How do urban forms enable political projects? The affordance of nationalism and nationhood during the modernisation of European cities.

The London School of Economics and Political Science

A thesis submitted to the European Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, May 2018
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Abstract

How do ideologies and cities shape each other? This work offers a theoretical strategy for explaining how urban forms and political projects have afforded each other's development historically, while avoiding a deterministic account of how political aims are realised in particular urban forms. To do this it focuses on the emergence of nationalism in the context of the modernisation of European cities in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. As background, the development of the concept of citizenship in the context of the medieval city is explored and an understanding of the exceptional political space of the city in political philosophy is outlined. The political philosophy of nationalism is seen to engender an urban-rural tension and the works of Rousseau and Herder are read to understand further the relationship between nationalist thought and the modern city. Then in order to structure an investigation of how urban form and ideology interact, an analytical framework is developed using JJ Gibson’s theory of affordances. The framework is applied to European urban forms which developed during the rise of nationalism, specifically in three historical city cases: Budapest, Vienna and Venice. The cases share in common an experience of Habsburg administration and the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century but have quite different formal contexts. Urban forms and affordances are discussed more generally using the phenomenon and concept of Haussmannisation and the usefulness of that concept is discussed. More general conclusions are drawn in which political ideas, ideologies and urban forms are understood to afford each other ranges of such possibilities without determining them.

Keywords: urban history, urban forms, affordances, politics, political ideas, ideology, history, nationalism, intellectual history, architecture, planning, modernity, philosophy, Budapest, Vienna, Venice
Acknowledgements

My sincere thanks, first of all, to my supervisors, Jonathan White and Simon Glendinning for their insights and the patience they have demonstrated in guiding me during this project. I am also most grateful for the opportunity they gave me to return to academia as a mature student and their encouragement at every turn. My thanks go to the staff of the Austrian State Archives and the University Library in Vienna, the State Archives of Venice, the Metropolitan Ervin Szabó Library, the Telephony Museum and the Library of Parliament in Budapest and the British Library and the LSE Library in London. Thanks also to Judit Böröcz in helping me navigate Budapest and for translating. This thesis was made financially possible by people at a variety of companies in London who paid for my project management services while I pursued my research. In particular I would like to thank Adam Fisher for stretching the definition of ‘working from home’ as far as Vienna. For the past ten years I have been fortunate to be able to discuss ideas with thoughtful and interesting contributors and attendees at Big Ideas, a series of events Rich Cochrane and I started in pubs across London. My thanks go to Rich, Andrew McGettigan, Clare Churly, Bob Kingham, Ralph McHugh, Clunie Reid, Danny Rye among many others for fascinating discussions which have no doubt contributed to my intellectual development and therefore to this thesis. I thank Danny Birchall who has always found the time to listen to my ideas, give thoughtful responses and has also been a great source of encouragement. Special thanks go to my parents, Neil Charlton and Viv Charlton, for instilling in me a love of reading and learning and for their love and support over the years. And heartfelt thanks to my children, Frank and Magali, for putting up with a distracted dad and for being a joy to spend time with when I was not distracted.
Alice Charlton has done everything possible to encourage me to pursue my academic journey and has supported me throughout. She has inspired me and enriched my life immensely and I am greatly indebted to her. This thesis is dedicated to Alice.
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Figure 1: Urban Population Changes in Budapest, Vienna and Venice 1750 – 1950 (de Vries, 1984)
**Introduction**

This thesis is concerned with how political projects have interacted with the material and institutional structures of the city and with the city as an assembled, human environment. It seeks a novel way of understanding this relationship through historical analysis and in doing so it has a particular concern for what the modern city has enabled politically. Three cases are drawn upon to explore this and many other shorter examples are used to inform and apply a theoretical framework. This framework is based on the work of JJ Gibson, in particular his concept of affordances. Though he specifically applied it to the field of ecological psychology, this concept has found itself transferred to several other fields such as design and, perhaps surprisingly, to literary criticism; it is this last application which is used as a starting point for analysing the city. Categories of forms developed by Caroline Levine, building on Gibson’s theory of affordances, are transferred for use with the historical case studies and a framework is elaborated which can be used to understand the relationship between urban environments, political ideas and ideology.

The theoretical framework allows for the possibility of a distinct urban life in which socio-economic conditions and cultural expression inform each other. It is used to examine cities which had become well-established in medieval Europe, which at the commencement of their modernisation shared the experience of Habsburg administration, and whose politics were infused with nationalising projects in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The case studies expand what might have been afforded, where that affordance was realised, where ideological practice might have narrowed the range of affordances and examine how cities, and more broadly place, impinged upon nationalist thought.
In investigating the city and its political and ideological possibilities, the opportunity presents itself to re-think and re-imagine urban concepts in a way that is not necessarily attached to a wider programme of social theory and is wary of locking in ideological biases and perspectives: a reading which accounts for the role of historical processes, institutions and structure in the creation and use of urban space while at the same time acknowledging such accounts as provisional and open to interpretation. The cases are drawn from emerging modern cities at a critical historical moment before urbanisation became a planetary phenomenon (Lefebvre, 2003, p. 113) and during which both modern urban and cultural forms and practices evolved within boundaries that were more clearly delineated in cities with perhaps a more distinct sense of place than in later periods. Thus, a way for reimagining how place and ideology relate to each other can be developed. The juncture in question is one in which cities globally, though initially concentrated in Europe and North America, became recognisably modern in structure and outlook. The latter half of the nineteenth century was a time in which industrialisation was at full acceleration and began to have a fundamental effect on the lives of all classes in Europe and beyond.

This is a reading of history through concepts. It is not a history of concepts, which is what ‘conceptual history’ tends to mean, but history organised by concepts. As historical research it should not be viewed as an inductive exercise in archival retrieval, although there are aspects of archival research to it. Instead it sets out to organise an understanding of what to look for in cities when seeking to understand the function of urban form and the associated use of ideology in the development of the modern city.

It is not aligned with a particular theoretical tradition or school of interpretation. The theoretical framework which is developed does not amount to a kind of explanatory theory of everything that happened in a certain period, in a way that a Marxist or
Weberian account might aim to do. It is not working with a set of concepts at a macro-theoretical level but neither does it take on an inductivist scepticism towards concepts. It operates instead at a level that works with ideas but wants to keep more fluent relationships between them rather than to try to put them into a more rigid structure. It draws conclusions which are generalisable beyond urban history and says something about how we read a city in any context, using a historical lens for this particular reading.

Nationalism is selected as an example of a set of political ideas, with the nation as an ideological project, which coincided with the development of the modern city at its moment of rapid growth in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe. In the first chapter, background on nationalism and urban history is outlined with reference to literature on the relationship of cities to nationalism. The reading of existing literature shows that there is an opportunity for conceptual innovation to understand better the relationship of political ideas to the built urban environment.

In the second chapter, political thought that had an influence on nationalist politics is examined with the aim of showing how it could account for modern cities and how nationalism could make use of modern urbanisation. How did the city itself impinge upon political philosophy, theory and political programmes? The development of the concept of citizenship is proposed as a historico-legal phenomenon aligned with the development of cities and urban institutions. The extent to which cities are interpreted as an exceptional space in political philosophy is explored along with the notion that politics itself is the product of this exceptional space. Turning to nationalist political philosophy, an urban-rural tension is identified as present in much nationalist thinking. Political nationalism has theoretical roots in the writings of Rousseau and Herder and their work is interrogated to understand a political philosophy of the city which accounts for ‘nation’. This is set within a wider understanding of the Western
political philosophical tradition. They are read for evidence of an urban-rural tension and to understand their strategies for dealing with it. Rousseau advocated for an urban environment which could maximise human freedom and facilitate a life of ‘amour de soi’ over ‘amour propre’. Herder treated cities as cultural products, the outworking of different kinds of civilisation and nation. Examining both of these writers shows both what the city affords political philosophy and how political theories can attempt to open up and shape different kinds of urban development. Even when it has been set up by romantic nationalism as a fount of modern corruption, the city’s future existence and role in a nationalist scheme have still had to be accounted for.

In the third chapter, a diverse set of short examples are set out to which the concepts of forms and affordances can be applied. Each of these examples shows different expressions of urban forms and what they afford politically. The geographical scope of the examples is wider than physical Europe and the historical scope extends out of the period covered in the main case studies. This enables a general exploration of what might be possible when cities are thought about through their constituent forms and highlights the role of urban forms that have endured over an extensive period in structuring modern cities. The examples show how use and meaning interact with the long persistence of urban forms. Combinations of material form and urban practices are shown to provide an underpinning for political and ideological programmes. The multiple examples also reinforce how the formal categories used – wholes, rhythms, hierarchies and networks – overlap and synthesise.

The conceptual framework of forms and affordances is then elaborated further through the three historical case studies in the next three chapters. The cities in the case studies have in common the experience of a process of modernisation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the specific context of nationalism. They
also share a common administrative context, that of historical Habsburg administration. The Habsburg lands were particularly rich in ethnic diversity and this was reflected in the composition of their cities. However, each of the three cases had its own diverse set of demographic, economic and social conditions which can show that similar dynamics of the interaction of political ideas and structure can occur in quite different contexts and that the framework’s conceptual categories can be applied far afield.

The cases studies offer a means to interrogate particular circumstances to shed light on a very broad research question. Approaches to urban questions have tended to be attenuated over time from unabashed grand narration to a more particularised investigation as the human sciences and the humanities have problematised and shied away from universal theorising. There is a tension, then, between the universal and the particular that is not easily nor necessarily resolved. The focus here is not on finding a resolution but instead to consider themes which might be described as universal and cases which are decidedly particular. It applies the theoretical framework to thinking about both, as it seeks to understand the relationship between urban forms and political and ideological practices and the possibilities afforded by the city in its various instantiations.

Chapter 4 takes Budapest as the first case study, the quintessential example of a ‘national’ city. Budapest presents a relatively straightforward case of an explicit political programme to nationalise the city and so provides straightforward examples to which a theory of forms and affordances can be applied. From relatively early in the nineteenth century there was activity aimed at creating an autonomous or independent Hungary centred on Budapest. National institutions or proto-national institutions were established in Pest and Buda during the 1820s and 1830s and the twin cities became central to Hungarian national culture. During the 1840s, nationalist unrest in the
Austrian Empire opened up the opportunity for urban centres to act as conduits for political activity, and particularly nationalist activity. The failed Hungarian Revolution of 1848-49 further cemented its role as a national centre and its part in a narrative of nationalist development, Budapest briefly being united and made national capital in 1849. As Hungary coalesced as an autonomous polity during the latter half of the nineteenth century, so it was that Budapest was developed as a Hungarian administrative centre, playing its part symbolically as a centre of nation and being subject to a process of nationalisation. The merging of urban centres into a unified Budapest was heavily linked to the carving out of a Hungarian nation. Therefore, Budapest provides the clearest case in this study for examining the reciprocity between political programme and urban development.

Chapter 5 provides a more equivocal case study, Vienna, a city that is perhaps best understood more as an imperial city than it is as a national city. The city’s historic position on the edge of the German-speaking world and adjacent to eastern Europe and the Balkans has contributed to it having a complicated relationship to nationalism; both to German nationalism which might lay claim to the city and to the various nationalisms which arose during the nineteenth century in the Habsburg lands for which Vienna was an administrative and cultural centre. The extent to which Vienna was shaped by its position in relation to nationalist political aspiration is more difficult to ascertain than for Budapest. Nevertheless, it is shown that it is possible to perceive how nationalism and ideologies more generally impinged upon its development and this makes Vienna a fitting comparison to its Habsburg urban relation downstream on the Danube. Vienna's relationship to power was quite distinct, the long-term presence of the Habsburgs having a marked effect on the development of the city. The city maintained an aristocratic core until much later than equivalent cities which in the nineteenth century
had come to be dominated by the bourgeoisie. There is a tension within the city of Vienna in which class dynamics and various political programmes are contested and it is possible to perceive this tension being worked out through its architecture and urban layout.

In Chapter 6, Venice, the final case study, provides the least straightforward case. It was an object of Italian nationalist desire and yet also the only city in the case studies which had a long history of self-government and independence with a kind of urban self-government which did not necessarily map on to a nineteenth century nationalist idea of a nation-state. Yet even here the possibilities of the affordance of nationalist politics in the city’s forms are seen. Venice’s position at the edge of western Europe and in the marginal land of its lagoon presents a special set of urban conditions quite distinct from the other two cases. Furthermore, it is a city of two overlapping identities, one more national, one more civic, both having a strong appeal to the majority population of Romance language speakers. These claims distinguish Venice from the relatively monolithic construct of Hungarian identity in Budapest and German or Austrian identities in Vienna. In terms of the aspiration of nineteenth century Italian nationalists to nationalise the city, Venice was, again, distinct in its being as much the object of nationalist attention as it, or its institutions, being active nationalist subjects. Venice had and has an extraordinary status. Its long history of independence, its mediating role between eastern Europe, Asia and western Europe and the celebration of its architecture have added to the sense of the city itself being a unique work of art. It is a city which might be claimed not only by the local Venetian population and the Italian nation-state but also claimed as part of an international patrimony. This makes for an instructive contrast with Budapest and Vienna in an investigation of the interaction of politics and urban forms.
Having shown how an analysis based on forms and affordances can be used to expand on how a city can incorporate nationalism or be part of a programme of nationalisation and, in turn, shape that nationalist programme, in Chapter 7 a wider view is taken in order to see how this kind of relationship operated more broadly. To do that, the analysis turns to a form of urban development, commonly seen as influential on all three of the case studies and also more generally on the modern European city. The restructuring of Paris in the late nineteenth century under Baron Haussmann produced the concept of Haussmannisation, a concept which can be applied descriptively, normatively and romantically. Descriptively, it is useful in naming a set of characteristics of the modern city in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in which straight boulevards were cut through irregular street plans and buildings were made to conform to a set of standards thereby providing a measure of visual unity. Normatively, it can be applied to describe a process in which authoritarian urban planning radically restructured diverse urban centres. Romantically, it can be used to glorify a kind of high modernist aesthetic order. Haussmannisation could be seen as the underlying context for all three cases in the late nineteenth century.

Analytically, though, the concept has its limitations. It is a concept which has been understood deterministically as if it were a template which could successfully reproduce certain kinds of social and political outcome, interpreted positively or negatively. The usefulness of Haussmannisation as a framework for understanding how political and ideological programmes are furthered in city design is explored and critiqued within the wider context of nineteenth century urbanisation and what it afforded politically and ideologically.

In the final chapter, conclusions are drawn about how different types of urban form can afford a variety of political practices. These types of urban form – ‘whole’
forms, rhythms, hierarchies and networks – each offer a range of affordances, from the mundane and prosaic to the ideologically and politically loaded. This typology of forms, adapted and developed to look at the environment of the city, is shown to be highly applicable not only in the three case studies but also to multiple smaller examples with the intention of producing a generalisable analysis. The typology of urban forms is noted as implying a separation of categories which in practice cannot be perceived separately. The streets of a city are not experienced as a series of discrete transactions with urban forms but rather the interaction between people and forms, and between forms themselves, is a synthesis. A synthesis of forms constitutes an experience unique to place and is complex in both how it is immediately experienced and how it is sustained over time.

This complexity, it is suggested, inures the city to total domination by particular ideologies and is what makes the concept of affordances, where multiple possibilities remain open even as ideology seeks to close them down, powerful. The conceptual framework based on forms and affordances offers an alternative to thinking about this urban complexity in terms of the hegemonic capture of the city. Instead, political ideas and urban forms are understood to afford other potentials without necessarily determining them. Even as the city’s streets are controlled and policed, other possibilities are present though they might be temporally narrowed.
1. Nationalism and Urban History

As industrialisation exerted an increasing influence on urban life – as, for example, manufacturing moved from being proximate to natural resources to being located in large population centres – cities whose structures both physical and institutional had persisted over centuries experienced tensions previously unimaginable. The forces of modern production were superimposed on medieval urban infrastructure and therefore urban forms had to respond both to the threat of those tensions and to the opportunities modernity engendered. Adaptations to massive inward migration, new technologies and new social and political forces were to reshape old cities and to reconceive what a city was. Modernised cities in Europe became modern not just because of ad hoc responses to socio-economic forces but also because urban authorities mandated large scale public works and administrative innovations. The resulting modern city not only looked different to the casual observer but also created a novel, modern urban experience which structured social and political action and responses. It provided a previously inconceivable range of possibilities for social and political organisation. By addressing how modern European cities enabled political projects, this work seeks to outline changes to urban forms as they modernised and create a framework for understanding how urban forms afford a range of ideological responses and practices.

During the period covered in the case studies, Budapest, Vienna and Venice were subject to different degrees to emerging nationalist narratives and competing claims on the allegiances of their populations regarding an identity beyond identification with the city itself. The overlapping claims of German, Austrian, Habsburg, Magyar, Hungarian, Venetian and Italian identities and additionally significant minority claims of Jewish, Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, Slovak and Czech ethnicities provide particularly rich sites
for investigation of modern urbanisation and the emergence of nationalist culture and ideology. Budapest, with its rapid expansion during the nineteenth century alongside vigorous nationalist activity and the formation of proto-national institutions, is the most clear-cut case of the three to apply and elaborate the proposed theoretical framework. Vienna during the same period also grew significantly but the influence on urban politics of nationalism strengthened later and was complicated by the city being the capital of a multi-ethnic empire. However, the affordance of ideology is still detectable and this case stretches the theoretical domain of affordances. Both Budapest and Vienna were modernised broadly along the same lines of other European cities during the period with the use of large, new boulevards and grand structures to transform the aesthetics and function of city centres. The case of Venice provides an example which, again, demonstrates broader potential for the application of the theory of affordances by showing how ideology worked in a city which had few roads to make into boulevards.

How nationalism was adopted and contested in the cities of central and eastern Europe is the subject of a growing body of scholarship and debate in history and urban studies. Several accounts in urban histories have sought to understand how nationalism was adopted and contested in the region. Gary Cohen’s ‘The Politics of Ethnic Survival’ has been important in this area, taking as it does the case of Prague in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and showing how the city itself created an environment for the contest of German, Czech and other identities (1981). Robert Nemes’ ‘The Once and Future Budapest’ studies the move of Magyar nationalism into Budapest’s cafe society and into the public realm (2005). These works have approached the subject of nationalism in particular urban contexts showing the city in the context of the rise of nationalism. In work such as Nathaniel Wood’s ‘Becoming Metropolitan’ the emphasis has been on the wide range of influencing forces on the urbanisation process, in Wood’s
case on Krakow (2010). Nationalist practice in these works features in the wider context of forces shaping urban society during this period. Indeed, these case studies of Prague, Budapest and Krakow are valuable in isolating nationalisms as ideologies which impacted the development of modern cities, ideologies whose influence can be difficult to identify clearly at the greater scale of the nation-state. Chad Bryant has noted, ‘urban history can reduce the scope of our inquiries – whether they be about nationalism, modernization, or something else – to a manageable size.’ (2011, pp. 776–777) The ambition of this thesis is to go a step further than using urban history as a method for more easily observing the effective functioning of wider ideological and social forces; it is to understand how urban form has been and is an active agent in the engagement of such forces, using historical urban cases in the context of nationalism to elaborate the mechanism by which they interact.

Key concerns relating to urban forms and affordances can be detected in Göran Therborn’s work on the monumental geographies of European capital cities (2002) which takes a view of the processes that made major European national capitals as a capture of cities by the state. Public architecture and monuments, the planning of urban spaces and the naming of cities are the material used by Therborn to provide a credible explanation for the increased importance of capitals in Europe, helping the state to assert itself against traditional authority and autonomous city-states. He shows how the first modern national capital cities, with Paris as the prime example, came about in the wake of the French Revolution, reordering them to act as the ceremonial focus for a 'national public' (2002, p. 45). Outside of this revolutionary influence other capitals were to follow this example including London and Berlin. The height of capital city building was, according to Therborn’s work, the latter half of the nineteenth century and up to the First World War. At this time:
'A future-looking historicism and mass didactic purpose constituted a common frame of reference among the iconographers of the epoch. Architecture and public sculpture drew heavily upon the old repertoire of European form, above all upon the Classicism of Antiquity, but also significantly upon medieval Gothic.’ (2002, p. 21)

He presented the European capital as having four monumental cornerstones. First, there was a network of wide streets, squares and grand railway stations for ostentatious bourgeois display. Second, there were national state institutions celebrated in such edifices as the parliament building. Third, there were buildings of high secular culture such as museums, libraries, operas and universities. Fourth, there was urban space which was politicised and monumentalised as never before, the aim being a national community of common, public symbols. The monumentalisation of cities suggests a complex interplay of factors which is shown as closely aligned with their nationalisation and which extends beyond capital cities to any city finding itself the object of nationalisation.

In each of Therborn’s examples, urban forms in capital cities afford different possibilities for nationalisation. Regarding what cities directly afford political projects, each of Therborn’s four cornerstones supports ideological affordances. The provision of large public spaces in the modern capital makes possible mass appreciation of ostentatious, nationalised architecture and monuments. Likewise, the capacity of the modern city’s accommodation allows a state’s authorities to draw on a labour force to power its administration at a previously inconceivable scale. Similarly, increased
population size made nationally-inspired high culture economically viable. Large public spaces afforded the crystallisation of imaginary national narratives in real space through monumental architecture. Insight into Therborn’s cornerstones can also be gained by considering what affordances of urban forms are blocked by ideology. National pride promotes a grandiose architectural aesthetic over a more functional one. The presence of national institutions can crowd the development of urban identities distinct from the national. As a national high culture is promoted, so a cultural hierarchy develops in which vernacular culture is downgraded. Monumental nationalism overwhelms contrasting narratives and imposes a more singular interpretation of ‘national’ events. Turning to how urban forms can afford the reinforcement of ideology, the ostentation of boulevards, railways stations and so on underpins the celebration of national achievement in the everyday life of the capital city. National institutions in the city bolster urban identity even if they narrow the possibility of a more autonomous identity for the city. Capital cities were benighted by their high cultural status, the presence of national orchestras, ballet and opera companies boosted their position on any international ranking of cultural cities. Finally, a permanent cast of national figures and stories in monumental form reinforced national identity for the urban citizen.

Work on nineteenth century urbanisation has generally understood nationalism as a relatively small component of the process, if such ideological constructs as nationalism are acknowledged as significant at all against urbanisation's socio-economic causes. Even in cases where the narrative of nationalism was very strongly associated with the creation of a nation-state, as with the ‘unification nationalism’ of Italy, the tendency has been to downplay its influence. Using the Italian example, however, recent reassessments of the period of the Risorgimento question the view that unification nationalism played an insignificant role in the formation and development
of Italy and, by implication, in the development of modern Italian cities. Lucy Riall outlines this shift in ‘Risorgimento – The History of Italy from Napoleon to the Nation State’ and highlights the work of Alberto Banti. Of particular interest is the attention she draws to theatre:

‘Theatre in particular played a nationalising role. The popularity of opera led to a wave of theatre construction in major cities and small towns, and these theatres created a recognisable and uniform public architecture across the Italian Peninsula.’ (2009, p. 126)

This can augment Therborn’s high cultural cornerstones of monumental European cities with the inclusion of urban settings beyond capital cities. In its identification of the development of an architectural template for the replication of public buildings with an Italian identity, it has shown a way forward to understanding the overlap between technical urban forms and programmatic ideological messaging.

The emphasis on nineteenth century Europe here is not aimed at obscuring the deeper roots of social change which opened up the way for modern urbanisation and ideological movements. Hohenburg and Lees have suggested that in the late eighteenth century ‘a new egalitarianism was developing around shared tastes and pursuits in literature’ and that ‘the new vertical bond of nationalism was already at work, ironically spurred by the same revolutionary wave that exacerbated horizontal divisions.’ The vertical bonds of nationalism were to subsume and replace the social structures of the early modern city (1985, pp. 150–151) and processes of replacement could be said to be afforded by the preceding social forms. The historical context for the conditions of
modernity and ideology in each of the city cases examined here are expanded in order to draw out such deep historical affordances.

To understand how ideological narratives and practices have meaningful effects on the formation, morphology and development of modern cities, it is helpful to set the scene in the context of broader historical trends. The influence of nationalist narratives on European society and politics can be viewed from three different but interrelated perspectives. First, there is a philosophical and theoretical development coming out of Romanticism which could be observed in the political philosophy and writings of Rousseau, Herder, Fichte and others. Second, there is the development of a discourse of nationalism which increased in intensity and volume during the nineteenth century as some of the great land empires of Europe began to experience internal tensions and alternative state structures – smaller and more dynamic than the imperial set-up – were contemplated, advocated for and fought for.

The rejection of traditional forms of political authority during the European Enlightenment, which had been previously vested in the Church and aristocracy, created the need to posit forms of political community suitable for a rationalised, secular world. The difficulty was that such communities required some kind of emotional appeal in order to replace those traditional institutions. There were, and are, a variety of European identities which could be defined as based on the concept of ‘nation’ (Hobsbawm, 1997, pp. 103–110). All are drawn from earlier, pre-modern and early modern European society and politics giving a modern spin to them to serve the purpose of creating national identities which appealed to modern citizens and served the interests of the modern state (Tilly, 1992, p. 63).

These new political, communal identities emerging during the Enlightenment gained particular importance in the wake of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic
expansion (Rowe, 2013, pp. 127–148): as the French military-imperial state constituted itself as the liberator of European peoples so it appealed over the heads of traditional figures of authority by creating new states in Italy, Germany and Poland. In the wake of the revolutions across Europe in 1848, during which time mass politics emerged in the context of population expansion, working class political organisation and migration from country to city, the idea of the ‘nation’ was particularly potent in what has been called the Springtime of Peoples (Hobsbawm, 1997, pp. 21–40). It was perhaps Fichte who operationalised the concept of the nation most readily in the early nineteenth century in his ‘Addresses to the German Nation’ (1922). Although he addressed himself to an elite liberal audience his words had the characteristics of an appeal to a mass audience as opposed to the drier political philosophical context in which the nation was spoken of in the writings of Rousseau and Herder.

In Europe, this politicisation of the concept of nation was most readily seen in the large land empires of Continental Europe as well as in the British Isles in Ireland (Hobsbawm, 2014, p. 171). In the Ottoman Empire it was seen early in Greece then Serbia (2014, pp. 173–175) and in the Habsburg lands the idea of nation was increasingly important in Hungary and Italy (2014, pp. 164–166). It is in the writings of such people as Mazzini that the Italian nation was elevated to a holy cause and a more complete ideological construct (Mazzini, 1891). In Germany, the ‘German nation’ was deployed to motivate movement towards a constitutional settlement which could unify the disparate political entities of the former Holy Roman Empire and the later German Confederation (Hobsbawm, 2014, pp. 111–112). In Russia as well as Prussia and Austria, agitation for an independent Polish state was increasingly underpinned by an appeal to a notion of the Polish nation (Lukowski & Zawadzki, 2006, pp. 168–170). The series of uprisings and revolutions in the late 1840s culminating in 1848-9 across
many of these lands saw the crystallisation of political movements which were heirs to the spirit of the French Revolution. That these various political programmes, originating in diverse social groups and locations, should realise some of their revolutionary plans and have such a dramatic effect on Europe in 1848, largely in an urban context, is significant.

Cultural as well as political responses in post-1815 reactionary states in Europe accompanied by the first wave of industrialisation in mainland Europe produced the context for future ideological developments. In the Austrian Empire under Metternich, a deeply conservative police state which actively supressed political activity, a kind of non-political cultural expression was especially productive. The so-called Biedermeier period of political quietism in Austria was to prove particularly beneficial to music with Beethoven’s ninth symphony premiering in Vienna in 1824 and Schubert at the height of his powers (Beller, 2006, p. 117). Music-making in the home enjoyed great popularity in the period between the Congress of Vienna and the 1848 revolution. Domestic music was a much-loved family pastime and informal gatherings such as the ‘Schubertiads’ featured Schubert's music, poetry readings and dancing indicative of the bourgeois, inward spirit of the Biedermeier era (Olson, 2015, p. 97). From the 1830s, however, there was evidence of dissatisfaction with the Metternich regime and Austrian literature had a more critical political edge, particularly from Austrians abroad. Charles Sealsfield anonymously published the critical ‘Austria As It Is’ in London, which was banned in Austria. The ‘Grenzboten’, a German magazine espousing liberal ideas which the conservative regime wanted suppressed, was imported illegally into Austria during the 1830s and 1840s. (Beller, 2006, p. 118) This increase in political opposition was triggered at least in part by a marked acceleration of industrialisation and economic growth in key parts of the Austrian economy, especially in Bohemia. The government
continued to suppress political life but permitted throughout the different lands outlets of a cultural life that were, in the era of Romanticism, often to focus on the idea of the ‘nations’ of the Austrian Empire. Institutions such as the Bohemian Patriotic Museum in Prague (Agnew, 2003, p. 66) and the Scholarly Society of Budapest (Nemes, 2005, p. 55) were founded with Austrian state support but rapidly became centres for the production of research on Czech and Magyar ‘national’ topics. The ‘historic nations’ such as the Bohemians, Poles, Italians and Magyars each had elites which were conscious of a sense of the rights set aside for their local royal or imperial territory and it was through them that cultural nationalism and political nationalism combined (Beller, 2006, p. 120). The Austrian administration could use these nationalist sentiments to its own benefit, effectively setting one ethnic group against another with rival nationalisms and deflecting political unrest that might have otherwise been directed at Vienna. So, it was that the use of the concept of ‘nation’ around which much cultural activity was organised was extended into political contestation. It was, at this earlier stage, largely used by the aristocracy and intellectuals of the Empire’s localities, (Judson, 2016, pp. 212–214). However, nationalist outlooks became more widely disseminated and increasingly informed the politics of the Habsburg lands just as modernisation and industrialisation were beginning to have an impact on its society, creating the conditions for a wider mass politics to emerge (2016, pp. 273–275). Nationalist ideas and rhetoric were to have increasing potency and became attached to a politics of resistance to the imperial centre. This might well have worked out differently for the Austrian Empire if, as Beller has speculated, the political culture of the Empire after 1815 had been more open – perhaps then German culture might have been more politically neutral and available as a complementary supra-national identity (2006, p. 121).
The increasing importance of the nation as a unifying identity and political community coincided with dramatic changes in migration occurring across Europe: migration increased to various places outside and also within Europe, with migration from the countryside to the city allied, of course, with increasing industrialisation (Hobsbawm, 1997, p. 228). These changes stretched and broke traditional social bonds thereby creating the opportunity for new forms of social, political and cultural identity and bonds to take root. By the late nineteenth century, as the franchise in various states expanded to create for the first time a mass politics, the appeal of ideologies such as nationalism could be used by politicians to target groups within the electorate.

New kinds of community and cultural affinity emerging during this period did not necessarily radically break with what went before them. As Benedict Anderson has it, ‘If nation-states are widely conceded to be “new” and “historical,” the nations to which they give expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and still more important, glide into a limitless future.’ (1991, pp. 11–12) Nineteenth century nationalist rhetoric frequently appealed to a deeper and longer history. In this appeal, a ‘nation’ without a state was one whose capabilities and power needed to be restored and this idea of restoration was fundamental to nationalist narratives. In an urban context, cities in which various sacred places needed restoration or rescuing from an alien authority could come to be the focus of nationalist activity. This could be detected in the wake of Greek War of Independence as Athens was reclaimed from the Ottomans and made capital of Greece, despite its diminutive size, conveniently appealing to the philhellenism of the educated bourgeoisie of other European states (Bastéa, 2000, pp. 9–12).

Liberalism had developed into a powerful set of tenets centred on concepts such as liberty and rationality; conservatism emerged in many ways as a response to liberal
challenges to the established order, drawing together disparate groups by appealing to notions such as order and authority; socialism was by the mid-nineteenth century a significant political phenomenon appealing to a newly industrialised working class, organised around a desire for equality and human wellbeing. As mass politics emerged, so these political traditions increased in their potency and through political parties and other institutions of civil society enabled different groups to coalesce and organise to influence and to take over policymaking. Liberal, conservative and socialist parties and groups were increasingly programmatic in their approach, organising on a large-scale and developing political language and materials which not only elaborated a core political philosophy but also aimed at activating and motivating a mass audience to action (Hobsbawm, 1997, pp. 122–142). It is this evolution from a debate around political ideas to a programme for mass political consumption that Michael Freeden has described as marking the transition from contestability to the determinacy of ideology; going from debate about, for example, human nature to a more concrete statement about what human nature actually is and thereby narrowing the possibilities for challenge (1996, p. 75).

The emergence of the modern European city afforded this kind of ideological transition. Monumental architecture could be used to take control of how urban forms were to be interpreted, for example. The many military monuments to national sacrifice dotted around European cities projected a connection between the modern city and a traditional order of church, monarchy and military and legitimated the use of the street for the processions of all three and narrowed the opportunity to contest that use. Further, urban forms could be narrated in order to control their interpretation and hence the perception of what they afforded. In the most literal sense, the narration of urban forms could be uttered through the naming of a city’s streets and buildings. The modern
boulevard Gran Vía in Madrid exemplifies such narration and its naming can be tracked through the naming of its three sections on completion between 1909 and 1921 (Conde de Peñalver, Pi y Margal and Eduardo Dato: in sequence, named after a former conservative mayor, an anarchist politician and conservative Prime Minister), their renaming during the Spanish Civil War (CNT, Rusia and Mexico: after the anarcho-syndicalist trade union, the country forming the core of the USSR which supported the Republican government and the major Spanish-speaking nation supporting the Republican government), their renaming on the victory for the Nationalists (all three sections named José Antonio, the founder of the Falange) and finally the post-Franco renaming to Gran Vía, the intentionally non-partisan name for the dawn of a supposedly post-ideological age (Corral, 2004, pp. 214–215). Each name not only advertised ideological merits but also tuned the street’s affordances as a site of official display, of protest and of commercial opportunity. The naming of the street masks other potential affordances – it is not that major retail brands were not afforded the possibility of setting up shop in Avenida José Antonio but that the association of the brand with fascism in the age of neo-liberalism might jar.
Avoiding Deterministic Accounts in Urban History

‘But in vain I set out to visit the city: forced to remain motionless and always the same, in order to be more easily remembered, Zora has languished, disintegrated, disappeared. The earth has forgotten her.’ Invisible Cities (Calvino, 1997, p. 13)

Zora is not an especially fine city. Its layout and its urban furniture, however, are profoundly evocative and are used as a device for memory. It is a city which has crossed from the bodily world to that of the mind so as to achieve a kind of immortality. Its permanence is illusory, however, and the preservation of a Zora of the mind has led to it vanishing in the world. The separation of mental processes from the environment is not just shown to be misconceived but degrading of the earthly city. In Zora, Calvino has Marco Polo conjure a disguised description of Venice. It is also a parable for the perils of the division of human from the urban environment, both in the conception of a city’s design and the appreciation and understanding of its design. It also contains a tragic inevitability: as soon as the whole form of the city is imagined it becomes frozen, a graveyard of ideas rather than a living place and rather than a place for living that is entangled in human activity.

The example from Zora warns of the danger of separating human action from the physical environment when thinking about the city. There is, though, an obverse danger: that the clear delineation of a well-established and attested object of history, the city, is lost in the effort to dissolve the line between a frozen, rational entity and the lived social world. Just as the street and architecture of the city are not in isolation from
each other, so the social use of the city is not isolated from the morphology of the city itself.

Cities are, of course, more than their material positioning. They are constituted as much by social practices and complex intermingling of material and social structures. Definitions of cities which focus upon absolute population size and density do not capture an essential urban quality – that they are places in which certain kinds of human settlement and practice are structured such that they create opportunities for regulated but unmediated social collaboration. That these possibilities present themselves outside of the urban context does not detract from the scale at which this can happen in a city. The complex array of material and social characteristics makes the city a slippery concept that is difficult to identify as an object of analysis and there may well be more definitions of a city than there are cities to define. Further, as urbanisation has increased vastly in scale and scope in the early twenty-first century, the question arises of whether cities have become too indistinct from other forms of modern settlement to be useful as a category.

The modern city since the nineteenth century has developed through the application of technical innovation, bringing together services, infrastructure and architecture into a functioning system. Urbanisation, expressed as this kind of technical phenomenon, has extended its reach in the meantime beyond what was typically defined as a city to the point where such technologies and services have, in many regions, become ubiquitous in both urban and rural areas. However, the city maintains a powerful identity which impinges upon political programmes and the significance of urban place cannot be ignored even as cities become a part of larger conglomerations.

The city is a place not just of established sophisticated urban machinery but also as somewhere which can focus human identity and action. It also persists as a historical
artefact: the historical city is the material with which modern cities have been grounded and built out. So, the persistence of the historical city, or at least its traces, secures the city category some relevance both to history and to any analysis aspiring to understand the trajectories followed over time to arrive at contemporary urban conditions. What is more, a city can have identities which are charismatic, identities which float free of a city’s physical forms and which focus and inspire social action. This charismatic city also gives some security to the city category if only as an object of narrative analysis.

As cities were modernised and expanded in Europe and elsewhere during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they drew on the historic foundations of early urban settlements and reused and reconfigured those places and space. Analogous processes were at work at the same time in a shift in cultural and political ideas which took traditional concepts and used them as historical bricolage for modern political discourse. Making sense of this coincidence of modern urbanisation and the rise of mass politics and its ideologies is central to this thesis. The aim is not to develop or add to a systematic theory of ideology: a cluster of terms such as ‘political projects’, ‘political ideas’ and ‘ideology’ are used to a certain degree interchangeably here to indicate a set of objectives around which groups organise, the emphasis being on how such objectives impinge on the city rather than how those objectives are arrived at. There is a particular focus on nationalism, a concept which can be defined as a standalone ideology or as part of a greater set of ideas, such as conservatism, which could be the level at which the term ideology is applied. For the purposes of this work, nationalism and programmes of nation-building provide the means by which political identities in modern Europe have laid claim both to the loyalty of a set of people and to territory, in particular to the loyalty of city-dwellers and their city. The mechanisms by which
political programmes and ideologies, such as nationalism, could be propagated in the city are considered more relevant than the extent of agency and intentionality involved.

