the European mainland.

139 Kaunda’s memo also listed more technical complaints about the dam, including the possibility of floods in Zambian territory derived from the project.
140 BAK, B136/2992, Letter from Kenneth Kaunda to Willy Brandt, 02.05.1970.
141 BAK, B136/2992, Memo from the Bundeskanzleramt, 16.06.1970; The Malawian regime, which was highly dependent on Mozambican routes, had a secret understanding with Lisbon to lobby against African anti-Portuguese activism. – Oliveira (2004), p.319.
142 BAK, B136/2992, Letter from Willy Brandt to Kenneth Kaunda (no date).
143 BAK, B136/2992, Memo from the Bundeskanzleramt, 12.08.1970; Dispatch from the AA,08.09.1970.
By the late summer of 1970, the African lobby was turning into a political force which Bonn’s foreign policy could no longer dismiss. Kenneth Kaunda became chairman both of the OAU and of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). He presided over an OAU summit in Addis Ababa (1-3 September), which featured strong criticism of West Germany for allegedly selling arms to South Africa and for supporting the Portuguese colonial wars. One week later, Kaunda hosted a NAM summit in Lusaka (8-10 September), in which fifty-four states took part, representing close to half of the UN’s total membership. As Willy Brandt explained to Indonesian President Suharto on the eve of the summit, this NAM meeting was the cause of serious apprehension among the West German authorities. Bonn feared that the Third World, in a misguided effort to support European détente, would choose to recognise the GDR en masse even before the inter-German negotiations were fully settled. Brandt was also worried about the possibility that, as had happened in Addis Ababa, the event would serve as a forum for claims of West German support for racism and colonialism. As it turned out, the Lusaka summit, which had a marked anti-Western tone, did focus mainly on the problems of southern Africa. Because Bonn had by then issued an emphatic denial of the allegations of arms trade with South Africa, it was not singled out in any resolution. Yet the FRG was still listed as one of the Western powers held accountable for sustaining Portuguese colonial rule in the region.

The summits made Bonn reassess the importance of its contacts with Kenneth Kaunda. The Auswärtiges Amt concluded that the African states were a more confident and united body than before, able to orchestrate a powerful diplomatic offensive. According to the AA’s Sub-Saharan Africa Department, after the end of the Nigerian-Biafran war earlier that year, the OAU states’ focus had now shifted to southern Africa. While acknowledging the implications of this shift for the FRG’s image, the Auswärtiges Amt’s internal documents also reflected confidence in Bonn’s relations with Kaunda. The AA regarded the Zambian President as a sincere and moderate politician who during his visit to West Germany had come to personally trust Willy Brandt. It helped that Kaunda had steadily refused to have Zambia recognise the GDR, despite the pressure of his party’s more radical wing. Significantly, he had also agreed

145 PAAA, B34/757, Memo from the Auswärtiges Amt, 12.10.1970.
146 PAAA, B34/757, Memo from the Auswärtiges Amt, 22.09.1970.
to withhold the ‘German question’ from the discussions at the Lusaka NAM summit. 147
Similarly, Heinz Kühn’s report about his talks with the Zambian President portrayed
him as a pacifist who was neither a communist nor a western pawn and who feared that
western cooperation with colonialism (e.g. Cahora Bassa) would push the African
struggle towards radicalisation and communism. Kühn explained that Kaunda was
proposing to mediate between the Portuguese authorities and the liberation movements
in order to achieve a step-by-step decolonisation at the negotiating table rather than on
the battlefield. 148 For Bonn, Kaunda suddenly seemed like the perfect ally. Therefore,
when he requested an OAU meeting with Brandt in order to clarify the accusations
against the FRG raised at the Addis Ababa summit, the federal authorities were quick to
accept. 149

On 15 October 1970, an OAU delegation met with Brandt for two hours in
Bonn. 150 As agreed prior to the meeting, the conversation focused on Cahora Bassa and
on the FRG’s bilateral military cooperation with South Africa and Portugal. The
Africans asked Brandt to side with them against Portuguese colonialism, framing their
position as “a fight against fascism”. They argued that the Mozambican dam was an
attempt to reinforce the Portuguese presence in the region and that to support the dam
project was to support the perpetuation of that presence. By contrast, sacrificing a few
economic interests in southern Africa would be a small price for Bonn to pay compared
to the risk of alienating the rest of the continent – “300 Million Africans are ultimately
a better market than the few Europeans in Africa”. Willy Brandt, while very friendly to
the African delegation, did not agree to any economic or military concessions. The
chancellor denied any military cooperation with South Africa, and he justified the
cooperation with Portugal through the partnership in NATO, which he described as a
“non-ideological organisation”. Brandt essentially repeated the arguments from his
August’s aide mémoire, including the reference to the end-use clause, stating that Bonn
would welcome any information on specific cases where the clause might have been
violated. In turn, Kaunda once again asked for support for the liberation movements,
reminding his German interlocutors that so far the nationalists had only received

147 PAAA, B34/757, Memo from the Auswärtiges Amt, 10.09.1970.
148 BAK, B136/2992, Bericht über eine Projektreise der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung...
149 PAAA, B34/757, Memo from the Auswärtiges Amt, 10.09.1970.
150 Kaunda’s delegation included the Foreign Ministers from Zambia, Algeria, Cameroons and Kenya, as
    well as Mali’s Employment Minister and the OAU’s Secretary-General Diallo Telli. On the German side,
    there were Ministers Scheel, Eppler and Ehmke, as well as Undersecretaries of State Sohn and von Braun.
support from the Soviet Bloc.\textsuperscript{151} This appeal reflected the dual strategy of the African rhetoric at this point. While the Lusaka Manifesto clearly distinguished the colonial wars from the Cold War, its spokesmen took advantage of the East-West competition when presenting their case. They pointed out that the West’s current position, more than harming Western material interests in the continent, was actually furthering the prestige, and subsequent influence, of the Eastern bloc, which had a more committed anti-colonialist attitude. As phrased by Kaunda, this sounded less like a threat than like a concerned warning.

Kenneth Kaunda appeared extremely pleased with the talks, especially when looking back on them after his subsequent disappointing trips to the UK and to the USA.\textsuperscript{152} His display of joyfulness in Bonn was criticised by the Tanzanian press, because the meeting with Brandt did not seem to have produced any visible results.\textsuperscript{153} Indeed, the Zambian President had even apparently accepted the end-use clause excuse despite the fact that – as the British Embassy in Lisbon pointed out at the time – “he knew as well as anyone else that the standard aircraft used by the Portuguese in Africa was the [German] Dornier 27”.\textsuperscript{154} Yet Kaunda’s enthusiasm reflected more than the fraternal environment in which the Germans had received him. During the visit to the FRG, Kaunda was discreetly informed by Bonn’s Minister for Special Affairs Horst Ehmke that, having met with Marcelo Caetano on 4 October, he believed that the Portuguese leader was willing to hold talks with Zambia.\textsuperscript{155} This development promised to finally reward the African pursuit of a policy of dialogue. That the FRG government was involved in the process carried a symbolic undertone, as the West German ambassador to the UN explained to Diallo Telli shortly after the trip:

“I retorted to [Telli] that we Germans faced a problem of human dignity as well, because 17 million of our countrymen must live under a regime which was imposed upon them and under foreign occupation. [We] had therefore a particularly true understanding of the African worries and difficulties.

\textsuperscript{151} PAAA, B34/757, Annotation on the Conversation between Chancellor Brandt and President Kaunda, 19.10.1970.
\textsuperscript{152} PAAA, B34/757, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lusaka, 23.10.1970.
\textsuperscript{153} PAAA, B34/757, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Dar es Salaam, 28.10.1970.
\textsuperscript{154} TNA, FCO45/509, Dispatch from the British Embassy in Lisbon, 20.10.1970.
\textsuperscript{155} PAAA, B26/445, Letter from Willy Brandt to Marcelo Caetano, 31.10.1970.
By late 1970, the influence of the African lobby had become clear, but so had its limitations. The OAU had been able to gather great publicity around its anti-Cahora Bassa campaign, particularly through Kaunda’s diplomatic demarches in Europe.\(^{157}\) The Italian firm SAE had ostensibly also left the project in May, after the Rome government had withdrawn its credit guarantees.\(^{158}\) On 14 December 1970, the UN General Assembly added a paragraph condemning the Cahora Bassa and Cunene projects to its annual resolution about the “activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of [Resolution 1514]”.\(^{159}\) Similarly, that day the Assembly’s annual resolution on the “territories under Portuguese administration” gained an explicit request for all governments to cease their involvement with the two dam projects and “to take all necessary measures to prevent the participation therein of any companies or individuals under their jurisdiction”.\(^{160}\) The fact that the General Assembly would go on to repeat both appeals annually, in a frustrated tone\(^{161}\), attested to their ineffectiveness. This failure to interrupt the two controversial hydroelectric schemes, coupled with the breakdown of Ehmke’s backchannel to Caetano – as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 – set the stage for the intensification of the African critique.

3. The intensification of the critique

The intensification of the African critique against the FRG was not simply an expression of the discouraging attempts to cooperate with Bonn regarding Portuguese colonial rule. Lisbon’s actions in the region exacerbated the tension between Portugal and the African states, feeding the more militant strand of African discourse. On the
night of 22/23 November 1970, naval and military units of the Portuguese armed forces invaded Guinea-Conakry via Guinea-Bissau. Together with mercenaries and exiles from the Conakry regime, they released local political prisoners and Portuguese POWs and destroyed bases and naval assets of the Guinean/Cape Verdean liberation movement PAIGC. The operation – *Operação Mar Verde* – also unsuccessfully tried to stage a coup d’État in Conakry in order to place a Portuguese-friendly regime in power.\(^{162}\) Although Lisbon denied any responsibility for the attack, referring to it as an internal Guinean revolt, Portugal could not avoid international uproar. While the first UN Security Council resolution about this event, on 23 November, only vaguely demanded the “immediate withdrawal of all external armed forces and mercenaries” from Guinea-Conakry, a second resolution, on 8 December, expressly condemned the Portuguese authorities. The latter, approved with four abstentions (France, the UK, USA and Spain) urged “all states to refrain from providing the Government of Portugal with any military and material assistance enabling it to continue its repressive actions against the peoples of the Territories under its domination and against independent African States”.\(^{163}\) Regardless, over the following years the Portuguese troops continued to stage interventions into the territories of their African neighbours.\(^{164}\) Lisbon accused those states of harbouring military bases for the liberation movements, thus presenting Portugal’s actions as part of a defensive war against aggressions coming from outside its borders.\(^{165}\) Lisbon also imposed an embargo against Zambia, in retaliation for the death of five prisoners of the Mozambican movement *COREMO* in Zambian territory.\(^{166}\) West Germany was caught up in this process of escalation from the start. In the UN and in the OAU – where Secretary-General Diallo Telli was himself from Guinea-Conakry – the blame for the November 1970 attack rubbed off on NATO countries collectively but the FRG suffered more than any of Portugal’s other allies.\(^{167}\)

\(^{162}\) For a detailed account of the operation, see Marinho, António Luís. 2006. *Operação Mar Verde: Um Documento para a História*, Lisbon: Temas & Debates.


\(^{165}\) AAPD 1971, Doc.197, 05.06.1971 (footnote).

\(^{166}\) PAAA, B34/756, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lusaka, 27.05.1971.

\(^{167}\) TNA, FCO45/509, Telegram from the FCO, 01.12.1970.
President Ahmed Sékou Touré demanded the immediate replacement of the FRG’s ambassador in Conakry, who was formally charged with complicity in the preparation and execution of the invasion. The German community in Guinea-Conakry – more than one hundred people, mostly development workers – was expelled from the country before the end of the year. Two German citizens were sentenced to forced labour for life, one of whom, Hermann Seibold, died in prison shortly afterwards.

The relations between Guinea-Conakry and the FRG quickly deteriorated. A public trial in Conakry reinforced the accusation that the West German authorities had been involved in the *Operação Mar Verde*, an accusation which Bonn vigorously denied. On 29 January 1971, the Guinean government finally broke off diplomatic relations with West Germany. Conakry published a comprehensive 6,000 word ‘white paper’ about the Portuguese aggression, including charges against the FRG and against the surviving German prisoner, brewery manager Adolf Marx. The federal government issued its own detailed counter-report in July 1971, written by the expelled Ambassador Dr. Lankes. In the report, Lankes categorized the evidence for the charges as either “self-contradictory”, “obviously absurd”, “ludicrous”, “in poor taste” or “irrelevant and too clearly indicative of [its] source”, i.e. East Germany. Lankes

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170 There was certainly not collusion between the two governments, since Caetano would not even admit the Portuguese responsibility in private correspondence with Brandt (BAK,B136/3595, Letter from Marcelo Caetano to Willy Brandt,11.12.1970). As described in the detailed historical-journalistic work Marinho (2006), the operation had been masterminded by local Portuguese Commander Guilherme Alpoim Calvão about a year before, coordinated with the Military Governor of Guinea-Bissau António de Spinola and DGS-Inspector Matos Rodrigues. Apart from a few testimonies by tortured prisoners (pp.75, 77) and a vague – although not unreasonable – suggestion of cooperation with the FRG’s secret services (p.82), Marinho’s book shows little indication of German involvement, especially not at the level of the top-rank. Curiously, even the memo from the *AA* which Conakry used as central evidence (pp.166-167) – and which Bonn denounced as fraudulent – was not all that revealing. Based on that document, the Portuguese informed the German Embassy in Lisbon of the operation’s rationale on the morning of 23 November and the federal authorities, concerned by the likelihood that the troops had used German arms, agreed not to compromise Portugal’s official stance of denying Portuguese involvement in the fighting. Ironically, the arms used in the attack had actually been purchased from the Soviet Union (pp.78-81).
171 PAAA, B34/866, Memo from the *AA*, 13.07.1971 – The report was sent to every West German diplomatic representation in Africa and translated into French and English, the latter under the title *The Guinea Affair*.
172 Hermann Seibold appeared to be in two different cities when the invasion occurred.
173 “Confession” by Adolf Marx that he had been “instructed to kill Sékou Touré by giving him poisoned beer.”.
174 Seibold had advised his colleague on the type of rifle he should bring to Kankan. Lankes dismissed this evidence by claiming that hunting was a common sport in Guinea and a licence readily issued.
175 “There is a direct link between the suicide of the German Ambassador to Lisbon and his wife and the abortive Portuguese aggression against the Republic of Guinea.”
176 Hermann Seibold, an ex-SS-Sturmbannführer, now with the Christian Organization of Youth Villages, and his colleagues at the Kankan Crafts Centre were accused of having kidnapped the wife of a GDR expert, to which Lankes replied: “nobody kidnap GDR citizens, in fact they flee whenever they can.”
claimed that the GDR had prepared an intensive misinformation campaign, which had fed on Sékou Touré’s pre-existing anti-FRG prejudices. Moreover, according to Lanke’s report, the Guinean President had sought to take advantage of the solidarity of the African continent after the invasion, seizing the opportunity to mobilise Africa in favour of a radical and violent approach to the liberation of the Portuguese territories. Lankes held that Conakry, with support from the GDR, had fabricated the link between the FRG and the Operação Mar Verde in an effort to demonstrate a potential threat of African ‘recolonisation’ by the “imperialistic forces allied with Portugal”. The report concluded:

“In making use of these fabrications or allowing himself to be deceived by them, Sékou Touré got entangled in a deplorable intrigue which led to the breach of a longstanding friendship between [our] two countries. He shattered what many unselfish and idealistic helpers had been willing to build up. Nobody can relieve the Guinea Government of its responsibility for this development.”

Significantly, the allies of the Portuguese government seemed to dismiss its responsibility, which further enflamed Africa’s anti-Western outrage. NATO scheduled a ministerial meeting to take place in Lisbon (3-4 June 1971) for the first time in more than twenty years. President Kaunda, who continued to defend a Western-inclusive African strategy, expressed great concern about the damage this meeting, coupled with the Guinea crisis, were causing to the FRG’s image in the region. The OAU Liberation Committee publicly condemned the decision to hold the meeting in Lisbon and presented it as proof of NATO’s endorsement of the Portuguese regime. Diallo Telli described the event as “an insult to Africa”.

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177 In July 1969, Sékou Touré had first linked the FRG with a report forecasting the overthrow of his regime, yet the episode had not affected the relations between the two states. The federal authorities believed the allegation had essentially a domestic purpose, thus disregarding the matter as a display of “Sékou Touré’s ever dramatic style of government”. They later came to perceive the incident as the product of a defamation campaign organized by the GDR. Furthermore, the Guinean President had expressed great resentment after one of his closest junior confidants had requested political asylum in the FRG in June 1970. The request had eventually been rejected, but only on 22 October, at which time the applicant had already left West Germany. In retaliation, Conakry had recognized the GDR, on 9 September. Bonn’s 1971 report harshly concluded: “Sékou Touré, through concern about his regime and exaggerated ambitions, was driven to a point where he lost contact with reality”.


180 PAAA, B34/756, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lusaka, 27.05.1971.

181 TNA, FCO45/862, “Criticism of NATO for meeting in Lisbon”, 04.06.1971.
These embarrassing episodes were certainly not enough to fully eclipse the FRG’s political capital on the African continent. Not only did West Germany have very strong trade relations with many African states, each of the parties in the Bundestag backed important philanthropic institutions specifically concerned with the Third World. In fact, Bonn was one of the leading international donors of aid, as well as one of its main advocates. West German diplomacy achieved furthermore some important successes. After the OAU summit of 21-23 June 1971, again in Addis Ababa, the AA celebrated the fact that for the first time in a long time “we were not accused of alleged arms transfers to South Africa”, even if one of the resolutions still accused all NATO powers of supporting Portugal. Initiatives such as Foreign Minister Walter Scheel’s tour around Africa between 14 and 23 October of that year – fortuitously coinciding with the announcement of Willy Brandt’s Nobel Peace Prize – helped promote neue Ostpolitik as a policy of peace and thus gather African diplomatic support for Bonn. Notably, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere discretely abandoned the campaign against the Cahora Bassa dam, in order not to disturb the FRG’s détente policy in Europe. Bonn’s contacts with Kaunda remained particularly close and he agreed to plead in favour of the German prisoner in Conakry. In turn, when Rhodesia closed its Zambian border in January 1973, Bonn – at Kaunda’s request – intervened with the Portuguese government to allow the use of the Angolan Benguela Railway as an alternative route for the Zambian copper traffic.

Yet Zambia’s political weight receded after Kaunda concluded his OAU mandate, in the spring of 1971, and so did the ‘Lusaka Manifesto’s’ spirit of compromise. That year, eastern and central African countries reassessed the Manifesto’s position through the ‘Mogadishu Declaration’, which concluded that the

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183 SPD’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation, CDU’s Konrad Adenauer Foundation and FDP’s Friedrich Naumann Foundation – TNA, FCO65/1162, Dispatch from the British Embassy in Bonn, 20.01.1972.
185 PAAA, B34/757, Speaking Notes for the visit of Zambian Foreign Minister Kankasa, 29.06.1971.
186 Nigeria, Congo-Kinshasa, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Mauritania.
189 PAAA, B34/757, Speaking Notes for the visit of Zambian Minister for Planning and Development Chikwanda, 10.09.1971.
190 PAAA, B34/757, Speaking Notes for the visit of Zambian Foreign Minister Kankasa, 29.06.1971.
regimes under white minority rule had rejected the offer to negotiate and so the only solution left was to support the armed struggle. The mainstream of the African discourse was moving Eastwards, as African elites acknowledged the inability of ‘third worldism’ to prevent neo-colonial forms of domination or even, in the Portuguese case, to formally dismantle the centuries-old empire. Simultaneously, communist China gained prestige in the region by backing the construction of local infrastructure, not to mention backing the liberation movements themselves. This was the scenario the moderate African leaders had warned the West about. These leaders, in fact, grew very worried about the radicalisation of the African liberation struggle. In Senegal, which shared borders with both Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry, Léopold Senghor was notoriously distrustful of the pro-Soviet Sékou Touré and feared the latter’s influence over an independent Bissau. On 7 March 1973, Nyerere confessed to a German delegation that he was displeased with the scale of illegal weapons being smuggled into Tanzania to support FRELIMO, even if he would not do anything about it out of fear of undermining his image of African solidarity.

Against this background, Bonn struggled to overcome the stigma of its relations with the Portuguese dictatorship. Although after 1971 the federal authorities heavily limited the military materiel they provided to Lisbon, the leaders of the liberation movements did not cease to point to Portugal’s use of German weapons overseas. Furthermore, West German mercenaries were rumoured to be training Portuguese troops in Guinea-Bissau for operations against Conakry. At the 1972 NATO spring ministerial meeting (30-31 May), Walter Scheel complained to Foreign Minister Rui

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195 He once claimed that Sékou Touré had only “intervals of lucidity”. – AAPD 1971, Doc.29, 25.01.1971


198 As discussed on chapter 4 of this dissertation.

199 For example, Frankfurter Neue Presse, 07.08.1973, in F&R,01.09.1973.

200 Rui Patrício assured Walter Scheel that there was no truth to this rumour in June 1971 – AAPD 1971, Doc.197, 05.06.1971 (footnote).
Patrício that for Africa no country had a greater association with Portugal than the FRG.201

The biggest test came in 1973, with the West German application to join the United Nations Organisation. Earlier in the year, the Auswärtiges Amt became concerned over the possibility of widespread African opposition to the FRG’s application, in retaliation for its relationship with Portugal. The visit of a FRELIMO delegation in Bonn during the summer, at the invitation of the SPD’s Commission for International Relations, raised African expectations of a change in the FRG’s policy towards Lisbon. However, these expectations were quickly deflated when the Bonn government denied any intention of altering its policy. The result was a wave of indignation, all over Africa, against the federal authorities, accused of “speaking with both sides of the mouth”. To compensate, the AA went to great lengths to woo the UN’s Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid, the Nigerian Edwin Ogebe Ogbu, who visited Bonn from 25 to 28 August.202 In the end, the symbolic importance of the application spoke louder than Lisbon’s damage and Africa gave Germany – and thus the peace process – its blessing. The FRG, together with its eastern counterpart, was successfully admitted to the United Nations on 18 September 1973 under Resolution 3050. The only ones to speak against the resolution were the representatives from Israel – who firmly opposed the entry of the GDR – and from Guinea-Conakry, who denounced Bonn’s ties to the “Portuguese torturers”. Ultimately, however, Conakry caved in to the general consensus, thus fulfilling the stated German dream of entry by acclamation.203

II. THE NORTHERN WORLD

1. The challenge of European anti-colonialism

Whether primarily moved by geo-strategic opportunism or genuine solidarity – not to mention ideological affinity – some European governments and social movements supported the cause of the African liberation movements and sought to isolate the Caetano dictatorship. In this ‘migration’ northwards, the anti-colonialist

201 AAPD 1972, Doc.157, 01.06.1972.
discourse was reshaped by the ideas and political aims of its European champions. However, many of them did not prove willing to compromise their own relations with the FRG government for the sake of the anti-colonialist cause. Therefore, unlike the African lobby, they mostly avoided directly confronting Bonn over its relationship with Lisbon.

1.1. The eastern version

While the Soviet Union, and indeed the Soviet Bloc as a whole, consistently spoke out for African self-determination, its rhetoric in regard to West Germany was more malleable. In September 1969, the USSR supported a UN motion to extend the sanctions against Rhodesia to include the regimes of South Africa and Portugal. Defending the proposal in the UN Security Council, the Soviet delegate spoke extensively about the FRG’s trade with these three countries, naming Bonn as one of the main allies “of the fascist and racist cliques” of southern Africa. Yet this event took place just before the SPD-FDP coalition came to power. Once Bonn’s policy of rapprochement with the USSR was firmly set in motion, Moscow toned down its traditional propagandistic portrayal of the FRG as a hub of neo-Nazism and revanchism. Significantly, neue Ostpolitik coincided with a Soviet reappraisal of its commitment to the liberation struggle in light of détente. One Soviet strand argued that Moscow should prioritise détente with the West, which, through superpower pacification and disarmament, could actually create conditions favourable for the liberation struggle. At the 1971 Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev enhanced this orientation with a more dogmatic reasoning. He referred to the national liberation movement as an ally of the world revolutionary process, yet subordinate to the vanguard of that process, i.e. the

204 AHD, PEA M603 Pr.341,10, Telegram from the Portuguese Mission to the UNO, 25.06.1969.
communist movement. Thus the priority, according to Brezhnev, was to ensure peaceful conditions for the construction of communism in the USSR.\footnote{Ibid pp.236-237.}

In the long run, however, the East-West rapprochement also paradoxically encouraged Moscow’s renewed concern with the Third World’s perception of the USSR. After all, once stability had been achieved in Europe, the competition between capitalism and socialism would have to take place somewhere else. This perspective was enhanced by the Soviet Union’s geo-ideological competition with China over influence among revolutionary Africa.\footnote{For a deeper discussion of the links between Soviet interventionist logic and détente, see Westad (2005), pp.202-206, 213-215.} Therefore, as the West German Embassy in Moscow passively acknowledged, there was little chance of Bonn ever coming to an understanding with the Soviets over Portugal. The Embassy described Lisbon’s colonial policy as “a favourite object of Soviet propaganda”, which was allowing Moscow to easily increase the USSR’s popularity in Africa. According to the German diplomats, for Moscow the possible negative effects of criticising Lisbon were minimal, since the Soviet Union had no relations – or relevant trade – with Portugal.\footnote{PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv 101.437, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Moscow, 29.01.1973.} It could thus accuse Western economic interests of single-handedly supporting Portuguese colonialism. On 7 February 1973, the leading Soviet newspaper 	extit{Pravda} featured a strongly worded article on this topic, leading the FRG’s embassy to remark to the A4 in a resigned tone that, for the first time in a long while, several West German examples were expressly mentioned.\footnote{PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv 101.437, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Moscow, 13.02.1973.}

Of all the states in the Soviet Bloc, the most vocal critic of West German-Portuguese relations was the one which did not even have a voice in the UN until 1973: East Germany. Virtually locked out of Africa by the Hallstein doctrine, East Berlin found in the FRG’s ties to Portugal and South Africa a chance to break this blockade. From the mid-1960s, the GDR’s Foreign Ministry prepared a large-scale propaganda effort expressing the notion that, having learned from Germany’s fascist past, East Germany was unequivocally anti-colonialist and anti-racist. In contrast, the propaganda argued that the FRG supported regimes under white minority rule and thus signalled the revival of German racist imperialism in the West. Through this juxtaposition, East Germany sought to simultaneously gain prestige – and thus diplomatic recognition – and justify its own rivalry with Bonn on an international level. Thus the GDR
distributed documentation denouncing the FRG’s links to Lisbon and Pretoria through a combination of accurate facts intermingled with circumstantial evidence.212

For Bonn, the East German strategy had the double inconvenience of discrediting the FRG and fuelling the influence of the GDR. By the early 1970s, East Berlin had finally broken its isolation in Africa – even if it had only managed to be recognised by a handful of left-wing regimes.213 The most visible product of its efforts was the Conakry affair. Immediately after the Portuguese attack in November 1970 – in which the GDR ambassador in Guinea had been killed – East Berlin launched a ferocious campaign in the East German press linking Bonn to the Portuguese raid. It also engaged in an elaborate intelligence offensive, supplying Conakry with incriminating documents from the Auswärtiges Amt, which the West German authorities claimed were forgeries. Thus the GDR greatly contributed to shaping the narrative presented by President Sékou Touré, promoting an escalation of the tension between Conakry and Bonn which culminated in the breakdown of diplomatic relations.214 Although not all of East Berlin’s initiatives were that successful215, West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel soon acknowledged the central role played by the Portuguese colonial question in allowing the GDR, as well as China and the USSR, to advance their positions in Africa.216

If there was pressure for Bonn to distance itself from Lisbon, therefore, it was a product of the FRG’s continuing rivalry with the communist countries, not of its reconciliation with the East. Contrary to the customary interpretation in Portuguese historiography217, neue Ostpolitik did not encourage a West German estrangement with


215 Kenneth Kaunda, for example, told the West German Embassy in Lusaka that he was aware that the accusations over the FRG’s arms sales to South Africa – raised at the 1970 OAU summit – had been fabricated by the GDR. (PAAA, B34/757, Telegram from the FRG’s Embassy in Lusaka, 09.09.1970) Moreover, the government of the Central African Republic ended up expelling the GDR representation from its country. (TNA, FCO65/1162, Agenda for Anglo-German Talks on Africa, 10.01.1972).


217 For example, in Telo (1994), p.142.
Portugal. Even though the Eastern states involved in rapprochement with FRG loudly championed the African cause at the international fora – particularly the USSR and the GDR – they did not make any related demands in their bilateral negotiations with Bonn. Thus there was no direct linkage between the FRG’s relationship with Portugal and the West German détente with Eastern Europe, just like there was no spill-over from this rapprochement into Portugal’s own relations with the Eastern Bloc.\footnote{218} Indeed, from a purely tactical point of view, those communist countries had little to gain from settling Africa’s dispute with the West, since this dispute was actually helpful to them in infiltrating the African continent. The impact of the Conakry invasion had even enabled the Soviet navy to move into the Guinean coast, following Sékou Touré’s request for protection.\footnote{220}

Consequently, the Eastern European leaderships most willing to collaborate with Bonn on the Portuguese problem were those with the more autonomous foreign policies. Such was the case of the Romanian Nicolae Ceaușescu, renowned for defying his neighbours’ foreign policy guidelines.\footnote{221} Apart from the USSR, Romania was the only country in the Soviet Bloc whose diplomatic ties to the FRG stretched back to before the SPD-FDP coalition. It therefore became a close partner of Bonn during the preparatory phase of the CSCE.\footnote{222} Conversely, not only did the Bucharest government display little sympathy for the Portuguese regime\footnote{223}, it tried to position itself in the

\footnote{218}{For an overview of negotiations between the two German states see, for example, Haftendorn, Helga. 2006 (A). *Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy Since 1945*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, pp.136-142,173-187; For the negotiations with the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, see Fink, Carole and Schaefer, Bernd (eds.). 2009. *Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European and Global Responses*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.15-79; For an extensive systematised collection of documents related to the German question, where the low-profile of the Portuguese issue is clear, see *DeD*.}

\footnote{219}{In February 1973, the Caetano regime made a tactful, if futile, effort to soften the Soviet Bloc’s antagonism towards Lisbon. Rui Patrício announced that Portugal was willing to stimulate positive trading relations with any interested Eastern European country. According to the German Ambassador in Lisbon, although the emphasis was on the economic aspect – Lisbon would continue to not recognise the GDR —, the Portuguese authorities possibly hoped that, in return, the Eastern Bloc would display more understanding for their overseas policy. (PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv 101.437, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 22.02.1973) The socialist states’ close ties to the Third World, however, naturally prevented most Eastern countries from furthering their relationship with Portugal. (PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv 101.437, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 13.04.1973).}


\footnote{223}{In 1969, Romania briefly toyed with the idea of opposing the participation of the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships in the CSCE, but it did not follow through with it. (*AAPD 1969*, Doc.128, 17.04.1969, and Doc.365,16.11.1969) Despite its prejudices, however, the following year Bucharest...}
forefront of the supporters of the southern African liberation struggle.\textsuperscript{224} In his quest to further that struggle, on 29 June 1973, the Romanian leader privately urged Willy Brandt and Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski – a member of the \textit{SPD}’s Executive – to support the African rebels and to persuade Lisbon to change its colonial policy. Thus, at a time when Moscow and East Berlin were capitalising on Bonn’s eroding prestige in Africa, Ceaușescu, in a typically counter-cyclical move, sought to recruit the West German social-democrats to join the anti-colonialist movement. He even warned the chancellor that the \textit{SPD}’s position on this matter was likely to reflect on Bonn’s future relations with the African territories after their inevitable decolonisation.\textsuperscript{225}

Yugoslavia, which had split from the Soviet Bloc in 1948, was an even more extreme case. Under the leadership of President Josip Broz Tito, the Belgrade government stoutly backed Africa’s anti-colonial outcry with political and financial assistance.\textsuperscript{226} Having become an important patron of the national liberation struggle in the Portuguese territories, Belgrade helped promote unofficial contacts between the \textit{SPD} and the Angolan movement \textit{MPLA}.\textsuperscript{227} Yet, just like the Soviets, the Yugoslav authorities, who had resumed diplomatic relations with Bonn in 1968, were also keen to expand their own cooperation with the FRG. Indeed, this spirit of conciliation was particularly fomented by the personal bond between Tito and Brandt.\textsuperscript{228} The result was paradoxical. On the one hand, Tito’s regime accused the NATO powers of sustaining Portuguese colonialism and repeatedly called for UN measures to prevent international political, military and economic support of Lisbon’s colonial policies.\textsuperscript{229} On the other hand, at the 1970 NAM conference in Lusaka, Yugoslavia successfully lobbied against Zambia’s proposal for a resolution that would specifically attack the German
participation in Cahora Bassa. During the discussion, Tito even made use of an aide-mémoire with facts and arguments supplied by Bonn.230

1.2. The western version

On the western side of the ‘iron curtain’, the loudest voices to address the FRG’s policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship belonged to non-governmental agents. Before the West German President Gustav Heinemann visited the Netherlands in November 1969, about thirty Dutch youth organisations wrote to him denouncing the construction of warships for the Portuguese Navy in Hamburg and unsuccessfully tried to arrange a meeting with him. The Dutch activist group Angola Comité repeatedly wrote about this and other issues to the Bonn government, parliamentary factions and to their respective party executives. It also convinced the Dutch television company VARA to investigate and report on the issue.231 The activists published extensive material about the FRG’s military supplies to Portugal232 and, in 1972, their petition accusing Bonn of lying about those supplies made it as far as the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation.233 Criticism emerged in other countries too, albeit more sporadically but sometimes to great symbolic effect. In December 1971, while Willy Brandt was accepting the Nobel Peace Prize at the University of Oslo, Norwegian protesters distributed pamphlets in front of the building condemning the FRG’s military and economic ties to the colonial wars, together with chants of “No to West German imperialism in Africa”.234 The British Catholic priest Adrian Hastings sent shockwaves through the international community in July 1973 with an article in the UK newspaper The Times exposing a massacre of 400 Mozambicans, including women and children, committed by Portuguese troops in the village of Wiriyamu the previous December. Although Lisbon denied the existence of the massacre and even of any village named Wiriyamu, the episode turned into a public relations disaster for the Caetano regime.235

231 CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, “Activities concerning the supply of three war-ships to Portugal by West Germany” (Angola Committee).
234 AHD-MNE, PEA M727 Pr.331, Dispatch from the Portuguese Embassy in Oslo, 25.01.1972.
In an extended book about the case, published in January 1974, Hastings vehemently singled out the dictatorship’s West German ally:

“More and more western European, especially German, investment is going into Portuguese Africa, and the greater part of the military equipment used by the Portuguese comes from Germany. In permitting the continuance of this monstrous trade Willy Brandt is, curious as it may seem, showing himself to be a successor to Adolf Hitler – insofar as he is effectively supporting the regime which more than any other today carries on the Nazi tradition, and at the expense of Africa. He is, of course, inheriting a policy of the Christian Democrats and one protective of the interests of German capitalism. In continuing it, he may have a greater effective responsibility for the maintenance of Portuguese tyranny in Africa today than any other man.”

The book received much publicity via the European mass media and Hastings’ remarks about Brandt certainly did not go unnoticed in the West German press.

Because of institutional and diplomatic loyalty, the Western governments were less ready to point the finger at Bonn, or even Lisbon, although they felt somewhat uncomfortable in regard to their Portuguese ally. Portugal may have been one of NATO’s founding members but the dictatorship had always had little affinity with the ideological principles of the Preamble of the North-Atlantic Treaty. Indeed, Salazar had been reluctant to join the Atlantic Alliance in the first place, having failed to convince his partners to extend the invitation to Spain’s Franco regime and to broaden the Alliance’s defence area to include the Portuguese colonies. Nevertheless, Salazar had ultimately recognised that NATO membership could still prove useful to the protection of the empire and so Lisbon had joined the group. To be sure, Salazar continued to advocate incorporating Africa, or at least the Cape Verde archipelago, in the NATO’s defence area. Portugal’s controversial status had less to do with originally having been the only non-democratic regime in the alliance – others followed, most notably Greece’s Regime of the Colonels (1967-1974) – than with the fact that it had begun using the organisation’s materiel to fight the African liberation movements. Throughout

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the 1960s, the recurring accusations in the UN regarding NATO’s alleged support for the Portuguese in the colonial wars had bred a general sense of embarrassment. Norway and Canada had briefly drafted proposals to expel Lisbon from the alliance, but overall Portugal’s position in NATO had remained remarkably stable, without any serious threat of exclusion.\(^{240}\)

Nevertheless, a few European governments displayed great determination to combat Portuguese colonialism. The predominantly social-democratic governments of Norway and Denmark, like that of neutral Sweden, publicly expressed their support for the liberation movements of southern Africa. Through those movements, they channelled economic and humanitarian aid – particularly in the field of education – to the peoples in the Portuguese territories.\(^{241}\) The Norwegian authorities accepted a request from the OAU to hold a large conference in Oslo on 9-14 April 1973 in support of the victims of colonialism and apartheid. Furthermore, the Scandinavian states maintained throughout this period total embargos on weapons and military exports to the Portuguese dictatorship, despite the fact that Norway and Denmark, like Portugal, were NATO allies. The Bonn government was well-informed of its northern neighbours’ policies towards the Caetano regime.\(^{242}\)

The Netherlands went through a radical transition. Throughout the 1960s, the official position of the state – itself a colonial power – had been far from critical of Portugal. The conservative Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, in office from 1952 until 1971, was notoriously pro-Portuguese.\(^{243}\) However, in the late 1960s a fiercely anti-colonialist movement emerged in Dutch society, of which one of the most active faces was the aforementioned Angola Comité. This group, which had strong ties to the liberation movements, organised a series of large-scale solidarity campaigns, most


\(^{241}\) Stockholm’s contribution totalled 5.7 Million Swedish Crowns in the fiscal year 1971/1972. In the following year, it rose to 21 Million (including 10 Million for PAIGC, 2 Million for FRELIMO and 2 Million for MPLA) and in 1973/1974 to 30 Million. Oslo granted 700,000 Norwegian Crowns to the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam in December 1971 and an extra million to the PAIGC five months later. In November 1972, the Norwegian Parliament approved a government proposal to grant another 5 million Crowns for assistance to the liberation of southern Africa. Meanwhile Denmark, through the World University Service, gave assistance to the MPLA, having also invested 3 Million Danish Crowns in a school project in Zaire.


\(^{243}\) Luns visited Portugal in 1968 and received from Salazar the Order of Christ distinction, sparking great controversy in the Dutch parliament.
notably the 1972 boycott of Angolan coffee.\textsuperscript{244} It also managed to have a progressive impact on the agenda of the opposition labour party \textit{PvdA}, stirring up a debate within the party about the possibility of the Netherlands withdrawing from NATO if Portugal was not excluded from the organisation. In February 1970, the parliament voted for changing the country’s complacent attitude in the UN to a more critical voting pattern.\textsuperscript{245} Moreover, like the Scandinavian states, the Dutch government began providing aid to the liberation movements.\textsuperscript{246} As a member of the EEC, the Netherlands was also involved in the negotiations for Portugal’s trade agreement with the Common Market, which for Hague became a hot topic domestically. The Dutch trade union confederations demanded that the parliament decline the trade agreement unless it included concessions regarding Lisbon’s domestic and colonial policies.\textsuperscript{247} In April 1972, Portuguese Foreign Minister Patrício’s trip to Hague to discuss the agreement was organised in secrecy and only after much hesitation by the Dutch authorities, who feared uproar in the capital.\textsuperscript{248} The anti-colonialist strand found greater expression in May 1973, with the formation of a coalition government headed by Joop den Uyl, of the \textit{PvdA}. He appointed Max van der Stoel to the Foreign Ministry with an outspoken agenda of firmly challenging Portugal and Greece within NATO.\textsuperscript{249} Shortly after coming to power, den Uyl and van der Stoel met with Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel and made clear their intentions to raise the pressure on those two dictatorships.\textsuperscript{250}

Although the mix of solidarity with Africa and concern with domestic and international public opinion was not an entirely new phenomenon among Lisbon’s allies, the tension within NATO reached a peak in the early 1970s. This was mostly a result of the Portuguese aggression against Guinea-Conakry, which had raised the level

\textsuperscript{244} It quickly dropped from 30\% to 5\% of the total coffee sales in the Netherlands.
\textsuperscript{246} AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Dispatch from Gerhard O. Kleipsties, 28.08.1973.
\textsuperscript{247} “Portugal & EWG”, \textit{iz3w}, vol.19, October 1972, p.21.
\textsuperscript{248} AD/MAE Europe 1944… Portugal 3506, Dispatch from the French Embassy in Lisbon, 22.04.1972; This trip was ultimately overshadowed by the football game Ajax (Amsterdam) – Benfica (Lisbon) in Lisbon, which controversially featured an advertisement of Angola coffee in the stadium, which appeared on Dutch television. Behind this stunt was the Dutch right-wing political group \textit{Nederlandse Volks-Unie}.
\textsuperscript{249} “New Dutch Foreign Minister: Action against Portugal within NATO”, \textit{Trouw} (Netherlands), 04.04.1972 (summary), in \textit{F&R}, 27.05.1972
of African criticism to unprecedented levels.\textsuperscript{251} As a consequence, NATO had become a stage of confrontation between conflicting approaches to the Portuguese regime, pushing Bonn to pick a side. In 1970, just as the UN Security Council was preparing its second resolution on the Conakry incident, delegations from NATO member-states had gathered for their annual winter meeting (3-4 December). Although the location of the next gathering – Lisbon – was randomly chosen, its implication was not overlooked by the foreign ministers from Canada, Norway and Denmark, who questioned the appropriateness of meeting in Portugal. In turn, Rui Patricio, urged by Marcelo Caetano, insisted on keeping the location choice. Thus, instead of discussing the SALT and MBFR talks as scheduled, the delegates spent almost two days debating the city of the next meeting. Patricio argued that what was at stake was not the Portuguese African policy, but NATO’s willingness to cave in to external pressure. According to him, there would always be controversies – today the Portuguese dictatorship, tomorrow the Greek – and showing weakness and lack of cohesion could destroy the organisation. After an intervention by Secretary-General Manlio Brosio, most foreign ministers, including Walter Scheel, agreed to stick to the initial location.\textsuperscript{252}

The episode set the pattern for future disputes. A few Western powers continued to campaign to isolate the Caetano regime within NATO, but their efforts never materialised into meaningful practical change. On 22 April 1971, the Norwegian parliament (\textit{Storting}) urged Foreign Minister Andreas Zeier Cappelen to address the issue of Portugal’s colonial policy at the Lisbon meeting. Walter Scheel and several of his other colleagues desperately begged him not to do it, but Cappelen went ahead with his speech anyway. Despite an aggressive reply from Rui Patricio, this time Secretary-General Brosio managed to prevent the argument from dominating the event.\textsuperscript{253} Cappelen reaffirmed his opposition to Portugal’s policy at the next ministerial session, on 9-10 December 1971. As he put it to the \textit{Storting} the following month, his actions sought not only to pressure Lisbon but also to show the Africans that the Atlantic Alliance \textit{per se} was not supportive of the Portuguese behaviour overseas.\textsuperscript{254} By 1973, there seemed to be an understanding among Portugal’s critics to keep their

\textsuperscript{251} Historian Christopher Coker described it as “NATO’s most embarrassing moment in Africa”, Coker (1985), p.56.
\textsuperscript{253} AAPD 1971, Doc.197, 05.06.1971.
\textsuperscript{254} PAAA, B31/428, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Oslo, 17.01.1972.
interventions low-key, in order not to disrupt the proceedings. Nevertheless, the anti-colonialist campaign gained further momentum at the various fora due to Dutch Foreign Minister van der Stoel, who in early 1974 prepared to extend his campaign to the EEC framework. Ironically, one of the most sympathetic figures towards Portugal within NATO was actually a Dutch ex-Foreign Minister – Joseph Luns, who in October 1971 had replaced Manlio Brosio as the Alliance’s Secretary-General.

2. In search of a partner among Portugal’s closest allies

France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, the three post-WWII occupying powers of West German territories which had ushered in the creation of the FRG, had developed multiple networks of coordination with Bonn and among themselves over the years. These networks were especially active during the early 1970s, not just because of the trio’s attention to *neue Ostpolitik* but because of their involvement in the process of European détente, and in particular in the CSCE. Like the FRG, these three powers were entangled with the Portuguese dictatorship and to some extent they all suffered a backlash because of Lisbon’s colonial policy. Despite Bonn’s exchange of ideas with the members of this selective club, however, their efforts to directly influence the dictatorship’s policy remained largely uncoordinated.

2.1. France

Since the beginning of the colonial wars, Paris had become the Portuguese dictatorship’s most unashamedly loyal ally. This situation had emerged out of a mix of traditional friendship and reciprocity for Lisbon’s political support during the (all too
similar) French-Algerian conflict. The Portuguese cause had become an instrument of President Charles de Gaulle’s quest to reaffirm Paris’ autonomy from Washington, since it had allowed de Gaulle to present himself as the great defender of Western European solidarity. Thus throughout the 1960s France had systematically abstained on UN resolutions directed against Lisbon’s colonialism, and it had made important material contributions to the Portuguese wars. Moreover, three French firms participated in Zamco, the consortium carrying out the Cahora Bassa enterprise. Yet this complicity with Lisbon a limited impact on France’s image in the Third World. By contrast with the Algerian case, Paris had ably managed the process of decolonisation in sub-Saharan Africa and had established successful post-colonial ties with the moderate African states. In general the francophone African countries, with which France had closer economic relations, were not as vocal against the French-Portuguese collaboration as their Anglophone counterparts. Therefore, although conservative President Georges Pompidou – who replaced de Gaulle in June 1969 – could not ignore the rising anti-Portuguese critique, he did not see any urgent need to significantly depart from his predecessor’s policy towards Portugal.

The German and French authorities studied each other’s case. In its revaluation of Afrikapolitik in May 1970, the Bundeskanzleramt’s Department for Foreign Affairs looked towards France as a successful role-model for the FRG’s relations with the Third World. Similarly, Paris observed with interest the attitude of the West German authorities in dealing with their controversial relationship with Lisbon. Initially, the main link between the two states’ policies towards the Caetano regime was the Cahora Bassa project. Recognising their interdependence, Rui Patrício simultaneously called Walter Scheel and his French counterpart Maurice Schumann to one side during the 1970 NATO spring ministerial meeting (26-27 May). Patrício got them to assure him that their governments would not withdraw support for the project, like the Swedish and Italians had done. On 3 July, away from Portuguese ears, Brandt and Pompidou

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263 BAK, B136/2992, Memo from the Bundeskanzleramt, 08.05.1970.
265 Author’s interview with Rui Patrício, 06.04.2011; Xavier (2010), pp.154-155.
had a heart-to-heart about the contentious nature of the dam in their respective countries and Pompidou confirmed that the French would stand “firm as a rock” by the project.266

As the African pressure mounted, the Auswärtiges Amt sought to take advantage of Paris’ and Bonn’s analogous situation. In September 1970, the AA approached its French colleagues about their availability to join forces in order to promote a détente between Lisbon and the African states267. However, the French Foreign Ministry at the Quai d’Orsay was convinced that any outside intervention risked complicating matters and thus delaying, rather than speeding up, a solution to the conflict. It considered that “the problem of the Portuguese presence in Africa should be solved by Portugal itself”.268 Consequently, the German Embassy in Paris was quickly informed that the Quai d’Orsay regarded the idea of a French-German demarche as premature, preferring to wait for President Kaunda to define how far the African campaign was willing to go.269

The controversial invasion of Guinea-Conakry in November produced contradictory results in Paris’ stance. Pompidou’s tone mixed the defeatism of someone who had seen this story before – in the case of Algeria – with the resignation of someone who understood the deluded stubbornness of a colonial power. Meeting with Patrício on 22 January 1971, Pompidou announced that from now on France would be more reserved in its military shipments to Portugal, so as not to further provoke the Africans. Yet he also assured Patrício that, despite disagreement over the Portuguese policy, Paris would continue to show goodwill towards Lisbon.270 Four days later, Pompidou shared with Willy Brandt his doubts about the short-term chances for a positive evolution of the colonial situation, despite Caetano’s policy of ‘progressive autonomy’. The French president argued that such evolution could only result in decolonisation, which the Portuguese military and administrative elites did not seem ready to accept.271 For now Pompidou was willing to let Lisbon sort out its own path in

266 CHAN/APR, 5 AG2/104, Transcript of the meeting between Pompidou and Brandt, 03.07.1970.
270 Besides announcing the restrictions in the military shipments, Pompidou made a point of explaining how Paris would help Lisbon discreetly circumvent those restrictions. He concluded with a message of “trust and cooperation” for Caetano. – CHAN/APR, 5AG2/1016, Meeting between President Pompidou and Rui Patrício, 22.01.1971.
271 AAPD 1971, Doc.32, 26.01.1971; CHAN/APR, 5AG2/1010, Meeting between President Pompidou and Chancellor Brandt, 26.01.1971.
Africa. At a parallel meeting between the French and German foreign ministers, however, Maurice Schumann showed himself shaken out of his previous laissez faire attitude by the events in Conakry. This time, Schumann told Scheel that he would welcome a plan to jointly approach Lisbon in order to promote an Afro-Portuguese détente, perhaps through Paris’ privileged contacts with the francophone Léopold Senghor. The two ministers raised the possibility of discussing the Portuguese colonial problem within the EEC in an effort to coordinate the positions of the member states.

Indeed, the EEC ended up becoming the framework for Bonn’s and Paris’ most productive collaboration. A directive from 19 November 1970 by the EEC Council of Ministers – at the time under German presidency – had already assigned the ambassadors of the six EEC countries in Lisbon to compare notes at joint meetings, but this had been postponed due to the suicide of the West German Ambassador Schmidt-Horix at the end of month. The background to this directive had been the current application for Portugal – its European territory – to be granted associate status with the Common Market in order to minimise the adverse effects of the UK’s and Denmark’s imminent transition from EFTA to the EEC. The French Ambassador Jacques Tiné revived the initiative the following spring, during France’s presidency of the Council. Yet Tiné soon found himself at odds with the benevolent outlook on marcelismo expressed by the recently arrived German Ambassador Ehrenfried von Holleben. On occasion of the first meeting, on 17 June 1971, Tiné considered that, out of all the ambassadors from the EEC countries, von Holleben was the “most optimistic, as well as the one who gives the most credit to [Caetano]”. Only the Italian chargé d’affaires, who was temporarily replacing the ambassador, shared similar, if less passionate, views to von Holleben. By contrast, the Belgian ambassador was particularly cynical towards any prospects of evolution in Lisbon’s policy. In the second meeting, on 30 August, von Holleben introduced his thesis that offering the Portuguese “the most favourable conditions” for their association with the EEC was the only way to avoid Lisbon’s drift into isolationism. He noted that the credibility of the more progressive and pro-

272 Before the end of the year, Pompidou secretly authorised further sales of military equipment to the dictatorship. – CHAN/APR, 5AG2/1016, Note from the Chief of the Military Staff of the President of the Republic to General Coudert, 21.12.1971.
273 AAPD 1971, Doc.29, 25.01.1971; CHAN/APR, 5AG2/105, Minute of the Meeting between Maurice Schumann and Walter Scheel, 29.01.1971.
274 AD/MAE Europe 1944… Portugal 3506, Dispatch from the French Embassy in Lisbon, 17.06.1971.
276 AD/MAE Europe 1944… Portugal 3506, Dispatch from the French Embassy in Lisbon, 17.06.1971.
European forces of the Portuguese regime was at stake and argued that undermining their efforts would strengthen the position of the conservative Africa-oriented faction. At the time, Tiné took issue with this interpretation, claiming that von Holleben was underestimating Portugal’s dependency on Europe. However, the French ambassador came to appreciate his colleague’s reasoning. Writing to Paris in April 1972, Tiné resolutely defended the need to accommodate and support the Portuguese demands in the EEC association negotiations. His arguments were now a perfect match with von Holleben’s.

