ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MOBILITY

IN THE LONDON REGION

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ABSTRACT

As there have been few studies of individual social mobility
in Britain, this thesis examines a wide range of aspects of the
mobility experience. Data reported come from secondary analysis
of a sample of men in the London Region in 1970 (N = 884) and
second interviews with a sub-sample (N = 117). Overall, there was
more upward and less downward mobility observed in 1970 than in
1949 but little change in degree of occupational rigidity. Down-
ward mobility generally proceeded from a 'peripheral' rather than
a 'core' middle-class position to a skilled manual trade, thereby
involving little or no discontinuity. The tendency of fathers of
the downwardly mobile to have been intragenerationally upwardly
mobile suggests a cyclical pattern in which sons of the same upwardly
mobile are not adequately socialized into a middle-class pattern.
The opposite hypothesis, that upward mobility proceeds from a
'sunken middle-class' family or one otherwise not well integrated
into the working class, was not well supported. Generally, up-
ward mobility was more complicated than downward mobility, in-
volving at least five distinct patterns. In only two of these
was it clear that occupational mobility had led to social mo-
bility in the sense of a shift in relational and normative dimen-
sions. The one-third of the men upwardly mobile through a formal
educational route were generally, though not exclusively, found
in these two patterns; 'distance' traversed was also an important
determinant of class change. Taken together, however, the up-
wardly mobile were found to bestride class of origin and destina-
tion with respect to a wide range of variables. This was also the
case when attention was directed to the negative or dissociative
consequences of upward and downward mobility. That is, the data
lend support to an acculturative, rather than a dissociative hy-
pothesis about the consequences of social mobility; the mobile
appeared to be no more isolated, detached, prejudiced or anomic
than was typical in the class which they were entering. Finally,
the meaning people give to social mobility is examined at some
length.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

This is a study about the experience of social mobility in British

society. Like other industrial societies, Britain is characterized by

considerable social mobility, or, to be more precise, by consistently

high rates of occupational mobility. Existing studies indicate that as

many as two-thirds of British males have a position in the occupational

prestige hierarchy which is either higher or lower than the one held by

their father. And, nearly one-third have positions on the opposite

side of the manual-non-manual line from that of their father. With some

few exceptions, however, intergenerational change in status is modest;

few have fallen to the 'very bottom' of the social hierarchy and few

have ascended as far as the 'elite' or aristocracy. Most of the move-

ment in sample surveys can, therefore, be called 'middle-mass' social

mobility in order to distinguish it from the extreme changes in fortune

which are more likely to come to mind.[1] Despite this, it is usual prac-

tice for sociologists while actually studying occupational mobility to

formulate conclusions and generalizations about social mobility in the

wider sense of meaning a change in class position. This is typically

justified by the view that in industrial societies class and status sit-

uation are both largely determined by occupational status, and that

changes in the latter will also involve changes in both of the former

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[1]The term is Wilensky's (1966) but others have distinguished be-
tween mass and elite mobility (See: Goldthorpe, 1964: 654).

dimensions of stratification. Especially with respect to the second part, there is little empirical foundation for such an assumption. We do not know enough about the experience of intergenerational occupational mobility in Britain to say with any degree of certainty that it is likely to lead to a significant change in social class. Nor is it known what various patterns of upward and downward occupational mobility there are or what consequences these might have for those defined as socially mobile.

As the title of this study suggests, my focus of inquiry is intentionally broad. I set out to give the same sort of attention that has sometimes been directed towards the more dramatic and extreme forms of social mobility to the 'more common garden variety' of intergenerational mobility. Who are the socially mobile in British society? What kinds of mobility routes upward and downward are typically employed? How do the family backgrounds of the socially mobile differ from those of non-mobile? What are the consequences of various patterns of mobility? How 'successful'--in terms of it involving relational and normative shifts-- is middle-mass mobility? How do people themselves define their experience? How closely do these personal definitions correspond to the conventional measures used by sociologists?

This thesis tries to answer some of these questions through an empirical study of a sample of men in the London region, most of whom had experienced either upward or downward occupational mobility.[2] In the rest of this chapter I describe the background, some early thoughts and preconceptions and some sociological literature which prompted and

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[2]Partly in order not to close the question beforehand and partly because it is less cumbersome, I will generally refer to social mobility, not occupational mobility. Two groups of men who had remained stable relative to their fathers were also interviewed.

influenced the asking of these questions.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

The concept social mobility refers to the movement of individuals and their families between higher and lower social classes or more generally between social positions within the society which are in some way hierarchically ordered. Although social mobility sometimes also is used to describe the process whereby a whole group or caste or stratum moves upward or downward (See: Sorokin, 1927: 133-134) this is not the meaning intended in this study as it has not been in the vast majority of studies to which I will be making reference. In common with these, I will be referring either to intergenerational or intragenerational individual mobility. The former is a person-to-person comparison, usually between father and son, in which the main interest is in how the son's status differs from his father's status. Intragenerational or career mobility, on the other hand, involves a comparison of the individual with himself at some earlier point in his lifetime. As I indicated above, within industrial societies the backbone of the stratification system is the occupational structure so that the occupation one holds is treated as the single best indicator of class and status position.[3] Social mobility has, as a result, almost invariably been measured--intergenerationally and intragenerationally--as movement upward or downward in the occupational hierarchy.[4]

DOWNWARD MOBILITY

The extent to which industrial societies are characterized by high

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[3]For amplifications of this point see Blau and Duncan (1967: 7); Parkin (1972: 18); Runciman (1968: 55).

[4]For a more extended discussion of the concept and measurement of social mobility see Miller (1955 and 1956), Carlsson (1958), Westoff (1960), Hopper (1971a), Hope (1972).

rates of downward as well as upward mobility was an especially compelling

aspect of both the Lipset and Bendix (1959) and Miller (1960) studies.

Instead of it being solely a concomitant of economic depression or reces-

sion as was generally supposed, the cumulative evidence from various

national studies shows downward mobility to be a regular and persistent

phenomenon in many countries. In the Miller (1960: Tables I & II) study,

for instance, thirteen of the twenty studies included in the comparison

showed higher rates of downward mobility than they did of upward mobility,

across the manual-non-manual dividing line.[5] Miller paid particular at-

tention to downward mobility not only because of its frequency and pre-

dominance but because as he suggested, if other things such as the occu-

pational structure remain more or less equal, then it is a better indica-

tor of fluidity in a society than is upward mobility. This is because

'a society which is dropping sons born in advantaged strata out of these

strata has more openness than one which brings up talented manual sons

but safeguards the privilege of the already advantaged' (P. 65).

Both the finding of generally high rates of downward mobility and

Miller's interpretation of these provided much of the initial impetus for

this present study. He implies that downward mobility is not solely an

outcome of economic or personal misfortune but is instead, perhaps, an

indicator of the extent to which a society institutionalizes the value

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[5]Rates of social mobility are conventionally expressed in outflow
percentages; that is, as the percentage of fathers who have sons in a
different class or category than themselves. The rate of upward or
downward mobility is, therefore, dependent on the relative size of the
classes. In Britain, for instance, about one-quarter of the fathers
in manual occupations had sons in non-manual occupations while about
two-fifths of the non-manual fathers had sons in manual occupations.
Britain, therfore, had a higher rate of downward than upward movement.
The actual number of people moving upward and downward was virtually
identical; about 15% of the total sample moved in each direction (See:
Miller, 1960: 71; Glass, 1954: 183).

of equal opportunity through the creation of structures which support and facilitate it. The fluidity of a society, for instance, is explicitly defined by Miller as 'an ease of movement from stratum to stratum . . . that is not due to changes in the occupational structure' (1960:   339).[6] It is, therefore, presumably a result of what Lipset and Zetterberg (1956: 565) call an 'interchange of ranks'; that is, mobility arising from the implementation of equality of opportunity. They argue that:

Interchange mobility will be determined in large part by the extent to which a given society gives members of the lower strata the means with which to compete with those who enter the social structure on a higher level. The more occupational success is related to educational achievements, which are open to all, the greater the occupational mobility.

Although empirically it appears that industrial societies are characterized by both structural mobility and interchange mobility (Jackson and Crockett, 1964; Broom et al, 1969), the structural changes have generally been such as to stimulate upward mobility (See: Clark, 1957). In other words, the downward mobility which has emerged so strikingly in the national mobility studies must analytically, at least, be considered as part of an interchange of ranks rather than any systematic shrinkage of higher status positions. This is in itself an intriguing problem. The implication is that either downward mobility results from personal misfortunes of one kind or another or, alternatively, that it is related to the fundamental selection and rejection processes of industrial society; meritocratic criteria rather than ascriptive criteria are somehow being employed, primarily within the educational system.

We cannot, of course, totally discount an explanation based on personal misfortunes. But samples used in mobility studies, based as

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[6]There are various other terms used in the literature to denote non-structural mobility. Rogoff (1953) refers to 'social distance mobility'; Kahl (1957) to 'individual mobility'; and Jackson and Crockett (1964) to 'circulation mobility'.

they are around the occupational structure, are unlikely to catch those

who because of mental illness, alcoholism and similar difficulties drift

downwards to 'the very bottom' of the social hierarchy. Inhabitants of

skid row, like members of elites and aristocracy, if they enter at all

into such samples, do so only incidentally. As to the downward mobility

which is observed in mobility studies, there is no existing evidence

which would show the extent to which it is or is not related to personal

factors of the kind sometimes advanced as explanations of extreme 'skid-

ding'.[7]

Yet, at the same time, given the systematic evidence available

about class distributions in life chances, a meritocratic explanation of

downward mobility also does not seem very plausible.[8] This is because

most mobility studies are referring mainly to movements downward from

lower-level managerial or various clerical positions into manual work

rather than what objectively are extreme falls in social status. From

the perspective of a meritocratic explanation this kind of movement down-

wards is inexplicable since it is unlikely that the educational system,

through its function of selection and rejection, could so operate as to

direct sons of middle-class fathers into working-class positions. As

Young (1958: 31) notes, members of families 'desire equal opportunity

for everyone else's children, extra for their own'. Thus it is unlikely

that even the dullest child of a middle-class family could not be given

sufficient polish to insure him a position, which though perhaps not

exactly comparable to his father, is at least within the white collar

stratum.

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[7]For example, see the review by Kleiner and Parker (1963).

[8]The literature available on this general topic is vast. However,
with respect to class differences in educational opportunities in Britain,
a useful compilation of articles is by Craft (1970). Also useful is
Young (1965) and Banks (1971).

Initially, then, I was interested in this phenomenon of downward mobility. I wanted to know how it comes about; what social mechanisms as opposed to the more random occurrences such as 'bad luck' or personal misfortune were involved. What specific role, for instance, does the educational system play in bringing about downward mobility? Connected to this is whether downward mobility occurs primarily intergenerationally or intragenerationally. That is, in comparison with their fathers, do the downwardly mobile begin their careers in manual occupations or is it something which occurs later in the career? Since mobility studies present a snapshot, a still photograph of a dynamic process, to what extent is the downward mobility measured in those studies a permanent loss of status?[9] In general I hoped that by seeking answers to these kinds of questions I would also be able to provide some leverage on the more fundamental question raised by Miller of whether a high rate of downward mobility is indicative of how open or meritocratic is that society.

CONSEQUENCES OF DOWNWARD MOBILITY

A second set of questions which initially prompted this investigation revolves about the central one of what is the social experience of those labelled as downwardly mobile. Specifically, what are the personal and social consequences of moving downward, relative to one's parents, in the occupational structure? One important problem was whether, and to what extent, actors and sociologists are likely to share the same definition of social reality. An implicit assumption in the sociological literature is that those considered to have moved downwards occupationally also define themselves this way. It is assumed that they share with

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[9]For instance, Lipset and Bendix (1959) found in analysing job histories considerable crossing back and forth across the manual-non-manual line.

others in the society values which lead them to rank a given social position as being more or less superior to another and that 'people do not like to be downwardly mobile; they prefer to keep their rank or to improve it' (Lipset and Zetterberg, 1956: 565). This assumption, raises a number of questions about how, social psychologically, do people respond and adapt to 'sinking', 'abasement', 'degradation' and 'failure', to use some of Sorokin's (1927) imaginative terminology. Given the importance placed on 'success' in most industrial societies, what compensating mechanisms, for example, do people typically employ in order to offset the negative evaluation society, as well as themselves, places upon them? Finally, what are the consequences for interpersonal relations and primary group structures of moving downwards?

With respect to these questions, the intentionality of the actor who moves downward seemed to me an important variable. What I regarded as a truism, virtually, is the proposition that no one acts willingly so as to lower his own status in his own eyes. Thus, people who deliberately choose a status position 'objectively' or consensually deemed to be below that of their parents must, perforce, be acting on the basis of a definition of the situation different from that generally held. An instance of this is the numbers of young people in the late sixties and early seventies who, for ideological as well as emotional reasons, 'opted' out of what they saw as the educational and occupational rat race their parents had anticipated for them.[10] Significantly, the rebellion

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[10]That this dropping out is not confined solely to this period is suggested by the following: 'The avowedly temporary hippy or beatnik is not a new phenomenon. Bohemias have always been locales where middle- and upper-class birds of passage could live below parental standards but with every intention eventually of returning home. Yesteryear, middle-class youths joined lower-class youngsters as both temporarily joined the tramp and hoboes who crisscrossed the continent while working sporadically' (Strauss, 1971: 172); (see also: Zorbaugh, 1929; Ware, 1935).

seemed to go beyond simply a generational conflict towards the adoption

of 'higher' values; along with a rejection of their parents went a rejec-

tion of business and the professions and of materialism, the very things

which had provided their parents with a relatively secure place in the

middle class. Employment in a laundry or restaurant became for some

symbolic of the denial of status and achievement striving while for

others it signified a commitment to the working class or proletariat.

Especially for those who failed to obtain academic credentials, it is

reasonable to suppose that economic consequences as well as social conse-

quences will persist perhaps over their whole lifetime. But compared

with those who do not voluntarily relinquish the social status of their

parents, it seemed unlikely that intentional downward mobility would be

accompanied by the same subjective sense of status loss and failure as

the former are likely to experience.

In addition, Strauss (1971: 171), who makes this same distinction

between voluntary and involuntary downward mobility,[11] suggests some

people may move down either because to do so is viewed as a necessary

step (to gain skill or experience) before eventual progress up the social

ladder or as a 'temporary' withdrawal and respite from the frustration,

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[11]Analytically, both upward and downward mobility might be distin-
guished by whether they are voluntary or involuntary. Involuntary up-
ward mobility could arise as an unanticipated consequence of others
evaluating highly an individual's performance in a work role even though
there was no intention or desire for promotion. It is a general belief--
perhaps ungrounded--that in many organizations to refuse promotion is
tantamount to resigning; it must be accepted whether particularly desired
or not. Whatever the reason for the objective mobility, people are like-
ly to treat the mobile person differently. He finds he has access to
groups and organizations he never sought out while at the same time
former membership groups may find his presence uncomfortable and patron-
izing. It may be meaningful, then, to refer to upward mobility as in
some senses 'forced' upon people by organizational upheavals, scarcity
of talent and unintended consequences of non-mobility oriented behavior.

constraints and tensions of regular life.[12] For example, the graduate

from engineering or business may work for some time on the factory floor

in order to gain practical experience. Unemployed actors, in order to

stay in acting may work for considerable periods in routine jobs such as

sorting mail rather than accepting jobs involving a re-direction of com-

mitment away from the theatre. And, for some, the lure of a non-competi-

tive, non-stressful small town or rural existence may be an acceptable

trade-off for the status and income of a managerial or sales career.

Again, conventional social mobility measures would show these people

as objectively downwardly mobile although, clearly, their own definition

might be quite the opposite. This does not mean that there would not be

consequences, beside the obvious economic one already mentioned. First,

those who make a deliberate choice to move down, for whatever reason,

must also convince others in the society, besides the sociologist, of the

legitimacy and appropriateness of their act. Voluntary downward mobility

may place greater strain, perhaps to the point of severance, on friend-

ship and kinfolk ties than does involuntary mobility.[13] In the latter

case it is easier to take the actor's role and either to offer support

or commiserate with him in his misfortune. In the former case, it is

more difficult to comprehend the 'why of it' and, if this is understood,

there is the additional problem that willful downward mobility may be in-

terpreted (perhaps correctly) as a threat to the legitimacy of 'orthodox'

lifestyles. Whether the intentions are comprehended or not there remains

also the sometimes justified fear on the part of kinfolk that the rever-

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[12]At the same time there is evidence that the downwardly mobile
may persist in defining their condition as 'temporary' for a very long
time (see: Lipset and Gordon, 1953).

[13]For a fictional account of voluntary downward mobility and its
consequences see the novel Hurry on Down, (John Wain, 1953).

sal in status may turn out to be permanent and irrevocable. Second, from the individual's point of view, even temporary downward mobility throws him into contact with others of a lower status so that he may come to see himself in a different and perhaps unanticipated light. There is, as well, the possibility of disorientation, loss of perspective and a 'psychological' as well as an 'actual' blocking off of routes back to his previous status. Thus, while voluntary downward mobility seemed qualitatively different than involuntary downward mobility, I also felt that certain patterns of it would involve personal and social consequences and dilemmas no matter how the individual actor defined what had happened to him.

UPWARD MOBILITY

Initially, I intended to focus on what might be called small scale sociological aspects of downward social mobility. Upward mobility, if it was to be considered at all, would be included mainly for comparative purposes. However, as I began to research the topic of downward mobility it became apparent that some of the questions I was directing towards downward mobility could equally well be asked of upward mobility. More is known about upward mobility than downward mobility particularly with respect to its determinants. As I suggested above, changes in the occupational structure in this century have generally been such as to induce considerable upward mobility in industrial societies. This, coupled with economic growth and demographic factors—differential fertility and migration—are plausible explanations of the rates and patterns of social mobility within given societies (Kahl, 1957). At the opposite end of the spectrum, considerable empirical evidence on the relationship of personal and psychological factors to upward mobility has also accumulated.[14]

[14] The most important review is still that by Lipset and Bendix (1959). Also useful is Banks (1971: Chapters 4 and 5).

Crockett (1966: 281) in his review of this literature enthusiastically

defended the right of the psychologist to tread on the 'turf' of the

sociologist:

Not much variance remains to be explained by personality factors when
mobility is studied from an overall societal point of view . . . The
conditions under which personality factors may contribute to (upward)
mobility are somehow controlled for, partialled out or obliterated in
such analyses. When one asks why, given the presence of certain social
structural conditions, particular persons rise, fall or remain station-
ary in the status system, personality characteristics immediately be-
come relevant and important.

However, without in any sense denying the usefulness of the macrosocio-

logical or the psychological approach in understanding social mobility,

both leave many questions unanswered; not all of the variance is ex-

plained by either approach. Hence, even with the most 'favorable' struc-

tural conditions not everyone is equally likely either to rise or to fall

in the class structure. Similarly, though intelligence and motivation

are important characteristics for upward mobility, not everyone who is

intelligent or highly motivated achieves upward mobility, nor are those

lacking these traits necessarily the ones who remain stationary or fall

(See: Jencks, 1972). Personality characteristics then, are necessary

but not sufficient causes of individual social mobility. I argued, in-

stead, that between these two approaches was a distinctively micro-socio-

logical perspective which has been relatively unexplored in previous re-

search.[15]

CONSEQUENCES OF UPWARD MOBILITY

Typically, upward mobility has been viewed as a social good--uni-

versally desired and essential for industrial society. The result is

that a considerable amount of social research and social policy has been

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[15]This perspective is described fully in Chapter 6.

directed towards the explication and eventual eradication of family and class factors which inhibit equality of opportunity. Since Durkheim (1897), at least, sociologists have also pointed out that rising in the social structure is not without psychic and social costs. Sorokin (1927: 522) in his classic study maintained that along with positive benefits to society, social mobility is dissociative, diminishing intimacy and increasing psychosocial isolation and loneliness. Thus, a large literature, mainly in the United States, has sought to document empirically what Tumin (1957) called the unapplauded consequences of social mobility.[16] Again, as with downward mobility, it is difficult to draw conclusions from this research. In commenting on this literature, Heller (1969: 311) pessimistically notes that 'if one compares the conclusions about the positive and negative consequences of mobility found in Sorokin and the present state of knowledge concerning this subject he is . . . likely to find only small advances, for they are still scanty and impressionistic'. As yet then, no coherent picture, even for the United States, has emerged that shows that upward mobility does or does not involve the kinds of negative consequences which have been imputed to it. And, while it has been assumed that social mobility would in European societies be even more disruptive in its consequences than in the United States, very little empirical work of a comparable nature has actually been carried out.[17]

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[16]A review of some of this literature will be found in Chapter 9.

[17]This is also generally true of Britain. However, see McKenzie and Silver (1968); Rose et al (1968); Willmott and Young (1960). Also useful are Hoggart (1957: Chapter 10); Jackson and Marsden (1962) and Bell (1968). For a discussion of mobility in European society, see Lipset and Bendix (1959: 64-70). For more general discussions of mobility in traditional versus industrial societies, see Germani (1966), Davies (1970) and Treiman (1970). I also discuss this in Chapter 9.

In focussing on the consequences of middle-mass mobility in Britain rather than upon extreme and sometimes abrupt movements upward in the social scale, two closely related problems arise: 1) the validity of occupational prestige as an indicator of class position in British society and 2) the relationship of the British educational system and its ideology to various patterns of middle-mass mobility.

MOBILITY AND STATUS RIGIDITY

The first problem arises from the fact that there is nearly as much upward mobility and considerably more downward mobility in the British occupational structure than there is in the American one. This is the case despite the emphasis in the United States on 'equality of opportunity' and its belief that it is a 'classless' society. To what extent and under what conditions, then, is occupation likely to be a similarly valid indicator of social class position and, in turn, of social mobility in the two countries? As Lipset and Bendix (1959: 66) have noted, 'In the United States there is . . . more likelihood that the successful individual need only change his residential neighborhood to bring his economic and his social status into line'. In contrast, the greater degree of status rigidity within British society suggests occupational mobility is less likely to be 'successful'. That is, there is a relatively lower likelihood that occupational mobility will be translated into class mobility and, as well, a greater likelihood that the occupationally mobile will be marginal--located at the periphery rather than at the core of their destination class.[18]

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[18] For a definition of status rigidity, see Hopper (1971a: 20-21). He suggests that, 'The degree of status rigidity can be called "moderate" when it is high enough to retard status mobility but low enough to permit economic mobility' (P. 21). British society would seem to be one society which approximates to this definition. The concepts of periphery and core status positions are also Hopper's (1971a: 15). For a related discussion in which similar concepts are used, see Shils (1968).

In this regard, the distinction made by Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1969) between, on the one hand, 'economic' changes and, on the other, 'normative' and 'relational' changes, is a useful one. Although they were, in testing the 'embourgeoisement' hypothesis, not dealing specifically with occupational mobility, their data do suggest the importance of clearly distinguishing between these three aspects of class change. They point out that proponents of the hypothesis usually make the assumption--not supported empirically--that as manual workers acquire incomes and living standards comparable to white-collar workers they will also adopt similar social norms and in turn will gain acceptance into middle-class society (P. 24). The results of their study did not support this assumption and have recently led one of the authors to question in a similar way what I am also questioning--the validity of occupational mobility as an indicator of social mobility:

Social mobility, as measured, is not simply a matter of individuals gaining more qualification, more income, more interesting work, etc., but further of their experiencing changes in their life-styles and patterns of association. The difficulty is . . . that the validity of occupational ratings construed in this way has never been established . . . In other words, we are simply not in a position to infer, with any acceptable degree of precision and certitude, what are the typical consequences of mobility as measured via occupational prestige ratings, for the actual social experience of those deemed to be mobile (Goldthorpe and Hope, 1972: 35-36).

This distinction represents an important orientation to the investigation of the consequences of middle-mass mobility. I, therefore, considered attitudes and patterns of association of the socially mobile both from the perspective of what has sometimes been called the dissociative hypothesis, and as indicators of the extent economic shifts had also involved normative and relational shifts as well.[19]

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[19]The term refers to Sorokin's (1927) view of social mobility as disruptive to social relationships. Ellis and Lane (1967) consider this as one of three hypotheses about the consequences of social mobility. The second perspective is closest to the acculturation model of social mobility first advanced by Blau (1956). I discuss both in Chapter 9.

EDUCATION AND MOBILITY

A second and related factor is the differentiated and specialized

nature of the British educational system. As Coleman (1968: 10) points

out, the dominant ideology underlying this somewhat unique system was

initially one not specifically providing equality of opportunity but

rather, 'differentiated education appropriate to one's station in life'.

Similarly, Cole (1955) described British social structure as consisting

of three separate systems of stratification juxtaposed yet co-existing

in a more or less permanent truce: the aristocratic structure based on

land; the plutocratic based on commerce and industry; the meritocratic

based on the education system. It is the latter system which has pro-

vided the generally accepted mode of upward mobility in British society.

Thus, educational reforms have managed to meet the industrial-based de-

mand for more highly qualified people without at the same time fundamen-

tally altering the historic pattern of the British stratification system--

'breeding' has in effect co-opted 'merit'.

It was also this aspect of British stratification which led Turner

(1960) to develop his now familiar distinction between sponsorship and

contest norms about social mobility. The former, of course, referring

to Britain, the latter to the United States.[20] His central and underly-

ing assumption was that 'the organizing folk norm that defines the accept-

ed mode of upward mobility is a crucial factor in shaping the school

system . . .' (P. 72). The logic of the two ideal-typical normative pat-

terns was, therefore, used to account for differences in the two societies

in the organization of their educational systems, the kind of value placed

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[20]More recently Hopper (1968) has argued that the educational sys-
tems of the United States and England may be viewed as 'only two special
cases in an expanded typology' (P. 92). Thus, educational systems, in
general, do not necessarily cluster around either of Turner's two ideal-
typical models.

on education, the content of education, and the selection procedures used.

Of most relevance to my present concern, however, were some hypotheses

postulated by Turner regarding the relative impact of upward mobility on

'personality development' in sponsorship and contest systems. In general,

he suggests that there would be less stress attached to striving for

higher status and fewer complications in making relational and normative

shifts under a sponsorship system than under a contest system.

Under the sponsorship system, recruits are selected early, segregated from
their class peers, grouped with other recruits and with youth from the
class to which they are moving, and trained specifically for membership
in this class. Since the selection is made early, the mobility experi-
ence should be relatively free from the strain that comes with a series
of elimination tests and long-extended uncertainty of success. The
segregation and the integrated group life of the 'public' school or
grammar school should help to clarify the mobile person's social ties
(1960: 88).

Turner's analysis is, then, implicitly in disagreement with the prevail-

ing view that social mobility would be less disruptive in the more 'open'

class system of the United States than in societies such as Britain,

where there is a relatively higher degree of status rigidity and there-

fore a much lower likelihood of the upwardly mobile gaining acceptance.

The major objection to Turner's thesis has come from Hopper (1971b).

He argues that it implicitly assigns education a monolithic role in the

mobility process. He points out that on the one hand, it does not take

account of the variety of educational routes available in Britain to both

the potentially mobile and the potentially non-mobile. On the other

hand, Hopper suggests, it tends to ignore the fact that a great deal, per-

haps most, of the upward mobility in Britain occurs independently of the

formal sponsorship system Turner described. Such mobility arises because

of the difficulty all societies have in effectively regulating ambition.

There is always the dual need to motivate people to fill strategic roles

and to select those most capable of filling them once it can be establish-

ed who they are. This Hopper calls the 'warming-up: cooling-out dilemma'
in which, 'the more effective is a society in raising and maintaining am-
bition at a high level initially, the more difficult is it to reduce and
to suppress ambition at a relatively low level at a later phase' (P. 299).
In industrial societies, it is mainly left to the educational system to
cope with this dilemma:

. . . at every level and through every route within its total selection
process, an educational system must strive, on the one hand, to 'warm-up'
some of its students, and on the other, to 'cool-out' those who are re-
jected for further training. Those who are warmed-up receive further
and more specialized training and those who are cooled-out are sent more
or less directly into the labour market (P. 305).

Sponsored social mobility then, implies that the talented among
the masses--the meritorious--are singled out, 'taken' from their parents
and educated separately for elite status.[21] As Hopper notes: 'In an
educational system with sponsorship and elitist ideologies (as in Brit-
ain) the development of achievement and mobility orientation is more
likely to follow than to precede some sign of educational success . . .
ambition is not a totally legitimate personal quality until some sign of
educational achievement has been recognized within the formal boundaries
of the system . . . ' (P. 318). What this means, in effect, is that
whereas in the United States virtually everyone is educated for social
mobility, only a select few of the lower classes are so educated in
Britain.[22] Instead, the expectation is that the majority will be effec-

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[21]For a satirical account of this process, see Young (1958).

[22]This explains, perhaps, why in the United States university cur-
riculum is so much more vocationally oriented than in Britain; students
seem to opt for something 'solid' in anticipation that rejection will
occur before an elite status is obtained (for example, at the end of a
B.A. degree or a two-year junior college). The British system of rela-
tively diffuse education falls very hard on those rejected part way
through. 'Their training will have consisted primarily of preparation
for the next phase of formal education, and not for occupational roles
which are available to them' (Hopper, 1971b: 315). Jackson and Mars-
den (1962) make the same point about those people in their sample who
did not go on for further education: 'It was as if education had never

tively cooled-out by age 11, or perhaps earlier, and be educated for what amounts to a non-mobility experience.

However, in all countries for which we have data, rates of social mobility are higher than can be accounted for by differentials in educational achievement (Anderson, 1961: 171). This would seem to be especially true for Britain where despite roughly comparable rates of occupational mobility, only about one-quarter as many students are enrolled in further education as in the United States. Partly this is explained by the fact that apprenticeships, technical education, articling, organizational acceptance of the office boy entry point, and promotion from within have been legitimate 'alternative mobility routes'. Whereas most Americans regard formal education as the key to occupational success, and access to college as a right, higher education has traditionally been viewed differently in England. According to Ben-David (1963-64: 471), for instance, entry into professions in Britain has not, up until recently, required a university education. 'It (higher education) never became the only, nor even the main channel of mobility through which one could rise from the "masses" to the "classes" . . . an academic title was not so much a means of achieving status as a confirmation of it' (See also: Hordley and Lee, 1970; Lee, 1968).

The other part of the explanation of the discrepancy between extent of education and rates of social mobility may be that the educational system is not completely successful in (1) deciding who should be selected and who rejected, and (2) 'cooling-out' those who were, in

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nourished in them any other capacities except those needed to score high marks in academic examinations' (P. 179). See also Hoggart (1957: Chap. 10) who speaks of students entering life 'disengaged', now that the series of academic hurdles had come to an end.

terms of the occupational structure, 'incorrectly' rejected.[23] In short,
as Hopper argues, the educational system is only partially successful in
resolving the 'warming-out: cooling-out dilemma'. Either through al-
ternative education or through channels not formally legitimated--what
Turner (1966) calls irregular mobility--a proportion of those in the low-
er classes 'cooled-out' of educational ambitions nevertheless remain gen-
erally ambitious and become upwardly mobile.

The extent to which the upward social mobility resulting from the
use of irregular alternative mobility routes can be viewed as 'successful'
is an important question. Generally, as Hopper notes, 'these routes pro-
vide almost no mobility-training experiences. Their career-training and
status-training experiences are for the lower classes, and are inappro-
priate for those who become upwardly mobile despite their having been re-
jected initially (and in effect incorrectly)' (1971b: 532). Within the
context of an elitist and meritocratic ideology the man who is successful
in improving his occupational position without the appropriate education
is in terms of the ideology, out of place. Shils (1968: 132) suggests,
more generally, that 'there is something "unseemly" or "eccentric" or
"perverse" or "unfortunate" about the individual or family whose positions
are scattered at a variety of unequal points on the several distributions'.
Upward mobility that is not sponsored, then, is likely to involve more
severe personal consequences than in societies such as the United States,
characterized by a less rigid status hierarchy and a more equalitarian
and universal educational system.[24]

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[23]In the United States it has been found that IQ correlates about
.50 with occupational status and with scholastic achievement. The corre-
lation between IQ and 'job performance' is only about..21 (See: Jensen,
1969). There is no reason to suppose that similar correlations would
not apply to Britain.

[24]The theoretical justification for this statement comes largely

Much less attention has been directed to the question of whether the educational system also 'facilitates' downward mobility. Turner, for instance, was almost exclusively concerned with the norms regulating upward mobility. He does not, as a result, consider what folk norms might relate to downward mobility or if it is in any sense, legitimized within the dominant ideology. However, the continuing importance in Britain of the private school system suggests that merit has been legitimized as one basis for selection for high status positions but not necessarily for rejection from them. As Turner (1960: 87) does point out, 'English "public schools" . . . are principally vehicles for transmitting the marks of high family status, their mobility function is quite tangential'. It might be added, however, that the less prestigeful private schools do function, in part, as an alternative for middle-class children unable to obtain a place in a state grammar school.[25] While it would not be correct, exactly, to say that under a contest system downward mobility is legitimated, the ideology as Turner described it by implication contains the possibility of downward mobility for some of those who are at the end

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from Hopper (1971a and 1971b). But, see also Germani (1966); Simpson (1970) and Kessin (1971) for additional theoretical and empirical support. It might be added that downward mobility through an educational route (that is, following a grammar school or 'public' school education) would, according to this hypothesis, be equally, if not more disruptive, than upward mobility without a grammar school or 'public' school education.

[25]Glass (1961: 402-403) commented some years ago: 'For middle-class parents, in particular, eleven-plus day is a day of national mourning. Like King Aegeus they sit on the cliffs, waiting to see if the returning sails are white or black. And if the incidence of neurosis among frustrated middle-class parents has not risen significantly, it is largely because the independent secondary schools giving education of a grammar school variety, offer parents a possible alternative in the struggle to maintain or improve the social status of their children. That is one of the reasons why the popularity of public schools has not diminished'.

of the contest found 'less deserving'. In the absence, then, of an ide-
ology to explain it and of formal mechanisms to cope with it, downward
mobility under a sponsorship system can be assumed to be particularly
difficult with respect to all three mobility problems (See: Hopper,
1971b).

Together, Turner and Hopper provide a theoretical framework parti-
cularly useful for a consideration of the possible consequences of middle-
mass mobility. There are a number of ways of studying social mobility
in which the notion of 'successful' social mobility does not loom quite
so large or problematic. One can, for instance, choose a sample made up
of (say) working-class grammar school students; of business managers; or
of university graduates. But when we look at social mobility in toto as
I have in this study, these special groups constitute only a part of the
picture. We are likely to find that in terms of occupational mobility
people have experienced a variety of mobility and non-mobility experiences.
Some have been upwardly mobile or have retained their father's high status
mainly through the education they were able to obtain; some may have been
downwardly mobile because they did not obtain it. Others have been up-
wardly mobile without this education while most members of the lower
classes have not experienced any change in status compared to their
fathers at all.

A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE[26]

Social mobility, then, is complicated and it is improbable and im-
practical that any one research design will adequately capture all the
varieties of mobility and non-mobility experiences people are likely to

[26]A fuller description of method is given in Appendix 1.

encounter.[27] In order to simplify the picture somewhat, my aim is to focus on four separate groups: an upwardly mobile group; a downwardly mobile group; a stable manual group, and a stable non-manual group. Beyond this, I also consider separately those in each of the four groups who had experienced a grammar school or private school education as opposed to a secondary-modern type of education.

The main purpose of this thesis was to describe as fully as possible these various patterns of middle-mass mobility and non-mobility, both generally and in terms of their social determinants and personal consequences. As I saw it, this involved both a descriptive and an analytical approach in conjunction with an attempt to get at the meaning of social mobility as people themselves describe it. As a result, the route taken in this study is in some ways a middle-path between what appears to be a widening chasm in academic sociology: the attempt on the one hand to make sociological measurement more precise and more amenable to parametrical statistics and on the other, the perspective of phenomenology and symbolic interactionism.[28] Some of the conflict between these positions

[27]Nor, as I describe in Chapter 9 is it likely that all of the structural, institutional and cultural contexts relevant to an understanding of social mobility can be contained in one investigation.

[28]As it relates to social mobility, the most successful example of the former approach is Blau and Duncan's (1967) influential study, The American Occupational Structure. Blalock, a leading methodologist, calls this work 'the most sophisticated and quantitative study that I have seen in the sociological literature' (American Sociological Review, 33 (2), April 1968: 297). Not only is it a kind of methodological tour de force overshadowing earlier attempts, but it has also stimulated a considerable amount of subsequent work. See, for example, Featherman (1971), Sewall et al (1969), Kessin (1971) and in Britain, Hope (1972). The best spokesman for the latter approach is Strauss, who in his book The Context of Social Mobility, asks: 'Who is to judge it? The "objective sociologist"? The actor himself? His parents, kinsmen or friends? The answer that will take us furthest in theorizing is the one that rules out firmly the sociologist's definition but includes the actor and anyone else who is relevant to the actor's interactions' (1971: 177).

is avoidable when it is recognized that these approaches are often responses to different kinds of questions rather than a fundamental methodological schism. This is especially true for the study of social mobility where at times the concern is with the individual while at other times it is the social or class structure which is under consideration. For example, as I tried to show earlier in discussing downward mobility, while I felt that the intentionality of the actor and hence his definition of the situation have an important bearing in terms of personal consequences, this does not obviate the possibility of objective consequences, for interpersonal relations, kinship and community structures, and class solidarity.

Thus, in reporting the findings of this study I move from an essentially quantitative analysis of survey data to, eventually, a subjective and qualitative--'soft data'--presentation. Without making too much of a virtue out of what the sampling frame available to me made a necessity, the approach was, I believed, an effective compromise between the highly structured survey and the detail of the case study method. The former--arms length and generally 'hired hand' research--suffers from remoteness and from the abstraction involved in comparing only a set of measurable traits. The latter, by itself, faces the researcher with the inevitable problem of how to cope with uneven data, how eventually to structure it, and how to generalize the findings.

THE SAMPLE

The findings presented in this study come from two different data sets, which I call 'the Work and Leisure Study' and a sub-sample which I call 'the Mobility Sample'. Although the people interviewed are the same in the two studies, they were interviewed at two different times. Data reported for the Work and Leisure Study were collected in the spring

and summer of 1970. This study, carried out by the Institute of Community

Studies, interviewed 1,928 people aged 17 and over in the London Metropol-

itan Region.[29] Of these, the necessary occupational information on them-

selves and their fathers was available for 884 men. Since the concerns

of the Institute project were not, specifically, to do with social mobi-

lity, the data I report in later chapters pertaining to the Work and Lei-

sure Study come from secondary analysis. The Institute project served

first of all as a sampling frame in which to find a representative group

of occupationally mobile men, and, secondly, as a moderately large data

set for measuring some correlates or consequences of social mobility.

Although most of the preliminary planning of the reserach had been done

before my joining the project, I worked as an interviewer during the

final pilot stages and on a regular basis in the main survey.

From early 1971 until November of 1971 I reinterviewed four sub-

samples of men who, relative to their fathers, had been 1) upwardly mo-

bile; 2) downwardly mobile; 3) stable non-manual or 4) stable manual in

terms of the Registrar General's classification of occupations. Together

these four groups make up the Mobility Sample. The men chosen for rein-

terviewing were selected randomly from the coded data of the Work and

Leisure Study. In all, 117 men were reinterviewed.[30] With one or two

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[29]Reported in Young and Willmott (1973).

[30]Initially I had anticipated a third data set from interviews with
the living fathers of men contacted a second time. Unfortunately, I was
only able to obtain completed interviews with 40 fathers out of a possi-
ble one-hundred. The attempt to undertake a two generation study did
limit the number of second interviews I could personally expect to com-
plete. Thus, out of 155 names drawn, I was able to interview 117 men a
second time. Because of the limited success of the two-generation study,
I do not in this study specifically report on the data collected from the
fathers. Some illustrations and case studies do, however, draw on this
data and in a postscript to Chapter 8 the data is used to examine the re-
lationship of measured intelligence to social mobility.

exceptions interviews took place in the respondent's home and lasted any-where from one to several hours. All were tape-recorded and later trans-cribed.

Because of the small size of the Mobility Sample, I have wherever it is relevant used data from the much larger Work and Leisure Study. At the same time I have assumed that, as a sub-sample of a random sample, the Mobility Sample is also a random sample (Blalock, 1960: 204). Thus, in reporting those findings unique to it, I have systematically pointed out differences between groups that have less than a five percent chance of being random or due to sampling fluctuation. Since the bases are in some instances too small for stable percentages, I have tended to place greater emphasis on measures of association and tests of statistical significance than on percentage differences.

In several chapters I have quoted extensively from the interviews I conducted. I have done so to illustrate and 'fill-out' the bare statis-tics but also because I hoped in this way to impart something of the imagery and feeling which people conveyed to me about their mobility ex-perience. I have, therefore, treated what people say as an integral part of the data. As a result, the quotations are not always typical or representative of a majority opinion. I justify this on two grounds: 1) that it is often the atypical response which is more likely to provoke and stimulate thought and conjecture; and 2) that despite its small size the Mobility Sample is a random sample in which each person is to some extent representing a much larger universe. At the same time, I have at-tempted to indicate where a particular quote was in my evaluation a rep-resentative one, and where a deviant or unusual response.

The following chapters are organized into three fairly distinct sections. The first section is largely a descriptive account of the a-mount of mobility, various dimensions of social mobility and the career

or work patterns of the four groups. The final chapter in this section (Chapter 3) presents a number of case studies illustrating the main patterns of mobility and non-mobility which emerged from the data. The second section (Chapters 4 to 6) is concerned with a sociological explanation of upward and downward mobility. In the last section I first attempt to assess the extent to which middle-mass occupational mobility in Britain has dissociative or disruptive consequences for those experiencing it, and, secondly, the extent to which it objectively and subjectively can be viewed as social mobility.

PART ONE

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

CHAPTER 2

RATES AND PATTERNS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

IN THE LONDON REGION

The aim of the next four chapters is to present an overview of the

nature of contemporary patterns of social mobility in British society.

The main emphasis will be on career and educational experiences and

their relationship to intergenerational patterns of mobility. This

chapter consists of a statistical and comparative analysis of the over-

all rate of social mobility in the London Region in 1970. It tries to

put into perspective and to create a framework for the description and

analysis which makes up the remainder of this study. How much social

mobility is there in Britain? Is British social structure more 'open'

than in the past? Have social mobility opportunities been increasing?

An analysis of one area of Britain, the London Region, cannot pro-

vide definitive answers to these questions. It is, however, the most

important area of Britain so that what occurs in this region is signifi-

cant for other parts as well. Therefore, the 1970 rates of occupational

mobility and manual and non-manual mobility are analysed, following the

method of Jackson and Crockett (1964), in terms of two ideal-typical

perspectives: a maximum stability model and a full-equality model.[1] As

well, some tentative comparisons with the 1949 data of the Glass (1954)

study are attempted. That study, in the absence of other more recent

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[1]As Blau and Duncan (1967: 94) show, these measures may have an
ambiguous meaning when used for comparative purposes. As a result, I
have followed the lead of Jackson and Crockett in using a number of
measures and summary statistics to interpret the findings.

empirical work, provides a bench mark against which to view the findings of the Work and Leisure study.[2]

RATES AND PATTERNS OF OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

The social origins and destinations of the 884 male respondents interviewed in the Work and Leisure Study are presented in the conventional mobility matrix in Table 2.1 and summarized in Table 2.2. Percentages in each cell in table 2.1 indicate in outflow terms, the distribution of sons of fathers in each class. For example, of the 379 fathers who were in class 4 (skilled manual), 4.2 percent had sons in class 1 and 2.9 percent had sons in class 6. Non-mobility or occupational inheritance as it is often called is shown along the major diagonal. Some 36 percent of the men 'inherited', if not their father's actual job, one having the same approximate social status. Figures to the left of the major diagonal show upward mobility; those to the right, downward mobility. In all, about 27 percent of the men were downwardly mobile and about 37 percent are upwardly mobile vis-à-vis their fathers. In absolute amounts, then, there is more upward than downward movement.

Congruent with other mobility studies is the finding that short

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[2]The Glass study differs in sample size, sampling frame and occupational classification from those of the present study. Particularly because of the latter difference, I make no comparisons between specific status categories and draw no conclusions from the analysis of the full mobility matrix for the Work and Leisure Study. This is because the Hall-Jones occupational classification (Hall and Jones, 1950) provides a finer breakdown of non-manual occupations than is possible with the Registrar-General's five classes which were used to code occupations in the present study. When these detailed categories are collapsed into a manual-non-manual dichotomy, the two status classifications become more compatible so that it is mainly on this basis that specific comparisons are made. Also, it is important to note that the Glass study was a national sample whereas this sample can be generalized only to the London Region. Some implications of this are considered later in this chapter.

distance mobility--that is, movement into adjacent categories--is far more frequent and predominant than is extreme upward or downward movement. No sons of class 1 fathers have fallen more than three classes while only a minute fraction of fathers in classes 5 or 6 have sons who have made the long ascent to class 1. Table 2.1 also reveals that the greatest occupational inheritance is for class 4--skilled manual; the lowest level of self recruitment is found in class 5--semi-skilled.

A somewhat unexpected finding is that in only two classes (2 and 4) is inheritance greater than social movement, even if the latter is only short distance mobility. For the Glass (1954) data this was also true: in only three of his eight status categories was inheritance greater than social movement.[3] But, an inspection of the mobility matrices for the 17 countries analysed by Miller (1960) suggests that in this respect Britain is atypical. That is, with the exception of the unskilled category, self recruitment is greater than social movement in virtually all of the countries and in all of the studies included. Similarly, the more recent study by Jackson and Crockett (1964: 6) shows that 'in every origin category (except unskilled worker) the most common destination is the occupational category of the father'.

The figures presented so far refer to outflow analysis but additional insight into the rates and patterns of social mobility in Table 2.1 can be obtained by employing the two ideal-typical theoretical models, mentioned above: the maximum stability model and the full-equality model.

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[3]All calculations of the Glass data are based on the special tabulation by R. K. Kelsall carried out for S. M. Miller's (1960) comparative study of social mobility. Category V of the Hall-Jones Classification was split into a non-manual and a manual stratum, giving an eightfold table instead of the original seven-fold one. It should also be noted that the N for the Glass data was 3,497; the N for the Kelsall retabulation was 3,498. I have used the latter figure in making further calculations.

A maximum stability model assumes that there would be no mobility beyond that which occurs when it is structurally impossible for all sons to occupy the same class as their fathers due to difference in the relative sizes of these classes. Thus, in Table 2.1 it can be seen by inspection of the marginals that there are more non-manual occupational positions in the son's 'generation'.[4] As a result, under conditions of maximum stability, all of the sons in classes 1, 2 and 3 could have inherited their fathers' class position. But, 78 sons (8.8% of the total sample) of manual workers had to move into non-manual positions simply to transform the origin distribution (fathers) into the destination distribution (sons). This is what is generally referred to as structural or 'forced' mobility.

In fact, there is a good deal more mobility than these structural changes require. In all, some 64 percent of the sample moved either upward or downward. If the structural mobility is subtracted from the total mobility, then 55 percent (63.8% - 8.8%) of the total mobility arose from the interchange of individuals between the different classes. Following Jackson and Crockett (1964), I use the term circulation mobility for mobility which cannot be explained by structural factors.[5]

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[4]As Duncan (1966: 54-63) warns, the distribution of fathers and sons in the mobility matrix does not represent samples of two separate historical generations. While the respondents (sons) are a cross-section of the present labour force, the fathers do not similarly represent a previous one. There are several reasons for this: (1) some fathers are still at work and are part of the present labour force while others died a long time ago; (2) some fathers have had more than one son; (3) because of migration some sons have fathers who are part of another country's labour force; and (4) not all (or perhaps even a majority of) fathers have a son at all. See also Broom and Jones (1969: 337).

[5]As used by Jackson and Crockett (1964: 388), circulation mobility is an estimate of how open is the occupational structure in times of structural stability. It implies that there is downward mobility as well as upward mobility. If the sole criterion for assignment to occupational roles was ability, individual differences would mean some sons would fall and others would rise, relative to their fathers. This would

TABLE 2.1

SOCIAL CLASS OF MALE RESPONDENTS BY FATHERS' SOCIAL CLASS, LONDON REGION, 1970.

Social Class of Respondents

Fathers' Social Class	1	2	3	4	5	6	Totals (100%)
1-Professional	39.4% (4.79)*	34.8% (1.70)	21.7% (1.50)	13.0% (0.34)	00.0% (0.00)	00.0% (0.00)	23
2-Managerial	11.0 (1.75)	37.6 (1.82)	17.7 (1.28)	22.1 (0.58)	9.9 (0.64)	1.7 (0.31)	181
3-Clerical	11.5 (1.84)	23.1 (1.11)	19.2 (1.39)	29.5 (0.76)	16.7 (1.07)	00.0 (0.00)	78
4-Skilled Manual	4.2 (0.67)	16.1 (0.78)	11.1 (0.80)	49.1 (1.28)	16.6 (1.07)	2.9 (0.54)	379
5-Semi-skilled Manual	1.4 (0.22)	12.1 (0.58)	13.5 (0.97)	43.3 (1.13)	18.4 (1.18)	11.3 (2.08)	141
6-Unskilled Manual	2.4 (0.38)	12.2 (0.59)	11.0 (0.80)	31.7 (0.82)	20.7 (1.34)	22.0 (4.00)	82
Totals:	56	182	122	339	137	48	884

*Bracketted values are indices of association and dissociation. These are described in the text.

The various mobility measures used in this analysis are summarized in Table 2.2 alongside the summary statistics for the Glass data as presented by Miller (1960). Given the assumption of maximum stability, some 7.7 percent of the 1949 sample would have had to move as a result of structural factors; slightly less than in 1970. But, at the same time, a larger proportion, 68.8 percent, were actually mobile in 1949 so that circulation mobility is also proportionally greater than in 1970. Put another way, about 11 percent of the mobility in 1949 is accounted for by structural changes compared to about 14 percent in 1970. It should not be concluded that there was 'more' mobility in 1949 than in 1970 because some portion of the difference in observed mobility in the two samples is a result of an eight-fold table for the former instead of a six-fold table in the latter sample. However, if the amount of circulation mobility is used as a rough indicator of the openness of the occupational structure, then there is a slight tendency towards greater rigidity reflected in these findings.

The second model, what Jackson and Crockett (1964) refer to as the full-equality model, is based on the supposition that there is statistical independence between fathers' status and sons' status.[6] When these

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be so even if there were no changes taking place in the occupational structure. In practice, as Blau and Duncan (1967: 25-26) have observed, the estimate of structural movement is the minimum estimate of mobility due to structural changes; part of the mobility may also involve concomitant but largely unobservable changes--what they call 'indirect repercussions of demand'.

[6]The full-equality model is sometimes referred to as 'perfect mobility' and appears to have been independently developed and used by Rogoff (1953) and Glass (1954).

theoretical values are summated, it appears that 75 percent of the

TABLE 2.2

SUMMARY MOBILITY MEASURES FOR TWO BRITISH STUDIES

	1970	1949*
Total N's	884	3498
Percent Mobile		
Observed	63.8%	68.8%
Structural	8.8	7.7
Circulation	55.0	61.1
Full-equality model	75.0	79.8
Cramer's V	.208	.240
Index of Association	1.446	1.548
Index of Dissociation	.852	.861
Upward Mobility		
Observed	37.0%	31.9%
Expected (full-equality model)	42.5	38.1
Index of dissociation	.877	.839
Downward Mobility:		
Observed	27.0%	36.8%
Expected (full-equality model)	32.5	41.7
Index of dissociation	.819	.883

*Adapted from Miller (1960: 71): special tabulation by R. K. Kelsall.
 The original data for 1949 is in Glass (1954: 183).

sample would have moved in one direction or the other, whereas in

reality only 64 percent did so. Similarly, given the assumption of

full equality, 42.5 percent and 32.5 percent would have been upwardly

and downwardly mobile, respectively, while the actual figures are 37

percent upward and 27 percent downward. These figures are shown in

Table 2.2. Observed movement does not, therefore, appear to depart

very radically from the amount of movement theoretically expected

if there was no association between fathers' status and sons' status.
This conclusion also applies to the data of the Glass study. As can
be seen in the second column of Table 2.2, there was a similar dispari-
ty between observed and expected mobility in 1949 as we have just seen
for our 1970 data; in 1949, 79.3 percent of the sample would have been
mobile upward or downward if the full-equality model were operative.
Instead, 68.8 percent of the sample were socially mobile--a difference
of 11 percent, virtually the same as in 1970. Table 2.2 shows, also,
that differences between observed and expected rates of upward and down-
ward mobility were of about the same magnitude in 1949 as in 1970.

The similarities between the two samples with respect to their
proximity to a full-equality model can be seen more systematically when
indices of association and dissociation--mobility ratios as they have
sometimes been called--are calculated. These are ratios found by divi-
ding the observed value in each cell by the expected frequency assuming
random association between fathers' and sons' status. Bracketed values
along the major diagonal in Table 2.1 are indices of association while
those to the left and right are indices of dissociation. If the full-
equality model were actually the case, observed and expected frequencies
would be equal and all indices would equal 1.00. On the other hand, if
there was a perfect correlation between fathers' status and sons' status
--perfect immobility--all cells to the left and right of the major diag-
onal would be empty. Ratios greater than 1.00 indicate that mobility or
non-mobility is greater than expected under the assumption of full equal-
ity. Correspondingly, ratios less than 1.00 indicate that the pattern
is less than expected.

These same expected frequencies can be summated and compared with
the actual mobility and non-mobility observed. The ratio of one to the

other provides an overall index of association and of dissociation: 1.446 and 0.852, respectively; values nearly identical to those for the Glass data (1.548 and 0.861).[7] These are shown in Table 2.2. They suggest that in both samples there is greater non-mobility and somewhat less mobility than would be theoretically expected, if the model of full-equality is taken as the standard. Looking at upward and downward mobility separately, our data suggests that upward mobility (0.879) is slightly more prevalent than downward mobility (0.819). Comparable figures for the Glass data are 0.838 and 0.883 for upward and downward mobility; a slight reversal of our 1970 data. Although having an interest in their own right, differences in these indices seem small and inconclusive. And, as we have already noted, the two studies employ separate occupational classifications so that conclusions about trends in intergenerational mobility are at this point unwarranted.

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FATHERS' AND SONS' STATUS

Of the two models proposed, it can be noted that both sets of data are more in conformity with a full-equality model than a maximum stability model. One further indication of this is to show that the degree of association between fathers' status and sons' status is not very strong. Jackson and Crockett (1964) suggest that an appropriate measure of association is Cramer's V (Blalock, 1960: 230), one of the traditional measures based on the chi square. For the data of Table 2.1, Cramer's V is only .208 and the corresponding value for the Glass data is V = .240. By way of comparison, Jackson and Crockett (1964) found a Cramer's V = .246 for their American data. Using parametric statistics, Blau and

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[7]Figures for the Glass data are based on the special tabulation by R. K. Kelsall for the Miller (1960) study. Glass (1954: 198) reports overall measures of association and dissociation of 1.440 and 0.858 when status category V is not split.

Duncan (1967: 403) report a zero-order correlation of $r = .40$ for fathers' and sons' status, a value identical to that found by Svalastoga (1965) for Europe. While not directly comparable with our non-parametric measure of association, these latter correlations do suggest that generally fathers' status is not strongly related to sons' status. Finally, it can be noted that there is a slightly weaker relationship between fathers' and sons' status in 1970 than there was in 1949. The difference, though, does not seem substantial enough to warrant very far reaching conclusions about decreasing occupational or class rigidity.

MANUAL AND NON-MANUAL SOCIAL MOBILITY

Partly for reasons of clarity and comparability, social mobility is conventionally measured as intergenerational (or intragenerational) movements across the manual-non-manual line. Perhaps of more import is that these categories have, in Britain and in many other countries as well, served as indicators of working-class and middle-class strata. Indeed, British sociologists tend to use these terms more or less interchangeably, a practice I have also followed in this study. Social movement between these broad categories would seem, therefore, to be closer to social mobility as it is generally understood, than is some of the movement between the six classes used so far in this analysis (See: Parkin, 1972: Chapter 1). In Table 2.3, the six occupational classes of Table 2.1 are collapsed into manual and non-manual categories. In order to provide a basis for comparison this table also presents a collapsed version of the Glass mobility data for 1949, again based on the material presented by Miller (1960: 71).

As in Table 2.1, the amount of mobility is presented in percentages based on outflow analysis. These show, for 1970, that of the fathers who were middle-class, 64.5 percent have sons who are also in non-manual

TABLE 2.3

MANUAL AND NON-MANUAL SOCIAL MOBILITY IN TWO BRITISH SAMPLES, 1949* and 1970**

Fathers' Social Class	Sons' Social Class					
	Middle-class (non-manual)		Working-class (manual)		Total N's	
	1949	1970	1949	1970	1949	1970
Middle-class	57.9% (1.56)	64.5% (1.59)	42.1% (0.67)	35.5% (0.60)	1298	282
Working-class	24.7% (0.67)	29.6% (0.73)	75.3% (1.20)	70.4% (1.19)	2200	602
Totals	1295	360	2203	524	3498	884

*Source for the 1949 data is Miller (1960: 71); a special tabulation of the Glass (1954) mobility data. Bracketted values are indices of association and dissociation.
**The 1970 data are that of the Work and Leisure Study.

Summary Mobility Measures	1949	1970
Total observed mobility	31.2%	31.4%
Upward	15.6	20.1
Downward	15.6	11.3
Structural	0.1	8.8
Circulation	31.1	22.6
Full-equality	46.7	46.7
Cramer's V	.332	.332
Index of Association	0.67	0.67

occupations. For working-class fathers we find that 70.4 percent have sons who are also in manual occupations. For the London Region the conventional outflow rate of upward mobility is 29.6 percent; the rate of downward mobility is 35.5 percent. The respective rates of upward and downward mobility in 1949 were 24.7 percent and 42.1 percent.

'CLASS' MOBILITY COMPARED

The same theoretical mode.s and other measures already used for analysing the full mobility matrix can also be applied to the manual and non-manual mobility data. Because social mobility now only refers to movements across the manual-non-manual line, part of the mobility shown in Table 2.1, becomes non-mobility. As a result observed mobility falls from 63.8 percent of the total sample to only 31.4 percent and expected mobility--using the full-equality model--falls from 75 percent to 46.7 percent. Since all of the structural mobility in Table 2.1 originated in the decline of manual occupations, 8.8 percent of the total sample still had to move in order to transform the origin distribution into the destination distribution. The main difference is in the proportion of 'circulators' who drop from 55 percent to 23 percent of the total sample.

To the extent that the classification of occupations into manual and non-manual strata is indicative of an actual class division, then the manual-non-manual line represents a real barrier to class mobility. Indices of association and dissociation (in brackets in the body of Table 2.3) show this most clearly. Values along the major diagonal underscore what the percentages also show: that occupational inheritance predominates and that it is more in ev:dence in the middle-class stratum than in the working-class stratum (1.59 versus 1.19). There is, accordingly, less upward and downward movement than there would be given statistical independence or full equality. However, the fact that the index for

downward mobility is somewhat less than that for upward mobility (.60 versus .73) suggests that the barrier acts to forestall downward mobility to a slightly greater degree than it does upward mobility. The greater tendency towards non-mobility, when the data is viewed in this collapsed and simplified way, is also reflected in the stronger, though still modest, relationship between fathers' and sons' status as measured by Cramer's V = .332.[8]

In the mobility matrix for the Glass study, shifts in the distribution of fathers and sons were much more complex than those shown in Table 2.1.[9] When the eight status categories are collapsed these shifts nearly balance out so that virtually none of the observed mobility across the manual-non-manual line is attributable to structural factors in 1949. In other words, almost all of the observed mobility consisted of the interchange of individuals between two strata. It can also be seen, in Table 2.3, that patterns of upward and downward mobility differ somewhat: in 1970 more upward and less downward mobility is theoretically expected and actually observed than in 1949. Beyond these differences, the main--and unanticipated--finding is the remarkable similarity in the total amount of observed and expected mobility and in measures of association and dissociation between the two samples. Whether considered in terms of mobility ratios (indices of association and dissociation in Table 2.3) or Cramer's V, the most apparent conclusion is that the father's status continues to exert about the same influence on sons' destination as it did two decades ago.

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[8] Blau and Duncan (1967: 104) found a Cramer's V = .336 when their 1962 American data were collapsed into broad occupational groups.

[9] Status categories I, III, IV and Vb were smaller while status categories II, Va, VI and VII were larger in the sons' generation than in the fathers' generation.

Before concluding from these latter measures that there has been
no change in the rate of intergenerational mobility it should be recalled
that the two studies are based on different sampling frames. The present
study, as I have already descri)ed, is based on a sample of the London
Region, a major section of the ;outh-East Region, while the 1949 data are
from a national sample. Not only is the South-East one of the fastest
growing regions in Britain, but it is also the most highly urbanized.[10]
In the absence of any firm data, we can only speculate as to the effect
these factors might have in creating differentials in the rate of mobility
between the London Region and other regions. But the hypothesis that
there is a higher rate of mobility in the London Region than in other
parts of Britain, seems intuitively the most plausible. If such a hypoth-
esis, is indeed, valid, then the similarity in measures of manual and
non-manual mobility just presen.ed for the two studies is at least sug-
gestive of a possible trend tow.irds greater rigidity in the occupational
structure. Further, the direction of the observed change in those measures
which did differ, is also consistent with this conclusion. That is, that
the higher rate of downward mobility and the larger amount of circulation
mobility found in the earlier study, are by conventional interpretations
of these measures, indicative of more fluidity or openness than is pre-
sently the case. Unfortunately the data presented in Table 2.3 do not
substantiate, adequately, this conclusion of worsening mobility opportu-
nities. At the same time, they do not provide any evidence that the
British occupational structure has become less rigid than two decades ago.
When taken at their face value, the summary statistics of Table 2.3 in-
dicate only that there has been very little change at all in the degree
of rigidity between the two time periods.

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[10] For example, see South East Joint Planning Team, Strategic Plan
for the South East: A Framewor:.. London, H. M. S. O., 1971.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Aside from its intrinsic interest, there were two reasons for examining in some detail the actual patterns and rates of mobility measured in the Work and Leisure Study. First, since the men who will be considered in the following chapters are part of this 'mobility matrix' it is useful to my discussion to have viewed them, so to speak, in some larger context. Secondly, I hoped that when social mobility was analysed in this way it would provide an objective 'backdrop' to the subjective--and largely optimistic--views about mobility, opportunity and class structure which occupy much of the 'front stage' in this study. The following paragraphs summarize the main findings of the analysis.

First, the data show considerable intergenerational movement between the six occupational classes. While most of this movement is short distance, into adjacent categories, some 64 percent of the men were, nevertheless, in a different status category than their father. The predominance of mobility rather than non-mobility is further emphasized by the fact that in only two occupational classes was occupational inheritance greater than social movement. Upward mobility surpassed downward mobility in frequency; slightly over one-quarter of the sample had been downwardly mobile, while nearly two-fifths had been upwardly mobile.

Throughout, I am concerned mainly with intergenerational movements upwards and downwards across the manual-non-manual line. When mobility is defined in this way, it emerged that the majority of the men are non-mobile; only about one-third had been intergenerationally mobile upwardly or downwardly across this important demarcation line. Conventional outflow measures of rates of manual and non-manual mobility worked out for the London Region as 29.6 percent upward and 35.5 percent downward.

Most of the mobility consisted of an interchange of individuals,

what I have called circulation mobility. And, of the two ideal-typical

models proposed, the amount of mobility observed was generally more in

accord with a full-equality of opportunity model than a maximum stability

model. This was true whether social movement was viewed as movement be-

tween the six classes, or as manual and non-manual mobility.

Perhaps the clearest indication of this was the relatively weak

association between fathers' status and sons' status, an association

which was still modest even when the data were collapsed into manual and

non-manual categories.

When the 1970 data are compared to the 1949 British data, the over-

riding impression is that mobility rates have remained more or less con-

stant. Manual and non-manual mobility--the most valid basis for compari-

son--for the two time periods, yielded virtually identical values for

several measures of association and dissociation. What differences there

were--in 1970 more upward and less downward mobility and less circula-

tion mobility than in 1949--are generally suggestive of a trend towards

greater rigidity in the British occupational structure. The fact that

downward mobility is not so significant relative to upward mobility bears

re-stressing. Whereas in 1949 there were, in absolute numbers, as many

people moving downwards as upwards across the manual-non-manual line,

there are in 1970 twice as many moving up as down. The conventional out-

flow rate of mobility has also shown a corresponding decline.

Of course, studies of gross rates of occupational mobility, by them-

selves or in comparison, reveal little about possible trends in income,

educational and residential dimensions of social mobility. Nor do they

tell us what proportion of the observed mobility in each time period was

translated into social or class mobility. Thus, improvements in any of

these aspects of social mobility might well be generally perceived as an

increase in mobility opportunities even though occupational mobility is either remaining constant or it actually declining. Also, not shown in the tables are the actual mobility and non-mobility routes used. The next three chapters address themselves to these kinds of questions concerning the mobility just measured.

CHAPTER 3

ROUTES AND DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

In this chapter I attempt two things. First, I shall describe something of the nature and complexity of the social mobility summarized and analysed in the last chapter. I do this, principally, through an examination of intragenerational mobility and educational and non-educational mobility routes. The second focus of this chapter is on the extent of change in basic stratification dimensions: income, residence and education as a result of intergenerational mobility.

