Urbanising the Event: 
how past processes, present politics and future plans shape London’s Olympic Legacy

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Declaration

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to investigate issues connected with planning urban futures from scratch and, conversely, with the development of long-term planning frameworks, by focussing on designs for the ‘Legacy’ transformation of the 2012 Olympic site. 2012 Games bid organisers claimed that Olympic-related investments would stimulate in east London – a region characterised by de-industrialisation and deprivation - the ‘regeneration of an entire community for the direct benefit of everyone who lives there’ (IOC, p. 19). The development of a long-term plan for the Olympic site post-2012 was said to be key in realising this objective, providing the basis for leveraging ongoing investment and restructuring east London’s economy. I am interested in how conceptions of regeneration and legacy are formulated and evidenced in plans for the site’s future and in what these mean for ‘community’ – historic, present and imagined constituencies of local residents and workers. Olympic sceptics argue that the problem with projected Olympic legacies is that there is all too little guarantee that they will actually come to fruition. Meanwhile, regenerations of other post-industrial sites in London are said to have produced unevenly distributed benefits, least advancing the prospects of those dispossessed by redevelopment and poorer, residual constituencies. This research considers how urban designs: a) frame future benefits connected with London 2012, and; b) mediate between the Olympic site as found, the needs and interests of local people and urban policy and planning objectives. Mixed methods and interdisciplinary perspectives are employed in examining conceptions and in empirically exploring the site’s transformation from 2005 to 2010. Aside from the major themes of legacy and regeneration, chapters are linked through attention on how transforming relationships between authorities and owners influence forms of urbanisation and use. These transformations help to reveal both actual and potential outcomes of 2012’s legacy plans.

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Preface

A background to this research

My interest in the area of London’s Lea Valley that this thesis focuses on began in 2000 when, priced out of Central London, we bought a house in Leyton and began to explore the area on bike and foot. I had a connection with the area because my grandmother had grown up in Leytonstone in the 1920s and early 1930s, her father working in Hackney as an engineer having completed service with the Royal Navy. The family moved out of London in the mid 1930s, relative pioneers of the waves of migrations from the East End that began before the Second World War and continued apace after it. She spoke fondly of her childhood neighbourhood – the two-up-two-down terraced house in which five children were raised, the friendly street on which other family members lived, the errand-runs to manufacturers and materials stockists in Hackney Wick and Forest Gate that she was allowed to accompany her father on, the shopping at lively Stratford with her mother – and yet it was apparent that she preserved few links. In part this was due to the journey in terms of class which her generation made, but was also a reflection of the scale of change to the area after the War – which soon meant that there were few social ties in it to keep. This personal story is echoed in wider histories, most poignantly for me in Young and Wilmott’s post-War account of *Family and Kinship in East London* (1957).

In our many quests for tools and paint for the house in these same neighbourhoods - which most friends regarded as beyond the pale (beyond ‘the edge of civilisation’ as one put it) - we became interested in what appeared as a blank space on the A-Z just to the west of Leyton. This territory, which had been a hub of industrial production during my grandmother’s childhood, appeared now as a world unto itself. It was a place that did not neatly fit ascriptions of either an inner city or an edge city, that was still industrial but also, in places, residential and agricultural - a redeveloped and yet ruined landscape. I was practicing as an architect, completing an art school building project in Wimbledon. Throughout this time, this eccentric, contradictory and imperfect landscape held an
alternative fascination - one that I began to imagine investing time in recording and mapping.

In 2003, we gathered that the British Olympic Association was constructing a bid, with the backing of the Greater London Authority, to host the 2012 Olympic Games in this landscape. Why here? It seemed an extraordinary choice. In July 2005, the even more surprising announcement came that the bid had been successful, an outcome widely attributed to the regeneration potentials connected with the site which the bid team had highlighted. A time limit was placed on the possibility of collating records of this area and making maps. On a freezing bike ride through what was now the Olympic site from Hackney Downs to the old gas works at West Ham six months later - New Year’s Day 2006 - I recorded, amongst other things, Traveller children playing in the street, the ebb and flow of identical white vans from a huge Ghanaian church, a pathway between bus depots leading to secret island allotments, river ways at low tide littered with dumped bicycles and cars, a mountain of fridges, fierce Alsatian dogs behind barbed security fencing, and graffiti on a footbridge spelling ‘fuck Seb Coe.’

Later in 2006, a listing appeared in the Hackney Gazette of all the properties subject to Compulsory Purchase so as to make way for the Olympics. Their addresses ran to pages – street names such as Pudding Mill Lane and Temple Mills Lane resonant of the industrial and pre-industrial history of the Lea Valley. I was interested to find out more about the people behind the addresses and of their position with respect to the emerging Olympic proposals that would transform their area – perhaps much as the territory of an earlier generation of East Enders had been transformed. Accordingly, the broad themes of this PhD emerged relating, firstly, to how urban regeneration as both idea and process engages with a social and spatial reality and, secondly, to how roles would be ascribed to local people in the context of the huge and potentially dislocating imposition of an Olympic park and, beyond, of the ‘regenerative’ spatial design and redevelopment processes referred to as important components of its legacy.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPO</td>
<td>Compulsory Purchase Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMS</td>
<td>Department of Culture, Media &amp; Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUG</td>
<td>Eastway Users Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELSBC</td>
<td>East London Small Business Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLA</td>
<td>Greater London Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDA</td>
<td>London Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVRPA</td>
<td>Lea Valley Park Regional Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLLDC</td>
<td>Leyton Lammas Lands Defence Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMF</td>
<td>Legacy Masterplan Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTGDC</td>
<td>London Thames Gateway Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGS</td>
<td>Manor Gardens Gardening Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Olympic Delivery Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA/PDT</td>
<td>ODA Planning Decisions Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLC</td>
<td>Olympic Park Legacy Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAPF</td>
<td>Opportunity Area Planning Framework</td>
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Introduction

What is the Legacy and who is it for?

Attracting the Olympics constitutes a major triumph for cities competing for investment, image and prestige in the global economy. In return for years of preparation following a successful bid, a host city becomes the focus of international media attention for a limited period. In this context, it has the opportunity to showcase its qualities, organisational capacities and aspirations to the world through global media channels. Whilst the Games themselves are the major focus of news coverage, there is also the chance to direct the media gaze toward broader endeavours being initiated by host cities - for example, development plans and infrastructural enhancements that reflect their growth, modernity and progress (Gold and Gold, 2007, p.5), and a variety of other ways in which they may be seeking to leverage Olympic investment to lasting effect.

Since the 1950s, lasting effects of the Games have been referred to as the Olympics’ ‘legacies’, though the strategic use of the Olympics to create specific outcomes is a more recent phenomenon (Gold and Gold, pp. 5-9). National governments and urban authorities have made increasingly strong efforts to anticipate and cultivate lasting effects and positive outcomes while justifying their extravagant expenditures on media-grabbing signature parklands, venues and ceremonies. The International Olympic Committee (IOC), which regulates the Olympics and generates the criteria for selecting candidate cities for the Games, has said that ‘legacy’ should be a principal driver for the Olympics today, alongside the historic political ideals underpinning the staging of these international sporting contests. This increased emphasis on the concept of legacy within official Olympic discourse has generated a wealth of both strategic and critical academic literature. Olympic studies have sought, amongst other things, to define the term, historicise its usage (Gold and Gold, 2007, 2009) and evaluate the relations between official discourses on legacy, the multiple interpretations of it that are formulated in applied fields of planning and practice and the actual impacts which unfold later on the ground (Burbank, Andranovich and Heying, 2001, 2002; Cashman, 1999, 2006). Whilst this thesis is broadly concerned with the relation
between official discourses on legacy and socio-economic impacts of hosting the 2012 Games in east London, it is more specifically oriented toward questions of how planning, urban design and redevelopment are used to physically create a legacy and what this means for people currently residing and working in the immediate locale of the Olympic site. It addresses these in order to speculate on what outcomes these processes may produce. London is arguably the city in which, to date, the notion of legacy has most strongly influenced the planning of Olympic parklands and venues and been most closely interwoven with authorities’ strategic plans for long-term growth and change at local through to regional scales.

The thesis sets out to evaluate the uses and meanings of legacy in terms of a planning and urban design process predicated on addressing long-term conditions of deprivation and on regenerating a former industrial part of London. It does so by focusing on the processes required to release and prepare the Olympic site for redevelopment, on the development of a spatial framework for the transformation of the 2012 event into a lasting piece of a future regenerated east London, and on the democracy of design and redevelopment processes. The thesis both examines some of the first actual consequences of redeveloping the Olympic site from 2007 and explores how legacy was envisioned as an urban future from 2007 to 2010. In so doing, questions of what these redevelopment and design processes suggest about who may be impacted or benefited, and how, are explored.

In spite of its focus on specific aspects of London’s legacy plans, the thesis endeavours to speak to a number of broader issues. Firstly, it aims to engage with the challenge of using global mega-events to realise local, specific social goals. Secondly, it seeks to unpack the orientations and attitudes toward the future that thinking about and making ‘legacies’ requires. It considers what it takes to make claims about what a legacy will be and what kinds of evidence, organisational structure and confidence need to be in place to ensure delivery. Legacy, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, means:

[t]he action or an act of bequeathing’, ‘[a] sum of money, or a specified article, given to another by will’ or ‘[a]nything handed down by an ancestor or predecessor.

This definition implies objects or things which, whilst made or acquired in the past, are ‘bequeathed’ to the future and, in this sense, straddle time. Through its focus on practices
and representations of urban design, the thesis considers the significance of how futures are envisioned and implemented now for what may unfold later. Thirdly, the thesis seeks to make a contribution to wider debates on the potential for disparity between imagined goals and real effects of mega-events on the social and economic fabric of cities (see for example: Jones, 2001; Lee, 2002; Smith & Fox, 2007). Who is established as the recipient of the legacy ‘bequest’ through political and planning processes and thus who begins to appear likely to gain by it?

I begin this introductory chapter by locating London’s urban legacy in terms of the development history of London’s Olympic site. In a section entitled ‘Why does legacy matter?’ I go on to consider the prominence that ideas about legacy have acquired in Olympic contexts, and the significance of some of the failures of past mega-events to realise positive legacies for how London framed its legacy objectives. In the final section, I outline four primary aims for the research which also reflect the structure of the thesis, and I briefly discuss this structure by introducing the upcoming chapters.

0.1 Locating the Olympic site

Figure 0.1 Locating the Olympic site in terms of: a) the Lea Valley; b) London’s former industrial areas and docklands; c) the Olympic Host Boroughs and the scope of the Lower Lea Valley Opportunity Area Planning Framework (GLA, 2007) (Source: Juliet Davis, 2011)

The Lea Valley, in which the site for the 2012 Olympic Games is located, forms a topographical fissure within London, as indicated in the first map above. The Lea River runs approximately north-south, flowing into the River Thames just east of the Isle of Dogs. Denoting the edge between the City of London and County of Essex until 1966, in more recent times the valley has served as marker of the divide between inner and outer east London. The site is located at the junction of four east London boroughs and between the residential neighbourhoods of Bow and Hackney Wick to the west, and Leyton and Stratford to the east. The Lower Lea Valley was associated with the expansion of London
through growth in manufacturing industry in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Martin, 1961, 1966). Thus, in spite of its geographic marginality, the area lay at the centre of London’s economy until well into the 1960s (Porter, 1994; Sassen, 2001). The Olympic site is located at the junction between the Lower Lea Valley and the Upper Lea Valley, which was far less intensively developed and used to create the Lea Valley Regional Park in 1966. By the turn of the twenty-first century, most of the original industries with which the valley was associated – from chemicals to building materials, porcelain to trains – had either relocated from the Lea Valley or vanished altogether. With the combination of de-industrialisation and the city’s growth from the 1960s, the Lower Lea Valley gradually became vestigial in terms of the economy whilst appearing to become more prominently located at the heart of east London.

In the early 1980s, this situation began to be transformed by government-led regeneration and redevelopment initiatives for the former London Docks (Foster, 1999; Hall, 1998). The Lower Lea Valley began to figure in strategic plans geared toward improving the prospects of development and investment in east London from the early 1990s. A significant impediment to development in the valley, in comparison to either the Isle of Dogs or the Royal Docks, was created by its location at the intersection of several local authorities, each with their own area-based strategies for physical and socio-economic development. It was only with the reestablishment of an authority for London in the form of an elected Mayor and Greater London Authority (GLA) by the New Labour government (elected into office in 1997) that it became feasible to consider the Lower Lea Valley’s role in a strategic regional context rather than only in terms of the alignment of local strategies.

With the establishment of the London Development Agency (LDA) in 2000 - intended to function as an executive arm of the GLA – the Lower Lea Valley was identified as an ‘Opportunity Area’ (Mayor of London, 2004), later becoming subject to an Opportunity Area Planning Framework (OAPF) (2007). The extent of this is indicated in the third map above. The Olympic site, outlined in red and selected in 2003, lies at the top of this area. The major ‘opportunity’ presented by the valley from the GLA’s perspective was the presence of extensive tracts of ‘deprived’ yet well-connected brownfield land which could be re-zoned for ‘compact’, mixed use development. This could be used to make a significant contribution to the targets produced by the GLA to reflect statistical projections for London’s growth whilst also responding to newly formulated government policies relating to regeneration, sustainable development and the promotion of an ‘urban renaissance’.
Meanwhile, the opportunity of an Olympic Games was said to rest in its capacity to mobilise far higher than usual levels of public funding and so bypass some of the frequent entrenchments of the UK planning system. London Mayor Ken Livingstone argued that it provided a good reason to channel significant levels of public funding into the chosen site’s environmental rehabilitation and the improvement of infrastructure to create a development ‘catalyst’ and so lastingly transform the Lea Valley and indeed the East End’s physical, economic and social fabrics (Livingstone, 2003). Thus, rather than the Olympic Park being created as an end point of redeveloping the site, the idea was that it would constitute just a first phase in what was imagined as a long-term transformation process. This was highlighted by the initiation in 2005 - following London’s Olympic bidding success - of two parallel masterplanning processes: the Olympic Facilities & Legacy Transformation Masterplan and the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF).

The LDA was devolved powers from central government to produce spatial strategies for regeneration in negotiation with local authorities and to purchase land and initiate its redevelopment. The process of acquiring land through Compulsory Purchase in the Olympic site began a full two years before the Olympic bid was won, underscoring a claim often made by the GLA that the site would have been redeveloped regardless of the outcome of the Olympic bid. The LDA became temporarily responsible for the development of the LMF from 2007. In January 2008, it appointed a team of architects to lead on the LMF’s design development – the Dutch masterplanning firm KCAP, the British architectural firm Allies & Morrison and the multi-national, interdisciplinary firm EDAW (now known as AECOM). In contrast, the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) was formed with the purpose of leading the design and development of the Olympic Facilities & Legacy Transformation Masterplan. Coordination between these agencies would clearly be key in achieving a successful reconciliation between the expectations of venues and a park for a global sporting event and of a viable, contextually specific piece of mixed use urban fabric. The design challenge involved in reconciling these different types of built environment forms an important part of the analysis in Chapter 5.

This brief discussion suggests the need to evaluate ideas and plans for London’s urban legacy in the context of both the historical processes that shaped development in the Lea Valley and evolving conceptions of what this location offers in terms of future ‘opportunities’. However, in order to understand the links between Olympic legacy and
plans for the regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley, there is also a need to take into account that London’s specific framing of the notion reflects wider issues, such as the increased prominence of plans for event legacies within Olympic bidding and selection processes and the relative successes of past Olympics in leaving legacies. The following section briefly outlines these.

0.2 Why does legacy matter?

In a 2003 report, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) confirmed that prospective Olympic host cities’ ‘legacy plans’ have increasingly informed their processes of evaluating Olympic bids. Notwithstanding, the report argues that ‘there are several meanings of the concept’, which render the task of assessing the relative merits of such plans a challenge. The report states that it is important the concept is tied back to long-established aims of the Olympic Movement and, in these terms, to the ‘mission of Olympism in society’ (IOC, 2003, p. 1). This mission, as articulated in the IOC’s 2007 version of the Olympic Charter, involves using sporting contest to reflect and support ‘the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity’ (p. 12). Whilst this statement is widely open to interpretation, the idea that the Legacy Masterplan Framework represents a ‘mission’ of this kind is nonetheless significant for the development of understandings of its specific purposes.

The IOC provides a list of broad meanings of Olympic legacies that it has come to recognise and which it indeed promotes in order to help bidding cities frame their strategies. These include: a) economic impacts of the Games on host cities over time; b) cultural impacts connected to social values which host cities may wish to highlight such as multi-cultural inclusivity; c) social debate created in the context of the development and reuse of Games infrastructure; d) political legacies arising through efforts to promote ‘peaceful’, skilled and fair sporting contest; e) education relating to the Olympic mission and; f) ‘sustainable development’ (pp. 2-4). Clearly, these categories suggest a wide range of possible outcomes, not all of which may figure to an even extent in cities’ bids. The IOC points out that although some of these Olympic Games legacies may be ‘tangible’ or quantifiable – such as acres of parkland or numbers of volunteers – others may be ‘intangible’ – such as the value of inspiration by athletes or a sense of belonging accruing through participation. The requirement for cities to deliver more than only physical change is clearly important.
Legacy has been said to have come to matter for the IOC as well as for bidding and host cities in the combined context of the escalating costs associated with the Games since the 1950s, the increasing potential for approaches to be both consumed and scrutinised through international media channels, and findings from Olympic studies that suggest the negative impacts of the Games on host cities’ finances and on localities have often been poorly matched by benefits (Cashman, 2003; Gold and Gold, 2007).

Studies focusing on the economics of staging the Olympics note that actual costs borne by governments have often run in excess of budgets, a reality that can carry consequences for other projects reliant on public finance (Li and Blake, 2009; Preuss, 2004, 2006). Although different Olympic cities develop their own particular strategies for financing the Games, it has been conventional for central and municipal governments to fund costs associated with Olympic infrastructure and for private finance combined with Olympic-related merchandise and ticket sales to fund the events themselves – including opening and closing ceremonies, advertising and broadcasting (Preuss, 2004). Cost overruns on creating a stage for the Games can take a long time (decades in the case of Montreal, host to the 1976 Games) to recoup. The prospect of heavy cost burdens creates the impression that host cities can be disadvantaged by the Olympics rather than only made more prominent and competitive. Meanwhile, the use of public funds creates a need, at least in democratic contexts, for authorities to justify the extent of their investments and account for benefits and returns in addition to providing proof of their ability to deliver on claims and promises.

The evolution of the cost plan for London’s Olympics suggests that the risk of overspend remains a present reality. Atkinson et al (2008) show that in 2002, it was estimated that the Games could be hosted for a net cost of as little as £500 million (p. 425). Three years later, London’s Candidature File stated that ‘the UK Government and the Mayor of London are committed to a £3.65 billion package for Olympic expenditure’ (London 2012, 2004, p. 11). By 2007, as Appendix D shows, anticipated costs associated with ‘core Olympic’ activities, infrastructure and regeneration had escalated to £5.254 billion, a 30% increase. The challenge for London’s legacy leaders is to prove that the benefits arising from their planning processes outweigh incurred costs over time.

Critics of the physical plans and stages for the Games observe that venues remaining after Olympic Games have often been over-scaled, producing ‘white elephants’ – large-scale,
underutilised structures that stand as testimonials to overstretched ambitions (Vigor, Mean and Tims, 2004). In spite of the investments in transportation that often precede the Games, Olympic Parks often remain poorly connected as well as over-concentrated in terms of the geography and population of host cities (Atkinson et al, 2008; Gold and Gold, 2007).

Gold and Gold argue that it is important to take into account that different sorts of outcome may have different durations and geographies of impact. Legacies may be in evidence in the immediate aftermath of the Games, such as increased levels of tourism to host cities, but these may prove difficult to sustain. The 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games is considered the first and only Olympics to generate ‘long-term tourism legacies’ (Li and Blake, 2009, p. 5). Benefits such as a boosted construction industry may be felt at the level of the city whilst costs may be borne simultaneously by localities impacted by rising property values, for example. Local people may additionally experience disadvantages through being dispossessed of their homes and livelihoods in order to make way for the scale of development that the Olympics have come to imply. These observations raise important questions about the temporality of legacy and who is in a position to benefit.

Much of the critical literature on past Olympics suggests good reason for caution in approaching the optimistic claims of the UK government and GLA that the Olympics matter for the future of the Lea Valley and East London. As if to reassure potential sceptics that it was bound to deliver on its claims, the GLA defined its broad approach to legacy in 2007 in terms of ‘Five Legacy Commitments’. These are as follows:

1. Increasing opportunities for Londoners to become involved in sport.
2. Ensuring Londoners benefit from new jobs, business and volunteering opportunities.
3. Transforming the heart of East London.
4. Delivering a sustainable Games and developing sustainable communities.
5. Showcasing London as a diverse, creative and welcoming city.

Whilst each of these commitments receives fuller description in the GLA’s publication *Five Legacy Commitments*, they are in themselves clearly wide in scope and potentially realisable in a variety of ways. The first, second and fourth commitments are made to communities at local and city-wide scales whilst the fifth involves national and global scales. The word ‘heart’ in Commitment 3 may be seen merely as synonymous with ‘middle’ or ‘centre’ but also appeals to a sense of East London as a living place. Meanwhile
‘transformation’, also in Commitment 3, suggests significant change, but over an uncertain time frame. Commitments 3 and 4, the fuller descriptions for which are included in Appendix C, are the most relevant to my explorations of an urban legacy. These commitments suggest the need to approach the analysis of London’s legacy in terms of three key, if broad dimensions: place, time and people. In Chapter 1, I provide a review of literature which frames my subsequent empirical explorations of these dimensions through analysis of urban designs and planning processes associated with the LMF.

Critical literature on past Olympics suggests good reason for considering how London’s Olympic leaders set out to address some of their drawbacks and failings. For example, an important feature of London’s financing strategy was an alignment with urban designs for the post-Olympic site, in order to show how the investment of public funds in the purchase of the site would be recouped through the sale of land for compact development after 2012. Recognising the limited potential for re-use of many large Olympic facilities at a single urban location, London planned to radically alter the site of the Games after 2012. Whilst some of the venues were to be kept in situ to ‘significantly improve the availability of sports facilities of an international standard in London’, others were to be transferred to cities across Britain. The removal of temporary venues would leave behind fully serviced ‘development platforms’ for future mixed-use development. The infrastructure required for the Olympics would thus form an underlay, enabling long-term processes of redevelopment to realise benefits in terms of the availability of spaces for everyday uses – residential, employment, educational, medical and so on.

Ultimately, legacy matters because the Olympics are known to be extremely successful vehicles for drawing in finance to chosen locations. This thesis considers what this means for the uses of urban design and masterplanning on a large scale to realise social and political goals associated with regeneration.

0.3 Aims for this research

Mayor of London Ken Livingstone’s Five Legacy Commitments (2007) formed an important starting point for this research. In different ways, each commitment raises questions relating to how it might translate into an urban development plan projected onto an existing place, who it is being made for, and what sort of time frames are involved.
In the context of this thesis, addressing such questions relies on being able to evaluate: a) some of the short-term or initial impacts of planning for the Olympics; b) how legacy benefits and opportunities are reflected in London’s long-term plans for the Olympic site; c) the time scales of the urban legacy, and; d) how current local users and residents of the site and surroundings are able to participate in the generation of outcomes.

The aims for this research are structured to reflect my interest in legacy in terms of envisioned impacts on place and on people, and how these unfold in time. The four are, in these terms, as follows:

1. Firstly, I aim to investigate how ‘legacy’ is conceived in terms of the spatial and physical transformation of the Olympic site in the Lea Valley and how such conceptions came to appear as effective for its regeneration and in the context of London’s wider urban development.

2. Secondly, I aim to investigate how the LMF engaged with aspects of the social and development history of the Olympic site whilst at the same time bringing the envisioned future realisation of legacy commitments into visibility. I consider how designers sought to ‘fix’ the past through preservation or allusion, address perceived historical problems and/or sever patterns of development previously associated with the site. I further consider the political and economic motivations for these approaches in relation to wider conceptions of a ‘legacy’.

3. Thirdly, I aim to investigate the democracy of the redevelopment process, by investigating relations between authorities, design and development ‘experts’ and the public in: a) the earliest stage of the site’s redevelopment, involving the site’s Compulsory Purchase, and; b) the development of the LMF to planning application stage. I consider the significance of long term ownership and authority relating to the design and delivery of the LMF and of the roles assigned to local people within these processes for developing future urban forms and uses of the Olympic site.

4. Fourthly, I aim to draw out the lessons from my research and consider its implications for thinking about regeneration efforts involving large-scale redevelopment over the long-term. Firstly, I consider the role of urban design and
planning in transforming the physical legacy of mega events into a contextually relevant piece of urban fabric. Secondly, I address the question of how the inherent uncertainties of the future can be managed through the governance of a long-term design framework. Thirdly, I consider the actual and potential roles of local people in addressing the conditions of deprivation upon which London’s Olympic legacy is predicated, by focussing specifically on participatory processes connected to the design of the LMF. Lastly, I return to the question of why creating an urban legacy to the 2012 Olympics matters for the regeneration of the Olympic site in east London’s Lower Lea Valley.

These aims are addressed through the upcoming chapters. Chapter 1 involves a review of literature relating primarily to the first three aims. Given the spatial, temporal and social dimensions of legacy, this literature is eclectic and interdisciplinary. Chapter 2 considers how to address the research aims methodologically, focussing particularly on the challenges of researching a dynamic process using social and spatial research methods. In Chapter 3, I explore the deprivation with which the Olympic site was associated in terms of historical evolutions in the relations of ownership, land use and authority.

In Chapters 4 through to 7, the findings from the research are presented. These are organised according to themes that relate to the first three research aims, but also to the chronology of the site’s redevelopment between 2005 and 2010. They are brought together in the conclusion chapter in which I particularly address the fourth research aim. In addition to considering wider implications for thinking about regeneration, I present my conclusions in the form of three propositions which suggest how conceptual approaches might translate onto the site in spatial terms, influencing the topography of its built form and use.
Chapter 1

Dimensions of an urban legacy

1. Introduction to the research framework

London’s Olympic legacy, as discussed in the introduction, may be seen to relate to a place, a time and a people. These ‘dimensions’ of legacy are reflected in the first three aims for this thesis, and go on to inform the structure of the substantive chapters. This first chapter consists in a review of literature which informs my approach to the topic of legacy in relation to these research aims. Before introducing each of the sections of this chapter, it is important to stress that whilst this review embraces Olympic and mega-event legacy studies, it is also extended beyond this literature. This is done, firstly, in order to address the aim of focussing on processes of spatial planning for the conversion of investments into post-Olympic outcomes in the context of east London and, more specifically, the Lower Lea Valley. This requires an understanding not only of how mega-events have been understood in broad terms or in other contexts to produce impacts, but on the nature of urban change and regeneration in post-industrial east London over recent decades. It is done, secondly, in order to respond to a desire to consider the significance of design and development processes relating to London’s Olympic legacy in terms of what it means in a broader sense to anticipate or actively seek to create urban futures and legacies. Thirdly, it relates to the aim of considering the roles of local people or ‘communities’ in the contexts of legacy design and legacy-enabling redevelopment processes. This requires an understanding of policy relating to the engagement of ‘communities’ in planning, of critical literature focussing on this topic and also of broader theories of ‘community’ including some of the conceptual difficulties which have been associated with this term. The result is an interdisciplinary foundation of literature which is used to inform research approaches and interpretations of findings in the following chapters.

This chapter begins by exploring the spatial dimension of the Olympic legacy, drawing on literature that helps to elucidate how plans to reconfigure space in the Lower Lea Valley in
relation to the Olympics may both contribute to and ensue from wider processes relating to the site’s location and the scale of the project, including: a) the significance of the transformation of London’s post-industrial role in the global economy for the choice of site for the Olympics; b) the role that Olympic Games and similarly large-scaled interventions play in global dynamics of inter-urban competition; c) the relationship between London 2012’s urban legacy and conceptions of the purposes and targets of redevelopment-led regeneration, and; d) the immediate and specific transforming reality of the Olympic site and its immediate surroundings. In the second part of the chapter, I focus on issues connected with the temporality of London’s legacy plans and planning processes - tying in with the second research aim. Given that the Olympic site’s intended regeneration began with a comprehensive demolition and relocation programme, I begin by considering literature that provides insight into the key differences between approaches to the city in terms of what may be called tabula rasa – implying the privilege of change - and processes of incremental change or accretion – which suggest the aim of establishing a balance between continuity and transformation over time. Next, I consider the role of masterplanning in mapping out futures over time by highlighting recent urban policy literature on the purpose of masterplanning practices and by discussing a number of more theoretical works which shed somewhat alternative light on questions of projected futures. The goal of this part of the chapter is to begin to consider some of the difficulties of planning ahead, particularly for the long-term, and in the context of the comprehensive erasure of the past which the Olympic site’s redevelopment reflected. In the third part of the chapter, I consider the question of who the design and masterplanned Olympic legacy is for by focussing on literatures that have sought to locate the existing and potential roles of local communities in urban processes – in terms of recent UK urban policy, the academic discourse of ‘the right to the city’ and specific strands of the broad social science literature of democracy in planning. Finally, I provide a brief outline of the thesis which shows how the literature discussed will be reflected in the structure of the following chapters and points towards the wider implications of the research.

1.1 Conceiving legacy: purposes and contexts of large scale transformation

London’s intention to use the hosting of a Games as a catalyst to the long-term spatial, social and economic transformation of a locality – which lies at the divide between two districts of east London and was formerly a manufacturing area - suggests the primacy of spatial and locational considerations for London’s urban ‘regeneration legacy’.
1.1.1 **Mega-projects, mega-events, and the global ‘urban system’**

Whilst the scale of redevelopment which has been imposed on the Lower Lea Valley through the winning of the 2012 Olympic bid is certainly impressive, development and redevelopment on a large scale has been a feature of approaches to regeneration in east London for some time. The Docklands, which began to be transformed physically under initiatives of the Thatcher Government in 1981 (Fainstein, 1994; Foster, 1999; Hall, 1998), formed the earliest phase of the redevelopment of the extensive areas formerly connected with manufacturing in east London. Industry in the Lea Valley and along the Thames began to decline in the 1960s, a process continuing in earnest through the 1970s and 80s (Porter, 1994; Sassen, 2001). Researchers’ written and visual accounts of the Lea Valley and nearby Docklands at the beginning of the 1980s present a picture of wide-spread, large-scale redundancy. The redevelopment of Docklands has been viewed as a leading example of the emergence of large-scale redevelopment or ‘mega-projects’ aimed at addressing the scale of change required in the context of ‘economic restructuring’ (Fainstein, 2009). It facilitated the transition of London’s economy during the 1980s and 90s from manufacturing to finance and services. Whilst thus bound up with change at the scale of the city’s economy, the Docklands appear to have had relatively little impact on former industrial areas immediately to the north of it, including the Olympic site. Sassen reveals that Outer East London, an area including the neighbourhoods flanking the site, had still not made the conversion to new economic sectors by the late 1990s and was thus still experiencing the far-reaching impacts of job losses from the manufacturing sector at this time (2001, p. 137). The Lea Valley remained not only physically marginal to the centres of London, but also lay at the margins of the main processes fuelling growth in London’s globalised economy (Sassen, 2007). As the latest piece in the spatial and socio-economic redevelopment jigsaw of the former Docklands, the Olympic and Legacy projects may be seen in terms of the ongoing transformation of post-industrial east London from economic marginality to having again a more pivotal role to play.

Fainstein views the scale of the Docklands redevelopment as an increasingly international phenomenon reflecting ‘both a functional response to and causal agent of restructuring’ (2009, p. 20). The focus of the redevelopment of the Docklands was on post-industrial economic sectors through the creation of high-quality office space designed to attract international companies specialising in finance and services. It also included extensive retail
and residential developments. Mega-projects connected with economic restructuring are often associated with new cultural centres and attractions geared to tourism industries. They are also associated with facilities designed for the hosting of international contests and events. They are often linked with large public and/or privately funded infrastructural investments, viewed as crucial ‘catalysts’ for leveraging ongoing investment (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). Other common features include high-profile ‘flagship’ buildings designed by famous architects and a primary orientation toward private market profitability (Fainstein, 2009). London’s plans for the Olympic site involve using the event of the Games as a stimulus to the development of mixed commercial, residential and cultural uses over time – designed to appeal to locals and international tourists. They may be viewed in these terms as emblematic of a number of the purposes which are ascribed to mega-projects in post-industrial economies worldwide.

Since the early 1970s, the effects in Western Europe and America of post-Fordist approaches to industrial production, de-industrialisation, and the weakening of the welfare state have been seen by a number of authors to presage the emergence of a new urban ‘regime’ or ‘order’ (Harvey, 1988; Sassen, 2001; Soja, 2000). Sassen argues that the dual processes of ‘dispersal’ by internationalisation - of factories to new low-cost production sites, service outlets and financial markets – and new ‘economic concentration’ (Sassen, 2001, p. 329) of production and services at strategic sites has both elevated the role of cities and significantly transformed their interrelationships. She points out that such linkages have impacted on ‘the whole notion of urban hierarchies, or urban systems’ previously understood in relation to the nation state but which must currently be viewed primarily in relation to the global economy. In London, ‘dispersal’ was clearly evident in the steady decline of manufacturing coupled with its relocation beyond the city’s limits or overseas. Large-scale ‘concentration’, in comparison, occurred in the City of London and newly designated Docklands Enterprise Zone in terms of office and residential space.1

Cities in a global economy are in direct competition with one another for mobile capital resources needed to stimulate their growth. The labelling of cities as ‘international’, ‘world-class’ and ‘global’ in league tables that rank them according to performance within a global economic system helps fuel this competition. Whilst history and geography play important roles in determining the positions that different cities occupy, strategic planning is

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1 London added 30 percent to its office supply within the CBD between 1985 and 1995
recognised as an important mechanism by which cities can alter their fortunes. Cities compete to draw in foreign direct investment in forms including multinational enterprise, industry or ‘post-industrial’ economic sectors such as retail, financial services, international tourism and the international property market (Sassen, 2001, p. 195), and through ‘mega-events’ such as major sporting contests (Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying, 2002). Cities’ abilities to maintain position or rise in the global league tables depends on their authorities’ efficacy in attracting such sources of investment, beginning with strategic choices including which economic areas, sites and enabling projects to concentrate on.

So what role does the Olympics as a leading mega-event play in these competitive dynamics and their ordering effects? Much emphasis is placed on the role of ‘place-marketing’ in attracting investment and numerous authors have ascribed to the Olympic Games a primary role in promoting cities for potential global investors (Ward, 2007). Mega-events are extremely costly, privileging those cities financially equipped to commit to them (Atkinson et al, 2008, p. 419). The Olympics can play a role in staging their host cities to world audiences through international media channels at the same time as the city stages the World’s Games (Gold and Gold, 2007). The IOC’s 2005 announcement of the outcome of the 2012 Olympic bid led politicians and civic leaders in London to hail it as confirmation of London’s status as a ‘Global City’ (Carter, 2006, p. 151). Arguably, this was based on the evidence the outcome provided of London’s bid team’s organisational capacities, its government’s compelling integration of the Olympics in its wider strategic plans, London’s existing qualities and ‘image’ and the opportunity the Olympics provided to showcase these further.

Publicity raises the profile of the Olympics in general, but is also generated by host cities in order to capture interest from potential tourists to the Games and beyond. In this regard, the Olympics may be said to participate in what Tsing (2000) refers to as the ‘economy of appearances’ - the production of imagery as a stimulus for transnational financial exchange. In a related manner, Carter argues that competing cities are participating in processes of ‘spectacular accumulation’ that prefigures the concentration of actual capital (in Carter, 2006, p. 152). Carter argues that a city engaged in the construction of one of these events is simultaneously producing space and producing symbols of its prosperity and aspirations. These are produced in the planning phase through drawings and visualisations as well as in construction and Games phases through new buildings and events themselves. Li and Blake (2009) suggest that the cultivation of ‘image’ is crucial for securing ‘tourist legacies’.

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Analysing the choice of images is therefore crucial for understanding the values governing development and redevelopment choices (Carter, 2006, p. 157).

Evans argues that the award of the 2012 Games to London provided the government with a motive for concentrating high levels of public funds at a specific site location (Evans, 2007, pp. 302-304). He suggests that the process of regenerating the site – itself a bid to keep London competitive - would begin from a higher base of capital investment than it would otherwise, so in theory increasing the opportunities for leveraging future investment in it. The Olympics function as a way of drawing potential investor attention to the Lea Valley as part of a newly extended region of ‘central London’ and in facilitating the future agglomeration of post-industrial economic sectors, including real estate, information technology, office space and retail.

It is often argued that the Barcelona 1992 Olympics provide the ‘model’ (Brunet, 2005; Tims 2007) for how an Olympic Games can ‘catalyse’ regeneration. Monclus argues that Barcelona’s planning authorities were astute in locating the plans for the 1992 Games within their wider ‘strategic planning’ processes (Monclus, 2007). As a result, Olympic developments were designed to provide the crucial and high-cost infrastructure for incremental urban transformation (Marshall, 2004; Monclus, 2007). Busquets argues that the city’s planning authorities used the award of the Games to ‘justify’ work on infrastructure including large-scale regeneration projects they had desired for more than thirty years (2005, pp. 390-400). The Olympics was thus crucial for transforming Barcelona’s ‘image’ as a provincial city of Spain to a primary European destination2. Tims (2007) additionally argues that Olympic organisers made intelligent use of the city’s existing cultural capital, ensuring that this was incorporated into images that were televised to the world. Numerous references to Barcelona as a paradigm for London are contained in official documentation relating to London’s bid from 20033, so this literature is important for this research.

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2 Studies indicate that the number of foreign visitors to Barcelona increased significantly after the 1992 Games (see for example, Brunet, 2005, p. 23). In 2005, the city lay at 6th position among European cities.

From this first part of this literature review, it is clear that a commonly sought outcome of the Olympics by cities is either advancement or maintenance of position on the global economic stage. This raises questions of how far-reaching aspects of Olympic legacy are connected to the more local impacts of the Olympics. Gold and Gold point out that the choice of locations for the Olympics tends to produce a specific geography of impacts and benefits (2007, p. 7). In the context of the redevelopment of the 2012 Olympic site, it is important to consider the specific forms these take – relating to the site’s history and topography, project governance and development processes for example. In the upcoming section, I focus on theoretical approaches to the study of what Lefebvre terms the ‘specificity of the urban’, considering its relevance for this research.

1.1.2 Olympic legacy and the specificity of the city

Lefebvre argues that the urban order of a particular city and of the city as opposed to other geographic scales – what he terms the ‘specificity of the city’ – can only be apprehended through examination of how different ‘levels of reality (global, national, local)’ (1996, pp. 105 - 111) which relate to different geographic scales impact upon it and are, in turn, impacted by it. For Brenner, one of the far-reaching lessons of this line of argumentation in Lefebvre’s work is its suggestion that ‘the urban scale is not only a localized arena for global capital accumulation’ but ‘also the product of dense interscalar networks linking dispersed geographical locations’ (Brenner, 2000, p. 366-369). Drawing on Lefebvre’s work, Brenner highlights three specific areas where the emphasis on scale in urban research is important. These are: a) the study of the specific and evolving ‘agglomeration’ dynamics produced in connection with economic globalisation; b) the political regulation of what he terms ‘glocal urbanization’ under neo-liberalism, including the ways in which government at different levels both targets investment at particular locations and at the same time endeavours to mediate the effects of ‘uneven geographical development’, and; c) the way in which space becomes the subject of political contestation, particularly in the context of struggles over the balance of ‘use values’ and ‘exchange values’ associated with different spaces and sites (p. 374). He highlights the renewed relevance of Lefebvre’s argument that a new ‘politics of scale’ was becoming evident, causing the city - as both a conceptual terrain and spatial reality - to take on radically different forms.

In The Global City, Sassen asks ‘how does the historical, political, economic and social specificity of a particular city resist, facilitate, remain untouched by incorporation into the
world economy?’ (2001, p. 15). In her later book *Territory, Authority Rights* (2007) she suggests the need to examine the city in terms both of the unevenly yet specifically distributed impacts of multi-scalar contemporary processes on its organisation and of how these processes and their effects are shaped by continuities from the past. An important focus of Sassen’s investigation is on the ‘borderlands’ (pp. 378-398) or sites of intersection between different spatial and temporal orders where specificity in the global landscape is produced. Soja also focuses on the contribution of history to urban specificity. He argues that although Los Angeles can be viewed as a paradigm in terms of the wider ‘urban system’, it is simultaneously the complex consequence of a unique set of historical and geographical circumstances which continue to shape it. For Soja, the ‘spatial specificity of urbanism’ encompasses the relatively fixed qualities of a built environment - its ‘urban form’ - and the multi-scalar dynamics of ‘urban process’ – combining politics, economics, development and everyday life (Soja, 2000, pp. 7-10). He thus calls for analytic approaches that go beyond the more static aspects of urban form or morphology to engage with processes of spatial ‘assembly’ – the ‘dynamic, generative, developmental and explanatory qualities’ of ‘cityspace’ (p. 9). He refers to these processes and their potentials as ‘synechism’ – a process defined as the ‘self-generating developmental capacity of cities and city regions’ (p. 180). ‘Synechism’ embraces the notion that space has cumulatively dynamic effects on social processes, not just that social processes impact on space.

Recalling Lefebvre, Soja argues that ‘assemblage’ and/or ‘agglomeration’ dynamics occur across and relate to different geographic scales as well as levels of authority and power. He emphasises that assembly is not simply a matter of materialisation or, to use Harvey’s (2007) notion, of ‘spatial fixing’ but is ‘continually filled with movement and change, tensions and conflict, politics and ideology, passions and desires (p. 10), and includes the imaginations of future realities which can be central to real-time material development processes’ (p. 178). The concurrence of different dynamics at any given site can lead to competition – between activities, development processes and relative levels of power. In these terms, he writes that ‘there is a constant tension embedded in cityspace that revolves around the power differentials between social classes, between men and women, between the state and civil society that is manifested and performed in and around the evolving spatial specificity of urbanism’ (p. 99).

One of the main reasons authors give for focussing on the spatial specificity of urbanism is the variety of spatial effects of economic and political process and change – transforming
the city into a mosaic of spatially specific realities. It is a useful concept for this thesis in three key respects. Firstly, it suggests the need to examine conceptualisations and implications of the Olympic legacy at different scales. Secondly, it suggests the need to consider the relationship between different levels of power and authority in influencing the form of legacy – a topic addressed in more detail in the third part of this chapter. Thirdly, Soja in particular suggests the need to focus in equal measure on the role of imagined futures and materialising realities in urban assembly processes. London’s social order, as Sassen teaches us, was deeply influenced by the economic restructuring of the late twentieth century (2001, pp. 323-327). Strategic documents relating to the redevelopment of the Olympic site often suggest that a key purpose of the Olympics and associated regeneration will be to address its multiple ‘deprivation’. With this in mind, the following section focuses on this aspect of the conceptualisation of London 2012’s urban legacy – as a planned and urban designed antidote to the social and economic disadvantage of a locality.

### 1.1.3 Deprivation and disorder

Assessments of ‘deprivation’ played an important role in providing the justification for the UK government, through the LDA, to intervene in the Olympic site and develop a strategy for its regeneration, as is examined in Chapter 4. Deprivation is defined in the official documents in terms of the *English Indices of Deprivation* (ODPM, 2004). As Noble et al (2006) (of the Social Disadvantage Research Centre (SDRC) at the University of Oxford) argue, the term ‘deprivation’ is frequently defined in conjunction with ‘poverty’, ‘disorder’ and ‘social exclusion’. However, in the context of the *English Indices of Deprivation*, it denotes a condition of residence in differently scaled geographic areas. The ID was developed in order to assist central government - then controlled by the Labour Party - in identifying areas of social ‘disadvantage’ across the UK and intended for use in focusing its strategic drive towards ‘narrowing the gap between deprived neighbourhoods and the rest.

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4 Key amongst these was a cost benefit analysis produced by Arup (2002), the summary version of which refers to the site as an ‘area of low intensity uses and physical dereliction in boroughs suffering high unemployment and multiple deprivation’.

5 See for example the following documents, which outline the UK Government and London Development Agency’s case for redeveloping the Olympic site:

of the country’ (OPDM, p. 1). The Indices combine thirty-seven indicators of deprivation located under seven ‘domain indices’ into a ‘ward level’ *Index of Multiple Deprivation* (IMD). Wards are also divided into smaller geographic units known as Super Output Areas (SOA) – containing average population sizes of 7,200. The seven key ‘domain indices’ are Income, Employment, Health and disability, Education, Skills and Training, Barriers to Housing and Services, Living Environment and Crime. Figures relating to each of the domain indices are aggregated to produce single measures for each SOA.

Spatial analyses of the distribution of ‘multiple deprivation’ across London’s local authorities suggested a distinctive geography (see, for example, OPDM, 2004, pp. 60-62). In terms of east London, deprivation levels were shown to rise sharply at the eastern boundary of the City of London and to remain high across the Lea Valley and along the Thames. These areas were where much of London’s manufacturing enterprise was formerly concentrated, were a target of bombing during the Second World War and a recipient of much post-war reconstruction and redevelopment. Lower levels of deprivation in the four east London Olympic host boroughs, as shown in Figure 1.1 below, corresponded with residential pockets which had begun to ‘gentrify’ – such as the largely preserved Victorian neighbourhood around Hackney’s Victoria Park, areas where major private development had proceeded over the last thirty years (such as the Docklands), or areas of suburbanisation. A study commissioned by the London Development Agency (LDA) of Price Waterhouse Cooper (2005) suggested that 20 per cent of the Super Output Areas across the Olympic Boroughs ranked amongst the 5 per cent most deprived in England. Over twice that proportion - 42 per cent - of SOAs in the immediate vicinity of the Olympic site ranked within this deprivation category.

In his study of inequality in London in the late twentieth century, Hamnett (2003) argues that whilst an important key to understanding deprivation in London at the turn of the twenty-first century is the changing ‘industrial structure’ of the economy, there appeared to be a longer-term spatial correlation between deprivation and the East End (p. 191). This, he argues, results from the coincidence of the geography of former industry with that of the working class and with long-term disparities in the value of land and property - resulting in historically poorer quality urban environments in the East End than in other parts of London. The correspondence between the most socially deprived areas and the poorest quality and least desirable spatial environments from property market perspectives serves to ‘concentrate individuals and households with the least market power and knowledge’
within them as an ongoing process, even though the conditions and causes of poverty have evolved (p. 201).

Whilst noting the continuity in the deprivation of east London, Hamnett’s analysis of earnings and incomes over time leads him to highlight a growing gap between wealthy and poor residents across London as a whole. His observations cohere with the finding of a number of authors that globalisation has exacerbated disparities between levels of opportunity and affluence in global cities like London and internationally, as well as producing more ‘uneven development’ (Sassen, 2006; Smith, 1984). In her study of London in the 1980s and 1990s, Sassen (2001) found that whilst certain economic sectors grew, ‘areas of concentrated poverty and other multiple disadvantages’ became more apparent (p. 201). This suggests the need to consider the deprivation of the Olympic site in terms of both continuous and specific conditions, in terms of its industrial history and more recent impacts of economic restructuring.

Figure 1.1: Deprivation extent in electoral wards across the four east London Host Boroughs (Statistics Source: the Indices of Deprivation, 2004) (Juliet Davis, 2010).
Though Hamnett observes a correlation between deprivation and poor quality built environments, numerous accounts of the impacts of modern planning suggest that this is not a straightforward relation. Post-war redevelopment across East London was carried out under the aegis of improved sanitation, public health, social progress and modernity, as Young and Wilmott (1957) explain. This in itself formed part of a longer history of “cleaning up” east London, an operation which at different moments had spatial, social, political and moral dimensions.

The poverty of the ‘lower classes’ of industrial mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century London was linked with ‘social disorder’ (Sampson, 2009). This has often been defined in terms of criminal activities (for example, Hobbs, 1988), perceived moral degeneracy and disease. Jack London (1977 [1903]) famously referred to the residents of the inner East End as the ‘people of the abyss’. In his Maps Descriptive of London Poverty (1898-99) Charles Booth provided a colour-coded representation of the distribution of residential affluence and associated social position across London. The lowest of these categories is referred to as ‘vicious, semi-criminal’, words linking the most severe conditions of economic deprivation with social ‘disorder’ (Booth and Pfautz, 1967, p. 191).

Whilst recognising the scale of change that has taken place in east London over a century, Dench, Gavron and Young (2006) argue that challenges to ‘social order’ continued to be felt at the turn of the millennium. These often came in the form of tensions and the creation of boundaries, typically between minority ethnic groups, ‘indigenous’ and newly immigrant communities along racial, political and religious lines. They are said to be exacerbated by real and perceived shortages in employment opportunities, overstretched social services, urban density and overcrowding. Whilst the direct causes of deprivation, the strategies and means for confronting them have evolved substantially since the nineteenth century, the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF) can nevertheless be understood as part of an historical project aimed at addressing condition of deprivation and disorder through the imposition of new ‘spatial orders’ (Boyer, 1997, p. 330).

Young and Wilmott’s critique of the modern reconstruction of East London focuses on some of the far-reaching impacts of post-War intervention in the spatial order of the city on the intimate scale of family life. Their findings resonate with the later philosophical division of the ‘social space’ of the city by Henri Lefebvre. For Lefebvre, ‘social space’ can be
differentiated in terms of realms of ‘spatial practice’, ‘representations of space’ and ‘representational spaces’ (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 38-40. For Lefebvre, the ‘conceived’ realm occupied by the representations of space of architects and planners dominates over the ‘lived’ or appropriated realm of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’ who make ‘symbolic use’ of the objects they create. This domination, he suggests, occurs at a cost to ‘spatial practice’. Young and Wilmott suggest that behind the failure of reconstruction to recreate ‘community’ lay the failure of planning authorities to engage with the lived realities of post-war Bethnal Green and hence to regard the community ‘spirit’ that already existed there ‘as a social asset’ for the future (p. 165).

Architectural theorist Jeremy Till is critical of what he is argues is a legacy of western architecture – the ‘the pursuit of an idea (and an ideal) of order’ (2009, p. 40). The ‘idea of order’ is embodied in planning, urban design and architecture through categories such as geometry, land-use distribution, materiality, colour and ornament (or its lack). These contributors to spatial order are often linked to politicised visions for how society should function or might in the future. Till draws and builds upon the intellectual tradition of architectural critique of the kind of modernity which Young and Wilmott evaluate. Rowe and Koetter (1984) for example, sought to address the problems confronting architecture and planning through the modern era of ‘disastrous urbanism of social engineering and total design’ (p. 107) through a re-theorisation of the complexity and values associated with the pre-twentieth century city. They depict urban formations which, adapted over time, appear as ‘idiosyncratic coagulation[s]’ (p. 114) and, similarly, show how collisions between incompletely realised urban visions of different eras infuse the ‘rational city’ with fertile contradiction or irrationality. The alternative urbanism they advocate takes the form of a ‘collage’ and/or of ‘bricolage’. The notion of bricolage fuses ‘the virtues of order with the values of chaos’ - complexity, contradiction, and the dynamics of change. Till places less emphasis on architectural and urban pluralism than Rowe and Koetter, instead focussing on the complexity of architectural design processes and building on his conceptualisations of architecture as a contingent reality.

The thesis considers how the aim of city authorities to present an ordered ‘image’ of the site and of London to investors and potential consumers is balanced by the equally compelling aim to address deprivation. To what extent are both these intentions realised in situ? It does so by making connections between the geographies of the deprivation indices
and the changing spatial planning environment of the Olympic site, sometimes calling into question the correspondence between the two.

1.2 Olympic Legacy: continuity and change

The second dimension of legacy, as introduced above, is the temporal. Through the thesis, I am interested in how urban planning, design and architecture engage with the history of the site and its physicality whilst at the same time projecting alternative futures for it. In the upcoming sections, I focus on these issues by exploring: a) how to conceptualise the significance of the site’s tabula rasa condition, and; b) the role of the masterplan in the creation of an urban future.

1.2.1 Tabula rasa and the privilege of change

Between July and December 2007, not only were some 250 businesses, 1500 residents and a range of local wildlife relocated, but all buildings were demolished with the exception of one, and soil across the whole site was excavated, washed and cooked at 500 degrees to remove all traces of former industrial contamination. What does it mean to replace a landscape produced over hundreds of years?

Lefebvre argues that the Modern Movement strove ‘for the condition of tabula rasa’ as part of a wider project of liberation from the past. He links this physical sign of imminent spatial reconstruction with a theory of ‘abstract space’ – in which ‘representations of space’, as discussed above, are used to suppress alternatives and so facilitate the extension and reproduction of dominant political and commercial interests over ‘use values’. Jane Jacobs’ study, contained in her book The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1972 [1961]), of the form, social life and economics of historic, mixed tenure, mixed use working class neighbourhoods - those particularly vulnerable to renewal - resonates with Lefebvre’s theorisation of the creative and political potentials of ‘appropriation’ for the city’s users and conversely, of the corrosive impacts of the continual privileging of ‘abstract space’ in the city of Modernity. For Jacobs, the dangers of large-scale redevelopment, the associated displacement of communities and the privileges of change that underpin both lay in their capacity to destroy the in situ ‘forces of regeneration’ contained in places (p. 354). She argues that the very projects intended to create change in areas of social disadvantage
tended instead to create ‘the worst kind of slums’ for the reason that these forces and their potentialities were either displaced or destroyed (p. 362).

Jacobs’ ‘forces of regeneration’ include the longevity of a population which, she argues, can often be correlated with levels of ‘attachment’ that residents acquire for their neighbourhoods, and the cumulative effects of their adaptations of property for the kinds of mixed, evolving uses that create ‘close-grained’, mixed neighbourhoods. Arguing that the ‘growth of diversity itself is created by means of changes dependent upon each other to build increasingly effective combinations of uses’, Jacobs suggests that cities, as complex aggregations of individual users and groups, ‘learn’ over time and thus that small scale, cumulative change is more likely to be an effective strategy for addressing disadvantage than comprehensive redevelopment. By extension, she argues that the cataclysmic investment of money in cities is likely to produce specific rather than widely felt benefits. She argues that this ‘must be converted into instruments of regeneration, from instruments buying violent cataclysm to instruments buying continual gradual, complex and gentler change’ (p. 414). For Jacobs’, the spatial equivalents of ‘gradual money’ are ‘close-grained’ urban fabrics that accrete over time rather than stemming from large-scale ‘renewal’ programmes.

Lynch (1972) focuses on the similar aspects of the problematic of redevelopment in the 1960s and early 1970s U.S., though he places more emphasis than Jacobs on urban form and on the time-scales connected with development. He argues that planning in this era often failed to strike a balance between preservation and ‘urban renewal’, based on poor understandings of the symbolic power of urban form and associated cultural values, including how these evolve (p. 37). The problem with tabula rasa, in Lynch’s terms, appears to be that it forecloses the plurality of possible futures as its instigators design pathways to specific, projected futures. Lynch argued for the need for ‘temporal models’ of development that represent a middle ground between the creation of absolute continuity, say through total preservation, and discontinuity through sudden ruptures or the drastic ‘disposal’ of existing urban fabric (pp. 29-90). Such models would be able to accommodate both ‘environmental change and social change’ and thus effectively ‘preserve’ the future (pp. 113-114). Success, he claims, depends not on a ‘single stage jump to a determinate future, in which only one kind of element is in play and transitions have a negligible consequence. The art of change management must, on the contrary, take account of the cumulative effect of transition processes’ (p. 238).
Although Jacobs and Lynch were writing thirty to forty years ago and in relation to different contexts, their critiques continue to echo much of the critical literature on planning for mega-event legacies, as highlighted in the introduction. The ‘cataclysmic’ investments that mega-events require have often failed to generate significant post-event returns (Cashman, 2003; Vigor, 2004; Vigor, Mean, and Tims, 2004). Mega-projects such as the London Docklands, according to Fainstein, often also testify to the risk associated with ‘cataclysmic’ capital investments (Fainstein, 1994). For Fainstein, Docklands exposed the ‘fatal weakness’ of relying heavily on projections of growth in property to stimulate regeneration, rather than more incremental and more diverse methods of improving the livelihoods of existing residents. The problem with these, as sociologists Barbara Adam and Chris Groves teach us, is that ‘projections are pronouncements of promised futures which are planned to be produced and actualized’ (2007, p. 29). They describe intentions rather than realities that can be proven by scientific method.

A motivation to alter an existing reality in order to realise an intended and imagined future might appear somewhat different to the motivation to memorialise or commemorate aspects of a vanished or vanishing past. However, a number of critics of postmodernism in architecture and urbanism have observed both motivations in play in the context of large-scale redevelopment projects. Harvey (1988), amongst others, points to the tendency in postmodern urbanism for the past to be invoked in the context of a ‘heritage industry’ for tourists and consumers, processes which actually often serve to reinforce the disconnection between historic places or artefacts and their former uses and use values. Such processes can lead to the ‘museumification’ of historic fabric considered to be of merit and the erasure of that which is not, to the eclectic deployment of architectural and urban references and metaphors, and to an emphasis on spectacle and scenography at the expense of the ‘real’ performance of everyday urban life (Boyer, 1994 pp. 124-126). Issues of commemoration and memorialisation are explored in relation to the LMF in Chapter 5 in terms of its focus on the role of design in the regeneration of the Olympic site over time.

**1.2.2 Masterplanning: between fixing the future and leaving it open**

Given the linkage of the word legacy with Masterplan and Framework in describing the spatial plan for the site’s redevelopment, it is clearly important to define each of these terms. Whereas ‘masterplans’ have often implied static plans focussed on the spatial
distribution of land-uses, ‘frameworks’ have been used to denote regeneration strategies with spatial, social, environmental, economic and temporal dimensions. However, the traditional meaning and purpose of a ‘masterplan’ has been subject to change too.

In their report *Towards an Urban Renaissance*, the government’s Urban Task Force (UTF) suggest that in the past masterplans have tended to represent: a) spatial visions for development which failed to engage with issues such as land ownership, the politics of local authority, local economy and community (DETR, 1999, pp. 73-74); b) two-dimensional land-use strategies produced by local authority planners which segregated use categories across a plan and often lacked imagination, and; c) singular visions evolved at particular moments rather than strategies for cultivating and sustaining renewal energies over time.

In the light of these criticisms, the UTF reconceived the *process* of masterplanning as: i) a means by which to integrate social, economic and spatial strategies; ii) as leading to the creation of three-dimensional models, implying a wider representational repertoire than the plan, and; iii) a reflection of ‘design and consultation process[es]’ not an imposed, ‘single blueprint’ produced at a particular moment. The UTF confirms that masterplans are not quick fixes, but long-term strategies. The masterplan is an ordering device but one which, in the terms of the ‘urban renaissance’, depends for success on adequately reflecting the democratic mediation of social and political forces over time.

A potential risk associated with process-led planning is what Lynch long ago observed as the phenomenon of ‘endless planning’ - in which continually debated goals can also continually shift. Notwithstanding, the UTF address at least some of the concerns associated with the relationship between plans as visions for change and the natural growth of cities, which Jacobs and Lynch, amongst others, raise. My interest lies particularly in how this masterplanning approach connects to notions of the long-term purposes of the Olympic legacy. For example, what is the relationship between understandings of masterplanning in terms of process and the *Five Legacy Commitments* established in 2007? How can we conceptualise the dynamic between these two approaches to an urban future?

In exploring these issues, sociologist Barbara Adam’s work is particularly helpful. With Chris Groves, she argues that commitments, like ‘contracts’, ‘promises’ and ‘obligations’, are powerful tools in effecting planned futures. They become so by establishing areas of apparent fixity in the context of the relative indeterminacy of urban processes. Masterplanning, in this context, may in turn be seen to provide some of the immediate
means for delivering commitments by leading to the production of a strategy for realising
them in a number of steps. It can thus be conceived as a process which, whilst not creating
grounds for certainty, is geared toward managing uncertainty by mediating multiple
interests and by organising the form and process of development toward achieving
anticipated and desired ends.

Adam and Groves argue that the fulfilment of commitments is often dependent on the
realisation of forecasts formed using the evidence of how related processes have unfolded
in the past (p. 87). They highlight that a danger with this is that events frequently do not
unfold as predicted. They argue that the gaps that appear between projected futures and
unfolded realities highlight the need for all future-oriented action to be taken following
careful consideration of ethical orientations as well as of knowledge of the ‘time-prints’ of
possible effects. Given the dramatic process of redevelopment to which the Olympic site
has been subject, on the basis of commitments create a lasting urban legacy, these
arguments suggest value in looking for clues to the ‘timeprints’ of action taken to create
this physically.