The French and German stances were crucial in what turned out to be very intense negotiations. Lisbon’s diplomats had known from the beginning that the EEC states were unlikely to accept any compromises beyond a trade agreement similar to that being negotiated with other EFTA members at the time. They had only made the application for associate status in the hope of raising the level of the negotiations’ starting point as they sought to achieve greater economic concessions than Spain’s own 1970 trade agreement with the Common Market. In particular, Portugal pressed to have its processed agricultural goods given the same export benefits as the industrial goods. Although France was less forthcoming than the FRG, due to conflicting economic interests, the former nevertheless endorsed the Portuguese side. At Caetano’s request, Pompidou personally intervened when the negotiations seemed to be blocked and helped reach a consensus. While the mere concession of an agreement might have been assured by the context of the EEC’s wider realignment, the support of these two leading powers was necessary in order to obtain a satisfactory result for Portugal, since the dictatorship did not have either economic leverage or political sympathy from the other member states. The final agreement, signed on 22 July 1972, although not fully satisfying Lisbon’s demands, was still considered a success by the Portuguese political elites. In practice, the Franco-German axis succeeded in

277 AD/MAE Europe 1944… Portugal 3506, Dispatch from the French Embassy in Lisbon, 30.08.1971.
278 AD/MAE Europe 1944… Portugal 3506, Dispatch from the French Embassy in Lisbon, 11.04.1972; For more on von Holleben’s views, see Chapters 5.
281 Author’s interview with Rui Patrício, 06.04.2011.
assisting the Portuguese economy, while never following up on the idea of a direct intervention concerning the colonial question.287

2.2. The UK

The United Kingdom had even stronger historical ties to Portugal than France did. In the case of England, those ties dated as far back as 1373. That the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance had survived for so long indicates both parties’ instrumental – and selective – use of it. Indeed, one of the driving forces of the Alliance had been Lisbon’s reliance on Britain to secure the protection of the vast Portuguese empire. The UK’s unwillingness to continue to fulfil that role, evidenced since the 1950s, had led to a relative estrangement in the relations between the two.288 Yet even during a period of decreasing political and economic collusion, the weight of the Alliance’s legacy had prevented any meaningful rupture. Furthermore, Caetano’s rise to power in 1968 raised positive expectations in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Edward Heath’s Conservative government, in power since June 1970, initially embraced the FCO’s outlook.289

After the first negative response from the Quai d’Orsay, in the autumn of 1970 the Auswärtiges Amt turned to the FCO in the quest for a multilateral mediation between Portugal and the African states, perhaps even through NATO.290 On 6 October, the AA’s Undersecretary of State Sigismund von Braun discussed the idea with British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home and the FCO’s Undersecretary of State Denis Greenhill, in London. The British advocated a hard stance against the OAU’s campaign, in order to prevent it from escalating into trade embargos on Portugal and South Africa, which could affect Western – and particularly British – economic interests. As for talking to Lisbon about the Portuguese colonial policy,

287 For the minutes of the regular meetings between French and German leaders and foreign ministers in 1971, 1972 and 1973, see CHAN/APR, 5AG2/105 and 5AG2/106.
288 The limits of London’s support for Lisbon’s colonial designs, although clear beforehand, had been blatantly exposed by the British passivity upon the invasion, by Commonwealth partner India, of the Portuguese colonies Goa, Daman and Diu in December 1961. Moreover, the British authorities had been more successful than the Germans in preventing the Portuguese armaments from making it to the colonial wars and, on very specific occasions, had even voted against Portuguese interests in the UN. Equally gone were the days of the economic protectorate status of Portugal in relation to Great Britain, a dependency that West Germany had decisively helped overcome in the 1960s.
289 For an encompassing overview of the Anglo-Portuguese relations from 1945 until 1975, see Oliveira (2007).
290 PAAA, B34/757, Speaking Notes for von Braun’s talk with the FCO, 22.09.1970.
although London was not totally opposed to the idea, Greenhill warned von Braun that previous British governments had already attempted this in the past, without success.\textsuperscript{291} It was hardly an enthusiastic endorsement of the German suggestion. The FCO’s scepticism was rooted in the fear of endangering what little progress Marcelo Caetano’s reform policies might achieve. As FCO’s Assistant Undersecretary of State Stanley Fingland put it: “The Portuguese [Government] would not necessarily react sensibly if they thought their allies were ganging up on them; and the Salazarist Old Guard might seize the opportunity to attempt a counter-reformation”.\textsuperscript{292} Therefore, when a delegate of the German Embassy in London once again brought up the AA’s proposal for concerted action, on 4 November 1970, the FCO rejected it once more.\textsuperscript{293}

Like Paris, London nevertheless began to recognise the need to talk to Lisbon following the Conakry episode. The UK dreaded similar Portuguese ventures against other African governments harbouring anti-Portuguese guerrilla movements, such as Commonwealth members Zambia and Tanzania. Douglas-Home admitted that “our representations would have a greater impact if they were preceded by an independent German demarche”.\textsuperscript{294} Thus the FCO began contemplating the option of “encouraging the Germans to exert some refined diplomatic pressure on the Portuguese [vis-à-vis] their African policies”. This essentially meant discreet German-Portuguese bilateral contacts, in opposition to a multilateral offensive in NATO. The FCO refused to go through NATO, not just because the organisation had “enough problems already”, but because London did not wish to “embarrass the progressive elements in Portugal at a particularly delicate period for Portuguese internal politics”.\textsuperscript{295}

By the time the British next talked to the Germans, however, the latter were already exploring a new tactic. When Prime Minister Edward Heath visited Bonn on 5-6 April 1971, Willy Brandt proposed an arrangement to provide joint military assistance to Portugal, as well as to the other two controversial states in the Atlantic Alliance: Greece and Turkey, where a coup d’état had occurred in March. Brandt sought to diffuse Bonn’s image of ‘immoral’ arms supplier by multilateralising the process. He argued that they could implement such a programme through NATO’s Military Committee but not through the Council, since the Scandinavians would certainly

\textsuperscript{291} PAAA, B34/757, Telegram from the FRG’s Embassy in London, 06.10.1970.
\textsuperscript{292} TNA, FCO45/509, Dispatch from the FCO, 01.12.1970.
\textsuperscript{293} BAK, B136/3595, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in London, 04.11.1970; TNA, FCO45/509, Dispatch from the FCO, 05.11.1970.
\textsuperscript{294} TNA, FCO45/509, Telegram from the FCO, 01.12.1970.
\textsuperscript{295} TNA, FCO45/859, Dispatch from the FCO, 24.03.1971.
oppose it. Heath replied that he would consider such a scheme involving Greece and Turkey, but that “Portugal was an embarrassment to the British government for political reasons”. In fact, London ended up rejecting the entire plan. Britain did not wish to agitate the Dutch, the Danes and the Norwegians any more than it wished to agitate the Portuguese.296

The British authorities struggled to decipher the FRG’s apparently erratic approach to the Portuguese problem in particular and its African relations in general. In January 1972, a dispatch from the British Embassy in Bonn stated:

“Germany is perhaps fortunate in that, even in her imperial days, she never felt either the duty to carry the white man’s burden which inspired British colonialists, or the need to undertake a mission civilisatrice like the French. Nor are any of her ex-colonies still in the hands of “kith and kin”. The Germans’ approach to relations with the Third World is therefore less emotional, and less cluttered by complications of an imperial past, than is ours or that of the French. Their relations with the Third World are likely in the future therefore to be based far more on a cool calculation of their own interests, primarily though not exclusively on the economic field.”297

However, an internal memo of the FCO shortly afterwards revised the statement, claiming that “German policy towards Africa is particularly prone to a sort of schizophrenia […] between what one might describe as the pragmatists and the ideologists”. The ‘pragmatists’, which included Minister of Economics Karl Schiller and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, looked at Africa “very much in the narrow terms of the Federal Republic’s economic and, secondly, political interest”. The ‘ideologists’, headed by Minister for Economic Cooperation Erhard Eppler, were invested in “supporting the more “progressive” regimes in black Africa and in opposing white racialists even at the cost of German business interests”. For the British, it was not clear which school of thought had greater influence in government policy, but they conceded that “on major issues, it is probably usually the pragmatists [who win]; on minor issues, concessions are often made to ideologists”.298

296 AAPD 1971, Doc. 121, 05.04.1971; TNA, FCO41/818, Letter from Lord Bridges, 04.05.1971.
297 TNA, FCO65/1162, Dispatch from the British Embassy in Bonn, 20.01.1972.
298 TNA, FCO65/1162, Steering Brief for Anglo-German Talks on 23 February 1972.
Because of Portugal’s role in the FRG’s African affairs, the aforementioned inconsistency, as the British were finding out, contaminated West Germany’s policy towards Lisbon. Since the Bonn government did not manage to overcome its own inner divisions, naturally it also failed to coordinate a démarche with other countries. What was really missing, as a memo from the FCO’s Southern European Department postulated, was a concerted Western policy pressing the Portuguese to withdraw from Africa, either via political or economic boycott, or via financial inducements by the EEC. The same document hinted that, on the British side, the lack of commitment to such an effort did not merely derive from worries about the impact which a hasty withdrawal from the colonies would have in Portugal. A crucial concern was the unpredictable consequences of such an action in the colonies themselves. Although recognising that the “liability which Portugal’s continued colonial presence in Africa represents to British and Western interests needs no spelling out”, the memo stated that an “independent Angola and Mozambique – either white-supremacist or anti-Western – could be liabilities of a different kind”.299

Still, London continued to compare notes with Bonn, even though British resistance to adopting a multilateral strategy to deal with the Portuguese problem persisted. After a two year interruption, in 1972 the AA and the FCO reactivated their longstanding practice of holding annual bilateral talks specifically about southern Africa.300 The Portuguese territories, of course, were a recurrent topic, even if hardly the only one. In the session of 23 February 1972, the two delegations compared strategies to prevent their arms from being used in the colonial wars.301 In the meeting of 26 April 1973, the Germans explained that the Portuguese question was “perhaps the main problem” for the FRG’s African policy, displaying a very pessimistic view of the situation. When they mentioned the possibility of the Bundestag pressuring the Brandt government to discuss the issue within NATO, the FCO assured them that no pressure of the sort was expected in the UK, where there was “much less steam behind anti-Portuguese feeling than behind opposition to apartheid”.302

300 The purpose of this exercise, according to the FCO, was to share with the federal authorities – “in the interest of Anglo-German relations” – British expertise on Africa and to benefit from their knowledge of the countries where the UK had no resident representation, as well as to obtain “discreet support” for London’s Rhodesian policy. – TNA, FCO65/1162, Steering Brief for Anglo-German Talks on 23 February 1972.
This prediction was soon proven inaccurate. Marcelo Caetano’s high-profile visit to London in July 1973, shortly after The Times had broken out the Wiriyamu massacre story, was the target of massive street demonstrations and heated debate in the press, as well as in the House of Commons. The notion of British participation in a concerted multilateral offensive against Portugal gained an unprecedented thrust with the Labour Party’s victory in the parliamentary elections of 28 February 1974. Labour leader Harold Wilson had developed much stricter views on the Portuguese issue since his last tenure as prime minister, which had ended four years before. His party’s electoral programme proposed the cancellation of Portugal’s trade agreement with the European Common Market – which the UK had joined the previous year – and Lisbon’s exclusion from future agreements with the EEC until the regime’s democratisation, as well as the dictatorship’s suspension from NATO. The programme also promised to support the liberation movements and to restrict British investments in and arms sales to Portugal. During its brief six weeks in power before Caetano’s downfall, however, the British government’s only meaningful initiative regarding the Portuguese colonial question was the holding of secret talks in London between representatives of the PAIGC and Portuguese authorities. This initiative had been prepared by Heath’s government, which in early 1974 had discerned signs of openness from Marcelo Caetano regarding a political solution to the wars, at least in the specific case of Guinea-Bissau, where the Portuguese military situation was at its worst. Although the meeting was ultimately unproductive, the British were the closest to mediating a settlement between the Africans and the Portuguese. 303 They did not invite the Germans along.

2.3. USA

In contrast to France’s consistent support for Lisbon and to the UK’s generally mild attitude, the USA’s policy towards Portugal – and specifically towards the colonial question – had been much more convoluted. Relations between Lisbon and Washington had reached their lowest point in 1961/1962, when President John F. Kennedy had pursued an active pro-African anti-colonialist agenda until Lisbon escalated the threat

to refuse American access to the Azores Lajes airbase. The Lyndon Johnson administration had adopted a posture of ‘benign neutrality’ towards Lisbon, while trying to convince the dictatorship to accept self-determination in the colonies. In turn, Republican President Richard Nixon, who came to power in 1969, dismissed the geo-strategic relevance of the African question, withdrawing any remaining support for the African nationalists and embracing Portugal’s position. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger formalised this policy-line as soon as 15 August 1969, with the National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39). This document, which effectively shaped Washington’s strategy for southern Africa for the next few years, laid out the following:

“The Whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists.”

Bonn paid close attention to the evolution of Washington’s position, but initially the two states did not have a particularly collaborative working relation with regard to Portugal. Since early 1969, the German Embassy in Lisbon tried to assess any possible changes in the USA’s policy towards the dictatorship brought on by the new president. By late October 1970, German Ambassador Schmidt-Horix was able to inform the Auswärtiges Amt that Washington was indeed planning to reorient its policy by adopting a more favourable attitude towards Lisbon, though Schmidt-Horix had had to consult unofficial sources at the American Embassy to get this information. The Nixon administration preferred to confide in the Heath government – which at the time was preparing its own rapprochement with Lisbon – than in Willy Brandt’s. When Washington did approach the West German authorities, it only displayed specific short-term goals. On 19 October 1970, the Secretary of the American Embassy in Bonn Mr. Spotts went to the AA to ask about Brandt’s recent talks with the OAU delegation, in

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307 PAAA, B31/347, Dispatches from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 24.03.1969 and 08.06.1970.
order to prepare for Kenneth Kaunda’s scheduled meeting with Nixon later that month. Spotts later tentatively shifted the conversation to the issue of Cahora Bassa. The American firm General Electric was interested in participating in the dam project and had heard that the Portuguese were not pleased with the German firms in Zamco, so Spotts wanted to know if those firms were at risk of losing their contract with Lisbon.\textsuperscript{309} The meeting was hardly the basis for a prolific partnership.

This initial lack of coordination over Portuguese affairs highlights the autonomous and proactive features of the FRG’s policy towards the Afro-Portuguese problem.\textsuperscript{310} Aware that the Nixon administration wished to keep a hands-off approach vis-à-vis the colonial question, the AA did not include Washington in its short-lived effort to organise an international demarche to promote détente in Africa.\textsuperscript{311} The independent attitude of the West German authorities reflected the political atmosphere of the time – since the late 1960s, Western European leaders and nations had been striving for emancipation from an all-encompassing American dominance, even when accepting their alliance with the USA in the context of the Western Bloc. Neue Ostpolitik, which was one of the strongest manifestations of this trend, had proven that Bonn could take the lead in articulating successful multilateral initiatives.\textsuperscript{312}

In order to secure its efforts, however, the SPD-FDP coalition had from the start anchored its new Eastern policy in a strong Western policy via full commitment to the EEC and NATO. Regardless of whether or not the latter policy was just a tool to discredit Western fears of a German pull towards the East and possibly neutralism in return for Eastern concessions on the ‘German question’\textsuperscript{313}, or whether perhaps the Western plus Eastern strategies formed parallel pillars in an overarching search for ‘European social-democratisation’\textsuperscript{314}, in practice the Western commitment did serve to validate neue Ostpolitik in the eyes of the FRG’s allies. Since the quadripartite agreement over Berlin required the endorsement of the former occupying powers, the West German government was concerned with gathering their support through a policy

\textsuperscript{309} PAAA, B34/757, Memo from the AA, 19.10.1970.
\textsuperscript{310} Contrary to Bolade Eyinla’s disingenuous portrayal in Eyinla (1996), p.69.
\textsuperscript{311} PAAA, B34/811, Memo from the AA, 15.02.1971.
\textsuperscript{313} As historian Donald Sassoon put it, the SPD “could not have conducted its own Ostpolitik had it not accepted NATO unconditionally” – Sassoon (1996), p.332.
\textsuperscript{314} Bange (2006), pp.713-714.
of confidence building, particularly in the case of France and the USA.\textsuperscript{315} As a result of this strategy, although Washington was sceptical of Bonn’s leading role in European détente – especially Henry Kissinger, who feared both an upsurge of German nationalism and a weakening of Western unity – the Americans ended up backing the policy.\textsuperscript{316} The emphasis on bloc loyalty indirectly encouraged the FRG to safeguard its relations with the Lisbon dictatorship, yet it was usually Bonn and not Washington who explicitly brought the Portuguese problem into the West German-American relationship. Such was the case with the already mentioned West German proposal of channelling military aid to Lisbon (as well as to Athens and Ankara) through NATO, which was presented to – and vividly welcomed by – the Americans before being rejected by the British.\textsuperscript{317}

In the same vein, as the international campaign against Lisbon expanded in the later period, a key Portugal-related concern for the FRG’s diplomacy was to enlist Washington in Bonn’s efforts to prevent the topic of Portugal from hijacking Western multilateral dynamics. In January 1973, the German Embassy in Washington signalled that Bonn could count on the USA to stand by Portugal, which was considered an important geo-strategic ally. According to the Embassy, while the American authorities did not approve of or formally support Portuguese colonial policy, they were willing to tolerate it even at the expense of some political difficulties in Africa.\textsuperscript{318} By then, however, those difficulties had begun to spread to Europe, as the Nixon administration found out while trying to rekindle Western European relations with the USA later that year. Washington wanted a NATO summit to be held during Nixon’s visit to the continent, but the \textit{AA}’s Political Director Günther van Well advised the American Embassy in Bonn against the idea, warning that the Scandinavians and the Dutch might oppose the attendance of the Portuguese and Greek leaders.\textsuperscript{319} On 29 September, while brainstorming with Nixon and Kissinger about the Declaration on Atlantic Relations for NATO’s 25\textsuperscript{th} birthday, Willy Brandt contributed: “I think we should not dwell too much on principles of democracy. If we take in too much of this, we get into a

\textsuperscript{315} Haftendorn (2006B), pp.222-224.
\textsuperscript{316} Klitzing, Holger. 2009. «To Grin and Bear It: The Nixon Administration and Ostpolitik». In Fink/Schaeffer (2009), pp.80-110.
\textsuperscript{317} USA’s Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was said to have “made enthusiastic noises”. – TNA, FCO41/818, Letter from Lord Bridges, 04.05.1971.
\textsuperscript{318} PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv 101.437, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Washington, 26.01.1973
discussion of Portugal, Greece, Turkey.” It was up to the American President to point out, shortly afterwards: “Yes, but there has to be some idealism. We can’t just talk hardware but we must find drafters who can put it in without antagonizing those who have none.”

In the end, the Declaration did recall, in a single passage, that

“[NATO members] have proclaimed their dedication to the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, justice and social progress, which are the fruits of their shared spiritual heritage and they declare their intention to develop and deepen the application of these principles in their countries”.

By the time the Declaration was adopted, on 18-19 June 1974, the Caetano dictatorship was already a thing of the past.

**Conclusion**

In the wider international context, the West German policy towards the Caetano regime gained considerable notoriety as a side effect of the backlash against Portuguese resistance to decolonisation. This phenomenon was inextricably tied to two important contemporary international dynamics. One of them was the rising tension between most independent African states and the remains of the white minority rule in their continent, including the Portuguese colonies. The other was the competition between the Eastern and the Western blocs for influence in the Third World. These two dynamics intersected as the former aggravated the African states’ relations with the Western allies of the ‘white-ruled’ regimes in the region, propelling African cooperation with the East in retaliation. Although by no means alone, the FRG’s policy towards Portugal was a catalyst as much as a fatality of this process. Because of the widespread portrayal of said policy as supporting Portuguese colonialism, Bonn faced several international appeals to discontinue it.

The most fervent appeals came from Africa, triggered by solidarity with the colonised peoples and, in the case of the states that shared borders with colonies, by the spill-over from the wars. African leaders campaigned at all levels and in all areas of


high politics for Bonn to cancel its credit guarantees for the Cahora Bassa dam project in Mozambique, to cease the supply of German military materiel to Portugal which the latter used in their wars, and to support the liberation movements struggling against Portuguese colonial rule. While sharing these common elements, the African discourse was not uniform. A more moderate strand, best expressed by the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto and by Kenneth Kaunda’s 1970/1971 presidency of the OAU, was willing to engage in a constructive dialogue with Portugal. This strand sought to dissociate the cause of African liberation from Cold War politics, even if reminding the West that tolerance of colonialism was fuelling the Soviet Bloc’s influence in the continent. This faction, although critical of Bonn’s actions, regarded the West German government as a potential partner who could influence Lisbon. By contrast, the more militant strand of African criticism, of which the main voice was Guinean President Sékou Touré, displayed less lenience towards the colonial and neo-colonial powers. Acknowledging that the only path to Portuguese decolonisation was violence, not dialogue, this strand embraced the support given by the Eastern Bloc and framed the liberation struggle as a fight against Western imperialism. This strand, which radically condemned the FRG’s complicity with Lisbon, gained greater prominence in the aftermath of the Portuguese attack against Guinea-Conakry, in November 1970, following Conakry’s accusations of West German collaboration in the aggression.

Apart from their emotional appeal to the democratic values which Bonn claimed to represent, the African states had some power of persuasion over West Germany due to their economic potential and, significantly, their influential role in the NAM. Despite the abandonment of the Hallstein doctrine, the FRG remained keen on ensuring as little diplomatic recognition of the GDR as possible, thus securing Bonn some leverage over East Berlin during the neue Ostpolitik negotiations. Furthermore, through its preponderant weight in the United Nations General Assembly, the African bloc could compromise West Germany’s desired admission to the UN, or any voting pertaining to German-related issues. On a more immediate level, Bonn witnessed in Conakry an extreme consequence of being associated with Portugal and what it perceived as a direct result of East German penetration in Africa.

Indeed, if the Africans tried to use the Cold War geo-ideological competition to serve their cause, the Eastern Bloc states used the African cause to advance their own position in the Cold War. The USSR and its allies supported the liberation struggle politically and militarily, which in turn strengthened their influence in the Third World.
The critique of Bonn’s policy towards Portugal was a valuable propaganda tool against the West in general and the Atlantic Alliance in particular. It allowed the Soviet Union to accuse NATO’s key European member of sustaining imperialism, racism and fascism. The GDR made the most out of this strategy, basing a crucial part of its own African policy during this period on the sabotage of the FRG’s reputation. It thus managed to break the isolation to which the Hallstein doctrine had confined the country during the previous decade and a half. This offensive represented an especially strong pressure for Bonn to revise its policy, both because it undermined the FRG’s stand in Africa and because it enabled the expansion of its rival eastern counterpart. Conversely, Romania and the non-aligned Yugoslavia – two communist states which maintained relations with the West and which Bonn had recognised prior to *neue Ostpolitik* – proved eager to help Willy Brandt reach out to the liberation movements.

Bonn’s image was compromised in the Western world as well. The campaigns of anti-colonialist activists such as the Dutch *Angola Comité* passionately denounced the FRG’s military and economic connections to Portuguese colonialism. At a governmental level, a different form of pressure emerged from the Scandinavian states and, gradually, from the Netherlands. Their governments openly supported the liberation movements and, notably, adopted a very critical stance regarding the Lisbon dictatorship. Their discourse about Portugal was both an echo of the African critique and an explicit reaction to that critique – a way to save the face of western institutions – as well as a response to domestic pressure groups. Yet the ensuing form of criticism, while keeping its anti-colonialist roots, also came to emphasise the authoritarian nature of the Portuguese regime at home. Thus Portugal, which was regularly paired with South Africa and Rhodesia as the ‘rotten apples’ of southern Africa, was now also paired with Greece and later Turkey as the ‘rotten apples’ of the Western alliance.

Although the governments of the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands did not direct their attacks at West Germany, they nevertheless exerted a type of peer pressure over Bonn. Not only did their governments belong to the same political family as Willy Brandt’s *SPD*, they brought the discussion to forums where the FRG participated – including NATO and later the EEC – forcing the Bonn government to take a side.

The thrust of these various forms of pressure was partially offset by a number of international factors which provided the Bonn government with the confidence to continue its traditional policy towards Portugal. Given West Germany’s strong economic relations with Africa, as well as its substantial supply of development aid and...
its engaged diplomatic strategy, Bonn insisted that it was still possible to salvage the FRG’s image on the African continent without openly confronting Lisbon. Crucially, this would enable the West German government to focus on the main aims of its foreign policy, i.e. *neue Ostpolitik* and European rapprochement. Indeed, while the Portuguese colonial question played a part in the Cold War competition, it had no place in the Cold War détente. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union and its European allies were still regarding the rapprochement with the Western Bloc as a priority over their aspirations in the Third World. Therefore, despite their public antagonism towards the West over the Portuguese resistance to decolonisation, the eastern European countries left the issue out of their engagement policy with the FRG. Without linkage between European détente and the African wars, the Portuguese colonial problem did not threaten to hinder Bonn’s eastern policy, which consequently did not push Bonn to alter its bond with Lisbon. Likewise, it seemed unlikely that the Brandt government’s policy towards Portugal would expose the FRG to any serious reprisals from its partners within the Western Bloc. Although NATO became the stage of dispute over the West’s attitude vis-à-vis the Caetano regime, only a minority proved willing to defy the Portuguese dictatorship within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Even at the peak of Portugal’s international isolation, it cannot be said that the dictatorship was fully ostracised by the Western powers. In fact, the powerful French, British and American conservative governments during this period displayed a mostly lenient attitude towards the Caetano regime.

More than simply enabling the continuation of Bonn’s tolerant policy towards Lisbon, these conditions actually actively discouraged the adoption of a more confrontational stance. On the one hand, the FRG could not count on the support of its common allies with Portugal for such a stance. In late 1970, when Bonn proposed to Paris and London a joint demarche to address the Afro-Portuguese tension, both rejected the idea. Although the Guinea-Conakry incident, with its disastrous consequences for the West, momentarily shook their convictions, the allies never agreed on a strategy to confront the Portuguese over their colonial problem. Their faith in Caetano’s professed reformism declined, but each feared that forcing the dictatorship to decolonise would be counterproductive. On the other hand, Bonn regarded the anti-Portuguese crusade of the other smaller Western states as disruptive to NATO. This was an important consideration in the context of *neue Ostpolitik*, since the Brandt government sought to reassure its allies of its commitment to the Western Bloc via
Alliance loyalty. Therefore, not only did Bonn’s rapprochement with the East not strain the West German-Portuguese relations, it actually made Bonn less keen to confront Lisbon.

In conclusion, the FRG’s policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship pitted different dimensions of Bonn’s foreign policy against each other. The continuation of friendly relations with Lisbon threatened the FRG’s position in Africa and in the UN, while undermining its advantageous diplomatic situation vis-à-vis the GDR. The discontinuation of those relations threatened the FRG’s strategy in the West and by implication in the East. Even within the Western Bloc, the option was not consensual, since the European governments ideologically closer to Bonn’s had aligned themselves, like some in their civil society, with Africa’s anti-colonialist cause. As we shall see, West Germany itself was not immune to the political and cultural appropriation of the anti-colonialist discourse by the northern world.
CHAPTER 2

Facing the ‘tribunal’: The Domestic Front

1. The rise of the solidarity movement

2. The economic sector’s counter-attack

3. The involvement of the German churches

4. The Portuguese dictatorship in the FRG’s public sphere

Conclusions
The FRG’s behaviour towards Portugal was not only dictated by international pressures, but also crucially by corresponding domestic pressures. Moving from the edges of the public discourse to the mainstream, this chapter examines the challenge posed to Bonn by national agents outside the three largest parties in the executive and legislative bodies. It begins by explaining how fringe student activists and anti-colonialist NGOs attacked the FRG’s Portuguese policy, giving it unprecedented visibility at home. The following sections look at the uneasy responses to this phenomenon by the West German business sector and the churches, two important groups in West German society which were implicated in the uproar. Finally, the chapter evaluates how these various strands shaped the significance of the Portuguese dictatorship in the FRG’s public sphere. As a whole, this chapter is a reflection of the social atmosphere in which Bonn made its policy towards Lisbon.

1. The rise of the solidarity movement

Since the mid-1960s, the FRG had witnessed an upsurge in youth mobilisation, including a strong engagement with international affairs. University students had rebelled against the shortcomings of the educational system and against the conservative atmosphere of West German society and politics, where clerical anti-communism was dominant and the Nazi past was still an un-mastered issue. By the end of the decade, student activism had become the most visible form of extra-parliamentary opposition in the country, with students rallying around political causes like the rejection of the 1968 so-called ‘Emergency Acts’ which had allowed the government to restrict civil rights in emergency situations. Despite its roots in the West German context, this movement reflected a broader wave of similar movements across Western countries during this period. Significantly, the Vietnam War had served as catalyst to expose the US as an imperialist force in the students’ eyes and it had motivated an increasing commitment to international solidarity.  

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The German student activists, who had embraced anti-colonialist ideals early on, found special meaning in the cause of southern African liberation. Bonn’s involvement with Lisbon fuelled in the students a sense of responsibility for the situation, driving them to take action at home. The most active community in this regard belonged to the University of Heidelberg. Here Portuguese student Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira became a prominent theorist for the movement, due to his ground-breaking analysis of the FRG’s economic ties to Portuguese colonialism. With a more utilitarian view, renowned activist Rudi Dutschke proposed using the “systematic exposure” of the German-Portuguese military ties to rally the masses against NATO, thus furthering the movement’s “anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist strategy”. In 1969, the national student body and the Socialist German Student League (SDS) promoted an information campaign together with the MPLA, including collections of money and medicine. Students organised related teach-ins in various cities in an effort to mobilise both their colleagues and the local working classes. The cause reached nationwide consensus among the student community, even if activism remained mostly circumscribed to specialised branches.

The student movement also engaged in militant action. On the night of 30 January 1969 a group of around 200 students in Cologne hurled stones at the Portuguese Consulate as part of a protest against contested foreign regimes. In late June 1970, the announcement of a meeting of World Bank executives with West German representatives in Heidelberg, supposedly to discuss the Cahora Bassa dam project, led to a hostile student demonstration with well over 1,000 participants in the

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323 In their retrospective account, activists Kössler and Melber point to episodes earlier in the decade, namely the Algerian war and the Congo crisis, as having fuelled a critical perspective regarding western colonial and neo-colonial practices. They highlight the importance of the call by PAIGC leader Amilcar Cabral for Europeans to assist African liberation by “fighting capitalist structures in their own countries”. – Kössler, Reinhart and Melber, Henning. 2002. «The West German Solidarity Movement with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa. A (self)-critical retrospective». In Germany’s Africa Policy Revisited: Interests, Images and Incrementalism, Engel, Ulf and Kappel, Robert (eds.). Münster: LIT, pp.104-105.
325 Author’s interview with Jorge Veludo, 14.09.2010.
328 Other targets included the buildings of the diplomatic and commercial representations of Greece, Spain and the US. – AHD-MNE, PEA, M595, Pr.331, Dispatch from the Portuguese Foreign Ministry to the Head of the PIDE (Political Police), 24.02.1969.
provincial university town. The resulting clashes with the police served as a pretext for the Land authorities of Baden-Württemberg to ban the local SDS section. The following week, a group of around 800 students marched in Hamburg protesting against that ban and reinforcing their opposition to Cahora Bassa. During the latter demonstration, rocks were thrown at the windows of an information centre for AEG – one of the companies involved in the Mozambican dam project – and at the Portuguese general-consulate.

The solidarity shown towards the southern African struggle and the wider Third World gradually expanded far beyond the student milieu. Significantly, people who had been involved in either government- or church-sponsored development work in Africa engaged in related activism upon their return to the FRG. The foundation in Freiburg in 1968 of the seminal Third World-focused action group Aktion 3.Welt was followed by a proliferation of grassroots NGOs, which became increasingly professionalized. Moreover, political organisations recruited students who brought with them a passion for the cause of African liberation. The cause became particularly fashionable among the many Maoist splinter groups which filled the leftist microcosm of society at the time. West German anti-colonialist mobilisation reached unprecedented levels of intensity with a crusade against Cahora Bassa that appealed to activists within and outside the student movement, including voices from the scientific community. Critics accused the dam of consolidating the Portuguese presence in Mozambique and of benefiting the neighbouring racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia. Although

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330 AHD-MNE, PEA, M641, Pr.331, Dispatch from the Portuguese General Consulate in Hamburg, 01.07.1970.
331 This group published, since 1970, the influential biweekly bulletin iz3w (informationszentrum 3.welt).
333 A study group from the Federation of German Scientists took a public position in favor of a withdrawal from the dam scheme. – „Stellungnahme der Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler, Studiengruppe „Probleme der Entwicklungsländer“, zum Cabora Bassa-Projekt“, in Afrika heute, 01.04.1971. This statement was discussed in the pages of Afrika heute throughout that year, with statements in favor (01.07.1971, pp.226-227 and 15.11.1971, pp.468-471) and against (09.08.1971, pp.322-324 and 31.08.1971, pp.347,348).
inspired by the African calls for action, the anti-Cahora Bassa protests developed a sharp national identity, as “West German Imperialism” was condemned.

While the campaign against the dam reached its first peak in 1970, the concern with Portuguese colonialism outlasted this initial outburst. Among the array of anticolonial groups created in the following period, the most prominent was the Deutsches Komitee für Angola, Guinea-Bissau und Mozambik (AGM-Komitee). Formed in Bonn on 4 June 1971, this Committee acted as a lobby that was well-connected to the policymaking circles, given the participation of numerous SPD members of the Bundestag. Besides producing new organisations, the long established German African Society – a conservative institution with a history of pro-Portuguese leaning was also equally drawn in by the momentum. During this period, the Society’s magazine Afrika heute became a forum for sympathisers of the liberation cause. Although the main target of the mobilisation was the colonial dimension of the Portuguese regime, small scale activism addressed the repression within Portugal as well.

Aktion 3.Welt, after meeting with various organisations in late 1971, sought to unite the activities of the solidarity movement’s disparate forces. It proposed a collective campaign which would build up from April 1972 and culminate in a large-
scale event called ‘Portugal-Tribunal’, scheduled for July. Following the model of the 1967 Russel Tribunal, which had held public hearings concerning the US intervention in Vietnam, the ‘Portugal-Tribunal’ would operate as a public trial without any formal legitimisation. Although both sides would theoretically be allowed to present their case, the stated aim was to create an “avalanche” of bad publicity about the colonial wars, as well as NATO’s and, particularly, the FRG’s perceived military, political and economic aid to the Portuguese. The initial plan suggested giving the press a “bite-sized ‘spectacle’” designed to discredit the image of Portugal and its supporters within the FRG, while publicising the goals and methods of the liberation movements, i.e. “democratic organisations, construction of socialist states”. According to the promoters of the campaign, this would constitute the first step “to effectively influence the Bonn-Lisbon relations”. The organisers sought to gain wide public support for their demands that the Bonn government stop arms deliveries to Portugal, cancel credit guarantees to the Cahora Bassa project, support the liberation movements, accept Portuguese deserters, and refuse any tax breaks or further guarantees for companies which did business with Portugal. 342

As soon as the Auswärtiges Amt found out about this plan, in January 1972, it determined that the ‘Portugal-Tribunal’ could endanger West Germany’s foreign interests. According to the first AA internal memo on this matter, not only were the protests likely to harm the FRG’s relations with Lisbon, they might also disrupt NATO’s spring ministerial meeting in Bonn (30-31 May) and possibly the Olympic Games in Munich that summer. Therefore, the memo proposed sabotaging the campaign, or at least minimising its impact, with the help of the Ministry of the Interior, the Head of the Chancellery and “suitable journalists”, who would be warned about the activists’ wish to manipulate the press. 343 In line with this strategy, in late January Foreign Minister Walter Scheel warned Minister of the Interior Hans-Dietrich Genscher about the disruptive nature of the planned campaign. Scheel’s message spoke of the need to “consider opportune measures against the organisation of the ‘Tribunal’”, as well as “appropriate action for the protection of the Portuguese embassy and for an undisturbed running of the NATO ministerial meeting”. Its only concrete suggestion,

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342 PAAA, B26/445, Konzeption Portugal-Tribunal (leaflet); See also “Kongrëss: Dokumentation verschiedener Konzeptionen”, iz3w, April/May 1973, pp. 26-30.
however, was to coordinate with the local authorities in Bonn in order to ensure that the city’s largest meeting places would not be available for the ‘Tribunal’.344

The AA’s efforts effectively slowed down the campaign’s momentum. The Ministry of the Interior was unable to outright forbid the event because, as Genscher reminded Scheel, it was intended as a peaceful public event in a closed space and, therefore, was safeguarded by the FRG’s Basic Law. Nevertheless, Bonn’s state authorities agreed to refuse the organisers access to the largest meeting places in the requested dates.345 Hoping to book the Beethovenhalle, Bonn’s most emblematic concert hall, the activists thus rescheduled the ‘Tribunal’ for the end of October 1972; but the local authorities prevented it once more.346 Despite having publicised the new date in the media347 and having already invited representatives of the liberation movements, in September the organisers announced a further postponement. By then, they had begun contemplating relocating the event to a more peripheral city.348 The final chosen date was 13/14 January 1973 and, instead of the Beethovenhalle, the gathering was moved to a more modest conference room on top of a Dortmund beer house.349 The German and the Portuguese foreign ministries each monitored the preparations, keeping contact with their respective national intelligence services.350 Once the AA realised that some of the speakers from Africa were travelling via Belgium, it instructed the German Embassy in Brussels to refuse them the visas required to enter the FRG351, thus preventing them from attending the Congress.352

The government’s interference apart, the activists had to overcome their own coordination problems. Associations from over 40 cities all over West Germany had joined the project, including development and solidarity NGOs, anti-racist and human rights working groups, local and international organisations specialised in southern Africa and in the Third World more broadly, information centres and political

344 PAAA, B26/445, Dispatch from Walter Scheel to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, January 1972.
345 PAAA, B26/445, Dispatch from Hans-Dietrich Genscher to Walter Scheel, 20.03.1972.
346 PAAA, B26/445, Dispatch from the BMI to the AA, 04.05.1972.
350 PAAA, Zwischenarchiv101.435, Dispatch from the BMI to the AA, 08.01.1973; IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, Pr.11, vol.11, C1(2), Serviços Alemães, Dispatch from the Portuguese Foreign Ministry to the DGS, 12.01.1973.
committees, self-proclaimed socialists and communists, anti-imperialists and pacifists, progressive Catholics and Protestants, students, apprentices, conscientious objectors and even consumer activists. A series of preparatory meetings allowed continuous discussion over the campaign’s strategy, but the lack of a fixed forum undermined the decision process. One recurring object of contention was the ‘Tribunal’ itself, as many argued that the function of mobilising the masses should not belong to a centralised event but rather to the individual groups, locally. In July 1972, the activists agreed to replace the ‘Tribunal’ project with a ‘Congress for the Freedom of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique’. Yet by September, when they finally formed an organising committee – from now on called Organisationskomitee – there was still no consensus regarding the actual implications of this change. The Organisationskomitee, with delegates from six groups, still placed the event’s focus on mobilising the general public and influencing the Bundestag.

Ultimately the Congress served as an outlet for the activists to express their outrage with the FRG’s business elite and government, as well as their solidarity with the liberation struggle in Africa and even in Vietnam. On Saturday 13 January 1973 close to 1,000 protesters marched through Dortmund. Over 700 delegates from around 80 different organisations attended the initial plenary session, split into six discussion groups in the local state library and reunited the following day to share their conclusions. The participants enthusiastically greeted MPLA’s António Neto and FRELIMO’s Armando Panguene, who spoke about the progress of their movements’ struggle, as well as Sietse Bosgra from the Dutch Angola Comité, who spoke about the successful civil campaigns to pressure the Netherlands’ government. The bulk of the discussion focused on Bonn’s policy towards Portugal.

Sectarianism undercut the resonance of the event. With the pretext of appearing as a united block and of avoiding scaring away average citizens, the

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353 For a preliminary list, see PAAA,B26,Zwischenarchiv101.435, Bulletin from the Deutscher Informationsdienst, Nr.1346, September 1972.
354 Aktion Dritte Welt (Freiburg), AGM-Komitee (Bonn), AKAFRIK (Bielefeld), AIB (Marburg), Initiativkreis Freiheit für AGM (Nürnberg) and SDAJ Bundesvorstand (Dortmund).
356 Each focused on one of the following topics: “Portuguese colonialism”, “The national liberation struggle”, “South African imperialism in Africa”, “The role of West German imperialism and the NATO states”, “Church and colonialism” and “Tasks of the solidarity movement in the FRG”.
357 AHD-MNE, PEA, M756, Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 16.01.1973; “Solidarisierung im Interesse Afrikas”, Afrika heute, January 1973, pp.32-34; For a transcript of the resolutions and key speeches see CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, Dokumentation des Kongresses “Freiheit für Angola, Guinea-Bissau und Mozambique.”
Organisationskomitee polished the campaign’s terminology. Some activists accused the committee of leaning too closely to the party line of the German Communist Party DKP and of disregarding the movement’s internal debate. SPD MP Lenelotte von Bothmer, a founding member of the AGM-Komitee, left the Congress after not being allowed to intervene at a plenary session – an episode highlighted by the Portuguese Embassy in order to denounce the “radicalism” of the organisers. By contrast, Afrika heute’s correspondent claimed that “the feeling that this congress consisted of a strong lobby of left radical circles […] vanished after a glimpse at the list of participants”, stressing the event’s diversity. The more Third World-oriented organisations complained that the Congress’ direction had not been radical enough. They disapproved of the leading role taken by the forces closer to the DKP and lamented that the proceedings had focused too much on making a domestic political statement rather than on tackling what they perceived to be the root of the problem, i.e. the capitalist system itself. Although many groups agreed to continue working together on the platform established for the Congress, they firmly rejected the Organisationskomitee’s request for a mandate to take public positions on other, unrelated political issues. Given the in-fighting surrounding the event, the Portuguese authorities concluded that the

358 In an effort to avoid terms perceived as too polarising, it dropped the Congress’ original sub-heading “Against the FRG-Imperialism”. It also replaced the generally anti-capitalist rhetoric with a specifically anti-monopolist discourse.

359 The DKP-linked youth organisation Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjugend had joined the Committee on the basis of the group’s “organisational power”, much to the chagrin of differently oriented activist cells which had been involved in the campaign for much longer.

360 This charge was aggravated by the Committee’s demand to approve all the Congress’ speakers, moderators, minute takers and on-site journalists beforehand. – iz3w, April/May 1973, pp.27-29.

361 According to the Embassy’s informers, although every topic sparked heated discussion among the various trends, the most “moderate” proposals were overwhelmingly overruled by the “extremist elements” in the Congress. – AHD-MNE, PEA, M756, Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 16.01.1973.


363 They were particularly disappointed with an open letter to Willy Brandt, which the Organising Committee had prepared in advance and sought to present as the outcome of the Congress. Besides decrying the Committee’s arrogant attitude, these activists criticised the option of essentially directing the Congress at the media and at the Chancellor, arguing that “in an anti-imperialist event, the ‘public’ cannot be Chancellor Brandt”.

364 At a balance meeting held on 16/18 March 1973 in Königstein, the delegates of 21 groups voted to carry on, 16 voted against it and 3 abstained.

365 CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, Newsletter from the Organising Committee (Gruppenrundbrief 8); iz3w, April/May 1973, pp.28-29; See also «Portugal-Kongreß und Perspektiven der “Dritte-Welt-Gruppen”», in links: Sozialistische Zeitung, nr.41, February 1973, pp.5-7, summarised in Afrika heute, February 1973, p.47.
solidarity movement’s impetus was unlikely to expand beyond the circles already involved.  

Although ideological quarrels continued to plague this movement, it still spurred new forms of protest. In February 1973, the Organisationskomitee publicly called upon African states to block the FRG from joining the UN unless Bonn promised “in an unambiguous way to stop all arms deliveries to Portugal and South Africa”. Activists across the country collected aid for the liberation movements, while producing miscellaneous anti-colonialist material designed to inform and agitate, ranging from placards to exhibitions and theatre productions. They answered an appeal by the UN General Assembly to multiply their initiatives during the last week of May, designated ‘UN Week Against Colonialism and Apartheid’. That summer, the AGM-Komitee began a long effort to expose the authorisation given by the Bonn government for a deal between the German firm Josef Meissner and a Portuguese production plant for ammunition. Articles in Afrika heute – renamed Afrika heute, III. Welt in June 1973 – openly championed the liberation struggle, pushing particularly for the FRG’s recognition of Guinea-Bissau’s September declaration of independence. The activists also continued to campaign for the right of asylum of persecuted Portuguese objectors to military service.

366 The Portuguese Embassy in Bonn was well-informed about the content of the Königstein meeting. – IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, Proc.11, vol.11, CI(2),Serviços Alemães, Dispatch from the Portuguese Foreign Ministry to the DGS,30.04.1973.
367 In April 1974, after a solidarity conference in Oxford, FRELIMO’s representative Janet Mondlane reported that the conference “went quite well, except for the constant quarrelling among the West German groups. [B]ut since it happens every year, it was a surprise for no one”. – Sellström, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa– Volume II: Solidarity and Assistance 1970-1974, Upssala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002, p.81 [footnote]; As for the strategic divergences within the AGM-Komitee, see AHD-MNE, PEA25/1974, 31/74, Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 26.03.1974.
368 Daily News (Tanzania),06.02.1973, in F&R,03.03.1973.
369 Activists created projects to finance the construction of an MPLA hospital, as well as to send communication, transport, medical and school material to the liberation movements.
372 Besides press releases, the AGM-Komitee wrote to the AA and, having received no reply, complained to the President of the FRG. – FAZ,01.03.1974, in F&R,30.03.1974.
373 This was the main theme of the September 1973 issue and the subject of a long article by Norman Paech in Afrika heute,III.Welt, March 1974, pp.15-20.
374 See, for example, the statement of the Frankfurt cell of Amnesty International in FAZ,06.12.1973, in F&R,05.01.1974.
“Only NATO keeps them upright” – The informationszentrum 3.welt accuses NATO and, particularly, the FRG of supplying weapons and aircraft used by Portugal in the colonial wars.375

From the outset, the Portuguese colonial issue served as the gateway for wider political critique. Aktion 3.Welt’s initial proposal for the ‘Tribunal’ argued that the denunciation of the German companies’ influence over Bonn’s policy towards Portugal would increase the number of “‘doubters’ of the capitalist system”.376 In turn, the Organisationskomitee linked the condemnation of the companies exclusively to the struggle against ‘unregulated’ capitalism, in line with the DKP’s defence of state monopoly capitalism.377 Others framed the issue in the specific context of emerging neo-colonialism. For example, in an early leaflet promoting the campaign378, the influential New Left organisation Sozialistisches Büro Offenbach blamed the West’s tacit collusion with Portuguese colonialism on its wish for unrestricted access to Africa’s resources. It added that the “accusation against Portugal must become an accusation against a system of exploitation and oppression of the systematically underdeveloped ‘Third World’”, concluding that the Portuguese case would serve as an “example”.379

375 iz3w, January 1974, pp.41,46.
376 PAAA, B26/445, Konzeption Portugal-Tribunal (leaflet).
377 According to the Congress’ flyer: “Solidarity means not only aid for the liberation movements themselves, but it is in the interest of [those] who [are] for democratic rights and against the companies’ uncontrolled exercise of power”.
378 It was distributed on 29 January 1972, during a meeting of development action groups of the Ruhr region. – PAAA, B26/445, Dispatch from the Federal Ministry of the Interior to the AA, 04.05.1972
379 PAAA, B26/445, Aufruf zum Portugal-Tribunal (leaflet).
While emphasising the solidarity with Africa, some of the activists’ rhetoric addressed specific domestic concerns as well. Firstly, they argued that a state “which oppresses and exploits other peoples will also steer its oppressive measures to the inside”, pointing out repressive tendencies of the West German state at home. Moreover, they accused neo-colonialism of leading to the export of capital, the outsourcing of production plants and the strengthening of the arms industry. The first of these meant less capital would be invested at home “in the improvement of the living conditions and in the creation of new jobs”. The second point posed a problem by providing companies with an alternative work force – with fewer rights – in Africa, thus making the employers less vulnerable to industrial action taken by workers in the FRG. Finally, investment in the defence industry meant both less investment in the public interest and the mounting influence of the military-industrial complex, resulting in “the growing subordination of our needs to alleged military-industrial necessities”.

The latter points were designed to appeal to the working class, particularly the employees of German companies with businesses in southern Africa.

The government, which intercepted these appeals early on, grew suspicious of the solidarity movement. In the context of increasing social upheaval at the time, not to mention the violent attacks by the far-left extremist Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), Bonn worried about any sources of disorder and conflict likely to unleash further violence. Thus the Auswärtiges Amt expressed concern over the ‘Tribunal’ campaign’s willingness to cast “doubt on the social order” of the FRG and to spur cooperation among “radical groups”. Furthermore, the AA displayed little sympathy for the fact that the government-funded Afrika heute had become a vehicle for criticism against Bonn’s policy. Having first warned the German African Society about this discomfort in April 1972, the AA substantially reduced the Society’s funding in May 1973 and even further by the end of that year.

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380 These were expressed in the efforts to “bar the opposition from activities in the public sphere” and to “defame” some oppositionists by labelling them “terrorists”, as well as in the police shooting and hitting of unarmed protesters.
381 PAAA, B26/445, Aufruf zum Portugal-Tribunal (leaflet).
382 iz³w, April/May 1973, p.27.
385 Afrika heute, 26.05.1972, p.211.
386 Afrika heute, III. Welt, June/July 1973, p.3.
387 Afrika heute, III. Welt, January/February 1974, p.3.
Ultimately, although it was hardly an isolated phenomenon in Europe, local conditions determined the particular evolution of the West German solidarity movement. In comparison with the governments of the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, which were much more critical of Portugal and supportive of the liberation organisations, Bonn faced anti-colonialist activism embedded within a harsher more specific anti-governmental critique and, in turn, pursued a more repressive policy towards the protests. Moreover, the FRG stood in contrast to the UK, where the solidarity movement was a much more powerful social force. Yet British activism was heavily dominated by the issue of apartheid, at least until Caetano’s controversial visit to London in 1973, while the German protesters singled out Portuguese colonialism as a prominent topic much sooner, due to their country’s joint ventures with the Lisbon regime.

2. The economic sector’s counter-attack

Because the protests of the solidarity movement were as much about denouncing the FRG’s neo-colonialism as about denouncing Portugal’s colonialism per se, much of the friction directly involved the companies profiting from the German-Portuguese relations, which of course were also under attack by the liberation movements themselves. The first clashes concerned the section of the industry responsible for the material earmarked to the colonial wars. On 4 April 1969, in a letter addressed to the shipyard Blohm & Voss in Hamburg, the MPLA demanded the termination of the construction of three corvettes ordered by the Portuguese Navy. German student activists helped mobilise the workers to question their enterprise and the shipyard responded with a series of layoffs. On 13 October, a bomb exploded aboard a small vessel, berthed alongside one of the corvettes, severely damaging it. A symbol of German collaboration with Portugal in the eyes of the solidarity

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388 Kössler/Melber (2002), p.103 [footnote].
movement, the shipyard became the subject of angry slogans in the local student demonstrations.395

Firms with business interests in the Portuguese colonies formed the other natural target of indignation. In Angola’s case, the most prominent example was Krupp, which since the early 1960s had been investing in iron ore mining companies in the southern region of Cassinga.396 Through those investments, Krupp had effectively achieved control over the powerful consortium Companhia Mineira do Lobito and in practice managed most of the Angolan production and export of iron ore.397 Thus the firm became synonymous with the exploitation of Angolan resources, accentuated by the fact that the Cassinga mines were the key beneficiary of the controversial Cunene power plant plan.398 In 1972, the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) further condemned Krupp for employing a private militia which supported the Portuguese in the war against the liberation movements. According to GRAE, that security force, consisting mostly of white and Congolese mercenaries, did not merely patrol the mines, but instead it systematically searched the region and tried to drastically eliminate the local guerrilla cells.399 This tense environment, however, did not discourage Krupp from publicly pursuing related business ventures. In March 1972, it announced an innovative project to pelletise the Cassinga iron ore output,400 and it made plans to expand its mineral schemes to Mozambique, hoping to take advantage of the energy produced by the Cahora Bassa dam.401

Yet it was the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam itself which brought about the most high-profile confrontations between the opposition to Portuguese colonialism
and the German private sector. FRELIMO fiercely condemned the enterprise, accusing it of being part of a Portuguese plan to install a million new settlers in that area and – through large-scale electricity export – draw South African support for the Portuguese presence in Mozambique. Thus the rebels soon labelled the project a primary target of guerrilla. After a few false starts, in 1971 the movement launched a persistent military campaign in the region. However, the ambushes only marginally affected the dam’s building work. Although FRELIMO’s troops sabotaged delivery routes, they did notraid the construction site directly, suggesting that, despite the inflamed rhetoric, their goal was to delay the works, rather than to effectively compromise the infrastructure altogether. Still, the guerrilla put a serious psychological strain on the hundreds of German technicians, while also achieving the strategic benefit of dispersing the Portuguese forces. As shown in the previous chapter, the battlefield of FRELIMO’s struggle also stretched into the international arena; and it engaged African leaders as well as European protesters.

At home, the German firms involved in Cahora Bassa defended the project unrelentingly against these protesters. Speaking for the group, in August 1970 Siemens stated that none of the German companies had any intention of breaching their contracts, arguing that, if they did so, either Mozambique would “remain at its current primitive level” or other international firms would build the dam anyway. The statement sought to further depoliticise the enterprise by invoking the industrialist rationale that “infra-structures such as dams and the related power-plants outlast all regimes and, in any case, contribute to lift the living standard of the whole population, not just a privileged layer”. This gesture did not discourage protests and boycotts. In May

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403 Ibid., pp.161-162.
405 Despite the protection provided by one of the largest minefields in the world (Isaacman, Allen, Sneddon, Chris. 2003. Portuguese Colonial Intervention, Regional Conflict, and Post-Colonial Amnesia: Cabora Bassa Dam, Mozambique 1965-2002. Portuguese Studies Review, Vol.11 (1), p.218) and by General Kaulza de Arriaga’s ambitious defence strategy (Arriaga, Kaulza de. 1973. A Luta em Moçambique: 1970-1973, Lisbon: Intervensão, pp.45-50), it is unlikely that FRELIMO could not have caused greater damage to such a wide and complex enterprise. Indeed, according to Middlemas, the “engineers noticed that the skillfully-laid ambushes and mines were never directed against the vital electro-mechanical components” (Middlemas (1975), p.186).
409 In January 1971, a group began issuing postcards to be sent to the Zamco firms announcing the intention of boycotting their products unless they ceased their engagement in Cahora Bassa. Two months later, the number of postcards reached 2,000. – Schreyögg, Georg and Steinmann, Horst. 1989.
1971, German activists who had acquired shares began to attend the shareholders meetings of Siemens, AEG, Hochtief and BBC. Despite police aid in blocking the entry of unauthorised persons, the boards could not prevent critical shareholders from questioning the companies’ participation in Cahora Bassa in terms of safety, morality and the impact on their corporate image, particularly in Africa. The firms’ chairmen first refused to discuss the topic and then downplayed the controversy by providing misinformation and pointing out that the project had the Bonn government’s official backing. They hired public-relations firms to plead their case and suggested that the student leaders were financed by East Germany, before developing more nuanced tactics, including a careful dialogue with church groups in Bavaria and Berlin, where Siemens’ main factories were located. The companies also recruited the help of Lisbon’s propagandists to explain the dam’s merits to the German public.

The national industrial and trade lobbies stepped up to ensure the private sector’s autonomy from Bonn’s foreign policy considerations. The Federation of German Industries (BDI), the Federation of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade (BDGA) and the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (DIHT) directly warned Willy Brandt against letting the dam’s controversial political nature affect the government’s commitment to the project. To do so, they argued, would undermine the

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410 The fifth German firm involved in the project, Voith Gmbh, was a private society.
411 In Manheim, a BBC meeting engaged 40 agents from the firm’s security unit, as well as a detachment of 20 men from the criminal and political departments of the local police. In Essen, Hochtief introduced special controls to check the participants.
412 At an AEG meeting in Berlin, the chairman called off the debate with aid of police, leading to great uproar.
413 Hochtief claimed that even the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic had supplied trucks to Cahora Bassa. Siemens stated that 850 kms of jungle separated the German workers from FRELIMO’s operational area and declared that the UN Economic Commission for Africa, backed by the black African heads-of-state, had endorsed the dam. The activists soon demonstrated that these statements were false.
414 “200 Mark Nennwert gegen Cabora Bassa”, Afrika heute, 01.04.1971, pp.132-133; “Cabora-Bassa Firmen unter Beschluß”, Afrika heute, 01.10.1971, p.218; By 1972, these disputes had come to dominate the proceedings. At a Hochtief assembly, the chairman devoted half of his opening speech to addressing the opponents of Cahora Bassa, whom he accused of using the meetings as forums for their radical political ideas, adding “Gentlemen, this is not the place where you belong, even if you procure yourself a DM 50 share as admission ticket and now, well adapted to the capitalistic society, talk about our Hochtief company”.
long-standing practice of basing export credit guarantees solely on economic criteria, which had so far allowed for the expansion of the FRG’s foreign investments and trade.\textsuperscript{417} DIHT’s president Otto Wolff von Amerongen, who was also the president of the German-Portuguese Society\textsuperscript{418}, evoked his credentials as a pioneer businessman at the forefront of the trade dimension of \textit{neue Ostpolitik}\textsuperscript{419} in order to point out the parallel between the two situations:

“I would regret it if, following the discussions surrounding the [Cahora] Bassa project, the separation between economy and politics, pursued until now, would be abandoned. Not only with regard to the trade with our eastern neighbours have I always advocated a separation of foreign trade and foreign policy in a well-understood sense.”\textsuperscript{420}

While the employers’ associations sought to keep business with Portugal outside of the political sphere, the position of the workers’ associations was less straightforward. The West German unions had a history of strong relations with anti-colonial movements stretching back to the 1950s\textsuperscript{421}, but they found it easier to side with persecuted trade unionist opposition in Portugal\textsuperscript{422} than with the African nationalists in the colonies. Due to its dominant anti-communist line during this period, the German Trade Union Federation (\textit{DGB}) was not inclined to endorse the Marxist-oriented liberation movements. Significantly, the \textit{DGB} did not want to fuel accusations of collaborating with communism by its US counterpart, the \textit{AFL-CIO}, which had already left the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in protest against \textit{neue Ostpolitik}.\textsuperscript{423} Yet not all shared this view. The official organ of the Industrial Union of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item BAK, B136/2992, Telegram from Otto Wolff von Amerongen to Willy Brandt, 29.07.1970.
\item Throughout the 1960s, they had come to divest themselves from this specific area of internationalist solidarity by delegating it to the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.— Hillebrand, Ernst and Vinnai, Volker. 2002. «The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and German policy on Africa. Some remarks». In \textit{Germany’s Africa Policy Revisited: Interests, Images and Incrementalism}, Engel, Ulf and Kappel, Robert (eds.). Münster: LIT, p.128.
\item In January 1972, the executive of the FRG’s Printing and Paper Industry Workers’ Union reacted to the trial of trade unionist Daniel F. Cabrita by issuing an appeal for Marcelo Caetano to stop the persecution of trade unionists in Portugal.— \textit{FAZ}, 24.01.1972, in \textit{F&R}, 04.03.1972.
\item Hillebrand/Vinnai, (2002), p.135; For details on the dispute with \textit{AFL-CIO}, see Fichter, Michael.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Metalworkers *IG-Metall* reported on the Wiriyamu massacre and demanded an end to the participation of German firms in Cahora Bassa. It sought to mobilise not just the union’s German workers, but also its thousands of Portuguese members. On 6 August 1973, the union’s executive held talks with a *FRELIMO* delegation and subsequently publicly expressed solidarity with the Mozambican struggle, even if awkwardly lamenting the threat posed by the guerrilla to the German workers in Cahora Bassa.

