ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MOBILITY
IN THE LONDON REGION

C. JAMES RICHARDSON

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ABSTRACT

As there have been few studies of individual social mobility in Britain, this thesis examines a wide range of aspects of the mobility experience. Data reported come from secondary analysis of a sample of men in the London Region in 1970 (N = 884) and second interviews with a sub-sample (N = 117). Overall, there was more upward and less downward mobility observed in 1970 than in 1949 but little change in degree of occupational rigidity. Downward mobility generally proceeded from a 'peripheral' rather than a 'core' middle-class position to a skilled manual trade, thereby involving little or no discontinuity. The tendency of fathers of the downwardly mobile to have been intragenerationally upwardly mobile suggests a cyclical pattern in which sons of the same upwardly mobile are not adequately socialized into a middle-class pattern. The opposite hypothesis, that upward mobility proceeds from a 'sunken middle-class' family or one otherwise not well integrated into the working class, was not well supported. Generally, upward mobility was more complicated than downward mobility, involving at least five distinct patterns. In only two of these was it clear that occupational mobility had led to social mobility in the sense of a shift in relational and normative dimensions. The one-third of the men upwardly mobile through a formal educational route were generally, though not exclusively, found in these two patterns; 'distance' traversed was also an important determinant of class change. Taken together, however, the upwardly mobile were found to bestride class of origin and destination with respect to a wide range of variables. This was also the case when attention was directed to the negative or dissociative consequences of upward and downward mobility. That is, the data lend support to an acculturative, rather than a dissociative hypothesis about the consequences of social mobility; the mobile appeared to be no more isolated, detached, prejudiced or anomic than was typical in the class which they were entering. Finally, the meaning people give to social mobility is examined at some length.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

This is a study about the experience of social mobility in British society. Like other industrial societies, Britain is characterized by considerable social mobility, or, to be more precise, by consistently high rates of occupational mobility. Existing studies indicate that as many as two-thirds of British males have a position in the occupational prestige hierarchy which is either higher or lower than the one held by their father. And, nearly one-third have positions on the opposite side of the manual-non-manual line from that of their father. With some few exceptions, however, intergenerational change in status is modest; few have fallen to the 'very bottom' of the social hierarchy and few have ascended as far as the 'elite' or aristocracy. Most of the movement in sample surveys can, therefore, be called 'middle-mass' social mobility in order to distinguish it from the extreme changes in fortune which are more likely to come to mind.\(^1\) Despite this, it is usual practice for sociologists while actually studying occupational mobility to formulate conclusions and generalizations about social mobility in the wider sense of meaning a change in class position. This is typically justified by the view that in industrial societies class and status situation are both largely determined by occupational status, and that changes in the latter will also involve changes in both of the former

\(^1\)The term is Wilensky's (1966) but others have distinguished between mass and elite mobility (See: Goldthorpe, 1964: 654).
dimensions of stratification. Especially with respect to the second part, there is little empirical foundation for such an assumption. We do not know enough about the experience of intergenerational occupational mobility in Britain to say with any degree of certainty that it is likely to lead to a significant change in social class. Nor is it known what various patterns of upward and downward occupational mobility there are or what consequences these might have for those defined as socially mobile.

As the title of this study suggests, my focus of inquiry is intentionally broad. I set out to give the same sort of attention that has sometimes been directed towards the more dramatic and extreme forms of social mobility to the 'more common garden variety' of intergenerational mobility. Who are the socially mobile in British society? What kinds of mobility routes upward and downward are typically employed? How do the family backgrounds of the socially mobile differ from those of non-mobile? What are the consequences of various patterns of mobility? How 'successful'—in terms of it involving relational and normative shifts—is middle-mass mobility? How do people themselves define their experience? How closely do these personal definitions correspond to the conventional measures used by sociologists?

This thesis tries to answer some of these questions through an empirical study of a sample of men in the London region, most of whom had experienced either upward or downward occupational mobility. In the rest of this chapter I describe the background, some early thoughts and preconceptions and some sociological literature which prompted and

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2Partly in order not to close the question beforehand and partly because it is less cumbersome, I will generally refer to social mobility, not occupational mobility. Two groups of men who had remained stable relative to their fathers were also interviewed.
influenced the asking of these questions.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

The concept social mobility refers to the movement of individuals and their families between higher and lower social classes or more generally between social positions within the society which are in some way hierarchically ordered. Although social mobility sometimes also is used to describe the process whereby a whole group or caste or stratum moves upward or downward (See: Sorokin, 1927: 133-134) this is not the meaning intended in this study as it has not been in the vast majority of studies to which I will be making reference. In common with these, I will be referring either to intergenerational or intragenerational individual mobility. The former is a person-to-person comparison, usually between father and son, in which the main interest is in how the son's status differs from his father's status. Intragenerational or career mobility, on the other hand, involves a comparison of the individual with himself at some earlier point in his lifetime. As I indicated above, within industrial societies the backbone of the stratification system is the occupational structure so that the occupation one holds is treated as the single best indicator of class and status position. Social mobility has, as a result, almost invariably been measured—intergenerationally and intragenerationally—as movement upward or downward in the occupational hierarchy.

DOWNWARD MOBILITY

The extent to which industrial societies are characterized by high

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3 For amplifications of this point see Blau and Duncan (1967: 7); Parkin (1972: 18); Runciman (1968: 55).

4 For a more extended discussion of the concept and measurement of social mobility see Miller (1955 and 1956), Carlsson (1958), Westoff (1960), Hopper (1971a), Hope (1972).
rates of downward as well as upward mobility was an especially compelling aspect of both the Lipset and Bendix (1959) and Miller (1960) studies. Instead of it being solely a concomitant of economic depression or recession as was generally supposed, the cumulative evidence from various national studies shows downward mobility to be a regular and persistent phenomenon in many countries. In the Miller (1960: Tables I & II) study, for instance, thirteen of the twenty studies included in the comparison showed higher rates of downward mobility than they did of upward mobility, across the manual-non-manual dividing line.  

Miller paid particular attention to downward mobility not only because of its frequency and predominance but because as he suggested, if other things such as the occupational structure remain more or less equal, then it is a better indicator of fluidity in a society than is upward mobility. This is because 'a society which is dropping sons born in advantaged strata out of these strata has more openness than one which brings up talented manual sons but safeguards the privilege of the already advantaged' (P. 65).

Both the finding of generally high rates of downward mobility and Miller's interpretation of these provided much of the initial impetus for this present study. He implies that downward mobility is not solely an outcome of economic or personal misfortune but is instead, perhaps, an indicator of the extent to which a society institutionalizes the value

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5Rates of social mobility are conventionally expressed in outflow percentages; that is, as the percentage of fathers who have sons in a different class or category than themselves. The rate of upward or downward mobility is, therefore, dependent on the relative size of the classes. In Britain, for instance, about one-quarter of the fathers in manual occupations had sons in non-manual occupations while about two-fifths of the non-manual fathers had sons in manual occupations. Britain, therefore, had a higher rate of downward than upward movement. The actual number of people moving upward and downward was virtually identical; about 15% of the total sample moved in each direction (See: Miller, 1960: 71; Glass, 1954: 183).
of equal opportunity through the creation of structures which support and facilitate it. The fluidity of a society, for instance, is explicitly defined by Miller as 'an ease of movement from stratum to stratum ... that is not due to changes in the occupational structure' (1960: 339).

It is, therefore, presumably a result of what Lipset and Zetterberg (1956: 565) call an 'interchange of ranks'; that is, mobility arising from the implementation of equality of opportunity. They argue that:

Interchange mobility will be determined in large part by the extent to which a given society gives members of the lower strata the means with which to compete with those who enter the social structure on a higher level. The more occupational success is related to educational achievements, which are open to all, the greater the occupational mobility.

Although empirically it appears that industrial societies are characterized by both structural mobility and interchange mobility (Jackson and Crockett, 1964; Broom et al, 1969), the structural changes have generally been such as to stimulate upward mobility (See: Clark, 1957). In other words, the downward mobility which has emerged so strikingly in the national mobility studies must analytically, at least, be considered as part of an interchange of ranks rather than any systematic shrinkage of higher status positions. This is in itself an intriguing problem. The implication is that either downward mobility results from personal misfortunes of one kind or another or, alternatively, that it is related to the fundamental selection and rejection processes of industrial society; meritocratic criteria rather than ascriptive criteria are somehow being employed, primarily within the educational system.

We cannot, of course, totally discount an explanation based on personal misfortunes. But samples used in mobility studies, based as

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6 There are various other terms used in the literature to denote non-structural mobility. Rogoff (1953) refers to 'social distance mobility'; Kahl (1957) to 'individual mobility'; and Jackson and Crockett (1964) to 'circulation mobility'.
they are around the occupational structure, are unlikely to catch those who because of mental illness, alcoholism and similar difficulties drift downwards to 'the very bottom' of the social hierarchy. Inhabitants of skid row, like members of elites and aristocracy, if they enter at all into such samples, do so only incidentally. As to the downward mobility which is observed in mobility studies, there is no existing evidence which would show the extent to which it is or is not related to personal factors of the kind sometimes advanced as explanations of extreme 'skidding'.

Yet, at the same time, given the systematic evidence available about class distributions in life chances, a meritocratic explanation of downward mobility also does not seem very plausible. This is because most mobility studies are referring mainly to movements downward from lower-level managerial or various clerical positions into manual work rather than what objectively are extreme falls in social status. From the perspective of a meritocratic explanation this kind of movement downwards is inexplicable since it is unlikely that the educational system, through its function of selection and rejection, could so operate as to direct sons of middle-class fathers into working-class positions. As Young (1958: 31) notes, members of families 'desire equal opportunity for everyone else's children, extra for their own'. Thus it is unlikely that even the dullest child of a middle-class family could not be given sufficient polish to insure him a position, which though perhaps not exactly comparable to his father, is at least within the white collar stratum.

7 For example, see the review by Kleiner and Parker (1963).

8 The literature available on this general topic is vast. However, with respect to class differences in educational opportunities in Britain, a useful compilation of articles is by Craft (1970). Also useful is Young (1965) and Banks (1971).
Initially, then, I was interested in this phenomenon of downward mobility. I wanted to know how it comes about; what social mechanisms as opposed to the more random occurrences such as 'bad luck' or personal misfortune were involved. What specific role, for instance, does the educational system play in bringing about downward mobility? Connected to this is whether downward mobility occurs primarily intergenerationally or intragenerationally. That is, in comparison with their fathers, do the downwardly mobile begin their careers in manual occupations or is it something which occurs later in the career? Since mobility studies present a snapshot, a still photograph of a dynamic process, to what extent is the downward mobility measured in those studies a permanent loss of status? In general I hoped that by seeking answers to these kinds of questions I would also be able to provide some leverage on the more fundamental question raised by Miller of whether a high rate of downward mobility is indicative of how open or meritocratic is that society.

CONSEQUENCES OF DOWNWARD MOBILITY

A second set of questions which initially prompted this investigation revolves about the central one of what is the social experience of those labelled as downwardly mobile. Specifically, what are the personal and social consequences of moving downward, relative to one's parents, in the occupational structure? One important problem was whether, and to what extent, actors and sociologists are likely to share the same definition of social reality. An implicit assumption in the sociological literature is that those considered to have moved downwards occupationally also define themselves this way. It is assumed that they share with

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9 For instance, Lipset and Bendix (1959) found in analysing job histories considerable crossing back and forth across the manual-non-manual line.
others in the society values which lead them to rank a given social position as being more or less superior to another and that 'people do not like to be downwardly mobile; they prefer to keep their rank or to improve it' (Lipset and Zetterberg, 1956: 565). This assumption, raises a number of questions about how, social psychologically, do people respond and adapt to 'sinking', 'abasement', 'degradation' and 'failure', to use some of Sorokin's (1927) imaginative terminology. Given the importance placed on 'success' in most industrial societies, what compensating mechanisms, for example, do people typically employ in order to offset the negative evaluation society, as well as themselves, places upon them? Finally, what are the consequences for interpersonal relations and primary group structures of moving downwards?

With respect to these questions, the intentionality of the actor who moves downward seemed to me an important variable. What I regarded as a truism, virtually, is the proposition that no one acts willingly so as to lower his own status in his own eyes. Thus, people who deliberately choose a status position 'objectively' or consensually deemed to be below that of their parents must, perforce, be acting on the basis of a definition of the situation different from that generally held. An instance of this is the numbers of young people in the late sixties and early seventies who, for ideological as well as emotional reasons, 'opted' out of what they saw as the educational and occupational rat race their parents had anticipated for them. 10 Significantly, the rebellion

10 That this dropping out is not confined solely to this period is suggested by the following: 'The avowedly temporary hippy or beatnik is not a new phenomenon. Bohemias have always been locales where middle- and upper-class birds of passage could live below parental standards but with every intention eventually of returning home. Yesteryear, middle-class youths joined lower-class youngsters as both temporarily joined the tramp and hoboes who crisscrossed the continent while working sporadically' (Strauss, 1971: 172); (see also: Zorbaugh, 1929; Ware, 1935).
seemed to go beyond simply a generational conflict towards the adoption of 'higher' values; along with a rejection of their parents went a rejection of business and the professions and of materialism, the very things which had provided their parents with a relatively secure place in the middle class. Employment in a laundry or restaurant became for some symbolic of the denial of status and achievement striving while for others it signified a commitment to the working class or proletariat. Especially for those who failed to obtain academic credentials, it is reasonable to suppose that economic consequences as well as social consequences will persist perhaps over their whole lifetime. But compared with those who do not voluntarily relinquish the social status of their parents, it seemed unlikely that intentional downward mobility would be accompanied by the same subjective sense of status loss and failure as the former are likely to experience.

In addition, Strauss (1971: 171), who makes this same distinction between voluntary and involuntary downward mobility, suggests some people may move down either because to do so is viewed as a necessary step (to gain skill or experience) before eventual progress up the social ladder or as a 'temporary' withdrawal and respite from the frustration,  

11Analytically, both upward and downward mobility might be distinguished by whether they are voluntary or involuntary. Involuntary upward mobility could arise as an unanticipated consequence of others evaluating highly an individual's performance in a work role even though there was no intention or desire for promotion. It is a general belief—perhaps ungrounded—that in many organizations to refuse promotion is tantamount to resigning; it must be accepted whether particularly desired or not. Whatever the reason for the objective mobility, people are likely to treat the mobile person differently. He finds he has access to groups and organizations he never sought out while at the same time former membership groups may find his presence uncomfortable and patronizing. It may be meaningful, then, to refer to upward mobility as in some senses 'forced' upon people by organizational upheavals, scarcity of talent and unintended consequences of non-mobility oriented behavior.
constraints and tensions of regular life. For example, the graduate from engineering or business may work for some time on the factory floor in order to gain practical experience. Unemployed actors, in order to stay in acting may work for considerable periods in routine jobs such as sorting mail rather than accepting jobs involving a re-direction of commitment away from the theatre. And, for some, the lure of a non-competitive, non-stressful small town or rural existence may be an acceptable trade-off for the status and income of a managerial or sales career.

Again, conventional social mobility measures would show these people as objectively downwardly mobile although, clearly, their own definition might be quite the opposite. This does not mean that there would not be consequences, beside the obvious economic one already mentioned. First, those who make a deliberate choice to move down, for whatever reason, must also convince others in the society, besides the sociologist, of the legitimacy and appropriateness of their act. Voluntary downward mobility may place greater strain, perhaps to the point of severance, on friendship and kinfolk ties than does involuntary mobility. In the latter case it is easier to take the actor's role and either to offer support or commiserate with him in his misfortune. In the former case, it is more difficult to comprehend the 'why of it' and, if this is understood, there is the additional problem that willful downward mobility may be interpreted (perhaps correctly) as a threat to the legitimacy of 'orthodox' lifestyles. Whether the intentions are comprehended or not there remains also the sometimes justified fear on the part of kinfolk that the rever-

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12 At the same time there is evidence that the downwardly mobile may persist in defining their condition as 'temporary' for a very long time (see: Lipset and Gordon, 1953).

13 For a fictional account of voluntary downward mobility and its consequences see the novel Hurry on Down, (John Wain, 1953).
sal in status may turn out to be permanent and irrevocable. Second, from the individual's point of view, even temporary downward mobility throws him into contact with others of a lower status so that he may come to see himself in a different and perhaps unanticipated light. There is, as well, the possibility of disorientation, loss of perspective and a 'psychological' as well as an 'actual' blocking off of routes back to his previous status. Thus, while voluntary downward mobility seemed qualitatively different than involuntary downward mobility, I also felt that certain patterns of it would involve personal and social consequences and dilemmas no matter how the individual actor defined what had happened to him.

**UPWARD MOBILITY**

Initially, I intended to focus on what might be called small scale sociological aspects of downward social mobility. Upward mobility, if it was to be considered at all, would be included mainly for comparative purposes. However, as I began to research the topic of downward mobility it became apparent that some of the questions I was directing towards downward mobility could equally well be asked of upward mobility. More is known about upward mobility than downward mobility particularly with respect to its determinants. As I suggested above, changes in the occupational structure in this century have generally been such as to induce considerable upward mobility in industrial societies. This, coupled with economic growth and demographic factors—differential fertility and migration—are plausible explanations of the rates and patterns of social mobility within given societies (Kahl, 1957). At the opposite end of the spectrum, considerable empirical evidence on the relationship of personal and psychological factors to upward mobility has also accumulated.  

14 The most important review is still that by Lipset and Bendix (1959). Also useful is Banks (1971: Chapters 4 and 5).
Crockett (1966: 281) in his review of this literature enthusiastically defended the right of the psychologist to tread on the 'turf' of the sociologist:

Not much variance remains to be explained by personality factors when mobility is studied from an overall societal point of view . . . . The conditions under which personality factors may contribute to (upward) mobility are somehow controlled for, partialled out or obliterated in such analyses. When one asks why, given the presence of certain social structural conditions, particular persons rise, fall or remain stationary in the status system, personality characteristics immediately become relevant and important.

However, without in any sense denying the usefulness of the macrosociological or the psychological approach in understanding social mobility, both leave many questions unanswered; not all of the variance is explained by either approach. Hence, even with the most 'favorable' structural conditions not everyone is equally likely either to rise or to fall in the class structure. Similarly, though intelligence and motivation are important characteristics for upward mobility, not everyone who is intelligent or highly motivated achieves upward mobility, nor are those lacking these traits necessarily the ones who remain stationary or fall (See: Jencks, 1972). Personality characteristics then, are necessary but not sufficient causes of individual social mobility. I argued, instead, that between these two approaches was a distinctively micro-sociological perspective which has been relatively unexplored in previous research. 15

CONSEQUENCES OF UPWARD MOBILITY

Typically, upward mobility has been viewed as a social good--universally desired and essential for industrial society. The result is that a considerable amount of social research and social policy has been
directed towards the explication and eventual eradication of family and
class factors which inhibit equality of opportunity. Since Durkheim
(1897), at least, sociologists have also pointed out that rising in the
social structure is not without psychic and social costs. Sorokin (1927:
522) in his classic study maintained that along with positive benefits
to society, social mobility is dissociative, diminishing intimacy and in-
creasing psychosocial isolation and loneliness. Thus, a large literature,
mainly in the United States, has sought to document empirically what
Tumin (1957) called the unapplauded consequences of social mobility. 16

Again, as with downward mobility, it is difficult to draw conclusions from
this research. In commenting on this literature, Heller (1969: 311)
pessimistically notes that 'if one compares the conclusions about the
positive and negative consequences of mobility found in Sorokin and the
present state of knowledge concerning this subject he is . . . likely to
find only small advances, for they are still scanty and impressionistic'.
As yet then, no coherent picture, even for the United States, has emerged
that shows that upward mobility does or does not involve the kinds of
negative consequences which have been imputed to it. And, while it has
been assumed that social mobility would in European societies be even
more disruptive in its consequences than in the United States, very little
empirical work of a comparable nature has actually been carried out. 17

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16 A review of some of this literature will be found in Chapter 9.

17 This is also generally true of Britain. However, see McKenzie
and Silver (1968); Rose et al (1968); Willmott and Young (1960). Also
useful are Hoggart (1957: Chapter 10); Jackson and Marsden (1962) and
Bell (1968). For a discussion of mobility in European society, see
Lipset and Bendix (1959: 64-70). For more general discussions of
mobility in traditional versus industrial societies, see Germani (1966),
In focussing on the consequences of middle-mass mobility in Britain rather than upon extreme and sometimes abrupt movements upward in the social scale, two closely related problems arise: 1) the validity of occupational prestige as an indicator of class position in British society and 2) the relationship of the British educational system and its ideology to various patterns of middle-mass mobility.

MOBILITY AND STATUS RIGIDITY

The first problem arises from the fact that there is nearly as much upward mobility and considerably more downward mobility in the British occupational structure than there is in the American one. This is the case despite the emphasis in the United States on 'equality of opportunity' and its belief that it is a 'classless' society. To what extent and under what conditions, then, is occupation likely to be a similarly valid indicator of social class position and, in turn, of social mobility in the two countries? As Lipset and Bendix (1959: 66) have noted, 'In the United States there is . . . more likelihood that the successful individual need only change his residential neighborhood to bring his economic and his social status into line'. In contrast, the greater degree of status rigidity within British society suggests occupational mobility is less likely to be 'successful'. That is, there is a relatively lower likelihood that occupational mobility will be translated into class mobility and, as well, a greater likelihood that the occupationally mobile will be marginal--located at the periphery rather than at the core of their destination class. 18

18 For a definition of status rigidity, see Hopper (1971a: 20-21). He suggests that, 'The degree of status rigidity can be called "moderate" when it is high enough to retard status mobility but low enough to permit economic mobility' (P. 21). British society would seem to be one society which approximates to this definition. The concepts of periphery and core status positions are also Hopper's (1971a: 15). For a related discussion in which similar concepts are used, see Shils (1968).
In this regard, the distinction made by Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1969) between, on the one hand, 'economic' changes and, on the other, 'normative' and 'relational' changes, is a useful one. Although they were, in testing the 'embourgeoisement' hypothesis, not dealing specifically with occupational mobility, their data do suggest the importance of clearly distinguishing between these three aspects of class change. They point out that proponents of the hypothesis usually make the assumption—not supported empirically—that as manual workers acquire incomes and living standards comparable to white-collar workers they will also adopt similar social norms and in turn will gain acceptance into middle-class society (P. 24). The results of their study did not support this assumption and have recently led one of the authors to question in a similar way what I am also questioning—the validity of occupational mobility as an indicator of social mobility:

Social mobility, as measured, is not simply a matter of individuals gaining more qualification, more income, more interesting work, etc., but further of their experiencing changes in their life-styles and patterns of association. The difficulty is . . . that the validity of occupational ratings construed in this way has never been established . . . In other words, we are simply not in a position to infer, with any acceptable degree of precision and certitude, what are the typical consequences of mobility as measured via occupational prestige ratings, for the actual social experience of those deemed to be mobile (Goldthorpe and Hope, 1972: 35-36).

This distinction represents an important orientation to the investigation of the consequences of middle-mass mobility. I, therefore, considered attitudes and patterns of association of the socially mobile both from the perspective of what has sometimes been called the dissociative hypothesis, and as indicators of the extent economic shifts had also involved normative and relational shifts as well. 19

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19 The term refers to Sorokin's (1927) view of social mobility as disruptive to social relationships. Ellis and Lane (1967) consider this as one of three hypotheses about the consequences of social mobility. The second perspective is closest to the acculturation model of social mobility first advanced by Blau (1956). I discuss both in Chapter 9.
EDUCATION AND MOBILITY

A second and related factor is the differentiated and specialized nature of the British educational system. As Coleman (1968: 10) points out, the dominant ideology underlying this somewhat unique system was initially one not specifically providing equality of opportunity but rather, 'differentiated education appropriate to one's station in life'. Similarly, Cole (1955) described British social structure as consisting of three separate systems of stratification juxtaposed yet co-existing in a more or less permanent truce: the aristocratic structure based on land; the plutocratic based on commerce and industry; the meritocratic based on the education system. It is the latter system which has provided the generally accepted mode of upward mobility in British society. Thus, educational reforms have managed to meet the industrial-based demand for more highly qualified people without at the same time fundamentally altering the historic pattern of the British stratification system—'breeding' has in effect co-opted 'merit'.

It was also this aspect of British stratification which led Turner (1960) to develop his now familiar distinction between sponsorship and contest norms about social mobility. The former, of course, referring to Britain, the latter to the United States. His central and underlying assumption was that 'the organizing folk norm that defines the accepted mode of upward mobility is a crucial factor in shaping the school system . . .' (P. 72). The logic of the two ideal-typical normative patterns was, therefore, used to account for differences in the two societies in the organization of their educational systems, the kind of value placed

20 More recently Hopper (1968) has argued that the educational systems of the United States and England may be viewed as 'only two special cases in an expanded typology' (P. 92). Thus, educational systems, in general, do not necessarily cluster around either of Turner's two ideal-typical models.
On education, the content of education, and the selection procedures used. Of most relevance to my present concern, however, were some hypotheses postulated by Turner regarding the relative impact of upward mobility on 'personality development' in sponsorship and contest systems. In general, he suggests that there would be less stress attached to striving for higher status and fewer complications in making relational and normative shifts under a sponsorship system than under a contest system.

Under the sponsorship system, recruits are selected early, segregated from their class peers, grouped with other recruits and with youth from the class to which they are moving, and trained specifically for membership in this class. Since the selection is made early, the mobility experience should be relatively free from the strain that comes with a series of elimination tests and long-extended uncertainty of success. The segregation and the integrated group life of the 'public' school or grammar school should help to clarify the mobile person's social ties (1960: 88).

Turner's analysis is, then, implicitly in disagreement with the prevailing view that social mobility would be less disruptive in the more 'open' class system of the United States than in societies such as Britain, where there is a relatively higher degree of status rigidity and therefore a much lower likelihood of the upwardly mobile gaining acceptance.

The major objection to Turner's thesis has come from Hopper (1971b). He argues that it implicitly assigns education a monolithic role in the mobility process. He points out that on the one hand, it does not take account of the variety of educational routes available in Britain to both the potentially mobile and the potentially non-mobile. On the other hand, Hopper suggests, it tends to ignore the fact that a great deal, perhaps most, of the upward mobility in Britain occurs independently of the formal sponsorship system Turner described. Such mobility arises because of the difficulty all societies have in effectively regulating ambition. There is always the dual need to motivate people to fill strategic roles and to select those most capable of filling them once it can be establish-
ed who they are. This Hopper calls the 'warming-up: cooling-out dilemma' in which, 'the more effective is a society in raising and maintaining ambition at a high level initially, the more difficult is it to reduce and to suppress ambition at a relatively low level at a later phase' (P. 299).

In industrial societies, it is mainly left to the educational system to cope with this dilemma:

... at every level and through every route within its total selection process, an educational system must strive, on the one hand, to 'warm-up' some of its students, and on the other, to 'cool-out' those who are rejected for further training. Those who are warmed-up receive further and more specialized training and those who are cooled-out are sent more or less directly into the labour market (P. 305).

Sponsored social mobility then, implies that the talented among the masses--the meritorious--are singled out, 'taken' from their parents and educated separately for elite status. As Hopper notes: 'In an educational system with sponsorship and elitist ideologies (as in Britain) the development of achievement and mobility orientation is more likely to follow than to precede some sign of educational success ... ambition is not a totally legitimate personal quality until some sign of educational achievement has been recognized within the formal boundaries of the system ... ' (P. 318). What this means, in effect, is that whereas in the United States virtually everyone is educated for social mobility, only a select few of the lower classes are so educated in Britain. Instead, the expectation is that the majority will be effec-

21 For a satirical account of this process, see Young (1958).

22 This explains, perhaps, why in the United States university curriculum is so much more vocationally oriented than in Britain; students seem to opt for something 'solid' in anticipation that rejection will occur before an elite status is obtained (for example, at the end of a B.A. degree or a two-year junior college). The British system of relatively diffuse education falls very hard on those rejected part way through. 'Their training will have consisted primarily of preparation for the next phase of formal education, and not for occupational roles which are available to them' (Hopper, 1971b: 315). Jackson and Marsden (1962) make the same point about those people in their sample who did not go on for further education: 'It was as if education had never
tively cooled-out by age 11, or perhaps earlier, and be educated for what amounts to a non-mobility experience.

However, in all countries for which we have data, rates of social mobility are higher than can be accounted for by differentials in educational achievement (Anderson, 1961: 171). This would seem to be especially true for Britain where despite roughly comparable rates of occupational mobility, only about one-quarter as many students are enrolled in further education as in the United States. Partly this is explained by the fact that apprenticeships, technical education, articling, organizational acceptance of the office boy entry point, and promotion from within have been legitimate 'alternative mobility routes'. Whereas most Americans regard formal education as the key to occupational success, and access to college as a right, higher education has traditionally been viewed differently in England. According to Ben-David (1963-64: 471), for instance, entry into professions in Britain has not, up until recently, required a university education. 'It (higher education) never became the only, nor even the main channel of mobility through which one could rise from the "masses" to the "classes". . . . an academic title was not so much a means of achieving status as a confirmation of it' (See also: Hordley and Lee, 1970; Lee, 1968).

The other part of the explanation of the discrepancy between extent of education and rates of social mobility may be that the educational system is not completely successful in (1) deciding who should be selected and who rejected, and (2) 'cooling-out' those who were, in nourished in them any other capacities except those needed to score high marks in academic examinations' (P. 179). See also Hoggart (1957: Chap. 10) who speaks of students entering life 'disengaged', now that the series of academic hurdles had come to an end.
terms of the occupational structure, 'incorrectly' rejected. In short, as Hopper argues, the educational system is only partially successful in resolving the 'warming-out: cooling-out dilemma'. Either through alternative education or through channels not formally legitimated—what Turner (1966) calls irregular mobility—a proportion of those in the lower classes 'cooled-out' of educational ambitions nevertheless remain generally ambitious and become upwardly mobile.

The extent to which the upward social mobility resulting from the use of irregular alternative mobility routes can be viewed as 'successful' is an important question. Generally, as Hopper notes, 'these routes provide almost no mobility-training experiences. Their career-training and status-training experiences are for the lower classes, and are inappropriate for those who become upwardly mobile despite their having been rejected initially (and in effect incorrectly)' (1971b: 532). Within the context of an elitist and meritocratic ideology the man who is successful in improving his occupational position without the appropriate education is in terms of the ideology, out of place. Shils (1968: 132) suggests, more generally, that 'there is something "unseemly" or "eccentric" or "perverse" or "unfortunate" about the individual or family whose positions are scattered at a variety of unequal points on the several distributions'. Upward mobility that is not sponsored, then, is likely to involve more severe personal consequences than in societies such as the United States, characterized by a less rigid status hierarchy and a more equalitarian and universal educational system.

23 In the United States it has been found that IQ correlates about .50 with occupational status and with scholastic achievement. The correlation between IQ and 'job performance' is only about .21 (See: Jensen, 1969). There is no reason to suppose that similar correlations would not apply to Britain.

24 The theoretical justification for this statement comes largely
Much less attention has been directed to the question of whether the educational system also 'facilitates' downward mobility. Turner, for instance, was almost exclusively concerned with the norms regulating upward mobility. He does not, as a result, consider what folk norms might relate to downward mobility or if it is in any sense, legitimized within the dominant ideology. However, the continuing importance in Britain of the private school system suggests that merit has been legitimized as one basis for selection for high status positions but not necessarily for rejection from them. As Turner (1960: 87) does point out, 'English public schools' . . . are principally vehicles for transmitting the marks of high family status, their mobility function is quite tangential'. It might be added, however, that the less prestigious private schools do function, in part, as an alternative for middle-class children unable to obtain a place in a state grammar school. While it would not be correct, exactly, to say that under a contest system downward mobility is legitimated, the ideology as Turner described it by implication contains the possibility of downward mobility for some of those who are at the end from Hopper (1971a and 1971b). But, see also Germani (1966); Simpson (1970) and Kessin (1971) for additional theoretical and empirical support. It might be added that downward mobility through an educational route (that is, following a grammar school or 'public' school education) would, according to this hypothesis, be equally, if not more disruptive, than upward mobility without a grammar school or 'public' school education.

Glass (1961: 402-403) commented some years ago: 'For middle-class parents, in particular, eleven-plus day is a day of national mourning. Like King Aegeus they sit on the cliffs, waiting to see if the returning sails are white or black. And if the incidence of neurosis among frustrated middle-class parents has not risen significantly, it is largely because the independent secondary schools giving education of a grammar school variety, offer parents a possible alternative in the struggle to maintain or improve the social status of their children. That is one of the reasons why the popularity of public schools has not diminished'.
of the contest found 'less deserving'. In the absence, then, of an ideology to explain it and of formal mechanisms to cope with it, downward mobility under a sponsorship system can be assumed to be particularly difficult with respect to all three mobility problems (See: Hopper, 1971b).

Together, Turner and Hopper provide a theoretical framework particularly useful for a consideration of the possible consequences of middle-mass mobility. There are a number of ways of studying social mobility in which the notion of 'successful' social mobility does not loom quite so large or problematic. One can, for instance, choose a sample made up of (say) working-class grammar school students; of business managers; or of university graduates. But when we look at social mobility in toto as I have in this study, these special groups constitute only a part of the picture. We are likely to find that in terms of occupational mobility people have experienced a variety of mobility and non-mobility experiences. Some have been upwardly mobile or have retained their father's high status mainly through the education they were able to obtain; some may have been downwardly mobile because they did not obtain it. Others have been upwardly mobile without this education while most members of the lower classes have not experienced any change in status compared to their fathers at all.

A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

Social mobility, then, is complicated and it is improbable and impractical that any one research design will adequately capture all the varieties of mobility and non-mobility experiences people are likely to

26 A fuller description of method is given in Appendix 1.
In order to simplify the picture somewhat, my aim is to focus on four separate groups: an upwardly mobile group; a downwardly mobile group; a stable manual group, and a stable non-manual group. Beyond this, I also consider separately those in each of the four groups who had experienced a grammar school or private school education as opposed to a secondary-modern type of education.

The main purpose of this thesis was to describe as fully as possible these various patterns of middle-mass mobility and non-mobility, both generally and in terms of their social determinants and personal consequences. As I saw it, this involved both a descriptive and an analytical approach in conjunction with an attempt to get at the meaning of social mobility as people themselves describe it. As a result, the route taken in this study is in some ways a middle-path between what appears to be a widening chasm in academic sociology: the attempt on the one hand to make sociological measurement more precise and more amenable to parametrical statistics and on the other, the perspective of phenomenology and symbolic interactionism. Some of the conflict between these positions

Nor, as I describe in Chapter 9 is it likely that all of the structural, institutional and cultural contexts relevant to an understanding of social mobility can be contained in one investigation.

As it relates to social mobility, the most successful example of the former approach is Blau and Duncan's (1967) influential study, *The American Occupational Structure*. Blalock, a leading methodologist, calls this work 'the most sophisticated and quantitative study that I have seen in the sociological literature' (*American Sociological Review*, 33 (2), April 1968: 297). Not only is it a kind of methodological tour de force overshadowing earlier attempts, but it has also stimulated a considerable amount of subsequent work. See, for example, Featherman (1971), Sewall et al (1969), Kessin (1971) and in Britain, Hope (1972). The best spokesman for the latter approach is Strauss, who in his book *The Context of Social Mobility*, asks: 'Who is to judge it? The "objective sociologist"? The actor himself? His parents, kinsmen or friends? The answer that will take us furthest in theorizing is the one that rules out firmly the sociologist's definition but includes the actor and anyone else who is relevant to the actor's interactions' (1971: 177).
is avoidable when it is recognized that these approaches are often responses to different kinds of questions rather than a fundamental methodological schism. This is especially true for the study of social mobility where at times the concern is with the individual while at other times it is the social or class structure which is under consideration. For example, as I tried to show earlier in discussing downward mobility, while I felt that the intentionality of the actor and hence his definition of the situation have an important bearing in terms of personal consequences, this does not obviate the possibility of objective consequences, for interpersonal relations, kinship and community structures, and class solidarity.

Thus, in reporting the findings of this study I move from an essentially quantitative analysis of survey data to, eventually, a subjective and qualitative—'soft data'—presentation. Without making too much of a virtue out of what the sampling frame available to me made a necessity, the approach was, I believed, an effective compromise between the highly structured survey and the detail of the case study method. The former—arms length and generally 'hired hand' research—suffers from remoteness and from the abstraction involved in comparing only a set of measurable traits. The latter, by itself, faces the researcher with the inevitable problem of how to cope with uneven data, how eventually to structure it, and how to generalize the findings.

**THE SAMPLE**

The findings presented in this study come from two different data sets, which I call 'the Work and Leisure Study' and a sub-sample which I call 'the Mobility Sample'. Although the people interviewed are the same in the two studies, they were interviewed at two different times. Data reported for the Work and Leisure Study were collected in the spring
and summer of 1970. This study, carried out by the Institute of Community Studies, interviewed 1,928 people aged 17 and over in the London Metropolitan Region. Of these, the necessary occupational information on themselves and their fathers was available for 884 men. Since the concerns of the Institute project were not, specifically, to do with social mobility, the data I report in later chapters pertaining to the Work and Leisure Study come from secondary analysis. The Institute project served first of all as a sampling frame in which to find a representative group of occupationally mobile men, and, secondly, as a moderately large data set for measuring some correlates or consequences of social mobility. Although most of the preliminary planning of the research had been done before my joining the project, I worked as an interviewer during the final pilot stages and on a regular basis in the main survey.

From early 1971 until November of 1971 I reinterviewed four subsamples of men who, relative to their fathers, had been 1) upwardly mobile; 2) downwardly mobile; 3) stable non-manual or 4) stable manual in terms of the Registrar General's classification of occupations. Together these four groups make up the Mobility Sample. The men chosen for reinterviewing were selected randomly from the coded data of the Work and Leisure Study. In all, 117 men were reinterviewed. With one or two

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29 Reported in Young and Willmott (1973).

30 Initially I had anticipated a third data set from interviews with the living fathers of men contacted a second time. Unfortunately, I was only able to obtain completed interviews with 40 fathers out of a possible one-hundred. The attempt to undertake a two generation study did limit the number of second interviews I could personally expect to complete. Thus, out of 155 names drawn, I was able to interview 117 men a second time. Because of the limited success of the two-generation study, I do not in this study specifically report on the data collected from the fathers. Some illustrations and case studies do, however, draw on this data and in a postscript to Chapter 8 the data is used to examine the relationship of measured intelligence to social mobility.
exceptions interviews took place in the respondent's home and lasted anywhere from one to several hours. All were tape-recorded and later transcribed.

Because of the small size of the Mobility Sample, I have wherever it is relevant used data from the much larger Work and Leisure Study. At the same time I have assumed that, as a sub-sample of a random sample, the Mobility Sample is also a random sample (Blalock, 1960: 204). Thus, in reporting those findings unique to it, I have systematically pointed out differences between groups that have less than a five percent chance of being random or due to sampling fluctuation. Since the bases are in some instances too small for stable percentages, I have tended to place greater emphasis on measures of association and tests of statistical significance than on percentage differences.

In several chapters I have quoted extensively from the interviews I conducted. I have done so to illustrate and 'fill-out' the bare statistics but also because I hoped in this way to impart something of the imagery and feeling which people conveyed to me about their mobility experience. I have, therefore, treated what people say as an integral part of the data. As a result, the quotations are not always typical or representative of a majority opinion. I justify this on two grounds: 1) that it is often the atypical response which is more likely to provoke and stimulate thought and conjecture; and 2) that despite its small size the Mobility Sample is a random sample in which each person is to some extent representing a much larger universe. At the same time, I have attempted to indicate where a particular quote was in my evaluation a representative one, and where a deviant or unusual response.

The following chapters are organized into three fairly distinct sections. The first section is largely a descriptive account of the amount of mobility, various dimensions of social mobility and the career
or work patterns of the four groups. The final chapter in this section (Chapter 3) presents a number of case studies illustrating the main patterns of mobility and non-mobility which emerged from the data. The second section (Chapters 4 to 6) is concerned with a sociological explanation of upward and downward mobility. In the last section I first attempt to assess the extent to which middle-mass occupational mobility in Britain has dissociative or disruptive consequences for those experiencing it, and, secondly, the extent to which it objectively and subjectively can be viewed as social mobility.
PART ONE

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL MOBILITY
CHAPTER 2

RATES AND PATTERNS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY IN THE LONDON REGION

The aim of the next four chapters is to present an overview of the nature of contemporary patterns of social mobility in British society. The main emphasis will be on career and educational experiences and their relationship to intergenerational patterns of mobility. This chapter consists of a statistical and comparative analysis of the overall rate of social mobility in the London Region in 1970. It tries to put into perspective and to create a framework for the description and analysis which makes up the remainder of this study. How much social mobility is there in Britain? Is British social structure more 'open' than in the past? Have social mobility opportunities been increasing?

An analysis of one area of Britain, the London Region, cannot provide definitive answers to these questions. It is, however, the most important area of Britain so that what occurs in this region is significant for other parts as well. Therefore, the 1970 rates of occupational mobility and manual and non-manual mobility are analysed, following the method of Jackson and Crockett (1964), in terms of two ideal-typical perspectives: a maximum stability model and a full-equality model. As well, some tentative comparisons with the 1949 data of the Glass (1954) study are attempted. That study, in the absence of other more recent

\[\text{As Blau and Duncan (1967: 94) show, these measures may have an ambiguous meaning when used for comparative purposes. As a result, I have followed the lead of Jackson and Crockett in using a number of measures and summary statistics to interpret the findings.}\]
empirical work, provides a benchmark against which to view the findings of the Work and Leisure study.²

RATES AND PATTERNS OF OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

The social origins and destinations of the 884 male respondents interviewed in the Work and Leisure Study are presented in the conventional mobility matrix in Table 2.1 and summarized in Table 2.2. Percentages in each cell in Table 2.1 indicate in outflow terms, the distribution of sons of fathers in each class. For example, of the 379 fathers who were in class 4 (skilled manual), 4.2 percent had sons in class 1 and 2.9 percent had sons in class 6. Non-mobility or occupational inheritance as it is often called is shown along the major diagonal. Some 36 percent of the men 'inherited', if not their father's actual job, one having the same approximate social status. Figures to the left of the major diagonal show upward mobility; those to the right, downward mobility. In all, about 27 percent of the men were downwardly mobile and about 37 percent are upwardly mobile vis-à-vis their fathers. In absolute amounts, then, there is more upward than downward movement.

Congruent with other mobility studies is the finding that short

²The Glass study differs in sample size, sampling frame and occupational classification from those of the present study. Particularly because of the latter difference, I make no comparisons between specific status categories and draw no conclusions from the analysis of the full mobility matrix for the Work and Leisure Study. This is because the Hall-Jones occupational classification (Hall and Jones, 1950) provides a finer breakdown of non-manual occupations than is possible with the Registrar-General's five classes which were used to code occupations in the present study. When these detailed categories are collapsed into a manual-non-manual dichotomy, the two status classifications become more compatible so that it is mainly on this basis that specific comparisons are made. Also, it is important to note that the Glass study was a national sample whereas this sample can be generalized only to the London Region. Some implications of this are considered later in this chapter.
distance mobility—that is, movement into adjacent categories—is far more frequent and predominant than is extreme upward or downward movement. No sons of class 1 fathers have fallen more than three classes while only a minute fraction of fathers in classes 5 or 6 have sons who have made the long ascent to class 1. Table 2.1 also reveals that the greatest occupational inheritance is for class 4—skilled manual; the lowest level of self recruitment is found in class 5—semi-skilled.

A somewhat unexpected finding is that in only two classes (2 and 4) is inheritance greater than social movement, even if the latter is only short distance mobility. For the Glass (1954) data this was also true: in only three of his eight status categories was inheritance greater than social movement. But, an inspection of the mobility matrices for the 17 countries analysed by Miller (1960) suggests that in this respect Britain is atypical. That is, with the exception of the unskilled category, self recruitment is greater than social movement in virtually all of the countries and in all of the studies included. Similarly, the more recent study by Jackson and Crockett (1964: 6) shows that 'in every origin category (except unskilled worker) the most common destination is the occupational category of the father'.

The figures presented so far refer to outflow analysis but additional insight into the rates and patterns of social mobility in Table 2.1 can be obtained by employing the two ideal-typical theoretical models, mentioned above: the maximum stability model and the full-equality model.

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3 All calculations of the Glass data are based on the special tabulation by R. K. Kelsall carried out for S. M. Miller's (1960) comparative study of social mobility. Category V of the Hall-Jones Classification was split into a non-manual and a manual stratum, giving an eight-fold table instead of the original seven-fold one. It should also be noted that the N for the Glass data was 3,497; the N for the Kelsall retabulation was 3,498. I have used the latter figure in making further calculations.
A maximum stability model assumes that there would be no mobility beyond that which occurs when it is structurally impossible for all sons to occupy the same class as their fathers due to difference in the relative sizes of these classes. Thus, in Table 2.1 it can be seen by inspection of the marginals that there are more non-manual occupational positions in the son's 'generation'. As a result, under conditions of maximum stability, all of the sons in classes 1, 2 and 3 could have inherited their fathers' class position. But, 78 sons (8.8% of the total sample) of manual workers had to move into non-manual positions simply to transform the origin distribution (fathers) into the destination distribution (sons). This is what is generally referred to as structural or 'forced' mobility.

In fact, there is a good deal more mobility than these structural changes require. In all, some 34 percent of the sample moved either upward or downward. If the structural mobility is subtracted from the total mobility, then 55 percent (63.8% - 8.8%) of the total mobility arose from the interchange of individuals between the different classes. Following Jackson and Crockett (1964), I use the term circulation mobility for mobility which cannot be explained by structural factors.

As Duncan (1966: 54-63) warns, the distribution of fathers and sons in the mobility matrix does not represent samples of two separate historical generations. While the respondents (sons) are a cross-section of the present labour force, the fathers do not similarly represent a previous one. There are several reasons for this: (1) some fathers are still at work and are part of the present labour force while others died a long time ago; (2) some fathers have had more than one son; (3) because of migration some sons have fathers who are part of another country's labour force; and (4) not all (or perhaps even a majority of) fathers have a son at all. See also Broom and Jones (1969: 337).

As used by Jackson and Crockett (1964: 388), circulation mobility is an estimate of how open is the occupational structure in times of structural stability. It implies that there is downward mobility as well as upward mobility. If the sole criterion for assignment to occupational roles was ability, individual differences would mean some sons would fall and others would rise, relative to their fathers. This would
### TABLE 2.1

SOCIAL CLASS OF MALE RESPONDENTS BY FATHERS' SOCIAL CLASS, LONDON REGION, 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fathers' Social Class</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>Totals (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Professional</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>00.0%</td>
<td>00.0%</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.79)*</td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Managerial</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.75)</td>
<td>(1.82)</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Clerical</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>00.0%</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.84)</td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Skilled Manual</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Semi-skilled Manual</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
<td>(2.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Unskilled Manual</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(4.00)</td>
<td>(4.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>884</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Bracketted values are indices of association and dissociation. These are described in the text.
The various mobility measures used in this analysis are summarized in Table 2.2 alongside the summary statistics for the Glass data as presented by Miller (1960). Given the assumption of maximum stability, some 7.7 percent of the 1949 sample would have had to move as a result of structural factors; slightly less than in 1970. But, at the same time, a larger proportion, 68.8 percent, were actually mobile in 1949 so that circulation mobility is also proportionally greater than in 1970. Put another way, about 11 percent of the mobility in 1949 is accounted for by structural changes compared to about 14 percent in 1970. It should not be concluded that there was 'more' mobility in 1949 than in 1970 because some portion of the difference in observed mobility in the two samples is a result of an eight-fold table for the former instead of a six-fold table in the latter sample. However, if the amount of circulation mobility is used as a rough indicator of the openness of the occupational structure, then there is a slight tendency towards greater rigidity reflected in these findings.

The second model, what Jackson and Crockett (1964) refer to as the full-equality model, is based on the supposition that there is statistical independence between fathers' status and sons' status. When these be so even if there were no changes taking place in the occupational structure. In practice, as Blau and Duncan (1967: 25-26) have observed, the estimate of structural movement is the minimum estimate of mobility due to structural changes; part of the mobility may also involve concomitant but largely unobservable changes—what they call 'indirect repercussions of demand'.

The full-equality model is sometimes referred to as 'perfect mobility' and appears to have been independently developed and used by Rogoff (1953) and Glass (1951).
theoretical values are summated, it appears that 75 percent of the

TABLE 2.2

SUMMARY MOBILITY MEASURES FOR TWO BRITISH STUDIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1949*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total N's</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>3498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Mobile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulation</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-equality model</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cramer's V</td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Association</td>
<td>1.446</td>
<td>1.548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Dissociation</td>
<td>.852</td>
<td>.861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upward Mobility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected (full-equality model)</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of dissociation</td>
<td>.877</td>
<td>.839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downward Mobility:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected (full-equality model)</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of dissociation</td>
<td>.819</td>
<td>.883</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


sample would have moved in one direction or the other, whereas in reality only 64 percent did so. Similarly, given the assumption of full equality, 42.5 percent and 32.5 percent would have been upwardly and downwardly mobile, respectively, while the actual figures are 37 percent upward and 27 percent downward. These figures are shown in Table 2.2. Observed movement does not, therefore, appear to depart very radically from the amount of movement theoretically expected.
if there was no association between fathers' status and sons' status. This conclusion also applies to the data of the Glass study. As can be seen in the second column of Table 2.2, there was a similar disparity between observed and expected mobility in 1949 as we have just seen for our 1970 data; in 1949, 79.3 percent of the sample would have been mobile upward or downward if the full-equality model were operative. Instead, 68.8 percent of the sample were socially mobile—a difference of 11 percent, virtually the same as in 1970. Table 2.2 shows, also, that differences between observed and expected rates of upward and downward mobility were of about the same magnitude in 1949 as in 1970.

The similarities between the two samples with respect to their proximity to a full-equality model can be seen more systematically when indices of association and dissociation—mobility ratios as they have sometimes been called—are calculated. These are ratios found by dividing the observed value in each cell by the expected frequency assuming random association between fathers' and sons' status. Bracketed values along the major diagonal in Table 2.1 are indices of association while those to the left and right are indices of dissociation. If the full-equality model were actually the case, observed and expected frequencies would be equal and all indices would equal 1.00. On the other hand, if there was a perfect correlation between fathers' status and sons' status—perfect immobility—all cells to the left and right of the major diagonal would be empty. Ratios greater than 1.00 indicate that mobility or non-mobility is greater than expected under the assumption of full equality. Correspondingly, ratios less than 1.00 indicate that the pattern is less than expected.

These same expected frequencies can be summated and compared with the actual mobility and non-mobility observed. The ratio of one to the
other provides an overall index of association and of dissociation: 1.446 and 0.852, respectively; values nearly identical to those for the Glass data (1.548 and 0.861).\(^7\) These are shown in Table 2.2. They suggest that in both samples there is greater non-mobility and somewhat less mobility than would be theoretically expected, if the model of full-equality is taken as the standard. Looking at upward and downward mobility separately, our data suggests that upward mobility (0.879) is slightly more prevalent than downward mobility (0.819). Comparable figures for the Glass data are 0.838 and 0.883 for upward and downward mobility; a slight reversal of our 1970 data. Although having an interest in their own right, differences in these indices seem small and inconclusive. And, as we have already noted, the two studies employ separate occupational classifications so that conclusions about trends in intergenerational mobility are at this point unwarranted.

**ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FATHERS' AND SONS' STATUS**

Of the two models proposed, it can be noted that both sets of data are more in conformity with a full-equality model than a maximum stability model. One further indication of this is to show that the degree of association between fathers' status and sons' status is not very strong. Jackson and Crockett (1964) suggest that an appropriate measure of association is Cramer's V (Blalock, 1960: 230), one of the traditional measures based on the chi square. For the data of Table 2.1, Cramer's V is only 0.208 and the corresponding value for the Glass data is \(V = 0.240\).

By way of comparison, Jackson and Crockett (1964) found a Cramer's V = 0.246 for their American data. Using parametric statistics, Blau and

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\(^7\) Figures for the Glass data are based on the special tabulation by R. K. Kelsall for the Miller (1960) study. Glass (1954: 198) reports overall measures of association and dissociation of 1.440 and 0.858 when status category V is not split.
Duncan (1967: 403) report a zero-order correlation of $r = .40$ for fathers' and sons' status, a value identical to that found by Svalastoga (1965) for Europe. While not directly comparable with our non-parametric measure of association, these latter correlations do suggest that generally fathers' status is not strongly related to sons' status. Finally, it can be noted that there is a slightly weaker relationship between fathers' and sons' status in 1970 than there was in 1949. The difference, though, does not seem substantial enough to warrant very far reaching conclusions about decreasing occupational or class rigidity.

**MANUAL AND NON-MANUAL SOCIAL MOBILITY**

Partly for reasons of clarity and comparability, social mobility is conventionally measured as intergenerational (or intragenerational) movements across the manual-non-manual line. Perhaps of more import is that these categories have, in Britain and in many other countries as well, served as indicators of working-class and middle-class strata. Indeed, British sociologists tend to use these terms more or less interchangeably, a practice I have also followed in this study. Social movement between these broad categories would seem, therefore, to be closer to social mobility as it is generally understood, than is some of the movement between the six classes used so far in this analysis (See: Parkin, 1972: Chapter 1). In Table 2.3, the six occupational classes of Table 2.1 are collapsed into manual and non-manual categories. In order to provide a basis for comparison this table also presents a collapsed version of the Glass mobility data for 1949, again based on the material presented by Miller (1960: 71).

As in Table 2.1, the amount of mobility is presented in percentages based on outflow analysis. These show, for 1970, that of the fathers who were middle-class, 64.5 percent have sons who are also in non-manual
### Table 2.3

**Manual and Non-Manual Social Mobility in Two British Samples, 1949* and 1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td>57.9% (1.56)</td>
<td>64.5% (1.59)</td>
<td>42.1% (0.67)</td>
<td>35.5% (0.60)</td>
<td>1298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>24.7% (0.67)</td>
<td>29.6% (0.73)</td>
<td>75.3% (1.20)</td>
<td>70.4% (1.19)</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>1295</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>2203</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>3498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source for the 1949 data is Miller (1960: 71); a special tabulation of the Glass (1954) mobility data. Bracketted values are indices of association and dissociation.

**The 1970 data are that of the Work and Leisure Study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary Mobility Measures</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total observed mobility</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upward</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downward</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulation</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-equality</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cramer's V</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Association</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
occupations. For working-class fathers we find that 70.4 percent have sons who are also in manual occupations. For the London Region the conventional outflow rate of upward mobility is 29.6 percent; the rate of downward mobility is 35.5 percent. The respective rates of upward and downward mobility in 1949 were 24.7 percent and 42.1 percent.

'CLASS' MOBILITY COMPARED

The same theoretical modes and other measures already used for analysing the full mobility matrix can also be applied to the manual and non-manual mobility data. Because social mobility now only refers to movements across the manual-non-manual line, part of the mobility shown in Table 2.1, becomes non-mobility. As a result observed mobility falls from 63.8 percent of the total sample to only 31.4 percent and expected mobility—using the full-equality model—falls from 75 percent to 46.7 percent. Since all of the structural mobility in Table 2.1 originated in the decline of manual occupations, 8.8 percent of the total sample still had to move in order to transform the origin distribution into the destination distribution. The main difference is in the proportion of 'circulators' who drop from 55 percent to 23 percent of the total sample.

To the extent that the classification of occupations into manual and non-manual strata is indicative of an actual class division, then the manual-non-manual line represents a real barrier to class mobility. Indices of association and dissociation (in brackets in the body of Table 2.3) show this most clearly. Values along the major diagonal underscore what the percentages also show: that occupational inheritance predominates and that it is more in evidence in the middle-class stratum than in the working-class stratum (1.59 versus 1.19). There is, accordingly, less upward and downward movement than there would be given statistical independence or full equality. However, the fact that the index for
downward mobility is somewhat less than that for upward mobility (.60 versus .73) suggests that the barrier acts to forestall downward mobility to a slightly greater degree than it does upward mobility. The greater tendency towards non-mobility, when the data is viewed in this collapsed and simplified way, is also reflected in the stronger, though still modest, relationship between fathers' and sons' status as measured by Cramer's \( V = .332 \).^8

In the mobility matrix for the Glass study, shifts in the distribution of fathers and sons were much more complex than those shown in Table 2.1.\(^9\) When the eight status categories are collapsed these shifts nearly balance out so that virtually none of the observed mobility across the manual-non-manual line is attributable to structural factors in 1949. In other words, almost all of the observed mobility consisted of the interchange of individuals between two strata. It can also be seen, in Table 2.3, that patterns of upward and downward mobility differ somewhat: in 1970 more upward and less downward mobility is theoretically expected and actually observed than in 1949. Beyond these differences, the main--and unanticipated--finding is the remarkable similarity in the total amount of observed and expected mobility and in measures of association and dissociation between the two samples. Whether considered in terms of mobility ratios (indices of association and dissociation in Table 2.3) or Cramer's \( V \), the most apparent conclusion is that the father's status continues to exert about the same influence on sons' destination as it did two decades ago.

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^8 Blau and Duncan (1967: 104) found a Cramer's \( V = .336 \) when their 1962 American data were collapsed into broad occupational groups.

^9 Status categories I, III, IV and Vb were smaller while status categories II, Va, VI and VII were larger in the sons' generation than in the fathers' generation.
Before concluding from these latter measures that there has been no change in the rate of intergenerational mobility it should be recalled that the two studies are based on different sampling frames. The present study, as I have already described, is based on a sample of the London Region, a major section of the South-East Region, while the 1949 data are from a national sample. Not only is the South-East one of the fastest growing regions in Britain, but it is also the most highly urbanized.\textsuperscript{10} In the absence of any firm data, we can only speculate as to the effect these factors might have in creating differentials in the rate of mobility between the London Region and other regions. But the hypothesis that there is a higher rate of mobility in the London Region than in other parts of Britain, seems intuitively the most plausible. If such a hypothesis, is indeed, valid, then the similarity in measures of manual and non-manual mobility just presented for the two studies is at least suggestive of a possible trend towards greater rigidity in the occupational structure. Further, the direction of the observed change in those measures which did differ, is also consistent with this conclusion. That is, that the higher rate of downward mobility and the larger amount of circulation mobility found in the earlier study, are by conventional interpretations of these measures, indicative of more fluidity or openness than is presently the case. Unfortunately the data presented in Table 2.3 do not substantiate, adequately, this conclusion of worsening mobility opportunities. At the same time, they do not provide any evidence that the British occupational structure has become less rigid than two decades ago. When taken at their face value, the summary statistics of Table 2.3 indicate only that there has been very little change at all in the degree of rigidity between the two time periods.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Aside from its intrinsic interest, there were two reasons for exam­
ing in some detail the actual patterns and rates of mobility measured
in the Work and Leisure Study. First, since the men who will be consid­
ered in the following chapters are part of this 'mobility matrix' it is
useful to my discussion to have viewed them, so to speak, in some larger
context. Secondly, I hoped that when social mobility was analysed in
this way it would provide an objective 'backdrop' to the subjective--and
largely optimistic--views about mobility, opportunity and class structure
which occupy much of the 'front stage' in this study. The following para­
graphs summarize the main findings of the analysis.

First, the data show considerable intergenerational movement be­
tween the six occupational classes. While most of this movement is short
distance, into adjacent categories, some 64 percent of the men were,
nevertheless, in a different status category than their father. The pre­
dominance of mobility rather than non-mobility is further emphasized by
the fact that in only two occupational classes was occupational inherit­
ance greater than social movement. Upward mobility surpassed downward
mobility in frequency; slightly over one-quarter of the sample had been
downwardly mobile, while nearly two-fifths had been upwardly mobile.

Throughout, I am concerned mainly with intergenerational movements
upwards and downwards across the manual-non-manual line. When mobility
is defined in this way, it emerged that the majority of the men are non­
mobile; only about one-third had been intergenerationally mobile upward­
ly or downwardly across this important demarcation line. Conventional
outflow measures of rates of manual and non-manual mobility worked out
for the London Region as 29.6 percent upward and 35.5 percent downward.

Most of the mobility consisted of an interchange of individuals,
what I have called circulation mobility. And, of the two ideal-typical models proposed, the amount of mobility observed was generally more in accord with a full-equality of opportunity model than a maximum stability model. This was true whether social movement was viewed as movement between the six classes, or as manual and non-manual mobility.

Perhaps the clearest indication of this was the relatively weak association between fathers' status and sons' status, an association which was still modest even when the data were collapsed into manual and non-manual categories.

When the 1970 data are compared to the 1949 British data, the overriding impression is that mobility rates have remained more or less constant. Manual and non-manual mobility—the most valid basis for comparison—for the two time periods, yielded virtually identical values for several measures of association and dissociation. What differences there were—in 1970 more upward and less downward mobility and less circulation mobility than in 1949—are generally suggestive of a trend towards greater rigidity in the British occupational structure. The fact that downward mobility is not so significant relative to upward mobility bears re-stressing. Whereas in 1949 there were, in absolute numbers, as many people moving downwards as upwards across the manual–non-manual line, there are in 1970 twice as many moving up as down. The conventional outflow rate of mobility has also shown a corresponding decline.

Of course, studies of gross rates of occupational mobility, by themselves or in comparison, reveal little about possible trends in income, educational and residential dimensions of social mobility. Nor do they tell us what proportion of the observed mobility in each time period was translated into social or class mobility. Thus, improvements in any of these aspects of social mobility might well be generally perceived as an
increase in mobility opportunities even though occupational mobility is either remaining constant or is actually declining. Also, not shown in the tables are the actual mobility and non-mobility routes used. The next three chapters address themselves to these kinds of questions concerning the mobility just measured.
CHAPTER 3

ROUTES AND DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

In this chapter I attempt two things. First, I shall describe something of the nature and complexity of the social mobility summarized and analysed in the last chapter. I do this, principally, through an examination of intragenerational mobility and educational and non-educational mobility routes. The second focus of this chapter is on the extent of change in basic stratification dimensions: income, residence and education as a result of intergenerational mobility.

