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Military Assistance as a Tool of 20th Century American Grand Strategy: The American Experience in Korea and Vietnam after World War II

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Declaration

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Abstract

Military Assistance, the development and training of capacity and capability of foreign security forces, has largely been ignored by the research community, including the security studies research community. Military Assistance, as a tool, creates the possibility of both positive and negative outcomes for both recipient and providing nations, and as such it should be examined within the broader framework of international relations, with regards to the projection and perception of power. This research is timely and important, since Military Assistance is an actively pursued security solution within the international system. With the growth of Military Assistance missions around the world, from Iraq and Afghanistan to the Central African Republic, understanding the dynamics that can create or facilitate successful Military Assistance and its broader implications has become more critical. As a tool of United States foreign policy, Military Assistance missions extend United States power, while at the same time minimizing the risk of protracted United States military involvement. Consequently, reliance on Military Assistance has become the preferred method for pursuing strategic military direction and the development of strategic alliances. This will be explored in two case studies: South Korea and Vietnam.

This research study seeks to recognize and define the dynamics of successful Military Assistance missions: more specifically, by defining its role in possibly linking the development of an army and a broader strategic alliance between states. I trace how the creation of capacities and capabilities establishes a more integrated relationship between two states, and acts as a prime process to extrapolate and test an applicable theory that can be used in multiple contexts. The goal of this research is a better understanding of Military Assistance as an international relations tool which can further strategic alliances and American Grand Strategy.

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Introduction

Accepting broad strategic failure since World War II has never been easy for the United States of America to admit, to itself or others. However, as many successful leaders have found, understanding their failures can create opportunities to reach their highest successes. The United States has experienced this in warfare as well, having had initial struggles followed by victory in the War of Independence, the Civil War, and World Wars I & II. Whether or not a cultural flaw, the United States has had challenging military experiences since becoming a global power after WWII, and central to that experience has been the pursuit to train and develop the capacities and capabilities of Foreign Security Forces, or Military Assistance.

The United States has had a long relationship with Military Assistance, both as recipient and supporter. Understanding this relationship is important due the United States' pursuit of Military Assistance missions numerous times since WWII with varying results. In addition, the United States Army recently recommitted itself to Military Assistance as an enduring capability, in the creation of the Security Force Assistance Brigades.¹ To this end, this research project explores the foundations of the relationship between the United States and Military Assistance, along with its application in the broader, geopolitical narrative, specifically, American Grand Strategy. Ultimately, this research project probes whether conditions can be created to result in more positive outcomes for the United States and its foreign nation allies while contributing to the United States' strategic goals.

From the policy perspective, the concept of Military Assistance became ever more relevant during the time of this research. What many times the United States has considered a secondary effort to combat operations is now² at the forefront of

¹ Thomas Gibbons-Neff, "Training Quick and Staffing Unfinished, Army Units Brace for Surging Taliban," *The New York Times*, January 26, 2018, accessed April 7, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/world/asia/afghanistan-army-trainers.html>. Morgan Smiley, "Security Force Assistance Brigades: It's About Time," *Small Wars Journal*, accessed April 7, 2018, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/security-force-assistance-brigades-it%E2%80%99s-about-time>.

² As of the writing of this section, in the winter and spring of 2018.

military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. On this point, the Secretary of the Army, Dr. Mark Esper, recently stated that Security Force Assistance would be an ongoing need for the Army. “My view right now is that with regard to irregular warfare, we’re going to be engaged in that indefinitely. There will always be a need to help build allied or partnered forces, so [the Security Force Assistance Brigades] can take on that mission, which is far better than us doing it with our combat brigades’ soldiers.”³ This evolution in thinking by senior military leaders cannot be minimized, as it is the first time that a leader of the Institutional Army⁴ has not only declared that Military Assistance is important, but placed institutional resources of money, manning, equipping, and training toward filling this gap.

On a personal note, while deployed in Iraq as a United States Army officer in 2007, I served as a member of a Training and Transition (TT) Team assigned to train, advise, and assist in developing the capabilities and capacities of Iraqi Security Forces, both Police and Military.⁵ While the American endeavor was both poorly designed and executed during this time, the entire experience began an internal dialogue of questioning how it could be done better. I had long conversations with my team chief, a Special Forces officer who had trained Foreign Security Forces around the world. Thinking that there must be a better method for such Training and Transition Teams, and more broadly, the development of Foreign Security Forces, I began to reflect on when and where in history this expansion of capabilities and capacities had been more strategically created and implemented — where Military Assistance emerged in context of a broader Grand Strategy.

³ Corey Dickstein, “Army Plans for More Security Force Assistance Brigades,” *Stars and Stripes*, April 1, 2018, accessed May 9, 2018, <https://www.stripes.com/news/with-1st-sfab-deployed-army-looks-to-build-more-adviser-brigades-1.519734>.

⁴ The Institutional Army is the part of the United States Army responsible for training, manning, and equipping soldiers for global operations. The Chief of Staff of the Army is the most senior military leader of the Institutional Army.

⁵ Training and Transition Teams were formed in 2006 as part of an effort to train and advise Iraqi Security Forces by the United States Army. Michael R. Gordon, “Break Point? Iraq and America’s Military Forces,” *Survival* 48, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 74.

At the height of the British Empire there were numerous examples of developing populations in many locales into competent forces fighting for the abstract concept of “King and Country” — a king they had never met, a country they had never seen, and no real emotional tie or connection to either. In one example, the Fourteenth Army in World War II (WWII) under the command of Field Marshall William Slim⁶ featured thousands of soldiers from every corner of what was known as Pax Britannia. Fighting in India and Burma as part of the Southeast Asia theater, the Fourteenth Army constituted one of the least known but most important fronts of WWII, as it supported China’s freedom to maneuver against the Japanese in the east, while limiting any possible assistance between the Axis powers.⁷ Had those supply lines and exchanges been opened, it is likely that the war would have taken far longer to reach its eventual conclusion. This was just one instance unearthed in my initial exploration of the history of Military Assistance that could be mined for more exacting questions.

My first challenge forced a re-evaluation of comparing the development of Foreign Security Forces under colonial rule versus those under the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan: the obvious difficulty being the comparison of such dissimilar concepts. In looking at the colonial dynamic, it was clear that colonial power existed absent of other formal governing structures or organizations.⁸ Indeed, the British colonial government was the only governing authority nationally existing in the case of India, although in fairness there was long history of governance among the various regions of India. In addition, there were similar examples around the globe composed of Colonial Britain. In contrast, there is a great deal of debate in viewing the present-day United States as a colonial power or even an empire.⁹ In spite of the

⁶ William Slim, *Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945* (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 180, 181, 183, 185, and 195. Russell Miller, *Uncle Bill: The Authorised Biography of Field Marshall Viscount Slim*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2013), 233-235.

⁷ Slim, *Defeat into Victory*, 373-376.

⁸ I certainly do not mean to imply in any way that these indigenous societies were not capable of governing themselves absent colonial rule or that they had been unable to do so prior to being colonized.

⁹ Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003), 47-48. Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 3-9.

United States being the leader of many coalitions, each member of such a coalition still acts, and more importantly, is empowered to act, within the norms of a sovereign nation state, placing limitations on their participation within said coalition. The United States may utilize diplomatic and economic incentives and pressure with varying forms and methods of severity, such as in Turkey's opening a northern front during the Iraq War in 2003.¹⁰ However, as a broad point of national policy, the United States has not pursued colonial endeavors in a similar manner as the nations of Europe, although there are certainly examples to the contrary, such as taking control of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and other territories after the Spanish American War. We can see, therefore, that the policy was inconsistent at best.¹¹

In contrast, the coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, had various forms of recognized international legal authorities that enabled the coalition's presence in both countries — sometimes after the fact.¹² In addition to working within a set of accepted international norms, both Iraq and Afghanistan had recognized governments. While their local forms of self-rule may differ from Western, liberal democracies, both maintain and maintained some level of legitimacy and sovereignty. The United States' coalitions had created interim governing systems that were as democratic as possible under

Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 367-370.

¹⁰ Dexter Filkins, "Turkey Seeks \$32 Billion for Helping U.S. in an Iraqi War," *The New York Times*, February 18, 2003, accessed April 24, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/18/international/europe/turkey-seeks-32-billion-for-helping-us-in-an-iraqi-war.html>.

¹¹ William McKinley, "First Inaugural Address," Speech, Washington, D.C., March 4, 1897, accessed April 8, 2018, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-4-1897-first-inaugural-address>. John L. Offner, "McKinley and the Spanish-American War," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (March 2004): 50, 52, 57, and 61, accessed May 24, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552563>.

¹² United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373, "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts," September 28, 2001, accessed April 13, 2018, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1373\(2001\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1373(2001)). United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1377, "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts," November 12, 2001, accessed April 13, 2018, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1377\(2001\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1377(2001)). United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1472, "Situation between Iraq and Kuwait," March 28, 2003, accessed April 13, 2018, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1472\(2003\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1472(2003)).

wartime conditions, and these systems created frameworks for the governments in Iraq and Afghanistan to come to power.¹³ This placed the United States in the situation of having to support those governments' independent sovereignty despite their frequent resistance to the United States' influence. This recognition led to my understanding that to compare colonial governance with a relatively clear line of authority to the complex systems and relationships in Iraq and Afghanistan would attempt to contrast very dissimilar entities, prohibiting logical or consistent conclusions. As such, this necessitated a step back to re-think the actual question to be answered, which was to understand the "why" of Military Assistance rather than the "what" or "where" or even "how" research questions, which have been discussed in other research projects.

In summation, the two underlying questions being explored in this research project are:

1. Why is Military Assistance a tool rather than a strategy?
2. Why was Military Assistance important in the context of Grand Strategy?

This research project probes these timely questions which are relevant for both policymakers and academics. As noted, policymakers' requirement to use Military Assistance has not diminished in the post-September 11th world; if anything, it has increased. As such, it is even more essential for policymakers to understand how Military Assistance can help, and its limitations, in achieving their policy goals and objectives. For academics, the concept of grand strategy become more relevant in International Relations literature¹⁴ — a growing appreciation of the necessity of broader, long term objectives as a focal point for national power. Consequently,

¹³ Mark Oliver, "The New Afghan Administration," *The Guardian*, December 5, 2001, accessed April 24, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/dec/05/qanda.markoliver>. Sharon Otterman, "Backgrounder – Iraq: Iraq's Governing Council," *Council on Foreign Relations*, February 2, 2005, accessed April 24, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-iraqs-governing-council>.

¹⁴ Paul von Hooft, "Grand Strategy," in *Oxford Bibliographies*, online edition, ed. Patrick James, August 23, 2017, accessed April 23, 2018, doi:10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0218.

exploring the relationship between Military Assistance and Grand Strategy is all the more important due to the gap in the literature.

Definitions

Although the entire Chapter 2: Military Assistance and United States Military Doctrine Post 9/11, is devoted to discussing military doctrine with these definitions in far more depth, it's essential to begin by establishing a fundamental understanding and baseline appreciation of context for various terms used. As with any research study of this magnitude, there are certain definitions and assumptions that must be made, while other related subjects simply cannot be explored due to time and space constraints. This section lays out the design and scope of concepts discussed in this study that will lay the foundation of analysis undertaken. Outlining multiple definitions surrounding the concept of Military Assistance is important because Military Assistance itself, as a concept, it has been quite muddled, consistently confused and used interchangeably with the concept of Military Aid. In addition, Military Support is another concept that is sometimes used synonymously with Military Assistance and Military Aid, and yet it is also quite different. Most important to appreciate is the idea that each of these concepts — Military Assistance, Military Aid, and Military Support — exists under the umbrella of Military Intervention and the fundamentals of understanding the definitions of warfare itself.

All too often, both in the realms of international relations and military strategy, definitions and conventional wisdom result in some variation of United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's famous "I know it when I see it"¹⁵ construct about obscenity. As in many scenarios of conventional wisdom, the "I know it when I see it" phrase only offers a glimpse of the story; however, it is the entirety of the concept, with all its nuances, that ascribes the challenges, difficulties, and the importance of defining key terms. In an odd way, the very idea of war and warfare has come to occupy this lexicon and definitional experience. The United States Army specifically has evolved in its usage of terms for the concept of war. Past terms such

¹⁵ *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 197 (1964).

as “full spectrum warfare”¹⁶ and “unified land operations,”¹⁷ to name a few, have become technical terms for what the general public would commonly consider as war — a vast array of armies, airplanes, and ships competing against one another for destruction or domination. Images of war are condensed into soldiers fighting in the trench warfare during World War I (WWI), enormous ships battling across the Pacific Ocean during WWII, or bombs being dropped from airplanes during the Persian Gulf War.

When Military Invention is discussed, it often evokes the popular idea of physically placing forces into a foreign conflict where an altruistic intention may or may not exist. Examples raised may include 1990 in Saudi Arabia, where the United States planned to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait.¹⁸ Another issue may be that of the Russians coming into South Ossetia in 2008 at the defense — flimsy though it may have been — to defend other ethnic Russians,¹⁹ or Yemen’s civil war with both Saudi Arabia and Iran backing their respective factions under various trumped up humanitarian goals, but actually competing for regional domination.²⁰ Military Intervention calls for situations that differ from traditional warfare, even though war may be experienced as a result of Military Intervention. *Military Intervention is considered a broader term and concept, the general idea being a military partnering with a foreign country, under which would be methods for how the military is partnering, or intervening: through aid, assistance, or support.* Military Intervention,

¹⁶ United States Army, *Field Manual 3-0: Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, February 27, 2008), 3-1.

¹⁷ United States Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0: Operations (with Change 1)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, October 6, 2017), 3-1. United States Army, *Field Manual 3-0: Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, December 6, 2017), 1-68.

¹⁸ Joseph P. Englehardt, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Chronology and Troop List for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis” (Carlisle, PA: Army War College), 14-43, accessed June 3, 2018, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a234743.pdf>.

¹⁹ CNN, “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts,” *CNN Library*, April 3, 2008, accessed June 3, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/index.html>.

²⁰ Kareem Fahim, “U.N. probe details fallout of proxy war in Yemen between Saudi coalition and Iran,” *The Washington Post*, January 11, 2018, accessed June 3, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-probe-details-fallout-of-proxy-war-in-yemen-between-saudi-coalition-and-iran-/2018/01/11/3e3f9302-f644-11e7-9af7-a50bc3300042_story.html.

however, is defined within United States military doctrine as “[t]he deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy.”²¹

Conceptually, there is differentiation between war and Military Intervention, and this is an important distinction that enables properly placing Military Assistance within its appropriate context. The best example to distinguish this difference between war and Military Intervention is that of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Operation Desert Shield was the operation focused on the buildup of resources and formation of the coalition seeking to remove Iraq from Kuwait in 1991,²² and more specifically, a Military Intervention, as it was the action whereby the United States deliberately acted “to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy.”²³ Operation Desert Storm was the actual war. These distinctions are important because aspects of Military Intervention in the form of Military Support, Military Aid, or Military Assistance can be introduced at any point within an operation, including within the actual activity of war.

It’s equally important to clarify what is not Military Assistance. It is not the equipment and/or training with that equipment, which would be defined factually as Military Aid; it is not the humanitarian assistance given by a military to further develop local relations. Military Aid is a popular tool of foreign policy, from the United States and many other states — one of the most prominent examples being the Lend Lease program during WWII. Indeed, one of the case studies that will be discussed, Vietnam, began as a Military Aid mission, especially prior to the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the French abandoning their claim. *Military Aid is defined as the act of supplying foreign security forces, official or otherwise, with military and/or civilian equipment in order to contribute to the military and political goals of those foreign security forces.*

Military Support is not an often-used term but its concept, as defined for the purposes of this research project, is often confused with Military Assistance. *Military*

²¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), GL-13.

²² Englehardt, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” 14-43.

²³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0*, GL-13.

Support is defined as the act of a military or coalition of similar capacity and capability allying with another military with armed forces and equipment. An example of Military Support is the United States becoming allies of the French and British during World War One (WWI) and WWII. Military Support as a concept could be considered problematic in the event that a hegemonic power such as the United States uses its power to create or manipulate a coalition, as was thought by many with regards to Operation Iraqi Freedom,²⁴ although not relevant for this research project.

Military Assistance does not refer specifically to training foreign security forces, but to advising and mentoring. Professors Antonio Giustozzi and Artemy Kalinovsky, in *Missionaries of Modernity*, clarify: “Mentors [trainers] practice a form of on-the-job training and focus on developing the skills of individuals. Advisors, by contrast, should be more focused on the organization within which individuals operate, even if they may be assigned to advise a particular individual.”²⁵ The authors continue to note the frequent confusion between trainers and advisors, but simply distinguish trainers as more often associated with Military Aid due to the relationship of equipment and training on that equipment. *Military Assistance, however, is defined as the efforts that develop capacities and capabilities in a foreign security force with an agreed-upon structure and doctrine understood by both the support nation and the recipient nation.*

As stated earlier, military doctrine will be analyzed in greater depth in Chapter 2; however, it is important at this juncture to clarify Military Assistance in the context of what is known in the United States Armed Forces as Security Force Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense. Security Force Assistance, or SFA, is “Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign

²⁴ Toni Erskine, “Coalitions of the Willing and Responsibilities to Protect: Informal Associations, Enhanced Capacities, and Shared Moral Burdens,” *Ethics and International Relations* 28, no. 1 (March 2014): 115-116, 121, and footnote 1.

²⁵ Antonio Giustozzi and Artemy M. Kalinovsky, *Missionaries of Modernity: Advisory Missions and the Struggle for Hegemony in Afghanistan and Beyond*, with contributions by Paul Robinson, Bob Spencer, and Alfia Sorokina (London: Hurst & Co., 2016), 21.

security forces and their supporting institutions.”²⁶ Foreign Internal Defense, or FID, as defined by United States Army Forces doctrine is “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”²⁷ To the casual observer the definitions of Military Assistance, SFA, and FID may seem somewhat redundant; however, FID by its very name focuses on internal defense, SFA is more comprehensive and encompasses all forms of foreign security forces, whereas Military Assistance, as I define it, is the only definition that stipulates the relationship between the recipient and supporting nation.²⁸ In addition, this research project will not be using International Military Education and Training, or IMET as it is known, for the simple reason that IMET happens in small numbers rather than a wholesale institutional development of foreign security forces.

Thus, Military Assistance, Military Aid, and Military Support are all methods of Military Intervention. It becomes essential to establish these definitions within the context of this research project, since within the literature, United States Armed Forces doctrine, and general usage these terms are used interchangeably and inconsistently. None of these concepts should be considered as replacement for “war” or “warfare,” whatever terminology used, although Military Support comes closest. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, these concepts’ evolving definitions make it all the more necessary to lay out a foundation of baseline understanding for this research. Ultimately, any form of Military Intervention, whether it be Military Support, Military Aid, or Military Assistance, applies the usage of military power and influence, thereby classifying these as tools rather than strategies. In the usage of any tool, the “why” question is the strategy. The goals and processes by which those goals are achieved — these are all aspects of strategy.

²⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), GL-11.

²⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22*, GL-7.

²⁸ Afghan War News Staff, “Difference between FID and SFA,” *Afghan War News*, accessed June 16, 2018, <http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/differenceFIDandSFA.htm>.

The purpose of this project is two-fold: first, to explore and answer the question about what conditions could and should contribute to a positive outcome for a Military Assistance mission, but also to expand the understanding of Military Assistance in the context of American Grand Strategy, ideally, to fill a gap in the minimal literature surrounding Military Assistance. While grand strategy will be explored in more depth in Chapter 1: Military Assistance and Grand Strategy, in the context of defining terms here, it may be useful to discuss the term “grand strategy” at this point. Basil Liddell Hart’s²⁹ definition states that the purpose of grand strategy “is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war — the goal defined by fundamental policy.”³⁰

The final definition to be explored at this juncture is the term “success.” Success as a concept can refer to numerous events, like most definitions; however, there is a specific application in the context of military action with regards to this research project. *Success should be considered the achievement of the military objectives of a nation state for the purpose of securing political goals.* Carl von Clausewitz’s treatise *On War* states, “War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.”³¹ The idea of imposing a “will” onto an enemy is based on having a political objective. Clausewitz considers that “war is to be regarded not as an independent thing but as a political instrument,”³² and therefore war is that continuation of efforts to achieve a political agenda or set of goals.³³ This is not intended to measure the rightness of the war, or the politics and motivations behind war, but simply to state this constant observed in Military Intervention.³⁴

²⁹ Basil Liddell Hart was a British soldier, historian, and military theorist who explored the field of strategy both professionally and academically.

³⁰ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy: 2nd Revised edition* (New York: Meridian, 1991), 322.

³¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. J. J. Graham, eds. F. N Maude and Anatol Rapoport (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1997), 5.

³² Clausewitz, *On War*, 23.

³³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 22.

³⁴ Military Intervention can and should be seen as a concept of war by other means, although the idea of Military Support would potentially look more like traditional warfare. While there certainly are instances of tactical engagements of violence that

Furthermore, if war is to be regarded as continuation or a means by which that political agenda or those goals would be achieved, then the basis of this must be achieving military objectives, as this is the measurement of the completion of military action. This is important because many consider success in context of victory in battle, but as many wars have shown, it is altogether possible to achieve military objectives in every battle but to ultimately lose the broader strategic war. All this is to say that any form of success in warfare must ultimately complement a political effort, and this is the rationale behind the definition of success stated above.

These definitions of success and the varying aspects of Military Intervention comprise the foundation of understanding for this research project. They are by no means the only definitions within this research project, but they are, thematically, the baseline conception for the context of this research project. While there is plenty of critique on Clausewitz's thinking and philosophy, the relationship between war and policy seems to have withstood the test of time and serves as a solid foundation of rationale.

Methodology³⁵

The methodology for this study will be historical case studies using the United States as the main protagonist. Specifically, the United States as the supporting nation should be considered the independent variable of this research study, while the respective recipient nations in the historical case studies would represent the dependent variable. It could be argued that since the Military Assistance is the action or method by which dependence, in the variable sense, is created, then the supporting nation, the United States, should be the independent variable, since the recipient nations only have a relationship with the United States due to the Military Assistance being given, at least as far as this research study is concerned. If this research study was solely about Military Assistance as a concept then this argument

can be imagined within the umbrella of Military Intervention, the focus is to pursue war through influence to achieve the political goals of which Clausewitz speaks.

³⁵ This section was developed using Stephen Van Evera's *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* but there was no individual quote or specific reference for a citation, thus the general citation here. Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

would be far more relevant. However, since this research project is, in fact, about Military Assistance as a tool, and specifically about how that tool contributes to American Grand Strategy, then that argument does not stand.

American Grand Strategy exists and is conceptually independent regardless of whether there is a nation receiving Military Assistance, and even regardless of whether or not Military Assistance is utilized as a tool. This would beg the question about why American Grand Strategy or Military Assistance as concepts are not considered variables, independent or dependent. The issue with placing either concept as a variable is that in this research project, and based on the question being asked, both concepts should be considered constants rather than variables. American Grand Strategy, while an ever-evolving construct, is, within the context of this research project, a constant, in that it does not change between the case studies being researched. Military Assistance, on the other hand, is more nuanced. On the practical side, every military mission is different and no two Military Interventions, even those between the same nations, will be exactly the same.³⁶ This, again, is why the application of the tool of Military Assistance is so important. Since the focus of the research project is about the broader strategic examination of the application of Military Assistance, the process of the application should similarly define Military Assistance as a constant. More pointedly, the application of that constant with respect to the independent variable, the recipient nation, and the dependent variable, the United States as the supporting nation, creates the proper structure for a research project.³⁷

³⁶ A perfect case of this is the two case studies on Lebanon outlined by Dr. Mara Karlin in her book on building militaries. Mara E. Karlin, "Lebanon I: 'The United States is Short of Breath' but Others are not" and "Lebanon II: 'The Side that Won was Willing to Kill and be Killed,'" in *Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 108-147 and 148-192.

³⁷ In one sense it could be confusing that the United States is thought of as the dependent variable given that the United States provides the Military Assistance. Since the underlying question of this research project is about the effect of Military Assistance on American Grand Strategy, it is the United States that actually experiences the effect.

Within the methodology of this research project, a natural evolution of thought when considering the concepts of Military Aid or Military Assistance is the relevance of colonialism,³⁸ the very construct of which involves enslavement, racism, and any number of charged concepts that would create a difficulty in any research study. While this research project touches on colonialism, it purposely avoids the topic, not out of cowardice or intellectual dishonesty, but in the true belief that trying to untangle the knot of colonialism does not assist in answer the questions surrounding Military Assistance. As a result, this study is not intended to focus on either colonialism or governance, since research into colonialism could easily necessitate a drift into a complex, moral quagmire, and ultimately not answer the question of focus of the research study. Similarly, research exploration of governance would focus more on the question of “how” Military Assistance evolves from the original conceptualization of policymakers,³⁹ rather than an exploration of “why” it can achieve its goal — a sustainable security in the nation receiving the Military Assistance. However, it was

1. Necessary to have a context of the nations that receive Military Assistance given their own history and experience with colonialism; and
2. Important questions about the underlying objectives of Military Assistance, ideally the pursuit of a Grand Strategy, and the methods to reach such objectives.

Due to these points from the perspective of developing the methodology for this research project, I determined to study and understand these questions from a qualitative approach rather than quantitatively. The rationale behind a qualitative approach rather than a quantitative one is derived from the old saying that “generals always fight the last war.”⁴⁰ This stems from an appreciation that generals, and even militaries as organizations, in addition to policymakers, tend to think

³⁸ Anthony F. Lang, *Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 197-198.

³⁹ Karlin, “Understanding the Problem” in *Building Militaries in Fragile States*, 1-19.

⁴⁰ This saying has numerous origins and references that are lost to time and history, but this source provided the best synthesis. Charles Clay Doyle, Wolfgang Mieder, and Fred R. Shapiro (ed), *The Dictionary of Modern Proverbs* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 94.

qualitatively rather than quantitatively, with a compounding body of literature concerning this topic from Professor Graham Allison's 1971 book *Essence of Decision* to Robert Komer's report "Bureaucracy does its Thing," both of which delve into the methods by which policymakers come to their decisions.⁴¹ While this should not minimize the importance of data or a quantitative methodology, there is an emphasis within military culture on history, and military history more specifically, that creates an understanding for decision-makers, and right or wrong, this is how many policymakers and decision-makers tend to view the world.

In his work on that subject, *Analogies at War*, Professor Yeun Foong Khong wrote: "The way they [policymakers] have invoked historical parallels when confronted with a domestic or foreign policy problem has ranged from the implausible to the prescient."⁴² He continues to describe how policymakers post-WWI viewed the diplomatic inflexibility as the foundation for the alliances that allowed what was a small regional conflict to escalate into the Great War. After the Treaty of Versailles there was a desire for more conciliatory exchanges in order to prevent hostilities, helping to drive the "peace in our time"⁴³ narrative that led to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the Munich Agreement. This, in turn, led to a post-WWII environment in which the fear of conciliating to a Hitler-like character developed into a deep concern, in that any form of diplomatic capitulation would be considered an allusion to the Munich Agreement.⁴⁴

In furthering Khong's work, Professor David Patrick Houghton states that many people, including senior policymakers, find themselves overloaded with information. In the search for the ability to make a rational decision, people allow

⁴¹ Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995). R. W. Komer, "Bureaucracy does its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam," The RAND Corporation, August 1972. David Patrick Houghton, *The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁴² Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 3.

⁴³ Neville Chamberlain, (speech, 10 Downing Street, London, 30 September 1938), *Oxford Book of Quotations: 8th Edition*, ed. Elizabeth Knowles (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), accessed April 8, 2018, doi:10.1093/acref/9780199668700.001.0001.

⁴⁴ Khong, *Analogies of War*, 4-5.

themselves to consider history, drawing satisfaction from the problem before them that has existed before, or a similar type of problem whose solution therefore can be referenced and categorized.⁴⁵ Incorporating both Khong's perception of policymakers and Houghton's view of history, the relevance to this research project was to utilize a methodology that would be clearly relatable to the thought process of policymakers.

Appreciating the basis with which to communicate this study, there are three possible approaches specific to historical case study research: time-period analysis, singular actor analysis, and regional analysis. A time-period analysis establishes a method to examine multiple cases over a finite period, such as examining Military Assistance from the years of 1950 to 1970. This is a challenging method for examining Military Assistance due to the breadth of examples, and more importantly in that the examination of a period of time for specific cases does not guarantee an answer to the underlying question of the conditions that can affect a successful or unsuccessful Military Assistance mission. Limiting the examination focus on a period would create an artificial set of boundaries without creating a more effective method to examine the variables of the case study, and at the end, potentially create more challenges than solutions. However, there remains an important element of time, in that focusing around a general but similar period would minimize the differing factors that could create the conditions for successful Military Assistance for the United States post-WWII. Like all projects of this nature it is just as critical, and possibly more so, to clearly delineate what will NOT be studied as much as it is defining the parameters of the research project itself.

Similarly, regional analysis examines cases in a specific geographic area such as Southeast Asia or Africa. The weakness with solely using this method is that the focus understandably and automatically becomes the region itself, and the possible underlying variables that are most likely affecting the outcomes rather than Military Assistance and its relationship to Grand Strategy. Another challenge that could derail logical conclusions is that a regional strategy is more than likely to focus on immediate outcomes in the diplomatic, development, or security areas of a region

⁴⁵ Houghton, *The Decision Point*, 13-15.

that could vary from a broader grand strategy. At the same time, the strength of a regional analysis is that the nature of the contrast is far more apparent, in that if the result in one nation is vastly different than that of another nation, the factors that have contributed to the differing outcomes or results are far more specific in what may influence those variables, making this aspect fascinating to study and providing a much-needed case study analysis.

This in no way mitigates the underlying challenge that what impacts one nation in a region could very likely have little or no effect on another nation. However, this challenge is minimized by broader construct of Military Assistance and its relationship with grand strategy in this research project. That is to say, given that this research project examines how Military Assistance is being applied with respect to grand strategy, the comparison and contrast is more apparent due to the fact that Great Powers had regional strategies and rarely approached international relations as a “one-off” and a country by country approach.⁴⁶ This is certainly the case in the Cold War in the personification of the United States and the Soviet Union. Ultimately, however, it is the separating of a regional strategy and a Great Powers’ grand strategy, more specifically American Grand Strategy, where the problem begins. That problem can manifest economically, diplomatically, or militarily, but the shortcomings of a solely regional analysis case study-based approach seemed to open too many variable interpretations, which prevented its adoption.

The singular actor method of analysis would examine Military Assistance through the prism of a singular actor as either the supporting or recipient nation. The challenge of using the recipient nation as the singular actor is that since support has been applied in varying forms from multiple nation states, in the middle or conclusion of conflicts, there is no clear line of correspondence drawn between the application of Military Assistance and by whom, in order to illicit what type of effect. Examples of this can be seen in Iraq or Afghanistan after the United States invaded each respective nation, when a coalition of multiple nations, including the United

⁴⁶ Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan, “The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era,” *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 51-86, accessed August 1, 2018, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600907>.

States, then participated (and as of this writing, are currently participating) in developing the capacity and capabilities of Foreign Security Forces. This becomes problematic from a logic perspective, due to the multiple types of support from multiple actors that ultimately fail to allow enough commonality or consistency to create a solid qualitative research methodology. Using a singular actor is therefore most fitting in the context of studying Military Assistance, as using one source of doctrine and relationship, while adding the flexibility of time and space, does not confine or restrict this research project.

While recognizing the challenges and shortcomings, the primary method for this study was determined to be the single actor analysis, using the United States as the main protagonist. At the same time, this research incorporated time-period analysis and regional analysis in order to examine the endeavor of Military Assistance as thoroughly as possible, and to minimize the possibilities of effects from other variables, as opposed to the application of Military Assistance. Using the United States takes advantage of its long history of Military Assistance as a means of expressing global presence and power, specifically being the main proponent of the Military Assistance mission within the time-period of the Cold War from the West in the context of the field of international relations. The time-period examined with the case studies will be narrowed to a specific period in the relationship between the United States and the recipient nation. In particular, the research will focus on the period at the beginning of the relationship, when aspects of Military Assistance are being explored and the Military Assistance effort is beginning to take hold. The origins of the relationship appear to establish foundations from which the remainder of the relationship can be examined, which is similar to the regional perspective that is being achieved by examining recipient nations in a specific region.

Case Studies

The case studies for this research project are South Korea and Vietnam, examined before and after WWII. The reason for the focus of this period is due to WWII's marking a turning point in international relations, chiefly with reference to the breakdown in prior global order, and foundation for the onset and development of the Cold War. This time featured the collapse of empires and colonialism as a

viable construct, which manifested in a final breakdown of a pre-WWI imperial global order. However, this research project overall avoids any focus on WWII itself. War, sometimes referred to as full spectrum warfare, will be analyzed in Chapter 2. Whereas the goal of Military Assistance is on the creation and maintenance of a sustainable security, war, true warfare such as WWII, does not allow Military Assistance to influence foreign policy. This is due to the complete focus on defeating the enemy by actors in this type of war, as opposed to concerns regarding long-term sustainable security.

It should be noted here that this is the main rationale for not including the examination of Lieutenant General Stilwell in China during WWII as a case study. Although Stilwell's experiences highlight one of the main conclusions of this research project, ongoing difficulties between recipient and supporting nation in the event of no shared understanding of methods and goals, this partnership did not emerge as a long-term Grand Strategy, as it did in the chosen case studies. While the Stilwell example was a critical strategic element that prevented the victory of the Japanese by the Chinese, the partnership did not play into a long-term Grand Strategy in the way of this research's case studies. Rather, it was the experience of Military Assistance solely in a time of war.

This is the difference between the United States' experience in China and South Korea, as South Korea already had a Military Assistance effort well underway prior to the Democratic Republic of Korea's crossing the 38th parallel to start the Korean War. In this example, the Military Assistance was implemented and tested during war rather than organized due to it, such as in the WWII China example.

After WWII, as India and Pakistan regained independence from the British, and the citizens of Algiers threw off French control, there was a general reordering of the broader colonial world into the West, represented by the United States and Europe, and the East, represented by the Soviet Union, China, and their assorted allies. The United States was acknowledged as the leader of the West just as the Soviet Union was the recognized leader of the East. The United States, like the Soviet Union, utilized any number of tools to project its power and influence through various forms of diplomacy, from economic influence to various types of Military

Intervention, with the Military Assistance mission being one of those tools within the toolkit of options for American policymakers.

While each case — South Korea and Vietnam — has its advantages and disadvantages, they mark a broad range of results, namely: clear success and clear failure. When the foundations contributing to these advantages and disadvantages are delineated and theoretically applied elsewhere in another time, these case studies can indicate a broader argument creating the conditions for future Military Assistance mission success. Due to the different outcomes, my conclusion will show why these particular outcomes developed by differentiating common conditions can be extrapolated, identifying a required quality or process for successful Military Assistance missions and the goal of long-term sustainable security.

In the case of South Korea, the United States developed a more permanent relationship with the Republic of Korea from the aftermath of the civil war on the peninsula. This relationship was based both nations going to war together and like brothers, they shed blood for one another. The United States operated under the grand strategy that containment of communism was fundamental to its freedom. Following the domestic belief that President Truman had “lost” China to communism, the emphasis for the Republic of Korea to survive became a driving force domestically. Consequently, the United States was determined to assist South Korea at all costs, leading to a brutal and bloody war that lasted roughly three years. After the Korean Armistice, the United States maintained bases and stationed tens of thousands of troops in South Korea, supporting a Military Assistance mission for the South Korean Army to this day. Meanwhile, South Korea developed from an impoverished, backwater nation to one of the top economies in the world. While the Korean War ended in a stalemate, this case study clearly exemplifies a successful Military Assistance mission, one that ended in a long-term stable and sustainable level of security.

The United States and Vietnam had a complex relationship due to military actions: from the insurgent operations that occurred after WWII, followed by the open warfare from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. This case study has many disadvantages, given the nature of both the conflict and the breadth of research that has been done on virtually every aspect of the conflict. Further challenging the

analysis is the fact that Military Assistance came in many different forms and was sometimes interwoven with the Military Aid and foreign aid disciplines, such as the case with the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support or CORDS Program.⁴⁷ This support program had both military and development personnel assisting the Vietnamese on multiple aspects of both civilian and military development of capacities and capabilities, in order to achieve a political outcome. The CORDS programs, while being acknowledged, will not be examined due to the emphasis on foreign aid as a core aspect of the program, which is not germane to this project.

On a macro level, the United States' policy operated on the domino theory with respect to communism, that being if one state in Asia fell to communism, the rest would likely follow, similar to that which occurred in the transformation of Eastern Europe after WWII. As such, in order to isolate the logic which enabled comparing and contrasting Vietnam with Korea, this research project ceased to examine Vietnam's situation after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964.⁴⁸ The rationale for this decision is that the Johnson Administration utilized this incident to justify the change of mission, from a Military Assistance mission under the Military Assistance Advisory Group to its eventual incarnation as the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam. Although the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam was the unit that operated from 1962 to 1973, after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the troop strength went from 23,000 to over 500,000, which completely transformed the face and operations of the mission.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future," *Military Review* 86, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 77.

⁴⁸ United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vietnam, 1964*, vol. 1, eds. Edward C. Keefer and Charles S. Simpson. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), documents 255-308, accessed August 1, 2018, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/ch8>.

⁴⁹ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Vietnam Conflict—U.S. Military Forces in Vietnam and Casualties Incurred: 1961 to 1972," Table No. 590, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1977* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 369.

The United States' and its allies' recent military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted these strategies and concepts in the public sphere. With the prominence of Military Assistance in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom,⁵⁰ it is understandable to wonder why this research project will not be using either action as case studies. This is due primarily to the fact that it would not be possible to determine whether this Military Assistance has been a success or failure in developing or even contributing to a long-term sustainable security, given the immediacy of each military experience. Even without the advantage of historical perspective, however, both experiences of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan created a scenario in which the responsible exit strategy for the US and its allies was to pursue a strategy of Military Assistance.

Chapter Overview

Providing a roadmap seems necessary in a research project of this magnitude. As discussed earlier, this research addresses a dual objective: on the one hand, to clearly answer the question regarding Military Assistance, while at the same time, to unequivocally identify the areas that are not being studied and stipulate why those areas are not germane to question at hand. Thematically, however, the goal here is to demonstrate how the basic questions of this research project are being answered. That goal speaks to the “why” questions around Military Assistance classification as a tool as opposed to a strategy (and the importance of that distinction), along with the placement and positioning of that tool within a broader strategic framework.

The first chapter of this dissertation is an explanation of the relationship between Military Assistance and American Grand Strategy. This relationship formulates the basis for the dissertation, in that it places Military Assistance in the framework of the tools required for policymakers to associate into the broader environment of International Relations. This chapter begins to contextually answer

⁵⁰ *Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Assistance Programs and Authorities, Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, 114th Congress* (March 9, 2016) (witnesses Mr. Jeffrey W. Eggers, Ms. Melissa G. Dalton, and Mr. Michael J. McNerney). *Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Iraq: Developments in U.S. Strategy and Operations and the Way Ahead, Before the Committee on Armed Services, 110th Congress* (September 10, 2008).

the second question of this research project: the importance of the tool of Military Assistance within American Grand Strategy. The chapter also explores the necessity of employing grand strategy as a great power in international relations. In addition, this chapter avoids going too far into the history of international relations or grand strategy, and yet provides the reader perspective to appreciate the questions being asked and explored.

The focus of the second chapter is to elucidate a fundamental understanding of how the United States Military considers the position of Military Assistance within the context of its own doctrine. This includes the examination of what conflicts exist within that recently-developed doctrine, and how these could be resolved. The challenge with this section is one of military doctrine itself, in that it is not a static phenomenon: all doctrines evolve, adapting to reflect new missions, equipment, and strategy. Military Assistance and the doctrine surrounding it is no different. A striking and timely example of an evolution in doctrinal terminology is that in the time that this research project has been completed, the United States Army has changed its term for warfare from “full spectrum war”⁵¹ to “unified land operations”⁵² to “multi-domain operations.”⁵³ This is the nature of doctrine. This chapter examines the basic views of strategic planning to determine how the United States Armed Forces considers and does not consider Military Assistance within its options of engagement for policymakers.

The third chapter offers a historic perspective and analysis of Military Assistance to the United States Army and its predecessors in Colonial America. The goal of this chapter was to create a structure which develops concepts and understanding to appreciate how the United States Military views the historical context of Military Assistance. This historical perspective stops at the early 1800s, due primarily to the

⁵¹ United States Army, *Field Manual 3-0: Operations*, 3-1.

⁵² United States Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0*, 3-1.

⁵³ David Perkins, “Multi-Domain Battle: Driving Change to Win in the Future,” *Military Review* 97, no. 4 (July-August 2017): 6-12. There is yet a current debate to change the term from “multi-domain battle” to “multi-domain operations” (Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Services Debate Multi-Domain: ‘Battle’ or ‘Operations,’” *Breaking Defense*, April 10, 2018, accessed July 23, 2018, <https://breakingdefense.com/2018/04/beyond-multi-domain-battle-services-brainstorm-broader-concept/>).

fact that the United States rarely experienced Military Intervention as a recipient nation after this period in the same manner as defined. The reason for this was that the United States at that time developed an isolationist stance focused on internal expansion, as seen in the Mexican-American War and Indian Wars. Between those conflicts, the Civil War and questions regarding slavery dominated the attention of the United States, until the Spanish-American War at the turn of the 20th century. The United States Armed Forces are in reality deeply aware of their traditions and history, and this chapter describes the role of Military Assistance in the formation of many of these traditions, ultimately affecting its perspectives and attitudes, and its perceptions regarding Military Assistance as a tool to utilize internationally.

