Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio in the 1990s.
‘Coopetition’ in post-Cold War Italian foreign policy?

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A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, May 2017
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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I declare that my thesis consists of 76,492 words.
Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to explore a specific feature of post-Cold War Italian foreign policy, throwing light from a perspective blending Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and other International Relations (IR) insights, on the interactions occurred in the 1990s between the Italian state institutions and the Community of Sant’Egidio (CSE), a Catholic lay organisation, one of the most influential non-governmental organisations (NGOs) based in Italy, with a remarkable level of international activity. Firstly, this work offers a detailed account of the Italian “Foreign Policy Community” (Santoro 1991; Hilsman 1967 and 1993) and of the Community of Sant’Egidio, taking into consideration the international and domestic changes occurred after the demise of the Cold War, in order to understand where for foreign policy governmental actors and a non state actor (NSA) such as Sant’Egidio fit within the bigger picture of the foreign policy process in Italy. This mapping exercise demonstrates that the country’s foreign policy setting is rather fragmented, featuring a) centres of power and influence scattered along different “rings”, according to the different issues and sub-policies at stake, on a case-by-case basis; and b) an institutional “inner ring” with a relatively high number of “access points” for external actors, i.e. a proactive NGO such as Sant’Egidio, which is located in the “second ring”.

Secondly, after identifying slowly emerging “policy subsystems” (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001) in the specific foreign policy subfields of a) preventive diplomacy/crisis management and b) peace-making, in which the Italian governmental foreign policy machinery and the Community are among the extremely small number of actors playing a role and enjoying a certain degree of policy autonomy, this thesis focuses on these two foreign policy areas, in order to try to understand how relations unfolded between the two actors in the cases of the Algerian crisis of 1994-1998 and of the Mozambican peace process of 1990-1992.

The examination of these events has showed both competitive (even conflicting) and cooperative relations, respectively on the Algerian dossier and in the Mozambican case. This thesis argues therefore that “coopetition”, a concept borrowed from literature on regulatory theory, and defined as “a flexible mix of competition and cooperation between governmental and non-governmental actors” (Esty and Geradin 2000), is – with some modifications – possibly the most accurate definition to capture the nature of interactions analysed.
Acknowledgements

I would never have imagined to try to enter the final stage of my doctorate without the constant encouragement of my supervisor, Professor Chris Alden. I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to him: I think he believed in me, in this enterprise and in this topic much more than myself, especially after the unexpected evolutions of my professional career outside the academia, occurred right in the middle of this long journey, started to seriously discourage me from carrying on.

I am grateful to the institutions that have financially supported the first part of my PhD studies (LSE, Inpdap). Special thanks go to my family, close friends and colleagues inside and outside the LSE: they have all shared with me the enormous challenges of this invaluable but very demanding experience.
To G.,
who left us
all too soon
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A slowly emerging policy subsystem in peace-making?

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Algerian Armée islamique du salut (Islamic Salvation Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVSI</td>
<td>Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale (International Service Volunteers Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CeSPI</td>
<td>Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (Centre for Studies on International Politics)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIRCaP/LAPS</td>
<td>Centro Interdipartimentale di Ricerca sul Cambiamento POLITICO/Laboratorio Analisi Politiche e Sociali (Centre for the Study of Political Change/Laboratory on Social and Political Analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSE</td>
<td>Community of Sant'Egidio</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>United States Energy Information Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENEL</td>
<td>Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica (National Corporation for Electricity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENI</td>
<td>Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (National Corporation for Hydrocarbons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIAT</td>
<td>Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino (Italian Automotive Corporation Turin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td><em>Front Islamique du Salut</em> (Algerian Islamic Salvation Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCSIV</td>
<td>Federazione Organismi Cristiani di Servizio Internazionale Volontario (Federation of International Volunteering Service Christian organisations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFS</td>
<td>Algerian Socialist Forces Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<td>FPC</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Front for Democracy in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group of Algeria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>General Peace Agreement (Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAI</td>
<td>Istituto Affari Internazionali (International Affairs Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPALMO</td>
<td>Istituto per le Relazioni tra l'Italia e i paesi dell'Africa, America Latina, Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Institute for Italy’s relations with African, Latin American, Middle and Far Eastern countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPRA</td>
<td>International Association for Peace Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISPI</td>
<td>Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (Institute for International Politics Studies)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMC</td>
<td>Contemporary Muslim Algeria (JMC)</td>
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<td>JVC</td>
<td>Joint Verification Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>LADH</td>
<td>Algerian League for Human Rights (League Algérienne pour la Defense de Droites de l'Homme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Algeria (Mouvement pour la démocratie en Algérie)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Development</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy and Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of European Parliament</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPWJ</td>
<td>No Peace Without Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>Non state actor</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>Opération des Nations Unies au Mozambique (United Nations Operation in Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCM</td>
<td>Presidency of the Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIO</td>
<td>Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Algerian Workers Party (Parti des Travailleurs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAI</td>
<td>Radiotelevisione Italiana (Italian Radio and TV Corporation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (National Resistance of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGSR</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIMEST</td>
<td>Società Italiana per le Imprese all'Estero (Italian Society for Companies Abroad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>Transnational actor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIL II</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>URNG</td>
<td>Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity)</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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Introduction

The international activism of the Community of Sant’Egidio¹, a lay Catholic-oriented non governmental organization (NGO) based in Italy, in the post-Cold War era is rather often reported in the news. In certain cases, it has been argued that the Community ‘was making foreign policy instead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, acting ‘on behalf of’ or anyway more rapidly and effectively than it, while on other occasions it seemed to play a more assertive role behind the scenes. The foreign policy areas in which this NGO is particularly proactive are preventive diplomacy and crisis management, peace-making, humanitarian emergencies and human rights advocacy, development cooperation.

A significant number of scholars in the academic literature have suggested that the Community both carries out a host of autonomous initiatives on the international scene and, more specifically, plays a important role in Italian foreign policy, on different issues and in different stages of the foreign policy process (Hume 1994; Ferraris 1996; Dottori 1997; Ajello 1999 and 2010; Bartoli 1999; Romano 2002; Berridge 2005; Hill 2003 and 2015; Roberts 2009; Carbone 2011; Carbone, Coralluzzo, Del Sarto and Tocci 2011). But what is the actual role of the Community and the scope of the international activities of this non state actor? Does the Community interact with the Italian foreign policy institutional apparatus? Does Italy informally or accidentally ‘delegate’ some classic state foreign policy activities to this proactive NGOs? Or do these relations unfold in different ways? Are such interactions cooperative or competitive and why?

The goal of this thesis is to shed light on a specific aspect of post-1989 Italian foreign policy, combining different insights from International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). In greater detail, the aim is to try to understand what type of relations – and why – have developed in the 1990s between the Italian state foreign policy institutions and the Community of Sant’Egidio. To this end, I have analysed the two foreign policy cases in which both of them, at the same time, played the most significant role: the Algerian crisis (1994-1998) and the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992).

¹ In Italian “Comunità di Sant’Egidio”; “Community of Sant’Egidio” is the English translation commonly used by the organisation itself in their publications and on their website.
Plan of the thesis

Part I of the thesis is aimed at placing the thesis in the context of the wider, relevant literature, presenting research questions and the analytical framework, addressing methodological concerns and mapping the object of inquiry.

In Chapter 1, in particular, after explaining the reasons for focusing on Italian foreign policy, the research questions underpinning this work and methodological issues, a review is offered of the existing International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis literature on non state actors (NSAs) and NGOs and their role in the context of foreign policy of states, in order to understand where this thesis fits into the academic literature. In addition, I clarify the analytical framework of this work, including definitions of the objects of inquiry, tools used to analyse the interactions between Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio, and the criteria for selecting the cases of the Algerian crisis (1994-1998) and the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992). Finally, the Chapter illustrates the contribution of this thesis to the existing research.

Chapter 2 offers firstly a discussion on the main features of the belated and slow process of establishment of the discipline of International Relations in Italy, in order to shed light on the neglected history of this research field in the country, and try to understand the effects of this state of affairs on the study of Italian foreign policy, as well as on foreign policy itself, to a lesser extent. Secondly, I present a brief overview of the literature (International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, Political Science and History, to some extent) produced on Italian foreign policy after the Second World War, focusing on works specifically dedicated to the post-1989 period, where possible. Thirdly, this Chapter shows the gaps in the literature on Italian foreign policy and explains the contribution of this thesis, placing it in the broader picture of the works produced on this topic. In closing, I try to sum up the basic features of Italian foreign policy between 1989 and 2001, in particular in the subfields (‘sub-policies’) of preventive diplomacy/crisis management and peace-making.
Chapter 3 is focused on mapping the landscape where the interactions between Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio take place. In greater detail, the Chapter offers a brief assessment of the Italian Foreign Policy Community, starting from the model first developed by Hilsman (1971, 1987 and 1993), and then modified in part and applied by Santoro (1990 and 1991) to the Italian case, in the time frame going from 1861 to 1989. The goal of this Chapter is twofold: firstly, it tries to place foreign policy state actors and non-state actors in the broader framework of the Italian Foreign Policy Community and process; secondly, it aims at offering a first, preliminary attempt to build on the illustration of the Italian Foreign Policy Community presented by Santoro twenty-five years ago, of course in a much less ambitious way, and to update it in the light of changes occurred over the last twenty years. At the end of the Chapter, some preliminary remarks are offered on where the internationally active NGO Sant’Egidio and other similar NGOs operate, and on the state branches and other non state actors they appear to engage the most with.

Chapter 4 offers a brief account of the establishment, structure, functioning, and international activities of the Community of Sant’Egidio. Firstly, it looks at the historical, political and cultural milieu the CSE originated from, at the end of the 1960s. Secondly, it elucidates the main activities conducted from its inception to the end of the Cold War in the religious, social and voluntary work fields. Thirdly, the chapter evaluates the projects of the Community in the international arena after 1989, especially in the subfields of preventive diplomacy/conflict resolution and peace-making, trying to look at how it has worked – particularly when also Italian government institutions were involved – in what areas of the world, and with what results. Fourth, some remarks are offered on the inner workings of the CSE and on its main leaders from the 1990s to present day. In closing, some reflections are articulated on policy subsystems emerging in the subfields of preventive diplomacy/crisis management and peace-making – policy subsystems, as explained later in the thesis, are situations in which policy autonomy is enjoyed by a small number of state and non state actors in a specific policy field (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001).
In Part II of the thesis I present the empirical research conducted on two selected foreign policy cases related to Post-Cold War Italian foreign policy, and in particular to the decade of the 1990s, which are relevant to the issue of relations between Italy and Sant’Egidio: the Algerian crisis (1994-1998) and the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992). In greater detail, these two cases have been drawn from the two aforementioned foreign policy subfields, where policy subsystems are seemingly materializing in the Italian context.

Chapter 5 assesses how relations between Italian foreign policy institutional actors and the Community of Sant’Egidio developed in the case of the Algerian crisis of 1994-1998 (subfield of a) ‘preventive diplomacy’/ ‘crisis management’). First, the Chapter presents a concise account of Italian foreign policy towards Algeria from the end of the Second World War to the outbreak of the crisis in the 1990s, and on the activities conducted on and/or in the country by Sant’Egidio since its establishment. Second, it casts light on how relations have developed between the state institutions and the CSE during the different phases of the crisis. Third, it attempts to understand what type of interactions (competitive) and why the two actors set up with each other in this case, by analysing how events have unfolded in this foreign policy issue.

Chapter 6, according to a similar structure, addresses the case of relations between Italy and the Community during the Mozambican peace process of 1990-1992 (subfield of b) peace-making). First, it offers a brief summary of the basic features of Italian foreign policy towards Mozambique from the early 1970s until the launch of the peace process, and of the activities concerning the country carried out by the Community. Second, it shows how relations have unfolded between the two actors during the three main stages of the peace process. Finally, it offers an assessment of the events occurred during the Mozambican peace process, in order to understand what kind of relations (cooperative) and why have unfolded between Italian state institutions and the Community of Sant’Egidio.

In Part III, I sum up the results of the empirical research in the light of the research questions suggested at the beginning of this work, and try to evaluate
their relevance to the theoretical and empirical scholarship on the subject matter. Finally, some remarks are suggested on possible further research developments, emerged during different stages of this work.
Part I - Research outline, analytical framework, literature review and mapping of the object of inquiry
Chapter 1. Research questions, literature review, analytical framework and methodology

1.1 Chapter outline

First, this Chapter presents the reasons why I have decided to focus on Italian foreign policy, the main research question this thesis tries to address and some related ones. Second, it tackles methodological issues and third, it includes a literature review on the role of non state actors and non governmental organisations in IR and FPA literature, and on Catholic NGOs and foreign policy. Fourth, I clarify in this Chapter the analytical framework of the thesis, illustrating definitions of the objects of inquiry, insights from the literature on how relations develop between states and NGOs in foreign policy, tools used to assess the interactions between Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio, and the criteria for selecting the cases of the Algerian crisis (1994-1998) and the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992). Finally, the Chapter shows the contributions offered by this thesis to the existing literature.

1.2 Why studying post-1989 Italian foreign policy?

The decision to focus on Italian foreign policy in this thesis is based on a number of reasons:

a) the rather underdeveloped state of the art of the theoretical and empirical reflections on Italian foreign policy, especially those focusing on the period following the end of the Cold War, and in particular from an IR/FPA perspective;

b) the significant changes occurred in the external environment of Italian foreign policy during the last twenty years, which have led to the slow emergence of an increasingly assertive foreign policy, favoured by a larger room for autonomous manoeuvre cleared by the end of the bipolar confrontation between 1989 and
1991 (see for example Santoro 1991; Andreatta and Hill 2000 and 2001; Andreatta 2001b; Walston 2007; Verbeek 2009; Carbone 2011; Molinari 2000, in terms of quality journalistic analyses);

c) the importance of the domestic political crisis unfolded between 1992 and 1994 in huge sectors of Italian political parties (key actors in foreign policy, as well as in the Italian political system in general), business and society, as a consequence of a large-scale judicial inquiry into cases of widespread corruption, and of the effect on the Communist Party of the collapse of the Eastern bloc. This crisis has resulted in the introduction of some, although limited, institutional reforms and in the formation of a new party system². These changes were expected to overturn, to some extent, the tendency for Italian foreign policy to be hostage of domestic politicking and, at the same time, to open up new opportunities for other societal actors in the domain of foreign policy (see for instance IAI 1993; Hill 2003 and 2015; Brighi 2005; Carbone 2011; Pons et al. 2014)³;

d) the representativeness of Italy as a member of the group of Western European countries, which a) are part of an extensive network of regional and international institutions, and are home to societal actors involved in foreign policy; b) share some typical foreign policy objectives and predicaments of democratic regimes, particularly with reference to the use of force in the international arena (Brighi 2005: 19); c) have been conducting a more active foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.

² This crisis has brought about what has been defined the ‘Second Republic’. Although it is not used by all analysts, this definition refers to the new political system established in the first half of the 1990s, mentioned earlier in the text, in an attempt to distinguish it from the one in place from the end of the Second World War (see for example Sartori 1992; Pasquino and McCarthy 1993; Mershon and Pasquino 1995; Katz and Ignazi 1996). Moreover, the term and the classification in ‘First Republic’ (1943-1992) and ‘Second Republic’ (1992-present) is now widely accepted and used among scholars of Italian foreign policy (see for instance Coralluzzo 2000; Walston 2007).

³ The international changes and the domestic political crisis just mentioned have been also defined by international affairs analysts and experts as the two components of a “dual crisis” that has enormously affected Italian foreign policy to the same extent as its political system (see for example IAI 1993).
Reasons a), b) and c) also explain why I have decided to focus on the post-1989 time frame. In particular, the cases analysed in this work are related to the decade of the 1990s.

1.2.1 Why Italy as a single case study?

Reflecting on single-case research design, Bennett argues that “[i]diographic studies, while often disdained, may provide data for later, more theoretically oriented case studies. Also, a study of a newly defined puzzle or phenomenon might begin with a fairly open-ended effort – sometimes called ‘soaking and poking’ in the data – to generate hypotheses that can then be tested more systematically” (George and Bennett 2005: 30). I have decided to concentrate on Italy as a single case study mainly because the very underdeveloped state of the theoretical literature on Italian foreign policy, in general terms⁴, does not allow yet for “a fully comparative exercise, while it can benefit from the study of so-called ‘heuristic cases’” (Brighi 2005: 23), let alone on the specific issue of the role of the NGO Sant’Egidio and its interactions with Rome’s foreign policy. Furthermore, also the empirical analysis of specific sectors of Italian foreign policy is less advanced if compared to similar studies concerning other Western European countries.

1.3 Main research question

The main research question this thesis tries to address is the following:

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⁴ “The discussion of Italian foreign policy, academic or otherwise, is perhaps nowhere more frustrating than in Italy. To start with, the analysis of foreign policy as an academic discipline is utterly non-existent, with the result that its study is often left to historians and jurists, if not journalists or former diplomats themselves. [...] political science [...] has made virtually no contribution to the field of foreign policy analysis. Two consequences follow directly from this state of affairs: on the one hand, the tone of much of the debate is rather impressionistic; on the other, there is almost a default reliance on a ‘matter-of-fact realism’ that naturally discourages more critical engagements with the subject matter” (Brighi 2005: 20).

⁵ See Eckstein 1975: 104.
– Why were relations between the Italian state institutions and the Community of Sant’Egidio different (cooperative or competitive), in different foreign policy cases? What can explain this variation?

1.3.1 Related research questions

A number of related research questions have emerged – and have been addressed – in different phases of this work, when dealing with specific aspects. These are the following:

– What are the main features of the Italian Foreign Policy Community?

– Where in the Italian Foreign Policy Community and foreign policy process do usually interactions between the state institutions and the Community of Sant’Egidio take place?

– Are policy subsystems emerging in any Italian foreign policy subfields?

– What are the main features of these policy subsystems, if any?

1.4 Methodology

This thesis aims at offering a theoretically-informed empirical account of the subject matter. The research design I have devised for this work is qualitative. For Part I of the thesis have used mainly secondary sources, i.e. academic literature produced in the fields of International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, Political Science and History, where relevant, and contributions by experts outside the academia, and primary sources, where available, i.e. official websites and official documents. For the empirical research, covered in Part II, I have used a mix of a) (a limited number of) primary sources, that is official documents publicly available, official press statements and communiqués; b) secondary sources, i.e. works published by academic scholars, think tank analysts,
practitioners and journalists\textsuperscript{6}. The methods and techniques I have employed are the following:

– process-tracing\textsuperscript{7}: micro and medium level of analysis to observe the behaviour of such actors in the cases of interest and to explore the nature of relations and/or possible causal mechanisms connecting the actions performed by the two actors, namely the Italian state institutions and Sant’Egidio;

- ‘attributed influence’ (March 1995)\textsuperscript{8}: study of actors’ perceptions of influence by analysing self-, peer- and expert-assessments in order to identify different channels of influence;

- interviews: unstructured élite interviews\textsuperscript{9} with retired diplomats, experts, think tanks analysts and journalists working on Italian foreign policy\textsuperscript{10}. Interviews have

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{7} Process tracing is useful for “identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context” (George and Bennett 2005: 6). It differs from historical narrative because it is aimed at transforming “a purely historical account that implies or asserts a causal sequence into an analytical explanation couched in theoretical variables that have been identified in the research design” (George and Bennett 2005: 225). By employing process-tracing “the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case. […]” (George and Bennett 2005: 176) (process verification). In addition, “[p]rocess-tracing can perform a heuristic function as well, generating new variables or hypotheses on the basis of sequences of events observed inductively in case studies” (George and Bennett 2005: 7) (process induction).
  \item \textsuperscript{8} The ‘attributed influence’ (March 1955) method consists of measuring influence on the basis of the actors’ own perceptions of their influence, the perception of other actors and the researcher’s own assessment, usually centered on secondary sources and process tracing. (Arts and Verschuren 1999).
  \item \textsuperscript{9} “Elite interviewing is characterized by a situation in which the balance is in favour of the respondent” (Burnham et al. 2004: 205), “and this can lead to additional challenges in gaining access and the respondents’ tendency to seek to control the agenda” (Burnham et al. 2004; Bygnes 2008), both quoted in Morris 2009: 209.
  \item \textsuperscript{10} During the very first phase, interviewees have been selected through purposive sampling, based on the author’s knowledge and on a preliminary assessment of available documents and sources.
\end{itemize}
been conducted in the interviewees’ and author’s mother tongue (Italian). Most people interviewed have preferred not to be cited here for anonymity reasons.

1.5 Literature review

1.5.1 Non State Actors in International Relations

Non State Actors (NSAs) matter in international relations. NSAs as an object of inquiry have received initial attention from International Relations scholars during the early 1970s, before being pushed again to the background until the end of the Cold War, to the advantage of the state-centred approaches dominating the academic scene. Slightly preceded by an article written by Kaiser (1971), one of the first major works in the field of NSAs – *Transnational Relations and World Politics* – has been published in 1972 by Kehoane and Nye. They feature among the first scholars who have stressed the need for rethinking the state-centric paradigm of IR. In this work they have defined the concept of ‘transnational interaction’ as “the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government” (1971: 332), and that of ‘transnational relations’ as consisting in “contacts, coalitions and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government” (1971: xi). Resting upon different cases studies (foundations, multinational companies, churches, revolutionary movements, labour unions and scientific networks), the authors have stressed the importance of NSAs in a growing number of subfields of international politics. One should not consider the nation-state as the only relevant actor in world politics nor the “gatekeeper between intra-societal and extra-societal flows of actions” (1971: 722-3). In their conclusion Kehoane and Nye have proposed a path for future research based on a plurality of actors, “to transcend the level of analysis [...] by broadening the conception of actors to include transnational actors and by conceptually breaking down the hard shell of the nation-state” (1971: 730).

By considering the state as the all-powerful, most important actor in international politics, realist and neo-realist approaches – the latter probably being the most
prominent school of thought in IR in the 1980s and the 1990s – have always dismissed the relevance of NSAs as such, let alone their theoretical importance. The role of NSAs in the collapse of the former Soviet bloc, during the last part of the Cold War, has promoted a renewed interest in the study of NSAs. Scholars have thus attempted to go beyond the ‘black box’ – to cite a popular quote in IR and FPA – of the state. Different streams of literature have since then challenged realist and neorealist strongholds in different ways. For example, neo-liberal institutionalists have stressed the need for analysing international institutions, while not rejecting the idea of states as the most important actors. Transnationalists have placed a special emphasis on the role of transnational networks and NSAs, downplaying at the same time the role of states (see, for example, among the most recent works, Weenink 2001; Arts and Van Roozendal 1999). Weenink (2001), for instance, has challenged the very Waltz’s neo-realist assumptions on the irrelevance of NSAs (Waltz 1979), from both a theoretical and methodological perspective, up to the point that “any actor can be considered relevant theoretically, however ‘unimportant’ they might be empirically”. “The fact that ‘the lion is the king of the jungle’ does not stop biologists from studying frogs”. For an actor being relevant in the light of the question one attempts to answer, “the choice of this actor or that one is methodological in nature”. However, the same author – consistently with his ultimate claim that NSAs do not really pose a serious threat to the state as the basic unit of analysis in international politics – warns, on the other hand, of the risk of being too empirical in nature that is associated with most transnationalist arguments (Weenink 2001: 5, 80 and 90).

On the relations between the state and NSAs, in Bringing Transnational Relations back in. Non-state actors, Domestic structures, and International institutions (1995), Risse-Kappen has argued that “[c]onfusing the impact of transnational relations on world politics with a ‘society-dominated’ view of international relations leads one to overlook the more interesting question of how inter-state and transnational relations interact. One does not have to do away with the state to establish the influence of transnational relations in world politics” (1995: 15).

In a book published in 2001, Non-state actors in world politics, Josselyn and Wallace have suggested the definition of Non State Actors used in this thesis.
According to these scholars, NSAs are organizations “largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control [...]”, operating as or participating in networks which extend across the boundaries of two or more states, thus engaging in ‘transnational’ relations [...] [and] acting in ways which affect political outcomes, either within one or more states or within international institutions” (Josselyn and Wallace, 2001: 3-4).

On the one hand, the question of autonomy of NSAs deserves close attention. The complexity of the real world does not allow for a clear-cut opposition between states and NSAs, public and private; the picture is much more nuanced, with several overlapping areas. Therefore, defining NSAs only according to their autonomy and independence from the states would be oversimplified and misleading (this point in fact is made also by Josselyn and Wallace 2001). It is worth recalling here the issue of the alleged independence of certain NSAs raised by Halliday. Providing a brilliant example – “was Christopher Columbus a Genoese non state actor or an agent of the Spanish state?” – he has stressed that in some cases NSAs, especially many NGOs, are so close to the state that can be considered as “contractors for states” (Halliday 2001: 26).

On the other hand, too broad definitions risk of becoming extremely vague. For instance, with reference to the German case, Le Gloannec et al. have opted for a rather broad definition of NSAs which brings into even sub-national regional units (Länder) and political party foundations, both of which seem not to be consistent with the most common accounts of what NSAs are in terms of legal status and funding, above all (see, for example, Risse-Kappen 1995; Josselyn and Wallace 2001: 3-4). Following this line of reasoning, some authors have gone even further, arguing that the very label ‘non-state actor’ may not be the correct one, the most appropriate probably being ‘actors outside central government’ (Jeffery 2007: 4 specifically on the case of German Länder; on the German political foundations active abroad see also Poppen 2007). In all probability, such a comprehensive definition goes too far from the intentions of the author and the scope of this thesis.

In Non-State Actors in International Relations (2001), the editors Arts, Noortmann and Reinalda have offered an interdisciplinary, wide-ranging outlook of NSAs, benefiting from political science/international relations, policy studies and international law perspectives. The authors have argued that NSAs are
relevant because they both directly influence international relations (‘strategic mattering’, on processes and/or outcomes) and have become institutionalised in international political, legal and policy settings (‘institutional mattering’). In the opening Chapter the scholars have effectively illustrated three main reasons why NSAs matter: 1) they have information and expertise useful for states; 2) they exert influence on political discourse, agenda setting, law making and decision making, as well as they play a public role in implementation procedures; 3) they are part of political, policy and institutional arrangements in the international system (2001: 3).

**Non State Actors and (‘their’) state.** Several works have investigated many aspects related to NSAs, e.g.: ethical problems, lack of democracy, autonomy. Not surprisingly, most scholars – especially the first generations, but not only (see for example Alston 2005) – have defined NSAs in contrast to the state. Furthermore, authors generally tend to stress the extreme diversity and the lack of homogeneity of the galaxy of NSAs, in terms of their nature, organization, functions and funding, but they appear to have paid considerably little attention to a crucial aspect, that is the diversity of patterns of relations with states. By ‘patterns of relations’ I mean here the “ways [NSAs] are integrated in national frameworks and in international networks, and the ways they interact with other non-state and state actors” (Le Gloannec 2007: 1).

Some specific patterns have been certainly investigated, yet they seem to concern mostly the dynamics of NSAs challenging and contesting the states activity, according to a confrontational logic. Other patterns, such as cooperative relations, have instead received less attention from the scholars, even with reference to the relations between NSAs and their state of origin11 – although,

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11 I am certainly aware that the link NSAs/‘their’ state is not always relevant when considering every single type of non state actor, this being in fact one of the reasons why this work does not intend focus on a comprehensive and exhaustive list of all the different NSAs a government cooperates with, when conducting its foreign policy. Let alone this is an attempt to overstretching the concepts of cooperative relations in a way somehow suggested by some authors. According to these scholars, even in the specific case of NSAs embedded in a transnational world since the very beginning (e.g.: on the one hand certain epistemic communities or advocacy coalitions, on the other one illegal traffics organizations), one may argue that the country of origin is a key element to assess them (see for instance Le Gloannec (ed.) 2007). Nevertheless, I believe that also the issue of non conflicting patterns of relations between NSAs and ‘their’ state deserves closer attention.
after all, “not all NSAs are engaged primarily in a world-wide dimension which transcends all borders” (Le Gloannec 2007: 3).

Diplomacy studies scholars – particularly from post-globalist perspectives – have paid some attention to non conflicting patterns of relations between governments and NSAs, when dealing with the transformations of diplomacy (Hemmati 2002; Langhorne 2005 and 2007; Cooper et al. 2008; Khagram 2006; Murray 2008). One pattern focuses on the ‘supportive role’ NSAs, mainly NGOs, play as intermediaries in peacebuilding and peace-maintenance activities, especially in the field of international development. Another mode of interaction is that of ‘joint-management’, in which NSAs engage with states through partnerships or cooperative arrangements with different degrees of institutionalization, as it is the case with the management of humanitarian emergencies assistance (Cooper and Hocking 2000; Hocking 2004 and 2011).

Going beyond the field of diplomacy studies, other scholars working on non competitive patterns of relations between governments and NSAs have focused mainly on international development aid (see, for example, Hulme et al. 1997; Tvedt 1998; Smillie 1999; Reimann 2000) and humanitarian emergencies (see, for instance, Goodhand 2006; Stoddard 2006; Mingst 2008), then followed by preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding (see, for example, Gerstbauer 2005; Krahmann 2005; Richmond and Carey 2005). More ‘classic’ diplomatic activities, such as international crisis/conflict resolution (peace-making activities such as provision of good offices, mediation and negotiation), traditionally conducted by states, have been less examined.

At any rate, the studies mentioned so far have not looked specifically at NSAs as entities based in a specific state, with the implications this may have for their interactions with the state of origin and its foreign policy. As far as the relations between NSAs and ‘their’ state are concerned, very little attention has been paid to them in the literature. The book edited by Le Gloannec (2007) on the case of Germany and mentioned before is among the few significant exceptions. Building on the definition proposed by this scholar, what I mean here by ‘their’ state is the state where NSAs are originally embedded, have their headquarters and their ‘constituencies’ of supporters among the general public, and with whose
institutions, social fabric and culture enjoy particular relations. Furthermore, another interesting feature to take into account is the institutionalized, physical presence of branches and subsidiaries of a NSA\textsuperscript{12} based in one country in a second country, which is relevant to the foreign policy of the former, that is the ‘host’ state (Gardner Feldman 2007: 16).

Another exception, illuminating the patterns of interaction between the state and the NSA based in its territory, is the work of Tvedt on NGOs in Norway. He has argued that in the case of Norway, functionalist theories do not carefully account for the long history and growth of NGOs in the foreign aid field, as they “cannot meaningfully be explained as the result of an adaptive response from society or groups in society to market or state failures, or as a functional response to social diversity, or as innovative response on the part of the society to novel problems” (Tvedt 1998: 53). Such functionalist theoretical approaches, however, may prove useful in some countries and for some issue-areas, but provide little insight for assessing NGOs in contexts which are similar to the Italian one. The explosion of the number of NGOs in Norway has indeed been deliberately boosted by government decisions and initiatives (Tvedt 1998: 53), a phenomenon that has not occurred in all European/Western countries.

1.5.2 State and Non State Actors (NSAs) in Foreign Policy Analysis

**Problematizing the state.** Quite paradoxically, FPA scholarship has not developed a clear-cut conception of the state, although it has extensively contributed to the unfolding of what realists considered as a ‘black box’. The state has been considered indeed as the sum of its human or bureaucratic parts, an arena or the sum of external and domestic pressure; it has not been systematically defined as an actor. This failure has undermined the intellectual gains of the middle-range FPA theories with epistemological, ontological and conceptual/analytical problems: to provide an example which is particularly relevant to this work, “FPA recognizes that the state enjoys a degree of autonomy from the society it rules and external actors. However, since the concept of state

\textsuperscript{12} For the sake of accuracy, the author uses the term ‘Transnational Actor’ (TNA).
is not explicitly developed, this autonomy cannot be discussed in either conceptual or analytical terms” (Alden and Aran 2011: 9-10 and 62-77). This problem is all the more evident when assessing the interactions of the state with NSAs rooted in its society.

“Foreign policy begins at home”\textsuperscript{13}. **NSAs as domestic sources of foreign policy.** With the exception of some strands of the “domestic structure approach” (see for example Risse-Kappen and Muller 1993; Hill 2000) and of certain pluralist accounts, most Foreign Policy Analysis scholars seem to have rather neglected the role of NSAs in foreign policy formulation and implementation\textsuperscript{14}. According to Verbeek and van Ufford, the main reason for the lack of studies on this topic is the inappropriateness of the analytical frameworks available to the discipline, which do not facilitate the accumulation and consolidation of knowledge in the field. The authors have identified four main drawbacks of FPA scholarship in dealing with NSAs: 1) the focus limited to traditional issues, mainly trade and security, with little attention to areas such as development aid, human rights and social policies; 2) the idea that power in foreign policy making still remains exclusively with state officials, such as politicians and civil servants; 3) the emphasis on major decisions and crisis situations instead of routine daily policy making; 4) the basic idea that foreign policy is conducted only by the state, therefore assuming that NSAs could not play any role in implementing foreign policy. Resting upon these arguments, indeed, FPA students have often left NSAs out or on the margins of the big picture of state-centred foreign policy. (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001: 127-130). All these assumptions seem relevant to this thesis, especially points number 2), on the argument that some form of power is today enjoyed in the realm of foreign policy also by actors operating outside the state machinery, and number 4), on the

\textsuperscript{13} This is the title of a book on U.S. foreign policy written in 1944 by James P. Warburg.

\textsuperscript{14} Perhaps surprisingly, Foreign Policy Analysis has paid very little attention to policy implementation in general. After the seminal work on this topic by Smith and Clarke (1984), this stage of the foreign policy process has been substantially dismissed, despite the well-established argument of the importance of bureaucratic impact on policy (Stern and Verbeek 1998: 208). Among the exceptions there are some works more focused on military aspects and Brighi and Hill (2008).
importance of the role of NSAs in foreign policy implementation. The authors have then gone further, introducing and applying (with reference to Dutch foreign policy) a policy subsystem theoretical framework\textsuperscript{15} to be used in Foreign Policy Analysis. This is one of the analytical tools I have tried to use in this work (see following sections).

The domestic domain is populated with a variety of actors, which can be conceptualized in terms of concentric circles, introduced for the first time by Hilsman (1971, 1987 and 1993)\textsuperscript{16} with reference to foreign policy making. At the heart of the system lies the government executive, while moving towards domestic society there are further circles of actors and activity for intra-governmental politics, competing elites, bureaucratic interests, parliaments, and then public opinion, pressure and interest groups, media, etc. (Hill 2003: 223). It is precisely in one of the peripheral circles where one can find NGOs. This model has been used in this thesis to map the Italian Foreign Policy Community (see later in the text).

1.5.3 Catholic NGOs and foreign policy

Most academic studies focus on the role of religion in world politics, rather than on the specific issue of Christian NGOs – let alone Catholic ones. Another common example of a topic explored by scholars is provided by the studies on the Roman Catholic Church as both one of the oldest transnational religious actors, with its increasingly decentralised network spreading in civil society, and a state-actor internationally recognized as a participant of international forums, i.e. the Vatican City State, from 1929 (Vallier 1972; Hanson 1987; Kent and Pollard 1994; Reese 1996; Casanova 1997; Rudolph 1997; Haynes 2001; Ryall 2001; Alvarez 2002; Böllmann 2010; Graziano 2010; Madeley and Haynes 2011).

On the contrary, religious NGOs have drawn less attention (Jeavons 1994). As pointed out by Tvedt, who has authored some of the few works on this topic, “[m]any NGOs, especially in certain regions and in some countries, are mission

\textsuperscript{15} For its use in FPA see also Stern and Verbeek 1998.

\textsuperscript{16} Hilsman’s concentric circles model of foreign policy making draws in turn on Almond’s account of public opinion and foreign policy (1950).
organizations, both Christian and Muslim, although literature tends to ignore this fact” and not to consider them as proper NGOs as they are involved with spiritual matters (Tvedt 1998: 216). The writer has added also that “[...] it is important to underline that the grand era of Western missions in terms of activities of missionaries was not in the last century or during colonial times. It is now, during the era of development aid in the period after World War II” (Tvedt 1998: 217). Assessments of internationally active Catholic NGOs in general, and of their relations with the foreign policy of the states they are based in (often Catholic majority countries), in particular, are therefore still missing in the literature.

1.6 Analytical framework

1.6.1 Definitions of the objects of inquiry

In the following section I briefly present the conceptual definitions employed in the thesis and a description of the object of inquiry.

**Foreign policy.** It is “the sum of total decisions made on behalf of a given political unit (usually a state) entailing the implementation of goals with direct reference to its external environment. Foreign policy inputs are those many factors that influence foreign policy decision-making, whilst the observable outputs of foreign policy are a feature of the state (and non-state) behaviour within the international system” (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne 2008: 392). In this thesis I consider preventive diplomacy/crisis management and peace-making as as different areas (‘sub-policies’) of foreign policy. Other subfields in which both Italy and Sant’Egidio have worked after 1989 are development aid (also known as foreign aid in the literature and in the practitioners’ jargon), humanitarian emergencies and human rights advocacy.

**Preventive diplomacy/crisis management.** Academic literature on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace processes has flourished since the
1960s, triggered by the work of its ‘founding father’, Johan Galtung\textsuperscript{17}, and by the articles published on the ‘Journal of Peace Research’, which he founded in 1964\textsuperscript{18}. Over the decades, the growing scholarly interest in how to prevent and end different types of conflicts, involving all kinds of actors, has led to the establishment of an autonomous field of social science called ‘peace studies’ or ‘peace and conflict studies’ (for an assessment of the state of the art of the discipline, see for instance Webel and Galtung 2007). Peace studies have contributed a substantive body of work on the definition and the different facets of preventive diplomacy and peace-making (the latter being covered in the next section), but as this thesis is not focused on assessing such activities in first place (i.e.: examining their features in terms of techniques employed, their ability to deliver good results, etc.), but rather on how Italian state institutions and Sant’Egidio have interacted in a specific case in this context, in this work I will not expand on literature from this stream of research. The debate on the concepts of preventive diplomacy and peace-making is rich and interesting, but for the purpose of this work I have decided to use as a footprint the ‘official’ United Nations definitions. Most activities in these field take indeed place either with some form of UN involvement (or at least blessing), or according to principles and methods enshrined in the UN Charter or in other documents produced by the UN family organizations and bodies (Ramcharan 2008).

Therefore, ‘preventive diplomacy’ here is “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (United Nations 1992: 20). “While it is conducted in different forms and forums, both public and private, the most common expression of preventive diplomacy is found in the work of diplomatic envoys dispatched to crisis areas to encourage dialogue, compromise and the peaceful resolution of tensions [...]” (United Nations - Department of Political Affairs: 2016). Because it has not always been easy to draw lines between the different types of activities performed by both Italy and the Community of

\textsuperscript{17} Galtung’s production (books, book Chapters, articles, etc.) is so huge that an overview here would go well beyond the scope of this section. For a comprehensive review of its contribution to the establishment of the peace studies academic field, see for instance Galtung 1985.

\textsuperscript{18} Galtung also established the Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in Oslo in 1959 and the International Association for Peace Research (IPRA) in 1964.
Sant’Egidio, I have decided to adopt an extensive interpretation of the concept, covering also more ‘classic’ diplomacy tools such as official visits (both high and low level), economic ties, or political pressure exerted through official declarations and public speeches. As such a wide-ranging interpretation verges on that of ‘crisis management’, I have decided to add the term ‘crisis management’ to that of ‘preventive diplomacy’. According to a widely known definition, ‘crisis management’ is considered in this thesis as “[t]he conduct of a crisis by diplomacy, normally in order to dampen it down. The term was popularized by US Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, formerly a businessman, following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962” (Berridge 2001: 56).

A further clarification is needed here. Preventive diplomacy and more ‘classic’ crisis management initiatives can sometimes overlap with peace-making efforts, as the very academic literature on conflict resolution points out. Boundaries between the two fields can be blurred at times, therefore it must be highlighted here that I have used in thesis a distinction based on the object these activities aim to have an impact on, as an operational guiding tool. On the one hand we have full blown conflicts, which peace-making activities are intended to work on; on the other, we observe politically strained situations, conflicts on the verge of breaking out and/or low-intensity unrest, which preventive diplomacy and more ‘classic’ crisis management deal with.

No specific mention of the involvement of NSAs/NGOs in preventive diplomacy and crisis management is included in the UN definition, but there is today a widespread agreement both in academia and among practitioners over the growing role and importance of such actors in these fields (for an assessment of research on this topic, see for instance Jentleson 2000; Hackett 2000; Lund 1996; Richmond and Carey 2005; Ramcharan 2008; Bartoli 2011; Stephenson 2011).

**Peace-making.** For the reasons explained in the previous section, in this thesis I have decided not to review the rich academic literature on the definition and characteristics of peace-making and preventive diplomacy/crisis management. To mention just an example of an overview of the academic field defined as ‘peace studies’ or ‘peace and conflict studies’, I refer again to Webel and Galtung 2007. Because the majority of peace-making initiatives are carried out with the UN participation or support, to varying degrees, or following its principles, the
definition I use here as a background concept is the one suggested by the United Nations, as in the case of ‘preventive diplomacy’ (see previous section).

The UN describes ‘peace-making’ as an “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the UN, ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’” (United Nations 1992: 20). The goal of this activity is therefore “to end the violence between the contending parties. Peace-making can be done through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and international courts” (Ouellet 2003). In some cases, peace-making activities seem to overlap with preventive diplomacy efforts; this is a problem acknowledged also by the academic literature itself. For the sake of clarity, it needs to be stressed again also here in this Chapter that it is not easy to draw clear dividing lines in this domain: as a point of reference in dealing with this issue, the reader can use the distinction between fully fledged conflicts (which peace-making applies to) on the one side, and political tense situations and/or low-intensity unrest (which preventive diplomacy is concerned with) on the other.

As argued when discussing preventive diplomacy, NSAs/NGOs are not included in the UN definition of peace-making, but there is today a common understanding among both scholars and practitioners on the fact that the burgeoning role of such actors in these fields is now an established reality (for an overview of the debate on this see for example Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999; Hocking 2011; Stephenson 2011). Aall, for instance, points to the four types of activities NGOs are better suited than governmental actors to perform in peace-making processes: traditional relief tasks; human rights abuse monitoring; early warning of violent conflicts on the verge of erupting; conflict resolution activities (Aall: 1996). As in the case of preventive diplomacy, it is important to stress that this Chapter is not aimed at evaluating the characteristics of the peace-making activities described per se, their quality, or their outcome, but rather at assessing the relations between the Italian foreign policy institutions and Sant’Egidio on a given occasion.

**Foreign policy executive and the state.** Building upon Hill’s definition of ‘foreign policy executive’ (2003: 56), the foreign policy executive is meant here in principle as composed of the Prime Minister (in Italy the ‘President of the Council
of Ministers’) and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, both of which with their bureaucratic ministerial apparatus (central headquarters in Rome and relevant diplomatic representations abroad) and their external advisors, to be complemented with other Ministers and Departments (e.g.: Defence, Economic Development) and other political actors (e.g.: parliamentary committees), whereas relevant. In the cases analysed in this work, as it will be elucidated later, the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister were the most active cabinet members most of the times, because of the specific features of foreign policy decisions and activities at issue.

An important clarification is needed here. In this work I use also the expression ‘foreign policy institutional system’/’machinery’ as a less sophisticated synonym to refer to the foreign policy executive, or the more generic terms ‘state’ or ‘government’, to convey a similar meaning. Concerning the concept of ‘state’, in previous sections I have touched upon the crucial problem of the lack in Foreign Policy Analysis of a clear idea of what ‘state’ means, especially when it comes to trying to understand where to draw a line between it and the society it regulates. Although FPA does not clearly sketches out a definition of ‘state’, and therefore does not expand on the type of autonomy the state has, it acknowledges that the state does enjoy some form of autonomy (Alden and Aran 62-77). Starting from this assumption, ‘state’ is used here to refer to the set of institutions, mostly pertaining to the executive power, entrusted with an institutional mandate to conduct foreign policy in a clearly autonomous way from non state actors and other societal actors. In addition, it is interesting to take into account that in Italian the term ‘state’ (‘stato’) is commonly used, in the everyday language, to refer specifically to public institutions and public administration. Because the idea of ‘state’ is limited in this thesis only to the executive branch, the expression ‘government’ is considered as another synonym. Finally, as in title of the thesis, also the term ‘Italy’ is used here as a synonym for the aforementioned concepts.

As far as the more ‘administrative’ aspects of daily management of foreign policy are concerned, what I mean are “the continuous administrative and legal systems that attempt to structure the relationships between NGOs and public authority within the [given] field”, with a view to avoid limiting the focus only to a restrictive set of formal organizations and rules (Tvedt 1998: 95). Some of the interactions between different actors in the realm of foreign policy are indeed of
a flexible and informal nature, and this aspect is especially relevant to the events analysed in this thesis). In the cases assessed in this work, as mentioned before, due to the predominantly political nature of the events administrative structures of interest are mainly that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Non Governmental Organization (NGOs).** Following the basic categorization proposed by Willets (1982, 1997), NSAs can be divided into NGOs, business groups, political organizations, religious entities and criminal organizations. The main feature of proper NGOs is that they result from private initiatives; are public in purpose; *on principle* they act independently of governments (Reinalda 2001: 12, emphasis added). Most of the IR literature on these burgeoning actors, especially in the first years, has portrayed them as autonomous societal actors, acting as standard-bearers for the emerging ‘global civil society’. As previously mentioned with reference to NSAs in general, also in the more specific domain of NGOs the role of the state has been underestimated, notwithstanding the crucial importance of governments in fuelling the expansion of all types of new NGOs, especially during the past two decades. According to Gerstbauer (2005: 25), many authors have basically focused on the advocacy role of these organizations (Risse-Kappen 1995; Willets 1995; Weiss and Gordenker; Willetts 1982 and 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998), rather than on the role of providers of services/foreign policy actions.