Geographer Mike Raco (2008) suggests that gaps between envisaged and actually unfolding
futures might begin to be closed by more closely understanding the different ‘time frames’
that apply to development. Raco argues that New Labour’s urban policy tended to privilege
‘imagined futures’, arguing that ‘discursive emphasis is now on what places can become’
rather than on what they are and/or have been (p. 2652). As a result, he sees a danger that
the government would ‘define [existing] places and communities as “blank slates”, to be
moulded and shaped’ (p. 2670) to meet imagined outcomes. In response, he argues that
regeneration discourses and planning practices should consider ways of more effectively
integrating ‘time frames’ – from those which govern the processes and profits of
developers to the bureaucratic time frames of planning process to those ‘non-institutional
time frames’ such as local resident communities. These times frames, he argues, should, in
effect, draw more closely together – by developers, for example, adopting the view that
long-term investment can be as rewarding as short-term speculation and through the
effective engagement of local communities in development processes. The fact that the
time frame for delivering the 2012 Olympic legacy extends beyond the life-time of many
residents of the Host Boroughs suggests that both consultation relating to the LMF should
be conceived as an ongoing process, with short, medium and long-term goals.
Sennett addresses similar issues in terms of his conceptualisation of ‘development narratives’, one of three conceptual strands comprising his model of the ‘Open City’ (Sennett, 2006). The ‘Open City’ is the opposite of what he terms the ‘Closed’ or ‘Brittle City’ forms which characterised the modern city, which were predetermined and often failed to adapt to the changing conditions of urban life. The ‘Open City’, by contrast, implies a flexible framework which can be built up incrementally and adapted over time. It implies the involvement of multiple actors at varying levels of power whose ‘narratives’ can intertwine in the incremental concretisation of the framework. The role of the urban designer with respect to the ‘Open City’, he argues, is ‘to shape the process of [...] exploration’ of the unforeseen. The idea that the form of the city may be shaped by urban design practitioners but is nonetheless produced by a collective that includes its users brings us to the final main section of this chapter and its focus on literature relating to the social dimension of legacy.

1.3 A legacy of urban democracy?

In focussing on legacy in terms of a social dimension, I am interested in considering questions of ‘to whom’ the legacy masterplanning process appears to appeal and be directed. In these terms, I seek to focus on both how local people were engaged in relation to early stages in the development of the LMF and on how future users of the site were imagined through masterplanning processes. The primary focus of exploration in this section of the chapter, as in the substantive parts of the thesis, is on notions of community – what a community is and isn’t and the relationship between communities and regeneration.

The emphasis placed on the role of ‘community’ in much of the official literature relating to the Olympic legacy produced between 2005 and 2009 is indicative of the wider focus of New Labour’s urban policy from the late 1990s on both building and regenerating communities (Imrie and Raco, 2007). This policy, Imrie and Raco argue, was developed in

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6 See for example:

7 See for example:
response to the property-led regeneration strategies endorsed by the previous Conservative regimes from the early 1980s. These strategies came under fire for a number of reasons including their tendency to emphasise physical over socio-economic components of local development, frequent realisation through short-term property speculation, frequent reliance on fiscal mechanisms such as tax incentives used to lever corporate investment (Fainstein, 1994) and the widely held assumption that the economic development accruing from such approaches would ‘trickle down’ to poorer neighbourhoods (Imrie and Thomas, 1999).

After Labour came to power in 1997, the governmental and institutional structures within which the planning system resides underwent reform. Spatial strategies developed under New Labour placed strong emphasis on terms such as ‘social inclusion’, ‘social cohesion’ and ‘active citizenship’ (Imrie and Raco, 2004) which were embedded what Geddes and Fuller (2008) term ‘a reconfigured rights and responsibilities agenda’. This agenda is illustrated in the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998) in which Tony Blair states that ‘success depends on communities themselves having the power and taking the responsibility to make things better’. Forms of ‘multilevel governance’ (Tewdr-Jones and Morphet, 2006) were developed as one way of facilitating this devolution of power to the local level of ‘community’. Forms of ‘partnership’ in development exemplified the government’s objective of dispersing centralised powers amongst a spectrum of regional and local level institutions, communities and individuals. The emphasis on ‘citizenship’ and community ‘responsibility’ is said to have suggested ‘a wider New Labour belief in the interdependence between the state and citizens’ (Geddes and Fuller, 2008). As Edwards notes, the ‘government [was] seen as no longer having a distributive, directive function, but having one where it acts as a collaborator, or adjudicator between many different agencies’ (2008, p. 1667).

Before 1997, local authorities were required to do little in terms of engagement with local people in the preparation of their plans and spatial strategies. After 1997, a wide range of policies and programmes were developed to promote community involvement in planning. The Local Government Acts of 1999 and 2000 strongly encouragement authorities to

involves the public in decision making relating to localities, including setting service standards. Stakeholder consultation and engagement became a statutory component of large-scale development and redevelopment processes under the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act of 2004. This might at first glance appear ironic given that Compulsory Purchase Orders (CPOs) have often been seen to create problems rather than deliver benefits for local communities. Criticism of CPO processes has focused on their typically adversarial nature and tendency to signify the disempowerment of local people at the hands of state-sponsored organisations (see, for example, Imrie and Thomas, 1989, 1997; Hall, 1998; Brownhill, 1993). The 2004 parliamentary act introduced the duty of local authorities to prepare Community Strategies, in partnership with a ‘local strategic partnership’ (Tewdr-Jones and Morphet, 2006). Community Strategies were expected to constitute integrated socio-economic development strategies and spatial plans, thus reflecting the aim of government to promote the dissolution of boundaries between the two and downplay the traditional emphasis of planners on the spatial dimension of their strategies. Their preparation was additionally expected to be informed by feedback from wide-ranging local stakeholders at consultation and engagement events. In 2006, with the publication of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister’s publication Sustainable Communities: building for the future, the role of communities was given a further boost, with the stability of communities becoming a key social indicator for sustainable regeneration.

In the upcoming sections, I explore in more depth a number of ideas connected with: a) the notion of ‘community’ in urban policy and planning; b) the place of community involvement in planning and development, and; c) the discourse of the ‘right to the city’.

1.3.1 The ‘community’ of urban policy and planning

A number of authors writing about the role ascribed to community in the urban policy and planning strategy developed under New Labour highlight that in spite of a vast array of literature, the actual term ‘community’ remains slippery.

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In the UTF report *Towards an Urban Renaissance*, ‘community’ is predominantly defined in terms of spatial issues and challenges. However, a major goal of the report is to promote diverse yet harmonious ‘community’. Such communities are viewed as the product of dense, mixed-use developments incorporating ‘well-designed and maintained public spaces’ (UTF, p. 1). For a number of authors such conceptions of communities have been seen to present a number of difficulties. Edwards argues that there is a tendency to conflate ‘community’ with ‘place’ (Edwards, 2008, p. 1668). Place-based definitions of community tend to focus on specific spatial scales – for example of a building, an estate, neighbourhood, Ward or Borough – and can in so doing appear to ignore the range of spatial scales at which communities cohere, as well as the sheer variety of formal and informal types of public, publicity and network formed through shared bonds of interest, friendship or family. Lees argues that one of the difficulties with the notion of ‘community’ in much of New Labour’s urban policy including the UTF report was its ‘all-embracing’ nature – its emphasis on ‘totalising’ notions such as harmony, cohesion and integration (Lees, 2003, p. 79).

I.M. Young was particularly wary of the way in which ‘the social subject is conceived as a relation of unity or mutuality composed by identification and symmetry among individuals within a totality’ (1990, p. 229). By emphasising unity, the significance of cultural diversity and difference is downplayed, as are the problems of social fragmentation resulting from economic polarisation (Sassen, 2001, p. 211) including urban realities of conflict and alienation. However, the emphasis on unity, as Sennett teaches us, can also serve to reinforce segregating tendencies within broader society (Sennett, 1977). He contends that during the twentieth century, ‘community’ was increasingly conflated with personal ‘identity’ and ‘intimacy’. ‘Intimate communities’ were formed on the basis of shared attributes amongst their members and tended to produce enclaves or ghettos within and/or beyond the urban fabric of cities. The UTF’s emphasis on public space and urban living may be seen as a response to the social problems associated with this kind of segregation. Notwithstanding, as Lees argues, it produces a particular image of urban life not necessarily geared to the true diversity of needs, tastes, values and practices that exist in British cities. Amin and Thrift argue, along similar lines, that as public spaces form but one site in local and translocal networks of association there is a danger in elevating their role in addressing social fragmentation too far (2002, p. 137). Amin, Thrift and Massey argue additionally that ‘visions’ of harmony and order are ‘unattainable in practice’ and
often ‘undemocratic in intent’ (2000, p. 10). One important reason for this is because they tend to focus on aspects of communities and indeed of the urban fabric of communities on which it most likely to be possible to reach consensus rather than on the specificities and multiplicities of life within and across spatial and temporal zones. Raco argues that ‘[i]f communities can be variously described as place-based, interest-based, class-based, gender-based, and so on, then policy makers at the local level [...] face an almost impossible task in resolving complex representational and practical issues’ (Raco, 2007, p. 239).

In somewhat differing ways, these authors suggest the need to consider the dynamic relationships between policy definitions of community, the practices of community consultation – which reflect the interpretation of policy by urban renewal actors – and how pre-given balances of power inform how these unfold.

1.3.2 Consultation: purposes and challenges

The UTF report recognised that ‘too often, design is imposed on communities rather than involving them. Community groups and local representatives are still excluded from the decision-making process and are not adequately supported by professional facilitators (1999, p. 7). A number of studies produced since the publication of this report highlight the challenge of involving communities and suggest that even with the increased provisions for community participation, this issue continued to be problematic. There appear to be a number of reasons for this.

First is the purpose of consultation and associated rules of engagement. Is consultation about asking for people’s views and opinions or telling them about something that’s happening? Is it about inviting them to participate in decisions or to give feedback? Holgersen and Haarstad argue that considering the purpose of consultation is crucial for their analysis as ‘collaborative processes [are often] shaped and delimited by institutions and agents with a particular agenda’ (Holgersen and Haarstad, 2009, p. 351). The practice of consultation can be reduced, Geddes and Fuller suggest, to forms of ‘top-down community socialisation’ (2008, p. 256). In this context, planning officers, developers and designers might ‘explain’ the ‘reality’ of projects but avoid exposing equally real uncertainties connected with it. They might choose to hold question and answer sessions rather than engage in dialogue, discussion or deliberation. There may be few or no means
by which community organisers or groups can be remunerated for their efforts in participation. Whilst ‘face-to face’ sessions have the advantage of enabling local people to see, meet and/or confront decision-makers, it also has its limitations, especially if its outcomes are not carefully correlated with wider policy objectives and combined with more distanced forms of political representation, as Young teaches us (Young, 1990, pp. 232-234). Consultation events can appear as bureaucratic “tick-box exercises” in which people are provided access to certain kinds of information but little access to decision-making.

How ordinary citizens can genuinely be offered the opportunity to participate in a variety of decision-making processes and form this opportunity should take has been the subject of considerable debate over many years. I.M. Young argues that democratic participation in areas of regulation and policy affecting localities should be decided through institutionalised forums for discussion. She envisages the establishment of local institutions ‘right where people live and work’ that might take the form of ‘neighbourhood assemblies’ charged with determining ‘local priorities and policy opinions which their representatives should voice and defend in regional assemblies’ (p. 252). For Amin and Thrift, Young’s deliberative democratic approach poses an immediate difficulty relating ‘the perfectibility of techniques’ – it assumes that people are motivated to appeal for justice on behalf of their areas and relies on their accurate understanding and representation of common views reached through process of rational deliberation (p. 138). The principle of rational consensus, they argue ‘does not deal on its own with the problem of entrenched inequalities and differences’ and the manifestations these make in participatory processes - differences in educational attainment, in expectations and horizons for example. This recalls Flyvbjerg’s (1998) not dissimilar critique of the ‘communicative ideal’ in planning which, he argues, is based on the notion that power relations are embedded merely in ‘communication and socio-cultural practices’ rather than more ingrained economic and social imbalances. Flyvbjerg contends that in the most deliberative settings, interest maintenance is evident, frequently leading to the assertion of power over rationality. His study of processes relating to the development of public transport strategy for Aalborg in Denmark suggests that sometimes cooperation is used as a tactical instrument, motivated by the prospect of gain rather than of reaching consensus. He argues indeed that ‘tactical considerations’ can ‘dominate any desire to reach some form of rationally informed consensus (p. 68). Flyvbjerg suggests that theorists as well as policy-makers should place emphasis not how participation settings can be more ‘discursive, detached and consensus-
dependent, that is rational’ but how ‘to tie them back to precisely what they cannot accept [...] power, conflict and partisanship’.

A second and related issue is that of ‘expertise’, including how it functions in development partnerships and consultations with the public. Local people can’t contribute to spatial planning in the same way as architects as they don’t have the same visual tools or training at their disposal. Conversely, designers often are often called in to provide solutions for localities which they lack the degree of familiarity with that local people have. Raco et al. argue that the ‘experts’ involved in development partnerships frequently fail to adequately include community representatives as these are considered not to ‘possess the relevant knowledge or capacities to make a meaningful contribution to the early stages of development planning’ (Raco, Henderson, and Bowiby, 2008, p. 2662). Geddes and Fuller argue that cultural differences and ‘enclaves’ of knowledge ‘act as “gatekeepers” and barriers’ that prevent “local people” from fully exercising their power in local partnerships’ (2008, p. 274). Whilst ‘New Labour emphasise[d] development of the capacities and skills of citizens [...] in reality [authorities] have been given little time to train local people, thereby further reducing their scope to play an active role in such bodies and challenge established interests’ (p. 262). Blundell Jones et al (Blundell-Jones, Petrescu, and Till, 2005) emphasise that different forms of knowledge and expertise should be deployed far less hierarchically at consultation events.

1.3.3 The right to the city

In consultations conducted by the LDA on early iterations of the LMF, it was frequently stated that one of their primary functions was to build a sense of ‘ownership’ amongst attendants. In exploring how ownership is actually defined and constructed in the discourse and practice of community engagement relating to the LMF, I draw on the discourse of the ‘right to the city’, beginning with the work of Lefebvre.

In his book Writings on Cities, Lefebvre defines this ‘right’ in relation to his critique of prevailing intellectual and practical approaches to the construction of the modern city and identification of a lack of ‘tools’ for actually understanding its conditions and problems (1996, pp. 147-151). For Lefebvre, what is crucial is that the “urban”, place of encounter, priority of use value, inscription in space of a time promoted to the rank of a supreme resource amongst all resources, finds its morphological base and practico-material
realization’ (p. 158). It is by means of this process that the city can become, for Lefebvre ‘again what it was’ (p. 154). This was a city created by citizens through their acts of participation or ‘appropriation’, everyday routines and capacities to realise their ‘social needs’ (p. 147), not only by means of ‘dominant strategies and ideologies’ (p. 154). Lefebvre argues that renewing this way of creating the city constitutes a ‘right’ which in the context of the deurbanising tendencies of modern cities appeared as a ‘cry and a demand’ (p. 158). This right pertains to ‘the interests of the whole society’, but would be intended to privilege ‘those who inhabit’. It can be regarded as a form of ownership, but one which at least in philosophical terms is differentiated from the processes of legally acquiring land and/or property for the purposes of exchange.

For several more recent writers, the ‘right to the city’ has been promoted in connection with criticism of distributive paradigms of social justice combined with emphasis on the ongoing need to conceptualise and apply frameworks of rights for citizens in the context of international capitalism. David Harvey sites a number of processes affecting the capacities of the contemporary city to ‘function as a collective body politic’ (2008, p. 33). These include the global property market and the widespread tendency for urban landscape to reflect defensive attitudes to private property. David Harvey writes that the ‘right to the city, as it is now constituted, is too narrowly confined, restricted in most cases to a small political and economic elite who are in a position to shape cities more and more after their own desires (Harvey, 2008, p. 38). Particularly relevant to this thesis’s focus on the significance of the restructuring of a site and the erasure of an existing landscape of use is his emphasis on how urban transformation, including strategies for urban renewal, have continued to involve ‘creative destruction [...] which nearly always has a class dimension since it is the poor, the underprivileged and those marginalized from political power that suffer first and foremost from this process’ (p. 33). He argues that the concept of the ‘right to the city’ provides a useful conceptual framework within which to evaluate the implications of such issues, given that doing so raises important questions of ‘who commands the necessary connection between urbanization and surplus production and use’ (p. 40). He emphasises the need for studies to reemphasise Lefebvre’s vision of generalised rights for city dwellers.

Along similar lines, Amin and Thrift argue that the ‘right to the city’ is ‘the right to citizenship for all, the right to shape and influence’ (2002, p. 154). The focus of their work is on how to apply this principle in practical terms. The ‘right to the city’, they argue, ‘cannot
draw on the politics of urban design and public encounter alone, but also requires rights based and other institutionalized actions at national and urban levels to build capacity and capability across the social spectrum’ (p. 154). In other words, it is not enough to allow people to participate in decision-making processes. People’s existing capacities and their ‘capabilities’ - defined in terms of the opportunity to realise the things they value (Sen, 2009, p. 231) – also need to be developed so they can do perform citizen roles more effectively. The solution they propose and which they refer to as a ‘politics of the commons’ does not begin with formalised rules of engagement but a recognition that the different interests that people have and contributions they can make constitute valid practices of citizenship and that these are what a mature democracy should seek to support and cultivate.

1.4 Structuring the thesis

In the chapters that follow, the spatial, temporal and social dimensions of an urban legacy which have been framed in the context of this literature review are explored and developed in relation to the Olympic site’s redevelopment from 2007 and the design development of the LMF.

Firstly, Chapter 2 considers some of the methodological challenges of research on these topics. It focuses particularly on the question of how to approach the analysis of a changing landscape – through reference to urban policy, designs relating to anticipated futures and explorations of its past, present and emerging realities. Given the prominence of accounts of deprivation in strategic literature relating to the Olympic legacy, the principal goal of Chapter 3 is to locate deprivation in the historical context of the site’s urbanisation, industrialisation and de-industrialisation between 1750 and 2005. An important theme arising from this chapter is ‘enclosure’. This is examined in terms of the relation between the physical enclosure of common land in the nineteenth century and urbanisation as well as in terms of David Harvey’s theorisation of capitalist economies in terms of a dynamic of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. This analysis is continued into Chapter 4 which focuses on the significance of accounts of deprivation for the LDA’s strategy of Compulsory Purchase as well as on some of the effects of the new form of enclosure which this represented on the site’s existing users. These effects are evaluated principally in terms of outcomes of consultation and negotiation over relocation with the LDA, thus speaking primary to the third research aim outlined in the introduction to the thesis. In Chapter 5, the first and
second research aims are addressed through focus on ‘conceptions’ of legacy in terms of design-led processes of regeneration or ‘renaissance’ and the significance of these for representations of the site’s past and future. In Chapter 6, issues relating to the third research aim are returned to in the context of focus on the governance of the LMF project. The chapter particularly examines the relation between the roles ascribed to local communities by the London Development Agency (LDA) in documentation relating to their ‘Consultation and Engagement Programme’ and the roles that actually materialised for participants at events themselves. I consider how effective the LDA was at using these events to build ownership and what the significance of this is for addressing the question of to whom the urban legacy might appeal. Chapter 7 focuses on the evolution of the LMF in the context of political and economic change between 2008 and 2010. In this context, I consider the significance of the dependence of projected futures including Mayor Livingstone’s Five Legacy Commitments on particular political and economic contexts and some of the implication of this for how to conceive legacy and in what timeframes.

In the concluding chapter, I begin by summarising my findings in relation to the first three research aims. I then address the fourth research aim by drawing out the wider lessons of my research for sustainable regeneration more widely. Finally, I represent my conclusions in terms of three propositions. These relate directly to the structure of the research questions and, in these terms, to each of the sections of the above literature review. These propositions have theoretical as well as spatial design implications and are thus represented both verbally and visually.
Chapter 2

Methodological challenges of urban research

2. Introduction

Motivating this research at its outset was a desire to explore aspects of processes in which I was engaged for ten years as a practicing and teaching architect. Work on a series of seven public space ‘gateway’ projects in 1999 began to fuel interests in both the urban scale – then new to me - and in the complex, overlapping roles that the outdoor urban spaces of the city play. As part of the process of developing proposals for these sites, a series of consultations were run with interest groups in each neighbourhood. This was my first experience of having to deal with more – many more in fact – than a single client group in addition to the more usual spectrum of consultants, authorities, standards and regulations. Consultation processes highlighted the difficulty of reconciling different roles and uses of public space under any single conceptual umbrella, of sifting through and understanding the significance of people’s different interests in the territories they shared, their perceived needs and stated priorities. It also highlighted the inadequacy of many of the standard forms of architectural image-making in communicating ideas, their tendency to privilege attributes of space over attributes of use and the difficulties that many non-architects have in reading or interpreting them. Key questions that arose for me were: a) how could public views be more effectively connected to ways of proposing through architectural drawings? and; b) how could designed spaces represent an intersection of plural views in a positive sense rather than be watered down in the process of reaching consensus?

Six years later I was asked to give a series of lectures to undergraduates at the Cambridge Department of Architecture which focussed on contemporary issues in architecture in London. Through the preparation of these, I returned to these projects and other related public spaces from the late 1990s. In looking at how projects had weathered, become layered with dirt, repairs, accretions of signage, unexpected uses or were less alive than
perspective renderings of them predicted, I became interested in what I saw as a lack of analysis of how projects perform over certain time periods following their construction. Architectural projects tend to be reviewed when they are first built, once and if they have become long-established monuments or once they are deemed to have failed, but much less commonly after intervals of around ten to twenty years. It is in such time periods that projects are put to a crucial test by the everyday conditions they were made to address and to which they either rise or fall. How to analyse and hence evaluate performance and the temporality of the project in this regard? How then to better anticipate it?

Each of the above questions relates to a broader theme of the differential roles that architects and users occupy in relation to articulating the built environment. These roles often become polarised, to the extent that that, following Raco, Henderson and Bowby’s (2008) analysis of the timescales of development, the time of design and the time of use can become quite separate. The democratic process appears to often lead, not to projects that reflect, in nuanced ways, complex needs and aspirations but to the derailing of projects, sometimes permanently. Authors that first began to inform my thinking around such problems were: a) architects and architectural theorists including Jonathan Hill, particularly in Occupying Architecture (1996) and Peter Blundell-Jones et al in Architecture and Participation (2005), and; b) philosophers and social theorists, particularly the work of Henri Lefebvre (1991b, 1996, 2003 [1970]). These authors suggest - in different ways and not always directly - that the resolution to such problems may be found through ways of more effectively linking the imagination or envisioning of future space with ways in which space is experienced, engaged or articulated through ‘spatial practice’ or, simply, use.

The choice of the Olympic site as a focus for this PhD came about for several key reasons. Given my architectural background, it felt natural to use a physical territory - a place – to circumscribe an area of research. As highlighted in the preface to the thesis, the Olympic site was somewhere I had known over a period of years. It was a bizarre, in many ways uncharted territory which had suddenly gained the attention of urban strategists seeking development ‘opportunities’ in central London and was thus existing at the cusp of erasure. It now represents the largest redevelopment project in Europe, has the potential to become paradigmatic in terms of other large-scale regeneration efforts and in relation to the discourses of urban ‘regeneration’, ‘Olympic Games-led regeneration’ and ‘Olympic legacy’ in the UK urban policy context and internationally. The Olympic and Legacy projects offer the opportunity to consider how possible future realities and processes that have
particular time trajectories – of seven years in the case of the Olympic Park, of forty years in terms of the urban legacy – are anticipated and represented.

The term ‘legacy’, as discussed in the introduction, implies a bequest - something made and defined in the present, but with the purpose of producing material benefits for people in the future. It implies that the future value of this something can be known in advance, can be calculated in terms of present ways of formulating, creating and designating value - in contexts, for example, of processes of ‘use’ and/or ‘exchange’ (Lefebvre, 1996, pp. 20-21). It involves determining beneficiaries and the nature of the benefit in relation to a conception, or potentially multiple conceptions of these people’s needs and aspirations, which are also projected into the future. Designs for the urban legacy of the 2012 Olympics play an important role in these processes of projecting value and need, leading to the production of images which endeavour to show in the concrete terms of buildings, spaces and uses how benefits said to be connected with the Olympics could be transposed onto its physical site context. However, understanding the nature of this role raises a number of methodological challenges which relate to the status of designs as mediations between present contexts of evaluation and conceptions of the future (Adam and Groves, 2007), as kinds of representation that appear in the light of continually unfolding negotiations between physical, temporal, economic and political issues and constraints, and which are communicated via an array of different media.

A particular strand of the process of developing and communicating plans for the Olympic Legacy that interests me in this research is the process of consultation with the public. Although practice-based experience of these kinds of events raised doubts as to their purpose and effectiveness, they continued to hold out the possibility of operating as important sites of mediation between the political and professional contexts of conceptualising and envisioning, and the contexts of reception, reaction and alternative imagination held within those local ‘communities’ said to be the principal beneficiaries of public projects. Focus on the 2012 Olympic Legacy project provided the opportunity to consider how a site, a locality and their resident communities, who are the subjects and recipients of designs and planning strategies, are defined as beneficiaries and also involved - and how they could potentially be better defined and involved in these processes. My aim through the research was to reach a point of being able, as Lefebvre suggests, to ‘propose’ (1996, p. 211) interventions in the structures of these processes, considering their possible impacts on the resolution and materialisation of architectural programme and form.
How to reach this point? Lefebvre advocates that ‘the analysis of urban phenomena [...] requires the use of all the methodological tools: form, function, structure, levels, dimensions, text, context, field and whole, writing and reading, system, signified and signifier, language and metalanguage, institutions, etc.’ (p. 111). This is clearly a tall order and one that suggests the need for interdisciplinary research approaches. Given my background, interest in the idea of a ‘regeneration legacy’ to an Olympic Games and the sociological department context for exploring this, this research endeavours to integrate architectural and sociological ‘ways of seeing’ (Berger, 1972), questioning, and some of their associated conventional ways of telling - techniques of recording, ways of showing. In Telling about Society, Howard Becker (2007) cautions that although ‘[t]he formats for telling about society may be quite divergent, ranging from fiction to drama, film and photography, maps, tables, statistical charts or ethnography’ (p. 269) particular standards must apply for any of these to qualify as sociology. Thus, whilst the topic of this research seems to call for eclectic research methods, applying these rigorously and consistently in the context of a sociological study poses a significant challenge.

Neither ‘legacy’ nor ‘regeneration’ are fixed or closed concepts but, in the terms Foucault (2002 [1969]) suggests, are ‘full of gaps [requiring] careful analysis of ‘regularities’ (an order, correlations, positions and functioning, transformation) (p. 41). This suggests the need for the establishment of a clear framework for evaluating how these concepts function in and between different contexts - including political commitments, urban policy, design and consultations - as well as in terms of the different forms of representation associated with each. Exploring and describing a process concerning many people and which was unfolding in the same time span as the research involved numerous decisions on how to categorise and deploy accounts or perspectives – on what happened, what is, what will happen, and in relation to how experiences continually cast past, present and future into new perceptual lights. In then seeking to provide my own narrative account of what happened – at negotiations over a Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO), at a set of public consultations, to the Legacy Masterplan Framework in the context of a series of unanticipated transformations - involved negotiating carefully between the facts – dates or physical marks on the site for example - and the versions of events that people present - whether in reports, interviews or discussions – at different moments.
This chapter is divided into two main parts, recognising Bauer and Gaskell’s (2000) differentiation between processes of ‘constructing a research corpus’ and ‘analytic approaches’. The first part is divided into two sections - records of place and records of process. The second section focuses on analytical approaches for this research.

2.0.1 Focussed, qualitative research

Given the large scale and complexity of the site and of the processes involved in planning for its redevelopment, there certainly seemed to be a need to be clear about specific thematic interests and related aspects of the process from the outset of the research or risk being overwhelmed with information.

Given the established connection between London’s Olympic legacy and regeneration in east London, I chose to focus on two processes which seemed to offer particular scope for the analysis of relationships between these concepts:

1. The Compulsory Purchase of the Olympic site in 2007 (CPO)
2. The Consultation and Engagement programme with community ‘stakeholders’ on the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF), conducted between late 2008 and early 2009

The first of these involved a complex negotiated process geared toward bringing the whole designated Olympic site under the single ownership of the London Development Agency. In exploring the outcomes of this process in terms of contested conceptions of regeneration and legacy with respect to impacted existing ‘communities’, I elected to focus on a number of specific ‘case-study’ groups. Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that a major advantage of case-study-led research is that it offers the opportunity to develop in-depth understandings, whether of physical structures, human subjects or both. The selection of eight groups was made in order to be able to encompass the variety of kinds of site occupancy whilst keeping the focus tight and bearing in mind the timeframe of the research. Interestingly and in a manner I did not anticipate when I began to research the CPO, several of the case-study groups became involved in the later LMF consultations, so creating the possibility of continuing to portray their accounts, alternative conceptions of what a regeneration process should be and interpretations of their rights and roles with respect to the future.

The case-study groups were as follows:
1. **Waterden Road Traveller site**: pitches formalised by Hackney Borough Council since 1985 accommodating twenty families of Travellers of Irish descent.

2. **Eton Manor Gardens**: sixty-seven allotment plots established under The Manor Charitable Trust in 1924.

3. **Clays Lane Cooperative housing**: a group of around 1500 single residents, formed as a cooperative in the 1970s.

4. **Eastway Cycle Circuit**: cycling tracks and club buildings managed by the Lea Valley Park Regional Authority, established in 1971.

5. **H. Forman & Son**: An industrial unit occupied by a salmon smoking business, founded in 1905 though only based in Hackney Wick since 1971.

6. **Nichols & Clarke Glass**: An industrial unit occupied by glass makers and distributors since 1984. The firm was actually founded in 1875 and dealt in glass, lead and paint pigments.

7. **FH Brundle & Son**: An industrial unit occupied by metal distributors since 1990. The firm was actually founded in 1894 and dealt primarily in nails and horseshoes.

8. **Bilmerton Wigs**: A unit in a 19th Century sweet factory occupied by third generation suppliers of wigs and hairpieces.

Flyvbjerg argues that whilst the ‘case study’ enables empirical knowledge of specific, concrete situations to be acquired, it can provide a springboard for broader, more general reflections and/or theorisations (2001, p. 76). In a related manner, Lefebvre (1991a) argues that placing emphasis on ‘the specific does not preclude the formal, and the particular does not preclude the general’ (p. 180). He argues that urban research should be able to move between different ‘levels of social reality’ and, thus, should progress ‘from the most general to the most specific... [and to] the general by identifying the elements and significations of what is observable in the urban’ (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]). Flyvbjerg suggests that case-studies enable ‘general’ theory to be ‘tested’ and, likewise, that knowledge of concrete examples can provide a strong basis for ‘propositional’ thinking (2001, p. 81).

This study’s inclusion of a range of case studies has the purpose of obtaining ‘information about the significance of various circumstances for case process and outcome’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 79). Constructing an explanation of the impacts of the Compulsory Purchase of the Olympic site relied, in these terms, on revealing, counterpoising and then evaluating the
significance of the variations between the accounts of the case study groups, in relation to official accounts of purposes and values associated with land assembly and redevelopment.

This research involved both ‘soft’ or qualitative research methods and quantitative research, though with an emphasis on the former. These methods, described in more depth in the next section, included in-depth interviews with representatives from the above groups and with representatives from the organisations leading the development of the LMF, mapping and documentary photography, attendance at and participation in public meetings relating to the above processes, the study of archival materials relating to the case study spaces and of political, legal and design documents relating to the two processes listed above.

Flyvbjerg supports social science research that involves, as he puts it, non-dualistic and pluralistic - ‘both-and’ - methodologies (2001, p. 47) as these, he claims, enable a subject to be revealed in a variety of different lights and thus, potentially, with greater accuracy than could be achieved through more singular approaches. Bauer and Gaskell also advocate forms of what they term ‘methodological pluralism’ (2000, p. 4). The ‘both-and’ or pluralistic methodology of this research allows me to take into account of visual, verbal and written modes and styles of communication as well as the spatial and temporal contexts through and in which views and values are propounded and/or decisions reached.

Part 1: Collecting data

2.1 Records of place

As I began to explore the CPO process in 2007, it became increasingly important to understand the site in an historical context – as a product of a number of processes unfolding over time which had gradually created the particular conditions of urban form and use to which strategic plans for the site responded.

As a result, I undertook archival research relating to the site in libraries around London, particularly the Guildhall, the Bishopsgate Institute and the London Metropolitan Archives. I was particularly interested in exploring the site in terms of: a) histories of the kinds of use which the case-study groups represented, and; b) official characterisations of the site as ‘deprived’ and therefore as in need of regeneration. This research led to a collection of
historic maps and photographs of the site and its immediate surroundings, which provided the springboard for further explorations into the backgrounds of these images as well as of the structures and uses they depicted. These are discussed in Chapter 3.

In the months preceding the LDA’s construction of the Olympic site boundary, I spent several weekends exploring it on foot and recording it photographically. The record is incomplete – given the shortage of time, I spent too much time selecting and thinking about the composition of particular views - not getting around the site quickly – only realising retrospectively that what I most needed was a comprehensive set of ‘snaps’ documenting as much of the area as possible. Notwithstanding, everything image I have would now be impossible to retake, making the set a valuable record of history that appeared long-gone after an interval of mere months. I employed it in descriptively explaining how the pre-Olympic site was occupied and used at the time of the CPO and a small number are included in Chapter 4. After the former site occupants had been relocated, I photographed the case study groups’ new spaces, producing a record of the spatial implications of their migrations and also of some of the first tangible legacies of the Olympics. A key question informing the framing of each was: what is distinctive about this space in comparison to what users had before? Some of the images from this set were shown at an exhibition held by the Oxford University based research group COMPAS at the Oxford Town Hall in 2010.

At the time that I was undertaking research on relating to the CPO, the site was beginning to be demolished and that there were no contemporary maps that recorded it in any detail – indicating for example the relationships between the form of the urban landscape, the materiality of its open spaces and the distribution of its occupancies and uses that I began to see as a crucial part of the story of how the CPO process unfolded and of why it unfolded as it did. I decided to produce one: to create a detailed description of the site that I could return to even once the demolition was complete. A Crown Copyright licence was obtained for a contemporary digital Ordnance Survey (OS) map (1:1250 scale) which was used as a base for this map. Adding information about uses, occupancies and specificities of particular spaces to the OS involved drawing on and effectively translating information from a range of other sources - as discussed in Section 2.3. These records of place were then complemented by records of process.
2.2 Records of process

2.2.1 Collecting interviews

I began to conduct interviews early on in the research and continued to pursue conversations with some interviewees until late in the writing up process. I found this to be crucial for the development of a nuanced view of the relation between people’s individual perspectives and the different stages of the site’s redevelopment. People’s views, levels of interest and involvements changed over the course of the research leading them at times to reconsider claims or statements made early on. This interview process also reflected a wider characteristic of this research, in which there was never a time of field-work versus a time of writing up. Researching and analysing were continually bound up with reading and writing.

Given the above areas of research focus, interviews were conducted with the following groups:

1. Owners, representatives and/or users from each of the case study spaces.
2. Representatives of organisations affiliated historically with these spaces that are still in existence.
3. Representatives from the main organisations involved in leading the public Consultation and Engagement programme undertaken in the preparation of the Legacy Masterplan Framework and which reflect the hierarchy of authority and decision-making on the project (Greater London Authority (GLA), London Development Agency (LDA), the local Borough authorities, the masterplanning team).

Forty-six interviews were conducted in total, as shown in Appendix A. This number includes only pre-arranged or planned conversations, thus excluding many informal and valuable conversations with people at the range of Olympic-related events I attended over the course of the research. For the most part, interviews were conducted with individuals representing their groups or organisations in terms of designated roles – such as local group spokespeople, managers of divisions at the LDA, ODA and OPLC and senior architects representing their firms’ proposals at public events. In the analysis of how positions on, say, the purposes of the CPO intersected or diverged, I was conscious of and endeavoured to
acknowledge that the relationship between individual voices and representations on behalf of groups is often far from straightforward.

Interviews were held at a number of locations, always of the interviewees’ choice. It seemed more important in terms of having an open, stimulating conversation to meet somewhere convenient and relaxing for the interviewee – whether at a pub, allotment plot or their office canteen - and to supplement scratchy sound recording with note-taking if necessary, than to be directive about a particular kind of venue for meeting.

In obtaining interviews with anyone appointed as a consultant by the ODA or LDA, it was necessary to gain official permission to speak to them. Once their processes of negotiation with the LDA over relocation and financial claims settlements were complete, the case study groups listed above were, for most part, keen to discuss their experiences. Exceptions to this rule were the Waterden Road Travellers. As a group they felt they had suffered at the hands of the press during the CPO process and were thus reluctant to expose their actions and outcomes to further scrutiny. After a number of e-mails, phone-calls and an official clearing, a meeting with a representative from the group was arranged through Hackney Homes and conducted in their meeting room. Once this meeting was over, the representative - who came across as nervous in that context - invited me to visit her family in their newly built home. This experience served to reinforce an instinct that being flexible and humble in my expectations of people’s willingness to talk was the way forward for securing some rewarding conversations.

Interviews were prepared for in advance by writing out a list of key questions. As my knowledge of sequences of events relating to the CPO and LMF design processes increased, I focussed more directly on people’s different experiences and views. This learning process created the need to return to respondents met early on in the process for more in-depth and nuanced conversations. Potential interviewees often wanted to know what the research was about and how they were being asked to contribute to it. When requested, pre-prepared questions were sent in advance of the interview enabling people to also consider their responses in advance, and thus for the balance of power in the conversation to be levelled. In some instances, it seemed that the presence of a list of questions led to rather quick-fire, un-spontaneous exchanges and it could be challenging to find ways - on the hoof - to get past the reiteration of institutional rhetoric or mere statements of fact. In others, conversations veered away from the pre-prepared questions, something I always
allowed to occur, valuing the rapport that often came about through doing so as well as the pieces of information gleaned at these times that weren’t necessarily directly related to my research aims but sometimes caused me to adjust them. A consequence of doing so, however, was some very long interviews and sometimes the sense of a need to find circuitous routes back to the site, the process and/or the research themes.

All interviews were transcribed verbatim, with the assistance of a professional firm. Each is between 15,000-30,000 words long, building up to a considerable document. Extracting the sections that were most relevant to the research aims outlined in the introductory chapter involved numerous readings and several attempts to code the transcripts. In order to protect the privacy of some interviewees, pseudonyms were given when highlighting their views in the text of the thesis. This strategy was agreed with respondents. Pseudonyms were not given to people whose identities in terms of their role in the CPO or LMF design development process would be virtually impossible to conceal.

### 2.2.2 Observation and participation

Between 2008 and 2009, I attended numerous public meetings relating to the design of the LMF hosted by the LDA as well as a number hosted by the ODA relating to ongoing negotiations over the legacy of Olympic venues with some of the case-study groups. The LDA’s LMF Consultation and Engagement programme was organised into three tiers of so called ‘Technical’, ‘Issue-led’ and ‘Public’ workshops. I was not able to attend the Technical Workshops, but attended all the other events. Not being able to attend the Technical Workshops helped to hone my third research aim, which focuses not on how design strategies are produced in relatively closed spheres, but on how, where and when they are released into the public domain.

The masterplanners, LDA representatives and other consultation experts who led these events were familiar with this research, often inviting me to contribute views at workshops and discussing issues informally whilst setting up PowerPoint presentations or over coffee. Rather than sound recordings, I took detailed notes for later comparison against the LDA’s minutes which, as a legitimate participant, I received a few weeks after each workshop. In the notes, I recorded details about the setting of the consultations – characteristics of the spaces in which these were held, where people sat in relation to one another and numbers of people present, for example – as well as the nature of the communicative exchanges
that took place at each - questions participants raised, details of the PowerPoint presentations shown, my perceptions of the general mood of the workshops and so on. I considered how what members of the public said was recorded, summarised and converted by them into briefing documents for the masterplanners. Finally, through interviews with architects in the masterplanning team, I considered how the contents of these documents then informed the design team’s visions. I sought to address the wider question of how concepts of the Olympic legacy and regeneration – in relation to the existing site, and the LMF vision of future benefits and ‘communities’ – functioned in the democratic context of these consultation settings.

2.2.3 Collecting policies, strategies and design reports

A range of different documents relating to the pre-Olympic site and to the processes outlined above are used in the investigations of the substantive chapters 4 - 7. The key policies and documents relating to the CPO and the LMF that particularly convey the themes of legacy and regeneration are as follows:

6. National, Metropolitan and Local Government policy and policy guidance relating to regeneration, under headings including ‘Urban Renaissance’ (for example, DETR, 1999) and ‘Sustainable Communities’ (ODPM, 2003; Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005; ODA & LDA, 2007).
7. The London Development Agency’s strategy and internal policies relating to ‘community consultation’ (ODA & LDA, 2008).
8. Versions of the pre-planning Legacy Masterplan Framework (which were known as Outputs B and C) presented at public consultation events between 2008 and 2009.

9. A work-in-progress version of the LMF produced following the public consultations in 2009 and in the context of political and economic change.

Versions of the LMF show the gradual development of the masterplan framework between different phases of pre-planning application consultation. In seeking to evaluate a) the conceptions of legacy and regeneration and they represent; b) the effectiveness of these presentations in communicating intentions to the public, and; c) their reception, it is important, as Becker, argues, to understand who the ‘makers’ of these images are and the contexts for their production. Making visual materials involves, in Becker’s terms, selecting particular ‘raw materials’ and then transforming them into new media through which they come to ‘take the form of an argument’ (2007, p. 27). Given that how masterplanners present their arguments about the regeneration potentials of the Olympic site at public consultations significantly influences their interpretation, this research considers the contexts for the making of images as well as the contexts for their interpretation by local users.

An important link between all the above documents except for the 2009 draft version of the London Plan and the final version of the LMF is that they were all produced in the context of a central and metropolitan level Labour Government. The significance of this for conceptions of the regeneration legacy is particularly suggested through the analysis in Chapter 7 of how political and economic change through 2009 and 2010 impacted on the masterplan.

Part 2: Analytic approaches

Approaching the above collected data in the light of the principal aims and questions of this research raised some particular challenges which are worth briefly stating before proceeding further.

Firstly, there was the issue of the relationship between data collection sites - the specific site selected for the Olympic Games, the urban policy and planning strategy sites of discourse on London’s Olympic Legacy and regeneration, the visual image sites through which spatial transformation visions were articulated, and the controlled social settings of
public consultations at which plans were received and views exchanged. Secondly, there was the issue of how to approach the analysis of change or transformation in each of these sites and consider how this influenced the relations between them. This part of the chapter is divided into two main sections entitled ‘Spatial Contexts’ and Discursive Contexts’ which relate to the records or place and process sections above but which also endeavour to bring them together.

2.3 Spatial Contexts: visual sociology and the analysis of visual materials

The thesis contains a range of visualisations, portraying findings of the research described in sections 2.2 above. These fall into two broad categories. The first includes all the visualisations that I made as part of the process of exploring, recording and describing the site, site context and processes of site development according to selected themes. These include a number of scaled maps, photographs and charts. The second category includes all the representations of the site or designs for it produced by others. These also include a range – historic maps and photographs, and architectural drawings, diagrams and charts forming part of the Olympic Park and Legacy Masterplan and the LMF. It is important to distinguish between these two categories because inevitably my relationship to them as ‘maker’, ‘user’ or, in some cases, somewhere between the two, to use Becker’s terminology, is crucial to the roles they perform in the research. The former may be characterised generally as the products of analysis, the latter generally as objects of analysis.

2.3.1 Making visuals

With several hundred photos taken, a range historical maps collected, a digital Ordnance Survey base and numerous Google Earth views downloaded, I was confronted with questions of how to make something of these that was both more than and more distilled than their sum. What information to prioritise or select? What, in the context of the research aims and focal areas could be done visually to link a set of photos, drawings or maps, to, as Becker suggests, fold them into an ‘argument’ (p. 27)?

Becker argues that visual materials only become ‘visual sociology’ when they are ‘elements integral to the sociological investigation and therefore to a reader’s sociological understanding’ (p. 199). The visualisations included in Chapters 3 and 4 were selected
and/or produced at the same time as the text for these chapters. Both, in these terms, began to be developed in response to the ‘raw data’ (Tufte, 1990, p. 10) I was collecting from the varied research sites. As a result, concentrating on either one at any time informed the later development of the other, leading to a continual exchange between writing and visualising.

Beginning to make, select or assemble images required a brief outline of their purpose in the light of research aims – for example, to explore the variability of spaces on the site or historic processes of urbanisation, and to represent these topics in a readily digestible way. In some cases, the purpose was to explore and document transformation in the physical landscape of the site. In others, it was to capture and, in a sense, allow a moment or period of time - in which, say, boundaries or urban forms appeared in a particular configuration - to be preserved.

Tufte refers to choices of representational approach and technique as ‘design strategies’, called forth in order to ‘effectively document and envision’ (p. 15). The words document and envision together convey the impression that visual analysis involves the representation of facts or actualities relating to a specific topic but also synthetic processes of reinterpretation and re-imagination in the terms of a visual language and/or system of notation. Envisioning information involves decisions not only on how to arrange and categorise gathered records relating broadly to research aims but on what to include and exclude, what data to bring together and how to deploy it in such a way as to be able, say, to identify previously unnoticed correlations between different records or record categories. Making and editing images involves further decisions with regard to representational tools – computer aided design (CAD), pens and pencils, Photoshop or desktop publishing for example - and associated graphical techniques relating, for example, to the deployment of colour, font, line weight or symbol. Such decision-making, if pursued with care, can contribute to analysts’ understandings of their objects of study, coming to reveal not just their described findings but their argued positions on it.

Given my professional background and keenness to consider the effects of regeneration policy and strategy implementation on a physical site, I often made use of architectural drawing conventions and tools in this research. Whilst the application of such conventions leads to the production of particular kinds of images and views – plans, sections or perspectives for example – there is still considerable scope within these conventions for
invention relating to the purposes of visual analysis and to the information at hand. Arguably, scaled drawings may be considered as displays of quantitative information. They are illustrations of ‘hard’ facts such as how forms and functions relate in terms of distance or concentration in geographic space. However, they also represent interpretations of the relative significance of such facts. As everything about a geographic locality cannot be shown on a single map, the selection, however carefully considered, of what to show is an interpretative act.

In Chapter 3, I used maps (projections of the site in a planimetric view) to explore how the site urbanised between 1750 and 1950. The base for these was a series of collected maps from archives which were photocopied, stuck together and then photocopy-reduced to an A4 paper format and size. In order not to confuse my aim with the stylistic differences between the maps I collected, I redrew each of them by hand, taking care to maintain consistency in terms of the informational range included in each images and in terms of graphical appearance. These redrawn images were then juxtaposed as a series along a timeline - a commonly-used strategy for describing processes. This suggested that the transformation from an agricultural to urban environment in the Lea Valley was never quite completed. The way in which, for example, development proceeded by incrementally infilling former fields recalled Sassen’s analysis of change as historically embedded, more often involving the re-assemblage than the destruction of ‘prior orders’ (2008). Thinking about the site in terms of an ‘order’ rather than simply of a spatial form led to a reworking of this series of maps by addition of the boundaries of authority in each represented period. The juxtaposition of visualised boundaries - which were often the same boundaries simply reinvested with new meanings – formed a springboard informed by literature for conceptualising the evolving site in terms of the wider phenomenon of capitalist urbanisation.

The maps included in Chapter 4 involved slightly different strategies to those described above. A major aim in producing maps showing spatial relationships between occupancy, use and urban form at the time of the CPO was to provide a level of detail and specificity that was present in the CPO document’s list of sites to be acquired, but not in any of the visualisations of the site included in the Olympic and Legacy Masterplan Planning Applications in 2007. I was inspired by the way in which makers of engraved maps such as John Rocque managed to characterise the environments of use they depicted. Focussing on specific categories such as use and form through visual representation involved extracting
information from the wealth of possible information that could be communicated about the site. The process of documenting the Olympic site in painstaking detail - space by space, boundary by boundary - served to reveal a density and mixing of use across the site that I was not aware of before. This enabled me to formulate a position on some of the potential values of urban complexity and (apparent) disorder. As a ‘design strategy’, it was deliberately quite different to that taken by the masterplanning team, whose drawings of the pre-development site suggested a far simpler order – in so doing helping them to justify a case for its erasure. Such representational differences help to highlight the discursive nature of envisioned information, discussed further in section 2.4 below.

2.3.2 Using visuals and ‘imagetexts’

All the images discussed above represent the site as it was in the past. Focussing on the LMF raises methodological challenges for the analysis of visualisations of imagined, future environments. What does the futurity aspect of them mean for their status in relation to the physical site? How to interpret images in relation to other statements about the Olympic Legacy and its purposes?

Whilst a literature has developed in recent years relating to ‘visual methodologies’ for the social sciences, there is little to no analysis of architectural representation within this area. There is therefore little discussion of the specific communicative roles that architectural drawings and models play in wider processes of development or on ways of analysing their content. The architectural drawing, unlike many other visual materials, is a form of proxy for a future, spatial reality – it mediates between the varied contexts of its design and the concrete reality in which it will unfold. The choice of drawing or model for a particular presentation is important if the ‘maker’ is to persuade their particular audience to support their project’s development to construction.

The LMF is presented as a report and hence continually combines images and text. Sometimes images appear as illustrations to text; at others, the text appears in a supporting role to images. Notwithstanding, throughout the report, both images and text are used to convey the masterplanners’ conceptual orientations and spatial propositions. Their interconnection yet intrinsic differences in terms of ‘representational practices’ (Mitchell, 1994, p. 83) creates methodological challenges for the analysis of both the LMF’s contents and its relation to wider, mostly (if not entirely) text-based regeneration
discourses. In response to the former of these challenges, I focus on identifying, in Foucault’s terms, ‘correlations’ or ‘regularities’ (2002 [1969], p. 41) between images and text. In response to the latter, I begin with the assumption that whilst architectural drawings constitute particular kinds of representation, they should be analysed in the context of a wider set of representations, including speech and text. In the LMF, drawings and textual narrative are integrated, forming a kind of ‘imagetext’ (Mitchell, pp. 83 - 110).

I focus most specifically on drawings in Chapter 5. Here I take into account what they contain and exclude (for example uses, structures or the weather) how they were made, how they, in themselves, serve to articulate both concepts and spatial organisations, and, lastly, some of the communicative possibilities and limitations of their principal conventions. Given that all the images in the LMF follow architectural conventions in one way or another, and given the lack of attention these receive in social science visual methodologies, I often refer to theories of architectural representation in my analysis.

2.4 Discursive contexts

In approaching the analysis of the varied contexts of interview transcript, consultations with the public in the design development of the LMF, urban policy and planning strategy relating to the regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley and the LMF itself, I drew particularly on specific literature from the relatively broad field of discourse analysis. The following were important in formulating my analytic approach:

Foucault argues that in seeking to study particular concepts, the problem ‘arises of knowing whether the unity of a discourse is based not so much on the permanence and uniqueness of an object as on the space in which various objects emerge and are continuously transformed’ (2002 [1969], p. 36). This suggests that discourse analysis should concentrate on the temporal, spatial and social contexts in which meanings are constructed and reconstructed – including, in this case, architects’ offices, the LDA’s meeting rooms and the Hackney Wick Community Centre where consultations were held. Dijk argues that discourse analysis ‘defines text and talk as situated: discourse is described as taking place or as being accomplished ‘in’ a social situation (1996, p. 11). This suggests the formulation of certain kinds of research question in relation to objects of discourse. These typically take the form of ‘how?’ questions and relate to the discovery or discerning of the processes which, as
Foucault writes, ‘make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time’ (2002 [1969], p. 36).

Gill (2000) identifies a core interest of discourse analysts as in exploring ‘texts in their own right, rather than seeing them as ‘getting at’ some reality which is deemed to lie behind the discourse - whether social, psychological or material’ (p. 174). Discourse analysts are generally less interested in using data to deduce ultimate truths or ‘what really happened’ than to develop understandings of relationships between different kinds of truth claim, specifically in terms of how these operate in given spheres of social practice. Gill argues that, ‘as social actors, we are continuously orienting to the interpretative context in which we find ourselves, and constructing our discourse to fit that context’ (p. 175).

After Foucault, I consider both ‘legacy’ and ‘regeneration’ as ‘discursive formations’ and sought to analyse some of their ‘rules of formation’ over the period of the research. Through my analysis, I focussed particularly on: a) contexts of their emergence, particularly urban policy, planning and urban design; b) their division into particular sub-categories, for example in terms of a set of defined benefits, in relation to particular communities, urban histories or urban forms, and; c) regeneration and legacy-building as practices which are delimited in certain ways, such as in the terms of exchange between masterplanners of the LMF and communities in statutory consultation processes.

Before going on to the next section, it is important to say that though much discourse analysis focuses in considerable detail on small pieces of text, my analysis ranges over a broad range of materials. I am thus conscious of using discourse analysis with a relatively light touch.

2.4.1 Analysing interviews

As a set, the interview transcripts contain a considerable amount of information. They denote a variety of different claims, statements and propositions about and with respect to the purposes and effects of regeneration for the Olympic site. Different transcripts reveal subtle differences in terms of how people say things – by choice or otherwise - and thus communicate their intentions, views and/or meanings. Beginning to analyse the contents of the transcripts involved a series of linear and iterative processes including: a) coding the data according to categories established by the research aims, then/also in terms of the
thesis chapters; b) looking in the transcripts for other terms or categories that appeared to correlate with the research themes (such as community involvement, site value or piecemeal development), and; c) rereading, checking and recoding. Manual techniques were selected for coding printed transcripts using coloured pens and post-it notes. Microsoft Word tools were employed in running searches for potential key words, highlighting these, extracting sections of transcript which provided the richest source of analytic material and pasting them under either thematic or chapter headings. Although this involved many hours of work and a rigorous, consistent approach, I was continually aware of being guided by hunches or intuitions about the material or by having greater interest in some topics over others. Sometimes the reading of an interview gave clues for a chapter or chapter section; at other times I went looking for a suitable quote in the transcripts. As Gill argues, it is important to accept that analysis leads only to interpretation though nonetheless ‘warranted by detailed argument and attention to the material being studied’ (2000, p. 184).

2.4.2 Analysing ‘consultation and engagement’ practices

The focus of my interest in consultations was on the practice of ‘including’ people, said to lie at the heart of the LDA’s participatory approach. Consultation and Engagement events led by the LDA provided settings in which, at least in theory, alternatives to the ‘dominant narrative’ of how the Olympic site’s redevelopment would benefit people in East London could be articulated and gain influence. Analysis focuses on some of the connections between official discourses and a discourse which unfolds ‘as an event’ (Foucault, 1981) in a deliberative setting.

A notable feature of the events viewed in terms of a politics of inclusion was the exchange of different kinds of representation — drawings, statistical charts, bullet-pointed statements, diagrams and so on — and the co-presence of people from numerous different institutions, disciplinary and professional backgrounds with different connections to the site. These differences created the need for each participant (including the masterplanners) to interpret and/or translate what others were saying.

Becker argues that translation is ‘a function that maps one set of elements (the parts of reality that makers want to represent) onto another set of elements’ (2007, p. 21). Those consulted were required to translate, in these terms, the visualisations that masterplanners
showed them. LDA representatives charged with note-taking at each event – who were usually not designers or planners - translated people’s highly varied responses by producing minutes. The masterplanning team, on receipt of these, endeavoured to translate meeting minutes into revisions of the masterplan. Each of these steps involved the reception of information in one form and its translation into another. These translations often appeared to have been performed inaccurately leading, for example, to misunderstandings between people at the events themselves, claims that the LDA were not listening, the loss of a sense of who was speaking and how in the LDA’s minutes, and the almost impossible task for designers of making meaningful sense of these minutes through their design processes. As Becker acknowledges, different contexts of seeing, interpreting and/or using representations constantly intervene in attempts at their translation. Representations ‘don’t have fixed meanings [but] live in social contexts [where they are] truth or fiction, document or imaginative construction, depending on what the ultimate users make of them’ (p. 203). In this case, inaccuracy in translations did not appear simply to reflect irreconcilabilities between different forms of communication but arose in the context of contest between masterplanners and ‘communities’, between different levels of authority and between expert and less experienced participants.

How to analyse this more closely? Basic questions I began with in establishing a framework for analysing the consultations I attended were, in debt to Foucault, as follows: a) Who spoke at each event and from what institutional context?; b) What did they show or say and how did they do this?; c) What position did they occupy – i.e. presenter, recorder, mediator, participant? Given that consultations were structured as organised events, it was also important to consider the terms in which communications between expert masterplanners and attending participants were made possible – question and answer sessions or focus groups for example. In terms of the LMF presentations, I considered how visual representations forming part of the LMF appeared to ‘invite’ particular ways of seeing or help persuade participants to believe or back the ‘Legacy Vision’. What did they show and how? What did they exclude about the site or from the presented vision of its future?

Given that not only what anyone said at the consultations but how they said it seemed to have a bearing on others’ interpretations, it seemed important to consider both statements and representations in terms of forms of communicative strategy. In her outline of the focus and purpose of ‘discourse analysis’, Dijk argues that discourse analysts are generally
concerned with how discourse constitutes forms of ‘social action’ (1996, p. 2) within broader frameworks of society and culture and therefore with ‘what people say or write in order to accomplish social, political or cultural acts’. Accomplishing such acts involves uses of linguistic and discursive tools that create, say, persuasive arguments, convincing evidence, or stirring rhetoric. It also, as has already been noted in terms of architectural drawings, involves uses of conventions in the deployment of language or what Tonkiss calls ‘expert languages’ which ‘[mark] out a field of knowledge’ and bestow authority (2004, p. 7). How, as Dijk suggests, ‘language users engage in discourse as members of (dominant, or dominated, or competing) groups or organisations’ (1996, p. 3) is key to understanding how power relations play out, are perpetuated or evolve.

What strategies were employed and by whom to in order to secure outcomes for individuals and/or groups with respect to the Legacy Masterplan Framework? The displaced cyclists, for example, in seeking to secure a piece of territory designated as parkland for sole use by cyclists, frequently adopted an aggressive stance, deploying a range of strategies including the interruption of masterplanners’ presentations, demands for other kinds of information or incredulous laughter. The LDA countered this with strategies of their own including making use of their authority to limit the scope of the cyclists’ participation. The analysis considers how strategies were developed in the context of adversarial relations and, conversely, how strategies were deployed in forging alliances or connections between disparate positions, levels of authority and ownership.

The above considerations allow me, particularly in Chapter 6, to evaluate the relationships between intended and actual outcomes of consultation on the planning of the project and to reflect more broadly on the challenge of integrating local perspectives in processes predicated on the long-term delivery of predetermined outcomes.

**2.4.3 Analysing policies, strategies and design reports**

The documents listed above are analysed in ways that also draw on the approaches to discourse outlined above. Taking the Mayor’s *Five Legacy Commitments* for example, I consider the kinds of rationalities they underscore - with respect to the purposes of Olympic-led regeneration on the one hand and building ‘communities’ on the other. Dijk argues that as ‘ideologies are developed by dominant groups in order to reproduce and legitimate their domination (p. 25) it is important that analysis of them takes into account
their particular social functions. She highlights how they exist in order to ‘solve a specific problem of coordination of acts of people in a social group or society’ and, in these terms, to articulate frameworks of shared identity, value or position (p. 29). In the context of this study, I consider how they filter through discourse relating to the role of the LMF and inform practices of consultation and engagement.

2.6. Why this research matters

Each of the above methods – of data collection and analysis – has been used in endeavouring to conceptualise the role of design in showing in terms of buildings, spaces and uses how benefits said to be connected with the Olympics could be transposed onto the physical site context of London 2012.

So, why does this research matter? The political commitments for legacy convey the sense of a debt on behalf of government to all the Londoners who contributed to the financing of the Games and the construction of the Olympic park. Legacy, over the course of this research, was a future and yet one in which large amounts of money had been invested. In 2005, the LDA, as we will see in Chapter 4, put forward a strong case for why investment in spatial redevelopment in Lea Valley would help would transform east London for the good of its residents. In so doing, it was responding to the criticism of past Games that local people have been negatively impacted by mega-events. However, promises, as Adam and Groves (2007) teach us, do not provide strong enough evidence that transformations will unfold as intended. At least some of the evidence lies in how processes unfold in the present, in what they ‘say’ and what they appear to make possible. So where is that evidence and how can we evaluate it?
Chapter 3

Beating the Bounds: charting boundaries of ownership and authority in the changing landscape of the Lower Lea Valley, 1745 – 2005

You can’t do away with the Manor Boys
For they’ll be needed bye and bye
For every one of the Manor Boys
Is ready to do or die
For they made the name of Hackney
As mighty as mighty can be
If it wasn’t for the Manor Boys
Where would dear old Hackney be?
In the workhouse.

The Eton Manor Club Song (Source: Villiers Park Educational Trust, 2008).

3. Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 1, swathes of the Lea Valley along with London’s former Docklands presented a picture of redundancy and dereliction by the beginning of the 1980s. Having constituted an important site in the context of London’s industrial economy, the Lower Lea Valley and its fringes were reduced to a margin in terms of the main processes fuelling London’s post-industrial economic growth. Although the Isle of Dogs, close to the mouth of the River Lea, began to be transformed into a new business district from the early 1980s, by the late 1990s, spatial, social and economic marginality remained a feature of the Lower Lea Valley. Whilst, as I discuss in the next chapter, this created certain kinds of opportunity for specific users of the valley during this time, it also helped to reinforce impressions of increasing polarisation in terms of levels of investment and the relative affluence of different parts of London. Strategic documents relating to the Compulsory Purchase of the Olympic site frequently associate levels of ‘deprivation’ measured in the Lower Lea Valley with the decline of heavy and processing industries in the area from the mid-twentieth
century and the later closure of the London Docks (RPG 3, 1996; Capita Symonds, 2007; Eversheds LLP and LDA, 2005, p. 3-5). The measurement of these levels of ‘deprivation’ is discussed in the next chapter in terms of its contribution to the formulation of a ‘case’ for large-scale redevelopment in the Lea Valley from the early 2000s including the comprehensive redevelopment of the Olympic site.

Whilst de-industrialisation clearly played an important role in influencing the fortunes of many residents of the London boroughs bordering the Lower Lea Valley from the 1960s, older historical records relating to it suggest that poverty and deprivation are more complexly and lastingly associated with this area. Charles Booth’s accounts, for example, of the living standards of workers in factories on the site at the end of the nineteenth century reveal that ‘chronic want’ was also experienced by people here at the height of Britain’s imperial might, London’s industrial productivity and its metropolitan expansion (Booth, 1892, 1895). Between 1830 and 1875, the valley was transformed from a system of rural fields and marshes bordered by villages and farms to an industrial district at the periphery of London. By 1900, it contained some of the most noxious, polluting, poorly paying industries requiring some of the least skilled labour in the capital and was lined with poor quality, crowded neighbourhoods.

In this chapter, I am interested in exploring how a history of poverty and deprivation became linked to the topography of the valley over time. This, I argue is crucial for developing understandings of the context in which the Lea Valley appeared as an ‘Opportunity Area’ ripe for redevelopment and as a suitable focus for an Olympic bid. The physical rift in the larger Thames Valley which the Lea River creates has been used to denote political boundaries for more than a thousand years. Throughout this time it has, if in evolving ways, been characterised as an edge to the centres of civic life that lie beyond it to both the east and west. Although the valley’s nineteenth and early twentieth century uses were central to London’s industrial economy, their environmental effects caused them to be relegated to the city’s margins and with them those disadvantaged communities who sought work within them. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between ‘deprivation’ - as a long-term social and spatial characteristic of the Olympic site - and the influence of changing boundaries of land ownership and authority. The chapter provides a background for the explorations of the next chapter which focuses on some of the effects of new boundary conditions formed through the Compulsory Purchase of the
Olympic site in 2007, and at the same time endeavours to use this to explain some of the ways in which this process unfolded.

In focussing on historic ‘deprivation’, it is important to acknowledge that this term has been defined in different ways and with different purposes over time. The ‘dimensions’, ‘domains’ and ‘measures’ of deprivation established by the *English Indices of Deprivation* (2000, 2004) are quite different from the categories established by Charles Booth (1902) for example, which link levels of material want to assumptions about character ‘types’ associated with social ‘classes’. In this chapter, I employ Noble et al’s broad definition of deprivation as ‘unmet need, which is caused by a lack of resources of all kinds, not just financial’ and as a characteristic of an area only ‘relative to other areas’ (Noble, Wright, Smith, and Dibben, 2006, pp. 9-10).

The exploration begins with an analysis of the changing nature and role of spatial boundaries which crossed the Olympic site between 1750 and 1950. The starting point for this analysis is a series of maps of London in a regional context produced at roughly seventy-five year intervals between these dates. Each of these provides comparable information about topography, figure ground, field patterns and so on. Information about land uses, ownership and local authority vary considerably in detail and accuracy however - in direct relation to the purposes for which each map was originally produced. For example, John Rocque’s mid-eighteenth century maps of London communicate detailed information about how physical boundaries between different land uses were constituted. However, they don’t suggest the same concern for plotting the precise geographies of administrative boundaries – a concern that is evident in the Tithe Maps of the mid-nineteenth century and the slightly later Ordnance Survey. In conceptualising the processes evidenced by the maps – the gradual aggregation of buildings and infrastructure but the only ever partial transformation of the site from ‘rural’ to fully ‘urban’ – Sassen’s (2006) and Soja’s (2000) ideas about the ‘specificity of the city’ are particularly useful. The exploration takes into account boundaries that have varying degrees of physical presence. I focus on the gradual shift in the significance of physical boundaries implying local territorial control to more abstract boundaries denoting political jurisdictions – the London boroughs, electoral wards and nineteenth century parishes. This shift can be viewed in the context of the far wider, gradual reorientation of English society from feudalism to the urban capitalist order of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Thompson, 1963), with significant consequences for the uses of the Lea Valley. Through this analysis, I consider how
boundaries ‘exert’, as Jane Jacobs suggests, ‘an active influence’ on the use of space (Jacobs, 1993 [1961], p. 336) as well as how they serve to denote both the scope of formal authority and less formalised kinds of participation and belonging. Although I use the word boundary to denote a variety of limits and edges, I acknowledge the subtlety of the distinction Sennett (2007) draws between ‘boundary’ and ‘border’ conditions.

In the second and third parts of the chapter, the role and significance of boundaries is further explored through three interrelated ways of assembling or ordering this territory - ‘Enclosure’, ‘Philanthropy’ and ‘Industrialisation’ - which relate to specific places on the Olympic site. The part on ‘enclosure’ focuses on the privatisation and urbanisation of common land in the Lea Valley from the nineteenth century. The part on industry and philanthropy focus on the frequently cited relationship between the loss of common productive land, industrialisation and the emergence of an English ‘working class’ (Thompson, 1963) including some of the ways in which philanthropic endeavours in east London sought to ameliorate some of the harshest conditions of urban life and labour. Harvey’s notion of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is employed in conceptualising the relationship between changing patterns of ownership of or affiliation to territory and this deprivation (Harvey, 2006). The chapter concludes with comments about historic linkages between forms of boundary making and ‘deprivation’, so setting the scene for the next chapter on the Compulsory Purchase of the Olympic site.

3.1 Mapping Ownership/Mapping Authority

The marshy depression of the valley of the River Lea has formed a political, administrative and territorial boundary since at least the sixth century. In 527 AD, the River Lea was designated the boundary between the Saxon kingdoms of Essex and Middlesex. From the ninth until the twelfth century, it denoted part of a quasi national and certainly legal and ethnic boundary known as the Danelaw between the Anglo-Saxon and the Danish Viking kingdoms of Britain (Davis, 1955). Following the Norman Conquest in 1066, this was transformed into a ‘county’ boundary between territories still possessing the Saxon names of Essex and Middlesex but which were now administrative and legal units of England. Although the functions of local government evolved considerably, this designation continued right up until 1965 when the County of Middlesex and the County of London were abolished as administrative entities and replaced by the Greater London Council
(GLC). The limits of London were also extended into areas formerly known as Essex in order to embrace the organic expansions of the city to the east of the River Lea.

Figure 1 is an excerpt of the surveyor and cartographer John Rocque’s *An Exact Survey of the City’s of London, Westminster, ye Borough of Southwark and the Country near 10 miles round London* engraved and published between 1741 and 1745. This was the first accurately scaled map (at scale: 5"3/4: 5000Ft) created using the most advanced trigonometrical surveying methods of the time, to depict London in a regional context. It is drawn to such a fine level of detail that it succeeds in suggesting not only the form and organisation of the cities and of their rural hinterlands but also the utilization of land (Varley, 1948). Although physical enclosures, boundaries and the built forms of villages are carefully drawn, administrative or property boundaries are not indicated.

![Figure 3.1: Excerpt from John Rocque’s An Exact Survey of the City’s of London, Westminster, ye Borough of Southwark, and the country near 10 miles round London, 1741-1745 (Source: The London Metropolitan Archives, 2011).](image)

In the portion of the map covering the current Olympic site, a floodplain of meandering river ways and partially drained marsh meadows is shown. The valley was bordered by the
manors and farms of Ruckholt, Chobham and Wick and by the associated villages of Leyton, Stratford, West Ham and Bow (Homerton is slightly to the west of the image below). Using realistic patterns and figures, the map differentiates between the rough grazing use of the marsh meadows, and the more structured organisation of orchards and arable fields associated with the farms and villages. To the north and south of the site were clusters of buildings, respectively marked as Temple Mills and West Ham Abbey. These were medieval monastic institutions associated respectively with the Knights Templar and the Cistercian Order, both disbanded by King Henry VIII in the sixteenth century. There were two connections across the valley, one a local road linking Homerton with Leyton, the other a primary road linking London over the marshes with the parishes, towns and villages of Essex. In the 1750s, this rural area was clearly still organised according to a feudal system which, as Sassen (2006) amongst others has argued, implied the significant conjoining of ownership of territory with political power.

Figure 3.2: Excerpt from Thomas Milne’s Plan of the Cities of London and Westminster, circumadjacent Towns and Parishes &c, laid down with a Trigonometrical Survey taken in the Years 1795-9. (Source: Hackney Archives, 2009).
Figure 2, above, is an excerpt from Plate 5 of Thomas Milne’s *Plan of the Cities of London and Westminster, circumadjacent Towns and Parishes &c, laid down with a Trigonometrical Survey taken in the Years 1795-9* (scale: 2 inches to the mile). The map indicates that considerable alterations were made to water courses in the vicinity of the site between 1750 and 1800 - most significantly through the construction of the River Lea Navigation which runs down the western edge of the valley. This map is more explicit about both ownership and use than Rocque’s map, if less detailed in its depiction of forms, surfaces and edges. Colour rather than a realistic texture pattern is used to distinguish between different parcels of land. Colours and letters, in combination, indicate their primary use and their status as either ‘enclosed’ or ‘common’. Combinations of letters and colours produce twelve possible types, descriptive of all the agricultural uses of land around London in 1800. Although the map also supplies the names of the local manors, parishes and even wards, the boundaries to these territorially bound authorities are not shown.

The portion covering the Olympic site is predominantly coloured grey green and coded ‘ma’ which indicates enclosed drained marshland pasture (Bull, 1956). However, the northern portion of the site is coded ‘c ma f’ which suggests ‘common drained marshland fields’. Its extent exactly follows the outline provided by Francis Lord Tyson Lord of the Manor in his *New and Correct Map of Hackney Marsh* of 1799, a survey of this Hackney manor’s ‘Lammas’ lands. The valley is bordered by areas of enclosed arable land indicated with yellow and the letter ‘a’, ‘paddocks or little parks’ indicated with pink and the letter ‘p’, and areas of enclosed meadows and pastures indicated with light green and the letter ‘m’. Clustered around the villages of Stratford, Leyton, Homerton and Bow were areas of enclosed market garden indicated with blue and the letter ‘g’. Although the map doesn’t show what ‘enclosure’ involved in terms of physical boundaries, it clearly shows the extent of ‘enclosed’ as opposed to ‘common’ land. Bull estimates that a third of the agricultural land shown in Milne’s complete set of maps was ‘common’ (Bull, 1956, p. 25). However, Milne succeeded in capturing a condition of land use at the cusp of change. By 1800, collective ‘open field system’ agriculture with which common land was associated was being rapidly outmoded by new technologies of agricultural production on the privately owned farms and powerful estates and by the provisions of the government’s Inclosure Acts (1750 – 1860).

Figure 3, below, is an excerpt from the Ordnance Survey first edition maps of 1867-1870 (scale 1:10560 or 5” to the mile). Given that the date of this map is only 70 years after the
Milne map, it indicates a considerable pace of change through the absorption of the rural villages into the expanding social and urban order of industrial, metropolitan London. It indicates a hybrid landscape, combining industry and terraced housing alongside vestiges of marsh and common land. It suggests that fields surrounding the traditional village nuclei were gradually infilled patch by patch with buildings. At the edges of the valley, this infilling predominantly took the form of terraced housing, intermixed with small to medium scale industries and new Victorian institutions such as the lunatic asylum and the workhouse. These institutions are suggestive not only of the presence of conditions of poverty in this area but also of the relegation of social ‘pathologies’ to the edge of the city by new urban authorities.

Figure 3.3: Excerpt from the Ordnance Survey Edition 1, 1867-1870 (Source: Edina Historical Digimap, 2010).

Industry swells north and south of the Bow to Stratford road, seeming to send out fingers of growth along the river banks. Some of the former fields in the valley are labelled as ‘brick fields’ - required by the booming construction industry and further reflecting the transformation of the Lea Valley from a rural border between country estates to the border
of a major city. However, some of the old farms and fields, like the villages, are still apparent, remaining as islands of “pure” rurality in Lefebvre’s terms (1996, p. 101), though presumably of dwindling importance for the residents and workers of the valley as a whole. They are notably divided by new rail lines. Even in the Ordnance Survey map, these have a considerable physical presence in the landscape and evidently influenced the imagination of the Lea Valley, as indicated in the somewhat optimistic image of the railway happily coexisting with country pursuits by the artist George Harley, below.

![Figure 3.4: View of the proposed Stratford Viaduct on the Eastern Counties Railway, showing two figures fishing on the bank of the River Lea, and a windmill, 1837 (Artist: George Harley; Source: The London Metropolitan Archives, 2010)](image)

The Ordnance Survey maps indicate and distinguish between different kinds of administrative boundaries – at county, borough, ward and parish levels – suggesting a new preoccupation with accurately plotting these in relation to the rapidly developing urban landscape. Though the map in 3.3 is too small to show it, the site itself is criss-crossed by boundaries of each of these kinds, most of which meet the principal county boundary running down the centre of the River Lea. These types of boundaries were not new, but urbanisation created the need for the scope of the control and responsibility which they encompassed to be more carefully defined. In the Lea Valley before the nineteenth century, as in many places, parish boundaries were marked not by cartographic records but recalled by means of annual ‘perambulation ceremonies’. These were often held on the days in the Christian calendar known as Rogation and involved whole parish participating in ‘beating
the bounds’ and the accompanying clergy beseeching (rogare) divine blessing upon the parish lands for the following harvest (Dean, 1996). These ceremonies served to reinforce the rights and responsibilities of those who were involved, a process which Fletcher (2003, pp. 186-192) views as a crucial form of public participation in localities ‘in an age before universal suffrage’.

In Medieval times, the parishes, according to Fletcher, were the ‘religious expression of the [feudal] manor’, an alignment which served to link the forms of local authority, governance and social organisation relating to each. With the introduction of the Old Poor Law in 1601 under Elizabeth I, the church became responsible for a range of civil functions in addition to its social and spiritual roles including the administration of poor relief (Fletcher, p. 179). This highly localised and unevenly managed system of welfare provision was only significantly altered with the coming of the New Poor Law in 1834. This created a far more centralised, national government controlled system which promoted the development of workhouses by Poor Law Unions and the abolition of ‘outdoor relief’ by the parishes (Mills, 1959).

Fletcher argues that this became necessary, at least in part because as the years passed and populations expanded, poor relief had become ‘so burdensome that parish boundaries became a subject of litigation’ (2003, p. 134). In general, nineteenth-century development and urbanisation created the need for a more coherent ‘system’ of governance that could rationalise the disjointed practices and territories inherited from medieval times in the form of ‘the parish, the county, the manor and the municipal corporation’ (Fletcher, 1999, pp. 132-134). In order to help achieve this, a major mapping and recording process was initiated in 1836 under Tithe Commutation Act. Interestingly, this was led by the so called Tithe Commissioners who were responsible for effecting the transformation of feudal property rights and dues in relation to the Inclosure Acts from the 1750s (Prince, 1959, p. 16). A major effect of this was the transformation of the relation of the parishes to the manorial estates and so of traditional concepts of authority and duty to ‘freehold’ property. It also underpinned the work of the Ordnance Survey.

The Ordnance Survey was created under act of parliament in 1841 (Fletcher, 1999). These maps were required in order that local authorities could efficiently coordinate developments in transport, utilities infrastructure, housing and industrial development, so also tackling issues of public health associated with the expending metropolis. A key
function of the Ordnance Survey was thus to determine the ‘public boundaries’ of mid to late-nineteenth century Britain. The ‘Metropolitan Board of Works’ (MBW) was established in London in 1856, the same year as the survey was being compiled. Leading to the creation of a series of urban districts, this represented a first serious attempt to introduce a system of local government accountable to a wider administrative body. Prominent projects for which the MBW was responsible that are visible on the above Ordnance Survey map are the Northern Outfall Sewer – part of a sewerage system constructed to designs by the engineer Joseph Balazgette between 1859-1865 as a measure to combat health deprivation produced by poor sanitation – and Victoria Park (which it didn’t initiate but became responsible for managing).

By the 1950s, all that was left of the agricultural uses of land on the site were a few patches of allotment garden. The urban grain and industrial use of the southern part of the site had become denser and more varied whilst, to the north, former common land had been converted into a mixture of recreational use, local dog-racing stadia and waste grounds beside the railway tracks, hugely expanded marshalling yards, train building works and sidings. On the 1950s Ordnance Survey maps, the county boundary between Middlesex and Essex clearly runs down the River Lea although it no longer serves to represent the limits of urban development, which now lines both sides of the valley. The borough and ward boundaries are indicated, but parishes are not, reflecting the reduced importance, if not the disappearance, of this unit of administration over time.

Figure 5, below, comprises a series of figure ground diagrams based on each of the above mentioned maps developed to show how the development of the Lea Valley proceeded over the course of two centuries.
Figure 3.5: Comparative Figure Ground drawings showing the area which is now the 2012 Olympic site. Primary boundaries of regional/local authority are marked where known (Blue = County; Red = Urban Districts; Orange= Parish (civil and religious)) (Source: Hackney Archives Ordnance Survey Collection; Maps redrawn by Juliet Davis, 2009)
This series indicates that development progressed through the incremental expansion of pre-existing settlement structures and that the evolving boundaries of authority frequently overlaid their predecessors. The nuclei of villages, primary connections such as the Bow to Stratford Road, old field patterns and common open spaces remained even as the area was enveloped by new built form and fabric, so reflecting a combination of continuity and change. This observation recalls Lefebvre’s contention that urbanization tends to ‘appropriate’ rather than to eradicate ‘old’ orders and thus that change always involves a significant degree of continuity (1996, pp. 73-74).

The city, Lefebvre argues, is ‘transformed [...] because of relatively continuous “global processes” [...] but also in relation to profound transformations in the mode of production, in the relations between ‘town and country’, in the relations of class and property’ (1996, p 105). There is arguably nowhere where the dynamics of these dialectical processes of transformation are more evident than at the edge of the city in any period of its growth. Soja (2000) has focussed more closely on the dynamic relation between these processes and the form of urban ‘agglomeration’. ‘Agglomeration’ which, in physical terms, is evident across the series of maps, is the product, according to Soja, of ‘reflexive, generative and innovative’ forces (p. 12) in social life which continually exist but acquire new kinds of ‘stimulus’ and momentum in certain periods and at specific spatial locations. The Lea Valley reflects a set of specific conditions whilst at the same time exemplifying the wider phenomenon of transformation which occurred in the relations between town and country during the period of Britain’s economic development and industrialisation in the nineteenth century. Sassen’s conceptualisation of the processes of historical transformation and (re)assembly in terms of three ‘constitutive elements’ - ‘capabilities’, ‘tipping points’ and ‘organising logics’ - helps explain the layered appearance of the later plan which is no longer of the same order as the 1750s one but nonetheless evidently a depiction of the same place, one which has been constituted and reconstituted over time through the reuse of fabric and space, through both accretion and reorganisation, not simply through the ‘destruction of the prior order’ (2007, p. 11).

In the following section, I explore three specific processes – Enclosure, Philanthropy and Industrialisation. Each has a specific relationship to the ‘deprivation’ that came to be associated with the Lea Valley’s industrialisation and urbanisation. Vestiges of these places and processes remained on the site until 2007. Given that the theme of ‘deprivation’ lies at
the heart of the regeneration aims for the Olympic Legacy, all may thus be seen as having on-going currency.

3.2 Enclosure and Cultivation

3.2.1 Lammas Lands

In medieval times, much of the site’s marshland lay within monastic lands held by the Knights Templar and the Cistercian Abbey of Langthorne. This land was transferred into the manorial domains bordering the valley following Henry VIII’s dissolution of the monasteries. From at least the thirteenth century, Hackney Marshes and East Marsh to the north of the site were Lammas Lands associated with the Village of Lower Homerton, the parish of Hackney and with the Hackney manor known as ‘Lordshold’ (Baker, 1995, pp. 92-101). From the early eighteenth century the marshes were absorbed into a wider estate formed through the purchase by Francis Tyssen of Lordshold plus two further Hackney manors—known as Grumbolds and Kingshold.

The official allocation of ‘Lammas Land’ dates from the reign of the Saxon king Alfred the Great in the ninth century, though practices relating to its use may well precede this. Lammas was the day marking midsummer and the beginning of the harvest in the Celtic Calendar. After 1752, Lammas was officially designated the 1st of August. Lammas Lands were collectively maintained meadow lands used in different seasons for growing hay and grazing livestock. The lands formed part of a system of collective farming that was widespread through Britain up until the nineteenth century under the manorial system. Under this system, land owned by estates was divided into three distinct categories of tenure. As Cunningham (1882) describes it, first was ‘the lord’s ‘domain, second the holdings of different classes of tenants, and third, the waste which belonged to the lord except in so far as many of the tenants had definite rights in regard to it’. The rights to which Cunningham refers related primarily to the use of the land and were often prescribed in relation to the manor’s scale of annual rental charges. In principle ‘commoners’ could use it to pasture their cattle from Lammas Day to Lady Day (March 25th). From Lady Day to Lammas Day they had the right to cut hay from it and store it as winter food for their livestock. The character of these meadow lands is evocatively portrayed by John Norden (1593):
This river passes through pleasant meadows and feedings which the inhabitants call marshes or meersches, and called of their low-lying or meerish or watery nature. But such a valley of fair meadows and green pastures doth accompany this river that the inhabitants there have not only a pleasant but a most profitable neighbour thereof. It yieldeth them hay in great abundance and the aftershare yieldeth food for their cattle until winter. It may make a man wonder to see the multitude of cattle which there are fed. (Ellis, Norden, and Camden Society, 1840)

![Map of Hackney Marshes and East Marsh Lammas Lands](image)

**Figure 3.6:** Location of Hackney Marshes and East Marsh Lammas Lands (Juliet Davis, 2009)

Local maps such as Tyson’s *New and Correct Map of Hackney Marsh* (1799) and Starling’s *Plan of the Parish of St. John at Hackney* (1831) indicate that these lands were cultivated in small strips that defined the extents of different users’ rights. As Cunningham explains, the dividing of cultivated common lands was done not only to ensure that each tenant household ‘might have its fair share of the annual produce’ (1882, p. 57), but also so that the Manor Lord could ascertain the extent of the tithes and other duties in respect of land
maintenance from different farmers. In reality Cunningham contends that often ‘the land which each man claimed was scattered and intermixed with the plots of his neighbours’ so generally, the work on common lands was carried out by means of common labour (p. 58).

Whilst the land was in cultivation, the strips were enclosed with temporary fencing in order to keep cattle from straying amongst the crops. Between 1st August and 25th March this was removed in order to throw them open for common grazing. A parish officer was appointed to ensure that the land was fairly shared and that no householder exceeded his allotted “stint” of cattle. Lammas Day was commemorated with celebrations, feasts and fairs. A customary event was the ‘beating of the bounds’ a process similar to that used from Anglo-Saxons times until the nineteenth century for marking the parish boundaries. It served the purpose of delineating ‘common ground’ - both a physical space and a social space of ‘shared interests’ (Mitchell, 2008).

Figure 3.7: Francis John Tyson, Lord of the Manor, A New and Correct Map of Hackney Marsh, 1799 (Source: Hackney Archives, 2009).
3.2.2 Enclosure

The process of by which agriculture was eased out of the Lea Valley began considerably before the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. Bull argues that small farmers of the Lea Valley began to feel threatened by the uses of the river for escalating trade and economic development purposes as early as the sixteenth century. The programme initiated to improve inland navigation on the River Lea appears to have created considerable conflict ‘between those who required unimpeded passage of the river for barges carrying wheat, malt, coal and iron, or for wherries carrying passengers, and those residents of the valley who were employed in farmland, mills, fisheries and game preserves’ (Bull, 1958, p. 375).

Across Britain, in the decades between 1750 and 1810, 2921 private Enclosure Acts were issued by government to already powerful land owners wishing to increase the productivity of their estates. Improving efficiency, as Allsopp (1912, p. 101) argues, required large compact farms, not scattered strips of land. The first General Enclosure Act created in 1801 lent national-level support to the processes which major landowners were initiating of enclosing land they owned, including that which was designated as common or which they rented to small-time tenant farmers. The Inclosure Act of 1821 facilitated this further. By 1850, a huge proportion of the land in England that had been ‘common’ had been formally enclosed. Greater efficiency meant more produce but also less employment for labourers in the countryside. A well-documented effect of this was a swelling number of people seeking employment in the industrialising and commercialising towns.

Marshes immediately to the south of Hackney Marshes were carved up from the 1840s as railways and utilities companies purchased already enclosed land under new acts of ‘Inclosure’ for train lines and waterworks – the Great Eastern Railway Company and the East London Waterworks company, for example. These raised features created significant new physical edges which tended to leave islands of abandoned marshland between them. Areas bordering the rivers and existing roads were gradually subdivided into plots and sold for private industrial development. Newly established public authorities also increasingly acquired both land and the rights to determine its form and use for the public good from the mid-nineteenth century. The Northern Outfall Sewer, designed by Metropolitan Board of Works chief engineer Joseph William Bazalgette following the cholera epidemics of 1849
and 1854, was constructed through this mode of land acquisition. In the 1870s, most of the common and Lammas Lands in the areas now covered by the London Boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Hackney, Newham and Waltham Forest were designated as open spaces but acquired under Act of Parliament by the Metropolitan Board of Works from Manor Lords. The Lammas Lands of Hackney Marshes were unusual in surviving into the twentieth century. However, as the villages of Hackney and Bow were transformed by the growth of industrial London and the manors were gradually divided, mortgaged and sold, their social and spatial context was transformed.

The Hackney Marshes only remained excluded from the MBW scheme because Lammas rights of grazing continued to be exercised, if by a dwindling proportion of the population, until the last decade of the nineteenth century. Finally, the 337 acres of the marshes were acquired by the London County Council in 1890 by purchasing the commoners’ rights and landowners’ interests for £75,000. They opened to the public in 1893 and were formally dedicated as public open space in 1894. The transformation of a landscape made and managed over years by cattle grazing to a recreational landscape of football pitches rapidly followed this incorporation. In 1807 the Settlement of St. Mary at Eton purchased land to the south of East Marsh as discussed further in the next section.

Opposition to the politics of enclosure in the Lea Valley is well documented by surviving local groups interested in preserving the memory and physical legacy of common land in East London. The Hackney Marshes Users Group, for example, has enthusiastically recorded its history and uses this to defend the area from urban encroachment and commercialisation to this day. A piece of former Lammas Land to the north of the site which has been the recipient of the relocated allotments from the Olympics has, similarly, been defended by local people in Leyton since the 1890s. In 1892, the East London Waterworks Company allegedly attempted to lay ‘rails’ across a bridle path within this territory without prior notification or agreement. According to a Leyton local history website ‘[t]he commoners were furious and when the company failed to remove them, led by board members, they tore up the rails on Lammas Day. When the company sought to take legal action against them, they formed a Lammas Lands Defence Committee to oppose the company’s parliamentary bill and so forced the company to negotiate. The actual location of this event is still commemorated with a notice which reads:'
In commemoration of Lammas Day 1892 when the people of Leyton led by C.G.Musgrave, H. Humphreys and E.C.Pittam asserted the commoners rights and successfully resisted the attempted encroachment upon these lands.

By the 1960s, much of the northern part of the Olympic site bordering industry had become a disjointed landscape in which empty fields, landfill sites, greyhound racing tracks, allotments and sports facilities jostled. These were incorporated into the Lea Valley Regional Park in 1971 to form part of a network of ‘Metropolitan Open Lands’. Whilst ‘Metropolitan Open Land’ is not common land in the traditional sense, public rights of access remain within their definition. From the early 1970s, The Lea Valley Regional Park began to act on plans to renew areas of desecrated or derelict landscape, emphasising the contemporary importance of recreation and leisure. In so doing it also focussed on what it viewed as the need to address problems inherent to a disjointed ‘backyard’ landscape which had never quite transitioned from rural to urban, which was at once ‘London’s kitchen garden, its well, its privy and its workshop’ (Civic Trust, 1964, p. 5).

**3.2.3 Depriving Effects**

For E.P. Thompson, the Inclosure Acts were a product both of the desire to support technological ‘progress’, efficiency and rationality and of political conservatism. He argues that the anxiety fuelled in the upper classes by the Napoleonic Wars had the effect of granting ‘[t]he English ancien regime [...] a new lease of life’ (Thompson, 1963, p. 197-219). In this context, the commons - which were “the poor man’s heritage for ages past” [...] - came to be seen ‘as a dangerous centre of indiscipline’ which technology had the capacity to help dissipate (p. 219). He suggests that a relationship was established between physical enclosure and the curtailment of commoners’ rights and freedoms. Opposition to the enclosure acts by diverse political groups – from the Jacobites to the Chartists and the Christian Socialists – often emphasise the link between the idea of freedom and the right to use and access land. In his essay *Agrarian Justice*, Thomas Paine (1817) expresses this link through the following claim:

> Liberty and Property are words expressing all those of our possessions which are not of an intellectual nature [...] Every individual in the world is born therein with legitimate claims on a certain kind of property, or its equivalent.
The major implication of the English ‘Inclosure Acts’ passed by Parliament from 1750 was the deprivation of those already possessing the least material wealth. Cunningham argues that ‘the manorial system had been the great preventative of pauperism’ but from the mid eighteenth century ‘old ties of service and obligation’ were broken (Cunningham, 1882, p. 261). Thompson argues that ‘[i]n village after village, enclosure destroyed the scratch-as-scratch-can subsistence economy of the poor – the cow or geese, fuel from the commons (p. 217). In addition, ‘[t]he cottager who was able to establish his [legal] claim [of a land title] was left with a parcel of land inadequate for subsistence and a disproportionate share of the very high enclosure costs’ (1963, p. 217). For Marx, ‘[t]he expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process’ of capital accumulation and capitalist expansion (Marx, 1976 [1867], p. 787). The transformation of the feudal rural system he conceived as a process of ‘primitive accumulation’ in which the primary conditions and opportunities for fully fledged industrial capital production and the production of surplus value were created. The idea of a new order being created within an apparently old system recalls Sassen’s argument that the ‘capabilities’ of ‘novel assemblages’ of territory, authority and rights are actually formed through historic processes (2007, pp. 11-18). The conversion of various forms of property rights and uses into exclusive private property rights and the suppression of the commons began to have the effect, for Marx, of ‘divorcing the producer from the means of production’ and creating a dispossessed ‘mass’ of people looking for work. Marx argues that a key feature of early capitalism was its presupposition of a ‘complete separation of the labourers from all property in the means by which they can realise their labour’ (1976 [1867], p. 714), transforming many former farmers and small-time producers into a dispossessed ‘proletariat’ for the manufacturing industry. Thompson reinforces this argument, arguing that through the Inclosure Acts, those who were already poor were further deprived through ‘economic exploitation and political repression’ (1963, p. 199).

In both the city and the country, wages came to relate less directly to the value of goods than to the availability of labour for their production. The surplus of labour created the possibility for these to drop so low - particularly in least skilled, most casual areas of work - that they were not adequate for subsistence. Marx pointed out the irony of a system which facilitated the driving down of wages to a point at which they had to be supplemented by official poor-law relief at parish level. However, even this relief was removed through the 1834 Royal Commission on the Poor Laws with the effect of further stimulating migration to
the towns (Thompson, 1963, p. 223). In London between 1831 and 1901 the population grew from 1,654,994 to 6,507,000.

### 3.2.4 Alleviation by Allotment

![Figure 3.8: Location of the Eton Manor Allotments and other allotments until the 1950s (Juliet Davis, 2009).](image)

The first allotments on the site were created towards the end of the nineteenth century in a triangle of land between the River Lea, the road to Temple Mills and the Temple Mills Marshalling Yards. They formed part of the area acquired by the Settlement of St. Mary of Eton in the early twentieth century. In his recent historical study, Burchardt explains that the ‘allotment movement’ in Britain was initially of a rural nature, first arising towards the end of the eighteenth century. Where Thompson argues that its formation at this time was explicitly linked to the processes of ‘Inclosure’, Burchardt somewhat downplays this. He argues that it arose in the context of a more complex web of social, economic and political circumstances which included pressures created by a rising rural population, the fluctuating demands for labour, falling wages, a series of unfortunate harvests and the politics of
enclosure (Burchardt, 2002). Early philanthropic proponents of the movement argued that allotments constituted an effective way of reducing the poor rate by increasing the ‘material welfare’ of the poorest agricultural labourers (p. 15). Parliamentary support for allotments first came in the 1830s. The Royal Commission on the Poor Laws also reported favourably on them in 1834 (p. 53) and, according to Burchardt, led to an official view that they could be deployed to assist in deflecting people’s attention away from social movements such as Chartism (p. 211). In reality, Burchardt argues, the allotment movement came to denote and also foster ‘rural trade unionism’. The movement acquired a presence in the industrial cities in the third quarter of the nineteenth century (Crouch and Ward, 1988). As the wages of manual labourers were threatened by the mechanisation of industry, their economic status was similar to that of the agricultural labourer. Like agricultural labourers, therefore, they turned to allotments to supplement their income.

The allotments on the site were created by a philanthropic institution dedicated to easing conditions of material and income deprivation. As a border to the city, arguably the Lea Valley allotments represented the concerns of rural and urban people alike. The Eton Manor Gardening Society explains that ‘[t]he gardens were established in 1900 by Major Arthur Villiers, director of Barings Bank and philanthropist, to provide small parcels of land for local people in that deprived area to grow vegetables’. An example of the kind of person these allotments of land assisted is also provided on the website in the following account:

David William Eason was born in Hoxton and via the workhouse in Shoreditch moved to Davey Road, Hackney Wick in about 1902. [...] He served in the Rifle Brigade and lost his right arm in battle so managing an allotment and a night watchman job at Lush and Cookes must have been a struggle. My Dad said his father was always bringing home veg for the table and it was some walk from the allotments to White Post Lane.

Legislation relating to the provision of allotments by local authorities was not fully codified until 1908, when it took the form of The Small Holdings and Allotments Act. These provisions were strengthened by the Allotment Acts of 1922 and 1950 which recognised an on-going need for allotments as a result of war-time food shortages and the interwar Great

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Depression. Under these Acts, local authorities were required to maintain an ‘adequate provision’ of land for allotment gardens available to residents at a low rent – which are to be used for subsistence, not for profit. Plots cannot therefore exceed 40 square ‘rods’ (1000 m²). The Essex County boroughs responsible for the Leyton and West Ham/Stratford areas provided their own allotments alongside the Eton Manor plots in the 1930s. These had mostly disappeared by the late 1950s, reflecting the growing affluence of people after the Second World War, falling food prices and the end therefore of a widespread need to supplement wages with cultivation. In the coming section, I focus on the role of the church in alleviating deprivation in the vicinity of the site, focusing particularly on the Eton Mission and Manor, located to this day in Hackney Wick.

![Figure 3.9: Eton Manor Allotments, 1920, (source: The Bishopsgate Institute).](image)

3.3 Philanthropy and industry

3.3.1 The Mission and the Manor

The mission of St. Mary of Eton was located in the small residential neighbourhood of Hackney Wick which developed in the 1860s in a knuckle of land between the River Lea Navigation and Hackney Marsh, alongside new industries, as indicated in Figure 9 above. It
was developed in the context of a variety of church-led endeavours to bring ‘hope’ and assistance to east London from the 1850s. They were motivated at least in part by proliferating commentaries by prominent authors including Charles Dickens, Charles Kingsley, John Ruskin and the Revd Andrew Mearns on the atrocious conditions of want and hardship experienced by east London’s poor. They included the Church of England supported ‘Young Men’s and Boys’ clubs’ developed in east London from the 1860s, (Eager, 1953) and a variety of both Church of England and non-conformist mission churches and mission settlements (Scotland, 2002).

In his recent book on the settlement and missions of late Victorian London, Scotland focuses on the inadequacy of the parish system in dealing with the ‘scale of human need and the sheer density of population’ (Scotland, 2007, p. 2). The failure of parish churches to reach people was reflected in declining attendance at church, captured in Charles Booth’s records of attendance across inner East London parishes on Sunday 24th October 1892. Of the 909,000 inhabitants known to live in the East End, he notes comparatively tiny figures of attendance: 95,700 Church of England, 20,000 Congregationalists, 26,000 Baptists, 19,000 Wesleyans, 11,000 Other Methodists, 4000 Presbyterians, 7600 Catholics and 7500 Other Denominations (Booth, 1892, pp. 121-122). The failure of parish churches to reach people was linked to the rise in vice and crime, activities that came to be seen as characteristics of the poor.

Eton College was the first of the English public schools to undertake to fund a mission outpost in east London, though by 1900 there were twenty-five such institutions. The undertaking was made in Hackney Wick on the basis of its being one of the most materially deprived neighbourhoods in London. It was ‘about the size of the Eton Playing Fields’, with a population of about six thousand men, women and children, described as being ‘of the very poorest’ class (Eagar, 1953, p. 205). Though the mission addressed a locality, this was a far smaller entity than a parish and it was not liable for the administrative duties of the parish church. The mission church was designed by George Frederick Bodley, an architect who had been apprenticed under the eminent figure of George Gilbert Scott. Following Scott, he was a proponent of the Gothic Revival, an architectural movement associated with the promotion of values of craft and craftsmanship in the context of industrialisation (Pevsner, 1960) and linked via Ruskin to Christian Socialist values underpinning the public school mission movement.
Christian Socialism was a distinctly urban faith movement founded by a group of men including Frederick Denison Maurice, the novelist Charles Kingsley and John Malcolm Ludlow immediately after the failure of the Chartist agitation of 1848. In its early days, the group was closely allied to other socially progressive Christian movements such as those promoting the cooperative ideas of Robert Owen and the Chartist churches (Jones, 1968, p. 10). They were critical of socially conservative Christianity and the economic principles of laissez-faire. They were responsible for founding a series of social enterprises in London including a night school in Little Ormond Yard, the Council for the Promotion of Working Men’s Associations, the Working Men’s College in London and the London Cooperative Store. The original movement dissolved in the late 1850s but was revived in the 1880s and 1890s, informing the thinking of many of the proponents of the clubs, missions and settlements of East London.

In its early years, the Eton Mission established a ‘rough boys club’, choir, men’s club and Sunday school alongside the activities of the church. These were accommodated in a two storey building separated from it by a narrow courtyard. The church tower presented and still presents an impressive red brick wall to the street. An arched opening beneath it gives onto a more intimate world of social spaces behind. In 1883, the mission established a club for boys who had been attendees of the mission’s Sunday school. Curates at the mission, who were ex-Etonians, provided training in a range of sports, including swimming, athletics and rowing. These took place in the valley and led to the construction of a series of small club buildings. The little timber rowing club and the athletics clubs continued in operation into the twenty-first century. As the reach and popularity of the clubs increased, the number of people involved at the mission grew.

In 1900, a row of terraced residences in an Arts and Crafts style were built to the rear of the courtyard to house its workers. At this point, the original mission acquired the status of a ‘settlement’. As such, it belonged to a family of institutions established after Samuel Barnett created Toynbee Hall with the support of Balliol College Oxford in Whitechapel in 1884. Settlements were established to create a ‘presence’ of educated people in deprived neighbourhoods (Scotland, 2002, p. 14). Booth describes them as ‘efforts by means of residential settlement to bring University culture into direct contact with the poorest of the people’ (Booth, 1892, p. 122). As Booth highlights with his meticulously recorded timetable of the weekly activities at Toynbee Hall, their activities were about far more than preaching and proselytising. Like the mission, they focussed on a territory over which they had no
formal authority but rather in which they sought to become socially and spatially embedded.

Eton Manor emerged as an offshoot of Eton Mission in 1909. Eton Manor is the name given to the area now caught in the scissor of Eastway and Ruckholt roads that cross the northern part of the site. Its founders sought to develop sporting discipline and skill amongst school-leaving aged boys (aged 14-16) with the premise of supporting their passage into work. Its primary founders, former Etonians Edward Cadogan, Alfred Wagg, Gerald Wellesley and Barings Bank director Arthur Villiers, began this project by developing a new club building at Riseholme Gate, at the edge of Victoria Park. Resembling a large Edwardian Villa, this opened in 1913, providing a series of flexible spaces of different scales which could be used for social gatherings, indoor sporting activities such as table tennis and chess and for dramatic arts.

Villiers’ obituary (unknown author, 1969) describes how he then ‘bought twenty acres of derelict water-filled ballast pits at Leyton and gradually developed and built a magnificent sports ground of some thirty acres, known to almost every Londoner as ‘the wilderness.’ The names ‘manor’ and ‘wilderness’ both have historical connotations, the ‘manor’ symbolising forms of ‘belonging’ associated with territory and wilderness implying an open, unfettered landscape so different to that of industrialisation. As the aerial photo below shows, the manor was divided into orderly pitches, tracks and courts landscaped at different levels, bordered by clean white pavilions and a strong brick wall - a space sequestered from the rubbish tips and industries at its borders.

As the Old Boys Club Rulebook suggests (Villiers Educational Trust, 2008), discipline was strongly encouraged amongst the Manor Clubs’ boys, not only in terms of sport but of social conventions and etiquette. A former club member interviewed as part of an oral research project conducted by the Villiers Park Educational Trust in 2008 explained that, ‘I think the main objective was to give people a half a chance in life. And East End boys, East End people, given half a chance, they would take it’. This illustrates how far the Mission and Manor’s approach to deprivation had come from the traditional parish church, involving the cultivation of skill and talent over a long period rather than the provision of temporary aid or relief. The club provided rare opportunity for poor boys to excel and helped to reinforce social ties within the localities of Hackney and Leyton. In 1950, the Eton Manor Athletics Club acquired the running track from the 1948 London Olympics, held in White City.
Following Villier’s death in 1969, all the Eton Manor sports facilities were incorporated into the Lea Valley Regional Park.

![Image of Eton Manor and Hackney Marshes]

**Figure 3.10 (above):** Aerial view of the Eton Manor, with Hackney Marshes at the top of the view and allotments at the bottom, 1935

**Figure 3.11 (left):** Eton Manor chess club, 1920
(Source: The Bishopsgate Institute, 2008).

### 3.3.2 Industrialising the Villages

The only industry shown in Rocque’s map above is the complex known as Temple Mills. These were originally water mills built by the Knight’s Templar in 1185 and used for milling flour. After the dissolution of the Templars in the fourteenth century, they passed to the Order of St. John. Following the Reformation, they passed to a succession of families who
remade them as leather, smalt and logwood mills (Baker, 1995). Widespread industry came to the Lea Valley later than other parts of England, only really exerting a dominant presence over other, older uses of the valley from the 1850s. According to Lysons, printing and colouring typified the mid-nineteenth century industries, though there were also a number of soap works and tanneries (Lysons, 1796). For these industries, the water of the rivers was vital as a means of waste disposal rather than mechanical power (Baker, 1995).

Figure 3.12: Photograph of a section of Goad’s Fire Insurance Plans (Source: The Guildhall Library, 2007).

Charles Goad’s *Fire Insurance Plan for London: North East District*, produced between 1894 and 1924 (scale 1:1250), record the site in even more detail than the Ordnance Survey maps. They were continuously annotated and amended to show up to date configurations of structures at risk from fire - a continuous concern for urban authorities following the Great Fire of 1666. They indicate that by the turn of the twentieth century, industry across the site was extensive, but the urban grain was fine, only slightly bigger than the residential urban grain, with relatively small scale enterprises packing together like particles in a rock. The plans are detailed enough as to show the different kinds of spaces associated with these firms and works – from boiling rooms to stores to small offices and mess rooms. It is clear that no masterplan underpinned this arrangement – it depicts a typically incremental, ‘laissez-faire’ form of development. The largest scale structures are to the west of the site,
within the bulging area formed by railway lines and the Stratford Railway works. Under the Eastern Counties Railways and then the Great Eastern Railway, these works formed the economic life-blood of Stratford from the 1840s until the late 1950s, motivating and partially funding the development of Stratford New Town, a new order of settlement to the north of the ancient village and parish of West Ham. The Ordnance Survey map series indicates rapid growth in the knotted, tangled strands of rail line contained within this area, along with their depots, sidings, sheds for building engines and warehouses for storing goods. A record was broken at Stratford in 1891 for the fastest ever assembly of a locomotive ‘which was complete and in steam after 9 hours and 47 minutes work’ (SEAX 10: railways in Essex (until 1923)).

Although Charles Booth’s (1902) ‘Maps Descriptive of London Poverty’ extend only as far as Hackney Wick, some of his notebooks and accounts of the *Life and Labour of the People in London* cover the Lea Valley as far as Stratford. Many of the industries named on Goad’s plans are described in detail in Booth’s Volume 6 (1895), particularly its chapter on ‘Sundry Manufactures’. ‘Sundry Manufacturers’ represented for Booth the sheer variety of London’s production base and included Glass and Earthenware, Chemicals, Soap, Candles, Glue etc., Leather Dressing etc., Saddlery and Harnesses, and Brushes and Combs. Each of these categories was represented on the site and/or its immediate fringes. Glass manufacturing was limited to one firm, *Robinson, King & Co Glass Bevellers*. However, chemical industries were extensive, dividing more or less evenly between those making products from using inorganic materials and those dealing with animal derivates - animal ‘grease [...] wax [...] oils’ or ‘gelatinous animal matter, bones and blood (p. 110).The former kind included varnish and printing ink factories such as Slater & Palmer Lamp Black Varnish & Printing Ink factory, and Smith Bros. & Co. Tar & Resin Distillery. The latter included the no doubt poisonsly pungent T.H. Harris & Sons Soap, Bone & Tallow Works, the London Soap Works, the Patent Marine Glue Works and Palmer & Co Victoria Candle Works. There were a number of industries associated with the production of potted meat and other foods - the sweet and lozenge factory of Clarinco (Clarke, Nickolls and Coombes) for example. There were also a number of sawmills and timber yards, engineering firms of various kinds, and a cooperage.

In addition to recording the variety of products made in London and their methods of production, Booth records the conditions and nature of work associated with each kind of enterprise - including forms of employment, levels of skill they required, methods of
training, degree of ‘unhealthiness’, wages, trade organization. Most of the industries located on the site required low-skilled manual labour. Many were reported to be undergoing a process of transition from manual work to mechanisation at the turn of the twentieth century. Booth’s research assistant Esme Howard writes in Volume 6 that ‘the ordinary chemical worker is rather to be called disciplined than skilled’ and that although the soap and candles industry ‘lies at the border-land between skilled and unskilled labour’ (p. 116), ‘steadiness and regularity are the qualities in request’ over skill (p. 100). Exceptions were the glass bevellers (pp. 86-87), engineers working for the railways, some of the confectioners and the trained chemists at the head of the chemical industries who were ‘men of scientific education’ (p. 100). The rest were ‘foremen, chemical labourers and yard foremen’. These employees, typically, required no apprenticeship to be able to do their work and were often employed on a casual or seasonal basis for ‘piece work’ or ‘time-work’. Work conditions and wages appear to have varied according to the degree to which workers in different trades were organised in trade unions. It appears that the chemical industry workers were poorly organised into friendly societies or shop club and yet that the work was both strenuous and dangerous. In one of his hand-written notebooks, Booth describes a worker at the Crown Chemical Works on Marshgate Lane as follows:

He said he was 45! He already looked much grizzled so that he looked over 50
(Booth, 1893, Notebook B93, p. 63).

The environment of the factories was clearly a contributor to the ‘grizzled’ look. Booth notes that at the Crown Chemical Works:

The furnace was in an open shed, simply roofed over but nevertheless when the door was opened either to rake out the stuff or for some other reasons, very pungent fumes came out and for a few moments at least this man was compelled to inhale them to some degree (pp. 61-62).

The harshness of this work suggests a good reason for the prevalence of public houses which, on Goad’s Plans, are usually located at the ends of factory roads such as Sugarhouse Lane and Marshgate Lane. Across the range of industries, approximately 30 percent of workers earned what Booth regarded as an extremely low wage of less than 25 shillings a year, forcing them to live in ‘crowded conditions’ in properties rented from often exploitative private landlords. Howard’s analysis suggests that in most cases ‘the employees
at chemical factories live near their work’ – in the small, hastily built, densely packed terraces of Bromley, Leyton and Hackney Wick (1895, p. 110). In his ‘perambulations’ of the residential fringes of the site at Hackney Wick and Fish Island with Inspector Carter (Booth, 1897, Notebook B346, p. 65), Booth made note of signs of moral decay such as of prostitutes soliciting in the streets of Fish Island as well as of environmental deprivation such as clusters of poor housing which was cut into islands by infrastructure and factories. The image below - of a boy in factory overalls fishing in murky tributaries of the River Lea at the end of the cramped backyard of a makeshift dwelling beside the Northern Outfall Sewer - is consistent with some of the scenes he describes. He observed a slight elevation in prosperity around the ‘mission church’ and also in the vicinity of the Clarnico Sweet Factory, which provided cottages for its workers and was supportive of their organisation into unions (pp. 157-171).

The urban environment portrayed above suggests that, in nineteenth-century industrialising Britain, some of the most powerful forces of investment in economic development and some of the most deprived working and living conditions became concentrated at the same spatial locations. The growing wealth of products made in the
valley was, in these terms, matched by the increasing poverty of the exploited environment and of the lowliest residential neighbourhoods.

David Harvey (2006) refers to the double-edged nature of this urban process as ‘accumulation by dispossession’. He draws on Marx’s notion of ‘primitive accumulation’ and develops it in order to conceptualise what he sees as long-term social and spatial impacts of capitalism. The notion of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ encompasses the devaluation of one set of assets - which, Harvey claims, may previously have constituted ‘viable livelihoods’ - in order to facilitate their productive and profitable reuse by capitalists in new contexts. He argues that, ‘[i]n the case of “primitive accumulation”, this entailed taking land, enclosing it, and expelling a resident population to create a landless proletariat, and then releasing the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation’ (p. 149). He further contends that ‘[t]he umbilical cord that ties together accumulation by dispossession and expanded reproduction is that given by finance capital and the institutions of credit, backed [...] by state powers’ (p. 152). State powers in the form of the Inclosure Acts, as we have seen, were crucial instruments enabling landowners to take back rights to the use and cultivation of land that had previously been shared with commoners.

3.3.3 The end of the Industrial Era

Another key feature of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ as Harvey describes it is the way in which capital is continuously moved from one location to another in the opening up of new territories to capitalist expansion and development (p. 139). This is a process that allows capitalism to continually seek and find ‘solutions’ for the profitable deployment of capital in regions where the material costs of production are either lower or can be driven down. The decay and post-industrialisation that began to set in the Lea Valley from the 1950s can be seen as indicative of the effects of this process. It began following the destruction in the Blitz of large swathes of industry across East London (Porter, 1994, pp. 338-339). However, the reasons for industrial decline are complex. To the cost of post-war reconstruction were added impacts on the value of British manufactured products by growing overseas competition, insufficient investment in the modernisation of factories and equipment, constraints on growth (Sassen, 2001, pp. 209-214) and the loss of global economic control through the dismantling of the British Empire (Lupton, 2003). Pressures induced by foreign competition to increase productivity and reduce labour costs through technological change in order to keep industry profitable led to wage cuts and job losses. Gradual
transformations in shipping and transportation technology signalled the decline of the nearby London Docks, with long and hard-felt consequences for the population of Newham and Tower Hamlets in particular (Hall, 1998). Between 1971 and 1978, East London lost 20,000 dock jobs (Lupton, 2003, p. 47). Similarly, in the railways sector, goods handling and transport were heavily impacted by the docks’ closures and the engine building industry at the Stratford Works had collapsed by the end of the 1950s. This new form of dispossession of workers and families in East London from their livelihoods led to well-documented political action and conflict. The marshalling yards on the ancient site of ‘Chobham Farm’ formed the focus of one of the most prominent industrial strikes of the 1970s (Hansard, 19 June 1972 vol 839 cc. 30-44).

Following from the effects of these processes, few late nineteenth or early twentieth-century buildings, owners or uses survived on the site at the turn of the twenty-first century. The forces which had, in Soja’s terms, converged to fix capital in the Lea Valley in the nineteenth century had effectively been dislodged from this same space over the course of the latter part of the twentieth century. Whilst Fish Island and Hackney Wick, at the site’s western fringes, retained a few late nineteenth or early twentieth-century buildings, the site itself had only one intact complex in 2007, King’s Yard, which was the former sweet and lozenge factory founded in the 1870s (MOLAS, 2006). Whilst printing remained a significant business type until 2007, it was a quite different industry from the ink and colour-works of the past. By 2007, the surfaces of the old marshalling yards and sidings had been overlaid by other uses, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Manufacturing on a large scale was replaced by a combination of micro-scale industry, salvage and repair works, and supply and distribution firms – typically of foods, building materials and waste (see figures 4.3 and 4.4 in Chapter 4 for illustration). Whilst small manufacturing businesses on the site in 2007 might be viewed as continuous with earlier industry, these kinds of firms only gained a foothold in the context of the site’s declining value for London. The depressed land value of the site provided an opportunity for new kinds of users to settle – a Ghanaian church called the Kingsway International Christian Centre (KICC) and groups of Gypsies and Travellers, for example. Unlike the industries of the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, early twenty-first century uses were marginal to London’s post-industrial service economy and indeed, to mainstream society. This transformed the valley into a new kind of periphery, an ‘outside’ within the city.
3.4 Conclusion: the status of land and deprivation

This chapter has explored changing relationships between land ownership, authority and deprivation in the current 2012 Olympic site between the 1750s and 2006 (when the Compulsory Purchase of the site took place). Through the analysis of changing boundaries of ownership and authority and of a number of specific spaces on the site, this chapter revealed correlations between the privatisation of land in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the expansion of the industrial city of London into the former rural hinterlands of the Lea Valley and conditions of want, poverty and material deprivation amongst its new residents and workers. According to numerous accounts, two principle contributors to these urban conditions were the ‘dispossession’ of common people from land on which they had traditionally created a livelihood and the associated migration of large numbers of rural people to the city. This created a pool of disenfranchised people and also surplus labour for the industrialising economy. Though Booth’s accounts of the industries associated with the site suggest that conditions of life were particularly harsh for people here at the turn of the twentieth century, the site also reveals the legacies of efforts by urban authorities and philanthropists to ameliorate these conditions – through the combination of infrastructural interventions, urban planning and the purchase of land for use by local people. Although Ordnance Survey maps of the site suggested the gradual ‘fixing’ of industry and the means of capital accumulation on and around the site, by the mid-twentieth century, this process had not only ceased to advance but had, in many ways, gone into reserve.

With the destruction of swathes of the East End during the Second World War and the subsequent decline of industry, many local people - in spite of the trade union affiliations that had developed - were dispossessed anew of their homes and livelihoods. This produced a pattern of outward migration from the area which is reported to continue to this day. Whilst low land values created opportunities for firms occupying the site at the turn of the twenty-first century, the site was effectively splintered amongst an array of divergent, small-scale uses. Echoing Harvey’s account of the dynamic of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, in time this created situation the conditions for the site to be redeveloped afresh, this time not for industry but for the 2012 Olympics. The significance of the new enclosure created around the site in the context of its Compulsory Purchase, for both the legacy of deprivation in the Lea Valley and the envisioned legacy of the Olympics, is explored next, in Chapter 4.
Re-ordering the Olympic Site: processes of compulsory purchase and relocation, 2005-2007

4. Introduction

The Lea Valley, as discussed in the last chapter, long formed a border between different territories, authorities and land uses. Even though it lay several kilometres inside the boundary of Greater London by the late twentieth century, it retained many characteristics of a far flung urban edge – an industrial zone beyond the residential core of the city and at the focal limits of local planning authority. These characteristics bore strongly on its capacity to attract large-scale investments following industrial decline and thus on the time it took for it to be recognised as a redevelopment ‘opportunity’. Following the closure of the docks between the late 1970s and early 1980s, the area they covered became subject to a business-oriented regeneration programme led by the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC). This rapidly gathered momentum, leading to the development of Canary Wharf on the Isle of Dogs in 1989 – widely viewed as a symbol of London’s process of transition from an industrial to a service economy under Thatcher’s conservative government. With the identification of the ‘Thames Gateway’ in the early 1990s as a regional focus for urban growth, the combined Docklands and Lower Lea Valley area was further seen to hold the potential to transform into a dense urban centre strategically located between London’s traditional core and this emergent region. For example, former LDDC chief Reg Ward promoted the idea of an east London equivalent to London’s West End, an ‘Eastminster’, which could build on the distinctive topography of the Lea Valley and so transform it into a ‘Water City’ (Ward, 1997, p. 41).

Such conceptions of the area’s economic and spatial potentials helped to focus the attention of national and regional level policy makers on the issue of its spatial disconnection, viewed as a major hindrance to redevelopment (Government Office for London, 1995, 1996). Stratford, to the immediate east of the Lower Lea Valley, was viewed...
as one of the more accessible local centres and therefore as an appropriate focus for new investments in connections. From the mid-1990s, Stratford Station was transformed in planning terms into a major intersection between new and existing lines of rail infrastructure – new lines including London Underground’s Jubilee lines, Crossrail and a high speed rail link from St. Pancras to Europe via the Channel Tunnel. The prospects of this increased connectivity began to attract the interest of speculators and developers in Stratford and the areas of the Lea Valley immediately adjacent to it. By 2004, the large Australian retail and property firm Westfield had attained planning permission to undertake what they claimed to be the largest ‘in-town’ retail development project in Europe on the large site of the former Stratford Railway Works. Known as Stratford City, this project was designed to provide a total of 1,300,000m² of space including 460,000m² of offices, 150,000m² of retail and 4,850 new homes. Its location is marked in Figure 4.1.

The decision to bid for the Olympic Games in 2012 was made against this planning and investment background. Crucial to the decision-making process was the reestablishment of a Greater London Authority, led by an elected Mayor. This new urban authority was able to provide the necessary leadership that earlier British bids for the Games in 1992, 1996 and 2000 had lacked (Thornley and Davis, 2010). With the election of Ken Livingstone to the post of Mayor of London in 2000, the British Olympic Association (BOA) sought to secure his support for the campaign they had already instigated for London 2012. Strategically - given the new Labour government’s policy focus on ‘urban renaissance’ (Urban Task Force, Rogers, and DETR, 1999) – the BOA placed strong emphasis on the possibility and potential of a regeneration ‘legacy’ to the Olympic Games and showed support for Livingstone’s regional planning policy focus on east London. National government support for the bid was secured in May 2003 following the publication of a ‘costs and benefits’ analysis associated with hosting the Olympics on a site just west of Stratford by the engineering firm Arup. Livingstone was in effect given a green light to incorporate the possibility of a 2012 Games into the London Plan - his spatial development strategy for the city (Mayor of London, 2004). Within the London Plan, the Lower Lea Valley, as previously mentioned, was highlighted as an ‘Opportunity Area’ capable of accommodating several thousand new jobs and homes. The bid documents highlighted the importance of the Olympic project and timescale in terms of creating momentum and raising ambition. It was stated that ‘without the Games, change would still happen, but it would be slower, more incremental and less ambitious from a sporting, cultural and environmental perspective’ (London 2012, 2004).
London’s winning bid for the 2012 Games was announced on July 6th 2005. Amid the celebrations and surprise that this provoked, it became apparent that a first major implication of the victory was the need for the site to be acquired in advance of its redevelopment. The Mayor’s pivotal role in this process became evident with the announcement that his London Development Agency - the executive body responsible for promoting and delivering policy objectives connected to the London Plan – would take the lead role. Under the terms of the *Regional Development Agencies Act* (1998), the LDA was invested with statutory power to compulsorily purchase land for purposes linked to economic development, urban regeneration and sustainable development. Following the bid victory, the LDA were directed to acquire the entire Olympic site, leading to the creation of a Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO). This chapter focuses on this process – seen as an important enabling project for the Olympic legacy as well as the first moment in which concrete impacts of the bid were experienced. Its wider purpose is to explore how the case for regeneration which this the CPO relied upon was constructed, but in addition to use other ways of seeing and experiencing the site as vehicles for problematising it and raising

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**Figure 4.1:** Figure Ground drawing showing the boundaries of the 2012 Olympic site and the site of Westfield’s Stratford City development (Source: Edina Digimap Collection; Map collated and redrawn by Juliet Davis, 2008)
questions about the alignment of the Livingstone’s commitment to create ‘sustainable communities’ with impacts of redevelopment.