INTERGENERATIONAL AND INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY

One of the more important findings in the Lipset and Bendix (1959: 185) mobility study was the extent to which men in Oakland, regardless of origin status, had held jobs quite far removed from that status. Most men of high social origin had at some time held low-level manual positions and nearly half the men of working-class parentage had held at least one high-status position.[1] A direct comparison with the findings of other studies is inappropriate because the Mobility Sample includes a disproportional number of those respondents who have at some time crossed the manual-non-manual line. Even taking this into account, however, my sample shows less heterogeneity than the American data imply. This can be seen in Table 3.1

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[1]Goldthorpe et al (1968b: 52) report findings somewhat along these lines. About one-third of their affluent workers had held a white-collar job at some point in their work history.

which shows by father's social class the proportion who have held at least one job on the other side of the manual-non-manual line. In reading these percentages it must be recognized that people may be counted twice; once if they have ever held a manual job and again if they have ever worked in a non-manual position. In all, 68 percent have worked at some time in a non-manual job and 65 percent have worked at some time in a manual job.

TABLE 3.1

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHOSE FATHERS WERE IN SPECIFIED

SOCIAL CLASSES AND WHO HAVE WORKED AT SOME TIME IN A

MANUAL OR NON-MANUAL OCCUPATION: MOBILITY SAMPLE

Father's Social Class	Category in Which Sons Have Held At Least One Job		
Non-manual	Non-manual	Manual	No. of Respondents
1	75%	25%	8
2	55	69	29
3	63	75	8
Manual			
4	64	67	36
5	83	65	23
6	77	69	13
All Non-manual	60	62	45
All Manual	72	67	72
All Groups	68	65	117

Reflecting, possibly, the exaggeration of the upwardly mobile in the sample, sons of manual fathers have more cross-class experience than those originating in non-manual families. As suggested above, the figures

given in Table 3.1 probably exaggerate the amount of heterogeneity, yet

even taking this into account, the proportions reported by Lipset and

Bendix are still, on the whole, higher than those for the Mobility Sample.[2]

Only about eight percent of the careers involved some complicated

pattern of movements back and forth across the manual-non-manual line.

Two-thirds of the men had spent their total career solely in either manu-

al occupations or non-manual occupations, and about one-fifth of the ca-

reers involved a more or less straightforward movement upwards from manu-

al to non-manual. Only three percent of the men had experienced a down-

ward movement from non-manual to manual.

These figures can be seen in the bottom row of Table 3.2 in which

the major patterns of intragenerational mobility are cross-tabulated with

conventional social mobility.[3] This table shows that 52 percent of the

upwardly mobile were intergenerationally mobile at the beginning of their

career, 43 percent have become intergenerationally mobile as a result of

upward movement in their career, and 5 percent have experienced more com-

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[2]For instance, 74 percent of their sample had worked in a non-manu-
al job and 80 percent had worked in a manual job at some time in their
career. Other figures are correspondingly higher, ranging from 57 per-
cent to 87 percent.

[3]Conventional social mobility refers to a comparison between the
father's present (last) occupation and son's present job. This, the
most reliable measure of mobility is used throughout this study. I
also recorded the father's job when he was the same age as the respon-
dent (age - specific) and his job when the son was age 16. The latter,
when compared with the son's first job gives a measure I call 'pure
intergenerational mobility'. I wondered whether an age-specific
measure might be a better predictor of attitudes and behaviour than a
conventional measure. However, on preliminary analysis of my data,
I found little difference between the two and therefore use the con-
ventional mobility measure both because of its greater reliability and
because results from the mobility sample would be compatible with
those of the Work and Leisure study. Because of intragenerational
mobility of the son and/or his father, the three measures do give
different rates of upward and downward mobility.

plicated patterns. It is also of interest that about one-fifth (21%) of

those who are now stable non-manual have achieved this position through

intragenerational mobility.[4] The downwardly mobile have, as a group,

the least experience in positions across the manual-non-manual line.

TABLE 3.2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPECIFIED PATTERNS OF

INTRAGERNERATIONAL MOBILITY AND CONVENTIONAL

SOCIAL MOBILITY
(Percentages)

Pattern of Intragenerational Mobility

Pattern of Conventional Mobility	All Manual	All Non-manual	Manual to Non-manual	Non-manual to Manual	Other*	Totals
Upward	__**	52%	43%	__	5%	100% (44)
Stable Non-manual	__	75	21	__	4	100% (24)
Downward	82	__	__	4	14	100% (22)
Stable Manual	74	__	__	11	15	100% (27)
All Groups	32	35	21	3	8	100% (117)

  * Includes patterns such as manual to non-manual to manual, non-
    manual to manual to non-manual and more complicated or erratic
    patterns.

 ** It is, of course, impossible to have been (say) upwardly mobile,
    intergenerationally, and have spent the total career in a manual
    occupation.

Neither Table 3.1 or 3.2 give any indication of the length of time

individuals have spent in a category different than their present one.

———————————

[4]Not all of the sons were downwardly mobile. Some fathers have
also been upwardly mobile, in the interval.

Any full-time job in another category held for at least three months was considered as eligible in these tables. Many of these, especially manual jobs in the context of a mainly non-manual career, may represent a rather trivial experience. Following the example of Lipset and Bendix (1959: 186), Table 3.3 shows by pattern of intergenerational mobility both proportions who have been intragenerationally mobile and the proportion of the career spent in a manual occupation. Since the length of time people have been in the labour force varied considerably, those aged 30 and over have been examined separately in the last two columns.

Column 1 indicates that whatever the intergenerational mobility pattern, from one-fifth to nearly one-half of the men in each category have held jobs on the other side of the manual-non-manual line to where they are presently located. With the exception of the upward and downward categories, differences between the mobility groups are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These figures are in contrast to those of Lipset and Bendix (1959: 186) who report comparable ones ranging from one-half to two-thirds. When the older age group is considered separately, (third column from the end) there is, as might be expected, a slight rise in the proportions for each category though differences are not very large.

An inspection of the second column of Table 3.3 gives a very different perspective. It emerges that, on the whole, most of the men have on average spent very little of their total career in a category different than their present one. In this respect, those who have non-manual origins--the downwardly mobile and the stable non-manual--have had very little cross-class experience at all. The downwardly mobile, it seems, enter manual occupations at the beginning of their career and in overwhelming numbers remain there the rest of their lives. Likewise, those who have retained a middle-class position appear to make forays of only

TABLE 3.3

SOCIAL MOBILITY, INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY AND TIME SPENT IN MANUAL OCCUPATIONS

Pattern of Conventional Mobility	Total Sample			30 Age Group		
	(1) Proportion Ever Holding Job in Category Other Than Present	(2) Percentage of Career Spent in Manual Job	Number of Resp.'s	(1)	(2)	Number of Resp.'s
Upward	48%	16%	44	50%	16%	28
Stable Non-manual	25	5	24	36	9	14
Downward	18	97	22	22	96	9
Stable Manual	26	85	27	33	81	15
All Groups	32	45	117	39	40	66

limited duration across the manual-non-manual line. Those who originate

in the working class tend to have the most cross-class experience. This

is as true, though in opposite directions, whether they have been social-

ly mobile or not. Still, the major part of the career of these two

groups has also been spent in their present category. While, as we saw

earlier, about half of the intergenerational upward mobility involved in-

tragenerational mobility, the average time spent in manual occupations

was not large. Again, these proportions do not alter appreciably or sys-

tematically when the older age group is considered separately.[5]

Despite the larger proportions having held jobs in a different

category in the Lipset and Bendix (1959) data, the duration of time spent

in manual occupations turns out to be highly similar. Whereas their

figures ranged from 7 percent to 90 percent my proportions range from 5

to 85 percent. The one important difference is in the upwardly mobile

category: they found that about one-quarter of the career had been spent

in a manual job, compared with 16 percent for this sample. In their study,

the fathers' social class (manual or non-manual) did distinguish between

the time spent in manual work by what are now non-manual workers (P. 187).

The 11 percent difference in the Mobility Sample between the stable non-

manual and the upwardly mobile (16% - 5%) does not, however, reach the

.05 level of significance. Thus, Americans, on the basis of these data,

have in aggregate more cross-class experience than their British counter-

parts, but the time spent 'experimenting' or perhaps, 'building-up steam',

is much the same.[6]

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[5]These work-life or career patterns are shown graphically in Chap-
ter 5 for each mobility and non-mobility group. See Tables 5.1 to 5.5.

[6]It is perhaps worth noting that in calculating the proportions in
the preceding tables, war service and national service were excluded both
because of its dependence on age and the difficulty of coding it reliably.

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY AND OTHER STATUS INDICATORS

Social mobility may be viewed as a special case of status incongruency, one in which, by definition, a characteristic in the mobile individual's status profile is out of line--the occupation of his father. As a result, the socially mobile are _ipso_ _facto_ status incongruent compared to the non-mobile, a factor which under some circumstances may be enough to deny them acceptance into the new class or group (See: Tumin, 1957).[7] But beyond this, are the socially mobile also more likely than the non-mobile to have other statuses similarly discrepant? In general, occupation is by no means a perfect indicator of other status dimensions (Duncan, 1961), so that 'empirically, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the prestige attributed to a position a man occupies and either the training or education required to enter it or the income received from pursuing it' (Hodge, 1970: 183). Is this likely to be especially the case for those who move upwards and downwards in the occupational prestige hierarchy? The following paragraphs try to answer that question with respect to income, residence and education.

1. INCOME

Do intergenerational changes in occupational prestige lead to corresponding changes in income? The data of Table 3.4 suggest that in general they do. As a whole, the group interviewed a second time was a prosperous one with the extreme in income distribution tending to be at

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Most of the men who had service experience were in the lower ranks so that cross-class experience measured as experience in manual occupations is somewhat underestimated. It is not clear in the Lipset and Bendix data whether war service was included or excluded.

[7]Much of the literature on status incongruence, status discrepancy, status inconsistency and lack of status crystallization as it has been variously called, is summarized in Lenski (1966). See also Malewski (1966); Lenski (1967); Hodge (1970); Hopper (1971b: 20-26).

the top end rather than the bottom end of the scale.[8] For instance,

about nine percent reported household income above ₤4,000 per annum.

With respect to patterns of mobility, the results in Table 3.4 reveal no

statistically significant differences between the high upwards, low up-

wards and stable non-manual groups. Although there appear to be some

differences between the high downward group and the low downward and

stable manual, these differences do not reach significance. The main

distinction is between the manual and non-manual who differ very sub-

stantially in average income. Entrants into the middle class are as

likely if not more likely to have a high income than are the established

members. Similarly, downward mobility also appears to carry with it the

likelihood of an income level as low, perhaps lower, than that of the

stable working class.

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[8]Unfortunately, comparable data on mobility and income could not
be tabulated for the Work and Leisure Study due to a technical diffi-
culty in the computer program. It is relevant to note at this point
that the two criteria used in constructing the mobility sub-sample--
intergenerational mobility and whether fathers were living--had the
effect of biasing the sample in terms of age, income and class. As
a group the mobility sub-sample is younger and more prosperous. Thus,
the mean age of the total Work and Leisure Study sample and the mo-
bility subsample were 44.6 and 35.4 respectively, a difference which
is significant ($t = 6.87$, $P < .001$). Similarly, with regard to in-
come, the mean household income, before deductions, for the Work and
Leisure Study and the mobility subsample, was ₤1,645 and ₤1,938 re-
spectively. This difference which is significant ($t = 2.59$, $P < .01$),
is caused by the disproportional sampling of the mobile. That is,
the subsample underrepresents manual respondents and overrepresents
non-manual respondents.

TABLE 3.4

CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME:

SUMMARY STATISTICS: MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 116)

Pattern of Social Mobility	Mean (£)	Standard Deviation (£)	Number of Respondents
(1) High Upward	2,583	1,234	27
(2) Low Upward	2,132	1,092	17
(3) Stable Non-manual	2,354	1,340	24
(4) High Downward	1,139	375	9
(5) Low Downward	1,308	629	13
(6) Stable Manual	1,346	476	26
Total Work & Leisure Study	1,645	1,023	870
Total Mobility Sub-sample	1,938	1,149	116

Using t-Test P = .05

1 X 2 -- N.S.	3 X 4 -- P < .001
1 X 3 -- N.S.	3 X 5 -- P < .001
1 X 6 -- P < .001	3 X 6 -- P < .001
2 X 3 -- N.S.	4 X 5 -- N.S.
2 X 6 -- P < .001	4 X 6 -- N.S.
	5 X 6 -- N.S.

2. RESIDENCE

I did not inquire systematically about possessions. But it was apparent that most of the homes visited in the second round of interviewing reflected in their furnishings the relative affluence just described. In working-class homes two and three piece black leatherette suites, bright, solid-colour wall-to-wall carpets and elaborate gas or electric fires were the rule rather than the exception. Frequently, Scandinavian dining room sets ccould be seen in the next room. On the

walls were pictures of leaping horses, large-eyed children, idealized young women--the sort which have earned the name of 'wall furniture'. There was, often, an impression of fanatic cleanliness and order--sometimes to the point of sterility. Books, papers, and professional wedding and baby photos were carefully positioned and were seemingly, irrevocably, in place. Some homes, of course, especially in inner London were rundown and overcrowded with minimal and nondescript furnishings, open coal fires or paraffin heaters warming only the room with the television. In one, bits of several motors were strewn about both the dining and living rooms. But these were so much the exception as to be memorable and outstanding.

Middle-class homes tended, on the whole, to be less tidy. Though 'G-Plan', especially in the housing estates, was much in evidence there were subtle differences from that found in working-class homes. Often, juxtaposed against the unity and homogeneity of modern furnishings, was some more ancient piece: a large heavily carved chair, a grandfather clock, a massive mahogany table, a sideboard. Televisions, less prominently displayed vied in importance with component stereo systems, the tangle of wires perhaps a form of inverted snobbery. Books, magazines and records, all much more in evidence, had, less obviously, a precise place or had long ago overgrown it.

Whereas working-class homes seemed to have been furnished all in one go, there were in middle-class homes, sometimes, conspicuously under-furnished rooms: a wall left vacant until the money now paying school fees could be diverted to a sofa; a bare floor awaiting eventually wall-to-wall carpets. Apologies for the lack of furniture, the overstuffed, often ugly cast-offs of parents and the untidiness were, it seemed, middle-class traits; the working class seldom were apologetic, whatever the

state of their home. Again, there were exceptions as with the working

class though in the opposite direction. There was the home of one re-

spondent in Surrey, in which four reception rooms were filled, respec-

tively, with what appeared to be genuine antiques each from a different

period. There was also the mansion in a street of equally massive houses

in North London, all built within the past decade rather than in some

more iniquitous era. However, instead of a coach house, each was now

provided with a cavernous garage still not large enough to house both

the Bentleys and Jaguars and the 'fast looking' Minis and Cortinas which

belonged to wives and teenagers.

Together these impressions might in the hands of a more sensitive

observer have formed the basis of a supplementary measure of the precise

status position of those interviewed. Like Chapin's (1933) 'living-room

scale', the way in which people present themselves through their posses-

sions did point elusively to differences between the established middle

class and the newcomers--the upwardly mobile.[9] And, among those who had

moved upwards there were also differences: university graduates for in-

stance, had seemed to gravitate to new housing estates and to have gone

about the furnishing of their modern homes in a similar way as had the

affluent working class--all at one time. In contrast, I found that some

among those who were upwardly mobile over their career were more firmly

typical of the middle class. The difference was in part age; most of the

university graduates interviewed were in their mid-twenties and in their

first home whereas men in the latter group had had time to settle, to ac-

cumulate possessions and to achieve a kind of middle-class shabbiness.

Somewhat more readily quantified and systematized was the basic

type of housing in which people lived. This has been simplified even

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[9]For a recent attempt to develop such a scale, see: Laumann and
House (1970).

further by making the important division that of whether people own their own home, rent it privately or live in a council property. I have therefore ignored the hierarchy within the private sector which has as its base the 'two-up and two-down' terrace house and at its pinnacle homes such as the carefully restored 'old rectory' parts of which were built, perhaps, in the sixteenth century.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND RESIDENCE

As can be seen in Table 3.5, more of my respondents own their home than otherwise. Non-manual respondents are more than twice as likely as manual respondents to do so. A more basic dichotomy is between council housing and private housing. There is, perhaps, not as great a stigma attached to council housing as there is to 'low income housing' in the United States but most middle-class people, whatever their income, are not likely to choose to live in a council owned property.[10] As two middle-class respondents who lived near council estates commented:

You get thefts, discipline problems, all sorts of damage being done. You never used to get it at all. It's entirely the sort of people and the environment they come from. It's only since the council has been built over there we've had the trouble.

When you have people from the East End of London out here in the middle of a suburb, there's bound to be difficulty. The children are used to crowded streets, they don't know what to do with so much open space. Now we have fish and chip wrappers on our lawn and we never used to have that.

---

[10]When I held income constant, I found manual workers were more likely to live in a council property than were non-manual workers.

TABLE 3.5

PROPORTIONS OF MANUAL AND NON-MANUAL RESPONDENTS BY

SPECIFIED TYPES OF HOUSING: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY
(N = 815)

Type of Housing*	Non-Manual	Manual	Total Sample
Flat or House, Owned	64%	31%	44%
Flat or House** Rented Privately	13	20	17
Council Flat or House	23	49	39
Totals	100% (325)	100% (490)	100% (815)

  * Respondents living with parents were classified according to
     the parents' housing arrangement.

** Includes respondents living in rooms and bedsitters.

$X^2 = 81.486$; P $<$ .001; C = .30[11]

For those people moving upward and downward in the occupational

hierarchy type of housing may, therefore, provide one important indica-

tion of their social as well as occupational mobility.   Sons of middle-

class fathers who live in council housing probably have shifted their

class membership group dramatically, whatever their occupational posi-

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[11]C, the contingency coefficient, is one of the traditional mea-
sures of association based on the chi-square. As it employs the chi-
square in its calculation, we may test its significance by deciding
whether the chi-square for the data is significant. Its properties and
limitations are discussed in Siegel, (1956: 196-202). Since the value
of chi-square depends on the size of the N, I have used C not so much
to indicate the strength of relationship between mobility and other
variables, but rather, to show the extent to which the four mobility
patterns differ from one another.

tion relative to their father. Conversely, upward movement occupational-
ly will be unlikely to involve much social mobility if the individual
has not moved into some form of private housing. Thus, not only is home
ownership a dimension of social mobility in its own right, and a highly
visible symbol of financial and occupational success, but it is also in-
dicative of the 'success' of occupational mobility.

Separating out the upwardly mobile from the non-mobile middle class
has the effect in Table 3.6 of raising somewhat the proportion of the
latter who are home owners. It can also be seen that most of the non-

TABLE 3.6

PATTERNS OF CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND TYPE OF

HOUSING: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY
Percentages
(N = 815)

	Mobility Pattern			
Type of Housing	(1) Upward	(2) Stable N-M	(3) Downward	(4) Stable Manual
Owned House or Flat	55%	73%	37%	30%
Privately Rented House or Flat	11	15	20	19
Council House or	34	12	43	51
Total	100% (160)	100% (165)	100% (95)	100% (395)

Comments: Chi-square and C's: owned and rented compared with council
tenancy P = .05.

	X^2	C	Prob.
1 X 2	21.610	.25	P < .001
1 X 3	2.271	.17	N.S.
1 X 4	13.464	.15	P < .001
2 X 3	32.341	.33	P < .001
2 X 4	73.207	.34	P < .001
3 X 4	1.830	.06	N.S.

manual council tenants are in fact those with manual rather than non-man-
ual origins. There is, however, no significant difference between the
downwardly mobile and the stable manual with respect to type of residence.
With this exception, all four patterns of social mobility differ in the
likelihood of living in private sector accommodation or council housing.
In general, then, those who move upwards are more likely than the stable
manual and less likely than the stable non-manual to own their own home
or to rent privately. Those who move downwards, by contrast, are not
distinguishable from their class of destination with respect to residence.
Downward movement has, therefore, a similar effect on choice of housing
as it does for average household income; it leads to a life style and
material standards similar to those of the stable working class.

3. EDUCATION

In comparing the educational attainment of the mobile and non-mo-
bile, the educational experiences of the Work and Leisure Study sample
provide an overall perspective. Table 3.7 shows that 83 percent of the
male respondents had completed their full time education by age 16 or
under.[12] By age 18 this figure rises to over 93 percent (not shown in
Table 3.7. Differences between the manual and non-manual workers are
also striking: non-manual workers are about nine times as likely to
stay on past age 16 as are manual workers. When, however, the socially
mobile are excluded, the gap between the non-manual and manual almost
doubles (3% versus 52% staying on until 17 or older).

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[12]Educational data for the Work and Leisure Study were coded
with the lowest age as 16 or under. A better breakdown for our
purposes here would have been 15 or under, but short of re-coding
the questionnaires these data are unavailable.

TABLE 3.7

PATTERNS OF CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND AGE ON LEAVING

FULL-TIME EDUCATION: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY

Pattern of Conventional Mobility	Age on Leaving Full-time Education		
	16 and Under	17 and Older	Total
			(100%)
(1) Upward	79%	21%	177
(2) Stable Non-Man.	48	52	178
(3) Downward	90	10	99
(4) Stable Manual	97	3	422
All Groups	83% (726)	17% (150)	876*

* Educational information for 8 respondents missing.

Summary Statistics (P = .05)

	x^2	C	P
1 X 2	36.355	.30	P < .001
1 X 3	5.245	.14	P < .05
1 X 4	56.633	.29	P < .001
2 X 3	47.290	.38	P < .001
2 X 4	212.039	.51	P < .001
3 X 4	11.586	.15	P < .001

That there are large differences between the manual and non-manual respondents in educational achievement is not unexpected. Of more interest is the comparison between the socially mobile and non-mobile. Table 3.7 indicates that there are significant differences between all of the mobility categories used. In particular, the upwardly mobile have on average a substantially lower amount of education than their stable-non-manual counterparts. Contingency coefficients (bottom of Table 3.7) calculated for the data suggest that in respect to educational achievement, the upwardly mobile are most like the downwardly mobile who are in

turn closest to the stable manual, their destination class.[13]

Similar though not so striking differences emerge from the more detailed data collected for the Mobility Sample. With the exception of the downwardly mobile and stable manual comparison, the same relationships as described above for the Work and Leisure Study held true when school leaving was dichotomized, as in Table 3.7. However, when school leaving age is considered in terms of minimum education (14 or 15) differences between the mobile and the nonmobile are less substantial. This can be seen in Table 3.8 where the only significant differences are between the two non-manual groups and the two manual groups. Over half of the upwardly mobile and nearly four-fifths of the stable non-manual stayed on beyond the minimum school leaving age, whereas 14 percent of the downwardly mobile and only 7 percent of the stable manual were able to do so.

TABLE 3.8

PATTERNS OF CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND AGE ON LEAVING

SCHOOL: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117)
(Percentages)

Pattern of Mobility	Age on Leaving School		
	15 or Under	16 and Over	Total Respondents (100%)
(1) Upward	43%	57%	44
(2) Stable Non-Man.	21	79	24
(3) Downward	86	14	22
(4) Stable Manual	93	7	27
All Groups	58%	42%	117

	Summary Statistics (P = .05)		
	x^2	C	P
1 X 2	3.401	.22	N.S.
1 X 3	11.196	.38	P < .001
1 X 4	17.334	.44	P < .001
2 X 3	19.753	.55	P < .001
2 X 4	27.012	.57	P < .001
3 X 4	.513	.10	N.S.

[13]A further breakdown into high and low upward and high and low

EDUCATIONAL ROUTES

In British society the educational route used is likely more sali-
ent in its consequences for the mobile and non-mobile than are the actual
years of education completed. The range of ages covered in the sample,
combined with both the past and present proliferation of educational sys-
tems and routes, requires a long list of possible codes, with the result
shown in Table 3.9: frequencies too small for analysis. However, inspec-
tion of the questionnaires themselves shows that those who attended a
comprehensive or a catholic school obtained an essentially non-grammar
school education. All eight of the respondents who attended a 'public'
school fell into the stable non-manual category. Thus, in Table 3.10
public school respondents have been considered as 'grammar school'. All
other educational experiences are treated as non-grammar.

TABLE 3.9

DISTRIBUTION OF MOBILITY SAMPLE BY TYPE OF SCHOOL ATTENDED

Type of School	Percent	No. of Respondents
Secondary Modern	34%	39
Secondary (before 1944)	15	17
Technical School	3	4
State Grammar	19	22
'Public' School	7	8
Comprehensive	5	6
Catholic School	6	7
Primary School Only	5	6
Other	6	7
	100%	117

Table 3.10 shows that grammar and public schools are used by the
middle class as a non-mobility route. None of those who moved downward

downward yielded no difference in education for the upwardly mobile.
High downwards tended to be slightly better educated than low downwards
though the difference was not significant.

had a grammar school education. On the other hand, sone of manual fathers who obtain a grammar school education become upwardly mobile. But, over two-thirds of the upward mobility is through what are essentially rejection routes or alternative education mobility routes. In short, grammar school education has in the Mobility Sample, invariably, the effect of maintaining class position in the middle class and insuring upward mobility of those of working-class parentage who had this experience. There is, nevertheless, more non-mobility in the middle class than can be accounted for by attendance at a grammar school. And, over two-thirds of the upward mobility is not accounted for by type of education.

TABLE 3.10

PATTERNS OF CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND GRAMMAR AND

NON-GRAMMAR SCHOOL MOBILITY ROUTES: MOBILITY SAMPLE
Percentages
(N = 117)

	Education Mobility Route		
Pattern of Mobility	Grammar	Non-Grammar	Total (100%)
(1) Upward	32%	68%	44
(2) Stable Non-Manual	67	33	24
(3) Downward	0	100	22
(4) Stable Manual	0	100	27
All Groups	26	74	117

Summary Statistics (P = .05)

	x^2	C	P
1 X 2	7.650	.32	P < .001
1 X 3	8.885	.34	P < .001
1 X 4	10.701	.36	P < .001
2 X 3	22.489	.57	P < .001
2 X 4	26.229	.58	P < .001
3 X 4			N.S.

STATUS INCONGRUENCE: INCOME AND EDUCATION

Apparently, then, many occupations either do not require special educational qualifications or contain a degree of ambiguity about what these should be. Particularly for the upwardly mobile there is, therefore, a good deal of incongruence between occupational prestige and education.[14] But as indicated earlier, the mean income of the upwardly mobile group is slightly higher than that for the stable non-manual group and is at least £ 1,000 higher than the mean for the stable manual group. This suggests that, overall, there is also incongruence between income and education. Table 3.11 is an attempt to summarize for each non-manual group in the Mobility Sample the proportion whose income and education are approximately congruent or incongruent.[15] Columns 1 and 4 show congruent patterns. Thus, if no attention is paid to the direction of the discrepancy, then the upwardly mobile are more likely than the stable non-manual to be differentially located in terms of educational and income dimensions of status (54% versus 29%; $X^2 = 4.032$; P < .05). Also, Table 3.11 shows that there is a considerable difference between high upwards--those who have moved upwards three or more occupational status categories--and low upwards--those who have moved up only one or two categories--with some 76 percent of the latter falling into one of the two status incongruent columns. ($X^2 = 5.731$; P < .05).

---

[14]The manual groups in the Mobility Sample are not considered because as indicated, none had stayed on in school past the age of 15.

[15]I am comparing columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.11 for all upward and stable non-manual.

TABLE 3.11

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY AND STATUS INCONGRUENCE BETWEEN

EDUCATION AND INCOME: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 68)
(Percentages)

Pattern of Conventional Mobility	(1) High Education High Income	(2) High Education Low Income	(3) Low Education High Income	(4) Low Education Low Income	Total (100%)
High Upward	44%	19%	22%	15%	27
Low Upward	24	41	35	0	17
All Upward	37	27	27	9	44
Stable Non-Manual	54	25	4	17	24
All Groups	43	26	19	12	68

Comments: Education is split into high and low based on those who completed their full-time education at age 15 or less and those who completed it at age 16 or higher.

Low income is under £ 2,000 per year; high income is £ 2,000 per year and higher.

When we attempt to consider the direction of the discrepancy—whether, for instance, a low level of education has yielded a relatively high income and therefore some measure of personal satisfaction or the opposite case, where the investment in education has not paid off in income, a presumably depressing experience (See: Hodge, 1970: 198)—Table 3.11 provides somewhat more complicated results. In general the difference between the mobile and the non-mobile lies in the greater ability of the former to enjoy a high income with a relatively low level of education (27% versus 4%; column 3; $x^2 = 5.362$; P < .05). In contrast, there is little difference in the proportions of each group who

are in the unsatisfying situation of a relatively high education and a
low income (27% versus 25%, respectively; column 2). Within the upward-
ly mobile group there are also some complications brought about by the
greater tendency of those in the low upward category to be status incon-
gruent in both directions. However, differences between the two mobile
groups who are in 'satisfying' versus 'unsatisfying' status combinations
are not statistically insignificant.

ALTERNATIVE EDUCATIONAL ROUTES

Grammar school or 'public' school and non-grammar school education
represent the dominant mobility and non--mobility educational routes in
English society and in later chapters this division will be used exten-
sively in considering the consequences of social mobility.[16] But, as
we saw earlier, there is the possibility that people passing through what
were initially rejection routes may subsequently obtain qualifications
from either full-time or part-time technical education. It has been sug-
gested that these alternative educational routes may constitute an impor-
tant channel for upward mobility. Alternatively, as Lee (1968) argues,
there is evidence that technical education has been predominantly employed
as a non-mobility route by the middle classes, who would, otherwise, have
been rejected by the formal educational system and possibly have faced
the prospect of downward mobility. In other words, as with the state
grammar school system, he argues that it has been the middle classes who
have benefitted most from the provision of technical education.

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[16]For example, educational route was for the upwardly mobile an
important indicator of home ownership: whatever the income level, those
who were upwardly mobile through a grammar school route were significant-
ly more likely to shun council housing with its working-class connotations
than were those upwardly mobile through other routes. See also the dis-
cussion below on education and time spent in a manual occupation. Educa-
tional routes and their theoretical and empirical effect on personal con-
sequences of social mobility are considered most fully in Chapters 9-11.

The distribution of the sample by type of further education is shown in Table 3.12. Any form of post secondary training mentioned in the interview was coded under one of the categories listed in the table. Yet even with this liberal definition, 60 percent had no formal training beyond their secondary education. Within the university or college category, as well, are some who took short courses and 'emergency' courses at a university without necessarily obtaining a degree. Three respondents received a B.A. as a result of an interrupted training for the Catholic priesthood. Included in 'Technical and Business' training are a variety of accountancy courses and a diploma in Agriculture. City and Guild training is an almost exclusively working-class non-mobility route, and in the following analysis is treated as 'no further education'.

The small numbers who did undertake some form of further education make any conclusive test of these competing hypotheses impossible. In general, those with grammar school education were more than twice as likely to have had some experience of further education (34% versus 15%).

TABLE 3.12

DISTRIBUTION OF MOBILITY SAMPLE BY SPECIFIED TYPES

OF FURTHER EDUCATION
(N = 117)

Type of Further Education	Percent	Number of Respondents
No Further Education	60%	70
City and Guilds	16	19
Technical or Business	9	11
University or College	12	14
Other	3	3
	100%	117

As can be seen in Table 3.13, the upwardly mobile and the stable non-man-
ual are about equally likely to have some form of further training. A-
gain, as with grammar school education, the distinction is between manual
and non-manual respondents rather than class of origin. Men of working-
class origin who obtain further education, are invariably upwardly mo-
bile; men of middle-class origin remain intergenerationally stable or
non-mobile. And, although the number of cases become too small for pro-
portions to be calculated, the same pattern is true whether the upwardly
mobile and the non-mobile attended grammar school or not.[17]

TABLE 3.13

PATTERNS OF CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND FURTHER EDUCATION:

MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117)
(Percentages)

	Education		
Mobility Pattern	Further Education	No Further Education*	No. of Respondents (100%)
Upward	39%	61%	44
Stable N-M	42%	58%	24
Downward	0%	100%	22
Stable Manual	0%	100%	27
	23%	77%	117
	(27)	(90)	

* No further education includes those respondents who have City and
  Guild's qualifications or are presently on day release.

[17]When the upwardly mobile and the non-mobile are compared with
grammar school or non-grammar school held constant, there is virtually
no difference in further education observable for either group. Chi-
squares for the two sets of data are almost zero.

Finally, when the training mentioned by respondents is divided into formal and alternative further educational routes, there is no statistical difference between the stable non-manual and the upwardly mobile in the use of these routes.[18]

EDUCATION AND TIME IN THE WORKING CLASS

Only a minority of the upwardly mobile used an alternative educational route. Most of those who did not attend a grammar school and then perhaps university moved upwards as a result of career or work-life mobility. As was shown in Table 3.3, the upwardly mobile had spent, on average, about 16 percent of their career in a manual occupation. The stable non-manual, by contrast, spent only five percent of their collective careers on the opposite side of the manual-non-manual line.

Perhaps the most striking finding of this chapter is the effect, especially for the high upwardly mobile, of a grammar school education on the time spent in manual work. This is shown in Table 3.14. Both low and high upward mobiles are as likely to enter directly into a middle-class position as are the stable non-manuals, when both have grammar school experience. Those without this experience spend nearly four times as long in manual jobs as do the stable middle class who went to neither public school or grammar school. Thus those who use a grammar school route are much less likely to be subjected to cross-class pressures than are those using non-grammar routes.

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[18]The numbers involved were small (N = 23). The Fisher Exact Probability Test produced a value greater than five percent. (Table I in Siegel, 1956).

TABLE 3.14

THE EFFECT OF GRAMMAR AND NON-GRAMMAR SCHOOL MOBILITY AND

NON-MOBILITY ROUTES ON PROPORTION OF CAREER SPENT IN MANUAL

OCCUPATIONS: MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 68)

| | Mobility Route | | | | |
Pattern of Conventional Mobility	Grammar Proportion of Career in Manual	No.	Non-Grammar Proportion of Career in Manual	No.	Total
High Upward	2%	9	28%	18	27
Low Upward	5	5	16	12	17
Total Upward	3	14	23	30	44
Stable Non-Manual	4	16	6	8	24

SUMMARY

This chapter confirms the view advanced in Chapter 1 that a considerable amount of upward mobility occurs outside of the formal educational system. Movement upward from the working class occurs invariably and rapidly when a grammar school education or further education are involved. But, about two-fifths of the men moved upwards without any education beyond the legal minimum. To be mobile through a non-educational route, however, means that a larger proportion of one's career is spent in a manual occupation. In contrast, grammar school, public school and further education function invariably for the stable middle class as a non-mobility route. No one, in other words, was found who had these kinds of educational experiences and who had also been downwardly mobile.

With respect to other indicators of social status besides educa-
tion--income and residence--occupational mobility appears to lead to
patterns not unlike those of the stable or non-mobile groups. This was
especially so for the downwardly mobile who have incomes and housing very
similar to the stable working-class group. In terms of income, those who
move upwards across the manual-non-manual line enjoy an income which on
average is nearly £1,000 higher than that of their class of origin, and
which, as well, is slightly higher than that of the class which they
are entering. At the same time, they are not as likely to own their own
home and to shun council housing as are those who remain stable in the
middle class. The implication is that for some of the upwardly mobile,
there has not as yet been much of a relational or normative transition,
and that for some time at least, they lag behind the patterns of their
new class. The fact that educational route is a significant predictor
of who among the upwardly mobile is likely to be a home owner gives added
weight to this conclusion; those who move upwards through a grammar
school route are about as likely to own their own home as are the stable
non-manual who did not attend a grammar school.

The brief consideration of status incongruence in the middle class
showed that while the upwardly mobile are the most likely to hold status
positions which are inconsistent with one another, they have as well,
the greater likelihood of the personal satisfaction of gaining an occu-
pational position with a certain degree of prestige and a relatively high
income despite a low level of education. At the same time, some--especi-
ally in the low upward category--have had the opposite experience of not
having education 'pay-off' in terms of income. However, the upwardly
mobile were not much different in this respect than stable members of
the middle class. Nevertheless, the upwardly mobile, while certainly

exhibiting changes in income, education and residence compared to the stable working class, do not, except with income, completely resemble their new class. In general they tend to bestride the two classes we have been considering. Of the two patterns of mobility, the variables considered in this chapter suggest downward movement is most clearly translated into social mobility. I turn, in the next two chapters, to a more detailed examination of career routes, job histories and actual occupations for further insight into the nature of social mobility.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL MOBILITY, WORK AND CAREERS

Occupational mobility as opposed to social mobility has been of considerable interest in its own right. Although the main focus of this study was on social mobility, the close linkage between occupation and class made it inevitable that a major portion of the interview would be taken up with jobs, job changes and attitudes about work. This chapter summarizes and illustrates aspects of the work-life histories relevant to social mobility. How do the mobile differ from the non-mobile with respect to commitment to work, expectations about promotion and job satisfaction? Is the work world of those who move downward inevitably worse than for those who maintain their status or move upward?

CAREERS VERSUS JOBS

By the most commonly used definition, 'a career is a succession of related jobs arranged in a hierarchy of prestige, through which persons move in an ordered, predictable sequence' (Wilensky, 1960: 127). Thus, the difference between 'work' and a 'career' is a large and fundamental one.[1] The notion of career implies commitment and expectations about the future whereas work suggests the accepting of a job as a means to some other non-occupational end. Those who are able to view their life and work as part of a trajectory, who are able to evaluate their present status in terms of where they think they will be at some future point

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[1]For textbook-type summaries and syntheses of material relating to these concepts, see Weiss and Reisman (1966) and Taylor (1968: Chapter XI).

and who therefore must be viewed not as they are but as they are becoming, appear more likely to see work not as something divorced and alien but as integral to their personality and life. It is generally believed, then, that much of the satisfaction and also the willingness to work hard and long at the job derives from work which is a segment of a career (Weiss and Reisman, 1966: 602).[2]

At the same time existing evidence on careers and occupations suggests that this kind of satisfaction is likely to be enjoyed by only a minority of the population. Wilensky, in the above cited article, believes that no more than one-quarter to one-third of the American work force can, within his definition, be said to have a career. The larger portion face either the propsect of a job which, other things remaining equal, will continue unchanged for perhaps the several decades until retirement or a disorderly series of jobs which together do not add up to any discernible sense of progress, fulfillment and commitment (Wilensky, 1960: 134-135).

The same finding also seems to apply to the British labour force. Carter (1966: 166) in his sympathetic portrayal of the work world of secondary modern school leavers, writes that:

There are . . . thousands of boys and girls in jobs that are dull and routine, and that are made worse by uninterested employers, foremen and charge hands. For although there is a variety of occupations open to school-leavers in important respects many of the jobs are similar: children may have the opportunity to move from one department to another, for example, or from one part of town to another, to deliver bread or laundry, but all of the jobs are of a type in being repetitive and lacking in prospects. The dull and muted life at work can spill over into the hours away from work, so that much of life is not so much lived as endured: in time, work expels any ambition or ability.

A sense of commitment and involvement with work and career is perhaps

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[2]For an excellent and brief review of the literature on careers and their importance in the middle class, see Bell (1968: 17-20).

not to be expected from the majroity of manual workers.[3] But, at all

class levels and at all ages the most striking impression which emerges

from the work histories is the degree of unpredictability and lack of

planning characterizing most people's work life. Instead of well orga-

nized and integrated steps on a ladder there were, even among the stable

non-manual respondents, some who had experienced ups and downs and a

chain of jobs which in retrospect had led nowhere.

The fact that occupational histories do not always add up to a

structured and coherent career does not mean that work had not been, to

use Dubin's (1956) phrase, a 'central life interest' for many. In con-

trast to manual workers, non-manual workers were generally intensely in-

terested in talking, often at great length and detail, about the most

significant aspect of their lives--their career or job history. There

was a real concern--sometimes wonderment and bewilderment--about where

in the past they had been, where they were now and where they might be

in years to come. It was also clear that a majority of the middle-class

men, whether intergenerationally stable or upwardly mobile, were, in the

interview, covering ground that had beenworked over and evaluated many

times before. In Berger's (1963: 56-57) phraseology, they seemed to

have been constantly reinterpreting and reconstructing their biography

in accordance with their present ideas of what is important and what is

not, 'very much as the Stalinists kept rewriting the Soviet Encyclopedia,

calling forth some events into decisive importance as others were ban-

ished to ignominious oblivion'. But even granting the inevitability of

this process of selective recollection, few men were able so to redefine

their past as to read into it an ordered and predictable sequence of

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[3]For example, see Sykes (1965) who compares clerks and manual
workers in their attitudes about promotion and career patterns. See
also Goldthorpe et al (1969: Chapters 3 and 5).

events. Rather, as with the Pahls (Pahl and Pahl, 1971), their ac-
counts were filled with references to such themes as luck, circumstance
and unexpected patronage. Hard work and ability while undoubtedly also
present were, perhaps because of modesty, seldom mentioned, often
denigrated.

INTERRUPTIONS AND REDIRECTIONS

To a considerable extent the combined effect of the work-life data
collected for this middle-mass sample of men was to lend credence to
Wilensky's (1960: 127) contention that there is 'a good deal of chaos
in modern labour markets, as in the lives of both buyers and sellers--
chaos intrinsic to urban industrial society'. For some men the chaos be-
gan with their first job, a largely unplanned and non-career oriented
event in their lives. For those who began in the bleak years of the
1920's and 1930's it was usually 'a case of taking what job you could
get' as more than one man put it. Later war intervened and redirected
the course of their occupational life, sometimes in a positive and some-
times in a negative direction.[4] Mr. Lawson, a headmaster, started out
in 1937 as a clerk with the Great Western Railway.[5] His father also
worked for the railway as a riveter. 'My father's ambition was always
that I become part of the clerical staff there. That and the fact that
it was convenient were the main reasons. I didn't have any particular
ambitions or anything like that'. After serving six years in the Army,
Mr. Lawson was able to attend an emergency training college:

I always wanted to be a teacher, always, right from the engine driver
stage. I thought it was impossible because my father had no money and
was due to retire. Because of my background, I seized the chance after
the war.

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[4]For similar findings about the role of war experience, see Young
and Willmott (1973: 241-242). In their special study of managers the
war figured as a turning point for a number of the men interviewed.

[5]Names used are fictitious.

Others found that the war experience gave them a new perspective on their own abilities and aspirations. Mr. Adams, who had been upwardly mobile, started out as a sheet metal worker. He is now an inspector in the police force.

Coming out of the services, I was feeling a bit discontented. I'd tasted outside life. I'd tasted the fresh air. I didn't want to go back inside a factory again. I decided I wanted to use my brain not my body. So after about six months in my old place I came out of there and applied for the police force and was accepted and there I was. I'd been a military police in the army. Taste of power, I think; I found it's possible to--a person from my background--suddenly found it possible to have a bit of power and responsibility. I've outgrown it, I hope.

Others saw the war as difficult, an important disruption in their lives. This was true for Mr. Dawson, a cost accountant to a firm of quantity surveyors. He was taking part-time courses in accounting when war broke out.

I started studying for what was the London Certified Accountants. I went through the interim but by the time the final came up it was war time. I was ambitious before the war. I was especially keen on this insurance company but when the war was over they didn't want me back. I must admit, when I, particularly when I came out of the war, was so glad to be alive I couldn't care less about anything. It was an RAF expression ('I couldn't care less'). You lived one day to the next. It took me the best part of 15 years to get my feet on the ground. Really, until I got this job, at which time it was too late in life. I tried to do the examination again but I'd been away from it too long. My brain had got atrophied in a way that I was just sunk.

JOB CHANGES

But without the obvious problems of depression, war and national service, chaos was also evident in the work-life histories of younger men. Here it was, perhaps paradoxically, the range of possible jobs, an embarrassment of riches, which confronted them. The first job did not need to be taken very seriously because another was so easy to find. Men in their twenties could and did change jobs with surprising frequency and for reasons which had little to do with career advancement. Nearly half of the mobility sample worked for less than two years at their

first job and on average, the time spent was about two and a half years. There was no systematic or appreciable difference between the men when grouped by either class, conventional mobility pattern, or age.

A variety of factors entered into the relatively quick shifts people made. For some there was a reasonably detailed calculation of where the job was or was not taking them **and how their career might be better** served. In part also, there was a recognition, primarily by the upwardly mobile that the first job was not even close to what they had hoped to do. Thus, the problematic nature of deciding on a course came out in many of the explanations. Mr. Beacroft, a chief engineer and plant manager, was one of these:

I left school at 15 to take up an apprenticeship in toolmaking, but looking at people around me and with my apprenticeship papers in one hand and my deferment papers in the other, I tore up my apprenticeship papers and went into the air force. By the time I came out I felt I knew everything, and I talked my way into a job as a structural designer.

As Mr. Knapp, an industrial chemist, found, the family tradition began to rankle: 'I became a carpenter because Dad was and because Uncle was and because Grandad was. I had to work to help out the family, so it was like Dad votes Labour, so I do. Then I said, "What am I doing this for"? and joined the Navy'. 'It was purely emotional. I was cheesed off with the manager and I was fed up with engineering work. So, I went to an employment agency and they sent me to the ship broker's firm where I am now', said a 22-year-old shipping clerk.

Whatever the mobility experience of the men interviewed there was evidence of considerable job shifting. Calculation of job changes is somewhat arbitrary since it is not always clear what is meant by a job change. Within one firm a man may have a succession of jobs, which he recalls as each being different. The other extreme is the skilled tradesman who though changing firms frequently, does exactly the same work in each. Especially in the building industry is this likely to be the case.

'I've had too many jobs to count,' said Mr. Turnbull, a plumber. 'In my
trade I change a lot because the firms demand that you travel. I didn't
want to travel too far away so when they said to me, "Oh, there's a job
in Coventry or up North", then I'd leave because there's always plenty
of work in London. I've tried to stay as close as I can to London. As
a result, by age 23, Mr. Turnbull could recall at least ten jobs he has
had since leaving school.

In direct contrast to Mr. Turnbull was Mr. Gadsby, who in 21 years
has worked only for the G.P.O.. Through part-time education he has stead-
ily gained in qualifications and was at the time of the interview just
finishing a Master's degree in Science. His promotions within the
G.P.O. have lock-stepped with his educational advancement going from
trainee technician to staff engineer. In his mind, he has had several
distinct jobs.

For all mobility groups the mean number of full-time jobs held
since leaving school is five (Table 4.1).[6] About 12 percent of the sam-

TABLE 4.1

MEAN NUMBER OF JOBS FOR VARIOUS PATTERNS OF CONVENTIONAL

MOBILITY AND NON-MOBILITY: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117)

High Upward	5.8
Low Upward	4.1
Combined Upward	5.2
Stable Non-Manual	4.6
Downward	4.0
Stable Manual	6.1
All Groups	5.0
All Non-Manual	5.0
All Manual	5.1

[6]In the end it seemed most appropriate for present purposes to

ple had held ten or more jobs in their lifetime. There are some differ-
ences when mobility is considered. Thus, those who have moved upwards
have had more jobs on average than those moving downwards or those who
have remained stable non-manual. When the men are grouped according to
their present class, however, there is no difference between the non-manu-
al and manual respondents in average number of jobs ever held. At the
same time, stable non-manual and manual respondents do differ in the
number of firms they have worked in (Table 4.2). Those who have moved
upwards have worked in fewer firms than those who remain within the work-
ing class.

TABLE 4.2

CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND NUMBER OF FIRMS EVER WORKED IN:

MOBILITY SAMPLE (N - 117)
(Percentages)

Pattern of Conventional Mobility	1-4	Number of Firms 5 or more	(100%) Number
Upward (1)	65%	35%	(44)
Stable Non-Manual (2)	75	25	(24)
Downward (3)	55	45	(22)
Stable Manual (4)	41	59	(27)
All Groups	60	40	(117)

1 X 2 $x^2 = .601$ N.S.   2 X 3 $x^2 = 2.117$ N.S.

1 X 4 $x^2 = 4.309$ P < .05   2 X 4 $x^2 = 6.080$ P < .05

3 X 4 $x^2 = .928$ N.S.

treat jobs within the same firm seen by the respondents as distinct, as
separate jobs. For example, Mr. Gadsby was recorded as having five jobs
in his lifetime. Consequently my figures are not comparable to those
of the second labour mobility survey (Harris & Clausen, 1966: 55-63).

Younger men have not had as much opportunity to change jobs as have older men. To take age into account I constructed a job stability index, to show the number of jobs per decade.[7] For all groups the median is 2.6 jobs per decade. As can be seen in Table 4.3, the one group which stands out at all is the stable manual category. However, the difference between this group and others in job stability does not reach statistical significance.

TABLE 4.3

CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND JOB STABILITY: MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 117)

Pattern of Conventional Mobility

Jobs per Decade	Upward	Stable Non-Man.	Downward	Stable Manual	
Exceeding Median	41%	42%	45%	55%	45%
Not Exceeding Median	59%	58%	55%	45%	55%
Total N's	100% (44)	100% (24)	100% (22)	100% (27)	100% (117)

Comments: Median = 2.6 jobs per decade. Cases falling at the median are taken as 'not exceeding the median'.

PROMOTION

Although most of the men wanted more money than they were presently earning, few admitted to seeking actively after promotion. Following Wilensky (1966), I asked everyone whether they would accept a higher position if it was offered to them. When faced with this kind of question more than half (57 percent) would be willing to accept such a position.

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[7]This was calculated by dividing the number of job changes made by the respondent by the years he has been in the labour force. This value was then multiplied by ten.

Despite expectations, there was virtually no difference in percent willing to accept promotion between the four mobility groups or by present class. Rather, it was in the kinds of responses which people made in qualifying or elaborating upon their basic agreement or disagreement that differences between the various groups could be found. These suggest that promotion has very different meanings for people at different positions in the occupational hierarchy. Manual workers were aware of the limited steps which lay above them, whereas the prospect of promotion is taken as a matter of course by white-collar workers. For example, in the Work and Leisure Study we asked whether there was a career ladder where people worked. It emerged that more than three-quarters of the men now in non-manual positions believed that their job does have a career ladder compared to about 47 percent of the manual workers. Differences were mainly based on present occupation and class rather than around patterns of social mobility and non-mobility.

The next step for most manual workers is charge hand or foreman and as the comments recorded about promotion suggest, these are generally thought to be undesirable positions.[8] Some saw the foreman's job as meaning simply more work and responsibility but little advance financially.

No, this is sort of what I want to do--basically go on bricklaying. I've got quite sufficient money for what I want. I have no ambitions to be foreman. Why should I go to work and have all the responsibility for peanuts basically? You'd be a mug to go and have all that responsibility. (Bricklayer).

Others were concerned about the particular nature of the supervisory role. As one man said:

I'd never take a foreman's job again so I'll always be a worker. From what I've seen of foremen, you're in-between. It's just not worth it, I think. (Motor Fitter)

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[8]See Chinoy (1955a: 6), who suggests that 'two ladders of advancement seem to have emerged in industry. One, open to workers, is short with few rungs, usually ending in foremanship'.

Escape rather than promotion loomed larger in the minds of most of the younger men. Mr. Justice, a 20-year-old camera assembler felt his best jobs so far were 'being on vans', since it got him around and about a bit, 'and landscape gardening' because it was outside. He said of his present work, 'Well, I don't mind working, but I hate to sit there for eight solid hours like a vegetable without a gap for a smoke which happens a lot. I don't like many restrictions'. And, Mr. Popple, a 19-year-old, had between the two interviews taken a 'temporary'--perhaps permanent-- leave from his apprenticeship in plumbing to work with a roofing gang who travelled all over the South-East.

The theme of escape was also apparent among the several men in their mid-twenties who wanted someday to become a sales and maintenance worker. Mr. Oram, a plumber, said about an ideal job: 'Within the scope of anything, I think I'd like to do sales work and maintenance as well. You know, sales and after service. One of these firms that has a roving salesman. That way I could get around and still use what I know about heating and ventilating'.

THE MIDDLE CLASS AND PROMOTION

Possession of a white-collar job carries with it the notion of a career ladder and the expectation of movement upwards on it.[9] As indi-

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[9]Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1969: 79), having reviewed the litera- ture, concluded that among white-collar workers the desire for promo- tion is almost universal. In their white-collar sample 87 percent of the men were in favour of promotion. My data agree with theirs in part. In answer to the question, 'Different people want different things out of a job. What are the things you feel are important?' only 11 percent put promotion as a first requirement. However, when in the next question I asked whether promotion was important or not, 74 percent of the white- collar men compared to 46 percent of the blue-collar men said it was im- portant ($P < .01$). The mobile did not differ very much at all from the pattern of their destination groups.

cated earlier, this is true whether the person holding the position has
been upwardly mobile or not. While most took for granted that the path
they were on was an upward one, only a few seemed totally committed to
their work, and showed the kind of persistent and pervasive drive and
confidence in their abilities that the careerist stereotype implies. In-
stead, both the desire and expectation of promotion were often tempered
by qualifications and by consideration of its effect on other aspects of
their lives--family, hobbies, and activities.

The striking contrast in this important aspect of 'life chances'
between the manual worker and the non-manual worker is perhaps best caught
in the expectations of two young men, both in their early twenties and
both from middle-class backgrounds.

It will be a gradual progression up the ladder from what I'm doing already.
Things can only get better since I've only been broking four years and
I'm down at the bottom of the ladder. After several years you go up to
senior broker and you get more complicated work to do. Eventually I
suppose directorship of a firm which becomes more managerial. (Insurance
Broker)

Middle management is my objective. I feel that at senior level, once
again your class distinction comes into it all. If you've got the con-
tacts--'public' school helps a lot, it's still dependent on the school
tie and the old boy network. I don't think my social contacts are good
enough. I didn't go to a 'public' school, or at least not the sort that
educates for senior management. If I made senior management, it would
be through hard graft and nothing else. (Accountant)

It was also within the stable middle-class sample that men were
found who seemed completely committed to their work and to reaching up that
next step. Mr. Phelps, a financial consultant (in his forties), was one
of these:

What I do today is basically a treadmill of expansion to a much larger
and grander scale. I only half know what lies around the corner, but
the way computers are developing I may have the opportunity of running
a European team to set up two giant installations with branches to
Brussels, Frankfurt, West Berlin, and Milan. It would be a logical
next step and one I'm working towards.

Others felt that there were 'other areas to conquer within their

orbit', including as one man, a sales manager, put it, 'running one of

the largest companies--preferably British--given the opportunity'. Mr.

Peet, who is a managing director, said, 'I want the company to expand and

me with it, taking over a few others along the way, buying them out in-

stead of the other way round'. But, these were, on the whole, exceptions.

A much lower level of ambition and aspiration than was shown by Mr.

Phelps and his counterparts was more common, especially among the upward-

ly mobile. Thus, some felt that they had risen as high as either their

ability or their personal career ladder would permit. For Mr. Gibson,

an authorized clerk in the City, it was the latter:

I can't go anywhere from here. That's my ultimate, really. I daresay
in ten years or so I would be senior dealer and I think I will be made
a member. The only difference is you use a different toilet and have
another badge on. Financially, it wouldn't help. You could say I'm at
the top of the tree because that's how big my tree is.

And Mr. Lawson, head master of a primary school in Kent, also felt his

upward movement was at an end:

I don't see myself going anywhere at this point. I don't even have any
particular desire to take on bigger things. As a parent I've known for
a long time said to me, 'It's funny you haven't gone to a bigger school,
but now I feel it's your place'. It does satisfy me a lot; I can make
of it what I like.

Within the stable non-manual segment of the middle class there were

several who placed a higher premium on locale than on promotion. Mr.

Toombs, an administrative manager as well as fearing 'ulcers at 55',

could not imagine leaving his family home in Buckinghamshire. 'I'm very

much a countryman and the thought of living in a city appalls me. So I

couldn't really consider moving to another firm, however good the offer,

if it meant giving up this place'.

For others, however, there was an active desire not to be promoted

any higher because of the costs entailed. Mr. Springall, a 45-year-old

advertising manager, declared,

I don't want to go any higher. What I've seen, some men, like one of our

directors, stays at his office until late in the evening, not because of what he has to do, but because he doesn't know what to do when he gets home. That's not my problem. I feel I've made a balance, but if someone said I could work fewer hours, I would.

Another man, a buyer, was also weighing the costs more carefully:

I'm not so ambitious as I was between 30 and 40. Having reached 40, I find to do overtime, work weekends, and so on, you stop and think, 'Do you want it? Are you earning enough'?

If there are conclusions to be drawn from a close reading of these aspects of the non-manual work histories, it would be that while work is highly important to these men, it is not for the majority so all-consuming as it has been generally portrayed in the past.[10] At the same time, men who came from middle-class backgrounds were, in what they had to say at least, somewhat more ambitious than those from working-class backgrounds. In part this is explained by the fact that upwardly mobile men who were older had already come a long way and had reached the peak of their trajectory. Younger men from working-class origins did not always know what steps might lie ahead, were only starting to become ambitious as various challenges had come their way and had been met successfully, or like Mr. Hennessey, a 23-year-old computer analyst, were taking stock: 'At the moment I'd like to get my wind', he said, 'I don't really want promotion. I sort of feel I need time to settle. I need to work things

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[10]Thus, Dahrendorf (1959: 56): 'the supreme social reality (for bureaucrats) is their career' and Seeley et al (1956: 118): 'to the people of Crestwood Heights, the career is of all concerns, the most momentous'. My data point rather to a decreased or qualified commitment to work among middle-class men. More atypical than typical was Mr. Ferguson, who is very much of the older stereotype:
I used to say 'enough is enough is enough' as the Times once said in a leader. In the closing stages of my life I thought how silly it would be to go on and collapse between the shaft like a broken-down old cab horse. But now the time is getting near and I still do feel vigorous and all that. I'm beginning to feel it a bit silly to pack up at 60. I ought to give it another few years. So, if the service said, 'Here's another project, take it on, will you?' I'd do so for a few more years or as long as it took to complete it.'

out a bit'. Especially in the stable middle class there were, it might
also be noted, a few who seemed to have accepted as fatalistically, the
prospect of a stagnant career as had some of the manual respondents.
Thus, Mr. Rickard, downwardly mobile relative to his father, a managing
director, concluded: 'Opportunities might come along, but I won't set
out to look for opportunities as such. I always felt I wouldn't die a
civil servant, but it probably is quite likely'.

THE ROLE OF LUCK

The data presented so far from the work-like histories does not
suggest that very many men have job histories which add up to a career.
This is not too surprising in light of the fact that the sample was repre-
sentative not of an elite group but of men in the middle-mass of the so-
cial structure. However, even among the few who were, in Clement's
(1958) terms, 'high flyers', there was little evidence of predictability
and prior planning. Like the Pahls, I too was struck by the role luck
and circumstance had played in what had happened to these men. Thus,
what Pahl and Pahl (1971: 99) had to say about their managers replicated
almost exactly my notes and impressions during the field work.

Few men were advancing along a clear and structured career line. A more
likely pattern was for the men to gain in confidence as a result of a
series of almost fortuitous circumstances, which teach them that they
can cope with new situations. The army or other service experience was
often the crucial stimulant to a managerial career. There is an over-
whelming sense, when reading their complete career histories, of men
being pulled up the management hierarchy, either through luck--being
in the right place at the right time--or by having a patron who knew
their name and suggested it at critical times.

The accounts people give of their own history must, of course, be read
with a degree of skepticism. What do people mean by luck? Neither my
data nor that of the Pahls agree that luck is simply as Jencks (1972:
227) suggests, a rationalization for failure: 'Those who are lucky tend,
of course, to impute their success to skill, while those who are inept

believe that they are merely unlucky'. Rather, it was often just the opposite: in describing their career, people were as inclined to attribute success as they were failure to chance happenings and in their own accounting to denigrate and downgrade the role hard work and ability had played in the eventual outcome.[11]

For example, Mr. Parkinson, a senior executive with a string of achievements behind him, also believed that his getting into a grammar school from a working-class background, was 'simply a fluke'. Indeed, his whole life was viewed from this perspective. 'I've been intensely lucky. I'm a great believer in luck. I've always thought there was a kind of providence that looks after you. Coming through the war was a bit of luck, so was meeting my wife, so has been most of my career'. However, the intensity and commitment which Mr.Parkinson had evidently devoted to his career and his obvious intelligence were not, mentioned in his account.

What luck seemed to mean to many men was that their work life and the changes in it were not planned in the sense of having some future goal in mind. Rather, as one man put it, 'It was in the lap of the gods where I went next', a description which fitted the work lives of most of the men. In varying degrees they were like Mr. Terry, who after a checkered career, had become an accounts manager. 'I think my jobs just happened. You're there at the right time. This last change was planned. I would say this last one was the only change out of the ten where I sat down and thought with a particular end in view. This last change was the only one'. Thus, it was only in retrospect that a particular move

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[11]Objectively, it turns out they may have been correct to do so. Perhaps the most outstanding conclusion in the study by Jencks and his colleagues is that there is no single variable which explains who gets ahead and why and that at least half the variation in achievement is due to luck.

or event could be seen as having been a 'lucky' one; it had led to an unanticipated course of events. For Mr. Evison, a physicist and one of the upwardly mobile, it was a layoff early in his career which even at age 29 he saw as decisive:

I didn't know what I wanted to do when I graduated, except to go into industry. After about three years I was made redundant. About a 1,000 people were laid off. I managed to get another job in Bristol and was later transferred back here. Now I have a feeling I'm starting to get ambitious though I wasn't to start with. I was happy trotting around in my little rut. I think the change in job, to new projects, that was the first time I'd really been given any responsibility. I found I liked it, and I find I'm capable of doing things I didn't think I was capable of doing. That was the turning point.

Luck was also invoked as a short-hand way of saying that the skill requirements of most jobs, however impressive their title, are not so especially high as to exclude many people from filling them. Mr. Killy, an insurance manager, put it this way:

It's mostly chance. The job I'm in is not poorly paid as you can imagine. So the reward I'm getting for the job puts me way up directors and managers. But the actual quality of the work, the job I do, it could be done by a railway porter if he had the opportunity. So I think one has to be there at the right time to get ahead. I was lucky in that I was there.

While at the outset of the research it was expected that one response to downward mobility might be to rationalize it as bad luck or bad breaks, only a minority (18 percent) of the whole Mobility Sample felt they had had bad breaks during the course of their life. There was no difference between those who had been mobile and those who had not.[12] Instead, at all class levels and whatever the mobility experience people tended to view their past life in terms of chance factors, rather than as ordered and planned events.

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[12]Question #45, see Appendix 2.. Some 59 percent said they had experienced good breaks, while another 23 percent saw themselves as having had both good and bad breaks. In probing further (question #46), there was a tendency for middle-class respondents to mention work whereas working-class respondents were more likely to mention family, illness, car accidents and the like. What people saw as bad breaks were seldom to do with their work.

MOBILITY AND MOTIVATION

One way to explore the relative commitments of the four groups to work, career and promotion is to show the level of motivation of each. To measure this, I used an approach originally devised by Reisman (1953) and subsequently used by Wilensky (1966). Lipset and Bendix (1959: 248) note about this measure:

(Reisman) asked his respondents to specify whether the fact that a better job might entail spending less time with their family, risks to health, moving to another community, etc. would interfere with it. The approach may measure more accurately than any other the practical effect of a-chievement motivation in the occupational structure. The inclination to defer gratification is usually inculcated in middle-class families.

Tables 4.4 and 4.5 suggest that it is men with middle-class parents who are most highly motivated, whatever their mobility experience. Sur-prisingly, downward mobile men are the most willing of all groups to un-dertake the ten items (shown in Table 4.5) though they do not differ significantly from stable members of their class or origin. The least

TABLE 4.4

CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND MOBILITY MOTIVATION:

MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 114)

Pattern of Conventional Mobility	Percent High*	Number
All Upward (1)	28%	42
High Upward	35	27
Low Upward	19	15
Stable Non-Manual (2)	47	24
Downward	60	22
Stable Manual	29	26
All Groups	38	114

* High is defined as willing on 7 or more of the ten items.

1 X 2	N.S.		2 X 3		N.S.
1 X 3	X^2 = 5.649	P < .02	2 X 4		N.S.
1 X 4	N.S.		3 X 4	X^2 = 3.884	

TABLE 4.5

PERCENT WILLING ON TEN DIFFERENT SACRIFICES: MOBILITY SAMPLE

Mobility Patterns

Item	All Up	High Up	Low Up	Stable N-M	All Down	Manual	All
1. Go without vacations for several years	36%	47%	33%	59%	68%	44%	49%
2. Leave friends/relatives and move to another part of country	67	72	60	82	74	56	69%
3. Live for awhile in a district you didn't like	76	83	67	71	79	52	70%
4. Take some risk to health	27	44	7	18	42	24	28%
5. See less of your family	42	56	27	76	74	52	58%
6. Move to another country	64	72	53	82	74	44	64%
7. Take on a lot of extra responsibility	73	72	73	95	79	56	74%
8. Give up some of your leisure time	73	83	60	76	89	68	76%
9. Hide your political views	45	50	40	76	79	64	62%
10. Learn a new routine	91	94	87	88	95	72	87%
Total N's	42	27	15	24	22	26	114

willing to make 'sacrifices' for the sake of upward mobility are those who have moved upwards one or two classes, a finding which in light of the comments sampled earlier is not unexpected. It was especially within this group that men were found who did not particularly want further promotion and responsibility. Details of what is summarized in Table 4.4 can be seen in Table 4.5. The downwardly mobile are most willing on six out of ten items followed by the stable non-manual who are highest on the other four. Stable manual respondents and the low upward group are, in contrast, lowest on five items each.