The proliferation of such actors in the recent past increasingly raises several questions about the complex interaction between NGOs and states and/or international organizations. They appear to work against, but also *with* and *for* governmental actors (Weiss and Gordenker 1996: 209-210, emphasis added). NGOs with different degrees of institutionalized relations with governments may play an important role in contexts/issue areas where states cannot operate, on certain occasions compensating for governments’ shortcomings, while on others almost replacing them (Gardner Feldman 2007). NGOs explored in the academic literature are particularly those that are active as agent of the states in the fields of international development and humanitarian emergencies.

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19 An evocative image of the contemporary blossoming NGOs landscape is sketched out by West: it is “like a pyramid that has a few big multinational NGOs at the top, thousands of small local NGOs at the bottom, and a number of medium-sized NGOs in the middle” (West 2001: 217).
Internationally active national Non Governmental Organizations: such NGOs are actors, substantially rooted in the domestic societal and political system of ‘their’ state\textsuperscript{20}, which are so organised and powerful that they are able to act internationally. Nevertheless, they are not: a) included in a network of similar NGOs in other countries – this being the case of national NGOs operating across national boundaries, so acting as transnational actors; b) embedded in an International Non Governmental Organization (INGO) – this being the case of various NGOs from three or more countries with similar features and aims, establishing a mechanism for co-operation, so acting as international actors. “In international relations the term NGO mostly equates with the term of INGO” [...] but “the difference between an INGO and such a national NGO acting as an international actor is that the latter only represents its national views and preferences, while the views and preferences of the INGO are the result of compromises between its national affiliates” (Reinalda 2001: 12).

Internationally active Catholic NGOs based in Italy - The Community of Sant’Egidio. This is a composite group of NGOs based in Italy (or whose central headquarters are on Italian territory) which define themselves ‘Catholic-inspired NGOs’. Such organizations, which in principle operate largely independently from the government, feature several differences in terms of legal status, mission, structure, activities, funding, etc. but are all active both in Italy and abroad, often participating also in broader non Catholic NGOs networks. Their distinctive location between the Italian state and the Vatican, to which they are somehow bound to different degrees, adds an interesting and challenging dimension to the issue. More specifically, some of these NGOs are Catholic lay ecclesial movements and associations and are defined ‘private’ or ‘public’ according to the Code of Canon Law. Others have no formal ties with the Vatican but, of course, share with it a strong ideational common ground and take

\textsuperscript{20} As specified before, ‘their’ state is the state where NSAs are originally embedded, have their headquarters and their ‘constituencies’ of supporters among the population, and with whose institutions, social fabric and culture enjoy particular relations, and sometimes are dependent on, for some aspects.
advantage of Parish churches networks on the Italian territory. However, they are all subject to Italian law and their embeddedness in the Italian society - in other words, their ‘Italian-nes’, is rather clear. The most important NGOs in this group are: Community of Sant’Egidio (that, as it will be explained later in this thesis, was particularly active in the Mozambique’s peace process, in Algeria, in Kosovo and Albania), FOCSIV network of Catholic-inspired NGOs, AVSI (a partner of Communion and Liberation), Focolare Movement, all extensively committed to humanitarian assistance and development aid, especially in Africa and Latin America. These NGOs also enjoy full ‘access’ to funds and projects supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the Italian law on development cooperation (Law 49/1987 and now 125/2014). The reason why I have decided to focus on the Community of Sant’Egidio in this thesis is that it is undoubtedly the most prominent among Italian NGO with a clear international vocation. While arguing that in Italy “Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which in other European/Western countries, especially in the development and environment field, are very vocal, [...] have failed to make a difference, particularly in policy advocacy”, Carbone has underscored that “[t]he only exception, probably, is the Community of Sant’Egidio, which played a widely acknowledged role in Mozambique in the 1990s, but has been very active in other areas of the world, especially in the Mediterranean” (Carbone 2011: 10; see also Ferraris 1996: 478-480; Carbone, Coralluzzo et al. 2011: 202; Barbato, De Franco and Le Normand 2012). Drawing on a useful comparison, Walston has added that “[t]here is nothing based in Italy of the influence of Amnesty, Greenpeace or Médecins Sans Frontières but there is one NGO, the Community of Sant’Egidio, which has a substantial international role” (Walston 2011: 74). Also scholars in the field of diplomacy studies have underlined the energetic role of this NGO – defined by a prominent Italian journalist as the “UN of Trastevere”\(^2\), after the

\(^2\) As one of the senior members of Sant’Egidio has explicitly pointed out, the international activism of the Community “is also a product of the city in which the Community is located – Rome. In addition to being the Italian capital and typically Italian, Rome is a crossroads for international relations linked to the foreign policies and the development activities of both the Italian government and the Vatican. St. Egidio has grown and thrived in this urban context open to international relations and has been favoured by the potentialities offered by the city” (Giro 1998: 86).

\(^2\) In Italian “ONU di Trastevere” (Man: 1995).
name of the historical neighbourhood in the heart of Rome where the Community is based – when providing examples of religious bodies active in ‘track-two’ diplomacy (see for example Berridge 2005: 202; Roberts 2009: 20 and 517).

As it will be showed later in Chapter 2, it is worth noting Sant’Egidio is the most prominent of all internationally active Catholic NGO based in Italy in the literature.

As a consequence of its action in Italy and abroad, the CSE was also able, in recent times, to enter, to some extent, the political arena in Italy; this has of course further increased its embeddedness in the country.

An important clarification is needed here. The fact that the Community of Sant’Egidio features a strong Catholic orientation is not considered here as a decisive factor per se. The Catholic inspiration of Sant’Egidio, in the two cases analysed in this thesis, can be treated only as a further sign of its embeddedness in the Italian social and cultural make-up – the country has indeed a well-known history of Catholic civil society organisations. The Community cannot be oversimplified as a civil society ‘arm’ of the Vatican in the international arena, even more so taking into account the fact that their agenda and that of the Holy See has sometimes diverged (also in the Algerian case, to some extent, looking at the deterioration of Sant’Egidio’s ties with the archbishop of Algiers; see more on this in Chapter 4). Therefore, it is not possible to argue that Sant’Egidio’s Catholic principles and its official recognition by the Vatican as a ‘public lay ecclesial movement’ somehow imply that the Vatican plays a substantial role in the Community activities, that would heavily interfere also in the Italian state-NGO relations. In addition, adding the Vatican to the picture, even only to assess a possible, limited influence on these interactions, would have complicated this research excessively both from theoretical point of view and in terms of practical feasibility (on this issue see also the Implications for further research at the end of the thesis).

23 As explained in Chapters 3 and 4, the founder and senior member of the Community of Sant’Egidio, Andrea Riccardi, was appointed in November 2011 as Minister for International Cooperation and Integration in the technocratic government formed by PM Mario Monti. In addition, Mario Giro, the CSE’s board member responsible for international relations, was appointed as Undersecretary (i.e. junior Minister) for Foreign Affairs in the Enrico Letta government in April 2013 and reconfirmed in his role in the two next cabinets.
1.6.2 Relations between states and NGOs

In this section I try to sum up some basic assumptions offered in the IR and FPA literature on the relations between states and NGOs which can provide a useful background for this work. At the end of this work, such hypotheses will be tested on the findings of the two cases analysed in Part II of the thesis.

a) NGOs as interesting partners for national governments - sources of influence. NGOs have a number of influence tools at their disposal which make them attractive partners for governments. These are: a) expertise: many NGOs have more specialized knowledge on issues that a national government may have, which enables them to affect agenda setting and makes them interesting partners in the implementation of international policies; b) resources: NGOs, especially in the recent years, have been capable of attracting additional resources from international organizations and networks of private donors which governments are not always entitled to receive; c) closeness to target groups: NGOs are often in close contact with, and recruit their members from, target groups of international policies, both from their headquarters or directly in the field. In some cases NGOs benefit from an institutionalized physical presence of branches and subsidiaries in other countries (see again Gardner Feldman 2007: 16 on this point). Again, this further enhances the NGOs capacities of participating in agenda setting, formulation and implementation of policies; d) domestic political constituencies: NGOs rooted in their domestic political environment have significant chances to influence support of like-minded sections of public opinion for governmental policies and may use this potential leverage over national governments; e) access to the media: NGOs attract the attention of national and international media, which furthers their agenda-setting capacities and their leverage power over governments through domestic channels of support. (Reinalda and Verbeek 2001: 150-151).

b) National NGOs and ‘their’ state. “National NGOs will lend their national leverage to external actors if that is in their interest. Although national NGOs will seek freedom of manoeuvre, e.g. from their national governments, in order to put pressure on those governments by an international route, they will remain largely
dependent on their national governments for regulation (and also for funding, political and technical support in specific cases, added by the author)”. This is the reason why unlike International NGOs, they can therefore never fully ignore national government’s interests. (Reinalda and Verbeek 2001: 150).

c) **Collaborative model of state-NGO interactions.** “Collaborative model is most common in Western welfare states” (Kramer 1981 and Salamon 1981 quoted in Tvedt 1998: 96). According to some authors, this tendency seems to have prevailed over conflictual patterns of relations. Development aid in general is a field in which donor governments and donor NGOs increasingly collaborate and in many cases states have used NGOs to enhance foreign policy interests in other countries (Tvedt 1998: 95), while in other domains this trend is less clear.

### 1.6.3 Assessing relations between Italy and the Community of Sant'Egidio

In the following section I try to sketch out the main concepts that I have used in this research, to understand the nature of the relations between Italy and the Community of Sant'Egidio.

‘Coopetition’. This term is used in this thesis in inverted commas because, similarly to the idea of informal/accidental ‘delegation’, it is borrowed from another body of literature, namely that on regulation in domestic policies and at the international level, and it is employed here with a slightly different nuance. According to the approach that Esty and Geradin, with reference to regulatory systems, have defined as “co-opetition”, “[...] optimal governance requires a flexible mix of competition and cooperation between governmental actors, as well as between governmental and non-governmental actors” (2000: 237; mentioned also in Hocking 2011: 231). In this thesis I use this definition, deprived of the prescriptive nuance it has in the Esty and Geradin original application, and I argue that the concept of such a mix of competition and cooperation is probably the more accurate definition to capture the nature of interactions Italy has had with the Community of Sant’Egidio in the realm of foreign policy, in the cases analysed here.
Informal/accidental ‘delegation’. In the early phases of this thesis, the idea of informal/accidental ‘delegation’ emerged as the most appropriate to describe relations between Italy and Sant'Egidio. When conducting the in-depth analysis of the empirical material, however, this concept gradually lost ground in favour of that of ‘coopetition’. Nevertheless, I have decided to keep it in the set of analytical tools because when assessing the interactions between the Italian state institutions and the Community in Chapters 4 and 5, I have tried to explain also why the idea of this kind of ‘delegation’ is not the most feasible to interpret them. The concept of ‘delegation’ has been used by IR scholars with reference to international cooperation and the process of states delegating certain powers, functions and competencies to international organizations (Pollack 1997; Epstein and Halloran 1999; Hawkins et al. 2006; Koremenos 2007; Lake 2007; Bradley and Kelley 2008; Joachim et al. 2008), also discussing in some cases the limits of principal-agent theory (Moore 2004; Vaubel 2006; Tierney 2008), and providing a highly formalized quantitative index to measure delegation (Brown 2010). Green 2008 is among the few scholars who has paid attention also to NSAs, with reference to the field of multilateral environmental treaties. In the literature on delegation to international organizations, delegation is defined as “a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former. [...] [It] is limited in time or scope and must be revocable by the principal” (Hawkins et al. 2006: 7)24.

In the academic world there is no general and well-established understanding of ‘delegation’ in the domain of foreign policy other than the formal/rule-based one described above. Therefore, by informal and/or accidental ‘delegation’ I do not

24 A similar concept, that of ‘outsourcing’, has been employed in the literature with reference to the subcontracting of military services to private military companies (see, for example, Kinsey 2006; Verkuil 2007; Freeman and Minow 2009). In a work on the foreign policy of United States, Stanger (2011) extends her focus beyond the military and the homeland security domains, exploring the privatization of diplomacy. Building upon the assumptions that a) the public sector expertise does not stand as a requisite anymore in drafting and implementing foreign policy, and that b) it is impossible for the government simply to appropriate again of functions successfully outsourced by this time to NSAs as NGOs, multinational corporations, etc., the author argues that the state should make the most of this state of affairs and better understand how to manage effectively such public-private partnerships. In addition, the concept of ‘outsourcing’ to NSAs has been touched upon in the field of diplomacy studies, but no extensive and operationalized definition of the idea has been put forward, let alone tested on empirical material so far (Hocking 2011).
mean here the formal process of subcontracting public functions and/or services to one or more third-party(ies), which to a certain degree has become a rather common practice in the contemporary world of international affairs, but a sort of more informal – and in some cases accidental – ‘delegation’ to some NSAs of foreign policy formulation and implementation activities, traditionally conducted by state institutions. This is the reason why I have decided to put the word in inverted commas.

Such definition is to some extent close, although not identical, to the idea of delegation proposed by some scholars of Italian foreign policy. Romano (2002) has argued that Italy, in practice, has renounced an autonomous foreign policy by delegating major choices to NATO and the European Union. On the same note, Fossati has written that the foreign policy of Italy between the end of the Second World War and the 1980s, defined as one of ‘low profile’, has relied on a ‘double delegation’. An external one to NATO and the European Economic Community/European Union; and an internal one to the Catholic Church with its missions abroad in the field of foreign aid, and to big and medium-sized business firms in the domain of political and diplomatic support to Italian economic interests in foreign countries (Fossati 1999: 26-35; 2008). Some commentators have termed the Italian diplomatic machinery acting in such context a ‘grey area diplomacy’ (Incisa di Camerana 1996: 68; Romano 2002: 253). As far as the ‘Second Republic’ (1992-present) is concerned, Carbone has argued that “the process of delegation to major groups in foreign economic policy that

25 It is worth mentioning here that, if the idea of informal/accidental ‘delegation’ had proved to be the best concept to understand the relations between Italy and Sant’Egidio, insights from principal-agent approaches would have been used, drawn again from the literature on delegation to international organisations (without their formal, legal element also in this case), to assess the nature of the actors, reasons for delegating or not and the problems of ‘agency loss’ associated with it (especially cases of ‘agency slack’, Hawkins et al. 2006: 8).

26 In Italian ‘diplomazia sommersa’ This metaphor refers, to a certain extent, to the ideas of black market, grey area economies, although not in their illegal sense.

27 Also Panebianco has mentioned the idea of delegation, but with reference to the delegation of foreign policy from citizens to the élites (government, pressure groups and parties) during the ‘First Republic’ (1943-1992). According to the author, such delegation in the foreign policy domain was far-reaching and more extensive than the one in the realm of domestic politics, due to the low level of interest in international affairs showed by the citizens and the resulting scarce salience of foreign policy as an electoral issue (1977: 859 etc.).
characterized the first republic has continued during the second republic. Undeniably, ENI and ENEL, Finmeccanica, and FIAT\textsuperscript{28} have been able to shape decisions respectively in the energy, defence and automobile sector” (Carbone 2011: 10, emphasis in the original).

### 1.7 Case selection

A small-N comparative analysis is conducted in this thesis through a qualitative approach (see for instance Ragin 1987 and 2014). The cases of the Algerian crisis (1994-1998) and of the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992) have been chosen for two main reasons. First, they are drawn from two different foreign policy subfields in which policy subsystems seem to be slowly emerging, and shed light on different types of foreign policy activities. In other words, in the light of the assessment of Italian foreign policy after 1989, these are two domains in which, especially after the end of the Cold War, it seems that a small number of actors, state and non-state actors, enjoy some degree of policy autonomy (see more on this in the following section, where the definition of policy subsystems is presented, and in Chapter 4). Development cooperation is another subfield where a policy subsystem is emerging, maybe with an even higher degree of development and consolidation. The reason why I have decided not to cover it is that in that domain the state is so dominant that the subsystem itself could hardly exist without it: in Italy, NGOs working on development cooperation projects abroad are so dependent on institutional funding and political/technical support that they do not really enjoy proper policy autonomy. Second, after a preliminary assessment of all the occasions in which Italian state institutions and the Community of Sant’Egidio were involved in the same foreign policy matter, these two cases turned out to be not only among the most

\textsuperscript{28} ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi), national oil and gas company; formerly state-owned, now only in part (30%); ENEL (Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica): energy provider company, once a state-owned monopoly, today only partially (30%); Finmeccanica: hi-tech industrial group working in the sectors of defense, security, aerospace, transport; owned in part by the state (30%); FIAT (Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino): the biggest Italian industrial group active in the automotive sector.
significant in terms of relations between the two actors, but also to feature two rather different types of interactions.

Third, in both cases events took place approximately in the same years – the decade of the 1990s – shortly after the “dual crisis” (IAI 1993), mentioned earlier in this Chapter, i.e. the simultaneous international and domestic crises materialized between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s (see Chapter 2). These events have hugely impacted on Italian foreign policy – and the international activities of Italian non state actors – offering new opportunities for them to act in the international arena.

Fourth, none of them had been analysed before in depth in the literature, especially the Algerian case, so I believed this would be a further way to offer a contribution to the scarce literature on Italian foreign policy and Italian NGOS with an international inclination. The very Mozambican case, that has drawn some attention by scholars, has been looked at mainly from the point of view of the peace-making process, negotiation theory, but not from the perspective of the interactions between Italy and Sant’Egidio.

**Policy subsystem theory.** In order to understand where relations between Italy and Sant’Egidio fit into the interactions the state has with other NSAs in the realm of foreign policy and, specifically, in which domains, I have employed the analytical tool proposed by Verbeek and van Ufford (2001) and applied to Dutch foreign policy. The concept of policy subsystem, unlike those of ‘policy networks’ and ‘iron triangles’, “refers explicitly to [situations in which, added] policy autonomy is enjoyed by a small number of actors in a specific policy field” (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001: 131). According to the authors, it includes all combinations of actors, across different levels of government. Policy subsystems can come in three forms: a) dominant, with stable relations among the small

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29 Unlike policy subsystems, ‘policy networks’ have been considered as less structured and stable policy arenas (see also Peterson 1995: 390). This concept is used also in diplomacy studies, underlying the ideas of ‘horizontal’ subsidiarity and of ‘loose couplings’, i.e. sparse and unstructured interactions between transnational and governmental actors (Coleman and Perl 1999).

30 Unlike policy subsystems, ‘iron triangles’ have been described as including actors who all operate at the same level of government (see also Smith 1988).
group of actors and generally a significant degree of control of issues and programs by the government; b) competitive: with (coalitions of) actors who permanently compete with each other and the field is open to new actors; c) disintegrated: with many actors, loose relationships between them and huge interference from outside. Moreover, policy subsystems are useful for capturing evolutions of pattern over time, as they are subject to change due to variations in the external political environment, decisions of actors outside the subsystem to intervene or to be included, and the introduction of new issues the actors have to deal with.

1.8 Contribution of the thesis to the existing literature

This thesis aims at contributing to the existing literature in different ways. First, by presenting an empirical account of the relations between a state and a non-state actor – specifically an NGO – in the realm of foreign policy, it tries to feed into the IR and FPA theoretical and empirical literature on this topic, and especially to the works dealing with interactions between NGOs and ‘their’ state. In particular, this thesis also looks at competitive/conflicting relations, which have been less studied by scholars than cooperative ones. Second, this work attempts to employ a concept borrowed from another body of literature, that of ‘coopetition’ (Esty and Geradin 2000), in a different field, and in the assessment of a different type of policy. Third, the thesis offers an empirical application of the theoretical tool of policy subsystems, that has been employed so far only in the case of Dutch foreign policy (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001). Fourth, it similarly tries to put in practice, from an empirical perspective, the model of Foreign Policy Community (Hilsman 1971, 1987, 1993), originally suggested for another state, the US, and, in particular, it aims at updating to the post-1989 period a previous application of the model to the Italian case (Santoro 1991).

As far as the literature on Italian foreign policy is concerned (see also Chapter 2 on this), generally speaking this work is aimed first of all at contributing to the limited body of literature on this topic, with special reference to the post-1989 era, by offering an original assessment of a specific issue, i.e. Italy-Sant’Egidio relations in foreign policy, that has never been examined before. As mentioned
earlier in the text, this thesis tries to apply, for the first time, the policy subsystem theory (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001) to given domains of Italian foreign policy, and to update, with some modifications, the model of the Italian Foreign Policy Community (Santoro 1991) to the post-Cold War context. Regarding the study of internationally active NGOs based in Italy, the gaps this thesis intends to fill concern both this category of NGOs in general, that sometimes cut across the trajectory of foreign policy made by the state, and the Community of Sant’Egidio in particular.
Chapter 2. Italian foreign policy after the Second World War. Literature review

“[...] Italian foreign policy as a field of scientific inquiry is still a mysterious object.”

(Carlo Maria Santoro 1991: 20)

2.1 Chapter outline

Firstly, this Chapter presents the main features of the establishment of IR as a discipline in Italy, in order to briefly throw light on the overlooked history of this research field in the country and to understand its effects on the study of Italian foreign policy.
Secondly, it offers a concise overview of the literature (IR, Foreign Policy Analysis, Political Science and History, to some extent) produced on Italian foreign policy after the Second World War, with a view to focus on works specifically devoted to the post-Cold War period, where available. Thirdly, this Chapter illustrates the gaps in the literature and the contribution of this thesis, placing the latter in the broader picture of the works produced on Italian foreign policy. In closing, it sketches out the main features of Italian foreign policy between 1989 and 2001, providing the context for the material presented in later Chapters.

2.2 Background: remarks on the study of IR in Italy

2.2.1 The belated and difficult establishment of IR in Italy

31 Note to the reader: English translations of quotes in Italian in this thesis have been provided by the author.
The discipline ‘International Relations’ was included for the first time in a few Italian university degree programmes only after the university reform of 1968\(^\text{32}\), and the first three professors\(^\text{33}\) to be granted a ‘chair’ (professorship) of International Relations were appointed only in 1975 (Bonanate 1990: 9). The first degree programmes in International Relations were introduced only at the beginning of the 1990s, and until the first years of the 2000s international history, law and economics courses still had the lion’s share of the modules taught in many IR degrees (Andreatta and Zambernardi 2010: 2–3).

What are the causes of the belated and difficult institutionalization of IR in Italy, if compared to other European countries? First of all, Italian IR has come across the same hurdles Political Science had run into when trying to settle in Italy, starting from the 1940s and 1950s. These are the following: (a) the prevalence of Marxist and Catholic political cultures and thought, considering politics – and international politics – as “ancillary to other more crucial fields of human activity” (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002: 127); (b) the consequent predominance of law, history and political philosophy, overshadowing any attempts to analyse politics from a political science perspective (Morlino 1991; Pasquino, Regalia e Valbruzzi 2013; Bonanate 1990: 17); (c) the reluctance of scholars to accept what was seen from part of the Italian ‘intelligentsia’ as another form of academic imperialism coming from the United States (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002: 127). Secondly, IR has encountered in Italy some additional problems, namely the (d) constraints imposed by the Cold War on Italian foreign policy and the (e) controversial historical legacy of the Fascist international posture\(^\text{34}\). Concerning point (d), towards the end of the 1970s an Italian leading political scientist, Gianfranco Pasquino, wrote that “the more dynamic the foreign policy of a state is, the higher will probably be the demand for scholars and experts on international studies and, consequently, the higher will be also the offer thereof”

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\(^{32}\) The first IR chair had been established exactly fifty years earlier at the then University of Wales (now University of Aberystwyth), and was assigned to Alfred Zimmern.

\(^{33}\) These three professors were Luigi Bonanate (University of Turin), Umberto Gori (University of Florence) and Antonio Papisca (University of Catania).

\(^{34}\) As a matter of fact, also Political Science had to struggle with the cumbersome Fascist past, also because the first Political Science departments had been established on the initiative of the Fascist regime itself (Morlino 1991: 96).
In this view, the challenging inception of IR scholarship in Italy (and consequently the scarcity of studies on Italian foreign policy), at least during the Cold War, should be explained by the substantial irrelevance and vagueness of the object of inquiry (see also Friedrichs 2004: 49). In contrast to this argument, another scholar, Luigi Bonanate, has suggested that this perspective, that he defined the “Pasquino-Hoffman law”, as if it was a sort of ‘economic law’, raises some doubts. For instance, if this assumption is applied in a comparative way, France should have witnessed a particularly flourishing tradition of International Relations scholars, consistently with its high-profile foreign policy and its imperial past. With the notable exception of Raymond Aron, this had not occurred, nor had France produced a considerably more developed IR research community than the Italian one (Bonanate 1984: 63; 1990: 18).

Whatever the most accurate evaluation of the impact of the quality of a state’s foreign policy on the IR scholarship in that country may be, it can be reasonably argued that when a country conducts an active foreign policy (or has an historical record thereof), provided that it is perceived in a positive way by politicians and intellectuals within the country, it is likely that “the tradition this past creates and the demand for policy responses it poses create the conditions for the easier flourishing of IR as a recognised discipline” (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002: 129). Therefore, in the case of Italy, a low-profile foreign policy combined with (e) the need for distancing from the Fascist era, after the end of the Mussolini’s era, have influenced (at least) the founding years of the discipline in the country (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002: 129), i.e. the time frame going from 1968 to the end of the 1980s. In addition, the marginal position of Italy in world affairs and the limited

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35 Emblematically, the title of Pasquino’s Chapter where such argument is presented is “International Relations in a country without foreign policy”. This ‘law’ is mentioned also in Friedrichs 2004: 49.

36 According to the American scholar Stanley Hoffman, the main reason for the great success of international studies in the United States is the country’s centrality in international politics. In particular, Hoffman argued that “when political élites are concerned/oppressed only with what occurs in their country, because it does not have the capacity of influencing and shaping what happens elsewhere, or because such lack of power has produced the habit of depending on other states (such as the US), or because very strict constraints limit the use of their power on the global scene, it is likely that scholars do not have enough motivations, nor the necessary inputs to transform their individual efforts into a proper scientific endeavour” (quoted in Bonanate 1984: 62-63).
room for manoeuvring left by the bipolar structure have also resulted in a presumed lack of interest in international affairs on the part of public opinion, seemingly more interested in domestic politics matters (Friedrichs 2004: 48). In conclusion, (d) a weak and erratic foreign policy can tell just one part of the story, and needs to be completed with different explanations – (a), (b), (c) and (e) – that are more “national” in nature, all contributing to elucidate why the discipline has encountered many obstacles in taking roots in the Italian academia (2002: 129).

2.2.2 IR in Italy after the end of the Cold War

While the ‘pioneering’ phase of the institutionalization of IR in Italy (Bonanate 1990: 15) can be considered today as concluded, the state of the academic discipline has continued to suffer from some relative weaknesses also from the 1990s onwards, that still hamper the present-day development of IR research in Italy. Indeed, if factors like a limited foreign policy (d) and the (e) historical heritage of Fascism today do not appear decisive anymore, and elements such as the (a) prevalence of Marxist and Catholic traditions of thinking politics, the (b) predominance of other internationalist specialties, and the (c) resistance to the import of a social science branch seen as essentially ‘American’, seem to have a very limited influence by now, over the last twenty years IR has been struggling with a couple of additional stumbling blocks. The (f) organisational features of the Italian university system still limit today an autonomous progress of the field, because IR is included in the same organisational unit (“scientific-discipline sector”, in the jargon of the Ministry of Education, University and Research) as Political Science, the very discipline with which it had shared part of the founding problems in the early years, which is today predominant as it is ‘older’ in terms of establishment date, and quantitatively ‘stronger’ with reference to the number of research staff. Technical as this detail may seem, it is important because it influences both teaching and research funding (Brighi and Petito 2012: 838-839). Over a longer timeframe, such context does not facilitate the reinforcement of (g) an undersized experts’ community (also beyond the academia), and (h) does not foster proper university-level training for future politicians, members of Parliament and
diplomats dealing with international affairs, who then tend to ignore the expertise and consultancy academics and policy pundits may contribute to their daily work (Andreatta and Hill 2001). In turn, elements (g) and (h) further weaken the consolidation of IR as a field of research, thus making even worse this sort of ‘vicious circle’.

To sum up, although the situation is starting to improve, with a growing number of research staff, PhD students and IR university taught courses, and with the increasing internationalisation of Italian academics (Andreatta and Zambernardi 2010; Clementi 2011), it is in the underdeveloped academic and cultural scenario described above that research on Italian foreign policy has found an all but comfortable environment to develop.

### 2.2.3 Consequences on the research on Italian foreign policy

Considerations presented in previous sections have clearly affected research on Italian foreign policy in different ways. Assessing in 1990 the state of the art of the scholarship on this topic, Bonanate believed that “the situation in the field of foreign policy [was] only partially regrettable. On the one hand, it is certainly true that robust theoretical studies on foreign policy are still missing, but on the other, it should be stressed that the level of attention for such issue [was] exceptionally high” (1990: 47). While it is reasonable to agree with this scholar in general terms, it must be specified firstly, as the very same author then does, that “[u]ndoubtedly, empirical and descriptive studies outnumber[ed] theoretical and interpretative analysis in quantitative terms, but they also predated the latter, as if for long time this field had not been considered a possible object of theoretical reflection” (1990: 47). Secondly, it is important to note that such interest has really become to increase substantially only in the 1980s, towards the end of the Cold War, which is again one of the reason why studies published on Italian foreign policy were so limited during the bipolar era. Thirdly, it must be clarified that, as Santoro correctly observed in 1991, until that moment Italian foreign policy had drawn only the attention of a small number of scholars, mostly historians or journalists (and only on a limited set of issues), while it had not triggered at all the “constant and far-reaching interest of political scientists and sociologists, neither working on domestic politics and comparative politics, nor
on international relations” (1991: 20). Interestingly for the purpose of this thesis, Foreign Policy Analysis in particular is still today “a substantially neglected discipline”, despite some limited improvements (Brighi 2001: 219).

When looking at the Bibliographical Catalogue including all academic and policy-oriented studies published between 1980 and 1990 on Italian foreign policy issues going from the unification of the country (1861) to the 1990s, the absence of a section specifically dedicated to Political Science/IR works is extremely striking. Indeed, the catalogue is mainly focused on historical, sociological and intellectual history studies: only a group of works under the category labelled as ‘foreign policy structures’ seems to take, to some extent, a political science/IR approach (Vigezzi 1997). The same holds true also for the updated version of the Catalogue, published in 2004 and covering works appeared between 1990 and 1995 (Vigezzi 2004). In a more recent collection of bibliographical references on Italy’s foreign policy, assembled by an IR scholar, there is a section devoted to ‘actors in Italian foreign policy - institutions and policy process’, yet it is extremely scarcely populated and many of the items listed are again works written by historians and law scholars (Croci 2013).

In such an underdeveloped academic scenario, in a country where not even policy-oriented, house organ publications of Ministry of Foreign Affairs – if any – have ever really contributed to the public debate, it is interesting to observe that attention for Italian foreign policy, at the beginning, has been encouraged precisely outside the academia, in think-tanks and private research centres such as the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI – Institute for International Political Studies), the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI – International Affairs Institute), and the Istituto per le Relazioni tra l’Italia e i paesi dell’Africa, America Latina, Medio ed Estremo Oriente (IPALMO – Institute for Italy’s relations with African, Latin American, Middle and Far Eastern countries). Obviously this state of affairs has favoured the appearance of

37: An example of a Ministry’s house organ publication is “Longitude”, launched in 2011 and published in English, while “Affari Esteri” (“Foreign Affairs”) is a non peer-reviewed journal published from 1969 to 2011 (now only online) by an association of diplomats rather close to the Ministry’s positions. Neither of these publications (especially “Longitude”) can be considered as playing (or having played) any significant role in the debate on Italian foreign policy (www.longitude.it and www.affari-esteri.it).
empirical, descriptive and/or policy-oriented works on the country’s foreign policy, as mentioned before. Therefore, to summarize, the key problem of the material on Italian foreign policy, at least until the end of the Cold War, disclosed by Gori already in 1978, is that on “Italian foreign policy exists [existed] by that time a rich literature. However, the latter hardly ever enhance[d] the ‘scientific’ understanding in this field. Straightforward and clear-cut hypothetical correlations [have] not been suggested, that may allow for control and accumulation of knowledge in this area. Moreover, many of the generalizations proposed, are not supported by any kind of empirical evidence: in the best-case scenario, they only entail linear causal relations” (1978: 263).

According to some scholars, Gori’s position could be applied also to the lamentable state of play of the studies produced after the end of the Cold War (Brighi 2001; Diodato 2014). However, as the section presenting in greater detail the literature review will show, over the last ten years a renewed interest in Italy’s international action has been reported on the part of Italian and foreign academics. With the exception of Santoro 1991, Political Science/IR-focused comprehensive, analytical efforts are yet to appear, aimed at developing a ‘model’ of Italian foreign policy, also catching up with the evolutions of the international environment occurred between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, but I believe that in general terms the current situation can be considered as gradually progressing.

2.3 Literature review

In order to sketch out a brief overview of Political Science/IR studies on post-1945 Italian foreign policy, I follow here the criteria set out by Brighi (2001 and 2013) to describe models and theories that have shaped the most common accounts of the country’s foreign policy. According to this author, these analytical efforts can be classified into two categories, corresponding to two broad, established ‘narratives’38, placed at the ‘extremes’ of an imaginary continuum,

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38 In the view of the author, a narrative is “a ‘reified’ model, i.e. a theoretical construction that taking advantage of its scientific authority, contributes to ‘preserve’ parts of the reality, preventing them from changing” (2001: 220).
that somehow mirrors the two elements of the nexus between domestic and international politics.

However, other works defy easy positioning close to one or to the other ‘extreme’ of this continuum and are better placed on the theoretically challenging boundary between international and domestic politics. In addition, there are also other studies such as Ferraris 1998, which rather than a proper investigation, is a sort of more traditional ‘handbook’ for the study of Italian foreign policy post-1943, trying to organize existing material (mainly contributions from diplomatic history), following a chronological account of basic events occurred.

2.3.1 From the outside looking in. External-centered explanations

According to one ‘narrative’, Italy’s action on the international scene is necessarily driven by strict international imperatives; according to the other, on the contrary, Rome’s foreign policy is the outcome of autonomous domestic dynamics (Brighi 2001).

Close to the first ‘extreme’, one can find studies trying to explaining the country’s foreign policy starting from some ‘constant features’ pertaining to the external environment, such as the geographical position, the fact of being part of the western alliance and of the European integration process. This external-focused perspective has laid the foundations for the ‘revival’ at the beginning of the 1990s of the Italian geopolitical debate led by the new journal “Limes – Italian Journal of Geopolitics” 39, a very successful publication in terms of sales. ‘Contaminated’ by the Fascist heritage and neglected during the four Cold War decades, geopolitical thinking has resurged outside the university system shortly after the collapse of the bipolar system (Antonsich 1997; Atkinson 2000), and has rapidly seized the attention of both academics and the general public. Widely read accounts of Italian foreign policy adopting such an approach have tried first of all to ‘rehabilitate’ the debate on the definition of Italian “national interest”, a ‘taboo’ concept for many years (Galli della Loggia, Panebianco and Rusconi 1993), and then to call for reorienting Italian foreign policy towards more assertive stances,

39 Despite its name, Limes is not a peer-reviewed academic journal, but a specialized monthly publication (see www.limesonline.com).
vis-à-vis for example other EU big states, in an attempt that in some cases seems to share very little with grounded analytical reflection (Jean 2012). Indeed, it appears that in most cases “the rationale of such a revival has been less to import geopolitical knowledge into IR and more to confer legitimacy and respectability to the analyses put forward [ex post] by scholars and practitioners” (Brighi and Petito 2012: 819). Therefore, geopolitical thought, self-defined as “a-theoretical” (Caracciolo and Konriman 1993), on the one hand has further frustrated the already problematic academic reflection on Italian foreign policy, and on the other has hampered the development of a serious public debate among politicians and the public opinion on this issue, serving as a sort of ‘legitimising’ discourse for those who practise it (on this see also Brighi and Petito 2014; Lucarelli and Menotti 2002 and 2006; Santoro 1996a; Bonanate 1997).

In a similar geopolitical vein, but far from the theoretically weak and vague works mentioned so far, Santoro has offered one of the most comprehensive and theoretically-grounded accounts ever produced on Italian foreign policy. In its book *The foreign policy of a middle power. Italy from the unification to the present* (1991), published on the verge of the collapse of the bipolar system, he has argued that geographical factors such as the position of Italy between Europe and the Mediterranean are the main explanation for the country’s various diplomatic fluctuations, and has envisaged that post-1989 Italian foreign policy would be offered a larger room for manoeuvring cleared by the end of the Cold War especially in Western Europe, in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean. It can be stated, with hindsight, that some of his intuitions have then proved right, although Rome has probably missed many of these opportunities for reasons that perhaps pertain more to the domestic politics domain and to the unfinished nature of the nation-building process of the 19th century (Chabod 1951; Varsori 2013). Furthermore, Santoro has popularized in the academia, and to some extent also in the public debate, among policy makers and in the press focusing on foreign affairs, the concept of ‘middle power’, in a country trying to recalibrate its role in a fast-moving international scenario (Verbeek 2009; Valigi 2008; Fossati 1999 and 2008).

Romano’s studies (with Bosworth 1991; 2004; 2007), although they do not amount to academic works in their own right, seem to give prominence to international factors, especially to Italy-US relations, considered as the most
importance variable influencing Italian foreign policy (on this see also Nuti 2003 and Croci 2005, 2007 and 2008b). Finally, Varsori, a prominent Italian historian who is also familiar with Political Science/IR research, has recently authored the first comprehensive historical account of Italian foreign policy in the final phase of the Cold War (1998-1992), based on a great amount of primary sources that had just become available (i.e. mainly material contained in the private archive of the then Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, one of the most influential politicians in post-1945 Italian history). In this work, the scholar stresses the influence of international factors such as the demise of the bipolar confrontation and the EU Maastricht Treaty of 1992 on Rome’s foreign policy and even on its domestic political system\(^{40}\), to the point that he sharply describes post-1945 Italy as the “Cold War Republic” (definition suggested by the historian Pons 2014, already disclosed in Varsori 2013: 245 as part of an unpublished manuscript version; see also Varsori 1998, 2014 and 2015).

2.3.2 “Foreign policy begins at home”\(^ {41}\). Domestic-focused accounts

At the other ‘extreme’ of the external/internal continuum mentioned at the beginning of this section, on the contrary, it is possible to find works trying to understand the international behaviour of Italy starting from the analysis of domestic factors like fragility of the party system, instability of government cabinets, or poor quality of a real, political and cultural domestic debate on Italian international affairs. The most compelling reflections following this research path have been offered for instance by Panebianco (1977), who has argued that the cause for the ‘low-profile’ Italian foreign policy are to be found in the domestic environment. In the peculiar political context of Cold War Italy, featuring the incompatibility between the internal goal of defending the political equilibrium (Christian Democrats vs. Communists), and the external objective of improving the country’s status on the international scene, domestic cultural and political dynamics have constantly underplayed and contained every type of tension possibly originating from foreign policy, therefore causing the ‘neutralisation’ and the ‘depoliticisation’ of the Italian international activity (Panebianco 1977:

\(^{40}\) A similar interpretation has been suggested also by the historian Gentiloni Silveri (2008).

\(^{41}\) This the title of a book on U.S. foreign policy written in 1944 by James P. Warburg.
For the purposes of this thesis, it is interesting to observe that Panebianco has also used the idea of foreign policy 'delegation', with reference to the delegation of foreign policy from citizens to the élites (government, pressure groups and parties). According to the scholar, such 'delegation' in the foreign policy domain was far-reaching and more extensive than that occurring in the realm of domestic politics, due to the low level of interest in international affairs showed by the citizens and the resulting limited relevance of foreign policy as an electoral issue (1977: 859 etc.). It is worth recalling here that the institutional system, political parties and political cultures are the domestic factors explaining Italian foreign policy in the author's view, but public opinion in a broad sense is far less decisive.

Moreover, in a book written twenty years later, Panebianco has examined in a comparative effort the foreign policies of the United States, United Kingdom, France and Italy, confirming similar (but more sophisticated in analytical terms) conclusions with respect to those outlined in the previous work, and claiming that the Italian institutional setting (i.e.: a consensual liberal democracy), the powerful role of the principal parties and a largely pacifist public opinion are the independent variables influencing the dependent variable, that is foreign policy decisions (Panebianco 1997). Such assumptions on the pre-eminence of domestic mechanisms in crafting Italian foreign policy seems to be confirmed also by other scholars like Verbeek, who claims that, paradoxically, the very increase in room for manoeuvring in the international environment opened up by the end of the bipolar confrontation, has not been well capitalized by Italy because even new golden opportunities (La Palombara 2001), for example in the Balkans in the 1990s, have been framed through the lenses of domestic confrontations, consistently with a general tendency to 'domesticization' of foreign policy that according to the author is taking place in many Western democratic states (Verbeek 2009: 11).

Also the very book by Santoro addressed in the previous section can be listed among the contributions giving importance to domestic dynamics, because it presents the first mapping of the actors intervening from within the country in the foreign policy decision-making, by employing the 'Foreign Policy Community' model that I start from in Chapter 3. Indeed, studies on the Italian foreign policy process published before and after Santoro's work are extremely limited, being
either well researched books that unfortunately are pretty outdated (for instance Kogan 1963; Sassoon 1978; Attinà 1979; Gori 1982), or practitioners’ memories written by top diplomats (for example Serra 1999 and 2009; and Gaja 1995 to some extent). Other scholars have suggested that the FPA-oriented decision-making process perspective may offer promising insights to understand Italian foreign policy, but unfortunately these authors have not (yet) elaborated extensively on their arguments (for example Zucconi 2006; Chelotti and Pizzimenti 2011), let alone have they turned to the assessment of empirical cases through these analytical lenses (see for instance Attinà 1972; 1983a and 1983b).

For Santoro foreign policy is “understood as a public policy, i.e. a specific aspect of the pervading action of the domestic political system on all the activities falling within its scope” (1991: 219; 1990: 51). He observed at the beginning of the 1990s that the “institutional architecture of the country, due to its unclear distribution of tasks between the different bodies, has produced a significant fragmentation of powers in the foreign policy field, [sometimes] conferred to structures and persons associated to various government sectors”, that has often produced an erratic foreign policy as seen from abroad (1991: 227). In addition, differently from other countries, and similarly to what argued by Panebianco (1977 and 1997), he has suggested that in Italy the party subsystem, together with institutions forms “a sort of systemic oligarchy […] that makes and decides at least 90% of national foreign policy, almost without any external influences and controls. Especially during the 1980s, this open-ended situation has predictably allowed for a sort of informal ‘monopolization’ of foreign policy areas/issues, previously not specifically attributed to any institution, by some political leaders (not always in government posts) (1991: 242). Today, such perspective still holds true, to some extent, although it is important to take into consideration that during the last two decades, the Italian political system has witnessed a gradual, both formal and informal strengthening of the post of Prime Minister42, which over the years has been enjoying greater autonomy at the expenses of other

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42 For the sake of accuracy, the official name of the post should be translated in English as ‘President of the Council of Ministers’ (‘Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri’, in Italian). This clarification is useful to better understand the relative weight of the cabinet as a whole in its interactions with the President. However, in this work the two expressions are used as synonyms.
ministers also in the foreign policy domain (more on this aspect is presented in Chapter 3).
Finally, looking at different domestic factors, Galli della Loggia (1993; 1998), Rusconi (1993), Corsico (1998) and Graziano (2007a and 2008) have explored, in particular, the nexus between political culture, identity and foreign policy, stressing that it is the very fragility of Italian national identity that has always weakened not only the way Italy thinks about itself in political terms, but also its uncertain behaviour in the international arena.

**2.3.3 More complex interpretations. The international/domestic nexus**

It is worth mentioning that some recent contributions have tried to thread their way through the two most accredited external/internal ‘narratives’, in order to suggest more nuanced and complex interpretations, taking in due consideration the importance of the international/domestic nexus and linkage politics. Among these works, we find for instance the study carried out by Coralluzzo (2000), which presents a modified (and reduced) version of the framework for the analysis of foreign policy suggested by Brecher for the case of Israel (1969 and 1972), focusing specifically on the scrutiny of ‘images’ and behaviours of decision-makers. In his view, the environment in which decision makers have to operate “affects directly the outcome of decisions, but it exerts its influence only insofar as it is filtered by their ‘images’ of internal and external factors” (Brecher 1972 quoted in Coralluzzo 2000). By applying this analytical framework on more than twenty Italian foreign policy cases (1946-2000), the scholar sketches out interesting features of the foreign policy behaviour of governments, ministries, parties, political leaders, and of the different élites perceptions developed during the various phases of almost four decades of foreign policy.

Brighi’s work (2005 and 2013), from a different theoretical perspective, proposes a sophisticated assessment of how foreign policy meets politics at the domestic and international level. In the first compelling and comprehensive application of Foreign Policy Analysis insights not only to pre-, but also to post-1989 Italian foreign policy, the scholar employs the dialectical ‘strategic-relational model’, built within critical realism, in order to keep track of all the forms of interplay
that may occur between foreign policy (a 100% political activity in its own right), international relations and domestic politics. The findings of the book demonstrate that Italy’s foreign policy has revealed to be more elaborate and nuanced than many stereotypes have traditionally suggested in the debate, when claiming, often with shifty arguments, that the country’s foreign policy is seriously and inexorably ‘condemned’ to be seriously limited, if existing at all (Levi 1974; Pasquino 1977; Romano 1992 and 1995).