### 3. The involvement of the German churches

Like the trade unions, the West German churches proved to be susceptible to the expansion of the solidarity movement. As mentioned, among the students and development workers dedicated to the anti-colonial cause were numerous members of religious organisations. Notably, this trend echoed a newfound understanding for the liberation movements that was displayed by key international religious institutions, including the World Council of Churches (WCC) and, to a lesser extent, the Holy See. In this vein, the Synod of the Protestant Church in Germany (*EKD*) decided to channel DM 100,000 to the southern African nationalists through a special fund of the WCC’s program to combat racism in 1970. Gatherings such as the 1970 *Katholikentag* in Trier and the 1971 ecumenical *Pfingsttreffen* in Augsburg passed resolutions urging the leaderships of the catholic and protestant churches to use their

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424 After a complaint by ten Portuguese union members, who claimed that their “national pride had been hurt” by the article, the editor-in-chief of the magazine – *Metall* – quickly arranged the printing and distribution of leaflets providing the Portuguese workers with “information which citizens under a dictator never receive”. According to the press, other leaflets notified the German Workers that “the neighbour on the production line or on the work bench coming from the Iberian Peninsula is not a colonial oppressor with aptitude for cruelty, but that he is himself a victim of colonial politics”. Moreover, *Metall*’s editor-in-chief announced the speedy preparation of a labour magazine in Portuguese, alongside other languages. – “After a Massacre Report: An Information Gap Was Filled” (translated), *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17.08.1973, in *F&R*, 19.09.1973.


influence to promote the independence of the Portuguese colonies. A symposium called by the WCC about the Angolan Cunene dam project, held in Arnoldshain in March 1972, produced a plan of action for the World Council of Churches. It recommended campaigns against firms profiting from the Cunene scheme and against any agreements between the EEC and Portugal, as well as a campaign to help draft resisters and deserters from the Portuguese army. The large presence of religious associations within the solidarity movement prompted a strand of activism focused on causes related to churches. The Aktionskomitee Afrika (AKAFRIK), which consisted essentially of theology students, and a section of the FRG’s Collective of Priestly Groups gave their support to Portuguese clergymen persecuted by the Lisbon regime. The 1973 Dortmund Congress held a discussion panel on ‘Churches and Portuguese Colonialism’ and at the plenary assembly it approved four resolutions from that panel. These requested that the German churches aid the liberation movements and recognise them as the sole legitimate representatives of the population of the colonies. They also appealed for the Catholic community to promote the rescission of the Vatican’s 1940 concordat with Portugal. A case which gained considerable notoriety involved a group of Portuguese who had gone on hunger strike in Lisbon’s Rato Chapel to protest against the colonial wars before being forcibly removed by the political police. The Congress expressed solidarity with the group and it condemned the Bishop of Lisbon, who they believed had stood by the police action. Besides supporting the African liberation movements, namely through financial and material aid, Christian activists took part in the fight against West Germany’s ties to Portuguese colonialism. The German section of the Franco-German NGO Pax Christi participated in the 1970 mobilisation against Cahora Bassa, which gained much visibility due to the commitment of the religious activists. Willy Brandt admitted

432 CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, Dokumentation des Kongresses...; A group of German Christians later circulated an open letter to the Bishop of Lisbon regarding this topic.– iz3w, March 1973, p.14; While the activists’ version of events generally matched what had happened, it was not entirely accurate. For a more precise account, see Pereira, Nuno Teotónio. 1996. «A Vigília da Capela do Rato». In Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Vol.II, Brito, José Maria Brandão and Rosas, Fernando (eds.). Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, pp.1008-1010.
433 CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, Materielle Hilfe für die...
as much in July, when discussing with French President Pompidou the opinion of those who opposed the dam project:

“Among us, there is a force, not in the name [of the church], but under influence of the church, which mobilises the opinion and creates difficulties for us. They are not leftists, communists or Maoists, but a force which will perhaps make this affair similar to Biafra’s. The opinion is strongly influenced by the churches, by non-radical yet moralising students. This opinion is currently forming.” 435

While religious mobilisation represented a distinctive strand of activism, it was not an isolated one. It integrated and interacted with other strands of the solidarity movement. Various local Christian activist cells adhered to the ‘Portugal-Tribunal’ campaign. 436 The Bielefeld cell of AKAFRIK was one of the original members of the Dortmund Congress’ Organisationskomitee and the German Catholic-Students Association (KDSE) joined the committee in March 1973. These groups contributed with their own initiatives to the May ‘UN Week’ campaign. 437 Furthermore, a branch of the WCC commissioned Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira – who was not associated with any church – to study the FRG’s economic role in the Portuguese resistance to decolonisation. 438

This enthusiasm did not reach all religious circles. Within the protestant current, the EKD Synod’s decision to channel funds to the African nationalist organisations had been far from unanimous 439, even after the Synod had declared that the resolution involved “no acceptance of the use of violence”. 440 While the Bishop of the Protestant Church of Westphalia publicly offered to fund social programs and scholarships for those organisations, the Protestant-Lutheran Church of Hanover asked for explicit guarantees that none of its contributions to the WCC would go to the anti-racism

435 CHAN/APR, 5 AG2/104, Transcript of the meeting between Pompidou and Brandt, 03.07.1970.
437 A flyer from the Katholische Deutsche Studenten-Einigung can be found in CIDAC,BAC0290A/a, Gruppenrundbrief 8.
438 It was published in 1975 as Strukturen der Abhängigkeit: Wirtschaftsbeziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu Angola und Mozambique.– Author’s interview with Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, 20.04.2010.
439 It was taken by 108 votes to 65, with four abstentions.
440 A motion asking that the Church negotiate with the WCC to ensure that the donations went only to organisations renouncing violence was defeated by 103 votes to 75. – The Star Weekly (South Africa),26.12.1970, in F&R,23.01.1971.
program.\(^{441}\) Opposing the African guerrilla’s violent methods, most protestant leaderships ultimately refused to support the liberation movements. Instead, they engaged in earnest, if unproductive, talks with the German companies involved in southern Africa regarding the conditions of their African employees.\(^{442}\)

Similarly, within the German Catholic Church, the activists faced a reticent establishment. At a gathering of the West European sections of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (\textit{Justitia et Pax}) in October 1972, the German delegation was one of the few to abstain on a motion about the Portuguese colonies.\(^{443}\) In April 1973, when \textit{AKAFRIK} asked all German catholic bishops to endorse the Dortmund Congress’ resolutions, the bishops either refused to take an official position or diplomatically defended the Vatican-Portugal relations. Bishop Heinrich Tenhumberg, from Münster, argued that Catholics who opposed the centralisation of the Church apparatus could not expect the Vatican to impose their own views towards Lisbon. The Chairman of the Episcopalian Conference Julius Döpfner expressed his confidence in “Portugal, which nobody can accuse of a racist policy”. According to Döpfner, Marcelo Caetano’s reforms could promote African self-determination, but the “terror” of the liberation movements was delaying the process.\(^{444}\) This position, seconded by other bishops, was in turn strongly criticised by the Association of Theologists at Universities of the FRG.\(^{445}\) Distressed with the students’ attitude, the Episcopalian Conference stopped funding the \textit{KDSE}.\(^{446}\)

The conflicting postures of the religious solidarity groups and the ecclesiastical elites were further exposed when the Christian youth associations organised their most ambitious autonomous initiative, the ‘Angola-Sunday’. The associations prepared a compilation of informative material about the struggle against Portuguese colonialism and asked churches across the country to exhibit and distribute it in the congregations at the mass on Sunday, 23 September 1973. Although the event gained plenty of media attention, it did not fulfil all its potential. Accusing the prepared material of bias in


\(^{446}\) AHD-MNE, PEA25/1974, 31/74, Pr.331,Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,26.03.1974
favour of the liberation movements, the institutional protestant and catholic leaderships refused to back the initiative and, in some cases, blatantly distanced themselves from it. For many bishops, it was not clear which party of the colonial conflict – which featured Christians on both sides – deserved their condemnation, nor was it certain that the Church should be compromised by openly siding with one party against the other.447

The religious community was deeply fragmented. The confessional current displayed some sympathy for the Portuguese colonial policy, seen as a Christian antidote to African underdevelopment and to Communism.448 In turn, solidarity activists invoked a moral imperative to support the emancipation of the oppressed African people, based on their interpretation of the scripture and, in the Catholic case, of the cultural legacy of Vatican II. However, since the FRG’s main churches publicly objected to the use of violence, the majority opinion found it hard to endorse the liberation movements. In a parallel discussion, many clergymen claimed that the German churches should not pick a side on the Afro-Portuguese dispute, while others regarded the churches’ mission as extending beyond national borders, arguing that ‘neutrality’ effectively implied an acceptance of the status quo. The Wiriyamu reports gave this debate an unprecedented public dimension throughout the summer of 1973. In September, the Joint Church Conference on Development Issues acknowledged that the German churches had disregarded the Portuguese colonial question for too long, but the Conference failed to agree on any concrete goals for the future. At Lisbon’s invitation, the FRG’s branch of Justitia et Pax sent two researchers to Angola and Mozambique the following month. Their report, based on the travels and meetings allowed by Lisbon449, mirrored the dictatorship’s rhetoric, presenting Portuguese rule in Africa as the only reasonable option for progress.450 In November, over a hundred religious and

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449 There were meetings with local administrative and military officials, bishops and foreign missionaries, as well as German businessmen, technicians and diplomats. The researchers met African journalists and former members of the liberation movements, but they did not talk to any current representative of those movements.
450 The report, by Dr. Paul Becher and Harry Neyer, essentially repeated a common Portuguese argument by determining that the current model promoted racial integration, whereas full independence of the territories would inevitably lead to chaos, either in the form of an “African option” (takeover by the Marxist rebels) or a ‘Rhodesian option’ (takeover by the settlers).
non-religious intellectuals\textsuperscript{451}, journalists and missionaries gathered at a colloquium in Bensberg about the churches’ role in promoting a solution for the colonial conflict, which encapsulated the striking disparity between these various strands.\textsuperscript{452}

The absence of a cohesive position limited the churches’ impact on the policy makers. Despite the activists’ efforts, southern African liberation did not become a wide-spread religious cause in West Germany, particularly not among the overwhelmingly conservative majority. Although some bishops committed themselves publicly, both for and against the cause, the governing bodies of the largest religious denominations did not adopt an official stance. It is noteworthy that the Dutch and, since 1973, the British and Belgian churches exerted coordinated pressure over the policy of their countries’ governments towards Portuguese colonialism. Bonn, however, did not have to face any similar large-scale religious lobby.\textsuperscript{453}

\textbf{4. The Portuguese dictatorship in the FRG’s public sphere}

Lenience towards the Lisbon regime had an inbuilt tradition in West German society and politics. Throughout the 1950s, Portugal had cultivated a sympathetic image in the FRG, particularly among the conservative circles, on the basis of its Christian values and anti-communist commitment. The press, displaying little interest in the country and mostly reproducing Portugal’s official representation, had typically portrayed António Salazar as a wise leader, who “against his will” headed a benign quasi-dictatorship, quite removed from the German fascist experience, with a non-racist type of colonialism.\textsuperscript{454} The pervasive indications of electoral fraud in Portugal’s 1958 presidential elections and the outbreak of the colonial wars had begun to undermine this image, although coverage of Portuguese affairs had remained quite superficial. Criticism, even if becoming more frequent, had not entirely replaced the established indulgent outlook towards Lisbon.\textsuperscript{455}

\textsuperscript{451} including some Portuguese, pro- and against the dictatorship, but no representatives of the liberation movements.

\textsuperscript{452} For a closer look at the debate’s nuances, see Grohs, Neyer (1975) and Lay (1981), pp.196-205. For a critical assessment of the Meyer-Becher report, see \textit{i23w},December 1973, pp.52-58.

\textsuperscript{453} For an overview of the attitudes of the West European ecclesiastical scene, see Lay (1981), pp.163-205.


\textsuperscript{455} Matos, Manuel de. 1977. \textit{Das Bild Portugals in der Öffentlichen Meinung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1961-1975}. Bonn: University of Bonn. PhD Dissertation, pp.91-154; Indeed, this outlook
German-Portuguese relations entered the forefront of public debate as a domestic issue. In 1960, Federal Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauß had launched an ambitious project to build an airbase near the Portuguese city of Beja. As will be explained in chapter 4, after years of construction work and at an estimated cost of DM 200 Million, the project had been suspended due to budget restrictions and because of logistical concerns. By 1968, the press had begun scrutinising the whole enterprise, from its questionable strategic relevance to its financial implications.\textsuperscript{456} The ‘Beja affair’ became a political weapon against those responsible for the venture, and it gained a particularly harsh coverage in \textit{Der Spiegel}, which harboured long-standing animosity towards Strauß.\textsuperscript{457} In an exposé in August 1968, the base was described as a megalomaniac project which had been ill-conceived from the start.\textsuperscript{458} Over the following years, \textit{Der Spiegel} ruthlessly denounced West German-Portuguese military cooperation as a pit of wastefulness and mismanagement.\textsuperscript{459}

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“German soldiers in Portugal: The special leave is off the cards” – The \textit{Westfalen-Blatt} mocks the abandonment of the Beja base.\textsuperscript{460}

had been validated with a Cultural Treaty between Portugal and the FRG, which encouraged state-sponsored dissemination of Portuguese culture. Both states had even officially agreed to exclude from their countries’ school books any “texts which might give students an inexact impression of the history, cultural values and the life of the other’s people”. The Treaty, signed on 22 October 1965, was published in \textit{Diário do Governo}, 18.02.1966.\textsuperscript{456} A vast collection of related newspaper articles can be found in AHD-MNE,PEA,M337-A),Pr332,30 and in BA-MA,BW1/90837.\textsuperscript{457} Strauß had infamously ordered raids and arrests against \textit{Der Spiegel} in 1962 because of an article about the FRG’s vulnerable defensive capability.– Schöps, Joachim. 1983. \textit{Die Spiegel-Affäre des Franz Josef Strauss}, Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.\textsuperscript{458} “Fehlplanung– Germanische Größe”,\textit{Der Spiegel}, 19.08.1968, pp.26-27.\textsuperscript{459} “Bei uns unüblich”, \textit{Der Spiegel}, 14.06.1971, pp.26-27; “Schilda in Beja”, \textit{Der Spiegel} (44), 25.10.1971, pp.102-104.\textsuperscript{460} \textit{Westfalen-Blatt}, 07.09.1968, in BA-MA, BW1/90837.
While it became increasingly hard for the dictatorship to preserve its usually low-key media profile during this period, the collateral damage for Bonn was still relatively limited. Although the more liberal-leaning newspapers presented a critical view of the Lisbon regime\textsuperscript{461}, the topic of Bonn’s policy towards Portuguese colonialism did not fit into the dynamics of their infatuation with neue Ostpolitik and the hailing of Willy Brandt as a champion of ‘ethical’ foreign policy.\textsuperscript{462} A 1971 editorial from Der Spiegel made a point of clarifying that the controversial Cahora Bassa dam was much more than an “unholy alliance” in which “Bonn’s social-democrats stand by international industry giants, colonialists and racists”. Editor Siegfried Kogelfranz argued that, regardless of the Portuguese intentions, the progress generated by the dam – indeed, already being generated by the dam’s construction – would help Mozambican emancipation:

“These black workers who drive the heavy Caterpillars, Mercedes Unimogs and Steyr-Puch Haflingers are becoming race- and class-conscious; one can no longer send them back to the subculture of bush kraals or canister slums with impunity. This is yeast for a country where in 500 years of Portuguese colonialism literally nothing happened, where a mild stone-age status was the guarantor of colonialism well into the postcolonial era. [...] For a Mozambique, where one day the majority will rule – and the people of colour have [a majority] of about fifty to one – will stand differently with the dam than without it. The giant power plant would be a foundation for development, like so far only a few developing countries have.” \textsuperscript{463}

In the more conservative media, German-Portuguese relations benefited from contemporary journalistic narratives even more. The aftermath of the failed Portuguese attack against Guinea-Conakry, with its disastrous consequences for the German volunteers in the region, became a lead story in early 1971, bringing the whole FRG development aid programme into question. Yet the focus of the story was not the invasion, just the reaction of Guinean President Sékou Touré, who was vilified with

\textsuperscript{461} On 27 October 1969, the week after the SPD-FDP coalition took power, Der Spiegel published an extensive ruthless piece on the poor living conditions in Portugal and its colonies (“Ordnung auf Elend gebaut”, pp.134-142), which set the tone for its coverage over the following years.


\textsuperscript{463} “Beihilfe zum Mord oder Fortschritt”, Der Spiegel, 01.11.1971, pp.164,166.
accusations of “barbarism” and syphilitic dementia\textsuperscript{464} and turned into a symbol of the tyranny and ungratefulness of African socialism. Much of the public political debate was permeated by an anti-African attitude which allowed for the perpetuation of a complacent tone about Lisbon’s colonialism in the conservative press.\textsuperscript{465}

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The \textit{Rheinische Post} blames development aid for the death of development worker Hermann Seibold at a Guinean prison, where he had been held for complicity with the Portuguese attack.\textsuperscript{466}

By contrast, the volunteer community, which was more directly affected by the Conakry episode, refused this simplistic interpretation of events.\textsuperscript{467} Indeed, feeling that the German news about the African problems had reached unbearable levels of distortion, in 1971 the solidarity activists created their autonomous information centre, the \textit{Informationsstelle Südliches Afrika}.\textsuperscript{468} It marked the start of what can be described as an all-out propaganda war with the Portuguese authorities.

The dictatorship had its own networks in the FRG. These included the German-Portuguese Society, created in 1964. The Society’s first president Otto Wolff von Amerongen – the president of \textit{DIHT} – had spent much time in Portugal on business during WWII and had a self-professed admiration for Salazar. The manager was Dr.

\textsuperscript{464} The former in \textit{Stuttgarter Zeitung}, 21.01.1971 and the latter in \textit{Christ und Welt}, 12.02.1971, as mentioned in Gerhard Groh’s media analysis “Der Fall Guinea in der deutschen Tagespresse”.\textit{Afrika heute}, 15.03.1971, pp.89-91.

\textsuperscript{465} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{466} \textit{Rheinische Post}, 21.01.1971, in \textit{Afrika heute}, 15.03.1971, p.91.

\textsuperscript{467} In an interview on 1 March 1971, when asked about the risk faced by German development workers in Africa as exposed by the Conakry episode, a representative from the German Development Service answered: “One could also ask me how I had the courage to return to Europe when in Northern Ireland people are being shot and in Spain, Portugal and Greece numerous people are arrested without trial and tortured.” She went on to point out that it was unfair to single out the violence committed by black Africans in Guinea-Conakry while disregarding the violence committed by white people in the region, namely in South Africa and in the Portuguese colonies. – AHD, PEA, M683, Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Lisbon, 10.03.1971.

\textsuperscript{468} Kössler/Melber (2002), p.112.
Manfred Zapp, a former Nazi press agent. Zapp’s office helped promote Lisbon’s official views in the FRG and alerted the Portuguese Embassy to possible scandals. Moreover, in July 1972 the embassy offered a first-class trip to Angola and Mozambique to Gerhard Kienbaum (an ex-FDP MP), who was not only a prominent businessman interested in working with the Portuguese in Mozambique after the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, but also the main stockholder of the public relations firm *Time*. In 1973, Lisbon hired *Time* to denounce the Dortmund Congress’ anti-Portuguese character among the local press, news agencies and churches. The Embassy also arranged for two friendly journalists to attend the event, but they were expelled by the *Organisationskomitee*, which also rejected *Time*’s request to distribute “informative material” with the Portuguese view at the congress itself.

Aware of the steady deterioration of the dictatorship’s public image, the Portuguese authorities tried to make sure they always sent someone to argue their case on broadcasts hostile to Lisbon’s positions, preferably someone with no official link to the Embassy.

The rising interest in Portugal also reached the FRG’s editorial world. After decades of mostly consigning the country to the realm of travel literature, in 1971 two publishers released extensive analytical essays aimed at explaining the Portuguese reality to the West German public. Fritz René Allemann’s book *8 Mal Portugal* ostensibly sought to give a balanced overview of the country’s various facets, including its political system, yet virtually excluding its colonial dimension. Relying chiefly on official and semi-official sources, the book displayed a melancholic version of Portuguese culture and history which occasionally veered rather close to Lisbon’s own
self-portrayal, but tempered this tendency with brutal assessments of Portugal’s
domestic repression and profound inequality.\textsuperscript{478} By contrast, Rudi Maslowski’s \textit{Der
Skandal Portugal} put greater emphasis on the material produced by the opposition in its
examination of the dictatorship. Just as Allemann evoked the critical yet cooperative
tone of the regime’s ‘liberal wing’, Maslowski channelled the indignation of the non-
parliamentary resistance. If the former work recognised the dictatorship’s authoritarian
character, the latter not only considered it ‘fascist’, but claimed on the very first page
that Salazar, “unlike Hitler and Mussolini, developed ‘silent’ fascism into
perfection”.\textsuperscript{479} Although coming from opposite directions, both authors agreed that
Marcelo Caetano had not yet ushered any deep changes to Portugal’s dictatorial and
colonial system.\textsuperscript{480}

Several publications grew out of the resentment against the Lisbon regime. The
churches’ engagement with Portuguese issues encouraged books about the role of
religious institutions within the dictatorship.\textsuperscript{481} A translated and extended version of
Mário Soares’ key political essay, 1972’s \textit{Le Portugal baillonné} [Gagged Portugal],
came out in October 1973, with the title \textit{Portugal: Rechtsdiktatur zwischen Europa und
Kolonialismus} [Portugal: A Right-Wing Dictatorship between Europe and
Colonialism].\textsuperscript{482} Out of the hundreds of works about southern Africa released by the
FRG’s solidarity movement, roughly half of the German-language ones concerned the
Portuguese colonies.\textsuperscript{483} Conversely, in \textit{Pro und kontra Portugal}, Joachim F. Kahl
expressed an optimistic view of Portuguese colonialism; but his book was less an
exception to the rising criticism than a reaction against it. The book condemned the left-
leaning confrontational discourse of the ‘Tribunal’ campaign, arguing that the
Portuguese authorities were the most fit to forge a path to independence suited to the
interests of the Angolan and Mozambican peoples. Kahl proposed a policy of friendly

\textsuperscript{478} Allemann (1971).
\textsuperscript{479} Maslowski, Rudi. 1971. \textit{Der Skandal Portugal. Land ohne Menschenrechte}, Munich: Carl Hansen
Verlag.
\textsuperscript{480} “Salazarismus ohne Salazar”, Allemann (1971), pp.348-372; “Salazarismus mit Prothesen”,
Maslowski (1971), pp.130-144.
\textsuperscript{481} Renard, Ludwig. 1968. \textit{Salazar: Kirche und Staat in Portugal}, Essen. Raske, Michael, et al. (ed.).
Dokumentation}, Dusseldorf: Patmos.
Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag.
\textsuperscript{483} For an extensive list of relevant titles, see CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, ISSA, \textit{Informationsmaterial}. 
dialogue with Lisbon and invoked *neue Ostpolitik* as an example of how cooperation with problematic regimes could lead to positive outcomes.\(^484\)

The Portuguese colonial conundrum became the focus of intellectual debate. A key polemic sprung from an article in *Afrika heute* by Sociologist Gerhard Grohs in June 1971. Regarding the extreme poverty of Portugal and its colonies as the main obstacle to decolonisation, Grohs proposed Portugal’s integration in the EEC, coupled with a European ‘Marshall-Plan’, on the condition that the Portuguese would grant independence to the colonies and that their new African rulers would associate the territories to the Common Market.\(^485\) Left-wing scholars pointed out that Portugal’s economy, including the colonies, was already deeply entangled with the EEC. They thus challenged Grohs’ assumptions that Portugal would barter its empire for European integration, that Europe would pay without an economic return, and that the liberation movements would accept a form of Western neo-colonialism.\(^486\) As it was, Lisbon’s 1972 trade agreement with the Common Market actually exposed the EEC to a new line of criticism. Not only did the agreement fail to live up to the organisation’s potential – as envisioned by Grohs – to be a bargaining tool for decolonisation, it was accused of economically sustaining the colonial wars through its tariff preferences to Portugal.\(^487\) A similarly long-running discussion thread in the pages of *Afrika heute* concerned the FRG’s specific interests and responsibilities in Africa. This debate was not limited to the academic milieu, as it featured contributions from members of opposing wings of the *Bundestag* as well.\(^488\)

The concern with Portuguese colonialism expanded into the mainstream liberal-leaning press, but at a much slower pace. *Der Spiegel* painted a devastating portrayal of the Portuguese territories\(^489\) and it repeatedly called attention to Lisbon’s repressive

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\(^{484}\) Kahl (1972).
\(^{485}\) "Portugals Überseeterritorien in Afrika, die EWG und wir", *Afrika heute*, 15.06.1971, pp.245-246; Grohs further explained his ideas in an interview in *Afrika heute*, 01.11.1971, pp.444-445.
\(^{488}\) This thread began in August 1972 and ran regularly until the end of the year. In January 1973, the discussion shifted specifically to the question of the FRG’s relations with the liberation movements. – *Afrika heute*.
\(^{489}\) “Gefangen im Vorhof der Hölle”, *Der Spiegel*, 01.11.1971, pp.152-162.
policies, in Africa as well as at home.⁴⁹⁰ Yet the colonial conflict itself, while not a completely new subject⁴⁹¹, only became a regular feature in the magazine’s pages by mid-1973⁴⁹² with the dissemination of evidence of the Portuguese troops’ cruel behaviour on the ground.⁴⁹³ Interest peaked after the British newspaper The Times denounced the Wiriyamu massacre, on 10 July 1973. The FRG’s papers enthusiastically embraced the story, which fuelled emotive condemnation of Portuguese colonialism, close attention to Caetano’s contested trip to the UK that month, and a frenetic research for leads to other, similar massacres. At the forefront of the coverage, the Frankfurter Rundschau and Der Spiegel unapologetically sided with the liberation movements, while the Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Zeit adopted a relatively more restrained editorial line.⁴⁹⁴

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Wiriyamu massacre as the front page story in Der Spiegel, 13.08.1973

Conversely, the conservative newspapers fully rejected any display of empathy towards Lisbon’s critics, whether African or German. In the aftermath of the Wiriyamu reports, the *Rheinischer Merkur* and the news agency *Katholische Nachrichtenagentur* closely followed the Portuguese line, denying the existence of a massacre and of Wiriyamu itself.\(^{495}\) The powerful *Axel Springer* media conglomerate’s papers, above all *Die Welt*, did the same. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) was more careful, but it nevertheless raised serious doubts about the credibility of the story’s sources.\(^{496}\) The FAZ, whose reports from Guinea-Bissau had actually earned praise within the solidarity movement\(^{497}\), tended to portray the activists with suspicion because of their predominantly left-wing orientation.\(^{498}\) The *Springer* publishing group took that mistrust to a passionate extreme\(^{499}\), particularly during the ‘Angola-Sunday’ campaign. On 14 August, *Die Welt* dismissed the event’s organisers as Communists and asked how the German churches could “grant support to clandestine fighters who put in the fields of Angola and Mozambique landmines supplied by the Eastern Bloc”.\(^{500}\) Despite the counter-attack of a *Frankfurter Rundschau* journalist, who appealed to Christians disgusted with the fact that “bombs, napalm and defoliant are dropped from airplanes with the Cross of the Order of Christ”\(^{501}\), *Die Welt*’s article proved instrumental in the churches’ rejection of the ‘Angola-Sunday’ initiative.\(^{502}\)

Against this dichotomous background, no episode did more to incite public debate about German-Portuguese relations than the visit of a *FRELIMO* delegation to Bonn in August 1973, at the invitation of the *SPD*’s Commission for International Relations. The conservative media defended the Lisbon regime and charged the *SPD* with support for a “terrorist organisation”\(^{503}\), a resonant charge in the context of *RAF* terrorism, not to mention the recent Palestinian attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics.

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496 Matos (1977), pp.160-163
497 "Portugals Kolonialkrieg in der Presse". *Afrika heute*, May1973, p.47
499 This antagonism stretched back to the student protests in the 1960s, when the publishing company had developed a famously harsh rhetoric against the students. – Hilwig, Stuart J. 1998. «The Revolt Against the Establishment: Students Versus the Press in West Germany and Italy». In *1968: The World Transformed*, Fink, Carole, Gassert, Philipp and Junker, Detlef (eds.). Washington DC: Cambridge University Press, pp.321-335.
500 AHD-MNE, PEA, M641, Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 18.08.1973.
501 This was a reference to the insignia of the Portuguese Air Force. For the article and its background, see IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, Pr.11, vol.11, Cl(2), *Serviços Alemães*, Dispatch from the Portuguese Foreign Ministry to the DGS, 21.08.1973.
503 AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III,11159,“Scheideweg-Entscheidung für die Union”, SPD-news service,24.08.1973; For a sample of clippings, see *Materialien*, Nr.41, October 1973.
Their columnists emphasised the strategic importance of supporting Portugal against Communism.\textsuperscript{504} The SPD faced a mixed reaction from public opinion, which ranged from praise and encouragement by local unions and solidarity groups to accusations of NATO-treason by outraged citizens echoing the Springer press. The angrier letters sent to the party often contrasted the SPD-FRELIMO initiative with neue Ostpolitik, asking why the SPD was less critical of the Eastern European dictatorships than of the Portuguese one, i.e. if it was willing to openly support armed resistance against Portugal, why did it not support the resistance in East Germany.\textsuperscript{505}

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\textit{Die Welt} questions the SPD’s “unconditional loyalty” to NATO\textsuperscript{506}

Portugal’s media exposure in the early 1970s took its toll on the dictatorship’s image, but in a limited way. Although the proliferation of news about the colonial wars affected the German public’s impression of the dictatorship negatively, there was still ample room for tolerance towards the Lisbon regime. Thus German-Portuguese relations became not only a more visible topic, but a polarising one.\textsuperscript{507} They did not,

\textsuperscript{504} “Portugal einmal anders gesehen”, \textit{FAZ}, 03.09.1973.

\textsuperscript{505} More than fifty related letters to the SPD, most of them negative, can be found in AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11777 – These letters allow insight into patterns of rhetoric used in connection with this topic but, naturally, they are not an accurate barometer of the level of approval/disapproval of the SPD’s initiative.


\textsuperscript{507} Matos (1977), pp.348-350.
however, become a decisive issue in Bonn’s relationship with the West German public. During the first years of the SPD-FDP coalition, Eastern policy dominated the political discussion, followed by the mounting inflation, the domestic reforms and the precarious balance of power in the Bundestag which translated into new elections in November 1972. Even when the liberal press turned against the executive, during Brandt’s final year in power, its main indictments concerned domestic scandals and policies, not its policy towards Lisbon. The government was hence considerably less threatened by the growing public disenchantment towards Portugal than by the growing disenchantment towards the Eastern European regimes and, by extension, towards what had been the government’s crucial electoral asset, neue Ostpolitik.  

**Conclusion**

On the domestic front, Willy Brandt’s governments had to contend with increasing commotion regarding the Portuguese dictatorship. This was not only a result of the notoriety of Portugal’s colonial wars, but of the high profile of the West German involvement with Lisbon’s colonial projects, most notably through the Cahora Bassa dam project.

The leading force pushing for a change – or discontinuity – in Bonn’s Portugal-policy was the grassroots-activist movement proclaiming solidarity with the African liberation struggle, which demanded support for the African nationalists and an end to the FRG’s military and economic ties to Portuguese colonialism. This splinter-movement grew out of the late-1960s university student-driven extra-parliamentary opposition, where it served as a vehicle to channel the youth’s resentment towards capitalism and fascism, as well as imperialism in general and NATO in particular. The cause proved attractive to religious associations and to groups involved in development work which were critical of colonialism and neo-colonialism. They crucially helped the solidarity movement gain national attention in 1970, with the anti-Cahora Bassa mobilisation. Hence this movement survived the students’ loss of momentum at the beginning of the decade. It spilled over into intellectual circles, left-wing political organisations and factions of the SPD. Due to its broad appeal, the ‘solidarity cause’ became increasingly politicised, serving the rhetoric of competing ideological groups.

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Moreover, a conscious attempt to recruit the working class led to the engagement of the trade unionist sector.

Despite some effort at coordination, this social movement never became a cohesive unit. It combined various kinds of actions, from information campaigns to collection of aid for the African liberation groups, from political lobbying to local protests against the German firms involved with Portuguese colonialism. The movement’s most ambitious joint initiative was the aborted ‘Portugal-Tribunal’ campaign, which led to the ‘Congress for the Freedom of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau’ in Dortmund in January 1973. The latter event highlighted the movement’s internal strife, as the DKP forces in the Organisationskomitee tried to use the congress to enhance their own political clout, between the extreme left and the SPD, much to the frustration of both the more moderate and the more radical strands.

For the government, the West German solidarity movement was problematic on different levels. By openly challenging the government’s current policy towards Portugal and southern Africa, the movement encouraged strong criticism against the executive in Bonn, including from inside the ruling coalition’s electoral base. Given the aggressive nature of some of its actions and discourse, the federal authorities also tended to regard the activism of the solidarity movement as a threat to public order and as a source of political radicalisation.

Debate among scholars and coverage by the mainstream media furthered the public’s awareness of Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon. As sympathisers and activists of the solidarity movement took over Afrika heute, the magazine of the German African Society, it became a key forum for debate about Portuguese colonialism and the FRG’s role in it. Prompted by the ‘Beja affair’ in the 1960s, the liberal press, particularly Der Spiegel, questioned the workings and rationale of the German-Portuguese military cooperation. It also frequently reported on Lisbon’s policies at home and in the colonies, partially as a consequence of the solidarity campaigns. The West German newspapers, however, only gave this topic consistent and widespread coverage in the summer of 1973, in the aftermath of the British press’ high-profile denunciation of the Wiriyamu massacre. Regardless, the more attention the media dedicated to the colonial conflict, the more it exposed the government’s related policy choices to public scrutiny.

The crescendo of criticism against the FRG’s relations with the Portuguese dictatorship did not occur without significant resistance from sectors of West German society that defended a continuity of the cultivation of traditionally good relations with
Portugal. At the head of this resistance was the business sector, particularly the companies involved in the Cahora Bassa project. Targeted with physical violence and propaganda by the liberation movements and by those supporting solidarity activism, the firms retaliated in a hostile way. Their strategy was threefold: they forcefully confronted their critics at a local level, they issued their own counter-propaganda to the public, and they collectively lobbied the government to safeguard their relations with Portugal. As a consequence, the Chancellery came under pressure from powerful domestic industrial and trade federations, which did not wish to see private economy at the mercy of Bonn’s foreign policy.

The ecclesiastical sector was divided, both at the base and at the top. Many theologians, students and congregations participated enthusiastically in the solidarity campaigns, including the organisation of the ‘Angola-Sunday’ in September 1973. However, these groups remained a minority within the religious community. For the most part, church leaderships, whether Protestant or Catholic, held a conservative position on the Portuguese colonial conflict, shaped by moral, political and diplomatic reservations. They exhibited an aversion to the violent and revolutionary behaviour of the liberation guerrilla and deposited their trust in the Portuguese regime. For the Catholic clergy, the situation was further complicated by the Vatican’s formal links with Portugal. Unable to agree on a coherent position, the religious institutions ended up expressing diffuse and even contradictory messages to the government and to the population.

As this last case demonstrates, the opposition to the solidarity movement was not exclusively rooted in the desire to protect business interests. In part, it reflected a degree of sympathy for the Christian and anti-communist Lisbon regime, moulded by the fact that for decades the West German politicians and media had distinctly downplayed the authoritarian character of the dictatorship. Mostly, however, the reaction derived from a profoundly suspicious attitude towards the German solidarity movement and the African liberation organisations, because of their connotation with the revolutionary left. While these views were encouraged by Lisbon’s own propaganda machine in the FRG, they also reflected the endemic stance of the conservative media. Above all, the Springer press, which was very influential among large sections of public opinion, refused to break away from its default benevolent portrayal of the Lisbon regime and to tolerate any reversal of Bonn’s friendly policy towards Portugal. A recurring motif within the criticism of antagonistic stances vis-à-vis the Caetano
dictatorship consisted of variations of a comparison with *neue Ostpolitik*, i.e. a demand for consistency between Bonn’s policy towards Portugal and its rapprochement policy with Eastern Europe, particularly with the despised regime of East Germany.

In conclusion, the Portuguese dictatorship and colonialism became a recognisable, if hardly consensual, topic in the FRG. The demand for change in German-Portuguese relations began as a fringe cause and it progressively spread from the radical left into the more liberal and progressive ‘establishment’, reaching maximum impact by mid-1973. Although this position did not fully take over the mainstream, it became harder for the government to disregard the domestic impact of policy in this area. Nevertheless, the Afro-Portuguese problem never grew into a central political issue, with clear electoral repercussions, on par with *neue Ostpolitik*. Thus the federal government forged Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon with awareness that this was a sensitive subject, but not a priority for the German public.
CHAPTER 3

From Außenwirtschaft to Außenpolitik: The Economic Front

1. Reciprocity in West German-Portuguese economic relations
2. The controversy over Cahora Bassa
3. The theory of Portugal’s rapprochement with Europe
4. The debate over development aid

Conclusion
The increasingly controversial image of the Caetano dictatorship posed a challenge to the already mentioned formula of ‘separation between foreign trade (Außenwirtschaft) and foreign policy (Außenpolitik)’. This chapter analyses how Bonn faced that challenge, i.e. how the federal government handled different efforts to channel political agendas into the FRG’s policy towards the Lisbon regime in the economic field. The opening section explains how macroeconomic factors encouraged both Bonn and Lisbon to promote West German-Portuguese economic relations. The second section looks at the case of the Cahora Bassa project, whose political undertones Bonn tried to downplay but which became the focus of outside pressure by the critics of the enterprise (African leaders, West German protesters) and by those involved in it (Portugal, France, private sector). The third section examines how a group in the Bundestag and the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, influenced by the discussion among the Portuguese elites, developed a political reasoning to encourage support for Portugal’s rapprochement with Europe. The closing section focuses on the intra-governmental debate concerning the supply of development aid to the dictatorship, which primarily opposed the Ministry for Economic Cooperation to the Auswärtiges Amt. The chapter thus assesses how Bonn engaged with various forces pushing for economic continuity and discontinuity towards the Portuguese dictatorship emerging from various spheres of power.

1. Reciprocity in West German-Portuguese economic relations

The late 1960s and early 1970s marked the culmination of almost thirty years of rapid and sustained economic growth in Western Europe. On the one hand, these final years saw the age of prosperity reach its peak, with an unprecedented level of productivity; on the other, the Western European economy was already developing symptoms of its transition towards a stage of slow growth and accelerating inflation, such as the exponential rise of prices and salaries. The collapse of the Bretton-Woods monetary system in 1971 resulted in an international monetary crisis which aggravated these earlier tendencies. The measures put into place by the European countries in an effort to contain inflation slowed down the economic expansion at the beginning of the decade, so less restrictive policies were adopted, leading in 1972 and 1973 to record
levels of economic growth and international trade. Yet capacity constraints – such as balance of payments disequilibrium – made it hard to sustain such a high growth rate. Furthermore, rampant inflation and the dramatic oil price shocks in late 1973 affected business confidence, resulting in near-stagnation in OECD countries in 1974.\textsuperscript{509} It was in this twilight of the ‘trente glorieuses’ that the West German and Portuguese economies found unprecedented reciprocity.

West Germany, which over the previous twenty years had established a major position in the global economy, was reaching its zenith. Stimulated by the EEC Common Market and by the Deutsche Mark’s convertibility, the FRG lived the ‘golden era’ of its international commerce between 1959 and 1971, becoming the world’s biggest trading nation after the USA.\textsuperscript{510} Despite a short recession in 1966-1967, the FRG maintained a regular positive balance of payments and had a particularly high surplus between 1966 and 1969, with its competitors regularly pressing Bonn to revaluate its currency. At the time, Economics Minister Karl Schiller introduced a neo-Keynesian economic strategy, based on the balance of the four key economic goals of full employment, steady growth, price stability and stable exchange rates – the so-called ‘magic square’. This policy helped West Germany overcome the 1966-1967 recession and reinvigorated its growth rate.\textsuperscript{511} When Willy Brandt became chancellor in 1969, the most rapidly expanding companies of the FRG were using their machinery almost at full capacity and, unlike in other countries of Western Europe, employment was on the rise.\textsuperscript{512}

If the high foreign demand stimulated West German production, it also set its pace. In 1970, over a third of the growth of the FRG’s main industries was determined by exports\textsuperscript{513}, which during this era consisted mostly of textiles, ironworks and chemical products, as well as automobiles, electric materials and several kinds of machinery.\textsuperscript{514} By 1974, 24.3% of all West German industrial production was directed

\begin{footnotes}
\item[512] 1.8% increase in 1969, Informações (CCILA), 15.02.1970.
\item[513] 31.8% in the chemical industry, 36.1% in the iron and steel industry, 36.6% in the machinery and transports industry and 30.5% in the electronic industry – Abelshauser, Werner. 2004. Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945, Munich: CHBeck. p.265.
\end{footnotes}
towards the international market and one in five jobs depended on exports.\textsuperscript{515} Thus for Bonn foreign trade played a central role – more than simply generating wealth, it helped sustain employment levels and allowed industry to use its full capacity even when domestic demand began to decrease.\textsuperscript{516}

Like West Germany, Portugal was going through a phase of expanded economic growth – the most accelerated of its history. Pulled by the international economic dynamism, Portugal’s growth rate was impressive even by European standards. The country had been a member of the OEEC since 1948, but only the establishment of EFTA in 1960 had truly internationalised the Portuguese economy. Enjoying a special statute under Annexe G of the Stockholm Convention, the Lisbon dictatorship had benefited from the lowering of foreign trade barriers, while being allowed to maintain an exceptional degree of protectionism. The Portuguese economy had thus expanded rapidly since 1960 and reached its peak of expansion between 1965 and 1973 with yearly growth rates above 7% and an increase of Portuguese foreign trade of nearly 10%. Notably, this period saw the transformation of the Portuguese sectorial structure, with the fall of agriculture as the main sector and the rise of industries and services, both in terms of capital and employment. This process spurred an industrialist class primarily oriented towards the European markets.\textsuperscript{517}

As in most areas, the period of marcelismo was marked by contradictory trends. Although Lisbon remained strongly interventionist in the economy,\textsuperscript{518} there was a relative liberalisation promoted by the ‘modernist’ sections of the regime, i.e. the Europeanist industrialists, the parliamentary ‘liberal wing’ and the small technocratic faction which Marcelo Caetano had brought into his government in 1969. In this regard, Undersecretary of State for Industry Rogério Martins fought a controversial quest to end the dictatorship’s legal restrictions on industrial growth and competition. Against this background, the Caetano years integrated Portugal’s third development plan (Plano


\textsuperscript{516} Études économiques de l’OCDE : Allemagne Mai 1974, p.5.


\textsuperscript{518} Lisbon’s interventionism was of course very different from Bonn’s. The former tended towards state corporatism and the later towards liberal Keynesianism and Schumpeterianism. The two approaches are clearly distinguished in Lopes (1996), pp. 269-270.
The fourth Plano de Fomento, set to go from 1974 until 1979, was never put into motion, because of the regime’s downfall in April 1974.


Estatísticas do Comércio Externo 1968-1974; see also ANNEX2/APPENDIX 1 at the end of chapter.

See ANNEX2/APPENDICES 2 and 3 at the end of chapter.


The strength of West German exports to Portugal during this era cannot be dissociated from the Portuguese industrial take-off. Among the FRG’s main exports to Portugal were motor vehicles, machine-tools, synthetic fibres and mill products, as well as investment goods.\textsuperscript{526} Equipment and machinery represented a substantial proportion of that trade\textsuperscript{527} and their export grew dynamically, especially in the beginning of this period.\textsuperscript{528} In 1970, as the total volume of trade between the FRG and Portugal rose by 11.7\%\textsuperscript{529}, the export of West German machines to the country increased by 30.3\%.\textsuperscript{530} This export would continue to grow in subsequent years, even if in less spectacular fashion.\textsuperscript{531} The main products, by far, were textile machines and accessories\textsuperscript{532}, followed by office and information technical material.\textsuperscript{533} The export of tractors and farm machines, after an initial boost, decreased drastically\textsuperscript{534}, whereas machine-tools and machines for the food industry continued to increase at a steady pace.\textsuperscript{535} This evolution mirrored the rise of industry and services in Portugal, as well as the inability of Portuguese agriculture to keep up with the industrial boom.

Commerce – and specifically Portugal’s endemic deficit in trade with the FRG – had been a motor of German-Portuguese cooperation from the start, but cooperation had faded in subsequent years. In the late 1950s, the federal government had agreed to help Lisbon reduce the country’s deficit by placing large orders with Portuguese industry and encouraging German tourism in Portugal. In this spirit, the two states had signed an Economic Cooperation Protocol in 1959.\textsuperscript{536} The following year representatives from banks, private companies and from the German and Portuguese governments had formed the German-Portuguese Mixed Commission for Economic

\textsuperscript{528} Comparing the first semester of 1969 with the first semester of 1970, the following West German exports to Portugal registered an extraordinary increase: machine-tools (87\%), machines for construction work (81\%), machines for the rubber and plastic industry (21\%), tractors (61\%), farm machines (63\%), lifting and transport machinery (58\%), machines and accessories for the textile industry (100\%) – Informações (CCILA), 15.12.1970.
\textsuperscript{529} Metropolitan Portugal exported an extra 5.4\% to West Germany and imported an extra 18.1\% from the FRG than it had the previous year. – Informações (CCILA), 01.03.1971.
\textsuperscript{530} Amounting to a total of DM 223.3 Million – Informações (CCILA), 01.08.1971.
\textsuperscript{532} DM 20.5 Million in 1969, DM 33.9 Million in 1970, DM 51.9 Million in 1971, DM 64 Million in 1972 – In 1972, textile machines represented 22\% of all West German machines delivered to Portugal and 6.1\% of all West German exports to Portugal.
\textsuperscript{534} DM 6.7 Million in 1969, DM 10.5 Million in 1970, DM 3.5 Million in 1971.
\textsuperscript{535} Informações (CCILA), 15.07.1972 and 01.07.1973.
Cooperation. One of the main aims of the Mixed Commission had been to promote German investment in Portugal, in order to compensate for Lisbon’s trade deficit with Bonn. In line with this, a second protocol, signed in 1961, had expressed Bonn’s commitment to endorsing the participation of West German companies in Portuguese projects and, as a result, the FRG had begun pumping public and private capital into Portugal. However, after two more meetings – in February 1961 and May 1962 – the Mixed Commission had drifted into limbo.537 Throughout the 1960s, Lisbon’s percentage in the whole of Bonn’s investments had remained quite small, with only a slight increase.538 The level of investments had not kept up with the rise in trade relations between the two countries and the consequent rise in Portugal’s deficit.539 By the end of the decade, the dictatorship’s exports to the FRG amounted to close to a fifth of its West German imports540 and the tendency was for the deficit to continue to escalate.541 In response, in 1969 Portuguese Undersecretary of State for Commerce Xavier Pintado publicly called for a closer analysis of the German market, renewing the interest in economic cooperation.542

A key figure in the subsequent economic dialogue was José Pinto Leite, who became the President of the Portuguese-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCILA) in early 1969. Pinto Leite visited the FRG in July/August and met with the managing director of the West German industrial federation BDI. They discussed ways in which to intensify the economic relationship between their two countries, agreeing that, in order to invite further investment, Lisbon ought to abolish the persistent remnants of its protectionism.543 Both mentioned the need to tighten contacts between economic agents so as to coordinate production and demand. In this regard, they addressed the possibility of reviving the neglected Mixed Commission.544 Later that year, Pinto Leite, who joined parliament as part of the ‘liberal wing’, headed the

537 PAAA, B60/785, Documents from the German-Portuguese Mixed Commission for Economic Cooperation.
538 In 1963, West German investments in Portugal represented 0.3% of the FRG’s total investments abroad and by 1969 this percentage had risen to 0.42% – Matos, Luís Salgado. 1973. Investimentos Estrangeiros em Portugal, Lisbon: Seara Nova. p.211; For a closer look at the evolution of these numbers see also Informações (CCILA), 15.11.1969.
539 Between 1964 and 1968, West German exports to Portugal increased almost 50%, while their Portuguese imports decreased 6%. – Informações (CCILA), 05.11.1969.
542 BAK,B102/288144, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 25.11.1969.
543 CCILA often reinstated this position in its biweekly bulletin. See, for example, Informações (CCILA), 15.11.1969.
544 BAK,B102/288144, Memo from the Foreign Trade Department of the BMWi, 29.07.1969.
celebrations of the CCILA’s 15th anniversary (10-15 November). This event was noteworthy for including a round-table discussion between members of Lisbon’s technocratic faction – including Xavier Pintado and Rogério Martins – and representatives of many German-Portuguese business enterprises for the first time.\footnote{BAK, B102/288144, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 25.11.1969.} Pinto Leite took the opportunity to once again push for a revival of the Mixed Commission.\footnote{BAK, B102/288144, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 05.11.1969.} His proposal was welcomed by the federal authorities, who felt that the abandonment of the original commission had resulted not so much from an absence of German interest, but from a lack of Portuguese initiative. The Federal Ministry for Economics (BMWi) expressed confidence in the President of the CCILA to overcome this obstacle.\footnote{BAK, B102/288144, Memo from the BMWi, 17.11.1969.}

The BMWi’s keenness derived from the fact that in the field of investment interests, like in the field of foreign trade, there was a newfound potential for reciprocity between Bonn and Lisbon. In the aftermath of the recession of 1966-1967, the FRG’s high exports had resulted in a constant monetary influx which aggravated inflation. Bonn tried to counterbalance that tendency through the export of German capital, either as direct investments or credits.\footnote{Ferreira (1975), pp.28-29.} This issue gained considerable public attention in the first half of 1969, when the recently elected president of DIHT Otto Wolff von Amerongen demanded more support for German investments abroad. As a result, Finance Minister Franz Josef Strauß (CSU) presented a state plan facilitating those investments, mainly through tax relief.\footnote{Informações (CCILA), 01.05.1969.} Portugal was in an advantageous position to benefit from this plan. Despite the dictatorship’s notoriously over-complicated bureaucracy,\footnote{BA-MA, BW1/66542, Speech by Rogério Martins, 28.01.1970.} Portugal presented attractive opportunities for the FRG’s industry because of local raw materials and low production costs, derived from an abundant labour force, low salaries and low taxes. Not only did production sites in Portugal alleviate the problem of the lack of labour force in West Germany, they allowed a privileged access to the markets of Portugal and, more importantly, EFTA.\footnote{Informações (CCILA), 01.05.1969.} Investment was facilitated by the fact that in his last years Prime Minister António Salazar had begun easing the strict protectionism which had blocked international access to metropolitan Portugal and to its colonial territories. This process, which had
been chiefly a consequence of the need to finance the colonial wars, had also been encouraged by the industrial sector’s wish to work more closely with Europe.552

The BMWi found in Rogério Martins a committed ally for the West German quest to export capital.553 The Portuguese Undersecretary of State visited the FRG at the invitation of the BMWi in January 1970 and discussed projects with several German companies554, as well as with the Deutsche Bank and the BDI. Upon his return to Lisbon, Martins declared that, as a result of these negotiations, German enterprises would invest DM 90 million555 in Portugal over the next couple of years and create eight to nine thousand new jobs.556 Thus West German investment in Portugal, which had totalled DM 67.8 million until 1969557, gained new momentum during marcelismo. In fact, the FRG became the most significant foreign investor in Portuguese industry558. The growth rate of its investments in Portugal was higher than West Germany’s average559, even if this still did not amount to more than 0.8% of the FRG’s overall investments in European countries.560 By 1973, the cumulated investment reached DM 198 million561, making the FRG the third largest foreign investor in Portugal, after the

552 Ferreira (1975), p.22.
553 Curiously, Rogério Martins started off on the wrong foot. He intimidated German investors during the CCILA’s 1969 anniversary celebrations with a harsh speech against the exploitative tendencies of foreign capitalism and the dangers of outside investments, which found an echo in the national press. His words, however, appear to have been a concession to – rather than a reflection of – the regime’s conservative attitude and were mostly aimed at American enterprises in Portugal. According to Ambassador Schmidt-Horix, during the subsequent round-table conference, in a more confined environment, Rogério Martins proved to be “much more open-minded and unexpectedly willing to make concessions”. – BAK, B102/288144, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 25.11.1969.
554 Daimler-Benz, Grundig, Hoechst, MTU, Nixdorf Computer, Olympia-Werken and Siemens.
555 Between 700 and 800 Million Escudos at the time and 2½ times what the FRG had invested in Portugal thus far.
556 BA-MA,BW1/66542, Speech by Rogério Martins, 28.01.1970 (at the airport, upon his return from the trip to Germany).
557 0.7% of the FRG’s total investment in Europe (Informações (CCILA), 15.05.1972) and considerably less than the more than DM 550 Million invested in Spain over the same period (BAK,B102/288144, Memo from the Foreign Trade Department of the BMWi, 29.07.1969).
558 Between 1968 and 1971, West German investments represented 17% of all foreign investments in the Portuguese transformation industry, followed by multinationals (15%), the USA (14%), the UK (11%) and France (11%). – Informações (CCILA), 15.07.1972.
559 Bonn’s direct investments in Portugal increased 33.5% in 1970 and 22% the following year, while its total investments in Europe increased 15% and 22.7%, respectively (Informações (CCILA), 15.05.1972). In the first semester of 1971, West German investments increased 21.5% in Portugal, but only 10% in Spain (Informações (CCILA), 15.11.1971).
560 Informações (CCILA), 15.05.1972.
USA and multinational conglomerates.\textsuperscript{562} Portuguese investments in West Germany were naturally much more modest, but they too accelerated during this period\textsuperscript{563}.

\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{2. The controversy over Cahora Bassa}

The most sensitive area of Bonn’s economic relations with Lisbon was, unsurprisingly, the Portuguese colonial territory. Concerned over potential accusations of directly financing Lisbon’s colonialism, the federal authorities had decided as soon as colonial war had broken out in Angola, in 1961, to refrain from supporting projects in Portugal’s non-European territories, particularly in Africa.\textsuperscript{564} One important exception to this rule occurred during marcelismo, with the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, situated in the basin of the Zambezi River in the Tete province of Mozambique. This hydroelectric dam, which was projected to be the third largest in the world, was part of an ambitious development plan for the region conceived in the late 1950s by the Missão de Fomento e Povoamento do Zambeze (MFPZ), a department set up by the Portuguese Overseas Ministry to study possible uses for the Zambezi basin.\textsuperscript{565} Under the guise of a neutral infrastructure project, Cahora Bassa became a political force of nature.

For Lisbon, the project had been political from the outset. Discussing it in the mid-1960s, the Portuguese ministers for economics and finance had opposed the megalomaniac enterprise for budgetary reasons, questioning the very principle of investing in Africa instead of focusing on the economic situation at home. By contrast, Minister for Overseas Joaquim da Silva Cunha and Foreign Minister Alberto Franco Nogueira had recognised political and strategic advantages in the project. Silva Cunha had presented Cahora Bassa as a way to prove to foreign critics that Portugal was not exploiting its colonies, but altruistically developing them as part of the national territory. The ultranationalist Franco Nogueira had looked at Cahora Bassa as a symbol of Portuguese prestige and might. He had also argued that engaging the international community in the scheme could increase foreign support for the Portuguese cause and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{563} During the first semester of 1971, they rose from DM 5.8 Million to DM 10.8 Million (86.2\% increase), amounting to 11\% of Bonn’s investments in Portugal. – \textit{Informações (CCILA)}, 15.11.1971
  \item \textsuperscript{564} Fonseca (2007), p.189.
\end{itemize}
that the whole enterprise would promote cooperation with Portugal’s African ‘white neighbours’ Rhodesia and South Africa. After both ministerial factions had presented their cases, the final decision, as always, had been up to Prime Minister Salazar. He had given the green light to the project in 1966, after Lisbon had secured an agreement with South Africa’s electricity company ESCOM for the consumption of the energy produced by the dam. Because Mozambique could not consume more than 10% of the produced electricity, 90% was to be exported, which theoretically ensured that Cahora Bassa would pay for itself in the long run.566

The choice to award the concession for the undertaking to the Zamco consortium – preferring it over the British-Italian Concassa and the American Cabora Bassa Builders567 – was the most politically convenient for the dictatorship. Zamco’s diverse background fitted with the regime’s policy of pluralizing economic relations, so that no specific country could gather so much influence as to challenge Lisbon’s control over its empire.568 Moreover, picking this consortium rewarded the FRG and France, the dictatorship’s main suppliers of armament, while simultaneously hinting at Lisbon’s hopes of eventual association with the Common Market. Indeed, Franco Nogueira’s Foreign Ministry proved set on using the dam project to gain leverage over its partners. In August 1968, the ministry instructed Portuguese Ambassador in Bonn Manuel Homem de Mello on how to approach the renegotiation of a series of military agreements with a hesitant federal government. According to the ministry’s line of argument, West German-Portuguese relations had to be understood as a whole, within which the context of military and political dimensions stretched beyond Europe. The ambassador was to explain to the Germans that the friendly relations between Lisbon and Bonn, as well as their communion of interests, had weighed in when the Cahora Bassa project had been awarded to Zamco. Yet the adjudication was provisional and in order for Lisbon to make it definitive, it required a level of assurance that West German-Portuguese relations would be stable and handled with a renewed spirit of German commitment. The ministry concluded by urging Homem de Mello to make those points “with utmost clarity yet maximum propriety” in order to make it clear “that

we wish to continue cooperating with the FRG [...] but such cooperation cannot be one-directional”. 569

Nogueira’s tactics of fuzzy linkage coupled with Silva Cunha’s bargaining manoeuvres to create a convoluted contracting process. After the official tendering process of the Cahora Bassa project was complete, on 10 July 1968, discussions with Zamco to reach full agreement on the contractual terms stretched for over a year. At one point, Lisbon even reopened negotiations with the interested American firms. With its internationally diverse background, Zamco was an uncoordinated hybrid, a fact which Silva Cunha’s ministry exploited to its own advantage. Adding to the general confusion, when Marcelo Caetano first took office, he seemed uncertain about going ahead with Cahora Bassa. Caetano delayed the final ruling on the matter until after his trip to the African colonies in April 1969, but he ended up embracing the enterprise, signalling the continuity of Salazar’s imperial view. After a few more months of financial disputes, Zamco and the Portuguese government signed the final contract in September 1969, although the deal was not completely settled until the end of 1970. 570

Within the West German Grand Coalition government, the decision to back the German sub-consortium of Zamco with export credit guarantees – known as Hermes cover – was economically-driven and fairly consensual. As early as January 1967, Chancellor Kiesinger had confirmed Bonn’s willingness to contribute with DM 250 million in credit guarantees to secure the project. 571 By October 1968, the pledge had risen to DM 380 million. 572 Cahora Bassa represented a chance to export a great deal of capital, as well as to test a new technique of high voltage DC transmission developed by German research centres, thus giving the FRG’s electrical industry international recognition. 573 In February 1969, Foreign Minister Willy Brandt was told by his Portuguese counterpart Franco Nogueira to regard Cahora Bassa as a political asset as much as an economic one. Sticking to his strategy of using Zamco to promote pan-

569 AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A), Pr.332,30, Telegram from the Portuguese Foreign Ministry to the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 14.08.1968.