The fourth chapter is the first case study on the relationship between the United States and South Korea, how that relationship was created and developed based on Military Assistance, and the experience of the Korean War. This case study is an example of how successful Military Assistance, characterized by achievement of military objectives in support of political goals, facilitated the strategic alliance between South Korea and the United States, as well as factors that allowed the Military Assistance to be successful. This case study demonstrates how Military Assistance fits as a tool for the successful pursuit of those strategic alliances in the broader framework of the International Relations discipline. Writing this case study helped crystalize a necessity to evolve and refine the approach and research question further, showing the need to incorporate the concept of strategic alliances as an end goal of Military Assistance, and how that fit into a broader American Grand Strategy. This case study also led to an appreciation about why considering and assessing Military Assistance in a vacuum is unrealistic and indeterminate, requiring a broader understanding while maintaining a specific focus. However, in a more comprehensive sense, the Military Intervention in the Korean War is an example of the successful use of Military Support and Military Assistance.

The next chapter and second case study concerns what could only be considered the most obvious failure in the history of American warfare, the Vietnam War. In its quest to combat a perceived global threat of Communism, the United States found itself immersed in the conflict in Vietnam. When this research project began, one of the major goals was to avoid the Vietnam conflict in its entirety, considering it too

large and too complex to encourage detailed research. Furthermore, due to the changing inflection points, as well as evolving political goals and military objectives, a case study about Vietnam simply appeared to be a journey into an intellectual quagmire and academic blackhole. However, as this project evolved, it became clear that understanding the beginning of the Military Assistance mission in Vietnam was crucial to appreciate how and why a Military Assistance mission can end in failure. As it is often noted that we learn more from our failures than our successes, understanding the failure of the Military Assistance mission in Vietnam was critical to appreciating its utility within the toolset of American foreign policy. At the same time, it is critical to recognize the extent to which the failures of Vietnam affected the United States. These include concerns of political leaders too involved in tactical military operations, such as planning bombing runs from the Oval Office, or questions of draft dodging that plague political candidates to this day. The Army also felt the trauma that the United States, as a nation, experienced, but it could be argued that the Army did not learn the lessons from Vietnam, which led to both the successes in the Persian Gulf War and the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan. While there are a myriad of failures evident in the story of the Vietnam War, the focus of this project will be on how the Military Intervention mission failed to link with a consistent set of political goals, starting with the Military Aid mission, followed by considering a Military Support mission to the French during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, and then evolving into the Military Assistance mission that eventually became a basis for the Military Intervention effort that went disastrously wrong.

The final chapter is the summation of the findings in the research project, wrapping up the thread of the questions posed at the beginning: 1. Why is Military Assistance a tool rather than a strategy? and 2. Why was Military Assistance important in context to Grand Strategy? This chapter also explains some of the issues that time and discipline determined were unable to be explored in depth, even given that these issues represent areas that could and should be researched. That these have not been academically explored is possibly due to a serious lack in a foundational literature surrounding Military Assistance, its nature and application.

Ultimately, the goal of this research project was to answer the question of where the Military Assistance mission pursued by the United States represented a tool of

its foreign policy, and how it fit into the options for policymakers in the pursuit of American Grand Strategy during the 20th century, eventually being applicable in the current international security environment. This perspective additionally includes understanding how the lessons learned from these experiences might be applied to current alliance development through Military Assistance by the United States. Furthermore, the underlying factor that seems to differentiate successful Military Assistance from a failed one is the clear linkage to a broader, achievable political goal. As linking military objectives to political goals is hardly a new concept, the case studies indicate the challenges of these linkages due to political leaders who failed to operate under a more inclusive strategic framework with respect to international relations, and military leaders who failed to challenge the political leadership to insure such a linkage.

Conclusion

The practical and theoretical underpinnings of Military Assistance are military power and its application, either through warfare or some other construct of international relations. While this research project addresses that aspect of Military Assistance which is a part of warfare, the more important aspect is to further understand international relations, very much within the rubric established by Clausewitz and political goals. This project will show that Military Assistance is a tool of military power, not a strategy, and has more substantial ramifications than that of the pursuit of war. This broader application explored is one whereby Military Assistance plays a key role in the creation or continuation of long-term sustainable security within the context of American Grand Strategy.

Chapter 1

Military Assistance and Grand Strategy

Within the various topics of International Relations, the idea of “Grand Strategy” is a relatively new one, coming into the academic lexicon in the 1920s with Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s classic work, *Strategy*.¹ As Professor Sayle mentions in his article, Liddell Hart’s comment about Grand Strategy states that, “the term ‘grand strategy’ serves to bring out the sense of ‘policy in execution.’ For the role of grand strategy — higher strategy — is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war — the goal defined by fundamental policy.”² Although a more recent academic concept, nation states have had and pursued grand strategies since their origins, whether it was the tribes of Israel in biblical times, the city-states of Thucydides’ Greece, or the empires that developed to expand their influence far past their shores. Each sought to pursue an agenda with their rivals, clients, and others, in order to further their interests while utilizing all of their nation’s resources and power.

Whether through expansions of power or engagements with others through alliances or simply a refusal to recognize other states, all were grand strategies being pursued in the context of international relations. Those grand strategies can be encapsulated and conceptualized as the following: engagement, selective engagement, and isolation.³ There is also a sense that a grand strategy should be global in its pursuit and should define a nation’s sense of its place in the world

¹ Timothy Andrews Sayle, “Defining and Teaching Grand Strategy,” *The Telegram* 4 (January 2011), accessed 27 February 2017, <http://www.fpri.org/article/2011/01/defining-and-teaching-grand-strategy>.

² Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy: 2nd Revised edition* (New York: Meridian, 1991), 322.

³ Foreign policy thinker, Ian Bremmer, in discussing the next steps for American foreign policy, refers to the United States as having three choices: Independent America, Moneyball America, and Indispensable America. Ian Bremmer, *Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World* (London: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015).

and world order, along with the willingness to pursue that grand strategy with all levels of its power and influence. In this sense, it is difficult to imagine that a weak or small state could pursue a grand strategy, and thus it has generally been the purview of a Great Power. This chapter will seek to explain Military Assistance in the context of grand strategy more inclusive and American Grand Strategy more specifically.

The realization of a necessity of security in general relates to Military Assistance in that security, or the need for safety, acts as the link or glue between Grand Strategy and Military Assistance. That connection draws upon the fundamental need for the population of a nation state to feel secure, with respect to Maslow's hierarchy of needs.⁴ With that fundamental need for security, an external actor can utilize Military Assistance as a tool of grand strategy to facilitate that need for security. This becomes an effective method of connection and dependency between a recipient nation and a supporting nation, which is the external actor.

Modern American Grand Strategy has been most traditionally recognized as the broad, strategic thinking that challenged Communism in the post-WWII bipolar global order. As the WWII fighting alliance that was commonly known as the "Allies" but in fact founded under the lofty name of "United Nations"⁵ began to dissolve in the aftermath of WWII, the rise of what is known as the liberal world order came into fruition in the form of institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Security Council, the North American Treaty Organization, and others. In one sense these institutions⁶

⁴ A. H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50, no. 4 (July 1943): 379, accessed April 12, 2017, doi:10.1037/h0054346.

⁵ Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 110. William Manchester and Paul Reid, *The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill Vol. 3 Defender of the Realm, 1940-1965* (New York: Little Brown and Company), 461.

⁶ It is important to note that these institutions that were considered the liberal world order were as much about maintaining and spreading capitalism as they were about collective security. It was thought that the protectionist economics in the aftermath of the Great Depression helped prolong and deepen the economic challenges for many, giving rise to the hyperinflation that led to the Nazis gaining power in WWII. Paul N. Hein, *A Low Dishonest Decade: The Great Powers, Eastern*

came into being in the hopes of creating an international forum that would be more successful than the ill-fated League of Nations, the international institution created in the aftermath of WWI.⁷ In another sense there was an underlying effort to link nations together economically to prevent the terrible cost of global wars; the idea was that where diplomacy had failed, economic dependency and the threat, rather than the application, of military force could succeed.

Success in the case of the liberal world order may be defined as an environment that would allow for a peaceful discussion of disagreements between nation states without escalating into the outbreak of another global conflict. However, an additional intention of the Western Powers in the founding of those military and economic organizations was to prevent the rise and expansion of Communism throughout the world. The Western Powers' perspective was that a community of many nation states committed to the betterment of all would be far more successful than the closed, controlled system of Communism practiced by the USSR and its satellite states, and this would be attractive to the various smaller potential client states throughout the world.⁸ The construct of this engagement type of Grand Strategy was endemic over many decades until the fall of Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, this was not the first time the United States had pursued or developed a purposeful Grand Strategy.

John Quincy Adams and America's First Grand Strategy

The history of American Grand Strategy is in one sense synonymous with the history of the United States. The origins of American Grand Strategy can be found within the Farewell Address written by outgoing President George Washington. As he commented, "With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain

Europe, and the Economic Origins of World War II, 1930-1941 (New York: Continuum, 2002), 394-395.

⁷ Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 1-2.

⁸ This is important with reference to grand strategy in that as Liddell Hart stated, it was about coordinating and directing all elements of a national power. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 322.

time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.”⁹ Many have incorrectly interpreted these comments as the original impulse toward an isolationist grand strategy,¹⁰ but this is a clear misreading of the text. Washington’s point “to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes” is an indication of his considered and balanced statecraft.

This perspective developed in his years overseeing the need for the young United States to find its own place within the broader array of 18th century nation states without suffering through the challenges and interference of alliances, wars, and other such events that could weaken the United States before it had “command of its own fortunes.” Washington had seen how the competing interests of the European nations created conflict. In fact, he and the United States had been the direct beneficiaries of such a policy, as the French competed with the British for spheres of influence and extensions of their respective empires, resulting in French support of American during the War of Independence. While from one perspective Washington’s Farewell Address is a distinctive advocacy of an isolationist grand strategy, the more nuanced understanding is that he had intended to allow the young nation its breathing room to grow, eventually enabling the United States to develop a stable, strong position in the world and in global affairs.¹¹

⁹ George Washington, “Farewell Address,” September 19, 1796, page 30, accessed August 8, 2016, http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents_gw/farewell/transcript.html.

¹⁰ Paul O. Carrese, “George Washington’s Legacy as a Foreign Policy Guide,” in *Public Discourse*, October 22, 2012, accessed May 23, 2017, <http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/10/6688>.

¹¹ John Avlon, *Washington’s Farewell: The Founding Father’s Warning to Future Generations* (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2017), 185-186.

The next chapter came from the son of Washington's successor. President John Quincy Adams¹² is identified as both the son of President John Adams and one of the less-skilled presidents of the young republic, even "by his own admission his single term was a failure."¹³ While John Quincy's presidency ended in disappointment, and eclipse by the rise of the Jacksonian era, the position that prepared him for the presidency and should enshrine his place in history was his role as Secretary of State for James Monroe. This was the position in which John Quincy would create a place for the United States in global affairs within the Commonwealth of Nations, and redefine American Grand Strategy through the development and drafting of the Monroe Doctrine.

The Monroe Doctrine was critical to the evolution of the United States for many reasons, not least of which being an establishment and change in American Grand Strategy. Washington's farewell address demonstrated both practical and strategic thinking, specifically as it related to international relations,¹⁴ but other presidents directly after Washington changed directions entirely. Presidents John Adams, Jefferson, and Madison decided to involve the country in international matters, rather than heeding Washington's warning to allow the United States to establish itself before engaging abroad. These series of involvements culminated in the War of 1812 and the destruction of Washington, D.C. by the British. Heeding the lessons of President Madison and through the work of John Quincy as Secretary of State, Monroe's presidency became the first presidential administration to establish a defined Grand Strategy, through the Monroe Doctrine. This Grand Strategy stated that the United States would establish its sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere and would protect its interests and influence there if necessary.¹⁵

¹² To more easily distinguish between John Quincy Adams and his father, John Adams, John Quincy Adams will be referred to as "John Quincy" and his father, "John Adams."

¹³ Lynn Hudson Parsons, *John Quincy Adams* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001), xvi.

¹⁴ Washington believed it prudent to avoid the international entanglements of Europe that he thought could lead to ruin for the young nation.

¹⁵ It is important to note that there is no desire to give an excuse or lend credibility to some of the actions taken by the United States in pursuit of

Another aspect of the Monroe Doctrine is that it was the first time in the nascent nation's history that it separated itself from the political dynamics of the European nations. As a small nation on the edges of empires, the United States was essentially a pawn in the various conflicts of Europe, being swept up into broader wars between various great powers. The conflicts of the United States from the French Indian War through the War of Independence to the War of 1812 were all, by some extension, simply different conflict theaters of European wars. The Monroe Doctrine declared to those European powers that the United States would no longer engage in European conflicts. It could be argued that this concept has become so ingrained within the identity of the United States that it formulates a foundation of resistance that prevented immediate entry into the global conflicts of WWI and WWII.¹⁶ From this perspective, it could easily be seen that the United States was in actuality creating a sense of isolationism, to literally and figuratively detach itself from European wars and power dynamics.¹⁷ However, this does not support the concept that the Monroe Doctrine actually represented, more a statement on the advent of selective engagement, in that the doctrine solidified the terms under which the United States would engage in global affairs.

John Quincy had what could only be described as an excellent background to become Secretary of State. While his father, John Adams, served the nation as first Ambassador to the Court of St. James in Great Britain, he brought his son, John Quincy, as his assistant. After the completion of his formal education, John Quincy became the ambassador to the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia, culminating in following his father's footsteps as the Ambassador to Great Britain. John Quincy had a front row seat to observe the European Powers using their economic might, diplomatic skill, and finally, military power in pursuit of

maintaining dominance in the Western Hemisphere, especially during the Cold War. The general point is to merely acknowledge that the Monroe Doctrine is an established tradition in United States foreign policy that has been maintained since the Monroe Doctrine's inception.

¹⁶ Marco Mariano, "Isolationism, internationalism and the Monroe Doctrine," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 9, no. 1 (March 2011): 36-39, accessed June 20, 2018, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14794012.2011.550776>.

¹⁷ Mariano, "Isolationism, internationalism and the Monroe Doctrine," 40.

their ability to best one another in a seemingly endless struggle for continental dominance. As the first ambassador to Russia, he witnessed the Napoleonic Wars first hand.¹⁸ As these wars were the birthplace of a major cornerstone of military strategy, Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*, so too were they the beginning conceptualizations of American Grand Strategy. However, it is important to note that Clausewitz's *On War* was a book on military strategy, and not about Grand Strategy. Professor Charles Edel describes, in his book on Grand Strategy and John Quincy Adams, the misconception that Grand Strategy must be developed prior to implementation or even success: "While [John Quincy] Adams acted broadly according to his grand strategy, he was also prepared to adjust when necessary....Adams's grand strategy helps explain why America's rise from a confederation of revolutionary colonies to a continental power was not an inevitable result of resources and demographics, but rather the product of a deliberate pursuit. And because grand strategy is assessed not only at a national level, but also at the personal level, it allows for an analysis of what occurred when certain principles, values, and priorities were in conflict."¹⁹

By way of advice from his father, the previous American Ambassador twenty years prior, John Quincy gained an understanding of the value of taking his first post in The Hague. He acknowledged that his was a unique opportunity to view the politics of Europe and in comparison, those of the United States. Europe in the late 18th century was awash in revolution and political instability, and this was the political uncertainty feared by John Quincy and the Founding Fathers.²⁰ Professor Edel articulated a key point: "He [John Quincy Adams] came to understand that without security, the nascent republican principles and institutions would not survive in a world dominated by militarized empires."²¹ That instability was fueled by nationalist moods of the population due to a

¹⁸ William Earl Weeks, *John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1992), 7-8.

¹⁹ Charles N. Edel, *Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 10.

²⁰ Edel, *Nation Builder*, 58-61.

²¹ Edel, *Nation Builder*, 62.

buildup of debt from wars and elites ignorant of the plights of their citizens.²² By its logical conclusion, there was a recognition that if security could be developed and managed without the cost of war, there would naturally be a lessened impact on the population, and with this rational, John Quincy appreciated that security was necessary to protect America. This foundational notion of John Quincy's, as he formulated his concepts of Grand Strategy and America's place in the world, could not be more relevant to the concept of Military Assistance. It is incumbent on a Military Assistance mission to have purpose, a strategy, that ideally links with a grand strategy.

Support for this conclusion is found in recent memory, for the Iraq War offers an interesting similar example of security as it relates to Grand Strategy and Military Assistance. When General Petraeus took command in Iraq, he stated: "the term 'secure' is a clearly defined doctrinal task, meaning to gain control of an area or terrain feature and to protect it from the enemy. Thus, the tasks will be clear-cut, though difficult. Certainly upcoming operations will be carried out in full partnership with Iraqi forces, with them in the lead whenever possible and with arm's length when that is not possible."²³ While it could easily be argued that the tasks were anything but clear, there can be no question that General Petraeus, based on his own Congressional testimony, saw the Military Assistance mission in Iraq as a critical effort to establish security for the Iraqi population. It was the security General Petraeus sought to establish that was fundamental to linking his efforts to a broader strategic effort in the War on Terror, even though a Grand Strategy in the War on Terror had not been readily apparent.

John Quincy's career arc reinforced this critical understanding of the principal need of security for the general public; however, his key question then considered was, "What next?" As wars continued to consume the European

²² George Rudé, *The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1964), 6-11.

²³ David H. Petraeus, "Opening Statement," United States Senate, Armed Services Committee, January 23, 2007, recorded by *Federal News Service* and reprinted by *The New York Times*, accessed August 20, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/23/world/middleeast/24petraeustextcnd.html>.

Powers, John Quincy commented to his father about the benefits of the United States' continuing policy of neutrality.²⁴ In a sense, John Quincy's comments were a forerunner to George Washington's Farewell Address, later in the same year. This is by no means a statement that John Quincy influenced Washington's thoughts on the matter of neutrality, as it would be a stretch of the imagination for John Adams to consider sharing his son's thoughts with President Washington. It does indicate, however, that there was common thinking between Washington and John Quincy in their assessment of a need for American neutrality and divorce from European machinations. More importantly, John Quincy's thoughts on the issue were more extensive than Washington's published Farewell Address, and displayed an appreciation that neutrality was not an ongoing Grand Strategy, but rather a temporary policy that recognized the United States' ability to influence events, which was to say, minimal at that point.²⁵

Security and Power Projection

In the context of Military Assistance this idea of a temporary strategy versus an actual Grand Strategy is interesting and relevant. In order to be successfully implemented, the tool of Military Assistance must support the Grand Strategy of the supporting nation: on a practical level, this could not be considered an act of neutrality according to John Quincy's line of thinking. However, as discussed, Grand Strategies can take many forms, though certainly not at the same time. When the United States pursued a grand strategy, be it engagement, selective engagement, or isolation,²⁶ Military Interventions can and have been used to further that Grand Strategy. For example, when the United States pursued a grand strategy of isolation prior to WWII, it utilized Military Aid in the form of the Lend-Lease Act, allowing the United States to arm the Soviet Union, China,

²⁴ Edel, *Nation Builder*, 83.

²⁵ Letter from John Quincy Adams to John Adams, 24 June 1796, in *Writings of John Quincy Adams*, 7 vols, ed. Worthington C. Ford (New York: Macmillan, 1913-1917), 1:497-508. Initially found through Edel, *Nation Builder*, 83.

²⁶ Bremmer, *Superpower*, 25-26.

Great Britain, and others.²⁷ When the United States chose a grand strategy of selective engagement, such as with China in WWII, Military Assistance was the tool of choice.²⁸ Finally, when the United States chose a grand strategy of engagement in WWII, it pursued an option of Military Support, in addition to Military Aid, prior to full commitment to the war.²⁹

Temporary strategies, however, make less sense to utilize Military Assistance, such as the neutral stance the United States took at its inception in the 18th century. The reason that a temporary strategy, like neutrality, does not work for a Great Power is that by its very definition it is transitory, in that it primarily is the movement from one permanent grand strategy to another. In general, these are a function of the flow of time, and the tools of Military Intervention will have difficulty fitting into the temporary strategy box. Specifically, Military Assistance as a tool of foreign policy must focus on supporting a specific end state and political objective.

Recall that John Quincy viewed the War of 1812 from the Russian Court of the Tsar, and the second rise of Napoleon from his next posting at the British Court of St. James, providing him with a unique perspective. Seeing these events from a distance metaphorically as an ambassador and their impact on American prestige and influence had a profound effect on John Quincy, who became more convinced of the necessity of power projection — essentially adopting the realist school of international relations.³⁰ It is important to note that John Quincy came

²⁷ Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, eds., “Lend-Lease Act,” in *The Reader’s Companion to American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), 649. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), 73 and 89-98.

²⁸ Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945* (New York, 1971), 1-5 and 529-531.

²⁹ Well before the United States declared war on Japan and Germany, December 8 and 11, 1941 respectively, the draft began over a year before with the knowledge that support would be provide to the United States’ allies. The National WWII Museum, “Research Starters: The Draft and World War II,” *The National WWII Museum*, accessed May 8, 2018, <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/draft-and-wwii>.

³⁰ Edel, *Nation Builder*, 101-102.

to this conclusion having considered the experience of the United States during the War of 1812, as it dealt with the small standing army and navy left by President Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans.³¹ This adoption of the Realist school of thought could seem to be the antithesis of the Jeffersonian model of a more liberal political philosophy, a belief in the rationality of populous, or, rule by the governed. While it is true that John Quincy aligned himself politically with Jefferson after his father left office, his commitment to a more established central government did not change.

He noted, “But the surest pledge that we can have of peace will be to be prepared for war. The peace of [the Treaty of] Ghent did not settle any of the contests for which the war had been waged, because the peace in Europe had removed the causes of the contest.”³² This comment bears a striking resemblance and parallel to the statement made by President Washington in his first State of the Union, “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.”³³ The difference between the two comments is that in John Quincy’s letter, he broadly addresses the need to employ Realism within the construct of international relations and the ability to project power, whereas President Washington’s statement is a point of departure without a clearer or expansive meaning.

John Quincy, however, understood that the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the War of 1812, was not agreed to by force of arms, but rather because the strategic necessity for warfare by the aggressor, Great Britain, simply dwindled away. John Quincy was confirming a greater acknowledgement of where military power fit within the nature of Grand Strategy, rather than the ideology of his current political party. The application of this entire experience for John Quincy

³¹ James Scythes, “Military Peace Establishment Act,” in *The Encyclopedia of the Wars of the Early American Republic, 1783-1812*, vol. 2, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2014), 422-423.

³² Letter from John Quincy Adams to William Plumer, 5 October 1815, in Worthington, ed., *Writings of John Quincy Adams*, 5:400-401. Initially found through Edel, *Nation Builder*, 102.

³³ George Washington, “First State of the Union,” January 8, 1790 in New York, NY, accessed March 25, 2017, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0361>.

led to his position as one of the early leaders of the United States who understood and appreciated the “where” and “how” of the application of the tool of military power with respect to Grand Strategy, essentially understanding the linkage between the two. That understanding is relevant to the relationship between Grand Strategy and Military Assistance, in that Military Assistance, like any other application of military power, also requires such a linkage.

It is in this regard that Military Assistance can be viewed as a tool for a similar projection of power. Whereas in the 18th and 19th centuries, power projection meant influence through colonies and naval presence on the high seas, in the later 19th and early 20th centuries, power was projected through colonial empires where resource extraction became a main focus. However, in the post-WWII era, where colonialism began to be considered a national form of enslavement, powerful nations more specifically required a more extensive set of options to apply power and influence. Whether hard power or soft power is projected, all are ultimately tools of Grand Strategy. This connection thereby relates back to Liddell Hart’s original definition, in that both hard power and soft power in pursuit of a policy objective inherently marshal the resources of a nation. John Quincy, in his own time, wrestled with these concepts in how most advantageously to project without threatening the European Powers — trying to digest and develop an appropriate grand strategy for the day and age.

Examining Hard and Soft Power with Respect to Grand Strategy

It is important to note that Military Assistance is the product of both hard and soft power. Given its military basis, the relation to hard power is clear, but considering that Military Assistance is also an aspect of soft power is a little less obvious. Professor Joseph Nye stated that “soft power rests on the ability to influence others”³⁴ but that it “is not merely the same as influence.”³⁵ He expanded in a later journal article, “Hard power is push; soft power is pull. Fully defined, soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by

³⁴ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.

³⁵ Nye, *Soft Power*, 6.

the 'co-optive' means of framing the agenda, persuasion, and positive attraction."³⁶ Military Assistance by its very nature is dependent on "persuasion" and "positive attraction" on a tactical basis as the manner of conduct between supporting trainers and receiving trainees. However, as a broader tool of American foreign policy, Military Assistance cannot help but become a projection of soft power. Nye agreed, pointing out that "The military can also play an important role in the creation of soft power. In addition to the aura of power that is generated by its hard-power capabilities, the [United States] military has a broad range of officer exchanges, joint-training, and assistance programs with other countries in peacetime."³⁷ This projection exists in the experience of soldiers serving side by side under austere and challenging circumstances,³⁸ but more importantly in the exchange of values. These values vary depending on the unit and the understanding of the mission: for example, from the torture that occurred in Abu Ghraib, to the communications of fundamental values of the United States Military, such as civilian control of the military. Whatever they result in formulating, these values contribute to the soft power that John Quincy understood, while at the same time recognizing the necessity for hard power to support it.

In the days that inaugurated John Quincy's tenure as Secretary of State, the State Department had a wide range of responsibilities in addition to the duties of foreign relations, from patents to the monitoring of laws in each of the states. Interestingly, almost two centuries later, Secretary Powell, understanding the pains and pressures of time and works schedules, would specifically schedule

³⁶ Joseph Nye, "Power and Foreign Policy," *Journal of Political Power* 4, no. 1 (2011): 19, accessed March 27, 2017, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/2158379X.2011.555960>.

³⁷ Nye, *Soft Power*, 116. As a side note, it is very likely that Professor Nye was referring to foreign assistance when discussing "assistance programs" in this quote.

³⁸ General Paek Sun Yup, the last living general officer from the Korean War, described how Korean soldiers would come back from serving in United States Army units with a newfound craving for coffee. Paek Sun Yup, in discussion with the author, November 11, 2015.

time on a regular basis to simply think.³⁹ John Quincy, however, had a staff of only ten. The sheer volume of critical needs from numerous directions overburdened this small staff, implementing the movement to segment and create efficient processes in order to develop effective administration of departmental responsibilities. This eventually enabled all involved to afford time to think, and by so doing, to appreciate the global dynamics afoot and their effect on the United States in the beginning of the 19th century that would allow them the opportunity to contemplate and develop America's first Grand Strategy.⁴⁰

Formulation of the First American Grand Strategy

Interestingly, it was the British, and more specifically, the British Ambassador to the United States, Stratford Canning, who happened to be the foreign minister's cousin, who instigated the discussions that developed both John Quincy's ideas of American Grand Strategy and the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Through various treaties, wars, and agreements the United States had acquired the territory of Florida, negotiated access rights in the Pacific Northwest, and agreed to relinquish its claim on Texas. Ambassador Canning sought John Quincy to discuss a broader alliance, essentially a "special relationship," because the United States and the United Kingdom were more closely aligned in governing styles, language, and relations than other nations in Europe. Due to this alignment, Ambassador Canning proposed that both nations should ally together with the intention to prevent any further expansion or influence of other nations in the Americas. President Monroe and much of his Cabinet were impressed by the offer, but John Quincy disagreed, understanding that this offer gave the British a great deal while limiting the United States' opportunities.⁴¹ John Quincy stated to the Cabinet, "we give her [Great Britain] a substantial and perhaps inconvenient pledge against ourselves, and really obtain nothing in return. Without entering now into the enquiry of the expediency of our annexing Texas or Cuba to our Union, we should at least keep ourselves free

³⁹ Daniel Patrick Forrester, *Consider: Harnessing the Power of Reflective Thinking in Your Organization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 66.

⁴⁰ Edel, *Nation Builder*, 107-116.

⁴¹ Weeks, *John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire*, 180.

to act as emergencies may arise, and not tie ourselves down to any principle which might immediately afterwards be brought to bear against ourselves.”⁴² The next month John Quincy wrote the draft that President Monroe gave in an address to Congress that articulated the Monroe Doctrine, the United States’ first endeavor at developing a Grand Strategy that was a response to a poor effort made by the British to continue expanding their empire.

In envisioning America’s first Grand Strategy, John Quincy understood that the United States would only be able to grow — physically and strategically, in both hard and soft power — by creating options for itself. This entailed preventing the British from expanding their influence in North America, rather than creating limitations for the United States’ own probable (and eventual) expansion throughout North America. As one scholar noted, “the three guiding principles of the Monroe [A]dministration’s foreign policy — reciprocity treaties and commercial retaliation, reconciliation with Great Britain, and a strengthened military — constituted a blueprint for global expansion.”⁴³ More importantly, though, John Quincy appreciated that these options to create opportunities of expansion, whether influence or trade or diplomacy, were all simply tools, much like Military Assistance, to achieve that Grand Strategy. As prescient as John Quincy was, no one could have predicted the far-reaching nature of the Monroe Doctrine. No one in the United States could have known with certainty how it would develop relations within the Western Hemisphere, but in the 19th century world of international relations, the Monroe Doctrine demonstrated that the United States was present on the international stage and understood how to define and achieve a Grand Strategy for itself.

From the perspective of Military Assistance, this foundational understanding of the difference between what is strategy, albeit Grand Strategy, and a tool of that strategy is an important and nuanced distinction that most policymakers fail

⁴² *The Diaries of John Quincy Adams: A Digital Collection* (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 2005), Diary 34, 1 January 1823 - 14 June 1824, 149, accessed March 30, 2017, <http://www.masshist.org/jqadiaries>. Originally seen in Edel, *Nation Builder*, 174.

⁴³ Weeks, *John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire*, 47.

to appreciate. While Military Assistance is by and large thought to be a tactical implementation of military doctrine, as discussed earlier in the chapter, there is a clear exchange of values. This value exchange, or soft power, should be placed in the context of the development of greater capabilities between the recipient and supporting nations. This leads to a natural conclusion that Military Assistance is in fact a tool rather than a strategy. Military Assistance cannot be a strategy because there can be no goal or achievement of militaries assisting one another that is anything other than tactical, such as meeting the goal of every soldier knowing how to fire a rifle or how to perform land navigation. Military Assistance must be a tool to achieve a broader goal or Grand Strategy. While the United States did not have the capacities or capabilities to utilize Military Assistance to pursue its Grand Strategy in the early 19th century, it was certainly familiar with the tool. This familiarity arose from the United States Army's essentially having been created through the Military Aid from France and the Military Assistance of Major General Baron de Steuben during the War of Independence. Although the option to utilize Military Assistance in pursuit of Grand Strategy was not available at the time, the post-WWII administration of President Truman proved to be a clear example of how Military Assistance could and would act as a tool of Grand Strategy.

Grand Strategy as a Presidential Doctrine

The Truman Doctrine was a declaration made to Congress on March 12, 1947 by President Harry Truman, as a clear statement that the United States would stand against Communism, as a political movement, in all ways — politically, economically, and militarily. In a broader sense, it was the first post-WWII pronouncement by the United States of a clear, focused Grand Strategy. The Truman Doctrine was the first declaration of the United States against the global spread of Communism. It was the embodiment of Liddell Hart's definition of Grand Strategy in the sense that Truman would marshal "all the resources of a nation" toward a "goal defined by fundamental policy."⁴⁴ While Truman never used the "domino theory" term, either as a theory or a metaphor, it should not be

⁴⁴ Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 322.

minimized that the Truman Doctrine as a Grand Strategy was the basis for the domino theory that President Eisenhower would express a few years later.⁴⁵

The March 1947 declaration to Congress never directly referenced Communism or its global spread, but there was no question to listeners concerning exactly to what Truman was referring.⁴⁶ He specifically called for economic and military assistance for Greece and Turkey,⁴⁷ both of which had growing Communist insurgencies. In addition, at the time there was a growing sense that the Soviets viewed themselves in a global competition with capitalism, or, as stated by noted foreign policy and Soviet expert, George Kennan (or “X”), “tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds.”⁴⁸

This type of antagonism was one which many within the international community were carefully observing. The year before Truman’s declaration, Former British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill dramatically stated: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing

⁴⁵ Frank A. Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 173-174.

⁴⁶ Dennis Merrill, “The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (March 2006): 28, accessed May 20, 2018, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.00284.x>.

⁴⁷ Harry S. Truman, “Message to Congress,” March 12, 1947, Document 171, 80th Congress, 1st Session, Records of the United States House of Representatives, Record Group 233, National Archives, accessed April 2, 2017, <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=81&page=transcript>.

⁴⁸ George Kennan [X, pseud.], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (July 1947): 570, accessed June 23, 2014, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20030065>. The reason for the differing dates between the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and the “X” article is that the article was internal to the Truman Administration and allowed to be made public so long as Kennan published under a pseudonym.

measure of control from Moscow.”⁴⁹ Churchill, in his eloquence, highlighted the impressions and emotions of many leaders in the West, but it took President Truman, as the leader of the free world, to communicate the Grand Strategy, in the Truman Doctrine.

The political world, articulated by Churchill, and the policy world, in the form of George Kennan, created a receptive environment for Truman’s declaration. In addition, there were domestic, political considerations, in that the Republican Party controlled the House of Representatives and the Senate, creating a political necessity for Truman to find commonalities to work with his opposition. The Truman Doctrine was fundamentally guided by Kennan’s principle of containment, which stated that it “is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”⁵⁰

The Truman Doctrine as a Grand Strategy based on this principle of containment created by and large a unification among politicians. There was little debate between liberals and conservatives as to whether the Soviet Union should be contained,⁵¹ but the debate as to how best to accomplish this goal was passionate, which created or dismantled many political careers. It should be noted that there was a great deal of criticism when the article was published,⁵² but with the coming period of McCarthyism and “Red Scare,” there were few who would stand against the policy of containment. At the same time, there was considerable doubt from the very architect of the containment policy, George Kennan, who, serving as the Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State

⁴⁹ Winston Churchill, “Sinews of Peace,” (speech, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 5 March 1946) The International Churchill Society, accessed April 4, 2017, <https://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/the-sinews-of-peace>.

⁵⁰ Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 575.

⁵¹ James M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf, “Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988” *The Journal of Politics* 52, no. 4 (November 1990): 1078-1079, accessed June 1, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131683>.

⁵² Charles Gati, “What Containment Meant,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 7 (1972): 29-30 and 32, accessed February 3, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147751>.

Department, was unable to publicly clarify his thoughts due to his government position. With regard to the containment areas being advocated based on his article, “The Source of Soviet Conduct,” Kennan, in fact, was not a supporter of President Truman’s policy of containment, believing instead that containment should only be pursued if it was within the United States’ capabilities.⁵³

However, establishing the Truman Doctrine as a Grand Strategy was unlikely to have been prevented or even limited by Kennan’s thinking. This was due to Liddell Hart’s original definition and understanding that the purpose of grand strategy was “to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war — the goal defined by fundamental policy.”⁵⁴ What Kennan was calling for amounted to a basic understanding and assessment of each challenge that the spread of Communism would create. It was a thoroughly rational approach that would be expected of Kennan as a disciplined planner and practitioner of foreign policy. However, Kennan’s measured approach and Truman’s broader Grand Strategy demonstrated that good policy rarely makes for good messaging in politics. Truman clearly felt that he needed the grand gesture to unify elements of his support for other initiatives at hand.⁵⁵ Had Kennan’s approach been implemented, quite likely many of the Military Assistance missions would have been constructed quite differently.

There is an underlying reason why the Truman Doctrine and the Containment Grand Strategy it espoused is so critical as it relates to Military Assistance. On a practical level, Military Assistance is often one of the first tools to be utilized by the United States post-WWII under the rubric of containment, and as a result has been used extensively. The general understanding in this usage is that if the United States could help create self-sufficiency among the recipient, sometimes client nations, this would be far less expensive than the

⁵³ Gati, “What Containment Meant,” 34.

⁵⁴ Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 322.

⁵⁵ Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power*, 172-174.

obligation of fighting an entire war in the respective region.⁵⁶ This strengthening of recipient nations was employed in Greece and Turkey as part of President Truman's declaration in March of 1947. Before that, Lieutenant General John Hodge, commander of the United States Army Military Government in Korea, implemented Military Assistance as a method for supplementing local security for which he did not have the personnel. An additional purpose for its implementation was to provide the foundation for an eventual South Korean army, which would be the Republic of Korea Army, supported by the United States Army Korean Military Advisory Group. It was used again in the Philippines before WWII under the leadership of General MacArthur, who served as the senior military officer to the Philippine government. Post-WWII, Military Assistance was instituted in a more formal manner in the Philippines when the United States organized the Joint United States Military Advisory Group. And again, this time in Indochina, which would become Vietnam, it was part of the Military Advisory Command-Vietnam. This utilization of Military Assistance as a tool of American Grand Strategy is entirely dependent on achievable political objectives being determined. In addition, it is dependent on policymakers understanding that the strategy they are putting forth is also achievable.

Grand Strategy as Theory

Domino theory⁵⁷ was a concept popularized by President Eisenhower during a press conference in 1954, when he discussed Vietnam as one of many possible falling dominos. He stated: "Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you call the 'falling domino' principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a

⁵⁶ It should also be noted that given the various manning needs of the United States Military, such as serving as the occupying force in Germany and Japan in the late 1940s, the full-scale Korean War in the 1950s, and then Vietnam in the 1960s, there were rarely more troops to send to another war in the event one developed.

⁵⁷ It is important to note that the idea of "domino theory" is not a political theory in the sense of International Relations theories such as Realism, Constructivism, or Neoliberalism. Domino theory is far more relevant as an aspect of American Grand Strategy and therefore is discussed in this chapter.

disintegration that would have the most profound influences.”⁵⁸ This statement was essentially the foundation of the United States’ policy of containment of Communism for the next twenty years, and it was the basis for escalation in Southeast Asia. In fairness to Eisenhower, he was only articulating what he saw as the natural evolution of the Truman Doctrine that established the focus of American Grand Strategy to contain the spread of Global Communism.

The problem with the domino theory was that it was a fallacy on the face of it, failing to appreciate any sense of strategic or practical thinking, despite the theory being propagated by Eisenhower, a great appreciator of strategic and practical thinking. The fallacy was that Eisenhower, and others who subscribed to the domino theory, conceived that the actions existing within one nation could create a predictable outcome in another nation. History can be conceptualized as occurring in waves, which is as good an explanation as any for the waves of revolution that were occurring around the world at that time. WWII had changed the global order of things, and the resulting bipolar world that arose from the ashes of war helped to create these waves. Conceptualizing a wave does not mean that there is a clear predictable outcome, such as a government falling or even failing. It does, however, mean that what happens in one nation will more than likely affect, in some manner, the dynamics of domestic affairs in its neighbor. This is extremely different from a domino theory and is far less predictable, making it more challenging to appreciate.

Many years later the neoconservatives seemed to believe that they were picking up the mantle of domino theory and Grand Strategy at the end of the Cold War. As noted former neoconservative Francis Fukuyama stated, “Communism collapsed within a couple of years because of its internal moral weakness and contradictions, and with regime change in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact threat to the West evaporated.”⁵⁹ However, it was the

⁵⁸ Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force, United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945 -1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, “The Pentagon Papers,” Part 5, Section A, Volume 1B, B-11.

⁵⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*, The Castle Lectures in Ethics, Politics, and Economics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006), 51.

neoconservatives misunderstanding of history that led to the Iraq War in 2003. Since this research project is not specifically exploring the Iraq War, delving into this conflict is not critical per se, but what is important to the broader dynamic of American Grand Strategy is how the neoconservatives saw the Iraq War in the context of American Grand Strategy.

The misunderstanding that neoconservatives had with regards to the fall of the Soviet Union and Communism had far more to do with internal issues, as discussed by Fukuyama. However, the neoconservatives viewed the fall of Communism very much under the rubric that the Reagan Administration created. The narrative consistently advocated was that the buildup of the United States Military created a competition that eventually broke the economy of the Soviet Union. This led to a natural conclusion by the neoconservatives that the external pressure contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union, and that actions made by external actors could create similarly predictable results. However, this, in fact, did not follow.

Fukuyama continued, “the [Soviet] hardliners themselves had no stomach for such a struggle [with respect to military force] suggested a much deeper moral rot at the heart of the communist system than practically anyone had suspected.”⁶⁰ Similar to the case of the Soviet Union, the neoconservatives viewed the Arab dictators and autocrats as resting on the “moral rot” of their governments and political organizations that allowed them to remain in power, which led the neoconservatives to believe that an external action could topple them from power. As the neoconservatives rose to power in the administration of President George W. Bush, they entered the Bush Administration looking to take on Saddam Hussein and Iraq.⁶¹ They did this for many reasons, not the least of which was the sentiment that Saddam had avoided justice during the first Gulf War, but also because they believed that they had enough support among the

⁶⁰ Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads*, 52.

⁶¹ Fredrik Logevall, “Anatomy of an Unnecessary War: The Iraq Invasion,” in *The Presidency of George W. Bush: A First Historical Assessment*, ed. Julian E. Zelizer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 90-93.

region and that there was a minimal risk of resistance among the United States' allies.⁶²

Ultimately, it was the goal of the neoconservatives to create a reverse domino effect: if the United States was able to topple a dictator and creating a liberal democracy in its place, this would result in a natural wave, or outbreak, of democracies throughout the Middle East. However, because of the misunderstood lessons of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as outlined by Fukuyama, the entire endeavor failed, and failed spectacularly. As previously stated, the purpose of this research project is not to delve into the Iraq War; however, this sidestep is useful to consider in this context, since the neoconservatives were attempting to develop and extend the reverse domino effect, based on the original domino theory propagated by Eisenhower, into a new Grand Strategy for the United States in a post-Cold War era. This idea of reverse domino effect is important, as it highlights what is not a Grand Strategy.

Ironically, the effect created by the Iraq War was exactly opposite in almost every aspect of what had been intended by the neoconservatives. To begin with, the United States quickly and painfully learned that where a nation state has none of the institutions necessary for a liberal democracy to flourish, democracy in any form would struggle. This lesson underlined the understanding that the formation of a liberal democracy is far more than simply having the public vote at a ballot box. With the total failure of the Iraq War to achieve its broader strategic aims, the idea of reverse domino effect through external actions for a Grand Strategy was deemed a failure. It should be noted that the idea for the reverse domino effect of democracy seemed as though it might come into fruition with the advent of Arab Spring, which arose at the end of 2010. As in the completion of this research project in 2017, the effects of the Arab Spring are still being integrated and debated, and although there was regime change in a number of Middle East countries, those transitions were all the result of internal rather than external pressure. Finally, the pursuit of this domino/reverse

⁶² Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (London: Atlantic Books, 2006), 39-43.

domino theory of Grand Strategy ended in the necessary examination and development around Military Assistance.