I am unable to explain satisfactorily why the downwardly mobile tend to show as much willingness to undergo these sacrifices as they do. A possible explanation advanced some years ago by Lipset and Gordon (1953) and again by Wilensky (1959), is that downward mobility is perceived as only a temporary drop in status. There is, in other words, an expectation of better things to come and a willingness to make sacrifices in order to reach them. As well, it is possible that with respect to these sacrifices, people tend to retain parental values and attitudes about the probable necessity of 'deferring gratification'--it becomes, in effect, a moral obligation to do so. For upwardly mobile people these are working-class orientations; for the downwardly mobile they are middle-class orientations. This is reflected in the data of Tables 4.4 and 4.5 where class of origin rather than present class is the more important determinant of motivation. However, as I shall attempt to show in the next chapter, the parents of the downwardly mobile are not, typically, middle-class in their values or background. Nor, as already seen, are the downwardly mobile very likely to aspire to a white-collar position. At the same time, there was among the downwardly mobile a number who were fairly committed to and interested in their particular trade. As I

did not specify that the advance entailing these sacrifices had to be an upward one--indeed, I was careful to avoid doing that--it is possible that what was recorded was the importance of doing well at the present job.[13]

JOB SATISFACTION

Because this study is about social mobility I have spent considerable time on job changes, career orientations and feelings and expectations about promotion. Inevitably in placing the stress on change in this way, the extent to which present jobs are sources of satisfaction has been underplayed. At the outset I wondered how beyond class differences, the experience of upward and downward mobility might affect job satisfaction. Are those who move up more or less satisfied with their work? Are those who move down more likely to be dissatisfied? While there have been many elaborate measures of job satisfaction,[14] we asked simply in the Work and Leisure Study: 'Taking it all round, how satisfied would you say you are with the job you've got at present'? In all, only nine percent of the men indicated that they were not satisfied with their present work and the majority were split evenly between those very satisfied and only fairly satisfied.[15] Of particular interest is that the basic responses to this question did not vary much between mobility and non-mobility.

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[13]Among those who were 'genuinely' downwardly mobile (See Chapter 5) were some dissaffected youth for whom these 'sacrifices' were treated with indifference. As one put it: 'It wouldn't bother me doing all of them, you know. There's nothing tying me or anything like that. I'd like to see less of my family'.

[14]For a review of these, see Robinson et al (1969: Chapters 4, 5, 6 & 7).

[15]Strauss (1974: 74) notes that only a minority of workers in over 40 years of measuring ever report being dissatisfied. A 1973 Gallup Poll in the United States found only 12 percent of male workers report being dissatisfied, a finding comparable to that of the Work and Leisure Study.

As Strauss (1974: 78) argues, _reporting_ satisfaction and being sat-
isfied may be very different things. Perhaps a more sensitive measure
of current job satisfaction is whether people, if they could start over
again, would choose the same or different work. Table 4.6 for the Mo-
bility Sample suggests that the pattern of mobility does have a bearing
on responses to this question. With respect to this criterion of satis-
faction, a majority of the men in the stable manual category would choose
different work if they could have their time over. Most content with
their decision are the stable non-manual men. The surprising group is
the downwardly mobile; exactly half show satisfaction with there present
occupation. In part this may be because, as I shall describe in the next
chapter, these men are often in trades which they chose. In contrast,
some upwardly mobile men, despite their present status, regret not having
a trade. Thus, in the bottom panel, nearly one-quarter of those choosing
differently, would 'next time' take up a trade. Of these slightly over
one-half are upwardly mobile men. Mr. Jamieson, a sales manager of a
small firm, was one of these. He had left school at 14 and worked in a
variety of jobs in his 25-year career. As he said:

Starting over, I'd have a trade—I'd be a tradesman. Then I'd maybe go
into this line of work, but initially I'd have a trade. Then I'd always
have that behind me.

There was a tendency, then, for men who had moved upwards not to be
satisfied with their work to the extent that they were as likely as the
downwardly mobile men to choose another line if their life could be
lived over. What was wrong with their work? Dissatisfaction with the
money earned was not very evident among any of the men but especially
not among the upwardly mobile.[16] Mr. Killy, a chief draughtsman, pro-

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[16]The one group who did seem dissatisfied with their income was the
stable middle-class group. For instance, stable non-manual men were the
most likely of all groups to choose more pay rather than more time off
at the same pay (Work and Leisure Study). Implications of this are
explored in Chapter 12.

TABLE 4.6

PERCENT WHO WOULD CHOOSE THE SAME WORK OVER AGAIN

BY MOBILITY PATTERN: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117)

		Percent
(1)	Upward	56%
(2)	Stable Non-Manual	75%
(3)	Downward	50%
(4)	Stable Manual	19%
	All Groups	50%

Tests of Significance

$1 \times 2 = X^2 = 3.680$ N.S.
1×3 N.S.
$1 \times 4 = X^2 = 16.388$ P   .001
2×3 N.S.
$2 \times 4 = X^2 = 5.463$ P   .02

CHOICES OF THOSE WHO WOULD CHOOSE DIFFERENTLY

Take up a Trade	23%
More Education	17%
Higher Status Job	23%
Lower Status Job	6%
Same Status but Different Work	31%
N =	64

vided a possible clue:

Money is not the mainstay in my estimation. Provided the money you're getting is giving a reasonable standard of living, then what I want out of a job is the satisfaction when you can see the end product, you can see what you've done.

Implied in the desire for a trade among the upwardly mobile men was, as well as security, an ambivalence and uncertainty about the worth of what they were doing. It was difficult for men in low level managerial positions actually to pin down just what it was they had accomplished

at the end of each day or week or month. Like many of the manual work-
ers a satisfying job is one that has defined projects with a concrete
beginning and an end. In contrast to the diffuse nature of managerial
work, these men often craved what Mr. Knapp, an engineer had found:

I like to put in time and see some sort of achievement. Being a bank
manager would drive me crazy. It's transferring money with no meaning
or end. Putting in a submarine cable is my idea of work. You put it
in and go away and say, 'We did that, that's it'.

Mr. Jennings, a trainee manager, was experiencing this sense of frustra-
tion:

Starting over, I'd probably break away completely from what I'm doing.
I think I would have liked to be a shop floor manager of some descrip-
tion. Then I could actually get involved in something, whereas I feel
a bit restricted working at a desk. It's all writing and telephoning
which all seems vague and pointless. I'd like to feel of some use. I'd
like to point at something and say 'I did that, or I helped do that'.

Since some of these men were also influencing their sons towards trades
rather than middle-class occupations, this source of dissatisfaction has
a number of implications for the stability of upward mobility.[17] Simply
stated here, I will return to this finding again in the next chapter
when we look at patterns of downward mobility, and in Chapter 7 which
considers some determinants of downward mobility.

SUMMARY

When one considers job changes, promotion and the extent of commit-
ment to work, it is the already well-trodden ground of class and its re-
lationship to work which re-emerges. On the whole, what has happened
to those moving upwards and downwards relative to their parents has also
happened to those who have remained intergenerationally stable. Quanti-
tatively, the mobile are not especially distinguishable from the non-

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[17]The concept of stability comes from Miller (1956) and refers to
the likelihood that those who move upwards are able to maintain their
new status into the next generation.

mobile with respect to time spent in a first job, job stability and the probability of working in a job with a well-defined career ladder. Nor were the upwardly mobile more motivated or more concerned about promotion than were the stable middle class. For reasons that are not entirely clear from the data, the downwardly modile did differ from their class of destination--the working class--and were in many respects much closer to the upwardly mobile and at times also to the stable middle-class group.

Despite the quantitative similarities, there were, especially between the upwardly mobile and the stable middle class, qualitative differences. I have quoted from the work histories of these people in an attempt to illustrate some of the more subtle ways in which the work experience of those moving upwards differs from that of those born in the middle class. While neither group shows a very strong commitment to work and to getting ahead, and while there is a certain amount of chaos in the lives of most people, there was more disorder, more reliance on luck and circumstances and unexpected events and less evidence of premeditation and planning in the job histories of the upwardly mobile. The same cannot be said of the downwardly mobile compared to the stable manual; reading the job histories of the former is much like reading those of the latter. What differences there are between the latter two tend to emerge more clearly when work-life patterns are seen in their entirety. This is also true, though not so clearly, for the middle-class groups, as well. The next chapter tries to pull together and illustrate through a series of case studies the predominant work-life patterns which have led to mobility and non-mobility.

CHAPTER 5

PATTERNS OF MOBILITY AND NON-MOBILITY IN THE MIDDLE MASS

The last chapter presented some aspects of the work-life histories of the men in the Mobility Sample. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of career or work-life patterns for each type of intergenerational mobility and non-mobility under consideration in this study.

CAREER NATURE

Keeping in mind Wilensky's definition of the career with which Chapter 4 opened, I first attempted to categorize the work-life histories of the men in terms of the general direction of the trajectory and whether it could be considered orderly or disorderly. One possibility was that the work lives of the upwardly and downwardly mobile might be characterized by greater instability and vacillations of various sorts than would those of the non-mobile. However, this did not seem to be the case. Instead, among those who are now non-manual there is little to choose between the mobile and the non-mobile with respect either to the direction various jobs have taken people or the orderliness with which it has come about. Evidently, one consequence of intergenerational upward mobility is the likelihood of involvement in what is objectively an upward moving career. For manual workers, job histories are less likely to form a coherent pattern. There is a higher likelihood of intragenerational 'skidding' and discontinuities and little chance of an upwardly moving career. Whether we consider the downwardly mobile

or the stable manual there is found in the working class, job histories punctuated by frequent, sometimes unplanned job changes which do not, together, yield either an observable improvement or decline in occupational career.

OCCUPATIONAL PATTERNS

While about half to three-quarters of the manual work histories and more than four-fifths of the non-manual work histories were 'orderly', they were so only in the sense that there were not complicated patterns of upward and downward movement or discontinuities reflected by this simple set of categories. Tables 5.1 through to 5.5 illustrate career patterns for each of the conventional mobility and non-mobility groups making up the Mobility Sample (the two downwardly mobile groups, being small in number, are combined in Table 5.4).[1] Their main purpose is not to portray individual career patterns but rather to show the overall pattern of job mobility for each kind of intergenerational mobility.

From Table 5.1 it can be seen that the work lives of men who have eventually moved up three or more categories contain a considerable amount of disorder and reversals in occupational status. As indicated

[1] These are based on a modified version of an approach developed by Form and Miller (1949). Their tables illustrated career patterns for each of the seven occupational categories of the Alba Edwards Census Scale and attempted to distinguish between 'initial work period' and a 'trial and stable work period'. Thus, the first dot in each line represents father's occupation; the second dot, represents the respondent's first job. While the years in the labour force are approximately accurate, vertical distances except in the sense of moving between status categories are not. In other words, someone who is shown as moving from (say) the bottom of the skilled manual row to the bottom of the clerical row is not different than someone shown as moving (say) from the top to the top of these respective rows. Dotted lines indicate work-life patterns of men who attended a grammar or 'public' school; solid lines indicate those who attended a secondary modern or its earlier equivalents. I have not attempted to distinguish between various phases of the work history as did Form and Miller.

in Chapter 3, those moving upwards through a grammar school route spend very little time in a manual occupation compared to those upwardly mobile through a non-educational route. This is vividly shown in Table 5.1 where men with a grammar school education (broken lines) move up quickly, usually at the point of their entry into the labour force and seldom fall back across the manual-non-manual line. Men moving upwards over their career, by contrast, (solid lines) tend to spend a very long time, sometimes the major part of their work life in various manual occupations before finally ending up in a non-manual position. Table 5.1 also indicates that while the general direction is upward, there is considerable passing to and fro from one status category to another and from non-manual to manual occupations and vice versa.

In contrast to the scattered and complex picture created by the high upward mobiles, the trajectories of those who moved up only one or two status categories form a more compact and orderly picture (Table 5.2). Again, grammar school experience creates a quick and seemingly 'solid' movement into a non-manual position. However, low upward movement even through a non-grammar school route is, compared to Table 5.1, also fairly rapid and shows fewer reversals in status. As would be expected, men who start out from a non-manual position (Table 5.3) enjoy, for the most part, a fairly straightforward middle-class career. The importance of grammar school and 'public' school education is reflected in the numbers of men who at the start of their careers moved into a status category equal to or higher than that of their father. With one or two exceptions, downward movement of this group stops at status category three--clerical-- and is reversed fairly early on in the career. The work histories of the few men from middle-class backgrounds who did not attend a grammar school stand in sharp contrast to the majority of the stable non-manual group. Most have spent some time in a manual occupation and have also

TABLE 5.1

WORK LIFE PATTERNS OF THE HIGH UPWARDLY MOBILE: MOBILITY SAMPLE

Status Category	Father's Status	⊕ APPROXIMATE YEARS IN LABOUR FORCE
1. PROFESSIONAL		
2. MANAGERIAL		
3 CLERICAL		
4. SKILLED MANUAL		
5. SEMI-SKILLED MANUAL		
6. UNSKILLED		

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28+

Table 5.2
WORK-LIFE PATTERNS OF THE LOW UPWARDLY MOBILE: MOBILITY SAMPLE

Status Category	Father's Status	Approximate Years in the Labour Force

Table 5.3
WORK-LIFE PATTERNS OF THE STABLE NON-MANUAL: MOBILITY SAMPLE

Status Category	Father's Status	Approximate Years in the Labour Force
1. Professional		
2. Managerial		
3. Clerical		
4. Skilled Manual		
5. Semi-skilled Manual		
6. Unskilled Manual		

experienced considerable fluctuations in occupational status with each

job change.[2] What is obscured in this table is the extent to which

straight lines within status categories—especially professional and

managerial—are in fact the most likely to conform to the notion of

career advanced in the last chapter.[3] Thus, it is these men who began

their work life in a mangerial or professional career who have, some-

times without leaving one of these broad categories, experienced a se-

ries of jobs with new challenges, higher income and ever increasing

commitment, involvement and responsibility.

DOWNWARDLY MOBILE AND STABLE MANUAL

Work life patterns of the downwardly mobile, shown in Table 5.4,

are in some ways among the most orderly of all the mobility groups.

Overwhelmingly, movement downward occurred at the outset of the work

life with the rest of the work life spent in a manual occupation.

While some men have moved upward and downward within the three manual

categories, only two men have made what turn out to be periodic trips

across the manual-non-manual line. As can be seen in Table 5.5, the

overall pattern for those deemed to be intergenerationally stable work-

ing-class is in fact more complicated than that for the downwardly mo-

bile.[4] Thus, it is evident that a number of these men have worked in

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[2]The two dotted lines which do plunge so dramatically downwards,
both represent the career paths of 'public' school educated men who,
before assuming a higher status position in their father's businesses,
worked for a short while in a manual job in that business.

[3]I also coded the occupational histories using the Hall-Jones
classification. Tables for the three non-manual categories while
showing more detail than Tables 5.1 to 5.3 of upward and downward mo-
bility within the non-manual stratum do not,in general,differ so ap-
preciably as to be worthwhile including. In other words, neither
scale is able to catch the more subtle changes in occupational status
which occur especially among the stable non-manual men.

[4]In Table 5.5 the three non-manual rows are drawn narrower and
the manual categories are wider compared to other tables. This was

Table 5.4

WORK-LIFE PATTERNS OF THE HIGH AND LOW DOWNWARDLY MOBILE:MOBILITY
SAMPLE

Status Category	Father's Status	Approximate Years in the Labour Force												
		2	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	17	20	22	24	26	28+

1. Professional

2. Managerial

3. Clerical

4. Skilled Manual

5. Semi-skilled Manual

6. Unskilled Manual

Table 5.5

WORK-LIFE PATTERNS OF THE STABLE MANUAL: MOBILITY SAMPLE

Status Category	Father's Status	Approximate Years in the Labour Force												
		2	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	24	26	28+

1. Professional

2. Managerial

3. Clerical

4. Skilled Manual

5. Semi-skilled Manual

6. Unskilled Manual

non-manual occupations at various points in their work life. In both

Tables 5.4 and 5.5 it can also be noted that those who have had the

least upward and downward movement are men who are employed in a

skilled trade (status category 4); men who move into non-manual posi-

tions when they fall, do so into either semi-skilled or unskilled jobs.

PATTERNS OF UPWARD MOBILITY

While there were marked contrasts--differences which only became

fully apparent in retrospective comparison--between the upwardly mobile

and the stable non-manual, it was, nevertheless the case that the lives

of many of those moving upwards had been characterized by great changes

relative to their parents. First, it was clear that in virtually all

status dimensions one might want to include--income, residence, life-

style, occupational prestige and sometimes education--they were in su-

perior positions to those held by their fathers--and by those held

generally by working-class respondents interviewed. For many, as was

seen in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the general direction of their career tra-

jectories has been an upward one, with in some instances, the peak not

yet reached. Yet, though their work lives have been marked with con-

siderable improvement in status, the upwardly mobile did nevertheless

differ in many subtle ways from stable members of the middle class.

One possible source of the difference might be in the kinds of occupa-

tions open to the upwardly mobile compared to stable members of the

middle class. Do occupational routes lead to the core or periphery of

the middle class?

In general, Table 5.6 suggests that about one-quarter of the men

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done for greater clarity since most paths are in the latter three
categories. Fluctuations are not therefore as extreme as appears
at first glance.

have risen into what are clearly middle-class occupations: accountancy and finance, senior management, science and education. For both low and high upwards, however, more than half of the movement is into class 2, a highly ambiguous category which encompasses senior sales manager at the one extreme and bus inspector at the other.[5] Most (57 percent) of those who were upwardly mobile started out from a class 4 (skilled manual) background rather than a semi-skilled or unskilled background. However, the basic dichotomy shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 between grammar school and non-grammar school routes does not, unexpectedly, distinguish very clearly 'final' destination points. There was a slight tendency for those with a grammar school education to come from class 4 (57 percent versus 47 percent). But, since only 14 of the 44 upward mobiles had attended grammar school, these percentage differences must be viewed very cautiously.

A somewhat more pronounced effect of education can be discerned when those with additional qualifications beyond the minimum or who attended grammar school are compared with those who left at the minimum age from a non-grammar school program. This is shown in Table 5.7.

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[5] In the Work and Leisure Study sample, 11 percent of the upward mobiles were presently in class 1; 49 percent were in class 2, and 39 percent were in class 3. Thus, the largest destination class for the upwardly mobile is still class 2. But, in the Mobility Sample, I purposely oversampled the high upward category relative to the low upward with the result that Table 5.7 shows twice as many in class 1 as actually were, and underrepresents mobility into class 3.

TABLE 5.6

OCCUPATIONAL ROUTES USED BY THE UPWARDLY MOBILE:

MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 44)

(Whole Numbers)

Fathers' Occupational Category

Son's Present Occupation	Class 4: Skilled	Class 5: Semi-skilled	Class 6: Unskilled	Total
Class 1: (Lecturer, engineer, chemist, physicist, chartered accountant, computer engineer)	8	2	0	10 (23%)
Class 2: (Buyer, business executive, opera singer, general sales manager, claims manager, senior dealer, civil servant, systems analyst, headmaster, police inspector, bus inspector)	13	7	3	23 (52%)
Class 3: (Clerk, film technician, shipping clerk, cashier, policeman, salesman)	4	4	3	11 (25%)

TABLE 5.7

UPWARD MOBILES AND TYPE OF EDUCATIONAL ROUTE USED:

MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 44)

(Percentages)

Educational Route

Respondents' Present Social Class	Grammar School and Additional Education	Non-Grammar Minimum Schooling
Class 1: Professional	36%	6
Class 2: Managerial	36	70
Class 3: Clerical	28	24
Total	100% (26)	100% (18)

Those without any additional educational qualifications are about twice
as likely to hold a class 2 occupational position than are those with
additional education (X^2 = 6.017; P < .001). Only one respondent
from the former category gained entry into a class 1 occupation, an
industrial training officer. Thus, men who were upwardly mobile
through a non-educational route were employed, at the time of the in-
terview, in the following jobs:

CID officer, buyer (2), civil servant, shipping clerk (2), shop mana-
ger, shopkeeper, police inspector, bus inspector, film technician,
general sales manager, claims manager, senior dealer, chief draughts-
man, technical assistant, chief engineer, training officer.

Additional education but not a grammar school education had, in the

Mobility Sample, led to jobs such as:

commercial accountant, research worker, production accountant, ac-
counts clerk, cashier, ordering clerk, sales manager, personnel mana-
ger, office manager, salesman, headmaster, opera singer.

Finally, those with a grammar school education and in some instances

university, were working as:

senior sales executive, college lecturer, railway clerk, chemist, ac-
counts superintendant, operating theater supervisor, physicist, civil
servant, computer engineer, police inspector, professional engineer,
systems analyst, policeman, headmaster.

No obvious typology or pattern emerges from the work histories of
the upwardly mobile as it might have done had I concentrated on only
upward movement into an elite category. Instead, as their actual jobs
suggest, the status position of these men has a very wide range. Fur-
ther, some who it was necessary to place in a high upward category are
there because of the low status from which they began rather than the
height they have reached. While numerically movement into a clerical
position from the 'bottom' of the working class is equivalent to move-
ment from the 'elite' of the working class--a skilled trade--to a man-
agerial or professional position, the two are likely to represent very

different mobility experiences. Similarly, certain occupations which

the Registrar-General assigns to class 2--bus inspector, police inspec-

tor, shop owner or manager--differ markedly from others also assigned

to this class--sales managers, administrators, company directors and

top executives--with respect to level of responsibility, income and the

routes which lead up to them.[6]

The difficulty of assessing whether certain occupations are 'gen-

uinely' middle-class is one that has been encountered in virtually all

of the studies of this highly heterogeneous and only partially under-

stood 'class'. Both local studies (Stacey, 1960; Bell, 1968) and

largely urban studies (Willmott and Young, 1960; Lockwood, 1958) have

been concerned about where to place what turn out to be a sizeable pro-

portion of anomalies.[7] Although a classification such as that devel-

oped by Hall and Jones (1950) does, through a more detailed set of non-

manual categories, attempt to overcome some of the most obvious prob-

lems, it does not overcome the basic difficulty of when a given person

is or is not 'properly' part of the middle class. Social mobility

adds an additional wrinkle to an already complex picture. Are those

who move upwards from working-class background most likely to end up

in anomalous positions? Are they, to use Stacey's (1960) term, mostly

members of the 'lower frontier' of the middle class? To what extent

are they members of the middle class at all?

The relational and normative aspects of this question of when is

occupational mobility 'genuine' social mobility were a central theme

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[6]For a further discussion of the shortcomings of the Registrar-
General's five (in this study, six) social classes see, Klein (1965:
430-431). See also Jones, Saunders and Moser (1958).

[7]An excellent review of these (excepting Bell, 1968) and other
works with respect to social class identification can be found in
Klein (1965: 313-326).

of Chapter 3. Here I am mainly concerned with the routes depicted in the preceding tables and in assessing, generally, the proportion which have led to firm middle-class positions and the proportion which could be said to be anomalous ones. If any patterns of upward mobility can be discerned in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, it would be somewhat as follows:

1. Self-Made Man -- High Upward
2. Self-Made Man -- Lower Managerial
3. The Marginally Upward
4. Young Grammar School Graduate
5. Young Secondary Modern Graduate

It should be kept in mind that these are not completely self-contained or perfectly clear-cut categories; some of the men encountered in this study straddled two or more patterns with respect to their attitudes, experiences and lifestyle.

SELF-MADE MEN--HIGH UPWARD

Only five men in the sub-sample of upwardly mobile men (N = 44) could be said to be in this category. With the exception of Mr. Ferguson, a high-ranking civil servant--high enough that to give details of his work history might destroy his anonymity--who was near retirement, these men were alike in being not at the peak of their career but still ascending.

Although they had typically begun their work life in low level clerical positions, the various jobs and positions held by these men had been fairly integrated in the sense that each successive job was a step higher than the previous one. There was, in other words, little evidence of discontinuities and fluctuations disturbing the career trajectories of these men. Once pointed in an upward direction they had consistently climbed higher.[8]

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[8]Mr. Ferguson, the civil servant, was again an exception in having held some 16 different jobs over his career. These were, nonetheless, also ones involving increasing responsibility and income. There was

Of the five, three had attended a grammar school and one had also attended Oxford University on a 'short course' just after the war. It is, perhaps, coincidental, but worth noting, that all of these men were born outside of the London Region in either the Midlands or the North. They had also married relatively late--age 27 to age 30--and found wives generally of a slightly 'better' background and with either the same or a better education than themselves.

SELF-MADE MAN -- LOWER MANAGERIAL

The second pattern discernable in the work-life history is somewhat larger making up from one-third to two-fifths of the sample depending on where one draws the line. This category consists of men whose beginnings are very similar to the High Upward Group but for a variety of reasons they have reached a lower level in the occupational hierarchy. They differ also in appearing to have reached the top of their particular ladders. I have used the term 'lower managerial' though in this category are men working in a variety of jobs such as civil servant, headmaster, and college lecturer as well as a number of lower managerial positions. There are also wide variations within this group of 'self-made men' with respect both to the precise level of their present occupation and in the nature of the routes taken to reach those positions. Typically these men began their careers in a manual occupation but moved upwards fairly early on in their work life. The minority whose first jobs were non-manual jobs are also those who had attended a grammar school.

This group of men had all achieved positions which were consider-

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little or no evidence that these were part of an organized career but, rather, involved a high degree of 'luck', circumstance and larger changes in the country and the world. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the role of luck in these men's careers.

ably higher than those of their fathers. Most had done so without a
grammar school education and without a long period in manual occupa-
tions. Again, they had tended to marry in their late 20's (average
age = 27) to women whose backgrounds were equally divided between
working-class and lower middle-class. About three-quarters of these
women had also attended a grammar school until at least age 16 and were,
therefore, typically better educated than their husbands.[9]

Educational achievements of their children varied considerably
but there had been or would be a common dependence on the state system.
Mr. Beacroft, for instance, reckoned that his son was 'repeating the
pattern by becoming an educational failure', and that he had been saved
by the local authority going comprehensive. Generally, there was con-
cern about their children's education but a reluctance to turn to pri-
vate schools in the event one 'failed' the '11+' exam. For some this
was not so much an ideological belief as a reflection of their own am-
bivalence about the value and necessity of education; having themselves
succeeded without much education they questioned its importance for
others.

Most seemed to see their upward mobility in instrumental terms and
though highly materialistic, frequently expressed a desire to be out
of it entirely. Mr. Jamieson, for instance, was making an active at-
tempt to move away from London to a less hectic life in Devon. If he
won the pools, Mr. Gadsby visualised himself 'running a mini-village'.
'I'd buy a nice sandy cove and put up these Spanish style cottages.
In the winter I'd do maintenance and in summer I'd run this holiday

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[9]At the same time, there was no evidence that the wife's family
had had any direct influence on the careers of the men. This may be
because most of the men were already into their career before marriage
and the women were generally from clerical backgrounds.

camp', he said. And, Mr. Elson found he was most at peace with himself when he was close to the soil. More fulfilling to him than his recent promotion to a bigger school he said, was that he had successfully chopped down an ailing elm in his spacious Marlow garden. Several also expressed a desire to own a farm or wished in 'doing it over' that they could be a farmer.

This second group, though somewhat apart from the solid middle class, have, nevertheless, experienced considerable upward mobility in all dimensions. They have few real contacts with the working class and in fact exhibited very little nostalgia about their origins. The social mobility of this group is, then, mainly 'genuine'. It is much more questionable whether what has happened to the next group--the marginally upward--should be called social mobility.

THE MARGINALLY UPWARD

For reasons which will be explored more fully in Chapter 8, upwardly mobile men in the first two categories were able to move up into a non-manual job at either the outset of their career or in a very short time. The result is that most of their experience has been in middle-class occupations in association with middle-class people. However, slightly over one-quarter of the men who according to the usual measure of intergenerational social mobility moved upward did so only after fairly long periods in manual occupations. Their career trajectories are those shown at the bottom of Table 5.1 and which in some instances involved considerable fluctuation between manual and non-man-strata.

These men differ from the first two groups in a number of ways but principally in the limited extent their eventual occupational mobility has been translated into social mobility.[10] One indication of

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[10]For instance, they married younger--the range was from 19 to 24,

this was that most are still living in council houses or flats. Another was that their accent and lifestyle though not exactly working-class were further from middle-class than the first two categories. Perhaps the most significant difference is in the value these men placed on manual occupations relative to the non-manual work in which they were now working. Almost universally these men expressed regret at not having a manual skill. Often they were directing their own sons not towards a middle-class occupation but towards a trade, usually the very one they had not been able to enter themselves.

As most were employed in low-level supervisory jobs, there was a keen desire to work at more specific and defined tasks. For instance, Mr. Cormack, a buyer, had wanted to be a draughtsman but had not been able to take an apprenticeship. He added spontaneously: 'I was very keen on geometry, technical drawing, that sort of thing. I didn't do it because it was tied up with apprenticeship. I didn't particulary get my way there. If it's relevant, My son is taking technical drawing'. In a somewhat different way, Mr. Cohen, who was now supervisor of a film processing laboratory, had managed to steer his children towards jobs involving travel.

I'd never stick in a rut again. I'd spend the first ten years just travelling around, seeing the world. I thought it would be a good idea for them (his children) to go to university. They didn't because I didn't have the sense to push them hard enough. But one has become a machine tool maker and has been in Australia. The other has a job with BOAC but it hasn't made him want to go around the world. All he could think about is getting married. He did travel around when he was single, of course.

As we look at the downwardly mobile later in this chapter, it is especially this aspect of the third pattern that will take on additional significance. As will be apparent, at least one pattern of downward

to women who were from solid working-class backgrounds. Neither the wives nor the husbands had any education beyond the minimum.

mobility is the result of upwardly mobile fathers encouraging their sons toward skilled manual occupations.

YOUNG UPWARD MOBILES

Men who were, at the time of the interview in their early twenties tended to fall into a category all of their own. In part this was because typically they had not yet had time to develop a lifestyle distinct from that of their parents. The ones who were not married were livng at home often in their parents' council house. Their friends, in many instances, were still drawn from the neighbourhood and were as likely to be working in a manual as a non-manual job. However, as one looks more closely at the younger men, their educational experience creates a further sub-division; there is also an enormous difference between grammar school men and secondary modern men, a difference not so readily apparent among older men who were upwardly mobile.

Typical of the latter was Mr. Balten, age 20, who between the first and second interviews had married and moved out of his parents' home. He was living in a furnished flat about a mile from his parents and was hoping for a council home in the near future. Mr. Balten Sr. (who was also interviewed) is a semi-skilled metal worker. He has had bouts of unemployment and, in general, has been close to the bottom of the social hierarchy.

Mr. Balten was ill between 14 and 15 with the result that most of his last year in the school was spent in hospital. 'I missed almost all my fifth year. They did say I could go back for a year. But I was school-leaving age so I left. I'm learning with experience, really. It just comes to you'. His first job was as an apprentice sheet metal worker though there was no sense of planning about it. It was, as he put it, 'simply a job with a source of money'. This first job lasted

only three weeks. 'I didn't settle', he explained, 'I must have had 20 jobs in two years'. Mr. Balten could not recall the jobs but they included van boy (several times), motor fitter, sheet metal work and varieties of factory work. In 1967, two years after he entered the labour force, he became a warehouseman and later a clerk in a men's clothing chain. Shortly before our first interview he had obtained his present job as manager of a sporting goods shop in North London. Aspirations for the future were centered about retailing. He has high expectations of one day having 'a shop of me own, a brand new shop where I buy and sell everything'.

Mr. Balten has, relative to where he began, come a long way. Others, of a similar age and background who were usually less outgoing and articulate, seemed to have 'drifted' into a non-manual job and seemed as likely to drift back out again. There was, in other words, very little difference between these young men and stable working-class young men interviewed in accent, interests, aspirations or experiences. As the work-life histories of older men suggest, it is too early to say whether these men will be permanently upwardly mobile or not.

Young men who had attended grammar school were, as might be expected, different both from their parents and from other young men encountered in the study. First of all, none had experience in a wholly manual occupation and, second, there was, in their work histories, less evidence of job changing. Third, while some were still living at home, their friendship networks tended to be more widely located than was true for the secondary modern leavers.

MR. HENNESSEY, GRAMMAR SCHOOL GRADUATE

Mr. Hennessey, for example, has a similar background to Mr. Balten.

His father is a semi-skilled worker for the LEB and while somewhat better off than Mr. Balten Sr., Mr. Hennessey Sr., too, has lived in a council estate for many years. His standard of living has only risen since his wife started working. Mr. Hennessey, age 22, also married between the two interviews, to a working-class grammar school girl. He had also just moved into a home, again about a mile from his parents. The similarity in patterns ends there, however; Mr. Hennessey had bought a house in a district which though physically close to his parents, was socially far removed from the council estate. It was an older house in a largely middle-class area of East London, very similar to the Woodford described by Young and Willmott(1960).

After finishing his 'A' levels, Mr. Hennessey started out as an actuarial trainee in an insurance company. While there had in his mind been some thoughts of going on to university he had decided against it:

The main reason was that I have a twin brother who had left school at 15. It was difficult to sort of expect my parents to support me until I was in my 20's when he left at 15. A grant might just about have supported me, but I certainly wouldn't be putting anything back into the home.

Insurance work turned out to be much less interesting than he had anticipated. Within the year he had returned to his school counselling service in search of another type of work. The result was a position as trainee computer programmer. Two years later the firm he was with moved its office to Stevenage and since he did not want to leave London, he resigned. In his next job he moved in the space of two years upwards from senior programmer to systems analyst. About the time he got married he switched to yet another firm and another job as a systems analyst.

Mr. Hennessey was aware of how quickly promotion had occurred in

his life with the result that he felt he could use a two-or three-year

standstill in which to work out what it is he does want to do. Although

on the one hand he looked forward to entering management in the future,

he shared with many of the upwardly mobile a desire to do manual work.

He said of his ideal job:

I don't actually feel my job is making a fantastic contribution to our
society. If I had the ability, I'd get a great satisfaction out of
making things. If I could build houses or make furniture, if I was a
really good carpenter. But I'm really pathetic.

PATTERNS OF DOWNWARD MOBILITY

In contrast to upward mobility, downward mobility turned out to

be less dramatic and interesting than the novelistic accounts have

led us to expect. It is, as has already been seen in Table 5.4, much

less complex and varied than upward mobility or even working-class non-

mobility. In all, only about 11 percent, or 100 respondents in the

Work and Leisure Study, had been intergenerationally downwardly mobile.

Of these I succeeded in interviewing only 22 a second time. Because

so little is known about downward mobility and because of the small

sample size, it may be useful to summarize what information there is

about present occupations and father's occupations for the entire Work

and Leisure Study before considering the Mobility Sample.

Origins and destinations of the downwardly mobile are summarized

in Table 5.8. Looking first at the extreme downward mobility it is ap-

parent that the main sources of downward mobility are from highly am-

biguous occupational designations: farmers and shopkeepers. Both are

occupations which include a wide range of possible income and status

levels under the same title, and which in many cases are only marginal-

ly part of the middle class. The question of how to treat movements

between agricultural and industrial occupations is an unresolved one.

While in Britain farmers are perhaps more part of the general strati-
fication system than in some other societies, the information col-
lected does not typically define clearly enough the size of the farm.
Only two farmers' sons entered into the Mobility Sample, one of which
until the latter part of his career was also a farmer; the other, more
clearly downwardly mobile, was presently employed as a maintenance
man. His father owned a small hold in Ireland. But, in general, I am
unable to say much about whether a movement from a farm background or
a manual occupation should be labelled as downward mobility or not.

TABLE 5.8

SUMMARY OF OCCUPATIONAL ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS OF THE
DOWNWARDLY MOBILE IN THE WORK AND LEISURE STUDY
(N = 100)

High Downward
(N = 22)

Fathers' Main Occupation	Percent	Sons' Occupation	Percent
Farmers	32%	Skilled Manual (e.g., toolmaker, fitter, carpenter, electrician)	27%
Shopkeepers	36		
Professionals (e.g., civil servants, chemist, company director)	23	Semi-Skilled (e.g., drivers, storemen)	46
Low Level Supervisory	9 / 100%	Unskilled	27 / 100%

Low Downward
(N = 78)

	Percent		Percent
Clerks & Bookkeepers	21%		
Farmers	18		
Sales (estate agents, & commercial travellers)	10	Skilled Workers	65%
Low Level Managers & Supervisory Personnel (e.g., bus depot inspector, station master, sales manager, works manager, transport officer)	24	Semi-Skilled	28
		Apprentices	7
Business Owners	12		
Other (policemen, technical workers)	16 / 100%		

HIGH DOWNWARD

In the case of sons of shopkeepers, the general pattern seems to have been an early movement into a manual occupation. The toehold these fathers held in the middle class was precarious and economically insecure. Notably, the four men interviewed a second time were old enough to have started work in the difficult period between the two wars.

Perhaps typical of this small group of high downwardly mobile men is Mr. Wade. Now nearly 70-years-old himself, he is the son of a long dead Chelsea greengrocer. He started his work life at 13 working in a cycle repair shop. This was followed by a job as an assistant milk roundsman and then seven years in the army. When he was demobbed in 1920, it was with a trade in bricklaying. He kept the same job in the building industry for 30 years. In 1950 he became a messenger in the Colonial office, a job he has only recently given up.

On the one hand, I done 30 years of building and they never said 'Thank you', even when I left. At the Colonial office, when I left, I got 400 which just shows where the difference is. But, it wasn't a job I could stick if I was young, I don't think. I like an outside job in such as the building line. It (civil service) was an intelligent job, but it was too drab.

Mr. Wade was born two houses away and except for his time in the trenches has lived all his life in the same turning. On the whole, he felt he had done much better for himself than had his father. His two daughters were educated sufficiently to become secretaries. They are married, respectively, to a company director and an accountant, both of whom have in turn been upwardly mobile.

There was little to distinguish Mr. Wade and others like him from non-mobile working-class fathers I was able to interview. The main impression was of immobility and stability. In his mind at least, there was a working-class chain unbroken until his daughters' generation. The idea of downward mobility did not seem applicable at all.

In contrast, at the other end of the age spectrum were a few in-
stances of what from a number of perspectives seemed more genuinely
downward mobility. One such is Mr. Buckland who left school at 15 and
now at 23 has had eight ('possibly more') jobs, all semi-skilled ones.
The first was as an assembly-line worker, followed by van driving
(several) pest control worker, maintenance and finally sotreman in an
electrical manufacturing firm. As he explained:

In school I was your average moron. Before I left I never really sort
of made up my mind to do anything particular. I wasn't particularly
brainy or anything like that. I wasn't in the grammar school stream.
I sort of wanted to work in a garage but my father knew somebody who
worked at Johnsons and he said 'Oh, you'll be alright'. It was al-
right there, but I'm an awful bloke to get on with. I planned a
couple of jobs but a couple I sort of got pushed from. I rub authori-
ty the wrong way.

How permanent, then, was his downward mobility? He said about himself:

I'm dormant. Compared to where I started. I can't really say I'm
better off now than then. I've been up and down at different times.
I suppose if I'd of stayed at Johnsons, I'd be a lot better off now,
I think. What I know now I'd probably have stuck with the first job--
not many people do, do they?

In the short run, at least, there was no evidence that Mr. Buck-
land was likely to reverse his downward mobility. Except in the sense
of a higher paying job he had difficulty conceiving of an ideal job
or where he would be in the future. 'I would like to sort of work
on the motor side. I have done it a bit on the side, on my own time,
but whether it would ever turn into an occupation that I could do, I
don't know. What I do know is I'm not the sort to do a job in an of-
fice. I'm sort of manual labour, not bricklaying but around machinery.
So, I may have more money, I may do better, but I don't think I shall
ever become any sort of cleverer'.

His father, who he described as having more money, more intelli-
gence and more education (even taking into account age), is a civil
servant, administrative grade. But, despite a grammar school education,

Mr. Buckland Sr. had spent over half of his work life in manual jobs, mainly as a driver.[11] The son of a tramdriver, he began in 1928 as a warehouse clerk but three years later, in the midst of the depression, found himself unemployed. He was out of work for nearly two years before he was able to find work as a driver salesman. Up until 1940 he worked in a number of similar jobs. In the war he was again a driver in an Armored Corps. In 1945 he entered the civil service as a clerk and since 1950 has been a clerical officer. He had tried for promotion several times but now, at age 59, he had accepted the possibility that he will not rise any higher.

There were only a few people interviewed a second time and from whom generalizations can be made. However, the overriding impression is that the extreme downward category does not involve as large a descent as the statistical presentation suggests. Some fathers—notably farmers and greengrocers—were only marginally part of the middle class, in the first place. Thus, their training, income and lifestyle were much more working-class than middle-class. They were not, typically, able to pass on to their sons either a secure position or a middle-class tradition. Some other fathers were intragenerationally mobile into a middle-class occupation so that an age-specific mobility measure would define the son as stable manual.

LOW DOWNWARD

Similar reservations—what might be called 'extenuating circumstances'—apply also to the low downward category. Movement downwards across the non-manual-manual line one or two social classes were defined as low downward mobility. Fathers, by definition, were in social

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[11]An age-specific measure of social mobility would, therefore, categorize Mr. Buckland as stable manual.

classes two or three and sons, as Table 5.8 indicated, are mainly in
skilled jobs or are training to enter one of these (72 percent). Only
28 percent are in semi-skilled occupations. In short, whereas there
was some evidence of poverty and low status immobility among the ex-
treme downward group, those moving one or two classes downward seemed
on the whole to have become part of a more affluent segment of the
working class.[12]

It is with this group of men that the description and analysis of
this chapter tend to come full circle. As I have described, one pat-
tern of upward mobility included a number of men who regretted not
having a trade 'to fall back on'. As we also saw, these men were usu-
ally directing their sons toward a trade of some kind. This was also
the pattern among those fathers I did succeed in interviewing a second
time whose sons were in the low downward category. That is, like Mr.
Buckland Sr. described above, they had not been born into the middle
class but had arrived there, typically, after a lifetime spent in manu-
al work with eventually a job in a supervisory, low level managerial
or sales capacity.[13] Thus, the preponderance of skilled trades in the
low downward group suggests that these sons were fulfilling dreams of
their fathers rather than experiencing downward mobility. The Middle-
tons are a particularly apt illustration of this pattern.

When Mr. Middleton left school at 15, he was unable to find work
except temporarily in the Kent hop fields. Much to his disgust he
found himself down the same sort of mine as his father and grandfather
had worked in before him.

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[12]In all, 62 percent of the downwardly mobile are in skilled trades,
32 percent are in semi-skilled trades and only 6 percent are in unskilled
trades.

[13]Managers and supervisors are especially likely to have sons in
a skilled trade or training for one.

Mining was the only work around there. Even people with A levels
couldn't get jobs. But any youngster can get a job down the mines if
you have reasonable eyesight. My grandfather was in the mines 50
years. It wasn't for me.

After a year he left for London and a job as a trainee sheet met-

al worker. A year later he went to another firm and for the past sev-

en years has worked as a hydraulic fitter. He now regards himself as

a skilled worker although he had not completed an apprenticeship. At

25 he has two small children and a council flat in a Deptford high

rise which he dislikes immensely. Beyond sharing the nearly universal

desire to 'live further out', Mr. Middleton appeared to be exceptional-

ly happy with his lot.[14]

I'm pretty well paid. My wages are above average and this particular
work has good chances. I always wanted to do engineering and I find
hydraulics is involved in everything right-left-centre. Maybe some-
day I'd like to move over to the clerical side, repping or something
like that, but not for a long time.

Mr. Middleton Sr. is a security supervisor for a large retail

chain, a managerial job which puts him in class 2. But the seeming

downward mobility of his son (to class 4 or 5) turns out to be mostly

statistical artifact. In his own words:

I still am working-class. You can't bribe over. If they stuck a pig
against a Tory candidate, I'd vote for the pig. I've voted Labour
everytime. I won't vote Communist but I vote Labour: I believe in
socialism.

Mr. Middleton Sr. was born in Yorkshire and spent nearly 24 years

down various mines in Wales and Kent. In 1957 he emigrated to Canada,

worked in a variety of semi-skilled and unskilled jobs, was unemployed

several times and in 1959 returned to England. He again worked in va-

rious factories on bench assembly and in 1962 obtained clerical job in

his present firm. Five years ago he was promoted to security super-

vision.

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[14]See Young and Willmott (1973: 47).

It's gradually worked up to this. I was pushed into it, really, this office work. I was always against office work. I was always against anything indoors. In mining I found you got a comradeship you don't get anywhere else. It's a rough job. Mining is always dangerous, you're dealing with mother nature and anything can happen. But finally I arrived at the conclusion that if everyone is going to get fat behind a desk, I might as well do it myself. I think I'll stick this job out. See, we're classed as management and we're dealing with management.

Like so many of the upwardly mobile fathers, he felt that he was 'really robbed of a trade'. As for his sons,

I don't believe in forcing anything on them. They can do what they like as long as they can make a reasonable living and have got a trade behind them. I think they've both done very well for themselves.

Low downward mobility, then, seemed to arise mainly from the upward movement of the father, often after the son was already embarked on a career himself. In mass, the downwardly mobile have less education, much lower incomes than middle-class men in the sample.[15] But in comparing them to their fathers, only in one instance was the education of the son below that of his father. If allowance is made for different school-leaving ages, there is little difference between fathers and sons. Income is, of course, more difficult to compare. Most felt they were better off than their fathers had ever been, some estimated they were better off than their fathers at a comparable age though not on a present comparison. Only two felt they were worse off, financially, at whatever age is chosen.

PATTERNS OF NON-MOBILITY: THE MIDDLE CLASS

Space does not allow as full an exposition of patterns of non-mobility as I have given of upward and downward mobility. Yet, as Table 5.3 and 5.5 illustrated, intergenerational stability does not necessarily imply an uneventful or stagnant work-life history.[16] For instance

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[15]This was shown in Chapter 3.

[16]It is important to keep in mind that social mobility is in this

in conducting the interviews it was sometimes difficult to keep in mind that a particular respondent was not part of the upward mobile sub-sample or, conversely, the downwardly mobile group. In placing so much emphasis on intergenerational changes in status it is easily forgotten that in everyday life the mobile share most of the same preoccupations, concerns, triumphs and setbacks which are also part and parcel of everyone's lives whatever their mobility experience.

About three-quarters of the stable non-manual men interviewed were firmly part of the middle class. They were from backgrounds in which I could find no trace of working-class connections. Fathers were company directors and secretaries, business owners, accountants, insurance executives, brokers, qualified engineers and doctors. The men themselves were employed in similar occupations. Some had simply entered the family business. Others were working in accounting, the civil service, insurance, broking, management and consulting of various kinds. Some had climbed higher than their fathers in the occupational hierarchy, a few were somewhat lower while the majority were, or would be by the end of their career, about the same occupational status as their father. In any event, their precise status was not usually of paramount importance in determining the composition of their social network. 'My father and I have the same contacts socially', said Mr. Nalder, a young insurance broker. 'With respect to work my father is above me obviously, but socially I'm on a par with him. I know so many of his friends and he knows so many of mine'.

The other quarter of the stable non-manual sub-sample was more marginally part of the middle class. Included in this group were men

study defined as movements across the manual-non-manual line. Men defined as stable may have been mobile within one of the two basic categories.

working as a company director, a manager of a debt collection firm, a
fruit merchant, an office manager and a draughtsman. All had come from
low level non-manual backgrounds in which there were, also, working-
class connections. Generally the father had worked in a manual job
part of his life, and one or both grandfathers were working-class.
Mr. Terry, for instance, is presently manager of a debt collection
agency. Over his 30-year-work life he has held at least ten distinct
jobs. They have gone somewhat as follows: garage hand--office boy--
factory hand--garage hand--air gunner--self-employed (partner in a
plastics factory)--car salesman--unemployed (one year)--commercial
traveller (3 firms)--debt collector--manager debt collection agency.
As he said, somewhat bemusedly, 'Life has gone full circle. What I do
now is handle all the legal work and court appearances. So, from the
15-year-old solicitor's general boy I've gone right round without any
legal training to handling all our litigations'. Mr. Terry Sr. had
also had many different jobs on both sides of the manual-non-manual
line until finally settling down as owner of a small electrical goods
store in the Midlands. Both of Mr. Terry's parents come from working-
class families and his son, an only child, has just completed an ap-
prenticeship as a printer. At the same time, Mr. Terry and the few
other men interviewed who were like him, were not working-class in
their perspectives and definitions of themselves. While very close to
the third pattern of upward mobility described earlier, they differed
in having a greater allegiance to the middle class than to the working
class. Mr. Terry, for example, said both of his grandparents were
'artisan' rather than working-class. For what it is worth, three of
the men described themselves as middle-class, two were unsure what
class they fitted into.

WORKING-CLASS NON-MOBILITY

It is, in the case of the stable manual men, more difficult to speak of patterns. Men interviewed were working in a variety of occupations both skilled and semi-skilled. They are printers, engineers, painters and decorators, carpenters, plumbers, motor fitters,metal workers, and drivers. Some preferred to call themselves heating and ventilating engineers instead of plumbers. Their fathers had similar occupational titles and while Table 5.5 suggests men from skilled backgrounds are likely to be in skilled work, there was also evidence of upward and downward mobility within the manual stratum.[17] These were occupations which in the vast majority of cases were likely to remain with the men until their work lives ended. None had, as I indicated in Chapter 3, gone on beyond the minimum school-leaving age or had attended anything beyond a secondary modern or its equivalent. Objectively, then, there was little indication that any of these men had been blocked in their mobility and only a tiny minority (5 out of the 27 men re-interviewed) were at all mobility oriented.[18]

SUMMARY

Upward mobility is complicated. In reading over the work histories of the men interviewed a second time, at least five patterns could be discerned. While none of the men conformed exactly to a typical middle-class profile, some patterns did appear to be more genuinely leading to a lifestyle not too different from the stable middle class

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[17]About 40 percent of the men interviewed had come from skilled backgrounds and had through apprenticeships become tradesmen themselves.

[18]That is, they expressed concern about improving their occupational and social status, as opposed to only their income, at some point in the interview.

than were the others. This was particularly so for the men who had risen fairly high in the occupational hierarchy and for younger men who had attended at least grammar school and perhaps university or technical college. Together these comprise about 25 percent of the upwardly mobile men. The second group, 'self-made men--lower managerial', are 'more' middle-class than working-class. But in a number of respects they appeared to be marginal almost standing outside the class structure. They were not, nor did they seem as likely, to be acculturated fully into a middle-class milieu as are the other two groups. Roughly one-third of the men were in this category.

Finally, about two-fifths of the men moved upwards into an occupation which is itself a marginally middle-class position. Included were two different groups of men; those who have moved upwards following a long period in manual occupations, and young secondary modern school leavers who for various reasons are working in non-manual jobs. In neither case is there much evidence of normative and relational change.[19] For the younger men there had not even been an economic shift as yet. In the former case, the movement upwards had come too late for very large shifts in these three dimensions to be expected. The latter group of men have not been independent of family and peers long enough for these changes to have taken place.

In looking at the occupations of the 100 men in the Work and Leisure Study who were designated downwardly mobile, there was little evidence of extreme skidding. This was also supported by the 22 work histories collected for the Mobility Sample. Most of the men who had fallen three or more categories had done so early on in their work life

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[19]Further evidence, using data from the Work and Leisure Study, of relational and normative changes, is presented in Chapter 11.

and had typically come from lower middle-class backgrounds. Fathers were often greengrocers, shopkeepers and small farm owners. The low downward category consisted mainly of men whose fathers had been like category 3 of the upwardly mobile, occupationally mobile late in their work life. These men had been actively encouraged to enter skilled manual trades which they had mainly done. Thus, there were only a very few men who had in any important sense come from a middle-class background. Downward mobility, in other words, was, in the sample, more statistical artifact than a social phenomenon of much significance.

The two groups of men stable in the occupational hierarchy were interviewed mainly to provide a benchmark against which to assess the men who were mobile. About three-quarters of the men in the non-manual group have followed a typical middle-class pattern. They have come from backgrounds with no trace of working-class connections and have followed orthodox middle-class routes. The other 25 percent are not easily categorized. They are less typically middle-class and have either worked in manual occupations or have working-class ties on one or both sides of their family. With some few exceptions, the stable manual group have all followed one or two basic patterns which have resulted in intergenerational non-mobility. None had more than the minimum of education and only a minority expressed regrets about not having had more education. For the most part the work lives of these men were fairly stable and secure. Despite this, attitudes, aspirations (for themselves and their children), and lifestyles were still decidedly working-class. While some wanted better things for their children these were not, typically, the same things middle-class and upwardly mobile people wanted. In short, most fitted the 'stable manual' category to which the coding procedure assigned them.

PART TWO

SOCIOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS AND CONDITIONS

OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

CHAPTER 6

TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF INDIVIDUAL

SOCIAL MOBILITY

To date, the main sociological contribution to the study of so-
cial mobility has been macro-sociological; attempting to explain vari-
ances in rates of mobility over time or between societies at the same
point in time. The psychological approach, on the other hand, has
sought to explain why, given certain social structural conditions, do
some people rise and others fall. The approach I wish to develop in
this chapter is a micro-sociological one. I want for the time being,
to take for granted the large scale factors which may determine rates
of social mobility. I also take for granted that certain psychologi-
cal attributes, especially motivation and ability, are to some extent
necessary baggage of the upwardly mobile and that the lack of these
may contribute to individual downward mobility.[1] My interest, rather,
is in elucidating some small scale structural factors or conditions
which might facilitate individual upward and downward mobility. I
will argue in this chapter that conditions which serve to reduce the
individual's or his family's of origin social integration are also
those that act as the impetus for mobility orientation and mobility.

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[1] I do not in this chapter discuss the large literature on per-
sonality characteristics and their relationship to mobility and mo-
bility striving. There are, however, two excellent reviews of these
by Lipset and Bendix (1959: 227-254) and Crockett (1966). Also
useful are Scanzoni (1966 and 1967); Jencks (1972) and Banks (1971:
61-70). In Chapter 7 evidence from the Work and Leisure Study and
the Mobility Sample pertaining to measured intelligence and its re-
lationship to patterns of mobility are considered.

Before presenting the theoretical and empirical evidence to support this argument, it will be necessary to show that, in opposition to the usual view, in British society it is mobility rather than non-mobility which is the deviant and problematic social process. To do this it will be necessary also to show that of the two predominant views about the nature of social stratification--the sub-cultural or culture-variation hypotheses--the sub-cultural hypothesis most relevantly depicts British class structure. Finally, I argue that it is only within these two frameworks that the one distinctively sociological theory of the determinants of social mobility--the theory of reference groups and anticipatory socialization--is of relevance to understanding the social mobility process.

SUB-CULTURE OR CONTINUUM?

As one reads through the massive and largely American literature on social mobility, equality of educational opportunity and class differences in level of aspirations, a predominant--indeed, taken-for-granted assumption--is the normativeness of mobility and mobility striving. Whether cast in terms of anticipatory socialization or simply as level of aspiration, most mobility research in the past few decades has considered attitudes and behaviour as 'conformity' when they have been attuned to a middle-class perspective and as 'deviance' when they reflect something else. This something else a minority of sociologists have come to recognize is perhaps a working-class sub-culture with its own distinct values, beliefs and conduct. The result is that it may be more productive to treat social mobility--upward as well as downward--as if it were a deviant pattern of behaviour subject to negative sanctions ranging from scorn and ridicule to outright ostracism. In Britain, for instance, class differentials in

level and kinds of aspirations and the historical development of the
present system of stratification combine to make what is for the mid-
dle class a routine fulfillment of expectations, a deviant behaviour-
al pattern when attempted by members of the working class.[2]

As Turner (1964) describes it, the choice in stratification theory
has been between two contending hypotheses: the culture-variation
hypothesis and the sub-culture hypothesis. The latter 'assumes that
each class is to some degree a self-contained universe developing a
distinctive set of values which guides its members' ways of life. Ob-
jects which are positively valued in one class subculture may be nega-
tively valued in another. According to this view members of classes
have different conceptions of what objectives are worthy of pursuit
and what qualities entitle a person to the esteem of his fellows' (pp.
9-10). In contrast to this hypothesis is the culture-variation approach
which 'begins by assuming a generally uniform system of values through-
out a society and treats class differences as variations on a society-
wide theme. Classes differ not so much in generating distinctive value
systems, but more in the relative emphasis and the embodiment of their
society's values, which derive from their distinctive life situations'
(P. 11).

In British studies the subcultural hypothesis has far more often
been viewed, implicitly or explicitly, as the more adequate model re-
flecting what seems a clearer body of evidence than can be mustered in
the North American context. These essentially ethnographic studies of
working-class communities have all, in varying degrees, implied that
because of the rigidity of the British stratification system, social

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[2]Evidence for this statement is presented below. See also
Chapter 12.

mobility is objectively and subjectively difficult to bring about.[3]

The detailed descriptions these studies give of the strains and stres-

ses involved in individual mobility striving are far more in accord

with the implications of the subcultural thesis than the culture-vari-

ation thesis, as Turner (1964: 12) describes them.

> Under culture-variation, the (upwardly mobile) individual will have
> to make some alteration in his value system, but the alterations are
> in a direction comprehensible to him and to the friends and family
> in his class of origin. Raising one's sights is likely to be accom-
> panied by adjustment pains, and there is bound to be an uncertain base
> for self-evaluation during the transition and perhaps permanently.
> But these pains do not incorporate the same element of moral conflict
> experienced in a change between groups with contradictory values.
> Some of the elements of marginality may be present because of the lack
> of well-established standards, but the whole classic pattern will not
> be there.

MOBILITY STRIVING AS THE NORM

In the United States, the culture-variation thesis has, however,

attracted some important and influential spokesmen with the result

that in much of the existing research there is the taken-for-granted

assumption that upward mobility striving is normative and ubiquitous

rather than a deviant and relatively infrequent phenomenon. Luckmann

and Berger (1964: 340), for instance, concerned with loss of identity,

argue that industrial societies are characterized by an overwhelming

and damaging emphasis on upward mobility and anticipatory socialization.

> Some articulation of the mobility ethos enters into nearly all the
> primary socialization of individuals . . . Through the mobility ethos
> a potential motivation of some or even many individuals becomes a com-
> pulsory life-goal for all . . . while everybody feels committed to up-
> ward mobility as a central life-goal, a majority fails to achieve it.

For Barber (1957), the ubiquity of the mobility ethos is, in the

United States, the main legitimation of the system of stratification.

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[3] I have relied most heavily on the following: Hoggart (1957);
Young and Willmott (1959); Jackson and Marsden (1962); Willmott (1963);
Willmott (1966). But a particularly helpful review of these and many
other studies of working-class life is that of Klein (1965). Lockwood
(1966) and Goldthorpe et al (1969) were also useful.

Mobility aspirations, if not actual mobility, are persistent and pervasive; they exist at all but the lowest strata of society. 'As soon as negroes receive even minimally satisfactory education, they join the great majority of Americans in approving of social mobility for themselves and everyone else' (P. 345). And, Lipset and Zetterberg (1956) have made the assumption of a widespread desire for social mobility central to their theoretical statement on the subject:

The theory . . . does not assume that mobility occurs only as a result of specific social norms, pressuring people to be mobile; instead the motivations for mobility are placed in the realm of more or less universal ego-needs operating within stratified societies. (P. 163).

Three years later, the point is made even more succinctly and forcefully by Lipset and Bendix (1959: 73).[4]

Our hypothesis is that the desire to rise in status is intrinsic in all persons of lower status, and that individuals and groups will attempt to improve their status (and self evaluation) whenever they have the chance to do so.

Statements such as these seem to apply most directly to a United States model of social mobility and social stratification yet both the Luckmann-Berger and Bendix-Zetterberg-Lipset arguments are explicitly referring to stratification systems in all Western industrial societies. To both, the differences between European and United States societies are ones of emphasis and extent rather than of kind. There is the clear implication that despite the persistence of ascription in European societies, 'the resulting motivation to move upward appears approximately equal on both continents' (Lipset and Zetterberg, 1956: 168).

ASPIRATIONS AND SOCIAL CLASS

The empirical evidence in the United States and Britain underlying

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[4]However, see page 249, where social mobility is referred to as deviant behaviour.

this assumption of the normativeness of mobility striving is rather

weak. In contrast, the substantial literature on the distribution of

mobility aspirations points mainly to the extent these are unevenly

distributed between classes. In what was an extremely influential

paper, Hyman (1953), with specific reference to Merton's (1949) essay

on social structure and anomie questioned the extent to which members

of different strata held similar values about the desirability of suc-

cess, mobility chances and other values which would aid them in reach-

ing or moving toward these goals. His evidence showed that there is

'a reduced striving for success among the lower classes, an awareness

of lack of opportunity and a lack of valuation of education' (P. 496).

Similarly Martin (1954: 70-71), after considering Merton's thesis,

suggests that, 'In British culture, success-goals are rather less

heavily and less universally emphasized (at lower levels) and there is

a correspondingly greater stress on the institutionalized norms'. A

host of other studies (Kahl, 1953; Katz, 1964; Kohn, 1959; Rosen,

1956: Sewall et al, 1957; Musgrove, 1967; Swift, 1967) have also poin-

ted to differentials in success striving between people brought up

with different social class backgrounds.

MOBILITY: A DEVIANT PATTERN

While the infrequency of a behaviour pattern is not the only basis

for labelling it as deviant, it is nevertheless, one criterion. Social

mobility seems more prevalent the higher up one goes in the social

hierarchy. Looked at from either a 'total perspective' or from the

point of view of a working-class person, social mobility must be seen

as the exception rather than the rule. Thus, mobility statistics tend

to obscure the overwhelming proportion who are to all intents and pur-

poses inter- or intragenerationally static in the class hierarchy. It

is, then, only in the middle class that it is relevant to speak of there being 'considerable' social mobility. But beyond its objective infrequency could it not still be as Merton (1957) argues in his analysis of the genesis of anomie that the desire for upward mobility is a pervasive one, permeating to virtually all class levels? Certainly, most research related to the general problem of inequality of opportunity has taken as its problem, non-mobility. It has usually asked what factors impede the course of bright working-class students who fail to do as well as their middle-class counterparts. It treats anticipatory socialization as conformity to what is seen as the dominant success ideology rather than as deviance from the values and norms of peer group and family. In contrast, Porter (1968: 14-15) reverses the problem and treats non-mobility as normative, high aspirations as possibly deviant. He therefore requests sociologists to ask a different set of questions than they have typically posed:

Middle-class investigators seem genuinely puzzled about how the lower or working classes do or should react to the realities of their class position. Evidence is presented that they are deviant, depressed or despaired and adopt a devil-may-care attitude. These would be logical reactions if working class people had indeed internalized middle-class norms . . . but could they not be participants in a working-class culture with different norms, and view their class position in relative terms according to their membership reference groups? . . . the concept (of reference groups) has been used in the analysis of mobility but mainly in terms of how reference groups aid mobility through anticipatory socialization. It has scarcely been used at all to explain low mobility aspirations.

British sociology more so than American sociology has produced a literature and research tradition which essentially is in accord with Porter's suggested orientation.[5] Generally, an attempt is made to understand the working class on its own terms as a self-contained (sometimes over-romanticized subculture. Status striving and mobility be-

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[5]For some notable exceptions see Miller and Reissman (1961 and 1968) and Gans (1962).

haviour are, therefore, more often interpreted as a deviation from sub-cultural norms[6] and as effectively a repudiation of the peer group and the family network. As in most forms of deviant behaviour there is a resulting effort to bring the upwardly mobile defector back into line. These processes are well documented in Willmott's (1966) study of Bethnal Green adolescents. He was able to distinguish, empirically, three ideal-typical categories of boys among the working class: 'middle-class', 'working-class' and 'rebel'. Between two-thirds to three-quarters of the boys were, on the basis of the 21 items used, categorized as 'working-class'; about 20 percent were 'middle-class' in orientation; ten percent were defined as rebels. Among a number of other characteristics, the 'working-class' boys were non-mobile both with respect to aspirations and actual occupational attainment. The 'middle-class' boys had already experienced some upward mobility and were oriented to values and groups outside the community. In sheer proportions, then, success drives as measured in middle-class terms were the deviant orientation.

Of most interest were the reports of the 'middle-class' boys themselves, which vividly showed how unfavourably their behaviour--defferred gratification, homework, accent and attitudes--was regarded by most other boys and in varying degrees by their families (pp. 93-99). Willmott notes that:

The school and its values are not in tune with the local way of life. Sometimes the strain may lead boys to become 'early leavers'. Of the boys in our sample who had left grammar school, nearly a third had left before they were 17 (P. 95).

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[6]Goldthorpe et al (1969:122) concluded about their sample of affluent workers that: 'the aspirations of our respondents were still in important ways shaped and defined by the social realities of their position as manual wage workers . . . secondly that their more "middle-class" aspirations were not held with any great belief in the possibility that they would be realised . . . and thirdly, that only rarely were aspirations specifically focused on status enhancement in the sense of there being a desire to emulate, and to gain the acceptance of persons regarded as belonging to a superior status group'.