The term ‘political projects’ does not necessarily imply conscious planning or consciously set objectives. Distinct nationalist organisations did have stated goals and plans but that is not the same as suggesting that their pursuit required an intentional, coherent plan. Rather the term ‘project’ here is used to describe a development of proposals around which people identifying with that nationalism could coalesce. To this extent there is human agency involved in working within a kind of programmatic politics. Regarding intention, a programmatic set of proposals could have multiple origins and may not have an intentional coherence, let alone cohere logically. An example of how such projects and proposals are worked out is seen in the Avenida da Liberdade in Lisbon. It may well have been constructed in the 1880s without significant nationalist influence and with, instead, the influence of Pombaline urban planning and the Enlightenment and liberal goals of late nineteenth century liberal ideology (Silva, 2016, pp. 53–54); it came in the twentieth century, through an accumulation of later additions, such as the avenue’s termination at Praça do Marquês de Pombal and the ‘Monumento aos Mortos da Grande Guerra’ depicting a figure of Pátria (the Fatherland) crowning a Portuguese soldier, to be used by the Novo Stado regime as a site of nationalist procession and commemoration. The avenue afforded this use as part of a nationalist project though an original nationalist ‘intention’ is not readily detected. Much more generally, cities themselves, as with all kinds of human settlement, can be viewed as being planned projects if projects are understood not just to be intentional, time-bound schemes but as sets of commonly understood, if modifiable, principles which guide development over generations.
The form and function of the city and urban space in human society have been theorised by multiple disciplines and the significance credited to the urban problematique varies as much as responses to it. The city is by some accounts merely a by-product of socio-economic conditions and by other accounts is a distinct object for research in and of itself. The coincidence of the rise of mass politics and rapid urbanisation can be interpreted through classical Marxism as being driven by an underlying proletarianisation of productive forces; in other words, attention should be focused on the base, with culture and particularities of the city being ideological superstructure. This reduction of the city to primary socio-economic forces is not only a Marxist reading but imminent in more liberal and conservative ones found, for example, in Rasmussen¹ and Hayek². If some reciprocity is acknowledged between

¹ Rasmussen’s classic account of the development of London implies an ascendancy of liberal democratic norms in London (over Absolutist Paris), a triumph which he celebrates. The London which Rasmussen portrays has not been determined by autocratic planners but conforms to his ideal of unfettered, organic urban development. It essentially reads the modern city as a by-product of political and productive forces rather than those forces operating in reciprocity with urban forms: ‘Wren's plan, finished in a few days, is a fine example of a certain type of town-planning - that type which is now going to be abandoned. It is the town-planning of Absolutism, which - as far as the exterior is concerned - has given such imposing results at the same time as the monumental form suppressed the vital functions of the towns. Paris, that has been admired as a most beautiful city, is a striking example of a great city, the natural growth of which has been checked. The government has constantly checked its expansion development, with the result that houses have grown higher and higher, and it has been possible to lay out grandiose streets and squares. The reverse side of the radiant medal is the disappearance of recreation grounds and too crowded and too populous quarters, a breeding place for the most dangerous type of populace. According to modern ideas it is impossible to give a town a definite and fixed form. A town plan is no longer a beautiful pattern of streets which a clever man can design in a day or two.’ (1937, p. 112)

² Hayek’s account of modern urbanism is underpinned with a reduction of its development to the mediation of individual property owners’ interests: ‘A different set of problems is raised by the fact that in the close contiguity of city living the price mechanism reflects only imperfectly the benefit or harm to others that a property owner may cause by his actions. …. In order that the market may bring about an efficient co-ordination of individual endeavours, both the individual owners and the authorities controlling communal property should be so placed as to enable them to take into account at least the more important effects of their actions on other property.’ (2011, pp. 474–475)
underlying socio-economic conditions and cultural expression, however, then tools are needed to understand how the physical phenomenon of the city and cultural and ideological practices relate. Analysis of urban space, spurred by Lefebvre (1991) and expanded in various ways by Harvey (1973), Massey (2005), Berman (2010) and others, have in different ways looked to address this and account for how cities structure social relations. Every mode of production is seen to produce its own kind of space and strategies for maintaining or changing social conditions must have their spatial correlative. This approach opens the possibility of neither being reliant on an essentialist understanding of the city category while at the same time accounting for the specificity of human experience in the urban setting. However, to theorise the interaction of a city with political and ideological projects pursued within it needs something additional to spatial analysis, tools which are appropriate for analysing the modern city both in its contemporary context, its origins and points in between.

As a historical inquiry into relationships between the modern European city, nationalism and nationhood, this work seeks to make some more generalised claims about relationships between urbanisation and ideology and, more tentatively, relationships between place and culture. An inquiry of this kind necessarily touches on and draws from a daunting body of literature in a wide variety of disciplinary categories and dialogues including nationalism studies, urban studies, political science, history – urban and otherwise – philosophy, literature and others. It would not be feasible to address debates regarding nationalism, nationhood and the city in each of these fields adequately while doing justice to these historical case studies; the method adapted here however has the flexibility to engage with each of these fields. The objective is not to find a methodology which is all-encompassing but rather something which can open up an understanding of the urban in which the possibility of multiple overlapping forms
are tolerated. The aim of identifying and analysing urban forms in this way is not to reinforce broader social and political theory but rather to describe what politics and social action such forms, and the interaction between different forms, make conceivable and viable. The open public square, connected to transport networks, administered by local government, served by retail outlets, cleaned by street cleaners makes possible the political demonstration, the military procession and the chance encounter of citizens. The form of the open public square does not determine these possibilities – neither do public transport, government or street cleaners – but they afford them.

JJ Gibson’s work examined how perception of the environment affords an organism various possible actions. By taking situated behaviour as his object of study, Gibson assumed a radical stance on the possibilities of predicting human behaviour: that humans are deeply embedded in their surroundings in a way which means that predictions about their behaviour can only be made by understanding their context and the rules governing their conduct cannot be generalised in isolation. Gibson conceptualised ‘affordances’, latent possibilities for action in an environment, which are independent of an animal recognising their potential but which are nevertheless dependent upon an animal’s ability to utilise them.

For Gibson, an animal’s environment was made up of surfaces whose composition and layout constituted what they afforded the animal. When an animal perceived a surface, it perceived what the surface could afford: in other words, things in the environment could be perceived directly without the addition of internal representation. An example Gibson started with is a horizontal surface: so long as it had the properties of sufficient scale and rigidity it would afford support for the animal and permit walking with an upright posture. In the language of ‘affordance’, a ‘horizontal, flat, extended and rigid’ surface offered the affordance of support to a biped, the
affordance being related to the animal’s characteristics. The affordance was something which had to be expressed in terms of the animal rather than the physical properties of the material of the surface in isolation from the animal. (1979, pp. 127–128)

From these simple principles was built a theory of affordances which Gibson used to frame his work on visual perception. What is helpful in terms of an analysis of the relationship between ideology and the city is the prominence given to the environmental context prior to the implementation of social practice. The affordances of an environment are real but also subjectively perceived. Unlike what Gibson terms ‘values and meanings’, which are conceived as subjective, affordances bridge the ‘environment’, notionally external to the animal, and ‘behaviour’, supposed to be internally motivated. In his words, ‘[a]n affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy’ (1979, p. 129).

Gibson's theory of affordances opens a conceptual field which, though its methods might not be suitable to be applied exhaustively, can be usefully applied to the historical context of the modernisation of European cities, especially since this kind of investigation is so particularly engaged with the built environment and with human actions within it. Before proceeding with the historical analysis of the city and nationalism in Europe, this conceptual field should be elaborated.

Gibson bases his definition of an ‘environment’ on animals (including persons) existing in a ‘medium’ in relationship to ‘substances’, ‘surfaces’ and ‘objects’. An animal in a terrestrial environment, for example, exists within the medium of air which affords respiration, unimpeded locomotion and visual and vibratory perceptions. The substance of water can have a boundary surface with air and affords drinking, containment, pouring and washing. Some solid substances afford nutrition to particular
animals; solid substances also have characteristic surfaces. A body of water lacks rigidity for walking but it may afford floating.

The ‘horizontal, flat, extended and rigid’ surface mentioned earlier is descriptive of the earth, or the ‘flat earth’ which is the earth experienced at the scale of the animal rather than the globe which is not directly experienced in everyday life. Surfaces, of course, can be modified: the surface forming a steep slope might be cut into with steps which afford ascent and descent. Objects in an environment are very diverse but in Gibson’s use they are, critically, perceived by animals according to what they afford rather than a more abstract set of properties. An example he gives is of an ‘elongated’ object which affords ‘wielding’. A human might use this object to hit something – the object is used as a hammer; a chimpanzee might use this object to pull in a banana from outside its cage – the object is used as a rake. The object’s classification might change according to how it is regularly used; however, its affordances are the complete set of its potential uses by an animal and the animal directly perceives the meaning of the object by what it affords that animal. (1979, pp. 130–135)

As humans have populated the planet they have altered the natural environment, converting substances and surfaces to change what they afford. In the scheme of the theory of affordances, humans have not created a new environment by doing this but have modified the pre-existing environment (1979, p. 129). Urbanisation then is a complex accumulation of changes to the substances and surfaces of the environment by humans. The scale of urbanisation and the layering of modifications to the environment mean that the theory of affordances, which for Gibson was applied to a generic ‘environment’, needs to be effectively transposed to the specifics of time and place found in the cities under investigation.
This transposition can occur by focusing on some key concerns inspired by Gibson which have particular relevance to the city and ideology. First would be a concern with the constraints which an environment, such as a city, could impose upon collective human activities and practices, such as those conceived of as ideological. Since humans perceive surfaces and substances to offer certain affordances, so other affordances are not offered. In an ideological scheme, this might either mean that certain collective activities are not available in reality, though they may be pursued through a shared imaginary world which is augmented by that which is afforded by the real environment. Further to this there may also be what Gibson referred to as ‘negative’ affordances which enable damaging behaviour which may undermine something like an ideological project. Second would be what affordances ideology might block in an environment. Although humans might perceive affordances, it might be possible that ideological language and practice would prevent such affordances from being realised. Gibson is concerned with an individual animal’s ability to distinguish between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ (1979, pp. 256–257) and this can be augmented with the notion of a collective imagination enabled by language. When considering the effects of ideological language and practice, however, it is possible that there are social constraints, communicated by cultural and ideological means, which preclude the realisation of certain affordances. Third would be the extent to which human changes to the environment might reinforce ideology. Just as ideology might influence the perception of affordances in the environment, so certain surfaces, substances and objects might be co-opted to the purposes of ideological projects; this might well just be a case of adopting what is afforded by the environment prior to human changes to it but of particular concern for this study is the possibility of changes which are ‘designed’ in some way to influence cultural and political behaviours.
By using Gibson’s concepts of animal habitats and their affordances there is the possibility of thinking through the materiality and form of urban places and what they afford in particular, neither omitting wider socio-economic and political forms nor subsuming the particularity of the city under universal themes. Such an application of the theory of affordances follows Caroline Levine’s utilisation in connecting literary forms to their social, political and historical context. Just as she states that literary forms operate within certain restraints across different contexts and that therefore examining their affordances gives the possibility of ‘a generalizable understanding of political power’ (2015, p. 7), so the same possibility is present when analysing urban forms. A theory of affordances is suitable for examining how formal arrangements order urban habitats. The urban environment can be viewed as being capable of shaping, and being open to being shaped, by political and ideological forces by looking at how the city is arranged and what the forms that give it order afford its citizens.

Levine’s ‘Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network’ (2015) provides a framework in which to start examining urban forms, how they overlap and what they afford. It is provided in the context of her demand for a new literary formalism but its application can be extended. Levine assembles her examples of forms under the four headings of the book’s title. ‘Wholes’ include containing spaces such as nations and prisons; ‘rhythms’ cover temporal forms like institutions which persist over time; ‘hierarchies’ are expressed in gender, class, and race; ‘networks’, though often confounding containing forms, have rules and patterns that give them their own form, with transnational markets, transportation and print culture being Levine’s initial examples. Levine goes on to show how forms under these four headings have structured culture, politics, and scholarship. In order to do this, Levine utilises Gibson’s theory of affordances, mediated through its application to design theory (Levine, 2015, p. 6; see
also Norman, 1998). In Levine’s account, a form has certain properties which afford uses which can be implemented, ignored, reacted against, undermined or transformed. Thus, a form can be seen to influence human action over time but cannot said to determine it entirely. Levine’s formal framework provides a structure for the application of an analytics of affordances in an urban context.

Urban wholes are several but almost always overlapping. The boundaries of the whole of the city can be marked on the ground and on a map. The morphology of a city is its whole shape which can be the object of improvement. Urban rhythms can be identified in all kinds of contexts: systems of government meeting regularly over long periods of time and also the ebb and flow of traffic. Urban hierarchies can be expressions of broader social ones, such as gender, class and race. They can also be specific to the city: citizen versus visitor; homeowner/renter/homeless. There are a profusion of urban networks: societies, associations, friendships; mass transportation; trade. It is the interactions between, conflict between and modifications of these forms which are used to highlight how political ideas and ideologies are brought to bear on urban space.

For the cases under examination, this can be useful in addressing more specific questions such as: how did modernising improvements to European cities impact their existing urban forms and what new affordances were created? For Budapest, Vienna and Venice their pre-modern existing forms were very varied and set each on a unique path which was to be navigated as improvements came to be implemented. The way in which Budapest came together as a new whole out of Buda, Óbuda and Pest; the way Vienna broke through its walls to create an expanded modern city; and the way that Venice, constrained by water, developed modern services and practices which modernised the experience of a pre-modern urban morphology; each of these paths to
modernity interacted with powerful forces such as nationalism, liberalism, populism and socialism.

For each city case this formalist reading can be applied at a more detailed level. To take Andrásy Avenue in Budapest as an example, the whole form is the complete boulevard with its grand vista, its processional space and its encapsulation of a certain kind of European bourgeois identity. Its rhythm can be found on the most immediate everyday level in mechanised traffic, particularly the regularity of mass transit, and on the much larger scale of the timing of the anniversary of the Hungarian Millennium in 1896 and the Avenue’s embellishment for that occasion. Hierarchy is demarcated by different sized plots affordable to people with different income levels and by socio-economic exclusion in high-end retail and in institutions like the opera house. The Avenue, of course, lies in the heart of several different networks: road and rail, social and political institutions, and so on.

This formalist reading can help define the extent to which new forms of wholeness, rhythms, hierarchies and networks constituted the improved modern European city, primarily through how new urban spatial forms were created which meant that modern cities could act as a backdrop for mass ideological movements in a way that the pre-modern city, with its more narrowly-defined spaces, could not. It is these kinds of urban practice and experience which are to be focused on. In emphasising the formal and the structural there is less scope to assign agency to individual actors and movements; the project is not to unmask a deliberate programme of manipulation of urban space. Justifications for modernisation could be primarily based on the immediate enhancement of citizens’ lives with arguments for the moral improvement of citizens being a secondary, though frequently expressed, goal. The economic drivers for these improvements are not to be ignored. Urban development provided a means to
absorb surplus capital and create profit; urban improvement projects were often effectively job creation schemes. The ideological context shaped and was shaped by urban forms that were in turn derived from other social and economic forces. These forms thus shaped then provided for a new and different urban experience and politics. Theorising this process provides a basis for thinking through contemporary urban development as much as making sense of urban history.
2. Theorising Politics, City and Nation

This chapter explores the development of the concept of citizenship in the context of the medieval city and shows how Western political philosophy opened an exceptional political space of the city. Turning to political thought underpinning nationalism, the texts of Rousseau and Herder are read to understand how nationalist thought could respond to and make use of modern urban forms.

The development of modern conceptions of citizenship has deep roots in the emergence of autonomous urban institutions in the Middle Ages. Citizenship entails an element of voluntary participation in a way that membership of a nation does not: the rights of a citizen need to be exercised whereas a member of a nation is deemed to have been born to their status or qualified through a one-off act of induction. Although the modern state has made effective use of both the concepts of citizen and nation, there is a sense in which citizenship could be said to fit well with the modern city with its dynamic and diverse populations, while national identity fits either with territory larger than just one city or with groups of people who are not necessarily territorially fixed. From this it might appear that there is a misfit between nationalism and the city, at least intellectually. However, there is a linkage between them to be found in works of political philosophy highly influential to nineteenth century European nationalism.

In this chapter, the historico-legal development of the concept of citizenship is explored in the context of the medieval city. An understanding of the exceptional political space of the city in political philosophy is elaborated. The political philosophy of nationalism is seen to engender an urban-rural tension and the work of Rousseau and Herder is read to understand a political philosophy of the city. This is set within a wider understanding of the Western philosophical tradition. Their approaches to the city and its relationship to the national community are shown to have a role for modern
urbanisation even if their attitude to the city is ambiguous. Hostility to city living as a corruption of the spiritual life of the nation is expressed in different ways by both Rousseau and Herder though there is a sense in which both are looking to find alternative urban models for the kind of society they want to support.
The European City and Citizenship

In the case of what Weber calls the ‘Occidental City’, social regulation in European cities historically had its basis in the ‘comune’, an urban entity which was to gain its own legal personality (1978, p. 1248). The creation of an administrative order, embodied in the urban corporation, shaped the mediaeval and early modern city prior to modernisation and was the indeed the subject of that modernisation. The modern city was institutionally built on that order and understanding changes to it helps understand what practices a city could afford before and after modernisation.

Weber’s ideal-typical city had five features which he derived from a historical study of cities, ancient and modern, with the mediaeval European city exhibiting them most clearly. A city had to be equipped with: a fortress; a market; its own law court; an ‘associational structure; and a degree of autonomy in which burghers could influence the appointment of administrative authorities (1978, p. 1226). Accepting these features as constitutive of the form of European cities since the Middle Ages, these last two features are of specific interest when explaining the changes to communalism influencing the development of the modern city and modern citizenship.

The medieval European city’s associational structure was that of a ‘sworn confraternity’ in which the members bound themselves directly one to another in the collective body of the commune (1978, p. 1248). People who had previously been unknown to each other were ritually brought together in a group for mutual benefit. This gave the member, the burgher, privileges derived from the group which meant that they had, ‘a “subjective” right to be dealt with under a common “objective” law’ (1978, p. 1249). Although this membership status levelled social groups in the city in a novel way by claiming primacy over other bonds, when dealing with city matters it is important to note that the confraternal corporation was a closed system in the sense that
it had strict barriers to entry and an effective limitation on widespread participation beyond the burgher class. While it is credible to claim that these urban institutional arrangements were precursors of modern citizenship it would be mistaken to imagine that citizenship at that time was recognisably close to its modern counterpart. Rather the corporate body of burghers informed the development of secular institutions at state level and developments at state level fed back into urban communalism.

Anticipating the formation of chartered cities in western Europe, Harold Berman described the opening up of a ‘secular’ legal sphere as a consequence of the Investiture Controversy in the eleventh century, what he referred to as the Papal Revolution. In order to resolve the powers of the Emperor and the Pope, more immediately with regard to the right to appoint bishops, a distinct body of law, the canon law, was brought into being for the Church and by so doing it for the first time established ‘political entities without ecclesiastical functions and nonecclesiastical legal orders.’ (1983, p. 273) The new secular polities, ‘imperial, royal, feudal, manorial, mercantile, urban’ required their own types of law and this opened up possibilities for autonomous social formations which administered their own laws and represented themselves communally to other polities. It was in this context that the wave of cities created by charter across Europe in the High Middle Ages became places where a new kind of subject, the burgher, could operate. Sassen characterises this context described by Berman as one in which urban law was ‘communitarian, secular, and constitutional’ (2008, p. 64). By ‘communitarian’ Sassen means a body of citizens associated together as a collection of individuals rather than deriving legitimacy from a kinship group external to urban relations, as set out by Weber (1978, pp. 1244–1248). By ‘secular’ is meant the location of urban authority outside ecclesiastical authority, permitting cities to produce their own variations of law. ‘Constitutional’ implies that there was ‘a
fundamental law establishing rights and constraints’ in the city, typically enshrined in
its charter, and whose authority was paramount and empowered a citizen to be involved
in government of the city (Sassen, 2008, pp. 65–66). It is this view of the medieval
city’s political structure as an embryonic form of citizenship which developed later at
state level. It would be inaccurate to suggest however that the city was an incipient
modern state since although it had characteristics in common – an increasingly
depersonalised administrative order – its type of communitarianism was in a critical
sense a closed arrangement. What marks out the modern city is the extent to which its
community is open – perhaps not to all-comers since membership is still restrained by
significant economic barriers as well as state control but the modern administrative
urban order is one which makes external bonds and identities a secondary concern.

The transition to such an order can be traced through changes in the
communitarian, secular and constitutional aspects of the city. As the guild system was
dismantled, city walls both physical and in the form of tariff barriers, ethnic and
religious restrictions and privileges were removed and property in the city rationalised
so the nature of the commune became more open-ended and the secularisation of urban
institutions became more pronounced. At the same time, the constitutionalism identified
by Sassen was encroached upon by the rise of the state, especially in those cities which
were under Absolutist rule from the seventeenth century on. This reconfiguration of the
urban order was to have a significant effect on the affordances of the city such that they
could respond to the demands of modernisation. The expansion of the electoral
franchise and the opening up of urban government to scrutiny changed the
communitarian characteristics of the city, moving from the notion of a membership and
privilege to citizenship and rights. The acceleration of secularisation meant the
desacralisation of tracts of the city previously given over to non-commercial,
ecclesiastical purposes; it also meant the removal, formally at least, of confessional barriers such as the ghettoisation of Jews. As technologies of state power developed, the constitutional element of the city which brought about a local ‘rule of law’ was increasingly challenged by state-level administrators whose objectives were to bring the city into a wider territorial system. The effect of this last point was to make possible large-scale schemes which impinged upon local property rights and for which the local urban administration lacked the distance from powerful local interests to enact significant change.

The historico-legal background to the modernisation of the European city shows how institutional forms were innovated and applied to increasingly sophisticated urban wholes at first in the European context and then, as European colonialism spread, globally. The breakdown of older forms of membership and privilege afforded the possibility of reimagining citizenship both at a state and a city level. While doing this, a tendency to attempt to find first principles from which a more rational order could be constructed was in evidence in the works of Enlightenment political philosophy. Even for philosophers whose work reacted against systematic approaches like Rousseau and Herder there was an effort to envisage the world prior to its perceived corruption. An account of how the world had changed up to the time of the Enlightenment was one which had to throw light upon the emergence of cities and politics.
The City as an Exception

‘The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, took it into his head to say, “This is mine,” and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. How many crimes, how many wars, how many murders, how many misfortunes and horrors, would that man have saved the human species, who pulling up the stakes or filling up the ditches should have cried to his fellows: Be sure not to listen to this impostor; you are lost, if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong equally to us all, and the earth itself to nobody! … Let us therefore take up things a little higher, and collect into one point of view, and in their most natural order, this slow succession of events and mental improvements.’ (Rousseau, 2009, pp. 63–64)

Rousseau identified a critical point of departure for humanity whose destination was inequality and bondage. At that point, the imposter enclosed property and created a kind of division which had previously been unknown. These prelapsarian conditions were ones in which civilised society had yet to be conceived. Rousseau took the idea of savage man and extrapolated from that device an essential, common humanity. Savage man was located, in Rousseau's time, everywhere that had not been colonized or had just been recently colonized by Europe; savage man’s reach also extended into periods preceding civilisation. Rousseau was careful to avoid resorting to a positive definition of a state of nature for humanity but negatively managed to derive an essential human nature using the savage placed on a timescale to show that the relatively short duration of civilisation made it an exception. This is a narrative strategy which effectively
conceals fundamental assumptions about human nature upon which a political philosophy can be structured, an unverifiable narrative explanation for the philosopher’s preconceptions. In the case of Rousseau these preconceptions were geared towards an understanding of humanity as fundamentally good.

Viewing the phenomena of the city and of politics with a lens that takes in the entirety of human social existence could be analytically excessive and such a broad perspective might not be needed to give insight into the modern city. Yet, in the narratives of political philosophy and nationalist ideology, underlying assumptions about human nature have their roots in the long span of anthropological time. The scale of this conception of time lends itself to the search for the ‘natural’ origins and conditions of human community because its greater part is dominated by a swathe of time in which human social development is understood as being relatively static. This is relevant to an understanding of the meaning of the city because of the sheer bulk of time in which there was no urban society and no recognisable politics as such.

This perspective on the development of human society looks to the emergence of settlement and agriculture after the end of the last ice age as the beginning of an exceptional era before which humans existed on a subsistence basis. Though there would have been human communities, typically in the tens rather than in the hundreds of thousands of people, these communities would have been mobile and often nomadic. They would have operated, as some very small societies today still continue to operate, on a hunter-gatherer basis (P. Jordan, 2014). For a civilised society to be afforded under such conditions, a series of changes over a relatively short time span would be necessary. The emergence of associated settled communities and the development of agricultural practices provides a place in time to locate a revolution in human social conditions. The existence of this historical break point lends itself to a broad understanding of
civilisation which perceives it as exceptional and, in some way, ‘unnatural’. It follows from this that the emergence of politics and cities is not possible under ‘normal’ conditions, the conditions under which human animals have existed for millennia, and a revolutionary transformation was required so that political human animals could emerge.

To take the notion of the revolution in agricultural practice as being a critical break for theorising the origins of politics further, it is the point at which agriculture was introduced that permanent settlement on a large scale also became possible and out of which politics became necessary. That critical juncture was reached when there was a development of technologies which enabled agriculture or when forms of agriculture developed which drove the production of new technologies. This moment was reached in geographically dispersed areas across the globe independently (Larson et al., 2014). In Mesopotamia, in China around the great rivers and in Central America agricultural practices emerged separately in the wake of the last ice age and the global dispersal of human populations. Outside of these agricultural societies, both before their creation and in human communities which were contemporary but outside of these exceptional areas, societies were very small. Following on from this it is relatively easy to read into this shift from hunter-gathering to farming a moment at which the prevalence of flexible, small communities shifted to the beginning of something more hierarchical with complex structures of power.8

These kinds of interpretation have been challenged within many disciplines – it is by no means commonly accepted that there is a fundamental developmental revolution leading to human modernity and, indeed, modern structures of power. However, their simplicity lends itself to narrative deployment and of particular interest here is how it might be deployed in nationalist narrative practice.
Agriculture, according to this line of thinking, provided surpluses at certain points which needed to be administered. Buildings were not only needed to house produce, institutional structures were also needed to maintain them. To facilitate this, accounting and writing developed to keep track of resources. Political structures were needed to decide how surpluses were allocated after the labour that had been required to gather the surpluses. Ideological and religious narratives could be readily applied to justify these structures and their decision-making. Therefore, by this account it is through agriculture that politics was brought into being and, because agriculture worked most efficiently if there was a reusable field system, ready availability of labour for seasonal work and ready availability of structures to handle surpluses, communities of humans gathered and settled in one place. This line of reasoning is somewhat deterministic and as such provides material for an essentialised conception of the origins of politics. It is a genealogy of politics that presents itself as empirically grounded but which is readily deployed ideologically.

Since humans have not lived in cities and have not had power institutionalised as politics until recently relative to anthropological time scales, this understanding of time enables a narrative exceptionalism to develop when theorising political community regarding the city and its relationship to politics. It is a device available to any political theory seeking to authenticate an account of how contemporary conditions can be overcome: that modern society, and its politics, can change because both modern society and politics are a recent, exceptional phenomenon. If civilisation is exceptional and is viewed as corrupt then it can be purified and doing so would change the course of history for the better. It is its deployment in urban relations and urban politics which gives it its primary power rather than its basis in fact. It gains its authenticity by association with the scientific study of human origins, though whether close scrutiny of
the evidence supports such an interpretation is secondary to its effectiveness as a rhetorical move. Human prehistory, as understood empirically by archaeology, anthropology, biology or other relevant disciplines, serves to colour an account of society which has already been conceived. Its effect is to place both politics and the city as phenomena coming from a common, artificial source. By applying an anthropological time scale to the political, the notion of the ‘political’ and the ‘city’ are temporalised in such a way as to make them appear ‘unnatural’ when set against an account of human ‘nature’ which occurs over a very long timeframe.

This narrative move is of course available both to emancipatory politics, where the desire would be to completely change society and to more reactionary politics which would want to roll back. The direction of travel of the narrative device, whether it is forwards to or backwards from a contemporary political urban moment, does not necessarily affect its successful operation. It is the tension between current circumstances and human prehistory which is the key to its deployment. It enables claims about human history and how civilisation and politics relate to it, a powerful message which says that humans have lived naturally in the distant past but now live in a civilised society constituting a polis; and it is because of these exceptional circumstances in the context of human history that politics is needed to organize people to respond to these circumstances because they cannot rely on normal human instincts, adapted as they are for a pre-civilised world.

9 The relation of the two is problematic as Heidegger, in discussing the Romanisation of Classical Greece, suggested that the Greek conception of the polis has been lost by the imposition of the Roman imperium: ‘[W]e think the “political” as Romans, i.e., imperially. The essence of the Greek ζώλις will never be grasped within the horizon of the political as understood in the Roman way.’ (Heidegger, 1998, p. 43)
A variation on this narrative is found in Hegelian thought. ‘This determinate spirit of the people, since it is actual and its freedom is as nature, has on this natural side the moment of geographical and climatic determinacy,’ was Hegel’s reconciliation of human agency and geographical determinism. It is not so much that there is a radical break but rather a dialectical development which generates civilised life. He went on, ‘it is in time and, as regards content, essentially has a particular principle and has to go through a development, determined by this principle, of its consciousness and its actuality; it has a history within itself.’ In this, Hegel’s use of time expands from the anthropological to the anthropocentric as historical developments unfolded with purpose. ‘As a limited spirit its independence is a subordinate matter; the spirit passes over into universal world-history, the events of which display the dialectic of the particular national spirits, the judgement of the world.’ (2007, p. 246) The actualisation of a human consciousness was analogous to the exceptional break with nature and the creation of politics but with a conception of the cycles of history which seemed not to offer the possibility of the recovery of an essential, pre-political human society. However, by transforming Hegel’s dialectic to one in which the ‘display’ of ‘particular national spirits’ was a product of an ideological superstructure masking the true economic basis for society, classical Marxism offered another account of how somewhere on the anthropological time scale a kind of exceptional politics had intervened from which humanity would be emancipated.

This exceptionalisation of politics and the city evokes the separation of action from environment in theorising the city that was touched upon in Calvino’s illustration of the city of Zora. In thinking through the separation of political theory from an embodied world, a fissure opens up between the politics and its territory. It is a separation which an understanding of the world being territory on to which human
violence projects itself. Heidegger contrasted this with what he perceived to be the Greek model of the polis: the polis was not simply a city with inhabitants but an entire political project in itself. In this scheme, the Greek polis and Roman civitas were distinct realisations of political community again temporalised in such a way as to make the older version the more authentic (1998, p. 43). It was a more nuanced variation of the application of a long timescale to contextualise the development of political communities but there was a similar effect in setting the more recent urban model as the less authentic community. They both suggested the possibility of a recovery or revitalisation of an older kind of human community and the removal of more recent political arrangements.

Not only does this temporalisation impose itself on how the city and politics are conceived by reference to a more modern, systematic understanding of human origins but it also works well with more traditional origin myths. Gilgamesh, the Garden of Eden and flood stories described similar worlds which were in some way closer to a divine ideal or at least a better human existence which through external intervention are somehow wiped away or lost. Being in a world which was identified as proceeding from that lost world demanded an attitude towards its lost inhabitants, the ancient ancestors. They could, for example, be poor, foolish folk or possessors of an ancient wisdom and a now obscure truth. National mythmakers could infuse their stories with these attitudes: late nineteenth century Hungarian nationalist discourse valorised the ancient Magyar nomads (Freifeld, 2000, pp. 16–17) who brought their simplicity and connection with the land to the Pannonian Basin and established order as they finally settled and farmed. Although they became settled farmers they sustained, in this account, a more ancient and less corrupt spirit.
Nationalism, Political Philosophy and the City

The activists of nineteenth century nationalism were often operating in a revolutionary mode, actively opposing traditional authorities and engaged in a struggle to build new national structures (Hobsbawm, 2014, pp. 164–166). As such, political philosophy and political theory were not often at the forefront of their writing and public rhetoric and indeed theoretical perspectives could be open to derision in such a politically active culture. Moreover, the notion of action coming from a national spirit rather than a rational philosophical position was often integral to nationalist political culture. For the Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini, for example, philosophers had instigated aberrations such as the Rights of Man which promoted individual rights and neglected social duties. It was from Dante that he found the ideal for a combination of thought and action: ‘God created us, not to contemplate, but to act. He created us in His own image, and He is Thought and Action, or rather, in Him there is no Thought which is not simultaneous Action.’ (Mazzini, 1862, p. 39)

Mazzini thought, wrote and acted against conservative forces controlling Italian lands and propagandised for an Italian nation to establish its control, with ‘Young Italy’ as its vanguard. The combination of Thought and Action was to bring about this control and central to that was control of an Italian urban inheritance:

‘Why should not a new Rome, the Rome of the Italian people – portents of whose coming I deemed I saw – arise to create a third and still vaster unity; to link together and harmonize earth and heaven, right and duty; and utter, not to individuals but to peoples, the great word Association – to make known to free men and equals of their mission here below?’ (Mazzini, 1891, p. 38)
Lajos Kossuth, borrowing from Mazzini's lexicon in describing a "young Pesth", described the events of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution and focused on the specific demands of the Hungarian nationalists centred on the abolition of feudal practices in the countryside. In the description of actual events, however, a journey connecting Pressburg, Buda and Pest is evoked as news spreads of the revolutions in Vienna and Pressburg down to "old Buda" and "young Pesth", placing the aspirations of the nation in the city of Pest. (Kossuth, 1853). Although the narrative of nationalism cited deep rural roots for the nation and the language of territory and control, its aspirations were to be played out in the urban setting and the nationalisation of the city was a realisation of national ambition. The city was not just a site of national struggle, it was an end in that struggle. Much as nationalists resisted a pure philosophical or theoretical position, the narrative associated with these aspirational targets exposed a theoretical position and it was one in which cities were to embody national goals.

Margaret Canovan distinguished between Romantic-Collectivist nationalism, coming out of the historicism of thinkers such as Herder, and Liberal-Individualist nationalism, citing later thinkers such as Mill (1996, pp. 6–9). She clearly placed figures like Mazzini in the former category and, with his Romantic notions of holy national destiny and the figure he cut in Italian national activism this would seem to be fair. However, the example of Mazzini shows that such nationalists cannot be excluded from the latter category – his nationalism was a means to an end, and that republican end was one which was more universal and had space for a kind of liberal individualism. Making a clean distinction between regressive and progressive nationalisms is not straightforward: nationalisms contain potential for both and contradictions sustaining both. Indeed, these potentialities and tensions shape nationalist responses towards modernity and urbanisation. Not all European nationalisms could be characterised as
being hostile to modernity; they might be seen as on a spectrum of attitudes to modernity, from a French nationalism rooted in revolutionary bourgeois politics to the deeply mystical varieties seen in Russian nationalism. They shared, however, an assumption about the past in which nations were constituted in a pre-modern environment. In that sense a nation’s genius, even as it might come to fruition in the modern city, lay in pre-modern soil.

Two key sources for European nationalist political philosophy contain a tension between idealised human communities and an emergent urbanisation and modernity. Though the intellectual lineage of nationalism can be taken further back than Rousseau and Herder, they both directly informed the intellectual milieu of nineteenth century political philosophy. Both exercised considerable influence over the development of nationalist thought and so it is appropriate to consider what influence they may have had in the production of a nationalist urbanism. While positive urban projects could be supported by readings of Rousseau and of Herder, both clearly show explicit hostility to cities, especially Paris, a city so closely associated with the Enlightenment. What can be drawn from their writings, however, are elucidations of forms of habitation and dwelling which would lend themselves to national identities that can be reconciled with modern urbanisation. For Rousseau, the institutional and physical configuration of Geneva provides for a model community and one which contrasted with corrupt Paris. For Herder, each ‘Volk’ had a unique set of characteristics developed in response to its environment and its climate. It is in the Classical world that the city had its day, the cities of Greece and Rome being at the height of their cultural achievements. That Herder believed the day of the city to have gone, to be replaced by a more agrarian northern culture, was a belief which could not be sustained through the nineteenth
century. Perhaps instead there was a new form of city which was suited to a new conception of European ‘man’.