INTERGENERATIONAL AND INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY

One of the more important findings in the Lipset and Bendix (1959: 185) mobility study was the extent to which men in Oakland, regardless of origin status, had held jobs quite far removed from that status. Most men of high social origin had at some time held low-level manual positions and nearly half the men of working-class parentage had held at least one high-status position.¹ A direct comparison with the findings of other studies is inappropriate because the Mobility Sample includes a disproportional number of those respondents who have at some time crossed the manual-non-manual line. Even taking this into account, however, my sample shows less heterogeneity than the American data imply. This can be seen in Table 3.1

¹Goldthorpe et al (1968b: 52) report findings somewhat along these lines. About one-third of their affluent workers had held a white-collar job at some point in their work history.
which shows by father's social class the proportion who have held at least one job on the other side of the manual-non-manual line. In reading these percentages it must be recognized that people may be counted twice; once if they have ever held a manual job and again if they have ever worked in a non-manual position. In all, 68 percent have worked at some time in a non-manual job and 65 percent have worked at some time in a manual job.

TABLE 3.1
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHOSE FATHERS WERE IN SPECIFIED SOCIAL CLASSES AND WHO HAVE WORKED AT SOME TIME IN A MANUAL OR NON-MANUAL OCCUPATION: MOBILITY SAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Social Class</th>
<th>Category in Which Sons Have Held At Least One Job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Non-manual</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Manual</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reflecting, possibly, the exaggeration of the upwardly mobile in the sample, sons of manual fathers have more cross-class experience than those originating in non-manual families. As suggested above, the figures
given in Table 3.1 probably exaggerate the amount of heterogeneity, yet even taking this into account, the proportions reported by Lipset and Bendix are still, on the whole, higher than those for the Mobility Sample.2

Only about eight percent of the careers involved some complicated pattern of movements back and forth across the manual-non-manual line. Two-thirds of the men had spent their total career solely in either manual occupations or non-manual occupations, and about one-fifth of the careers involved a more or less straightforward movement upwards from manual to non-manual. Only three percent of the men had experienced a downward movement from non-manual to manual.

These figures can be seen in the bottom row of Table 3.2 in which the major patterns of intragenerational mobility are cross-tabulated with conventional social mobility.3 This table shows that 52 percent of the upwardly mobile were intergenerationally mobile at the beginning of their career, 43 percent have become intergenerationally mobile as a result of upward movement in their career, and 5 percent have experienced more com-

2 For instance, 74 percent of their sample had worked in a non-manual job and 80 percent had worked in a manual job at some time in their career. Other figures are correspondingly higher, ranging from 57 percent to 87 percent.

3 Conventional social mobility refers to a comparison between the father's present (last) occupation and son's present job. This, the most reliable measure of mobility is used throughout this study. I also recorded the father's job when he was the same age as the respondent (age - specific) and his job when the son was age 16. The latter, when compared with the son's first job gives a measure I call 'pure intergenerational mobility'. I wondered whether an age-specific measure might be a better predictor of attitudes and behaviour than a conventional measure. However, on preliminary analysis of my data, I found little difference between the two and therefore use the conventional mobility measure both because of its greater reliability and because results from the mobility sample would be compatible with those of the Work and Leisure study. Because of intragenerational mobility of the son and/or his father, the three measures do give different rates of upward and downward mobility.
plicated patterns. It is also of interest that about one-fifth (21%) of those who are now stable non-manual have achieved this position through intragenerational mobility. The downwardly mobile have, as a group, the least experience in positions across the manual-non-manual line.

TABLE 3.2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPECIFIED PATTERNS OF INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY AND CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>All Manual Non-manual</th>
<th>Manual Non-to manual</th>
<th>Non-to manual</th>
<th>Other*</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upward</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Non-manual</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes patterns such as manual to non-manual to manual, non-manual to manual to non-manual and more complicated or erratic patterns.

** It is, of course, impossible to have been (say) upwardly mobile, intergenerationally, and have spent the total career in a manual occupation.

Neither Table 3.1 or 3.2 give any indication of the length of time individuals have spent in a category different than their present one.

4 Not all of the sons were downwardly mobile. Some fathers have also been upwardly mobile, in the interval.
Any full-time job in another category held for at least three months was considered as eligible in these tables. Many of these, especially manual jobs in the context of a mainly non-manual career, may represent a rather trivial experience. Following the example of Lipset and Bendix (1959: 186), Table 3.3 shows by pattern of intergenerational mobility both proportions who have been intragenerationally mobile and the proportion of the career spent in a manual occupation. Since the length of time people have been in the labour force varied considerably, those aged 30 and over have been examined separately in the last two columns.

Column 1 indicates that whatever the intergenerational mobility pattern, from one-fifth to nearly one-half of the men in each category have held jobs on the other side of the manual-non-manual line to where they are presently located. With the exception of the upward and downward categories, differences between the mobility groups are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These figures are in contrast to those of Lipset and Bendix (1959: 186) who report comparable ones ranging from one-half to two-thirds. When the older age group is considered separately, (third column from the end) there is, as might be expected, a slight rise in the proportions for each category though differences are not very large.

An inspection of the second column of Table 3.3 gives a very different perspective. It emerges that, on the whole, most of the men have on average spent very little of their total career in a category different than their present one. In this respect, those who have non-manual origins—the downwardly mobile and the stable non-manual—have had very little cross-class experience at all. The downwardly mobile, it seems, enter manual occupations at the beginning of their career and in overwhelming numbers remain there the rest of their lives. Likewise, those who have retained a middle-class position appear to make forays of only
### TABLE 3.3

**SOCIAL MOBILITY, INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY AND TIME SPENT IN MANUAL OCCUPATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>30 Age Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion Ever Holding Job in Category Other Than Present</td>
<td>Percentage of Career Spent in Manual Job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upward</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Non-manual</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downward</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Manual</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
limited duration across the manual-non-manual line. Those who originate in the working class tend to have the most cross-class experience. This is as true, though in opposite directions, whether they have been socially mobile or not. Still, the major part of the career of these two groups has also been spent in their present category. While, as we saw earlier, about half of the intergenerational upward mobility involved intragenerational mobility, the average time spent in manual occupations was not large. Again, these proportions do not alter appreciably or systematically when the older age group is considered separately.⁵

Despite the larger proportions having held jobs in a different category in the Lipset and Bendix (1959) data, the duration of time spent in manual occupations turns out to be highly similar. Whereas their figures ranged from 7 percent to 90 percent my proportions range from 5 to 85 percent. The one important difference is in the upwardly mobile category: they found that about one-quarter of the career had been spent in a manual job, compared with 16 percent for this sample. In their study, the fathers' social class (manual or non-manual) did distinguish between the time spent in manual work by what are now non-manual workers (P. 187). The 11 percent difference in the Mobility Sample between the stable non-manual and the upwardly mobile (16% - 5%) does not, however, reach the .05 level of significance. Thus, Americans, on the basis of these data, have in aggregate more cross-class experience than their British counterparts, but the time spent 'experimenting' or perhaps, 'building-up steam', is much the same.⁶

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⁵These work-life or career patterns are shown graphically in Chapter 5 for each mobility and non-mobility group. See Tables 5.1 to 5.5.

⁶It is perhaps worth noting that in calculating the proportions in the preceding tables, war service and national service were excluded both because of its dependence on age and the difficulty of coding it reliably.
**OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY AND OTHER STATUS INDICATORS**

Social mobility may be viewed as a special case of status incongruency, one in which, by definition, a characteristic in the mobile individual's status profile is out of line—the occupation of his father. As a result, the socially mobile are *ipso facto* status incongruent compared to the non-mobile, a factor which under some circumstances may be enough to deny them acceptance into the new class or group (See: Tumin, 1957). But beyond this, are the socially mobile also more likely than the non-mobile to have other statuses similarly discrepant? In general, occupation is by no means a perfect indicator of other status dimensions (Duncan, 1961), so that 'empirically, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the prestige attributed to a position a man occupies and either the training or education required to enter it or the income received from pursuing it' (Hodge, 1970: 183). Is this likely to be especially the case for those who move upwards and downwards in the occupational prestige hierarchy? The following paragraphs try to answer that question with respect to income, residence and education.

1. **INCOME**

Do intergenerational changes in occupational prestige lead to corresponding changes in income? The data of Table 3.4 suggest that in general they do. As a whole, the group interviewed a second time was a prosperous one with the extreme in income distribution tending to be at

Most of the men who had service experience were in the lower ranks so that cross-class experience measured as experience in manual occupations is somewhat underestimated. It is not clear in the Lipset and Bendix data whether war service was included or excluded.

7 Much of the literature on status incongruence, status discrepancy, status inconsistency and lack of status crystallization as it has been variously called, is summarized in Lenski (1966). See also Malewski (1966); Lenski (1967); Hodge (1970); Hopper (1971b: 20-26).
the top end rather than the bottom end of the scale. For instance, about nine percent reported household income above £4,000 per annum. With respect to patterns of mobility, the results in Table 3.4 reveal no statistically significant differences between the high upwards, low upwards and stable non-manual groups. Although there appear to be some differences between the high downward group and the low downward and stable manual, these differences do not reach significance. The main distinction is between the manual and non-manual who differ very substantially in average income. Entrants into the middle class are as likely if not more likely to have a high income than are the established members. Similarly, downward mobility also appears to carry with it the likelihood of an income level as low, perhaps lower, than that of the stable working class.

Unfortunately, comparable data on mobility and income could not be tabulated for the Work and Leisure Study due to a technical difficulty in the computer program. It is relevant to note at this point that the two criteria used in constructing the mobility sub-sample—intergenerational mobility and whether fathers were living—had the effect of biasing the sample in terms of age, income and class. As a group the mobility sub-sample is younger and more prosperous. Thus, the mean age of the total Work and Leisure Study sample and the mobility subsample were 44.6 and 35.4 respectively, a difference which is significant (t = 6.87, P < .001). Similarly, with regard to income, the mean household income, before deductions, for the Work and Leisure Study and the mobility subsample, was £1,645 and £1,938 respectively. This difference which is significant (t = 2.59, P < .01), is caused by the disproportional sampling of the mobile. That is, the subsample underrepresents manual respondents and overrepresents non-manual respondents.
TABLE 3.4
CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME:

SUMMARY STATISTICS: MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 116)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Social Mobility</th>
<th>Mean (£)</th>
<th>Standard Deviation (£)</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) High Upward</td>
<td>2,583</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Low Upward</td>
<td>2,132</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Stable Non-manual</td>
<td>2,354</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) High Downward</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Low Downward</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Stable Manual</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Work &amp; Leisure Study</td>
<td>1,645</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Mobility Sub-sample</td>
<td>1,938</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using t-Test $P = .05$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Using t-Test</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 X 2 -- N.S.</td>
<td>3 X 4 -- $P &lt; .001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 X 3 -- N.S.</td>
<td>3 X 5 -- $P &lt; .001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 X 6 -- $P &lt; .001$</td>
<td>3 X 6 -- $P &lt; .001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 X 3 -- N.S.</td>
<td>4 X 5 -- N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 X 6 -- $P &lt; .001$</td>
<td>4 X 6 -- N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 X 6 -- N.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. RESIDENCE

I did not inquire systematically about possessions. But it was apparent that most of the homes visited in the second round of interviewing reflected in their furnishings the relative affluence just described. In working-class homes two and three piece black leatherette suites, bright, solid-colour wall-to-wall carpets and elaborate gas or electric fires were the rule rather than the exception. Frequently, Scandinavian dining room sets could be seen in the next room. On the
walls were pictures of leaping horses, large-eyed children, idealized young women—the sort which have earned the name of 'wall furniture'. There was, often, an impression of fanatic cleanliness and order—sometimes to the point of sterility. Books, papers, and professional wedding and baby photos were carefully positioned and were seemingly, irrevocably, in place. Some homes, of course, especially in inner London were rundown and overcrowded with minimal and nondescript furnishings, open coal fires or paraffin heaters warming only the room with the television. In one, bits of several motors were strewn about both the dining and living rooms. But these were so much the exception as to be memorable and outstanding.

Middle-class homes tended, on the whole, to be less tidy. Though 'G-Plan', especially in the housing estates, was much in evidence there were subtle differences from that found in working-class homes. Often, juxtaposed against the unity and homogeneity of modern furnishings, was some more ancient piece: a large heavily carved chair, a grandfather clock, a massive mahogany table, a sideboard. Televisions, less prominently displayed vied in importance with component stereo systems, the tangle of wires perhaps a form of inverted snobbery. Books, magazines and records, all much more in evidence, had, less obviously, a precise place or had long ago overgrown it.

Whereas working-class homes seemed to have been furnished all in one go, there were in middle-class homes, sometimes, conspicuously underfurnished rooms: a wall left vacant until the money now paying school fees could be diverted to a sofa; a bare floor awaiting eventually wall-to-wall carpets. Apologies for the lack of furniture, the overstuffed, often ugly cast-offs of parents and the untidiness were, it seemed, middle-class traits; the working class seldom were apologetic, whatever the
state of their home. Again, there were exceptions as with the working class though in the opposite direction. There was the home of one respondent in Surrey, in which four reception rooms were filled, respectively, with what appeared to be genuine antiques each from a different period. There was also the mansion in a street of equally massive houses in North London, all built within the past decade rather than in some more iniquitous era. However, instead of a coach house, each was now provided with a cavernous garage still not large enough to house both the Bentleys and Jaguars and the 'fast looking' Minis and Cortinas which belonged to wives and teenagers.

Together these impressions might in the hands of a more sensitive observer have formed the basis of a supplementary measure of the precise status position of those interviewed. Like Chapin's (1933) 'living-room scale', the way in which people present themselves through their possessions did point elusively to differences between the established middle class and the newcomers—the upwardly mobile. And, among those who had moved upwards there were also differences: university graduates for instance, had seemed to gravitate to new housing estates and to have gone about the furnishing of their modern homes in a similar way as had the affluent working class—all at one time. In contrast, I found that some among those who were upwardly mobile over their career were more firmly typical of the middle class. The difference was in part age; most of the university graduates interviewed were in their mid-twenties and in their first home whereas men in the latter group had had time to settle, to accumulate possessions and to achieve a kind of middle-class shabbiness.

Somewhat more readily quantified and systematized was the basic type of housing in which people lived. This has been simplified even

9 For a recent attempt to develop such a scale, see: Laumann and House (1970).
further by making the important division that of whether people own their own home, rent it privately or live in a council property. I have therefore ignored the hierarchy within the private sector which has as its base the 'two-up and two-down' terrace house and at its pinnacle homes such as the carefully restored 'old rectory' parts of which were built, perhaps, in the sixteenth century.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND RESIDENCE

As can be seen in Table 3.5, more of my respondents own their home than otherwise. Non-manual respondents are more than twice as likely as manual respondents to do so. A more basic dichotomy is between council housing and private housing. There is, perhaps, not as great a stigma attached to council housing as there is to 'low income housing' in the United States but most middle-class people, whatever their income, are not likely to choose to live in a council owned property. As two middle-class respondents who lived near council estates commented:

You get thefts, discipline problems, all sorts of damage being done. You never used to get it at all. It's entirely the sort of people and the environment they come from. It's only since the council has been built over there we've had the trouble.

When you have people from the East End of London out here in the middle of a suburb, there's bound to be difficulty. The children are used to crowded streets, they don't know what to do with so much open space. Now we have fish and chip wrappers on our lawn and we never used to have that.

When I held income constant, I found manual workers were more likely to live in a council property than were non-manual workers.
### Table 3.5

**PROPORTIONS OF MANUAL AND NON-MANUAL RESPONDENTS BY SPECIFIED TYPES OF HOUSING: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY**

\( (N = 815) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Housing*</th>
<th>Non-Manual</th>
<th>Manual</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flat or House, Owned</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat or House**, Rented Privately</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Flat or House</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents living with parents were classified according to the parents' housing arrangement.

** Includes respondents living in rooms and bedsitters.

\[ X^2 = 81.486; P < .001; C = .30^{11} \]

For those people moving upward and downward in the occupational hierarchy type of housing may, therefore, provide one important indication of their social as well as occupational mobility. Sons of middle-class fathers who live in council housing probably have shifted their class membership group dramatically, whatever their occupational posi-

\[ C, \] the contingency coefficient, is one of the traditional measures of association based on the chi-square. As it employs the chi-square in its calculation, we may test its significance by deciding whether the chi-square for the data is significant. Its properties and limitations are discussed in Siegel, (1956: 196-202). Since the value of chi-square depends on the size of the \( N \), I have used \( C \) not so much to indicate the strength of relationship between mobility and other variables, but rather, to show the extent to which the four mobility patterns differ from one another.
tion relative to their father. Conversely, upward movement occupationally will be unlikely to involve much social mobility if the individual has not moved into some form of private housing. Thus, not only is home ownership a dimension of social mobility in its own right, and a highly visible symbol of financial and occupational success, but it is also indicative of the 'success' of occupational mobility.

Separating out the upwardly mobile from the non-mobile middle class has the effect in Table 3.6 of raising somewhat the proportion of the latter who are home owners. It can also be seen that most of the non-

TABLE 3.6

PATTERNS OF CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND TYPE OF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility Pattern</th>
<th>Type of Housing</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Upward</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>N-M</td>
<td>Downward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned House or Flat</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately Rented House or Flat</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council House or Flat</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(160)</td>
<td>(165)</td>
<td>(95)</td>
<td>(395)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: Chi-square and C's: owned and rented compared with council tenancy, $P = .05$. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X²</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21.610</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>$P &lt; .001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.271</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.464</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>$P &lt; .001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.341</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>$P &lt; .001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73.207</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>$P &lt; .001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.830</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
manual council tenants are in fact those with manual rather than non-manual origins. There is, however, no significant difference between the downwardly mobile and the stable manual with respect to type of residence. With this exception, all four patterns of social mobility differ in the likelihood of living in private sector accommodation or council housing. In general, then, those who move upwards are more likely than the stable manual and less likely than the stable non-manual to own their own home or to rent privately. Those who move downwards, by contrast, are not distinguishable from their class of destination with respect to residence. Downward movement has, therefore, a similar effect on choice of housing as it does for average household income; it leads to a life style and material standards similar to those of the stable working class.

3. EDUCATION

In comparing the educational attainment of the mobile and non-mobile, the educational experiences of the Work and Leisure Study sample provide an overall perspective. Table 3.7 shows that 83 percent of the male respondents had completed their full time education by age 16 or under. By age 18 this figure rises to over 93 percent (not shown in Table 3.7. Differences between the manual and non-manual workers are also striking: non-manual workers are about nine times as likely to stay on past age 16 as are manual workers. When, however, the socially mobile are excluded, the gap between the non-manual and manual almost doubles (3% versus 52% staying on until 17 or older).

---

12 Educational data for the Work and Leisure Study were coded with the lowest age as 16 or under. A better breakdown for our purposes here would have been 15 or under, but short of re-coding the questionnaires these data are unavailable.
TABLE 3.7

PATTERNS OF CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND AGE ON LEAVING
FULL-TIME EDUCATION: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>Age on Leaving Full-time Education</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 and Under</td>
<td>17 and Older</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Upward</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Stable Non-Man.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Downward</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Stable Manual</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>83% (726)</td>
<td>17% (150)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Educational information for 8 respondents missing.

Summary Statistics (P = .05)

- \(X^2\)  
- \(C\)  
- \(P\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(X^2)</th>
<th>(C)</th>
<th>(P)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 X 2</td>
<td>36.355</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 X 3</td>
<td>5.245</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>&lt; .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 X 4</td>
<td>56.633</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 X 3</td>
<td>47.290</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 X 4</td>
<td>212.039</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 X 4</td>
<td>11.586</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That there are large differences between the manual and non-manual respondents in educational achievement is not unexpected. Of more interest is the comparison between the socially mobile and non-mobile. Table 3.7 indicates that there are significant differences between all of the mobility categories used. In particular, the upwardly mobile have on average a substantially lower amount of education than their stable-non-manual counterparts. Contingency coefficients (bottom of Table 3.7) calculated for the data suggest that in respect to educational achievement, the upwardly mobile are most like the downwardly mobile who are in
turn closest to the stable manual, their destination class. 13

Similar though not so striking differences emerge from the more detailed data collected for the Mobility Sample. With the exception of the downwardly mobile and stable manual comparison, the same relationships as described above for the Work and Leisure Study held true when school leaving was dichotomized, as in Table 3.7. However, when school leaving age is considered in terms of minimum education (14 or 15) differences between the mobile and the nonmobile are less substantial. This can be seen in Table 3.8 where the only significant differences are between the two non-manual groups and the two manual groups. Over half of the upwardly mobile and nearly four-fifths of the stable non-manual stayed on beyond the minimum school leaving age, whereas 14 percent of the downwardly mobile and only 7 percent of the stable manual were able to do so.

**TABLE 3.8**

**PATTERNS OF CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND AGE ON LEAVING**

**SCHOOL: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117)**

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Mobility</th>
<th>Age on Leaving School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 or Under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Upward</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Stable Non-Man.</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Downward</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Stable Manual</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary Statistics (P = .05)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(X^2)</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 X 2</td>
<td>3.401</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 X 3</td>
<td>11.196</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>P &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 X 4</td>
<td>17.334</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>P &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 X 3</td>
<td>19.753</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>P &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 X 4</td>
<td>27.012</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>P &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 X 4</td>
<td>.513</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 A further breakdown into high and low upward and high and low
EDUCATIONAL ROUTES

In British society the educational route used is likely more salient in its consequences for the mobile and non-mobile than are the actual years of education completed. The range of ages covered in the sample, combined with both the past and present proliferation of educational systems and routes, requires a long list of possible codes, with the result shown in Table 3.9: frequencies too small for analysis. However, inspection of the questionnaires themselves shows that those who attended a comprehensive or a catholic school obtained an essentially non-grammar school education. All eight of the respondents who attended a 'public' school fell into the stable non-manual category. Thus, in Table 3.10 public school respondents have been considered as 'grammar school'. All other educational experiences are treated as non-grammar.

TABLE 3.9
DISTRIBUTION OF MOBILITY SAMPLE BY TYPE OF SCHOOL ATTENDED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of School</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Modern</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (before 1944)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical School</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Grammar</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public' School</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic School</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School Only</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>117</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.10 shows that grammar and public schools are used by the middle class as a non-mobility route. None of those who moved downward yielded no difference in education for the upwardly mobile. High downwards tended to be slightly better educated than low downwards though the difference was not significant.
had a grammar school education. On the other hand, some of manual fathers who obtain a grammar school education become upwardly mobile. But, over two-thirds of the upward mobility is through what are essentially rejection routes or alternative education mobility routes. In short, grammar school education has in the Mobility Sample, invariably, the effect of maintaining class position in the middle class and insuring upward mobility of those of working-class parentage who had this experience. There is, nevertheless, more non-mobility in the middle class than can be accounted for by attendance at a grammar school. And, over two-thirds of the upward mobility is not accounted for by type of education.

**TABLE 3.10**  
**PATTERNS OF CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND GRAMMAR AND NON-GRAMMAR SCHOOL MOBILITY ROUTES: MOBILITY SAMPLE**  
Percentages  
(N = 117)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Mobility Route</th>
<th>Grammar</th>
<th>Non-Grammar</th>
<th>Total (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Upward</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Stable Non-Manual</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Downward</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Stable Manual</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary Statistics (P = .05)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 X 2</td>
<td>7.650</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 X 3</td>
<td>8.885</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 X 4</td>
<td>10.701</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 X 3</td>
<td>22.489</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 X 4</td>
<td>26.229</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 X 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STATUS INCONGRUENCE: INCOME AND EDUCATION

Apparently, then, many occupations either do not require special educational qualifications or contain a degree of ambiguity about what these should be. Particularly for the upwardly mobile there is, therefore, a good deal of incongruence between occupational prestige and education.\textsuperscript{14} But as indicated earlier, the mean income of the upwardly mobile group is slightly higher than that for the stable non-manual group and is at least £1,000 higher than the mean for the stable manual group. This suggests that, overall, there is also incongruence between income and education. Table 3.11 is an attempt to summarize for each non-manual group in the Mobility Sample the proportion whose income and education are approximately congruent or incongruent.\textsuperscript{15} Columns 1 and 4 show congruent patterns. Thus, if no attention is paid to the direction of the discrepancy, then the upwardly mobile are more likely than the stable non-manual to be differentially located in terms of educational and income dimensions of status (54\% versus 29\%; $X^2 = 4.032; P < .05$). Also, Table 3.11 shows that there is a considerable difference between high upwards--those who have moved upwards three or more occupational status categories--and low upwards--those who have moved up only one or two categories--with some 76 percent of the latter falling into one of the two status incongruent columns. ($X^2 = 5.731; P < .05$).

\textsuperscript{14}The manual groups in the Mobility Sample are not considered because as indicated, none had stayed on in school past the age of 15.

\textsuperscript{15}I am comparing columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.11 for all upward and stable non-manual.
TABLE 3.11

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY AND STATUS INCONGRUENCE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND INCOME: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 68)

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>(1) High Income</th>
<th>(2) High Education</th>
<th>(3) Low Income</th>
<th>(4) Low Education</th>
<th>Total (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Upward</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Upward</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Upward</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Non-Manual</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: Education is split into high and low based on those who completed their full-time education at age 15 or less and those who completed it at age 16 or higher.

Low income is under £2,000 per year; high income is £2,000 per year and higher.

When we attempt to consider the direction of the discrepancy—whether, for instance, a low level of education has yielded a relatively high income and therefore some measure of personal satisfaction or the opposite case, where the investment in education has not paid off in income, a presumably depressing experience (See: Hodge, 1970: 198)—Table 3.11 provides somewhat more complicated results. In general the difference between the mobile and the non-mobile lies in the greater ability of the former to enjoy a high income with a relatively low level of education (27% versus 4%; column 3; \( \chi^2 = 5.362; P < .05 \)). In contrast, there is little difference in the proportions of each group who
are in the unsatisfying situation of a relatively high education and a low income (27% versus 25%, respectively; column 2). Within the upwardly mobile group there are also some complications brought about by the greater tendency of those in the low upward category to be status incongruent in both directions. However, differences between the two mobile groups who are in 'satisfying' versus 'unsatisfying' status combinations are not statistically insignificant.

**ALTERNATIVE EDUCATIONAL ROUTES**

Grammar school or 'public' school and non-grammar school education represent the dominant mobility and non-mobility educational routes in English society and in later chapters this division will be used extensively in considering the consequences of social mobility. But, as we saw earlier, there is the possibility that people passing through what were initially rejection routes may subsequently obtain qualifications from either full-time or part-time technical education. It has been suggested that these alternative educational routes may constitute an important channel for upward mobility. Alternatively, as Lee (1968) argues, there is evidence that technical education has been predominantly employed as a non-mobility route by the middle classes, who would, otherwise, have been rejected by the formal educational system and possibly have faced the prospect of downward mobility. In other words, as with the state grammar school system, he argues that it has been the middle classes who have benefitted most from the provision of technical education.

---

16 For example, educational route was for the upwardly mobile an important indicator of home ownership: whatever the income level, those who were upwardly mobile through a grammar school route were significantly more likely to shun council housing with its working-class connotations than were those upwardly mobile through other routes. See also the discussion below on education and time spent in a manual occupation. Educational routes and their theoretical and empirical effect on personal consequences of social mobility are considered most fully in Chapters 9-11.
The distribution of the sample by type of further education is shown in Table 3.12. Any form of post secondary training mentioned in the interview was coded under one of the categories listed in the table. Yet even with this liberal definition, 60 percent had no formal training beyond their secondary education. Within the university or college category, as well, are some who took short courses and 'emergency' courses at a university without necessarily obtaining a degree. Three respondents received a B.A. as a result of an interrupted training for the Catholic priesthood. Included in 'Technical and Business' training are a variety of accountancy courses and a diploma in Agriculture. City and Guild training is an almost exclusively working-class non-mobility route, and in the following analysis is treated as 'no further education'.

The small numbers who did undertake some form of further education make any conclusive test of these competing hypotheses impossible. In general, those with grammar school education were more than twice as likely to have had some experience of further education (34% versus 15%).

**TABLE 3.12**

**DISTRIBUTION OF MOBILITY SAMPLE BY SPECIFIED TYPES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Further Education</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Further Education</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City and Guilds</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical or Business</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University or College</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td><strong>117</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be seen in Table 3.13, the upwardly mobile and the stable non-manual are about equally likely to have some form of further training. Again, as with grammar school education, the distinction is between manual and non-manual respondents rather than class of origin. Men of working-class origin who obtain further education, are invariably upwardly mobile; men of middle-class origin remain intergenerationally stable or non-mobile. And, although the number of cases become too small for proportions to be calculated, the same pattern is true whether the upwardly mobile and the non-mobile attended grammar school or not. 17

TABLE 3.13

PATTERNS OF CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND FURTHER EDUCATION:

MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117)
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility Pattern</th>
<th>Further Education</th>
<th>No Further Education*</th>
<th>No. of Respondents (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upward</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable N-M</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downward</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Manual</td>
<td>0% (23%)</td>
<td>100% (77%)</td>
<td>27 (117)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* No further education includes those respondents who have City and Guild's qualifications or are presently on day release.

17 When the upwardly mobile and the non-mobile are compared with grammar school or non-grammar school held constant, there is virtually no difference in further education observable for either group. Chi-squares for the two sets of data are almost zero.
Finally, when the training mentioned by respondents is divided into formal and alternative further educational routes, there is no statistical difference between the stable non-manual and the upwardly mobile in the use of these routes.18

EDUCATION AND TIME IN THE WORKING CLASS

Only a minority of the upwardly mobile used an alternative educational route. Most of those who did not attend a grammar school and then perhaps university moved upwards as a result of career or work-life mobility. As was shown in Table 3.3, the upwardly mobile had spent, on average, about 16 percent of their career in a manual occupation. The stable non-manual, by contrast, spent only five percent of their collective careers on the opposite side of the manual-non-manual line.

Perhaps the most striking finding of this chapter is the effect, especially for the high upwardly mobile, of a grammar school education on the time spent in manual work. This is shown in Table 3.14. Both low and high upward mobiles are as likely to enter directly into a middle-class position as are the stable non-manuals, when both have grammar school experience. Those without this experience spend nearly four times as long in manual jobs as do the stable middle class who went to neither public school or grammar school. Thus those who use a grammar school route are much less likely to be subjected to cross-class pressures than are those using non-grammar routes.

18 The numbers involved were small (N = 23). The Fisher Exact Probability Test produced a value greater than five percent. (Table I in Siegel, 1956).
TABLE 3.14

THE EFFECT OF GRAMMAR AND NON-GRAMMAR SCHOOL MOBILITY AND NON-MOBILITY ROUTES ON PROPORTION OF CAREER SPENT IN MANUAL OCCUPATIONS: MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 68)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility Route</th>
<th>Grammar Proportion of Career in Manual</th>
<th>Non-Grammar Proportion of Career in Manual</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</td>
<td>High Upward 2%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Upward 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Upward 3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stable Non-Manual 4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUMMARY

This chapter confirms the view advanced in Chapter 1 that a considerable amount of upward mobility occurs outside of the formal educational system. Movement upward from the working class occurs invariably and rapidly when a grammar school education or further education are involved. But, about two-fifths of the men moved upwards without any education beyond the legal minimum. To be mobile through a non-educational route, however, means that a larger proportion of one's career is spent in a manual occupation. In contrast, grammar school, public school and further education function invariably for the stable middle class as a non-mobility route. No one, in other words, was found who had these kinds of educational experiences and who had also been downwardly mobile.
With respect to other indicators of social status besides education—income and residence—occupational mobility appears to lead to patterns not unlike those of the stable or non-mobile groups. This was especially so for the downwardly mobile who have incomes and housing very similar to the stable working-class group. In terms of income, those who move upwards across the manual-non-manual line enjoy an income which on average is nearly £1,000 higher than that of their class of origin, and which, as well, is slightly higher than that of the class which they are entering. At the same time, they are not as likely to own their own home and to shun council housing as are those who remain stable in the middle class. The implication is that for some of the upwardly mobile, there has not as yet been much of a relational or normative transition, and that for some time at least, they lag behind the patterns of their new class. The fact that educational route is a significant predictor of who among the upwardly mobile is likely to be a home owner gives added weight to this conclusion; those who move upwards through a grammar school route are about as likely to own their own home as are the stable non-manual who did not attend a grammar school.

The brief consideration of status incongruence in the middle class showed that while the upwardly mobile are the most likely to hold status positions which are inconsistent with one another, they have as well, the greater likelihood of the personal satisfaction of gaining an occupational position with a certain degree of prestige and a relatively high income despite a low level of education. At the same time, some—especially in the low upward category—have had the opposite experience of not having education 'pay-off' in terms of income. However, the upwardly mobile were not much different in this respect than stable members of the middle class. Nevertheless, the upwardly mobile, while certainly
exhibiting changes in income, education and residence compared to the stable working class, do not, except with income, completely resemble their new class. In general they tend to bestride the two classes we have been considering. Of the two patterns of mobility, the variables considered in this chapter suggest downward movement is most clearly translated into social mobility. I turn, in the next two chapters, to a more detailed examination of career routes, job histories and actual occupations for further insight into the nature of social mobility.
CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL MOBILITY, WORK AND CAREERS

Occupational mobility as opposed to social mobility has been of considerable interest in its own right. Although the main focus of this study was on social mobility, the close linkage between occupation and class made it inevitable that a major portion of the interview would be taken up with jobs, job changes and attitudes about work. This chapter summarizes and illustrates aspects of the work-life histories relevant to social mobility. How do the mobile differ from the non-mobile with respect to commitment to work, expectations about promotion and job satisfaction? Is the work world of those who move downward inevitably worse than for those who maintain their status or move upward?

CAREERS VERSUS JOBS

By the most commonly used definition, 'a career is a succession of related jobs arranged in a hierarchy of prestige, through which persons move in an ordered, predictable sequence' (Wilensky, 1960: 127). Thus, the difference between 'work' and a 'career' is a large and fundamental one. The notion of career implies commitment and expectations about the future whereas work suggests the accepting of a job as a means to some other non-occupational end. Those who are able to view their life and work as part of a trajectory, who are able to evaluate their present status in terms of where they think they will be at some future point

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1 For textbook-type summaries and syntheses of material relating to these concepts, see Weiss and Reisman (1966) and Taylor (1968: Chapter XI).
and who therefore must be viewed not as they are but as they are becoming, appear more likely to see work not as something divorced and alien but as integral to their personality and life. It is generally believed, then, that much of the satisfaction and also the willingness to work hard and long at the job derives from work which is a segment of a career (Weiss and Reisman, 1966: 602).

At the same time existing evidence on careers and occupations suggests that this kind of satisfaction is likely to be enjoyed by only a minority of the population. Wilensky, in the above cited article, believes that no more than one-quarter to one-third of the American work force can, within his definition, be said to have a career. The larger portion face either the prospect of a job which, other things remaining equal, will continue unchanged for perhaps the several decades until retirement or a disorderly series of jobs which together do not add up to any discernible sense of progress, fulfillment and commitment (Wilensky, 1960: 134-135).

The same finding also seems to apply to the British labour force. Carter (1966: 166) in his sympathetic portrayal of the work world of secondary modern school leavers, writes that:

There are . . . thousands of boys and girls in jobs that are dull and routine, and that are made worse by uninterested employers, foremen and charge hands. For although there is a variety of occupations open to school-leavers in important respects many of the jobs are similar: children may have the opportunity to move from one department to another, for example, or from one part of town to another, to deliver bread or laundry, but all of the jobs are of a type in being repetitive and lacking in prospects. The dull and muted life at work can spill over into the hours away from work, so that much of life is not so much lived as endured: in time, work expels any ambition or ability.

A sense of commitment and involvement with work and career is perhaps

\[2\] For an excellent and brief review of the literature on careers and their importance in the middle class, see Bell (1968: 17-20).
not to be expected from the majority of manual workers. But, at all class levels and at all ages the most striking impression which emerges from the work histories is the degree of unpredictability and lack of planning characterizing most people's work life. Instead of well organized and integrated steps on a ladder there were, even among the stable non-manual respondents, some who had experienced ups and downs and a chain of jobs which in retrospect had led nowhere.

The fact that occupational histories do not always add up to a structured and coherent career does not mean that work had not been, to use Dubin's (1956) phrase, a 'central life interest' for many. In contrast to manual workers, non-manual workers were generally intensely interested in talking, often at great length and detail, about the most significant aspect of their lives—their career or job history. There was a real concern—sometimes wonderment and bewilderment—about where in the past they had been, where they were now and where they might be in years to come. It was also clear that a majority of the middle-class men, whether intergenerationally stable or upwardly mobile, were, in the interview, covering ground that had been worked over and evaluated many times before. In Berger's (1963: 56-57) phraseology, they seemed to have been constantly reinterpreting and reconstructing their biography in accordance with their present ideas of what is important and what is not, 'very much as the Stalinists kept rewriting the Soviet Encyclopedia, calling forth some events into decisive importance as others were banished to ignominious oblivion'. But even granting the inevitability of this process of selective recollection, few men were able so to redefine their past as to read into it an ordered and predictable sequence of

3 For example, see Sykes (1965) who compares clerks and manual workers in their attitudes about promotion and career patterns. See also Goldthorpe et al (1969: Chapters 3 and 5).
events. Rather, as with the Pahls (Pahl and Pahl, 1971), their accounts were filled with references to such themes as luck, circumstance and unexpected patronage. Hard work and ability while undoubtedly also present were, perhaps because of modesty, seldom mentioned, often denigrated.

**INTERRUPTIONS AND REDIRECTIONS**

To a considerable extent the combined effect of the work-life data collected for this middle-mass sample of men was to lend credence to Wilensky's (1960: 127) contention that there is 'a good deal of chaos in modern labour markets, as in the lives of both buyers and sellers--chaos intrinsic to urban industrial society'. For some men the chaos began with their first job, a largely unplanned and non-career oriented event in their lives. For those who began in the bleak years of the 1920's and 1930's it was usually 'a case of taking what job you could get' as more than one man put it. Later war intervened and redirected the course of their occupational life, sometimes in a positive and sometimes in a negative direction. Mr. Lawson, a headmaster, started out in 1937 as a clerk with the Great Western Railway. His father also worked for the railway as a riveter. 'My father's ambition was always that I become part of the clerical staff there. That and the fact that it was convenient were the main reasons. I didn't have any particular ambitions or anything like that'. After serving six years in the Army, Mr. Lawson was able to attend an emergency training college:

I always wanted to be a teacher, always, right from the engine driver stage. I thought it was impossible because my father had no money and was due to retire. Because of my background, I seized the chance after the war.

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4 For similar findings about the role of war experience, see Young and Willmott (1973: 241-242). In their special study of managers the war figured as a turning point for a number of the men interviewed.

5 Names used are fictitious.
Others found that the war experience gave them a new perspective on their own abilities and aspirations. Mr. Adams, who had been upwardly mobile, started out as a sheet metal worker. He is now an inspector in the police force.

Coming out of the services, I was feeling a bit discontented. I'd tasted outside life. I'd tasted the fresh air. I didn't want to go back inside a factory again. I decided I wanted to use my brain not my body. So after about six months in my old place I came out of there and applied for the police force and was accepted and there I was. I'd been a military police in the army. Taste of power, I think; I found it's possible to—a person from my background—suddenly found it possible to have a bit of power and responsibility. I've outgrown it, I hope.

Others saw the war as difficult, an important disruption in their lives. This was true for Mr. Dawson, a cost accountant to a firm of quantity surveyors. He was taking part-time courses in accounting when war broke out.

I started studying for what was the London Certified Accountants. I went through the interim but by the time the final came up it was war time. I was ambitious before the war. I was especially keen on this insurance company but when the war was over they didn't want me back. I must admit, when I, particularly when I came out of the war, was so glad to be alive I couldn't care less about anything. It was an RAF expression ('I couldn't care less'). You lived one day to the next. It took me the best part of 15 years to get my feet on the ground. Really, until I got this job, at which time it was too late in life. I tried to do the examination again but I'd been away from it too long. My brain had got atrophied in a way that I was just sunk.

**JOB CHANGES**

But without the obvious problems of depression, war and national service, chaos was also evident in the work-life histories of younger men. Here it was, perhaps paradoxically, the range of possible jobs, an embarrassment of riches, which confronted them. The first job did not need to be taken very seriously because another was so easy to find. Men in their twenties could and did change jobs with surprising frequency and for reasons which had little to do with career advancement. Nearly half of the mobility sample worked for less than two years at their
first job and on average, the time spent was about two and a half years. There was no systematic or appreciable difference between the men when grouped by either class, conventional mobility pattern, or age.

A variety of factors entered into the relatively quick shifts people made. For some there was a reasonably detailed calculation of where the job was or was not taking them and how their career might be better served. In part also, there was a recognition, primarily by the upwardly mobile that the first job was not even close to what they had hoped to do. Thus, the problematic nature of deciding on a course came out in many of the explanations. Mr. Beacroft, a chief engineer and plant manager, was one of these:

I left school at 15 to take up an apprenticeship in toolmaking, but looking at people around me and with my apprenticeship papers in one hand and my deferment papers in the other, I tore up my apprenticeship papers and went into the air force. By the time I came out I felt I knew everything, and I talked my way into a job as a structural designer.

As Mr. Knapp, an industrial chemist, found, the family tradition began to rankle: 'I became a carpenter because Dad was and because Uncle was and because Grandad was. I had to work to help out the family, so it was like Dad votes Labour, so I do. Then I said, "What am I doing this for"? and joined the Navy'. 'It was purely emotional. I was cheesed off with the manager and I was fed up with engineering work. So, I went to an employment agency and they sent me to the ship broker's firm where I am now', said a 22-year-old shipping clerk.

Whatever the mobility experience of the men interviewed there was evidence of considerable job shifting. Calculation of job changes is somewhat arbitrary since it is not always clear what is meant by a job change. Within one firm a man may have a succession of jobs, which he recalls as each being different. The other extreme is the skilled tradesman who though changing firms frequently, does exactly the same work in each. Especially in the building industry is this likely to be the case.
'I've had too many jobs to count,' said Mr. Turnbull, a plumber. 'In my trade I change a lot because the firms demand that you travel. I didn't want to travel too far away so when they said to me, "Oh, there's a job in Coventry or up North", then I'd leave because there's always plenty of work in London. I've tried to stay as close as I can to London. As a result, by age 23, Mr. Turnbull could recall at least ten jobs he has had since leaving school.

In direct contrast to Mr. Turnbull was Mr. Gadsby, who in 21 years has worked only for the G.P.O. Through part-time education he has steadily gained in qualifications and was at the time of the interview just finishing a Master's degree in Science. His promotions within the G.P.O. have lock-stepped with his educational advancement going from trainee technician to staff engineer. In his mind, he has had several distinct jobs.

For all mobility groups the mean number of full-time jobs held since leaving school is five (Table 4.1). About 12 percent of the sam-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEAN NUMBER OF JOBS FOR VARIOUS PATTERNS OF CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND NON-MOBILITY: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGH UPWARD</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
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</table>

6 In the end it seemed most appropriate for present purposes to
people had held ten or more jobs in their lifetime. There are some differences when mobility is considered. Thus, those who have moved upwards have had more jobs on average than those moving downwards or those who have remained stable non-manual. When the men are grouped according to their present class, however, there is no difference between the non-manual and manual respondents in average number of jobs ever held. At the same time, stable non-manual and manual respondents do differ in the number of firms they have worked in (Table 4.2). Those who have moved upwards have worked in fewer firms than those who remain within the working class.

**TABLE 4.2**

CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND NUMBER OF FIRMS EVER WORKED IN:

MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117)

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>Number of Firms 1-4</th>
<th>Number of Firms 5 or more</th>
<th>(100%) Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upward (1)</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Non-Manual (2)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downward (3)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>(22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Manual (4)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>(27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(117)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$1 \times 2 \: x^2 = 0.601 \quad \text{N.S.}$

$2 \times 3 \: x^2 = 2.117 \quad \text{N.S.}$

$1 \times 4 \: x^2 = 4.309 \quad p < .05$

$2 \times 4 \: x^2 = 6.080 \quad p < .05$

$3 \times 4 \: x^2 = 0.928 \quad \text{N.S.}$

treat jobs within the same firm seen by the respondents as distinct, as separate jobs. For example, Mr. Gadsby was recorded as having five jobs in his lifetime. Consequently my figures are not comparable to those of the second labour mobility survey (Harris & Clausen, 1966: 55-63).
Younger men have not had as much opportunity to change jobs as have older men. To take age into account I constructed a job stability index, to show the number of jobs per decade. For all groups the median is 2.6 jobs per decade. As can be seen in Table 4.3, the one group which stands out at all is the stable manual category. However, the difference between this group and others in job stability does not reach statistical significance.

**TABLE 4.3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exceeding Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Exceeding Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: Median = 2.6 jobs per decade. Cases falling at the median are taken as 'not exceeding the median'.

**PROMOTION**

Although most of the men wanted more money than they were presently earning, few admitted to seeking actively after promotion. Following Wilensky (1966), I asked everyone whether they would accept a higher position if it was offered to them. When faced with this kind of question more than half (57 percent) would be willing to accept such a position.

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7 This was calculated by dividing the number of job changes made by the respondent by the years he has been in the labour force. This value was then multiplied by ten.
Despite expectations, there was virtually no difference in percent willing to accept promotion between the four mobility groups or by present class. Rather, it was in the kinds of responses which people made in qualifying or elaborating upon their basic agreement or disagreement that differences between the various groups could be found. These suggest that promotion has very different meanings for people at different positions in the occupational hierarchy. Manual workers were aware of the limited steps which lay above them, whereas the prospect of promotion is taken as a matter of course by white-collar workers. For example, in the Work and Leisure Study we asked whether there was a career ladder where people worked. It emerged that more than three-quarters of the men now in non-manual positions believed that their job does have a career ladder compared to about 47 percent of the manual workers. Differences were mainly based on present occupation and class rather than around patterns of social mobility and non-mobility.

The next step for most manual workers is charge hand or foreman and as the comments recorded about promotion suggest, these are generally thought to be undesirable positions. Some saw the foreman's job as meaning simply more work and responsibility but little advance financially.

No, this is sort of what I want to do—basically go on bricklaying. I've got quite sufficient money for what I want. I have no ambitions to be foreman. Why should I go to work and have all the responsibility for peanuts basically? You'd be a mug to go and have all that responsibility. (Bricklayer).

Others were concerned about the particular nature of the supervisory role. As one man said:

I'd never take a foreman's job again so I'll always be a worker. From what I've seen of foremen, you're in-between. It's just not worth it, I think. (Motor Fitter)

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8See Chinoy (1955a: 6), who suggests that 'two ladders of advancement seem to have emerged in industry. One, open to workers, is short with few rungs, usually ending in foremanship'.
Escape rather than promotion loomed larger in the minds of most of the younger men. Mr. Justice, a 20-year-old camera assembler felt his best jobs so far were 'being on vans', since it got him around and about a bit, 'and landscape gardening' because it was outside. He said of his present work, 'Well, I don't mind working, but I hate to sit there for eight solid hours like a vegetable without a gap for a smoke which happens a lot. I don't like many restrictions'. And, Mr. Popple, a 19-year-old, had between the two interviews taken a 'temporary'--perhaps permanent--leave from his apprenticeship in plumbing to work with a roofing gang who travelled all over the South-East.

The theme of escape was also apparent among the several men in their mid-twenties who wanted someday to become a sales and maintenance worker. Mr. Oram, a plumber, said about an ideal job: 'Within the scope of anything, I think I'd like to do sales work and maintenance as well. You know, sales and after service. One of these firms that has a roving salesman. That way I could get around and still use what I know about heating and ventilating'.

THE MIDDLE CLASS AND PROMOTION

Possession of a white-collar job carries with it the notion of a career ladder and the expectation of movement upwards on it. As indi-

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9Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1969: 79), having reviewed the literature, concluded that among white-collar workers the desire for promotion is almost universal. In their white-collar sample 87 percent of the men were in favour of promotion. My data agree with theirs in part. In answer to the question, 'Different people want different things out of a job. What are the things you feel are important?' only 11 percent put promotion as a first requirement. However, when in the next question I asked whether promotion was important or not, 74 percent of the white-collar men compared to 46 percent of the blue-collar men said it was important (P < .01). The mobile did not differ very much at all from the pattern of their destination groups.
cated earlier, this is true whether the person holding the position has been upwardly mobile or not. While most took for granted that the path they were on was an upward one, only a few seemed totally committed to their work, and showed the kind of persistent and pervasive drive and confidence in their abilities that the careerist stereotype implies. Instead, both the desire and expectation of promotion were often tempered by qualifications and by consideration of its effect on other aspects of their lives—family, hobbies, and activities.

The striking contrast in this important aspect of 'life chances' between the manual worker and the non-manual worker is perhaps best caught in the expectations of two young men, both in their early twenties and both from middle-class backgrounds.

It will be a gradual progression up the ladder from what I'm doing already. Things can only get better since I've only been broking four years and I'm down at the bottom of the ladder. After several years you go up to senior broker and you get more complicated work to do. Eventually I suppose directorship of a firm which becomes more managerial. (Insurance Broker)

Middle management is my objective. I feel that at senior level, once again your class distinction comes into it all. If you've got the contacts—'public' school helps a lot, it's still dependent on the school tie and the old boy network. I don't think my social contacts are good enough. I didn't go to a 'public' school, or at least not the sort that educates for senior management. If I made senior management, it would be through hard graft and nothing else. (Accountant)

It was also within the stable middle-class sample that men were found who seemed completely committed to their work and to reaching up that next step. Mr. Phelps, a financial consultant (in his forties), was one of these:

What I do today is basically a treadmill of expansion to a much larger and grander scale. I only half know what lies around the corner, but the way computers are developing I may have the opportunity of running a European team to set up two giant installations with branches to Brussels, Frankfurt, West Berlin, and Milan. It would be a logical next step and one I'm working towards.

Others felt that there were 'other areas to conquer within their
orbit', including as one man, a sales manager, put it, 'running one of the largest companies—preferably British—given the opportunity'. Mr. Peet, who is a managing director, said, 'I want the company to expand and me with it, taking over a few others along the way, buying them out instead of the other way round'. But, these were, on the whole, exceptions. A much lower level of ambition and aspiration than was shown by Mr. Phelps and his counterparts was more common, especially among the upwardly mobile. Thus, some felt that they had risen as high as either their ability or their personal career ladder would permit. For Mr. Gibson, an authorized clerk in the City, it was the latter:

I can't go anywhere from here. That's my ultimate, really. I daresay in ten years or so I would be senior dealer and I think I will be made a member. The only difference is you use a different toilet and have another badge on. Financially, it wouldn't help. You could say I'm at the top of the tree because that's how big my tree is.

And Mr. Lawson, head master of a primary school in Kent, also felt his upward movement was at an end:

I don't see myself going anywhere at this point. I don't even have any particular desire to take on bigger things. As a parent I've known for a long time said to me, 'It's funny you haven't gone to a bigger school, but now I feel it's your place'. It does satisfy me a lot; I can make of it what I like.

Within the stable non-manual segment of the middle class there were several who placed a higher premium on locale than on promotion. Mr. Toombs, an administrative manager as well as fearing 'ulcers at 55', could not imagine leaving his family home in Buckinghamshire. 'I'm very much a countryman and the thought of living in a city appalls me. So I couldn't really consider moving to another firm, however good the offer, if it meant giving up this place'.

For others, however, there was an active desire not to be promoted any higher because of the costs entailed. Mr. Springall, a 45-year-old advertising manager, declared,

I don't want to go any higher. What I've seen, some men, like one of our
directors, stays at his office until late in the evening, not because of
what he has to do, but because he doesn't know what to do when he gets
home. That's not my problem. I feel I've made a balance, but if some­
one said I could work fewer hours, I would.

Another man, a buyer, was also weighing the costs more carefully:
I'm not so ambitious as I was between 30 and 40. Having reached 40, I
find to do overtime, work weekends, and so on, you stop and think, 'Do
you want it? Are you earning enough'?

If there are conclusions to be drawn from a close reading of these
aspects of the non-manual work histories, it would be that while work is
highly important to these men, it is not for the majority so all-consum­
ing as it has been generally portrayed in the past. At the same time,
men who came from middle-class backgrounds were, in what they had to say
at least, somewhat more ambitious than those from working-class back­
grounds. In part this is explained by the fact that upwardly mobile men
who were older had already come a long way and had reached the peak of
their trajectory. Younger men from working-class origins did not always
know what steps might lie ahead, were only starting to become ambitious
as various challenges had come their way and had been met successfully,
or like Mr. Hennessey, a 23-year-old computer analyst, were taking stock:
'At the moment I'd like to get my wind', he said, 'I don't really want
promotion. I sort of feel I need time to settle. I need to work things

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10Thus, Dahrendorf (1959: 56): 'the supreme social reality (for
bureaucrats) is their career' and Seeley et al (1956: 118): 'to the
people of Crestwood Heights, the career is of all concerns, the most
momentous'. My data point rather to a decreased or qualified commitment
to work among middle-class men. More atypical than typical was Mr. Fer­
guson, who is very much of the older stereotype:
I used to say 'enough is enough is enough' as the Times once said in a
leader. In the closing stages of my life I thought how silly it would
be to go on and collapse between the shaft like a broken-down old cab
horse. But now the time is getting near and I still do feel vigorous
and all that. I'm beginning to feel it a bit silly to pack up at 60.
I ought to give it another few years. So, if the service said, 'Here's
another project, take it on, will you?' I'd do so for a few more years
or as long as it took to complete it.'
out a bit'. Especially in the stable middle class there were, it might also be noted, a few who seemed to have accepted as fatalistically, the prospect of a stagnant career as had some of the manual respondents. Thus, Mr. Rickard, downwardly mobile relative to his father, a managing director, concluded: 'Opportunities might come along, but I won't set out to look for opportunities as such. I always felt I wouldn't die a civil servant, but it probably is quite likely'.

THE ROLE OF LUCK

The data presented so far from the work-like histories does not suggest that very many men have job histories which add up to a career. This is not too surprising in light of the fact that the sample was representative not of an elite group but of men in the middle-mass of the social structure. However, even among the few who were, in Clement's (1958) terms, 'high flyers', there was little evidence of predictability and prior planning. Like the Pahls, I too was struck by the role luck and circumstance had played in what had happened to these men. Thus, what Pahl and Pahl (1971: 99) had to say about their managers replicated almost exactly my notes and impressions during the field work.

Few men were advancing along a clear and structured career line. A more likely pattern was for the men to gain in confidence as a result of a series of almost fortuitous circumstances, which teach them that they can cope with new situations. The army or other service experience was often the crucial stimulant to a managerial career. There is an overwhelming sense, when reading their complete career histories, of men being pulled up the management hierarchy, either through luck—being in the right place at the right time—or by having a patron who knew their name and suggested it at critical times.

The accounts people give of their own history must, of course, be read with a degree of skepticism. What do people mean by luck? Neither my data nor that of the Pahls agree that luck is simply as Jencks (1972: 227) suggests, a rationalization for failure: 'Those who are lucky tend, of course, to impute their success to skill, while those who are inept
believe that they are merely unlucky'. Rather, it was often just the opposite: in describing their career, people were as inclined to attribute success as they were failure to chance happenings and in their own accounting to denigrate and downgrade the role hard work and ability had played in the eventual outcome.  

For example, Mr. Parkinson, a senior executive with a string of achievements behind him, also believed that his getting into a grammar school from a working-class background, was 'simply a fluke'. Indeed, his whole life was viewed from this perspective. 'I've been intensely lucky. I'm a great believer in luck. I've always thought there was a kind of providence that looks after you. Coming through the war was a bit of luck, so was meeting my wife, so has been most of my career'. However, the intensity and commitment which Mr. Parkinson had evidently devoted to his career and his obvious intelligence were not, mentioned in his account.

What luck seemed to mean to many men was that their work life and the changes in it were not planned in the sense of having some future goal in mind. Rather, as one man put it, 'It was in the lap of the gods where I went next', a description which fitted the work lives of most of the men. In varying degrees they were like Mr. Terry, who after a checkered career, had become an accounts manager. 'I think my jobs just happened. You're there at the right time. This last change was planned. I would say this last one was the only change out of the ten where I sat down and thought with a particular end in view. This last change was the only one'. Thus, it was only in retrospect that a particular move

11Objectively, it turns out they may have been correct to do so. Perhaps the most outstanding conclusion in the study by Jencks and his colleagues is that there is no single variable which explains who gets ahead and why and that at least half the variation in achievement is due to luck.
or event could be seen as having been a 'lucky' one; it had led to an unanticipated course of events. For Mr. Evison, a physicist and one of the upwardly mobile, it was a layoff early in his career which even at age 29 he saw as decisive:

I didn't know what I wanted to do when I graduated, except to go into industry. After about three years I was made redundant. About a 1,000 people were laid off. I managed to get another job in Bristol and was later transferred back here. Now I have a feeling I'm starting to get ambitious though I wasn't to start with. I was happy trotting around in my little rut. I think the change in job, to new projects, that was the first time I'd really been given any responsibility. I found I liked it, and I find I'm capable of doing things I didn't think I was capable of doing. That was the turning point.

Luck was also invoked as a short-hand way of saying that the skill requirements of most jobs, however impressive their title, are not so especially high as to exclude many people from filling them. Mr. Killy, an insurance manager, put it this way:

It's mostly chance. The job I'm in is not poorly paid as you can imagine. So the reward I'm getting for the job puts me way up directors and managers. But the actual quality of the work, the job I do, it could be done by a railway porter if he had the opportunity. So I think one has to be there at the right time to get ahead. I was lucky in that I was there.

While at the outset of the research it was expected that one response to downward mobility might be to rationalize it as bad luck or bad breaks, only a minority (18 percent) of the whole Mobility Sample felt they had had bad breaks during the course of their life. There was no difference between those who had been mobile and those who had not.12 Instead, at all class levels and whatever the mobility experience people tended to view their past life in terms of chance factors, rather than as ordered and planned events.

12 Question #45, see Appendix 2. Some 59 percent said they had experienced good breaks, while another 23 percent saw themselves as having had both good and bad breaks. In probing further (question #46), there was a tendency for middle-class respondents to mention work whereas working-class respondents were more likely to mention family, illness, car accidents and the like. What people saw as bad breaks were seldom to do with their work.
MOBILITY AND MOTIVATION

One way to explore the relative commitments of the four groups to work, career and promotion is to show the level of motivation of each. To measure this, I used an approach originally devised by Reisman (1953) and subsequently used by Wilensky (1966). Lipset and Bendix (1959: 248) note about this measure:

(Reisman) asked his respondents to specify whether the fact that a better job might entail spending less time with their family, risks to health, moving to another community, etc. would interfere with it. The approach may measure more accurately than any other the practical effect of achievement motivation in the occupational structure. The inclination to defer gratification is usually inculcated in middle-class families.

Tables 4.4 and 4.5 suggest that it is men with middle-class parents who are most highly motivated, whatever their mobility experience. Surprisingly, downward mobile men are the most willing of all groups to undertake the ten items (shown in Table 4.5) though they do not differ significantly from stable members of their class or origin. The least

TABLE 4.4

CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND MOBILITY MOTIVATION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility Sample</th>
<th>Percent High</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Upward (1)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Upward</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Upward</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Non-Manual (2)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downward</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Manual</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* High is defined as willing on 7 or more of the ten items.

1 X 2 \( \chi^2 = \) N.S. 2 X 3 N.S.
1 X 3 \( \chi^2 = 5.649 \quad P < .02 \) 2 X 4 N.S.
1 X 4 N.S. 3 X 4 \( \chi^2 = 3.884 \)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>All Up</th>
<th>High Up</th>
<th>Low Up</th>
<th>Stable N-M</th>
<th>All Down</th>
<th>Manual</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Go without vacations for several years</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Leave friends/relatives and move to another part of country</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Live for awhile in a district you didn't like</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Take some risk to health</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. See less of your family</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Move to another country</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Take on a lot of extra responsibility</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Give up some of your leisure time</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Hide your political views</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Learn a new routine</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total N's</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
willing to make 'sacrifices' for the sake of upward mobility are those who have moved upwards one or two classes, a finding which in light of the comments sampled earlier is not unexpected. It was especially within this group that men were found who did not particularly want further promotion and responsibility. Details of what is summarized in Table 4.4 can be seen in Table 4.5. The downwardly mobile are most willing on six out of ten items followed by the stable non-manual who are highest on the other four. Stable manual respondents and the low upward group are, in contrast, lowest on five items each.

I am unable to explain satisfactorily why the downwardly mobile tend to show as much willingness to undergo these sacrifices as they do. A possible explanation advanced some years ago by Lipset and Gordon (1953) and again by Wilensky (1959), is that downward mobility is perceived as only a temporary drop in status. There is, in other words, an expectation of better things to come and a willingness to make sacrifices in order to reach them. As well, it is possible that with respect to these sacrifices, people tend to retain parental values and attitudes about the probable necessity of 'deferring gratification'—it becomes, in effect, a moral obligation to do so. For upwardly mobile people these are working-class orientations; for the downwardly mobile they are middle-class orientations. This is reflected in the data of Tables 4.4 and 4.5 where class of origin rather than present class is the more important determinant of motivation. However, as I shall attempt to show in the next chapter, the parents of the downwardly mobile are not, typically, middle-class in their values or background. Nor, as already seen, are the downwardly mobile very likely to aspire to a white-collar position. At the same time, there was among the downwardly mobile a number who were fairly committed to and interested in their particular trade. As I
did not specify that the advance entailing these sacrifices had to be an upward one—indeed, I was careful to avoid doing that—it is possible that what was recorded was the importance of doing well at the present job.\textsuperscript{13}

**JOB SATISFACTION**

Because this study is about social mobility I have spent considerable time on job changes, career orientations and feelings and expectations about promotion. Inevitably in placing the stress on change in this way, the extent to which present jobs are sources of satisfaction has been underplayed. At the outset I wondered how beyond class differences, the experience of upward and downward mobility might affect job satisfaction. Are those who move up more or less satisfied with their work? Are those who move down more likely to be dissatisfied? While there have been many elaborate measures of job satisfaction,\textsuperscript{14} we asked simply in the Work and Leisure Study: 'Taking it all round, how satisfied would you say you are with the job you've got at present'? In all, only nine percent of the men indicated that they were not satisfied with their present work and the majority were split evenly between those very satisfied and only fairly satisfied.\textsuperscript{15} Of particular interest is that the basic responses to this question did not vary much between mobility and non-mobility.