Connecting Grand Strategy to Military Assistance

Due to the failure of standard warfare in both Iraq and Afghanistan against the local insurgencies that the United States was unable to defeat, Counterinsurgency or COIN doctrine was developed for United States Military. This doctrine was based on the work of David Galula⁶³ and his more contemporary evolution, David Kilcullen,⁶⁴ who both made the argument that the goal of COIN was to win the “hearts and minds” of the people, (from the perspective of the United States Armed Forces) to legitimize the local government. This was done through first clearing out enemy militants or combatants, then engaging with the population, building infrastructure to maintain or raise the populations’ standard of living, and finally, developing local security forces to keep the population secure.

It is important to note that this is the origin of the United States Armed Force’s recognition that it needed to begin the process of developing a set of doctrines around the concept of Military Assistance, beginning with the creation of the United States Army Field Manual 3-24.⁶⁵ Previous doctrinal endeavors had failed to become institutionalized with the conventional forces of United States Armed Forces and more specifically within the United States Army.⁶⁶ This led to the further development of Joint Doctrine: that is, doctrine developed by the

⁶³ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964). A. A. Cohen, *Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012).

⁶⁴ David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* 86, no. 3 (May-June 2006): 103-08, accessed April 5, 2014, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art017.pdf

⁶⁵ Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008* (London: Allan Lane, 2009), 24-31.

⁶⁶ Acknowledging that there has been a great deal of doctrinal development within the Special Forces and Special Operations community, little of that doctrine had been applied to the conventional forces of the United States prior to the thorough re-write of FM 3-24 by then LTG Petraeus.

Joint Staff within the Department of Defense that is applicable to the entire United States Armed Forces, and created to explore and clarify elements of Military Assistance. This area of research will be further explored in Chapter 2.

The connection and relevance of Military Assistance and Grand Strategy as theory is that Military Assistance is a tool, a method of implementation, by which to achieve a grand strategy. COIN similarly is a method of implementation to accomplish a grand strategy. The failed understanding of the neo-conservatives regarding the domino and reverse domino theories was the unsupported belief of a predictable outcome given the application of an external influence. At the same time, policymakers seem to have mistaken the nature of COIN and Military Assistance and the connection between both. The flawed strategies of the domino and reverse domino theories were potentially as problematic as believing that a tool or method can be construed as a strategy. This demonstrated the misunderstanding of the nature and the differentiation between strategy and methods. As military theorist Professor Colin Gray stated, “in modern times it has become ever easier for policymakers and military commanders to be so diverted by the proliferation of different forms of war that they have neglected ‘the basics’ of strategy.”⁶⁷

The Powell Doctrine and Military Assistance

The Powell Doctrine was further evolution on the Weinberger Doctrine⁶⁸ and was both a result of and a response to the Domino Theory of the Vietnam era. At its essence, the Powell Doctrine outlined the principle concept to only commit military force as a last option. As will be discussed in Chapter 2 on United States Military Doctrine, the nature of the strategic level of warfare is such that international relations is first and foremost an integral part of military planning. This construct of strategic thinking, however, is distinctively different from

⁶⁷ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 127.

⁶⁸ Walter LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine,” *Political Science Quarterly* 124, no. 1 (March 2009): 73, accessed March 13, 2017, doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb00642.x.

Grand Strategy, and this understanding is important when appreciating the utilization of the tool of Military Assistance.

The Powell Doctrine is relevant to military strategic planning in that “the Powell Doctrine largely came to define the conventional wisdom among much of the military leadership and officer corps.”⁶⁹ It colored the process by which military planners and advisors presented options to their political masters. This eventually created enough of a disconnect that then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, in a now famous exchange, told the United States Senate Armed Services Committee that it would take approximately 350,000 soldiers to secure Iraq.⁷⁰ This was wildly different from the Bush Administration’s predictions, but in a sense, both were correct, and both were wrong. General Shinseki, responding from the perspective of the Powell Doctrine, was correct in his prediction that those soldiers would be required in order to achieve overwhelming force, both during the force on force phase of the conflict, as well as securing the population. General Shinseki was wrong, however, in thinking that the goals for his estimate were the same as the Bush Administration’s goals. The Bush Administration, on the other hand, was correct in its assessment based on its Grand Strategy of reverse domino theory, while being incorrect regarding the need to emphasize a clear, coherent plan for the day after the military victory.

Why outline the Powell Doctrine within the context of this research project? Military planners and advisors mistake the Powell Doctrine for a Grand Strategy. The Powell Doctrine neither meets the definition outlined by Liddell Hart nor does it outline a goal or set of goals. The Powell Doctrine is rather more of a checklist of necessary factors that should, or must, in then General Powell’s opinion, be met prior to beginning military action. This is not to say that there is no use or utility in the Powell Doctrine’s being considered as a strategy on any level, but it should be specified as a method or a tool for achieving a strategy or

⁶⁹ Jonathan Monten and Andrew Bennett, “Models of Crisis Decision Making and the 1990–91 Gulf War,” *Security Studies* 19, no. 3 (August 2010): 503, accessed March 13, 2017, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2010.505129>.

⁷⁰ Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 101-102.

Grand Strategy. This is the relevance of the Powell Doctrine to American Grand Strategy, in that similar to Military Assistance, the Powell Doctrine must be considered a tool rather than a strategy.

Military Assistance as a Tool of Grand Strategy

At best, the doctrine around Military Assistance constitutes a tactical strategy, which may be conceptualized as a strategy that is implemented by tactical military units, that is, by soldiers on the ground. This is not a traditional construct of strategy, in fact, as Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman stated in his seminal work *Strategy: A History*, “there is no agreed-upon definition of *strategy* that describes the field and limits the boundaries.”⁷¹ As stated, while this issue will be explored in detail in Chapter 2, it is important to extrapolate that this perspective of the United States Military and policymakers is incorrect. Military Assistance, as it has been defined in terms of developing the capacities and capabilities of an indigenous military, cannot be thought of as a “strategy,” even by Professor Freedman’s loose definition.

“There was a consensus that strategy had something to do with the supreme commander and it was about linking military means to the objects of war.”⁷² By this construct of strategy, Military Assistance does not fit, as it is much more of a “means” or a method to engage the enemy, rather than matching the broader concept of a strategy. As a “means” or method, it is far more logical to think of Military Assistance as a tool within a range of options for policymakers, Military Assistance simply being one option for policymakers to consider with respect to a broader strategy or Grand Strategy. On a more practical side, as the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars evolved into insurgency-based conflicts and a COIN strategy was agreed upon, Military Assistance became a critical component of that COIN strategy, as a method to achieving the broader Grand Strategy in the War on Terror, a grand strategy that was never fully articulated or understood.

⁷¹ Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), xi.

⁷² Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 74.

Ultimately, however much disagreement there exists among policymakers regarding nation building,⁷³ it remains a means or method of American Grand Strategy. Given the various grand strategies available to the United States that are likely to be pursued by policymakers,⁷⁴ an engagement grand strategy is one in which Military Assistance is most likely to be implemented in pursuit of a COIN strategy, since this Grand Strategy is one where nation-building seems most likely.

Conclusion

If there is one lesson from warfare, it is what United States Naval Academy historian Kenneth Hagan and University of New South Wales professor Ian Brickerton concluded: “Going to war did not solve problems, it created new ones.”⁷⁵ War in pursuit of Grand Strategy creates an inherent conflict, in that pursuit of a Grand Strategy requires utilization of all elements of national power in pursuit of “fundamental policy.” However, if war is being used in pursuit of that Grand Strategy, there will automatically be an issue with limiting the construct of the pursuit of war. At the same time, there can be no question that the dynamics of international relations have evolved such that limited warfare is the only option that will be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the international community.

The reason that many concepts by policymakers are referred to as “doctrines” is more a matter of political messaging and framing of what many are trying to thematically develop into an American Grand Strategy. However, very few “doctrines” can or should be considered as Grand Strategy: many are simply sets of rules or guidelines by which policy or military action should be pursued, as was outlined with the Powell Doctrine. However, the history of Grand Strategy in the United States, begun under John Quincy Adams in his role as Secretary of

⁷³ Barbara J. Falk, “1989 and Post-Cold War Policymaking: Were the “Wrong” Lessons Learned from the Fall of Communism?” *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 22, no. 3 (September 2009): 309-310, accessed May 20, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25621927>.

⁷⁴ Bremmer, *Superpower*, 17-19 and 44-45.

⁷⁵ Kenneth J. Hagan and Ian J. Bickerton, *Unintended Consequences: The United States at War* (Reaktion Books Ltd: London, 2007), 188.

State, established a broad base of power internationally that allowed the United States to grow and prosper domestically. That the Monroe Doctrine continues to endure as a policy of United States foreign policy to this day speaks to the acceptance of that policy by other nations. The costs of this policy have been extremely high, whether with reference to the Native Americans driven from their homes, or the South American regimes supported to prevent the spread of Communism. However, it must be recognized that due to this Grand Strategy, the United States was able to establish itself as a force in the world.

Leading off that example, President Truman, being pressured domestically for being soft on Communism, needed to establish a clear signal of where the United States would stand. By establishing a policy of containment versus the global spread of Communism, using Military Assistance as a tool of that Grand Strategy, Truman unknowingly established a link between the two that has been maintained throughout the Cold War and after. At the same time, policy makers must understand the relationship between Grand Strategy and Military Assistance in that Military Assistance can and should be considered as an application of both hard and soft power. Appreciating that Military Assistance has a natural connection of both hard and soft power enables a clear link between those who want to project power and those who see institutional development as a critical method for establishing power.

Chapter 2

Military Assistance and United States Military Doctrine Post 9/11

Customarily found only within the grounds of military doctrine, the concepts surrounding Military Assistance are ultimately rooted more broadly in the concepts of international relations. As previously discussed, Military Assistance is a tool rooted in both the projection of power and cooperation within an extensive international regime and the fraying global order. This chapter describes and develops a fundamental understanding of the different types of Military Assistance, the concepts of Foreign Internal Defense, Security Force Assistance, and the Advise and Assist mission that collectively exist within United States Armed Forces' joint doctrine, placing those concepts into the overall structure of the operational timeline that is a foundation of that doctrine. The purpose of this fundamental understanding is then to translate these concepts from military tactics and methods, placing them within the larger context of the international relations security narrative, in order to better explain the strategy nature of the tool of Military Assistance. While this doctrine has been primarily developed from the lessons of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the methods and structure that are found within the doctrine are still applicable to the chosen case studies of Korea and Vietnam. However, the doctrine and this chapter are intended to give context to the tool of Military Assistance and the framework of American Grand Strategy.

Though the tool of Military Assistance has involved training the respective militaries to lead and fight a conflict in their own indigenous methods, its purpose is to develop the foreign security force to the extent that those forces could eventually assume responsibility for the overall security within their respective nation. At the same time, throughout history, nations have sought to influence other nations through other methods of Military Intervention, such as Military Aid or Military Support, as discussed during the Introduction. Examples of Military Intervention in history can be seen in the Athenian and Spartan alliance during the Peloponnesian War, the Crusades in which European nations

sought to save Christendom, efforts to modernize the Japanese military in the late 1800s, and the experience of United States Civil War veterans in Egypt. Military Intervention has been a time-honored tradition for nation states to consistently extend their influence, within an international context for their own security. They operationalize the theoretical arguments about the need and desire to project power with an international framework. Iran, for example, believes that to protect itself from the United States, it must extend its sphere of influence into Lebanon through Hezbollah and in Iraq through various armed militias.¹ While the fallacy or genius of this strategy has and will be debated for years to come, the fact is that the strategy is a reality, one in which nation states presently operate under and have done so for centuries.²

During those centuries, theorists and strategists have discussed how the fundamental nature of war works with respect to relations between nation states. Sun Tzu described in *The Art of War* how the goal of warfare was to impose one nation's will onto another through violence,³ while Clausewitz declared in *On War* that war was not only a continuation of politics by other means but "a real political instrument."⁴ These understandings have become so ingrained into the lexicon of warfare that they are fundamental to the perceptions and assumptions of the nature and origins of war. The idea that war has this fundamental nature in terms of an extension of relations between states is essentially the core of the understanding of international relations, regarding how nation states relate to one another, with war being a violent expression of that core idea. Within the more expansive construct of war and warfare, Military Assistance is a nuanced approach to expanding a nation's power and influence,

¹ Dexter Filkins, "The Shadow Commander," *The New Yorker*, September 30, 2013, accessed December 8, 2013, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander>.

² Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 136–139.

³ Sun Tzu, "The Art of War," trans. Lionel Giles, *Sun Tzu's Art of War*, 6:2, accessed April 3, 2014, <http://suntzusaid.com/book/6/2>.

⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. J. J. Graham, eds. F. N Maude and Anatol Rapoport (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1997), 22.

while in one sense to extend relations, but more as an exercise in extending a nation's interests. The connection between Military Assistance and Military Intervention is that Military Assistance is the concrete manifestation of Military Intervention, which more comprehensively is the extension of the nations' interests. As French President and former general Charles de Gaulle once stated, nations did not have friends; they had interests.⁵ The concepts and constructs of war and the nature of war and warfare are relevant to the United States Armed Forces' doctrine, because that doctrine too is based on understanding and incorporating the fundamentals of war and warfare.

If war is, as Clausewitz observed, politics by other means, then the extensive concept of Military Assistance should be interpreted as war by other means, and just as military operations have existed and do yet exist in modalities of peacetime, so too can Military Assistance. Military Intervention has taken many different forms throughout the ages, from the Persian funding of various Greek city-states to ferment animosity between them,⁶ to the Soviet Union's sending weapons and other materials to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam War,⁷ both forms of Military Aid. Military Assistance has often become a method of being involved in a conflict without being fully committed to a war, as will be shown in more detail in the case studies. The essence of this concept entails allowing others to do the fighting and dying, while the sponsoring nation helps develop the capacities and capabilities of a recipient nation. In one sense, it could be considered a less expensive military endeavor or more aggressive form of military engagement, and possibly thought of as a war on the cheap, but in another sense simply a lighter exertion of influence.

⁵ Yoel Marcus, "A self-respecting country has interests, not friends," Haaretz, last modified November 22, 2013, accessed April 6, 2014 <http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.559444>.

⁶ M. I. Finley, "Appendix 4: Notes on Book VIII," in Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 617-620. Hermann Bengtson, *The Greeks and the Persians: From the Sixth to the Fourth Centuries*, trans. John Conway (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), 297.

⁷ John Prados, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 545-549.

It is important to note, however, that this type of Military Assistance is rarely only about building and developing capacity and capabilities — it is in fact all about extending and projecting power through international cooperation. In both the example of Persia's Greek city-states, and the Soviet Union with the Viet Minh, neither was about anything more than creating a strategic quagmire for their respective enemies in extended conflicts. The Persians were trying to keep the Greek city-states from uniting and fighting the Persian Empire, which eventually did happen under Alexander the Great.⁸ The Soviet Union similarly was supporting the Vietnamese to limit the Chinese as much as to frustrate the United States.⁹

Capabilities and Capacities

Building capacity and capabilities is an integral part of not only developing a military but also the broader national security apparatus. In examining both the idea of capabilities and capacities, capabilities should be understood as the development of skillsets within the overall goals of a military. If, for example, a unit within the United States Army is to have the capability of being an airborne unit, there will be a set of tasks associated with that capability. Those tasks would, for example, include the ability of each Soldier to parachute out of an airplane at a certain altitude, or the ability to operate without a resupply for a certain number of days. Each of the tasks exists in order for the unit to become capable of carrying out a specific type of mission. That mission must then feed into an overall strategy, and this concept is known within United States Army doctrine as nesting.

Nesting refers to the act of vertically connecting from that list of tasks that create a capable military unit, all the way up through to the national strategic

⁸ Bengtson, *The Greeks and the Persians*, 306-307 and 310.

⁹ Joseph L. Noguee, "The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, June 20, 1980), 16-17 and 20, accessed May 20, 2017 <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA090959>.

objectives.¹⁰ Tasks lead to capabilities that lead to the capacity to accomplish a given mission, which in turn leads to accomplishment of military objectives, which in turn ultimately leads to the overall national strategic objectives achieved. Essentially, this is how the smallest of details can develop, create, and even have an impact on the integration of the most expansive circumstances.¹¹

The term, capacity, by traditional definition, is specifically about numbers or resources, but in a military context similar to capabilities, have to do with the nature of how military units are able to function. *Whereas capabilities relate to a unit's ability to accomplish a task, capacity has to do with whether a unit has the time, space, and most importantly, the resources to accomplish the task in question.* Capacity essentially involves the resource constraints a unit may have that enables it to be capable of accomplishing that task, and this is the reason that the concept of time and space is so critical to the definition of capacity. As such, capacity building is about creating sustainability, insuring that a unit can in fact maintain its operations throughout the duration of a mission. Capacity building is more than simply having a unit allocated supplies, but in reality, deals with developing systems, processes, and models that can fluctuate and be flexible depending on mission circumstances and dynamics.

Capacity building and unit sustainment are a necessary aspect of developing foreign security forces. Although numerous books and studies have been done on military logistics, capacity building is much more about the underlying

¹⁰ United States Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 5: The Operations Process* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, May 17, 2012), 2-14 to 2-19.

¹¹ The concept is so common that Benjamin Franklin cited a traditional nursery rhyme in *Poor Richard's Almanac*: "For want of a nail the shoe was lost. For want of a shoe the horse was lost. For want of a horse the rider was lost. For want of a rider the message was lost. For want of a message the battle was lost. For want of a battle the kingdom was lost. And all for the want of a horseshoe nail." Benjamin Franklin, *Poor Richard's Almanac* (New York: H. M. Calwell Co., 1900), 17-18 accessed April 6, 2014, <https://archive.org/details/poorrichardsalm01frangoog>. Kenneth Mackey, *For Want of a Nail: The Impact on War of Logistics and Communications* (London: Brassey's (UK), 1989), xiii. Based on "Outlandish Proverbs: #499," in Mr. G. H. (thought to be George Herbert), *Outlandish Proverbs*, (London, 1640).

organization and the systems it supports rather than specifically about the delivery of goods and services. Maturing those foreign security forces into self-sufficient and reliable forces, capable of securing their local population, is the fundamental principle of Military Assistance. It is only by developing and expanding the capacities and capabilities of the recipient nation's military and security forces that the supporting nation can assist in creating long-term sustainable security. From the perspective of the supporting nation, once the recipient nation's military and security forces become capable of maintaining local security, the recipient nation can cease to be a resource drain on the supporting nation, and may be thought of as a future ally, such as the Republic of Korea during the Korean War.

Understanding capacities and capabilities is necessary, then, for appreciating Military Assistance, in that they form the foundational, practical basis for Military Assistance. While on a theoretical basis Military Assistance may be about power projection through international cooperation on the unit level, on the soldier-to-soldier level, Military Assistance must entail expanding capacities and developing capabilities. It is only from this expansion and development that Military Assistance can possibly achieve a long-term, sustainable security that is linked to a political objective.

Military Assistance and Joint Doctrine

United States Armed Forces joint doctrine outlines warfare generally in two separate concepts: regular or conventional warfare¹² and irregular warfare.

¹² The doctrinal terminology for what would commonly be thought of as "war" such as in WWI or WWII has evolved even since pursuing this research project. Initially the term "full spectrum operations" was outlined in *Field Manual 3-0: Operations* in 2008 (page 3-1) and then evolved to "unified land operations" in *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0: Operations* in 2017 (Glossary-9). The term is currently under review with a quick evolution to "multi-domain battle" (David Perkins, "Multi-Domain Battle: Driving Change to Win in the Future," *Military Review* 97, no. 4 (July-August 2017): 6-12). There is a current debate to change the term from "multi-domain battle" to "multi-domain operations" (Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., "Services Debate Multi-Domain: 'Battle' or 'Operations,'" *Breaking Defense*, April 10, 2018, accessed July 23, 2018, <https://breakingdefense.com/2018/04/beyond-multi-domain-battle-services->

Irregular Warfare is defined as “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s),”¹³ and is the underlying basis for Security Force Assistance and as such, Military Assistance. The challenge is that while there are libraries (and generations of those libraries) about traditional, regular warfare there is little in the way of official military doctrine on Irregular Warfare.¹⁴ Indeed, one of the foundational (and current) documents on Irregular Warfare is the Joint Operating Concept titled “Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats” from 2010. In this Joint Operating Concept are five core activities or operations that can be used, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Irregular Warfare: counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations.¹⁵

As a footnote of the Joint Operating Concept, there is mention that Security Force Assistance overlaps with FID.¹⁶ As it was noted in the Introduction of this dissertation, Security Force Assistance and FID involve two different doctrinal missions with differing capabilities and capacities. To revisit the definitions discussed in the Introduction, FID is “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”¹⁷ Security Force Assistance entails “Department of Defense activities

brainstorm-broader-concept). Within Joint Doctrine the term “traditional warfare” is used and is outlined in *Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the United States Armed Forces* (25 March 2013 incorporating Change 1, 12 July 2017, X).

¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the United States Armed Forces*, GL-8.

¹⁴ This has been a factor for years and was even noted when United States Army doctrine began maturing for WWII in the late 1930s. Walter E. Kretchik, *U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror* (Lawrence, KS: The University of Kansas Press, 2011), 145-147.

¹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operating Concept: Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 May 2010), 5.

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operating Concept*, 5 note 7.

¹⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), GL-7. (This doctrine has

that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.”¹⁸ The general difference between the two is that FID is a core capability of Special Forces,¹⁹ while Security Force Assistance as stated by Secretary of the Army Dr. Mark Esper indicates that it was capability that the Army had been doing and was going to continue doing as practice of Irregular Warfare.²⁰ Military Assistance, however, was defined in the Introduction as the efforts that develop capacities and capabilities in a foreign security force with an agreed-upon structure and doctrine understood by both the support nation and the recipient nation. A nuanced difference but a difference nonetheless.

Within the broader construct of Military Assistance, this chapter will seek to analyze all the various forms that Military Assistance can take: Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Force Assistance, and then the Advise and Assist mission. In order to appreciate the context and nuances between these three, it is crucial to understand and appreciate how each participates in the broader rubric of military operations and concepts of international relations. Moreover, to best understand and appreciate that broader rubric, an explanation of the general timeline or phases of military operations is required. Existing within military operations planning are six phases along the operational timeline: Shape (Phase 0), Deter (Phase 1), Seize Initiative (Phase 2), Dominate (Phase 3), Stabilize (Phase 4), and Enable Civil Authority (Phase 5).²¹ These phases exist irrespective

not been updated since 2010 but discussions are currently underway to address this shortcoming within various sections of the Joint Staff).

¹⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22*, GL-11.

¹⁹ Special Forces are commonly referred to as “Green Berets” in reference to the headgear they wear, but as a general point the “Special Forces” referred to here is the range of special operations forces, only one part of which, are “Green Berets.”

²⁰ Corey Dickstein, “Army Plans for More Security Force Assistance Brigades,” *Stars and Stripes*, April 1, 2018, accessed May 9, 2018, <https://www.stripes.com/news/with-1st-sfab-deployed-army-looks-to-build-more-adviser-brigades-1.519734>.

²¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017), V-9 to V-11.

of the type of military operation and whether the operation is foreign humanitarian assistance or counterinsurgency or full spectrum warfare. Each phase, however, is distinctive while at the same time malleable, and *has the potential to bleed into one another*.

In the Shape phase, Armed Forces have begun planning efforts of possible outcomes based on the type of scenario that may develop, while on the diplomatic side, ongoing negotiations and relationship development would be a status quo. At this point there is a status quo phase, when no specific mission or scenario is being engaged. This enables the Armed Forces to continually plan for any number of contingencies, and the diplomats to constantly negotiate and build relationships. From the perspective of international relations, this idea of contingency planning is a challenge to the idea of the status quo, because there is always some crisis, humanitarian or otherwise, happening in the world. Due to the nature of military action, there does exist a “steady state” or status quo as conceived by the Shape phase. The same cannot be said of the international arena since the nature of the international arena is always an existing conflict, conflict in the field of international relations being different than the idea of conflict in a military setting. Ultimately, then, the definition for the Shape phase that makes the most sense in the area of international relations is a phase in which international actors can manage and drive events rather than be controlled by them.²² An obvious example of this situation would be when Iraq invaded Kuwait and prior to the Persian Gulf War until the buildup of forces for Operation Desert Shield, as it was a period in which the international community was working to shape events in the broader sense.

The Deter phase is the phase of the initial response to a crisis. If that crisis is humanitarian in nature, then the response will begin with the civilian leadership outlining the scope of the response with personnel and/or resources, such as in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake. If the crisis is military in nature,

²² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operational Planning* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III-42. (The 2017 version of this joint publication does not address the phasing aspect of planning).

various military posturing would begin this phase with something akin to massing forces at a border, such as during Operation Desert Shield from 1990 to 1991. If the crisis is diplomatic in nature, there could be an effort of shuttle diplomacy such as the actions of Secretary Henry Kissinger with Arab-Israeli disputes in the 1970s. In general, however, the nature of crisis is that two or three of these aspects are present simultaneously and this requires a multi-faceted approach, because no single crisis can be prevented by one solution set. The international relations dynamic to this phase involves actors being driven by events rather than being drivers of them, because in some sense outside actors and external events are imposing a set of events. As events continue to develop, actors become more and more consumed by those events, trying to prevent them from escalating and continuing to exacerbate.²³

The next phase, the Seize Initiative phase, is one that can be best described as the phase in which friendly forces, be they military, humanitarian, or diplomatic, create a scenario to allow for freedom of maneuver within the operational area. While usually thought of as a physical area, such as the seizing of a beachhead at the outset of Operation Overlord (more popularly known as D-Day), this area does not necessarily have to be restricted to a physical space. On the diplomatic side, there could be the creation of a metaphoric space, such as United Nations' Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's address to the United Nations Security Council during the Cuban Missile Crisis.²⁴ In this instance, enough "space" was created for a solution to be created between the Soviet Union and the United States behind the scenes. From the perspective of the international relations aspect, this phase on the operational timeline is one in which actors transition from a more preventative or defensive stance to a proactive one. Essentially, this phase

²³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0*, III-42.

²⁴ Thomas Hamilton, "Stevenson Charges in U.N. Cuba is Soviet Bridgehead," *The New York Times*, October 24, 1962, accessed May 18, 2017, <https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1962/10/24/90546817.html?pageNumber=1>.

is preparation for the Dominate phase, which at this point in the operational timeline is usually a foregone conclusion.²⁵

Building on the Seize Initiative phase, the Dominate phase is one in which decisive operations take place. It is in this phase of the operational timeline that the necessary efforts to accomplish the overall goal or goals are accomplished. Diplomatically, this might be the time when negotiations conclude and ratification of a treaty takes place, essentially where the diplomatic actions are being implemented and completed. On the humanitarian side, an example of a Dominate phase would be when an emergency response begins, because that type of response is the critical part of the operation. On the military side, the focus of this phase is on operations specifically designed to accomplish the key task or set of tasks that will achieve the overall strategic goals of the mission. At the level of international relations, the Dominate phase is one, as Sun Tzu stated, whereby one actor is taking the actions necessary to impose goals onto another.²⁶ Clausewitz would recognize this principle as one whereby an actor is intent on compelling another to fulfill his or her will.²⁷ Actors are hoping to achieve the focus of their actions that have occurred within the operational timeline thus far. In achieving those actions through maneuvering within the international system, the actors can and will be able to impose their will upon the system more widely.²⁸

Following the Dominate phase is the Stabilize phase, in which the concept of nation building begins. Whether the operation is humanitarian, military, or diplomatic in nature, this is the phase for the development of governance capacity. From the international relations perspective, this is the phase on the operational timeline in which the will that was imposed by one nation on the other during the Dominate phase becomes normalized. By making the actor's newly imposed will normalized or the new status quo, the purpose of this phase

²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0*, III-42 and III-43.

²⁶ Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, 6:2.

²⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, 5.

²⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0*, III-43.

becomes one of transition into a scenario where that will is integrated into the overall system.²⁹ While on the face of it, this phase may resemble one not taken seriously by planners or actors, as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Paul Bremer, found during Operation Iraqi Freedom, this phase is extremely difficult, one that requires substantial effort and planning. In fact, WWII is an excellent example of how the Stabilize phase prepares for ongoing relations, as there were numerous conferences of political leaders during the war, such as Teheran in 1943 and Yalta in 1945, in which the war's aftermath was discussed in detail, in addition to planning teams devoted to long-term solutions for Italy, Germany, and Japan.³⁰


Finally, in the last phase, Enable Civil Authority, all elements focus on legitimizing the host, or invaded, nation government and the transition to having the host-nation in the lead begins. This is to say that the dynamics within the nation are such that there exists a new reality or a new normal or status quo; a capacity and capability to maintain security and basic services to the population. This is the reality in the frame of reference of the international relations perspective as well. As the government becomes more legitimized, both internal to the nation and within the international community, the government, on behalf of the nation, becomes capable of being admitted as an actor within the extensive international arena. Operating within this new paradigm, the host nation will be seeking to pursue all avenues that create and solidify its legitimacy, the new status quo, or in military parlance, a new "steady state."

An important point to note is that these phases have elements of their primary activities happening in some form concurrently throughout each phase, and depending on the specific phase, on which activity is most demonstrative, as the graph below displays. For example, within the Stabilize phase there are serious elements of the Dominate phase still at work that can and do create

²⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0*, III-43.

³⁰ Office of the Historian, "Tehran Conference, 1943," United States Department of State, Milestones: 1937-1945, accessed May 18, 2017, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/tehran-conf>.

constraints on personnel and resources. Due to the dynamic nature of the international systems in which actors and militaries operate, each of these phases may even be occurring simultaneously, depending on the situation at any given moment. However, due to the nature of the international system, there generally exists a primary scenario that is the predominate focus within the international community.³¹



Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, III-39.

Foreign Internal Defense

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is defined by the United States Military's Joint Staff³² as "the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in

³¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0*, V-5 to V-29. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0*, III-38 to III-44.

³² The term "Joint Staff" refers to those civilians and military members that work directly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Staff, on behalf of the Chairman, is responsible for the development of Joint Doctrine.

any of the action programs taken by another government or designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.”³³ Traditionally, the FID mission is developed and accomplished by United States Special Forces, sometimes known by the more popular nomenclature “Green Berets,” and not by Conventional Forces. FID connects into a more comprehensive nation assistance program and is dependent on the recipient nation’s support. That support cannot simply be an invitation into the country, and is dependent on a plan known as an Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Plan. In addition, the recipient nation’s support must include a whole of government approach in cooperation. This means that based on the Joint Staff doctrinal definition, FID cannot only consist of a military-to-military cooperation; there needs to be an integration with the recipient nation’s government to create a broader basis of capacities and capabilities, such as comprehensive institutional reforms. The concept of institutional development is referred to in military doctrine as Defense Institution Building (DIB) or sometimes, Minister of Defense Advising (MODA).³⁴ From the planning perspective, the government agencies responsible for internal security should be incorporated into the security arrangements for the recipient nation, and the supporting nation should be prepared to work towards such initiatives. The IDAD plan is the document in which the recipient nation will clarify these initiatives, the capacities and capabilities needed to create a sustainable security.

According to Joint Staff doctrine, the IDAD plan “focuses on building viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of the host nation’s society.”³⁵ As such, the IDAD is the foundational document that creates a baseline of the status quo of the host nation, from the perspective of where the host nation would like to be with respect to those institutions, and in a

³³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), I-1.

³⁴ Walter L. Perry, et al, *Defense Institution Building: An Assessment* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).

³⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22*, II-1.

sense it is logical that the “recipient nation” of Military Assistance, or FID in this case, is referred to as a “host nation,” since in a FID the host nation is quite literally hosting the supporting nation.

This is an important goal-building process for the host nation for several reasons: first, in that it creates a need in the host nation to understand and confront likely or current issues with respect to its security, and secondly, the process helps inform both the host nation and the supporting nation of the various dynamics at work that could possibly prevent the success of the mission. These dynamics could be internal, from competing internal politics to economic challenges to an actual insurgency, or they could be external, from a neighboring aggressor to general regional insecurity. The necessity is to understand and plan in an all-encompassing way around the total security situation faced by the host nation.

As a doctrinal concept, FID creates numerous concerns that should be examined more closely, particularly in that the definition is problematic in terms of its alternating from being both too specific and not being specific enough. Where the definition delineates “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government,” there exists an implication to develop a whole of government solution, which creates a further problem when addressing the issue of which agency of the host nation is the coordinator during a FID mission. Logic would conclude that this be a Ministry of Defense due to the FID mission being promulgated by United States Special Forces,³⁶ but that is not necessarily the case. The challenge arises from the fact that the definition is unclear on this point because the United States Armed Forces doctrine maintains that a FID operation can occur during any phase of an overall operational timeline, as was discussed earlier.³⁷ This does not necessarily make sense, however, in the broader

³⁶ Afghan War News Staff, “Difference between FID and SFA,” *Afghan War News*, accessed June 16, 2018, <http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/differenceFIDandSFA.htm>.

³⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22*, I-4 and I-5.

construct of both Military Assistance and international relations, or even the United States Armed Forces' own operational timeline.

From the military perspective, each phase on the operational timeline has elements of all the others, as seen above on the graphic, even during its own predominant phase; therefore, the idea of FID strategically fitting into the operational timeline at any phase is not justified by the understanding of the operational timeline established by United States Armed Force doctrine. FID and nation building more broadly cannot fit into the Deter, Seize Initiative, or Dominates phases. While many types of Military Assistance missions could be taking place during these phases, it would not make sense to begin FID during these phases. This is due to the emphasis of those phases being on the development and implementation of an operation, rather than the overall strategic perspective. In addition, from a logical perspective it is unlikely that a host nation will have the capacity or capability to create the IDAD plan during these phases.³⁸ Looking at these three phases specifically, the Deter phase is highlighted by a response. As previously mentioned, in the Deter phase, actors are being driven by events, and this does not allow beginning a FID effort, because an actor is being driven by events and trying to focus on controlling the outcome. It is unlikely that the actor, being focused on that outcome, will be able to integrate the type of broad national assistance program that would have incorporated FID into its national strategy, because the host nation's national security assets would be consumed by the events in the ongoing operation.

The Seize Initiative phase, emphasized by creating the space for a successful offensive, whether that space is physical or metaphoric, is also a poor choice to begin FID. It could be argued that a method for creating that space is to begin a FID program, but that follows from misunderstanding where the Seize Initiative phase ends up on the operational timeline. The space or freedom to maneuver in

³⁸ Examples of where host nations have worked with the United States on a Military Assistance mission during Phases I-III, such as Columbia, have had governing institutions that, while not ideal, certainly function. The point here, is that Phases I-III are entirely separate from institution building or development.

military parlance exists in order have a successful Dominate phase, in which the protagonist “focuses on breaking the enemy’s [or opposing forces’] will,”³⁹ or as Sun Tzu stated, “to impose one’s will on the enemy.”⁴⁰ A FID program, however, in its fully realized state, is not going to break the enemy or opposing forces in either a military operation or humanitarian crisis, because at its core a FID program is supporting and developing, not imposing. As such, actions to launch a FID program during the previous phase of Seize Initiative would not lead to the breaking of anyone’s will, and so should not be a phase of consideration for a FID program.

This leaves three possible phases to begin a FID program: Stabilize, Enable Civil Authorities, and Shape. The Stabilize phase is a possibility, because as stated, this is when nation building begins as a primary focus, or when the actor’s will that was imposed during the Dominate phase begins to become the status quo. A fully develop FID program would seem to make sense during any stage where the primary focus is nation building, since the cornerstone of any functioning society is one in which citizens feel secure to pursue their interests, and the purpose of a FID program is to create security capacity and capability.

There are, however, a few challenges that come with the Stabilize phase that lend itself to not being an ideal phase for a FID program. One perspective is that any state beginning in some way to rebuild itself, on its own or with external assistance, has a primary focus of legitimizing itself. As such, the state, or more specifically, the government, is unlikely to have the capacity or capability to focus on first developing an IDAD plan and then integrating the broad nature of a FID program into a probably nascent national security apparatus.⁴¹ The reason there is such a focus on an IDAD plan is that, when properly developed, the IDAD

³⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0*, III-43.

⁴⁰ Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” 6:2.

⁴¹ While the host nations’ legitimacy must be a concern, and may even be a goal, of the IDAD plan, it must be a result of the plan rather than a part of the plan due to the fact that the United States Armed Forces, be they conventional or non-conventional forces, do not have the capability to bequeath legitimacy upon a host government.

plan will help to expose many of the fault lines and discrepancies within the security structure of a nation state. The Stabilize phase, due to its transitory nature, theoretically is unlikely to have functioning national security institutions or government, and will not be able to identify where its long-term shortcomings exist, because there simply has not been time to create or develop a baseline apparatus.

Another challenge with the Stabilize phase is that since it is transitory,⁴² it enables an actor to move from the Dominate phase to the Enable Civil Authorities phase, taking into consideration the reality that there are variations of stability. It also clarifies that an actor must have a strategy to assist in this transition, since no nation could emerge from either a conflict or disaster with an unscathed government. At the same time, from the perspective of international relations, the Stabilize phase could be constructed to be that stage of transition. Since a FID program could also be considered a transitory program, and one that would fit within the dynamic described by the Stabilize phase, there is a challenge in that this analysis could be parsing over minutia, as it is a matter of degrees.

Based on Joint Staff doctrine,⁴³ a FID program is part of a larger nation assistance effort, and there is an inherent need for the nation to exist at a certain level of stability in order to receive a fully advanced program of assistance. This is due to the simple reality that any nation, whether advanced or developing, only has a limited amount of capacity with which to absorb and utilize any external assistance, and this is equally true of Military Assistance. When an actor is in the Stabilize phase on the operational timeline, this means that the actor and/or the host nation is transiting from unstable to stable, because the Dominate phase of the operational timeline is an inherently unstable phase. In

⁴² It has been noted that each of the phases are, by their own nature, transitory. However, Phases V and 0 can be maintained and go back and forth depending on the operational nature in question. At the same time, the Stabilize phase is transitory in the sense that there is an operational shift from Phases I-III to Phases V and 0.

⁴³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22*, I-1, IV-1, IV-2, and IV-16.

addition, because the concept of the Stabilize phase is transitory, this does not mean that no instability exists. In fact, more than likely there will be pockets of significant instability. The instability that exists will probably be both geographic and societally specific, more likely in the areas of the economy or governance. If that instability is too great, then broad assistance efforts will likely fail.

The host nation needs to have a certain level of capacity and capability in order to internalize any external development efforts. Recognizing this is crucial for any national assistance program to be successful, and a FID program specifically will not create the sustainable level of military competence or broader security that is needed to be considered successful without an overall national assistance program to act as the foundation.⁴⁴ No military structure can exist in a governance vacuum. This dynamic of a FID program and the Stabilize phase does not give the best foundation for a FID program to begin, because of its transitory nature. The Stabilize phase, however, does call for a type of Military Assistance to be discussed later in this chapter.

As stated earlier, the Enable Civil Authorities phase is one that highlights the recipient or host nation's being the primary driver with respect to security and other areas of governance. The purpose of this phase is to legitimize the state, and more specifically, the government. It is important to note that the Enable Civil Authorities phase ends in transitioning back to Phase 0, the Shape phase. When looking at the operational timeline, it may seem natural to view it linearly, but in fact the timeline should be conceptualized and viewed as circular. This view of one phase blending into the next makes it is easier to imagine the nuances of each phase, appreciating that there are no hard stops in transitioning from one phase to another, but more of a shading between one another, and thereby elements of one phase exist in another.

Based on this understanding of a circular timeline, there will be elements of instability within the Enable Civil Authorities phase. As the phase progresses and

⁴⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22*, I-1 and GL-9. Walter L. Perry, et al, *Defense Institution Building*, 33 and 115-116.

the host nation and government become more legitimized, the natural outcome is that less instability exists, and the more substantially the government can maintain its existence. For the FID program, Enable Civil Authorities is not the ideal phase to start due to the instability and the lack, though being reduced, of the legitimization of the host nation. With the assumption that the foundation of the FID program is to expand the capacities and capabilities of the national security apparatus within a host nation, it is equally necessary that a FID program develops into long-term, sustainable security.

In order to establish such long-term, sustainable security, the population must recognize the government as legitimate. With that legitimization, a sense of permanence can extend the efforts the government is pursuing, and in keeping with that permanence, the developments in the national security apparatus that come with a FID program are a seamless fit. However, the Enable Civil Authorities phase is one in which the host nation is moving from less stabilizing toward more stabilized. A FID program cannot create stability, as it is developing capacity and capability to create a sustainable national security apparatus, because the government remains in transition. That transition is critical for the host nation to develop through, but the FID program might be mistaken for a stabilizing force, which it is in the sense that it results in a deeper level of military expertise in the host nation. At the same time, it is not primarily stabilizing, since in order for a FID program to be implemented, the host nation must have effectively developed an IDAD plan. To imagine that IDAD plan being created during a period of instability is simply not realistic for many of the same reasons discussed regarding the Stabilize phase.

The creation of the IDAD plan, which is a separate but necessary step completed before beginning a FID program, should ideally start during the Enable Civil Authorities phase. While it is also possible to develop the IDAD plan during the Shape phase, the Enable Civil Authorities is the ideal phase for several reasons. The first reason is that by the time the host nation is capable of transitioning through much of the remaining elements of instability from the Stabilize phase, the host nation has developed, in order to survive, a level of

depth in both its national security knowledge and its capabilities. More than likely, due to the transition from instability, the host nation has some capacity challenges, and therefore is requiring a FID program. This level of depth in the national security apparatus is the expertise necessary to develop a thorough IDAD plan. Indeed, a solid IDAD plan may be a sign of government legitimacy, both in how the host nation sees itself, and in how the population will react to an invitation of foreign trainers aiding the host nation's capacities and capabilities.