In addition, it must be stressed that a small number of IR studies on post-Cold War Italy’s foreign policy have been published over the last few years, either exploring specific policies and/or actors, or following geographical criteria (e.g. Giacomello and Verbeek 2011; Carbone 2011; Marchi, Whitman and Edwards 2015). Being in all cases collections of essays written by different authors, it is not easy to classify them neither in the group of ‘external-centered’ accounts, nor among the domestic-focused works. For instance, in Giacomello and Verbeek 2011, scholars have built on the concept of ‘middle power’ employed by Santoro twenty years before, and although acknowledging that such notion is elusive and defies easy-theorizing, they have engaged with different theoretical approaches, ranging from neoclassic realist to constructivist views (Giacomello and Verbeek 2011, reviewed in De Simone 2012). It is especially significant to underline here that some of the Chapters in this book feature among the few IR contributions interestingly introducing the puzzle of non-state actors in Italian foreign policy the post-Cold War era (Darnis 2011; Coticchia, Giacomello and Sartori 2011). The authors of these Chapters have argued that the changed international and domestic context has paved the way for more proactive non-state actors on the international stage, and for new patterns of interaction with the government (i.e.: partially state-owned companies in strategic industries such as oil and gas, electricity, defense, aerospace). In addition, although these scholars do not expand in depth on this from a theoretical point of view, like Brighi (2005 and 2013) they seem to recognize the relevance of the international-domestic nexus, when arguing that middle power status is “a product of domestic processes leading to the definition of the role a state seeks to play in world politics weighed
against the expectations other states have regarding the role of the state in question” (Giacomello and Verbeek 2011: 16)\(^43\).

**2.3.4 Studies on internationally active Catholic NGOs based in Italy**

As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, most Political Science/IR studies in the domain of internationally active Catholic NGOs deal with the role of religion in world politics, or with the Vatican as a state actor and a transnational religious actor (Vallier 1972; Kent and Pollard 1994; Reese 1996; Casanova 1997; Hanson 1987; Rudolph 1997; Ryall 2001; Alvarez 2002; Böllmann 2010; Graziano 2010; Madeley and Haynes 2011). An extremely limited number of works explore religiously inspired NGOs – be them Catholic or not – with a significant level of activity in the international arena, and the same holds true for their relations with the states they are embedded in and their foreign policy.

This is all the more striking in the Italian case, as one would probably expect the opposite, being (or, at least, having been) Italy a country with some of the most significant social and political Catholic constituencies in Europe and in the world. Over the last few years, however, some limited attention has started to be devoted to these aspects. It is important to observe that among all the internationally active Catholic NGOs based in Italy Sant’Egidio is indeed the most – and almost the only one – analysed in the literature. As it has been mentioned in Chapter 1, some authors have devoted some attention to the Community of Sant’Egidio, arguing that, with its work on the Mozambican case and also in other areas of the world, it is the only remarkable NGO in the Italian landscape, that is quite underdeveloped in contrast to what happens in other European and Western countries (Carbone 2011: 10; see also Ferraris 1996: 478-480; Carbone, Coralluzzo et al. 2011: 202; Barbato, De Franco and Le Normand 2012). Sant’Egidio has been studied also by scholars working in the domain of diplomacy studies, as an example of a religious actor involved in ‘track-two’ diplomacy (Berridge 2005: 202; Roberts 2009: 20 and 517).

\(^{43}\) At the end of the book the authors affirm that the results of their study show that Italy has not always been considered a middle power by its fellows. Therefore, the gap between Italy’s aspirations and the status actually achieved is significant and will probably broaden in the future. Contributors conclude on a downhearted note that in the future “settling for the status of ‘great small power’ may be, after all, Italy’s most promising option” (Giacomello and Verbeek 2011: 225).
However, only a few scholars have gone a bit further, taking into account also the interactions with the Italian government, with special reference to the cases of Mozambique and/or the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, although these studies either look at the object of enquiry only from a diplomacy studies theoretical perspective, or are ‘only’ (sometimes) detailed memoirs written by some of the ‘protagonists’ of these events (Hume 1994; Bartoli 1999: 245-273; Ajello 1999 and 2010: 615-642; de Courten 2003; Hill 2003: 214-215; Petito and Thomas 2015; Ferrara and Petito 2016). Furthermore, a recent interesting contribution (Marchetti 2013) has analysed the relations between Sant’Egidio44 and the Italian public institutions in the case of the UN Moratorium on the death penalty (2007), and again on the occasion of the Mozambican peace process, presenting six ‘conditions’ that must be verified to facilitate a successful civil society-government synergy (concerning in brief government funding, bipartisan political support, role of other international institutional partners, involvement of other NGOs abroad, resonance of normative factors with institutional paradigms, focus on soft policy sectors). However, the author does not take into consideration cases in which NGOs-government relations are not good and conflicting situations materialize instead of win-win synergies (Marchetti 2013: 105).

In any case, the role of other internationally active Catholic NGOs based in Italy (FOCSIV, AVSI, Focolare Movement, mentioned in Chapter 1 and 4), should not be underestimated, especially in the domain of governmental development cooperation. Indeed, Italian foreign aid, during the Cold War, has often been at the mercy of different competing private interests of some political leaders and their constituencies, with the relevant Directorate general of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, officially in charge of the management of foreign aid, acting only as a ‘clearing house’. This pattern of interactions between the Italian state and NGOs – defined as one of ‘partial privatization’, in contrast to the model of ‘de facto nationalisation’ of other European countries, for example France – has been argued to be particularly evident in the case of Catholic NGOs. It has been suggested that some of them (e.g.: FOCSIV network) heavily influence Italian strategic choices in terms of countries or sub-regions to privilege, especially in

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44 The authors examine also another small group of non Catholic Italian NGOs.
Africa, often promoting a set of priorities not directly relevant to Italy’s national interests (Dottori 1997). Despite the influence they exert, it is not possible, however, to suggest that Italian NGOs are able to pursue an autonomous agenda and autonomous development cooperation activities, as they remain still heavily reliant on government funds to devise and implement their projects.

In conclusion, existing Political Science/IR literature on internationally active Catholic NGOs based in Italy is scarce and fragmented, offering only a few scattered remarks on Catholic NGOs different from the Community of Sant’Egidio and only an extremely limited analysis of conflicting government-NGOs patterns.

2.4 Conclusions: gaps in the literature on Italian foreign policy and contribution of the thesis

To sum up, it seems fair to argue, also drawing on some scholars’ considerations, that over the last fifteen/twenty years, academic literature has witnessed a significant rise in Political Science/IR studies on Italian foreign policy. Hill, for instance, has written that “[...] there has been a notable upsurge of interest in Italian [and, particularly, German foreign policy]” (2003: 6).

However, in the light of the brief literature review presented in this Chapter, it appears reasonable to claim that “we can be anything but unsatisfied with the state of play of the theoretical [and empirical] debate on foreign policy, that in Italy proves more limited than in other countries in comparative terms” (Brighi 2001: 244). As a matter of fact, if of course the situation is currently improving, many problems still affect the state of the art of research on Italian foreign policy. On the one hand, the history of the late establishment of such disciplines in Italy and their current academic status have not helped create the best ‘structural’ conditions for well-grounded research to take root, nor has the general indifference to Italy’s international action on the part of scholars, policy analysts and (on some occasions) the very foreign policy professionals, being the topic an object of inquiry which proves to be more complex and challenging than how it is described by superficial clichés. On the other, and partially as a consequence of the elements just mentioned, the work of students and researchers intending to study Italian foreign policy is all the more difficult as the availability of primary
and secondary sources is sometimes extremely limited, especially on events occurred in the last two decades. Regarding primary sources, it must be taken into consideration that Italian diplomatic documents currently available in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives cover only the period going from 1861 to mid-1950s (on this issue and on its impact on research see Nuti 2002 and Varsori 2015). Interestingly, Nuti argued in 2002, when discussing not only the documentation related to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also the archival production of all the other Italian government departments, that “[t]he Italian archival system is mostly regulated by a law which is not as liberal or as researcher-friendly as are those of other Western states. The reasons for this will probably require a separate essay, but suffice it to say that no political force or group of scholars has hitherto deemed it particularly important to try to get the system modified” (2002: 93). This situation has not improved significantly since Nuti’s reflections of 2002: while finally Italian diplomatic documents have been digitalised and are now available online, it is not clear whether and when material drafted after the mid-1950s will be ready for reference. In a way, the problem of the scarce availability of primary sources can be considered both as a cause and a consequence of the general underdeveloped Italian interest in international affairs. A partial exception to this rule is represented by the fact that since the 1990s, some former parties, political foundations and cultural institutions have decided to open their archives and make material available for scholars, journalists and the general public. Although they only tell part of the story, these documents can compensate for official documents, to some extent, when reconstructing some specific foreign policy events and decisions, especially when key politicians (the archives are dedicated to) were on the very frontline of such events (Varsori 2015: 294). In a few cases, documents stored in the abovementioned archives cover also events occurred in the first half of the 1990s. Concerning secondary sources, as described in the previous sections, Political Science/IR studies on this topic are in overall terms scarce and scattered. A number of good analyses have been published, but comprehensive and in-depth works are limited and often focused on the Cold War era. This seems surprising

45 For instance, the Christian Democracy Party and the Communist Party, and foundations established in memory of leading political figures of the past such as Giulio Andreotti, Bettino Craxi, Alcide De Gasperi, Amintore Fanfani, Giovanni Gronchi, Aldo Moro (Varsori 2015: 294).
because of the changes occurred in Italian foreign policy during the last twenty years, leading to the slow emergence of an increasingly active foreign policy in some areas (Santoro 1991; Andreatta and Hill 2000 and 2001; Andreatta 2001b; Walston 2007; Verbeek 2009; Carbone 2011), and because of the relevance of the domestic political crisis broken out between 1992 and 1994 in most sectors of Italian political parties, business and society, then favouring the introduction of some institutional reforms and the formation of a new party system (see for instance IAI 1993; Hill 2003 and 2015; Brighi 2005; Carbone 2011). Therefore, by focusing on the post-1989 period, this thesis aims to contribute first of all to filling this general gap in works on Italian foreign policy after the demise of the bipolar confrontation.

Looking more closely at the scarcely populated group of works existing on this object of inquiry, the second most evident gap the present work aims to contribute to partially fill is the lack of FPA studies on Italian foreign policy decision making, starting from the first application of the model of the Foreign Policy Community, in the only work of this nature conducted so far on the Italian case, twenty-five years ago (Santoro 1991), and employing FPA analytical tools like policy subsystem theory (see Chapter 1), to be combined with slightly revised versions of more general IR concepts such as delegation.

Thirdly, the last gap this thesis aims to fill is the one concerning the role of NGOs based in Italy in general, which are active on the international scenario, and sometimes cross Italian foreign policy’s path, a topic which has drawn very poor little attention so far.

Furthermore, some general considerations are needed here. The regrettable state of play of Political Science/IR literature on Italian foreign policy, especially with reference to post-1989, “[...] is all the more unfortunate, as in contemporary global politics – after the demise of the ‘regime of certainty’ constituted by the Cold War – it would be fruitful to have models, interpretations and hypotheses leading states in navigating the troubled waters between the Scylla of structural forces increasingly diversified and widespread, and the Charybdis of domestic politics that are more and more demanding” (Brighi 2001: 244). It is important to recall that in the medium/long run such state of affairs produces negative consequences also on the quality of daily management of Italian foreign policy, as described in previous sections, especially if compared to what occurs in other
Western European countries with a similar standing in the European and international arena. Indeed, one should hope that the further development of Italian foreign policy studies in Italy and on Italy could contribute somehow not only to the enhancement of the scientific understanding of the topic, but also to the advancement of a still poorly structured public debate on these issues.

In conclusion, is it useful to go back to the question raised almost fifty years ago by the prominent Italian diplomat Pietro Quaroni on the existence of an Italian foreign policy (1967: 801). In the words of Ferraris, “Italian foreign policy is an obscure object: it exists because it could not be otherwise, but often, too often, it is not seen and above all, it is not heard” (1998). I believe the answer to Quaroni’s question is affirmative, although it is not straightforward, nor unproblematic. After all, also “non-actions, when the option of influencing the external environment is viable and a state [or an actor] decides not to do it, can be considered as foreign policy actions” (Gori 1973: 40). It is precisely the cultural, general indifference to this topic, especially and paradoxically in Italy, that is ‘risky’, in intellectual, policy and political terms, in the current uncertain global arena (Mammarella and Cacace 2008: 300-303).

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46 Ferraris’ argument resonates with the idea of a ‘low profile’ foreign policy mentioned before. A similar perspective has been put forward by Gaja (1995: 23).
Chapter 3. The Italian Foreign Policy Community after the end of the Cold War

“The first answer to the question ‘who makes foreign policy in Italy?’ should be ‘nobody’”

(Ambassador Pietro Quaroni, 1967)

3.1 Chapter outline

This Chapter offers a brief examination of the Italian Foreign Policy Community, building upon the model firstly developed by Hilsman (1971, 1987 and 1993), and then partially modified and applied by Santoro (1990 and 1991) to the Italian case.

The Chapter has two goals: first, it aims at locating institutional foreign policy actors and non-state actors within the bigger picture of the Italian foreign policy process; second, it intends to offer a first, very preliminary attempt to briefly build on the description of the Italian Foreign Policy Community presented by Santoro more than twenty years ago, of course in a much less ambitious way, and to update it in the light of changes occurred over the last twenty years. At the end of the Chapter, some preliminary conclusions are drawn on where in the Italian Foreign Policy Community internationally active Sant’Egidio and other Catholic NGOs operate, and on the actors they tend to interact the most with.

47 This provocative remark was made during a conference by Ambassador Quaroni, one of the most prominent diplomats of his generation, in order to give an idea of the fragmentation of the decision-making process in Italian foreign policy (Bonanni 1967: 801).
3.2 The Foreign Policy Community

3.2.1 Definitions

The process of foreign policy making and implementation are considered in this Chapter starting from the assumption that foreign policy is a public policy, i.e. “as a particular aspect of the pervasive action exerted by the domestic political system on all the activities taking place within its scope” (Santoro 1990 and 1991; Coralluzzo 2000). Because foreign policy is seen in this case as the outcome of the cooperative and/or conflicting interactions of domestic actors of different nature, such theoretical perspective on foreign policy can be located within the broader research streams inaugurated by scholars of the ‘organizational process’ and ‘governmental politics’ models, to borrow the definitions put forward by Allison in 1971, in its seminal work on the Cuban missile crisis (1971).

The concept of ‘Foreign Policy Community’ (FPC) employed here was suggested by Santoro in The foreign policy of a middle power. Italy from the unification to present-day (1991), the first (and last) IR contribution published so far offering a preliminary description of all the actors intervening in the foreign policy arena in Italy. According to his definition, built upon that elucidated by Hilsman concerning the US case (1971, 1987 and 1993), the Foreign Policy Community is the constellation of political, institutional, bureaucratic, economic actors, etc., public or private, that are involved to different extents in the foreign policy political process (Santoro 1991: 238).

Although this goes beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth adding briefly here that Santoro (and Hilsman, to some extent), because in his research aims at offering an ambitious, comprehensive model of Italian foreign policy, includes the Foreign Policy Community and its process within the bigger picture of an open system in which he analyses also the interactions of the FPC actors with external and internal independent variables (e.g.: international political and socio-economic trends, geographical and historical ‘constant features’, ‘national

48 Other works worth mentioning are Kogan (1963) and Sassoon (1978), although they were published well before Santoro’s work, and use less complex theoretical tools.
attributes’), and the output of such relations in terms of decisions/non decisions and their different implementation patterns.\textsuperscript{49}

According to the aforementioned authors, within the Foreign Policy Community the various actors are located in three main concentric rings, according to their degree of proximity to the decision making core: 1) the ‘inner ring’; 2) the ‘second ring’; 3) the ‘outer ring’. It can be highlighted from the outset that the Italian foreign policy process features some interesting differences not only from the American case investigated by Hilsman\textsuperscript{50}, but also from that of other big European countries (for example France, in first place), as the following sections in this Chapter will show. The mapping of the Italian Foreign Policy Community briefly sketched out in this Chapter has two objectives: first, it is useful to put non-state actors in context, as it is not always clear where exactly in the process their action unfolds; second, it is the first attempt\textsuperscript{51} to briefly build on the description of the Italian Foreign Policy Community presented by Santoro more than two decades ago, and to try to update taking into consideration changes occurred over the last twenty-five years (in the following subsection I will add more details on this second goal). Taking into account the scope of this Chapter and of the entire thesis, it goes without saying that this is only a preliminary overview which is not intended to be complete and exhaustive.

\textsuperscript{49} Santoro’s model is processual in nature and is firstly based on the ‘input/output’ scheme of the ground-breaking model of ‘political system’ developed by Easton (1965); it also borrows from McGowan and Shapiro (1973), Rosenau (1987), Hermann, Hermann and Hagan (1987).

\textsuperscript{50} According to Hilsman (1971, 1987 and 1993) in the case of the US foreign policy process, the first ring (‘inner ring’) refers to those individuals and institutions that, according to the Constitution, are involved in the decision-making process, i.e.: a) the president; b) the White House staff; c) political appointees as ministers, undersecretaries of major departments, as well as all other spoil system staff members; then d) the Congress; e) the bureaucracies of National Security, the Department of State, Intelligence services and the Armed Forces. The second ring (‘second ring’) gathers the actors, individual or institutional, which are not part of the official governmental or parliamentary arenas, but whose very reason for being there lies in their ability to influence foreign policy. These are: a) interest groups of different types and nature, b) the media. The third ring (‘outer ring’) includes two very broad groups of actors: a) public opinion, analysed through surveys and polls, and b) the electorate, as it emerges from the results of elections.

\textsuperscript{51} A partial exception is Coralluzzo (2000), although this book applies the Brecher concept of ‘foreign policy system’ (1972), and focuses on the Cold War period.
3.2.2 Time frame

Santoro’s book was researched and published between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Unlike it has been suggested in different parts of the books, the scholar has neither elaborated more on the topic of that work, nor has put the concepts and models developed to the test, applying them to an empirical case of Italian foreign policy (this was probably also due to the premature death of the author). Therefore, the description of the actors of the Italian Foreign Policy Community put forward in his 1991 book could fully take into account the major changes occurred after the double international and domestic crises unfolded in Italy at the end of the Cold War, especially the internal one that would burst only the year after the publication of the book52.

Changes occurred in Italian foreign policy during the last twenty years, as a consequence of the abovementioned crises, have been very significant indeed. On the international stage, the demise of the Cold War has produced the slow emergence of a gradually more assertive Italian foreign policy, facilitated by a larger room for autonomous manoeuvring offered by the demise of the East-West confrontation between 1989 and 1991 (see for instance Santoro 1991; Andreatta and Hill 2000 and 2001; Andreatta 2001a; Walston 2007; Verbeek 2009; Carbone 2011). On the domestic scene, the political crisis unravelled between 1992 and 1994 in many sectors of Italian political parties (crucial actors in foreign policy as well as in the Italian political system in general), economic environment and society, triggered by major judicial investigations, resulted in the introduction of some, albeit limited in scope, institutional reforms and in the shaping of a new party system (and, according to some scholars, also in the establishment, more broadly, of a new political system, termed ‘Second Republic’, as explained earlier in this thesis).

For the reasons explained above, and consistently with the overall time frame of the thesis, I have therefore decided to focus here on the present-day setting of the

52 No other scholars have followed this strand of research during the following two decades, at least not in such a comprehensive way; only a few of them have made similar research efforts (Carbone 2011; Chelotti and Pizzimenti 2011; Darnis 2011; Giacomello and Verbeek 2012; Marchetti 2013), but within a more limited scope, usually focusing only on one actor.
Italian Foreign Policy Community, stressing the differences from the previous Cold War make-up where needed.

3.3 The ‘inner ring’. The institutional machinery

The first concentric circle of the model, defined as the ‘inner ring’, is the place where one can find state institutions tasked by the Italian Constitution, constitutional and ordinary laws, with an explicit role in the field of foreign policy. The institutions analysed in greater detail in the following subsections are: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; President of the Council of Ministers and its Office; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Economy and Finance and that of Economic Development; Foreign Affairs Parliamentary committees.

It is important to underline here that the institutional setting of Italy, a parliamentary republic, especially if compared to that of other Western European countries such as France, Germany or the UK, features a significant degree of open-endedness in terms of attribution of tasks to the various institutions, resulting in a great level of fragmentation of powers in the realm of foreign policy (Attinà 1982, 1983a and 1983b; Santoro 1991; Fossati 1999; Mammarella and Cacace 2008: 289-293; Ferro and Leotta 2011). In addition, differently from the US and French cases, for instance, inside the Italian inner ring hierarchy in foreign policy between the different institutions is not always clear-cut. Such scenario has only partially been modified by the greater autonomy that the President of the Council (Prime Minister) and its Office have gained at the expense of other Ministers, as a result of both formal changes in the legal framework, and more informal evolution in practice, as it will be explained later. The institutional setting and the foreign policy process, as a consequence, remain fairly unstructured and in transition.

3.3.1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the government department in charge of performing all the duties associated with the political, economic, social and cultural relations of the Italian state with foreign countries. More specifically, according to the art. 12 of the legislative decree no. 300/1999, the institutional
tasks assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the following: “1. [...] representation, coordination and protection of Italian interests in international forums; analysis, decision and implementation of the Italian action in the field of international politics; management of relations with other states and with international organizations; stipulation and revision of the treaties and international conventions and coordination of relevant activities of management; analysis and settlement of issues of international law and international litigation; representation of the Italian position on the implementation of the provisions relating to the Common foreign and security policy envisaged by the Treaty on European Union, and in the domain of political and economic external relations of the European Union; development cooperation, migration and protection of Italian citizens and workers abroad; management of the activities within the European integration process, related to the negotiation of the Treaties of the European Union, the European Community, Euratom”. The aforementioned legislative decree also assigns to the MFA the important task of ensuring the overall consistency of the international and European activities of the specific government institutions with the overall objectives of international politics, but without prejudice to the functions attributed to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Baldi 2006; Silvestri 2000; Serra 2009).

Beyond the political leadership, represented by the Minister and Deputy Ministers/Undersecretaries, at the headquarters level the MFA, since the last reorganization in 2010, is now structured in a General Secretariat and eight general directorates (identified according to thematic/functional criteria, in contrast to the previous geographically-based organizing principle), that in turn are divided into offices and units (Zucconi 2006). At the peripheral level, the MFA has a diplomatic-consular network of about 310 offices, located in most countries of the world: embassies, permanent representations to international

53 Apart from the legal provisions, in the daily management of foreign policy it is not always easy to set clear boundaries between the functions and activities of the MFA on the one hand, and those of other institutions of the state (and some other departments in particular, like the Presidency of the Council) on the other. Further analysis of such interplay, however, goes beyond the scope of this work.

54 The number shown is approximate on purpose, because of the proposed closing/merge of some peripheral offices, under consideration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of writing.
organizations, special diplomatic delegations, consular offices and Italian Cultural Institutes.

In Italy, when new governments (or new ministers) take office, tend not to replace top administrative officials: such trend reinforces the role of bureaucracies in the daily management of ministries, often ensuring quite a high level of continuity in some policy areas, regardless of the changes – rather frequent – in the political leadership of the Ministry. This holds particularly true in the case of the MFA, as diplomats feature a significant ‘esprit de corps’, and a rather resilient “institutional memory” (see Hill 2003: 77, with specific reference to foreign policy) and organisational culture. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, first of all because of the limited material available for examination (Nuti 2002), the role of the MFA bureaucracy\(^{55}\) has been overlooked by scholars (Chelotti and Pizzimenti 2011). According to Croci, however, it can be argued that “[a]vailable evidence does instead suggest that MFA officials have always played a central role in the elaboration of Italian foreign policy and thus assured continuity through changes of government and political regimes” (2007b: 294), both during the Cold War and after the fall of the Berlin wall\(^{56}\).

For the purpose of this thesis it is worth noting that activities in preventive diplomacy/crisis management are today dealt with by the cabinet of the Minister, the secretariats of the Vice Minister and the Undersecretaries, as far as policy guidelines are concerned, and by the Directorate of Political Affairs and Security, assisted by the relevant Embassies in the world and by Directorates on the basis of the countries involved, in the daily management of tasks. At the time of the

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\(^{55}\) Draghi (1988) being the only notable exception, although it is a sociological study. Despite being a journalistic detailed report written in the 1970s, it is also worth mentioning here Ostellino (1972).

\(^{56}\) On the influence of the MFA’s civil servants and on the role of political parties in foreign policy during the bipolar era, it is interesting to take into account the reflection offered by the historian de’ Robertis, who also served as an international affairs consultant to the Christian Democratic Minister of Foreign Affairs for many years. “It has often been the case that the government – even when headed by a Christian Democrat and with a Christian Democratic Foreign Minister – has made decisions that, even if not totally in contrast with, did nevertheless significantly deviate from, the line elaborated by the party’s foreign bureau. One of the reasons is that within the party one looked at issues from an ideological point of view, often, albeit not always, taking into consideration the position of the Vatican. Within government by contrast, especially on the most delicate issues, decisions were made taking into consideration the Atlantic constraint, and through a policy process which included the civil servants [emphasis added], and hence did not always and precisely reflect the preferences of political leaders such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry’s undersecretaries, even if these were the people formally responsible for those decisions (2003: 78, quoted in Croci 2008a: 293).
events described in this thesis, however, the Directorate of Political Affairs was basically the only unit in charge of the daily supervision of those issues, consistently with the then organisational structure of the Ministry. Development cooperation is instead managed by a dedicated General directorate for Development Cooperation, led by a senior diplomat, and by a number of field offices located in some recipient countries. Within the directorate there is an office specifically devoted to the Ministry’s relations with “civil society, non-governmental and volunteering organizations” in the domain of development cooperation, in charge of assessing NGOs applications for managing development cooperation public funds for their projects in developing countries and of overseeing all matters relating to their work in the field. The track record of the ‘Italian Cooperation’ activities during the 1970s and the 1980s was rather poor in terms of aid effectiveness, and even more in terms of mismanagement of public funds by MFA political figures, party officials and top diplomats, with a significant number of judicial inquiries for cases of alleged corruption (Fossati 1999; Carbone 2007). Such events, combined with budgetary cuts of last years, the political will of a few MEPs and of a bunch of ministers and undersecretaries, the pressure from NGOs and other civil society organisations particularly vocal in this domain, and the need for meeting the increasingly demanding development cooperation targets set at the European Union level, have led to the much anticipated modification of the 1987 law regulating development cooperation. Among the innovations introduced by the reform law (125/2014), finally approved by the Parliament in August 2014, after many years of negotiations, there is the establishment of an ad hoc Agency, under the responsibility of the MFA, in line with the development cooperation governance models of other European countries (France and Germany, for instance).

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57 Italian MFA official website: http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Ministero/Struttura/DGCoopSviluppo/default.htm?LANG=EN

58 This is an alternative name for the MFA development cooperation activities.


60 Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgs/Documentazione/NormativaItaliana/legge%202011%20agosto%202014%20n.%20125%20-.pdf
3.3.2 Prime Minister Office

The Prime Minister Office (officially the “Presidency of the Council of Ministers”, PCM)\(^{61}\) is the organizational body serving the President of the Council of Ministers\(^{62}\). In general terms, according to the legislative decree no. 303/1999, the President relies on the Presidency of the Council “for the exercise of the autonomous functions of political initiative, direction and coordination assigned to it by the Constitution and laws of the Republic” (article 2, paragraph 1). In addition, the PCM is required to provide, “[...] through liaison activities with other relevant government departments, the unity and consistency of the overall political and administrative orientations of the government, in accordance with article 95 of the Constitution” (article 2 paragraph 1).

The legal provisions detailing the specific role of the President and of the PCM in the conduct of foreign policy are rather scanty. Its functions must therefore be inferred from the norms regulating their powers of general nature that are related to the implementation of general policy objectives, as determined by the Council of Ministers, to be balanced anyway with the attributions and responsibilities of individual ministers, first of all, in this case, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In addition, it is necessary to combine the basic legal framework with analysis of the practice. Over the entire history of the Republic, at least until the end of the so-called 'First Republic' in 1992-1994, government practice in foreign policy has witnessed an oscillation between a more proactive role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a stronger action by the Prime Minister, depending on the degree of cohesion of the cabinet political coalition, for example, or on the specific interest

\(^{61}\) While it is not possible here to address the issue in more detail, it is worth noting that from the entry into force of the Republican Constitution (1948) to present-day, the President of the Council has progressively acquired greater autonomy from other Ministers in the informal, daily government practice. At the same time, a process of strengthening of the Presidency of the Council (i.e. the Office) has taken place, which culminated firstly in the approval of law 400/1988, detailing the legal provisions regulating the activities of the government and the organization of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and then in the promulgation of legislative decree no. 300 and 303 on the reorganization of ministries and again of the Presidency of the Council.

\(^{62}\) For the sake of clarity, it should be explained that the expressions “President of the Council of the Ministers” and “Prime Minister” are used here as synonyms, although the latter is not the official legal term. In addition, it is useful to underline that the correct form, “President of the Council of the Ministers”, better elucidates the relative weight of the cabinet as a whole in its interactions with the President. Indeed, in the daily practice the President does not always fully wields the power of the 'prime' among all ministers.
in foreign affairs on the part of the individual politicians in office. Instead, with regard to the governments of the “Second Republic”, it is possible to observe a growing degree of proactivity of the PCM in the field of foreign policy, at least at the highest level of broader political goals, consistently with the concurrent, more general trend towards the ‘enhancement’, in all policy domains, of the functions of the President and of the PCM to the detriment of those of other ministries and of the Council of Ministers as a body (Ferraris 1996; Mammarella and Cacace 2008).

In conclusion, it is not possible to argue that the driving force of foreign policy in Italy can be always identified in the Prime Minister or in the Foreign Minister, but rather that “a principle of varying ‘polycentric’ decision-making” (Ferro and Leotta 2011) is applicable to the field of the conduct of foreign policy.

Concerning specifically the organisation of the Office of the Presidency of the Council, according to the law 400/1988, the General Secretariat of the Presidency is tasked with assisting the President “through analysis and documentation services, [...] in managing international relations and, in general, in conducting all foreign policy actions” (article 19 paragraph 1, letter i). Similar duties are assigned also as to external advisers and consultants appointed by the President, as well as to a senior diplomat seconded by the MFA (“Diplomatic Adviser”, in Italian “Consigliere Diplomatico”), assisted by a staff composed of career diplomats. Within its office, every diplomat is usually in charge of covering dossiers related to specific geographical areas. In the Office of the Presidency there is also an office of the Military Adviser, led by a senior official from the Ministry of Defence, who is responsible for providing support to the President and its Office in its coordination activities with all the institutions dealing with matters concerning defence and security, and with all matters relating to the military commitments deriving from Italy’s membership of relevant international organizations (UN, NATO, EU, etc.). In this respect, over the past twenty years, the PCM has been particularly active in politically endorsing and supporting the Italian contribution to NATO and EU peace support operations abroad (Coticchia 2006; Giacomello and Verbeek 2011). Finally, also intelligence services, that play an important role in the pre-decision making phase of the foreign policy process, are now located under the PCM after the last reform law of the intelligence system, passed in 2007. The Department of Information for Security, reporting
directly to the President and to a dedicated PCM Undersecretary, is responsible for overseeing the activities of the two intelligence agencies. In particular, the agency dealing with external security, together with the military intelligence department of the Ministry of Defence, is in charge of collecting intelligence out of the national territory and is therefore one of the supporting tools the Prime Minister and the PCM can rely on to make foreign policy decisions.

**3.3.3 Ministry of Defence**

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is the ministry in charge of performing the state duties in the domain of defence and military security. In particular, the MoD is responsible for “the political and military participation of Italy in peace support operations, the Italian contribution to international organizations dealing with security and defense policies, the general and operational planning of the armed forces and of planning in the industrial defence sector” (article 20, paragraph 1, legislative decree. No. 300/1999).

Although according to the relevant legal provisions it does not wield specific powers in foreign policy, in the light of practice it is possible to observe that from the 1980s onwards, the role of the MoD in matters of international concern has greatly expanded. This transformation has taken place on the basis of a peculiar trait of the Italian foreign policy of the last thirty years, i.e. the progressive increase of military commitments made by Italy in the framework of the multinational UN/NATO/EU peace support operations, especially after the end of the Cold War, in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the ‘broader Middle East’ (Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan). The significant Italian contribution to these missions and possible gains in terms of political leverage and prestige are considered by some commentators as one of the most successful foreign policy activities carried out by Italy after the end of the Cold War (Giacomello and Verbeek 2012).

The political leadership of the MoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the four Armed Forces involved in various crisis areas have in fact gained more weight in the decision-making and implementation process concerning the establishment and management of these military missions, due to the operational and technical nature of the activities. It is therefore possible to argue that the Ministry of
Defence contributes to the development of the Italian foreign and security policy through the formulation of politico-military guidelines applicable to the Italian participation to these operations.

In greater detail, the Ministry of Defence oversees the politico-diplomatic implications of the operations through the office of the Diplomatic Adviser (in Italian ‘Consigliere Militare’) and the office of Military Policy. The importance of international military operations for the political leadership of the MoD has clearly emerged in recent years, inter alia, from the regular visits of defence Ministers and top officials to Italian troops deployed in theatres of operation in different areas of the world.

At the level of Chiefs of Defence Staff, the Department III - Military Policy and Planning supports the Ministry in the development of defense and national security policies, as well as in the assessment of security priorities related to the geographical position of the Italian peninsula. The Joint Staff Operational Command however, in particular through the Operations Division, is responsible for the tasks of command, control and coordination of peace support operations, and works closely with all Italian military actors present in the field, including military attachés, if any. In carrying out these tasks, the Command is in close contact with the MFA, in accordance with the agreements signed on coordination of their respective roles in operational contexts abroad.

With respect to countries where Italian military units are deployed, however, the network of military attachés and their offices, embedded in the Italian embassies abroad, plays an important role as it is responsible for covering issues of military interests affecting the host state. This network also reports to the Division for Information and Security, the department of military intelligence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (already mentioned in the section on the PCM).

3.3.4 Ministry of Economic Development

The Ministry of Economic Development (MED) is the institution tasked with assisting the main sectors of Italian economy, with regard to the enhancement and development of competitiveness of the national productive system, and for what concerns the harmonization and monitoring of the internal market. According to the law no. 117/2008, the MED subsumed the former ministries of

In accordance with the Prime Minister’s decree no. 158/2013, detailing the reorganization of the ministry, the MED is now structured in 15 Directorates-General headed by General Directors, and coordinated at the top level by a Secretary General.

Given that the MED is undoubtedly one of the ministries with the most complex and diverse portfolios, and that the boundary between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ in certain policies is increasingly blurred, there are different Directorates General which are involved to some extent in the foreign policy decision making and implementation process. To name only the most important ones, there are the Directorate-General for international trade policy, the Directorate-General for internationalization of business firms and the promotion of trade, and the Directorate General for security of energy supply and energy infrastructures. All these directorates-general have offices covering different regions of the world; the second of them, in particular, is also responsible for giving political guidance and for overseeing the network of the “Institutes for Foreign Trade”, located in many countries abroad, in cooperation with the MFA and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Founded in 1926, abolished in mid-2011 and re-established at the end of 2013 in the form of an agency, its objective is to promote economic and trade relations of Italian companies abroad, with particular attention to the needs for internationalization of small and medium-sized enterprises, and to strengthen the image of Italian products in the world. The Institute is structured in headquarters offices and 60 branches around the world, working in cooperation with the diplomatic-consular network of the MFA, and is an important tool of foreign and economic policy.

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63 In the light of the limited scope of this Chapter, I have decided not to cover all the actors of the Italian Foreign Policy Community. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), although not included here, is nonetheless an important player not only in supporting the MED in assisting Italian firms abroad, but also because it is a fundamental shareholder in some Italian large firms with a prominent international projection, as discussed later in this thesis. In addition, MEF plays an important part in the decision-making process in all matters concerning the Italian participation in international economic organisations and forums (EU/G8/G20/IMF/World Bank), and according to the 2014 law on development cooperation, it has a fundamental say in the management of financial aspects of the allocation of Italian foreign aid.
Finally, the Directorate-General dealing with energy is especially important in the Italian foreign policy process, as one of the main tenets of Italian foreign policy has always been to secure its energy needs by maintaining good relations with important oil and gas producing countries (Libya, Algeria, Russia). Although they are not formally related to the MED, it is useful to mention at this point two organizations that in different ways play a part in the economic foreign policy process in Italy. Founded in 1977, transformed in 2004 in a public company, SACE is an insurance and finance group totally controlled by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, offering export credit, credit insurance, investment protection abroad, financial guarantees and deposits to Italian companies interested in exporting to foreign countries, being them SMEs or large companies. SACE also provides monitoring and analysis of the political-economic risk factors in countries which companies intend to do business with. SIMEST (“Italian Society for Companies Abroad”), established in 1991 by the former Ministry of International Trade (now MED), and transformed into a public company in 2012, is tasked with assisting in the process of internationalization of Italian firms, by acquiring up to 49% of their capital. With the Ministry of Economy and Finance being the majority shareholder of SIMEST, the company offers also consulting services to various firms, and provides funding for feasibility studies and technical assistance programs, as well as initiatives for exporting companies.

3.3.5 Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committees

In the Italian system of ‘perfect bicameralism’, both chambers of the Parliament, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, wield the same powers, therefore there are two identical standing Foreign Affairs Committees in the two parliamentary bodies. Within the scope of their competences, the standing Committees perform legislative functions, offer political guidance to and parliamentary overseeing on the executive; the Foreign Affairs Committees, in particular, are responsible for the matters concerning “foreign affairs, European Union (treaties revisions, relations with non EU states and political relations with EU members); migration”\(^64\). Public hearings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, senior

\(^64\) Chamber of Deputies website: http://www.camera.it/leg17/737
diplomats, academics and experts, are regularly organised before the Committees, and in cases of particular urgency ad hoc sessions are set up on specific issues.

Interesting accounts of the role of Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committees in the Italian foreign policy making have been offered by many scholars, but especially from a legal point of view (Attinà 1972; Cassese A. 1982; Manzella 1982; Rogati 1982; Garavoglia 1984; Massai 1984; Casu 1995). However, they date back to the 1970s and the 1980s, therefore they clearly do not cover the post-Cold War period. Only one scholarly research has been conducted over the past two decades, and again from a legal perspective: according to the author, the analysis of such committees demonstrates that the Italian parliament exerts a role of “occasional, irregular centrality” in foreign policy. In contrast to the cases of the US, France, the United Kingdom and Germany, “the parliament offers a wide array of regular meetings and venues for debating and overseeing foreign policy issues”, but the fragmentation of the occasions for exercising its functions of political guidance and parliamentary control of the executive proves sometimes inefficient and time-consuming (Longo 2011).

Further political science/IR research is of course needed on this topic, nonetheless it is possible to try to suggest some preliminary remarks. It is clear that due to the nature of foreign policy, most functions and powers are attributed to the government. This holds true particularly in the case of Italy, where the Constitution and other types of laws assign only a limited role to the Parliament (and therefore to the corresponding Committees), in terms of law-making. However, on the basis of the analysis of the work performed by the Committees and by specific MPs both on a daily basis, and on the occasion of specific foreign policy events/decisions concerning Italy, it can be argued that during the last few years these parliamentary bodies have been experiencing a slow shift towards greater involvement. Indeed, they have been fairly active on a number of occasions, considering the limited scope of their attributions, in terms of supporting/challenging the executive in the public debate on specific issues, parliamentary questions required, passing of motions and resolutions containing political guidance for the government, etc. (Ranieri 2006; Zanon 2006; Ronzitti and Di Camillo 2008). Concerning the aforementioned limited role that they can play in the domain of foreign policy law-making, it is important to underline, as
a partial ‘exception’, that in the case of the reform of the ‘Italian Cooperation’, approved in 2014 and previously mentioned in this Chapter, the political pressure coming from a group of MPs belonging to Foreign Affairs Committees in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate has been crucial for achieving such goal. In addition, although specific analyses on this have not been produced so far, it is possible to suggest that the work of these committees (and the ‘informal’ influence they seem to have gradually started to exert) should be studied also in combination with the examination of the role of parties in the foreign policy process. On the one hand, they are indeed a privileged site for parties’ political action, together with the executive, and on the other they are for MPs an important step towards top political appointments in the MFA or in international organizations with political forums for MPs (on political parties see the relevant subsection).

3.4 Between the ‘inner ring’ and the ‘second ring’

3.4.1 Political parties

During the Cold War, political parties have played a crucial role in the whole Italian political system. The expression ‘Republic of parties’, coined by an Italian historian and quite popular both in the scholarly literature and the public debate, well epitomizes the centrality of party actors in Italian politics (Scoppola 1997). According to Santoro (1991: 242), still at the end of the Cold War the party subsystem, unlike in the US case, played a fundamental role of ‘filter’ between the ‘inner ring’ on the one hand, composed of the institutional bodies of the executive and of the legislative, tasked by the Constitution with specific attributions in the domain of foreign policy, and the ‘second ring’, where non state actors can be found (on Italian political parties and foreign policy during the Cold War see also Pilati 1978; Putnam 1978; Panebianco 1977 and 1982). In sum, in Italy there was “a sort of double systemic oligarchy (institutions and parties) that create[d] and

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65 In greater detail, the scholar argues that the Italian party subsystem has hampered the development of a mature democracy in Italy, although he acknowledges that in the aftermath of the II World War no other options were viable for Italy to rebuild its institutional and political system.
decide[d] at least 90% of national foreign policy with almost no external influences from the outside” (Santoro 1991: 242).

No comprehensive accounts of the role of parties in Italian foreign policy have been published after the collapse of the party system between 1992-1993, but it can be argued that some changes have occurred in this domain. Although the subject would need in-depth analyses, some preliminary considerations can nonetheless be suggested. The demise of historical parties such as the Christian Democracy Party and the Communist Party, that with some leading political leaders (especially Christian Democrat ones) had managed the foreign policy of the country for almost fifty years, for the first part of the 1990s has left a vacuum not filled by the emergence of political figures with a particular expertise on foreign affairs. This tendency, in addition, has also further increased the influence of civil servants vis-à-vis the politicians charged with managing foreign policy, as described in the section on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A few years later, some politicians hailing from the remnants of the two main parties have slowly emerged with a particular interest in international politics. On the centre-left side of the political spectrum they were Beniamino Andreatta, Romano Prodi, Massimo D’Alema, Piero Fassino, Umberto Ranieri, Enrico Letta and Marta Dassù (Croci 2008a; Brighi 2007), and more recently Federica Mogherini, Lapo Pistelli, Vincenzo Amendola and Lia Quartapelle. On the center-right side, on the contrary, the establishment of a leading party with a pronounced tendency towards the ‘personalisation’ of politics and of the organisation of the party itself, has led to the centralisation of functions and skills in foreign policy in the leader Silvio Berlusconi and in an extremely narrow circle of very close, low profile foreign policy advisers with no significant appointments within the party structure (Brighi 2006; Coralluzzo 2006; Croci 2002).

As this is one of the most overlooked areas of the Italian foreign policy process, it is extremely difficult to argue whether political parties still play the crucial role illustrated by Santoro or not (1991). When thinking of the main events occurred in Italian foreign policy over the last two decades, the first impression is that on the center-left side of the political arena they still do, although in a different way.

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66 Interestingly, some scholars also stressed the emergence of a sort of ‘bipartisan consensus’ on many foreign policy issues (Giacomello, Coticchia and Chelotti 2006; Carbone 2011).
and with different tools. One of the arguments supporting this idea could be, for instance, the fact that many of the political appointees at the top of the MFA (ministries and undersecretaries) had previously worked as shadow ministers or party board members with tasks related to foreign policy. Finally, the role of parties can be examined also through the lenses of their behaviour within coalition cabinets. While in most cases coalition partners have shared a significant number of views on foreign policy matters, on two occasions, the stability of a government was on the contrary challenged in Parliament by coalition junior partners, resulting in cabinet crises (in 1997 and 2007, and in both cases on the center-left side of the political arena). It is important to underline that on the contrary, during the Cold War, the extremely frequent cabinet crises witnessed by the Italian political and institutional system had never been triggered by a confrontation over foreign policy issues (Carbone 2011). Coticchia and Davidson (2015) have recently started to explore the dynamics of the management of foreign policy by Italian coalition cabinets, with a special emphasis on the role of ‘radical’ parties, but further research is anyway much needed on political parties in the Italian foreign policy arena (Brighi 2013).

3.5 The ‘second ring’. Non state actors

Some scholars have argued that the significant changes occurred for Italy at the end of the Cold War and at the onset of the 1990s, both on the international and on the domestic scene, were expected to reverse, to some extent, the tendency for Italian foreign policy to be hostage of domestic politicking and, at the same time, to open up fresh space for other societal actors in the realm of foreign policy (IAI 1993; Hill 2003 and 2015; Brighi 2013; Carbone 2011). This holds true especially for some of these actors. The ‘second ring’ of the model presented here includes large business firms with a remarkable international projection, media, academia, think-tanks and NGOs.

3.5.1 Large business corporations

ENI, the “National Hydrocarbons Corporation”, founded in 1953 as a public firm and transformed in 1992 into a limited company, is a global company active in
the production, transportation, transformation and marketing of oil and natural gas. Owned for about 30% of shares by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, it is one of the largest companies in the world in the energy sector and is now present in 90 countries. For the management of institutional and international relations of the company, ENI has an International Relations Director. Interestingly, in recent years a career diplomat has been appointed to this posting, by virtue of a law authorizing the secondment of diplomats from the MFA to major Italian strategic companies for a short period of time. Both the Directorate of International Relations and the offices dealing with political and financial risk analysis cover daily political and security developments affecting areas of the world where the group is present, in cooperation with relevant MFA departments. However, beyond such specific offices, the proactive and prominent role that the company has always played in the making of foreign policy in Italy, from the 1950s to today, has to be undoubtedly attributed to the top management of the company, in general terms. Notwithstanding ups and downs, the relationship between ENI’s leadership and the Foreign Ministry and other top policy-makers have historically been very sound. As a result, among all Italian economic actors, the company is the one that, in the long run, has definitely exerted the biggest influence on many Italian foreign policy issues (Darnis 2011; Coticchia, Giacomello and Sartori 2011). In this context, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and most recently Russia and some areas of Sub-Saharan Africa have traditionally been key regional scenarios for the group.