\textsuperscript{13}Among those who were 'genuinely' downwardly mobile (See Chapter 5) were some dissaffected youth for whom these 'sacrifices' were treated with indifference. As one put it: 'It wouldn't bother me doing all of them, you know. There's nothing tying me or anything like that. I'd like to see less of my family'.

\textsuperscript{14}For a review of these, see Robinson et al (1969: Chapters 4, 5, 6 & 7).

\textsuperscript{15}Strauss (1974: 74) notes that only a minority of workers in over 40 years of measuring ever report being dissatisfied. A 1973 Gallup Poll in the United States found only 12 percent of male workers report being dissatisfied, a finding comparable to that of the Work and Leisure Study.
As Strauss (1974: 78) argues, reporting satisfaction and being satisfied may be very different things. Perhaps a more sensitive measure of current job satisfaction is whether people, if they could start over again, would choose the same or different work. Table 4.6 for the Mobility Sample suggests that the pattern of mobility does have a bearing on responses to this question. With respect to this criterion of satisfaction, a majority of the men in the stable manual category would choose different work if they could have their time over. Most content with their decision are the stable non-manual men. The surprising group is the downwardly mobile; exactly half show satisfaction with their present occupation. In part this may be because, as I shall describe in the next chapter, these men are often in trades which they chose. In contrast, some upwardly mobile men, despite their present status, regret not having a trade. Thus, in the bottom panel, nearly one-quarter of those choosing differently, would 'next time' take up a trade. Of these slightly over one-half are upwardly mobile men. Mr. Jamieson, a sales manager of a small firm, was one of these. He had left school at 14 and worked in a variety of jobs in his 25-year career. As he said:

Starting over, I'd have a trade—I'd be a tradesman. Then I'd maybe go into this line of work, but initially I'd have a trade. Then I'd always have that behind me.

There was a tendency, then, for men who had moved upwards not to be satisfied with their work to the extent that they were as likely as the downwardly mobile men to choose another line if their life could be lived over. What was wrong with their work? Dissatisfaction with the money earned was not very evident among any of the men but especially not among the upwardly mobile. Mr. Killy, a chief draughtsman, pro-

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16 The one group who did seem dissatisfied with their income was the stable middle-class group. For instance, stable non-manual men were the most likely of all groups to choose more pay rather than more time off at the same pay (Work and Leisure Study). Implications of this are explored in Chapter 12.
TABLE 4.6

PERCENT WHO WOULD CHOOSE THE SAME WORK OVER AGAIN

BY MOBILITY PATTERN: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility Pattern</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upward</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Non-Manual</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downward</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Manual</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests of Significance

\[ \chi^2 = 6.80 \] N.S.

\[ \chi^2 = 16.388 \] P .001

\[ \chi^2 = 5.463 \] P .02

CHOICES OF THOSE WHO WOULD CHOOSE DIFFERENTLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Take up a Trade</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Education</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Status Job</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Status Job</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Status but Different Work</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 64

Implied in the desire for a trade among the upwardly mobile men was, as well as security, an ambivalence and uncertainty about the worth of what they were doing. It was difficult for men in low level managerial positions actually to pin down just what it was they had accomplished.

Money is not the mainstay in my estimation. Provided the money you're getting is giving a reasonable standard of living, then what I want out of a job is the satisfaction when you can see the end product, you can see what you've done.
at the end of each day or week or month. Like many of the manual work-
ers a satisfying job is one that has defined projects with a concrete
beginning and an end. In contrast to the diffuse nature of managerial
work, these men often craved what Mr. Knapp, an engineer had found:

I like to put in time and see some sort of achievement. Being a bank
manager would drive me crazy. It's transferring money with no meaning
or end. Putting in a submarine cable is my idea of work. You put it
in and go away and say, 'We did that, that's it'.

Mr. Jennings, a trainee manager, was experiencing this sense of frustra-
tion:

Starting over, I'd probably break away completely from what I'm doing.
I think I would have liked to be a shop floor manager of some descrip-
tion. Then I could actually get involved in something, whereas I feel
a bit restricted working at a desk. It's all writing and telephoning
which all seems vague and pointless. I'd like to feel of some use. I'd
like to point at something and say 'I did that, or I helped do that'.

Since some of these men were also influencing their sons towards trades
rather than middle-class occupations, this source of dissatisfaction has
a number of implications for the stability of upward mobility.① Simply
stated here, I will return to this finding again in the next chapter
when we look at patterns of downward mobility, and in Chapter 7 which
considers some determinants of downward mobility.

SUMMARY

When one considers job changes, promotion and the extent of commit-
ment to work, it is the already well-trodden ground of class and its re-
ationship to work which re-emerges. On the whole, what has happened
to those moving upwards and downwards relative to their parents has also
happened to those who have remained intergenerationally stable. Quanti-
tatively, the mobile are not especially distinguishable from the non-

① The concept of stability comes from Miller (1956) and refers to
the likelihood that those who move upwards are able to maintain their
new status into the next generation.
mobile with respect to time spent in a first job, job stability and the probability of working in a job with a well-defined career ladder. Nor were the upwardly mobile more motivated or more concerned about promotion than were the stable middle class. For reasons that are not entirely clear from the data, the downwardly mobile did differ from their class of destination—the working class—and were in many respects much closer to the upwardly mobile and at times also to the stable middle-class group.

Despite the quantitative similarities, there were, especially between the upwardly mobile and the stable middle class, qualitative differences. I have quoted from the work histories of these people in an attempt to illustrate some of the more subtle ways in which the work experience of those moving upwards differs from that of those born in the middle class. While neither group shows a very strong commitment to work and to getting ahead, and while there is a certain amount of chaos in the lives of most people, there was more disorder, more reliance on luck and circumstances and unexpected events and less evidence of premeditation and planning in the job histories of the upwardly mobile. The same cannot be said of the downwardly mobile compared to the stable manual; reading the job histories of the former is much like reading those of the latter. What differences there are between the latter two tend to emerge more clearly when work-life patterns are seen in their entirety. This is also true, though not so clearly, for the middle-class groups, as well. The next chapter tries to pull together and illustrate through a series of case studies the predominant work-life patterns which have led to mobility and non-mobility.
CHAPTER 5

PATTERNS OF MOBILITY AND NON-MOBILITY IN THE MIDDLE MASS

The last chapter presented some aspects of the work-life histories of the men in the Mobility Sample. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of career or work-life patterns for each type of intergenerational mobility and non-mobility under consideration in this study.

CAREER NATURE

Keeping in mind Wilensky's definition of the career with which Chapter 4 opened, I first attempted to categorize the work-life histories of the men in terms of the general direction of the trajectory and whether it could be considered orderly or disorderly. One possibility was that the work lives of the upwardly and downwardly mobile might be characterized by greater instability and vacillations of various sorts than would those of the non-mobile. However, this did not seem to be the case. Instead, among those who are now non-manual there is little to choose between the mobile and the non-mobile with respect either to the direction various jobs have taken people or the orderliness with which it has come about. Evidently, one consequence of intergenerational upward mobility is the likelihood of involvement in what is objectively an upward moving career. For manual workers, job histories are less likely to form a coherent pattern. There is a higher likelihood of intragenerational 'skidding' and discontinuities and little chance of an upwardly moving career. Whether we consider the downwardly mobile
or the stable manual there is found in the working class, job histories punctuated by frequent, sometimes unplanned job changes which do not, together, yield either an observable improvement or decline in occupational career.

OCCUPATIONAL PATTERNS

While about half to three-quarters of the manual work histories and more than four-fifths of the non-manual work histories were 'orderly', they were so only in the sense that there were not complicated patterns of upward and downward movement or discontinuities reflected by this simple set of categories. Tables 5.1 through to 5.5 illustrate career patterns for each of the conventional mobility and non-mobility groups making up the Mobility Sample (the two downwardly mobile groups, being small in number, are combined in Table 5.4). Their main purpose is not to portray individual career patterns but rather to show the overall pattern of job mobility for each kind of intergenerational mobility.

From Table 5.1 it can be seen that the work lives of men who have eventually moved up three or more categories contain a considerable amount of disorder and reversals in occupational status. As indicated

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1 These are based on a modified version of an approach developed by Form and Miller (1949). Their tables illustrated career patterns for each of the seven occupational categories of the Alba Edwards Census Scale and attempted to distinguish between 'initial work period' and a 'trial and stable work period'. Thus, the first dot in each line represents father's occupation; the second dot, represents the respondent's first job. While the years in the labour force are approximately accurate, vertical distances except in the sense of moving between status categories are not. In other words, someone who is shown as moving from (say) the bottom of the skilled manual row to the bottom of the clerical row is not different than someone shown as moving (say) from the top to the top of these respective rows. Dotted lines indicate work-life patterns of men who attended a grammar or 'public' school; solid lines indicate those who attended a secondary modern or its earlier equivalents. I have not attempted to distinguish between various phases of the work history as did Form and Miller.
in Chapter 3, those moving upwards through a grammar school route spend very little time in a manual occupation compared to those upwardly mobile through a non-educational route. This is vividly shown in Table 5.1 where men with a grammar school education (broken lines) move up quickly, usually at the point of their entry into the labour force and seldom fall back across the manual-non-manual line. Men moving upwards over their career, by contrast, (solid lines) tend to spend a very long time, sometimes the major part of their work life in various manual occupations before finally ending up in a non-manual position. Table 5.1 also indicates that while the general direction is upward, there is considerable passing to and fro from one status category to another and from non-manual to manual occupations and vice versa.

In contrast to the scattered and complex picture created by the high upward mobiles, the trajectories of those who moved up only one or two status categories form a more compact and orderly picture (Table 5.2). Again, grammar school experience creates a quick and seemingly 'solid' movement into a non-manual position. However, low upward movement even through a non-grammar school route is, compared to Table 5.1, also fairly rapid and shows fewer reversals in status. As would be expected, men who start out from a non-manual position (Table 5.3) enjoy, for the most part, a fairly straightforward middle-class career. The importance of grammar school and 'public' school education is reflected in the numbers of men who at the start of their careers moved into a status category equal to or higher than that of their father. With one or two exceptions, downward movement of this group stops at status category three—clerical—and is reversed fairly early on in the career. The work histories of the few men from middle-class backgrounds who did not attend a grammar school stand in sharp contrast to the majority of the stable non-manual group. Most have spent some time in a manual occupation and have also
Table 5.4
WORK-LIFE PATTERNS OF THE LOW UPWARDLY MOBILE: MOBILITY SAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status Category</th>
<th>Father’s Status</th>
<th>Approximate Years in the Labour Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Professional</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Managerial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Clerical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Skilled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Semi-skilled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Unskilled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.3
WORK-LIFE PATTERNS OF THE STABLE NON-MANUAL: MOBILITY SAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status Category</th>
<th>Father's Status</th>
<th>Approximate Years in the Labour Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Managerial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Clerical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Skilled Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Semi-skilled Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Unskilled Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
experienced considerable fluctuations in occupational status with each job change.\(^2\) What is obscured in this table is the extent to which straight lines within status categories—especially professional and managerial—are in fact the most likely to conform to the notion of career advanced in the last chapter.\(^3\) Thus, it is these men who began their work life in a managerial or professional career who have, sometimes without leaving one of these broad categories, experienced a series of jobs with new challenges, higher income and ever increasing commitment, involvement and responsibility.

**DOWNWARDLY MOBILE AND STABLE MANUAL**

Work life patterns of the downwardly mobile, shown in Table 5.4, are in some ways among the most orderly of all the mobility groups. Overwhelmingly, movement downward occurred at the outset of the work life with the rest of the work life spent in a manual occupation. While some men have moved upward and downward within the three manual categories, only two men have made what turn out to be periodic trips across the manual-non-manual line. As can be seen in Table 5.5, the overall pattern for those deemed to be intergenerationally stable working-class is in fact more complicated than that for the downwardly mobile.\(^4\) Thus, it is evident that a number of these men have worked in

\(^2\)The two dotted lines which do plunge so dramatically downwards, both represent the career paths of 'public' school educated men who, before assuming a higher status position in their father's businesses, worked for a short while in a manual job in that business.

\(^3\)I also coded the occupational histories using the Hall-Jones classification. Tables for the three non-manual categories while showing more detail than Tables 5.1 to 5.3 of upward and downward mobility within the non-manual stratum do not, in general, differ so appreciably as to be worthwhile including. In other words, neither scale is able to catch the more subtle changes in occupational status which occur especially among the stable non-manual men.

\(^4\)In Table 5.5 the three non-manual rows are drawn narrower and the manual categories are wider compared to other tables. This was
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status Category</th>
<th>Father's Status</th>
<th>Approximate Years in the Labour Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.5
WORK-LIFE PATTERNS OF THE STABLE MANUAL: MOBILITY SAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status Category</th>
<th>Father's Status</th>
<th>Approximate Years in the Labour Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Managerial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Clerical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Skilled Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Semi-skilled Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Unskilled Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
non-manual occupations at various points in their work life. In both Tables 5.4 and 5.5 it can also be noted that those who have had the least upward and downward movement are men who are employed in a skilled trade (status category 4); men who move into non-manual positions when they fall, do so into either semi-skilled or unskilled jobs.

**PATTERNS OF UPWARD MOBILITY**

While there were marked contrasts—differences which only became fully apparent in retrospective comparison—between the upwardly mobile and the stable non-manual, it was, nevertheless the case that the lives of many of those moving upwards had been characterized by great changes relative to their parents. First, it was clear that in virtually all status dimensions one might want to include—income, residence, lifestyle, occupational prestige and sometimes education—they were in superior positions to those held by their fathers—and by those held generally by working-class respondents interviewed. For many, as was seen in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the general direction of their career trajectories has been an upward one, with in some instances, the peak not yet reached. Yet, though their work lives have been marked with considerable improvement in status, the upwardly mobile did nevertheless differ in many subtle ways from stable members of the middle class. One possible source of the difference might be in the kinds of occupations open to the upwardly mobile compared to stable members of the middle class. Do occupational routes lead to the core or periphery of the middle class?

In general, Table 5.6 suggests that about one-quarter of the men done for greater clarity since most paths are in the latter three categories. Fluctuations are not therefore as extreme as appears at first glance.
have risen into what are clearly middle-class occupations: accountancy and finance, senior management, science and education. For both low and high upwards, however, more than half of the movement is into class 2, a highly ambiguous category which encompasses senior sales manager at the one extreme and bus inspector at the other. Most (57 percent) of those who were upwardly mobile started out from a class 4 (skilled manual) background rather than a semi-skilled or unskilled background. However, the basic dichotomy shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 between grammar school and non-grammar school routes does not, unexpectedly, distinguish very clearly 'final' destination points. There was a slight tendency for those with a grammar school education to come from class 4 (57 percent versus 47 percent). But, since only 14 of the 44 upward mobiles had attended grammar school, these percentage differences must be viewed very cautiously.

A somewhat more pronounced effect of education can be discerned when those with additional qualifications beyond the minimum or who attended grammar school are compared with those who left at the minimum age from a non-grammar school program. This is shown in Table 5.7.

---

5 In the Work and Leisure Study sample, 11 percent of the upward mobiles were presently in class 1; 49 percent were in class 2, and 39 percent were in class 3. Thus, the largest destination class for the upwardly mobile is still class 2. But, in the Mobility Sample, I purposely oversampled the high upward category relative to the low upward with the result that Table 5.7 shows twice as many in class 1 as actually were, and underrepresents mobility into class 3.
### TABLE 5.6

**OCCUPATIONAL ROUTES USED BY THE UPWARDLY MOBILE:**

**MOBILITY SAMPLE**

\( N = 44 \)

*(Whole Numbers)*

Fathers' Occupational Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Son's Present Occupation</th>
<th>Class 4: Skilled</th>
<th>Class 5: Semi-skilled</th>
<th>Class 6: Unskilled</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class 1:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Lecturer, engineer, chemist, physicist, chartered accountant, computer engineer)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Buyer, business executive, opera singer, general sales manager, claims manager, senior dealer, civil servant, systems analyst, headmaster, police inspector, bus inspector)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Clerk, film technician, shipping clerk, cashier, policeman, salesman)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5.7

**UPWARD MOBILES AND TYPE OF EDUCATIONAL ROUTE USED:**

**MOBILITY SAMPLE**

\( N = 44 \)

*(Percentages)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Route</th>
<th>Grammar School and Additional Education</th>
<th>Non-Grammar Minimum Schooling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondents' Present Social Class</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1: Professional</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2: Managerial</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3: Clerical</td>
<td>100% (26)</td>
<td>100% (18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Those without any additional educational qualifications are about twice as likely to hold a class 2 occupational position than are those with additional education ($X^2 = 6.017; P < .001$). Only one respondent from the former category gained entry into a class 1 occupation, an industrial training officer. Thus, men who were upwardly mobile through a non-educational route were employed, at the time of the interview, in the following jobs:

CID officer, buyer (2), civil servant, shipping clerk (2), shop manager, shopkeeper, police inspector, bus inspector, film technician, general sales manager, claims manager, senior dealer, chief draughtsman, technical assistant, chief engineer, training officer.

Additional education but not a grammar school education had, in the Mobility Sample, led to jobs such as:

commercial accountant, research worker, production accountant, accounts clerk, cashier, ordering clerk, sales manager, personnel manager, office manager, salesman, headmaster, opera singer.

Finally, those with a grammar school education and in some instances university, were working as:

senior sales executive, college lecturer, railway clerk, chemist, accounts superintendent, operating theater supervisor, physicist, civil servant, computer engineer, police inspector, professional engineer, systems analyst, policeman, headmaster.

No obvious typology or pattern emerges from the work histories of the upwardly mobile as it might have done had I concentrated on only upward movement into an elite category. Instead, as their actual jobs suggest, the status position of these men has a very wide range. Further, some who it was necessary to place in a high upward category are there because of the low status from which they began rather than the height they have reached. While numerically movement into a clerical position from the 'bottom' of the working class is equivalent to movement from the 'elite' of the working class--a skilled trade--to a managerial or professional position, the two are likely to represent very
different mobility experiences. Similarly, certain occupations which
the Registrar-General assigns to class 2--bus inspector, police inspec-
tor, shop owner or manager--differ markedly from others also assigned
to this class--sales managers, administrators, company directors and
top executives--with respect to level of responsibility, income and the
routes which lead up to them. 6

The difficulty of assessing whether certain occupations are 'gen-
unely' middle-class is one that has been encountered in virtually all
of the studies of this highly heterogeneous and only partially under-
stood 'class'. Both local studies (Stacey, 1960; Bell, 1968) and
largely urban studies (Willmott and Young, 1960; Lockwood, 1958) have
been concerned about where to place what turn out to be a sizeable pro-
portion of anomalies. 7 Although a classification such as that devel-
oped by Hall and Jones (1950) does, through a more detailed set of non-
manual categories, attempt to overcome some of the most obvious prob-
lems, it does not overcome the basic difficulty of when a given person
is or is not 'properly' part of the middle class. Social mobility
adds an additional wrinkle to an already complex picture. Are those
who move upwards from working-class background most likely to end up
in anomalous positions? Are they, to use Stacey's (1960) term, mostly
members of the 'lower frontier' of the middle class? To what extent
are they members of the middle class at all?

The relational and normative aspects of this question of when is
occupational mobility 'genuine' social mobility were a central theme

6 For a further discussion of the shortcomings of the Registrar-
General's five (in this study, six) social classes see, Klein (1965:
430-431). See also Jones, Saunders and Moser (1958).

7 An excellent review of these (excepting Bell, 1968) and other
works with respect to social class identification can be found in
of Chapter 3. Here I am mainly concerned with the routes depicted in the preceding tables and in assessing, generally, the proportion which have led to firm middle-class positions and the proportion which could be said to be anomalous ones. If any patterns of upward mobility can be discerned in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, it would be somewhat as follows:

1. Self-Made Man -- High Upward
2. Self-Made Man -- Lower Managerial
3. The Marginally Upward
4. Young Grammar School Graduate
5. Young Secondary Modern Graduate

It should be kept in mind that these are not completely self-contained or perfectly clear-cut categories; some of the men encountered in this study straddled two or more patterns with respect to their attitudes, experiences and lifestyle.

**SELF-MADE MEN--HIGH UPWARD**

Only five men in the sub-sample of upwardly mobile men \( (N = 44) \) could be said to be in this category. With the exception of Mr. Ferguson, a high-ranking civil servant--high enough that to give details of his work history might destroy his anonymity--who was near retirement, these men were alike in being not at the peak of their career but still ascending.

Although they had typically begun their work life in low level clerical positions, the various jobs and positions held by these men had been fairly integrated in the sense that each successive job was a step higher than the previous one. There was, in other words, little evidence of discontinuities and fluctuations disturbing the career trajectories of these men. Once pointed in an upward direction they had consistently climbed higher.\(^8\)

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\(^8\)Mr. Ferguson, the civil servant, was again an exception in having held some 16 different jobs over his career. These were, nonetheless, also ones involving increasing responsibility and income. There was
Of the five, three had attended a grammar school and one had also attended Oxford University on a 'short course' just after the war. It is, perhaps, coincidental, but worth noting, that all of these men were born outside of the London Region in either the Midlands or the North. They had also married relatively late--age 27 to age 30--and found wives generally of a slightly 'better' background and with either the same or a better education than themselves.

**SELF-MADE MAN -- LOWER MANAGERIAL**

The second pattern discernable in the work-life history is somewhat larger making up from one-third to two-fifths of the sample depending on where one draws the line. This category consists of men whose beginnings are very similar to the High Upward Group but for a variety of reasons they have reached a lower level in the occupational hierarchy. They differ also in appearing to have reached the top of their particular ladders. I have used the term 'lower managerial' though in this category are men working in a variety of jobs such as civil servant, headmaster, and college lecturer as well as a number of lower managerial positions. There are also wide variations within this group of 'self-made men' with respect both to the precise level of their present occupation and in the nature of the routes taken to reach those positions. Typically these men began their careers in a manual occupation but moved upwards fairly early on in their work life. The minority whose first jobs were non-manual jobs are also those who had attended a grammar school.

This group of men had all achieved positions which were consider-

little or no evidence that these were part of an organized career but, rather, involved a high degree of 'luck', circumstance and larger changes in the country and the world. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the role of luck in these men's careers.
ably higher than those of their fathers. Most had done so without a grammar school education and without a long period in manual occupations. Again, they had tended to marry in their late 20's (average age = 27) to women whose backgrounds were equally divided between working-class and lower middle-class. About three-quarters of these women had also attended a grammar school until at least age 16 and were, therefore, typically better educated than their husbands.⁹

Educational achievements of their children varied considerably but there had been or would be a common dependence on the state system. Mr. Beacroft, for instance, reckoned that his son was 'repeating the pattern by becoming an educational failure', and that he had been saved by the local authority going comprehensive. Generally, there was concern about their children's education but a reluctance to turn to private schools in the event one 'failed' the '11+' exam. For some this was not so much an ideological belief as a reflection of their own ambivalence about the value and necessity of education; having themselves succeeded without much education they questioned its importance for others.

Most seemed to see their upward mobility in instrumental terms and though highly materialistic, frequently expressed a desire to be out of it entirely. Mr. Jamieson, for instance, was making an active attempt to move away from London to a less hectic life in Devon. If he won the pools, Mr. Gadsby visualised himself 'running a mini-village'. 'I'd buy a nice sandy cove and put up these Spanish style cottages. In the winter I'd do maintenance and in summer I'd run this holiday

⁹ At the same time, there was no evidence that the wife's family had had any direct influence on the careers of the men. This may be because most of the men were already into their career before marriage and the women were generally from clerical backgrounds.
camp', he said. And, Mr. Elson found he was most at peace with himself when he was close to the soil. More fulfilling to him than his recent promotion to a bigger school he said, was that he had successfully chopped down an ailing elm in his spacious Marlow garden. Several also expressed a desire to own a farm or wished in 'doing it over' that they could be a farmer.

This second group, though somewhat apart from the solid middle class, have, nevertheless, experienced considerable upward mobility in all dimensions. They have few real contacts with the working class and in fact exhibited very little nostalgia about their origins. The social mobility of this group is, then, mainly 'genuine'. It is much more questionable whether what has happened to the next group--the marginally upward--should be called social mobility.

THE MARGINALLY UPWARD

For reasons which will be explored more fully in Chapter 8, upwardly mobile men in the first two categories were able to move up into a non-manual job at either the outset of their career or in a very short time. The result is that most of their experience has been in middle-class occupations in association with middle-class people. However, slightly over one-quarter of the men who according to the usual measure of intergenerational social mobility moved upward did so only after fairly long periods in manual occupations. Their career trajectories are those shown at the bottom of Table 5.1 and which in some instances involved considerable fluctuation between manual and non-manual strata.

These men differ from the first two groups in a number of ways but principally in the limited extent their eventual occupational mobility has been translated into social mobility. One indication of

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10 For instance, they married younger--the range was from 19 to 24,
this was that most are still living in council houses or flats. Another was that their accent and lifestyle though not exactly working-class were further from middle-class than the first two categories. Perhaps the most significant difference is in the value these men placed on manual occupations relative to the non-manual work in which they were now working. Almost universally these men expressed regret at not having a manual skill. Often they were directing their own sons not towards a middle-class occupation but towards a trade, usually the very one they had not been able to enter themselves.

As most were employed in low-level supervisory jobs, there was a keen desire to work at more specific and defined tasks. For instance, Mr. Cormack, a buyer, had wanted to be a draughtsman but had not been able to take an apprenticeship. He added spontaneously: 'I was very keen on geometry, technical drawing, that sort of thing. I didn't do it because it was tied up with apprenticeship. I didn't particularly get my way there. If it's relevant, My son is taking technical drawing'. In a somewhat different way, Mr. Cohen, who was now supervisor of a film processing laboratory, had managed to steer his children towards jobs involving travel.

I'd never stick in a rut again. I'd spend the first ten years just travelling around, seeing the world. I thought it would be a good idea for them (his children) to go to university. They didn't because I didn't have the sense to push them hard enough. But one has become a machine tool maker and has been in Australia. The other has a job with BOAC but it hasn't made him want to go around the world. All he could think about is getting married. He did travel around when he was single, of course.

As we look at the downwardly mobile later in this chapter, it is especially this aspect of the third pattern that will take on additional significance. As will be apparent, at least one pattern of downward...
mobility is the result of upwardly mobile fathers encouraging their sons toward skilled manual occupations.

YOUNG UPWARD MOBILES

Men who were, at the time of the interview in their early twenties tended to fall into a category all of their own. In part this was because typically they had not yet had time to develop a lifestyle distinct from that of their parents. The ones who were not married were living at home often in their parents' council house. Their friends, in many instances, were still drawn from the neighbourhood and were as likely to be working in a manual as a non-manual job. However, as one looks more closely at the younger men, their educational experience creates a further sub-division; there is also an enormous difference between grammar school men and secondary modern men, a difference not so readily apparent among older men who were upwardly mobile.

Typical of the latter was Mr. Balten, age 20, who between the first and second interviews had married and moved out of his parents' home. He was living in a furnished flat about a mile from his parents and was hoping for a council home in the near future. Mr. Balten Sr. (who was also interviewed) is a semi-skilled metal worker. He has had bouts of unemployment and, in general, has been close to the bottom of the social hierarchy.

Mr. Balten was ill between 14 and 15 with the result that most of his last year in the school was spent in hospital. 'I missed almost all my fifth year. They did say I could go back for a year. But I was school-leaving age so I left. I'm learning with experience, really. It just comes to you'. His first job was as an apprentice sheet metal worker though there was no sense of planning about it. It was, as he put it, 'simply a job with a source of money'. This first job lasted
only three weeks. 'I didn't settle', he explained, 'I must have had 20 jobs in two years'. Mr. Balten could not recall the jobs but they included van boy (several times), motor fitter, sheet metal work and varieties of factory work. In 1967, two years after he entered the labour force, he became a warehouseman and later a clerk in a men's clothing chain. Shortly before our first interview he had obtained his present job as manager of a sporting goods shop in North London. Aspirations for the future were centered about retailing. He has high expectations of one day having 'a shop of me own, a brand new shop where I buy and sell everything'.

Mr. Balten has, relative to where he began, come a long way. Others, of a similar age and background who were usually less outgoing and articulate, seemed to have 'drifted' into a non-manual job and seemed as likely to drift back out again. There was, in other words, very little difference between these young men and stable working-class young men interviewed in accent, interests, aspirations or experiences. As the work-life histories of older men suggest, it is too early to say whether these men will be permanently upwardly mobile or not.

Young men who had attended grammar school were, as might be expected, different both from their parents and from other young men encountered in the study. First of all, none had experience in a wholly manual occupation and, second, there was, in their work histories, less evidence of job changing. Third, while some were still living at home, their friendship networks tended to be more widely located than was true for the secondary modern leavers.

MR. HENNESSEY, GRAMMAR SCHOOL GRADUATE

Mr. Hennessey, for example, has a similar background to Mr. Balten.
His father is a semi-skilled worker for the LEB and while somewhat better off than Mr. Balten Sr., Mr. Hennessey Sr., too, has lived in a council estate for many years. His standard of living has only risen since his wife started working. Mr. Hennessey, age 22, also married between the two interviews, to a working-class grammar school girl. He had also just moved into a home, again about a mile from his parents. The similarity in patterns ends there, however; Mr. Hennessey had bought a house in a district which though physically close to his parents, was socially far removed from the council estate. It was an older house in a largely middle-class area of East London, very similar to the Woodford described by Young and Willmott (1960).

After finishing his 'A' levels, Mr. Hennessey started out as an actuarial trainee in an insurance company. While there had in his mind been some thoughts of going on to university he had decided against it:

The main reason was that I have a twin brother who had left school at 15. It was difficult to sort of expect my parents to support me until I was in my 20's when he left at 15. A grant might just about have supported me, but I certainly wouldn't be putting anything back into the home.

Insurance work turned out to be much less interesting than he had anticipated. Within the year he had returned to his school counselling service in search of another type of work. The result was a position as trainee computer programmer. Two years later the firm he was with moved its office to Stevenage and since he did not want to leave London, he resigned. In his next job he moved in the space of two years upwards from senior programmer to systems analyst. About the time he got married he switched to yet another firm and another job as a systems analyst.

Mr. Hennessey was aware of how quickly promotion had occurred in
his life with the result that he felt he could use a two-or three-year standstill in which to work out what it is he does want to do. Although on the one hand he looked forward to entering management in the future, he shared with many of the upwardly mobile a desire to do manual work. He said of his ideal job:

I don't actually feel my job is making a fantastic contribution to our society. If I had the ability, I'd get a great satisfaction out of making things. If I could build houses or make furniture, if I was a really good carpenter. But I'm really pathetic.

**PATTERNS OF DOWNWARD MOBILITY**

In contrast to upward mobility, downward mobility turned out to be less dramatic and interesting than the novelistic accounts have led us to expect. It is, as has already been seen in Table 5.4, much less complex and varied than upward mobility or even working-class non-mobility. In all, only about 11 percent, or 100 respondents in the Work and Leisure Study, had been intergenerationally downwardly mobile. Of these I succeeded in interviewing only 22 a second time. Because so little is known about downward mobility and because of the small sample size, it may be useful to summarize what information there is about present occupations and father's occupations for the entire Work and Leisure Study before considering the Mobility Sample.

Origins and destinations of the downwardly mobile are summarized in Table 5.8. Looking first at the extreme downward mobility it is apparent that the main sources of downward mobility are from highly ambiguous occupational designations: farmers and shopkeepers. Both are occupations which include a wide range of possible income and status levels under the same title, and which in many cases are only marginally part of the middle class. The question of how to treat movements between agricultural and industrial occupations is an unresolved one.
While in Britain farmers are perhaps more part of the general stratification system than in some other societies, the information collected does not typically define clearly enough the size of the farm. Only two farmers' sons entered into the Mobility Sample, one of which until the latter part of his career was also a farmer; the other, more clearly downwardly mobile, was presently employed as a maintenance man. His father owned a small hold in Ireland. But, in general, I am unable to say much about whether a movement from a farm background or a manual occupation should be labelled as downward mobility or not.

### TABLE 5.8

**SUMMARY OF OCCUPATIONAL ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS OF THE DOWNWARDLY MOBILE IN THE WORK AND LEISURE STUDY**

(N = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fathers' Main Occupation</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Sons' Occupation</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(e.g., toolmaker, fitter, carpenter, electrician)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopkeepers</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals (e.g., civil servants, chemist, company director)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Semi-Skilled (e.g., drivers, storemen)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Level Supervisory</td>
<td>9/100%</td>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>27/100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Low Downward

(N = 78)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sons' Occupation</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Workers</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Skilled</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprentices</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Owners</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (policemen, technical workers)</td>
<td>16/100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HIGH DOWNWARD

In the case of sons of shopkeepers, the general pattern seems to have been an early movement into a manual occupation. The toehold these fathers held in the middle class was precarious and economically insecure. Notably, the four men interviewed a second time were old enough to have started work in the difficult period between the two wars.

Perhaps typical of this small group of high downwardly mobile men is Mr. Wade. Now nearly 70-years-old himself, he is the son of a long dead Chelsea greengrocer. He started his work life at 13 working in a cycle repair shop. This was followed by a job as an assistant milk roundsman and then seven years in the army. When he was demobbed in 1920, it was with a trade in bricklaying. He kept the same job in the building industry for 30 years. In 1950 he became a messenger in the Colonial office, a job he has only recently given up.

On the one hand, I done 30 years of building and they never said 'Thank you', even when I left. At the Colonial office, when I left, I got 400 which just shows where the difference is. But, it wasn't a job I could stick if I was young, I don't think. I like an outside job in such as the building line. It (civil service) was an intelligent job, but it was too drab.

Mr. Wade was born two houses away and except for his time in the trenches has lived all his life in the same turning. On the whole, he felt he had done much better for himself than had his father. His two daughters were educated sufficiently to become secretaries. They are married, respectively, to a company director and an accountant, both of whom have in turn been upwardly mobile.

There was little to distinguish Mr. Wade and others like him from non-mobile working-class fathers I was able to interview. The main impression was of immobility and stability. In his mind at least, there was a working-class chain unbroken until his daughters' generation. The idea of downward mobility did not seem applicable at all.
In contrast, at the other end of the age spectrum were a few instances of what from a number of perspectives seemed more genuinely downward mobility. One such is Mr. Buckland who left school at 15 and now at 23 has had eight (‘possibly more’) jobs, all semi-skilled ones. The first was as an assembly-line worker, followed by van driving (several) pest control worker, maintenance and finally sotremen in an electrical manufacturing firm. As he explained:

In school I was your average moron. Before I left I never really sort of made up my mind to do anything particular. I wasn't particularly brainy or anything like that. I wasn't in the grammar school stream. I sort of wanted to work in a garage but my father knew somebody who worked at Johnsons and he said 'Oh, you'll be alright'. It was alright there, but I'm an awful bloke to get on with. I planned a couple of jobs but a couple I sort of got pushed from. I rub authority the wrong way.

How permanent, then, was his downward mobility? He said about himself:

I'm dormant. Compared to where I started. I can't really say I'm better off now than then. I've been up and down at different times. I suppose if I'd of stayed at Johnsons, I'd be a lot better off now, I think. What I know now I'd probably have stuck with the first job—not many people do, do they?

In the short run, at least, there was no evidence that Mr. Buckland was likely to reverse his downward mobility. Except in the sense of a higher paying job he had difficulty conceiving of an ideal job or where he would be in the future. 'I would like to sort of work on the motor side. I have done it a bit on the side, on my own time, but whether it would ever turn into an occupation that I could do, I don't know. What I do know is I'm not the sort to do a job in an office. I'm sort of manual labour, not bricklaying but around machinery. So, I may have more money, I may do better, but I don't think I shall ever become any sort of cleverer'.

His father, who he described as having more money, more intelligence and more education (even taking into account age), is a civil servant, administrative grade. But, despite a grammar school education,
Mr. Buckland Sr. had spent over half of his work life in manual jobs, mainly as a driver. The son of a tramdriver, he began in 1928 as a warehouse clerk but three years later, in the midst of the depression, found himself unemployed. He was out of work for nearly two years before he was able to find work as a driver salesman. Up until 1940 he worked in a number of similar jobs. In the war he was again a driver in an Armored Corps. In 1945 he entered the civil service as a clerk and since 1950 has been a clerical officer. He had tried for promotion several times but now, at age 59, he had accepted the possibility that he will not rise any higher.

There were only a few people interviewed a second time and from whom generalizations can be made. However, the overriding impression is that the extreme downward category does not involve as large a descent as the statistical presentation suggests. Some fathers—notably farmers and greengrocers—were only marginally part of the middle class, in the first place. Thus, their training, income and lifestyle were much more working-class than middle-class. They were not, typically, able to pass on to their sons either a secure position or a middle-class tradition. Some other fathers were intragenerationally mobile into a middle-class occupation so that an age-specific mobility measure would define the son as stable manual.

**LOW DOWNWARD**

Similar reservations—what might be called 'extenuating circumstances'—apply also to the low downward category. Movement downwards across the non-manual-manual line one or two social classes were defined as low downward mobility. Fathers, by definition, were in social

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11 An age-specific measure of social mobility would, therefore, categorize Mr. Buckland as stable manual.
classes two or three and sons, as Table 5.8 indicated, are mainly in skilled jobs or are training to enter one of these (72 percent). Only 28 percent are in semi-skilled occupations. In short, whereas there was some evidence of poverty and low status immobility among the extreme downward group, those moving one or two classes downward seemed on the whole to have become part of a more affluent segment of the working class.\textsuperscript{12}

It is with this group of men that the description and analysis of this chapter tend to come full circle. As I have described, one pattern of upward mobility included a number of men who regretted not having a trade 'to fall back on'. As we also saw, these men were usually directing their sons toward a trade of some kind. This was also the pattern among those fathers I did succeed in interviewing a second time whose sons were in the low downward category. That is, like Mr. Buckland Sr. described above, they had not been born into the middle class but had arrived there, typically, after a lifetime spent in manual work with eventually a job in a supervisory, low level managerial or sales capacity.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, the preponderance of skilled trades in the low downward group suggests that these sons were fulfilling dreams of their fathers rather than experiencing downward mobility. The Middletons are a particularly apt illustration of this pattern.

When Mr. Middleton left school at 15, he was unable to find work except temporarily in the Kent hop fields. Much to his disgust he found himself down the same sort of mine as his father and grandfather had worked in before him.

\textsuperscript{12} In all, 62 percent of the downwardly mobile are in skilled trades, 32 percent are in semi-skilled trades and only 6 percent are in unskilled trades.

\textsuperscript{13} Managers and supervisors are especially likely to have sons in a skilled trade or training for one.
Mining was the only work around there. Even people with A levels couldn't get jobs. But any youngster can get a job down the mines if you have reasonable eyesight. My grandfather was in the mines 50 years. It wasn't for me.

After a year he left for London and a job as a trainee sheet metal worker. A year later he went to another firm and for the past seven years has worked as a hydraulic fitter. He now regards himself as a skilled worker although he had not completed an apprenticeship. At 25 he has two small children and a council flat in a Deptford high rise which he dislikes immensely. Beyond sharing the nearly universal desire to 'live further out', Mr. Middleton appeared to be exceptionally happy with his lot.  

I'm pretty well paid. My wages are above average and this particular work has good chances. I always wanted to do engineering and I find hydraulics is involved in everything right-left-centre. Maybe someday I'd like to move over to the clerical side, repping or something like that, but not for a long time.

Mr. Middleton Sr. is a security supervisor for a large retail chain, a managerial job which puts him in class 2. But the seeming downward mobility of his son (to class 4 or 5) turns out to be mostly statistical artifact. In his own words:

I still am working-class. You can't bribe over. If they stuck a pig against a Tory candidate, I'd vote for the pig. I've voted Labour everytime. I won't vote Communist but I vote Labour: I believe in socialism.

Mr. Middleton Sr. was born in Yorkshire and spent nearly 24 years down various mines in Wales and Kent. In 1957 he emigrated to Canada, worked in a variety of semi-skilled and unskilled jobs, was unemployed several times and in 1959 returned to England. He again worked in various factories on bench assembly and in 1962 obtained clerical job in his present firm. Five years ago he was promoted to security supervision.

14 See Young and Willmott (1973: 47).
It's gradually worked up to this. I was pushed into it, really, this office work. I was always against office work. I was always against anything indoors. In mining I found you got a comradeship you don't get anywhere else. It's a rough job. Mining is always dangerous, you're dealing with mother nature and anything can happen. But finally I arrived at the conclusion that if everyone is going to get fat behind a desk, I might as well do it myself. I think I'll stick this job out. See, we're classed as management and we're dealing with management.

Like so many of the upwardly mobile fathers, he felt that he was 'really robbed of a trade'. As for his sons,

I don't believe in forcing anything on them. They can do what they like as long as they can make a reasonable living and have got a trade behind them. I think they've both done very well for themselves.

Low downward mobility, then, seemed to arise mainly from the upward movement of the father, often after the son was already embarked on a career himself. In mass, the downwardly mobile have less education, much lower incomes than middle-class men in the sample. But in comparing them to their fathers, only in one instance was the education of the son below that of his father. If allowance is made for different school-leaving ages, there is little difference between fathers and sons. Income is, of course, more difficult to compare. Most felt they were better off than their fathers had ever been, some estimated they were better off than their fathers at a comparable age though not on a present comparison. Only two felt they were worse off, financially, at whatever age is chosen.

PATTERNS OF NON-MOBILITY: THE MIDDLE CLASS

Space does not allow as full an exposition of patterns of non-mobility as I have given of upward and downward mobility. Yet, as Table 5.3 and 5.5 illustrated, intergenerational stability does not necessarily imply an uneventful or stagnant work-life history. For instance

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15 This was shown in Chapter 3.

16 It is important to keep in mind that social mobility is in this
in conducting the interviews it was sometimes difficult to keep in mind that a particular respondent was not part of the upward mobile sub-sample or, conversely, the downwardly mobile group. In placing so much emphasis on intergenerational changes in status it is easily forgotten that in everyday life the mobile share most of the same preoccupations, concerns, triumphs and setbacks which are also part and parcel of everyone's lives whatever their mobility experience.

About three-quarters of the stable non-manual men interviewed were firmly part of the middle class. They were from backgrounds in which I could find no trace of working-class connections. Fathers were company directors and secretaries, business owners, accountants, insurance executives, brokers, qualified engineers and doctors. The men themselves were employed in similar occupations. Some had simply entered the family business. Others were working in accounting, the civil service, insurance, broking, management and consulting of various kinds. Some had climbed higher than their fathers in the occupational hierarchy, a few were somewhat lower while the majority were, or would be by the end of their career, about the same occupational status as their father. In any event, their precise status was not usually of paramount importance in determining the composition of their social network. 'My father and I have the same contacts socially', said Mr. Nalder, a young insurance broker. 'With respect to work my father is above me obviously, but socially I'm on a par with him. I know so many of his friends and he knows so many of mine'.

The other quarter of the stable non-manual sub-sample was more marginally part of the middle class. Included in this group were men study defined as movements across the manual-non-manual line. Men defined as stable may have been mobile within one of the two basic categories.
working as a company director, a manager of a debt collection firm, a fruit merchant, an office manager and a draughtsman. All had come from low level non-manual backgrounds in which there were, also, working-class connections. Generally the father had worked in a manual job part of his life, and one or both grandfathers were working-class. Mr. Terry, for instance, is presently manager of a debt collection agency. Over his 30-year-work life he has held at least ten distinct jobs. They have gone somewhat as follows: garage hand--office boy--factory hand--garage hand--air gunner--self-employed (partner in a plastics factory)--car salesman--unemployed (one year)--commercial traveller (3 firms)--debt collector--manager debt collection agency. As he said, somewhat bemusedly, 'Life has gone full circle. What I do now is handle all the legal work and court appearances. So, from the 15-year-old solicitor's general boy I've gone right round without any legal training to handling all our litigations'. Mr. Terry Sr. had also had many different jobs on both sides of the manual-non-manual line until finally settling down as owner of a small electrical goods store in the Midlands. Both of Mr. Terry's parents come from working-class families and his son, an only child, has just completed an apprenticeship as a printer. At the same time, Mr. Terry and the few other men interviewed who were like him, were not working-class in their perspectives and definitions of themselves. While very close to the third pattern of upward mobility described earlier, they differed in having a greater allegiance to the middle class than to the working class. Mr. Terry, for example, said both of his grandparents were 'artisan' rather than working-class. For what it is worth, three of the men described themselves as middle-class, two were unsure what class they fitted into.
WORKING-CLASS NON-MOBILITY

It is, in the case of the stable manual men, more difficult to speak of patterns. Men interviewed were working in a variety of occupations both skilled and semi-skilled. They are printers, engineers, painters and decorators, carpenters, plumbers, motor fitters, metal workers, and drivers. Some preferred to call themselves heating and ventilating engineers instead of plumbers. Their fathers had similar occupational titles and while Table 5.5 suggests men from skilled backgrounds are likely to be in skilled work, there was also evidence of upward and downward mobility within the manual stratum. These were occupations which in the vast majority of cases were likely to remain with the men until their work lives ended. None had, as I indicated in Chapter 3, gone on beyond the minimum school-leaving age or had attended anything beyond a secondary modern or its equivalent. Objectively, then, there was little indication that any of these men had been blocked in their mobility and only a tiny minority (5 out of the 27 men re-interviewed) were at all mobility oriented.

SUMMARY

Upward mobility is complicated. In reading over the work histories of the men interviewed a second time, at least five patterns could be discerned. While none of the men conformed exactly to a typical middle-class profile, some patterns did appear to be more genuinely leading to a lifestyle not too different from the stable middle class.

17 About 40 percent of the men interviewed had come from skilled backgrounds and had through apprenticeships become tradesmen themselves.

18 That is, they expressed concern about improving their occupational and social status, as opposed to only their income, at some point in the interview.
than were the others. This was particularly so for the men who had risen fairly high in the occupational hierarchy and for younger men who had attended at least grammar school and perhaps university or technical college. Together these comprise about 25 percent of the upwardly mobile men. The second group, 'self-made men--lower managerial', are 'more' middle-class than working-class. But in a number of respects they appeared to be marginal almost standing outside the class structure. They were not, nor did they seem as likely, to be acculturated fully into a middle-class milieu as are the other two groups. Roughly one-third of the men were in this category.

Finally, about two-fifths of the men moved upwards into an occupation which is itself a marginally middle-class position. Included were two different groups of men; those who have moved upwards following a long period in manual occupations, and young secondary modern school leavers who for various reasons are working in non-manual jobs. In neither case is there much evidence of normative and relational change. For the younger men there had not even been an economic shift as yet. In the former case, the movement upwards had come too late for very large shifts in these three dimensions to be expected. The latter group of men have not been independent of family and peers long enough for these changes to have taken place.

In looking at the occupations of the 100 men in the Work and Leisure Study who were designated downwardly mobile, there was little evidence of extreme skidding. This was also supported by the 22 work histories collected for the Mobility Sample. Most of the men who had fallen three or more categories had done so early on in their work life.

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19 Further evidence, using data from the Work and Leisure Study, of relational and normative changes, is presented in Chapter 11.
and had typically come from lower middle-class backgrounds. Fathers were often greengrocers, shopkeepers and small farm owners. The low downward category consisted mainly of men whose fathers had been like category 3 of the upwardly mobile, occupationally mobile late in their work life. These men had been actively encouraged to enter skilled manual trades which they had mainly done. Thus, there were only a very few men who had in any important sense come from a middle-class background. Downward mobility, in other words, was, in the sample, more statistical artifact than a social phenomenon of much significance.

The two groups of men stable in the occupational hierarchy were interviewed mainly to provide a benchmark against which to assess the men who were mobile. About three-quarters of the men in the non-manual group have followed a typical middle-class pattern. They have come from backgrounds with no trace of working-class connections and have followed orthodox middle-class routes. The other 25 percent are not easily categorized. They are less typically middle-class and have either worked in manual occupations or have working-class ties on one or both sides of their family. With some few exceptions, the stable manual group have all followed one or two basic patterns which have resulted in intergenerational non-mobility. None had more than the minimum of education and only a minority expressed regrets about not having had more education. For the most part the work lives of these men were fairly stable and secure. Despite this, attitudes, aspirations (for themselves and their children), and lifestyles were still decidedly working-class. While some wanted better things for their children these were not, typically, the same things middle-class and upwardly mobile people wanted. In short, most fitted the 'stable manual' category to which the coding procedure assigned them.
PART TWO

SOCIOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS AND CONDITIONS

OF SOCIAL MOBILITY
CHAPTER 6

TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF INDIVIDUAL
SOCIAL MOBILITY

To date, the main sociological contribution to the study of social mobility has been macro-sociological; attempting to explain variances in rates of mobility over time or between societies at the same point in time. The psychological approach, on the other hand, has sought to explain why, given certain social structural conditions, do some people rise and others fall. The approach I wish to develop in this chapter is a micro-sociological one. I want for the time being, to take for granted the large scale factors which may determine rates of social mobility. I also take for granted that certain psychological attributes, especially motivation and ability, are to some extent necessary baggage of the upwardly mobile and that the lack of these may contribute to individual downward mobility.¹ My interest, rather, is in elucidating some small scale structural factors or conditions which might facilitate individual upward and downward mobility. I will argue in this chapter that conditions which serve to reduce the individual's or his family's of origin social integration are also those that act as the impetus for mobility orientation and mobility.

¹I do not in this chapter discuss the large literature on personality characteristics and their relationship to mobility and mobility striving. There are, however, two excellent reviews of these by Lipset and Bendix (1959: 227-254) and Crockett (1966). Also useful are Scanzoni (1966 and 1967); Jencks (1972) and Banks (1971: 61-70). In Chapter 7 evidence from the Work and Leisure Study and the Mobility Sample pertaining to measured intelligence and its relationship to patterns of mobility are considered.
Before presenting the theoretical and empirical evidence to support this argument, it will be necessary to show that, in opposition to the usual view, in British society it is mobility rather than non-mobility which is the deviant and problematic social process. To do this it will be necessary also to show that of the two predominant views about the nature of social stratification—the sub-cultural or culture-variation hypotheses—the sub-cultural hypothesis most relevantly depicts British class structure. Finally, I argue that it is only within these two frameworks that the one distinctively sociological theory of the determinants of social mobility—the theory of reference groups and anticipatory socialization—is of relevance to understanding the social mobility process.

**SUB-CULTURE OR CONTINUUM?**

As one reads through the massive and largely American literature on social mobility, equality of educational opportunity and class differences in level of aspirations, a predominant—and indeed, taken-for-granted assumption—is the normativeness of mobility and mobility striving. Whether cast in terms of anticipatory socialization or simply as level of aspiration, most mobility research in the past few decades has considered attitudes and behaviour as 'conformity' when they have been attuned to a middle-class perspective and as 'deviance' when they reflect something else. This something else a minority of sociologists have come to recognize is perhaps a working-class sub-culture with its own distinct values, beliefs and conduct. The result is that it may be more productive to treat social mobility—upward as well as downward—as if it were a deviant pattern of behaviour subject to negative sanctions ranging from scorn and ridicule to outright ostracism. In Britain, for instance, class differentials in
level and kinds of aspirations and the historical development of the present system of stratification combine to make what is for the middle class a routine fulfillment of expectations, a deviant behavioural pattern when attempted by members of the working class.2

As Turner (1964) describes it, the choice in stratification theory has been between two contending hypotheses: the culture-variation hypothesis and the sub-culture hypothesis. The latter 'assumes that each class is to some degree a self-contained universe developing a distinctive set of values which guides its members' ways of life. Objects which are positively valued in one class subculture may be negatively valued in another. According to this view members of classes have different conceptions of what objectives are worthy of pursuit and what qualities entitle a person to the esteem of his fellows' (pp. 9-10). In contrast to this hypothesis is the culture-variation approach which 'begins by assuming a generally uniform system of values throughout a society and treats class differences as variations on a society-wide theme. Classes differ not so much in generating distinctive value systems, but more in the relative emphasis and the embodiment of their society's values, which derive from their distinctive life situations' (P. 11).

In British studies the subcultural hypothesis has far more often been viewed, implicitly or explicitly, as the more adequate model reflecting what seems a clearer body of evidence than can be mustered in the North American context. These essentially ethnographic studies of working-class communities have all, in varying degrees, implied that because of the rigidity of the British stratification system, social

2Evidence for this statement is presented below. See also Chapter 12.
mobility is objectively and subjectively difficult to bring about.\textsuperscript{3} The detailed descriptions these studies give of the strains and stresses involved in individual mobility striving are far more in accord with the implications of the subcultural thesis than the culture-variation thesis, as Turner (1964: 12) describes them.

Under culture-variation, the (upwardly mobile) individual will have to make some alteration in his value system, but the alterations are in a direction comprehensible to him and to the friends and family in his class of origin. Raising one's sights is likely to be accompanied by adjustment pains, and there is bound to be an uncertain base for self-evaluation during the transition and perhaps permanently. But these pains do not incorporate the same element of moral conflict experienced in a change between groups with contradictory values. Some of the elements of marginality may be present because of the lack of well-established standards, but the whole classic pattern will not be there.

**MOBILITY STRIVING AS THE NORM**

In the United States, the culture-variation thesis has, however, attracted some important and influential spokesmen with the result that in much of the existing research there is the taken-for-granted assumption that upward mobility striving is normative and ubiquitous rather than a deviant and relatively infrequent phenomenon. Luckmann and Berger (1964: 340), for instance, concerned with loss of identity, argue that industrial societies are characterized by an overwhelming and damaging emphasis on upward mobility and anticipatory socialization. Some articulation of the mobility ethos enters into nearly all the primary socialization of individuals. Through the mobility ethos a potential motivation of some or even many individuals becomes a compulsory life-goal for all while everybody feels committed to upward mobility as a central life-goal, a majority fails to achieve it.

For Barber (1957), the ubiquity of the mobility ethos is, in the United States, the main legitimation of the system of stratification.

\textsuperscript{3} I have relied most heavily on the following: Hoggart (1957); Young and Willmott (1959); Jackson and Marsden (1962); Willmott (1963); Willmott (1966). But a particularly helpful review of these and many other studies of working-class life is that of Klein (1965). Lockwood (1966) and Goldthorpe et al (1969) were also useful.
Mobility aspirations, if not actual mobility, are persistent and pervasive; they exist at all but the lowest strata of society. 'As soon as negroes receive even minimally satisfactory education, they join the great majority of Americans in approving of social mobility for themselves and everyone else' (P. 345). And, Lipset and Zetterberg (1956) have made the assumption of a widespread desire for social mobility central to their theoretical statement on the subject:

The theory . . . does not assume that mobility occurs only as a result of specific social norms, pressuring people to be mobile; instead the motivations for mobility are placed in the realm of more or less universal ego-needs operating within stratified societies. (P. 163).

Three years later, the point is made even more succinctly and forcefully by Lipset and Bendix (1959: 73).

Our hypothesis is that the desire to rise in status is intrinsic in all persons of lower status, and that individuals and groups will attempt to improve their status (and self evaluation) whenever they have the chance to do so.

Statements such as these seem to apply most directly to a United States model of social mobility and social stratification yet both the Luckmann-Berger and Bendix-Zetterberg-Lipset arguments are explicitly referring to stratification systems in all Western industrial societies. To both, the differences between European and United States societies are ones of emphasis and extent rather than of kind. There is the clear implication that despite the persistence of ascription in European societies, 'the resulting motivation to move upward appears approximately equal on both continents' (Lipset and Zetterberg, 1956: 168).

ASPIRATIONS AND SOCIAL CLASS

The empirical evidence in the United States and Britain underlying

4 However, see page 249, where social mobility is referred to as deviant behaviour.
this assumption of the normativeness of mobility striving is rather weak. In contrast, the substantial literature on the distribution of mobility aspirations points mainly to the extent these are unevenly distributed between classes. In what was an extremely influential paper, Hyman (1953), with specific reference to Merton's (1949) essay on social structure and anomie questioned the extent to which members of different strata held similar values about the desirability of success, mobility chances and other values which would aid them in reaching or moving toward these goals. His evidence showed that there is 'a reduced striving for success among the lower classes, an awareness of lack of opportunity and a lack of valuation of education' (P. 496). Similarly Martin (1954: 70-71), after considering Merton's thesis, suggests that, 'In British culture, success-goals are rather less heavily and less universally emphasized (at lower levels) and there is a correspondingly greater stress on the institutionalized norms'. A host of other studies (Kahl, 1953; Katz, 1964; Kohn, 1959; Rosen, 1956; Sewall et al, 1957; Musgrove, 1967; Swift, 1967) have also pointed to differentials in success striving between people brought up with different social class backgrounds.

**MOBILITY: A DEVIANT PATTERN**

While the infrequency of a behaviour pattern is not the only basis for labelling it as deviant, it is nevertheless, one criterion. Social mobility seems more prevalent the higher up one goes in the social hierarchy. Looked at from either a 'total perspective' or from the point of view of a working-class person, social mobility must be seen as the exception rather than the rule. Thus, mobility statistics tend to obscure the overwhelming proportion who are to all intents and purposes inter- or intragenerationally static in the class hierarchy. It
is, then, only in the middle class that it is relevant to speak of there being 'considerable' social mobility. But beyond its objective infrequency could it not still be as Merton (1957) argues in his analysis of the genesis of anomie that the desire for upward mobility is a pervasive one, permeating to virtually all class levels? Certainly, most research related to the general problem of inequality of opportunity has taken as its problem, non-mobility. It has usually asked what factors impede the course of bright working-class students who fail to do as well as their middle-class counterparts. It treats anticipatory socialization as conformity to what is seen as the dominant success ideology rather than as deviance from the values and norms of peer group and family. In contrast, Porter (1968: 14-15) reverses the problem and treats non-mobility as normative, high aspirations as possibly deviant. He therefore requests sociologists to ask a different set of questions than they have typically posed:

Middle-class investigators seem genuinely puzzled about how the lower or working classes do or should react to the realities of their class position. Evidence is presented that they are deviant, depressed or despaired and adopt a devil-may-care attitude. These would be logical reactions if working class people had indeed internalized middle-class norms . . . but could they not be participants in a working-class culture with different norms, and view their class position in relative terms according to their membership reference groups? . . . the concept (of reference groups) has been used in the analysis of mobility but mainly in terms of how reference groups aid mobility through anticipatory socialization. It has scarcely been used at all to explain low mobility aspirations.

British sociology more so than American sociology has produced a literature and research tradition which essentially is in accord with Porter's suggested orientation. Generally, an attempt is made to understand the working class on its own terms as a self-contained (sometimes over-romanticized subculture. Status striving and mobility be-

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[For some notable exceptions see Miller and Reissman (1961 and 1968) and Gans (1962).]
behaviour are, therefore, more often interpreted as a deviation from sub-cultural norms and as effectively a repudiation of the peer group and the family network. As in most forms of deviant behaviour there is a resulting effort to bring the upwardly mobile defector back into line. These processes are well documented in Willmott's (1966) study of Bethnal Green adolescents. He was able to distinguish, empirically, three ideal-typical categories of boys among the working class: 'middle-class', 'working-class' and 'rebel'. Between two-thirds to three-quarters of the boys were, on the basis of the 21 items used, categorized as 'working-class'; about 20 percent were 'middle-class' in orientation; ten percent were defined as rebels. Among a number of other characteristics, the 'working-class' boys were non-mobile both with respect to aspirations and actual occupational attainment. The 'middle-class' boys had already experienced some upward mobility and were oriented to values and groups outside the community. In sheer proportions, then, success drives as measured in middle-class terms were the deviant orientation.

Of most interest were the reports of the 'middle-class' boys themselves, which vividly showed how unfavourably their behaviour—deferred gratification, homework, accent and attitudes—was regarded by most other boys and in varying degrees by their families (pp. 93-99). Willmott notes that:

The school and its values are not in tune with the local way of life. Sometimes the strain may lead boys to become 'early leavers'. Of the boys in our sample who had left grammar school, nearly a third had left before they were 17 (p. 95).

6 Goldthorpe et al (1969: 122) concluded about their sample of affluent workers that: 'the aspirations of our respondents were still in important ways shaped and defined by the social realities of their position as manual wage workers . . . secondly that their more "middle-class" aspirations were not held with any great belief in the possibility that they would be realised . . . and thirdly, that only rarely were aspirations specifically focused on status enhancement in the sense of there being a desire to emulate, and to gain the acceptance of persons regarded as belonging to a superior status group'.
The sorts of tensions experienced by these boys seem on the basis of other similar studies (Jackson and Marsden, 1962; Hoggart, 1957) to be fairly typical of working-class communities. All point to an essential conflict between school and neighbourhood influences for those intent on moving upward. 7

Paradoxically, negative sanctions of the kind described in these studies, often go hand-in-hand with a genuine desire on the part of parents and maybe even peers, for the person to do well. As Willmott's study, and other descriptions show, however, the context in which mobility behaviour takes place, the definitions attached to it by members and by the specific actor are shifting and perplexing. 8 Yet parents and perhaps the community, for example, might, in a variety of ways, encourage aspirations toward 'visible' and 'comprehensible' occupational goals--engineer, draughtsman, professional footballer—while remaining apathetic (at best) about 'similar' aspirations to less 'visible' occupations—accountant, solicitor, marketing analyst. And parents, who initially think education a 'good thing', may revise their view when they learn what is implied in terms of children's work load, its inconvenience to them and the way it violates vague norms of 'enough is enough'. As Jackson and Marsden (1966: 18) note:

7The basic dichotomy in orientation between Whyte's (1949) College Boys and Corner Boys, especially as viewed from Doc's perspective, is a particularly relevant illustration of the nonconformity and disaffiliation involved in the process of anticipatory socialization.

8Thus, Haggart (1957: 294) notes that the scholarship boy finds himself cut off by his family because "'e's got the brains or 'e's bright'. But, there can also be a limiting quality in the tone with which the phrase is used; character counts more. Still, he has brains—a mark of pride—and almost a brand; he is heading for a different world, a different sort of job'. See also Klein (1965: 591) who notes that 'what parental ambitions were mentioned in St. Ebbe's (Mogey, 1956) were vague and unrelated to specific courses of action; such parents wanted their sons "to do well", "to get on well"'.
Long homework hours, even more than 'accent', cut into the vital centres of family life, dislocated the whole household's living. It could generate hostility, misunderstanding, irritation, jealousy; and many mothers had to make a special effort to take it under their protection to create a new rhythm around it.