The CPO, as I touched on in chapter 1, has been viewed as a controversial instrument in regeneration practices, particularly in terms of the ways in which ‘communities’ and their interests have been defined (see, for example, Imrie & Thomas 1989, 1997; Hall, 1998; Brownhill, 1993). As Imrie and Thomas note, CPOs have often been presented to localities in nonnegotiable terms ‘underpinned by a legal ideology which seeks to legitimise land acquisition by appealing to a broader public interest’ (1989, p. 1401). Interpretations of ‘the public interest’, they suggest, have often been mobilised to ‘justify the ignoring of specificities of individual need’ (p. 1401). Raco has similarly argued that CPOs and their associated regeneration schemes have tended to be shaped ‘by powerful, non local agents whose main concern is to maximise profit returns’ (Raco 2004, p. 35) in the short-term, a process which would appear to run counter to the notion ‘public interest’. The frequent association of CPOs with tabula rasa approaches to development suggests not only the devaluing of local people but also of existing places, indicative for Raco of a broader philosophy of continually prioritising visions of change over continuity (2004, p. 36).

The first part of the chapter explores the social and spatial context of Olympic site. It begins by focusing on official accounts of ‘deprivation’ associated with the Olympic site and its fringes. These include findings based on the Government’s Indices of Multiple Deprivation (2000, 2004), assessments of living and working conditions on the site and statements about the condition of its built and natural environment. These accounts were used, crucially, in the construction of the ‘justification’ (Eversheds LLP, 2005, pp. 43-44) for a social, spatial and economic reordering of the site. It goes on to provide a closely focused study of uses and occupancies associated with the pre-Olympic site as a precursor to exploring how and why plans to relocate people met with opposition in a number of instances. The study draws on a variety of sources of information about the site, including the London Development Agency’s (LDA) CPO documents, records I compiled on walks across it in 2006 and 2007, Ordnance Survey data and Google Earth images. Undertaking this study gave the opportunity to gain a critical distance from the official accounts of ‘deprivation’ used to support the site’s compulsory purchase.

The second part of the chapter explores the strategic purposes of the CPO – particularly in terms of addressing frequently raised questions of why a project predicated on improving
the spatial and social fabric of local ‘communities’ should involve the displacement of local jobs and residents, the consolidation of fragmentary land ownerships under a single ownership and the razing of a site developed over hundreds of years. I focus on the role of relocation in the reordering of use at a regional scale and the advantages of strategic planning over more ‘piecemeal change’ (LDA, 2006) from the perspectives of representatives from the GLA, the LDA and the masterplanning firm EDAW.

In the third part of the chapter, I focus on the instrumentation of the CPO, particularly in terms of the LDA’s practices of consultation with the site’s occupants. I examine relationships between the LDA’s and user groups’ conceptions of the site’s ‘communities’ and their roles, and consider how differences of opinion impacted on both processes and outcomes of engagement. In a related way, I also examine user groups’ accounts of the adequacy of ‘market value’ or other monetary forms of compensation. In doing so, I draw on a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with the case-study groups in 2008-2009: the Waterden Road Travellers, Eton Manor Allotment gardeners, Clays Lane Cooperative housing members, Eastway Cycle Circuit users, H. Forman & Son, Nichols & Clarke Glass, FH Brundle & Son and Bilmerton Wigs. The chapter concludes with comments about the effectiveness of this negotiated CPO and by considering the role of the CPO in terms of the wider and longer term regeneration legacy of the Olympics.

4.1 Order and disorder of the pre-Olympic site

4.1.1 Accounts of deprivation

Accounts of deprivation formed an important strand of the LDA’s ‘case’ for the CPO. The international property consultancy Capita Symonds - appointed by the LDA to prepare an Environmental Statement in support of the first outline planning application to the future Host Boroughs for developing the site for the Olympics -placed emphasis on the contamination of the site’s degraded physical landscape created by the legacies of the chemical industries of the late-nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century and of more recent waste disposals on the site (2004). In their first Relocation Strategy from 2004 (which formed an appendix to the Environmental Statement), the LDA added that the valley was characterised by patterns of short-term investment, with only 30 per cent of all occupiers having been there since 1995 or before – a pattern it linked with the poor physical condition of the site (LDA, 2004b, p. 2). In a report commissioned by the
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) on likely national, regional and local impacts of hosting the Olympics in London, Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) (2005) focussed on the deprivation ‘rankings’ of areas on the Olympic site according the government’s Index of Multiple Deprivation. PWC suggested that 20 per cent of the Super Output Areas across the Olympic Boroughs ranked amongst the 5 per cent most deprived in England. Just over twice that proportion - 42 per cent - of SOAs in the immediate vicinity of the Olympic site ranked within this high deprivation category. These suggestions are reflected in the diagram below. Here, the geography of aggregate deprivation scores around the site appears uneven, though all ‘Super Output Areas’ apart from one rank between the 1st and the 30th percentile of most deprived such areas in England. PWC suggested that particularly high levels of income deprivation were present in the Olympic site and its fringes but that deprivation levels in each of the other domains were also high. The most deprived LSOAs meanwhile were those accommodating the highest levels and/or densities of social housing.

The LDA’s Statement of Case for the CPO (prepared by legal firm Eversheds LLP) (2005) argues that, in addition to the findings of the IMD, deprivation was reflected in a) the site’s visual appearance which was characterised by ‘worn out buildings, large tracts of derelict land and outdated infrastructure’ (p. 5), and; b) the uses of the site characterised as residues of a ‘traditional’ manufacturing sector and as ‘an ageing business infrastructure’ (p. 3). The loss of jobs over the previous thirty or so years as a result of ‘decentralisation and decline in the heavy and processing industries’ (p. 5) was seen as the chief culprit of deprivation scores across all indicators. In stating that ‘the majority of the Order Lands are characterised by remnants of past uses’ (p. 15) that had left behind high levels of industrial contamination and large tracts of ‘unused and under-used’ land, the document implies that the value the site had once had for London as a site of production was now extinguished. The ‘past uses’ to which the LDA refers are the manufacturing uses which had predominated in the Lea Valley from the mid-nineteenth century. However, the ‘remnants’ presumably refers to the business, residential and other uses that occupied the site at the time the case was made. Whilst the LDA’s description conveys the clear impression of a vanishing economic sector, closer study of the uses on the site and their spatial configurations provides a more complex view of how it was constituted and of some of the qualities and vitalities that existed in spite of drawbacks linked to marginality.
4.1.2 Types and rhythms of occupancy and use

At the time that the LDA initiated the process of acquiring the site, there were 210 businesses operating on it as well as a diverse range of cultural, recreational and urban agricultural uses, as indicated in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 below. These maps indicate the location of specific user groups on the site as well as the diversity of different groups. Making these maps involved linking data relating to occupancy supplied by the LDA with topographical data from the Ordnance Survey and photographic data from Google Earth and ground level surveys that I carried out between 2005 and 2007. Occupants are classified by use types as indicated in the drawing keys. As buildings were inhabited by more - often many more - than one type of use, in larger versions of these drawings occupants and users are listed specifically by name and keyed into the drawings through a numbering system. Appendix A also includes a full list of these occupants.
The maps provided a means to describe succinctly how the site was organised spatially and how uses were distributed across it. Although this wasn’t an anticipated result, making these maps helped me later on in the research to understand why some users’ accounts of what the site offered differed from the accounts of negative deprivation discussed above. The above map suggests that the uses of buildings varied widely. Business uses included scaffolding pole suppliers, glass manufacturers, metal distributors, a smoked salmon producer, newspaper printers, waste recyclers, set building workshops for the Royal Opera House, a Halal butchers, numerous second hand car part dealerships and a wig manufacturer. Residential use formed a small proportion of the total area, but encompassed nonetheless a variety of types, from Traveller pitches to a gated, private residence. The site also formed a base for cultural groups such as the Ghanaian Pentecostal church known as The Kingsway International Christian Centre, entertainments ranging from traditional East End ‘caffs’ to nightclubs and, in terms of sport, the activities of the Eton Manor and a cycle centre. Although the LDA drew attention to the short timescale of use on the site by many businesses, there were actually still a few such as Bowden’s Curved Glass that had considerably older affiliations with the site than this. There were also several firms who may have been located on the site for no more than fifteen years but whose foundation long predated this. Some firms originating in the inner East End towards the end of the nineteenth century had relocated to Stratford in the 1990s as prices closer to the centre rose and the Lea Valley became a more economical option. These included Nicholls & Clarke, former glass and paint manufacturers, FH Brundle & Son, former suppliers of nails for the wooden crate packing industry on the docks, and the smoked salmon manufacturers of eastern European descent H Forman & Son.
Open space uses included allotments, an informal market occupying the bowl of a former dog-racing track and club grounds for cycling and athletics. Actual uses of these spaces, encompassed a wide range of formal, informal and illicit activities. Some spaces could certainly be more easily characterised by disuse than by use, such as derelict railway sidings. Others represented use and disuse simultaneously, such as the partially disassembled dog racing track. The photographic portrait of this market and its surroundings by the photographer Stephen Gill conveys the chaotic and dilapidated nature of this space - a tumble of merchandise and waste, fleetingly assembled (Gill, 2005). Public green space for recreational use was limited to the designated Metropolitan Open Land sites of Arena Fields and former Lammas lands of East Marsh and to the Greenway footpath over Bazalgette’s Northern Outfall Sewer.

Users of the Olympic site had different forms of affiliation to it in terms of land ownership. Most of the land occupied by businesses - including bus depots and waste management sites - was privately owned, forming a complex mosaic of freehold plots. Though many owners were also the primary occupants of their sites, many others were absent, their sites tenanted and sub-tenanted, often multiply, to a variety of small businesses (LDA, 2005). Roadways, railways and public spaces, as elsewhere in London, were owned by a series of
public bodies including Thames Water, the British Waterways Board and the London Boroughs of Newham, Tower Hamlets, Hackney and Waltham Forest, emphasising how fragmented public authority over this border territory had become. The Lea Valley Regional Park Authority owned land in the northern part of the site used for recreational purposes by Eton Manor Sports Centre and the Eastway Cycle Club and for gardening at the Eton Manor Allotments. The CPO documents indicate that a range of other public bodies owned land including included Network Rail, Transport for London and the LDA. Much of this land had been purchased after 2002 in the context of emerging urban policy promoting regeneration in the Lower Lea Valley.

Overlaying the patchwork of private ownerships were various other kinds of occupation. These included legitimate tenancies held by unregistered businesses and local authority endorsed residential occupations of publically owned land by families of Romany and Irish Travellers. Many spaces, though formally owned by public bodies - such as the edges of river ways, spaces under the elevated A12 highway, the former dog racing track and the Greenway footpath - could be said to relate to the category of space that Franck terms ‘loose space’ (Franck, 2006, p. 26) which is characterised by informal or ‘unexpected uses [of urban space] not set by a predetermined program’ (Franck, 2006, p. 27). It is space that, in Lefebvre’s terms, is ‘appropriated’ rather in a manner that is ‘clearly distinct from [...] property’ (Lefebvre, Kofman, and Lebas, 1996, p. 174). According to Frank, ‘loose space’ is also a product of ‘tactics’, denoting everyday practices of users who, in de Certeau’s terms, ‘take advantage of “opportunities”’ to make the city their own (de Certeau, p. 94). This opportunity is clearly conceived differently from the opportunities presented in relation to the Olympic Games, a topic I return to in later chapters, as in the conclusion to this chapter.

The allotment holders, protected under the so called Eton Settlement, could be seen to correspond in a number of ways to these definitions. It should be said that plot holders were neither formal site owners nor informal appropriators of their sites but rather legal tenants. Notwithstanding, the organisation and assembly of each garden plot revealed processes of appropriation in terms of the gathering of reclaimed materials – from second hand floorboards and doors to electrical cables to milk bottles – to form improvised yet also carefully judged spatial frameworks suited to the growing of crops and storage of tools. Over time, gardeners’ proximities to one another and sociability led to a ‘loose’ programming of the site including food sharing and communal cooking.
Figure 4.5: top left: Waterden Road Traveller site; Top right: car parts dealership; Middle left upper: Eton Manor Allotments; Middle left lower summer wastelands, Middle right: Bowden’s Curved Glass; Bottom left: Golden House, Waterden Road; Bottom right: Waste below the A12 flyover (photos by Juliet Davis, 2006).
However, a number of other site uses that could also be said to correspond with these definitions appeared to be detrimental to the experience of the site from the perspectives of other occupants. The Hackney Wick Market was ‘loose’ in the sense that traders took opportunities to establish footholds in the absence of a formal programme for the former dog racing track. For David Jones, a former manager of the Eastway Cycle Centre, the market, along with other under-used, under-managed areas of the site created problems for many occupants, becoming associated with law avoidance tactics and opportunistic use – including fly-tipping, the vandalism of property, sales in stolen goods and formations of illegal Gypsy encampments. He recalled that Hackney Wick Market ‘was a boot sale market, so it was anyone, so of course it was an outlet for the black market... I mean they closed it down eventually ‘cause they were selling arms’ (Interview, Hog Hill, 17.08.2008).

Whilst much of the green, open space of sports grounds and parkland lay to the north of the site, most of the businesses were located to the south, reflecting the historical processes of the site’s development discussed in Chapter 3. Across the site however, at a finer scale of focus, the specific uses of buildings and spaces aggregated in a haphazard fashion. For example, in one building, a church congregated next to a wooden bed maker; in another, a newspaper printer lay next to charity offices. The pitches of twenty Traveller families huddled next to a bus depot. The randomness of these juxtapositions was echoed in the aggregation of built forms. Some buildings were purpose-built, if flexibly designed industrial units. Others were former industrial buildings that had been adapted to new uses and/or subdivided into multiple use units. Some run-down and poorly repaired buildings had been converted into yards, interiors supplaned by containers or caravan offices.

In The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1972 [1961]), Jane Jacobs makes a link between diversity of use and urban vibrancy. This link was not evident on the site. In spite of the proximity of many different kinds of uses including social spaces such as churches, allotments and cycle clubs, the streetscape often appeared desolate. This may have reflected the fact that the site’s uses included a number of the kind that Jacobs refers to as ‘destructive’ for urban life, such as transport depots and scrap yards. It may also have been a reflection of the small residential population, which was insufficient in quantity and kind to form a base of ‘secondary use’ beyond work (p. 260). The edges of rivers, rail lines and other infrastructure such as the Northern Outfall Sewer recalled Jacobs’ analysis of ‘border vacuums’ (p. 265). These spaces were usually far less populated by pedestrians than by articles of fly-tipped waste. Their quietness, particularly under cover of night, created the
opportunity for illicit and illegal activities to flourish. In an interview at FH Brundle & Son, Tom Brundle reminded his father of how ‘you got your car broken into - it must be four or five times. You had a knife pulled on you. You had money [...] the wages grabbed out your hands’ (Interview, FH Brundle, 10.2009).

To use Lefebvre’s terminology, the ‘blending’ of ‘rhythms’ of activity associated with the many different uses of the site in the street tended to occur in the crossing of vehicles on their way to and from specific spaces rather than pedestrians who could ‘animate the street’ (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 229). Apart from the residents, users of the site tended to come with specific purposes – whether to garden on an allotment, supply materials to a business or attend a church service. Even the residents had little to do on the site apart from inhabiting their homes, relying on local centres such as Leyton and Stratford for their local services. Though the Hackney Wick Market and the churches attracted enough cars to cause congestion in the roads around, they were convened occasionally, producing moments of intensity punctuating episodes of quiet. In only a few instances, spatial arrangements of proximate uses within the site created ‘sites of exchange’ (Sennett, 2007), though some of these coexisted tacitly rather than happily with neighbours. Caffs were frequented by workers in the second-hand car part industry concentrated around Carpenters Road. The venue Club Dezire was situated to catch the passing trade of bus drivers concluding shifts at their depots at lonely hours. These ‘rhythms’ often appeared to reflect users’ desire to keep themselves to themselves. Many described to me their surprise at finding out about the diversity of their neighbours through the CPO process.

Numerous aspects of the above analysis of the site’s occupancy and use reinforce rather than counter official accounts of its ‘deprivation’, particularly in terms of: a) the apparent influence of crime on the form of built environment and sociability of its users, b) the sense of a salvaged or surviving rather than a renewed built environment, and c) the continual appearance of waste. Notwithstanding, the sheer diversity of uses, captured by photographers Marion Davies and Debra Rapp in their documentary series Dispersal (2007)\(^1\) appears to counter claims that there were ‘large tracts of derelict land’ and that uses were merely ‘residual’. The somewhat grubby appearance of building and structures was arguably not simply or always a reflection of redundancy but of the nature of industrial use.

\(^1\) See [http://www.debrarapp.co.uk/Olympic/Olympic.html](http://www.debrarapp.co.uk/Olympic/Olympic.html) (accessed 10.2009)
From 2006 to 2008, these two independent photographers visited over 70 businesses that were located on the Olympic site.
As Forman of H Forman & Son put it, ‘It was not clean [...] and it wasn’t particularly pretty. It’s not like Canary Wharf. But these are businesses, creating things, earning money’. He was of the view that aesthetic considerations were weighted too highly in official evaluations of the site, stating that ‘I mean, you know, the place where they store the bins at Buckingham Palace probably isn’t very pretty either!’ (Interview, H. Forman & Son, 10.2008). Some of the spatial products of adaptation - exemplified by the allotment gardens - recalled some of the positive ‘uses of disorder’ in Sennett’s terms (Sennett, 1973). The textures, sense of stillness and spring time renewal in the image below by Jason Orton, suggest that the site was somewhere that human imagination as well as action could seize. Such reflections recall the Spanish architect Sola Morales’s (1996) claim that the ‘terrain vague’ of post-industrial hinterlands of cities, in spite of decay, can acquire value for residents precisely because they lack a single purpose or imposed cultural program.

![Image](Figure 4.6: The Channelsea River (Jason Orton, 2009))

4.2 Compulsory Purchase: purposes and values

Determining the validity of the CPO and associated Relocation Strategy under the Regional Development Agencies Act relied on the substantiation of a view that regeneration of the
site, regardless of the Games, could not be achieved without redevelopment. Arup argued that the strategic cultivation of ‘entirely different activities in the future’ (p. 9) could not achieved without ‘site assembly’. The LDA argued that overcoming the ‘impediments to regeneration’ (Eversheds LLP, 2005, p. 1) would only be achieved ‘firstly, by the intervention of an agency with the skills, capability and resources to identify and overcome the obstacles, and, secondly, with the injection of large amounts of public funds’ (p. 25). The ‘assembly’ of the Olympic site involved two separate CPOs, the first was a Power Lines CPO, the second, relating to all property interests, was the Lower Lea Valley, Olympic Legacy Compulsory Purchase Order 2005².

4.2.1 Relocation and regional planning

Strategic planning documents relating to the Lower Lea Valley produced by the Greater London Authority (GLA) between 2002 and 2007 emphasised its capacity for increased ‘economic utility’ (GLA, 2003, 2004b, 2007). In interview, a representative from the GLA’s Design for London explained that ‘[y]ou want to somehow try and redistribute stuff so everything’s in its right place and free up space in the Lea Valley by allowing some of the non-strategic uses to move out’ (GLA DfL, Interview, 12.12.2007). This statement suggested that an important purpose of the CPO and relocation processes was to assist in the realisation of land-use planning objectives at a regional scale. Emerging plans for the Thames Gateway produced by the GLA at the time of the CPO indicate new industrial use locations at Gallions Reach in Beckton and a stretch referred to as London Riverside between Barking and Rainham. The 2004 London Plan identifies locations where brownfield land could accommodate residential and mixed-use development. It notes the existence of large tracts of this kind of land in inner east London, particularly in the Lea Valley. These documents suggest the dual aim of closing the seam which the Lea Valley formed between inner and outer east London with residential and mixed-use development and relegating industry that had been at the periphery of London until the 1960s to the newer periphery of Greater London.

The Relocation Strategy developed by the LDA for the Olympic site was not intended to render any of the former uses of the Olympic site - business or otherwise – inoperable. The

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² These were confirmed by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on 4th April 2005 and 18th December 2006 respectively.
LDA explained that, to the contrary, new ‘state-of-the-art’ facilities ‘specifically for businesses currently on the Olympic Park site [would] offer many of these companies [a] chance to develop’\(^3\) which they didn’t have where they were. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 reveal the pattern of relocations following the CPO. Although a few businesses were relocated locally and a further few moved out of London, more than 50 per cent were relocated to the outer east London boroughs. Many of those that were relocated locally were food-related businesses whose proximity to Canary Wharf and the City the GLA viewed as strategic. H Forman & Son, being a food business, moved less distance than the other case-study businesses, a mere two hundred metres to Fish Island in Tower Hamlets. The other three case-study businesses were relocated to new industrial estates in outer east London areas of Barking and Rainham. Residential users including the Waterden Road Travellers and the Clays Lane Peabody Trust housing residents moved into the existing residential fringes of the valley. The Eton Manor Allotments were relocated to a site a mile to the north, within the Lea Valley Regional Park (LVRP) in Waltham Forest. The Eastway Cycle Centre meanwhile moved out of the LVRP to the edge of the Forest of Hainault.

\(\text{Figure 4.7: Relocations from the Olympic Site across and beyond London (Juliet Davis, 2008)\textendash }\)

A justification frequently given in interviews with the GLA, LDA and EDAW for the site’s redevelopment was that it was ‘blighted’ by issues that could only be addressed effectively at the scale of the whole, not in either parts or increments. Blighting, according to Mark Preston, one of the architect directors at EDAW included ‘contamination [of the] environment, overhead power lines, sewage in the rivers, poor connections…’ Derelict open spaces were, in addition, said to have been overrun by two non-native, ‘invasive’ weeds.
known to be destructive to indigenous plant life and fragile ecologies as well as to buildings - the Giant Hogweed (Herculeum Mantegazzianum) and the Japanese Knotwood (Fallopia Japonica). Preston explained that before the Olympic bid, his firm were considering the possibility of conserving more of the existing urban fabric and open spaces, threading new infrastructure through them, enhancing existing connections and densifying the existing built fabric rather than comprehensively demolishing it.

However, before the reality of the Olympics had even created the need for comprehensive redevelopment, he argued that the extent of contamination, alongside known difficulties of introducing above and below ground infrastructure in the context of existing urban fabric rendered this ‘piecemeal change’ approach extremely challenging. He considered that it was both more time and cost effective to tackle contamination in a single process led and funded by a government agency/ single land owner than in numerous procedural steps led by different authorities and owners and potentially funded through planning gain from as many sources. He argued that the consequences of a ‘piecemeal approach’ would have been as follows:

[If] you take it out in bite size chunks [...] it left you with very major problems [...] and none of that, none of that could be resolved by one person or one development of one site. What you would have probably [seen would have been] a sort of an approach which would have evaluated these as individual sites in the context of dereliction or at least low value uses. So you would have had a relatively low value response that would have then probably limited your options dramatically in terms of remediation, infrastructure provision... So, in effect, you enter into a cycle where you’ll get incremental change but you are chasing your tail around the same set of issues (Interview, EDAW, 22.10.2008).

Peter Johnson and Chris Pruit (respectively a Senior Development Manager and Development Officer at the LDA who played significant roles in land assembly) also argued that pursuing a piecemeal development approach would have drastically reduced the potential of the site to contribute to or ‘catalyse’ regeneration in the wider East End. This was principally because piecemeal development is usually the product of a lack of advance planning. The lack of a plan relating to the long-term future of the site would have made it difficult if not impossible to make the case for large-scale ‘upfront’ public investment in it (Interview, LDA, 26.01.2009). Strategic planning combined with the Olympic Legacy
concept, on the other hand, would allow the LDA as a designated single authority to secure the funds to ‘create a framework’ for guiding and transforming the site’s fortunes over time.

An important role of spatial planning, in addition to showing how perceived barriers could be overcome in the first instance would be to show how public investment in infrastructure and decontamination would be cultivated over time. Johnson explained that after the Olympics, specific portions of the site would be resold to the private sector in order to generate returns which it could use firstly to redeem the costs of land acquisition and later reinvest in ‘social infrastructures’ for ‘the community’ including parklands, educational facilities and services that were currently lacking in the area. As he put it, ‘[s]o the money that we’ve spent to date that will need to be repaid is actually an investment in creating the value over and over. In the long-term it will do that. What we need to do is make sure that the [investment] profile balances the long-term profile of receipts expected in’ (Interview, LDA, 26.01.2009). The development of a strategic spatial plan would require the integration of local authority and ‘community’ objectives for the shorter to longer term through the creation of a representative governance structure. This would ensure that ‘investment that should be garnered from land uplift’ would eventually ‘go to the right piece of social infrastructure’ to assist in raising the deprivation indices of the Lower Lea Valley. Preston from EDAW added that far from distracting the LDA and their appointed regeneration agents from this task, making the case for redevelopment including securing the funds for it was greatly assisted by the Olympics. As he put it:

The point is you have to change, we have to change the game, we have to go for a value lift [...] and, in effect, that is what the Olympics gave you, it gave you a cause to intervene and an element of investment that would allow you to restructure... and that was the difference (Interview, EDAW, 22.10.2008).

The case that these representatives presented combined the logic of the property market – understandings of how to raise the ‘exchange value’ of real estate and fuel speculation – with processes which Molotch and Logan refer to as ‘land-use regulation on behalf of use-values’ (1987, p. 279). The result, in the form of a planning framework, would be a set of what they term ‘price-inflating regulation[s]’ (p. 280) aimed at making the property industry deliver the uses and spaces that people in the area needed – better jobs, better homes, a better environment.
Another important, if more conceptual, reason given for redeveloping the site was the idea that drastic change in the short term could provide the basis for continuity in the longer term. Preston argued that a crucial question for the team was ‘how do you build stability, how do you [...] bring forward a regeneration scheme which is essentially about anchoring a place, creating stability, social cohesion, permanent land uses?’ in contrast to the ‘transience’ that was said to have characterised the site before. He emphasised that the aim of the exercise was not to dispossess small local firms of lands and resources, but to provide the opportunity for marginalised groups to re-establish themselves at locations where they would be better served by infrastructure and local services. In conceptualising what the components of ‘stability’ for the future might include, he argued that re-establishing relationships between the site’s development ‘offer’ and the needs and capabilities of surrounding, existing ‘communities’ were crucial. ‘What we can’t do’ he said, is make the Canary Wharf mistake where, in effect, the jobs are essentially for people who were not traditionally in the area, they were bankers arrived from New York, bright young things from all over the world coming to work here and if you go north of Poplar High Street, the relevance of Canary Wharf to Tower Hamlets disappears straight away unless you want to drive a bus or sweep floors (Interview, EDAW, 22.10.2008).

One way to re-establish relationships between the redeveloped site and its surroundings might be to promote the revitalisation of some of the small-scale sporting, gardening and cultural uses that had existed there – including some of the legacies of the late nineteenth century Eton Mission and Manor. Preston argued that ‘if you take that those [spaces represented] specific relationships between historic community and historic cultural circumstances [then] I think it is absolutely critical that the underlying principles of what they were trying to do are understood and to some extent more than memorialised ... [made to] be again very active’. In this spirit, he was supportive of the idea that a number of relocated users might return to the site after the Games. Though the reality of a seven year interval between the CPO and the end of the Games could mitigate against this possibility, he maintained that the idea of ‘on-site legacy’ for specific uses and user groups in the context of its integration with surrounding localities was worth exploring, particularly as it was one which created a particular link between the LDA’s participatory approach to the CPO and the Mayor’s commitments for the Olympic legacy.
In 2008, when these interviews were conducted, the immediate consequences of re-planning the site and redistributing uses were in evidence. Closure of the site in July 2007 was followed by a wholesale demolition of all by one listed structure, the Kings Yard, producing a *tabula rasa* or rubble-scape from which all traces of former life and occupation had been removed.

### 4.3 Relocation: a negotiated strategy

In several documents relating to the CPO, the LDA express their intention to involve site occupants in decision-making processes about their relocations. These intentions reflect the broad emphasis of New Labour urban policy on the creation of ‘partnerships between government and civil society’ (Imrie and Raco, 2003, p. 7) through development processes. In contrast to the enterprise and property led approaches said to typify regeneration and large-scale development under the previous Conservative governments, these policies place emphasis on ‘sustainable communities’ (ODPM, 2005, p. 16) – a notion which is embedded in the commitments for the Olympic legacy.

Key messages of the LDA’s *Relocation Strategy* were that, a) financial and advisory support and compensation would be available to site ‘owners’, including ‘offer[ing] landowners a market value for their sites’ (LDA, 2004a, p. 10), and; b) ‘it is vital to talk to each [landowner] individually to establish detailed requirements and clarify need’ (p. 3). Hayes from the LDA explained that the agency realised that it would be difficult and problematic to generalise the ‘needs’ of different groups on the site given the disparate nature of their uses. In addition, they wished to avoid having to draw down CPO powers by ‘negotiating’ towards private compensation and relocation settlements with each legal occupant. Chris Pruitt from the LDA’s Land Assembly team explained that the team engaged with ‘illegal’ occupants, providing advice on how they might formalise their enterprises in time to qualify for compensation (Interview, LDA, 26.01.2009). He suggested that by extending the reach of their offer of compensation as far as possible, the LDA sought to maximise opportunities to use a land-acquisition process as a means to tackle those ‘unsustainable’ social problems of opportunism and transience with which the site was associated.

In spite of this deliberative approach to land purchase, a number of occupants, most prominently - though not without exception - the non-business users campaigned
vociferously against relocation and negotiations with the LDA became protracted. In late 2005, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government announced that a Public Inquiry would be held before deciding whether or not to confirm the CPO. This was held between May and August 2006. The LDA alleged that by the time the hearing commenced, 90 per cent of the land was in their possession and that 70 per cent of jobs on the site were safeguarded, suggesting that only a small number of individuals were objecting. Whilst the redevelopment of the site was contingent on the outcome of the enquiry, influencing its outcomes were both the success of the LDA in acquiring most of the land already and the unmovable dates of the Games. The need to have the Olympic Park complete by August 2012 virtually obliged the LDA to deliver a vacant site in July 2007. The hearing concluded in the LDA’s favour and the deadline was met, despite negotiations with several user groups remaining incomplete. For them as we will see, this served to significantly undermine the notion that ‘negotiation’ was being conducted as a conversation between people on the kinds of equal footing that this mode of interaction implies.

4.3.1 Converting sites into values

Of particular interest in the interviews I conducted with relocated case-study groups in 2008 and 2009 were accounts of: a) their former situation, including reasons for either wanting to be at or wanting to move from the site; b) their social ties or ‘communities’ and how these aligned or not with the strategic emphasis on ‘communities’ of consultation, relocation and ‘stabilisation’, and; c) how they experienced the negotiation of compensation for the spaces they had had. The following subheadings reflect these three points.

a) Site and Situation

The interviews suggested that the site created both opportunities and drawbacks for people in a range of ways. For all of the businesses interviewed, the site had the advantage of good road connections and ‘cheap business premises’ close to central London. However, most argued that it was a challenging environment to work in from the points of view of security – with ‘little tykes’ (implying the Travellers) hanging around the quiet streets waiting for an opportunity to steal a wallet, office equipment or materials – and of appearance. Each of these groups spoke positively about the LDA’s early, pre-Olympic ideas.
of improving rather than redeveloping the site and articulated a sense of shock at becoming aware of the more drastic implications of the Olympic bid plans. Even so, all claimed to be relatively unconcerned - ‘not too bothered’ as Brundle from FH Brundle & Son said - about the idea of relocation in itself, so long as this did not increase their overheads. Nicholls & Clarke Glass, a large firm employing hundreds of people which distributes glazing components all over the country spoke only of benefits of relocation to outer east London including the availability of larger sites, proximity to the M25 and the transnational road network. Bilmerton on the other hand, a niche industry employing eight people and supplying wigs and hair extensions from factories in China to predominantly locally based Afro-Caribbean retailers, described a number of drawbacks of being disembedded from a local market in which it was ‘known’ but not formally networked. The other businesses articulated views somewhere between these two positions. Forman of H Forman & Sons, for example, argued that proximity to central London was crucial for his firm as the relative freshness of his products gave him an edge over competitors: ‘You know, we get chefs phoning us up saying, “Oh, I’ve made a mistake, I desperately need three fillet salmon for lunch. You've got to be there. I need it in half an hour”’ (Forman, 20.11.08). Forman also emphasised the ‘marketable’ value of the historical association of manufacturing enterprise with the site. The fact that his business had its ‘roots’ in the inner East End was, he argued, of on-going significance for its brand and made him reluctant to move east.

For the residents, cyclists and allotment holders, the site’s location and features of their spaces within it created different kinds of advantage. A small group of former Clays Lane residents were, at the time of our first interview in late 2008, nostalgically compiling an architectural history of their estate - established as a fully mutual housing cooperative for single people in the late 1970s and later acquired by the Peabody Trust - and relayed in detail how its design had enabled a community of common interest to be formed amongst quite disparate individuals who lacked the support of family and many of whom stayed for many years. A representative for the Waterden Road Travellers, Margaret Barry, argued that the site’s isolation had made it a good location for a marginalised group to bring up their children – which included being able to inculcate norms and values which she claimed that people often assumed they wouldn’t have. Her account was poignantly opposed to the view which many site occupants held of the Travellers. It suggested that spatial remoteness from the world outside their ‘intimate community’ (Sennett, 1979) was as practical an aspiration for them as it was for many of the businesses, a feature of the site
which transformed it into much more than an opportunity – into a ‘home’ (Interview, Travellers, 07.01.2009).

David Jones, the former manager at the Eastway Cycle Centre (ECC) affectionately recalled details about it including the names riders had given over the years to particular slopes and bends in its cycle track (Interview, ECC, 11.2008). One of the leaders of the so called Eastway Users’ Group (EUG), Michael Taylor, downplayed the significance of the site itself, strategically seeing early on the futility of fighting to preserve it and seeking as a reward for collaboration with the LDA a high quality replacement amenity that could cater to a ‘viable community’ of interest. The Eastway Users Group was formed in 2004 as an alliance of club members who sought to become involved in discussions relating to the nature of their use and the adequacy of potential replacements for ‘the Eastway’. As Taylor put it, ‘all I needed to know - and all any rider needed to know - was that they were going to get a facility where they could do their sport’ (Interview, EUG, 19.08.2008).

For Eton Manor Allotment holders, building their sheds and trellises, maturing their plum-tree windbreaks and crops, and working alongside others had created strong emotional ‘attachments’ to the site which converted it into more than a spatial location -into a place in time which would be virtually impossible to replicate elsewhere. One representative, Elaine Hudson, who was particularly combative with the LDA argued that ‘the land that we’re on is very much part of [our] relationships’ (Interview, Eton, 01.09.2008). The gardens appeared to invert the defensive divisions evident across much of the site. Gardening at the allotments created bridges across a number of cultural boundaries. As she put it, there were:

Things like the Turkish woman who’s single being able to hang out with the Turkish Cypriot guy when they’re up at the gardens, but that would never happen in their community [...] I mean, we’ve got doctors and we’ve got architects, we’ve got, you know, people [from] all kinds of different backgrounds. And then you’ve got the generational mix as well [with] people [being in] contact with other generations (Interview, EMGS, 01.09.2008).

She suggested that these relationships were not instant products of ‘gardening side by side’, but formed in the context of the garden’s long life, its history as a refuge for local people impacted by industrialisation and the evolution since of a ‘ninety year old
community’. At Public Enquiry hearings, she and other plot holders objected to the CPO on the grounds that their community was so embedded in the site that the loss of the one would compromise the survival of the other (LDA, 2006).

b) Contested views of ‘community’

Some former occupants’ accounts suggested that an important reason why negotiations over the terms of the CPO became protracted was that the LDA held a different view of ‘community’ from the ones which they held. Jacob Sheppard from Clay’s Lane argued that they were offered a raw deal in comparison to the Travellers because they were not classed as a community by the LDA in the same way. He argued that this was because they seen as a ‘mixed group’ defined only as a community by virtue of proximity and by having particular ‘housing needs’ (Interview, Clays, 01.09.2008). Whether or not the Clays Lane residents were officially viewed as a ‘community’ had important implications for the relocation options they would be offered. As far back as 2003, in the first survey set of consultations run by the LDA through the consultancy Fluid, the possibility of the residents relocating as a group to a new estate, much as the Travellers eventually did, was raised. About half of the 450 residents were said to have been interested.

After the Olympic bid victory, Sheppard claimed that the LDA, under pressure of time, began to persuade them of the benefits of moving individually rather than as a group. He claimed to have been told categorically in this context that ‘you’re not a community’ (Interview, Clays, 01.09.2008). In interview with Peter Johnson and Chris Pruft from the LDA Land Assembly, Sheppard and his supporters were portrayed as a ‘ruling clique’ in the estate rather than as representatives of a ‘community’. They argued that the cooperative was ‘dominated’ by strong individuals, characterised by ‘lack of transparency’ and had mismanaged its finances to a point of corruption – leading to a necessary takeover by the Peabody Trust. In meetings with the estate, he claimed that the efforts of the ‘community engagement’ consultants Snoo (who took over from Fluid in the context of the CPO) to push forward the idea of ‘group moves’ for those who were genuinely interested ‘fell to pieces’ because there was no ‘real’ cohesion amongst participants, not because the LDA was unwilling to engage with them. Johnson conveyed frustration that ‘you know, there were all these shifting alliances and [so], as one issue is resolved, a whole group of people who would stand shoulder to shoulder suddenly would disappear’ (Interview, LDA/land, 26.01.2009).
The Eton Manor allotment holders also claimed that the LDA sought to persuade them to disband and relocate individually to existing allotment gardens in the area. This would have eliminated the need for them to create a bespoke replacement site for Eton Manor. Their representative, Elaine Hudson, confirmed that ‘that was kind of the basis of a lot of our discussion with them really, to keep on saying we’re a community, don’t forget we’re a community and you know we’re an old one and we go back two or three generations’ (Interview, Clays, 01.09.2008). In interview with the LDA, an opposing view was presented that the allotments were not as cohesive a group as some of them tried to make out. Many allegedly ‘looked for someone to take a lead’, but what most of them really wanted, Chris Pruitt claimed, was not to get into a political debate but to ‘just get on with gardening’ as quickly as possible (Interview, LDA, 26.01.2009).

These differences of opinion echo some of the theoretical difficulties with definitions of ‘community’ in the context of the contemporary city that a number of authors have raised (see for example, Edwards, 2008; Imrie and Raco, 2003; Lees, 2003). However, the specific difficulties which relocated groups revealed in negotiations with the LDA also reflect the unsettling situation they found themselves in which created the need, suddenly, for people to weigh up their own interests against their group loyalties. Representatives claimed that people felt defeated as the LDA repudiated their acts of self-defense and used ‘atomising’ tactics to divide them. Forman alleged that expressions of anti-Olympic sentiment were continually repressed, reflecting the assertion of law in the context of the LDA’s fear of negative publicity over public opinion. Sheppard from Clays Lane argued additionally that the LDA actively helped to break up groups and isolate their spokespeople. There was, he claimed, an ‘approach of chopping the heads off objectors’ that made many people ‘very frightened’ so preventing them from pursuing their ultimate goals (Interview, Clays, 01.09.2008).

c) Contesting views of ‘market value’

For some businesses, the strategic relocation of their activities combined with the offer of a ‘market value’ compensation for their sites and facilities was adequate and even advanced their situations. Nicholls & Clarke and even FH Brundle & Son – who had reservations about the regeneration potential of the Olympics – reported that compensation was sufficient to allow them to move to considerably larger, brand new buildings on freehold sites in
exchange for old factory buildings on land which they had leased. Although the Compulsory Purchase Act (2004) stipulates that compensation must not include ‘betterment’, these businesses seemed better off after their relocation. The main drawback they each reported was the ‘slow’ pace of the LDA in approving expenditures which they had incurred.

For firms H Forman & Son and Bilmerton, the process of ascertaining ‘market value’ appeared to have been far more problematic. As a small firm, Bilmerton lacked the capital and the manpower to be able to pay costs upfront and take on the extra work of relocation. Bilmerton’s director John Jang reported ‘getting into debt’ as well as depression whilst paying out fees and expenses that were required in order to comply with the terms of the CPO - including contracting a surveyor, a legal advisor, a ‘relocation specialist’ and an estate agent - finding a suitable site in a rapidly inflating industrial land market and continuing to run the business. Although he reported that he had got on well with the LDA, he explained how, in the end:

I couldn’t understand how, you know, some, some, some operation like that could leave a smaller company like ourselves to just move and expect us to be able to pay, according to the Compensation Code which is: spend the money first. There were costs which … not only did I not have the money but I also wasn’t sure whether it was a compensatable item, and so I wouldn’t incur the cost in case it [wasn’t] (Interview, Bilmerton, 01.2009).

Although Bilmerton did relocate to a new industrial unit in Barking, Yang reported a year later that they were still struggling financially. Forman argued that in the LDA’s definition of ‘market value’, a number of economic consequences of relocation for businesses in the specific context of the Olympics were disregarded. For example, he claimed that because the law stipulated that legal occupants could not profit from the exchange of their land, the deals they were offered discounted the capitalisation that immediately followed the announcement of London’s winning bid. As he put it:

They had to pretend that they weren’t even thinking about the Olympics. And they go back to a time [before], to what the land was at that time, then add a bit for inflation, and say right, this is your land without the benefit of the Olympics […] Problem is, in the real world, the Olympics IS happening. And when you need to go and find a piece of land to move to, you can’t tell a
potential vendor “can’t you [also] pretend the Olympics isn't happening?” So, of course, you’re out of pocket. And worse than that, you know, if it was one business, you know, it might not affect the market too much; when you’ve got 250 businesses all looking to move, of course the price goes up even more.

Land designated in local authority development plans for residential development was six to seven times more expensive than industrial land. In addition, industrial land was more expensive to the west of the Olympic site than just to its east (Valuation Office Agency, 2007). Forman argued that after the bid was won, industrial land holders bordering the site saw the opportunity of a likely land use re-designation of their properties to residential use to sell their plots at much higher values than they were currently worth. As he put it, ‘they were just waiting until a time that they [could] get residential planning’. The LDA’s ‘market value’ assessments encouraged businesses to move east to cheaper land. It became difficult, in this context, for him to make competitive offers on any of the sites which he desired which all lay to the west of the Olympic site.

Forman claimed that eighty per cent of his time between 2004 and 2006 was spent ‘fighting the battle rather than […] being able to grow the business’ for which he had subsequently ‘put in a loss of profit claim against the LDA’. He believed that the LDA’s processes of assessment led to the privileging of businesses that had the resources to appoint professional negotiators or were otherwise well equipped to negotiate their terms - verbally, legally, and through the media. He emphasised the value of the support network and alliances he had developed with other impacted businesses as well as the publicity and political support that he was able to attract through his wider social networks. These helped him, eventually, to secure a prominent site opposite the Olympic Stadium where, as we will see in Chapter 7, he succeeded in cultivating a series of economic opportunities and advantages for his business connected to the Olympics.

Given that the residents were all social housing tenants of one kind or another, the issue of ‘market value’ was not directly applicable to them, though the broader question of whether the CPO would materially disadvantage them or not was. Early on in their processes of engaging with the LDA, the Waterden Road Travellers felt that the site options they were first offered compared poorly with what they had. Margaret Barry described her experiences as follows:
So we started getting consultations with the London Development Agency [...] and we started having meetings then about building new properties for us, new homes [...] but the choices that we were given at first were bad choices. They were the wrong sites, wrong sizes, wrong facilities [...] They expect seven people (families) to go into a place that couldn’t be bigger than for four families to fit in, do you know what I mean? But as time went on [...] they got to understand that we were human beings (Interview, Travellers, 09.01.2009).

This understanding, she claimed, came about following a hearing the group managed to secure through the London Gypsy and Traveller Unit (LGTU) and their legal advisors at the High Court to challenge the Secretary of State’s decision to allow the CPO before the LDA had found suitable alternative accommodation for them. The outcome of this was a ruling in favour of the Travellers that their site would not be taken until a suitable alternative had been secured. The LDA, Margaret reported, were suddenly far more collaborative, soon identifying three small sites in Hackney each capable of accommodating a few of the families. Once the Travellers had agreed to this and plans for each site were underway, she described how the LDA even ‘let us pick the colour of the brick’ and suggested that this freedom, in the end, more than compensated for the difficulties of the move: ‘we got good out of it, but really…’

The ability of the Travellers to participate in the design of their new homes appeared to other residents as unjust, given this was not an option they were readily offered. Sheppard of Clays Lane argued that because of the transfer of the estate to the Peabody Trust, residents of the former cooperative didn’t get to benefit from the sale of the site to the LDA. The shared houses at Clays Lane had provided the means for people to divide utility bills amongst themselves, so keeping their costs down. Their layout also helped facilitate the development of ‘a network of support for vulnerable people’ which individuals living in new ‘mixed communities’ would no longer have. The small packages of financial compensation for disruption they were each offered did not make up for the increase in the cost of services which he and others now bore. For some time after relocation was presented to residents as inevitable, they were not given ‘decent status’ by the local authority Newham – a title which puts displaced social housing residents in a good position to ‘bid’ for alternative flats. This, Sheppard claimed, ‘put us at a disadvantage’ relative to other people in the local area seeking social housing at the same time. He speculated that the delay was caused by a protraction of negotiations with the LDA over the ‘nomination
rights’ that Newham wanted to social housing in the Olympic Park. Newham, he argued, were ‘using us as bargaining counters’ in securing these rights, conveying the impression that human needs formed a key if sensitive part of the measure of the ‘value’ of Clays Lane.

Elaine Hudson from Eton Manor Allotments argued that the LDA never really engaged with the question of whether sites was ‘worth’ salvaging, instead focussing on ‘selling’ the Olympic ‘story’ to plot holders. The notion that the process was a negotiation was a fabrication as far as she was concerned - ‘people [were] so cowed by authority that they would just agree to anything.’ The LDA had no tools to measure the value of the ‘maturity of this ninety year old landscape’ despite apparently recognising the ‘investment’ of time that it took to create. ‘Negotiation’ appeared to her as a token democratic gesture. The most positive outcomes, she argued, in echo of Forman, the Travellers and cyclists (below) came about once the group had engaged the interest of the media, the writer Iain Sinclair (Sinclair, 2008) and several professional photographers. This helped to lead, finally, to the LDA’s agreement of a ‘group move’ to a patch of scrubland in Leyton - Marsh Fields.

![Figure 4.9: Opposition to the relocation of Eton Manor Allotments (photo: Sam Strickland, 2007)](image)

In an interesting reversal of the history of allotment formation in response to the enclosure of common land, this proposed move impinged on the interests of the Leyton Lammas Lands Defence Committee (LLLDC), a group who campaign to defend residual slivers of ‘Lammas land’ in the Lea Valley. For some while, the allotment holders joined forces with the LLLDC in jointly opposing relocation to this site – as a form of double enclosure of common land. This was overturned at the CPO Public Enquiry, though with a ruling in favour of the allotments holders that ‘the Legacy development will include new allotment provision’ (LDA, 2006, p. 316). Although the correct number of sixty seven plots and
prefabricated green sheds were provided in replacement for those lost and although Marsh Fields is only half a mile from Eton Manor, a series of factors - proximity to a busy road, appearance, a standard layout and a different, uncultivated soil – conspired, as predicted, to sever ties between members of the gardening community. For Hudson, this pointed to a failure in the LDA’s conception of how to build, support or reinforce ‘sustainable communities’.

The compensation which users of the Eastway Cycle Circuit sought was not ‘market value’ but rights of use relating to an amenity. As the circuit was owned, funded and managed by the Lea Valley Regional Park Authority (LVRPA), the group was initially offered the alternative site of Rammey Marsh within the park. The EUG rejected this on grounds that it was former industrial land known to be contaminated and that its air was polluted by fumes from the M25 motorway. In 2005, they identified a site, Hog Hill, which they claimed would suit their members better and subsequently lobbied the LDA to be offered this instead. This site comprised agricultural land in the ‘greenbelt’, was owned by the Crown Estates, lay at the edge of protected Hainault Forest and well beyond the LVRPA, thus presenting a challenging and more costly option for the LDA.

Through garnering interest from Redbridge Borough Council and the media, EUG eventually succeeded in persuading the LDA to purchase this site and apply for planning permission for a cycling centre which would be managed by Redbridge Council. The facility – far superior to the Eastway - was opened by Boris Johnson in September 2008 amid official claims that it represented one of the first tangible legacies of the Olympics. In spite of his achievements in realising it, Taylor argued that ‘it’s just been a lot of unnecessary pain because [the LDA] set out, I think, with an agenda that was basically to drive through what they wanted to see’ (Interview, Taylor, 18.09.2008). This meant that negotiation had to be conducted in a far more combative way than it might have done and was costly for them in terms of time and energy. In their different ways, these accounts highlight disjunctures between ‘exchange value’ from the perspective of a large organisation and in the context of a strategic plan and ‘use value’ from the varied perspectives of small-scale groups each seeking opportunities to cultivate their interests.
Figure 4.10: top left: Wallis Road Traveller site; Top right: H Forman & Son; Middle left: Eton Manor Allotments; FH Brundle & Son, Middle right: Nicholls & Clarke Glass; Bottom left: Gallion’s Reach; Bottom right: Hog Hill Cycle Centre; (photos by Juliet Davis, 2009)
4.4 Conclusions: the politics of new enclosure

The chapter began by counterpoising official accounts of the site’s social, physical and economic deprivation with a closely focussed study of its uses and occupancies. I argued that though aspects of the site’s use and occupancy could be said to reinforce official accounts of its deprivation in the context of the CPO, others at least suggested the potential for alternative interpretations - ones which might begin by countering assumptions that ad-hoc or unplanned assemblages of small-scale use and occupancy are necessarily emblems of ‘disorder’ in a negative sense.

In the second part of the chapter, some of the strategic purposes of the CPO with respect to realising a ‘regeneration legacy’ of the Olympics were examined. Key amongst these were aims to: a) facilitate a planning approach that could leverage far higher levels of investment in the long-term than ‘piecemeal change’ could achieve, and; b) address what were seen as ‘barriers to regeneration’ such as ground contamination in a time and cost effective way. Whilst these purposes explained why the site’s existing urban fabric, its uses and residents were not viewed as potential catalysts to the site’s regeneration, they also suggested that addressing conditions of deprivation would not involve tackling the realities of this in terms of the everyday life of the site. Indeed, the LDA’s relocation strategy highlighted a policy of dispersing those people, uses and forms of occupancy deemed to be associated with the site in its deprived, un-regenerated state. This raises a number of questions relating to the issues of: a) who gains by the ‘regeneration legacy’ of the Olympics, and; b) how the Olympics itself can serve to legitimate a tabula rasa approach to regeneration.

In the third part, I explored the refraction of the LDA’s purposes through their practices of engagement with site occupants in order to further problematise their case for the CPO. Although there were some notable correspondences between the LDA’s strategic goals and users’ desires for a better situation, engagements also revealed some important discrepancies between them. These, I argued, often appeared in the context of different ways of evaluating and indeed of assigning value to land as opposed to places, futures as opposed to histories connected to place, and of different kinds of ‘community’. In addition, for a number of the case-study groups, ‘negotiation’ rapidly descended into battle which was only drawn to a close in the context of the time pressures imposed by the Olympic schedule. Conflictual exchanges between the LDA and the site’s occupants recall Imrie and
Thomas’s wider point that practices of community engagement in relation to Compulsory Purchase orders is often ‘conducted within a discourse and culture which recognises a limited range of considerations and perspectives as legitimate’ (Imrie and Thomas, 1997, p. 1410) and which, in spite of a careful choice of words such as ‘negotiation’, are characterised by uneven power relations. Regardless of the benefits for future users and ecological systems of remediating a polluted landscape, the contested understandings of community and of the value of particular sites which arose in the context of some exchanges between the LDA and former occupants suggests the need for greater acknowledgement at urban policy level of the diverse ways in which people define and forge social connections in relation to places of use. This is not to specifically endorse place-based definitions of community, but to highlight the importance of the space that people make themselves for the enhancement of their social lives.

Many users conveyed the impression that though the struggle was challenging, the outcome at the end of the struggle was positive. Forman’s new factory, the new allotments (given a few years of soil improvement), the bright, safe new Traveller homes and the cycle centre at Hog Hill can be seen, in a number of respects, as lastingly positive outcomes of the CPO. Notwithstanding, some of their more troubled accounts of struggle echo Harvey’s analysis of the dynamics of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ discussed in the previous chapter – the capture of land assets at a time of low market value with the promise of its capitalisation, a promise which former occupants and owners of the site stand to gain far less from than they appeared to in the immediate aftermath of the CPO. The most explicit symbol of this new ‘enclosure’, which in the following year became an important focus for anti-Olympic sentiment and action, was a chemical blue fence the ODA erected along the site boundary.

Tactics developed for demonstrating political resistance to the ‘enclosure’ and consequent inability of local residents to access the site included lambasting the colour, pushing it into the background of graffiti images or digging through it as though to reveal its thinness as a masquerade. From early 2008, the ODA and LDA retaliated by utilising the fence as a medium for communicating their vision of the renewed landscape they were creating in the interior and what forms of legacy this would create. The following chapter takes this up by exploring the vision of the future constructed for the newly bounded site as presented in the early stages of the LMF.
Chapter 5

Envisioning Legacy: structuring and picturing a better urban future

Figure 5.1: Draft illustrative perspective of the Olympic Park in legacy. (Produced for the LDA 2008)

5. Introduction

The image above is a rather different sort of image from the Jason Orton photograph included in chapter 4 (see figure 4.7), which focuses on the same stretch of the Channelsea River. It was presented at the second series of local public consultations on the draft Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF), held in 2009. Orton’s photograph is a ground level view implying the momentary appropriation of a scene from the perspective of immersion within it. This image, in contrast, is a computer generated aerial view suggesting a vantage point of command over the whole site. The difference between the two recalls de Certeau’s (1984)
theorisation of power in terms of the difference between a panoramic view over the city and the experience of ordinary walkers, and Lefebvre’s related distinction between the ‘representational spaces’ and ‘represented spaces’ of the city. In the above image, form, colour and materiality are abstracted and simplified. Orton’s photograph, on the other hand, emphasises the oldness of the tide-worn banks of a distinctly grey-brown, post-industrial river. The above image is a vision of future transformation rather than a documentary record of an actual place. Whose vision is it and what does it depend upon?

In the previous chapter, I argued that although the site’s economic revaluation by physical regeneration was intended to produce benefits for the local area, outcomes of its first phase - the Compulsory Purchase - suggested that achieving these goals would be challenging without greater acknowledgement of its worth from the perspective of existing users and occupants. This aim of this chapter is to investigate how the regeneration goals broadly articulated by Mayor Ken Livingstone in his Five Legacy Commitments (2007) were addressed through specific urban design approaches to the LMF. The chapter focuses in these terms on the LMF designers’ role in mediating between commitments tolastingly regenerate the Olympic site and the site’s concrete realities. It considers both how the site’s existing potentials were conceived by designers and how a vision for its regenerated future was superimposed over these. In the process, it takes into account the role ascribed to designers and design in policy contexts relating to the ‘urban renaissance’ in the years leading up to the launch of the LMF. Analysis concentrates on how ‘projections’ in the form of architectural drawings included in the early 2009 version of the LMF (referred to as Output C) were structured and used in accomplishing this task.

The three urban design and architecture practices commissioned by the London Development Agency (LDA) to develop a Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF) were first appointed in January 2008. These were the international urban planning, landscape and design firm EDAW (now AECOM), the English architectural practice Allies & Morrison Architects, and the Dutch architectural and urban design practice KCAP. With the Olympic Games masterplan as its base (see Figure 5.2), the LMF was to provide an overlay showing how the site’s hard boundaries could be blurred after the Games and the so-called ‘serviced platform’ sites of temporary Games infrastructure reused for mixed-use development. As the word framework implies, the LMF was to be more than a conventional spatial plan used to establish a preferred distribution of future land uses (KCAP, EDAW, A&M, 2009, p. 1). It was intended to provide a guide for regeneration processes which masterplanners claimed
would ‘never be “finished”’ (p. 97). The masterplanning team was challenged with providing a flexible plan which could be resolved in terms of land use and form in different ways but also a more specific image of a three-dimensional environment that could be shown to correspond with Livingstone’s commitments to regeneration. The team’s focus in this regard was on the subtle articulation of a balance between design for the immediate post-2012 period through the invention of specific ‘catalysts’ to future use and sustainably regenerative investment, ‘scenario planning’ for how social use and development might actually look and unfold, and a more ‘open’ conception of development processes.

![Figure 5.2: Site wide 2012 Land Use Plan (Source: Olympic Delivery Authority; EDAW Consortium, 2007).](image)

The word *envisioning* has been chosen as this chapter’s title firstly in connection to the profuse use of the word ‘vision’ in policy and planning literature relating to the 2012 Olympic Legacy; secondly, for its general dictionary designation of processes of imagining the future; and thirdly in relation to the specific way in which Tufte uses it to denote processes of conceiving and (re)visualising information. It can be said to encompass the continual exchanges that take place in design between what Tufte calls the *mind’s eye* views, the varied contexts of a site, brief, budget, policy and regulation, ‘visual strategies’ (Tufte, 1990) of communication, and represented information and/or proposition.
The Output C LMF (LDA, 2009) was developed for the purposes of pre-planning application consultation with a wide range of project partners and stakeholders. It is a substantial document, running to 396 pages of spatial strategy and another 364 pages of Socio-economic strategy. Given how much is said and drawn in it, a challenge in structuring this chapter was to identify core themes relating to my research questions which would allow for an in-depth analysis but considerably more succinct presentation. The chapter begins by exploring some of the features of the masterplan framework’s ascribed purposes in the context of wider urban regeneration approaches supported by the national and metropolitan level governments of the time (Mayor of London, 2004a, 2004b, 2007b; UTF, 1999). Focus is on: a) how the masterplan framework may be conceptualised as a process rather than as a fixed plan, and; b) what sort of orientation it presents in terms of urban form. I argue that the LMF can be seen to cohere within a wider discourse of ‘design-led’ urban regeneration developed under Labour, beginning with the Urban Taskforce’s document *Towards an Urban Renaissance* (DETR, 1999). My main objective in this section is to consider how design for the site’s regenerated future is embedded in a present discursive and political context and to begin to suggest the significance of this for the durability of the masterplan – a topic which is further explored in Chapter 7.

In the second and third parts of the chapter, I consider two specific questions: a) firstly, what aspects of the existing site context and/or its history does the LMF particularly emphasise or engage with? and; b) secondly, how is its transformation over time envisioned? In the second part, I consider how value is assigned to different attributes of the existing site and how these are represented as opportunities for value-creation. I then explore how the site’s history was used in conceptualising design for regeneration as a process of transformation. Lastly, I examine how masterplanners sought to overcome the site’s significant disconnection from its immediate surroundings and so facilitate the realisation of the vision of ‘compactness’ in which policy for sustainable urban renewal promoted.

The third part focuses on the relation between immediate post-2012 outcomes (or ‘catalysts’) and long term possibilities (or ‘scenarios’) and on the designers’ related conceptualisation of the masterplan framework as an ‘Open City’. I use this section to discuss the dependence of the envisioned ‘catalyst effect’ of the Olympics on forecasts contained within the Socio-economic strategy coming to fruition and, similarly, how the
preferred spatial ‘scenario’ presented towards the end of the LMF can be construed to some extent as a visualisation of these same anticipated realities. However, it is clear from taking a closer look at perspectival projections forming part of this set that these are not just illustrations of the site’s potential for development and the phases in which this might unfold, but were made with the purpose of galvanising broad-based interest and support for an urban vision. It is important to remember that the function of these drawings in the context of consultations is to provide a sense of a future ‘at hand’ (Mitchell, p. 359) – and so apparently a persuasive view of the envisioned future environment.

However, for all that they show and tell about how the site’s future was conceived in a specific present, what do representations conceal about what might actually happen, what may become ‘subject to revision’ (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 41)? The LMF provides some concerning indications of the possibility for disjuncture between the envisioned future and the future present. I argue that drawings used to present the future ‘at hand’ to stakeholders and communities fail to indicate either the flexibility of the ‘Open City’ or the full consequences of the LMF’s Socio-economic strategy. The chapter concludes with comments about the tension between ‘open’ and fixed elements of the framework and the significance of this for the development of a temporal model of development.

5.1 The context of the file

The LMF, in itself a bulky file, is related to a far more extensive corpus of policy and planning literature that invokes the discourses of design-led urban regeneration and ‘Urban Renaissance’. As numerous authors have pointed out, the latter of these terms denotes a turn in urban policy beginning with the election of the Labour government in the late 1990s (see, for example, Imrie & Raco, 2003). In the forward to the LMF, it is stated that ‘the aim of the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF) is to deliver a world-class model of urban regeneration which combines the best design, technology, environmental and socio-economic development, while satisfying the urgent requirements vital to the integrity and aspirations of the local communities’ (LDA, 2009, p. 1). A primary role of the LMF in these terms is to provide an exemplar for design-led regeneration defined in the terms of this urban policy turn.