Regarding the use of anthropological time scales to understand how urbanisation was contextualised in a wider narrative of human and national development, one purpose of examining both Rousseau and Herder is to draw out how some of the underlying theoretical structures of nationalist thought might have relied on such temporalisation. Performing such an analysis requires sensitivity to the possibility of applying similar temporal frameworks to the phenomenon of nationalism itself. To do so would be to contextualise nationalism itself as somehow derived from a kind of exception of civilisation. To avoid this assumption of an exceptional corruption of human history requires different ground on which to stand when drawing out the implications of Rousseau’s and Herder’s attitudes to urban life. The approach here will be to take modern ideologies and urbanisation both to be the products of unexceptional human practices, modern modes of interpretation of the environment and how humans interact and settle within it. In other words, something akin with ideology has been present in human communities in all of its interactions with the environment and nationalism and modern urbanisation are contemporary iterations of intrinsically human practices. There is of course the danger of overreaching with this approach and effectively substituting one essentialised ideological fixed point with another and it is at best a provisional position which can be deployed to gain a strategic distance from such a fixed point.
Rousseau

If Rousseau is acknowledged as ‘the doctrinal founder of political nationalism’ (Barnard, 1983, p. 231), his stridency on the corruption of the emerging modern city would suggest a dissonance between a project of national legitimacy and the development of the modern city. Rousseau informed a tradition of civil, or liberal, nationalism. Rousseau sought to promote the essential human capacity for compassion and in large cities he saw artifice which obstructed this capacity's fulfilment. This artifice deluded the people and enabled them to be enslaved. So, it would seem that for a people to be free while living under government which is subject to the General Will there would be a need to restrict the development of the city. Nevertheless, a more careful reading of Rousseau shows a place for the city in his thinking. His attitude to the city should be thought of more as a bid to recast the role of the city in the world after the Enlightenment. He would contrast examples of urban life thus:

‘What deceives reasoners is that, seeing only states that are ill-constituted from the beginning, they are impressed with the impossibility of maintaining such a policy in those states; they laugh to think of all the follies to which a cunning knave, an insinuating speaker, can persuade the people of Paris or London. They know not that Cromwell would have been put in irons by the people of Berne, and the duke of Beaufort imprisoned by the Genovese.’ (Rousseau, 1998, p. 105)

The implication is that there are cities less susceptible to cunning knaves than others; that the cities of Berne and Geneva would have dealt swift justice to people who in London and Paris were permitted to engage in follies. A hierarchy of urban rectitude
is deployed; this was not simply a passing comparison made by Rousseau but one which was underwritten by a developed understanding of the relationship of urban place to the morality of citizens. For Rousseau, a society would become corrupt when a pre-social love of self which allowed for empathetic pity, ‘amour de soi’, would degenerate into a form of self-love which would depend on the opinion of others, that of ‘amour propre’.

The theatrical backdrop of Paris provided a setting where citizen-actors sought the approval of an urban audience rather than attain self-respect. He located societies in which ‘amour de soi’ was a defining feature within cities with smaller populations. He held up Geneva as an ideal in this regard and was explicit in praising that city for its industry, a place where ‘[e]veryone is busy, everyone is moving, everyone is about his work and his affairs.’ (Rousseau, 1968, p. 3)

Despite this advocacy for Geneva, Rousseau has been read as vehemently against city life. Richard Sennett claimed that Rousseau ‘investigated the great city thoroughly, as though dissecting a cancer’. Sennett took Rousseau's ‘Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre’ to be a general indictment of the city (Sennett, 2002) rather than a concerned intervention in the affairs of an urban model admired by Rousseau and the promotion a moral project for the city. Rousseau did, though, use Paris as an example of a failed city and an inauthentic community. He sought direct intervention in the affairs and in the design of the city of Geneva in order to promote a healthy community and through this demonstrated an appreciation of a different kind of urban life than that exemplified in Paris.

Sennett identified oppositions in the ‘Letter’ – cosmopolitanism versus small town, acting versus authenticity – and placed them in a wider theory of corruption. Sennett correctly identified Rousseau's hatred of that corruption in a kind of theatrical mode, one which could disturb the city's morality. However, Sennett so closely
identified the modern city with theatre that he too easily dismissed Rousseau's project to reinforce cities against the corrupting influence of the theatre instead. In the ‘Letter’, Rousseau presented his case against the establishment of a theatre in Geneva. Rousseau's portrayal of Geneva was one in which the people are hard-working and naturally happy. His view was strongly gendered and deeply misogynistic: the introduction of the theatre would, in his view, promote the somewhat trivial concerns of women and ‘extend the empire of the fair sex’ and undermine the citizens through gossip, an effect he perceived as being demonstrated on the streets of Paris. The public presence of women would promote the corruption of young men and took them away from their patriotism. Men's vices, such as excessive drinking, were supposed to have a less negative social effect than female vice. He cited the public silence of women in Sparta, despite their central governing role, as a example of a more virtuous city in this regard. Theatre, moreover, contained people in enclosed spaces and made them passive observers – far better, he believed, to have public, outdoor festivals which would bring the people together with nature. (Rousseau, 1968)

What is important here is that in his Romantic understanding of an ideal society Rousseau is interested in preserving and shaping urban institutions. His invocation of pre-social humanity was not an attempt to idealise a rural existence: rather it was a method to understand an essential human nature in the hope of using this understanding to create an ideal order. Indeed, in in The Discourse on Inequality he remarked of other philosophers that, ‘[t]hey spoke about savage man, and it was civil man they depicted,’ but that the thought, ‘did not even occur to most of our philosophers to doubt that the state of nature had existed, even though it is evident from reading the Holy Scriptures that the first man … was not himself in that state.’ (Rousseau, 1987, p. 38) Whilst using an artificial pre-social state to illuminate human nature, Rousseau specifically
addressed himself to the urban form, with Geneva embodying an ideal of a city with ‘moeurs’. In setting up this ideal, Rousseau effectively established a hierarchy of cities ordered by compliance with this moral exemplar. Geneva was the benchmark by which other cities could be measured and it was also an ideal whose reality needed to be actively preserved against the corruption of theatre.

A contrast can be drawn between Rousseau's Geneva and Kant's Königsberg. In the former an ideal is set up for a moral citizenry while the latter is set up as a cosmopolis and, as such, is an ideal location for the study of anthropology (Kant, 2006, p. 4). Both Geneva and Königsberg were trading centres, though the latter larger, in the eighteenth century when both Kant and Rousseau were writing. Politically these cities were different in that Geneva was a city-state and a republic whereas, although it had its own rights within the state, Königsberg was a part of the Kingdom of Prussia. Commenting on Geneva had the potential to have an effect on the politics of the republic itself: indeed, Rousseau frequently addressed the city's rulers directly throughout his work. Kant's cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, was not principally addressed to Königsberg, in part because of the universal nature of cosmopolitanism as he understood it, but also because the state was not a republic and his writing had less opportunity to have a direct political effect on the city itself.

A reading of Rousseau which concludes that his thinking indicated a rejection of urban life fails to account for the crucial point that Rousseau was explicitly promoting an urban ideal. That this ideal is at odds with one which sees a cosmopolitan city as a stage in which urban actors can lose themselves behind masks must not be interpreted as a form of anti-urbanism. To do so would be to misconstrue the Romantic response to the Enlightenment and to modernity as a purely negative move. Rhetorically there was certainly a strong element of negativity towards the city and a promotion of
a rustic past. However, this pastoral ideal was not an exclusive construction. Rousseau reminisced about the outskirts of a town he knew in his youth where he saw, ‘a mountain entirely covered with dwellings, each in the midst of its land, so that those houses, as equally spaced as the fortunes of their owners, at once gave the numerous inhabitants of that mountain the inner contemplation of withdrawal and the charms of society.’ (Rousseau, 1968) In Rousseau’s writing, his harking back to a pre-urban, and then to a pre-social, life is best read as a methodological pose, one which seeks to tell a story about the origins of humanity or a people. Rousseau looked for an urban form in which a better human life was possible and was quite adamant that the exemplar of Paris was not it. The advocacy of Geneva was not on the basis of it being less city-like, however; rather it was on the basis of it not being an excessive city like Paris: ‘Its aims, its use of time, its vigilance, its austere parsimony, are the treasures of Geneva.’ (Rousseau, 1968, p. 93)

It is the notion of the city of moeurs which is a key to understanding how anti-cosmopolitan movements such as nationalism might construe the city. The nation is an imaginative construct and one which fulfils a replacement role – it is not dependent upon religious or feudal ties which made sense of rural medieval European communities. It is a response to a problem of modernity and one which is from the outset an urban response. That it glorifies an imagined rural/pastoral authenticity does not mean that it rejects the urban. It seeks, instead, to shape the urban. Rousseau’s ‘Letter’ provides a template to understand how this plays out.

The corruption to which Rousseau referred was one in which artifice predominates in human relations. As a corrective, he was proposing a regulated environment and one which was most effectively regulated through urban institutions and structures. Irrational feudal and religious structures could just as easily be corrupted
but it is in Geneva that Rousseau identified a specific configuration of institutions which could in his view preserve a more equitable existence.

There is, perhaps, a distinction being drawn between a theatrical city and a moral city which might in turn see its realisation respectively in the cosmopolitan city and the nationalist city. In this simple typography, it is only the former which Sennett acknowledges as a city proper and, hence, his claim that Rousseau is against urban life. Opened up to the possibility of more than one formulation of the city, it becomes possible to perceive a different nationalist urban project which is not necessarily at odds with nationalist pastoral ideals. Cosmopolitan and nationalist cities can overlap, contend for territory and co-operate – it is not a scheme in which Paris necessarily ends up in one type and Budapest in the other.

Of later nineteenth century Europe Sennett says, ‘Rousseau hoped for a social life in which masks would become faces, appearances signs of character. In a way, his hopes were realized; masks did become faces in the nineteenth century, but the result was the erosion of interaction.’ (Sennett, 2002, p. 217) Sennett traced the onset of public silence as cities modernised in which the spectacle has a passive audience rather than active citizen. The implication is that Rousseau's hopes for society became expressed, ironically, in a form which was against his overall ambitions. Yet it is precisely this passivity which is at the heart of Rousseau's critique of the theatre. ‘People think they come together in the theatre, and it is there that they are isolated. It is there that they go to forget their friends, neighbors, and relations in order to concern themselves with fables, in order to cry for the misfortunes of the dead, or to laugh at the expense of the living.’ (Rousseau, 1968) (see also Kohn, 2008)

It is into this alienated late nineteenth century urban form that popular nationalism made its intervention. In the absence of a society in which people dealt with
each other face-to-face but rather were passive observers and consumers of the city, nationalism provided a pseudo-communal, spiritual dimension. To this extent it was a travesty of Rousseau’s ideal society. However, nationalism's idealisation of community overlaps with Rousseau’s ambition for a society in which the communal experience mattered. It is this shared ambition which drove a moral project for the city which contended with, and is in dialogue with, more cosmopolitan notions of the city.
Herder

Herder provided an alternative Romantic geography framing the purpose and function of cities in Europe. Whereas Rousseau maintained a certain universal humanism in his notion of community, Herder was decidedly particular in his approach. Cities, in this view, would be the product of a people, the physical geography of the land shaping their customs and, as a result them of following these customs, marking the land. This could be set beside a more universal Romantic conception of the city as a moral project – in this model the city, although its more moral form might be produced by particular circumstances and conditions, would potentially be available to all cultures. Though there is an exclusionary element in both models, the city as the height of cultural achievement has the potential to be one which is the product of just one Volk to the exclusion of others, a more exclusive urban geography than that of Rousseau. The city as a moral project most certainly condemns other cities as immoral and corrupt and this stance is there from the outset in Rousseau’s work with his denunciations of Paris. There are also, however, overlaps with something akin to a cosmopolitan city – a more plural city – in both. The city held as the height of a nation’s cultural achievement could surely tolerate other cultures as its civilising effects are a gift from one people to many. The city as a moral project has its universality embedded if only from a perspective which says all humanity can be freed in a more equitable world in which corruption has been excluded by well-run institutions.

For Herder, geography and culture were bound together in a way which produced distinct expressions of human genius. Geographies could shape peoples: cold northern European climes made for a rugged individualism and southern European warmth and fertility fed civilisation and languor. This effect was reproduced across space and time from the dawn of civilisation in the East to the rise of the Germanic
world and Christianity. All of this had hints of Hegel’s teleology but without a strong underlying systematic dialectical explanation. This noted, Herder’s claim that Roman civilisation in southern Europe had cleared the way for northern tribes was a variety of dialectical explanation. However, there was less of a sense, despite Herder’s exuberance about German culture, of a progression to a pinnacle of human achievement. Instead certain expressed characteristics, entities and institutions could be seen as a kind of blossoming of a people. In the case of Classical civilisation, this blossoming took the form of large cities.

John Breuilly suggested that Herder’s political values contradicted his historicism and that he could not be described as a nationalist (1994, p. 56). This may well be true of a narrower nationalism which necessarily defines itself as chauvinistic. Herder’s historicism sat perfectly well with what might be described as a proto-nationalist position. He certainly tries to find a means of getting away from narrow parochialism and, importantly, away from the possibility of war between nations. Breuilly set out a process for the development of nationalist ideology: historicism, a legitimate intellectual response to modernity and a rebuttal of universalist approaches of the Enlightenment, was turned into ideology through notions of ‘authenticity’ and ‘teleology’ (1994, p. 102). Herder's historicism could well be ideologically operationalised as narrow nationalist doctrine but the possibility of its influence on less chauvinistic approaches is something to be explored further.

In ‘Another Philosophy of History’, Herder explored radical differences between peoples and cultures over different periods. Allied to an embryonic German nationalism this provided for an explanation of the role of northern European cultures in the development of contemporary Europe and a close reading of Herder shows that he took a deliberate position on the role of the city in that development. For the northern
cultures, Herder identified that cities were initially not aligned with their characteristics and tendencies, replacing as those cultures did the more urban Roman one: ‘The fine Roman laws and insights could not … revive driving forces that had been depleted; thus death! – an emaciated corpse lying in a pool of blood – when in the North a new man was born.’ (Herder, 2004, p. 33)

Roman civilisation, with cities as its most visible achievement across Europe, had lost its vitality only to be replaced by new barbarian energy in northern Europe. This new northern force though was primarily rural and feudal rather than urban and culturally refined:

‘But as they brought nature instead of the arts, healthy Northern intelligence instead of the sciences, strong and good, albeit savage customs instead of refined ones, and as everything fermented together – what a spectacle! How their laws breathed manly courage, sense of honor, confidence in intelligence, honesty, and piety! How their institution of feudalism undermined the welter of populous, opulent cities, building up the land, employing hands and human beings, making healthy and therefore happy people.’ (2004, p. 33)

So, the health of the wild barbarian tribes of the North defeated corruption in cities of the South in Herder’s account. As European culture was Christianised, Herder asserted, it maintained these Northern values and later in ‘Another Philosophy’ he defended feudalism as being a means by which the growth of cities was constrained. The glory of the German people and its moral virtue was something inward here, an expression of a culture which was psychologically clear-headed and healthy, not one
which expressed itself through the city. This might have presented problems for German nationalists drawing on the work of Herder later during a period of industrialised urban expansion. Herder’s conception of a plurality of cultures, however, might have presented a way out. Non-German cultures, both ancient and contemporary, had different characteristics which meant that there were different material expressions of a people’s genius according to their geographic context. Regarding Greek culture, for example: ‘How distasteful, even now, are agriculture, city life, the slavery of the artisan’s shop to the Oriental!’ The roots of Greek civilisation lay in 'Oriental' culture in this account. At its base, Herder claimed, the structures of city-life were rejected by this component of Greek culture. In contrast to this Oriental aspect, the Egyptian influence on Greek culture provided a different dimension: ‘To the Egyptian … how loathsome and repulsive was the shepherd … when the more refined Greek later elevated himself above the Egyptian and his vices, this meant nothing more than when a boy is repulsed by an infant.’ The conflict in attitudes to different forms of life expressed in the Oriental, Egyptian and Greek aspects of Greek culture should create a tension. However, Herder would have it that, ‘all three belong together, following one upon the other. The Egyptian would not have been Egyptian without his Oriental childhood instruction, the Greek no Greek without his Egyptian schoolboy’s diligence—their very loathing demonstrates development, progression, steps on the ladder!’ (2004, p. 13)

So, the urban form had its cultural context. On Herder’s ‘ladder’, the city had risen to a cultural summit, though by this logic it informed ‘the German’ as the German would not be German without an urban Roman heritage. Indeed he sets out to demonstrate how the Roman world made a clearing in Europe for northern values to thrive (2004, pp. 42–45). Since Herder was reacting in ‘Another Philosophy’, and in
much of his other work, to what he perceived as the pretensions and errors of the French philosophes (Berlin, 2000, p. 168), to identify a preference for or against the city is to some extent beside the point. He was in favour of the particular and this preference shows which direction a ‘Herderian’ approach to the modern city might follow.

Elsewhere Herder specifically addressed city life and identity in his discussion of Greek civilisation. For Herder, there was a puzzle in the identification of citizens of the Classical city-states as Greek. He described a system in which Greek local ties – both urban and rural – could assimilate. It was a system which used the ritualised performance of violence and struggle to form a common Greek identity. The creation of and participation in, ‘common games and competitions … gave Greece a unity and diversity that here, too, made for the most beautiful whole. Hostility and assistance, striving and moderating: the powers of the human spirit were most beautifully balanced and unbalanced.’ (2004, p. 20)

The possibility of a competitive city-state system with the common bond of Greek-ness was maintained, as Herder would have it, through ritualised interaction and competition. This was something which, later in the nineteenth century as urbanisation in Europe took hold, resurfaced as a means of providing a bond for cities and nations in a new way for Europe, through the codification and popularisation of such spectator sports as football and, indeed, through the re-creation of the Olympic Games.

However, to take any of these positive historical references as an indication of a positive forward-looking urbanism on the part of Herder is to take things much further than he intended. In ‘Another Philosophy’ he intervened in an Enlightenment discourse on universal brotherhood, in which distinctions like the nation would dissipate (the ‘another’ in ‘Another Philosophy of History’ is an ironic reference to philosophies of history informed by this universality produced by philosophes such as Voltaire (1965)).
He attacked the notion that history is progressive and that each age improves upon the last. For example, the institution of serfdom, condemned by Enlightenment philosophers, had for Herder in its own time a worthwhile function in which, ‘so-called primitive country estates restrained the excessive, unhealthy expansion of the cities, those abysses for the vitality of mankind; the scarcity of trade and refinement prevented self-indulgence and preserved simple humanity.’ (Herder, 2004, p. 41)

Rather than taking Herder’s pluralism (cf. Berlin, 2000) as his guiding principle, the tension which is perceptible in ‘Another Philosophy’ between an almost reluctant admiration for other people, their customs and their cities should be set against a certain triumphalism regarding northern European, and specifically Germanic nations. These nations, he explicitly stated, were not only non-urban in their best manifestation but anti-urban in the way that their institutions squeezed the spaces of European urbanism. So, cities, especially in their Classical form, were to be both admired and to be feared as corrupt. This tension was nothing new – Babylon and Rome feature persistently in Christian discourse in demonstrating the attractions and perils of the city. What Herder brought to this, however, was the notion that the city had been overcome and replaced by something better.

Elsewhere Herder made clear his disdain for the idea of the possibility of a return to the cultural heights of previous great nations: ‘the path of fate is iron and strict’ (2004, p. 77). There was a forward-looking impulse in much of Herder’s philosophy which would preclude Classicism and medievalism in a Germanic national project. Despite this, Herder had admiration for Greek and Roman urban models because in them he could identify a working patriotism which would promote virtue. He found his ‘small societies’ exemplified in the Greek cities. The city-states were an ideal because it was in such societies that it was, ‘the land of the fathers that one protected; it was
companions from one’s youth—siblings and friends—for whom one yearned. The league of love into which young men entered was approved and made use of by the fatherland.’ This loving bond enabled a concept of friendship to be on a par with that of family: ‘One wished to be buried with one’s friends, to enjoy things together, to live and die with them.’ The cost of building such a community by ancestors meant a price of loyalty to them was to be paid later: ‘And since the noble ancestors of these tribes had built the community to which they belonged with the protection of the gods … so the bond of such laws was sacred to their descendants as a moral fatherland’ (2004, p. 111).

Out of this bond to a fatherland the descendants of these Greek citizens were able to hold to the laws of previous generations and thus it became a moral fatherland. Through this process, then, the sense of a fatherland was strengthened: a small society created laws and institutions that reinforced bonds through a naturally occurring love for each other; then that fatherland became abstracted into something which could be followed by descendants without the original context. In other words, patriotism could be transmitted to a larger society over time. The particular geography which guided the formation of Classical Greece led to city-states which were adapted to the cultural and institutional characteristics of the Greeks. By the same token then the characteristics of the Germanic and northern European peoples were not seen to lead to a city-based culture. This was a proposition which for nationalists would have to shift as the nineteenth century progressed and the proportion of that northern European population which was urbanised vastly increased. It is less Herder's prescription of the characteristics of northern European culture which is important here, rather a model of understanding a culture’s relationship to place.
Both Rousseau and Herder had in their influential writings idealised urban forms which were suitable models for nationalist narrative and aspiration. Rousseau’s city of moeurs was one in which its formal composition affords and was afforded by a society free of bondage and a people able to act morally. Herder’s understand of the city was situated in history as a cultural product – it reflected the characteristics of a particular culture. It was not something which every culture could produce and in the German case was not for Herder its emblematic product but, much as ‘Oriental’ and ‘Egyptian’ modes of thought and living contributed to Greek culture the ‘Roman’ city contributed to the German one.
3. Urban Forms and Affordances

Before going on to conduct formal analysis on the specific cases of Budapest, Vienna and Venice, forms and affordances in a diverse set of examples will be explored in this chapter. The geography of these examples goes wider than physical Europe and further back than the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The role of urban forms which persist over long periods of time and which structure modern settings is drawn out by these examples.

For urban wholes, the examples are: Barcelona, looking at the demolition of walls and the creation of repeatable patterns of expansion of an urban whole; Rome, and the superimposition of contended urban wholes; and Bruges/Chicago as an example of an organic whole/planned opposition. Rhythms which structure urban forms are examined: on the London to Birmingham Railway and the structuring effect of timetabled rhythms; and in Amsterdam with its regulation of water courses. Hierarchical forms which impact and shape cities are demonstrated by the examples of: legal developments in medieval northern Italy and the contention for authority over cities creating a gap for urban autonomy; and, later, in the city of Krakow and the physical separation of districts embodying urban hierarchies. The connections within and between cities forming urban networks are exemplified: in Saint-Nazaire in which physical geography afforded modern shipping, the transfer of large scale port facilities and connection to global trade from nearby Nantes; in Nantes itself and the creation of the first omnibus service in 1826, prior to rail, which compressed urban space for ordinary citizens whilst expanding intra-urban networks; by the trans-Saharan trade and Islam as affording regularised trading links over vast distances; and by the Randstad conurbation in the Netherlands which in the twentieth century became a hybrid intra- and inter-city network, coordinating existing urban infrastructure to create a new
networked urban form. What these examples will show is how a scheme of formal affordances can be applied to a variety of urban settings and begin to detail how ideology and urban forms are enmeshed.
Figure 2: Map of Barcelona 1855 (Sala, 1855)

Figure 2 shows a plan of the city of Barcelona as it was before the completion of demolition of most of its defensive walls and the subsequent development of the city’s extension. The city administration, the Ajuntament de Barcelona, had commissioned a report published in 1841 which had called for the demolition of the walls largely on public health grounds (Monlau, 1841). The resistance of Madrid-based state institutions to the project made the report’s prime recommendation a rallying cry over the next decade. The opportunity was taken during a political crisis and popular unrest to go ahead with the demolition in 1854. The project became strongly associated with Catalan nationalism as a result of the impasse with Spanish authorities (Hughes, 2001, pp. 274–278). On the plan, the city is contained within its walls and overseen by a fortress on its eastern flank, the Citadella. Order is afforded by the hard boundaries of
the city and by the elevated position of the Citadella, a military base for forces representing the Spanish state overlooking the activities of the citizens of the largest Catalan city. The street layout shows evidence of having been augmented over a long period, showing no obvious overarching scheme. The everyday urban experience of the residents is framed by the irregular buildings and streetscape. The location of the Roman colonia of Barceno is still evident in the street pattern around the Plaza de la Constitucion. Public spaces are largely related to the functions of buildings and institutions. The whole is divided by the straight thoroughfare of Las Ramblas, a culverted water course to the west of which land belonging to church institutions had (Hughes, 2001, p. 199) been developed and then enclosed by the walls. Since the hard boundary is difficult to extend, the city effectively can only grow in population by increasing density and therefore the outsider coming into the city makes a direct demand on the limited resources of the city.

Figure 3: Map of Barcelona 1861 (Cerdá & Roca, 1861)
Figure 3 shows the plan proposed by Ildefonso Cerdá to demolish its walls and extend the city. Existing structures are shown by darker blocks and the proposed layout is shown in lighter blocks. The plan shows the scale of the proposal in relation to the existing city and although it is labelled as a ‘reforma y ensanche’ (reform and enlargement) there is ambiguity about whether the smaller whole is being extended or whether the larger whole is absorbing the smaller. The walls of the old city have disappeared and it is now delineated by straight edges rather than the jagged ones of the walls. The new scheme is porous with many entry points and long boulevards taking traffic through it. It is a repeated and repeatable pattern suggesting that newcomers could be accommodated by further extension while keeping population density stable. Since habitats are more equal in size and uniform, the urban experience of the residents has the potential to be equalised. Public spaces are created by the intersections of road layout rather than particular and adjacent institutional or building functions. It is more difficult to gain a panoptical view of the new city than was the case from the old city from the Citadella but it is more legible to policing authorities through the regularisation of space. The plan of the extension is not derived from the natural features of the land on which it sits, unlike the old city whose layout was related to the seaport and to the overlooking hills.
Figure 4 shows the outline of Rome’s defensive walls in 1871. The walls, constructed on the right bank in the third century CE (Claridge, 2010, p. 24; Taylor, Rinne, & Kostof, 2016, p. 131), in the ninth century CE on the left bank (Taylor et al., 2016, p. 232) and well-maintained since, in 1871 enclose and defend a city that is controlled by the Papacy and that is the objective for inclusion by the new secular Italian state, it having been declared the new kingdom’s capital in 1861 (Chabod & McCuaig, 2014, p. 125). The walls’ defensive and symbolic function overlap as the city is laid siege by republican troops and defended by out-numbered papal forces. The Pope decides that it is inevitable that the city will be ceded as Italian republican troops approach to take it; however, he insists that the papal forces must put up a show of resistance first to demonstrate non-compliance. Italian forces bombard the Porta Pia
and penetrate the walls enabling them to take the city (De Amicis, 1995, pp. 23–28).\(^\text{10}\) Once the city is taken the Pope declares himself a ‘prisoner’ and retreats to the Vatican Palace (Mazzoni, 2010, p. 13). The Papacy is offered but rejects the offer to be allowed the Leonine City, on the left bank of the Tiber enclosed by the river and walls (Kertzer, 2004, p. 42). The Holy See and the Italian state settle their dispute over Rome in the Lateran Pact of 1929 in which a new state is created, the Vatican City State, an enclave within Rome (2004, p. 292). Between 1871 and 1929 three Roman wholes are concurrent: disputed Rome enclosed by the Aurelian Walls, the Leonine City and the Vatican.

The bifurcation of modern Rome by the River Tiber affords the separation of Church and State. Again, practical and symbolic functions overlap. The whole is separable and this permits ambiguous answers to questions of authority: Is the whole of the city occupied by the Italian state? Is the Pope imprisoned in a part of the whole city or is that part effectively removed? The river also indicates a divide between pre-Christian Rome on the left bank of the Tiber and the right bank which was largely outside of the city walls, only to be fully included within new walls after the Church had established the Vatican as the burial site of St Peter and made it the site of a basilica. The definition of the Roman urban whole, although it aspires to establish hard

\(^{10}\) Immediately after the proclamation of Rome being the new capital, Haussmann (who had left his role leading the renewal of Paris under a cloud of financial scandal) was consulted directly by the city’s new secular authorities, as a contemporary report in The Pall Mall Gazette shows: ‘A correspondent of the Telegraph reports the arrival of M. Haussmann at Rome. The famous reconstructor of ancient cities is understood to have been called in by the Municipality of Rome for a serious consultation with respect to the demolition of the old and useless edifices in the present city and erection of public and private buildings, in conformity with the necessary requirements of the future capital of Italy.’ (“Summary of This Morning’s News,” 1871) See also Haussmann’s own account of an approach to join a commercial venture to redevelop Rome (1893, p. 553)
boundaries, is contested by different ideological perspectives on the idea of Rome.

Urban wholes are perhaps the kind of urban form on which claims of historical continuity can be most readily demonstrated. Rome’s ‘Eternal City’ claim is based on an unbroken reproduction of the Roman urban whole at the same topos. For the new Italian state, built on post-Enlightenment secular lines, the claim of a link back to Classical Rome provided a way of legitimising the replacement of papal power. In the words of Cavour, ‘it is impossible to conceive a constituted Italian kingdom without Rome for its capital.’ (1861). The papal claim to the Roman urban whole was a claim of an unbroken connection to the purported first Bishop of Rome, St Peter, and the apostolic succession was closely aligned with continuity in the city of Rome.

Figure 5: Bruges in the 16th Century, Lukas - Art in Flanders VZW, photo Hugo Maertens, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 (Anonymous, n.d.)
Figure 5 shows a plan of Bruges around 1500 and Figure 6 shows a map of Chicago in 1893. Both are used by Scott to advance an argument regarding the imposition in the modern era of rational order as part of a project to make geographies ‘legible’ to emerging state institutions (Scott, 1998). Urban geometric order is, according to Scott, notable for being ‘most evident … from above and outside’ (1998, p. 57); in other words, the imposition of this kind of rational order on a city is an external instrument. It could be said that the concept of a ‘whole city’ itself is an instrument of control, a large and potentially unwieldy population made visible through a panoptic lens locating its place, plan and identity. Scott contrasts Bruges, whose plan has organic resemblances and whose order is not immediately obvious to the external observer, to Chicago, on a grid whose order he describes as ‘utopian’ for an administrator.

Figure 6: Map of Chicago 1898 (“Bird’s-Eye View of the Business District of Chicago,” 1898)
The organic/planned opposition in urban thought is one which relies on an urban whole as its analytical object. The evidence of centralised planning is highly visible on a city plan in a way which is more difficult to demonstrate over a wider territory. For this reason, urban wholes are readily available for demonstrating the efficacy of planning over time as they help make claims to be stable objects on which a chronology of changes are intelligible. In the case of the comparison Scott makes, his descriptions of the plans for each city are in fact descriptions of the street plans. He ignores the similarities in arrangement of water courses in both sixteenth century Bruges and nineteenth century Chicago which conform less to a regular pattern but instead are a compromise between the topology of the underlying earth and access to wharves in the concentrated urban core. In fact, both cities required thoroughgoing planning for their water-based economies to function. What marks them out as different to each other however is their relative liminal restrictions: Chicago is without walls and, though bound on the east by Lake Michigan is in the open for undefined development in other directions with a repeatable urban street plan; Bruges with its walls has its development bounded and any new additions or alterations happen within a highly contextual system.

What Scott’s comparison does highlight is the apparent separation of street-level urban experience from that of the urban whole. A city does not present its entire layout to its inhabitants at street level, with the possible exception of specific vantage points. The ‘whole city’ is a synoptic view. It would therefore follow that discourse regarding the whole city – whether, for example, it is an ‘organic’ or ‘planned’ city – is necessarily removed from the everyday experience of the city. It is this removal that he then explores further in his account of the High Modernist City and the work of Le Corbusier. Le Corbusier’s work not only separated itself from everyday urban experience through its functional separation of human activities which effectively atomised the citizenry
but also it radically decontextualised urban development, making it follow Cartesian forms at the expense of underlying, pre-existing forms. Le Corbusier’s architecture represents the violent assertion of the primacy of the whole over other formal categories: it is the all-encompassing remit of the Plan which seeks to order and regulate all other forms.

Urban wholes defined by a grand, open layout contrast with those defined by constraint and delineation, ways of controlling cities that are facilitated by containment. As European cities modernised, there was a recurring question of what to do with physical walls. The debate around the demolition of walls in Vienna, explored further in its case study, has its parallels in Barcelona and Rome. All three had their walls removed prior to the modernisation of each city. In each city, however, quite different justifications were deployed. In the case of Barcelona, the demolition of the walls was justified both on health grounds and as part of a movement for Catalan separatism, the walls being seen as the physical embodiment of capture by the Castilian state. In the case of Rome, the demolition of the walls was seen as the removal of a barrier between the newly created Italian nation and its natural capital. The case of Vienna was also similarly justified as part of a scheme for improvement; the walls were also seen ideologically as representative of the traditional state targeted for demolition by the liberal bourgeoisie (Schorske, 1981, pp. 24–31) but with no significant nationalist sentiment associated with it. All three share a reaction to traditional institutions symbolised by their walls. However, they each have three quite different relationships to national projects. In the Barcelonan case, it is a national project expanding outwards that is at issue. The Roman example is one in which external national forces are allowed in by the walls’ removal. The Viennese example does not readily match up to a national project. The outcome in all three cases is very similar in the creation of modern urban
wholes. Different ideological movements were afforded by the walls and their removal but also similar physical outcomes were afforded by the same.
In communities where economic production is heavily dependent on ecological cycles and weather, the rhythms which govern human activity are grounded externally. As the primary economic purpose of a community becomes removed from these cycles, so new rhythms gain importance. Patterns of social behaviour constructed by a community internally feature more: religious rites, gatherings to decide on and enforce rules, structured learning, maintenance of public facilities, the ebb and flow of crowds and traffic are all socially generated and their links to external ecological cycles are secondary. Since cities are largely economically removed from production dependent on the land, it is these internal rhythms which are more deeply embedded in urban life.

Figure 7: London to Birmingham Time Table 1839 (Bradshaw, 1839)

Timetables became an important part of everyday life with the introduction of passenger rail services in the mid-nineteenth century. Since time-keeping varied from
region to region, the lack of standardisation made timetables difficult to compile and maintain and it was only by introducing the concept of railway time, a precursor of internationally standardised time, that the railway network could function efficiently and in a manner comprehensible to passengers (Osterhammel, 2014, pp. 69–71). Figure 7 shows the timetable for services between London and Birmingham in 1839. The timetable uses local time for each station and therefore does not indicate precisely the duration of a journey. The rhythm provided by the timetable not only signals the peaks of noise and traffic produced by the arrival of the train but also provides intervals for most of the stations where trains do not stop. In the example here, only London and Wolverton (the main locomotive works for the line) are visited by every train. Birmingham and Coventry are only missed once by a train which terminates early at Wolverton. The regularity of trains stopping at these stations not only indicates the economic importance of their locations to the economic viability of the railway but also because fewer trains could be heard stopping at these stations, the relative unimportance of these locations was reinforced with their inhabitants. This contrasts with Crick and Brandon for which only two trains stop going up on their way to Birmingham while seven trains pass on through signalling their relative insignificance. The contrast here is between stopping and passing traffic and this is obviously something which far predates the railway. However, rather than the ebb and flow of traffic varying day by day, the timetable provided a clearly understood metrical rhythm that was repeated daily.

What the timetable does is to regulate the rhythms governing mass transit and in turn human and animal movement. It is this regulated rhythm – the superimposition of mechanical timekeeping on ecological cycles – which is a marker of urban modernisation in the late nineteenth century European city. Some particular targets for
regularisation in the context of urban rhythms are water, traffic, the working day and public gatherings.

Figure 8: Map of Amsterdam around 1300 (Tirion & Wagenaar, n.d.)
Figure 9: Bird’s-eye View of Amsterdam 1538 (Anthonisz, 1538)

Figure 10: Amsterdam 1662 (Stalpaert, 1662)
Mumford’s selection of Amsterdam as his exemplary commercial city demonstrates the regulation of rhythms to afford long distance commercial trading (1961). Often the urban Netherlands is understood as having been built on ‘reclaimed’ land. As the series of plans for Amsterdam show (Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10) in fact they were as much a synthesis of stable land and rhythmic seas, an exercise in control of tides and river flows harnessed to move goods and people. The plans show the progression of Amsterdam’s enlargement from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. At each stage, marginal land is brought into the urban system, exposing it to navigable water courses and affording access to water-bound trade and traffic. Just as agricultural land can be brought into existence using irrigation and drainage, so the city can be made fertile for trade. Other rhythms work with this hydraulic engineering: the dams, sluices and polders of the Netherlands are maintained through the institution of the ‘waterschap’, the system of water boards created in the thirteenth century which constitute one of its earliest forms of local government. The institution is sustained not just through authority being delegated by the state but also through its persistence through regular meetings, levy collection and day-to-day maintenance tasks of the waterschap (Tol & Langen, 2000).

Amsterdam’s case is also notable in that the regulation of water occurs in tandem with the positive expansion of economic activity as much as by defence of existing urban structures. Figure 10 shows the city’s expansion in the latter half of the seventeenth century which was planned and directed by the city authorities but involved private capital and development to undertake and pay for it (Mumford, 1961, p. 442). As the plan shows, it created land open for speculative building which was already tightly integrated into an existing system of canals. Thus, land was brought within a set of urban rhythms and given regulated access to the city and to the sea.
Mumford uses Amsterdam as an example of a city which balanced long term urban planning with shorter term capitalist speculation and profit-making. This balance might be achieved in different ways in different places but Amsterdam’s development was afforded by its situation in the Netherlands and its context within a set of rhythms, both ecological and social. The setting affords regulation and then, in a self-reinforcing process, existing regulation orders the expansion of the setting. Regulation in this context is the ordering of rhythm, making it more predictable. A city which has its rhythms regulated is able to calculate risks – Amsterdam was well suited to replace Antwerp as a major centre of the insurance industry in the seventeenth century (Spufford, 2006, p. 165). Rhythms with complex meter whose cycles are not easily measured – meteorological rhythms are an example – generate uncertainty and hence risk is more difficult to assess and calculate. The development of a city like Amsterdam is one in which control is imposed to provide a simpler metrical rhythm so that a surge of river water produced by excess rain sluices the city’s water courses rather than flooding the city itself.