Nor, unfortunately, does education provide very many skills which have value in manual oriented environments. Workers who must put up with complements of student workers each summer are invariably perplexed at the ways in which they are less adept, slow to learn, perhaps, as Hoggart (1957: 301) observes, exhibiting 'an unconvincing pride in (their) own gaucheness at practical things--"brain workers" are never "good with their hands"'. And, yet, as these men are likely to point out, they have all this 'schooling' which has not helped them a bit. People honestly want to know 'what it's all in aid of' but the answer even when it is known, may be too complex to be very meaningful.

While most of my illustrations come from studies of British working-class societies, I do not mean to imply that these same pressures are not found in other working-or lower-class communities. There is, for instance, a remarkable similarity in the way Gans (1962) described life in his West End of Boston slum to what British investigators have also found. Although the community was Italian, he could be describing the processes which impede social mobility in British working-class communities.

Changes that involve a transformation of attitudes and relationships toward the outside world and participation in its activities are still discouraged (P. 219). West Enders not only keep their distance from the middle class, but they will reject other West Enders who stray too far from the peer group society and adopt middle-class ways. Relatives and friends whose taste for furniture or clothes begin to move in a middle-class direction are criticized for having gone 'high society' and people who moved away from the group are described as renegades or deserters. Only those few who can achieve upward mobility in the occupational sphere without becoming 'uppity' . . . are likely to be spared from scorn. (P. 221)
REFERENCE GROUP THEORY AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

What these various studies of working-class life suggest about social mobility as an essentially deviant process is also implicit in general perspectives of reference group theory and anticipatory socialization. To date reference group theory has perhaps been the most significant theoretical contribution to the problem of social mobility available in the literature. (Lipset and Bendix, 1959: 256). The theory, or at least the particular aspects of it developed by Merton, is now thoroughly familiar; it has implicitly or explicitly guided and prompted a considerable amount of what might otherwise have been disparate and non-theoretical research. With respect to research on social mobility, it is the notion of 'anticipatory socialization' which has been the most obvious contribution. Within that aspect of the theory, I wish to narrow the discussion even further to consider mainly how Merton directs attention to the often over-looked fact that anticipatory socialization is from the point of view of the membership group likely to be seen as a deviant orientation even though it may be in conformity with either middle-class or societal values. Thus, as well as providing a framework in which to view the relationship of the individual to the social structure, Merton also presents a systematic analysis of what is implied by the working-class studies considered above: behaviour can only be labelled as conforming or non-conforming

9 The term 'reference group' was coined by Hyman (1942). The major statement comes from Merton and Rossi's (1949) reformulation of data from The American Soldier (Stouffer et al, 1949). An extensive elaboration of the theory was published by Merton in 1957. Kelly (1952), Shibutani (1955) and Newcomb (1950) have also made important contributions to a refinement of the basic concepts. Bott (1954) and Runciman (1966) have both used the theory in studying social stratification. For a sample of the large literature on reference group theory, see Hyman and Singer (1968).
with reference to specific units of the social system.

Merton argues that:

In the language of reference group theory, attitudes of conformity to the official mores can be described as a positive orientation to the norms of a non-membership group that is taken as a frame of reference. Such conformity to norms of an out-group is thus equivalent to what is ordinarily called non-conformity, that is, non-conformity to the norms of the in-group (Merton, 1957: 264).

Such out-group orientation may, as perspectives shift, be interpreted as 'functional' or 'dysfunctional' to the various units of the social system. If, on the other hand, the social system is not an open one, or is characterized by a relatively high degree of status rigidity, anticipatory socialization is 'dysfunctional' for the individual and gives rise to the phenomenon of 'the marginal man, poised on the edge of several groups but fully accepted by none of them... The same reference group behaviour in different social structures has different consequences' (pp. 265-266).

Of considerable significance is that for the individual's in-group or membership group, anticipatory socialization represents, usually, deviance and is often interpreted by the group as rejection. Social mobility, then, is the outcome of a process in which there is

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10 Merton (pp. 360-364) distinguishes between 'non-conformity' and 'deviant behaviour' for reasons which seem to reflect a bias toward order and morality rather than any profound differences in the patterns of observable behaviour. At certain levels of analysis, some fairly obvious differences become apparent which relate more to the sociology of law and of criminology than to social-psychological processes. However, I am aware that from the point of view of deviance theory, the inclusion of 'anticipatory socialization' under the label of 'deviant behaviour' may be to trivialize the latter concept. In calling mobility behaviour deviant behaviour, then, I do so partly because I am not convinced that at the social-psychological level of analysis there is any theoretically important distinction between non-conformity and deviant behaviour.

11 For Merton's use of function and dysfunction, see his essay 'Manifest and Latent Functions' in Merton (1957: 104).
the distinct probability of 'a deterioration of social relations within the membership group and positive attitudes toward the norms of a non-membership group. What the individual experiences as estrangement from a group of which he is a member tends to be experienced by his associates as repudiation of the group . . . the individual estranged from the one group has all the more motivation to belong to the other' (P. 270).

Moreover, though it has not to my knowledge been exploited, Merton suggests that some patterns of downward mobility can also be interpreted within reference group theory.

The framework of reference group theory, detached from the language of sentiment, enables the sociologist to identify and to locate renegadism, treason, the assimilation of immigrants, class mobility, social climbing, etc., as so many special forms of identification with what is at the time a non-membership group. The transfer of allegiance of upper class individuals from their own to a lower class . . . belongs to the same family of sociological problems as the more familiar identification of lower class individuals with higher class . . . Our cultural emphases notwithstanding, the phenomenon of top dogs adopting the values of the underdog is as much a reference group phenomenon lending itself to further inquiry as that of the underdogs seeking to become topdogs (P. 269).

The difference it might be noted, is that downward mobility is relatively easy to regard as non-conforming behaviour. It is relatively infrequent, it runs contrary to the dominant values of the middle class, and in some circumstances may be defined as a social problem: if it is 'voluntary', then some proportion of the middle class are not being sufficiently motivated. Hence, it is only through recourse to an explanation such as that provided by reference group theory that it is possible to take the role of the downwardly mobile at all and to absolve it of such value-laden terms as 'degradation', 'abasement', 'sinking' and 'failure' (Sorokin, 1927). \(^{12}\) Upward mobility,

\(^{12}\) At which point it is not clear whether adopting the values of an objectively less prestigious stratum is, from the actor's point of reference, downward mobility at all. This was discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.
on the other hand, seems more in accord with taken-for-granted conceptions of social structure and 'human nature'. For this reason, it is somewhat more understandable and less problematic.

ANTICIPATORY SOCIALIZATION

Anticipatory socialization has been the concept used to describe the orientation and conformity to attitudes and behaviour which while deviant to the person's objective membership group are instrumental in creating acceptance in the non-membership group. How does this shift in reference group affiliations come about? What prompts some people to ignore the pressures and spurn the security of family, peer group and community for what may only be partial acceptance in a different group? Since the emphasis has generally been on upward mobility these questions, typically, are sidestepped. This is possible because of the implicit assumption that 'higher' status positions are intrinsically superior and that people will normally strive to reach them. As the evidence presented earlier suggests, however, working-class members are not necessarily eager to move into a higher class and may have highly negative evaluations of middle-class work and lifestyles. As Gans (1962: 253) said of his West Enders: 'they are not yet eager to move into the middle class . . . their culture is still that of the working class'. Merton (1957: 270) notes that ambitious privates were alternatively accused of 'brown-nosing', 'sucking up' and 'bucking for promotion'. Likewise Young (1965: 65) describes how the upwardly mobile are castigated as 'the toffee-nosed Lah de dah swank pots'. Implied in such expressions is a sense of 'place' and an acceptance of existing relationships of inequality as 'right' and 'proper'. Jackson and Marsden (1962: 259) found that some of the fathers in their sample were hostile to the nation of grammar school for their children, 'sensing
a class barrier which they were reluctant to penetrate'.

Because of this social pressure—perhaps outright rejection—directed towards those who aspire to a different and usually higher life style, the easier path is likely to be the one involving non-mobility rather than mobility. To be mobile, as Gans further suggests, the individual 'must first break—or have broken for him—his dependence on family and peers' (1962: 254). In short, he must be able to live his life apart from the people with whom he has grown up, and take both their ostracism and criticism. Because of the difficulties that must be endured, and the obstacles that must be overcome, (social mobility) is sought today by only a few people' (P. 222).

Similarly, Lipset and Bendix (1959: 249) observe that 'the process of social mobility requires, beyond the motivation to achieve, the capacity to leave behind an early environment and to adapt to a new one'. Once started, of course, the process of out-group affiliation is likely to take on the appearance of a vicious circle. There is, as Merton (1957: 270) put it, 'a continued and cumulative interplay between a deterioration of social relations within the membership group and positive attitudes towards the norms of a non-membership group'. However, this does not answer the question of how some people begin to orient themselves outwards rather than inwards. What are the social and personality factors which might predispose the individual to make the initial break with family and peer group?

WHEN DOES ANTICIPATORY SOCIALIZATION OCCUR?

In considering some conditions which might provide a possible answer to these questions it is relevant to look more closely at the na-

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13 For further data on working-class attitudes about mobility, see: Chapter 12 of this study.
ture of anticipatory socialization. Is it an outcome of contact with out-group members? Does it occur prior to the shift in reference groups? Is what we measure as anticipatory socialization a change in attitudes occurring only after social mobility has taken place? As Turner (1964: 85-86) has pointed out it is extremely difficult, even analytically, to untangle the chain of causation connecting anticipatory socialization and social mobility. However, one attempt to do so is to be found in an important paper by Lane and Ellis (1968).

Basing much of their argument on their own research experience, they show that there are at least four distinct ways anticipatory socialization can enter into the mobility process. This leads them to posit four 'temporal paradigms': (1) anticipatory socialization; (2) situational socialization; (3) routine socialization; and (4) post socialization. Because of their relevance to the present problem, it is useful to describe these paradigms very briefly. 14

The basic model, anticipatory socialization, is that proposed by Merton and described in the preceding paragraphs. It is one which involves, first of all, a weakening of the level of social integration so that there is the possibility and motivation for a positive shift in reference group from membership to non-membership group. This is followed by re-socialization and then social mobility. In Lane's and Ellis's terms, the sequence is: 'out-group affiliative motives → out-group social contact → social learning → social mobility' (P. 9). As we have just seen, the genesis of the original motivation is—excepting personality characteristics—unexplained. Except by assuming, for instance, that adherence to middle-class values and norms

14 While relying heavily on their excellent review of the literature, I have in what follows also augmented it where relevant.
is widely dispersed throughout the social structure, this paradigm cannot provide an adequate explanation of why social mobility occurs at all.

Closely related to anticipatory socialization is situational socialization in which there is a reverse relationship between social contact and the shift in reference group. Much of the research on the formation or determination of aspirations is, Lane and Ellis suggest, in accord with this second paradigm. That is, that attitudes and values change after contact with significant others: a teacher, a community leader or a more prestigious peer group. For reasons that are not entirely clear, promising, talented or attractive individuals are 'adopted' or singled out for special attention through a process of formal or informal sponsorship (Turner, 1960). A number of studies (Alexander and Campbell, 1964; Bell, 1963; Bennett and Gist, 1964; Beilin, 1956; Bordua, 1960; Campbell and Alexander, 1965; Ellis and Lane, 1963; Haller and Butterworth, 1960; Kraus, 1964; and Simpson, 1962) confirm that contact with middle-class peers helps to account for high status aspirations among working-class boys. The sequence for situational socialization, then is: 'out-group social contact → social learning → out-group affiliative motive → social mobility' (Lane and Ellis, 1968: 10).

The third paradigm 'routine socialization' assumes that there will be little or no acculturative problem associated with social mobility. Instead 'it premised that for reasons of downward mobility the parents (or kin) of lower-class youth are able in the normal course of sociali-

15 In one of the latest reports on the longitudinal study of Wisconsin boys by Sewell and his associates, the authors came to similar conclusions about the role of reference groups in the mobility process. Clearly, the variable we have called significant others' influence is an important factor. The present evidence appears to show that once formed its effects are far-reaching. Also, besides being a powerful explanatory factor, significant others' influence should be amenable to manipulation. It thus suggests itself as a point at which external agents might intervene to change educational and occupational attainment levels (Sewell et al, 1969: 89).
zation to familiarize them with the knowledge, attitude and skills of the middle-class subculture'. The sequence is 'in-group social contact \[\rightarrow\] social learning \[\rightarrow\] social mobility' (Lane and Ellis, 1968: 11). The paradigm seems to be in accord with a number of research findings on the contribution of family environment to ambition and social mobility. It puts another way the somewhat commonsensical but well documented view that mobility orientations, whether measured in terms of aspirations or more articulated psychological traits, arise in the home and are a direct outcome of parental influences (Bordua, 1960; Bell, 1963; Bennet and Gist, 1964; Ellis and Lane, 1963; Floud et al, 1956; Kahl, 1953; Sewell and Shah, 1968; and Swift, 1967).

But more significantly, the presence of these influences in the home, suggests that in many cases, the family as well as the mobile individual is to some extent deviant with respect to its objective position in the class structure. As Turner (1962: 397) puts it, 'the child fails to hold the ambitions which are characteristic of his class background because the impact of that background is comprised by inconsistent elements'. The family, he continues, mediates the impact of social class

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16 I have not, in this chapter considered aspects of family structure --notably size of family of origin and sibling position. The most reliable evidence is that provided by Blau and Duncan (1967: 295-330) which confirms earlier findings and beliefs that 'the proverbial large happy family is not conducive to occupational success' (P. 328). In terms of sibling position, it appears that, with many qualifications, the first-born and last-born children enjoy an advantage over the middle-born and that it is more disadvantageous to have younger siblings than older ones (pp. 328-329). Thus, working-class parents who are themselves achievement oriented may purposefully conform to middle-class behaviour by restricting their family size either to accelerate their own mobility or that of their children (Westoff, 1953; Berent, 1952; and Duncan, 1966). It follows that middle-class parents who are either low in achievement orientation or who have failed to internalize middle-class norms and values (perhaps as a result of social mobility) may have larger families thus creating disadvantages for their children. However, as class differentials in fertility seem to be narrowing and as determination of size of family is likely predicated on a variety of factors of which social mobility is but one, fertility will likely be less useful in the future (Glass, 1968: 118). Some data relating to family structure are considered in Chapter 7.
position upon the child in two ways:

First, the family either faithfully creates the typical life situation for each member, or it creates a situation which is atypical for members of the social stratum. Second, the family transmits a subculture which either corresponds to the family's position or deviates from it.

In support of this paradigm, Lane and Ellis (1968) refer to Miller and Reissman's (1961) argument that in the United States those who do move into the middle class have relatives who were or are middle-class. And, in England, Jackson and Marsden (1962: 70) attribute a sizeable proportion of upward mobility to membership in the 'sunken middle class'.

One of the consequences of throwing open grammar school education has been that middle-class families who have collapsed through ill health, bankruptcy, foolishness or any of the stray chances of life, have been able to educate their children out of their condition and reclaim the social position of their parents and grandparents.

Another study, by Cohen (1958), found that significantly more downwardly mobile fathers had sons in college compared to their stationary counterparts. Downwardly mobile mothers were even more highly associated with sons' mobility potential: 80 percent of sons whose mother had a white-collar family background were going to college compared to only 42 percent with mothers of a working-class background (reported in Lipset and Bendix, 1959: 238). Similarly, in Britain Floud et al (1956: 88) found that 'mothers of successful working-class children . . . had frequently before marriage followed an occupation "superior" to that of their husbands'. Without necessarily claiming downward mobility on the part of the mother, the often repeated wisdom that 'if you educate a woman you educate a family' has been supported empirically in a number of studies (Bennett and Gist, 1964; Davis, 1957; Ellis and Lane, 1963; Martin, 1954; Simpson,1962; Turner, 1962; Strodtebeck, 1958; Young, 1965: 61).\footnote{Much of this research represents a departure from Kahl's (1953)\footnote{For a detailed and personal account of this process, see D. H. Lawrence's semi-autobiographical novel, Sons and Lovers. Hoggart (1957: 295) has also discussed at some length the important role women play in the early life of the upwardly mobile.}}
analysis of 'common man' boys where the pre-eminent factor in distinguishing the mobile from the non-mobile is the father. Variances in ambition within the same status and level of intelligence, are he argues, attributable to differences in parents—particularly the father's orientation. Parents who were discontented tended to train their sons from the earliest years of grammar school to take school seriously and use education as the means to climb into the middle class. Only sons who internalized such values were sufficiently motivated to overcome the obstacles which faced (them) in school (P. 364).

However, Turner argues on the basis of his Los Angeles study (1962 and 1964) that both views may be correct. Unable to find support for the 'mother hypothesis' he concluded that 'the special influence of the mother washed out in favour of the more parsimonious principle that any element in the family situation which introduces a higher class component contributes to (upward) mobility' (quoted in Crockett, 1966: 302). Nor does it seem that the higher class component need actually to be an objective factor. Himmelweit (1963), for instance, found that parents of working-class grammar school boys were 'more' middle-class in their values than the parents of middle-class grammar school boys. Not only were the boys deviant with respect to their objective class, but so were the families. They had either retained or acquired a divergent set of values to be duly passed on to their children.

Central to the concept of anticipatory socialization is the acquisition, by the mobile individual, of values and norms of the class or group to which he aspires but is not yet a member. It is only when these have been learned, that social mobility occurs. But the fourth paradigm suggested by Lane and Ellis, 'post socialization' is based on the possibility that social learning occurs after the individual has been able to alter his objective status. Following on from Blau's (1956: 293) statement that 'economic changes are transformed into shifts in social affiliation only by those occupationally mobile individuals most of whose
friends are members of their terminal social stratum, the middle class in case of the upwardly mobile, the working class in case of the downwardly mobile', they set out the sequence of the paradigm as follows: 'occupational mobility \rightarrow out-group social contact \rightarrow out-group affiliative motive \rightarrow social learning \rightarrow social mobility' (P. 11).

Of the four paradigms, the post socialization sequence may be most relevant to intragenerational middle-mass mobility where education, excluding part-time training, has not been to any appreciable extent involved. Since intragenerational mobility has not been studied from this point of view, evidence is scanty. However, in a remarkable study, using longitudinal data on foremen's attitudes, Liebermann (1956) showed that workers promoted to foreman underwent systematic changes in attitudes after they achieved the new roles. Later, due to redundancies, some foremen were cut-back to their former status. Re-administration of the questionnaire revealed that 'foremen who were demoted tended to revert to the attitudes they had previously held while they were in the worker role, while foremen who remained in the foreman role maintained the attitudes they had developed' (P. 331). While certainly of interest for role theory, it is unknown whether these findings are wholly applicable to downward social mobility in general. Studies of voting and union membership (Lipset and Gordon, 1953; Wilensky, et al, 1959) indicate that retention of middle-class attitudes by the downwardly mobile is the more likely outcome. Also, the studies discussed under 'routine socialization' imply that the downwardly mobile (sunken middle class) do not undergo resocialization into working-class values.

**SOURCES OF OUT-GROUP ORIENTATION**

Explanations of the source of the 'out-group affiliative motive' are generally couched in terms of personality differences (Lipset and
Bendix, 1959: 249). Gans (1962), for instance, suggests that the 'possession of special talents' will be enough to impel the individual out of the peer group and 'into the training grounds of the middle class'. But as he also notes, this is but one source of what he considers the requisite isolation necessary for the mobility venture. 'It requires that the young person be isolated from his family and peer group by a combination of pressures which push him out of these groups and incentives which pull him into the outside world'. Likewise, Merton (1957: 270) provides an important clue in his suggestion that 'it is the isolate, nominally in a group but only slightly incorporated in its network of social relations, who is most likely to become positively oriented toward non-membership groups'. Beyond personality factors, then, are essentially sociological conditions which promote and facilitate out-group affiliations and, in turn, social mobility.

Personal crises and late arrival into the peer group are also advanced by Gans as events producing the isolation he feels is so necessary if social mobility is to occur. In addition, the paradigm Lane and Ellis (1968) call 'routine socialization', as well as being an important modification of the basic Mertonian concept of anticipatory socialization, is also highly suggestive of from where the isolation or low integration may stem. As we have seen, research presented by them and augmented by British studies point to the possibility that the source of the deviant orientation—the out-group affiliative motive—may be traced not simply to the individual but to the marginal status of the family of origin. Prior experiences, within-family inconsistencies in class background, geographical mobility and similar events may all contribute to its low integration into the community. Thus, for reasons of downward mobility of one or both of the parents or blocked
mobility, upward mobility of the children might more appropriately be viewed as an objective or subjective **restoration** of status rather than as a **change** in social status.

**DOWNWARD MOBILITY**

Although the emphasis has throughout been on upward mobility, the same argument is also applicable to the phenomenon of downward mobility. Moving downward in the social scale is not, of course, simply the obverse of upward mobility. It is, for instance, difficult to think in terms of concepts such as 'structural supports for downward mobility'. However, the failure of the family to be fully incorporated into its objective class milieu--because of upward mobility of the parents, discrepancies within the family or perhaps ideological commitments--may mean the individual is more likely to deviate from middle-class achievement patterns and goals. Turner (1962: 398), for example argues that:

The typical middle class situation is often thought to be one in which the members experience relative economic security, receive a good deal of sustained attention and affection from their parents, experience a stable family life and which in other ways reflects the constellation of the small family in economic sufficiency. When this constellation is altered by family breakup or by the unusually large family, some of the important conditions which make the middle class child into the typical adult from his class background may be missing.

Similarly, Miller (1960: 10) in considering the 'stability' of mobility asks whether 'those who rise provide a firm footing for their progeny to maintain or to move above the new position, or is the third generation likely to fall back to the grandfather's position'? Evidence so far is too scanty to support or reject the hypothesis of 'clods to clods in three generations' though the Glass (1954) data show that British society does contain 'unstable elements' which are 'involved in reverse shifts in status in successive generations' (P. 286). 18 Fur-

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18 For a summary of historical and comparative data, see Coode (1966: 590).
ther, novelistic if not sociological literature has often been concerned with the way a 'strong' and ambitious father inhibits the development of his son and how these traits re-emerge in the grandson. Lastly, and of less dramatic interest, it seems likely as Chapter 4 and 5 have shown fathers who over the course of their work life achieve non-manual occupations, may not take on middle-class values; they either actively encourage their children to enter manual occupations or are unable to convey to their children appropriate middle-class achievement behaviour.

In addition to the notion that low integration of the family of origin may be a result of social mobility, there may be other conditions or events which lead to the same result. In general, my interpretation of the evidence presented in this chapter and from observation led to the following general hypothesis: any source of non-integration of the family of origin into its objective class situation will make it more likely that the potentially mobile person will (1) affiliate himself with out-groups; (2) be able to withstand social pressures to conform to non-mobility patterns of behaviour; and (3) to cut community and peer group ties. This incomplete incorporation of the family of origin into the normal social milieu is an explanation congruent with Merton's observation that it is the isolate who is most prone to become positively oriented to norms of a non-membership group. It also provides a sociological approach towards elucidating what, beyond 'intelligence and motivation' may be involved in the capacity to break away from one social milieu and adapt to a new one. While there are still likely to be dissociative consequences entailed in 'pulling up roots' in this way, the impact may be mediated appreciably if the family of origin is only nominally a part of the old environment or diverges from it in important ways. A number of factors besides social mobility of the parents could
conceivably contribute to the low integration. At the outset, the most plausible were geographical mobility of the parents, the lack of an extended kinship structure, a disorderly work-life history of the father and the extent to which the family of origin engages in 'privatised' behaviour.

**SUMMARY**

Since the argument presented in this chapter is complicated, it may be useful to summarize the main points. I have tried to show that because values about success and status striving are not universally shared at all levels of the social structure, working-class people who aspire to middle-class status are likely to be treated as deviant. Evidence from those studies which view the working class as a more or less distinct sub-culture indicate that people who do orient themselves to middle-class lifestyles must contend with a considerable amount of negative social pressure from family and peers. There would seem to be two reasons for why this should occur: (1) middle-class work and lifestyles are not generally very well regarded by working-class people and (2) orientations and behaviour directed outside of the membership group are often seen by implication, as a rejection of the membership group. The general perspective on these processes emerging from such studies is one which is roughly in accord with Merton's application of reference group theory to social mobility. He suggested that while anticipatory socialization aids the individual to change his social class, it is also a direct repudiation of membership group norms. Negative sanctions are likely to be directed at those who depart from its norms and attempt to adopt those of a higher group. These sanctions have, it would appear, sufficient force so as to make mobility emotionally and socially difficult; it requires special strength and motivation to overcome the hurdles
which arise not only from the top but also the bottom of the social structure.

Alternatively, the individual may simply be so unusually intelligent or possess such special talents that middle-class sponsors single him out. They are able to offer incentives great enough to offset the social and emotional costs of cutting former ties. But beyond these personality characteristics, neither reference group theory or the studies reviewed in this chapter are able to provide an adequate explanation of the source of the initial impetus for affiliation and attempt at conformity with out-groups. What conditions or events predispose some people to take the more difficult path of deviating from group norms?

The one clue which does emerge is that the mobile or mobility-oriented person must be to some extent isolated from his objective membership groups. However, as one looks more closely at the sequence of events in the mobility process it becomes apparent that the Mertonian model of anticipatory socialization is but one of four possible paradigms. Of the four, the pattern Lane and Ellis call 'routine socialization' seemed to fit much of the evidence from research on the genesis of mobility aspirations. This research suggests that the mobile individual, while deviating from his peer group and general class culture, may in fact be conforming to the values of his family of origin. This is, I argue, because the family itself is not well integrated into or is in other ways divergent from its social environment. Thus, instead of looking for events and conditions in the lives of individuals per se, the paradigm suggested the usefulness of examining more closely what had happened to the family of origin and to its members prior to one or more of its members moving upwards.

Much the same argument is meant to apply also to certain patterns
of downward mobility. While misfortunes of various kinds may account for some downward mobility I have argued in this chapter that a low level of integration of certain families objectively in the middle class might contribute to what, objectively, is a downward orientation and mobility of their children.

The next two chapters are concerned with conditions and events which might lead to a low level of integration and then to mobility. I will be looking, then, at the accounts the men in the Mobility Sample gave of their earlier home experiences and the structure and attitudes of their family of origin. These data are supplemented by those collected in the course of interviewing fathers of these men. Chapter 7 focusses principally on factors related to educational aspirations and achievement. Chapter 8 looks at influences and events connected to the entry into work and choice of occupation.
CHAPTER 7

FAMILY BACKGROUNDS AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

This chapter presents findings from the Mobility Sample that relate to the general hypothesis outlined in Chapter 6. This is that the socially mobile originate in families not well integrated into their class and community. The data reported are mainly retrospective. I was asking people to recall aspects of their own childhood, a time which lay from one to several decades in the past. Because of this I have wherever possible supplemented the accounts people gave with those provided by the fathers. Although the choice of a first job and of a career as much as education is probably influenced by what happens in the home, I will be looking mainly at family influences on educational achievement in this chapter. The relationship of family background to career choice and first jobs is considered in Chapter 8.

As we have seen in Chapter 6, social mobility is problematic; it runs contrary to the systematic evidence we have concerning the distribution of life chances in society. Thus stratification theory directs our attention not to inequality per se, but to the way in which inequalities are structured, persisting from generation to generation. The key unit in the process of stratification is therefore the family rather than the individual; though internally it may approach the socialist ideal of equality and redistribution of wealth, it acts in society as the principal institution perpetuating and crystallizing inequality. According to stratification theory, it is the command by higher-class families over economic and status resources which allows their children to maintain or improve their social and economic position. It is the
lack of these resources which appears to consign children from less advantaged families to positions at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

It was, initially, the anomalous nature of social mobility that led to the search for factors—social origins, aspirations, lifestyles—that might set the families of mobile individuals apart and detached from the general class milieu in which they were placed. Given what we do know about the forces which lead to perpetuation of status from generation to generation, I argued that if a family was only partially integrated into its objective class then it would be more likely to inculcate in children values which would in turn lead to mobility. For the working class, these would take the form of some adaptation of middle-class values or perhaps, simply, a discontent with their present lot and an only partially articulated desire for something better of different for their children. While parents are unlikely to want their children to do worse than themselves, I argued further that the particular circumstances in what we categorize as middle-class families may be such that their children either fail to learn the appropriate middle-class attitudes and values or they are taught a set of values which are more appropriate to a working-class than a middle-class milieu. In short, the middle-class family which is only partially integrated into its objective class may be a determinant of downward mobility.

CLASS ELEMENTS: FATHERS' ORIGINS

In their study of 88 working-class grammar school boys, Jackson and Marsden (1962) wondered whether they 'were to some extent dealing with new or temporary accretions to the working class. Not so much upper working-class homes as sunken middle-class families'? Starting from this important clue one hypothesis was that the upwardly mobile are more likely to have fathers who were downwardly mobile than are the
stable manual respondents. Similarly, downward mobiles are more likely to have fathers who were upwardly mobile than are the stable non-manuals. This suggests a kind of cyclical phenomenon in which the mobile form a status group peripheral to their objective stratum existing more or less independent of 'core' middle-class and working-class status groups. If this were to prove accurate, then the notion of 'clods to clods in three generations' would be a phenomenon affecting only a segment of society. On the one hand would be continuity and on the other something approximating perpetual intergenerational change.

Unfortunately, more than a third of the men could not recall, even in general, what occupation their grandfathers had held. With the use of the interview schedules for the fathers, it was possible to piece together some additional family ties and thereby decrease the number of unknowns and dubious titles to about 30 percent of the sample. The results, by type of mobility are shown in Table 7.1. These show that there is little or no difference between the stable manual and the upwardly mobile and what difference there is, is in the opposite direction to that predicted by the hypothesis. Thus, about 78 percent of the upwardly mobile men come from families in which the father and grandfather were both in manual occupations. In contrast, 71 percent of the stable manual men had working-class fathers and grandfathers. With respect to the downwardly mobile, the data tend to support the hypothesis. Although the numbers are small, the difference between the downwardly mobile and the stable non-manual is statistically significant. It appears that the downwardly mobile are much more likely than the stable non-manual to have had working-class grandfathers (60 percent versus 22 percent).
TABLE 7.1
CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND FATHERS' INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 82)

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1 X 4: $X^2 = .341$; N.S.  
2 X 3: $X^2 = 4.891$; P < .05

As I described in Chapter 5, one pattern of downward mobility identified was one in which the father had been upwardly mobile over his career and usually without the benefit of additional education beyond the minimum. By ignoring the father's intergenerational mobility, which in the absence of the data on all the grandfathers, is incomplete, and concentrating on his career mobility, more of the data can be used. Table 7.2 provides a parallel set of findings to that of Table 7.1. That is, that there is very little difference between the upwardly mobile and the stable manual groups. The downwardly mobile again differ significantly from the stable non-manual in having fathers who were upwardly mobile over their own work life. Thus, Table 7.2 provides confirmation of what was shown in Chapter 5 to be an important pattern of downward mobility. Here it emerges as an equally important explanation of downward mobility.
TABLE 7.2
CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND FATHERS' CAREER MOBILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility (Sons)</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fathers' Mobility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Mobile</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 X 4: $X^2 = 1.090$; N.S. 2 X 3: $X^2 = 5.599$; $P < .02$

DOWNWARD MOBILITY AND FATHER'S CLASS OF ORIGIN

It is useful to examine this in more detail. The most noteworthy aspect is the considerable similarity between some of the upwardly mobile informants and the fathers of most of the downwardly mobile informants in the sample. Men in my sample who had been upwardly mobile through a non-educational route tended to share with these fathers a more working-class than middle-class set of values and attitudes. For both, occupational mobility had come too late in life for ties with the working class to be severed. One indication of this was in their inability to see the possible implications of education for their children. It was not so much that they did not value education as that they were unaware, except in a vague way, of how an experience such as grammar school might be of benefit. Some, of course, were antagonistic towards the whole idea. Mr. Middleton, encountered in Chapter 5, said, 'My parents wasn't very interested, I didn't think.¹ They thought gram-

¹Names are fictitious. The addition of 'Sr.' means I am referring to the father of one of the respondents in the Mobility Sample.
mar school and that lot was a load of nonsense'. More often there was a positive pressure exerted to direct sons into technical fields and skilled trades and by implication away from white-collar work and further education.

They kept on at me about apprenticing. 'Don't go for the big money. Don't worry about friends getting 20 pounds when you're getting four to ten as an apprentice, because you'll find out at the end of the time you're getting twice as much as them, plus a better job' (Skilled engineer--father a buyer).

I couldn't think of anything to do when I left school and a couple of my friends went to Acme engineering. My father said, 'Take an apprenticeship whatever you decide'. So I took the engineering side up (Toolmaker--father, a company director).

I wasn't a hundred percent sure of anything but my mother and father thought that printing was something with a future. I can remember from an early age, 11 or 12, my mom and dad, saying 'Become a printer'. I wouldn't say I didn't want to become a printer, but I never thought of anything else, really (Newspaper printer--father, a clerk).

They were, it often appeared, directing their sons into the very trades they felt they had been robbed of by the depression or by the hiatus of war, as more than one man described it.

A second, and equally important aspect of the mobility of the fathers was that these were also the men who expressed the most disillusionment with their present work. However successful they were relative to where they began, they were in occupations which were apparently insecure. The frequently expressed desire 'to have a trade behind me' suggested their jobs were somewhat futile and nebulous compared with the tangible work done by tradesmen. The result was that they had passed on to their children a largely negative view of the middle class and the sorts of work its members do. With emphatic nods of agreement from his father, an office supervisor, Mr. Biggin, gave me his views and apparently his father's as well, on the occupational hierarchy.

Some jobs are waster jobs. People doing these jobs are well paid and they're doing nothing. Take a chartered accountant, for instance, he's
got to do his training but once that's through he only works a formula, really. Everything works the same—near enough identical—once he gets his qualifications. Or take a job like works manager. From what my father tells me they're absolutely useless. It seems to work out that the brightest people are not at the top. There's more money to be earned on the tools than on the management side so only the lazy people go on the management side.

Mr. Biggin is a very contented, almost archetypal, bricklayer. Mr. Willets Sr., now in a non-manual job, maintained that,

These glorious suburban boys make me sick. The toffee-nosed, what you see, rushing across London at 9:00 in the morning with their brollies in hand and rushing back again at 5:00. It's one big rat race and they're all so damned ambitious they trample anybody who gets in their way. I work with them now, and they're the most unpleasant people you can meet. The more, the higher they are in status, the worse they are.

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that his son had become a semi-skilled worker.

SATISFIED FATHERS

On the whole, there was no group of fathers any more satisfied with how things had worked out for their children than were those of the downwardly mobile respondents. What might have been a difficult question to ask of these fathers, was in most cases just the opposite. When they had not positively directed their children into trades they had bent to what seemed the 'natural' leaning of the child. Mr. Newbold, who is apprenticing, explained it this way (his father is an inspector for London Transport):

I've been fooling around with electrical stuff since I was about eight. My father was always behind me, it's his hobby as well. Both he and my mother went to grammar schools so it was important for me to pass the 11+. And everytime we used to go down and see those cousins (who had passed) after I had taken the 11+ and didn't pass, it was 'How well they're getting on at grammar school'. But my father never let me down ever. He knew there was something going on and that I wouldn't just leave school and get any old job. I've proven that now.

Only in a few instances were there signs of discontent about what had happened to their sons. Mr. Buckland Sr., a civil servant and a grammar school graduate (discussed in Chapter 5), was both bemused and angry
with the choice of lifestyle his son had adopted. At one point he said, "I wanted him to go into light engineering, to get some sort of trade, if he wasn't going to go on in school. I feel he let himself and me down".

MOTHERS' SOCIAL CLASS AND MOBILITY

So far I have centered the discussion on the relationship of the father's social origin to his son's intergenerational mobility pattern. As it is father-son mobility which is of paramount concern in this study, the majority of the data collected pertain to the career, background and attitudes of the father. Yet, as Douglas (1964: 72) notes:

We cannot afford to ignore the background of the mothers when looking at the educational progress of their children; they make an equal contribution with the fathers to inherited ability and possibly a greater one to attitudes to learning. In ambitious working-class households it is not unusual to find that the mother comes from a middle-class family and supplies the drive and incentive for her children to do well in school.

Similarly, in the Huddersfield study by Jackson and Marsden (1962), the fact that either the father or mother came from middle-class backgrounds was considered an important factor explaining the upward mobility of their grammar school students. Their evidence is also congruent with the approach of Turner (quoted in Chapter 6) who argues that any higher class component is likely to contribute to upward mobility (Turner, 1962).

In the accounts of their early life there is, among the upwardly mobile, evidence that there were middle-class connections on the mother's side of the family, though, curiously, not on the father's side. Invariably, then, it was the mother who was seen as having brought a middle-class influence into the family. As some commented:

My mother was the one that did the driving. She's the one that set me on the course. She was much different than my father, shall we say from a different environment? My mother came from the Midlands and she was more or less tied to local life and her family were the local publicans. This is an entirely different environment to engineering. She
could probably see through it better to what the job meant (Chief Draughtsman).

He's not the working class. Not the cloth cap type. They're reasonably well off now, but still basically working-class. I wouldn't want my mother to hear me say that. I suppose she thinks of herself as not being working-class. Anyway, she's not got a working-class outlook (Cost Accountant).

My mother always felt she had come down in the world, she'd married beneath her, marrying my father. I don't know a great deal about my mother's side of the family because of that. I know they were quite well off. I should say they were middle-class types. Her father was a director of one of the shipping companies. An engineer was a great comedown in the world for her and she let him know about it (Financial Analyst).

However, as one begins to count up the number of men who did have mothers who had 'married down', it emerges that men who remained in the working class are about as likely to have a mother with middle-class origins as are the upwardly mobile. This is shown in Table 7.3. Few of the stable working-class men mentioned it spontaneously, suggesting that perhaps the upwardly mobile are more conscious of family background or that the mother had made it more apparent than in those families where there has been little or no social mobility. In the absence of additional data one can only speculate as to the precise reason.

TABLE 7.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Social Mobility</th>
<th>Mother's Original Social Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Upward Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Stable Non-Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Downward Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Middle Class</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Working Class</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 X 4: (X^2 = .102); N.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, it may be, as Hoggart (1957: 295) suggests, that the up-
wardly mobile scholarship boy tends to be closer to the women of the house than to the men. It may also be that the upwardly mobile are more aware of the relationship of occupation to class and status and in retrospect are able to see that their mothers had married 'down'. Perhaps by virtue of their more marginal status, they are more sensitive to status differences and in quest of a status for themselves are searching their own background for clues as to what in the present they 'really' are.

Once again, as in looking at the social origins of the fathers of the men in the Mobility Sample, it is the downwardly mobile who stand out. Table 7.3 shows that they are twice as likely as are the stable non-manual men to have mothers who originated in the working class. These findings along with those about father's class of origin suggest that men labelled downwardly mobile tend not to come from a solid middle-class background, but from a much more peripheral or marginal segment of it. In other words, both sets of data are suggestive of inter-generational instability; sons of some upwardly mobile men return to the working class. Thus, most of the fathers of these men fit best into the third pattern of upward mobility described in Chapter 5 and as I also noted there, men moving up late in their work life had, almost universally, married women of an equal or lower social class and level of education than themselves.

The opposite pattern, of restoration of status in the next generation by a sunken middle class, is not supported by these data. At the same time, figures for the Mobility Sample are fairly close to those given by Jackson and Marsden (1962: Table 4, P. 68). They found that about 30 percent of their upwardly mobile sample had at least one middle-class grandparent. In the Mobility Sample 30 percent of the upward-
ly mobile and 33 percent of the stable manual men had at least one mid-
dle-class grandparent. There is, unfortunately, no comparison group
of stable manual people in the Jackson and Marsden study. Had there
been, it is, on the basis of my evidence, questionable whether they
would have put stress on the concept of 'sunken middle class' since
people of working-class origin are, whether mobile or non-mobile, about
equally likely to have middle-class elements in their family tree. 2

PARENTAL ENCOURAGEMENT

Connections with a middle-class milieu are equally present in the
backgrounds of both the mobile and non-mobile who originated in the
working class. Are the effects of these the same for both groups? I
asked everyone whether their parents had been ambitious for them and
if so, whether it was their mother, their father or both who had been
the most encouraging. Table 7.4 gives the results for the first ques-
tion for each pattern of social mobility. There are systematic and
statistically significant differences between the respective groups in
the direction anticipated. That is, the upwardly mobile are more like-
ly than those who are manual to recall there being a sense of encourge-
ment and ambition in their home; the downwardly mobile are less likely
than the stable non-manual to have experienced encouragement. Further,
the downwardly mobile appear to have received the least encouragement
of all groups from their father or mother.

2 For additional evidence on the 'sunken middle class' see Gold-
thorpe et al (1969: 96). The way in which their figures are com-
bined make comparisons difficult but about two-thirds of their manual
workers had experience of white-collar milieux from family or occupa-
tional life.
TABLE 7.4
PROPORTION RECALLING THAT THEIR PARENTS WERE ENCOURAGING
BY CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY (N = 110; Unknowns = 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility Pattern</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Upward</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Stable Non-Manual</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Downward</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Stable Manual</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 3.982; \ C = .23; \ P < .05 \]
\[ X^2 = 10.777; \ C = .51; \ P < .001 \]

The small proportion of present manual workers who did recall any sense of encouragement (16 percent in all) make percentage comparisons of which parent was the most ambitious misleading. Thus, Table 7.5 shows in whole numbers those who in answer to the second question mentioned specifically their mother as opposed to their father or both. 3

TABLE 7.5
CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND SOURCE OF PARENTAL ENCOURAGEMENT: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 62)
(Whole Numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Encouragement</th>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father/Both</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 X 4: Fisher's Exact Test: \( P = .02 \)
2 X 3: Fisher's Exact Test: \( P = .34; \) N.S.

3 The data are dichotomized in this way in order to use the Fisher Exact Probability Test which can only be calculated for 2 X 2 tables (Siegel, 1956: 96-104).
It can be seen that for the upwardly mobile it is, compared to the stable manual, mothers who are most likely to be mentioned. Among those men with middle-class origins who were encouraged, there are no differences by mobility pattern—the downwardly mobile are as likely to mention their mother as are the stable non-manual.

THE MEANING OF ENCOURAGEMENT

What did this encouragement amount to? Often the answers were vague; people were not able to define just exactly how or in what way the parents had been ambitious for them. For those defined as stable middle-class, the sense of encouragement was, generally, a taken-for-granted aspect of growing up. Mr. Rickard, a civil servant, articulated what was more often left implicit: 'probably my mother was more ambitious for us than our father. But there was, well it was the way we were brought up, to encourage ourselves. We weren't driven but we were always made aware that in order to get on in life, it paid to work and pass exams'. But, it was more often in what was done, notably interfering with the educational selection process, that middle-class parents showed concern about their children's future: 'The attitude at home was that it was necessary to pass the 11+', Mr. Reddick explained, 'If I hadn't passed, my father would have paid to send me to a grammar school. He paid for my brother and sister, so I'm sure he would have, had the situation arose'. In Mr. Nalder's case, the need did arise:

I recall the 11+ was basically an intelligence test. I reckon I was always a late developer and I flunked it. I went to a private school where I got a couple of 'O' levels (Insurance Broker).

Others in this group never did encounter the state school system and as a matter of course went from preparatory school to a public school. As Mr. Merry-West said, 'My education was planned in advance. I went
to a prep school and then a "public school", in the English sense, and took the "A" levels before I left. There was every intention of my going on to university'. The general impression from the interviews is that middle-class parents are often prepared to intervene if the 'normal' selection procedure threatens their child's welfare, and in other cases to ignore the main educational system; their children may not even be tested against the formal selection processes of the society.

At the other end of the social scale—the stable working class—the predominant attitude is one that can best be summarized as 'laissez-faire'. Over and over there was, reflected in what people said, a genuine desire to avoid over-influencing the child while at the same time being prepared to 'back them up in whatever they want to do'. Something of the dialectic of this, a perhaps contemporary working-class phenomenon, was caught by Mr. Popple Sr. He is a foreman mechanic. His son apprenticed as a panel beater.

Up to about 15 he wanted to go into the merchant navy. But he also wanted to be a train driver and a fireman, like all kids. I don't know what put him off the navy. We never tried to influence him; neither of our children have we ever tried to do that to. We let them choose their lives for themselves. I'd never stop them like that. We wanted them to get on but there again, you can't be too ambitious, otherwise you're going to influence them. So I was happy about his choice of work. I knew something about it, but I didn't influence him.

Thus, there is, on the one hand, a vague desire for the child to obtain a good education and a good job, but only if he has the 'natural' ability and wants it. 'I'd be a bit more ambitious for them than my father was for me', Mr. Smythe, a carpenter, said about his children, 'but I wouldn't push them too far but as far as he likes or is able to go'. Above all, force or 'pushing' is to be avoided. Mr. Irvine, a brewery delivery driver, was of this view:

I'd like a good education for them. If they so desire, they can carry on beyond fifteen to higher things. I'd back them all the way. But I wouldn't force them into anything they didn't want to do.
This was what people believed was true for their children and it was what they recalled about their own parents. 'I didn't really think about education, really', said Mr. Reid, a printer, 'You just left when you were 15 and that was it. It was "if you pass, you pass, if you don't, that doesn't matter". You know, if you start pushing kids, they get worried'. Another added, with approval, 'As long as I was happy, they didn't push me at all. As long as I was working and earning was all they wanted of me'.

That children should do what, within their capabilities and desires would make them most happy, was the main sentiment. It stands in opposition to the middle-class view in which educational decisions and, as I shall show in the next chapter, even career decisions are made for the child. It is a view different also from the older working-class view in which children were assets to be exploited as soon as possible. Only among the older men and often those who had in the end been upwardly mobile, did it appear that parents had anxiously awaited the day their children would be working. Mr. Cormack, now a buyer, said:

I thought about an apprenticeship but your mother and father said, 'ten bob a week is nothing. You can't go. You got to be put in something earning a bit more', showing a lack of foresight. I wish I had gone through an apprenticeship.

A much younger man commented:

A half day off, that's about all I can remember (about the 11+). My parents weren't concerned really. The only thing was that we had to go to Chiswick to school if we passed and there was all the paraphernalia of school uniforms and you must do this, and you must do that. With three of us I don't think they were in a position to spend the money.

But this was a view quickly disappearing. Mr. Brooks Sr., whose son had been upwardly mobile, recognized the transition:

In my young days when I was at school, the only thing you heard from your parents was, 'Be glad when they start to work' and you were pushed into anything as long as you brought in a bit of money. That was what I had. But my children didn't have that. In fact, I had 12 months
money from the two of them. Martin worked for 12 months and lived with us and saved 50 pounds and he had to spend that when he went on his course at Oxford.

In few working-class homes visited in the interviewing, then, was 'stopping on' an insurmountable financial obstacle. At least, few manual respondents or fathers made any reference to the costs entailed 'in backing them as far as they are able or as they desire'. At the same time the frequent use of this phrase, 'stopping on' among working-class people is suggestive of where education fits in the larger world. Not only is continuing one's education beyond the minimum seen as unusual but it is also a postponing of adulthood. It is marking time before entering the real world in which people work and live instead of going to school. Because of this conception of education, it was not always easy to draw the line between a democratic attitude and an indifferent one. What some fathers regarded as the democratic and correct thing to do—let their children decide for themselves—was sometimes interpreted by sons, my respondents, as indifference. As two young working-class informants put it:

If parents were concerned they were careful not to show it. Anyway, no one in my family knew anything about the 11+ or grammar school. It wasn't in then and even if it was, I only wanted out (Core Winder).

I think it was up to the parents and it wasn't very important to them, whether I took the 11+ or not. I left school with everybody else at 15. My parents weren't worried about it one way or another. (Carpenter's Mate).

At the same time, the fathers of these two men were both of the opinion that they had been encouraging but not forceful. They had let their boys and the school work out what was 'best' for them.

UPWARD MOBILITY AND ENCOURAGEMENT

Some years ago Kahl (1953) after intensive interviewing of lower

4 Evidence presented by Banks (1971: 64-66) suggests this is generally true.
middle-class boys, what he called 'common man boys', found that beyond IQ, the single most important determinant of educational achievement of the boys was the positive influence exerted by parents. As he concluded, 'Parents who were discontented tended to train their sons from the earliest years of grammar school to take school seriously and use education as the means to climb into the middle class. Only sons who internalized such values were sufficiently motivated to overcome the obstacles which faced the common man boys in school; only they saw a reason for good school performance and college aspirations' (P. 364). It would simplify matters considerably if my evidence showed that the men who moved upwards came from homes where there was encouragement, support and an attempt to inculcate middle-class values. Certainly, as Table 7.4 showed, upwardly mobile men reported encouragement at home somewhat more often than did the stable manual men.

However, in reading over the interview schedules of the upwardly mobile, the most striking aspect is the frequency with which negative influences are described. Adversity, antagonism and 'short sighted' attempts to influence the child were in the descriptions of the upwardly mobile actually more common than support and encouragement.5

Only in a few instances was there much of what my informants called 'pressure'. Mr. Bruce, whose Bethnal Green father 'scrimped and saved' in the event that he might want to 'stop on', recalled there being some. He is now a senior clerk for BOAC.

It was important that I pass the 11+. I was promised a bike and such stuff. As it happened, I passed the 11+ and didn't want the bike. I didn't study for it, I didn't worry about it. It was entirely different when the G.C.E.'s came along because all along it was drummed into you, you pass the G.C.E.'s, or this is it.

5In the interview schedules, it might be noted, there are sometimes vivid inconsistencies between what was said spontaneously and answers given to other questions of a more closed nature. Thus, some men who felt that their parents 'had been ambitious for them', said nearly the opposite in other parts of the interview.
A variety of positive forces coalesced in Mr. Nash's case. The son of a ship's plater, he attended grammar school and art college and now at 26, is rising quickly in commercial art. He said of his home life:

"My parents were very keen for me to go to grammar school. They were delighted when I passed the 11+. Particularly so because two of their friends' children didn't. It was the exception rather than the rule to go to grammar school from that kind of a background even then, which is comparatively recently. They, of course, coming from their background, thought of it as a major triumph."

Mr. Carswell said of his parents:

"Father frightened me into it, my mother encouraged me. My mother helped me a lot with my study. She would spend no end of hours asking me questions, going through the books, especially for the G.C.E. Because she wanted to stay on in school, but her parents wouldn't have it. She's had a kind of flirtation with it. She liked education and wanted me to have it."

Some parents had, like the Nashes and the Carswells, striven to improve the lot of their children and a few men also placed particular emphasis on the positive role their mother had played in encouraging them. "My family are engineers basically. I expected to follow in the family tradition but my mother stepped in and said, "No, you're not going to do that dirty, filthy work"", said Mr. Killly, now a chief draughtsman.

And Mr. Fidler, an accountant, said:

"I probably grew up in a sort of very narrow field. My father is a fitter, one brother is a sort of engineer, my other brother followed my father. That was the only horizon I had, to become an engineer or something. I really just had a general secondary education because of the war. At the end of it, my mother was a bit depressed with the state of my education, so she sent me to a commercial school. To go into an office was from my mother's point of view, quite something; to do a white-collar job, that sort of thing'."

These accounts, however, have to be set against those of men who remembered only antagonism and ignorance on the part of one or both parents. Remarks such as the following were equally, if not more, predominant among men who had moved upwards.

"I don't think they cared, to be honest. They just left me go my own
way and that was it (Shop Manager).

In actual fact, I have arguments with me father. I always have had. He thinks I'm a bit big-headed. I want to keep going. I want to achieve what he never achieved. Whereas he's content to go have a drink at night, I'm concerned. That's not living; I can't just nip down to the pub for a drink and all my feelings are gone (Sales Manager).

The situation where we lived in Scotland was so awful that when I was a kid of 12 I had the highest marks in the whole of Scotland for the scholarship examination. And, my father wouldn't let me go to the grammar school because you had to sign a form saying you were staying on until you were 15, and because he wanted me to leave school at the earliest opportunity (Headmaster—who later went part way through the priesthood).

What I remember is I wanted to pass the 11+. I wanted to pass, I wanted to go to grammar school. I wanted to go to university. For a long time it was suggested by my parents that I leave and go for an apprenticeship. My family felt that way even when I was in grammar school, in fact (Physicist).

Younger upwardly mobile men, some of whom did go to grammar school and some who did not, recalled the dual influences of family and peers as a pressure acting primarily to keep them in the secondary modern stream. Parents, if not antagonistic about 'stopping on', seemed to have been as passive as those of stable manual men about what happened educationally to their children. Mr. Jarvis, now a shipping clerk, said about the '11+' exam:

I remember I didn't sit it because I wanted to go to the same school as my brother. I could have sat for it. It was my decision. My parents, possibly, wanted me to go for it, I'm not sure. I was at the age where I just said, 'oh, I want to go with me brother'. If I had of sat it, I don't think I would have taken it properly which was, I suppose, foolish of myself.

Likewise, Mr. Gammon, who did get some 'O' levels at a secondary modern school, was strongly influenced by friends and family:

The thing I remember most about the 11+ was I didn't want to pass. Me brother was at Southgate, me sister was there at the time, most of me friends at the time were where I was. I used to come near enough the top in the class (the B class not the A class). I knew they wouldn't make it, I didn't want to go to a higher grade, the grammar school or something like that. I wanted to go to Southgate. I answered the questions fairly and I don't think I would have passed anyway. But I didn't want to pass. I didn't want to go to grammar school.
Mr. Hennessey, a computer analyst, also went to the exam with similar feelings:

I remember the day of the 11+ very well. I had my twin brother; and we all sort of trotted over there together. I wasn't worried about it at all because I was with my friends and we all sort of felt we were doing the same thing and probably all going to the same local secondary school. My parents didn't worry a lot about it either. They didn't tell us to go to bed early or anything like that. We were working-class and I hadn't really given it any thought: going to grammar school. Most of them didn't go to grammar school. My brother didn't go, he didn't do well enough. I ended up almost all on my own. I regret that my brother's intelligence is round about the same as mine and he left school at 15 and didn't get as good an education as I did. He got a raw deal, really.

Mr. Fleming, who lived not far from Mr. Hennessey, found that doing well on the 11+ exam set him apart, 'I felt, well, individualistic is the best word. I mean I didn't plan to go to grammar school or university; I just passed the 11+, and that was it. It made me feel very much alone for awhile, especially since I had to go to a school way over in Chiswick'.

Few, then, of the upwardly mobile, expected to go to a grammar school and many, at that age anyway, did not even want to. Parents, as well, were not unduly worried or totally aware of what grammar school might mean to their children.

NEGATIVE REFERENCE GROUPS

As Kahl (1953) implies, one can emulate a higher status group or individual or one can be discontented or one can simply accept one's present position. Without actually explaining the 'why' of it, he argued instead that it was first of all a repudiation of the membership class or group which leads people positively to encourage their children. Anticipatory socialization, in other words, follows or parallels discontent. Thus, among the upwardly mobile, a second pattern of what was at least a predisposition to mobility, centered around either their own determination or that of their parents or both, that the working-class
environment was one to escape or avoid if at all possible. Perhaps because they had escaped it, these men were willing to talk about it, whereas the stable manual informants could not do so without also, in effect, demeaning their own present position. At any rate, rather than emulating their father many men used him as an example of what not to be. And some fathers also used themselves or their fathers in a similar way as a negative reference person. Mr. Adams Sr. explained:

I used to say to him (his son), there's nothing dishonourable about your grandfather; he's a lovable old dustman—you must never be a dustman; I used my father as an example of what not to be.

Similarly, Mr. Brooks Sr., described how he had encouraged his son:

My wife worked in a boot factory before we were married, so we both knew that side of it. It was really to avoid that type of life that we encouraged them. That was more the motive. It wasn't for grabbing a lot of money and we hadn't any special jobs in mind for them. We just didn't want them to go through my working-life experience in the factory. They both won a place to the grammar school, so I didn't have to pay. So we encouraged them to work at school and then something nice'd open up for 'em, which it has done. So we did encourage them for the simple reason of avoiding that type of life we had to work in.

Some men recalled with horror and repugnance, the sort of environment in which they were raised without necessarily knowing what or when the realization that there were alternatives arose. Said Mr. Robbins:

I went into clerical work just to get out of the awful slum in which I lived. When my father came back after the first world war, he was an engineer—he'd served an apprentice for 5 years. His salary was three pounds something per week for more than a 48-hour week. I used to watch my father come back smothered with grease. He broke his arm, he caught it in a belt. It didn't seem to me it was any kind of life for a person (Commercial Accountant).

Mr. Garritt, now an office manager, described his part of London this way:

In those days being from Fulham was a big hindrance. I don't think you can imagine what life was like in London in the 20's and 30's. If you were raised in a poor area you had wonderful parents, lots of brothers and sisters, lots of friends. But you were even classed by where you live. This is a terrible thing for a kid. When I was about 14, going out to talk to girls, trying to find my way out of the district, right up until I did service, I was always ashamed of where I lived. The
point was, it was a deep inferiority complex thrust upon us. We grew up inferior. We all felt inferior, everyone on our street.

Again and again, the theme of narrow horizons came up as these men spoke of their childhood. The symbolic and literal merged in Mr. Adams' case: 'I lived in a flat near the gas works—the only thing that opened out of my window was the gasometer—a place called Laundry Yard, a cul de sac. That was my only knowledge of the world outside, that gasometer and the sheet metal works next door'.

These are, of course, mainly the older men in the sample, raised during the 1920's and 1930's when grammar school and further education were not much more than a theoretical possibility for most. 'You didn't hear about scholarships in those days', said Mr. Allen, 'All you heard about a scholarship was when someone won one and they were usually the folks of the town's kiddies'. Mr. Ferguson, who did win one, recalled that 'the family actually roared with laughter when I said I was 18th in the town. They said, "Oh, you're looking at the list upside down". I used to wonder years later how it happened, me the son of a well digger; I wasn't bright or anything'. But, nevertheless, it did happen to Mr. Ferguson and in different ways all of these men have managed to move upwards in the occupational hierarchy. Equally discouraging forces and obstacles stood in the way of most of these men as for those who did not rise above the status of their father. There were some differences, perhaps in personality, perhaps in the internal dynamics of the home which a survey approach is unable to illuminate. For example, one father interviewed had twin boys, one of whom was in my upwardly mobile sub-sample; the other who if interviewed would have been in the stable manual group. He said of them:

Now Arthur is middle-class but Michael is still working-class. It's mainly because Arthur got A levels, he's sort of more bright than Michael, so he's ended up with a better job. We really don't know why there is
the difference. Arthur was always brighter, right from a baby. Both went to the same school and had the same upbringing. Arthur was grammar school material and Michael wasn't. That's all there is to it. We're close to them both; we've never made any distinctions. But we were told at the school that Michael wasn't grammar school standard so it was no good trying to force him. You can't put in what's not there. He's more on the labour side, let's say. It's made a big difference; Michael has had to plod, where Arthur has had plain sailing.

Similarly, Mr. Christie, a postman, seemed to have had as much if not more ambition and drive than men who did move up. There was little in his background to distinguish him from these men. Yet, as he put it:

I was born right next to Kings Cross Station; no one could be born in a worse slum than that. At the same time, I always felt I could do a little better. But coming to the turn where I've tried, nothing much has happened, and now I've found I've left it just a little bit too late.

Finally, there was Mr. Markham who, in what he described of his early life, should have been a case study of upward mobility. Instead he has spent most of his work life as a milk roundsman:

I suppose it was mainly the church that influenced me. Here I think it goes back to my childhood. You've got to have in mind the conditions I lived under and how I carried myself as a youngster. Dad used to drink and his outlook was so long as you have a roof over your head, a pair of shoes, that's alright. As soon as I was old enough I progressed from what was a Sunday school—I took a very deep interest in the church. I spent most of my time with them and through those people I developed my outlook. I taught myself to speak better than people around me where I lived. I moved in that kind of circle. And from that I thought I wanted to be somebody and I sort of broke into office work; I got the job by myself.

Even from that job as a junior I met a tremendous lot of people and I got invited out: 'Would you like to come out for the weekend?' Oh yes! I never missed a chance to go out in the country coming from where I did in London. To me it was marvelous to spend a weekend in somebody's house who had a garden and a nice home. This is how I felt. But the war came along and shattered what should have been a life-long relationship.

Whereas both Mr. Markham and Mr. Christie had, for a variety of reasons, been frustrated in their desire to achieve a higher status, some younger men had simply 'found themselves' in a white-collar job without benefit of a grammar school education or any further training.
Mr. Blake, for instance, wanted to be a docker like his father except that an illness has made outside work impossible. As a result he has a job in an office and was beginning to consider taking some courses in accounting. Similarly, other men had seemed to 'fall' upwards without any prior design or desire.

**GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY**

If geographical mobility is as unsettling as various studies have suggested (Bell, 1968; Pahl and Pahl, 1971) then it is likely to be an important reason for low integration into the community and the local environment. Particularly within the working class, families which do move may find themselves in established communities where the label 'newcomer' may persist for several decades, or in new estates where as Willmott and Young (1960: 7) put it, 'people (are) cut off from relatives, suspicious of their neighbours, lonely ...'. In either case, the family unit or the individual is more easily able to go against the prevailing norms of neighbourhood and peer group because they have not become well knit into the community. Negative sanctions and other pressures from peers against aspirations and behaviour which are mobility oriented but at odds with dominant norms of the sub-culture may carry less weight if the family is marginal or isolated. In a similar way, geographical mobility of middle-class families may have a negative effect on the educational achievement of children. Not only might the move come at a crucial point in the child's education, but he may also be less influenced by middle-class norms about achievement.

I asked everyone how often they had changed homes during the time they were growing up and how many of these moves were to be different areas or districts. As can be seen in Table 7.6, 64 percent--nearly
two-thirds of the men—had not moved to a different area or district at all.