ENEL, the “National Corporation for Electricity”, established in 1962 and transformed in a limited company thirty years later, is a multinational utility company working in the production and distribution of electricity and gas. Approximately 25% of the company’s shares are today owned by the Italian government, through the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Unlike ENI, ENEL does not have a Director or an office specifically dealing with international affairs, but dedicated board members are now appointed to deal respectively with Europe, South America, and North and Sub-saharan Africa, consistently with the fast-moving expansion of the company in these areas since the 1990s. At the same time, over the last two decades the influence of the company, particularly of its top management, on Italian foreign policy matters has clearly increased.
Founded in 1999 as part of ENEL, following the liberalization of the electricity sector, Terna is the leading independent operator of the electricity transmission networks in Europe in terms of kilometres of lines managed. It is responsible for the National Transmission Network, based on the Grid Development Plan approved each year by the Ministry of Economic Development. A rather young company in this sector, Terna has an Office of International Affairs, located within the Department of Public Affairs, which deals with the daily relations of the company with Italian institutions and foreign partners. The group has nowadays a strong interest in enhancing its international projection in Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

Edison, established in 1884, is the oldest European company operating in the field of energy. Today in Italy it is the second largest producer of electricity, and the second operator in the hydrocarbons sector, meeting about 17% of the country’s gas needs. The company is also engaged in the exploration and production of hydrocarbons in various areas of the world, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. External Relations and Communication, Management and Economic Studies Departments work in support of the institutional and international strategies of management of Edison.

The Astaldi group, founded in the 1920s, is one of the most important suppliers of engineering solutions in Italy and in the world in the fields of transport infrastructure, water and renewable energy, and civil and industrial construction. Mainly engaged in the construction of railways, water mains, ports and public buildings in Italy and in some African countries until the outbreak of World War II, after the war the company managed to expand its presence in other parts of the world, while in Italy it focused primarily on post-war reconstruction. Nowadays, Astaldi operates in many areas of the world, from Central Europe to the Middle East, from North Africa to the Americas.

Born in 1948 as “Institute for Industrial Reconstruction” (IRI) and privatized in the early 1990s, Leonardo Finmeccanica is currently the leading Italian industrial group in the high technology sector and among the top global companies in the areas of defence, aerospace and security. With about 30% of its shares owned by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the group is active in the fields of military aircraft, defence electronics and security and aviation, as well as those of defence systems and satellite services. In addition to the Italian one, the three most
important markets for Finmeccanica are the United States, the United Kingdom and Poland, but the company is also active in (and exports to) many other areas of the world (e.g.: Middle East countries). From an organizational point of view, the top management is assisted by a Directorate for External Relations, Communication and Institutional Affairs and a Research Department, tasked with developing strategies to expand its presence in foreign markets. In the same way as ENI, also the senior management of Finmeccanica itself carefully monitors political and economic issues related to the countries of interest for the company (Darnis 2011).

3.5.2 Media

Generally speaking, all Italian media with national circulation (or broadcasting on a national scale) devote some attention to Italian foreign policy and to international politics in general. However, the quality of information conveyed to the public, at least on mainstream media, is often poor and the message is rather oversimplified. One of the reasons for such circumstances is that historically, Italian public opinion, for a number of reasons partially touched upon in Chapter 2 and in the section on public opinion in this Chapter, has never been particularly interested in foreign affairs, and such feature of the Italian audience has certainly had its impact on the activity of the media in this field (Vigezzi 1991; Isernia 1992). According to Santoro (1991), in addition, during the Cold War the media’s attitude tended to show a rather uncritical acceptance of the political leanings of specific parties in foreign policy, more or less openly (some of them were directly financed by parties, and media in general have always benefited and still benefit today from huge public funding).

Over the last twenty years, the number of articles and TV reports on international politics published and offered by the widely popular mainstream newspapers like ‘Corriere della Sera’ and ‘La Repubblica’, or by the TV public service broadcasting RAI and the main private broadcasting corporations Mediaset and Sky, especially when it comes to pieces contributed by correspondents and reporters from the field, has decreased, as well as their quality, with an all-time low over the past few years, mostly due to the budgetary crisis almost all traditional media have gone through. Over the last few years, TV national evening news have dedicated
approximately 6% of the programme to international politics, compared to 22% to domestic politics and 12% to crime reporting (Barretta 2013: 2, for the Observatory on Media of the University of Pavia). The situation is partially different as far as new media are concerned, as some good quality websites dealing with international politics, sometimes related to universities or think-tanks, are slowly emerging. At the same time, the limited – but growing – exposure of the Italian public to foreign media is somehow having a moderate impact on how citizens approach this kind of specialised information.

Unfortunately, academic research has not focused on the role of the media in the Italian foreign policy arena so far, neither in the domain of political science/IR, nor in the field of communication studies, with the exception of Turato (2013), dealing with the role of the media in the process of ‘personalisation’ of foreign policy in Italy, with a specific focus on the Berlusconi governments. On the basis of the assessment of the main foreign policy issues Italy has been confronted with after the Cold War, it is possible to argue that on some occasions media have played a part in the foreign policy arena, for instance as a ‘mouthpiece’ for the actions of the government, e.g. in the case of the Italian diplomatic and then military initiatives after the outbreak of the 2006 Lebanon War, or in the case of the liberation of Italian hostages in war-zones, etc. In other cases, specifically related to the Italian participation to NATO military operations, media activities have been constrained, to some extent, by a strict information policy issued by the Minister of Defence (Biloslavo 2007; Ignazi, Giacomello and Coticchia 2012; Coticchia and De Simone 2014). Of course, examples mentioned here do not provide sufficient empirical evidence to draw conclusions, but are presented in order to offer some preliminary suggestions for further analysis.

3.5.3 Academia

During the Cold War, the Italian academia has never had a significant impact on the foreign policy process, with the exception of an extremely narrow group of

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67 For the sake of accuracy, although most academic institutions in Italy are publicly funded and depend on the Ministry for Education and Research, they are described together with other non state actors because for the purpose of this analysis, they behave as if they do not have formal ties with the state.
historians and jurists, that had developed close ties with MFA top officials during part of their career (for instance the historian Mario Toscano). In contrast to the cases of the US or other European countries, in Italy the appointment of academics to government postings has never been common practice in the field of foreign and defence policy. If one follows the line of reasoning suggested by Pasquino in 1977, according to which “the more dynamic a state foreign policy is, the higher the demand for scholars and international practitioners (and the offer thereof) would be” (1977: 27), it should be inferred that being the object of inquiry so poor, the low number of academics and experts dealing with foreign policy was a natural consequence, as well as the extremely limited impact they had on the Italian foreign policy process. However, as explained in Chapter 2, the establishment of political science and IR as academic disciplines, respectively in the 1940-1950s and in the 1960-1970s, has been hampered in Italy by different institutional, intellectual and political reasons. Such scenario has produced two main consequences concerning the (non-) impact of academia on the Italian foreign policy process. On the one hand, it has led to the lack of a well-established foreign policy Italian epistemic community, and to the marginalization of political science/IR academic pundits in this field, whose expertise has simply been ignored by foreign policy élites (Andreatta and Hill 2001). On the other, it has resulted in the graduation of would-be politicians, diplomats, etc. with a particularly poor university-level training in political science and IR (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a)

Over the last twenty years, such state of affairs seems to have changed, at least partially. The number of scholars and students working and graduating specifically in political science and IR has constantly increased: as a result, some academics have gradually started to become formal or informal advisers of top political appointees within the government (a trend much stronger in the realm of economics, in Italy), participate in public hearings before the Foreign Affairs parliamentary committees, or regularly contribute op-ed and opinions on foreign policy issues to major newspapers and TV channels. In addition, a moderately higher number of politicians dealing with foreign affairs now hold a university

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68 To provide an example, still today the Italian national exam for entering the diplomatic career does not cover political science/IR topics, but only international history, international and EU law, international economics and two foreign languages.
degree in these subject, and although the effects of such changes will probably be clear only in the mid- or long-term, they will likely be more inclined to approach matters with a different attitude from the past (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a; Andreatta and Zambernardi 2010; Clementi 2011).

3.5.4 Think-tanks

As an exhaustive analysis of all think-tanks and political foundations would have gone beyond the limits of this Chapter, think-tanks analysed here have been selected on the basis of their role in the foreign policy process and on their activities in the policy/geographical areas relevant for the development of this thesis (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002b and 2004).

The Istituto Affari Internazionali (Institute for International Affairs – IAI), founded in 1965 as a non-profit cultural association, on the initiative of the pro-European intellectual Altiero Spinelli, is today the leading Italian think-tank in the field of international politics. The goal of IAI is to raise awareness and promote the knowledge of international affairs, security and international economics in Italy through studies, research, publications, conferences, public outreach activities, often in cooperation with other foreign think tanks, government institutions and business companies. Very limited financing is supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while most of the funding comes from EU sponsored and private research projects. Over almost fifty years of activity, thanks to the network of members, the Institute has become a regular interlocutor and partner of the institutions responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, major Italian companies with international projection and other actors from academia and of civil society, for example during the negotiations for the Italian accession to the Non Proliferation Treaty during the second half of the 1960s, or on occasion of the Euromissiles crisis at the end of the 1970s. Close ties with top politicians working in the foreign policy area are still in place today. In some cases, IAI researchers have worked as formal or informal consultant for policy-makers and large firms (Darnis and De Simone 2014). The Institute is headed by a President and a Director, and is structured in different research areas: European Union; Transatlantic relations; Mediterranean and Middle East; Turkey; Security and Defence; International Economics; Italian foreign policy.
The Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (Institute for International Political Studies – ISPI) was established in Milan in 1934 by a group of scholars from the universities of Milan and Pavia, and has traditionally been funded by a small grant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, like IAI, and from corporate donors (Longhini 2015: 582). It is less research-oriented than IAI but it has always been very active in the field of education, offering for instance short and executive courses, and a year-long programme for training students who aim to take part in the national exam to join the diplomatic corps. ISPI is organised in different observatories and programmes: Asia, Cyber security; Europe and global governance; Geoeconomics; Middle East and North Africa; Radicalisation and International terrorism; Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia; Energy security; Latin America; Migration; Transatlantic relations. Mediterranean and Middle East. Since the beginning of the 2010s, ISPI’s staff presence in the public debate on international issues and their interactions with state foreign policy institutions and policy makers have been growing significantly.

The Centre for Studies on International Politics (in Italian ‘Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale’, CeSPI), is an independent, not-for-profit organization founded in Rome in 1985 as a research center on international politics affiliated with the Italian Communist Party. After a few years of readjustment, due to the collapse of the Communist Party at the end of the Cold War, the Centre has resumed its activities, securing its funding by participating in research projects supported by the EU and other international organizations, providing consulting services to business firms and other actors, and benefiting from a small contribution offered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although the degree of proximity of CeSPI to the ‘control rooms’ of foreign policy and to the political parties has obviously decreased over time, the Centre is nonetheless part of a number of international networks of think tanks and foundations, and organizes a number of conferences and seminars open to the public each year. The Centre is headed by a President and a Director, and conducts research according to some prevailing guidelines: international cooperation, financing for development, security and peace; decentralized cooperation, cross-border cooperation and regional development; human mobility, transnationalism and co-development; enlargement, neighbourhood policy and global projection of the European Union; role of international and foreign economic policy in Italy. From a
geographical perspective, the areas covered by the Centre are Eastern Europe and the Balkans; Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and the Mediterranean.

The Institute for Relations between Italy and the African, Latin American, Middle and Far Eastern Countries (IPALMO), is a think-tank established in 1971 in Rome by a group of politicians and intellectuals close to some members of the Christian Democracy Party, and to socialist and communist leaders. A non-profit organization, the purpose of IPALMO is to contribute to raising awareness of international politics, and to stimulate debate on Italian foreign policy and on Italian Development Cooperation policy. The Institute conducts research and policy studies and international economics, economic and cultural cooperation, regional integration processes and relations between countries with different levels of economic development. During the first part of its life, the IPALMO was primarily devoted to issues relating to decolonization, the struggle for democracy in Latin America, and North-South relations in the world. In the 1980s, the Institute has focused on the politics of development cooperation in Italy, contributing to the drafting of the first framework law for the reform of the Italian Cooperation in 1987, in collaboration with the MFA. The demise of the bipolar confrontation and the crisis of the Italian Development Cooperation led the Institute to modify the focus of its activities, looking also at the private sector as a priority issue and analysing the role of Italy in the Mediterranean and in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. In recent years, the Institute has also expanded its focus to Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. IPALMO is headed by a President and a Director, and today its funding comes from a small MFA grant and from the research projects carried out by the Institute.

3.5.5 NGOs

The number of NGOs operating in Italy is rather high, as well as the proportion of them being active on the international scene. However, the vast majority of them are rather small in size and are active in the domains of development cooperation and human rights advocacy domains, while very few organisations work also in the fields of preventive diplomacy and crisis management. To name but a few with no specific Catholic orientation, there are two vocal NGOs affiliated to the Transnational Radical Party, “No Peace Without Justice” and “Hands off
Cain”, that have been very proactive in coordinating the efforts towards the establishment of the International Criminal Court (the Statute was indeed signed in Rome in 1998), and in supporting in the UN General Assembly, together with the Italian government, the Moratorium on Death Penalty in 2007 and a resolution containing a ban on female genital mutilation in 2012 (Cugliandro 2009; Marchetti 2013).

As explained in Chapter 1, the Community of Sant’Egidio is situated in a broader, diverse group of NGOs based in Italy (or whose central headquarters are on the Italian territory), which consider themselves ‘Catholic-inspired NGOs’. Such organisations, which in principle operate largely independently from the government, feature several differences in terms of legal status, mission, structure, activities, funding, etc. but are all active both in Italy and abroad, often being part also of broader non Catholic NGOs networks. Some of these NGOs are Catholic lay ecclesial movements and associations and are defined ‘private’ or ‘public’ according to the Code of Canon Law. Others have no formal ties with the Holy See but obviously share a strong ideational common ground with it, and rely on Parish churches networks on the Italian territory. Nevertheless, they are all subject to Italian law and their rooting in the Italian society is pretty evident. Apart from Sant’Egidio, that will be described in the next section, the most important NGOs in this group are the FOCSIV network of Catholic-inspired NGOs, founded in 1972 and made today of approximately 60 organisations; AVSI, an NGO established in 1972 in the framework of Communion and Liberation, a broader, prominent lay ecclesial movement which is very influential in different sectors of Italian domestic politics; Focolare Movement, a movement founded in Italy at the end of the 1940s that is currently present in 182 countries all over the world, with local councils and delegates. These NGOs are all extensively involved in the fields of development aid, humanitarian assistance and human rights protection, especially in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. These organisations enjoy full access to funds and projects managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the Italian law on development cooperation (law 49/1987, modified in 2014). None of them, however, has developed a specific expertise in the domains of preventive diplomacy and crisis management, unlike Sant’Egidio (see the following Chapter).
3.6 The ‘outer ring’

3.6.1 Public opinion

Studies on Italian public opinion during the Cold War demonstrate that the level of interest in foreign policy on the part of citizens has always been rather low, and that their attitudes and preferences have been significantly stable over time (Battistelli and Isernia 1991). Many scholars and commentators have argued that Italy’s extremely limited room for action in foreign policy during the bipolar era, and the sort of ‘delegation’ of Italian foreign and defence policy to NATO, have pushed Italian public opinion (and politicians and academia too, to some extent) to an overall lack of concern about foreign and military affairs, and made any debate over national interests nearly impossible to develop (Pasquino 1977; Vigezzi 1991; Isernia 1992 and 2001; Battistelli 2012). “The two main political cultures and parties, the Christian Democrats and the Communists, which also had to come to grips with the historical inheritance of fascism, found common ground on two basic points: first, the image of Italy as a ‘pacifist’ actor on the international stage, backing only UN or multilateral initiatives; second, the necessity of avoiding harsh political confrontation on military issues” (Coticchia and De Simone 2014; see also Panebianco 1997; D’Amore 2001; Coticchia 2010).

It is clear that if debates on contentious foreign and defence issues were disregarded by the main parties, it was all the more difficult for public opinion to receive the appropriate incentives to get informed on these policies and the role of Italy. Generally speaking, a rather inward looking attitude is confirmed also after 1989. An extensive poll conducted on Italian public opinion and foreign policy in 2013, showed that 65% of people interviewed believed that Italy should focus mainly on its domestic problems, while only 27% argued that international affairs should be the priority (CIRCaP/LAPS-IAI 2013: 7). However, such scenario has started to change during the last two decades, at least as far as specific foreign policy issues are concerned, for a number of reasons. First of all, like in other Western countries (and beyond) the advent of new media technologies such as satellite TV and the internet brought Italian public opinion closer to events occurring in remote corners of the world. Secondly, and more importantly, the renewed
activism of Italy on the international stage started to moderately draw the attention of a higher share of public opinion. Italian involvement in UN/NATO/EU peace support operations abroad is a litmus test in this sense, as public opinion interest in foreign and defence policies has begun to increase on these occasions (Isernia 2001). The use of the military instrument within the framework of international organizations has been considered a legitimate and crucial tool of foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008), a significant data taking into account the fact that participation in such operations has been one of the most successful Italian foreign policy activities over the last two decades.

As briefly illustrated, Italian public opinion is slowly emerging in the foreign policy process as an actor gradually building a rather sound set of ideas and beliefs on different issues. Public opinion surveys are now much more carefully considered by politicians also in this field (again, especially as far as public support for military operations is concerned; see Battistelli 2012; Coticchia and De Simone 2014). However, compared to other policy areas, foreign and defence policies are yet to become a decisive issue in the public debate and during electoral campaigns (Silvestri 2013).

3.7 Conclusions. Back and forth from the ‘second ring’ to the ‘inner ring’. Possible interactions between the state and NGOs

As described in this Chapter, the Italian Foreign Policy Community is composed of many different actors, and their roles and tasks are not always clearly set out, not even at the institutional level. While conducting a complete assessment of all patterns of interaction possibly developing among all the actors of the FPC would be impossible due to the scope of this Chapter – more than a whole thesis would be necessary – it can be reasonably argued that the Italian institutional setting in foreign policy is rather fragmented, and that it features a) centres of power and influence scattered along different ‘rings’, according to the different issues and sub-policies at stake on a case-by-case basis; and b) an institutional ‘inner ring’ with a relatively high number of ‘access points’ for external actors, to

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69 For a brief historical – not political science/IR oriented – overview of the foreign policy process in Italy since the unification in 1861 see Mammarella and Cacace 2008: 289-293).
use the metaphor suggested by Hilsman (1971, 1987 and 1993) and Santoro (1991), according to the different issues and sub-policies at stake on a case-by-case basis. It is assuming this picture as a general map of the fragmented foreign policy landscape in Italy that the concept of ‘policy subsystem’\(^7\), presented in Chapter 1, will be employed in the following parts of this thesis in order to identify emerging policy subsystems in two foreign policy subfields, and that interactions between the state institutions and Sant’Egidio in the cases selected will be tracked.

Within this framework, Sant’Egidio and other internationally active Catholic NGOs can channel their proposals and advance their goals interacting with other actors at different points of the ‘rings’. First of all, because of their long-standing presence in the subfields of preventive diplomacy and peace-making activities, human rights advocacy and development cooperation, they certainly have the ability to get closer to a crucial sub-actor at the basis of the ‘inner ring’, i.e. the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealing on a daily basis with such sub-policies (especially development cooperation), in order to influence their activities, secure funding, and negotiate issues of their interest according to the government agenda (if any).

Second, each of the main Catholic NGOs, especially Sant’Egidio, on given occasions, in specific periods of time, and to a different extent, has managed to establish and maintain particularly close ties with top politicians at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the Prime Minister Office (ministries, undersecretaries, etc.), because of common political or religious leanings, or simply because of a background of good personal relations accumulated when political appointees were in a previous stage of their career (e.g., when they were MPs working in the foreign policy arena). This is particularly important when these NGOs aim to play a role on more important high politics issues, as it is the case when preventive diplomacy and peace-making activities are at stake.

\(^7\) The concept of ‘policy subsystem’, unlike those of ‘policy networks’ and ‘iron triangles’ “refers explicitly to policy autonomy enjoyed by a small numbers of actors in a specific policy field” (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001: 131). According to the authors, it encompasses all combinations of actors and at across different levels of government; policy subsystems can come in three forms: dominant, competitive, and disintegrated (for more on these concepts see Chapter 1).
Third, these NGOs often have established relations with political parties (located between the ‘inner’ and the ‘second’ ring), which are crucial in the Italian institutional system, although they are not formally ‘part of the state’. Interestingly, they are often on good terms not only with parties and MPs belonging to the former Christian Democracy Party, but also with center-left groups hailing from the remnants of the Communist Party. In an exceptional case, the founder and head of the Community of Sant’Egidio, Andrea Riccardi, became himself part of the government with the support of a Catholic party recently founded. He was appointed as Minister for International Cooperation (i.e.: development cooperation) in the Mario Monti’s technocratic government, in office from late 2011 to early 2013.

Finally, although in the ‘second’ and in the ‘outer ring’ no state institutions can be found, it is clear that in order to advance their international agenda, it is very important for these NGOs to demonstrate their credibility to the state interlocutors also through the level of support received by societal actors such as the media, relevant academics and public opinion. As mentioned before in this Chapter, part of the added value of these NGOs is the fact of being deeply rooted in the Italian social fabric.

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**Italian foreign policy between 1989 and 2001. Background**

**Basic features**

Further reflections are needed here on the basic features of Rome’s foreign policy after the demise of the bipolar confrontation, that has been also termed “dual crisis” in Chapter 1, in order to illustrate to the reader the backdrop against which a) the Italian Foreign Policy Community actors described later in Chapter 3 have acted, and b) the events presented in Chapters 4-6 have unfolded.

The operational environment of Italian foreign policy has experienced radical changes between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s (see for instance Santoro 1991; Andreatta and Hill 2000 and 2001; Andreatta 2001b; Walston 2007; Verbeek 2009 and 2011; Carbone 2012 Varsori 2013; Pons et al.
2014). On the international side, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Cold War in 1989 have ushered in a new historical phase, marked by a significant easing of the bipolar system strict constraints, which has urged all the actors on the global scenario to rethink their own international position and redefine their strategic interests in the world. This increase in both international opportunities and responsibilities for all states, also defined in terms of “diffusion of power”, has been particularly “crucial for middle powers like Italy, forced during the Cold War to play a subordinate role within their respective asymmetrical alliances” (Santoro 1991: 9).

On the domestic side, ‘Mani Pulite’\(^71\), a major judicial investigation into cases of widespread political corruption started in 1992, the introduction of a quasi-majoritarian electoral system in 1993 and the entry into force of the EU Maastricht Treaty in 1993 have resulted in a huge and complex process of political and institutional transformation, and in the formation of a new bipolar political and party system (two coalitions emerged, alternating in power), that some scholars have defined as the transition from the ‘First’ to the ‘Second Republic’\(^72\).

These domestic transformations were expected to contain, to some extent, the inclination of Italian foreign policy to fall victim to domestic political skirmishes, while clearing somehow the way for the action of other societal actors in the domain of foreign policy, such as NGOs or business groups (Hill 2003 and 2015; Brighi 2005; Carbone 2011; Pons et al. 2014) – on these transformations and their impact on institutional and political setting of Italian foreign policy refer also to Chapter 3, on the Italian Foreign Policy Community.

After the short-lived center-right government headed by Silvio Berlusconi between April 1994 and January 1995, and the following technocrat cabinet led by Lamberto Dini until the general election in 1996, the center-left governments in power between 1996 and 2001 inaugurated a process of reconsideration of Italian foreign policy and of ‘rediscovery of the concept of “national interest”

\(^71\) In English ‘Clean Hands’.

\(^72\) As explained in previous Chapters, these definitions are today rather established both in the public debate and in academia, and are accepted also by scholars of Italian foreign policy (see for instance Coralluzzo 2000; Walston 2007), although a small number of political scientists and historians do not agree on it. It refers to the new political system emerged in the first half of the 1990s, in order to distinguish it from that in place from the end of the Second World War (on this debate see for instance Sartori 1992; Pasquino and McCarthy 1993; Mershon and Pasquino 1995; Katz and Ignazi 1996).
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had suddenly presented Italy with international responsibilities that the country, for more than half a century, had to some extent “delegated” (Romano 2002; Fossati 1999: 26-35 and 2008; Carbone 2011: 10) to the United States and the Western camp in general, and to the partners of the European integration process, especially in its close geographic neighbourhood.

At the same time, the demise of the Cold War brought about new ‘neighbours’ for Italy. Over the previous fifty years, the country had been perceived as a ‘border land’ at the heart of Europe, in a world dominated by the West-East divide. Instead of the Communist bloc, at the beginning of the 1990s Italy realised – or was supposed to realise – that other ‘unchartered’, unstable territories lied on its doorstep. These were the Balkan tinderbox, with its ever-simmering ethnic and political fault lines, and the Mediterranean, with its southern and eastern shores experiencing at that time the challenges posed by political Islam and radical Islamic terrorism.

Until that moment the concept of ‘national interest’ had represented almost a taboo. From the international perspective, contrasts between the Western camp and the Soviet bloc after the end of World War II had strongly influenced any substantive reflection on Italy’s main goals on the international scene, essentially leading to the identification of Rome’s priorities with the main tenets of the Western alliance, namely NATO and the European integration process (Santoro 1991; Romano 2002; Carbone 2011). From the domestic politics point of view, in addition to evoke the imperial ambitions of the Fascism era, the political and/or public debate on the definition – and possible fine-tuning over time – of national interest had long been paralysed by harsh ideological confrontation, especially between the ruling Christian-democrat party and the Communist Party (such conflict was in turn shaped also by the abovementioned international elements) (Galli della Loggia, Panebianco and Rusconi 1993; Molinari 2000). Not only did the lack of a well thought out debate on Italian foreign policy goals hamper and delay during the Cold War the establishment of international studies in general,

73 As explained in Chapter 2, the notion of “national interest” has re-emerged in the public debate at the beginning of the 1990s, especially in the wider context of the ‘rediscovery’ of geopolitical thought in Italy, together with demands by some intellectuals and politicians for recalibrating Italian foreign policy in a more assertive way (Galli della Loggia, Panebianco and Rusconi 1993; Brighi 2013). For a detailed assessment of this issue refer to Chapter 2.
and IR in particular, in the country, as explained in Chapter 2 (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002: 129, among others); another outcome of such political and cultural standstill was that the few attempts to launch a careful assessment of Italian foreign policy and national interest were carried out only by right wing parties and intellectuals.

In the changing landscape of international politics in the 1990s, Italy has come to realize that it was urgent to try to rethink a fresh and more coherent foreign policy agenda to adapt to an evolving scenario, steadily reaffirming at the same time the Western/NATO and European Economic Community (later EU) membership. Therefore, on the one hand it was essential for Italy to demonstrate its loyalty to its allies and not to articulate interests in conflict with those of its partners; on the other, Rome had to try to pursue an “effective [foreign policy, *added by the author*] reorientation in many other key areas of the world and [...] an increased international credibility as a [reliable, *added*] strategic and economic partner” (Colombo and Zannoni 2001: 45).

However, the ‘modus operandi’ of the different center-right and center-left governments in power between 1992 and (at least) 2001, in order to identify national interest and foreign policy tools to advance it, has not stood out for being particularly strategic and forward-looking, but rather for relying on a case by case evaluation of specific events and on a piecemeal – if not inconsistent and erratic – policy. At the same time, like most of the small and medium powers over the world, Italy was faced with a more complex international arena and with a gradual specialisation process of the conduct of international affairs which presented all actors with both opportunities and challenges. In addition, in the same period of time the country has set out on a risky but somehow necessary path towards a ‘bipartisan’ foreign policy (Carbone 2011). Finally, it is interesting to note here that the new Italian activism in foreign policy was “also brought about by MAE [i.e. MFA in Italian, *added*] officials and not [only, *added*] by politicians” (Croci 2008a; see also Croci 2003), in line with the dynamism civil servants working on foreign policy had showed, on some occasions, also during the bipolar era.

An assessment of how Italy has conducted its foreign policy over the years going from 1989 to 2001 in terms of results, effectiveness, consistency, etc. goes absolutely beyond the scope of this thesis. However, as further explained in
following Chapters, it can be argued that Rome showed a certain degree of
activism in domains such as preventive diplomacy, peace-making, human rights
advocacy, and particularly in traditional geographical areas of interest, namely
the Balkans and the Mediterranean/Middle East (Carbone 2011; Giacomello and
Verbeek 2012; Molinari 2000; Romano 2002). This is one of the main reasons
why the cases selected for this thesis are all related to these foreign policy
subfields and/or geographical regions.

**Preventive diplomacy/crisis management in post-Cold War Italian
foreign policy**

The changes produced by the simultaneous international and domestic crises
occurred between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, also
defined in the public debate as a “dual crisis” (IAI 1993) (see Chapter 2 for further
remarks on this), have opened up new opportunities for diplomatic action of
states such as Italy, especially in its close neighbourhood, i.e. Balkans and the
Mediterranean/Middle East. Preventive diplomacy and more ‘classic’ diplomacy
tasks pursued in crisis management are among the domains in which this Italian
foreign policy renewed activism has unfolded, in some cases in combination with
peace-making efforts and significant contributions to international peace-
keeping and peace-enforcing operations (see Chapter 5 on this).

Among the main features of Italian foreign policy and diplomacy of the second
half of the 1990s, there was an attitude to grant countries seen at that time as
‘pariah’ actors by the international community lines of ‘political credit’,
consistently with previous foreign policy choices dating back to the Cold War era,
such as the unilateral diplomatic initiatives aimed at reaching out to the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation, Libya and Syria (Guazzone 2000: 433;
Ferraris 1998; Romano 2002; Mammarella and Cacace 2008). However, a fresh
diplomatic blueprint has apparently emerged in the 1990s, moving away from
previous initiatives, often occasional and inconclusive. In many cases, during the
Cold War these moves were indeed aimed at carving out a small niche of
autonomy and independence for Italy in the context of the Western alliance, in
order to a) win the consent of domestic, Catholic and leftist constituencies, b) try
to increase Rome’s bargaining power in negotiations with western allies or, in
some cases, c) gain limited economic benefits in terms of energy supply or trade. On the contrary, starting with the center-left cabinet which took office after the 1996 general election, led by Romano Prodi, the decision to open channels for dialogue with countries considered as ‘troublesome’, seemed to be consistent with a more comprehensive and quite well thought out vision of specific national interests, to be promoted more independently from – although not overtly in conflict with – those of traditional partners (Molinari 2000 and 2001; Romano 2002).

This was the case, for instance, of diplomatic initiatives launched in those years concerning Iran, Libya, Iraq and Algeria (the latter is the case addressed later in this Chapter). On the Iran dossier, between 1997 and 2001 Rome has played a prominent role in the first attempts of rapprochement between Europe and Iran.

In 1997, after the ‘Mykonos affair’74, the European Union decided to freeze relations with Iran, interrupting the ‘Critical Dialogue’75 launched in 1992 (Struwe 1998)76. Taking advantage of the fact that other EU countries were not in a position to take the lead in a diplomatic attempt to improve relations with Iran – Germany, for example, was directly involved in the ‘Mykonos’ legal dispute, while the United Kingdom was concerned with the case of Salman Rushdie, the Anglo-Indian writer sentenced to death by a fatwa issued in 1989 by the then Iran’s Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, on blasphemy grounds – Italian leaders realised they had a chance of trying to play the diplomacy card to ease tensions and normalise relations with Tehran. The idea of Prime Minister Romano Prodi and of Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini was precisely to place Italy at the forefront of a diplomatic ‘offensive’ aimed at building bridges between the

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74 According to the verdict of the German Supreme Court, high level Iranian officials working for the Ministry of Interior were found guilty of giving the order for the assassination in 1992 of four members of the Iranian-Kurdish opposition in a Berlin restaurant called ‘Mykonos’.

75 The ‘Critical Dialogue’, initiated by the European Council in 1992, was based on the idea that although the time was not yet ripe for establishing formal relations through the standard EU external relations tools, such as trade and cooperation or political agreements, some form of dialogue had to be maintained with Iran, considering its importance in the Middle East. However, EU Member States stressed that the dialogue had to be ‘critical’ because at the same time it had to urge Iran to improve its record in terms of human rights and international terrorism (Hill and Smith 2000: 320).

76 In greater detail, the Council of the European Union agreed on a series of measures entailing the suspension of bilateral relations in a number of domains; in particular, they decided to suspend official bilateral Ministerial visits to or from Iran (Hill and Smith 2000: 321).
West and the Islamic Republic of Iran, at a time when relations between Europe (and even more so Washington) and Tehran were hitting a historical low. With a good sense of timing, Rome seized this opportunity, further favoured by a combination of additional factors. First, the ‘reformist’ turn in Iranian politics after the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, which some Italian observers defined at that time, somehow incautiously, a “Thermidorian” evolution of the regime (Zanardi Landi 1998: 210). Second, the lack of a significant colonial past and of any historical heritage of political influence in the region, unlike states such as the United Kingdom, for instance; third, Italy’s attitude of presenting itself as a non-aggressive power; fourth, the uninterrupted presence of Italian diplomats posted to Tehran even in the worst phases of the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, during which many Western countries had been forced or had decided to recall their ambassadors and, in some cases, even close their diplomatic representations (Molinari 2000).

Through the joint action of the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister and top diplomats, Italy has conducted a diplomatic action which, at least for a few years, before the George W. Bush’s election in 2000 and the emergence of the nuclear dossier, has contributed to fairly improve the relations between Western countries and Iran. The tools used were rather ‘classic’ instruments of diplomacy: establishing or resuming behind the scenes contacts, strengthening economic ties and, above all, organising the first official visits to Iran since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 of a EU/Western state head of government (Prime Minister Romano Prodi travelling to Tehran, in 1998), and of an Iranian president to Europe (President Mohammad Khatami visiting Italy, in 1999). An important role in this process was played also by the partially state-owned oil and gas company ENI, a firm with a long-standing presence in Iran. The United States were of course kept informed during this flurry of diplomatic activity, in order not to damage relations with Washington, and some of the indirect contacts between

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77 Over-optimistic comments such as the one quoted here are emblematic of the expectations raised by the election of Mohammad Khatami during those years, and of the high value Italian foreign policy makers, businessmen and observers placed on the political and economic potential of strengthened bilateral ties with Tehran.

78 Between 1997 and 2005, Italy was alternately Iran’s first or the second trade EU partner. In 2003, for the first time, Italy has even run a trade surplus with an increase in exports of around 8% (Italian-Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2005).
the formal ‘enemies’, the US and Iran, were exchanged at that time through this Italian channel behind the scenes (Molinari 2000 and 2001). All these initiatives were of course very welcomed also by the Iranian side – especially by Mohammad Khatami’s cabinet and the business sector – that was trying to find a way out of two decades of international isolation.

As many analysts have argued, the icebreaking diplomatic rapprochement with Iran brokered by Italy, although limited in time and scope, and then overshadowed by the emergence of the nuclear dossier in 2002-3, was probably the most significant foreign policy success chalked up in the 1990s by Italy in the Middle East. By facilitating a gradual diplomatic reconciliation between the European/Western world and Tehran, Italy has obtained three main results: a) it gained the status of EU privileged partner of Iran in political terms; b) it benefited from new economic opportunities; c) it has strengthened its presence in the Persian Gulf, that until that moment had stayed out of the traditional areas of Italian interest (Guazzzone 2000: 437).

In the case of Libya, between 1996 and 1999 Rome has played a role in the process of Western/European détente with the Ghaddafi regime, leveraging (and further strengthening, at the same time) its long-standing political and economic ties with Libya. The core issue hindering the improvement of relations at that time was the resolution of the Lockerbie affair (1998)\textsuperscript{79}. Tripoli was urged especially by the United States and the United Kingdom, but also by other European countries and the United Nations, to extradite the two Libyan suspects to the Scottish court in charge of investigating the case. In addition to wielding political pressure through frequent contacts and official visits of Ministers and top diplomats to Libya, Italy took responsibility of the delicate matter of the transfer of the Libyans from Tripoli to the Netherlands, where the court was relocated at Libya’s request, using a government official aircraft (Molinari 2000).

Not always, however, has Italian diplomatic activism yielded positive results. As far as Russia is concerned, for example, the “bridge approach” (Collina 2008) that Italy has tried to adopt in more than one occasion since the end of the 1990s, in order to improve relations between European Union countries (and sometimes also the United States) on one side, and Moscow on the other, has often been a

\textsuperscript{79} Lockerbie is the Scottish town where in 1988 the wreckage of Pan Am flight 103 crashed after a bomb attack aboard the flight, which killed 270 people. Following a joint UK-US investigation, arrest warrants were issued for two Libyan officials.
failure. According to some scholars, such “obsession with mediation”, is a common feature of Italian foreign policy, “which implies a persistent offer to mediate even when that role is not requested by the involved parties, generally with the [sole, added by the author] aim to gain visibility in the international arena” (Coralluzzo 2006). This attitude has complemented (if not replaced) the Cold War era “old ‘obsession with visibility’, which implied an excessive preoccupation with presence rather than with policy outcomes” (Carbone and Coralluzzo 2011: 189). The latter was also defined as “the chair policy”” (Quaroni 1956) by the prominent Italian diplomat Pietro Quaroni, to stress the idea that the very fact of sitting at international tables and forums was more important, for Italian political leaders and officials, than the substantive reasons for (and the concrete aims of) being part of the game. These reflections on Italian foreign policy ‘obsessions’, undoubtedly, hold true also for activities conducted in the realm of peace-making (see Chapter 5 on this).

Peace-making in post-Cold War Italian foreign policy

In Chapter 2 I have briefly mentioned that the international and domestic crises striking the country between the end of the Cold War and the first years of the 1990s have generated fresh opportunities for preventive diplomacy activities carried out by states like Italy. The same holds true also for peace-making efforts. It is useful here not to consider them as a tool per se, but rather to place them in the broader context of a set of foreign policy instruments, all used to enhance the country’s international position.

In some cases, peace-making activities have indeed gone hand in hand with – and have preceded, too – significant contributions to international peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations, and it is worthwhile having a look at the latter tool here. Since the end of the Cold War, Italian armed forces have indeed participated in a great number of UN/NATO/EU/multinational missions around the world. Such dynamism in the post-1989 War era is a striking feature if compared to the Cold War era reluctance to get involved in military efforts abroad (Attinà 2008; Ignazi et al. 2012), and has transformed the country from a security consumer into a security producer (Ratti 2011; Coticchia and De Simone 2014). “The identification of peace support operations as a bipartisan and legitimate foreign
policy tool was matched with an increasing public awareness of the relevance of the military instrument, especially when employed for peace-keeping interventions and in multilateral contexts” (Coticchia and De Simone 2014: 5; see also on this Battistelli and Isernia 1991; Battistelli 2004; Battistelli et al. 2012). In addition, contributing a significant number of troops to these operation has become in the eyes of Italian policymakers a crucial instrument to advance Rome’s positions in the global arena in general, and specifically within international organisations, and in the context of bilateral relations with its allies, especially the US and other major EU partners (Davidson 2011), and countries where military units were/are deployed. The high value placed on multilateralism, in all its dimensions – military, political, economic – is indeed a distinctive feature of Italian foreign policy both pre- and post- Cold War; Ratti has even argued that being a multilateral actor is “the inescapable destiny of a middle power” like Italy (2011: 123).

Besides the experience with the Mozambican conflict, which is the case covered later in this thesis, the Lebanese war of 2006, for instance, is a case in point of a peace-making effort that has then been complemented by a remarkable – considering the size and the armed forces of the country – contribution to a peace-keeping mission. On that occasion, Italy has managed to carve out a small niche for its international action contributing to the political and diplomatic peace-making initiatives that have then resulted in the launch of the so called UN peace-keeping operation ‘UNIFIL II’ (Del Sarto and Tocci 2008; Carbone 2008). Following the outbreak of the conflict between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah in July that year, on the initiative of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Italian diplomats coordinated the organisation of a multilateral conference in the Foreign Ministry headquarters in Rome, at the end of the month, to try to reach a cease-fire. This political and diplomatic effort was facilitated by good personal relations between the Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and leaders of different Lebanese political factions, and by a direct channel established with the US Secretary of State and her staff. Although the outcome of the diplomatic summit in itself was modest, the conference was a rather good diplomatic move per se for a country like Italy, that has managed to take the lead of the process, also taking advantage of the French and German hesitations (Aliboni 2006; Brighi 2007), on a relevant foreign policy issue for
Rome – due to its geographical position, Italy has historically been interested in preserving security and stability in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East (Santoro 1996b; De Leonardis 2003; Bardi et al. 2008; Graziano 2007b; Coralluzzo 2008). The conference was also a first step towards the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in August 2006, establishing the enhanced presence of blue helmets forces in the country, that are still deployed there today (Ronzitti and Di Camillo 2008). In addition, it is important to stress that since 2006 Italy has always ranked first in the list of countries contributing troops to the mission (UNIFIL official website\(^{80}\)).

However, not every Italian attempt at launching (or participating in) peace-making activities has been successful. An example of a failed bid is, for instance, the modest attempt made by the then Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in 2008, after the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian conflict, to present himself as a broker between Moscow and Tbilisi, and between Moscow and European Union countries, leveraging its personal friendship ties with the Russian leader Vladimir Putin. “While Russia publicly praised his successful mediation, Georgia not only accused Italy of taking sides, but also rejected its proposal for an international conference on stability in the South Caucasus to be held in Rome” (Carbone and Coralluzzo 2011: 185). The “obsession with mediation” (Carbone and Coralluzzo 2011: 189) illustrated in Chapter 4, with reference to preventive diplomacy and more ‘classic’ crisis management diplomacy, is therefore relevant also as far as peace-making is concerned. Ratti (2011: 138), with reference to Italy, pointed to the concept of “catering diplomacy”, defined as “the hosting and promotion of high-level diplomatic events at the expense of a deeper and more systematic analysis about whether and how ‘catering’ events feed into wider international policies”. In the specific domain of peace-making, sometimes the risk of “catering diplomacy” appeared indeed to be high for Rome (Coralluzzo 2006; Carbone 2013), and this will probably be the case also in the near future.

\(^{80}\) unifil.unmissions.org (last retrieved: 2016).
Chapter 4. The Community of Sant’Egidio

4.1 Chapter outline

This Chapter presents a brief illustration of the Community of Sant’Egidio, shedding light on its establishment, structure, functioning, and activities on the international scene, mostly following a chronological criterion. First, it looks at the establishment of CSE at the end of the 1960s, its founders and the politico-cultural milieu they were embedded in at that time. Second, it briefly presents the activities carried out in the time frame going from its inception to the demise of the Cold War in the religious, social and voluntary work fields (e.g. spreading the Catholic religious message and providing help for people in need). Thirdly, the chapter takes stock of what the Community has done in the international arena after 1989, especially in the subfields of preventive diplomacy/conflict resolution and peace-making, trying to understand how it has operated – particularly in cases when also Italian state institutions were involved – in what areas of the world it has been mostly active, and with what sort of outcomes. Fourth, some remarks are offered on the internal structure of the CSE and on its main leaders from the 1990s to present day. In closing, some remarks are presented on policy subsystems emerging in the subfields of in preventive diplomacy/crisis management. Although they refer, in part, to some of the material on Italian foreign policy presented in previous Chapters, they have been included here as they are based also on considerations on Sant’Egidio activities on the international stage presented in this Chapter.

4.2 1968-1973. The early days. The birth of an ‘innovative’ Catholic non state actor in Italy

The Community of Sant’Egidio is a Catholic-oriented civil society movement founded in Rome in 1968, in the wake of the Second Vatican Council of 1962-1965, by a bunch of high school students led by the then 18 years old Andrea Riccardi. The original core of the association was formed by a rather unstructured group of middle and upper class kids – ten of whom attending one of the most
distinguished schools in the city, the “Liceo Virgilio” (“Vergilius Lyceum” in English) – who started to meet spontaneously to read and discuss the Gospel, and pray. They gathered together for the first time on 7 February 1968, in the oratory of “Chiesa Nuova” (“New Church”), in the center of Rome. From 1968 to 1973, the group was known simply as “the community” and did not have yet proper headquarters (Marazziti and Ivereigh 2006: 30-31).

One of the main topics of discussion during their first meetings was the role the Church should play within the society, with special reference to the contribution of the Catholic faithful to alleviate the sufferings of unfortunate people. The issue was highly debated among Catholics at that time, after Pope John XXIII had clearly articulated in 1962 his vision for the Catholic community as a “Church for everyone, and particularly for the poor” (A.A.S. 1962: 682). The goal of putting in practice the Gospel teachings by helping people in need soon became evident in the group’s early activities, going hand in hand with their interest in the in-depth study of religious texts. They physically moved, indeed, the center of gravity of their activities to Trastevere, an historical neighbourhood that during the 1960s was still a popular district, and to other low-income urban areas in the outskirts of the city, for instance Primavalle, Garbatella and Tufello, that at that time were crowded with working class immigrants coming mostly from the south of Italy. Their projects, during the first years, were quite unstructured, and basically consisted in helping poor people, providing health care assistance, and teaching free classes to needy children. They often met in the basements of buildings rented in these popular areas to read the Bible and pray (Marazziti and Ivereigh 2006: 30; Montonati 1999: 16-17).

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81 It is interesting to note that the very fact of getting together in churches to pray and study the Bible, without the guidance of a Catholic priest, was still considered at that time rather peculiar, because it was viewed as a Protestant feature. For this reason, it caused some problems to the group in the first years, especially when they did not have yet a place of their own for their meetings (Riccardi, interviewed by Catherine Odell 2004, quot. in Marazziti and Ivereigh 2006: 41).

82 A.A.S. is the acronym used to refer to “Acta Apostolicae Sedis”, i.e. the Vatican official bulletin including for record purposes all the laws, regulations, decrees, speeches, etc. concerning the activity of the Holy See.