Examples such as the London-Birmingham railway and Amsterdam show rhythms related to stable infrastructure – material interventions which shape an established landscape and cityscape which then shape the interaction of urban populations in a regularised and predictable manner. In contrast to these material rhythms are those which are primarily derived from social phenomena. Such social rhythms can be complementary to the material: tourism is often profoundly dependent on material infrastructure and the rhythms of scheduled flights and holiday seasons being synchronised. Urban social rhythms are to be observed in everyday practices such as commuting but also in less frequent examples associated with spectacular events, pilgrimage and mass tourism. The population density and urban character of cities such
as Varanasi, Mecca and Jerusalem are dynamically altered by seasonal pilgrimage as well as being shaped in the long term by their status as sacred sites. Rhythmic expansion and contraction of population mean that services must be provided which are redundant for significant periods, making a city’s infrastructure look uncannily out of scale for significant periods of time. Similar effects are to be observed in so-called non-places such as airports (Augé, 2008). Resort towns are similarly subject to such fluctuations though fashions and changing geopolitics might make these rhythms more irregular. Under modern conditions, such social rhythms proliferate as populations increase and as the tendency to homogeneity produces crowds to be regulated in many different areas of urban life. The ideological utility of these types of social rhythm are various – the pilgrim is the most explicitly ideological subject in this context but the tourist is engaged equally in the reinforcement of modern liberal economics and neo-colonial potentials and the passenger at the airport is subject to the attentions of control mechanisms which reinforce cultural norms: as Korstanje observes, ‘three institutions, migrations, customs and police work together to keep the security of nation state. Airports serve in this vein as ideological mechanism of discipline and control so passengers embrace the cultural values of current societies.’ (2015, p. 55)

Since urban rhythms are necessarily regulated, they offer the opportunity for institutional control and manipulation thereby giving them potential as ideological tools at the same time as seeming to be prosaic and technocratic. The striking livery of public transport vehicles regularly plying the streets of a city are advertising their services and convenience to the public but can also represent the bountiful provision of an urban administration and can even be integral to urban identity in much the same way as a navy and a flag can be for a nation. In the era of the modern city, the proliferation of rhythmic forms through mechanisation and industrialisation has created many new
opportunities for ideological co-option and reinforcement. These forms are the means by which order is projected on to a city and shape the habits and customs of citizens and visitors alike. The rhythm is one in which the citizen is relatively passive and therefore receptive – to move to a different rhythm in a city is to go against a crowd and to be immediately identifiable as such.
Urban Hierarchies

Forms of hierarchy in cities shape social practices and also locate a city’s identity within a wider context of other places and territories. Human settlement is the instantiation of the principle of hierarchy as the agricultural life which sustains it needs a sharpened division of labour. However, hierarchical order is not static or uncontest. Claims of control in the city and of the city are constantly wrestled. Urban inhabitants can be subdued, in contest with or can override urban elites. The city can dominate its hinterland, be subsumed into larger territorial structures or, again, be in conflict with its neighbours and powers that seek to dominate it.

The cities of Lombardy and Tuscany in the High Middle Ages exemplify this tension. Cities in northern Italy emerged as significant economic entities around the tenth and eleventh centuries. These cities found themselves caught between the imperial power of the Holy Roman Empire, whose core lay on the other side of the Alps, and the Church in Rome and both vied for temporal authority in the Italian peninsula. Given their increasing economic power, however, the cities had significant leverage of their own. This leverage needed both military and ideological forces to give it legitimacy. When the University in Bologna first became established, in around 1088, it was the first of its kind and its purpose was initially primarily for the study of the recently rediscovered Roman legal code enshrined by Justinian. A code of civil law was increasingly desirable as trade grew in the northern Italian cities and the Justinian code provided a legal framework for the adjudication of such things as contractual disputes (Landau, 1999, p. 115). As universities at Bologna and elsewhere developed, the study of law in northern Italy matured and so the beginnings of a set of conceptual tools began to be produced which would enable the cities to defend against claims over them (Skinner, 1978). By the time of the military campaigns of Holy Roman Emperor
Frederick Barbarossa in the twelfth century which sought to consolidate imperial power or claim imperial power in northern Italy, the cities were in a position to combine into a defensive military force through the establishment of the Lombard League under the leadership of the Milanese; and, crucially, an interpretation of the legal status of the cities was developed and promoted by the cities themselves through legal theory in the universities and through the deployment of the rhetoric of rights and liberty. At this time, conceptual defences started to be deployed, appealing for example for the defence of the ‘honour and liberty of Italy’ (Bueno de Mesquita, 1965), liberty in this context meaning the ability to act independently of imperial authority and maintain local systems of government. In the latter half of the thirteenth century the Papacy, a counterweight for the northern cities to imperial power, claimed increasing influence that was seen to encroach upon urban autonomy. In cities such as Padua, conflict over whether the Church needed to pay local taxes represented a wider struggle for control and the use of legal and rhetorical argument to assert and dispute local rights (Skinner, 1978, p. 7). As ongoing struggles for control continued into the fourteenth century, the centre of defence of autonomy shifted from Lombardy to Tuscany where Florence had become the leading city. Emperor Henry of Luxembourg arrived in Italy from across the Alps in 1310 in an attempt to assert his imperial power, much as Frederick Barbarossa and Frederick II had before him. The concept of liberty was again deployed in the service of the right to rule themselves as Florentine diplomatic letters proclaimed the ‘liberty of Tuscany’ (Bueno de Mesquita, 1965). As the century progressed jurisprudence evolved with ‘postglossators’ such as Bartolus de Saxoferrato shifted from applying the law strictly to shaping the facts to prioritising facts when they appeared to conflict with the law. The outcome of this approach was to further legitimise the de facto independence of the Italian city-states (Skinner, 1978).
In the Italian city-state example, several hierarchical forms vied for primacy and not only was urban autonomy afforded by the authority of legal scholars but also the conflict of hierarchies itself afforded the growth of independent city-state institutions. Imperial and papal precedence was exercised but the theoretical claims of a new academic class asserted the primacy of law. The legal framework could be used to make power abstract and reduce the claims of imperial and ecclesiastical authorities with argument, thereby reinforcing economic and social power originating in the expanding and successful cities of northern Italy. Urban institutions were afforded increasing autonomy through conflicts between existing hierarchies and the creation of new ones.

Forms within the city’s physical layout itself can embody this tension of hierarchies. Krakow was the royal seat of the Kingdom of Poland until the sixteenth century. The institutions of Polish royalty were located on the Wawel hill to the south of the main settlement on the River Vistula (Carter, 2006, p. 65). The administration of Poland-Lithuania moved from Krakow to Warsaw in the early seventeenth century (2006, p. 186). Although Krakow’s fortunes waned in subsequent centuries it maintained a symbolic state role as the venue for royal coronations and burials. By the time of the dissolution by partition of the Polish-Lithuanian state at the end of the eighteenth century, a long period of deterioration through warfare had reduced the city so that it ‘presented a picture of complete decline’ (Bieniarzówna & Malecki, 1994; cited in Damljanović & Makaš, 2015). Krakow’s occupiers in the aftermath of the partitions removed the crown jewels, downgraded the site of coronations from a cathedral to an ordinary church and sited barracks and a hospital on the Wawel hill (Damljanović & Makaš, 2015, p. 190). Such actions were intended to symbolise the demise of the Polish-Lithuanian state and as such the Wawel conversely took on the symbolism of aggrieved defeat.
Krakow was, however, to take on a new role in the years after the Napoleonic wars. It was granted a measure of independence. This Free City of Krakow in fact not only included the city centre itself but also its hinterland to the north of the River Vistula. It was subordinate to its neighbouring empires but enjoyed administrative autonomy and a duty-free status which gave it economic freedom. It became a focus for Polish nationalist sentiment and activity such that it was the focus of the Uprising of 1846 in support of Polish independence. Its failure led to the annexation of Krakow by the Austrians, adding it to the province of Galicia (Lukowski & Zawadzki, 2006, pp. 169–170).

Krakow’s reshaping during the nineteenth century shows the repurposing of a separation in the layout of many European medieval cities which divided a castle district from the rest of a walled city; this separation went from being one in which aristocracy and ecclesiastical symbols are reserved in a sanctified, elevated site from more mundane
industry and trade of the civilian population, to one which was transposed on to one in which a deracinated castle district becomes symbolic of a national group and the rest of the city is regularised in a modern scheme. In the case of Krakow, the Wawel Hill was maintained in its walled state under the Free City authorities while the main body of the city underwent major demolitions in order to open it up to modernity – its walls were removed and replaced with open greenery, the Planty; also, the Town Hall was demolished, opening up a massive public square (Damljanović & Makaš, 2015, p. 191). Accordingly, the stratification of the medieval and early modern city was reordered by modern developments creating new hierarchies of meaning. This order was continuous with a distinction between the ‘historic’ centre and other zones of cities in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century in which meanings are encoded in urban layout.
Urban Networks

Cities are embedded within multiple networks, connected as they are to their hinterlands and to other distant places. Indeed, when viewed within a network they are nearly always crucial nodes, termination points of people, goods and information travelling along network vertices. In addition to, and complementing, this urban interconnection is urban intra-connection which at its most basic is exemplified by city streets and neighbourly relations. As with other urban forms, urban networks can overlap and contest with other forms; there is no rigid structure organising and isolating urban forms proposed here. However, the components of urban networks can be difficult to identify and grouping their types can help analyse their operation and impact. Urban networks as understood here are at their most basic level made up of vertices that convey people, goods, utilities and information which intersect at nodes. The simplest network is a conveyance by one vertex between two nodes and the most complex can contain an enormous set of nodes and vertices which crossover each other many times. Networks can be represented through multiple layers of abstraction but can be reduced to physical phenomena; the metro map represents an abstraction of the physical network of rails, rolling stock, passengers and stations of the underlying metro network, for example. Urban networks afford many kinds of social activity and cultural representation.

Port cities provide a good example of nodes in a physical network. The evolution of port facilities in the Lower Loire in the nineteenth century tracks the eclipse of the old slaving port of Nantes 50km inland from the Atlantic by the planned port of Saint-Nazaire which built modern facilities to handle transatlantic passenger and goods traffic for steamships in the post-slavery, capitalist economy of the north Atlantic in the late nineteenth century. Saint-Nazaire’s placement was afforded by its physical
geography, in a section of the Loire that could handle the deeper draughts of modern ships which could not travel up to Nantes but still sheltered from the stormy seas of the Bay of Biscay (“Plan Local d’Urbanisme,” 2009). Although it largely replaced Nantes as a port it nevertheless ensured that the economy around Nantes was sustained and the area became an embarkation point for the United States and the throughput of people from areas outside of the region provided cosmopolitan cultural input of a sort which would have been very different to the slave-based colonial economic network to which it had been connected in the previous century.

Nantes itself provides a historical example of the initiation of an intra-connected network with the development by of the first omnibus service in 1826 by Stanislas Baudry. Baudry’s concept was to develop a service which could transport potential customers from the centre of Nantes to a bathhouse on the city’s outskirts (Belenky, 2007). The innovation he introduced was to provide a regular, timetabled service which did not need to be pre-booked. In this way, citizens of Nantes had a permanent connection to an urban facility which was depersonalised. By instituting a network which was not dependent on demand from specific passengers but which would provide a vertex between two nodal points automatically, urban space began to be compressed. Urban mass public transport could be developed to afford cities which were no longer restricted by how far people could walk or the high cost of specialised carriages; instead the omnibus, which Baudry quickly introduced on a large scale to Paris, along with railways, afforded a massive expansion of urban space.

The establishment of regularised trade across the Sahara demonstrates features which afford successful urban connections, enriching the cities at the nodes of a vast network. The Sahara is surrounded by very diverse economies and this has been the case for millennia. To the north, the Mediterranean coastal regions are fertile and have
been in reasonably constant cultural, political and mercantile contact with the northern and eastern Mediterranean and beyond (Austen, 2015, p. 665). To the south of the Sahara is a region rich in materials such as salt and gold and a source of labour, forced through slavery or otherwise (2015, p. 667). Complex cultural formations have arisen, fallen and reconfigured on the margins of the desert over a long period. However, evidence of trans-Sahara trade prior to the eighth century suggests that it was not a constant, embedded feature of these societies (2015, p. 672).

Austen defines the two main conditions for conveying commodities across the Sahara as ‘the presence of goods with sufficient value to warrant the expense and risk’ and ‘the availability of a transport system that could make the cost … competitive’ (2015, p. 668). The first condition may well have been dependent on the existence of the second as much as the other way around – salt mining in northern Mali became established as caravan routes were starting in the fourth century CE. The second condition has a technical and political element: the technical element was fulfilled by the domestication of the dromedary whereas the political element required a stable political and diplomatic system for the camel caravan system to be regularised. Austen identifies the gap between ‘the presence of domesticated camels’ and the commencement of ‘direct and sustained trans-Saharan trade’ as a delay explained by the lack of this political element until the establishment of Islam throughout the Maghreb and with it an ideology that would provide common cultural and political bonds across distant Saharan communities (2015, p. 676). West African state systems in the Islamic era developed around urban centres such as Kumbi Saleh and Gao, and later Timbuktu, and thrived from trans-Saharan trade. Routes connecting these centres with areas to the north and east of the desert have been in constant use since this time transporting goods and people, including devout Muslims completing the Hajj to Mecca.
Urban connections, where urban centres are nodes in a network, require not only differentiated, high-value products for trade but also political and social consistency in the form of the protection of travellers, common standards for vehicles so that they can pass without significant obstruction and be maintained. For a network like that of the Sahara which has lasted for over 1,200 years, this consistency has not necessarily been provided through stable state institutions so much as being underpinned by a durable set of religious practices and laws and a common lingua franca in the form of Arabic.

Inter-urban networks can take many forms and are commonly represented in terms of interconnecting infrastructure such as roads and port facilities. However, the trans-Saharan network shows that interconnecting physical infrastructure can be virtually absent if a clearly understood set of practices and principles are in place, are durable and can be maintained.

Networked forms not only operate at inter-city and intra-city levels but also can be a means of integrating multiple city identities. Proximate cities can extend into each other forming conurbations and this enmeshing can serve several purposes. A
conurbation with multiple centres might be identified in order to measure the operation
of a social formation or economy at the level at which it most regularly functions. The
Randstad is an example of this: first applied in 1938 by Albert Plesman, of Dutch airline
KLM, he used the idea of the Randstad, literally ‘Ring City’, to discuss airport facilities
in The Netherlands and to advocate for a single airport to serve Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
The Hague and Utrecht. His observation was that from the air these four cities formed
a ring around a green area of The Netherlands and that they should be considered as a
unit when planning for an airport. The idea of the Randstad was potent in the sense that
it was adopted in the post-war era not only to conceptualise how the four cities actually
operated but also as a forward-planning goal (Laar & Kooy, 2003). In this way, the
conurbation was used to essentialise an aspiration: Plesman represented the Randstad
as a reality that was only visible from the air and used this to promote a project with
economic benefits for his company and hence brought that reality into being. The
Randstad describes a kind of hybrid intra/inter-city network, one in which existing
infrastructure physically links proximate cities and in conceptualising itself allows for
that network to be expanded, reinforcing the reality of the conurbation. This mechanism
is to some extent operating with all conurbation concepts to a greater or lesser extent.
In many cases, proximate cities ‘collide’ in the sense that the accretion of planning and
development decisions bring cities together so that their dense urban infrastructure
become contiguous. There are many examples of this where administrative structures
lag behind the emergence of a networked urban form which combines multiple cities.
A prime example of this is London where the collision of the City of London with
Westminster has never been reflected comprehensively in its administrative structure,
with the Corporation of London continuing to control the City in parallel with other
London-wide authorities. As the built-up area of London has expanded so its networked
infrastructure has been used to consolidate it functioning as a city; in the case of the London Underground system it has been used to encourage urbanisation of rural areas by private developers through the extension of the Metropolitan Railway into the Middlesex countryside (Sheppard, 2000). Such enmeshing of neighbouring urban territory through network consolidation applies and expands an order, systemising citizens’ lives. This process is at work in suburbanisation which has been boosted by the expansion of road networks and enables the compression of time and space within one urban system as well as between multiple urban nodes. The urban network entails a distinct challenge to nation-state identity with the possibility of excessive urban growth being described in terms which blur national jurisdictions and boundaries (Copenhagen-Malmö, made possible by the Øresund Bridge, spans Danish and Swedish national boundaries) and this can open new ideological meanings and contests.

In this brief survey of examples of urban form, a series of diverse cases has laid out what might be possible when cities are thought of through their affordances. A common thread is the interaction of physical persistence of urban forms with choices made about use and meaning. Historical patterns and new technologies combine to shape and change cityscapes and human action and language mediates this process as it progresses. These combinations of material form and practice can provide the basis for ideological interaction and intervention in the city. It is also clear that formal definitions overlap: networks, for example, operate by being entwined with rhythmic and hierarchical forms. The detailed cases of Budapest, Vienna and Venice during their development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will show how the creation of modern urban forms from a variety of pre-existing structures and arrangements afforded the advancements of ideological projects, programmes of nationalisation of cities and nationalist politics. That they did so to different degrees and through different means
helps demonstrate a variety of urban forms in different combinations can enable the practices of nationalism and, more generally, political projects.
4. Budapest

The first case study, Budapest, will show how the cities which came to constitute Budapest functioned until the mid-nineteenth century, how they came to be unified and how the newly merged city’s spaces, layout and architecture related to a project of nationalisation of the urban environment. Urban forms are identified, Budapest’s ‘whole’ forms being developed from the restoration of Pest after flooding, the construction of a bridge across the Danube linking the cities of Pest and Buda and a statistical view of Budapest’s population after its unification. These forms are joined with rhythms created by institutional forms, the attachment of the city to a national rail network and its place in a hierarchy of cities to show how nationalism and processes of nationalisation engendered a Hungarian Budapest. In turn, the unified city afforded the performance and practice of national and nationalist activity and three examples from the 1890s are explored with the funeral procession of a nationalist leader, the Hungarian Millennium Celebrations of 1896 and an early electronic broadcast service bringing news and cultural events in the Hungarian language to subscribers in the city.

The emergence of a distinct, modern Hungarian proto-state, a Hungarian capital called Budapest and an assertive Hungarian nationalism with mass appeal all occurred within a period of decades and had its greatest momentum between 1848 to 1873. All three phenomena were closely related and, focusing on two of them, Budapest urbanism and Hungarian nationalism were entangled in a way which exemplifies how urban forms can enable ideological projects. Budapest's transformation in the nineteenth century, of course, was part of a wider movement of European urbanisation. Its development occurred in the wake of and was influenced by the modernisation of Paris, Vienna and others. Of particular note with regard to Budapest, however, is the extent to which its creation worked in alliance with the emergence of a modern Hungarian
identity and state and the ways in which that identity and state shaped Budapest (Nemes, 2005). An idea of the nation was forming in the late nineteenth century which defined itself increasingly by its exclusions. Budapest conformed with this national idea through its increasing use of Hungarian over German in everyday life (2005, pp. 122–189, 182). It also began to provide places which allowed for the practice of nationalism — processional geographies imposed themselves; monumental artifice focused national devotion. Budapest provides a strong example of the nationalisation of the European city, a process which had varying impact upon most European cities and which has left a deep mark on the contemporary city. The systematisation and rationalisation of urban infrastructure and practices were perhaps an indication of the death of control by traditional authorities on the fundamental form of cities. Cities were becoming increasingly secular and commercial and their inhabitants were increasingly isolated from more traditional social relations. Rather than simply creating a class of individuated, rational citizens, however, this isolation created a desire for, and presented the opportunity for the exploitation of, secular communal belief. The rite of nationalism could be practised across the classes and be put to the service of the formation of mass, national politics and as an organising principle for the deployment of capital. Nationalism could provide spiritual nourishment for the citizen of the supposedly disenchanted city and provided a guiding hand to the city's physical and practical development; its modern urban forms fed this through boulevards and public squares and the paucity of interpersonal communion on the streets. Desanctified urban forms were vacuums into which ideology could expand.

As cities modernised they became the focus for social relationships which were increasingly regularised and monetised (Simmel, 2002, pp. 12–13). The modernised city became a resource to exploit both in terms of systematic deployment of capital to
provide new infrastructure and to speculate on land prices, and in terms of providing places in which consumers could pursue shopping and culture in a money economy. These kinds of commercialisation were by no means new to the city, but the modernised city provided for them on a scale which was unparalleled. Previous constraints such as guilds and tariffs were swept away and the city became open to market forces. When markets faltered, such as in Europe during the 1870s, and protection was put in place, safeguards were generally at a national rather than a city level. The exposure of modernised cities to market forces gave rise to a search for social protection and an organising principle for action (Polanyi, 2001, pp. 223–228). In late nineteenth-century Budapest, as in many other places, this search was often mediated through a national idea.

There is no process of history to be isolated in describing great social change in Budapest any more than elsewhere. Change in nineteenth-century Europe can be ascribed to the expansion of free market capitalism, industrialisation, modernisation, political and social liberalisation, urbanisation and so forth. There was certainly a dramatic change in human life across the continent during the nineteenth century. A new form of life developed focused on cities – a form from which today’s urbanised world derives. The sweeping away of older social arrangements is a movement which in a classical liberal interpretation leaves space for an essential human actor who is well placed to pursue individual interests without further hindrance. A more complex reality is found in the development of Budapest where the formation of a new urban entity – a transition from a conglomerate of ancient social arrangements in which German language and culture were integral to a set of modern arrangements in which Hungarian rapidly became the dominant urban identity – and notions of ethnicity and nationalism played an increasingly important part of the politics of the city and its hinterland.
Historical Context

Hungary in the nineteenth century was transformed from being effectively an Austrian province to being a proto-state with a fully-fledged polity and control over its affairs apart from foreign policy. The cities of Pest, Óbuda and Buda were transformed from three medium-sized provincial towns with a majority of German speakers to one metropolis, Budapest, with a majority Hungarian-speaking population and acting as capital to the Hungarian Kingdom.

The Hungarian Crown Lands, in which the three cities lay, were far from homogeneous in demography or in administrative arrangements. Two territories, Transylvania and Croatia, were notionally separate and linguistically dominated by Romanian and Croatian respectively (Ingrao, 2000, pp. 12–13). Since the entire region had been significantly depopulated during Turkish rule, many different ethnicities had migrated to Hungary during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and many of the supposedly Magyar\(^\text{12}\) nobility, though most frequently Magyar-speaking, had diverse European origins (Várkonyi, 1970, pp. 156–159). Even in the mid-nineteenth century the Hungarian lands were only just over one third Hungarian-speaking (Dányi, 1992, pp. 66–67). So, the question of national identity was contentious. The Hungarian capital during the eighteenth century was Pozsony (Pressburg in German and today the Slovakian capital, Bratislava). Pozsony was, like Buda and Pest, a city of mixed ethnicity with German predominating. There was a movement of the Hungarian elite

\(^{12}\) The terms Magyar and Hungarian are often used interchangeably; a distinction broadly followed is between a Magyar ethnicity and language based on an idea of blood lineage with a Hungarian civic identity which includes non-Magyar elements. This distinction does not always hold up and indeed a certain conceptual slippage is at the heart of tensions in varieties of Hungarian/Magyar nationalism.
towards the end of the eighteenth century from Pozsony towards the Buda area following a move of the Habsburg administration of Hungary in the same direction (Bácskai, 1975, p. 28).

The history of Buda, Óbuda and Pest\(^{13}\) contains many interruptions and shifts in power. The first significant Hungarian settlement in the area was in what became Óbuda – the original Buda – in the ninth century. Built on the site of the old Roman town of Aquincum on the right bank of the Danube, it appears to have had princely and royal associations from its foundation (T. Nagy, 1975, p. 83). The town of Pest emerged on the left bank as a chartered municipality in the thirteenth century (Kubinyi, 1975, p. 12). An acceleration of trade in the area during the twelfth century drew settlers from further afield, principally German speakers. Mongol incursions during the thirteenth century led to fortifications being built on hills to the south of the original Buda and this took on the name of Buda, the old site becoming Óbuda – Old Buda. Charters were granted during this period to both Buda and Pest and the two were closely related in terms of rights and governance, with Buda taking precedence (1975, p. 13). The towns continued to grow and to establish commercial links across Europe until the sixteenth century when they were taken by Turkish forces and incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. The towns’ economic activity was then focused away from European Christendom for the next 145 years and they developed under Ottoman rule with a significant Turkish population (1975, p. 24). The conquest of Buda and Pest by forces

\(^{13}\) There are numerous names used in Hungarian, German and English for the towns which came together to form Budapest and for Budapest as a whole: the contemporaneous Hungarian use will prevail here. The three towns in Hungarian are Buda, Óbuda/Ó-Buda and Pest, being rendered in German respectively as Ofen, Alt-Ofen and Pesth/Pest and in English as Buda/Ofen, Old Buda/Old Ofen and Pest. The unified city is referred to from 1873 almost exclusively as Budapest though other usages from before crop up including Buda-Pest, Pest-Buda, Pesth-Ofen and so forth.
allied to the Holy Roman Empire in the late seventeenth century left the towns depopulated and new settlers arrived, the re-expanding cities in the post-Ottoman era sustaining both German and Magyar speakers alongside Slovak, Croat and Serbian minorities (Bácskai, 1975, p. 25). Town charters, administration and guilds were re-established under the new regime – the Habsburg family who were Dukes of Austria also then took the Crown of Hungary, which had remained at the city of Pozsony in the part of Hungary which had not come under Ottoman rule. During the eighteenth century, Hungarian administrative machinery was transferred from Pozsony to Buda and Pest and together the towns ended that century as Hungary’s principal commercial and administrative centre. In the latter part of that century reforms in the Habsburg Austrian Empire saw improvements to both cities being enacted and to a rationalisation of administration (L. Nagy, 1975, p. 66).

The transformation of a collection of ancient towns on the Danube, governed and operated by a complex web of old corporate arrangements, to the modern, singular city of Budapest is all the more remarkable because of the timespan in which it took place. The development of a more sophisticated urban whole in the Budapest area which took its cues from wider trends in European city planning started to occur on the instigation of the Enlightenment-influenced Emperor Joseph II in the late eighteenth century (1975, p. 66). The class structure of early modern Buda, Óbuda and Pest was complex and governed rights of different ethnicities and their interrelationships. The town councils of Buda and Pest were both dominated by German merchants and artisans. Hungarian nobility and some merchants also had a degree of influence. The administration of the town was conducted in German. Until late into the nineteenth century the cities had several administrative masters: the town councils under the sway of mercantile interests (Bácskai, 1975, p. 26); Pest-Pilis-Solt County representing
landed interests and included the rural hinterland (Nemes, 2005, pp. 21–22); and the Austrian Habsburg administration which formed such city-based organisations as the Embellishment Commission (2005, pp. 42–43). By the 1830s Habsburg reforms had made Pest, at least, a relatively modern provincial town and there were increasing signs of Hungarian national sentiment influencing life there with, for example, instances of student action against German signage of the traditionally German shopkeepers. (Nemes, 2005, p. 124) Indeed, the Hungarian national movement made great headway during the 1830s and 1840s in promoting a spoken and written Hungarian through the Hungarian Scholarly Society which had an official role in the development of the Hungarian language and the study and propagation of the sciences and the arts in Hungarian (2005, p. 84). Largely German speaking institutions were augmented by Hungarian institutions such as the Hungarian Academy, the Museum and the Parliament, all of which had national significance but all of which were rooted in Budapest rather than in the original Habsburg Hungarian seat at Pozsony.

The promotion of Hungarian was of course a programme for the whole of Hungary, but its effect on the identity of Buda and Pest was particularly pronounced given the entrenchment of German in everyday life there. This national effort had its more liberal proponents but it also had a strong section of supporters who saw linguistic and cultural homogeneity as essential. An article from 1844 by Imre Vahot, cited by Robert Nemes, gives an indication as to what this would mean in terms of a Hungarian urban vision, his vision of a 1950s Budapest being somewhere:

‘One will somehow be able to learn that Budapest was once German only from the German inscriptions on the scarcely legible gravestones in the cemeteries, and our national capital can say with proud confidence to the homeland and the
nation: “I am proud that you named me the head and center of Hungary.”” (2005, p. 105)

The towns of Buda, Óbuda and Pest were far from this homogeneity, however, and German continued to be a major language even as it contended with Hungarian. Many citizens were bilingual and not all saw the replacement of the area’s other languages with one, national language as essential (2005, pp. 101–102). The course of nationalisation of Budapest would have obstacles to overcome to the create a functioning, modern and unified city and to mould a population which would identify as Hungarian.

Figure 13: Map of Pest and Buda from 1832 (Blaschnek, 1832)
Urban Forms

Unified ‘whole’ across the Danube. Hungarian national aspiration and the rise of Budapest as a major European city were driven not only by local circumstances but also by processes of European industrialisation, modernisation and the breakdown of traditional structures. For Budapest to go from being a collection of German dominated towns to a large Hungarian city required all of the large, epoch-shifting processes moving Europe. For Budapest to become a Hungarian space required modernity and the conversion of the peasantry to urban life. Indeed, this came to pass: from 1848 to 1873 the Budapest area became a huge metropolitan area, its population increasing greatly and a majority now spoke Hungarian.

A pivotal moment in the creation of the modern city is the Great Flood of 1838\textsuperscript{14} (Nemes, 2005, p. 107). In March of that year the Danube broke its banks and the resulting damage devastated both public buildings and domestic dwellings alike. The subsequent rebuilding of Pest and the regulation of the Danube provided the basis for the transformation of the whole region during the latter nineteenth century and the creation of a unified entity. The disaster acted as a spur to make Pest into a city which had a sturdy infrastructure and which had buildings appropriate for a modern city. The rebuilding effort attracted donations from across Hungary. It took only four years for over 1,000 buildings to be constructed, changing the character of the city from that of a provincial town to one which, according to Nemes, foreign visitors reported as being more like other European cities. (2005, p. 108) The flood provided the opportunity for

\textsuperscript{14} In the modern period, the opportunity lent by catastrophe for a new start for a city is a recurrent theme, most famously in the cases of London (the Great Fire of 1666) and Lisbon (the earthquake of 1755) but more recently and closer to Budapest: the 1895 earthquake in Laibach (Ljubljana in today’s Slovenia) triggered a significant redevelopment of the city.
people identifying themselves as the Hungarian nation to take part in a collective effort to produce a city worthy of that nation.

Aside from the rebuilding activity necessitated by the flood, reformers such as Count István Széchenyi had been calling for the reform of Hungary from the early nineteenth century onwards. Reformers of Széchenyi’s kind were often of Magyar aristocratic origin and were interested in reforms which would create a rational Hungarian territory to govern rather than necessarily an ethnically Hungarian one. Since Hungarians were still in the minority in Hungary some of the aristocracy, and especially Széchenyi, saw it as in their interests to take careful consideration of other minorities (Nemes, 2005, p. 57). In his proposals for modernising Buda and Pest Széchenyi therefore was unlikely to have been looking to create a purely Hungarian idea of the city. Others in the Hungarian national movement, such as Lajos Kossuth, were less conciliatory and effectively sought the elevation of Hungarian culture as the natural dominant culture of the Hungarian lands, above Romanian, Croat and Slovak culture, if not German (Judson, 2016, pp. 162–163; Sugar, Hanák, & Frank, 1990, p. 200). The idea of the Hungarian nation was one which had been closely associated with the nobility, to the effective exclusion of other Hungarian speakers, and the creation of a wider Hungarian culture had the potential to mobilise these others even as it drew clearer lines between other minorities. Széchenyi’s more classically liberal vision for a modern Hungary, and a modern Budapest, started to lose out to more direct appeals to a more exclusionary nation as the nineteenth century progressed.

It was around at around this time of reconstruction of Pest after the flood that proposals were put forward for the construction of a permanent bridge joining Pest and Buda. There had been an impermanent pontoon bridge across the Danube since the late eighteenth century which listed and had to be removed during the winter months when
the Danube froze. What Széchenyi proposed was put in its place was a modern, British built suspension bridge. Its construction began in 1840, as rebuilding work in Pest after the flood was progressing, and it was opened in 1849 at the time of the failed Hungarian Revolution and the first attempt to formally unite Budapest. The bridge acted not only as a piece of infrastructure to connect the two banks and stimulate traffic and trade but also its scale acted as a symbol of unity and of Hungarian national power and pride, even as the Revolution ended in failure. Crucially Széchenyi argued strongly for the nobility to give up many of their privileges, especially their exemption from taxes – this exemption extended to a prohibition on charging nobles tolls for crossing the Danube, an exemption done away with in time for when Széchenyi’s suspension bridge came into operation between Buda and Pest in 1849 (Nemes, 2005, pp. 117–118). A permanent structure of a bridge not only overcame the physical barrier of the river but permanently integrated the roadways of Buda and Pest, making for a unified experience of a modern Budapest. Renovated Pest and the Castle District in Buda were brought into the same the urban whole, the banks of the river becoming an urban feature rather than lines drawn between the cities and brought a new urban whole into existence.15 In this way, the bridge symbolised not only the integration of Budapest but also a modern replacement for the old order. Beyond the symbolism was what this new whole afforded

15 ‘The bridge swings over the stream “with ease and power.” It does not just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge expressly causes them to lie across from each other. One side is set off against the other by the bridge. Nor do the banks stretch along the stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land. With the banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and bank and land into each other's neighborhood.’ (Heidegger, 1993, p. 354) ‘Thus the bridge does not come to a locale to stand in it; rather, a locale comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge.’ (1993, p. 356)
the citizen: movement from one side to the other without restriction, a new viewpoint from the river from which to stop and gaze upon Buda and Pest balanced together in view, their unified identity reinforced. The new bridge went further than replacing the old pontoon structure – it created something novel which was to enable the cities to integrate and set a precedent for further infrastructural developments to bring modern Budapest into being.

The connection between the regularisation of Budapest and the fate of the nation of Hungary was emphasised right at the beginning with the first instance of a liberal Hungarian state. The merger of Buda, Pest and Óbuda was decreed in 1849 by the Hungarian government set up in as a result of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution and was independent of Austria. Bertalan Szemere, the Minister of the Interior, was direct: ‘an administrative reorganization throughout the whole Hungarian state is now urgent . . . on these grounds that the two sister capitals together with Ó-Buda, are destined to form one municipality as both in their situation and in the number of their inhabitants’; and further, ‘the Hungarian state can only have one capital in which Pest chiefly provides the living strength and Buda chiefly its ancient historic memory’. (Ságvári, 1975a, p. 90)

So, the regularisation and rationalisation of the towns which became Budapest meant the elimination of old privileges and traditional forms of life which allowed for a more plural cultural world. In place of that world came one in which a form of social organisation which took care of the identity of citizens needed to form and nationhood was at the core of Budapest's new identity.

By the time of the Ausgleich in 1867 and the granting of effective autonomy to Hungary, the ‘sister capitals’ were primed for their next, unified role in the new Hungarian state. Significant energy was directed by the newly autonomous Hungarian
state into developing a capital city and during the next 6 years primary national legislation created a Board for the development of the capital and finally formally unified the city. It is in the Ministerial Preamble of the Budapest Municipality Act from 1871 that a clear indication of motivations for creating a unified city is given:

‘The Hungarian state stands in need of a centre, which should serve as a real focus for its interests and their principal support and promoter which should worthily represent the ideal of Hungarian statehood, and should exert an irresistible force of attraction on both the intellectual and material sectors of the country, in the interests of national development.’ (Ságvári, 1975a, p. 93)

In many respects, late nineteenth-century Budapest took on the symbolism of its predecessors more than their functions. The Pest side was – and remained – a mercantile centre on top of which national administrative, monumental, industrial and retail layers were placed; Buda continued its ceremonial role and in doing so vested the new capital with an authenticity grounded in older Royal traditions. What is important to note is the extent to which those roles were put to the service of a national idea. It was not just that Budapest was to be the hub of nation; it was to serve a deeply symbolic purpose and take on a role in the creation of a self-sustaining Hungarian state. Implicit in the Ministerial Preamble is the desire for Budapest to enable freedom from domination by Vienna. In other words, what could not be achieved through revolution and armed force would be achieved through urbanisation set to work on behalf of the nation.
Figure 14: Map of Budapest in 1872, map sketch by Zoltán Kemény, © Ágnes Ságvári 1975, used by permission. (Ságvári, 1975a, p. 221)
Measuring the demographic whole. The desire to create a Hungarian identity for Budapest, as expressed by Vahot in the 1840s, was initially given momentum by the active promotion of language and culture in order to encourage the existing population to identify with the nation. However, as the nineteenth century wore on, the massive expansion in population was driven by the migration of Hungarians from the countryside into industrial jobs in the city and hence the Magyarisation of Budapest was largely a product of that migration (see Figure 15). Important too is the inclusion of Jewish migrants in Hungarian statistics. Jewish, Hungarian-speaking migrants from the countryside were co-opted by Hungarian statisticians into a conflation of language and ethnicity with the effect of boosting Hungarian numbers. So, alongside an official programme of active Magyarisation there was the passive element of Hungarian inward migration which fuelled the nationalisation of the city, though undoubtedly the two were able to reinforce each other.

Figure 15: Chart of changes in Budapest’s population between 1880 and 1920 (Ságvári, 1975c, p. 158)
Budapest's statistical office took an active interest in the process of Magyarisation of the city and in 1881 produced a report for the Hungarian Academy of Sciences which sought to analyse and explain the phenomenon. It was noted that with regard to the languages spoken in Budapest that, ‘[two] common factors exercise influence on each language: schooling and immigration. Since the rapid expansion of Budapest is not due to natural growth but is thanks to immigration, the question arises as to how the country’s counties are represented in the nation’s capital’ going on to point out that, ‘not one geographical region contributes to population growth in Budapest’, Pest county, in the immediate vicinity, excepted. This indicates that not only was the proportional reduction in German's prevalence in the urban area reduced through massive immigration of Hungarian speakers but also that the city authorities and Hungarian academics had a consciousness of the process for which there was a desire to account. (Kőrösi, 1882, p. 24)
Budapest’s whole forms. Four wholes have been identified here which bear on the development of modern Budapest alongside the pursuit of Hungarian nationhood. The restoration of Pest after the 1838 flood, the construction of the permanent bridge in 1849, the formal merger of Buda, Óbuda and Pest in 1871 and a statistical, panoptical view of the entire Budapest population after the merger which categorised and quantified inhabitants by ethnic and linguistic group. The 1838 flood afforded a kind of conversion of the urban whole – by developing so many buildings in one go it was possible to break continuity with an older Pest. The claims of tradition were washed over by the Danube’s waters: the city of Pest no longer afforded an appeal to continuity when it came to buildings damaged by the flood which needed replacing. Had the flood not occurred, such a large-scale modernisation – one which by contemporary accounts made the city more ‘European’ – would have required significant conflict with entrenched interests. A catastrophic intervention could constrain this opposition. The newly renovated city afforded the possibility of modernisation on a wider scale.