The sorts of tensions experienced by these boys seem on the basis of other similar studies (Jackson and Marsden, 1962; Hoggart, 1957) to be fairly typical of working-class communities. All point to an essential conflict between school and neighbourhood influences for those intent on moving upward.[7]

Paradoxically, negative sanctions of the kind described in these studies, often go hand-in-hand with a genuine desire on the part of parents and maybe even peers, for the person to do well. As Willmott's study, and other descriptions show, however, the context in which mobility behaviour takes place, the definitions attached to it by members and by the specific actor are shifting and perplexing.[8] Yet parents and perhaps the community, for example, might, in a variety of ways, encourage aspirations toward 'visible' and 'comprehensible' occupational goals—engineer, draughtsman, professional footballer—while remaining apathetic (at best) about 'similar' aspirations to less 'visible' occupations—accountant, solicitor, marketing analyst. And parents, who initially think education a 'good thing', may revise their view when they learn what is implied in terms of children's work load, its inconvenience to them and the way it violates vague norms of 'enough is enough'. As Jackson and Marsden (1966: 18) note:

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[7]The basic dichotomy in orientation between Whyte's (1949) College Boys and Corner Boys, especially as viewed from Doc's perspective, is a particularly relevant illustration of the nonconformity and disaffiliation involved in the process of anticipatory socialization.

[8]Thus, Hoggart (1957: 294) notes that the scholarship boy finds himself cut off by his family because '"e's got the brains or "e's bright". But, there can also be a limiting quality in the tone with which' the phrase is used; character counts more. Still, he has brains—a mark of pride—and almost a brand; he is heading for a different world, a different sort of job'. See also Klein (1965: 591) who notes that 'what parental ambitions were mentioned in St. Ebbe's (Mogey, 1956) were vague and unrelated to specific courses of action; such parents wanted their sons "to do well", "to get on well"'.

Long homework hours, even more than 'accent', cut into the vital cen-
tres of family life, dislocated the whole household's living. It could
generate hostility, misunderstanding, irritation, jealousy; and many
mothers had to make a special effort to take it under their protection
to create a new rhythm around it.

Nor, unfortunately,does education provide very many skills which

have value in manual oriented environments. Workers who must put up

with complements of student workers each summer are invariably per-

plexed at the ways in which they are less adept, slow to learn, per-

haps, as Hoggart (1957: 301) observes, exhibiting 'an unconvincing

pride in (their) own gaucheness at practical things--"brain workers"

are never "good with their hands"'. And, yet, as these men are likely

to point out, they have all this 'schooling' which has not helped them

a bit. People honestly want to know 'what it's all in aid of' but the

answer even when it is known, may be too complex to be very meaningful.

While most of my illustrations come from studies of British work-

ing-class societies, I do not mean to imply that these same pressures

are not found in other working-or lower-class communities. There is,

for instance, a remarkable similarity in the way Gans (1962) described

life in his West End of Boston slum to what British investigators have

also found. Although the community was Italian, he could be describing

the processes which impede social mobility in British working-class

communities.

Changes that involve a transformation of attitudes and relationships
toward the outside world and participation in its activities are still
discouraged (P. 219). West Enders not only keep their distance from
the middle class, but they will reject other West Enders who stray too
far from the peer group society and adopt middle-class ways. Relatives
and friends whose taste for furniture or clothes begin to move in a
middle-class direction are criticized for having gone 'high society'
and people who moved away from the group are described as renegades or
deserters. Only those few who can achieve upward mobility in the occu-
pational sphere without becoming 'uppity' . . . are likely to be spared
from scorn. (P. 221)

REFERENCE GROUP THEORY AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

What these various studies of working-class life suggest about social mobility as an essentially deviant process is also implicit in general perspectives of reference group theory and anticipatory socialization.[9] To date reference group theory has perhaps been the most significant theoretical contribution to the problem of social mobility available in the literature. (Lipset and Bendix, 1959: 256). The theory, or at least the particular aspects of it developed by Merton, is now thoroughly familiar; it has implicitly or explicitly guided and prompted a considerable amount of what might otherwise have been disparate and non-theoretical research. With respect to research on social mobility, it is the notion of 'anticipatory socialization' which has been the most obvious contribution. Within that aspect of the theory, I wish to narrow the discussion even further to consider mainly how Merton directs attention to the often over-looked fact that anticipatory socialization is from the point of view of the membership group likely to be seen as a deviant orientation even though it may be in conformity with either middle-class or societal values. Thus, as well as providing a framework in which to view the relationship of the individual to the social structure, Merton also presents a systematic analysis of what is implied by the working-class studies considered above: behaviour can only be labelled as conforming or non-conforming

[9]The term 'reference group' was coined by Hyman (1942). The major statement comes from Merton and Rossi's (1949) reformulation of data from The American Soldier (Stouffer et al, 1949). An extensive elaboration of the theory was published by Merton in 1957. Kelly (1952), Shibutani (1955) and Newcomb (1950) have also made important contributions to a refinement of the basic concepts. Bott (1954) and Runciman (1966) have both used the theory in studying social stratification. For a sample of the large literature on reference group theory, see Hyman and Singer (1968).

with reference to specific units of the social system.[10]

Merton argues that:

In the language of reference group theory, attitudes of conformity to the official mores can be described as a positive orientation to the norms of a non-membership group that is taken as a frame of reference. Such conformity to norms of an out-group is thus equivalent to what is ordinarily called non-conformity, that is, non-conformity to the norms of the in-group (Merton, 1957: 264).

Such out-group orientation may, as perspectives shift, be interpreted as 'functional' or 'dysfunctional' to the various units of the social system.[11] If, on the other hand, the social system is not an open one, or is characterized by a relatively high degree of status rigidity, anticipatory socialization is 'dysfunctional' for the individual and gives rise to the phenomenon of 'the marginal man, poised on the edge of several groups but fully accepted by none of them. . . The same reference group behaviour in different social structures has differ-ent consequences' (pp. 265-266).

Of considerable significance is that for the individual's in-group or membership group, anticipatory socialization represents, us-ually, deviance and is often interpreted by the group as rejection. Social mobility, then, is the outcome of a process in which there is

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[10]Merton (pp. 360-364) distinguishes between 'non-conformity' and 'deviant behaviour' for reasons which seem to reflect a bias to-ward order and morality rather than any profound differences in the patterns of observable behaviour. At certain levels of analysis, some fairly obvious differences become apparent which relate more to the sociology of law and of criminology than to social-psychological processes. However, I am aware that from the point of view of devi-ance theory, the inclusion of 'anticipatory socialization' under the label of 'deviant behaviour' may be to trivialize the latter concept. In calling mobility behaviour deviant behaviour, then, I do so partly because I am not convinced that at the social-psychological level of analysis there is any theoretically important distinction between non-conformity and deviant behaviour.

[11]For Merton's use of function and dysfunction, see his essay 'Manifest and Latent Functions' in Merton (1957: 104).

the distinct probability of 'a deterioration of <u>social relations</u> within the membership group and positive <u>attitudes</u> toward the norms of a non-membership group. What the individual experiences as estrangement from a group of which he is a member tends to be experienced by his associates as repudiation of the group . . . the individual estranged from the one group has all the more motivation to belong to the other' (P. 270).

Moreover, though it has not to my knowledge been exploited, Merton suggests that some patterns of downward mobility can also be interpreted within reference group theory.

The framework of reference group theory, detached from the language of sentiment, enables the sociologist to identify and to locate renegadism, treason, the assimilation of immigrants, class mobility, social climbing, etc., as so many special forms of identification with what is at the time a non-membership group. The transfer of allegiance of upper class individuals from their own to a lower class . . . belongs to the same family of sociological problems as the more familiar identification of lower class individuals with higher class . . . Our cultural emphases notwithstanding, the phenomenon of top dogs adopting the values of the underdog is as much a reference group phenomenon lending itself to further inquiry as that of the underdogs seeking to become topdogs (P. 269).

The difference it might be noted, is that downward mobility is relatively easy to regard as non-conforming behaviour. It is relatively infrequent, it runs contrary to the dominant values of the middle class, and in some circumstances may be defined as a social problem: if it is 'voluntary', then some proportion of the middle class are not being sufficiently motivated. Hence, it is only through recourse to an explanation such as that provided by reference group theory that it is possible to take the role of the downwardly mobile at all and to absolve it of such value-laden terms as 'degradation', 'abasement', 'sinking' and 'failure' (Sorokin, 1927).[12] Upward mobility,

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[12]At which point it is not clear whether adopting the values of an objectively less prestigeful stratum is, from the actor's point of reference, downward mobility at all. This was discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.

on the other hand, seems more in accord with taken-for-granted concep-
tions of social structure and 'human nature'. For this reason, it is
somewhat more understandable and less problematic.

ANTICIPATORY SOCIALIZATION

Anticipatory socialization has been the concept used to describe
the orientation and conformity to attitudes and behaviour which while
deviant to the person's objective membership group are instrumental in
creating acceptance in the non-membership group. How does this shift
in reference group affiliations come about? What prompts some people
to ignore the pressures and spurn the security of family, peer group
and community for what may only be partial acceptance in a different
group? Since the emphasis has generally been on upward mobility these
questions, typically, are sidestepped. This is possible because of
the implicit assumption that 'higher' status positions are intrinsically
superior and that people will normally strive to reach them. As the
evidence presented earlier suggests, however, working-class members are
not necessarily eager to move into a higher class and may have highly
negative evaluations of middle-class work and lifestyles. As Gans
(1962: 253) said of his West Enders: 'they are not yet eager to move
into the middle class . . . their culture is still that of the working
class'. Merton (1957: 270) notes that ambitious privates were alter-
natively accused of 'brown-nosing', 'sucking up' and 'bucking for pro-
motion'. Likewise Young (1965: 65) describes how the upwardly mobile
are castigated as 'the toffee-nosed Lah de dah swank pots'. Implied
in such expressions is a sense of 'place' and an acceptance of existing
relationships of inequality as 'right' and 'proper'. Jackson and Mars-
den (1962: 259) found that some of the fathers in their sample were
hostile to the nation of grammar school for their children, 'sensing

a class barrier which they were reluctant to penetrate'.[13]

Because of this social pressure--perhaps outright rejection--directed towards those who aspire to a different and usually higher life style, the easier path is likely to be the one involving non-mobility rather than mobility. To be mobile, as Gans further suggests, the individual 'must first break--or have broken for him--his dependence on family and peers' (1962: 254). In short, he must be able to live his life apart from the people with whom he has grown up, and take both their ostracism and criticism . . . Because of the difficulties that must be endured, and the obstacles that must be overcome, (social mobility) is sought today by only a few people' (P. 222). Similarly, Lipset and Bendix (1959: 249) observe that 'the process of social mobility requires, beyond the motivation to achieve, the capacity to leave behind an early environment and to adapt to a new one'. Once started, of course, the process of out-group affiliation is likely to take on the appearance of a vicious circle. There is, as Merton (1957: 270) put it, 'a continued and cumulative interplay between a deterioration of social relations within the membership group and positive attitudes towards the norms of a non-membership group'. However, this does not answer the question of how some people begin to orient themselves outwards rather than inwards. What are the social and personality factors which might predispose the individual to make the initial break with family and peer group?

WHEN DOES ANTICIPATORY SOCIALIZATION OCCUR?

In considering some conditions which might provide a possible answer to these questions it is relevant to look more closely at the na-

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[13]For further data on working-class attitudes about mobility, see: Chapter 12 of this study.

ture of anticipatory socialization. Is it an outcome of contact with out-group members? Does it occur prior to the shift in reference groups? Is what we measure as anticipatory socialization a change in attitudes occurring only _after_ social mobility has taken place? As Turner (1964: 85-86) has pointed out it is extremely difficult, even analytically, to untangle the chain of causation connecting anticipatory socialization and social mobility. However, one attempt to do so is to be found in an important paper by Lane and Ellis (1968). Basing much of their argument on their own research experience, they show that there are at least four distinct ways anticipatory socialization can enter into the mobility process. This leads them to posit four 'temporal paradigms': (1) anticipatory socialization; (2) situational socialization; (3) routine socialization; and (4) post socialization. Because of their relevance to the present problem, it is useful to describe these paradigms very briefly.[14]

The basic model, anticipatory socialization, is that proposed by Merton and described in the preceding paragraphs. It is one which involves, first of all, a weakening of the level of social integration so that there is the possibility and motivation for a positive shift in reference group from membership to non-membership group. This is followed by re-socialization and then social mobility. In Lane's and Ellis's terms, the sequence is: 'out-group affiliative motives --> out-group social contact --> social learning --> social mobility' (P. 9). As we have just seen, the genesis of the original motivation is--excepting personality characteristics--unexplained. Except by assuming, for instance, that adherence to middle-class values and norms

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[14]While relying heavily on their excellent review of the literature, I have in what follows also augmented it where relevant.

is widely dispersed throughout the social structure, this paradigm cannot provide an adequate explanation of why social mobility occurs at all.

Closely related to anticipatory socialization is situational socialization in which there is a reverse relationship between social contact and the shift in reference group. Much of the research on the formation or determination of aspirations is, Lane and Ellis suggest, in accord with this second paradigm. That is, that attitudes and values change <u>after</u> contact with significant others: a teacher, a community leader or a more prestigeful peer group. For reasons that are not entirely clear, promising, talented or attractive individuals are 'adopted' or singled out for special attention through a process of formal or informal sponsorship (Turner, 1960). A number of studies (Alexander and Campbell, 1964; Bell, 1963; Bennett and Gist, 1964; Beilin, 1956; Bordua, 1960; Campbell and Alexander, 1965; Ellis and Lane, 1963; Haller and Butterworth, 1960; Kraus, 1964; and Simpson, 1962) confirm that contact with middle-class peers helps to account for high status aspirations among working-class boys.[15] The sequence for situational socialization, then is: 'out-group social contact --> social learning --> out-group affiliative motive --> social mobility' (Lane and Ellis, 1968: 10).

The third paradigm 'routine socialization' assumes that there will be little or no acculturative problem associated with social mobility. Instead 'it premises that for reasons of downward mobility the parents (or kin) of lower-class youth are able in the normal course of sociali-

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[15]In one of the latest reports on the longitudinal study of Wisconsin boys by Sewell and his associates, the authors came to similar conclusions about the role of reference groups in the mobility process. Clearly, the variable we have called significant others' influence is an important factor. The present evidence appears to show that once formed its effects are far-reaching. Also, besides being a powerful explanatory factor, significant others' influence should be amenable to manipulation. It thus suggests itself as a point at which external agents might intervene to change educational and occupational attainment levels (Sewell et al, 1969: 89).

zation to familiarize them with the knowledge, attitude and skills of the middle-class subculture'. The sequence is 'in-group social contact --> social learning --> social mobility' (Lane and Ellis, 1968: 11). The paradigm seems to be in accord with a number of research findings on the contribution of family environment to ambition and social mobility. It puts another way the somewhat commonsensical but well documented view that mobility orientations, whether measured in terms of aspirations or more articulated psychological traits, arise in the home and are a direct outcome of parental influences (Bordua, 1960; Bell, 1963; Bennet and Gist, 1964; Ellis and Lane, 1963; Floud et al, 1956; Kahl, 1953; Sewell and Shah, 1968; and Swift, 1967).

But more significantly, the presence of these influences in the home, suggests that in many cases, the family as well as the mobile individual is to some extent deviant with respect to its objective position in the class structure. As Turner (1962: 397) puts it, 'the child fails to hold the ambitions which are characteristic of his class background because the impact of that background is comprised by inconsistent elements'.[16] The family, he continues, mediates the impact of social class

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[16]I have not, in this chapter considered aspects of family structure —notably size of family of origin and sibling position. The most reliable evidence is that provided by Blau and Duncan (1967: 295-330) which confirms earlier findings and beliefs that 'the proverbial large happy family is not conducive to occupational success' (P. 328). In terms of sibling position, it appears that, with many qualifications, the first-born and last-born children enjoy an advantage over the middle-born and that it is more disadvantageous to have younger siblings than older ones (pp. 328-329). Thus, working-class parents who are themselves achievement oriented may purposefully conform to middle-class behaviour by restricting their family size either to accelerate their own mobility or that of their children (Westoff, 1953; Berent, 1952; and Duncan, 1966). It follows that middle-class parents who are either low in achievement orientation or who have failed to internalize middle-class norms and values (perhaps as a result of social mobility) may have larger families thus creating disadvantages for their children. However, as class differentials in fertility seem to be narrowing and as determination of size of family is likely predicated on a variety of factors of which social mobility is but one, fertility will likely be less useful in the future (Glass, 1968: 118). Some data relating to family structure are considered in Chapter 7.

position upon the child in two ways:

First, the family either faithfully creates the typical life situation for each member, or it creates a situation which is atypical for members of the social stratum. Second, the family transmits a subculture which either corresponds to the family's position or deviates from it.

In support of this paradigm, Lane and Ellis (1968) refer to Miller and Reissman's (1961) arguement that in the United States those who do move into the middle class have relatives who were or are middle-class. And, in England, Jackson and Marsden (1962: 70) attribute a sizeable proportion of upward mobility to membership in the 'sunken middle class'.

One of the consequences of throwing open grammar school education has been that middle-class families who have collapsed through ill health, bankruptcy, foolishness or any of the stray chances of life, have been able to educate their children out of their condition and reclaim the social position of their parents and grandparents.

Another study, by Cohen (1958), found that significantly more downwardly mobile fathers had sons in college compared to their stationary counterparts. Downwardly mobile mothers were even more highly associated with sons' mobility potential: 80 percent of sons whose mother had a white-collar family background were going to college compared to only 42 percent with mothers of a working-class background (reported in Lipset and Bendix, 1959: 238). Similarly, in Britain Floud et al (1956: 88) found that 'mothers of successful working-class children . . . had frequently before marriage followed an occupation "superior" to that of their husbands'. Without necessarily claiming downward mobility on the part of the mother, the often repeated wisdom that 'if you educate a woman you educate a family' has been supported empirically in a number of studies (Bennett and Gist, 1964; Davis, 1957; Ellis and Lane, 1963; Martin, 1954; Simpson,1962; Turner, 1962; Strodtbeck, 1958; Young, 1965: 61).[17] Much of this research represents a departure from Kahl's (1953)

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[17]For a detailed and personal account of this process, see D. H. Lawrence's semi-autobiographical novel, Sons and Lovers. Hoggart (1957: 295) has also discussed at some length the important role women play in the early life of the upwardly mobile.

analysis of 'common man' boys where the pre-eminent factor in distinguish-

ing the mobile from the non-mobile is the father. Variances in ambition

within the same status and level of intelligence, are he argues, attri-

butable to differences in parents--particularly the father's orientation.

Parents who were discontented tended to train their sons from the earli-
est years of grammar school to take school seriously and use education
as the means to climb into the middle class. Only sons who internalized
such values were sufficiently motivated to overcome the obstacles which
faced (them) in school (P. 364).

However, Turner argues on the basis of his Los Angeles study (1962

and 1964) that both views may be correct. Unable to find support for

the 'mother hypothesis' he concluded that 'the special influence of the

mother washed out in favour of the more parsimonious principle that any

element in the family situation which introduces a higher class compon-

ent contributes to (upward) mobility' (quoted in Crockett, 1966: 302).

Nor does it seem that the higher class component need actually to be an

objective factor. Himmelweit (1963), for instance, found that parents

of working-class grammar school boys were 'more' middle-class in their

values than the parents of middle-class grammar school boys. Not only

were the boys deviant with respect to their objective class, but so were

the families. They had either retained or acquired a divergent set of

values to be duly passed on to their children.

Central to the concept of anticipatory socialization is the acquisi-

tion, by the mobile individual, of values and norms of the class or group

to which he aspires but is not yet a member. It is only when these have

been learned, that social mobility occurs. But the fourth paradigm sug-

gested by Lane and Ellis, 'post socialization' is based on the possibil-

ity that social learning occurs after the individual has been able to

alter his objective status. Following on from Blau's (1956: 293) state-

ment that 'economic changes are transformed into shifts in social affili-

ation only by those occupationally mobile individuals most of whose

friends are members of their terminal social stratum, the middle class in case of the upwardly mobile, the working class in case of the downwardly mobile', they set out the sequence of the paradigm as follows: 'occupational mobility --> out-group social contact --> out-group affiliative motive --> social learning --> social mobility' (P. 11).

Of the four paradigms, the post socialization sequence may be most relevant to intragenerational middle-mass mobility where education, excluding part-time training, has not been to any appreciable extent involved. Since intragenerational mobility has not been studied from this point of view, evidence is scanty. However, in a remarkable study, using longitudinal data on foremens' attitudes, Liebermann (1956) showed that workers promoted to foremen underwent systematic changes in attitudes _after_ they achieved the new roles. Later, due to redundancies, some foremen were cut-back to their former status. Re-administration of the questionnaire revealed that 'foremen who were demoted tended to revert to the attitudes they had previously held while they were in the worker role, while foremen who remained in the foreman role maintained the attitudes they had developed' (P. 331). While certainly of interest for role theory, it is unknown whether these findings are wholly applicable to downward social mobility in general. Studies of voting and union membership (Lipset and Gordon, 1953; Wilensky, et al, 1959) indicate that retention of middle-class attitudes by the downwardly mobile is the more likely outcome. Also, the studies discussed under 'routine socialization' imply that the downwardly mobile (sunken middle class) do not undergo resocialization into working-class values.

SOURCES OF OUT-GROUP ORIENTATION

Explanations of the source of the 'out-group affiliative motive' are generally couched in terms of personality differences (Lipset and

Bendix, 1959: 249). Gans (1962), for instance, suggests that the 'possession of special talents' will be enough to impel the individual out of the peer group and 'into the training grounds of the middle class'. But as he also notes, this is but one source of what he considers the requisite isolation necessary for the mobility venture. 'It requires that the young person be isolated from his family and peer group by a combination of pressures which push him out of these groups and incentives which pull him into the outside world'. Likewise, Merton (1957: 270) provides an important clue in his suggestion that 'it is the isolate, nominally in a group but only slightly incorporated in its network of social relations, who is most likely to become positively oriented toward non-membership groups'. Beyond personality factors, then, are essentially sociological conditions which promote and facilitate out-group affiliations and, in turn, social mobility.

Personal crises and late arrival into the peer group are also advanced by Gans as events producing the isolation he feels is so necessary if social mobility is to occur. In addition, the paradigm Lane and Ellis (1968) call 'routine socialization', as well as being an important modification of the basic Mertonian concept of anticipatory socialization, is also highly suggestive of from where the isolation or low integration may stem. As we have seen, research presented by them and augmented by British studies point to the possibility that the source of the deviant orientation--the out-group affiliative motive--may be traced not simply to the individual but to the marginal status of the family of origin. Prior experiences, within-family inconsistencies in class background, geographical mobility and similar events may all contribute to its low integration into the community. Thus, for reasons of downward mobility of one or both of the parents or blocked

mobility, upward mobility of the children might more appropriately be viewed as an objective or subjective _restoration_ of status rather than as a _change_ in social status.

DOWNWARD MOBILITY

Although the emphasis has throughout been on upward mobility, the same argument is also applicable to the phenomenon of downward mobility. Moving downward in the social scale is not, of course, simply the obverse of upward mobility. It is, for instance, difficult to think in terms of concepts such as 'structural supports for downward mobility'. However, the failure of the family to be fully incorporated into its objective class milieu--because of upward mobility of the parents, discrepancies within the family or perhaps ideological commitments--may mean the individual is more likely to deviate from middle-class achievement patterns and goals. Turner (1962: 398), for example argues that:

The typical middle class situation is often thought to be one in which the members experience relative economic security, receive a good deal of sustained attention and affection from their parents, experience a stable family life and which in other ways reflects the constellation of the small family in economic sufficiency. When this constellation is altered by family breakup or by the unusually large family, some of the important conditions which make the middle class child into the typical adult from his class background may be missing.

Similarly, Miller (1960: 10) in considering the 'stability' of mobility asks whether 'those who rise provide a firm footing for their progeny to maintain or to move above the new position, or is the third generation likely to fall back to the grandfather's position'? Evidence so far is too scanty to support or reject the hypothesis of 'clods to clods in three generations' though the Glass (1954) data show that British society does contain 'unstable elements' which are 'involved in reverse shifts in status in successive generations' (P. 286).[18] Fur-

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[18] For a summary of historical and comparative data, see Goode (1966: 590).

ther, novelistic if not sociological literature has often been concerned with the way a 'strong' and ambitious father inhibits the development of his son and how these traits re-emerge in the grandson. Lastly, and of less dramatic interest, it seems likely as Chapter 4 and 5 have shown fathers who over the course of their work life achieve non-manual occupations, may not take on middle-class values; they either actively encourage their children to enter manual occupations or are unable to convey to their children appropriate middle-class achievement behaviour.

In addition to the notion that low integration of the family of origin may be a result of social mobility, there may be other conditions or events which lead to the same result. In general, my interpretation of the evidence presented in this chapter and from observation led to the following general hypothesis: any source of non-integration of the family of origin into its objective class situation will make it more likely that the potentially mobile person will (1) affiliate himself with out-groups; (2) be able to withstand social pressures to conform to non-mobility patterns of behaviour; and (3) to cut community and peer group ties. This incomplete incorporation of the family of origin into the normal social milieu is an explanation congruent with Merton's observation that it is the isolate who is most prone to become positively oriented to norms of a non-membership group. It also provides a sociological approach towards elucidating what, beyond 'intelligence and motivation' may be involved in the capacity to break away from one social milieu and adapt to a new one. While there are still likely to be dissociative consequences entailed in 'pulling up roots' in this way, the impact may be mediated appreciably if the family of origin is only nominally a part of the old environment or diverges from it in important ways. A number of factors besides social mobility of the parents could

conceivably contribute to the low integration. At the outset, the most plausible were geographical mobility of the parents, the lack of an extended kinship structure, a disorderly work-life history of the father and the extent to which the family of origin engages in 'privatised' behaviour.

SUMMARY

Since the argument presented in this chapter is complicated, it may be useful to summarize the main points. I have tried to show that because values about success and status striving are not universally shared at all levels of the social structure, working-class people who aspire to middle-class status are likely to be treated as deviant. Evidence from those studies which view the working class as a more or less distinct sub-culture indicate that people who do orient themselves to middle-class lifestyles must contend with a considerable amount of negative social pressure from family and peers. There would seem to be two reasons for why this should occur: (1) middle-class work and life-styles are not generally very well regarded by working-class people and (2) orientations and behaviour directed outside of the membership group are often seen by implication, as a rejection of the membership group. The general perspective on these processes emerging from such studies is one which is roughly in accord with Merton's application of reference group theory to social mobility. He suggested that while anticipatory socialization aids the individual to change his social class, it is al-so a direct repudiation of membership group norms. Negative sanctions are likely to be directed at those who depart from its norms and attempt to adopt those of a higher group. These sanctions have, it would appear, sufficient force so as to make mobility emotionally and socially diffi-cult; it requires special strength and motivation to overcome the hurdles

which arise not only from the top but also the bottom of the social structure.

Alternatively, the individual may simply be so unusually intelligent or possess such special talents that middle-class sponsors single him out. They are able to offer incentives great enough to offset the social and emotional costs of cutting former ties. But beyond these personality characteristics, **neither** reference group theory or the studies reviewed in this chapter are able to provide an adequate explanation of the source of the initial impetus for affiliation and attempt at conformity with out-groups. What conditions or events predispose some people to take the more difficult path of deviating from group norms?

The one clue which does emerge is that the mobile or mobility-oriented person must be to some extent isolated from his objective membership groups. However, as one looks more closely at the sequence of events in the mobility process it becomes apparent that the Mertonian model of anticipatory socialization is but one of four possible paradigms. Of the four, the pattern Lane and Ellis call (routine socialization' seemed to fit much of the evidence from research on the genesis of mobility aspirations. This research suggests that the mobile individual, while deviating from his peer group and general class culture, may in fact be conforming to the values of his family of origin. This is, I argue, because the family itself is not well integrated into or is in other ways divergent from its social environment. Thus, instead of looking for events and conditions in the lives of individuals per se, the paradigm suggested the usefulness of examining more closely what had happened to the family of origin and to its members prior to one or more of its members moving upwards.

Much the same argument is meant to apply also to certain patterns

of downward mobility. While misfortunes of various kinds may account

for some downward mobility I have argued in this chapter that a low

level of integration of certain families objectively in the middle

class might contribute to what, objectively, is a downward orientation

and mobility of their children.

The next two chapters are concerned with conditions and events

which might lead to a low level of integration and then to mobility. I

will be looking, then, at the accounts the men in the Mobility Sample

gave of their earlier home experiences and the structure and attitudes

of their family of origin. These data are supplemented by those col-

lected in the course of interviewing fathers of these men. Chapter 7

focusses principally on factors related to educational aspirations and

achievement. Chapter 8 looks at influences and events connected to the

entry into work and choice of occupation.

CHAPTER 7

FAMILY BACKGROUNDS AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

This chapter presents findings from the Mobility Sample that re-
late to the general hypothesis outlined in Chapter 6. This is that the
socially mobile originate in families not well integrated into their
class and community. The data reported are mainly retrospective. I
was asking people to recall aspects of their own childhood, a time which
lay from one to several decades in the past. Because of this I have
wherever possible supplemented the accounts people gave with those pro-
vided by the fathers. Although the choice of a first job and of a ca-
reer as much as education is probably influenced by what happens in the
home, I will be looking mainly at family influences on educational a-
chievement in this chapter. The relationship of family background to
career choice and first jobs is considered in Chapter 8.

As we have seen in Chapter 6, social mobility is problematic; it
runs contrary to the systematic evidence we have concerning the distri-
bution of life chances in society. Thus stratification theory directs
our attention not to inequality _per se_, but to the way in which inequal-
ities are structured, persisting from generation to generation. The
key unit in the process of stratification is therefore the family rather
than the individual; though internally it may approach the socialist
ideal of equality and redistribution of wealth, it acts in society as
the principal institution perpetuating and crystallizing inequality.
According to stratification theory, it is the command by higher-class
families over economic and status resources which allows their children
to maintain or improve their social and economic position. It is the

lack of these resources which appears to consign children from less advantaged families to positions at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

It was, initially, the anomalous nature of social mobility that led to the search for factors--social origins, aspirations, lifestyles --that might set the families of mobile individuals apart and detached from the general class milieu in which they were placed. Given what we do know about the forces which lead to perpetuation of status from generation to generation, I argued that if a family was only partially integrated into its objective class then it would be more likely to inculcate in children values which would in turn lead to mobility. For the working class, these would take the form of some adaptation of middle-class values or perhaps, simply, a discontent with their present lot and an only partially articulated desire for something better of different for their children. While parents are unlikely to want their children to do worse than themselves, I argued further that the particular circumstances in what we categorize as middle-class families may be such that their children either fail to learn the appropriate middle-class attitudes and values or they are taught a set of values which are more appropriate to a working-class than a middle-class milieu. In short, the middle-class family which is only partially integrated into its objective class may be a determinant of downward mobility.

CLASS ELEMENTS: FATHERS' ORIGINS

In their study of 88 working-class grammar school boys, Jackson and Marsden (1962) wondered whether they 'were to some extent dealing with new or temporary accretions to the working class. Not so much upper working-class homes as sunken middle-class families'? Starting from this important clue one hypothesis was that the upwardly mobile are more likely to have fathers who were downwardly mobile than are the

stable manual respondents. Similarly, downward mobiles are more likely to have fathers who were upwardly mobile than are the stable non-manuals. This suggests a kind of cyclical phenomenon in which the mobile form a status group peripheral to their objective stratum existing more or less independent of 'core' middle-class and working-class status groups. If this were to prove accurate, then the notion of 'clods to clods in three generations' would be a phenomenon affecting only a segment of society. On the one hand would be continuity and on the other something approximating perpetual intergenerational change.

Unfortunately, more than a third of the men could not recall, even in general, what occupation their grandfathers had held. With the use of the interview schedules for the fathers, it was possible to piece together some additional family ties and thereby decrease the number of unknowns and dubious titles to about 30 percent of the sample. The results, by type of mobility are shown in Table 7.1. These show that there is little or no difference between the stable manual and the upwardly mobile and what difference there is, is in the opposite direction to that predicted by the hypothesis. Thus, about 78 percent of the upwardly mobile men come from families in which the father and grandfather were both in manual occupations. In contrast, 71 percent of the stable manual men had working-class fathers and grandfathers. With respect to the downwardly mobile, the data tend to support the hypothesis. Although the numbers are small, the difference between the downwardly mobile and the stable non-manual is statistically significant. It appears that the downwardly mobile are much more likely than the stable non-manual to have had working-class grandfathers (60 percent versus 22 percent).

TABLE 7.1

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND FATHERS'

INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY: MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 82)

Fathers' Intergenerational Mobility	Pattern of Conventional Mobility (Sons)			
	(1) Upward	(2) Stable Non-Manual	(3) Downward	(4) Stable Manual
Upward	0	22%	60%	0
Stable	78%	78%	40%	71%
Downward	22%	0	0	29%
Total	100% (32)	100% (18)	100% (15)	100% (18)

1 X 4: $x^2 = .341$; N.S.   2 X 3: $x^2 = 4.891$; P $<$ .05
          df $= 1$ df $= 1$

As I described in Chapter 5, one pattern of downward mobility identified was one in which the father had been upwardly mobile over his career and usually without the benefit of additional education beyond the minimum. By ignoring the father's intergenerational mobility, which in the absence of the data on all the grandfathers, is incomplete, and concentrating on his career mobility, more of the data can be used. Table 7.2 provides a parallel set of findings to that of Table 7.1. That is, that there is very little difference between the upwardly mobile and the stable manual groups. The downwardly mobile again differ significantly from the stable non-manual in having fathers who were upwardly mobile over their own work life. Thus, Table 7.2 provides confirmation of what was shown in Chapter 5 to be an important pattern of downward mobility. Here it emerges as an equally important explanation of downward mobility.

TABLE 7.2

CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND FATHERS' CAREER MOBILITY

	Pattern of Conventional Mobility (Sons)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Fathers' Mobility	Upward	Stable Non-Manual	Downward	Stable Manual
Mobile	2%	21%	55%	7%
Non-Mobile	98%	79%	45%	93%
Totals	100% (44)	100% (24)	100% (22)	100% (27)

1 X 4: $x^2 = 1.090$; N.S.   2 X 3: $x^2 = 5.599$; P $<$ .02

DOWNWARD MOBILITY AND FATHER'S CLASS OF ORIGIN

It is useful to examine this in more detail. The most noteworthy aspect is the considerable similarity between some of the upwardly mobile informants and the fathers of most of the downwardly mobile informants in the sample. Men in my sample who had been upwardly mobile through a non-educational route tended to share with these fathers a more working-class than middle-class set of values and attitudes. For both, occupational mobility had come too late in life for ties with the working class to be severed. One indication of this was in their inability to see the possible implications of education for their children. It was not so much that they did not value education as that they were unaware, except in a vague way, of how an experience such as grammar school might be of benefit. Some, of course, were antagonistic towards the whole idea. Mr. Middleton, encountered in Chapter 5, said, 'My parents wasn't very interested, I didn't think.[1] They thought gram-

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[1] Names are fictitious. The addition of 'Sr.' means I am referring to the father of one of the respondents in the Mobility Sample.

mar school and that lot was a load of nonsense'. More often there was

a positive pressure exerted to direct sons into technical fields and

skilled trades and by implication away from white-collar work and fur-

ther education.

They kept on at me about apprenticing. 'Don't go for the big money.
Don't worry about friends getting 20 pounds when you're getting four
to ten as an apprentice, because you'll find out at the end of the
time you're getting twice as much as them, plus a better job' (Skilled
engineer--father a buyer).

I couldn't think of anything to do when I left school and a couple of
my friends went to Acme engineering. My father said, 'Take an appren-
ticeship whatever you decide'. So I took the engineering side up
(Toolmaker--father, a company director).

I wasn't a hundred percent sure of anything but my mother and father
thought that printing was something with a future. I can remember
from an early age, 11 or 12, my mom and dad, saying 'Become a printer'.
I wouldn't say I didn't want to become a printer, but I never thought
of anything else, really (Newspaper printer--father, a clerk).

They were, it often appeared, directing their sons into the very trades

they felt they had been robbed of by the depression or by the hiatus of

war, as more than one man described it.

A second, and equally important aspect of the mobility of the

fathers was that these were also the men who expressed the most disil-

lusionment with their present work. However successful they were rela-

tive to where they began, they were in occupations which were apparent-

ly insecure. The frequently expressed desire 'to have a trade behind

me' suggested their jobs were somewhat futile and nebulous compared with

the tangible work done by tradesmen. The result was that they had pas-

sed on to their children a largely negative view of the middle class

and the sorts of work its members do. With emphatic nods of agreement

from his father, an office supervisor, Mr. Biggin, gave me his views

and apparently his father's as well, on the occupational hierarchy.

Some jobs are waster jobs. People doing these jobs are well paid and
they're doing nothing. Take a chartered accountant, for instance, he's

got to do his training but once that's through he only works a formula, really. Everything works the same--near enough identical--once he gets his qualifications. Or take a job like works manager. From what my father tells me they're absolutely useless. It seems to work out that the brightest people are not at the top. There's more money to be earned on the tools than on the management side so only the lazy people go on the management side.

Mr. Biggin is a very contented, almost archetypal, bricklayer. Mr.

Willets Sr., now in a non-manual job, maintained that,

These glorious suburban boys make me sick. The toffee-nosed, what you see, rushing across London at 9:00 in the morning with their brollies in hand and rushing back again at 5:00. It's one big rat race and they're all so damned ambitious they trample anybody who gets in their way. I work with them now, and they're the most unpleasant people you can meet. The more, the higher they are in status, the worse they are.

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that his son had become a semi-

skilled worker.

SATISFIED FATHERS

On the whole, there was no group of fathers any more satisfied with

how things had worked out for their children than were those of the down-

wardly mobile respondents. What might have been a difficult question

to ask of these fathers, was in most cases just the opposite. When they

had not positively directed their children into trades they had bent to

what seemed the 'natural' leaning of the child. Mr. Newbold, who is

apprenticing, explained it this way (his father is an inspector for Lon-

don Transport):

I've been fooling around with electrical stuff since I was about eight. My father was always behind me, it's his hobby as well. Both he and my mother went to grammar schools so it was important for me to pass the 11+ . And everytime we used to go down and see those cousins (who had passed) after I had taken the 11+ and didn't pass, it was 'How well they're getting on at grammar school'. But my father never let me down ever. He knew there was something going on and that I wouldn't just leave school and get any old job. I've proven that now.

Only in a few instances were there signs of discontent about what had

happened to their sons. Mr. Buckland Sr., a civil servant and a grammar

school graduate (discussed in Chapter 5), was both bemused and angry

with the choice of lifestyle his son had adopted. At one point he said, 'I wanted him to go into light engineering, to get some sort of trade, if he wasn't going to go on in school. I feel he let himself and me down'.

MOTHERS' SOCIAL CLASS AND MOBILITY

So far I have centered the discussion on the relationship of the father's social origin to his son's intergenerational mobility pattern. As it is father-son mobility which is of paramount concern in this study, the majority of the data collected pertain to the career, background and attitudes of the father. Yet, as Douglas (1964: 72) notes:

We cannot afford to ignore the background of the mothers when looking at the educational progress of their children; they make an equal con-tribution with the fathers to inherited ability and possibly a greater one to attitudes to learning. In ambitious working-class households it is not unusual to find that the mother comes from a middle-class family and supplies the drive and incentive for her children to do well in school.

Similarly, in the Huddersfield study by Jackson and Marsden (1962), the fact that either the father or mother came from middle-class backgrounds was considered an important factor explaining the upward mobility of their grammar school students. Their evidence is also congruent with the approach of Turner (quoted in Chapter 6) who argues that any higher class component is likely to contribute to upward mobility (Turner, 1962).

In the accounts of their early life there is, among the upwardly mobile, evidence that there were middle-class connections on the mother's side of the family, though, curiously, not on the father's side. Invari-ably, then, it was the mother who was seen as having brought a middle-class influence into the family. As some commented:

My mother was the one that did the driving. She's the one that set me on the course. She was much different than my father, shall we say from a different environment? My mother came from the Midlands and she was more or less tied to local life and her family were the local pub-licans. This is an entirely different environment to engineering. She

could probably see through it better to what the job meant (Chief Draught-sman).

He's not <u>the</u> working class. Not the cloth cap type. They're reasonably well off now, but still basically working-class. I wouldn't want my mother to hear me say that. I suppose she thinks of herself as not be-ing working-class. Anyway, she's not got a working-class outlook (Cost Accountant).

My mother always felt she had come down in the world, she'd married be-neath her, marrying my father. I don't know a great deal about my moth-er's side of the family because of that. I know they were quite well off. I should say they were middle-class types. Her father was a direc-tor of one of the shipping companies. An engineer was a great comedown in the world for her and she let him know about it (Financial Analyst).

However, as one begins to count up the number of men who did have

mothers who had 'married down', it emerges that men who remained in the

working class are about as likely to have a mother with middle-class

origins as are the upwardly mobile. This is shown in Table 7.3. Few

of the stable working-class men mentioned it spontaneously, suggesting

that perhaps the upwardly mobile are more conscious of family background

or that the mother had made it more apparent than in those families where

there has been little or no social mobility. In the absence of addition-

al data one can only speculate as to the precise reason.

TABLE 7.3

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND ORIGINAL SOCIAL CLASS

OF MOTHERS: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 86; Unknowns = 31)

	Pattern of Social Mobility			
Mother's Original Social Class	(1) Upward	(2) Stable Non-Manual	(3) Downward	(4) Stable Manual
Middle Class	21%	68%	27%	25%
Working Class	79%	32%	73%	75%
Totals	100% (33)	100% (17)	100% (16)	100% (20)

1 X 4: $X^2 = .102$; N.S.   2 X 3: $X^2 = 5.241$; P $<$ .05

For example, it may be, as Hoggart (1957: 295) suggests, that the up-

wardly mobile scholarship boy tends to be closer to the women of the house than to the men. It may also be that the upwardly mobile are more aware of the relationship of occupation to class and status and in retrospect are able to see that their mothers had married 'down'. Perhaps by virtue of their more marginal status, they are more sensitive to status differences and in quest of a status for themselves are searching their own background for clues as to what in the present they 'really' are.

Once again, as in looking at the social origins of the fathers of the men in the Mobility Sample, it is the downwardly mobile who stand out. Table 7.3 shows that they are twice as likely as are the stable non-manual men to have mothers who originated in the working class. These findings along with those about father's class of origin suggest that men labelled downwardly mobile tend not to come from a solid middle-class background. but from a much more peripheral or marginal segment of it. In other words, both sets of data are suggestive of intergenerational instability; sons of some upwardly mobile men return to the working class. Thus, most of the fathers of these men fit best into the third pattern of upward mobility described in Chapter 5 and as I also noted there, men moving up late in their work life had, almost universally, married women of an equal or lower social class and level of education than themselves.

The opposite pattern, of restoration of status in the next generation by a sunken middle class, is not supported by these data. At the same time, figures for the Mobility Sample are fairly close to those given by Jackson and Marsden (1962: Table 4, P. 68). They found that about 30 percent of their upwardly mobile sample had at least one middle-class grandparent. In the Mobility Sample 30 percent of the upward-

ly mobile and 33 percent of the stable manual men had at least one middle-class grandparent. There is, unfortunately, no comparison group of stable manual people in the Jackson and Marsden study. Had there been, it is, on the basis of my evidence, questionable whether they would have put stress on the concept of 'sunken middle class' since people of working-class origin are, whether mobile or non-mobile, about equally likely to have middle-class elements in their family tree.[2]

PARENTAL ENCOURAGEMENT

Connections with a middle-class milieu are equally present in the backgrounds of both the mobile and non-mobile who originated in the working class. Are the effects of these the same for both groups? I asked everyone whether their parents had been ambitious for them and if so, whether it was their mother, their father or both who had been the most encouraging. Table 7.4 gives the results for the first question for each pattern of social mobility. There are systematic and statistically significant differences between the respective groups in the direction anticipated. That is, the upwardly mobile are more likely than those who are manual to recall there being a sense of encouragement and ambition in their home; the downwardly mobile are less likely than the stable non-manual to have experienced encouragement. Further, the downwardly mobile appear to have received the least encouragement of all groups from their father or mother.

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[2] For additional evidence on the 'sunken middle class' see Goldthorpe et al (1969: 96). The way in which their figures are combined make comparisons difficult but about two-thirds of their manual workers had experience of white-collar milieux from family or occupational life.

TABLE 7.4

PROPORTION RECALLING THAT THEIR PARENTS WERE ENCOURAGING

BY CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY (N = 110; Unknowns = 7)

Mobility Pattern	Percent	Total N
(1) Upward	64%	42
(2) Stable Non-Manual	86%	22
(3) Downward	37%	19
(4) Stable Manual	41%	27
All Groups		110

1 X 4: x^2 = 3.982; C = .23; P < .05

2 X 3: x^2 =10.777; C = .51; P < .001

The small proportion of present manual workers who did recall any sense of encouragement (16 percent in all) make percentage comparisons of which parent was the most ambitious misleading. Thus, Table 7.5 shows in whole numbers those who in answer to the second question mentioned specifically their mother as opposed to their father or both.[3]

TABLE 7.5

CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND SOURCE OF PARENTAL
ENCOURAGEMENT: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 62)
(Whole Numbers)

Source of Encouragement	Pattern of Conventional Mobility			
	(1) Upward	(2) Stable Non-Manual	(3) Downward	(4) Stable Manual
Mother	16	11	4	2
Father/Both	10	7	3	9
Totals	26	18	7	11

1 X 4: Fisher's Exact Test: P = .02

2 X 3: Fisher's Exact Test: P = .34; N.S.

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[3]The data are dichotomized in this way in order to use the Fisher Exact Probability Test which can only be calculated for 2 X 2 tables (Siegel, 1956: 96-104).

It can be seen that for the upwardly mobile it is, compared to the stable manual, mothers who are most likely to be mentioned. Among those men with middle-class origins who were encouraged, there are no differences by mobility pattern--the downwardly mobile are as likely to mention their mother as are the stable non-manual.

THE MEANING OF ENCOURAGEMENT

What did this encouragement amount to? Often the answers were vague; people were not able to define just exactly how or in what way the parents had been ambitious for them. For those defined as stable middle-class, the sense of encouragement was, generally, a taken-for-granted aspect of growing up. Mr. Rickard, a civil servant, articulated what was more often left implicit: 'probably my mother was more ambitious for us than our father. But there was, well it was the way we were brought up, to encourage ourselves. We weren't driven but we were always made aware that in order to get on in life, it paid to work and pass exams'. But, it was more often in what was done, notably interfering with the educational selection process, that middle-class parents showed concern about their children's future: 'The attitude at home was that it was necessary to pass the 11+', Mr. Reddick explained, 'If I hadn't passed, my father would have paid to send me to a grammar school. He paid for my brother and sister, so I'm sure he would have, had the situation arose'. In Mr. Nalder's case, the need did arise:

I recall the 11+ was basically an intelligence test. I reckon I was always a late developer and I flunked it. I went to a private school where I got a couple of 'O' levels (Insurance Broker).

Others in this group never did encounter the state school system and as a matter of course went from preparatory school to a public school. As Mr. Merry-West said, 'My education was planned in advance. I went

to a prep school and then a "public school", in the English sense, and took the "A" levels before I left. There was every intention of my going on to university'. The general impression from the interviews is that middle-class parents are often prepared to intervene if the 'normal' selection procedure threatens their child's welfare, and in other cases to ignore the main educational system; their children may not even be tested against the formal selection processes of the society.

At the other end of the social scale--the stable working class--the predominant attitude is one that can best be summarized as 'laissez-faire'. Over and over there was, reflected in what people said, a genuine desire to avoid over-influencing the child while at the same time being prepared to 'back them up in whatever they want to do'. Something of the dialectic of this, a perhaps contemporary working-class phenomenon, was caught by Mr. Popple Sr. He is a foreman mechanic. His son apprenticed as a panel beater.

Up to about 15 he wanted to go into the merchant navy. But he also wanted to be a train driver and a fireman, like all kids. I don't know what put him off the navy. We never tried to influence him; neither of our children have we ever tried to do that to. We let them choose their lives for themselves. I'd never stop them like that. We wanted them to get on but there again, you can't be too ambitious, otherwise you're going to influence them. So I was happy about his choice of work. I knew something about it, but I didn't influence him.

Thus, there is, on the one hand, a vague desire for the child to obtain a good education and a good job, but only if he has the 'natural' ability and wants it. 'I'd be a bit more ambitious for them than my father was for me', Mr. Smythe, a carpenter, said about his children, 'but I wouldn't push them too far but as far as he likes or is able to go'. Above all, force or 'pushing' is to be avoided. Mr. Irvine, a brewery delivery driver, was of this view:

I'd like a good education for them. If they so desire, they can carry on beyond fifteen to higher things. I'd back them all the way. But I wouldn't force them into anything they didn't want to do.

This was what people believed was true for their children and it was what they recalled about their own parents. 'I didn't really think about education, really', said Mr. Reid, a printer, 'You just left when you were 15 and that was it. It was "if you pass, you pass, if you don't, that doesn't matter". You know, if you start pushing kids, they get worried'. Another added, with approval, 'As long as I was happy, they didn't push me at all. As long as I was working and earning was all they wanted of me'.

That children should do what, within their capabilities and desires would make them most happy, was the main sentiment. It stands in opposition to the middle-class view in which educational decisions and, as I shall show in the next chapter, even career decisions are made for the child. It is a view different also from the older working-class view in which children were assets to be exploited as soon as possible. Only among the older men and often those who had in the end been upwardly mobile, did it appear that parents had anxiously awaited the day their children would be working. Mr. Cormack, now a buyer, said:

I thought about an apprenticeship but your mother and father said, 'ten bob a week is nothing. You can't go. You got to be put in something earning a bit more', showing a lack of foresight. I wish I had gone through an apprenticeship.

A much younger man commented:

A half day off, that's about all I can remember (about the 11+). My parents weren't concerned really. The only thing was that we had to go to Chiswick to school if we passed and there was all the paraphernalia of school uniforms and you must do this, and you must do that. With three of us I don't think they were in a position to spend the money.

But this was a view quickly disappearing. Mr. Brooks Sr., whose son had been upwardly mobile, recognized the transition:

In my young days when I was at school, the only thing you heard from your parents was, 'Be glad when they start to work' and you were pushed into anything as long as you brought in a bit of money. That was what I had. But my children didn't have that. In fact, I had 12 months

money from the two of them. Martin worked for 12 months and lived with us and saved 50 pounds and he had to spend that when he went on his course at Oxford.

In few working-class homes visited in the interviewing, then, was 'stopping on' an insurmountable financial obstacle.[4] At least, few manual respondents or fathers made any reference to the costs entailed 'in backing them as far as they are able or as they desire'. At the same time the frequent use of this phrase, 'stopping on' among working-class people is suggestive of where education fits in the larger world. Not only is continuing one's education beyond the minimum seen as unusual but it is also a postponing of adulthood. It is marking time before entering the real world in which people work and live instead of going to school. Because of this conception of education, it was not always easy to draw the line between a democratic attitude and an indifferent one. What some fathers regarded as the democratic and correct thing to do--let their children decide for themselves--was sometimes interpreted by sons, my respondents, as indifference. As two young working-class informants put it:

If parents were concerned they were careful not to show it. Anyway, no one in my family knew anything about the 11+ or grammar school. It wasn't in then and even if it was, I only wanted out (Core Winder).

I think it was up to the parents and it wasn't very important to them, whether I took the 11+ or not. I left school with everybody else at 15. My parents weren't worried about it one way or another. (Carpenter's Mate).

At the same time, the fathers of these two men were both of the opinion that they had been encouraging but not forceful. They had let their boys and the school work out what was 'best' for them.

UPWARD MOBILITY AND ENCOURAGEMENT

Some years ago Kahl (1953) after intensive interviewing of lower

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[4]Evidence presented by Banks (1971: 64-66) suggests this is generally true.

middle-class boys, what he called 'common man boys', found that beyond IQ, the single most important determinant of educational achievement of the boys was the positive influence exerted by parents. As he concluded, 'Parents who were discontented tended to train their sons from the earliest years of grammar school to take school seriously and use education as the means to climb into the middle class. Only sons who internalized such values were sufficiently motivated to overcome the obstacles which faced the common man boys in school; only they saw a reason for good school performance and college aspirations' (P. 364). It would simplify matters considerably if my evidence showed that the men who moved upwards came from homes where there was encouragement, support and an attempt to inculcate middle-class values. Certainly, as Table 7.4 showed, upwardly mobile men reported encouragement at home somewhat more often than did the stable manual men.

However, in reading over the interview schedules of the upwardly mobile, the most striking aspect is the frequency with which negative influences are described. Adversity, antagonism and 'short sighted' attempts to influence the child were in the descriptions of the upwardly mobile actually more common than support and encouragement.[5]

Only in a few instances was there much of what my informants called 'pressure'. Mr. Bruce, whose Bethnal Green father 'scrimped and saved' in the event that he might want to 'stop on', recalled there being some. He is now a senior clerk for BOAC.

It was important that I pass the 11+. I was promised a bike and such stuff. As it happened, I passed the 11+ and didn't want the bike. I didn't study for it, I didn't worry about it. It was entirely different when the G.C.E.'s came along because all along it was drummed into you, you pass the G.C.E.'s, or this is it.

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[5] In the interview schedules, it might be noted, there are sometimes vivid inconsistencies between what was said spontaneously and answers given to other questions of a more closed nature. Thus, some men who felt that their parents 'had been ambitious for them', said nearly the opposite in other parts of the interview.

A variety of positive forces coalesced in Mr. Nash's case. The son of a ship's plater, he attended grammar school and art college and now at 26, is rising quickly in commercial art. He said of his home life:

My parents were very keen for me to go to grammar school. They were delighted when I passed the 11+. Particularly so because two of their friends' children didn't. It was the exception rather than the rule to go to grammar school from that kind of a background even then, which is comparatively recently. They, of course, coming from their background, thought of it as a major triumph.

Mr. Carswell said of his parents:

Father frightened me into it, my mother encouraged me. My mother helped me a lot with my study. She would spend no end of hours asking me questions, going through the books, especially for the G.C.E. Because she wanted to stay on in school, but her parents wouldn't have it. She's had a kind of flirtation with it. She liked education and wanted me to have it.

Some parents had, like the Nashes and the Carswells, striven to improve the lot of their children and a few men also placed particular emphasis on the positive role their mother had played in encouraging them. 'My family are engineers basically. I expected to follow in the family tradition but my mother stepped in and said, "No, you're not going to do that dirty, filthy work"', said Mr. Killy, now a chief draughtsman. And Mr. Fidler, an accountant, said:

'I probably grew up in a sort of very narrow field. My father is a fitter, one brother is a sort of engineer, my other brother followed my father. That was the only horizon I had, to become an engineer or something. I really just had a general secondary education because of the war. At the end of it, my mother was a bit depressed with the state of my education, so she sent me to a commercial school. To go into an office was from my mother's point of view, quite something; to do a white-collar job, that sort of thing'.

These accounts, however, have to be set against those of men who remembered only antagonism and ignorance on the part of one or both parents. Remarks such as the following were equally, if not more, predominant among men who had moved upwards.

I don't think they cared, to be honest. They just left me go my own

way and that was it (Shop Manager).

In actual fact, I have arguments with me father. I always have had. He thinks I'm a bit big-headed. I want to keep going. I want to achieve what he never achieved. Whereas he's content to go have a drink at night, I'm concerned. That's not living; I can't just nip down to the pub for a drink and all my feelings are gone (Sales Manager).

The situation where we lived in Scotland was so awful that when I was a kid of 12 I had the highest marks in the whole of Scotland for the schol- arship examination. And, my father wouldn't let me go to the grammar school because you had to sign a form saying you were staying on until you were 15, and because he wanted me to leave school at the earliest opportunity (Headmaster--who later went part way through the priest- hood).

What I remember is I wanted to pass the 11+. I wanted to pass, I wanted to go to grammar school. I wanted to go to university. For a long time it was suggested by my parents that I leave and go for an apprenticeship. My family felt that way even when I was in grammar school, in fact (Physicist).

Younger upwardly mobile men, some of whom did go to grammar school and some who did not, recalled the dual influences of family and peers as a pressure acting primarily to keep them in the secondary modern stream. Parents, if not antagonistic about 'stopping on', seemed to have been as passive as those of stable manual men about what happened educationally to their children. Mr. Jarvis, now a shipping clerk, said about the '11+' exam:

I remember I didn't sit it because I wanted to go to the same school as my brother. I could have sat for it. It was my decision. My par- ents, possibly, wanted me to go for it, I'm not sure. I was at the age where I just said, 'oh, I want to go with me brother'. If I had of sat it, I don't think I would have taken it properly which was, I suppose, foolish of myself.

Likewise, Mr. Gammon, who did get some 'O' levels at a secondary modern school, was strongly influenced by friends and family:

The thing I remember most about the 11+ was I didn't want to pass. Me brother was at Southgate, me sister was there at the time, most of me friends at the time were where I was. I used to come near enough the top in the class (the B class not the A class). I knew they wouldn't make it, I didn't want to go to a higher grade, the grammar school or something like that. I wanted to go to Southgate. I answered the questions fairly and I don't think I would have passed anyway. But I didn't want to pass. I didn't want to go to grammar school.

Mr. Hennessey, a computer analyst, also went to the exam with similar

feelings:

I remember the day of the 11+ very well. I had my twin brother; and we
all sort of trotted over there together. I wasn't worried about it at
all because I was with my friends and we all sort of felt we were doing
the same thing and probably all going to the same local secondary school.
My parents didn't worry a lot about it either. They didn't tell us to
go to bed early or anything like that. We were working-class and I hadn't
really given it any thought: going to grammar school. Most of them
didn't go to grammar school. My brother didn't go, he didn't do well
enough. I ended up almost all on my own. I regret that my brother's
intelligence is round about the same as mine and he left school at 15
and didn't get as good an education as I did. He got a raw deal, really.

Mr. Fleming, who lived not far from Mr. Hennessey, found that doing well

on the 11+ exam set him apart, 'I felt, well, individualistic is the

best word. I mean I didn't plan to go to grammar school or university;

I just passed the 11+, and that was it. It made me feel very much alone

for awhile, especially since I had to go to a school way over in Chis-

wick'.

Few, then, of the upwardly mobile, expected to go to a grammar

school and many, at that age anyway, did not even want to. Parents, as

well, were not unduly worried or totally aware of what grammar school

might mean to their children.

NEGATIVE REFERENCE GROUPS

As Kahl (1953) implies, one can emulate a higher status group or

individual or one can be discontented or one can simply accept one's

present position. Without actually explaining the 'why' of it, he ar-

gued instead that it was first of all a repudiation of the membership

class or group which leads people positively to encourage their children.

Anticipatory socialization, in other words, follows or parallels dis-

content. Thus, among the upwardly mobile, a second pattern of what was

at least a predisposition to mobility, centered around either their own

determination or that of their parents or both, that the working-class

environment was one to escape or avoid if at all possible. Perhaps be-

cause they had escaped it, these men were willing to talk about it,

whereas the stable manual informants could not do so without also, in

effect, demeaning their own present position. At any rate, rather than

emulating their father many men used him as an example of what not to

be. And some fathers also used themselves or their fathers in a simi-

lar way as a negative reference person. Mr. Adams Sr. explained:

I used to say to him (his son), there's nothing dishonourable about your
grandfather; he's a lovable old dustman—you must never be a dustman;
I used my father as an example of what not to be.

Similarly, Mr. Brooks Sr., described how he had encouraged his son:

My wife worked in a boot factory before we were married, so we both knew
that side of it. It was really to avoid that type of life that we en-
couraged them. That was more the motive. It wasn't for grabbing a lot
of money and we hadn't any special jobs in mind for them. We just didn't
want them to go through my working-life experience in the factory. They
both won a place to the grammar school, so I didn't have to pay. So we
encouraged them to work at school and then something nice'd open up for
'em, which it has done. So we did encourage them for the simple reason
of avoiding that type of life we had to work in.

Some men recalled with horror and repugnance, the sort of environ-

ment in which they were raised without necessarily knowing what or when

the realization that there were alternatives arose. Said Mr. Robbins:

I went into clerical work just to get out of the awful slum in which I
lived. When my father came back after the first world war, he was an
engineer—he'd served an apprentice for 5 years. His salary was three
pounds something per week for more than a 48-hour week. I used to watch
my father come back smothered with grease. He broke his arm, he caught
it in a belt. It didn't seem to me it was any kind of life for a per-
son (Commercial Accountant).

Mr. Garritt, now an office manager, described his part of London

this way:

In those days being from Fulham was a big hindrance. I don't think you
can imagine what life was like in London in the 20's and 30's. If you
were raised in a poor area you had wonderful parents, lots of brothers
and sisters, lots of friends. But you were even classed by where you
live. This is a terrible thing for a kid. When I was about 14, going
out to talk to girls, trying to find my way out of the district, right
up until I did service, I was always ashamed of where I lived. The

point was, it was a deep inferiority complex thrust upon us. We grew up
inferior. We all felt inferior, everyone on our street.

Again and again, the theme of narrow horizons came up as these men
spoke of their childhood. The symbolic and literal merged in Mr. Adams'
case: 'I lived in a flat near the gas works--the only thing that opened
out of my window was the gasometer--a place called Laundry Yard, a cul
de sac. That was my only knowledge of the world outside, that gasometer
and the sheet metal works next door'.

These are, of course, mainly the older men in the sample, raised
during the 1920's and 1930's when grammar school and further education
were not much more than a theoretical possibility for most. 'You didn't
hear about scholarships in those days', said Mr. Allen, 'All you heard
about a scholarship was when someone won one and they were usually the
folks of the town's kiddies'. Mr. Ferguson, who did win one, recalled
that 'the family actually roared with laughter when I said I was 18th
in the town. They said, "Oh, you're looking at the list upside down".
I used to wonder years later how it happened, me the son of a well digger;
I wasn't bright or anything'. But, nevertheless, it did happen to Mr.
Ferguson and in different ways all of these men have managed to move up-
wards in the occupational hierarchy. Equally discouraging forces and
obstacles stood in the way of most of these men as for those who did
not rise above the status of their father. There were some differences,
perhaps in personality, perhaps in the internal dynamics of the home
which a survey approach is unable to illuminate. For example, one father
interviewed had twin boys, one of whom was in my upwardly mobile sub-
sample; the other who if interviewed would have been in the stable man-
ual group. He said of them:

Now Arthur is middle-class but Michael is still working-class. It's
mainly because Arthur got A levels, he's sort of more bright than Michael,
so he's ended up with a better job. We really don't know why there is

the difference. Arthur was always brighter, right from a baby. Both
went to the same school and had the same upbringing. Arthur was grammar
school material and Michael wasn't. That's all there is to it. We're
close to them both; we've never made any distinctions. But we were told
at the school that Michael wasn't grammar school standard so it was no
good trying to force him. You can't put in what's not there. He's more
on the labour side, let's say. It's made a big difference; Michael has
had to plod, where Arthur has had plain sailing.

Similarly, Mr. Christie, a postman, seemed to have had as much if

not more ambition and drive than men who did move up. There was little

in his background to distinguish him from these men. Yet, as he put it:

I was born right next to Kings Cross Station; no one could be born in a
worse slum than that. At the same time, I always felt I could do a
little better. But coming to the turn where I've tried, nothing much
has happened, and now I've found I've left it just a little bit too
late.

Finally, there was Mr. Markham who, in what he described of his

early life, should have been a case study of upward mobility. Instead

he has spent most of his work life as a milk roundsman:

I suppose it was mainly the church that influenced me. Here I think it
goes back to my childhood. You've got to have in mind the conditions
I lived under and how I carried myself as a youngster. Dad used to
drink and his outlook was so long as you have a roof over your head,
a pair of shoes, that's alright. As soon as I was old enough I progres-
sed from what was a Sunday school--I took a very deep interest in the
church. I spent most of my time with them and through those people I
developed my outlook. I taught myself to speak better than people
around me where I lived. I moved in that kind of circle. And from
that I thought I wanted to be somebody and I sort of broke into office
work; I got the job by myself.

Even from that job as a junior I met a tremendous lot of people and I
got invited out: 'Would you like to come out for the weekend?' Oh
yes! I never missed a chance to go out in the country coming from
where I did in London. To me it was marvelous to spend a weekend in
somebody's house who had a garden and a nice home. This is how I felt.
But the war came along and shattered what should have been a life-long
relationship.

Whereas both Mr. Markham and Mr. Christie had, for a variety of

reasons, been frustrated in their desire to achieve a higher status,

some younger men had simply 'found themselves' in a white-collar job

without benefit of a grammar school education or any further training.

Mr. Blake, for instance, wanted to be a docker like his father except that an illness has made outside work impossible. As a result he has a job in an office and was beginning to consider taking some courses in accounting. Similarly, other men had seemed to 'fall' upwards without any prior design or desire.

GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY

If geographical mobility is as unsettling as various studies have suggested (Bell, 1968; Pahl and Pahl, 1971) then it is likely to be an important reason for low integration into the community and the local environment. Particularly within the working class, families which do move may find themselves in established communities where the label 'newcomer' may persist for several decades, or in new estates where as Willmott and Young (1960: 7) put it, 'people (are) cut off from relatives, suspicious of their neighbours, lonely . . .'. In either case, the family unit or the individual is more easily able to go against the prevailing norms of neighbourhood and peer group because they have not become well knit into the community. Negative sanctions and other pressures from peers against aspirations and behaviour which are mobility oriented but at odds with dominant norms of the sub-culture may carry less weight if the family is marginal or isolated. In a similar way, geographical mobility of middle-class families may have a negative effect on the educational achievement of children. Not only might the move come at a crucial point in the child's education, but he may also be less influenced by middle-class norms about achievement.