83 The message of Pope John XXIII and the activities of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) were important contextual factors leading to the birth of the Community, as it will be highlighted later in this Chapter.
Some remarks on the founder of the CSE, Andrea Riccardi, and on the political, social and cultural context of the second half of the 1960s are useful here to try to understand where the idea of Sant'Egidio came from. Riccardi was born in 1950 into a wealthy family, to parents who were Catholic but not particularly practising (Riccardi 1997: 11-12). His father worked as a banker and had never been an advocate of the Christian Democracy Party, but liberal and secular, and close to the group of the Italian intellectuals contributing to the political and cultural and economic weekly magazine “Il Mondo” (in English “The World”), inspired by left-wing liberal, radical and laicist political ideas, that was published in Italy in the 1950s and 1960s (Montonati 1999: 9-10; Orsina 2015: 245). Riccardi was raised according to the main traditional Catholic principles, but he actually started to develop a genuine interest in theology and Catholic doctrine out of the family context, and only when he was in high school, and then at the University of Rome, where he graduated first in Law and then in History. Although Riccardi had not framed, during his childhood and high school years, any explicitly political orientation, nor was the intellectual background of the other founding members of the group particularly politically nuanced, the social and political effects of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) are of course a contextual factor that has exerted a significant degree of influence on the establishment of the group (Riccardi: 30-31). This ecumenical Council, the formal conference of bishops, ecclesiastical figures and theological experts from all over the world, gathering together to discuss and settle disputes on issues of doctrine and practice, was announced by Pope John XXIII in January 1959, and was the first comprehensive attempt ever made by the Catholic Church to modernize itself, by addressing a wide array of topics, encompassing nearly all the issues concerning its relations with the contemporary society. The conference was basically aimed at fostering spiritual renewal for the Church, and starting a dialogue with other Christian denominations (Orthodox, Protestant, etc.), to explore options for some form of reconciliation. Such an opening to the external world was per se a powerful driver for stimulating a fresh debate on new, more modern ways of practising the Catholic faith, in Italy and in the rest of the world (Reese 1996; Graziano 2010). Yet the Second Vatican Council was all the more important, as far as Catholic-inspired civil society movements are concerned, because two of the documents approved by the assembly, the Dogmatic
Constitution “Lumen Gentium” (in English “Light of the Peoples”) and the decree “Apostolica Actuositatem” (“Apostolic Activity”), were focused precisely on the role of the laity in the Catholic community, i.e. all the believers except those who are members of Holy orders or religious institutes (Hayes 2006; Melloni 2015). In particular, for the first time the documents explicitly attached great importance to the activities of lay faithful in the everyday life of the Catholic Church. The decree “Apostolica Actuositatem” was specifically aimed at further promoting the participation of lay people, and better organising their activities in Catholic-inspired daily life, outlining their basic principles (evangelization and sanctification, renewal of the temporal order, charitable works and social aid) and giving pastoral guidelines on the issue (A.A.S. 1966: 837-864). This turn towards a more pronounced opening to the broader society triggered the establishment of a great number of ‘associations of the faithful’, i.e. groups of Catholic believers (lay or clerics, or both together), who started to gather together autonomously from the Church hierarchy – and even more so, outside of it, being completely embedded in civil society in their countries. Their objective is to “strive with a common effort to foster a more perfect life, or to promote public worship or Christian teaching. They may also devote themselves to other works of the apostolate, such as initiatives for evangelisation, works of piety or charity, and those which animate the temporal order with the Christian spirit” (Code of Canon Law 2016: art. 298.1). Although, according to the definition of ‘association of the faithful’, also clerics can participate in such associations, most of the members of these new groups were lay people: this is the reason why this shift turned out to be so significant for the role of the Church in the society (Hayes 2006; Graziano 2010). In 1967, a dedicated Pontifical Council for the Laity was established within the Roman Catholic Curia, the complex of central administrative bodies of the Vatican. The department was (and still is today) in charge of assisting the Pope in dealing with the many lay movements founded after 1967, and in

84 A Pontifical Council is a central administrative unit of the Roman Catholic Curia, that could be roughly equated to a Ministry in other states. The name ‘Dicastery’ is also used, and other terms for central departmental units are ‘Secretariat of State’, ‘Congregation’, ‘Tribunal’ and ‘Offices’. These bodies are generally headed by a cardinal ‘prefect’ or a presiding archbishop, assisted by a group of other cardinals and bishops, a secretary, advisors, senior administrators, and officials (A.A.S. 1988: 859-860). In August 2016, the Pontifical Council for the Laity was merged with the Pontifical Council for the Family and transformed in a Dicastery for the Laity, Family and Life (Vatican website 2016).
particular to examine associations, movements and groups in order to grant them the Holy See’s official recognition as ‘international’ associations of the faithful, with Sant’Egidio falling into this category later in its history.

Some of these movements, “even those whose origins antedate the council, identify themselves as “the fruit of the Vatican II” and claim legitimacy on the basis of the council – if not in the ‘letter’ of its documents certainly in its ‘spirit’” (Heft and O’Malley 2012: xvi). The new organizations that emerged or strengthened their role in Italy in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council – apart from the CSE, for instance the Focolare Movement, Communion and Liberation, the Pope John XXIII Community, Pax Christi, the Association of Italian Catholic Guides and Scouts, or the Christian Workers Movement, to name just the most renowned – were very different in nature, objectives and trajectory, but all of them gained inspiration or momentum from that event, and are still operating today. For the purpose of this thesis, it is interesting to note that, like Sant’Egidio, although on a smaller scale, some of these organizations later developed also an interest in the international scene, at least in terms of development cooperation with least developed countries in Africa and Asia (Hayes 2006; Heft and O’Malley 2012).

In addition to the post Second Vatican Council religious ‘climate’, the wave of protests of 1967-69 brought to the fore, in Italy as in the rest of Europe and in the United States, social and political demands that, in turn, prompted in the short and in the medium term other kinds of civil society mobilization in the country,

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85 Official recognition to similar associations, having only a national or local scope, is granted instead by the country’s Episcopal Conference and local bishops.

86 The essential requirement for recognition as ‘international association of the faithful’ “is that an association be international in character, with a consolidated presence of members in particular churches in different countries. Other elements taken into consideration are the number of members in the association, its nature and the purpose of the association’s activities. As can be seen, these criteria are general and flexible, in order to take into account the specificity of each association”. A fair degree of personal connections between the members of the group and Holy See’s officials is of course also important: “periodic contact between the association’s leaders and the Dicastery is also an indispensable part of the recognition process, as it provides the Dicastery with a better knowledge of the association” (Vatican official website 2016).

87 Elaborating more on the effects of the social, political and cultural atmosphere of the late 1960s on the Catholics in Italy, it is worth mentioning that a scholar has even written that “the real winners of the struggle within Italian Catholicism after 1968 were movements like Communion and Liberation on the one side, and the Community of Sant’Egidio on the other, which embodied and represented the Rome-linked and at the same time post institutional face of Roman Catholicism – while expressing two different sets of style and theological cultures” (Faggioli 2016: 80).
i.e. social care groups, trade unions-led movements, extra-parliamentary political groups, even terrorist organizations\(^\text{88}\) (Lepre 1993: 238-245, to name just one of many scholars who have worked on this topic). Also the high school attended by the founding members of Sant’Egidio was actively involved in 1968 student movements. Although Riccardi and his fellows “shared something of the spirit of ‘1968’” (Marazziti and Ivereigh 2006: 33), instead of taking the road of political left (mostly Marxist), in order to address pressing social concerns, they started looking for a Catholic way, so to speak, to deal with the same issues. Such idea was shared also by a non Italian commentator, the Vatican correspondent of the National Catholic Reporter from 1998 to 2014, John Allen. The CSE was “founded in 1968 by a group of young Catholic leftists who did not want to drift off into secular radicalism but remain anchored in the Gospel” (Allen 2004: 163, quot. in Hayes 2006: 41). In sum, if any particular political leanings are to be found when analysing the orientation of the first members of the CSE, it is possible to argue that they were close, to some extent and only in terms of intellectual tenets, to the ideas of the then leftist political trend within the Christian Democracy Party (the consolidation of this group within the party in itself could be viewed, at least partially, as an outcome of the Second Vatican Council). However, they did not seem to have any specific ties with political parties, their youth wings, individual political leaders, nor with other para-political entities, like cultural foundations or research centres, etc. After the end of the Cold War, the CSE of course developed good relations with some political leaders from different parties, also due to its work on the international stage, on issues some political leaders were also dealing with, but it was only in recent years (2011-2013) that some of its members got involved in politics, as it will be illustrated later in this Chapter. It is worth mentioning here that a different perspective on this aspect has been suggested by Melloni, a renowned Italian Church historian specializing in the the Second Vatican Council, who has argued that the Community “that entered parliament and the government in 2011-2013, had a very political future” since the very beginning, unlike other groups, e.g. the Focolare Movement, or the Neocatechumenal Way, that were lacking a political agenda, and were instead fine with receiving just some form of ecclesiastical acknowledgment (Melloni

\(^{88}\) For the sake of brevity, here various forms of civil society involvement are briefly mentioned all together as a mere example. The author is aware of the significant differences among all of them.
2015: 418). This is not the preferred interpretation used here in this thesis because it seems, at least to some extent, to be influenced by ‘hindsight bias’, i.e. by later developments that started to affect the activities of the CSE only towards the end of the Cold War.

4.3 1973-1989. The Cold War era: quite a ‘classic’ Catholic-oriented NGO

It is against the social and cultural backdrop sketched out in the previous section that the Community took its first steps between 1968 and 1973. In 1972, the first important change occurred for the group, with the arrival of the first cleric member, Vincenzo Paglia. A young priest serving in a parish church in the popular district of Casal Palocco, he was very open to the debate on the new forms of interaction between the Church and the society stirred by the Second Vatican Council, of which the Community was somehow a ‘product’, as illustrated in the previous section. For this reason, he was highly interested in the innovative vision of the Community, and soon became one of its most prominent members, as it will be explained also later in this Chapter. His presence turned out to be crucial not only for the group to become more sophisticated in terms of religious knowledge, but also as far as he acted as a sort of ‘bridge’ towards the Church establishment (Riccardi 1997: 30; Montonati 1999: 38-40).

In 1973, the Community started to better shape itself and its activities. After makeshift meeting places scattered over various Roman suburban districts, and after a temporary relocation to a university chapel, in September 1973 they set up their first – and last, to this day – proper headquarters in Trastevere. In the historical neighbourhood they moved to an abandoned wing of a Carmelite nuns' convent, owned by the state and located in Sant'Egidio square, first ‘occupying’ the property to some extent unlawfully, then formally renting it (Montonati 1999: 17-20). The square had been named after the small church annexed to the convent, dedicated to Sant'Egidio. From that moment on, the convent and the church, reopened shortly after, on the initiative of Paglia, became closely associated to the group, and vice versa: it was then that the group officially became known as the “Community of Sant'Egidio” (Montonati 1999: 17). The reopening of the church to the public also marked a significant shift for the CSE, as it signalled its gradual transition from a relatively small-scale, close-knit group
of people, to an entity that was started to reach out to a broader audience, first of all by sharing the moment of mass liturgy. Furthermore, during that period the CSE begun to consider the option of expanding also outside the city of Rome, where it was already operating a dozen centres – also called informally ‘communities’– in different suburban areas, and in 1974 a branch was established in Naples, working on people in need in distressed districts of the city. More centres followed suit in the next years, all over the country (Riccardi 1997: 44).

From 1973-4 to the mid-1980s, the Community strengthened its role in performing ‘classic’ activities for a Catholic inspired lay movement. As explained in the previous section, their first objective was essentially traditional in nature, for a religiously inspired association: a) meeting to discuss the Gospel, spreading its message and putting in practice its teachings. Their first sources of inspiration were the first Christian community of the Acts of the Apostles (I century)\(^89\) and Saint Francis of Assisi (XIII century), the Italian preacher who founded the Order of Friars (CSE official website: 2016). Both these ‘models’, indeed, immediately point to the core activities carried out by the Community from its early stages and up to present day: a) dissemination of the Catholic message, as argued before, and b) assistance to people in need. As it will be illustrated later in this Chapter, their c) involvement in preventive diplomacy/conflict resolution, peace-making and development cooperation abroad came later, only in the 1980s. In 1974 the CSE started to gain popularity and visibility in Rome by participating for the first time in a big public event, a religious/lay conference on the main social and economic problems of the city organised by the local diocese that caused considerable stir in the Roman public debate. On that occasion, the Community introduced itself as an actor actively committed to addressing the problem of the widening social gap between different parts of the city, and at the same time it started to establish the first contacts with the Catholic hierarchy (Montonati 1999: 42). Among the most relevant initiatives launched during those years and still in progress today, in Rome and in other Italian regions, are the following: prayer groups to study the Gospel (“Scuole del Vangelo”, “Gospel Schools”), a big charity canteen operating every day in the center of Rome, Italian language

\(^{89}\) I.e. the first group of Christians, considered as the most authentic (and faithful to the original message of Jesus Christ) community of Christian believers. Their deeds, including the foundation of the Catholic Church and the spread of the religion through the other provinces of the Roman Empire, are portrayed in the book called “Acts of the Apostles”, that is part of the New Testament.
courses for immigrants, centres delivering staple foods for low-income families, after-school tuition for children, centres for assisting disabled people, terminally ill patients, and for mental health care, assistance to older people, clinics (CSE official website).

Towards the end of the 1970s, the Community’s encounter with Pope John Paul II marked another important shift for the association. In December 1978, during a visit to a Roman popular neighbourhood, the newly elected pontiff stopped by a kindergarten run by the CSE, almost by chance, getting to know firsthand one of the projects of the group. The Pope acts formally also as the bishop of Rome, and Karol Wojtyla, more clearly than his predecessors, was determined to attach great importance to his role of head of the local Roman Church community too. For this reason, he placed great value on establishing direct links with local entities like the CSE. From that moment on, contacts between the leader of the Catholic Church and Sant’Egidio intensified with other meetings and an official visit paid by the Pope to the headquarters of the CSE in 1981 (Montonati 1999: 24-26) (more came also during the 1990s). In the words of its founder, a sort of ‘friendship’ was born, more than a fully-fledged ‘acknowledgment’ (Riccardi 1997: 79). The group was then granted the official recognition from the Pontifical Council for the Laity of the Holy See as an ‘international association of the faithful’ in 1986.

A few remarks could be useful here on relations of the Community with the Vatican. As explained in other parts of this thesis, adding also the Vatican to the examination of the interplay between the Italian state institutions and the CSE in the realm of foreign policy would have proved unfeasible for different reasons. However, it is worth mentioning that from the analysis of the history and activities of the group, very little has emerged pointing to some form of ‘subordination’ of the association to the Vatican hierarchy. Undoubtedly, both actors could have possibly seen each other as being mutually beneficial on a number of issues, concerning both the Italian domestic debate and international politics, and the Community itself has certainly taken advantage of its good ties with the Holy See, especially with some of its leaders, for instance Pope John II\(^{90}\). However, these facts hardly amount for the small group to being ‘directed’ from

\(^{90}\) An American commentator has argued, as if it was an outright contradiction, that “[s]ociologically and politically, the centre of gravity in Sant’Egidio is on the left, yet it has **terrific** [emphasis added] contacts with the Vatican” (Allen 2004: 163, quot. in Hayes 2006: 41).
the much more powerful Roman Curia. This is all the more probable when acknowledging that in some cases, as illustrated later in the Chapter on the Algerian case, frictions occurred between the two actors, or at least with part of the Church’s hierarchy, both in Rome and at the local level, in Algeria. Therefore, it can be reasonably argued that the Community has always operated autonomously from the Vatican leadership, both in its early contacts with it, and later, when it became a well-known entity on the international scene.

Relations with the Holy See have probably been more important for the history of the CSE in another respect. In effect, a) close ties with the Vatican leaders, and in particular with John Paul II, a Pope with a pronounced interest in international affairs – that in the first years of the Community had been pretty non existent – are maybe one of the factors that, at least to some extent, contributed to the ‘internationalisation’ of the activities of Sant’Egidio. Another crucial element, in this regard, possibly even more relevant than the previous one, is the b) progressive expansion abroad that the Community experienced in the 1980s. After the first center was opened in Würzburg, Germany, in 1982, on the initiative of two young German priests who had previously cooperated with the CSE during a study period in Rome, other branches were established in the following years in different cities in Germany, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and in Prague, Kiev and Moscow. Interestingly, in some of these countries also Christians Orthodox or Evangelical members joined the centres. From the mid-1980s, centres were set up also in other continents: Central America, for instance in El Salvador, Mexico, Argentina, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Cuba, and Africa, for example in Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Conakry, Mozambique, and Indonesia. Such a massive expansion abroad was not centrally directed by the headquarters in Rome, but – as in the case of the establishment of the first branch abroad, in Germany – was the spontaneous outcome of the international exposure that the Community gradually started to gain. Many foreigners started to get in touch with the group in Rome in that period, and it should be remembered that the city has always been a sort of a ‘required stop’ for theology students, Catholic clerics, etc. from all over the world (Montonati 1999: 130-1). Finally, a third factor influencing the decision of Sant’Egidio to ‘go international’, is of course the c) gradual opening up of the international arena that had already set in motion towards the end of the Cold War, at the end of the 1980s. As discussed in other parts of this thesis,
such context offered new opportunities both to middle and small powers, and to non state actors, in a number of foreign policy subfields, for example development cooperation and, later on, also for preventive diplomacy/conflict management and peace-making. As far as foreign aid projects are concerned, in the 1980s the CSE begun to work with the funds distributed to NGOs by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that in that decade begun to boost its development cooperation policy, especially in African and Central and South American countries (Fossati 1999). Since 1987 it is part of the list of Italian NGOs entitled to receive and manage funds of the Italian foreign aid, allocated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA official website: 2016).

Another experience that strengthened the international credentials of the Community was the organisation from 1987 of annual meeting of religious representatives to address issues of international peace, and pursue interreligious dialogue. The initiative followed up on the “World Day of Prayer for Peace”, organised by Pope John Paul II in Assisi in 1986, an event that for the first time had brought together the leaders of the main religions of the world. Since then, these events have been organised every year in different cities in Europe, the United States and the Middle East, and interreligious dialogue has become another hallmark of the Community (Scott Appleby 2000: 157; Graziano 2010).

4.4 1989-2001. The post-bipolar world: Sant’Egidio enters the international arena

Building upon the first initiatives with an international dimension carried out in the 1980s, sketched out in the previous section, with the end of the Cold War the CSE entered the international stage, albeit preserving its ‘Italian-ness’, that has clearly emerged from the history of the group discussed earlier in this Chapter. The leaders of Sant’Egidio did not see this as a major shift from, but as a natural ‘spin-off’ of their ‘classic’ activities (Montonati 1999: 26), because it was precisely through its long-standing commitment to helping poor people that, the CSE came “to better understand that war is the mother of poverty”. The Community’s work in different poor and war-torn countries contributed to enhance its strong “belief in the ‘weak power’ of prayer and in the transforming power of non-violence and persuasion” (CSE official website: 2016). The group started to perform a great
number of activities, ranging from supply of foreign aid to poor countries (especially in the sector of health care) to human rights protection (i.e. campaigning for the abolition of the death penalty), from preventive diplomacy/conflict management to peace-making. Most of these initiatives are still carried out today. Here in this Chapter, due to the purpose of this thesis, special attention is devoted to the activities implemented by the CSE particularly in the domains of preventive diplomacy/conflict management. With varying degrees of success, as it will be illustrated in the next sections, Sant’Egidio has worked in many different conflict scenarios, from Mozambique to Algeria, from Albania to Burundi, from Kosovo to the Democratic Republic of Congo, earning the nickname of “UN of Trastevere” (Man 1995).

4.4.1 The Community of Sant'Egidio and preventive diplomacy/crisis management

As explained earlier in this thesis, the role of non state actors in preventive diplomacy/crisis management has been the focus of a number of academic works over the past few years, in the broader context of the study of transformations of diplomacy (to name just a few: Langhorne 2005 and 2007; Cooper et and Hocking 2000; Khagram 2006; Murray 2008). Hocking has defined the growing international involvement of NSA in these activities as a process of “diplomatization” of these entities (Hocking 2011). Concerning in particular NGOs, Krahmann 2005, Stoddard 2006 Jentleson 2000, Hackett 2000 and Lund 1996 have focused on the features of NGOs involvement in different forms of preventive diplomacy, including their participation in early warning activities. For works dealing with the contribution of NGOs to peace-making see instead the following section. Catholic NGOs (in general, and those based in Italy in particular) involved in preventive diplomacy have received less attention by academics – on the contrary, they have been explored a bit more with reference to the domain of development cooperation activities – with the exception of the Community of Sant’Egidio.

As far as Sant’Egidio’s preventive diplomacy activities in particular are concerned, literature is less rich but it is still possible to find some interesting accounts of its role in the Albanian scenario in 1991-1997 (de Guttry and Pagani 1999; Molinari 2000; Morozzo della Rocca 2010a), in Kosovo in 1993-1997 (Lund
2000; Morozzo della Rocca 1998 and 2010b; Giro 2011), and in Algeria in 1994-1998 (Rupesinghe 1998; Hill 2003 and 2015; de Courten 2003; Impagliazzo 2010), which is the case addressed later in this thesis.

In the case of Albania, after an energetic mediation activity, in June 1997 the Community was able to broker an agreement between contending political factions called “Pact for the Future of Albania”, that allowed regular elections to take place after a few days (Morozzo della Rocca 2010a). A state where a pro-communist political regime, in power since the end of the Second World War, had de facto banned most forms of relations and contacts between the local population and the outside world, Albania was also a country with a poor track record of protecting Christian minorities, something which certainly had not encouraged the set up of a Catholic-oriented civil society presence its territory.

The arrival of Sant’Egidio in Albania dated back to the collapse of the communist regime in 1991, and its activities during the political transition of 1991-1993, aimed at delivering aid to a poverty-stricken population in sectors such as healthcare, social assistance, education, etc., regardless of religion and political stances, helped the Community leaders and volunteers establish good connections with different sectors of Albanian society and politics. This action proved effective and fruitful also in strengthening diplomatic ties between Rome and Tirana, and even more in facilitating the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Albania in 1991 (Morozzo della Rocca 2010a: 155-157).

When in the first half of 1997 the Albanian financial and political crisis broke out, also with violent street demonstrations, Sant’Egidio suggested the idea of a pre-electoral ‘guarantee’ pact between the two main opposing parties, i.e. the Socialist Party and the Democratic Party, and a number of smaller groups, defining the conditions according to which all parties would recognize the validity of the outcome of the ballots, and seeking to prevent political and social unrest from erupting again after the elections, by including a precise commitment to the inclusiveness of the process of government formation. Over two weeks, in June 1997, representatives of the Community engaged in a sort of ‘shuttle diplomacy’⁹¹ among the various parties, in order to work on and finalize a draft proposal

⁹¹ The term “shuttle diplomacy” was coined in 1974 by journalists covering the short trips to the Middle East of the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was trying to secure a deal after the Yom Kippur war of October 1973 (US Department of State – Office of the Historian 2013).
prepared by Sant’Egidio itself. They succeeded in these efforts because they were able to take advantage of their image of a third-party, neutral actor maintaining good ties with representatives of different political factions, and relying on a sound expertise in Albanian history and society gained working on the field (Morozzo della Rocca 2010a). In addition, it is important to note that the Community also played a useful role in keeping the Italian government, that was deeply interested and involved in the management of the Albanian crisis, informed on the whole process. As a testimony of fruitful cooperation on the Albanian question, a cabinet member, the Minister of Defense Beniamino Andreatta, on 23 June 1997 attended the signing ceremony of the Pact, held at the Sant’Egidio headquarters in Rome, on behalf of the Italian government, although it must be stressed that Italian state institutions had played only a minor role in brokering the political deal.

The preventive diplomacy effort conducted by the Community in the case of Kosovo between 1993 and 1999 resulted in the “Educational Agreement”, signed on 1 September 1996 by the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and Ibrahim Rugova, the Albanian leader in Kosovo, in their respective cities, without meeting each other in person. The agreement stated that a significant number of Albanian children who were not granted access to public schools would return to school after five years spent in a sort of ‘parallel’ education system. It also affirmed the “normalization” of the school system there, including classes taught in Albanian, and the set up of a “3+3” implementation commission composed of three representatives from the Serbian government and three from the Albanian community. Sant’Egidio’s mediation efforts built on the indirect knowledge of the area (at least as far as the Albanian side of the matter was concerned), ‘spilling over’ from the Community’s simultaneous activities in Albania during the first half of the 1990s, mentioned earlier in this section, and on some humanitarian aid delivery projects (mostly in the health sector), set up by the NGO for both Serbs and Albanians. After a series of unsuccessful trips of Sant’Egidio representatives to Belgrade, Pristina and Tirana to meet Serbian and Albanian leaders between 1993 and 1995, mutual distrust among the two opposing parties gradually started to give way to cautious signs of availability to start off some form of dialogue. In the summer of 1996, Serbs and Albanians agreed on Sant’Egidio’s mediation role because it was seen as a neutral and impartial third party and in a
set of meetings held in Rome, in the Community offices, they decided to start their step-by-step negotiations from education issues, leaving purely political matters for a later stage of the process. Such activities were organised with no direct involvement of Italian authorities, although political support was occasionally showed by cabinet members like Prime Minister Giuliano Amato and Minister of Foreign Affairs Beniamino Andreatta.

Unlike the initiative in Albania, the activity in Kosovo was only a partial success, because for a number of reasons – including controversies on “the legitimacy of international mediation provided by Sant’Egidio on what the Serbs perceived to be a domestic issue” (Morozzo della Rocca 1998: 14) – the “Implementation Protocol” was signed only in March 1998, shortly before the political situation significantly changed and violence broke out during the summer of that year. However, what at first sight may appear as a dialogue forum and a technical deal in a low politics domain such as education, should be assessed against the broader backdrop of the tense relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo between 1993 and 1999. Indeed, it turned out to be the only negotiating table where Serbs and Albanians started some form of direct dialogue (Morozzo della Rocca 2010b: 182), and managed to sign the “first official agreement of any kind reached between the Serbian government and the Albanian community in [that] century” (Morozzo della Rocca 1998: 13).

4.4.2 The Community of Sant’Egidio and peace-making

A rather significant body of literature has been produced on the role of NGOs in peace-making activities during the past two decades. Some scholars have examined the role of Norwegian NGOs working on the issues of Oslo Accords (Israeli-Palestinian conflict) (1993), Guatemala (1996), Haiti, Sudan, Cyprus, Kosovo (1999), and Colombia (2000) (Kelleher and Taulbee 2005, quoted in Bullion 2001), while Gerstbauer (2005) has looked more at NGOs involved in peace-building92. Norwegian NGOs addressed by this stream of literature are of

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92 According to the “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” (commonly known as the “Brahimi Report”, the definition of ‘peace-building’ is the following: “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations, something that is more than just the absence of war” (2000).
particular interest to this thesis not only as they have a religious connotation (Lutheran), but especially because, in the cases mentioned above, they have actively cooperated with the Norwegian government, setting up a mutually beneficial relation. In this interaction, on the one hand NGOs have taken advantage of the image of ‘honest broker’ Norway has built over decades of engagement in strengthening international peace and in fostering development in the Third World, earning a sound reputation for moral standing, and ensuring parties to the conflict secrecy and ‘quiet’, behind the scenes diplomacy. On the other, government institutions have benefited considerably from the well-grounded and first-hand knowledge of war-torn countries they had to operate in, accumulated thanks to their long-standing physical presence there (Kelleher and Taulbee 2005).

As in the case of preventive diplomacy (see previous section), activities carried out in the peace-making domain by Catholic NGOs in general, and by those based in Italy in particular, have not been examined extensively by academics, with the exception, again, of the Community of Sant’Egidio. Besides scholarly works on (or mentioning) the mediation work provided by the Community in the Mozambican conflict, that will be investigated later in this thesis (Hume 1994; Bartoli 1999 and 2011; Ajello 1999 and 2010; de Courten 2003; Hill 2003 and 2015; Roberts 2009; Anouilh 2011; Bartoli 2011; Carbone 2011; Giro 2011; Marchetti 2013; Borruso 2014; Perry 2014), the efforts of this NGO in other scenarios have been studied by some scholars. For instance, Hara (1999), Romano (2010), Anouilh (2011) and Nhlapo and Alden (2015) have looked at the parallel diplomacy conducted by the Sant’Egidio in Rome during the Burundian conflict in 1997-1998. Others have studied its mediation action in Kosovo in 1993-1997 (Morozzo della Rocca 1998), in Albania in 1991-1997 (de Guttry and Pagani 1999), and Guatemala in 1993-1996 (Bonini 2008; Morozzo della Rocca 2010c). On the occasion of the Guatemalan civil war, for example, the Community has been very active in relaunching the existing peace process with a series of meetings organised between 1995 and 1996, and in helping the United Nations conclude it successfully, with the signing of a Peace Agreement at the end of 1996 (Giro 1998; Cugliandro 2006; Bonini 2008; Morozzo della Rocca 2010c). Unlike other peace-making efforts, such as the one concerning Mozambique, in this case the Community did not have to set up a peace process starting from scratch, but
reactivated a process that had been frozen approximately one year before, aimed at bringing to an end a war started thirty-four years earlier (Giro 1998: 98). The war had broken out in 1962 between the Guatemalan government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala (URNG, in English ‘Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity’) guerrilla movement, one of the oldest insurgent groups in Central America, and had claimed approximately 200,000 lives, being the bloodiest war in Latin America in the twentieth century and the second longest-running of the continent after the Colombian conflict (Morozzo della Rocca 2010c: 91).

The peace process had been launched long before the decade of the 1990s, but it had been largely ineffective. At the beginning of 1994, the United Nations had taken official responsibility for reinvigorating the peace process by acting as an official mediator, but had run into the stumbling block represented by the lack of mutual trust and of direct contacts between the Guatemalan government and URNG group; the leaders of the different parties to the conflict, indeed, had never met each other in person (Giro 1998: 98). The main task the Community of Sant’Egidio decided to focus on to overcome this stand off was providing some form of informal but direct contact between the warring factions, leveraging the good ties established with both parties. The good reputation earned through years spent in the country carrying out development cooperation activities in different areas was, according to Sant’Egidio leaders, a sound asset to present the Community as an honest and neutral third party for mediation (Morozzo della Rocca 2010c: 93-94).

Discretion was essential at that stage, in order to verify whether the conditions for restarting the negotiating process, so after a series of preliminary secret contacts, meetings were held in San Salvador, in December 1995, between the then presidential candidate Alvaro Arzu, who had previously showed its interest in the peace process, and the leaders of the URNG group. Others encounters followed in the same city, in Mexico City, and after Arzu’s victory in the presidential election in January 1996, also in Rome, at the Sant’Egidio headquarters, in February that year. It was only on the occasion of the last meeting in Rome that the parties decided to go public and to break the news of the resumption of the peace process with a joint press statement (Morozzo della Rocca 2010c: 104).
Although the representatives of the Guatemalan government and of URNG group announced that the peace process was not over yet, they stressed that the secret meetings had been decisive in persuading the warring factions to go back to the negotiating table (Giro 1998: 99). With the impasse being resolved also thanks to the work of Sant’Egidio, the ball of negotiations then returned to the United Nations’ court. The official mediator resumed the process starting from the results of the meetings facilitated by the Community, and after further months of intense work performed in parallel, on related issues, in Oslo, Stockholm, Madrid and Mexico City, a Peace Agreement was signed in December 1996 in Mexico City (Morozzo della Rocca 2010c: 106). For the purpose of this thesis, it is worth noting that on this occasion the Italian government was not involved at all in any stage of the process.

The mediation work performed by the Community during the Burundian conflict is another topic that has been studied by scholars and practitioners (Hara 1999; Anouilh 2011; Romano 2010; Nhlapo 2015). Unlike the Guatemalan scenario, where the Community has a) intervened in the framework of a peace process already in place, although stalled, steered by an intergovernmental official mediator, i.e. the United Nations, which b) was kept always updated on its moves over the whole duration of the negotiating effort, on the Burundian affair Sant’Egidio has engaged in “parallel diplomacy”. This notion, similar to that of “track-two diplomacy”, is defined as “non state diplomacy that occurs simultaneously with, but it is not coordinated with, state diplomacy” (Hara 1999: 158).93

In June 1993, the Hutu candidate Melchior Ndadaye won the first multiparty, democratic elections ever held since the country’s independence from Belgium (1962). After his assassination by Tutsi military officers in October that year, an Hutu-Tutsi national unity government led by the Hutu politician Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was formed in September 1994, with the United Nations blessing94, but failed to stabilize the situation. A Hutu group opposing

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93 “Parallel diplomacy” is a term also used by some scholars (Kuznetsov 2015: 26) as a synonym for “paradiplomacy”, a concept first introduced in social sciences in the 1960s by Butler (1961) and then popularised in the academic literature by Soldatos (1990 and 1993) and Duchacek (1988; 1990).

94 The power-sharing agreement shoring up the formation of the coalition cabinet was defined as “Convention of Government” (Hara 1999: 143).
the coalition cabinet set up an armed group called CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy), and a brutal civil war erupted shortly after, claiming between 200,000 and 300,000 victims and forcing hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee to bordering countries (Hara 1999: 143).

Some attempts at solving the crisis were made over the following two years with two international conferences, organised respectively in Cairo in 1995 and in Tunis in 1996, but none of this efforts succeeded in bringing the hostilities to an end. In the meanwhile, Burundians and the international community were haunted by memories of the recent Rwandan genocide of 1994, as the ethnic and social make up of the country was similar to that of the neighbouring country (although less polarised) (Romano 2010: 113). After Major Pierre Buyoya, the Tutsi Burundi’s president from 1987 to 1993 came back into power with a coup staged by the military in July 1996, a host of mediation initiatives were launched by different actors: an internal dialogue platform between the Buyoya government and the FRODEBU (Front for Democracy in Burundi, a Hutu party), the Arusha group, formed by different states of central and east Africa and coordinated by the former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere95, and the Sant’Egidio process. In addition, the Organisation of African Unity dispatched military observers in the country, while the United States, Canada, South Africa, Kenya and the European Union appointed special envoys during 1996 to try to contribute to put a stop to the conflict.

In such a crowded scenario, with actors of different nature – states, international organisations, domestic political actors, NGOs – all committed to find a solution to the crisis, the Community worked, in particular, on what has been defined as the ‘second track’ component96 of the peace talks, that was facilitation of secret, direct meetings between the Pierre Buyoya government and CNDD-FDD representatives in Rome, at Sant’Egidio headquarters, in 1995-1997, in parallel with the other regional and international ‘public’ mediation efforts. The Community was approached to coordinate this work by the national unity

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95 Former United States President Jimmy Carter with his Carter Center, a non-profit NGO involved in conflict resolution and human rights advocacy, also participated in this process.

96 The other two track components being 1) formal talks organised in Arusha under the auspices of Julius Nyerere, and 2) internal talks within the ‘Convention of Government’ framework led by President Pierre Buyoya (Nhlapo and Alden 2015: 4).
government itself, that had come to know the Italian NGO for its mediation in the Mozambican conflict a few years earlier (Romano 2010: 111). Preliminary contacts to arrange these encounters took place in 1995-1996; during this phase, Sant’Egidio’s ties with the Burundian Catholic Church’s network on the field proved very useful, with archbishops, priests, missionaries, etc. frequently visiting the headquarters in Rome to help the Community staff get a more accurate picture of the situation on the ground (Romano 2010: 119). The position of Sant’Egidio and its ‘second track’ component were rather delicate, urging the Community to navigate the whole process with special discretion, as “[t]he special envoys from the EU, US and South Africa argued that rumours of these secret discussions fed into the conspiracy theories that were festering amongst Burundians involved in other negotiation initiatives” (Nhlapo and Alden 2015: 4).

The mediation offered by Sant’Egidio continued also after the 1996 coup by Pierre Buyoya, at the request of both negotiating parties, with an even more secretive format: no representatives of any international organisation or state were allowed to attend the meetings in Rome, except of course for the Community staff (Romano 2010: 132). Representatives from the government and CNDD-FDD went back and forth between Burundi and Italy several times, until a first milestone was reached in March 1997, with the brokering of a “Framework Agreement” preparing the ground for future negotiations; the deal included details on the agenda items to be discussed, stated that Sant’Egidio continue to act as a mediator, and reaffirmed that the agreement be still kept secret (Romano 2010: 134).

However, the agreement was disclosed to the Burundian press by CNDD-FDD shortly after, in May that year, in a hazardous political move producing political tensions in the country that prevented the meetings from going on in Rome. The situation in Burundi, worsened by the secret negotiations publicly disclosed, and other political gridlocks resulted in the suspension of peace talks until June 1998. They resumed in Arusha in a multiparty format, and after highs and lows, with Nelson Mandela replacing Julius Nyerere, who had passed away in 1999, and many hurdles to overcome, the peace negotiations finally produced the Arusha Accords, signed in 2000 (Romano 2010: 136-143). In the final stages of the talks, the Community attended all the meetings but did not play a leading mediation
role, as in the earlier phases of the process. The Italian foreign policy apparatus was not part of the mediation efforts, although it was aware of the involvement of Sant’Egidio in the exercise.

4.5 Sant’Egidio: structure and who’s who

First of all, it must be said that it is not easy to understand the structure and the inner working of the Community from their official material, as they have always been pretty inclined to be discreet and low-key about it. No organizational chart is published on its website, nor are the names of its leaders stated in a systematic way on their main online outlet. However, some basic information can be collected from scattered posts on events and activities uploaded on its website, rich memoirs written by their leaders, their association statute (publicly available from other sources), and news reports and interviews.

According to the Italian civil law, the Community is incorporated as a private ‘association of voluntary work and solidarity’ and enjoys legal personality. On the basis of its statute, Sant’Egidio is led by a President, assisted by a Council (made up of 5 to 7 members), a Secretary General and an Assembly including all the members. Although the post is not mentioned in the statute, an Ecclesiastical Assistant is also part of the top leadership, and is a member of the clergy who is usually a bishop or an archbishop. The President, the Council and the Secretary General are elected every five years by the Assembly of the representatives of all the Community groups (in countries where there are several local branches, a national President may be appointed) (CSE statute 2016; Vatican directory of the ‘International associations of the faithful’, managed by the Dicastery, formerly Pontifical Council, for the Laity, Family and Life 2016; CSE official website 2016). Apart from statutory bodies, a number of less structured committees, both at the central and local level, are in charge of managing different issues, such as health care, canteen services, assistance to old people, international affairs, etc. Committees are run by coordinators, selected by the members with consensus-based methods and approved by the governing bodies of the Community. Generally speaking, and apart from the leading bodies, the CSE portrays itself as an entity with a rather flexible and adjustable structure (Riccardi 1999: 54-55), although dissenting opinions have been suggested on this issue, arguing that the
group is, on the contrary, conflict-ridden and run by an overtly hierarchical structure (Magister 1998).

In order to become a member, an applicant must demonstrate to share the purposes of the association, and contribute actively to its projects; his/her admission must be approved by the Council. The overwhelming majority of Sant’Egidio members participate on a voluntary basis and do not work for the Community full time; on the contrary, “[a]lmost all members live active lives in the nonreligious world with their own families and professions, and are self-supporting and unpaid by the association” (Bartoli 1997: 256). The CSE today has approximately 50,000 members in more than 70 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, North America and South America (CSE official website 2016; Pontifical Council for the Laity website 2015), plus an unspecified number of volunteers cooperating with the Community on a case-by-case basis, or only for limited periods of time, without being ‘official’ members (CSE official website: 2016). As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, the presence of Sant’Egidio abroad comes in different forms: it is either organised in well established, ‘formal’ groups, or it is active on a less permanent basis, relying on other NGOs and/or the networks of local Catholic Churches to manage development cooperation projects or humanitarian assistance activities (Riccardi 1997; Morozzo della Rocca 2010).

The CSE has developed also a rather dynamic online communication strategy, with a website published in 17 languages, mirroring the Community’s geographical reach and interests (11 European idioms, and 6 non European languages, namely Albanian, Russian, Ukrainian, Swahili, Chinese, and Indonesian; oddly enough, Arabic is not included), and a widespread presence on all the main social media – they have even launched a smartphone app live-streaming the group prayer organised every day in the Church of Santa Maria in Trastevere. In addition, most of its leaders have personal websites and social media accounts.

As far as financial matters are concerned, according to the statute members are required to pay an annual membership fee, and the association can receive funds from private or public external actors. The greatest share of funding comes indeed from donations from citizens from Italy and abroad; public national and internationals entities such as the Italian government and the European Union, especially to finance public events and development cooperation projects abroad;
public local bodies, like the Municipality of Rome and the Lazio Region, particularly to sustain permanent activities in Rome, such as the canteen and housing services for the poor and the disabled; local parish churches, dioceses, and religious congregations, from Italy and other countries in the world; private foundations and sponsoring companies (CSE statute 2016; Montonati 168-169).

In terms of who’s who in Sant’Egidio, it is interesting to note the high degree of continuity in its leadership over the almost 50 years of life of the association. The main protagonists of the early years of the CSE are more or less all still working for the group, in a formal or informal leadership capacity, and this is all the more true for leaders directly involved in preventive diplomacy/conflict management and peace-making tasks. Since 2003, the Community is led by the President Marco Impagliazzo, a university professor teaching Contemporary History at the University for Foreign Students in Perugia. However, also the founder Andrea Riccardi, who then became a university professor of Contemporary History, specializing in Church History at the University of Rome “La Sapienza”, is still a very influential figure in the management of Sant’Egidio, although he does not hold anymore any official position in the organisational structure. Apart from his work in the CSE, after serving as Minister for International Cooperation and Integration (without portfolio) in the technocratic government led by Mario Monti from November 2011 to March 201397, he is now also the President of the “Società Dante Alighieri” (in English “Dante Alighieri Society”, an institution founded at the end of the XIX century to promote Italian language and culture abroad, that is also in charge of issuing one of the internationally recognised language certificates of Italian as a foreign language). Other prominent members of the group are: the archbishop Vincenzo Paglia, mentioned previously in this Chapter, the former Ecclesiastical Assistant of the Community, who had served in the past as parish priest in the Church of Santa Maria in Trastevere, the most important church in the Rome’s neighbourhood, where Sant’Egidio’s headquarters are based, and is currently also the President of the Pontifical Academy for Life, a Vatican body dealing with bioethics and moral theology. From 2012 to 2016, he was the President of Pontifical Council for the Family, in

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97 It is worth stressing that for the first time in Italian history that an apposite Ministry – although without an administrative structure and a dedicated budget – was established on that occasion specifically for development cooperation, traditionally managed exclusively by the Directorate General for Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
charge of rather crucial issues in the contemporary public debate in Italy. Mario Giro, the head of CSE’s international relations from 1998 to 2013, served first as an advisor to Ricardi (during the former’s tenure as Minister for International Cooperation and Integration), then was appointed as Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs in the center-left cabinet led by Enrico Letta, and was reconfirmed also by the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi in 2014, with the upgrade to Vice minister and the portfolio of development cooperation—98—and in the cabinet formed by Paolo Gentiloni at the end of 2016. Matteo Maria Zuppi, who was directly involved in peace-making negotiations on Mozambique, as it will be illustrated later in the thesis, served as Ecclesiastic Assistant of the CSE from 2000 to 2012 and is now also the archbishop of Bologna. Mario Marazziti, a journalist and spokesperson for the Community who was elected as an MP in 2013, is currently sitting in the parliamentary committees on Foreign Affairs, Human rights protection and Social affairs and is one of most active members dealing with these issues. Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, an historian teaching at the University of Roma Tre, focusing on history of the Balkans, worked in particular on Sant’Egidio’s efforts in Albania and Kosovo (information published on the CSE official website and on personal websites). It is important to underline here that all the key members mentioned above have played leading roles in every important preventive diplomacy/crisis management activity the Community has conducted in its history, some of which are analysed in this thesis. In addition, it is interesting to note that many of them come from—and work in, on a permanent basis—the Italian academia.

A slowly emerging policy subsystem in preventive diplomacy/crisis management?

Policy subsystem theory, as explained in Chapter 1, is one of the analytical tools, proposed by Verbeek and van Ufford (2001), that I have decided to use to conduct the empirical inquiry of the subject matter of the thesis. The concept of policy subsystem, applied by the authors to given cases of the Netherlands’ foreign

98 The reform law of Italian development cooperation (125/2014) (see also Chapter 3) established the post of a Vice minister of Foreign Affairs specifically in charge of development cooperation.
policy, revolves around the very “policy autonomy enjoyed by a small numbers of actors in a specific policy field”. Policy subsystems can span all combinations of actors at all different levels of government, and illustrate evolutions of inclusion/exclusion/modification patterns over time (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001: 131). Policy subsystems can be of three different types: a) dominant, with stable relations among the small group of actors and generally a significant degree of control of issues and programs by the government; b) competitive, with (coalitions of) actors who permanently compete with each other and the field is open to new actors; c) disintegrated: with many actors, loose relationships between them and huge interference from outside.

As illustrated by the activism of both Italy and the Community after the end of the Cold War, described in previous sections, it can be argued that a policy subsystem is slowly emerging in the domain of preventive diplomacy/crisis management, although it is still in a preliminary stage and it comprises, for the time being, only two – the Italian government and Sant’Egidio–, or three-four at most – NGOs, including one or two other vocal organisations, such as “No Peace Without Justice” or “Hands off Cain” (despite the latter two are more committed to promoting human rights protection as a way to defuse tensions in the long term, *inter alia*, than to facilitating preventive diplomacy/crisis management initiatives.

As far as the type of policy subsystem is concerned, of course it is not possible to draw general conclusions because a broader set of events should be assessed for that purpose. However, as the next Chapter will show, the Algerian events suggests that *probably* the subsystem gradually taking shape is competitive. In addition, despite being always open and easy to access for new actors, in theory, new actors seem not to have entered the field of this policy subsystem, at least until now.

**A slowly emerging policy subsystem in peace-making?**

Taking into consideration the rather intense activity of the Italian government and Sant’Egidio after the end of the Cold War, elucidated in previous sections, it can be suggested that a policy subsystem is gradually taking shape in the field of peace-making. Like preventive diplomacy/crisis management, addressed in
Chapter 4, it is still in an early phase of formation; differently from the other case, for the time being, only two actors – the Italian government and the Community of Sant'Egidio – appear to be operating in this policy subsystem. As a matter of fact, it seems that other Italian NGOs, like for instance “No Peace Without Justice” or “Hands off Cain”, mentioned in the previous section, have not played yet a significant role in the domain of peace-making. A variegated landscape of civil society NGOs dealing with these issues, such as the Norwegian one, is far from taking root in Italy.