The trajectory of modernisation continued with the proposal, coming not long after Pest’s reconstruction, for a permanent bridge. The close links between Buda and Pest were evident throughout their development over centuries. However, the river always mediated and intervened in those links. The pontoon bridge was an arrangement which made the link precarious and subject to external forces. The permanent bridge altered the link radically. It elevated traffic and provided a seamless experience of the roadways between the two river banks. Its advanced design afforded civic pride and, given the cities’ key role in Hungarian national aspiration, the potential for national pride also.

The final unification of the cities in 1871 had its precedent in 1848-49. However, it was only when Hungarian autonomy was secured in the Ausgleich that such a unified
arrangement proved sustainable. The unification itself was predicated on national identity: Hungary’s elevation required an administrative centre and the rhetoric of national pride dictated that the capital should be one to compete for equivalence with other European capitals. National aspiration produced modern Budapest as an urban site for the further promotion of that aspiration. The new urban whole was a reconfiguration of the old and the production of a new urban identity which aligned with the modern state, and with the proto-nation-state of Hungary.

Bringing all of this together is demographic expansion: both the multiplication of population and the expansion of the scientific, statistical view of the population. The statistical office provided a panoptic view of the new urban whole – categorising urban identities and membership and also layering ethnic and linguistic composition. By providing this objective understanding of the population, it served to give credibility and authority to the process of Magyarisation that was at work and to feedback progress on the Magyarisation process to relevant institutions. The co-option of the Jewish population to boost the Hungarian category is the most obvious political decision in the compilation of statistics (Kamusella, 2009, p. 685).
Institutional rhythm. Plans for a Hungarian Academy or Scholarly Society had existed since at least 1810 when István Marczibányi left a legacy of 50,000 florins to be used for its foundation. The idea was to create an institution which could both encapsulate and promote Hungarian culture and intellectual life and connect the nation to international academic life. Marczibányi’s money funded a series of Hungarian language publications in lieu of the foundation of a Hungarian Scholarly Society (Nemes, 2005, p. 49). It was in the 1820s that Széchenyi gave the project impetus as part of a string of civil society institutions he funded to promote Hungarian culture (2005, p. 55). The Hungarian Scholarly Society in Pest became the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1845 and has maintained a continuous presence there since (“History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,” 2017). In the 1850s, the suppression of many economic and political clubs and societies meant that nationalists retreated to other areas of civil society that were purely cultural (Nemes, 2005, p. 158). The Academy, perceived as a more conservative institution and regulated to control its political influence, survived as an entity with its President, Emil Dessewffy, imposed by the authorities in Vienna. However, if it was their intention to use Dessewffy to thwart its place in Hungarian culture then he was to disappoint when he continued to promote a Hungarian cultural hegemony in Hungary and called for ‘intellectual battles that sustain our nationality.’ (Gróf Dessewffy Emil akadémiai megnyitó beszéde. (1862, January 5). Vasárnapi Ujság, p. 1. Pest, Hungary. Cited in Nemes, 2005, p. 159). As Hungary gained more political autonomy in the 1860s so the Academy increasingly featured in Budapest’s cultural and intellectual life and in 1865 moved into its current grand neo-Renaissance home on the Pest side of the Széchenyi bridge (“History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,” 2017).
The point at which the wish for an academic institution to support Hungarian national aspirations became a reality was when the institution received official sanction, found premises in Pest and formed its Board. Its General Assembly has met on an annual basis since 1831 and this has been the backbone of its institutional life (“History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,” 2017). The city’s whole demographic form – its sizeable population – and its whole physical form – its layout allowing institutional life at its centre – afforded the foundation of the Scholarly Society. However, what has been critical to its institutional survival as a key national presence has been the rhythm of its gatherings, programmes of events and courses and of its annual General Assembly. The city’s size and facilities has afforded this rhythmic form. Institutions are not just formed by buildings, committed resources and the association of likeminded people but also by the frequency and rhythm of their gatherings.

**Connecting the nation.** The arrival of railways in the cities of Europe during from the 1830s onwards fundamentally shifted the relationship of cities to the country that surrounded them and to other cities. In most cities, for the first time it was possible to get to another city within the same day, two urban landscapes experienced without the barrier of sleep. Rural areas previously relatively isolated from cities were beginning to be connected into an urban system, at first economically and increasingly socially. The nodal points on the railway network are for the most part commensurate and provide an imaginary equality of places.

Railways provided the physical means of integrating a nation-state (Hobsbawm, 1992, pp. 80–81). A railway built within the confines of the nation could increase economic interdependence, link provinces with nationally available daily newspapers and increase the possibility of social mixing between citizens from different regions. The imaginary nation, which might be depicted narratively as consisting of a people,
land and topographical features, needed the compression of time and space provided by rail travel to sustain its imagination. The Romantic poet and Hungarian revolutionary Petofi Sándor made this rail and nation building connection explicit in his 1847 poem, Vasúton (Rail), in which the new Hungarian railway is valorised and its relationship to the nation likened to a vascular system. (Petőfi, 1928, p. 90)

The consequences of the 1848-49 revolution, crushed by the Austrians with Russian assistance, for Hungarian liberal nationalist aspirations were dire in the short term. Repression of political opposition and censorship of the press ensured that Hungarian nationalists were unable to organise for a long time (Nemes, 2005, pp. 149–150). However, although the union of Budapest was undone by the Habsburg authorities, the cities continued to develop along modern lines. Aspects of the bourgeois revolution succeeded from an economic point of view and capital remained unimpeded in shaping the urban landscape. The Budapest area became a thriving industrial centre as the railway network of the Austrian Empire linked it to vast new markets and industries such as milling and engineering made the area a major player in an increasingly industrialised Europe. All of this new industrial activity fuelled inward migration from the Hungarian countryside and the towns expanded rapidly. The new population and new industries overwhelmed the older urban order and a modern city, recognisable today, was emerging. The area became a Hungarian cultural centre and this complemented an increasingly vociferous Hungarian national movement agitating for freedom from absolutist Habsburg rule from Vienna.

Prior to the arrival of the railways the Danube was the most efficient connection to the world outside Hungary. The fact that its path was restricted to passing between the cities was for many years to their benefit as they were able to control the flow of goods and people and profit from their position on the Danube. The railways, by
connecting with multiple destinations through numerous different routes changed this dynamic (Osterhammel, 2014, p. 911). Other Hungarian population centres away from the river were now in direct communication with the Budapest region through modern, fast transport – travel times went from days and weeks to hours. The railway created the possibility of mass migration to the city. It also, along with telegraph, improved outward communication through press and other publications affording the possibility of a shared cultural experience. Temporary events in the city could now be attended en masse by Hungarians from afar – the railway made it possible for the Hungarian Millennial Exhibition in 1896 to be a truly national experience by opening up the site to so many outside visitors.

Hierarchies of urbanisation.

‘Do not let our capital be like Paris and London: that is, do not let it be a home to maddening luxury, vast wealth, and poverty, the nest of immorality and every vice. Let our capital be the homeland's altar, on which the flame of loyalty to the homeland will ever burn.’ (Táncsics, 1976, pp. 11–12, trans. Robert Nemes)

Written in 1864, before the Ausgleich, Táncsics is expressing a desire for a distinct city to reflect what he sees as a distinctive Hungarian nation. It is a sentiment that echoes that of Rousseau in his attitude to corrupt Paris against virtuous Geneva. Nemes shows that Táncsics text, ‘Fővárosunk’ (‘Our Capital’), brought together, ‘different models of national-mind urbanism: Széchenyi’s emphasis on infrastructural improvements, Szemere's insistence that the city have a pronounced Hungarian character, and Vahot's fantasies of national homogeneity.’ (2005, p. 168) He also shows Táncsics' influence on Ferenc Reitter, the Director of the Municipal Board of Works
joining with him in calls for urban canal building. In other words, this urbanism imbued with Hungarian nationalism was not just a fringe fantasy but had a direct effect on the future direction the city took.

The urban plan which emerged from the Municipal Board of Works under Reitter’s directorship provided not only a method of creating much increased commercial space and more efficient and profitable use of land, it also provided a scheme by which the city could signal its modernity to its population and to the world. Boulevard construction opened up places for modern culture and it is this arrangement of cultural material alongside the technological and commercial as part of a unified aesthetic scheme that provided the opportunity for the construction of a Budapest which represented the Hungarian nation on such a scale as would never have been possible before.

What formed at the core of the city from the 1870s to lead up to the national celebrations of the 1890s was a permanent demonstration of the accomplishments of a nation. It is significant that the Baedeker guide in 1891 described Andrássy Avenue as ‘flanked with handsome edifices resembling those in the Ring-Strasse at Vienna’ (Southern Germany and Austria, including Hungary, Dalmatia and Bosnia: handbook for travellers with 16 maps and 31 plans, 1891, p. 345). It was a technically advanced place with its underground railway, a cultured place with its Opera House and museums, a powerful place with its massive Gothic Parliament building modelled on the British Parliament and, later, a proud place with its Millennial Monument. The municipal Board of Public Works was tasked with regulating the Danube and providing a master plan for the development of a modern, unified Budapest (Ságvári, 1975b). The Board had representation from both Buda and Pest as well as significant representation from the national administration. The result of the plan was the realisation of a scheme, seen
in such streets as Andrássy Avenue and the series of roads which made up the Grand Boulevard, which dazzled the rapidly expanding population with the technological capabilities of a maturing nation. It was a clearly-signalled urban experience – one could immerse oneself in the city and feel awe.

Figure 16: Andrássy Avenue in 1896 (Klösz, 1896a)
New streets were erected in the Pest part of Budapest on a large scale following the pattern of Paris’ boulevards – Andrássy Avenue and the Grand Boulevard became the site of grand public buildings, commercial offices, fine shops and national ceremony (as can be seen in Figure 18 at the funeral of Lajos Kossuth in 1896). They provided a context for the representation of idealised Hungarian culture with institutions such as the Opera House, the Palace of Art, the Museum of Applied Arts and Royal National Hungarian Academy of Music and their grand facades behind which the folk art and music of Hungary was repackaged and reproduced for a sophisticated urban audience.

As Budapest grew, its architecture borrowed from various European sources. The revival of Classical forms vied with those of the Gothic here as in London, though often under different labels. It took until the end of the century for a mature attempt at a Hungarian style, one which was distinctive and produced an architectural vocabulary
for Hungarian nationalism. Ödön Lechner both theorised and practised this new architecture and it was in such buildings as the Museum of Applied Arts that it can still be seen. Hungarian architects of this period were also increasingly influenced by the maturation of Hungarian ethnography, particularly the ethnographic studies of folkloric traditions and practices from the Kalotaszeg region. Much was made of the textile traditions of Kalotaszeg, with its intricate embroidery and this visual culture informed later architectural developments. (Moravánszky, 1998, p. 258)

Táncsics in calling for Budapest to become the ‘homeland’s altar’ was not calling for a reproduction of traditional urban forms; neither did he want a city driven by luxury. Instead he wanted to inject the city with meaning. It is the city as the altar for a modern spirituality resisting the nihilism of both capitalism and historicism.16 This recovery and repurposing of traditional religious imagery for modern ends cuts against the rationalising spirit of the modernisation seen in other cities like, for example, Paris. Táncsics abandoned a hierarchy of luxury for ranking cities and created instead a moral hierarchy. This moral preference is also seen in the choice of neo-Gothic architecture for the Hungarian Parliament over the Classicism of the Austrian Parliament in Vienna: the injection of moral purpose into modern urban forms. Nevertheless, it is far from a resistance to urbanisation – it is not a programme of anti-urbanism but the affordance of an urban spirituality infused with national myth.

16 ‘The antiquarian sense of a man, a city or a nation has always a very limited field. Many things are not noticed at all; the others are seen in isolation, as through a microscope. There is no measure: equal importance is given to everything, and therefore too much to anything. For the things of the past are never viewed in their true perspective or receive their just value; but value and perspective change with the individual or the nation that is looking back on its past.’ (Nietzsche, 2010, p. 19)
Affordances

Nationalism in Budapest manifested itself in many different forms and indeed the modern city itself became a part of the mechanics for the practice of nationalism in the late nineteenth century. Three examples are shown here, all three from the 1890s: the funeral of Lajos Kossuth with its procession passing down the Grand Boulevard; the Millennium Celebrations of 1896 with an exhibition at the City Park, and supporting infrastructure such as the Millennium Railway under Andrássy Avenue; and the initiation and progress of a cutting-edge, broadcast technology called Telefon Hirmondó which brought a news service and programme of cultural events in the Hungarian language to the elite of Budapest.

The funeral of the revolutionary leader, Lajos Kossuth, who had been exiled for many years in Turin, took place in Budapest on 2 April 1894 (Barenscott, 2010b, p. 48). His death in Turin had caused conflict between the Habsburgs on the one hand and the Hungarian government, students, nationalists and newspapers on the other. A royal ban on the public funding of the funeral was put in place and the return of the body, carefully avoiding Austrian lands, and the funeral itself was to be funded by private subscription (2010b, pp. 35–36). In fact, Budapest city authorities found a way to contribute financially to the funeral in defiance of the ban and Habsburg objections fuelled popular participation. Up to 500,000 people attended (2010b, n. 39) and many peasants were drawn from the countryside to see the funeral.
The procession of the body occurred over a few days. First it arrived from Italy and was formally handed over by the mayor of Turin to the mayor of Budapest. It was then transferred to the National Museum, site of the 1848 revolutionary parliament, where the body lay in state. On the day of the funeral, the body processed along the boulevards on which buildings were draped in black. The massive crowds, many of which had arrived in Budapest by train, congregated at the sides of the route. Many had no accommodation in the city and had lingered for days beforehand to pay their respects. Barenscott notes the intersection of a notion of pilgrimage, cited by newspapers at the time, with that of mass tourism, a secularisation of a religious act as mass spectacle (2010b, p. 58). The photograph (Figure 18) shows the Erzsébet Boulevard, the road, the buildings and the people coming together in an act of memorialising a national hero;
the possibilities of the city's processional geography are fully realised in the practice of nationalism.

‘The truly royal words of the Monarch at the opening of the Millennium Exhibition will resound with powerful, magical chimes in the soul of the Nation and cause the mountains to vibrate with proud joy, but also ring out across the world to convey the message that the representatives of empires and states will not be invited to an empty, grandiose spectacle which will only satisfy national vanity, but to celebrate an earnest historical moment in the evolving destiny of a nation that has worked its way up to the height of civilised society, thereby becoming a significant one, cultivating the products of civilisation and becoming an emerging European power.’ (“Handelsübersicht der Woche,” 1896 trans. Nathan Charlton)

This florid editorial description in the liberal nationalist Pester Lloyd newspaper reporting on the opening of the Hungarian Millennium Exhibition encapsulates a idea of national destiny which seeks meaning and expression in the city. The desire to proclaim Hungary's progression towards being a worthy European power is, according to this, fulfilled through mystical means. The royal words (‘royal’ – königlich – being the Hungarian adjective for the Dual Monarch as opposed to the Austrian ‘imperial’ – kaiserlich) are metaphorically amplified and cause the mountains which surround the Hungarian lands to vibrate. In other words, the location of this ‘earnest historical moment’ is at Budapest where the products of civilisation have been cultivated and this location transforms the country. Mystical nationalism here has relocated from the land
of Hungary with its folk traditions and into a civilised space. It is this new space from which the nation can compete with the rest of Europe.

Figure 19: Rolling stock on the Underground Railway with the Millennium Memorial in the background, FOTO:FORTEPAN, CC-BY-SA-3.0 (Fortepan, 1954)

During the 1890s the completion of Budapest’s modernisation included the construction of an underground railway, the second underground system to be built in the world after London. The first line ran underneath Andrásy Avenue and was built in time to take patrons from the centre of the city out to the site of the Millennium Celebrations. The link between a constructed Hungarian past, which legitimated Hungarian power through a connection of the modern polity with the occupation of the Hungarian Plain in the ninth century, and the modernity of the ‘Millennium Underground Railway’ sought to reinforce a message about the progress of the Hungarian nation and provided a popular and accessible entry point to a new national experience (Barenscott, 2010a, p. 571).
By the 1890s Budapest was maturing as a modern, technologically-advanced city. Of note was a unique system, a telephone-newspaper, Telefon Hirmondó, which piped news and culture in Hungarian into bourgeois homes across the city. Subscribers had equipment installed in their homes and a loudspeaker system would broadcast to a preordained schedule. A precursor of radio, this system linked the elite of Budapest with a common system of news and piped in a decidedly Magyar culture. Live broadcasts (Telefon Hirmondó was always live as suitable recording equipment was yet to be made practical for use on such a system) came from various cultural establishments. The first musical broadcast was from Budapest’s Opera House with Ferenc Erkel’s ‘Hunyadi László’, the first significant Hungarian opera and depicting a national myth of the defence of Hungary against the Turks (Kukan, 1983, p. 50). Telefon Hirmondó was available to a wider public via outlets at public places and at hotels and at its height had a subscriber base of 10,000 (1983, p. 52), with many more listeners. As with the Underground Railway, modern progress was reinforced with Hungarian national identity and myth. In this way the electrical systems of the city were gilded with nationhood.
Figure 20: Telefon Hirmondó subscriber set (Telefónia Múzeum, Budapest / Nathan Charlton)

Figure 21: Telefon Hirmondó advert (Telefónia Múzeum, Budapest / Nathan Charlton)
The shift towards a Hungarian Budapest was followed during the twentieth century with a decisive shift by Pozsony – Hungary’s old capital – towards being a Slovakian Bratislava. Undoubtedly such later shifts in urban-national allegiances were a consequence of the ruptures of war. The ordering of ethnicity in European cities became more extreme and violent as the twentieth century wore on. However, what can be seen in the development of Budapest is how these shifts were a part of a longer trend of urban modernity. As cities, such as Budapest, modernised they also attempted to clear messiness – old, ‘unhealthy’ districts were demolished and new, gleaming boulevards were laid out. As well as the physical refinement of the modern city there was the desire for social refinement and there was an extent to which the delineation of ethnicity and the identification of a city with a particular nation above all others fulfilled this desire.

Industrialisation, the rise of the market economy, the growing pressure on the European land empires to accommodate ethnic and national groups – all have been viewed through a state-territorial frame. Yet it is the city that provides mechanisms by which a mass market economy of individuals is created and these modern citizens can be organised with modern identities. The factory, mass transit, the apartment block, the cafe, the boulevard all provide the means by which the vestiges of European feudal society can be disassembled and reassembled as modern European secular society; old rites can come new ideologies. Ideologies such as nationalism have the potential to provide cohesion to a disenchanted urban population. Its mythology is rooted in the land; its reality is thoroughly urban.

The close association of large city and nation was not consolidated across the continent until the nineteenth century. In the case of Budapest this association came at the same time as its formation as one city. Its development into a national city provides an understanding of the course of similar developments across Europe. During the
eighteenth century, a few European cities closely associated with nation might be identified. Paris was central both to the cogency of the old Kingdom of France and central to the realities and mythologies of the French Revolution. Moscow and St Petersburg both served different purposes in the Tsarist project, the former the heart of Holy Russia, the latter the westward facing portal for a modernised Russia. London and Lisbon for the English and Portuguese were ports at the heart of their respective national stories of overseas imperial glory. Despite this, other great cities were less national as such and played ambiguous role in relation to notions of nation. Vienna and Madrid were, foremost, royal seats. In Prague, the German population dominated and its role in a Czech national identity contended with its old associations having with been a seat of the Holy Roman Emperor. Rome’s identity was rooted in the Church and further back in antiquity, its Italian identity one of many competing for the allegiance of its citizens.

Nationalism’s myths are dependent upon modern technologies and techniques which thrive in the city. From the systematic collection of folk artefacts and texts through archaeology, ethnography and ethnomusicology to the interpretation, repackaging and dissemination of folk knowledge as national myth through technologies such as the Telefon Hirmondó, as well as more mainstream media such as newspapers and through cultural institutions such as museums and concert halls, all of these products are complementary to the city and require the city to provide their mass audience. The construction of large-scale public works in the fabric of urban centres provides not only a focal point for ceremonial activity but also provides an aesthetic scale which inspires awe and the city goes beyond the individual human scale even as it shatters old social bonds and leaves individuals in a disorienting context. That awe
provides a sense of something greater than the self, the expression of the technologies of power bringing the individual citizen to submission.

The urban forms which afforded the Kossuth funeral, the 1896 Millennium Celebrations and Telefon Hirmondó emerged through the modernisation and unification of Budapest and show a strong relationship with a project of nationalisation and with nationalist aspirations. Regarding whole forms, the city's first unification in 1848-49 and second in 1873 were both given impetus by a wider Hungarian national project. In turn, the city's role as capital of Hungary opened up possibilities for Magyarisation concentrated in a new Hungarian urban space. Urban institutions in Budapest were developed which promoted a national culture, institutional rhythms such as that of the Academy producing cultural activity and practice as well as signalling themselves as permanent Hungarian presences. These forms worked in tandem with more generic modern urban forms developing in other cities at this time like the hierarchical ordering of cultural institutions and the connection to a rail network, affording association with the national hinterland. The nationalisation and national symbolism of Budapest was afforded by a synthesis of all these urban forms.
5. Vienna

Vienna, like Budapest, was modernised in the same fashion as other European cities in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the aesthetics and function of city centres transformed by the cutting through of boulevards, public squares and the construction of grand buildings. The population of Vienna during the same period also grew significantly but nationalist influence on urban politics strengthened later than in Budapest and was complicated by the city being the capital of a multi-ethnic empire. Nevertheless, the modernised Viennese metropolis was a place in which spaces were set free of their traditional meanings and created forms in which new ideological and cultural practices, including nationalism, could be afforded. Whereas Budapest's modernisation was quite explicitly part of a programme in which the Hungarian nation was to be elevated, Vienna was most strongly identified with an imperial project. It provides a contrasting case for an investigation of its affordance of ideological projects.

The city, which historically developed as a settlement for military and commercial reasons, is strategically located next to a long, navigable river, the Danube and in a break in mountain ranges which allows for easy transit between northern and southern Europe. From this strategic origin, the accretion of development meant that the city gained significant scale and became a centre of imperial and state systems not necessarily because of its physical location but because it was a city with its own autonomous identity and purpose. The imperial seat might have been better located elsewhere yet it was Vienna which became the Residenzstadt of the Holy Roman Emperor because of a pre-existing identity. Vienna already had its own gravity, the pull of architecture and thriving socio-economic activity.

In the case of Budapest, it was the material existence of the three cities of which it is constituted which had continuity beyond that of its medieval socio-economic
activity. When the Ottomans took possession of the cities, their inhabitants and their economic orientation were replaced, only for the place to be reclaimed by the Habsburgs over a century later invoking its previous existence tied to Christian Europe in order to justify its conquest. What was sustained there, no matter who lived there, who ruled it and to where it was connected, was architecture and street plan – the cities of Buda, Óbuda and Pest maintained something of an autonomous identity. A narrative of continuity here was enough to sustain it in the absence of administrative continuity. Though Vienna did not have such a dramatic break, from the medieval period onwards it is as well to note the importance of a narrative of continuity in which the city was on the front line of the defence of Christendom against the Ottomans as much as the continuous presence of an imperial administration. Vienna has been able to draw upon a narrative of institutional as well as physical continuity and this additional long duration of continuous city life presents a contrasting case for the examination of the formal setting and affordance of ideological projects.

In this chapter several urban forms will be examined that afforded Vienna's transformation from a conservative and traditional walled city to a modern and rationally ordered one. Its definition as an urban whole was facilitated until the mid-nineteenth century by its substantial and highly symbolic city walls. It was the demolition of these walls and their replacement with a ring road, the Ringstrasse, which redefined the Viennese urban whole as a large, integrated metropolis rather than a traditional aristocratic core city with attached minor suburbs. This modern metropolis further afforded different ideologically informed plans and interpretations of the Viennese urban whole in the twentieth century. Red Vienna, the conception of the city as a social democratic ideal, is presented as one example alongside a competing conservative notion of Vienna being the swollen head on the newly reduced Austrian
republic, draining its resources. Additionally, the regulation of water provides an illustration of the ordering of rhythmic urban forms. Architectural hierarchies displayed on the Ringstrasse and the cultural network of coffeehouses are also examined. The affordance of a narrative of Viennese modernity is critiqued along with its use an allegory for the dangers of the abandonment of liberal values. The modern Viennese urban whole created a city which could be the subject of modern mass political programmes. Its cultural networks and its status as a diverse cosmopolitan city, or an imperial city, set it off against provincial nationalisms of the Empire at least until the Christian Socials won power in Viennese local government, then acted as a foil to the Austrian republic's largely rural conservative politics and during the 1930s saw the city's cosmopolitanism overtaken by the fascist, nationalist politics of its hinterland.
**Historical Context**

In the Habsburg lands during the nineteenth century, rapid urbanisation occurred largely in areas with large non-German ethnicity, though the cities themselves often contained large German-speaking populations. Of cities with a population over 75,000 by the end of the century, only Vienna (1.5 million) and Graz (130,000) were in regions in which German ethnicity predominated (de Vries, 1984). Whilst cities such as Budapest, Prague, Trieste and Lemberg were centres of Hungarian, Czech, Italian, Ukrainian and Polish cultural and national aspiration, urban centres in the Austrian German-speaking Crown Lands had a more indirect ethnic and national identity. In areas where other ethnic identities were strong, German linguistic and cultural influences could be more directly associated with Austrian imperialism, whereas in Vienna German identity could be set in the context of rising German power outside of Habsburg lands, particularly Prussia and its capital Berlin. Added to this was that Vienna, as imperial capital, was an administrative and economic centre for the entire empire and as such had the potential to present a more cosmopolitan identity, distinguishing it from the other Habsburg cities with more local, nationalist and ethnic identities. Why this identity had historical depth in addition to the socio-political background outlined here bears elaboration.

Vienna sits in a river basin, the Danube flowing through between the eastern end of the Alps and western end of the Carpathians. It provides a route from northern Europe to southern Europe which avoids mountainous terrain: archaeological finds provide evidence that the Amber Route from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean passed through the area from at least the early Iron Age (de Navarro, 1925). Due to its physical location, the Vienna area has long been at the crossroads of culture and long distance trade and as such has been in frequent contact with multiple cultures. Like many large
cities in Europe especially in western Europe Vienna has a claim to Roman origins, it being the site of Roman ‘Vindobona’. This name (which is unlikely to be related to the modern name for the city on the same site) apparently has Celtic etymology and suggests that the place was named and used by Celtic-speaking Iron Age people prior to Roman use. (Csendes, 2001, p. 57) Etymology aside, the city can claim continuity of urban form and settlement from the vestiges of the Roman town layout at Vienna's centre.

However, the relationship of the Roman town to its geopolitical and economic context was quite different to that of the city which emerged later. Vindobona sat on the frontier of the Roman Empire and the reason for its existence was primarily defensive (Scherrer & Sedlmayer, 2007). The settlement appears to have been had a military foundation. Later, as Roman imperial power waned, various smaller political entities – Germanic, Avar, Magyar and Slavic – at various points contested and settled in the area (Beller, 2006, pp. 10–15). The establishment of the place with the identity Wien/Vienna came later in the Middle Ages as the Holy Roman Empire is established. This later incarnation also had a defensive purpose but one which had an outward-looking function as imperial and colonising actors looked not only to defend borders but expand beyond them.

At the margins of the Holy Roman Empire, margravates were established and given extensive powers to administer border areas and defend against external threats. It was in one of these border areas, ‘terra Orientalis’ – the Bavarian Eastern march held by the Babenberg family – where territory was expanded and extended along the Danube and as it did so a series of centres of power, each more easterly, was established (Strohbach-Hanko, n.d., p. 11). The easternmost and last of these was at Vienna and it appears that this effectively marked the reestablishment of urban life there. By this time
The settlement’s function was more mercantile than in Roman times, it being close to the lands downstream in the Pannonian Plain (now occupied by the modern countries of Hungary, with parts of Romania and Slovakia) which were being settled and farmed more intensively. Vienna was at the gateway between this productive region to its east and south, and to the markets of Germany and beyond to its west and north. In 1221 Vienna was granted rights as a staple port, ‘Stapelrecht’, which required merchants passing by the city to have to stop and offer their products for sale to local citizens for three days (Czeike, 2004, p. 316). Vienna, sitting between two long and inhospitable mountain ranges, was in a good position for medieval trade.

This development can be seen in the wider context of the increase in urbanisation in central and eastern Europe during this period, the ‘Ostsiedlung’ (eastern settlement), characterised by the foundation and chartering of cities with ‘Stadtrecht’ (German town law) (Rady, 2012, p. 178). This was a movement of colonisation carrying German culture – in part a move from the land to the city by local populations and in part a migration of German speakers into previously Slavic and Magyar speaking lands. Vienna anchored settlement further to the east in Hungary and Transylvania and provided communication with the imperial heartland. Yet despite this elevation of economic status during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Vienna still had a lesser economic and ecclesiastical role than other comparable cities in the region than in later times. It was outshone by Prague (Scales, 2011, p. 81), which became a major imperial centre when Charles IV was elected Holy Roman Emperor, and it was subservient to Passau which was the seat of the bishop; Vienna only gained its own cathedral and bishopric in the late fifteenth century (Herbermann, Pace, Pallen, Shahan, & Wynne, 1912, p. 417). In the medieval period, other than its economic status, its power came from it being the headquarters of the Duchy of Austria and it did not feature as a major
imperial or ecclesiastic actor until the election of the Duke as Emperor in 1452. It was in the sixteenth century that Vienna became firmly established as the Emperor’s permanent residence (Csendes & Opll, 2001, p. 517).

The shift in imperial power to Vienna had a direct impact on the administrative status of the city for the next three centuries. In 1522 it had its civic autonomy largely removed (Perger, 2001, pp. 241–242). This was precipitated by actions of the town authorities who opposed the Archduke, Ferdinand I, and took the opportunity of his extended absence to take full control of the city. On his return from being reconfirmed as ruler of Austria, he dealt with rebellious Viennese burghers by executing them and abolishing the town council. From then on the city was under the direct control of the Archduke-Emperor. Although a degree of autonomy returned in 1783 when a limited form of government for the city centre was instituted (Pauser, 2003, p. 80), the imperial dominance of city affairs can still be detected in the order initiating the building of the Ringstrasse in 1857 when the Emperor Franz Joseph permitted the demolition of the city walls and subsequent development by using the formula, ‘Es ist mein Wille’, the command coming directly from him (“Amtlicher Theil, Wiener Zeitung,” 1857) rather than from the newly re-established town council. It was this direct relationship between city and imperial power that detached the Viennese citizenry from significant control over the city’s affairs and contributed to an identity that was somewhat tangential to that of the state. Other major cities in the Holy Roman Empire gained the status of ‘Freie Reichsstadt’, free imperial city, and maintained autonomy and answered not to a local aristocrat but directly to the Emperor (Benecke, 2007, pp. 391–393). These cities represented themselves, in the period before the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, at the Aulic Council in Vienna. However, Vienna itself never attained this status; instead
it became defined by an imperial presence as the Emperor’s Residenzstadt rather than having an autonomous status.

Closely related to this imperial identity was the emergence of Vienna’s symbolic ecclesiastical role as a centre of the Counter-Reformation and the last bastion of Christendom protecting Europe from Ottoman incursion and Islam. For the first, it was out of the threat of Protestant schism that Ferdinand I had taken direct control of the city in the first place. Subsequently over the next two centuries as the wars of religion were fought across Europe, the Habsburgs became the staunchest of Catholic defenders and to that end not only battled for territorial dominance in Europe and beyond but also for cultural dominance through the encouragement of religious orders and art which strengthened Catholic influence in Europe. Vienna was besieged twice during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both times the Ottomans failed to breach the city walls. The sieges of Vienna were the high watermark of Ottoman imperialism in Europe and in its retreat the vacuum was occupied by Habsburg power, especially in Hungary. Vienna and its walls, which had been reinforced after the first siege and surrounded by cleared land, the glacis, became symbolic of the defence of Catholic Christianity, and Christendom more broadly defined. This symbolism retained power such that it featured again in the nineteenth century when the walls came to be demolished.

The final Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 and the defeat of Ottoman forces precipitated a renewal of buildings in the city, with aristocrats moving into the medieval core and building their palaces there. Unlike Britain and France where the trend was for aristocrats to live primarily at their country estates only coming to London or Paris for specific seasons, Austrian nobility used Vienna for their primary residences close to the imperial court. A pattern of development emerged in which the centre of the city became an upper class enclave and the lower classes, separated by the walls and the glacis, lived
in the expanding Viennese suburbs (Olsen, 1986, p. 65). The wall and the glacis became a socioeconomic and a very visible class barrier. This was a model which obtained as the city developed and expanded for a considerable time.

In the late eighteenth century, the city’s development was shaped by the policies of Joseph II which sought to bring enlightened order to the imperial state. In its relationship to Empire, Vienna augmented its status when the royal crown of Hungary was moved to it from the Hungarian capital, at that time Pressburg (Kann, 1980, p. 203). This was indicative of policies which sought to rationalise the imperial territories from a series of interconnected realms to a unified state. Along with policies to promote German as the Empire-wide language of administration (Judson, 2016, p. 79) (replacing Latin in the Hungarian lands), this had the consequence of a reaction which could be seen as local patriotisms opposed to Austrian-German hegemony, a precursor perhaps of the full-blown nationalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On Viennese territory, enlightened ‘Josephinism’ during the reign of Joseph II, was expressed in developments such as the conversion of the glacis to a public park, in common with other European city public spaces created as part of an enlightened public order.

The enlightened absolutism of Josephinism subsided at the turn of the century in response to the revolutionary wars with France and, after 1815, the Congress of Vienna, which reordered Europe along more reactionary lines. Austria, under Klemens von Metternich, became a conservative state opposed to liberal reform and nationalist sentiment (Beller, 2006, pp. 115–117). In this context the city played host to Europe’s diplomats and its symbolism as a bulwark against external and revolutionary threats was reinforced. This pivot away from liberalism is important in providing context for Vienna’s accelerated expansion in the latter half of the century: whereas comparable cities, in terms of size and political importance, like Paris and London, were
increasingly influenced by liberal politics, Vienna was seen as holding on to a traditional idea of the organisation of society and hence its reordering in that later era was all the more radical. It was in 1848 that was the beginning of the end for conservative Vienna. It was in 1848 that a series of city-focused revolutions took place in states across Europe, the so-called ‘The Springtime of Peoples’ (Hobsbawm, 1997, p. 21) and this was to have a profound effect on the constitution and politics of the Habsburg lands for decades to come even though the immediate aftermath seemed to be a victory for reactionary forces. Over the course of the 1850s and 1860s liberal politics established itself across the Austrian Empire. For Vienna this meant the creation of a city government in 1850 which included the suburbs as well as the core city and brought about direct elections (“Kundmachung der f.f. Statthalterei und Kreisregierung von Niederösterreich von 20 März 1850,” 1850).

This opened up the possibility for a new direction for the city of Vienna, one which took it from being defined by its imperial, ecclesiastical and military functions at the centre of an empire to being a modern ‘Weltstadt' defined by its bourgeois culture, business and, as the century progressed, by its mass politics. This modernising move commenced later in Vienna than in comparable capitals such as London and Paris and it did so in the context of an urban culture which was not heavily identified with a strong national identity, in contrast to other cities in the Austrian Empire such as Prague and Buda-Pest. Its modernity was suffused with a cosmopolitanism that derived from being the heart of power in a multi-ethnic empire; this cosmopolitanism was to be

18 A term in frequent use in German-language newspapers in the mid-nineteenth century, it encapsulates not only the idea of a global city in terms of size but also of cultural depth. Compare two articles from 1856, one in which a feuilleton describes the delights of ‘dieser schönen Weltstadt’, Paris (“Der erste Abend in Paris,” 1856) and the other which the hero of a story of immigration drifts around the Weltstadt, New York (Kürnberger, 1856).
increasingly challenged by a mass politics, embodied in the form of the Christian Social Party whose antisemitism effectively defined a political identity negatively (Schorske, 1981, pp. 139–140).
Urban Forms

**Containing Vienna.** The walls of Vienna were a material and symbolic constraint on the expansion and development of the centre of the city. Their replacement by the Ringstrasse development, then, marked a critical moment in the city's modernisation. As has been noted, the walls had been important militarily in defence against the Ottomans in the seventeenth century but subsequently their defensive relevance was diminished. However, they maintained an important symbolic meaning. They represented imperial and Catholic religious order upheld by Austria as it defended Christian Europe against the Islamic Ottoman Empire. Therefore, until the nineteenth century, the walls and their glacis remained even as Vienna’s population expanded and new construction increasingly took place outside of their perimeter.

Schorske identifies the Ringstrasse with the liberal accession to power in Vienna in the 1850s, a time when the city was shaped by the newly ascendant middle class (1981). The institutions of liberal constitutionalism and civil society line the development, in particular the Austrian Parliament, Vienna Town Hall and the University of Vienna which are situated on the western periphery. A museum quarter, an opera house, and large palaces for wealthy families reinforced the representation of bourgeois culture. So emblematic of the new order was the Ringstrasse that, as Schorske shows, it became the focus of debate over competing urbanist visions later in the century as the legacy of the Ringstrassenstil was questioned by architects and planners such as Camillo Sitte and Otto Wagner.