571 Kiesinger’s only requests in this regard were that both Cahora Bassa’s profitability and Lisbon’s approval of the project were confirmed. – IAN/TT/AOS, CO/UL-49B (4ª subdivisão), Dispatch from Fernando de Castro Fontes (Chief-Engineer from MFPZ), 17.01.1967.

572 BAK, B136/2992, Memo from the Bundeskanleramt, 03.04.1970.

573 Ferreira, Eduardo de Sousa. 1972. Portuguese Colonialism: from South Africa to Europe, Freiburg: Aktion Dritte Welt. pp.72,73; Middlemas (1975), pp.43-45; Four of the German companies involved produced electro-mechanic equipment, while the remaining one – Hochtief – was a construction group.
European complicity with Portugal, Nogueira insisted that Lisbon had given the Germans and the French the opportunity to set foot in southern Africa and show neighbouring countries that Europe’s influence in the region was not restricted to the British and their American allies.\(^{574}\) Yet showing that was exactly what Brandt was afraid of. Although his Auswärtiges Amt did not oppose Bonn’s involvement in Cahora Bassa, it requested that the FRG’s share would not exceed France’s and that on the surface Zamco would look like a French-led consortium.\(^{575}\) In September 1969, when the contract was finally signed after its tortuous renegotiations, the government-owned development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) provided DM 404.5 million in Hermes guarantees to cover the German participation in Cahora Bassa, just below the French DM 423 million.\(^{576}\)

Even if the federal authorities had seen the dam’s potential for controversy, they underestimated its proportions. As the previous chapters demonstrated, the attempt to disguise the West German involvement in the enterprise proved fruitless in the context of public scrutiny generated by the intense African critique of Portuguese colonialism. The federal government nevertheless remained committed to the project, pragmatically admitting that as an extremely export-oriented country the FRG relied on foreign economic relations, including with politically controversial states. Bonn did not even immediately grasp the full implications of the anti-colonialist critique, reacting to the wave of African protests in early 1970 with little sensitivity. An internal memo from the Chancellery rationalised Bonn’s position by arguing as follows: “African states often reproach the former colonial powers for having done too little for Africa’s economic development. [Cahora] Bassa is an infrastructure project of general economic interest.”\(^{577}\)

The Bundeskanzleramt’s proposed responses to the rising African backlash generally followed two strands. One strand suggested removing any moral element from the enterprise: “It is not a case of public German development aid, but of the participation of German private companies within the framework of the free market economy”; according to the FRG’s “liberal constitution, the government has limited possibilities to influence the decisions of German companies”. The other strand revolved around variations of a developmentalist formula which ended up endorsing the

\(^{574}\) AAPD 1969, Doc.87, 03.03.1969.
\(^{575}\) BAK, B136/2992, Memo from the Bundeskanzleramt, 23.10.1968.
\(^{576}\) BAK, B136/2992, Memo from the Bundeskanzleramt, 03.04.1970.
enterprise: “The federal government hopes that the realisation of the Cahora Bassa project proves advantageous to Mozambique’s industrial development and to the welfare of its inhabitants. It further hopes that the possibility of purchasing cheaper electrical energy will be a benefit for other African states.” 578

Yet the Chancellery’s Department for Foreign Affairs soon realised that it was hard to defend the virtues of the hydroelectric scheme without appearing to defend Portuguese colonialism. In its reassessment of Afrikapolitik on 8 May 1970, the Head of the Department, Per Fischer, recognised that the “notion that economic returns would hold the African states in the Western collective passes by the reality of African emotionality”. Fischer explained that this was precisely the fallacy incurred by the South African, Rhodesian and Portuguese justificatory argument that the population under white minority rule lived in better material conditions than the one in neighbouring African states. According to Fischer, the cry of “better dead than a slave” was alive in Africa and so the West German attempt to justify the dam with talk of raising living standards was wholly inappropriate. Consequently, “the fact that the [Cahora] Bassa dam constitutes the biggest power station in Africa, surpassing the power of the Aswan dam [in Egypt, funded by the USSR], will serve us much less than the construction of the North Egyptian dam served the Soviet Union”. Regarding the distinction between private economic enterprises and public services, Fischer remarked that the Africans did not acknowledge such a distinction, adding that “we blur it anyway, as we declare the Hermes covers advantageous to developing countries to be a development policy service and simultaneously assign Hermes guarantees to commercial operations like the [Cahora] Bassa dam”. 579

The dam’s impact on the FRG’s relations with Africa was but one level of what was escalating into a multilayered political conundrum. The large campaign organised by the solidarity movement in West Germany made Cahora Bassa a domestic problem as well as an international one. Concerned about the dam’s impact on public opinion, Willy Brandt began to question the firmness of his stance, as he confessed to French President Georges Pompidou. Brandt did not, however, doubt the validity of the project itself, dismissing FRELIMO’s accusation that the dam was part of a plan to exponentially expand the number of white settlers in the region: “This idea is grotesque,

578 BAK, B136/2992, Sequence of memos from the Bundeskanzleramt which begins on 24.04.1970.
579 BAK, B136/2992, Memo from Bundeskanzleramt, 08.05.1970.
because where will the Portuguese take these two millions whites from?”.

During this conversation, Pompidou reaffirmed France’s unshakeable commitment to Cahora Bassa, thus implicitly adding a further layer to the conundrum, since compromising the enterprise would necessarily undermine the interests of Bonn’s French allies.

Moreover, the same applied to Portugal: on 26 May 1970, the German Ambassador in Lisbon warned the AA that abandoning the Cahora Bassa project would formidably damage the West German-Portuguese relationship. According to Schmidt-Horix, such a step would weaken Marcelo Caetano’s government, which after initial hesitation had fully endorsed the dam, and it would provide the Portuguese far-right ‘ultras’ with arguments for a more isolationist policy. Schmidt-Horix predicted that Caetano’s downfall might give rise to a regime similar to the Greek Colonels’ dictatorship.

To aggravate matters, at stake was not just the question of abandoning the project. After the withdrawal of the Swedish firm ASEA the previous year, the German sub-consortium of Zamco had risked losing its share of the contract to the eager American General Electric. In order to secure it, the German companies had asked the KfW to cover at least an extra DM 140 million for the project.

Thus Brandt found himself between protesters demanding a full retreat from Cahora Bassa and industrialists pushing for a stronger commitment. Two days before the final cabinet meeting on this matter, which took place on 30 July, the chancellor received alarmed individual messages from the presidents of the main industrial and trade federations expressing their utmost disapproval of any eventual ‘politicisation’ of the Hermes cover.

The federal authorities weighed their options politically as well as economically. On 15 July, the Auswärtiges Amt presented its recommendation for the maintenance of the credit guarantees, taking into consideration the fact that the French were doing the same.

Six days later, the Bundeskanzleramt issued a note concluding that the FRG

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580 CHAN/APR, 5 AG2/104, Transcript of the meeting between Pompidou and Brandt, 03.07.1970; Eduardo Mondlane’s book, which had articulated FRELIMO’s accusation – although mentioning only 1 million settlers – had taken this point into account: “Considering that the total population of Portugal is about 9 million, this figure can be taken at all seriously only if moves to settle large numbers of non-Portuguese whites are assumed as well.” – Mondlane, Eduardo. 1969. The Struggle for Mozambique, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.98.

581 CHAN/APR, 5 AG2/104, Transcript of the meeting between Pompidou and Brandt, 03.07.1970.

582 BAK, B136/2992, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 26.05.1970.


could not afford to open an exception to its longstanding practice of separating politics from economic interests, nor could it be seen as breaching a previously established agreement. At the same time, it was hard to ignore the public backlash. Therefore, at the end of the month the government announced a compromise solution: it agreed to honour existing pledges, but refused to grant the additional credit guarantees. The German companies went to get the remaining financial cover from the South African authorities and from a consortium headed by the private Deutsche Bank.

Bonn was aware that such a decision was not enough to satisfy the critics of the dam. Thus, although Willy Brandt had been privy to the negotiating process leading up to Zamco’s guarantees from the onset, he justified his government’s current position by blaming it on the legacy of that previous commitment. The chancellor explained to the OAU delegation later that year that the African opposition had come too late, as the government could not breach a signed contract. Brandt sought to use Germany’s Nazi past to his advantage, for once, by emphasising the FRG’s need to regain international credibility – he told Kaunda that it was little over 25 years ago that Germany had “a regime which did not keep its promises” and therefore Bonn needed to be very careful in keeping its word with firms and with its French partners. Future projects, however, were a different matter: as a result of this entire episode the federal authorities became more cautious about further enterprises in southern Africa.

3. The theory of Portugal’s rapprochement with Europe

While Cahora Bassa represented the Africa-oriented side of the Portuguese economy, Bonn discerned a strong counter-current inclined to cooperate in a European context. In the summer of 1970, however, two events contributed to the reshaping of the features of this European cooperation. One was José Pinto Leite’s death in a helicopter accident in Guinea-Bissau on 25 July, which once again postponed the

587 Middlemas (1975), p.83; This bank consortium (Ferreira (1975) was the same which contributed loans for the Cunene project (Standard (Tanzania), 03.01.1972, in F&R, 08.01.1972).
588 His AA had been involved in those negotiations at least since October 1967. – BAK, B136/2992, Memo from Bundeskanzleramt, 03.04.1970.
589 PAAA,B34/757, Annotation on the Conversation between Chancellor Brandt and President Kaunda,19.10.1970.
590 In an interview to the Tanzanian newspaper Sunday News (19.12.1971), Minister Erhard Eppler admitted that the controversy around Cahora Bassa led Bonn to refuse guarantees for uranium prospecting in Namibia. – F&R,08.01.1972.
Mixed Commission’s reactivation\textsuperscript{591}. The other was Bonn’s refusal to raise the \textit{Hermes} cover for the Cahora Bassa project. Although the Head of the Chancellery Horst Ehmke wrote to the President of \textit{BDI} Fritz Berg reassuring him that Bonn’s commitment to the ‘separation’ of foreign trade and foreign policy had not changed\textsuperscript{592}, the German industrialists grew sceptical – much to the government’s concern.\textsuperscript{593} In September, during meetings for the reactivation of the Mixed Commission, the \textit{BDI} made a point of highlighting that the private sector should be at the forefront of the proceedings.\textsuperscript{594} It soon implemented this vision: on 17 December 1970, the \textit{BDI} committed itself to a practical intensification of cooperation with its Portuguese counterpart \textit{AIP} and with \textit{CCILA}, independent of an eventual formal re-establishment of the Mixed Commission. The associations decided to operate through task-forces directed at specific industries and, although they invited the public authorities to participate, the process was to be coordinated by these private agents.\textsuperscript{595} Thereafter neither Bonn nor Lisbon made any further attempts to revive the Mixed Commission.\textsuperscript{596} The issue sporadically came up within the \textit{BMWi}, but the final position was that the scope of such a commission had been overtaken by the private initiative and by Portugal’s economic boom.\textsuperscript{597}

Just as the German industrialists were reinforcing the autonomous character of business coordination between the two states, however, a new link was forming between the Portuguese industrialists and a section of the FRG’s political power. At the invitation of the \textit{BMWi}, Director-General of \textit{AIP} Mário Neves visited the FRG in late September 1970 and met with delegates from the three factions of the \textit{Bundestag} to discuss the issue of Portugal’s economic rapprochement with Europe. As a result, the unofficial Committee for European and International Cooperation (\textit{KeiZ}) – which included MPs from the three German parliamentary parties – decided to pay closer attention to the Portuguese case. In order to understand the local context the \textit{KeiZ} made the first of its many trips organised by the \textit{AIP} to Portugal between 13 and 21 March 1971. The delegation visited the southern region of Alentejo and the industrialised area

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{591} BAK, B102/288144, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 07.10.1970.
\textsuperscript{592} BAK, B136/2992, Letter from Horst Ehmke to Fritz Berg, 11.08.1970.
\textsuperscript{593} BAK, B136/2992, underlined copy of “Industrie befürchtet Politisierung des Exportgeschäfts”, \textit{FAZ}, 10.09.1970.
\textsuperscript{594} PAAA, B60/785, Memo from the \textit{BMWi}, 01.10.1970.
\textsuperscript{596} BAK, B102/288144, Memo from the \textit{BMWi}, 01.03.1974.
\textsuperscript{597} BAK, B102/288144, Memo from the \textit{BMWi}, 28.02.1974.
\end{footnotesize}
in the north of the country, as well as Lisbon, and it reported its conclusions to the federal government.598

The KeiZ’s report was able to distinguish three groups represented within Portugal’s single-party system. The “traditionalists/feudalists” (estimated 20-25% of the parliamentary seats) were headed by ex-Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira – who had left office in October 1969 – and were composed of military elites as well as landowners and other faces of Portugal’s ‘big capital’, including a few industrialists. This group – in practice, the ‘ultras’ – was the true successor to Salazar’s worldview and it opposed Caetano’s reforms as well as the notion of a Portuguese opening to Europe, preferring to capitalise on the economic potential of the colonial empire. The “national-conservative reformers” (20-25% of the seats) were a middle-of-the-road group which accepted some of the reforms, but was suspicious of actual democratisation. Finally, the “liberal-democrats” (around 50% of the seats) – in practice, the ‘modernists’ – were the basis for the reform efforts. They sought a democratic constitution, the general improvement of living standards through a modern economic and social policy, education reform, and Portugal’s rapprochement with the European community. Many of them regarded Caetano’s ‘participative and progressive autonomy’ formula for Africa as an intermediate stage before dissociation from the colonies – they did not believe in a “Portuguese unitary state with autonomous regions”, but they argued that the Portuguese mainland first needed to be economically strengthened and modernised so that it could “sustain the disengagement” and accommodate the returned settlers. Importantly, they rejected “abrupt changes” and “revolutionary situations” in either Portugal or its overseas territories, preferring to pursue their goals through the “consistent continuation of a decisive reform policy”. In turn, the non-parliamentary opposition was mostly bundled together as “communists-anarchists, etc” and described as “not very strong numerically, but a well-trained group due to its long underground-existence”. The report speculated that if the formation of parties were permitted, the ones representing the ‘liberal-democrats’ “would surely achieve a big majority” in parliament.599

Although the German committee claimed to have been scrupulously allowed to talk to representatives from all political strands, except for the “extremist forces”600, the

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598 PAAAA,B60/929, Report from the KeiZ, April 1971.
599 ibid
600 ibid
The report was clearly heavily influenced by the organisers of the trip, i.e. the ‘modernist’ sections of the Lisbon regime. The *KeiZ* estimated a large progressive base within the dictatorship: its definition of “liberal-democrats” extended much beyond the independent parliamentary ‘liberal wing’ – which was actually composed of only 19 out of 130 MPs[^601] – and it admittedly included members of the dictatorship’s state-party. Ultimately, the committee shared the ‘modernists’ belief that they could change the system from within, as well as their faith that Caetano was inclined towards structural reform and only lacked the material and political conditions to undertake it. More than that, the *KeiZ* seemed to share their very liberal assumption that economic modernisation would automatically translate into political change. Thus the report’s recommendations ended up reproducing the ‘modernists’ wishes for European economic support: “A determined support from the [FRG] – and naturally from the EEC – must encompass the areas of economic cooperation, targeted financial and technical assistance [and] educational endowment for executives but also for skilled workers.” In turn, the report discouraged the pursuit of “ideologised aid”, i.e. the imposition by Bonn of “democratic principles”. It argued that Portugal should be allowed to change by itself, postulating: “Interference from the outside would only disrupt the already initiated transformation in Portugal. This also applies to the problem of the ‘overseas provinces’.”[^602] In other words, in order for support to work, it had to be unconditional:

> “Due to the unstable political base for the realisation of reform projects and due to the plain difficulties of clearing up traditions, engrained ideas and out-dated worldviews, Caetano’s government – to put it better, Caetano and his actual team, since the government is not completely uniform either – relies on quick visible success. If Portugal, instead of support, is to expect indifference or critique and hostility, this reform policy will fall apart. The reaction of the far-right and the inevitable actions of the far-left would create a situation in Portugal which would greatly worry the whole West.”[^603]


[^603]: PAAA,B60/929, Report from the *KeiZ*, April 1971.
The KeiZ’s views were shared by the German Ambassador to Portugal, Ehrenfried von Holleben. Having arrived in Lisbon in early 1971, von Holleben began to report extensively about the ‘liberal wing’ and SEDES, an association with an exceptional degree of independence from the state, aimed at studying and promoting Portugal’s social and economic development.604 The ambassador became a passionate advocate of the strategy of welcoming Portugal into Europe in order to empower Caetano and the ‘modernists’ against the ‘ultras’605, thus subscribing to the notion that Portugal’s rapprochement with Europe would be made at the expense of its African interests. Such a notion was certainly not a German invention, as it informed a lively debate within the dictatorship itself, namely between the more extreme Africa-oriented section and the more extreme Europe-oriented one.606 Notably, von Holleben did not just advocate this theory to his superiors in Bonn, but also to his colleague ambassadors in Lisbon.607 On 5 November 1971, after talking to Rogério Martins, the ambassador complained to the AA, in his typically verbose and emphatic style, that the work of “Caetano and his progressive team” was not being sufficiently appreciated in Europe: “Every Portuguese with experience abroad, especially those who participate in international conferences, is still seen as an ‘abscess’ in the European world – like an ‘illness’, whose healing process one wishes is made visible in order to then be able to help.”608

The notion of promoting a rapprochement with Europe translated into practical steps in Bonn. Portugal’s application for associate status in the Common Market was publicly and privately endorsed, not only by von Holleben609, but also by Foreign Minister Walter Scheel610 and Minister for Economics Karl Schiller.611 Admittedly, this was not a major concession on Bonn’s part, since unlike some of its EEC partners the FRG’s northern European agriculture was not threatened by the Portuguese plum tomato; still, it was a political matter.612 Walter Scheel’s office even toyed with the idea of having the German Foreign Minister express in all privacy to his Portuguese counterpart his sincere wishes that Portugal’s economic development could speed up a

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604 A collection of his related dispatches can be found in PAAA, B26/444 and B26/445.
605 PAAA, B26/444, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon,28.07.1971.
607 AD/MAE Europe 1944… Portugal 3506, Dispatch from the French Embassy in Lisbon, 30.08.1971.
608 PAAA, B26/444, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon,05.11.1971.
609 Informações (CCILA), 01.06.1971.
610 AD/MNE,PEA,M683,Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,21.04.1971.
611 BA-MA,BW1/66542, Memo from the BMVg, January 1970.
612 PAAA,B26/445, Speaking Notes of Walter Scheel for the talk with Rui Patrício,18.05.1972.
solution for the African question. Simultaneously, the KeiZ tightened its partnership with the AIP. Together, they organised a political-economic conference in Lisbon with presentations about development policies (6-10 October 1971). A second conference followed (5-9 April 1972), this time focusing on three key topics: ‘Enlargement of the European Community’, ‘Consequences/Solutions for the Portuguese Economy’ and ‘Problems of Europe’s Competition Policy’. Contrary to what this strand had theorised, after the EEC trade agreement was signed on 22 July 1972, ‘ultra-colonialists’ like Franco Nogueira held ever more political power in Lisbon than the Europeanists. Indeed, in 1972 the main faces of the ‘liberal wing’ resigned from parliament, disappointed with marcelismo, and each of the technocrats either voluntarily left the government or was forced out. As became evident, a Europe-oriented economy did not preclude an Africa-centred policy. For all the inflamed and bizarrely contradictory speeches by Franco Nogueira, in practice his political wing had been strategically accepting the Europeanization of the Portuguese economy at least since the creation of EFTA in 1960. Indeed, by 1970 the EEC countries had already been buying 41.9% of Portugal’s exports and supplying 48.8% of its imports. European trade was thus clearly not an antidote to Lisbon’s colonial policy. On the contrary, it was its financial backer.

Nevertheless, throughout this period delegations from the KeiZ and AIP continued to meet twice a year in either Lisbon or Bonn to debate the development of Portugal’s ties to the Common Market. These meetings were attended by MPs, industrialists, high officials and technical personnel from different public departments.

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613 PAAA,B26/445, Speaking Notes of Walter Scheel for the talk with Rui Patrício, 13.04.1972, marked „Only address in opportune occasion and between four eyes“.
614 PAAA,B26/446, Memo from the KeiZ, 24.09.1971.
617 In a famous parliamentary debate on 8 April 1970, Nogueira declared that A) European integration was a disintegrating myth, B) if Portugal were to integrate the Common Market, Portugal would be “colonised” by Europe and then Europe would “colonise” the Portuguese overseas territories, and C) that would somehow also lead to the loss of Portugal’s national independence to Spain.
619 Romão, António. 1996. «Comércio Externo». In Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Vol.I. Brito, José Maria Brandão and Rosas, Fernando (eds.). Lisbon: Circulo de Leitores, pp.168-171; At the time, 43% of Portugal’s commerce with the EEC was with West Germany (PAAA, B26/444, Politischer Jahresbericht 1970 über Portugal, 12.08.1970).
The KeiZ may not have achieved the political change in Lisbon it had desired, but it managed to promote an informal forum to discuss projects of cooperation which were beneficial for economic groups on both sides, effectively taking the place of the ill-fated Mixed Commission.620

4. The debate over development aid

The combination of the controversy over Cahora Bassa and the theory of Portugal’s rapprochement with Europe spurred a debate within the federal government which came to focus on the issue of development aid to the Portuguese dictatorship. Bonn’s foreign development aid policy (Entwicklungspolitik) was handled by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMZ), which during this period was headed by Erhard Eppler, of the SPD’s left wing. Yet Entwicklungspolitik was also inextricably tied to foreign policy – it had traditionally embodied the ‘carrot’ in the ‘carrot and stick’ approach of the Hallstein doctrine621 – as well as to economic policy, since it promoted the export of capital. Credit decisions therefore had to be coordinated between the BMZ, the AA and the BMWi.622 Thus the topic of development aid exposed the views of each ministry regarding Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon.

The federal government had been providing Lisbon with aid credits since 1961. That year, the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau had agreed to lend Portugal DM 150 million, two thirds of which were to be invested in an irrigation plan in Alentejo.623 In 1968 Kiesinger’s Grand Coalition government granted an extra DM 25 million in aid credits for the Alentejo irrigation plan and for a dam in Odivelas.624 In addition, Bonn provided around DM 4 million in technical aid.625 The DM 125 million financed a number of hydro-agrarian development schemes in Alentejo626, which were closely

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620 AHD-MNE,PEA,M756,Pr331, Report from AIP,20.09.1973; In this regard, the last significant meeting between the two countries’ industrial lobbies was the trip to Portugal of a delegation from BDI on 13/14 March 1974. – BAK,B102/288144, Memo from BDI,18.03.1974
622 Informações (CCILA), 01.05.1969
623 The remaining DM 50 Million were for the construction of the airports in Lisbon, Oporto, Faro and Funchal. The credit interest was 3.25% per year, with a grace period of 5 years and repayment over 20 years for the Alentejo project. – Pais, Artur. 2002. Contributos para a História da Base Aérea n.º11 e do Projecto do Aeroporto de Beja, Beja: Artur Pais. pp.62,63
624 PAAA,B60/929, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon,21.08.1968
625 PAAA,B26/445, Memo from the AA,08.07.1971
626 Including the construction of dams in the rivers Mira, Caia, Roxo and Divor
followed by technical missions from the KfW.\textsuperscript{627} This dimension of Bonn’s policy became more complicated in 1969, when Lisbon requested credit for a new stage of the plan, including the construction of a dam in the Alqueva River. Having other budgetary priorities, the BMWi proved reluctant to finance the project. In December, a newly FDP-led Auswärtiges Amt, wishing to avoid any strain on the relations with Lisbon, decided not to inform the Portuguese authorities of this turn of events, telling them instead that a final decision would be taken later in the following year. The AA hoped to wait until the imminent approval of West German funding for a similar irrigation scheme in Spain, in order to then be able to convince the other ministries to accept Portugal’s request on the basis of Iberian parity.\textsuperscript{628}

Serious intra-governmental discussion on this issue ensued. On 24 June 1970, the Political Director of the BMZ Ulrich Börnstein wrote to the AA asking that Portuguese requests for additional aid credits be refused. The dispatch referred to both technical and political issues. Firstly, it argued that Portugal had reached a stage of economic development which did not justify Bonn’s aid. According to Börnstein, by being a member of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Portugal should not even qualify as a developing nation. Secondly, the document argued that these credits would invite a critical reaction in the FRG’s public opinion. In this regard, Börnstein mentioned a recent backlash against Minister Eppler for – reluctantly – having subsidised the aforementioned irrigation scheme in Franco’s Spain, which had evidenced the high level of public scrutiny over Bonn’s development policy. Börnstein explained that in the case of Portugal, because of its colonialist status, the backlash over this aid would extend to the Third World. Just as in the case of Cahora Bassa, aid to Portugal could end up seriously undermining the credibility of Bonn’s Entwicklungspolitik.\textsuperscript{629}

The Ministry for Economics, which received a copy of the BMZ’s dispatch, was less authoritative. An internal memo of the BMWi listed the various arguments in support of funding the Alqueva plan. On the question of whether or not Portugal was a developing country, the memo noted that an OECD report from October 1969 did list it

\textsuperscript{627} PAAA, B60/929, Memo from the Portuguese Foreign Office, 14.02.1969; AHD-MNE, EEA, M438, Pr.42, Memo from the Portuguese Public Credit Board (Junta do Crédito Público), 30.09.1971

\textsuperscript{628} PAAA, B60/929, Memo from the BMWi, 19.05.1969, Dispatch from the AA to the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 05.12.1969.

\textsuperscript{629} PAAA, B60/929, Dispatch from the BMZ to the AA, 24.06.1970.
as one of OECD’s “Developing Member Countries”. The memo pointed out that Portugal’s per capita income was low even by non-European standards, being lower than Chile’s and only slightly higher than Peru’s. Further arguments in favour of providing aid credits to Portugal included the promise of German-Portuguese economic cooperation dating back to the 1961 Protocol, the fact that stimulating the Portuguese economy would be beneficial for West German trade with the country, the FRG’s highly favourable credit balance with Portugal and Marcelo Caetano’s signs of openness and democratic reform. While in principle the BMWi was not opposed to providing aid to Portugal, however, it took into account the BMZ’s second point, regarding public opinion. Thus its cautious official position, stated on 28 July 1970, was that the granting of further aid was “not advisable under the current circumstances”.

By contrast, the Auswärtiges Amt challenged both arguments of the BMZ, which it considered to be solely motivated by ideological antipathy towards Lisbon’s colonial policy and type of regime. A memo from the AA’s Section for Foreign Trade, Development Policy and European Economic Integration quoted Otto von Bismarck, who in 1886 had remarked that the basis for foreign policy was not the “cosy interest” that other countries have “justice and fairness”. Prioritising instead what it interpreted as Bonn’s national interest, the section called a meeting of the ministry’s related departments and political sections for 29 July to try to come up with an official AA response. They were to take into account that financing the Alqueva plan would promote not just economic development, but social development as well, which would foster Caetano’s efforts towards Portugal’s liberalisation and its rapprochement with the EEC. Moreover, granting aid could help Bonn’s case in other economic negotiations, such as pending German assets seized by Portugal in the aftermath of WWII and Lisbon’s imminent decision on whether or not to adopt the PAL colour television system, developed in the FRG. Conversely, Lisbon – a NATO ally – would not comprehend Bonn’s refusal to grant credit to Portugal shortly after having granted it

630 As the dispatch acknowledged, while it was true that Portugal was member of DAC, in practice Lisbon was only providing development aid to its own colonial territories, not to other countries, a few contributions to UN agencies notwithstanding.
631 PAAA, B60/929, Memo from the BMWi, 02.07.1970.
632 PAAA, B60/929, Dispatch from the BMWi to the AA, 28.07.1970.
to Spain. Because the Alqueva project, unlike Cahora Bassa, would take place in the Portuguese mainland, no comparable African protests were expected.633

Further voices made the case for granting aid to Lisbon. Upon his visit to the FRG in September 1970, Director-General of AIP Mário Neves was invited by the BMWi to discuss Portugal’s development with representatives of the BMZ. Neves explained to them that the Portuguese economy still needed a stronger industrialisation in order to stabilise and reach European standards.634 Likewise the position of Ambassador von Holleben was not surprising. He noted that telling Lisbon that Bonn was unwilling to support the project just because of the protests against Cahora Bassa was not likely to generate much Portuguese sympathy. In turn, according to the ambassador, a West German contribution to the country’s economic and social development would strengthen Caetano’s social reforms, giving the prime minister leverage for further political undertakings.635 Meanwhile, the KeiZ agreed to lobby Lisbon’s request to the Bundestag and to the federal government, passing along information documents about the Alqueva scheme prepared by the Commercial Attaché of the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn.636

For the dictatorship, the situation did not seem hopeless. In December 1970, the Portuguese Finance Ministry still argued that Lisbon should not even search for alternative external sponsors for the Alqueva project before assessing Bonn’s final position.637 The following year, the federal government gave a sign of goodwill by prolonging an agreement for the creation of a centre for experimentation and technical support to agriculture in Alentejo – originally signed in 1968 and set to expire on 6 June 1971 – for an extra year and a half.638 In July, the KeiZ informed Caetano’s government that the conditions were favourable for a Portuguese request of a DM 220 Million credit for the construction of the Alqueva dam.639 According to MP Erwin Lange (SPD) – who had headed the KeiZ’s delegation to Portugal earlier that year – ultimately the credit depended on “momentary political circumstances” – i.e. on the

633 PAAA, B60/929, Memo from the AA, 29.07.1970 – The point about Cahora Bassa was challenged by a handwritten note on the memo.
634 PAAA, B60/785, Minute from the Foreign Trade Department of the BMWi, 01.10.1970.
635 PAAA, B60/929, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 09.02.1971.
636 AHD-MNE, EEA, M432, Pr.42, Dispatch from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 04.07.1971.
638 AHD-MNE, EEA, M438, Pr.42, Note for the Portuguese Minister for Agriculture, 01.09.1971.
pragmatic BMWi – not on Erhard Eppler’s attitude, since that minister had no veto power in the matter.640

However, Eppler’s importance stretched beyond his formal power. The minister was gaining a reputation as an outspoken advocate for an assertive position against the Portuguese dictatorship. In an interview with the newspaper Schwäbisches Tagblatt of 5 October 1970, he condemned NATO’s passive acceptance of Portuguese colonialism, asking “How much longer will the Portuguese tail still be allowed to wag with the NATO dog?”. 641 Eppler insisted on this point on 20 November, during an interview to the weekly Christ und Welt in which he declared:

“With regards to the Portuguese colonies, my actual opinion is that the people from Mozambique or Angola have the same right to self-determination as we do. The Portuguese colonial policy is an anachronism whose disappearance is in the NATO countries’ best interest.” 642

In fact, Erhard Eppler was in a complicated position himself. As Walter Scheel explained to the Portuguese Embassy, the main defiance did not necessarily come from the minister, but from the BMZ employees. Scheel – himself a former minister of the BMZ – commented that there had been a recent radicalisation of that institution, which was the cause of great concern for the AA.643 This was primarily the case with the volunteers of the BMZ-supervised German Development Service DED – the FRG’s version of the US Peace Corps. German development workers in the Third World were joining protests against local regimes and often condemning Bonn’s policy, which caused a headache for the FRG’s diplomats. Many of these workers returned home to form the activist ranks of the solidarity movement – as described on chapter 2 – while others campaigned from abroad.644 Eppler, who had initially embraced this politicisation as part of the SPD’s tactical – yet not necessarily cynical – effort to co-opt the disenfranchised German youth back into the SPD645, recognised the flipside of such

642 Ibid
644 “Entwicklungshelfer: Häßliche Deutsche”, Der Spiegel,13.09.1971,pp.46,49; In December 1970, a group of 36 DED volunteers in Tanzania interviewed FRELIMO Vice-President Marcelino dos Santos, who accused the Bonn government of supporting the Portuguese in the colonial wars. The volunteers’ interview and an open letter were sent to 60 German newspapers and can be found in F&R,09.01.1971.
an intense ideological thrust. He insistently called for the DED to adopt a more balanced position towards world affairs – what he termed a ‘critical solidarity’. In October 1970, one of the volunteers wrote an open letter to the minister condemning this notion. She deemed regimes such as the Portuguese unworthy of solidarity, recalling that, like them, Adolf Hitler had also promoted development at the cost of human suffering. Hence the letter accused Bonn of unethical complicity:

“[…] Personally, I want to give solidarity […] to the Africans forced to fight for their independence and self-determination. As an employee of the DED, as a German, however, I belong to a nation whose leaders help prevent just that, through the direct economic support (and indirectly also moral and military support) of the white, racist, colonialist and imperialist domination of southern Africa. […]”

Erhard Eppler found himself reproducing the same ambiguity which marked Bonn’s overall policy towards Portugal. On the one hand, the minister admitted that, despite his provocative assertions, he was unwilling to endorse actual economic sanctions against Lisbon or the colonies. Eppler explained to a Tanzanian newspaper that a “country whose national product comprises 20 per cent exports cannot choose the countries to trade with from the point of view of whether their system is regarded as good or bad”. In his reply to the aforementioned letter, Eppler also made an analogy between the West German Portugal-policy and neue Ostpolitik:

“You are shocked that a government that calls for critical solidarity admits trade with South Africa, does not revoke the permit for [Cahora] Bassa, receives Suharto. Maybe I can further complete the record of this government’s sins, according to the moral criteria you establish. This government seeks an understanding with the countries that, two years ago, suffocated with their weapons a Czechoslovak effort towards socialism with a human dimension. It talks to those who order shooting at the wall of shame, in Berlin.”

646 AHD-MNE,PEA,M683,Pr.331, Open Letter from Christa Brandt to Erhard Eppler, October 1970 [translated from Portuguese].
648 AHD-MNE,PEA,M683,Pr.331, Open Letter from Erhard Eppler to Christa Brandt. [translated from Portuguese].
On the other hand, Eppler used his limited power within the government to make political statements against Portuguese colonialism. In 1972, while renewing the law that ensured tax relief for investments in developing nations, the BMZ introduced an annex explicitly excluding investments in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, as well as in Rhodesia and Namibia. The Portuguese ambassador in Bonn recognised that the practical effects of the annex would be insignificant for the Lisbon regime, given the very small amount of West German investments in the colonies, not to mention the fact that investments in metropolitan Portugal were to remain included in the law. Nevertheless, the ambassador protested vehemently against what he considered to be the “discriminatory character” of the addendum. His demarches did not prevent the annex from going to the Bundestag, although they did convince the federal authorities to change the wording, if not the content. The final text did not name any specific regions, but stated that “territories outside Europe belonging to or dependent on European countries cannot be considered developing nations for the purposes of this law”. The annex gathered enough votes in the Bundestag, despite loud protests from the CSU opposition, which accused it of institutionalising the “global defamation campaign” against Cahora Bassa.

The peculiar Portuguese case made the Ministry for Economic Cooperation fight against the attribution of aid, while the self-professed realist AA pushed the virtues of development. Internally, the AA even admitted explicitly that it needed to make sure that someone from its staff with a background on Iberian agriculture was ensured a place at the inter-ministerial meetings; otherwise there was the risk that the BMZ could block any plans for Alentejo. Coming from different positions, both ministries agreed on the end-goal of Portuguese decolonisation. Yet while Eppler’s declarations suggested a confrontational stance against Lisbon, the AA made a clear distinction between the African territories and metropolitan Portugal, rationalising aid to the latter as part of a wider strategy. This view was typified by the First Secretary of the AA’s Department for Sub-Saharan Africa Peter Maier-Oswald in a long report of his trip to Angola and Mozambique in May 1972. Maier-Oswald acknowledged that West

649 AHD-MNE, PEA, M727, Pr331, Dispatch from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 27.10.1972; From 1952 to 1972, the FRG had invested DM 1.23 Billion in Africa, but only DM 0.9 Million in Angola and DM 0.1 Million in Mozambique. – Schroers (1998), p.88.
650 Most likely the AA, given Walter Scheel’s reaction to this subject in the meeting with Ambassador Freitas Cruz in 28 January 1972 – AHD-MNE, PEA, M727, Pr331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,31.01.1972.
651 AHD-MNE, PEA, M727, Pr331, Dispatch from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,27.10.1972.
652 PAAA,B60/851, Memo from the AA,11.05.1971.
German economic aid would contribute to the strengthening of Portugal and consequently also to the strengthening of the Portuguese position in the colonies. Nevertheless, he insisted that “it would be easier for an economically and politically strong Portugal to give up the overseas territories”, not the least because of Lisbon’s fear of being absorbed by Europe if it did not have a clear “separate identity”.653

By 1973, the erosion of the dictatorship’s image in the FRG’s public sphere took its toll. Despite signs of openness on the German side, the request for funding for the Alqueva project, delayed for budgetary reasons654, had missed its window of opportunity. In April, the Federal Parliamentary State Secretary for Economics and the Head of the KeiZ explained to the leaders of AIP that, because of public opinion, the government and the parliamentary committee now found it considerably more difficult to defend Portuguese interests in that specific regard.655 Timing had worked against the AA’s plan of developing Portugal while staying away from the Portuguese empire: ironically, the federal government had given up on its support for the dam in Alentejo while sticking with its support for the dam in Mozambique.

**Conclusion**

Bonn’s policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship in the economic field had both economic and political implications. While the federal government insisted that the latter should not interfere with the former, it could not fully prevent the former from interfering with the latter.

The main political factor working against the FRG’s friendly economic relations with Portugal, i.e. promoting their discontinuity, was the controversial nature of the Portuguese dictatorship in public opinion, particularly its colonialist dimension. In no case was this more manifest than in the case of the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam in Mozambique, with West German state credit guarantees. FRELIMO’s successful mobilisation of African leaders and, crucially, West German protesters lent great force to the demand for the federal government to withdraw from the enterprise. While the campaign did not effectively achieve Bonn’s disengagement from Cahora Bassa, it prevented the federal authorities from extending further credit cover for the

654 PAAA, B26/445, Memo from the AA, 25.08.1971.
project in the summer of 1970 and it discouraged them from pursuing similar ventures elsewhere. In particular the anti-Portuguese public mood discouraged the government from providing Lisbon with the requested credit to finance the Alqueva dam, in Alentejo. Although the BMWi was not fundamentally opposed to granting this credit, it caved in to concerns over the possible negative impact in public opinion.

A second factor threatening Bonn’s policy towards the Lisbon dictatorship in the economic field was the determined anti-colonialist stance of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation, led by Erhard Eppler. The BMZ, which opposed providing development aid to Portugal, proved instrumental in convincing the more pragmatic BMWi not to fund the Alqueva project. In a noteworthy symbolic gesture, Eppler’s ministry also managed to remove tax benefits for eventual West German investments in the Portuguese colonies. Indeed, Minister Erhard Eppler became the main voice speaking against Lisbon from within the government, even if he was ultimately more pragmatic than some of the forces within the BMZ.

These aspects did not seriously disturb West German-Portuguese economic relations, as a number of factors contributed to their continuity and even intensification. First and foremost was the fact that the two economies reached a high level of reciprocity during the Brandt/Caetano era, especially during the earlier years, taking advantage of the expansionist momentum both countries were going through at the time. The Portuguese industrialisation stimulated German exports – particularly of equipment and machinery – as well as business investments. It thus furthered the FRG’s exports industry, which was a major driving force of West German productivity, and allowed for a greater internationalisation of German capital. The latter aspect was of great importance for Bonn, since the FRG’s uneven balance of payments made it difficult to reevaluate its capital. This German concern coupled with the Portuguese quest for liberalisation and modernisation led to a renewal of West German-Portuguese cooperation. Although technocrats like undersecretaries of state Rogério Martins and Xavier Pintado were a minority – and revealingly not granted the title of ‘minister’ – within the Caetano government, they were able to work together with the BMWi to boost both countries’ economies. From December 1970, however, government agents were mostly pushed aside by private industrial associations such as the BDI, CCILA and AIP.

The AA and the BMWi certainly had economic considerations in mind, but direct interests in Portugal are not enough to explain Bonn’s cooperative stance against such a
turbulent background. Although their relationship was mutually beneficial, undoubtedly it was Lisbon who benefited the most. In fact, Portugal’s economic penetration of the FRG was not very significant, nor was its weight in West German trade as a whole. Therefore, while both countries had interest in a positive evolution of their economic relations, Portugal was clearly much more dependent on it. Despite this disproportional advantage, the FRG was not in a position to pressure the Caetano regime on political matters due to Bonn’s adherence to the principle of ‘separation’ between economy and foreign policy. Bonn backed up this adherence with multiple arguments. In a practical sense, this avoided creating a precedent; compromising economic relations with the Portuguese regime for political reasons could put into question the FRG’s economic relations with other, more lucrative, controversial regimes, which was a fearful scenario for a country with such a high level of dependency on foreign trade. Ideologically, the FDP and even the SPD respected the right of the private sector to pursue business with Portugal in the context of free market capitalism. Finally, in a more immediate political sense, the principle of backing profitable business ventures without passing judgment on the states where they took place was the backbone of the crucial economic dimension of neue Ostpolitik.

While this principle played a decisive role in the controversy over Cahora Bassa, it was not the only factor to support Bonn’s continued commitment to the project. The federal government feared that breaching its initial agreement might hinder Bonn’s relations with the various parties involved in the enterprise. It might hinder Bonn’s relations with the companies and the business world in general by discrediting the reliability of the guarantees provided by the Hermes cover. It might hinder Bonn’s relations with Paris – an important West German ally, particularly in the context of the negotiations of the quadripartite agreement over Berlin. It might hinder relations with Lisbon, driving the Portuguese dictatorship into a more hard-line isolationist position.

Tied to this last point was the theory that Portugal’s rapprochement with Europe would facilitate Lisbon’s disengagement from the colonies. According to this view, the strengthening of Portugal’s economy in a European context would empower the more progressive forces of the dictatorship, giving them leverage over the ‘ultras’ like Franco Nogueira, who insisted that Portugal’s priorities lay in Africa. Consequently, assisting Lisbon’s European policy was a roundabout way to challenge its African policy. Although not a completely innovative theory, this notion gained fervent advocates during the period, including the Bundestag’s Committee for European and International
Cooperation, the German Ambassador Ehrenfried von Holleben and the ‘modernist’ sections of the Portuguese dictatorship itself. The theory was particularly influential in the Auswärtiges Amt, which lobbied in favour of further development credit for Portugal and supported Lisbon in the negotiations leading up to the EEC trade agreement. However, because of the need to sell the European option to the Portuguese political elites, proponents of this theory argued that there should not be any explicit linkage between European support and Portuguese decolonisation. This position embodied the hope in Caetano’s reformism and in the influence of the ‘modernists’, as well as the idea that economic liberalisation would by itself be sufficient to promote political liberalisation. In other words, this group had argued itself into giving the Portuguese dictatorship the best economic advantages in exchange for as few clear political concessions and commitments as possible on the behalf of the Portuguese.

In conclusion, while Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon in the economic field became a contentious matter within the FRG and even within the federal government, it was highly positive for Portugal. The German economic input supported Portugal’s industrial expansion and helped compensate the costs of the colonial wars. The ‘modernists’ obtained diplomatic support in their efforts to lead Portugal closer to the EEC. The ‘ultras’ secured Cahora Bassa, a huge colonialist enterprise. Rogério Martins gained a trade agreement; Franco Nogueira gained a dam. The dualist interpretation of Portuguese geopolitics according to which the strengthening of Lisbon’s interests in Europe would symmetrically weaken its Africanist tendencies misunderstood the complementary relation between Portugal’s European economy and African policy. Similarly, the assumption that it was possible to ‘separate’ economic relations from foreign policy with the Portuguese dictatorship disregarded the fact that Lisbon did not clearly distinguish between the two. Bonn therefore found it hard to separate economic cooperation with the dictatorship from Portuguese colonialism, just as it was finding it hard to separate military cooperation with Lisbon from the Portuguese colonial wars.
CHAPTER 4

The price of “German grandeur”: The Military Front

1. West German-Portuguese military relations: from Adenauer to Brandt

2. In the shadow of the ‘Beja affair’

3. The inescapable issue of military supplies

4. The more ambiguous areas of cooperation

Conclusion
If the FRG’s economic relations with the Lisbon dictatorship carried with them political implications, this was even more pronounced in the case of military relations, especially given Portugal’s warfare in its colonies. With that in mind, this chapter examines Bonn’s attempts to disentangle its military links with Lisbon from Portugal’s actions in Africa. The chapter begins by explaining the historical background of the West German military entanglement with the Lisbon regime, in order to convey the precedents which informed the SPD-FDP coalition’s policy in this field. A second section focuses specifically on the significance of the Beja airbase used by the German armed forces in Portugal, which was by far the main legacy of the previous era. Taking into account the weight of these commitments, the chapter then examines how Bonn reassessed the ties between West German-Portuguese military cooperation and Portugal’s military activities in its African colonies, first with regard to the more ‘direct’ ones – the supply of military equipment used in the wars – and then with regard to the more ‘indirect’ ties – mainly the reinforcement of Portuguese military industry. This chapter thus shows how far the Brandt governments went in terms of distancing the FRG from the inherited role of material backer of the colonial wars.

1. West German-Portuguese military relations: from Adenauer to Brandt

The FRG’s military relations with the Portuguese dictatorship were closely entwined with their membership in NATO. Not only did Article 3 of the North-Atlantic Treaty encourage military cooperation between member states, but NATO’s early strategy of ‘massive retaliation’ predetermined the deployment of nuclear weapons at the very beginning of a potential conflict with the Eastern Bloc. In this scenario, if war broke out, ‘Germany’ – at the heart of the Cold War divide – would likely be the centre stage. In the late 1950s, the fact that the GDR, armed with Soviet theatre nuclear missiles, could easily target the FRG’s logistical facilities encouraged Bonn to look for alternative locations outside West German territory for armaments storage and troop retreat staging areas. In case of war, the West German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) would use this rearguard to recover and safely access material support coming from
overseas. Portugal appeared to be an ideal location for this plan, since it was, within continental Europe, the NATO country most distant from the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{656} If Bonn wanted to rebuild its military power and to establish a logistical rearguard for the eventuality of war, Lisbon was keen on modernising its outdated defence industry and obtaining financial support from West Germany. The first armament transactions between the two states were notably part of their concerted efforts to counterbalance the Portuguese trade deficit. In 1959, the Bonn government agreed to place orders of armaments and uniforms with Portugal worth millions of DM, thus stimulating the Portuguese arms and textile industries.\textsuperscript{657} What started out as an economic understanding, however, soon developed into a military accord. In January 1960, Federal Minister for Defence Franz Josef Strauß signed in Lisbon an Administrative Convention defining the parameters of military cooperation between the two states. This agreement stipulated the reciprocal use of military facilities and the storage of German war equipment in Portugal, as well as the production and acquisition of military materiel of common interest. It also promoted mutual administrative support and the free exchange between the two defence ministries of new studies of material, technical and commercial interest for both countries. In addition, Strauß’ visit marked the creation of the German-Portuguese Military Mixed Commission (GPMMC), which would serve as a liaison body between the two governments in negotiations concerning military affairs.\textsuperscript{658} In line with Bonn’s intentions of preparing a strategic rearguard, the first German requests presented through the GPMMC on 29 March 1960 were for an airbase, a network of warehouses and the assurance of Portuguese medical assistance for the Bundeswehr in case of war. Over the following years, Lisbon and Bonn agreed to a number of joint projects in order to fulfil these requests, as West Germany helped finance the construction or readjustment of the required facilities in Portugal.\textsuperscript{659}

While the initial agreements between the two ministries of defence had been handled in absolute secrecy – even the Auswärtiges Amt was kept in the dark until late


\textsuperscript{658} Fonseca (2007), pp.44,47.

1961\textsuperscript{660} – it became necessary to develop an elaborate operation to manage the various projects. Thus, in 1964, the FRG established a special military representation assigned to Portugal, the \textit{Zentrale deutsche Verbindungsstelle in Portugal (ZdVP)}. Its mission, in peacetime, was to plan and organise the logistics of the eventual supply chain of goods for the \textit{Bundeswehr} and to ensure military readiness. Additionally, the \textit{ZdVP} was meant to handle the transfers of military materiel between the German and the Portuguese Armed Forces. In wartime, the \textit{ZdVP} Commando would be the highest authority of all \textit{Bundeswehr} troops and administrative bodies stationed in Portugal, in charge of storing the goods coming from overseas and, if applicable, forwarding them to West Germany. A complimentary administrative branch of \textit{ZdVP} was responsible for management, legal advice, contract negotiation, construction businesses and military economic cooperation with Portuguese offices and companies, as well as matters related to taxes and customs. In 1966, the \textit{ZdVP}’s mission was extended to incorporate all \textit{Bundeswehr} matters in Portugal, including the coordination of the military relations between the two states. Only three years after its inception, by 1967, the \textit{ZdVP} was already employing 100 persons\textsuperscript{661}.

For Lisbon the close military relations with the FRG played a significant role as well, particularly in the context of the dictatorship’s military activities in Africa, much to the chagrin of Bonn’s diplomats. Since the early 1960s, the FRG helped modernise Portugal’s defence industry with German planning, equipment and credit. Bonn also became Portugal’s biggest provider of military hardware, supplying practically all of the infantry armament used in the colonial wars, as well as several vehicles and military equipment.\textsuperscript{662} The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} opposed many of these deliveries from the outset, warning that they could damage West Germany’s international prestige, particularly in the Third World. However, Strauß and Adenauer, who both shared great personal sympathy for Salazar’s regime, considered support for the Lisbon dictatorship a preferable alternative to its possible weakening and the consequent rise of Iberian communism.\textsuperscript{663} In addition, military cooperation with Portugal was encouraged by the \textit{BMWi}, because it furthered West German ambitions in the international aircraft

\textsuperscript{660} AAPBD 1968, Doc. 330.
\textsuperscript{663} Fonseca (2007), p.156.
In turn, the governments under Ludwig Erhard and Kurt-Georg Kiesinger came to see the issue of military supplies as an increasingly political affair which could no longer be treated chiefly as a military-economic matter. In this vein, the Federal Ministry for Defence ($BMVg$), which had in the early years arranged the arms deals with the Salazar dictatorship with relative autonomy, came to rely more and more on authorisation from the $AA$ which now carefully scrutinised Lisbon’s requests on a case by case basis.\(^665\)

More than this newfound watchfulness over arms sales, the Grand Coalition’s biggest blow to West German-Portuguese military cooperation was its decision to suspend or divest from most of Bonn’s military projects in Portugal. While this step might have signalled an early manifestation of the SPD’s critical stance towards the Portuguese colonial wars, the considerations behind it were markedly financial and strategic. On the former plane, the recession of 1966-1967 led to the reduction of the federal defence budget.\(^666\) On the latter, NATO, in response to the Warsaw Pacts’ increased military strength, had amended its defence strategy, replacing the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ with one of ‘flexible response’. Under the new strategy – which dated back to 1961 – Eastern aggression would be met with an ‘appropriate level’ of response, instead of a full blown nuclear attack. Consequently, as many troops as possible were now needed at the front line in the earlier stages of the conflict. The idea of a logistical rearguard, which had been at the core of the West German-Portuguese cooperation, lost much of its appeal.\(^667\)

The blow was somewhat softened by NATO’s instability during this period, including the threat of imminent dissolution. The Atlantic Alliance underwent a crisis of its own with Charles de Gaulle’s 1966 decision to remove all French armed forces from NATO's integrated military command. In this context, the idea of replacing Portugal’s NATO membership with a bilateral military understanding with France became an

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\(^{664}\) Fonseca (2007), pp.165-166.

\(^{665}\) The Portuguese authorities also perceived this shift. Ambassador Homem de Mello wrote to the Portuguese Foreign Minister in January 1967 noting that “so far, negotiations [on a working level] have been conducted exclusively by the military, who try to keep both countries’ diplomatic services in the dark”. Realising the $AA$’s growing influence, he suggested that matters of military cooperation should henceforth be negotiated with the German ambassador, Herbert Müller-Rorschach, who was well-connected within the federal government, limiting the military’s role to technical advice. (AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A) Pr332,30, Letter from Homem de Mello to Franco Nogueira, 03.01.1967). Müller-Rorschach, however, was acting under precise instructions not to give in to Lisbon’s further requests for German military equipment. (Fonseca (2007), p.19).


appealing option to Lisbon, particularly if NATO was seen as failing to support Portuguese interests in Africa. In Bonn’s perspective, however, this alternative presented a worrisome scenario, since it might cost the Atlantic Alliance the strategic Lajes Airbase.\textsuperscript{668} Portugal’s withdrawal might also sever NATO’s indirect connection with Spain, which was bound to Portugal by the Iberian Pact.\textsuperscript{669} These fears, together with the contracts and compromises already established between the two countries, helped secure a degree of military cooperation. In August 1968, one month before Caetano’s accession as prime minister, the Portuguese Ambassador in Bonn Manuel Homem de Mello stated his conviction that the \textit{AA}, headed by Willy Brandt, had a “better understanding” of Portuguese African policy than it had three years before. Nevertheless, the ambassador noted the “mysterious” tone that characterised the latest German-Portuguese military cooperation agreements. They had been looked into by the \textit{Bundestag}’s Defence Commission, but had not been validated in parliament, even though according to some jurists they should have been.\textsuperscript{670} This illustrates Bonn’s awareness of the controversial nature of its military relations with Lisbon, but it also shows that, for all the cutbacks on projects in Portugal, the Grand Coalition government remained determined to continue pursuing those relations. Indeed, Chancellor Kiesinger said as much during his visit to Portugal in October 1968.\textsuperscript{671} Later that year, on 26 November and 5 December, ministers for defence Sá Viana Rebelo and Gerhard Schröder renewed the validity of the bilateral treaties between the two states. They did it one year prior to the original expiry date, in 1969, due to Bonn’s worry that the possible dissolution of NATO or Portugal’s withdrawal from the organisation might jeopardise the German-Portuguese bilateral agreements.\textsuperscript{672}

When Brandt became Chancellor, in October 1969, he showed no intention of giving up on the German-Portuguese military cooperation either. While clearly not as smooth as in the early 1960s, Bonn’s military relations with Lisbon were to remain friendly.\textsuperscript{673} By then, West Germany had invested too much in Portugal already and it

\textsuperscript{668} Schroers (1998), pp.48-49.
\textsuperscript{670} AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A) Pr332,30, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 17.08.1968.
\textsuperscript{672} Fonseca (2007), pp.217-218.
\textsuperscript{673} In a meeting on 7 January 1970, the Head of the \textit{BMVg}’s Department of Administrative Affairs Ernst Wirmer assured the Portuguese Minister for Defence that the newly formed government had brought no change regarding Bonn’s friendly military relations with Lisbon (BA-MA, BW1/66542, Minute of the meeting between Wirmer and Sá Viana Rebelo, 07.01.1970). Two months later, the German Army
did not dare sacrifice that investment, as evidenced by its policy regarding the Beja airbase.