I asked everyone how often they had changed homes during the time they were growing up and how many of these moves were to be different areas or districts. As can be seen in Table 7.6, 64 percent--nearly

two-thirds of the men--had not moved to a different area or district
at all.

TABLE 7.6

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY

OF THE FAMILY OF ORIGIN: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N - 117)

Number of Moves	Pattern of Conventional Mobility				
	(1) Upward	(2) Stable Non-Manual	(3) Downward	(4) Stable Manual	Totals
No Moves	61%	58%	55%	81%	64%
One or More	39%	42%	45%	19%	36%
Totals	100% (44)	100% (24)	100% (22)	100% (27)	100% (117)

Comments: 1 X 4: $X_2^2 = 3.167$; P $<$ .05 (1-tailed test)
           2 X 3: $X^2 = .067$; N.S.

Of the 36 percent who had moved, it was in an overwhelming number of
cases a single move. Thus, by the standards of much of the recent
data, the Mobility Sample was highly immobile.[6] Nevertheless, even one
move--(say) from the North to the South of England--may be a crucial
factor in undermining solidarity or social integration. When the geo-
graphical mobility of the sample is viewed in terms of patterns of so-
cial mobility, it is the stable manual group which is the most likely
not to have moved at all. The upwardly mobile men are more than twice
as likely to have moved one or more times than are those who have re-
mained in the working class. Similar findings for the downwardly mobile
and the stable non-manual groups do not emerge from the data; there is
only a trivial and statistically non-significant difference between
these groups. Indeed, there is very little difference between the three

[6]A number of studies are summarised in Bell (1968: 22-23).

groups having either origins or present status in the middle class.

It was, however, the downwardly mobile who were most likely to per-
ceive a relationship between their geographical mobility and what had
happened to them educationally. Mr. Felton, a semi-skilled fitter, said:

I never took the 11 because I had to go out to Canada with my parents.
When I came back I was put in a secondary modern. When I came back I
was surprised to see who had gone to grammar school and who hadn't.
One teacher took an interest when I was about 9 and I went right to the
top of the class. But we went out to Canada and when we came back I
didn't have the interest. When I saw the ones who went to grammar school
I was really surprised. If their chances had of been based on what they
done previously, they'd never have gone.

Similarly, Mr. Pullen Sr. felt that the uprooting of his family to move

to Southern England was a factor in his son not achieving as well as

he had hoped. A research engineer, Mr. Pullen Sr. had advanced from

a paper mill hand to his present position as chief engineer. He acquired

the qualifications along the way through part-time education. His son,

on the other hand, left school at 15 and at the time of the interview

was working as a handbag assembler. Mr. Pullen Sr. had wanted him to

continue his education and perhaps go on to university. But, as he ex-
plained:

In the north we were part of a large family: cousins and aunts and uncles
and nephews. So moving down here we're away from all that completely.
I think it has affected my son as well. When you're part of a large
family you have a feeling of security, there are other people besides
me to advise him and maybe encourage him. When you're part of a very
small family group, very few people visit you. He grew up too much
alone, I think.

The Pullen family had also spent two years in South America prior to

coming to Southern England, again because the firm had sent Mr. Pullen

Sr. there. They have made very few friends where they now live and Mr.

Pullen Jr. described himself as 'somewhat of a loner'. He said of the

neighbourhood, 'You can talk to them, I suppose. They're friendly

enough as far as it goes. But you don't go around sitting in people's

houses. We have no real friends around here'.

In order to avoid just this situation, Mr. Chapman Sr., a statistical clerk, had taken a considerable drop in occupational status.

Jobs with Clifton's are more tied to location than person, so they said to me, 'Your job's over in Liverpool'. It would have meant a promotion but my boys, the oldest was doing well, the second was doing well, the one you talked to was just on the verge of starting. I took the view, why should I ruin their lives for my life. They had theirs to look forward. It would have meant a lift-up, more money, a higher position, but it meant you pulling up your roots and moving into an entirely different area of the country. There's no sort of beloved relations in that area on the other side, and my wife's very attached to her family, so I said I was sorry I can't agree. We parted very amicably.

However, geographical shifts were not for most perceived as having played a part in the decision to obtain a better education or a job at a higher level than that typical in the family. Physical movement was largely seen as disruptive and as a possible explanation of downward mobility and non-mobility rather than upward mobility. Thus, none of the upwardly mobile respondents recalled that moving had altered their perceptions of the world: none suggested it had widened their horizons or awakened in them any sense of restlessness. Indeed, it was the upwardly mobile who were most likely to recall strong community and kinship ties relative to the stable manual group. This emerged when I asked everyone, much more directly, whether they had been part of a community when they were growing up and whether they had felt part of a group themselves, or somewhat isolated. I had tentatively hypothesized that the mobile were more likely than the non-mobile to have felt isolated and relatively less a part of the community as a family. However, the data do not support these hypotheses. I could find no significant differences between the mobility sub-groups and what differences there were tended to be in the opposite direction to that predicted.

FATHER'S WORK LIFE

In Chapter 6 it was also suggested, following Wilensky (1960), that

a disorderly and discontinuous work life on the part of the father might also contribute to low integration and hence to social mobility. While complete data on the occupational history of fathers are not available, there is, in what were collected, no evidence that father's work life was related to the social mobility of sons. In reading the work histories of 'fathers', there are, of course, very similar patterns as those described in Chapters 4 and 5 for 'sons'. That is, that some had made frequent job changes and moves back and forth across the manual-non-manual line. But, beyond the fact that men who had moved up over their work life are likely to have downwardly mobile sons (See: Table 7.2), men with complicated work histories are as likely to have non-mobile sons as they are mobile sons.

CONCLUSIONS

Neither the quantitative data nor the more subjective and retrospective accounts people provided about their families and early experiences add up to any overwhelming support of the general hypothesis that low integration leads to social mobility. The most crucial aspect of this, the existence of a 'sunken middle class' anxious to regain, if only in the next generation, their former status, is only partially supported. About a third of the upwardly mobile men recalled that at least one of their grandparents had held a middle-class occupation but this was also true of those who remained stationary in the working class. The difference between the two groups is found in the qualitative data: upwardly mobile men tended to attach greater importance and meaning to the existence of these ties than did stable working-class men. For example, some, at least, of the former group recalled that their mother, if middle class in origin had influenced them to continue in school or seek a white-collar occupation. Apparently, then, objective membership in a

sunken middle class is not enough; the family, as members of the family must also possess a subjective awareness of being 'partly' middle class before mobility is likely to occur. Thus,it is in the subjective or qualitative data about class position that we find some support for a relationship between low social integration and social mobility.

With respect to downward mobility, the opposite idea, what might be called a 'risen working class' received considerable support from the data. Both intergenerationally and in their work lives, fathers of the downwardly mobile remain closely connected to the working class. Mothers of these men were also found to be from working-class not middle-class backgrounds. Thus, on the basis of both the quantitative and qualitative data, downward mobility is, in terms of this hypothesis, more adequately explained than upward mobility.

During the time they were growing up, men who moved upward experienced about twice as much geographical mobility as did stable manual men. While this finding is congruent with the hypothesis that geographical mobility and social mobility are related, probing in the interview failed to reveal ways in which that movement had affected either the individual or his family of origin. It had not seemed to lead to marginal membership in the community or peer group. Indeed, the upwardly mobile were only slightly less likely to feel they had been integrated than were their stable manual counterparts. The downwardly mobile had moved about as often as the stable non-manual men. They were, however, the most likely of the four groups to feel they had been part of a group and that their family had been part of a community.

It is worthwhile recalling that the data are survey data and are retrospective in nature. I asked people to think back to a time and to events which were of varying importance to them. For stable working and

middle class people lack of encouragement and encouragement, respective-

ly, are a taken-for-granted aspect of family life: 'everybody' leaves

school at 15; 'everybody' goes to a grammar school or a public school.

Hence, people in these categories had a limited recall of what was usu-

ally an uneventful transition. The upwardly mobile, in contrast, ap-

peared to have expended considerable effort in constructing their bio-

graphy and in trying to recall what actually happened to bring about

the discontinuity in their lives which sociologists call social mobili-

ty.[7]

Chapter 8 covers much of the same ground as this chapter, except

that the focus will be on the choice of work and career and some factors

related to that decision.

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[7]Berger (1963: 60) is relevant in this regard. He notes that
'American society having been one of high mobility for quite some time,
many Americans seemingly spend years of their life reinterpreting their
own background, retelling over and over again (to themselves and to
others) the story of what they have become . . .'. So it was with my
upwardly mobile men. Few, as I show in the next chapter, were able to
'account', satisfactorily, for their mobility, however.

CHAPTER 8

THE ENTRY INTO WORK

The last chapter was concerned with early experiences or conditions which contributed to various levels of educational and occupational aspirations. This chapter describes the way the entry into work differed for men who were socially mobile and those who remained middle-class or working-class.

PLANS AND EXPECTATIONS

The point at which the first entry is made into the occupational hierarchy has important consequences for the level of achievement an individual can hope to reach over his career. Yet, as with education, the kinds of jobs the men chose and the method by which they were chosen point more directly to the perpetuation and continuity of class differences rather than intergenerational changes in occupational status. As Lipset and Bendix (1959: 198) noted some years ago, 'The accumulation of advantages or disadvantages is evident also in the choice of first job. We know that the choice of first job is for many a largely fortuitous decision. Those in the lower socioeconomic groups tend to take "the only job they know about" at the time they enter the labour market. This choice of the first job is made with more deliberation by individuals with more education and a family higher up the occupational ladder'.

While the data from the Mobility Sample do not in any fundamental way contradict these and other findings in the literature, they do show

that at all class levels there was a striking lack of prior planning.

People, by their own accounts, were more likely to be acted upon than

act on their own behalf.[1] Thus, more than one-third of the men could

not recall having given much consideration to work or a choice of job

prior to entering the labour force. Another third, though having given

some thought to their eventual work, started out in a job different than

the one they had wanted. Also, when the mobility and non-mobility groups

were considered separately, the upwardly mobile were the most likely to

have seen their future in problematic terms (55 percent compared to 23

percent). This is a finding in line with the general impression ad-

vanced in previous chapters that the upwardly mobile, by and large,

found most of their work life problematic and uncertain. In contrast,

the downwardly mobile were as likely as the stable non-manual men to

have given prior thought to work and to have started in a job which was

close to the work they wanted to do.

METHODS OF FINDING A JOB

Somewhat similar findings emerged when people were asked how they

had come to take a job that they did. While there were a variety of

answers to this question, it appeared that nearly two-fifths had, in ef-

fect, 'fallen' into their first job. Only about 11 percent, 13 men in

all, said that their choice was the result of a 'childhood ambition'.

Do methods of choosing jobs differ by mobility and non-mobility

pattern? In Table 8.1, various methods have been combined in order to

provide a clearer answer to this question. This table shows that the

upwardly mobile are the least likely to have relied on the influence

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[1]For a particularly insightful analysis of this phenomenon, see
Sennet and Cobb (1973: Chapter IV). They consider this passivity
as one of the 'hidden injuries of class'. It is not unlike the con-
cept of 'cognitive poverty' developed by Klein (1965).

or guidance of a relative or friend and are the most likely not to be able to account for their first choice or simply took what work was available at the time. It is also of interest that the downwardly mobile differ only trivially from both the stable non-manual and stable manual group.

TABLE 8.1

CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND METHODS OF CHOOSING

FIRST JOBS: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117)
(Percentages)

Method	Pattern of Conventional Mobility				
	(1) Upward	(2) Stable Non-Manual	(3) Downward	(4) Stable Manual	All Groups
Relative or Friend	23%	46%	45%	55%	39%
External Agency	18	8	14	4	12
Other Reasons (only work available, not sure)	50	17	9	30	31
Childhood Ambition	9	29	32	11	18
Total	100% (44)	100% (24)	100% (22)	100% (27)	100% (117)

1 X 4: $x^2 = 9.810$; P < .05; 3 df.
2 X 3: Not significant; 3 df.

The more detailed accounts people gave of their entry into work tend to substantiate what is summarized in Table 8.1: that the class background of the individual can in some circumstances set very definite limits on the kind of occupations considered to be appropriate. Carter (1966: 108) quotes a study by R. V. Clements of 271 school

leavers which was in accord with his findings and with impressions I recorded in this present study:

The analysis of the jobs chosen and of those mentioned as to be avoided, suggested that these children did not choose from the whole range of occupations though they may not have realized this--their mental endowment and their social and educational _milieu_ have established, within broad limits, the particular segment of possible occupations in terms of which they think. It does not occur to the secondary modern boy that he might at least aspire to become a barrister, whilst the clever grammar boy seldom entertains even the notion of becoming a semi-skilled mechanic. . .

This is a description which most clearly fits those who remained stable in either the working class or middle class. Both are subject to equally confining parameters whose general effect is to inhibit upward and downward mobility. With respect, first of all, to the middle class, something of this is illustrated by Mr. Mansell's description of how he became an accountant.

That was an interesting decision that was made. Because I did modern languages and quickly realized that if they wanted anyone to speak a language they got a native from that country and that languages as such are of no use for a career without going on to university. Also I had a family business that I may or may not be going into but the option was to be kept open to me. So, if you come to the outside, as it were, the decisions are fairly clear-cut. They're either the law or medicine or industry in the form of accounting, or the services. The services was out, and in my side of the family, anyway, there is no legal background at all. So I didn't consider the law, and medicine, of course, requires a science background which I hadn't taken. The decision not to go into the family business was to a certain extent made for me.

It is perhaps worth noting that Mr. Mansell's mother comes from a family of solicitors. Mr. Thomas's career decision was prompted by almost identical considerations:

My school life was aimed entirely at going into my father's business, but on the other hand it was also known that whatever I did, it should be something that would benefit me if I left the family business.

Even where there was less knowledge of what to do with their life the original middle-class position dictated what was considered available and appropriate. Mr. Phelps, financial consultant, was perhaps more aware of this than most of my middle-class informants. As he said,

'The idea of going into clerical work was strictly a middle-class atti-

tude, I suppose, nothing more and nothing less. I had a choice of work-

ing for a bank and I didn't fancy going into town, or the job in accounts.

It was a question of an office for a job, anything else was inconceivable

to my parents. But I had no more idea of what I wanted than my son who

is about to do "A" levels'. And Mr. Merry-West, an editor, had come

to realize much the same thing: 'I actually wanted to be a cobbler but

it was much more the done thing to go to Oxford, and so that's what I

did!

Working-class people also perceived a limited range of possibili-

ties though the choices were, of course, different. The type of school

plays an important part in the process. Where grammar school education

sets up aspirations for white-collar work, the secondary modern school

re-directs and shapes people to expect low status jobs. As Mr. Allen

noted, 'I remember my headmaster saying: "Some of us got to stand on

the back of the lorries" (a lot of calls were made to our school to sup-

ply van boys). So, really, we were sort of funnelled and geared into

being van boys only'. Mr. Cannon, who is younger than Mr. Allen, said

with anger, 'I went to a comprehensive school and me brothers went to

the old-style secondary school and I've seen the result. We've got two

plumbers and a lorry driver—you might as well say three bums'. Another

in his early twenties, commented somewhat bitterly:

Fifteen-year olds have their decisions made for them in this country.
Either their parents say you've got to do this job, or the youth employ-
ment says you've got to do this job. It may be different for grammar
school when they stay on to do 'O' levels. I suppose they've got wider
aspects (sic) about what life is all about.

For some, the pattern was not too different than the middle-class one

we have observed above. Mr. Reid's explanation of why he became a

printer was such a one:

Everybody who's come in our house is near enough the print. Nothing else comes into your mind. It's stuck in your brain when you was born. If you don't go in the print, you're an outcast.

For both stable working-class and middle-class men, knowledge of particular jobs and sometimes lifetime occupations or careers came more often from relatives than from any other source. (See Table 8.1)[2] There was at the same time somewhat less evidence from what people said that friends or relatives had actually exerted influence to get them the job. In the middle class, however, knowledge and influence are more intermingled. When men were not already committed to a family business there was considerable reliance on relatives, notably uncles or cousins who were regarded as uncles.

I didn't really know what I wanted to do. My father has a cousin, I think of him as an uncle, who was a senior marine broker with the firm I started with and we were generally talking about it. He mentioned that there was this place going as a general office boy and would I like to try it. I tried it and found I liked it. My father, of course, is with an insurance company but a quite different sort of insurance (In- surance Broker).

It was suggested that I go into my uncle's business. I wasn't particu- larly brilliant in school. I think it was basically more laziness than any lack of intelligence. I started out wrapping parcels, cutting sam- ples, that sort of thing. Basically, it was a training program with the idea that I would go into the business with him (Company Director).

I was associated at that time with the River Yacht squadron. One cousin of my father's who was also a member, suggested I try my first firm by just walking in and let it be known I was a member (Shipping Agent).

Though the direct influence in the form of tangible jobs was some- times missing, the fact that a relative, again often an uncle, was in that kind of work, was an important factor in the eventual decisions for men following their fathers into manual work. Some also mentioned

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[2]Willmott (1966: 111) found that 32 percent of his working-class boys relied on a relative or friend to find their first job. For subse- quent jobs this rose to 47 percent. Also, about two-fifths of the boys used the Youth Employment Service to find their first job whereas only 4% of the men in the Mobility Sample specifically mentioned this source.

their brother as having provided a reference model to follow. Said Mr.

Dressel, a carpenter: 'I was emulating me brother. I've regretted it'.

And Mr. Turnbull had also followed his brother;

I wanted to leave school but I was torn two ways when I left school. I
was offered a job in art, which I enjoy and I was torn between that and
I wanted to be a plumber like me brother.

Mr. Castin almost followed his father into the docks but chose printing

because, 'Newspaper printing sounded exciting; films about reporters

and things. I had an uncle, actually, who was in the print and who got

me an introduction'. For Mr. Osborne, a self-employed heating and venti-

lating engineer, two relatives had influenced him:

I've thought a lot about it and I can't honestly imagine. I can't for
the life of me think of why I went into the buildings. The only thing
I can think of, it's a psychological thing. When I left school I wanted
to go into a shop because my uncle was manager of a grocery shop and
that was at the back of my mind. Then when I saw the employment man he
said, 'You'll have to work Saturday afternoons'. Well! As I played
football and did sport every Saturday, I said straight away, 'That cuts
that out: I won't do that'. The next thing, I went and decided to be-
come an engineer. Another uncle of mine became one. He lives in Middle-
sex and I live in Essex, but it was in the back of my mind.

Only a minority, about five percent of the manual respondents,

mentioned their fathers with respect to first jobs. Mothers, on the

other hand, were sometimes mentioned as having 'put them into a job'.

For instance, while there were no butchers among the men intervierwed,

it was clearly a job which had at one time appealed to some mothers,

though not to their sons.

My mother knew the butcher in our neighbourhood. I started off as an
errand boy on a bike. It just developed into a full-time job when I
left school (Mobile Crane Driver).

When I first left school I went into the butcher's trade. We knew the
butcher quite well, my mother had been down there for years, and she
got me in. But I'd been used to being around and about and I soon
pulled out of that (Brewery Delivery Driver).

The fear of the unknown was, presumably, a factor making some

mothers take decisions for their children. Mr. Gallagher, who eventu-

ally did move upwards into a supervisory job, recounted a particularly

dramatic illustration of this conservatism.

> I had big ideas. I wanted to do better. I went and got an interview
> with Jensens. You've got to remember, I came from a very poor dis-
> trict. I came from Kennington. I didn't want to be a messenger boy
> at 15 bob a week. I came to leave school and I hadn't heard from them.
> I spoke to my mom and she said, 'You don't want to hang around here,
> get yourself a little job somewhere and if this thing comes along, you
> can decide which is the best offer'. I just got a job in the local
> dairy. Months went by and I heard nothing. I decided to go back to
> Jensens. My mom said, 'I wouldn't bother, I've been checking around.
> This job's no good for you, you're better off where you are; we'll
> always need a milkman'. What happened, I'd sent the application.
> They'd sent me information on when to start, and Mom just thought it
> out and said, 'He don't want that'. So that's the reason I became a
> milkman. It wasn't what I wanted (Office Manager.

Some, of course, were not able to recall very much about their en-

try into work and what factors led them to choose the job they did.

Particularly among the younger men, the immediate earnings were a big

factor. Mr. Carey, a storeman who started in a metal works factory,

commented:

> I didn't think of it as a trade. I just thought, I'm going out into
> a job. Having a source of money. I never thought about what was go-
> ing to happen in the future, never. It didn't bother me.

Mr. Bolter found the entry into work as equally untroublesome as had

Mr. Carey.

> My father didn't influence me. It was the youth employment. They
> brought out a card and said, 'We've got a job for a school leaver at
> Smith's'. So I took it. I mean, if they'd brought out a card saying
> shop work for a 15-year-old boy, I would have took it. I mean, it
> all depended on what card came out first, I suppose.

DOWNWARDLY MOBILE AND FIRST JOBS

Little has been said about the downwardly mobile because as I tried

to show in Chapter 7 this group had for the most part entered occupa-

tions which also reflected family influence. These men, it emerged,

had been influenced by fathers who were because of upward mobility, mar-

ginal to the middle class in which objectively they were placed. Often

they were directing their children away from a middle-class pattern of

an extended education and a white-collar job.[3] As a result, the men

interviewed who according to the coding scheme were downwardly mobile,

had tended to give, relative to other groups, considerable thought to

their eventual occupation. They had, as well, ended up in fields which

strongly reflected either their own or their father's interests.

UPWARD MOBILITY AND THE ENTRY INTO WORK

The entry into work entailed a different set of influences, prob-

lems and experiences for those who moved upwards relative to their fa-

thers. This was so despite the fact that exactly half of these men

started out as manual workers, in jobs not very different from those

taken up by the stable manual men. The other half, those who started

out in a non-manual position, were also those who usually had attended

a grammar school or had taken further qualification beyond 14 or 15.

But, the experiences of these men were also different than those of

their stable non-manual counterparts. First, in both groups, Table 8.2

revealed that parents and relatives were less likely to have been men-

tioned with respect to choosing a first job. Secondly, there was also

a greater degree of uncertainty and lack of planning about what work

they wanted to do and how they found the first job. In reading the ac-

counts of these men, there are also differences between those who were

mobile over their career and those who, because of education, moved up

at the start of their working life.

For those who used an educational route, expectations about the

kind of work they would do, were naturally higher. But, the actual choice

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[3]The arbitrary nature of splitting educational aspirations and
choice of work is particularly evident in analysing the downwardly mo-
bile. The decision to consider this group mainly in the last chapter
was based on the desire to show that these men, in their minds at least,
had not so much been rejected by the formal educational system, but that
they had rejected it in favour of taking up a trade.

was still problematic. Mr. Emery, an insurance manager, described it:

There was very little career guidance in school. My father was a gas
worker limited to some extent in the help and advice he could give me.
I wouldn't say I actually drifted into it but maths was a subject I was
keen on and this is why I went into it. I didn't know any one in the
field who could advise me.

For Mr. Pennington, there was a similar though much less powerful inclina-

tion:

I sort of drifted into physics. I was pretty good at physics in school
and I was exhorted to go to university and do physics. I'm quite happy
with what I do though you'll never be a millionaire. There are lots of
other jobs that I could have done where I would have earned a lot more
money. I could have been a dentist or an engineer. I'd probably have
been just as satisfied.

Generally it was the school, rather than parents which had raised

aspirations and encouraged particular talents. Whereas the stable work-

ing-class people and stable middle-class men appeared able to invoke the

help of relatives, an uncle, a cousin or an older brother--though in-

terestingly, seldom a father--upwardly mobile men seemed to be without

this kind of support. I had thought it might be possible, if the upward-

ly mobile came from sunken middle-class families, that there might be

some contact with the white-collar world. However, there was no evidence

that this had occurred. Instead, the entry into work had to depend up-

on external agencies, such as the youth employment, the advice of head-

masters and printed material issued by various concerns.

Mr. Chapman, a chemist and a grammar school graduate, said of his

first job, 'It was a gamble. The youth employment office just sent me

out there. I was studying chemistry in school anyway: "A" level maths,

physics and chemistry; so as long as it was technical and an interesting

job I would've taken it'. Mr. Jarvis, a clerk, said:

A teacher I had knew somebody--a relative, I think--in this building
society, and he mentioned me to him. I went up for an interview, and
that was that.

For Mr. Gadsby, it was the impersonal brochure of the Post Office which

was the deciding factor:

My father thought I should join the gas board but they didn't seem to
have anything very exciting to offer. At school we had these brochures
Passed around from the post office--just a brochure, no one came with
them. There was a picture of some little man adjusting a relay set and
this looked quite exciting. I'd left school and still hadn't a job and
all I could think of was this brochure still in my desk. So I cycled
back to the school and got the caretaker to let me in. Sure enough,
there it was in my desk and I followed it up and the post office was
pleased to have me.

Although those who moved upwards via grammar school routes were pre-

disposed by their specialization and presumably their interests, to look

in certain directions, those who moved up later in their careers, or

without any additional education, the choice often seemed to be to 'take

whatever work was available' or what chance put in their way. These

were the men who could recall the most about their entry into work and

who had unusual stories to tell.

It was purely accidental. I wanted to be a journalist, I thought, and
I went to get a job in the Old Star. The old twit at the labour exchange
gave me the wrong day so when I got there they had already picked the
boy. I was very disappointed and I thought what is my Dad going to say,
me not getting a job here at a stockbrokers. I barely knew what a stock-
broker was; I didn't know whether it was a religion or what (Senior
Dealer).

Chance also entered into Mr. Garrit's decision:

A chappie I've now lost touch with, mainly for reasons of his current
stature, we both went up to the city together because we were recom-
mended by our headmaster that that was the place we should be. We
tossed a coin to go for an interview with a stockbroker firm. I won
the bet. Didn't like the firm. Bearing in mind I was 15 and a bit
cocky and dear Old Peter took the job. The last I heard he'd bought
a Mercedes-Benz out of his bonus. He, of course, just had the flair.
I may have taken the job and not made the success of it he did. This
is life.

Mr. Chambers eventually became a sales manager. But the transi-

tion from school to work was a quick and at the time non-problematic

one. Until he had talked to some other students, he was not even clear

that his schooling had ended:

I left school on a Friday and Saturday morning went over to the sheet
metal works on the same turning as our flat. One of the lorry drivers

asked me would I like to sit on the back of the lorry and go over with
it to Kennington. I sat on the back of the lorry and got over to the
other side. 'When'd you leave school?' they asked. 'Yesterday'. 'What
you going to do?' 'I don't know'. 'Well, how'd you like to come work
here?' That was it.

For others the entry into work was equally unplanned though there

was the fact that clerical rather than manual work was somewhat inexpli-

cably chosen. As has already been seen in the previous chapter, some

parents had stressed office work as providing a release from the kind

of life they had led. But for others there was not much indication that

mobility aspirations played a prominent role in the decision to choose

a non-manual job. Towards the end of the interview I sometimes asked

people to give me their theory of how it happened that they had gone in-

to white-collar work. The answers were generally not very revealing.

Apart from the theme of escape mentioned in Chapter 7, reasons given

were either tautological or were in other ways not very informative.

It was often as Mr. Dawson, an accountant, put it:

My first job was like everybody else in my generation. You just got a
job as an office boy. You were jolly lucky to get a job at all. I had
no particular ambitions. You just looked around to see what you could
do.

Similarly, Mr. Ferguson, a very perceptive man, was unable to pinpoint

any one factor which had led him out of the working class.

It was the height of the depression and I was part of a large family.
I simply started off as a very junior newspaper boy at 10 shillings a
week. There were few jobs about, so I felt myself, and indeed I was,
very lucky. Because in those days you often had to pay a little pre-
mium and work for nothing. Five shillings was common enough. So, at
ten bob, I was pretty well done by.

There were a few men among the upwardly mobile who had had a white-

collar job imposed upon them by their inability to do manual work--mainly

because of illness or generally poor health.

My father has a small painting and decorating business and the money was
quite good there. But my health hasn't allowed me to do manual work,
labouring or something like that. I guess my only real ambition was
to be a professional football player which was impossible. So it was

just a case of if I'm not going to be an outside worker, then I'll be an inside worker. I didn't know anyone older who was at work in an office or anything like that.

Mr. Blake, also in his early twenties, is a clerk in a food import-

ing firm. His first choice was manual work:

My health is not too good. Not all that bad, but it limits me to office work only. If I had the chance to be a dock worker like my father was, I'd go and be a dock worker. I'd be better off possibly. The money is better anyway. But I'm not healthy enough.

Thus, instead of poor health contributing to downward mobility, the

evidence is that it was at times an explanation of upward mobility.

This was a phenomenon not unlike that indicated in Chapter 4 and 5 where

it was shown that men who eventually moved upwards into white-collar

jobs probably would not have done so had they been able to take on ap-

prenticeship.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Data set out in this chapter lead to a set of conclusions not very

different from those of Chapter 7. That is, in examining conditions

and influences related to a choice of career, these were again more clear-

ly identified for downward than for upward mobility. As in the last

chapter, I was unable to pinpoint any one set of sociological factors

which explain why some people are upwardly mobile while others from what

on the surface seem like similar sorts of backgrounds, are not. In

starting out their work life, the upwardly mobile group of men in fact

turned out, relative to non-mobile men, to be more, rather than less

disadvantaged. They were less likely to have available to them the sup-

port, advice and influence of relatives and friends than non-mobile men

of either social class had known. Instead they relied upon outside agen-

cies or, more typically, took the first job that they came across. One

consequence of this was that few started in work that they had hoped to

do, even assuming that they were among the minority who had some idea of what that was. In contrast, men labelled as downwardly mobile often knew within narrow limits what it was they wanted to do and were usually able to start out in that work. Their choice of work was, unlike the upwardly mobile, strongly influenced by parents who along with relatives played an important role in helping them get started.

In reading over what people said about their entry into work, the most striking finding is the extent to which all but the upwardly mobile were blinkered and restricted by class-based norms and parameters. As in the type and amount of education, the choice of career was for non-mobile men generally an unproblematic and taken-for-granted aspect of their lives. If their accounts are accurate, they had experienced very little indecision and uncertainty and had shown little independence. Thus, with almost no indications of rebellion or regret most appeared to have conformed to parental expectations and, therefore, to the typical code of their social class. In this aspect of their lives, the working-class and middle-class non-mobiles (and downwardly mobiles) were very much alike. All seemed to have been acted upon rather than acting. The difference, of course, lies in what range of occupations is for each group deemed to be appropriate and acceptable.

In sharp contrast were the upwardly mobile. What these men said about their earlier life and of their entry into work suggests that to move upward is to face, more or less unaided, highly problematic and unpredictable conditions. Not to follow in the footsteps of one's father or some other relative is, it appears, to be without support, guidance and influence. One must go it alone and in retrospect, at least, reckon up the regrets about errors made and cul de sacs unwittingly entered along the way. The future, at least for a considerable time, does not have the patterned certitude that men stable in the social hierarchy

expect. However, as Part III will show more clearly, these are conditions capable of being stood on their head. Although social mobility may perhaps be uncomfortable, maybe even stressful, it is at the same time a process in which by moving part way, at least, to another class, the individual is also able to step beyond and look outside the narrow confines of his former class milieu. It involves both the desire and experience of being subjected to new influences, rising aspirations, changes in evaluation of self and others. Thus, as some of my respondents perceived, upward mobility stemmed from the strong desire to escape out of the restricted and narrow world inhabited by their parents.

In neither this or the previous chapter am I able to locate systematically sociological factors explaining this desire. The foregoing does, nevertheless, suggest that at least the upwardly mobile are in this respect deviant. They have deviated from what the accounts of the non-mobile suggest are pervasive and powerful norms dictating what are permissible (and conceivable) aspirations. Perhaps the genesis of this deviance must be sought in the realm of 'personality' traits, too subtle to be caught by my survey approach. Certainly, as Gans (1962) notes, outstanding ability may in itself so set the individual apart that he is thrust out of his peer group and 'into the training grounds of the middle class'.[4] But, what other factors, psychological as well as socio-

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[4]In the first round of interviewing all respondents in the Work and Leisure Study were asked to attempt a twenty-part verbal test by Miner (1957) (See Young and Willmott, 1973: 334), found to correlate highly with other more elaborate tests. With the exception of the downwardly mobile and stable manual comparison, there were marked and statistically significant differences in mean scores between mobility sub-groups: upwardly mobile men scored substantially higher than stable manual men but not as high as stable non-manual men; the downwardly mobile scored on average substantially lower than the upwardly mobile and the stable non-manual. The educational system did not appear to act as a selection mechanism. Within the group now non-manual there was no significant difference in verbal test scores between those attending grammar school, obtaining further education or staying on until age 17 or over and those who did not.

logical contribute to the motivation to withstand social pressures and

thereby create the 'requisite isolation' necessary for social mobility

do not emerge very clearly from this research.

A second analysis, comparing the scores of the 40 fathers inter-
viewed with their actual sons' scores, provided striking results. The
general finding is straightforward: sons more intelligent than their
fathers tend to rise; sons less intelligent than their fathers tend to
fall (Fisher's Exact Probability Test: $P < .025$; Kendall's $Q = .976$--
excluding stationary respondents). These findings are consistent with
those of an earlier pilot study by Young and Gibson (1963). Tables
supporting these statements are available on request.

PART THREE

THE EXPERIENCE OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

CHAPTER 9

THE CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL MOBILITY (I)

The four chapters making up this section are all concerned with the experience and consequences of social mobility. In this chapter I will introduce some of the sociological perspectives which generally have been of import to the study of social mobility as an independent rather than a dependent variable. In the next two chapters I present findings from the Work and Leisure Study and the Mobility Study pertinent to two main questions: 1) the extent to which it can be said social mobility is in Britain a disruptive and dissociative experience and 2) the extent to which it involves normative and relational discontinuities. In Chapter 12 I try to show how people themselves define and interpret their mobility experience and, more generally, the class structure and their place in it.

The assumption that social mobility might have disruptive or otherwise negative consequences for the individual is now a familiar one. Thus, there is a rich tradition of sociological literature which has attempted to link it to a wide variety of social phenomena. The main theoretical justification is related to the belief that movement upwards and downwards will contribute to the anomie, rootlessness and status anxiety which more generally are held to characterize modern industrial society. While generally favoring tendencies towards more open and fluid social structures, the conservative impulse, as Nisbet (1967: 11) describes it, cautions that conditions conducive to personal freedom, autonomy, innovation and individualism may also be anomic and alienative, undermining personal and social integration.[1] Similarly, sociologists

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[1] For a succinct review of these views, see Olmstead (1966).

have been inclined to see social mobility as 'Janus faced'. The expecta-

tion is that the prizes for those who succeed in moving upwards have at-

tached to them personal and social costs which may outweigh their value.

THE INFLUENCE OF DURKHEIM AND SOROKIN

One of the earliest and most influential recognitions in the socio-

logical literature that social mobility might have negative consequences

is found in Durkheim's Suicide (1897: 189). Without actually using the

term, social mobility, he argued that as the restraints characteristic

of a mechanical society are weakened, individuals may find themselves in

ill-defined and potentially anomic situations. So long as systems re-

main more or less closed, he maintained, social restraints act to limit

the aspirations of everyone and to regulate the distance which they may

fall. 'A genuine regimen exists, therefore, although not always legally

formulated, which defines with relative precision the maximum degree of

ease of living to which each social class may legitimately aspire'

(Durkheim, 1897: 249). But when the stratification system is no longer

so subject to these restraints both economic disasters and abrupt growth

of power and wealth constitute situations potentially dangerous to the

moral order.

In the case of economic disasters, something like a declassification
occurs which suddenly casts certain individuals into a lower state than
their previous one. Then they must reduce their requirements, restrain
their needs, learn greater self-control . . . their moral education has
to be recommenced. But society cannot adjust them instantaneously to
this new life and teach them to practice the increased self-repression
to which they are unaccustomed . . . hence the suffering which detaches
them from a reduced existence even before they have made trial of it
(P. 252).

Similarly, Durkheim suggested, a rapid rise in fortune or power is

equally critical for the maintenance of social integration except that

in this case the problem is that there is no ceiling on ambitions: 'the

limits are unknown between the possible and the impossible, what is just

and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate . . . nothing gives satisfaction and all this agitation is uninterruptedly maintained without appeasement' (P. 253). 'How', asks Durkheim, finally, 'could the desire to live not be weakened under such conditions?'. Thus, for Durkheim, the very conditions which give rise to the possibility of social mobility are those which are also conducive to anomie. It, in turn, contributes to the social suicide rate.

Sorokin, writing in 1927, also shared some of these same preoccupations with the disruptive consequences of social mobility. Where he differed from Durkheim, however, was in his attempt to balance the negative with positive effects of mobility--what he refers to as the 'functions' of social mobility. Although, he maintained, social mobility may make positive contributions towards the 'versatility' and 'plasticity' of human behaviour, increase innovation and cosmopolitanism and make more adequate use of talent, it does so at considerable psychic cost. In particular, he singled out the degree to which mobility increases 'mental strain, mental diseases, superficiality and skepticism'. Furthermore, he argued, social mobility diminishes intimacy, increases isolation restlessness and loneliness. And, taking his evidence from Durkheim, he also maintained that it strengthens a predilection towards suicide. All such phenomena are viewed as outcomes of being socially mobile in 'a society mad in its mobility and futile strenuousness' (P. 510).

THE DISSOCIATIVE HYPOTHESIS

These assertions as well as Durkheim's earlier statements, have generally been taken very seriously by American sociologists. The result is that the alleged devotion of American society to the rags-to-riches saga has usually been countered by an emphasis in the sociologi-

cal literature on the disruptive aspects of upward striving.[2] As Miller

(1971: 64-65) has suggested, 'the attraction of mobility-as-an-explain-

er was that it served in the fifties to provide criticism of Eisenhower

bourgeois society. It was a way of saying: watch out for the prices

paid in conforming to the American motif of onward and upward'. Certain-

ly, beginning with the late 1940's, empirically oriented sociologists

have tried to relate upward and downward mobility to such diverse phe-

nomena as anomie, social disintegration, alienation, prejudice, politi-

cal extremism, voting behaviour, and patterns of participation and so-

ciability.[3] However, firm conclusions to be drawn from these are few

and at best tentative.

As well as these empirical studies, a number of more theoretical

and speculative essays have also had considerable influence on the direc-

tion of theory and research. Tumin (1957), for example, wrote about

what he chose to call 'some unapplauded consequences of social mobility'.

Among the undesirable effects of upward mobility, he notes the decline

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[2]During the depression years attention shifted to the study of down-
ward mobility (Mack and Yellin, 1957) but in the post-war years the con-
cern has been almost entirely with the effects of upward mobility. A
complete explanation for the lack of interest in downward mobility would
involve recourse to a sociology of knowledge approach. It might also be
noted that studies in recent years have not uncovered a great deal of
downward mobility. The result is that unless samples are large, the
analysis of these data is difficult and sometimes unreliable.

[3]I do not propose to review all of these studies. More and more
frequently, data on intergenerational mobility are collected as a routine
part of survey research, whatever the focus of the research. Thus, so-
cial mobility may be becoming a 'face sheet' variable similar to age,
SES, income, sex, and ethnic background. Since these are then more or
less routinely cross-tabulated with the main independent variables, the
number of articles and monographs mentioning social mobility is im-
mense. Rather, I concentrate on those works and findings which have had
a cumulative impact on research and thought in this area.

in social criticism and the possible diffusion of insecurity. Some

years later this second theme, was extended and reiterated by Luckmann

and Berger (1964). Their concern was with how the very normativeness

of upward mobility and of anticipatory socialization create strains to-

ward status insecurity and social disintegration. This, they argue,

poses a considerable threat to the maintenance of personal identity

since, enjoined to seek an ever higher status, people are unable to con-

solidate existing status positions and to form intimate and long-lasting

friendship ties. In a similar vein, Strauss (1971) refers to the dual

themes of 'turned to ashes' and 'you can't go home again', both of which

he maintains permeate the technical and novelistic literature on social

mobility. The first he describes as 'the existential disappointment

of arriving where you dreamed of arriving and then being disappointed at

not finding it all--or anything at all--as it was supposed' (P. 188).

The second theme is closer to that of Luckmann and Berger. It involves

'a possible sense of discontinuity with one's past and one's enduring

identity'. It is a feeling which 'can appear with movement at any so-

cial level, with regard to any amount of distance traversed and with re-

spect to any mode of mobility' (P. 188-189).

One of the most widely cited essays in the literature on social mo-

bility was that of Janowitz (1956). After a careful review and summary

of the then existing data, he concluded that for primary group struc-

tures both upward and downward mobility are socially disruptive.

In a wide range of subject matters--family organization, prejudice, men-
tal health, and the like--the conclusion repeatedly emerges as to the
dysfunctional, disruptive and disorganizing contributions of social mo-
bility' (pp. 194-195).

However, in contrast to the negative effect on primary group structures,

he could find little evidence that the upwardly mobile were less well

integrated into secondary group structures. On the other hand, 'down-

ward mobility', he suggested, 'does not produce effective involvement in secondary group structures in pursuit of self-interest' (P. 193). Put simply, those who move downward do not, his evidence suggests, join unions or political parties appealing to working-class interests.

BRITISH STUDIES

Although there have been very few empirical studies of the consequences of social mobility in Britain, similar views about its negative aspects are, nevertheless, present in the literature. Jackson and Marsden (1962), for instance, found that upward mobility had created in their 88 working-class people, a high degree of conservatism, a lack of sympathy for those left behind and for about a third of the sample, what they describe as 'a drifting, rudderless existence' (P. 177). In some they also discerned a sense of guilt and ambivalence towards their parents, a barrier which kept them apart even after grandchildren had arrived.[4]

This study, both an empirical and impressionistic one, substantiates many of the personal observations made some years earlier by Hoggart (1957). The title of the chapter in which these are presented-- 'The Uprooted and the Anxious'--is itself an explicit expression of the conception of social mobility held by this very perceptive and humanistic observer. Speaking mainly of the scholarship boy of modest talent, he notes that they are, for a very long period, alone and marginal--not fully part of any group. Befause of their mobility they are caught between the pressures of two classes yet are seldom part of a 'classless intelligentsia'; rather than 'free floating', they are trapped by an ambivalence of their own making.

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[4]Lemasters (1954: 230) made a similar observation about American working-class students whom he had studied: 'They often feel a vague

He cannot go back; with one part of himself he does not want to go back
to a homeliness which was often narrow; with another part he longs for
the membership he has lost, 'he pines for some nameless Eden where he
never was . . .' He both wants to go back and yet thinks he has gone
beyond his class, feels himself weighted with knowledge of his own and
their situation, which hereafter forbids him the simpler pleasures of
his father and mother (P. 301).

In Hoggart's view, the principal mechanism of upward mobility, the

educational system, is by its very nature destructive to the personality

of those using it. The result, Hoggarts suggests, is that in later life,

the scholarship boy continues to look for 'set-pieces', the series of

hurdles which he has successfully mastered. Hence 'the driving-belt

hangs loosely, disconnected from the only machine it has so far served,

the examination passing machine'. Hoggart concludes that:

He finds difficulty in choosing a direction in a world where there is
no longer a master to please, a toffee-apple at the end of each stage,
a certificate, a place in the upper half of the assessable world. He
is unhappy in a society which presents largely a picture of disorder,
which is huge and sprawling, not limited, ordered, and centrally-heated;
in which the toffee-apples are not accurately given to those who work
hardest nor even to the most intelligent; but in which disturbing im-
ponderables like 'character', 'pure luck' 'ability to mix' and 'bold-
ness' have a way of tipping the scales (pp. 298-299).

THE ACCULTURATION HYPOTHESIS

Undoubtedly the most useful attempt to pull together a large num-

ber of empirical findings with the more speculative and impressionistic

writings was that of Blau (1956). By placing the emphasis on the prob-

lem of acculturation faced by the socially mobile, he is able to take

a position somewhat different from the dissociative hypothesis. Blau

argues that the mobile individual is faced with the dilemma of choosing

whether to seek friendships in his new class or of retaining former ties.

As he describes it:

The upwardly mobile must choose between abandoning hope of translating
his occupational success into social acceptance by a more prestigeful

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sense of guilt--they feel that they should have more in common with
their families than they do; sometimes they seem to feel as if they had
deserted their families'.

group and sacrificing valued social ties and customs in an effort to gain such acceptance. The downwardly mobile must choose between risking rejections for failure to meet social obligations that are beyond his financial resources and resigning himself to losing his affiliation with a more prestigeful group (P. 290).

As a result of these dilemmas, social integration is inhibited and this in turn is used by Blau to explain many of the observed consequences of social mobility. Thus, where behaviour and attitudes--voting and fertility--of the mobile are intermediate between the stable groups, the explanation is couched in terms of what he calls the pattern of acculturation: 'both groups exert some influence over mobile individuals since they have, or have had, social contacts with members of both, being placed by economic circumstances amidst the one, while having been socialized among the other (P. 291).[5] Political affiliation and fertility were found to be related to social mobility in a manner compatible with this explanation or pattern.

A second pattern described by Blau, that of social insecurity, finds the two mobile groups 'sharing first place, stationary lows second and stationary highs a close third' (P. 291). Existing evidence on prejudice, preoccupation with health, nervousness and mental disorders suggested that these tended to be more prevalent among the mobile than the non-mobile. Blau argued that these kinds of behaviour were all indicative of the same underlying insecurity. As he puts it: 'Lack of firm social support engenders feelings of insecurity and this has the result that the mobile person tends to assume the extreme position not the intermediate one, in respect to those attitudes that constitute expressions of insecurity' (P. 292).

Finally, Blau attempts to explain the 'overconformity' of the up-

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[5]As in this present study, Blau conceives of two mobility and two non-mobility groups.

wardly mobile on certain attitudes by using this same perspective of in-
terpersonal dilemmas. Status consciousness, emphasis on the conjugal
family and discrimination against Negroes had been found to be more pro-
nounced among the upwardly mobile than among stationary high status re-
spondents. This, he suggests, can be explained by a combination of so-
cial insecurity and lack of acculturation:

Without integrative social relations to define and support his standing
in the community, the individual becomes anxiously concerned about his
social status. And the less security a person derives from close re-
lations with friends, colleagues and neighbours, the more apt he is to
turn to his conjugal family for emotional support (P. 293).

Status consciousness and discrimination against Negroes, Blau main-
tains, are more pronounced among high status people than among lower
status people.[6] Hence, the upwardly mobile, already insecure and also
attempting to conform to higher status values overdo it, as it were.
Whereas for the upwardly mobile these two social forces coalesce and re-
sult in overconformity, they neutralize one another in the case of down-
ward mobility. The reason, is that despite the status insecurity atten-
dant upon moving downward, there is also the process of acculturation
to the new class. Its values tend to be opposite to those attitudes
which are the result of status insecurity. The result is that there is
little difference between the downwardly mobile and their class of ori-
gin with respect to these variables.

SUPPORT FOR THE ACCULTURATION HYPOTHESIS

The importance of Blau's paper lies in its recognition that the
problem or dilemma of acculturation is as important as the dissociative
syndrome engendered by social mobility. It has, therefore, served as a

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[6]As Hodge and Treiman (1966) point out, prejudice has most often
been inversely related to social status, not directly related as Blau
says.

theoretical underpinning for the statistical analyses which came later. Thus, what may be considered as a third generation of empirical studies about the consequences of social mobility have provided considerable support for Blau's first pattern, that of acculturation, and have questioned seriously the dissociative hypothesis, the dominant view of at least the first two generations of investigations. The major impetus for these studies comes from statistical techniques developed by Duncan (1966) and Hodge and Treiman (1966).

Duncan (1966: 91) uses fertility to show that 'one is not entitled to discuss "effects" of mobility until he has established that the apparent effect cannot be due merely to a simple combination of effects of the variable used to define mobility'. For example, Duncan, after re-examining Berent's (1952) data on fertility, concluded that: 'there is no need to postulate any "effect" for "mobility" qua mobility. The couples in the study behaved as if they determined their fertility by combining the fertility pattern of their class of origin with the fertility pattern of their class of destination in a simple additive or averaging process' (P. 93).

In other words, the acculturation hypothesis, as opposed to the dissociative or compensatory hypotheses, predicts that the socially mobile will tend to bestride the two classes--origin and destination--in their attitudes and behaviour. Recently, a rash of studies all modelled on this hypothesis have emerged, all tending to support Duncan's original statement. Such phenomena as political party preference (Knoke, 1972); voting behaviour (Thompson, 1971); participation in voluntary associations (Vorwaller, 1970); family relationships, interpersonal relationships and emotional adjustment (Kessin, 1971) work satisfaction (Laslett, 1971); alienation (Bean, et al, 1972); and kinship relations

(Aiken and Goldberg, 1969) have been related to social mobility with results generally favouring an acculturation hypothesis.[7]

BRITISH SOCIAL MOBILITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

These data refer almost exclusively to the United States as do the more theoretical essays described earlier in the chapter. Which perspective applies to Britain? Are British patterns of social mobility likely to be more, less, or equally detrimental in their consequences?

Although the evidence is scanty,[8] the most general expectation about social mobility in societies like Britain is that it is likely to be more detrimental than in the United States. This is in turn premised on the unproven assumption that the greater the degree of status rigidity the more likely is social mobility to be disruptive in its consequences. Thus, Lipset and Bendix (1959: 66), speaking about Europe generally, conclude that 'individuals moving up occupationally in Northern Europe where shifts from one class to another require major adjustments in living style are more likely than comparably successful Americans to retain links to their class of origin. In a similar vein, Germani (1966: 371) holds that 'mobility is disruptive in a "traditional" society with an "ascriptive" system of stratification, while in an "industrial" society that approaches the opposite ideal type, it is a normal recurrent process favorable to (or even required for) the maintenance of system equilibrium'.

Although in most respects British social structure lies toward the

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[7]These studies are described in the next two chapters.

[8]Stacey (1969) in a paper devoted explicitly to the consequences of social mobility in Britain, cites only six British references. Of these, only two had, in any empirical way, addressed themselves to this matter. These were Jackson and Marsden (1962) and Willmott and Young (1960).

latter end of this continuum, there are, as Germani shows, a number of

intervening contextual variables which it is important to take into ac-

count such as degree and rate of economic growth, configuration of mo-

bile and non-mobile sectors and the actual structure of the stratifica-

tion system which he, in turn, breaks into seven characteristics. Be-

yond this, he suggests that there may also be 'intervening psychosocial

variables' relevant to an analysis of the consequences of individual so-

cial mobility. With respect to a number of these, British society ap-

pears to lie somewhat closer to the "traditional" and "ascriptive" ideal

type than does American society, despite its obvious status as an "in-

dustrial society".[9]

While the framework of analysis proposed by Germani is complex, its

particular virtue is that it does emphasize that social mobility may

have different consequences in different social structures. Thus, Kessin

(1971) uses this general framework to advance a similar position that

mobility is more likely to be disruptive in its effects in traditional

societies. This is a hypothesis based on assumptions about the impor-

tance of the degree of status rigidity and of other factors in a society

for the consequences of mobility. As he says:

Disruptive consequences can be anticipated if: socialization to the new
status is inadequate; the magnitude of movement is extreme; the stratum
of arrival or departure rejects the mobile person, or the newcomer re-
jects the new or old stratum; geographical mobility accompanies social
mobility; mobility is a unique event (mobility rates are low); social
status is highly salient; one's mobility and one's origins are visible
(pp. 2-3).

Although Kessin does not use the concept, status rigidity, it is

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[9]For example, Germani (1966: Table 2) lists seven characteristics
of the structure of the stratification system relevant to an analysis
of the consequences of mobility. On all but one of these, 'Real possi-
bilities of mobility' it is apparent that British society differs sub-
stantially from American society and in a direction suggestive of great-
er disruptive effects both at the individual and social level. For a
detailed analysis of Germani's approach, see Davies (1970).

apparent that he is concerned with much the same set of variables or properties of the stratification system as is Hopper (1971a and 1971b).[10] This perspective described in Chapter 1, is concerned primarily with upward mobility and non-mobility and is again within the general view that mobility in Britain is likely, because of the greater degree of status rigidity, to be usually more disruptive than in the United States. However, Hopper's analysis suggests that to the list of contextual variables presented by Germani (1966) and Kessin (1971), the route through which mobility occurs must also be considered before anticipating what he calls 'pathogenic conditions'.[11] As indicated in Chapter 1, this is a perspective which extends and qualifies Turner's (1960) argument, that because of a system of norms organizing upward mobility—what he called sponsorship norms—upward mobility need not be as detrimental in British society as was generally anticipated. In effect, sponsored mobility by being regular and institutionalized is hypothesized as having less impact upon individuals than contest mobility (Turner, 1960: 88; Turner, 1966).

In general, Hopper supports Turner's position that upward mobility through an educational route is in Britain likely to be relatively unproblematic. However, as he points out, there is as much, if not more, upward mobility through non-educational (non-grammar) routes as through educational routes, an observation supported by data in this study (see Chapter 3). Given the relatively high degree of status rigidity of

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[10]For example, compare Hopper's definition of status rigidity (Hopper, 1971a: 21), with Kessin's list of conditions most conducive to creation of negative consequences for individuals experiencing social mobility.

[11]Miller (1971: 63) adds yet another context, that of the time when the data were collected. As he says: 'Studies of 1936 or 1952 have the same significance for 1971 as do studies of 1968. Implicitly there is a belief in the significance of structure regardless of changes in social climate. A pseudo-cumulativeness exists, acting as though data are floating in statistical space unconnected to their historical emergence'.

British social structure, sucn non-institutionalized mobility, he sug-
gests, is likely to be especially problematic for individuals experi-
encing it, more so than in the United States where educational routes
are more uniform and the status hierarchy is less rigid. The reason is
that in any society it is difficult to slough-off in adulthood one mode
of behaviour and thinking for another—the almost universal condemnation
of _nouveau riche_ bears witness to this fact. But, in Britain the problem
of re-acculturation is more acute than in some other industrial socie-
ties because as differences in accent, lifestyle and attitudes between
classes attest, there is a high degree of discontinuity between such
broad strata as working class and middle class.[12] The result is that
without the status training provided by grammar-school-type education,
occupational mobility is not likely to deliver anywhere near the same
status benefits that it might do in perhaps the United States.[13]

Hopper's position, then, is generally in fundamental accord with
those advanced by Germani (1966), Treiman (1970), Simpson (1970) and
Kessin (1971). All hypothesize that upward mobility is likely to be
most disruptive in societies tending towards the traditional and ascrip-
tive end of an industrial-achievement-traditional-ascriptive continuum
and when it is irregular or non-institutionalized. As a result, it is
either implied or actually anticipated that for these reasons upward mo-
bility will be more disruptive in its effects within British than in
American society. The exception, analysed by Hopper and earlier by
Turner, is that upward mobility that takes place within the context of

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[12]For evidence of this, see Klein (1965), Lockwood (1966) and Gold-
thorpe et al, (1969).

[13]As I noted in Chapter 1, Hopper (1971b: 332) also hypothesizes
that individuals upwardly mobile through an educational route, but who
do not complete their education are also more likely to encounter pato-
genic conditions in Britain than in the United States.

a sponsorship system of norms is likely to pose fewer difficulties than mobility which occurs in other contexts. The position with respect to downward mobility is less clearly specified. The general expectation is, however, as we saw earlier, that it ought to be a socially isolating and disruptive experience in virtually all contexts. According to Hopper (1971b: 332), for example, downward mobility is likely to be more disruptive (pathogenic) in Britain than in the United States.

SUMMARY

The traditional position about social mobility is that along with positive benefits for society, and in the case of upward mobility for the individual, there are personal and social effects which are detrimental. There is some empirical evidence and a great deal of speculation that social mobility destroys kinship and friendship ties; that it leaves the mobile individual isolated and marginal; that in a status-oriented society social mobility creates added anxiety and strain manifested in a variety of patterns of behaviour and attitudes such as increased prejudice, extremist political attitudes and anomie. However, against this older view--the dissociative hypothesis--is a more recent body of research which tends to discount the impact of social mobility qua mobility. Rather, attitudes and behaviour believed to be the consequence of social mobility are shown, instead, to be a product not of mobility per se but of the failure of the mobile to be fully acculturated into either the class of origin or destination. In either case, the general consensus of sociological thought is that upward mobility because of status anxiety or because of the difficulty of re-acculturation is to some extent at least, consequential, if not in a disruptive sense, then in creating a degree of marginality. Downward mobility has received less theoretical and empirical attention, but the general expectation has been that the

process of moving downward will be a more disruptive experience than
that of moving upward. Again, the more recent view is that moving down-
ward is as with upward mobility mainly a process of re-acculturation.

Recent thought about the consequences of social mobility suggests
that if there are disruptive consequences these are most likely to occur
where the status hierarchy is relatively rigid, where mobility is non-
institutionalized and non-normative and where those who are mobile are
fairly visible. In short, in 'traditional' societies in which the de-
gree of status rigidity is such that achieved statuses do not override
ascribed ones to the extent that status incongruence can be avoided.
Existing evidence suggests that social mobility will, therefore, be
relatively consequential in British society unless it takes place through
a grammar-school-type route and conforms to sponsorship norms.

While there is evidence in preceding chapters that the careers and
career choices of upwardly mobile men were more problematic than for
men who remain stationary in the class system, this was a relative dif-
ference not so severe as to suggest undue anxiety and stress as a result
of it. In other words, there is a certain amount of disorder, set-backs,
triumphs, unanticipated rises and various stresses in the lives of most
people. My evidence does not at this point lead me to anticipate that
the experience of intergenerational mobility is in the middle mass as
'fateful' as some of the literature suggests.

In a similar vein, the evidence presented in preceding chapters
about intergenerational downward mobility suggests that it does not in-
volve as much discontinuity and sense of failure as the literature leads
one to expect. As I suggested in Chapter 1, involuntary downward mobi-
lity through what for the middle class is generally a non-mobility route--
grammar or public school--would likely be a disruptive or dissociative

experience and whether voluntary or involuntary would pose interpersonal dilemmas. However, in my sample at least, this theoretical pattern of mobility does not have an empirical counterpart. Similarly, movement downward over the work life, what Wilensky and Edwards (1959) call 'skidding', was also virtually non-existent in the sample. The downward mobility observed was, instead, from marginally middle-class positions and, at the beginning of the work life, led into skilled manual trades. As a result, I do not anticipate that this pattern, essentially voluntary downward mobility, will involve especially detrimental effects for those experiencing it.

In the next two chapters I turn to some findings from the Work and Leisure Study and the Mobility Sample about the consequences of social mobility in British society. It is usual practice, following a review of this nature, to attempt a synthesis of existing theory and research and from this to formulate definite hypotheses. However, the paucity of British empirical research and the lack of theoretical and empirical consensus in the United States where research has been done, makes such a task, at this point, futile. Rather, the main question in the next two chapters is whether social mobility in Britain is significantly related regardless of direction, to various social phenomena which have been studied elsewhere (mainly in the United States). Aside from the usual distinction between upward and downward mobility and middle-class and working-class non-mobility, I also follow Hopper (1971b) in attempting to distinguish between upward mobility and middle-class non-mobility which occurs through two basic routes: a grammar school or 'public' school route and a non-grammar (secondary modern or equivalent) route.

CHAPTER 10

THE CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL MOBILITY (2)

In the last chapter, by way of an introduction to a study of the
consequences of social mobility in Britain, I discussed the major per-
spectives which have been advanced in the sociological literature. Now
I wish to present some findings from the Work and Leisure Study and the
Mobility Sample which might provide indications of whether middle-mass
social mobility has disruptive consequences for the individuals experi-
encing it. In particular, I look at four variables—two of which are
attitudinal and two of which are behavioural—that are assumed to be
manifestations of the dissociation or malintegration postulated as aris-
ing from the experience of social mobility. These are (1) anomia; (2)
prejudice; (3) social isolation; and (4) social participation.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Sociological writings on the consequences of social mobility have
as we saw in Chapter 9 tended to emphasize the detrimental effects of
changing social class. The implication is that to leave one's class of
origin is also to leave behind its standards, values and social support
and that once severed, these are not easily supplanted by those of other
classes which the mobile person objectively enters or attempts to enter.
In general, then, the consequences of social mobility are couched in
images similar to MacIver's (1950) definition of 'anomy', or 'anomia'
as it is more commonly called.[1]

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[1]Although the literature is far from consistent, the term anomie has
generally been used to refer to the condition of a society and anomia to
the condition of an individual. 'Anomy' is, as Merton observes, an obso-
lete spelling of the word.

(It) signifies the state of mind of one who has no longer any standards but only disconnected urges, who has no longer any sense of continuity, of folk, of obligation. . . . Anomy is a state of mind in which the individual's sense of social cohesion—the mainspring of his morale—is broken or fatally weakened (Quoted in Merton, 1957).

Durkheim, however, developed the concept of anomie to refer specifically to a property of the society and not, as MacIver does, to a property of individuals (Merton, 1957: 215). As his study of suicide suggests, he was, nevertheless, concerned with the reaction of individuals to anomic conditions (Finifter, 1972: 55). Principally, these conditions are seen as the outcome of rapid economic and social change, shifts as likely to thrust people abruptly upwards in social and economic position as they are to plunge them downwards through sudden and involuntary declassification (Durkheim, 1897: 252). Once the social constraints—the values, norms and sanctions—are undermined, the individual is left with no clear-cut rules defining his place and role in society. In Steven Lukes' words, 'anomic man is, for Durkheim, the unregulated man who needs rules to live by, limits to his desires, "circumscribed tasks" to perform and "limited horizons" for his thoughts' (Lukes, 1972: 25).[2]

I suggested in Chapter 9 that there is increasing recognition that the impact of social mobility may differ with the structural, cultural and institutional contexts in which it occurs. To the extent that social mobility may be considered as a source of anomia, it follows that one would expect its intensity to vary both with the pattern of mobility and

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[2]Anomia and the related concept, alienation, have become intertwined, perhaps inextricably, in the sociological literature. In Seeman's (1959) schema, anomia or normlessness is treated as one of five dimensions of alienation. In his later work (Seeman, 1972, for example) the term anomia is used interchangeably with alienation. Nettler (1957) also holds a similar view. However, for a useful attempt to distinguish between the two concepts, see Lukes (1972).

non-mobility and with the social context.[3] Otherwise, one would be deal-

ing simply with a chronic and general condition either of modern indus-

trial society, or perhaps of the human condition, generally.[4]

Following Hopper (1971a and 1971b), it is plausible to hypothesize

that to the extent anomia and related phenomena are induced by social

mobility, these consequences will be more intense for men upwardly mobile

through a non-grammar school route than for men upwardly mobile through

a grammar or public school route. Similarly, for reasons suggested by

Blau (1956), it is anticipated that the downwardly mobile would under

most conditions be more anomic and more likely to exhibit anomic-related

attitudes and behaviour than the non-mobile and the upwardly mobile.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND ANOMIA

The measure of anomia administered to all respondents in the Mobility

Sample was the widely used instrument devised by Srole (1956). Whereas

for Durkheim anomie was a social condition, Srole was interested in tap-

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[3]The evidence is scanty. However, see Tumin et al (1959), Meier
and Bell (1959), Wilensky (1966), Simpson (1970), Kessin (1971), which
suggests that in the United States there is in varying degrees a relation-
ship between social mobility and anomia. Generally, though, the mobile
tend to bestride their class of origin and destination suggesting the
acculturative hypothesis rather than the dissociative hypothesis. To my
knowledge the relationship between social mobility and anomia has not
been tested in Britain.

[4]Some have, of course, taken this view. For example, Luckmann and
Berger (1964), cited in Chapter 9, argue that the general emphasis on
status and status seeking in industrial societies, creates a loss of
identity and of social integration. I believe, however, that it is use-
ful to consider anomie at a lower level of generality, at what might be
considered a middle-range level of conceptualization. As Merton (1957:
217) suggests, there is merit in searching out patterned sources of a
high or 'acute' degree of anomie, compared to 'simple' anomie, which may
be endemic to all societies. For a related attempt to locate factors
intensifying alienation, see Blauner (1964). An insightful analysis of
levels of generality in the study and conceptualization of anomie and
alienation, is found in Lukes (1972).

ping the malintegration of individuals. In his words, 'the immediate analytical objective would be to place individuals on a eunomia-anomia continuum representing variations in interpersonal integration with their particular social fields as "global" entities' (P. 61). The scale, consisting of five items, attempts to tap five different components of the general phenomenon of malintegration or 'self-to-others alienation', as Srole at one point calls it. These statements refer to (1) the individual's perceptions of the social order as essentially fickle, unpredictable and without order; (2) the individual's sense of powerlessness because of the indifference of community leaders to his needs; (3) the individual's view that life-goals are receding rather than being realized; (4) 'the deflation or loss of internalized social norms and values, reflected in the individual's sense of the meaninglessness of life itself' (P. 63); and, finally, (5) the individual's feeling that his immediate social network is no longer predictable or psychologically and socially supportive.[5]

Table 10.1 (third column) presents the proportion of men who either agreed or strongly agreed with each of the five statements of the Srole anomia test as well as the average percentage agreeing or disagreeing with the items. In all, nearly two-fifths of the men can, on the basis of this scale, be considered as evidencing signs of anomia. From item to item, however, there are sizeable differences in the proportion expressing agreement. Thus, over half of the men believe that the social order is unpredictable and that they are essentially powerless to influence community leaders. At the same time, very few (15 percent) agree with item 3, which Srole suggests taps the component closest to Durkheim's definition of anomie, as a sense of the meaninglessness of life.[6] It

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[5]For the precise statements, see Table 10.5. Item 3 has, following Tumin et al (1959), been made into a positive statement to reduce a possible 'halo' effect of five negative statements one after another.