The correlation between ‘good design’ and regeneration was first articulated by the Urban Taskforce (UTF) with the publication of Towards an Urban Renaissance in 1999 – the early
years of the New Labour regime. This document served to situate design at the heart of urban policy and in these terms to place urban design high up in the list of strategic priorities for addressing conditions of decline in deprived areas. In an similar statement to that above, the UTF argued that its purpose was to ‘establish a new vision for urban regeneration founded on the principles of design excellence, social well-being and environmental responsibility within a viable economic and legislative framework’ (DETR, 1999, p. 1). These principles, as they are set out in the report, may be categorised according to two primary themes: a) the expanded notion of design and its implementation to encompass the imagination of processes – requiring, for example, better ‘co-ordinated action’ across the spheres of planning, architecture and development as between urban authorities and the communities they represent (DETR, pp. 1 - 3), and; b) the integrated imagination of spatial reality and social reality – in terms of urban form and its accompanying possibilities for use, social interaction, mobility and exchange.

Many of the key principles established by the UTF report were reflected and developed in national and metropolitan London levels of urban policy over the following decade as well as in the strategic approaches developed by the Mayor’s Architecture & Urbanism Unit, his later Design for London and in design-related guides produced by the government’s architecture and urbanism watchdog, CABE. Good design is viewed, broadly speaking, as a way of adding value to existing places and their ‘communities’ and thus of attracting ongoing investment. The emphasis placed on ‘best design’ in the LMF as a key ingredient of the long-term regeneration of the Lea Valley may thus be viewed not as a particular feature of goals for the LMF but in the context of a ‘discursive unity’, in Foucault’s terms (2002[1972], pp. 23-34). In consideration of this, in the following subsections I concentrate on the themes of process-led design and the orientations to urban form first established by the UTF report in terms of the LMF, also highlighting correlations with other key documents and statements.

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1 The following constitute a few key documents from a wide selection emphasising the primacy of design for regeneration:
5.1.1. The purpose of the masterplan framework: the process approach

In the introduction to the LMF, the purpose of designing a masterplan framework is said to be to ‘fix the necessary parameters [for regeneration] and leave elements open and flexible for later stages of implementation. A framework should also clearly articulate the overarching ambitions and vision of a place’ (p. 1). This statement clearly suggests that a framework should reflect the organisation of a process rather than only of the urban order of a site. It is to map a series of project stages or phases whilst somehow or other also articulating qualities of ‘place’ that the process might eventually deliver. This raises the immediate question of the relationship between the ‘openness’ endorsed by this form of planning and the role of design in creating a ‘vision of a place’, and of the potential for strategic design or planning to foreclose the range of futures that might become both possible and/or desirable.

The Output C LMF is in two parts – a spatial strategy and a socio-economic strategy, in these terms addressing the UTF’s acknowledgement that the physical dimension of regeneration had been counterproductively privileged over socio-economic considerations. The first part includes a portfolio of drawings that together with a textual narrative explain how the Olympic site may transform after 2012. Much of this is assembled in the form of a conceptual framework comprised of ‘six spatial concepts’. These are developed towards the end of the file into a set of more detailed spatial ‘scenarios’. Although the word ‘scenario’ suggests possibility rather than certainty, drawings reflecting the full array of architectural representation conventions – plan, section, elevation, perspective and isometric – are used to convey their designers’ imaginations of their future characteristics as actual places, though it is unclear from the documentation to what extent this vision of place is fixed or merely provisional. Certainly the presence of ‘detailed scenarios’ appears to reflect the UTF’s suggestion that designers’ emphasis on spatial qualities should not be negatively impacted by placing greater emphasis on development processes, but rather deepened through an expanded sense of the place of design itself in the dynamics of growth and change. Nonetheless, as we will see later in the chapter, articulating the relationship between an open process and a possible end result, however tentatively depicted, presents a number of conceptual and practical challenges.

An important dimension of the UTF’s focus on design is what it refers to as the need for ‘coordinated action’ between different levels of the planning and development process.
Apparently in echo of this, the LMF states that a key part of its role is to represent a mediation between different authorities and stakeholders in the project. Output C, as already stated above, was developed as the basis for a variety of consultations with project partners and stakeholders. These consultations form the main focus of Chapter 6’s analysis of the LMF team’s capacity to mediate between contexts, forces and interests. The way in which design was distributed between three firms may also be viewed as indicative of the broader emphasis of the UTF and the urban approaches it stimulated on joined-up design and development processes.

The three urban design and architectural firms selected to develop the LMF were appointed as a consortium. Each of the firms had achieved critical acclaim in international planning and urban design circles for their work. Allies & Morrison had, in the previous year alone, received a ‘Mayor’s Award for Excellence in Planning’ and the title of ‘Masterplanning Architect of the Year’ at the Building Design Awards. EDAW (now known as AECOM) had specialisms in the fields of regional planning, urban regeneration strategy, community development, landscape architecture, land management, water and natural resource planning, sustainability planning, habitat creation and restoration, engineering and construction management, as well as urban and architectural design. All had decades worth of experience: EDAW was founded in 1939, Allies & Morrison and KCAP in the late 1980s. At the time of their appointment to the LMF, they were all working on several other large-scale developments worldwide. EDAW was not only working on projects across the globe but had offices in thirty-two different cities. All were familiar with the UK policy context of regeneration and had worked on sites approximating the post-industrial conditions of the Lea Valley. KCAP, for example, had been responsible for producing masterplans for the mixed-use redevelopment of ‘brownfield’ former dockland sites in Amsterdam and Hamburg. EDAW had a history of involvement in the Lea Valley having been commissioned by the LDA and the GLA in 2002 to produce the Lower Lea Valley Regeneration Framework and also the Olympic and Legacy Masterplans underpinning London’s successful Olympic bid (see Chapter 4). EDAW had other Olympic experience, having produced plans for the Aquatics Park for the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the Olympic Village for the 2000 Sydney Olympics. So why, one may ask, did it appear necessary to bring them together? Aside from the sheer scale of the site, a representative for the LDA argued in interview that the purpose of bringing these firms together was to maximise the benefits of their collective experience and create a shared rather than singular ‘vision’ of the post-Olympic site. By appointing three firms, the masterplan could be said to represent a consensus of expert
views on the site’s transformative possibilities and on how to transform it – an outcome viewed as highly desirable. Design leadership was, in effect, distributed between their varied aesthetic, formal, and philosophical orientations and practices. Thus, the design-led approach being encouraged was one which downplayed the significance of single-authored or iconic products in favour of intelligent, collaborative approaches to urban development process.

5.1.2 Urban form

The LMF suggests an orientation to urban form which coheres with a wide range of policy and strategic documents produced from 1999 that promote and provide the parameters for ‘compact city’ development, including the densification of existing cities. Reflecting The London Plan’s design principles for compact city development (Mayor of London, 2004a), the LMF Socio-economic Strategy states masterplanners’ intention to ‘maximise the potential of sites and more efficient use of land’ (LDA, 2009, p. 51). This potential is presented primarily in terms of a target for residential development, construed in terms of a range of 10,000-12,000 new homes. It also reflects London Plan principles by presupposing a mixed-use environment which clusters residential development around neighbourhood ‘centres’ where education, faith, recreation, public health provision, civic amenities and retail would be readily accessible.

The UTF argued that the ‘compact city’ was the most ecological solution to urban growth. This was based on evidence showing that dense, mixed-use European cities such as Barcelona consumed fewer natural resources than sprawling, functionally zoned cities. This was said to be because proximity between uses in a city: a) reduces the burden on transport networks; b) increases opportunities for cycling and walking, and; c) reduces pollution levels, the pressures of growth on open space, natural habitats and agricultural land (DETR, 1999, pp. 54-55). Design for compactness, the UTF claim, creates the opportunity to cluster uses around transportation ‘hubs’ and/or in relation to the scale of

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communities, to more efficiently plan transport and other infrastructure, and to create networks of small-scale open spaces that relate to the scale of localities whilst also linking them within regional frameworks. With this approach to form, Lees notes, came a “continental attitude” towards urban life’ and the promotion of a ‘face-to face’, café-culture city seen as a necessary antidote to a typically British defensive retreat to interiors and suburbs (Lees, 2003, p. 65).

In addition to endorsing and developing the UTF’s compact city principles, The London Plan provided an outline strategy for the Lower Lea Valley ‘Opportunity Area’ - so establishing the link between evaluations of its existing uses, form and environment and the discourse of ‘Urban Renaissance’. In the Mayor of London’s slightly later planning strategy for the Lower Lea Valley (2007a), the UTF non context-specific design principles are translated into a contextually specific ‘vision’ for transformation. The key components of this vision are: a) mixed use development based around transport interchanges (here referred to for the first time as ‘places of exchange’); b) residential development accommodating mixed tenures distributed across a range of densities supported in the London Plan; c) the reinforcement of ‘connections’ across the valley, and; d) high quality parklands that build on the valley’s ‘unique network of waterways’ (Mayor of London, 2007a). In the process, both the site and its ascribed ‘opportunities’ are assigned value – in terms of its existing ‘assets’ and of the capacity to maximise ‘site potential’ (Mayor of London, 2007a, p. 1). It is in the context of such evaluations – of site and potential - that I now explore the LMF. I focus on the dense, mixed and integrated aspects of the model of ‘compact city’, considering how this procedural and formal vision relates to evaluations of the Olympic site.

5.2 Envisioning Site

How is the Olympic site defined in the LMF? What aspects are highlighted and what aspects are suppressed in its varied representations? In this section, I am particularly interested in understanding how the site is presented in the LMF in terms of potentials and value, arguing that this provides at least one measure for the kind of regeneration the urban legacy may represent.
Figure 5.3: (from top to bottom): The city moving east (p. 10); A well connected site (p. 14); Existing arts, culture and leisure map, correct as of 2008 (p. 20) (Produced for the LDA 2008).
5.2.1 Diagramming values

Certain features of the site and its location are referred to in the LMF using an economics-oriented language of ‘assets’. In contrast, drawbacks are usually referred to as ‘barriers’ – a term encompassing physical limits as well as impediments to social-economic development. The redefinition of the site in terms of assets and barriers forms a primary step towards its strategic reconstruction.

For the most part, information about the site is given in terms of legacy masterplan proposals. However, the first few pages are devoted to a site analysis. Conveyed through a series of diagrams and accompanying text, this concentrates on locating the site in relation to processes and contexts at regional, city and local scales. As Figure 5.3 above indicates, these include: a) growth in population and development, seen to be concentrated on east London; b) large-scale development sites in London; c) city-wide and intercity connections via the public transport rail network; d) deprivation, seen to be particularly high in the area covered by the site; e) London’s Lea Valley Regional Park (LVRP), which intersects the site; f) the location of cultural and leisure facilities in the host boroughs and City of London, and; g) connections between the site and its immediate ‘fringes’, which are shown to be poorly articulated. The analysis serves to reveal those locational advantages of the site which the LMF could reinforce and locational drawbacks in which the LMF could intervene, so suggesting where to begin the task of ‘reconcil[ing] discrep[ancies]’ between the two (p. 15).

Each of the above drawings would be described as a diagram and, more specifically, a diagrammatic plan. This is important for the reason that, as Vidler argues, diagrams are ‘neutral zone(s), where certain relations are mapped precisely but without aura’ (Vidler, 1999, pp. 84-85). Aura, clearly, is what the Jason Orton photograph of the pre-Olympic site in Chapter 4 has. In their exclusion of ‘aura’, diagrams are effective in communicating information and making statements about places that does necessarily relate to how things appear physically.

Making such diagrams involves the selection of information that lends itself to being mapped at a given scale and that can be readily simplified to lines, tones and/or textures. In the case of the middle and lower diagrams, it also involves not only the simplification but abstraction of actual topography to symbolic forms. Each of the diagrams is reflective of
choices - in terms of a palette of colours and line-styles, topographical features to help orient viewers, symbols and forms of notation. In the top image, colours, line styles and line weights are used to suggest that whilst London’s western boundary is fixed, its eastern boundary is fluid and shifting. Vertical bands distributed across the Thames Valley suggest a relative concentration of development density in central London and its dispersal in the outer London boroughs and Essex. In the lower view, symbols are deployed to suggest a concentration of cultural and recreational facilities in the City of London and Greenwich relative to the North London host boroughs. Relations are mapped not only in order to communicate information in a general sense but to indicate designers’ approaches to it. In these terms, we can see in the top image a suggestion of the suitability of a relatively compact development approach to the site and in the bottom one, a suggestion of need for more recreational facilities in the host boroughs. In each of the diagrams, crucially, we are provided with the impression that the site is well located and thus a good investment opportunity given its position at the edge of a major area of growth, of a significant public transportation node and surrounded by existing arts, culture and leisure facilities.

Within and in the immediate vicinity of the site, assets are said to include: a) a few physical attributes of the pre-Olympic site, including the site’s ‘natural’ system of islands and rivers and surviving fragments of the Lea Valley’s industrial past, but mostly post-Olympic artefacts - venues, infrastructures and open spaces – which create future use and development potentials; b) the site’s association with past events and their memories – including the birth of certain industries, the loss of boys from the Eton Manor in the First and Second World Wars, and the 2012 Olympics Games – which provide opportunities for future commemoration, and; c) ‘the strength and diversity of [the site’s] communities’.

Physical attributes and historic events are often linked together under the umbrella term of ‘heritage’ – a term which it would seem curious to emphasise given the site’s erasure in 2007. After 2007, the only traces of pre-Olympic occupation consisted in a few next to derelict nineteenth-century tidal locks on the river ways, the brick viaduct used by the London Underground’s Central Line service and listed King’s Yard former sweet factory buildings. Referring to this scattered collection as ‘heritage’ serves to place utilitarian elements of the industrial landscape which lay in the background of the city into the foreground of the post-2012 Olympic urban scene, with doubtful benefits. Along with venues, these are positioned as ‘set pieces’ – a term used to describe the focal elements
and/or key orientation devices in assembled, perspectival views and belonging to the classical tradition of ‘scenography’ in design (see, for example, Rowe, 1978; Till, 2009).

The LMF states that ‘heritage’ is important for the site in the sense that it denotes repositories of existing ‘value’ - loosely construed in terms of prominent histories that could still act to draw visitors to the site – signifiers of ‘identity’ and/or ‘character’. Defining character as an asset or assets as character relies on evaluations of what constitutes character to begin with, what good character is, and on where character lies – in terms of use, age, form, specificity, and scale. ‘Character’ is often defined in relation to elements such as the river ways which are regarded as ‘distinctive’ or ‘unique’ (see, for example, pp. 53-57). The term is also used to refer to existing site features which new development could respond to and build upon. Thus, ‘character neighbourhoods’ are said to arise in response to the pre-given ‘character’ of the stadium or of a viaduct.

Waterway ‘assets’ are said to be crucial to the site’s future ‘character’. They are consistently referred to as ‘natural features’ in spite of their significant variation and degrees of canalization. They are also and potentially conflictually described as the foundations for the new Water City – a notion which, as discussed in Chapter 4, had been circulating in relation to the Lea Valley for some years. It is said that the design of future development would draw on studies of urban form associated with cities such as Venice and Amsterdam and of urban islands such as Paris’s Isle de la Cite. Morris argues that the relationship between urban form and water in these examples was established in the context of the specific uses of water – as part of a system of defensive structures and/or as the infrastructure of seaborne trade, for example - and of symbolic associations that water developed in the cultural and political contexts of these cities (Morris, 1994). It is not easy to find in the LMF, in either textual description or diagrams, an equivalent sense of how a new form of ‘water city’ might be developed in relation to specific uses and symbolisms of water. The closest approximation is perhaps the combination of ‘hidden ecology’, civic space and ‘leisure opportunities’ that is seen to currently lie ‘dormant’ in the Lea Valley’s rivers but to nonetheless present qualities and potentials that could help in structuring and characterising a new urban fabric (p. 20). Importantly in terms of the goals of redevelopment discussed in Chapter 4, the restoration of the polluted post-industrial landscape and its conversion to a park are said to have the strategic capacity to lower deprivation scores relating to ‘living environment’ (p. 72).
It is said that future development would allude – predominantly through the imitation of scale – to the retained industrial heritage still present at the site’s fringes, including Sugar House Lane, Stratford Town Centre and Fish Island (p. 111). This, somewhat curiously, suggests that in exchange for the erasure of most of the site’s pre-Olympic features and characteristics, new development would to a degree be built to commemorate it. In 2010, an Allies & Morrison’s project architect, David Roth, argued that formal allusions along with historical features provided a way to ‘hang the project off something’ (Interview, A&M, 02.2010). He followed on with the explanatory words: ‘I mean, what can be the authenticity of a culture that is built from scratch?’ Allusions may be said, in these terms, to form part of a wider ‘story’ about what makes the LMF project of this site in a phenomenological sense rather than of somewhere else and, about where to focus energies in terms of, say, protecting habitats, preserving views or opening up pedestrian pathways. However, the risk, as he acknowledged in a later conversation, is that they come to represent the very qualities and identities which they ‘displaced’ (Interview, A&M, 09.2010).

In spite of its emphasis on history, the LMF makes clear that it is the Olympic venues, park and infrastructure, far more than any aspects of a deeper past of industry or agriculture, which are its main ‘inheritance’ from the past, to ‘be captured as [the] fundamental starting point for the LMF project’ and thus as its major asset (p. 45). The LMF refers in almost mystical terms to the physical memory of the Games event which is being ‘offered up to the Legacy [challenging] the Masterplan Framework to provide them with a new urban context to sustain their role for present and future generations’ (p. 47). Each of the retained venues (denoted by a red shape in the plan below) is described as a crucial component in the constitution of the ‘identity’ of future neighbourhoods. ‘Identity’ is used to denote the dual capacity of these structures, firstly as national and international landmarks, to become future headquarters for national-level sporting organisations and tourist destinations, and, secondly as local landmarks, to form backdrops to the unfolding dramas of everyday urban life on the redeveloped site. What does the effective realisation of these capacities depend upon?

According to KCAP’s project architect for the LMF, Stephen Akkerman, it would rely, firstly, on the venues having a ‘memory character’ (Interview, KCAP, 08.2008), a spatial and visual quality akin to what Lynch refers to as ‘imageability’ (1959, p. 9) which would lastingly signal the significance of these Games for Olympic history. Secondly, it would rely on being
able to preserve the spatial integrity of the Olympic Park whilst also opening it up to its surroundings. Achieving this would in turn rely on negotiations between the LDA’s objectives for the site in terms of future density and connectivity and the given organisation and order of elements in the Olympic plan. The location of the venues at the edge of the park, as the image below shows, ensures that each marks the culmination of a vista across the park. Akkerman expressed concern that Olympic venues would lack the necessary ‘monumentality’ to assure a future ‘heritage value’ and that simultaneously, that the memory of the park’s ‘enclosure’ would be difficult for the design team to erase. This latter difficulty could, he argued, serve to undermine the value created at the heart of the site through the remediation of the parklands bounding the River Lea and investment in venues positioned at its edges.

**Figure 5.4:** Olympic inheritance diagram (Produced for the LDA, 2008).

This brings me to a final point regarding the site’s assets. It is said that ‘the strength and diversity of [the site’s] communities’ are assets. The use of the word diversity is significant, tying in, as will be seen more in Chapter 6, and as Imrie, Raco et al (2003) highlight, with the New Labour discourse of ‘community cohesion’ – produced in response to some of the
negative consequences of cultural plurality in British cities. How the diverse community is or can become an asset in terms of the LMF’s conceptual and strategic framework is left open to interpretation. Notwithstanding, the ascription is in itself significant, suggesting a more active role for communities than that implied by the more common labeling of them as beneficiaries.

Figure 5.5: Draft mood representation of the six proposed neighbourhoods correct as of 2008 (Produced for the LDA).

Assets, in a general sense, are grounds for ‘investment’, for, as the LMF puts it, ‘securing’ a return (in every sense of the word) on that original investment’ in the Games. (p. 42). Stating that industrial buildings, rivers and a park are grounds for investment relies on the existence somewhere of an evidence base to support the idea and evaluations of the merit of different sorts of investment. The LMF does not include this kind of evidence, making it necessary for target audiences to trust or use their experience to assess the credibility of such statements. The LMF is hung, to use David Roth’s own words, on tiny fragments of the past and present, creating the need for the invention of new identities on a massive scale. The jumble of different words and graphics, forms and logos, and precise and abstract mapping techniques in the map/collage above is symptomatic of this challenge.
In terms of barriers to future development, the LMF concentrates on the ‘historic separation of the Lower Lea Valley – not just in a physical sense but also in the way that people understand and use the city’ (p. 57). The diagram below, usually the first to be shown in verbal presentations of the LMF, communicates the team’s conceptualisation of the disconnection difficulties with which the Lea Valley was associated. It depicts the Lea Valley as an open zip which the LMF project is endeavouring to close. It seems to leave audiences in little doubt of what, in principle, is meant - if also little idea (yet) of the range of ways in which the ‘zip’ could be done up or the issue of disconnection addressed.

The LMF also concentrates on barriers to public services that help to produce the high scores achieved by the site and its fringe areas in the *Indices of Multiple Deprivation*. The view is presented that the site’s spatial disconnection into a series of islands at least in part explains the social deprivation of the area (p. 64). The conceptual intertwining of socio-economic barriers and physical barriers produces the converse view that connections and spatial proximities are the solutions to a wide range of problems or ills.

### 5.2.2 The past’s future

The site’s past is not only important in the LMF in terms of residual traces of its pre-Olympic uses and urbanisations, but for the masterplanning team’s conceptualisation of new development. The site, somewhat romantically, is recalled as a ‘working landscape’, one ‘which generated the wealth to build the city’ and in addition accommodated the brickfields and others manufactories which produced materials used literally to build the city. It is argued that the LMF could establish a resonance with this history, not so much by memorialising as through strategic planning for the facility to accommodate emerging knowledge and technology industries that could acquire a similar level of significance for
London’s future economy. Planning for the facility to accommodate the functions of a restructured economy is a different sort of planning exercise to accommodating certain uses and suggests the capacity for the grain of the site to appear quite different to what the LMF Output C suggests. In the absence of certainty about future site functions or development, the LMF team provides a framework for thinking about the process of ‘build-out’. Their concept of ‘Field Evolution’ (pp. 91-97) was informed by the abundance of open spaces in London named as fields - including Highbury Fields, London Fields and Lincoln’s Inn Fields. It is also informed by knowledge of the relationship between the urban grain of much of London and the pattern of the agricultural fields that it overlaid over the course of the nineteenth century.

This concept, illustrated in the image below, responds to the difficulties of conceiving a development process over a long time frame. Given the LDA’s association at the time of the CPO of site vacancy with environmentally harmful ‘opportunistic’ uses and their need to generate a positive image as soon as possible after the Games, the appearance of vacancy was not something they wished to encourage. What was envisaged instead in the LMF is that development plots yet to be sold or developed could be activated by provisional or ‘interim uses’ which might ‘change or rotate’, as the arable fields of the ‘parent landscape’ once did (p. 91). This proposal coheres with the surge of interest in architectural and urban studies in recent years in the possibilities and merits of ‘interim use’ strategies. Much of this has stemmed from analyses of shrinking and post-industrial cities such as Berlin and Liverpool (Oswalt, 2005; Pallagst, Wiechmann, and Martinez-Fernandez, 2010) which highlight the difficulties of renewing large-scale investor confidence and some of the inadequacies of traditional approaches to land-use planning in uncertain times and settings. It has informed the formulation of strategy for typically small-scale, locally-driven forms of investment in the creation, at least initially, of ‘use’ rather than ‘exchange’ value. Interim and temporary use studies tend to associate such strategies with economical, lightweight physical interventions and with deregulated or ‘loose’ rather than planned territories or spaces (Franck and Stevens, 2006; Haydn and Temel, 2006). In the Output C documents, little definition is provided in terms of how interim uses might be organised spatially or what they might include. Key questions arising for me are: a) to what kinds of evaluations would interim use propositions be subject that would ensure both their distinction from the so-called ‘opportunistic’ temporary uses that were relocated from the site in 2007 and from uses that would be able to lay claims to ‘permanence’? and; b) what are the time limits of the ‘interim’ and why the focus on a dialectic of permanence
and impermanence rather than first, as Foucault suggests, on the question of ‘how it is possible for there to be a succession’ of events and then, on more subtly imagined gradations of the transitional (1989, p. 187)? Imagining the site as a succession of events would present a challenge to the rigid distinction between ‘interim’ and ‘final’ use and form and extend the scope of opportunity for conceiving urban design in terms of living processes.

Figure 5.7: Draft phasing diagram correct as of 2008 (Produced for the LDA 2008)

5.2.3 Towards reconnection

As discussed above, a major objective for the LMF is to overcome issues of the site’s disconnection from its surroundings – seen as a product of underinvestment, neglect by planning, geography and historic uses. ‘Connectivity’, as highlighted in section 5.1, formed an important part of the spatial and social agenda of the ‘Urban Renaissance’. Enhancing physical connections acquired a role in addressing observed conditions of social and spatial fragmentation. In these terms, as Lees argues, the idea of an urban order of spatial connectivity was linked to the political goal of creating culturally diverse yet harmonious
'communities' (2003, pp. 78-79). However, as the various strategic planning documents for the Lea Valley suggest, the philosophy of ‘connectivity’ is not just about improving the spatial and social fabric of existing communities but also about ‘facilitating development and enhancing the sustainability of existing and future communities’ (GLA, 2007, p. 10).

In interview, architects from KCAP and Allies & Morrison argued that although severing was a condition of the pre-Olympic site, it was one which, ironically, the Olympic Games plan had exacerbated. David Roth from Allies & Morrison put it in the following terms:

The Games is a sort of fortress where it’s predicated on keeping people out and limiting access and pushing circulation as far as possible to the exterior to create a kind of internal world which is separate, whereas in fact in the Legacy Commitments, the opposite is true. It is supposedly completely integrated, getting as many people to it, not inward looking but outward looking. (Interview, A&M, 08.2008)

He argued that the LMF consortium had been confronted with the challenge of how to make best use of infrastructure which could never serve the purposes for which it was intended to be put to use in the long term – to connect communities and address conditions of deprivation. The combination of constraints created by existing infrastructure and the need to link the venues together had led, in several instances, to alignments of the ‘loop road’ between the venues with other infrastructure such as the Greenway. This ‘doubling up’, architects explained, had created zones of infrastructure up to 200 metres across. This is not readily evident in plans as the relationships between pre-Olympic, Olympic and LMF proposed connections are rarely shown in a single image and, where they are, true widths, relative heights and levels are masked. How to insert compact, connected development against and between such monumentally divisive structures? Efforts were concentrated on: a) working with and against the given conditions of the ‘loop road’ designed to connect up all the venues and main gates to the park as well as provide a link from the A12 motorway into the new Stratford City shopping centre, and; b) creating subtle east-west links across the site against the north-south grain implied by the linear park, valley and rivers. In addition, the team focussed on creating links across the physical boundaries inherited from the pre-Olympic site. These, ironically, also took the form of ‘major instruments of connectivity’ as Roth put it - thick lines of parallel rail tracks, six to eight lane motorways running along three of the site’s edges, the Northern Outfall Sewer,
the huge new cut of the high-speed rail link to Europe and the tangle of the valley’s rivers. These not only criss-cross the site as indicated in figure 5.8, but are also located at different levels relative to one another. At the centre of the site, where the Stratford City Link meets the Olympic loop road, the Lea River and the North London Line, the valley floor also falls away by up to ten metres, with significant consequences for the experience of these infrastructural junctions. Roth argued that ‘[i]t’s only when you look at them as a designer and you start drawing them in section that you realise, gosh this is a real problem’ for the imagination of regeneration in terms of a connected, compact urban fabric. For the masterplanners, this suggested the need to introduce a series of far smaller ‘stitches’ scaled to the pedestrian and/or cyclist which could address each existing boundary condition. These would include small bridges over canals and rivers, reinforcements of the existing network of canal tow paths, and underpass crossings of the Greenway and rail lines. This suggests the need for strategies not just of alignment between these different priorities and plans for the site but the reconciliation of disjunctures between them – here specifically relating to the distinction between generalised ideas about the benefits of connectivity and the actual impacts of connectivity infrastructures on the pedestrian navigability of a landscape.

Figure 5.8: Analysis of local reconnection challenges (Sources: Ordnance Survey, Juliet Davis, 2010)
5.3 Envisioning change

Developing a spatial framework suited to a long-term development process relies on articulated conceptions of the way in which the future will unfold, in turn based on ways of anticipating it. In this section of the chapter, as discussed in the Introduction, we focus on the relation between immediate post-2012 outcomes (or ‘catalysts’) and long term possibilities (or ‘scenarios’) and on the designers’ related conceptualisation of the masterplan framework as an ‘Open City’. I consider how these conceptions interrelate and what they suggest in terms of the form of regeneration.

5.3.1 The site as a catalyst

The site’s assets, as highlighted above, are referred to as ‘catalysts’ to its on-going development. ‘Catalyst’ is a term that urban theorists have used broadly speaking to denote stimuli to particular processes of urbanisation. Jane Jacobs uses it in the context of her argument that comprehensive redevelopment fails to solve urban problems when planning authorities fail to grasp what the ‘forces of decline or regeneration’ are and in these terms, what ‘the catalysts to those processes’ are (Jacobs, 1972 [1961], p. 454). Architect Aldo Rossi uses it somewhat differently, in the context of an argument about the potential of cultural institutions – or what he terms foundational and/or ‘primary elements’ of an urban order - to accelerate or stimulate urbanisation by creating the need for other, adjacent uses and facilities (Rossi, 1984, p. 87). In recent years, it has often been used in the context of studies of urban renewal of a small scale, bottom-up, appropriative kind, often involving the ‘temporary use’ or occupation of down-at-heel urban spaces. This kind of urban renewal lies at the opposite end of the renewal spectrum from the Olympics. So how does this notion function within the LMF?

The Olympics are said to be catalytic for future development in the sense of leaving behind facilities of architectural merit as well as with future use and revenue-generating potentials,
of providing a level of infrastructure which future development would require and of providing an opportunity over the period of the Games to promote the site as a newly remediated and well-designed landscape to an international audience. The LMF’s role with respect to this is to provide the spatial regulatory structure for leveraging both Olympic and ongoing sources of investment in the site to the combined advantage of public and private investors, urban authorities and local communities.

The masterplanning team appears to take up Jacobs’ critique in claiming to be engaged in formulating a process that evolves ‘in response to local needs’ (p. 51) and in the context of their interpretations of the specific urban processes that led to decay and deprivation in the past. Their articulation of the idea of using the Olympics to invest the site with new meanings and as the foundations of a new urban order connects with Rossi’s discussions of the catalytic role of events historically in urban form-making. The masterplanners also appear to endorse the idea of bottom-up urban renewal processes through the LMF’s focus on temporary uses and on the role of ‘communities’ in consultation. In Chapter 6, we will consider the extent to which these actually played a role.

The long-term catalyst ‘effect’ of Olympic inheritance and the site’s other assets via the LMF’s strategic plan is intended to result in a combination of: a) built form and, through it, the establishment of ‘successful communities’ that remain in the area and help to reverse long-established patterns of ‘churn’ associated with it (p. 320); b) the ‘strengthening of ‘London’s position as a global city’ through enhancing the site’s capacity to contribute to London’s economy and transforming the image of the East End (p. 69); c) the provision of a ‘critical mass’ of high-quality space for new media and creative industries in the form of the Olympic International Media and Broadcast Centre, so helping to ‘reverse the flow of economically mobile people to other parts of London’, and d) an ongoing structure of strategic exchange between sources of investment and the provision of ‘social infrastructure [...] which is sustainable and inclusive’ (p. 76). It is important to note that this catalyst effect relies on processes which lie outside the immediate scope of spatial design and planning, relating for example, to London’s demographics, its property market, economy and urban policy landscape.

However, an important role of the LMF’s Socio-economic strategy was to chart out a likely course for the LMF development in relation to forecasts and projections connected to such processes over the short to long term.
5.3.2 Statistical projection and perspective projection

The Olympic site forms part of the strategic developable land area of four local authorities. Each produces its own projections for growth and change - in terms including demographics, the constitution of households and land values - and its own local policy frameworks in relation to these. The projections put forward in the Outputs B and C LMFs build on these local statistics along with regional forecasts for growth, particularly the 2005-based Greater London Authority (GLA) Economics projections and 2003-based Office for National Statistics (ONS) projections of population growth across London to 2028.

Projections are said to be required in order to anticipate the sectors likely to ‘drive demand’ for residential and employment space within the LMF site over the coming decades, and in these terms those most likely to yield high values, and thus to enable the spatial design team to model likely rather than only imaginary or idealised scenarios for the site’s future. Although the economic downturn of 2008 was said to have a bearing on the level of confidence that was being placed by the LMF masterplanning and client teams in forecasts in the short-term, it is confidently stated in the Socio-economic strategy that the long-term forecasts informing the housing and development policy contained within the 2004 London Plan would be unaltered by these events.

The total available land for development was established by subtracting from the total site area of 230 hectares Ken Livingstone’s legacy commitment to safeguard 102 hectares of park (see Appendix C), the Games venues and an estimate of the additional open space required for connections (roadways, bridges, walkways and the like). This left only 70 hectares, just under a third of the total site area. The ‘capacity’ of this 70 hectare area was then established through a complex process of correlating, mediating and combining: a) borough-level projections for population change and growth, including at the level of the household; b) evaluations of the proportion of each borough’s developable and potentially developable land lying within the Olympic site and thus of the relative strategic importance of the site to the different boroughs; c) evaluations of housing and employment need at local, city and regional levels; d) an economic model constructed between central government, the GLA and the LDA for redeeming the public debt of land acquisition and remediation (amounting to just short of £1 billion, as shown in Appendix F) through the sale of developable land, and; e) London Plan policy establishing the spatial design parameters for compact city development and integrated, inclusive ‘sustainable
communities’. Finally, the timescales of development were established by assessing the relationship between needs for housing and employment relative to growth/change statistics and the potential impacts of either undersupply or oversupply on market values.

![Figure 5.9: Density Matrix (Source: GLA London Plan, 2004).](image)

In terms of housing, this calculation produced a ‘proposed minimum range of 10,000 (with an estimated population increase of around 19,100 people in the LMF Core Area) and a proposed upper limit of 12,000 new homes by 2040 (p. 167). The LMF’s strategy for housing takes into consideration London Plan policy suggesting that new development should accommodate a range of housing types related to different household types, levels of affordability and density. Density levels are subject to the London Plan’s ‘design principles for a compact city’ (p. 51). These include a ‘density matrix’ which establishes principles for residential densities according to a relation between habitable rooms, unit sizes and numbers of units per hectare, as shown in the figure above. The suitability of particular densities to given locations is ascertained primarily through measures of Public Transport Accessibility (PTALs). Based on high levels of connectivity and public transport accessibility, the Socio-economic strategy proposes a housing density range corresponding to the upper end of the London’s Plan’s density ranges. Family housing, said to comprise 41 per cent of the total provision is generally situated at the lower end of this range (in the ‘Urban’ category of 200-450 hr/ha). This concession to families appears to have created the
need for some considerably higher density developments – up to twenty-two storey towers. Given the requirement for the LDA in their management of the LMF to balance Mayoral commitments relating to public space, social infrastructure and affordable housing provision with a strategy for recouping the LDA’s investment of public funds in land acquisition, the density ranges suggested above can be seen not only as a response to ‘Urban Renaissance’ and compact city policy but actually as a need created in the context of the Olympic project.

Throughout the LMF Socio-economic strategy, the numerical outcomes of mediation between political, economic and spatial claims on the site are referred to as the site’s aggregate ‘potential’. The site’s ‘potential’ to create benefits for local communities in terms of open space provision, family housing, social infrastructure and the like whilst also creating revenue-raising possibilities for the Olympic host boroughs and the government forms the basis of the spatial planners’ modeled scenario for how the site could develop over time, as indicated in the diagrammatic isometric perspective renderings below.

![Figure 5.10: Draft phasing model correct as of 2008 (Produced for the LDA).](image-url)
A number of techniques were used in making these images which are important for how it comes across. An aerial photographic underlay transforms what would otherwise appear as an abstract CAD model into a high-level view. Colours are used to differentiate Olympic structures (beige) from existing buildings (white) and new development (red), thus emphasizing the extent of new development. The ground plane is flat so helping to draw attention to the changing skyline of the site as opposed to the not inconsequential actual profile of the valley. The final image suggests that the highest density development would exist just to the west of Stratford City. Notwithstanding, true densities are masked by the choice of viewpoint which helps to flatten buildings, put the imagined viewer of the scene at a great distance and, in addition, push the highest densities into the background. Thus, it is somewhat conveniently not immediately evident quite how tall some of the proposed buildings are.

The series denotes the spatial masterplanners’ collective translation of the socio-economic strategists’ evaluation of the site’s potential via its constraints to a spatial ‘scenario’. This is said to represent what designers consider to be ‘the most appropriate [option] for achieving the vision and ambitions for the LMF as they are currently defined’ (p. 100). Those words ‘currently defined’ are some of the only indications we are given in a reading of the document of the possibility for variation, not only from the statistics and matrices that underpin it, but of how they intersect and when. Because this was considered the ‘most appropriate’ option, no other was presented.

The scenario is developed from the middle half of the spatial strategy onwards into a set of urban and architectural visualisations including plans, sections and perspective projections. These drawn projections are in some respects analogous to the Socio-economic strategy’s quantitative projections. However they differ by also serving to convey imagined spatial ‘qualities’. Allies & Morrison’s David Roth suggested that many of these qualities were as much derived from perceptions of the site’s needs as more abstract figures for affordable housing and density were. He argued that the team had endeavoured to make visually manifest their sense of an ‘urban responsibility - setting out how a team of architects and urbanists envision what the obligations of today are for tomorrow’ (Interview, A&M, Feb 2009). He was referring particularly to matters of the design of public space and the extension of rights to all to access it through the prioritisation of connections, but also to what may be seen as other ‘use-value’ considerations including how social housing might most subtly and ‘justly’ be integrated with market housing. Such considerations, he
suggested, required a team prepared to set aside the seductions of iconic design for a pragmatic design able to integrate social, spatial, environmental and economic considerations, issues and realities. However, at the beginning of one of the public presentations of the LMF in early 2009, Roth emphasised the provisional nature of the scenario, stating that ‘though we’ve drawn it this way, you can be pretty sure that it won’t end up this way’ (A&M, Feb 2009). He claimed that it provided the means of testing design concepts by bringing them to a form of spatial resolution - a ‘what if’. It also enabled the team to communicate with stakeholders in terms of spatial proposals rather than only in terms of envisioned processes and open possibilities. Perspectival drawings formed an important part of the set of drawings used to communicate these proposals.

Figure 5.11: Draft illustrative perspective of the area near Pudding Mill in Legacy (Produced for LDA, 2008).

The hand-drawing technique of perspective was developed during the Italian Renaissance as a way of simulating human vision (Evans, 1995; Perez-Gomez, 2002; Perez-Gomez and Pelletier, 1997). It was developed into a convention which architects used, particularly from the seventeenth century, not only to show how the spaces they were designing might in all truth *appear*, but to design or, as architectural theorist and historian Perez Gomez puts it,
as ‘a generative idea’ (Perez-Gomez, 2002, p. 13). In a similar manner, Lefebvre argues that the perspectival ‘vanishing line, the vanishing-point and the meeting of parallel lines “at infinity” were the determinants of a representation, at once intellectual and visual, which promoted the primacy of the gaze in a kind of “logic of visualisation”’ (2002, p. 41). The rules of perspective transformed how architects envisioned space by shifting attention onto the locus of an imagined viewer – which they could locate at a position of their choosing - of an assembled scene. Interestingly, given the focus of this chapter on the role of the masterplan framework, Perez Gomez is critical of the way in which perspective appears to privilege ‘scenography’ over programmatic and temporal considerations – what he calls the “‘process work’”, that might yield true discoveries’ (2002, p. 3).

The perspectival view above is one example from the range included in the LMF. Unlike Figure 5.10, it is constructed such that the imagined viewer has their feet on the ground. It depicts a busy street, full of the clutter of signs, people and activities. Qualities of street life reminiscent of historic parts of London are linked with ideas about the potential form, architecture and materiality of high-density, mixed-use development.

This image is evidently not a photograph, nor is it a wholly accurate perspective (construed in the terms of traditional conventions of perspective construction). The images that are collaged together are of real buildings and real people. However, they are rendered as imaginary through the way they are brought together in the view. What might be some of the grounds for evaluating its accuracy or ‘objectivity’ as a depiction of the Olympic site’s future? Let’s make a few observations. Firstly, value: how often have you witnessed such eclectic public realm uses in the context of new commercial developments? It seems improbable that shops as specialised or as low-key as those suggested by the signs on the right would occupy new, presumably premium-value commercial buildings. Secondly, scale: look how big the children on the left are next to the white van. The scale of the tower is masked by situating it in the distance and ensuring it occupies only a small proportion of the overall view. Thirdly, use: what are the relationships between the users of the public realm and the users of the depicted buildings? Are they the same? A conception of London as ‘diverse’ and ‘inclusive’ is represented in terms of a somewhat chaotic ground level public realm but less, it would appear, in terms of the building blocks that surround it. The buildings only suggest residential and commercial uses. Where and how might cultural institutions – for example, the churches, mosques, synagogues and
temples that characterise diverse neighbourhoods throughout the rest of east London - find space to appropriate, or fashion their ‘representational spaces’ (Lefebvre, 1991) here?

When I raised some of these questions with David Roth, it emerged that he was dissatisfied with the images – predominantly owing to an approach which, he claimed, had been imposed by the LDA, rather than to their evidently draft status. The LDA had rejected a number of images that his team produced in which they endeavoured to produce a genuinely dense urban and/or more culturally mixed-use building environment. The LDA wanted the people in the views to suggest London’s ethnic and cultural diversity and literally reflect their political emphasis on the project’s social credentials and its alignment with New Labour policies of social inclusion and equality. However they appear to have felt that placing cultural symbols such as a minaret in one of these drawings would be inflammatory. Designers were obliged to only include people shot by the LDA’s photographer. They were not allowed to populate images with people who might appear to LMF readers as ‘deprived’ or who were engaged in activities which anyone else could construe as detrimental to health or to a wide range of legitimate uses of the public realm. For example, ‘you can’t have someone drinking a beer’, Roth claimed. Nor were they allowed to portray the proposals on rainy days as this would impact negatively on the ‘mood’ of the representations. The perspective projections, to use Kester Rattenbury’s term, are ‘media constructions’ (Rattenbury, 2002). In Lefebvre’s terms they are ‘representations of space’ which may not only not look quite like this in future reality but will almost certainly not look like this at all. For Roth himself, they were representations of ‘political control’ and ideological ‘decorum’, contemporary equivalents of Sebastiano Serlio’s ‘Tragic Stage Set’.

5.3.3 The role of the scenario in the ‘Open City’

The drawing below is referred to as an ‘illustrative masterplan’ – the image which summarises the design team’s proposals by bringing together a summary of the site’s developmental potential (in the terms discussed above) with their proposals for how to resolve issues of disconnectivity and other site constraints.

The masterplan describes an environment which would be far more complex in three dimensions than this plan view suggests. As discussed above, the site’s ground plane is not flat but undulating, a combined result of the original valley profile, its land-reclamation history, the height differential of the Lea River’s tide and the ground levels established in the Olympic masterplan for the sporting venues. Although, as highlighted above, designers viewed this three-dimensional complexity as a significant challenge, here they appear to dismiss it by implying that connections that would in all likelihood pass each other at
different levels would join on the flat. Roth argued that the team were well aware of the three-dimensionality of the site and that the plan was accurate. However, he acknowledged the difficulties in communicating this information and some of the failures of the Output C LMF to do so.

One of the key difficulties with the image below is that everything in it appears as equally determined and equally vague. Given that design, envisioning and development as processes are said to be so important for the ascribed role of the masterplan framework, wouldn’t a more appropriate approach have been to make the most important image in the LMF one which expressed the temporality of development, including its more and less fixed and ‘open’ aspects? The case for this would appear particularly compelling given KCAP and Allies & Morrison’s conceptual interest in the notion of the ‘Open City’.

How this notion was understood by the consortium was revealed, at least in part, at a lecture given at the LSE in November 2007 by KCAP principal Kees Christiaanse. Here he outlined a critique of contemporary urbanism that shed light on his practice’s own view of the centrality of public space for masterplanning. His thesis was that the ‘free city’ of capitalistic property speculation and unregulated development had led to the production of ‘non-free space’. The control of the city by private developers and property owners had gradually transformed pieces of the city that were ‘open filtering urban areas’ into gated compounds, a critique that resonates with wider discourses of gated communities and surveillance⁵. Aggregated gated compounds, claimed Christiaanse, produce rigid ‘tree’ or ‘ladder’-like urban structures implying one-way connections between insular islands of urban life and centralised infrastructures and authorities. He envisioned the ‘Open City’ instead as one structured in terms of a web or network implying a more complex, less hierarchical set of relations between the different ‘pieces’ of the city as between localities and wider geographies, individuals and wider civil society. He cited his office’s masterplan for HafenCity in Hamburg as an exemplar of this alternative approach, which involved defining the spaces in-between buildings rather than built form itself. He referred to this as an ‘unplanned’ approach as it did not involve regulating how development should unfold, though it did involve fixing ‘very strongly [the] public space network [...] the relationship between car use and slow traffic use [...] and the relationship between recreational space and public transport’.

⁵ Foucault’s notion of ‘the carceral archipelago’ in particular and I’m thinking mainly about its influence on Ed Soja’s conceptualizations of Los Angeles (2000).
Why are these kinds of relationships not more evident in the LMF, particularly the plan and perspectival drawings above? Masterplanners from KCAP and Allies& Morrison suggested that this reflected tensions that had arisen between the different design firms in the consortium and between the consortium as a whole and the LDA over what elements to prioritise for the illustrative masterplan - over the relationship, in effect, between fixed and open elements, between the vision of a regenerated urban *product* and a regeneration *process*. In spite of the urban policy endorsement of the process approach outlined above, it would appear that it was difficult for clients and designers alike to reconcile its implications for representation. The above plan fails to provide any sense of the temporality of development – such as by indicating which elements of the construction would lead and which follow, which are more or less fixed or certain. Presumably, in the light of Christiaanse’s ideas, the fabric of buildings denotes just one possible future development ‘scenario’ whilst the yellow-coloured network of hard-landscaped open spaces and connections denotes a more concrete proposal. If so then this network is, in effect, the framework, or the beginnings of it – the area where the consortium is most likely and, in many respects, most able to influence the urban future of the Olympic legacy by mediating between the spatial organisation of the park and the site’s urban fringes, and between varied interests in and practical motives for providing access and making connections.

**5.7 Conclusion: brittle and open**

This chapter set out to investigate how the task of regeneration broadly articulated by Ken Livingstone in his *Five Legacy Commitments* (2007) was interpreted by the designers of the LMF through analysis of key aspects of their design approach to the Olympic site and their representations.

In the first part of the chapter, I located the LMF in relation to regeneration and ‘Urban Renaissance’ policy and strategic planning literature from the late 1990s. My focus was on understanding the purposes of the design-led masterplanning approach which the LMF exemplifies, particularly in terms of the emphasis the Urban Renaissance literature places on development frameworks rather than rigid, two-dimensional land-use plans. Reflecting the recommendations of this literature, the Output C LMF authors claimed not to present fixed or completed plans, but a more conceptually and spatially ‘open’ framework that acquires legitimacy by establishing some of the primary guides for diverse and as yet
unknown economic, political and social forces to shape and claim it over time. In other words, design effort was targeted at establishing the right conditions for regeneration. Notwithstanding, the emphasis placed on principles of compactness and connectivity in the ‘Urban Renaissance’ literature suggests that the options either presented in or endorsed through the LMF in terms of urban form would be constrained. This, combined the other imperatives for dense residential development had implications for designers’ capacities to design and present a ‘masterplan framework’ rather than a traditional land-use plan.

The second part of the chapter focussed on the masterplanners’ approaches to the existing site. First, I explored the conceptualisation, in diagrammatic form, of the site’s existing ‘assets’ and development barriers; second, the uses of the past for inspiration about how to imagine the future, and; third, designers’ approaches to ‘stitching’ the site back together. In the first subsection, I argued that whilst designers appeared to be concerned with using the existing site ‘assets’ they identified to help create value for the future, it was often unclear why or how these were indeed of value, what kinds of value they represented, to what and to whom. The value of heritage assets appeared particularly nebulous, given the erasure of the site in 2007 and the displacement of its former ‘identities’. From the second subsection, I concluded that whilst ‘interim use’ formed an important part of the conception of the temporality of development - presented by reference to the site’s former rotating agricultural landscape - it was unclear how the interim might inform the longer-term uses and topographies of the site. Was the only purpose of interim use to fill in the gap in time before market-led development or could it have a more extensive role in shaping the site’s longer-term future? Creating a rigid conceptual distinction between ‘interim’ and permanent uses and form appeared to limit the scope for imagining the regeneration process as ‘open’ to possibility and the role of design in unfolding processes. In the third subsection, I documented designers’ struggle to resolve disjunctures between the compound-like structure of the Olympic plan and conceptualisations of a well-connected, compact urban legacy. Although the Olympics was seen to create opportunities for regeneration that would not otherwise have been available - as discussed in Chapter 4 - here it was apparent that an Olympic events plan also created drawbacks for the regeneration conceived at least in part in terms of a ‘compact city’.

The third part of the chapter focussed on how the LMF was conceived as a process, focussing on the functioning of the Olympic Park as an urban ‘catalyst’, on the role of development scenarios and the uses of ‘projection’. I explored the relationship between
the principal scenario for the appearance of the different development areas contained in
the LMF, the projections for need and growth contained in the Socio-economic Framework,
the pressing issue of redeeming a debt through mixed-use development, and delivering on
the political vision of a compact, well-connected city.

Although masterplanners’ articulations of the notion of an ‘Open City’ suggested that the
future could unfold in a number of ways, the LMF Socio-economic strategy suggests a
closely regulated, almost uniformly high-density solution. Perspectival drawings reveal a
curious disjuncture between the two, failing to indicate either the suggested flexibility of
the ‘Open City’ or the full consequences of the Socio-economic strategy. Whilst a form of
open access is communicated through perspectival representations of a densely populated
public realm, the proposed built form of offices and residences conveys the opposite
impression. In argued that these representations failed to provide a sense of a realistic
future ‘at hand’ to stakeholders, but instead provided a vehicle for the LDA to manage its
own image.

Given the design consortium’s emphasis on the notion of the ‘Open City’, it is useful to
consider how sociologist Richard Sennett has, somewhat differently, used this term to
denote approaches to city-making which he endorses. For Sennett (2007), the ‘Open City’
is not just about connectivity or any particular built form, though he does emphasise the
important role of territories of ‘passage’ in the everyday exchanges characterising urban
life. Urban development processes or ‘narratives’ form an important part of his
conceptualisation, but do not only include urban practitioners and their modes of
anticipating futures but also residents and everyday users. Building the ‘Open City’ in
Sennett’s terms is about establishing a framework for nurturing and building on existing,
everyday ‘spatial practices’ and their spatial qualities. It is fundamentally about crafting the
future out of the present. This, given the tabula rasa of the Olympic site in 2007, was not
something that LMF designers were in a position to do.
Chapter 6

Localising Legacy: connections, alliances, opportunities, 2008-2009

6. Introduction:

“M’ brother in law used to work in the factories that was there”, said the elderly woman sitting in the last row of the minivan, pointing to a place on the river just beyond the contaminant-eating bio-beds. “In their breaks they used to feed the swans”, she added, craning her neck to see more of the water, “which of course ain’t there anymore.”

Her companion put her hand to her brow, shielding her eyes as she looked out – towards the tubes sprouting from the piled soil and ragged brown teeth of sheet piling biting into the banks of the churned river. “I can’t even find a landmark to locate me,” she remarked, shaking her head. “It’s completely thrown me” (JD notes 08.10.08)

This snippet of conversation captures a moment of surprise for two women returning to a place they thought they knew - had known in fact, not long before. It took place on a minivan tour of the Olympic site arranged by the Olympic Delivery Authority in mid-2008 for residents of the London Borough of Newham to show how redevelopment was progressing. This tour was precursory to a public consultation event at Stratford Town Hall at which one of the first versions of the LMF was presented. Given that shortly after the Compulsory Purchase processes discussed in Chapter 4 had been completed, a chemical blue fence had been erected around the site, pre-arranged tours were the only way to access the transforming world within it. As the tour guide presented the view outside the windows - giving out figures as he did so for tonnages of moved earth, chemical pollutants extracted, lengths of security fencing, projected jobs in construction and so on – my two companions seemed more interested in seeking out remnants of what was once familiar in the upturned landscape. Although the above notes capture a mere moment’s conversation, they reveal a way of looking at somewhere through a lens of experience and familiarity, as opposed to one primarily oriented toward the future.
Once back outside the site, the van toured alongside the fence for a time, giving ample opportunity to absorb the publicity images which it had, by mid-2008, acquired. The words ‘Dig. Design. Demolish.’ - describing the early stages of the site’s redevelopment – jostled with images of performing athletes in the prime of life and views of the future park. Logos of Olympic sponsors Coca-Cola, Samsung and MacDonald’s were succeeded, without hiatus, by words like ‘Create’ and ‘Everyone’s 2012’ – words which appeared to extend an invitation to all to participate in the Olympics and its Legacy. Given the context of the tour, the role of the fence in mediating between the gritty, time worn edges of east London lying to one side of it and the vision beginning to be assembled to the other seemed particularly apparent. In representing the Olympic project’s purpose and some of the opportunities it held for east Londoners in the ODA and LDA’s positive language, the fence had become an element in the communicative machinery of their ‘consultation and engagement’ programme.

In fact, at the consultation event which followed, as at many others, masterplanners referred to the fence as the opposite of what the LMF was being designed to do for the immediate locality of the site as well as for east London more broadly. Masterplanners acknowledged the symbolism of remote power and privatisation which the fence had acquired and the old fears of ‘enclosure’ still present in the valley, but sought to reassure attendants that the LMF would breach these boundaries. They emphasised the LMF’s spatial connectivity strategy for linking the site and its locality, in the process developing a high-quality public realm and ‘building communities’. The purposes of enhanced physical connectivity were interestingly echoed in one of the ODA and LDA’s key aims for their ‘consultation and engagement’ programme - to ‘connect’ a diverse base of interests to the design development of the post-2012 site (ODA & LDA, 2008). Following on from the focus of Chapter 5 on spatial visions of the urban legacy, this chapter explores the theme of connection in terms of how the LDA and to some extent the ODA engaged with the locality – conceived in terms of both local authorities and communities.

Whilst ‘consultation and engagement’ were ascribed considerable importance in the ODA and LDA’s documentation of their philosophy, this chapter asks to what extent local organisations and actors were actually able to set the agenda. Inspired by Flyvbjerg’s (1998) approach to the study of ‘democracy in practice’, I seek to examine relationships between the intended and actual outcomes of consultation and engagement - to explore
the extent to which these actually formed a crucial part of the process-driven approach to masterplanning. In the process, I consider some of the modes of communication, explanation and collaboration that made or might have made the participation of wide-ranging consultation attendants genuinely possible. In these terms, analysis focuses on connections between official discourses of consultation and engagement and what might be described as the situated discourse of actors engaged in consultation ‘as an event’ (Foucault, 1981).

The first part of the chapter locates the practices of consultation and the role of local people within the hierarchy and structure of ‘engagement’ within the governance of the project as a whole. Through examination of a variety of official documents related to this topic, it begins by examining the officially defined roles of project ‘partners’ and ‘stakeholders’ in the project, focussing on how traditional levels of authority – the national, metropolitan and local – were recombined in defining these roles, and the significance of this for the democracy of the governance process.

The second part focuses on the lower levels of this hierarchy in terms of a number of consultation ‘opportunities’ offered by the LDA and ODA. The principal focus is on two sets of consultations conducted by the LDA which I attended between mid-2008 and early 2009. The first set related to the earliest version of the LMF released into the public domain – known as Output B; the second to the slightly later Output C documents explored in the previous chapter. The analysis of these events begins by focussing on the nature of the opportunity they presented to wide-ranging participants. It goes on to consider some of the difficulties they presented in relation to officially ascribed purposes. For example, although ‘transparency’ was said to be one of the key goals of consultations, this was not particularly evident in the communicative dynamics of the consultations. Both masterplanners and local participants sought to influence the consultations, employing tactics to secure the outcomes to the events which they desired. Some local participants presented doubt as to the reality of the LMF proposals – some considering them fantastical, and many identifying disjuncture between visualisations of the project and existing qualities of the East End with which they were familiar. Although the LDA claimed that a key goal of the consultations was to ‘build ownership’, one of the only offered means of achieving this was through the dissemination of information about the LMF plans, not through developing the capacity of local participants to share in decision-making.
In the third part, I focus on two contrasting consultation processes relating to the Legacy Parklands which came about through the efforts of former site occupants – the Manor Gardens Gardening Society (MGS) and the Eastway Users Group (EUG) – to reclaim their former lands and use interests. At the time of the research, the Parklands lay within the remit of the ODA. Through a combination of interview analysis and attendance at consultation events, I explore the conditions which made these involvements possible, how the groups made use of these conditions to further their causes and some of the converse tactics employed by the ODA to limit their countervailing power. I also explore the dynamic nature of the connections formed between the ODA and these groups as design and engagement processes proceeded. My purpose here is to consider the value of consultation that is given the opportunity to mature – and how, through this, one-way obligations to fulfil commitments can develop into more collaborative ways of working or adversarial relations replaced by at least provisional forms of trust. The chapter concludes with comments on the effectiveness of consultations in achieving the democratic aims ascribed to them in the context of the ‘bureaucratic rationality’ (Young, 1990) of the project overall.

6.1 The Hierarchy and structure of engagement

6.1.1 Partnership

The purpose of this section, as discussed above, is to locate the practices of consultation and engagement in terms of the wider governance of the Olympic and LMF projects. The need to design an Olympic Park and its transformation into a piece of city in broadly the same timeframe (2007-2012) helped to produce a complex governance structure. This involved the distribution of responsibility for decisions relating to both the Olympics and the legacy over several different authorities, but also the need for careful integration between them. In recognition of this particular need but also in the context of the urban governance approached endorsed by national government, seven principal organisations were linked together in a partnership for the purpose of developing the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF). Each was defined in the LDA and ODA’s Code of Consultation (2008) in terms of specific responsibilities.

In brief, the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) was responsible for the development of the Olympic Park up to the end of the phase referred to as Legacy Transformation, including building the venues and laying the infrastructure necessary to host the Games and to
enable the legacy as planned. In other words, their responsibilities for taking the lead in urban design terms significantly overlapped with the LDA’s. The ODA was responsible for taking planning decisions on matters relating to Olympic and legacy transformation plans up until 2013. The LDA was the site’s principal landowner and responsible for realising Mayoral priorities and commitments for Legacy through their leadership of the LMF. They didn’t have the authority, however, to take planning decisions – a fact that had major consequences for the transforming governance of the LMF from 2009. The five Host Boroughs, consisting of representatives from Greenwich, Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets, and Waltham Forest remained the elected authorities for the Olympic Park, though with diminished responsibility for taking decisions relating to its future between 2005-2012. The GLA’s role was crucial, being a co-signatory to the ‘Host City Contract’ and responsible for establishing strategic planning policy for London. The Mayor was a part-funder of the ODA’s work through London’s council tax base. The London Thames Gateway Development Corporation (LTGDC) was a government agency established to take a lead in the development of ‘sustainable communities’ in the Lower Lea Valley. The Lea Valley Regional Park Authority (LVRPA) owned fifty per cent of the area within the Olympic site designated as parklands and was envisaged as the authority that would be responsible long-term for its management. Last but not least, the UK Government, led by the Olympic Minister, had a vital stake as a part-funder of the Games (using regeneration funding and lottery revenues) and was leader in the promotion of regeneration values and priorities for the Lower Lea Valley.