TABLE 7.6
CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY OF THE FAMILY OF ORIGIN: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Moves</th>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Upward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Moves</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One or More</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: 1 X 4: \(X^2 = 3.167; P < .05\) (1-tailed test)
2 X 3: \(X^2 = .067; \text{N.S.}\)

Of the 36 percent who had moved, it was in an overwhelming number of cases a single move. Thus, by the standards of much of the recent data, the Mobility Sample was highly immobile. Nevertheless, even one move—(say) from the North to the South of England—may be a crucial factor in undermining solidarity or social integration. When the geographical mobility of the sample is viewed in terms of patterns of social mobility, it is the stable manual group which is the most likely not to have moved at all. The upwardly mobile men are more than twice as likely to have moved one or more times than are those who have remained in the working class. Similar findings for the downwardly mobile and the stable non-manual groups do not emerge from the data; there is only a trivial and statistically non-significant difference between these groups. Indeed, there is very little difference between the three

6A number of studies are summarised in Bell (1968: 22-23).
groups having either origins or present status in the middle class.

It was, however, the downwardly mobile who were most likely to perceive a relationship between their geographical mobility and what had happened to them educationally. Mr. Felton, a semi-skilled fitter, said:

I never took the 11 because I had to go out to Canada with my parents. When I came back I was put in a secondary modern. When I came back I was surprised to see who had gone to grammar school and who hadn't. One teacher took an interest when I was about 9 and I went right to the top of the class. But we went out to Canada and when we came back I didn't have the interest. When I saw the ones who went to grammar school I was really surprised. If their chances had of been based on what they done previously, they'd never have gone.

Similarly, Mr. Pullen Sr. felt that the uprooting of his family to move to Southern England was a factor in his son not achieving as well as he had hoped. A research engineer, Mr. Pullen Sr. had advanced from a paper mill hand to his present position as chief engineer. He acquired the qualifications along the way through part-time education. His son, on the other hand, left school at 15 and at the time of the interview was working as a handbag assembler. Mr. Pullen Sr. had wanted him to continue his education and perhaps go on to university. But, as he explained:

In the north we were part of a large family: cousins and aunts and uncles and nephews. So moving down here we're away from all that completely. I think it has affected my son as well. When you're part of a large family you have a feeling of security, there are other people besides me to advise him and maybe encourage him. When you're part of a very small family group, very few people visit you. He grew up too much alone, I think.

The Pullen family had also spent two years in South America prior to coming to Southern England, again because the firm had sent Mr. Pullen Sr. there. They have made very few friends where they now live and Mr. Pullen Jr. described himself as 'somewhat of a loner'. He said of the neighbourhood, 'You can talk to them, I suppose. They're friendly enough as far as it goes. But you don't go around sitting in people's houses. We have no real friends around here'.
In order to avoid just this situation, Mr. Chapman Sr., a statistical clerk, had taken a considerable drop in occupational status.

Jobs with Clifton's are more tied to location than person, so they said to me, 'Your job's over in Liverpool'. It would have meant a promotion but my boys, the eldest was doing well, the second was doing well, the one you talked to was just on the verge of starting. I took the view, why should I ruin their lives for my life. They had theirs to look forward. It would have meant a lift-up, more money, a higher position, but it meant you pulling up your roots and moving into an entirely different area of the country. There's no sort of beloved relations in that area on the other side, and my wife's very attached to her family, so I said I was sorry I can't agree. We parted very amicably.

However, geographical shifts were not for most perceived as having played a part in the decision to obtain a better education or a job at a higher level than that typical in the family. Physical movement was largely seen as disruptive and as a possible explanation of downward mobility and non-mobility rather than upward mobility. Thus, none of the upwardly mobile respondents recalled that moving had altered their perceptions of the world: none suggested it had widened their horizons or awakened in them any sense of restlessness. Indeed, it was the upwardly mobile who were most likely to recall strong community and kinship ties relative to the stable manual group. This emerged when I asked everyone, much more directly, whether they had been part of a community when they were growing up and whether they had felt part of a group themselves, or somewhat isolated. I had tentatively hypothesized that the mobile were more likely than the non-mobile to have felt isolated and relatively less a part of the community as a family. However, the data do not support these hypotheses. I could find no significant differences between the mobility sub-groups and what differences there were tended to be in the opposite direction to that predicted.

FATHER'S WORK LIFE

In Chapter 6 it was also suggested, following Wilensky (1960), that
a disorderly and discontinuous work life on the part of the father might also contribute to low integration and hence to social mobility. While complete data on the occupational history of fathers are not available, there is, in what were collected, no evidence that father's work life was related to the social mobility of sons. In reading the work histories of 'fathers', there are, of course, very similar patterns as those described in Chapters 4 and 5 for 'sons'. That is, that some had made frequent job changes and moves back and forth across the manual-nonmanual line. But, beyond the fact that men who had moved up over their work life are likely to have downwardly mobile sons (See: Table 7.2), men with complicated work histories are as likely to have non-mobile sons as they are mobile sons.

CONCLUSIONS

Neither the quantitative data nor the more subjective and retrospective accounts people provided about their families and early experiences add up to any overwhelming support of the general hypothesis that low integration leads to social mobility. The most crucial aspect of this, the existence of a 'sunken middle class' anxious to regain, if only in the next generation, their former status, is only partially supported. About a third of the upwardly mobile men recalled that at least one of their grandparents had held a middle-class occupation but this was also true of those who remained stationary in the working class. The difference between the two groups is found in the qualitative data: upwardly mobile men tended to attach greater importance and meaning to the existence of these ties than did stable working-class men. For example, some, at least, of the former group recalled that their mother, if middle class in origin, had influenced them to continue in school or seek a white-collar occupation. Apparently, then, objective membership in a
sunken middle class is not enough; the family, as members of the family must also possess a subjective awareness of being 'partly' middle class before mobility is likely to occur. Thus, it is in the subjective or qualitative data about class position that we find some support for a relationship between low social integration and social mobility.

With respect to downward mobility, the opposite idea, what might be called a 'risen working class' received considerable support from the data. Both intergenerationally and in their work lives, fathers of the downwardly mobile remain closely connected to the working class. Mothers of these men were also found to be from working-class not middle-class backgrounds. Thus, on the basis of both the quantitative and qualitative data, downward mobility is, in terms of this hypothesis, more adequately explained than upward mobility.

During the time they were growing up, men who moved upward experienced about twice as much geographical mobility as did stable manual men. While this finding is congruent with the hypothesis that geographical mobility and social mobility are related, probing in the interview failed to reveal ways in which that movement had affected either the individual or his family of origin. It had not seemed to lead to marginal membership in the community or peer group. Indeed, the upwardly mobile were only slightly less likely to feel they had been integrated than were their stable manual counterparts. The downwardly mobile had moved about as often as the stable non-manual men. They were, however, the most likely of the four groups to feel they had been part of a group and that their family had been part of a community.

It is worthwhile recalling that the data are survey data and are retrospective in nature. I asked people to think back to a time and to events which were of varying importance to them. For stable working and
middle class people lack of encouragement and encouragement, respectively, are a taken-for-granted aspect of family life: 'everybody' leaves school at 15; 'everybody' goes to a grammar school or a public school. Hence, people in these categories had a limited recall of what was usually an uneventful transition. The upwardly mobile, in contrast, appeared to have expended considerable effort in constructing their biography and in trying to recall what actually happened to bring about the discontinuity in their lives which sociologists call social mobility.7

Chapter 8 covers much of the same ground as this chapter, except that the focus will be on the choice of work and career and some factors related to that decision.

7 Berger (1963: 60) is relevant in this regard. He notes that 'American society having been one of high mobility for quite some time, many Americans seemingly spend years of their life reinterpreting their own background, retelling over and over again (to themselves and to others) the story of what they have become...'. So it was with my upwardly mobile men. Few, as I show in the next chapter, were able to 'account', satisfactorily, for their mobility, however.
CHAPTER 8

THE ENTRY INTO WORK

The last chapter was concerned with early experiences or conditions which contributed to various levels of educational and occupational aspirations. This chapter describes the way the entry into work differed for men who were socially mobile and those who remained middle-class or working-class.

PLANS AND EXPECTATIONS

The point at which the first entry is made into the occupational hierarchy has important consequences for the level of achievement an individual can hope to reach over his career. Yet, as with education, the kinds of jobs the men chose and the method by which they were chosen point more directly to the perpetuation and continuity of class differences rather than intergenerational changes in occupational status. As Lipset and Bendix (1959: 198) noted some years ago, 'The accumulation of advantages or disadvantages is evident also in the choice of first job. We know that the choice of first job is for many a largely fortuitous decision. Those in the lower socioeconomic groups tend to take "the only job they know about" at the time they enter the labour market. This choice of the first job is made with more deliberation by individuals with more education and a family higher up the occupational ladder'.

While the data from the Mobility Sample do not in any fundamental way contradict these and other findings in the literature, they do show
that at all class levels there was a striking lack of prior planning. People, by their own accounts, were more likely to be acted upon than act on their own behalf. Thus, more than one-third of the men could not recall having given much consideration to work or a choice of job prior to entering the labour force. Another third, though having given some thought to their eventual work, started out in a job different than the one they had wanted. Also, when the mobility and non-mobility groups were considered separately, the upwardly mobile were the most likely to have seen their future in problematic terms (55 percent compared to 23 percent). This is a finding in line with the general impression advanced in previous chapters that the upwardly mobile, by and large, found most of their work life problematic and uncertain. In contrast, the downwardly mobile were as likely as the stable non-manual men to have given prior thought to work and to have started in a job which was close to the work they wanted to do.

METHODS OF FINDING A JOB

Somewhat similar findings emerged when people were asked how they had come to take a job that they did. While there were a variety of answers to this question, it appeared that nearly two-fifths had, in effect, 'fallen' into their first job. Only about 11 percent, 13 men in all, said that their choice was the result of a 'childhood ambition'.

Do methods of choosing jobs differ by mobility and non-mobility pattern? In Table 8.1, various methods have been combined in order to provide a clearer answer to this question. This table shows that the upwardly mobile are the least likely to have relied on the influence

1For a particularly insightful analysis of this phenomenon, see Sennet and Cobb (1973: Chapter IV). They consider this passivity as one of the 'hidden injuries of class'. It is not unlike the concept of 'cognitive poverty' developed by Klein (1965).
or guidance of a relative or friend and are the most likely not to be able to account for their first choice or simply took what work was available at the time. It is also of interest that the downwardly mobile differ only trivially from both the stable non-manual and stable manual group.

**TABLE 8.1**

CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY AND METHODS OF CHOOSING FIRST JOBS: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117) (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relative or Friend</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External Agency</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Reasons</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(only work available, not sure)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Childhood Ambition</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(44) (24) (22) (27) (117)

$1 X 4: \chi^2 = 9.810; P < .05; 3 df.$

$2 X 3: \text{Not significant; 3 df.}$

The more detailed accounts people gave of their entry into work tend to substantiate what is summarized in Table 8.1: that the class background of the individual can in some circumstances set very definite limits on the kind of occupations considered to be appropriate.

Carter (1966: 108) quotes a study by R. V. Clements of 271 school
leavers which was in accord with his findings and with impressions I re-
corded in this present study:

The analysis of the jobs chosen and of those mentioned as to be avoided, suggested that these children did not choose from the whole range of occupations though they may not have realized this—their mental endow-
ment and their social and educational milieu have established, within broad limits, the particular segment of possible occupations in terms of which they think. It does not occur to the secondary modern boy that he might at least aspire to become a barrister, whilst the clever grammar boy seldom entertains even the notion of becoming a semi-skilled mechanic. . .

This is a description which most clearly fits those who remained stable in either the working class or middle class. Both are subject to equally confining parameters whose general effect is to inhibit upward and downward mobility. With respect, first of all, to the middle class, something of this is illustrated by Mr. Mansell's description of how he became an accountant.

That was an interesting decision that was made. Because I did modern languages and quickly realized that if they wanted anyone to speak a language they got a native from that country and that languages as such are of no use for a career without going on to university. Also I had a family business that I may or may not be going into but the option was to be kept open to me. So, if you come to the outside, as it were, the decisions are fairly clear-cut. They're either the law or medicine or industry in the form of accounting, or the services. The services was out, and in my side of the family, anyway, there is no legal back-
ground at all. So I didn't consider the law, and medicine, of course, requires a science background which I hadn't taken. The decision not to go into the family business was to a certain extent made for me.

It is perhaps worth noting that Mr. Mansell's mother comes from a family of solicitors. Mr. Thomas's career decision was prompted by almost iden-
tical considerations:

My school life was aimed entirely at going into my father's business, but on the other hand it was also known that whatever I did, it should be something that would benefit me if I left the family business.

Even where there was less knowledge of what to do with their life the original middle-class position dictated what was considered available and appropriate. Mr. Phelps, financial consultant, was perhaps more aware of this than most of my middle-class informants. As he said,
'The idea of going into clerical work was strictly a middle-class attitude, I suppose, nothing more and nothing less. I had a choice of working for a bank and I didn't fancy going into town, or the job in accounts. It was a question of an office for a job, anything else was inconceivable to my parents. But I had no more idea of what I wanted than my son who is about to do "A" levels'. And Mr. Merry-West, an editor, had come to realize much the same thing: 'I actually wanted to be a cobbler but it was much more the done thing to go to Oxford, and so that's what I did!'

Working-class people also perceived a limited range of possibilities though the choices were, of course, different. The type of school plays an important part in the process. Where grammar school education sets up aspirations for white-collar work, the secondary modern school re-directs and shapes people to expect low status jobs. As Mr. Allen noted, 'I remember my headmaster saying: "Some of us got to stand on the back of the lorries" (a lot of calls were made to our school to supply van boys). So, really, we were sort of funnelled and geared into being van boys only'. Mr. Cannon, who is younger than Mr. Allen, said with anger, 'I went to a comprehensive school and me brothers went to the old-style secondary school and I've seen the result. We've got two plumbers and a lorry driver--you might as well say three bums'. Another in his early twenties, commented somewhat bitterly:

Fifteen-year olds have their decisions made for them in this country. Either their parents say you've got to do this job, or the youth employment says you've got to do this job. It may be different for grammar school when they stay on to do 'O' levels. I suppose they've got wider aspects (sic) about what life is all about.

For some, the pattern was not too different than the middle-class one we have observed above. Mr. Reid's explanation of why he became a printer was such a one:
Everybody who's come in our house is near enough the print. Nothing else comes into your mind. It's stuck in your brain when you was born. If you don't go in the print, you're an outcast.

For both stable working-class and middle-class men, knowledge of particular jobs and sometimes lifetime occupations or careers came more often from relatives than from any other source. (See Table 8.1)²

There was at the same time somewhat less evidence from what people said that friends or relatives had actually exerted influence to get them the job. In the middle class, however, knowledge and influence are more intermingled. When men were not already committed to a family business there was considerable reliance on relatives, notably uncles or cousins who were regarded as uncles.

I didn't really know what I wanted to do. My father has a cousin, I think of him as an uncle, who was a senior marine broker with the firm I started with and we were generally talking about it. He mentioned that there was this place going as a general office boy and would I like to try it. I tried it and found I liked it. My father, of course, is with an insurance company but a quite different sort of insurance (Insurance Broker).

It was suggested that I go into my uncle's business. I wasn't particularly brilliant in school. I think it was basically more laziness than any lack of intelligence. I started out wrapping parcels, cutting samples, that sort of thing. Basically, it was a training program with the idea that I would go into the business with him (Company Director).

I was associated at that time with the River Yacht squadron. One cousin of my father's who was also a member, suggested I try my first firm by just walking in and let it be known I was a member (Shipping Agent).

Though the direct influence in the form of tangible jobs was sometimes missing, the fact that a relative, again often an uncle, was in that kind of work, was an important factor in the eventual decisions for men following their fathers into manual work. Some also mentioned

²Willmott (1966: 111) found that 32 percent of his working-class boys relied on a relative or friend to find their first job. For subsequent jobs this rose to 47 percent. Also, about two-fifths of the boys used the Youth Employment Service to find their first job whereas only 4% of the men in the Mobility Sample specifically mentioned this source.
their brother as having provided a reference model to follow. Said Mr. Dressel, a carpenter: 'I was emulating me brother. I've regretted it'.

And Mr. Turnbull had also followed his brother:

I wanted to leave school but I was torn two ways when I left school. I was offered a job in art, which I enjoy and I was torn between that and I wanted to be a plumber like me brother.

Mr. Castin almost followed his father into the docks but chose printing because, 'Newspaper printing sounded exciting; films about reporters and things. I had an uncle, actually, who was in the print and who got me an introduction'. For Mr. Osborne, a self-employed heating and ventilating engineer, two relatives had influenced him:

I've thought a lot about it and I can't honestly imagine. I can't for the life of me think of why I went into the buildings. The only thing I can think of, it's a psychological thing. When I left school I wanted to go into a shop because my uncle was manager of a grocery shop and that was at the back of my mind. Then when I saw the employment man he said, 'You'll have to work Saturday afternoons'. Well! As I played football and did sport every Saturday, I said straight away, 'That cuts that out: I won't do that'. The next thing, I went and decided to become an engineer. Another uncle of mine became one. He lives in Middlesex and I live in Essex, but it was in the back of my mind.

Only a minority, about five percent of the manual respondents, mentioned their fathers with respect to first jobs. Mothers, on the other hand, were sometimes mentioned as having 'put them into a job'. For instance, while there were no butchers among the men interviewed, it was clearly a job which had at one time appealed to some mothers, though not to their sons.

My mother knew the butcher in our neighbourhood. I started off as an errand boy on a bike. It just developed into a full-time job when I left school (Mobile Crane Driver).

When I first left school I went into the butcher's trade. We knew the butcher quite well, my mother had been down there for years, and she got me in. But I'd been used to being around and about and I soon pulled out of that (Brewery Delivery Driver).

The fear of the unknown was, presumably, a factor making some mothers take decisions for their children. Mr. Gallagher, who eventually did move upwards into a supervisory job, recounted a particularly
dramatic illustration of this conservatism.

I had big ideas. I wanted to do better. I went and got an interview with Jensens. You've got to remember, I came from a very poor district. I came from Kennington. I didn't want to be a messenger boy at 15 bob a week. I came to leave school and I hadn't heard from them. I spoke to my mom and she said, 'You don't want to hang around here, get yourself a little job somewhere and if this thing comes along, you can decide which is the best offer'. I just got a job in the local dairy. Months went by and I heard nothing. I decided to go back to Jensens. My mom said, 'I wouldn't bother, I've been checking around. This job's no good for you, you're better off where you are; we'll always need a milkman'. What happened, I'd sent the application. They'd sent me information on when to start, and Mom just thought it out and said, 'He don't want that'. So that's the reason I became a milkman. It wasn't what I wanted (Office Manager).

Some, of course, were not able to recall very much about their entry into work and what factors led them to choose the job they did. Particularly among the younger men, the immediate earnings were a big factor. Mr. Carey, a storeman who started in a metal works factory, commented:

I didn't think of it as a trade. I just thought, I'm going out into a job. Having a source of money. I never thought about what was going to happen in the future, never. It didn't bother me.

Mr. Bolter found the entry into work as equally untroublesome as had Mr. Carey.

My father didn't influence me. It was the youth employment. They brought out a card and said, 'We've got a job for a school leaver at Smith's'. So I took it. I mean, if they'd brought out a card saying shop work for a 15-year-old boy, I would have took it. I mean, it all depended on what card came out first, I suppose.

**DOWNWARDLY MOBILE AND FIRST JOBS**

Little has been said about the downwardly mobile because as I tried to show in Chapter 7 this group had for the most part entered occupations which also reflected family influence. These men, it emerged, had been influenced by fathers who were because of upward mobility, marginal to the middle class in which objectively they were placed. Often they were directing their children away from a middle-class pattern of
an extended education and a white-collar job. As a result, the men interviewed who according to the coding scheme were downwardly mobile, had tended to give, relative to other groups, considerable thought to their eventual occupation. They had, as well, ended up in fields which strongly reflected either their own or their father's interests.

UPWARD MOBILITY AND THE ENTRY INTO WORK

The entry into work entailed a different set of influences, problems and experiences for those who moved upwards relative to their fathers. This was so despite the fact that exactly half of these men started out as manual workers, in jobs not very different from those taken up by the stable manual men. The other half, those who started out in a non-manual position, were also those who usually had attended a grammar school or had taken further qualification beyond 14 or 15. But, the experiences of these men were also different than those of their stable non-manual counterparts. First, in both groups, Table 8.2 revealed that parents and relatives were less likely to have been mentioned with respect to choosing a first job. Secondly, there was also a greater degree of uncertainty and lack of planning about what work they wanted to do and how they found the first job. In reading the accounts of these men, there are also differences between those who were mobile over their career and those who, because of education, moved up at the start of their working life.

For those who used an educational route, expectations about the kind of work they would do, were naturally higher. But, the actual choice

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3 The arbitrary nature of splitting educational aspirations and choice of work is particularly evident in analysing the downwardly mobile. The decision to consider this group mainly in the last chapter was based on the desire to show that these men, in their minds at least, had not so much been rejected by the formal educational system, but that they had rejected it in favour of taking up a trade.
was still problematic. Mr. Emery, an insurance manager, described it:

There was very little career guidance in school. My father was a gas worker limited to some extent in the help and advice he could give me. I wouldn't say I actually drifted into it but maths was a subject I was keen on and this is why I went into it. I didn't know any one in the field who could advise me.

For Mr. Pennington, there was a similar though much less powerful inclination:

I sort of drifted into physics. I was pretty good at physics in school and I was exhorted to go to university and do physics. I'm quite happy with what I do though you'll never be a millionaire. There are lots of other jobs that I could have done where I would have earned a lot more money. I could have been a dentist or an engineer. I'd probably have been just as satisfied.

Generally it was the school, rather than parents which had raised aspirations and encouraged particular talents. Whereas the stable working-class people and stable middle-class men appeared able to invoke the help of relatives, an uncle, a cousin or an older brother—though interestingly, seldom a father—upwardly mobile men seemed to be without this kind of support. I had thought it might be possible, if the upwardly mobile came from sunken middle-class families, that there might be some contact with the white-collar world. However, there was no evidence that this had occurred. Instead, the entry into work had to depend upon external agencies, such as the youth employment, the advice of headmasters and printed material issued by various concerns.

Mr. Chapman, a chemist and a grammar school graduate, said of his first job, 'It was a gamble. The youth employment office just sent me out there. I was studying chemistry in school anyway: "A" level maths, physics and chemistry; so as long as it was technical and an interesting job I would've taken it'. Mr. Jarvis, a clerk, said:

A teacher I had knew somebody—a relative, I think—in this building society, and he mentioned me to him. I went up for an interview, and that was that.

For Mr. Gadsby, it was the impersonal brochure of the Post Office which
was the deciding factor:

My father thought I should join the gas board but they didn't seem to have anything very exciting to offer. At school we had these brochures passed around from the post office—just a brochure, no one came with them. There was a picture of some little man adjusting a relay set and this looked quite exciting. I'd left school and still hadn't a job and all I could think of was this brochure still in my desk. So I cycled back to the school and got the caretaker to let me in. Sure enough, there it was in my desk and I followed it up and the post office was pleased to have me.

Although those who moved upwards via grammar school routes were pre-disposed by their specialization and presumably their interests, to look in certain directions, those who moved up later in their careers, or without any additional education, the choice often seemed to be to 'take whatever work was available' or what chance put in their way. These were the men who could recall the most about their entry into work and who had unusual stories to tell.

It was purely accidental. I wanted to be a journalist, I thought, and I went to get a job in the Old Star. The old twit at the labour exchange gave me the wrong day so when I got there they had already picked the boy. I was very disappointed and I thought what is my Dad going to say, me not getting a job here at a stockbroker. I barely knew what a stockbroker was; I didn't know whether it was a religion or what (Senior Dealer).

Chance also entered into Mr. Garrit's decision:

A chappie I've now lost touch with, mainly for reasons of his current stature, we both went up to the city together because we were recommended by our headmaster that that was the place we should be. We tossed a coin to go for an interview with a stockbroker firm. I won the bet. Didn't like the firm. Bearing in mind I was 15 and a bit cocky and dear Old Peter took the job. The last I heard he'd bought a Mercedes-Benz out of his bonus. He, of course, just had the flair. I may have taken the job and not made the success of it he did. This is life.

Mr. Chambers eventually became a sales manager. But the transition from school to work was a quick and at the time non-problematic one. Until he had talked to some other students, he was not even clear that his schooling had ended:

I left school on a Friday and Saturday morning went over to the sheet metal works on the same turning as our flat. One of the lorry drivers
asked me would I like to sit on the back of the lorry and go over with it to Kennington. I sat on the back of the lorry and got over to the other side. 'When'd you leave school?' they asked. 'Yesterday'. 'What you going to do?' 'I don't know'. 'Well, how'd you like to come work here?' That was it.

For others the entry into work was equally unplanned though there was the fact that clerical rather than manual work was somewhat inexplicably chosen. As has already been seen in the previous chapter, some parents had stressed office work as providing a release from the kind of life they had led. But for others there was not much indication that mobility aspirations played a prominent role in the decision to choose a non-manual job. Towards the end of the interview I sometimes asked people to give me their theory of how it happened that they had gone into white-collar work. The answers were generally not very revealing. Apart from the theme of escape mentioned in Chapter 7, reasons given were either tautological or were in other ways not very informative. It was often as Mr. Dawson, an accountant, put it:

My first job was like everybody else in my generation. You just got a job as an office boy. You were jolly lucky to get a job at all. I had no particular ambitions. You just looked around to see what you could do.

Similarly, Mr. Ferguson, a very perceptive man, was unable to pinpoint any one factor which had led him out of the working class.

It was the height of the depression and I was part of a large family. I simply started off as a very junior newspaper boy at 10 shillings a week. There were few jobs about, so I felt myself, and indeed I was, very lucky. Because in those days you often had to pay a little premium and work for nothing. Five shillings was common enough. So, at ten bob, I was pretty well done by.

There were a few men among the upwardly mobile who had had a white-collar job imposed upon them by their inability to do manual work—mainly because of illness or generally poor health.

My father has a small painting and decorating business and the money was quite good there. But my health hasn't allowed me to do manual work, labouring or something like that. I guess my only real ambition was to be a professional football player which was impossible. So it was
just a case of if I'm not going to be an outside worker, then I'll be an inside worker. I didn't know anyone older who was at work in an office or anything like that.

Mr. Blake, also in his early twenties, is a clerk in a food importing firm. His first choice was manual work:

My health is not too good. Not all that bad, but it limits me to office work only. If I had the chance to be a dock worker like my father was, I'd go and be a dock worker. I'd be better off possibly. The money is better anyway. But I'm not healthy enough.

Thus, instead of poor health contributing to downward mobility, the evidence is that it was at times an explanation of upward mobility.

This was a phenomenon not unlike that indicated in Chapter 4 and 5 where it was shown that men who eventually moved upwards into white-collar jobs probably would not have done so had they been able to take on apprenticeship.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

Data set out in this chapter lead to a set of conclusions not very different from those of Chapter 7. That is, in examining conditions and influences related to a choice of career, these were again more clearly identified for downward than for upward mobility. As in the last chapter, I was unable to pinpoint any one set of sociological factors which explain why some people are upwardly mobile while others from what on the surface seem like similar sorts of backgrounds, are not. In starting out their work life, the upwardly mobile group of men in fact turned out, relative to non-mobile men, to be more, rather than less disadvantaged. They were less likely to have available to them the support, advice and influence of relatives and friends than non-mobile men of either social class had known. Instead they relied upon outside agencies or, more typically, took the first job that they came across. One consequence of this was that few started in work that they had hoped to
do, even assuming that they were among the minority who had some idea of what that was. In contrast, men labelled as downwardly mobile often knew within narrow limits what it was they wanted to do and were usually able to start out in that work. Their choice of work was, unlike the upwardly mobile, strongly influenced by parents who along with relatives played an important role in helping them get started.

In reading over what people said about their entry into work, the most striking finding is the extent to which all but the upwardly mobile were blinkered and restricted by class-based norms and parameters. As in the type and amount of education, the choice of career was for non-mobile men generally an unproblematic and taken-for-granted aspect of their lives. If their accounts are accurate, they had experienced very little indecision and uncertainty and had shown little independence. Thus, with almost no indications of rebellion or regret most appeared to have conformed to parental expectations and, therefore, to the typical code of their social class. In this aspect of their lives, the working-class and middle-class non-mobiles (and downwardly mobiles) were very much alike. All seemed to have been acted upon rather than acting. The difference, of course, lies in what range of occupations is for each group deemed to be appropriate and acceptable.

In sharp contrast were the upwardly mobile. What these men said about their earlier life and of their entry into work suggests that to move upward is to face, more or less unaided, highly problematic and unpredictable conditions. Not to follow in the footsteps of one's father or some other relative is, it appears, to be without support, guidance and influence. One must go it alone and in retrospect, at least, reckon up the regrets about errors made and cul de sacs unwittingly entered along the way. The future, at least for a considerable time, does not have the patterned certitude that men stable in the social hierarchy
expect. However, as Part III will show more clearly, these are conditions capable of being stood on their head. Although social mobility may perhaps be uncomfortable, maybe even stressful, it is at the same time a process in which by moving part way, at least, to another class, the individual is also able to step beyond and look outside the narrow confines of his former class milieu. It involves both the desire and experience of being subjected to new influences, rising aspirations, changes in evaluation of self and others. Thus, as some of my respondents perceived, upward mobility stemmed from the strong desire to escape out of the restricted and narrow world inhabited by their parents.

In neither this or the previous chapter am I able to locate systematically sociological factors explaining this desire. The foregoing does, nevertheless, suggest that at least the upwardly mobile are in this respect deviant. They have deviated from what the accounts of the non-mobile suggest are pervasive and powerful norms dictating what are permissible (and conceivable) aspirations. Perhaps the genesis of this deviance must be sought in the realm of 'personality' traits, too subtle to be caught by my survey approach. Certainly, as Gans (1962) notes, outstanding ability may in itself so set the individual apart that he is thrust out of his peer group and 'into the training grounds of the middle class.4 But, what other factors, psychological as well as socio-

4In the first round of interviewing all respondents in the Work and Leisure Study were asked to attempt a twenty-part verbal test by Miner (1957) (See Young and Willmott, 1973: 334), found to correlate highly with other more elaborate tests. With the exception of the downwardly mobile and stable manual comparison, there were marked and statistically significant differences in mean scores between mobility sub-groups: upwardly mobile men scored substantially higher than stable manual men but not as high as stable non-manual men; the downwardly mobile scored on average substantially lower than the upwardly mobile and the stable non-manual. The educational system did not appear to act as a selection mechanism. Within the group now non-manual there was no significant difference in verbal test scores between those attending grammar school, obtaining further education or staying on until age 17 or over and those who did not.
logical contribute to the motivation to withstand social pressures and thereby create the 'requisite isolation' necessary for social mobility do not emerge very clearly from this research.

A second analysis, comparing the scores of the 40 fathers interviewed with their actual sons' scores, provided striking results. The general finding is straightforward: sons more intelligent than their fathers tend to rise; sons less intelligent than their fathers tend to fall (Fisher's Exact Probability Test: $P \leq .025$; Kendall's $Q = .976$—excluding stationary respondents). These findings are consistent with those of an earlier pilot study by Young and Gibson (1963). Tables supporting these statements are available on request.
PART THREE

THE EXPERIENCE OF SOCIAL MOBILITY
CHAPTER 9

THE CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL MOBILITY (I)

The four chapters making up this section are all concerned with the experience and consequences of social mobility. In this chapter I will introduce some of the sociological perspectives which generally have been of import to the study of social mobility as an independent rather than a dependent variable. In the next two chapters I present findings from the Work and Leisure Study and the Mobility Study pertinent to two main questions: 1) the extent to which it can be said social mobility is in Britain a disruptive and dissociative experience and 2) the extent to which it involves normative and relational discontinuities. In Chapter 12 I try to show how people themselves define and interpret their mobility experience and, more generally, the class structure and their place in it.

The assumption that social mobility might have disruptive or otherwise negative consequences for the individual is now a familiar one. Thus, there is a rich tradition of sociological literature which has attempted to link it to a wide variety of social phenomena. The main theoretical justification is related to the belief that movement upwards and downwards will contribute to the anomie, rootlessness and status anxiety which more generally are held to characterize modern industrial society. While generally favoring tendencies towards more open and fluid social structures, the conservative impulse, as Nisbet (1967: 11) describes it, cautions that conditions conducive to personal freedom, autonomy, innovation and individualism may also be anomic and alienative, undermining personal and social integration. ¹

¹For a succinct review of these views, see Olmstead (1966).
have been inclined to see social mobility as 'Janus faced'. The expectation is that the prizes for those who succeed in moving upwards have attached to them personal and social costs which may outweigh their value.

THE INFLUENCE OF DURKHEIM AND SOROKIN

One of the earliest and most influential recognitions in the sociological literature that social mobility might have negative consequences is found in Durkheim's *Suicide* (1897: 189). Without actually using the term, social mobility, he argued that as the restraints characteristic of a mechanical society are weakened, individuals may find themselves in ill-defined and potentially anomie situations. So long as systems remain more or less closed, he maintained, social restraints act to limit the aspirations of everyone and to regulate the distance which they may fall. 'A genuine regimen exists, therefore, although not always legally formulated, which defines with relative precision the maximum degree of ease of living to which each social class may legitimately aspire' (Durkheim, 1897: 249). But when the stratification system is no longer so subject to these restraints both economic disasters and abrupt growth of power and wealth constitute situations potentially dangerous to the moral order.

In the case of economic disasters, something like a declassification occurs which suddenly casts certain individuals into a lower state than their previous one. Then they must reduce their requirements, restrain their needs, learn greater self-control . . . their moral education has to be recommenced. But society cannot adjust them instantaneously to this new life and teach them to practice the increased self-repression to which they are unaccustomed . . . hence the suffering which detaches them from a reduced existence even before they have made trial of it (P. 252).

Similarly, Durkheim suggested, a rapid rise in fortune or power is equally critical for the maintenance of social integration except that in this case the problem is that there is no ceiling on ambitions: 'the limits are unknown between the possible and the impossible, what is just
and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate . . . nothing gives satisfaction and all this agitation is uninterruptedly maintained without appeasement' (P. 253). 'How', asks Durkheim, finally, 'could the desire to live not be weakened under such conditions?'. Thus, for Durkheim, the very conditions which give rise to the possibility of social mobility are those which are also conducive to anomie. It, in turn, contributes to the social suicide rate.

Sorokin, writing in 1927, also shared some of these same preoccupations with the disruptive consequences of social mobility. Where he differed from Durkheim, however, was in his attempt to balance the negative with positive effects of mobility—what he refers to as the 'functions' of social mobility. Although, he maintained, social mobility may make positive contributions towards the 'versatility' and 'plasticity' of human behaviour, increase innovation and cosmopolitanism and make more adequate use of talent, it does so at considerable psychic cost. In particular, he singled out the degree to which mobility increases 'mental strain, mental diseases, superficiality and skepticism'. Furthermore, he argued, social mobility diminishes intimacy, increases isolation restlessness and loneliness. And, taking his evidence from Durkheim, he also maintained that it strengthens a predilection towards suicide. All such phenomena are viewed as outcomes of being socially mobile in 'a society mad in its mobility and futile strenuousness' (P. 510).

THE DISSOCIATIVE HYPOTHESIS

These assertions as well as Durkheim's earlier statements, have generally been taken very seriously by American sociologists. The result is that the alleged devotion of American society to the rags-to-riches saga has usually been countered by an emphasis in the sociologi-
cal literature on the disruptive aspects of upward striving. As Miller (1971: 64-65) has suggested, 'the attraction of mobility-as-an-explain-er was that it served in the fifties to provide criticism of Eisenhower bourgeois society. It was a way of saying: watch out for the prices paid in conforming to the American motif of onward and upward'. Certainly, beginning with the late 1940's, empirically oriented sociologists have tried to relate upward and downward mobility to such diverse phenomena as anomie, social disintegration, alienation, prejudice, political extremism, voting behaviour, and patterns of participation and sociability. However, firm conclusions to be drawn from these are few and at best tentative.

As well as these empirical studies, a number of more theoretical and speculative essays have also had considerable influence on the direction of theory and research. Tumin (1957), for example, wrote about what he chose to call 'some unapplauded consequences of social mobility'. Among the undesirable effects of upward mobility, he notes the decline

2During the depression years attention shifted to the study of downward mobility (Mack and Yellin, 1957) but in the post-war years the concern has been almost entirely with the effects of upward mobility. A complete explanation for the lack of interest in downward mobility would involve recourse to a sociology of knowledge approach. It might also be noted that studies in recent years have not uncovered a great deal of downward mobility. The result is that unless samples are large, the analysis of these data is difficult and sometimes unreliable.

3I do not propose to review all of these studies. More and more frequently, data on intergenerational mobility are collected as a routine part of survey research, whatever the focus of the research. Thus, social mobility may be becoming a 'face sheet' variable similar to age, SES, income, sex, and ethnic background. Since these are then more or less routinely cross-tabulated with the main independent variables, the number of articles and monographs mentioning social mobility is immense. Rather, I concentrate on those works and findings which have had a cumulative impact on research and thought in this area.
in social criticism and the possible diffusion of insecurity. Some years later this second theme, was extended and reiterated by Luckmann and Berger (1964). Their concern was with how the very normativeness of upward mobility and of anticipatory socialization create strains toward status insecurity and social disintegration. This, they argue, poses a considerable threat to the maintenance of personal identity since, enjoined to seek an ever higher status, people are unable to consolidate existing status positions and to form intimate and long-lasting friendship ties. In a similar vein, Strauss (1971) refers to the dual themes of 'turned to ashes' and 'you can't go home again', both of which he maintains permeate the technical and novelistic literature on social mobility. The first he describes as 'the existential disappointment of arriving where you dreamed of arriving and then being disappointed at not finding it all--or anything at all--as it was supposed' (P. 188). The second theme is closer to that of Luckmann and Berger. It involves 'a possible sense of discontinuity with one's past and one's enduring identity'. It is a feeling which 'can appear with movement at any social level, with regard to any amount of distance traversed and with respect to any mode of mobility' (P. 188-189).

One of the most widely cited essays in the literature on social mobility was that of Janowitz (1956). After a careful review and summary of the then existing data, he concluded that for primary group structures both upward and downward mobility are socially disruptive. In a wide range of subject matters--family organization, prejudice, mental health, and the like--the conclusion repeatedly emerges as to the dysfunctional, disruptive and disorganizing contributions of social mobility' (pp. 194-195).

However, in contrast to the negative effect on primary group structures, he could find little evidence that the upwardly mobile were less well integrated into secondary group structures. On the other hand, 'down-
ward mobility', he suggested, 'does not produce effective involvement in secondary group structures in pursuit of self-interest' (P. 193). Put simply, those who move downward do not, his evidence suggests, join unions or political parties appealing to working-class interests.

**BRITISH STUDIES**

Although there have been very few empirical studies of the consequences of social mobility in Britain, similar views about its negative aspects are, nevertheless, present in the literature. Jackson and Marsden (1962), for instance, found that upward mobility had created in their 88 working-class people, a high degree of conservatism, a lack of sympathy for those left behind and for about a third of the sample, what they describe as 'a drifting, rudderless existence' (P. 177). In some they also discerned a sense of guilt and ambivalence towards their parents, a barrier which kept them apart even after grandchildren had arrived. 4

This study, both an empirical and impressionistic one, substantiates many of the personal observations made some years earlier by Hoggart (1957). The title of the chapter in which these are presented--'The Uprooted and the Anxious'--is itself an explicit expression of the conception of social mobility held by this very perceptive and humanistic observer. Speaking mainly of the scholarship boy of modest talent, he notes that they are, for a very long period, alone and marginal--not fully part of any group. Because of their mobility they are caught between the pressures of two classes yet are seldom part of a 'classless intelligentsia'; rather than 'free floating', they are trapped by an ambivalence of their own making.

4 Lemasters (1954: 230) made a similar observation about American working-class students whom he had studied: 'They often feel a vague
He cannot go back; with one part of himself he does not want to go back to a homeliness which was often narrow; with another part he longs for the membership he has lost, 'he pines for some nameless Eden where he never was . . .'. He both wants to go back and yet thinks he has gone beyond his class, feels himself weighted with knowledge of his own and their situation, which hereafter forbids him the simpler pleasures of his father and mother (P. 301).

In Hoggart's view, the principal mechanism of upward mobility, the educational system, is by its very nature destructive to the personality of those using it. The result, Hoggarts suggests, is that in later life, the scholarship boy continues to look for 'set-pieces', the series of hurdles which he has successfully mastered. Hence 'the driving-belt hangs loosely, disconnected from the only machine it has so far served, the examination passing machine'. Hoggart concludes that:

He finds difficulty in choosing a direction in a world where there is no longer a master to please, a toffee-apple at the end of each stage, a certificate, a place in the upper half of the assessable world. He is unhappy in a society which presents largely a picture of disorder, which is huge and sprawling, not limited, ordered, and centrally-heated; in which the toffee-apples are not accurately given to those who work hardest nor even to the most intelligent; but in which disturbing imponderables like 'character', 'pure luck' 'ability to mix' and 'boldness' have a way of tipping the scales (pp. 298-299).

THE ACCULTURATION HYPOTHESIS

Undoubtedly the most useful attempt to pull together a large number of empirical findings with the more speculative and impressionistic writings was that of Blau (1956). By placing the emphasis on the problem of acculturation faced by the socially mobile, he is able to take a position somewhat different from the dissociative hypothesis. Blau argues that the mobile individual is faced with the dilemma of choosing whether to seek friendships in his new class or of retaining former ties. As he describes it:

The upwardly mobile must choose between abandoning hope of translating his occupational success into social acceptance by a more prestigeful sense of guilt--they feel that they should have more in common with their families than they do; sometimes they seem to feel as if they had deserted their families'.

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The upwardly mobile must choose between abandoning hope of translating his occupational success into social acceptance by a more prestigeful sense of guilt--they feel that they should have more in common with their families than they do; sometimes they seem to feel as if they had deserted their families'.
group and sacrificing valued social ties and customs in an effort to gain such acceptance. The downwardly mobile must choose between risking rejections for failure to meet social obligations that are beyond his financial resources and resigning himself to losing his affiliation with a more prestigious group (P. 290). 

As a result of these dilemmas, social integration is inhibited and this in turn is used by Blau to explain many of the observed consequences of social mobility. Thus, where behaviour and attitudes—voting and fertility—of the mobile are intermediate between the stable groups, the explanation is couched in terms of what he calls the pattern of acculturation: 'both groups exert some influence over mobile individuals since they have, or have had, social contacts with members of both, being placed by economic circumstances amidst the one, while having been socialized among the other (P. 291). Political affiliation and fertility were found to be related to social mobility in a manner compatible with this explanation or pattern.

A second pattern described by Blau, that of social insecurity, finds the two mobile groups 'sharing first place, stationary lows second and stationary highs a close third' (P. 291). Existing evidence on prejudice, preoccupation with health, nervousness and mental disorders suggested that these tended to be more prevalent among the mobile than the non-mobile. Blau argued that these kinds of behaviour were all indicative of the same underlying insecurity. As he puts it: 'Lack of firm social support engenders feelings of insecurity and this has the result that the mobile person tends to assume the extreme position not the intermediate one, in respect to those attitudes that constitute expressions of insecurity' (P. 292). 

Finally, Blau attempts to explain the 'overconformity' of the up-

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5 As in this present study, Blau conceives of two mobility and two non-mobility groups.
wardly mobile on certain attitudes by using this same perspective of interpersonal dilemmas. Status consciousness, emphasis on the conjugal family and discrimination against Negroes had been found to be more pronounced among the upwardly mobile than among stationary high status respondents. This, he suggests, can be explained by a combination of social insecurity and lack of acculturation:

Without integrative social relations to define and support his standing in the community, the individual becomes anxiously concerned about his social status. And the less security a person derives from close relations with friends, colleagues and neighbours, the more apt he is to turn to his conjugal family for emotional support (P. 293).

Status consciousness and discrimination against Negroes, Blau maintains, are more pronounced among high status people than among lower status people.6 Hence, the upwardly mobile, already insecure and also attempting to conform to higher status values overdo it, as it were. Whereas for the upwardly mobile these two social forces coalesce and result in overconformity, they neutralize one another in the case of downward mobility. The reason, is that despite the status insecurity attendant upon moving downward, there is also the process of acculturation to the new class. Its values tend to be opposite to those attitudes which are the result of status insecurity. The result is that there is little difference between the downwardly mobile and their class of origin with respect to these variables.

SUPPORT FOR THE ACCULTURATION HYPOTHESIS

The importance of Blau's paper lies in its recognition that the problem or dilemma of acculturation is as important as the dissociative syndrome engendered by social mobility. It has, therefore, served as a

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6 As Hodge and Treiman (1966) point out, prejudice has most often been inversely related to social status, not directly related as Blau says.
theoretical underpinning for the statistical analyses which came later. Thus, what may be considered as a third generation of empirical studies about the consequences of social mobility have provided considerable support for Blau's first pattern, that of acculturation, and have questioned seriously the dissociative hypothesis, the dominant view of at least the first two generations of investigations. The major impetus for these studies comes from statistical techniques developed by Dun­
can (1966) and Hodge and Treiman (1966).

Duncan (1966: 91) uses fertility to show that 'one is not entitled to discuss "effects" of mobility until he has established that the apparent effect cannot be due merely to a simple combination of effects of the variable used to define mobility'. For example, Duncan, after re-examining Berent's (1952) data on fertility, concluded that: 'there is no need to postulate any "effect" for "mobility" qua mobility. The couples in the study behaved as if they determined their fertility by combining the fertility pattern of their class of origin with the ferti­
licity pattern of their class of destination in a simple additive or av­
eraging process' (P. 93).

In other words, the acculturation hypothesis, as opposed to the dissociative or compensatory hypotheses, predicts that the socially mo­
 bile will tend to bestride the two classes—origin and destination—in their attitudes and behaviour. Recently, a rash of studies all modelled on this hypothesis have emerged, all tending to support Duncan's origi­
nal statement. Such phenomena as political party preference (Knoke, 1972); voting behaviour (Thompson, 1971); participation in voluntary associations (Vorwaller, 1970); family relationships, interpersonal re­
lationships and emotional adjustment (Kessin, 1971) work satisfaction (Laslett, 1971); alienation (Bean, et al, 1972); and kinship relations
(Aiken and Goldberg, 1969) have been related to social mobility with results generally favouring an acculturation hypothesis. 7

BRITISH SOCIAL MOBILITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

These data refer almost exclusively to the United States as do the more theoretical essays described earlier in the chapter. Which perspective applies to Britain? Are British patterns of social mobility likely to be more, less, or equally detrimental in their consequences?

Although the evidence is scanty, 8 the most general expectation about social mobility in societies like Britain is that it is likely to be more detrimental than in the United States. This is in turn premised on the unproven assumption that the greater the degree of status rigidity the more likely is social mobility to be disruptive in its consequences. Thus, Lipset and Bendix (1959: 66), speaking about Europe generally, conclude that 'individuals moving up occupationally in Northern Europe where shifts from one class to another require major adjustments in living style are more likely than comparably successful Americans to retain links to their class of origin. In a similar vein, Germani (1966: 371) holds that 'mobility is disruptive in a "traditional" society with an "ascriptive" system of stratification, while in an "industrial" society that approaches the opposite ideal type, it is a normal recurrent process favorable to (or even required for) the maintenance of system equilibrium'.

Although in most respects British social structure lies toward the

7 These studies are described in the next two chapters.

8 Stacey (1969) in a paper devoted explicitly to the consequences of social mobility in Britain, cites only six British references. Of these, only two had, in any empirical way, addressed themselves to this matter. These were Jackson and Marsden (1962) and Willmott and Young (1960).
latter end of this continuum, there are, as Germani shows, a number of intervening contextual variables which it is important to take into account such as degree and rate of economic growth, configuration of mobile and non-mobile sectors and the actual structure of the stratification system which he, in turn, breaks into seven characteristics. Beyond this, he suggests that there may also be 'intervening psychosocial variables' relevant to an analysis of the consequences of individual social mobility. With respect to a number of these, British society appears to lie somewhat closer to the "traditional" and "ascriptive" ideal type than does American society, despite its obvious status as an "industrial society".  

While the framework of analysis proposed by Germani is complex, its particular virtue is that it does emphasize that social mobility may have different consequences in different social structures. Thus, Kessin (1971) uses this general framework to advance a similar position that mobility is more likely to be disruptive in its effects in traditional societies. This is a hypothesis based on assumptions about the importance of the degree of status rigidity and of other factors in a society for the consequences of mobility. As he says:

Disruptive consequences can be anticipated if: socialization to the new status is inadequate; the magnitude of movement is extreme; the stratum of arrival or departure rejects the mobile person, or the newcomer rejects the new or old stratum; geographical mobility accompanies social mobility; mobility is a unique event (mobility rates are low); social status is highly salient; one's mobility and one's origins are visible (pp. 2-3).

Although Kessin does not use the concept, status rigidity, it is

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9 For example, Germani (1966: Table 2) lists seven characteristics of the structure of the stratification system relevant to an analysis of the consequences of mobility. On all but one of these, 'Real possibilities of mobility' it is apparent that British society differs substantially from American society and in a direction suggestive of greater disruptive effects both at the individual and social level. For a detailed analysis of Germani's approach, see Davies (1970).
apparent that he is concerned with much the same set of variables or properties of the stratification system as is Hopper (1971a and 1971b).\textsuperscript{10} This perspective described in Chapter 1, is concerned primarily with upward mobility and non-mobility and is again within the general view that mobility in Britain is likely, because of the greater degree of status rigidity, to be usually more disruptive than in the United States. However, Hopper's analysis suggests that to the list of contextual variables presented by Germani (1966) and Kessin (1971), the route through which mobility occurs must also be considered before anticipating what he calls 'pathogenic conditions'.\textsuperscript{11} As indicated in Chapter 1, this is a perspective which extends and qualifies Turner's (1960) argument, that because of a system of norms organizing upward mobility--what he called sponsorship norms--upward mobility need not be as detrimental in British society as was generally anticipated. In effect, sponsored mobility by being regular and institutionalized is hypothesized as having less impact upon individuals than contest mobility (Turner, 1960: 88; Turner, 1966).

In general, Hopper supports Turner's position that upward mobility through an educational route is in Britain likely to be relatively unproblematic. However, as he points out, there is as much, if not more, upward mobility through non-educational (non-grammar) routes as through educational routes, an observation supported by data in this study (see Chapter 3). Given the relatively high degree of status rigidity of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} For example, compare Hopper's definition of status rigidity (Hopper, 1971a: 21), with Kessin's list of conditions most conducive to creation of negative consequences for individuals experiencing social mobility.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Miller (1971: 63) adds yet another context, that of the time when the data were collected. As he says: 'Studies of 1936 or 1952 have the same significance for 1971 as do studies of 1968. Implicitly there is a belief in the significance of structure regardless of changes in social climate. A pseudo-cumulativeness exists, acting as though data are floating in statistical space unconnected to their historical emergence'.
\end{itemize}
British social structure, such non-institutionalized mobility, he sug-
gests, is likely to be especially problematic for individuals experi-
encing it, more so than in the United States where educational routes
are more uniform and the status hierarchy is less rigid. The reason is
that in any society it is difficult to slough-off in adulthood one mode
of behaviour and thinking for another—the almost universal condemnation
of *nouveau riche* bears witness to this fact. But, in Britain the problem
of re-acculturation is more acute than in some other industrial socie-
ties because as differences in accent, lifestyle and attitudes between
classes attest, there is a high degree of discontinuity between such
broad strata as working class and middle class. The result is that
without the status training provided by grammar-school-type education,
occupational mobility is not likely to deliver anywhere near the same
status benefits that it might do in perhaps the United States.

Hopper's position, then, is generally in fundamental accord with
those advanced by Germani (1966), Treiman (1970), Simpson (1970) and
Kessin (1971). All hypothesize that upward mobility is likely to be
most disruptive in societies tending towards the traditional and ascrip-
tive end of an industrial-achievement-traditional-ascriptive continuum
and when it is irregular or non-institutionalized. As a result, it is
either implied or actually anticipated that for these reasons upward mo-
bility will be more disruptive in its effects within British than in
American society. The exception, analysed by Hopper and earlier by
Turner, is that upward mobility that takes place within the context of

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12 For evidence of this, see Klein (1965), Lockwood (1966) and Gold-

13 As I noted in Chapter 1, Hopper (1971b: 332) also hypothesizes
that individuals upwardly mobile through an educational route, but who
do not complete their education are also more likely to encounter pato-
genic conditions in Britain than in the United States.
a sponsorship system of norms is likely to pose fewer difficulties than
mobility which occurs in other contexts. The position with respect to
downward mobility is less clearly specified. The general expectation
is, however, as we saw earlier, that it ought to be a socially isolating
and disruptive experience in virtually all contexts. According to
Hopper (1971b: 332), for example, downward mobility is likely to be more
disruptive (pathogenic) in Britain than in the United States.

**SUMMARY**

The traditional position about social mobility is that along with
positive benefits for society, and in the case of upward mobility for
the individual, there are personal and social effects which are detrimen­
tal. There is some empirical evidence and a great deal of speculation
that social mobility destroys kinship and friendship ties; that it leaves
the mobile individual isolated and marginal; that in a status-oriented
society social mobility creates added anxiety and strain manifested in
a variety of patterns of behaviour and attitudes such as increased pre­
judice, extremist political attitudes and anomie. However, against this
older view—the dissociative hypothesis—is a more recent body of re­
search which tends to discount the impact of social mobility qua mobility.
Rather, attitudes and behaviour believed to be the consequence of social
mobility are shown, instead, to be a product not of mobility per se but
of the failure of the mobile to be fully acculturated into either the
class of origin or destination. In either case, the general consensus
of sociological thought is that upward mobility because of status anxie­
ty or because of the difficulty of re-acculturation is to some extent
at least, consequential, if not in a disruptive sense, then in creating
a degree of marginality. Downward mobility has received less theoretical
and empirical attention, but the general expectation has been that the
process of moving downward will be a more disruptive experience than that of moving upward. Again, the more recent view is that moving downward is as with upward mobility mainly a process of re-acculturation.

Recent thought about the consequences of social mobility suggests that if there are disruptive consequences these are most likely to occur where the status hierarchy is relatively rigid, where mobility is non-institutionalized and non-normative and where those who are mobile are fairly visible. In short, in 'traditional' societies in which the degree of status rigidity is such that achieved statuses do not override ascribed ones to the extent that status incongruence can be avoided. Existing evidence suggests that social mobility will, therefore, be relatively consequential in British society unless it takes place through a grammar-school-type route and conforms to sponsorship norms.

While there is evidence in preceding chapters that the careers and career choices of upwardly mobile men were more problematic than for men who remain stationary in the class system, this was a relative difference not so severe as to suggest undue anxiety and stress as a result of it. In other words, there is a certain amount of disorder, set-backs, triumphs, unanticipated rises and various stresses in the lives of most people. My evidence does not at this point lead me to anticipate that the experience of intergenerational mobility is in the middle mass as 'fateful' as some of the literature suggests.

In a similar vein, the evidence presented in preceding chapters about intergenerational downward mobility suggests that it does not involve as much discontinuity and sense of failure as the literature leads one to expect. As I suggested in Chapter 1, involuntary downward mobility through what for the middle class is generally a non-mobility route--grammar or public school--would likely be a disruptive or dissociative
experience and whether voluntary or involuntary would pose interpersonal dilemmas. However, in my sample at least, this theoretical pattern of mobility does not have an empirical counterpart. Similarly, movement downward over the work life, what Wilensky and Edwards (1959) call 'skidding', was also virtually non-existent in the sample. The downward mobility observed was, instead, from marginally middle-class positions and, at the beginning of the work life, led into skilled manual trades. As a result, I do not anticipate that this pattern, essentially voluntary downward mobility, will involve especially detrimental effects for those experiencing it.

In the next two chapters I turn to some findings from the Work and Leisure Study and the Mobility Sample about the consequences of social mobility in British society. It is usual practice, following a review of this nature, to attempt a synthesis of existing theory and research and from this to formulate definite hypotheses. However, the paucity of British empirical research and the lack of theoretical and empirical consensus in the United States where research has been done, makes such a task, at this point, futile. Rather, the main question in the next two chapters is whether social mobility in Britain is significantly related regardless of direction, to various social phenomena which have been studied elsewhere (mainly in the United States). Aside from the usual distinction between upward and downward mobility and middle-class and working-class non-mobility, I also follow Hopper (1971b) in attempting to distinguish between upward mobility and middle-class non-mobility which occurs through two basic routes: a grammar school or private school route and a non-grammar (secondary modern or equivalent) route.
CHAPTER 10

THE CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL MOBILITY (2)

In the last chapter, by way of an introduction to a study of the consequences of social mobility in Britain, I discussed the major perspectives which have been advanced in the sociological literature. Now I wish to present some findings from the Work and Leisure Study and the Mobility Sample which might provide indications of whether middle-mass social mobility has disruptive consequences for the individuals experiencing it. In particular, I look at four variables—two of which are attitudinal and two of which are behavioural—that are assumed to be manifestations of the dissociation or malintegration postulated as arising from the experience of social mobility. These are (1) anomia; (2) prejudice; (3) social isolation; and (4) social participation.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Sociological writings on the consequences of social mobility have as we saw in Chapter 9 tended to emphasize the detrimental effects of changing social class. The implication is that to leave one's class of origin is also to leave behind its standards, values and social support and that once severed, these are not easily supplanted by those of other classes which the mobile person objectively enters or attempts to enter. In general, then, the consequences of social mobility are couched in images similar to MacIver's (1950) definition of 'anomy', or 'anomia' as it is more commonly called.  

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1 Although the literature is far from consistent, the term anomie has generally been used to refer to the condition of a society and anomia to the condition of an individual. 'Anomy' is, as Merton observes, an obsolete spelling of the word.
(It) signifies the state of mind of one who has no longer any standards but only disconnected urges, who has no longer any sense of continuity, of folk, of obligation. . . . Anomy is a state of mind in which the individual's sense of social cohesion—the mainspring of his morale—is broken or fatally weakened (Quoted in Merton, 1957).

Durkheim, however, developed the concept of anomie to refer specifically to a property of the society and not, as MacIver does, to a property of individuals (Merton, 1957: 215). As his study of suicide suggests, he was, nevertheless, concerned with the reaction of individuals to anomic conditions (Finifter, 1972: 55). Principally, these conditions are seen as the outcome of rapid economic and social change, shifts as likely to thrust people abruptly upwards in social and economic position as they are to plunge them downwards through sudden and involuntary declassification (Durkheim, 1897: 252). Once the social constraints—the values, norms and sanctions—are undermined, the individual is left with no clear-cut rules defining his place and role in society. In Steven Lukes' words, 'anomic man is, for Durkheim, the unregulated man who needs rules to live by, limits to his desires, "circumscribed tasks" to perform and "limited horizons" for his thoughts' (Lukes, 1972: 25).

I suggested in Chapter 9 that there is increasing recognition that the impact of social mobility may differ with the structural, cultural and institutional contexts in which it occurs. To the extent that social mobility may be considered as a source of anomia, it follows that one would expect its intensity to vary both with the pattern of mobility and

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2 Anomia and the related concept, alienation, have become intertwined, perhaps inextricably, in the sociological literature. In Seeman's (1959) schema, anomia or normlessness is treated as one of five dimensions of alienation. In his later work (Seeman, 1972, for example) the term anomia is used interchangeably with alienation. Nettler (1957) also holds a similar view. However, for a useful attempt to distinguish between the two concepts, see Lukes (1972).
non-mobility and with the social context. Otherwise, one would be dealing simply with a chronic and general condition either of modern industrial society, or perhaps of the human condition, generally.

Following Hopper (1971a and 1971b), it is plausible to hypothesize that to the extent anomia and related phenomena are induced by social mobility, these consequences will be more intense for men upwardly mobile through a non-grammar school route than for men upwardly mobile through a grammar or public school route. Similarly, for reasons suggested by Blau (1956), it is anticipated that the downwardly mobile would under most conditions be more anomie and more likely to exhibit anomie-related attitudes and behaviour than the non-mobile and the upwardly mobile.

**SOCIAL MOBILITY AND ANOMIA**

The measure of anomia administered to all respondents in the Mobility Sample was the widely used instrument devised by Srole (1956). Whereas for Durkheim anomie was a social condition, Srole was interested in tapping...

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3 The evidence is scanty. However, see Tumin et al (1959), Meier and Bell (1959), Wilensky (1966), Simpson (1970), Kessin (1971), which suggests that in the United States there is in varying degrees a relationship between social mobility and anomia. Generally, though, the mobile tend to straddle their class of origin and destination suggesting the acculturative hypothesis rather than the dissociative hypothesis. To my knowledge the relationship between social mobility and anomia has not been tested in Britain.

4 Some have, of course, taken this view. For example, Luckmann and Berger (1964), cited in Chapter 9, argue that the general emphasis on status and status seeking in industrial societies, creates a loss of identity and of social integration. I believe, however, that it is useful to consider anomie at a lower level of generality, at what might be considered a middle-range level of conceptualization. As Merton (1957: 217) suggests, there is merit in searching out patterned sources of a high or 'acute' degree of anomie, compared to 'simple' anomie, which may be endemic to all societies. For a related attempt to locate factors intensifying alienation, see Blauner (1964). An insightful analysis of levels of generality in the study and conceptualization of anomie and alienation, is found in Lukes (1972).
ping the malintegration of individuals. In his words, 'the immediate analytical objective would be to place individuals on a eunomia-anomia continuum representing variations in interpersonal integration with their particular social fields as "global" entities' (P. 61). The scale, consisting of five items, attempts to tap five different components of the general phenomenon of malintegration or 'self-to-others alienation', as Srole at one point calls it. These statements refer to (1) the individual's perceptions of the social order as essentially fickle, unpredictable and without order; (2) the individual's sense of powerlessness because of the indifference of community leaders to his needs; (3) the individual's view that life-goals are receding rather than being realized; (4) 'the deflation or loss of internalized social norms and values, reflected in the individual's sense of the meaninglessness of life itself' (P. 63); and, finally, (5) the individual's feeling that his immediate social network is no longer predictable or psychologically and socially supportive.\(^5\)

Table 10.1 (third column) presents the proportion of men who either agreed or strongly agreed with each of the five statements of the Srole anomia test as well as the average percentage agreeing or disagreeing with the items. In all, nearly two-fifths of the men can, on the basis of this scale, be considered as evidencing signs of anomia. From item to item, however, there are sizeable differences in the proportion expressing agreement. Thus, over half of the men believe that the social order is unpredictable and that they are essentially powerless to influence community leaders. At the same time, very few (15 percent) agree with item 3, which Srole suggests taps the component closest to Durkheim's definition of anomie, as a sense of the meaninglessness of life.\(^6\) It

\(^5\) For the precise statements, see Table 10.5. Item 3 has, following Tumin et al (1959), been made into a positive statement to reduce a possible 'halo' effect of five negative statements one after another.