2. In the shadow of the ‘Beja affair’

One of the original 1960 Mixed Commission requests, the Beja airbase had been the most ambitious German project in Portugal. Defence Minister Strauß had conceived it as a fall-back base, which in times of peace could be used for aircraft repairs and flight instruction. Apart from being located far from the Cold War front line and forming a strategic axis with North America, Portugal had a number of other advantages: cheap labour, an average of 300 sunny days per year – which is ideal for flight training – and a thinly populated area near the Atlantic Ocean, in stark contrast with the crowded airspace over the populous West Germany.

Lisbon had ensured a good deal for itself. With the Base Accord signed on 16 December 1960 by Franz Josef Strauß and his Portuguese counterpart Júlio Botelho Moniz, Lisbon had agreed to lease Airbase No.11, near the city of Beja, in Alentejo. According to the President of the Portuguese Delegation to the GPMMC Admiral Sousa Uva, while the base represented another military target on Portuguese territory – in addition to the Lajes airbase – guaranteeing German involvement in Portugal’s anti-aerial defence was compensation enough. The Bundeswehr had thus gained permission to use the base, as well as the buildings and facilities constructed within its limits, plus the roads and railways connected to the base. The German Air Force (Luftwaffe) had been permitted to train at supersonic speeds, but only in specific areas, agreed beforehand with the Portuguese authorities. No shots were to be fired, nor any attack or defence devices to be dropped or bombs launched. The Accord had also stated that the base would remain under Portuguese sovereignty and the Bundeswehr’s troops...

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674 Strauß had originally planned for a similar project in Spain, but the FRG’s western allies feared that a Bonn-Madrid axis might affect containment negotiations with the USSR. Portugal, however, was already a NATO member. “Fehlplanung...”, Der Spiegel, 05.10.1970, Nr.41, p.26.

675 Der Tagesspiegel, 06.05.1971 (BA-MA, BH28-2/113); Pais (2002), pp.31-35,40; Schroers (1998), p.41

676 This location was chosen because it allowed for the most economical adaptation and because of the interest of the Portuguese Air Force in developing a base south of the Tagus River (Pais (2002), p.47).

there would be submitted to Portuguese law. \(^\text{678}\) Significantly, in return for the facilities, the Bundeswehr had agreed to place a considerable amount of orders to the Portuguese military industry and to keep 10 beds available at the Hamburg-Wandsbeck Military Hospital specifically for Portuguese soldiers. \(^\text{679}\)

Located 12km away from the city of Beja and about 2,000 km away from Germany, with an area of 600 ha, Bonn’s first airbase abroad had been an extravagant project. The Portuguese side had provided the necessary land and administrative and technical assistance regarding personnel and material, while the German side had handled the construction both technically and financially. \(^\text{680}\) The initial construction plans had included a 4 km jet runway, a 3.2 km runway for conventional flights, a control tower, 4 hangars and barracks for 100 pilots and about 400 soldiers. In order to accommodate all the expected military personnel (2,000), the technical and administrative personnel (800) and their respective families (2,500), German plans had also included a residential neighbourhood, a school, a hospital, two churches and leisure zones, as well as administrative buildings. Building work had begun in 1962 and it was still far from finished five years later, when the federal government ordered its suspension. \(^\text{681}\)

The project had been plagued by controversy. In addition to NATO’s new strategic concept and Bonn’s decision to decrease the federal defence budget, German authorities had failed to obtain a permit to fly regularly over Spanish territory. \(^\text{682}\) The Bundeswehr was therefore required to solicit authorisation from Madrid two weeks before each flight to Beja. \(^\text{683}\) To make matters worse, since 1966 de Gaulle’s new stance towards NATO created a similar predicament with France. This meant that if one of those two countries remained neutral in the case of war, West Germany would not be

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\(^\text{679}\) AHD-MNE, PEA, M337-A) Pr332,30, Note for the Portuguese Embassy in Madrid, 22.08.1968; Primeiro de Janeiro, 05.03.1964, in Bosgra/Krimpen (1972), p.67; Diário da Manhã, 18.06.1964, in Fonseca (2007), p.181.


\(^\text{681}\) “Fehlplanung...”, Der Spiegel, 19.08.1968,pp.26-27; The airbase included an industrial complex, which according to Portuguese researcher Artur Pais may have been initially devised by the FRG as a way to circumvent the restrictions to produce certain types of military materiel in Germany. With the Cold War arms race, those restrictions were soon lifted, which may explain Bonn’s subsequent attempts to find different uses for the facilities (Pais (2002), pp.40-41).

\(^\text{682}\) AHD-MNE, PEA, M337-A) Pr332,30, Dispatch from the Military and Aeronautical Attaché in the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn.

allowed to fly military aircraft over them\textsuperscript{684}, nullifying one of Beja’s main purposes.\textsuperscript{685} By 1968, the \textit{Bundestag} and public opinion were openly questioning the enterprise’s logistics and the planning mistakes of the federal authorities had gained the title of ‘Beja affair’.\textsuperscript{686} In August 1968, the \textit{FDP} parliamentary opposition started pressuring the government about its plans for the base.\textsuperscript{687}

When Caetano came to power, the tone of the German and international press was suggesting that Beja was now a burden which the federal government was desperately trying to get rid of. West Germany’s establishment of an alternative flight-instruction arrangement with the USA seemed to confirm the most pessimistic interpretation.\textsuperscript{688} During 1968, Airbase No.11 had been practically deserted, with most buildings empty and an average of one flight per day.\textsuperscript{689} Yet while it is true that by then the German authorities were only interested in finishing the infrastructure that was already in its last stages of construction, they refused to abandon the project altogether. Bonn did not want to give Lisbon the impression that it was uncommitted to military cooperation with Portugal and thus willing to compromise future projects.\textsuperscript{690} Indeed, among the agreements signed in November/December 1968, Schröder and Sá Viana Rebelo renewed the Base Accord and regulated the status of the \textit{Bundeswehr} in Portugal, the status of the Portuguese personnel and of the Portuguese firms involved in the maintenance and repair work in Airbase No.11.\textsuperscript{691} Set on making use of the base, even if on a much smaller scale than originally planned, the federal government looked for ways to take advantage of what had been constructed so far. The number of apartments already built exceeded the needs of the few German personnel stationed there at the time\textsuperscript{692}, so they rented them to the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{693} Bonn also began looking

\textsuperscript{684} BA-MA, BW1/90837, Speaking Notes of the Director of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Department for the meeting with the Chief Editor at the \textit{BMVg} on 28.1.1969.

\textsuperscript{685} Flying over Great Britain implied an extra 600 km and most German aircraft did not have the capacity to do so without a stopover (\textit{Hamburger Abendblatt}, 13.05.1966, in Matos (1977), p.43).

\textsuperscript{686} A vast collection of related newspaper articles can be found in AHD-MNE,PEA,M337-A),Pr332,30 and in BA-MA,BW1/90837.

\textsuperscript{687} AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A) Pr332,30, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 16.08.1968

\textsuperscript{688} Telo (1996A), p.141.

\textsuperscript{689} Der \textit{Spiegel}, 25.10.1971; see also Pais (2002), p.60.

\textsuperscript{690} In the words of the \textit{Bundestag}’s Defence Commission, keeping Beja was a way for Bonn to “keep a foot in the door” – PA, 5.Bundestag (5.), Ausschuss für Verteidigung, Ausschussdrucksache Nr.41, \textit{Bericht einer Delegation des Verteidigungsausschusses und anderen Abgeordneten des Bundestages über die Reise nach Portugal vom 12.-20. Oktober 1968}

\textsuperscript{691} AHFA, \textit{Acordos Com Alemães Base Beja}.

for other possible uses for the airbase’s empty industrial facilities, known as Zone III.\textsuperscript{694} Moreover, an agreement with Lisbon on 14 and 22 May 1969 allowed civilian airlines from both countries – namely the German \textit{Lufthansa} and the Portuguese \textit{TAP} – to use the base for flight instruction.\textsuperscript{695}

To better understand Bonn’s insistence on the project, even after the logistical setbacks which had put its usefulness and applicability in question, it is vital to acknowledge the full scope of the Beja enterprise. Beja was a massive financial undertaking that the federal authorities somehow had to justify\textsuperscript{696}, particularly as the liberal opposition was using the so-called ‘Beja affair’ as a political tool to attack members of the government, namely Strauß, Schröder and Kiesinger.\textsuperscript{697} From a strategic viewpoint, the base had not completely lost its relevance; with the heavy presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, it made sense for NATO to develop a base for rapid deployment in the European southwest.\textsuperscript{698} Yet most of all, the whole project had become a symbol, an affirmation of West Germany’s military might which risked turning into a national embarrassment. In 1968, \textit{Der Spiegel} quoted Ernst Wirmer, a head of department at the \textit{BMVg}, referring to it as a “testimony to German grandeur”\textsuperscript{699}. That almost exact phrase would be used three years later by Helmut Schmidt (\textit{SPD}), Brandt’s first defence minister, in an interview with \textit{Die Welt}.\textsuperscript{700} Indeed, the \textit{SPD-FDP} government did not go against this conception at first. As early as November 1969 it instructed the \textit{Luftwaffe} to engage in conversations with the Portuguese Air Force (\textit{FAP}) about the possibilities of intensifying use of the airbase. They soon began negotiations for the construction of a joint tactical air-ground fighter training range, which would maximise the base’s potential.\textsuperscript{701}

The prospects for the controversial enterprise thus seemed once more on the rise. While the negotiations for the construction of the training range were taking place, the Portuguese Ministry of Defence granted the \textit{Luftwaffe} authorisation to use the Alcochete

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{693}] BA-MA, BW1/90837, Speaking Notes of the Director of the 3rd Department for the meeting with the Chief Editor at the \textit{BMVg} on 28.1.1969; BA-MA, BW1/37311, Memo from the \textit{Bundeswehr} Administration Centre in Beja, 24.02.1971.
\item [\textsuperscript{694}] \textit{Handelsblatt} (Düsseldorf), 01.08.1968 (AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A) Pr332,30).
\item [\textsuperscript{695}] AHFA, \textit{Acordo Luso-Alemão, Utilização Base Beja por Empresas de Aviação}.
\item [\textsuperscript{696}] Press reports usually mention a cost of DM 200 Million until this period, but in January 1969 Schröder told the Parliament the actual amount was DM 150 Million (BA-MA, BW1/90837).
\item [\textsuperscript{697}] AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A) Pr332,30, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 17.08.1968
\item [\textsuperscript{698}] \textit{Handelsblatt} (Düsseldorf), 01.08.1968 (AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A) Pr332,30).
\item [\textsuperscript{699}] “Fehlplanung…”, \textit{Der Spiegel}, 19.08.1968, pp.26-27.
\item [\textsuperscript{700}] \textit{Die Welt}, 02.06.1971.
\item [\textsuperscript{701}] BA-MA, BW1/66542, Memo from the \textit{BMVg}, 03.07.1970.
\end{itemize}
25km east of Lisbon. This authorisation was transitional, revocable and seriously constrained: the German aircraft only had access to the runways on a limited number of days, coordinated with the FAP, and were not allowed to use explosive or incendiary armament. Nevertheless, it was an exception to the explicit prohibition to shoot included in the 1960 Accord and it represented an important effort by the Portuguese authorities to improve German-Portuguese military relations. 702 Having visited the site, the German Delegation to the GPMMC issued a positive report about Beja in March 1970. 703 Moreover, a projected American base in Spain reflected the Franco regime’s more cooperative stance towards NATO, opening the possibility for new negotiations regarding the Luftwaffe’s over-flight rights. 704 Meanwhile, a study from March 1971 indicates that Bonn continued to look for ways to take advantage of the industrial Zone III. 705 In May 1971, the federal government announced that the BMVg now had a detailed programme for intensive use of the base. The first German F-104 jets were scheduled to fly to Portugal that very month. 706

Lufthansa and TAP, already training in Beja, were at last joined by the Luftwaffe. The German Air Force flew in fighter-bombers (Jagdbomber-) and light fighter-bomber wings (Leichte Kampfgeschwader), transport squadrons (Transportverbände) and dockyard groups (Werftgruppen) and used the base as a weapons training centre. 707 According to the rotation system, around 20 pilots of F-104 Starfighters, Fiat G-91 and Phantoms would go to Beja, spend a few weeks practicing shooting in Alcochete and then be replaced by the next group 708. Transport Squadron 61 was flown in for an instruction programme to convert the Luftwaffe’s Noratlas pilots to the Transall C-160 aircraft. 709 An article from Der Tagesspiegel even speculated that the Portuguese airbase might also be used in the future to instruct pilots to fly new European-designed military aircraft, such as the Panavia 200, planned for release in 1976. 710 Before the end of the year, Beja was supporting three to four thousand flights per month and had 721

702 BA-MA, BW1/90397a, Letter from Sá Viana Rebelo to Helmut Schmidt, 06.02.1971; The idea of using the Alcochete range had been first put forth by the Portuguese defence minister in September 1969 – BA-MA, BW1/66541, Memo on von Hase’s meeting with Sá Viana Rebelo, 23.09.1969.
703 BA-MA, BW1/66542, Report about Beja, 10.03.1970.
705 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Notiz über die Verwendungsmöglichkeit der Zone III A/Beja, 09.03.1971.
706 Der Tagesspiegel, 06.05.1971 (BA-MA, BH 28-2/113).
708 Hamburger Abendblatt, 12.05.1971, in Matos (1977), P.52.
709 Der Spiegel, 14.06.1971 (AHD-MNE, PEA M683 Pr331).
710 Der Tagesspiegel, 06.05.1971 (BA-MA, BH 28-2/113).
soldiers and 81 civilian employees stationed there.\(^{711}\) It was much less than the original plans, but considerably more than during the previous years, even if the CDU/CSU opposition insisted that the base’s potential was being squandered.\(^{712}\)

The arrangement which had helped renew the FRG’s interest in Airbase No.11, however, was still too precarious for German needs. In September 1971, twelve delegates of the Bundestag’s Defence Commission visited the base to meet with Portuguese representatives for the purpose of finding new ways to improve its use.\(^{713}\) The ZdVP took the opportunity to complain to them about Alcochete, where the coordination between Portuguese and German pilots was apparently problematic.\(^{714}\) Yet the negotiations for the new shooting range were not going easily either. Little progress had been made by the summer of 1972, when Ernst Wirmer – who had become President of the German Delegation to the GPMMC two years earlier – wrote to his Portuguese counterpart Vice-Admiral Armando de Roboredo e Silva requesting permission for the construction of the range.\(^{715}\) The Portuguese Delegation, the Portuguese Air Force and the Portuguese Embassy all expressed their willingness to comply with the German request, clearly using it as a sign of goodwill in the ongoing negotiations concerning the end-use clause on military equipment\(^{716}\), as discussed later in this chapter. Indeed, in early 1973 Bonn found further reasons to trust Lisbon’s commitment to the project, as the Alcochete range was scheduled to close down the following year and the FAP would need a replacement. Nevertheless, it was becoming apparent that there were inadequate geographical conditions to sustain the project. The federal authorities had requested a range of about 600 km\(^2\) in the vicinity of Beja, but the area did not seem capable of accommodating it, being too densely populated and crossed by railways and roads. The Portuguese side had alerted them of these practical obstacles, but emphasised the possibility of finding a narrower place which could serve the training purposes of the Luftwaffe.\(^{717}\) The German military believed that the


\(^{713}\) AHD-MNE, PEA M683 Pr331.

\(^{714}\) BA-MA, BW1/66544, Memo from the BMVg, 25.09.1971.

\(^{715}\) BA-MA, BW1/248536, Letters from Ernst Wirmer to Roboredo e Silva, 12.06.1972 and 07.07.1972.

\(^{716}\) BA-MA, BW1- 90397/b, Memo from the BMVg, 31.01.1973.

\(^{717}\) BA-MA, BW1- 90397/b, Memo from the BMVg, 31.01.1973.
enterprise would be feasible if only the Portuguese authorities were prepared to give up some roads and resettle a few people.\footnote{Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst, 17.08.1973, in Entwicklungspolitik Materialien Nr.41, October 1973.}

Without the new range, the Federal Air Force had little interest in Beja. The \textit{Bundeswehr} was going through a difficult financial situation and Airbase No.11 did not seem to compensate for its high costs. The NATO range Decimomannu in Italy, already built and easily available to the \textit{Luftwaffe}, presented a much more reliable alternative. This led the FRG to once again decrease its activities in Beja.\footnote{BA-MA, BW1/248536, Speaking Notes of State Secretary Fingerhut for his visit to Lisbon, 20.03.1973.} In August 1973, when this announcement was made, Airbase No.11 had a total of 97 German soldiers and 86 civilians (24 \textit{Bundeswehr} officials, 62 local workers) stationed there permanently.\footnote{BA-MA, BH 28-2/113.} The reduction plan was to eventually discontinue training exercises for Starfighter and Fiat G-91 pilots, while other projects would remain, as would \textit{Lufthansa}’s instruction programmes.\footnote{\textit{Bonner Rundschau}, 05.01.1974 (BA-MA, BW1/119773).} The cut in personnel would not be drastic, as it would guarantee the presence of 84 soldiers and 79 civilians.\footnote{PA, 7.Bundestag (8.) Haushaltsausschuss, Kurzprotokoll der 26.Sitzung des Haushaltsausschusses am Mittwoch, dem 17. Oktober 1973, 10.00 Uhr.}

It was the closest Bonn came to actual disengagement. The federal government declared that it would be reducing its overall military investments in Portugal, decreasing them from DM 9 million to DM 6 million per year. The \textit{BMVg} publicly stated that the main criteria for the decision were practical – inability to obtain the shooting range near Beja – and financial – until September 1971, Bonn had spent DM 214.6 million in infrastructure in Portugal, including DM 144 million for the Airbase Nr.11 alone\footnote{BA-MA, BW1/248536, Memo from the \textit{BMVg}, 18.11.1971.} – and not a reaction to the Portuguese colonial policy.\footnote{Frankfurter Rundschau, 18.08.1973; Neue Hannoversche Presse, 23.08.1973 (BA-M,A BW1/119773) AAPBD 1973, Doc. 78.} Official documents seem to confirm those priorities.\footnote{At the time, Beja had Europe’s largest runway (4,000 x 60 meters) and the most modern electronic and navigational features of any training base in the continent. – Matos (1977), p.54.} Indeed, the mere fact that the federal authorities refused to treat the act as political removed much of the political capital they could have gained from it. Nevertheless, the German conservative press accused the government of wasting Beja’s potential\footnote{Bayernkurier, 17.11.1973, in Menar, Henning von Löwis. 1979. \textit{Bilateralismus und Multilateralismus in der Außenpolitik Portugals seit 1945}, Hamburg: University of Hamburg, Dissertation. p.341.} purely for ideological reasons.\footnote{AAPBD 1973, Doc. 78.} Bonn dissolved the \textit{ZdVP} at the end of the year, transferring its tasks to the Defence Attaché.
at the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, to the Luftwaffe command at Beja, to the division working with the aeronautical plant in Alverca and to the Bundeswehr Administration in West Germany. On 25 April 1974, there were about 500 Bundeswehr soldiers in Portugal: 400 had come for shooting practice and about 100 were stationed there.

3. The inescapable issue of military supplies

The true price for the Beja airbase had always exceeded the one stipulated in the 1960 Base Accord. From early on, Lisbon had made it clear that in return for West German use of the airbase the Portuguese expected a degree of compliance in terms of providing them with military hardware. That the hardware was destined to be used for colonial warfare was something the Germans had more or less awkwardly come to accept. Fearing an international backlash because of military sales to the dictatorship, in 1962 the Auswärtiges Amt had asked the Portuguese for a formal assurance that the purchased materiel would not be used in the African wars. The dictatorship had agreed to declare that the materiel would remain in Portugal, which, as the Portuguese ambassador explained to the AA, allowed for multiple interpretations: Bonn could claim to believe that the materiel was restricted to Europe, while Lisbon would have enough leeway to argue that its ‘overseas provinces’ were included in the agreement, since according to the Portuguese Constitution they were part of the national territory. At the time, Bonn knowingly acquiesced, setting an important precedent. Over subsequent years the end-use clause (Endverbleibsklausel) on West German military sales had settled on the still rather vague – and ultimately disregarded – formulation: “German weapons and equipment supplied to Portugal in the spirit of reciprocity of the 15 January 1960 Accord” were to be used “exclusively in Portugal and for purposes of defence within the framework of the North-Atlantic Pact”.

In this regard, aircraft and their uses deserve closer attention. Portugal used aircraft extensively in its African wars, due to the great distances that needed to be covered and the limited number of roads. The African liberation movements controlled much of the countryside, blocking surface transport in many areas, and some

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729 Matos (1977), pp.53-54.
731 BA-MA, BW1/248536, Memo from the BMVg, 18.11.1971; SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 1971. The Arms Trade with the Third World, Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell. p.673
Portuguese military posts relied entirely on aerial supply. The FRG’s role had therefore been decisive: until 1969, Bonn sold or lent more than 200 aircraft to Lisbon, including 40 Fiat G-91, 70 T-6 Texan/Harvard, around 100 Dornier DO-27 and 11 to 15 Noratlas, plus 10 helicopters. The last dispatch consisted of 30 DO-27, delivered to Portugal in July 1969 to compensate for the reduction of German military projects in the previous years. Additionally, in May 1969 the federal government complied with the Portuguese request to extend the loan of the 70 T-6 and 60 of the DO-27 to the FAP for five more years.

Together with the DO-27, the outdated Nord Noratlas aircraft was the most popular with the FAP. It was a tough aircraft, able to land on and take off from short runways and bad ground and to transport up to 7 tons of hardware or 45 men. The FAP used it for air supply in the three war zones and for dropping paratroops. Notably, several of these former German aircraft even retained their German paint-scheme, as well as the unit badge of the Luftwaffe Transport Wing LTG-62: a white elephant on a black disc. Given the German Air Force had a surplus of Noratlas after replacing them with the Transall, in July 1969 the Auswärtiges Amt, still under Willy Brandt, had approved the sale of 20 such aircraft to Portugal. In a meeting in September the Portuguese defence minister openly explained to the BMVg’s Undersecretary of State Karl-Günther von Hase Portugal’s need of 12 to 15 further Noratlas to transport people and materiel to the colonial wars and the need of spare parts for that type of aircraft. Later that year, Bonn sold another 6 Noratlas to the FAP for the price of DM 100,000 each under a contract from 20 October and an extra one under a contract from 5 December.

The recently elected SPD-FDP coalition government did not change much initially. It was clear that the Portuguese dictatorship was not employing all the

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734 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Report from the BMVg, 12.03.1971.
735 Fonseca (2007), p.216; That batch had initially been earmarked for Nigeria, but due to severe criticism concerning the Biafra conflict was instead supplied to Portugal (Bosgra/Krimpen (1972), p.18; Cardoso, Adelino. 2000. Aeronaves Militares Portuguesas no Século XX, Lisbon: Essencial, p.200).
736 BA-MA, BW1-90298/a, Letter from Sá Viana Rebelo to Gerhard Schröder, 20.05.1969.
738 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Report from the BMVg, 12.03.1971.
739 BA-MA, BW1/66541, Memo on von Hase’s meeting with Sá Viana Rebelo, 23.09.1969.
740 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Memo from the ZdVP, 08.04.1971.
purchased materiel solely for NATO’s defensive purposes, not the least because Portugal’s contribution to NATO was actually quite small. Indeed, an internal memo from the Chancellery of May 1970 clearly admitted that “we know from different sources that [the end-use] clause is not always strictly adhered to”, which placed Bonn in the awkward situation of “pointing out the end-use clause to the outside, while in silence we are aware of the violation of this clause by Portugal”. Yet the federal government was trapped in a dilemma. On the one hand, fulfilling its agreements with Lisbon brought forth domestic and international criticism. On the other hand, Bonn depended on the goodwill of the Portuguese regime for the continued bilateral military cooperation, specifically regarding the use of Beja and Alcochete. The result was an ambiguous ad-hoc policy. The new AA, headed by Walter Scheel, told the BMVg that the authorisation for the Noratlas sales from July 1969, which had not been fully used, was no longer the basis for new deals. Nevertheless, the federal authorities sold 2 Noratlas to Portugal in 1970, under a contract from 7 October, with the approval of Scheel’s Ministry. Moreover, on 9 September 1970 the BMVg proposed the sale of 3 more Noratlas to Portugal. The Portuguese authorities showed interest in purchasing two, but their delay in answering meant that Bonn sold the planes to Greece instead. The Portuguese government then asked for another two, for extraction of spare parts, and one was delivered in 1971. In addition, during this period the Luftwaffe and the Portuguese state-owned aeronautical plant OGMA signed several contracts for the delivery of thousands of Noratlas spare parts. The supply of spare parts was a way to circumvent the restrictions to the export of full aircraft.

On top of the surplus hardware delivered by the Bundeswehr, the private sector played a significant role in transactions with Lisbon. The West German arms industry made around DM 170 million in sales to Portugal from 1959 until 1968 and reached around DM 220 million in 1970. Portugal was the second biggest consumer of

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742 BAK, B136/2992, Memo from the Bundeskanzleramt, 08.05.1970.
743 BA-MA, BW1/248536, Memo from the BMVg, 18.11.1971.
744 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Report from the BMVg, 12.03.1971.
745 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Report from the BMVg, 12.03.1971.
746 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Memo from the ZdVP, 08.04.1971.
747 BA-MA, BW1- 90397/b, Memo from the BMVg, 31.01.1973.
749 BA-MA, BW1/66544, Minute of the meeting between Backes and Roboredo e Silva, 13.09.1971.
750 AAPBD 1968, Doc. 330.
751 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Report from the BMVg, 12.03.1971.
German war materiel in 1970, and was surpassed only by the Netherlands. That year alone, Portugal contributed DM 58.1 million to the FRG’s armament industry, representing 14.9% of the industry’s DM 389 million total exports. In fact, during the first year of the Willy Brandt-led coalition government West Germany’s arms trade with the Portuguese dictatorship increased considerably: Portugal contributed 6½ times more to federal weapons exports in 1970 than in the previous year. The difference was brought about by the acquisition of three very expensive German corvettes, although Portugal also purchased machine guns, submachine guns and pump shotguns, as well as bullets and munitions.752

The three corvettes, built at the shipyard Blohm & Voss in Hamburg, did not go unnoticed. When they had been ordered, in April 1968, the BMWi had agreed to leave out the end-use clause.753 Bonn however reportedly delayed the construction of the ships, fearing their transfer to Africa.754 Indeed, the warships had been designed by a Portuguese naval engineer with the specific purpose of fulfilling the dictatorship’s needs in the colonies755 and – as the liberation movements and solidarity activists did not cease to point out – the Portuguese military press made no secret of this goal.756 When protests broke out in the yard, the Militärischer Abschirm Dienst – a federal military security department – was put in charge of its security.757 In the end Bonn allowed the delivery, seeing that it was an important economic enterprise for the FRG: these were the biggest warships built in West Germany since World War II.758 Portugal paid DM 47.8 million, which represented 12.3% of total West German arms exports in 1970.759 Although Bonn sought to convince OAU Chairman Kenneth Kaunda760 – and even

752 BA-MA, BW1/90837, Die deutsche Ausfuhr von Kriegswaffen, -gerät und dergleichen durch Händler und Hersteller im Jahre 1970, 10.09.1971 – This report only includes exports from traders and manufacturers. It does not include exports from the federal government for NATO and foreign military assistance, nor illegal arms deals.
753 AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A) Pr332,30, Dispatch from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 20.05.1968.
756 In June 1969, the navy magazine Revista de Marinha wrote: “These corvettes will be provided with helicopters and will be equipped for prolonged service overseas in order to support our fleet units of patrol vessels and landing craft, as well as to fulfil various patrol tasks over there”. (Bosgra/Krimpen (1972), p.47, see also Revista de Marinha, May 1969, and Defesa Nacional, September 1969).
757 Bosgra/Krimpen (1972), p.47.
758 Bosgra/Krimpen (1972), p.45.
759 In the previous year, the naval industry’s contribution had only reached DM 8 Million, 4.1% of the FRG’s total arms export. (BA-MA, BW1/90837, Die deutsche Ausfuhr von Kriegswaffen, -gerät und dergleichen durch Händler und Hersteller im Jahre 1970, 10.09.1971).
760 For example, in PAAA, B34/757, Speaking Notes of President Heinemann for the talk with Kenneth Kaunda on 27.04.1970.
itself\textsuperscript{761} – that the warships only drew 3 meters of water and were therefore unsuitable for the Portuguese colonial territories, Lisbon transferred the first corvette – the 1,365 ton \textit{João Coutinho} – to Angola in May 1970\textsuperscript{762} and later assigned it to Mozambique.\textsuperscript{763} The Portuguese Navy used it for several missions in Africa during the wars, as well as the other two corvettes built in Hamburg: the \textit{Jacinto Cândido} and the \textit{General Pereira D’Eça}.\textsuperscript{764}

As the blatant Portuguese use of German equipment in the colonial wars became a recurring source of controversy for the federal authorities, they did become more careful. In 1970, when Lisbon asked Bonn for 25 to 30 more DO-27 – mostly for extraction of spare parts – the federal government kept postponing the decision, wanting to wait at least until after Willy Brandt’s October meeting with the OAU delegation.\textsuperscript{765} The \textit{Bundeswehr} showed interest in selling its out-of-service aircraft: they were not airworthy, but the \textit{FAP}, which had about 150 DO-27 at the time, could tear them apart and re-use their components.\textsuperscript{766} Nevertheless, on 23 December 1970 the \textit{AA} officially blocked the delivery even of these out-of-service aircraft which were then sold to private German buyers instead.\textsuperscript{767}

By early 1971 Bonn clearly felt the need to finally tackle the problem, but it was uncertain about what to do, its priority being not so much to put an end to the military exports to Portugal as much as to save the FRG’s face in view of rising criticism. On 11 January a spokesman for the federal government announced that Bonn had no intention of providing further military assistance to Lisbon\textsuperscript{768}, but the statement was not fully backed up by the \textit{AA}.\textsuperscript{769} In early April, Chancellor Brandt suggested to the British Prime Minister that they create a multilateral approach to provide military aid to the Lisbon dictatorship. His stated goal was to remove the issue of military exports to Portugal from the FRG’s domestic political front. The chancellor explained that this plan would allow the Germans to continue their military production, with the only difference being that Bonn would ship it to a different address, i.e. NATO, which in turn

\textsuperscript{761} BAK,B136/2992, Memo from the \textit{Bundeskanzleramt},08.05.1970.
\textsuperscript{765} BA-MA, BW1/66542, Memo of the \textit{BMVg}, 18.09.1970.
\textsuperscript{766} BA-MA, BW1/66543, Memo from the \textit{ZdVP}, 08.04.1971.
\textsuperscript{767} BA-MA, BW1/66543, Report from the \textit{BMVg}, 12.03.1971.
\textsuperscript{768} F&R,23.01.1971.
\textsuperscript{769} According to the British Ambassador, the \textit{AA} merely wanted to issue a clarification to the effect that “practically no” German weapons were being sold to Portugal, but the government’s press spokesman misunderstood. – TNA, FCO45/862, Dispatch from the British Embassy in Bonn, 20.04.1971.
would ship it to the Portuguese. London outright rejected this plan. According to the British Embassy in Bonn, even the Auswärtiges Amt had seemed sceptical of the idea, which had originated in the BMVg.

The government finally agreed on a set course during a meeting of the Federal Security Council (Budessicherheitsrat – BSR), an inter-ministerial committee, on 28 April 1971. The committee instructed the AA to negotiate a new clause with Lisbon which would state explicitly that German military equipment sold to the dictatorship could only be used in the NATO geographical area, specified in article 6 of the North-Atlantic Treaty. Without this new clause, Bonn was not to deliver any more armament to Portugal, subjecting every export to the War Weapons Control Law or to the Foreign Trade Law. Despite the statement at the beginning of the year, in November Bonn informed the Portuguese ambassador that it was perfectly willing to continue its arms deliveries, as soon as Lisbon approved a satisfactory end-use clause. Although the measure clearly had the dictatorship’s controversial status in mind, the new status quo was coherent with Bonn’s overall strategy of distancing the FRG’s arms industry from areas of conflict.

Caetano’s dictatorship responded by insisting on the linkage with the rest of the military cooperation. It claimed that Bonn’s behaviour represented a departure from the spirit of the German-Portuguese Accord of 1960, considering the act improper for friendly relations. Lisbon kept reminding the federal authorities that the Portuguese side had exceeded its obligations with regard to the Alcochete range and expected similar consideration from the Germans. Thus the delegation of the Bundestag’s Defence Commission that visited Portugal in September 1971 – headed by MP Dr Friedrich Zimmermann (CSU) – returned to Germany convinced that the FRG, due to its interests

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770 AAPBD 1971, Doc. 121.
771 TNA, FCO41/818, Letter from Lord Bridges, 04.05.1971.
773 BA-MA, BW1/248536, Memo from the BMVg, 18.11.1971; Article 6 referred to “the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, […] the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; as well as “the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” – Full text of the Treaty in http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm on 26.09.2011.
774 BA-MA, BW1/248536, Memo from the BMVg, 18.11.1971.
776 BA-MA, BW1/66544, Minute of the meeting between Backes and Roboredo e Silva, 13.09.1971.
in Airbase No.11, could not afford to provoke a hostile attitude by the dictatorship. That very month, the BSR, at the request of the BMVg, agreed to the export to Portugal of a number of fuses for mortars and explosive artillery.\footnote{BA-MA, BW1/66544, Memo from the BMVg, 12.10.1971.} In 1972, Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt wrote to the Auswärtiges Amt requesting further exceptions to the new policy, fearing complications in the negotiations for the Bundeswehr’s requested tactical shooting range near Beja. The AA replied that the government could not run the risk of German armament ending up in the Portuguese colonies, as it would contradict its previous statements to the parliament and to African leaders. Nevertheless, the Auswärtiges Amt was prepared to allow a few exports, under the previous clause, of materiel of untraceable origin.\footnote{This included 653,095 primers, 404,391 detonators, 75 spare parts for 9mm pistols, 100 tons of cells for munitions, 40 tons of ball powder and about 200 tons of “Messing 72” (used in the production of cells for munitions), as well as, exceptionally and as a sign of German goodwill in case Lisbon was not satisfied, 1,000 tripods for HK-21 machineguns.} It also issued a detailed list of the Portuguese requests which Bonn was not willing to follow through on\footnote{Namely further HK-21 tripods, HK-21 spare parts, fuses for mortar grenades, tank motors and electronic components, 3 more Noratlas aircraft, spare parts for G-91 aircraft and more than one million individual components for G-3 rifles.}, because the origin of the materiel was traceable or the price too indiscreet.\footnote{BA-MA, BW1/90397a, Letter from the Auswärtiges Amt, 16.05.1972.}

As indicated by the concern with keeping the materiel’s origin obscure and the deals low-profile, these exceptions were made with the awareness that no sale was safe without the new end-use clause. Indeed, by itself the BSR’s decision to review the old clause showed that the federal authorities at least suspected that the dictatorship was fighting in Africa with materiel acquired from Bonn. Moreover, a report from the FRG’s General-Consul in Lourenço Marques from October 1971 had even given a detailed description of the materiel used in the Portuguese military operations in Mozambique, including German-provided aircraft such as eleven Noratlas, thirteen Fiat G-91, around fifteen T-6 Texan/Harvard and ten DO-27, as well as the three corvettes built in Hamburg.\footnote{BAK, B136/2992, Report from the Federal General-Consul in Lourenço Marques, 14.10.1971.} In a meeting with West German President Gustav Heinemann later that year, the Portuguese ambassador acknowledged the situation, although stressing that the German armament in Africa was in small quantities and in conformity with the original end-use clause.\footnote{AHD-MNE, PEM 683 Pr331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 11.12.1971.}

Lisbon tried out every trick in its book. Meeting with Walter Scheel on 1 June 1972, Foreign Minister Rui Patrício made it clear that the federal authorities had to
solve the issue of the pending Portuguese requests before any negotiation about the new end-use clause could take place. Patrício insisted on the defensive nature of Portuguese warfare, the aim of which was to protect “Portugal’s African population” from attack by heavily armed militias. The Portuguese minister complained that the Eastern Bloc did not hesitate in arming Lisbon’s enemies and that Portugal would have been in a better position to fulfil its wishes if it “belonged to another alliance”.

Although aware that the matter was mostly in the hands of the AA, the dictatorship also upped the pressure on the BMVg, both formally and informally. The Portuguese authorities contacted Undersecretary of State Günter Wetzel during his vacation in Portugal in the summer of 1972. Days later, the newly appointed Minister for Defence Georg Leber (SPD) fired Wetzel for, among other things, meeting unofficially with Portuguese ministerial representatives, having thus disobeyed instructions from the AA. Wetzel’s replacement, Helmut Fingerhut, made his own visit to the country, in official capacity, in March 1973, and during his meeting with Portugal’s Defence Minister Sá Viana Rebelo, he was unsubtly reminded that the Portuguese war effort was also protecting German economic interests under attack, most notably at Cahora Bassa.

The Bundeswehr’s divestment in 1973 increased the urgency of solving the impasse, at the risk of further deteriorating German-Portuguese relations. Bonn did not want to compromise the remaining German military projects and facilities in Portugal. Therefore, the BSR prepared an alternative “lighter version” of the end-use clause, referring only to “spectacular armament” (ships, aircraft, tanks, missiles, etc), to be suggested in case the negotiations with the Portuguese proved inconclusive. In May, in order to create a good atmosphere in the talks, Undersecretary of State Fingerhut asked the AA to permit the delivery to Portugal of a small number of Walther pistols and respective spare parts, as well as two Noratlas aircraft. The Foreign Office authorized the sale of two old, barely airworthy Noratlas.

These occasional exceptions, concerning essentially so-called ‘light armament’ weaponry, were hardly enough to satisfy Portuguese military needs. In August 1973, with the trade of war materiel having been mostly frozen for the previous two years, the dictatorship finally caved in. Lisbon attached the requested clause in an order for

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783 AAPBD 1972, Doc.157.
784 Der Spiegel, Nr.30, 1972 (BA-MA, BW1/248536).
785 BA-MA, BW1/248536, Minute of the meeting between Fingerhut and Sá Viana Rebelo, 23.03.1973.
786 AAPBD 1973, Doc. 78.
788 BA-MA, BW1/183516, Memo from the BMVg, 23.05.1972.
101,000 fuses for mortar grenades (DM 2 million), Fiat G-91 spare parts (DM 500,000) and 10 mortar simulators together with 2,000 training shells (DM 27,200) to German companies Diehl-Gruppe, Dornier and Dynamit-Nobel, respectively. The federal ministries for Defence, Economics and Foreign Affairs all approved the transaction.789

Such compromise, however, did not fully rescue Bonn’s image. Despite the stalemate, the federal authorities had not been able to convince African public opinion that no German arms were being used in the Portuguese overseas territories.790 After all, if nothing else, those of pre-1971 vintage would still be around, not to mention the abundant G-3 automatic rifles, which, as explained below, were produced in Portugal with German license. It did not help that the Portuguese newspapers were not always discrete791 or that their German counterparts had an understandable interest in this topic. In a particularly embarrassing moment for Bonn, the West German press published photos of a fallen G-91 in Guinea-Bissau, with the Luftwaffe cross discernible under the FAP colours.792 On 22 July 1973, a group of 26 SPD MPs suggested that the FRG should impose a full military embargo on Portugal, i.e. also stop supplying even weapons tagged for NATO use. These MPs questioned Bonn’s ability to actually ensure that any German-provided military equipment would not be employed in the Portuguese colonies.793 Lisbon’s attitude was certainly unconvincing, as seen by Rui Patrício’s reaction to this proposal in a German television interview aired on 13 August. Although denying that Portugal was using any NATO resources in the wars, Patrício insisted on Lisbon’s right to arm itself by invoking images of violence in Europe:

“I ask if a campaign against the shipment of weapons to any government facing terrorist movements should be admissible. This would mean that England would also not be allowed to have weapons to defend itself from the Irish terrorists. Also any other European country where a similar problem could emerge tomorrow would not be allowed to have weapons for the protection of its population. We know that there is an organised campaign against Portugal and that some try to undermine our relations with our allies. It is a campaign with no moral or political authority

789 BAK, B102/274672, Memo from the BMWI, 28.08.1973.
791 An article from the Portuguese newspaper Diário de Notícias from 29 June 1971 mentioned German Fiat G-91 flying in Mozambique. (Bosgra/Krimpen (1972), pp.69-70).
792 AHD-MNE, PEA M655 Pr.352, Memo from the aeronautical company Alberto Maria Bravo.
whatsoever. But maybe it also lacks a good slogan. I suggest the following: ‘Arm only the murderers.’.” 794

Although in the public domain the federal government stubbornly insisted that there was no evidence that Portugal was employing German weapons in the wars,795 the fact was that Bonn was not ready for a full military embargo. The BSR argued that such an initiative would contradict Article 3 of the North-Atlantic Treaty, which promoted support for the military defence of the NATO member states,796 even though other NATO members had already imposed embargos on Portugal.797 At the end of the day, even the Auswärtiges Amt, for all its concern over the FRG’s image abroad, felt that Portugal should not be pushed out of NATO, directly or indirectly. Not that the dictatorship’s military contribution to the Atlantic Alliance was very significant – after all, although it was in a process of intense militarisation798, the Lisbon regime was directing the vast majority of its resources to Africa. Nevertheless, as stressed by the AA’s Political Director Günther van Well in August 1973, Portugal served as bridge, both “geo-strategic” and “psychological”, between Europe and the USA. Van Well also recognised that excluding Portugal from NATO might open the way to questioning the status of the two other dictatorships in the organisation – Greece and Turkey – thus further compromising the stability of the Atlantic Alliance.799

While sticking to its military relations with Lisbon, however, the SPD-FDP government made an effort to avoid taking any more risks than necessary. In 1974, when the Luftwaffe was set to release 50 to 60 airworthy Fiat G-91 R/3, Bonn ordered the Air Force not to sell the aircraft to any foreign country, fearing that they would end up in Portugal. Switzerland, for example, showed interest in the aircraft, but was not allowed to purchase them. The Portuguese company Alberto Maria Bravo & Filhos proposed purchasing the Fiats through the company Dornier, as spare parts, and then

794 A transcript of the interview can be found in the BMZ’s publication Entwicklungspolitik Materialen Nr.41, October 1973.
797 See Chapter 1.
798 The size of Portugal’s Armed Forces in relation to its population in this period was exceeded only by those of Israel and the two Vietnams. In proportional terms the Portuguese army was five times the size of that of the United States, even at the height of the Vietnam war, and three times that of Britain and Spain. (Macqueen, Norrie. 1997. The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire, London: Longman. p.76).
reassembling them in Portugal, but by then neither Dornier nor the Portuguese authorities were willing to defy the Bonn government’s position.800

4. The more ambiguous areas of cooperation

Linked to the West German-Portuguese military relations – and to the Beja project in particular – were a number of more subtle ties to the Portuguese war effort, most notably in the field of military-industrial cooperation. Such was the case, for example, of Bonn’s collaboration with the Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronáutico (OGMA), a Portuguese state-owned aeronautical plant in Alverca, about 20 km north of Lisbon. After a 1962 agreement between the Logistical Office of the German Air Force (Materialamt der Luftwaffe) and the OGMA, the FRG had supplied the plant with machines and technical equipment and paid for its expansion and modernisation. In return, the OGMA would perform periodic overhaul of German Noratlas aircraft, as well as the required repair work. More than the economic factor, the greatest advantage for Portugal had been the acquisition of know-how and machinery which, when not in service of the FRG’s demands, could serve the Portuguese Armed Forces.801 This aeronautical dimension of cooperation had been expanded in 1965, as the Bundeswehr had launched ‘Project Triton’. The project had aimed to build a large engine maintenance factory in Alverca that would manage the simultaneous overhaul of thirty Luftwaffe engines, namely twenty J79 for the Lockheed F-104G Starfighters and ten Rolls-Royce-Tyne for the Transall C-160.802 The federal government had suspended the enterprise in 1966 as part of that era’s general divestment803, but a ministers’ meeting in

800 AHD-MNE, PEA M655 Pr.352, Document from Alberto Maria Bravo annotated by the Portuguese Undersecretary of State for Aeronautics; According to historian António José Telo, the dictatorship was not opposed to deliveries through third countries or similar cover-ups, but the Portuguese Foreign Ministry argued that this type of deal should be limited, since one single international exposé could endanger overall relations with West Germany. – Telo (1996A), pp.142,143; Based on the compiled lists of FAP aircraft, all the transactions during this period seem to be accounted for. – Cardoso (2000); Lopes, Mário Canongia. 2001. Os Aviões da Cruz de Cristo/The Airplanes of the Cross of Christ, Lisbon: Dinalivre.
801 Tavares (2005), pp.62,63; BA-MA, BW1/66543, Speaking Notes of State Secretary Birkholz for the visit to OGMA/Alverca, 16.04.1971.
802 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Memo from the BMVg, March 1971.
803 While not as controversial as the Beja project, Triton nonetheless had its fair share of polemic due to the F-104 Starfighter’s notoriously high accident rate. (Schroers (1998), p.47).
November 1967 had decided to reactivate it, with a reduced scope, in return for Lisbon’s approval of the suspension of other German projects.804

**OGMA** represented one of the most successful areas of German-Portuguese cooperation. The costs of the overhauls in Alverca were considerably lower than in West Germany, even when taking into account that the Portuguese needed twice the working hours compared to German plants.805 Thus in 1968 the FRG began developing a programme for the overhaul of Transall aircraft at the **OGMA**. An agreement signed on 26 November 1969806 determined that this would replace the Noratlas programme in two years. By 1970, the Portuguese aeronautical plant was doing up to six Noratlas periodical overhauls monthly, which totalled around 200,000 hours (72 aircraft x 2,500 hours each overhaul, plus 300 hours of material preservation work). In January 1971, the **OGMA** did their last four Noratlas overhauls for the **Luftwaffe** and began overhauling the Transall. The **BMVg** was keen to not only maintain but even to increase the FRG’s cooperation with the **OGMA**.807 Indeed, an article from the **Neue Hannoversche Presse** from August 1973 estimated a yearly average of DM 500,000 worth of **Luftwaffe** aircraft overhauls in Portugal during this period.808

The Triton project was a different matter. In late 1968, together with the agreements about Beja, the two countries’ ministers for defence had signed an agreement securing the continuity of Triton. A few months later, however, the German Air Force had realised that the Portuguese had neither the know-how nor the technical personnel to fulfil their part of the contract. Lisbon asked for **Luftwaffe** specialists to help with the work and to instruct personnel, but the **Bundeswehr** which had a shortage of engine technicians refused. By 1971, the two enormous hangars, for which the federal government had paid DM 24 million, remained empty. Bonn was not willing to have any machines installed until it was certain that someone could operate them.809

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804 BA-MA, BW1/66542, Memo from the ZdVP, 16.07.1970; BA-MA, BW1/66543, Memo from the **BMVg**, March 1971.

805 In 1968, the labour costs per hour in Alverca were DM 6, while in Germany they were around DM 25. The costs of flying the aircraft to Portugal were compensated by those aircraft being used for exercises in Beja. – **PA**, 5.Bundestag (5.), Ausschuss für Verteidigung, Ausschussdrucksache Nr.41, Bericht einer Delegation des Verteidigungsausschusses...

806 The decision dates back to June, prior to the **SPD-FDP** coalition.

807 The price of the overhauls rose to US$ 2 per hour in 1971. At this rate and without taking into account future inflation, West Germany would be paying the **OGMA** around US$ 166,400 in 1971, US$ 192,000 (for 16 Transall overhauls) in 1972, US$ 240,000 (for 20 Transall overhauls) in 1973 and US$ 288,000 (for 24 Transall overhauls) in 1974. – BA-MA, BW1/66543, Speaking Notes of State Secretary Birkholz for the visit to OGMA/Alverca, 16.04.1971.

808 **Neue Hannoversche Presse**, 23.08.1973 (BA-MA, BW1/119773).

809 **Der Spiegel**, 14.06.1971 (AHD-MNE, PEA M683 Pr331).
The BMVg suggested a private company, MTU (Motoren-Turbinen-Union, a joint venture of Daimler-Benz and MAN) to provide the technicians that Portugal required. MTU began negotiations with Lisbon and proposed a budget of DM 49.3 million. Under a provision with the Portuguese, DM 20 million of these expenses would be deducted through overhauls of German aircraft at the OGMA. Portugal would compensate further DM 18 million by providing free labour while the federal government and MTU would put up DM 6 million each. Lisbon, however, went back on this agreement and Bonn refused to give a more extended financial contribution. In addition, the creation of a joint venture between OGMA and MTU brought forth juridical questions that further complicated the process.

Economical constraints aside, West Germany’s attitude towards Triton did reveal some perseverance, as Bonn continued to work with Lisbon to come up with a solution for the empty facilities. By late 1971, the BMVg was considering telling Lisbon that there was no point in going on with the project. Yet Triton, at least since its reactivation, had acquired an underlying meaning. As Ministerialrat Karl-Heinz Backes explained to the Portuguese Delegation to the GPMMC, the FRG had enough overhaul capacity at home. Ultimately, Bonn was not interested in Triton because it needed it, but to prove its commitment to its cooperation with Portugal. The project was only officially abandoned with Bonn’s military reduction of 1973.

Although the OGMA cooperated with the German private sector as well as with the Bundeswehr, the federal authorities were always involved to some degree. Such was the case with Lisbon’s attempt to replicate the Dornier DO-27, a type of German Liaison/Reconnaissance aircraft which the FAP flew extensively in Africa. The company Dornier-Werke had ceased production of the DO-27 in 1965 and a couple of years later the Portuguese dictatorship expressed its interest in reproducing this type of aircraft at the OGMA. In 1970, after negotiations between both their directors, the two companies began working on the project. This being a commercial enterprise, the BMVg

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810 AHD-MNE, PEA M641 Pr331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 13.01.1970.
811 Rogério Martins visited Daimler-Benz and MTU during his trip to West Germany, as described in chapter 3.
812 BA-MA, BW1/66542, Studie zur Nutzung der von der BRD in Alverca/Portugal geplanten, erstellten und finanzierten Einrichtungen, 22.01.1970.
813 AAPBD 1970, Doc. 554; Der Spiegel, 14.06.1971 (AHD-MNE, PEA M683 Pr331).
814 BA-MA, BW1/66542, Minute of the meetings of Ernst Wirmer with Sousa Uva and with General-Brigadier Fernandes (Director of the OGMA) in 06.01.1970.
815 BA-MA, BW1/66544, Memo from the BMVg, 12.10.1971.
816 BA-MA, BW1/66544, Minute of the meeting between Backes and Roboredo e Silva, 13.09.1971
817 AAPBD 1973, Doc. 78.
did not take part in the deal, but it did act as intermediary. Furthermore, it provided the specific tools and required apparatus, which were property of the Luftwaffe yet stored at Dornier-Werke. The President of the Portuguese Delegation even asked for a free loan of this material, but, for budget reasons, the BMVg did not comply, choosing to sell it instead.\footnote{BA-MA, BW1/66542, Memo of the ZdVP, 30.09.1970; It should be noted, however, that even though yearly reports from the BMVg (such as BA-MA, BW1/66544, Memo of the BMVg, 12.10.1971) state that Dornier-Werke and OGMA were indeed developing a version of the DO-27 together, there is no indication that the model actually made it to the production stage.}\footnote{BA-MA, BW1/66543, Memo from the BMVg, March 1971.} The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}, usually concerned with avoiding links between West Germany and the Portuguese colonial wars, did not oppose the enterprise, because this type of aircraft, not being a combat aircraft, was not subjected to the War Weapons Control Law.\footnote{BA-MA, BW1/66543, Memo from the BMVg, March 1971.} However, in addition to assistance, reconnaissance and transport missions, the \textit{FAP} did use the DO-27 for combat operations, equipping it with rockets under the wings.\footnote{Afonso/Gomes (2000), pp.363-364.} And, the federal authorities were aware of this through \textit{Luftwaffe} reports\footnote{Fonseca (2007), p.163.} and press articles.\footnote{Air Pictorial, May 1968, p.170; Cockpit, March 1968; Frankfurter Rundschau, 28.10.1971, all in Bosgra/Krimpen (1972), p.18.}

Bonn was similarly ambiguous regarding Bonn’s ties to the Portuguese arms and munitions industry, an area of cooperation which had been highly dynamic since the early 1960s. The FRG had supported Lisbon’s efforts to reequip Portuguese military factories and technical personnel earlier in the decade in exchange for Portugal reserving a significant portion of its industrial capacity for West German orders of war materiel. The placement of these orders, therefore, had represented not only a direct profit for the Portuguese military industry, but also the assurance of West Germany’s contribution to the industry’s modernisation.\footnote{Tavares (2005), p.55.} Moreover, the FRG’s high number of orders had guaranteed the factories’ permanent activity. As Portugal had ventured into the colonial wars, its government only had to invest in production costs, not in the maintenance of the factories, making the production of armament and ammunition much cheaper for the Portuguese state.\footnote{Fonseca (2007), p.46.} In particular, state factories \textit{Fábrica Nacional de Munições para Armas Ligeiras (FNMAL)} and \textit{Fábrica Militar de Braço de Prata} had largely benefitted from Bonn’s technical and financial support. The latter had begun producing and assembling the German-licensed G-3, the main automatic rifle used in
the colonial wars. The metal-mechanic factory Fundição e Construção Mecânicas de Oeiras (FCMO) had also established a great number of deals with the BMVg.825

This field was one of the most affected by the changing environment. The Grand Coalition had cancelled most of its orders with Portugal, claiming that, as a result of the new economic and strategic context, Bonn could no longer afford to purchase such high amounts of Portuguese manufactured munitions.826 In response, FNMAL repeatedly delayed the deadlines for its deliveries to the FRG, hoping to get new orders in the meantime and to benefit from Bonn’s extended technical support. By mutual agreement, an order of shells placed in 1963, initially to be delivered in 1967, was thus postponed to 1968 – only to be concluded in the summer of 1970.827 Yet the SPD-FDP government had from the start a clear policy of refusing new deals, even if it did allow the conclusion of previous contracts, namely the ones with FNMAL and with FCMO (for mortar ammunition and tank fist shells, concluded in 1972).828 In 1970, Bonn actually dropped an order for 16,168 shells for 105mm howitzer, but did so at the request of the Portuguese authorities, who needed those munitions for their own army.829 It was the end of an era: from 1959 until the end of 1970, the sales of the Portuguese arms industry to the Bundeswehr had reached DM 340 million.830 The Portuguese Delegation to the GPMMC complained that Portugal’s arms and munitions industry had grown specifically in order to accommodate West Germany’s requests; i.e. it was not self-sufficient.831 In fact, even Lisbon’s efforts to readapt and to find new international buyers required Bonn’s collaboration, since the agreement concerning the G-3 stated that Portugal’s export of this rifle required the approval of the federal government, as well as of Heckler & Koch, the patent holder.832

For all the commitment to stop importing Portuguese arms and munitions, the Brandt governments were not so strict when it came to West German exports aimed at the Portuguese military industry. In September 1971, Bonn allowed Dynamit-Nobel to export to the FNMAL know-how, machines and instruments for the manufacture of primers for munitions with calibres 7.62mm, 5.56mm and 9mm. The Auswärtiges Amt

825 Tavares (2005), pp. 48-49,63-64. 
826 AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A) Pr332,30, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 16.08.1968. 
829 AHM, FO/007/B/41 c.365 doc.18, Memo of the Portuguese Delegation to the GPMMC, 09.04.1970. 
830 BA-MA, BW1/66543, Report from the BMVg, 12.03.1971. 
831 BA-MA, BW1/66544, Minute of the meeting between Backes and Roboredo e Silva, 13.09.1971. 
actually encouraged this licence, hoping that it would render further exports of primers to Portugal unnecessary. 833 The underlying logic was that it was less damaging to provide the Portuguese with German machinery and means to produce munitions than it was to provide them with the same kind of munitions produced through the same kind of machinery and means in West Germany. This precedent soon came into play when Josef Meissner, a company based in Cologne, requested permission to export facility parts to the private Portuguese company Explosivos da Trafaria, which produced artillery munitions, grenades and bombs. On 29 March 1972, three months after the request, the Federal Office for Commerce (Bundesamt fuer gewerbliche Wirtschaft) approved the deal. The authorisation, after being prolonged in July, was valid until 29 March 1973 and during that period Meissner fulfilled the order. 834 This time the anti-colonialist group AGM-Komitee picked up on the deal and it denounced it publicly, leading similar activist associations to write to the federal government in protest. MP Uwe Holtz (SPD) brought the Meissner case to the Bundestag in December 1973 and again in February 1974, asking if Bonn was ready to demand the return of the German equipment. 835 The federal authorities refused to do so, stating that the deal had been consistent with Bonn’s policy, whose sole purpose was to prevent German material sold to Lisbon from being used in Africa. Because in this case the material was being used in a factory located on the Portuguese mainland, in Europe, the question of ‘final destination’, they argued, was not an issue. 836

Bonn applied the same literal-minded interpretation to the issue of the special medical assistance granted to Portuguese soldiers since 1964 in agreement with the Beja negotiations. 837 On 14 September 1973, when an SPD MP addressed this issue in the Bundestag, the AA’s Parliamentary State Secretary Karl Moersch denied knowledge of the situation. 838 On 22 January 1974, a number of MPs wrote to Walter Scheel questioning him on the same topic. His answer stated that the Hamburg Military Hospital provided humanitarian assistance to patients who could not get the necessary medical care in their home countries, regardless of their race, religion or nationality. He

834 BAK, B102/274672, Note for the Parliamentary State Secretary from the BMWi, February 1974 (the same file contains a letter from Meissner detailing the background behind the deal).
835 Both Holtz’s questions and the letters can be found in BAK, B102/274672.
836 BAK, B102/274672, Note for the parliamentary State Secretary from the BMWi, February 1974.
837 AHD-MNE, PEM A337-A) Pr332,30, Dispatches from the Portuguese Ministry of the Army; Bild-Zeitung, 10.08.1973 (in BA-MA, BW1/90837).
claimed to see no reason to exclude the Portuguese from this policy. According to an article from the Deutsche Zeitung, until mid 1973, out of 441 patients from NATO-states attended at Hamburg-Wandsbeck, 430 belonged to the Portuguese army.