This brief outline of the key partners’ roles suggests a number of key features of the partnership as a whole. The partners were drawn from across the different traditional levels of authority, consistent with Tewdwr-Jones, Morphet and Allmendinger’s (2006) observation that ‘multilevel governance’ characterised regeneration processes under Labour (1997-2010). The partners’ different roles were all subject to change as different responsibilities came to either dominate or diminish in significance as the project advanced. Whilst central government and the GLA were accountable in the long-term for the consequences of their commitment of public funds to the Olympics, the LDA and ODA’s remits were relatively short-term and, in spite of the equality suggested by the term ‘partner’, dependent on central government. The various responsibilities of partners and their timings are illustrated in the diagram below.
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- ⬤ = indirectly
- ⬤ = to 2013 or before
- ⬤ = directly
- ⬤ = to and beyond 2013

DCLG = Department of Communities and Local Government
DCMS = Department for Culture, Media and Sports

* Land = land ownership, control and management

Figure 6.1: Legacy Partner organisations, their responsibilities and timeframes (Source: Juliet Davis, 2010)

Figure 6.2 below shows how the key partners’ roles influenced the hierarchical organisation of decision-making relating to the LMF, down to the execution of the masterplan. This is not quite a pyramidal structure, as the top tiers of the hierarchy are heavily represented by the partner organisations. A number of organisations are represented at several different levels of the diagram at the same time, producing a complex web of connections in reality between partner organisations. The theme of ‘engagement’ appears relatively high up in the hierarchy in the form of the ‘Engaging People Working Group’ located beside the figure of Gareth Blacker, Director of the LDA until 2009. Engagement, as the Code makes clear, covers communications across and between all levels of involvement in the project – from government actors to private sponsors to local communities. It is thus key to the collaborative style of governance being promoted throughout. Masterplanning lies at the heart of the diagram, with strategic spatial design activities situated to the left and socio-economic development to the right.
Figure 6.2: Olympic Park and Lower Lea Legacy Organisational structure for the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF) (Source: LDA, March, 2008; redrawn by Juliet Davis, 2011)
6.1.2 Partnership for local authorities

Given my interests in the local impacts of planning for legacy as these began to unfold between 2007 and 2010, I was interested in how effective these complex partnering arrangements and their representations in the hierarchy of organisation were in reality. One of the main issues identified by studies of the impacts of authorities created in relation to special zones of development and regeneration in the past, such as the Urban Development Corporations created by the Thatcher government in the 1980s, has been the exclusion of elected local authority interests, plans and priorities (Hall, 1998; Imrie, 1999). I conducted interviews with representatives for the Host Boroughs of Hackney and Newham in order to explore the degree of inclusion which the partnership had represented for them.

The head of Hackney Borough Council’s 2012 Unit, Alex Hall, suggested that his experience had evolved over time. He confirmed that from 2007 to 2008, ‘[w]e had quite a strong relationship going with the government’s DCMS, with the London Development Agency and others’ (Interview, LBH 2012 unit, 11.2009). Hackney will encompass the second largest portion of the Olympic site after Newham after 2012. Notably, the International Media Broadcast Centre/ Media Press Centre (IMBC/ MPC) and most of the northern Park fall within their boundaries. The borough was keen that the Press Centre be developed to appeal to the media industry - including film and television - post 2012, as part of borough-wide initiatives to cultivate ‘creative industries’. Other partners appear to have supported this vision at the time, though it would appear that with the onset of recession in 2008, this situation changed, leading to the assertion of greater power by the LDA. Hall confirmed that suddenly:

We had no direct control over our own vision for... for the area. So that means the only piece of land in Hackney that can generate a very large number of new jobs [we didn’t have control of]. And actually, about Christmas time last year (2008), the LDA made a break for it and tried to really get rid of the media centre as a meaningful concept altogether and just get Westfield to put up one of their office blocks early and put the press in there and just put a two year large shed on the Wick for... for the broadcasters. I’d like to say that we stopped it [...] I don’t think [we did]; I think that the dynamic didn’t work with Westfield. They couldn’t get a deal (LBH 2012 unit, Interview, 2009).
Lack of control in the short-term made Hackney nervous about what the authority would be taking on post-2012. It would be all very well, Hall suggested, if they went ‘into some kind of a deal which means that we don’t have much control for it but then equally we don’t have much responsibility’ longer-term. However, this version of events seemed unlikely at the time.

A councillor at Newham, Andrew Dodd, also suggested that his local authority felt they had diminished say and responsibility for decisions on the site. Always one for presenting views in terms of a story, he relayed the following:

We’d all get invited along and you would be – your views would be solicited at that moment. But you wouldn’t be allowed to take the presentations away. So, I mean, I can remember one occasion where our director of regeneration picked up a document, you know, which they presented, and he decided to take it away so he could think about it later… and it was confiscated coming out the door... of Newham town hall! You know, this is our door as a matter of fact! (Interview, Newham Councillor/ Leaside Regeneration, 01.2010).

The boroughs’ ‘voice’ appears to have been more instrumental after the establishment of the 5 Host Boroughs Units, under Roger Taylor, in early 2009. In this year, they became responsible for producing ‘a collective’ local authority-led vision in the form of a Multi-Area Agreement for the Olympic site post 2012 (The Five Host Boroughs, July 2009, p. 10). Multi Area Agreements were introduced by government in 2006 and made statutory by Labour under The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act, 2009 (CLG, March 2010, pp. 7-9). The main components of this vision were: a) to close ‘the deprivation gap’ in east London, and; b) strike an even balance of potential costs and benefits for each of the boroughs relative to the parts of the site they would control in the future. Following on from this, the Five Host Boroughs Unit became responsible for the development of the Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF), a strategy aimed at identifying pathways to ‘convergence’ between the Host Boroughs as a whole and the rest of London in terms of the Indices of Multiple Deprivation. The LMF refers to this strategy several times, including the intention of masterplanners to find spatial expressions for ‘convergence’.
So what does engagement mean for those located at the base of the hierarchy and how does local ‘community’ fit into the complex collaborative structure and its division of decision-making labour?

6.1.3 Local stakeholders

In the ODA and LDA’s *Code of Consultation* (2008), a number of allied terms are used to define different levels of participation in the project by stakeholders. The lowest is simply called ‘involvement’ - defined as the ‘exchange [of] views’ without the opportunity being given to those involved of influencing strategic action. Next up are ‘engagement’ and ‘relationship building’ - both viewed as precursors to having actual influence in the project, but not yet at that level. ‘Relationship building’ implies a positive maturing of conversation, the stabilisation or regularising of a form of exchange, forms of alliance and connection. This suggest that having ‘influence’ for the ODA and LDA is a privilege arising from ‘relationship building’ exercises rather, one may presume, than from discordant or conflictual communicative exchanges. The highest level of participation is referred to as consultation, defined as:

A process of dialogue between decision-makers and stakeholders with the aim of providing the opportunity to influence a decision or programme of action.

Consultation should only be undertaken where there is the possibility of influencing decisions and not where decisions have already been made.

The distinction between decision-makers and stakeholders is important to note. A more powerful group provides opportunity for a less powerful group, not just to receive information to enable them to evaluate their position, or simply to exchange views, but to actually influence a decision. The consultation ‘opportunity’ is given at a particular moment, before a decision has been taken, but not necessarily throughout the process of reaching it.

The consulted included a wide range of ‘stakeholders’ - representatives for divisions in the main partner organisations, such as local authorities’ Building Control and Planning departments, technical ‘specialist’ or consultants to the LDA and ODA, and local communities. The distinction between partners and stakeholders was thus fairly indeterminate at the level of organisations, but rested more in a distinction between individuals’ roles in the decision-making process. According to the Code, ‘[t]he definition of
a ‘stakeholder’ for the London 2012 Olympic project is anybody who might directly be affected by or have an influence on the regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley, or the hosting of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (ODA & LDA, 2008, p. 8).

Community stakeholders are divided into two categories: a) community, which denoted voluntary and community sector organizations and known local community representatives, and; b) the ‘general public’. The ‘general public’ is defined according to place – the four boroughs or the ‘fringe’ localities bordering the site. So who were the general public who were consulted as Olympic Legacy stakeholders?
The ‘general’ public around the site are said in the Code to be ‘heterogeneous and diverse’, predominantly in terms of ethnicity and faith. The Code doesn’t provide further details than this – prompting, for example, consideration of the spatial variability of ‘heterogeneity’ around the site (see figure 6.3 above\(^1\)), or the longevities of different groups’ residence in these areas. One of the notable features of the population of the Host Boroughs noted by the Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF) is its turnover or ‘churn’. The chart below indicates that between mid-2007 and mid-2008, ‘churn’ in each of the four boroughs intersecting the site was significant, but that Newham experienced higher levels than any other London borough. This, as Young & Wilmott (1957) teach us, has a long history, dating at least as far back as the devastation of east London during the Second World War and its post-War reconstruction.

Figure 6.4: Chart indicating relative ‘churn’ within four of the Host Boroughs, June 2007–June 2008 (Note: numbers are in thousands, negative numbers indicating overall outward migration).

\(^1\) This diagram, which I produced in early 2010, formed part of a set of studies commissioned by the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) when they took over from the LDA as site owners and leaders of the LMF. Whilst the dotted black lines indicate the boundaries of local authority wards, the dotted red lines indicate the site. The drawing shows that whilst around the Hackney and Waltham Forest portions of the site, the population is highly ethnically diverse, in the South west, there are more marked divisions between ethnicities: White and Asian (typically residents of Bangladeshi and Bengali descent).
The way in which diversity is presented in the *Code* is connected with how the issue of ‘equality’ of access to consultation opportunities is conceived. In other words, it is far less about the specificities of the site and its fringe areas than about a wider conception of diversity and its implications for an equally wide conception of equality. Focus is directed toward potential regions of ‘inequality’ and ‘hard to reach’ groups within the six ‘equality strands’ of ethnicity, faith, age, gender, sexuality and disability. Whilst laudable in many ways, this focus on people whom the ODA and LDA take to be excluded ‘on the basis of age, disability, access to housing, (BAME) communities or groups, sexuality and faith’ (pp. 19-20) – has the effect, I argue, of shifting attention away from at least the following: a) social groups formed on the basis of interest rather than in terms of these discrete equality categories; b) specific local groups, and; c) fairly significantly, the majority. The groups that would be most consulted and thus in theory have the greatest opportunity for self-expression, would be those who could claim the greatest number of minority or inequality statuses.

The *Code* states that consultation methods should meet the following criteria: ‘Proportional’, ‘Inclusive’, ‘Genuine’, ‘Consistent’, ‘Transparent’. In the next section, I consider how these were achieved in practice, focussing on outcomes from consultations held by the LDA in 2008 and 2009 (as list, by date and kind, in Appendix G).

6.2 At the intersection of expert and public views

6.2.1 Opportunities to engage

In October 2008 and February 2009, the LDA hosted a series of consultations at which draft versions of the Legacy Masterplan Framework – known respectively as Outputs B and C - were presented. Immediately preceding these were a series of ‘road show’ exhibitions held in public spaces in each of the host boroughs and designed to raise interest in the project. The main features of these exhibitions were jigsaw models of the site which local people could ‘play’ at making major spatial decisions with. The photograph below was taken at the Hackney Empire Theatre in February 2009, just before the commencement of the Output C consultations. This model was beautifully made, and each of the puzzle pieces – which represented buildings and uses - fitted only in one place. In other words the challenge for ‘players’ was to find the ‘right’ place rather than to identify creative alternatives. It was also significant that the project and its design was presented as a game, as this, as we will see
later, cohered with a range of methods which emphasised the public’s lack of spatial planning expertise by recourse to somewhat infantilising styles of communication.

Figure 6.5: Explaining the scheme to interested locals (Photograph by Juliet Davis, 2009)

The main consultations were run by the LDA’s Consultation and Engagement team in collaboration with Beyond Green - an organisation specialising in the production of sustainability strategies for large scale development projects. They were organised into three sets of events, targeted at audiences with differing levels of expertise and ‘stake’ in the project. At the top of the hierarchy were Technical Workshops to which senior members of staff in the partner organisations and ‘technical stakeholders’ - specialists in areas including house building, the management of affordable housing, sustainable development and local business representation - were invited. Next, Issue-led Workshops offered some places to the ‘general public’ but were mostly targeted at invited local organisations involved directly in projects related to workshop themes – ‘Environment’, ‘Transport’, ‘Social Infrastructure’, ‘Parklands and the Public Realm’ and ‘Housing’. The third kind were Local Workshops which were for the general public of the Olympic Host Boroughs, and widely advertised by poster, flier and on the LDA’s website.

Events were separated with the view that the contributions of technical stakeholders would be of greater strategic value to the LDA and masterplanning team than those of local
community groups. It was not, Therese Hayes, a consultation expert from the LDA assured me, because attendants at the different sessions were provided with different kinds of information or that this was presented in different ways. One of the key representatives from Beyond Green, Lauren Fernandez, acknowledged that a drawback of the segregated sessions was that ‘[s]ometimes you don’t see that there is an alignment between what a borough councillor is saying and what their [...] residents are aspiring to also’ (Interview, Beyond Green, 02.2009). In other words, it was dangerous to assume that the general public would have little of relevance to say in comparison to planning experts.

The local and Issue-led events were held in venues close to the site, ensuring that they were accessible to local people. However, they were held during the day, which rendered them inaccessible to all but those who could justify taking time off work or were currently not working. Each lasted approximately two hours and involved the following: a) the presentation of a standard slideshow of twenty slides illustrating the conceptual framework, economic drivers and timeline for of the LMF; b) a theme-specific presentation by a technical expert in the case of the Issue-led Workshops, and; c) a ‘Q & A’ session or break-out group discussion focussing on particular topics. The presentations were given by different members of the masterplanning team, ranging from Beyond Green to members of the design consortium and their consultants – each of whom had their own styles of presenting and ways of ‘telling’ the project. The major part of each session was devoted to relaying information, rather than dialogue creating the opportunity for the ‘influence’ said to form a crucial part of consultation.

Therese Hayes defended this approach by emphasising that the LMF was being shown at an earlier stage of development than statutory consultation policy required. She argued that,

‘[Q]uite often in a lot of planning [...] you’re just pre-application consultation before any of the discussion and the debate starts. And there may well be time to feed back and influence the designs, but it’s a really short window (Interview, LDA C&E dept, 02.2009).

After the presentations, the LMF file was uploaded onto the LDA’s website, so the longer ‘window’ offered on this project included time for online comments to be received. In part making up for the timing of the consultations, they were supplemented by a variety of other ways in which the LDA engaged with local people. Lauren Fernandez explained the
important of this in these terms: ‘I always feel that there is kind of a break between political representation and community representation and it’s always a danger that [...] you give excessive weight to the opinions of those who can actually make it to the meetings’ (Interview, Beyond Green, 02.2009). Extending the LDA’s reach to local people beyond consultation events was intended to ensure ‘community representation’ as far as possible. For the most part, this was done by forming specific connections with local people and their social groups. Through 2008 and the first half of 2009, the team’s Outreach Officers gradually built up a database of local contacts and an associated meetings schedule. Therese Hayes claimed that the LDA were happy to have issues and organisations drawn to their attention, describing how ‘[when new organisations or new groups] say, “oh we want you to come talk to us about this”, we say, “we’d love to do that, let us know when, and we’ll come and see you”’ (Interview, LDA, C&E dept, 02.2009). Special meetings were held with schools and faith groups, for example, focussing on specific experiences of such organisations in the area and on their interpretations of ‘inclusive’, LMF neighbourhoods.

Whilst the sheer effort of the consultation and engagement team in these regards was impressive, it is important to note that all these engagements involved privileging face-to-face exchanges, which as Young teaches us ‘implies a model of the good society as consisting of decentralized small units which is both unrealistic and politically undesirable, and which avoids the political question of just relations among such decentralized communities’ (1990, p. 190). The collection of these face-to-face exchanges, in Young’s terms, does not constitute ‘community representation’, but rather locates all the power of mediation and of decision-making relating to the importance of the varied issues they raised for the LMF with the LDA and Beyond Green.

The significance of this became apparent for me in the way in which Hayes and Fernandez described their objectives with respect to special consultations with faith groups. They relayed that in communicating with ‘the churches, the synagogues, the mosques’, their aim was to discover areas of overlap or common ground that could lead to groups agreeing to share a space within the site eventually. For them, the ‘rebranding’ of traditional faith spaces and typologies to create something ‘more’ for a wider range of people in the form of a multi-faith centre was an effective way of expressing the equality of all. A participant in the Faith Forum, from St. Johns Church in Stratford described some of the problems with this from a Church of England perspective:
[The] consultants were very nice but completely secular and had absolutely no understanding [...] There’s a chaplaincy model which you would have somewhere like a hospital where people go for personal prayer because there’s an operation coming up, or perhaps they’re scared of flying. [...] But when you start thinking about worshipping communities, [they] want to do so much more than pray! [S]o this sort of idea from a secular point of view that you can have one building and the Muslims can have it on Fridays and the Jewish people can have it on Saturdays and the Christians can have it on Sundays doesn’t work [...] All the different faiths [attending the meeting] said, ‘It won’t work’ [...] I was saying that, from a Christian point of view, we want to be in there quite early, sort of, eight o’clock in the morning, we want to perhaps run a nursery, preschool stuff and after school stuff and sort of seniors lunch clubs and youth clubs and all these things. [...] And there was a lovely Sikh gentleman [who] said, ‘We will want to be there at four o’clock because we feed everybody. I can get there at four o’clock and get the kitchens working’ [...] And the Muslims will want to have a school - very important for them that they have a school. And, you know, the idea that somehow all they want to do is to have one sort of act of worship once a week just – it’s not [...] [rolls eyes]. So [sighs] this was said. Did they listen? We’ll wait and see (Interview, St. John’s Stratford, 10.2009).

Meanwhile, Fernandez described the resistance of faith groups to the multi-faith centre in the terms of a need for them to ‘bridge some of those traditional, maybe they’re gaps, maybe they’re just extra routes that they can make with their faith’ (Beyond Green, Interview, 02.2009). What people said, including people as articulate and expert on matters of ‘community’ as the above speaker\(^2\), appeared to be subject to manipulation by the LDA and Beyond Green whose own rationality in terms of how community integration should be expressed remained fairly fixed.

Returning to the LMF Outputs B and C workshops, attendance at the Local Workshops ranged between fifteen and forty people each, whilst at the Issue-led Workshops it ranged between nine and thirty four. Approximately a quarter of attendants at the Issue-led sessions included employees of the host boroughs and of the LDA. Even the busiest

\(^2\) Who, incidentally, has a degree in Sociology underpinning decades of experience in local regeneration in Newham and direct involvement with the religious community at St John’s Church.
workshops represented a tiny fraction of the population of each of the boroughs. Whilst some attendants came through interest in the project, others came because they already had a history of involvement in, including opposition to it – The Eastway Users Group (EUG), Manor Gardens Gardening Society and the Mabley Green User’s Group for example. Though attendance was so low that it could not be said to represent the locality, the attendants themselves revealed a variety of territorial, political, prospective business and social interests in the site. Hayes expressed ‘disappointment that people haven’t turned up’ but also said she had intended to ‘avoid the big forum model of engagement’ as this can lead to lecture-like situations rather than focussed, round-table discussions. In interview, she emphasised that as this was not the only method her team were using for engaging with people, it didn’t have to ‘do everything’. For one attendant however, the smallness of sessions ‘really lost [the] richness’ of the diversity of local groups including ‘NGOs, consultancies and environmental lobby groups’ (Issue-led Workshops: Parklands & Public Realm, 02.2009).

In the sections that follow, I consider the outcomes of the consultations in terms of a series of themes that enable me to explore their effectiveness and meaning for the wider LMF development process.

6.2.2 Transparency

As stated above, the consultations were supposed to represent the LDA’s willingness to be ‘transparent’ (ODA/ LDA, 2008). What was presented at them was, however, clearly carefully controlled. What was allowed to become public knowledge was that which already represented consensus between the masterplanning consortium, the LDA and other project partners. Therese Hayes acknowledged that local people ‘don’t know all the detailed considerations that go into the plan or the analyses that underpin the decisions’, though she nonetheless maintained that the LDA was being appropriately transparent in its communications (Interview, LDA C&E dept, 02.2009). Transparency relies not only on the presentation of wholly accurate information but on the respondents’ capacities for absorption, in Young’s terms, without ‘mediation’. That the LMF as drawn represented wholly accurate information may be called into question by some of the very uses of the consultations in Olympic and Legacy ‘image-building’ for the media and, as EDAW’s Richard Morris suggested, in encouraging the public just ‘to let us get on with it’. This may also be questioned in the context of the hierarchy of decision-making as well as in terms of the
complex interaction of forces, rationales and political wills shaping the LMF, none of which could be said to be wholly transparent to one another, and which the masterplanners could do little other than interpret and interpolate. This point is well-captured in the following excerpt from an interview with the project architect Stephen Akkerman from KCAP:

There’s a complex overlay of like, there’s the grass roots public consultation of the you and me and everyone. And there is groups which are better organised which manage to kind of raise their voice much more kind of professional with the people who in the end make those decisions. And then there’s the layer of, like, the whole political game of London Mayor versus the local mayors. And then there is the economic rationale, the whole developer world. I think these three [latter] forces are the ones which we are dealing with - and to some extent anticipating. But this whole soup underneath, I think, is absolutely meaningless (Interview, KCAP, 11.2008).

All too often, the consultation presentations focussed on the conceptual framework of the project at the expense of discussion on how it was anticipated that this might come to fruition. Notwithstanding, there were some occasions when presenters succeeded in identifying specific issues to which people were able to respond effectively and, potentially, usefully. Richard Morris from EDAW said in one of the 2008 events that ‘[w]e need a shopping list of activities, for example, a hip hop academy, a children’s painting venue, cafes, internet facilities…’ and ideas of models that form ‘a different kind of retail experience to Stratford City’ (Output B Consultation: Arts and Culture, 2008, EDAW presentation). This was still not an example of either the LDA or masterplanning team being transparent about the LMF’s future as a whole, but of at least offering a clear pathway to meaningful involvement in the present.

Coming back to the issue of transparency in terms of representation, it is important to note that the ‘users of representations’ (Becker, 2007, p. 62) at these events had different kinds and degrees of affinity with their ‘makers’ ways of ‘telling’. This considerably influenced the ways in which they commented and were able to engage with the content of the presentations in question and answer sessions that followed them. Information was least transparent, in these terms, to the people least familiar with architectural drawing conventions. The LDA’s awareness of this problem had led them to seeking to establish a
simple, legible representational repertoire, including the models discussed at the start of this section and the ‘feel-good’ perspectives discussed in Chapter 5.

I would argue that the issue is not how to make the LDA and masterplanners’ representations appear more accessible to more people – such as by reducing their content further – but how to accord due recognition to the different ways that people engaged in consultations see and know localities. This argument picks up on Young’s contention that ‘the ideal of a transparent society, visible and legible in each of its parts [...] devalues or represses the ontological difference of subjects’ (1990, p. 230). In her terms, for democratic process to be effective, it must proceed from the assumption that people are different and concentrate thus on a ‘politics of difference’.

6.2.3 Power play

The LDA and Beyond Green generally sought to minimise confrontation and downplayed its value in progressing the project. In interview, they often blamed the negative positions taken by the press for the negative and embattled attitudes that some people came to consultations with. In the experience of Hayes and Fernandez, ‘when [people] know the breadth of the work that’s taking place, they’re really quite satisfied’ (Interview, LDA C&E dept, 02.09). Negative publicity increases the LDA or ODA’s need to be seen to be listening to interest groups, as will be seen in the upcoming section about the cyclists. It helps, Hayes argued, for people to see that masterplanners, ‘aren’t evil, malicious people that are dreaming up plans in, you know, tower blocks up in some glorified place that means nothing to them’ (Interview, LDA, 02.2009).

Other major reasons they saw for reducing confrontational exchanges were that these tended to: a) spring from a deeper base of dissatisfaction and resentment which lie outside the scope of the project; b) dominate sessions, making other participants retreat or lose interest, and; c) have disruption as the objective, making the LDA’s aim of using session to reaching informed, consensual decisions impossible. A lot of ‘power play [...] makes our job quite difficult’ (Interview, LDA/ Beyond Green, 02.2009).

In the sessions I attended, people who were confrontational were always local residents and/or former site occupants. Their anger often related to the displacements of people from the site in 2007, their difficulties in accessing housing or public services in their
localities or winning contracts relating to the project – all examples of ways in which people are made aware of power differentials. One of the Arts and Culture Issue-led Workshops, for example, was dominated by an artist who hadn’t been successful in securing a commission from the LDA. She proclaimed that ‘[The LDA] are brushing aside ideas that are being offered. I have given you an answer on a plate [...] You have to respond to it!’ (Output B Consultations: Arts and Culture, 2008). Someone from the EUG attempted to demand an ‘adjournment’ of a Parklands & Public Realm Issue-led Workshop (Output C, 2009) because he hadn’t formally been invited to it. He proceeded throughout the session to use his detailed knowledge of cycling, the Lea Valley Regional Park and of his rights as a stakeholder to make the masterplanner’s authority appear hollow. ‘You let me know in writing on that’, he demanded when they couldn’t provide an answer to a particular question. Recalling Flyvbjerg’s (1998) critique of the ideal of rational deliberative democracy, major issues with this kind of power play were that: a) it related in few instances to topics that were of concern to people beyond the specific individual and their immediate groups, and; b) in focussing on their own interests, the individuals conducting it were both hostile to other perspectives and often poor at empathising with other causes. This form of ‘countervailing power’, to use Wright & Fung’s (2003, pp. 259-266) definition of the term, was adversarial and in its own way authoritarian. As these authors argue, this is typical of top down governance processes and should therefore be evaluated in this wider context. How could processes otherwise encourage attendants to engage in what Till calls ‘transformative participation’ (in Blundel-Jones, Petrescu and Till, 2005, pp. 27-30) involving genuine problem-solving?

6.2.4 What planet’s he on?

My neighbour whispered these words under her breath as EDAW was presenting the scheme at the Output C Issue-led consultation on Housing in Stratford. It cohered with a group of retorts during the various workshops that masterplanners hadn’t got to grips with East London’s ‘realities’. These included the outmigration of traditional East End residents from the host boroughs since the War – a dynamic blamed on immigration, planning and the collapse of traditional industries. A female resident of Newham for more than sixty years argued that ‘I’ve lived in Newham all my life and every ten years someone comes along to try and make it better, and it doesn’t [...] I want to keep it as it is!’ (Output B Local Workshops: Newham, 2008).
Local people at the events frequently asked whether facilities would be ‘for local people’, ‘small businesses, the people that matter’ or part of what someone called ‘an artificial area with no connections and all about big business’ and another saw as all promise, no reality ‘like the O2 arena’ for which all the imagining and design had been ‘done for them’ (Output B Consultations: Arts and Culture, 2008). The sense of having been deprived of the right to imagine struck me as particularly interesting, recalling Lefebvre’s (1991) argument about the correspondence between authority and the capacity to create ‘representations of space’ (pp. 38-39).

When masterplanners at a Newham Local Workshop showed a set of precedents that had been chosen to illustrate the ‘character’ of future Olympic site neighbourhoods, a revealing response which received several nods of approval from the floor was ‘I can’t see myself in these drawings’ (Output B Local Workshops: Newham, 10. 2008). When, at the same session, a representative from EDAW presented a diagram showing different typological possibilities for the housing ‘offer’, all versions of what could be considered ‘good practice’, this was instantly rejected with a response that the choice many families are making in the borough was to move away to Romford or the Essex coast where they could buy a house with a garden and not live in the ‘high density housing’ which many still associated with the displacements of the post-war period. Attendants seemed to be of a general view that the LMF was for the rich, the immigrant poor or both, resonating with Young, Gavron and Dench’s observations that ‘white East Enders [have become set against] against political modernisers and the minorities who they regard as favoured by them’ (Dench, Gavron, and Young, 2006, p. 230).

The presentations often emphasised the redundancy of the Lea Valley which was viewed as ‘a black hole’ accommodating ‘over-represented growth sectors of refuse, printing, distribution’ and lots of small businesses, and requiring a boost toward growth in ‘finance and public sector administration’ and ‘big, key employers who can stay in the long-term’ (Output B Consultations: Arts and Culture, Beyond Green presentation, 2008). In response, attendants highlighted the value of capitalising on the ‘local skills base’ that still existed in manufacturing in the area as a legacy of twentieth century industrialisation and on the sheer diversity of small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the wider Olympic area. A local resident and lecturer from UEL who attended all the sessions spoke in a related

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3 Note that these quotes come from different people attending the sessions
manner of the ‘value in supporting FE colleges focussing on catering, hospitality, hair and beauty [...] and construction skills’ which reflected the local business base.

Although discussions about urban and local ‘character’ were often somewhat diffuse, a cluster of local people’s comments focussed productively on urban qualities created over the passage of time. Though some respondents focused literally on architectural ‘styles’, most people’s concern was more to do with ‘feel’. Between the LDA’s notes and my own at one Local Workshop, the following ‘feels’ were recorded: ‘[a] hotchpotch mix of uses along the same road, as is typical of the East End – for example a factory next to a house, next to a local shop, next to a small park’, the ‘village feel, but in the middle of the city feel’ of New York’s Greenwich Village and Soho, ‘a Spitalfields type feel’ and the ‘lovely quality’ of Neal’s Yard in Covent Garden [which is] slightly hidden and warren like’ (Local Workshops: Hackney, 2008). Whilst these concerns are varied, they also display a degree of consistency. In particular, they suggest a common wish for images and indeed the processes of envisioning to be grounded in a here-and-now, in values associated with the tried-and-tested. This observation recalls Becker’s argument about ‘criteria of believability’ on which users of representations base evaluations of their worth. He claims that these are established through a comparison of what anyone tells anyone else with their knowledge and experience of life (Becker, 2007, p. 116). This raises the important question of how the value of place-based experience for a design process could be better assessed. To what wider issues, for example of authenticity or homeliness relating to the order of newly built ‘communities’ could they be compared in order to draw out their significance for the future of this site?

6.2.5 Whose project?

Towards the very end of our interview in February 2009, Therese Hayes finally explained that in reality, it was not realistic for local people to ‘influence’ the project at this stage. More valuable, she argued, was, ‘getting them feeling like, it’s their patch and they can use it on a daily basis and they look forward to using it, and they make good use of it. So we need that sort of regular contact and awareness and familiarity [...] So when we talk about local ownership, that’s what we’re trying to instil’ (Interview, LDA, 02.2009).

The word ‘instil’ is significant, suggesting that at least in part consultation events serve an educational purpose, intended to convey knowledge about the site and how authorities
intend it to be used. This recalls Foucault’s argument that ‘[a]ny system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledges and powers that they carry’ (Foucault, 1981, p. 64). From the LDA’s perspective, the difficulties experienced by some attendants in understanding the scope of their ‘ownership’ underlay some of the less positive outcomes of consultation. The major question this appeared to raise for them was how to instil or describe the rules of the game better.

Allies & Morrison’s project architect David Roth agreed that ‘influence’ was about the last attribute that most local attendants had. He described them as the ‘voiceless people at consultations’ who the LDA tried to win around, rather than actively teasing out their ‘fears of enclosure, perceived problems of ownership’ or using the consultations as formative settings for considering issues such ‘what one really is as a citizen’ (Interview, A&M, 18.11.2009). For him, the consultations revealed how poorly articulated the links between the administration of ‘consultation practice’ and their possible functions, for example in terms of ‘social betterment’ were in the minds of those leading the project. The few times when he thought productive exchanges occurred at consultation events were when the consulted arrived organised into groups, sometimes with their own meeting agendas, and became able to alter the pre-determined course of events through a subtle combination of adversarial tactics and taking the maximum legitimate advantage of offered opportunities. He argued that residents at Leabank Square\(^4\) had, for example, been effective in articulating their aims at events in Hackney, at creating alliances within Hackney Borough Council and, subsequently, influencing areas of planning that impacted on the uses and views of their group. He referred to this as an inherently if unusually positive process by which a group of local people had begun to ‘urbanise from within’ by asserting their perceived rights to urban territory. The result was a reshaping of the LMF plan that reflected designers’ inclusion of these residents’ needs-claims within the mix of interests in the north western corner of the site.

\(^4\) Leabank Square, as its name suggest is on the banks of the Lea Navigation, a 1980s development integrating mixed-tenure housing which faces the International Media Broadcast Centre and Media Press Centre (IMBC/ MPC). The residents have formed their own residents’ association in order ‘to better fight for improved services from landlords, Hackney Council, the Olympic Delivery Authority, The Mayor of London, London Transport, Thames Gateway, etc.’ (http://www.groupsnearyou.com/groups/leabank_square_residents_association).
The consultation events were recorded by note takers who, Hayes claimed, ‘scribe everything’ (Interview, LDA, 02.2009). Notes circulated as minutes following the Outputs B and C consultations were effective in portraying the sequence of points that people made but left out the sense in which people said things and any markers of their identities. I could only tell whether a comment had been made by a local authority officer or a local resident by reading them against my own notes. The more confrontational remarks and exchanges that took place were neutralised – either because they were not recorded or because the note takers had removed the sting. This has the effect of rendering certain points of view ‘scarce’, to use Foucault’s term, disconnecting them from the process. They emphasised public statements that offered open interpretations such as ‘the need to celebrate local tradition and the importance of “quality”’ (Output B Consultations: Arts and Culture, 2009). Despite the rhetoric of transparency and freedom of information therefore, Foucault’s comment that ‘[i]t is just as if prohibitions, barriers, thresholds and limits had been set up in order to master, at least partly, the great proliferations of discourse, in order to remove from its richness the most dangerous part, and in order to organise its disorder according to figures which choose what is most controllable about it’ rings true (in Young, 1981, p. 66).

In an early report on consultation practices, the LDA claimed to use both quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse the results of events (LDA, 2004). However, in the issued notes, no analysis beyond the note-takers’ interpretations of comments and the foregrounding of certain quotations viewed by the LDA as important, was in evidence. It seemed to fall to the masterplanners to select from the diversity of popular ideas which were most relevant, in other words the most attuned to what they were already planning. In conversations with architects from each of the practices in the consortium, it appeared that how they selected or worked with popular ideas relied more often on their taste and intuition and the value they ascribed to consultations than any more rigorous or objective selection. An architect from EDAW confirmed that their favourite public idea came from a child at one of the local schools’ workshops who imagined ‘an island full of squirrels that cut hair’. Clearly this was one of the most impractical and therefore most irrelevant to the masterplanners’ design processes.
OPLC was being established and the LDA’s own authority was uncertain. Whilst in theory, Figure 6.6: Output C, draft plan of the north park presented at the Parklands and Public Realm event and marked up by EDAW in response to comments from the floor (Photograph by Juliet Davis, 2010)

What the comments say:
1. Green walls and rainwater harvesting on media centre to supply food growing areas and allotments
2. Allotment hub at a distance from road and easily accessed from Gainsborough school
3. Windmill to draw water from river for growing food
4. Connections between food and wildlife areas – food gathering possibilities – watercress, blackberries, water supply

In addition, it appeared that certain ideas that were of interest to masterplanners were impossible to take forward, given the stage of the project. For example, the ideas marked by an attendant at a Parklands and Public Realm Issue-led workshop (2009) would have been practically impossible for the team to incorporate given their level of specificity – at a time when, behind the façade of organisation and structure presented by the LDA, the OPLC was being established and the LDA’s own authority was uncertain. Whilst in theory,
lists of such ideas could be and were drawn up and kept by designers, is there any guarantee either that individuals that contributed to them would be interested in contributing further several years in the future, or that resources would become available to realise them?

6.3 Better connected: hardy breeds of community

This section concentrates on two different kinds of consultation, not anticipated at the inception of the project, but through which local groups managed to mobilise and gain influence. Neither exemplify the collaborative forms of decision-making that Wright and Fung (2003) advocate, but both also reveal some interesting kinds of movement in that direction.

6.3.1 Opponents: The velo-community

The Eastway Users’ Group discussed in chapter 4 managed to become powerful stakeholders in the development of the Velopark. These former users of the old Eastway Cycling facility form just one group of many potential future user groups, but both their former relationship with the site and opposition to its redevelopment had made them appear for the moment as the main ‘community stakeholders’ for whom the facilities were being planned.

Whereas the general public at formal consultations were guided through presentations and invited to contribute views in prescribed formats and ways, the cyclists were eventually able to set the terms of the agenda for some of the meetings relating to the legacy of the Velopark. This did not make them popular with the ODA or LDA. The leader of the EUG, Michael Taylor, claimed that the elevation of his position began at the time of the CPO, ‘with my cross-examination outcome with Lord Coe [in 2006]’ and ‘when David Higgins got a right roasting at a public meeting in Bethnal Green [in 2007]. He argued that ‘[t]hey’ve taken me much more seriously since then; now [laughs wryly] they tolerate me’ (Interview, EUG, 2009). Note the ‘me’. Taylor was prepared to work single-handedly at the task of achieving what he saw as ‘justice’ for a group of cyclists, notably including his eldest son, who would otherwise be disadvantaged by the process.
He had his enemies. However, he was also effective at creating important strategic alliances – including with prominent cyclists likely to compete in 2012 and representatives for the LVRPA. In spite of this, Taylor claimed that British Cycling either wouldn’t or ‘couldn’t represent the community’ requiring ‘us to develop the media savvy to be able to do that’. He speculated that before EUG had registered their objection to relocation, British Cycling already ‘had a deal with London’s bid team’ to get a Velodrome plus a headquarters in exchange for their backing of the bid. This may be conspiracy theory, but it may as well be truth as proclaiming it brought his small group into a position of power level with the national sporting body.

His most effective communications, he claimed, took place via ‘open confrontation’ and ‘via the press’. He succeeded in demonstrating in a manner which has seemed irrefutable, that how the group was treated by the LDA through the CPO was not only unjust but politically unwise. He was skilled at achieving what Flyvbjerg calls the transformation of ‘the problem from a technical one to a political one’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 35) but also back again. In these terms, he used his technical knowledge of cycling, tracks and races to attack the ODA, as well as his counter-political tactics.

The negative publicity he helped to fuel in relation to the Olympics and the Velodrome even influenced the selection of its post-planning permission design consortium, led by Hopkins Architects. The ODA’s project sponsor for the Velodrome Peter Oswald relayed how ‘in relation to the Legacy element, they were the one team that really got it’ (Interview, ODA, 29.01.10). By ‘really got it’, he meant that Hopkins understood the politics surrounding the project – the displacement of a cycling ‘community’ which had turned political will against the scheme, putting the ODA ‘in a hole’.

A director for Hopkins Architects, Paul Davies, explained that the involvement of the EUG alongside British Cycling in their design processes from mid-2008 to early 2010 was facilitated as a special concession to them for ignoring their interests at the time of the CPO. A series of five consultations were established, the last of which I attended in early 2010. These were not actually consultations but what Taylor himself described as closer to a genuine ‘design team meeting’. The cyclists had considerable influence on the process of determining the configuration of the cycle track - including resisting an early scheme which placed the track alongside and running over and under the A12 - and contributing to details of the track design – the radiuses of its bends, gradients and widths, lighting at night,
fencing, surfaces, the position of the judges’ box relative to the finish line and so on. The resulting circuit scheme lay south of the A12 road, wrapping around the Velodrome, and over the River Lea into the area now known as ‘Waterden Meadows’ - once home to the Waterden Road Travellers.

My own experience of this session suggested that the ODA continued not to take the EUG particularly seriously in a professional sense although they had been forced to in a political one. Peter Oswald was skilled at keeping the discussions focussed on the specificities of the cycling track and at shifting the emphasis away from politics. Whilst this arguably helped to stimulate positive working relationships, good publicity for the project and the creation of a scheme which the ODA, Hopkins and the EUG all claimed to be satisfied with, other members of the team explained some of the costs and compromises that were involved in appeasing EUG. Architects from KCAP and Allies &Morrison argued that,

Roth (A&M): The cycle people’s preferred layout of tracks requires an addition of eight bridges and underpasses with the price tag of between £20 and 40 million pounds which would have to be supplied by the ODA , [creating] a private compound of which they are the sole beneficiaries. What they’ve done is they’ve positioned themselves as the underdog, as the people who’ve had their land pulled out from under their feet... It’s an interesting indication of how things get distorted and manipulated.

Akkerman (KCAP): Yes, there have been at least twenty different layouts for this Velopark as it stands at the moment. And only one version actually satisfied this group. [...]They get much more than they had previously!

A representative for the landscaping firm LDA Design, working on the park layout, argued that adhering to the cyclists’ exacting requirements had produced conflicts between the cycle circuit and broader aims for the North Park as a haven for ‘nature’ (LDA Design, December 2009). In part as a result of this, the Velopark proposals attracted a ‘negative reception’ from the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE) in mid-2009 and opposition from The London Borough of Hackney on the grounds of a diminished public realm and poorer access for other users to the river.

The CABE review considered whether the cycle circuit could be seen as part of the public realm, or not. The conclusion was that it could not and must therefore constitute a private
zone within the public realm. In addition, racing cyclists created evident safety-risks for other users, leading to a view that the circuit should be enclosed. For Taylor, enclosure was undesirable as this would give the impression of ‘a Japanese racing circuit or, worse, a greyhound racing track’ (Interview, EUG, 14.12.2009). Taylor was, as usual, canny in his portrayal of the political issues at stake, stating that, ‘I find it hard to see how this chimes with landscape principles and exclusion issues ... cyclists become the target!’ Paul Davies from Hopkins supported this view, arguing that ‘cyclists are part of the public and so of course the cycle ways are part of the public domain’. He was opposed to what he saw as desires to create an illusionistic ‘Arcadian landscape’ against valid claims to its practical use. Finally, the layout was approved and outline planning permission awarded by the ODA’s Planning Decisions Team (ODA/PDT), making a few small concessions to CABE and Hackney critics in the process. For Paul Davies, the ‘position people like [Michael Taylor]’ are able to have ‘reflects the democracy of the planning process [in terms of] a desire to have people on side, to not attract negative publicity (Hopkins, interview, December 2009). However Taylor argued that only by dint of huge effort could a serious challenge to the bureaucracy of the process – the ‘risk assessment mentality’ as he called it – be made.

Some months on, it again became unclear whether the cycle circuit would, in spite of the permissions in place, go ahead as planned. The timing of the establishment of the OPLC created the possibility for re-evaluating the project’s merits and remaking decisions. At the time of writing, it appeared that CABE and Hackney’s views were being taken more seriously into account and that the EUG had again been side-lined. In spite of the wasted funds on design and consultation that this entailed, the publicity surrounding the cyclists’ cause appeared to give a post-Olympic reality to the Velodrome which some of the other venues lacked. At an Olympic Symposium hosted at the House of Lords in 2010, Mayor of Newham Robin Wales pronounced with no doubt that ‘the Cycling [which was] developed with an existing cycling community will be a tremendous success’ (Olympic Symposium 3, Wales, 06.2010).

6.3.2 Perennials: The Manor Gardening Society

Like the cyclists, the displaced Manor Gardens Gardening Society (MGS) was organised enough to succeed in making their case for returning to the site after 2012 quite prominent. They were not quite as effective in this as the cyclists. Although determined,
they did not have a figure head prepared to be quite as challenging and combative as Michael Taylor.

The MGS were not happy with their relocation site. From 2006, they endeavoured to mobilise the legal, political and emotive resources at their disposal to secure the outcome they most desired – to return to their old site. They had a formal agreement with the ODA and LDA, established at the time of the CPO, that their relocation was temporary. This agreement did not include a return to their original site, but did include the ODA’s commitment to provide the 2.1 hectares of land they had lost somewhere within the Olympic Park. A landscape architect from LDA Design, Peter Hatfield, argued that ‘the profile that MGS created for themselves over the CPO stood them in very good stead. They made the allotments a very emotive issue and [made use of the Legacy principle] that community would be embodied in legacy’ (Interview, LDA Design, 12.2009).

Designers were instructed by the LDA in 2008 to review options, not for the location of allotments, but of ‘community gardens’ – implying a wider ‘community’ access. They were also asked to look into the viability of developing ‘temporary use’ allotments, relating to the thirty year build-out timeline for the LMF. In interview, MGS representative Elaine Hudson presented three strong oppositions to these options. Firstly, she claimed that people from a diverse and mobile population don’t invest in community gardens as there isn’t a strong sense of local community. Secondly, if the word ‘allotment’ is dropped from the designation of productive urban land, its status changes and both ownership and protection under law become grey. Designated allotments are protected under law and are difficult to obtain permission to build on. Under Section 8 of the 1925 Allotments Act, a local authority must seek permission from the Secretary of State before selling or changing the use of a ‘statutory' site. Thirdly, the land they had before the Olympics had been given in ‘perpetuity’ by The Eton Settlement. The MGS were prepared to weather storms and hold out for this level of land-use commitment.

In the summer of 2009, the MGS chairman reported in minutes of an MGS meeting that, in spite of the ODA’s commitment, they ‘are currently unable to find a single 2.1 Ha site within the Legacy Park’. This related to the ways in which the public realm and developable or private land were assigned through the masterplan. The designated areas of public space related to Mayor Livingstone’s Five Legacy Commitments. The assigned redevelopment sites were, on the other hand, crucial to the economic model that London’s Olympic
organisers were developing. In relation to the former, allotments appeared as an exclusive use within ‘common land’; in relation to the latter, they were unviable – an allotment plot of 5 rods costing in the region of £40 per annum. Although allotments would benefit from the newly decontaminated land, there appeared to be little high-level political support for these as an outcome of the substantial investment of national public funds in the Olympics.

ODA Parklands project sponsor John Hopkins announced in June 2009 that whilst the ODA remained committed to the 2.1 hectares, ‘[i]t is not implicit that all is exclusively for MGS [...] As the land-owner, [the LVRPA’s] wish [...] would be to move to a modern form of allotments which whilst giving exclusive use of allotment plots which is more socially inclusive, provides an educational programme to a regional audience on best practice for growing crops and looks at food preparation and cooking’. Elaine Hudson claimed that the LDA and ODA viewed their group as ‘closed’ simply because of the way it relied on formal membership rather than looser mechanisms of inclusion.

With the ODA’s proposal to open out ‘services’ to a wider audience would come changes in terms of ownership, the MGS’s traditional ‘self-management’ requiring the supervisory control of the local authority and the LVRPA. The MGS were not opposed to the idea of bolting additional programmes onto allotments, say relating to cooking and education, but they did object to the idea that this would not necessarily increase the 2.1 hectare area which had been promised them and that it would affect their organisation.

This led to further conversations including an occasions when the ODA Parklands Sponsor agreed to meet the MGS at the allotments. The ODA appeared to use what Flyvbjerg refers to as a ‘stroking strategy’ (1998, p. 74) – a way of maintaining ‘an air of being receptive and constructive rather than critical and aggressive’ in order to gently bring the group on board with their own priorities. In some of the correspondence between the MGS and ODA which followed the meeting at the allotments, the ODA suggested that few of the ‘original’ plot-holders would still wish to return the site in 2013. On this basis, Hopkins confirmed his desire to ‘wait and see’ what the interest was in 2013 rather than commit to the MGS five years in advance of this. Arguably, this was not just a delaying tactic aimed at gently encouraging the MGS to give up their battle but related to other uncertainties about the course of the legacy plan’s development. Allotment holders didn’t have all the information about the decision-making processes relating to them at their disposal and this was clearly key to the ODA’s maintenance of power.
Further to the difficulties between the ODA and the MGS, Hackney and Waltham Forest councils and the LVRPA were all resistant to having allotments accommodated in their areas. Hackney’s Alex Hall confirmed that they were unwilling to have allotments re-sited in Hackney even though many MGS members were Hackney residents because ‘they weren’t originally in Hackney and because therefore including them there meant taking away common land’ (Interview, LBH 2012 unit, 11.2009). Through this, Hackney were responding to the calls of other pressure groups in the area. However, Hall was keen to stress Hackney’s broad support for allotments – ‘[y]ou know, we’ve got a member, a cabinet member for sustainability who’s very, very keen on looking at ways in which we can extend edible space, gardening space and so on’. He went on to explain the definition of ‘common land’ had provoked ‘enormous debates’ within the council, particularly over how to strike a balance between conserving the openness of the marshes - a place for dog-walkers and ramblers, a feral rather than either wild landscape or agricultural common land of the past – and commercialising them with the purpose of funding their rehabilitation and upkeep. In these terms, the issue of whether to ‘enclose’ common land for allotments was bound up with the council’s dilemma over the purposes of common land.

For some time then, the allotments were ‘floating’ on the Legacy Masterplan. A planning application that was submitted in December 2009 of ‘Reserved Matters’ - details following the 2007 outline approval - showed the 2.1 hectares in Newham’s land on Eton Manor, on land owned by the LVRPA and with the added bonus of being formerly part of the Eton Settlement. This location transforms them into a ‘buffer’ use between prime parkland and railway lands, outside of the main Olympic Park (and Livingstone’s 102 hectares). The main planning application drawing shows 85 plots – ‘to match the number that MGS previously had’ LDA Design’s Peter Hatfield said (Interview, LDA Design, 12.2009) – between 5 and 6 or 10 and 12 rods in size. The design builds on the original layout of the gardens ‘including composting areas, facility building, community barbeque area’ but also endeavours to integrate principles of disabled accessibility through features such as a five-metre wide ‘green lane’ connecting all the plots and ‘several raised beds for wheelchair users’ (LDA Design, interview). According to Hatfield, the LVRPA embraced the allotments when they saw them in this location, and the allotment holders were happy that ‘by being next to the Hockey Centre, there would be constant activity nearby, reducing security risks to them’. However, all this mutual happiness still does not supplant the ‘magic’ which almost everyone who knew them uses as a word to describe the allotments as they were before.
6.4 Conclusion: the limits of consultation

In the first part of this chapter, I located the practices of consultation and the role of local people within the hierarchy and structure of ‘engagement’ within the governance of the project as a whole. I did so by focussing on the respective roles of project partners and stakeholders. I argued that although the project partners were drawn from across the different traditional levels of authority and connected in a multilevel governance arrangement, this did not always appear to translate into effective collaboration with local authorities in the period covered the research. Two implications of this were: firstly, that as the governance of the project evolved over time, in the shift from the Olympic development to Legacy, what local authorities inherited would not adequately reflect the visions they had for their own areas, and; secondly, that partnership arrangements implying the dilution of traditional boundaries were to a degree in conflict with hierarchy of roles created in large part in the context of delivering the Olympics on time.

The roles of ‘stakeholders’ were considered in the context of the ODA & LDA’s Code of Consultation. Having the power of ‘influence’ appeared to be an ultimate goal of consultation, yet it remained unclear what local or ‘general public’ influence might mean for the hierarchy of decision-making or in the context of opposing perceptions, forms of knowledge and/or views. One of the problems with the conception of ‘community’ presented in this document is that, whilst emphasising certain defining categories, it negates more specific ways that, as Amin and Thrift’s work shows, people cohere in local areas - as friends, as affiliates, as adversaries or allies in achieving political or practical goals. The attendant ‘community’ and their ‘equality’ of access were both too broadly and too narrowly conceived, leading to disproportionate emphasis on so called ‘hard-to-reach’ groups. In addition and as the cases of the cyclists and the allotment holders towards the end of the chapter suggested, the focus on ‘equality’ had tangible effects in the emerging landscape as project sponsors and LMF leaders appeared to seek to actively discourage specific groups from claiming space in the ‘common’ public realm.

In then focussing on consultation practices relating to the LMF, I argued that there was little connection between the way these operated and the ability of attendants to gain
'influence' and the ODA & LDA’s *Code of Consultation*. There was an over-emphasis on ‘telling’, on reinforcing regeneration narratives already formulated by the LDA and masterplanning team. In spite of claims to ‘transparency’, the top-down decision-making process was rigid and prescribed. It didn’t help of course that these events were viewed with scepticism by a number of the masterplanning team, who viewed them as a waste of design time or as bureaucratic tick box exercises. For those that viewed them as more than this, the engagement process was unsatisfactory. The LDA’s emphasis on minimising discordant exchanges ignored the correlation that Wright & Fung (2003) identify between the occurrence of these and top-down decision-making processes. Although the LDA placed emphasis on the equality of information provided to attendants of the different levels of the engagement programme, clearly this didn’t - and also shouldn’t be expected to – connect to equality of influence, kind and scale of input and contribution. However, the purposes and degree of influence that might have been possible to achieve through the Public and Issue-led consultations were arguably overly unclear and their primary purpose thus appeared to be to provide carefully controlled information with the aim of ‘placating’ (Till, Petrescu and Blundell-Jones, 2005) potential opponents and gaining support for decisions that had already been taken.

In the LDA’s translation of the events into minutes, much of the context of people’s comments was lost. Little analysis of these in terms of outcomes was provided. As the section entitled ‘What Planet’s he on?’ suggested, some interesting links could be drawn between some of the comments and the East End’s twentieth-century history. Some comments suggested fundamental differences between what we might call projective ‘ways of seeing’ the site that pertain to the expert makers of ‘representations of space’ (Lefebre, 1991, p. 38) and ways of seeing in terms of everyday life and experience. These differences arguably influenced some respondents’ abilities to believe in the proposals or to imagine situating their own lives within them.

Outcomes approaching ‘collaborative decision-making’ (Wright and Fung, 2003) were achieved by two specific interest groups – the Manor Gardening Society (MGS) and Eastway Users Group (EUG) - through self-initiated processes of engagement with the ODA and LDA. Both groups were strategic in organising their groups, appointing representatives and cultivating alliances with more powerful political and promotional organisations. In both cases, their campaigns led to greater integration in the decision-making process and to at least partial success in achieving goals. This recalls Flyvbjerg’s (1998) contention that power
is the primary context of ‘rational’ decision-making in supposedly democratic urban development processes. In the cyclists’ case, this influence was short-lived, collaborative decisions being overturned under the OPLC’s new management of the project. This is turn recalls Logan and Molotch’s description of the urban development process as political ‘drama’ in which the ‘making and unmaking of coalitions’ is continually produced (1987, p. 39). Whilst Flyvbjerg’s argument suggests the need for sustained engagement between opposing forces to create the possibility for the balance of power between them to evolve, Logan and Molotch highlight the difficulties of sustaining relationships in urban development contexts. What might be a solution?

Amin and Thrift argue that a crucial aspect of the ‘democratic city [...] lies in the democratisation of the terms of engagement’ (2002, p. 131). In relation to this research, this suggests that there needs to be a breadth of ways in which interested groups and organisations can access opportunities in terms of forms of engagement relating to the Olympic legacy – to register a concern or loss, support or undermine an application for a future use, access information, join a volunteering programme, put forward a business proposition or apply for a post. In the process, it suggests that recognition that the grounds for engagement may change over time in response to evolving circumstances is important. At times, direct power struggles might be effective means for local interest groups to register claims relating to issues such as land-use, price or tenure. At others, deliberation and being generally ‘on the side’ of the process – through volunteering, bidding for contracts and proffered opportunities - may be more effective means of achieving goals. This recognition need not diminish the significance of what people are prepared to fight for in the here and now. In 2007, as we saw in Chapter 4, the site’s physical boundaries were a major area of contention. After 2012, the cost of and right to use space may seem more pressing.

These ideas are further explored in Chapter 7. Here I return to the design of the LMF in order to explore how conceptions of a long-term legacy can be altered in the context of political and economic change and the significance of this in the short to medium term for ideas of a design-led regeneration and for legacy’s localisation.
Chapter 7

The Timescales of Legacy: realising commitments at a time of political and economic uncertainty, 2008-2010

7. Introduction

Within two and a half years of the appointment of the design consortium for the LMF in January 2008, London’s economic circumstances and political landscape had transformed. In addition, significant changes had been made to the governance structure of the LMF project. The election of a new London Mayor and new national government and the transfer of land assets to a new legacy company all occurred within this timeframe and against the unfolding backcloth of a global economic recession. Through 2009, the pace of change in these areas and indeed in the rapid advancement of construction on the Olympic Park toward the fixed date of the Games was inversely reflected in the slowing pace of development on the LMF. By late 2009 however, the spatial and socio-economic strategies outlined less than a year before were up for review with a view to revision. Was this review required because the economics of the proposals discussed in Chapter 5 were no longer considered to function? Was it required for political reasons such as a perceived need for newly established authorities to assert leadership? Certainly both delays and revisions served to highlight that the evolution of early-stage designs for the LMF was contingent on the continuity of a political and economic climate and in no way given by a pre-established framework for staging a development process. This in turn spoke to what Till (2007, 2009) considers to be the conceptual and practical difficulties associated with designers’ current and historic attempts to prescribe elements of a lasting urban order given the dynamics of the urban cultures and politics in which design practices and designed places are situated.

The aim of this chapter is to further explore the issues associated with urban design and planning for the long-term by focussing on some of the direct effects of and challenges created by political and economic change in relation to the evolution of the spatial strategy for the Olympic site. It focuses particularly on the interplay between urban policy, land
ownership arrangements and the urban design process. The chapter follows from Chapters 4, 5 and 6 which together explored the unfolding relation between conceptions of the Olympic site’s future and some of the early impacts of redesign and redevelopment. In different respects, these chapters highlighted both some of the potentials latent in existing social and spatial conditions and some of the potential risks and uncertainties associated with the tabula rasa redevelopment approach. This chapter furthers these studies by investigating the consequences of change over a short-time frame - between mid-2008 and early 2010 - on long-term conceptions of where regeneration priorities should lie and how the future might appear. It considers some of the impacts of change on the projected timescales of the 2007 Five Legacy Commitments and how the processes of development were used to mediate surfacing tensions between these and newly established priorities, with the aim of ensuring a persuasive correspondence with both. The main aim of this chapter is to consider the potential influence of ways of making the future now on capacities to deliver later, and some of the messages of uncertainty for those ways of making.

The chapter is divided into three parts. The events discussed in this chapter are presented in a narrative sequence, inspired by Flyvbjerg’s approach to ‘telling the story of Aalborg’ (1998, p. 7). Mapping events chronologically is important for exploring their overlaps and effects. However, the chapter is also structured thematically in order to be able to concentrate on the transforming political and economic context of design, the outcomes of design and role of local people in design in specific sections. Through a combination of interviews and the analysis of policies and reports, the first part explores the relationship between political and economic change and the timescales envisaged for designing and realising the LMF. The ‘story’ begins a few months before the consultation events discussed in Chapter 6, with the election in May 2008 of the Conservative candidate Boris Johnson as Mayor of London, which ended eight years of Labour control of City Hall under Ken Livingstone. It goes on to consider the significance of this for legacy in terms including the alteration of the London Plan and the establishment of a ‘special delivery vehicle’ for legacy - the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) - in 2009.

An important feature of London’s proposed Olympic legacy from an economic standpoint was the plan to sell on sites designated temporarily for Games operations and venues for mixed-use development after 2012, as this provided the opportunity for the cost of the land – a significant portion of the public financing package provided by the LDA for the
site’s regeneration - to be recouped. The 2008 ‘Credit Crunch’ and related context of diminishing land values impacted on the timeframe in which this could be achieved. Although the authorities responsible for developing and realising plans for legacy variously emphasised the resilience of the Legacy Commitments, it became clear in 2009 that conceptions of how their associated benefits would be realised were being transformed. Of particular significance, policy changes introduced through the 2009 draft London Plan raised the question of how and/or when affordable housing and housing volume components of the GLA’s third, key regeneration-focussed Legacy Commitment – ‘transforming the heart of east London’ (see Appendix C) - would be secured.

The second part of the chapter considers the influence of political and economic change on the design of the LMF via the leadership of the newly established OPLC. I focus on how the form of future residential development was reconfigured in response to Boris Johnson’s preference for lower density urban typologies, away from the tall, high density solutions facilitated by the ‘compact city’ policy discourse of the previous GLA regime. I consider how this new political direction was reinforced by critique emerging within the OPLC of the Output C LMF. The main purpose of this part of the chapter is to investigate how urban design is shaped by political and economic forces, in these terms extending Till’s conceptualisation of the contingency of urban and architectural design practice on social, political and economic contexts (2007, 2009), and to consider the significance of this for legacy. In the process, I also consider the capacity of designers to lead in setting the future urban agenda by focusing on key aspects of the interpretations of six practices (the original design consortium plus three newly involved firms) invited to respond to the OPLC’s new brief for the site. Through interview-based research, I explore some of the challenges created by the redesign for the timescales of public investment redemption and the realisation of commitments. However, working with interviews and design drawings, I also highlight potentials contained within some practices’ conceptualisations of future urbanisation processes for a more contextually specific and yet ‘Open’ legacy (in Sennett’s terms, 2007) than we have seen before.

In the third part of the chapter, I extend Chapter 6’s explorations of relationships between how local people were represented in policy and planning terms and involved as ‘beneficiaries’ and/or participants in the development of the LMF. Firstly, through interviews with the OPLC, I consider if and/or how feedback from the consultations conducted by the LDA in 2008 and 2009 influenced the evolution of the LMF plans under
the OPLC. I go on to consider the significance of the OPLC Consultation and Engagement team’s early stages of conceptualising their role - which appeared to lay more emphasis than the LDA on cultivating entrepreneurial initiatives than on securing ‘benefits’ - for the site’s local purpose in the future. I consider the potential implications of this new entrepreneurial approach by focussing on an account by one of the businesses relocated from the site in 2007 of its persistent engagements with authorities over uses of the site. H. Forman and Son’s capacity to expand its business and cultivate its profile was clearly extended by the opportunities it was able to secure in connection with the Olympics. The purpose of this part of the chapter is to consider how placing a greater emphasis on the place-making capacities of existing businesses and institutions might assist in embedding legacy more effectively, both conceptually and spatially, and so begin to create a more ‘embodied’ (Adam and Groves, 2007), less top-down vision of its future.