\(^6\) It is of interest to compare these proportions with those reported by Seeman (1972) for France and the United States.
can also be seen in Table 10.1 that level of anomia is inversely related to social class. Thus, on three of the five items working-class respondents are significantly more likely to agree with the statement than are middle-class respondents. There is also a significant difference between working- and middle-class respondents in percent agreeing with all of the items.

**TABLE 10.1**

PERCENT ANOMIC (AGREETING OR STRONGLY AGREEING) FOR THE FIVE ITEMS OF THE SROLE ANOMIA SCALE BY RESPONDENT'S PRESENT CLASS: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 110)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Middle Class (N = 65)</th>
<th>Working Class (n = 45)</th>
<th>Total Sample (N = 110)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. There's little use in trying to influence the authorities these days because often they aren't interested in the problems of the average man.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. In spite of what some people say, the situation for the average man is getting better all the time.**</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world today, with the way things look for the future</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. These days a person doesn't know whom he can count on</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Percentage:</strong></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests of Significance: (Differences of proportions (Blalock, 1960: 176-178) test):

- Item 1: N.S.
- Item 2: \( P < .001 \)
- Item 3: N.S.
- Item 4: \( P < .001 \)
- Item 5: \( P < .05 \)
- Average: \( P < .05 \)

* There were seven inadequate responses.

** Figures given are percent disagreeing with this statement. It was reversed to reduce possible 'halo. effects.

The relationship between level of anomia and the four basic patterns
of mobility and non-mobility is not as clear-cut as when present social class was considered (Table 10.2).

TABLE 10.2

PERCENT ANOMIC (AGREEING OR STRONGLY AGREEING) FOR THE FIVE ITEMS OF THE SROLE ANOMIA SCALE BY PATTERN OF CONVENTIONAL MOBILITY: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 110)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Srole Items**</th>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item 1</td>
<td>Upward Non-Manual</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>81%*</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 2</td>
<td>Downward Manual</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 3***</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N's</td>
<td></td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(110)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests of Significance: Comparing average for all items. (Difference of Proportions (Blalock, 1960: 176-178).)

1 X 2: N.S. 2 X 3: N.S.  * Significant: P < .05
1 X 3: P < .02 2 X 4: N.S.
1 X 4: N.S. 3 X 4: N.S.

* There were seven inadequate responses.

** See Table 10.1 for wording of items.

*** Figures refer to percent disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with this statement.

Looking first at downward mobility, the proportions agreeing with each of the items are generally in the direction predicted by the hypothesis. That is, that they are more anomie than either their class of origin or class of destination. However, only with respect to items 1 and 2 do these differences reach statistical significance. Overall, as the bot-
tom panel of Table 10.1 shows, the downwardly mobile, though more anomic than any other group, do not differ sufficiently for it to be said that this is not a finding due simply to sampling fluctuation or chance. In particular, the general similarity of this group to the stable manual group suggests that moving downwards in the occupational hierarchy puts people into a social context not dissimilar to that experienced by stable working-class people.

The one exception is the comparison between the downwardly mobile and the upwardly mobile: the latter emerge as significantly lower in anomia than the former. Again, while it cannot be said that the upwardly mobile are significantly lower in level of anomia than the two stable groups, the proportions agreeing with each item (except number 3) and agreeing with all five items are smaller than the comparable figures for the stable non-manual or stable manual groups. Taken at face-value, then, these figures are in the opposite direction to either a dissociative or acculturative hypothesis. With the former, the upwardly mobile are expected to be more anomic than their class of destination and perhaps class of origin as well. The acculturative hypothesis leads one to expect them to be less anomie than their class of origin and more anomie than their class of destination. Instead, Table 10.2 suggests that generally conventional social mobility does not distinguish who are the anomie and who are not.

A second measure of mobility anticipated as being of interest, is based on the respondent's assessment of his class mobility or non-mobility. The four patterns of this measure, what I call subjective mobility, and proportion anomie are presented in Table 10.3. First, com-

7 This measure is discussed more fully in Chapter 12. In the Work and Leisure Study we asked everyone whether they thought they belonged to the middle class or the working class. In reinterviewing the men in
### TABLE 10.3

**PERCENT ANOMIC (AGREEING OR STRONGLY AGREEING) FOR THE FIVE ITEMS OF THE SROLE ANOMIA SCALE BY PATTERN OF SUBJECTIVE MOBILITY:** MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 106)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Srole Items**</th>
<th>Pattern of Subjective Mobility</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stabile</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Downward</td>
<td>Working</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upward</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Downward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 3***</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N's</td>
<td></td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**
* There were 11 inadequate responses to one or both variables.
** See Table 10.1 for wording of items.
*** Figures refer to percent disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with this statement.

Comparing this table with the two preceding ones it can be seen that there is some disagreement between the way individuals assess the class of themselves and their fathers and the way our 'objective' measure places them. Details of this discrepancy will be considered in Chapter 12.

The main finding to be noted here is that neither self-assigned class or subjective mobility are variables distinguishing those who are anomie from those who are not. Whereas Table 10.1 indicated a significantly lower level of anomia among men in middle-class positions than among the Mobility Sample, I asked in which of the two classes men felt their father (and mother) belonged. Hence, upward mobility refers to men who assigned themselves to the middle class and their fathers to the working class, and so on. Some data on mothers' social class were presented in Chapter 7.
men in working-class positions, the data of Table 10.3 suggest little or no difference when class position is subjectively determined (38 percent versus 42 percent agreeing with all five items for middle class and working class, respectively). Similarly, there is no evidence that men who see themselves in a different class from their father, be it higher or lower, are more or less likely to be high in anomia as measured by this instrument.  

Finally, it can be noted that educational route did not distinguish level of anomia. The average percentage for men who moved upwards and who attended a grammar school was 28 percent compared to 25 percent for men who did not attend a grammar school. Similarly, among the stable non-manual group a grammar school or public school route resulted in 39 percent anomie compared to 33 percent for men not using a grammar school route. These differences, both in a direction opposite to that hypothesized, are not, however, statistically significant.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this first analysis is that while there are class differences in level of anomia, the experience of mobility seems to have the main effect of placing the individual in a less or more anomie context, depending on whether he moves up or down. On the basis of this evidence it cannot be said that social mobility per se contributes to feelings of meaninglessness and normlessness.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND PREJUDICE

One of Srole's purposes in devising the anomia scale was to determine which of two scales—the anomia scale or an authoritarian scale—

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8 While in Table 10.3 the subjectively downwardly mobile are more anomie than other groups, the base is small and percentages are, accordingly, unstable. Differences between the downwardly mobile and the other three groups do not reach statistical significance.

9 There are also very little differences in level of anomia between men who experience high upward or downward mobility and those who experienced low upward or downward mobility.
was more strongly related to prejudice. On the basis of his Springfield data, Srole concluded that anomia was the most important. Because of this relationship and because social mobility has been frequently linked to prejudiced attitudes it is of interest whether the socially mobile are more or less prejudiced than their non-mobile counterparts. Before presenting my findings I first consider those discussed in previous research.

The idea that social mobility might be linked to prejudice goes back to the 1950's. Among the first to investigate this and to posit a theoretical connection were Bettelheim and Janowitz (1950), who found that both downward mobility and extreme upward mobility were related to prejudice beyond the norms of the sample as a whole. This study was replicated and elaborated by Greenblum and Pearlin (1953), who also included a subjective measure of social mobility in their analysis. In general, they found that the upwardly mobile were more prejudiced than the stable respondents of their destination class. In turn, the downwardly mobile were found to be more prejudiced than stable manual respondents. Both studies are premised on the theory that heightened status insecurity leads to heightened prejudice. For mobile people, Greenblum and Pearlin (1953: 488) argue:

... prejudiced attitudes as yielded by our findings have a functional significance. They function as attitudinal props, to maintain at higher levels the subjectively felt diminishing prestige of groups objectively descending in the social status ladder ... In the case of groups objectively rising in social status, such attitudes function to enhance and secure their newly-won prestige which they subjectively feel to be raised but find threatened or unstable.

Srole found a correlation of +.43 between prejudice and anomia, compared with +.29 between authoritarianism and prejudice. For a review of subsequent research and theory on the relative power of these two concepts to predict prejudice, see Lutterman and Middleton (1970). In the Mobility Sample I found a rank correlation of $Tc = .21$ (Kendall's Tau). When the two variables are dichotomized $C = .18; \chi^2 = 3.963; P < .05$. 

---

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In a somewhat more sophisticated study, Silberstein and Seeman (1959) attempted to test the basic social-psychological explanation which had been advanced in these two earlier studies. Instead of hypothesizing that upward and downward mobility are, of themselves, productive of prejudice, they suggest it will also depend on the individual's attitude towards mobility. Thus, their research showed that mobility alone did not predict either Negro or Jewish prejudice. When the sample was divided into those who were mobility oriented and those who were achievement oriented, however, it was found that all groups who were status conscious had higher prejudice scores. The greatest prejudice was among the downwardly mobile who were high in mobility orientation. That is, those who stressed the importance of status and yet had, objectively, lost status were found to be the most prejudiced. As the authors suggest, 'the interpretation of this is that being high in status needs and finding no satisfaction in their occupational world, (the downwardly mobile) who are mobility oriented maximize other avenues of status satisfaction, and in this case they achieve it through the relative downgrading of minorities' (P. 264).

In attempting to replicate these findings with Swedish data, Seeman, Rohan and Argeriou (1966) were unsuccessful. A modification of the scale already used by Silberstein and Seeman (1959) was administered to 558 men in Malmo, Sweden. As in the previous study, the sample was also split into those who were 'mobility' or 'status' oriented and those who were not. The results were largely negative: there were no significant or consistent differences between the downwardly mobile and the stationary manual and between the upwardly mobile and the stable non-manual. Similarly, Tumin and Collins (1959), in yet another investigation of prejudice and social mobility, looked at what they call 'readiness for desegre-
gation'. They found that the most ready for desegregation were the high stationaries followed by upward mobiles, downward mobiles and low stationaries. There was, however, little difference between the latter three groups—differences between the low stationaries and downward mobiles were not statistically significant.

In what has emerged as an extremely important paper for the study of consequences of social mobility, Hodge and Treiman (1966) reanalysed the data of the Greenblum and Pearlin study, the Silberstein and Seeman Study and presented some additional findings from a 1963 American national sample. All of the data were examined within the context of two competing hypotheses, what they call additive and interaction models. The first is premised on the view that 'individuals form their attitudes by striking a kind of average between the views appropriate to their class of origin and the views appropriate to their class of destination'. The latter, the more historical of the two, suggests mobility has an effect beyond that which is based on the fact of the mobile having two separate statuses. The results, which they confine to Negro intolerance, are that while the upwardly and downwardly mobile are more prejudiced than the stable manual, they concluded that their data 'do not at all support the idea that mobility per se is a source of prejudice: the upwardly and downwardly mobile are more prejudiced than stable persons, but one would expect that to be true just from a knowledge of their average place of origin and point of destination' (P. 102). Their analysis seriously undermines the theoretical and empirical linkage which had been established between mobility and prejudice. Instead of the

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11 The additive model is what was described in Chapter 9 as the acculturation hypothesis. The interaction model is similar to what I called the dissociative hypothesis in the same chapter.
dissociative hypothesis on which that linkage had been based, their research suggests that the acculturation hypothesis is the more plausible interpretation:

In sum, it seems fair to conclude that the evidence supporting the theory of personal and social control is at best tenuous, while that supporting the notions derived from a consideration of competition between groups for status and socialization practices is more substantial.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND PREJUDICE IN BRITAIN

There is very little evidence available in Britain about the relationship of social mobility to prejudice. One of the most comprehensive studies of colour prejudice was that carried out by the Institute of Race Relations (Rose et al, 1968). In their survey of attitudes, the incidence of prejudice was related to a variety of social and demographic characteristics with distributions not very different than those found for the sample in its entirety (P. 553). Nor were they able to find evidence that social mobility was significantly related to prejudiced attitudes. Their sample was, however, divided into only three categories: upward, downward and stable. Mobility was defined as intergenerational movement one or more social classes whether this involved crossing the manual-non-manual line or not. On the basis of their measure of mobility, the upwardly mobile were found to be slightly more prejudiced than those who had fallen in the social scale. Nevertheless, the authors conclude that 'the attitudes of these people . . . were not strikingly different in general outline from those of the rest of the sample' (P. 561).

Since their measure of social mobility differed from the one used in this study and because the stable group were not divided, it is useful, notwithstanding this conclusion, to reinvestigate the relationship of social mobility and prejudice. In order to do so, I used a modified
version of the four questions used to form the Tolerant-Prejudice Scale. I did so because of limited resources available to pilot adequately a new set of questions, and because of the obvious empirical anchorage provided by this much larger survey.

### TABLE 10.4

**INCIDENCE OF PREJUDICE AGAINST IMMIGRANTS: MOBILITY SAMPLE**

(N = 116)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Prejudice</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant Inclined</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice Inclined</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudiced</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.4 shows that nearly one-half of the men in the Mobility Sample indicated no overt hostility or prejudice and another 11 percent were inclined towards tolerance. Thus, in only about one-fifth of the interviews was I able to detect sufficient hostility so as to code the respondent as 'prejudiced'. In short, the distribution of responses in the Mobility Sample, though only roughly similar to those reported in

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The specific questions are given in Appendix 4, numbers 88-91. These differ from those administered in the 'Survey of Race Relations' (Rose et al, 1968: 790-791) in the following ways: (1) Instead of mentioning specific ethnic groups, I simply referred to 'immigrants'; (2) The question about whether the authorities should let or refuse to let a council house or flat to a coloured person was deleted in favour of one asking about immigration laws and whether they should be tightened (question #88). The method and technique of scaling was identical to that described in Appendix VII.3 of the Rose et al study. For example, respondents who in answering question #89 (Appendix 4) would avoid having coloured immigrants as neighbours and who would still object even if they were professional people, were given a score of 15. Following Rose et al (1968: 552), the resulting numerical scale divided respondents into four categories:

- **Tolerant:** those respondents who gave non-hostile answers on all 4 questions.
- **Tolerant-inclined:** those who gave only 1 hostile reply.
- **Prejudice-inclined:** Those who gave two hostile replies on the four questions.
- **Prejudiced:** those who gave 3 or 4 hostile replies.
Colour and Citizenship (Table 28.1: P. 553), do not suggest that there is a great deal of outright prejudice in the British population. 13

Colour, as many were quick to point out, was not the major issue. Rather, the most frequently mentioned objection to immigrants centered around the dual problems of overpopulation and the threat to the British way of life. Many were, for example, adamant that no more coloured people should be allowed into Britain, but they were equally adamant that the door be closed to others as well; 'this is a very small island', warned many. Coupled with this was the fear looming large in many people's minds for the future of the British way of life, if there were to be large groups who, in their view, were unwilling or unable to change their customs and habits. Over and over there was the repeated question about why immigrants cannot conform. A few also put emphasis on the self-fulfilling prophecy that immigrants lower property values. 'Shore', said Mr. Terry, somewhat inconsistently, 'I'd try to keep them out because it would lower the property values. But at the same time, I'd sell to a black because I know I could get a higher price'. Others, reflecting perhaps the British distrust of written-down laws, seemed more concerned with the legislation than with the actual presence of immigrants next door or in the country at large.

It is, of course, impossible to assess the extent to which what people stated were 'rationalizations' constructed for their own or my benefit. Nor are attitudes the same thing as behaviour, an observation which cuts both ways. Some, no doubt among those coded as tolerant, would act very differently if faced with a coloured neighbour or work mate or some other similar situation. By the same token, the friendly

13 The exact figures given by Rose et al (1968: 553) are respectively, 35%, 38%, 17% and 10% for each of the levels of prejudice shown in Table 10.1.
demeanor and personality of some men who did express hostile attitudes made me wonder whether they practiced what they advocated. The main themes, then, centered around problems of overpopulation, threats to British culture, property values and the general dislike by most British of laws which purport to tell them what they can and cannot feel and do. But it should be stressed that unconditional hostility was rare; negative statements were usually hedged by qualifications. Nor was I able to detect much sense of these immigrant groups serving as scapegoats on which to pin personal or social malaises which some no doubt felt and were experiencing. Finally, as I describe later, excepting stable middle-class men, concern about status did not seem to be related to negative attitudes about immigrants. One indication of this is that only about eight percent were prepared to say that 'on the whole, the majority of coloured people in Britain were inferior to themselves', and to give as the reason a totally colour-related reason; many answered that some were superior, some inferior, and some equal while others observed that in terms of education most were inferior both to themselves and to the majority of British people.

CLASS, MOBILITY AND PREJUDICE

Consistent with other studies, (see Hodge and Treiman, 1966) level of prejudice is in the Mobility Sample inversely related to social class. That is, that the higher the social class, the less likely were people to express prejudiced attitudes. This can be seen in Table 10.5 where middle-class respondents are shown to be less likely to be prejudiced and more likely to be tolerant than are working-class respondents.\(^\text{14}\)

There is little or no difference between the classes with respect to the two middle categories--those inclined towards tolerance or prejudice.

\(^{14}\)Since it was anticipated that prejudice and class would be inversely related, I have used a 1-tailed test in calculating level of significance.
### TABLE 10.5

**LEVEL OF PREJUDICE AND SOCIAL CLASS: MOBILITY SAMPLE**

(N = 116) (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present Social Class</th>
<th>Tolerant</th>
<th>Tolerant inclined</th>
<th>Prejudice inclined</th>
<th>Prejudiced</th>
<th>Total (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>(48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X² = 3.228; P < .05 (using a 1-tailed test; 1df) comparing Tolerant with those exhibiting some degree of prejudice.

As a result, the overall chi-square value for the table does not reach statistical significance (X² = 4.591; N.S.; 3df--1-tailed test).

Turning next to the relationship of social mobility to level of prejudice, Table 10.6 suggests that, with one exception, differences between the four mobility groups are trivial and unpatterned. The exception is the upwardly mobile group which, in contradiction to theoretical views, emerges as the most likely to be tolerant. However, as the tests of significance for Table 10.6 show, the only significant difference is between the upwardly mobile and their class of origin. On the whole, then, the four groups tend to resemble one another in extent of prejudice much more than they differ, even considering percentage differences.

Of particular interest is that there is no indication that downward mobility is a source of prejudiced attitudes. In Table 10.6 those defined as downwardly mobile do not differ significantly from the other three groups. These results are not entirely surprising since as I have described in previous chapters, those who, objectively, have moved downwards did not appear to have been involved in an experience likely to have engendered any patterned feelings of subjective deprivation or status insecurity of the kind described by Greenblum and Pearlin (1953).
TABLE 10.6

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND LEVEL OF PREJUDICE:

MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 116) (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>(1) Upward</th>
<th>(2) Stable Non-Manual</th>
<th>(3) Downward</th>
<th>(4) Stable Manual</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant inclined</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice inclined</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudiced</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests of significance (comparing Tolerant with those exhibiting some degree of prejudice):

1 X 2: $X^2 = 1.100$; N.S.  
2 X 3: $X^2 = .001$; N.S.  
1 X 3: $X^2 = 1.100$; N.S.  
2 X 4: $X^2 = 1.202$; N.S.  
1 X 4: $X^2 = 5.248$; $P < .05$  
3 X 4: $X^2 = 1.202$; N.S.

With respect to those who moved upwards, one can only speculate as to reasons for their expressing such a low level of prejudiced attitudes. It may be that unlike men in the other three categories, they are not firmly enough integrated into any class so as to be concerned about their status vis-à-vis other groups. Contrary to most expectations, men who moved upwards did not, compared to stable middle-class men, evince much concern with status or status-related issues. Thus, it was only among those who were more firmly ensconced in the middle class that I encountered a sense of exclusiveness, status anxiety and concern about family background. I have already tried to show some of these differences in Chapter 5, and in Chapter 12 I will describe them further. But, the four questions about immigrants, designed to tap attitudes about prejudice also revealed some of the concern people felt about social status—living in the right kind of neighbourhood, knowing
the right sort of people and maintaining some degree of social distance from those regarded as social inferiors. The result is that status and prejudice tended, for middle-class people, to be intertwined. As Mr. Montgomery, an accountant, pointed out:

Very few are of the same social standard. When you think of immigrants, you think of the mass who are bus conductors, roadsweepers, that sort of thing. On a social scale I wouldn't object to people of the same social scale, but I would object strongly to a West Indian roadsweeper coming and living next door. I'm not sure, really, whether I'm objecting to a roadsweeper or to a coloured roadsweeper. As to professionals, it doesn't really apply, does it? I mean, they aren't professional, are they?

Men who moved upwards in the occupational hierarchy, then, were less concerned about normative aspects of status positions and were also the most likely to be tolerant. Are men who perceive themselves as having gone from working class to middle class also likely to be more tolerant than those who see themselves as stable middle-class? Table 10.7 indicates that this is roughly the case. That is, though differences between the four mobility groups are not statistically significant, those subjectively upwardly mobile are somewhat more tolerant than

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Prejudice</th>
<th>Stable Upward</th>
<th>Stable Middle-Class</th>
<th>Stable Downward</th>
<th>Stable Working-Class</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant and Tolerant Inclined</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudiced and Prejudiced Inclined</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = 106) (Percentages)

Tests of Significance:

1 X 2: $X^2 = 0.819; \text{N.S.}$
1 X 3: $X^2 = 1.649; \text{N.S.}$
1 X 4: $X^2 = 2.209; \text{N.S.}$
other groups. The most striking aspect of Table 10.7, however, is its close resemblance to Table 10.6, which related conventional social mobility and prejudice. Again, no significant relationship between social mobility and prejudice emerges.

Finally, it can be noted that level of prejudice does not differ significantly between the two basic types of educational mobility routes. Thus, men who move upwards with a grammar school or grammar-school-type education were only slightly less likely to be prejudiced than are men who moved upwards, after leaving school at 14 or 15. For men who have remained stable in the middle class, there is, interestingly, no difference in level of prejudice by educational experience.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIAL ISOLATION

Perhaps the most often asserted consequence of social mobility is that it increases social isolation and loneliness. This is particularly so with relationships with kinfolk. Glass (1954: 25), for instance, notes that 'actual movement itself may, save in special circumstances, distort or destroy kinship associations, with possible personal and social deprivation'. Similarly, Stacey (1969: 7) states unequivocally that the mobile 'are characteristically isolated people who are never deeply involved with acquaintances, friends or relatives'. With respect to kinship relations, the traditional argument is based on Parsons' (1943 and 1953) contention that the extended family is incompatible with the

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15 I also attempted to analyse the relationship between prejudice and a combined measure of mobility orientation (The Index of Mobility Orientation was based on four measures, each worth one point and weighted equally. A score of four goes to men who desired their own business, who mentioned promotion or prospects as something desirable in a job, who think promotion is important and who think moving up in the world is important.). There was, however, only a small correlation (Kendall's Tau = +.12) between these variables.
need of an industrial society for social and geographical mobility. In contrast, the isolated nuclear family is seen by Parsons as especially functional for occupational mobility. This is largely because extended family relations are by their nature in conflict with universalistic-achievement norms of industrial societies.

In opposition to this argument is the view that while the classical extended family is antithetical to occupational mobility, a modified version of it is not (Litwak, 1960). One of the main reasons he suggests, is that segregation of friends from relatives is institutionalized in modern societies, a practice made possible by the general anonymity of urban social life. Further, as Sussman (1953) and Bell (1968) show, there continues to be a 'help pattern' at least among middle-class families which does not necessarily interfere with occupational placement. 16

Bell (1968: 182) concludes from his Swansea study that:

... a particularistic kinship ideology may be of great importance for the individual's emotional needs in an industrial society, though in his behaviour he may be completely committed to a universalistic pattern of relationships. Extended family ties become theoretically possible when universalistic and particularistic value systems are not seen as a continuum pervading all social systems but as applicable to different systems of society independently of each other. Extended family aid in the middle class has to do with standard of living and only in unusual circumstances with occupational appointments.

However, some theorists have argued that social mobility will tend to disrupt kinship relations because of the status differences between the mobile and their relatives. Willmott and Young (1960), for example, note that 'When fathers and sons similarly have the same occupation, on farm or in family business of any kind, they have a similar bond, but when they not only have different occupations, but these carry different social status, for many of them the bond becomes a barrier. Men

Data presented in Chapter 8, however, indicate that relatives do play an important role in the occupational sphere as well.
naturally judge each other according to the jobs they hold and are liable to feel uneasy with any close relative who has in the worldly sense succeeded more than they themselves'. Beyond the data they present, there is other evidence and speculation that this is likely to be the case. \[17\] Lemasters (1954), Schneider and Homans (1955), Young and Willmott (1959), Jackson and Marsden (1962), and Stuckert (1963) have all shown that the mobile tend to sever or have severed for them, kinship ties.

The link between social mobility and isolation from friends and acquaintances is equally uncertain. Nevertheless, since Sorokin (1927) the general view has been as Simpson (1970: 1002) put it, that 'if one severs ties with his class of origin, he may never again have meaningful ties with anyone'. Evidence for this general proposition is scanty and comes mainly from investigations of special groups. Studies of business leaders who have been upwardly mobile, for instance, suggest that they tend to be socially isolated (Warner and Abegglen, 1955; Clements, 1958). Ellis (1952) found among her sample of career women evidence of a similar inability to form close personal ties. In a study of lower class students at Stanford, Ellis and Lane (1963) find that they undergo both stressful and isolating experiences. On the basis of this study, the authors conclude that their evidence bears out 'Sorokin's dissociative hypothesis that upward mobility is itself a disruptive social experience which leaves the individual for an appreciable period with roots or effective social support' (P. 237). Although he does not provide evidence, Janowitz (1956) argues that both upward and downward mobility are socially disruptive for primary group structures among which he includes family, work groups

\[17\] Data from the Work and Leisure Study do not support Willmott and Young's (1960) finding that mobile men see less of their parents. With respect both to fathers and mothers, I found the mobile were as likely to have seen their parents in the last week as were the non-mobile.
and friendship cliques. In a similar vein, Blau (1956: 294), while qualifying the situation for the upwardly mobile, maintains that under any circumstances, 'the predicament of the downwardly mobile is that the social conditions of his existence make it . . . likely that he will find himself without close friends'.

However, studies of the relationship of mobility to both kinship and friendship ties have not used consistent measures of social mobility, of involvement, or types of samples. For example, some have been unable to compare their mobile group with a class of origin group (e.g., Ellis and Lane, 1963; Warner and Abegglen, 1955; Jackson and Marsden, 1962). Others (Willmott and Young, 1960; Lemasters, 1954) do not distinguish between high and low status in the non-mobile group. As a result, it is not clear from these studies whether the degree of isolation exhibited by the socially mobile is necessarily caused by social mobility or whether it is simply an aspect of re-acculturation into the behavioural patterns of the destination class. Involvement with kinfolk has generally been found to be inversely related to social class while friendship involvement is directly related to social class. The acculturation hypothesis would therefore predict that the upwardly mobile would have a stronger involvement with kinfolk than stable middle-class members and a lower level of involvement than working-class members of their class of origin. The downwardly mobile, assuming no mobility effect, would similarly be intermediate between the pattern of their class of origin and class of destination. The plausibility of this hypothesis is suggested by findings in two studies (Litwak, 1960; Aiken and Goldberg, 1969), both of which show that social mobility has no depressing effect on visiting with kin. While one would expect that studies of friendship patterns would also find the socially mobile intermediate between the two stable
groups, there is to my knowledge none which have investigated the effect of mobility on visiting with friends.

Some data from the Work and Leisure Study allow a test of whether social mobility is an isolating experience. In the first round of interviewing respondents were asked, first of all, how many relatives they had seen in the last week and secondly, the occupation of the last one seen. A similar set of questions were put concerning the number of friends seen in the last week. I begin with an examination of what these questions tell us about level of involvement with friends.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND FRIENDSHIP RELATIONSHIP

In the pilot stage and in the main interviewing for the Work and Leisure Study we encountered a striking number of people who claimed to have no friends and to have seen no one in the week preceding our interview. This was, of course, more often true of older people than of younger people, but at all ages, there was an impression of people 'keeping to themselves', or 'staying out of one another's pocket' as many people liked to put it. The final data from the Work and Leisure Study tend to confirm this impression. For example, some 23 percent of the men said they had not seen a friend socially in the last week either inside or outside their home and nearly three-fifths had seen five or less people socially in the last week. This did not mean that the respondent had necessarily interacted with no one at all. People encountered at work, for instance, were not counted unless the interaction took place

18 If more than one person was seen at a time, respondents were asked to give the occupation (husband's occupation for married, widowed, separated or divorced women) of the one they felt closest to. This was also done for friends. The findings from these two questions are reported in Chapter 14. For both sets of questions I report only the findings on the men in the Work and Leisure Study.
outside office hours, at lunch or in the pub after work. Also the word friend itself had particular connotations for some. Thus, men who claimed that 'my friend is me wife' had, one suspects, a rather narrower definition of friendship than was implied by the question.

### TABLE 10.8

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NUMBER OF FRIENDS SEEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number Of Friends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Non-Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 or more</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average No. of Friends Seen</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(177)</td>
<td>(182)</td>
<td>(99)</td>
<td>(420)</td>
<td>(878)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests of significance and contingency coefficients (2 df):

1X2: $X^2 = 3.306; C = .99; N.S.$
1X3: $X^2 = .009; C = 0.00; N.S.$
1X4: $X^2 = 26.060; C = .20; P < .001$

2X3: $X^2 = 1.99; C = .08; N.S.$
2X4: $X^2 = 41.204; C = .25; P < .001$
3X4: $X^2 = 16.602; C = .18; P < .001$

* Number of friends seen is based on total responses to three questions: (1) How many friends have you seen in the last week who live within ten minutes walk? (2) How many friends from your work have you met socially in the last week? (3) How many other friends have you met socially in the last week?

Overall, the extent of friendship involvement tends to vary inversely with social class, with middle-class people not only having more contacts with friends but these come from further afield than for working-

---

19 Friends seen in the last week were in the Work and Leisure Study divided into local friends, work friends, and other friends. Separate tabulations of these with conventional social mobility failed to yield any systematic or significant differences by mobility pattern. For details of class and type of friends, see: Young and Willmott (1973: Table 46).
class people (see: Young and Willmott, 1973: 228). What is the effect of social mobility on visiting patterns? Are the socially mobile likely to be more or less isolated than their non-mobile counterparts? Table 10.8 suggests an almost opposite conclusion. While stable working-class men tend to see significantly fewer friends than the stable middle-class group, there is virtually no difference between the upwardly mobile, the stable middle class and the downwardly mobile in number of friends seen in the preceding week. In other words, men who move up shift their pattern of sociability to correspond to that prevalent in the middle class. Downward mobiles, on the other hand, tend to retain the middle-class pattern, rather than to adopt the pattern observed among stable manual men. In all, there is no evidence that social mobility depresses or inhibits relations with friends and acquaintances. 20

| TABLE 10.9 |
| CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NUMBER OF RELATIVES |
| SEEN IN THE LAST WEEK (N = 880): WORK AND LEISURE STUDY |
| (Percentages) |
| Pattern of Conventional Mobility |
| None | 30% | 36% | 26% | 23% | 27% |
| 1 - 4 | 53 | 47 | 48 | 50 | 50 |
| 5 or More | 17 | 17 | 26 | 27 | 23 |
| Totals | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| (178) | (182) | (99) | (421) | (880) |

Tests of Significance and Contingency coefficients (1 df):

1X2: $X^2 = 1.712; C = .07; N.S.$ 2X3: $X^2 = 2.912; C = .10; N.S.$ 1X3: $X^2 = 1.385; C = .00; N.S.$ 2X4: $X^2 = 11.718; C = .14; P < .001$ 1X4: $X^2 = 3.255; C = .07; N.S.$ 3X4: $X^2 = .533; C = .03; N.S.$

20 It should be noted, however, that this measure tells us nothing about the intensity of the friendships each group experiences.
SOCIAL MOBILITY AND CONTACTS WITH KIN

When we turn to the question of kinship relationships, the pattern is slightly clearer, (Table 10.9). There is, again, a statistically significant difference between the stable non-manual and stable manual, but this time it is in the opposite direction. That is, middle-class people are somewhat more likely to state that they have seen no relatives in the past week than are working-class people. The differences are not very great, however, with the result that the socially mobile in falling in-between, do not differ significantly from either origin or destination class. Thus, those moving upwards see fewer relatives than members of their class of origin and more than their destination class. Similarly, men who move downwards see fewer relatives than does their destination class but more than their class of origin. To repeat, these differences are not statistically significant so that the appropriate conclusion is that in this sample of men, social mobility is unrelated to extent of kinship relationships.  

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND PARTICIPATION

In general, then, to the extent these measures are indicative of the extent of interpersonal relationships, the hypothesis that social mobility has the effect of inhibiting social relationships is not supported by these data for the London region. A final measure considered is the extent to which social mobility—upwards or downwards—affects people's participation in activities, both social and non-social, and in secondary organizations.

A principal concern in the Work and Leisure Study was the rela-

---

21I was also unable to find any relationship between educational route and extent of relationships with friends or kinfolk. Similarly, dividing the upwardly and downwardly mobile according to amount of mobility did not produce any differences in numbers of people seen in the previous week.
tionship of various factors—car ownership, hours of work, kind of work, class, age, to name a few—to leisure activities. A series of questions about active and spectator sports, hobbies and entertainments were put to all respondents. On the basis of the general knowledge about class and leisure activities it was anticipated that higher status people would be engaged in a wider variety of activities than lower status people. Beyond this, I wondered at the outset whether social mobility would be a variable having predictive importance in this respect. Following the general theoretical and empirical position of the literature described in this and the last chapter, I anticipated that if mobility does have an effect on level of social integration it would also inhibit involvement in leisure activities.

TABLE 10.10
CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NUMBERS OF ACTIVITIES DONE 12 OR MORE TIMES IN THE LAST YEAR: WORK & LEISURE STUDY
(N = 884) (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>(1) Upward</th>
<th>(2) Stable Non-Manual</th>
<th>(3) Downward Stable Manual</th>
<th>(4) All Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers of Activities</td>
<td>(178)</td>
<td>(182)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(424)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (0-9)</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (10-19)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (20+)</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests of Significance and Contingency coefficients:

1X2: \( X^2 = 1.662; \ C = .07; \) N.S. 2X3: \( X^2 = 1.721; \ C = .08; \) N.S.
1X3: \( X^2 = 5.888; \ C = .14; P < .02 \) 2X4: \( X^2 = 9.096; \ C = .12; P < .01 \)
1X4: \( X^2 = 19.040; \ C = .18; P < .001 \) 3X4: \( X^2 = .970; \ C = .03; \) N.S.

Separate lists of activities for things done within the home and outside were systematically presented to all respondents. For each activity they were asked if they did it, and if so, about how many times in the last year. Activities within the home included such things as television watching, knitting, listening to music, gardening, etc. Activities outside included as well as sports, going out for a meal, attending a play, going to the cinema, taking a walk and so on. Detailed descriptions of these questions are found in Young and Willmott (1973: Appendix 3).
Table 10.10 suggests, instead, that the experience of moving upwards has the opposite effect. Of the four patterns of mobility and non-mobility it is the upward group which has the highest numbers of activities. However, there is only a trivial difference between this group and the stable non-manual group. The result is that in the middle class, social mobility is not a useful predictor of involvement in leisure activities. Whereas the upwardly mobile do differ significantly from their class of origin, the downwardly mobile fall in-between origin and destination class; they do not differ significantly from either the stable manual or the stable non-manual groups.

**TABLE 10.11**

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND PERCENT BELONGING TO ONE OR MORE CLUBS: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY

(N = 877)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Upward</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Stable Non-Manual</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Downward</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Stable Manual</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests of Significance (Difference of Proportions):

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 X 2: P</td>
<td>.10; N.S.</td>
<td>2 X 3: P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 X 3: P</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>2 X 4: P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 X 4: P</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>3 X 4: P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Much the same pattern emerges when we consider membership in clubs and organizations as in Table 10.11. The upwardly mobile tend to be fairly similar to the stable non-manual group but differ significantly from both the downwardly mobile and stable manual. While it could be said that the downward mobility has the effect of reducing membership in clubs, the fact that there is virtually no difference between the two manual groups suggests, rather, that they are simply following the
pattern of their objective class position. In general, then, both the upwardly and downwardly mobile tend to conform to their class of destination. Instead of mobility being deleterious for level of participation, the upwardly mobile are in fact the most likely to belong to at least one club or organization of the four groups.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

The aim in this chapter has been to examine the general hypothesis that social mobility is a disruptive process inhibiting the level of social integration and social support and thereby creating isolation and anxiety. I have looked at the relationship of four kinds of social phenomena which according to previous research and theory are effects of the experience of social mobility: anomia, heightened prejudice against minority groups, social isolation and degree or participation in activities and secondary relationships.

In sum, there is no evidence of personally disruptive consequences following from social mobility. In all four measures, there was a significant difference between middle-class and working-class men. The socially mobile were generally found to be indistinguishable from their destination classes and sometimes from their origin class as well. On most of these measures the downwardly mobile appear to be either acculturated into the new class milieu or are acting as if they were being pulled by both class of origin and destination. While the upwardly mobile were never significantly different from their destination class, the tendency was for them to be less anomie, less prejudiced and to be more active than stable middle-class men. To the extent that these patterns of attitudes and behaviour are indicative of a 'healthy' and integrated personality and social life, there are, it seems, bonuses besides the economic ones, rather than costs, attached to moving upwards
in the occupational hierarchy.

The next chapter examines findings pertaining to the question of whether occupational mobility leads to social mobility in the sense of a change in norms and social relationships.
CHAPTER 11

INDICATORS OF SOCIAL CLASS MOBILITY

The last chapter revealed that there are not strong grounds for pos-
tulating negative or disruptive consequences from social mobility. In-
stead, the mobile demonstrated patterns of attitudes and behaviour gen-
erally similar to those of their new class. In this chapter I examine
two further indicators of the extent to which middle-mass mobility is in
Britain translated into social mobility. Does middle-mass social mobili-
ty lead to changes in the nature of social relationships? Do the social-
ly mobile adopt the standards and outlook of their new objective class
position? Although there were a wide variety of characteristics tapped
in the Work and Leisure Study¹ which might have served as indicators of
re-acculturation, the two which I regarded as especially crucial and of
theoretical interest were voting behaviour and the social class of peo-
ple seen by respondents in the previous week.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR

Much of the research interest in the question of how the mobile are
likely to behave politically comes from the work of Lipset and Bendix

¹For example, fertility and intended fertility were measured in the
Work and Leisure Study. However, as Glass (1968: 118) has pointed out,
class differentials in fertility are rapidly diminishing, a conclusion
in this study as well. Thus, family size or intended family size was so
similar between the classes that it no longer serves as an indicator of
the adoption or failure to adopt destination-class values, norms and be-

behaviour. I also considered patterns of leisure activities. Do the up-
wardly mobile, for instance, watch cricket more than football? However,
these were difficult data to pull out of the Work and Leisure Study, the
numbers for any particular activity were often small and there were fac-
tors such as age and car ownership which transcended and obfuscated class
differences. See Young and Willmott (1973) for a detailed discussion of
class and leisure activities.
(1959). In their review of existing studies, they show that in the United States the upwardly mobile tend to be more conservative than are the members of their destination class. This was in contrast to the situation which existed in Europe (Germany, Finland, Norway and Sweden) where the upwardly mobile were found to remain more radical than their stable middle-class counterparts. For downward mobility the pattern seems to have been more consistent: Lipset and Bendix argue that those who move downwards do not identify with their new class, but rather, tend to be more conservative in terms of political behaviour. As a result, they are, politically, somewhere between the middle class from whence they came and the working class where they now find themselves.

Two separate explanations were advanced to account for these findings. For the upwardly mobile, the explanation was couched in terms of the degree of status rigidity they are likely to encounter. In the United States it is easier for people to bring their social status into a congruent position with their economic status than in most older societies. By contrast, the upwardly mobile in European societies are, they argue, less likely to be fully accepted into the middle class and are therefore more likely to retain ties with their class of origin. In other words, translating occupational mobility into social mobility is more difficult in Europe than in America. One result of this is that while upwardly mobile Americans 'overconform' and become more conservative their European counterparts continue to be more radical or left, at any rate, than the rest of the middle class. For the downwardly mobile, however, the situation is similar in both Europe and America: 'In all countries manual workers coming from middle-class backgrounds should be expected to desire a return to the higher class, and hence should be likely to retain middle-class values and patterns of behaviour' (Lipset
and Bendix, 1959: 69). In one of the few studies which has concentrated on the downwardly mobile, Wilensky and Edwards (1959) provide support for this explanation. They found that the downwardly mobile were more conservative in their beliefs and attitudes than were the stable manual workers in the factory in which their sample was located. This was a finding which, generally speaking, held true whether younger men or older men, intergenerational or work-life mobility was considered. In speculating on these findings for class solidarity they suggest that instead of 'a cadre of creative men of independent mind, released from traditional norms, ready to provide some needed novelty and flexibility' (P. 230), their data picture the 'skidder' as 'optimistic-grateful' rather than 'creative-independent'. To the extent that there is downward mobility in a society, then, collective interests tend to be weakened by individual striving or withdrawal.2

SUBSEQUENT RESEARCH ON UPWARD MOBILITY

The view of differences between the upwardly mobile in the United States and Europe became widely accepted. Tumin (1967: 94), for example, in summarizing some consequences of social mobility states unequivocally that 'In America, persons who move up into the middle class are more conservative than those born into it, whereas in the European countries studies, the latter are more conservative than the former'. Lopreato (1967) was also accepting of this finding though emphasizing that the tendency has been to treat the American case as normal and then seek to explain the European case by reference to the American (P. 587). Along with an analysis of his Italian data he posits an explanation—which Lip-

2Lipset and Gordon (1953) provide similar evidence for downward mobility and trade union membership. See also Janowitz (1956), who makes a similar point to that of Wilensky and Edwards.
set and Bendix had not—for the American case in which the upwardly mobile while emulating the more prestigeful stratum, are also (in America) more likely to emphasize success and achievement. Thus, the more 'excessive' nature of this stress tends to overcome earlier socialization and leads to overconformity.

More recently, however, the basic finding by Lipset and Bendix has been questioned by Thompson (1971) who uses data from six elections extending from 1948 to 1966. In contrast to earlier findings, he found that in none of the elections were the upwardly mobile more conservative than the middle-class stables. When only male respondents were considered, it emerged that on some elections the mobile were more conservative and on others less conservative than the stable middle class. But, when the data for the six elections were aggregated it was found that 'Among American men, upward mobiles tend to be politically indistinguishable from middle-class stables' (P. 229). Upwardly mobile women, by contrast, though bestriding the two stable groups, were found to be closer, generally, to the stable manual group than to their destination class. While not disconfirming these findings, Knoke (1972) has recently shown that the data on American mobility and political behaviour conform, statistically, to an acculturation model of the kind described in Chapter 9. That is, that mobile people act as if they are combining the behavioural patterns of their class of origin and present status. Thus, he discounts the view that the tendency for the mobile to be conservative is due to any effect of social mobility per se. Instead, the political behaviour of the socially mobile is postulated as an outcome not of disruptive effects but of the failure of the occupationally mobile to become fully acculturated.

Much more so than in many European countries, Britain is a two-party
system with fairly consistent class differences in party allegiance. Nevertheless, the fit is far from complete. While about 70 percent of the British population is working-class, the two major parties tend to split the vote nearly in half. As Robert McKenzie has noted, 'massive shifts' to Conservative or Labour usually mean that about 2 percent of the voters shifted allegiance.\(^3\) The extent to which the socially mobile may contribute to the diverse elements in class voting behaviour has not received much attention. Indeed, the one study I was able to find was that of McKenzie and Silver (1968). In what is virtually an aside, they note that 'those (of the working class) who claim to have had middle-class parents are twice as likely as others to vote Conservative . . . However, since only 17 percent\(^4\) described their fathers as middle-class, this circumstance is very far from being a major factor contributing to working-class Conservatism' (P. 97). There is, of course, nothing said in this study about upward social mobility since there were no white-collar workers in their sample.

**THE WORK AND LEISURE STUDY**

As information on voting intention was collected in the Work and Leisure Study, the analysis of mobility and voting behaviour will be based mainly on this larger sample. We asked everyone what party they intended to vote for in the next General Election and after June, 1970, what party they voted for.\(^5\) The results are shown by social class in Table 11.1. The data are in the general direction that one would expect:

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\(^3\) Seminar at L.S.E.

\(^4\) The comparable figure for the Work and Leisure Study sample is 19 percent.

\(^5\) Interviewing for the Work and Leisure Study took place from March, 1970, to September, 1970. It was not known, of course, at the beginning that a General Election would be called.
TABLE 11.1
SOCIAL CLASS AND VOTING INTENTION: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY
(N = 861) (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting Intention</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Won't Vote</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(x^2 = 84.54, \ C = .30; \ P < .001\)

middle-class respondents are about twice as likely to vote Conservative as are working-class respondents. Nevertheless, slightly more than a fifth of the working class are prepared to vote against what have traditionally been viewed as objective class interests while about the same proportion of men are prepared to vote Labour. Looking along the table, it can also be seen that there are only trivial differences in the proportions of each class favouring the Liberal party. In addition, working-class men are somewhat more likely to indicate that they would not vote or that they were unsure. The popular view that inclement weather on an election day tends to favour the Conservative party receives some support when we consider these latter proportions.

HOW DO THE SOCially MOBILE DIFFER?

Voting intentions and patterns of the socially mobile and non-mobile are shown in Table 11.2. The first thing to be noted is that there are systematic and significant differences between the four groups in terms of the proportion voting Conservative and Labour. Looking first of all at the Conservative voters, the order is: stable non-manual; upwardly mobile; downwardly mobile and stable manual. Although the mobile differ
significantly from both their classes of origin and destination, the observed difference in conservatism between the two mobile groups is not significant and, indeed, there is a considerable split in their voting intentions. One indication of this is that when the mobile are removed there is a stronger relationship ($C = .27$ versus $C = .36$) between class and voting than was found in Table 11.1 when the mobile are included.

**TABLE 11.2**

**CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND VOTING INTENTION:**

**WORK AND LEISURE STUDY**
(N = 861) (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Social Mobility</th>
<th>Voting Intention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Upward</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Stable Non-Manual</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Downward</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Stable</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests of Significance (comparing Labour Voters and Conservative voters):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>$X^2$</th>
<th>C $&gt;$</th>
<th>$P$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1X2$</td>
<td>9.803;  C=.18;  $P &lt; .01$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1X3$</td>
<td>2.162;  C=.10;  N.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1X4$</td>
<td>22.776;  C=.22;  $P &lt; .001$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2X3$</td>
<td>17.144;  C=.27;  $P &lt; .001$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2X4$</td>
<td>69.943;  C=.36;  $P &lt; .001$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3X4$</td>
<td>4.556;  C=.11;  $P &lt; .05$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11.2 shows, also, that there is little support for the notion that the mobile are more likely to be politically apathetic than established members of the two broad classes (See: Lipset and Bendix, 1959: 69). Thus, looking further along the table, it can be seen that there are only trivial differences in proportions of each group who indicated
that they were completely undecided or who were not intending to vote at all. Likewise, my data show that while there are some small differences, notably for the downwardly mobile in Liberal voting, these do not reach statistical significance. As a result, the pattern of Labour and Conservative voters are almost mirror images of one another.

How does the mobility route used affect political affiliation? As I have mentioned previously, the Work and Leisure Study did not discriminate between those who attended a grammar school (or 'Public' school) and those who did not. The coding frame only indicates the age at which people completed their full-time education and uses 16 or younger as the lower category. However, the majority of respondents who stayed on past age 61 were in grammar or 'Public' schools. And, though the two experiences cannot be equated, most of the others who stayed on did so in order to take 'O' or 'A' level examinations at a comprehensive school.

**TABLE 11.3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility &amp; Education</th>
<th>Work and Leisure Study (N = 284)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting Intention</td>
<td>Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stable Non-Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(73)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excludes Liberal voters, undecided and Won't Vote categories.

Comments:
- Low education = Finished full-time education at age 16 or less
- High Education = Finished full-time education at age 17 or older

Tests of Significance:
1 X 3: $X^2 = 3.916; C = .15; P < .05
2 X 4: $X^2 = 2.569; C = .12; N.S.
1 X 2: $X^2 = .392; N.S.
3 X 4: $X^2 = .733; N.S.
The expectation was that men who moved upwards through an educational route would be more similar to stable middle-class men in voting behaviour than are men moving upwards through a non-educational route. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 11.3.

Generally, the proportions voting Conservative are in the predicted direction: people with high education are more likely to vote Conservative than are those with low education, whatever their mobility experience. Also, men upwardly mobile and in the low education category differ significantly from both groups of stable non-manual men in percent voting Conservative. In contrast, these in the high education category do not differ significantly from either group of stable non-manual men, suggesting a greater shift in standards and values has taken place. However, amount of education has only a very modest effect on voting intention within both the upwardly mobile group and the stable non-manual group. While this might be the expected result for men stable in the middle class, educational route should, according to the general hypothesis, have had an effect on political preference of men moving upwards. That is, upwardly mobile men high in education should be more fully integrated into the middle class than men mobile with less education. This would, in turn, be reflected in a difference in political allegiance. As Table 11.3 indicates, this is not the case. This weakens, somewhat, a possible conclusion that the kind of mobility route has consequences for the extent of acculturation of the upwardly mobile into their destination class.

Since the measure of school-leaving age available in the Work and Leisure Study used an awkward cutting point, it is useful to consider data from the Mobility Sample where it is possible to separate grammar school from non-grammar school routes. As expected, Table 11.4 provides findings generally congruent with the larger sample. Although we should
TABLE 11.4
CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY, EDUCATIONAL ROUTE AND VOTING INTENTION: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 65) (Whole Number)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility and Type of Education</th>
<th>Upwardly Mobile</th>
<th>Stable Non-Manual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grammar</td>
<td>Non-Grammar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 4.941; \quad C = .33; \quad P < .05 \]

\[ \chi^2 = 4.542; \quad C = .40; \quad P < .05 \]

not put a great deal of store by these figures because of the small frequencies, it does appear that educational route is a significant predictor of voting in the middle class. But, this is true whether men have been intergenerationally mobile or stable in the middle class since grammar and non-grammar school educational routes create significant differences in voting behaviour for both groups of men. As the contingency coefficients suggest, the type of education may in fact have a greater impact on tendency to vote Conservative in the stable non-manual group than in the upwardly mobile group. While these results must be treated tentatively, they do reinforce the notion that in Britain years of education are not as crucial as the type of education.

SUBJECTIVE MOBILITY AND VOTING

So far I have considered two objective variables—occupational change and amount and type of education—and the effect these have on voting behaviour. How people assess their mobility experience I also considered to be of interest. McKenzie and Silver (1968), for instance, found among their working-class subjects that those who called themselves middle-class were far more likely to vote Conservative than those thinking of themselves as working-class (61 percent versus 23 percent). In Table 11.5 the relationship between class assignment, mobility and voting in-
tention is presented. The comparable proportions in the working class
to the McKenzie and Silver data are 68 percent versus 29 percent, respec-
tively.

TABLE 11.5
CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY, SELF-ASCRIBED CLASS
AND VOTING INTENTION: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Mobility &amp; Self-Ascribed Class</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>(100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Totals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-Class</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>(57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-Class</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>(81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Non-Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-Class</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>(106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-Class</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>(41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-Class</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-Class</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>(54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-Class</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>(40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-Class</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>(289)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests of Significance:
Upward: $X^2 = 7.367; C = .22; P < .01$
Stable Non-Manual: $X^2 = 1.018; C = .08; N.S.$
Downward: $X^2 = 6.385; C = .28; P < .01$
Stable Manual: $X^2 = 24.826; C = .26; P < .001$

With one exception, there are significant differences in proportion
voting Labour or Conservative between those identifying themselves with
the middle class and those identifying themselves with the working class.
The one exception is the stable non-manual group in which self-ascribed
class makes very little difference in proportions voting Conservative
or Labour. Of particular interest is the upwardly mobile group. Of the
three which do differ by self-ascribed class, this group has the lowest
contingency coefficient and is also the most divided about which is the
appropriate class with which to identify (41 percent middle class versus
59 percent working class). In short, the confusion the upwardly mobile
appear to feel about their present class position is also reflected in their more divided political affiliations. People who have remained stable in the middle class are less likely to see themselves as working-class and even when they do so, still tend to vote Conservative.

PATTERNS OF SOCIABILITY

As we saw in Chapter 9, there is little evidence in my data that upward or downward social mobility is particularly disruptive to extent of interpersonal relations. While Blau (1956) concluded that mobility would inhibit social integration, he was concerned mainly with the interpersonal dilemma faced by the socially mobile. In his view the major decision for the mobile individual is whether to retain or sever ties with members of one's class of origin. If he chooses the former alternative it is unlikely that upward occupational mobility will be successfully translated into social mobility. Severing ties, on the other hand, has its own set of problems. These may include guilt about abandoning former friends, associated and perhaps kinfolk. In the process of making new friends the mobile individual may be accused by former ones of 'putting on airs', of becoming 'toffee-nosed' as he begins to adopt the ways of the new class. Nor, unfortunately, is there any guarantee that he will be accepted by higher-status people. For the downwardly mobile, Blau (1956) believes relational shifts may bring home to the individual his objective class position, a scarcely comfortable realization. If

6 Self-ascribed class is described more fully in the next chapter. It might also be noted at this point, however, that there is a high degree of agreement between objective class and self-ascribed class. Hence, self-ascribed class is only slightly better as a predictor of voting intention, than is objective class. For example, when class (either ascribed or objective) is tabulated with Labour and Conservative voters, the contingency coefficients are $C = .32$ (for ascribed class) and $C = .28$ (for objective class).

7 For example, see Tumin (1957).
he attempts to retain former ties, he may find that because of his lowered economic status he is unable to maintain a similar lifestyle as these friends. Further, he exposes himself to the constant stress of the inevitable invidious comparisons between their status and his.

Social mobility, however, is usually a gradual process in which things like additional education, promotion and economic rises create changes, but seldom overnight. People drift apart as a result of these and other changes, certainly, but is this necessarily unique to the socially mobile? Is there mentally or physically a point where the dilemmas posed by Blau actually occurs? My initial impression was that there is not.

Nevertheless, with these questions in mind, I enquired during the interview about changes in friendship and kinship relations. On the whole, these were not very successful. Most of the men, whatever their mobility experience, felt that they had changed friends as various things happened to them over the course of their life. Some of the younger men were, of course, still living at home and had kept the same group of friends as they had known in school, but generally there was little evidence in what people said, of abrupt transitions in friendship patterns. The exception was young men who had been upwardly mobile and who had attended a grammar school. For these men the school had forced upon them a shift in relationships. This was also the only group who mentioned either spontaneously or as a result of my further 'probes', that their change in social class was a factor. Some comments were:

Most of my close friends went to grammar school. One or two didn't, they passed the other way, so to speak. Of course, they naturally ceased to be in one's social sphere because you cultivate your friends in school (Trainee Manager).

Things did get a bit rough for awhile, with my family and my brother and the kids we grew up with when we were first separated at school. Really, in a sense, there's a class thing. I was suddenly moving with wealthier,
perhaps more intelligent kids, and they were staying with the secondary (modern) level. I perhaps thought I was a bit better than them for a bit. My brother and I never had a bad relationship, but we grew apart for several years. (Computer Programmer).

Mr. Chapman, an industrial chemist, had found himself between two classes as a result of going to a grammar school. He said:

Coming from a council estate like this one meant that socially I was way down the ladder at grammar school. I was a bit of a loner through most of grammar school. I didn't run around with anyone on the estate and I couldn't get on with the people at school. I was in the top stream and they were all a bit snobby and a bit too wrapped up in things I didn't know too much about.

Mr. Howarth, who also attended grammar and is now a post-office engineer, related a similar experience:

I didn't really get along with the school. I just didn't enjoy it. Not many people from our end went there and I found myself with sort of two groups of friends.

Now, a lot of my friends, they come from areas like the Angel. Most of them come from working-class families and have done what I did, go to a grammar school. There's a few come from higher classes, but I sort of get on better with those from working-class families. These are the ones who you make friends.

But, overall, I was unable with my questions to detect much about social networks of my respondents and how they might have changed. While people were keen to talk about themselves and sometimes their families, they were reticent and vague when attention turned to their friends and associates. With respect to relatives, people were only somewhat more forthcoming. I asked in a general way about relationships between the respondent, his parents and kinfolk. Where it was appropriate or relevant I raised the issue of whether their different economic and social positions had had any noticeable effect. Most, over 80 percent, felt they had remained 'close' to their parents rather than 'drifting apart'.

Mr. Lawson, a headmaster, was very much an exception. He said in answer to my general question:

Most of my mother's relative became sort of middle-class, but my father's relatives were very working-class, and weren't very close anyway. My
wife's relatives: one owned a sawmill, one owned a garage and a cousin became a teacher. But my sisters and their husbands remained what one would call working-class. I haven't actually lost touch. We frequently visit them and them me, but we're not the same. Even when I was little it was a question of higher intelligence, really. It sounds priggish saying so, but they were about average intelligence and consequently, our interests diverged. I suppose the army, seven years away, was the finishing touch.

**FRIENDS' AND RELATIVES' SOCIAL CLASS**

More informative than data from the Mobility Sample about social mobility and patterns of sociability are two questions asked in the Work and Leisure Study: (1) the social class (occupation) of the last friend seen and (2) the social class (occupation) of the last relative seen. Such data do not, of course, provide a full picture of the networks in which people are involved and tells nothing at all about the proportions of social contacts which are based around the class of origin or around the class of destination. Nevertheless, these data do provide indication of the way the class composition of social networks might vary by mobility pattern.

The relationship of social mobility and friends' social class is shown in Table 11.6. It appears from this table that the mobile have in making an economic shift, also generally, made a relational shift as well. Whereas over three-quarters of the stable non-manual men have last seen a middle-class friend, two thirds of the upwardly mobile men have done so. The nine percent difference between the two groups is not statistically significant, suggesting mobility in the middle class does not differ from non-mobility in the class nature of friends. In contrast to those moving upwards, the downwardly mobile are only half as likely to have seen a middle-class friend and, indeed, do not differ sig-

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8 Where respondents had seen more than one person at a time, they were asked to give the occupation of the one they felt closest to.
nificantly from the stable manual group of men in this measure. To the extent, then, that this finding can be treated as an indicator of acculturation, the conclusion to be drawn is that even in the middle mass, occupational mobility does involve relational discontinuity, to use Goldthorpe and Hope's (1972) terminology, followed by a re-acculturation or re-integration into the new class.

**TABLE 11.6**

**CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIAL CLASS OF LAST FRIEND SEEN IN PREVIOUS WEEK: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY**

(N = 731) (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Social Mobility</th>
<th>Friends' Social Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Upward</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Stable Non-Manual</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Downward</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Stable Manual</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
1 \times 2: X^2 = 3.034; \quad \text{N.S.}
\]

\[
1 \times 3: X^2 = 24.329; \quad P < .001
\]

\[
1 \times 4: X^2 = 98.664; \quad P < .001
\]

\[
2 \times 3: X^2 = 42.115; \quad P < .001
\]

\[
2 \times 4: X^2 = 138.09; \quad P < .001
\]

\[
3 \times 4: X^2 = 3.033; \quad \text{N.S.}
\]

This is true in Table 11.6 when various mobility and non-mobility routes are lumped together. What is the effect on friendship patterns if these routes are considered separately? This is shown in Table 11.7. As might be expected, the general effect of a high education—a grammar school or 'Public' school training—is to raise the proportion of middle-class respondents who had seen a middle-class friend. The same thing happens to upwardly mobile men, though the change is not so dramatic. For the former group it can be seen that respondents maintaining a middle-class position without a middle-class education are actually less likely to have seen a middle-class friend than are low educa-
tion upward mobiles. This would seem to suggest that in the middle class generally, there is a dichotomy based to a considerable degree upon educational background. Education has, in this respect, much the same effect on friendship patterns for both the mobile and non-mobile.

**TABLE 11.7**

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY, EDUCATIONAL ROUTE AND SOCIAL CLASS OF LAST FRIEND SEEN IN THE PREVIOUS WEEK: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY (N = 315)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Mobility and Education*</th>
<th>Friends' Social Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upward</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Education</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stable Non-Manual</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Education</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Low Education = 16 and under; High education = 17 and over.

Tests of Significance:
- Upward: High & Low Education: $X^2 = 4.751; P < .05$
- Stable Non-Manual: High & Low Education: $X^2 = 21.283; P < .001$

**RELATIVE'S SOCIAL CLASS**

In theory, at least, we have the option of choosing our friends. Except indirectly through marriage one has no such freedom where relatives are concerned. As I suggested in Chapter 10 there is evidence from a variety of sources which has taken some of the edge off the belief that occupational mobility and extended kinship relations are antithetical. Thus, the extended family remains an important source of social contacts despite geographical and social mobility. People are, according to Litwak (1960) and Bell (1968), able to segregate visits with
friends and associates from those with relatives within urban and largely anonymous milieus. Indeed, it appears to be institutionalized in most segments of urban society to do so. In light of the preceding two tables on social class of friends, it is of interest to see how this works out in practice, especially for the socially mobile.

**TABLE 11.8**

**CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIAL CLASS OF LAST RELATIVE SEEN IN PREVIOUS WEEK (N = 771)
(Percentages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Total N's (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upward</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>(155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Non-Manual</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>(165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Non-Manual</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>(320)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downward</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>(81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Manual</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>(370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Manual</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>(451)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11.8 suggests that both stable groups as well as both mobile groups are in contact with relatives in a different social class than themselves. Because of the greater impact of the upwardly mobile on the composition of the middle class, there is more cross-class contact in this group than in the working class. Within both classes, however, it is the mobile who are most subject to influences from a class other than the one to which they are now objectively members. While about two-thirds of the upwardly mobile men had last seen a middle-class friend, only about one-third (37 percent) had seen a middle-class relative. As we saw in Chapter 10, upwardly mobile men see slightly more relatives than do stable non-manual men. The former, then, face a more formidable task in segregating friends and relatives from each other.
While norms about appropriate role behaviour for friends usually differ from those for relatives, the upwardly mobile generally must also contend with shifts in class-based role expectations as well.