An argument could be made that a host nation that is able to develop an IDAD plan competently likely does not need a FID program, but this conclusion creates a possible false correlation, since one does not necessarily result in the other. One rationale for this argument could be the logic that if a host nation is able to clearly define and describe its shortfalls, then it should be able fix them, perhaps not at the speed that it would prefer, but still capable of accomplishing such an effort. When a host nation is capable of developing a thorough IDAD plan, it could simply be due to a deep understanding of the internal defense and security issues, an awareness on the part of the host nation. This is a level of self-awareness that should exist by the time an IDAD plan is developed in the Enable Civil Authorities or Shape phase.

The IDAD must be developed in concert with the supporting nation, because if the host nation has an unrealistic understanding of the capacities and capabilities that the supporting nation brings to the endeavor, then the FID program will clearly fail. The work on the IDAD can take many different forms, and in theory, each set of circumstances will dictate not only the final developed IDAD plan, but also the style in which the host nation and supporting nation will work with one another. At the conclusion, however, the goal of both should be the same, in that they have a foundational plan from which to accomplish the FID mission.

The FID program is best aligned for the Shape phase primarily because of its stable nature, although this could also mean beginning the FID program at the end of the Enable Civil Authorities phase. This is due to the recognition that the host nation's military will have the most ability to absorb the broad dynamics of

a FID program and incorporate those lessons during times of greater stability. It is important to remember that a FID program is about expanding the capacities and capabilities of the entire national security apparatus. Any nation, especially one emerging from a transition period the way that a host nation likely would evolve into the Shape phase, can best adapt and evolve during a more stable environment. At the same time, organizations and specifically military organizations change and adapt during periods of conflict or instability; however, they do not necessarily institutionalize that new way of thinking or acting. Many times, the new ways are just considered as adaptations specific to the current circumstance, and not as options for long-term change. During a period of stability, and given the probable transition necessitating a FID program, the host nation has opportunities to determine what kind of capabilities and capabilities it wants and needs its military to have, which is why the IDAD plan is developed.

The concept of a FID program is encompassed within an overall national assistance program, which requires stability so that it, too, can become sustainable. In pursuance of that sustainable national assistance effort to exist, security must have been established at an early phase within the operational timeline. Based on the understanding of the operational timeline, the phase where the host nation moves from instability to stability is the Stabilize phase, and additionally into the Enable Civil Authorities phase. These are the phases in which the concepts of Security Force Assistance and the Advise and Assist mission become part of the national security reality in the host nation.

Security Force Assistance

Security Force Assistance (SFA) is defined by Joint Staff doctrine as “a range of activities to enhance the capacity and capability of partner nations by organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and building, and advising and assisting FSF [foreign security forces].”⁴⁵ The challenge with this definition is that it is essentially similar to the definition for FID, which was defined as “the

⁴⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22*, VI-30.

participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.”⁴⁶

There are two problems with these definitional similarities, the first being the execution of the mission. SFA, as defined by Joint Staff doctrine, can and is executed by any member of the United States Armed Forces; however, traditionally this has involved the training and development of foreign security forces by the Conventional Forces, which would be defined as those service members who are trained for regular warfare rather than Irregular Warfare.⁴⁷ The conceptual problem as discussed previously in this chapter is that the definition of FID given within the Joint Staff’s doctrine is too broad, and encompasses aspects of the United States Government that are neither under the authority or expertise of the United States Armed Forces.

To enable a FID program to be part of the sustainable security effort, it must, by its own nature, address the broader capacity and capability with the host nation’s national security apparatus. In the context of the above definitions, this means that a FID must broadly meet the needs of the host nation to aid in the expansion of its national security capacity and capabilities. To equip the FID program to address those concerns, it (and by logical extension the IDAD plan), must focus on national security as a whole, its interactions and interdependencies, but cannot seek to control them. More specifically, just as the Department of Defense cannot dictate Department of State policy, even in Afghanistan during the decade-plus conflict, neither can a FID program seek to develop a control between the host nation’s military and other parts of its national security apparatus. Joint Doctrine does, however, state this,⁴⁸ and while

⁴⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22*, I-1.

⁴⁷ Irregular Warfare is defined as “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).” Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the United States Armed Forces*, pg. GL-8.

⁴⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-20: Security Cooperation* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 23, 2017), viii and I-10.

a FID program can and should seek to develop the host nation's capabilities for interagency coordination and cooperation, it should not attempt to create a scenario in which the host nation's military is dictating those relationships as the doctrine implies. It is due to this reasoning that the definition for SFA is in fact a much better and precise definition for a FID program.

How then should SFA be defined and where should it exist on the operational timeline? In spite of the doctrinal definition, SFA is best defined, under the rubric of Military Assistance, as those security operations where the host nation, which at this point may only be thought of as a "nation" in a limited manner, is not in the main effort nor do its security forces have the capacities and capabilities to successfully secure the population. The supporting nation has primary authority over what will eventually be the host nation's territory in this scenario. This is not to say that the host nation does not have some form of sovereignty that is recognized domestically, and even possibly diplomatically recognized within the international community. At the same time, the reality on the ground is likely that the host nation has little or no authority or control over much of anything, for example, when Afghan President Hamid Karzai was referred to as the "Mayor of Kabul" in order to highlight his lack of authority and control.⁴⁹ More than likely, the host nation is primarily focused on getting its domestic political house in order. In this situation, the host nation needs to ensure that it has a legal and moral framework for the government to govern. That legal framework will most likely take the form of a constitution or a similar type of document, which will be of no practical use unless the population, and probably the various factions within the nation, support that overall framework. It is this support that forms the basis of the moral framework that can and will express itself in empowering the legitimization of the government or not.

⁴⁹ Ullrich Fichtner, "The Third World War: Why NATO Troops Can't Deliver Peace in Afghanistan," *Speigel Online*, May 29, 2008, accessed June 28, 2018, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-third-world-war-why-nato-troops-can-t-deliver-peace-in-afghanistan-a-556304-4.html>.

Based on its definition, the placement of SFA most naturally presents itself in the Stabilize phase. This phase in the operational timeline is one in which the host nation is still developing and formulating its government, building coalitions that will hopefully lead it to legitimization by the broader population. During the Stabilize phase the host nation's military forces, from the perspective of the United States Armed Forces, will likely be at a nascent level due primarily from having withstood a Dominate phase in some form, whether the circumstances are military conflict or a humanitarian disaster. At the same time, because the purpose of the supporting nation is to leave a legitimate government in its wake, and since part of a legitimate government is having a functioning security force that both enforces and upholds rule of law in the nation, there is an implied task to begin developing the host nation security forces. As a result, a rebuilding effort of the host nation's national security apparatus and military forces will be required. However, at the Stabilize phase the host nation's national security apparatus is still beginning to be formed, based on the founding governing efforts taking place. Thus, the focus from the protagonist (or supporting) nation must be on the military or FSF itself.

In focusing on the FSF, the supporting nation will understand the nascent capabilities and capacities inherent in the FSF and plan accordingly, which entails the SFA being defined more carefully than Joint Staff doctrine implies. SFA should be defined as a specific mission and implemented at a specific point in the operational timeline. As previously discussed, SFA should be defined as an effort to learn through partnership and teaming-up together with the forces of the supporting nation. While stating that SFA was best placed at the Stabilize phase, Joint Staff implies that aspects of SFA exist within each phase on the operational timeline,⁵⁰ although this results in an untidy conceptualization in which to utilize the SFA aspect of Military Assistance.

⁵⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Note 1-13: Security Force Assistance* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 April 2013), III-10 & III-11.

Operational realities suggest that SFA should be integrated with the Stabilize phase because of its emphasis on the dynamics of development of FSF, where few capabilities and capacities exist. For Joint Staff doctrine to declare that SFA exists within each of the phases indicates a lack of understanding or appreciation of the six phases outlined with the Joint Staff's own doctrine. This type of misunderstanding parallels the lack of understanding of FID, first and foremost about what the SFA mission clearly is and what it is not, and about how the definition of that mission is linked with its placement on the operational timeline. SFA could not address diminished capabilities and capacities with FSF in the Shape, Deter, Seize Initiative, or Dominate phases, because the nature of each of those phases indicates that FSF in those phases has a credible level of competence. In reality, this would amount to doing SFA for the sake of doing SFA, without achieving a strategic effort. As such, there is no need for an SFA mission at this time, but there are instances specifically in the Shape phase where a FID program is likely needed, as discussed previously in this chapter. This leaves the Stabilize and the Enable Civil Authorities phases as possibilities.

In the Enable Civil Authorities phase, the fundamental element is that the host nation has already transitioned, or is in the later stages of transitioning, into a situation of stability in which the government of the host nation is becoming or has become legitimate. While it is taken for granted that in each of these situations, the dynamics on the ground are volatile at best, there still must be some element of stability. It is difficult in any scenario to have a legitimate authority of a government when it has little or no control of the security scene within its own borders. These types of situations establish a population's unsurprising conclusion that its government, rather than being a legitimate representation of the people, is in fact a puppet government playing the pliable front for the supporting nation, which clearly helps neither the supporting nor the recipient nation. Since the previous phases in the operational timeline are partially a response to some form of unstable situations, for the population to believe in the independence of its government, the people must see signs of transition as well as basic services being met, which is the core of the legitimization efforts of the Enable Civil Authorities phase. One of the elements of

government that will be most visible during the phases of instability is the host nations' security forces. The government will hardly be considered as legitimate if the security policy and its security forces are blatantly seen being dictated by a foreign power, such as the supporting nation. While not the purpose of SFA, this scenario is certainly a plausible risk that would need to be addressed. This idea and concept of host nation legitimization makes the Enable Civil Authorities phase a less natural phase for SFA than the Stabilize phase.

The Stabilize phase should be the period for the SFA mission, due to its nature as one of transition from the instability of the Dominate phase to the stability of the Enable Civil Authorities phase. Similarly, SFA must also be a mission of transition.⁵¹ This is not only to help develop the FSF, but even more importantly, to assist in assuring the population of the temporary disposition of the supporting nation's involvement, preventing the perception that the recipient nation's security forces are beholden to the support nation's security forces. Ideally, for the host nation, the supporting nation is sincere in its desire to remain solely for a limited period. This is most important for the population: to believe that ultimately, it will have influence over the future of their nation. When the population does not believe in either the legitimacy of the government or its eventual independence, expected concerns will arise. Those concerns will be represented in the population's interests in the social contract with the government, and if not, then the consent of the governed begins to breakdown. That breakdown will likely lead to some form of protest, either marching or rioting, or in the worst of cases, an actual armed insurgency such as the clashes

⁵¹ While there is no doctrinally set timeline for an SFA mission, there are implications within the doctrine regarding its not being an indefinite mission. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Note 1-13: Security Force Assistance*, III-2). However, there are numerous examples of the SFA mission from South Korea to Afghanistan where the mission has, as of the writing of this dissertation, continued indefinitely.

between the United States Marines and the forces of Muqtada al-Sadr in Fallujah in 2004.⁵²

The transition that the SFA efforts are striving for is from the nascent condition of FSF post the Dominate phase, into a security force that exists independent of the recipient nation, due to the supporting nation's own increased capacities and capabilities. This transition is intertwined with the transition of the overall phase from Stabilize to Enable Civil Authorities. The SFA mission can begin during the Dominate phase depending on the broader operational mission of the supporting nation, because the supporting nation will be the primary proponent of the SFA mission. Specifically, the commander of the supporting nation's forces will set the priority of starting and resourcing the SFA mission. It will be the staff of the commander that will set up a structure to monitor and evaluate the development of the FSF, whose monitoring and evaluation will need to clearly delineate a desired end state to demonstrate when the transition from the SFA is complete. It is essential that this monitoring and evaluating be fluid and flexible, for, as the host nation's government comes into power, it will be required to set up its own priorities and metrics for its security forces. Once the end state for the supporting nation is reached and the SFA is complete, the dynamics in the recipient nation should be at a place where it can transition, or be near transitioning, to the Enable Civil Authorities phase.

As the host nation transitions into the Enable Civil Authorities phase, the necessity for Military Assistance is not to be eliminated; rather, the FSF are at a critical juncture in their development. That juncture can best be described as the stage in which the host nation's security forces are the main effort, and primarily planning and executing operational missions. More than likely, however, they will not yet have created an extensive logistical supply chain and training capabilities or capacities. Due to this lack of capability and capacity, the

⁵² Steven M. Buechler, "Social Strain, Structural Breakdown, Political Opportunity, and Collective Action," *Sociology Compass* 2, no. 3 (May 2008): 1035, accessed May 18, 2017, <http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00109.x>.

supporting nation will be obligated to provide some form of assistance to the host nation, as the host nation is not likely to be able to develop an IDAD plan as a precursor to a FID program. At the same time, this phase is a point when Defense Institutional Building or MODA should begin. As recipient and supporting nations are in a transitory phase, so too is the transition from SFA to the Advise and Assist mission of Military Assistance.

Advise and Assist Mission

While Joint Staff doctrine does not clearly define the specifics of the Advise and Assist mission, it does recognize that advising and assisting is part of SFA;⁵³ however, this does not allow for transition between an SFA and a FID program. That bridge should be characterized as the Advise and Assist mission. Allowing for different understandings of the dynamics that compromise the main tenet, the Advise and Assist mission from the supporting nation provides Military Assistance to help legitimize the host nation, given the focus of the Enable Civil Authorities phase. The Advise and Assist mission is best described as a training effort, whereby the supporting nation is allowing (and at times insisting) the recipient nation's FSFs to be the main effort during operational missions. The supporting nation will be required to provide continual logistical aid, and will probably be called on to actively assist FSFs to create systems and processes where none previously existed, in some cases where there has been no history of the FSF having a system or a process.

The Advise and Assist mission, however, cannot be limited to logistical support. As the bridge between SFA and a FID program, the Advise and Assist mission must continue helping to develop capacities and capabilities around the planning and staff functions that are indicative of a modern military organization. These staff functions are essential, because it is the staff that will develop the IDAD plan, which will in turn create the foundation for the FSF to becoming a fully functioning military organization. The supporting nation, as a result, will need to adjust its resourcing of this mission from the units that were

⁵³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22*, VI-30.

originally partnered with the FSF during the SFA mission, to groups or teams of advisers that can focus the FSF unit on its development. It is important to note that the theoretical scenario cannot overcome the dynamics of human relationships, making this critical to the success of the mission, not only so that the supporting nation's teams have good relations with the FSF commander, but additionally so that the FSF commander desires the advice and assistance of the supporting nation's team. In the end, both the supporting nation and the recipient nation have a security relationship that is dependent on the good relations between individuals, making the development of the advising teams a critical effort of the supporting nation.

The Advise and Assist mission reaches its culmination point once the recipient nation's military forces have demonstrated the capacity and capability to both train and equip themselves independent of external resources or knowledge, and to own the planning abilities in order to develop a competent IDAD plan. The IDAD plan, as previously noted, is important at this juncture to develop more sophisticated planning and systems of a modern military organization. These two benchmarks for the Advise and Assist mission's completion are required so that each feeds into the overall effort of creating a military that is independent. From the training and equipping capacity, the host nation will need to have the infrastructure, processes, and systems in place for a smooth flow on both logistics and personnel. This will ensure that the requesting military unit receives what is required in a timely manner. The completion of the IDAD plan is critical, given that the capabilities needed to develop an IDAD plan validate the host nation military's underlying understanding and ability to assess where and how it must train so as to develop into a better military. Once the FSF have that capability and can capably execute the IDAD plan, they are prepared to transition to the next phase and embrace a FID program.

Operational Levels of Warfare⁵⁴

The importance of the Operational Levels of Warfare to Military Assistance is to understand the nature of the impact of the Military Assistance mission from the perspective of the United States Armed Forces. The challenge that many military operations suffer from, be they SFA or other types of missions, is that there is a failure to link the actions of the Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine on the ground with a broader strategic narrative, or even a grand strategy.⁵⁵ In order to appreciate this underlying fundamental theme of this research project, it is necessary to establish a baseline understanding of what the levels of warfare are from the planning methodology, and how they factor into the Military Assistance mission and its relationship to American Grand Strategy.

The doctrine of United States military operations divides operational planning into three levels of warfare – tactical, operational, and strategic. Each level is based on unit size and focus.

1. Tactical level operations tend to focus on immediate tasks with limited perspective of long-term implications. They take the form of operations such as the need to hold a crossroad for effective flow of logistical traffic, or the need to take control of a mountaintop for visibility. The units that focus on these operations range from a few to several hundred people. Since the tactical level operations focuses primarily on immediate tasks, and those tasks may either be achieved or not, the tactical level of warfare is the easiest level to examine under the framework of success and failure. The concept of success and failure concentrates on achieving or not achieving a task or set of tasks. While this appears obvious, the need to appreciate the grander strategic effort necessitates a link to the operational level of warfare.⁵⁶
2. The operational level of war tends to focus on the “why” of the tasks or set of tasks along with the planning factors of warfare, essentially planning and connecting tactical operations into more comprehensive strategic goals. These units are composed of many tactical units, totaling a few hundred to a few thousand personnel. Common knowledge holds that a military can win

⁵⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0*, I-12 to I-14.

⁵⁵ Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marine Corps Gazette* 83, no. 1 (January, 1999): 18-22.

⁵⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0*, II-11 and GL-15.

every battle but ultimately lose the war, a concept applicable to many wars that the United States has fought since World War II, from Vietnam to the post-9/11 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This happens when the link between the tactical level and operational level of warfare is not properly established, and the operational level is not adequately nested with the strategic level of warfare.⁵⁷

3. Strategic level operations are those military operations most associated with international affairs. These tend to be internationally based operations on a scale that involves several or many nations, such as General Eisenhower's command of the European Theater during WWII, or General MacArthur's during the Korean War. Strategic level operations allow for the linking of the tactical and operational levels of warfare into a broader international strategic narrative, one that must be closely aligned with a political objective and foreign policy goals or ideally, a grand strategy. An example of this interconnected relationship between strategic narratives is the Korean War; an example of when this relationship was not well interconnected is the Vietnam War.⁵⁸

Within each of these levels of warfare exist nuances that differ from one another in levels of varying subtleties, and those levels are only coherently linked to one another through the concept of "nesting," a concept defined earlier as the process of connecting tasks to national strategic objectives. The United States Army defines nesting as "a planning technique to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding echelon's concept of operations is aligned by purpose with the higher echelons' concept of operations."⁵⁹ This means that tactical operations or tasks done by a specific unit must be clearly aligned with the overall goals of the campaign. It also means that if a unit's task is not properly nested, it could go on continually completing tasks, "being successful" by one definition, but in the broader strategic dynamic, in fact, failing to contribute its requirements for the overall mission. This idea of nesting then becomes almost

⁵⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0*, II-13 to II-14 and GL-13.

⁵⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0*, II-13 and GL-14.

⁵⁹ Department of the Army Headquarters, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0: The Operations Process* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2012), 2-20.

like the conceptual connective tissue between the levels of warfare, which when severed creates a disconnect effecting the entire endeavor.

Since nesting is also an important factor in shaping mission failure or success, it should be the responsibility of the operational level of warfare in order to ensure that the concept is being properly implemented. Monitoring and implementation tend to be the driving factors for determining success or failure at this level of warfare. Because the operational level of warfare must focus on linking the tactical level of military operations to the broader strategic goals of a campaign, operational units must logically be able to assess and analyze. This includes not only the success or failure at the tactical level, but whether the tactical level tasks being assigned and achieved are fitting properly, or “nested,” within the overall strategic narrative. This is true for both the planning and the implementation of tasks or sets of tasks.

Even though there is no higher level of warfare for a strategic unit to nest with, it would be a mistake not to appreciate that at the strategic level of warfare, nesting also serves a critical purpose. That role is to balance the military strategic efforts and goals with the desired civilian or political outcomes, in essence, nesting the military strategy with a political end state or objective. Those outcomes are both dictated to and from the dynamic existing within the field of international relations and structure of the global political regime. This is what an overall strategic narrative means — that the civilian political objective must be the ultimate focus of any military operation.

Conclusion

The aspects of the doctrine surrounding Military Assistance are important not only because of the framework to develop capabilities and capacities at the local and nation state level, but also in how these aspects of Military Assistance contribute to the broader concepts within international relations and a nation’s grand strategy. Since the focus of these tools is to help create a sustainable security in the recipient nation, it is important to also recognize that this is a contribution to the stability of the international arena. In that regard, there is no better example of regional stability (or lack thereof) than the Arab Spring that

occurred throughout 2011, as one country's protest led to another's, because instability bred more instability.⁶⁰ Sustainable security and stability throughout the international environment is the goal of all aspects of Military Assistance, including the forms of SFA, Advise and Assist, and FID, as they function within a cohesive framework of international relations.

The basis of that stability in the end is due to the support of the population, and it is this support that forms the foundation for the security of the nation. From the perspective of international relations, it is necessary to appreciate that these aspects of Military Assistance are both dependent on and dependent of the experience of the local population. "Dependent on" because as previously mentioned, these Military Assistance aspects must have the support of the population to ultimately allow a transition from instability to stability. "Dependent of" in that the support of the population will be unlikely to come to fruition in the event of a poor security environment. In the framework of international relations, Military Assistance should be considered a tool of a nation's foreign policy, and to the degree that these aspects of Military Assistance are utilized in the broader strategy of a nation, that nation can more easily transition through the phases of the operational timeline.

The approach within this chapter has been to examine, assess, and clarify the concepts of Military Assistance from the perspective of United States Armed Forces doctrine under the framework of the operational timeline. The operational timeline that has been developed under Joint Staff doctrine is the foundation for this research project, because all of the case studies being examined have in common the United States' acting as the supporting nation. The challenge with the existing doctrine is a lack of clarity and a general inconsistency. This lack comes from the inability of current doctrine to clarify

⁶⁰ Florence Gaub, "Understanding Instability: Lessons from the 'Arab Spring'" (Swindon, UK: Arts and Humanities Research Council, December 2012), 8, accessed June 3, 2018, <https://ahrc.ukri.org/documents/project-reports-and-reviews/ahrc-public-policy-series/understanding-instability-lessons-from-the-arab-spring>.

distinct definitions and differences between the different tools and even within the construct of Military Intervention itself. This causes a natural and structural confusion when examining and assessing the tools and aspects within the rubric addressed.

While Joint Staff doctrine can and will change and evolve, the underlying dynamics of war rarely do so. Realizing the aspects and definitions of Military Assistance within the context of international relations challenges the paradigm of traditional constructs of power projection and international cooperation. The framework of the operational timeline allows for this context, enabling those Military Assistance aspects to be examined within the structure of military operations. Most importantly though, defining the concepts of Military Assistance creates a need for the United States Armed Forces to re-examine its fundamental understanding of Military Assistance, enabling the intellectual rigor to re-think and re-frame its doctrine, which is a constant effort in refinement. The broader debate with the international relations field with regards to the global order is further appreciated due to Military Assistance furthering the strategic efforts of a nation understanding the concept as a tool of grand strategy.

Chapter 3

Military Assistance in Context of the Early American Military Experience

The history of Military Assistance within the early American military experience can be conceptualized as a microcosm history of warfare and grand strategy. In whatever time and age that nation states have attempted to project power through alliance or subterfuge with minimal expenditure of money and manpower, Military Assistance has often been a strategy pursued either in the forms of material or advisors. Material, however, has been referred to in the Introduction as Military Aid, whereas Military Assistance is actually in the form of people, such as those present in a recipient nation to develop capacities and capabilities. The formation of the modern state recognized under the Treaty of Westphalia is replete with such examples, whether as the Soviets training the Vietnamese or Cubans against the United States, or Iranians and Syrians training Hezbollah against the Israelis. This chapter seeks to establish a historic foundation and framework from which to assess the United States Armed Forces experience with the tool of Military Assistance and how that experience forms the basis of the utilization of Military Assistance.

The focus of Military Assistance must begin on the development capacity and capabilities of another military for a broader strategic purpose, a grand strategy, because tactical success divorced from a strategy does not end in victory. One such example is advisors who are nominally commanding the troops of a recipient nation, such as the Marquis du Lafayette during the Revolutionary War,¹ an experience that will be seen repeated during the Korean War by the American advisors of the Korean Military Advisory Group. Another example is the Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, which, while not uniformed military personnel, did provide technical assistance in Vietnam from 1955 to 1962 in the form of public administration and police training.²

¹ Harlow Giles Unger, *Lafayette* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002), 21-22 and 55.

² Robert Scigliano and Guy H. Fox, *Technical Experience in Vietnam: The Michigan State Experience* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

Examining the dynamics by which a supporting nation pursues and furthers its power and influence through extending the capacities and capabilities of a recipient nation is necessary for appreciating Military Assistance as a tool within the context of the comprehensive framework of international relations, and through this, a grand strategy. By way of integrating this discussion with the case studies developed further in this project, the focus of this historical analysis will feature the United States' military origins and the colonial experience of Western Europe in the Americas.

The focus on Western Europe is due to the colonial military history of the Americas, and how that history has become part of the underlying military culture of the United States. The United States simply did not absorb the military cultures of Asia or other parts of the globe in the same manner or tradition that it has with Europe. This is likely due to America's own colonial connections with Europe, but also due to common language and recognition of national power. Furthermore, placing this history in context helps establish the understanding of the capabilities and capacities that the Europeans brought to the New World. Although it could be argued that Russia and China also have and have had enormous capacities and capabilities, both have a limited history with the United States with regard to Military Assistance, other than perhaps in opposing one another or in the present-day competition. A noted exception to this is when, at the onset of WWII, the United States sent military advisors to China to train and develop the Chinese Nationalist Army, teaming senior military advisor Lieutenant General Joseph "Vinegar Joe"³ Stillwell to assist China's leader, Chiang Kai-shek.⁴

It should also be noted that both this chapter and this research project focuses on Military Assistance with reference to advisors rather than military observers. While both may serve varying political ends, and more inclusively, the

³ The irony of the United States sending a senior advisor to China whose nickname was Vinegar Joe should be lost on no one.

⁴ Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *China-Burma-India Theater: Stillwell's Mission to China* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1987. First published 1953 by Government Printing Office.), 212–221.

projection of power in a realist sense, the distinction is that advisors are present in a recipient nation to assist in the development of that nation's military capacities and capabilities. Observers, on the other hand, may have any number of intentions, from genuine to more sinister, but have more of an intelligence-gathering function rather than a development endeavor. Observers certainly have been utilized within the context of sharing information around similar enemies or conflicts, and the United States has a long tradition of sending military observers even up to the present. An example of this can be seen in the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel,⁵ which resulted in an entire United States Army battalion stationed on the Sinai as observers. Since their focus is to "observe" rather than "advise" there is little to be gained from understanding how a military observer could extend the capacities and capabilities of a recipient nation in this instance.

Professor Donald Stoker, of the Naval Postgraduate School, notes that "military advising" usually can be categorized as one of the following: 1. Military modernization; 2. Nation building; 3. Economic purpose or penetration; 4. Ideological; 5. Counterinsurgency; or 6. A corporate approach for fun or profit.⁶ While Stoker's categorization of Military Assistance is quite complete, it still fails to allude to either the dynamics of power projection in an extended sense or more specifically, the need for both the supporting nation and recipient state to cooperate in order to accomplish each other's broader goals. While these categories of Stoker may define the tactical or operational basis of Military Assistance, they do not include the principles of the strategic interaction between states or their underlying motivations for partnering to expand capabilities and capacities of another state's military. This is important in that

⁵ Thomas W. Spoehr, "This Shoe No Longer Fits: Changing the US Commitment to the MFO," *Parameters* 30, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 109-25, accessed July 20, 2018, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/articles/00autumn/spoehr.htm>.

⁶ Donald Stoker, "The History and Evolution of Foreign Military Advising and Assistance, 1815 – 2007," in *Military Advising and Assistance*, ed. Donald Stoker (London: Routledge, 2008), 2.

the categorizations of Stoker are ultimately limited in their scope, failing also to capture the need of a nation state that has a grand strategy driving its agenda.

In looking at Military Assistance from the perspective of the United States and the framework provided by United States Armed Forces doctrine, the levels of warfare offer an insight into the experiences of Military Assistance. The three levels of warfare — tactical, operational, and strategic — are primarily viewed through the prism of the size and scope of a unit, from smallest to largest. The levels of warfare within the overall construct of Joint Staff doctrine are both a standard and an ideal of placing the context within the greater scope of history of Military Assistance with respect to the discipline of international relations. The concept of a grand strategy should also be considered from the holistic perspective of encompassing all the levels of warfare, because as United States Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak noted, even a corporal at the tactical level can affect the national strategic narrative.⁷

Military Assistance and the Origins of the Colonial Americas

Military knowledge does not exist in a vacuum, and the relevance of the origins of Colonial America can be appreciated in the modern experience of Military Assistance. Unlike many other disciplines, Military Assistance has no single discovery that flips every known prior on its proverbial head: it is a discipline of precedence, making origins of military relations in the Americas critical for understanding and appreciating the issues of present day international relations.⁸ For example, contemporary United States Army Rangers learn that many of their current tactics have a direct lineage to experiences of Colonel Benjamin Church in Colonial Massachusetts.⁹

⁷ Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marine Corps Gazette* 83, no. 1 (January, 1999): 18-22.

⁸ John M. Collins, "How Military Strategists Should Study History," *Military Review* 63, no. 8 (August 1983): 32, 38, and 44.

⁹ Garrett DeWayne Hall, "Benjamin Church and the Origins of American Rangers" (masters' thesis, Valdosta State University, May 2016), 20, https://vtext.valdosta.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10428/2174/hall-garrett_thesis_history_2016.pdf.

The origins of the United States differ when examined from the perspective of the various states. From the penal colony of Georgia to the religious freedom of Massachusetts to the Dutch merchant trading center of New Amsterdam (New York), each state had its own origination story, an understanding of self-actualization that was affected by its wider interests in becoming part of the overall United States,¹⁰ and it could be said that these differences continue to play out into the present day. This origination story can be seen almost as a social or cultural construct. A simple example of an origination story as a cultural construct is the mythology that has developed in the American South around what is widely considered the Flag of the Confederacy, although in fact it is the battle flag of the Army of Virginia from the American Civil War.¹¹ As in many histories, the myth acts as the basis of reality from which future generations learn and act, the interpretation of which becomes a new reality. Since the origins of the Americas are rooted in a Colonial past, one that survived based on the assistance and involvement of Western European powers, in its essence, the military foundation of the United States was formed on the concepts of Military Assistance.

In some instances, that Military Assistance took the form of weaponry, an example of Military Aid; in others, it was sending troops from Britain during the French and Indian War in the 1750s, which included the training of local Colonists.¹²

¹⁰ Colin Woodward, *American Nations: A History of the Eleven Rival Regional Cultures of North America* (New York: Viking, 2011), 23-111.

¹¹ John M. Coski, *The Confederate Battle Flag: America's Most Embattled Emblem* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 13-14 and 292.

¹² An important note is that because the United States, at the time of the French and Indian War, was a colony of Great Britain, concepts of Military Assistance do not apply. The colonists viewed themselves as British subjects, which had much to do with the origin of the complaints during the American Revolution. Don Higginbotham, "Army, U.S.: Colonial and Revolutionary Eras," in *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, online edition, ed. John Whiteclay Chambers (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), accessed May 19, 2017, doi:10.1093/acref/9780195071986.001.0001.

In effect, conflicts that existed in the colonies were simply extensions of the conflicts that existed in Europe, a fight for supremacy between the Great Powers of England, France, and Spain. Despite the extension of European power in the New World, each nation had settled in the Americas for different reasons. For the French, it was furs; Spanish focus was gold; Dutch interest was trade; and the English came for land.¹³

This theme continued throughout every region, and through the colonizing of the Americas, the Great Powers extended their search for resources and wealth in newfound areas, while at the same time continuing many of the same interactions of the Old World. But this only explains part of the equation, that of the Europeans Powers. Ultimately, as the American Colonies stated in their Declaration of Independence certain terms relating to the principles of John Locke:¹⁴ "Governments are instituted among man, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."¹⁵ So even prior to the Revolutionary War, the Colonist in the Americas had some sense of cooperation, such that Military Assistance was requested by the local population and supported by a European Power. Indeed, this concept of Military Assistance to local communities was the basis of local militias, which evolved in the United States more formally into the National Guard due to the Militia Act of 1903.¹⁶ This capability and capacity development as it relates to Military Assistance came to be engaged in the early years of the colonies leading up to the French and Indian war.

The origin of this dynamic initially coming to fruition was in fact the competition between the British colony of Massachusetts and the French in Quebec. The French, in their desire to extract resources for the accumulation of wealth, primarily furs, in the most efficient way possible, had created an alliance

¹³ Robert Leckie, *The Wars of America*, 2nd revised and updated edition (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 1998), 7-8. D. W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History, Vol 1 Atlantic America, 1492-1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 41-42.

¹⁴ John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government*, ed. J. W. Gough, 3rd edition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd., 1966), 49.

¹⁵ United States Continental Congress, *Declaration of Independence*, 1776.

¹⁶ Louis Cantor, "The Creation of the Modern National Guard: The Dick Militia Act of 1903," PhD diss., Duke University, 1963, Proquest (AAT 6307503), 248.

with Native American tribes against the major tribe of the region around the French settlement. In this alliance, the French neither supplied weaponry nor training, but soldiers to partner with their Native American allies for the purpose of defeating the Iroquois. This was not based on a need to project power, since power projection would not create greater efficiency of resource extraction or make them more money. If anything, projecting power would cost money and resources; however, the relationship between the French and the Native American tribes can be appreciated more in the context of a cooperative coalition.¹⁷ This was indicative of the general experience in the North American Colonies. The various Western European Powers amongst and against one another perpetuated that dynamic, a projection of power and pursuit of interests, prior to the War of Independence, through various forms of Military Assistance. Therefore, to appreciate the underlying effects of the power undercurrents between the Great Powers of the day, understanding the ebb and flow of Military Assistance is all the more critical.

It could be argued that these efforts advanced due to either the immediate realities or necessities within the various colonies. This offers, however, a limited perspective in that it fails to incorporate the strategic military perspective and the extensive political goals of the Western European states. More importantly, at best it presents an idea that the tactical realities being experienced were divorced from any overall grand strategy, and in a larger sense, that the efforts of Military Assistance may have been simply tactics that were pursued for expediency. However, examining Military Assistance within the framework of the levels of warfare instead of an extension of tactical efforts provides a more complete understanding of that broader strategic understanding.

Europe and the Native Americans

Although it may have been considered at the time an effort of expediency, when the British Colonies of New England gave arms and weapons training to the Iroquois so that the tribe could pursue revenge against the French,¹⁸ there

¹⁷ Leckie, *The Wars of America*, 3-10.

¹⁸ Leckie, *The Wars of America*, 5-6

were unforeseen benefits. This action also had the effect of blunting French expansion efforts, which was certainly part of the English policy of expanding its territorial control on the continent.¹⁹ As per the definitional differences of Military Assistance and Military Aid, the efforts of the New England colonists would clearly be construed as Military Aid, as there was little exchange of capabilities and capacities that were not focused around material in some form. However, the tradition of Military Intervention, in both the form of Military Aid and Military Assistance, would contribute to conflict between the Native Americans and the European Colonists until the conflict resulted in the French-Indian War.

While there is an element of extending or exporting the European military methods and capabilities, there was also the blending of techniques that allowed the American Colonies to develop into a fighting force able to withstand the strength of the British Empire.²⁰ This blending of techniques was both by necessity due to a need to focus on the practicalities of warfare in a colonial (and often wilderness) region over the ceremonies popular in Europe, and the underlying need to be linked to the overall strategic narrative, the political goals of the War of Independence. Though not to minimize the contribution of the French during the War of Independence, the support had to have a structure both logistically and organizationally,²¹ and yet also had to properly feed or nest into both nations' strategic narratives, which was to blunt British power and influence in the Americas.

At the beginning of the colonial experience, it was in fact the Military Assistance that the Native Americans gave to the Colonists that enabled America's eventual edge over the British. Both before and after the French-

¹⁹ Jack P. Greene, "The Seven Years' War and the American Revolution: The Causal Relationship Reconsidered," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 8, no. 2 (January 1980): 86 and 89.

²⁰ Leckie, *The Wars of America*, 117-118. Paul Lockhart, *The Drillmaster of Valley Forge: The Baron de Steuben and the Making of the American Army* (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 166.

²¹ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 37-39.

Indian War, the Colonists, French, and British learned numerous techniques from Native Americans. In some instances it was more formal tutelage, such as the techniques that Lieutenant Colonel Robert Rogers learned that led to the foundation of the Rangers.²² In others, it was learning from the techniques used by Native Americans against the Colonists, such as the raiding parties that occurred during King Philips' War, which created a great deal of fear in the New England Colonies.²³ Taking the best practices and marrying them with political objectives is what created the environment for the Military Assistance of the 17th Century to become part of the American military lexicon. This is exactly what happened during the French-Indian War.

The French Experience in Canada

Since by and large the American Colonies each existed as completely separate entities, with their own origins and goals, it was difficult to conceptualize how they would form an effective identity let alone an effective fighting force. Indeed, in this regard the French had a great deal of advantage. Because the goal of the French Colonies was resource extraction, the French had an authoritarian settlement structure with a military to support it. However, the British Colonies had a minimal military presence, and were supported more generally by local militias.²⁴ Although these militias could be quite professional, and many of them were paid wages for participation, they were still a part-time, volunteer force that was not regarded as having same level of expertise as a professional military.

In North America it was the French, not the British, who were clearer on their strategic objectives and grand strategy: namely, resource extraction versus colonization of land. However, in this sense the French did not have a greater political objective, because resource extraction, while economically important,

²² Owen Connelly, "Rangers, U.S. Army," in *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, doi:10.1093/acref/9780195071986.001.0001.

²³ Philip Ranlet, "Another Look at the Causes of King Philip's War," *New England Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (March, 1988): 79 and 100.

²⁴ John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*, Revised edition (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1990), 31-33.

did not lend itself to a political goal. It should be noted in passing that among a current set of recognized international military values, such aims of the French and British were repugnant at best, and illegal or immoral at worst. In spite of this contemporary perspective, the purpose of this research project is not to delve into values, but rather to understand and appreciate relevant historical antecedents to modern constructs of military planning and its application to the field of international relations. Within the context of the operational framework of the levels of warfare at that time, the French had developed and were implementing a more efficient, although not long-term, sustainable approach.

The difference between the two approaches, the French goals of resource extraction versus the British goals of land colonization, is that the French tactical level of warfare was linked to the overall strategic narrative, while that of the British was not. The French decisions focused on resource extraction, whether by means of outposts or relations with the Native Americans. From the perspective of the levels of warfare, French leaders made sure that their tactical efforts were in pursuit of their strategic objectives.

An illustration of this concept is the example of Samuel de Champlain and the founding of Quebec with respect to the Military Assistance against the Iroquois. Champlain had reasoned that if he had a local ally to aid his growing colony, then he could be more profitable overall in his trading and extracting efforts.²⁵ This is the rationale that led him to support the Huron and other tribes. It could be argued that Champlain was simply reacting to the circumstances that were presented to him, and this could very well be true; however, even if those decisions were simply tactical in nature they ended up, in hindsight, to link excellently with the broader strategic goals of France, in that local allies could further French interest in aiding with resource extraction.

Continuing to delve into the framework of this perspective, it would be understandable to adopt a position that strategic narratives were layered onto the tactical achievements and efforts after the fact. However, this concept does

²⁵ John C. Weaver, *The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900* (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), 186-187.

not take into consideration the origins that most of these efforts had to begin with: explorers and colonizers do not set forth from a vacuum. Indeed, all involved had to raise money and gain support from their respective states or monarchies to pursue both their ventures and adventures. When gaining support, all parties had to offer feasible plans to recoup the investment in one way or another, a type of business plan during the Age of Discovery. The French were quite clear about their desire to extract resources, just as the English were for colonization.²⁶

Partnerships as a form of Military Assistance

The partnership aspect of Military Assistance is the common thread, as it relates to the broader construct of the European experience in the Americas. The theoretical framework that the levels of warfare offers is the understanding that Military Assistance is both a projection of power in the realist sense, and a cooperative dynamic. It is important to note here that Military Assistance challenges each theoretical paradigm, in that both are necessary to establish a balanced effort, the potential limitations of one being too great without the underlying appreciation of the other. Champlain could not project the power of France through Military Assistance with the Native Americans without also embracing a dynamic of partnership.

The example of Champlain highlights this concept of partnership, in that both he and the Native American tribes came out of the Military Assistance relationship in positions of greater influence than they began. For Champlain and the French, there was further support for resource extraction involvement in the region with a minimal commitment of resources and assets expended, while for the Huron there was a stronger advantage over the Iroquois. Since both parties met their objectives, the experience between the two with respect to Military Assistance should be considered a success. In addition, both achieved a projection of power, the Huron in that they had an ally who expanded their capabilities, and Champlain who had an ally expanding his capacities.

²⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order* (London: Profile Books Ltd, 2011) 330.

There was, however, completely no regard for a long-term effort to develop the capacities and capabilities necessary for sustainable security, nor an appreciation of Grand Strategy, although in fairness, neither party was in position or had the geopolitical vision to pursue a grand strategy, let alone articulate one. In this regard, the example of Champlain serves as a failure. It is certainly appropriate to acknowledge that the French had little interest and more specifically, no strategic interest, in assisting Native Americans to develop any type of modern military organization. And though it could be questionable as to whether the Native Americans had a cultural interest in adapting to develop those European capacities and capabilities, they certainly accepted Military Aid when offered. In addition, there was no effort to assist or offer to assist Native Americans in developing the necessary institutions, nor was there any idea of a need for sustainable security for the Native Americans from either their side or that of the Europeans.