In terms of types of policy subsystem, as explained earlier in this thesis, clearly it is not possible to reach general conclusions because of the limited number of cases analysed in this work. Yet, as the Mozambican case illustrated in the following section will suggest, it may be the case that the policy subsystem gradually emerging is dominant, with stable relations among the actors and generally a significant degree of control – or, at least, of ‘non-opposition’ – of issues and programmes by the government. In addition, the fact that new actors have not entered yet the subsystem until now, although it is open and relatively easy to access, could be explained by the very type of subsystem taking shape. According to Verbeek and van Ufford (2001), new actors are expected to join more frequently competitive policy subsystems than dominant ones.

Finally, it cannot be excluded that there will be in the future a trend for the emerging policy subsystem in peace-making to overlap with that gradually taking shape in preventive diplomacy/crisis management, at least to a certain degree. It is not easy indeed, in some cases, to draw a line between the two set of activities, and the relatively small number of actors operating in both scenarios is another factor pushing towards that direction.
Part II - Empirical cases
Chapter 5. Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio in the Algerian crisis (1994-1998)

5.1 Chapter outline

According to a functional division along the lines of the two different issue-areas (‘sub-policies’) of foreign policy analysed in this thesis, this Chapter presents the empirical research conducted on a case concerning the first of them, i.e. preventive diplomacy/crisis management. In particular, I have looked here at the relations between the Italian state and the Community of Sant’Egidio in the case of the Algerian crisis of 1994-1998.

First, the Chapter offers a brief account of Italian foreign policy towards Algeria from the end of the Second World War to the eruption of the crisis in the 1990s, and on the activities carried out on and/or in the country by the CSE since its inception. Second, it sheds light on how interactions have developed between the state institutions and the Community during the three main phases of the crisis: 1) preliminary initiatives by the CSE (1994); 2) Sant’Egidio’s “Rome Platform” and the government’s wait-and-see reaction (1994-1995); 3) suspension of any preventive diplomacy/crisis management effort by the Italian authorities (1996-1998). Third, it wraps up the empirical material presented and argues that relations maintained by the two actors were mostly competitive.

5.2 Background

5.2.1 Algeria in Italian foreign policy

The Mediterranean, and its southern shore in particular, has always been one of the most important geographical areas for the Italian international agenda (Santoro 1996b; De Leonardis 2003; Bardi et al. 2008; Graziano 2007b; Coralluzzo 2008). According to a widely known metaphor in the academic literature on this topic, the Mediterranean is one of the three traditional “circles”
of post-1945 Italian foreign policy\textsuperscript{99}, together with the transatlantic alliance and the European integration project (De Leonardis 2003). The Mediterranean was (and still is today) crucial for Italy for both political stability/security matters and economic reasons. The international projection of Italian business firms towards the Mediterranean, be they big companies or small and medium enterprises, has been a constant feature throughout the history of the Republic. For a country with limited energy resources, that needed to rebuild its industrial base from scratch, restart the whole economy and find new markets for its companies, it was a straightforward option to turn to its Mediterranean neighbours in the aftermath of the Second World War. Between the mid-1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, this international economic agenda was pursued mainly by ENI, the national oil and gas company, founded in 1952 as a state-owned firm, and then transformed in 1992 into a limited company (with the state still holding a significant 30% share today). As illustrated in Chapter 3, together with other business corporations, and both before and after the fall of the Berlin wall, ENI has always wielded a significant influence on foreign policy decisions made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the President of the Council of Ministers, and on major economic policies with an international dimension, managed by other economic government departments (Romano 2002; Carbone 2011; Darnis 2011; Coticchia, Giacomello and Sartori 2011). The vision of Enrico Mattei, the founder and then head of ENI, inspired – and was inspired by, in turn – a “neoatlanticist”\textsuperscript{100} policy

\textsuperscript{99} Other authors have argued, in recent years, that a fourth ‘circle’ should be added, comprising the Danube-Balkans area, or its inclusion in the Mediterranean one, because of the growing importance of the area for Italy since the 1990s (Coralluzzo 2000: 36; Carbone 2008). In addition to the idea of the three ‘circles’, scholars working on this have suggested the metaphor of a triangle with vertices pointed towards the north, south and west), or that of an hourglass, facing Central Europe on one side, and North Africa on the other (Panebianco 1977; Garruccio 1982).

\textsuperscript{100} The scholarly debate on ‘neoatlanticism’ in Italian foreign policy is quite rich and interesting. The expression (in Italian ‘neoatlantismo’, first introduced in 1957 by the then Italian Foreign Minister Giuseppe Pella, “was meant to describe a new kind of relationship between Italy and the other members of the transatlantic alliance as a way to enhance the Italian position within the military organisation. Neo-Atlanticists believed that Italy could play a major role in the organisation by becoming the NATO ambassador to the [Mediterranean and the] Middle East, due to an alleged Italian vocation in dealing with Mediterranean affairs. In return, Italy would have had the opportunity to improve its power position in the alliance while pursuing its national interest in the region” (Pirani 2010: 221), although it could imply, on some occasions, deviating from the path of US preferences in the area. Graziano (2007b) has added the adjective “Mediterranean” to the word “atlanticism”, in order to stress the specific geographical element of this policy. De Leonardis, on the contrary, has offered a more nuanced interpretation of the alleged quest for a more independent foreign policy, that according to other scholars was at the heart of Rome’s “neoatlanticism”. He has argued that it was an attempt made by Italy during the second half of the 1950s to present itself as a “privileged partner of the United States in the
crafted by the Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani and by the President of the Republic Giovanni Gronchi, with a clear pro-Arab stance. During those years, representatives of the Italian government and Mediterranean countries frequently exchanged official visits, and Rome immediately established friendly contacts with the governments of the various countries of North Africa that had just gained independence, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, offering political cooperation, and promoting major oil deals that ENI was then able to sign with Tunisia, Libya and Egypt ENI, often in exchange for technical and economic aid and training (Bini 2014). This strategy remained basically unchanged also during the cabinets led by the Christian Democratic Prime Minister Aldo Moro and during his tenure as Foreign Minister, between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s.

Within the Mediterranean scenario, Algeria has always been one of the most relevant country for Italian foreign policy, even before the country gained independence from France in 1962; there was also a significant Italian community living in the Mediterranean country, that had started to settle down there at the end of the XIX century, mostly to establish business activities. It was, however, shortly after the declaration of independence, achieved after an 8-year bloody conflict, that bilateral relations between Rome and Algiers started to consolidate in a more robust way, because of flourishing economic ties, with Italy immediately publicly offering to cooperate with Algiers in 1962 (De Leonardis 2003). Algeria rapidly became one of the most important suppliers of natural gas for Italy; relations with this country, of course, were no exception to the rule of the “unscrupulous economic diplomacy” conducted by Enrico Mattei (Romano 2002: 106). Thanks to his friendly ties with the Algerian post-colonial authorities, strengthened by the support Mattei had provided to the National Liberation Front (FLN, from the name in French, ‘Front de Libération Nationale’) that had
fought against the French colonial rule (Graziano 2007a: 295), Mattei’s ENI managed to negotiate a three-part deal with Algiers and Paris, that he would have finalised with the new Algerian president in late 1962, a week after he lost his life in a plane crash accident101. Economic relations with Algeria grew significantly although the agreement was not signed, and during the tenure of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, in 1983, the first part of the Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline (also known as the ‘Mattei pipeline’), was finally built to transport natural gas from Algeria to Northern Italy, via Tunisia, to provide up to 30 per cent of Italian consumption still in 2014 (Graziano 2007a; Verda 2014)102.

Close ties with the North African countries were built since the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s also in the field of development cooperation and in the industry sector (in addition to the oil and gas field). The latter was, in part, “also the consequence of Italian industry’s scramble for markets in the aftermath of the first oil shock. The bigger corporations, from both the private and the public sector, were obviously better placed to participate in the export drive, and such household names as Fiat, Pirelli, Italsider, Ansaldo, plus various ENI subsidiaries such as Saipem, Agip or Snam Progetti, as well as civil engineering groups like Impresit, Italconsult and Lodigiani [were] quick to establish themselves in the Arab states where, particularly in North Africa, they proved to be a match for French and German competition” (Donini 1988: 178). A host of highly specialised small and medium enterprises too, started to turn to the Maghreb to expand their international presence, acting at the beginning as sub-contractors of big companies already active in these countries, and then setting up autonomous relations. This trend further increased the importance of these countries for Italian foreign policy, considering that the overwhelming majority of Italian

101 In 1961, Mattei had refused to become part of the oil cartel in exploiting Algeria’s oilfields, as he believed that “ENI should have no part in developing Algeria’s natural resources while the country was still under French colonial rule, correctly believing that the Italian state corporation would be given preferential treatment after independence” (Donini 1988: 177). Mattei’s assumption proved right a year later, after the declaration of independence, when his good ties with Algerian new leaders convinced the French government that Italy could join France in assisting the country in managing oil resources. “The three-cornered agreement was to involve Italian technical assistance to be paid for by direct ENI ownership of a quota of Algerian crude, as well as by gas deliveries through the pipeline which was finally commissioned over two decades later” (Donini 1988: 177).

102 During the early 1980s, however, Italian needs in terms of energy resources stayed largely the same, with a remarkable exposure to countries such as Algeria and Libya, not offset by sufficient export flows of Italian products to these markets; in that period Italy ranked first among OECD members for export credit insurance granted, as far as Mediterranean countries were concerned.
companies, in general, is made up of small or medium firms. As far as Algeria in particular is concerned, a case in point was that of a pool of approximately twenty companies, “each specializing in a particular stage of the textile cycle, which joined forces with [the major company, added] Generale Impianti to develop the backbone of Algeria’s textile industry” (Donini 1988: 178). Against a backdrop of sound political and economic links between Rome and Algiers, the events described later took place in the 1990s.

Although this goes beyond the time frame of the case analysed here, it is worth underlining that also today, clearly, relations in the energy sector with Algeria still feature as one of the main pillars of Italian energy and foreign policy, especially after the turmoil erupted in 2011 in Libya, the fall of Ghaddafi’s regime and the conflict still ongoing – Libya, together with Russia, are the other main partners Italy imports energy products from.

5.2.2 The Community of Sant’Egidio and Algeria

Since its inception in 1968, Sant’Egidio had always considered Algeria as a suitable country for pursuing interreligious dialogue, one of its flagship activities, between Muslim, Christians and Jewish (see Chapter 4). The first contacts between the CSE and Algeria were established in the 1980s through Léon Étienne Duval, who had been serving as the archbishop of the Algerian Catholic Church since 1954. During the liberation war, he had never sided with the French, as he was convinced that it was crucial to preserve good relations with the Muslim majority, therefore attracting much hostility from part of the Christian community in Algeria. On the contrary, Duval was very vocal, since the very outbreak of the conflict, in condemning the tortures perpetrated by the French military against FLN members. Thanks to this attitude, after the 1962 independence the Catholic Church had been able to continue its activities in the country, “developing a peculiar experience as a [Catholic, added] Church in an Islamic land” (Impagliazzo 2010: 61). Over the first two decades of work, the CSE had forged friendly ties also with the community of the monastic Order of Trappists, based in the Atlas Abbey of Tibhirine, in the north of the country, and with the archbishop of Algiers, Léon-Étienne Duval, who served in this position from 1954 to 1988, and Henri Antoine Marie Teissier, who succeeded him the
same year. Since 1984, CSE members visited Algeria every year to organize interreligious conferences and youth meetings and members of Algerian Muslim, Christian and Jewish communities attended the annual interreligious meetings organized from 1986 onwards by the Community in Italy or in other European countries (Scott Appleby 2000: 291).

5.3 Relations between Italy and the Community of Sant'Egidio during the Algerian crisis

The Italian government and Sant'Egidio acted in the context of the Algerian turmoil together with other state and non state actors. Other main actors involved were the following:
- Algerian government, led in 1991-1998 by various FLN’s political leaders
- United States
- France
- European Union

A clarification is needed here. I have mentioned in the section focusing on definitions that, as suggested by the academic literature on this topic, preventive diplomacy and crisis management deal mostly with conflicts on the brink of explosion and/or low-intensity turmoil, and not with fully fledged conflicts, be they civil wars or international wars. Algerian events of the 1990s, at least until 1995, are included in the category of unrest preventive diplomacy and crisis management deal with, because they are not considered as amounting to a full blown civil war. Arguing on the exact and detailed nature of this crisis goes beyond the scope of this thesis; the decision to put it in this grouping was based on how the conflict was perceived at that time by the actors analysed here (especially Italy) and other international and regional players. Never did the Italian government, nor France, the United States, the European Union or states of the region term the unrest as a ‘civil war’, for political reasons that are not the object of inquiry of this thesis (Molinari 2000; de Courten 2003: 86). The Algerian government and its definition of the turmoil has obviously been not accounted for in this assessment, as it was one of the opposing parties. Neither did Sant’Egidio, that used the term ‘crisis’ in the title of the document resulted from its crisis management initiative (see further details later in this section). The
nature of the conflict, together with other factors, also led to the impossibility of launching any serious peace-making effort, that would have changed the scenario for other actors trying to play a role in it, in terms of tools, actions, patterns of interactions, etc.\textsuperscript{103}

The origins of the Algerian crisis date back to early January 1992, when a military coup was staged by the ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), to overturn the outcome of the first round of parliamentary elections, held in December 1991 and won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, from the “French Front Islamique de Salut”), an Islamist political force, with a majority of approximately 47\% of votes (Mortimer 1996: 25). The second round of elections was called off, the military dissolved the National Assembly and took power, forcing FLN’s President Chadli Bendjedid to resign, FIS was banned from political life and many of its members were arrested (Addi 1996: 94). A series of Islamist radical groups – more extremist than the FIS in almost all cases – were soon set up to occupy the political vacuum left by the disbandment of FIS. One of the most prominent among them was the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA, from the French ‘Groupe Islamique Armé’); another major group was the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS, from the French ‘Armée islamique du salut’), that considered itself as the ‘armed wing’ of the FIS (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997). Clashes between the ruling coalition, especially the so-called ‘éradicateur’ (“eradicator”) wing of the army, and opposition factions, including militant splinter groups of the FIS, started out with low intensity, also because the government appeared to be in control of the radical Islamist groups. By the end of 1994, however, violence increased up to a level that state authorities were not able to manage the situation anymore: from 1992 to 1994, the turmoil in the country had already claimed at least 30,000 lives (Mortimer 1996: 18). Terrorist attacks and brutal massacres were repeatedly carried out, also against civilian population (de Courten 2003; Impagliazzo 2010). A few attempts were made in 1992 and 1993 to start a dialogue between opposing parties, but to no avail; also the effort to negotiate with all parties, launched in January 1994 by the newly appointed ‘President of the state’, the former Minister of Defence Liamin Zéroual,

\textsuperscript{103} ‘Le Pouvoir’ (in English ‘the Power’) is the term commonly used by Algerians, since the country’s independence in 1962, to refer to “the real ‘constitution’, the real system of power [...] that had already taken firm shape behind the nascent institutions of the new state”, essentially represented by the military and the FLN (McDougall 2017: 244).
was short-lived (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 29). The unrest went on for six more years. In short, terrorist attacks perpetrated by GIA spilled over also in France, with the hijacking of flight Air France 8969 in 1994 and the Paris metro bombing in 1995. The level of violence continued to be very high until 1999, when an amnesty bill was passed after the election of FLN’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika. After claiming approximately 45,000 lives (Roberts 2003; Hagelstein 2008), the conflict approached its resolution in 2000 with a government peace plan, and GIA was destroyed in 2000-2002 by military operations conducted by the Algerian army. The crisis resolution process, however, was essentially a domestic one, Algerian-owned; no significant external actor got involved in crisis management efforts (Roberts 2003; McDougall 2017).

The actions taken by the Italian government and the Community of Sant’Egidio during the Algerian crisis are here divided in three stages: 1) first initiatives by the CSE (1994); 2) Sant’Egidio’s “Rome Platform” and the government playing a waiting game (1994-1995); 3) Italian authorities turning down any conflict preventive diplomacy/crisis management initiative (1996-1998).

5.3.1 Eruption of the crisis and first initiatives (1994)

As it has been mentioned in the previous section, frequent meetings and interreligious exchanges and initiatives had taken place in Algeria during the 1980s between Sant’Egidio members, Catholic groups based in the country, and Muslims and Jewish communities, also after the archbishop Henri Antoine Marie Teissier had succeeded Duval as the head of the Algerian Church in 1988 (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997). Building on such a track record of good ties with these Algerian actors, the initiative by Sant’Egidio to try to solve the crisis materialized at the end of 1994. Unlike the case of Mozambique, when, as it will be explained in Chapter 6, a specific request was made by parties to the conflict for the CSE to intervene first as an observer, and then as mediator, in the case of the Algerian crisis Sant’Egidio took the lead of the initiative autonomously, as the result of an independent decision. According to the members of the CSE, the idea was triggered by two events: a) the assassinations by GIA of father Henri Vergès and sister Paule-Helene Saint-Raymond, two close associates of Sant’Egidio based in Algiers, and b) a proposal submitted informally to the community’s
founder, Andrea Riccardi, by some Algerian Muslims during one of the annual interreligious conferences for peace organized by the CSE (see Chapter 4), held in September 1994 in Assisi, Italy (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 49). In a press conference during the meeting, Riccardi stated that “some Algerian Muslim friends [of the CSE, had, added] repeatedly asked us: ‘Why the Christians, who often rally to defend human rights, stop when a Muslim country is involved?’ It seemed to me a challenge to take up” (Impagliazzo 2010: 61). The CSE was said to be particularly concerned by the deteriorating situation for both civilians in general, and religious minorities.

A working team was set up on the issue in September 1994, to explore possible options on the table; it was staffed with four CSE members: father Matteo Zuppi, who had already participated in the negotiating team in the Mozambican peace-making process in 1990-1992, Marco Impagliazzo, an academic who would become the President of the Community in 2003, Mario Marazziti, a journalist and spokesperson for the organisation and Mario Giro, who became in 1998 head of CSE’s international relations. An intense flurry of activity took place to resume and/or open new channels of communications with the main Algerian government members and political forces, and in a relatively short period of time – two months – the first meeting was held in Rome in November 1994.

The Italian government, during the time frame going from the launch of the idea by the CSE in September 1994 to the first meeting in November 1994 and then the second in January 1995, was not involved in the process, let alone was considering to take any autonomous initiative on the Algerian issue (interviews a104, b105, h106 and i107). In July 1994, a few months before the first meeting held by the CSE in Rome, Antonio Martino, the Foreign Minister of the center-right cabinet led by Silvio Berlusconi, had stated during the G7 summit held in Italy that talking to the FIS was necessary to solve the crisis in Algeria. With this declaration, the first slow transformation of the Italian stance towards Algeria had been set in motion, at least in public statements. Rome had started to gradually move away from the French position, that was rather similar to that of the government in Algiers, to get closer to the US idea of engaging in a dialogue

104 Franco de Courten (Rome, 28 July 2014).
105 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
106 Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).
107 Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).
with all political forces, starting from the Islamist groups. The time seemed indeed ripe for such a political readjustment not only from the CSE’s point of view, but also from the perspective of some state actors involved in the crisis (namely the US and Italy), as yet another attempt to launch a national dialogue had just failed in Algiers during the summer of 1994.

5.3.2 Sant’Egidio’s “Rome Platform” and the government in a ‘wait-and-see’ mode (1994-1995)

On 21-22 November 1994, representatives of the most important Algerian political parties met in Rome, at the Community’s headquarters in Trastevere, for a dialogue session organised by the CSE to assess political options to solve the crisis. Actually, the term ‘dialogue’, used in this thesis as a synonym, was not employed by the organisation, in order not to irritate the government in Algiers, as the word could have brought to mind a more structured form of negotiations, that according to Sant’Egidio should have taken place, if ever, in Algeria (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 48-49). The French term ‘colloque’, in English ‘symposium, colloquium’, was preferred, and the CSE spokesperson used every occasion to underline that the Community merely wished to offer a neutral physical space where all the parties could exchange their views (Impagliazzo 2010: 66).

Somewhat surprisingly, a wide array of political forces was represented in Rome during the “Colloque sur l'Algérie” (in English “Dialogue on Algeria”), from the nationalist party FLN to the disbanded Islamist group FIS, to other smaller secular and religious groups, with the exclusion of GIA. Only the Algerian government declined the invitation. Participants included: Anwar Haddam from the FIS, endorsed by its two main political leaders, the shuyukh Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj; FLN’s secretary, Abdelhamid Mehri; Aït Ahmed, president of the FFS (from the ‘French Front de Force Socialistes’); Ahmed Ben Bella from the MDA (from the French ‘Mouvement pour la démocratie en Algérie’; Abdallah Jaballa, president of the movement Islamic rebirth - Ennahda; Ali Yahia, lawyer and president of the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LADDDH); Mahfoud Nahnah, head of the Movement for Islamic Society-Hamas; Noureddine Boukrouh, founder of the Party for Algerian Renewal (PRA); Ahmed
Ben Mohammed from Jeunesse Musulmane Contemporaine (JMC); Louisa Hanoune, the spokesperson for the Worker’s Party (PT, from the French ‘Parti des Travailleurs’) and only woman in the group (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 53). Unlike most of the meetings during the Mozambican negotiations (see Chapter 6), the event was extensively covered by the press, as more than 250 international journalists flocked to the entrance of CSE’s headquarters in Trastevere (Hegertun 2010: 26). As it will be explained later in this Chapter, such a great exposure to the international media spotlight probably proved a risky move, arousing even more resentment among members of the Algerian government. During the session a certain degree of consensus seemed to coalesce among the participants on the condemnation of violence and the need for dialogue, and limited optimism emerged on concrete proposals for democratic reforms to implement in the country.

Reactions from other actors, on the contrary, were mixed. While certain European countries welcomed the news of the gathering in Rome with moderately positive remarks, Algiers’ military government immediately reacted, publicly criticizing the Community for facilitating the meeting, and accusing the NGO of ‘external interference’ in Algerian domestic affairs, a harsh criticism that it would frequently reiterate on following occasions. Prime Minister Mohammad Sifi, interviewed by an Italian journalist, commented that “Algeria [was] not like Haiti, the Algerians [would] never [have] allow[ed] anyone to interfere” (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 84). Algerian authorities staunchly opposed any kind of dialogue with Islamist forces, and believed that political conditions for dialogue among all political forces were already present in Algeria, therefore meeting up for discussions in another country was not necessary (Scuto 1994). In greater detail, they declined CSE’s invitation claiming that there actually was a previous dialogue effort already ongoing in the country, although the last attempt of this kind had failed only a few weeks earlier, in October 1994 (Impagliazzo 2010: 7).

Government-controlled media in Algiers defined the participants as terrorists, traitors and mercenaries (Hegertun 2010: 27), and the initiative was often linked by the press to both the US and the Vatican policies, beyond being mocked as “a Christian intervention in an Islamic nation” (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 78). Concerns over supposed connections between the Holy See and the CSE on this
dossier were raised also in private diplomatic circles: “[s]ome ambassadors from different countries went to the Vatican, the Algerian ambassador as well. He was received [...] by officials from the Vatican, and he asked them to stop their people [emphasis added], Sant’Egidio” (Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 83). The Vatican quickly replied also in public to these accusations, with his spokesman Joaquín Navarro Valls stating that “Sant’Egidio’s initiative [was] autonomous and in no way linked to the Holy See” (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 91). Replying to harsh comments coming from Algeria, for his part, Ahmed Ben Bella from the MDA declared that “[t]he government ha[d] scolded us for coming to Rome ‘in the Vatican’s shade’ [...]. We have not come here to plot against someone, but because we believe in the necessity of dialogue, which we have not been able to establish for months” (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 79). All parties, except for the Islamic Movement for Islamic Society - Hamas and the PRA, signed the final communiqué, including a declaration on the need to convene more dialogue sessions and a formal request to the CSE to host further meetings in its headquarters (Roberts 1995: 259). Algerian parties, indeed, led by Ait Ahmed from the FFS and supported by the leaders of FIS, asked for another session to be held in Rome to draw up a plan to eventually trigger, if conditions were met, real negotiations (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 109).

Despite the first negative reactions from Algiers, Sant’Egidio decided to accept the request coming from the Algerian groups and its activities carried on, with a second meeting being held in Rome in January 1995. Neither on this occasion was the Italian government involved in the initiative (interviews a108, b109, h110 and i111). On 8 January, the parties met again at the CSE in Rome, this time behind closed doors and without press coverage, probably to avoid drawing unnecessary attention, as it had happened during the first round112. In an animated but

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109 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

110 Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).

111 Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).

112 Reflecting a few years later on the media attention aroused by Algerian talks at Sant’Egidio, Giro argued: “[d]uring the fifteen days of the Algerian negotiations we had more journalists at our doors than in 27 months of the Mozambique negotiations. Why? Algeria is a strategic country because it’s an oil producer. And the Italian national society of oil that is very much depending on
constructive atmosphere, participants discussed possible ways to negotiate with the government, new elections, civil society engagement in the reconciliation process, etc. (Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 28). FIS was clearly one of the most important Algerian groups attending the sessions – and at the same time the less desirable for the Algerian government. Its very involvement and attitude during the meetings probably were the most important added value provided by Sant’Egidio in the whole initiative. Urged by the CSE, FIS’ leaders Madani and Belhadj put forward their requirements for negotiations and their representative in Rome, over the days, was talked into accepting more conciliatory positions on a number of issues, for instance the inclusion of explicit references to democratic principles and human rights. The CSE had reissued an invitation for the government to attend the second meeting, but unsurprisingly the government refused again to show up in Rome (Roberts 1995: 261; Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 121).

After a week-long talks marathon, the leaders of eight parties (representing, in total, over 80% of the ballots cast in 1992) agreed on a common plan to put forward to the government (Impagliazzo 2010: 59). The political forces that signed the document during the ceremony, held on 13 January 1995, were the nationalist party FLN, the Islamist group FIS, the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), the Movement for Democracy in Algeria (MDA), the Workers Party (PT), the Algerian League for Human Rights (LADDH), and the Islamist parties Ennahda and the Contemporary Muslim Algeria (JMC). In sum, all the parties convened in Rome agreed on the text except for the Movement for Islamic Society - Hamas and the PRA. The document, the only political proposal to solve the unrest ever submitted during the entire crisis, defined the “Rome Platform for a Peaceful Solution of Algeria’s Crisis”, called for an end to the massacres, the release of all political prisoners, the convening of a national conference, composed of members from both the government and the opposition, leading to new elections, every step to prevent foreign entities from intervening in the Algerian crisis, and the legal rehabilitation of the FIS, including the release of its members in prison (Rupesinghe 2007: 179-180). In greater detail, Section A of the Platform addressed basic democratic principles, Section B dealt with preparatory
measures for negotiations (and not only mere dialogue with the government), Section C focused on restoration of peace, Section D centered on the return to the constitutional order and rule of law, Section E called for returning to popular sovereignty and Section F set out mutual guarantees for all the signing parties (Impagliazzo 2010: 82-85). A final attempt was made by the CSE to persuade the Algerian government to show at least a limited form of adhesion or support. The draft text of the Platform was sent to Algiers for the government to make comments on it, but the cabinet dismissed again the invitation (Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 82).

Predictably, also in this case the military cabinet in Algiers publicly reacted very negatively to the initiative. Even before the conclusion of the meeting, on 9 January, the government spokesman, Ahmed Attaf, stated that they had “proof that the Sant’Egidio initiative was in fact a cover up, behind which foreign forces hid” (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 166). He then officially declared in a press conference – only five days after the signing of the Platform, on 18 January – that the government rejected it “on the whole and in detail”, and even defined the meeting in Rome as a “non évènement” (‘a non-event’, in English) (Garçon 1995).

The Algiers regime then insisted on carrying on with the organization of its own presidential election later that year, “as a way of disarming the democratic critique the Platform represented” (Roberts 1995: 237).

After the signing of the “Rome Platform” on 13 January 1995, some commentators reported at that time that conjectures had started to circulate among Algerian officials that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was behind the scenes of CSE’s initiatives (Scuto 1994; interviews b113, c114, h115 and i116). However, there is no evidence that some structured form of cooperation was in place between the Community and the Italian government, neither in the preparatory phase of the initiative, nor during the sessions in Rome (interviews

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113 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
114 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).
115 Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).
116 Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).
Of course the government was informed of the meetings, but the role of the Italian state institutions, also in formal terms, was limited to a diplomat attending the signing ceremony of the “Rome Platform” in the audience, together with other informal observers – also two representatives from the US and French embassies in Rome were among the attendees (Scuto 1995, interview a121). Italy, together with the US, France, Spain and the European Union, warmly greeted the submission of the proposal; an official declaration was made by the head of the Italian Senate Foreign Affairs committee, endorsing the Community’s efforts (Scuto 1995). The US State Department, on the same day the Platform was announced, issued a statement praising “the results of the St. Egidio reunion, [which] seem[ed] to be a serious attempt to help re-establish the process that [could] lead to a non-violent solution of the Algerian crisis”. The official declaration seemed to further encourage the CSE’s work, when affirming that the US “hope[d] that concrete steps [would] be taken by all sides to reduce the level of conflict (US State Department 1995). On 13 January, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé underlined France “interest” in “a number of initiatives” going on in that period, hinting of course at the “Rome’s Platform”, and a few days later affirmed that “France regard[ed] with great interest the dialogue which ha[d] opened in Rome”. The spokesman of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs made an official statement on 16 January, calling on “all the actors in the Algerian political life” to engage in a dialogue after the “peace offer” put forward in Rome (Le Monde 1995; Roberts 2003: 175). International media (the New York Times, The Economist, Le Monde) also welcomed the document signed in Rome with careful optimism (Hegertun 2010: 83).

However, expressions of support for the “Rome’s Platform” by the international community never really transformed into something that was politically more effective, later on, when it came to concrete steps to be taken. The inflexible reaction of the military government in Algiers, mentioned before, absolutely

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117 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
118 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).
119 Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).
120 Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).
121 Franco de Courten, Italian retired diplomat, former Italian Ambassador to Algeria (Rome, 28 July 2014).
prevented the “Rome Platform” from being further discussed and implemented. In addition, after the Algerian government’s complete rejection of the CSE’s initiative triggered some kind of readjustment of international actors’ positions on the issue, despite their initial public – albeit hesitant and vague – endorsement, the most important governments with a stake in the crisis did not follow up on the Community’s efforts. Absence of substantive support from European countries, especially France, the former colonial power, turned out to be particularly striking and damaging for the CSE’s exercise. In the first months of 1995, the French President, François Mitterrand, and the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, put forward even the idea of a multilateral conference on Algeria sponsored by the EU, taking stock of the activities carried out by the CSE in Rome, but backed off from this suggestion only a few days later (Akacem 2004: 158).

Despite a phase of initial ambivalence in its policy, during the next years of the crisis, Paris proved indeed to be one of most supportive countries for Algiers, through financial and military aid (Roberts 2003: 175-77), and according to the CSE France openly hampered Sant'Egidio attempts to work on Algeria also later (Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 87).

The United Kingdom and Germany preferred to water down their initial constructive public statements, declaring that they preferred to act in coordination with other EU partners. The European Union as a whole, however, never really showed to have an actual interest in getting involved in the crisis, although it could have leveraged the huge volume of aid earmarked to Algeria and the strong economic bonds to persuade the government to participate in the talks, at a time when the country was going through a crippling financial crisis. To give an idea of the country’s financial problems, the nationalist government in Algiers had indeed been forced, a few months earlier, in April 1994, to sign a deal with the International Monetary Fund in an unprecedented move, dismissed more than once in the past for preserving its political independence from abroad, (Impagliazzo and Giro 1999: 121-122 and 197; Hegertun 2010: 84).

Also the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who two years earlier, in 1992, had welcomed with enthusiasm the successful outcome of the CSE-led Mozambican peace-making process (Boutros-Ghali 1993; see Chapter 6), clearly conveyed to Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi his discouraging point of view on the matter, trying to advise the Community against continuing to work on the
issue (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 123). It soon become apparent that while the Mozambican conflict, in its final stages, was not at the top of the agenda of any prominent state actor, and therefore was a matter on which broad international consensus was rather easy to build, the Algerian crisis was a highly contentious issue for many in the international community.

With no state and/or international organizations in sight, willing and/or able to channel the process in a track one format and push it forward towards its effective implementation, and exerting pressure on the Algerian government, the Platform was doomed to fail shortly after being publicly announced. It cannot be argued that it was the CSE's intention to keep the process in a track two setting: on the contrary, they were probably eager to receive a formal political endorsement by at least some track one actors, sooner or later (interviews b\textsuperscript{122}, d\textsuperscript{123} and h\textsuperscript{124}).

Another important aspect of the crisis management effort concerned terrorism. Some media and intellectuals in Italy and in France started to fiercely criticize the CSE for reaching out to terrorists, an allegation that of course the Community strongly condemned. However, FIS and other Islamist political groups were apparently perceived in Europe, by some sections of public opinion, as too closely associated with terrorist groups like GIA in any case (Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 88). This was another aspect that may have discouraged the Italian government to get closer to the project launched by Sant'Egidio (interviews b\textsuperscript{125}, h\textsuperscript{126} and i\textsuperscript{127}).

The CSE' initiative on Algeria was probably genuinely based on the best of intentions (interviews b\textsuperscript{128}, d\textsuperscript{129}, h\textsuperscript{130} and i\textsuperscript{131}). In the words of Mario Giro, who

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{122} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{123} Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{124} Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).
\item \textsuperscript{125} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{126} Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).
\item \textsuperscript{127} Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).
\item \textsuperscript{128} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{129} Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{130} Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).
\item \textsuperscript{131} Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).
\end{enumerate}
was part of the working team dealing with the issue, “[o]ur proposal was very simple: it was not possible to speak about peace publicly in Algeria. Come to Rome or Paris! We offer you the possibility to have an open colloquium with journalists, media etc. to speak openly, freely and authentically about the crisis in Algeria, and to try to find possibilities for a peaceful settlement. The only condition we put forward is that the talks will only be about peace; don’t come to Rome to talk about war” (Giroquot. in Hegertun 2010: 64). On other occasions, however, like in the Mozambican or in other cases (see Chapter 6 and 4), the decision of the Community to get involved had originated from at least a certain degree of (previously received) political support – if not a formal request asked by parties to the conflict and/or other international stakeholders. In the Algerian case, on the contrary, not enough consensus had emerged, not even behind the scenes, to suggest or ask them to take an active role in facilitating preventive diplomacy/crisis management initiatives, let alone fully fledged peace-making efforts, neither during or after the signing of the “Rome Platform”. The whole process, from beginning to end, was completely track two, with all team members coming from the CSE, and no formal or informal cooperation of any kind with the Italian state authorities, other governments or international organizations (interviews a132, b133, c134, h135 and i136; Magister 2003). In sum, the launch of the project, as mentioned earlier in this Chapter, was prompted by a) informal suggestions received by Andrea Riccardi from Algerian Muslim friends of the CSE (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 49), and possibly by b) the positive track record of the Mozambican success of 1990-1992, and/or c) an inaccurate assessment of the crisis and its international context combined with an overestimation of the Community’s possible role. A few comments can be made on c). Apart from receiving only “some verbal support from the US and tacit support from some European nations in relation to the first [emphasis added] round of negotiations, Sant’Egidio operated alone” (Raffaelliquot. in Hegertun 2010: 65). When asked

132 Franco de Courten, Italian retired diplomat, former Italian Ambassador to Algeria (Rome, 28 July 2014).
133 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
134 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).
135 Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).
136 Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).
about the reasons for embarking in such a ‘solitary’ and somehow risky enterprise, Giro replied: “[b]ecause we did it. My impression is that no one really seriously tried to do this gathering, because others only wanted to gather a part of them: for example, not the fundamentalists. Really, no one wanted the whole picture”. It is probably true that they had no clear idea of what they should have expected from engaging in such an effort (Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 65), but they were to realize soon how the international context could impact on their initiatives, the importance of Algeria as an economic and energy partner for the main European states, France and Italy first of all, and the pivotal role that the ‘Pouvoir’ played in the management of the Algerian economy (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 225). Even a limited form of cooperation with the Italian state institutions, at least in terms of exchange of views, may have added useful details to the CSE’s assessment of the situation (interviews b137, h138 and i139). Finally, it appears that once the process had been set in motion with the first meeting, and Sant’Egidio was by then fully on-board, although in the meanwhile it had become apparent that the chances for Dialogue to transform into official track one negotiations were very low, the CSE was not really in a position anymore to disentangle itself from the initiative, and therefore it just decided to take a gamble and see what the outcome could be (interviews b140, d141, h142 and i143).

During 1995, the level of violence only partially diminished in the country, while the GIA started to organise terrorist attacks also abroad, namely in France (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997; Roberts 2003). The government announced new elections, held in November 1995 and won by Liamine Zéroual, who was therefore ‘reconfirmed’ in his post; the political impasse continued also over 1996, and a new constitution was adopted in November, strengthening presidential powers. A new wave of violence towards civilian population hit Algeria, beginning with

137 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

138 Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).

139 Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).

140 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

141 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014).

142 Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).

143 Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).
the massacre of Thalit in April 1997, when the entire population of a village was assassinated with brutal methods, and lasting until the end of that year. Despite the difficulties faced by the CSE when announcing the “Rome Platform” in 1995, during the next years the Community continued to publicly support the importance of the meeting held in Rome and of the document, in an attempt to revive the initiative.

5.3.3 The government weighs in: “no preconditions for parallel diplomacy” (1996-1998)

In the meanwhile, in Italy Berlusconi’s center-right government (1994-1996) had collapsed and the general election of April 1996 were won by the center-left coalition led by the Prime Minister Romano Prodi, from The Italian People’s Party\textsuperscript{144}, with the centrist Lamberto Dini appointed as Foreign Minister. With a new political leadership in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two competing political positions emerged concerning Algeria. The first was supported by the Undersecretary responsible for African Affairs, Rino Serri, from the Movement of Unitarian Communists\textsuperscript{145}, who opposed any type of initiative by Sant’Egidio that could damage Italy’s relations with the Algerian government. The second was backed by the Undersecretary Piero Fassino, from the Democratic Party of the Left\textsuperscript{146}, and, to some extent, by the Minister Lamberto Dini, who had initially been more open towards the Community’s activities in the country (de Courten 2003; Impagliazzo 2010; interviews a\textsuperscript{147}, b\textsuperscript{148} and c\textsuperscript{149}). Yet, advocates of these two rival

\textsuperscript{144} The Italian Peoples’ Party was a centrist/center-left party established in 1994 after the dissolution of the Christian Democracy Party. In 2002, it merged with The Daisy Party and in 2007 with the Democrats of the Left, establishing today’s Democratic Party.

\textsuperscript{145} The Movement of Unitarian Communists was a small political party established in 1995, after the Communist MPs who had decided to support the government of Lamberto Dini, split off from the Communist Refoundation Party. The latter, in turn, was a one of the parties born from the demise of the Italian Communist Party, dissolved in 1991. In 1998, the Movement of Unitarian Communists merged with the Democratic Left Party.

\textsuperscript{146} The Democratic Left Party was the main party originating from the break-up of the Italian Communist Party in 1991. In 1998, it transformed into Democrats of the Left, and in 2007 it merged with the center-left The Daisy Party to create the Democratic Party.

\textsuperscript{147} Franco de Courten, Italian retired diplomat, former Italian Ambassador to Algeria (Rome, 28 July 2014).

\textsuperscript{148} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
political stances were all aware of the importance of Algeria for Italian foreign policy in energy and economic terms. The issue was clearly perceived by all people working on it in the Ministry – both in political and administrative posts – as being so crucial that everyone was inclined to act very cautiously, whatever the policy option or the attitude they may decide to pick vis-à-vis the crisis and Sant’Egidio’s actions (interviews b\textsuperscript{150}, e\textsuperscript{151} and h\textsuperscript{152}). In the meanwhile, the Community continued to publicly advance the feasibility and political value of the “Rome Platform”, and in 1998 it even suggested the idea of convening an international conference, to no avail (Impagliazzo 2010: 72; de Courten 2003; Impagliazzo and Giro 1997).

The story of the Italian Ambassador who took up his posting in September 1996, Franco de Courten, was a litmus test of these divergences among top politicians dealing with foreign affairs at the time, with the diplomat eventually falling ‘victim’ to these tensions. Before leaving Rome, the senior diplomat was summoned for receiving the instructions, usually given to an ambassador before taking his post abroad, from the Undersecretary Rino Serri and two other diplomats serving in the two top positions of the diplomatic bureaucratic machine: the Secretary General of the Ministry, Boris Biancheri, and the Head of Cabinet of the Minister, Umberto Vattani. The three all reaffirmed the importance of Algeria for Italian foreign policy, and urged de Courten to closely monitor the evolving situation and to make every possible effort in order to further strengthen bilateral relations, on both the political and economic side. No in-depth discussion took place on the “Rome Platform” or on Sant’Egidio initiatives on Algeria in general (interview a\textsuperscript{153}). After a few weeks in Algeria, the diplomat realised that actually the Community did not have the same level of presence and activity on the ground they had been (and would be, later) able to establish in other countries where they had worked (and would operate), in the fields of preventive/crisis management and peace-making, such as Albania,

\textsuperscript{149} Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).

\textsuperscript{150} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

\textsuperscript{151} Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).

\textsuperscript{152} Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).

\textsuperscript{153} Franco de Courten, Italian retired diplomat, former Italian Ambassador to Algeria (Rome, 28 July 2014).
Kosovo, Burundi and Mozambique. According to the ambassador, at that time the Community did not maintain strong relations neither with the Italian embassy in Algiers; in the country, Sant’Egidio maintained regular contacts only with Teissier. Also the archbishop, however, after a first phase of cautious support, stopped promoting the Community’s activity concerning the conflict, considered too risky, and his relations with the CSE began to worsen (interviews a154, b155 and i156; Magister 2003). The head of the Algerian Church, in March 1997, even complained with the ambassador about the overambition of Sant’Egidio, and bluntly asked the diplomat “whether the Italian government was behind the Community’s ‘foreign’ policy”. de Courten strongly turned down the archbishop’s speculations, because on the one hand he was trying to follow the instructions on keeping sound relations with the Algerian government, received before leaving Rome, and on the other he was personally convinced that the CSE’s initiatives were not politically appropriate, also because its Catholic orientation was not, in his view, appreciated by Algerian interlocutors at that time (de Courten 2003: 143). The CSE, after the end of the unrest, reacted to de Courten’s remarks on its involvement in the crisis, with Giro affirming that the ambassador was among those “officials who tried to undermine our mode of mediation and get the political environment against us” and, on a bitter note, that the diplomat “was used or threatened by the Italian oil or gas industry that was against any agreement. Because they were deeply worried that the military government of Algeria would retaliate against Italy because we are Italian, and stop the oil and gas delivery from Algeria. When you fiddle with these things...” (Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 87).

A few remarks on the question of the religious inspiration of the CSE and the possible role of Catholic faith in this case are needed here. As mentioned also earlier in this Chapter, unsurprisingly also the Algerian government criticized the meetings in Sant’Egidio and the “Rome Platform”, also on the grounds of religion, blaming the NGO – and even the Vatican, for supposedly leading the initiative from behind – for being an unsuitable actor to engage with the issue at stake, also

154 Franco de Courten, Italian retired diplomat, former Italian Ambassador to Algeria (Rome, 28 July 2014).

155 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

156 Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).
because it was a Catholic group trying to reach out to parties that were overwhelmingly Muslim, in a Muslim majority country. On a similar note, even archbishop Teissier started to publicly criticize the very idea of dialogue and possible negotiations (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 91-92), although, according to the CSE, he did so after receiving personal threats by the Algerian government (Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 84). Undoubtedly, the crisis had a strong (Islamic) religious component (Roberts 2003), and it cannot be denied that the Christian minority was a target for attacks by extremist groups like the GIA157 (Appleby 2000: 382), but whether Sant’Egidio’s Catholic orientation was a decisive factor for the failure of its crisis management efforts or not is a disputable question. Although this debate falls outside the scope of this thesis, it is interesting to look at it as far as similar reflections may have been included in calculations made by the Italian government when assessing if and how responding to Sant’Egidio’s moves in the different stages of the process. In this thesis I think that explanations slightly downplaying the role of religion in the Algerian crisis – and in the Sant’Egidio-led project – are better suited to understand the evolution of the entire sequence of events (Appleby 2000; Roberts 2003; Hegertun 2010). The very fact that a number of Algerian Islamic-oriented formations had agreed to convene in Sant’Egidio’s headquarters in Rome, clearly shows that its openly stated Catholic leanings were not considered as an obstacle, when assessing the CSE’s credibility as a neutral observer and/or mediator. In addition, the Community received public statements of encouragement for its activities on Algeria also from Muslim political actors from Muslim countries, like Egypt and Morocco (Impagliazzo and Giro 1999: 187; interview b158 and c159). It is not possible, of course, to imagine what would have happened, had a non-Catholic non state actor based in Italy – or in another foreign, probably still European country – come up with the idea of engaging in a preventive diplomacy/crisis management efforts concerning the Algerian crisis, as no other similar initiatives were taken on this issue. However, it is rather clear that the decisive flaw of the CSE’s initiative was of a different nature: the absence of one of the two belligerent

157 On 26 March 1995, GIA kidnapped and then executed seven Trappist monks in Tibhirine.

158 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

159 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).
parties from the meeting table, the Algerian government. Had Algiers’ cabinet showed even limited signs of willingness to at least consider the possibility of joining the dialogue in Rome, the Italian government attitude towards the NGO would have probably been more open, cooperative and less conflicting. Indeed, I believe arguments claiming that the crisis was essentially political in nature – albeit with additional ethnical, identity-based and religious nuances – are pretty convincing (Appleby 2000; Roberts 2003; Hegertun 2010). Such a feature of the Algerian unrest further contributed to the perception, by the Italian state authorities, of the events as being part of an extremely complex and delicate foreign policy dossier. This, in turn, has certainly impacted on the decision of the government not to consider any form of active cooperation with the CSE on the issue, unlike in the Mozambican case, and to openly challenge Sant'Egidio activities, from a certain phase of the process onwards (interviews a\textsuperscript{160}, b\textsuperscript{161}, c\textsuperscript{162}, and h\textsuperscript{163}).