Beginning with the election of Boris Johnson, the chapter ends with the defeat of the Labour Government under which the Olympic bid had been secured at the General Election by a coalition of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat political parties in May 2010. It ends here for the practical reason that this is when writing up this chapter needed to begin, but also because my interest is in exploring actual and possible impacts of change, not on representing an endless sequence of changes. Although the chapter focuses on a relatively short period of time, links are made with longer term futures and the history of the site.

7.1. Impacts of political and economic change

7.1.1 Political change and the urban policy context

Boris Johnson was elected three months before the first version of the LMF was issued for public consultation. Although the LMF design team was only appointed in January 2008, significant design progress had been made by the time of the election according to a timetable which set the planning application date at July 2009. In the run up to the Mayoral election, Boris Johnson signalled some of the key policy changes he would introduce in office. At the launch of his housing manifesto Building a Better London at the Royal Institute of British Architects in April 2008, Johnson made clear to the assembled audience that he intended to revise policy relating to affordable housing and shift the balance of power between the GLA and local boroughs in favour of the latter. The manifesto articulated these intentions in terms of wider concerns with: a) ‘protecting’ London’s historic fabric and the
density and scale of a ‘garden city’ – thus presenting an opposing model of London’s urban future to Ken Livingstone’s ‘compact city’ vision; b) emphasising the quality over quantity of new buildings in the capital, and; c) bringing an end to a top down ‘target culture’ said to have been encouraged by Livingstone and which had proved ineffective (2008, pp. 15-16). Johnson purported to be more interested than Livingstone in working collaboratively with the boroughs, the private sector and communities to achieve outcomes that aligned with housing needs in particular areas rather than processes that aligned with imposed government targets. His approach, he argued, would be more likely to succeed in meeting long term growth and housing need projections as it would encourage direct engagement with the complex issues and dynamics influencing housing supply (p. 14). In mid-2008, now in office, Johnson commissioned David Ross – co-founder of the mobile phone provider Carphone Warehouse - to prepare a ‘high-level’ report summarising the current situation in terms of the Olympic development and its legacy proposals. This was intended to identify risks associated with both projects and for the GLA - in terms of funding, development timescales and organisational structures (Ross, 2008 p. 1). Key findings are indicated below:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>☺ Achievements:</th>
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<tr>
<td>The LDA’s funding of £1,969 billion to cover land assembly and remediation was mostly complete and appeared to be in order.</td>
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<th>☝ Primary Challenges:</th>
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<td>The LDA controlled 230 hectares of land, of which 102 hectares was committed to Metropolitan Open Land after the Games by condition of the 2007 Planning Approval for the Olympic Park. Of the remaining 128 hectares, 50 were committed to venues, roads, rivers and utilities, leaving only 78 hectares of land available for mixed-use development. Constituting less than a third of the total area, this land was under significant pressure to deliver financial returns to pay for the land purchase.</td>
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<th>☹ Commitments at Risk:</th>
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<td>Plans for the legacy of the major venues are said to be lagging behind where they ‘should be’, raising the spectre of earlier unsuccessful Olympic Games. The economic viability of the venues is viewed as a crucial dimension of a financially successful legacy, particularly given the relatively small proportion of the site designated for mixed use development. The income which the GLA projected in 2007 from the sale of land and property after the 2012 Games are at risk as assessments underlying the forecasts were made at a time when property market futures appeared more optimistic than in mid-2008. This raises the possibility that land sales will not compensate for the public investment in the Olympic site as planned, exposing the LDA to the risk of financial loss.</td>
</tr>
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Figure 7.1: Analysis of David Ross’s Olympic Preparedness Report (Juliet Davis, 2008).
The two above ‘commitments at risk’ relate to the government and the former Mayor’s Legacy Commitment 3: ‘transforming the heart of east London’ (Mayor of London, 2007). Ross concludes his report by stating that although the most senior decision-making group, the Olympic Board, had agreed that the LDA should act as the legacy client for the Olympic Park, in his view this public sector albeit functional body was not the right kind of organisation to perform this role long-term, particularly in view of the risks highlighted above. Ross argued instead for the need for a ‘focused and commercially oriented vehicle to implement the development strategy to maximise the benefits from legacy’ and hence produce the best ‘value for money’. As an initial step towards this, he advised the Mayor to ‘establish a Legacy Board of Advisors to work and advise you exclusively on the Olympic Park legacy after 2012 and move as quickly as possible to establish a separate vehicle with responsibility for legacy delivery’. Far from indicating a radical departure from Ken Livingstone and the LDA’s approach to realising the urban legacy, Ross’s emphasis on a private sector development model came as an interesting echo of earlier, more local calls for an entrepreneurial style of legacy delivery. In 2007, the Water City Group – comprising ‘social entrepreneurs and community businesses operating in the Lower Lea Valley’ along with the engineering giant ARUP - argued that a body dedicated simultaneously to the cultivation of business opportunities and a long-term regeneration strategy could help ensure that large-scale public sector investment in the Olympic site was matched by diverse ‘public benefit objectives’ over time (Water City Group and ARUP, 2007). Notwithstanding, there is no indication in the Ross report of the extent to which a ‘commercially-oriented’ vehicle would also be as socially and locally minded as the Water City Group.

The day that Ross submitted his report, Johnson replied with a memorandum and speech confirming that,

> We must now get a move on and agree a clear and defined vision for the future of the Olympic park after the Games [...] We should now establish a separate vehicle responsible for delivering a legacy for London [...] So I have asked him to work with me to establish rapidly a Legacy Board of Advisers to advise me exclusively on the Olympic Park legacy after 2012.

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As this work was taking place, the LDA was subjected to a comprehensive review of its spending and activities pending a restructuring process. The review took the form of a ‘forensic audit’ carried out by a panel led by former Sunday Telegraph editor Patience Wheatcroft (Wheatcroft, 2008). Some months prior to this review being undertaken – in the run-up to the Mayoral election - the Evening Standard newspaper had run a number of articles written by journalist Andrew Gilligan alleging that the LDA was ‘corrupt’ and calling for the stripping of its powers in relation to the Olympic Legacy (Gilligan, 2007). The forensic audit did not find the LDA to be corrupt, but did identify areas of ‘inefficiency’, poor record-keeping and excessive bureaucracy against which economies in spending on legacy in the short-term could be made. In part as a result of this, the audit proposed that the LDA’s responsibilities were drawn back from the actual delivery of urban projects – which would have a direct bearing on its authority over the LMF. The report asserted – interestingly in line with certain views Johnson articulated before commissioning it - that ‘[t]he responsibility for delivery should be discharged through the London Boroughs, the third sector, or the private sector, working in parallel. In our view, the better and most cost effective vehicle [...] generally speaking would be the London Boroughs’. By the end of 2008, the LDA’s role had been redefined. Whilst it still included participating in partnerships developed in order to realise cross-borough Mayoral spatial planning priorities, it no longer included project-delivery. In the process, major changes were introduced at the level of the LDA’s Board and 173 jobs across the agency were lost (Carpenter, 2010). It is important to note that the emphasis of both Ross and Wheatcroft was on the relationship between cost and the organisational structure of delivery, but less on the impacts of different models on capacities to realise ‘benefits’. The assumption appears to be that expanded public sector bureaucracy would not necessarily increase the long-term prospects of legacy, but rather increase the potential for available funds to be squandered in the short-term.

In mid-2008, Johnson announced his decision to create a new London Plan rather than amend the existing plan produced by his predecessor Ken Livingstone. Throughout the latter half of 2008, journalists speculated on what this new plan would involve (see for example, Mayhew, 2008). A major headline was Johnson’s alleged plan to relax regulations relating to the provision of affordable housing – so appearing to dismiss this long-acknowledged need for low to middle income residents across the capital. In one of its own press releases, the GLA claimed that a major aim was to create a ‘clearer, shorter’ plan which ‘contains fewer policies, which are at a more strategic level’ as a way of allowing for
flexibility in ways of realising objectives at a time of economic uncertainty. This statement certainly supports Adam and Groves’ wider point that ‘accelerating change increases uncertainty’, in the process challenging capacities to envision and plan for long-term futures. The future is in effect ‘emptied’, to again use Adam and Groves’ terminology, of content in the context of uncertainty, opening a door to more wide-ranging planned scenarios.

At an event hosted at the LSE in the summer of 2008, the Head of the London Plan Andrew Barry-Pursell confirmed additionally that key changes would include more emphasis on outer London, on heritage and context, on neighbourhood and ‘quality of life’ as urban planning principles, and on a more diverse approach to the economy. Each of these could have an influence on spatial planning approaches pursued through the LMF, though whether they would and how was not specified at this stage. It is important to note that the LMF, including its vast socio-economic strategy was being developed at the same time, but according to the 2004 version of the London Plan, including its growth statistics. The timescales of the project at this stage appeared therefore to be curiously misaligned with what was unfolding at the level of urban policy. Continuing to develop the project according to existing policy blueprints may be interpreted as one way of dealing with the uncertainty which the projected revision to the London Plan represented. Given the likelihood that at least some key elements of the existing Plan would continue, it enabled a degree of progress to be made and the valuable impression to be relayed to media and public critics alike that legacy planning processes were underway.

In October 2008, a board of legacy advisors was appointed by Johnson’s administration. October 2008 was also when the draft LMF was presented to ‘stakeholders’ in its Output B incarnation – notably without mention of the uncertainties hanging over its modes of delivery. The Mayor’s Legacy Board of Advisors comprised nine members (see Appendix E) representing organisations across the private and public sectors including property investment and development, capital markets and private equities, urban policy, community sports and patronage of the arts. The board met on a monthly basis between October 2008 and April 2009 with the aim of developing that by now familiar product, ‘a vision for legacy’ which would be fed into the legacy masterplanning process - proceeding curiously both in advance of and behind it. The board was also charged with establishing

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the administrative framework of a new ‘commercially oriented’ delivery vehicle. By April 2009, a chairman, Baroness Margaret Ford had been appointed to OPLC and the selection of a candidate list for the post of chief executive was reported as having been made (The Mayor’s Legacy Board of Advisors, 2009).

In interview, one of the board members, Henry Newton a senior representative for the property investment and development company Grosvenor, shed light on debate surrounding the establishment of the ‘delivery vehicle’ (Interview, Grosvenor, 11.2009). He suggested that there was no precedent for a government ‘quango’ such as the LDA to both own and manage the development of a mixed-tenure urban neighbourhood over many years. On the other hand, there were numerous private sector and other non-governmental organisational models including limited companies and property trusts which could provide useful case-studies and in which various tiers of government could become principal shareholders. This prospect, he argued, need not be interpreted in negative terms as the ‘privatisation’ of a site acquired with public finances. The delivery vehicle could become responsible for managing the site’s land asset in trust on behalf of the public. The role of the delivery vehicle would be to cultivate public sector investment through site design in order both to realise legacy commitments relating to the provision of space and judiciously capitalise on its assets. Grosvenor’s management of the Grosvenor Estate in West London, he argued, was a useful precedent for conceiving how this could work at organisational and administrative levels.

The Grosvenor Estate was developed between 1720 and 1785 by the aristocratic family of the same name\(^3\) on 100 acres of manorial land which they acquired through marriage in the late seventeenth century. Since the late eighteenth century the upkeep, finances, leases and uses of the estate have been managed by a trust on behalf of the Grosvenor family (Sheppard, 1977, pp. 6-9). Putting aside issues of social disparity traditionally associated with feudalism, the Newton argued that the family’s investment in the estate and the continuity of their interests in its profile and management had been instrumental to the creation of a coherent and valued piece of London – now regarded as of ‘national importance’, as a legacy for the nation. The continuities of ownership, authority and the Trust’s responsibility to both family and estate were reflected in the careful preservation

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\(^3\) The Grosvenors trace their ancestry back to William the Conqueror in the eleventh century. The land of the London Estate was acquired in 1677 through the marriage of Thomas Grosvenor to Mary Davies who had inherited it. In 1874, their descendent Hugh Grosvenor was awarded the title of Duke of Westminster by Queen Victoria.
yet continual adaptation of structures and spaces to a range of uses and tenures over time. Crucial components of success appear to have been: a) the scale of the estate, as this had allowed Grosvenor to manage a piece of the city and ensure that land within it was put to ‘best use’ for the area as a whole; b) Grosvenor’s ability to retain the freehold and thus control of the whole urban complex over three centuries; c) a long-term investment perspective. Newton argued that unlike short term speculative developers, long term investors in the fabric of the city have an interest in ensuring that the developments they help create are lastingly attractive locations for people to live and work in.

The capital of long term investors is ‘patient’ in the sense that they plan to recover costs and realise profit over time, reducing pressure on development sites to produce instant yields. They have the capacity to become ‘stewards’, a term denoting a style of urban management which balances the development of property assets with the protection of natural environments, the promotion of public health and provision of facilities and resources for local mixed-income communities. The legacy delivery body, he argued, should be established as long-term steward of the Olympic site - a long-term, site-specific management firm with a social conscience, firmly embedded and continually reinvesting in the site and its active borders with neighbouring localities.

Notwithstanding, he foresaw a number of major challenges for the development of a financially plausible estate on the Olympic site in the future. These included: a) the social housing targets committed by Ken Livingstone; b) the ratio of public realm to development plot in the masterplan which placed considerable pressure on the latter to yield sufficient revenues to redeem debts and cover administrative overheads over time, and; c) the potential for cost overruns on the Olympics to reduce the budget needed for the Legacy Transformation. Failure to create a financially sustainable model for the long-term could lead to the site being subjected to the ‘traditional [short-term] recouping cash investment model’. The Government - particularly a new Conservative government from mid-2010 he argued - ‘could insist on this’. Urban design, one may assume, would be crucial to the formation of a financially sustainable model for the long-term whereas a ‘traditional cash recoupment model’ suggests a reduced emphasis on urban design and the short-term maximisation of profit with uncertain long-term consequences for value.

In April 2009, following the publication of the Output C LMF, the masterplanning team was instructed to slow down, placing design development processes on hold. This had the
immediate effect of moving the scheduled date for submitting the LMF for planning approval from the summer to December 2009. Around this time, global legal firms KPMG and Eversheds were commissioned to review all Olympic land commitments and legal liabilities that could influence the transfer of land assets from LDA to the OPLC (LDA, 2009). On May 1st 2009, the LDA’s Group Director for the Olympic Legacy, Tom Russell, resigned. Numerous speculations appeared in the press about why this had happened – including that Russell had become caught between the GLA and ODA’s competing priorities (Norman, 2009), and that he was frustrated at being unable to overturn a commitment made by Lord Coe in 2005 to transform the Olympic Stadium into a permanent athletics centre after 2012 (Hayman, 2009) in spite of evidence to suggest that this was not as financially resilient as a future use as a football stadium. Shortly after this, Gareth Blacker, project leader for the LMF, was suspended following the discovery of irregularities in the accounting of land deals and compensation packages relating to the CPO. This is discussed further in the following section. Suffice to say that it began to be clear that claims of financial mismanagement which had beleaguered the LDA for much of the previous year appeared to be producing more concrete fruit in the context of the Eversheds review.

In their various details, the unfolding of the above sequence of events suggests an inverse correlation between the pace of political change and the progress and delivery of spatial planning. Although the new Mayor and his team emphasised the value of both long-established traditions and long-term future perspectives, the short term effect of new leadership was discontinuity and accelerated change. In terms of the OPLC, emphasis was placed on establishing an administrative and executive model for long-term community planning and management. But in terms of the LMF, attention was effectively shifted from the envisioned future through the revision of the administrative structures put in place previously to deliver it.

7.1.2 The urban context of economic austerity

In 2007, the estate agency Knight Frank was commissioned by the LDA to produce a valuation of the Olympic site. This included an estimate of the value of the site following the Compulsory Purchase Order in 2006-2007 and a projected value following the Games. The projected value was based on 2007 property market forecasts which drew on data from the previous decade in which the property market had been particularly buoyant. Recalling Adam and Groves’ discussion of the danger of relying on past-based predictions in
the context of change (2007, pp. 25-31), this created an expectation of capital receipts from the land designated for mixed-use development and employment in the 2007 Olympic Planning Application Legacy Plan - as indicated in figure 2, above. These receipts were intended to redeem not the cost of the whole Games, but the specific cost of land acquisition plus £675 million of investment in the Games from the National Lottery (including inflation). It may be assumed that this expectation helped to determine the ratio of public open space to venues and development sites that this Planning Application established. The projected value in 2012 was £838 million – not enough to recover the above sums, but a comfortable margin above the LDA’s budget of £620 million for land acquisition (see Tables 1 and 2, Appendix F).

Figure 7.2: Diagram indicating the proposed distribution of uses across the Olympic site (Juliet Davis, 2009).
This value was used in determining the distribution of land uses, numbers of residential units and residential densities in the Output B and C versions of the LMF. In early 2009, Boris Johnson’s Budget and Performance Committee reported (2009, p. 1) that ‘from 2007 onwards the UK in general experienced falls in the property market, which may affect […] future capital receipts for the LDA’. Although, according to Knight Frank (2010), sales in new build houses and flats rose in London through 2009, price drops occurring in 2008 did not recover in 2009. There were sharp falls in the value of land for residential development between January 2008 and July 2009, though by early 2010 there were signs of recovery (VOA, 2009). Lowered values correlate with the reduced availability of credit from late 2008 onwards, impacting particularly strongly on buy-to-let and land markets, high density residential development schemes and mixed-tenure housing (Knight Frank, 2010). With the optimism that came with identifications of east London as an area of on-going high demand for residential property, came also concern that an oversupply of stock in 2013 could trigger a crash. In general, the picture appeared more positive in 2010, supporting confident long-term projections, but suggesting the need for a flexible delivery strategy that could adapt to a somewhat volatile economic context. How would such suggestions impact on designs for the LMF, given its concurrent roles in presenting a plausible present image and plan for the long-term?

![Figure 7.3: The changing value of land for residential development as at 1 January 2007 for Inner and Outer London (averages) (Valuation Office Agency, 2009).](image)
David Ross had argued that since the LDA’s accounts were in satisfactory order and that the Olympic Park was mostly running to budget, the falling property market constituted a relatively short-term risk for the legacy project. He added however that containing this risk would rely on careful on-going management of the Olympic budget. Between June and October 2009, Eversheds uncovered that in fact the LDA had incurred a budget deficit of £159 million through their land acquisition and remediation processes (see Table 1, Appendix F). Ironically, a process which was intended to exemplify an inclusive Compulsory Purchase practice and demonstrate that the regeneration Olympics would genuinely benefit local businesses and communities, appeared at this stage to have had the effect of increasing risk associated with the realisation of a long-term Olympic legacy for Londoners and locals.

The following section explores effects of political and economic change on conceptions of how the aim to use the redevelopment of the Olympic site to lower levels of deprivation in the Lower Lea Valley would be achieved.

7.1.3 Re-conceptions of the deprived locality’s needs

A revised London Plan was released by the GLA in draft form for consultation in October 2009. This was a considerably shorter document than its predecessor, cohering with Johnson’s emphasis on scaling back the bureaucracy of Livingstone’s leadership. In terms of housing provision, the new Plan does not entirely move away from the ‘target culture’ which Johnson claimed to be against, providing ‘monitoring targets’ to 2021 for each of the thirty-three London boroughs. These targets are set towards the bottom end of a supply range identified as a sum of: a) potential requirement ranges arising from demographic growth across London, and; b) current figures for ‘unmet need’ - based on a relation between housing demand and provision. The figures provided for projected demographic growth and housing need over the next 10-20 years match those used to establish the targets set in Livingstone’s 2004 version of the Plan. In fact, the overall house building targets for London to 2021 are slightly higher than those included in the earlier Plan (at 32,600 per year rather than 30,500). Setting targets to the bottom end of a supply range may be interpreted as a cautionary measure which takes into account both short-term uncertainties in housing output created by the recession and longer-term dangers of oversupply for the property market. The graph below indicates that the four east London
Olympic Host Boroughs were anticipated to densify significantly over ten years from 2009, particularly the London Boroughs of Newham and Tower Hamlets.

The Plan provides a density matrix for new residential development (measured in terms of residential units/ hectare). This is similar to the one discussed in Chapter 5 relating to the 2004 London Plan. However there are some key differences too, which raise interesting questions about the direction that the OPLC would pursue with respect to the urban form of legacy. In terms of the themes of this chapter, the following three points are key. Firstly, the Plan conveys that density should be viewed as ‘only the start of planning housing development, not the end’ (p 67). Secondly, it states that ‘it is important that higher density housing is not automatically seen as requiring high-rise development (p. 68). Thirdly, it states that density ranges should be applied not ‘mechanistically’ according to public transport accessibility principles only but according to a range of contextual considerations (p. 67). These statements may be interpreted as denoting a shift in direction from the tall, sectional building solutions for increasing densities that were promoted by ‘compact city’ advocates under Livingstone toward dense but lower-rise approaches. The use of traditional, local precedents to inform these approaches is also encouraged.

![Numbers of houses](image)

**Figure 7.4:** Housing Provision Monitoring Targets for the Host Boroughs, 2011-2012 (Source: GLA Statistics).

The Plan states that affordability is a pressing issue for London, particularly given the rapid escalation of median house prices relative to median earnings over the decade between 1998 and 2008 (GLA General Statistics Team, 2010). However, it also emphasises the importance of ‘consumer choice’ in the housing offer. Arguably it privileges consumer
choice over affordability by placing greater emphasis on the need for a variety of dwellings to suit different household types than on types of tenure to suit income distributions. Whilst a ‘need’ for family housing is identified for the Olympic area, no mention is made of the need for this to be affordable. The Plan encourages developers to take a long-term view of tenure mix in buildings and larger urban development areas - rather than have to prescribe it at the outset - and to build flexibility into new developments for ‘movement between tenures’ over time (p. 73). The Plan does not prescribe how this movement between tenures might unfold or what the mechanisms for either enabling or enforcing it might be, thus shifting responsibility for determining it out of the temporal range of the GLA’s current policy and into a longer term future. At least in part, the Plan’s reserve can be seen as a cautionary measure reflecting the difficulties of regulating private sector development in the context of an economic downturn without stifling it.

In the section of the Plan devoted specifically to the Olympic legacy, it is stated that that the Host boroughs’ shared ambition of achieving the ‘convergence’ of deprivation levels in their areas with London averages through a Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF) is ‘shared by the Mayor and Government’. This illustrates the Mayor’s keenness to support Borough-led initiatives whilst signalling the GLA’s retreat from the details of provision and delivery in response to needs. However, it is also interesting to note that in expressing support, the Plan avoids referring to the well-established measures of area-based deprivation on which the SRF was based, highlighting instead more interpretatively open measures of ‘quality of life’.

In a number of newspaper and internet articles in late 2009, the leaders of the newly established OPLC were reported as being concerned about the levels of family housing suggested in the Output C LMF but also about the potential for affordable housing to be lost in a new deregulated housing policy environment. The Guardian reported that ‘Baroness Ford, the new OPLC chair raised concerns recently that the park should have more affordable and family housing or risked becoming a second Canary Wharf (Goldberg, 2009). This statement suggests recognition that altering housing affordability policy could impact on the geography of deprivation in east London in the future, potentially perpetuating the pattern for new development to create pockets of greater affluence that fail to significantly influence the deprivation scores of adjacent areas.
The issue of family housing – a planning term which essentially means a dwelling of three or more bedrooms - appeared to become increasingly pressing in late 2009. OnePlace, an independent reviewer of public services in Newham reported that ‘the partnership [of Host Boroughs] understands the urgent need to provide family size accommodation’. The ODA’s Planning Decisions Team claimed, following their review of the LMF Output C documents in mid-2009, that the 41 per cent figure given for family housing was insufficient. It also stated preference for ‘a greater mixture of typologies’, a general reduction in the volume of large blocks, a more contextual urban grain and character, and that a 22 storey tower to the north of the site was inappropriate (ODA/PDT, 2009).

In February 2010, four months after the release of the draft London Plan, the NHPAU published a report entitled The Implications of Housing Type/Size Mix and Density for the Affordability and Viability of New Housing Supply (Bramley et al., 2010). This report put forward the view that high or low density development was financially rewarding for developers but rarely the ‘intermediate mixes’ (p. 24-25). These produce more affordable homes but this is generally because they do not tend to attract premium prices. Given that there was a fall-off in the viability of tall high-density schemes as a consequence of the Credit Crunch, that affordable housing provision had become challenging for many developers, and that Boris Johnson was more in favour of lower-rise projects, it may be concluded that between mid-2009 and early 2010, the predominantly high and intermediate density vision presented in the LMF was under threat. But, how would a lower density version of the scheme succeed in delivering the volume of affordable previously included in the plan, and thus in genuinely avoiding becoming another ‘Canary Wharf’? What might it mean also for the realisation of Livingstone’s Legacy Commitment 3, which linked the lowering of deprivation levels with, amongst other indicators, the provision of affordable housing.

7.2 Flexing the LMF

7.2.1 Towards a new urban vision for the Olympic legacy

In October 2009, concurrent with the release of a revised draft London Plan, it was publically announced that a chief executive, Andrew Altman, had been appointed to lead the new OPLC. Altman was previously the deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development and Director of Commerce in the City of Philadelphia and prior to that, the
CEO of the Anacostia Waterfront Corporation in Washington DC. Anacostia was, not unlike the OPLC, a government-owned organisation intended to oversee an eight billion dollar redevelopment plan over a period of twenty years. Changes at the level of mayoral administration and widely reported frustrations with the pace of redevelopment led to the corporation being disbanded after only three years. In interview, Andrew Altman emphasised three major principles for ensuring this fate would not befall the OPLC and the London Olympic legacy. Firstly, he emphasised the need for government, the GLA and local authorities to maintain their confidence in the economic model outlined at the time of the Olympic bid which created the possibility for using the development of the Olympic Park to catalyse further development and improve the urban environment of the Lower Lea Valley. He argued that ‘the danger of it all is that you start […] changing course, saying we need to move on… It’s the tenacity to, just, you know, to remain committed to it and let it evolve. It’ll produce. There’s no question it will produce value (Altman, Interview, 04.01.2010). He suggested that maximising future value – which he portrayed as a complex combination of ‘price’, social use and heritage - of the site would be achieved through processes of: a) transforming the park after the Games to create an accessible public realm providing attractions for a wide range of users and consumers, and; b) cautious development, with emphasis placed on ‘getting it right’ stage by stage, piece by piece, delivering buildings and open spaces to high material and spatial standards.

Secondly, he argued for the need to get the timing ‘right’, thereby resisting temptations to ratify land deals that would allow public investment in the site to be recouped as soon as possible. In any case, he argued that:

If you force trying to recoup, first of all, I don’t think that you could […] The land and everything was bought at a high point of the market. You’re at a low point of the market [now]. It’s going to go back to more normal growth rates than we saw before, so you may not have, you know, eight per cent, you know, annual growth rates [in the future] (Altman, Interview, 04.01.2010).

The return to ‘normal growth rates’ suggested either a slower process of development even than that envisaged in the context of the 2009 legacy masterplan – raising questions about how the interim period between 2012 and full build-out would be filled - or a longer-term process of estate management providing the opportunity for some of the funds to be recouped through extended leases and rents. In the short term, for Altman, it also
suggested the need to make use of time available before 2012 to undertake a careful critique of the documents produced by the LMF consortium under the LDA, to consider the implications of new urban policy, the economic downturn, the relationship with local planning authorities and then to remodel options for making ‘a site of this scale work’ as a complementary piece to a complex historical city. Thirdly, he underscored the primary role of long-term landownership in achieving the first two principals. Long-term land ownership would enable the OPLC to develop the capacity to maintain a long view, much as Grosvenor appear to have done, in the face of changing economic and political circumstances and, in this context to manage the development and evolution of the LMF over time.

According to the Chief Design Advisor to the OPLC, criticism of the LMF Output C documents from within the OPLC had focused on: a) how form had been generated, in his terms, ‘purely’ to reflect housing policy statistics; b) the failure to ‘characterize the site as a place’ situated within an existing spatial and social context; c) the over-emphasis on planning ‘processes’ rather than on the ‘feel’ and form of urban artefacts, and; d) the failure to respond adequately to the three dimensionality of the existing site. These points echoed and reinforced some of the comments made by the ODA’s Planning Decisions Team on the LMF in 2009, so further signalling areas of potential change for the project.

The first tangible evidence of Altman’s approach to the masterplan appeared with the issue of a design brief for the Olympic Legacy Masterplan Framework in January 2010. This was issued to nine practices - including the three firms in the LMF consortium - invited to participate in a design charrette. David Roth from Allies and Morrison argued that the inclusion of six new practices enabled more voices and views to be included in the design process; it did not signal a demotion of the consortium. In fact, he argued that all the newly included practices had been recommended by the consortium at the time of their appointment in 2008. The OPLC’s Chief Design Advisor explained that the brief explicitly avoided providing targets or figures. The aim was to avoid ‘talking about money or numbers for six weeks’, but to focus on issues such as ‘What’s a street? and ‘Where are we connecting to?’

As discussed in Chapter 5, an important conceptual driver for the LMF Output C scheme was the idea of the ‘Open City’. This was represented by diagrams which suggested that rather like rotating crops in agricultural fields, the use potentials of development plots could be tested by use of temporary ‘soft’ structures and activities prior to being developed
and that the development of harder, more lasting structures could begin in different locations and proceed in a variety of ways. It was also founded on the principle that the public realm should provide the basic unit of structure for the masterplan framework, acting as a device for regulating the edges, but not the contents of development as this would unfold over time. In Chapter 5 I argued that this design principle was somewhat undermined by the tight prescription of density and the narrow development ranges provided in the LMF Output C Socio-economic framework. In addition, I argued that too little emphasis was placed on the specific qualities of the public realm and what sorts of development-regulating devices this might include.

Through their brief, the OPLC appeared to be suggesting the basis for a re-conceptualisation of the ‘Open City’ in the context of economic uncertainty. Their focus was at least initially no longer on quantities that might or might not be deliverable and might or might not yield projected returns but on specific qualities of place – whether established by the topography of the site or by the scale and typology of urban form - that could attract and build value under any circumstances. As Roth put it, since ‘short-term investment exploitation had become less of an imperative’, more opportunity had been created to focus in this timeframe on design (Interview, Allies and Morrison, 05.2010). So what did this mean for the design of the LMF?

### 7.2.2 What kind of city?

In terms of urban form – building type, density, and urban grain - key messages from the OPLC’s brief were as follows:

1. Whereas the Output C LMF predominantly indicated ‘ubiquitous’ ‘European style’ courtyard blocks, the pattern of development is now to be based on the ‘best of London’s tradition’ of mixed residential neighbourhoods (including Georgian and Victorian ‘great estates’, areas such as Notting Hill, Belgravia and Bloomsbury’) that ‘works with London’s polycentric DNA’.

2. Whereas the Output C LMF denoted one particular area of ‘family housing’, this, along with ‘communal gardens’ is now to be considered the ‘fundamental typology for building neighbourhoods’.
3. Whereas the Output C LMF kept the ‘metropolitan open land’ all together, with residential development lining the edges of it, some of this open space is now to be integrated with the residential uses, forming a series of smaller scale spaces that connect to the surrounding context.

4. Whereas the Output C LMF focussed on the interiors of courtyard blocks, buildings are now encouraged to relate more closely to streets.

Many of the points contained here resonate with aspects of the transformations leading to the LMF’s revision discussed above – from Henry Newton’s promotion of the Grosvenor Estate to the altered policy directions introduced through the 2009 draft London Plan. In so doing, they highlight not the political nature of urban form and design practice, but the dependency of form, in Till’s terms, on an enabling context (Till, 2009).

Tenure is mentioned only once in the brief, in the context of requesting designers to ‘consider social mix and phasing of affordable housing provision in the [Olympic] Village and other residential zones’. This requirement accords with the new ways of conceptualising the delivery of affordable housing outlined above – as a process unfolding over the twenty to thirty year time frame of the project in response to the wider economic climate rather than as a proportion of units in every newly constructed building.

Figure 7.5: Key plan showing the portions of the site taken by each of the above firms of architects (Juliet Davis, 2010).
Each of the invited firms was asked to look at a particular aspect or area of the site, as indicated in the diagram above. Additionally, the original consortium provided a review of their Output C documents and a revised plan for the whole site based on the input of each of the other practices.

So how did the invited practices respond to the brief and what did they add through this? The image below, by Allies and Morrison, was produced in response to the OPLC’s first item, calling for designers to draw on London’s ‘tradition of mixed residential neighbourhoods’. This image is a digitally assembled collage of historical building types literally cut from aerial photographs of streets and buildings across London and reassembled on the site to form an impression of a cluster of slightly different environments. As an approach to the representation of urban assembly, it recalls the analytical and theoretical approaches to the city endorsed by Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter, and by Aldo Rossi in the 1980s (Rossi, 1982; Rowe and Koetter, 1984). These theorists challenged the notoriously anti-historical heroism of modern urbanism and architecture by theorising the temporality of urban form – the capacity of the ‘urban artifact’ for example, in Aldo Rossi’s terms, to persist in spite of social change and, in so doing, become a rich ‘repository of history’ (1982, p. 129), memory and meaning. ‘Collage’, in Rowe and Koetter’s terms, provides a conceptual and representational frame for the analysis of the city in terms of incremental urban assemblage - what they term ‘bricolage’.

How do these ideas relate to the image below? Although this image suggests the gathering together of different urban types, this is not a process which has an established foundation in history - either in the general terms presented by Rowe and Koetter or of the specific urbanisation history of the site. Although the use of aerial photography to denote both proposed and existing urban fabric helps to make the project seem to blur with its surroundings, the question of what ingredients of place - beyond the image of vernacular form - could engender the qualities or mixed uses of three hundred year old London neighbourhoods such as Bloomsbury, Mayfair or Fitzrovia is left open. Notwithstanding, the superimposition of a grain of development common to London begins to give a specific scale to the public realm – as a network of streets connected where possible into the surrounding urban fabric - which the earlier version of the masterplan lacked.
Figure 7.6: Work in progress draft illustrative masterplan, produced during the design review (Produced for the Olympic Park Legacy Company, 2010).

According to the report produced to document all the design outcomes of the charette, Stratford Waterfront was the only area for which high density courtyard block and tower development was still being considered. KCAP’s sectional drawings indicate tripartite tower blocks of offices and residences as high as twenty-two stories on urban plinths that would bridge between the levels of the Channelsea River and Stratford City. For the other areas, lower density structures were suggested. For example, Caruso St. John Architects’ sketches
for a southern portion of the site close to Edwardian warehouses indicate five storey terraced townhouses, whereas McCreanor Lavington’s images for a northern portion close to Leyton indicate rows of four storey terraces interspersed with two storey ‘mews’ houses.

In the Output C documents, the area designated specifically for family housing was denoted by terraced houses, suggesting a correspondence between these household and form types. The wider spread of terraced housing across the new plan is emblematic of the OPLC’s emphasis on making the family house the ‘fundamental typology’ for the site. A reason frequently given for this correspondence was that terraced houses offer garden space which market research and consultation identify as a commodity desired by families. However the primary reason was that the terraced house is a key component of London’s pre-twentieth century urban structure.

With this in mind, it is interesting to turn to the German architect Hermann Muthesius’s 1904 study of the ‘English House’ in the context of Industrial Revolution urban expansion (Muthesius, 2007 [1904]). His visual analysis of the ‘Typical Terraced House’ shows how it evolved into a mass-reproducible form designed to suit the generalised needs of the Victorian family and reflect its place in wider society. The family’s independence, for example, was articulated by the access it had to its own entrance from the street and private rear garden or yard, and by the party walls that separated each house from the next. Its place in wider society was reflected by the unity of the terrace - a sum of all the houses on a street. Relative positions in the social hierarchy were conveyed through varying the scale of terraces – from tiny ‘two up, two down’ terraces to grand five or six storey townhouses – as well as through materials – the relationship between brick and stucco for example – details and qualities of construction. Since the nineteenth century, this legible order has been considerably transformed – as a result of urban dynamics leading to the decline or renewal of urban areas, transformation in the order and size of average households and increased pressures on space and land. As a result Muthesius’s ‘typical terrace’ has, across London, been adapted – divided to create multiple, mixed-tenure, sometimes mixed-use occupancies, extended to provide modern conveniences such as bathrooms, larger kitchens and utility spaces and modified to increase environmental efficiencies and comfort levels. For the most part, this adaptation has occurred without compromise to the urban unity of streets of terraced houses and shop houses. The distribution of residential unit types throughout terraces of different scales in the charrette report shows how, not only the original form of the single family terraced house but
versions of the adapted typologies which London has since inherited might be applied to the new-build context of the Olympic site. The calm repetition of austere yet somehow grand townhouse elevations in Caruso St. John’s scheme (see figure 7.7 below), for example, belies a more complex picture behind of two storey, three bed maisonettes with ground floor entrances and private gardens, two storey maisonettes with garden loggias, and single level, stacked apartments.

![Figure 7.7: Design study of proposed housing typology (Produced for the Olympic Park Legacy Company, 2010).](image)

One may presume that an attraction of the terrace for the new urban authorities and for architects of the LMF is the on-going capacity for it to be adapted, the fact that its coherent structure doesn’t prescribe tenure, use or future household composition – features which cohere with crucial ingredients of Sennett’s conceptualisation of the ‘Open City’ in terms of ‘incomplete form’ (Sennett, 2007, pp. 294-295).

So what did the extension of this form across the site mean for urban density and numbers of dwellings? David Roth confirmed that the 10,000-12,000 dwellings range previously committed by Ken Livingstone was being reduced to around 9,000, not including the Olympic village. In spite of the emphasis on family housing as a typology, he also confirmed that the actual quotient this was being increased by was in the order of 1 per cent. Density ranges are not provided in the charette documents though Caruso St. John refer to the generally 4-6 storey, close grained environment depicted as ‘low to the ground high density’. So what did the reduction in numbers of dwellings to 9,000 mean for the economics of the project? Would the value of the land still be able to be recouped through
this reduced number, even over a longer time-frame? Roth confirmed that in spite of the possibility created by economic uncertainty to rethink approaches to the form of the project and in spite of the OPLC’s emphasis on quality rather than quantity, providing fewer, higher-specification homes could create a need for a good number of these to attract high-end market values (Interview, Allies and Morrison, 05.2010). Appealing to the high-end of the residential sales market could, he argued, carry consequences for the public realm - which developers planning for wealthier residents might wish to secure - and for designers’ preferred ‘pepper-potted’ approach to mixing tenures throughout buildings and blocks. Such consequences clearly would serve to reduce the site’s capacity to realise the key terms of Livingstone’s third regeneration commitment.

Witherford Watson Mann’s (WWM) contribution addressed the third and fourth points listed above. They challenged the image of the park suggested in the earlier LMF. They argued that the steeply banked river dividing the site in two and its frequent cross-section by infrastructure negate this characterisation and suggest the suitability of a ‘wilder’ treatment. In their proposals, the ‘wild’ River Lea is no longer imagined as the single public heart of a new urban centre but reconceived as an edge between inhabited territories. In the process, they proposed pushing centrality in terms of civic ‘places of exchange’ (WWM, 2010) to the borders of the site where, significantly, they would be situated between new and existing residential and employment areas.

WWM’s drawings indicate institutions such as mosques and churches, revealing their deep understanding of the social and spatial complexities of the site’s surroundings and alternative approach to urbanising diversity from what the LDA or design consortium had previously suggested (see Chapter 6). They also proposed using participation, through forging connections with existing institutions such as Hackney Wick’s Gainsborough Primary School, the Eton Mission rowing club and H. Forman and Son’s smoked salmon factory in Fish Island as a precursor to defining physical spaces and connections. They argued that establishing ‘soft’ links in the first instance would be vital for establishing the characteristics of long-term physical ‘stitches’ and ‘reciprocities’ between the site and its fringes (Interview, WWM, 02.2010). Through their proposals, WWM emphasised the catalytic potential not only of large-scale Olympic infrastructure but of specific, already existing uses and spatial qualities which characterised the site and surrounding localities. In this regard, their proposals might be said to have used more ingredients of ‘present and immediate reality’ (Lefebvre, 1996) than we had seen thus far in the LMF and thus to present a more
contextual or embedded vision for how to build an urban future. In developing specific ideas about how and where development should start, and the place of existing interest groups in realising site potentials, their proposals also resonate with Sennett’s conception of design as a mediation of ‘development narratives’ (2007, p. 296).

Figure 7.8: Design study of proposed connections to the Legacy site (Produced for the Olympic Park Legacy Company, 2010).

The above discussion shows how, under the OPLC, the emphasis in the LMF shifted from concerns with processes geared to meeting targets to questions of how to create lasting value through design. The urban form of the typical London terrace appeared as one way to embody or capture lasting value, based on the widely recognised adaptability of terraced houses and their on-going marketability. In interview, David Roth highlighted the desire to explore in more depth the precise organisational and dimensional characteristics of terraced houses that create the potential for adaptation and gives them such lasting appeal (Interview, Allies and Morrison, 09.2010). He feared that out of the hands of sophisticated designers, the idea of the terrace could be diluted by developers. It could end up being applied merely as a ‘pastiche’, satisfying in a minimal sense the needs of a ‘romantic attachment’ to an image ‘of old London’. ‘Urban content’, he argued, would be lost in this context. This possibility created a dilemma – of how to set standards through the LMF without creating prohibitive constraints for developers whose future investment would be crucial to the OPLC’s own future as ‘stewards’ in a scarce public funding environment. In a somewhat different sense from WWM’s, Roth’s concern echoes the challenge which Sennett views as lying at the heart of the designer’s ‘art’ of mediation – how to manage and
balance competing priorities, logics and levels of power in urbanisation processes. However, with the issue of the land-debt inherited from the LDA still influencing the OPLC’s budget for the future, his concern was also based on uncertainty over the extent to which LMF leaders and designers would actually have the power to mediate in future contests between economic power and other interests.

7.2.2 What kind of when?

In early 2010, Baroness Ford was reported as stating that ‘the company’s review of the Olympic Park legacy masterplan, which will aim to shift the focus from high density apartment living to a development based around family homes, is contingent on the land being unencumbered by debt’

It was at the international annual property event MIPIM in March 2010 that Boris Johnson announced that the Labour government under Gordon Brown had agreed to absorb the debt. From Boris’ perspective, this enabled the creation of:

a strong and resilient and independent Olympic Legacy Company which will have good title and control of those fantastic assets in east London [...] Now we can use the 9.3 billion pounds of tax payers’ money that we are investing to leverage in private-sector investment in that site in east London for decades to come.

Perhaps the most important message in this brief statement is that the public funds invested through the LDA between 2006 and 2008 would be used to leverage private investments. There is no mention here of what public benefits in terms of economic development or social infrastructure this might produce or in what kind of timeframe.

The government provided £138million as a direct payment to the OPLC and in exchange for an agreement that the full land purchase costs plus the £675 million from the National Lottery would be redeemed in stages (see Table 2, Appendix F). The OPLC’s duty to settle these costs over time led the regeneration news commentator Allister Hayman to suggest that ‘it will not be until the next decade that the Olympic Park’s legacy benefits begin to be

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realised [and] lottery good causes may need to wait at least [ten] years for reimbursement’ (2010). Echoing this, in the final interview of the research, the Chief Design Advisor to the OPLC confirmed that in spite of the redesign, ‘we are no closer to solving the problem of regeneration in east London’ (Interview, OPLC, 09.2010).

7.3 Inheritance Now: reinterpreting what the people said

Given that in Chapter 6 I argued that how local communities were defined and involved in the design development of the LMF constituted a tangible legacy of the site’s redevelopment which contrasted with the high ambitions and envisioned impacts of the projected legacy, it seemed important to complete this chapter by returning to this context, and by asking how, if at all communities and their roles had been transformed along with altered approaches to the LMF plans.

No further consultation events were organised by the OPLC following their take-over of the LMF, at least not between late 2009 and late 2010. Reasons given for this by Emma David, an OPLC employee working with its Consultation and Engagement team, were that: a) there was a need for time to digest the outcomes of the 2009 consultations with local stakeholders alongside reviewing the feedback on the plan from partners, planning authorities and bodies such as CABE; b) there was a need for time to address the consequences of political and economic change before returning to the public (Interview, OPLC/C&E team, 09.2010). She communicated the OPLC’s intention to return to the public consultation arena once the new ‘Legacy Vision’ had been launched in October 2010. At that point, it would be possible to say to the public ‘you’ve said this; we’ve listened; it’s informed this’.

David relayed that her team had spent time on trying to identify areas of correspondence between the 2009 community consultation feedback and some of the new directions being pursued through the masterplan, in order to be able to represent these at consultations in early 2011. Asked what the main areas of correspondence were, she responded that a) family housing had been one of the most pressing perceived needs of local people; b) the public had found the proposals ‘very European’ and did not ‘get’ either the tall or ‘intermediate scale’ of development. It is striking how directly these items of allegedly local feedback cohere with the new approach be taken to the LMF for a variety of different reasons.
In the minutes issued by the LDA in 2009, perceived needs for family housing and issues of urban form certainly do figure in the list of public comments. However, at housing sessions in particular, people frequently also raised issues of affordability and social infrastructure, seeking reassurance, for example, that ‘finance’ would not be allowed to ‘dictate’ form but that the site would be developed to address the ‘need’ for good quality local housing and amenities in the four boroughs (Respondent, Issue-led Workshop on Housing, 02.2009). Thus, whilst appearing to demonstrate the role of the local ‘voice’, the OPLC was actually using consultation feedback as a mask for some of the real motivations for constructing a revised spatial model as well as some of the potential consequences of doing so for the site’s long-term regeneration. This use of consultation also, arguably, placed excessive weight on statements made by people – whether local residents or the representatives of local organisations - at specific moments and in the context of controlled access to information.

For the most part, the Consultation and Engagement team at the OPLC were the same team that had worked previously for the LDA. David relayed how the team had undertaken a review of its practices since joining the OPLC and were now of the view that the LDA’s approach had failed on a number of counts. Finding attempts to forge closer ties across the diverse local community by creating common ground such as a multi-faith centre had suggested the need to step back from prescribing spatial outcomes for political drivers such as ‘equality’. She now saw such efforts as forms of social engineering which carry the risk of only functioning as representations rather than embedded, lived spaces.

She foresaw that there would continue to be a disparity between ‘the community in general’ and those vocal few who take time and energy to achieve things to suit their interests. However, she no longer viewed consultation as the best means to ascertain the values and views of the community in general. Interestingly echoing Young’s argument about the limits of face-to-face engagement (1990), she spoke of the value associated with different degrees and proximities of political representation and participation. However, she also suggested that the OPLC was now more interested in cultivating entrepreneurial initiatives within the locality – through, for example, the extension of the LDA-established Compete4 programme - than on consulting on ‘benefits’. In this vein, she suggested that one approach might involve treating local groups ‘like any other developer’, equally entitled to bid for a piece of the site in the context of ‘signing up to our vision’. How would small
local enterprises and especially non-profit-making cultural groups be able to compete in this environment? They would need to be able to form alliances or associations with larger and more economically powerful groups, and/or the backing of the OPLC - perhaps in partnership with local regeneration bodies – which would provide support through mechanisms such as Section 106 planning gain or support for appropriately scaled credit loans.

Notwithstanding, the successes of one local business relocated from the site in 2007 may be said to suggest the potential of this kind of approach. H. Forman and Son, whose controversial relocation was discussed in Chapter 4, expanded their business considerably between 2007 and 2010, an opportunity made possible to large degree by the support network and publicity which relocation attracted. In the possession of a bigger site with a new, more prominent building overlooking the Olympic Stadium, the original smoked salmon curing business was expanded following the relocation to include the supply and distribution of fine foods, a restaurant, gallery and space for corporate entertainments. By 2009, the venue had become a preferred spot for Olympics-related functions – for example, Sir Robert McAlpine, the main contractor on the Olympic Stadium, held its Christmas party there in 2009. By early 2010, Forman had become interested in redeveloping the former industrial site next to his factory, which he had recently acquired, for the accommodation of media during the Games. He was also pursuing interim use opportunities relating to food on the site after the Games, one idea being ‘a huge farmers market’ located inside or just beside the Stadium (Interview, H. Forman and Son, 02.2010).

Echoing findings in Chapter 6, this case illustrates the effectiveness of on-going forms of negotiation between local people and site authorities relating to specific issues over one-off formal consultation events. In part this is because the nature of opportunity that the Olympics or the redeveloped site represents is continually evolving and to a degree specific to different groups and organisations. It is also because people’s views and relationships to sites and processes are dynamic, rendering the outcomes of long-distant exchanges as increasingly poor evidence of their desires or capacities.

Forman has three generations of family knowledge about a business behind him, education and confidence, a clear sense of his interests, and extensive social and political networks to assist him in achieving his goals. I would argue that these are the kinds of advantage that other local organisations, enterprises and other social groups need to realise small scale but
importantly ‘embodied’ rather than only imagined legacies (Adam and Groves, 2007). A principle role of the OPLC as an engaged estate should be to mediate between them – firstly, as Amin and Thrift suggest, through ‘explicit recognition’ of the value of supporting everyday associations of sociability’ (2002, p. 153), ensuring that self-interest alone does not rule but that a wide variety of entrepreneurial, recreational and cultural interests and capacities are taken into account.

7.4 Conclusion: the status of vision

This chapter has concentrated on investigating the consequences of change on longer-term conceptions of where the regeneration priorities for the LMF should lie. In early 2009, the LMF was presented as a plausible, if early vision of a future five to twenty years ahead. It was appeared to be given both purpose and credibility by a variety of tools for ‘telling the future’ (Adam and Groves, 2007, p. 25) including official forecasts for London’s economic and demographic growth and by the Legacy Commitments made by government at the time of the Olympic bid. This chapter highlighted some of the difficulties of relying on these kinds of tools, given the potential for unanticipated change to transform prospects, at least in the short to medium term. A risk that emerged through interview-based research in the second part of the chapter was that the urban ‘content’ of an architecturally and socially diverse, mixed-use environment could be sacrificed in the interests of debt-redemption to a superficially urban-traditional, but actually more suburban, more exclusive urbanism.

One of the notable findings from the first part of the chapter was the dependence of processes of long-term envisioning on present political will and associated public finance capacities - suggested by impacts on the timescales of design-development and on project governance created by the exposure of the LDA’s cost overrun on land assembly. A second was the capacity for political change to transform not only the envisaged ways of reaching anticipated ends but the objectives of development. Whilst differences between the Output C LMF and the OPLC’s new brief and charrette explorations indicated progression in a number of respects, they also reflected Adam’s wider point that ‘western societies create their futures as a continuing affair in the present’ (Adam, 1994, p. 98). This suggests that visions and plans produced years in advance of actual development deals should be regarded as signs of present intent rather than as the firm horizon of an endeavour.
Although the emphasis of project leaders continued to be placed on the value of long-term design and planning as counterpoints to the traditionally short term legacies associated with Olympic Games, the events discussed above suggested at least the possibility that design processes could be subject to ‘endless’ rounds of redevelopment (Lynch, 1972). The creation of a delivery body which is independent from the political cycle is intended to mitigate this risk in the future. The OPLC’s role as long-term landowner indeed promises to create the possibility for long-term goals formulated at the inception of its management of the LMF maintained, even in the context of volatility at the level of the economy and of urban and national politics.

If, following Adams and Groves, a major risk of change is the escalation of uncertainty, then surely the focus of the OPLC and of the LMF design team should be on securing outcomes in stages, with a clear sense, as Sennett (2007) suggests, of where to start, how to follow and how long things may last, in relation to primary conceptions of legacy’s goals. Adam and Groves’ argument that ‘the empty future of contemporary economic and political change is fundamentally uncertain and unknowable’ leads them to advocate ‘context-bound’ futures. In the second part of the chapter, I argued that even in the sketchy terms of the OPLC’s design charette, WWM’s proposals suggested a more contextual, incremental design approach than we had seen thus far with the LMF which began with close consideration of existing spatial qualities, local inhabitations and their immediate potential to inform the site. This kind of design approach could perhaps dovetail with parallel approaches to consultation and engagement by focussing on the diverse capacities of Olympic fringe occupants to define uses and create their own ways of connecting to the site. H. Forman and Sons’ successes in cultivating business opportunities associated with the Olympics suggested that with some strategic recognition, it may be possible to scale up these kinds of outcomes. Through this, might it also be possible to start to embed the site’s long-term possibilities in the existing contexts of local interested parties, beginning to create in the process a more ‘embodied’ (Adam and Groves, 2007) beginning to a future?
The Post-Olympics: cultivating legacies

In its focus on projected plans and planning for the 2012 Olympic legacy, this enquiry has steered away from the emphasis placed by many Olympic studies on the assessment of post-Olympic outcomes (see for example Cashman, 2003; Gold & Gold, 2007; Li and Blake, 2009; Preuss, 2004). It has also steered away for the most part from comparative research on approaches adopted by different host cities (see for example Gold and Gold, 2007; 2009; Preuss 2004). It has focussed instead on processes of planning for the conversion of investments into post-Olympic outcomes in the context of a single Olympic city. In spite of the many meanings that Olympic legacy has acquired, even in the London context, the study has been particularly concerned with what is termed London’s ‘regeneration legacy’. It has considered the evolving meanings of this legacy in terms of the Olympic site’s physical redevelopment, the construction of ‘representations’ of spatial outcomes, and the democratic processes of consultation and negotiation over proposed change with local community ‘subjects’ of regeneration. Exploring these contexts has made it possible to consider legacy in terms both of the development of ideas of how a sustainable, regenerated city should look and be and of received meanings in concrete situations – those in which some of the first impacts of planning were received. In broader terms, it has created the possibility to reflect on the politics of urban change in terms of the different capacities and/or authorities that people have to think and plan at a large scale and over long-time frames.

Seeking to evaluate an anticipated rather than realised ‘regeneration legacy’ involved the formulation of certain kinds of question about different kinds of data throughout the research process. These questions were continually formulated with the aim of discovering gaps between the articulated intentions of legacy planners and their possible effects. What, for example, was lost in the evaluation of the site and its fringes as deprived and what may be risks connected with the comprehensive redevelopment approach designed to address this evaluation? What were the relations between the Olympic plan and the LMF and what did these suggest about the ease or difficulty of realising designers’ conceived legacy
'drivers'? What are possible implications of the rapid pace of redevelopment imposed by the Olympics and the top-down governance structure devised to facilitate this for the ability for renewal actors at city and local levels to realise a contextually specific legacy over the long term?

The findings of this thesis – based on explorations of potentially short-term impacts or perceptions of the Olympics, the site’s redevelopment and legacy plans - might appear to offer limited evidence of how effective authorities might be at delivering successful physical and socio-economic regeneration over the long-term. My approach was informed by Adam and Groves’s (2007) arguments about the need for greater emphasis on the present contexts in which futures are constructed. The thesis of their book *Future Matters* (2007) is that whilst contemporary societies’ capacities to produce futures are great, their capacities to anticipate the spectrum of potential outcomes of imagination, planning or manufacturing are insufficiently developed given the pressing need for sustainable progress in today’s world. This thinking appeared to resonate with the view broadly expressed by Olympic critics that whilst notions of legacy had acquired more prominent roles in Olympic bids, host cities still appeared to struggle to achieve a correspondence between the legacy promises they formulated in their vision statements and the actual impacts of the Games. It suggested a focus not only on how legacy and regeneration are conceived and imagined as futures but on the dependencies of such visions on present economic and political contexts.

In terms of considering the relationship between urban designers’ visions and the perspectives of local people experiencing change in their daily lives, Adam and Groves work was also influential in suggesting attending to the relationship between different ways of knowing a place in time – whether principally in terms of strategic ‘potential’ or of concrete realities, everyday hopes and needs. In terms of concluding the thesis, it prompted an emphasis on drawing out those mechanisms connected with the *Legacy Masterplan Framework* (LMF) by which the social goals associated with regeneration might be realised. These, as I discuss in more depth below, include what Adam and Groves have termed ‘a shift in perspective from product as result to product as effecting process’ (p. 3), considered here in terms of the imagination of future urbanism and, simultaneously, the creation of structures for long-term accountability and decision-making. Focussing on the outcomes of the CPO, local consultations and the governance of the LMF in this way offers a valid approach to identifying some of the issues that may arise over the long projected timeframe for translating visions into outcomes.
This study has been informed by several key intellectual orientations and traditions. These related to the three ‘dimensions’ of legacy which I outlined in the introduction: place, time and people. For its focus on the means of converting spaces designed for an international mega-event into a compact, mixed-use urban fabric, conceptualisations stemming from Lefebvre (1996) on the ‘specificity of the city’ were key. These provided a framework for thinking not only about how ‘global’ processes are reflected at ‘local’ levels and scales but about how localities in and of themselves can influence how impacts are experienced and received. In turn, Lefebvre’s conceptualisation of the production of space in terms of a triad of ‘representations of space’, ‘representational space’ and ‘spatial practice’ (1991, pp. 38 -39) suggested a conceptual frame for considering the relationship between the envisioned purposes of legacy regeneration and its actual and perceived impacts. Although Adam and Groves’s work (2007) was crucial for honing my interest in exploring the temporality of legacy in terms of how futures are made in the present in a philosophical sense, Jane Jacobs (1972 [1961]) and Kevin Lynch (1972) guided my focus on the possible impacts of large-scale, comprehensive redevelopment over more incremental, contextually-specific approaches to urban problems. Sennett’s (2007) conceptualisation of the ‘Open City’ meanwhile offered a conceptual alternative to thinking about masterplanning in terms of fixed structures and pre-conceived futures - one which appeared to have direct relevance for how LMF masterplanners were conceiving the task of designing a ‘process’.

Considering the social dimension of legacy in terms of local people’s right to participate in the design of the LMF involved drawing on a number of authors and theoretical orientations. Challenges posed in discourses of ‘the right to the city’ (Lefebvre, 1996; Amin and Thrift, 2002; Harvey, 2008) to think about democracy in planning beyond mechanisms such as consultation or deliberative methods for building consensus informed my focus on the communicative limitations of practices of engagement relating to the CPO and the design of the LMF. Foucault’s work on the ‘unities of discourse’ and ‘discursive formations’ was employed lightly throughout the thesis, but was nonetheless important for formulating a research methodology for exploring conceptions of ‘regeneration’, ‘legacy’ and ‘community’ and how these terms functioned in different communicative settings.

At the end of this study, I am interested in considering how the LMF could present more than just a picture of an idealised future - one which I have argued has at times been dangerously disengaged from the present-day realities around it. Throughout this research,
I have been interested in considering how context could be better integrated – not just in terms of physical connections but of existing qualities of place and human neighbours. In this, I wish to reinforce the possibilities for more bottom-up decision-making and legacy-defining – a desire which may appear next to insurmountable in the context of the Olympics. However, I argue that at least in the immediate post-Olympic future, the site’s adjacent residents may have valuable capacities to offer and could themselves be catalysts to futures of different durations. My aim is to forge better understandings of spatial possibilities for small stakeholders in large regeneration projects.

I do this over the course of the following chapter sections. In the first, I address the three first research aims outlined in the Introduction. In the second, I address the fourth research aim by considering lessons arising from my research for large-scale, sustainable regeneration more broadly. I focus here on issues of land purchase and long-term ownership, the design of urban processes and the roles of local users in development over time. In the third, I translate these conclusions into three propositions. They relate to: 1) the ‘specificity’ of London’s urban Olympic legacy; 2) the temporality of legacy, and; 3) the roles of local people in the governance of long-term projects. In formulating these propositions, I draw on both the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 and on the research presented in each of the subsequent chapters. These propositions have theoretical as well as spatial design implications and are thus represented both verbally and visually.

8.1 Interim Conclusions

8.1.1 Towards a legacy of spatial and physical transformation

The first aim of this research was to investigate how London’s Olympic legacy was conceived in terms of the spatial and physical transformation of the Olympic site in the Lea Valley and how such conceptions came to appear as effective for its regeneration and in the context of London’s wider urban development.

The first point to make is that the legacy was conceived spatially in terms of a number of ways of addressing long-standing conditions of spatial, social and economic marginality associated with the Olympic site. This is located in a post-industrial region encompassing the Lea Valley and the former London Docklands which had become increasingly cut off from the rest of London. It was also conceived in terms of a large-scale intervention which
would have the capacity to transform these circumstances. In both these respects, the 2012 Olympic and Legacy projects may be understood in the wider context of the global emergence of ‘mega-projects’ developed to address the scale of change which the regeneration by economic restructuring of post-industrial sites and cities has appeared to require (Fainstein, 2009). They may also be understood in the context of the uses of ‘mega-events’ to attract investment to cities competing for investment and prestige in a global economy. In these terms, the primary purpose of the Olympic and legacy masterplans may be seen to be to provide a spatial framework for transforming the historic marginality of the site into a new form of urban centrality - which could serve to impact not only on London’s metropolitan geography but also its position in the world.