Champlain's strategic interests of resource extraction had little to do with the long-term, sustainable security of his partner. From the Native American perspective, strategic interests had much more to do with regional relations with other tribes than the resource extraction the French had planned. The conflict existed not only where the actors' strategic interests did not align with the construct of sustainable security, but also with each other's strategic interests. Ultimately the reason Champlain's case is not one of Military Aid is that it was more strategically based than it was materially or logistically based. The Military Assistance experience between Champlain and the Huron met one aspect of a successful construct, such that both had a motivation to enter into a temporary partnership, which was the foundation for the rest of the military relationship between the actors. However, both were pursuing their own interests, which ultimately led to the downfall of both in the region.

This is not to imply that identical interests are necessary for the tool of Military Assistance to be successful, but there must be an alignment of interests. A recent study by Dr. Kathleen McInnis and Nathan Lucas for the Congressional Research Service discussed the alignment between parties as a key factor for partner capacity. "An alignment of interests between the United States and

recipients of security assistance in the short, medium, and long term appears to be important for overall BPC [Building Partner Capacity] success.”²⁷ This is to say that success matters with respect to an alignment, but there is no requirement for identical interests.

The concept of partnerships is important when conceptualizing Military Assistance as a tool, because even though each side of a partnership will not always have an equal set of equities, nor will they even be “equals,” they should have an equal desire for the relationship to achieve a desired and mutually agreed upon end state. For Champlain and the Huron, the desired end state was to displace the Iroquois as the predominant power in the region, making this entire endeavor limited in its scope and accomplishment. This exchange of Military Assistance however, is simply a means to an end for Champlain, whose sole purpose was to facilitate the resource extraction goals of French policy.

More comprehensively, this idea of partnerships relates back to the levels of warfare, in that the “why” of warfare must be actors’ motivation to develop and create the capacity and capability for a sustainable security for all. In this regard, the “why” or operational level of warfare is the concept or interaction that marries tactical victories, such as individual battles won, being nested with a grander strategic narrative or possibly an actual Grand Strategy through the strategic level of warfare, the interplay between nation states.

Military Assistance in the American Colonies

Continuing the origins of the European experience in the Americas, the Colonial American military experience was also based in the concept of Military Assistance. However, the implementation of Military Assistance produced an early undercurrent of separateness between the Colonists and the British. This separateness was created when the American Colonists realized that neither they nor their service to the British Empire was viewed in the same regard as that of British natives. It was a classic case of bigotry, one that played time and

²⁷ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *What is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’: Issues for Congress*, by Kathleen J. McInnis and Nathan J. Lucas, R44313 (2015), 4-5.

time again between the Colonies and England. Prior to the French and Indian War from 1754 to 1763,²⁸ a British expedition against the Spanish was planned and executed to conquer the port of Cartagena. The expedition went poorly from the start, as the British Government's inefficient planning resulted in inadequate equipment and provisions, setting the stage for internal conflict. This manifested as the British regular army soldiers' consideration of their Colonial compatriots with contempt and disregarding any need to treat them with respect.

This lack of regard by the British towards the Colonists created a feeling of separation, because prior to this time the Colonists regarded themselves as Englishmen, citizens of the British Empire who simply did not live in England. The idea that they would be considered less than full citizens of the British Empire had to have been a foreign and distasteful concept to them. Indeed, even when the Thirteen Colonies of the Americas tried to petition King George III, it was over the idea that their rights as Englishmen were not being respected or regarded.²⁹

Furthering the experience of the Cartagena expedition, the French and Indian War compounded many of these beliefs. Even at the beginning of the conflict, Major General Braddock comment on the Virginia militia: "their slothful and languid disposition renders them very unfit for military service."³⁰ Indeed, the French and Indian War in many ways created the fermentation needed for the Revolutionary War. For many of the soldiers on both sides of that war, Revolutionaries and Loyalists had served the British during the French and Indian War. This is how that war experience relates to Military Assistance: the entire British campaign assisted in developing the capabilities and the capacities

²⁸ While referred to as the French and Indian War in the United States, most Europeans would refer to it as the North American theater of operations for the Seven Years' War between the French and British empires. Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2000), xv.

²⁹ Walter A. McDougall, "The Colonial Origins of American Identity," *Orbis* 49, no. 1 (Winter, 2005): 8-9, accessed May 19, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2004.10.002>. Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 19.

³⁰ Leckie, *The Wars of America*, 46.

of the American Colonists such that they in turn developed the foundation and structure to emerge victorious over the British roughly twenty years later.

Principally, the American Colonists' engagement in combat with the British was the Americans' first exposure to a modern military organization. The French and Indian War in retrospect was a perfect type of military exchange, as the British learned techniques from Rogers' Rangers, and the American Colonists witnessed the effects of combining warfare, the merging of irregular and regular troops with artillery.³¹ Ultimately, the Colonists absorbed a lesson in the development of capacities and capabilities where none was anticipated or intended.

By the time of the French and Indian War, Captain Robert Rogers was considered as one of the military innovators of irregular combat in the Americas.³² He had learned techniques from Native Americans in tracking and frontier survival, which, combined with European weaponry, was a substantive advantage over the fixed positions of the British, or minimal firepower of Native Americans. Indeed, techniques of the Rogers' Rangers may still be found in the United States Army Ranger Regiment, which continues the lineage to the present day. During the French and Indian War, despite most British commanders who thought little of American Colonists, Brigadier Lord Augustus Howe observed the irregular warfare techniques of the Colonials and ordered them applied throughout the rest of the main British force.³³

The situation of the supporting nation in fact receiving and giving Military Assistance from the recipient nation is rare. Although the American Colonies and British were not separate nations at that time, in terms of capacities and

³¹ Peter E. Russell, "Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (October 1978): 630 and 641-647. Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 13-14.

³² Armstrong Starkey, *War in the Age of Enlightenment, 1700-1789* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 194-196.

³³ Leckie, *The Wars of America*, 57.

capabilities they certainly could have been considered as such.³⁴ Unfortunately for both the American Colonists and the British quest to crush the French in New France (now Canada), Lord Howe was killed in one of the first engagements of the campaign,³⁵ and as so many Military Assistance engagements are personality based, so too was this one, which failed to mature after Lord Howe's death.

The uniqueness of this type of exchange is expressed in the fact that Colonial America was in effect a developing nation in terms of infrastructure, while at the same time having many aspects of a developed nation. The relationship of colonizer and the colonized at times had created a tendency for romanticism within American thinking, one put forth by noted foreign policy expert, George Kennan in his book, *The Cloud of Danger*. Kennan references the Wisconsin Indian tribe of his grandparents' time, 1851, and relates how the individuals of the time focused on industry rather than war.³⁶ This romanticized fallacy at the very least discounts the Civil War fought only ten years after the time that Kennan references: he remembers this period as one where Americans thought of farming rather than the political reality, that the United States was tearing itself apart over the issue of slavery, which was the focus of most political decisions.

These points apply to the American experience of Military Assistance with respect to the British, in that the Colonists and Colonial America were not simply a third-world infrastructure with developed world mentality. The American Colonists at the time of the French and Indian War, and even the War of Independence, were primarily a nation of British expatriates, British citizens living abroad. While the Colonists may not have had a similar set of capabilities and capacities honed by hundreds of years of military conflict, they did have a

³⁴ A similar, more recent historical exchange of Military Assistance can be seen in the Gurkhas of India, where the development of these capabilities originated from a singular entity. Just as Lord Howe for the Americans, so was the British East India Company Army for the Gurkhas. George Evans, "The Gurkhas," *The Contemporary Review* 276, no. 1611 (April 1, 2000): 197.

³⁵ Leckie, *The Wars of America*, 57.

³⁶ George Kennan, *The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), 38 – 39.

fundamental cultural understanding and motivation to desire, accept, and integrate the Military Assistance offered to them. This is relevant in that, while there was no formal partnership per se, that fundamental cultural familiarity allowed for an ease of exchange and knowledge transfer.

An argument against this idea of a unique exchange of capabilities and capacities can be seen in the French, whose local Canadian colonists³⁷ had likewise adopted many of the techniques of Native Americans. However, there is no evidence of an exchange of tactics between the local Canadians and the native French. In fact, there is a great deal of evidence that the French held their colonists in the same contempt that they did Native Americans,³⁸ frequently threatening those Native Americans into submission and in this regard affirming the French as very similar in their relations to Native Americans as the British. This is relevant because it likely became a factor that drove the Native Americans to develop a relationship, and thus offer Military Assistance, to the Colonists, be they of French or British origins, because the Native Americans saw and dealt more frequently with the Colonists.

Military Assistance and the Battle of Quebec

The culmination of this Irregular Warfare capability in the French and Indian War occurred at the Battle of Quebec in 1759. It was the third campaign offensive for the British and their American Colonists, the previous two having ended in failure. While the Military Assistance that American Colonists had provided was long past useful, having been developed with an entirely different expedition, the Battle of Quebec campaign was a clear example of how leadership could affect the outcome of smaller battles, and as a result a larger theater of operations. Most importantly, however, was the critical value of staff officers to

³⁷ It should be noted that the French used the term “Canada” and “New France” “interchangeably.” Germaine Warkent in and Carolyn Podruchny, eds., *Decentring the Renaissance: Canada and Europe in Multidisciplinary Perspective, 1500-1700* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 234, note 1.

³⁸ Gordon M. Sayre, “John Smith and Samuel de Champlain: Founding Fathers and Their Indian Relations,” in *Les Sauvages Américains: Representations of Native Americans in French and English Colonial Literature* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 49-78.

develop the engineering, logistical, and planning capabilities necessary for prolonged campaigns in modern warfare. The Colonial American officers here experienced all of these capabilities for the first time.

The British military staff present at the Battle of Quebec was a long way from the development of the tradition of the Prussian General Staff becoming institutionalized at the time under the leadership of Fredrick the Great.³⁹ However, the American Colonists would have seen the combined action of the Royal Navy and Royal Army, in the forms of Admiral Saunders and General Wolfe, both in conflict and working through their differences to achieve military victory. In this regard, the Colonial American officers would have seen the extraordinarily confusing chain of command, one where General Wolfe had been placed in charge of war effort while Admiral Saunders had a different reporting authority.⁴⁰ They would have observed and possibly worked with the engineers assessing the breastworks of the French, and understood the critical necessity in the emplacement of artillery. Most important, the officers from the American Colonies would have considered how these capabilities worked and did not work together, in addition to the leadership and command personality necessary to create a plan utilizing all the pieces of this particular puzzle.

Levels of War in the French and Indian War

Within the dynamics of the levels of warfare, the French and Indian War presents a case that on its surface level is simplistic at best: the British and the American Colonists won, while the French and their allies lost. The facts, however, present a far more interesting case: until the final campaign and the Battle of Quebec in 1759, the British had consistently lost, a scenario of losing each battle but ultimately winning the war. The difference is that between the second and third campaign, French tactics became divorced with broader French

³⁹ Christopher Duffy, *The Army of Fredrick the Great* (London: David & Charles, 1974), 143-149.

⁴⁰ It may well be that these experiences contributed to the American method of military leadership, which was to have a clearly designated officer as the Commander-in-Chief during a given campaign with clear lines of command and control.

strategic endeavors of resource extraction that came to the fore, and created a stir of trying to project power in the form of territorial expansion with little or no planning behind the strategic shift.⁴¹ It could easily be argued that this confusion in French strategy began much earlier, with the building of a new fort at what is now Pittsburgh. When American Colonists, being led by then Major Washington, requested that the French leave what the Colonists considered British territory, the French attacked the Colonists. Had the French continued to solely focus on resource extraction, which was how their military and political assets were organized, the possibility of threatening British territory would have been unlikely. This is a disconnect of the French Grand Strategy that would ultimately prove its undoing on the continent and the Seven Years War.

Relating back to Military Assistance, this attack initially motivated the British only to give Military Aid, in the form of arms and training, but grew to include Military Support, in the form of British soldiers and officers, and Military Assistance, in the forms of training and command structure, which expanded their capacities by developing the American Colonists' capabilities — a complete Military Intervention. This exercise would have been meaningless had the entire endeavor not been linked with the strategic level of warfare and a political objective — a grand strategy. Understanding that Military Assistance is a tool, and not a strategy, to implement national policy creates an appreciation for how the British used that tool, and by so doing, expanded the capacities of the British military by creating the capabilities of the American Colonists. This demonstrates how the tactical level of warfare was nested within the broader British strategic narrative. That strategic narrative was one of development and colonization focusing on the British goals of expanding its empire, one with which the French expansion efforts was bound to create conflict.

The French began the entire endeavor in North America during the French and Indian War conflict period by locating the original fort, Fort Duquesne, nearby what is now Pittsburgh. Whether it was planned or not, the British believed that the French were trying to extend and expand their power in North

⁴¹ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 11-32.

America,⁴² using territorial expansion in a manner very like previous British efforts in the Americas to project influence. Since these were the days of slow communications and minimal level of introspection, one certainly operating from the Realist school of international relations, the British interpreted the actions of the French as little other than an attempt by the French to exploit the position of the British and the gaps in their security.

With respect to the operational framework, the emplacement of the fort was a disconnect for the French between the actions they were implementing — projecting the expansion of their territory — and their actual and state strategic goals, namely resource extraction. The fort did not facilitate their resource extraction efforts, neither from a capability or capacity basis. Due to the efforts by the French to project power, when then Major Washington came to request the fort's dismantling, the request was automatically dismissed. These efforts are consistent with the French attempt to create a more permanent colony in the Americas, although there is little evidence to support a claim that the French planned to develop a broader set of capacities or capabilities. However, it could be argued that there was an increased security posture presented by the French, thereby being considered as the further development of capacities and capabilities. On the other hand, those capabilities and capacities did not nest within the strategic goals of the French, and therefore were not conducive toward the operational framework. Had the French properly nested these efforts, or at the very least thought through their implications under a strategic framework, the outcome might have changed. However, there can be little question as to the fact that the French, while able to win many the battles of the French and Indian War, eventually lost and were essentially ejected from the continent.

Ultimately, however, there were no permanent efforts by the French to develop capacities and capabilities during the time of the French and Indian War, and as such, it is difficult to appreciate the strategic efforts of the French under the levels of warfare. This is due to the underlying resource extraction strategy

⁴² Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 15-17.

being pursued by the French, which was properly nested through the operational framework, from the tactical level of warfare to the operational level of warfare, but not to the strategic level of warfare. Each of these factors collectively reinforce the paradigm of the inability of the French during the French and Indian War to develop a Military Assistance mission that contributed to the broader strategic narrative being pursued by the French Empire of the 18th century.

This was a challenge to the paradigm existing within the traditional construct of colonies and colonists, which may have occurred simply in the course of the pressure of the French creating the necessity to extend their existing capacities and capabilities. Whether by accident or by design, there is a great deal of evidence that the British commanders, with the notable exception of Brigadier Lord Howe, did not think much of their American Colonists.⁴³ However, the response to the power projection efforts of the French was to develop the capacities and capabilities among the American Colonists. It was necessary to extend those efforts to maintain a sustainable security in the Colonies through the creation of military institutions and structure, which, ironically would prove to be the undoing of the British.

The development of sustainable security through an expansion of capabilities and capacities was possible because of the alignment of strategic purpose between the American Colonists and the British, namely, that both desired the British Empire to be the dominant power in the New World. This strategic narrative was the basis for the tactics pursued by the British and American Colonists that were finally victorious against the French. Since their efforts were properly nested between their strategic goals and tactical operations, the British and American Colonists were able to sustain continuous campaign setbacks, yet eventually were able to accomplish their strategic goals in the French and Indian War and emerge victorious.

⁴³ Leckie, *The Wars of America*, 46 and 57.

Military Assistance and the Origins of the American Military

Although the origins of the American Military can be found in the capacities and capabilities developed through the experiences of the American Colonists during the French and Indian War, the War of Independence has an origin of separate, almost regional beginnings. Indeed, the New Englanders who started in Concord and Lexington had little in common with the landowners of the South, who, while displeased with British policy, were not as committed to declaring open war on the Crown.⁴⁴ While the Continental Congress was formed to help unify the Thirteen Colonies, it was the proposal of Massachusetts Representative, John Adams, to appoint then Virginia Militia Colonel George Washington to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army. This calculated action on Adams' part was to help bring the South into the revolution, to create a sense of unity of purpose among all the Thirteen Colonies. The result was that the United States unified in some respects, not necessarily by the cause, but in a practical sense, by the formation of the Continental Army.

When the Seven Years' War between France and Great Britain had ended, many European officers saw their career prospects stall and the American War of Independence provided an opportunity to those officers to continue employment in the only profession they knew. This was common practice in Europe in the 18th century. Officers would be awarded their commission from one nation and after a period of service to their nation, if circumstances warranted, would request a commission in another nation's military.⁴⁵ Baron Friedrich de Steuben was one such officer.

Raised in a military household, training from a young child for a life in the Prussian military, Steuben attended the Prussian version of a staff college under the tutelage of Fredrick the Great, and became a rising star in Prussian military

⁴⁴ James MacDonald, "Appointment as Commander in Chief," *George Washington's Mount Vernon*, accessed May 8, 2017, <http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/appointment-as-commander-in-chief>.

⁴⁵ Scott Hendrix, "Continental Army, Foreign Officers in," in *Encyclopedic of War and American Society*, vol. 1, ed. Peter Karsten (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006), 193-194.

circles. However, Steuben's climb in the Prussian Army was prevented by some competing rivals, ending in his being unceremoniously ousted from the Prussian Army in 1763. After being employed in various households in Europe, he petitioned for a commission from the Americans, who were recruiting European military officers.⁴⁶

Accepting the opportunity to be a soldier again, he travelled to General Washington's camp, developing relationships with many of the factions of Revolutionary America. Upon arrival at Valley Forge, he made numerous recommendations to General Washington, and eventually was appointed the Inspector General of the Continental Army, a position responsible for the training and development of the Army. Specifically, he was given a few weeks to train the Continental Army to fight the British, who were perceived at the time to be one of the best militaries in Europe.⁴⁷

The training and development that Steuben instituted was not unique, and other European officers who had received commissions in the Continental Army remarked as such. What Steuben did instinctively understand, even better than many American officers themselves, was how different the America citizens were compared to the conscripts of Europe. As Steuben wrote a friend later in his life, "The genius of this nation is not to be compared...with that of the Prussians, Austrians, or French. You say to your soldier, 'Do this,' and he does it; but I am obliged to say, 'This is the reason why you ought to do that,' and *then* he does it."⁴⁸

In this regard, Steuben was challenging the paradigm of the American officers, who themselves were modeled from the British from their experiences

⁴⁶ Eric Spall, "Foreigners in the Highest Trust: American Perceptions of European Mercenary Officers in the Continental Army," *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 12, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 353-354 and 363, accessed May 20, 2017, http://muse.jhu.edu/content/crossref/journals/early_american_studies_an_interdisciplinary_journal/v012/12.2.spall.html.

⁴⁷ Spall, "Foreigners in the Highest Trust," 352. Leckie, *The Wars of America*, 181-183.

⁴⁸ Lockhart, *The Drillmaster of Valley Forge*, 104.

both during the French and Indian War and in the Colonies. The British model of officer-ship however, was one of detachment, allowing the non-commissioned officers to provide much of the interaction with the soldiers. The Prussian model was one in which the officers progressed through the lowest ranks, being treated as an officer trainee, and then ultimately training soldiers on the technical aspects of the profession. Steuben modified this model for the Continental Army and American culture and in this aspect, Steuben intuitively embraced the concept of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare.

Washington's war strategy was to pursue a war of attrition. He believed, and was proven correct, that the debt of obligations of the British were such that the British public would not meet a protracted war in a distant land with support either politically or financially. He also knew that a key factor in defeating the British was drawing other European powers into a military alliance with the nascent nation. This meant taking tactical losses, sometimes very difficult ones such as the retreats from New York and then Philadelphia. Washington held this strategy in order to maintain the very existence of the Continental Army, and to perpetuate the belief that the American Colonies could and would maintain the protracted war effort. As a result, while Steuben shouted and ordered on the drill field at Valley Forge, he infused a level of pride and confidence in the Continental Army, which in the modern military is defined as morale. More importantly, however, Steuben inculcated a professionalism and discipline within the Continental Army where none had existed prior to his arrival.⁴⁹ This discipline and professionalism was the connection between the tactical level of warfare and the strategic goals for which Washington was striving, the "why" of warfare, essentially creating the link between tactics and General Washington's strategy.

Steuben developed both the capacity and capability of the Continental Army. The capacity he expanded by developing a training regime that would institute a confidence in the Army such that it could do more with the little it had. The capability he similarly deepened, by imparting military skills where little had previously existed. This experience of Military Assistance, unlike the previous

⁴⁹ Leckie, *The Wars of America*, 181.

examples, was one where there was no expression of power projection by another state. Indeed, there was no other state involvement, since Steuben was to a certain degree a man without a nation, and certainly a man without an agenda on behalf of another nation. While many other foreign officers had ties with their former nations to varying degrees, Steuben had not lived much in Prussia since 1763. Therefore, when examining the Military Assistance rendered by Steuben, there is a unique aspect that does not apply, simply because there was no supporting nation using Steuben as a tool with which to project power. Even looking at Stoker's model, none of the six general categories fit, given Steuben's status as a lone operator. He was simply a man with the right skills at the right time and in the right place, a place that had the right need and exactly the right leaders willing to incorporate his knowledge into their efforts.

The importance of Steuben cannot be minimized, and though he did not know it at the time, Steuben was developing, through his training and later writing of the original rules and regulations of the Continental Army, the basis that would become the foundation for the United States Army.⁵⁰ In essence, he created the foundations for institutional development that would extend far beyond his service. At the same time, it is accurate to state that what Steuben wrote was not so unique that it created a paradigm shift in thinking, such as those by Frederick the Great or Napoleon, or any of the other military innovators of the day. However, Steuben did understand how to take aspects of the Prussian system, marry it with French military thinking, and simplify both, to adapt these into a system for adoption into an American practical process. By developing a basis for the Continental Army, Steuben was developing an institutional foundation whereby the United States could operate within the international regime, furthering its alliance to the French and eventually leading to alliances with Spain and other European powers. It is this memory which exists in the traditions and lineage of the United States Army to this day.⁵¹ As such, it is logical to recognize that those traditions assist in creating a social construct that

⁵⁰ "Publisher's Note," in *Baron von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual: A Facsimile Reprint of the 1794 Edition* (New York: Dover Publications, 1985).

⁵¹ Collins, "How Military Strategists Should Study History," 31-44.

continues to affect the manner in which the United States Armed Forces view Military Assistance.

Military Assistance and the American Army's Initial Conflicts

The initial conflicts of the nation did little to change or develop the military footprint in the United States. Whether it was the various conflicts with Native Americans, the Barbary Wars, or the rebellions that began from time to time, most notably the Shays and Whiskey rebellions, none of these military engagements had much of an impact on the broader military buildup or evolution of the United States. Congress under both the Articles of Confederation and then the United States Constitution always had more pressing business than authorizing an appropriate military force posture. Indeed, given the experience of the War of Independence, and prior, with respect to the British Army,⁵² the public was suspicious of standing armies.⁵³

Although Congress had little interest in creating or developing an appropriate military foundation or structure, the War of 1812 provided an abrupt awakening. Even though this War ended quietly, much like it had begun, it did have an enormous psychological impact, as it pertained to expanding the capacity and capabilities of the United States Armed Forces. It was after the War of 1812 that Congress began supporting naval innovation,⁵⁴ as well as developing further capabilities regarding procurement and logistics by standardizing the components, in addition to centralizing distribution.⁵⁵ As researcher Adam Rothstein states, “open and standardized systems improved manufacturing performance, and we see a new coordination between the military and industry.”⁵⁶ However, it was Lt. General Winfield Scott who would

⁵² Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 24,” in *The Federalist*, ed. Terence Ball (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 110-114.

⁵³ This gave rise to the desire and ultimately to the ratification of the Third Amendment to the Constitution: “No Soldier shall, in times of peace be quartered in any house, without consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be proscribed by law.” United States Congress, *Constitution of the United States Bill of Rights*, 1792.

⁵⁴ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 60 – 65.

⁵⁵ Adam Rothstein, *Drones*, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015) 21.

⁵⁶ Rothstein, *Drones*, 22.

define the strategic impact on the 19th century military experience, one rooted in his own experiences with Military Assistance.

Scott grew up in Virginia, educated for a career in law, which enabled his access to the trial of Vice President Aaron Burr.⁵⁷ After experience in the local militia, he was able to secure a commission as a captain in the light artillery from President Jefferson, since the Army was expanding. This would be a constant for Scott both in terms of his rank and the political methods he used to gain it, allowing him to end the War of 1812 as a brigadier general, having achieved that rank at the age of 27.⁵⁸

While the Monroe Doctrine and the Grand Strategy that it defined were the prevailing foreign policies of the period between the War of 1812 and the Civil War, the United States was far more absorbed in pushing the Native Americans further west. At first glance, the idea that the European methods of warfare would be most efficient against Native Americans could be considered counterintuitive, since formations seemed poorly designed to fight an irregular combat. However, when there are few, if any, concerns about the safety, or lives, of non-combatants, the European methods were surprisingly effective. They were effective because the focus of European tactics at the time was to mass

⁵⁷ *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL. D* (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1864), 12-15, accessed May 20, 2017, <https://archive.org/details/memoirsoflieutge00inscot>. Suzanne B. Geissler, "A Piece of Epic Action: The Trial of Aaron Burr," *The Courier* 12, no. 2, (Spring 1975): 5.

⁵⁸ It is important to note that the United States Armed Forces currently goes to extreme lengths to remain apolitical in every possible way, in order to avoid the conditions of which General Scott was able to take advantage. Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, *Department of Defense Directive 1344.10: Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces*, February 19, 2008, accessed March 13, 2015, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/134410p.pdf>. However, the American Military of the 1800s had no such reservations, and officers were routinely involved in dealings with politicians, who made numerous decisions based on political dealings, rather than what was best for the United States Military as whole. Steve Corbett and Michael J. Davidson, "The Role of the Military in Presidential Politics," *Parameters* 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009-2010): 59-60, accessed May 20, 2017, <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/Articles/09winter/corbett%20and%20davidson.pdf>.

fires, which is to say, a concentration of firepower, toward the enemy, and combine arms, such as artillery and cavalry. Many of these tactics, along with maneuvering actions for logistics to support that, were experienced during the Napoleonic Wars on the European continent, and it was there that General Scott traveled after the War of 1812.

This version of Military Assistance differs from the previous examples or even the traditional understandings of Military Assistance, namely that others would be present in the recipient nation to expand the capacities and capabilities of that nation's military. In this regard, Scott was in fact an importer of Military Assistance, taking ideas and concepts that he would learn and absorb from Europe, developing them into an American method, and thereby utilizing the knowledge of a supporting nation to create and develop the capacities and capabilities of the United States Armed Forces. This started with his efforts in 1815 as presiding officer for the Board of Tactics, which essentially translated and minimally adapted a 1791 French manual on infantry tactics.⁵⁹ His efforts continued when he wrote an entire set of standardized regulations for the United States Army in 1818, drawing heavily on his European travels.⁶⁰ Scott repeated this experience again in 1826 in his effort to develop and standardize other aspects of the Army, such as engineering, artillery, and ordinance, among others.⁶¹

Through each of these developments, Scott became an importer of Military Assistance. Understanding tactics from the French and the British, general staffs and planning from the Prussians, these enrichments of capabilities and capacities contributed to the long-term security of the United States after the War of 1812. Scott's importation of Military Assistance contributed to the tactical level of warfare, in that the standardization techniques the Army adopted were directly applied to the Native Americans in the West. While understandably the military actions against the Native Americans by the United States Army are now

⁵⁹ Timothy D. Johnson, *Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 68.

⁶⁰ Johnson, *Winfield Scott*, 75–77.

⁶¹ Johnson, *Winfield Scott*, 79.

seen as neither moral nor ethical, it is still important to acknowledge the tactical effect in Scott's techniques. This tactical effect nested directly with the America's strategic goals of a manifest destiny, along with a broader strategic political narrative of the Monroe Doctrine.

Conclusion

The idea within the construct of the levels of warfare with respect to the origins of the American military experience is one in which the framework aids in appreciating the broader history and context in which the United States Military views itself.⁶² From the founding Western European colonies in the North Americas, to the evolution and development of the United States Army, Military Assistance is a common thread and theme. The origins of the United States Army, like the origins of any institution, have affected and molded the culture organizationally and strategically. As this chapter describes, the principles of the tools of Military Assistance are embedded within the origins of the American military culture, tradition, and experience.

This history and context are further perpetuated by the principle within the United States Army, that its foundation as an institution was strengthened due to its receiving Military Assistance, and that this foundation has been the cause of its success. Indeed, in some of the most significant but subtle ways, Military Assistance has influenced the American way of war, one clear example being Steuben's adoption of equipment accountability, a cultural aspect that influences the United States Army to this day. In and of itself the concept of equipment accountability is seemingly innocuous; however, the culture of accountability extends from an individual soldier's equipment to the accountability of the personnel themselves. That leaders within the United States Armed Forces believe in continuing to apply this concept of accountability of personnel supports the morale of the entire military culture. Similarly, many of Steuben's drill and ceremonial exercises have continued to be carried out in United States Army units to this day. Here, simple ideas imported in 1777, due to the frugality

⁶² Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 65 – 66.

of an imported Prussian officer, have expanded into an organizational cultural bedrock of the United States Armed Forces.

It is these institutionalized and ingrained memories enshrined within the United States Armed Forces that the tool of Military Assistance creates to develop capacities and capabilities. Given the intimate experience with Military Assistance as a foundation of the United States Army, from its birth in the Colonies to United States' emergence as a great power, it is only natural that the institution has a visceral connection to Military Assistance. More specifically, on both a policy basis and a level of strategic thinking, it is on this foundation that the United States Armed Forces continue to hold that Military Assistance is a viable tool. The commonality among these seemingly disparate military experiences of the United States supports the process of adoption and internalizing from a cultural aspect of Military Assistance. Ultimately, the reason the United States Armed Forces views Military Assistance as a viable tool to work within the international framework is that it developed this structure, which it values as the basis for its success.

Chapter 4

The United States and the Republic of Korea:

A Case Study in Successful Military Assistance

When examining Military Assistance as a tool of foreign policy from the perspective of the United States, the most relevant time period to be considered is after WWII. It was at this time that the United States emerged on the world stage as the dominant power in the Western world, doing so through international forums and alliances such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the post-WWII environment, the United States pursued a policy of Military Intervention utilizing the tools of Military Assistance, Military Support, and Military Aid. In some cases, this policy was instituted so as to influence another nation's progress, and in other instances to develop relationships with the leaders, but in all cases to prevent the spread of Communism and the growing influence of the Soviet Union — the pursuit of the Grand Strategy of the Truman Doctrine. While the United States was neither successful nor moral in every scenario related to the pursuit of its interests, it did so under a perceived ideal of expanding its influence through the empowerment of institutional development in the post-WWII order and with the motivation of preventing the rise of Communism. The experience of the United States' relationship with Korea, and later South Korea, offers an example of these pursuits through the tool of Military Assistance. This chapter will examine and analyze the United States' relationship with South Korea before and during the Korean War, the extent to which this ongoing relationship was developed and forged by the tool of Military Assistance into a sustainable security for South Korea, and how Military Assistance contributed to American Grand Strategy.

To understand the origins of this discussion, it's important to appreciate that while the rest of the world was modernizing through the industrial revolution in the 19th century, what little power and influence Korea had was waning. This was due primarily to isolation and rebellion, and ultimately Korea was conquered and annexed by the Japanese starting in 1910, ending a five-century-

old dynasty that had grown insular and corrupt.¹ The occupation of the Japanese, which lasted until the end of WWII, was a traumatic experience for the Korean people and one which provoked a challenging dynamic between the Korean people and the American Military Government after WWII.² Many elements of the Korean establishment, and as a result, the Korean population, resisted American-led rule of their homeland and opted out of the process, thereby siphoning-off much of the legitimacy from the endeavor. This resulted in enabling Dr. Syngman Rhee to seize power virtually unopposed in the newly formed Republic of Korea in 1948.³

Many factors led to the Korean War, leaving scholars to examine and re-examine the war even now, seventy years later. Although the reverberations of the Korean War continue to play into the general affairs in the region, specifically due to North Korea's continuous quest for weapons of mass destruction, the war also had an enormous impact on the developing relationship between the United States and the newly-formed Republic of Korea (South Korea or ROK). While it is not the purpose of this chapter to examine the origins of war in the process of appreciating the dynamics of the ongoing military relationship between South Korea and the United States, it is crucial to understand the relationship in context.

Historical Context

At the Yalta conference in 1945, President Roosevelt secured an agreement with Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin to support the Allies against Japan in the Pacific Theater of WWII after achieving victory in Europe.⁴ In August of 1945, during the period when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet Union revoked its neutrality agreement with the

¹ James F. Schnabel, *The United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1992), 2-3.

² Bonnie B. C. Oh, ed., *Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 1-2.

³ Jinwung Kim, "South Korea," in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War*, eds. James I. Matray and Donald W. Boose (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Pub. Ltd, 2014), 27.

⁴ Schnabel, *The United States Army in the Korean War*, 7.

Japanese and declared war on Japan. The Soviets immediately began invading Manchuria, which threatened Japan's supply chain, and at the same time positioning troops to attack into the Korean peninsula.⁵ This led the Japanese leadership to begin serious discussions on surrender, resulting in the eventual signing on the decks of the USS Missouri, and placing command of the Far East, including South Korea, with General Douglas MacArthur.

As the war in the Pacific drew to a close, many within the United States Armed Forces and the Truman Administration knew that the Cold War with the Soviet Union was just beginning.⁶ In Washington, D.C., military planners were discussing how Korea would be dealt with after Japan's surrender, and it was then arbitrarily decided that the 38th parallel would act as a demarcation point between North and South.⁷ The Soviet Union agreed, and marched its forces to the line of the 38th parallel. There they waited at the newly-drawn border until Lieutenant General John Hodge landed "the 25,000-strong 24th Corps of the United States Tenth Army"⁸ at Inchon in September of 1945, before occupying the remaining southern half of the peninsula. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were backing leaders who would support their respective political goals in order to accomplish their respective efforts of a Grand Strategy at work throughout the world. On the Korean peninsula the Soviet Union was supporting Kim Il-sung, who had proven himself to the Soviets by serving with the Red Army in WWII. For the United States it was Dr. Rhee who had developed good relations

⁵ The Learning Network, "Aug. 9, 1945: U.S. Drops Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki," *The New York Times*, August 9, 2011, accessed June 23, 2015, <http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/aug-9-1945-u-s-drops-atomic-bomb-on-nagasaki-japan>.

⁶ Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignan, "World War II and the Beginning of the Cold War" (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1996), 1, 17-18, and 30-32.

⁷ William Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 11 – 13.

⁸ Oh, *Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948*, 3.

with the United States military and diplomatic leaders since the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.⁹

For the next few years the American Military Government acted as the administration of South Korea, until the United Nations agreed on a plan leading to the election of a legislative body and an eventual constitution.¹⁰ The Soviet Union protested the adoption of the United Nations plan under the grounds that it violated the United Nations Charter. Rhee was elected by the South Korean legislature as the first President of the ROK, and proceeded to embark on creating a government that quickly became known as thoroughly corrupt and incompetent.¹¹ The American Military Government withdrew, as did most of the United States Armed Forces except for the 500-man Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAC). It was under these auspices that Kim Il-sung, as leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK), established in 1948, launched an offensive in June of 1950, the beginning of the Korean War.¹²

The Truman Administration was able to gain approval to intervene by the United Nations Security Council due to the Soviet Union's boycotting its seat on the Security Council, a boycott ironically started because the United Nations had not granted the new government in China, the Peoples' Republic, the Chinese seat on the Security Council, instead leaving that power with Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China on Taiwan.¹³ After obtaining United Nations Security Council

⁹ Michael Breen, "Fall of Korea's First President Syngman Rhee in 1960," *The Korean Times*, April 10, 2010, accessed July 2, 2015, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/01/113_64364.html.

¹⁰ Schnabel, *The United States Army in the Korean War*, 26-27.

¹¹ Kim, "South Korea," in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War*, eds. Matray and Boose, 30.

¹² Hakjoon Kim, "North Korea," in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War*, eds. Matray and Boose, 37.

¹³ The Soviet boycott was in protest of Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China on Taiwan's continuing to hold China's permanent seat on the UN Security Council rather than the People's Republic of China on the mainland. The Learning Network, "Oct. 25, 1971: People's Republic of China In, Taiwan Out, at U.N.," *The New York Times*, October 25, 2011, accessed September 3, 2015, <https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/oct-25-1971-peoples-republic-of-china-in-taiwan-out-at-un>.

authority under United Nations Security Council Resolution 82,¹⁴ the United States counterattacked with a coalition of United Nations forces.¹⁵ The next three years of fighting up and down the peninsula eventually ended in a stalemate in 1953 around an area eventually known as the demilitarized zone or DMZ. The DMZ that was established under the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953 was a far more natural barrier than the initial line of the 38th parallel, and has remained to this day the dividing line between North and South Korea.¹⁶

Republic of Korea as a Successful State

To appreciate the extent to which the Military Assistance to the ROK Army may have impacted the United States and its alliance with the ROK, it is necessary to consider what constitutes a successful state and why the ROK can be considered as such. For example, is a successful state one that could be an example to others, having progressed throughout a period of years? While there can be no question about any state being perfect, all having their issues and challenges, the specific dynamics that constitute a successful state and to what extent might well be a Western construct.

Despite this perspective, at the end of the Korean War, South Korea was by any standard a decimated nation. Furthermore, unlike the Western European nations after WWII, the newly created Republic of Korea did not have similar capacities or capabilities upon which to draw. Western European nations, despite having been the stage of over ten years of war throughout WWII, had capacity and capability, and in addition, a level of modernity prior to the outbreak of WWII that South Korea did not possess. Having endured Japanese occupation since 1910, and prior to that, an imperial-styled monarchy that was decidedly isolationist, South Korea had not created a high level of expertise in developing an infrastructure or industrial-based capacity that would be

¹⁴ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 82, "Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea," June 25, 1950, accessed September 5, 2015, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/82\(1950\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/82(1950)).

¹⁵ These were not blue-helmeted United Nations peacekeeping forces but a wartime coalition far more similar to NATO operations.

¹⁶ William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 210, 238, and 320.

recognized as a modern nation. This necessitated the ROK's development of these capacities and capabilities internally, with the aid and assistance of external nations, specifically the United States.

Although there can be no question that the development of a nation, both politically and economically, has to do with numerous factors, from culture to history to natural resources, there are measurements that can be examined and assessed. And "while most of the world's societies have endorsed to some extent modern (Western) configurations such as capitalism, liberalism and democracy, no single civilization or basic ideological principle has become dominant."¹⁷ This indicates that while the Western understandings of the success of a nation state have become prominent, there still remains a broad debate within the field for exploration. The parameters of the current discussion are very much rooted in a Western construct of the development of human potential and state building.¹⁸ Underlying all of this discussion, the relevance to Military Assistance and more specifically, to this research project, is to provide a context by which the Republic of Korea could be considered a "success" and relate this to the Military Assistance provided by the United States.

The end of the Korean War, then, is a natural place to begin an examination of the success of South Korea as a state, since it was imperative for South Korea to rebuild both economically and politically. While new statistics and understandings are continually being developed to measure democratization and economic development, there have been several standards that have advanced from the development community. One such statistic is the Freedom in the World index, a measurement of democratization that was created by the NGO Freedom House, which states that the Freedom in the World index "is the standard-setting comparative assessment of global political rights and civil

¹⁷ Kyong Ju Kim, *The Development of Modern South Korea* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 13.

¹⁸ Rather than delve into this debate, it should suffice to acknowledge that there exists a substantial debate within the International Relations and International Development fields, and that the exploration of this debate is not crucial for this research regarding Military Assistance.

liberties.”¹⁹ Covering the years from 1973 to 2015, the index rated South Korea as “Not Free” in 1973 and “Free” in 2015 as the state relates to political rights and civil liberties.²⁰ Although the index does not continue back to 1953, research of that time period includes numerous citations confirming South Korea’s poor level of freedom.²¹

Regarding the economic development aspect, there is no index that has become quite so renown in the development field as the Human Development Index or HDI, developed from the works of Nobel Laureate Professor Amartya Sen. An obvious statistical analysis of economic development might be based on per capita income, which is a nation’s Gross Domestic Product divided by the population. The goal of Per Capita Income to develop a clearer understanding of an individual’s purchasing power parity is a measurement of the true cost of purchasing goods and services across different countries. Per Capita Income however, is only part of HDI, which seeks to capture a picture of a nation’s economic opportunity, doing so not only through Per Capita Income but also education, based on literacy rates, and health, from measurements in life expectancy. By applying these three indicators in HDI and comparing it between nations, a statistical understanding emerges on where the greatest economic opportunities exist to survive and thrive in a society.²²

HDI has evolved and been refined over the years, with the latest review and improvement occurring in 2010, and though these refinements have affected the placement of a nation’s rank in comparison to others, it cannot account for the dramatic shift of South Korea’s position. In 1980, when the United Nations

¹⁹ Freedom House, “Freedom in the World,” accessed August 22, 2015, <https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VbidG5NViko>

²⁰ Freedom House, “Individual Country Ratings and Status, 1973-2015 (final)” accessed August 22, 2015, <https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VbidG5NViko>

²¹ Gregg Brazinsky, “Institution Building: Civil Society,” in *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 41-70.

²² Sudhir Anand and Amartya Sen, “The Income Component of the Human Development Index,” *Journal of Human Development* 1, no. 1 (2000): 84-85, accessed September 19, 2015, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14649880050008782>.