This liberal bourgeois order in Vienna was distinct from that in other Habsburg cities, however, because its identity was more closely aligned with an imperial vision than it was with a national one. In Budapest, not long later, equivalent controlling interests were more closely identified with national identity and to some extent
associated with the desire for Hungarian autonomy. The urban morphology which emerged after the Ausgleich in 1867 in Budapest was quite explicitly at the service of Hungarian identity. Vienna, on the other hand, was similarly modernised through the construction of grand boulevards and the technical integration of the city but this was, at least at first, conducted in the context of the augmentation of the imperial centre rather than as a symbol of Germanic pride or national aspiration. As liberalism became ascendant the Ringstrasse development was not only associated with bourgeois high culture generally but with Jewish secular success in particular; again, making Vienna’s relationship to German identity complex (Schorske, 1981, p. 7). Even as liberal politics receded and mass political parties emerged, the Viennese political scene became defined more in the negative – antisemitic, anti-Slav, anti-Hungarian – than with a positive German programme.
**Hydraulic rhythms.** The city’s relationship with water was changed during the modernisation and technical integration of Vienna. The city’s proximity to a major European waterway navigable to the Black Sea contributed to its position as a trading power. Its relationship to the Danube, though, has been ambiguous: the city as it developed from medieval times to the modern era maintained a separation from the river, its walls keeping out not only invaders from further downstream but also direct access to the water itself. Unlike major river cities such as Budapest, Prague, Berlin, Paris and London, the layout of Vienna was relatively unintegrated with its river up until the eighteenth century. In medieval times the main branch of the river had sat next to the city itself but gradually it drifted away until it was at a significant distance and the link with the city was via a side channel (Hohensinner et al., 2013). In fact, a series of channels ran across a flood plain close to city. So, although the river was the city’s principal line of communication it was also a somewhat unruly threat which was kept at a distance from the city streets. A tributary of the Danube, the Wienfluss, also passes close to the city centre and, in the past, this was also a source of flooding and so it was not integrated into the layout of the city. Over the centuries several efforts were made to arbitrate the city’s need for access to water and the threat posed by it. It was only in the late nineteenth century, however, that a comprehensive solution was enacted which integrated the Danube and the Wienfluss (Pollack, 2013, p. 3) and brought fresh spring water from the Alps.

The regulation of water and the development of the Ringstrasse were concurrent and there is a sense in which one contextualises the other. The view of the city as a system in which fluid dynamics had to be controlled is seen literally in the case of water regulation and figuratively in the case of the clearance of walls in favour of a street which controlled the flow into and around the city. Eduard Suess, the author in 1863 of
the report which brought a fresh water supply to the city (Seidl, 2015, p. 219), was an eminent geologist and theorist in whose work the concept of the biosphere originates. It is indicative of the scientific and technological approach to developing the city that scientists with such a systemic world view were so closely involved. (The mayor of Vienna during much of the redevelopment was Cajetan von Felder, an entomologist. (Santifaller & Obermeyer-Marnach, 1957, pp. 294–295)) This strong technocratic element is found in other urban developments of the time too. In the case of Vienna, the absence of a strong ideological driver – nationalist or imperial, for example – brings this technocratic motivation into relief.

**Architectural hierarchies.** As Vienna entered the modern industrial era, several factors contributed to how Viennese urban forms related to the ethnic and social politics of Empire. The city was less closely associated with an adjacent national hinterland than other Habsburg cities such as Prague and Budapest and was therefore, perhaps, more heterogeneous in its outlook. Vienna's administrative role at the centre of the Empire, gave more exposure to cosmopolitan ideas. Its physical transformation in the nineteenth century occurred during by the relatively late rise of a liberal bourgeoisie and its transformation signalled the decline of traditional authority.

Vienna’s varied sources of culture are reflected in the architecture of the Ringstrasse’s civic buildings. The mix of idealised historical architectural styles which are on display along the street are arranged as a showcase in a capital city which wants to be at ease with past forms. The Parliament building is modelled on Classical Greek architecture with the rationale that this style would reflect the democratic values of Classical Athens. The City Hall imitates the Gothic style of medieval Flemish equivalents, for example that of Brussels, which signals a commitment to the autonomy seen in northern European cities. The Renaissance elements of the University’s main
building echo the flowering of Humanism in Italy (Bergdoll, 2000, p. 257). This mixture of styles is synthesised by a high bourgeois culture which is confident in citing historical influences as part of a controlled, rational plan. The combination of styles in an urban environment is inevitable over time but what is peculiar in the case of the Ringstrasse is that these buildings were constructed almost simultaneously and without much evidence of high contention over the most appropriate form for each building. Contrast this with contemporaneous debate in other parts of Europe, London being exemplary. Later Austrian architects were to rebel against this mishmash of ideas and influences and develop more austere buildings in Vienna which eschewed the perceived frivolity of Historicism. In the light of more parochial attitudes in other parts of Europe, however, the first wave of Ringstrasse buildings as a collection are able to use catholicism of taste to signal a more cosmopolitan culture which pre-figures that later austerity leading into Modernism. The Ringstrasse’s curve affords this kind of eclectic display where each building moves into view like an exhibit as the traveller progresses along the road.

A cosmopolitan Vienna which could be compared with other great cultural centres of the world was one which had emerged out of stages of development that were unusual for a significant modern city – Olsen, writing about the city at the start of the Gründerzeit in 1857 summarises that development thus: ‘From a baroque Residenzstadt

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20 The so-called ‘Battle of the Styles’ in London was fought over whether Classical or Gothic forms would be used for the new Foreign Office building between Whitehall and St James’s Park (Bergdoll, 2000, p. 201). Advocates for the Gothic style insisted it reflected an English, Christian, national style, contrasting it with pagan classicism; for their part the supporters of Classical architecture derided the Gothic as mired in medieval superstition and unsuitable for a modern liberal age (Remarks on a national style in reference to the proposed Foreign Office, 1860). George Gilbert Scott, who won the Foreign Office commission on the basis of a Gothic proposal, was forced to change the final design to the more Classically-proportioned Italianate style (Bremner, 2005). That architectural styles were so readily pressed into service for conflict over the nature of English, British national and British imperial identities throws the Historicism of the Ringstrasse into relief.
awkwardly fitting into the physical structure of a medieval Bürgerstadt, Vienna was about to transform itself into a metropolitan Weltstadt.’ (1986, p. 58) It is in the contrast with cities which had overseas empires but relatively homogeneous ethnic homelands, such as London and Paris, with Vienna and its association with a multi-ethnic land empire that a distinctive kind of cosmopolitanism is afforded. Internal migration within the Habsburg lands made Vienna one of the most ethnically diverse cities in Europe and it was in this context that a particularly vibrant culture was able to develop. Incoming non-German populations, particularly Jewish immigrants whose ability to return to their previous homes elsewhere in the Empire was limited by prejudice, had an interest in maintaining a pluralism that was amenable to a cosmopolitan ethic (Beller, 2006, p. 155). This cosmopolitan ethic was to be increasingly challenged by populist politics from the 1880s onwards (Beller, 2006, p. 156) and these two aspects of Viennese society and culture – cosmopolitanism and ethnic nationalism – defined its intellectual class and its fate. Added to this was Austria’s exclusion from the unification of Germany, meaning that Germans-speakers in the Habsburg lands occupied an oddly marginal position in German Europe even if the most dominant language was German. Vienna went from being the prime centre of German national culture to the periphery as Germany was united under Prussian hegemony and Berlin emerged to take Vienna’s place. This left space for a more cosmopolitan Viennese culture to emerge.

There was a sense in which Vienna from the onset of the Gründerzeit was playing cultural catch-up: as middle class liberalism came late to Vienna, having been stifled by the failure of the 1848 revolution, so it sought to accelerate what it deemed appropriate bourgeois culture for a major European capital. Central Vienna had been dominated by the aristocracy in a way not seen in comparable cities and the carving out of a space both literally, with the Ringstrasse, and metaphorically for the middle class
provided an opportunity for rapid cultural expansion. An increase in status for the liberal arts and sciences, so admired by the nineteenth century liberal middle class, was reflected in its cultural and academic output.

That Vienna came to define a deep fissure in Austrian politics and culture after 1918 is indicative of the unusual role it had found itself taking as a city and an urban polity. In a region in which the nationalised city was so dominant a concept, with Budapest and Prague as newly promoted capitals, Vienna stands out as the imperial exception, not fulfilling the role of German national centre to the surrounding territories dominated by German speakers. Even on the wider imperial stage, compared to London, Paris or Berlin, Vienna had a relative deficit of national identification due to its position within a former multi-ethnic empire. When it became co-opted to nationalism was through force: in 1934 the Social Democratic Party was supressed by the government (Beller, 2006, p. 223) and a one-party state instituted across Austria with the Nazis invading in 1938 (2006, p. 231). The return to democracy after the Second World War saw a political settlement which carved up government between the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats effectively institutionalising the separation of the distinct political culture of Vienna and the rest of Austria (2006, p. 255).

The situation of this new middle class order in place of the city walls and glacis is significant. The walls had acted as a boundary for the aristocratic centre of the city with the suburbs and its lower classes physically separated. Further, the walls themselves were symbolic of a defence of the old order. The replacements of these symbols effectively reinforced the calls for reform that had emanated during the 1848 revolution even as the Habsburgs reasserted their power. This bourgeois relationship to traditional expressions of power can be seen played out in the architecture and layout of the Ringstrasse. As noted above, architectural forms from different historical periods
were used but underpinned by modern technologies, seen in the historicism of the ‘Ringstrassenstil’. Gothic and Classical could sit side-by-side, both contained in a modern setting, made safe and purely symbolic. Thus, the competing interests of state and city could be represented by a Classical Parliament building, a Gothic Town Hall and Renaissance and Baroque influences on the main University building, brought together by the modern infrastructure of the Ringstrasse. This play of architectural styles was not necessarily stable: the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest had Gothic as its guiding style in contrast to the Classical Austrian Parliament in Vienna which preceded it, a particular Hungarian Gothic projecting a particular Hungarian national aspiration in contrast with Austrian imperial-liberal universalism embodied in Classical form. The diverse buildings on the Ringstrasse were and are in dialogue with each other and with buildings beyond and there is no straightforward mapping of style to ideology. If there is a unifying theme it is one which Otto Wagner in particular objected to later (Schorske, 1981, p. 83) – the expression of multiple and conflicting messages, ornamented architecture which is under the imperial aegis.
The cultural network of the coffeehouse. The coffeehouse was an institution across central Europe and in Vienna it played a critical role in the day-to-day life of citizens acting as a place for the transmission and debate of ideas and information. The coffeehouse offered services beyond refreshment: a large complement of newspapers, expensive to buy and not sold on the street (Twain, 1898, p. 532), was available to customers along with the receipt of mail and collection of laundry. The public accessibility of the coffeehouse and its freedoms were an important resource for intellectual life in Vienna (Johnston, 1983, p. 119). Coffeehouses are also a part of the mythmaking about Vienna’s capacity for violent politics, playing host at the same time to soon-to-be Soviet revolutionaries and to Hitler – the city not only afforded their activity but also the mythmaking about that activity.

The sheer number of cafes and brasseries in Vienna was extraordinary and they were patronized by all sectors of Viennese society in the late nineteenth century. Lichtenberger interprets evidence of the declining number of cafes and its correlation to the improvement of housing as meaning that this was to do with the poor quality of housing and this is compelling as an explanation of the role of the coffeehouse (1970, pp. 155–156). Such was its extensive role as an institution that it could be said to a form a network which made Viennese citizens more connected in a social space to each other and connected to the outside world through the communication of news through the cafes. Victor Tissot wrote as a French visitor in ‘Un hiver à Vienne’, published in 1888, that, ‘cafe and the brasserie are for the inhabitant of Vienna a second home’ and describes a world in which engrained practices are enacted in the café, brasserie and wine merchants store that were an essential part of everyday life in the city. (1888, pp. 283–286)
Aside from this more cosmopolitan identity, the mundane functions of the city’s technical integration are also representative of a kind of technocratic order which belies ethnic particularism. Although this was not unique to Vienna, there are some aspects of it which make it more pronounced than elsewhere. The course of Vienna’s development in the late nineteenth century produced linkages between inner city and suburbs, the regularisation of the medieval core and the creation of exit roads all of which were a response to the need to adapt the city to population growth and consequent pressure on infrastructure. In the context of the post-1848 Habsburg state, the technical objectives of the Ringstrasse project strike a chord of officially-sponsored harmony rather than something designed to highlight national prowess. In contrast to Paris, where French national technical prowess was on display, or even London, where British industriousness could be celebrated in the work of Bazalgette in regularising sewers, the Thames and extending the underground railway, the Viennese urban expansion was much less conspicuously at the service of promotion of German identity.

The remodelling precipitated by the Ringstrasse development was bound up more in bureaucratic provision for an integrated, interconnected city than it was in explicit political concerns. Much as the flow of water was to be controlled and directed so too was the city, its people and traffic. Again, this was not unique to Vienna but in the absence of stronger national discourse it is thrown into relief here more than in other European cities, and especially more than in other Habsburg cities. The old city was a feature which could be overcome and given rational order. That this was achieved at least initially outside of a recognisable mass-political ideological context marks it out in the Habsburg world as different. Gründerzeit Vienna was to be shaped on liberal-scientific lines, a cosmopolitan city which measured itself against other Weltstädte and was above the narrower ethnic concerns of Prague and Budapest.
**Rhythms of supply and demand.** After the 1914-18 war, antipathy towards Vienna as it became the capital city of the newly established Austrian republic was aggravated by the perception that it was draining scarce rural resources. Austria’s sources of food and industrial supplies in Hungary and Bohemia were cut off by the disruption of the dissolution of the Empire and so the remaining Austrian provinces to which Vienna was attached were for a while its principal source of food. Requisitioning by the government was resented, as was the practice of Rucksackverkehr, ‘backpacking’, in which people travelled from Vienna out into the countryside to buy up scarce produce – so widespread that it was explicitly banned (“Der Rucksackverkehr Eingestellt.,” 1919; “Gänzlichliches Verbot des Rucksackverkehres.,” 1919). Previous trading rhythms between Vienna and the Austrian provinces being disrupted exposed a more local fissure between the Viennese and the surrounding Austrian population. Without a strong common ‘Austrian’ bond, despite a shared language, Vienna was set apart from the German-speaking provinces21. Its former imperial status and weak role as a German national symbol made this divide all the more marked.

The rhythms of Vienna’s water courses were regulated in a demonstration of scientific, technological and technocratic power. This did not preclude the use of such technical feats to glorify state or nation; but it also afforded a less parochial interpretation, a city modernised and improved for the benefit of a modern citizenry, a city fit to lead a multi-ethnic empire. The amputation of non-German dominated provinces left Vienna in a German-Austrian state, its modernity turned against it to contrast it with the increasingly nationalist hinterland. The image of the swollen head

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21 See, for example, the electioneering of the Christian-Democrat newspaper ‘Reichspost’ in which appeals to Viennese voters on the basis that a Red Vienna will mean isolation from the States of German-Austria (“Um Sonntag ist Wahltag!,” 1919).
on the body of German Austria, and the excessive, greedy Viennese depriving the countryside of its food with rucksacks both emphasise this resentment of Vienna’s cosmopolitanism and signalled the start of a future of Vienna having primarily national rather than imperial concerns.

**Hydrocephalus.** During 1918-19 the Empire was dissolved and the Republic of Austria emerged effectively as its rump state. The population of Vienna in 1920 was over 1.8 million; it was over four times larger than the next six cities in the new Republic of Austria combined (Statistische Zentralkommission, 1920). The new state’s administration in Vienna was a continuation of the old and therefore disproportionate to the much-diminished territory and population. Calls for its reform referred to the Viennese bureaucracy as a hydrocephalus (Moser, 1921, p. 2) (see also Blasel, 1918, p. 6; cited in Healy, 2004, p. 56), the city’s head bloated in comparison to the body of the Republic, an apt metaphor not just for the state apparatus but also for the whole city in relation to a truncated Austria.

Rather than being moulded as a German-Austrian nationalised place, modern Vienna became a national capital by default. In the Constitution of 1920, Vienna became its own Federal State in the new Republic, separated from the rest of the state of Lower Austria. The party politics of the new state was effectively separated territorially with the Christian Social Party dominating the countryside outside Vienna and the national government and the Social Democrats pursuing a programme of socialist transformation within the newly created Federal State of Vienna. Having failed to secure a grip on power in whole of the new Republic, the socialist retreat into Vienna was supposedly tactical; however, it was this partisan separation which was to define Austrian politics until the Nazi takeover and Anschluss in 1938.
**Red Vienna.** The Social Democratic administration of Vienna from the early 1920s precipitated an unprecedented urban social transformation – never before had a social democratic party gained power by election in a European city of significant size. It had gained an electoral mandate in the city, with 54% of the vote in 1919 (“Die Ergebnisse der Gemeinderatswahl am 4 Mai 1919,” 1919) from a newly widened franchise which included women for the first time. The separation of the city from the Federal State of Lower Austria gave it wide ranging fiscal powers and a high degree of independence from the Austrian state (Blau, 1999, p. 33). The administration of the city was transformed so that the executive apparatus was highly responsive and accountable to political appointees. This enabled a coherent programme of reform to be pursued during the 1920s bringing about access to health services, education and housing for all Viennese, paid for by progressive taxation.

The legacy of the Social Democratic administration’s programme is most immediately evident today in the form of the ‘Gemeindebauten’, large state-built housing blocks whose construction was aimed at bringing down housing costs, increasing capacity and introducing forms of social living that would embed socialism in Austrian society. The typical Gemeindebau had a large main entrance leading into a central, shared courtyard (Blau, 1999, p. 460). The fortress-like, modern construction was symbolic of newly-acquired working-class power and the Gemeindebauten were targeted as such by assaults of conservative forces in the Austrian Civil War in 1934 (Blau, 1999, p. 400).

The contest between ‘wholes’ defined by different interests reflects a contest between different worldviews and, potentially, ideologies. In the case of Vienna in the nineteenth century, the whole city delimited by the walls and the glacis was one which supported a traditional view of the city, its institutions and those of the Habsburg
Empire; the whole city without its walls and with bourgeois institutions encamped on the former glacis on the new Ringstrasse supported a modern, liberal ascendancy. The removal of the walls afforded a liberal programme and to some extent retarded a German-Austrian nationalist programme which could have used Vienna’s symbolism as the last bastion of Christianity as an effective bolster to national identity. Instead a more cosmopolitan Vienna afforded and was afforded by the Ringstrasse and the expanded Viennese whole. It was later with the emergence of mass politics going into the twentieth century that this expansive whole was to act as an effective other to a German-Austrian identity in the surrounding countryside of the new Austrian republic.
Affordances

Late nineteenth and early twentieth century Vienna provided the backdrop to an extraordinary blossoming of intellectual and artistic activity. The development of Modernism was concentrated in Vienna with unrivalled intensity, the works of Schoenberg and Mahler in music, Klimt and the Vienna Secession and developments in Philosophy associated with the Vienna Circle are just some aspects of the energy of Viennese intellectual life. Norman Stone declared that, ‘most of the twentieth-century intellectual world’ originated in Vienna (1983) and indeed significant parts of the foundations of twentieth century thought lie in this period in Vienna, the focus on the Self provided by the lens of Freudian psychoanalysis being one. The political and cultural environment which fostered such creativity was febrile and the rise of populist politics could also be seen as a precursor to later global developments.

Recognition of Vienna’s role as a centre of modern culture came late. As Beller has indicated, until the early 1970s Vienna had not featured, at least in anglophone academia, as a noteworthy contender for a central role in the development of modernity; Paris, Weimar Berlin and New York were placed in a series of cities which had driven forward modernity with Vienna not challenging for position (2001, p. 1). What precipitated the rise in academic interest in Vienna’s role in the modern world was the work of Schorske starting during the 1960s in which he gave structure to the subject of fin-de-siècle Vienna; his essays were collected in the seminal ‘Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture’ (1981). Alongside Johnston’s ‘The Austrian Mind’ (1983) and Janik and Toulmin’s ‘Wittgenstein’s Vienna’ (1973), a particularly potent version of what Beller refers to as ‘Vienna 1900’ has taken root in anglophone academia. Schorske’s contention was that turn of the century Viennese culture was marked by a reaction against liberal tenets of reason and progress, a retreat by Vienna’s bourgeois
culture into the aesthetic and psychological and a rise in irrationalism in mass politics.

22. It was this thesis which was to shape much subsequent academic interest and debate. Vienna as a microcosmic analytical object for the study of modernity was born. The arguments over what its role was are well-rehearsed but it is the fact of its emergence as a kind of modern parable that is of interest here along with understanding what afforded the city’s part in a narrative about modernity.

The narrative of Vienna’s pivotal role in the construction of the modern world is enhanced by stories of migration of intellectuals, largely not by choice but because of the suppression of the Jews and of culture deemed un-German by the Nazi regime. The effects of these migrations can be most readily seen in the naming of movements and schools of thought which have gone on to have global impact: the Austrian School in economics; the Vienna Circle in philosophy; the Second Viennese School in music. This extension of influence out of Vienna might have found routes other than migration had the Nazis not intervened. Vienna and Austria are also not exclusive regarding the migration of intellectuals and the naming of schools of thought – the Frankfurt School is just one such example. The intellectual migration from the 1930s and 1940s does add

22 A slogan that has encapsulated this myth of a Vienna of dangerous ideas is the ‘proving-ground of world destruction’. It is a phrase which returns 185 results as an exact match on Google, the majority of which ascribe it to Karl Kraus talking about Vienna. The earliest reference, and likely source, to this translated phrase in English appears to be from Janik and Toulmin in 1973. They use it to describe the ‘de-humanizing forces’ which Kraus perceived at work in Vienna. Their citation is from Die Fackel in July 1914 and the phrase in German in that edition, ‘österreichischen Versuchsstation des Weltuntergangs’ and is used in the context of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and how events associated with him are playing out in Austria and the world (Kraus, 1914b, p. 2, 1914a, p. 46). This is not to ignore Kraus’s deep loathing for much of Vienna’s cultural life but it is telling that this phrase has been mangled and co-opted in order to shape a view of Vienna in late twentieth century anglophone academia.
a political and moral dimension to the story of Vienna’s modernity and global influence that makes it all the more dynamic.

The phenomenon of fin-de-siècle Vienna as an object of research and analysis is one which has a narrative purpose in demonstrating wider lessons – Vienna has acted as an allegory for the dangers of populist politics, aestheticism and the abandonment of liberal, rational values. The Cold War lessons drawn from this by writers such as Schorske riffed on the theme of a degenerate culture which needed to be reinvigorated. What made Vienna a candidate for such a role is its position at the physical and political interstices of European geography. In the Cold War, Vienna was the city which was neither East nor West, its soul seemingly up for grabs by either side. As an imperial capital, its role was concluded and the possibility of a state system which was neither quite liberal democracy nor dictatorship made it a neat starting point as a historical object lesson. Its multi-ethnic pre-war character had the advantage of making it a city which had resemblances to the USA which, for Schorske at least, provided an underlying analogy between Viennese and American politics in his work. All of these reasons were related in some way to Vienna not being a 'national' city but something else.

Vienna was transformed from a backwater trading city into an imperial city with a deeply symbolic role in the story of the defence of Christendom and the attempt by the Habsburgs to transform itself into a universal monarchy with Austria, and Vienna, at its heart. This particular historical context means that Vienna provides a good example of a city whose distinctive characteristics are exposed in a way that helps understand the link between urban form and political projects. Distinctive social and historical structures find physical architectural expression in Vienna and its social
structure is instantiated in physical form. By identifying the limitations and obstructions to this process in Vienna there are broader conclusions which may be drawn.

Human settlement leave traces in the landscape beyond the conditions under which settlement first occurs. A successful settlement might be initially located because of particularly suitable conditions for, say, the growing of a particular crop or the ease with which a place can be defended. There is a point at which, however, new activity in a place is initiated for the primary reason that the place already exists. In other words, human activity can be initiated in a place simply because it is there, or primarily because it is there, rather than because it is the best place for a specific activity.

Where there is existing physical infrastructure and established socio-economic activity there is already something shaping whatever comes next. Development of place always happens within the context of what has come before: new developments are shaped by existing morphology and architecture. Since human construction of place almost invariably persists for longer than a single human’s lifespan, developments accumulate in a way which makes the persistence of a singular guiding project impossible. The accretion of many different projects and ideas make a place unique and gives it an identity beyond one that locates it on the earth, divorced from human activity or intervention.

What is generally true for the structure of place is, of course, true of cities and not just to the extent that cities are places. Cities are places with scale; however, cities gain additional narrative functions because of that scale, or primarily because of that scale. This further adds to, and influences, its development. Places other than cities might gain strong identities and narrative importance – sacred places might not have scale but have other significance, for example. For ordinary settlements where humans practice everyday life, though, it is the sheer scale of a city’s construction and activity
that can create narratives with emotional and psychological power that can influence people's actions and developments.

These narratives which relate to urban scale provide individual cities with unique identities that can have a real effect on how architecture and infrastructure is constructed in a city. Monumental architecture is there to glorify the city, to make the city worthy of its name in some way. Cities gain a type of autonomous identity which is difficult to reduce with a simple definition but is certainly initially related to the scale of a place and the power which is associated with it in some way; so it is in the case of Vienna.

Vienna, in order to maintain its identity whilst innovating, has had to recast its story constantly in order to justify its next development. An example is that of the demolition of the city walls to make way for the Ringstrasse, promotion and resistance to which was based in part on the meaning of the walls themselves as a symbol of powerful traditional elements in the military and the meaning of a street which would encircle the old city with residences and institutions of the emergent bourgeoisie.

In addition to the contest over traditional symbolism, there is a need to understand more progressive developments. During the nineteenth century, old European cities were subject to large public works of a scale previously unknown and many of which were performed under the broad rubric of ‘improvements’ and tackling urban problems identified under categories like ‘circulation’. There is undoubtedly a naked economic rationale for the application of new technologies of the urban fabric: these improvements allowed for cities to operate on a larger scale capable of handling and attracting more traffic and inhabitants, scale providing economies which helped cities to be successful economically. However, there is an extent to which these projects were as much about simplifying the city, of making it more intelligible and
understandable to the growing bureaucracies (Scott, 1998). Developments which create more ordered straight lines give a clear language on a map and a plan that can be picked up and understood more easily than medieval street layouts and unconventional building arrangements.

Complementary to the project of simplification is one in which the ordering of the modern city enables policing and control. This is a project familiar in urban studies literature (Harvey, 2006) and identifies Haussmann-like projects to create grand boulevards as implementing a system which allows for the transmission of police and troops to control radical political activities amongst the growing working class in addition to their more prosaic aims of increasing retail space and the value of land. There is also the extent to which these projects were there to add to the grandeur of a city, augment the identity of a city and increase its narrative power. The monumental architecture and processional geographies of avenue des Champs-Élysées in Paris, The Mall in London, Andrássy Avenue in Budapest and the Ringstrasse in Vienna all attest to the continuing impact and durability of such projects.

There are four distinct characteristics of the social structure of Vienna, from the High Middle Ages until the modern period, which have their expression in the architecture, infrastructure and morphology of the city.

First is the development of an aristocratic core; in Vienna’s case distinct in the sense that in other similar European cities, there was a tendency for the aristocracy in the modern period to dwell further away from the city and to have their primary residences, or to develop their primary residences, away from the city and in the countryside. In Vienna the aristocracy maintained a presence in the centre of the city that gave its core an identity; and it is a core that although it is now overlaid with modern functions and practice, persists in form. The walls of medieval Vienna are gone,
replaced by the Ringstrasse. The street patterns of the centre of the city remain, and its compactness are a reflection of the persistence of this aristocratic, urban presence. Related to this aristocratic core is the imperial presence, Vienna as Residenzstadt. The aristocratic-imperial dominance of the organisation of Vienna weighs heavily on its layout today.

Second, Vienna was relatively late in developing bourgeois institutions which could influence the growth of the city, most notably an autonomous city council and mayoralty. Direct imperial control was far stronger for much of the early modern period. Again, the walls around the medieval core city are an example, their maintenance until late in the city’s development relates to the desire for imperial, military, ecclesiastical symbols of control and power in the city. Although this is not unique to Vienna – as noted earlier, Barcelona’s walls, also demolished during the 1850s, had been maintained up until that point as a symbol of Castilian power over the Catalan city – it is notable for a city that is not under external subjugation to have its development so heavily directed by such an autocratic power.

A third characteristic is the separate track of the nation-state project associated with the Germans, they being the dominant ethnic group in Vienna. Vienna’s German cultural identity was rooted in its dominance of a multi-ethnic empire rather than to an ethnically-homogeneous nation-state. Aspirations to lead Germany-speaking Europe through the German Confederation meant that Austria had strong connections to the other Germans-speaking states until 1866 (Beller, 2006, p. 136) However, as Austria lost prestige and influence to rising Prussia, the potential for an Austrian leadership role in the development of a German nation receded (Judson, 2016, p. 259). This had consequences for how Vienna developed. German nationalist monuments are not prevalent in Vienna and it is imperial symbols and symbols of bourgeois institutions
that define the city more than a German ethnic identity. The straight lines of Unter den Linden in Berlin, avenue des Champs-Élysées in Paris or The Mall in Westminster have national processional roles that Vienna lacks, the curves of the Ringstrasse with its diverse historicist architecture providing a more nuanced mix of class, state and ethnic identities.

This segues into the last characteristic which is the ethnic diversity of Vienna. A diverse ethnic population is not unique by any means to Vienna, especially as cities in Europe and America grew in the nineteenth century. American seaboard cities especially had a similar ethnic mix or similar types of ethnic mixing. London and Paris also had a significant ethnic diversity. However, in Vienna, because it was the capital of a land empire, ethnicities inhabiting Vienna from that empire had some claim on Vienna, or at least perceived a claim on Vienna. For example, Czech speakers who in Vienna could see themselves as not emigrating to a foreign city but rather to the capital of lands of which Bohemia and Moravia were a thriving part. Consequently, there was a complex relationship between the large ethnic groups that made up Vienna in terms of their identity as imperial citizens with their identity as outsiders. The material effect of this diversity on the architecture is less obvious than the effect of the other three characteristics identified but it has a significant effect on its politics and consequently an effect on its entire development.

Although Vienna and Budapest shared many characteristics as large cities on the Danube, the urban forms which developed and operated as Vienna modernised, at least at first, were not put to service as part of a project of Budapest style nationalisation of the city. Vienna's expansion was a more cosmopolitan affair fitting its role as imperial centre. It was only later that the mass politics, to which a large city such as Vienna could play host, was to be fully exploited by more nationally minded politicians such as the
Karl Lueger, who came to power in the late 1890s. Even then, the city's monumental and architectural geographies were not nationalised to quite the extent of Budapest. Indeed, the narrative of Vienna as a parasite on the Austrian national body politic which formed after the First World War and the division of the new republic between Vienna and the rest of Austria on party political lines meant that Vienna's national status came to be defined negatively.
6. Venice

In this chapter, hard boundaries constructed between land and water are shown to trace the limits of a Venetian 'whole' form. Following this, the rhythms of decay and preservation necessitating constant administration and maintenance are defined. Networked forms are examined, including the canal network as the setting for processions and the move from traditional to modern internal urban transport; also, Venice’s connection to the rail network, whose positioning upheld a separation from the historical core of the city and set it off as an artistic object of desire, contributed to the affordance of the city’s status as an object of desire for the Italian nation. The inhabitant/visitor hierarchy is shown as affording views of the local population and of visitors as potentially destructive forces in the city.

The case of Venice demonstrates a fundamentally different relationship between urban forms, the state and territory. The setting of Venice is such that the city requires constant vigilance to keep it viable in a more intensive way than cities built for the most part on more stable land, like Budapest and Vienna. Such a persistent need for maintenance has a bearing on narratives associated with the city: the speed with which the city could decay should it be neglected means that the question of what defines Venice is foregrounded emphatically throughout its history. That there is something ‘different’ about Venice, as a European island city and former city-state, is evident through contrast to other cities; nevertheless, it is important to highlight just what this difference means in the context of modern urbanisation. One notable difference is the institutional effort required to change the morphology of a city which is built on liminal territory. The role of a deliberate urban plan, even if not formally declared as such, must be at work in a place where the regulation of waterways means a change in one place almost always has an immediate impact on the urban whole. Second, the impact of
significant remodelling of the city centre is necessarily that much greater than in ‘conventional’ cities held together with roadways rather than canals since a canal does not afford the ambulatory movement that roadways do. Third, the regulation of water in these conventional cities is one in which water is tamed, buildings are as far as possible separated from waterways and water is put to use as a sanitary utility. For Venice, this is much less the case: buildings are effectively built to co-exist with water rather than to be fundamentally separated.

Venice’s differences are declared upfront not to use them to explain directly how its forms relate to ideology but because they underlie to some extent all of its urban forms. There are many ways in which these three essential differences might have been overcome – not least a wholesale move of the city to the Venetian republic’s Terraferma, its adjacent mainland territory – but the fact that they have remained is a much a part of a deliberate attempt to enhance and preserve a historical particularity as anything else. In Budapest, modern sites may have been co-opted at times to the service of nationalism; in Vienna, that co-option might be said to be more in the service of nineteenth-century middle-class liberalism; in Venice, as far as can be generalised, the cityscape is at the service of Venetian particularism, a significant construct in itself.

Bosworth sets out a couple of recurring tropes which form a part of this construct. First, there is the modern planning axiom of ‘com’era, dov’era’, ‘how it was, where it was’, an expression which was formulated to sum up what would guide development to preserve the city, if not in exact form then in spirit; the city as it was when its independence of over 1,000 years was lost on 12 May 1797. This pivotal date has been given a significance which comes into play each time there is a major decision about the future of Venice to be made (Bosworth, 2014, p. 49,187). Second, there is the recurrence of the claim of imminent death: ‘Death in Venice’; the sinking city in crisis;
the Disneyfication of the city; the decline in the number of residents; the influx of tourists that is perceived as destructive of an authentic Venice; the pollution of the Lagoon; the list of threats to Venice’s existence is long. To bring these two tropes together, a powerful narrative of preservation and loss is formed which is augmented by other aspects of Venetian historical context – its autonomy, standing alone as a city-state long after the decline of others; its mediative role between East and West, Greek and Latin worlds; its status as a ‘work of art’. These other aspects have a common element which is their significance beyond the city. Indeed, the claim on Venice as a universal work of art which needs to be saved for humanity is set against the claim on it by its inhabitants. A universal role for a city is not unique – Paris as Benjamin’s ‘Capital of the Nineteenth Century’ comes to mind – but, in the case of Venice, this role overrides others like perhaps no other city. Venice is different and it apparently needs to be saved from the Venetians.

Venice shared with Budapest the distinction of being a city governed by Austrians and yet having another allegiance. However, whereas Budapest became and remains the quintessential Hungarian city, the Italian claim on Venice was initially less clear-cut. There is a Venetian identity, and indeed language, which muddies the Italian-ness of the city. The desire to detach Venice from Austria and attach it to Italy during the early nineteenth century was strong amongst Italian nationalists but not necessarily a prime political goal amongst Venetians for most of the period (Laven, 2002, p. 226). In Budapest, the infusion of Hungarian identity was boosted by migration into the city. In Venice, no such demographic transformation can be identified: there was no mass immigration from other parts of the new Italian state that might have adjusted its local identity. Rather the local population, and local organisational structures, made accommodations with Austrian, Italian and occasionally French masters. The city was
an object to be gained by various nationalist and imperialist projects but it was not strongly shaped architecturally and spatially by these projects. Instead the accretion of changes to the city under these external forces added to a Venetian identity rather than replacing it.

Turning to technological transformation, Venice was profoundly affected by the arrival of the railway which turned it from an elite tourist to a mass tourist destination during the nineteenth century. The medium for transport on the central islands themselves though was not significantly altered by technology – roads for anything other than pedestrians were minimal and transport by water retained primacy. Improvements and modernisation were focused on housing and sanitation, the latter being a particular problem for a city at sea level sited in a relatively stagnant lagoon (Bosworth, 2014, pp. 32–34). Typical urban problems that were being addressed in other European cities at this time – for example, those of traffic circulation and military mobilisation – were not as relevant in the case of Venice due to its low number of land-based thoroughfares and internal dependence on waterborne transport. Given the lack of space for the large public parks and gardens of many other European cities, public space in Venice is more evident in enclosed squares such as St Mark’s. In terms of other infrastructure and housing, both have been significantly upgraded during the past two centuries and Venice has not resisted the adoption of technology to a greater degree than elsewhere. Modern consumer culture has taken a central role in the life of Venice both for tourists and residents. Finally, industrialisation has occurred – and Venice was historically early to large industrial concerns with it glass making and ship building activities going back to its early days (Horodowich, 2009, p. 71) – but in the twentieth century has occurred in zones outside of central Venice and in Venice’s industrial surrogate, Mestre (2009, p. 222).
Indeed, it was these technical modern improvements that acted, and continued to act, as the threat to which a response of ‘com'era, dov'era’ could be invoked. Between the completion of the railway bridge in 1846 and the completion of the train station in 1852 came the insurrection of 1848 and the subsequent short-lived Republic of San Marco. It was during the aftermath of the retaking of Venice by Austria and the arrival of rail travel that Ruskin was to write his influential ‘Stones of Venice’ in which he used the Gothic architecture of Venice to illustrate a theory of architecture that looked to the past for its inspiration against soulless modernity and traced Venice’s decline through its adoption of more Classical architectural forms (2007). From the outset, then, Venice’s emergence into modern urban life was framed as an existential threat rather than just damage to an older urban idea.