Finally, one area which remained largely unsupervised was the cooperation between the two countries’ intelligence services. In September 1956, the Portuguese political police PIDE (later renamed DGS), had established an intelligence exchange protocol with the federal secret services BND. While the initial purpose of the exchange had concerned Portuguese citizens in West Germany and Soviet agents in the Portuguese colonies, as the dictatorship began its colonial wars, the exchange also came to include military matters. In the early 1970s, the BND provided training and intelligence to the DGS and it even occasionally collaborated in special missions in Africa. At the heart of this relationship between the two secret services was the connection between each organisation’s main rivals – i.e. between the liberation movements and the Soviet Bloc, including East Germany – which created the potential for a mutually beneficial intelligence exchange arrangement.

**Conclusions**

Willy Brandt’s governments, which inherited an elaborate framework of military cooperation with the Lisbon regime, sought to take advantage of the structures already in place and maintain the working relationship between the two states. This strategy,

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839 BAK, B102/274672; Indeed, the Bild-Zeitung newspaper reported that the Bundeswehr Hospital also handled soldiers from France, Turkey, USA, Ethiopia, Chile, Iran, Israel, Korea, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Spain and Thailand, when it had spare beds. (Bild-Zeitung, 10.08.1973 – BA-MA, BW1/90837)
841 IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, Proc.6341/A, CI(2), Acordo com os Serviços Alemães (Gehlen) para troca de informações, PIDE Report, September 1956 (pp.5-16).
842 In July 1970, a delegation from the DGS visited a BND instruction facility for radio and covert listening devices. The BND agreed to instruct 3 or 4 Portuguese technicians over two weeks, not only on how to operate the devices, but also on specific intelligence gathering techniques. The BND also proved willing to collaborate with a DGS operation to penetrate the radio system of Tanzania’s Security Services, by providing related intelligence, devices and training to the Portuguese agents. In return, they asked only to be informed of the outcome of the operation. – IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, Proc.7477-CI(2), f.4, Operação Simba, Memo from the DGS, 10.07.1970.
843 The BND reported that Chinese arms and military equipment, initially earmarked for North-Vietnam, would be used in Guinea-Bissau and later in Angola and Mozambique, informing the Portuguese upon the delivery of the first batch of that armament. In 1973, the BND exchanged several messages with the DGS regarding the Scud missiles used by the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau. In return for providing detailed reports about that type of weaponry, the BND asked the DGS for any available photos or descriptions of the missiles, and even to borrow one, for study purposes, in case the Portuguese managed to capture it. – IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, Proc.332-CI(2), Misseis, 5, pp.36-37,63-86,103-122,130-139; Mateus, Dalila Cabrita. 2004. *A PIDE/DGS na Guerra Colonial 1961-1974*, Lisbon: Terramar, p.370.
however, was counterbalanced by general efforts to dissociate West German-Portuguese cooperation from the Portuguese colonial wars.

A degree of disengagement – or *discontinuity* – in the field of military cooperation was the recent legacy of the Grand Coalition government. Under Chancellor Kiesiger, the government had already cancelled orders to the Portuguese military industry and had aborted or reduced the scope of the ambitious schemes laid out by Defence Minister Strauß in the early 1960s, such as the Beja airbase project. In part, those decisions had been pragmatic reactions to changing circumstances: the recession of 1966-1967 had tightened Bonn’s budget and NATO’s shift to a ‘flexible response’ strategy had challenged the conceptual basis of the original plans. The Beja project had been plagued by specific logistical problems as well, namely by the *Bundeswehr*’s dependence on unreliable Spanish and French over-flight rights. The moves to disengage also reflected the *SPD*’s concerns with Bonn’s entanglement with the Portuguese colonial wars, as evidenced by the *AA*’s comparatively less permissive stance on the export of military materiel during Willy Brandt’s tenure.

After the *SPD* became the leading partner in the government coalition formed in 1969, this last concern gained political weight. Not only did it respond to an ideological condemnation of the wars, the concern was also a reaction to African and domestic criticism, giving it a realist dimension which appealed to the now *FDP*-led *Auswärtiges Amt*. The parliamentary wing of the *SPD* played a particularly significant role by scrutinising and questioning many of the government’s potential links to the wars. Consequently, Bonn did not place any new orders to the Portuguese arms and munitions industry; it only allowed the completion of previously agreed deals. More importantly, the supply of military equipment grew increasingly precarious. This tendency culminated in the decision by the Federal Security Council in May 1971 to only allow further military exports to Portugal in exchange for an end-use clause explicitly exempting the hardware’s use in Africa. Lisbon’s initial refusal to comply led to a period of over two years during which almost no military sales took place. This represented a major departure from the past, and was by far the most serious setback in Portuguese relations with the FRG.

The other main factor which undermined West German-Portuguese individual cooperation was the dictatorship’s unreliability. The lack of Portuguese know-how, technical personnel and financial commitment prevented the activation of Project Triton. The poor coordination at the Alcochete shooting-range rendered the arrangement
with the Luftwaffe unsustainable. The successive delays in the negotiations regarding the new range near Beja – which Lisbon prolonged as a bargaining device for more military sales to Portugal – and the refusal to fulfil Bonn’s specific requests for the range ultimately compromised the appeal of Airbase No.11. The massive German divestment announced in 1973 was not a political statement, but the result of the dictatorship’s inability and unwillingness to satisfy the FRG’s military needs.

The fact that Bonn’s divestment was only announced in August 1973 – and even then it was not comprehensive – attests to the fact that overall the SPD-FDP governments were committed to securing the continuity of the FRG’s military cooperation with Portugal. Rather than squandering the vast contribution to that cooperation developed by previous governments, the federal authorities sought to make use of its potential, even if in a more cautious way than the one advocated by the CDU/CSU opposition. Cooperation expanded at the OGMA and, until 1973, at Airbase No.11, which had never seen so much activity. The case of Beja is particularly representative of the importance of legacy, since it had been an enormous investment, which had gained a connotation as a symbol of wastefulness; it dented the Bundeswehr’s prestige.

Apart from the general policy of commitment to West German-Portuguese cooperation, many aspects of this cooperation were fuelled by the interests of specific agents. The BMVg lobbied for military sales – mostly aircraft – to Portugal as a way to support the West German military industry and the Federal Armed Forces, which could thus sell their surplus – and often outdated – materiel. The BMWi allowed sporadic deals which benefited German businesses, such as the sale of the three corvettes built by Blohm & Voss and of the explosives-making machinery by Josef Meissner. The BND trained military engineers and DGS operatives, and supplied the Portuguese forces with intelligence and equipment to combat the African liberation movements, in exchange for intelligence on Soviet armaments.

By contrast, some important areas of West German-Portuguese military cooperation did not grow out of specific German interests, but were the result of linkage between those interests and Portuguese demands. An explicit example was the medical assistance regularly provided to wounded Portuguese troops at the Hamburg-Wandsbeck Military Hospital, in exchange for the lease of Airbase No.11. In most cases, however, the linkage was not written down – Bonn simply took the initiative of furthering Lisbon’s interests in order to prove to the Portuguese its commitment to their
military relations. In this regard, the most prominent case was project Triton, which had been suspended and reopened in 1967 as a way to compensate for the divestment in other areas, and which remained open for years despite Bonn’s acknowledgement that it was neither necessary nor feasible.

Naturally in most cases linkage was imposed, clearly or implicitly, by the Portuguese side, usually as a form of ‘quid pro quo’. After being practically abandoned for years, use of Airbase No.11 only became viable again in 1970 because of the promise to build a shooting-range near Beja, and, in the short-run, because of the authorisation for the German Air Force to use the Alcochete range. With these two offers, the dictatorship had opened up an exception to its initial accord with the FRG in authorising the West German troops to shoot in Portugal. Lisbon signalled that it expected similar flexibility on Bonn’s part. Moreover, the fact that the arrangement at Alcochete was so unstable and that the negotiations for the new range depended on Portuguese goodwill, gave Lisbon some leverage over its German partners. By keeping the federal authorities uncertain as to the future use of the Beja airbase, the dictatorship – much like it was doing with the Americans vis-à-vis the Lajes airbase – was able to obtain concessions on their strict control over the military exports to Portugal.

Nevertheless, German willingness to pursue military cooperation with Portugal cannot be understood exclusively as the consequence of material interests. During the 1960s the BMVg had lost control of this field to the Auswärtiges Amt and while Walter Scheel’s ministry was certainly not insensitive to the practical interests of BMVg colleagues, the AA was deeply conscious of the foreign policy implications that the FRG’s connotation as Portugal’s closest military ally carried. Yet equally, the AA had political reasons to remain a committed ally, namely the fear that if Lisbon ceased to have its military needs met by its NATO allies (at least to some degree), Portugal would leave the Atlantic Alliance, causing great disruption to the organisation and geopolitics. Consequently, the AA – and even the Chancellery – proved keener to publicly distance the FRG from Portuguese warfare than to effectively stop German involvement in the conflicts. This was demonstrated by Bonn’s continued supply of spare parts instead of full equipment, by the export of know-how and machinery to produce munitions instead of exporting the munitions themselves, and by Willy Brandt’s attempt to arrange a multilateralisation of NATO’s military assistance to Portugal. In this sense, the 1971 BSR decision to reinforce the end-use clause should be seen less as an attempt to disturb West German-Portuguese relations, than as a way to preserve them. Its underlying
principle was that formally disentangling military cooperation from the colonial wars would enable the continuation of that cooperation between the two countries.

In conclusion, the Willy Brandt governments went farther than any of their predecessors in their effort to reduce the FRG’s ‘direct’ involvement with Portuguese colonial warfare. They did not, however, sever West German military ties to the dictatorship. By continuing to cooperate with Lisbon in a context of such strong military mobilisation, Bonn necessarily ended up contributing to the Portuguese war effort. It did so indirectly – for example, by developing Portuguese aeronautical technology – as well as directly – most notably through exceptions to its supply restrictions aimed at improving negotiations over Beja. Nevertheless, there was still friction between the two states as the gap between what Lisbon wanted and what Bonn was willing to provide gradually widened. The impact of this friction can only be measured by framing it in the broader context of Bonn’s diplomatic strategy towards Lisbon.
CHAPTER 5

Trapped by the “typical dilemma”: The Diplomatic Front

1. First impressions
2. The rise and fall of interventionism
3. The reinforcement of cooperation
4. The SPD offensive
5. Coping with multilateralism

Conclusion
Diplomacy brought together different dimensions of the West German-Portuguese relationship, setting a general atmosphere for Bonn’s official overall approach to the Caetano regime. In order to assess the evolution of that approach, this chapter follows a chronological order. The first section concentrates on the late 1960s and explores how Bonn and Lisbon interpreted each other’s change in leadership. The second section looks at how throughout the year of 1970 the FRG’s Portugal-policy, pushed by the Chancellery as well as the AA, shifted from passivity to interventionism to resignation. A third section focuses on 1971 and 1972, when the AA was in relative control of this area of policy and reinstated a cooperative attitude. A fourth section deals with the accumulation of diplomatic crises caused by the inner circles of the SPD in 1973. Finally, a fifth section addresses the aftermath of those crises and Bonn’s responses to the increasing multilateralisation of the Portuguese problem. By outlining this evolution, the chapter sheds new light on the impact of the various aspects discussed so far.

1. First impressions

The late 1960s witnessed unprecedented transformation at the top of the power chain of both the Portuguese dictatorship and the FRG, with the replacement of the leaderships which had headed each regime from its inception – Prime Minister António Salazar in Lisbon and the CDU/CSU sister-parties in Bonn. In the latter case, change had been foreshadowed in December 1966 by the formation of the Grand Coalition, which had first brought the SPD into the West German national circle of power. Despite this party’s markedly anti-colonialist and anti-fascist imprint, at the time the Portuguese Embassy in the FRG had not been overly concerned. By then, Portugal had already consolidated the trust of the federal authorities through its constant support regarding the ‘German question’ – although in this context Portuguese diplomacy had carefully avoided the term ‘self-determination’, for the sake of coherence with Lisbon’s rhetoric about its empire. In any case, Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger had been a conservative and had even told Portuguese Ambassador Homem de Mello in a letter

845 Kiesinger was even a former member of the Nazi Party. – Graf, William David. 1976. The German
that Lisbon could count on his support. Having feared an SPD victory in the 1965 elections, Ambassador Homem de Mello had also begun establishing connections with the SPD, starting with Willy Brandt himself. The ambassador had shown confidence in these contacts gathering some goodwill, although he had not overestimated their potential, having told Lisbon that “we can expect a certain amount of sympathy [towards Portugal] on Willy Brandt’s part, but we should not have too many illusions.”

On the German side, Marcelo Caetano’s emergence as successor to the ill Salazar did not catch Bonn by surprise either. The federal authorities had considered Caetano a likely candidate at least since 1956 and they looked positively to his declared reformist views. When Caetano then came to power, German Ambassador Müller-Rorschach reported to Bonn with a list of what he felt could be expected from the new prime minister. Caetano would – “step by step and surely with some resistance from the far-right and from the established circle of power” – finally uphold the (systematically disregarded) rights granted by the Portuguese Constitution of 1933, including civil liberties and free elections; turn Portuguese economy away from state-corporatism and towards “free association corporatism”; pay greater attention to the various social layers of the Portuguese population than Salazar – with his “conservative Maurras imprint” – ever had; grant the Catholic Church more freedom of conscience in social matters; and gradually release the press from its restrictions. In the foreign policy domain, Müller-Rorschach predicted no change either in Portugal’s friendly relations with the FRG or in the policy towards its non-European territories. Nevertheless, colonial administrative reforms were considered likely, with Lisbon aiming to speed up the cultural and social integration of the black population. The Auswärtiges Amt, however, was cautious in its hopes. In an internal AA memo it was claimed: “It is too soon to determine whether Caetano possesses enough authority […] to remain leader of the government for a considerable length of time or whether his tenure will only last for a more or less short transitional period.”

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847 AHD-MNE,PEA,M337-A),Pr332,30, Letter from Homem de Mello to Franco Nogueira,03.01.1967
849 Described as an updated version of the Pope Pius XI 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, which would include the workers’ right to free association and possibly even the right to strike.
850 PAAA, B26/408, Telegram from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon,26.09.1968.
851 PAAA, B26/409, Memo from the AA,30.09.1968.
In this era, the most symbolic moment for the German-Portuguese diplomatic relations came just one month after Caetano had stepped into office, as Chancellor Kiesinger visited Portugal, upon Salazar’s invitation, which had followed the chancellor’s award of an honorary degree earlier that year by the University of Coimbra. The trip had initially been scheduled for May and Kiesinger had already postponed it once. In September, the AA considered cancelling or postponing it again due to concerns over Salazar’s looming death and the uncertain longevity of Caetano’s government. Yet in the end Kiesinger chose to pursue the enterprise, visiting Lisbon and Coimbra from 24 to 28 October 1968, before heading to Madrid. It was the first trip to Portugal by a foreign leader since Salazar’s replacement. For the Portuguese authorities, it served as a way to strengthen both the country’s standing at a time of growing international isolation and Caetano’s own image as the new leader. In turn, it was the first time that a chancellor from the FRG visited the Iberian Peninsula. As Government Spokesman Günter Diehl explained in his memoirs, the popular belief was that “Franco’s and Salazar’s late-fascist governments were not a good company for the young democratic Germany”. Going against this view, Kiesinger argued already at the time that this initiative would in fact serve to bring Portugal and Spain closer to democratic Europe. Thus the chancellor met with Marcelo Caetano and President Américo Thomaz and even paid a visit to the hospital where Salazar was convalescing. Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, who did not wish to be directly associated with the initiative, sent in his place the Head of the AA’s Northern Mediterranean Department Niels Hansen and the AA’s Political Director Paul Frank.

The potential for a negative media spin was evidenced two days before the trip when the AA received the translation of an advance copy of Caetano’s speech for the welcoming ceremony. The speech began by stressing Portugal’s commitment to the question of German reunification and quickly shifted to the recent invasion of Czechoslovakia. If the growing Soviet threat called for greater solidarity among the western European states, that solidarity, as the prime minister put it, could not be

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851 In order to coincide with the celebration of the anniversary of the 28 May 1926 Coup d’Etat that had brought down the first Portuguese Republic.
853 PAAA, B26/409, Memo from the AA, 30.09.1968.
restricted “to a few issues in our own continent”, because “the West is a bloc and on every occasion and in every place in the world where its values or interests are threatened, we have an obligation to defend them”. Predictably, the speech followed up on this idea by claiming that Portugal was doing its part by fighting to keep its territories in the Western Bloc and that, therefore, its African policy was in Europe’s best interest. Caetano would conclude by addressing the German-Portuguese relations:

“The relations between our two countries, Mr. Chancellor, are excellent, whether in the area of politics, of culture or in the military sector with a defensive nature. The understanding and the wish of mutual help are always decisive. We have experienced good cooperation from the German side. I express my conviction that we ourselves have provided a useful contribution to the Federal Republic of Germany.”

Despite the initial statements of Kiesinger and his entourage about a mission to bring Portugal and Europe closer together, Bonn ended up trying to downplay the political meaning of the visit. It was not an easy task, as the press immediately picked up on the implication of Caetano’s words, asking Kiesinger after the speech if the federal authorities would repay the Portuguese support for the ‘German question’ with similar support for the Portuguese colonial question. The chancellor replied that although he personally believed the time for colonialism was over he had not come to a country just to criticise that country’s policies. Both in his speech and in his answers to the press, Kiesinger talked about general solidarity towards Portugal but tactfully avoided an explicit commitment to the dictatorship’s African policy. Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira, in his own press conference, helpfully clarified that the Portuguese were not, in fact, requesting German support for their cause. Yet the Grand Coalition

856 PAAA, B26/409, Telegram from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 22.10.1968.
857 PAAA, B26/409,Telegram from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 22.10.1968.
858 Which included, among others, the Vice-President of the Bundestag Dr. Richard Jäger, known for his pro-Portuguese statements (Fonseca (2007), pp.152-155, Schroers, Thomas. 1998. Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: die Entwicklung der Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur Portugiesischen Republik 1949-1976, Hamburg: Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Phd dissertation., pp.58,59) and whom Günter Diehl enigmatically claimed “was somewhat extemporaneously thrust” at the delegation, in Diehl (1994), p.436. Notably, Diehl, who was himself a former Nazi, was described by Ambassador Homem de Mello as having “manifest sympathy for Portugal”, in AHD-MNE,PEA,M337-A),Pr.332,30, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 14.03.1968.
859 To the point that a German newspaper would later publish: “It was […] not to understand what kind of visit it actually was: a state visit, an official visit or the awarding of an honorary degree hat with political side effects.” – Rheinischer Merkur, 01.11.1968, in Schroers (1998), p.76.
had just found out what its successor government would come to experience in just the same way – that it was easier to be associated with Portugal’s negative image than to associate Portugal with the positive image of its allies. In the actual bilateral conversations, the rise of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and the renegotiations of German-Portuguese military cooperation took centre stage over the chancellor’s stated goals of discussing Portugal’s place in Europe.\textsuperscript{860}

A shadow version of the event took place four months later, when Willy Brandt, at his own suggestion, discreetly met with Franco Nogueira in Lisbon, during a stop-over on his way to the USA.\textsuperscript{861} Brandt displayed personal sympathy for Nogueira, whom he came to call “the charming reactionary”.\textsuperscript{862} having first met him during Nogueira’s trip to West Germany in September 1966, when the Portuguese minister had complimented the then-Mayor of West Berlin Brandt during his speech in that city.\textsuperscript{863} On 17 February 1969 they had a lengthy and friendly conversation about world affairs\textsuperscript{864}, which gave Brandt close insight into what to expect from the dictatorship. Nogueira repeated in private that Lisbon was not looking for an endorsement of its African policy. At the same time, he warned that if Portuguese influence in Africa were to break down its place could be taken by powers which were less in sync with Europe, namely the UK or the USA. He asked Brandt to take this reasoning into account regarding the West German position towards Portugal’s African policy, stressing that the French had already done so.\textsuperscript{865} This confirmed Lisbon’s attitude towards Bonn and its western allies in general: it would not solicit direct support, but ‘understanding’ and ‘solidarity’.

In the autumn of 1969, the two countries had almost simultaneous legislative elections and the results were followed with interest by both sides. In the aftermath of the 26 October elections in Portugal, the German ambassador in Lisbon predicted hopefully that the newly elected ‘liberal’ MPs could prove instrumental in enabling Caetano’s reformist programme.\textsuperscript{866} In turn, the results of the FRG elections on 28


\textsuperscript{861} AHD-MNE, PEA, M595, Pr331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 10.02.1969.


\textsuperscript{863} AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A), Pr332, 30, Letter from Homem de Mello to Franco Nogueira, 03.01.1967.

\textsuperscript{864} The two ministers discussed the growing Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, as well as in the southern Atlantic and Indic Oceans, the evolution of the EEC, Europe’s increasing contacts with the USSR, the FRG’s role in the Cahora Bassa dam project and their concerns over Africa’s future. In the end they exchanged personal gifts.

\textsuperscript{865} AAPD 1969, Doc. 87.

\textsuperscript{866} PAAA, B26/399, Telegram from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 27.10.1969.
September and, particularly, the SPD-FDP coalition government empowered on 21 October caused some apprehension in Lisbon, which was accustomed to dealing with a sympathetic conservative executive in Bonn.\textsuperscript{867} Yet Ambassador Homem de Mello downplayed the impact of the change of Bonn’s political landscape, having been reassured by the AA’s Political Director Hans Ruete that the new chancellor had great appreciation for Portugal and for its loyalty to the FRG.\textsuperscript{868} Between West German expectations of Caetano’s reformism and Portuguese expectations of Brandt’s pragmatism, both states still shared a benevolent outlook of their future together as they entered the new decade.

2. The rise and fall of interventionism

It is not surprising that the first impulses towards a new direction in the FRG’s policy towards Lisbon emerged from the Bundeskanzleramt. Willy Brandt’s Chancellery would come to take control of Bonn’s foreign policy, to the point of often blatantly bypassing Walter Scheel’s foreign office. Significantly, Brandt’s Chancellery consisted essentially of former members of the Auswärtiges Amt – including, notably, the chancellor himself, his undersecretary of state Egon Bahr and two close collaborators of Bahr in charge of foreign affairs, Carl Werner Sanne and Per Fischer – who brought with them experience, ideas and relationships from their previous tenure.\textsuperscript{869} Imbued in the spirit of neue Ostpolitik, this was the team that wanted to take bold steps, away from traditional dogmas of West German foreign policy. In view of the Portuguese colonial system – as in the case of the similarly controversial regime in South Africa – the traditional line had been to avoid direct diplomatic intervention by evoking the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.\textsuperscript{870}

The escalation of the African critique in early 1970, under the banner of the anti-Cahora Bassa campaign, opened the first fissures in this practice. The landmark memo of 8 May by Per Fischer reviewing the obstacles to the FRG’s Afrikapolitik

\textsuperscript{867} After meeting with Caetano, the French Ambassador remarked that the Portuguese leader seemed uncertain of whether or not he could maintain with the new West German government the same kind of good relations he had had with the previous one. – AD/MAEEurope Portugal 1961-1970, Vol.108, Telegram from the French Embassy in Lisbon,06.10.1969.

\textsuperscript{868} AHD-MNE,PEA,M595,Pr331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,18.11.1969.

\textsuperscript{869} DzD 1969/70, p.XIV.

suggested a radical reassessment of the West German strategy in order to accommodate African demands. According to Fischer, not only should Bonn make its opposition to colonialism and racism much more explicit, it should also inform the authorities of Portugal and South Africa of its potential willingness to disrupt their political – and ultimately their economic – relations with the FRG unless steps towards decolonisation and end of apartheid would be taken. Fischer advised avoiding any sign of intimacy with those regimes, including refusal of mutual visits from ministers and heads-of-state. He suggested that the private nature of their trading relations should be stressed before the African public and attempts made to compensate the “negative effect” of private enterprises in the areas ruled by white minorities through the “positive effect” of development policies in the black-ruled African states. A further correction to Bonn’s behaviour should be persuading private corporations to reduce their businesses with “politically unpleasant” countries. Regarding the military exports, Fischer proposed that “we should, upon proving a clear breach by Portugal of the end-use clause, abandon the delivery of weapons to this country and secretly [unter der Hand] let the African states know it”. Finally, Per Fischer recommended that Bonn give humanitarian aid to the African liberation movements, just as it had been doing to Arab guerrilla organisations, including medicines, bandages and care for their wounded in Germany.  

While the memo was clearly meant as the kick-off for a new age, Bonn’s initial inclination was to keep business as usual. As we have seen, for all of Brandt’s worries over the popular anti-Cahora Bassa mobilisation, the federal government did not disengage itself from the Portuguese dictatorship at this stage, neither militarily nor economically. In fact, Bonn even reasserted its commitment to Cahora Bassa that summer. It is in this context of determination to proceed with the traditional policy that Brandt asked Ministerpräsident of North Rhine-Westphalia Heinz Kühn (SPD) to deliver personally his answer to the appeal for a change in the West German policy towards Portugal made by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda. Brandt’s letter and attached memorandum politely reiterated Bonn’s intention of essentially staying on the same course.

871 BAK, B136/2992, Memo from the Bundeskanzleramt, 08.05.1970.  
872 BAK, B136/2992, Letter from Willy Brandt to Kenneth Kaunda (no date).
Ironically, while Brandt was aiming to gather African tolerance for Bonn’s cooperation with Lisbon, Heinz Kühn’s trip to Africa (15 August-1 September) ended up becoming the first serious diplomatic incident in the West German-Portuguese relations of this era. In his first declarations to the press during the trip, Kühn complied with the role of Brandt’s ambassador, explaining that Bonn would not go back on its decision to participate in the Cahora Bassa project. Yet in an interview with a reporter from Die Welt published on 29 August 1970 Kühn admitted that he regretted the federal government’s stance. This caused a great stir in the West German media. The most problematic incident, however, was Kühn’s public announcement that the SPD-associated Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), of which he was vice-president, intended to grant humanitarian relief to the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies. More than contradict the government’s official position, this statement put the federal authorities on the spot, since the FES was partly subsidised by the government. Kühn added to the commotion shortly after returning from his trip by embracing interventionist rhetoric in an interview to Der Spiegel:

“[…] the federal government should, together with other European governments, influence its NATO-partner Portugal so that the Portuguese agree to gradually grant independence to their colonies, like Zambian President Kaunda called for. Otherwise Mozambique can become a new Biafra. […] In the long run Lisbon’s government could not ignore a certain pressure from the NATO Alliance.”

Lisbon reacted with more concern than indignation. Foreign Minister Rui Patrício met with German Ambassador Schmidt-Horix and expressed his worry over the future of German-Portuguese relations and, in particular, his fears that the FRG would change its policy towards southern Africa by starting to fund the anti-colonialist rebels. In turn, the Portuguese embassy in Bonn approached the federal authorities in order to find out what kinds of relief those groups were going to be provided with by the FES. The embassy’s envoy underlined the political implications of this episode by stating

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873 In his letter to Kaunda, Brandt actually claimed that he was sending Kühn to explain the German position. – BAK,B136/2992, Letter from Willy Brandt to Kenneth Kaunda (no date).
874 Kühn visited Ceylon (Sri Lanka) from to 15 to 21 August, Zambia from 22 to 26 August and Tanzania from 26 August to 1 September 1970.
875 BAK,B136/2992, Memo from the AA,08.09.1970.
that Kühn’s statements had strengthened the anti-Cahora Bassa campaign and that “moral support for the liberation movements means support for the guerrilla war that is being conducted against NATO-partner Portugal in Africa”. The envoy argued that the provision of humanitarian relief to the rebels would allow them to save funds which they could then use to purchase weapons. He also noted that a “valorisation” of those organisations through external assistance would hinder the possibilities of any “friendly arrangement” between Portugal and Kaunda. Despite these observations, the Portuguese dictatorship did not defy the federal authorities. Instead, the biggest immediate consequence was psychological. For the first time, Lisbon seemed to seriously fear a change in Bonn’s policy of non-interference in the Portuguese affairs in Africa.

The federal government responded by dissociating itself from Heinz Kühn’s remarks. Ambassador Schmidt-Horix explained to Rui Patrício that Kühn had spoken as a member of the FES and not as a representative of the government, which would not change its foreign policy, as signalled by its continued commitment to Cahora Bassa. When questioned in parliament by MP Walther Leisler Kiep (CDU), Willy Brandt gave the same answer. Kiep then asked if Bonn would consult with Portugal before supporting the liberation movements. Brandt replied that, since that support would not be coming from the federal government but from an independent foundation, there was no need for inter-governmental consultation.

Despite Brandt’s claim to the contrary, the Chancellery did discuss the problem directly with the Portuguese leadership. Head of the Bundeskanzleramt Horst Ehmke, who was also federal minister for special affairs, travelled to Lisbon to meet with Caetano on 4 October 1970, in order to smooth out this political crisis. According to his initial instructions, Ehmke – who had met Caetano before as fellow jurist at an international congress in Santiago de Compostella – was to assure the Portuguese leader that the federal government had not been briefed about the FES’ intentions and therefore could not provide much information on this. He should also clarify that the Bonn government itself had no designs to give any kind of aid to the liberation

880 BAK,B136/2992, Willy Brandt’s written answer to Walther Kiep’s question, 03.10.1970.
movements. Nevertheless, on 25 September, the Head of the Bundeskanzleramt’s Section for Foreign Affairs Carl-Werner Sanne added an important point to Ehmke’s mission: “An issue which should be incorporated into your conversation with Caetano is Kaunda’s proposal to sit the Portuguese government and representatives of the liberation movements at the same table in order to usher a step-by-step liberation.” This addendum was prompted by the visit – scheduled for 15/16 October – of the OAU delegation led by Kaunda himself, who had recently become chairman of OAU and NAM. The Bundeskanzleramt hoped to turn the African perception of West Germany around by impressing the OAU delegates with new developments on the Portuguese colonial question. Success might mean turning Portugal from the main thorn in the FRG’s Afrikapolitik into a major asset of that policy. Both in its conception of a dialogue-based long-term transition and in its practical attempt to create a direct backchannel between the prime minister and the Chancellery, the initiative seemed like a deliberate effort to reproduce the conditions of Bonn’s successful neue Ostpolitik.

By this time, African pressure was also pushing the Auswärtiges Amt to contemplate the adoption of a more active diplomacy regarding Portugal. On 16 September, Ambassador Schmidt-Horix proposed to Bonn organising a collective démarche by the dictatorship’s Western partners to talk Lisbon into changing its African policy. The AA was cautious about the proposal, especially after having consulted the French Foreign Ministry, which disapproved of the idea. Nevertheless, it decided to consult the British about the possibility of using the NATO framework to arrange a settlement between Portugal and the African states, as well as to encourage a more open-minded African policy in Lisbon. In this regard, the AA’s Political Section regarded Ehmke’s planned meeting with Caetano as a possible test to see how vulnerable the Portuguese were. Paul Frank, who was now undersecretary of state in the AA, asked Ehmke to tell Caetano that the controversial status of Lisbon’s African policy – especially within West German society – made it complicated for Bonn to

885 PAAA, B26/398, Dispatch from Paul Frank to Horst Ehmke, 22.09.1970.
886 PAAA, B34/757, Speaking Notes for the talk of von Braun with the FCO, 22.09.1970.
remain neutral or to support the Portuguese position in future EEC negotiations. The meeting thus became a test tube for the strategies of both cabinets.

Horst Ehmke found it difficult to decipher Marcelo Caetano’s typically elusive rhetoric. Ehmke repeated the statement proposed by the AA as a prelude to asking Caetano about the chances of Lisbon negotiating with Kaunda. The prime minister in turn explained that he was preparing a constitutional revision which would grant more autonomy to the Portuguese territories but rejected any talk of decolonisation, since he did not even admit there was such a thing as Portuguese “colonialism”. Caetano added cryptically that even if one planned to grant the territories independence in the long run, one could not admit it loudly, since either the black Africans would rush the process or the white community might seize power, like it had happened in Rhodesia. Puzzled by this declaration, Ehmke could not decide whether or not it could be interpreted as a sign of “theoretical” disposition to eventually give independence to the colonies. Caetano told the minister that he had been approached by emissaries from Zambia a few times before and had shown openness to dialogue with them, but they had not followed through on his replies. Later, he explained that he was not mandated to negotiate with Kaunda about the Portuguese territories and so he could not do it. This, too, caused Ehmke some surprise, since he regarded the two statements as contradictory. Caetano then noted that in the past some talks with Zambian delegates had in fact taken place in the UN backstage and he indicated his willingness to reopen them in that forum. He assured Ehmke that he would welcome further exchange of ideas with the Germans and that he would promptly reply to related correspondence by Willy Brandt. Although the head of the Chancellery shared with Brandt his impression that Caetano viewed his own leeway regarding Portugal’s African policy as narrow within the strict confines of the regime, Ehmke still believed that he had made a breakthrough. He suggested to the chancellor informing Kaunda about the Portuguese leader’s flexible views on dialogue and following up this démarche with a personal letter.890

The AA had fewer illusions about their chances of success. Ambassador Schmidt-Horix, who served as translator during the conversation and was therefore its only other witness, displayed a more nuanced understanding of Caetano’s words. Contrary to Ehmke, Schmidt-Horix seemed to pick up that the prime minister

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888 PAAA, B26/398, Dispatch from Paul Frank to Horst Ehmke, 22.09.1970.
889 Caetano displayed personal antipathy towards Kenneth Kaunda, but ignored Ehmke’s suggestion to ask Ugandan President Milton Obote to take his place.
890 PAAA, B26/398, Dispatch from Horst Ehmke to Willy Brandt, 08.10.1970.
distinguished between holding talks to soften the tension with Zambia and actually
discussing the status of the Portuguese territories. In fact, Schmidt-Horix’s report to
Paul Frank was much clearer on the fact that Caetano had shown no interest in letting
the Germans take any mediator role regarding Lisbon’s affairs, as evidenced by the
preference for sorting those out through the UN backchannel.891 On 6 October, as the
ambassador’s report was posted to Bonn, AA’s Undersecretary of State Sigismund von
Braun talked to the British foreign office and learned that London, like Paris, was not
inclined to give in to African pressure. Feeling a lack of support on all sides, the
Auswärtiges Amt then tried to keep things in perspective. Invoking its allies’
pragmatism, the AA recommended to Brandt categorically reaffirming to the OAU
delegation Bonn’s refusal to compromise any economic interests in southern Africa,
including Cahora Bassa. The only practical concessions advised by the AA were a
tighter control of the end-use clause and a disposition to talk to the Portuguese.892

Ehmke steadily proceeded with his plan. Having talked to Kaunda in Bonn, he
commissioned a letter to be sent directly from Brandt to Caetano. The Chancellery’s
Department for Foreign Affairs prepared a friendly letter explaining that “lately it has
become increasingly harder, in the area of domestic and foreign politics, for the federal
government to stay out of the discussion involving the Portuguese African policy”. The
letter pointed out that the FRG’s participation in the Cahora Bassa project was under
fire both domestically and internationally. It stressed, nonetheless, the importance Bonn
placed on the cooperation with Portugal within NATO. Fearing that the two states’
“fortunately still good bilateral relations” should suffer because of the “conflict of
opinions about the Portuguese African policy”, the letter asked for a way to spare both
countries unwanted nuisances. Ultimately, it boiled down to two wishes: first, that
Caetano would confide in Brandt the long-term objectives of Portugal’s African policy;
and second, that he would follow through on the idea of engaging in talks with Zambia.
The text, approved by the Auswärtiges Amt, intentionally avoided any indication of
what measures Bonn would be willing to undertake in order to pressure Portugal. Head
of Department Per Fischer proposed that initiatives such as a full weapons embargo

891 PAAA, B26/398, Dispatch from Hans Schmidt-Horix to Paul Frank, 06.10.1970.
892 PAAA, B34/757, Telegram from the FRG’s Embassy in London, 06.10.1970; Speaking Notes for the
talk with Kaunda, 12.10.1970.
“should be included in a future letter [from Brandt] or, if possible, in a joint demarche with other allies”. Brandt signed and sent the letter, dated 31 October 1970.

Marcelo Caetano’s reply, dated 11 December, was a textbook display of the dictatorship’s inflexible rhetoric. Caetano declared that “relations between our two countries have been very friendly and as far as I am concerned I only wish that that friendship continues and expands”, but he avoided the chancellor’s insinuation that a change in Lisbon’s African policy could safeguard their relationship. Instead, the prime minister delivered a brief lesson about the ‘originality’ of the Portuguese presence in Angola and Mozambique. Regarding the FRG’s domestic debate, Caetano lamented “the propaganda that is being made in the Federal Germany against my country because of the overseas problem and with the pretext” of Cahora Bassa. As for the international pressure, he proclaimed that the Afro-Asian group’s policy in the UN and the campaign against Cahora Bassa in particular had the “pure and simple” aim of expelling white people from Africa. According to Caetano, delivering “the rule of southern Africa to the African parties of revolutionary ideology would be the ruin of all the civilising work the Europeans have been able to achieve there”. Moreover, such a step would leave the region open to Soviet and Chinese penetration. He therefore described Kaunda as an “enemy of the West, all the more dangerous because he knows how to disguise his true feelings and manages to fool the people who listen to him”. Caetano did not even stray from Lisbon’s official denial of the recent Portuguese attack against Guinea-Conakry, making a point of denouncing the “speculation in the United Nations” surrounding those events with the aim of tarnishing “Portugal’s good name” and the “peaceful evolution of its policy”. The prime minister concluded that Lisbon would continue to unalterably follow the same path, which “deserves, I believe, [our] friends’ understanding.” Despite such intransigency, Caetano finished by remarking that he thought “this exchange of opinions and information” had been highly beneficial and that he was willing to further it.

The letter was a serious blow to the Chancellery’s ambition of influencing the Portuguese government in this matter and particularly of mediating an understanding with Kaunda. Willy Brandt’s frustration would later echo in his memoirs:

895 Caetano claimed he had only received Brandt’s letter a few days before.
“I also recall the stupidity we encountered in Lisbon in autumn 1970, when, after consultation with Kenneth Kaunda, we sounded on the possibility that Portugal’s possessions might be granted a change of status over the next ten to fifteen years. The Portuguese Government reacted negatively – so much so that a full transmission of their reply would have left the Zambian President with little more than a verbal kick in the pants.” 897

In January 1971, a discouraged Brandt admitted to French President Pompidou that he had no hope at all in Lisbon’s willingness to change the status of its African possessions. 898 The dictatorship’s relatively tame reaction to Kühn’s statements had exposed the limits of Lisbon’s readiness to compromise German-Portuguese relations and had encouraged the Chancellery to push forth its agenda. Caetano’s letter, in turn, had painfully demonstrated the limits of Bonn’s ability to persuade Lisbon to give in on what was the cornerstone of the dictatorship’s policy. The Bundeskanzleramt never followed up with Fischer’s proposed ‘stricter’ letter. No arms embargo was ever threatened or put into place. The Chancellery’s impulse to change had not made it to the winter.

3. The reinforcement of cooperation

The western – particularly West German – diplomatic crisis caused by Portugal’s botched attempt to stage a coup in Conakry gave new sense of urgency to the AA’s compulsion to act, but its plans had grown less forceful. By February 1971, the ministry still wished to know how the British, French and even American authorities were planning to deal with the Portuguese problem, but for the moment it had decided to focus on bilateral action. Moreover, the AA no longer sought to use Bonn’s unavailability to cooperate in the EEC as leverage. Having perceived “Caetano’s highly limited leeway” regarding the colonial question, the Department for Sub-Saharan Africa postulated: “Although Caetano’s reform [is an] undeniable progress, we are concerned about further evolution [and] fundamentally committed to support all

898 AAPD 1971, Doc.32, Conversation between Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou in Paris, 26.01.1971; CHAN/APR, 5AG2/1010, Meeting between President Pompidou and Chancellor Brandt, 26.01.1971
liberalising tendencies in Portugal, as well as the country’s closer cooperation with Europe”. 899

The AA’s accommodating attitude was particularly noticeable in the way Bonn handled the Conakry episode. There were no direct consequences for the FRG’s bilateral relations with Portugal, even despite the fact that one of the victims on the night of the Portuguese raid had been a West German count. 900 When talking to Ambassador Homem de Mello, Walter Scheel did no more than lament the situation. The minister recognised that the whole episode had temporarily compromised the policy of dialogue proposed by the moderate African governments, but he officially put the blame for this solely on Sékou Touré and East Berlin. 901 Similarly, Bonn’s public ‘white paper’ about the breakdown of West German-Guinean diplomatic relations carefully tiptoed around the Portuguese role in the invasion. 902 One explanation for this tame diplomatic reaction was the fact that the embassy in Lisbon underestimated Caetano’s responsibility. Its diplomats had become strongly – and inaccurately – convinced that the DGS and the sections of the military supported by the ‘ultras’ had moved in Conakry against the prime minister’s will, in order to discredit his new African policy. Indeed, on 1 February 1971 the AA had been assured by the embassy that the ‘ultras’ were plotting a fierce opposition against Caetano’s policies of ‘liberalisation’. 903

It was in this atmosphere of conspiracy and uncertainty that in early February the new ambassador Ehrenfried von Holleben had arrived in Lisbon, only to become the main advocate for the theory of enhancing cooperation with Marcelo Caetano. Von Holleben was convinced that the prime minister was a tactician who was adopting a right-wing posture in order to appease his more conservative adversaries just so he could pass the constitutional revision. The ambassador claimed that once those texts were approved, Caetano could adopt measures which would profoundly change the

899 PAAA, B34/811, Memo from the AA, 15.02.1971.
900 Count von Tiesenhausen had worked for a West Berlin firm which supplied equipment to the local military factories. Bonn’s report suggested that he was shot because he was driving a Volkswagen the same colour as those of the PAIGC, without explicitly acknowledging who killed him. – PAAA, B34/866, The Guinea Affair, p.6; see also Marinho, António Luís. 2006. Operação Mar Verde: Um Documento para a História, Lisbon: Temas & Debates. p.123.
902 PAAA, B34/866, The Guinea Affair.
903 PAAA, B26/444, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 01.02.1971; In reality, Marcelo Caetano – unlike Rui Patrício – had been informed of the operation, even if only on 16 November. He had personally authorised it, under the condition that there would be no traces of Portuguese involvement. – Marinho (2006), pp.86-88.
status of the overseas provinces. While single-mindedly repeating this premise to Bonn, von Holleben argued that Lisbon should be supported, rather than confronted:

“For us in NATO or in the EEC Council of Ministers, the conclusion of [Caetano’s] Constitutional Reform should be a starting point for a reflection on how together we can take Portugal by the hand, help it slowly solve the dilemma of its attachment to Africa and bring it to a respectable place in the European integration.”

NATO’s 1971 spring ministerial meeting in Lisbon (3-4 June) put the AA’s stance to the test. On 27 May, Zambian authorities proposed to the local West German embassy that Bonn would issue an official clarification stating that the FRG’s partnership with Portugal in the Atlantic Alliance in no way implied an approval of Lisbon’s colonial policy. They suggested that the Western powers could actually use the NATO meeting to convince the Portuguese regime to change its policy. Switching to a more domestic problem, Lusaka also asked that Bonn persuade the Portuguese to lift the suffocating embargo imposed on Zambian goods in the ports of Beira (Mozambique) and Lobito (Angola). On the European front, Oslo sent a memo to the Auswärtiges Amt on 28 May explaining the Norwegian decision to address the Portuguese colonial policy at the NATO meeting.

The AA held firm. Undersecretary of State Paul Frank explained to the Norwegian envoy that Bonn was quite familiar with the Portuguese problem, having been particularly affected by the Conakry episode. However, he expressed his doubts about whether the NATO Council was “a suitable panel in which to present complaints about the Portuguese policy ‘in coram publico’”. According to Frank, NATO ran the risk of disintegrating if it entangled itself too much with the inner affairs of Portugal – if nothing else that could feed similar controversies over Greece and Turkey. Frank summed up the AA’s new attitude:

“NATO is exclusively a defence alliance, not a forum in which there must be a joint policy towards every issue. Besides, the federal government’s endeavour is to

904 AD/MAEEurope 1944…Portugal 3506, Dispatch from the French Embassy in Lisbon, 17.06.1971.
905 PAAA, B26/444, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 28.07.1971.
906 PAAA, B34/756, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lusaka, 27.05.1971.
907 AAPD 1971, Doc. 197.
influence Portugal in a rational way. Prime Minister Caetano is manifestly inclined to follow an evolutionary policy in Africa. His position will certainly not be strengthened if Portugal’s pride is challenged by, as host of the Council meeting, losing face in its own capital.”

While the Auswärtiges Amt had not abandoned the idea of using the NATO framework to further its agenda, it was extremely wary of its partners’ overly confrontational attitude. Not only did the AA refuse to side with the critics of Lisbon, it instructed the German ambassador in Oslo to try to coordinate with the French ambassador a joint demarche in order to persuade the Norwegian foreign minister to put off his planned statement for the Lisbon meeting. In turn, true to the AA’s plan to establish a friendly and constructive dialog with the Portuguese, on the eve of the meeting Walter Scheel had a private conversation with Rui Patrício. Scheel expressed Bonn’s concerns over the rising tension between Portugal and the African states, particularly Zambia, and the wish to discuss related matters in greater detail. Patrício assured his German counterpart of Lisbon’s willingness to settle the disputes with Zambia, even disingenuously denying the existence of an actual embargo. According to the Portuguese minister, Lisbon was interested in securing a friendly coexistence between Zambia and Mozambique, which would be achieved as soon as Zambia stopped sheltering bases for the liberation movements. Patrício left a good impression. After this conversation, the AA decided against any official West German public declaration distancing the FRG from Portugal’s African policy, like the one Kaunda had proposed.

Inspired by the openness demonstrated by Walter Scheel, the Portuguese embassy suggested regular consultations between the two foreign ministers, an arrangement similar to the one the FRG already had with Spain. The embassy justified this proposal with Portugal’s general reinforcement of the connections with its closest

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908 AAPD 1971, Doc. 197.
909 AD/MAE Europe 1944… Portugal, 3509, Relations avec le RFA, Telegram from the French Embassy in Oslo, 24.05.1971.
910 AAPD 1971, Doc.197, 05.06.1971 (footnote); PAAA, B24/757, Dispatch from the AA to the FRG’s Embassy in Lusaka, 08.06.1971; PAAA, B26/445, Memo from the AA,03.01.1971 (this is the date on the document, but given its content the actual date is probably 03.01.1972); The existence of an embargo was acknowledged by Patrício in Xavier, Leonor. 2010. Rui Patrício: A Vida Conta-se Inteira, Lisbon: Temas e Debates, pp.183-184.
allies, as well as with the wish of discussing bilateral questions such as the West German economic assistance to Portugal. The Portuguese diplomats also pointed out that Kiesinger’s visit in 1968 required a counter-visit, although they acknowledged that given the turbulent external environment it would be more convenient to invite the Portuguese foreign minister rather than the prime minister himself.

The Auswärtiges Amt’s initial reaction was positive. As late as November 1971, the AA still showed predisposition for a meeting between Walter Scheel and Rui Patrício, even if stressing that a “visit from the Portuguese foreign minister to Germany [...] should be as inconspicuous as possible”. For Bonn’s foreign office, it was an opportunity to tackle what it perceived to be a threat to the international state of affairs. The Portuguese wars were seen as “[undermining] our NATO-partner, [providing] the Soviet Union and Red China with a starting point for a stronger penetration in Africa and [hampering] our relations and the relations of the West in general with the African states”. The ideal scenario for the AA would be an “evolutionary solution” (in opposition to a ‘revolutionary’ one) for the colonial question, i.e. the colonies’ “gradual transition” towards independence managed from above. The Department for Sub-Saharan Africa argued that this way would avoid a defeat of Lisbon with “far-reaching consequences for the situation in Portugal and in Africa”. Apart from that, the AA showed additional interest in using the meeting to discuss the expanding German-Portuguese economic relations.

Despite this early enthusiasm, the AA ended up taking into greater consideration the damages that a close political association with Portugal would do to the FRG’s image in contrast to the little results it could produce. The AA recognised that “a meeting between Scheel and Patricio [would] expose us to further [propaganda] attacks from the communist side”. It feared in particular being accused of supporting the Portuguese in the wars and of forming a “Bonn-Lisbon-Pretoria axis”. Besides, even if the goal was to influence the Portuguese colonial policy, the federal authorities could not acknowledge it publicly. On the one hand, because there was little chance of success – “we should not overestimate our ability to persuade Portugal”. On the other hand, because Bonn’s “efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the overseas question

911 In 1971, these included – as the embassy pointed out – visits from the British and American foreign ministers to Lisbon and a visit from the Portuguese foreign minister to Paris, as well as ministerial contacts with Brazil and Spain.
912 PAAA, B26/445, Memo from the AA, 03.01.1971.
914 PAAA, B26/445, Memo from the AA, 26.11.1971.
will only get us very limited sympathy in Africa”, since “most African states call for […] the political, economic and military isolation of Portugal”. There was even the risk that the Portuguese would request that Bonn “support their position during the transitional period”. The idea of regular consultations would thus substantially reduce the leeway of Bonn’s policy. As for the FRG’s arrangement with Spain, it dated from years before, when the timing had been more appropriate. Furthermore, Portugal, unlike Spain, was a NATO member and all NATO foreign ministers got together twice a year, so Scheel and Patrício could contact each other without having to establish new protocols. For all these reasons, the AA ultimately rejected both the proposal for regular meetings and the suggestion for an official bilateral visit. In turn, Rui Patrício was invited to once again talk to his West German counterpart during the following NATO ministerial spring meeting.915

This diplomatic back and forth encapsulated the ambiguous yet cordial modus vivendi of the West German-Portuguese relationship. As we have seen, ministers, undersecretaries of state and ambassadors met regularly with each other to discuss the very dynamic economic and military relations between their states; yet Bonn was not keen on the bad publicity which high-profile events could bring, even if it avoided explicitly telling that to the Portuguese.916 Lisbon was not, however, an exceptional case in West German foreign policy, which included relations with similarly controversial regimes such as Greece and South Africa.917 As Willy Brandt explained to the Federal Foreign Affairs Committee on 16 March 1972, Bonn’s commitment to democracy and human rights did not interfere with its relations with dictatorships, so long as those relations furthered the three priorities of West German foreign policy: European integration, security and détente.918 This concept was, of course, at the very

915 PAAA, B26/445, Memos from the AA, 25.11.1971 and 03.01.1971 [03.01.1972].
916 When, in an informal conversation with Willy Brandt in November 1972, Franco Nogueira suggested – of his own initiative – a visit to Portugal, Brandt replied diplomatically: “Well, let me see if I can fit something in my schedule.” (IAN/TT/AMC,Cx.40, nº52, Note from Franco Nogueira to Marcelo Caetano,27.11.1972). That month, the Portuguese government invited a group of ambassadors for a trip through Portuguese Africa and the AA instructed Ambassador von Holleben to decline the offer. He did so, as directed, by tactfully justifying the refusal with alleged schedule incompatibilities. (PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv101.435, Memo from the AA,12.01.1973, Memo from the AA,29.01.1973, Dispatch from FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon,05.06.1973).
917 For an overview of Bonn’s relations with these two states, especially from a perspective of Bonn’s concern with human rights, see Rock, Philipp. 2010. Macht, Märkte und Moral - Zur Rolle der Menschenrechte in der Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den Sechziger und Siebziger Jahren, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
918 Greece and Turkey, as NATO members, fitted that profile. With regards to the Middle Eastern states, Brandt acknowledged the importance of Bonn’s economic interests. – PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv101.435, Memo from the AA,16.01.1973.
foundation of *neue Ostpolitik*. While the Portuguese colonial situation did pose an original problem in comparison with other authoritarian regimes, in the end the same principles applied. Thus the federal government kept the relations with the NATO allied Caetano regime on a friendly level.\(^{919}\) From time to time, Foreign Minister Walter Scheel included lines in his speeches referring to Portugal’s future being in Europe rather than Africa, only to ultimately excise them from the final spoken version.\(^{920}\)

The Portuguese diplomats, who were well aware of Lisbon’s controversial image in West German society, did not ask for wholehearted political recognition of the two states’ friendship, but they did expect some protection against the opposition. Ambassadors and consuls complained about the sporadic acts of vandalism against their facilities\(^{921}\), asked the local authorities to pay the repair bills\(^{922}\) and even solicited from the police the restriction of leafleting on their street.\(^{923}\) The Portuguese authorities, who avoided any kind of relationship with the West German far-right despite their ideological affinity\(^{924}\), appealed to Bonn to prevent delegates of the liberation movements from visiting West Germany. Moreover, if it was difficult enough for the Lisbon dictatorship to accept the criticism enabled by the FRG’s free press, the hostile declarations coming from the ranks of the *SPD* – the main party in government – were particularly hard to swallow. Yet Undersecretary of State von Braun explained to Ambassador Homem de Mello that, given the political backlash for the decision to stick


\(^{920}\) NARA-AAD, Doc. 1974BONN04706, “EC ROLE IN PORTUGUESE DECOLONIZATION”, 25.03.1974

\(^{921}\) For example, on the dawn of 18 December 1972, a group painted slogans at the entrance gates of the Portuguese Embassy calling for the freedom of Angola and Mozambique. – AHD-MNE, PEA, M727, Pr. 331, Dispatch from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 18.12.1972; See also chapter 2.

\(^{922}\) AHD-MNE, PEA, M641, Pr. 331, Dispatch from the Portuguese General Consulate in Hamburg, 01.07.1970.

\(^{923}\) by evoking the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations even tough Portugal had not ratified that treaty – AHD-MNE, PEA, M683, Pr. 331, Dispatch from the Portuguese General-Consulate in Hamburg, 25.11.1971.