Development Program, the organization responsible for creating the yearly HDI reports, began its measurements, South Korea was ranked 45, which was a high rank among lesser-developed nations. This is in comparison to the United States, which was ranked 2, and Australia, which was ranked 1. By 2013, South Korea had jumped to tie with Hong Kong (which does not including the rest of China or Taiwan) at 15, in comparison to the United States' ranking of 5 and Australia's of 2.²³ Again, similar to the Freedom in the World index, there is not an HDI ranking for 1953, but the state of the South Korean economy can be seen through the per capita income of \$1,072 in 1953 whereas in 2010 it was \$21,701, in 1990 US\$ and in comparison Australia is \$7,505, the United States is \$10,613 in 1953 rising to \$25,584 and \$30,491 for Australia and the United States, respectively.²⁴ There can be little debate that the ROK emerged from the aftermath of the Korean War as an economic success, which is not to excuse the method and process the ROK government pursued to achieve that success, nor the behaviors the United States excused in order to maintain its alliance. The statistics simply show that South Korea experienced a dramatic economic evolution as a nation, rising to greater democratization and economic development.

Context of Military Assistance in South Korea

With the alliance between the United States and South Korea and the general use of the tool of Military Assistance post WWII, it could be assumed that the purpose of the military relationship is one of military modernization and the promotion of an ideological agenda. In the previous chapter, Professor Stoker was referenced regarding his model of the six underlying categories of Military Assistance, from modernization to corporatization. He outlined these six

²³ United Nations Development Programme, "Table 2: Human Development Index trends, 1980-2013," accessed August 23, 2015, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-2-human-development-index-trends-1980-2013>. United Nations Human Development Programme, "Korea (Republic of)," in *Human Development Report - The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World*, lead author Khalid Malik (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2013), accessed August 23, 2015, <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/KOR.pdf>.

²⁴ The Maddison-Project, accessed August 24, 2015, <http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm>, 2013 version.

categories as a framework to view Military Assistance, and one of these was the category of Military Assistance “as a tool of nation building.”²⁵ This point must be challenged, in that fundamentally all Military Assistance is focused on nation-building, including in South Korea, as discussed below. Whether the emphasis of the Military Assistance mission is promoting a counterinsurgency strategy such as in the case of the Philippines, or Military Assistance with a corporate emphasis such as Iraq’s private security contractors, any of these categories conclude as an effort to further develop the capacities and capabilities within a nation. Irrespective of whether nation-building is a good or bad endeavor, whether thought to be an extension of a colonialist or a humanitarian mindset, nation-building fundamentally is about developing capacities and capabilities within a state with little cultural impact. Military Assistance, the development of capacities and capabilities to create a sustainable security within and on behalf of a state, is a part of that nation-building, but more fundamentally it is about the pursuit of a political objective.

Additionally, it is likewise logical to dismiss Professor Stoker’s other options, from “corporatization of military advice” to “economic purpose or penetration” to “counterinsurgency.” In these categories, he describes companies and individuals who help train foreign security forces for profit as mercenaries,²⁶ whereas on the economic side he describes Military Aid.²⁷ There is little evidence of mercenaries being used to any great effect in South Korea, although the idea of counterinsurgency efforts was an original concern of ROK security forces. The DPRK’s methods of infiltration prior to the Korean War were frequently deployed, and created numerous challenges for the American occupation prior to 1948 and the ROK government thereafter.²⁸ Due to this concern, one of the primary missions of the Constabulary and then the ROK Army was a focus on

²⁵ Donald Stoker, “The History and Evolution of Foreign Military Advising and Assistance, 1815 – 2007,” in *Military Advising and Assistance*, ed. Donald Stoker (London: Routledge, 2008), 2.

²⁶ Stoker, *Military Advising and Assistance*, 6.

²⁷ Stoker, *Military Advising and Assistance*, 3-4.

²⁸ Kim, “South Korea,” in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War*, eds. Matray and Boose, 28-29.

infiltration by Communists and their sympathizers, and this was supported by the advisory efforts of the United States.²⁹ As it turned out, this mission focus was detrimental to the development of the ROK Army, as it prevented more training and development as a combat force, which became apparent with the invasion of the DPRK as will be discussed in this chapter.

Finally, the economic effort, or Military Aid as defined in this research project, was not a major factor in the security relationship between the United States and South Korea, at very least not prior to the Armistice. As Stoker puts it, “nations selling the arms...generally wanted to place missions in foreign nations because they believed that it gave them leverage for the sale of arms. To the nation supplying the mission the sale of weapons was far more important than the modernization of the military forces of the country in question.”³⁰ This becomes an important point for the alliance between the United States and South Korea: over the sixty-plus years of their security relationship, billions in Military Aid have been given to South Korea by the United States.³¹ It is not due to leverage that either South Korea has over the United States nor leverage that the United States has over South Korea that the alliance has continued. It is due, however, to an underlying desire by the United States to assist in modernization, so that South Korea can more fully maintain in its own defense, lessening the cost for the United States in manpower and resources, which, as a point of policy, has been reducing the number American troops over the years.³² At no time was this more prevalent than between the occupation of South Korea by the American Military Government and the end of the Korean War. Acting on behalf of the United States, the little KMAC equipment and general logistical guidance to

²⁹ Allan R. Millet, “The Ground War, 1948-1953,” in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War*, eds. Matray and Boose, 112-114.

³⁰ Stoker, *Military Advising and Assistance*, 3-4.

³¹ Pil Ho Kim, “Guns over Rice: The Impact of US Military Aid on South Korean Economic Reconstruction,” *International Development Cooperation Review* Vol 9, no. 1 (2017), 33-50, accessed July 1, 2018, <https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/2/20360/files/2017/04/GoR-final-w0lqqp.pdf>.

³² Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., “Aftermath, 1953-2013,” in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War*, eds. Matray and Boose, 421-434.

the Constabulary and then the ROK Army was focused on trying to support them at a minimal level of functioning. This was due to the simple fact that the KMAC mission was low on the priority list for the United States Armed Forces consumed with the occupations of Germany and Japan, while the United States Government focused on the rebuilding of Western Europe.

Another scholar, Derek Reveron, defines the goals of Military Assistance (or as he calls it “security assistance”)³³ as the following: “creating favorable military balances of power; advancing areas of mutual defense or security arrangements; building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and preventing crisis and conflict.”³⁴ The difficulty with these goals is that they are limited in their scope primarily to the immediate threat, as opposed to taking a more global perspective. In the case of South Korea, this is certainly applicable due to having a very realistic immediate threat in the north from both the DPRK and China. There can be no question that this immediate threat is a prime motivator for the actions and reactions in terms of the security posture and development of capabilities and capacities in South Korea, especially given the period of focus.

The challenges, however, with these underlying goals is that they all take a narrow view of comprehensive United States’ foreign policy interests, regarding the United States as utilizing the tool of Military Assistance solely under a realist

³³ Dr. Reveron is clearly not referring to “security assistance” in the United States Joint Staff doctrinal definition, which is much closer to the definition in this dissertation of Military Aid. Security Assistance is defined as “Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), GL-11.

³⁴ Derek S. Reveron, “From Confrontation to Cooperation: Weak States, Demanding Allies, and the US Military,” eds. Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 68.

agenda in order to pursue its immediate interests. While there can be no question that the United States pursues its foreign policy goals as part of a broader interest-based agenda, it must, as the most powerful military in the world, look beyond its immediate interests and into potential threats and future conflicts. In the past, this was the pursuit of a defined Grand Strategy. The United States could afford this privilege of assessing potential threats and futures because of its economic power and influence. These can and should be seen in a more global context, particularly against the perceived threat of Communism, which, given the time, consumed the attention of the United States as a strategy of containment. For example, had the United States simply pursued an interest-based agenda, there can be little question that it would have left Vietnam far earlier, as the conflict began becoming more unpopular, and political leaders incurred the wrath of voters and the American population in general.³⁵

The United States continued its Military Intervention, first in the form of Military Assistance and then in the form of Military Support in places such as Vietnam, as some would argue, well past the viability of the mission. This was due to a commitment to the Truman Doctrine, and coupled with the domino theory, defined American Grand Strategy as focusing on the containment of the march of Communism around the globe. The basis, however, of these concepts originated from the liberal neurosis and accepted narrative that President Truman had “lost” China.³⁶ The politics of post-WWII in the United States was dominated by the “Red Scare” propagated by Senator Joseph McCarthy, a concept that began with a speech on 9 February 1950,³⁷ barely four and half months before North Korea would cross the 38th parallel. Any number of factors led to the rise of McCarthy, not the least of which was the Senator’s own desires for

³⁵ Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 129.

³⁶ Arthur Waldon, “How China was ‘Lost’?: And could it have been saved?,” *The Weekly Standard* 18, no. 9, January 28, 2013, accessed April 3, 2017, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/how-china-was-lost/article/696345>.

³⁷ Office of the Historian, “Senate History, 1941-1963: February 9, 1950,” United States Senate, accessed August 26, 2015, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Communists_In_Government_Service.htm.

fame and glory. On the national security front, McCarthy's claims of Communist infiltration of the United States Government, specifically the State Department, fed the idea that President Truman had "lost" China not through lack of influence or resolve but by purposeful negligence.³⁸ These factors exacerbated the domestic political dynamics pushing Truman into a foreign policy corner, and are relevant to the Korean peninsula because they forced President Truman to act.

Once the DPRK had broken through the ROK Army defenses and the country was in chaos, there was a great possibility that the ROK would be crushed by its enemy and simply cease to exist. However, partially due to the domestic political pressures faced by Truman and his Administration, the United States affirmed the concept of collective security. Additionally, for the United States the Korean War marks an interesting point in the pursuit of war, from a general abandonment of war as a sole nation endeavor, into an alliance-based pursuit, if for no other reason than to create the perception publicly of an easing burden of cost in manpower and expense. Granted, in the case of the Korean War, the alliance was American-led, but still the United States was operating under the mandate of the United Nations, a similar dynamic that would be repeated in Vietnam, although not with the identical construct of collective security.

The other change that the Korean War created for the United States was the abandonment of the strategy of total war. Although General MacArthur was quite public about utilizing the combat strategy of total war through the use of nuclear weapons, specifically against the Chinese as they entered the war to assist the DPRK, it was the decision of Truman and his Administration that from a political perspective, a regional conflict such as the Korean War required containment, establishing Kennan's misunderstood policy as the prime strategic prism through which conflicts would be viewed throughout the Cold War and

³⁸ Waldon, "How China was 'Lost'?: And could it have been saved?," accessed April 3, 2017, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/how-china-was-lost/article/696345>.

solidifying the concept of limited warfare in the nuclear age.³⁹ It is this concept of limited warfare and fear of being placed into a quagmire that created this space of Military Assistance, especially in the case of South Korea during the American occupation and the ROK afterwards. Military Assistance allowed the United States to reduce its military footprint, meaning the number soldiers in country, while at the same time cultivating relationships and influence to support the desired political outcome. Most critical, however, was that Military Assistance empowered a nation such as the ROK to develop its capabilities and capacities by way of crafting methods and processes in order to create a long-term, sustainable security situation.

Like the political construct of limited warfare, the Armistice of 1953 between the Koreas was unlike previous conclusions of conflicts, such as in WWI or WWII. It could, in fact, be considered the continuation of the changing characteristics of warfare in the post-WWII era, which was that neither side truly stopped being at war; there was just a secession of full spectrum armed hostilities. Each side simply went back to their respective physical areas to restructure, resupply, and re-strategize for the next phase of conflict. This dynamic has happened in numerous post-WWII conflicts, from the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973, as well as the multiple military conflicts between India and Pakistan.

That the Armistice of the Korean War displayed this new dynamic of warfare is not critical for this research project, but what is essential is that the Armistice evolved and developed into a permanent level of an amplified security posture, necessitating a unique security structure being put in place that was based on a firm alliance between the ROK and similarly anti-Communist United States. The reason for a permanent security structure was due to the permanent perceived threat, in the form of the DPRK and its ongoing sabre rattling, as well as a legal framework that created a permanent mandate, in the form of United Nations

³⁹ Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no. 4 (December 1980): 563-592, accessed May 20, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/173775>.

Security Council Resolution 84.⁴⁰ In spite of this security posture, it was Military Assistance that provided the connection between the nations to establish that sustainable security.

The United States and President Rhee — A Case of Strange Bedfellows

The permanent security arrangement between South Korea and the United States partially had its origins in the relationship between the United States and President Rhee, the nominal leader of the South Korean elite. Rhee was an individual whom the United States had backed as early as WWII, and other Korean elites supported him largely due to that backing, although he had been ousted in the Korean independence movement in the 1920s.⁴¹ However, this solidified an interesting American method of operating foreign policy, one in which the individual became the prime avenue of relationship rather than developing an alliance with a nation state in the post-WWII era. As Roger Makins, later Lord Sheffield, serving as the United Kingdom's ambassador to the United States, pointed out: "the American propensity [is] to go for a man, rather than a movement — Giraud among the French in 1942, Chiang Kai Shek in China. Americans have always liked the idea of dealing with a foreign leader who can be identified and perceived as 'their man.' They are much less comfortable with movements."⁴²

This concept is highly significant in the context of Military Assistance in that the United States having "their man" tends to be the foundation of the relationship with another state, developing into an alliance. This has led to numerous relationships with dictators all in the pursuit of defeating Communism, a willingness to sacrifice long-term ideal for short-term

⁴⁰ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 84: Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea," July 7, 1950, accessed September 1, 2015, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/84\(1950\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/84(1950))

⁴¹ Michael Breen, "Syngman Rhee: president who could have done more," *The Korea Times*, November 2, 2011, accessed September 2, 2015, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/issues/2014/03/363_97887.html.

⁴² Interview between Roger Makins (Lord Sheffield) and Max Hastings on 10 Jan 1986. Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1987), 23.

objectives.⁴³ Those alliances are the basis by which Military Assistance and Military Aid and Military Support are given, and certainly was in the case of the ROK. This relationship, during the Cold War, led to a skillset among recipient nations, which some would refer to as client states and their dictator leadership, of resource. Noted Strategic Studies Professor Michael Handel stated, “The diplomatic art of the weak states is to obtain, commit, and manipulate, as far as possible, the power of other, more powerful states in own interests. Weak states can sometimes manipulate and lead a great power, almost against its own will.”⁴⁴

During the Vietnam War, the desire by the Johnson Administration to create the appearance of an international coalition led President Johnson to request troops from the ROK, which readily supplied over 300,000 soldiers, but did so based on the pretense of gaining more Military Aid.⁴⁵ While the Military Aid might be crucial from a bottom line dollar amount, it was, in fact, the Military Assistance that helped to cement the relationship between the ROK and the United States into a long-term alliance. In addition, it was the Military Assistance to the ROK Army that allowed those roughly 300,000 soldiers to support the Vietnam campaign.⁴⁶

This was the dynamic that played out between Rhee and the United States: Rhee used the United States’ fear of Communist expansion to gain greater commitments in the beginning years of the ROK’s existence. The United States, through its ambassador, John Muccio, was able to use Military Assistance to extract itself out of a perpetual obligation by pointing out how well the ROK Army was performing. Rhee also publicly praised the ROK Army for its skill level and once doing so, there was little he could do when the United States

⁴³ Samuel P. Huntington, “American Ideals versus American Institutions,” *Political Science Quarterly* 97, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 1-37.

⁴⁴ Michael I. Handel, *Weak states in the International System* (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 257.

⁴⁵ Charles K. Armstrong, “America’s Korea, Korea’s Vietnam,” *Critical Asian Studies* 33, no. 4 (September 2001): 531-532. Callum A. MacDonald, *Korea: The War Before Vietnam* (New York: Free Press, 1986), 263.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

announced the withdrawal of military forces in 1949.⁴⁷ In this instance the United States was pursuing its foreign policy interests through Military Assistance as it impacted several policies. The most obvious expression of that pursuit was that the United States, specifically the Truman Administration, did not want to continue the American Military Government any longer than necessary, in order to bolster the United Nations as an institution charged to peacefully resolve international disagreements. In addition, the United States did not favor creating or exacerbating an area of contention with the Soviet Union any more than required. Lastly, the Truman Administration had concerns about the expenses of maintaining military personnel on a continuous basis, given that Congress had not given such formal financial authorization.⁴⁸

The undercurrent of these issues was the Military Assistance being provided by the United States because of the relationship it had with President Rhee. Ambassador Muccio seemed to understand, prior to the Korean War, that Rhee would do all he could to retain a heavy presence of American military forces. However, Military Assistance provided yet another tool for the United States to continue both its relationship and influence without the heavy burden in costs and personnel, allowing the United States to pursue its foreign policy goals of preventing the spread of Communism. This was possible due to the relationship the United States believed it had developed with Rhee, namely, that Rhee was so fervently anti-Communist that the United States was willing to gloss over his many other imperfections, from his unstable temperament to his poor ability to govern.

Time and time again throughout the Cold War, the United States found itself developing similar relationships with comparable dictators and dictator-like individuals, as referenced by Ambassador Makins. There was a constant belief that the threat of the spread of Communism was so great that all other issues

⁴⁷ "Oral History Interview with John J. Muccio, Special Representative of the President to Korea, 1948-49; Ambassador to Korea, 1949-52; Envoy Extraordinary to Iceland, 1954," by Jerry Hess, Trumanlibrary.org, February 10, 1971, accessed September 3, 2015, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/muccio1.htm>.

⁴⁸ Schnabel, *The United States Army in the Korean War*, 19.

were minimal in comparison. As a result, clients like the ROK learned quickly that in order to secure the support necessary, connecting that argument to the Communist threat was the surest way to succeed.⁴⁹ This is not to say that the threat was not real: the ROK saw that threat from the north in the form of both the DPRK and Communist China. However, from a broader perspective, this client relationship served the United States extremely well with respect to its Grand Strategy in the post-WWII era to defeat the global spread of Communism. At the same, the United States in its pursuit of that Grand Strategy was willing to sanction many sorts of dictators, as long as they pledged to be anti-Communist. This by and large is the challenge with the foreign policy of the United States: short-term, with a blatant disregard for the long-term costs associated with the gains.⁵⁰ This dynamic has been consistent in American endeavors for many years, one where the smaller evils perpetrated by clients like Rhee were overlooked for the “greater good.” Ultimately, the challenge with this perspective is that at the individual and local levels, the small evil is much more painful to the population than the perceived goodness of the greater good. So, for example, the corruption and incompetence of the Rhee government was felt more acutely than the perceived fear of a takeover by Communism, one reason, no doubt among many, that President Rhee was eventually deposed in 1960. The concept, however, of backing an individual leader has continued as a foreign policy habit of the United States continually creating blind spots, such as President Rhee was prior to the beginning of the Korean War.

Origins of the Korean War

The interweaving of the past in this case creates a necessary fascinating background of perspective. As mentioned, one of the reasons that the Korean War was able to receive a United Nations mandate through United Nations Security Council Resolution 82 was that the Soviet Union had been boycotting

⁴⁹ Terence Roehrig, *From Deterrence to Engagement: the U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 119-120 and 124.

⁵⁰ James F. Dobbins, “America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq,” *Survival* 45, no. 4 (Winter 2003-2004): 87-89.

the Security Council. As mentioned, this was enacted as a protest because the People's Republic of China was not seated at the Council, but went to the Republic of China on Taiwan. In President Roosevelt's conception of the United Nations, his desire was that China would become a world power,⁵¹ and based on that belief, he ensured China's seat on the United Nations Security Council. This intention was based on the belief that Chiang had a firm grip on China, a scenario exemplifying what Lord Sheffield stated about the United States' backing a man as opposed to a movement. The problem, however, was that Chiang constantly worried about his position, even during WWII when General Stilwell was leading the Military Assistance mission in China. In 1943, General Stilwell commented to General Marshall "that the Generalissimo did not want the [Chinese] regime to have a large, efficient ground force for fear that its commander would inevitably challenge his position as China's leader."⁵² Ultimately, as with many Military Assistance missions, the relationship between advisor and advisee helped to dictate the relationship between nations. The relationship between Stilwell and Chiang degraded to the point that Stilwell was recalled.⁵³ Being challenged as he was, when Chiang lost to Mao Zedong in 1949, escaping to Taiwan, Chiang took China's relationship with the United States with him.⁵⁴

There were numerous factors that led to the loss of China to the Communists; however, those factors and the reality that the Communists won are not critical in the context of Military Assistance in South Korea. Nevertheless, that the loss occurred is extremely important, as it placed President Truman in a position in which he could not risk Korea's being "lost." It should be noted here that some scholars, such as critic Noam Chomsky, have objected to defining China as a "loss," in that this implies a sense of ownership. "In 1949, China declared independence, an event known in Western discourse as 'the loss of China' in the

⁵¹ Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987. First published 1953 by Government Printing Office.), 62.

⁵² Romanus and Sunderland, *China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Mission to China*, 353.

⁵³ Rana Mitter, *China's War with Japan, 1937-1945: The Struggle for Survival* (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 344 and 348-349.

⁵⁴ Mitter, *China's War with Japan, 1937-1945*, 369, 379, and 381.

US, with bitter recriminations and conflict over who was responsible for that loss. The terminology is revealing. It is only possible to lose something that one owns. The tacit assumption was that the United States owned China, by right, along with most of the rest of the world, much as postwar planners assumed.”⁵⁵

This point is absurd, however, that the United States or even the Western Powers were implying an ownership of China. When discussing the situation, foreign policy officials clearly stated that this “loss” represented a loss to Communism from the Chinese Nationalists and the perspective of Western democracies. This situation thereby created a state that the Western Powers knew they could not work with or possibly influence, making the “loss” not one of ownership, but a loss of a relationship and likely influence. The relevance to the Military Assistance in South Korea is that the loss of China had to be a factor for leaders in Washington and MacArthur, as they allowed for the withdrawal of troops from South Korea, leaving only the KMAC mission in its stead. This raised the question of to what extent the Korean peninsula was being considered in the broader context of the struggle against Communism prior to the DPRK’s invasion, to which the simple response is not much at all.

This was one of many miscalculations by both sides that led to the escalation of the Korean War, another being the full force of McCarthyism as a considerable domestic pressure on Truman in the United States. Chomsky in his critique cites Kennan’s comment that “we should cease to talk about vague and — for the Far East — unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better. We should recognize that our influence in the Far Eastern area in the coming period is going to be primarily military and economic.”⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Noam Chomsky, “‘Losing’ the world: American decline in perspective, part 1,” *The Guardian*, February 14, 2012, accessed September 3, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/feb/14/losing-the-world-american-decline-noam-chomsky>.

⁵⁶ George F. Kennan, “Policy Planning Staff Memo 23: Review of Current Trends US Foreign Policy,” February 24, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General: The United Nations, Vol. I, Part 2*, eds. Neal H. Petersen et al

This prism, by which a senior foreign policy advisor at the State Department defined how he foresaw the Cold War evolving, is crucial with respect to Military Assistance and relevant as to how Military Assistance was practiced in South Korea before, during, and after the Korean War, the relationship construct by which the military alliance with the ROK was based. Given the numerous abuses of power by South Korean elites towards their own people, from corruption to military coups, the United States was extremely tolerant in one way or another in order to continue the ROK-US alliance against a possible Communist influence or invasion. Under this rubric it is understandable that the evolution of foreign policy during the Cold War takes on a Realist perspective in terms of international relations theory.

This Realist perspective can be considered the context for the Military Assistance mission between South Korea and the United States, despite the fact that the advisory mission begins at the end of WWII and before the machinations between Stalin and the West evolved into the Cold War. That period between the end of WWII and end of the Korean War was the incubator which set in motion both the Cold War on a global scale, as well as how the United States would approach and maintain its alliances and their development. The purpose of the ROK and United States alliance was ultimately for the purpose of promoting the ideology of anti-Communism. This alliance was able to do so through the Military Assistance mission that was to utilize military modernization as a method to extend and solidify the ROK Army's capabilities and capacities in the security arena.

The Military Assistance experience in the Republic of Korea

After considering the background of Military Assistance in South Korea, the next consideration in investigating the topic of alliance development through Military Assistance is exploring the form and substance of the Military Assistance provided by the United States to the ROK. In addition, it is helpful to appreciate

(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1976), accessed September 3, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v01p2/d4>.

the context of the American Occupation in South Korea after WWII and the presence of the United States Military in support of the ROK after the Occupation and prior to the outbreak of the Korea War. Historically speaking, in some form or another the United States had a Military Assistance relationship with Korea dating back to 1881.⁵⁷ However, the current Military Assistance mission in the ROK can find its origins in the KMAG⁵⁸ that began with the Occupation by the United States of South Korea and the American Military Government in Korea in 1945.⁵⁹ That Military Assistance mission during and after the American Military Government was extremely distinctive, given that before the Korean War the underlying need in South Korea was simply to exist: that mission created a structural foundation that would become the ROK Army. It was this structure that withstood the might of the DPRK surprise invasion and that ultimately held together the ROK Army during its retreat over the first months of the Korean War.⁶⁰ This timeframe, between the American Military Government and the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953, is critical because it provided for the foundation of alliance between the United States and the ROK, all based on the form and substance of the Military Assistance begun in 1945.

The KMAG and its predecessors were primarily focused on the Advise and Assist mission, first with the Korean Constabulary and then the ROK Army once it was constituted under the founding of the ROK. The Advise and Assist mission

⁵⁷ Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War*, ed. Walter G. Hermes (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1963), 5.

⁵⁸ The KMAG prior to the Korea War was referred to initially as the Department of Internal Security (DIS) during the American Military Government, evolving into the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) once the Republic of Korea declared its independence and the Constabulary became the ROK Army. For the sake of ease of understanding, I will refer to the DIS, PMAG, and KMAG simply as the KMAG.

⁵⁹ Robert D. Ramsey III, *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 5. Bryan R. Gibby, *The Will to Win: American Military Advisors in Korea, 1946–1953* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2012), 3. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 35 & 45.

⁶⁰ A military retreat is considered one of the most challenging tactical movements. That the ROK Army was able to hold together while so engaged bespeaks of camaraderie and unit discipline.

was defined earlier in terms of the recipient nation in the lead with the support nation taking an advisory role, possibly helping more directly on logistics and material to expand the capacities and capabilities of the recipient nation. This is consistent with the general understanding of the Advise and Assist aspect of Military Assistance discussed in Chapter 2. The reason for the emphasis on the Advise and Assist mission is that the American Military Government emphasized local security being led by local forces. The Constabulary mission grew out of the effort to create a domestic security force capable of withstanding infiltration from the north and internal insurgencies, which current United States Joint Staff doctrine would consider a foreign internal defense mission.⁶¹ In fairness to the American Military Government, it was not well prepared to take on governing responsibilities and knew little of the area or Korean people. The best that could be said about the American Military Government in South Korea is that it knew itself to be a transitory government until political leaders both in Korea and around the world agreed on the final disposition of the Korean peninsula. It also knew how to help facilitate an internal security force. The intent was to have military-like security, which was separate from the National Police, and while there was no stated declaration that what was known as the Constabulary would become the Army of South Korea when the occupation ended, it could not have been far from the minds of the American Military Government, the elites around Rhee who would eventually form the ROK, or the advisors of the Constabulary.⁶²

The Constabulary

Although there was a desire to have greater capability than a militarized version of the National Police, there was serious political posturing both internally as well as on the international stage surrounding the establishment of the Constabulary. Internally, there were concerns by the State Department about the ongoing negotiations with the Soviet Union on the final disposition of the

⁶¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), GL-7.

⁶² Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*, 73-74. Schnabel, *United States Army in the Korean War*, 32-33.

Korean peninsula.⁶³ At the same time, General Hodge, the commander of the American Military Government, must have believed that the Constabulary was an achievable effort to undertake. The precise capabilities and capacities that the Constabulary would set as a goal seems to have been the subject of an ongoing discussion between Hodge and MacArthur. Although both wanted the Constabulary to have a greater military capability, the State Department, uneasy concerning Soviet reactions, influenced both Generals. The Constabulary would end up more capable than the National Police, having small pieces of artillery, but not as capable as an actual army, resulting in minimal machine guns and anti-tank weaponry.⁶⁴ This represented minimal concern for an internal force but a major capability gap, as was found in June 1950.

The initial officers of the Korean Constabulary would eventually form the core of the ROK Army that would eventually be established. From the class of 110 of the first officers, 75 would become general officers, and of these, 13 would become the chief of staff.⁶⁵ However, the Constabulary experienced an immediate conflict between the United States Army training doctrine and discipline with the equipment, manuals, and even money left by the Japanese.⁶⁶ In addition, many of the officers from the Constabulary had been part of the Japanese military, which allowed them a better than basic understanding of military operations, but it also had the effect of tainting those officers, allowing them to be seen as Japanese collaborators, and as such, sometimes mistrusted by the Korean populace. These officers had to deal with the underlying challenge of negotiating between Japanese and American military doctrines. While the Korean members of the Constabulary made for competent soldiers, suspicion of them initially prevented attaining any level of senior command.⁶⁷ As the Constabulary evolved into the ROK Army, the officers who advanced did so on the basis of their relations both with their KMAG advisors and President Rhee

⁶³ Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*, 73.

⁶⁴ Schnabel, *The United States Army in the Korean War*, 33.

⁶⁵ Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 30.

⁶⁶ Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*, 76-77. Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 31-32.

⁶⁷ Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*, 74.

and his inner circle.⁶⁸ The KMAG advisors had disproportionate levels of influence due to their ability to supply the Constabulary with weapons, ammunition, and basic living amenities along with general logistical support.⁶⁹ In this regard, it was both the Military Aid and the Military Assistance that developed the relationship between the KMAG trainers and the Korean trainees.

The American advisors, however, found other ways by which to involve themselves in the development of the Constabulary. At the very beginning of its formation, it was not unusual to see American officers traveling with their Korean counterparts to partake in a recruitment drive. This put the Constabulary in direct competition with the National Police for material and men, but as the National Police started arresting leftists, more men rushed to join the Constabulary. The recruitment rush caused conflicts, given that at the time the Constabulary's mission was to assist the National Police and prevent the infiltration by Communists. During these endeavors, one of the major issues of focus for the American advisors was to create the structure for the Constabulary based on the Prussian model of staff support to a commander, the first time South Korea had tried to develop this type of capability.⁷⁰ While this Prussian-based structure did little good when the Constabulary was struggling for food, weapons, and bullets, it began to integrate a level of professionalism and planning discipline within the Korean defense structure that became critical in the war to come.

This was the type of Military Assistance that the United States provided: professionalization of the security forces and logistical assistance, as the American Military Government transitioned power to the South Koreans. It is important to note that there was very little Military Aid given to the South Koreans, either before or after the ROK declared its independence. As noted, most of the equipment provided to the South Koreans was leftover Japanese supplies from WWII. However, the Constabulary's professionalization extended not only to the development of the Prussian staff model, but also to the creation

⁶⁸ Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 67.

⁶⁹ Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 14-15.

⁷⁰ Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 23-25.

of their professional military education. The KMAG developed, through their Korean counterparts, the beginnings of technical and leadership training. The technical training created was in the form of artillery, engineering, signal, infantry, and logistics schools, training which was for all ranks in the Constabulary.⁷¹

Although the technical military education was important in adding capabilities to the nascent Constabulary, capacity would come from the leadership training. Initially, there was a specific development of the Officer Training School (OTS) course, which because of minimal requirements was able to push through class after class of junior leaders. This in turn created an additional difficulty for which the KMAG was unprepared: a Korean officer corps as inexperienced as the Constabulary they helped bring into being. However, the KMAG was able to develop an officer academy modeled on West Point early in the existence of the Constabulary and gain access for many graduates to the branch schools in the United States for specialized training such as infantry, artillery, and engineering.⁷² The few officers who were able to attend were not present in enough numbers to have a significant effect on the junior officers. Although those few were able to do so as they rose through the ranks, the experience of training in the United States had a profound effect. One officer commented on how, for the first time, he conceptualized the idea of service to a “nation” rather than an individual.⁷³ While the positives and negatives of nationalism may certainly be debatable, the important effect on these young officers was to begin to experience their service as part of a broader contribution, an offering to something greater than themselves. However, despite this broadening experience, a few junior officers were not able to influence the challenges of inexperience within the Constabulary. This inexperience resulted in a natural tension between those with Japanese training and development of capacities and capabilities the KMAG was trying to instill in

⁷¹ Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*, 75.

⁷² Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 180-181.

⁷³ Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*, 75.

the Constabulary, a challenge that continued throughout the existence of the Constabulary.

As the ROK began taking control in the government from the American Military Government in 1948, the expectation of the ROK Army was to continue the mission of the Constabulary. Focusing on internal defense, primarily from Communist infiltration, and border defense from the DPRK, raiding became the primary mission.⁷⁴ It was at this time that a discussion took place between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House, and General MacArthur as the Commander-in-Chief of United States Armed Forces Far East regarding the final disposition of forces in the ROK. MacArthur stated, "the United States did not have the capability to train and equip Korean troops to the point where the Koreans would be able to cope with a full-scale invasion."⁷⁵ He further stipulated that in the event of an invasion, the United States would have to actively support the ROK Army, but then, in a move confusing in retrospect, concurred with the recommendation to withdraw United States Armed Forces in the ROK. The intention to remove United States Armed Forces in 1948 seems to have been based more on costs⁷⁶ than on any desire to build and develop a long-term alliance with the ROK. It would be hard to imagine that newly appointed President Rhee could not help but feel abandoned by the United States due to the reliance by the ROK on the United States,⁷⁷ since it was withdrawing thousands of troops and leaving less than 500 personnel⁷⁸ to manage what could only be defined as a herculean effort to train and develop the capacities and capabilities of the soon-to-be-founded ROK Army.

Shortly before the transition from the Constabulary to the ROK Army, Brigadier General William Lynn Roberts assumed direct responsibility of the KMAG, taking command from May 1948 until a month after the invasion, when

⁷⁴ Ramsey, *Advising Indigenous Forces*, 5.

⁷⁵ Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 37.

⁷⁶ Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 19.

⁷⁷ Allan R. Millet, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 156.

⁷⁸ "Theme of the Quarter: A Closer Look at...Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group-Korea," *DISAM Journal* 5, issue 2 (Winter 1982-1983): 5.

the Eighth Army assumed command of all forces in Korea. The KMAC had continued its mission of advising and assisting after the completion of the American military occupation. This mission evolved very directly as the forces of the DPRK broke through the 38th parallel on the 25th of June in 1950.⁷⁹ Unfortunately, many of the KMAC personnel, along with the ROK Army officers, were absent due to the weekend when DPRK forces rolled through.⁸⁰ The ROK Army was in a state of disarray, as were their American trainers. While the ROK Army was being decimated by the onslaught of the 135,000-man attack,⁸¹ the KMAC focused on retreating and reorganizing the ROK Army to face the enemy.⁸² As with many surprise attacks, and with the benefit of hindsight, there had been many warnings but none had been heeded, resulting in the KMAC, and more specifically Brigadier General Roberts and the ROK Army, bearing the brunt of the criticism for failing to stop the North Korean advance.⁸³ However, a more fair argument can be appreciated in the perception of United States Army historian, Colonel Bryan Gibby: “the confused state of the advisory groups simply mirrored confused policy in Tokyo [at MacArthur’s headquarters] and Washington.”⁸⁴ That confusion of policy had already led to the withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces a few years before.

The continued confusion in policy resulted in major miscalculations on both sides of the 38th parallel. In 1948, Truman believed that when United States Armed Forces left Korea they were doing so with a partner in Rhee and the establishment of the ROK.⁸⁵ Rhee, however, was known to have a difficult personality, and had been projecting through various actions that he wanted to unite Korea under his rule by conquering the DPRK.⁸⁶ These were not the dynamics that created a strong alliance, but this was the broader framework

⁷⁹ Hastings, *The Korean War*, 438.

⁸⁰ Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 124.

⁸¹ Hastings, *The Korean War*, 45.

⁸² Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 124.

⁸³ Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 7 and 9.

⁸⁴ Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 7.

⁸⁵ Kim, “South Korea,” in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War*, eds. Matray and Boose, 27 and 29.

⁸⁶ Stueck, *The Korean War*, 22.

under which Roberts and the KMAC were operating. A myth arose, however, throughout MacArthur's headquarters and the national security circles in Washington that the KMAC failed completely in its mission of developing the ROK Army prior to the invasion. The KMAC, however, had been consistently reporting the lack of existing capability and capacity within the ROK Army.⁸⁷ Part of the challenge arose from the idea that because the ROK Army had beaten back various skirmishes, raids, and withstood artillery bombardments, they were assumed to be prepared for a full assault. However, in fairness to the KMAC, neither MacArthur nor the military and civilian leaders in Washington considered this a serious possibility, and apparently MacArthur did not remember his earlier assessment that the ROK could not withstand an assault.⁸⁸

At the time of the invasion the KMAC consisted of roughly 249 officers and NCOs. Although like other advisors, Roberts had no formal training to advise foreign military forces, he had a foundational understanding of how to advise. He recommended that his KMAC subordinates give advice and not attempt to command, ensuring that they were sensitive to not try to remake the American Army.⁸⁹ But his challenges with the Constabulary on his arrival were such that many of the Korean officers, who had trained under the Japanese military system and been mistrusted, resulted in an army in which leadership was based more on relationships than professional military skill. However, one positive of the soon-to-be Korean War was that any competency of the Korean officers enabled them to quickly rise to the top.

During his time commanding the KMAC, Roberts gave every impression that the ROK Army was excelling. However, it is critical to appreciate that he was judging them proficient compared to their basic beginnings, praising their excellence based on the expectations of the ROK leadership and to a much lesser extent that of the United States.⁹⁰ Given the expectation that the ROK Army

⁸⁷ Bryan R. Gibby, "American advisors to the Republic of Korea: America's first commitment in the Cold War, 1946-1950," ed. Donald Stoker, *Military Advising and Assistance*, 103-104.

⁸⁸ Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 119 – 120.

⁸⁹ Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 98.

⁹⁰ Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 103-104.

would be able to prevent the intrusion of the DPRK, either in the form of border skirmishes or infiltration, Roberts gave praise to the ROK Army and in his reports on numerous occasions.⁹¹ At the same time, he agreed with MacArthur's initial assessment from January 1949 that the ROK Army was not prepared to withstand a total assault. However, the reports left impressions in the minds of many senior leaders, who held to their belief that Roberts had misled them, as the ROK Army nearly collapsed in June and July of 1950 following the DPRK's invasion.⁹²

In his reports, Roberts outlined the successes of the KMAC and the ROK Army, praising the burgeoning force as he "expressed the view that the Korean Army had the capability of containing the North Korean forces in being. However, he pointed to the need for additional U.S. aid for the Korean security forces."⁹³ Since the Pentagon and national security apparatus of the United States were focused on nuclear weapons, the Communist threat, and general internal machinations such as the Revolt of the Admirals in 1949, the concept that senior leaders did not have to worry about Korea must have been a relief, and considerations of the region being more as an afterthought. Judging by the Joint Chiefs of Staff disbelief regarding the North Korean onslaught and their overall disappointment in the KMAC's accomplishments, it could easily be assumed that there was little, if any, attention being paid to the Korean peninsula. The nature of the disappointment by the senior leaders likely had two effects in the days following the North Korean invasion: the first being that Roberts was permitted to continue his retirement process when the more advantageous course of action

⁹¹ Gibby, "American advisors to the Republic of Korea," in Stoker, *Military Advising and Assistance*, 104.

⁹² Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 311 note 119. Bryan P. Gibby, "Best Little Army," *The Journal of Military History* 77, (January 2013): 187-188.

⁹³ Everett F. Drumwright [For the Ambassador], "Memo to the Secretary of State, Subject: Ambassador Jessup's Visit to Korea," January 28, 1950, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Vol. VII*, Document 7, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1976), accessed September 5, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d7>.

would have been to re-activate him, and the second was to doubt the viability of the KMAG mission altogether.

The KMAG and the Surprise Attack

Shortly after the initial assault, Truman called on both the United Nations Security Council and the United States Congress to authorize a UN mission to fight back the DPRK invasion.⁹⁴ There are disputing sources as to whether the Soviet Union and China had given permission to Kim Il-sung to launch the attack. However, neither were in a position to prevent the diplomatic effort at the United Nations, since the Peoples' Republic of China had no voice on the Security Council, that seat being occupied by the Republic of China on Taiwan, and the Soviets, who were continuing to boycott their seat at the Security Council in protest of the People's Republic of China not being given that permanent seat.⁹⁵ This maneuvering created the diplomatic space for the Truman Administration to create a global response to what they viewed as Communist aggression. The United Nations mandate under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 82 created a legal framework for the American-led coalition, although according to Ambassador Muccio, the reality is that the United States was operationally moving ahead at the same time that the diplomatic efforts were underway.⁹⁶

While the diplomatic machinations occurred on the international level, the KMAG officers and enlisted were in flight-and-fight mode, and the KMAG advisors were acutely aware that their actions could have ramifications far beyond Korea, despite having little time to consider the broader implications of their actions. As KMAG Army historian Major Robert Sawyer stated, "there were three alternatives that immediately came to mind: they [the KMAG Advisors] could take up arms and actively help the South Koreans repel the invaders; they

⁹⁴ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 83, June 27, 1950, accessed September 5, 1950, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/83\(1950\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/83(1950)). United Nations Security Council, Resolution 84, July 7, 1950, September 5, 1950, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/84\(1950\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/84(1950)).

⁹⁵ Hastings, *The Korean War*, 50 – 51.

⁹⁶ "Oral History Interview with John J. Muccio," <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/muccio1.htm>.

could advise the ROK Army in combat operations; or they could leave Korea and abandon the republic to its fate. These alternatives involved questions of U.S. national policy and had to be decided on the highest levels of the United States Government.”⁹⁷ During the initial invasion, the instincts of the KMAG advisors took over, many times for their own survival, and began heavily pressuring their ROK Army officer counterparts to maintain as much unit cohesion as possible, given the circumstances. This heavy pressure evolved in many cases with the KMAG officers in reality becoming operationalized, as in not acting or behaving in an advisory status, and in emergencies began to take command from the ROK Army officers.⁹⁸

As in so many cases of Military Assistance and even warfare itself, many more factors were at play than just the invasion from the DPRK. One related gem of wisdom in Military Assistance is the Fifteenth Article that Colonel T. E. Lawrence wrote in his 1917 essays, the Twenty-Seven Articles: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.”⁹⁹ Although Lawrence speaks of a specific situation and time, this principle still holds: the most sustainable way to develop capabilities and capacities through Military Assistance is that the recipient must be the driving force. The example of the KMAG officers taking over for the ROK officers during the invasion violated every aspect of the broad framework of Military Assistance intended to be established, but the realities of warfare are many times overcome by expediency.