The institutional effort required to maintain a low-lying archipelago affords more frequent, conscious consideration of urban forms. In Venice’s case, this has meant urban forms are constantly responding to historical narratives guiding their planning and development, the ‘com'era, dov'era’ doctrine being a prime example. This makes for a city whose historical identity is heightened. Canals have different affordances to roadways and since they are the principal thoroughfares in Venice, Venice’s layout has different affordances including the affordance of ideological projects. Likewise, buildings and public spaces that co-exist with close proximity to water provide a constant, everyday reminder of the liminal existence of the city and the possibility of it succumbing to being washed away. This impermanence and fragility affords different historical narratives which in turn make for different narrative interpretations. As Venice’s urban forms and affordances are elaborated in more detail, so these special conditions need to be considered.
Historical Context

Situated on the Adriatic Sea in a protective, marshy lagoon, the islands which were to form Venice acted as a refuge for those fleeing attacks from invaders (Norwich, 2003, pp. 4–5) and the rule of the Lombard tribes in post-Roman Italy (2003, pp. 10–11). Citizens of cities in the old Roman province of Venetia were on the main route for invasions from beyond the Balkans and the Alps and, at various points in the fifth and sixth centuries, were increasingly dependent upon the sanctuary offered by nearby marshy land from mounted invading tribes. Inhabitants of Altinum, for example, were effectively transplanted to the island of Torcello in the northern part of the Venetian Lagoon during the invasions of Attila (Horodowich, 2009, p. 8). Liminal land was slowly transformed as techniques developed to stabilise land using, for example, closely situated logs as piles on which to build. This occurred all along the northern Adriatic coast from modern Grado in the north to Ravenna in the south with the Venetian Lagoon centrally located and later becoming dominant. (Horodowich, 2009, pp. 3–10) All large-scale construction projects entail clearing and stabilising the land on which development takes place but it was the extent to which Venetians did so in close proximity to water which distinguished Venice’s development. The notion of a distinct identity is heavily encoded into the morphology and edifice of Venice; its low-lying location with the mainland on the horizon gives the sense that this marginal settlement is sited in proximity to, yet just out of reach of, neighbouring powers. Whereas other cities might have prospered because of their accessibility, it was inaccessibility and defensiveness which defined early Venetian settlement in the north Adriatic. It was to enable inhabitants of the Lagoon to control access for trade as well as having a military advantage and this became increasingly important as Venice found itself at crux of trade
between western Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, and northern and southern Europe, as it entered the High Middle Ages (2009, pp. 29–31).

In addition to the production and trading of salt extracted from marshes in the Lagoon (Norwich, 2003, p. 7), Venice's initial commercial and strategic advantage was attained by serving as the entrepôt for goods from the Byzantine world (Nicol, 1992, pp. 41–42). As power struggles in the Adriatic and eastern Mediterranean settled and became regularised after the dissolution of the Western Roman Empire, so Venice was able to develop trading partners and it acted as a bridge between mutually hostile forces and territories. Initially commodities and goods moving from east to west were salt, fish and luxury items exchanged for wheat and other staples moving from west to east. As trade developed and Venetian merchants established themselves, their grip on Adriatic markets increased and slaves and lumber were added to their inventories. (Tilly, 1992, p. 144) Until the early ninth century, the Venetian Lagoon was a collection of small island settlements and it was only as the area was contested between the Franks and the Byzantines that the central settlement which comprises the core of Venice today emerged as concentrated centre of defence and power (Norwich, 2003, pp. 18–22). It was at this time that the Rialto was systematically reclaimed, its watercourses defined and significant building work on top of deeply driven piles undertaken. That this effort was initiated by the first historically attested Doge, Agnello Partecipazio, is instructive as it was local leadership which had proven itself in struggles against the Franks that led the move to the Rialto in a position in the Lagoon which provided for the maximum defence against interference from both the Franks and the Byzantines – even the Byzantine Emperor sent craftsmen from Constantinople to assist the construction of the settlement (2003, pp. 22–26). So, although the settlement of the Venetian Lagoon might have occurred until this time in a piecemeal fashion, the foundation of the central Venetian
urban settlement was the result of a deliberate plan executed through the exercise of effective local autonomy.

The development of Venetian state-like institutions was a process which was distinct from many of its neighbours in the northern Mediterranean. The imperative to trade drove the city to seek dominance of sea lanes and hence trade with coastal Mediterranean settlements. This provided a powerful motivation for the expansion of Venetian military power which came before a desire for colonial settlement. The use of galleys in the Mediterranean from Roman times up until the early modern period governed the scope of shipping lanes and navigation. Both commercial and naval ships made use of coastline hugging shipping lanes and the labour required to power galleys meant frequent stops at intermediate ports during long journeys. Such a system made shipping a capital-intensive industry and long distance trade was, by and large, only cost-effective for carrying high value cargo. (Pryor, 1992, p. 177) Effective maritime power for a state was exercised by securing either direct control of, or privileges at, a series of ports on major shipping routes. Venice’s geo-political position meant that it was able to acquire the necessary control of many Mediterranean ports needed to make it the region’s most influential maritime power. Consequently, it had access to more diverse markets than most of its competition and its established power enabled it to defend against challenges both from other states and from piracy. As a participant in crusading, it was instrumental in providing and extending access to the eastern Mediterranean to enable western Christian states to capture territory and trade from the control of Islamic competitors and this in turn significantly expanded its sphere of influence. In 1203 and 1204, Venice effectively diminished Byzantine imperial power as it seized Constantinople and took control of large portions of the Empire for itself. It then established dependent local rulers with the prime objective of maintaining access

As trading links expanded Venice also expanded its power, first by conquering the adjacent Italian mainland, the Terraferma, and then taking territory along its trading routes on the Adriatic and as far away as Crete. It lay at the heart of a Mediterranean trading zone and kept a controlling grip on trade between east and west. As its wealth and power grew, administrative, military and financial functions of the city expanded and the archipelago at its heart became a densely populated and increasingly lavishly adorned centre (Norwich, 2003, pp. 268–276). Although the city could and did expand through land reclamation, the islands were a constraint such that it meant that nobility, artisans and the poor were in very close proximity. Its citizenry had a strong identification with the republic across different classes, though small local neighbourhoods, the ‘sestieri’, provided the most immediate local identity and were often in violent conflict with each other (Davis, 1994, p. 20). What was common throughout was a deep sense of connection with other inhabitants, a clear separation from a rural hinterland and a greater barrier between other cities than in other city-states in Italy during the Middle Ages and early modern periods.

As the city grew and its overseas empire expanded, it was its commercial interests which drove its main ventures and policies. A system of government evolved in the republic which had the Doge at its head but whose power was subject to representatives in the patrician Great Council and a series of bodies and procedures which ensured the interests of the major families were upheld and that autocratic power was curtailed (Norwich, 2003, pp. 282–283). Venetian economic policy protected its centrally established elite and guided its trade through the city rather than it being
dispersed across its empire and its sphere of influence (Apellániz, 2013, p. 163). Due to this, and its geography, the projection of Venetian power was as much an idea as it was to do with control of territory and populations. In order to control trade in the Adriatic and to force non-Venetian merchants to go through Venice rather than trade point-to-point, there was a requirement for a strong naval presence (Lane, 1973, pp. 124–125) but also a clearly articulated idea of Venice as a power and as part of a legal structure with could be applied outside of its home territory. Its identity as a go-between for East and West was also predicated on a narrative idea which fed into legal justification to exert its power independent of Byzantium. Founding myths helped unpin this narrative idea: the application of historical events such as the flight of citizens of former Roman cities away from barbarians to the Lagoon to seek liberty was a part of this myth-making (Brown, 1996, pp. 12–15). In addition, the use of the relics of Saint Mark, apparently stolen from Alexandria by Venetian merchants eager to protect them from Muslim possession or destruction, gave the city a patron who was one Christ’s apostles, something which drew the city to the level of Rome with its association with Saint Peter (Brown, 1996, p. 12).

By the late eighteenth century there was a sense in which Venice’s difference has become accentuated by a perception of anachronism. As the major nation-states of Europe were solidifying and Enlightenment philosophy was influencing and reordering state administration in many territories, Venice’s diplomatic power was waning rapidly and its future independence was no longer taken as secure by other European powers (Norwich, 2003, pp. 601–604). Its uniqueness became a weakness in the face of the Napoleonic transformation of continental Europe which not only saw France conquering states including Venice but also whose revolutionary mind-set looked to eliminate special privileges and sought to standardise. Much as the last vestiges of the
Holy Roman Empire were destroyed by Napoleon in 1806, a precursor in 1797 was the destruction of the Most Serene Republic of Venice (2003, pp. 628–631) and its absorption into, variously, French, Austrian (Horodowich, 2009, pp. 190–200) and finally Italian state structures (2009, pp. 200–203). It was during the period of French domination, however, that some key changes were enacted which brought Venice into line with the prevailing revolutionary mood of Europe. Symbolic acts, such as the removal of the gates of the Ghetto (Ravid, 2001, pp. 27–28), signalled the implementation of a modern citizen-state relationship and the demise of an old corporatist idea of society. At the same time the French made other structural changes: some public works such as the Via Eugenia, a thoroughfare covering an old canal; new public gardens for the enjoyment of ordinary Venetians (Plant, 2002, p. 59); and the removal of artworks, most notably the Horses of St Mark, to Paris where they were exhibited (Horodowich, 2009, p. 187). These changes set precedents that were followed later, of filling in old canals, regularising walkways (2009, p. 209) and the aestheticisation of artworks, separating them from their symbolic power and role in the old Venetian Republic.

The end of over a thousand years of Venetian political independence put Venice in play as an object of diplomatic negotiation during the nineteenth century among the Great Powers (Plant, 2002, pp. 43–48). The transfer from Austria to France and back to Austria during the Napoleonic wars saw the city and its hinterland territory used as a tactical pawn in a much larger game. It was as part of a French client state between 1805 and 1814 that Venice first became part of a political entity that was identified as Italian, the Kingdom of Italy (of which Napoleon was himself king). National feeling was inspired by the creation of such Napoleonic states in other parts of Europe though its direct effect on Venice is difficult to ascertain. Under Austrian rule resistance was,
until the 1840s, muted and when it did become strong was associated as much with the cause of Venetian autonomy and independence – Viva San Marco! as much as Viva l’Italia! (Ginsborg, 1979, p. 100) – as it was with the cause of Italian unity and the Risorgimento.

Venice, like Rome, became an object of desire for Italian nationalists as the Italian state evolved in the 1850s and 1860s. The Venetian language had much in common with other northern Italian languages and dialects but had a history of use associated with Venice that gave it power and prestige and the promotion of a standardised Italian national language was bound to reduce the prominence of Venetian. A standard Italian based on the Florentine dialect was to replace those diverse languages and dialects (Lepschy, 2002, p. 44). Although Venice resembled what nationalists understood as an Italian city, its differences were marked. Venice, along with its surrounding province, was transferred to the newly constituted Kingdom of Italy from Austria after the defeat of Austria by Prussia in 1866 (Judson, 2016, p. 259). It is arguable to what extent the Venetian public were enthused by becoming citizens of Italy though there had been little support for the departing Austrians either. This is not to overplay Venice’s detachment from the Italian national project or to place Italian incorporation of Venice on a par with an imperialist annexation by Austria but relative to the urban identity of other large cities associated with national projects at this time, the overlap between Venetian identity and Italian identity is complex.
Urban Forms

**Defining the whole on marginal land.** Venice’s demarcation brings into play several different urban wholes. The core Rialto archipelago on which the classic cityscape sits is one such whole, one that is most frequently cited in guidebooks as historic Venice. However, the entire Lagoon has many different settlements and its islands and waterways are interconnected ecologically, economically and politically in such a way as to make the entire Lagoon an urban system. A simple separation of urban from rural is not easily made in such a system; though the outlying islands are experienced as rural they are dependent upon the Lagoon’s urban system. The whole Lagoon is a managed environment in the service of an idea of the preservation of Venetian life. This set of relationships constitutes a Venetian whole which goes well beyond the so-called historic centre. Although Venice has long had a relationship with the Terraferma, the early twentieth century saw a deliberate effort to move large-scale industrialisation from the islands to the mainland and to incorporate Mestre into the Venetian administrative orbit, the commune (Zucconi, 2003, p. 74). This expanded whole completed a separation of historic and modern which began at least as far back as the creation of the rail and maritime stations at the edge of the core of Venice. Like any other urban territory, Venice has and has had a variety of overlapping wholes which afford control of the city, the difference with Venice being that these wholes are not so much determined by hard demarcation (like walls) and by territorial annexation but rather by different ways of controlling a volatile physical environment.

Venetian exceptionalism in revealed in the variance from formal urban norms – its whole form is separated more exclusively; the development and transformation of its institutions were out of step with its neighbours; as a former city-state it retained and retains a place to the side of more normal state-region-city hierarchies; and, it
interrelation to external actors and institutions is different in the sense that it is an object of desire and concern and is in some sense universally ‘owned’ more than many other cities. This exceptionalism can help reveal processes and practices which govern the relationship between space, architecture and ideology. At first glance, the urbanised island of the Venetian Lagoon, and the core city in particular, present themselves as ‘organic’ in opposition to a sharp-angled rational or planned city. Horodowich offers an explanation of Venice’s non-conformity to the gridded Roman urban plan – widely maintained in Italian cities throughout the Middle Ages – which takes the Byzantine influence as determinative of the jumbled arrangement of canals and streets (2009, pp. 12–13). Although this eastern influence might be a factor in the layout of the city, the engineering challenge of stabilising the land and regulating water would have been significant and overridden an imperative to follow normal orders of town planning, Roman or otherwise. What is in evidence, however, is the early presence of administrative capability and power to bring about this kind of engineering (Mutinelli, 1841, p. 11). The fact that at the time of the development of the Rialto archipelago local autonomy had been confirmed by the Byzantine Empire and that the prestige of the office of the Doge was enhanced by victory of the Frankish Empire would have meant that the order to transform the Rialto would have been easier to carry through since options for resistance from imperial authorities would have been limited. Coupled with the Grand Canal following a pre-existing watercourse and the islands being small and not clearly marked off from the Lagoon, the absence of normal Roman urban organisation does not necessarily support evidence of an alternative, competing influence. Rather, the Venetian urban whole is one in which particularly strong incentives have been in place to make radical changes to the landscape and waterscape in order to create an exceptional urban site. It is the exceptional site of Venice, the
placement of the whole, which affords a different path for urban identity. Its layout and architecture are afforded by this placement.

Venice, of course, is not unique for the prevalence of canals, its location on islands or even it relationship to large neighbouring empires. Amsterdam is an example which might be said to be comparable. However, whereas modern Amsterdam has a dominant role in the nation-state which has formed around it, modern Venice is peripheral to mainland Italy both physically and politically with more dominant regional voices influencing Italian politics from Milan, Turin, Naples and Rome. Prior to its inclusion in the Italian nation-state, Venice certainly played a dominant role through the Venetian state apparatus but it was not, unlike Amsterdam, a part of a network of large urban areas across a wider territory; rather it produced a state whose aim was to sustain the island city itself with considerations of other territories subservient to that aim. In other words, there was not a significant wider territorial identity of which Venice was a constituent part, unlike Amsterdam and Dutch identity. The Venetian urban whole is distinct for transcending a state/city hierarchy of identity.

The central Venetian islands are susceptible to flooding. This is not uncommon for many cities. However, the extent of possible flooding is unusual as is the sense of existential threat brought about by such flooding. The so-called ‘acqua alta’ in which a significant part of the city is inundated occurs with enough frequency for there to be permanent mitigating arrangements in place. The flooding, which has been exacerbated by works on the Lagoon since the fifteenth century to redvert rivers and clean sedimentation (Bondesan & Furlanetto, 2012), can typically cover 14% of the city’s walkways and on average every 4 years cover more than 50% of the city’s walkways (Boato, Canestrelli, Facchin, & Todaro, 2009). In 1966 almost the entire city’s walkways were underwater (Horodowich, 2009, p. 223) and the islands were effectively
cut-off from the mainland. The ready possibility of universal flooding means that land in the city has a vulnerability that does not allow for something that other cities have – effectively protected higher status areas which are either on high land (like Buda in Budapest) or in a well-regulated area protected from the water by walls (like Vienna prior to the Ringstrasse being built). The relative equality of flooding in Venice means that hierarchical demarcation takes different forms to other urban environments.

**The canal network.**

![Figure 22: Map of Venice (Clark, 1853)](image)

Venice’s physical isolation was significantly reduced by the arrival of the railway in 1846. The bridge carrying the tracks terminated at the edge of the core Venetian islands and was appended to Venice rather than integrated. This relationship is instructive – Venice was the object of modern urban sensibilities as a preserved attraction rather the subject of a thoroughgoing modernisation itself. The influx of tourists after the arrival of the railway and the failed revolution of 1848-49 presented new infrastructure and traffic management challenges (Bosworth, 2014, pp. 9–10). Modernisation was generally predicated upon a desire for the improvement of traffic
circulation and accommodation (2014, p. 33). The city was not well positioned or equipped for the kind of modernisation prevalent in many other European cities for which the opportunity for national aggrandisement was afforded. The reinterment of Daniele Manin in 1868, with its dramatic fleet of gondolas processing down the Grand Canal, is an example of how an old urban artery was used for the purposes of celebrating a Venetian/Italian nationalist figure (Bosworth, 2014, p. 26); unlike the similar funeral procession for Lajos Kossuth in Budapest twenty-four years later, the apparent technical prowess demonstrated by newly engineered boulevards, which could be used to reinforce a narrative of national prowess, was not afforded by the city's layout and instead the romanticism of unpowered transport and ancient affinities with the water offset by Venetian Gothic palazzos were the order of the day.

This noted, some of the objectives which could be labelled as ‘liberal improvement’ which were pursued by many contemporary urban modernisation schemes were also pursued in Venice. The aim of bringing hygiene to the city, both physical and moral, was expounded in arguments for major public works to upgrade working class housing and general sanitation (Bosworth, 2014, pp. 33–34). In addition, many canals were filled in, both by city authorities and private landlords, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in order to reduce putrid standing water, increase pedestrian walkways and to reduce the cost of maintenance. (Horodowich, 2009, p. 221)

As the canal network was rationalised, so use of the traditional method of public transport, the gondola, declined. As cities in Europe became more attuned to efficiency and speed, human powered gondolas were an anachronism as the prime means of transport. Gondoliers put up considerable resistance to competition but vaporetti, steam ferries, were introduced to Chioggia in the south of the Lagoon in 1873. By 1881, the
Grand Canal was being served by vaporetti, the inaugural journey completed by the ‘Regina Margherita’ named after the Italian queen and a notable nod to Italian nationalist sensibilities. (Bosworth, 2014, pp. 34–35) Technology was being adapted to the city’s morphology, maintaining a pre-modern Venetian cityscape with modern underpinnings. As such, the city developed an ongoing debate between the imperatives of progress and the pieties of preservation. As the economy of Venice industrialised further and also came to rely more on tourism for income, this contest inevitably became more animated. Ideological positions did not necessarily neatly align in these contests but different sides could be co-opted to views of what should change and what should remain in the city.

**The railway network.** The arrival of the railway in Venice was responsible for vastly increasing the potential volumes of visitors. The positioning of the station is significant given the effect these visitors have had on the city’s capacity for internal traffic. The station has been located at the western end of the central islands at a point nearest to the mainland since the inception of the railway. It is peripheral to the central archipelago and it is not well-integrated into the city's other modes of transport other than to disgorge pedestrians on to the city’s walkways. The building of the railway bridge ended Venice’s water-bound isolation and did not proceed without great controversy (Plant, 2002, pp. 109–111), so the railway did and does symbolise the entrance of modernity into an older cityscape.

The station site is an example of the beginning of the use of zoning in Venice whereby larger industrial developments began to be separated out from the centre of the city. Given that the city had been built by and for trading and associated industries, this was a departure and strengthened an opposition of a historical core and industrial periphery. The railway station’s site was soon joined by the modern maritime station,
again taking trade out of the centre and placing it to the side of the central islands. The rail and maritime stations feed the central core with goods and passenger traffic but take away a function of the centre of the city, particularly the Grand Canal, of being an entrepôt.

This zonal separation of historical core from modern industry reinforces the objectification of the core city as a protected work of art. The connection to the rail network facilitates an audience, renewed daily, which enters the city via a modern portal, yet the city's core appears unintegrated and untainted by the network’s physical infrastructure. The lack of significant volumes of motorised traffic on land or underground underlines the city's exceptional status. The railway aside, transport around the city by foot or waterway produces an unusual urban experience. The visitor does not experience the city’s architecture or layout at speed, unlike in other modern cities. Rather the optical effect of the rail connection is to present the cityscape on the horizon, a distant goal bridged by a modern railway, approached at speed but once disembarked the visitor’s speed slows down enforcing a reverential entrance to the city.
Decay and preservation. As has been noted, there have constantly been special environmental concerns which derive from Venice’s position lying low on marginal land in water. While it is not the only city to have to negotiate its relationship to water, Venice has been particularly susceptible to flooding and erosion and this has required constant vigilance and maintenance to keep it liveable. Moreover, any reduction in that maintenance is more immediately apparent in the cityscape: institutional deficiency is reflected in the decay of the cityscape perhaps more immediately in Venice than in equivalent urban contexts. Despite this tendency to be unforgiving in exposing neglect, the city’s situation requires an ongoing process of regeneration, even if what is generated is modelled on what went before. This peculiar process makes possible the narrative of Venice as a living relic. The material for Venice’s patrimony is embedded in the ‘everyday’ city. That this ‘everyday’ is one which is shaped by mass tourism does not take away from the integration of contemporary and the historical.

The collapse of the campanile in Piazza San Marco is a case in point. The structure of the tower was frequently compromised by lightning strikes, earthquakes and instability of the foundations over centuries. Despite this, the structure was maintained and embellished until its catastrophic failure in July 1902. The subsequent debate regarding its replacement involved many different proposals; however, the decision was taken to follow the ‘com'era, dov'era’ principle by recreating a building whose exterior was a facsimile of the structure before its collapse but whose foundations and frame made use of modern stable building techniques. (Bosworth, 2014, pp. 51–54) This process of preservation augmented with modern underpinnings was one in which the aesthetics of the cityscape reflected an idealised Venetian past leapfrogging French, Austrian and Italian influences post 1797.
It is through the doctrine of com'era, dov'era that Venice has taken on a self-consciously historical role. In taking the preservation of the city at a particular point in time, the city’s institutions have identified it with a moment at which its authenticity was supposedly suspended. That this moment has been selected before the development of popular Italian nationalism has meant that Venice’s relationship to the Italian nation is mediated through other myths, those surrounding the lost independence of the city. This is not to ignore efforts to introduce the national into the Venetian urban setting or to suggest that Venice is in some way a reluctant appendage to the Italian national project. Rather, it is to emphasise the special role that the city’s institutions have carved out for Venice within that national project and that this role is afforded by the rhythmic form of Venice as a city in a constant state of decay and preservation.

The special conditions of Venice and their effects on the aesthetics of the cityscape leave it open to an interpretation of a city that is dying. In the late nineteenth century, this interpretation had particular resonance for artists who looked to romanticise Venice’s decay. Artistic appreciation and mass tourism were brought together as museumified Venice was captured in guidebooks as an object to be gazed upon and for artists the perceived unique light available in the Lagoon, along with a reputation for pleasure in which they could be more free in their life and work, was an attraction. Wagner’s residence there further mythologised the city as a place for brooding artists and his death there in 1883 wrote the city into real-life Wagnerian drama (Barker, 2008, p. 3).

Nietzsche’s stay in Venice allowed him to muse on the city’s qualities, his perception, according to Plant, being that the city was a kind of image of the ‘man of the future’, melancholic and atomised. (Plant, 2002, pp. 197–198) The decaying rhythms of Venice afford self-dramatisation and an escape from a modern malaise.
**Inhabitant/visitor hierarchy.** The restrictions on Venice’s expansion within the Lagoon have meant that increasing the population normally would entail increasing population density. Between 1300 and 1800, the population fluctuated within the 100,000 to 150,000 range and in 1800 the population stood at 44% greater than in 1300 (de Vries, 1984). Compared to Budapest which, more typically for similar European cities, grew around 5 times larger and Vienna around 10 times larger during the same period, constraints on population growth were apparent even during the economic heyday of Venice. Coupled with an imperial policy which sought less to add territory and people but rather to control trade for the core Venetian citizenry, the distinction between inhabitant of Venice and visitor was driven by local geography and resources.

The priorities in this relationship have been reversed as the Venetian population and institutions have moved from being active agents in governing the direction of development of the city to the object of concern in preserving the city. Ruskin, for example, decries the ignorance of the citizens of Venice during his stay there in 1849:

‘… the shafts of St. Mark’s at Venice were used by a salesman of common caricatures to fasten his prints upon … and this in the face of the continually passing priests: while the quantity of noble art annually destroyed in altarpieces by candle-droppings, or perishing by pure brutality of neglect, passes all estimate.’ (Ruskin, 2007, p. 371)

Ruskin’s treatment of Venice as a study of the principles of Gothic architecture follows a narrative which sees the city as a living museum and one that is constantly under threat from the Lagoon, railways and neglectful inhabitants; the desire to ‘save’ Venice from these threats arises from the belief that it is only external appreciation and
resources that can fully comprehend and preserve a unique and universal work of art. This made the city a symbolic prize for Italian nationalism – Venice was as much a possession which was fully formed and whose prestige was used to enhance Italian national aspirations as it was a city that must be Italianised in some way. After 1860, only Rome and Venice remained as mainstream Italian nationalist objectives (Riall, 2009, p. 147). This bound Venice to Rome in the early 1860s in the nationalist political imagination. However, when it came to Venetia and Venice being incorporated it is significant that a plebiscite was required in Venice – one in which a tiny minority took part. When the vote indicated that Venice should join Italy, the Italian king came to Piazza San Marco by barge (Bosworth, 2014, p. 18). By having the Italian king arrive in traditional Venetian style, Venice maintained a distinct doubled identity, both Italian and Venetian.

However, another dynamic was disturbing the configuration of Venetian identity. As the Ruskin quote highlights, there was a concern for Venice from well beyond Venice, Venetia and Italy. The internationalisation of Venice was a phenomenon that began to see the city as part of an international patrimony. Concern for its fate from the nineteenth century onwards crystallised into pressure on local authorities to preserve the city. The elevation of the city to a position of being a work of art created a critic/citizen/tourist hierarchy in which the sensitive, concerned international critic seeks to save Venice from its local, oblivious population and cretinous visitors. This is summed up by Henry James writing in 1909:

‘Venetian life, in the large old sense, has long since come to an end, and the essential present character of the most melancholy of cities resides simply in its being the most beautiful of tombs. …The everlasting shuffle of these
irresponsible visitors in the Piazza is contemporary Venetian life. Everything else is only a reverberation of that. The vast mausoleum has a turnstile at the door, and a functionary in a shabby uniform lets you in, as per tariff, to see how dead it is.’ (James & Auchard, 1995, p. 33)

Ordered by this hierarchy, the city’s identity is problematised in relation to a conception of the city mediated by nationhood. It is a city populated by Italian citizens who are not in full control of its destiny, Italian or otherwise.

The economic dependency of Venice upon tourism orders its relationship to the outside world in ways that are distinct. The sandbars which protect the Lagoon were home to some of the original Venetian settlements and as the centre of gravity for the city moved to the Rialto archipelago they provided a defensive role as well as port facilities directly on the Adriatic Sea. As the defensive role became redundant after the Republic’s demise and as port facilities were developed on a larger scale elsewhere, the Lido sandbar was opened up for a new form of activity. Sea-bathing, which had become fashionable in Europe during the late eighteenth century, opened up to a wider public with the introduction of the railways as well as providing the possibility of travel to more exotic and pleasant locations (Horodowich, 2009, p. 206). The Lido was developed as an exclusive sea-bathing resort and into the twentieth century became an internationally renowned and frequented tourist destination. Venetian entrepreneurs and local authorities sought to develop Venice as a cosmopolitan magnet and the city’s marginal location, the Lido’s especially, afforded that role.

As Venice opened up then to an international audience, so the narrative of its past glories became available to the Italian nationalist cause. If it were not possible for the city to be fully possessed by Italian identity then its history could be put into service
to bolster that identity. Gabriele D'Annunzio’s speech at the closing of the first Venetian international art exhibition, now the Venice Biennale, was a florid celebration of the traditions of Venice and yoked them to the ambitions of an expansionist Italian nationalism. (Woodhouse, 2001, pp. 143–144) The right-wing writer, poet and journalist was born in Pescara in central Italy but closely associated with Venice in his writings and activities from the time of his first visit in 1887 for the unveiling of a statue to King Victor Emmanuel II. (Bosworth, 2014, p. 45) His themes of ‘murder, eroticism, cruelty, and madness, along with hints of incest and necrophilia’ (Woodhouse, 2001, p. 151) nourished his outrageous celebrity in Italy and beyond and added a dynamic libidinal quality to the artistic narrative of death and corruption associated with fin de siècle Venice.

As Bosworth indicates, D'Annunzio indulged dark Venetian motifs but also was able to draw something from Venice’s history with which to elaborate a future. (Bosworth, 2014, p. 46) In much the same way as Nietzsche, Venice offered some kind of route out of modern malaise but for D'Annunzio this was through the glorification of Venetian imperial power in the Mediterranean in its heyday. In particular, it was the naval tradition of Venice that he sought to appropriate for Italian nationalism, supporting his view expressed in 1888 that Italy, ‘either will be a Great Naval Power or it will be nothing’. (2014, p. 46)
**Affordances**

Victor Emmanuel II, the first king of newly united Italy, died in 1878 and was immortalised across the country with an array of memorials and monuments. Venice’s contribution to this collection is an equestrian statue with reliefs and figures surrounding its pedestal. The striking statue is of Victor Emmanuel himself, wielding a sword astride his battle horse. His heroic posture and the readiness of the horse to charge are somewhat undermined by the implication that from this point in Venice in order for him to combat the enemy, the Austrians, the king would need to dismount and embark on a vaporatto at the San Zaccaria stop on the quay in front on the monument. The allegories depicted by the two figures at the foot of the monument tie Venetian struggles against the Austrians with the wider Italian national effort for unification and independence. One is ‘Venezia soggiogata’, Venice subjugated and the other is The Lion of St Mark defending the plebiscite result of 1866 in which the Venetian electorate voted to join the Kingdom of Italy. Even as they bind Venice to Italy, they assert a local identity that voluntarily opts in to the Italian nation.

A comparison with the equivalent equestrian figure in the Piazza del Duomo in Milan is telling. There the statue stands proud in the middle of a large square which could represent itself as a parade ground or battlefield. The monument is sanctified by its relationship to the imposing façade of Milan’s cathedral and is also complemented by the triumphal arch entrance to the Galleria Vittorio Emanuele II, itself a Haussmannesque development combining modern retail and architecture with national glory. Here the dynamic, mounted king has somewhere to go and a place in a symbolic network. In Milan Victor Emmanuel is an all-conquering hero, in Venice he is another visitor. He is welcome on the banks of the Lagoon but there is no place for him in Venice’s equivalent to Piazza del Duomo, Piazza San Marco.
Venice lacks formal aspects which many other cities, such as Milan, are able to offer for ideological service. Its tenuous connection to the mainland means that it cannot reinforce a national narrative of community unified by land. The way in which the islands have been stabilised for construction mean that it does not lend itself to the building of grand, wide streets which can be pressed into service for national aggrandisement. Its processional geography is water-bound: not in itself a barrier to procession, of course, but closely associated with the city itself, the city’s distinct identity impressing itself through the signature of a gondolier fleet processing along the Grand Canal. Even as Venice’s whole has expanded to include the mainland, the symbolism of the historic centre has the potential to overpower. For Venice to work in the service of an ideology like nationalism, different techniques need to be brought to bear on its distinct formal arrangements.

For the Italian national imagination, it could be that Venice itself is the monument at the focal point of a fine vista. The nationalisation of European cities had inward and outward facing features: inwardly it reinforced the idea of national achievement, the genius of the nation instantiated in the forms of the city; outwardly the city was in contest with other nationalised cities, just as nationalisms were perceived as part of a struggle between nations for supremacy. For the inward aspect to work for Italian nationalism in Venice, the national genius is perhaps best showcased as the whole form of Venice, since to foreground other forms of the city leads Italian identity into strong competition with other Venetian narratives that could conflict with Italian-ness. For the outward aspect to work there is perhaps a need for cities to have shared common components for comparison: the collection of buildings around the Ringstrasse could be compared to the collection on Andrássy Avenue but Venice cannot offer up an equivalent for comparison with Vienna and Budapest.
Having been a major political entity in its own right in Italy prior to 1797, Venice's role in nineteenth century nationalism was at first peripheral. Unlike the previous two case studies, Venice's development in the nineteenth century was not marked by expansion out from the core of the city to create a new urban whole but a consolidation of its existing footprint. The city's urban forms were honed and the narrative of Venice as an exceptional work of art was augmented. This work of art was an object of desire for visitors and for Italian nationalists. Under such circumstances the city's status was reinforced as much by the idealisation of the city as it was by its actual physical and social conditions. Venice’s formal configurations afford diverse and complex co-option to service ideological goals. The ‘whole’ forms of the of the city are, by virtue of placement, exceptional. Its historic position between East and West, politically and culturally, makes its national status less secure. Venetian networks have reinforced a logic of separation which in the modern era has revealed itself as a separation of historical and industrial parts and therefore the integration of nationalist symbols is hampered by the preservation of the historical zone. Hierarchically, the concept of citizenship in Venice is complicated by particular concerns: interventions from the outside which deem Venice part of the international patrimony and which make the local inhabitants just one more stakeholder in the city’s plight; and the prevalence of tourism which comes from within and outside Italy make for a local citizenship experience which is under pressure day-to-day and which makes local solidarity an attractive counterpoint.
7. Reconsidering Haussmannisation

In the three case studies, the theoretical framework of forms and affordances has been applied to show how cities interact with projects of nationalisation. Broadening this will show how modernised cities were more generally implicated in political projects in the late nineteenth century. The restructuring of Paris in the late nineteenth century under Baron Haussmann was on such a scale and profile that the concept of Haussmannisation became a phenomenon which influenced the modernisation of many other cities and the cases of Budapest, Vienna and Venice share the influence of Paris’ renovation. This chapter will look at the phenomenon and what the reconfiguration of Paris afforded politically while critically examining the concept of Haussmannisation as it has been interpreted since.

‘The temples of the bourgeoisie’s spiritual and secular power were to find their apotheosis within the framework of these long streets. The perspectives, prior to their inauguration, were screened with canvas draperies and unveiled like monuments; the view would then disclose a church, a train station, an equestrian statue, or some other symbol of civilisation. With the Haussmannization of Paris, the phantasimagoria was rendered in stone.’ (W. Benjamin, 2002, p. 24)

Several cities might be taken as forerunners or early adopters of modern urbanism: London grew explosively at this time and New York and Chicago were to present superlative examples of modern urban grid systems, far less incumbered by historical urban forms than their European counterparts. However, it was Haussmannised Paris which has been held up as the most complete template for others to follow. The scale and ambition of the transformation of the city inspired and repulsed
generations of urban planners and builders. It is appropriate then to examine Haussmannisation, in terms of its genesis in the remodelling of Paris, how it came to mean something for other cities and to a subsequent critics, and its limits as a concept.

Much has been written on the phenomenon of Haussmannisation and its significance both for Paris itself and for modern urbanisation more generally. For Mumford, Haussmann was one of the ‘regimenters of human functions and urban space’ (1961, p. 172), at best serving bankers and speculators rather than citizens. For Lefebvre, what Haussmann unleashed on the city was ‘an authoritarian and brutal spatial practice’ and ‘the effective application of the analytic spirit in and through dispersion, division and segregation’ (1991, p. 308). Robert Moses, the American developer who transformed New York in the mid-twentieth century, took inspiration from Haussmann but saw a tendency of his plans ‘to neglect the lower middle class and the poor’ (1942). Harvey’s more nuanced analysis of Haussmann’s work acknowledges him as ‘one of the founding figures of modernist urban planning’ (2006, p. 112). Leonardo Benevolo decries the damage to European architectural heritage initiated by Haussmann as ‘historical urban and structural forms were used schematically as models for modern planning’, leading to ‘the destruction of a large part of the earlier setting: the widening of streets, the isolation of ‘monuments’ and the substitution of stylistic copies for early structures’ and consequently, ‘Europe began to squander its historical patrimony, preserving certain elements in museums or in the new open urban spaces, which functioned as outdoor museums’ (1995, p. 186).

The redevelopment of Paris from 1852 has become the canonical example of modern urban planning. ‘Haussmannisation’ is the historical reference point for understanding the origins of modern urban spatial relations and it temporally coincides with the emergence of mass politics and ideology. The development of new urban forms
in modernising cities such as Haussmannised Paris afforded new forms of ideology. It is valuable to explore the possibilities for new ideological practices afforded by Haussmannised urban forms while at the same time being sensitive to the limitations of ‘Haussmannisation’ as an analytical category.

Benjamin positioned Paris as the critical urban structure in the history of the development of modern capitalism and implicated the city deeply in the project of modernity (2002, pp. 14–15). Benjamin’s unfinished ‘Arcades Project’ was an investigation of an early iteration of the industrialised development of Paris, namely the iron and glass arcades, which were constructed from the 1820s and which were superseded in popularity, form and in spirit by the fundamental remodelling of the city which took place after 1852. His investigation placed the arcades in the context of that later remodelling led by Haussmann and looked at the dizzying pace of destruction and rebuilding. He also documented the emergence of an urban form which was capable of rendering a distinctly modern ecstatic experience, the heir to traditional sacred architecture. In this view, capitalism had destroyed limited traditional spiritual places and replaced them with something more spectacular and fantastical. For Benjamin, this process began before Haussmann with the glass arcades marking the start of a transition from a society of production to one of consumption but it was Haussmannisation which did this on a terrific scale, creating grand boulevards and avenues lined with extravagant sites for bourgeois fantasy in the café, the theatre and department stores (2002, pp. 14–26).