In any case, implementing the guidelines received in Rome before his mission, based on the idea of maintaining – and possibly also strengthening – political and economic ties with the government in office turned out to be a tall order for the ambassador and its 2-person diplomatic staff\textsuperscript{164}. Adding to the confusion, public declarations and press interviews by top officials in Rome, between 1996 and 1998, were sometimes contradictory, although de Courten clarified some years later that despite these uncertainties, directives issued from the Ministry in Rome to him in Algiers had never officially changed during his entire stay in the country (interview a\textsuperscript{165}).

Such ambiguity, of course, was not well-received by the Algerian authorities. In January 1997 bilateral relations between Rome and Algiers deteriorated when,

\textsuperscript{160} Franco de Courten, Italian retired diplomat, former Italian Ambassador to Algeria (Rome, 28 July 2014).

\textsuperscript{161} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

\textsuperscript{162} Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).

\textsuperscript{163} Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).

\textsuperscript{164} His staff included his deputy, Nicola Di Tullio, and the junior diplomat Luca Zelioli (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2016).

\textsuperscript{165} Franco de Courten, Italian retired diplomat, former Italian Ambassador to Algeria (Rome, 28 July 2014).
commenting on a visit to Italy by an FFS leader, Undersecretary Fassino mentioned the “Rome Platform” as a sign of the Italian willingness to work on a political solution. The reaction of the government in Algiers was immediate: Italy was again accused of ‘interference’ in the domestic affairs of the country, like in the case of the submission of the “Rome Platform” in 1995, and the ambassador was summoned to officially protest with the Italian government at the Undersecretary’s declarations (Impagliazzo 2010: 68; interviews b166, d167, h168 and i169).

At the end of April 1997, confusion over the Algerian issue in the Italian foreign policy machinery was concisely summarized by the ambassador in Algiers, pretty much reflecting the same political preferences expressed in the Ministry in 1996, shortly after the change of government. According to the diplomat, who was trying to figure out the reasons for Rome’s inertia, one the one hand, “Rino Serri, Undersecretary for African affairs, and Boris Biancheri, Secretary General of the Ministry, [were] certainly still shoring up the early government’s policy, [on the other, added] Piero Fassino, Umberto Vattani and Amedeo De Franchis appear to me, very influenced by CSE’s positions, while the Democratic Left Party [was] probably divided internally because Aït Ahmed [was] much appreciated within the Socialist International [of which the party was member, added]. Dini, maybe, [had] not made a decision yet, and ENI believe[d], and I think they [were] wrong, that they [could] do business regardless of politics” (de Courten 1998: 165).

At this point, the scenario started to change, again in an erratic way. Suddenly, in April 1998, the Foreign Ministry decided to recall the ambassador to Algeria, and replace him with ambassador Antonio Armellini (taking office in August 1998), without providing de Courten a detailed explanation; it was only said in diplomatic and press circles that the Minister Dini in person had made the
decision (Veronese and Vinci 1998; interviews a\textsuperscript{170}, b\textsuperscript{171}, h\textsuperscript{172} and i\textsuperscript{173}). The move appeared all the more unusual because, according to the Ministry rules, an ambassador cannot be removed during the first two years of his mandate, and de Courten had been appointed only 20 months before the decision (Veronese and Vinci 1998; interviews b\textsuperscript{174}, h\textsuperscript{175} and i\textsuperscript{176}). Apparently, the political line in favour of Sant’Egidio, advocated within the Ministry by the Undersecretary Piero Fassino and the Secretary General Umberto Vattani (the former Head of Cabinet of the Minister, until 1997), had won over the Minister, who had therefore decided to remove from the scene one of main opponents of the NGO’s conduct in Algeria. It appears that the Community and other diplomats, politicians and experts, supporting Sant’Egidio for domestic political reasons, had probably put pressure on the Ministry leadership to strengthen its cause (de Courten 2003: 370-371; interviews a\textsuperscript{177}, b\textsuperscript{178}, c\textsuperscript{179}, h\textsuperscript{180} and i\textsuperscript{181}).

But the story was not over yet. Such an accommodating attitude towards the CSE was to remain an isolated event indeed, or at least to be balanced by another move. Shortly after, signalling once more the volatility of Italian foreign policy orientations on the issue at that time, the Foreign Minister readjusted again his policy towards Algeria. This was probably because of a more careful assessment – and/or pressure received by ENI and other economic actors – of the high-

\textsuperscript{170} Franco de Courten, Italian retired diplomat, former Italian Ambassador to Algeria (Rome, 28 July 2014).

\textsuperscript{171} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

\textsuperscript{172} Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).

\textsuperscript{173} Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).

\textsuperscript{174} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

\textsuperscript{175} Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).

\textsuperscript{176} Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).

\textsuperscript{177} Franco de Courten, Italian retired diplomat, former Italian Ambassador to Algeria (Rome, 28 July 2014).

\textsuperscript{178} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

\textsuperscript{179} Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).

\textsuperscript{180} Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).

\textsuperscript{181} Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).
priority Italian energy and economic interests in the country, that discouraged every political position vis-à-vis the crisis that could hamper bilateral relations with the Algerian government (interviews h\textsuperscript{182}, d\textsuperscript{183}, h\textsuperscript{184} and i\textsuperscript{185}). When a long due official visit to Algiers was finally arranged in July 1998, Dini tried everything to convince its irritated counterparts that the “Rome Platform” belonged to the past. “Today there are absolutely no preconditions for parallel diplomacy”, the Minister declared in a press conference organised at the Italian Embassy in Algiers, hinting of course at Sant’Egidio’s activities. Although he expressed its consideration for the useful work of the Community, he assured the Algerians that similar initiatives would not occur again (Cianfanelli 1998). A few years later, Dini explained that “[t]he agreements proposed by Sant’Egidio were not part of Italian foreign policy [emphasis added]” \textsuperscript{186}. Sant’Egidio tried, in good faith, a sort of reconciliation, but through a legitimation of parties that Algiers had never been willing to accept. My visit was meant to explain our government’s stance towards Algeria. We also offered our help for the reconstruction [of the country, \textit{added}] and support for the victims of violence. But, most of all, we offered Algeria to restart relations with the European Union. That was the new starting point” (Dini and Molinari 2001: 77). When asked for his opinion on Sant’Egidio ‘diplomacy’ in general, he praised its success in the case of the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992) (see Chapter 5) and its efforts concerning Kosovo, but clearly stated that the mediation attempt in Algeria had completely failed. Furthermore, he candidly affirmed that the CSE members “can play a useful role in the resolution of even complex situations, but \textit{cannot act as the diplomatic arm of a state}”. After returning from Algeria, Dini discussed with Vincenzo Paglia from the Community about his official visit, and “from that moment on the Community of Sant’Egidio was discouraged to deal with Algeria”

\textsuperscript{182} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

\textsuperscript{183} Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014).

\textsuperscript{184} Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).

\textsuperscript{185} Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).

\textsuperscript{186} On a similar vein, commenting on Algerian events, de Courten, clearly affirmed that in its view “foreign policy must be made by the government” (interview a, Italian retired diplomat, former Italian Ambassador to Algeria Rome, 28 July 2014).
(Dini and Molinari 2001: 78; interviews b\textsuperscript{187}, h\textsuperscript{188} and i\textsuperscript{189}). From that moment on, no further Sant’Egidio initiatives on the Algerian crisis were organised or even conceived, and Italy-Algeria bilateral relations gradually returned at pre-1995 levels.

5.4 Conclusions. Competitive relations

In the case of the Algerian crisis, the Italian institutional machinery and the Community of Sant’Egidio maintained relations that were moderately positive at the beginning, then predominantly competitive and, ultimately, overtly conflicting.

As Hill (2003) has argued, in the grey, halfway ‘intermestic zone’, responsibilities of states and non state actors are often confused and overlapping. “[S]tates tend to overstate and TNAs to understate their respective roles; the one not to have their responsibilities diminished, the others not to attract unnecessary attention”.

If asked how the attempt at mediation started by Sant’Egidio should be interpreted, a realist may argue that the NGO “was probably a convenient front for the Italian government, and possibly behind them other western governments which could not afford to be seen as publicly active”. An advocate of international civil society, by contrast, “would stress the autonomous will and capacity of Sant’Egidio in the vacuum created by the cynicism and ‘prudence’ of the neighbouring states” (Hill 2003: 214-215). Hill concludes that “[m]ore likely than either of these competing interpretations, however, is the one which combines the two and accepts the messy character of events like these”, as in such delicate and dangerous contexts all actors are, to a certain extent, interdependent.

The interpretation suggested here completely agrees with Hill’s position, but develops it further by arguing that the nature of events was not only messy, but also competitive and, in the end, clearly conflicting, because the respective agendas of the Community and of the Italian government – or, at least, of a part of the latter, that in the end prevailed on the other – turned out to be clearly

\textsuperscript{187} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

\textsuperscript{188} Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016).

\textsuperscript{189} Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016).
irreconcilable at some point. Furthermore, it seems that in the first phase the Italian government did not openly oppose Sant’Egidio’s conduct, because it was possibly waiting to see whether the situation on the ground could evolve towards a scenario in which the “Rome Platform” could be further developed. In that case, the government would have probably made the most of the NGO’s initiative endorsing it and playing a proactive role for itself, like in the Mozambican case, at least with a certain degree of support and involvement (see Chapter 5).

In addition, it should be noted that the analysis of the events has demonstrated that the concept of informal and/or accidental ‘delegation’, proposed in the early phases of this thesis, could not work in this case. What the Community did to try to defuse tensions among the different Algerian parties, undoubtedly was not the consequence of an informal ‘delegation’ of tasks by the Italian government. As it appears clearly, in this case the top level of the institutional machinery dealing with foreign policy (namely the Foreign Minister, the most senior career diplomats and the Prime Minister), decided to craft a policy on Algeria that at the beginning was uncertain but in any case not cooperative, apart from vague, initial public statements, and then in contrast with the positions of the Community; therefore ‘delegation’ could not have been possible in any case. Neither evidence of accidental ‘delegation’ can be found when tracking the events occurred. On the contrary, when the government started to realize that Sant’Egidio’s activities could have had a negative impact on Italy’s policy towards Algeria, also in the light of the tough reactions of the Algerian government and of the evolution of the events on the ground, it made every possible effort to explicitly distance itself from the Community’s positions and to discourage its actions, even in absence of any kind of ‘delegation’.

Again, relations between the two actors in this case fall within the category of ‘normal’ – competitive and, in the end, openly conflicting, as we have seen – relations between a state and an NGO based in its territory, on a foreign policy issue, with both actors acting, in principle, on an equal footing, without any ‘delegation’ mechanism at work. After all, this also in line with what the literature now widely suggests on the increasing role of non state actors in international politics, as mentioned in Chapter 1 (Hocking 2011; Reinalda 2012, to name just a few).
Chapter 6. Italy, the Community of Sant’Egidio and the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992)

6.1. Chapter outline

In line with the theme-based subdivision into two different issue-areas (‘sub-policies’) of foreign policy, this Chapter presents the empirical research conducted on a case pertaining to the second subfield, peace-making. It focuses on the interactions between the Italian state and the Community of Sant’Egidio in the case of the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992).

First, the Chapter briefly presents the essential features of Italian foreign policy towards Mozambique from the early 1970s until the launch of the peace process (with some insights also on the following period), and the activities performed by the Community concerning the country. Second, it elucidates how relations have unfolded between the two actors during the three main stages of the peace process: 1) first initiatives taken by the Community (1988-1990); 2) multiparty negotiations with the participation of the Italian government; 3) signing of the peace agreement and launch of the UN mission ONUMOZ. Third, the Chapter takes stock of the material presented and argues that relations between Italian institutions and Sant’Egidio were essentially cooperative in this case.

6.2 Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio in the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992)

6.2.1 Mozambique in Italian foreign policy

As illustrated in Chapter 4, the core business of Italy’s foreign policy in the Republican era has historically included the transatlantic bond, the European Community/European Union integration process and the Mediterranean/Middle East. Sub-Saharan Africa was a geographical area traditionally neglected in Rome’s international agenda, with the exception of the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia, an Italian colony from the end of the eighteenth century to 1941, and
Ethiopia, occupied by Italian troops between 1936 and 1941. Bilateral ties with other Sub-Saharan countries have never been very strong because of the extremely limited Italian colonial presence, and because until the 1970s-1980s, these countries have not been particularly attractive for Italian economic expansion. In contrast to what has been argued concerning Algeria in Chapter 5, relations with Mozambique have indeed never occupied a high ranking position among the priorities of Rome’s international agenda, at least until the 1970s-1980s (Borruso 2014).

Only in the 1970s did Portuguese colonies emerge as a privileged area for Italian development cooperation in Africa. Italian governments encouraged civil society initiatives in support of the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. During that decade, Italian interests began to strengthen, especially in Angola and Mozambique, with Italian companies, first of all ENI, starting to gradually carve out a significant market niche in the oil and gas sectors of both countries (Carbone G., Bruno et al. 2014: 26). As far as Mozambique is specifically concerned, during the decade-long liberation war from the Portuguese colonial rule (1964-1974), Italian civil society organisations and local governments ushered in the establishment of the first informal contacts and partnerships, especially from a political point of view, with the FRELIMO army and the northern areas of the country that had just been liberated (FRELIMO, as it will be explained later in this Chapter, was the centre-left nationalist group leading the liberation war). After the country gained complete independence in October 1975, the Italian government immediately recognised the new state and appointed an Ambassador to the capital Maputo a few months later (Ferraris 1998: 298). Mozambique immediately entered the top ten of countries receiving

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190 The early involvement of different levels of local government (regions, provinces and municipalities), since the 1960s-1970s, in establishing political, economic and development cooperation ties with foreign countries, especially developing ones that had recently become independent from colonialist rule, brought forward a phenomenon that would then fully unfold from the 1980s onwards, when local administrations played an important and dynamic role in the so called “decentralised cooperation” (in Italian “cooperazione decentrata”), i.e. the set of development aid activities funded and/or managed by such public actors instead of the central government authorities. This tendency introduced new actors – either partners or ‘competitors’ for the central state institutions, on a case by case basis – in the Italian foreign aid policy arena. To give an idea of the evolution of this trend, it should be noted that towards the end of the 2000s, about 10% of the bilateral programmes was managed by local governments, with projects being implemented by international organisations or NGOs. “While until the early 1990s local governments received funds from the MFA, in recent years they have started to finance their own projects” (Carbone 2007: 919).
Italian development aid (Quartapelle 2012: 1), and Italy soon became one of the most important foreign donors for the country, also during the ensuing civil war (Gianturco 2010: 28). Consistent with a typical trend in Italian development cooperation policy, that lasted until the end of the 1980s, ties with the newly independent state adopted a clear political nuance since the onset (Seton Watson 1991; Fossati 1999 and 2008). The Italian Communist Party and left-leaning civil society organisations were indeed at the forefront of this engagement with Mozambique because of their support for FRELIMO, that was on the same side of the political spectrum. This ‘special relationship’ fostered by the Communist Party was of course very useful not only from the perspective of political ties between the two states at the top level, and in terms of the party’s international politics, but also for the bureaucracy of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its daily management of bilateral relations and development aid earmarked for Mozambique (Fossati 1999; Quartapelle 2012).

At the beginning of the 1990s, because the huge corruption scandal disclosed by the major judicial investigation ‘Mani Pulite’, mentioned in Chapter 2, involved also politicians and diplomats who had dealt with development cooperation activities, foreign aid funding was heavily reduced (Ferraris 1998: 507-508; Carbone 2007: 914), therefore bilateral aid to Mozambique decreased significantly. A judicial inquiry was conducted also into some aid activities carried out precisely in Mozambique by the municipality of Reggio Emilia (Cancellieri 1986). The events described later in this Chapter took place exactly in this phase of ‘transformation’ of relations with the African country. While ties in the development cooperation field came to a standstill that lasted at least until the

191 According to Fossati, ideological preferences suggested by given political forces in the framework of Italian foreign aid policy, officially dealt with by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, like in the case of Mozambique, soon turned into a sort of “partitioning’ practice”, [in Italian “lottizzazione”, added], through which single parties (and not the institutions) managed development cooperation with third world countries. For example, only the Christian Democrat party (and not the MFA) negotiated with Ethiopia, the Socialist party with Somalia, the Communist party with some Marxist regimes of Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania” (2008: 7). In addition, it is interesting that Ethiopia and Somalia drew special attention because of post colonial history and ties still in place.

192 Bribery in the management of foreign aid policy was not only a natural consequence of the massive influence which political parties exerted in nearly every policy in post-1945 Italy, as illustrated in Chapter 3, when discussing the centrality of party actors in Italian politics (Scoppola 1997), but also one of the outcomes of the ‘partitioning practice’ described above (Carbone 2007: 914).
end of the 1990s, economic relations inaugurated in the 1970s in the oil and gas domain, especially by ENI, further consolidated in the following decades. It is interesting here to take a look at how Italian-Mozambique relations developed from the 1990s onwards, although this goes beyond the time frame of events illustrated later in this Chapter. As it will be showed, the role of the Italian government and of the Community of Sant’Egidio in the Mozambican peace process yielded an important return for Italy in terms of political capital and credibility, that after a few years produced a positive impact also on economic relations. First of all, it should be noted that, as a further sign of political friendship – and of the closely related determination to step up economic opportunities – in 2002 the Italian government decided to cancel 100% of Mozambican public debt, as part of G7 commitments responding to the IMF-World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Like on many other occasions, ENI then led the way, starting to operate in the country in 2006. Massive investments in Mozambique soon began to bear fruit, and the company announced in 2011 the discovery, in Mamba, of the largest natural gas field in the company’s exploration history up to that date (ENI 2011). It is clear that such an event, together with the other two discoveries of 2012 and 2014, represented a game-changer both for the significance of the African country for ENI – and, as a consequence, for Italian foreign policy – and for Mozambique itself. According to some estimates, in 2014 Mozambique was already the third-largest proved natural gas reserve holder in Africa, after Nigeria and Algeria (EIA 2014). Oil and gas is not the only sector Italian business firms have started to invest in, since the end of the 1990s. Approximately thirty large companies, plus a growing number of small and medium enterprises, are active in the fields of construction, infrastructures, mining, transport, rails, telecommunications, food and tourism. It seems reasonable to argue that ties between Rome and Maputo will further consolidate in the next years, as ENI’s presence in the country is expected to remain constant and even to increase. According to an estimate by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thanks to the huge investments planned by ENI and its smaller subcontractor firms, operating especially in the energy infrastructure sector, Italy could become the leading foreign investor in Mozambique in the near future (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015).
A final note on the presence of Italian nationals in the country. Unlike the case of Algeria, and as another proof of the limited importance of the country for Rome’s foreign policy, the community of Italian citizens living in Mozambique on a permanent basis has always been very small in size and unimportant in terms of influence. It has been growing a little since the 1970s, with the arrival of a number of development cooperation experts and staff employers of Italian firms working in the country; yet, it cannot be considered a significant community of Italian nationals abroad (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2009).

6.2.2 The Community of Sant’Egidio and Mozambique

The history of ties between the CSE and Mozambique dates back to the early 1970s: a young Mozambican priest, Jaime Gonçalves, living in Rome in that period to complete his religious studies, got in touch with the Community and started to cooperate on a series of activities, although he was not a full member. After the country’s independence, the Holy See appointed Gonçalves as bishop of Beira, the second-largest city after the capital Maputo (Bartoli 1999: 256). During his tenure he gained first-hand experience of the harsh difficulties that Catholics were facing under the new leftist government, led by FRELIMO, as they were perceived as being associated to the Portuguese colonial rule. In 1977 he conveyed these reflections to Sant’Egidio, although he was fully aware of the fact that the CSE was not directly associated to the political stances of the Vatican, that at that time did not enjoy good relations with Mozambican state authorities. In turn, the Community realised that a window of opportunity for dialogue could be opened leveraging the good relations between FRELIMO and the Italian Communist Party, that turned out to agree on the idea of getting in touch with Mozambican Catholic groups. Sant’Egidio organised two meetings in 1982 and in 1984 at its headquarters in Rome between bishop Jaime Gonçalves and the Communists’ secretary Enrico Berlinguer (Hume 1994: 17; Gianturco 2010: 28; Perry 2014: 79).

At the same time, Sant’Egidio was working also on its ‘traditional’ charity activities, i.e. food and medicine distribution for internally displaced persons fleeing areas particularly stricken by heavy fighting. In 1984, the Community set up a committee, called “Friends of Mozambique”, in order to manage a charity
fundraising campaign, involving different donors throughout Italy, to deliver aid
to the African country through a humanitarian flight (Corriere della Sera 1984).
On that occasion, Andrea Riccardi and father Matteo Zuppi from the CSE joined
the crew travelling to Mozambique, upon their arrival were greeted by three
cabinet ministers and had the opportunity to visit some areas of the country. This
trip to the country further strengthened Sant’Egidio’s ties with Mozambican
government figures (Ferraris 1998: 479). In 1986 and in 1988, “Friends of
Mozambique” organised two “ships of solidarity”: after a fundraising campaign
launched in Italy by the CSE and other civil society organisations, approximately
11,000 tons in total of staple foodstuffs, medicines and farming equipment were
dispatched to various parts of Mozambique and distributed on the field by CSE
staff, working with the Caritas local branch. When the first ship left Italy in 1986,
the then Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs for African affairs Mario Raffaelli,
who would later join the negotiating team (see next sections), attended the
ceremony on behalf of the Italian government (Dragosei 1986; La Repubblica
1986; Hume 1994: 18; Gianturco 2010: 29). Even if Italian state institutions were
not directly involved in the project – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only provided
the initiative with some form of political ‘blessing’ and part of the logistical
support – the presence of a government member on that occasion can be
interpreted as an early sign of the more broad-ranging cooperative and
synergetic relations that the government and the CSE would establish on
Mozambique a few years later. In addition, although it is worth stressing again
that the Community was not coordinating its projects concerning the country
with the Vatican (Giro 1998: 87; interview b193 and d194) it must be noted that also
the process of normalization of relations between Mozambique and the Holy See,
set in motion in 1985 by an unexpected, last minute meeting in Rome between
the President Samora Machel and the Pope John Paul II, facilitated also by the
CSE itself, probably contributed to the positive perception of Sant’Egidio as a
reliable, – albeit Catholic – non state actor, in the eyes of the secular political
leaders in Maputo, who were rather wary of all things related to the Mozambican
Catholic Church.

193 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
194 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014).
Connections with RENAMO (the main opposition party, a right-wing militant organization, as it will be explained later) were instead established later, in 1987. When at the end of the 1980s FRELIMO came to realize that a political agreement was the only viable option to bring the civil war to an end, Gonçalves (and Sant’Egidio) facilitated contacts between the ruling party and RENAMO, acting as a coordinator of a composite group of Mozambican religious figures in favour of peace.

It was precisely building on this positive track record of relations with the main political and religious actors in Mozambique that at the beginning of the 1990s the Community was able to weave its web for conducting a negotiating process, as it will be explained later in this Chapter. It is important to note that ties between Sant’Egidio and Mozambique were built in the 1970s and the 1980s, while simultaneously relations between Italian institutions and the African country developed on political and economic grounds, sometimes crossing their respective paths in the ‘intermediate’ zone of the international activity of political parties – in particular the Communist Party and the Socialist Party – but never clashing with each other.

As argued above when discussing Mozambique in Italian foreign policy, the successful experience of the peace process of 1990-1992 ‘rewarded’ also the CSE later on – and it still does today – with a new mediation role for one of its members, again on an issue concerning Mozambican politics. In July 2016, indeed, at the request of the Mozambican President, Filipe Nyusi, the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, appointed the CSE’s international relations chief, Angelo Romano, and Mario Raffaelli (not representing the Italian government this time, but as an independent expert and President of the Italian branch of the NGO AMREF Health Africa working), as mediators on behalf of the EU in the negotiations between the Government of Mozambique, led by FRELIMO, and RENAMO, together with other international and Mozambican Church mediators. Tensions in Mozambique had arisen again as of late in 2014, after RENAMO had refused to accept the results of the general election in six provinces of the country, levelling accusations of vote rigging against the FRELIMO-led government. The two parties are up to this time the main actors in the country’s contemporary political arena, and RENAMO is still headed by Afonso Dhlakama, who already
was the party secretary during the negotiations of 1990-1992 (Club of Mozambique 2016b). Although Angelo Romano and Mario Raffaelli have been chosen formally by the EU, of course their previous experience in the peace process of 1990-1992, respectively with the CSE and the Italian government, as well as their first-hand familiarity with some of the same Mozambican leaders they had worked with almost two decades earlier, have played in their favour (Club of Mozambique 2016b).

6.3 Relations between Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio during the Mozambican peace process

The Italian government and Sant’Egidio played a mediating role on the Mozambican dossier in a context including of course also other state and non-state actors. Other main actors involved in the issue were the following:
- Government of Mozambique, led by President Joaquim Alberto Chissano, who was also leader of left-wing FRELIMO (The Liberation Front of Mozambique, in Portuguese ‘Frente de Libertação de Moçambique’);
- RENAMO (National Resistance of Mozambique, in Portuguese ‘Resistência Nacional Moçambicana’), the main opposition party, a right-wing militant organization, headed by Afonso Dhlakama;
- United States, Portugal, United Kingdom, France and the UN (as observers).

The civil war in Mozambique broke out in 1977, shortly after the country’s independence from Portugal. Two fronts opposed each other in this conflict: on the one side there was FRELIMO, a centre-left nationalist group that had led the war of independence from Portuguese control in 1975, and had come into power right after defeating the colonial rule\(^\text{195}\). On the other there was RENAMO (National Resistance of Mozambique, in Portuguese ‘Resistência Nacional Moçambicana’), a right-wing armed group opposing the new government, founded in 1975 with a strong anti-Communist stance. The conflict was particularly bloody, leaving approximately one million dead, over five million displaced and/or refugees out of a total population of approximately 14-15 million.

\(^{195}\) After the country’s independence, achieved on 25 June 1975, the first appointed President was Samora Moises Machel, who had been the leader of FRELIMO during the 10-year struggle against the colonial rule. He passed away in a plane crash in 1986, and was succeeded by the Foreign Minister, Joaquim Chissano (Newitt 1995: 569).
at that time, and a huge number of landmines (Hanlon 2020: 78), completely cleared only 23 years after the end of the war. In addition, it was exacerbated by Cold War rivalries and their reflections on the African regional politics. In line with other contemporary proxy wars, also in the Mozambican civil conflict the two confronting ‘coalitions’, at least in its early phases, partially mirrored, in ideological terms, the Cold War international scheme: the socialist movement FRELIMO received significant military and financial assistance from the Soviet Union, while white minority governments of Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and South Africa supported the center-right party RENAMO. However, the US government never officially sanctioned RENAMO or gave it support. On the contrary, at a later stage the Americans, together with France and the United Kingdom started to support FRELIMO. With the classic bipolar confrontation scheme already petering out in the Mozambican case – even before the Cold War itself came to an end – the international context was possibly increasing the chances of a feasible attempt to resolve the conflict (Barnes 1998: 120-121). The international agreement that brought the 15-year old civil war to an end was signed on 4 October 1992, after a 2-stage peace process. The first phase was based on negotiations held in Rome from 10 July 1990 and 4 October 1992; the second consisted of a United Nations peace-keeping mission, ONUMOZ, launched shortly after the peace agreement was signed, that operated until 1994, when Joaquim Alberto Chissano, FRELIMO’s leader, took power after the first free and fair general election ever held in the country (Bartoli 1999: 248). In this Chapter I will focus mostly on the first stage of this process. The role of Italian institutions and of the CSE in the peace negotiations is further split here into three phases: 1) preliminary initiatives taken by the Community (1988-1990); 2) multiparty negotiations with the full involvement of the Italian government; 3) signing of the agreement concluding the process and the launch of ONUMOZ.

196 According to UNDP data, Mozambique was considered as “one of the most mined countries in the world, alongside Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Bosnia and Iraq”, the result of both the war of independence and the civil war (UNDP Mozambique: 2015).
6.3.1 Sant’Egidio’s preliminary steps on the Mozambican dossier (1988-1990)

As it has been mentioned in the previous section, at the end of the 1980s/beginning of the 1990s the Community could already count on rather strong relations with FRELIMO, built from the second half of the 1970s onwards. With RENAMO, on the contrary, first contacts were established only in 1987, when CSE’s Matteo Zuppi met in Rome Juanito Bertuzzi, an Italian national who had lost some private assets and properties in Mozambique after the post-independence nationalization, and had maintained contacts with some RENAMO’s leaders in the country, through a mutual friend, Bertina Lopes, a Mozambican artist living in the Italian capital. Thanks to Bertuzzi, Zuppi got in contact with Artur Da Fonseca, a RENAMO’s foreign branch representative based mostly in West Germany, who turned out to be a key figure when, one year later, in 1988, the Community managed to set up a secret meeting in Mozambique between archbishop Gonçalves and RENAMO’s leader Afonso Dhlakama (Gianturco 2010: 31).

Between 1988 and 1990 FRELIMO had indeed realized that a political agreement was the only viable option to bring the civil war to an end. Before 1990 different national and regional state and non state actors had tried and failed to launch negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO: Mozambican Catholic Church, Protestant leaders, Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa, etc. The last regional meeting on the issue to fail was due to be held in Malawi on 12 June 1990 (and then cancelled), only one month before the first direct contacts between the two parties in Rome (Hume 1994). In April 1990, the Mozambican FRELIMO government, through the Minister of Work, Aguiar Mazula, established preliminary contacts with Sant’Egidio to explore if the Community was willing to set up secret meetings in its headquarters in Rome to start peace talks. Mazula, in addition, had previously consulted with the Vatican on the involvement of the CSE; the Holy See had not objected to this option, but had decided to remain out of the scene. For an almost fortuitous coincidence, also RENAMO, through its senior member in charge of international affairs, Raul Domingos, turned to the CSE for the same reason shortly after. Only three days after the cancelled meeting in Malawi, on 16 June 1990, Raul Domingos travelled to Rome on behalf of
RENAMEO to formally request Sant'Egidio to organise a first round of talks, and ask the Italian government to participate as an observer and to cover the financial costs associated to meetings and delegates’ travel expenses. Both parties to the conflict, starting from different perspectives, ended up approaching the same third party to ask for mediation (Gianturco 2010: 34). Since the very beginning, notwithstanding the Community’s familiarity with Mozambican issues, the involvement of Sant’Egidio in the peace process appeared (also to CSE members themselves) as something unexpected and interesting because the Community was not at the time – and it has never become, to some extent – an organisation professionally dedicated only to conflict resolution (see Chapter 5 for more on the nature of its activities) (Riccardi 1997: 98). However, the CSE decided to fully commit itself to the mediation efforts and started to work to facilitate early contacts between the ruling party and RENAMO, together with Gonçalves, who could act, for his part, as a coordinator of a composite group of Mozambican religious figures in favour of a resolution of the conflict. The peace process had therefore been set in motion.

It is important to underline that the Italian government, between 1989 and the first quarter of 1990, did not show any particular interest in what was happening in Mozambique at the end of the 1980s, from a political point of view. The conflict appeared as one that would slowly head towards some form of settlement, sooner or later (Ferraris 1998: 478-480; interview d\(^{197}\) and e\(^{198}\)). As explained in previous sections, the country had of course gained significance in the government’s international agenda during the 1970s and the 1980s, but mostly only as far as development cooperation policy was concerned. For historical and geographical reasons, on the contrary, it remained out of the picture in purely international political terms, at least from the perspective of the cabinet and the institutional machinery (political parties are not included here). This held all the more true for the government in office at that time, led by the Christian Democrat Giulio Andreotti\(^{199}\), whose foreign policy in that period was extremely focused on other

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197 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014).
198 Former MP with working experience in the Mozambican peace process (Rome, 30 July 2014).
199 For the sake of accuracy, it must be clarified that in 1988 Giulio Andreotti, then Foreign Minister, had met with Gonçalves to discuss the situation in the country. The encounter, however, basically amounted only to a routine bilateral diplomacy meeting (Hume 1994: 47).
issues, such as the attempt to come to terms with the tremendous effects of the
demise of the Cold War on Italy, the participation in the First Gulf War, and the
negotiations of the crucial Treaty of Maastricht, in the framework of the European
Economic Community (Varsori 2013). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the
Socialist Gianni De Michelis, was not involved in any way in the preliminary
contacts between the Community and the Mozambican counterparts, let alone
did he imagine a role for Italy as part of this peace process (Veronese 1994;
interviews b200, c201, d202 and e203). To be sure, in February 1990 RENAMO’s
Dhlakama met secretly in Rome with Bruno Bottai, the Secretary General of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the top post in the Italian diplomatic career and the
most important non political position in the Ministry) (Perry 2014: 78), but “the
Italian government not want to be officially involved at that time”, as confirmed
later, in 1995, also by the CSE’s Matteo Zuppi (Chartroux 1998: 30).

6.3.2 The Italian government steps in: multiparty negotiations in full
swing (1990-1992)

The process unexpectedly gathered speed in a matter of just a few days, between
12 and 16 June 1990. Immediately after the cancellation of the meeting in Malawi,
scheduled for 12 June, CSE’s Andrea Riccardi quickly resumed contacts with
FRELIMO, RENAMO and Gonçalves, to explore the possibility of bringing the
parties to Rome for a meeting, with the Community offering its headquarters as
a venue. Sant’Egidio’s efforts achieved their goal, as the Mozambican parties
agreed to travel to the Italian capital (Hume 1994: 32). Therefore, on 16 June
1990, Raul Domingos travelled to Rome on behalf of RENAMO to formally
request Sant’Egidio to organise a first round of talks, and ask the Italian
government to participate as an observer and to cover the financial costs
associated to meetings and delegates’ travel expenses. It was crucial for the CSE
to persuade Italian institutions to take part in the process, and it was not

200 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
201 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).
203 Former MP with working experience in the Mozambican peace process (Rome, 30 July 2014).
particularly difficult for the Community leaders to reach out to the Italian government to ask for their formal involvement for the process, as “cooperation [italics added] between the NGO and the government level was created by the proximity of the Community to the political and diplomatic circles” in Rome (Bartoli 1999: 261; interviews b204 and d205).

Hence it was only during those days that Italian foreign policy institutions seriously considered – and then agreed to – some form of participation in the talks. As mentioned before, “[s]upport from the Foreign Minister [De Michelis, added] was not as first as complete as it could have been. […] There was no open resistance, certainly at first there was a perplexed attitude on the part of professional diplomats […]” (Chartroux 1998: 32). Italy’s good ties with FRELIMO were indisputable, as showed by the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations with Mozambique when it gained independence in 1975, after the FRELIMO-led war of liberation, and by the ensuing level of Italian development aid contributed to the country (see earlier in this Chapter). On the contrary, smooth relations between Rome and RENAMO could not be taken for granted. Although it was RENAMO that had requested the involvement of the Italian government in the talks, the level of mutual diffidence between them was still rather high, especially on their part. “RENAMEO had an absolute mistrust for the international community, which it felt did not understand its struggle for freedom against a Marxist regime, and especially for Italy, Mozambique’s largest donor country” (Chartroux 1998: 31). The CSE, recognizing the importance of a) welcoming the early gestures of goodwill by RENAMO and, at the same time, b) bringing the Italian government on board in the process, was key to overcoming this hurdle. Sant’Egidio pledged indeed to RENAMO that if the movement had confirmed its serious commitment to the peace talks, it would have helped them to gain support from Italy. The Community, therefore, managed to break the deadlock establishing itself as an actor trusted by both Mozambican parties: “FRELIMO accepted it because the Community was backed by Italy, and RENAMO accepted Italy because it trusted the Community” (Chartroux 1998: 31) (Perry 2014: 78; Riccardi 1997: 100). In addition, at least to some extent, Rome’s attractiveness – for both Mozambican parties – as an appropriate setting for

204 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

205 Former MP with working experience in the Mozambican peace process (Rome, 30 July 2014).
negotiations was probably due to its 'double status' of capital of Italy and, at the same time, of the Vatican and the Catholic world (Giro 1998: 86).

The Italian government, in the end, despite some initial hesitations, made apparent by the Foreign Minister De Michelis, decided to give the process – and its contribution to it – a chance. Prime Minister Andreotti played a decisive role, making the final decision to get Italy officially involved (although, at the beginning, only as an observer and a financial sponsor), because of the confidence he had in the Community’s reliability, and especially because of the previous successful cooperation on the more limited activities already carried out by the state institutions and the CSE on Mozambique (i.e. the development cooperation initiatives of the 1980s mentioned earlier in this Chapter) (interviews b, c and d). In addition, the government may have also realized that it was worth betting on a low-risk foreign policy dossier in which the main traditional stakeholders – the US, Portugal and the UK – were not particularly interested, as they were possibly paying more attention to other issues and areas of the world, at a time when the Cold War was drawing to a close (Hume 1994: xi). The non-applicability of the classic bipolar confrontation scheme to the Mozambican conflict, and the relative absence of the US, a traditional ally of Italy, from the scene, made it all the more feasible for Rome to try to play a leading role in the Mozambican peace negotiations. A similar view on the changing international context and its impact on the Mozambican issue, although from a different angle, was of course shared also by the CSE: “[t]he Mozambique conflict was the last of Cold War conflicts, that is, with two ideologically opposed contenders. At the same time, it was the first non-traditional "post-1989" conflict, with its ambiguities, nuances and obscurities” (Giro 1998: 89). Last but not least, there was no risk of the Mozambican conflict ever becoming a contentious issue in the Italian political debate: bipartisan political support could be easily achieved as the Communist, the Socialist and the Christian Democratic Party had no

206 It is interesting to observe here that this initial inconsistency between the positions of the Foreign Minister and those of the Prime Minister points to what has been suggested in Chapter 3 on the somehow blurred division of competences and powers between the two figures in Italian foreign policy decision-making, defined as “varying ‘polycentric’” by Ferro and Leotta (2011).

207 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

208 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).

incentives to oppose the process, either for previous ties with FRELIMO, as explained earlier, or for some sort of loose but ideological proximity to a Catholic-oriented actor such as the CSE and/or the Mozambican Catholic Church (Marchetti 2013: 108-9; Gianturco 2010: 33). With the Italian government agreeing in June 1990 to provide the initiative with at least some limited kind of political and financial support, mutually beneficial synergies for Italy and the CSE were thus put in place already in the preliminary stages of the peace process. Rome also named a Socialist MP, Mario Raffaelli, to assist with the process as an ‘observer’. He was then joined by Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi from the CSE and archbishop of Beira Jaime Gonçalves (Hume 1994: 32). However, it seems that the Italian government opted at the beginning for a cautious approach, i.e. accepting to bear the financial costs of the negotiations, but appointing at the same time a representative, the MP Mario Raffaelli, who did not hold any official position in the government at that time, and was officially only a ‘personal’ representative of the Foreign Minister. Raffaelli’s somehow ‘ambiguous’ assignment even raised some doubts among practitioners and commentators, in the aftermath of his appointment (interviews b210, c211 and d212; Veronese 1994).

The reason for this low profile political attitude, at least in the first phases of the process, was probably a mix of simple distraction – or rather lack of attention by a cabinet that, as said before, was focusing its attention to other issues – and willingness to avoid a possible failure on a dossier that was not considered as the most urgent for Italian foreign policy (Veronese 1994; interviews b213, c214 and d215).

It was indeed at the specific request of one of the parties to the conflict, and upon the invitation by the CSE, that the Italian cabinet agreed to step in, therefore transforming the talks scheme in a multiparty format. The concept of ‘multiparty mediation’ – although during the first round of meetings were still termed as

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210 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

211 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).

212 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014).

213 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

214 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).

‘observers’ – refers to simultaneous interventions by more than one mediator in the conflict, interventions by composite actors such as regional organizations or contact groups, as well as sequential mediated interventions that again involve more than one party” (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999: 10). As far as rules of the game to be applied, the team decided to work on the basis of parameters traditionally applicable to ‘track-one’ diplomacy, although only one out of the three members of the mediation team was acting on behalf of a state (Raffaelli). Bartoli (1999: 271) argued that “[t]his may have been the result of Sant’Egidio’s strong presence in Rome”, probably referring pointing to the Community’s familiarity with Italian political leaders and bureaucrats.

On 24 June the Mozambican President Joaquim Alberto Chissano informed the Italian Ambassador in Maputo, Manfredi Incisa di Camerana, that FRELIMO had agreed to send a representative in Rome to meet with RENAMO representatives (Hume 1994: 32). The first round of direct talks between FRELIMO’s government officials and RENAMO representatives took place on 8 July 1990 at Sant’Egidio’s headquarters in Trastevere, but the first difficulties arose immediately as the two Mozambican sides disagreed over the role and prerogatives of third parties’ participation (namely the Community, the Italian government and the archbishop of Beira) (Gianturco 2010: 34-35). FRELIMO preferred to have direct talks with its counterpart, with the three actors staying simply as observers, while RENAMO suggested the idea of transforming them in fully-fledged mediators (Hume 1994: 33-34). It is precisely within that uncommon 4-member negotiating group – defined by the Washington Post as “an unlikely team of mediation peace brokers” (1992) – that relations between Italian institutions and Sant’Egidio developed on a daily basis during the whole duration of the peace process. Already at the end of the first meeting, Riccardi and Zuppi drafted a report for the Prime Minister Andreotti to keep him updated on the outcome of the talks, inform him about the financial costs to be covered by the Italian government, and let him know that the United States had promised their full support to Italy and to Community in their mediation efforts through the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman J. Cohen, they had just met with, an important development in the eyes of the Italian government, as it came from one of its most important international partners (Hume 1994: 35). Only during the second round of talks, in August 1990, the two parties decided to
recognize the group of observers as the official mediation team (Venancio and Chan 1998: 34).

A closer look at the mediators’ team is useful here. Mario Raffaelli, however, was not a newcomer to Mozambican issues, as it had already dealt with this topic on previous assignments. During his tenure as Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs in charge of African affairs (1983-1989), he had worked with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Giulio Andreotti to provide the CSE with the necessary political and logistical support for the organisation of the two “ships of solidarity”, in 1986 and in 1988, to deliver humanitarian aid to Mozambique (see previous sections).

Apart from Raffaelli, coordinating the group, the negotiating team was composed of the CSE founder Andrea Riccardi, who in the meanwhile had become a university professor, focusing on history of Christianity, Matteo Zuppi, a priest member of the CSE, and Jaime Gonçalves, who was still serving as archbishop of Beira (he was bishop at the time of previous contacts with the Community), and played a crucial role acting as an intermediary between the two Mozambican parties and the CSE/Italian side. The pick of a representative of the Mozambican Catholic Church like Gonçalves, was a well-advised move to win the confidence of RENAMO, while the presence of a Socialist MP like Raffaelli was of course appreciated by FRELIMO. A fifth person, who was not part of the official negotiating team, also performed a decisive role: the ambassador Manfredi Incisa di Camerana, serving in Maputo, assisting only by a small staff of diplomats, including his deputy, Pierluigi Velardi, and a junior diplomat, Diego Ungaro, replaced in 1991 by another junior official,

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216 In the witty words of the journalist who covered the negotiations for a major Italian newspaper, the success of the peace process was the outcome of the work of a ‘weird’ combination of three key people. One of them, the ambassador, was not even part of the official negotiating team: “[...]

217 Probably confirming that Mozambique was not on the top of the list of priorities of the Foreign Minister, some commentators suggested that shortly after taking office, the Minister had decided to appoint ambassador Incisa di Camerana, then serving in the headquarters in Rome, to Maputo, considered at that time an unimportant posting for the Italian diplomatic career, as a sort of ‘punishment’ for supposed, previous disagreements on other issues (Veronese 1994).
Roberto Vellano²¹eight (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2016). Finally, as it will be mentioned later in this Chapter, other state actors and international organizations participated in the process, with varying degrees of commitment and at different stages: United States, United Nations, Portugal, France, United Kingdom, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa and the Organisation for the African Unity all acted as observers, although with a low profile, less active role.

In November 1990, a third round of talks was first cancelled, and later rescheduled for December after the United States made their – albeit indirect – support for the process explicit, and a series of meetings between the mediators’ team and leaders of regional states involved in the Mozambican crisis took place (Hume 1994: 47; Bartoli 1999: 259). During the third round of meetings, the first step forward was finally taken, with an agreement reached on maintaining a partial cease-fire along major transportation routes, and on granting humanitarian aid agencies access to conflict areas. The parties also set up a Joint Verification Mission (JVC), with FRELIMO’s government suggesting Congo, France, the USSR, and the UK as members of the mechanism, and RENAMO Kenya, Portugal, the US and Zambia. During its first meeting, the JVC appointed the Italian Ambassador in Maputo, Incisa di Camerana, as its chairman. The role of the diplomat within the JVC in Mozambique, who worked also with CSE members based in the country, proved very useful as he could have first-hand knowledge of what was happening on the field, and was another sign of complementarity and synergy between Italian institutions and the Community (Hume 1994: 47; Ajello 1999: 620 and 2010: 19).