The focus of Military Assistance during the Korean War was on developing the ROK Army into a fighting force that could aid the United Nations Coalition, not specifically developing long-term capabilities and capacities that would contribute to a long-term, sustainable security, nor was there an effort on furthering alliance development. The Military Assistance endeavor once the

⁹⁷ Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 121.

⁹⁸ Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 114 and 136.

⁹⁹ T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-seven Articles,” *Arab Bulletin*, August 20, 1917, accessed September 10, 2015, http://www.telstudies.org/writings/works/articles_essays/1917_twenty-seven_articles.shtml.

Korean War began was, however, primarily on survival of the ROK Army, their KMAC advisors, and the ROK presence in South Korea itself. As was previously alluded, Kim Il-sung is thought to have planned his attack of June 25th to be such a surprise that it would overwhelm the ROK Army. At the time of the attack the operational experience level of leadership in the ROK Army was dramatically low, as many of the division commanders were colonels in their late twenties or early thirties. By contrast, United States Army divisions are usually commanded by two-star generals in their fifties. Though some of the ROK Army officers had served in WWII under the Japanese, the only combat many had experienced was the skirmishes with the DPRK over the past five years. As any battle-hardened commander knows, probing skirmishes is a world of difference from a surprise attack of 135,000 troops backed by artillery and airpower. Thus, the KMAC found themselves leaderless and overwhelmed, as Roberts had returned to the United States to retire, advising a leaderless and overwhelmed ROK Army.

KMAC during the Korean War — Forging an Alliance

It was no secret that President Rhee desired a solid partnership with the United States.¹⁰⁰ Having spent his formative years in America, Rhee knew, intimately, how the United States could form alliances within regions, and given his own deposing from the Korean independence movement in the mid-1920s, he likely knew that having the United States behind him would continue to ensure his authority. To that end, Rhee put in place two policies after the beginning of the War that effected not only his, and by extension South Korea's, relationship with the United States; it also bound together the nations' militaries into the present day, both directly influencing the broader Military Assistance mission in the Republic of Korea.

The first action of Rhee that helped establish the close relationship during and after the Korean War was to cede command and control of all ROK Army forces to General MacArthur.¹⁰¹ There is no clear way to describe the basis for

¹⁰⁰ "Oral History Interview with John J. Muccio,"
<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/muccio2.htm>.

¹⁰¹ "Oral History Interview with John J. Muccio,"
<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/muccio2.htm>.

this type of decision; there is certainly no clear history of this happening in the United States. In fact, the United States tends to adopt the exact opposite stance, in that generally, United States Armed Forces will only function under the command of an American commander.¹⁰² This was a standard policy dating back to WWI, when General Pershing was placed in command of the American Expeditionary Forces as opposed to allowing American Soldiers to simply replenish British and French units in the trenches.¹⁰³ MacArthur himself, though, had prior experience with gaining control of a foreign military force, since prior to WWII, he had developed and commanded the Philippine Army at the bequest of its government. However, the experience MacArthur had there was during a period of relative peace and prosperity, and not in the heat of combat. The importance, ultimately, of Rhee's relinquishing command and control of military forces to MacArthur is because in the most fundamental aspects of military institution, Rhee had bound the United States to the ROK.

A more cynical analysis could propose that Rhee was motivated simply by the political desire for plausible deniability for any challenges that the military might have.¹⁰⁴ This, however, does not negate Rhee's underlying desire to eventually conquer and unite all of Korea under the ROK flag and rule. There can be little doubt of Rhee's intention to bind the United States closer to the fate of the ROK. Relinquishing command and control to MacArthur may not have been by design, as it may have been the best decision in a moment of panic and desperation, but there can be no doubt as to the effect. Though various Status of Forces Agreements have changed the command structure of the United States Forces - Korea (USFK), similar elements remain that essentially allow the Commanding General of USFK to assume command and control of the ROK military forces in

¹⁰² There are numerous exceptions to this concept, not the least of which were the operations in Southeast Asia being under the command of Admiral Mountbatten during WWII in the Southeast Asia Theater.

¹⁰³ Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 682 and 727.

¹⁰⁴ Victor D. Cha, "'Rhee-strait': The Origins of the U.S.-ROK Alliance," *International Journal of Korean Studies* 15, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 2011): 6-8.

the event of an invasion from the DPRK.¹⁰⁵ However, the underlying question is: what did this change of command and control have to do with the KMAG and its mission?

By 1951, the ROK Army had enough combat experience against the DPRK forces that more serious conversations could be entertained between the United States Eighth Army Commander General James Van Fleet and the KMAG leadership about the ROK Army and its development. Van Fleet approached Rhee with an ultimatum that the ROK Army needed better leadership, which it would need to focus more on the extended construct of serving the nation rather than a single political leader. Van Fleet was straightforward with the ROK President, asserting that it would be difficult to continue to guarantee American support of the ROK if the ROK Army did not have that better leadership.¹⁰⁶ This proved to be a watershed moment for the Military Assistance mission, because it placed Rhee in a political situation where his own survival was at stake. The result was that the KMAG was able to assist the ROK political leadership in assessing the military capabilities of the ROK officers, something for which the KMAG was perfectly suited, having advised and many times fought alongside the units in question.

Under normal circumstances there potentially could have been major unit repercussions involving the removal of officers, especially by foreign forces. The Koreans had understandable cultural concerns with imperialism, as it was less than a decade since Japanese rule over the Korean peninsula. With the American Military Government immediately replacing the Japanese rule of South Korea, creating a rough transition in the Korean-American relationship, it would have been reasonable if the ROK Army units had looked upon the KMAG advisors with disdain, causing friction during combat operations. However, due to the fact that

¹⁰⁵ Won Gon Park, "The United Nations Command in Korea: Past, Present, and Future," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 21, no. 4 (December 2009): 486, accessed May 22, 2017, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10163270903298959>.

¹⁰⁶ Allan R. Millet, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2010), 458. Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 166-168.

the KMAG had been with their ROK Army units in the field and on the combat lines, in the middle of battle, there was an inherent earned respect between the ROK Army units and their KMAG advisors.¹⁰⁷ In addition, the KMAG's effort in removing poor ROK Army officers, which could have been seen as heavy-handed, was primarily focused on those ROK Army officers who had displayed blatant disregard for their soldiers. Colonel "Tiger" Kim Chong-won, who was relieved of command for beating a ROK Army soldier and shooting a fellow officer, exemplified this.¹⁰⁸ Due to the common relations and the underlying and noticeable intention for soldier care, the KMAG rarely had challenges within units, proving to be a microcosm of the broader dynamics at work within the US-ROK alliance.

Korean Augmentation to the United States Army

Rhee further offered MacArthur to assist in filling American units experiencing critical shortfalls, which greatly affected the US-ROK alliance. Thus, was born the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army or the KATUSA program. The idea was that English-speaking South Koreans would become full-fledged members of the United States Army, going through the same training, with the same ranks, and essentially being treated exactly like American soldiers, although there is no evidence that they were similarly paid. When the KATUSA soldiers finished their training, they were assigned an American Army unit in which to serve. The program was enormously successful, bringing thousands of Koreans into the American Army during the beginning stages of the war. This program has continued to the present day, although as the number of American military forces have decreased, so too have the Koreans serving in the KATUSA program.¹⁰⁹ The KATUSAs, as they were known, added capabilities to their American Army units in that they were able to assist in Korean cultural understanding, as well as aiding in anti-Communist infiltrations. They knew

¹⁰⁷ Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 182, 185, and 187-188.

¹⁰⁸ Millet, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951*, 286. Gibby, *The Will to Win*, 139.

¹⁰⁹ David Curtis Skaggs, "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the US Army, 1950-1965," *Military Affairs* 38, no. 2 (April 1974), 53-58.

what to look for in terms of the subtle signs that might indicate an individual was from the north.¹¹⁰

While on a practical level, the KATUSAs added capabilities and capacities at the unit level, the symbolism in the time of war was far greater. The United States, as discussed in previous chapters, has a long history of alliance operations. From the Colonists and the British Army in the French Indian War, to Baron de Steuben and the French during the Revolutionary War, the American Army has constantly fought its wars with embedded allies; however, the KATUSA program extended the idea of embedded allies to another level. It is important to note that while the Korean War was a coalition operation, as indicative of being a United Nations command and mission, and that Americans were used to fighting alongside other nations' militaries, there was no history within the United States Army of formally bringing foreigners into an American combat unit, as evidenced in the French Foreign Legion.

Like the experience of the KMAC and its efforts to replace poor commanders and leaders within the Korean Army Officer Corps, the KATUSA program could easily have disrupted combat unit cohesion, but the results were quite the opposite. As the KMAC noted in their interactions with the ROK Army, the South Koreans were extremely proficient fighters, but needed the equipment and direction, in the form of combat leadership, to utilize their ferocious skills. It was this involvement, of not only having ROK Army units fighting side-by-side with American units, that helped create the sense of "bleeding together," but it was the actuality of bleeding together, side-by-side, that forged a common sense of unit cohesion which helped to create a deeper bond. And because the Korean War was such an all-encompassing experience for the ROK, as every citizen was affected, this sense of "bleeding together" and the creation of that bond at an individual level became part of the US-ROK lexicon.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Martin Blumenson, "KATUSA," *Military Review* 37, no. 5 (August 1957): 51-56.

¹¹¹ Paek Sun Yup, in discussion with the author, November 11, 2015.

Conclusion

The US-ROK alliance has been one of the most persistent throughout the Cold War, having withstood military coups, leadership challenges on both sides, and sometimes questionable levels of support from the United States. The alliance has endured not despite its challenges, but because of them. These challenges, ultimately, were differences in political dynamics. However, the sense between both nations, especially within the ROK, that an inseparable bond was created and developed in combat during the Korean War, gave a sense of permanence to the relationship. This was a sense that the blood that was shed would bind both nations into the common purpose of resisting the spread of Communist influence and aggression.

The Korean War United Nations' mandate, while still American-led, remains intact to the present day, although now it has evolved to a Korean-United States coalition known as the Combined Forces Command (CFC), which continues to operate under the United Nations mandate. That mandate provides a legal framework for the security of South Korea, allowing United States forces to remain as both a viable deterrent to the active aggression of North Korea, and continue to act as tool of modernization for the ROK Army. It is the evolution of the United States Forces – Korea, the security provided to the ROK, that has allowed South Korea to develop, ultimately reducing the requirement for the United States to keep forces in South Korea long-term. This is the fruition of the Military Assistance provided at the outset of the alliance, formed side-by-side by the bonds of combat.

The KMAC and United States-Republic of Korea relationship is rare in the United States' post-WWII efforts of Military Assistance in that it was a clear success. The invasion of the DPRK failed, the ROK reached a sustainable security, although it is necessary to continue the United States' presence in the ROK, due to the threat of the DPRK rather than the internal threat of insecurity. More extensive, though, is the application of the Military Assistance that was given to the Grand Strategy of containment that was being pursued by the United States. Because of the ability of political leaders to take military operations, the Korean War, and apply them to a narrow political goal, preventing Communist

domination of the Korean peninsula, there was remarkable success in furthering the United States' Grand Strategy.

Chapter 5

Vietnam: Military Assistance and the Origins of Failure

“Wars with undefined purposes are dangerous things”¹

In examining the Vietnam conflict, there is almost too much research. Even in the small area of Military Assistance there exist numerous aspects to review and study, from the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program to the precursor to the United States Agency for International Development which trained a civil and police force (legal and otherwise), to the direct development of indigenous capabilities and capacities. The Vietnam conflict academically, as much as militarily, politically, or diplomatically, becomes something of a quagmire. At the same time, the theme of understanding Vietnam for the United States remains: military objectives that were never consistently linked to political objectives with a recipient governing partner that was perceived as legitimate by both the security forces and the population. However, contrary to the popular opinion the Second Indochina War, the Vietnam War, was not lost when the American public abandoned the United States Armed Forces. The war in fact was lost at the beginning, and Military Assistance was the foundation of that failure.

The United States Military Assistance Advisory Group Indochina (MAAG Indochina) was formed in September 1950 to assist the French military and their South Vietnamese allies against the Viet Minh military forces and the Communist North Vietnamese. MAAG Indochina and its evolutions offered the best insight into how a Military Assistance mission can fail. It could be argued, however, that failure was a foregone conclusion due to complete lack of understanding of Vietnam, both politically and culturally, as well as its relations with the French and then with the Communists.² Most importantly, there was a general lack of

¹ James Wright, “Have Americans Forgotten Afghanistan?” *The Atlantic*, March 23, 2013, accessed August 3, 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/have-americans-forgotten-afghanistan/274331>.

² Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), xxii and 109.

understanding or appreciation of the history and its context within the region. Added to that, an inability to adapt the organizational structure to different types of warfare created a recipe for failure of the Vietnam War, but fundamentally, the failure was due to the origins of the conflict — a war that was lost before the first battle had begun.

Furthermore, the United States' experience in Vietnam demonstrates how the inability to understand these various dynamics led to a failure of understanding how and with whom to partner for its Military Assistance missions. This chapter will seek to create context for the history of the Vietnamese independence movement and the resistance to the support provided by the United States. This will explain why the origins of the American "adventure" in Vietnam caused a failure of the Military Assistance provided prior to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution,³ foreshadowing the inevitable failure of the overall military mission in Vietnam.

Historical Context of the United States-Vietnam Relationship

Vietnam has a long colonial history, starting as early as 111 BCE, when the Chinese seized the lands and people of an ethnic group known as the "Viet." For roughly 1,000 years the Chinese ruled the people and the land, until internal strife and corruption within China weakened its grip on its external territories, much like the fall of the Western Roman Empire. As nature abhors a vacuum, likewise does governance and power; the opportunity created by the weakness of the Chinese Empire was seized by local military leaders, who spent the next hundreds of years fending off the Chinese through occasional wars, diplomacy, and strategic alliances. While consistently concerned with the Chinese, the Viet themselves began expanding into what is now modern-day Laos and Cambodia. In the 1600s, a split that had been brewing became a full-blown civil war between the North, the traditional seat of government power, and South, where access to the sea had developed the area into an economic center. Eventually, as the exploring Europeans began to establish colonies throughout Asia in the 18th

³ The Johnson Administration used the Gulf of Tonkin incident and a subsequent Congressional Resolution as the precipice for the increase in troops and the expansion of the Vietnam War.

and 19th centuries, France realized that it was at risk of losing out in the Southeast Asia region. This led France to formally establish French Indochina in 1887, which initially encompassed what is now Vietnam, and over the next few years expanded into what is now Laos and Cambodia.⁴

Interestingly, the French did not necessarily have a clear or consistent policy of engagement in Asia. As noted Hebrew University scholar, Professor Meron Medzini concluded in his doctoral dissertation, “France did not behave in Japan the way she behaved in North Africa and Indo-China, and what happened in Japan was very different from what happened in India or China. The record of French activity in Japan suggests that European expansion in the nineteenth century was a more complex phenomenon than is sometimes allowed.”⁵ Professor Medzini, in this case, is referring to the Military Assistance provided by the French to the Japanese, including some of the elements found in the book and subsequent movie, *The Last Samurai*. This is an important dynamic, since roughly 100 years later, in the 1950s in French Indochina, the French were receiving a large amount of Military Aid from the United States, but did not allow subsequent tactical training on the equipment. As Major General David Ott wrote:

“French forces were happy to receive the new material but refused American advice on how to employ it. The U.S. desire was that all Vietnamese units be organized and trained to provide internal defense of their own country and that aid be used to equip those units. Such a desire was at odds with existing French policy. The French Army was employed not only to counter enemy forces but also to assert France as a colonial power.”⁶

The French were interested in re-establishing their colonial presence in Vietnam after WWII. A common opinion among elites led the French to a policy that it must recreate its pre-WWII French Empire in order that France continue

⁴ Mark Attwood Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 8-11.

⁵ Meron Medzini, *French Policy in Japan During the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Regime* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 175.

⁶ David Ewing Ott, *Vietnam Studies: Field Artillery, 1954-1973* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1995), 21.

to be regarded as a global power in the post-WWII era.⁷ This policy was in stark contrast to Great Britain, which was able to transition into the Cold War with much greater ease — understanding that the time of colonial power was ending. What is more important to appreciate is that the French had an inconsistent set of colonial policies. In addition, the French desire to reassert colonial rule over Vietnam affected the United States' Military Aid, the training that went along with that aid, and eventually the Military Assistance provided to South Vietnamese soldiers. The relevance, though, to both the United States and this research project specifically, is that the Vietnamese population would readily perceive the United States' efforts, no matter how well intended, as a continuation of French colonialist policy, due to the population seeing American equipment being used to support French colonialism.⁸ At the same time, in a more expansive sense, the inconsistent political goals of the United States would be unable to be supported by military operations, thereby creating an unachievable and unwinnable scenario for the United States Armed Forces.

The historical relationship, however, between the United States and Vietnam began at the birth of the United States, when newly installed Ambassador to France, Thomas Jefferson, asked some French traders in what is now known as Vietnam to find rice seeds that he hoped could grow in the Southern States.⁹ While the seed venture failed, it was a future prognosis for the commercial endeavors between the two countries until the 20th century. As both Dr. Douglas Borer, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, and historian Ambassador Robert Miller recognized, with the Spanish-American War and the occupation of the Philippines by the United States, and Japan's newfound power after the Russo-Japanese War, a conflict was inevitable between the United States and Japan.¹⁰ Interestingly, it was Vietnam that would exacerbate the conflict between

⁷ Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History*, 29.

⁸ Kathryn C. Statler, *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 261.

⁹ Robert Hopkins Miller, *The United States and Vietnam, 1787-1941* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990) p. xv-xvi (preface).

¹⁰ Miller, *The United States and Vietnam*, 154. Douglas A. Borer, *Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 51-52.

the United States and Japan. However, the first direct interactions between the United States and Vietnam in the early part of the century were at the Paris Peace Conference in Versailles in 1919, when Vietnamese nationalists¹¹ stated, “Since the Allies’ victory, all subject peoples are trembling with hope before the prospect of an era of law and justice that ought to open for them by virtue of the formal and solemn commitments undertaken before the whole world by the various Entente powers during the fight of Civilization against Barbarism.”¹² Nothing came of that communication, and it is unlikely that Secretary of State Robert Lansing received the message. However, as an interesting side note, future Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who would become central in the Vietnam conflict, was assisting his uncle, Secretary Lansing, during the negotiations at Versailles.¹³

Moving forward, once the Japanese began their invasion of China in 1931, as a forerunner to WWII, the United States began using Vietnam as platform for logistical transit so as to support the Chinese war efforts in a program of Military Aid and Military Assistance to Chiang Kai-shek.¹⁴ Interestingly, this became an issue, as the pre-war French government insisted that the United States protect Vietnam, or Indochina as it was known then, from Japanese aggression. This demand was considered recompense for the United States continuing to use Vietnam as a supply transit; however, the United States declined.¹⁵ Within a few years, Japanese expansion had led to taking over Vietnam from the French, and with the German conquest of France and establishment of the French Government in Vichy, the point of contention was moot. As Borer commented about the entire United States-Vietnam relationship prior to WWII: “One could

¹¹ The author is identified as Nguyen Ai Quoc, who would later be known as Ho Chi Minh.

¹² Ho Chi Minh, “An Appeal to the World Powers,” Note to US Secretary of State Robert Lansing at the Versailles, June 18, 1919, in *The Vietnam War: An International History in Documents*, ed. Mark Atwood Lawrence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 5. Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History*, 18-19.

¹³ Michael A. Guhin, *John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 26-33.

¹⁴ Borer, *Superpowers Defeated*, 32-33.

¹⁵ Borer, *Superpowers Defeated*, 33. Miller, *The United States and Vietnam*, 159.

characterize US policy toward Vietnam in terms of a continuous absence of significant interaction, with major changes occurring in the years following the Second World War.”¹⁶

Post-World War II and the First Indochina War

In August 1945, after the unconditional surrender of the Japanese, Bao Dai, the Emperor of Vietnam, attempted to instate a provisional Vietnamese government, but was unable to do so, due to Viet Minh forces that were already establishing themselves as the new authority in the land.¹⁷ In addition, “the Vietnamese had learned that the British would be arriving in Vietnam to [formally] receive the Japanese surrender south of the 16th parallel, as the Chinese were to do in the north. Behind the British, however, hovered the French.”¹⁸ Bao Dai, recognizing the situation with the Viet Minh, chose to abdicate to Ho Chi Minh, who, as president, declared the independence of the newly formed Democratic Republic of Vietnam.¹⁹ In one of his last acts as Emperor, Bao Dai, fearing the coming French re-colonization of Indochina, wrote to French leader Charles de Gaulle:

“I address myself to the people of France, to the country of my youth. I address myself as well to the nation's leader and liberator and I wish to speak as a friend rather than as Head of State.

You have suffered too much during four deadly years not to understand that the Vietnamese people, who have a history of twenty centuries and an often glorious past, no longer wish, can no longer support any foreign domination or foreign administration.

You could understand even better if you were able to see what is happening here, if you were able to sense this desire for independence which has been smoldering in the bottom of all hearts, and which no human force can any longer hold back. Even if you were to arrive to re-establish a French administration here, it would no longer be obeyed; each village would be a nest of resistance, every former friend an

¹⁶ Borer, *Superpowers Defeated*, 38.

¹⁷ Arthur J. Dommen, *The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), 100-107.

¹⁸ Dommen, *The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans*, 105-106.

¹⁹ Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History*, 26.

enemy, and your officials and colonists themselves would ask to depart from this unbreathable atmosphere.

I beg you to understand that the only way to safeguard French interests and the spiritual influence of France in Indochina is to recognize frankly the independence of Vietnam and to renounce any idea of re-establishing French sovereignty or administration here in whatever form it may be.

You would be able to listen to us so easily and become our friends if you would stop aspiring to become our masters again.

Making this appeal to the well recognized idealism of the French people and the great wisdom of their leader, we hope that peace and the joy which has rung for all the people of the world will be guaranteed equally to all people who live in Indochina, native as well as foreign.”²⁰

This statement would be a harbinger of the things to come over the next thirty years, one of numerous signs that the dynamics at play in Vietnam were not favorable to any form of external intervention. Bao Dai himself said regarding his abdication, “that he could live as a simple citizen in an independent country rather than king of a subjugated nation.”²¹

In what could only be described as a perfect storm of events leading to the First Indochina War, the United States unintentionally created an eventual vacuum that would lead to further involvement in Vietnam, by positioning Vietnam to become a symbol for the ideological fight between the West and the Global Communist movement. To start with, when Roosevelt and Stalin met in Tehran in November of 1943, both had begun discussing the post-war order. Neither was supportive of the European Powers regaining their colonial

²⁰ Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force, United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945 -1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, “The Pentagon Papers,” Part 1, Section B (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1971), 29-30, accessed November 3, 2016, <https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers>. Hereinafter referred to as “The Pentagon Papers.” Citing Joseph Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*, vol. 1 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), 435-436. Citing Bao Dai, “Letter of Bao Dai to General de Gaulle,” August 18, 1945, *Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945-1955*, ed. Allan B. Cole (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956), 17-18.

²¹ Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (London: Century Publishing, 1983), 147. This comment is quoted but an original source is not cited.

possessions, and used the occasion to agree that France should not regain control of Indochina. This played out in that Stalin wanted France to pay for supporting Nazi Germany during the war, and Roosevelt was against colonialism in general, as an institution.²² The French after WWII, on the other hand, believed that they would only be able to regain power on the world stage once they had recovered the colonies and territories lost during the War.²³

The contention began with the end of WWII, the death of Roosevelt, the civil war in China, and the Rise of Global Communism, leading to a perceived need to keep a Western alliance together. At the end of the War, the Chinese, still under the authority of Chiang Kai-shek, along with the British, demobilized the Japanese occupying Vietnam. As the French re-inserted themselves through politics and force in 1946, the Truman Administration was called upon to do a quick calculation on an issue that seemed to be of prime importance to its French allies and of little importance to the United States. The Truman Administration declared, despite many efforts by Ho Chi Minh and the newly formed DRV, that the United States would remain neutral, while as a matter of American policy indicating its displeasure for colonialism. With the fall of China to Mao's Communist revolution in 1949, and the perception within the United States that Truman had "lost" China, the United States began to be lured into the First Indochina War as part of the extensive fight against Communism. This neurosis was carefully supported by the French to maximize the benefits of the involvement of the United States' money and equipment without the involvement of the United States in the field, which the French regarded as an internal matter.²⁴

The United States, as mentioned earlier, began supporting the French and South Vietnamese allies with Military Aid through the work of MAAG Indochina.²⁵ The Truman Administration tried to convince the French that the

²² The Pentagon Papers. Part 5, Section B, Volume 1, 24-25.

²³ Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History*, p. 29.

²⁴ Robert H. Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960* (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2005, reprinted from 1985 edition), 95, 103, 110.

²⁵ Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years*, 115-121.

Vietnamese would stop supporting Ho Chi Minh if they did not identify the South Vietnamese as a tacit continuation of French colonial rule. The French, however, easily manipulated the United States due to its need of French support on the global stage, specifically in Europe against the Soviet Union, and more importantly, due to the ongoing war in Korea. Additionally, other communist movements began during 1948 in Malaya and Burma,²⁶ which continued the perception that there was a communist wave in the making.²⁷ This created a domestic pressure whereby the Truman Administration was unable to strongly protest French actions in Vietnam, allowing the colonial machinations reasserting control to continue.²⁸

The relevance of this history to the present research project is that the ability of the French to manipulate greater involvement in Vietnam by the United States is very like the actions other client nation states would pursue so as to involve either great power during the Cold War.²⁹ In fairness to the French, they were not the first actors to pursue this strategy of endeavoring to draw in the Great Powers in this conflict. Indeed, Ho Chi Minh specifically designed the announcement of the DRV to reflect the terminology of the United States' Declaration of Independence.³⁰ On the founding of the DRV, Ho Chi Minh stated, "All men are created equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."³¹ To be fair to the United States, it was adjusting to its newfound leadership of the Western democratic world as it was pushed onto the world stage after the victory of WWII. However, with loss at the Battle at Dien Bien Phu,

²⁶ Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History*, p. 36.

²⁷ The idea of a communist wave is essentially the argument of the "domino theory" that was prominent from the late 1940s until the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam in 1945. Domino theory was discussed extensively in Chapter 2: Military Assistance and Grand Strategy, but it was a driving rationale that the French were able to utilize to bring the United States into the First Indochina War.

²⁸ Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History*, p. 29-41.

²⁹ Benjamin Miller, *States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 226-227.

³⁰ Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History*, p. 27.

³¹ The Pentagon Papers, Part 1, Section B, 34.

the French negotiated a peace at the Geneva Conference of 1954 that would create the separate countries popularly known as North and South Vietnam and, more broadly, created the likelihood that Southeast Asia would be perceived to be “lost” to Communism.³²

There were additional dynamics with respect to the French, due to their perception that Vietnam was critical to their regaining the power and prestige in world affairs that they had lost during WWII. There existed a real chance that had the United States not responded to aid the French in Indochina, the French would have abandoned the Western alliance in Europe and other places in the world.³³ As mentioned, the French skillfully modified the concept of the fight in Vietnam, from the reinstatement of colonial rule, which the United States was opposed to, into a fight against Communism, knowing that the United States would not resist being drawn into the conflict.³⁴ This change, along with the real risk that the French could and likely would abandon NATO and other global security cooperation efforts around the world, was a risk that the United States was unwilling to take. In this case, the challenge was that the Grand Strategy being pursued by the United States, that of containment of the Global Communism movement, dictated an involvement in Vietnam.

Direct Involvement of the United States in Vietnam

The hubris of the United States was not that it chose a specific side in the conflict, or even the belief that it could succeed where France had failed, despite France’s long history in the nation. The United States’ failure, and hubris, resulted from not appreciating the internal nuances of the Vietnamese people and their relationship to a ruling authority. It has been said that wars begin because of miscalculations upon miscalculations.³⁵ The Vietnam War, or in this

³² Bernard B. Fall, *Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina* (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2005, originally 1961), 312-313.

³³ Statler, *Replacing France*, 19-21.

³⁴ Statler, *Replacing France*, 15-16.

³⁵ Barbara Tuchman is often quoted as saying, “War is the unfolding of miscalculations.” She is even cited for this quote in the New York Times (Anatole Broyard, “Books of the Times: War by Albert R. Leventhal,” *The New York Times*, December 3, 1973, accessed March 15, 2017,

case the Second Indochina War, is a perfect example of these miscalculations. What if the people of the United States had heard Ho Chi Minh in 1945 declaring the independence of the DRV, and been motivated to support him, or at least, to not support the conflict against him? What if the United States had been able to convince the French that they did not need to reestablish themselves in Vietnam to be thought a global power? These “What ifs” could go on and on, but the importance for this research project is that these miscalculations started at the very beginning of the direct involvement of the United States in Vietnam, specifically influencing the Military Assistance efforts, in addition to the United States’ political goals.

As stated, as France looked after its own interests, it manipulated the United States into giving large amounts of Military Aid in the form of supplies and equipment. In addition, the United States in the form of MAAG Indochina gave advice to the French concerning the use of that equipment, which was mostly ignored, when it was permitted to be given at all.³⁶ Furthermore, the United States was also consulted for advice at Dien Bien Phu. The defenses at Dien Bien Phu were toured by many senior military officers from around the world, including the United States, studying all areas of the defenses, and giving all sorts of tactical advice. Lieutenant General John O’Daniel, the commander of MAAG Indochina, led the United States team.³⁷ The advice, however well intentioned, proved to be poor, especially regarding the location of the artillery.³⁸ As Vietnam historian Bernard Fall put it, the blame was very much

<http://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/03/archives/through-a-lens-darkly-books-of-the-times-expression-of-proud.html>). There is, however, no known original source that Mrs. Tuchman ever made this statement. It is the belief of the Yale University Manuscripts and Archives Division, where Mrs. Tuchman’s papers were donated, that the quote was mistaken from the original: “History is the unfolding of miscalculations” in her book *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911 -1945* (originally published by Macmillan in 1970 but quoted from the 2001 edition published by Phoenix Press, page 132). This note is to clarify any confusion that may arise regarding this citation.

³⁶ Ott, *Vietnam Studies: Field Artillery, 1953-1973*, 21.

³⁷ Fall, *Street Without Joy*, 318 and 323-324.

³⁸ Joseph Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*, vol. 2 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), 824.

placed at the feet of the French Commander-in-Chief, the northern theater commander, and the fortress commander.³⁹

In fact, the fortress artillery chief, Colonel Piroth, was the first to understand the “fatal error,” and killed himself during the battle with a grenade after apologizing to those around him for the failure.⁴⁰ In contrast with the French artillery placement, the DRV forces were perfectly placed. Mountains that the French and other military advisors believed would be insurmountable with any type of artillery surrounded the French base at Dien Bien Phu. They had chosen this position because of the airfield, which allowed easy access for supplies and soldiers. The DRV, cognizant of the hazardous terrain, were nevertheless able to bring their artillery up into the mountains and surround the French, digging into the mountain to provide ideal cover and concealment for that artillery. The result was that the DRV forces could deploy their artillery in an effective circle around the French base, firing down on the French with minimal risk to DRV forces, whereas the French artillery had very little ability to strike back and neutralize the threat.

Once the attack from the DRV forces was underway, the French had begun to realize that Dien Bien Phu was their last stand. The Fourth Republic’s dreams of the French Union were quickly being undone.⁴¹ Knowing that the Geneva Conference was taking place in a few weeks, the French decided to make a final diplomatic effort to prevent a disaster. The US Ambassador to Vietnam, Donald Heath, was deeply concerned with the situation, and believed that conflict in some form would continue until the Vietnamese people were independent of France. At the same time, the United States Ambassador to France, C. Douglas Dillon, argued in Washington that the Vietnamese were at fault and that the United States should not do anything to undermine the French.⁴²

³⁹ Fall, *Street Without Joy*, p 318

⁴⁰ Fall, *Street Without Joy*, p 323.

⁴¹ Tony Smith, "A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no. 1 (1978): 74 accessed April 28, 2017, http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0010417500008835. Dommen, *The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans*, 212-216.

⁴² Dommen, *The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans*, 224.

Unites States Considers Airstrikes to Support the French

While the diplomatic back and forth continued, the French Chief of the General Staff of National Defense, General Paul Ely, led a mission to the United States in March of 1954, about one week into the siege of Dien Bien Phu. The diplomatic efforts between the various factions of the Communist Vietnamese and the French Government had failed; the political negotiations in the French Government that would have allowed a French withdrawal and Vietnamese independence failed; and the military situation was failing. While President Eisenhower removed himself and tried to appear disengaged, multiple efforts were taking place; one of the more important events was a meeting hosted by Secretary Dulles, Admiral Radford (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and the Congressional leadership. This meeting was a background brief on the current state of affairs in Indochina, and was meant to have Congressional leaders begin efforts around a joint resolution for airstrikes, since the United States had the military resources in the area on a “training” exercise.⁴³

As noted, French General Ely, who had sought to plea for American military support, predicated the meeting with Congressional leaders on his mission to the United States. However, upon confronting Admiral Radford, General Ely found that there was already a plan being formulated to support the French at Dien Bien Phu, Operation Vulture, once there was a formal request from the Government of France to the Government of the Unites States. After General Ely had returned to France the request was made, but in a stunning reversal, the United States formally rejected the request. Secretary Dulles had intervened.⁴⁴

⁴³ Chalmers M. Roberts, “The Day We Didn’t Go to War,” from *The Reporter*, September 14, 1954, reprinted in *The Vietnam Reader: Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Vietnam Crisis*, eds. Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (New York: Random House, 1965), 57-66. John Prados, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 27-29.

⁴⁴ Guhin, *John Foster Dulles*, 242-243 and 247. Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*, vol. 2, 816-824 and 1082-1083 (endnotes). Dommen, *The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans*, 233.

What could easily be thought a betrayal was considered by Secretary Dulles as a strategic necessity. “He [Secretary Dulles] did not want a one-strike American intervention to save the French at Dien Bien Phu. He wanted more. Indochina — all of it — had to be saved from Communism.”⁴⁵ This was the shift in which the United States moved from supporting the efforts of the French, to taking on the responsibility for the outcome. While it is only natural to question why Secretary Dulles shifted his strategic perspective, and why President Eisenhower supported such a shift, what is obvious is that “Dulles was not interested in U.S. intervention merely to improve the position of the French for a deal with the Communists at Geneva.”⁴⁶ This change was based on a belief that there was a requirement to expand the conflict, supporting it to evolve from a regional conflict to bring a colonial empire back to power, and into a full civil war that was being supplied and supported by Western democracies and the Soviet Union and their Communist allies.

This entire incident relates back to the issues around Military Assistance in a rather unique way, because what becomes clear from this example is that the circumstances surrounding the airstrikes in support of the French at Dien Bien Phu were not Military Assistance nor was it Military Aid. As discussed earlier, Military Assistance is about developing capacities and capabilities of an indigenous force to support a long-term, sustainable security for the recipient nation; Military Aid refers to the equipment and training on that equipment for an indigenous military. This example does not readily fit either definition, as the French and their Vietnamese allies were already capable and already had sufficient capacity at Dien Bien Phu in terms of the definitions explored in this research project. This situation does exemplify the issue that just because a given military already has a high level of capabilities and capacities, it does not guarantee victory in battle.

It could well be argued that the circumstances of this example of Military Intervention at Dien Bien Phu, and that of the Korean War, discussed previously

⁴⁵ Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*, vol. 2, 820.

⁴⁶ Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*, vol. 2, 820.

in Chapter 4, were quite similar. In one sense, in each scenario there was an ally on the ground facing an aggressive Communist attack being ultimately supported by the Soviet Union. Both are examples of a Military Support type of Military Intervention, while at the same time both had an integrated Military Assistance mission already underway, although the KMAG in Korea was far more robust than its Vietnamese counterpart. In the case of Vietnam, as seen here, there had not been a robust Military Assistance mission previously due to the presence of the French.

The perspective from the discipline of international relations, however, is far more interesting. In Korea, there was an expanded Military Support mission that was tied to a focused, limited political objective to prevent a first Communist victory, and from the domestic politics side to prevent any interpretation of giving way to the Communists. *In Vietnam, due to the machinations of Secretary Dulles, a limited Military Support mission to help the French at Dien Bien Phu was disconnected from the limited United States Military Assistance mission, which was not pursued in order to enable a more expansive political objective — the global containment of Communism.* This is in direct contrast to the Korean War, in which the Military Assistance mission and the Military Support mission were dependent and supportive of one another.

With hindsight, the remarkable issue is not that every military official missed the possibility that the DRV forces would be so familiar with the territory as to capably place artillery in what was considered impossible places. What is striking is that after observing the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu, there was no reassessment from any level of military establishment of the DRV's will to fight, especially in context of Bao Dai's original plea to de Gaulle. Although there was little additional consideration that there might be shifted situational dynamics that should give pause before fully committing additional forces from the military perspective, there was plenty from the political perspective. Everyone involved was exhausted with spent efforts, and saw the Geneva Conference, which began while the Battle of Dien Bien Phu raged, as the sole possible agency to untangle the situation with a minimal amount of

embarrassment.⁴⁷ There was no reconsideration of the desired political end state, though it should be argued that there was an inconsistent one between the United States and France and their Vietnamese allies.

The defeat at Dien Bien Phu, which happened in the middle of the Conference, however, forced the French to negotiate with the DRV for a withdrawal from North Vietnam, as well as the effective pullout of French forces from the south.⁴⁸ The eventual split of Indochina and the founding of the Republic of Vietnam (or South Vietnam), occurred through negotiations at the Geneva Conference. In addition, it was due to this conference that the Military Assistance in Vietnam began as the mission focus by the United States through the Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam, which had been in country since 1950 as a distributor of Military Aid.

The Geneva Conference of 1954

The Geneva Conference of 1954 was initially structured around the issues of the Korean peninsula,⁴⁹ but since the Korean peninsula had evolved into a cold peace after the Armistice was signed in July 1953, the focus of the conference became squarely intent on Indochina. This was a general agreement, since the battle of Dien Bien Phu was being played out during the conference opening. This conference was like any other foray in international relations, however, with declining nations, such as France, trying to maintain their power, and ascending nations attempting to be recognized for the achievements they had already made, such as the DRV's intention to capitalize on their soon-to-be victory. In addition, each negotiating government was deeply concerned with its own domestic politics: British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and the British tried to maintain popular support for the Conservative Party; the French were in the process of a governing upheaval that, combined with Algerian uprising, would bring about the collapse of the Fourth Republic; the DRV attempted to secure the recognized independence that it had promised its citizens; the United States

⁴⁷ Prados, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War*, 30.

⁴⁸ Ott, *Vietnam Studies: Field Artillery, 1953-1973*, 22.

⁴⁹ The dynamics of the Korean War had a distinctive impact on United States' operations in the Philippines and Vietnam.

aimed to prevent being seen, in any way, as soft on Communism, given the state of McCarthyism going on domestically. This conference, however, was the first meeting of the international community trying to settle the question of Southeast Asia, once the lines of the Cold War had been set.

The importance of the Geneva Conference is that while the fall of Dien Bien Phu set the stage for the military conflict to come, the Conference set the stage for the political and diplomatic conflicts that would inevitably arise. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, prior to the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Bao Dai, the Emperor who abdicated the throne in 1945 to become Chief of State, asked Ngo Dinh Diem to become the Prime Minister of what would become the Republic of Vietnam, and it was during this Conference that Diem accepted that offer.⁵⁰ One of the major outcomes of the conference was the partition of Vietnam. While there were some extended discussions concerning whether Indochina should be partitioned into two or three separate areas, an agreement was finally settled upon: it would split into a North, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and a South, the Republic of Vietnam, at the 17th parallel. As scholar and diplomat Dr. James Waite stated, “Partition, coupled with the failure to reunite Vietnam in 1956, [through the Geneva Conference-scheduled free elections] provided an important cause for the conflict’s second phase, which culminated with US entry into the war as a belligerent.”⁵¹ While the conference ended declaring a state of peace and armistice,⁵² many disagreed with the diplomatic conclusion, and this would come to define the Military Assistance mission in Vietnam.

The challenge with the partition was rooted in the challenges of the Geneva Conference itself. Bao Dai and his government, with the partnership of the French, had been fighting a war against the DRV and the Viet Minh. Bao Dai’s

⁵⁰ Prados, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War*, 37. James Waite, *The End of the First Indochina War: A Global History* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012), 130-131.

⁵¹ Waite, *The End of the First Indochina War*, 81.

⁵² “Final Declaration of Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954,” in *The Vietnam Reader: Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Vietnam Crisis*, eds. Raskin and Fall, 96-97.

administration knew that the French were losing their will to fight, and while his government was ardently anti-communist, they were also firmly nationalist. They feared that the Conference would think that the French, in their desire to withdraw with some semblance of dignity, would ignore their wishes completely and make a deal directly with the DRV and the Viet Minh, abandoning the South Vietnamese. The reason this was so risky for Bao Dai's government was that its political, and potentially literal, survival was dependent on an external ally for some form of Military Intervention, which had been Military Aid and Military Support,⁵³ though not in the traditional sense. That these would be an ancillary concern was the primary reason for Bao Dai's government's resistance to the Geneva Conference.⁵⁴ This became relevant since the Republic of Vietnam's government felt no ownership of either the process or the outcome.

These well-found fears became reality. The French saw the partition as a way for them to withdraw with some honor intact; the Soviets, Chinese, and Viet Minh were all pleased because they knew that with continued support, the Viet Minh and the DRV would eventually be able to conquer the remaining part of the south that was not under their control, and that the French would no longer be a part of the military equation.⁵⁵ The continuing conversation during the Geneva conference between Eden and Prime Minister Churchill was a recognition that the United States, through Secretary Dulles, wanted to escalate the situation in Indochina, and the British were increasingly uninterested in going along.⁵⁶ As Dulles wrote Eisenhower, "UK attitude is one of increasing weakness. British seem to feel that we are disposed to accept present risks of a Chinese war and this, coupled also with their fear that we would start using atomic weapons, has badly frightened them."⁵⁷

⁵³ As previously discussed, the French, prior to the Geneva Conference, would not allow Military Aid to be given directly to the Vietnamese people, even their allies.