\(^{924}\) In April 1971, the press reported that a delegation from the controversial German neo-nazi party *NPD* would be travelling to Lisbon to meet with Portuguese officials. The Portuguese Ambassador in Bonn wrote to his Foreign Ministry asking for the delegation to be ignored by governmental entities and by the Portuguese press. (AHD-MNE, PEA M683 Pr. 331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 16.04.1971) The Foreign Ministry denied that there had been any arrangements with the members of the *NPD* and gave instructions for them not to be received, not even by lower state officials. (AHD-MNE, PEA M683 Pr. 331, Telegram from the Portuguese Foreign Ministry, 27.04.1971, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 13.05.1971).
to Cahora Bassa, Bonn had no option but to tolerate even such initiatives as the FES’ plan to give aid to the liberation movements.\textsuperscript{925} In a sense, this was the political price the dictatorship had to pay for its partner’s commitment to the Mozambican dam. Grudgingly accepting this, Portuguese diplomacy tactfully agreed to refrain from pointing out to its critics that the previous Bonn government – with Willy Brandt as foreign minister and vice-chancellor – had lobbied in favour of the adjudication of Cahora Bassa to the Zamco consortium.\textsuperscript{926}

Ultimately the dictatorship settled for ensuring the loyalty of the federal government itself. Although the Embassy showed that it trusted Willy Brandt’s and Walter Scheel’s goodwill, it repeatedly complained that Minister Erhard Eppler’s public condemnation of Lisbon’s African policy went against the good relations between the two states.\textsuperscript{927} Furthermore, responding to the creation of the anti-colonialist activist group AGM-Komitee in 1971, which caused a stir in the Portuguese press\textsuperscript{928}, the Embassy’s chargé d’affaires asked the AA to guarantee that the committee would not get public funds with which to support the liberation movements. He worried that the organisation might try to get state subsidies, since a number of its founders were SPD members of the Bundestag.\textsuperscript{929}

The AA and even the Chancellery pulled some weight to prevent the alienation of the Portuguese. The AA seemed to count on Horst Ehmke to use his clout to quiet the most prominent anti-colonialist voices in the SPD. On 22 April 1971, the day after one of Homem de Melo’s rants to Scheel about Eppler, Ehmke told the ambassador that he had had a long talk with the BMZ minister about his “attitude” towards Portugal.\textsuperscript{930} Similarly, in January 1972, Walter Scheel asked Ehmke to persuade his SPD colleague Hans Matthöfer, who was at the head of the AGM-Komitee, to abandon the ‘Portugal-Tribunal’ campaign. Scheel made the point that, as Ehmke himself had found out first-hand, Bonn’s “attempt to influence the Portuguese overseas policy” could only be successful if the Bonn-Lisbon alliance consisted of “mutual trust”. He argued that the ‘Portugal-Tribunal’ would shake the foundations of that trust.\textsuperscript{931} Indeed, for the AA, the planned propaganda offensive risked considerably straining West German relations

\textsuperscript{925} AA, B26, IA446, Memo from the AA, 29.12.1970.
\textsuperscript{926} AHD-MNE,PEA,M683,Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,21.04.1971.
\textsuperscript{927} PAAA, B26/446, Memo from the AA,29.12.1970.
\textsuperscript{928} PAAA, B26/444, Telegram from the German Embassy in Lisbon, 02.07.1971.
\textsuperscript{929} PAAA, B26/444, Note from the AA, 21.06.1971.
\textsuperscript{930} AHD-MNE, PEA,M683,Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,22.04.1971.
\textsuperscript{931} PAAA, B26/445, Dispatch from Walter Scheel to Horst Ehmke, January 1972.
with Lisbon and thus reducing the “possibilities of influencing Portuguese policy in a positive way”.  

This fear justified the AA’s hostile behaviour towards the solidarity movement, although – as described in chapter 2 – said behaviour was also linked with other political concerns. Likewise, it was not necessarily merely out of worry over Lisbon’s feelings that Paul Frank instructed the FRG’s embassies in Oslo and Copenhagen to request the Norwegian and Danish authorities to refrain from further critiques against Portugal during the following NATO meeting (30-31 May 1972). Frank, who had been mandated by Willy Brandt, certainly had a particular interest in ensuring the smooth running of the meeting, since it was set to take place in Bonn. Regardless, for once the Scandinavians agreed not to address the colonial question, creating a propitious environment for Scheel’s second private rendezvous with Rui Patrício.

Like the Chancellery, by then the AA had accepted that it could not persuade the dictatorship to decolonise through sheer reasoning. Walter Scheel’s notes two weeks before his talk with Patrício – which took place on 1 June 1972 – show that the Auswärtiges Amt changed the emphasis of its tactic in order to reinforce the idea of Portuguese rapprochement with Europe. The notes suggest that the conversation was to focus preferably on economic issues, particularly on Portugal’s increasing ties with the EEC, ties which would hopefully make it easier for the dictatorship to disconnect from Africa. It was not a new idea, but one that now took centre stage away from the colonial question. Nevertheless, if Patrício brought it up, Scheel was prepared to insist on Bonn’s evolutionary views, as well as to stress the need for more regulation over the military materiel that West Germany was providing Portugal with. The German-Portuguese bilateral military cooperation ended up dominating the conversation, even if Scheel did manage to briefly slip in the EEC angle at the beginning of the meeting.

Although it was not making much visible progress, the AA’s cooperative policy had become institutionalised as Bonn’s default position, even if the conditions on the ground did not inspire much hope – marcelismo’s initial cycle of openness and reform had clearly drawn to a close by 1971/1972 – and neither did the West German...
Embassy. Von Holleben, who as late as September 1971 – looking back at Caetano’s first three years in power – had still argued that the expectations formulated by his predecessor Müller-Rorschach could be fulfilled, was becoming less confident. In May 1972, he admitted to the AA that “in the three and half years since Caetano came to power, he has not managed to clarify, or he has not wished to clarify, in which direction he wants to lead Portugal”. The ambassador’s correspondence with the AA began displaying a greater awareness of Lisbon’s failure to deal with the mounting social and political crisis in Portugal and Africa; his tone grew not only more critical, but often sarcastic. Yet von Holleben’s disenchantment had little impact in the AA.

For all the talk of change – in Bonn as well as in Lisbon – the priority was stability. The AA’s Political Director Günther van Well practically admitted as much in a long memo in January 1973, where he presented a balance sheet of Bonn’s Afrikapolitik in a changing world. Although predicting that “in the short-term the Portuguese overseas policy will remain the main problem of our African policy”, van Well argued that the federal government was irresistibly bound to the Lisbon regime by its NATO membership and by Bonn’s interests in Portugal, such as the Beja airbase. The FRG’s government therefore had no “realistic alternative” but to continue to live with its “typical dilemma” of professing ‘self-determination’ while at the same time maintaining its solid relations with Portugal. The events of the rest of the year gave van Well the opportunity to prove the AA’s commitment to this view.

937 PAAA, B26/444, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 27.09.1971.
938 PAAA, B26/444, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 15.05.1972.
939 A particularly striking example is von Holleben’s description of Américo Thomaz’ 1972 presidential campaign: “[...] the leaders travel throughout the country, visit hospitals and retirement homes, inaugurate dams, open exhibitions… and give speeches. Before it was their purpose to draw the Portuguese people’s attention to the event of the presidential election, but now the priority is obviously to explain to the citizens how come Thomaz, who has been head of state for 14 years already, will occupy that post for another 7 years, even though he, at 77, has reached an age which, according to common sense, predestines him to retirement rather than statesmanlike activities. As usual in Portugal in such occasions, a ‘democratic’ play is staged. A true sea of congratulatory telegrams and solidarity testimonies pours over the government. Every village worth its name – from the farthest bush in Guinea, Angola and Mozambique – welcomes enthusiastically the old man’s decision to remain president. The tone, the melody and the compass are given by Caetano, who on 3 July held another emission of his tv show Conversas em Família [Family Conversations]. Against general expectations, he did not mention Thomaz’ candidacy at the beginning of the broadcast, but only at the end, so his speech consisted of 10% of content and 90% of introduction. [...]” – PAAA, B26/444, Dispatch of the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 10.07.1972.
940 AAPD 1973, Doc. 23.
4. The SPD offensive

As the Heinz Kühn/FES controversy had demonstrated, the federal government’s ultimately rather gentle policy towards the Caetano regime was not embraced by all factions of the SPD. This discord had been manifest in the actions of SPD MPs both in the Bundestag and, via the AGM-Komitee, in non-parliamentary protest movements. It had even been institutionalised during the party’s annual congress in 1970 (Saarbrücken, 11-14 May), where a short resolution called for the Bonn government to cancel all arms sales contracts with Portugal and to refuse further contracts.\(^{941}\) By 1973, however, the phenomenon had reached a completely different scale, as the most dedicated anti-colonialist forces of the SPD pushed for a more aggressive stance against Lisbon. Regardless of its actual effect on policy, by itself this push was able to generate a series of diplomatic crises.

The first incident, which occurred right at the beginning of the year, looked in hindsight like a small-scale rehearsal in view of the turbulence that lay ahead. The Dortmund Congress (13-14 January) organised by the solidarity movement had brought a number of representatives of the liberation movements to the FRG, much to Lisbon’s chagrin. In this context the AA had even agreed to refuse a visa to FRELIMO’s Vice-President Marcelino dos Santos.\(^{942}\) However, the AA had to deal with dissent coming from within the government itself, where the solidarity movement had gained greater representation after the November 1972 elections, with the appointment of Hans Matthöfer – of the AGM-Komitee – to parliamentary state secretary of the BMZ. On 15 January, the Frankfurter Rundschau reported that Matthöfer was going to receive Armando Panguene, a member of the FRELIMO Central Committee. Contacted by the Portuguese embassy in Bonn, Political Director van Well declared that the Auswärtiges Amt, after careful consideration, had recommended to all members of the federal government to refrain from meeting with representatives of the liberation movements from the Portuguese territories. The AA’s own Parliamentary State Secretary Karl Moersch (FDP) phoned during van Well’s talk to the ambassador to deny that Matthöfer had ever had any intention of receiving Panguene in the first place. However, the Portuguese authorities considered that the Frankfurter Rundschau’s story had probably originally been true, given Matthöfer’s “known hostility towards Portugal”

\(^{941}\) Parteitag der SPD 1970, p.934.
and the AA’s exaggerated reaction. While apparently a minor episode, it signalled to the Embassy that it could rely on the AA to contain Bonn’s hostile impulses against Lisbon,

Yet the solidarity movement had not just penetrated the government, where it could be relatively supervised by the AA; it was working from within the SPD party structures as well. Notably, the party’s youth organisation Young Socialists (Jusos) joined the frontline of the anti-colonialist mobilisation in the aftermath of the Dortmund Congress. This group, which had been undergoing a process of intense radicalisation since the late 1960s, had great weight within the SPD and presented a vigorous political challenge to the party’s established elite. This challenge came into full swing during the 1973 annual SPD congress, from 10 to 14 April, in Hanover. At this radically charged congress, the ranks of the SPD approved two resolutions aimed against the Lisbon regime. One of them stated that the SPD was “on the side of the peoples of the Third World” and it requested that the federal government use its influence in Europe to put an end to colonialism and to promote self-determination, including through the granting of humanitarian relief to the liberation movements. The other important resolution demanded that Bonn, independently from its alliances and obligations, cease any supply of weapons to dictatorships, namely Spain, Greece and Portugal.

While these two incidents may have gone unnoticed among the general, less politically interested public, by the summer the SPD dissent reached greater visibility. Shortly after the British press released reports on the Wiriyamu massacre, causing international outrage against the Lisbon regime to reach its peak, Minister Erhard Eppler wrote an article for the SPD’s official newspaper Vorwärts, with the cover date 26 July 1973. The minister attacked the dictatorship’s refusal to decolonise, which he saw as the main cause for the acts of “terrorism” perpetrated by both sides of the conflict. Contrasting the Portuguese case with the Vietnam War, Eppler condoned Bonn’s low-profile regarding the latter because it had been an American internal

944 CIDAC, BAC0290A/a, Gruppenrundbrief 8, p.9.
946 Parteitag der SPD 1973, pp.1103,1108.
matter\textsuperscript{947}, but spoke of the need to raise international pressure regarding the former, which involved a European nation:

“The Vietnam War was decided in the USA’s public opinion. Nowhere else. […] The duration of the Portuguese colonial wars will be decided in Europe’s public opinion, more precisely in the [EEC] Nine. We had to let Vietnam happen, we should not let a new Vietnam happen in Portuguese Africa. It is not just a matter of humanity or moral, nor of the right to self-determination. It is about our own interests. It cannot be true that a country like Portugal should be allowed to poison Europe’s relations with Africa. However one wishes to politically rate Portugal, it is not a world power, but a country at the edge of Europe with the quota of illiterates of a developing nation. Its future is in Europe, nowhere else.” \textsuperscript{948}

The minister quoted the British newspaper \textit{The Observer} of 15 July, which argued that Portugal would ultimately have to choose between association with the EEC and pursuing its wars in Africa. Eppler stated that Europe should present that dichotomy clearly, concluding that “even where one does not get many free elections, one must eventually make a choice”. \textsuperscript{949}

Eppler’s article became the epicentre of the already ongoing discussion surrounding Portuguese colonialism, which reached its highest point that summer. The Portuguese Embassy in Bonn reacted immediately with a press release accusing Erhard Eppler of supporting his “already known personal view” with the “prophecy of a British weekly newspaper”. The Embassy also invited Eppler to visit the Portuguese territories in Africa in order to “get a clear picture of the actual situation”. \textsuperscript{950} The BMZ replied with its own press release, stating that “a visit to Mozambique could neither bring clarity about what is going on in the different parts of that vast territory, nor could it change the fact that every type of colonialism is an anachronism in our time”. \textsuperscript{951} The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} explicitly refused to take part in the controversy. \textsuperscript{952} Over the following weeks, Eppler’s remarks were the subject of several articles in the West

\textsuperscript{947} “What would have gone differently in Vietnam, if the federal government – like the French and the Swedish – had strongly condemned the USA’s intervention? Probably nothing. The peace in Vietnam would not have been easier, but instead the peace policy in Europe would have been harder.”


\textsuperscript{949} ibid


German and Portuguese press, with the latter exhibiting an atypically harsh tone.953 Interviewed by the West German television programme Report, aired on 13 August 1973, Foreign Minister Rui Patrício rejected Eppler’s notion of Lisbon having to choose between its African territories and its European economic cooperation. Patrício argued that the two were complementary and an intrinsic part of the Portuguese identity: “Portugal has been a European nation for eight centuries and an African nation for five”.954

Erhard Eppler defended his views, even if he was evasive about their practical implications. On television – and also in the Bundestag on 19 September – he reaffirmed his position, although stressing that his article’s main idea was taken from The Observer and that he had merely underlined its arguments. Eppler avoided the question of European states’ right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Portuguese state by talking about public opinion pressure instead of specific sanctions against Lisbon. Additionally, he wrote an open letter to Portuguese Ambassador João de Freitas Cruz, dated 29 August 1973, stating that he was ready to accept the invitation to visit Mozambique and Angola. Eppler added, however, that he would only do so after Lisbon had allowed for an independent international commission to investigate the reported Wiriyamu massacre.955 This was a diplomatic move: the Portuguese were clearly not willing to comply with such a condition, which created an impasse between the two parties.956

In parallel with Eppler’s polemics, one of the most symbolic episodes to take place in the ‘hot’ summer of 1973 was the visit of a FRELIMO delegation to Bonn, at the invitation of the SPD’s Commission for International Relations. During this visit, which took place from 2 to 8 August, the Commission officially announced that the SPD was going to offer the FRELIMO political and humanitarian support. This caused a great stir among the Portuguese authorities, not to mention the Portuguese press.957 Portugal’s Embassy in Bonn issued a public protest declaring that such type of

953 For example, commentator Francisco Dutra Faria wrote that Eppler’s position recalled Adolf Hitler’s threats against small countries like Denmark and Romania. – “epplers drohungen erinnern an hitlers umgangston”, report from Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27.07.1973, in Materialien Nr.41, October 1973.
954 For a transcript of the broadcast as well as a collection of related press articles, parliamentary debates and press releases, see Materialien Nr.41, October 1973. For the reaction of the Portuguese press, see also ADSD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III,11477.
955 Both a transcript of the broadcast and Eppler’s letter can be found in Materialien Nr.41, October 1973.
957 For a compilation of related Portuguese news articles, see AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III,11477.
invitations hurt the chances of peace in Africa and that they fully dismissed “Portugal’s valid struggle for the political, economic and social progress of Mozambique”. In a telegram to Lisbon from 15 August, Ambassador Freitas Cruz wrote that “it is clear that the ‘lobby’ for the terrorist movements includes high-profile figures of the federal government”, referring not only to Erhard Eppler but also to Egon Bahr, who had recently replaced Ehmke as minister for special affairs. Nevertheless, Freitas Cruz acknowledged that the FRELIMO action had been a private initiative of the SPD, which he considered to be party-politically motivated in the desire to catch up with the positions of the Scandinavian and Dutch social-democrats. Just like the West Germans, the Portuguese had to learn to accept their partners’ idiosyncrasies in the name of the bigger picture. When he met with Walter Scheel on 29 August, Freitas Cruz admitted that the only real “thorn” in the bilateral relations between the two states were the difficulties in the supply of West German military materiel to Portugal.

Thus the main dispute related to the FRELIMO episode turned out not to be inter-governmental, but intra-governmental – indeed, it struck at the core of the coalition. The Auswärtiges Amt had not been informed, much less consulted, about either the SPD’s invitation or its decision to grant relief to the liberation movement. Foreign Minister Walter Scheel adopted a quiet and distant position, like the rest of the federal government, but he was very displeased. An article in Die Welt from 8 August 1973 quoted him complaining that Bonn’s biggest party – which also happened to be the chancellor’s party – should not run a diplomatic agenda which contradicted the government’s line, at the risk of compromising West Germany’s outside image. On 17 August, Scheel wrote to Willy Brandt about his reservations regarding the recent comments and actions of prominent SPD members. He warned Brandt that they could lead other countries – particularly in Africa, where the governmental power usually belonged to single parties, not to coalitions – to believe that the federal government as a whole had changed its policy towards southern Africa. The foreign minister stated that, because there was “no basic alternative” to Bonn’s current policy – which Brandt himself had helped shape during his tenure in the AA – it was not wise to give such an impression. While FRELIMO’s visit to the FRG might have invited a positive reaction

958 Diário de Notícias, 07.08.1973, in IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS,Cl(2),Pr.11,vol.11,Serviços Alemães.
959 AHD-MNE,PEA,M756,Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,15.08.1973.
960 AHD-MNE,PEA,M756,Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,30.08.1973.
from the African states, Scheel pointed out its long-term effects. On the one hand, that initiative suggested that “all it took was some extra pressure against the federal government” to achieve a “spectacular turn in [Bonn’s] African policy”. On the other hand, as the government could not fulfil the expectations of change, disappointment would inevitably ensue.962

The AA clearly had no intention of changing course. Asked to define the guidelines of Portugal-Politik, Political Director van Well produced a long memo which ultimately boiled down to the usual formula: proceed with cooperation while keeping a healthy diplomatic distance. Although justifying this position with the FRG’s immediate interests, van Well insisted that Bonn should remain a friendly partner with Lisbon because that would please the regime’s ‘liberals’ and “could also be helpful for the Portuguese leader”. By contrast, according to van Well, to isolate Portugal would merely strengthen its colonialist tendencies. Consequently, the AA’s consistently firm position was that the federal government should continue to avoid official contacts with – and support of – the liberation movements fighting against Portugal, as well as oppose any international sanctions on the Lisbon regime.963 The AA even wrote to the SPD’s International Department explaining that any short-term solutions for the Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique – FRELIMO’s victory, with or without other African and Chinese troops, or even a Rhodesia-style takeover by the whites – were unlikely to work and the result would be “probably bloody”. For the AA, the only alternative would be a long-term transition based on the British and French models of decolonisation.964

As Scheel had predicted, ultimately the true centre of the controversy was not so much Erhard Eppler’s personal comments about Portuguese colonialism or even FRELIMO’s visit per se, but the question of whether those initiatives signalled a shift in Bonn’s policy towards Lisbon. This clarification became all the more necessary with the announcement in August 1973 that the FRG would be reducing its military investments in Portugal. In the Bundestag, MPs from CDU/CSU repeatedly demanded that the federal government define its position once and for all. They frequently alluded to neue Ostpolitik, asking if Lisbon would be allowed a better treatment if it were a Communist dictatorship. By contrast, the SPD faction requested a firm statement

against the Caetano regime. The Auswärtiges Amt acknowledged that, if the Wiriyamu reports were proven accurate, it would not hesitate to condemn the behaviour of a friendly ally.\textsuperscript{965} Yet the AA announced that Bonn had no intentions of changing its overall policy towards Lisbon.\textsuperscript{966} The BMVg issued a similar statement, explaining that, regardless of the military divestment, the West German-Portuguese relations would continue to be based on three core elements: loyal cooperation within NATO, a traditional good bilateral relationship and the efforts of the federal government to include Portugal in the process of European integration.\textsuperscript{967} On 13 September, Willy Brandt declared that the West German government could not identify “with the Portuguese point of view, according to which Angola and Mozambique are inseparable from Portugal”. Nevertheless, he added, that was “a domestic problem from our ally” and one which Bonn would not interfere with.\textsuperscript{968} In practice, the whole debacle demonstrated that, even if pushed, the government would not bulge.

5. Coping with multilateralism

The final challenge to Bonn’s policy in the convulsed year of 1973 did not come from the SPD. The FRG’s entry to the UN in September seemed set to further strain the West German-Portuguese relations by forcing Bonn to assume a clearer stance on Portuguese colonialism. After all, the FRG now had to take sides on the UN’s frequent disputes between Lisbon and the African Bloc. The voting policy on Portugal-related resolutions as conceived by Political Director van Well recommended that Bonn should lean in the same direction as its most important European partners. Such a guideline, however, was explicitly not meant to apply to any resolutions which might conflict with the Bonn’s national interests, namely NATO cohesion and European economic cooperation. Moreover, the Auswärtiges Amt rejected voting in favour of resolutions which had “a pure demagogic nature” or which might isolate Lisbon, since that would automatically prevent “all chances of success”.\textsuperscript{969} Yet van Well was also aware that, if Bonn’s voting policy was too prone to compromise with Portuguese interests, it would

\textsuperscript{965} Key parliamentary debates on this issue took place on 14 and 19 September. Relevant excerpts can be found in Materialien Nr.41, October 1973.
\textsuperscript{966} AHD-MNE,PEA,M756,Pr.331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,15.08.1973.
\textsuperscript{967} “Keine entscheidende Änderung im Verhältnis zu Portugal”, press release from the SPD’s Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst, 17.08.1973, in Materialien Nr.41, October 1973.
\textsuperscript{969} PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv 101.436, Memo from the Auswärtiges Amt, 17.08.1973.
necessarily gain little sympathy from the African states. Part of the problem was that East Berlin was bound to side with the Africans on the more radical anti-Portuguese resolutions and therefore it might get reciprocal support in any debates over German matters. This was no small predicament, since the African Bloc occupied a third of the seats in the UN General Assembly and was the most cohesive voting group.\footnote{AAPD 1973, Doc.23, 23.01.1973.}

Although probably not intentionally, both the Portuguese and the African discourses seemed designed to appeal to Bonn’s political profile. Rui Patrício, speaking at the General Assembly on 3 October 1973, claimed that African fanaticism was preventing peace in southern Africa. He said that Portugal was open to work out a reasonable détente policy with its African neighbours, not unlike the rapprochement which the FRG had undertaken vis-à-vis the Eastern European states.\footnote{TNA, FCO9/1781, Record of the UN General Assembly, 03.10.1973; It is worth noting that during this period South Africa pursued a similar rhetoric strategy (Dedering (2009)).} The following day, in the same forum, the Zambian mission pleaded for the recognition of Guinea-Bissau, which had recently unilaterally proclaimed independence. In his speech, Zambia’s spokesman stressed that countries which gave Portugal military and economic assistance were “as responsible as Portugal for the atrocities committed against the indigenous peoples of Angola, Mozambique and the rest of Africa”.\footnote{TNA, FCO9/1781, Record of the UN General Assembly, 04.10.1973.}

Bonn faced its first big test on 9 October, when a member of the West German Delegation had to define before the UN Trusteeship Council the guidelines of the FRG’s policy towards the Portuguese colonies. According to his statement, West Germany believed in the right to self-determination, consolidated by a peaceful evolutionary process. It therefore supported the UN’s demand for Portugal to suspend the colonial wars and to negotiate with representatives of the local people. Moreover, Bonn’s government would not provide weapons for those wars, even though it would continue to cooperate militarily with Portugal, which was “necessary for our own personal security”. The FRG would also continue to trade with the Portuguese territories in Africa as long as the UN Security Council did not impose obligatory sanctions, such as it had done in the case of Rhodesia.\footnote{IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS, Proc.16.282, Embaixada da Alemanha em Lisboa, Statement from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 11.10.1973.} Upon being informed of these statements, the Portuguese Foreign Ministry made a complaint to the West German embassy in Lisbon.\footnote{PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv 101.436, Memo from the Auswärtiges Amt, 29.10.1973.} Marcelo Caetano himself expressed his displeasure with Bonn’s
words. As the federal authorities recognised, however, none of the stated guidelines were new. It was mostly the way they had been formulated which had offended the Portuguese government.975

In reality little changed in the position the FRG took regarding the Afro-
Portuguese clash. Bonn’s ambiguous stance, predictably, translated into ambiguous voting. West Germany did not recognise Guinea-Bissau’s independence and it abstained in UN resolutions directed against Lisbon’s interests.976 In early 1974, Walter Scheel explained to the new Ambassador Futscher Pereira that the FRG’s abstentions had not decisively altered any of the voting results. In fact, Scheel added, in some cases its moderate attitude had influenced other EEC states, more inclined to vote against Portugal, to abstain as well. As the minister himself apologetically acknowledged, this was the natural outcome of the federal government’s traditional dilemma regarding Africa and Portugal. 977

The other multilateral forum where Bonn found itself forced to take a position on Portugal was the EEC itself. In February 1974, the Dutch pushed for the creation of a working group with the specific intention of coordinating action to press Portugal to decolonise. The Head of the AA’s East and Southern Africa Department Wolfgang Eger was appointed to chair the initiative.978 The following month, Eger confessed to the American Embassy in the FRG that the federal government was opposed to the idea of a common EEC demarche against Lisbon so he would not follow through on the Dutch plans. Nevertheless, according to Eger, Bonn would respect the wish of its EEC partners to approach the Portuguese on a bilateral basis, even if the West German authorities themselves were not planning any further demarches in the near future. 979

975 Ambassador von Holleben asked Bonn to, from then on, refrain from using expressions like “colonialism” or “colonial war”, which contradicted Lisbon’s official terminology. – PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv 101.436, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 24.10.1973.
976 Including a General Assembly resolution from early November 1973 condemning the “illegal occupation” of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau by Portuguese forces, which was passed with sixty-five in favour, thirty abstentions and seven against. (Macqueen, Norrie. 1997. The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire, London: Longman, p.62) West Germany also abstained regarding an initiative to establish a commission to investigate the Wiriyamu massacre, claiming that the proposed resolution had sentenced Portugal even before the investigation. (PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv 101.436, Memo from the Auswärtiges Amt, 29.10.1973).
On 14 March 1974, unable to predict how close they were to the end of an era, Scheel sat down with the Portuguese ambassador and made a balance of the recent turbulence and vows for the future. The minister sensed that the anti-Portuguese trend of the West German press and of “certain political groups” had begun fading away and that the public’s attention was turning to other issues, such as the energy crisis or the Chilean coup against Salvador Allende. He even told the Portuguese diplomat not to feel discouraged by the campaigns raged by small radical segments of the public opinion. Scheel assured Futscher Pereira that in the Auswärtiges Amt and in the federal government – “whatever the exceptions” – Lisbon could still count on a large amount of “understanding and sympathy”. Futscher Pereira received Scheel’s personal guarantee that the federal government would never take any hostile action against Portugal or its African policy. 980 Although shaken by the incidents of the previous year and the increased projection of the dictatorship, West German-Portuguese relations had held up, as both governments had decided they must.

**Conclusion**

The shifts in power in Portugal and West Germany in the late 1960s laid the groundwork for a new era in the relations between the two states. In the latter case, the emergence of the SPD – a party with a marked ideological aversion towards Lisbon’s type of regime – as a driving political force signalled the possibility of a significant transformation in Bonn’s policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship.

Nevertheless, the initial push towards transformation – or discontinuity – did not come from the change in power, but from a change in external circumstances. African diplomatic lobbying combined with West German social movements – chiefly united under the banner of the anti-Cahora Bassa campaign – pressured the FRG’s government coalition to adopt a proactive attitude in terms of promoting Portuguese decolonisation. This pressure escalated throughout 1970 and Bonn, having disregarded it at first, succumbed to its force by the late summer/autumn of that year. The Chancellery, which had already theorised on a new policy but had refused to put it into practice, took the initiative of approaching Marcelo Caetano, timidly encouraging him to negotiate a long-term plan for decolonisation together with the African lobby headed by Kenneth Kaunda. This approach, which in practice was limited to a private conversation

980 AHD-MNE,PEA,25/1974 31/74,Pr.331, Dispatch from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn,14.03.1974.
between Caetano and Minister for Special Affairs Horst Ehmke as well as a polite letter from Chancellor Willy Brandt, was the closest Bonn came to shifting the direction of its policy, which had so far been characterised by non-interference in Portuguese affairs. During this period, the *Auswärtiges Amt* too flirted with the notion of interventionism, namely in the form of a joint demarche with Portugal’s other allies in order to convince Lisbon to engage in dialogue with the African community, if not the liberation movements themselves. This urge resulted in a series of consultations in late 1970 but it never left the exploratory stage.

One external factor which exercised constant, yet indirect, pressure over the federal government was the East German propaganda offensive in Africa. While the weight of this aspect was not enough to promote a serious rupture in West German-Portuguese relations, it did encourage the maintenance of a healthy perceptible distance between Bonn and Lisbon. The most patent impact of the concern with GDR propaganda was the *AA’s* reticence in developing too close a close working relationship with its Portuguese counterpart.

The full force of the *SPD*’s rejection of a passive policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship was only felt in the later part of the period in question. This factor certainly played a role before that – most notably with the diplomatic crisis provoked by the *FES’* declared support for the liberation movements in 1970 – but only in 1973 did a systematic multifaceted *SPD* offensive take place. This offensive included lobbying the government through the party structure and parliamentary faction, a provocative public statement by Minister Erhard Eppler and the invitation of a *FRELIMO* delegation to visit Bonn in the summer. The projection of these initiatives was enhanced by the topicality of the condemnation of Portuguese colonialism in connection with the reports of the Wiriyamu massacre and consequent indignation in public opinion.

The *SPD*’s 1973 offensive was both proof that the federal government’s policy towards Lisbon had been generally committed to *continuity* and a test to that commitment. By protesting, demanding change and searching for alternative channels of policy, the *SPD* demonstrated how far the government had strayed from the party’s expectations of transformation in this field. As a result, it exposed the federal authorities’ dedication to relations with Portugal by providing a propitious atmosphere for change, forcing them to assume their option. A similar phenomenon occurred with the FRG’s entry to the UN in September 1973 and with the contemporary
multilateralisation of the campaign against the Portuguese dictatorship headed by Dutch diplomacy.

A factor that helped block Bonn’s earliest thrust to switch policy was Paris’ and London’s initial rejection of an interventionist strategy. The Auswärtiges Amt’s suggestion of a collective effort to address the Afro-Portuguese situation was met by these two powers with manifest lack of interest. This severely weakened the momentum of the AA’s transformative impulse in late 1970.

Yet the key international agent to undermine that momentum was Marcelo Caetano himself, paradoxically through both his intransigence and his self-proclaimed willingness to reform. The former tendency, embodied by Caetano’s replies to the Chancellery’s demarches, had a strong demoralising effect on Willy Brandt, who henceforth gave up on the intention of directly influencing Lisbon. By contrast, the AA – in line with the interpretation of Ambassador Ehrenfried von Holleben – came to defend a cooperative relationship with Lisbon, based on the theory that such behaviour would empower Caetano and the progressive forces of the regime, thus promoting liberalisation and eventual decolonisation. This option was facilitated by the fact that Caetano’s reform ideas appealed to Bonn’s own evolutionary perspective on change.

Although faith – or wishful thinking – in Caetano played a central role in the strategy devised by the AA, it was not necessarily the motor of that ministry’s policy towards Lisbon. In fact, the AA’s policy was significantly determined by a pragmatic resolve to safeguard objective national interests. One of those interests was the preservation of NATO cohesion and Western unity, which also appealed to Willy Brandt’s Chancellery. Thus not only did the Bundeskanzleramt acquiesce to the AA’s policy, it joined in the quest to mitigate the international pressure on Portugal.

In conclusion, just as Caetano failed to live up to the expectations that he would meaningfully reform the dictatorship, Willy Brandt’s SPD-FDP coalition did not live up to the expectations that it would enforce a substantially harsher policy towards Lisbon. While Bonn sough to keep some diplomatic distance from the dictatorship and it certainly did not openly condone Portuguese actions in Africa, it generally tolerated them, which was the main aim of Lisbon’s diplomacy. This does not mean that the SPD was not a productive force in the opposition against the Caetano regime. Yet, as we shall see, the party mostly channelled its impetus into initiatives outside of governmental policy-making.
CHAPTER 6

Either weapons or coffins: The Parallel Front

1. Cautious solidarity with the Portuguese opposition

2. Reaching out to the liberation movements

Conclusion
Having examined the formal policy of the Bonn government towards the Caetano dictatorship, this thesis has repeatedly noted that the SPD as a party established its own alternative foreign policy regarding Portugal. Specifically, the German social-democrats developed important, if limited, ties with the opposition to the dictatorship. This chapter briefly examines these ties, emphasising the distinction between the SPD’s relations with the Portuguese opposition – most notably with the socialist movement – and its ties with the African liberation organisations fighting in the Portuguese colonies. The first section explains how the relationship with the Portuguese socialists was marked by a tension within the SPD between ideological solidarity with this group and scepticism over its chances of success. The second section demonstrates that the SPD was willing to invest greater financial and political capital in its relations with the liberation movements than in those forged with the Portuguese socialists, yet the former proved to be much more problematic, particularly the case of FRELIMO. Although the parallel policy pursued by the SPD remained largely autonomous from the federal government, this chapter explores its significance in the context of Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime.

1. Cautious solidarity with the Portuguese opposition

For the SPD, the idea of pursuing relations with the Portuguese opposition gained increasing appeal in the mid-1960s, as Prime Minister António Salazar’s looming mortality signalled a possible political shift in Lisbon. A post-Salazar scenario could present specific challenges to West Germany, since traditionally the strongest opposition movement in Portugal was the clandestine Communist Party, which had forged positive relations with the GDR. Thus, the communists were extremely critical of the FRG, which they denounced as a force of western imperialism, as well as a crucial backer of the Lisbon dictatorship. Ideologically, the SPD found a more natural partner in the pro-western left-wing organisation Portuguese Socialist Action (Acção Socialista Portuguesa...
– ASP). Founded in 1964 by Mário Soares, Manuel Tito de Morais and Francisco Ramos da Costa, the ASP was a much smaller group than the Communist Party and it sought to make up for that by establishing links to like-minded European parties.\textsuperscript{983} The Portuguese socialists first contacted the West German social-democrats in late 1966. Shortly thereafter the SPD-associated Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) recommended that the SPD aid their organisation.\textsuperscript{984}

Despite this encouraging background, Willy Brandt, during his tenure in the AA from December 1966 until October 1969, did not seem willing to strain Bonn’s relations with Lisbon by openly endorsing the ASP. Indeed, the SPD remained generally indifferent to the group’s appeals, especially in comparison to the openness displayed by other European social-democratic parties, including those in power at the time, such as the British Labour Party, the Swedish Socialdemokraterna and the Italian PSU.\textsuperscript{985} This behaviour also stood in contrast to the active collaboration between the German social-democrats and the clandestine Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party PSOE at the time.\textsuperscript{986} Nevertheless, with the acknowledgement of the AA, the SPD’s International Department – headed by Hans-Eberhard Dingels – expressed its solidarity with Mário Soares after the Portuguese authorities had him deported, in February 1968, to the island of São Tome.\textsuperscript{987}

Although in June 1968 Dingels wrote to the Portuguese socialists stating his wish to finally cement the relations between the SPD and the ASP\textsuperscript{988}, Salazar’s replacement by Marcelo Caetano in September reinforced the hesitations on the German side. On the one hand, under the new Portuguese leadership, which allowed Soares to return to Portugal, there appeared to be better circumstances than ever before for the ASP to grow as a


\textsuperscript{984} Soares and Ramos da Costa travelled to Bonn in September 1966 and directly asked the SPD to support the ASP (AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 10513, Letter from Francisco Ramos Costa to Willy Brandt, 25.06.1968). Two months later a FES representative visited Lisbon and wrote a detailed report on the situation of the socialist group, a copy of which was sent to Willy Brandt. The report acknowledged the poor image of the FRG among the Portuguese opposition and strongly recommended complying with the ASP’s request for aid. (Sánchez, Antonio Muñoz. 2005. La Socialdemocracia Alemana y el Estado Novo (1961-1974). Portuguese Studies Review, Vol.13, pp.482,483)

\textsuperscript{985} AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 10513, Letter from Francisco Ramos Costa to Willy Brandt, 25.06.1968.


\textsuperscript{987} Following a unanimous decision within the Socialist International, Dingels sought to have the direction of his Party write to the Portuguese Ambassador expressing the SPD’s great concern over Soares’ situation – AdsD/WBA, A11.4, Mappe 31, Dispatch from the SPD’s International Department, 18.04.1968.


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serious opposition movement. However, SPD encouragement of the supposedly reformist Caetano and of the most liberal politicians within the regime seemed like a more constructive strategy than aiding the marginal ASP. Thus the SPD disregarded Soares’ emphatic pleas for support in the preparation for the October 1969 elections in Portugal, where the socialists were running as part of the non-communist opposition list CEUD (*Comissão Eleitoral de Unidade Democrática*). The SPD even refrained from participating in the initiative of the Socialist International (SI) to send a delegation to Portugal to observe the campaigns. Although Dingels told the SI that all the main SPD personalities were busy with their own electoral campaign in the FRG, he confessed to fellow SPD member Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski that he felt the SPD should distance itself from the initiative. He defended this position, “not just due to German foreign policy interests, but because of the effectiveness of such a delegation”, i.e. such a display of distrust from Europe would only serve to fuel the counter-reformist strands of the Lisbon dictatorship.989 When Soares – with the help of leading FES member Robert Lamberg – made it to the SPD’s Bonn headquarters in April, Dingels refused to let him see Willy Brandt.990

The failure to get a single parliamentary representative elected in the – relatively more open, for the dictatorship’s standards – 1969 elections was a major blow to Portuguese opposition in general and particularly to the *ASP*. CEUD officially received 1.5% of the votes, which was not only much less than the 87.7% of the dictatorship’s state-party *União Nacional* – which took every parliamentary seat, as usual – but also considerably less than the 10.7% of the communist-backed opposition list *CDE*.991 Despite the opaque electoral process, on the surface the result seemed to support the notion that the socialists had little popular expression and therefore no leverage in Portugal’s political scene. *ASP* members – many of whom left the country after the elections – subsequently adopted a fully confrontational posture against the Lisbon regime, denouncing the dictatorship while striving for recognition on the outside.992 They found a useful ally in the Secretary General of the Socialist International, the Austrian Hans Janitschek, who devoted much of his tenure (1969-1977) to the build-up of similar

991 PAAA, B26/399, Dispatch from the FRG’s Embassy in Lisbon, 05.11.1969.
992 Sánchez (2005), pp.496-497.
movements around the world. Yet even the SI, which in June 1969 had passed a resolution appealing to all members to give their support to the Portuguese socialists whenever possible and, in September, had set apart £1,000 in funds to support the ASP, proved vulnerable to the electoral debacle. In 1970, the organisation felt pressured to re-examine its ties to the unsuccessful ASP, due to concerns by those member parties which had governmental responsibilities, including the SPD.

While the SPD’s responsibility in government precluded a high-profile involvement with the Portuguese socialists, it did not prevent the Friedrich Ebert Foundation from discreetly forging links with them. Foundations like the FES enjoy a special status in German politics. Although they are ‘close’ to certain political parties – as is the case with the FES and the SPD – by law they are not ‘party foundations’. This legal grey-zone provides them with a formal degree of autonomy from their respective parties and from the government. Safeguarded by this status, the FES agreed to grant five scholarships in West Germany in December 1969, and an extra one in March 1970, to Portuguese students proposed by Mário Soares. These students were not members of the ASP, but they needed to escape from the Portuguese dictatorship and Soares was helping them as a favour to a common acquaintance. Besides the grants, the foundation paid them trips to social-democratic seminars, as well as a lawyer when two of them came under investigation by the domestic intelligence agency Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz because of left-wing social activism in the FRG. Regardless of this support, the exiles remained very critical of the SPD-led government, due to its perceived complicity with the Lisbon regime. Indeed, the FES’ relations with these students – and with the slightly larger group of Spanish students recommended by Spanish socialist

998 They were four male students on the verge of being drafted (Luis Leitão, Vasco Esteves and Jorge Veludo, who were being disciplined for their activities in the student union of the Instituto Superior Técnico, and Francisco Moita) and their two girlfriends (Elsa Pereira and Maria da Luz Moita).
999 Klaus Croissant, the lawyer of the Rote Armee Fraktion who was later uncovered as an East German spy.
1000 Esteves, Veludo and Luz Moita founded the immigrant support association *Associação Operária 1º de Maio de Stuttgart* and the immigrant newspaper *A Batalha*.
1001 They complained, for example, that the German social-democrats lectured them about the lack of human rights in East Germany, but hypocritically kept quiet about the situation in Portugal.
Tierno Gálvan – were essentially financial, not political. A final scholarship was granted in January 1971.

By this time, the struggle of the Portuguese opposition was gradually garnering a fair amount of sympathy within sectors of the SPD. This was partially inspired by several German social-democrats’ past personal experiences of political exile and by the activism of Portuguese immigrants in unions close to the SPD. Also relevant was the close relationship established between the FES and Portuguese asylum seeker Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, who had first obtained a scholarship from the foundation in the early 1960s. Although theoretically barred from political activism due to his asylum status, Ferreira became a prominent voice in Germany against the Lisbon dictatorship through writings which critically examined Portugal’s colonial system from a Marxist perspective. The FES commissioned him to write a study about the changes brought about by Marcelo Caetano, particularly to Lisbon’s African policy. In this study, written in early 1970, Ferreira argued that the planned institutional reforms sought only to preserve the essence of Portuguese colonialism. In doing so he clearly challenged the thesis that supporting Caetano would by itself ensure a positive change in Lisbon’s politics.

Against this background, the FES sought to tighten its contacts with the Portuguese opposition, even if the cooperation remained on a relatively small scale. The foundation occasionally funded trips by Portuguese socialists to relevant international meetings and it conducted seminars, for example about the organisational structure of political parties. Mário Soares was paid to write for the FES journal Nueva Sociedad and to tour Latin America to give a series of talks about European social-democracy. These various actions were coordinated by FES delegate Elke Sabiel de Esters, who forged close personal friendships with some members of the Portuguese socialist group. In line with the foundation’s particular legal status, the initiatives remained independent from the

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1002 Author’s interviews with Maria da Luz Moita, 11.09.2010, and Jorge Veludo, 14.09.2010.
1005 Having fled Portugal for political reasons, in 1962 Ferreira arrived in West Germany, where he applied for funding to continue studying. The FES ended up funding Ferreira’s studies for 8 years, as well as his lawyer in the long process until obtaining political asylum in the FRG – the only Portuguese to do so. The FES was very supportive of Ferreira, even if his Maoist political leanings prevented him from being invited to join the organisation.
1006 Author’s interview with Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, 20.04.2010; According to Ferreira, the FES decided not to publish the piece out of concern for Lisbon’s reaction. It was later published in English, as part of Ferreira, Eduardo de Sousa. 1972. Portuguese Colonialism: from South Africa to Europe, Freiburg: Aktion Dritte Welt.
On a more official level, the SPD pursued contacts with the dictatorship’s ‘liberal wing’. In the early 1970s, the federal authorities regularly invited individual representatives of this wing to visit the FRG, allegedly to show them the workings of German economics and politics, but in practice in order to get information on the evolving situation in Portugal. Although perceived by the Germans as ‘opposition’ MPs, the ‘liberals’ actually displayed trust in the Marcelo Caetano government, pointing to the ultraconservative right as the true obstacle to democratisation. Their accounts thus reinforced the idea that it was wiser to empower the current government in Lisbon than to weaken it by endorsing the illegal opposition.1009 This view, of course, stood in stark contrast to the writings of Ferreira1010 and Soares.1011

The SPD ended up playing both sides. At Janitschek’s insistence1012, Hans-Eberhard Dingels agreed to meet with Mário Soares on 21 May 1970. During the meeting, Soares discussed the possibility of returning to Portugal. Dingels showed concern for his safety and made arrangements to inform the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn of the SPD’s interest in the well-being of the socialist leader.1013 Nevertheless, when addressing a Portuguese MP the following year, Dingels confessed that his party disapproved of Soares’ hostile statements against the Caetano government and had repeatedly recommended that he return to Portugal with a more moderate attitude. In the same conversation, Dingels expressed a personal admiration for Caetano’s evolutionary strategy, adding that if his reforms were to fail the result would necessarily be either

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1008 For example, it paid him to tutor the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking students funded by the foundation. – Author’s interviews with Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, 20.04.2010, and Jorge Veludo, 14.09.2010.
1009 IAN/TT/AMC, Cx.54, n.3, José da Silva’s report of his trip to the FRG from 31.10. to 10.11.1970; IAN/TT/AMC, Cx.37, n.23, Manuel José Archer Homem de Melo’s report of his trip to the FRG from 01. to 04.03.1971. Additionally, Francisco de Sá Carneiro also accepted Bonn’s invitation for a similar trip in May 1972 (PAAA, B26/444, Dispatch from the Federal Embassy in Lisbon, 08.05.1972).
1010 Ferreira (1972).
“fascist tragedy or communist dictatorship”.\textsuperscript{1014} While the SPD was willing to safeguard its discrete ties to the ASP, it remained cautious not to upset any possible progress which might come out of the Caetano regime.

Despite the lack of a full commitment on the SPD’s side, the German social-democrats played a historical role in the development of the Portuguese socialist movement via FES. Indeed, while the overall level of success of the ASP’s international networking efforts remains the subject of some dispute\textsuperscript{1015}, with the aid of the FES' resources the Portuguese group did increase its reputation throughout this period, to the point that in June 1972 it was admitted as a full member of the Socialist International.\textsuperscript{1016} Furthermore, on 16-19 April 1973, twenty seven members of the ASP discretely met in the FES-owned Kurt Schumacher Academy in Bad Münstereifel, where they founded the Portuguese Socialist Party. The trips and accommodations were paid for by the FES, although the foundation had no role in the agenda or in the dénouement of the event. The only Germans present were Elke Esters, the MP Holger Börner and, on the last day, Hans-Eberhard Dingels, neither of whom intervened in the congress.\textsuperscript{1017} Although relations were kept essentially at FES-level, Mário Soares, who displayed a pragmatic understanding for Bonn’s official relationship with Lisbon, still regarded Willy Brandt’s party as an important ally of the Portuguese socialists.\textsuperscript{1018} He nevertheless admitted that the SPD’s inner circles did not even seem to read the detailed reports he sent them requesting support for the Socialist Party’s planned actions.\textsuperscript{1019}

In practice little had changed in the SPD’s posture, as the party’s International Department remained keen to preserve links with Lisbon. In the fall of 1973, the German social-democrats once again refused to participate in the SI delegation sent to monitor the Portuguese elections. Having established a backchannel to the Portuguese embassy in Bonn in March, Hans-Eberhard Dingels repeatedly provided Ambassador Freitas Cruz with information on the inner-party orientations regarding Portugal. Dingels, who

\textsuperscript{1014} IAN/TT/AMC, Cx.37, n.23, Manuel José Archer Homem de Melo’s report of his trip to the FRG from 01. to 04.03.1971.
\textsuperscript{1015} Former ASP member Rui Mateus bitterly describes the group as lacking international credibility and proper official support from the European social-democratic parties, in Mateus (1996), pp.38-41. In contrast, scholar Juliet Sablosky paints a more positive picture of the cooperation with those organisations, in Sablosky (2000), pp.29-35. Naturally, this is a politically charged topic, as it involves giving a more humiliating or a more dignified take on the roots of one of Portugal’s largest parties.
\textsuperscript{1016} Martins (2005), pp.198-199.
\textsuperscript{1018} Author’s interview with Mário Soares, 15.09.2010.
claimed to Freitas Cruz that Mário Soares was too “disconnected from the Portuguese reality”, explained to the ambassador that he personally opposed the “socialist romantic” view of the SPD sectors which pinned their hopes on Soares’ movement. Indeed, Dingels expressed his wish to go to Portugal and consult with representatives of the Lisbon government.\(^\text{1020}\) After Freitas Cruz’ replacement by Ambassador Futscher Pereira soon afterwards, Dingles was glad to see his personal backchannel to the embassy reopened in January 1974.\(^\text{1021}\)

By contrast, Soares’ efforts to reach the SPD faced substantial reluctance. Only after repeated requests by Soares did the SPD agree to receive a delegation from the Portuguese Socialist Party in Bonn in April 1974 – a year after its founding and after several European labour parties\(^\text{1022}\) had already done so.\(^\text{1023}\) Even then, as discussed internally by member of the International Department Veronika Isenberg, there was much worry about creating a political incident at a time when both the SPD and the Lisbon regime were facing serious internal crises. Thus, as late as 20 March, the International Department was unwilling to arrange meetings between Soares and high-level officials of the SPD and much less to satisfy the Portuguese socialist’s request for a Soares-Brandt meeting to take place, although the Department did raise the possibility of organising a more official event a couple of months later.\(^\text{1024}\)

Soares made some progress in the final weeks of the dictatorship. He managed to talk to Hans-Eberhard Dingels and Veronika Isenberg, first at an IS session in London on 31 March 1974 and then in Cologne on 6 April. Soares told them that the Portuguese military had a plan to overthrow the regime and that the conspirators were considering three members of the Socialist Party for a post-coup government, including Soares as foreign minister.\(^\text{1025}\) Dingels sent Isenberg’s report about these talks to the Bundeskanzleramt with a note on the seriousness of the matter, suggesting that Washington should be informed.\(^\text{1026}\) The Chancellery acknowledged the relevance of the

\(^{1020}\) AHD, PEA, M756, Pr331, Telegrams from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 09.04.1973 and 06.09.1973.


\(^{1022}\) Namely the parties from the UK, France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands.


\(^{1024}\) AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Note from Veronika Isenberg to Holger Börner, 20.03.1974.

\(^{1025}\) AdsD/WBA, A8, Mappe 29, Note from Veronika Isenberg, 08.04.1974.

news but it did not deem the issue a priority – a week passed before Willy Brandt asked Egon Bahr to inform the Americans about the alleged revolutionary plan. Nevertheless, between 23 and 25 April, Soares and three other representatives of his party were discreetly welcomed in Bonn, where they met informally with a few SPD personalities, including the BMZ’s Parliamentary State Secretary Hans Matthöfer and the BMVg Parliamentary State Secretary Willi Berkhan. The latter secret arrangement had been organised by Dingles who, covering all the angles as usual, thought that Soares’ intelligence about the Portuguese military could be useful for the BMVg. Writing to Berkhan on 24 April, Dingels recognised the importance of maintaining good relations with the pro-Western Soares, whom he now described as “a very wise man, no doubt removed from false emotions”.

The SPD remained sceptical until the end. In general, Soares was treated with a mix of sympathy and condescension, on the basis that the information gathered by NATO, the CIA, the German secret services and the German diplomats in Portugal all pointed against the possibility of an imminent end to the Caetano dictatorship. On the evening of 24 April, Willi Berkham told Soares that he was bound to spend a long time in exile and explained to him the perspective of the German social-democrats. They believed that once Spanish dictator Francisco Franco died, Spain – with the support of the SPD – would find a democratic solution and Portugal would eventually follow. The process, however, was bound to take a few years. After this unproductive discussion, Soares sought to present his case to Willy Brandt, whom he hoped to finally be able to meet the following day. That meeting ended up not taking place, however, if nothing else because upon hearing about the Revolution in the morning Soares immediately flew back to his home in Paris and began preparing his return to Portugal.

\[1027\] As pointed out in Sánchez (2005), p.499.
\[1028\] Maria Barroso, Tito de Morais and Ramos da Costa.
\[1029\] AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Programme for Soares’ trip to Bonn, 23-25 April 1974; The AA’s Parliamentary State Secretary Hans Apel had agreed to have dinner with Soares as well (Dispatch from Dingels to Apel, 18.04.1974), but his name is crossed from the final programme, indicating that he did not make it in the end.
\[1030\] AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Dispatch from Dingels to Berkhan, 24.04.1974
\[1031\] In his interview with the author, Mário Soares stated that he had this conversation with the federal finance minister (Helmut Schmidt, at the time). Soares described the same episode, in lesser detail, to Maria João Avillez in Avillez (1996), p.266, where he identified his interlocutor as the defence minister. The documents in AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159 clearly indicate that it was Willi Berkhman who had dinner with Soares that evening.
\[1032\] Author’s interview with Mário Soares, 15.09.2010.
2. Reaching out to the liberation movements

Willy Brandt’s ascension to chancellor in late 1969 created a propitious environment for Bonn’s rapprochement with the most prominent liberation movements fighting against the Portuguese presence in Africa. The leaders of these movements, which by then had already lost their faith in Marcelo Caetano’s will to promote decolonisation\textsuperscript{1033}, initially showed some hope in the new federal government. Agostinho Neto and Amilcar Cabral, leaders of Angola’s MPLA and of Guinea-Bissau’s and Cape Verde’s PAIGC, respectively, resented Bonn’s reluctance to confront Portugal, but they believed that the West German government was going to gradually loosen its ties with the Caetano dictatorship.\textsuperscript{1034} The most remarkable sign of faith in Brandt, however, came from Mozambique’s FRELIMO in the form of a letter specifically addressed to the chancellor in April 1970. The letter, which denounced West German participation in the Cahora Bassa project and the FRG’s military supplies to Portugal, passionately appealed for Willy Brandt to renounce cooperation with Lisbon in the name of his social-democratic values. It ended on a poetic note:

“It is past the time to put an end to the collusion between fascist Portugal and your country  a collusion which started when the Portuguese Government flew its flag at half-mast on the occasion of Hitler’s death. It is time for your country to cease to carry the tragic infamy of being the devoted supplier and the greedy investor in the minority racist regimes. It is time that the Deutsche Mark, which you have just revalued on the financial market, lose its tinge of blood and suffering.”\textsuperscript{1035}

While, as we have seen throughout the thesis, there was only so far the chancellor was willing to go on a governmental level, the SPD independently sought to reach out to the African movements. A leading personality behind this strategy was Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, a committed anti-colonialist who as MP had founded the lobby group Angola-Komitee in 1964 with the purpose of promoting Portuguese decolonisation.\textsuperscript{1036} Wischneski, who headed Bonn’s Ministry for Economic Cooperation from December 1966 until October 1968, had even approached PAIGC’s charismatic leader Amilcar

\textsuperscript{1033} Ferreira (1972), pp.41-44.
\textsuperscript{1034} Around this time, they confided as much to Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, who knew them personally. – Author’s interview with Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, 20.04.2010.
\textsuperscript{1035} A copy of the letter can be found, for example, in BAK, B136/2992.
\textsuperscript{1036} Verber, Jason. 2010. The Conundrum of Colonialism in Postwar Germany, University of Iowa: PhD dissertation, pp.71-72.
Cabral during his time in office. In 1970, Wischnewski joined the SPD’s National Executive (Bundesvorstand), where he remained very active in regard to Arab and African issues. His arguments for supporting the liberation struggle were not restricted to solidarity; they had a strategic justification as well. During the French-Algerian war, Wischnewski had arranged for the SPD to secretly support the Algerian liberation front FLN. He seemed to proudly identify that effort as the basis for the good relationship that the FRG had forged with Algeria after its independence and therefore he sought to apply the same strategy to Portuguese Africa. Wischnewski argued pragmatically that if the SPD lent moral and practical support to the liberation movements, it could ensure positive relations with the eventual post-colonial regimes in those regions.

This motivation tied into the framework of inter-German competition because, unlike the Portuguese socialists, the African liberation movements were getting assistance from East Germany – in some cases as far back as 1967 – and so were more likely to adopt a pro-GDR policy in the future.