In the case of the downwardly mobile, the situation is objectively the same: they are more likely to face the added role conflict arising from having friends in one social class and relatives in another than are stable manual men. However, as previous chapters have shown, the downwardly mobile come from backgrounds which are more accurately typified as working-class than as middle-class. For this reason the cross-class pressure felt by the downwardly mobile may, relative to the upwardly mobile, be quite minimal. At any rate, in the second round of interviewing very few men who had moved downward occupationally felt that this had affected relationships with kinfolk. As the next chapter shows, men who moved upwards often felt there to be a considerable gap between themselves and their relatives, especially parents.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

This chapter has attempted to assess the extent to which occupational mobility leads to social mobility in the sense of normative and relational shifts as well as an economic shift. I have used two indicators only—voting behaviour and the social class of the last friend seen. What conclusion can we draw from this analysis? With respect

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9 See especially Chapter 7.

10 Following the lead of Goldthorpe et al (1969: 88–90), I also tried to assess the degree to which visiting patterns of the upwardly and downwardly mobile conformed to those of their destination class. Men who moved upward as well as seeing more friends and fewer relatives than stable manual men, also chose their friends from further afield. That is, unlike the working class, men who moved upwards were less likely to limit their friendship network to neighbours. In this they were indistinguishable from the stable non-manual men. Those who moved downward were, likewise, very similar to stable manual workers.
to voting behaviour, the socially mobile tend to bestride their class of origin and class of destination. In the middle class, amount of education had very little effect on the proportions voting Conservative. However, the Mobility Sample data show that the stable and the upwardly mobile segments of the middle class were more likely to vote Conservative if they had attended a grammar or 'public' school. In short, those who are socially mobile do change their voting behaviour but not to the degree of becoming totally assimilated into the standards of their new social class.

It is worth underscoring that neither upward nor downward mobility appears in Britain to lead to political extremism, or political alienation. My data are, in other words, in agreement with the more recent findings in the United States and elsewhere described at the beginning of this chapter.

Unlike voting behaviour, the single attempt to describe the nature of the interpersonal relations of the mobile revealed that the two groups were indistinguishable from their destination class. Men who moved upwards were as likely to have seen a middle-class friend as were the stable non-manual men. Similarly, the last friend seen by the downwardly mobile men was working-class as often as it was for the stable manual men. In the middle class, as might be expected, education beyond age 16 increased the likelihood of respondents having last seen a middle-class person.

At the same time, some upwardly mobile respondents suggested that while their friends were in middle-class occupations, they too had come from working-class homes. Although my data do not go far enough in that direction, it may be that the upwardly mobile tend to associate not with established members of the middle class but with others like themselves. Like migrants to a city, they tend to meet only those
from 'back home' and from other places. In any event, the findings of this chapter indicate that the socially mobile generally choose to associate with members of their objective social class rather than with members of the old one. The exception is, of course, relatives who provide constant reminders of a different lifestyle, more so for those moving upwards than for those moving downwards in the occupational hierarchy.

This and the last chapter suggest that in a number of attitudes and patterns of behaviour the upwardly mobile are different than either their class of origin or destination. The downwardly mobile, on the other hand, tend not to be very different from the rest of the working class. I turn in the next chapter to consider the degree to which respondents thought they have been socially, as opposed to occupationally, mobile.
CHAPTER 12

THE MEANING OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

The concept of social mobility in its fullest sense means for the sociologist the passage of persons from one social class to another. It is the process of changing perspectives, behaviour, social relationships and self-identification. Throughout this study, I have treated the class structure, the occupational hierarchy and movements between parts of these, as sociological 'givens'. In Laswell's (1965: 100) words, I succumbed to 'the tendency to reify social structure--to believe that it is a stable entity which exists objectively in an objective society which can be measured, labelled, and described objectively'. To offset that bias, I end this study by focussing on what people themselves feel and believe about social class and social mobility. What does social mobility mean to most people? How do they assess their own experience of what we objectively label as mobility and non-mobility? What do people think are the chances of social or class mobility in British society?

SELF-ASCRIBED CLASS

Because of its anticipated importance for voting behaviour, social mobility and self-ascribed class have already been partially examined in Chapter 11 (Table 11.5). Table 12.1 shows more clearly the extent to which people with different mobility experiences agree and disagree with the sociologist's placement of them. Of those who were prepared to assign themselves to a social class (about 94 percent) the most agreement was by those men who have remained intergenerationally stable in

1See Shibutani (1961: 582), for instance.
the class structure. This is especially so for stable manual men who overwhelmingly regarded themselves as working-class, a proportion not affected very much when, as at the bottom of the table, the downwardly mobile are included. Men who have, like their fathers, a non-manual job, show somewhat more uncertainty: only two-thirds of the stable non-manual category call themselves middle-class.

**TABLE 12.1**

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SELF ASCRIBED SOCIAL CLASS: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY (N = 869) (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>Total N's (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Upwards</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Stable Non-Manual</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Downwards</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Stable Manual</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Non-Manual</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Manual</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests of Significance (leaving out Don't Know category):

\[ 1 \times 2: X^2 = 30.066; C = .29; P < .001 \]
\[ 1 \times 3: X^2 = 4.892; C = .14; P < .05 \]
\[ 1 \times 4: X^2 = 59.625; C = .31; P < .001 \]
\[ 2 \times 3: X^2 = 46.600; C = .39; P < .001 \]
\[ 2 \times 4: X^2 = 197.104; C = .51; P < .001 \]
\[ 3 \times 4: X^2 = 13.466; C = .16; P < .001 \]

There is a similar level of disagreement, except in the opposite

---

2 This was a forced question. It was as follows: Most people say they belong either to the middle or to the working class. If you had to make a choice, would you call yourself:

**PROMPT**

Middle-class

Working-class

(Don't know, can't say)
direction, among the men who, objectively, have moved downwards. Slightly over one-quarter consider themselves as middle-class despite their manual occupations. However, it is among the upwardly mobile men that we find the most disagreement and uncertainty about class position. Thus, only 38 percent of these men believe that they are now middle-class and over one-half have retained a working-class identification.

Table 12.2 indicates that distance traversed by the socially mobile has a bearing on class identification of the upwardly mobile, but not for the downwardly mobile. Those who have moved upwards three or more status categories are more likely to view themselves as middle-class than are those who have only moved up one or two categories. In the downwardly mobile category differences are small and not statistically significant.

TABLE 12.2
DISTANCE OF SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SELF-ASCRIBED CLASS:
WORK AND LEISURE STUDY (N = 250)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Ascribed Class</th>
<th>Pattern of Social Mobility**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-Class</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-Class</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(110)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes Don't Know Category
** High = 3 or more status categories
Low = 1 or 2 status categories (across the manual-non-manual line)

\[ X^2 = 3.892; \ P < .05 \]
\[ X^2 = .471; \ N.S. \]

MOBILITY ROUTE AND CLASS IDENTIFICATION

The effect of the educational route employed by the two non-manual groups of men on class identification is also of interest and could as
easily have been considered in the previous chapter where I considered extent of acculturation. Table 12.3 reveals that in the middle class, the greater the amount of education, the more likely are people to call themselves middle-class. I expected, as with other variables considered earlier, \(^3\) that stable non-manual men would identify with the middle class whatever their educational experience, whereas the upwardly mobile would do so only if they had attended a grammar school, or had additional years of schooling beyond the legal minimum. In part this is the

**TABLE 12.3**

**CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY, EDUCATION AND SELF-ASCRIBED CLASS: WORK AND LEISURE STUDY (N = 320)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility and Education**</th>
<th>Self-Ascribed Class</th>
<th>(Percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Working Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upwards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Low Education</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) High Education</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Non-Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Low Education</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) High Education</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes 'don't know' category
** High Education = Finished full-time education at age 17 or over
Low Education = Finished full-time education at age 16 or younger

Tests of Significance:

\[ 1 \times 2: \chi^2 = 4.211; \ C = .16; P < .05 \]
\[ 3 \times 4: \chi^2 = 16.362; \ C = .30; P < .001 \]

case. The upwardly mobile low in education are the least likely to see themselves as middle-class while highly educated mobiles are much the same as low education non-mobiles. However, as the contingency co-efficients in Table 12.3 show, education is more strongly associated with

\(^3\) For example, choice of residence, analyzed in Chapter 3.
class identification within the stable rather than the mobile group. Thus, among the highly educated non-mobiles, there is nearly unanimity (85 percent) about what is their social class; much more uncertainty is found among men who have less education.  

The data contained in all three of these tables point toward a similar conclusion: whatever the mobility route or the social distance traversed, men moving upwards are more uncertain about their status than are men stable in the class structure. Even when occupational mobility has been accomplished via the regular or institutionalized channel, and is, effectively, sponsored mobility (see Turner, 1960), more than two-fifths of the men have not in their own assessment become middle-class. These findings, then, bear witness to what I have suggested in earlier chapters: that when one moves beyond the 'surface' or easily measurable variables, the impression is that upwardly mobile people are in many respects different from either working- or middle-class people. They are, it seems, in a kind of status limbo, tending to conform to middle-class attitudes and behaviour but not totally reaching either. These data confirm, also, earlier statements that the downwardly mobile are, on the whole, more integrated into the working class than apart from it. While they do differ significantly from stable working-class men in their willingness to accept working-class status, the differences (as indicated by the contingency coefficient, Table 12.1) were not large.

Although the numbers are small these general findings are replicated in the Mobility Sample, when grammar school and non-grammar school routes are specifically considered. Stable non-manual men who attended a grammar or public school almost uniformly (90%) call themselves middle-class. Whatever their educational route, over 85 percent view themselves as middle-class. Grammar school has less affect on upwardly mobile men. Some 57 percent of grammar school men compared with 47 percent of non-grammar school men, say they are middle-class.
OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE MOBILITY

In Chapters 10 and 11 I showed the relationship of the measure I called 'subjective mobility' to various social phenomena under consideration. Generally, it proved to be no better a predictor of behaviour and attitudes than did conventional mobility. As Table 12.4 indicates, the main reason for this is that there is a high degree of agreement between objective and subjective mobility. For instance, when the two are cross-tabulated, the resulting contingency coefficient is very high ($C = .62$). Nevertheless, it is by no means a perfect relationship. As with self-ascribed class, the introduction of father's class to create this measure points to the degree of ambiguity felt especially by men objectively upwardly mobile. Hence as many of this group feel they have not changed class relative to their fathers as feel they have made such a change. Also, among the downwardly mobile nearly as many men

### Table 12.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>Upward</th>
<th>Stable</th>
<th>Downward</th>
<th>Stable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subjective Mobility</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upward (W-C to M-C)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Middle Class (M-C to M-C)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downward (M-C to W-C)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Working Class (W-C to W-C)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total N's</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on forced choice question of respondents' and respondents' fathers' social class. M-C = middle class; W-C = working class. $X^2 = 66.295; C = .62; P < .001$
(38 percent versus 43 percent), do not think of themselves as downwardly mobile. Rather, they assign both themselves and their fathers to the working class.

UPWARD MOBILITY AND SOCIAL CLASS

Men who according to the objective measure were upwardly mobile, also displayed considerable uncertainty about where they themselves fit into the class structure, much less so than did the downwardly mobile about where to place their fathers. The predominant pattern, as Table 12.4 indicated, was for these men to reject middle-class status and retain identification with the working class. Why did they do so? One reason, certainly, is that some occupations simply defy neat categorization. Just as individuals may for many reasons be difficult to place, so individual occupations can also be anomalous. As I tried to show in Chapter 5, there is a tendency for middle-mass upward mobility to involve occupations which have an ambiguous or marginal status. It is easy with an occupation like 'solicitor', for people to invoke the 'relevant rank attributes' to use Parkin's (1972: 43) terminology. Jobs like business manager, on the other hand, admit of a much wider set of rank attributes and it was, principally, the latter where the mobile were most likely to end up. In reading over the interviews it was apparent that my respondents often recognized this fact as well.

In any event, there was a tendency for men who I put in category 3—the marginally upward—to feel they had not changed class. Mr. Fleming, a training officer, was in this category. He said about himself:

As I will try to show later in this chapter, there was generally a tendency for people to assign themselves to working-class rather than middle-class, because the former seemed to many less pretentious or snobbish than the latter.
I don't think I'm very far from working-class, and I don't think I could change from that. You say middle-class with tongue in cheek. I'm slightly higher than, say, London working-class.

Mr. Lambeth, a sales representative, had come to an almost identical conclusion: 'You'd like to think middle-class, but we're not far off from working-class'. The mixed nature of his job as a chief draughtsman has led Mr. Killy to put himself down as working-class in the first interview.

I'm not all that much better off socially than my father. I've put myself between two levels, really. I live differently than he does and did. I have a social side, he never had one because of the environment of the day. But my station in life falls between. I'm in the business and managerial side, but I have the technical side as well. So it's in between what I'd call middle class and working class.

Living in a working-class neighbourhood negated for some any claims they might have had to a middle-class status. Said one man:

If you live in this area, and with all due respect to the people who live around me, you are in this area and you tend to look at yourself as working-class. If you lived in a different area where people probably own their own houses, that would give you a different view (Sales Manager of a small firm).

It seemed that if there was any doubt about their entitlement to a middle-class position that these men opted for a working-class title. In part this was because whatever their occupational title, many of the upwardly mobile had been unable to shake off an attachment to the working class. They had, as more than one man quipped, 'a middle-class income with working-class habits'. Mr. Ferguson, a civil servant, recognized this factor very well:

I think of myself as working-class because I am working-class origin, with my roots strongly there. But I recognize that I have middle-class income and I recognize that I have middle-class interests. The kinds of books that I read, the lectures I go to, the kinds of conversations

---

6 An exception was Mr. Cole, who seemed to me in every way conceivable, working-class, including living in a council house. He had become an inspector for London Transport: 'I've moved from working-class to middle-class, there's no doubt about it. It's a bit of achievement, starting off as a farm labourer. I've come a lot farther than my brothers'.

I have are definitely middle-class. So I recognize that I'm a dual personality. One half of me is middle-class but on the other hand, I'm strongly conscious that I'm working-class, and I'm thoroughly at home in working-class company. Many of my friends are working-class, truly, as indeed, my family are. I go into working-class activities, working class men's clubs, and so on. I'm in an angling club where 90 percent of them are working-class chaps, labourers and so on, and I'm thoroughly at home with them and them with me.

Faced with choosing one class or the other, Mr. Ferguson had chosen middle class and had, therefore, agreed with the objective placement of him. Mr. Laing, an office manager, despite similar sentiments had in the end decided he was 'more' working- than middle-class. He put it this way:

I find a curious ambivalence. On the job I suppose I'm middle-class. This isn't inverted snobbery 'ah, the self-made man who's got a middle-class income but still pulls in his working-class background', I genuinely feel working-class. On the whole, I deal with people who have a good standard of education, perhaps university degrees. Most of them come from middle-class homes, so I think it is a genuine middle-class atmosphere at work, and I think they see me as middle-class as well.

And Mr. Gibson felt he should qualify the bald label of middle-class:

I'd like to say I'm lower middle-class. To me middle class means you've come away from that sort of East End Cockney which holds you back. Yet, when I get excited I still slip into a cockney accent. It used to get me down because everybody on the stock market has been to Eton or Harrow. I've been accepted socially, now, I think. Sometimes the boss takes me along on some trip. It may be a big house with servants padding around. It amuses me a bit, with my background.

For these men the identification was seen largely in personal terms. Their background was a part of them that could not be easily eradicated despite what others in their social network might think of them. For a few, their reasons for 'staying' working-class were ideological. Mr. Elson, a headmaster, in many respects very middle-class in lifestyle and attitudes, commented:

It would go against everything, I believe (to say I've changed class). I've enjoyed life and I enjoy a better standard than my mother and father. But, what I ask myself a good deal is 'have you remained the same?' You see, I think it's a disloyalty to my class to say I'm middle-class. People that do that, it means they've forgotten the friends they were brought up with. Like me going back to Wales and passing friends who were drug up same as me without stopping to talk to them.
Others simply discounted the importance, sometimes even the existence of class.

I disagree with the whole class thing. What I mean is that there's no difference between working class and middle class. I think there should be an upper class, but after that everyone—I mean a bloke who builds bricks, and if I sell bricks, it makes no difference. (Sales manager).

THE NON-MOBILE AND CLASS POSITION

Among men who moved upwards I could often detect uneasiness, occasionally disgust, about the concept, middle class. Many seemed to have retained the working-class disdain of the 'in-between' class described some years ago by Zweig (1948). Few who assigned themselves to the working class indicated a need to qualify that assessment as did those deciding that they were 'in fact and after all, middle-class'. The men interviewed who were stable middle-class stood in sharp contrast to the upwardly mobile. Indeed, it is in their general acceptance of the class structure and in their certainty as to where they belonged in it that much of the difference between the two segments of the middle class emerges. Where upwardly mobile men were divided and inconsistent, stable non-manual men were precise and sure in their statements about class and status. Thus, it was often at this stage of the interview that the full force of the differences I have tried in previous chapters to pin down, measure and quantify became apparent. But, how does one capture a tone of voice, an accent, a mannerism? The responses which follow only partially illustrate these impressions.7

Well, assuming there are degrees of middle, I'd say my father is the upper part of middle, if you're with me. Like father, like son, we know basically the same people. I see no reason to alter it from him.

---

7See: Zweig (1948), who says of the middle class: 'Their whole mentality, attitude and behaviour are so markedly different from those of the working class that it struck me as perhaps the most outstanding single fact brought to light in my inquiry' (quoted in Klein, 1965: 304).
Socially, quite a few people I know are part of the higher, the upper class, and in work there are people of lower class. I figure I'm pretty well dead-center of the middle class (Advertising Manager).

I would put myself in the middle class tending to the upper half because as a breed, again you've got levels inside the breed, but as a breed, socially acceptable. Also you can tell from the areas where people live, coming out of London. Around here to Redhill, up to Sutton, out to Epsom Downs, is the insurance broker's belt. You get further out to Weybridge and further south to Crawley into Sussex, that's stock broker region (Insurance Broker).

We're middle-class, well, topside of middle-, not upper-class. It's difficult, because you don't have the rigid distinctions between upper class, middle class and working class anymore (Civil Servant).

While the men who had remained stationary in the working class were just as matter-of-fact and certain about their class position, their additional comments suggested a certain defensiveness totally lacking in other groups of men. 'I like me as I am' and 'I wouldn't change', and similar sentiments emerge from these interviews. In this respect the downwardly mobile group were often very similar. As two men said:

I like me as I am. I'm among all sorts of posh people when I'm painting, but I wouldn't want to be one of them. I mean, I'm free, I can speak as I want. Sometimes I have to speak posh or near enough like them, but if you're dressed manual, you talk most of the time as you are dressed (Painter and Decorator).

Even if I had a bigger position, I wouldn't move up to middle class. I'm working-class and if you're genuine working-class, then you just can't change from working-class to middle-class. You're either very rich or you're working-class. I don't believe there is an in-between middle class. To me a bit of a cockney to walk into a mansion and try to pawn myself off as one of them, is just not on. You're either aristocracy type of thing or you're working-class. There is no in-between (Carpenter).

IS IT POSSIBLE TO CHANGE SOCIAL CLASS?

Although many people raised the issue more or less spontaneously as a result of other questions, I also asked everyone whether they thought it possible for someone to change social class. Responses

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8 For example, see below under views about changing class.
to this question and the main reasons given for their answers are shown in Table 12.5. As the last column indicates, nearly 70 percent of the

<p>| TABLE 12.5 | SOCIAL CLASS, PERCENT BELIEVING AND DISBELIEVING IT POSSIBLE TO CHANGE SOCIAL CLASS AND REASONS GIVEN: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117) (Percentages) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change Social Class and Reasons</th>
<th>Respondent’s Present Social Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible (total)</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (occupational)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Possible (total)</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascribed (born that way, etc.)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Barriers (exclusion, won't be accepted, etc.)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No such thing as classes</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Reasons</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(68) (49) (68)

men did not believe it to be possible. While there were only small differences between mobility groups and as is seen in this table, between classes, the reasons varied considerably depending on where people were located in the social hierarchy. Hence, among the manual or working-class men who believed it possible to change social class, the principal means suggested is through acquiring money. The possibility that education might achieve the same effect was hardly mentioned at all. Middle-class men, in contrast, do not generally see money as providing
 Rather, education and 'other' criteria (usually a high ranking occupation) are considered equally essential for class change.

Different reasons were also advanced by the two groups as to why it is impossible to change social class. Middle-class men were more inclined to see the main difficulty as one of social barriers imposed from above. For the working-class, on the other hand, class was seen as something one is born with that cannot be changed—it is, in other words, ascribed and immutable. People born into an upper class, it was generally argued, 'can't help it'. As a result, it is normal and acceptable for them to behave as they do. To be middle-class, however, was usually defined as being a snob. Since they are neither aristocracy nor working-class, those who call themselves middle-class have, in many manual worker's eyes, no legitimate claim to status or deference.

For an individual born into the working class, it seemed, then, that the best tribute that could be paid to him is to say he has all the trappings of a higher status group, but he is still the same fellow. This theme of 'rise as high as you like, but don't change' was one expressed or implied by informants at all social levels, whether mobile or non-mobile. Thus, the attempt to change one's social, as opposed to economic, position was generally interpreted as being 'untrue

---

9 If the idea of upward social mobility was largely unknown, 'declassification' was doubly so. In the 117 interviews only two or three men showed any recognition that the phenomenon might exist. As one said: If a roadsweeper becomes a managing director he'll still be a roadsweeper. No matter how hard he tries, he can't make it because someone will always say 'Ah, he used to be a roadsweeper'. You have to be born into it. You've got to go to a public school and everything. If it goes the other way, he'd be able to do the work alright, but it would be 'he's toffee-nosed, he has lah de dah manners', he wouldn't get rid of those (Motor Mechanic).
to one's real self'. The possibility that new experiences might in some instances lead to a resocialization, a basic change in an individual's attitudes and interests was not recognized by most men interviewed. Here are two young men talking of friends who have evidently been socially mobile. The first was in the downwardly mobile category, the second in the low upward group.

It's very hard to change class. It's possible if you have the right contacts. You've got to have a reasonable education, you've got to go to one of the recognized schools. University helps. I'm thinking of a friend who did go to university and he classed himself one step above us. We didn't agree. He did try it. He put on a speech, he tried to speak differently than he was used to: hoity toity. It just didn't work, we wouldn't accept it (Apprentice electrician—father a sales supervisor).

One of my friends went into stockbroking. He went in as office boy and he's sort of worked up; he's done well for himself. But he sort of changed with it. He goes out with people in the firm; he goes yachting and sailing. It's just hard to accept. He doesn't cease to be a friend, but I don't trust him as much. If they remain natural I have more trust in them (Shipping Clerk—father a carpenter).

Examples were given of the unhappiness which results from the attempt to be other than one's 'true self'.

I know one person, he's got his own firm. He's got an airplane and his own place in Spain, and he's having his own place built here. He thinks he's better off than I am. And my sort of class he doesn't bother to speak to. People with the same sort of money he's got won't speak to him because he hasn't got the education. He can't enter into their class, their way of thinking, you know. Deep down inside he's still a bricklayer, laying bricks on a site. He's not happy at all. He's the loneliest person I know. I know because he's the wife's brother-in-law (Toolmaker).

WORKING-CLASS PERSPECTIVES ON CLASS MOBILITY

As I describe below in considering the meaning people attach to 'moving up in the world', few manual workers (and here I include the downwardly mobile) thought in terms of changing social class. Whereas this often arose spontaneously in interviews with middle-class men, the possibility of class change had to be put directly to the working-class respondents. Either the idea of social mobility had simply never oc-
curred to them or it was a taken-for-granted assumption that it was impossible. 'No, I think that's not on', said Mr. Mobey, a carpenter, 'there's no way you can be accepted. You more or less have to be born into it'. 'Deep down it's not changing. It'll never change. Especially in areas like this and in Surrey, no matter what happens in London or in, say, Huddersfield', said a Brentwood printer. Mr. Tyrrell, a panel beater, was also pessimistic. 'You can go up the scale a rung or two, but never from bottom to top. What happens is you'll never be accepted, up or down. Money has nothing to do with it, really. It's snobbery: people either are or they're not'.

Others thought mainly about how hard it is to change oneself. 'You can try to put on a front, but you can always tell. It shows in the way they speak. If you speak like us, you won't go very far', said Mr. Snell. 'To get out of the working class you've got to put on a false front and do away with old friends and be like the new ones in the different atmosphere, which is sometimes very hard to do', Mr. Guthrie, a motor fitter, maintained. Mr. Willets, a foreman fitter, was one of several who felt a sense of change. He is in his late fifties and his father was a village shop keeper.

It's easier to become rich than to change class. It's easier today than when I was a boy. Then, if there were gentry in the village we were in hot water if we didn't doff our hats and the girls curtsy. We were in the dog house when we got home because our parents were that way inclined. You must be showing respect to the nobility sort of thing. I would say things have changed, there aren't the very rich good-class people around that there used to be. There's rich people about, but they're not really good-class people.

**VIEWS OF THE UPWARDLY MOBILE**

Upwardly mobile men were, of course, in a better position to judge the possibility of changing social class because some had tried to do so. Their views, nevertheless, were not too different from those ex-
pressed by my working-class informants. Mr. Brooks, Home and Export Manager for his firm, had already made a substantial rise compared to his father and would probably go even higher. Despite his occupational success, he had not enjoyed a corresponding social success. As he put it:

In this country, so I've found, it's easier to increase your income and that lot, than to move from one social class to another. Because when you leave one social class it presupposes you'll be accepted by another, which as far as I'm concerned, is not all that bloody easy. It certainly hasn't happened to me. In this country, believe you me, it's more subdivided than you realize.

Other men, almost as successful as Mr. Brooks, had also bumped into a barrier. Mr. Garritt, for instance, is an authorized dealer on the stock exchange. 'There's a limit to how much you can change your class', he said. 'In the end there's still family influence to contend with: there's always these up and coming "whiz kids". They're mainly people who have come from fairly good family backgrounds and whose fathers or grandfathers have made quite a financial standing in their time'. Likewise, Mr. Enticott, an insurance manager:

Even though I earn a middle-class salary, I still don't think I could get into the establishment even here in Sevenoaks. I've got nothing against these people, but always in some way they'd make me odd man out if I was to go amongst them. No matter what I tried to do, buying clothes, learning correct table manners, I would be odd man out. I think breeding is important. It's necessary to be brought up with money. Acquiring money later on will never give you what comes naturally.

Implicit in the above is at least some desire to achieve acceptance into what are seen as closed and exclusive strata. Others, perhaps echoing working-class attitudes, avowed a lack of interest in social status or class. Like gossiping, social climbing is something other people do.

It is possible but undesirable. Typical of this group was Mr. Lawson:

You can change class if you've got the ambition; you can do it, if you want to join the local golf club, which doesn't interest me. This is one of the steps. As soon as you have a nice house, you want a big car. It's a status symbol like the idea of an aerial before they had a TV set. I've no feeling about social standing at all (Quantity Surveyor).
Neither education nor wealth are, in most people's minds seen as factors able to overcome family background. How do people from social positions higher up in the social scale view prospects for social mobility? These are, after all, in part at least, the people who are able to erect the barriers perceived by those in inferior statuses. Are these real or imagined obstacles? While there was only a few of the stable middle-class interviewed in the Mobility Sample, there was an impressive unanimity in what they had to say about social and occupational mobility.

Almost to a man they were convinced of the impossibility of an individual changing his social class because they themselves would not forget where he had come from. As a financial analyst living in Surrey warned, 'You cannot change somebody's background. They perhaps can change the background of their children, and so on. The son of a road-sweeper can in his lifetime go from roadsweper, which his father is, to doctor, which is a jump right across. In social terms it will be considerably less of a movement because I'll then impose a different order of classes on it'. Mr. Mansell, a cost accountant agreed:

There is a super class, as it were, which is something to do with property, I think. I think anybody can become a doctor and it doesn't matter where they come from. But, there are some doctors I would know and some doctors I wouldn't know. Then one must redefine class. In terms of profession, there is considerable movement. Class in terms of background, there is considerably less movement.

An insurance broker asked incredulously, 'Change your social class? No, of course you can't; it's just not possible'. He then added with considerable pride: 'It's something we've built up over 2,000 years of civilization. It's part of our way of life. If your father was a miner, you're going to be a miner'. Others spoke matter-of-factly and in generally approving tones about the continued existence of class
barriers.

I know there's a barrier in this country. I've never felt it because we have the advantage of being on the right side of the barrier, so to speak. But talking to people, even my employees, the sort of thing they do and enjoy, and so forth, one realizes there is a gate somewhere. I'd put the aristocracy out of it. The barrier is between lower-middle class and higher-middle class. I suppose we come under the heading of higher-middle-class (Company Director).

Still others put the emphasis on the 'in-born' nature of 'class' and the difficulty individuals aspiring to mobility have in changing their attitudes and behaviour.

I don't think you can change class. Once it's there it's with you whatever happens. Family background, where you were born, that's what I mean. You can't change a person's nature. Winning the pools won't do it. Even a good education isn't enough. Funny thing, isn't it, class? (Post Office Executive).

MOVING UP IN THE WORLD

It is apparent, then, that movement into another social class, whether upward or downward, is a social phenomenon unknown and generally inconceivable to most people. This nearly universal downplaying and disdain of social status does not, at the same time, mean that there was not a concern with getting ahead—that is, becoming economically and occupationally mobile. Whereas there was a general dislike of the snobbery and pretense involved in attempting to change one's social status, economic mobility was seen not only as possible, but highly desirable for oneself and for others. Mr. Bruce, a senior railway clerk caught in his observations about 'moving up in the world' an interpretation of social mobility that was widely held by people of all class levels and backgrounds.

I should say my idea of moving up in the world is a combination of getting more skills, more education, more responsibility. It's the ability to command a fairly good standard of living. But as I see most people striving for it, it's moving into a situation where they're not really happy. I suppose it's a class thing, really. People consciously trying to move up, obviously it means class to them. But to a normal person, you say: 'You're getting on O.K.' He says: 'Oh yeah, I'm getting on O.K. It's the normal course of things, isn't it?' But,
I'm still my same old self'. We have relatives in Suffolk who are book­makers, sort of thing, change their car every year, their house every two years. They're obviously getting on very well, but I don't think they'd think they've moved up in the world. It's not a class thing to them.

Overall, as Table 12.6 shows, most people tended to think of moving up in the world in financial and occupational terms. Only about two­ fifths of the men put some aspect of status or status change at the forefront in their definition. Tests of statistical significance in Table 12.6 suggest that the main differences in responses to this question are class ones. Thus, only about a fifth of the manual group compared to over half of the non-manual group thought of moving up in status or status-related terminology. 'Moving up'? a film accountant asked, 'I can only relate it in my way to money'. 'Having sufficient money to do what you want to do. Good holidays, good car, good plays, generally having what you want', said Mr. Buckland, a storeman. For Mr. Oram, a carpenter's mate, it was, 'Money, definitely money. It's a lot to do with possessions, isn't it? You get a car and some people say, "Oh, you're moving up in the world." You get a colour television, and they say, "Oh, you're moving up"'. Many simply repeated what began after a time and a number of interviews to sound like a catechism: 'Earning more money, getting a bigger car, and a better house'.

In contrast were the minority who thought mainly about changes in social status. 'It means running around with a higher class of people', said Mr. Kimber, a power press operator, and one of the few manual respondents who did not first mention money or possessions. 'It's a bet­

10 As the interview schedules reveal, people sometimes mentioned two or three dimensions all in one breath. Said one man: 'To me it means moving into a higher job with more money, more responsibility, more status, a higher circle of friends'. In coding these responses, I attempted to assess where the most stress was placed. While this was possible, it would not likely be replicable in a larger study with more than one interviewer and coder.
ter social position, not necessarily more money, though that's compli-
mentary to it', replied Mr. Thomas, an executive in the Post Office.

For Mr. Brooks, a sales manager, it meant a spatial as well as a social
move: 'Socially, is the way I take it. In other words, leaving South-
gate, Ridgeway, and going to Cuthfield Ridgeway; then going on to one
of the very fine houses on Hampstead Heath, or something like that. It's
merely a social thing. I'm sure it's not spiritually moving up'.

TABLE 12.6

CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND MEANING OF
'MOVING UP IN THE WORLD': MOBILITY SAMPLE
(N = 113) (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Conventional Mobility</th>
<th>Financial</th>
<th>Occupational</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Total N's (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Upward</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Stable Non-Manual</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Downward</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Stable Manual</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>(26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) All Non-Manual</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>(68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) All Manual</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>(45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups:</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>(113)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Financial—'More money, better car, bigger house, etc.'
Occupational—'Better job', 'More responsibility', etc.
Status—'Higher social sphere', 'social climbing', 'put-on airs', etc.

1 X 2: $X^2 = 3.131$; N.S. 2 X 3: $X^2 = 4.901$; N.S.
1 X 3: $X^2 = 9.990$; $P < .01$ 2 X 4: $X^2 = 11.330$; $P < .01$
1 X 4: $X^2 = 20.011$; $P < .001$ 3 X 4: $X^2 = 1.107$; N.S.
5 X 6: $X^2 = 22.268$; $P < .001$

For at least a third of the men 'moving up' was viewed primarily
as advancement in a career. 'A better job and more salary. It just
follows from that', said Mr. Potter, a mobile crane driver. Mr. Shield,
an accountant, noted that 'if you move up in the true sense, you move up in the world because your job is of such a character that you have advanced yourself financially. Your social status advances because of your job'. 'Moving up is getting promotion, getting more responsibility on the job, getting to know the bosses. Getting invited to their homes', explained Mr. Gibson, a clerk.

While many gave a general idea of what they thought was meant by moving up in the world, others had a more personal definition in mind. For Mr. Dawson, a cost accountant and keen bird watcher, moving up meant: 'having a little more money, a little more leisure—if I could afford a better pair of binoculars, that would be moving up to me'. Mr. Springall, an office manager, had somewhat grander aspirations: 'To me moving up means getting a bigger house with a bit of land attached to it. To get a paddock and a pony, that's the extent of my ambition'. 'It's back to the class system, isn't it?', asked Mr. Adams, a police inspector living in Central London. 'Going out and getting a bigger house in a better area. I wouldn't treat it as class, but for me, it would mean a house in the country with a garden and lots of trees'. Moving up was in Mr. Cannon's eyes, 'achieving the ambition which I started out. I feel I want to push until I've reached a peak. I feel I should have money. It's a silly thing, but I like all the dinners and dances, meeting people, going to theatres, things which if I had the money I'd do automatically'.

Implied in these personal definitions and in most of the accounts was the same emphasis on 'social climbing' being what others do or mean by moving up. Mr. Merry-West, an editor, put it more explicitly. 'It means absolutely nothing to me because it's never once occurred to me to do so. I know what it means, of course. It means becoming more
prestigious, more prosperous and more snobbish. I detest it myself'.

Whereas Mr. Merry-West had been middle-class for many generations, Mr. Jarvis, an accounts superintendent, had moved up from a fairly low background. He saw his move entirely in economic terms:

I'm not interested in moving up in the world. We have a car—a very fast car—my parents never did. We have a colour television set and vast numbers don't have that. We own this house and the one next door. So I've progressed a lot further than my parents ever did. So it comes down to social climbing and I'm not interested in social climbing.

These comments suggest that the term 'moving up in the world' has, for most, negative connotations. People associate it with snobbishness and pretention and, as with the more direct question about class change, disavow any personal desires to climb socially. Moving up, whatever it might mean to others was, personally, transformed into modest aspirations to 'get on', but in a purely financial and occupational sense. While middle-class men were more inclined to mention status or status-related aspects, it was apparent that they also believed what ought to occur is what working-class people generally stated: economic improvement within the parameters of one's original class milieu. Mr. Toombs, a company director, spoke approvingly of what had happened to him and his friends:

All we know of people is our friends who, like ourselves, are middle-class. They've had their promotions as time went on, one expects that. But I don't think they've become snobs or anything like that, but they've kept to the good standard of living, as I think we have, for our class of people. None of them have tried to be more than they are. They have improved themselves, obviously, but I don't see that it has altered their class in any way.

While few people thought they had changed in a social sense, over half (57 percent) felt they had in their own terms and according to their definition of the concept, moved up in the world. However, as can be

11 Willmott and Young (1960: 28) note about Woodford's middle class, 'It is always a small car they talk about as though not even a puritan could object as long as it was not a large car'.
seen in Table 12.7 this is mainly because of the disproportional numbers of upwardly mobile in the sample. Overwhelmingly, these men see themselves as having moved up in at least one of the ways described above. Mostly these men were contrasting their lot with their father's or from 'where they had started out', as many put it. 'I'm very infinitely better off than my father. There's no doubt I've moved up', said Mr. Fairburn, a production accountant. Mr. Cormack, a buyer, also used other people as a reference point.

I've moved up, yes, certainly. My obvious response is compared to my father, which is the answer many people give. I'm trying to think of relatives and friends. My friends are at the same level as me, really. So it's relatives, I think. My brother, it must be. He's a postman.

TABLE 12.7

| CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND PERCENT BELIEVING THEY HAVE MOVED UP IN THE WORLD: MOBILITY SAMPLE (N = 117) |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Percent                                         | Total N's |
| (1) Upward                                      | 82       | (44)    |
| (2) Stable Non-Manual                           | 54       | (24)    |
| (3) Downward                                    | 36       | (22)    |
| (4) Stable Manual                               | 37       | (27)    |

Tests of Significance:

\[
1 \times 2: X^2 = 5.897; \quad P < .02 \\
1 \times 3: X^2 = 13.636; \quad P < .001 \\
1 \times 4: X^2 = 14.708; \quad P < .001 \\
2 \times 3: X^2 = 1.466; \quad \text{N.S.} \\
2 \times 4: X^2 = 1.506; \quad \text{N.S.} \\
3 \times 4: X^2 = .002; \quad \text{N.S.}
\]

Of some interest in Table 12.7 is that the downwardly mobile are, as with many other things looked at in this study, indistinguishable from stable manual men; in both cases only 37 percent indicated that they had moved upwards, even financially. For both it was difficult to determine the reference point on which their evaluation was based. Some said that they didn't know while others simply said, 'just meself,
I guess', and left it at that. Despite their objectively lower occupational status only two of the downwardly mobile men felt they had 'moved down in the world'. In all, only about ten percent of the men made such an evaluation. Notably, all but the two just mentioned, were stable non-manual respondents. For a few of these men it was a status decline, for others it was financial, and for some it was both. Invariably, however, it was their father with whom they were comparing themselves. 'Financially my father was always very comfortable. I can hardly say that about myself', said Mr. Munford, an accountant. Mr. Payne, though a manager in a chemical company, still felt pressed financially.

I don't know what private income my father is getting, but I certainly feel a lot worse off given the cost of living and what salary he was earning at my age. Socially, I dare say, we're the same.

For Mr. Montgomery, a civil servant, it was both. If anything I suppose I've moved down in the world. At comparable ages and certainly now, I'm worse off than my father. Thirty years ago he was on a salary which would be worth a lot more than mine is now. And socially, where he was upper-middle-class, I'm slightly lower and probably won't alter that much in my lifetime.

In the sample as a whole these were, of course, exceptions. Almost everyone, whatever their present occupational status, thought they were better off than their fathers at comparable ages and, usually, now in the present. Notwithstanding this general optimism, few manual workers and only about half of the stable non-manual men believed that they had experienced sufficient change to warrant saying they had moved up in the world. Apparently these three groups of men were not thinking in intergenerational terms but, rather, about what had happened to them over their own lives. While most felt they had progressed 'naturally', it did not deserve the phrase, 'moving up in the world'.

12 Nevertheless, there was a good deal of agreement between my objective measure of occupational mobility and respondents' rankings of their own and their fathers' occupations in terms of prestige (X² = 48.602; P < .001; C = .55). The most agreement was by the socially mobile. In
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Three main conclusions emerge from the data presented in this chapter. First, while there is, generally, a good deal of agreement between 'objective' measures of class and of social mobility, the upwardly mobile appear especially divided in what they think is their present social class. Over four-fifths of this group believe that they have 'moved up in the world' and nearly three-quarters consider their occupation to be of higher social standing than their father's. But less than two-fifths think of themselves as middle-class. Generally the more education a person has, the more likely is he to say he is middle-class. But again, even with high education, only 58 percent of the upwardly mobile men consider themselves as having become middle-class. Although the downwardly mobile too are split in their views about their own class position, the division is not so marked as with the upwardly mobile. They tend, on the whole, to think of themselves as working-class and are mainly uncertain about whether to call their fathers middle-class or working-class.

The second conclusion is that very few people (26%) believe that it is possible for themselves or others successfully to change social class. This, it emerged, was a view held with equal intensity by high and low status men and by mobile and non-mobile men alike. The reasons contrast two-fifths of the men treated in this study as stable manual believe themselves to be employed in an occupation of higher social standing than that of their father. Another fifth believe they are, relative to their fathers, downwardly mobile. The tendency for the working class to upgrade manual occupations is reflected in the finding that about one quarter of this group place both themselves and their fathers in one of the top three categories. Although the stable non-manual men are more in agreement with the objective label than stable manual men, over half believe they have been occupationally mobile--upward of downward--relative to their father. There was, finally, no evidence that respondents were biased for or against their own occupation (see: Blau, 1957).
differed by social class; working-class men, if they believed it possible to change one's social class, most often linked it to an increase in wealth, whereas middle-class men more often mentioned occupational and educational achievements. Almost no one entertained the possibility of declassification. Thus, if upward social class mobility was largely inconceivable, movement downward appeared to be doubly so.

Thirdly, in what people said, it was evident that not only is social class mobility seen as difficult and often inconceivable, but it is also deemed undesirable as well. Most did not reject all forms of social mobility. Rather, it is changes that involve a transformation of attitudes and behaviour which were most obviously condemned. Thus, social mobility was largely defined and limited to occupational and financial dimensions and within that definition, was often desired for themselves and approved of as an ambition in others. Condemnation, scorn and self-righteousness were directed towards those who in obtaining a better job and more possessions undergo a change or treat them as claims to a higher status. At all class levels, then, 'social climbing'—moving up in the world—was treated as a repudiation and betrayal of one's friends, family and origins and as a disloyalty to one's 'true' and 'unchangeable' self. The anticipated consequences of status striving were loneliness, unhappiness and marginality. The idea that people might genuinely change as a result of various experiences, went largely unrecognized.

An especially significant aspect of this emerges not from what these men said but what they so seldom talked about: the role of education in the mobility process. Apparently, the idea that particular educational experiences might cause a change in aspirations, outlook, accent and interests that are 'real' rather than 'pretence', was simply
not one that occurred to most people, whatever their status. Whereas
in North American society education is generally recognized as a means
for social mobility and the main access to middle-class life, it did
not occur to the majority of these men that it might serve a similar
function in Britain. This was, of course, particularly true for work­
ing-class people interviewed but, as well, few middle-class men indi­
cated that education might conceivably alter an individual's social
class. Like their working-class counterparts, many thought only in
terms of rapid rises in fortunes—winning the pools or doing well in
business—as means of upward movement. These, as we have seen, were
not thought likely to lead to successful class mobility. Some implica­
tions of these findings will be considered in the next chapter, the
conclusion to this study.
CHAPTER 13

CONCLUSION

There are several parts to this conclusion. First, I summarise what has been learned in the study about downward and upward social mobility in Britain. While this will mainly be a repetition of the detailed summaries and conclusions which appear at the end of each chapter, I will also attempt to place these findings in a more general theoretical context. The final section tries to go beyond the study to consider what ought to be the response of educators and legislators concerned with developing social policy with regard to education and social mobility.

DOWNWARD MOBILITY

One of the major contributions of this study has been to explain the meaning and nature of downward mobility in industrial society. At the macro-level of analysis, an attempt was made to assess its significance as an indicator of the fluidity of society and of the extent of subordination of particularistic-ascriptive values to the values of universalism and achievement. At the micro or social psychological level my concern has been with the personal consequences related to a decline in social status. As indicated in Chapter 1, the impact of downward mobility at both levels of analysis is dependent upon an explanation of how it occurs. At least three explanations of individual downward mobility are either implicit or explicit in the literature.¹

¹There are also structural factors associated with downward mobility such as shifts in the occupational structure reducing the proportion of white-collar occupations and economic depression resulting in underemployment and unemployment of portions of the labour force. These
1) Downward mobility is related to personal disorganization or poor mental or physical health on the part of individuals.

2) Downward mobility is the result of rejection within the formal educational system.

3) Downward mobility arises because of the failure or inability of some middle-class families to provide a social and/or economic foothold sufficient to maintain a similar status for their sons.

The data of this study pertaining to downward mobility tend to be most compatible with the third of these possible explanations. Instead of proceeding from a core status group, as has been generally assumed, the predominant pattern was for downwardly mobile men to come from families which were only nominally part of the middle class. These families were marginal either because the father had been upwardly mobile over his work life or because he was employed in a status-ambiguous occupation. Conceptually, the former can be designated as 'risen working class' while the latter approximate to a peripheral middle-class status group.

In both cases the essential outcome was that sons had been exposed to and had internalised working-class not middle-class values and norms. Despite their having a white-collar occupational status, the families of these men had retained a working-class disdain of non-manual work and middle-class life styles and had encouraged their sons towards manual work and, in particular, to skilled trades of various kinds. In this regard, it was frequently apparent that men who moved downward were in effect realizing the frustrated ambitions of their fathers who regretted not having a trade themselves. As a result, these men showed relatively

have to do, principally, with the conditions favourable for a high rate of downward mobility; they do not explain individual downward mobility. In any case, neither has occurred during the past few decades.

2 In contrast to Jackson and Marsden's (1962) concept of sunken middle class.
little uncertainty about the choice of a career and were, in their attitudes to work, among the most satisfied and committed of the four groups studied. Typically these men had voluntarily entered the working class at the beginning of what turned out to be a very stable work life and showed every sign of remaining there until retirement.

As suggested in Chapter 1, downward mobility may be separated analytically into 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' mobility. The above findings suggest that in the middle-mass most downward movement is voluntary in that occupational choice was not related to personal misfortune, economic depression or blocked aspirations. Instead, parents of these men had exerted positive influence to direct sons towards jobs perceived as possessing security, relatively high income and intrinsic satisfaction—jobs not very different from those ultimately chosen. Thus, to the extent that any decision can be considered voluntaristic, the majority of the downwardly mobile chose their occupation, and unintentionally their social status, freely and with the general approval and collusion of their family.

REFERENCE GROUP THEORY

In applying the framework of reference group theory to downward mobility, Merton suggests that 'it is the isolate, nominally in a group but only slightly incorporated in its network of social relations who is most likely to become positively oriented toward non-membership groups' (Merton, 1957: 324). While my data do not provide an adequate measure of social isolation, they do suggest a low level of integration into middle-class networks. However, where Merton had postulated a cumulative interplay between a deterioration of social relations within the membership group and positive attitudes towards the norms of a non-membership group, the concept of 'risen working class' suggests that these
social relations were never well-formed in the first place. For at least the main pattern of downward mobility observed here, the reference group perspective must be modified to take into account the possibility that the objective membership group may not at any point have constituted a meaningful standard for those eventually mobile. In moving upwards economically, but not normatively or relationally, families of the downwardly mobile had, in Turner's (1964: 397) terminology, failed to create the life situation typical for members of the new social stratum of which they were now a part. Lacking that particular constellation of factors generally understood as the middle-class way of life, allegiance and identification was from the outset with the lower status group and involved no actual shift in reference groups and group affiliations in the manner suggested by the theory.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Neither of the other explanations of downward mobility are supported by the evidence from this study. Not only was there no link between poor mental or physical health and downward mobility but the scanty evidence concerning the former tends to support the opposite hypothesis: men who would otherwise have chosen a manual occupation were, if in poor health, constrained to look for less strenuous white-collar work. In addition, though it would be technically accurate to argue that the downwardly mobile had been rejected by the formal educational system, this could also be said of those who remained stable in the working class as well. The findings discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7 indi-

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3 As Goldthorpe et al (1969: 159) note, this may not necessarily be because of white-collar exclusiveness but because there is very little desire to form middle-class social relationships. As they suggest, economic advancement does not necessarily imply a concern with status striving.

4 The majority of downwardly mobile men identified themselves as working class; there was less agreement about where to place their fathers (see: Chapter 12).
cated that the educational experiences of these two groups of men were virtually identical. Both had left school at the minimum leaving age after what was invariably a non-grammar school training and in neither group was there much evidence of higher educational aspirations than they had in fact achieved. Instead of being 'cooled-out' from mobility striving, the downwardly mobile seemed to be part of the majority in Britain who are never 'warmed-up' by the educational system in the first place (see: Hopper, 1971b).

These findings about downward mobility cast serious doubt on the validity of downward mobility as an indicator of the fluidity of a society. The ideal-typical pattern implied by Miller (1960) is one in which because of meritocratic norms, some sons born in advantaged strata are unable to maintain that status and are therefore downwardly mobile. There is the further assumption that the educational system is one of the principal mechanisms insuring that the less competent fall in the social structure. However, as we have just seen, almost none of the men who moved downwards occupationally could be said to come from solid middle-class backgrounds. Middle-class men unable to obtain a place in a state grammar school were still able to maintain a roughly similar status to that of their father. In large part this was made possible by the existence of the private school system and by occupational selection procedures which continue to give considerable weight to ascriptive factors, to personal influence and to particularism. In short, the results of this study are not at all what one would expect if downward mobility is to be treated as a valid indicator of how open and meritocratic is British society. They also suggest that for downward mobility to be utilised as a valid comparative statistic, considerably more must be known about it than simply its rate.
CONSEQUENCES OF DOWNWARD MOBILITY

The classical theoretical position concerning downward mobility is one in which 'dilemmas faced by mobile individuals in their interpersonal relations inhibit social integration and are responsible for many aspects of their attitudes and conduct' (Blau, 1956: 290). Despite its voluntary nature, subjective definitions were generally congruent with my objective measure of downward mobility. The invidious comparisons implied by these recognitions of differential occupational and social status should, then, within this theoretical framework give rise to various responses functional in reducing the impact of status deprivation. Instead, the findings discussed in Part Three of this study suggest that the objective drops in status experienced by these men had not resulted in heightened status anxiety and feelings of status deprivation. What have been hypothesised as manifestations of these psychological states—anomia, heightened prejudice, political extremism and isolation—were not found to be related to these patterns of downward mobility.

At the same time as they were very different from stable middle-class men, they were in virtually every variable considered, indistinguishable from men stable in the working class. Only relative to the former can it be said that the downwardly mobile are anomie and prejudiced. They appear to be neither more nor less so than others in the working class. With respect to extent of interpersonal relations they also followed a working-class not a middle-class pattern of involvement with friends and kin. Finally, voting patterns of the downwardly mobile tended to fall between origin and destination class but could not in any way be typified as exhibiting political extremism. Thus, in terms of their personal and political attitudes, the downwardly mobile do not, in Britain, appear to constitute a social or political force of much
significance.  

MITIGATING FACTORS

There would appear to be a number of factors intervening between the theory and my empirical findings which either modify the theory or render it inappropriate to this empirical context. First, the possibly unprecedented rise in standard of living and level of employment over the past three decades had led to the general belief—not always accurate—that everyone was better off than the previous generation. This, and the greater job security which most men in the sample were presently experiencing were quite clearly seen as offsets to what was, after all, only a moderate drop in occupational status. Secondly, in generally identifying with the working class, downwardly mobile men shared with their stable working-class counterparts a general disinterest in status striving and a tendency to define mobility solely in its economic dimensions. Thirdly, the downwardly mobile conformed very closely to patterns of sociability typical in the working class in that the majority of their social relationships were with kinfolk. Hence, some potential interpersonal dilemmas were avoided because of this tendency to follow a family oriented and relatively privatised social existence. As we have seen, this was not so much a matter of acculturation into the working class as a continuation of attitudes and styles of life learned in the family of origin.

In concluding this discussion of downward mobility it is essential to keep in mind that the focus throughout was on middle-mass downward mobility and that what objectively constituted downward movement was of necessity measured crudely. The findings just described do not, therefore, necessarily refute the general hypothesis that an involuntary and

5 For an argument along these lines, see Davies (1970).
perceived loss of status may in a number of respects be dissociative. Such patterns of mobility may well give rise to attitudes and behaviour which have functional significance in preserving and buttressing self-esteem. Both for historically specific reasons and because of the nature and genesis of the main pattern of mobility found in this study, actors had at their disposal a number of plausible interpretations of their objective experience which made it possible to deny any loss of status and to find compensatory factors mitigating its impact. Other patterns or degrees of downward mobility may not provide the same kinds of compensatory mechanisms. For example, as I discuss later, the more subtle drops in status which occur within the middle class may, with respect to the dissociative theory, be a relevant target for further empirical enquiry. In short, where downward mobility proceeds from a core status group to a status group lower in the social hierarchy, where there is, on the part of the actors involved, a concern with status striving and where the actor is confronted with a real choice about which norms and attitudes to adopt, the dissociative hypothesis may have considerable validity.

To reiterate what has been said in a number of places in this study, theoretical conclusions about downward mobility do, nevertheless, derive principally from studies of middle-mass occupational mobility of the kind examined here. This, the only empirical study of downward mobility in Britain of which I am aware, yields findings roughly in accord with recent American research which has, in turn, tended to overturn previous theoretical thinking about downward mobility. Until further evidence of a contrary nature is forthcoming, it is reasonable to conclude that previous theory and conjecture had overestimated the social and psychological significance of downward mobility. It neither creates a cadre
of discontents vulnerable to political extremism and racism nor does it
tell us very much about how open or fluid is the social structure.

**UPWARD MOBILITY**

Essentially the same kinds of interests pervaded this study with
respect to upward mobility as had been of concern in analysing downward
mobility. First of all, several chapters were concerned with the con-
gruence between occupational and social mobility—what I have referred
to as the success of upward mobility. Along with a detailed considera-
tion of mobility routes, I also followed the lead of Goldthorpe et al
(1969) in looking not only at what had happened to people in terms of
economic change but also at what relational and normative shifts had
occurred as well. Both in their 1969 study, and in a later essay,
(Goldthorpe and Hope, 1972), the question is raised as to whether occu-
pertional mobility also involves shifts in patterns of association and
life styles for those moving upwards.

A number of findings of this study are of relevance to this gener-
al question. As Chapter 3 showed, upward mobility had involved an eco-
nomic shift for most of those experiencing it. But, despite their having
an average income as high, if not higher than, the stable middle-class
group, the upwardly mobile were, even at comparable income levels, more
likely to live in council housing, the implication being that they had
experienced very little change in life style or pattern of association.
Findings in Part Three underline the argument that economic mobility is
not inevitably accompanied by social mobility in the fullest sense of
the word. This was generally more true for normative and subjective di-
mensions of social mobility than for relational dimensions. Men who
moved upwards were less likely to vote Conservative than stable middle-
class men and were considerably less likely to define themselves as mid-
dle-class. However, in looking at various patterns of association—extent of kinship interaction relative to friendship interaction, social class of friends, numbers of contacts and participation in secondary organizations—difference between the upwardly mobile and the stable middle class were not as a rule, statistically significant.

When these findings are evaluated alongside the qualitative data recorded, the clearest impression is of a continuum along which the occupationally mobile are ranged. At one end there is almost no evidence of economic, normative or relational change while at the other extreme, one finds a pattern of measurable characteristics virtually identical to those traditionally viewed as middle class. Also, without too much forcing of the data, it was possible to discern five separate patterns of upward mobility. Of these, three were in varying degrees toward the latter end of the continuum, involving a good deal of social as well as occupational mobility. These were: (1) The Self-made Man—High Upward; (2) The Self Made Man—Lower Managerial; (3) The Young Grammar School Graduate. At the other end of the continuum were two groups who had experienced some occupational mobility but very little social mobility. These I labelled as: (4) The Marginally Upward and (5) The Young Secondary Modern Graduate. While the dividing lines between these mobility patterns are somewhat arbitrary, it could be reasonably concluded on the basis of the detailed case studies and the more general findings from the Work and Leisure Study, that about two-thirds of the upward mobility in the sample was in one of the first three categories.

An analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative data about upward mobility leads to the following hypotheses: Occupational mobility is more likely to lead to relational and normative change where:

1) It proceeds through an educational route rather than through what is formally a rejection route.
2) It involves considerable change in intergenerational occupational status.

3) It occurs relatively early on in the work life of the individual. In some instances, of course, all three conditions were found to be present in the same work-life history. Hence, as might be expected, for those who had attended a grammar school or its equivalent there was a greater likelihood of successful social mobility resulting. But, this was partly so because these men (plus those obtaining further education) moved up into a white-collar job at the beginning of their work lives, thereby spending very little time in a working-class milieu. Further, some of these men had reached, or anticipated reaching what in the context are relatively high positions. However, about two-fifths of the men in the upward mobility sample had minimal education and had apparently moved upwards with no educational qualifications besides a school leaving certificate. A proportion of these men had also experienced social as well as occupational mobility so that the educational experience is not the sole explanatory factor.

Except for those few who had entered a profession, amount and kind of education was not a very good predictor of how high individuals had risen or what occupational categories they had reached. The main reason was that the most common occupational destination for upwardly mobile men was a managerial or administrative position—occupational categories requiring a wide range of skills and academic credentials and in which there is little control over the certification of entrants. This is not to say that education was totally without effect. In the sample as a whole, its impact was dramatic; grammar school and/or further education invariably led to upward mobility for men of working-class origin and for men born in the middle-class, to retention of parental status. Nevertheless it bears repeating that a good deal of the upward mobility
took place via a 'non-educational' rather than a 'formal educational' route.

THE STABILITY OF MOBILITY

The one-third of the men in the sample who had been occupationally but not socially mobile are of considerable interest in regard to the question of the stability of mobility. To paraphrase Miller (1956), are those who move upwards able to provide a firm foothold for their children, or, do they move downwards again in the second generation? Both the evidence found concerning upward mobility and that presented above with respect to the genesis of downward mobility lead to the following hypothesis:

Unless there is a substantial normative and relational shift accompanying upward occupational and economic mobility, children of those moving upwards are likely to be downwardly mobile.

In main, the warrant for this hypothesis derives from the finding that in terms of work-life histories, lifestyles and norms, men in the latter two patterns of upward mobility were very similar to the fathers of downwardly mobile men interviewed. Especially crucial was that these men were also the most likely to express dissatisfaction with their work, to resent not having a skilled trade, to downgrade non-manual work and to minimize the value of education. Among those old enough to have children there was evidence that they would, or had, encouraged their sons toward skilled trades rather than toward middle-class occupations. As we have already seen, these attitudes were typically to be found in the backgrounds of men interviewed in this study as downwardly mobile. In other words, sons of marginally upwardly mobile men would be counted as downwardly mobile were they to appear in a future sample survey.

DETERMINANTS OF UPWARD MOBILITY

The usual practice of treating mobility aspirations and anticipatory
behaviour as conformity and non-mobility as deviant and problematic has had the unfortunate consequence of obfuscating what is perhaps the most important perspective of reference group theory: that what from one vantage point is conformity is from another non-conformity. In losing that insight, there has also been a tendency to ignore the theoretically and empirically relevant problem of how reference group behaviour is generated in the first place. That it is useful to keep before us this perspective was underlined by the summary in Chapter 6 of a number of ethnographic accounts of working-class life on both sides of the Atlantic. The situation described is one in which, typically, the potentially mobile individual faces strong pressures from family and peers to conform to norms antithetical to mobility and status striving. Similarly, data presented in Chapter 12 provide additional support that mobility orientations generally go against prevailing working-class norms and are in that sense deviant-behaviour.

One contribution of this study, then, was to synthesize a number of otherwise disparate and generally non-theoretical empirical studies of working-class life by viewing them from the theoretical perspective of reference group theory. This exercise also provided both empirical support and a theoretical anchorage for a general hypothesis that any source of non-integration of the family of origin into its objective class situation will make it more likely that the potentially mobile person will:

1) Affiliate and identify with out-groups of which he is not objectively a member;
2) Be able to withstand social pressures to conform to non-mobility patterns of behaviour;
3) Be willing and able to cut community and peer-group ties.

I concentrated on factors in my respondents' childhood and in their family of origin which were hypothesised as contributing to a low level
of social integration and hence to mobility. Of particular importance was the finding from previous studies in Britain and elsewhere that the upwardly mobile tend to come from 'sunken middle-class' families. Additionally, geographical mobility, the stability of the father's work life and the size and nature of the extended kinship network were also hypothesised as factors contributing to a low level of social integration into the objective social class milieu.

In main, this retrospective research failed to reveal factors uniquely associated with upward mobility. Although the family trees of about one-third of the upwardly mobile men contained inconsistent class elements—a mother or father or both who had come from a middle class background—this was found to be true of men stable in the working class as well. A strict adherence to the quantitative data, therefore, leads to the conservative conclusion that membership in a 'sunken middle-class' family was not a predictor of who in the working class is likely to be upwardly mobile and who is not. At the same time, the qualitative data emerging from the accounts people gave of their backgrounds suggest that the significance of these middle-class ties is not the same for both groups of men—upwardly mobile individuals were more likely to mention these ties and to invest them with some significance as factors orienting them away from a manual occupation. Thus, attention must also be directed toward the exact nature of these cross class relationships before concluding that they are not related to upward mobility.

Of other factors hypothesised as having a bearing on a low level of integration into the working class, only geographical mobility was significantly related to upward mobility. There was little evidence to suggest that the individual or his family had been especially isolated
or at odds with the immediate social situation. Instead, the accounts these men gave of their childhood, family life and climate, education and entry into work spoke most directly to the obstacles which should have retarded rather than facilitated or encouraged upward mobility.