[6]It is of interest to compare these proportions with those reported by Seeman (1972) for France and the United States.

can also be seen in Table 10.1 that level of anomia is inversely related to social class. Thus, on three of the five items working-class respondents are significantly more likely to agree with the statement than are middle-class respondents. There is also a significant difference between working- and middle-class respondents in percent agreeing with all of the items.

TABLE 10.1

PERCENT ANOMIC (AGREEING OR STRONGLY AGREEING) FOR THE FIVE

ITEMS OF THE SROLE ANOMIA SCALE BY RESPONDENT'S PRESENT

CLASS: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 110)*

	Respondent's Social Class		
Item	Middle Class (N = 65)	Working Class (n = 45)	Total Sample (N = 110)
1. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.	52%	67%	58%
2. There's little use in trying to influence the authorities these days because often they aren't interested in the problems of the average man.	40	78	55
3. In spite of what some people say, the situation for the average man is getting better all the time.**	25	33	28
4. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world today, with the way things look for the future	6	27	15
5. These days a person doesn't know whom he can count on	32	51	40
Average Percentage:	31%	51%	39

Tests of Significance: (Differences of proportions (Blalock, 1960: 176-178) test):

      Item 1: N.S.   Item 4: $P < .001$
      Item 2: $P < .001$ Item 5: $P < .05$
      Item 3: N.S.   Average: $P < .05$

* There were seven inadequate responses.
** Figures given are percent disagreeing with this statement. It was reversed to reduce possible 'halo. effects.

The relationship between level of anomia and the four basic patterns

of mobility and non-mobility is not as clear-cut as when present social

class was considered (Table 10.2).

TABLE 10.2

PERCENT ANOMIC (AGREEING OR STRONGLY AGREEING) FOR THE

FIVE ITEMS OF THE SROLE ANOMIA SCALE BY PATTERN OF

CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 110)*

	Pattern of Conventional Mobility				
Srole Items**	(1) Upward	(2) Stable Non-Manual	(3) Downward	(4) Stable Manual	All Groups
Item 1	45%	64%	81%*	54%	58
Item 2	36	45	86	71	55
Item 3***	20	32	29	38	28
Item 4	9	0	33	21	15
Item 5	27	41	62	42	40
Average Percentage	27	36	58	45	39
Total N's	(43)	(22)	(21)	(24)	(110)

Tests of Significance: Comparing average for all items.
(Difference of Proportions (Blalock, 1960: 176-178).)

1 X 2: N.S.	2 X 3: N.S.	* Significant: P < .05
1 X 3: P < .02	2 X 4: N.S.	
1 X 4: N.S.	3 X 4: N.S.	

  * There were seven inadequate responses.
 ** See Table 10.1 for wording of items.
*** Figures refer to percent disagreeing or strongly disagreeing
    with this statement.

Looking first at downward mobility, the proportions agreeing with each

of the items are generally in the direction predicted by the hypothesis.

That is, that they are more anomic than either their class of origin or

class of destination. However, only with respect to items 1 and 2 do

these differencee reach statistical significance. Overall, as the bot-

tom panel of Table 10.1 shows, the downwardly mobile, though more anomic than any other group, do not differ sufficiently for it to be said that this is not a finding due simply to sampling fluctuation or chance. In particular, the general similarity of this group to the stable manual group suggests that moving downwards in the occupational hierarchy puts people into a social context not dissimilar to that experienced by stable working-class people.

The one exception is the comparison between the downwardly mobile and the upwardly mobile: the latter emerge as significantly lower in anomia than the former. Again, while it cannot be said that the upwardly mobile are significantly lower in level of anomia than the two stable groups, the proportions agreeing with each item (except number 3) and agreeing with all five items are smaller than the comparable figures for the stable non-manual or stable manual groups. Taken at face-value, then, these figures are in the opposite direction to either a dissociative or acculturative hypothesis. With the former, the upwardly mobile are expected to be more anomic than their class of destination and perhaps class of origin as well. The acculturative hypothesis leads one to expect them to be less anomic than their class of origin and more anomic than their class of destination. Instead, Table 10.2 suggests that generally conventional social mobility does not distinguish who are the anomic and who are not.

A second measure of mobility anticipated as being of interest, is based on the respondent's assessment of his class mobility or non-mobility. The four patterns of this measure, what I call subjective mobility, and proportion anomic are presented in Table 10.3.[7] First, com-

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[7]This measure is discussed more fully in Chapter 12. In the Work and Leisure Study we asked everyone whether they thought they belonged to the middle class or the working class. In reinterviewing the men in

TABLE 10.3

PERCENT ANOMIC (AGREEING OR STRONGLY AGREEING) FOR THE FIVE
ITEMS OF THE SROLE ANOMIA SCALE BY PATTERN OF SUBJECTIVE
MOBILITY: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 106)*

Pattern of Subjective Mobility

Srole Items**	Upward	Stable Middle Class	Downward	Stable Working Class	All Groups
Item 1	58%	58%	78%	59%	61
Item 2	46	58	71	57	51
Item 3***	25	29	36	30	29
Item 4	17	8	29	16	16
Item 5	42	33	43	36	38
Average Percentage	38	38	50	40	36
Total N's	(24)	(24)	(14)	(44)	(106)

Comments: * There were 11 inadequate responses to one or both vari-
             ables.
            ** See Table 10.1 for wording of items.
           *** Figures refer to percent disagreeing or strongly dis-
               agreeing with this statement.

paring this table with the two preceding ones it can be seen that there

is some disagreement between the way individuals assess the class of

themselves and their fathers and the way our 'objective' measure places

them. Details of this discrepancy will be considered in Chapter 12.

The main finding to be noted here is that neither self-assigned class

or subjective mobility are variables distinguishing those who are anomic

from those who are not. Whereas Table 10.1 indicated a significantly

lower level of anomia among men in middle-class positions than among

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the Mobility Sample, I asked in which of the two classes men felt their
father (and mother) belonged. Hence, upward mobility refers to men who
assigned themselves to the middle class and their fathers to the work-
ing class, and so on. Some data on mothers' social class were presented
in Chapter 7.

men in working-class positions, the data of Table 10.3 suggest little or no difference when class position is subjectively determined (38 percent versus 42 percent agreeing with all five items for middle class and working class, respectively). Similarly, there is no evidence that men who see themselves in a different class from their father, be it higher or lower, are more or less likely to be high in anomia as measured by this instrument.[8]

Finally, it can be noted that educational route did not distinguish level of anomia. The average percentage for men who moved upwards and who attended a grammar school was 28 percent compared to 25 percent for men who did not attend a grammar school. Similarly, among the stable non-manual group a grammar school or public school route resulted in 39 percent anomic compared to 33 percent for men not using a grammar school route. These differences, both in a direction opposite to that hypothesized, are not, however, statistically significant.[9]

The main conclusion to be drawn from this first analysis is that while there are class differences in level of anomia, the experience of mobility seems to have the main effect of placing the individual in a less or more anomic context, depending on whether he moves up or down. On the basis of this evidence it cannot be said that social mobility per se contributes to feelings of meaninglessness and normlessness.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND PREJUDICE

One of Srole's purposes in devising the anomia scale was to determine which of two scales--the anomia scale or an authoritarian scale--

[8]While in Table 10.3 the subjectively downwardly mobile are more anomic than other groups, the base is small and percentages are, accordingly, unstable. Differences between the downwardly mobile and the other three groups do not reach statistical significance.

[9]There are also very little differences in level of anomia between men who experience high upward or downward mobility and those who experienced low upward or downward mobility.

was more strongly related to prejudice. On the basis of his Springfield

data, Srole concluded that anomia was the most important.[10] Because of

this relationship and because social mobility has been frequently linked

to prejudiced attitudes it is of interest whether the socially mobile

are more or less prejudiced than their non-mobile counterparts. Before

presenting my findings I first consider those discussed in previous re-

search.

The idea that social mobility might be linked to prejudice goes

back to the 1950's. Among the first to investigate this and to posit

a theoretical connection were Bettelheim and Janowitz (1950), who found

that both downward mobility and extreme upward mobility were related to

prejudice beyond the norms of the sample as a whole. This study was

replicated and elaborated by Greenblum and Pearlin (1953), who also in-

cluded a subjective measure of social mobility in their analysis. In

general, they found that the upwardly mobile were more prejudiced than

the stable respondents of their destination class. In turn, the down-

wardly mobile were found to be more prejudiced than stable manual res-

pondents. Both studies are premised on the theory that heightened sta-

tus insecurity leads to heightened prejudice. For mobile people, Green-

blum and Pearlin (1953: 488) argue:

. . . prejudiced attitudes as yielded by our findings have a functional
significance. They function as attitudinal props, to maintain at higher
levels the subjectively felt diminishing prestige of groups objectively
descending in the social status ladder . . . In the case of groups ob-
jectively rising in social status, such attitudes function to enhance
and secure their newly-won prestige which they subjectively feel to be
raised but find threatened or unstable.

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[10]Srole found a correlation of +.43 between prejudice and anomia,
compared with +.29 between authoritarianism and prejudice. For a re-
view of subsequent research and theory on the relative power of these
two concepts to predict prejudice, see Lutterman and Middleton (1970).
In the Mobility Sample I found a rank correlation of $Tc = .21$ (Kendall's
Tau). When the two variables are dichotomized $C = .18$; $X^2 = 3.963$;
$P < .05$.

In a somewhat more sophisticated study, Silberstein and Seeman (1959) attempted to test the basic social-psychological explanation which had been advanced in these two earlier studies. Instead of hypothesizing that upward and downward mobility are, of themselves, productive of prejudice, they suggest it will also depend on the individual's attitude towards mobility. Thus, their research showed that mobility alone did not predict either Negro or Jewish prejudice. When the sample was divided into those who were mobility oriented and those who were achievement oriented, however, it was found that all groups who were status conscious had higher prejudice scores. The greatest prejudice was among the downwardly mobile who were high in mobility orientation. That is, those who stressed the importance of status and yet had, objectively, lost status were found to be the most prejudiced. As the authors suggest, 'the interpretation of this is that being high in status needs and finding no satisfaction in their occupational world, (the downwardly mobile) who are mobility oriented maximize other avenues of status satisfaction, and in this case they achieve it through the relative downgrading of minorities' (P. 264).

In attempting to replicate these findings with Swedish data, Seeman, Rohan and Argeriou (1966) were unsuccessful. A modification of the scale already used by Silberstein and Seeman (1959) was administered to 558 men in Malmo, Sweden. As in the previous study, the sample was also split into those who were 'mobility' or 'status' oriented and those who were not. The results were largely negative: there were no significant or consistent differences between the downwardly mobile and the stationary manual and between the upwardly mobile and the stable non-manual. Similarly, Tumin and Collins (1959), in yet another investigation of prejudice and social mobility, looked at what they call 'readiness for desegre-

gation'. They found that the most ready for desegregation were the high stationaries followed by upward mobiles, downward mobiles and low stationaries. There was, however, little difference between the latter three groups—differences between the low stationaries and downward mobiles were not statistically significant.

In what has emerged as an extremely important paper for the study of consequences of social mobility, Hodge and Treiman (1966) reanalysed the data of the Greenblum and Pearlin study, the Silberstein and Seeman Study and presented some additional findings from a 1963 American national sample. All of the data were examined within the context of two competing hypotheses, what they call additive and interaction models.[11] The first is premised on the view that 'individuals form their attitudes by striking a kind of average between the views appropriate to their class of origin and the views appropriate to their class of destination'. The latter, the more historical of the two, suggests mobility has an effect beyond that which is based on the fact of the mobile having two separate statuses. The results, which they confine to Negro intolerance, are that while the upwardly and downwardly mobile are more prejudiced than the stable manual, they concluded that their data 'do not at all support the idea that mobility per se is a source of prejudice: the upwardly and downwardly mobile are more prejudiced than stable persons, but one would expect that to be true just from a knowledge of their average place of origin and point of destination' (P. 102). Their analysis seriously undermines the theoretical and empirical linkage which had been established between mobility and prejudice. Instead of the

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[11]The additive model is what was described in Chapter 9 as the acculturation hypothesis. The interaction model is similar to what I called the dissociative hypothesis in the same chapter.

dissociative hypothesis on which that linkage had been based, their re-

search suggests that the acculturation hypothesis is the more plausible

interpretation:

In sum, it seems fair to conclude that the evidence supporting the theory
of personal and social control is at best tenuous, while that supporting
the notions derived from a consideration of competition between groups
for status and socialization practices is more substantial.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND PREJUDICE IN BRITAIN

There is very little evidence available in Britain about the rela-

tionship of social mobilty to prejudice. One of the most comprehensive

studies of colour prejudice was that carried out by the Institute of Race

Relations (Rose et al, 1968). In their survey of attitudes, the inci-

dence of prejudice was related to a variety of social and demographic

characteristics with distributions not very different than those found

for the sample in its entirety (P. 553). Nor were they able to find

evidence that social mobility was significantly related to prejudiced

attitudes. Their sample was, however, divided into only three categories:

upward, downward and stable. Mobility was defined as intergenerational

movement one or more social classes whether this involved crossing the

manual-non-manual line or not. On the basis of their measure of mobili-

ty, the upwardly mobile were found to be slightly more prejudiced than

those who had fallen in the social scale. Nevertheless, the authors

conclude that 'the attitudes of these people . . . were not strikingly

different in general outline from those of the rest of the sample' (P.

561).

Since their measure of social mobility differed from the one used

in this study and because the stable group were not divided, it is use-

ful, notwithstanding this conclusion, to reinvestigate the relationship

of social mobility and prejudice. In order to do so, I used a modified

version of the four questions used to form the Tolerant-Prejudice Scale.[12]

I did so because of limited resources available to pilot adequately a

new set of questions, and because of the obvious empirical anchorage

provided by this much larger survey.

TABLE 10.4

INCIDENCE OF PREJUDICE AGAINST IMMIGRANTS: MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 116)

Level of Prejudice	Percent	Number
Tolerant	47%	55
Tolerant Inclined	11%	12
Prejudice Inclined	20%	17
Prejudiced	22%	26

Table 10.4 shows that nearly one-half of the men in the Mobility

Sample indicated no overt hostility or prejudice and another 11 percent

were inclined towards tolerance. Thus, in only about one-fifth of the

interviews was I able to detect sufficient hostility so as to code the

respondent as 'prejudiced'. In short, the distribution of responses in

the Mobility Sample, though only roughly similar to those reported in

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[12]The specific questions are given in Appendix 4, numbers 88-91.
These differ from those administered in the 'Survey of Race Relations'
(Rose et al, 1968: 790-791) in the following ways: (1) Instead of men-
tioning specific ethnic groups, I simply referred to 'immigrants'; (2)
The question about whether the authorities should let or refuse to let
a council house or flat to a coloured person was deleted in favour of
one asking about immigration laws and whether they should be tightened
(question #88). The method and technique of scaling was identical to
that described in Appendix VII.3 of the Rose et al study. For example,
respondents who in answering question #89 (Appendix 4) would avoid having
coloured immigrants as neighbours and who would still object even if
they were professional people, were given a score of 15. Following Rose
et al (1968: 552), the resulting numerical scale divided respondents
into four categories:
Tolerant: those respondents who gave non-hostile answers on all 4
questions.
Tolerant-inclined: those who gave only 1 hostile reply.
Prejudice-inclined: Those who gave two hostile replies on the four
questions.
Prejudiced: those who gave 3 or 4 hostile replies.

Colour and Citizenship (Table 28.1: P. 553), do not suggest that there
is a great deal of outright prejudice in the British population.[13]

Colour, as many were quick to point out, was not the major issue.
Rather, the most frequently mentioned objection to immigrants centered
around the dual problems of overpopulation and the threat to the British
way of life. Many were, for example, adamant that no more coloured
people should be allowed into Britain, but they were equally adamant
that the door be closed to others as well; 'this is a very small island',
warned many. Coupled with this was the fear looming large in many peo-
ple's minds for the future of the British way of life, if there were to
be large groups who, in their view, were unwilling or unable to change
their customs and habits. Over and over there was the repeated question
about why immigrants cannot conform. A few also put emphasis on the
self-fulfilling prophecy that immigrants lower property values. 'Shore',
said Mr. Terry, somewhat inconsistently, 'I'd try to keep them out be-
cause it would lower the property values. But at the same time, I'd
sell to a black because I know I could get a higher price'. Others, re-
flecting perhaps the British distrust of written-down laws, seemed more
concerned with the legislation than with the actual presence of immi-
grants next door or in the country at large.

It is, of course, impossible to assess the extent to which what
people stated were 'rationalizations' constructed for their own or my
benefit. Nor are attitudes the same thing as behaviour, an observation
which cuts both ways. Some, no doubt among those coded as tolerant,
would act very differently if faced with a coloured neighbour or work
mate or some other similar situation. By the same token, the friendly

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[13]The exact figures given by Rose et al (1968: 553) are respec-
tively, 35%, 38%, 17% and 10% for each of the levels of prejudice shown
in Table 10.1.

demeanor and personality of some men who did express hostile attitudes made me wonder whether they practiced what they advocated. The main themes, then, centered around problems of overpopulation, threats to British culture, property values and the general dislike by most British of laws which purport to tell them what they can and cannot feel and do. But it should be stressed that unconditional hostility was rare; negative statements were usually hedged by qualifications. Nor was I able to detect much sense of these immigrant groups serving as scapegoats on which to pin personal or social malaises which some no doubt felt and were experiencing. Finally, as I describe later, excepting stable middle-class men, concern about status did not seem to be related to negative attitudes about immigrants. One indication of this is that only about eight percent were prepared to say that 'on the whole, the majority of coloured people in Britain were inferior to themselves', and to give as the reason a totally colour-related reason; many answered that some were superior, some inferior, and some equal while others observed that in terms of education most were inferior both to themselves and to the majority of British people.

CLASS, MOBILITY AND PREJUDICE

Consistent with other studies, (see Hodge and Treiman, 1966) level of prejudice is in the Mobility Sample inversely related to social class. That is, that the higher the social class, the less likely were people to express prejudiced attitudes. This can be seen in Table 10.5 where middle-class respondents are shown to be less likely to be prejudiced and more likely to be tolerant than are working-class respondents.[14] There is little or no difference between the classes with respect to the two middle categories--those inclined towards tolerance or prejudice.

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[14]Since it was anticipated that prejudice and class would be inversely related, I have used a 1-tailed test in calculating level of significance.

TABLE 10.5

LEVEL OF PREJUDICE AND SOCIAL CLASS: MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 116)   (Percentage)

Respondent's Present Social Class	Level of Prejudice				
	Tolerant	Tolerant inclined	Prejudice inclined	Prejudiced	Total (100%)
Middle Class	54	10	19	16	(68)
Working Class	38	10	21	31	(48)

$x^2 = 3.228$; P $<$ .05 (using a 1-tailed test; 1df) comparing Tolerant with those exhibiting some degree of prejudice.

As a result, the overall chi-square value for the table does not reach statistical significance ($x^2 = 4.591$; N.S.; 3df--1-tailed test).

Turning next to the relationship of social mobility to level of prejudice, Table 10.6 suggests that, with one exception, differences between the four mobility groups are trivial and unpatterned. The exception is the upwardly mobile group which, in contradiction to theoretical views, emerges as the most likely to be tolerant. However, as the tests of significance for Table 10.6 show, the only significant difference is between the upwardly mobile and their class of origin. On the whole, then, the four groups tend to resemble one another in extent of prejudice much more than they differ, even considering percentage differences.

Of particular interest is that there is no indication that downward mobility is a source of prejudiced attitudes. In Table 10.6 those defined as downwardly mobile do not differ significantly from the other three groups. These results are not entirely surprising since as I have described in previous chapters, those who, objectively, have moved downwards did not appear to have been involved in an experience likely to have engendered any patterned feelings of subjective deprivation or status insecurity of the kind described by Greenblum and Pearlin (1953).

TABLE 10.6

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND LEVEL OF PREJUDICE:
MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 116)   (Percentages)

Level of Prejudice	Pattern of Conventional Mobility				
	(1) Upward	(2) Stable Non-Manual	(3) Downward	(4) Stable Manual	All Groups
Tolerant	59	46	46	31	47
Tolerant inclined	14	4	0	19	11
Prejudice inclined	18	21	18	23	20
Prejudiced	9	29	36	27	22
Totals	100% (44)	100% (24)	100% (22)	100% (26)	100% (116)

Tests of significance (comparing Tolerant with those exhibiting some degree of prejudice:

1 X 2: $X_2^2 = 1.100$; N.S.   2 X 3: $X_2^2 = .001$; N.S.
1 X 3: $X_2^2 = 1.100$; N.S.   2 X 4: $X_2^2 = 1.202$; N.S.
1 X 4: $X^2 = 5.248$; P $<$ .05   3 X 4: $X^2 = 1.202$; N.S.

With respect to those who moved upwards, one can only speculate as to reasons for their expressing such a low level of prejudiced attitudes. It may be that unlike men in the other three categories, they are not firmly enough integrated into any class so as to be concerned about their status vis-à-vis other groups. Contrary to most expectations, men who moved upwards did not, compared to stable middle-class men, evince much concern with status or status-related issues. Thus, it was only among those who were more firmly ensconced in the middle class that I encountered a sense of exclusiveness, status anxiety and concern about family background. I have already tried to show some of these differences in Chapter 5, and in Chapter 12 I will describe them further. But, the four questions about immigrants, designed to tap attitudes about prejudice also revealed some of the concern people felt about social status—living in the right kind of neighbourhood, knowing

the right sort of people and maintaining some degree of social distance

from those regarded as social inferiors. The result is that status and

prejudice tended, for middle-class people, to be intertwined. As Mr.

Montgomery, an accountant, pointed out:

Very few are of the same social standard. When you think of immigrants,
you think of the mass who are bus conductors, roadsweepers, that sort
of thing. On a social scale I wouldn't object to people of the same
social scale, but I would object strongly to a West Indian roadsweeper
coming and living next door. I'm not sure, really, whether I'm object-
ing to a roadsweeper or to a coloured roadsweeper. As to professionals,
it doesn't really apply, does it? I mean, they aren't professional,
are they?

Men who moved upwards in the occupational hierarchy, then, were

less concerned about normative aspects of status positions and were also

the most likely to be tolerant. Are men who perceive themselves as

having gone from working class to middle class also likely to be more

tolerant than those who see themselves as stable middle-class? Table

10.7 indicates that this is roughly the case. That is, though differ-

ences between the four mobility groups are not statistically signifi-

cant, those subjectively upwardly mobile are somewhat more tolerant than

TABLE 10.7

SUBJECTIVE MOBILITY AND PREJUDICE: MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 106) (Percentages)

Level of Prejudice	Pattern of Subjective Mobility				
	Upward	Stable Middle-Class	Downward	Stable Working-Class	All Groups
Tolerant and Tolerant Inclined	71%	58%	50%	52%	58%
Prejudiced and Prejudiced Inclined	29	42	50	48	42
Total	100% (24)	100% (24)	100% (14)	100% (44)	100% (106)

Tests of Significance: 1 X 2: X_2^2 = .819; N.S.
1 X 3: X_2^2 = 1.649; N.S.
1 X 4: X_2^2 = 2.209; N.S.

other groups. The most striking aspect of Table 10.7, however, is its close resemblance to Table 10.6, which related conventional social mobility and prejudice. Again, no significant relationship between social mobility and prejudice emerges.

Finally, it can be noted that level of prejudice does not differ significantly between the two basic types of educational mobility routes.[15] Thus, men who move upwards with a grammar school or grammar-school-type education were only slightly less likely to be prejudiced than are men who moved upwards, after leaving school at 14 or 15. For men who have remained stable in the middle class, there is, interestingly, no difference in level of prejudice by educational experience.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIAL ISOLATION

Perhaps the most often asserted consequence of social mobility is that it increases social isolation and loneliness. This is particularly so with relationships with kinfolk. Glass (1954: 25), for instance, notes that 'actual movement itself may, save in special circumstances, distort or destroy kinship associations, with possible personal and social deprivation'. Similarly, Stacey (1969: 7) states unequivocally that the mobile 'are characteristically isolated people who are never deeply involved with acquaintances, friends or relatives'. With respect to kinship relations, the traditional argument is based on Parsons' (1943 and 1953) contention that the extended family is incompatible with the

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[15] I also attempted to analyse the relationship between prejudice and a combined measure of mobility orientation (The Index of Mobility Orientation was based on four measures, each worth one point and weighted equally. A score of four goes to men who desired their own business, who mentioned promotion or prospects as something desirable in a job, who think promotion is important and who think moving up in the world is important.). There was, however, only a small correlation (Kendall's Tau = +.12) between these variables.

need of an industrial society for social and geographical mobility. In contrast, the isolated nuclear family is seen by Parsons as especially functional for occupational mobility. This is largely because extended family relations are by their nature in conflict with universalistic-achievement norms of industrial societies.

In opposition to this argument is the view that while the classical extended family is antithetical to occupational mobility, a modified version of it is not (Litwak, 1960). One of the main reasons he suggests, is that segregation of friends from relatives is institutionalized in modern societies, a practice made possible by the general anonymity of urban social life. Further, as Sussman (1953) and Bell (1968) show, there continues to be a 'help pattern' at least among middle-class families which does not necessarily interfere with occupational placement.[16]

Bell (1968: 182) concludes from his Swansea study that:

. . . a particularistic kinship ideology may be of great importance for the individual's emotional needs in an industrial society, though in his behaviour he may be completely committed to a universalistic pattern of relationships. Extended family ties become theoretically possible when universalistic and particularistic value systems are not seen as a continuum pervading all social systems but as applicable to different systems of society independently of each other. Extended family aid in the middle class has to do with standard of living and only in unusual circumstances with occupational appointments.

However, some theorists have argued that social mobility will tend to disrupt kinship relations because of the status differences between the mobile and their relatives. Willmott and Young (1960), for example, note that 'When fathers and sons similarly have the same occupation, on farm or in family business of any kind, they have a similar bond, but when they not only have different occupations, but these carry different social status, for many of them the bond becomes a barrier. Men

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[16]Data presented in Chapter 8, however, indicate that relatives do play an important role in the occupational sphere as well.

naturally judge each other according to the jobs they hold and are liable to feel uneasy with any close relative who has in the worldly sense succeeded more than they themselves'. Beyond the data they present, there is other evidence and speculation that this is likely to be the case.[17] Lemasters (1954), Schneider and Homans (1955), Young and Willmott (1959), Jackson and Marsden (1962), and Stuckert (1963) have all shown that the mobile tend to sever or have severed for them, kinship ties.

The link between social mobility and isolation from friends and acquaintances is equally uncertain. Nevertheless, since Sorokin (1927) the general view has been as Simpson (1970: 1002) put it, that 'if one severs ties with his class of origin, he may never again have meaningful ties with anyone'. Evidence for this general proposition is scanty and comes mainly from investigations of special groups. Studies of business leaders who have been upwardly mobile, for instance, suggest that they tend to be socially isolated (Warner and Abegglen, 1955; Clements, 1958). Ellis (1952) found among her sample of career women evidence of a similar inability to form close personal ties. In a study of lower class students at Stanford, Ellis and Lane (1963) find that they undergo both stressful and isolating experiences. On the basis of this study, the authors conclude that their evidence bears out 'Sorokin's dissociative hypothesis that upward mobility is itself a disruptive social experience which leaves the individual for an appreciable period with roots or effective social support' (P. 237). Although he does not provide evidence, Janowitz (1956) argues that both upward and downward mobility are socially disruptive for primary group structures among which he includes family, work groups

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[17]Data from the Work and Leisure Study do not support Willmott and Young's (1960) finding that mobile men see less of their parents. With respect both to fathers and mothers, I found the mobile were as likely to have seen their parents in the last week as were the non-mobile.

and friendship cliques. In a similar vein, Blau (1956: 294), while qualifying the situation for the upwardly mobile, maintains that under any circumstances, 'the predicament of the downwardly mobile is that the social conditions of his existence make it . . . likely that he will find himself without close friends'.

However, studies of the relationship of mobility to both kinship and friendship ties have not used consistent measures of social mobility, of involvement, or types of samples. For example, some have been unable to compare their mobile group with a class of origin group (e.g., Ellis and Lane, 1963; Warner and Abegglen, 1955; Jackson and Marsden, 1962). Others (Willmott and Young, 1960; Lemasters, 1954) do not distinguish between high and low status in the non-mobile group. As a result, it is not clear from these studies whether the degree of isolation exhibited by the socially mobile is necessarily caused by social mobility or whether it is simply an aspect of re-acculturation into the behavioural patterns of the destination class. Involvement with kinfolk has generally been found to be inversely related to social class while friendship involvement is directly related to social class. The acculturation hypothesis would therefore predict that the upwardly mobile would have a stronger involvement with kinfolk than stable middle-class members and a lower level of involvement than working-class members of their class of origin. The downwardly mobile, assuming no mobility effect, would similarly be intermediate between the pattern of their class of origin and class of destination. The plausibility of this hypothesis is suggested by findings in two studies (Litwak, 1960; Aiken and Goldberg, 1969), both of which show that social mobility has no depressing effect on visiting with kin. While one would expect that studies of friendship patterns would also find the socially mobile intermediate between the two stable

groups, there is to my knowledge none which have investigated the effect of mobility on visiting with friends.

Some data from the Work and Leisure Study allow a test of whether social mobility is an isolating experience. In the first round of interviewing respondents were asked, first of all, how many relatives they had seen in the last week and secondly, the occupation of the last one seen.[18] A similar set of questions were put concerning the number of friends seen in the last week. I begin with an examination of what these questions tell us about level of involvement with friends.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND FRIENDSHIP RELATIONS

In the pilot stage and in the main interviewing for the Work and Leisure Study we encountered a striking number of people who claimed to have no friends and to have seen no one in the week preceding our interview. This was, of course, more often true of older people than of younger people, but at all ages, there was an impression of people 'keeping to themselves', or 'staying out of one another's pocket' as many people liked to put it. The final data from the Work and Leisure Study tend to confirm this impression. For example, some 23 percent of the men said they had not seen a friend socially in the last week either inside or outside their home and nearly three-fifths had seen five or less people socially in the last week. This did not mean that the respondent had necessarily interacted with no one at all. People encountered at work, for instance, were not counted unless the interaction took place

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[18]If more than one person was seen at a time, respondents were asked to give the occupation (husband's occupation for married, widowed, separated or divorced women) of the one they felt closest to. This was also done for friends. The findings from these two questions are reported in Chapter 1?. For both sets of questions I report only the findings on the men in the Work and Leisure Study.

outside office hours, at lunch or in the pub after work.[19] Also the word

friend itself had particular connotations for some. Thus, men who claimed

that 'my friend is me wife' had, one suspects, a rather narrower defini-

tion of friendship than was implied by the question.

TABLE 10.8

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NUMBER OF FRIENDS SEEN

IN THE LAST WEEK: WORK AND LESIURE STUDY* (N = 878)
(Percentages)

| Number Of Friends | Pattern of Conventional Mobility | | | | |
	(1) Upward	(2) Stable Non-Manual	(3) Downward	(4) Stable Manual	All Groups
None	14%	13%	14%	33%	23%
1-5	45	37	44	41	41
6 or more	41	50	41	26	36
Average No. of Friends Seen	6.1	6.9	5.8	4.0	5.2
Totals	100% (177)	100% (182)	100% (99)	100% (420)	100% (878)

Tests of significance and contingency coefficients (2 df):

1X2: X_2^2 = 3.306; C = .99; N.S. 2X3: X_2^2 = 1.99; C= .08; N.S.
1X3: X_2^2 = .009; C = 0.00; N.S. 2X4: X_2^2 = 41.204; C= .25; P < .001
1X4: X^2 = 26.060; C = .20; P < .001 3X4: X^2 = 16.602; C= .18; P < .001

* Number of friends seen is based on total responses to three
  questions: (1) How many friends have you seen in the last
  week who live within ten minutes walk? (2) How many friends
  from your work have you met socially in the last week? (3)
  How many other friends have you met socially in the last week?

Overall, the extent of friendship involvement tends to vary inverse-

ly with social class, with middle-class people not only having more con-

tacts with friends but these come from further afield than for working-

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[19]Friends seen in the last week were in the Work and Leisure Study
divided into local friends, work friends, and other friends. Separate
tabulations of these with conventional social mobility failed to yield
any systematic or significant differences by mobility pattern. For
details of class and type of friends, see: Young and Willmott (1973:
Table 46).

class people (see: Young and Willmott, 1973: 228). What is the effect of social mobility on visiting patterns? Are the socially mobile likely to be more or less isolated than their non-mobile counterparts? Table 10.8 suggests an almost opposite conclusion. While stable working-class men tend to see significantly fewer friends than the stable middle-class group, there is virtually no difference between the upwardly mobile, the stable middle class and the downwardly mobile in number of friends seen in the preceding week. In other words, men who move up shift their pattern of sociability to correspond to that prevalent in the middle class. Downward mobiles, on the other hand, tend to retain the middle-class pattern, rather than to adopt the pattern observed among stable manual men. In all, there is no evidence that social mobility depresses or inhibits relations with friends and acquaintances.[20]

TABLE 10.9

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NUMBER OF RELATIVES SEEN IN THE LAST WEEK (N = 880): WORK AND LEISURE STUDY
(Percentages)

| Number of Relatives Seen | Pattern of Conventional Mobility | | | | |
	(1) Upward	(2) Stable Non-Manual	(3) Downward	(4) Stable Manual	All Groups
None	30%	36%	26%	23%	27%
1 - 4	53	47	48	50	50
5 or More	17	17	26	27	23
Totals	100% (178)	100% (182)	100% (99)	100% (421)	100% (880)

Tests of Significance and Contingency coefficients (1 df):

1X2: $x^2 = 1.712$; C=.07; N.S.   2X3: $x^2 = 2.912$; C=.10; N.S.
1X3: $x^2 = .385$; C=.00; N.S.   2X4: $x^2 = 11.718$; C=.14; P < .001
1X4: $x^2 = 3.255$; C=.07; N.S.   3X4: $x^2 = .535$; C=.03; N.S.

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[20]It should be noted, however, that this measure tells us nothing about the intensity of the friendships each group experiences.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND CONTACTS WITH KIN

When we turn to the question of kinship relationships, the pattern is slightly clearer, (Table 10.9). There is, again, a statistically significant difference between the stable non-manual and stable manual, but this time it is in the opposite direction. That is, middle-class people are somewhat more likely to state that they have seen no relatives in the past week than are working-class people. The differences are not very great, however, with the result that the socially mobile in falling in-between, do not differ significantly from either origin or destination class. Thus, those moving upwards see fewer relatives than members of their class of origin and more than their destination class. Similarly, men who move downwards see fewer relatives than does their destination class but more than their class of origin. To repeat, these differences are not statistically significant so that the appropriate conclusion is that in this sample of men, social mobility is unrelated to extent of kinship relationships.[21]

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND PARTICIPATION

In general, then, to the extent these measures are indicative of the extent of interpersonal relationships, the hypothesis that social mobility has the effect of inhibiting social relationships is not supported by these data for the London region. A final measure considered is the extent to which social mobility--upwards or downwards--affects people's participation in activities, both social and non-social, and in secondary organizations.

A principal concern in the Work and Leisure Study was the rela-

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[21]I was also unable to find any relationship between educational route and extent of relationships with friends or kinfolk. Similarly, dividing the upwardly and downwardly mobile according to amount of mobility did not produce any differences in numbers of people seen in the previous week.

tionship of various factors—car ownership, hours of work, kind of work, class, age, to name a few—to leisure activities. A series of questions about active and spectator sports, hobbies and entertainments were put to all respondents.[22] On the basis of the general knowledge about class and leisure activities it was anticipated that higher status people would be engaged in a wider variety of activities than lower status people. Beyond this, I wondered at the outset whether social mobility would be a variable having predictive importance in this respect. Following the general theoretical and empirical position of the literature described in this and the last chapter, I anticipated that if mobility does have an effect on level of social integration it would also inhibit involvement in leisure activities.

TABLE 10.10
CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NUMBERS OF ACTIVITIES
DONE 12 OR MORE TIMES IN THE LAST YEAR: WORK & LEISURE STUDY
(N = 884) (Percentages)

Numbers of Activities	Pattern of Conventional Mobility				
	(1) Upward	(2) Stable Non-Manual	(3) Downward	(4) Stable Manual	All Groups
Low (0-9)	19%	25%	32%	37%	30%
Medium (10-19)	60	62	47	49	54
High (20-)	21	13	21	14	16
Totals	100% (178)	100% (182)	100% (100)	100% (424)	100% (884)

Tests of Significance and Contingency coefficients:

1X2: $x^2_2 = 1.662$; C=.07; N.S.   2X3: $x^2_2 = 1.721$; C=.08; N.S.
1X3: $x^2_2 = 5.888$; C=.14; P $<$.02   2X4: $x^2_2 = 9.096$; C=.12; P $<$.01
1X4: $x^2 = 19.040$; C=.18; P $<$.001   3X4: $x^2 = .970$; C=.03; N.S.

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[22]Separate lists of activities for things done within the home and outside were systematically presented to all respondents. For each activity they were asked if they did it, and if so, about how many times in the last year. Activities within the home included such things as television watching, knitting, listening to music, gardening, etc.. Activities outside included as well as sports, going out for a meal, attending a play, going to the cinema, taking a walk and so on. Detailed descriptions of these questions are found in Young and Willmott (1973: Appendix 3).

Table 10.10 suggests, instead, that the experience of moving upwards has the opposite effect. Of the four patterns of mobility and non-mobility it is the upward group which has the highest numbers of activities. However, there is only a trivial difference between this group and the stable non-manual group. The result is that in the middle class, social mobility is not a useful predictor of involvement in leisure activities. Whereas the upwardly mobile do differ significantly from their class of origin, the downwardly mobile fall in-between origin and destination class; they do not differ significantly from either the stable manual or the stable non-manual groups.

TABLE 10.11

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND PERCENT BELONGING TO ONE

OR MORE CLUBS: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY

(N = 877)

	Percent	Number
(1) Upward	75	132
(2) Stable Non-Manual	66	119
(3) Downward	46	46
(4) Stable Manual	44	186
All Groups	55	483

Tests of Significance (Difference of Proportions):

1 X 2: P .10; N.S.	2 X 3: P .01
1 X 3: P .001	2 X 4: P .001
1 X 4: P .001	3 X 4: P .20; N.S.

Much the same pattern emerges when we consider membership in clubs and organizations as in Table 10.11. The upwardly mobile tend to be fairly similar to the stable non-manual group but differ significantly from both the downwardly mobile and stable manual. While it could be said that the downward mobility has the effect or reducing membership in clubs, the fact that there is virtually no difference between the two manual groups suggests, rather, that they are simply following the

pattern of their objective class position. In general, then, both the upwardly and downwardly mobile tend to conform to their class of destination. Instead of mobility being deleterious for level of participation, the upwardly mobile are in fact the most likely to belong to at least one club or organization of the four groups.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The aim in this chapter has been to examine the general hypothesis that social mobility is a disruptive process inhibiting the level of social integration and social support and thereby creating isolation and anxiety. I have looked at the relationship of four kinds of social phenomena which according to previous research and theory are effects of the experience of social mobility: anomia, heightened prejudice against minority groups, social isolation and degree or participation in activities and secondary relationships.

In sum, there is no evidence of personally disruptive consequences following from social mobility. In all four measures, there was a significant difference between middle-class and working-class men. The socially mobile were generally found to be indistinguishable from their destination classes and sometimes from their origin class as well. On most of these measures the downwardly mobile appear to be either acculturated into the new class milieu or are acting as if they were being pulled by both class of origin and destination. While the upwardly mobile were never significantly different from their destination class, the tendency was for them to be less anomic, less prejudiced and to be more active than stable middle-class men. To the extent that these patterns of attitudes and behaviour are indicative of a 'healthy' and integrated personality and social life, there are, it seems, bonuses besides the economic ones, rather than costs, attached to moving upwards

in the occupational hierarchy.

The next chapter examines findings pertaining to the question of whether occupational mobility leads to social mobility in the sense of a change in norms and social relationships.

CHAPTER 11

INDICATORS OF SOCIAL CLASS MOBILITY

The last chapter revealed that there are not strong grounds for pos-
tulating negative or disruptive consequences from social mobility. In-
stead, the mobile demonstrated patterns of attitudes and behaviour gen-
erally similar to those of their new class. In this chapter I examine
two further indicators of the extent to which middle-mass mobility is in
Britain translated into social mobility. Does middle-mass social mobili-
ty lead to changes in the nature of social relationships? Do the social-
ly mobile adopt the standards and outlook of their new objective class
position? Although there were a wide variety of characteristics tapped
in the Work and Leisure Study[1] which might have served as indicators of
re-acculturation, the two which I regarded as especially crucial and of
theoretical interest were voting behaviour and the social class of peo-
ple seen by respondents in the previous week.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR

Much of the research interest in the question of how the mobile are
likely to behave politically comes from the work of Lipset and Bendix

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[1]For example, fertility and intended fertility were measured in the
Work and Leisure Study. However, as glass (1968: 118) has pointed out,
class differentials in fertility are rapidly diminishing, a conclusion
in this study as well. Thus, family size or intended family size was so
similar between the classes that it no longer serves as an indicator of
the adoption or failure to adopt destination-class values, norms and be-
haviour. I also considered patterns of leisure activities. Do the up-
wardly mobile, for instance, watch cricket more than football? However,
these were difficult data to pull out of the Work and Leisure Study, the
numbers for any particular activity were often small and there were fac-
tors such as age and car ownership which transcended and obfuscated class
differences. See Young and Willmott (1973) for a detailed discussion of
class and leisure activities.

(1959). In their review of existing studies, they show that in the United States the upwardly mobile tend to be more conservative than are the members of their destination class. This was in contrast to the situation which existed in Europe (Germany, Finland, Norway and Sweden) where the upwardly mobile were found to remain more radical than their stable middle-class counterparts. For downward mobility the pattern seems to have been more consistent: Lipset and Bendix argue that those who move downwards do not identify with their new class, but rather, tend to be more conservative in terms of political behaviour. As a result, they are, politically, somewhere between the middle class from whence they came and the working class where they now find themselves.

Two separate explanations were advanced to account for these findings. For the upwardly mobile, the explanation was couched in terms of the degree of status rigidity they are likely to encounter. In the United States it is easier for people to bring their social status into a congruent position with their economic status than in most older societies. By contrast, the upwardly mobile in European societies are, they argue, less likely to be fully accepted into the middle class and are therefore more likely to retain ties with their class of origin. In other words, translating occupational mobility into social mobility is more difficult in Europe than in America. One result of this is that while upwardly mobile Americans 'overconform' and become more conservative their European counterparts continue to be more radical or left, at any rate, than the rest of the middle class. For the downwardly mobile, however, the situation is similar in both Europe and America: 'In all countries manual workers coming from middle-class backgrounds should be expected to desire a return to the higher class, and hence should be likely to retain middle-class values and patterns of behaviour' (Lipset

and Bendix, 1959: 69). In one of the few studies which has concentrated on the downwardly mobile, Wilensky and Edwards (1959) provide support for this explanation. They found that the downwardly mobile were more conservative in their beliefs and attitudes than were the stable manual workers in the factory in which their sample was located. This was a finding which, generally speaking, held true whether younger men or older men, intergenerational or work-life mobility was considered. In speculating on these findings for class solidarity they suggest that instead of 'a cadre of creative men of independent mind, released from traditional norms, ready to provide some needed novelty and flexibility' (P. 230), their data picture the 'skidder' as 'optimistic-grateful' rather than 'creative-independent'. To the extent that there is downward mobility in a society, then, collective interests tend to be weakened by individual striving or withdrawal.[2]

SUBSEQUENT RESEARCH ON UPWARD MOBILITY

The view of differences between the upwardly mobile in the United States and Europe became widely accepted. Tumin (1967: 94), for example, in summarizing some consequences of social mobility states unequivocally that 'In America, persons who move up into the middle class are more conservative than those born into it, whereas in the European countries studies, the latter are more conservative than the former'. Lopreato (1967) was also accepting of this finding though emphasizing that the tendency has been to treat the American case as normal and then seek to explain the European case by reference to the American (P. 587). Along with an analysis of his Italian data he posits an explanation—which Lip-

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[2]Lipset and Gordon (1953) provide similar evidence for downward mobility and trade union membership. See also Janowitz (1956), who makes a similar point to that of Wilensky and Edwards.

set and Bendix had not--for the American case in which the upwardly mo-
bile while emulating the more prestigeful stratum, are also (in America)
more likely to emphasize success and achievement. Thus, the more 'ex-
cessive' nature of this stress tends to overcome earlier socialization
and leads to overconformity.

More recently, however, the basic finding by Lipset and Bendix has
been questioned by Thompson (1971) who uses data from six elections ex-
tending from 1948 to 1966. In contrast to earlier findings, he found
that in none of the elections were the upwardly mobile more conservative
than the middle-class stables. When only male respondents were con-
sidered, it emerged that on some elections the mobile were more conser-
vative and on others less conservative than the stable middle class.
But, when the data for the six elections were aggregated it was found
that 'Among American men, upward mobiles tend to be politically indis-
tinguishable from middle-class stables' (P. 229). Upwardly mobile wo-
men, by contrast, though bestriding the two stable groups, were found to
be closer, generally, to the stable manual group than to their destina-
tion class. While not disconfirming these findings, Knoke (1972) has
recently shown that the data on American mobility and political behaviour
conform, statistically, to an acculturation model of the kind described
in Chapter 9. That is, that mobile people act as if they are combining
the behavioural patterns of their class of origin and present status.
Thus, he discounts the view that the tendency for the mobile to be con-
servative is due to any effect of social mobility per se. Instead, the
political behaviour of the socially mobile is postulated as an outcome
not of disruptive effects but of the failure of the occupationally mo-
bile to become fully acculturated.

Much more so than in many European countries, Britain is a two-party

system with fairly consistent class differences in party allegiance. Nevertheless, the fit is far from complete. While about 70 percent of the British population is working-class, the two major parties tend to split the vote nearly in half. As Robert McKenzie has noted, 'massive shifts' to Conservative or Labour usually mean that about 2 percent of the voters shifted allegiance.[3] The extent to which the socially mobile may contribute to the diverse elements in class voting behaviour has not received much attention. Indeed, the one study I was able to find was that of McKenzie and Silver (1968). In what is virtually an aside, they note that 'those (of the working class) who claim to have had middle-class parents are twice as likely as others to vote Conservative . . . However, since only 17 percent[4] described their fathers as middle-class, this circumstance is very far from being a major factor contributing to working-class Conservatism' (P. 97). There is, of course, nothing said in this study about upward social mobility since there were no white-collar workers in their sample.

THE WORK AND LEISURE STUDY

As information on voting intention was collected in the Work and Leisure Study, the analysis of mobility and voting behaviour will be based mainly on this larger sample. We asked everyone what party they intended to vote for in the next General Election and after June, 1970, what party they voted for.[5] The results are shown by social class in Table 11.1. The data are in the general direction that one would expect:

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[3] Seminar at L.S.E..

[4] The comparable figure for the Work and Leisure Study sample is 19 percent.

[5] Interviewing for the Work and Leisure Study took place from March, 1970, to September, 1970. It was not known, of course, at the beginning that a General Election would be called.

TABLE 11.1

SOCIAL CLASS AND VOTING INTENTION: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY
(N = 861)   (Percentages)

Respondent's Social Class	Voting Intention					
	Labour	Conser-vative	Liberal	Won't Vote	Don't Know	Total
Middle Class	28%	54%	6%	9%	3%	(347) 100%
Working Class	51	27	5	13	4	(514) 100%
All Groups	42	38	5	12	3	100% (861)

$$x^2 = 84.54, \quad C = .30; \quad P < .001$$

middle-class respondents are about twice as likely to vote Conservative as are working-class respondents. Nevertheless, slightly more than a fifth of the working class are prepared to vote against what have traditionally been viewed as objective class interests while about the same proportion of men are prepared to vote Labour. Looking along the table, it can also be seen that there are only trivial differences in the proportions of each class favouring the Liberal party. In addition, working-class men are somewhat more likely to indicate that they would not vote or that they were unsure. The popular view that inclement weather on an election day tends to favour the Conservative party receives some support when we consider these latter proportions.

HOW DO THE SOCIALLY MOBILE DIFFER?

Voting intentions and patterns of the socially mobile and non-mobile are shown in Table 11.2. The first thing to be noted is that there are systematic and significant differences between the four groups in terms of the proportion voting Conservative and Labour. Looking first of all at the Conservative voters, the order is: stable non-manual; upwardly mobile; downwardly mobile and stable manual. Although the mobile differ

significantly from both their classes of origin and destination, the ob-
served difference in conservatism between the two mobile groups is not
signicant and, indeed, there is a considerable split in their voting
intentions. One indication of this is that when the mobile are removed
there is a stronger relationship (C ≈ .27 versus C ≈ .36) between class
and voting than was found in Table 11.1 when the mobile are included.

TABLE 11.2

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND VOTING INTENTION:

WORK AND LEISURE STUDY
(N ≈ 861)   (Percentages)

Pattern of Conventional Social Mobility	Voting Intention					
	Labour	Conservative	Liberal	Won't Vote	Don't Know	Total
(1) Upward	35%	46%	5%	10%	4%	100% (170)
(2) Stable Non-Manual	22	62	6	9	1	100% (177)
(3) Downward	41	35	9	11	4	100% (98)
(4) Stable	53	26	4	13	4	100% (416)
All Groups	42	38	5	12	3	100% (861)

Tests of Significance (comparing Labour Voters and Conservative voters):
1X2: X^2_2= 9.803; C=.18; P < .01   2X3: X^2_2=17.144; C=.27; P < .001
1X3: X^2_2= 2.162; C=.10; N.S.   2X4: X^2_2=69.943; C=.36; P < .001
1X4: X^2= 22.776; C=.22; P < .001   3X4: X^2= 4.556; C=.11; P < .05

Table 11.2 shows, also, that there is little support for the notion
that the mobile are more likely to be politically apathetic than estab-
lished members of the two broad classes (See: Lipset and Bendix, 1959:
69). Thus, looking further along the table, it can be seen that there
are only trivial differences in proportions of each group who indicated

that they were completely undecided or who were not intending to vote at all. Likewise, my data show that while there are some small differences, notably for the downwardly mobile in Liberal voting, these do not reach statistical significance. As a result, the pattern of Labour and Conservative voters are almost mirror images of one another.

How does the mobility route used affect political affiliation? As I have mentioned previously, the Work and Leisure Study did not discriminate between those who attended a grammar school (or 'Public' school) and those who did not. The coding frame only indicates the age at which people completed their full-time education and uses 16 or younger as the lower category. However, the majority of respondents who stayed on past age 61 were in grammar or 'Public' schools. And, though the two experiences cannot be equated, most of the others who stayed on did so in order to take 'O' or 'A' level examinations at a comprehensive school.

TABLE 11.3
CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NON-MOBILITY IN THE
MIDDLE CLASS, EDUCATIONAL ROUTE AND VOTING INTENTION:
WORK AND LEISURE STUDY (N = 284)*

	Pattern of Conventional Mobility & Education			
	Upward		Stable Non-Manual	
Voting Intention	(1) Low Education	(2) High Education	(3) Low Education	(4) High Education
Labour	44%	38%	30%	23%
Conservative	56%	62%	70%	77%
	100% (106)	100% (34)	100% (71)	100% (73)

*Excludes Liberal voters, undecideds and Won't Vote categories.

Comments:
          Low education = Finished full-time education at age 16 or less
          High Education = Finished full-time education at age 17 or older

Tests of Significance:
          1 X 3: X_2^2 = 3.916; C = .15; P $<$ .05
          2 X 4: X_2^2 = 2.569; C = .12; N.S.
          1 X 2: X_2^2 = .392; N.S.
          3 X 4: X^2 = .733; N.S.

The expectation was that men who moved upwards through an educational route would be more similar to stable middle-class men in voting behaviour than are men moving upwards through a non-educational route. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 11.3.

Generally, the proportions voting Conservative are in the predicted direction: people with high education are more likely to vote Conservative than are those with low education, whatever their mobility experience. Also, men upwardly mobile and in the low education category differ significantly from both groups of stable non-manual men in percent voting Conservative. In contrast, these in the high education category do not differ significantly from either group of stable non-manual men, suggesting a greater shift in standards and values has taken place. However, amount of education has only a very modest effect on voting intention within both the upwardly mobile group and the stable non-manual group. While this might be the expected result for men stable in the middle class, educational route should, according to the general hypothesis, have had an effect on political preference of men moving upwards. That is, upwardly mobile men high in education should be more fully integrated into the middle class than men mobile with less education. This would, in turn, be reflected in a difference in political allegiance. As Table 11.3 indicates, this is not the case. This weakens, somewhat a possible conclusion that the kind of mobility route has consequences for the extent of acculturation of the upwardly mobile into their destination class.

Since the measure of school-leaving age available in the Work and Leisure Study used an awkward cutting point, it is useful to consider data from the Mobility Sample where it is possible to separate grammar school from non-grammar school routes. As expected, Table 11.4 provides findings generally congruent with the larger sample. Although we should

TABLE 11.4

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY, EDUCATIONAL ROUTE AND VOTING
INTENTION: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 65) (Whole Number)

| Voting | Mobility and Type of Education | | | |
| | Upwardly Mobile | | | Stable Non-Manual |
Intention	Grammar	Non-Grammar	Grammar	Non-Grammar
Labour	5	20	1	3
Conservative	9	8	15	4
Totals	14	28	16	7

$$X^2_2 = 4.941; \quad C = .33; \quad P < .05$$
$$X^2 = 4.542; \quad C = .40; \quad P < .05$$

not put a great deal of store by these figures because of the small frequencies, it does appear that educational route is a significant predictor of voting in the middle class. But, this is true whether men have been intergenerationally mobile or stable in the middle class since grammar and non-grammar school educational routes create significant differences in voting behaviour for both groups of men. As the contingency coefficients suggest, the type of education may in fact have a greater impact on tendency to vote Conservative in the stable non-manual group than in the upwardly mobile group. While these results must be treated tentatively, they do reinforce the notion that in Britain years of education are not as crucial as the type of education.

SUBJECTIVE MOBILITY AND VOTING

So far I have considered two objective variables—occupational change and amount and type of education—and the effect these have on voting behaviour. How people assess their mobility experience I also considered to be of interest. McKenzie and Silver (1968), for instance, found among their working-class subjects that those who called themselves middle-class were far more likely to vote Conservative than those thinking of themselves as working-class (61 percent versus 23 percent). In Table 11.5 the relationship between class assignment, mobility and voting in-

tention is presented. The comparable proportions in the working class to the McKenzie and Silver data are 68 percent versus 29 percent, respectively.

TABLE 11.5

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY, SELF-ASCRIBED CLASS
AND VOTING INTENTION: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY

Pattern of Mobility & Self-Ascribed Class	Voting Intention		(100%) Totals
	Labour	Conservative	
Upward			
Middle-Class	30%	70%	(57)
Working-Class	53	47	(81)
Stable Non-Manual			
Middle-Class	24	76	(106)
Working-Class	32	68	(41)
Downward			
Middle-Class	30	70	(20)
Working-Class	63	37	(54)
Stable Manual			
Middle-Class	33	67	(40)
Working-Class	72	28	(289)

Tests of Significance:

Upward: $X^2 = 7.367$; C = .22; P < .01
Stable Non-Manual: $X^2 = 1.018$; C = .08; N.S.
Downards: $X^2 = 6.385$; C = .28; P < .01
Stable Manual: $X^2 = 24.826$; C = .26; P < .001

With one exception, there are significant differences in proportion voting Labour or Conservative between those identifying themselves with the middle class and those identifying themselves with the working class. The one exception is the stable non-manual group in which self-ascribed class makes very little difference in proportions voting Conservative or Labour. Of particular interest is the upwardly mobile group. Of the three which do differ by self-ascribed class, this group has the lowest contingency coefficient and is also the most divided about which is the appropriate class with which to identify (41 percent middle class versus 59 percent working class). In short, the confusion the upwardly mobile

appear to feel about their present class position is also reflected in their more divided political affiliations. People who have remained stable in the middle class are less likely to see themselves as working-class and even when they do so, still tend to vote Conservative.

PATTERNS OF SOCIABILITY

As we saw in Chapter 9, there is little evidence in my data that upward or downward social mobility is particularly disruptive to extent of interpersonal relations. While Blau (1956) concluded that mobility would inhibit social integration, he was concerned mainly with the interpersonal dilemma faced by the socially mobile. In his view the major decision for the mobile individual is whether to retain or sever ties with members of one's class of origin. If he chooses the former alternative it is unlikely that upward occupational mobility will be successfully translated into social mobility. Severing ties, on the other hand, has its own set of problems. These may include guilt about abandoning former friends, associated and perhaps kinfolk. In the process of making new friends the mobile individual may be accused by former ones of 'putting on airs', of becoming 'toffee-nosed' as he begins to adopt the ways of the new class. Nor, unfortunately, is there any guarantee that he will be accepted by higher-status people.[7] For the downwardly mobile, Blau (1956) believes relational shifts may bring home to the individual his objective class position, a scarcely comfortable realization. If

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[6]Self-ascribed class is described more fully in the next chapter. It might also be noted at this point, however, that there is a high degree of agreement between objective class and self-ascribed class. Hence, self-ascribed class is only slightly better as a predictor of voting intention, than is objective class. For example, when class (either ascribed or objective) is tabulated with Labour and Conservative voters, the contingency coefficients are C = .32 (for ascribed class) and C = .28 (for objective class).

[7]For example, see Tumin (1957).

he attempts to retain former ties, he may find that because of his low-
ered economic status he is unable to maintain a similar lifestyle as
these friends. Further, he exposes himself to the constant stress of
the inevitable invidious comparisons between their status and his.

Social mobility, however, is usually a gradual process in which
things like additional education, promotion and economic rises create
changes, but seldom overnight. People drift apart as a result of these
and other changes, certainly, but is this necessarily unique to the so-
cially mobile? Is there mentally or physically a point where the dilem-
mas posed by Blau actually occurs? My initial impression was that
there is not.

Nevertheless, with these questions in mind, I enquired during the
interview about changes in friendship and kinship relations. On the
whole, these were not very successful. Most of the men, whatever their
mobility experience, felt that they had changed friends as various things
happened to them over the course of their life. Some of the younger men
were, of course, still living at home and had kept the same group of
friends as they had known in school, but generally there was little evi-
dence in what people said, of abrupt transitions in friendship patterns.
The exception was young men who had been upwardly mobile and who had
attended a grammar school. For these men the school had forced upon
them a shift in relationships. This was also the only group who mentioned
either spontaneously or as a result of my further 'probes', that their
change in social class was a factor. Some comments were:

Most of my close friends went to grammar school. One or two didn't,
they passed the other way, so to speak. Of course, they naturally ceased
to be in one's social sphere because you cultivate your friends in school
(Trainee Manager).

Things did get a bit rough for awhile, with my family and my brother and
the kids we grew up with when we were firsr separated at school. Really,
in a sense, there's a class thing. I was suddenly moving with wealthier,

perhaps more intelligent kids, and they were staying with the secondary (modern) level. I perhaps thought I was a bit better than them for a bit. My brother and I never had a bad relationship, but we grew apart for several years. (Computer Programmer).

Mr. Chapman, an industrial chemist, had found himself between two classes as a result of going to a grammar school. He said:

Coming from a council estate like this one meant that socially I was way down the ladder at grammar school. I was a bit of a loner through most of grammar school. I didn't run around with anyone on the estate and I couldn't get on with the people at school. I was in the top stream and they were all a bit snobby and a bit too wrapped up in things I didn't know too much about.

Mr. Howarth, who also attended grammar and is now a post-office engineer, related a similar experience:

I didn't really get along with the school. I just didn't enjoy it. Not many people from our end went there and I found myself with sort of two groups of friends.

Now, a lot of my friends, they come from areas like the Angel. Most of them come from working-class families and have done what I did, go to a grammar school. There's a few come from higher classes, but I sort of get on better with those from working-class families. These are the ones who you make friends.

But, overall, I was unable with my questions to detect much about social networks of my respondents and how they might have changed. While people were keen to talk about themselves and sometimes their families, they were reticent and vague when attention turned to their friends and associates. With respect to relatives, people were only somewhat more forthcoming. I asked in a general way about relationships between the respondent, his parents and kinfolk. Where it was appropriate or relevant I raised the issue of whether their different economic and social positions had had any noticeable effect. Most, over 80 percent, felt they had remained 'close' to their parents rather than 'drifting apart'. Mr. Lawson, a headmaster, was very much an exception. He said in answer to my general question:

Most of my mother's relative became sort of middle-class, but my father's relatives were very working-class, and weren't very close anyway. My

wife's relatives: one owned a sawmill, one owned a garage and a cousin became a teacher. But my sisters and their husbands remained what one would call working-class. I haven't actually lost touch. We frequently visit them and them me, but we're not the same. Even when I was little it was a question of higher intelligence, really. It sounds priggish saying so, but they were about average intelligence and consequently, our interests diverged. I suppose the army, seven years away, was the finishing touch.

FRIENDS' AND RELATIVES' SOCIAL CLASS

More informative than data from the Mobility Sample about social mobility and patterns of sociability are two questions asked in the Work and Leisure Study: (1) the social class (occupation) of the last friend seen and (2) the social class (occupation) of the last relative seen.[8] Such data do not, of course, provide a full picture of the networks in which people are involved and tells nothing at all about the proportions of social contacts which are based around the class of origin or around the class of destination. Nevertheless, these data do provide indication of the way the class composition of social networks might vary by mobility pattern.

The relationship of social mobility and friends' social class is shown in Table 11.6. It appears from this table that the mobile have in making an economic shift, also generally, made a relational shift as well. Whereas over three-quarters of the stable non-manual men have last seen a middle-class friend, two thirds of the upwardly mobile men have done so. The nine percent difference between the two groups is not statistically significant, suggesting mobility in the middle class does not differ from non-mobility in the class nature of friends. In contrast to those moving upwards, the downwardly mobile are only half as likely to have seen a middle-class friend and, indeed, do not differ sig-

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[8] Where respondents had seen more than one person at a time, they were asked to give the occupation of the one they felt closest to.

nificantly from the stable manual group of men in this measure. To the
extent, then, that this finding can be treated as an indicator of ac-
culturation, the conclusion to be drawn is that even in the middle mass,
occupational mobility does involve relational discontinuity, to use
Goldthorpe and Hope's (1972) terminology, followed by a re-acculturation
or re-integration into the new class.

TABLE 11.6

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIAL CLASS OF LAST

FRIEND SEEN IN PREVIOUS WEEK: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY
(N = 731) (Percentages)

Pattern of Conventional Social Mobility	Friends' Social Class		
	Middle Class	Working Class	Total N's (100%)
(1) Upward	67%	33%	153
(2) Stable Non-Manual	76	24	156
(3) Downward	32	68	75
(4) Stable Manual	21	79	347

1 X 2: $X_2^2 = 3.034$; N.S. 2 X 3: $X_2^2 = 42.115$; P < .001
1 X 3: $X_2^2 = 24.329$; P < .001 2 X 4: $X_2^2 = 138.09$; P < .001
1 X 4: $X^2 = 98.664$; P < .001 3 X 4: $X^2 = 3.033$; N.S.

This is true in Table 11.6 when various mobility and non-mobility
routes are lumped together. What is the effect on friendship patterns
if these routes are considered separately? This is shown in Table 11.7.
As might be expected, the general effect of a high education--a grammar
school or 'Public' school training--is to raise the proportion of mid-
dle-class respondents who had seen a middle-class friend. The same
thing happens to upwardly mobile men, though the change is not so dra-
matic. For the former group it can be seen that respondents maintain-
ing a middle-class position without a middle-class education are actu-
ally less likely to have seen a middle-class friend than are low educa-

tion upward mobiles. This would seem to suggest that in the middle

class, generally, there is a dichotomy based to a considerable degree

upon educational background. Education has, in this respect, much the

same effect on friendship patterns for both the mobile and non-mobile.

TABLE 11.7

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY, EDUCATIONAL ROUTE AND SOCIAL

CLASS OF LAST FRIEND SEEN IN THE PREVIOUS WEEK: WORK AND

LEISURE STUDY (N = 315)

Pattern of Mobility and Education*	Friends' Social Class		
	Middle Class	Working Class	Total N's (100%)
Upward			
Low Education	64%	36%	129
High Education	84	16	32
Stable Non-Manual			
Low Education	59	41	74
High Education	91	9	80

*Low Education = 16 and under; High education = 17 and over.

Tests of Significance:
  Upward: High & Low Education: $X^2 = 4.751$; P < .05
  Stable Non-Manual: High & Low Education: $X^2 = 21.283$; P < .001

RELATIVE'S SOCIAL CLASS

In theory, at least, we have the option of choosing our friends.