Four more rounds of talks followed, between January and October 1991, focusing on political and electoral reforms, but with a faltering pace and amid frequent accusations of breaching the ceasefire levelled by both parties. Tongue-in-cheek comments started to circulate in the early months of 1991 among international diplomats, especially Portuguese, on the slow pace of negotiations, underlining “mediators’ weakness. Someone suggested the option of resuming negotiations elsewhere” (Morozzo della Rocca 1993a: 78-9). At some point, during the slowing down phase of the process of 1991, RENAMO even tried to gain support from

²¹eight Interestingly, Vellano returned to Mozambique from 2012 to 2016, serving as ambassador (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2016), when the country had become much more relevant for Italian foreign policy, mostly for energy-related reasons, as described in previous sections.
Portugal and the United Nations, but both refused to step in the process, arguing that all stakeholders had sanctioned the Rome talks as the only official forum for negotiations (Hume 1994: 65). While such rumours and behind-the-scenes attempts were probably aimed at possibly benefiting actors playing a secondary role the process, like the Portuguese, inaccurate and confusing reactions on this issue by Foreign Minister De Michelis were all the more ill-timed and unsuitable. He declared indeed that Rome would probably get involved in negotiations “in the observers’ group, moving from an unofficial role to an official one”, at a time when Italy had already been officially upgraded from the status of ‘observer’ to that of ‘mediator’ in the process, raising doubts also among the two Mozambican delegations (Ferraris 1998: 479; Morozzo della Rocca 1993a: 78-79; Chan and Venancio 1998: 36). On the one hand, this episode signals, at least to some extent, a certain degree of confusion and/or poor communication on the dossier within the Italian foreign policy machinery, between the bureaucrats working daily on the issue, and the top political level of the Ministry (see also Chapter 3 on this). On the other, it also further points to the initial, low interest of the government in the negotiations argued earlier in this Chapter, even after Rome’s appointed representative was included in the mediation team.

In order to overcome the impasse of January-October 1990, during the eight and ninth rounds of talks, held from October 1991 to March 1992, the mediation team drafted a series of Protocols dealing with specific issues. Protocol I focused on basic principles, such as the commitment of the Mozambican government not to pass any law in contrast with provisions set by the Protocols, and RENAMO’s pledge to refrain from armed struggle after the end of the war (Hume 1994: 70 and 75). Protocol II, signed in November 1991, focused instead on criteria to establish and recognise political parties, basically preparing the ground for RENAMO to transform in a fully fledged political party after the end of the conflict (Hume 1994: 79). Negotiations for Protocol III, dealing with electoral reform, on the contrary, were on the verge of paralysing again the whole process. Yet, pressure from all the three mediators and the US convinced the parties to postpone discussions on the matter, and an agreement on the issue was then reached in March 1992 (Hume 1994: 92; interviews b and d).

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219 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

220 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014).
With the tenth round, negotiations finally gained momentum and entered the last part of the process, going from June to September 1992. By June 1992, if all parties had agreed to formally include the US and Portugal in the peace process, other problems were still on the table to be solved, such as military issues, while the humanitarian situation on the ground was deteriorating (Hume 1994: 107).

6.3.3 “Italian formula, Mozambican peace”. The signing of the “General Peace Agreement” (1992)

The final breakthrough finally materialized during the summer of 1992. In order to unlock another stall in negotiations in Rome, a summit was organized in July by Tiny Rowland, a British business executive active in the resolution of the crisis, between President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, President Quett Masire of Botswana, RENAMO’s Afonso Dhlakama. The meeting proved key to persuade Dhlakama to hold face-to-face talks with FRELIMO’s President Joaquim Alberto Chissano, that eventually took place from 5 to 7 August in Rome (Hume 1994: 134). During what was defined as an ‘African’ summit, Chissano and Dhlakama met in the presence of Mugabe and Masire, negotiated the last details and agreed to meet again in October to sign the peace agreement (Gianturco 2010: 45). While at the negotiating table time seemed ripe for reaching a comprehensive peace deal, behind the scenes there were still many doubts, especially on the part of RENAMO. Final, limited but hectic meetings were held between the mediators and the delegates to solve still contentious questions such as the future of the army and the reform of the police (Hume 1999: 124; Gentili 2013: 7). In addition, the Italian government pledged 15 million USD to RENAMO, in order for the movement to transform into a fully-fledged political party (Vines 1998: 74).

After ten rounds of talks and three summits, the “General Peace Agreement” (GPA) for Mozambique was finally signed in Rome on 4 October 1992, by Joaquim Alberto Chissano, Mozambican President and FRELIMO’s leader, and Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO’s president. At the final ceremony, held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two parties signed the agreement under the chairmanship of the Italian government and in the presence of the Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo, a symbolic setting that underlined the importance of the role of Italy in the peace process. Participants in the ceremony included:
President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, President Quett Masire of Botswana, the vice-president of Kenya, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Pik Botha, the Malawian Minister in the Office of the President John Tembo and Assistant Secretary General of the UN, James O.C. Jonah, representatives of the US, Portuguese, French and British governments (Gentili 2013: 8). Thanks to the innovative multiparty mediation activity, a deal was reached on a declaration of cease-fire, the recognition of political parties, the organisation of general elections, the set up of a unified army, the presence of international monitors in the country to oversee the implementation of the accords, the involvement of regional and international actors, with a specific mention of the role of Italy in supporting the Mozambican government in the electoral process (information collected from the original text of the agreement). The Agreement tasked United Nations with overseeing the implementation of the accords. Therefore, immediately, the day after the signing ceremony, the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Aldo Ajello, a senior Italian UN official with a previous experience as a Radical and then Socialist MP, and as MEP in the European Parliament, as Interim Special Representative to Mozambique – his appointment as Special Representative of the Secretary General (SGSR) was then confirmed by the Security Council Resolution 782 a few days later, on 13 October 1992. The fact that an Italian senior official was chosen to head the UN mission is a sort of further testimony to the fact that the UN and the international community had acknowledged the contribution of Italy to the resolution of the conflict and, in other words, that cooperating with the CSE had proved a good choice for the Italian government (Ajello 2010: 19-20; interview b221).

On 13 December 1992 the Security Council passed a resolution establishing the creation and deployment of a peace-keeping mission to the country (ONUMOZ), which operated in the country between December 1992 and December 1994. Italy deployed the largest share of troops (Operation Albatros was the name of the specific Italian contribution) in one of the first international military operations the country had ever participated in after the Second World War (Ignazi et al. 2012). As it would occur in the following years also on other occasions (see for instance the case of the 2006 Lebanese war, described earlier in this thesis), Italian foreign policy combined efforts in peace-making with the tool of

221 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
international military operations and managed to strengthen its role and prestige on the international scene and in a specific area of the world. On the whole, relations between and Sant'Egidio developed smoothly during the 2-year negotiating process, despite towards the end of the talks two different Ministers took responsibility for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Christian Democrats Vincenzo Scotti and Emilio Colombo, first because of the formation of a new government at the end of June 1994, led by the Socialist Giuliano Amato, and second due to a cabinet reshuffle only one month later. As stressed in different points of earlier sections of this Chapter, in such a multiparty peace-making effort, it soon became clear that cooperation between the two actors was mutually beneficial for both of them (Hume 1994; Bartoli 1999; Gianturco 2010). Also the attitude of the Italian press (despite the limited coverage of the process before the final months) and of the general public was positive towards the joint effort made by the CSE and the Italian government, although from February 1992 onwards the major corruption scandal disclosed by the judicial investigation "Clean Hands" almost 'monopolised' the public debate on the vast majority of political issues in Italy (interview b, c, d, e and f).

Over the entire duration of the process, constant updates and views were periodically exchanged between the Italian government institutions – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, first of all – and the CSE members involved in the activities, especially through the presence of Raffaelli in the team. The General Directorate for Political Affairs of the Ministry, in particular senior diplomats Maurizio Melani and Enrico Guicciardi, closely followed the whole process, providing technical and diplomatic advice to the team when necessary (interview

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222 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
223 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).
224 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014).
225 Former MP with working experience in the Mozambican peace process (Rome, 30 July 2014).
226 Senior journalist (Rome, 24 October 2016).
b\textsuperscript{227}, c\textsuperscript{228}, d\textsuperscript{229} and g\textsuperscript{230}). The role of the Italian government was indeed even reinforced at some point: in March 1991, the evolution of the peace talks required the advice of military experts among the mediators that only Italy was in a position to provide, also at the request of the US Deputy Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Davidow.

“The amount of less visible work – collecting and sharing information, decision-making, analysing, brainstorming, creative thinking to resolve crises as well as to determine long-term goals – constituted the bulk of the mediation’s team labour”, conducted especially by Matteo Zuppi and Mario Raffaelli together (Bartoli 1999: 262; interviews b\textsuperscript{231} and d\textsuperscript{232}). Ensuring confidentiality to the whole process was also a crucial issue, because both parties, and especially FRELIMO, were facing internal opposition from hard-liners strongly resisting any form of dialogue with their counterpart, therefore they needed to prevent information on the talks and details of negotiations from circulating out of the negotiations channels (Giro 2011: 96). The limited international press coverage of the issue, due to a general lack of interest in Mozambican affairs, was of course another feature helping the mediating team to keeping the talks secret. Only in the final months of the process, a spokesperson for the talks was appointed (Mario Marazziti, from the CSE) (Bartoli 1990: 263; Gianturco 2010: 37). Also in this regard, cooperation between the Community – offering the physical facilities for meetings, its low-key headquarters in the historical centre of Rome, relatively shielded from press and public scrutiny – and the Italian government – facilitating discreet delegates’ trips from and to the city, and granting RENAMO’s members entry to the Italian territory although they did not hold passports (Riccardi 1998: 99) – seemed to go smoothly (Nigro 1990; Bartoli 1999: 263;

\textsuperscript{227} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
\textsuperscript{228} Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).
\textsuperscript{229} Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014).
\textsuperscript{230} Former international organisations’ official with working experience in the Mozambican peace process (Rome, 30 July 2014).
\textsuperscript{231} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).
\textsuperscript{232} Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014).
interview b\textsuperscript{233}, c\textsuperscript{234} and d\textsuperscript{235}). The fact that the four mediators and all the other members of Sant’Egidio staff were working on their mediation efforts (together with administrative and logistical support) was perceived as a sign of sincere commitment by Mozambican parties and international observers (Bartoli 1999: 263). Also in this case, synergic relations between the Community and the Italian government seemed to have developed. If on the one hand Sant’Egidio was able to contribute its volunteers’ work and its premises for both the meetings and back office activities, on the other Italian state institutions – through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – were able to cover the lion’s share of all other unavoidable expenses incurred, with minor contributions coming from the Swiss government, international foundations and NGOs and the Italian network of Catholic parish churches (Hume 1994: 32; Gianturco 2010: 39). In greater detail, Italy contributed 20 million USD\textsuperscript{236} in total to finance the costs of the process, plus 30,000 USD to cover part of Sant’Egidio’s expenses. (Chartroux 1998: 33; Vines 1998: 73). On the issue of funding, it should be noted that if the Italian government had decided to decline to financially support the negotiations, probably the CSE would have found an alternative state sponsor – maybe the United States, or Portugal – or an international organisation willing to bear the costs – perhaps the United Nations or the Organization of the African Unity. In other words, the Italian financial contribution was important but not necessarily vital for the mediation work by Sant’Egidio; this should be taken into account because it means that it did not actually affect significantly the Community’s policy autonomy. In addition, it is important to underline that although Italy funded most of the Rome expenses, the US government was always present behind the scenes throughout the negotiations, becoming an official observer and providing technical advice (legal, military). Political supervision for the whole process, in Washington, was assigned to the State Department Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman J. Cohen, and his Deputy, Jeffrey

\textsuperscript{233} Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014).

\textsuperscript{234} Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014).

\textsuperscript{235} Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014).

\textsuperscript{236} The amount of money spent turned out to be rather high because it included also the costs for both delegations of keeping their leaders and colleagues in Mozambique constantly updated on every step of the negotiations. For instance, RENAMO’s telephone bills alone, from January to July 1992, amounted to 60,000 USD.
Davidow, while the Deputy Head of Mission of the US Embassy to the Holy See, Cameron Hume, was tasked with closely monitoring the activities and offering concrete, daily support to the mediators in Rome (Bartoli 1999: 258-259). The success of the process, dubbed as “Italian formula” (Boutros-Ghali 1993), rested on a negotiating format combining non state actors and state actors, with a NGO spearheading and coordinating the process (Sant’Egidio), a government fully on board providing mediation efforts with traditional statecraft diplomatic tools (Italy) and, in their capacity of observers, a number of other international state stake-holders supporting the process outside of the negotiating team (Boutros-Ghali 1993; Giro 2011: 96). Set in motion by a (rather neophyte) ‘track-two-diplomacy’ actor as the CSE, probably negotiations would not have reached their goal, if a sound synergy between Sant’Egidio and other ‘track-one diplomacy’ actors had not been achieved. In other words, “[t]he winning formula of the Mozambican mediation was confidence building coupled with power diplomacy. It was power diplomacy that ensured that the political arrangements in the GPA were not left in the vague or undefined and that democracy was to be supported by adequate political and economic incentives” (Gentili 2013: 8). At the same time, the added value provided by a non state actor such as Sant’Egidio – nicknamed “UN of Trastevere” (Man 1995) – in this context was that “non-official diplomacy can create the conditions for taking up contacts and picking up threads within national communities in crisis, but above all for reconstructing links to isolated realities that have slipped out of the control of the state system and international institutions” [i.e. with actors located on a sub-state level, added] (Giro 1998: 89). In the words of Mario Raffaelli: the process “starts from a commitment of solidarity and evangelization on the ground [on the part of CSE, added], mediation occurs, because the ongoing war prevents the very commitment from being fulfilled in the wake of the diplomatic success, the government gets involved in an ‘unusual’ military engagement, and in any case synergic with Vatican policy” (Raffaelli 1992: 107).

6.4 Conclusions. Cooperative relations

Relations between Italian institutions and the Community of Sant’Egidio in the case of the Mozambican peace process were on the whole cooperative. The
initiative (and the management of) the mediation initiative was clearly in the hands of the Community, but because it soon became clear that some form of state commitment was useful, if not necessary, both actors realised that working in *synergy*\(^{237}\) was the best option to achieve their goals. The latter, all differences considered, were rather similar for both the Italian state and the Community: a good quality mediation work, possibly a successful outcome of the talks, prestige and the reputation gained on the international scene even only for the mere fact of being able to launch a peace process, regardless of the final result of the negotiations. The two actors were largely interdependent on this occasion: on the one hand the NGO Sant’Egidio was deeply rooted in the Italian society, had always valued its ‘Italian-ness’, also in the eyes of other actors, and was partly dependent on the Italian government for political, technical and financial support. On the other, Italian institutions had the chance of stepping in a process already set in motion by an NGO and play a significant role Rome had probably not even envisaged before, making the most of political and diplomatic room for Italy cleared by the fact that in that period the attention of the US, Portugal and the UK was mostly focused on other areas of the world. It can be argued that Italy obtained an even higher ‘profit’ from the events, as it was involved in a process in which most of the initial, demanding ‘investments’ had been already made over many years by another actor, i.e. the Community. In addition, even if the Italian government had showed a specific interest in the resolution of the Mozambican issue – a pure theoretical speculation, as we know that this was not the case –, being on the front line of the initiatives, instead of a non state actor such as Sant’Egidio, would not have probably been actually fruitful for the success of the peace process. “Characteristic of the mediation in Mozambique was the paradox that the weaknesses of the negotiating team reduced the possibility of imposing outside solutions (through coercive diplomacy, military threat, and so forth), which forced the parties to negotiate to for themselves. [...] The paradox is that, positioned weakly, the mediation team established a strong and effective direct negotiation almost by default” (Bartoli 199: 249). It can probably be argued that “Sant’Egidio was able to succeed as a conduit of negotiations because of the very

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\(^{237}\) For an interesting account of the *synergy* occurred in this case, see Bartoli (1999: 249): “Synergy is the ability to use the energy of great powers in a coherent way. [...] Although Sant’Egidio lacked the political prestige and stature might have given it the authority to act as a coordinator, it was able to see coherence in the actions of the actors involved in the process and to proceed appropriately.
weakness [emphasis added] that made it such an unlikely leader – its lack of international prestige and power, which prevented it from being cast into and constricted by the formalities of more traditional efforts" (Bartoli 1997: 248).

At the same time, the CSE required the formal engagement of a state actor, that in turn, at a later stage, facilitated the ensuing involvement/support by other states and international organizations. In the words of Giro, one of the Community’s members, commenting on the Mozambican talks: “[t]he diplomacy of civil society is no substitute for national diplomacy. The state and its official institutions have a role to play and it is important that they play it. The ideal solution involves synergy between the “institutional” and the “informal”, in which the greater flexibility of the informal is complemented by the necessary “officialness” of the institutional” (Giro 1998: 89). In conclusion, “this unique mixture of governmental and non-governmental peace-making activity”, as summarized by the then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1993), and the cooperative relations that the Italian government and the Community enjoyed during the process, were key to both the favourable outcome of the peace negotiations, and the success of the single diplomatic efforts made individually by the two actors.

The assessment of the events occurred has showed that the idea of informal and/or accidental ‘delegation’, originally suggested in the early stages of this thesis, was not applicable in this context. The role of Sant'Egidio in launching the peace-making efforts cannot be considered as the result of an act of 'delegation' by the Italian foreign policy institutional machinery, neither informal, nor accidental. First, the analysis of how the Community got involved in the peace process has demonstrated that this occurred exclusively thanks to its activism and its good track record of relations with the parties to the conflict, in a completely autonomous way from the Italian government that, on the contrary, at the onset of the process was not even considering the option of playing a role on that foreign policy case. Second, the special formula of multiparty mediation used in the Mozambican case, that was in turn a consequence of the emergence of new actors in the international arena after the end of the Cold War, clearly showed that far from being an activity still confined to the 'exclusive domain' of states (and therefore possibly ‘delegated’ from them to non state actors), the
peace-making field was open to different actors and could greatly benefit from cooperation between state and non state actors.
Part III - Conclusions and implications for further research
Conclusions. ‘Coopetition’?

This thesis was aimed at throwing light on a specific aspect of Italian foreign policy after the demise of the Cold War, using different insights from International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. In particular, its goal was to assess what kind of interactions – and why – developed in the 1990s between the Italian state foreign policy machinery and the Community of Sant’Egidio, a very proactive Catholic-oriented NGO based in Italy with a pronounced activity in the international arena. In addition, this work was intended to understand the reasons for variation in their relations, in terms of nature of foreign policy subfields, domestic and external actors involved, perceived national interests at stake, etc. In order to do so, I have analysed the two foreign policy issues on which the role of both of them, simultaneously, was most evident: the Algerian crisis (1994-1998) and the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992).

Before conducting the assessment of these two events, in Part I of this thesis I have examined other four aspects.

1. In Chapter 2, I have illustrated the gaps in the underdeveloped literature on Italian foreign policy, in order to place the contribution that this thesis has attempted to offer in the broader picture of existing works. I have also tried to understand why literature on this topic is limited, and tried to track the history of the belated and difficult establishment of IR in Italy, to understand its effects on the study of Italian foreign policy. Clearly, a) the late establishment of the discipline in Italy and its current academic status have not facilitated the creation of the best conditions for well-grounded research to flourish. In addition, b) the general lack of attention for Italy’s international affairs by scholars, policy analysts, think tankers and (on some occasions) the very foreign policy professionals, has further hampered the emergence of a well-established tradition of studies on this topic. Such indifference, to some extent, is also due to the fact that this is an object of inquiry which turns out to be more complex, nuanced and challenging than common stereotypes often suggest. Finally, and partially as a consequence of the elements abovementioned, c) the availability of
primary and secondary sources is often extremely limited, especially on events occurred in the last three decades, therefore researching Italian foreign policy is all the more difficult. Over the last fifteen years, there has been a significant rise in academic studies on Italian foreign policy. If this trend is to be confirmed, it could hopefully contribute to the further development of Italian foreign policy studies in Italy and on Italy, enhancing not only the scientific understanding of the topic, but also a public and media debate on these issues that is still lamentable. In the medium and long term, the current state of the art has indeed also another important policy implication: indirectly, it produces negative consequences also on the quality of the political and administrative, daily management of Italian foreign policy, especially in comparison with similar Western European countries. I have come to believe that it is precisely the cultural, general indifference to this topic, particularly – and paradoxically – within Italy, that is ‘hazardous’, in intellectual, policy and political terms, considering the nature and level of challenges posed by today’s world.

2. In Chapter 3 I have described the Italian Foreign Policy Community, starting from the model developed by Hilsman (1971, 1987 and 1993), and then partially modified and applied by Santoro (1990 and 1991) to the case of Italian foreign policy between 1861 and 1990, in order to locate institutional foreign policy actors and non-state actors within the bigger framework of the Italian foreign policy landscape, taking into account the evolutions occurred with the end of the Cold War. Such mapping has showed that the Italian foreign policy institutional setting is quite fragmented, and that it features a) centres of power and influence scattered along different “rings”, according to the different issues at stake, sub-policies, and on a specific case-by-case basis; and b) an institutional “inner ring” with a relatively high number of “access points” for external actors, for instance for a proactive NGO such as Sant’Egidio, which is situated in the “second ring”.

3. In Chapter 4 I have looked in greater detail at the Community of Sant’Egidio, tracking its evolution from a rather ‘classic’ Catholic-inspired NGO, dealing with religious and social voluntary activities, to its arrival on the international scene after the end of the Cold War. Such an assessment is probably one of the few attempts to take a closer look at the CSE in a rather comprehensive way (at least
in terms of time frame considered and heterogeneity of activities analysed) made by an author who is not also member – or associate, affiliate, or friend – of the Community. It is worth noting indeed that most of the works produced on this topic are written by persons who work or have worked with the group. Coupled with a tendency to keep some of the details on the inner workings confidential, especially in the past, this has made the collection of data on the CSE and its activities not always an easy task. However, an interesting, albeit certainly incomplete, portrait of the Community – and of its critics, too – has emerged, confirming and/or throwing new light on a number of issues: a) the fact that Sant’Egidio both performs a host of autonomous initiatives on the international scene and plays a remarkable role in Italian foreign policy, on different issues and in different phases of the foreign policy process; b) its ‘double’, complementary and mutually beneficial nature of a ‘traditional’ Catholic-oriented NGO, working in Italy on fighting poverty, etc., and of an NGOs with an established presence abroad, dealing on the international scene with promoting peace and providing humanitarian assistance; c) its autonomy from both the Italian and the Vatican policies and, at the same time, its capacity to smartly make the most of its location, halfway between the capital of Italy and that of the Catholic world, in the eyes of third parties abroad; d) its prominence in the Italian landscape of internationally active NGOs; e) its complete embeddedness in Italian society and, more recently, politics. A final remark on e): it is interesting to realize that when this work was in its early stages, the Community had not entered yet the Italian political arena, did it one year later, somehow ‘confirming’ that the CSE was probably a topic worth ‘keeping an eye on’, after all.

4. Precisely because the foreign policy landscape emerged in Chapter 3 is rather fragmented, and there are various “access points” for external actors to get close to the institutional “inner ring”, I have observed at the end of Chapter 4 that policy subsystems, i.e. situations in which policy autonomy is enjoyed by a small number of state and non state actors in a specific policy field (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001), are slowly emerging in two foreign policy subfields, i.e. a) preventive diplomacy/crisis management and b) peace-making. In the a) preventive diplomacy/crisis management domain, a policy subsystem seems to be consolidating, despite being still in an early phase and including, for the time
being, only two actors – the Italian government and Sant’Egidio –, or other two, or three at most NGOs. The latter are for instance “No Peace Without Justice” or “Hands off Cain”, although they are more involved in advocating human rights protection as a tool to reduce tensions in the long run, than in setting up specific preventive short and medium run diplomacy/crisis management initiatives. Although it is not possible to draw general conclusions from the limited set of events analysed, it can be argued that the policy subsystem in this field is probably mostly competitive, i.e. with actors (or coalition of actors) constantly competing with each other, and with a playing field that is open to new actors. However, despite being always open and relatively easy to access, at least in theory, additional actors seem not to have entered yet this policy subsystem. Also in the b) peace-making domain, the policy subsystem gradually taking shape appears to be still in a preliminary phase of formation. Differently from preventive diplomacy/crisis management, however, for the time being, only two actors – the Italian government and the Community of Sant’Egidio – seem to be actively engaged in this policy subsystem. This is a far cry from the multifaceted scenario of NGOs working on these issues thriving in other Western countries like Germany or Norway, for example. Despite general conclusions cannot be reached due to the small number of events studied in this thesis, it can be suggested that the policy subsystem gradually emerging is dominant, with well-established relations among the actors and usually a notable level of control – or, at least, of ‘non-opposition’ – of issues by the state institutions. The fact that new actors have not accessed yet the policy subsystem until now, despite being open and relatively unchallenging to enter, could be explained by the very type of subsystem coalescing. According to the definition of policy subsystems by Verbeek and van Ufford (2001), new actors are expected to join more often competitive policy subsystems than dominant ones. Finally, it cannot be excluded that, in the future, the emerging policy subsystem in the domain of peace-making will overlap with that gradually materialising in the subfield of preventive diplomacy/crisis management, at least to some extent. It is not straightforward indeed, in some cases, to draw a clear-cut line between the two set of activities, and the relatively small number of (the same) actors active in both sub-policies is another element pointing towards that direction.
In Part II I have presented the assessment of the two cases chosen, drawn respectively from the a) preventive diplomacy/crisis management and b) peace-making sub-policy domains.

In the case of the Algerian crisis (1994-1998), (a) preventive diplomacy/crisis management), described in Chapter 5, relations between the Italian state and the Community of Sant’Egidio were cautiously positive at the beginning, then became mostly *competitive* and, in the end, openly *conflicting*. The Italian government did not overtly oppose Sant’Egidio’s action until the situation on the ground and the reaction of the Algerian government significantly changed. It was probably waiting on the side-lines, in order to see whether the Algerian scenario could evolve in such a direction that Italy could play a role in the possible implementation of Sant’Egidio’s political proposal, like in the Mozambican case. But when it appeared clear that the government in Algiers was pursuing a different political agenda, and that therefore the CSE’s efforts did not have any chances of being further followed up by state institutions, the Italian government readjusted its policy towards Algeria, and as a consequence, vis-à-vis the initiatives of Sant’Egidio on the crisis. In other words, the respective agendas of the Italian government and of the Community clearly became at some point, completely incompatible and the government openly renounced any kind of support for the CSE’s activities on Algeria.

In the case of the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992), (b) peace-making sub-policy), presented in Chapter 6, interactions between Italy and Sant’Egidio were overall *cooperative*. The initial peace-making driver of the process – and, later, its management – was completely an initiative of the CSE, with no pressure or even encouragement by the Italian government. However, when both actors realised that a certain degree of government’s involvement was necessary to build a credible and effective peace process – as one the two Mozambican parties itself had started to request at some point – the state foreign policy machinery agreed to *work together* with the NGO. The two actors were largely interdependent in this case: Sant’Egidio was significantly dependent on the Italian government for political, technical and financial support, while Italy was an important part of the process, but not a decisive one in terms of ‘ownership’ of the initiative, and probably would never have been politically willing and/or able to organise it on
its own. Italian institutions seized indeed the opportunity of ‘jumping on the bandwagon’ of a process already launched by another actor, an NGO (in terms of preparation of the talks, as the CSE could make the most of its long-standing ties with the Mozambican society). In other words, the government ended up being able to play a role on a rather important foreign policy matter it had probably not even imagined before. Probably Italy gained also an additional ‘benefit’ from the events, as it was involved in a process in which most of the initial, exacting and time-consuming ‘investments’, in terms of building contacts and relations, had already been made over many years by another actor, and where the latter, and not the government itself, would have borne the majority of the ‘costs’ in case of failure of the peace-making process. From the perspective of the government, even the mere fact of contributing to initiate the peace-making process in Italy, earned it prestige and reputation on the international stage, regardless of the final outcome of the talks. Effective synergies, however, were made possible first and foremost by the fact that, unlike the Algerian case, the positions of the Italian government and of the CSE on the Mozambican affair were compatible, as they were both interested in trying to bring the conflict to an end, pursuing good quality mediation efforts and possibly reaching a successful conclusion.

The outcome of the assessment of events occurred in the two cases analysed in this thesis has showed that the concept of informal and/or accidental ‘delegation’, originally put forward in the early stages of this work, is not appropriate for explaining relations between the Italian state institutions and the Community of Sant’Egidio. The same holds true for the findings emerged when briefly assessing other foreign policy events in which both actors played a role, mentioned in other Chapters. No elements of ‘intentionality’ or ‘unintentionalness’ were found that were supposed to steer the action of both actors, in case of informal and/or ‘accidental’ delegation. In the Algerian case (Chapter 5), for instance, the Community’s activities were not at all the outcome of an informal ‘delegation’ of tasks by the Italian government. On this occasion, political leaders in charge of foreign policy (i.e. the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister, supported by civil servants), decided to craft a policy on Algeria that at first was hesitant and uncertain, but in any case not cooperative, and subsequently in open contrast with the positions of the CSE: therefore ‘delegation’ could not have been possible
in any case. Neither evidence of accidental ‘delegation’ was found when assessing the events occurred. On the contrary, when the government realised that Sant’Egidio’s activities could have had a negative impact on Italy’s relations with the Mediterranean country, also considering the harsh reactions of the Algerian government and the evolution of the situation on the ground, it made every possible effort to explicitly distance itself from the Community’s positions and to discourage its action, even in absence of any kind of structured cooperation on the issue, let alone any form of ‘delegation’.

Similar considerations can be suggested also on the Mozambican case (Chapter 6). The activism of the Community in initiating the peace-making process cannot be seen as the result of an act of ‘delegation’ by the Italian state institutions, neither informal, nor accidental. First, the analysis of how the Community has become involved in the peace process has showed that this has happened only thanks to its work and its positive track record of relations with the parties to the conflict, in a completely autonomous way from the Italian government. The latter, on the contrary, at the beginning was not even considering the option of playing a role whatsoever on that foreign policy issue. Second, the special formula of multiparty mediation used in the Mozambican case, clearly showed that far from being an activity still confined to the ‘exclusive domain’ of states – and therefore possibly ‘delegated’ from them to non state actors – the peace-making arena was open to other types of players and greatly benefited from cooperation between state and non state actors.

The two cases analysed have therefore showed that relations between Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio fall within the scope of ‘normal’ relations – competitive, if not openly conflicting, or cooperative – between a state and an NGO based in its territory, on a foreign policy issue. No ‘delegation’ mechanisms are therefore in place, there are no roles of ‘principal’ and ‘agent/actor’, but both actors, in substance, play on an equal footing. In general terms, this is in line with what the academic literature today extensively argues on the post-Cold War increasing role of non state actors in international politics in general, and in democratic systems in particular, as described in Chapter 1 (see for instance Hocking 2011 and Reinalda 2012).
In greater detail, this also confirms the hypothesis mentioned in Chapter 1 that NGOs that can employ some influence tools – expertise, resources, closeness to target groups, domestic political constituencies, access to the media – can be interesting partners for governments (Reinalda and Verbeek 2001: 150-151). It clearly emerges from the analysis of the events that Community of Sant’Egidio had at its disposal in its toolbox all these assets, both in the Algerian and the Mozambican cases, and that the combined use of them made it – or would have potentially made it – an interesting possible partner or, in any case, a non state actor to watch for, for better or for worse.

In addition, findings from the two cases validate also the hypothesis that although national NGOs try to seek autonomous freedom for manoeuvring from their national governments, in order to put pressure on them through an international route, they remain largely dependent on their national governments for regulation, funding, politico-diplomatic and technical support in specific cases. In this respect, unlike international NGOs, NGOs with a strong ‘national’ connotation can never fully ignore national government’s interests, strategies and actions (Reinalda and Verbeek 2001: 150). Both in the Algerian and the Mozambican case, the Community’s set of options was indeed constrained by the Italian government agenda. In the Mozambican case, goals of both actors overlapped and this resulted in cooperation; in the Algerian one, on the contrary, Italy ended up practically stopping any kind of further moves by the CSE, because it was seen as conflicting with its foreign policy objectives. The NGO’s scope of action was therefore extremely limited by the national government in that case. On the issue of the pronounced ‘national’ (Italian) feature of Sant’Egidio, the findings of this work can add further reflections to the assumptions offered by the existing literature. The fact that the NGO was clearly perceived by third parties abroad as closely associated to the Italian state institutions in a broader sense (politically, but also in cultural-religious terms, as it embodied common features of the Italian social fabric), was an important element both in a positive and in a negative way. In the Mozambican peace-making process, it had a mutual, synergetic, ‘multiplier effect’ on the credibility capital of both the government and the CSE, in the eyes of the parties to the conflict, and of other international actors and observers. In the context of the Algerian crisis, in contrast, this close association between the two actors only worsened the odds of both the
Community and the Italian government of pursuing their own, already conflicting policies on Algeria. The CSE, on the one hand, at some point lost indeed the favour – albeit hesitant from the very beginning – of the Italian institutions for its proposal for the resolution of the crisis, and therefore lost support also vis-à-vis the Algerian political forces, in a context where track one support by states could have been decisive to try to sustain and then, after the failure, to revive its crisis management effort. The Italian government, on the other, as soon as it decided to craft a different policy on the matter, had a hard time trying to distance itself from the activities of the Community in the eyes of Algerian actors, and explain the Algerian government that it was not behind Sant’Egidio’s conduct.

Finally, the hypothesis that the two cases confirm only in part is that the cooperative model of NGO has somehow prevailed over conflicting patterns of relations (for instance Tvedt 1998; Hemmati 2002; Langhorne 2005 and 2007; Cooper et al. 2008; Khagram 2006; Murray 2008). While the Mozambican events can certainly substantiate this assumption, the Algerian one cannot validate it, as competitive and then conflicting relations were observed in that case.

A few important remarks must be made on what has emerged from the assessment of relations between Italy and the CSE, as far as the Italian Foreign Policy Community (presented in Chapter 3) is concerned. In both cases, Italy’s conduct was a reaction to a first move made by the Community, a further sign of its activism and its ability to carve out a niche for itself in the Foreign Policy Community of the country (the same holds true also in other cases touched upon in this thesis, for instance Kosovo and Albania, mentioned in Chapter 4). On both occasions, the CSE managed to gain access, from the ‘second ring’, to the institutional ‘inner ring’, using one of the different ‘access points’ for external actors. In the Mozambican case, the ‘access point’ was provided by its long-standing personal contacts with the then Christian Democrat Prime Minister, the political constituencies associated with the Socialist and the Communist parties, and a few senior bureaucrats working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the Algerian events, ‘access points’ were again offered by personal ties already existing with some top politicians and diplomats, although in the end they did not turn out to be useful for advancing the CSE’s agenda. The ability of Sant’Egidio
to establish significant ties – and in the Mozambican case also to cooperate, taking the lead of the initiatives – with the institutional ‘inner ring’, before the Italian government started even to imagine to devise a position or crafted a clear policy on the issues at stake, is a further proof of the level of fragmentation of the Foreign Policy Community and its decision-making process, as argued by Santoro (1991) and suggested also in this thesis, with reference to the post-Cold War period. It should also be noted that the CSE’s capacity of enjoying policy autonomy in an arena with a small number of actors, including the government, ultimately feeds into the assumptions of policy subsystem theory itself. Finally, it should be added that probably the fragmentation of the Foreign Policy Community and Sant’Egidio’s activism were probably facilitated also by the fact that the top political level of the foreign policy institutional machinery, in the case of Mozambique, was entering at that time the first stages of the turbulent and huge political transformations epitomized by the ‘dual crisis’ (international and domestic), while, in the case of Algeria, it was trying to come to grips with the urgency of finally seriously reflecting on its post-1989 foreign policy.

If relations between Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio can be included in the category of ‘normal’ relations between a state and an NGO based in its territory, in the realm of foreign policy, when and why were these relations cooperative, competitive, or overtly conflicting in the cases analysed? First, on the basis of the findings of the two cases, it can be argued that in the Algerian dossier (a) preventive diplomacy/crisis management subfield), the issues at stake – and therefore the related risks – were higher than in the Mozambican case, in political terms, for the Italian government. As described in Chapter 6, Algeria has always been a very important country for Rome’s foreign policy, in political, security and economic (especially energy) terms, while Mozambique had started to draw a certain level of attention only in the 1970s, from a development cooperation point of view. The Italian government was

238 On a side note, it is interesting to underline that the scenario is different today, as the African country has become an important player in Italy’s international agenda, because of the huge gas discoveries and investments made by ENI in the energy domain (see Chapter 6). Probably the Italian company is currently taking advantage also of the political credibility that Italy had gained with the peace-making process in 1990-1992, in the eyes of the Mozambican leadership: this is a further positive spill over of those negotiation efforts that certainly the Italian government could not have imagined at that time.
indeed all the more interested in avoiding any tensions with Algiers, and therefore decided to openly countering CSE’s initiatives, that were in turn strongly opposed by the Algerian government. Therefore, it can be reasonably argued that in similar cases, when the issues of interest are particularly sensitive in political terms, the government is probably less willing to cooperate with Sant’Egidio, and it is ready to compete, counter and even block its activities, if their respective goals diverge. On the contrary, when the matter is politically less delicate, their plans are less likely to be conflicting and cooperation is possibly more frequent, also because it can bear unexpected and low-cost benefits for the government’s foreign policy, on matters that sometimes, at first, are not really at the top of its agenda.

Second, cooperative interactions occurred when the events fell within the scope of the b) peace-making sub-policy. In this domain, issues at stake are generally less politically sensitive because the conflicts have usually already entered a phase in which most parties have already agreed at least on the political lowest common denominator, i.e. the basic necessity that some form of negotiations should be pursued. The Mozambican scenario was the typical one in which a middle-sized country like Italy, in constant search for visibility and prestige, as described in this thesis, would step in looking for a role, should the chances of a peace-making efforts arise, especially if mostly managed by Sant’Egidio or another non state actor. On the contrary, in the a) preventive diplomacy/crisis management sub-policy domain, reality on the ground is usually more uncertain and the risk of political failure and/or to deteriorate relations with other international actors involved is higher for a country like Italy, lacking the capacity of imposing its political will on conflicting parties. This is exactly what happened in the case of Algeria. Therefore, in such cases, the Italian government is probably expected to wait on the sidelines, not to rush into supporting the activities of Sant’Egidio or another NGO, nor to establish fully fledged synergies with it.

The examination of these events has showed that it is not possible to single out a unique type of relations developed between the two actors, in the two foreign policy cases in which they were simultaneously more proactive (Algeria and Mozambique). Cooperation or competition (or even conflict) depend on a number of factors, mainly the political sensitiveness of the issues at stake, the
sub-policy of interest, the level of access to the government and civil service that the Community (or another non state actor) enjoys. This is where the concept of ‘coopetition’ kicks in. As explained in Chapter 1, the term “co-opetition” refers to the fact that “[...] optimal governance requires a flexible mix of competition and cooperation between governmental actors, as well as between governmental and non-governmental actors” (Esty and Geradin 2000: 237; mentioned also in Hocking 2011: 231). The expression is used here in inverted commas because, like the idea of informal/accidental ‘delegation’, it is borrowed from another body of literature, i.e. that on regulation theory in domestic policies and at the international level. In addition, it is used in this thesis without the prescriptive nuance that Esty and Geradin have attached to it in their original application. I argue that the concept of such a mix of competition and cooperation is, all things considered, probably the more accurate definition to capture the nature of interactions Italy had with the Community of Sant’Egidio in the cases analysed here. In addition, I think that models of interactions between the two actors, and therefore “optimal governance” (in the words of Esty and Geradin), at least in the two sub-policies analysed, a) preventive diplomacy/crisis management and b) peace-making, could benefit from this mix of cooperation and competition for two reasons. First, as shown in both cases, both cooperative and competitive relations, developed after the government reacted to the Community’s first move, have served, in general, as a constant stimulus for the Italian foreign policy apparatus, often ‘distracted’ by domestic politicking and/or internal bureaucratic turf wars, to think more carefully about foreign policy issues and problems it had not even devoted its attention to, at the beginning. Second, on the one hand cooperative relations in the Mozambican case (but also in the cases of Kosovo and Albania), a) were (and would be also in the future) extremely useful to build reciprocal trust between the two actors; b) mutually benefited the state institutions and the Community in a foreign policy effort in which the two were interdependent; c) enabled the Italian government to capitalise on the positive track record of activities performed by the CSE on the international scene, in order to carve out a role for itself on a foreign policy issue it had not even imagined before; d) ultimately made possible the very peace-making process and its successful outcome. On the other, competitive relations, in the Algerian case, although in the end did not result in a foreign policy activity, because they became
openly conflicting, proved useful at least to stir some form of debate within the foreign policy establishment, and to some extent also in the media, on a crisis striking a country rather close to Italy, on the opposite shore of the Mediterranean. Considering the underdeveloped state of the public debate on foreign policy in Italy, mentioned in Chapter 1, 2 and 3, this effect should not be underestimated. In addition, a certain degree of competition, together with the evolutions of the situation on the ground, pushed both actors to rethink, readjust and fine-tune their policies on the crisis, in a constructive way. Third, a good mix of cooperation and competition between the government and the CSE, has avoided in the two cases analysed that Sant’Egidio, an NGO with a pronounced international vocation that, however, depends on the state it is based in for a number of reasons previously described in this thesis, ended up in a subordinate position, vis-à-vis the government, that would distort the nature of state-NGO relations in a democratic political environment.

In conclusion, a few remarks with policy implications should be made. This combination of cooperative and competitive relations between Italy and the NGOs based in Italy (of which Sant’Egidio is probably the most important representative), should it occur again on other foreign policy issues, could produce positive effects, in the medium-long run, on the nature of the Italian Foreign Policy Community and of the quality of Italian foreign policy in general. The mutual engagement of state and non state actors, in a ‘coopetitive’ way, may indeed a) help rekindle the attention of the general public for foreign policy matters; b) strengthen a Foreign Policy Community that, especially in its “second ring” is not as vibrant, open and developed as it is in other similar European countries; and c) improve the quality and level of current foreign policy actions pursued by the government, by introducing fresh contributions from civil society organisations active on the international scene. All these developments could undoubtedly make the Italian foreign policy process and Italian foreign policy in general more inclusive and pluralistic.
**Implications for further research**

As in every thesis, topics analysed and research tracks followed in this work have of course left out of the picture a number of issues, in some cases also due to the problem of the lack of primary sources (described in Chapter 2) that affect most of the research topics related to Italian foreign policy issues occurred in the last three-four decades.

In possible further research paths, it could be interesting to expand the focus also to the Italy-CSE relations in the domain of development cooperation. As explained in Chapter 1, however, this policy subsystem seems to feature a higher level of consolidation, to the point that it is so dominant that it could hardly exist without the government institutions, that provide the majority of funding for aid activities implemented by Italian NGOs. Unlike other Western countries, the amount of private donations for development cooperation activities managed by NGOs is not very high in Italy. Such aspect, differentiating development cooperation from other sub-policies, should be dealt with before comparing it with other sub-policies such as preventive diplomacy/crisis management and peace-making. As far as policy subsystem theory is concerned, further in-depth analysis, over a longer time frame, of the two policy subsystems assessed in this thesis, i.e. preventive diplomacy/crisis management and peace-making, could be fruitful to understand whether such *emerging* policy subsystems are consolidating or are just an expression of “muddling through” (Lindblom 1959 and 1979), i.e. of policies that tend to evolve according to more or less erratic incrementalist patterns.

Another thought-provoking research track would be expanding on the fragmented nature of the Italian Foreign Policy Community, for two reasons. First, it would help clarify how this fragmentation impacts on the foreign policy process, and especially on the relations between the ‘inner ring’ and the ‘second’ and the ‘outer’ rings. Second, in more theoretical terms, starting from the compelling idea that Italy is probably “a society without a state” (Cassese S. 2011), these reflections could possibly feed into one of the most urgent debates in FPA
scholarship, that I have briefly touched upon in the thesis, i.e. the lack of a clear-cut definition of ‘state’ and of the boundary between the state and the society it rules, that makes it extremely difficult to articulate how the state enjoys some form of autonomy from social actors (undoubtedly, this happened frequently in the case of this thesis). The contribution of Historical Sociology to International Relations, for instance, may offer possible solutions to this theoretical impasse.

Many other issues related to the Italian Foreign Policy Community would deserve closer attention, also in connection with NGOs. As mentioned in Chapter 3, for instance, the role of the political parties is one of the less studied areas of the Italian foreign policy process. It would be very fruitful to try to understand whether political parties still play in the post-1989 era, the crucial role of ‘filters’ between the ‘inner ring’ and the ‘second ring’, elucidated by Santoro (1991). This issue would be interesting also from the perspective of the state-NGO relations, as the Mozambican case (and, to some extent, also the Algerian one) has showed that the ‘access points’ used by the CSE to reach the ‘inner ring’ were facilitated also by long-standing ties Sant’Egidio had established with the three main Italian political parties, i.e. the Christian Democracy Party, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party during the Cold War, and with their successors after 1989-1992.

Finally, as far as the Catholic feature of the Community is concerned, at some point in this research I have decided not to treat is as a decisive factor. The preliminary desk research showed that the Catholic orientation of Sant’Egidio, in the two cases selected, could be considered only as a sign of its being steadily rooted in the Italian national, social and cultural fabric, and not necessarily as the proof of an encumbering role played by the Vatican in those matters, that would have possibly, heavily interfered in the state-NGO relations. Adding the Vatican to the picture in future research efforts building upon this thesis, however, could be very interesting. The topic appears indeed to have started to draw the attention of scholars in recent years: a work published in 2015 argued that “Italy could represent a special case of religious engagement in foreign policy because of its unique geo-religious position: in the context of the current epoch-making changes in the international society, there is a sense in which Rome has become again, religiously-speaking, caput mundi — the center of the world — as a unique
hub of a transnational network of religions connections” (Petito and Thomas 2015: 40-41; Ferrara and Petito 2016). For interesting as it may be, however, such research development would be extremely challenging at the same time. First, in theoretical terms it would entail a series of problems related to the role of the Vatican in Italian foreign policy (and in Italian politics in general), that is a topic almost missing from political science and IR academic research, and would push the focus of this work well beyond its original scope, that from the very beginning was intended to deal first and foremost with the Italian state foreign policy machinery and its interaction with non state actors well-grounded in the Italian society, regardless of their religious orientation. Second, from the point of view of research feasibility, the problem of primary sources would be even more difficult to tackle.
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