⁵⁴ Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*, vol. 2, 834.

⁵⁵ James Cable, *The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1986), 61-65.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ John Foster Dulles, "Telegram to President Eisenhower," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The Geneva Conference*, Volume XVI, eds. Allen H.

The relevance of this entire focus on the 1954 Geneva Conference to the Military Assistance mission in Vietnam is that this issue set up the entire mission for failure. Because the local government had not bought into the Conference and the resulting partition, they did not feel obligated to follow through on the commitments made on their behalf. This resulted in a disastrous situation, when, after consolidating power for two years, President Diem (previously appointed Prime Minister in 1954 under Bao Dai), purposefully declined to hold free elections in 1956 as agreed to at the Geneva Conference. His argument declared that the Republic of Vietnam was now a sovereign state, and therefore was not bound by a treaty signed by a foreign power, France, on its behalf,⁵⁸ exacerbating an already tense political situation locally. The result of this situation was that there were multiple constituencies vying for power, playing the French off the Americans and vice versa.

The political will in the South Vietnamese ruling class was not one that accepted a long-term sustainable political resolution to the conflict, as much as it aimed to gather enough power and wealth for itself, resulting in a military coup in 1963. As a result, there were no legitimate political partners for the United States to work with to establish a long-term political objective so that the Military Assistance mission could meet a long-term goal, there being no long-term goal. Without political partnership, there was no possibility for any military to achieve a long-term, sustainable security through any kind of military operation, including Military Assistance. On the international side, Secretary Dulles managed to both fail to develop a partnership of an ally, the British, while at the same time committing to the strategy of containing Global Communism when there was no clarity that the United States had the ability or resources to achieve such a significant goal. This inconsistency would affect the Military Assistance mission's beginnings and goals.

Kitchens and Neal H. Petersen (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1981), Document 378, accessed December 5, 2016, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v16/d378>. Originally in Cable, *The Geneva Conference*, 65.

⁵⁸ Dommen, *The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans*, 343-348.

The Origins of Military Assistance in Vietnam

While there was some ongoing activity between of the DRV and Viet Minh leaders with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner to the CIA, during WWII, the establishment of the Military Assistance Program did not begin until 1950. The initial effort of Military Intervention came in the form of a Military Aid request, which was characterized “as modest and appropriate in view of the military situation in Vietnam.”⁵⁹ However, as military historian Robert Spector stated, “military leaders earlier had viewed Southeast Asia as important chiefly because of its relationship to the island chain of Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the Joint Chiefs now [in 1950] saw Southeast Asia as strategically important in its own right.”⁶⁰

The Joint Chiefs’ of Staff Strategic Shift

Although the reasons why the Joint Chiefs made such a strategic shift is not germane to this research project, the point is that they did, and the ramifications of this strategic transition are germane to this research project. It very likely could have been the general view that many in the West had, seeing Communism as a monolithic movement, there being no difference between Stalin and Mao in their minds, no matter that both deeply mistrusted one another, especially after the Korean War. Perceiving a monolithic communist movement that was expanding across the Asian continent had to be a concern. Their suspicions could only have been confirmed a few months later, when North Korea launched a surprise attack on the unprepared South Korea, pushing allied forces to the sea. Articulating their views in the memorandum, the Joint Chiefs stated, “With respect to the measures which, from the United States military point of view, might be taken to prevent Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend early implementation of military aid programs for Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma.”⁶¹

⁵⁹ Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years*, 105.

⁶⁰ Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years*, 107.

⁶¹ Omar Bradley, “Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense: Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia,” April 10, 1950, in *The Pentagon Papers*, Part 5,

This is germane for examining the failures made by senior leaders with respect to Military Assistance in Vietnam. This memorandum outlines the first recommendation by military leaders to the civilian, political leadership to formalize a Military Aid and Military Assistance program. The problem with the Joint Chiefs' recommendation is that it lacked a connection to any political objective. Certainly, prevention of the spread of communism, the domino theory, is a political objective; however, the disconnect is that the Joint Chiefs, like many, had a monolithic view of Communism — that what was happening from a policy side in the Soviet Union was having a clear manifestation in Southeast Asia. Although there is little question that there was an inherent relationship, at this point there was poor connection to the underlying reasons of pursuit. Whereas in Russia, Communism came to fruition due to class and economic disconnects, in Southeast Asia there existed the belief that the Capitalist West intended colonial interests and prevention of local governance. In pursuit of Grand Strategy, there was the argument to contain the global spread of Communism; however, the advice of George Kennan to initially pursue the policy of containment where it was feasible had not been heeded. The Joint Chiefs were mindful, in the memorandum, about expenses, and made a clear budget request for the fiscal year; however, in 1950 there had been no in-depth study of resource input versus outputs.

It is entirely possible that this was the beginning of the gradual escalation that seemed to feature prominently in planning during the entire period that the United States was active in Vietnam, but more concerning was the Joint Chiefs themselves. All the Joint Chiefs — General of the Army Omar Bradley as Chairman, General Clifton Cates as Commandant of the Marine Corps, Admiral Forrest Sherman as Chief of Naval Operations, General Hoyt Vandenberg as Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Lawton Collins as Chief of Staff of the Army — had extensive war records, having served in combat during both WWI and WWII. In addition to their extensive war records, all were part of the Joint Chiefs during the first part of the Korean War, so the natural question to ask is how one

Section B, Subpart 2(b), 310. Originally referenced in Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years*, 107.

Military Assistance mission came to become so successful while this one was clearly not.

One difference was in the wars themselves. In the Korean War, there was an immediate full spectrum engagement, while in Vietnam there was a gradual escalation. The problem with this answer, however, is twofold. First, in the Korean War, as noted in Chapter 4, the Joint Chiefs thought that Brigadier General Roberts and the KMAC had done a poor job in preparing the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army for combat against the Communist North.⁶² This view caused the KMAC to be essentially ignored, but for ROK President Syngman Rhee giving command and control of the ROK Army to General MacArthur, until the KMAC was able to prove its worth by assisting in the replacement and development of many ROK Army officers. Furthermore, the policy regarding corrupt or inept officers being replaced must also have impacted the overall outcome of the conflict. In addition, the Korean War more clearly resembled the wars of the Joint Chiefs' pasts, in that it was a war with clear battle lines and military-on-military maneuvers, attacks, and counterattacks. In contrast, the war that was being fought in Vietnam was one of counterinsurgency and the perception by the local populace that the United States had intentions to reassert foreign rule.

The second reason is that none of the Joint Chiefs would remain in their positions much longer. General Cates would leave in 1951, Admiral Sherman died that year, and Generals Vandenberg, Collins, and Bradley would all leave in 1953. Who is to know what they would have decided in later years if they had been in the same positions, and whether they would have pushed back against Secretary Dulles' desire to expand the nature of the containment of the perceived communist threat? In this regard, there was an inherent flaw in the system. Significantly, the system at that time did not require strategic review or long-term planning. Indeed, while this 1950 memorandum to Secretary of Defense Johnson is termed a "Strategic Assessment," rather than an actual strategic assessment, it became more of a situational assessment. The difference is that

⁶² Bryan R. Gibby, *The Will to Win: American Military Advisors in Korea, 1946–1953* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2012), 7 and 9.

the memorandum examined the situation in Southeast Asia but reviewed very little of the strategic dynamics at work. In addition, there is no related analysis, but a wholehearted embracing of the domino theory when the memo states, “The fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of the other mainland states of Asia.”⁶³ This declaration was made years before President Eisenhower would similarly articulate the issue. The relevance of this is to ask whether there was, in fact, a structural problem regarding the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in that each Chief would only serve approximately four years and as such, would be unable to assess and reassess their strategic decisions, or whether simply a tragic mistake was made by extraordinarily competent and experienced men.

However, there was a reversal of the underlying dynamics of the Joint Chiefs, although not a change in policy. About a year after the Strategic Assessment memorandum was written, Truman, on the advice of the same Joint Chiefs of Staff, relieved MacArthur from command of United Nations Forces in Korea. In May of 1951, Bradley was asked to testify at a joint Senate committee composed of the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations on the circumstance around the relief of MacArthur. General Bradley represented the thoughts of the Joint Chiefs regarding the broader situation of the Korean War, stating, “Under present circumstances, we [the Joint Chiefs] have recommended against enlarging the war. The course of action often described as ‘limited war’ with Red China would increase the risk we are taking by engaging too much of our power in an area that is not the critical strategic prize.”⁶⁴ In this case the Joint Chiefs were articulating need for a limited war of the “limited war,” that is, to narrow the military focus of the Korean War to achieve the political objective of a limited containment of Communism. Bradley continued to make his now infamous statement, “Red China is not a powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us

⁶³ Bradley, “Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense,” in *The Pentagon Papers*, Part 5, Section B, Subpart 2(b), 309.

⁶⁴ Omar N. Bradley, “Testimony,” May 15, 1951, United States Senate, Committee on Armed Forces and the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Military Situation in the Far East, hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 2* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), 731.

in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”⁶⁵

This was all unfolding while at the same time there was gradual escalation of commitment to French Indochina, and at no point did the Joint Chiefs state that the conflict in Indochina threatened to expand throughout Southeast Asia. However, the 1950 Strategic Assessment memorandum from the Joint Chiefs requests the development of Military Aid programs throughout the region. In addition, while there was no way to know how these military leaders would have changed and evolved in their thinking, or not, had they continued in their positions as Joint Chiefs, Bradley’s views are in fact known. Bradley, after his retirement from active service in 1954,⁶⁶ continued to give advice on the Vietnam conflict to President Johnson as part of an informal group called the Wise Men. Bradley stood out as one member in 1968, after the Tet Offensive, who continued to advise that military escalation continue.⁶⁷

The question again, then, is how could there be such a divergence in results between the wars and their relation to Military Assistance? The difference in results is much the same with respect to both the wars and the Military Assistance, and ultimately has to do with a foundation of Liberal international relations theory, which is based on partnerships and international cooperation. The evolving situation in Indochina could not develop government that was considered as legitimate in the eyes of the population. The French were viewed as invaders and colonial occupiers, and after the loss at Dien Bien Phu, the Republic of Vietnam was viewed as a personal fiefdom of Prime Minister, later

⁶⁵ Bradley, “Testimony,” May 15, 1951, United States Senate, *Military Situation in the Far East, hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 2*, 732.

⁶⁶ “American officers holding five-star rank [technically] never retire. They draw full active duty pay for the remainder of their lives, although after a certain point their actual military duties and responsibilities become minimal.” David T. Zabecki, “Military Ranks,” in *The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, Second Edition*, vol. 4, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 1685.

⁶⁷ Rodney J. Ross, “Wise Men,” in *The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, Second Edition*, vol. 3, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 1344-1345. Frank E. Vandiver, *Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson’s Wars* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), 326-327.

President, Ngo Dinh Diem and his family. After Diem's overthrow and assassination in November 1963 by a military junta, the Republic of Vietnam was ruled by a succession of military leaders — all of whom failed in varying degrees. For the United States, there was no legitimate government to partner with throughout the war with which it could engage on a broader political objective.

In addition, after the French left Indochina due to the negotiated settlement at the 1954 Geneva Conference, and the United States took on more and more of the burden of the Vietnam conflict, there was not the same sense of international cooperation as there had been in the Korean War. This was due to Truman's taking advantage of the lack of Soviet Union participation in the United Nations Security Council, and securing broad, global support against the clear aggression of the DPRK. In contrast, due to the continuing challenges of any clear political objective in the Vietnam conflict, there existed far less of an international presence in the combat force, with so few nations contributing that the effort was more of a regional security effort. Interestingly, a young Colin Powell saw this first-hand, and made certain that the concept of broad, international involvement was a cornerstone of future engagements for which he would be responsible during his service in Vietnam, forming the important tenet of the Powell Doctrine as discussed in Chapter 1.

Given the wide ramifications of the Vietnam conflict, these moments may seem insignificant or trivial at best, but they all point to tremendously important fundamentals of Military Assistance. It is clear from the Joint Chief's memorandum that there was an intent to have an established Military Assistance mission in what would become Vietnam from the very beginning of the United States Armed Forces involvement. That Military Assistance mission was never properly linked to a political objective, something of which senior military leaders such as the Joint Chiefs were certainly aware, taking Bradley's comments about "Red China" in his Congressional testimony into account.

The Failure of the Military Assistance Mission

While the shift in thinking by the Joint Chiefs happened prior to the beginning of the Korean War, the change in approaches for the Military Assistance mission happened after the Battle Dien Bien Phu, as the French withdrew, and the United

States became more involved in the Republic of Vietnam. MAAG Indochina had been formed due to the recommendations in the Joint Chiefs' memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on April 10, 1950. MAAG Indochina was specifically designed as a small unit to keep track of equipment and money from the United States to the French and French Union soldiers, but this became a challenge due to efforts by political leaders to expand the influence of the United States in Indochina.

The first commander of MAAG Indochina, Brigadier General Francis Brink, who commanded from the fall of 1950 to the summer of 1952, had a disagreement with the newly installed head of the State Department run Economic Cooperation Administration, Robert Blum. Blum, along with the State Department for which he distributed economic aid, thought that given the level of financial commitment the United States was making, it should be afforded more influence over the military affairs in Indochina, and directly train the Vietnamese rather than the French training the Vietnamese. Brink and much of his team, disagreed, believing that to properly resource such a change in the military mission would require over 4,000 soldiers.⁶⁸

This break between the understanding of the political leadership in the form of the State Department and the United States Armed Forces responsible for carrying out their agenda would not be the first such. In this case, many Washington, D.C. leaders must have misunderstood the reports being filed by MAAG Indochina, which the Washington, D.C. based leaders believed were positive. This is in direct contrast to MAAG Indochina's actual statements reporting a lack of understanding or training on American-made equipment, with the Vietnamese Navy's readiness even worse. These challenges culminated in Brink's suicide while in Washington D.C. in July 1952. He was replaced by a commander from the Korean War, Brigadier General Thomas Trapnell, who provided a youthful enthusiasm. He quickly sobered, having deep concern with

⁶⁸ Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years*, 155.

the French and their inability to properly incorporate the Vietnamese soldiers into their efforts.⁶⁹

The experience of Brink highlights a frequent challenge that the United States Armed Forces has had with political leadership with respect to military operations and Military Assistance more specifically, which is appropriately linking resources with objectives. This has been seen in Brink's being refused resources for the change in training the Vietnamese, Defense Secretary Les Aspin turning down a request for armored vehicles to be used in the Somali raid in 1993 (popularized by the book, *Black Hawk Down*),⁷⁰ and General Shinseki's testimony stating the need for far more soldiers than had been planned to conquer and hold Iraq.⁷¹

There is a natural "tug-of-war" that occurs between policymakers and operators, with operators asking for more and policymakers wanting or being constrained, making it necessary to give less, either due to expense or the political challenges of having a heavy military footprint in the respective country. This tug-of-war has beneficial results, in that it demonstrates that each profession is acting in accordance with how they are required to function to achieve their respective goals. The fundamental challenge, however, is one of contingencies.

In all military operations, from the smallest Military Aid mission, such as MAAG Indochina when it was conceived, to the largest scale battles such as Operation Overlord in WWII, there is one question that must always be asked: What happens if every assumption being made is wrong? This is a question ultimately of risk for both policymakers and military leaders. Brink and his staff had clearly made the assessment that given the dynamics in Indochina at the time, especially given the complications of dealing with the French, it would be a

⁶⁹ Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years*, 156-157.

⁷⁰ Michael Gordon with Thomas L. Friedman, "Details of U.S. Raid in Somalia: Success So Near, a Loss So Deep," *The New York Times*, October 25, 1993, accessed May 19, 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/25/world/details-of-us-raid-in-somalia-success-so-near-a-loss-so-deep.html>.

⁷¹ Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (London: Atlantic Books, 2006), 101-102.

mistake to pursue a more extensive Military Assistance mission. This was an assessment that General Shinseki had been able to make with respect to the Iraq invasion, and that Secretary Aspin had not been able to make with respect to the Somali raid.⁷² This is exactly the set of challenges and issues that would greet Lieutenant General John O'Daniel when taking command of MAAG Indochina in April of 1954.

O'Daniel was considered a top field commander, having served in WWI and WWII with distinction, but his experience in Vietnam was less stellar, highlighted by his declaration that it was not possible that the French base at Dien Bien Phu would fall. In a report to the Joint Chiefs, he stated, "I feel that it [Dien Bien Phu] can withstand any kind of an attack that the Viet Minh are capable of launching. However, a force with two or three battalions of medium artillery with air observation could make the area untenable. The enemy does not seem to have this capability at present."⁷³ It was also clear from the report that the French remained uninterested in involving the United States in Indochina affairs that the French regarded as internal, while at the same time the Vietnamese were extremely anxious for more assistance from the United States.⁷⁴ It is important to note that MAAG Indochina in 1954 remained a unit focused on tracking Military Aid.

After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent negotiations at the Geneva Conference culminating in the Geneva Accords, with the formal division of Indochina into the Republic of Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, MAAG Indochina was renamed MAAG Vietnam and placed under the command of Lieutenant General Samuel Williams. Here was a unique officer in that, after having been fired from his position as a general officer during combat

⁷² The Somali raid offers an interesting example of a military operation in which the political goals were both achievable and clearly defined, and yet the operation still went poorly. This relates back to risk and a lack of risk analysis, in that there was no serious consideration of what could happen, or in military planning parlance, what was the enemy's most dangerous course of action.

⁷³ John W. O'Daniel, "Report of U.S. Special Mission to Indochina," February 5, 1954, in The Pentagon Papers, Part 5, Section B, Subpart 3(b), 252.

⁷⁴ O'Daniel, "Report of U.S. Special Mission to Indochina," in The Pentagon Papers, Part 5, Section B, Subpart 3(b), 246-258.

operations in WWII and being transferred to a staff position, Williams was able to perform at a high enough level of excellence that he was later able to secure a promotion back to a general officer rank. When he took over MAAG Vietnam from O'Daniel in 1955, the entire Military Intervention in Vietnam was at a critical juncture.

In his book, *Masters of War*, acclaimed Professor Robert Buzzanco stated, “[Lieutenant General] Williams ignored both [President] Diem’s repressive ways and the need to train the southern Vietnamese army to fight a guerrilla war. With U.S. acquiescence, Diem organized his army not to fight the Communist enemy so much as to maintain his own authority.”⁷⁵ Williams commented in an interview in 1964 about how good his relationship was with Diem and how the Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN) was organized based on the desires of Vietnamese general officers, and not the United States’ military leadership.⁷⁶ In this interview, in addition to other sources, Williams cannot help but come across as incredibly naïve in that he fails to recognize that Diem’s regime was corrupt, or that the Vietnamese general officers might have an ulterior motive for the organization of the ARVN in supporting Diem’s powerbase.

The organization decided on was a division-based army, which is a structure that is based on a larger movement of soldiers, 15-20,000, and equipment. It is a structure that is based on force versus force, or in the language of international relations — a state versus state conflict. As historian Joseph Buttinger, pointed out, “Organized under American direction on a division instead of in small mobile units, and equipped for the task of holding off an invasion from the North, the army was technically unprepared to counter insurgency.”⁷⁷ Williams, while stating that he was following the guidance of the Republic of Vietnam military leaders, was criticized in a report written by a contractor based on the question of how the United States could be victorious in so many battles but ultimately be

⁷⁵ Robert Buzzanco, *Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55-56.

⁷⁶ “Why U.S. is Losing in Vietnam — An Inside Story: Interview with Former Chief U.S. Military Adviser, Lieut. Gen. Samuel T. Williams (Ret.),” *U.S. News and World Report*, November 9, 1964, 62-72.

⁷⁷ Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*, vol. 2, 984.

defeated in the overall war. The reported stated, “That concentration on the conventional approach [an organization around divisions] to security was objected to by both the South Vietnamese military and the United States Embassy.”⁷⁸

Brigadier General James Collins, writing on the training of ARVN in *The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army*, commented: “In organizing and training the South Vietnamese Army, the United States relied heavily on its recent experience in South Korea. The similarity between the Vietnamese situation of 1954 and the Korean situation of 1950 prompted the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam to concentrate on developing a South Vietnamese force capable of meeting an overt invasion from North Vietnam.”⁷⁹ This tends to be the trend for many militaries, and the United States Army is no exception in training for the next war based on the last war. When Williams took command of MAAG Vietnam in 1955, the Korean War was fresh in the minds of most in the United States, and especially with respect to his own most recent operational time as a division commander of the 25th Infantry Division in the Korean War. As military historian, Max Boot, stated, “A veteran of the Korean War, Williams worried primarily about a conventional invasion across the DMZ...The army that he was building was ill equipped to handle the guerrilla threat that South Vietnam would soon face.”⁸⁰

However, ultimately the “American military and civilian observers in the field had no trouble at all in finding out why the armed forces of the Diem regime failed so conspicuously in fighting the Vietcong guerrillas. It needed no military

⁷⁸ BDM Corporation, *A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam*, vol. 6, book 1 (McLean, VA: BDM Corporation, 1980), I-19. Seen in Buzzanco, *Masters of War*, 62.

⁷⁹ James Lawton Collins, *The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975), 12. Seen first in BDM Corporation, *A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam*, vol. 6, book 1, I-20.

⁸⁰ Max Boot, *The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam* (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, a division of W.W. Norton & Company, 2018), 287.

expert to see that the army had been trained for the wrong kind of war.”⁸¹ Williams and MAAG Vietnam, along with the political and military leadership of the Republic of Vietnam, had been training, to use Bradley’s words, for the “wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”⁸² The war in South Vietnam was a counterinsurgency war, being fought in the south, in hearts and minds of villages and highlands, and by the time it was discovered to be a mistake it was too late. “While the threat of an external aggression was real, it was not until 1959 that the internal subversion and insurgency openly supported by the north was recognized as the major threat and that a strong effort to give South Vietnam a counterinsurgency capability began.”⁸³ The United States had failed before its soldiers were committed to combat.

Conclusion

Observing the breadth of history, from the waning days of WWII through to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and knowing what would happen to the United States over the course of the next decades to a generation of service members, their families, and communities, one cannot help but be pressed with feelings of awe and frustration. Awe with reference to the sacrifices that were made: frustration at the numerous failures, large and small, that no one of substance, at any juncture, asked aloud, “What are we doing?” or “What if everything we have assumed is wrong?” There seems to have been an almost blind and continuous miscalculation, an underlying inability to assess and reassess what the long-term goals and ramifications were of continuing the Military Assistance mission and then following that, the Military Support mission in Vietnam. Eventually, after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and the buildup of troops in Vietnam, the United States settled on a strategy for winning over the Vietnamese people. The program was called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and worked well for a while, but in the end, it was as Robert Komer, the

⁸¹ Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*, vol. 2, 984.

⁸² Bradley, “Testimony,” May 15, 1951, United States Senate, *Military Situation in the Far East, hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 2*, 731.

⁸³ Collins, *The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army*, 12.

first leader of the CORDS program, who observed, “its failure to have greater effect on the overall Vietnam situation to too little, too late.”⁸⁴

For his doctoral dissertation, retired Lieutenant General, and previous National Security Advisor, H.R. McMaster wrote what became the book *Dereliction of Duty*. It has been popularized that the Joint Chiefs failed to confront their civilian, political leaders when they saw that the strategy was not working in Vietnam. The true failure of Vietnam can be extrapolated from the experience of the Military Assistance mission a decade before the events of *Dereliction of Duty*, and the lack of securing a clearly defined political objective — one that would allow the United States Armed Forces to both project power and strengthen international cooperation. This inability to define an end state for the Vietnam Military Assistance mission was exacerbated by the lack of partnership options that existed for stable governance. The constant dependency by the United States on President Diem, further showed that Roger Makins, the United Kingdom’s ambassador to the United States at this time, was correct in his assessment that United States has a consistent desire to have “their man” in power.⁸⁵ Another important lesson learned from the actions in Vietnam is that United States Armed Forces can have a relatively successful security force assistance program, followed by a good Advise and Assist effort, even coupling it with a hearts and minds program like CORDS, winning every battle but still losing the war.

Ultimately, the Vietnamese people voted with their support, the support of the security structure that would keep them safe. The United States, as some have argued, has been thought to have lost the Vietnam War domestically — in newspapers, town halls, and college campuses — before the political will escalated to pressure Congress and the rest of the United States Government to stop the Vietnam War. This case shows, however, that the Vietnam War had been

⁸⁴ Ross Coffey, “Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq,” *Military Review* 86, no. 2 (March-April, 2006): 32. Due to the lack of correct grammar, it should be noted that this is a direct quote.

⁸⁵ Interview between Roger Makins (Lord Sheffield) and Max Hastings on 10 Jan 1986. Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1987), 23.

lost at the very beginning by leaders who failed to understand the political goals of military action, and were unable, or unwilling, to question and reassess whether their military strategy was meeting any political objective at all. The Military Assistance mission was a microcosm of this entire endeavor, and given its relatively small size, would have been far easier to perceive where there were serious strategic shortfalls. Had this effort been made, perhaps a different result would have been possible, were it possible to re-make history.

Chapter 6

In Summation:

Military Assistance in the Context of Warfare and International Relations

This project began with the goal of understanding what concepts of international relations, both the discipline and the phenomenon, could contribute to a successful Military Assistance mission and as in all projects of this magnitude, it has evolved into something similar and yet, slightly different from its intended goals. In one sense, the consistency between the beginning of the project and its completion has been that goal to understand the components of a successful Military Assistance mission, namely: discovering, understanding, and appreciating the necessity for political objectives in any form of Military Intervention, including Military Assistance. More specifically to Military Assistance is the crucial component of a partnership between supporting and recipient nations that is of good faith. In another sense, the method and process by which the conclusions were made were vastly different than those at the project's beginning. Initially, the idea was to compare the Military Assistance done during the height of the British Empire, when the British Army trained and developed foreign security forces in India, the Caribbean, Africa, and everywhere the Union Jack flew, with the efforts of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan to train and develop their respective indigenous forces. The challenge with this approach was that areas in which the British Empire was training and developing foreign security forces were colonies in some form, and thus regarded by the Government in London as possessions.

In contrast, the United States has struggled mightily to assist the development of governance and security forces on all levels in Iraq and Afghanistan, trying to respect each country's sovereignty, but in many cases failing to appreciate local customs or traditions that directly affected the abilities of the government to govern in those countries. These efforts were attempts to impose some hybrid of Western democracy on peoples who had little history or connection to that form of governance, while at the same time being cultures with long traditions of honor and justice. This is a critical point as it relates to

Military Assistance, because ultimately the British Empire could impose its will and methods on foreign security forces, due to those forces being part of the Empire, and the Royal Army along with the Government in London considering and relating to them as such. However, the United States had to rely on relationships and influence in its experiences with Military Assistance, while the foreign security forces simply looked to the United States as a supermarket of resources.

Though the United States is often considered an empire, and many times referred to pejoratively as a colonial power or an imperial republic, there is minimal evidence to suggest that the United States has operated as a traditional colonial power post-WWII. Put more bluntly, if the United States is a colonial power, it is without a doubt the most incompetent colonial power in the history of the world. Though there can be no question that the United States has used its power and influence to further its interests, as any nation state does, the number of setbacks that have occurred with client states such as Iraq and Afghanistan suggest an ongoing effort by the United States to respect other nations' sovereignty and long-term independence.

With reference to Military Assistance, the United States' challenges in training and developing forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were compounded by Army doctrine. The doctrine at that time emphasized large, unit maneuvers, and very little in the realm of Advise and Assist or Security Force Assistance. Indeed, much of the thinking in this area was done in 2006 during the development of Field Manual 3-24, the United States Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which concluded that training foreign security forces was a critical method for increased local security. Although the Counterinsurgency Field Manual adjusted military thinking at a tactical level, it did not include, nor was it appropriate to include, a reassessment of the political dynamics and Grand Strategy that led to the broad failures in combatting the Iraqi Insurgency.

This leads to an additional crucial point that is often confused by political leaders:¹ Military Assistance is not a strategy, but a tool within the broad array of policy and even military options for policymakers to employ to reach their political goals, ideally in order to pursue a grand strategy. This confusion tends to be due to the lack of understanding about the nature of strategy as a general concept within the political leadership in general, as this group is far more concerned with immediate needs and concerns, as opposed to long-term thinking and planning. The challenge with this misunderstanding, however, is that if Military Assistance is incorrectly viewed as a strategy, then it may be considered a comprehensive solution to an overall conflict, which is unlikely at best and very dangerous at worst. Military Intervention of any sort should not be considered a strategy, and to do so would seem to continue that misunderstanding despite Professor Sir Freedman's highlighting the vagueness of the definition of strategy. Furthermore, if Military Assistance is correctly recognized as a tool rather than a strategy, then like all military efforts, it must be linked with a specific set of broader strategic or political goals: *A military means to a political end*. In this way, it has a great deal of applicability within the field of international relations as a practical application in the discipline. These differing experiences by policymakers can be seen throughout the case studies in this research project: South Korea and Vietnam prior to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

¹ Thom Shanker, "The Struggle for Iraq: The Military; General Says Training of Iraqi Troops Suffered From Poor Planning and Staffing," *The New York Times*, February 11, 2006, accessed July 30, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/11/washington/world/the-struggle-for-iraq-the-military-general-says-training.html>. Editorial, "Afghanistan's Army," *The New York Times*, December 4, 2009, accessed July 30, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/05/opinion/05sat1.html>. Peter Baker, Helene Cooper, and Michael R. Gordon, "Obama Looks at Adding Bases and Troops in Iraq, to Fight ISIS," *The New York Times*, June 11, 2015, accessed July 30, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-us-military-bases-martin-e-dempsey.html>. Max Boot, "Back to Nation-Building in Afghanistan. Good.," *The New York Times*, August 22, 2017, accessed July 30, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/president-trump-nation-building-afghanistan.html>.

The examination of the case studies of South Korea and Vietnam reveals a commonality of history: that of colonialism and its relation to the Military Assistance provided by the United States. At the same time, the United States entered into these relationships with each nation differently, creating an understandable confusion in relating to an all-embracing grand strategy or strategic vision for the United States in its approach to international relations. This is not to say that there is a uniform approach to Military Assistance, but the broader commonality should be strategic in nature, and for the United States, as a Global Power, a grand strategy. In this respect, the United States falls woefully short in its approach to global hegemony, if that was in fact its goal. Considering itself far more of a limited power — and failing to be cognizant of its perception in the world by other nations — the United States pursued relations with South Korea and Vietnam in an almost transactional methodology, or as a grand strategy of selective engagement, picking and choosing where to be active. By this means, the United States gave a truly clear understanding of a long-term strategy neither to allies nor enemies. The main difference between the examples was the clarity of the long-term sustainable political goals the United States had with each country, as well as the extent to which each nation agreed with that political goal. The relationship with South Korea is the one clear exception, though more by accident of circumstances than deliberate purpose.

The accident, of course, was one of timing. The DPRK and their allies, the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China, had assumed that the United States would not return to assist the Republic of Korea, after all but abandoning the peninsula a few months prior. President Truman was forced from a domestic political perspective to pursue war and resist the aggression from the DPRK, although domestically challenged by the general perception of having “lost” China, and having developed the cornerstone of the post-WWII American Grand Strategy of containment, a policy specifically focused on communism. The accidental timing also helped to create the deep relationship between the ROK Army and KMAC, even enabling the KATUSA program into existence. Although the Military Assistance mission had already been underway in the ROK, this timing allowed for a designed effort to pursue a Military Assistance mission that

formed the foundational basis for the strategic relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea for years to come.

That strategic relationship, together with the strategic relationship with the Japanese, formed the basis of the United States' influence in Asia. While there was an underlying dependence on the United States by the Republic of Korea, much like most client-based relationships, there still existed a sincere perception of indebtedness by the South Korean people to the United States, for the American servicemen who served and sacrificed for the freedom of the South Korean people. In addition, the relationship of the Republic of Korea with those providing Military Assistance was successful due to the nature of the Korean War, and to postponing any long-term political concerns due to the necessity of survival. These "smaller" successes built the foundation of the long-term successful strategic alliance and Military Assistance relationship enjoyed by the United States and the Republic of Korea.

While the timing of the Korean War and the political circumstances that forced President Truman into the conflict may have seemed happenstance, those circumstances could not have developed into an actual success had it not been for the important dynamics that were unique to the relationship between the United States and Republic of Korea. One of the most important dynamics was a clear understanding of the political goals of the relationship, namely, to resist the aggression of the DPRK, which also fit well within the American Grand Strategy of containment, preventing a global spread of communism. Although the goals of the United States with respect to its Grand Strategy were clear in the case of Korea, Vietnam offered a muddling effect of the domino theory concept.

In stark contrast to the Republic of Korea, Vietnam provided few or no examples of a successful relationship, either sustainable or strategic, related to Military Assistance. As the case study explores, the relationship misfired from the beginning, as the United States misunderstood the anti-colonial sentiments in Vietnam, allowing the French to frame the conflict as an anti-communism endeavor, rather than a desire by the Vietnamese to be a free people, a policy the United States fervently supported. The failure was also due to a poor broader strategic understanding of the United States, one that gripped its international

relations for decades: the domino theory — a different manifestation of the Grand Strategy of containment. This conceptualization would eventually (and similarly) place the United States on an unstable strategic footing. Rather than following the Truman Doctrine of containment, with clear limitations on how far the United States would extend itself, the United States allowed the Vietnam conflict to occupy more and more of its time and resources.

The origins of the United States' involvement in Vietnam were such that unless a dramatic and widespread reevaluation of the original assumptions had changed, there was little possibility of any other outcome. The inability of the United States to find a legitimate partner and develop a set, or even a single, clear political goal created a disconnect between the operations in Vietnam and the Grand Strategy being pursued by the United States. In this case, Military Assistance was unable to truly contribute positively to the overall mission due to the inherent challenges evident in the mission itself. Many of lessons learned by the United States, from both military and political aspects, failed to take hold, and inevitably the United States repeated numerous mistakes.

Many policy leaders who worked in government during the years of the Vietnam conflict continued in public service, and some evolved into a group of fervent anti-communists known as the Neoconservatives. They recognized that the Soviet Union and the communist system upon which it survived were crumbling at its foundation, and this group came to believe that a little external pressure was all it would take to bring down that house of cards. As many of them came into power during the presidency of George W. Bush, their understanding of the fall of communism, joined with their belief in the domino theory of Vietnam, made for a dangerous combination applied to the Middle East, where they sought to spread democracy through a strategy of reverse domino theory, with disastrous results. Ultimately, the failure of Vietnam and the domino theory is the same as reverse domino theory — an external pressure or actor cannot bring down, or build up, a nation state with a predictable end state because any external actor may create unforeseen factors that can affect a positive outcome for all. In fairness, however, this concept could be an entirely new dissertation topic in and of itself.

New Areas for Research

As in all research studies, a few answers always result in more questions and this one is no different. Although the focus of this study has always been on Military Assistance, and the research aimed to avoid involving the experience of Military Aid, there is a distinctive linkage between the two. An area in need of further exploration is an understanding about the point of the convergence between Military Assistance and Military Aid. This is due to the practical reality that many American- and NATO-based tactics are directly tied to the equipment being used. In addition, there is a need to explore the instances of Military Assistance that have been implemented to reduce a recipient nation's dependence on Military Aid. Such objectives may have been continued influence and/or the continuation of a domestic, industrial base, among others.

On a more conceptual level, this research project has shown how some of the factors that the United States Armed Forces takes for granted may be the reasons for so much concern or failure with respect to Military Assistance. Some years ago, Peruvian author Hernando de Soto published *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*. This book detailed a theory that the reason capitalism was successful in the West was due to there being a recognized and minimally corrupted manner of acknowledging property rights, allowing anyone to be recognized owners of property. Alternatively, in countries where there was little or no proof of ownership, the poor were unable to claim assets that may have existed in their families for generations. When capitalist systems were introduced in these societies, they failed for the most part because only those with recognized ownership rights could participate. Essentially, this occurred because no one thought to question whether the very foundational principles of the free flow of capital was in place for all to experience. The point in relation to this study is that there are many underlying factors of a Western-style democracy that are taken for granted, that are part of the fabric of democracy, and that should be examined. This is especially true where it pertains to security and the military where, by and large, the benefit of the doubt is given to others.

One of democracy's founding principles with reference to its military is civilian authority of the military. The United States is truly unique in the world in that it has never experienced a military coup, as the United States Armed Forces, as an institution, relies on the political leaders to understand and appreciate the support necessary to conduct military operations. This research project has discussed at length how one of the most sacred values of the United States Armed Forces, civilian control and oversight, is a principle neither communicated nor developed as a value of Military Assistance in a clear, consistent manner. Civilian control of the military should be explored from the perspective of the military, as it is a cornerstone of sustainable, long-term security for a nation.

Another impression that came out of this research project and the review of literature is that much of the strategic thinking about the contest and competition with Communism may be compared to that of the War on Terror. As discussed in Chapter 1: Military Assistance and Grand Strategy, the domino theory was popularized during the Cold War as a method to prevent the spread of Communism. Similarly, the reverse domino theory developed from Kant's theory about democracies not attacking one another. In this regard, there has been little change in the strategic approach to the War on Terror as it relates to the Cold War. In addition, the language used is very similar when discussing the War on Terror and the Cold War. It could be argued that this has much to do with the actors in the United States' national security apparatus, whether they are Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative. Furthermore, this may be due to whether their careers started during the Cold War or whether they were educated, or mentored, by those who were involved in policy-making at that time. Either way, the similarity of language begs for further insight and research.

Lastly, an area in which further research is clearly needed is that of international relations political theory as it relates to Military Assistance. This research project was not intended to be an international relations theory project; however, there is a great deal of applicable international relations theory left to explore. Having only reviewed and interacted with the major schools of international relations theory, it has become clear that this entire topic could and

should be the subject of a research project of its own, one that encompasses international relations theory and security sector reform.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this research project gives evidence of the following:

- Military Assistance, while not a strategy, is a useful tool for policymakers;
- Like other tools of military power, it must be linked with a broader strategy and ideally, a grand strategy;
- As simple as the concept may seem, it is incredibly hard, resulting in the United States failing far more than it has succeeded.

The resolution of conflict is immensely complicated, and the case studies of this research project portray only certain aspects of some of those complications. The creation of those complications is due to limited warfare. There has come to be a need for limited warfare with respect to international law and the Geneva Conventions of War. In a modern context, specifically with respect to nuclear war, limited warfare has been the standard of the United States since Truman fired MacArthur for communicating contrary policy about the use of nuclear weapons during the Korean War. Once the decision has been made to operate a conflict with limitations, options for the conduct of that conflict and its conclusion became limited as well. Under the “Pottery Barn rule” for nation states where Secretary of State Colin Powell famously stated that “if you break it [Iraq] you own it,”² Military Assistance becomes a tool that should naturally be considered as a practical option for nation building.

While the nature of warfare has not changed from the Clausewitz-principled idea of the imposition of political will through violence,³ the speed at which war and peace develop has been changing the character of war itself. The order and manner by which conclusions of warfare are imposed must be being acted upon

² William Safire, “It You Break It...,” *The New York Times Magazine*, October 17, 2004, accessed July 31, 2018,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/if-you-break-it.html>.

³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. J. J. Graham, revised by F. N. Maude (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1997), 11-14 and 20-21.

and pursued at the same time and in the same aggressive manner as the war itself for the peace to have any hope of being sustainable. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dunford, stated, “the nature of war I wouldn’t argue has changed, but the character of war — highlighted by those capabilities and functions that I spoke about earlier and what our peer competitors as well as — as well as non-state actors would have — the character of war is actually pretty dynamic.”⁴ Given the dynamics of Military Assistance, there is an inherent necessity to secure a plan to develop and incorporate all aspects of Military Assistance prior to the beginning (or at very least, immediately after the beginning) of a conflict, and to be flexible in the application of such a plan. Creating this immediate basis of sustainable security can only help to solidify the gains made during the conflict, as well as creating the bond for both opposing security forces and the population.

If, however, the idea for such a plan is considered as an afterthought, or as a secondary problem to the coming conflict, there will be an unavoidable and possibly irreparable disconnect between the conquering military force and the development of a sustainable security for the population. While it could be argued that the plan for what should happen after a war should be second to the plan for the war, the experience of Military Assistance post-WWII suggests the opposite. In the two case studies in this research project, the one case that was a clear success, South Korea, happened without planning and under duress, in the sense that there was no real initial plan other than for survival. However, as the Korean War progressed, the tool of Military Assistance that was integrated prior to the war’s beginning became more integrated at every level, in every aspect of the war, and then after the war. This was evident when South Koreans began serving in the United States Army, so that Military Assistance became a main driver for the military-to-military relationship. The key was having the tool of Military Assistance understood by both recipient and supporting nations as

⁴ Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., “Keynote Speech at the Center for a New American Security,” Defense One National Security Forum, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2015.

integral to the success of the Korean War, and naturally to the peace that would follow.

Vietnam, unfortunately, did not have such integrated approaches, and the development of a Military Assistance program was more of an added effort once other options failed. Seeking to recreate some of the success seen in South Korea, the United States' Vietnam involvement started as a Military Assistance mission, and yet became an example of what happens to a Military Assistance mission when there are no clear set of political goals, in addition to a lack of a willing recipient nation that has a sustainable security plan, or at least security objectives.

These efforts seem to have been continued in military operations after Vietnam, as have the poor ability of policymakers to give sufficient policy guidance for the United States Armed Forces to implement. However, leaders of the United States Armed Forces must shoulder some of this blame, as they have become more reluctant to push back against their political leaders. In conclusion, the one principle that has become abundantly clear from this research project is that military operations are implemented and concluded best when both policymakers and military leaders work together and challenge each other constructively. Grand Strategy must be understood to be a vision to which the entire nation commits all aspects of its resources; policymakers and military leaders are most successful when they understand and support that vision through their own respective endeavors. Military Assistance, as has been shown in this research project, is but one tool in pursuit of that Grand Strategy.

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