Except indirectly through marriage one has no such freedom where rela-

tives are concerned. As I suggested in Chapter 10 there is evidence

from a variety of sources which has taken some of the edge off the be-

lief that occupational mobility and extended kinship relations are anti-

thetical. Thus, the extended family remains an important source of so-

cial contacts despite geographical and social mobility. People are,

according to Litwak (1960) and Bell (1968), able to segregate visits with

friends and associates from those with relatives within urban and large-ly anonymous _milieux_. Indeed, it appears to be institutionalized in most segments of urban society to do so. In light of the preceding two tables on social class of friends, it is of interest to see how this works out in practice, especially for the socially mobile.

TABLE 11.8

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIAL CLASS OF LAST

RELATIVE SEEN IN PREVIOUS WEEK (N = 771)
(Percentages)

Pattern of Conventional Mobility	Middle Class	Working Class	Total N's (100%)
Upward	37%	63%	(155)
Stable Non-Manual	72	28	(165)
All Non-Manual	55	45	(320)
Downward	41	59	(81)
Stable Manual	23	77	(370)
All Manual	26	74	(451)

Table 11.8 suggests that both stable groups as well as both mobile groups are in contact with relatives in a different social class than themselves. Because of the greater impact of the upwardly mobile on the composition of the middle class, there is more cross-class contact in this group than in the working class. Within both classes, however, it is the mobile who are most subject to influences from a class other than the one to which they are now objectively members. While about two-thirds of the upwardly mobile men had last seen a middle-class friend, only about one-third (37 percent) had seen a middle-class rela-tive. As we saw in Chapter 10, upwardly mobile men see slightly more relatives than do stable non-manual men. The former, then, face a more formidable task in segregating friends and relatives from each other.

While norms about appropriate role behaviour for friends usually differ from those for relatives, the upwardly mobile generally must also contend with shifts in class-based role expectations as well.

In the case of the downwardly mobile, the situation is objectively the same: they are more likely to face the added role conflict arising from having friends in one social class and relatives in another than are stable manual men. However, as previous chapters have shown,[9] the downwardly mobile come from backgrounds which are more accurately typified as working-class than as middle-class. For this reason the cross-class pressure felt by the downwardly mobile may, relative to the upwardly mobile, be quite minimal. At any rate, in the second round of interviewing very few men who had moved downward occupationally felt that this had affected relationships with kinfolk. As the next chapter shows, men who moved upwards often felt there to be a considerable gap between themselves and their relatives, especially parents.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has attempted to assess the extent to which occupational mobility leads to social mobility in the sense of normative and relational shifts as well as an economic shift. I have used two indicators only--voting behaviour and the social class of the last friend seen.[10] What conclusion can we draw from this analysis? With respect

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[9] See especially Chapter 7.

[10] Following the lead of Goldthorpe et al (1969: 88-90), I also tried to assess the degree to which visiting patterns of the upwardly and downwardly mobile conformed to those of their destination class. Men who moved upward as well as seeing more friends and fewer relatives than stable manual men, also chose their friends from further afield. That is, unlike the working class, men who moved upwards were less likely to limit their friendship network to neighbours. In this they were indistinguishable from the stable non-manual men. Those who moved downward were, likewise, very similar to stable manual workers.

to voting behaviour, the socially mobile tend to bestride their class of origin and class of destination. In the middle class, amount of education had very little effect on the proportions voting Conservative. However, the Mobility Sample data show that the stable and the upwardly mobile segments of the middle class were more likely to vote Conservative if they had attended a grammar or 'public' school. In short, those who are socially mobile do change their voting behaviour but not to the degree of becoming totally assimilated into the standards of their new social class.

It is worth underscoring that neither upward nor downward mobility appears in Britain to lead to political extremism, or political alienation. My data are, in other words, in agreement with the more recent findings in the United States and elsewhere described at the beginning of this chapter.

Unlike voting behaviour, the single attempt to describe the nature of the interpersonal relations of the mobile revealed that the two groups were indistinguishable from their destination class. Men who moved upwards were as likely to have seen a middle-class friend as were the stable non-manual men. Similarly, the last friend seen by the downwardly mobile men was working-class as often as it was for the stable manual men. In the middle class, as might be expected, education beyond age 16 increased the likelihood of respondents having last seen a middle-class person.

At the same time, some upwardly mobile respondents suggested that while their friends were in middle-class occupations, they too had come from working-class homes. Although my data do not go far enough in that direction, it may be that the upwardly mobile tend to associate not with established members of the middle class but with others like themselves. Like migrants to a city, they tend to meet only those

from 'back home' and from other places. In any event, the findings of this chapter indicate that the socially mobile generally choose to associate with members of their objective social class rather than with members of the old one. The exception is, of course, relatives who provide constant reminders of a different lifestyle, more so for those moving upwards than for those moving downwards in the occupational hierarchy.

This and the last chapter suggest that in a number of attitudes and patterns of behaviour the upwardly mobile are different than either their class of origin or destination. The downwardly mobile, on the other hand, tend not to be very different from the rest of the working class. I turn in the next chapter to consider the degree to which respondents thought they have been socially, as opposed to occupationally, mobile.

CHAPTER 12

THE MEANING OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

The concept of social mobility in its fullest sense means for the sociologist the passage of persons from one social class to another. It is the process of changing perspectives, behaviour, social relationships and self-identification.[1] Throughout this study, I have treated the class structure, the occupational hierarchy and movements between parts of these, as sociological 'givens'. In Laswell's (1965: 100) words, I succumbed to 'the tendency to reify social structure—to believe that it is a stable entity which exists objectively in an objective society which can be measured, labelled, and described objectively'. To offset that bias, I end this study by focussing on what people themselves feel and believe about social class and social mobility. What does social mobility mean to most people? How do they assess their own experience of what we objectively label as mobility and non-mobility? What do people think are the chances of social or class mobility in British society?

SELF-ASCRIBED CLASS

Because of its anticipated importance for voting behaviour, social mobility and self-ascribed class have already been partially examined in Chapter 11 (Table 11.5). Table 12.1 shows more clearly the extent to which people with different mobility experiences agree and disagree with the sociologist's placement of them. Of those who were prepared to assign themselves to a social class (about 94 percent) the most agreement was by those men who have remained intergenerationally stable in

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[1] See Shibutani (1961: 582), for instance.

the class structure.[2] This is especially so for stable manual men who overwhelmingly regarded themselves as working-class, a proportion not affected very much when, as at the bottom of the table, the downwardly mobile are included. Men who have, like their fathers, a non-manual job, show somewhat more uncertainty: only two-thirds of the stable non-manual category call themselves middle-class.

TABLE 12.1

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SELF ASCRIBED

SOCIAL CLASS: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY (N = 869)
(Percentages)

Pattern of Conventional Mobility	Self-Ascribed Class			
	Middle Class	Working Class	Don't Know	Total N's (100%)
(1) Upwards	38%	54%	8%	172
(2) Stable Non-Manual	66	26	8	177
(3) Downwards	26	67	7	98
(4) Stable Manual	12	83	5	422
All Non-Manual	52	40	8	349
All Manual	14	80	6	520

Tests of Significance (leaving out Don't Know category):

$$1 \times 2: \quad x_2^2 = 30.066; \quad C = .29; \quad P < .001$$
$$1 \times 3: \quad x_2^2 = 4.892; \quad C = .14; \quad P < .05$$
$$1 \times 4: \quad x_2^2 = 59.625; \quad C = .31; \quad P < .001$$
$$2 \times 3: \quad x_2^2 = 46.600; \quad C = .39; \quad P < .001$$
$$2 \times 4: \quad x_2^2 = 197.104; \quad C = .51; \quad P < .001$$
$$3 \times 4: \quad x^2 = 13.466; \quad C = .16; \quad P < .001$$

There is a similar level of disagreement, except in the opposite

[2]This was a forced question. It was as follows: Most people say they belong either to the middle or to the working class. If you had to make a choice, would you call yourself:

Middle-class

PROMPT   Working-class

(Don't know, can't say)

direction, among the men who, objectively, have moved downwards. Slightly over one-quarter consider themselves as middle-class despite their manual occupations. However, it is among the upwardly mobile men that we find the most disagreement and uncertainty about class position. Thus, only 38 percent of these men believe that they are now middle-class and over one-half have retained a working-class identification.

Table 12.2 indicates that distance traversed by the socially mobile has a bearing on class identification of the upwardly mobile, but not for the downwardly mobile. Those who have moved upwards three or more status categories are more likely to view themselves as middle-class than are those who have only moved up one or two categories. In the downwardly mobile category differences are small and not statistically significant.

TABLE 12.2

DISTANCE OF SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SELF-ASCRIBED CLASS:

WORK AND LEISURE STUDY (N = 250)*

| Self-Ascribed Class | Pattern of Social Mobility** | | | |
| | Upward | | Downward | |
	High Up	Low Up	High Down	Low Down
Middle-Class	53%	36%	33%	25%
Working-Class	47	64	67	75
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(110)	(49)	(21)	(70)

* Excludes Don't Know Category
** High = 3 or more status categories
   Low = 1 or 2 status categories (across the manual-
         non-manual line)

$x^2 = 3.892$; P < .05 $x^2 = .471$; N.S.

MOBILITY ROUTE AND CLASS IDENTIFICATION

The effect of the educational route employed by the two non-manual groups of men on class identification is also of interest and could as

easily have been considered in the previous chapter where I considered

extent of acculturation. Table 12.3 reveals that in the middle class,

the greater the amount of education, the more likely are people to call

themselves middle-class. I expected, as with other variables considered

earlier,[3] that stable non-manual men would identify with the middle

class whatever their educational experience, whereas the upwardly mobile

would do so only if they had attended a grammar school, or had addition-

al years of schooling beyond the legal minimum. In part this is the

TABLE 12.3

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY, EDUCATION AND SELF-ASCRIBED

CLASS: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY (N = 320)*
(Percentages)

Pattern of Conventional Mobility and Education**	Middle Class	Working Class	(100%) Total N's
Upwards			
(1) Low Education	38%	62%	(127)
(2) High Education	58	42	(33)
Stable Non-Manual			
(3) Low Education	56%	44%	(78)
(4) High Education	85	15	(82)

* Excludes 'don't know' category
** High Education = Finished full-time education at age 17 or over

   Low Education = Finished full-time education at age 16 or
                         younger

Tests of Significance:

$$1 \times 2: \quad X^2_2 = 4.211; \quad C = .16; \quad P < .05$$
$$3 \times 4: \quad X^2 = 16.362; \quad C = .30; \quad P < .001$$

case. The upwardly mobile low in education are the least likely to see

themselves as middle-class while highly educated mobiles are much the

same as low education non-mobiles. However, as the contingency co-effi-

cients in Table 12.3 show, education is more strongly associated with

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[3] For example, choice of residence, analyzed in Chapter 3.

class identification within the stable rather than the mobile group.
Thus, among the highly educated non-mobiles, there is nearly unanimity
(85 percent) about what is their social class; much more uncertainty
is found among men who have less education.[4]

The data contained in all three of these tables point toward a
similar conclusion: whatever the mobility route or the social distance
traversed, men moving upwards are more uncertain about their status
than are men stable in the class structure. Even when occupational mo-
bility has been accomplished via the regular or institutionalized chan-
nel, and is, effectively, sponsored mobility (see Turner, 1960), more
than two-fifths of the men have not in their own assessment become
middle-class. These findings, then, bear witness to what I have sug-
gested in earlier chapters: that when one moves beyond the 'surface'
or easily measurable variables, the impression is that upwardly mobile
people are in many respects different from either working- or middle-
class people. They are, it seems, in a kind of status limbo, tending
to conform to middle-class attitudes and behaviour but not totally
reaching either. These data confirm, also, earlier statements that the
downwardly mobile are, on the whole, more integrated into the working
class than apart from it. While they do differ significantly from
stable working-class men in their willingness to accept working-class
status, the differences (as indicated by the contingency coefficient,
Table 12.1) were not large.

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[4]Although the numbers are small these general findings are re-
plicated in the Mobility Sample, when grammar school and non-grammar
school routes are specifically considered. Stable non-manual men who
attended a grammar or public school almost uniformly (90%) call them-
selves middle-class. Whatever their educational route, over 85 percent
view themselves as middle-class. Grammar school has less affect on up-
wardly mobile men. Some 57 percent of grammar school men compared with
47 percent of non-grammar school men, say they are middle-class.

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE MOBILITY

In Chapters 10 and 11 I showed the relationship of the measure I called 'subjective mobility' to various social phenomena under consideration. Generally, it proved to be no better a predictor of behaviour and attitudes than did conventional mobility. As Table 12.4 indicates, the main reason for this is that there is a high degree of agreement between objective and subjective mobility. For instance, when the two are cross-tabulated, the resulting contingency coefficient is very high (C= .62). Nevertheless, it is by no means a perfect relationship. As with self-ascribed class, the introduction of father's class to create this measure points to the degree of ambiguity felt especially by men objectively upwardly mobile. Hence as many of this group feel they have not changed class relative to their fathers as feel they have made such a change. Also, among the downwardly mobile nearly as many men

TABLE 12.4

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL
MOBILITY: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 115)
(Percentages)

Pattern of Subjective Mobility*	Pattern of Conventional Mobility			
	Upward	Stable Non-Manual	Downward	Stable Manual
Upward (W-C to M-C)	41%	17%	0%	17%
Stable Middle Class (M-C to M-C)	13	65	19	0
Downward (M-C to W-C)	5	4	43	8
Stable Working Class (W-C to W-C)	41	13	38	75
Total N's	100% (44)	100% (23)	100% (22)	100% (26)

*Based on forced choice question of respondents' and respondents' fathers' social class. M-C = middle class; W-C = working class.
X^2 = 66.295; C = .62; P < .001

(38 percent versus 43 percent), do not think of themselves as down-
wardly mobile. Rather, they assign both themselves and their fathers
to the working class.[5]

UPWARD MOBILITY AND SOCIAL CLASS

Men who according to the objective measure were upwardly mobile,
also displayed considerable uncertainty about where they themselves fit
into the class structure, much less so than did the downwardly mobile
about where to place their fathers. The predominant pattern, as Table
12.4 indicated, was for these men to reject middle-class status and re-
tain identification with the working class. Why did they do so? One
reason, certainly, is that some occupations simply defy neat categoriza-
tion. Just as individuals may for many reasons be difficult to place,
so individual occupations can also be anomalous. As I tried to show
in Chapter 5, there is a tendency for middle-mass upward mobility to
involve occupations which have an ambiguous or marginal status. It is
easy with an occupation like 'solicitor', for people to invoke the
'relevant rank attributes' to use Parkin's (1972: 43) terminology.
Jobs like business manager, on the other hand, admit of a much wider
set of rank attributes and it was, principally, the latter where the
mobile were most likely to end up. In reading over the interviews it
was apparent that my respondents often recognized this fact as well.

In any event, there was a tendency for men who I put in category
3--the marginally upward--to feel they had not changed class. Mr.
Fleming, a training officer, was in this category. He said about him-
self:

---

[5]As I will try to show later in this chapter, there was generally
a tendency for people to assign themselves to working-class rather
than middle-class, because the former seemed to many less pretentious
or snobbish than the latter.

I don't think I'm very far from working-class, and I don't think I could change from that. You say middle-class with tongue in cheek. I'm slightly higher than, say, London working-class.

Mr. Lambeth, a sales representative, had come to an almost identical conclusion: 'You'd like to think middle-class, but we're not far off from working-class'. The mixed nature of his job as a chief draughtsman has led Mr. Killy to put himself down as working-class in the first interview.

I'm not all that much better off socially than my father. I've put myself between two levels, really. I live differently than he does and did. I have a social side, he never had one because of the environment of the day. But my station in life falls between. I'm in the business and managerial side, but I have the technical side as well. So it's in between what I'd call middle class and working class.

Living in a working-class neighbourhood negated for some any claims they might have had to a middle-class status. Said one man:

If you live in this area, and with all due respect to the people who live around me, you are in this area and you tend to look at yourself as working-class. If you lived in a different area where people probably own their own houses, that would give you a different view (Sales Manager of a small firm).

It seemed that if there was any doubt about their entitlement to a middle-class position that these men opted for a working-class title.[6] In part this was because whatever their occupational title, many of the upwardly mobile had been unable to shake off an attachment to the working class. They had, as more than one man quipped, 'a middle-class income with working-class habits'. Mr. Ferguson, a civil servant, recognized this factor very well:

I think of myself as working-class because I am working-class origin, with my roots strongly there. But I recognize that I have middle-class income and I recognize that I have middle-class interests. The kinds of books that I read, the lectures I go to, the kinds of conversations

---

[6] An exception was Mr. Cole, who seemed to me in every way conceivable, working-class, including living in a council house. He had become an inspector for London Transport: 'I've moved from working-class to middle-class, there's no doubt about it. It's a bit of achievement, starting off as a farm labourer. I've come a lot farther than my brothers'.

I have are definitely middle-class. So I recognize that I'm a dual personality. One half of me is middle-class but on the other hand, I'm strongly conscious that I'm working-class, and I'm thoroughly at home in working-class company. Many of my friends are working-class, truly, as indeed, my family are. I go into working-class activities, working class men's clubs, and so on. I'm in an angling club where 90 percent of them are working-class chaps, labourers and so on, and I'm thoroughly at home with them and them with me.

Faced with choosing one class or the other, Mr. Ferguson had chosen middle class and had, therefore, agreed with the objective placement of him. Mr. Laing, an office manager, despite similar sentiments had in the end decided he was 'more' working- than middle-class. He put it this way:

I find a curious ambivalence. On the job I suppose I'm middle-class. This isn't inverted snobbery 'ah, the self-made man who's got a middle-class income but still pulls in his working-class background', I genuinely feel working-class. On the whole, I deal with people who have a good standard of education, perhaps university degrees. Most of them come from middle-class homes, so I think it is a genuine middle-class atmosphere at work, and I think they see me as middle-class as well.

And Mr. Gibson felt he should qualify the bald label of middle-class:

I'd like to say I'm lower middle-class. To me middle class means you've come away from that sort of East End Cockney which holds you back. Yet, when I get excited I still slip into a cockney accent. It used to get me down because everybody on the stock market has been to Eton or Harrow. I've been accepted socially, now, I think. Sometimes the boss takes me along on some trip. It may be a big house with servants padding around. It amuses me a bit, with my background.

For these men the identification was seen largely in personal terms. Their background was a part of them that could not be easily eradicated despite what others in their social network might think of them. For a few, their reasons for 'staying' working-class were ideological. Mr. Elson, a headmaster, in many respects very middle-class in lifestyle and attitudes, commented:

It would go against everything, I believe (to say I've changed class). I've enjoyed life and I enjoy a better standard than my mother and father. But, what I ask myself a good deal is 'have you remained the same?' You see, I think it's a disloyalty to my class to say I'm middle-class. People that do that, it means they've forgotten the friends they were brought up with. Like me going back to Wales and passing friends who were drug up same as me without stopping to talk to them.

Others simply discounted the importance, sometimes even the existence

of class.

I disagree with the whole class thing. What I mean is that there's no difference between working class and middle class. I think there should be an upper class, but after that everyone—I mean a bloke who builds bricks, and if I sell bricks, it makes no difference. (Sales manager).

THE NON-MOBILE AND CLASS POSITION

Among men who moved upwards I could often detect uneasiness, oc-

casionally disgust, about the concept, middle class. Many seemed to

have retained the working-class disdain of the 'in-between' class de-

scribed some years ago by Zweig (1948). Few who assigned themselves to

the working class indicated a need to qualify that assessment as did

those deciding that they were 'in fact and after all, middle-class'.

The men interviewed who were stable middle-class stood in sharp con-

trast to the upwardly mobile. Indeed, it is in their general acceptance

of the class structure and in their certainty as to where they belonged

in it that much of the difference between the two segments of the mid-

dle class emerges. Where upwardly mobile men were divided and incon-

sistent, stable non-manual men were precise and sure in their statements

about class and status. Thus, it was often at this stage of the inter-

view that the full force of the differences I have tried in previous

chapters to pin down, measure and quantify became apparent. But, how

does one capture a tone of voice, an accent, a mannerism? The responses

which follow only partially illustrate these impressions.[7]

Well, assuming there are degrees of middle, I'd say my father is the upper part of middle, if you're with me. Like father, like son, we know basically the same people. I see no reason to alter it from him.

---

[7]See: Zweig (1948), who says of the middle class: 'Their whole mentality, attitude and behaviour are so markedly different from those of the working class that it struck me as perhaps the most outstanding single fact brought to light in my inquiry' (quoted in Klein, 1965: 304).

Socially, quite a few people I know are part of the higher, the upper class, and in work there are people of lower class. I figure I'm pretty well dead-center of the middle class (Advertising Manager).

I would put myself in the middle class tending to the upper half because as a breed, again you've got levels inside the breed, but as a breed, socially acceptable. Also you can tell from the areas where people live, coming out of London. Around here to Redhill, up to Sutton, out to Epsom Downs, is the insurance broker's belt. You get further out to Weybridge and further south to Crawley into Sussex, that's stock broker region (Insurance Broker).

We're middle-class, well, topside of middle-, not upper-class. It's difficult, because you don't have the rigid distinctions between upper class, middle class and working class anymore (Civil Servant).

While the men who had remained stationary in the working class were just as matter-of-fact and certain about their class position, their additional comments suggested a certain defensiveness totally lacking in other groups of men. 'I like me as I am' and 'I wouldn't change', and similar sentiments emerge from these interviews.[8] In this respect the downwardly mobile group were often very similar. As two men said:

I like me as I am. I'm among all sorts of posh people when I'm painting, but I wouldn't want to be one of them. I mean, I'm free, I can speak as I want. Sometimes I have to speak posh or near enough like them, but if you're dressed manual, you talk most of the time as you are dressed (Painter and Decorator).

Even if I had a bigger position, I wouldn't move up to middle class. I'm working-class and if you're genuine working-class, then you just can't change from working-class to middle-class. You're either very rich or you're working-class. I don't believe there is an in-between middle class. To me a bit of a cockney to walk into a mansion and try to pawn myself off as one of them, is just not on. You're either aristocracy type of thing or you're working-class. There is no in-between (Carpenter).

IS IT POSSIBLE TO CHANGE SOCIAL CLASS?

Although many people raised the issue more or less spontaneously as a result of other questions, I also asked everyone whether they thought it possible for someone to change social class. Responses

[8] For example, see below under views about changing class.

to this question and the main reasons given for their answers are shown

in Table 12.5. As the last column indicates, nearly 70 percent of the

TABLE 12.5

SOCIAL CLASS, PERCENT BELIEVING AND DISBELIEVING IT
POSSIBLE TO CHANGE SOCIAL CLASS AND REASONS GIVEN:
MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117) (Percentages)

Change Social Class and Reasons	Respondent's Present Social Class		
	Non-Manual	Manual	All Groups
Possible (total)	26%	24%	26%
Education	12	2	8
Money	4	22	12
Other (occupational)	10	0	6
Not Possible (total)	73%	63%	69%
Ascribed (born that way, etc.)	13	41	25
Social Barriers (exclusion, won't be accepted, etc.	44	12	30
No such thing as classes	7	6	7
Other Reasons	9	4	7
Don't Know	0	12	5
Totals	100% (68)	100% (49)	100% (68)

men did not believe it to be possible. While there were only small dif-

ferences between mobility groups and as is seen in this table, between

classes, the reasons varied considerably depending on where people were

located in the social hierarchy. Hence, among the manual or working-

class men who believed it possible to change social class, the princi-

pal means suggested is through acquiring money. The possibility that

education might achieve the same effect was hardly mentioned at all.

Middle-class men, in contrast, do not generally see money as providing

entry into a higher class.[9] Rather, education and 'other' criteria
(usually a high ranking occupation) are considered equally essential
for class change.

Different reasons were also advanced by the two groups as to why
it is impossible to change social class. Middle-class men were more
inclined to see the main difficulty as one of social barriers imposed
from above. For the working-class, on the other hand, class was seen
as something one is born with that cannot be changed--it is, in other
words, ascribed and immutable. People born into an upper class, it was
generally argued, 'can't help it'. As a result, it is normal and ac-
ceptable for them to behave as they do. To be middle-class, however,
was usually defined as being a snob. Since they are neither aristo-
cracy nor working-class, those who call themselves middle-class have,
in many manual worker's eyes, no legitimate claim to status or defer-
ence.

For an individual born into the working class, it seemed, then,
that the best tribute that could be paid to him is to say he has all,
the trappings of a higher status group, but he is still the same fel-
low. This theme of 'rise as high as you like, but don't change' was
one expressed or implied by informants at all social levels, whether
mobile or non-mobile. Thus, the attempt to change one's social, as op-
posed to economic, position was generally interpreted as being 'untrue

---

[9]If the idea of upward social mobility was largely unknown, 'de-
classification' was doubly so. In the 117 interviews only two or
three men showed any recognition that the phenomenon might exist. As
one said: If a roadsweeper becomes a managing director he'll still
be a roadsweeper. No matter how hard he tries, he can't make it be-
cause someone will always say 'Ah, he used to be a roadsweeper'. You
have to be born into it. You've got to go to a public school and
everything. If it goes the other way, he'd be able to do the work
alright, but it would be 'he's toffee-nosed, he has lah de dah manners',
he wouldn't get rid of those (Motor Mechanic).

to one's real self'. The possibility that new experiences might in some

instances lead to a resocialization, a basic change in an individual's

attitudes and interests was not recognized by most men interviewed.

Here are two young men talking of friends who have evidently been so-

cially mobile. The first was in the downwardly mobile category, the

second in the low upward group.

It's very hard to change class. It's possible if you have the right
contacts. You've got to have a reasonable education, you've got to go
to one of the recognized schools. University helps. I'm thinking of
a friend who did go to university and he classed himself one step above
us. We didn't agree. He did try it. He put on a speech, he tried to
speak differently than he was used to: hoity toity. It just didn't
work, we wouldn't accept it (Apprentice electrician--father a sales
supervisor).

One of my friends went into stockbroking. He went in as office boy
and he's sort of worked up; he's done well for himself. But he sort
of changed with it. He goes out with people in the firm; he goes
yachting and sailing. It's just hard to accept. He doesn't cease to
be a friend, but I don't trust him as much. If they remain natural I
have more trust in them (Shipping Clerk--father a carpenter).

Examples were given of the unhappiness which results from the attempt

to be other than one's 'true self'.

I know one person, he's got his own firm. He's got an airplane and his
own place in Spain, and he's having his own place built here. He thinks
he's better off than I am. And my sort of class he doesn't bother to
speak to. People with the same sort of money he's got won't speak to
him because he hasn't got the education. He can't enter into their
class, their way of thinking, you know. Deep down inside he's still a
bricklayer, laying bricks on a site. He's not happy at all. He's the
loneliest person I know. I know because he's the wife's brother-in-
law (Toolmaker).

WORKING-CLASS PERSPECTIVES ON CLASS MOBILITY

As I describe below in considering the meaning people attach to

'moving up in the world', few manual workers (and here I include the

downwardly mobile) thought in terms of changing social class. Whereas

this often arose spontaneously in interviews with middle-class men, the

possibility of class change had to be put directly to the working-class

respondents. Either the idea of social mobility had simply never oc-

curred to them or it was a taken-for-granted assumption that it was impossible. 'No, I think that's not on', said Mr. Mobey, a carpenter, 'there's no way you can be accepted. You more or less have to be born into it'. 'Deep down it's not changing. It'll never change. Especially in areas like this and in Surrey, no matter what happens in London or in, say, Huddersfield', said a Brentwood printer. Mr. Tyrrell, a panel beater, was also pessimistic. 'You can go up the scale a rung or two, but never from bottom to top. What happens is you'll never be accepted, up or down. Money has nothing to do with it, really. It's snobbery: people either are or they're not'.

Others thought mainly about how hard it is to change oneself. 'You can try to put on a front, but you can always tell. It shows in the way they speak. If you speak like us, you won't go very far', said Mr. Snell. 'To get out of the working class you've got to put on a false front and do away with old friends and be like the new ones in the different atmosphere, which is sometimes very hard to do', Mr. Guthrie, a motor fitter, maintained. Mr. Willets, a foreman fitter, was one of several who felt a sense of change. He is in his late fifties and his father was a village shop keeper.

It's easier to become rich than to change class. It's easier today than when I was a boy. Then, if there were gentry in the village we were in hot water if we didn't doff our hats and the girls curtsy. We were in the dog house when we got home because our parents were that way inclined. You must be showing respect to the nobility sort of thing. I would say things have changed, there aren't the very rich good-class people around that there used to be. There's rich people about, but they're not really good-class people.

VIEWS OF THE UPWARDLY MOBILE

Upwardly mobile men were, of course, in a better position to judge the possibility of changing social class because some had tried to do so. Their views, nevertheless, were not too different from those ex-

pressed by my working-class informants. Mr. Brooks, Home and Export

Manager for his firm, had already made a substantial rise compared to his

father and would probably go even higher. Despite his occupational suc-

cess, he had not enjoyed a corresponding social success. As he put it:

In this country, so I've found, it's easier to increase your income and
that lot, than to move from one social class to another. Because when
you leave one social class it presupposes you'll be accepted by another,
which as far as I'm concerned, is not all that bloody easy. It cer-
tainly hasn't happened to me. In this country, believe you me, it's
more subdivided than you realize.

Other men, almost as successful as Mr. Brooks, had also bumped in-

to a barrier. Mr. Garritt, for instance, is an authorized dealer on the

stock exchange. 'There's a limit to how much you can change your class',

he said. 'In the end there's still family influence to contend with:

there's always these up and coming "whiz kids". They're mainly people

who have come from fairly good family backgrounds and whose fathers or

grandfathers have made quite a financial standing in their time'. Like-

wise, Mr. Enticott, an insurance manager:

Even though I earn a middle-class salary, I still don't think I could
get into the establishment even here in Sevenoaks. I've got nothing
against these people, but always in some way they'd make me odd man
out if I was to go amongst them. No matter what I tried to do, buying
clothes, learning correct table manners, I would be odd man out. I
think breeding is important. It's necessary to be brought up with
money. Acquiring money later on will never give you what comes natural-
ly.

Implicit in the above is at least some desire to achieve acceptance into

what are seen as closed and exclusive strata. Others, perhaps echoing

working-class attitudes, avowed a lack of interest in social status or

class. Like gossiping, social climbing is something other people do.

It is possible but undesirable. Typical of this group was Mr. Lawson:

You can change class if you've got the ambition; you can do it, if you
want to join the local golf club, which doesn't interest me. This is
one of the steps. As soon as you have a nice house, you want a big car.
It's a status symbol like the idea of an aerial before they had a TV
set. I've no feeling about social standing at all (Quantity Surveyor).

THE MIDDLE CLASS AND MOBILITY

Neither education nor wealth are, in most people's minds seen as factors able to overcome family background. How do people from social positions higher up in the social scale view prospects for social mobility? These are, after all, in part at least, the people who are able to erect the barriers perceived by those in inferior statuses. Are these real or imagined obstacles? While there was only a few of the stable middle-class interviewed in the Mobility Sample, there was an impressive unanimity in what they had to say about social and occupational mobility.

Almost to a man they were convinced of the impossibility of an individual changing his social class because they themselves would not forget where he had come from. As a financial analyst living in Surrey warned, 'You cannot change somebody's background. They perhaps can change the background of their children, and so on. The son of a roadsweeper can in his lifetime go from roadsweeper, which his father is, to doctor, which is a jump right across. In social terms it will be considerably less of a movement because I'll then impose a different order of classes on it'. Mr. Mansell, a cost accountant agreed:

There is a super class, as it were, which is something to do with property, I think. I think anybody can become a doctor and it doesn't matter where they come from. But, there are some doctors I would know and some doctors I wouldn't know. Then one must redefine class. In terms of profession, there is considerable movement. Class in terms of background, there is considerably less movement.

An insurance broker asked incredulously, 'Change your social class? No, of course you can't; it's just not possible'. He then added with considerable pride: 'It's something we've built up over 2,000 years of civilization. It's part of our way of life. If your father was a miner, you're going to be a miner'. Others spoke matter-of-factly and in generally approving tones about the continued existence of class

barriers.

I know there's a barrier in this country. I've never felt it because we have the advantage of being on the right side of the barrier, so to speak. But talking to people, even my employees, the sort of thing they do and enjoy, and so forth, one realizes there is a gate somewhere. I'd put the aristocracy out of it. The barrier is between lower-middle class and higher-middle class. I suppose we come under the heading of higher-middle-class (Company Director).

Still others put the emphasis on the 'in-born' nature of 'class' and

the difficulty individuals aspiring to mobility have in changing their

attitudes and behaviour.

I don't think you can change class. Once it's there it's with you what-ever happens. Family background, where you were born, that's what I mean. You can't change a person's nature. Winning the pools won't do it. Even a good education isn't enough. Funny thing, isn't it, class? (Post Office Executive).

MOVING UP IN THE WORLD

It is apparent, then, that movement into another social class,

whether upward or downward, is a social phenomenon unknown and general-

ly inconceivable to most people. This nearly universal downplaying and

disdain of social status does not, at the same time, mean that there

was not a concern with getting ahead—that is, becoming economically

and occupationally mobile. Whereas there was a general dislike of the

snobbery and pretense involved in attempting to change one's social sta-

tus, economic mobility was seen not only as possible, but highly desir-

able for oneself and for others. Mr. Bruce, a senior railway clerk

caught in his observations about 'moving up in the world' an interpre-

tation of social mobility that was widely held by people of all class

levels and backgrounds.

I should say my idea of moving up in the world is a combination of get-ting more skills, more education, more responsibility. It's the abili-ty to command a fairly good standard of living. But as I see most peo-ple striving for it, it's moving into a situation where they're not really happy. I suppose it's a class thing, really. People conscious-ly trying to move up, obviously it means class to them. But to a nor-mal person, you say: 'You're getting on O.K.'. He says: 'Oh yeah, I'm getting on O.K. It's the normal course of things, isn't it? But,

I'm still my same old self'. We have relatives in Suffolk who are book-makers, sort of thing, change their car every year, their house every two years. They're obviously getting on very well, but I don't think they'd think they've moved up in the world. It's not a class thing to them.

Overall, as Table 12.6 shows, most people tended to think of moving up in the world in financial and occupational terms. Only about two-fifths of the men put some aspect of status or status change at the forefront in their definition.[10] Tests of statistical significance in Table 12.6 suggest that the main differences in responses to this question are class ones. Thus, only about a fifth of the manual group compared to over half of the non-manual group thought of moving up in status or status-related terminology. 'Moving up'? a film accountant asked, 'I can only relate it in my way to money'. 'Having sufficient money to do what you want to do. Good holidays, good car, good plays, generally having what you want', said Mr. Buckland, a storeman. For Mr. Oram, a carpenter's mate, it was, 'Money, definitely money. It's a lot to do with possessions, isn't it? You get a car and some people say, "Oh, you're moving up in the world." You get a colour television, and they say, "Oh, you're moving up"'. Many simply repeated what began after a time and a number of interviews to sound like a catechism: 'Earning more money, getting a bigger car, and a better house'.

In contrast were the minority who thought mainly about changes in social status. 'It means running around with a higher class of people', said Mr. Kimber, a power press operator, and one of the few manual respondents who did not first mention money or possessions. 'It's a bet-

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[10]As the interview schedules reveal, people sometimes mentioned two or three dimensions all in one breath. Said one man: 'To me it means moving into a higher job with more money, more responsibility, more status, a higher circle of friends'. In coding these responses, I attempted to assess where the most stress was placed. While this was possible, it would not likely be replicable in a larger study with more than one interviewer and coder.

ter social position, not necessarily more money, though that's complimentary to it', replied Mr. Thomas, an executive in the Post Office. For Mr. Brooks, a sales manager, it meant a spatial as well as a social move: 'Socially, is the way I take it. In other words, leaving Southgate, Ridgeway, and going to Cuthfield Ridgeway; then going on to one of the very fine houses on Hampstead Heath, or something like that. It's merely a social thing. I'm sure it's not spiritually moving up'.

TABLE 12.6

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND MEANING OF 'MOVING UP IN THE WORLD': MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 113) (Percentages)

Pattern of Conventional Mobility	Dimensions Mentioned as Moving Up*			
	Financial	Occupational	Status	Total N's (100%)
(1) Upward	11%	42%	47%	(44)
(2) Stable Non-Manual	21	21	58	(24)
(3) Downward	48	26	26	(19)
(4) Stable Manual	62	23	15	(26)
(5) All Non-Manual	14	34	52	(68)
(6) All Manual	56	24	20	(45)
All Groups:	31%	30%	39%	(113)

*Financial--'More money, better car, bigger house, etc.'
 Occupational--'Better job', 'More responsibility', etc.
 Status--'Higher social sphere', 'social climbing', 'put-on airs', etc.

1 X 2: $x^2_2 = 3.131$; N.S.

1 X 3: $x^2_2 = 9.990$; P < .01

1 X 4: $x^2 = 20.011$; P < .001

2 X 3: $x^2_2 = 4.901$; N.S.

2 X 4: $x^2_2 = 11.330$; P < .01

3 X 4: $x^2_2 = 1.107$; N.S.

5 X 6: $x^2 = 22.268$; P < .001

For at least a third of the men 'moving up' was viewed primarily as advancement in a career. 'A better job and more salary. It just follows from that', said Mr. Potter, a mobile crane driver. Mr. Shield,

an accountant, noted that 'if you move up in the true sense, you move up in the world because your job is of such a character that you have advanced yourself financially. Your social status advances because of your job'. 'Moving up is getting promotion, getting more responsibility on the job, getting to know the bosses. Getting invited to their homes', explained Mr. Gibson, a clerk.

While many gave a general idea of what they thought was meant by moving up in the world, others had a more personal definition in mind. For Mr. Dawson, a cost accountant and keen bird watcher, moving up meant: 'having a little more money, a little more leisure—if I could afford a better pair of binoculars, that would be moving up to me'. Mr. Springall, an office manager, had somewhat grander aspirations: 'To me moving up means getting a bigger house with a bit of land attached to it. To get a paddock and a pony, that's the extent of my ambition'. 'It's back to the class system, isn't it?', asked Mr. Adams, a police inspector living in Central London. 'Going out and getting a bigger house in a better area. I wouldn't treat it as class, but for me, it would mean a house in the country with a garden and lots of trees'. Moving up was in Mr. Cannon's eyes, 'achieving the ambition which I started out. I feel I want to push until I've reached a peak. I feel I should have money. It's a silly thing, but I like all the dinners and dances, meeting people, going to theatres, things which if I had the money I'd do automatically'.

Implied in these personal definitions and in most of the accounts was the same emphasis on 'social climbing' being what others do or mean by moving up. Mr. Merry-West, an editor, put it more explicitly. 'It means absolutely nothing to me because it's never once occurred to me to do so. I know what it means, of course. It means becoming more

prestigious, more prosperous and more snobbish. I detest it myself'.

Whereas Mr. Merry-West had been middle-class for many generations, Mr.

Jarvis, an accounts superintendent, had moved up from a fairly low back-

ground. He saw his move entirely in economic terms:

I'm not interested in moving up in the world. We have a car—a very
fast car—my parents never did. We have a colour television set and
vast numbers don't have that. We own this house and the one next door.
So I've progressed a lot further than my parents ever did. So it comes
down to social climbing and I'm not interested in social climbing.

These comments suggest that the term 'moving up in the world' has,

for most, negative connotations. People associate it with snobbishness

and pretention and, as with the more direct question about class change,

disavow any personal desires to climb socially. Moving up, whatever it

might mean to others was, personally, transformed into modest aspira-

tions to 'get on', but in a purely financial and occupational sense.[11]

While middle-class men were more inclined to mention status or status-

related aspects, it was apparent that they also believed what ought to

occur is what working-class people generally stated: economic improve-

ment within the paramaters of one's original class milieu. Mr. Toombs,

a company director, spoke approvingly of what had happened to him and

his friends:

All we know of people is our friends who, like ourselves, are middle-
class. They've had their promotions as time went on, one expects that.
But I don't think they've become snobs or anything like that, but they've
kept to the good standard of living, as I think we have, for our class
of people. None of them have tried to be more than they are. They have
improved themselves, obviously, but I don't see that it has altered
their class in any way.

While few people thought they had changed in a social sense, over

half (57 percent) felt they had in their own terms and according to their

definition of the concept, moved up in the world. However, as can be

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[11]Willmott and Young (1960: 28) note about Woodford's middle class,
'It is always a small car they talk about as though not even a puritan
could object as long as it was not a large car'.

seen in Table 12.7 this is mainly because of the disproportional numbers

of upwardly mobile in the sample. Overwhelmingly, these men see them-

selves as having moved up in at least one of the ways described above.

Mostly these men were contrasting their lot with their father's or from

'where they had started out', as many put it. 'I'm very infinitely bet-

ter off than my father. There's no doubt I've moved up', said Mr. Fair-

burn, a production accountant. Mr. Cormack, a buyer, also used other

people as a reference point.

I've moved up, yes, certainly. My obvious response is compared to my
father, which is the answer many people give. I'm trying to think of
relatives and friends. My friends are at the same level as me, really.
So it's relatives, I think. My brother, it must be. He's a postman.

TABLE 12.7

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND PERCENT BELIEVING THEY
HAVE MOVED UP IN THE WORLD: MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 117)

	Percent	Total N's
(1) Upward	82	(44)
(2) Stable Non-Manual	54	(24)
(3) Downward	36	(22)
(4) Stable Manual	37	(27)

Tests of Significance:

1 X 2: $x_2^2 = 5.897$; P < .02   2 X 3: $x_2^2 = 1.466$; N.S.
1 X 3: $x_2^2 = 13.636$; P < .001   2 X 4: $x_2^2 = 1.506$; N.S.
1 X 4: $x^2 = 14.708$; P < .001   3 X 4: $x^2 = .002$; N.S.

Of some interest in Table 12.7 is that the downwardly mobile are,

as with many other things looked at in this study, indistinguishable

from stable manual men; in both cases only 37 percent indicated that

they had moved upwards, even financially. For both it was difficult to

determine the reference point on which their evaluation was based.

Some said that they didn't know while others simply said, 'just meself,

I guess', and left it at that. Despite their objectively lower occupational status only two of the downwardly mobile men felt they had 'moved down in the world'. In all, only about ten percent of the men made such an evaluation. Notably, all but the two just mentioned, were stable non-manual respondents. For a few of these men it was a status decline, for others it was financial, and for some it was both. Invariably, however, it was their father with whom they were comparing themselves. 'Financially my father was always very comfortable. I can hardly say that about myself', said Mr. Munford, an accountant. Mr. Payne, though a manager in a chemical company, still felt pressed financially.

I don't know what private income my father is getting, but I certainly feel a lot worse off given the cost of living and what salary he was earning at my age. Socially, I dare say, we're the same.

For Mr. Montgomery, a civil servant, it was both.

If anything I suppose I've moved down in the world. At comparable ages and certainly now, I'm worse off than my father. Thirty years ago he was on a salary which would be worth a lot more than mine is now. And socially, where he was upper-middle-class, I'm slightly lower and probably won't alter that much in my lifetime.

In the sample as a whole these were, of course, exceptions. Almost everyone, whatever their present occupational status, thought they were better off than their fathers at comparable ages and, usually, now in the present. Notwithstanding this general optimism, few manual workers and only about half of the stable non-manual men believed that they had experienced sufficient change to warrant saying they had moved up in the world. Apparently these three groups of men were not thinking in intergenerational terms but, rather, about what had happened to them over their own lives. While most felt they had progressed 'naturally', it did not deserve the phrase, 'moving up in the world'.[12]

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[12]Nevertheless, there was a good deal of agreement between my objective measure of occupational mobility and respondents' rankings of their own and their fathers' occupations in terms of prestige ($X^2 = 48.602$; $P < .001$; $C = .55$). The most agreement was by the socially mobile. In

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Three main conclusions emerge from the data presented in this chapter. First, while there is, generally, a good deal of agreement between 'objective' measures of class and of social mobility, the upwardly mobile appear especially divided in what they think is their present social class. Over four-fifths of this group believe that they have 'moved up in the world' and nearly three-quarters consider their occupation to be of higher social standing than their father's. But less than two-fifths think of themselves as middle-class. Generally the more education a person has, the more likely is he to say he is middle-class. But again, even with high education, only 58 percent of the upwardly mobile men consider themselves as having become middle-class. Although the downwardly mobile too are split in their views about their own class position, the division is not so marked as with the upwardly mobile. They tend, on the whole, to think of themselves as working-class and are mainly uncertain about whether to call their fathers middle-class or working-class.

The second conclusion is that very few people (26%) believe that it is possible for themselves or others successfully to change social class. This, it emerged, was a view held with equal intensity by high and low status men and by mobile and non-mobile men alike. The reasons

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contrast two-fifths of the men treated in this study as stable manual believe themselves to be employed in an occupation of higher social standing than that of their father. Another fifth believe they are, relative to their fathers, downwardly mobile. The tendency for the working class to upgrade manual occupations is reflected in the finding that about one quarter of this group place both themselves and their fathers in one of the top three categories. Although the stable non-manual men are more in agreement with the objective label than stable manual men, over half believe they have been occupationally mobile--upward of downward--relative to their father. There was, finally, no evidence that respondents were biased for or against their own occupation (see: Blau, 1957).

differed by social class; working-class men, if they believed it possible

to change one's social class, most often linked it to an increase in

wealth, whereas middle-class men more often mentioned occupational and

educational achievements. Almost no one entertained the possibility

of declassification. Thus, if upward social class mobility was largely

inconceivable, movement downward appeared to be doubly so.

Thirdly, in what people said, it was evident that not only is so-

cial class mobility seen as difficult and often inconceivable, but it

is also deemed undesirable as well. Most did not reject all forms of

social mobility. Rather, it is changes that involve a transformation

of attitudes and behaviour which were most obviously condemned. Thus,

social mobility was largely defined and limited to occupational and

financial dimensions and within that definition, was often desired for

themselves and approved of as an ambition in others. Condemnation,

scorn and self-righteousness were directed towards those who in obtain-

ing a better job and more possessions undergo a change or treat them

as claims to a higher status. At all class levels, then, 'social

climbing'--moving up in the world--was treated as a repudiation and be-

trayal of one's friends, family and origins and as a disloyalty to one's

'true' and 'unchangeable' self. The anticipated consequences of status

striving were loneliness, unhappiness and marginality. The idea that

people might genuinely change as a result of various experiences, went

largely unrecognized.

An especially significant aspect of this emerges not from what these

men said but what they so seldom talked about: the role of education

in the mobility process. Apparently, the idea that particular educa-

cational experiences might cause a change in aspirations, outlook, ac-

cent and interests that are 'real' rather than 'pretence', was simply

not one that occurred to most people, whatever their status. Whereas

in North American society education is generally recognized as a means

for social mobility and the main access to middle-class life, it did

not occur to the majority of these men that it might serve a similar

function in Britain. This was, of course, particularly true for work-

ing-class people interviewed but, as well, few middle-class men indi-

cated that education might conceivably alter an individual's social

class. Like their working-class counterparts, many thought only in

terms of rapid rises in fortunes—winning the pools or doing well in

business—as means of upward movement. These, as we have seen, were

not thought likely to lead to successful class mobility. Some implica-

tions of these findings will be considered in the next chapter, the

conclusion to this study.

CHAPTER 13

CONCLUSION

There are several parts to this conclusion. First, I summarise what has been learned in the study about downward and upward social mobility in Britain. While this will mainly be a repetition of the detailed summaries and conclusions which appear at the end of each chapter, I will also attempt to place these findings in a more general theoretical context. The final section tries to go beyond the study to consider what ought to be the response of educators and legislators concerned with developing social policy with regard to education and social mobility.

DOWNWARD MOBILITY

One of the major contributions of this study has been to explicate the meaning and nature of downward mobility in industrial society. At the macro-level of analysis, an attempt was made to assess its significance as an indicator of the fluidity of society and of the extent of subordination of particularistic-ascriptive values to the values of universalism and achievement. At the micro or social psychological level my concern has been with the personal consequences related to a decline in social status. As indicated in Chapter 1, the impact of downward mobility at both levels of analysis is dependent upon an explanation of how it occurs. At least three explanations of individual downward mobility are either implicit or explicit in the literature.[1]

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[1]There are also structural factors associated with downward mobility such as shifts in the occupational structure reducing the proportion of white-collar occupations and economic depression resulting in underemployment and unemployment of portions of the labour force. These

1) Downward mobility is related to personal disorganization or poor mental or physical health on the part of individuals.

2) Downward mobility is the result of rejection within the formal educational system.

3) Downward mobility arises because of the failure or inability of some middle-class families to provide a social and/or economic foothold sufficient to maintain a similar status for their sons.

The data of this study pertaining to downward mobility tend to be most compatible with the third of these possible explanations. Instead of proceeding from a core status group, as has been generally assumed, the predominant pattern was for downwardly mobile men to come from families which were only nominally part of the middle class. These families were marginal either because the father had been upwardly mobile over his work life or because he was employed in a status-ambiguous occupation. Conceptually, the former can be designated as 'risen working class'[2] while the latter approximate to a peripheral middle-class status group.

In both cases the essential outcome was that sons had been exposed to and had internalised working-class not middle-class values and norms. Despite their having a white-collar occupational status, the families of these men had retained a working-class disdain of non-manual work and middle-class life styles and had encouraged their sons towards manual work and, in particular, to skilled trades of various kinds. In this regard, it was frequently apparent that men who moved downward were in effect realizing the frustrated ambitions of their fathers who regretted not having a trade themselves. As a result, these men showed relatively

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have to do, principally, with the conditions favourable for a high rate of downward mobility; they do not explain individual downward mobility. In any case, neither has occurred during the past few decades.

[2]In contrast to Jackson and Marsden's (1962) concept of sunken middle class.

little uncertainty about the choice of a career and were, in their atti-
tudes to work, among the most satisfied and committed of the four groups
studied. Typically these men had voluntarily entered the working class
at the beginning of what turned out to be a very stable work life and
showed every sign of remaining there until retirement.

As suggested in Chapter 1, downward mobility may be separated ana-
lytically into 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' mobility. The above find-
ings suggest that in the middle-mass most downward movement is voluntary
in that occupational choice was not related to personal misfortune,
economic depression or blocked aspirations. Instead, parents of these
men had exerted positive influence to direct sons towards jobs perceived
as possessing security, relatively high income and intrinsic satisfac-
tion—jobs not very different from those ultimately chosen. Thus, to
the extent that any decision can be considered voluntaristic, the majori-
ty of the downwardly mobile chose their occupation, and unintentionally
their social status, freely and with the general approval and collusion
of their family.

REFERENCE GROUP THEORY

In applying the framework of reference group theory to downward mo-
bility, Merton suggests that 'it is the isolate, nominally in a group
but only slightly incorporated in its network of social relations who
is most likely to become positively oriented toward non-membership groups'
(Merton, 1957: 324). While my data do not provide an adequate measure
of social isolation, they do suggest a low level of integration into
middle-class networks. However, where Merton had postulated a cumula-
tive interplay between a deterioration of social relations within the
membership group and positive attitudes towards the norms of a non-mem-
bership group, the concept of 'risen working class' suggests that these

social relations were never well-formed in the first place. For at

least the main pattern of downward mobility observed here, the reference

group perspective must be modified to take into account the possibility

that the objective membership group may not at any point have constitu-

ted a meaningful standard for those eventually mobile. In moving up-

wards economically, but not normatively or relationally, families of the

downwardly mobile had, in Turner's (1964: 397) terminology, failed to

create the life situation typical for members of the new social stratum

of which they were now a part.[3] Lacking that particular constellation

of factors generally understood as the middle-class way of life, allegi-

ance and identification was from the outset with the lower status group

and involved no actual shift in reference groups and group affiliations

in the manner suggested by the theory.[4]

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Neither of the other explanations of downward mobility are suppor-

ted by the evidence from this study. Not only was there no link between

poor mental or physical health and downward mobility but the scanty

evidence concerning the former tends to support the opposite hypothesis:

men who would otherwise have chosen a manual occupation were, if in

poor health, constrained to look for less strenuous white-collar work.

In addition, though it would be technically accurate to argue that the

downwardly mobile had been rejected by the formal educational system,

this could also be said of those who remained stable in the working

class as well. The findings discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7 indi-

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[3]As Goldthorpe et al (1969: 159) note, this may not necessarily
be because of white-collar exclusiveness but because there is very
little desire to form middle-class social relationships. As they sug-
gest, economic advancement does not necessarily imply a concern with
status striving.

[4]The majority of downwardly mobile men identified themselves as
working class; there was less agreement about where to place their
fathers (see: Chapter 12).

cated that the educational experiences of these two groups of men were virtually identical. Both had left school at the minimum leaving age after what was invariably a non-grammar school training and in neither group was there much evidence of higher educational aspirations than they had in fact achieved. Instead of being 'cooled-out' from mobility striving, the downwardly mobile seemed to be part of the majority in Britain who are never 'warmed-up' by the educational system in the first place (see: Hopper, 1971b).

These findings about downward mobility cast serious doubt on the validity of downward mobility as an indicator of the fluidity of a society. The ideal-typical pattern implied by Miller (1960) is one in which because of meritocratic norms, some sons _born_ in advantaged strata are unable to maintain that status and are therefore downwardly mobile. There is the further assumption that the educational system is one of the principal mechanisms insuring that the less competent fall in the social structure. However, as we have just seen, almost none of the men who moved downwards occupationally could be said to come from solid middle-class backgrounds. Middle-class men unable to obtain a place in a state grammar school were still able to maintain a roughly similar status to that of their father. In large part this was made possible by the existence of the private school system and by occupational selection procedures which continue to give considerable weight to ascriptive factors, to personal influence and to particularism. In short, the results of this study are not at all what one would expect if downward mobility is to be treated as a valid indicator of how open and meritocratic is British society. They also suggest that for downward mobility to be utilised as a valid comparative statistic, considerably more must be known about it than simply its rate.

CONSEQUENCES OF DOWNWARD MOBILITY

The classical theoretical position concerning downward mobility is
one in which 'dilemmas faced by mobile individuals in their interperson-
al relations inhibit social integration and are responsible for many as-
pects of their attitudes and conduct' (Blau, 1956: 290). Despite its
voluntary nature, subjective definitions were generally congruent with
my objective measure of downward mobility. The invidious comparisons
implied by these recognitions of differential occupational and social
status should, then, within this theoretical framework give rise to
various responses functional in reducing the impact of status depriva-
tion. Instead, the findings discussed in Part Three of this study sug-
gest that the objective drops in status experienced by these men had not
resulted in heightened status anxiety and feelings of status deprivation.
What have been hypothesised as manifestations of these psychological
states—anomia, heightened prejudice, political extremism and isolation—
were not found to be related to these patterns of downward mobility.
At the same time as they were very different from stable middle-class
men, they were in virtually every variable considered, indistinguishable
from men stable in the working class. Only relative to the former can
it be said that the downwardly mobile are anomic and prejudiced. They
appear to be neither more nor less so than others in the working class.
With respect to extent of interpersonal relations they also followed
a working-class not a middle-class pattern of involvement with friends
and kin. Finally, voting patterns of the downwardly mobile tended to
fall between origin and destination class but could not in any way be
typified as exhibiting political extremism. Thus, in terms of their
personal and political attitudes, the downwardly mobile do not, in
Britain, appear to constitute a social or political force of much

significance.[5]

MITIGATING FACTORS

There would appear to be a number of factors intervening between the theory and my empirical findings which either modify the theory or render it inappropriate to this empirical context. First, the possibly unprecedented rise in standard of living and level of employment over the past three decades had led to the general belief-not always accurate-that everyone was better off than the previous generation. This, and the greater job security which most men in the sample were presently experiencing were quite clearly seen as offsets to what was, after all, only a moderate drop in occupational status. Secondly, in generally identifying with the working class, downwardly mobile men shared with their stable working-class counterparts a general disinterest in status striving and a tendency to define mobility solely in its economic dimensions. Thirdly, the downwardly mobile conformed very closely to patterns of sociability typical in the working-class in that the majority of their social relationships were with kinfolk. Hence, some potential interpersonal dilemmas were avoided because of this tendency to follow a family oriented and relatively privatised social existence. As we have seen, this was not so much a matter of acculturation into the working class as a continuation of attitudes and styles of life learned in the family of origin.

In concluding this discussion of downward mobility it is essential to keep in mind that the focus throughout was on middle-mass downward mobility and that what objectively constituted downward movement was of necessity measured crudely. The findings just described do not, therefore, necessarily refute the general hypothesis that an involuntary and

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[5]For an argument along these lines, see Davies (1970).

perceived loss of status may in a number of respects be dissociative. Such patterns of mobility may well give rise to attitudes and behaviour which have functional significance in preserving and buttressing self-esteem. Both for historically specific reasons and because of the nature and genesis of the main pattern of mobility found in this study, actors had at their disposal a number of plausible interpretations of their objective experience which made it possible to deny any loss of status and to find compensatory factors mitigating its impact. Other patterns or degrees of downward mobility may not provide the same kinds of compensatory mechanisms. For example, as I discuss later, the more subtle drops in status which occur within the middle class may, with respect to the dissociative theory, be a relevant target for further empirical enquiry. In short, where downward mobility proceeds from a core status group to a status group lower in the social hierarchy, where there is, on the part of the actors involved, a concern with status striving and where the actor is confronted with a real choice about which norms and attitudes to adopt, the dissociative hypothesis may have considerable validity.

To reiterate what has been said in a number of places in this study, theoretical conclusions about downward mobility do, nevertheless, derive principally from studies of middle-mass occupational mobility of the kind examined here. This, the only empirical study of downward mobility in Britain of which I am aware, yields findings roughly in accord with recent American research which has, in turn, tended to overturn previous theoretical thinking about downward mobility. Until further evidence of a contrary nature is forthcoming, it is reasonable to conclude that previous theory and conjecture had overestimated the social and psychological significance of downward mobility. It neither creates a cadre

of discontents vulnerable to political extremism and racism nor does it tell us very much about how open or fluid is the social structure.

UPWARD MOBILITY

Essentially the same kinds of interests pervaded this study with respect to upward mobility as had been of concern in analysing downward mobility. First of all, several chapters were concerned with the congruence between occupational and social mobility-what I have referred to as the success of upward mobility. Along with a detailed consideration of mobility routes, I also followed the lead of Goldthorpe et al (1969) in looking not only at what had happened to people in terms of economic change but also at what relational and normative shifts had occurred as well. Both in their 1969 study, and in a later essay, (Goldthorpe and Hope, 1972), the question is raised as to whether occupational mobility also involves shifts in patterns of association and life styles for those moving upwards.

A number of findings of this study are of relevance to this general question. As Chapter 3 showed, upward mobility had involved an economic shift for most of those experiencing it. But, despite their having an average income as high, if not higher than, the stable middle-class group, the upwardly mobile were, even at comparable income levels, more likely to live in council housing, the implication being that they had experienced very little change in life style or pattern of association. Findings in Part Three underline the argument that economic mobility is not inevitably accompanied by social mobility in the fullest sense of the word. This was generally more true for normative and subjective dimensions of social mobility than for relational dimensions. Men who moved upwards were less likely to vote Conservative than stable middle-class men and were considerably less likely to define themselves as mid-

dle-class. However, in looking at various patterns of association-extent of kinship interaction relative to friendship interaction, social class of friends, numbers of contacts and participation in secondary organizations--difference between the upwardly mobile and the stable middle class were not as a rule, statistically significant.

When these findings are evaluated alongside the qualitative data recorded, the clearest impression is of a continuum along which the occupationally mobile are ranged. At one end there is almost no evidence of economic, normative or relational change while at the other extreme, one finds a pattern of measurable characteristics virtually identical to those traditionally viewed as middle class. Also, without too much forcing of the data, it was possible to discern five separate patterns of upward mobility. Of these, three were in varying degrees toward the latter end of the continuum, involving a good deal of social as well as occupational mobility. These were: (1) The Self-made Man-High Upward; (2) The Self Made Man-Lower Managerial; (3) The Young Grammar School Graduate. At the other end of the continuum were two groups who had experienced some occupational mobility but very little social mobility. These I labelled as: (4) The Marginally Upward and (5) The Young Secondary Modern Graduate. While the dividing lines between these mobility patterns are somewhat arbitrary, it could be reasonably concluded on the basis of the detailed case studies and the more general findings from the Work and Leisure Study, that about two-thirds of the upward mobility in the sample was in one of the first three categories.

An analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative data about upward mobility leads to the following hypotheses: Occupational mobility is more likely to lead to relational and normative change where:

1) It proceeds through an educational route rather than through what is formally a rejection route.

2) It involves considerable change in intergenerational occupational status.

3) It occurs relatively early on in the work life of the individual.

In some instances, of course, all three conditions were found to be present in the same work-life history. Hence, as might be expected, for those who had attended a grammar school or its equivalent there was a greater likelihood of successful social mobility resulting. But, this was partly so because these men (plus those obtaining further education) moved up into a white-collar job at the beginning of their work lives, thereby spending very little time in a working-class milieu. Further, some of these men had reached, or anticipated reaching what in the context are relatively high positions. However, about two-fifths of the men in the upward mobility sample had minimal education and had apparently moved upwards with no educational qualifications besides a school leaving certificate. A proportion of these men had also experienced social as well as occupational mobility so that the educational experience is not the sole explanatory factor.

Except for those few who had entered a profession, amount and kind of education was not a very good predictor of how high individuals had risen or what occupational categories they had reached. The main reason was that the most common occupational destination for upwardly mobile men was a managerial or administrative position-occupational categories requiring a wide range of skills and academic credentials and in which there is little control over the certification of entrants. This is not to say that education was totally without effect. In the sample as a whole, its impact was dramatic; grammar school and/or further education invariably led to upward mobility for men of working-class origin and for men born in the middle-class, to retention of parental status. Nevertheless it bears repeating that a good deal of the upward mobility

took place via a 'non-educational' rather than a 'formal educational' route.

THE STABILITY OF MOBILITY

The one-third of the men in the sample who had been occupationally but not socially mobile are of considerable interest in regard to the question of the stability of mobility. To paraphrase Miller (1956), are those who move upwards able to provide a firm foothold for their children, or, do they move downwards again in the second generation? Both the evidence found concerning upward mobility and that presented above with respect to the genesis of downward mobility lead to the following hypothesis:

Unless there is a substantial normative and relational shift accompanying upward occupational and economic mobility, children of those moving upwards are likely to be downwardly mobile.

In main, the warrant for this hypothesis derives from the finding that in terms of work-life histories, lifestyles and norms, men in the latter two patterns of upward mobility were very similar to the fathers of downwardly mobile men interviewed. Especially crucial was that these men were also the most likely to express dissatisfaction with their work, to resent not having a skilled trade, to downgrade non-manual work and to minimize the value of education. Among those old enough to have children there was evidence that they would, or had, encouraged their sons toward skilled trades rather than toward middle-class occupations. As we have already seen, these attitudes were typically to be found in the backgrounds of men interviewed in this study as downwardly mobile. In other words, sons of marginally upwardly mobile men would be counted as downwardly mobile were they to appear in a future sample survey.

DETERMINANTS OF UPWARD MOBILITY

The usual practice of treating mobility aspirations and anticipatory

behaviour as conformity and non-mobility as deviant and problematic has
had the unfortunate consequence of obfuscating what is perhaps the most
important perspective of reference group theory: that what from one
vantage point is conformity is from another non-conformity. In losing
that insight, there has also been a tendency to ignore the theoretically
and empirically relevant problem of how reference group behaviour is
generated in the first place. That it is useful to keep before us this
perspective was underlined by the summary in Chapter 6 of a number of
ethnographic accounts of working-class life on both sides of the Atlan-
tic. The situation described is one in which, typically, the potentially
mobile individual faces strong pressures from family and peers to con-
form to norms antithetical to mobility and status striving. Similarly,
data presented in Chapter 12 provide additional support that mobility
orientations generally go against prevailing working-class norms and
are in that sense deviant-behaviour.

One contribution of this study, then, was to synthesize a number
of otherwise disparate and generally non-theoretical empirical studies
of working-class life by viewing them from the theoretical perspective
of reference group theory. This exercise also provided both empirical
support and a theoretical anchorage for a general hypothesis that any
source of non-integration of the family of origin into its objective
class situation will make it more likely that the potentially mobile
person will:

1) Affiliate and identify with out-groups of which he is not objectively
   a member;
2) Be able to withstand social pressures to conform to non-mobility
   patterns of behaviour;
3) Be willing and able to cut community and peer-group ties.

I concentrated on factors in my respondents' childhood and in their
family of origin which were hypothesised as contributing to a low level

of social integration and hence to mobility. Of particular importance
was the finding from previous studies in Britain and elsewhere that the
upwardly mobile tend to come from 'sunken middle-class' families. Ad-
ditionally, geographical mobility, the stability of the father's work
life and the size and nature of the extended kinship network were also
hypothesised as factors contributing to a low level of social integra-
tion into the objective social class <u>milieu</u>.

In main, this retrospective research failed to reveal factors
uniquely associated with upward mobility. Although the family trees of
about one-third of the upwardly mobile men contained inconsistent class
elements--a mother or father or both who had come from a middle class
background--this was found to be true of men stable in the working
class as well. A strict adherence to the quantitative data, therefore,
leads to the conservative conclusion that membership in a 'sunken mid-
dle-class' family was not a predictor of who in the working class is
likely to be upwardly mobile and who is not. At the same time, the
qualitative data emerging from the accounts people gave of their back-
grounds suggest that the significance of these middle-class ties is not
the same for both groups of men--upwardly mobile individuals were more
likely to mention these ties and to invest them with some significance
as factors orienting them away from a manual occupation. Thus, atten-
tion must also be directed toward the exact nature of these cross class
relationships before concluding that they are not related to upward
mobility.