In line with Wischnewski’s ideas, on 30 April 1970 the Director of the SPD’s International Department Hans-Eberhard Dingels secretly received three delegates from the liberation movements in the SPD’s headquarters in Bonn, namely Luis d’Almeida (MPLA), Armando Panguene (FRELIMO) and Alcides Beito (PAIGC). Throughout the meetings, Dingels underlined the goodwill of his party towards their organisations. The guests took the opportunity to ask the SPD for material aid, complaining that the previous year they had supplied the FES with a list of requests but so far had received no positive reply. In a report to Whischnewski, Dingels claimed that on the whole the conversations had been free from “negative emotions”, even despite some disagreement over the controversial topic of Cahora Bassa. According to Dingels, the recent West

1037 Years before the breakdown of West German-Guinean relations, President Sékou Touré had helped Wischnewski meet with Cabral – whom he had first met years before – three times during a trip to Conakry in late April 1968. – PAAA, B26/408, Press release from the BMZ, 29.05.1968, Dispatch from the AA, 06.06.1968.
1040 IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS,CI(2),Pr.11,vol.11,Serviços Alemães, Dispatch from the DGS Office in Mozambique, 06.09.1973.
1042 Dingel’s report mentions a request for the “expansion” (Ausweitung) of aid, so presumably the FES had already provided some amount of support before.
German talks with Kenneth Kaunda had caused a particularly good impression on the African delegates.\(^{1043}\)

The SPD’s International Department was keen to proceed with the backchannel, but it was careful not to cause problems with Lisbon by visibly compromising the whole party’s image and especially the government’s. Thus the SPD did not send any official delegate to the prominent anti-colonialist ‘International Conference in Support of the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies’, which took place in Rome on 27-28 June 1970. Although Dingels did not oppose the presence of a FES observer at the event, he told the liberation movements that the SPD itself could not send any representative due to schedule incompatibilities. In reality, as he explained to Wischnewski, he felt that the party should keep its relations with the movements at a discrete bilateral level.\(^{1044}\) This double strategy was consistent with Dingel’s concern with keeping every channel open, as demonstrated in the case of the relations with the Portuguese socialists.

The SPD’s plan benefitted from the momentary goodwill of the Auswärtiges Amt, which was concerned with the FRG’s tainted image in Africa. In February 1970, an AA internal memo had already speculated that Wischnewski’s unofficial contacts with Amilcar Cabral would prove valuable if they could lead such a relevant personality as the charismatic Guinean leader to discontinue the denunciation of the FRG’s arms supplies to Portugal.\(^{1045}\) The BMZ served as bridge, which is not surprising since it was Wischnewski’s former ministry and one with a strong anti-colonialist imprint. Officials from the BMZ, the AA and the FES met on 3 July to discuss the possibility of aiding the liberation movements and on 13 August the AA approved the BMZ’s request to grant the FES budgetary funds – DM 205,000 in 1970 and DM 211,000 in 1971 – for that purpose. The only conditions were (a) that the funds should be used exclusively for humanitarian, educational and social relief and (b) that all kind of publicity should be avoided.\(^{1046}\) The choice to channel the funds through the FES was not uncommon – this kind of foundations often serve as a more or less independent tool of German foreign policy, able to operate in areas too sensitive for Bonn’s official diplomacy. Their international operations are funded by the BMZ and the Auswärtiges Amt, yet while the AA should

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\(^{1043}\) AdsD/WBA,A11.4,Mappe59, Dispatch from the SPD’s International Department, 04.05.1970.

\(^{1044}\) AdsD/WBA,A11.4,Mappe59, Dispatch from the SPD’s International Department, 25.06.1970; Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, who attended the conference, was asked to explain to the Africans, on an informal basis, that despite their absence the German social-democrats gave the movements their moral support (Author’s interview with Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, 20.04.2010).

\(^{1045}\) AAPBD 1970, Doc.73, Dispatch from State Secretary Harkort, 24.02.1970.

\(^{1046}\) BAK, B136/2992, Dispatch from the Auswärtiges Amt, 08.09.1970.
theoretically give its consent to their projects, it does not actually have a final say over them, giving the government some deniability.\textsuperscript{1047}

The latter characteristic soon proved useful as the AA’s second requirement fell through. During his famous trip to Africa in late August 1970, FES Vice-President Heinz Kühn took the initiative to publicly announce the foundation’s plans to aid the liberation movements.\textsuperscript{1048} This caused great controversy, not only vis-à-vis Portugal, but within West Germany itself. At a time when violent actions of the RAF had already made their first headlines, it was not easy to openly support Marxist-influenced guerrilla groups which were officially designated as ‘terrorists’ by the Portuguese authorities. Indeed, Kühn’s efforts to explain to the West German public the subjectivity of the term “terrorists” were not always successful.\textsuperscript{1049} The conservative press accused the FES of supporting armed struggle, to which Kühn responded that the foundation would not be supplying weapons, but “moral and material aid” aimed at promoting the self-improvement and self-management of the colonised peoples.\textsuperscript{1050}

The social-democrats sought to contain the political effects of the episode by ostensibly dissociating the government from the FES’ activities. Chancellor Brandt assured the Bundestag\textsuperscript{1051}, as well as his ministers\textsuperscript{1052} and the African leaders\textsuperscript{1053}, that the foundation was financing the relief effort with its own funds and that the federal government had nothing to do with the matter. This position, markedly different from the self-publicised support to anti-colonialist organisations provided by the Scandinavian governments\textsuperscript{1054}, safeguarded the initiative from critics both outside and within the SPD, where a more conservative wing had a sceptical view of the liberation movements.\textsuperscript{1055}

However, while the FES did maintain a high degree of autonomy, it consulted with the SPD’s International Relations Commission about its projects. Moreover, a forum informally known as the ‘Group of 6’ held regular discussion rounds about, among other

\textsuperscript{1047} Erdman (2006), pp.181-183.
\textsuperscript{1048} BAK, B136/2992, Dispatch from the Auswärtiges Amt, 08.09.1970.
\textsuperscript{1049} Journalist Siegmar Schelling wrote a particularly virulent article in the conservative newspaper Rheinischer Merkur when Kühn compared the African liberation movements to the German resistance against Hitler. – Rheinischer Merkur, 04.09.1970 (in BA-MA,BH28-2/119).
\textsuperscript{1050} BAK,B136/2992, Heinz Kühn’s report of his trip to Ceylon, Zambia and Tanzania.
\textsuperscript{1051} BAK, B136/2992, Willy Brandt’s written answer to Walther Kiep’s question, 03.10.1970.
\textsuperscript{1052} BAK, B136/2992, Dispatch from the Bundeskanzleramt, 22.09.1970.
\textsuperscript{1054} See chapter 1.
topics, the party’s African policy. Its participants were Willy Brandt, Minister Erhard Eppler, International Secretary Dingels, the foreign policy spokesman of the SPD’s parliamentary group, the head of the FES’ International Division Siegfried Bangert and, occasionally, the foundation’s Director Günter Grunwald. 1056

The FES thus acted out the SPD’s non-governmental African policy. Indeed, Siegfried Bangert, who had accompanied Kühn to Africa in August 19701057, came to earn the nickname of “secret foreign minister” of the FRG among the Zambian politicians.1058 The FES’ aid programme to the liberation movements included scholarships in African and German universities, aimed at training the members of the movements “in cooperative, trade union and administration matters” in order to help them prepare to administer their countries after gaining independence. To this educational aid, the FES added material relief in the form of medicines, children’s food and sewing machines, among other items.1059 It also funded a hospital in Zambia which provided care for the anti-colonialist groups.1060 These initiatives were organised through a series of secret backchannels. Building on the relationship between Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski and Cabral, the FES developed an arrangement to provide humanitarian aid to the PAIGC.1061

After a long process of preliminary discussions with Agostinho Neto – partially mediated by the Yugoslav government1062 – in November/December 1970 the FES also began supplying the MPLA with food and medicines through Lusaka.1063 Presidents Kenneth Kaunda, from Zambia, and Julius Nyerere, from Tanzania, served as liaisons with the liberation movements from Angola and Mozambique, as well with similar movements in Namibia (SWAPO) and Rhodesia (ZANU). Kaunda and Nyerere agreed to secretly channel the German relief through their own governments’ institutions.1064 They

1056 Ibid, p.133.
1057 BAK, B136/2992, Dispatch from the Auswärtiges Amt, 08.09.1970.
1064 In the case of FRELIMO, through Dar es Salaam, and in the case of the MPLA, through Lusaka.
guaranteed that the aid would be given according to the criteria of the OAU and that local FES representatives could attend the relevant meetings.\textsuperscript{1065} Kaunda, who was a personal friend of Siegfried Bangert, played a particularly influential role in guiding the FES’ work in southern Africa.\textsuperscript{1066}

The case of FRELIMO was the least successful. Wischnewski had personally met the organisation’s first president Eduardo Mondlane\textsuperscript{1067}, but Mondlane had been assassinated in 1969. During their trip to Africa in the summer of 1970, Heinz Kühn and Siegfried Bangert had managed to talk to delegates of a smaller Mozambican liberation movement, COREMO\textsuperscript{1068}, but had had no luck in their efforts to meet with FRELIMO’s Vice-President and International Delegate Marcelino dos Santos.\textsuperscript{1069} FRELIMO did come to have contacts with the Jusos and with the representative of the FES in Dar es Salaam\textsuperscript{1070} and, in fact, two members of the movement discretely visited the FRG for a few days in late 1970.\textsuperscript{1071} Nevertheless, the SPD failed to establish an arrangement with FRELIMO similar to the ones it had with the other liberation movements.\textsuperscript{1072} On top of the disagreement over Cahora Bassa, the relations between the West Germans and the Mozambican nationalists were undermined by Marcelino dos Santos’ passionate anti-Western attitude. He reacted to the FES’ public offer of aid by quipping that the FRG supplied the weapons used by the Portuguese and that the FES now wanted to help the Africans buy the coffins.\textsuperscript{1073} In a press release and in an interview to a Tanzanian newspaper in October 1970, dos Santos stated that FRELIMO would only accept relief from the FES if the foundation officially distanced itself from Bonn’s policies. Bangert came to perceive this behaviour as a reflection of the fact that FRELIMO was moving politically closer to the Eastern Bloc. FRELIMO received the bulk of its weapons and funding from the GDR and both the USSR and China sought to strengthen their own partnerships with the group. This was all the more problematic for the West German

\textsuperscript{1068} BAK, B136/2992, Dispatch from the Auswärtiges Amt, 08.09.1970.
\textsuperscript{1069} Dos Santos later told Wischnewski that there had been a logistical mix-up (AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Record of the meeting between Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski and Marcelino dos Santos, 23/24.07.1973). However, according to Bangert, dos Santos had deliberately avoided meeting with him despite Julius Nyerere’s advice to do so (AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Dispatch from Siegfried Bangert, 23.07.1973).
\textsuperscript{1071} PAAA, B26/446, Dispatch from the AA, 08.01.1971.
\textsuperscript{1073} PAAA, B26/446, Dispatch from the AA, 08.01.1971.
intent of polishing Bonn’s image in Africa because FRELIMO was the most internationally renowned of the liberation movements from the Portuguese colonies.1074

The truth is that the FES’ work was not enough to deter the movements from condemning the Western states’ perceived collusion with Portuguese actions in Africa. On 31 March 1971, FRELIMO wrote to UN Secretary General U Thant appealing to him to stop NATO’s upcoming ministerial meeting in Lisbon from taking place. The cable claimed that the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies regarded the meeting as deliberate support by NATO member-countries for activities aimed at strengthening and financing Portugal’s war effort.1075 In February 1972, while speaking at a special UN Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa, Amílcar Cabral highlighted the centrality of the West’s role:

“Who does not know that Portugal – an underdeveloped country and the most backward in Europe – would not be in a position to devote about 50 per cent of its annual budget to the colonial war and for years to wage three wars against the African peoples were it not for the aid of [its] allies? Who does not know that Portugal, which does not even manufacture toy aeroplanes for its children, uses against us airplanes, helicopters, and the most modern of weapons, furnished by its allies? […] Who in all honesty can believe that the Portuguese Government, which respects neither the rules nor the principles of NATO, would have been able to leave the arms and weapons received from that organisation to go rusty when it needs to repress our aspirations of freedom?” 1076

If all the movements criticised Lisbon’s Western allies, FRELIMO was the harshest when it came to singling out the FRG. In March 1972, its President Samora Machel explained to the Tanzanian newspaper Sunday-News that the West German government was linked with the Portuguese to the point that it simply could not stop its support to Lisbon. Even Bonn’s effort to restrict the military deliveries to the dictatorship served as no consolation. As Machel put it: “West Germans have advisers, they have officers, they manufacture weapons in Portugal. It is easier to make the weapons there than to transport them from West Germany.”1077 Machel’s tone contrasted, for example,
with the more positive words of the leader of the PAIGC in an interview with *Der Spiegel* a few months later:

“I am glad that it was your Chancellor Willy Brandt who got the [1971] Nobel Peace Prize, since he is a socialist and a man of principles. This gives us the hope that, because of his socialist conscience and the moral weight of the Peace Prize, he may take decisive measures in order to put an end to the Federal Republic’s assistance to the Portuguese regime.” 1078

As mentioned in the previous chapter, by 1973 the SPD’s grassroots were themselves growing very critical of the colonial wars and of Bonn’s Portugal-policy. As a result, they became more supportive of the liberation movements. On 18 February, a sub-district party congress (*Unterbezirksparteitag*) of the SPD requested that the party’s National Executive set up a fund for the support of the African groups fighting against Portuguese colonialism. 1079 Two months later, the SPD party congress in Hannover passed the resolution stating that the party was going to “offer to the national liberation movements all our solidarity and our political and humanitarian support”. 1080 The resolution obtained more than 90% of the votes. 1081 What had started as a minority position was now embraced by the party’s mainstream.

It is against this background that the German social-democrats decided to increase their efforts to cooperate with FRELIMO. Siegfried Bangert was convinced that, as influential as Marcelino dos Santos was, his views were not necessarily widespread among the elite of the Mozambican group. Bangert told Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski that there was a rising trend within FRELIMO of disillusionment with the type of support provided by the Soviet Union and China – limited to weapons and money – as well as with the scope and ideological requirements of such support. Furthermore, according to Bangert, the SPD could count on Julius Nyerere to intercede on its behalf. Not only was the Tanzanian leader worried about FRELIMO’s dependency on the Eastern Bloc, he had little sympathy for the movement’s policy of straining the budget of the Tanzanian government while refusing aid from Nyerere’s political friends. 1082

1079 Kreyssig (1990), p.32.
Wischnewski, who had become chairman of the SPD’s International Relations Commission in July 1972, went to great lengths in the quest to reach out to the Mozambican nationalists. On 17 July 1973, he invited FRELIMO to send a leading representative to Bonn in order to “pursue the mutual exchange of views” concerning the situation in Mozambique. He received Marcelino dos Santos in the SPD headquarters on 23 and 24 July and tried to persuade FRELIMO’s sceptical vice-president of the goodwill of the German social-democrats. To prove its resolution, the SPD’s International Relations Commission openly welcomed a delegation of FRELIMO in Bonn between 2 and 8 August 1973. The programme included talks with members of the FES and the SPD, including Parliamentary State Secretary Hans Matthöfer in his role as member of the SPD’s National Executive and International Relations Commission. In stark contrast to the brief and surreptitious meetings of the past, this visit even included a joint press conference with the FRELIMO delegation and the SPD’s International Relations Commission. In the conference, both groups condemned Portuguese colonialism and any kind of military support to the Caetano regime. The German spokesmen announced the SPD’s will to aid FRELIMO’s public relations within the FRG and to promote, as soon as possible, a conference with all the social-democratic parties from NATO countries. According to the communiqué, such a conference should establish a joint policy to ensure that Portugal would stop the flagrant violation of the principles of the Atlantic Alliance.

Despite their efforts, the German social-democrats were not able to fully satisfy the African delegation. Against the delegation’s wishes, they refused to recognise the existence of an actual Mozambican government in exile. Furthermore, because the West German government itself was not involved in the visit, FRELIMO could get no official assurance that the FRG would adopt a strong position against Portugal in NATO or in the UN. As usual, Cahora Bassa was also a major point of friction. While FRELIMO saw the

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1087 The program also included meetings with representatives of the catholic and protestant churches, of the unions and of the AGM-Komitee, as well as with the African ambassadors in Bonn. – AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, “Visit of the members of the Executive Committee of FRELIMO in the Federal Republic of Germany”.
project as an instrument of colonialism, the social-democrats claimed that the dam should
be regarded as part of the modern infrastructure which would eventually be inherited by a
liberated Mozambique.1089 The private talks with the FRELIMO representatives almost
broke off because of the latter issue, which took up to ten hours of intense discussion.1090

The trip was steeped in controversy. As described in previous chapters, the SPD
faced a political backlash from the Auswärtiges Amt and from the German conservative
press and opposition. The event also put the party in the delicate position of having to
justify to the German companies involved in Cahora Bassa – and to the wider public
opinion – why it sought to support a guerrilla group which was threatening the safety of
German workers.1091 On the international front, Dingels took care of the damage control
with regard to Lisbon – he met with Ambassador Freitas Cruz to assure him that the
government had played no part in FRELIMO’s visit, which had been exclusively an
initiative of the inner-circles of the SPD.1092 Yet even in Africa the reactions were mixed.
West German embassies in the continent reported that the joint SPD-FRELIMO press
communiqué did not seem to have presented with sufficient clarity the SPD’s position
regarding the military shipments to Portugal.1093 In fact, what goodwill the initiative
garnered in Africa dissipated as soon as the Bonn government clarified that the FRG’s
relations with Lisbon were to remain unchanged.1094

Most notably, the event also failed to achieve its central purpose, i.e. to
consolidate relations with FRELIMO. On the day of his return to Africa, Marcelino dos
Santos privately sent his German hosts a few kind words about the “progress which we
could observe in our relationship”, yet he also made it clear that his group hoped that the
FRG would soon take an official stand against Portuguese colonialism.1095 Weeks later,
in the absence of such a stand, dos Santos publicly announced that FRELIMO was
refusing any assistance from the West Germans. On 30 August, he told the Tanzanian

1089 AD/MAE Europe 1944 Portugal, 3509, Dispatch from the French Embassy in Bonn, 10.08.1973.
1090 AAPBD 1973, Doc. 253, Letter from Minister Scheel to Chancellor Brandt, 17.08.1973 (footnote);
IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS,Cl(2),Pr.11,vol.11,Serviços Alemães, Dispatch from the DGS Office in Mozambique,
1091 Wischnewski set up a meeting with the President of Hochtief on 11 August, in order to explain what
kind of aid the SPD intended to provide and why he believed that could help safeguard the workers on the
site. – IAN/TT/PIDE-DGS,Cl(2),Pr.11,vol.11,Serviços Alemães, Dispatch from the DGS Office in Mozambique,
1092 AHD, PEA, M756, Pr331, Telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 06.09.1973.
1093 AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Handwritten note (Gespräch mit Dr. Merkel AA),
1094 NARA-AAD, Doc.1973BONN12585, Dispatch from the US Embassy in Bonn, 31.081973
1095 AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Telegram from Marcelino dos Santos to Hans-
newspaper *Daily News*: “They wanted to give military help to Portugal and at the same time give medicines to us to treat our wounds. We considered this an immoral position.” Dos Santos complained that the *SPD*, despite being the main force in government, would only commit itself as a party – in his view, the *SPD*’s offer of solidarity was not enough if it would not stop the federal government from continuing to work with Lisbon. Dos Santos also described the attitude of the German social-democrats as paternalistic. He criticised the *SPD*’s insistence that its aid should be used exclusively for humanitarian purposes – unlike the unconditional aid provided, for example, by the Dutch – as well as the *SPD*’s view on Cahora Bassa: “How can we believe that a party really wants to cooperate with us when they want to decide what is good for our people?”¹⁰⁹⁶ The contacts between *FRELIMO* and the *SPD* were interrupted.¹⁰⁹⁷ Frustrated, the German social-democrats even agreed to discretely talk to the leader of *COREMO* in January 1974, even though they were aware of how less relevant that group was in comparison to *FRELIMO*.¹⁰⁹⁸ Even if dos Santos’ attitude mostly reflected his personal and ideological leanings – particularly in comparison with the goodwill displayed by the pro-Western Mário Soares – the *FRELIMO* episode had exposed the limitations and contradictions of the *SPD*’s parallel policy.

**Conclusion**

In alternative to Bonn’s official Portugal-policy, the *SPD* established relations with the opposition to the Lisbon dictatorship and to its colonial rule. The main agent of these parallel relations was the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which concerted its actions with the foreign policy organs of the *SPD* but retained a degree of independence. Given that the *SPD* was the leading party in the government, it is important to consider the significance of these initiatives.

By their very nature, these initiatives represented a considerable rupture with Bonn’s cooperative posture vis-à-vis the Portuguese regime. The *FES* financed disenfranchised Portuguese students in West Germany, including exile Eduardo de Sousa

¹⁰⁹⁶ AHD, PEA, M756, Pr. 331, Aerogram from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 30.08.1973.
¹⁰⁹⁷ *FRELIMO* only reactivated them almost a year later, in the aftermath of the Portuguese Revolution, when it sought to exploit the *SPD*’s ties to newly appointed Portuguese Foreign Minister Mário Soares. – AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Dispatch from the *SPD*’s International Division, 15.07.1974.
¹⁰⁹⁸ AdsD/SPD-PV, Internationale Abteilung III, 11159, Dispatch from the *SPD*’s International Relations Commission, 02.08.1974.

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Ferreira, who conceptualised and articulated substantial criticism against the dictatorship. The foundation also supplied some support to the Portuguese socialist movement, including – in a major symbolic gesture – the funds and location for the founding congress of the Portuguese Socialist Party. By facilitating the circulation and networking of the Portuguese socialists and enhancing their reputation – for example, by aiding their integration in the Socialist International in 1972 – the German social-democrats furthered the international projection of one of the most emblematic forces of the political opposition to the Lisbon dictatorship. Moreover, the FES provided humanitarian relief to liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, most notably the MPLA and the PAIGC. Finally, the SPD itself lent these movements some political support by publicly endorsing their anti-colonialist ideals. These initiatives were partially based on solidarity with the causes of those movements and individuals, even if Mário Soares’ socialist group ASP was the only one of them ideologically close to the SPD. A further, more practical, consideration was the need to cultivate positive relations with the successors of the ruling elite in Portugal as well as in the colonies. Such a need was enhanced by the fact that the African rebels had substantial material and ideological ties to East Germany, which increased the urgency of developing good relations with them.

Naturally, most of these processes cannot be fully dissociated from the federal government itself. Chancellor Willy Brandt was aware of his party’s parallel policy, not the least because of his consultations with the implementers of that policy in the FES and SPD. As chairman of the SPD, he presumably would have been able to take steps against this policy, yet he accepted it, even if he chose to minimise his, and his government’s involvement. The state budget funded some of the humanitarian aid provided by the FES to the liberation movements. The latter decision was encouraged by the BMZ, which generally displayed a marked anti-colonialist predisposition. In 1970, this initiative also briefly gained the acquiescence of the AA, which hoped that by aiding the liberation movements these would adopt a less critical discourse towards the FRG and thus help clean up Bonn’s image in Africa. Parliamentary State Secretary Hans Matthöffer met with the delegations from FRELIMO and from the Socialist Party; in the latter case, so did his colleague Willi Berkham, although neither did it in an official capacity. Furthermore, as explained in the previous chapter, Bonn’s tolerance of the initiatives of the FES and SPD became the focus of occasional diplomatic friction with Lisbon. Thus it can be argued that this parallel policy represented a manifestation of discontinuity even in the formal West German policy towards Portugal.
Nevertheless, it is important to take into consideration the limitations of this parallel foreign policy. For example, the amount of practical support for the Portuguese socialists was very modest and low-profile. While the FES cooperated with the ASP, the SPD as a party adopted a more reserved position due to the conviction that Soares’ group stood little chance of coming to power any time soon. In part – and especially during the earlier years of this period – this view was tied to positive expectations regarding Marcelo Caetano and the dictatorship’s ‘liberal wing’, i.e. Soares’ illegal opposition had to compete with the liberals’ legal opposition for the face of the most credible agent of peaceful democratisation in Portugal. Mostly, however, Soares had to compete with the German conviction that change in Portugal would only occur in the long-run and that therefore there was no point in compromising the immediate relations with Lisbon in the name of the ASP, particularly at the risk of weakening Caetano’s stand against the ultraconservative faction of the Lisbon regime. Thus, the relations with the socialists were greatly shaped by the Germans’ perception of the evolving situation in Lisbon, as well as by the division between a more idealistic and a more pragmatic sector of the SPD.

Regarding the support for the liberation movements, the West German case stood in contrast to its Dutch and Scandinavian neighbours, where the governments themselves adopted a more committed position. This proved to be particularly important because the SPD’s elites’ rejected a full departure from the government line, most notably regarding Cahora Bassa. Significantly, as Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski found in his contacts with FRELIMO, the SPD’s position could be interpreted as insufficiently counterbalancing Bonn’s policy with no guarantees of actual governmental change. The prevalence of continuity was thus evidenced by the fact that the German social-democrats found it easier to restrain Lisbon’s indignation over their small-scale cooperation with the liberation movements than to restrain the Mozambican group’s outrage over their large-scale cooperation with Lisbon.

In conclusion, the SPD’s parallel foreign relations served less as a disruptive force than as a vehicle to compensate for – and therefore safeguard – the official relationship between the FRG and Portugal. These relations confirmed the existence of a strand within the SPD and FES which was moved by solidarity with the resistance against the Lisbon regime and which created a space outside the government to act out its political ideals. However, by remaining essentially and admittedly non-governmental, these initiatives only ended up highlighting the government’s own ambiguous position towards the Portuguese dictatorship. In fact, in its most extreme case, this alternative foreign policy
was not only limited but undermined by its reluctance to compromise Bonn’s actual stance of *continuity*. 
CONCLUSION

Between Cold War and Colonial Wars
The defining feature of West German policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship during the governments headed by Willy Brandt and Marcelo Caetano was its ambiguity. The final chapter of this thesis draws together elements from across my research in order to analyse this ambiguous policy. A first section determines the practical dilemmas at the root of the policy, which reflected the influence of multiple factors coming both from within and outside of the SPD-FDP coalition in power. Some of these factors contributed to reinforce the FRG’s traditionally stable and friendly policy vis-à-vis the Lisbon regime, while others pressured Bonn into discontinuing areas of that policy and adopting a more confrontational stance. This section demonstrates that, as contradictory as the result of these various clashes was, there was a predominant strand: the government essentially carried out a policy of continuity, despite a few significant exceptions. The closing section delves into the wider historical implications of this policy option. It argues that the FRG helped sustain the Lisbon dictatorship and consequently the process of Portuguese resistance to decolonisation. This was not Bonn’s primary intention, but rather a by-product of contemporary West German priorities, namely the safeguarding of neue Ostpolitik and a preference for peaceful evolutionary solutions. Therefore this thesis concludes that the context of Cold War in Europe coupled with a flawed interpretation of Portuguese European and colonial reality posed a challenge to the dynamics of African emancipation.

The dilemmas of Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime

At the core of Bonn’s ambiguous policy towards the Caetano regime was the attempt to find a compromise solution for three interconnected dilemmas related to Lisbon’s resistance to decolonisation. The first of these dilemmas and the central one, from which the others derived, was the ‘Portugal vs Africa’ dilemma. On the one hand, the FRG, which was an ally of Portugal within the framework of NATO, had historically entangled itself with the Lisbon dictatorship, including, inevitably, its colonial dimension. On the other hand, the anti-colonialist African states were the largest voting group in the UN General Assembly and the FRG required their support for its bold foreign policy aimed at long-term German self-determination. Bonn’s reputation as an accomplice of Portuguese colonialism endangered this support, creating a serious conflict of interests. In this regard, the two most controversial aspects were the
West German-Portuguese military cooperation – which indirectly provided Portugal with equipment used in the colonial wars – and the West German participation in the Cahora Bassa dam project, in Mozambique. Notably, these issues were exploited by East German propaganda, which furthered the expansion of the GDR’s influence in Africa, thus undermining the advantageous position of the FRG in inter-German negotiations and competition.

The Brandt governments tried to reconcile their relations with Lisbon and with its critics, often with incongruous results. At times, they agreed to supply the Portuguese with military materiel which they suspected might be used in the wars while also briefly supplying the liberation movements with humanitarian relief. Moreover, they resisted African demands to abandon the Cahora Bassa project, but they also rejected a request for further credit to cover the enterprise. Ultimately, the SPD-FDP coalition could not choose between Portugal and Africa or between NATO and the United Nations, no more than it could choose between national security and national self-determination, for the former preserved the federal state and the latter was the purpose that drove its foreign policy. Although this was hardly a new problem, it became more pressing during this era with the escalation and subsequent radicalisation of the African critique of the FRG’s ties to Portugal, which found a potent echo in the solidarity movement within West German society. In the autumn of 1970, Bonn sought to break away from this dilemma by encouraging a dialogue between Lisbon and the independent African states, taking advantage of the latter’s willingness to discuss a solution for the colonial conflict. Bonn’s effort proved unsuccessful due to the Portuguese dictatorship’s reluctance to negotiate with the African side.

The need to promote Portuguese flexibility formed the basis for Bonn’s second policy dilemma, which concerned the best way to approach Lisbon: ‘cooperation vs confrontation’. According to one of the main advocates of cooperation, the German Ambassador in Lisbon Ehrenfried von Holleben, Portugal’s rapprochement with Europe and a conciliatory international attitude would legitimise the more progressive and pro-European forces within the dictatorship, or at least prevent Lisbon’s drift towards isolationism. With this in mind, Bonn supported Portugal in the negotiations for the 1972 trade agreement with the EEC and it lobbied against Scandinavian and Dutch efforts to marginalise the dictatorship internationally. By contrast, confrontational measures against Lisbon were suggested within and outside the government, including tougher diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, a military embargo and a multilateral
demarche. Bonn did not fully embrace any of these measures, but it occasionally came close to adopting softer versions: the Chancellery’s shy attempt to directly engage with Caetano, the BMZ’s and BMWi’s reluctance to provide further development aid, the AA’s demand for stricter control over the final destination of military sales and its short-lived attempt to coordinate a joint action with France and the UK. Nevertheless, because confrontational approaches increased the risk of alienating Lisbon, which would have meant picking a side in the ‘Portugal vs Africa’ dilemma, Bonn adopted cooperation as its default policy line.

The cooperative stance propelled a third dilemma: ‘close collaboration vs diplomatic distance’. The cornerstone of Bonn’s official strategy was the idea of cooperating with Lisbon in order to shift Portugal’s interests towards Europe and to help it overcome its dependency on Africa. At the same time, however, the federal government did not want to be seen working too closely with such a controversial regime. In this regard, the East German propaganda offensive had a particularly paradoxical effect, indirectly promoting closer contact between the West German and Portuguese foreign ministers, but preventing their interaction from becoming more formalised. Careful to avoid guilt by association, Bonn maintained some distance from Lisbon on the surface while scrupulously preserving their amicable relationship.

The policy approaches generated by these three dilemmas can be aggregated into two distinct strands. Approaches with a more pro-Portuguese, pro-cooperative and pro-collaborative orientation placed the emphasis on the continuity of traditionally positive relations with Lisbon. In turn, approaches with a more pro-African, pro-confrontational or pro-distance orientation represented a discontinuity with traditional policy. The two strands competed, but they also occasionally complemented each other. For example, until 1973 the federal government’s approach to the issue of military cooperation with Portugal was admittedly one of continuity, as illustrated by the commitment to make use of the Beja airbase. In order to secure this cooperation in a sensitive international environment, however, Bonn sought to ostensibly dissociate military relations from the colonial wars. Thus in April 1971 Brandt attempted to replace the FRG’s direct bilateral supply of military aid to Lisbon with an indirect multilateral supply of aid through NATO. Shortly after the UK rejected this plan, the Bonn government changed strategy by enforcing a strict end-use clause attached to military sales to the dictatorship, which explicitly forbade the use of the acquired equipment outside of Europe. While both measures were aimed at enabling the continuity of cooperation, the latter ended up
creating a virtual impasse in the exports of West German military materiel to Portugal for two years, which was a clear element of discontinuity in the overall West German-Portuguese relations.

In part, Bonn’s various contradictory stances resulted from tension between interests and ideology, but it should be taken into account that both continuity and discontinuity were justified with materialist as well as ideological arguments. The case for continuity was based on economic, military and strategic interests. From an economic perspective, positive relations with Portugal promoted the FRG’s foreign trade and export of capital, while also giving West German companies the opportunity to participate in the economically appealing – if politically contaminated – Cahora Bassa project. Conversely, the idea of compromising economic interests for political reasons, as advocated by the anti-Cahora Bassa campaign, was seen as dangerously undermining the foundation of the FRG’s external economic relations. From a military perspective, the main benefit of an appeasing attitude was ensuring Lisbon’s goodwill in allowing the Luftwaffe’s use of the Alcochete range and the construction of a new range, which was necessary for the training programs at the Beja airbase. From a strategic perspective, a key concern was to prevent Portugal’s expulsion or voluntary withdrawal from NATO, which could have started an internal crisis in the Atlantic Alliance and would have cost the organisation the crucial Lajes airbase. Yet continuity also had an ideological reasoning, based on the theory that economic liberalisation and development in Portugal would lead to political liberalisation and decolonisation. Similarly, the advocates of discontinuity combined pragmatic and idealist counter-arguments. From a realist perspective, Bonn’s relationship with the unpopular Lisbon regime posed serious problems by inviting a domestic public opinion backlash, damaging the international prestige of the FRG and indirectly contributing to African radicalisation. Regardless of these practical considerations, the case for discontinuity often relied on genuine anti-colonialist and anti-authoritarian values.

The ambiguity of Bonn’s policy reflected the fact that both overriding strands were represented within the federal government. The most extreme cases were the Auswärtiges Amt, which mostly favoured continuity, and the BMZ, which often advocated discontinuity. At the top level, this divergence signalled the coalition’s ideological plurality. After all, the AA was headed by Walter Scheel, who was the chairman of the liberal FDP and who presented liberalism and moderate reform as the preferred path for social and political change. By contrast, the BMZ was headed by a
member of the left wing of the social-democratic SPD, Erhard Eppler, who envisioned a more active role in promoting change. The division did not run merely across party lines: for example, the BMVg often defended Portuguese interests, even though it was headed by Helmut Schmidt and later Georg Leber, two SPD politicians from a more conservative wing of the party. Yet policy orientations reflected not just each minister’s political inclination, but also the predisposition of the ministerial apparatus. The AA’s bureaucrats frequently defended continuity on the basis of Realpolitik, the generally leftist employees of the BMZ displayed less tolerance for the Lisbon right-wing dictatorship, the staff at the BMVg pushed for exceptions in the restriction of military exports to Portugal in line with the interests of the Armed Forces and of the industrial-military complex. This is not to say that the ministries were fully consistent: despite its tendencies favourable to continuity, the AA was tough on arms’ supplies to Lisbon, which were a key target of African criticism. Similarly, under Karl Schiller (SPD) the BMWi encouraged investments in Portugal and Portuguese rapprochement with the EEC, but it was hesitant on the issue of economic aid for the Alqueva dam because of the possible negative effect on public opinion. Within the Chancellery, key actors related to foreign affairs such as Horst Ehmke, Carl-Werner Sanne, Per Fischer and possibly Egon Bahr were involved in the unsuccessful attempt to establish a productive backchannel to Marcelo Caetano in late 1970. As Chancellor Willy Brandt felt frustrated over the dictator’s intransigence, the Chancellery abandoned its plans for a more active diplomacy towards Lisbon. It essentially delegated this area of policy back to the AA, which determined Bonn’s official strategy regarding Portugal for the following years.

Thus the SPD’s ideals of peace, democracy and self-determination ended up having a limited impact on the government’s policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, the BMZ’s public defiance notwithstanding. This explains why the SPD ranks – in stark contrast to the support for continuity by the CDU/CSU – were at the forefront of the political opposition to this area of Bonn’s policy, both in parliament and in the activist campaigns, most notably through the AGM-Komitee. At an institutional level, a wing of the SPD’s party structure funnelled its opposition to Lisbon into non-governmental channels, including the party’s International Department, its Commission for International Relations and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. These institutions developed a parallel foreign policy, lending discrete support to the illegal Portuguese socialist opposition and reaching out to the African liberation movements. This process
reached a peak in 1973 with the foundation of the Portuguese Socialist Party in Bad Münstereifel and a visit from a FRELIMO delegation to the FRG. Both the SPD’s role as opposition and its urge to establish alternative foreign relations underline the gap between the party’s discourse and the government’s actual policy towards Lisbon.

By weighing the behaviour of the Brandt governments in various fields this thesis has concluded that they continued to pursue an endemicly lenient policy towards the Lisbon regime, with sporadic adjustments and concessions to critical forces. The only large-scale disengagement was the military divestment announced in the summer of 1973, near the end of this period and primarily motivated by logistical and financial concerns rather than political ones. This assessment challenges the impression conveyed by Portuguese research on the topic, which has emphasised the deterioration of West German-Portuguese relations during this era as a side effect of neue Ostpolitik.1099 The fact that the stance of the Brandt governments was comparatively less forthcoming than that of those in the early 1960s and the existence of specific elements of marked discontinuity should not override the prevalence of positive West German-Portuguese relations during marcelismo. Only by acknowledging Bonn’s overall benevolent acceptance of the Caetano regime can we begin to assess its implications.

The implications of Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime

Portugal, the poorest country in Western Europe with little perceived political weight outside of its borders, was deeply dependent on its Western allies for the pursuit of its policy of resistance to decolonisation. Given the material burden of three simultaneous wars in Africa, it is not surprising that said resistance would take the form of an invisible ‘team effort’ rather than an isolationist undertaking. This situation was not fully exceptional, as demonstrated by the key role of the USA in bankrolling Western European imperial projects in the 1950s, when the UK could no longer financially afford its empire1100 and France faced destabilising colonial wars in


Indochina and Algeria. In fact, the prerequisite of international support to stall the African anti-colonialist momentum had been unmistakably acknowledged – although not admitted in public – by the Portuguese dictatorship even before the outbreak of the first large-scale armed conflict. As argued by António José Telo, it had been this very perception that had fuelled Lisbon’s rapprochement with Bonn in the late 1950s. However, not only material resources were at stake. In his analysis of the late stages of Portuguese colonial policy, Okon Udokang highlighted the importance of political complicity. According to Udokang, in the “existing international atmosphere of general revulsion against foreign domination”, imperial powers realised that their national policy was “more likely to succeed if pursued in collaboration with those sharing a commonality of values and interests”. Indeed, Lisbon had from the onset appealed to its allies with a rhetoric based on the notions of European civilisation and anticommunism. Yet by the time Caetano came to power the dictatorship could not escape the Zeitgeist anymore than it could escape the African guerrillas and so it no longer expected an open endorsement. Unlike the Brandt governments, which successfully multilateralised their own national goals by framing them in the context of a wider European peace strategy, the Caetano regime did not strive for recognition of its international aims – it settled for agnostic tolerance and resentful acquiescence.

The dictatorship found the latter in the West German government. Even if the passing sympathy for Lisbon’s regime of the Adenauer-Strauß years had given way to a more assuredly anti-colonialist identity in Bonn, Caetano did not face rupture with or consistent antagonism from West German diplomacy. After all, while Chancellor Brandt was clearly ideologically farther away from Portugal than his predecessors had been, the relationship between Bonn and Lisbon – as both would have gladly admitted – had never been grounded in common political values as much as in compatible goals of foreign policy. The SPD-FDP coalition governments were certainly not committed to defending the Portuguese colonial empire, but they had priorities other than its termination, namely, at the top of the list, East-West European rapprochement. As we have seen, Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime was the product of multiple conflicts between contradictory forces, most of which bore no discernible relation to

neue Ostpolitik. Yet the latter nonetheless ended up playing a key part, because whenever European détente was at stake in a conflict, the final balance would tip in favour of whichever position seemed more likely to safeguard it. Consequently, neue Ostpolitik contributed decisively to the final West German policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship on two levels: political and geo-strategic.

On a purely political level, neue Ostpolitik reduced Bonn’s leeway to undermine its relationship with the Portuguese regime through a hostile strategy. As both the West German left and right pointed out, the idea of building bridges and cooperating with disreputable authoritarian regimes was at the basis of the new Eastern policy. If Bonn attacked Portugal for its cruel colonial practices while appeasing the GDR, this could signal to the German public that the Brandt government was more committed to combating the oppression of the Africans or the Portuguese than the oppression of the Germans in the neighbouring state. For various sections of the FRG society, the implication that their government would downplay the suffering in East Germany was very difficult to accept, especially for those who still had family on the other side of the border.

On a geo-strategic level, neue Ostpolitik was grounded on Bonn’s clear commitment to its Western allies. Brandt’s policy of reaching out to the East neither implied acceptance of the Soviet model nor the assumption that the East-West conflict was over – on the contrary, it rested on the notion of a strong and solid Western bloc. True to this principle, Bonn opposed the attempts to stigmatise the Portuguese dictatorship within NATO, fearing that the organisation might erode through in-fighting. Even if one questions the personal devotion of Willy Brandt and especially Egon Bahr to the Atlantic Alliance and accepts their yearning to overcome it in the future\textsuperscript{1104}, the short-term conditions – i.e. the need to secure the trust of European and American allies – reinforced the FRG’s need to display loyalty to its NATO partner Portugal. Contrary to the aforementioned interpretation by Portuguese historiography, the FRG’s new status quo with the authoritarian regimes of the East actually reduced its breathing space to act against the Portuguese dictatorship.

Although neue Ostpolitik’s role in the context of Bonn’s Portugal-policy was chiefly as a factor blocking some of the impulses towards discontinuity, its presence

could also be felt among the forces pushing for continuity. The supporters of friendly relations with Lisbon – most notably those in the AA – presented their strategy as one based on realism and communication, i.e. on accepting the established reality of the dictatorship and trusting that contact with Portugal might lead to its penetration by Bonn’s ideas. This plan assumed that once Lisbon had lost the fear of being pushed out of Africa, it could enter into a process of increasing interaction with Western Europe. Rapprochement might then result in the transformation of Lisbon, albeit a gradual one: Portuguese rule in Africa was not to be abruptly abolished but changed over time. Such a theory rested on the notion that the African colonial question could only be solved through cooperation with Portugal and not through antagonistic behaviour. If we replace ‘Africa’ by ‘Eastern Europe’ and ‘Portugal’ by ‘Soviet Union’, we come very close to the principles of neue Ostpolitik, as originally formulated by Egon Bahr.1105

This is not to say that West German politicians necessarily regarded Bonn’s policy towards Portugal as a variation of their policy towards the East, even if the comparison was explicitly or implicitly made by several actors, as shown throughout the thesis. What the resemblances in the rhetoric of the two policies reflect is their common origin in the idea of phased long-term transformation within a framework of stability. This was the idea behind such neue Ostpolitik slogans as ‘change through rapprochement’ or ‘liberalisation through stabilisation’. In principle, Marcelo Caetano’s reformism was perfectly suited to Bonn’s views, as evidenced by his similar concepts of ‘evolution within continuity’ in the regime and ‘progressive autonomy’ in the colonies. Such formulas served as groundwork for the AA’s policy of continuous positive relations with Lisbon, regardless of whether German political agents perceived them with genuine hope or cynicism – or whether, as it usually seems to be the case, they simply viewed Caetano as the lesser evil in comparison to the regime’s ‘ultra-right’ faction. As a result, the Portuguese dictatorship obtained diplomatic, economic and even military benefits through its relationship with the FRG which were devoid of any sustained pressure to make concessions on the democratic or colonial fronts.

Bonn’s justification for its policy of continuity relied on the interrelated flawed assumptions that there could still be stable and peaceful evolution in Portugal and in the colonies. The idea that economic rapprochement with Europe would challenge the

dictatorship’s Africanist tendencies rested on a false dichotomy. The Portuguese economy had been steadily turning towards Europe since the early 1960s and that had not prevented the prolonged engagement in the colonial wars – in fact, the extraordinary economic growth had helped compensate for the state’s heavy military expenditure. The intense economic relations with Europe in the early 1970s confirmed that Lisbon’s attachment to Africa was primarily politically driven, not economically driven, and thus the solution to the colonial question had to be political as well. In fairness, the AA and even circles of the SPD presented the dictatorship’s ‘liberal wing’ – perceived as a version of Bonn’s own liberal-reformist posture – as the protagonists of a possible political solution, but this view overestimated that faction’s actual influence within Lisbon. Contrary to German wishful thinking, economic development did not translate into political power for the ‘liberals’. While the rapprochement with Europe had spurred an industrialist and political class willing to look beyond the empire-centred ideology, the regime itself was blocked and unable to change regardless of Caetano’s rhetoric – and without meaningful regime change there could not be transformation of the policy towards Africa.

More importantly, the idea that, given time and propitious conditions, the dictatorship would come to its senses and decolonise presupposed that Lisbon was entitled to manage the dissolution of its empire, i.e. that the metropolis was – or should be – in full control of the decolonising process. Not only did this assumption accept the very principles of colonial rule which it sought to overcome, it disregarded the impact of the ongoing liberation struggle in the colonies. Indeed, the practicality of a slow evolution had already been compromised by the long duration of the process of Portuguese resistance to decolonisation. However, even after a decade of liberation struggle, the concern with stability and the insistence on an evolutionary solution led Bonn – the Chancellery as well as the AA – to defend a long-term (10 to 15 years) non-revolutionary transition to independence.

In the end, Bonn’s policy towards the Caetano regime did succeed in the priorities it had set for itself. It safeguarded German material interests. It kept Portugal in NATO, avoiding a crisis within the organisation. It secured the FRG’s pro-Western credentials. It effectively prevented the Afro-Portuguese colonial problem from disturbing neue Ostpolitik or the first stages of the CSCE. Ultimately it was not the Lisbon dictatorship but the West German government who chose Europe over Africa, by subordinating African aspirations to its European policy and by placing the onus of
decolonisation on European agency, i.e. on Portugal’s readiness. The paradox, of course, was that by enabling Lisbon’s colonialism, the federal government was denying to the Portuguese colonies the very right to self-determination which Bonn was striving to obtain for its own nation.

The European focus of Bonn’s policy was reflected in the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution. The federal government’s former relations with the dictatorship did not prevent the FRG from maintaining its role as a close ally of Portugal. In this regard, the parallel foreign policy developed by the FES paid off, securing tight relations with the Portuguese Socialist Party, particularly important during the revolutionary period (1974-1975). Willy Brandt, no longer chancellor but still chairman of the SPD, became an active patron of the party’s efforts to establish a Western-style democracy in the country.1106 By contrast, Bonn’s relations with the former Portuguese colonies were a disaster, particularly in the case of Mozambique1107, even if, in a final twist, the FRELIMO leadership came to embrace the Cahora Bassa dam shortly after achieving independence1108, on 25 June 1975. While West Germany’s ties to Africa were not completely tarnished, the prestige of the FRG in the continent became seriously compromised in the second half of the decade, in stark contrast to East Germany’s.1109 Brandt, who after leaving his mark in East-West relations would come to focus on the North-South divide, most notably through his 1980 ‘Brandt Report’, timidly reassessed his governments’ position in his memoirs:

“Portuguese colonial policy had caused me much concern as Foreign Minister and Chancellor. Although we insisted when supplying arms within the framework of the Alliance that all such equipment must remain in Portugal, it was inevitable that the African liberation movements should mistrust us. Our own attitude to them was unduly reserved. The Soviet commitment in Angola might never have happened if the West had evolved a consistent policy towards Africa.”1110

In conclusion, the African and the West German ‘nationalist’, if internationalised, quests for self-determination became intertwined to the point of challenging each other. Willy Brandt’s SPD-FDP coalition gradually perceived a contradiction between its Northern and Southern policies and it ultimately chose the former. In doing so, it sacrificed its self-professed solidarity with African liberation in the name of European détente. Although Cold War competition was also a part of Bonn’s Afrikapolitik, this final choice represented a clear dominance of Cold War concerns over decolonisation politics. It should be noted, however, that while the Cold War framework may have enabled and encouraged Bonn’s compliance with colonialism, it did not necessarily force it. After all, it would be no more counterfactual to state that Bonn could have safeguarded its neue Ostpolitik goals with a different policy towards Lisbon than it would be to assume that there was no alternative. Only by acknowledging that the Cold War did not determine actions, but the perceptions which shaped those actions, can we begin to accurately evaluate its role in the history of colonial and postcolonial politics.
Annex 1

Hierarchy of the Federal Government

1. Chancellor (*Bundeskanzler*)

2. Federal Minister (*Bundesminister*)

3. Parliamentary State Secretary (*Parlamentarische Staatsssekretäre*)

3. Head of the Chancellery (*Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes*)

4. Undersecretary of State (*Staatssekretär*)

5. Political Director (*Ministerialdirektor*)

6. Head of Section (*Ministerialdirigent*)

7. Head of Department (*Vortragender Legationsrat Erster Klasse*)

7. Head of Department (*Ministerialrat*)

8. First Secretary of Department (*Legationsrat Erster Klasse*)
APPENDIX 1

FRG’s percentage in the Portuguese foreign trade (special trade):  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports from the FRG</th>
<th>Exports to the FRG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>15,6%</td>
<td>5,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>15,7%</td>
<td>6,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>15,5%</td>
<td>6,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>15,7%</td>
<td>6,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>14,8%</td>
<td>7,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>14,4%</td>
<td>7,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>13,4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 2

FRG’s exports to Portugal and colonies in DM 1,000 (percentage of the total West German exports):  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>831,026(0.73%)</td>
<td>981,414(0.78%)</td>
<td>980,497(0.72%)</td>
<td>1,047,390(0.70%)</td>
<td>1,241,704(0.70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>132,105</td>
<td>140,162</td>
<td>155,455</td>
<td>136,055</td>
<td>160,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>96,949</td>
<td>108,442</td>
<td>115,135</td>
<td>116,504</td>
<td>193,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>5,067</td>
<td>6,271</td>
<td>6,022</td>
<td>5,145</td>
<td>4,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor, Macau</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>1,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,065,778(0.94%)</td>
<td>1,236,671(0.99%)</td>
<td>1,257,503(0.92%)</td>
<td>1,305,641(0.88%)</td>
<td>1,601,791(0.90%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1111 Estatísticas do Comércio Externo (INE)  
APPENDIX 3

FRG’s imports from Portugal and colonies in DM 1,000 (percentage of the total West German imports): 1113

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>256,761</td>
<td>270,638</td>
<td>262,037</td>
<td>313,799</td>
<td>415,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26%)</td>
<td>(0.25%)</td>
<td>(0.22%)</td>
<td>(0.24%)</td>
<td>(0.29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>158,602</td>
<td>133,897</td>
<td>79,400</td>
<td>100,448</td>
<td>142,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>26,276</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>35,145</td>
<td>42,868</td>
<td>69,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-</td>
<td>5,521</td>
<td>6,278</td>
<td>2,397</td>
<td>2,236</td>
<td>3,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bissau, Cape</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Verde, São</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tomé and</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Principe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor,</td>
<td>47,587</td>
<td>39,033</td>
<td>49,221</td>
<td>44,737</td>
<td>52,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macau</td>
<td>(0.50%)</td>
<td>(0.41%)</td>
<td>(0.36%)</td>
<td>(0.39%)</td>
<td>(0.47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>494,747</td>
<td>451,866</td>
<td>428,200</td>
<td>504,088</td>
<td>683,508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex 3

Notable Actors

Adenauer, Konrad *(CDU)* – Chancellor of West Germany (1949-1963)


Becker, Herbert – President of the German Delegation to the GPMMC (1960-1970)

Berkhan, Willi *(SPD)* – Parliamentary State Secretary of the *BMVg* (1969-1975)

Böhrnstein, Ulrich *(SPD)* – Political Director of the *BMZ* (1968-1974)

Bothmer, Lenelotte von *(SPD)* – Member of Parliament for the *SPD* (1969-1980), Member of the *AGM-Komitee* (1971-1975), Member of the Board of the German African Society (1972-1975)


Cruz, João Carlos Lopes Cardoso de Freitas – Portuguese Ambassador in the FRG (1971-1973)


Eger, Wolfgang – Head of the Sub-Saharan Africa Department\textsuperscript{1114} at the AA (1970-1975)


Eppler, Erhard (SPD) – Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation (1968-1974)


Fingerhut, Helmut – Undersecretary of State of the BMVg (1972-1978)

Fischer, Per – Head of the Chancellery’s Department for Foreign Affairs (1969-1972), Head of the Chancellery’s Section for Foreign Affairs\textsuperscript{1115} (1972-1974)


Hansen, Niels – Head of the Northern Mediterranean Department at the AA (1968-1970)


Kiesinger, Kurt Georg (CDU) – Chancellor of West Germany (1966-1969)

Kühn, Heinz (SPD) – Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia (1966-1978), Vice-President of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (1970-1983)


Leite, José Pedro Pinto (Count Olivaes) – President of CCILA (1969-1970)

Maier-Oswald, Peter – First Secretary of the Sub-Saharan Africa Department at the AA (1969-1972)

\textsuperscript{1114} In 1972, the name changes into East and Southern Africa Department

\textsuperscript{1115} Full title: Section for Foreign and Inter-German Relations, External Security

Matthöfer, Hans Hermann (SPD) – Member of Parliament for the SPD (1961-1987), Member of the AGM-Komitee (1971-1975), Parliamentary State Secretary of the BMZ (1972-1974), Member of the SPD’s Executive (1973-1984)

Mello, Manuel da Cunha Pimentel Homem de – Portuguese Ambassador in the FRG (1964-1971)

Moersch, Karl (FDP) – Parliamentary State Secretary of the AA (1970-1973)

Müller-Rorschach, Herbert – German Ambassador in Portugal (1966-1969)

Neves, Mário – Director-General of AIP (1948-1972)


Nyerere, Julius – President of Tanzania (1961-1985)


Pereira, Vasco Luís Caldeira Futscher – Portuguese Ambassador in the FRG (1973-1974)


Pompidou, Georges – President of France (1969-1974)

Rebelo, Horácio José de Sá Viana (General) – Portuguese Minister for Defence (1968-1973)

Ruet, Hans Helmuth – Political Director of the AA (1967-1970); German Ambassador in France (1970-1972)

Salazar, António de Oliveira – President of the Council of Ministers (Prime-Minister) of Portugal (1932-1968)

Sannes, Carl-Werner – Head of Department at the Chancellery (1969-1970); Head of Chancellery’s Section for Foreign Affairs (1970-1972); Political Director of the Chancellery (1973-1977)
Santos, António Augusto dos (General) – President of the Portuguese Delegation to the GPMMC (1973-1974)


Silva, Armando Júlio de Roboredo (Vice-Admiral) – President of the Portuguese Delegation to the GPMMC (1970-1973)

Soares, Mário Alberto Nobre Poacher – Founding member of the ASP (1964-1973), Secretary-General of the PS (1973-1986)


Uva, Joaquim de Sousa (Vice-Admiral) – President of the Portuguese Delegation to the GPMMC (1960-1970)

Well, Günther van – Head of the Political Section of the AA (1971-1972), Political Director of the AA (1972-1977)

Wetzel, Günter (SPD) – Undersecretary of State of the BMVg (1971-1972)

Wirmer, Ernst – Head of Department (Ministerialrat) of Administrative Affairs at the BMVg (1965-1975), President of the German Delegation to the GPMMC (1970-1975)

Wischnewski, Hans-Jürgen (SPD) – Member of Parliament for the SPD (1957-1990), Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation (1966-1968), Member of the SPD’s Executive (1970-1985), Member of the Board of the German African Society (1972-1975)
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Willy-Brandt-Archiv im Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn (AdsD/WBA)

Portugal

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Arquivo Histórico Diplomático do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisbon (AHD-MNE)
Arquivo Histórico da Força Aérea, Alfragide (AHFA)
Arquivo Histórico Militar, Lisbon (AHM)
Arquivo Marcello Caetano, Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais, Torre do Tombo, Lisbon (IAN/TT/AMC)
Arquivo Oliveira Salazar, Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais, Torre do Tombo, Lisbon (IAN/TT/AOS)
Centro de Intervenção para o Desenvolvimento Amílcar Cabral, Lisbon (CIDAC)

**France**

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**United Kingdom**

National Archives, London (TNA)

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