NEGATIVE REFERENCE GROUPS

The objective evidence was, therefore, at odds with what would be expected from the model developed in Chapter 6 in which families of the upwardly mobile are seen as already middle class in orientation and therefore poorly integrated into their objective class situation. But, without necessarily adopting a middle-class perspective, some parents had imbued in their sons a vague and unarticulated notion that there might be a better way to live. Not only did they pass on largely negative attitudes about certain kinds of manual work and the immediate neighbourhood, but they sometimes also treated themselves and their own relatives as role models of what not to be. In this regard, mothers were more important than fathers. Others had apparently developed negative feelings about their condition out of their own perception of their immediate situation or as a result of new experiences such as War or National Service. They had, in the language of reference group theory, developed negative attitudes about their objective membership group but in contradistinction to the classical formulation not developed simultaneously a specific set of attitudes in conformity with an out-group of higher social status.

This would appear to require as yet another paradigm concerning the connection between anticipatory socialization and social mobility beyond those already formulated by Lane and Ellis (1968). It was initially expected that findings about upward mobility would empirically be most in accord with what these authors referred to as 'routine so-

6See Chapter Six: pages 151-156.
cialization'. It will be recalled that the sequence was: 'In-group so-
cial contact→ Social learning→ Social mobility (p. 278). However,
the predominant pattern of upward mobility actually observed would ap-
pear to require a modified version of the basic 'Anticipatory Sociali-
zation' model originally formulated by Merton. The sequence for this
model was described by Lane and Ellis as: 'Out-group Affiliative Motive
→ Out Group Social Contact→ Social Learning→ Social Mobility.
On the basis of the qualitative data concerning the genesis and process
of upward mobility, the sequence may more adequately be described as:
'in-group negative attitudes→ out group social contact→ occupational
mobility→ out-group affiliative motives→ social learning→ social
mobility. That is, re-socialization into middle class attitudes occurs
over a considerable length of time as aspirations and attitudes become
focused and altered by other events such as promotion, economic advance-
ment, and residential and geographical mobility. As well, it was ap-
parent that for some of the men, those who had experienced occupational
but not social mobility, a number of these conditions or steps were
missing. For at least the latter two patterns of mobility described
earlier, economic shifts had not been transformed into shifts in social
affiliation, presumably because they had continued to hold positive at-
titudes about their original membership group.

Support for this analytical description of the process of social
mobility comes largely from the quantitative and qualitative data of
Chapters 7 and 8. Although the particular constellation of social and
personality factors which made it possible to translate negative atti-
tudes about the membership group into actual mobility are only partially
explicated by the research, it does nevertheless indicate that at some
point reference individuals (out-group social contacts) were involved.
Someone had singled these men out; they had been selected, encouraged
and eventually promoted. If their mobility route was an educational one, someone had recognized their ability and provided some encouragement. Others, seemingly possessed of an equally powerful motivation, an equally great dissatisfaction with their place in society, had been unable to achieve occupational and social mobility.

THE ROLE OF LUCK

Although ability and hard work undoubtedly played a significant part in the determination of who is likely to be upwardly mobile, 'luck', 'chance' and 'being at the right place at the right time' were also of considerable significance in altering to the better the direction of many careers. This is what people believed and what recent research in the United States (Jencks et al, 1972) has tended to substantiate: the store of plausible sociological and psychological variables when once exhausted leave at least half the variation in occupational and financial achievement unexplained. To refer to the remaining residual as 'luck' is, of course, to say that we do not know what else to measure. But, while such an admission is theoretically unsatisfying, leaving as it does large gaps in the elucidation of a reference group theory of social mobility, the failure of social research to uncover all of the determinants of achievement is of relevance to more general theory concerning social mobility in industrial society. It suggests that despite the general stress on rational-legal norms in industrial and post-industrial society, there remains a degree of 'looseness' in the selection process. We are, in other words, some distance away from the rigid meritocracy envisioned by Michael Young (1958) in which only measurable ability would qualify one for advancement. In the same vein what was shown earlier about downward mobility indicates that ascribed factors remain of crucial significance; those born with high status but lower
ability are not automatically downgraded.

This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that in a more general sense there is not a sorting out of people in the society, a cybernetical mechanism, as Young and Gibson (1963) put it, but that the educational system, however important, is not monolithic. As Marshall (1950: 55) concluded,

... it is good that some captains of industry should have started life at the bench, and that trade unions should be led by genuine members, men of outstanding general ability who have climbed a ladder other than the educational one. It is important to preserve these other ladders, and it is fortunate that the selection net has some pretty big holes in it. It is fortunate too, perhaps, that human affairs cannot be handled with perfect mechanical precision, even in the Welfare State.

Marshall was writing in 1950, a scant few years after the 1944 Education-Act. Do these 'holes' still exist? Will they continue to do so in the future? My data do not provide unequivocal answers to these questions. This is because men who had experienced a considerable amount of upward mobility and who had left school at the minimum leaving age were also those educated in the difficult pre-war years of the '20's and '30's. For these men to have gone to a grammar school would have been a very unusual occurrence, indeed. Part-time qualifications and on-the-job training were much more the norm than the exception. On the other hand, younger men upwardly mobile without a grammar school education were not far enough along in their careers for it to be known how high they would eventually rise or even how permanent is their upward mobility. It is, therefore, too early to say whether or not intragenerational mobility is declining in favour of intergenerational mobility through formal educational routes (See Goldthorpe, 1964).

Nor can it be said from these data that people are able to rise to positions of importance in society from humble origins. Only a handful of men interviewed in this study approximate to the label 'captains of
industry'. Instead, as the specific occupations of the upwardly mobile men revealed, most upward mobility is into positions within small or medium-sized enterprises. In any period, then, it may be that intragenerational mobility routes (as opposed to intergenerational mobility through an educational route) have most often involved smaller and more informal organizations; less often larger and more bureaucratic organizations. Thus, even as British society follows the American pattern in becoming more qualification-conscious, these less defined mobility routes may continue to be of considerable importance.  

CONSEQUENCES OF UPWARD MOBILITY

The measures used in this study illuminate only slightly personality differences between mobile and non-mobile individuals. What, nevertheless, do they tell us about the consequences of individual upward mobility? Briefly, as with downward mobility, the data give no indication that the negative consequences which have been imputed to upward mobility apply to men socially mobile in what I have called the middle mass. On the contrary, the evidence presented suggests that the upwardly mobile were no more isolated, no more prone to 'status insecurity', prejudice and anomia than others in the sample. Relative to stable working-class men and those downwardly mobile, they were economically, occupationally, physically, socially and, perhaps even psychologically, better off. Compared to their stable middle-class counterparts, men who moved up were in some dimensions, equal, and in others, superior. They were, for example, slightly richer, slightly less prejudiced, and much less dissatisfied with the present relative to the past.  

Evidence compiled by Collins (1971) indicates that in the United States academic qualifications required differ both by size of firm and by the nature of organizational goals.
Furthermore, these data fail to reveal differential consequences within the group of upwardly mobile when they are split on the basis of whether the mobility was sponsored or irregular (See: Turner, 1966). It has been hypothesised by Hopper (1971b) that 'upward mobility from the lower social classes through initial rejection routes in England is more likely to be pathogenic than its analogous pattern in the United States'. By implication, this pattern of upward mobility should then also be more pathogenic than mobility which conforms to sponsorship norms. While these hypotheses may as yet be valid for some patterns of upward mobility, they do not receive empirical support with respect to the middle-mass mobility examined in this study. Although movement upward through a formal education route provided a greater likelihood of acculturation into middle-class patterns, lack of a grammar school experience did not appear to affect individuals detrimentally relative to those who did have this experience.

At a more general theoretical level, these findings for Britain augment those for the United States which tend to refute the dissociative hypothesis concerning the effects of upward mobility. Following Durkheim's theoretical concerns with the problem of lack of social solidarity in industrial societies, this theory suggests that to experience social mobility is to be set apart, deprived of social supports and social restraints. As we have seen, this theoretical orientation appeared to have particular relevance to British society because of 1) the degree of status rigidity and 2) the significance of class subcultures as institutions mediating between the individual and the mass society. Under these conditions social mobility should be more likely to lead to marginality and to be more disruptive in its consequences than in societies where social mobility is an institutionalized fact of life. The findings outlined above cast serious doubt on the validity
of this theory and suggest, instead, that the significance of social mo-
tility has, perhaps, been overemphasised as a factor in people's lives
and as a sociological variable useful for explaining a variety of social
phenomena. It can be concluded that in Britain middle-mass mobility
does not involve its participants in attitudes and behaviour very dif-
ferent from those experienced generally by individuals in an industrial-
ised and urbanised society.

What, then, are the 'costs' of upward mobility? I have tried to
show that whatever their educational and occupational achievements, the
upwardly mobile had not become exactly like the stable middle-class men
I interviewed in the Mobility Sample or who were interviewed in the lar-
ger Work and Leisure Study. As a group their attitudes and patterns of
behaviour tended to be somewhere between those of the working-class and
the middle-class groups; they are not middle-class, but neither are they
any longer working-class. This was still true, though in more subtle
ways, of that portion of the upwardly mobile sample which in gross terms
had experienced social as well as occupational mobility. Generally,
the upwardly mobile showed less concern with the 'proprieties' of status
position; they were less interested in status striving; they were less
sure where they belonged in the class structure; they had more doubts
and misgivings about the 'rightness' of that structure; they were less
sure how to measure social class. Relative to stable middle-class men,
indeed, to all of the other men in the sample, upwardly mobile men re-
called many more aspects of their work and personal histories which had
been problematic. Often, they were still interpreting what had happened
to them, still evaluating the 'rightness' of various turning points in
their lives, still working out their position and role in society. The
result was that both the present and future also retained, for these
men, elements of unpredictability and uncertainty. In a word, occupa-
tional mobility had wrenched them out of the taken-for-granted world that seemed to be so readily available to those who had not been mobile.

COGNITIVE POVERTY

Are these costs or are these the unanticipated fringe benefits of social and occupational mobility? In the end, of course, this is a value question. Does one believe, as does Hoggart (1957), that there are virtues in working-class life that are lost to those who move upwards, not to be replaced by what are perhaps the equally meritorious values of the middle class? Or, does one point to the truncated and blinkered existence, what Klein (1965) calls the cognitive poverty of class, which in this study as in hers, paradoxically created a bond of commonality between those stable in the middle and working class? Are the upwardly mobile the harbingers of change, those possessed of the 'plasticity' and 'inventiveness' required by a complex society, or are they, instead, the destroyers of tradition, victims of the deracination of industrial society, men unsure of their place in the world?

The experience of this research leads me to the former interpretation. I set out to look at the consequences of social mobility, but I found instead that it is the 'cognitive poverty', resulting from stability in the class structure rather than the 'rootlessness' caused by social mobility which is, perhaps, the greater concern. Whereas the upwardly mobile, generally, were 'their own men', those stable in the middle or working class more often than not emerged as 'prisoners' of family and class, acted upon rather than acting, faithfully reproducing in yet another generation, attitudes and behaviour which in different ways, 8

8 For a more extended discussion of cognitive poverty in groups at various levels in the class structure, see pages 87-96; 367-8; and 535-7 of Klein (1965).
perhaps, have become 'dysfunctional' within an industrial or post-industrial society. As Gans (1962: 249) observes, sub-cultures are essentially responses to the perceived structures of opportunities and social conditions; they provide their members with ways of coping and with world views buttressing and preserving self-respect. But, they may also perpetuate a set of inappropriately narrow attitudes and values after opportunity structures and social conditions have changed or are in the process of changing.

One result is that in the working class, aspirations remain generally low, education is devalued and upward social mobility is discouraged. At the same time, moving up in the world for most working class people was defined strictly in economic rather than in status or occupational dimensions. Most were very aware of the possibly unprecedented rise in general standard of living which everyone had experienced since the War. Restrained as they were by these same sub-cultural norms, it was not apparent that 'needs' had undergone so much of a transformation as to vastly overtake the rises in disposable income most had experienced. In short, there was little evidence of either relative or absolute economic and status deprivation among men stable in the working class (or downwardly mobile).

Such a conclusion is clearly not applicable to stable middle-class men. Indeed, one of the most striking impressions of this study was the extent 'core' members of the middle class evidenced status and financial deprivation. Mostly I was comparing these men with the upwardly mobile, those at the periphery of the middle class. But, interestingly, few seemed aware of the actual possibility of upward mobility into their midst; this, despite the fact that about half of what is objectively defined as middle class is composed of newcomers.\(^9\) Evidently it was not

\(^9\) At which point it is relevant to ask: which is the middle class:
these men, largely unrecognized as they are, who comprised the comparative reference group. Rather, what I recorded were sentiments recognized at least since Orwell was writing in the '30's: that relative to their own past and to the working class of today, they feel worse off. While middle-class incomes have risen, if not faster, then as fast as those of other classes, the costs of traditional middle-class needs have in their view risen much more quickly. They feel less able than their fathers to reject the institutions of the Welfare State—council housing, public education, often the National Health—yet they also feel compelled by class standards to attempt to do so. In what must be seen as an inversion of the Nietzschean concept of 'ressentiment', envy, anger and hatred instead of being directed towards those at the top finds its most common target in the dockers and car assembly workers.\textsuperscript{10} They resent but feel unable to copy the 'carefree' and 'easy' life of the affluent worker unencumbered as he often is by Building Society Loans and school fees.

\textsuperscript{10} Scheler (1972: 45) describes the phenomenon of ressentiment as 'a self-poisoning of the mind...a lasting mental attitude caused by the systematic repression of certain emotions affects.... Their repression leads to the constant tendency to indulge in certain kinds of value delusions and corresponding value judgements. The emotions and affects primarily concerned are revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to detract and spite'.
Implicit in the preceding paragraphs is a plausible interpretation of why social mobility may not, or may not any longer, involve the kinds of consequences which the dissociative theory has led us to expect. It will be recalled that the disruptive effects of mobility have generally been understood to be more likely to occur where there is a relatively high degree of status rigidity, inadequate preparation for mobility and where the social distance traversed is large. There is the further assumption that the constraints of class are powerful and binding and when once broken by social mobility effectively leave the individual isolated and anxious about his social status and identity. However, it would appear that several of these necessary conditions are in present day British society either missing or less relevant than in the past. While core members of the middle class remain concerned with status and do not readily accept newcomers into their midst, evidence in Chapter 12 suggests those moving upwards do not, by and large, seem very anxious to be accepted by this group; it does not appear to constitute a significant reference group for them. Thus, not only has their mobility not been so intensive as to cause them to come directly into contact with core members of the middle class, but the upwardly mobile also appear to be relatively devoid of interest in status striving.

Furthermore, as Goldthorpe et al (1969: 163) have pointed out, there has been a general shift away from a community-oriented form of social life 'towards recognition of the conjugal family and its fortunes as concerns of overriding importance'. My data would tend to bear out their thesis of increasing 'privatisation' at various levels in the social structure. It may be, then, that those moving upwards are, perhaps, more in tune with the predominant norms concerning sociability and class allegiance than those they were being measured against. The
latter may in their continuing concern with status striving and the pro-
prieties of status situation reflect vestiges of a status system no long-
er meaningful for the majority of individuals in the society. If this
is indeed the case, then, along with an input of new talent into the
middle class, upward mobility also provides it with a modicum of vitali-
ty and sensitivity to changing circumstances.

These, then, are the conclusions which can be drawn from the study
relating specifically to the question of the consequences of upward so-
cial mobility in Britain. The present study cannot, of course, claim
to be a definitive statement. Its major contribution is to have moved
this aspect of the study of upward and downward mobility in Britain
from speculation based on earlier findings in other societies to the
realm of empirical enquiry. ¹¹ My operational measure of social mobili-
ty is occupational mobility and I have confined the analysis to inter-
generational movements across the manual/non-manual line and vice versa.
Intensive study of mobility upward and downward within the middle class,
especially into and out of elite groups is, on the basis of my findings
about the middle class, clearly required. It is also important to keep
in mind that these data are not timeless. They are historically speci-
fic and involve, principally, men who were born in the depression years
and during World War II. Men born in the affluent post-war years are
likely to have very different aspirations and, at mid-career, to look
back upon their mobility experience from a very different perspective
than men raised in the '20's and '30's. Thus, not only do conditions
change, but so do attitudes and values. But within the confines of
these caveats, the most firm conclusion is that it is as much, if not

¹¹There are a number of examples of the former, but see especially
more likely to be, non-mobility rather than mobility which is associated with negative consequences. In different ways, perhaps, the upwardly and downwardly mobile appeared to be very satisfied with what had happened to them over their lifetime.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This study was not undertaken with specific policy issues in mind but it may be useful to put the findings of this study in a policy as well as theoretical context. We are, I believe, in a period of re-evaluation of our sociological and political thinking about the relationship of education to social mobility. A decade ago, policy statements would inevitably have included a plea for an expansion in state education and for other changes which were thought likely to provide easier access for those of lower status. Education was held to be key to social mobility for the individual as well as essential in the functioning of an industrialised and bureaucratised society. Both theory and policy were, therefore, embedded in the liberal value that equality of opportunity is an acceptable substitute for equality of condition. Meritocracy, though problematic with respect to certain aspects of social justice was, nevertheless, viewed as congruent with the equally compelling norms of universalism, achievement and efficiency. Education was accorded a central role in industrialisation because of what Collins (1971) calls the technical-functional theory of education. The assumption was that the skill requirements of jobs in industrial society are constantly rising making more and more formal education necessary if these jobs are to be performed adequately.

In recent years this highly positive view of education and its function in society has come under serious attack from a variety of
quarters. First, although there is now conclusive evidence that amount of education is positively related to occupational status, the linkage is much weaker than had been supposed. As I have tried to show in this study, for instance, education does not provide the only mobility route in industrial society. Secondly, the American attempt to promote equality of opportunity has shown that 'schooling up society' makes very little difference to the amount of inequality in society. Rather than an independent factor able to shape and alter the stratification system, education is, therefore, currently debunked as an institution whose main function is to reproduce and legitimize relations of inequality from generation to generation. The potential for educational change to change society, or the rate of social mobility for that matter, would appear, then, to be much more limited than was previously supposed.

Furthermore, the functional significance of education has also been under attack. Rather than a necessary concomitant of industrialisation, the more pessimistic conclusion is that education is, in main, counter-productive and wastes social resources. Collins (1971) presents a convincing argument that educational expansion has preceded much more rapidly than the technical or skill requirements of industrial society and that education contributes little to individual productivity; vocational skills are learned primarily on the job not in school. The requisite credentials for entry into occupations rise not because of

12 The literature is vast and growing. With particular reference to this discussion, however, see: Collins (1971); Gintis (1971 and 1972); Karabel (1972); Illich (1971).

13 American studies have indicated that the correlation between schooling and occupational prestige is about \( r = 0.50 \). While far from a modest relationship, it does mean that only about one-quarter of the variance in occupational achievement is explained by education. (See: Blau and Duncan, 1967; Sewall et al, 1969).

14 For example, see Chapter 2 in which I showed that rates of social mobility had not changed despite educational reform.
technological change but because of the ability of some occupational groups to control entry. In sum, education is increasingly viewed as a power resource, a strategic device to maintain and legitimate class barriers and in a process akin to constant rounds of wage settlements, education becomes subject to inflation—given levels of education 'buy' ever decreasing amounts of occupational status and income.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR BRITAIN**

In Britain, unlike the United States, education has not so far been oversold nor has it, as yet, a monopoly on access to opportunity. It has been suggested that in the United States the concern moved from quantity of education to equality of opportunity and is now beginning to be directed to the problem of the quality of the education. Historically in Britain the third of these concerns has received a considerable amount of attention. While the provision of literacy was met much earlier on, there has been considerable resistance to the substitution of quality by quantity. For reasons suggested above, the second of these problems is not likely solvable by the educational system and could, for the time being, be more fruitfully ignored. What has up until recently looked like a lack of progress in educational expansion and reform might be transposed into a positive program designed to make more rational use of social resources. Thus, while a total process of deschooling is probably sociologically impossible, the further creation of an artificial credential system is, by the same token, not necessarily inevitable.

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15 See Gintis (1972) for further corroboration of these somewhat surprising findings. His finds that there is virtually no correlation between occupation and cognitive ability. For an earlier British view along these lines, see Cotgrove (1962).

16 For instance, progressive raising of the school leaving age is not likely to have much effect on the second of these concerns.

17 There are, of course, strong pressures to make the only valuable
The alternative may be to direct greater attention to improving and strengthening existing educational structures rather than extending schooling into even more areas of social life. In this respect, the findings of this study suggest a number of recommendations which as well as being compatible with individual needs would also be beneficial at the societal level in both providing people with the necessary skills while not at the same time squandering resources.

First, a concerted effort should be made to retain apprenticeship programs and to extend and strengthen them wherever possible. This view represents, of course, a reversal in thinking during the 1960's which resulted in the 1964 Industrial Training Act. This act effectively represented a new initiative in that it shifted the ultimate responsibility for training from employers to the state. But, the message which seems to emerge most clearly from recent thinking on education and mobility in the United States is that while the State may have taken over this function it has done so inefficiently and ineffectively. Despite the proliferation of degree and diploma programmes, transmission of actual skills apparently still occurs mainly in the work place. These skills those which are the result of formal education. As I have shown in this study, if one wants to be upwardly mobile or to maintain a middle-class status then it pays to go to a grammar school. At the individual level the race for more credentials makes rational sense as a reasonable defence in the more general battle for status. But as in the vicious circle of wages and prices, what is individually rational may be, seen as irrational when applied to the group or societal level. For example, it is simplistic to suppose that men in my sample who found their mobility limited because of their lack of academic credentials would have fared better had there been greater educational opportunities or if the private school system had been eliminated. More likely is that other ascriptive criteria, or even more academic credentials, would have been imposed as means to exclude them from entry into elite status groups.

18 Carter (1966: 179). This study presents an especially good analysis of industrial training as it was in the mid-1960's. My interviews suggest that the shortcomings and problems Carter describes have if anything worsened.
Programs, no matter how often they are revised are simply not able to keep in touch with what is happening in industry and remain relevant to the needs and aspirations of young people.

At the same time, the experience of some of my informants provides impressive proof of the worth of retaining the link between further education and work. This was especially so for men employed in larger organisations with clearly defined hierarchies. The G.P.O. was, in this regard, a model organisation with its provision of a clear set of rewards and promotions for each level of certification achieved. For some, of course, an apprenticeship amounted as Carter (1966: 183) puts it, 'to no more than "standing next to Nelly"--that is, standing alongside a skilled man, watching what he does and taking advantage of any tips that he may give'. For others in my sample, especially those in small firms, an apprenticeship seemed to mean little more than that they were relative to friends in factories providing cheap labour. It is not surprising, therefore, that a sizeable proportion of my respondents had abandoned their so-called apprenticeship in favour of more highly paid semi-skilled and unskilled jobs.

Thus, my objection with respect to industrial training is not that the state ought to become less involved but that there are more productive ways it might act than simply providing more schooling. With respect to improving social mobility its efforts may more usefully be directed toward providing financial encouragement to firms and individuals engaged in apprenticeship programs. For young school leavers who take up apprenticeships this might imply subsidies designed to bring their income up to levels competitive with semi-skilled and unskilled work. Introduction of a voucher system by which those who did not enter an apprenticeship on leaving school might do so later without substan-
tial loss of income would perhaps be of benefit to men who like many of
my informants regretted not having taken up a trade. The state might,
at the same time, provide the necessary structures and incentives for
smaller firms unable or unwilling to provide their own apprenticeship
program. 19 What it need not do is mindlessly emulate the American model
of a totally 'schooled-up' society by further expansion of the education-
al establishment.

Pressure to do so, of course, comes in part from the growing struc-
tural problem of how to fit young people into the wider society; the
caretaker function of post-secondary education cannot be entirely ig-
nored. But to refer again to the experience of the United States, it
is also apparent that the disappearance of apprenticeship programs must
be held partially accountable for the existence of the problem in the
first place. 20

The American experience makes it doubtful that locking up young
people--keeping them off the streets in the popular jargon--and providing
them with what turns out to be largely a meaningless education is the
solution to the problem. While the student role is in some respects
useful in providing a place for young people in society, it is also
apparent that within a class society educational institutions are neces-
sarily also stratified so that it is erroneous to speak of a single
student body. (Karabel, 1973). As Gintis (1972: 57) notes, 'the so-
cial relations of education produce and reinforce those values, attitudes
and affective capacities which allow individuals to more smoothly into

19 In some instances this might more effectively be carried out by
local authorities contracting out to private firms some of the training
now carried out by colleges of further education and other types of lo-
cal colleges. (For a discussion of 'performance contracting', see:
Corwin (1973).

20 This is an important theme in most of Paul Goodman's writing on
education.
an alienated and class-stratified society'. Like community colleges in the United States, colleges of further education if they were to become obligatory would function not only 'to keep adolescent off the street' but also as Illich (1971: 401) puts it, 'to school them down to size' — make them more accepting of their probably mediocre position in the class structure. If this is indeed the latent functions of further education it could, at least be made manifest thus opening the way for a curriculum which is more 'entertaining' than that which presently leads to City and Guild and National Certificates.

My comments have been directed mainly at further education because this aspect of education appears to be sufficiently undeveloped that depending on the policy developed, it could be moved in a different direction. Change is not completely blocked by vested educational interests. With respect to other educational routes the structures appear more solidified and resistant to change. With respect to grammar school education, there is little which emerges from my research which has not already been said better and more thoroughly by Jackson and Marsden (1962) in their admirable study of grammar school education and social mobility. For reasons suggested in the preceding discussion of cognitive poverty, it would seem that they are correct in feeling it desirable to break the stranglehold the middle class has upon grammar school training. As they suggest, grammar schools are not very effective in transmitting adequately a middle-class culture to upwardly mobile working-class students. But even if this function of status training was performed adequately, it is questionable whether complete acculturation into a middle class perspective is any longer a service to either the individual or society. Transmission of what Jackson and Marsden refer to as 'one central culture' might, therefore, better be performed
by a more extensive provision of sixth forms within the secondary modern system. Certainly, this had benefitted some of my informants enabling them to obtain Ordinary and Advanced level qualifications without at the same time undergoing the usual stress of breaking with family and peers or subjecting them to a marginal and rudderless social existence as seems inevitable for those who win a place in a grammar school. There remains, of course, the distinct danger that academic credentials earned in this way may not be as highly valued as those obtained in the traditional manner; relative first to public school and then to a state grammar school, such credentials may be treated as an inferior currency in the market place. Nevertheless, extension of this policy may be an effective compromise in providing an additional occupational mobility route without, at the same time, creating the sense of status anxiety and status ambivalence normally the lot of the 'scholarship boy'. As we have seen, the concern that people have about objective discrepancies in status versus economic position have, perhaps, been exaggerated by sociologists; many people are satisfied to improve only economically.

In conclusion, this study when set into the context of theory, research and ideology bolsters the general policy advocated by T. H. Marshall in the early years of the Welfare State: that as long as we are burdened with a class society, the aim should be to keep open as many mobility channels as is possible. The most just and rational policy is one which insures that no single criterion nor social institution becomes the sole legitimate means of access to various positions in the social hierarchy. To lose sight of that goal is also to lose sight of the fact that the principal virtue of an open society is its tolerance for and acceptance of a large degree of variability and uncertainty in its selection processes.
APPENDIX 1

THE DATA COLLECTION PROCESS

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

While this study was in many ways exploratory, the kinds of questions I chose to ask were, for the most part, guided by a tentative allegiance to the non-integration hypothesis described in Chapter 6. Thus, I suggested that the mobile individual is likely to have come from a background characterized by some manifestations of marginality or lack of integration into his objective class membership group. Further, I argued that this pattern of marginal behaviour might carry over into adult life and in part account for the kinds of variances which have been observed in previous research. As well, some specific hypotheses having little or nothing to do with this general hypothesis were included. These, pertaining to both determinants and consequences of social mobility, come from existing research (mainly American) and are ones about which there are contradictory findings or which have not been systematically investigated in Britain.

It should be noted, also, that when, below, social mobility is treated as an independent variable, I had in mind that various mobility measures—intergenerational occupational mobility, career mobility and 'subjective' mobility—would be related to the data collected. How, and to what extent, these would differ was unclear. There is, therefore, a null hypothesis, unstated below, to the effect that there are no differences between various mobility measures in the observed patterns of behaviour.\(^1\) Finally, although most of these hypotheses imply

\(^1\) Very little of this is reported in preceding chapters because in analysing the data, I could find between various measures of mobility little difference in predictive power.
direction, the evidence was not always so clear as this suggests. In some instances the question is at this stage only whether there are any differences between the mobile and the non-mobile, upward mobility and downward mobility and so on. The main and explicit hypotheses which prompted me to ask the questions I did are, then, as follows.

**SOCIAL MOBILITY AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE**

The first set of working hypotheses are concerned with the non-integration theory outlined in Chapter 6:

1. Sons of upwardly mobile fathers are most likely to be downwardly mobile than sons of stationary high status fathers. Sons of downwardly mobile fathers are more likely to be upwardly mobile than sons of stationary low status fathers.

2. Geographical mobility of the parental family will be positively associated with social mobility.

3. Mobiles are more likely than non-mobiles to report they experienced social isolation while growing up.

4. Fathers of mobile sons are more likely to have felt isolated and report fewer social contacts while the respondent was growing up than non-mobiles.

5. Mobiles are more likely to have changed peer or friendship groups during adolescence than non-mobiles.

6. Extreme mobiles are more likely than either stationaries or low mobiles to report an unhappy childhood.

7. Fathers' job stability will be negatively associated with downward mobility of respondents.

8. Parental family disorganization will be positively associated with downward mobility of the respondents.

Some other hypotheses, related mainly to family structure, which have emerged from the review of the literature were:

9. More mobiles than non-mobiles will have had extra-familial support and guidance in the choice of first job.

10. Only children and children in extreme sibling positions are more likely to be upwardly mobile than children in middle sibling positions.

11. Children from small families are more likely to be upwardly mobile than children from large families.
(12) Respondents with upwardly mobile older brothers are more likely to be mobile than those with non-mobile older brothers.

(13) Parents of upwardly mobile respondents will have been more 'ambitious and encouraging' than parents of stationary and downwardly mobile respondents.

(14) Strong encouragement from the respondent's mother will be positively associated with upward mobility.

(15) Upward mobiles will tend to marry later than non-mobiles and downward mobiles.

(16) Upward mobiles begin families later than stationaries or downward mobiles.

(17) Failure to achieve the educational level 'required' to maintain the occupational level of respondents' father will be positively related to downward mobility.

(18) Poor health will be positively associated with downward mobility of respondents.

**SOCIAL MOBILITY AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE**

Here there was more previous research about the consequences for social integration and acculturation into attitudes and behavioural patterns of the destination class. At the same time, there is little agreement about the direction of relationships between patterns of mobility and these variables. While in the text I have attempted to postulate the direction of these relationships, I cast them here in the null-form.

(1) There is no difference between the upwardly mobile and stable non-manual in numbers of relatives seen in the previous week.

(2) There is no difference between the downwardly mobile and stable manual in numbers of relatives seen in the previous week.

(3) There is no difference between the upwardly mobile and stable non-manual in numbers of friends seen in the previous week.

(4) There is no difference between the downwardly mobile and stable manual in numbers of friends seen in the previous week.

(5) There is no difference between the upwardly mobile and the stable non-manual in level of participation in activities and secondary organizations.
(6) There is no difference between the downwardly mobile and the stable manual in level of participation in activities and secondary organizations.

(7) There is no difference between upwardly mobile and stable non-manual in level of prejudiced attitudes.

(8) There is no difference between downwardly mobile and stable manual in level of prejudiced attitudes.

(9) There is no difference between upwardly mobile and stable non-manual in level of anomia.

(10) There is no difference between downwardly mobile and stable manual in level of anomia.

(11) There will be no difference between upwardly mobile and stable non-manual in political party preference.

(12) There will be no difference between downwardly mobile and stable manual in political party preference.

(13) For each of these it was also hypothesized that there would be no difference between high upward and low upward mobiles; between high downward and low downward mobiles; between the upwardly mobile through an educational route and the upwardly mobile through a non-educational route. 2

THE SAMPLE

One difficulty in the way of an intensive analysis of individual social mobility is what type of sieve will best sort the mobile from the non-mobile. Most mobility studies are by-products of other sociological concerns, or are carried out alongside a number of interests all competing for space on the questionnaire. The result is that the usual random or stratified random sampling frame suffers from 'asking the many too many and the few too few questions' (Svalastoga, 1956: 150). This will be true whenever mobility is defined as movement upward or downward between manual and non-manual categories since only about 25 to 30 percent of the male population have in fact been mobile. Thus, a large number of the socially mobile will not be included. Yet,

2 The concepts used in these hypotheses are discussed in Chapters 9-11.
the way around this problem, disproportional stratified sampling requires some prior identification of the socially mobile and non-mobile. It means, in practice, re-interviewing a set of sub-samples having different sampling fractions so that the upwardly and downwardly mobile have, compared to the non-mobile, a greater chance for inclusion than their relative proportions would dictate. In this study there are two sets of data under consideration called, respectively, the Work and Leisure Study and the Mobility Sample. The respondents in both are the same, the difference is when they were interviewed and what data were collected.

THE WORK AND LEISURE STUDY

In the spring and summer of 1970, the Institute of Community Studies interviewed 1,928 people aged 17 and over in the London Metropolitan Region. This is an area extending roughly from Reading in the West to Southend-on-Sea in the East; from Stevenage in the North to within five miles of Brighton in the South. All of Greater London and a substantial proportion of what can in somewhat vague terms be called the commuter region are encompassed within these boundaries. According to the 1971 census, slightly over one-quarter (26.1%) of the population of England and Wales live within this area.

Using a two-stage random sample, the survey investigated various aspects of family life, work and leisure. Although social mobility

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3 Disproportional stratified sampling is discussed in Blalock (1960: 401-402).

4 By way of contrast, the South-East Region contains some 35 percent of the total population of England and Wales (Census, 1971: Preliminary Report).

5 A more detailed description of how the sample was drawn is given in Young and Willmott (1973).
was not an important interest of the study, respondents were questioned in some detail about their present occupations and in somewhat less detail about those of their fathers. All occupational data were coded using a modification of the Registrar-General's five-fold social class scheme. Class III--skilled manual and routine grades of non-manual--was split into manual and non-manual. Throughout, Class III was treated as consisting of two classes, yielding a six-fold classificatory scheme which we refer to using arabic numerals. It was, therefore, possible to determine who had been intergenerationally mobile and non-mobile as measured in terms of occupational movement.

The final sample of names and addresses came, in all cases from the most recent voting lists for each ward. Interviewers were, therefore, required to contact the specific person chosen, not just anyone in the house. Without 'replacement', 2,644 of the original 3,000 names and addresses were defined as eligible for interviewing. These, in turn, yielded 1,928 completed interviews (934 men and 994 women), a response rate of 73 percent. Comparison with the sample census, 1966, suggests that the Work and Leisure sample under-represented young people and single people and unskilled workers. As well, 40 male respondents had, for my particular purposes, to be excluded because of inadequate information (mainly on fathers' occupations). Ten male full-time students were also excluded. These latter exclusions were fairly evenly distributed over the five occupational classes and do not appear to represent any further departure from the above estimates of representatives. In terms of social mobility, the main effect of these biases, possibly, is to underestimate downward mobility. There were, in total, then, 884

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6 The precise wording was for respondents: 'What is your occupation?'; or in the case of retired and unemployed people, 'What was your (main) occupation?'; for fathers: 'What is or was your father's (main) occupation?'.


men for whom complete occupational data on themselves and their fathers were available.

**MOBILITY SUB-SAMPLE**

As I was to do all the interviewing, the Mobility Sub-sample had to be one that was manageable, given the time, money, and above all, energy I had available. Secondly, whatever number I decided upon would (hopefully) be doubled by the decision to make the study a two generation one. That is, I hoped to interview the fathers of the respondents wherever possible, as well. Thus, on the one hand the effective sample which I had to draw from was drastically reduced by the elimination of those respondents, whose fathers were no longer living. But, on the other, the number of people who I could hope to interview had to take into account the fact that each completed interview would also generate another potential one.

The final sampling strategy was a compromise between the limitations imposed by working as a lone researcher, the desire to catch the extremes of mobility, and the obviously important factor of having a sufficiently large sample that some basic cross tabulations could be carried out and differences could be generalized. Taking into account the two generation aspect of the study, it seemed likely on the basis of a small pilot study that I could expect to interview about 120 respondents who would, in turn, generate about 80 fathers; 200 interviews in all.

The next step was to classify the respondents in the Work and Leisure Study into upward and downward mobility, short distance and long distance mobility and non-mobility. Social mobility was defined in the conventional manner as intergenerational movement upward or downward across the manual-non-manual line and all other patterns as non-mobili-
ty. Using the six classes of the modified Registrar-General's Classification, mobility was then conceived as forming four patterns, depending on direction and distance—the number of social classes-traversed.

These were:

1. High upward: Intergenerational movement 3 to 5 classes from manual to non-manual.
2. Low upward: Intergenerational movement 1 or 2 classes from manual to non-manual.
3. High downward: Intergenerational movement 3 to 5 classes from non-manual to manual.
4. Low downward: Intergenerational movement 1 or 2 classes from non-manual to manual.

For comparison purposes, it was also necessary to include some of the non-mobile. Non-mobility was, therefore, conceived as:

5. Stable manual: Manual respondents whose fathers were also in manual occupations.
6. Stable non-manual: Non-manual respondents whose fathers were also in non-manual occupations.

These two latter categories therefore contained as well as stable people, men who were 1 or 2 categories upward or downward from their fathers.

Column (1) and (2) of Table A.1 presents the data, so classified, from the total Work and Leisure Study and for that portion with fathers living. The measure of mobility used was the number of occupational categories between the respondent's present job and his father's last or main job.
### TABLE A.1
SUMMARY OF MOBILITY DATA FOR THE WORK AND LEISURE STUDY & THE MOBILITY SAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility</th>
<th>(1) Total</th>
<th>(2) Total Fathers in Mobility</th>
<th>(3) Total Chosen Sample</th>
<th>(4) Fathers Interviewed</th>
<th>(5) Interviews Completed*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Upward</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Upward</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Downward</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Downward</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Non-manual</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Manual</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>884</strong></td>
<td><strong>332</strong></td>
<td><strong>155</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>117</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on the final coding of fathers' and sons' occupations; there were some errors and changes from the initial coding in the Work and Leisure Study.

Choosing of the actual people, was, except for the High Upward category, reasonably straightforward. The High Upward category was made up as follows: all of the male respondents who had been four or five categories upwardly mobile were selected. As well, all of those who had been upwardly mobile 3 categories and whose fathers were living were included. An additional 10 were selected, randomly, from those whose fathers were not living. The total respondents in the High Upward category were 40. All of the High Downward respondents were chosen, whether their fathers were living or not. Total = 17. The Low Downward category consists of all respondents in that category with fathers living at the time of the interview. Total = 23. Finally, I chose at random 25 respondents with fathers living, from the Low Upward, Stable

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7All eligible respondents in each category were numbered and then selected using a table of random numbers.
Non-manual and Stable Manual categories. Total = 75. These figures are summarized in Column (3) of Table A.1.

As I indicated in Chapter 3, the Mobility Sample is on the whole significantly wealthier and younger than the Work and Leisure Study sample. This is largely because of the disproportional sampling of the upwardly mobile who are, of course, in white-collar occupations. The effect on the class composition of the Mobility Sample compared to the Work and Leisure Study of this sampling method is shown in Table A.2. As the last two rows suggest, the Mobility Sample overrepresents non-manual and underrepresents the manual by about 20 percent. This is an unavoidable result of the attempt to include more of the socially mobile than is usually the case.

**TABLE A.2**

CLASS COMPOSITION OF THE MOBILITY SUB-SAMPLE AND THE WORK AND LEISURE STUDY SAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Work and Leisure Study</th>
<th>Mobility Sub-Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number of Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N-M</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Manual</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>884</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Differences do not cancel due to rounding.*

INTERVIEWING

All of the advantages of the area sampling used in the Work and
Leisure Study washed out in the second round of interviewing. Whereas it was possible the first time round to employ interviewers living in or close to the selected areas, my respondents were dotted thinly over the whole of the London Metropolitan Region. While I attempted to create some sort of systematic coverage of areas it usually occurred that there was one 'telephoneless' individual left in (say) Tunbridge Wells when I was directing most of my time to, perhaps, Reading. As a result, it was not unusual to drive for two hours or more in the hope of making an appointment, seldom an interview, finding no one at home, and driving two more hours home again. As well, it was often the case that one night's work would result in a week's work of appointments, leaving no time over to make more for the week following. Interviewing tended therefore to go in spurts, with a busy week or 10 days punctuated by several days of making new appointments.

Before contacting each person, he received a letter reminding him of the previous interview and explaining in general terms the purpose of the second interview. A few days later I contacted him by telephone, or more usually in person. In most cases, it was preferable to conduct the interview another evening when the respondent was ready. Some contacted me; in two instances, to refuse; but a number also wanted to arrange an appointment or to tell me they would be away during certain times, on business or holiday. To complete 117 interviews, plus another 40 with fathers, took the greater part of eleven months from January, 1971 to December, 1971, and meant working nearly every week night and many Saturdays during that period. I also covered the London Region many times over, driving more than 10,000 miles in the pursuit of interviews.

The interviews themselves, took from about an hour to in some cases
several hours. Most were in people's homes or gardens with endless cups of tea and coffee, sherry, beer, and in one memorable instance, 'five star' cognac. Two interviews were conducted in offices, one in a club in Piccadilly, the interviewee arriving breathless from a 100-mile-an-hour run; from Birmingham. Another, with a service station owner, could only be done in the intervals between filling cars with petrol. Most often I saw the man alone, but wives, sometimes merely curious, sometimes keen to be interviewed themselves and sometimes resentful of the 'male chauvinism' implied by my solely male study, listened in. In a rare few, the whole family and the television were present, there seeming to be only one room available or warm enough, or it may not have occurred to the respondent that privacy is helpful.

All interviews were taped and later transcribed on to the interview schedule. While an onerous and boring task, I found the tape recorder aided immensely in allowing the interview to be a semi-conversation rather than an interrogation. I asked everyone if they minded me taping the interview, and in no instance did anyone refuse. Nor did it seem to create much sense of discernible awkwardness. At the same time, few forgot its presence either. This was often illustrated by my respondents warning people entering the room that they were being taped. But on the whole, the moments of awkwardness were vastly over-balanced by the ease it allowed in the interview, the time saved where factual questions were answered as part of another and, most of all, in giving me freedom to 'probe' or follow-up interesting digressions.

LOSSES

Although I drew 155 names, I was only able to obtain complete interviews with 117 men. The success rate was, therefore, 75.5 percent—not much different than that obtained in the first round of interview-
ing. Reasons for the losses were many as Table A.3 shows:

**TABLE A.3**

**REASONS FOR FAILURE IN MOBILITY SUB-SAMPLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refusal</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Contact</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceased</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From one viewpoint the number of refusals was surprising, since all of respondents had been interviewed previously and had indicated that they would be willing to undergo a second interview. They had, however, already been through a fairly taxing interview of about one hour in length and many had, as well, been asked to keep a diary listing their activities for one week. The pattern and size of the failure rate turned out about the same as if I had called 'cold' on a random selection of people taken directly from voting lists. The difference, then, was mostly in the kind of reception I received and the ease with which it was possible to explain why I was calling. In terms of 'completed' interviews, however, there appears to be little advantage in using a sample already interviewed once.

One difference was that I knew a considerable amount about those who refused a second interview. As there is a good deal of speculation about the characteristics of those who refuse interviews, I attempted to link up some basic variables, such as class, mobility pattern, age and education. However, I was unable to find any systematic relationship between these variables and success rate. Presumably, failures are, as is generally hoped, randomly distributed in the population.
THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE\(^8\)

As I have indicated, this study was in large part an exploratory one. Thus, as well as wanting to 'try out' some American findings on British data, I wanted, to use Wilensky's (1966: 31) phrase, information about 'where a man has been, where he is now and where he expects to go'. Social mobility is a rich concept involving many more aspects than we are usually able or willing to measure and I hoped by a second interview to gain some insights and impressions not usually possible from survey data. I had, from the first interview, an objective measure of intergenerational mobility along with considerable data about income, housing, 'subjective class', job satisfaction, participation, leisure habits and extent and nature of interpersonal relationships. The second interview supplemented this with information about the individual's education and work-life history, his family background and that of his wife, his aspirations and expectations (for himself and his children) and a personal evaluation of his mobility achievement within the context of his view of social structure. In addition, I also attempted to tap attitudes about politics, immigration, powerlessness and anomia.

Because resources for extensive piloting were not available, a number of questions were either taken directly from other studies or were closely modelled on them. In particular, I used verbatim the Srole anomia scale (Srole, 1956) and with some minor modifications, the measure of prejudice devised by Rose et al (1968). Questions about occupations, though not precisely the same, were modelled to a considerable extent on those used by Wilensky (1966). The same is true of the scale of ambition (17) which is a combination of one devised by Reissman (1953)

\(^8\) The complete schedule is presented in Appendix 2.
and revised by Wilensky (1966).

The idea of asking each respondent to grade a list of occupations proved a particularly effective way of achieving several goals. Firstly, it served as a talking point around which to base a number of questions about occupational prestige and class structure. Secondly, after grading the occupations in terms of social standing, I asked everyone where their own occupation would go and where they would, similarly, put their father's occupation. In this way I obtained a measure of intergenerational mobility which was both subjective and which was also within the context of the individual's conception of the occupational structure. This method, while somewhat round-about, worked extremely well. In main, people made assessments which sometimes put them above, sometimes below and sometimes equal with their fathers. While most put together an 'orthodox' grading, using a variety of criteria, two could not, after much thought, grade them at all, and quite a number thought in terms of only two classes. 9

Questions about 'moving up in the world', near the end of the interview, were similarly designed to tap people's evaluation and definition of social mobility. If class was not mentioned, as it seldom was, I then asked whether in the respondent's opinion it is possible for an individual to change social class and if so whether he felt he had done so. 10 This set of questions seemed to have worked very well. The range of responses they elicited suggests there was little or no carryover from the earlier discussion of occupational prestige and mobility.

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9 Only a few aspects of this part of the interview are reported in this study.

10 This question was incorrectly omitted from the interview schedule. It was, however, asked systematically of everyone.
One of the unresolved problems in measuring social mobility is at what point to record the fathers' and sons' occupations. The measure I had, from the Work and Leisure Study was the son's present job and the father's last or main job. I supplemented this by two more measures of occupational mobility: (1) father's job when the son was age 16 and (2) father's job when he was the same age as the respondent was at the time of the interview, what is usually referred to as an age-specific measure. The mobility measure obtained from the Work and Leisure study can be considered as the conventional measure of intergenerational mobility, the second as a measure of 'pure' intergenerational mobility and the age-specific measure as the one most appropriate for questions about the openness and fluidity of the class structure and the nature of the opportunity structure. An attempt was also made, while constructing the family tree, to obtain information on grandfathers' occupations as well. Unfortunately, as indicated in Chapter 7, this was extremely hard to do; a majority of respondents were unable to recall what their grandfather (on either side) had done for a living.

**TWO GENERATION STUDY**

Lipset and Bendix (1959: 183) suggest that what we require is a complete career history of both generations. Since this is clearly impossible, they argue that the best approximation is to interview the living fathers of all sons in a sample. As well as the more complete picture of the patterns of mobility over three generations, such a study could also provide valuable information about family structure, family 'climate' and parental attitudes and perceptions of the son's mobility—data which is difficult to obtain from a single generation perspective.

Information collected in the Work and Leisure Study made it possible to determine who had fathers living. This suggested that a two genera-
tions study would be feasible. During the interview, I therefore asked everyone for permission to contact their father as well. The purpose of this was explained in some detail and it was stressed that the interview would be much shorter than the one just completed. Despite a high degree of success in the pilot stage, the results from the main study were disappointing. Where I had hoped to obtain some 80-100 completed interviews, I was in the end able to see only 40 fathers. There are a variety of reasons for the size of the failure rate, but by far the largest single source of 'fall-out' was through the direct refusal by sons to give me permission to visit their fathers. Refusals did not simply reflect suspicion, or fear of loss of privacy but in many cases, fairly objective reasons (illness, senility, deafness and so on). A number, however, seemed to feel their father would refuse because he was suspicious or 'ornery'. In fact, many who did give me permission, prefaced it with some remark of this kind. At the same time, leaving aside those I was unable to contact, I had only one refusal from a father, and never in any instance received the kind of hostility I was told to anticipate.

The two generations were, fortunately, treated as separate studies; I did not depend on fathers for information, instead viewing them as an additional source of data, and a possible check on reliability of data provided by the sons. In view of the disappointing results of this attempt, the results of the two-generation study are not reported in detail in any of the preceding chapters. The only conclusion which draws upon the interviews with fathers pertains to the remarkable similarity between one pattern of upward mobility and fathers of the downwardly mobile men. I used data from the fathers' interviews mainly as illustrative material, or to supplement inadequate responses from sons about family history.
APPENDIX 2

THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Note: Before visiting each respondent I recorded from the Work and Leisure Study about 25 basic background variables. Details of the Work and Leisure Study Questionnaire can be found in Young and Willmott (1973: Appendix 2). Not all questions are discussed in this thesis.

1. First of all, about how many jobs would you have had in your life-time, that's including your present one?

2. (IF MORE THAN ONE) Could we just go through your various jobs starting with your first one. What was your first job?

3. About how long did you work at that very same job? Kind of firm? When was that?

4. What made you decide to leave it? Did you get a rise in pay at your next job?

5. What did you do next? (IF NOT CLEAR) Was that the same kind of work or different?

6. (IF FOUR OR MORE JOBS) You've had a number of different jobs. On the whole would you say you planned each change or did it just happen, or what?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unplanned/Unexpected</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

7. (IF NOT PLANNED) Is there any way in which you feel this has affected your life?

8. (TO ALL) Now some questions about your first job. How old were you when you started working?

9. Was that a training job, or an apprenticeship or anything like that?
   - No 1
   - Apprenticeship 2
   - Articling 3
   - On Job Training 4
   - Other 5

10. How did you come to choose that particular job?
    - Probe: Well, for instance, did someone suggest it to you?
    - Probe used 1
    - Probe not used 2

11. Was this the kind of work you had hoped to do?
    - Yes 1
    - No 2
    - DK 9
12. (IF NO) What kind of work had you wanted to do?
Probe: What happened that you weren't able to do what you wanted?

13. If you had the chance to start your working life over again, would you choose the same kind of work or different?
- Same work 1
- Different 2
- DK/NA 9

14. (IF DIFFERENT) What would you choose instead?

15. Taking into account all the jobs you've had or will have, what would be the best job you expect to have in your lifetime?
- Present Job 1
- Past Job (specify) 2
- Future Job 3
- DK/NA 9

(IF FUTURE) About how long do you think it will be before you get that job?
- Don't Know 9

16. (IF NOT SELF EMPLOYED) If a higher position came open where you're working now, would you be interested in taking the job if it were offered to you?
- Yes 1
- No 2
- DK/NA 9

(IF NO) Why do you say that?

17. Talking in general now, suppose you were offered a chance to make a really big advance in a job or occupation but not necessarily where you're working now. Which of these would you be willing to do, which ones would you be unwilling to do in order to get such a job?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willing</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>Unwilling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 1</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 1</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 1</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 1</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 1</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 1</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 1</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 1</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. 1</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. (IF WILLING ON 4+)
What sort of job would it have to be for you to make these kinds of sacrifices?

19. (IF MANUAL WORKER) Is there a union where you work? Are you a member?
- Yes 1
- No 2
- Member 1
- Not a member 2

19b. (IF A MEMBER) Would you consider yourself an active member of the union or not?
- Active 1
- Not Active 2
- Other 3

19c. Do you attend meetings regularly, occasionally, hardly at all, or what?
- Regularly 1
- Occasionally 2
- Hardly at all 3
- Never 4

**See P. 629 for list of items.
19d. If workers in another industry or another part of the country were on strike do you feel your union should strike in sympathy if it would help those workers to get their demands?

20. Family Tree

A. Ego's Father
   -present/last job
   -job at same age as Ego
   -job when Ego was 16

B. Brothers
   -birth order
   -occupation

C. Sisters
   -birth order
   -occupation/husband's occupation

D. Wife
   -occupation

E. Wife's Father
   -occupation

F. Sons in Paid Work
   Ego =

21. What social class would you say your father belonged to most of his life? Would it be:
   Middle class 1
   Working class 2
   Other (specify) 3
   DK/NA 9

22. And your mother, would she be:
   Middle class 1
   Working class 2
   Other (specify) 3
   DK/NA 9

23. Going further back, what kind of work did your father's father, that is your grandfather, do most of his life?

24. And your mother's father, that is your grandfather, what kind of work did he do most of his life?

List of Occupations

Barman
Bricklayer
Business Manager (10-100 employees)
Carpenter
Chartered Accountant
Chef (hotel)
Coal Miner
Commercial Traveller
Company Director
Civil Servant (executive grade)
Docker
Doctor (medical)
Farm Worker
Farmer (over 100 acres)
Fitter (electrical engineer)
Insurance Agent
Jobbing Master Builder
Lorry Driver
Minister (nonconformist)
Newsagent & Tobacconist (one-man)
News Reporter
Policeman
Primary School Teacher
Railway Porter
Road Sweeper
Routine Clerk
Shop Assistant (drapery store)
Solicitor
Tractor Driver (agricultural)
Works Manager (industrial)
25. We are interested in social class. Occupation is one of the things that determines a person's social class. We would like to know in what order you would grade the occupations on this list— IN TERMS OF THEIR SOCIAL STANDING. What we want to know is the order in which you feel people in general would grade these occupations AS TO THEIR SOCIAL STANDING... NOT how you yourself feel about them. I'll ask you about that in a minute. It will help if you begin by thinking in terms of five main social classes—A, B, C, D & E. A is the highest, E is the lowest. Just go through the list and put a tick where you think most people would put that occupation. You can put as many or as few under each letter. You don't have to use all the five classes.

26. Why do you think that people put these occupations in that order? I mean, what is it that puts one occupation above another?

27. Is it right do you think that people you've put at the top should get more pay than people you've put at the bottom?
   Yes 1
   No 2
   DK/NA 9

28. If I'd asked you to grade these occupations the way you personally see them, would you grade them differently than you've just done?
   Differently 1
   Not Differently 2
   Other 9

29. (IF DIFFERENTLY) Here's another list. Will you put them where you feel they ought to go. Just do the ones that you would grade differently.

30. Why do you think they should go that way?

(USE FIRST LIST)

31. (IF OWN OCCUPATION NOT ON LIST) In terms of its social standing, which occupation on the list would be nearest to your own job?

32. What about your father's present/last occupation? Which job on the list would be nearest to it?

33. I see that you've put your father's job higher/lower/about the same as your job. Still, taking everything into account, would you say that you're better off, worse off or about the same as your father when he was your age?
   Better off 1
   Worse off 2
   Same 3
   Other 9
34. (IF WORSE OFF) In what way? How do you think that came about?

34b. Will that be true in the future?

35. (IF BETTER OFF) You say you're better off than your father when he was your age. Do you think that is true for most people of your generation or just people like yourself?
   Most people 1
   People like yourself 2
   Other 3

 Comments:

36. (IF BETTER OFF) The cost of living has gone up a good deal since your father was your age. Even taking that into account, do you think that you're better off?

37. (IF BETTER OFF) On the whole, would you say that you've had an easier time of it than your father?

38. (TO ALL) Different people want different things out of a job. What are the things you feel are important?
   (CIRCLE MORE THAN ONE)
   Money 1
   Security 2
   Interesting work 3
   Satisfaction 4
   Other (specify) 5
   Promotion 6

39. (IF 1-5) What about chances for promotion, is that important to you?
   Important 1
   Not Important 2
   Other 3

(IF NOT) Why is that?

40. What job would you consider to be an ideal one for yourself?

41. (IF NOT PRESENT JOB) What are the chances of your getting that kind of job do you think?

42. Up to now would you say your health had been:
   Very good 1
   Fair 2
   Poor 3
   Prompt
   Other 4

43. (IF POOR) In what way has it affected your life or what you wanted to do?

44. I'm now going to read a list of statements. Will you tell me for each one whether you agree with it or disagree with it. If you agree, tell me whether you strongly agree or only moderately agree. If you disagree, whether you strongly disagree or moderately disagree:

   1. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.
   2. There's little use in trying to influence the authorities these days, because often they aren't interested in the problems of the average man.
   3. In spite of what some people say, the situation for the average man is getting better all the time.
4. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world today, with the way things look for the future.

5. These days a person doesn't know whom he can count on.

45. On the whole, do you feel that you've had good breaks in life or bad breaks?
   Good breaks 1
   Bad breaks 2
   In-between 3
   DK/NA 9

46. What are you thinking of when you say that?

47. On a different topic now. What were the names of the schools you went to?

48. You left school when you were ___ years old. Is that right? What exams did you try for then?
   Which ones did you pass?
   11+ or Scholarship 1
   O Levels 2
   A Levels 3
   Other 4
   No exams 9

   Yes  No
   11+ passed 1  2
   O Levels 1  2
   A Levels 1  2

   Comments:

49. (IF 11+ ATTEMPTED OR PASSED) Thinking back, was it important to you, at the time, whether you passed the 11+ (or equivalent) or not?
   Important 1
   Not Important 2
   Other 3

   Probes: In what way? Why was it important?

50. What about your parents. Did they expect you to pass or not?

51. What further education did you take? Were you able to complete it?

52. (IF NO FURTHER EDUCATION) At the time, had you wanted to leave school as soon as you could or had you originally planned to go on further?
   Go on further 1
   Stop when possible 2
   Other 3

53. (IF FURTHER) Has it affected your life in any way that you weren't able to go on further?
   Probe: What is it that you have been unable to do?

54. (TO ALL) Do you feel now that you left school at the right age or not?
   Right Age 1
   Other (Write in) 2
   DK/NA 3

55. Do you feel your parents were ambitious for you? I mean, did they encourage you to go on in school as far as you could or were they unconcerned?
   Yes 1
   No 2
   DK 9

   In what way?
56. (IF YES) Were you encouraged most by your father, your mother or both equally?
   Father 1
   Mother 2
   Equally 3
   DK/NA 9

57. How old was your father when he left school? And your mother?
   Years  
   Father  
   DK  
   Mother  
   DK  

58. (IF MARRIED WITH CHILDREN) OTHERS SKIP TO Q. 63
   Have you thought (or did you think) much about what sort of education you would like for your children?
   Yes 1
   No 2

59. (IF YES) What sort of education would you like (did you want) them to have? What would be the minimum they should get?
   Comprehensive 1
   State Grammar 2
   'Public' 3
   Other 4
   No preference 5

60. Have you (or had you) any preference for the kind of school which they should go to?
   Which?
   Comprehensive 1
   State Grammar 2
   'Public' 3
   Other 4
   No preference 5

61. (IF A SON) Would you (would you have been) pleased if your son went into the same sort of work as yourself?
   Pleased 1
   Not pleased 2
   Did go into 3

62. In general (have you done) will you do things very differently for your children than your parents did for you?
   Same 1
   Different 2
   Other 3

63. (TO ALL) Taking everything into account, would you rate your own childhood as very happy, or sometimes quite unhappy?
   Very happy 1
   Sometimes happy 2
   Unhappy 3
   Other 9

64. Some people grow apart from their parents as various things happen in their lives. Others remain very close. Would you say that you are still close to your parents or have you drifted apart?
   Close 1
   Apart 2

65. (IF 2) Why have you drifted apart?

66. Thinking now about the friends you had when you were in school. Did you keep the same group of friends throughout or did they change as various things happened?
   Changed 1
   Stayed the same 2
   Other 3

67. (IF CHANGED) Why was it you changed friends do you think?
68. (IF NOT CHANGED) Do you still see any of them socially?

69. (TO ALL) At that time, did you feel you belonged to any group or were you a bit of a lone wolf or what?

70. How about now? Do you feel you belong to any group now?

71. Up until the time you left home, about how many times would you have changed homes? (Roughly)

72. (IF MOVED) About how many of those moves were to different towns or districts?

73. What about yourself now? How many times have you moved since you started working?

74. (IF MOVED) How many of those were to different towns?

75. Since you started working have you ever received any financial help from your parents or other relatives? Gifts or loans or anything like that?

76. (IF MARRIED) What about your in-laws, have they ever given you and your wife any kind of help?

77. A few general questions now. We often hear people talking about moving up in the world. What does that mean for you?

78. Can you think of anyone, a friend or relative, perhaps, who has really moved up in the world?
   Yes 1
   No 2

79. What have they done?

80. What about yourself now. Would you say that you've moved up in the world, or not?

81. Who would you be comparing yourself with when you say that?

82. Is it important to you to be thought of as someone who has moved up in the world?

83. How do you think that people who do move up in the world, manage it?

84. In general, do you feel you can do much to make your future what you want it to be?
   Yes 1
   No 2
   (IF NO) Why is that?
   (IF YES) How do you mean? In what way? What kinds of things do you feel you can do?

85. Almost everybody feels sometimes that his life isn't going along just the way he wants it to. In what ways do you feel your life isn't just the way you'd want it to be?

86. Some people feel the Government does too much for people while others think it doesn't do enough. What do you think?
87. There's been a lot of talk lately about immigrants in this country. Would you say that there should be no more people allowed into Britain or just no more coloured immigrants, or what?

(IF NO MORE COLOURED) Would you feel the same, do you think, if only skilled or professional coloured workers were allowed to come in?

88. If you had the choice, would you particularly avoid having coloured immigrants as neighbours?

(IF YES) Would you still feel the same if they were professional people working at the hospital or the university or something like that?

89. Do you think that landlords should be able to refuse to let to coloured immigrants?

Yes 1
No 2

(IF YES) How would you feel about it if the family or person could supply references showing they were responsible and able to afford the rent? Would your answer be the same?

Yes 1
No 2

90. On the whole, do you think the majority of coloured people in Britain are superior to you, equal to you or inferior to you?

Why do you say that?

(IF NO MORE COLOURED)

17. Go without vacations for several years.

2. Leave your friends and relatives and move to another part of the country with your family.

3. Live for awhile in a district that you didn't like.

4. Take some risk to your health.

5. See less of your family.

6. Move to another country, say Australia or Canada.

7. Take on a lot of extra responsibility.

8. Give up some of your leisure time.

9. Hide your political views.

10. Learn a new routine.
APPENDIX 3

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