Of other factors hypothesised as having a bearing on a low level
of integration into the working class, only geographical mobility was
significantly related to upward mobility. There was little evidence to
suggest that the individual or his family had been especially isolated

or at odds with the immediate social situation. Instead, the accounts these men gave of their childhood, family life and climate, education and entry into work spoke most directly to the obstacles which should have retarded rather than facilitated or encouraged upward mobility.

NEGATIVE REFERENCE GROUPS

The objective evidence was, therefore, at odds with what would be expected from the model developed in Chapter 6 in which families of the upwardly mobile are seen as already middle class in orientation and therefore poorly integrated into their objective class situation. But, without necessarily adopting a middle-class perspective, some parents had imbued in their sons a vague and unarticulated notion that there might be a better way to live. Not only did they pass on largely negative attitudes about certain kinds of manual work and the immediate neighbourhood, but they sometimes also treated themselves and their own relatives as role models of what not to be. In this regard, mothers were more important than fathers. Others had apparently developed negative feelings about their condition out of their own perception of their immediate situation or as a result of new experiences such as War or National Service. They had, in the language of reference group theory, developed negative attitudes about their objective membership group but in contradistinction to the classical formulation not developed simultaneously a specific set of attitudes in conformity with an out-group of higher social status.

This would appear to require as yet another paradigm concerning the connection between anticipatory socialization and social mobility beyond those already formulated by Lane and Ellis (1968).[6] It was initially expected that findings about upward mobility would empirically be most in accord with what these authors referred to as 'routine so-

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[6]See Chapter Six: pages 151-156.

cialization'. It will be recalled that the sequence was: 'In-group social contact-→ Social learning-→ Social mobility (p. 278). However, the predominant pattern of upward mobility actually observed would appear to require a modified version of the basic 'Anticipatory Socialization' model originally formulated by Merton. The sequence for this model was described by Lane and Ellis as: 'Out-group Affiliative Motive -→ Out Group Social Contact-→ Social Learning-→ Social Mobility. On the basis of the qualitative data concerning the genesis and process of upward mobility, the sequence may more adequately be described as: 'in-group negative attitudes-→ out group social contact-→ occupational mobility-→ out-group affiliative motives-→ social learning-→ social mobility. That is, re-socialization into middle class attitudes occurs over a considerable length of time as aspirations and attitudes become focused and altered by other events such as promotion, economic advancement, and residential and geographical mobility. As well, it was apparent that for some of the men, those who had experienced occupational but not social mobility, a number of these conditions or steps were missing. For at least the latter two patterns of mobility described earlier, economic shifts had not been transformed into shifts in social affiliation, presumably because they had continued to hold positive attitudes about their original membership group.

Support for this analytical description of the process of social mobility comes largely from the quantitative and qualitative data of Chapters 7 and 8. Although the particular constellation of social and personality factors which made it possible to translate negative attitudes about the membership group into actual mobility are only partially explicated by the research, it does nevertheless indicate that at some point reference individuals (out-group social contacts) were involved. Someone had singled these men out; they had been selected, encouraged

and eventually promoted. If their mobility route was an educational one, someone had recognized their ability and provided some encouragement. Others, seemingly possessed of an equally powerful motivation, an equally great dissatisfaction with their place in society, had been unable to achieve occupational and social mobility.

THE ROLE OF LUCK

Although ability and hard work undoubtedly played a significant part in the determination of who is likely to be upwardly mobile, 'luck', 'chance' and 'being at the right place at the right time' were also of considerable significance in altering to the better the direction of many careers. This is what people believed and what recent research in the United States (Jencks et al, 1972) has tended to substantiate: the store of plausible sociological and psychological variables when once exhausted leave at least half the variation in occupational and financial achievement unexplained. To refer to the remaining residual as 'luck' is, of course, to say that we do not know what else to measure. But, while such an admission is theoretically unsatisfying, leaving as it does large gaps in the elucidation of a reference group theory of social mobility, the failure of social research to uncover all of the determinants of achievement is of relevance to more general theory concerning social mobility in industrial society. It suggests that despite the general stress on rational-legal norms in industrial and post-industrial society, there remains a degree of 'looseness' in the selection process. We are, in other words, some distance away from the rigid meritocracy envisioned by Michael Young (1958) in which only measurable ability would qualify one for advancement. In the same vein what was shown earlier about downward mobility indicates that ascribed factors remain of crucial significance; those born with high status but lower

ability are not automatically downgraded.

This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that in a more general sense there is not a sorting out of people in the society, a cybernetical mechanism, as Young and Gibson (1963) put it, but that the educational system, however important, is not monolithic. As Marshall (1950: 55) concluded,

. . . it is good that some captains of industry should have started life at the bench, and that trade unions should be led by genuine members, men of outstanding general ability who have climbed a ladder other than the educational one. It is important to preserve these other ladders, and it is fortunate that the selection net has some pretty big holes in it. It is fortunate too, perhaps, that human affairs cannot be handled with perfect mechanical precision, even in the Welfare State.

Marshall was writing in 1950, a scant few years after the 1944 Education-Act. Do these 'holes' still exist? Will they continue to do so in the future? My data do not provide unequivocal answers to these questions. This is because men who had experienced a considerable amount of upward mobility and who had left school at the minimum leaving age were also those educated in the difficult pre-war years of the '20's and '30's. For these men to have gone to a grammar school would have been a very unusual occurrence, indeed. Part-time qualifications and on-the-job training were much more the norm than the exception. On the other hand, younger men upwardly mobile without a grammar school education were not far enough along in their careers for it to be known how high they would eventually rise or even how permanent is their upward mobility. It is, therefore, too early to say whether or not intragenerational mobility is declining in favour of intergenerational mobility through formal educational routes (See Goldthorpe, 1964).

Nor can it be said from these data that people are able to rise to positions of importance in society from humble origins. Only a handful of men interviewed in this study approximate to the label 'captains of

industry'. Instead, as the specific occupations of the upwardly mobile men revealed, most upward mobility is into positions within small or medium-sized enterprises. In any period, then, it may be that intra-generational mobility routes (as opposed to intergenerational mobility through an educational route) have most often involved smaller and more informal organizations; less often larger and more bureaucratic organizations. Thus, even as British society follows the American pattern in becoming more qualification-conscious, these less defined mobility routes may continue to be of considerable importance.[7]

CONSEQUENCES OF UPWARD MOBILITY

The measures used in this study illuminate only slightly personality differences between mobile and non-mobile individuals. What, nevertheless, do they tell us about the consequences of individual upward mobility? Briefly, as with downward mobility, the data give no indication that the negative consequences which have been imputed to upward mobility apply to men socially mobile in what I have called the middle mass. On the contrary, the evidence presented suggests that the upwardly mobile were no more isolated, no more prone to 'status insecurity', prejudice and anomia than others in the sample. Relative to stable working-class men and those downwardly mobile, they were economically, occupationally, physically, socially and, perhaps even psychologically, better off. Compared to their stable middle-class counterparts, men who moved up were in some dimensions, equal, and in others, superior. They were, for example, slightly richer, slightly less prejudiced, and much less dissatisfied with the present relative to the past.

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[7] Evidence compiled by Collins (1971) indicates that in the United States academic qualifications required differ both by size of firm and by the nature of organizational goals.

Furthermore, these data fail to reveal differential consequences within the group of upwardly mobile when they are split on the basis of whether the mobility was sponsored or irregular (See: Turner, 1966). It has been hypothesised by Hopper (1971b) that 'upward mobility from the lower social classes through initial rejection routes in England is more likely to be pathogenic than its analogous pattern in the United States'. By implication, this pattern of upward mobility should then also be more pathogenic than mobility which conforms to sponsorship norms. While these hypotheses may as yet be valid for some patterns of upward mobility, they do not receive empirical support with respect to the middle-mass mobility examined in this study. Although movement upward through a formal education route provided a greater likelihood of acculturation into middle-class patterns, lack of a grammar school experience did not appear to affect individuals detrimentally relative to those who did have this experience.

At a more general theoretical level, these findings for Britain augment those for the United States which tend to refute the dissociative hypothesis concerning the effects of upward mobility. Following Durkheim's theoretical concerns with the problem of lack of social solidarity in industrial societies, this theory suggests that to experience social mobility is to be set apart, deprived of social supports and social restraints. As we have seen, this theoretical orientation appeared to have particular relevance to British society because of 1) the degree of status rigidity and 2) the significance of class subcultures as institutions mediating between the individual and the mass society. Under these conditions social mobility should be more likely to lead to marginality and to be more disruptive in its consequences than in societies where social mobility is an institutionalized fact of life. The findings outlined above cast serious doubt on the validity

of this theory and suggest, instead, that the significance of social mobility has, perhaps, been overemphasised as a factor in people's lives and as a sociological variable useful for explaining a variety of social phenomena. It can be concluded that in Britain middle-mass mobility does not involve its participants in attitudes and behaviour very different from those experienced generally by individuals in an industrialised and urbanised society.

What, then, are the 'costs' of upward mobility? I have tried to show that whatever their educational and occupational achievements, the upwardly mobile had not become exactly like the stable middle-class men I interviewed in the Mobility Sample or who were interviewed in the larger Work and Leisure Study. As a group their attitudes and patterns of behaviour tended to be somewhere between those of the working-class and the middle-class groups; they are not middle-class, but neither are they any longer working-class. This was still true, though in more subtle ways, of that portion of the upwardly mobile sample which in gross terms had experienced social as well as occupational mobility. Generally, the upwardly mobile showed less concern with the 'proprieties' of status position; they were less interested in status striving; they were less sure where they belonged in the class structure; they had more doubts and misgivings about the 'rightness' of that structure; they were less sure how to measure social class. Relative to stable middle-class men, indeed, to all of the other men in the sample, upwardly mobile men recalled many more aspects of their work and personal histories which had been problematic. Often, they were still interpreting what had happened to them, still evaluating the 'rightness' of various turning points in their lives, still working out their position and role in society. The result was that both the present and future also retained, for these men, elements of unpredictability and uncertainty. In a word, occupa-

tional mobility had wrenched them out of the taken-for-granted world that seemed to be so readily available to those who had not been mobile.

COGNITIVE POVERTY

Are these costs or are these the unanticipated fringe benefits of social and occupational mobility? In the end, of course, this is a value question. Does one believe, as does Hoggart (1957), that there are virtues in working-class life that are lost to those who move upwards, not to be replaced by what are perhaps the equally meritorious values of the middle class? Or, does one point to the truncated and blinkered existence, what Klein (1965) calls the cognitive poverty of class, which in this study as in hers, paradoxically created a bond of commonality between those stable in the middle and working class?[8] Are the upwardly mobile the harbingers of change, those possessed of the 'plasticity' and 'inventiveness' required by a complex society, or are they, instead, the destroyers of tradition, victims of the deracination of industrial society, men unsure of their place in the world?

The experience of this research leads me to the former interpretation. I set out to look at the consequences of social mobility, but I found instead that it is the 'cognitive poverty', resulting from stability in the class structure rather than the 'rootlessness' caused by social mobility which is, perhaps, the greater concern. Whereas the upwardly mobile, generally, were 'their own men', those stable in the middle or working class more often than not emerged as 'prisoners' of family and class, acted upon rather than acting, faithfully reproducing in yet another generation, attitudes and behaviour which in different ways,

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[8]For a more extended discussion of cognitive poverty in groups at various levels in the class structure, see pages 87-96; 367-8; and 535-7 of Klein (1965).

perhaps, have become 'dysfunctional' within an industrial or post-industrial society. As Gans (1962: 249) observes, sub-cultures are essentially responses to the perceived structures of opportunities and social conditions; they provide their members with ways of coping and with world views buttressing and preserving self-respect. But, they may also perpetuate a set of inappropriately narrow attitudes and values after opportunity structures and social conditions have changed or are in the process of changing.

One result is that in the working class, aspirations remain generally low, education is devalued and upward social mobility is discouraged. At the same time, moving up in the world for most working class people was defined strictly in economic rather than in status or occupational dimensions. Most were very aware of the possibly unprecedented rise in general standard of living which everyone had experienced since the War. Restrained as they were by these same sub-cultural norms, it was not apparent that 'needs' had undergone so much of a transformation as to vastly overtake the rises in disposable income most had experienced. In short, there was little evidence of either relative or absolute economic and status deprivation among men stable in the working class (or downwardly mobile).

Such a conclusion is clearly not applicable to stable middle-class men. Indeed, one of the most striking impressions of this study was the extent 'core' members of the middle class evidenced status and financial deprivation. Mostly I was comparing these men with the upwardly mobile, those at the periphery of the middle class. But, interestingly, few seemed aware of the actual possibility of upward mobility into their midst; this, despite the fact that about half of what is objectively defined as middle class is composed of newcomers.[9] Evidently it was not

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[9]At which point it is relevant to ask: which is the middle class:

these men, largely unrecognized as they are, who comprised the compara-
tive reference group. Rather, what I recorded were sentiments recog-
nised at least since Orwell was writing in the '30's: that relative to
their own past and to the working class of today, they feel worse off.
While middle-class incomes have risen, if not faster, then as fast as
those of other classes, the costs of traditional middle-class needs
have in their view risen much more quickly. They feel less able than
their fathers to reject the institutions of the Welfare State--council
housing, public education, often the National Health--yet they also feel
compelled by class standards to attempt to do so. In what must be seen
as an inversion of the Nietzschean concept of 'ressentiment', envy,
anger and hatred instead of being directed towards those at the top
finds its most common target in the dockers and car assembly workers.[10]
They resent but feel unable to copy the 'carefree' and 'easy' life of
the affluent worker unencumbered as he often is by Building Society Loans
and school fees.

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those born there or those who moved up? Throughout, I have treated the
former as the benchmark against which to compare attitudes and be-
haviour of upwardly mobile men. I have done so because middle-class
institutions--including grammar schools--largely reflect and convey the
lifestyle of the 'core' middle-class. As we have seen, those who move
upwards are, in varying degrees, affected by these institutions. They
cannot help but be so since they have no other institutions of their
own; there are no working-men's clubs nor country clubs for the up-
wardly mobile. It is of some interest that upward mobility through a
grammar school route brings attitudes more in line with those of the
'core' middle-class. If, indeed, other mobility channels cease to
exist, as is generally suggested, some of the benefits suggested by
Marshall of different mobility routes would disappear.

[10]Scheler (1972: 45) describes the phenomenon of ressentiment as
'a self-poisoning of the mind...a lasting mental attitude caused by the
systematic repression of certain emotions affects.... Their repression
leads to the constant tendency to indulge in certain kinds of value de-
lusions and corresponding value judgements. The emotions and affects
primarily concerned are revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to
detract and spite'.

Implicit in the preceding paragraphs is a plausible interpretation of why social mobility may not, or may not any longer, involve the kinds of consequences which the dissociative theory has led us to expect. It will be recalled that the disruptive effects of mobility have generally been understood to be more likely to occur where there is a relatively high degree of status rigidity, inadequate preparation for mobility and where the social distance traversed is large. There is the further assumption that the constraints of class are powerful and binding and when once broken by social mobility effectively leave the individual isolated and anxious about his social status and identity. However, it would appear that several of these necessary conditions are in present day British society either missing or less relevant than in the past. While core members of the middle class remain concerned with status and do not readily accept newcomers into their midst, evidence in Chapter 12 suggests those moving upwards do not, by and large, seem very anxious to be accepted by this group; it does not appear to constitute a significant reference group for them. Thus, not only has their mobility not been so intensive as to cause them to come directly into contact with core members of the middle class, but the upwardly mobile also appear to be relatively devoid of interest in status striving.

Furthermore, as Goldthorpe et al (1969: 163) have pointed out, there has been a general shift away from a community-oriented form of social life 'towards recognition of the conjugal family and its fortunes as concerns of overriding importance'. My data would tend to bear out their thesis of increasing 'privatisation' at various levels in the social structure. It may be, then, that those moving upwards are, perhaps, more in tune with the predominant norms concerning sociability and class allegiance than those they were being measured against. The

latter may in their continuing concern with status striving and the pro-prieties of status situation reflect vestiges of a status system no long-er meaningful for the majority of individuals in the society. If this is indeed the case, then, along with an input of new talent into the middle class, upward mobility also provides it with a modicum of vitali-ty and sensitivity to changing circumstances.

These, then, are the conclusions which can be drawn from the study relating specifically to the question of the consequences of upward so-cial mobility in Britain. The present study cannot, of course, claim to be a definitive statement. Its major contribution is to have moved this aspect of the study of upward and downward mobility in Britain from speculation based on earlier findings in other societies to the realm of empirical enquiry.[11] My operational measure of social mobili-ty is occupational mobility and I have confined the analysis to inter-generational movements across the manual/non-manual line and vice versa. Intensive study of mobility upward and downward within the middle class, especially into and out of elite groups is, on the basis of my findings about the middle class,clearly required. It is also important to keep in mind that these data are not timeless. They are historically speci-fic and involve, principally, men who were born in the depression years and during World War II. Men born in the affluent post-war years are likely to have very different aspirations and, at mid-career, to look back upon their mobility experience from a very different perspective than men raised in the '20's and '30's. Thus, not only do conditions change, but so do attitudes and values. But within the confines of these caveats, the most firm conclusion is that it is as much, if not

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[11]There are a number of examples of the former, but see especially Stacey (1969).

more likely to be, non-mobility rather than mobility which is associated with negative consequences. In different ways, perhaps, the upwardly and downwardly mobile appeared to be very satisfied with what had happened to them over their lifetime.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This study was not undertaken with specific policy issues in mind but it may be useful to put the findings of this study in a policy as well as theoretical context. We are, I believe, in a period of re-evaluation of our sociological and political thinking about the relationship of education to social mobility. A decade ago, policy statements would inevitably have included a plea for an expansion in state education and for other changes which were thought likely to provide easier access for those of lower status. Education was held to be key to social mobility for the individual as well as essential in the functioning of an industrialised and bureaucratised society. Both theory and policy were, therefore, embedded in the liberal value that equality of opportunity is an acceptable substitute for equality of condition. Meritocracy, though problematic with respect to certain aspects of social justice was, nevertheless, viewed as congruent with the equally compelling norms of universalism, achievement and efficiency. Education was accorded a central role in industrialisation because of what Collins (1971) calls the technical-functional theory of education. The assumption was that the skill requirements of jobs in industrial society are constantly rising making more and more formal education necessary if these jobs are to be performed adequately.

In recent years this highly positive view of education and its function in society has come under serious attack from a variety of

quarters.[12] First, although there is now conclusive evidence that amount of education is positively related to occupational status, the linkage is much weaker than had been supposed.[13] As I have tried to show in this study, for instance, education does not provide the only mobility route in industrial society. Secondly, the American attempt to promote equality of opportunity has shown that 'schooling up society' makes very little difference to the amount of inequality in society. Rather than an independent factor able to shape and alter the stratification system, education is, therefore, currently debunked as an institution whose main function is to reproduce and legitimize relations of inequality from generation to generation. The potential for educational change to change society, or the rate of social mobility for that matter, would appear, then, to be much more limited than was previously supposed.[14]

Furthermore, the functional significance of education has also been under attack. Rather than a necessary concomitant of industrialisation, the more pessimistic conclusion is that education is, in main, counter-productive and wastes social resources. Collins (1971) presents a convincing argument that educational expansion has preceded much more rapidly than the technical or skill requirements of industrial society and that education contributes little to individual productivity; vocational skills are learned primarily on the job not in school. The requisite credentials for entry into occupations rise not because of

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[12]The literature is vast and growing. With particular reference to this discussion, however, see: Collins (1971); Gintis (1971 and 1972); Karabel (1972); Illich (1971).

[13]American studies have indicated that the correlation between schooling and occupational prestige is about r = .50. While far from a modest relationship, it does mean that only about one-quarter of the variance in occupational achievement is explained by education. (See: Blau and Duncan, 1967; Sewall et al, 1969).

[14]For example, see Chapter 2 in which I showed that rates of social mobility had not changed despite educational reform.

technological change but because of the ability of some occupational groups to control entry.[15]   In sum, education is increasingly viewed as a power resource, a strategic device to maintain and legitimize class barriers and in a process akin to constant rounds of wage settlements, education becomes subject to inflation--given levels of education 'buy' ever decreasing amounts of occupational status and income.

IMPLICATIONS FOR BRITAIN

In Britain, unlike the United States, education has not so far been oversold nor has it, as yet, a monopoly on access to opportunity. It has been suggested that in the United States the concern moved from quantity of education to equality of opportunity and is now beginning to be directed to the problem of the quality of the education. Historically in Britain the third of these concerns has received a considerable amount of attention. While the provision of literacy was met much earlier on, there has been considerable resistance to the substitution of quality by quantity. For reasons suggested above, the second of these problems is not likely solvable by the educational system[16] and could, for the time being, be more fruitfully ignored. What has up until recently looked like a lack of progress in educational expansion and reform might be transposed into a positive program designed to make more rational use of social resources. Thus, while a total process of deschooling is probably sociologically impossible, the further creation of an artificial credential system is, by the same token, not necessarily inevitable.[17]

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[15]See Gintis (1972) for further corroboration of these somewhat surprising findings. His finds that there is virtually no correlation between occupation and cognitive ability. For an earlier British view along these lines, see Cotgrove (1962).

[16]For instance, progressive raising of the school leaving age is not likely to have much effect on the second of these concerns.

[17]There are, of course, strong pressures to make the only valuable

The alternative may be to direct greater attention to improving and strengthening existing educational structures rather than extending schooling into even more areas of social life. In this respect, the findings of this study suggest a number of recommendations which as well as being compatible with individual needs would also be beneficial at the societal level in both providing people with the necessary skills while not at the same time squandering resources.

First, a concerted effort should be made to retain apprenticeship programs and to extend and strengthen them wherever possible. This view represents, of course, a reversal in thinking during the 1960's which resulted in the 1964 Industrial Training Act. This act effectively re-presented a new initiative in that it shifted the ultimate responsibility for training from employers to the state.[18] But, the message which seems to emerge most clearly from recent thinking on education and mo-bility in the United States is that while the State may have taken over this function it has done so inefficiently and ineffectively. Despite the proliferation of degree and diploma programmes, transmission of actual skills apparently still occurs mainly in the work place. These

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skills those which are the result of formal education. As I have shown in this study, if one wants to be upwardly mobile or to maintain a mid-dle-class status then it pays to go to a grammar school. At the indi-vidual level the race for more credentials makes rational sense as a reasonable defence in the more general battle for status. But as in the vicious circle of wages and prices, what is individually rational may be, seen as irrational when applied to the group or societal level. For ex-ample, it is simplistic to suppose that men in my sample who found their mobility limited because of their lack of academic credentials would have fared better had there been greater educational opportunities or if the private school system had been eliminated. More likely is that other ascriptive criteria, or even more academic credentials, would have been imposed as means to exclude them from entry into elite status groups.

[18]Carter (1966: 179). This study presents an especially good analysis of industrial training as it was in the mid-1960's. My inter-views suggest that the shortcomings and problems Carter describes have if anything worsened.

Programs, no matter how often they are revised are simply not able to keep in touch with what is happening in industry and remain relevant to the needs and asperations of young people.

At the same time, the experience of some of my informants provides impressive proof of the worth of retaining the link between further education and work. This was especially so for men employed in larger organisations with clearly defined hierarchies. The G.P.O. was, in this regard, a model organisation with its provision of a clear set of rewards and promotions for each level of certification achieved. For some, of course, an apprenticeship amounted as Carter (1966: 183) puts it, 'to no more than "standing next to Nelly"--that is, standing alongside a skilled man, watching what he does and taking advantage of any tips that he may give'. For others in my sample, especially those in small firms, an apprenticeship seemed to mean little more than that they were relative to friends in factories providing cheap labour. It is not surprising, therefore, that a sizeable proportion of my respondents had abandoned their so-called apprenticeship in favour of more highly paid semi-skilled and unskilled jobs.

Thus, my objection with respect to industrial training is not that the state ought to become less involved but that there are more productive ways it might act than simply providing more schooling. With respect to improving social mobility its efforts may more usefully be directed toward providing financial encouragement to firms and individuals engaged in apprenticeship programs. For young school leavers who take up apprenticeships this might imply subsidies designed to bring their income up to levels competitive with semi-skilled and unskilled work. Introduction of a voucher system by which those who did not enter an apprenticeship on leaving school might do so later without substan-

tial loss of income would perhaps be of benefit to men who like many of my informants regretted not having taken up a trade. The state might, at the same time, provide the necessary structures and incentives for smaller firms unable or unwilling to provide their own apprenticeship program.[19] What it need not do is mindlessly emulate the American model of a totally 'schooled-up' society by further expansion of the educational establishment.

Pressure to do so, of course, comes in part from the growing structural problem of how to fit young people into the wider society; the caretaker function of post-secondary education cannot be entirely ignored. But to refer again to the experience of the United States, it is also apparent that the disappearance of apprenticeship programs must be held partially accountable for the existence of the problem in the first place.[20]

The American experience makes it doubtful that locking up young people--keeping them off the streets in the popular jargon--and providing them with what turns out to be largely a meaningless education is the solution to the problem. While the student role is in some respects useful in providing a place for young people in society, it is also apparent that within a class society educational institutions are necessarily also stratified so that it is erroneous to speak of a single student body. (Karabel, 1973). As Gintis (1972: 57) notes, 'the social relations of education produce and reinforce those values, attitudes and affective capacities which allow individuals to more smoothly into

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[19]In some instances this might more effectively be carried out by local authorities contracting out to private firms some of the training now carried out by colleges of further education and other types of local colleges. (For a discussion of 'performance contracting', see: Corwin (1973).

[20]This is an important theme in most of Paul Goodman's writing on education.

an alienated and class-stratified society'. Like community colleges in
the United States, colleges of further education if they were to become
obligatory would function not only 'to keep adolescent off the street'
but also as Illich (1971: 401) puts it, 'to school them down to size'
--make them more accepting of their probably mediocre position in the
class structure. If this is indeed the latent functions of further edu-
cation it could, at least be made manifest thus opening the way for a
curriculum which is more 'entertaining' than that which presently leads
to City and Guild and National Certificates.

My comments have been directed mainly at further education because
this aspect of education appears to be sufficiently undeveloped that
depending on the policy developed, it could be moved in a different
direction. Change is not completely blocked by vested educational in-
terests. With respect to other educational routes the structures ap-
pear more solidified and resistant to change. With respect to grammar
school education, there is little which emerges from my research which
has not already been said better and more thoroughly by Jackson and
Marsden (1962) in their admirable study of grammar school education and
social mobility. For reasons suggested in the preceding discussion of
cognitive poverty, it would seem that they are correct in feeling it
desirable to break the stranglehold the middle class has upon grammar
school training. As they suggest, grammar schools are not very effective
in transmitting adequately a middle-class culture to upwardly mobile
working-class students. But even if this function of status training
was performed adequately, it is questionable whether complete accultura-
tion into a middle class perspective is any longer a service to either
the individual or society. Transmission of what Jackson and Marsden
refer to as 'one central culture' might, therefore, better be performed

by a more extensive provision of sixth forms within the secondary modern system. Certainly, this had benefitted some of my informants enabling them to obtain Ordinary and Advanced level qualifications without at the same time undergoing the usual stress of breaking with family and peers or subjecting them to a marginal and rudderless social existence as seems inevitable for those who win a place in a grammar school. There remains, of course, the distinct danger that academic credentials earned in this way may not be as highly valued as those obtained in the traditional manner; relative first to public school and then to a state grammar school, such credentials may be treated as an inferior currency in the market place. Nevertheless, extension of this policy may be an effective compromise in providing an additional occupational mobility route without, at the same time, creating the sense of status anxiety and status ambivalence normally the lot of the 'scholarship boy'. As we have seen, the concern that people have about objective discrepancies in status versus economic position have, perhaps, been exaggerated by sociologists; many people are satisfied to improve only economically.

In conclusion, this study when set into the context of theory, research and ideology bolsters the general policy advocated by T. H. Marshall in the early years of the Welfare State: that as long as we are burdened with a class society, the aim should be to keep open as many mobility channels as is possible. The most just and rational policy is one which insures that no single criterion nor social institution becomes the sole legitimate means of access to various positions in the social hierarchy. To lose sight of that goal is also to lose sight of the fact that the principal virtue of an open society is its tolerance for and acceptance of a large degree of variability and uncertainty in its selection processes.

APPENDIX 1

THE DATA COLLECTION PROCESS

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

While this study was in many ways exploratory, the kinds of ques-
tions I chose to ask were, for the most part, guided by a tentative al-
legiance to the non-integration hypothesis described in Chapter 6.
Thus, I suggested that the mobile individual is likely to have come from
a background characterized by some manifestations of marginality or lack
of integration into his objective class membership group. Further, I
argued that this pattern of marginal behaviour might carry over into
adult life and in part account for the kinds of variances which have
been observed in previous research. As well, some specific hypotheses
having little or nothing to do with this general hypothesis were includ-
ed. These, pertaining to both determinants and consequences of social
mobility, come from existing research (mainly American) and are ones
about which there are contradictory findings or which have not been sys-
tematically investigated in Britain.

It should be noted, also, that when, below, social mobility is
treated as an independent variable, I had in mind that various mobili-
ty measures—intergenerational occupational mobility, career mobility
and 'subjective' mobility—would be related to the data collected. How,
and to what extent, these would differ was unclear. There is, there-
fore, a _null_ hypothesis, unstated below, to the effect that there are
no differences between various mobility measures in the observed pat-
terns of behaviour.[1] Finally, although most of these hypotheses imply

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[1]Very little of this is reported in preceding chapters because in
analysing the data, I could find between various measures of mobility
little difference in predictive power.

direction, the evidence was not always so clear as this suggests. In some instances the question is at this stage only whether there are any differences between the mobile and the non-mobile, upward mobility and downward mobility and so on. The main and explicit hypotheses which prompted me to ask the questions I did are, then, as follows.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The first set of working hypotheses are concerned with the non-integration theory outlined in Chapter 6:

(1) Sons of upwardly mobile fathers are most likely to be downwardly mobile than sons of stationary high status fathers. Sons of downwardly mobile fathers are more likely to be upwardly mobile than sons of stationary low status fathers.

(2) Geographical mobility of the parental family will be positively associated with social mobility.

(3) Mobiles are more likely than non-mobiles to report they experienced social isolation while growing up.

(4) Fathers of mobile sons are more likely to have felt isolated and report fewer social contacts while the respondent was growing up than non-mobiles.

(5) Mobiles are more likely to have changed peer or friendship groups during adolescence than non-mobiles.

(6) Extreme mobiles are more likely than either stationaries or low mobiles to report an unhappy childhood.

(7) Fathers' job stability will be negatively associated with downward mobility of respondents.

(8) Parental family disorganization will be positively associated with downward mobility of the respondents.

Some other hypotheses, related mainly to family structure, which have emerged from the review of the literature were:

(9) More mobiles than non-mobiles will have had extra-familial support and guidance in the choice of first job.

(10) Only children and children in extreme sibling positions are more likely to be upwardly mobile than children in middle sibling positions.

(11) Children from small families are more likely to be upwardly mobile than children from large families.

(12) Respondents with upwardly mobile older brothers are more likely to be mobile than those with non-mobile older brothers.

(13) Parents of upwardly mobile respondents will have been more 'ambitious and encouraging' than parents of stationary and downwardly mobile respondents.

(14) Strong encouragement from the respondent's mother will be posiitvely associated with upward mobility.

(15) Upward mobiles will tend to marry later than non-mobiles and downward mobiles.

(16) Upward mobiles begin families later than stationaries or downward mobiles.

(17) Failure to achieve the educational level 'required' to maintain the occupational level of respondents' father will be positively related to downward mobility.

(18) Poor health will be positively associated with downward mobility of respondents.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

Here there was more previous research about the consequences for social integration and acculturation into attitudes and behavioural patterns of the destination class. At the same time, there is little agreement about the direction of relationships between patterns of mobility and these variables. While in the text I have attempted to postulate the direction of these relationships, I cast them here in the null-form.

(1) There is no difference between the upwardly mobile and stable non-manual in numbers of relatives seen in the previous week.

(2) There is no difference between the downwardly mobile and stable manual in numbers of relatives seen in the previous week.

(3) There is no difference between the upwardly mobile and stable non-manual in numbers of friends seen in the previous week.

(4) There is no difference between the downwardly mobile and stable manual in numbers of friends seen in the previous week.

(5) There is no difference between the upwardly mobile and the stable non-manual in level of participation in activities and secondary organizations.

(6) There is no difference between the downwardly mobile and the stable manual in level of participation in activities and secondary organizations.

(7) There is no difference between upwardly mobile and stable non-manual in level of prejudiced attitudes.

(8) There is no difference between downwardly mobile and stable manual in level of prejudiced attitudes.

(9) There is no difference between upwardly mobile and stable non-manual in level of anomia.

(10) There is no difference between downwardly mobile and stable manual in level of anomia.

(11) There will be no difference between upwardly mobile and stable non-manual in political party preference.

(12) There will be no difference between downwardly mobile and stable manual in political party preference.

(13) For each of these it was also hypothesized that there would be no difference between high upward and low upward mobiles; between high downward and low downward mobiles; between the upwardly mobile through an educational route and the upwardly mobile through a non-educational route.[2]

THE SAMPLE

One difficulty in the way of an intensive analysis of individual social mobility is what type of sieve will best sort the mobile from the non-mobile. Most mobility studies are by-products of other sociological concerns, or are carried out alongside a number of interests all competing for space on the questionnaire. The result is that the usual random or stratified random sampling frame suffers from 'asking the many too many and the few too few questions' (Svalastoga, 1956: 150). This will be true whenever mobility is defined as movement upward or downward between manual and non-manual categories since only about 25 to 30 percent of the male population have in fact been mobile. Thus, a large number of the socially mobile will not be included. Yet,

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[2]The concepts used in these hypotheses are discussed in Chapters 9-11.

the way around this problem, disproportional stratified sampling, requires some prior identification of the socially mobile and non-mobile. It means, in practice, re-interviewing a set of sub-samples having different sampling fractions so that the upwardly and downwardly mobile have, compared to the non-mobile, a greater chance for inclusion than their relative proportions would dictate.[3] In this study there are two sets of data under consideration called, respectively, the Work and Leisure Study and the Mobility Sample. The respondents in both are the same, the difference is when they were interviewed and what data were collected.

THE WORK AND LEISURE STUDY

In the spring and summer of 1970, the Institute of Community Studies interviewed 1,928 people aged 17 and over in the London Metropolitan Region. This is an area extending roughly from Reading in the West to Southend-on-Sea in the East; from Stevenage in the North to within five miles of Brighton in the South. All of Greater London and a substantial proportion of what can in somewhat vague terms be called the commuter region are encompassed within these boundaries. According to the 1971 census, slightly over one-quarter (26.1%) of the population of England and Wales live within this area.[4]

Using a two-stage random sample, the survey investigated various aspects of family life, work and leisure.[5] Although social mobility

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[3] Disproportional stratified sampling is discussed in Blalock (1960: 401-402).

[4] By way of contrast, the South-East Region contains some 35 percent of the total population of England and Wales (Census, 1971: Preliminary Report).

[5] A more detailed description of how the sample was drawn is given in Young and Willmott (1973).

was not an important interest of the study, resondents were questioned in some detail about their present occupations and in somewhat less detail about those of their fathers.[6] All occupational data were coded using a modification of the Registrar-General's five-fold social class scheme. Class III--skilled manual and routine grades of non-manual-- was split into manual and non-manual. Throughout, Class III was treated as consisting of two classes, yielding a six-fold classificatory scheme which we refer to using arabic numerals. It was, therefore, possible to determine who had been intergenerationally mobile and non-mobile as measured in terms of occupational movement.

The final sample of names and addresses came, in all cases from the most recent voting lists for each ward. Interviewers were, therefore, required to contact the specific person chosen, not just anyone in the house. Without 'replacement', 2,644 of the original 3,000 names and addresses were defined as eligible for interviewing. These, in turn, yielded 1,928 completed interviews (934 men and 994 women), a response rate of 73 percent. Comparison with the sample census, 1966, suggests that the Work and Leisure sample under-represented young people and single people and unskilled workers. As well, 40 male respondents had, for my particular purposes, to be excluded because of inadequate information (mainly on fathers' occupations). Ten male full-time students were also excluded. These latter exclusions were fairly evenly distributed over the five occupational classes and do not appear to represent any further departure from the above estimates of representatives. In terms of social mobility, the main effect of these biases, possibly, is to underestimate downward mobility. There were, in total, then, 884

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[6]The precise wording was for respondents: 'What is your occupation?'; or in the case of retired and unemployed people, 'What was your (main) occupation?'; for fathers: 'What is or was your father's (main) occupation?'.

men for whom complete occupational data on themselves and their fathers were available.

MOBILITY SUB-SAMPLE

As I was to do all the interviewing, the Mobility Sub-sample had to be one that was manageable, given the time, money, and above all, energy I had available. Secondly, whatever number I decided upon would (hopefully) be doubled by the decision to make the study a two genera- tion one. That is, I hoped to interview the fathers of the respondents wherever possible, as well. Thus, on the one hand the effective sample which I had to draw from was drastically reduced by the elimination of those respondents, whose fathers were no longer living. But, on the other, the number of people who I could hope to interview had to take into account the fact that each completed interview would also generate another potential one.

The final sampling strategy was a compromise between the limita- tions imposed by working as a lone researcher, the desire to catch the extremes of mobility, and the obviously important factor of having a sufficiently large sample that some basic cross tabulations could be carried out and differences could be generalized. Taking into account the two generation aspect of the study, it seemed likely on the basis of a small pilot study that I could expect to interview about 120 re- spondents who would, in turn, generate about 80 fathers; 200 interviews in all.

The next step was to classify the respondents in the Work and Lei- sure Study into upward and downward mobility, short distance and long distance mobility and non-mobility. Social mobility was defined in the conventional manner as intergenerational movement upward or downward across the manual-non-manual line and all other patterns as non-mobili-

ty. Using the six classes of the modified Registrar-General's Classifi-

cation, mobility was then conceived as forming four patterns, depending

on direction and distance--the number of social classes-traversed.

These were:

(1) High upward: Intergenerational movement 3 to 5 classes from manual
to non-manual.

(2) Low upward: Intergenerational movement 1 or 2 classes from manual
to non-manual.

(3) High downward: Intergenerational movement 3 to 5 classes from non-
manual to manual.

(4) Low downward: intergenerational movement 1 or 2 classes from non-
manual to manual.

For comparison purposes, it was also necessary to include some of the

non-mobile. Non-mobility was, therefore, conceived as:

(5) Stable manual: Manual respondents whose fathers were also in manu-
al occupations.

(6) Stable non-manual: Non-manual respondents whose fathers were also
in non-manual occupations.

These two latter categories therefore contained as well as stable people,

men who were 1 or 2 categories upward or downward from their fathers.

Column (1) and (2) of Table A.1 presents the data, so classified,

from the total Work and Leisure Study and for that portion with fathers

living. The measure of mobility used was the number of occupational

categories between the respondent's present job and his father's last

or main job.

TABLE A.1

SUMMARY OF MOBILITY DATA FOR THE WORK AND LEISURE STUDY &

THE MOBILITY SAMPLE

Mobility	(1) Total	(2) Total Fathers Living	(3) Total Chosen in Mobility Sample	(4) Fathers Inter- viewed	(5) Interviews Completed*
High Upward	56	18	40	8	27
Low Upward	122	50	25	3	17
High Downward	24	11	17	6	9
Low Downward	76	27	23	7	13
Stable Non-manual	182	84	25	11	24
Stable Manual	424	142	25	5	27
Total	884	332	155	40	117

*Based on the final coding of fathers' and sons' occupations; there were some errors and changes from the initial coding in the Work and Leisure Study.

Choosing of the actual people, was, except for the High Upward category, reasonably straightforward. The High Upward category was made up as follows: all of the male respondents who had been four or five categories upwardly mobile were selected. As well, all of those who had been upwardly mobile 3 categories and whose fathers were living were included. An additional 10 were selected, randomly, from those whose fathers were not living.[7] The total respondents in the High Up- ward category were 40. All of the High Downward respondents were chosen, whether their fathers were living or not. Total = 17. The Low Down- ward category consists of all respondents in that category with fathers living at the time of the interview. Total = 23. Finally, I chose at random 25 respondents with fathers living, from the Low Upward, Stable

[7] All eligible respondents in each category were numbered and then selected using a table of random numbers.

Non-manual and Stable Manual categories. Total ■ 75. These figures
are summarized in Column (3) of Table A.1.

As I indicated in Chapter 3, the Mobility Sample is on the whole
significantly wealthier and younger than the Work and Leisure Study
sample. This is largely because of the disproportional sampling of the
upwardly mobile who are, of course, in white-collar occupations. The
effect on the class composition of the Mobility Sample compared to the
Work and Leisure Study of this sampling method is shown in Table A.2.
As the last two rows suggest, the Mobility Sample overrepresents non-
manual and underrepresents the manual by about 20 percent. This is an
unavoidable result of the attempt to include more of the socially mobile
than is usually the case.

TABLE A.2

CLASS COMPOSITION OF THE MOBILITY SUB-SAMPLE AND THE WORK AND LEISURE STUDY SAMPLE

Respondents' Present Social Class	Work and Leisure Study		Mobility Sub-Sample		
	Percent	Number of Respondents	Percent	Number of Respondents	Differences*
1	6	56	16	19	-10
2	21	182	31	36	-10
3	14	122	14	16	0
4	38	339	24	28	-14
5	16	137	13	15	-3
6	5	48	3	3	-2
Total N-M	41	360	61	71	-20
Total Manual	59	524	39	46	-20
Total	100%	884	100%	117	

* Differences do not cancel due to rounding.

INTERVIEWING

All of the advantages of the area sampling used in the Work and

Leisure Study washed out in the second round of interviewing. Whereas it was possible the first time round to employ interviewers living in or close to the selected areas, my respondents were dotted thinly over the whole of the London Metropolitan Region. While I attempted to create some sort of systematic coverage of areas it usually occurred that there was one 'telephoneless' individual left in (say) Tunbridge Wells when I was directing most of my time to, perhaps, Reading. As a result, it was not unusual to drive for two hours or more in the hope of making an _appointment_, seldom an interview, finding no one at home, and driving two more hours home again. As well, it was often the case that one night's work would result in a week's work of appointments, leaving no time over to make more for the week following. Interviewing tended therefore to go in spurts, with a busy week or 10 days punctuated by several days of making new appointments.

Before contacting each person, he received a letter reminding him of the previous interview and explaining in general terms the purpose of the second interview. A few days later I contacted him by telephone, or more usually in person. In most cases, it was preferable to conduct the interview another evening when the respondent was ready. Some contacted me; in two instances, to refuse; but a number also wanted to arrange an appointment or to tell me they would be away during certain times, on business or holiday. To complete 117 interviews, plus another 40 with fathers, took the greater part of eleven months from January, 1971 to December, 1971, and meant working nearly every week night and many Saturdays during that period. I also covered the London Region many times over, driving more than 10,000 miles in the pursuit of interviews.

The interviews themselves, took from about an hour to in some cases

several hours. Most were in people's homes or gardens with endless cups

of tea and coffee, sherry, beer, and in one memorable instance, 'five

star' cognac. Two interviews were conducted in offices, one in a club

in Picadilly, the interviewee arriving breathless from a 100-mile-an-

hour run; from Birmingham. Another, with a service station owner, could

only be done in the intervals between filling cars with petrol. Most

often I saw the man alone, but wives, sometimes merely curious, some-

times keen to be interviewed themselves and sometimes resentful of the

'male chauvinism' implied by my solely male study, listened in. In a

rare few, the whole family and the television were present, there seem-

ing to be only one room available or warm enough, or it may not have

occurred to the respondent that privacy is helpful.

All interviews were taped and later transcribed on to the inter-

view schedule. While an onerous and boring task, I found the tape re-

corder aided immensely in allowing the interview to be a semi-conversa-

tion rather than an interrogation. I asked everyone if they minded me

taping the interview, and in no instance did anyone refuse. Nor did it

seem to create much sense of discernible awkwardness. At the same time,

few forgot its presence either. This was often illustrated by my re-

spondents warning people entering the room that they were being taped.

But on the whole, the moments of awkwardness were vastly over-balanced

by the ease it allowed in the interview, the time saved where factual

questions were answered as part of another and, most of all, in giving

me freedom to 'probe' or follow-up interesting digressions.

LOSSES

Although I drew 155 names, I was only able to obtain complete in-

terviews with 117 men. The success rate was, therefore, 75.5 percent--

not much different than that obtained in the first round of interview-

ing. Reasons for the losses were many as Table A.3 shows:

TABLE A.3

REASONS FOR FAILURE IN MOBILITY SUB-SAMPLE

	Percentage of Total	Number
Refusal	10.3%	16
No Contact	7.7%	12
Deceased	.6%	1
Moved	5.8%	9
Total		38

From one viewpoint the number of refusals was surprising, since all of respondents had been interviewed previously and had indicated that they would be willing to undergo a second interview. They had, however, already been through a fairly taxing interview of about one hour in length and many had, as well, been asked to keep a diary listing their activities for one week. The pattern and size of the failure rate turned out about the same as if I had called 'cold' on a random selection of people taken directly from voting lists. The difference, then, was mostly in the kind of reception I received and the ease with which it was possible to explain why I was calling. In terms of 'completed' interviews, however, there appears to be little advantage in using a sample already interviewed once.

One difference was that I knew a considerable amount about those who refused a second interview. As there is a good deal of speculation about the characteristics of those who refuse interviews, I attempted to link up some basic variables, such as class, mobility pattern, age and education. However, I was unable to find any systematic relationship between these variables and success rate. Presumably, failures are, as is generally hoped, randomly distributed in the population.

THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE[8]

As I have indicated, this study was in large part an exploratory one. Thus, as well as wanting to 'try out' some American findings on British data, I wanted, to use Wilensky's (1966: 31) phrase, information about 'where a man has been, where he is now and where he expects to go'. Social mobility is a rich concept involving many more aspects than we are usually able or willing to measure and I hoped by a second interview to gain some insights and impressions not usually possible from survey data. I had, from the first interview, an objective measure of intergenerational mobility along with considerable data about income, housing, 'subjective class', job satisfaction, participation, leisure habits and extent and nature of interpersonal relationships. The second interview supplemented this with information about the individual's education and work-life history, his family background and that of his wife, his aspirations and expectations (for himself and his children) and a personal evaluation of his mobility achievement within the context of his view of social structure. In addition, I also attempted to tap attitudes about politics, immigration, powerlessness and anomia.

Because resources for extensive piloting were not available, a number of questions were either taken directly from other studies or were closely modelled on them. In particular, I used verbatim the Srole anomia scale (Srole, 1956) and with some minor modifications, the measure of prejudice devised by Rose et al (1968). Questions about occupations, though not precisely the same, were modelled to a considerable extent on those used by Wilensky (1966). The same is true of the scale of ambition (17) which is a combination of one devised by Reissman (1953)

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[8] The complete schedule is presented in Appendix 2.

and revised by Wilensky (1966).

The idea of asking each respondent to grade a list of occupations proved a particularly effective way of achieving several goals. Firstly, it served as a talking point around which to base a number of questions about occupational prestige and class structure. Secondly, after grading the occupations in terms of social standing, I asked everyone where their own occupation would go and where they would, similarly, put their father's occupation. In this way I obtained a measure of intergenerational mobility which was both subjective and which was also within the context of the individual's conception of the occupational structure. This method, while somewhat round-about, worked extremely well. In main, people made assessments which sometimes put them above, sometimes below and sometimes equal with their fathers. While most put together an 'orthodox' grading, using a variety of criteria, two could not, after much thought, grade them at all, and quite a number thought in terms of only two classes.[9]

Questions about 'moving up in the world', near the end of the interview, were similarly designed to tap people's evaluation and definition of social mobility. If class was not mentioned, as it seldom was, I then asked whether in the respondent's opinion it is possible for an individual to change social class and if so whether he felt he had done so.[10] This set of questions seemed to have worked very well. The range of responses they elicited suggests there was little or no carryover from the earlier discussion of occupational prestige and mobility.

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[9] Only a few aspects of this part of the interview are reported in this study.

[10] This question was incorrectly omitted from the interview schedule. It was, however, asked systematically of everyone.

One of the unresolved problems in measuring social mobility is at
what point to record the fathers' and sons' occupations. The measure
I had, from the Work and Leisure Study was the son's present job and the
father's last or main job. I supplemented this by two more measures of
occupational mobility: (1) father's job when the son was age 16 and
(2) father's job when he was the same age as the respondent was at the
time of the interview, what is usually referred to as an age-specific
measure. The mobility measure obtained from the Work and Leisure study
can be considered as the conventional measure of intergenerational mo-
bility, the second as a measure of 'pure' intergenerational mobility
and the age-specific measure as the one most appropriate for questions
about the openness and fluidity of the class structure and the nature
of the opportunity structure. An attempt was also made, while construct-
ing the family tree, to obtain information on grandfathers' occupations
as well. Unfortunately, as indicated in Chapter 7, this was extremely
hard to do; a majority of respondents were unable to recall what their
grandfather (on either side) had done for a living.

TWO GENERATION STUDY

Lipset and Bendix (1959: 183) suggest that what we require is a
complete career history of both generations. Since this is clearly im-
possible, they argue that the best approximation is to interview the
living fathers of all sons in a sample. As well as the more complete
picture of the patterns of mobility over three generations, such a study
could also provide valuable information about family structure, family
'climate' and parental attitudes and perceptions of the son's mobility--
data which is difficult to obtain from a single generation perspective.

Information collected in the Work and Leisure Study made it possible
to determine who had fathers living. This suggested that a two genera-

tions study would be feasible. During the interview, I therefore asked everyone for permission to contact their father as well. The purpose of this was explained in some detail and it was stressed that the interview would be much shorter than the one just completed. Despite a high degree of success in the pilot stage, the results from the main study were disappointing. Where I had hoped to obtain some 80-100 completed interviews, I was in the end able to see only 40 fathers. There are a variety of reasons for the size of the failure rate, but by far the largest single source of 'fall-out' was through the direct refusal by sons to give me permission to visit their fathers. Refusals did not simply reflect suspicion, or fear of loss of privacy but in many cases, fairly objective reasons (illness, senility, deafness and so on). A number, however, seemed to feel their father would refuse because he was suspicious or 'ornery'. In fact, many who did give me permission, prefaced it with some remark of this kind. At the same time, leaving aside those I was unable to contact, I had only one refusal from a father, and never in any instance received the kind of hostility I was told to anticipate.

The two generations were, fortunately, treated as separate studies; I did not depend on fathers for information, instead viewing them as an additional source of data, and a possible check on reliability of data provided by the sons. In view of the disappointing results of this attempt, the results of the two-generation study are not reported in detail in any of the preceding chapters. The only conclusion which draws upon the interviews with fathers pertains to the remarkable similarity between one pattern of upward mobility and fathers of the downwardly mobile men. I used data from the fathers' interviews mainly as illustrative material, or to supplement inadequate responses from sons about family history.

APPENDIX 2

THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Note: Before visiting each respondent I recorded from the
Work and Leisure Study about 25 basic background var-
iables. Details of the Work and Leisure Study Ques-
tionnaire can be found in Young and Willmott (1973:
Appendix 2). Not all questions are discussed in
this thesis.

1. First of all, about how many jobs would you have had in your life-time, that's including your present one?

2. (IF MORE THAN ONE) Could we just go through your various jobs starting with your first one. What was your first job?

3. About how long did you work at that very same job? Kind of firm? When was that?

4. What made you decide to leave it? Did you get a rise in pay at your next job?

5. What did you do next? (IF NOT CLEAR) Was that the same kind of work or different?

6. (IF FOUR OR MORE JOBS) You've had a number of different jobs. On the whole would you say you planned each change or did it just happen, or what?
Planned   1
Unplanned/Unexpected   2
Other   3
Comments:

7. (IF NOT PLANNED) Is there any way in which you feel this has affec- ted your life?

8. (TO ALL) Now some questions about your first job. How old were you when you started working?

9. Was that a training job, or an apprentice- ship or anything like that?
No   1
Apprenticeship   2
Articling   3
On Job Training   4
Other   5

10. How did you come to choose that particular job?
Probe: Well, for in- stance, did someone suggest it to you?
Probe used   1
Probe not used   2

11. Was this the kind of work you had hoped to do?
Yes   1
No   2
DK   9

12. (IF NO) What kind of work had you wanted to do?
    Probe: What happened that you weren't able to do what you wanted?

13. If you had the chance to start your working life over again, would you choose the same kind of work or different?
    Same work   1
    Different   2
    DK/NA   9

14. (IF DIFFERENT) What would you choose instead?

15. Taking into account all the jobs you've had or will have, what would be the best job you expect to have in your lifetime?
    Present Job   1
    Past Job (specify)   2
    Future Job   3
    DK/NA   9

    (IF FUTURE) About how long do you think it will be before you get that job?
    Don't Know   9

16. (IF NOT SELF EMPLOYED) If a higher position came open where you're working now, would you be interested in taking the job if it were offered to you?
    Yes   1
    No   2
    DK/NA   9

    (IF NO) Why do you say that?

    **See P. 629 for list of items.

17. Talking in general now, suppose you were offered a chance to make a really big advance in a job or occupation but not necessarily where you're working now. Which of these would you be willing to do, which ones would you be unwilling to do in order to get such a job?**

	Willing	Not Sure	Unwilling
1.	1	2	3
2.	1	2	3
3.	1	2	3
4.	1	2	3
5.	1	2	3
6.	1	2	3
7.	1	2	3
8.	1	2	3
9.	1	2	3
10.	1	2	3

18. (IF WILLING ON 4+) What sort of job would it have to be for you to make these kinds of sacrifices?

19. (IF MANUAL WORKER) Is there a union where you work? Are you a member?
    Yes   1
    No   2
    Member   1
    Not a member   2

19b. (IF A MEMBER) Would you consider yourself an active member of the union or not?
    Active   1
    Not Active   2
    Other   3

19c. Do you attend meetings regularly, occasionally, hardly at all, or what?
    Regularly   1
    Occasionally   2
    Hardly at all   3
    Never   4

19d. If workers in another industry or another part of the country were on strike do you feel your union should strike in sympathy if it would help those workers to get their demands?

20. Family Tree

A. Ego's Father
   -present/last job
   -job at same age as Ego
   -job when Ego was 16

B. Brothers
   -birth order
   -occupation

C. Sisters
   -birth order
   -occupation/husband's occupation

D. Wife
   -occupation

E. Wife's Father
   -occupation

F. Sons in Paid Work

   Ego = _____

21. What social class would you say your father belonged to most of his life? Would it be:
   Middle class   1
   Working class   2
   Other (specify)   3
   DK/NA   9

22. And your mother, would she be:
   Middle class   1
   Working class   2
   Other (specify)   3
   DK/NA   9

23. Going further back, what kind of work did your father's father, that is your grandfather, do most of his life?

24. And your mother's father, that is your grandfather, what kind of work did he do most of his life?

List of Occupations

Barman
Bricklayer
Business Manager (10-100 employees)
Carpenter
Chartered Accountant
Chef (hotel)
Coal Miner
Commercial Traveller
Company Director
Civil Servant (executive grade)
Docker
Doctor (medical)
Farm Worker
Farmer (over 100 acres)
Fitter (electrical engineer)
Insurance Agent
Jobbing Master Builder
Lorry Driver
Minister (nonconformist)
Newsagent & Tobacconist (one-man)
News Reporter
Policeman
Primary School Teacher
Railway Porter
Road Sweeper
Routine Clerk
Shop Assistant (drapery store)
Solicitor
Tractor Driver (agricultural)
Works Manager (industrial)

25. We are interested in
social class.
Occupation is one of
the things that deter-
mines a person's social
class.
We would like to know
in what order you would
grade the occupations on
this list--IN TERMS OF
THEIR SOCIAL STANDING.
What we want to know is
the order in which you
feel people in general
would grade these occu-
pations AS TO THEIR
SOCIAL STANDING. . . .
NOT how you yourself
feel about them. I'll
ask you about that in a
minute.
It will help if you be-
gin by thinking in
terms of five main soc-
ial classes--A, B, C,
D & E. A is the high-
est, E is the lowest.
Just go through the
list and put a tick
where you think most
people would put that
occupation.
You can put as many or
as few under each
letter. You don't have
to use all the five
classes.

26. Why do you think that
people put these occu-
pations in that order?
I mean, what is it that
puts one occupation
above another?

27. Is it right do you think
that people you've put
at the top should get
more pay than people
you've put at the
bottom?
   Yes   1
   No   2
   DK/NA   9
   Probe:

28. If I'd asked you to
grade these occupa-
tions the way you
personally see them,
would you grade them
differently than
you've just done?
   Differently   1
   Not Differently   2
   Other   9

29. (IF DIFFERENTLY)
Here's another list.
Will you put them
where you feel they
ought to go. Just
do the ones that you
would grade differ-
ently.

30. Why do you think
they should go that
way?

   (USE FIRST LIST)
31. (IF OWN OCCUPATION
NOT ON LIST) In
terms of its social
standing, which occu-
pation on the list
would be nearest to
your own job?

32. What about your fa-
ther's present/last
occupation? Which
job on the list would
be nearest to it?

33. I see that you've put
your father's job high-
er/lower/about the same
as your job. Still,
taking everything into
account, would you say
that you're better off,
worse off or about the
same as your father
when he was your age?
   Better off   1
   Worse off   2
   Same   3
   Other   9

34. (IF WORSE OFF) In what way? How do you think that came about?

34b. Will that be true in the future?

35. (IF BETTER OFF) You say you're better off than your father when he was your age. Do you think that is true for most people of your generation or just people like yourself?

    Most people   1
    People like yourself   2
    Other   3
    Comments:

36. (IF BETTER OFF) The cost of living has gone up a good deal since your father was your age. Even taking that into account, do you think that you're better off?

37. (IF BETTER OFF) On the whole, would you say that you've had an easier time of it than your father?

38. (TO ALL) Different people want different things out of a job. What are the things you feel are important?
    (CIRCLE MORE THAN ONE)
    Money   1
    Security   2
    Interesting work   3
    Satisfaction   4
    Other (specify)   5
    Promotion   6

39. (IF 1-5) What about chances for promotion, is that important to you?
    Important   1
    Not Important   2
    Other   3

    (IF NOT) Why is that?

40. What job would you consider to be an ideal one for yourself?

41. (IF NOT PRESENT JOB) What are the chances of your getting that kind of job do you think?

42. Up to now would you say your health had been:
    Very good 1
    Fair   2
    Poor   3   Prompt
    Other   4

43. (IF POOR) In what way has it affected your life or what you wanted to do?

44. I'm now going to read a list of statements. Will you tell me for each one whether you agree with it or disagree with it. If you agree, tell me whether you strongly agree or only moderately agree. If you disagree, whether you strongly disagree or moderately disagree:

1. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.

2. There's little use in trying to influence the authorities these days, because often they aren't interested in the problems of the average man.

3. In spite of what some people say, the situation for the average man is getting better all the time.

4. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world today, with the way things look for the future.

5. These days a person doesn't know whom he can count on.

45. On the whole, do you feel that you've had good breaks in life or bad breaks?
    Good breaks   1
    Bad breaks   2
    In-between   3
    DK/NA   9

46. What are you thinking of when you say that?

47. On a different topic now. What were the names of the schools you went to?

48. You left school when you were __ years old. Is that right? What exams did you try for then? Which ones did you pass?
    11+ or Scholarship   1
    O Levels   2
    A Levels   3
    Other   4
    No exams   9

	Yes	No
11+ passed	1	2
O Levels	1	2
A Levels	1	2
    Comments:

49. (IF 11+ ATTEMPTED OR PASSED) Thinking back, was it important to you, at the time, whether you passed the 11+ (or equivalent) or not?
    Important   1
    Not Important   2
    Other   3
    Probes: In what way?
    Why was it important?

50. What about your parents. Did they expect you to pass or not?

51. What further education did you take? Were you able to complete it?

52. (IF NO FURTHER EDUCATION) At the time, had you wanted to leave school as soon as you could or had you originally planned to go on further?
    Go on further   1
    Stop when possible   2
    Other   3

53. (IF FURTHER) Has it affected your life in any way that you weren't able to go on further?
    Probe: What is it that you have been unable to do?

54. (TO ALL) Do you feel now that you left school at the right age or not?
    Right Age   1
    Other (Write in)   2
    DK/NA   3

55. Do you feel your parents were ambitious for you? I mean, did they encourage you to go on in school as far as you could or were they unconcerned?
    Yes   1
    No   2
    DK   9
    In what way?

56. (IF YES) Were you en-
    couraged most by your
    father, your mother or
    both equally?
    Father   1
    Mother   2
    Equally   3
    DK/NA   9

57. How old was your father
    when he left school?
    And your mother?
                    Years   DK
    Father   ___   9
    Mother   ___   9

58. (IF MARRIED WITH CHILD-
    REN) OTHERS SKIP TO
    Q. 63
    Have you thought (or did
    you think) much about
    what sort of education
    you would like for your
    children?
    Yes   1
    No   2

59. (IF YES) What sort of
    education would you like
    (did you want) them to
    have? What would be the
    minimum they should get?

60. Have you (or had you)
    any preference for the
    kind of school which
    they should go to?
    Which?
    Comprehensive   1
    State Grammar   2
    'Public'   3
    Other   4
    No preference   5

61. (IF A SON) Would you
    (would you have been)
    pleased if your son
    went into the same sort
    of work as yourself?
    Pleased   1
    Not pleased   2
    Did go into   3

62. In general (have you
    done) will you do
    things very differ-
    ently for your child-
    ren than your parents
    did for you?
    Same   1
    Different   2
    Other   3

    (Different) In what
    way?

63. (TO ALL) Taking every-
    thing into account,
    would you rate your own
    childhood as very hap-
    py, or sometimes quite
    unhappy?
    Very happy   1
    Sometimes happy   2
    Unhappy   3
    Other   9

64. Some people grow apart
    from their parents as
    various things happen
    in their lives. Others
    remain very close.
    Would you say that you
    are still close to your
    parents or have you
    drifted apart?
    Close   1
    Apart   2

65. (IF 2) Why have you
    drifted apart?

66. Thinking now about the
    friends you had when
    you were in school.
    Did you keep the same
    group of friends
    throughout or did they
    change as various
    things happened?
    Changed   1
    Stayed the same   2
    Other   3

67. (IF CHANGED) Why was
    it you changed friends
    do you think?

68. (IF NOT CHANGED) Do
you still see any of
them socially?

69. (TO ALL) At that time,
did you feel you be-
longed to any group or
were you a bit of a
lone wolf or what?

70. How about now? Do you
feel you belong to any
group now?

71. Up until the time you
left home, about how
many times would you
have changed homes?
(Roughly)

72. (IF MOVED) About how
many of those moves
were to different
towns or districts?

73. What about yourself
now? How many times
have you moved since
you started working?

74. (IF MOVED) How many of
those were to different
towns?

75. Since you started working
have you ever received
any financial help from
your parents or other
relatives? Gifts or
loans or anything like
that?

76. (IF MARRIED) What about
your in-laws, have they
ever given you and your
wife any kind of help?

77. A few general questions
now. We often hear
people talking about
moving up in the world.
What does that mean for
you?

78. Can you think of any-
one, a friend or rela-
tive, perhaps, who has
really moved up in the
world?
Yes   1
No   2

79. What have they done?

80. What about yourself
now. Would you say
that you've moved up in
the world, or not?

81. Who would you be com-
paring yourself with
when you say that?

82. Is it important to you
to be thought of as
someone who has moved
up in the world?

83. How do you think that
people who do move up
in the world, manage
it?

84. In general, do you feel
you can do much to make
your future what you
want it to be?
Yes   1
No   2
(IF NO) Why is that?

(IF YES) How do you
mean? In what way?
What kinds of things do
you feel you can do?

85. Almost everybody feels
sometimes that his life
isn't going along just
the way he wants it to.
In what ways do you feel
your life isn't just the
way you'd want it to be?

86. Some people feel the
Government does too much
for people while others
think it doesn't do e-
nough. What do you
think?

87. There's been a lot of talk lately about immigrants in this country. Would you say that there should be no more people allowed into Britain or just no more coloured immigrants, or what?

(IF NO MORE COLOURED) Would you feel the same, do you think, if only skilled or professional coloured workers were allowed to come in?

88. If you had the choice, would you particularly avoid having coloured immigrants as neighbours?

(IF YES) Would you still feel the same if they were professional people working at the hospital or the university or something like that?

89. Do you think that landlords should be able to refuse to let to coloured immigrants?
Yes   1
No   2

(IF YES) How would you feel about it if the family or person could supply references showing they were responsible and able to afford the rent? Would your answer be the same?
Yes   1
No   2

90. On the whole, do you think the majority of coloured people in Britain are superior to you, equal to you or inferior to you?

Why do you say that?

_____

(17)
1. Go without vacations for several years.

2. Leave your friends and relatives and move to another part of the country with your family.

3. Live for awhile in a district that you didn't like.

4. Take some risk to your health.

5. See less of your family.

6. Move to another country, say Australia or Canada.

7. Take on a lot of extra responsibility.

8. Give up some of your leisure time.

9. Hide your political views.

10. Learn a new routine.

APPENDIX 3

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