I argued that it was also important to consider the transformation of the site’s marginality in terms of impacts on the immediate and specific context of its surroundings, particularly given that the impacts of mega-events on local places and people have often been regarded as problematic in Olympic legacy studies. The choice of site for the Games and subsequent concentration of funds in transforming it may be understood in the light of Brenner’s development of Lefebvre’s notion of the ‘specificity of the city’ to encompass contemporary measures to ameliorate the effects of ‘uneven geographical development’ (2000, p. 374). One of the frequently stated local purposes of the site’s redevelopment was to address conditions of social deprivation in the Lea Valley by creating both amenities and catalysts to future enterprise and development. Transforming the site’s spatial marginality formed a crucial ingredient in regeneration plans for ameliorating localised forms of deprivation produced in the context of the Lea Valley’s industrial demise.

Transforming marginality relied on capacities to alter the role that boundaries of local authority and land ownership had played historically in informing the site’s uses and topography. The site’s Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) in 2007 enabled it to be converted into a large-scale public landholding managed by the LDA. London’s success in winning the 2012 Olympic bid in turn created the ability to form a new site-specific planning authority - the ODA. Transforming these circumstances made it possible to comprehensively remove development which was seen to be associated with the site’s former but now largely redundant economic functions, and re-plan the site around a central feature and future amenity - the Olympic Park – which was located along and across the lines of what were formerly boundaries.
The displacement of local decision-making authority as of historic, small-scale land ownership and economic activity raised questions relating to the possible effects of redevelopment on the geography of deprivation. Would addressing uneven development of the past be achieved at the scale of the localities surrounding the site or would it simply have the effect of displacing disadvantage to new locations? Would the Olympic site in time appear on deprivation maps as a pocket of relative affluence, or would elements of the LMF function in the context of regeneration strategies developed to address issues of deprivation in situ?

Beyond the CPO, legacy was conceived in terms of spatial design processes for transforming the planned Olympic Park into a mixed use piece of city for the long-term. Whilst venues and parklands were carefully connected within the Olympic masterplan, the site as a whole was effectively sealed off from its immediate surroundings. A key purpose of the LMF was to transform the relationship between the site and its surroundings or fringes, making them far more porous to one another. Notwithstanding designers encountered difficulties in their efforts to reconnect the site to its surroundings - owing in part to the combination of the interiority of the park and the presence of large-scale transport infrastructure along all edges of the site. This suggested wider difficulties associated with the reconciliation of the city through to global level purposes of hosting an Olympics with the aim to use the Games in the context of local regeneration – the transformation of existing conditions of deprivation and the elevation of an existing area’s prospects.

In the context of the earliest versions of the LMF, legacy was conceived in terms of a particular approach to urban form. Addressing deprivation through planning and design in the context of the LMF was presented in terms of a vision of ‘urban renaissance’. The ‘bad city’ of fragmentation and disorder, the Output C LMF suggested, would be replaced by a ‘good city’ conceived in terms of ordered development processes and sustainable, compact urban form. Compact development provided the means to deliver several thousand social and affordable housing units, thus making a significant contribution to each of the east London host boroughs’ housing targets, as well as increasing the site’s contribution to job creation and social infrastructure across these areas. Conceiving legacy in terms of the development of compact urban form was thus also seen as an effective way of expressing the site’s contribution to socio-economic regeneration in the Lea Valley and in East London.
However, this particular conception of legacy in terms of spatial and physical transformation proved to be short-lived. Whilst compact development provided the means to deliver large numbers of social and affordable housing units as well as job creation opportunities and social infrastructure, it also appeared as a necessity in terms of the economics of the Olympic project by providing the means to redeem public funding debts related to it. This form of development also appeared to be less likely to be realisable in the context of the economic downturn from 2008.

Influenced by the effects of falling land values from 2008 and political change at the city level, the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) from mid-2009 created the possibility for rethinking the correspondence between the Olympic legacy and compact urban form. This in turn created the possibility for loosening the dependency of the plan on an economic model for debt redemption. Whilst this flexibility created the opportunity for designers to re-conceive legacy by concentrating more on in urban qualities than on spatially resolving numerical targets, achieving those quotas for housing, jobs and social infrastructure suggested which the Output C LMF put forward as key elements of its regeneration strategy became more challenging. At the close of this research, the challenge of balancing conceptions of legacy in terms of ‘urban quality’ with conceptions of legacy in terms of specific kinds and amounts of benefit had not been met.

8.1.2 Towards a legacy of tabula rasa and redesign

The second aim, developed in response to the idea of legacy as a form of bequest, was to explore how urban legacy strategies and designs engaged with the development history of the Olympic site whilst also endeavouring to bring the envisioned future realisation of legacy commitments into visibility.

Urban legacy strategies and designs engaged with the development history of the Olympic site in a number of ways. As already highlighted above, the Olympic legacy was conceived as a vehicle for addressing historical conditions of deprivation associated with the site. It was also conceived in the context of evaluations of pre-Olympic spatial and social ‘barriers’ to regeneration, and thus in terms of the need for spatial design and redevelopment processes to overcome these. These barriers included environmental degradation produced as a legacy of industrialisation, fragmented authority – between four boroughs and a number of government agencies – fragmented land ownership, short-term occupancy, a
low-rise, incoherent and low-value urban topography, and spatial disconnection. The comprehensive redevelopment approach adopted for the site suggested that the legacy would primarily address the past through decisive intervention in the slow, cumulative processes which had produced the topography which was in evidence in 2007.

I argued that such ways of engaging with the history of the site created a number of difficulties. Firstly, although accounts of deprivation provided by the LDA in relation to the CPO identified few assets connected with the existing site, a number of those displaced from the site in 2007, attendants at public consultations and even members of the LMF design team argued that other interpretations of the site’s existing potentials could have been formulated. Secondly, accounts of deprivation appeared to focus on the relation between current circumstances and de-industrialisation, not on the longer history of poverty associated with the Olympic site. From the early nineteenth century, deprivation was a continuous outcome of changing economic circumstances, raising at least the possibility that the attraction of investment and new economic sectors to the site in the future would fail to impact on levels of existing deprivation. Material deprivation was produced in the urbanising East End of the nineteenth century in the context of the dispossessions of rural people from land, suggesting the need to carefully evaluate relationships between contemporary forms of dispossession – relating compulsory purchase and enforced relocation – and conceptions of regeneration. Thirdly, the tabula rasa site appeared to create difficulties for designers seeking to provide a sense of the future ‘character’ or ‘identity’ of legacy for local stakeholders. There was all too little to hang the project off, as one architect put it in interview and this created the need to imagine what an urban fabric and its associated ‘communities’ might be and look like from scratch.

These points resonated with Jane Jacobs’ (1972 [1961]) critique of comprehensive redevelopment. She argues that this form of development, which is often associated with ‘cataclysmic money’, undermines the capacities that often already reside in deprived locations to catalyse the forms of bottom-up regeneration that often prove to be the most resilient. They also resonated with Adam and Groves’ (2007) wider point that a major danger associated with envisioning futures lies in the very uncertainty of the future - the difficulty of predicting quite how change will unfold and thus all the potential consequences of action. Uncertainty in terms of the capacity to fulfil Livingstone’s 2007 commitments to jobs and affordable housing in turn raised questions concerning the wisdom of pouring
upfront funds into venues, parklands and infrastructure on the basis only of possibility and limited evaluations of potential.

Conceiving the task of masterplanning the Olympic legacy as a ‘process’ suggested one way of overcoming some of the dangers of uncertainty and speculation about the future created in the context of the CPO. Firstly, designing a process rather than fixed objects implied an extension of the traditional scope of urban design to include phasing in response to building economics and flexibility to evolving urban policy, use and technology. What aspects needed to be fixed early in the plan in order to provide the means for long-term goals to be fulfilled? Secondly, it suggested the need to consider the development of buildings and spaces designed for economic activities and other uses in terms of duration. Which aspects of the masterplan should be considered as long-term interventions? Which, in comparison, might be considered as interim developments or occupations? Thirdly, it suggested the need to carefully consider the distinction between long-term potentials and closer-range deliverables.

The design of a process, even in the short timeframe of this research, proved to be challenging and raised a number of issues for the future of the masterplan. These included questions of what levels of detailed resolution were appropriate in relation to different phases and the relative durability or flexibility of different elements. KCAP principal Kees Christiaanse’s (2007) conceptualisation of the design of the ‘Open City’ suggested how the design consortium interpreted the challenge of designing a process. Christiaanse placed emphasis on the public realm as both a locus of social value and a fixed, organising device which future development would respond to. However, his ideas appeared to contradict the LMF’s Socio-economic framework which, as mentioned above, concentrated on maximising compact urban development and quantifying the social benefits in terms of housing and social infrastructure that this would provide. Rather than an ‘Open City’, what was presented was what Sennett (2007) might refer to as a ‘brittle’ urban scenario.

There was also the matter of the dependence of legacy commitments relating to affordable housing and social infrastructure on a political and economic context. The reliance of regeneration goals on a financing model that could no longer be realised in the context of global economic recession created the incentive for project leaders to re-emphasise long-term perspectives. One obvious consequence of this was the shifting of dates for realising commitments relating, for example, to affordable housing outside of the scope of present
political mandate and action. Clearly this has implications for the accountability of project leaders to commitments made in the past.

At the same time, the imperative was created to begin to realise a form of legacy in terms of smaller scale use and economic activity in the ‘interim’. Witherford Watson Mann Architects’ proposals suggested an approach which placed greater emphasis than we had seen thus far on existing qualities of place relating to the site’s underlying history, and local inhabitations at the site’s fringes. I argued that with these kinds of approaches, it may become possible to create a stronger relationship between understandings of the site’s long-term possibilities and, albeit small-scale, existing, closer-range potentials – what Adam and Groves (2007) might refer to as an ‘embodied’ rather than abstract beginning to the future.

I argued that holding on to long-term goals whilst at the same time working with present political and economic contexts relies on continuity in terms of leadership. The OPLC’s role as site owners and LMF leaders in cultivating such approaches is vital. Continuity in leadership is crucial for the development of a durable and yet ‘open’ rather than ‘brittle’ (Sennett, 2007) masterplan and for the management of its build-out over time.

### 8.1.3 Towards a legacy of participation in masterplanning

The third aim, developed to reflect the idea that legacy is not a bequest in an abstract sense but relates to particular constituencies of people, was to consider who the beneficiaries of the urban legacy might be. This aim was addressed principally by investigating the role of democratising practices of consultation and engagement with local people in the redesign and redevelopment of the site.

The processes of the CPO suggested that primarily, the Olympic legacy was not about existing use groups and occupants but about future, imagined ‘communities’. Given that existing users included the kinds of marginal social groups, small-scale businesses and poor residents that often become the subject of CPOs (see for example: Thomas, 1994; Imrie and Thomas, 1997; Thomas and Imrie, 1989), these processes also suggested that legacy was not for them. Whilst the compensation packages available to displaced groups could be said to constitute legacies of sorts, these were calculated on the basis of evaluations of the conditions of the site in 2006-7, not of the value that the LDA would be able to extract from
it over time. Benefits associated with relocation were unevenly distributed amongst the displaced groups. Whilst compensation packages were for some overshadowed by drawbacks such as the need to relocate to more expensive or otherwise less favourable areas, others enabled groups to become more settled and financially secure - by becoming the legal owners of new properties for example. It appeared that those that benefitted most were the ones whose own goals aligned best with the interests of the LDA. Conversely, those who struggled to secure positive outcomes included users whose self-understandings of their groups and place attachments aligned least well with LDA-held conceptions of ‘community’, the site’s value and the purposes of redevelopment. The impacts of alternative understandings of community on how compensatory processes unfolded highlighted Imrie’s and Thomas’s wider point that although CPOs may be presented in terms of ‘common goods’, they in fact constitute ‘contest[able] social practices’ (1997, p. 1416).

Perspectival views included in the Output C LMF depicted a wide range of users. However, these for the most part bore signs of prosperity and thus little resemblance to the socially and economically diverse inhabitants of the site’s surroundings. These included local authority housing tenants, small industry workers, recent migrants and artists amongst other – constituents rarely associated with economic prosperity. In spite of the LMF’s emphasis on the importance of local connections, perspectival views did not capture the significance of locating and forming these in terms of existing localities and realities beyond the site. Views neither depicted the surrounding urban context from within the envisioned legacy site nor indicated how physical connectivity might serve to create links between it and existing places, uses and people. In this regard, it was significant that the LMF did not communicate any information on the social topography of the site’s surroundings – its diverse ethnic and cultural base, its mix of tenures and types of use for example. This raised questions as to what extent masterplanners and the leaders of the LMF were genuinely concerned and prepared to engage with the existing local context and locality.

In spite of the emphasis placed on the role of the ‘community’ in terms of the governance of the project, this research revealed that some of the tactics that were employed by the LDA in the context of consultations to control how information about the LMF was presented actually served to prevent local participants from becoming involved. Contrary to the LDA’s official claims, public consultation processes relating to the LMF were circumscribed and top down, producing few opportunities for local participants to
intervene. Neither of the LDA’s claims that these settings would be effective in ‘building ownership’ or reflective of their commitment to ‘transparency’ was realistic given their concurrent fears of negative publicity and the practical difficulties at that stage of design and development processes to take any firm decisions about future forms, buildings or uses. Whilst the LDA made records of the events in the form of minutes, they did not appear to process these analytically before passing them on to the masterplanning team to absorb, somehow or other. The apparent lack of a method for analysing or evaluating the significance of individual versus shared views, for example, made it difficult for masterplanners to integrate outcomes of consultations into their own spatial conceptions of the LMF. This raised question of the value of these events beyond information-giving.

Outcomes approaching ‘collaborative decision-making’ in Wright and Fung’s terms (2003) were achieved by some specific interest groups through self-initiated processes of engagement with the ODA and LDA. Although ODA project sponsors entered into negotiation with these groups with the stated purpose of identifying mutually satisfying solutions, they were at the same time notably keen to discourage the development of niche interests in what they viewed as an open public realm for the community ‘at large’. In part, this resistance may be attributed to the decision-making imperative which was so important for meeting the 2012 Olympic deadline. I argued that although outcomes for cyclists and allotment holders were disappointing, their persistent, skilled endeavours highlighted not only the value such groups could bring to authorities prepared to engage with them but the need for energy and focussed action amongst local groups. It is significant that the only groups who had demonstrable impacts on the LMF were those whose claims led them to formulate alternative plans and, in this regard, to seek to challenge ‘power, [create] conflict and partisanship’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 68) as a precursor to collaboration on more equal terms. I argued that in order for the practices of consultation and engagement to have more bearing on the creation of local Olympic legacies, they should become: a) more diverse, so as to be able to include large-scale events for canvassing wide-spread views as well as small-scale dialogues and negotiations with particular interest groups, and; b) more focussed on specific sites, possibilities and issues in order to garner the interest of local groups with capacities to contribute to the conceptualisation, planning and delivery of viable post-2012 uses. Such groups and their contributions don’t have to last ‘forever’ and need not be big, but could be of value for the fine-grained localisation of the urban legacy now.
8.2 Wider implications of the research for sustainable urban regeneration

The fourth aim of this research was to consider the wider implications of this research and the above findings for sustainable urban regeneration processes more broadly, in the UK and beyond. This section of the chapter is divided into three sub-sections in which three distinct implications are presented. In the first sub-section, I focus on the issue of land ownership, particularly in terms of its significance for the ability to plan long-term. In the second, I focus on the challenge of planning and designing for the long-term. In the third, I return to the issue of local people’s involvement in large-scale development or redevelopment processes.

8.2.1 Land ownership and legacy

The form and structure of land ownership created by the LDA through the CPO was crucial for realising the transformation of the Olympic site from a borderland or seam into a new centre for urban living. Large-scale land ownership, particularly when combined with planning authority, creates the ability to intervene at a large scale and thus to address infrastructural, environmental, spatial and social issues at this scale. Large-scale land ownership creates the possibility for determining the scale and distribution of built and open spaces and, in this regard, the distribution of economic and use values across large areas. Large-scale land ownership, furthermore, creates the possibility of formulating plans for the long-term that stand a chance of being managed continuously. The OPLC, for example, is now able to plan for the long-term in the secure knowledge that, whilst it may become subject to restructuring (as a result of being itself owned by the government), it will not be elected out of office. Large-scale land ownership may in these terms be seen as key to the realisation of sustainable regeneration goals that take time to realise.

Notwithstanding, there are a number of issues associated with land-ownership for sustainable urban regeneration which this research has identified. How land is acquired and how that purchase is justified can be problematic for the users, occupants and owners who find themselves subject to ‘enclosures’ or Compulsory Purchase Orders. The acquiring of land for regeneration is often viewed as forms of ‘land grab’ by authorities who may fail to define their purposes, and may become unable or unwilling to deliver to realise benefits for displaced and/ or neighbouring communities. It can lead to the creation of enclaves within cities, which private owners manage for the primary purpose of maximising their margins of
profit. It can serve to reinforce existing patterns of inequality as the economic prosperity created for some in relation to the large-scale redevelopment of new landholdings fails to ‘trickle down’ to surroundings neighbourhoods needy of jobs and prospects. The redevelopment of the Isle of Dogs has been seen by a number of authors as illustrative of this phenomenon (see, for example, Foster, 1999; Hall, 2001). Large-scale land-purchases backed by the UK national government powers have often involved the creation of new authorities - such as the London Docklands Development Corporation or the LDA – which are able to take planning decisions and/or effect drastic change, creating the risk that development will fail to address existing local authorities’ perceived local needs and concerns. Finally, there is the issue that public and private land-owners usually constitute unelected bodies but ones that can wield considerable power.

These issues need to be addressed for land-ownership to realise its potential to be a cornerstone for sustainable regeneration. Large-scale landowners should be accountable not only to those who use or occupy their land but to their neighbours in order to overcome the fact that they are unelected authorities. The purpose of capitalising on a land asset through development and eventually sales should be to reinvest in that land in terms of maintenance, enhancements and concessions such as the protection of use rights for groups that might otherwise be disadvantaged in property markets - small businesses, less affluent tenants, social enterprises and small cultural organisations for example. Large-scale land-owners should: a) work to balance regulation and policy with market forces in relation to urban form, environment and land use; b) use their long-term security strategically by managing the process of development or ‘build-out’ cautiously over time; c) control the form and quality of development to the extent that this allows regeneration and sustainability goals established for it to be met, but also allow fashions, evolving markets and individual tastes to help produce a diversely scaled and shaped built environment. Not doing so risks creating a ‘brittle’ urban environment and volatility in terms of the realisation of a vision.

8.2.2 Planning for the long term

Comprehensive land ownership, particularly when combined with planning authority, creates the possibility not only for effecting change at a large scale, as discussed above, but for speeding up decision making. This may be viewed as both positive and desirable, particularly in the context of the drawbacks in terms of cost and delivery that may become
associated with slower yet more democratic processes of decision-making in planning. This research, particularly for Chapter 7 has, however, borne out the claim made by Adam and Groves that speeding up processes can have the effect of increasing uncertainty rather than allowing goals to be achieved more quickly.

Over the course of this research, it has become clear that realising a ‘vision’ for regeneration over time relies on a balance between continuous leadership and flexibility in the implementation of strategies. Achieving this balance in terms of the management of an urban design framework requires that processes of envisioning are based less on maximising returns in short time frames and less on either predictions or ideologies relating to how urban form will unfold than on identifying: a) the context-specific social goals with which that development should be associated, and; b) the primary spatial interventions required for their incremental realisation. It may be that in some years, a shortage of funds requires that the pace of realisation is slowed or that the emphasis on a certain form of development or kind of use needs to change. Continuity in terms of leadership can ensure that temporary changes in direction do not fundamentally alter the social and environmental goals of a project. With continuity in terms of leadership comes the privilege of not being under pressure to secure returns on investment in the short-term. The OPLC’s debt-free ownership of the Olympic site, for example, offers the advantage of being able to address uncertainty by proceeding slowly.

For urban designers, continuity in terms of leadership (and ownership) creates a real possibility for reimagining design in terms of processes, for formulating what Lynch (1972) refers to as a ‘temporal model of development’ and Sennett (2007) refers to the ‘Open City’. Designing processes implies the need to consider the relationship between primary or fixed elements and those which may be adapted or may have shorter lives. Fixed elements are those which can serve to catalyse further development – types of infrastructure and the basic layout of streets, connections and open spaces. Adaptable elements are those which, in contrast, may be more dependent on economic, social and or cultural circumstances. They also imply the need to balance the imagination of an urban plan in terms of possible development phases, quantities or sequences with the judicious analysis of continually unfolding present opportunities. This in turn implies the need to think beyond the dialectic of ‘interim use’ versus permanent use, but rather in terms of a variety of durations and durability.
8.2.3 The spatial form of engagement

Findings of this research support Sennett’s and Young’s contentions that people’s conceptions of what communities are, include and can be are often limited. Conceptions of community become limited or exclusive when they fail to encompass the diverse ways in which individuals and groups cohere in terms of interest or affiliation in space and time – the ways in which they do this for themselves. Research on the CPO and on consultation and engagement processes related to the LMF suggested that the LDA’s conception of community and of the community’s role with respect to processes of negotiation or decision-making was at times distant from local realities. If legacies are to be relevant to the lives of local people living around sites in the present, then there is a need for such conceptions to become better integrated with in-depth understandings of the social topography of local areas – as they are now, not only how they might be twenty or thirty years from now. There is also a need to consider what this more specific yet open understanding might mean for practices of consultation and engagement.

This could, for example, lead to strategies which focus not only on how the built environment could realise benefits conceived by authorities and designers but on making use of capacities that already exist at the fringes of development – whether in terms of horticulture, business or education - to specifically shape aspects of the site’s form and offer. Such an approach may be said to resonate with David Harvey’s (2008, p. 37) claim that the ‘right to the city’ has been too narrowly defined in terms of political and economic elites and should therefore be re-expanded to meet Lefebvre’s vision of generalised rights for city dwellers. This suggests the need not only for ‘opportunities’ connected with physical and economic regeneration to be made available to local people, but for those people to have more clearly articulated say in what opportunities are offered, how they are constituted, and how they are translated into physical form.

In the course of this investigation it has become clear that, in relation to long-term planning processes, it is important to consider how and in what timeframes local people are able to assert claims to space. My analysis of public consultation practices suggested that leaders and masterplanners were ill-equipped to consider how what people say about their current circumstances might be relevant to the long-term futures which they imagined. They were similarly poorly equipped to evaluate the relationship between local people’s expertises
with respect to knowing their areas and the expertises of masterplanners in terms of evaluating and visualising its potential. These findings suggest that for these types of events to be more effective, it is important to at least situate local people’s concerns and views in relation to the envisioned timeline of a project. Doing so may assist in addressing the kind of conflict which negotiations with cyclists and allotment holders exemplified - between those able to see and formulate ‘a big picture’ and those whose specific, local claims are not necessarily invalid but inevitably more spatially and temporally limited. It may therefore help in the formulation of a framework for evaluating the outcomes of public consultation which allows for the support of partial claims whilst still embracing larger, longer-term concerns such as environmental sustainability or issues of inequality and deprivation.

8.3 The shape of things to come: three propositions

In the following section of the chapter, as briefly discussed in the introduction, the above conclusions are translated into three propositions. The first of the sub-sections below is closely connected to the first research question and is concerned with the ‘specificity’ of London’s urban Olympic legacy. The second relates to the second research question and is concerned with how this urban legacy might unfold over time. The third, relating to the third research question, concerns the roles of local people in the governance of large-scale, long-term projects.

**PROPOSITION 1: A specific urban legacy**

This first proposition, as the title suggests, is that the local ‘level of reality’ (Lefebvre, 1996) is important in determining the specific qualities of impacts of the 2012 Olympics. The following key points underscore this argument.

a. **Responding to the context:** Whilst considerable emphasis is placed in Olympic studies as well as by LMF leaders on how the Olympics impact on host cities and localities, far less consideration is given to how localities do, let alone could, make use of, transform and create opportunities in relation to it. This research has shown that the force of opposition which some groups – the Manor Gardening Society, the Eastway Users Group and H. Forman & Son for example - were able to generate in the contexts of both the CPO and the masterplan was influential in enabling them eventually to create specific legacies for themselves, albeit to the chagrin of
designers and authorities. In contrast to the more and less certain legacies being imagined for the bulk of the Olympic site, these became real, materialising legacies. Although they involved small-scale spatial interventions in comparison to the envisaged long-term creation of thousands of new homes and jobs, their significance lay in the capacity they revealed for local people to influence circumstances that affect their lives. To the extent that the urban legacy is a local phenomenon, the place-making skills of such groups are generators of the specificity of this (emerging piece of) city and can contribute to its future value.

This finding suggests that both more analytical and design time should be devoted to understanding what Soja has called the ‘centripetal and centrifugal’ forces of ‘urban agglomeration’ (2000, p. 257) at the local scale of sites and surroundings. These include dynamics of occupancy, opportunistic uses of space, entrepreneurial activities and political action generated in response and in reaction to the imposition of an Olympic Games on an existing locality. Investing this time might serve to create better understandings of the impacts of the Olympics on its immediate surroundings – from the evolving approach of local planning authorities to these areas, increasing property values, speculation, and the varied responses of businesses, institutions and residents to these dynamics. It would allow questions both of where opportunities lie and where opportunities are sought in this evolving local landscape to be addressed. It might also create the possibility for closer examination of the potential for legacy masterplanners to take a more informed, political stance with respect to these dynamics as a precursor to formulating more contextually relevant proposals on matters of local connectivity, the mix of land uses and forms of tenure, and the adaptability of urban form. The key benefit of this for this project as well as for regeneration practices more broadly would be that masterplanning could play a more direct role in encouraging improvement to take place within the site and its existing surroundings and less by means of relocation and dispossession.

b. **Protecting the public realm:** How boundaries of ownership and authority were transformed between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries was shown the historical part of this research to have been influential on the form of development in these periods as well as on the later marginality of the site. A major benefit of again transforming the boundaries of ownership and authority in the context of the
Olympics was, as discussed above, the creation of the capacity to secure areas for public use at the intersections of localities who would otherwise not be able to realise this objective. The Olympic Park may in these terms be seen as a primary legacy, not only of the Olympics but of the CPO, and as a piece of landscape and investment whose long-term benefits need to be seen to continually outweigh the costs of change in 2007. This argument suggests the need for masterplanners to emphasise the primacy of the park in their designs and, in so doing, to concentrate on defending its public nature.

In the context of the design charrette sponsored by the OPLC, architecture firms Allies & Morrison and WWM both argued that a design challenge posed by the site, even once the park was in place in outline terms was to transform what had been an urban ‘back’ and then an enclosed site for an international event into a ‘front’, or at least into series of subtle articulations of front and back that would facilitate connection to surrounding localities. WWM looked to the site’s existing topography, history and geology with the purpose of uncovering clues for making carefully judged suggestions for how to achieve this. They argued that the valley profile which the park emphasises and the ‘wild’ character of the river running through it suggested that treating this element as a ‘centre’ was inappropriate. It should instead remain as a semi-rural fringe and refuge so that ‘centrality’ with the masterplan could be displaced to the areas of connection between existing neighbourhoods and the post-Olympic development. This approach, based on close observation of the site and its surroundings, created the possibility for translating general ‘drivers’ for legacy such as connectivity and public space into specific, purposeful realities for people living and working in the locality as well as for visitors from afar. These kinds of contextualising approaches are key to the creation of integrated and coherent urban landscapes on a large-scale, regardless of the form and density that built form might eventually take.

Indeed, on-going lack of certainty about forms of future development only reinforces the need for designers to focus attention in the short to medium term on the primary legacy of the public realm including its interfaces with the site’s surroundings and with future development sites. In order to preserve public interests, interfaces or edges should become subject to certain rules – for example, that there are only frontages onto the public park but no sides or backs, that a
buffer of public space is always created along waterways and that a building line, set-back or height is continually maintained. These rules would intervene in specific processes of urban ‘assembly’ over time but they would not determine them.

These ideas are illustrated in the conceptual diagram above. The black areas denote the public realm. Red is used to indicate the site boundary and the boundaries of the local authorities. The diagram shows how the public realm extends over these boundaries, in some cases by providing a simple bridged crossing, in others by opening out and offering the possibility for re-activating territories for public use along their seams.

**PROPOSITION 2: A locally accreting urban legacy**

This second proposition is that thinking and planning over long timeframes requires a continual exchange between contexts of present need or contested value, and conceptions of the longer range goals of development and change. In terms of the Olympic legacy, this implies the following:
a. **Addressing the challenge of comprehensive redevelopment:** The major challenge of comprehensive redevelopment is that it creates the need to invent a new urban environment from scratch. Masterplanners acknowledged the difficulty of this, and research on the Output C LMF suggested that the legacy vision became overly dependent on projections and promises - the fulfilments of which were themselves dependent on a political and economic context. This suggested the need for the identification of those aspects of the masterplan which depended less on the economic climate but the implementation of which would nonetheless be key in terms of attracting and facilitating urban investment and development in the future. In the context of a return to economic growth, a wide range of interests in the site is likely to be expressed – by volume housing and commercial property developers through to social housing providers and potential venue operators. However, this study argues for the value in terms of regeneration of concurrently considering interests, claims and capacities of located within the site’s existing surroundings – in order to avoid the extension of comprehensive, if less extensive redevelopment approaches to the site’s fringes.

b. **Design for accretion:** It is envisaged that full build-out of the Olympic site after 2012 will take some thirty years. The main reason for this, as OPLC chief executive Andy Altman argued, was to be able to bring forward development at a moment when a context and market for it had emerged, not before. Realising development across the site in a gradual fashion suggests the need to carefully consider open spaces, buildings and infrastructure as well as uses and occupancies in terms of different increments and durations. Increments of time relating to different kinds of use and built form may vary according to different areas of the site and different development plots. For example, a so-called ‘interim use’ relating to the last of the plots to be developed may in fact need to last half a generation. Some of the so-called ‘permanent’ uses of new buildings may not last as long. Over thirty years, the market for the development of buildings suited to different use categories may have transformed, requiring early phase developments to be adapted or redeveloped. The so-called ‘catalysts’ to development created by the Olympics in the form of the Olympic Park, infrastructure, utilities and enhanced connections may still function as such or may have become redundant.
Thinking in terms of different increments of time suggests certain design logics. Designers responding specifically to the needs of specific users should consider the likely timescales of their uses. However, buildings and infrastructures which are costly to replace should have in-built flexibility. This flexibility is analogous to what Sennett refers to as the design of ‘incomplete form’ – one of the key components to the realisation of an ‘open’ city. Aldo Rossi’s (1981) study of the ‘architecture of the city’ suggested that those structures versatile enough to be able to persist in spite of social change and changes of use are those most likely to gather not only physical marks of time that transform them into ‘artifacts’ but cultural and memorial value. Lasting value is a key component of the urban legacy which London set out to create. In spatial terms, creating it would appear to rely on loosening the sense of a strict correspondence between form and use and, perhaps instead, focusing on measures of utility. Such measures might include a quality of natural light, material durability, urban legibility or dimensional generosity with respect to both places of pause and passage.

c. **Taking the small and short-term seriously:** Thinking about use and development in terms of widely ranging increments of time creates the possibility not only for planning for future change but for focusing close-range. What could occupy spaces with uncertain long-term futures in the meantime, for increments of time ranging between days to a few years? What opportunities and immediate legacies could be provided to small-scale entrepreneurs or cultural groups this way? For example, thinking of H. Forman & son, what uses and spaces could local food producers bring to the post-event site in 2013? What could the linkage of local schools with, say, the LVRPA’s Conservation Programme suggest about how to transform a green open space from a festival landscape to a local public space forming part of a regional park? Could some of the uses which activate the Olympic Park immediately following the Games, whether these are connections between schools and the park, artist or food festivals, stay? In asking this question, I am also proposing that there is scope for treating the ‘interim’ as laboratory in which the real future is actually made.
Rather than always presenting far in the future views - safely removed from the messy contexts of everyday politics – the LMF could also portray ‘futures in the making’ through forms of notation that render more legible the relationship between long-term or fixed forms and as yet flexible zones of negotiation or transition. This is illustrated in the diagram above.

**PROPOSITION 3: A legacy of the ‘commons’**

The third proposition is that the common lands of the site in the eighteenth century could have renewed relevance in terms of conceptualisations of participation in design. This proposition builds on the key research findings discussed above on how relevant ‘communities’ are conceived, engaged and mobilised in relation to processes of urban development.
a. **Sustaining engagement:** This research, as discussed above, has revealed a number of difficulties associated with public consultation practices relating to Compulsory Purchase and legacy masterplanning. These relate in particular to differential levels of power between project leaders and local participants, to how communities are defined in the context of planned futures, to the timescales of this project and to the diversity of public views. Those user groups who managed to assert claims to use the site for particular purposes in the future had to convince authorities, the press and the public of the wider significance of their endeavours against claims that they were isolated interest groups taking advantage of a pressure of time and authorities’ needs for public support. Their achievements suggested that, in spite of the difficulties they encountered in reaching them and the continuity of power imbalances, sustained face-to-face communication in small taskforce groups over pressing issues can sometimes be a more effective vehicle for reaching solutions than one-off, wider consultation events. This is because, as Wright and Fung (2003) contend, building collaborative working relationships in asymmetric contexts of power is challenging and needs to be given time.

b. **Common land:** In general, the LDA appeared keen to focus consultation participants’ attentions on the possibilities for shared spaces – a single park, a multi-faith centre or community gardens for example – rather than on differentiated spaces that could ‘belong’ to particular residential areas, be used to host particular local activities and potentially lead to a more highly textured landscape. Why should faith groups have to compromise on space for their particular rituals and activities in order to demonstrate mutual tolerance for one another? Why, similarly, should allotment holders have to become educationalists in order to qualify for space to do their organic gardening and cultivate their multi-ethnic food-growing community? Soja (2000, p.280) suggests that ‘rather than seeing difference including the difference associated with intergroup inequalities, only as something to be erased, the right to be different is asserted as the foundation of the new cultural politics’. This is turn suggests a different way of evaluating particularities of use in the context of the public realm.

The ‘politics of the commons’ in Thrift and Amin’s (2002) terms does not begin with formalised rules of engagement but with more a live and let live attitude – a
recognition that the different interests that people have and contributions they can make constitute valid practices of citizenship. Higher praise and value for some of the work that groups such as the Leyton Lammas Lands Defence Committee, the Manor Gardening Society, local environmental protection groups, creators of local radio stations, local faith groups and/or artist practices do within their localities would constitute a significant step in this direction. Perhaps, in these terms, at least some parts of the public realm could be conferred both the physical presence that the stakes used to denote the plots of the multiple common ‘owners’ of the Lammas Lands had in the past?

c. **Rewards for engagement:** Young (1990, p. 232) asserts that ‘[d]emocratisation requires the development of grass-roots institutions of local discussion and decision making’ but crucially that ‘[s]uch democratisation is meaningless unless the decisions include participation in economic power’. Following the analysis of Chapter 6, I would argue that the current information-giving form of consultation should be expanded in a number of directions, one of which would include the presentation of opportunities for funded involvement in making decisions about the future. Perhaps also, once the processes of urbanisation are underway, mechanisms could be established for encouraging established, larger-scale enterprises settling on the site to support and work with more vulnerable groups, small-scale start-ups or social enterprises, the aim being to secure a wide range of uses, enterprises and endeavours in a commercial context.

The diagram below illustrates the point made in the discussion above about parts of the public realm being conferred the presence of stakes used to denote the plots of the multiple common ‘owners’. This has been made by superimposing parts of the 1799 map of the former Lammas Lands of Hackney Wick included in the historical chapter onto the site. The purpose is to suggest that the public realm could be more variegated, that parts could be specific to different user groups without necessarily undermining the sense in which it is public.
Figure 8.3: Commons (Juliet Davis, 2011, based on KCAP, EDAW and Allies & Morrison, 2010 and OS data)
8.4 On future impact

One of the challenges of conducting a study focussed on something that has not yet happened yet is to draw conclusions based on evidence rather than surmise or speculation. This study has addressed this by focussing on a combination of impacts unfolding over the period of the research on both the actual site context and on processes of envisioning the future. There are many future impacts which the Olympics may have that have not been touched on at all. As the project develops, it will be important for researchers at each stage to develop appropriate measures of impact – whether in terms of house prices and land values, out-migration or ‘churn’, on-going management costs for local authorities, on-going costs of infrastructure, design and management, the role of the OPLC, revenue accruing from and popularity of venues, improvements in local sports, small business growth and so on. One possible follow up to this study would be to focus on the relationship between promises, commitments and visions articulated in the early stages of the LMF’s design development, and development as built five to ten years later. How different will the urban legacy actually be from what its leaders suggested in the early years of its design development, between 2005 and 2012? How will later leaders explain divergences from the early-presented visions and goals? And what will this enable us to say about the durability of long-term strategies, promises and visions and their roles in shaping our cities?
Bibliography


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Appendix A

Schedule of Interviews (2008-2010)

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<th>Organisation and Role</th>
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<td><strong>Design for London (DfL)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Senior Urban Designer</td>
<td>Frances Heath</td>
<td>12.12.07</td>
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<td><strong>London Development Agency (LDA)</strong></td>
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<td>Senior Planning Manager</td>
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<td><strong>Land Assembly Team</strong></td>
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<td><strong>13</strong> Member of the Advisory Board to the Mayor of London on the Olympic Legacy</td>
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<td>Henry Newton</td>
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<td>Russell Phelps</td>
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| **21** Project Architect |
| Richard Morris |
| 14.10.08 |

| **22** Project Landscape Architect |
| Joe Young |
| 15.10.09 |

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<td>Stephen Witherford</td>
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Appendix B

Use and Occupancy on the pre-Olympic site (2007)

**LONDON BOROUGH OF HACKNEY**

1. Eastway Commercial Centre:
   - Units A; B: Hoo Hing Cash and Carry
   - Unit C: Hoo Hing Oriental Foods (83)
   - Unit D: Hingley Meats (81) and Polarwan Meats (136)
   - Unit E: Lucky Wholesale (177), Cameron Car Wash, P Roy Ltd.
   - Units F,G: Mark H Ltd.
   - Unit H: Kingsway International Christian Centre (A)
   - Unit I: Warehouse for C

1a. Eastway Cycle Centre (C)
2. Lea Mill
   - Park Communications Ltd. (175)

3. Caravan site known as Waterden Crescent (B)

4. Eastway Cycle Centre (C)

5. Eton Manor Sports (D)
6. Kingsway International Christian Centre, 57 Waterden Road (A)
7. Hackney Stadium offices (E)
8. Golden House:
   - Wonis Cash and Carry (172)
   - Workman’s Cafe
   - Nightclubs Club Dezire and Kokonut Grove

9. Auction Rooms
   - Mc Phillips Food Ltd.
   - Retriever Ltd. (146)

9. FirstBus Depot, workshops and garages (66), 53-55 Waterden Road

10. Stagecoach East London(57), 44 Waterden Road
11. Pentaluck Ltd. (131), 35 Waterden Road
   - LW Saig & Sons LLP (176)
   - A & S Trading Ltd.
   - New Image Upholstery
   - All in One Ltd.
12. East Cross Centre, Waterden Road
12a. Unit A: DHL Express (49), A&A Self Storage (1),
    Mr S Miah (117),
    Osman Sheepskin wear,
    Dilkush Printers,
    Tony Freuil Display Services,
    Adrian Stanley Printing Ltd.
12b. Units B, C, D: Offices for Moss Bros (117)
12c. Units E, F: Vacant Industrial Units
12g. Unit G: AJ Corbyn Transport, H&S Polythene and Entrees International Ltd. (75)
12h. Unit H: A Warren & Sons (BSS Plc) (4)
12i. Unit I,J: DHL Express
12k. Unit K: Collective Colour (44) and GT Transport (74)
12l. Unit L: Haringay Meat Traders (78), Club Sangeat

**LONDON BOROUGH OF WALTHAM FOREST**
15. Bywaters Waste Management Depot, Lea Interchange (33)
16. GB Macks Skips Depot (73)
17. Eton Manor Sports Ground, Storage buildings, pavilions (D)
18. ‘The Farm’, 50-56 Temple Mill Lane

LONDON BOROUGH OF TOWER HAMLETS

20. King’s Yard
20a. Units 1-9
   _ Mr. Bagel Ltd. (9)
   _ Approachable Ltd.
   _ Styletrade Ltd. (156)
   _ GT Nicholls
   _ Rock Drill Ltd.
   _ Gary Nicolls: Vortex Studios
   _ Stuart Witham
   _ Alex Relph
   _ Lee Pat Reproductions (98)
   _ Eight by Four Ltd.
   _ Farrugia Wood Craftsmanship Ltd. (64)
   _ London Tradition: Mr Chowdaby (104)
   _ Club le Print Ltd. (43)
   _ Kim Fashions Ltd
   _ Barlen Ltd.
   _ Lenny Beaument
   _ Mrs Annette Shimoni
   _ Ibrahim Karaduman
20b. Unit 16:
   _ Curved Pressings Ltd.
   _ D&C Glass and Glazing (46)
   _ M&D Pallets
   _ Boudicca (134)
   _ Bilmerton Ltd. (18)
21. Capital Dairy (Bishopsgate) Ltd. (161), 132 Carpenters Road
22. Nageena House, 1 Waterden Road
   _ UK Snacks Ltd. (167)
23. Britannia Works, Carpenters Road
   _ M&J Motors
   _ Workshop, Scrapyard
24. Lea Works, Carpenters Road
   _ Unit 1: Advance Press Ltd.
   _ Perivan Ltd. (132)
   _ Units 2/ 2a: Scotia Plastic Binding Ltd.
   _ Unit 2: EDF Energy Networks Ltd.
25. Carpenters Business Park
25A. Units 1 & 5: Boots the Chemist Ltd. (21) and Fedex Express Europe (65)
25B. Unit 3: Warehouse and Offices for Buildbase Ltd. (30) and Rom Group Ltd.
25C. Unit 15 : Warehouse and offices for Newsfax International Ltd. (121)
26. Bow Industrial Park
26a: Unit 1: Task Systems Ltd. (160)
26b: Unit 2: Travers Smith Braithwaite Ltd. (162)
26c: Unit 3: Akzo Nobel Decorative Coatings Ltd. (7)
26d: Unit 4: Caversham Finance Ltd. (40)
26e: Unit 5: Forza Furniture Ltd.
26f: Unit 6: Task Systems Ltd. (160)
26g: Unit 7 & 8: Learay Trading Company Ltd.
26h: Unit 9: Bunzi Outsourcing Services Ltd. (31)
26i: Unit 10: Van Lauren (Imports) Ltd. (168)
26j: Unit 12: Capital Veneer Company Ltd. (36)
26k: Units 13 & 14: Nicholls & Clarke Glass Ltd. (123)
26m: Unit 16: Warehouse and offices for Newsfax International Ltd. (121)
26n: Units 17, 18: Royal Opera House Covent Garden Ltd. (149)
26o: Unit 19: Yomiuri Europe (174)
26p: Unit 20: Logicmedia Ltd. (101)
26q: Unit 21: Egerton Property Procurement (58)
26r: Unit 22: Rapid Response Europe Ltd. (143)
26s: Unit 23: HMM Services Ltd. (80)
26t: Unit 24: Quickmarsh Ltd. (101)
26u: Unit 25: DPS Print Solutions Ltd. (54)
26v: Unit 26: Electrical Factors Ltd.
26w: Unit 27: BSL Brammer Ltd. (26)
26x: Unit 28, 29: Rapid Response Europe Ltd. (143), DPS Print Solutions Ltd. (54)
26y: The Trustees of Barnados
27. Lock Cottages, Dace Road
28. Riverside House, Bow Industrial Park: FH Brundle (63)
29. Bow Freight Terminal
   _ English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd.
   _ Mr. Bear
   _ Aggregates Industries UK Ltd. (6)
   _ London Concrete Ltd. (102)
   _ London Cement Ltd.
   _ Plasmor Ltd. (133)
   _ Demnex Plant Hire Ltd. (48)
   _ London Development Agency

THE LONDON BOROUGH OF NEWHAM

35. Pumping Station, West of Temple Mills Lane
36. Housing Estate known as Clays Lane
37. Caravan site, Gas store, Pumping station
38. Housing Estate known as Clays Lane Close
39. High Meads Industrial Estate
   _ Celsius First Ltd.
   _ Direct Wholesal Food (London) Ltd.
   _ Quality Kebab Ltd.
   _ A&N Exotic Foods Ltd.
   _ Alpha Rentals Ltd.
   _ Claims Assistance plc.
   _ Kim Son Ltd.
   _ Wing’s Seafood Ltd.
   _ Apetito Ltd.
   _ The Official Receiver
   _ Unilever Plc
   _ Swallow Foods UK Ltd.
   _ Todd Meat Trading Company Ltd.
   _ Aria Foods Ltd.
   _ Reliance Employment Ltd.
   _ Eurocross Frozen Fish Ltd.
   _ Ronald Muggleton (Raynor Transport)
   _ Carribean Foods London Ltd.
   _ H Smith (Meat & Poultry) Ltd.

40. Chobham Farm, Barrier, Gatehouse and Buildings
   _ Channel Tunnel Rail Link Ltd.
   _ Rail Link Engineering Consortium
   _ Skanska Construction UK Ltd.
   _ London Underground Ltd.

41. 92a Carpenters Road, known as Cooper’s Metals
   _ J White (Bulk Fuels) (89)
   _ Tarmac Ltd. (159)
42. Electricity Substation, 92a Carpenters Road
43. Breakers Premises and yard, 92 Carpenters Road
44. Electricity Substation, 98/100 Carpenters Road
45. Electricity Substation, 105 Carpenters Road
46. Wallis Recovery (171), 103, 111 Carpenters Road
47. Electricity Substation, situated at former Number 3 Works
48. Caerns Works, including sheds formerly known as GSB Transport, 263-269 Carpenters Road
   _ Bow Tyres, Jay J Autos (90)
   _ M&M Motors (106), Jaymar (153)
   _ Japanese Car Parts
   _ Stratford Accident Repair Centre
   _ 1st Glass and Mirror Company Ltd. (67)
   _ Z Shazad
   _ Paul David
   _ Alan Drummond
   _ Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd.
49. Industrial unit and Storage yard, north of Carpenters Road
   _ Rooff Group Ltd. (148)
50. Thatched House Yard, north east of Carpenters Road
   _ Unit 1: Falcon Print Distribution and Storage Ltd.
   _ DDS (London) Ltd. (47)
   _ Truck Serve Ltd. (164)
Amjad Jaffery
Atrium Access Ltd. (11)
Francis Richard Kestla
JW Plant and Electrical
All Round Roofing and Advisory Specialist Ltd.
Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd.
B&B Hire and Sales (12)
Hanson Premix
Hanson Quarry Products Europe Ltd. (77)
52. Greengate Works, 7 Marshgate Lane
C2 International (34)
53. Vanguard Trading Estate, 16 Marshgate Lane
53a: Units 1, 2:
Unit 1: Glory of Life Church
Unit 1: Celestial Church of God
Unit 1: Discount Beds Direct Ltd.
Unit 2a: Bibeuns of London Ltd (17)
53b: Units 3, 4, 5, 6
Unit 3, 4: K&D Joinery Ltd. (95)
Units 5 & 6a: Vacant
Unit 6: JG Belts Ltd. (92), E Abrahams & Co Ltd. (56)
53c: Units 7, 8, 9:
Unit 7: Capricorn Fashions Ltd. (39), Newtec Packaging (122), Garden Fresh Fruit and Vegetable (71), Free Trade Beers and Minerals (69)
Unit 8: Vacant
Unit 9: Kenton Steel Construction Company Ltd.
53d: Units 10-16:
Unit 10: Autocars
Unit 10: Imperial Distributors Ltd. (86)
Unit 11: Vitesse Mailing (170)
Unit 12, 13, 17, 18: DP Communications
Unit 16: Andy’s Motors
54. M Laurier & Sons (105) warehouse and offices, 18 Marshgate Lane
55. Axis Business Centre, 20 Marshgate Lane:
Discount Double Glazing (51)
Bedrock Print Finishers (16)

Bodyworks Repair (20)
Facility Solutions Ltd.
Parts Plaza UK Ltd. (129)
56. Marshgate Centre, 22 Marshgate Lane
Unit A & D3: Discount Beds Direct Ltd
Unit A1: Gillian Ruth Simpson
Unit A2: Caspar Sawyer, Carlos Dombelindo, Trevor Percy
Unit B1: Priest Brothers (139)
Unit B2: BTC Catering Ltd. (26)
Unit B3: Akmol Hussain Khan, Print Emporium (140)
Unit C: Cumberland Bedding Company (45)
Unit D1: MR Printers (107)
Unit D4: BD Corporation (UK) Private Ltd. (14)
Unit D5: BTS Project (28)
Unit D6: the Hangar
Unit D7: Jayne Nee
Units E1 & E2: Bangla Frozen Food Ltd. (13)
Unit E3: Post Scriptum Ltd. (138)
Unit E4: Adrian Dutton
Unit E7: Ricky Gilmore
Reyco Ltd. (147)
Units F1 & F2: Polysew Trimmings (137)
Units F4: A Walker Veneered Panels (3)
Unit F5: Hurley Brothers (84)
Unit F6: Deza Steward, Marcus Rivas, Dylan Leonard, Rafael Lopez, Ruben Garcia, Simone Romano, Stefano di Renzo
Unit F7: Paul Fryer
Unit F9: Mr Z Ahmed, Capital Couriers Ltd. (35), Studio 4: Mr Silke Elizabeth Dettmers
Unit H1: HRG Print Finishers Ltd. (23)
Unit H2: Mr. A Phipps (166)
57. Banner Chemicals, 24 and 26 Marshgate Lane
Prism Chemicals Ltd.
58. Marshgate Trading Estate, 30a Marshgate Lane
58a. Unit 1: H Forman and Son (Smoked Salmon) (76)
58b. Unit 2: Moorgate Paper Company Ltd (116)
58c. Unit 3, Marshgate Trading Estate: Recall Total Information Management (144)
58d. Unit 4: Harrow Green Interiors (79), Unit 5: Bywaters Waste Management Ltd.
59. Arnell House, Marshgate Trading Estate, Marshgate Lane: Tyrone Textiles Ltd. (145)
60. Angel House, 30 Marshgate Lane _ Reginald Charles Lewis (Kinberley Freight Services) (145)
61. Gateway House, 34 Marshgate Lane _ Capital Print and Display Ltd. (37) _ EDF Energy Networks Ltd.
62. Palmers, 35-39 Marshgate Lane _ Palmer’s Ltd. (126)
63. Substation, north-west of 39 and south-east of 41 Marshgate Lane
64. Levercare Ltd. (99), 41 Marshgate Lane
65. Site Analytical Services (152), 43-45 Marshgate Lane

66. Offices, showroom, Warehouse, Empty House, Yards, 44 Marshgate Lane _ Dominion Mosaic & Tile Company Ltd. (53) _ Maple Windows Company Ltd. (108) _ Alphachoice Ltd. _ Astorheights Ltd. _ Bayit Carpets Ltd. _ Brandnow Ltd. _ Charitworth Ltd. _ Direct Bargain Centre Ltd. _ DMH Educational Trust Ltd. _ Dominion Associates Ltd. _ Finswift Ltd. _ Headbright Ltd. _ Leenstar Ltd. _ Metro Associates Ltd. _ Metrona Ltd. _ Mosaic Property Developments Ltd. _ Overseas Plastic Import Export Ltd. _ Priestly & Moore Ltd. _ Rexel Estates Ltd. _ Tomenstar Ltd. _ Tradescore Ltd.
67. Ifield & Barrett Roofing Ltd. (85), 47-49 Marshgate Lane
68. 51a Marshgate Lane _ John Price Digital Ltd. _ O’Connell Plant & Groundworks Ltd. (124) _ Tanara (UK) Ltd. _ Spot On UV Ltd.
69. O’Connell Plant (124), 53 Marshgate Lane
70. Parts Plaza UK Ltd. (129), 57-63 Marshgate Lane
71. former site of Queen Mary College Faculty of Engineering, 101 Marshgate Lane _ Bywaters Ltd. (33) _ Shed Productions (BG4) Ltd. _ Bouygues (UK) Ltd.
72. Clearun Waste Management Facility, Clearun Wharf, 151 Marshgate Lane _ Clearun Ltd.
73. Marshgate Business Centre, Marshgate Lane
73A. Units 9, 14, 17, 18: DP Communications
73B. Unit 7: Andy Latham Scenery _ Unit 1: Sirva UK Ltd. _ Unit 2: Bowden Glass Ltd. _ Unit 5: John Denton (93) _ Units 3,4,8,15: Alpha Building Services _ Unit 6: Wolseley UK Ltd. _ Units 19 & 20: Rapid Response Europe Ltd. (143) _ Unit 22a: Colbrook Plastics Ltd. _ Unit 22b: Lal Miah
74. Marshgate Railway Sidings
   _ HireMasters Ltd. (82)
   _ BTS Skips Ltd.
   _ A & R Waste (2)
   _ ESS Ltd. (Edwin Shirley Staging) (61)
   _ Docklands Waste Disposal (52)
   _ T&N Commercials Ltd. (157)
   _ J White (Bulk Fuels) (88)
   _ Best Japanese Second Hand Car Spares
   _ Bow Midland Waste Recycling Ltd.
   _ Bedrock Crushing and Recycled
   _ Materials Ltd.
   _ Topmix
75. Riverside Works, east of River Lea, west of Marshgate Lane
76. 3 Knobbs Hill Road: Multiservices
   Kent Ltd. (119)
   _ Parkes Galvanizing Ltd.
77. 4, 5, 5a Knobs Hill Road
   _ Dof (UK) Scrap Yard (55)
   _ Meyers Transport Ltd. (93)
   _ Vanstone Woodchips (169)
   _ Brewsters Waste Management Ltd. (22)
   _ Erith Waste Management Ltd.
78. Old Ford Pumping Station Cottage,
   Dace Road
79. Pudding Mill Lane Station
   _ Serco Docklands Ltd.
80. H for Mercedes (112), 1a Pudding Mill lane
81. Bow Power Station, Puddingmill Lane
   _ Eastman Engineering Ltd. (Engine World)
   _ Panache Outerwear Ltd. (127)
82. Thermotec Services Ltd., 53 Warton Road
83. Japanese Spares, 55a Warton Road
84. AV Autos, 57, Warton Road
   _ AV Autos
   _ Dof (UK) Ltd. (55)
   _ Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd.
   _ Discurn Ltd.
85. Maxmor House, Warton Road
   _ Best Selling Ltd.
   _ King Vision
86. Warton Road Car Pound, west of
   Warton Road, Drakes Group Ltd.
87. Bridgewater Estate, south of
   Bridgewater Road
   _ Bridgewater Distribution &
   Management Ltd.
   _ Kesslers Investment Ltd. (24)
88. Mc Gregor Cory House, Mc Gregor
   Cory (Commodities) Ltd., south of
   Bridgewater Road
   _ Simply Loos (151)
   _ Acrise Ltd.
   _ Ambala House, Ambala Foods (8)
89. Bow Paper Works, Bridgewater Road
   _ EDF Energy Networks Ltd.
   _ Kendon Packaging Group plc. (96)
90. Grays Waste Services, 8, 8a, 8b & 8c
   Barbers Road
91. Heron Industrial Estate, Units 1-9,
   north west of Barbers Road
   _ Unit 1: Mr Lee & London Development
   Agency
   _ Unit 8: Jarroy (Importers) Ltd.
   _ Unit 9: Deloitte & Touche LLP
   _ Yard: South Herts Waste Management
92. Discovery House, 1 Livingstone Road
   _ Ranger Ltd. (142)
93. 1-5 Livingstone Road
   _ BJB Holdings Ltd.
   _ Tropifruit UK (163)
   _ Lazerlink UK (97)
94. Vacant Factory, formerly Livingstone
   House
95. Mc Fen Haulage & Plant Ltd. (110),
   55-57 Stanley Road
96. Units 1& 2 Stanley Road
   _ Unit 1: Mr J Patel, ELL (62)
   _ Unit 2: Garments Processing Complex
   (72)
97. Royal Victor House, 5 Livingstone
   Road
98. Adler & Allan: 22-42 Livingstone Road
   (5)
99. Stratford Commercial Repairs & Coachwork (155), 87-111 Livingstone Road
100. Laxmi House, 160-170 High Street
101. Embassy Demolition Contractors (60), Livingstone Works
The Mayor of London Ken Livingstone’s Five Legacy Commitments (2007)

Commitment 1
Increasing opportunities for Londoners to become involved in sport.

Commitment 2
Ensuring Londoners benefit from new jobs, business and volunteering opportunities.

Commitment 3
Transforming the heart of East London.

Commitment 4
Delivering a sustainable Games and developing sustainable communities.

Commitment 5
Showcasing London as a diverse, creative and welcoming city.

Commitment 3
Homes

- Ensure the Olympic Village is of the highest environmental and design standard (developed to level 4 of the code for sustainable homes).
- The Olympic Village, which will house the athletes and officials, will leave an immediate post-Games legacy of around 9,000 homes, of which at least 30 per cent will be affordable.
- The site will contribute to a total target of around 40,000 new homes in the Lower Lea Valley to be constructed over a period of years after the Games.
- Homes will be built to high environmental and design standards.
- New residential developments will have ‘good access to schools, healthcare, shopping and leisure facilities.'
• Future housing will contain a mix of flats and family homes ‘to meet the needs of all Londoners (30% of which to be ‘affordable’).

Regeneration

• Develop a Legacy Masterplan Framework that will identify how the Olympic Park and sports venues will be managed after the Games.
• Demolish 52 pylons and place power lines underground on the Olympic Park site.
• Enable approximately 11,000 additional employment opportunities in the Olympic Park after the Games.

Commitment 4

Legacy

• Permanent venues in the Park to use 40 per cent less water and carbon emissions for permanent buildings in Park to be reduced by 50 per cent (based on current building regulations).
• After legacy conversion, at least 20 per cent of energy requirements on Olympic Park to be supplied by on-site renewable energy infrastructure.
• 102 hectares of new open space in Olympic Park, linked to the Green Grid.
• Games time Polyclinic transformed into a community health centre.
• Develop capacity of local supply chains to support Games and legacy procurement needs.
• Develop and deliver health programmes in conjunction with local Primary Care Trusts to get people more active and leading healthier lifestyles.
• Co-ordinate education programmes and workshops across London schools and universities to use the Games to improve learning.
Table 1: 2007 Funding of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (£ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: The Department of Culture, Media and Sport</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exchequer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Lottery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater London Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Breakdown of the budget for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, in comparison to the 2004 bid estimate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs and provisions</th>
<th>2007 budget (£ millions)</th>
<th>2004 bid estimates (£ millions)</th>
<th>Difference (£ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Olympic Delivery Authority budget:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Olympic Costs</td>
<td>3,081</td>
<td>1,966</td>
<td>1,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure and regeneration *</td>
<td>1,673</td>
<td>1,684</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>No estimate included</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,254</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,650</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,604</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (non-ODA) Olympic:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other provisions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing and wider security</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>No estimate included</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax **</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>No estimate included</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme contingency</td>
<td>2,247</td>
<td>No estimate included</td>
<td>2,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,683</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,683</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,325</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,036</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,289</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The sums listed here include the 995 million for land purchase and remediation

** The Minister’s announcement on 10 December increased the ODA’s pre-tax budget by £43, with an equivalent decrease in the tax provision to £793 million.

**Appendix E**

**London Mayor Boris Johnson’s Legacy Advisory Board Members**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and Current Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Gregson</td>
<td>Chairman of Phoenix Equity Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neale Coleman</td>
<td>Mayor of London's Advisor on the London 2012 Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Bob Kerslake</td>
<td>Chief Executive of the Homes and Communities Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvey McGrath</td>
<td>Chairman of the London Development Agency and Vice Chair of the Mayor of London's Skills and Employment Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Newsum</td>
<td>Executive Trustee of the Grosvenor Estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julia Peyton-Jones</td>
<td>Director of the Serpentine Gallery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jules Pipe</td>
<td>Mayor of Hackney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tessa Sanderson</td>
<td>Olympic medallist and head of the Newham Sports Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Sharp</td>
<td>Retired Chairman of Goldman Sachs’ European Principal Investment Area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1: London Development Agency’s Olympic land commitments: the original budget and the resultant costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>£m to</th>
<th>2007/8</th>
<th>2008/9</th>
<th>2009/10</th>
<th>2010/11</th>
<th>2011/12</th>
<th>2012/13</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Original budget (£ millions):</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land acquisition</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remediation</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other costs *</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revised budget (£ millions):</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land acquisition</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remediation</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other costs *</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INCREASE</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes costs associated with legacy planning

**Source:** London Development Agency, *Olympic land commitments and revised budget 2009/10, Report No: Public Item 02.1. 16 September 2009* (report by: Andrew Travers, Group Director, Resources and Performance)

### Table 2: Redemptions through Land Sales, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Lottery</th>
<th>£675</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>85% of the first £650 million of proceeds – around £550 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£470 million of the next £1.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater London Authority</td>
<td>15% of the first £650 million of proceeds – around £100 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15% of the next £1.3 billion – around £195 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A share (TBT) of the Olympic Village receipts, after all ODA costs have been paid, which will be recycled back into supporting the OPLC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total land sales</td>
<td>£1.8 billion needed for the above model to work</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>