By examining phenomena which came together in Haussmann's Paris, it is possible to detect the foundations of a new kind of city, one which became a model for many others just as a more strident nationalism developed in Europe and as smaller nations, yet to be states, began to assert their presence. This opens up discussion of what
possibilities Haussmannisation created in European cities for aspirant nationhood and nationalism and how this sat with a cosmopolitan conception of Paris and also what this did to reinforce and renew already existing nation-states and to late nineteenth-century imperialist fantasy in the larger European nations. In the realisation of Haussmann's plan there was already the demonstration of how the state imposes and communicates order through the city; there was also a use of the city for the purposes of a glorious imperialism. The opening up of the possibility of a mass nationalist politics can be seen to be preceded by a process of nationalisation of the city. Finally, the concept of ‘Haussmannisation’ itself should be scrutinised as a potentially limiting analytical category and the need to account for its relationship to ideological ends within a deeper analytical framework should be explored.

23 The opposition of nationalism and cosmopolitanism describes a tension philosophically between particular and universal claims and conceals a complex relationship between the two: ‘Nationalism par excellence is thus not foreign to philosophy, like an accident come along to pervert an essentially universalist, cosmopolitan, essentialist destination of philosophy. It always presents itself as a philosophy, or better, as philosophy itself, in the name of philosophy, and it claims a priori a certain essentialist universalism—showing thus that philosophy, by virtue of a structural paradox that will dominate this seminar, always has in some way the potential or the yearning, as you wish, for nationality and nationalism.’ (Derrida, 1992, p. 17)
**Affordance of a New Paris**

The modern city’s transformation was made possible by a combination of innovations which were introduced in an increasingly sophisticated way. These changes often followed a similar pattern and cities which adopted new, modern forms early could act as templates for others to follow. Paris’ renewal not only changed the city’s morphology but also introduced a new kind of urban existence. Long established urban forms in the city afforded this programme of modernisation and in the process enabled a new kind of urban order, one in which urban administration became focused on an endless enhancement of both the functioning and prestige of the city. Such an order, in turn, created new urban forms which enabled different ideological practices.

By the 1840s Paris had, like many western European cities, experienced rapid population growth. Between 1800 and 1850 the population grew 121% (de Vries, 1984). Linked with the processes which were driving the industrial revolution in western Europe, this population increase was powered by migration from the countryside. The industrial revolution also precipitated technological change across France with canal and railway networks expanding rapidly to serve industry (Heywood, 1995, p. 16). This in turn made the existing Parisian urban infrastructure strained in terms of housing, sanitation and traffic and in the context of technological change (Osterhammel, 2014, p. 245) the medieval layout of the city was improved to address what was understood to be unsustainable pressure.

In addition to this, a changing legal context was enabling methods of property acquisition and control that had previously not been possible. Revolutionary France had swept away many of the ancien régime’s social and legal arrangements and the complex web of duties and rights associated with property in the city was codified and simplified. This led to laws which specifically enabled compulsory purchase in urban environments
with arrangements to compensate private property owners (Benevolo, 1995, p. 169). So regularised property relations and, crucially, a sharpened distinction between public and private places and spaces which had emerged during the 60 years prior to Haussmannisation, structured urban hierarchical forms and enabled the massive scale of intervention, destruction and construction required for Haussmann’s plan to be realised.

It should also be noted that significant alterations and improvements to Paris, on a lesser scale but with grand ambition, had taken place during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The walls fortifying it were removed by Louis XIV and replaced with a circuit of what became known as boulevards\(^{24}\). Added to this was avenue des Champs-Élysées which extended out from the Tuileries Garden (Jacobs, Macdonald, & Rofè, 2002, p. 63), developing as a fashionable boulevard during the eighteenth century, and the commencement of rue de Rivoli as a principle axis in the centre of the city by Napoleon I (Hanser, 2006, pp. 121–122). These boulevards and other developments provided a model to follow and an existing network to augment and integrate into Haussmann’s modern plan.

More immediately, the revolution in France in 1848 ended with the rise to power of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, later Napoleon III, who initially won over the French electorate with promises of the restoration of order and national glory (Hobsbawm, 1997, pp. 36–40). When he nominated himself Emperor for life in 1852 he effectively granted himself extraordinary administrative power and it was out of that power that Haussmann gained office as prefect of the Seine region with a remit to renovate Paris

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\(^{24}\) ‘Boulevard’ originally meant the top of a military rampart, synonymous with the English word ‘bulwark’ (Jacobs et al., 2002, p. 63)
and raise it to the status of London as a thoroughly modern and ordered capital. Haussmann immediately set about enacting a programme of public works which continued up until 1870, near the end of the Second Empire and included the demolition of much of the medieval layout and the construction of the major boulevards which still structure the centre of the city today.

The Haussmann plan was on a scale never previously attempted and fundamentally reconfigured Paris’ form and provided a model for others to follow (Benevolo, 1995, p. 171). Haussmann was to fuse existing techniques of urban transformation into something new. The city was an organic whole which could be operated upon, improving its circulation and its respiration through the opening up of thoroughfares and the creation of large green spaces. Through legal regulation, private development in the city would be consistent with its surroundings (Bergdoll, 2000, p. 249) creating an aesthetic urban whole greater than the sum of its parts.

The city had long been the dominant centre of French culture, administration and politics. As unrest increased in the 1840s, due in part to massive social change and distress (Hobsbawm, 2014, p. 141), Paris itself acted, as it had long done, as the conduit for national social and political action (2014, p. 154). As King Louis-Philippe was deposed in 1848, triggering a series of revolutions in the cities of Europe (Hobsbawm, 1997, p. 22), its inhabitants played a central role in the sort of radical revolutionary activity which terrified the bourgeoisie across Europe’s cities (1997, p. 28), some of which proved vulnerable to the tactics demonstrated by the revolutionaries of Paris. The subsequent new regime under Louis-Napoleon consolidated its position over the next

25 Louis-Napoleon spent much time prior to 1848 exiled in London and appears to have been influenced by projects such as Nash’s Regent’s Park (Hall, 1997, pp. 315–316)
four years until Louis-Napoleon became Emperor in the wake of a coup (Hobsbawm, 2014, pp. 39–40). The attempt to adjust to modernity through democratisation and through socialism – the aims of many revolutionary groups in the 1830s and 1840s – had failed (Harvey, 2006, p. 85) and instead France became governed by a regime which had the trappings of monarchy but which put in place the underpinnings of a modern technocratic, and authoritarian, state (Furet, 1995, p. 451). The energies of French political and military institutions became focused on the glorification of an imperial project as bourgeois power was consolidated.

It was in this context that Napoleon III’s appointee, Haussmann, was tasked with the remodelling of Paris. Plans for the modernisation of the city had existed before but it was the scale and totality of Haussmann's vision which was to have such a fundamental impact on its physical shape and social structure. What was different this time was that the modern French state’s organisational resources provided the possibility of a development of such scale that Paris’ streets and buildings could be turned into spaces whose function was not predetermined as such. Real estate in the centre of the city was turned into a fungible asset to be exchanged at will. Again, this was not a new practice but its operation at such magnitude was novel. Wide boulevards created by the Haussmann plan turned the city’s streets into a place for anonymous conduct. Wide boulevards had existed before but the number of them and their domination of the central cityscape was effectively able to create a new urban experience. A massive reconfiguration of the street plan was undertaken in phases, from 1853-1860 creating the central Croisée de Paris plan and from 1860-70 creating an extensive network of roads cutting through the old layout (Hall, 1997, p. 78). Concurrently, work was undertaken to create a modern system of sewers and other urban infrastructure improvements (1997, p. 88). There was also a fundamental
improvement of services in the city. The central hospital, Hôtel-Dieu de Paris, was
renovated and modernised (D. P. Jordan, 1995, p. 198). The old buildings making up
the central market, Les Halles, were replaced (1995, p. 208) with a modern glass and
iron construction and markets across the city were both established and renovated.
Schools were renovated across the city (Hall, 1997, p. 88) ensuring a school in every
arrondissement. Town halls in several arrondissements were built or enlarged (D. P.
Jordan, 1995, p. 358). The palais Garnier was commenced to house the Paris Opera
(1995, p. 160) and several new theatres were completed and opened. Two large public
parks were created from old royal hunting grounds, Bois de Boulogne to the west and
Bois de Vincennes to the east (1995, p. 10).

The legacy of Haussmann’s work is often interpreted in conjunction within the
wider context of Napoleon III’s rule and the Second Empire. While this is reasonable
in terms of understanding the personal and political motivations driving Haussmann
and his collaborators, it should be distinct from an interpretation of the outcomes of that
work in the city. Further, a critical view should be taken of the intervention of
Haussmann which draws a hard line between the old city versus the new, not least
because this is an interpretation which Haussmann himself was so eager to promote
because it enabled him to frame his remodelling of the city as essential and a way to
counter objections to the destruction of urban patrimony (Harvey, 2006, pp. 9–10). To
draw too sharp a dividing line between pre- and post-Haussmann is to pass over existing
older urban forms in the city which afforded modern innovation. It was an interaction
between these older forms and larger historical forces such as technological advances
which were changing the wider world and were demanding a response from large cities
such as Paris, which crystallised in the Haussmann plan. The destruction and the
construction which resulted opened up a series of possibilities, including the possibility of enforcing greater state control on the population.

The language of health and the language of nation can overlap: just as citizens can either be choking under industrial conditions or thriving in healthy garden cities, so nations seemed to be in a struggle against one another and could be perceived as in decrepit decadence and destined to disappear or emboldened, thriving, competing and winning\(^\text{26}\). The project of state-building, with its need to create strong political identities, could coincide with state power being used to order urban environments to reinforce those identities. The double potency of the use of health as a justification for large scale re-ordering of the city was in its ability to inform a narrative of progress, both social and economic, and a narrative of hygiene which could augment ideological rhetoric.

‘How one stifles in these dark, damp, narrow corridors which you are pleased to call the streets of Paris!’ – Delphine de Girardin 1838 (quoted in Pike, 2005, p. 106)

Themes of health and cleanliness recur frequently in nineteenth century narratives of urban improvement. That these themes refer to the need to combat epidemic diseases such as cholera is not in doubt. Improving conditions under the label

\(^{26}\) Hungarian nationalist politician and writer Gusztáv Beksics boasted of the Hungarian race in his 1895 book, ‘The Romanian Question and the Battle of the Species in Europe and Hungary’: ‘There is no race in Europe, not even excluding the Russians and Germans, which would have more fertility than Hungarians. It is therefore very natural that because of a high mortality rate which, due to the climatic conditions of the Great Plain, particularly affects the Hungarian species, this species has been attacking other species by a small minority since the last century. \textit{If the high mortality rate of the Hungarian race would cease - and in this respect the development of public health will do a lot - the spectacular Hungarians would overwhelm the empire of St. Stephen with incredible speed.}’ (Emphasis added) (1895, p. 189)
of health was a critical motivation for the project of Haussmannisation and was an
overriding concern when it came to initiating major urban restructuring (Haussmann,
1893, p. 240). A combination of factors made this motivation paramount, not least
improvements in medical science and epidemiology. It became possible to envisage a
humanly-constructed healthy city which left behind medieval reliance on religious
institutions for care of the sick which had had little other provision for directly
maintaining the health of citizens. However, there are additional aspects to this that bear
drawing out. First, the arguments for cleaning up an unhealthy district regularly
coincide with a powerful economic argument on the part of the developer. Railways,
for example, ploughed their way through working class areas of cities because housing
in these areas was often built on the land of a single landowner with whom a deal could
be made, the land being cheaper to purchase, providing an easier route for eviction of
residents (Kellett, 2013, p. 334) and, in moving those residents further down the line,
provided paying commuters (Lees & Lees, 2007, p. 138). The argument that these
districts needed to be abolished because of ill-health was potentially subsidiary to the
economic case. Second, there is an aspect more pertinent to the question of nationalism
– the extent to which there is a parallel in the regularisation of unhealthy districts with
the regularisation of identity.

The significance of Haussmann's plan for Paris was not found in it clearance of
old districts and the building of new roads – as Benjamin points out these were achieved
with simple tools which had been available for a long time (W. Benjamin, 2002) – but
the fact that the state could direct such a massive effort and that financial capital could
be raised on such a scale as to create a new city on top of the old, the new city being
itself a work of art guided by a creative mind. The modern state provided the
organisational resources to reorder the whole city and to treat the city as a whole form,
this modern state’s administrative power being structured by pre- and early modern institutional practices.

Arrangements for financing the public works in Paris were complex and controversy surrounding them followed Haussmann to the end of his tenure there. Initially the underlying financial justification for the schemes was based on an 1841 law which allowed the city authorities not only to buy up land needed for public works but also to purchase adjacent land (D. P. Jordan, 1995, p. 114). This allowed the city to benefit from the increase in value of the land through disposals after development was completed and a system of debt was set up to enable this. Investor confidence was essential for a debt model to work and that confidence was engendered by, amongst other things, the ability of the state and of administrative law to execute compulsory purchases and ensure that local opposition was overcome, with the implied guarantee of the backing of the state should things go wrong. As was the case for Vienna and Budapest, new development in Paris was controlled by powers outside of the regular city administration. The process was radically altered, and to some extent undermined, by a court judgement in 1858 which stopped the city benefiting from the increase in value of appropriated land (W. Benjamin, 2002, p. 130). At this time the ‘caisse des travaux de Paris’, a body which appears to have only answered to itself, organised the financing of land appropriation and construction through the issue of bonds (Faure, 2004, p. 443). Development continued to be funded by this and through loans agreed by Haussmann with the state.

However, debt accumulated off the books and away from outside oversight, through a system of debentures. It was only in the late 1860s that the size of this hidden debt became public, partly through the work of opponents of the regime such as Jules Ferry and Emile Zola. Haussmann was effectively forced to retire as a result, but on his
own terms and after his work had fundamentally changed Paris (Hall, 1997, p. 74). Prior to the scandal, however, the displaced control over development of the city was a feature which permitted controversial decisions to be made while making opposition difficult and it focused investor confidence by putting bond investments outside of the control of normal politics. What Haussmann's Paris afforded was the opening up of extensive new opportunities for the deployment of capital. Whereas previously a city might be developed primarily through the use of citizens’ taxes, the city became an investment opportunity in the same way that an industrial concern can take on investors and provide a return.

These characteristics of the new city, alongside more prosaic justifications for redevelopment, were the context a new phase of capitalism starting in the late nineteenth century. The period from around 1870 to 1914, after the Second Empire in France, was marked by what has been termed as a second industrial revolution (Geddes, 1915, pp. 60–83) which described a collection of technical innovations emerging primarily from ascendant German and American commercial enterprises and research and was most readily seen in the electrification of cities from the 1880s onwards. Electrification allowed for mass transit, in the form of street trams, trolley buses and electrified metro systems to take off. It also provided lighting for the city at night, extending hours of functional use and, through innovative use of lighting in advertising, made the city at entertainment. After the initial remodelling of Paris by Haussmann this second industrial revolution continued to transform it and cities across Europe, providing a potent mix of rapid urbanisation and technology which went beyond the shift in a relationship between citizen and city and produced a fundamentally new way of living.
The transformation of Paris was enabled by institutional forms which were radically evolving: the regularised institution of public health which matured during this period and informed justifications of massive intervention in the cityscape; financial institutions which created new markets for public debt and effectively mortgaged property in the city whilst keeping the financial instruments outside of any democratic political control; and, an expansion of capitalist ventures which drove technological change. These evolving institutional forms afforded not only the physical transformation of the city but also the context for the opening up of a new kind of mass politics and identity.

This new environment went beyond the straightforward glorification of state and nation and took on a broader significance – one which began to elide the particularism of the medieval city and which was more universal and cosmopolitan. To this extent the European city, in the remodelling of Paris, began to grow out of its European context and into a universal frame. As part of this process, the construction of the boulevards was in effect the creation of undetermined sites: places which do not just serve to enhance existing functions or ideological practices but which is open to new, as yet undefined, functions and practices and from which there is a potential for a financial surplus to be garnered by financial speculators. It was one in which the relationship between state and citizen was essentially mediated by the city and by technology, a new relationship which at the same time created the conditions for the emergence of a truly mass politics. Later this relationship perhaps sowed the seeds for a counter move towards the depoliticisation of the urban citizenry (Schmitt, 2007).
**Haussmannisation and Its Affordances**

Urban development of the magnitude entailed by the Haussmann scheme requires a vision which is collectively inspiring if not collectively inspired. Rather than the accretion of buildings and streets over time to form a city, which implies the gradual response to discrete interests, there is the abrupt appearance of new forms over a wide area which responds to and creates multiple interests. Whereas 'improvements' made to cities imply a discrete response to a clearly identified problem, the modern city is characterised by generalised and open-ended development on a large scale. In the case of the Haussmannisation of Paris, as each element was put in place the map was made more regular, was expanded with the annexation of suburbs at Haussmann’s behest and a new aesthetic order began to take hold on the city. The city was no longer a collection of different buildings and districts but was a work of art in itself.

From 1852 Charles Marville, later to be named as Paris’ official photographer, captured images of the process of redevelopment in the city. A comparison of Marville’s image of the former rue Tirechape (Figure 23) and an image of the street which replaced it under Haussmann's scheme, rue du Pont-Neuf, (Figure 24) highlights the changes which took place both in terms of absolute and abstract space, to use Lefebvre's categorisation (Lefebvre, 1991)²⁷. In terms of absolute space, the new boulevard was wider than rue Tirechape and overran its buildings. There is the creation of broad, uniform pavements for pedestrians; the Tirechape pedestrian had to walk on the cobbles in the street. There is also a new uniformity in the size of the buildings. There is much more, however, to identify within abstract rather than absolute space. Rue Tirechape

²⁷ Many of Marville’s images are compared with modern day equivalents in Patrice de Moncan’s ‘Paris avant-après: 19e siècle-21e siècle’ and the comparison of rue Tirechape with a photograph taken by Moncan is made in that book (2010, p. 41).
shows itself to be a street with many possible residences and trades, but the dairy shop on the corner is a presence which intervenes in Tirechape's identity in a way not possible in rue du Pont-Neuf. In rue du Pont-Neuf the street's scheme – its furniture, its uniformity – overwhelm the singular identity of shops. Were the dairy shop at the corner of Tirechape to change there would be a perceptible change in the character of entrance to the street; in rue du Pont-Neuf the trade and the shop are interchangeable with respect to the street's identity. The boulevard stands on its own account, unlike rue Tirechape.

Figure 23: Rue Tirechape in 1854 by Charles Marville (1854)
Marville’s earlier photography shows a city empty of people – the technical result of long exposure times (C. Marville & Moncan, 2010, p. 16) but it also reveals a way in which Paris was being documented, not by observing social activity but by gazing upon empty spatial forms and buildings frozen in time. The fault to be corrected by Haussmann was the narrow, crooked street and consequently the faults of the city’s occupants could also be corrected. The citizen-people in this view were interchangeable, objects to be reinserted into a restored, rational city plan.

At the centre of the plan was the grand croisée, the perpendicular arrangement of two major thoroughfares, boulevard de Sébastopol and rue de Rivoli. Both were based on routes in place beforehand and indeed rue de Rivoli had been begun under Napoleon I but the orderliness which was applied to their intersection and the widening work which took place gave the city principle arteries for the transmission of increasing traffic and readily accessible retail units in a high traffic area. The grand croisée meant that the gare de l’Est, completed in 1849, was connected directly through the boulevard de Sébastopol and attached Boulevard de Strasbourg axis, as was the nearby gare du Nord. In this way passenger arrivals at stations to the north of the city would be ushered
to the centre along a wide, airy and luxurious route. Once at the crossroads, features such as the tour Saint-Jacques and the fontaine du Palmier were arranged, setting them off against the modern thoroughfare as monumental destinations. The fountain, which has a column topped by a Victory statue celebrating Napoleon I’s exploits and conquests, was moved as one piece into an expanded place du Châtelet and two new theatres built at the sides of the square (D. P. Jordan, 1995, p. 197). A view of the Hôtel de Ville from boulevard Sébastopol in the vicinity of these central features was achieved by breaking through a maze of streets with a new straight road, avenue Victoria. This combination of new roads, renovated and rearranged monuments and new perspectives on historic structures had the effect of reconfiguring the centre of the city and afforded an entirely new urban experience, one in which an integrated network of historic and modern landmarks was presented to the citizen and visitor as sights to be consumed. Interaction with the city was made as simple as possible and a passive consumption of its wares was emphasised.

As well as creating a new relationship between city and visitor, Paris’ citizen's relationship to urban space and place shifted dramatically as the city was remodelled. A form of consumerism can be perceived to be on the rise with the arrival of long streets lined with shops and cafés. As Sennett has noted, café practices changed during this period. Prior to the 1850s, the café was a place for interaction between customers, from casual conversation to organised meetings. The new boulevard café provided something different – the customer became an observer as pavement seating was turned to look outwards on to the street rather than inwards to make customers face each other (Sennett, 1996, p. 345). It was the city as the place of mass consumption. The boulevards’ straight lines provided the setting for the grand presentation of retailing, the multiplication of
premium urban vistas, for premium residential units with premium prices, at a scale unknown beforehand.

Starting with pioneering cities like Paris, the development of urban infrastructure in the latter half of the nineteenth century produced a massive increase in the scope of what a city could offer its occupants. The period is a crossing point in the process of European urbanisation: Europe moved away from a majority rural population to a majority urban one; cities became much more accessible to inhabitants of the surrounding countryside through newly built railway networks; as modern communication links improved, industry moved increasingly away from areas where the natural resources they consumed were produced and to urban production centres, transportation costs having been lowered enough to justify the expense; the working urban population began to be more organised and class identities coalesced. Mass consumption in the city thereby became possible: mass transportation through commuter railways and omnibuses; mass entertainment through sporting events and music halls.

Yet even as urbanisation enabled mass consumption, mass politics and identities to form, as Benjamin observed, the urban design promoted by Haussmann seemed to militate against collective social action on the streets, from the wide-open spaces in which speeches to crowds could be absorbed by background noise, to the urban distraction of the shop window, the people-watching opportunities at the café and the sheer overwhelming size of the architecture which serves to inspire awe. A key feature of Haussmannisation was the disruption of the social structure of, and the reinforcement of bourgeois values in, the city centre itself. Class tensions were now played out as urban core against urban periphery (Harvey, 2006, pp. 236–238). Despite the best efforts of Haussmann, the revolutionary thirst of the city failed to be entirely quenched.
by its beatification, as was seen in dramatic form during the Commune of 1871 when even the barricade received a reprieve on the wide boulevards, though those boulevards did also serve their purpose to shift troops to quash the rebellion (Fetridge, 1871, pp. 281–338).

Urban transformations such as Haussmann’s create a tension here between a passive consumer and active politics. The modern city offers new modes of urban experience and political engagement. Two examples could be called a fantastical\(^{28}\) mode and a utilitarian mode. The former sees the city as the setting for a dream, whether it be Romantic, utopian, dystopian; the latter sees the city as the place at which the satisfaction of human need is sought. These two possibilities lend themselves to political projects across the spectrum. There can be cosmopolitan outcomes in both modes as there can be nationalistic ones. Both are reflexes against modern pessimism and aim to superimpose meaning on the city. The modern city, and its interconnectedness, is the place in which a fantastical community can emerge: the limits of space and time are eased.\(^{29}\) This phenomenon would be distinct from, though related to, a collective consciousness which can come about because of new forms of work under capitalism. Despite segmentation by class and inequalities of income resulting in vastly different lived lives in the city, there can be a common modern urban experience even if it is rudimentary. Ideologies which can acknowledge this can take advantage of

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\(^{28}\) Cf. Benjamin’s use of the phantasmagorical, taken from Marx, to describe a kind of celebratory false consciousness which has its own ideological existence and which potentially transforms society’s base (2002).

\(^{29}\) Benedict Anderson makes the case for print capitalism as being the primary enabling factor in the production of nationalism in ‘Imagined Communities’, print and literacy being vital to the creation of a simultaneous readership made up of people who will never meet but who nevertheless demonstrably share the same language. Communities imagined in print and made fantastical in the streets can be said to share a poïesis of community and it is in the city’s streets that nationalism’s communal praxis flourishes. (1991)
it and nationalism was well-placed to take advantage of the spatial and temporal
dimensions of the modern, interconnected city.

The area in which Haussmannised Paris particularly excels as an example is in
performing the role of a fantastical city, a setting for dreams. It is notable that for a city
whose redevelopment was predicated on and justified by rationalisation and
modernisation should come so quickly to be seen as the archetypal romantic setting. In
Paris, Haussmann's scheme made the romanticisation of modern urban culture possible,
moving beyond the pre-modern urban ideal embodied, for example, in neo-Gothic
architecture. There is no prevalent ‘French’ historicism prescribed in the architecture of
the renewed city and aesthetic unity achieved is through the application of a relatively
simple building code rather than adherence to the tenets of architectural schools. On the
other hand, Haussmann went to some lengths to ensure that the new boulevards served
to display monuments in their best light, framing such nation-glorifying monuments as
the arc de Triumphe. The layout presents a unity and viewed as such produces an effect
of national and imperial grandeur. It is the nature of post-revolutionary French political
projects that a tendency towards universalism, even as a particular French culture is
realised, reveals itself. So, the relationship of the form of the new city to the national
project is complex.

Haussmann's, and Napoleon III's, objectives in urban remodelling were clear
enough. They were explicitly designed to ease traffic congestion, improve the
productivity of the various districts of the city by making them accessible to each other,
create a unified urban order through strict building regulations and to beatify through
the aesthetic of the boulevard. (Hall, 1997, pp. 55–83) The street was no longer just a
collection of individual buildings but an architectural whole in itself. What the new plan
also afforded was not just an aesthetic order but a complementary imposition of social
and political order through the creation of wide boulevards which could efficiently transmit police and military forces to quell unrest. After the French Revolution, the city had been at the heart of revolutionary activity in Europe and to this extent Paris provided an example for others to follow. What came about in Paris in the 1850s was the commencement of a project which would see the shape of the city moulded to align with the aims of the state, glorifying French imperial ambitions on an unprecedented scale, providing an efficient national transport hub where connections between railway termini were cleared quickly and providing social and political order. These were objectives which could aimed at in any modern nineteenth-century city and the pursuit of them in Paris spurred emulation.

Haussmannisation has many of the characteristics of programmes which fundamentally alter the possibilities of ideological projects in the city. Consequently Paris, in providing a template for other cities to follow, enabled the propagation of such ideological affordances. The opening up of wide thoroughfares afforded a new processional geography for the demonstration of mass organised power. Processions and demonstrations on a scale that was not possible before allowed marginal radicalised groups to be able to contend possession of the city. The scale of the city was changed such that the imprint of state and city government power was reproduced at the lowest level, meaning that the opportunities for highly localised autonomous and independent identities and politics were reduced.
Figure 25: Barrière de Neuilly and environs 1850 (Maillard, 1850)

Figure 26: Place de l'Etoile and environs 1870 (Vuillemin, 1870)
The Haussmannisation of the setting of the arc de Triomphe is an example which demonstrates how the transformation of the urban layout afforded new possibilities for ideological practice while building upon existing forms. In Figure 25 the moment is shown on a map in its setting at barrière de Neuilly. It is aligned with the centre of the avenue des Champs-Élysées and, outside of the image, with the Tuileries Garden and the Louvre. Its position as a monumental arch is already prominent, an effective entrance into Paris from outside of the old walls and highly visible to observers at the centre of the city. It is also at the centre of the view from two other major boulevards.

The map in Figure 26 shows how the prominence and centrality of the monument has been transformed by the Haussmann plan. The arch is now at the intersection of 6 axes containing twelve boulevards most of which are new and have pierced through a series of older streets which were not aligned with the new plan. The symmetrical boulevards beaming outwards give new meaning to a name for this area, Etoile. What is marked on the map in Figure 26 as rue Circulaire, also known as rue de Tilsitt and rue de Presbourg, creates a space to relieve the main monumental area of traffic and also to add emphasis and grandeur. One of the old boulevards, Rome, has effectively been moved westwards simply to line it up with another to make an aligned axis. Whereas in the old scheme the monument has been placed prominently as an adornment to the streetscape, the new scheme integrates the street plan itself with the monument creating a vastly expanded monumental and processional geography which has been used for military parades on Bastille Day and at critical junctures in French history for displays of national pride, and indeed national humiliation under conquest.

So, developments in modern institutional and administrative forms such as public health, finance and technology enabled by capitalism, afforded a new kind of large scale city. Haussmann was a relatively early innovator taking advantage of these
new affordances and in the process of modernising Paris afforded new urban experiences and politics. A fantastical mode of living in the modern city created an abstract space for new ideological imaginaries and the realignment of streets created absolute space for the practices of ideologies such as nationalism.
The Affordances of Modernised Cities

Haussmannisation as a concept is applied in a variety of ways and for a variety of ends. It is to an extent useful to apply Haussmannisation conceptually to understand how the modern European city, beyond Paris, developed and was structured. It is descriptive of a period and a style of urban development, characterised by wide boulevards cutting through an older street layout, the creation of large public squares, the alignment of monumental architecture for optimal display to the public and the creation of modern commercial and residential space which attracts a premium income over what went before. It is applied normatively as political phenomenon, often negatively, associating Haussmann and his imitators with a violent intervention in the city, demolishing working class housing, creating socio-economic barriers and providing maximum efficiency for the deployment of police and military power to prevent revolt and to protect property. It is also applied romantically, Haussmannisation as the bringer of modern aesthetics to the city, the City of Light which has unashamedly left behind the traditional medieval city. All of these applications of the concept of Haussmannisation contain a degree of deterministic thinking: that the urban plan on such a large scale, in fundamentally altering the urban experience, contributes to a particular set of outcomes. However, it can instead be seen as a phenomenon which changed what practices were possible in the city without determining them as such. In other words, Haussmannisation created new affordances in the city which could be used, or not, depending on the social and ideological conditions and context. In the case of Budapest, the wholesale transformation of a polyglot collection of urban centres to an integrated, modern and Haussmannised capital city infused with the practices and symbols of Hungarian-ness and Hungarian nationalism tends to suggest that Haussmannisation generally is a critical means by which modern urban ideological
intervention can take place. However, the example of Venice is one where, while sharing some of the characteristics of a Haussmannised city, the affordance of nationalism was not highly dependent on a visible ‘Haussmannised’ aesthetic.

Haussmannisation can be seen in the wider context of rapid urbanisation and its affordance of modernity, creating radically altered urban forms and opening up new affordances which could then be contested. That the Second Empire sought to narrow what the city’s form afforded through ideological intervention, an act of decontestation, did not mean that the new urban forms apparent in Paris were themselves responsible for restricting alternatives to French imperialism and capitalism. It was when the Commune of 1871 briefly imagined an alternative that other affordances were made visible, even if this was to be short-lived. What Haussmannisation did do was to create urban forms whose potential uses were far more open than before; spaces and places were created which could be appropriated for a greatly widened array of possible activities. Haussmannisation secularised the city and removed much of its traditional and sacred geography. At the same time this removal left Paris open to more imaginative geographies and it was the imaginaries of Second Empire triumphalism which were most successfully projected upon the newly renovated cityscape.

Cities in Europe prior to the acceleration of urbanisation in the nineteenth century were relatively isolated from each other, linked to a hinterland but with relatively weak links to areas outside. By the end of the century, the continent's population was well on its way from being predominantly rural to predominantly urban: its cities were connected by a system of communications which meant that information, goods, services and people could be transferred with relative ease. The forms of cities themselves had been transformed with the built environment being designed and planned as part of a much larger urban system; the ends of such planning went from
being largely limited improvements to radical undertakings. The whole urban system
now required ongoing attention and intervention.

Over the nineteenth century, the European city became more rationalised and
depersonalised and as it grew in size new urban forms infiltrated citizens’ everyday
lives more deeply. Aspects of urban life which had played their part in controlling the
everyday life of the city: the regulation of building; a citizenry which was served by a
commune or corporation with a degree of autonomy; the policing and control of the
urban population by formal and informal local institutions and customs, were all to be
transformed. Even as this was the case, however, the opportunities for people to break
free of traditional social constraints both because of a shift of values and an increase in
the possibilities that anonymity gave them for greater individual liberty than before.
The story of the transformation of European cities in the nineteenth century is not
simply one of a shift in administrative attitudes. Instead, it indicates a tipping point
reached in the history of market capitalism. The large projects which shaped the newly
transformed cities were funded on an unprecedented scale by private capital and public
debt. The latter half of the century was the point at which globalising economic forces
meant that there was often no longer an agrarian economy capable of taking back those
who had migrated to the city. The new cities were places in which a newly-minted
modern citizenry of all classes had to play their part in modernity. The population and
the fabric of the modern city might be driven by economic imperatives but they are
shaped by cultural forces too. Nationalism represents itself in abstract terms such as
‘people’ and ‘nation’ but its outworking must come in an environment where there is a
mass of people who can respond to its calls to the exclusion of others. Rural Europe
was not such a place – though the peasantry might be rallied to the call of a national
idea, it is an idea which is rooted in the personality of monarchy or the authority of the
Church. It is in the city that the idea of a self-sustaining nation can really take hold as the abstractions of nation and people can be visualised in the masses on the street. Ideologies such as nationalism were successful in mobilising the citizenry, giving them a meaningful role aside from, and elevated above, production and leisure.

Haussmann’s Paris is a reference point for the modern European city not because it was the first example of rational town planning but because of the scale of its execution and the fundamental shift in the application of a far-reaching and encompassing plan which acted as a template which others followed. The execution of the plan was heavily criticised by opponents for its insensitivity to the old city, and for its financial underpinnings. Yet at the time it served to influence many subsequent urban development projects. Aside from the original scheme, it is the template this provided for development which matters when it comes to understanding how the modern European city took shape. In other cities, the Haussmann model was adopted in the context of emergent nationalisms and nationhood.

The city was a benchmark against which other cities could measure themselves; what it provides now is an ideal type of modern city by which other European cities can be interpreted. On the first, it is important to note that Haussmann’s plan did not provide an exact form to be followed. Rather, conceptually it built certain foundations of urban modernity that provided an underpinning for modern urban ideology. To isolate parts of those foundations: interchangeable sites are manufactured on a grand scale; hygiene is built into the urban fabric through, among other things, the universal provision of water and sewerage services; the city becomes a military object, it is no longer a fortified bastion to be defended but rather an open system of clean lines of communication via which the military can penetrate the city and bring order; grandeur and spectacle are inbuilt through the use of processional geographies and monumentalisation. None of
these parts are exclusive to Haussmannisation. Instead, it is the gathering of these particular parts which promotes emulation. It is in this emulation that the resulting form of the city – its architecture, infrastructure, institutions and social relations – generates ideological possibilities and in the late nineteenth-century nationalist ideology in particular was able to thrive on the setting of modernity. More broadly, what is imported to a city when it adopts the Haussmann template is an environment into which a mass citizenship can move freely and project its own fantasy as never before. That fantasy is, as far as the city's developers are concerned, the coda for a kind of consumer desire and one which it is hoped is profitable. What it cannot preclude, however, is other desires appearing, ones which project revolutionary hope, nationalistic fervour and utopian schemes on it.

How far Haussmannised Paris actually acted as a template for the late nineteenth-century modern European city is, however, difficult to measure definitively. Many of the European city improvement projects in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as has already been highlighted, were responding to problems thrown up by industrialisation and urban migration. The extent to which it was a direct reference point differed from city to city: Budapest certainly shows Haussmann’s influence and Glasgow’s redevelopment from the 1860s was directly influenced by his work (Hunt, 2004, p. 233) but others such as Barcelona, Berlin and Vienna show their own unique features and, given their close temporal proximity, are projects which might only have a tangential relationship to Paris (cf. Lees & Lees, 2007, pp. 169–170). Further, the immediate political context of each application of Haussmannisation by and large differed from the Second Empire. In Barcelona's case, Cerdà's Eixample had socialist aspirations and was realised in the context of a nascent Catalan nationalism; in Vienna's case, it occurred as a modernisation under Habsburg administration, initiated by fiat by
the Austrian Emperor. It would seem that Haussmannisation was able to accommodate and be accommodated by many different political forms and ideologies. These disparate projects, however, have in common a response to the consolidation of bourgeois power in Europe and a new modern European cityscape shaped by the socio-political possibilities of the future urban order.

The name of Haussmann has become associated with a form of urbanism which has attracted much criticism. During his time this was largely because of his financial practices but also because of his administrative arrogance. The opponents of Napoleon III's regime singled out Haussmann for attack as a way of undermining the Empire itself. The totalising aspect of the design has also lamented, both at the time and in subsequent years. Benjamin's Arcades Project is, in some ways, an ode to a Paris which he saw as destroyed by Haussmann. Haussmann's disciples in the twentieth century – Le Corbusier and Robert Moses being the most prominent – are the epitome of a kind of bureaucratic planning that has become deeply unfashionable in the neo-liberal era. However, focusing on the rationalisation and commercialisation promoted by state-sponsored planning in Paris on such a large scale misses a wider point. The Haussmann model in itself does not determine its despotic use as some would claim Haussmann (W. Benjamin, 2002, pp. 189–220; Lefebvre, 1991, p. 297). Whatever the intention of Paris' planners, it was the flexibility of the scheme within a well-defined organising structure that goes a long way to explain its endurance.

Any restructuring of the city on such a massive scale would necessarily alter the lived experience of the Parisian and the radical possibilities of social and political action within the city. The demolition of old parts of the city and the construction of grand boulevards did not, as Benjamin would have it, give the city an ‘inhuman character’ or ‘estrange[s] the Parisians from their city’ (2002, p. 12) but it was the interaction of
Haussmannisation and the Second Empire which narrowed the affordances of the newly emerging modern city. It is a mistake to understand urban forms as being the extensions of a singular expression of the power of one world-historical actor, class or ideological movement. Though any of these might motivate and enable the production of new urban forms, those forms have an excess of affordances which could support or undermine those original aims. It is the goal of ideology in the city to reduce those affordances through the shaping of social practices, both externally and internally policed. When it came to the Communards erecting barricades where apparently they had been engineered out of the design of the city, it was a less a failure of engineering of the environment to ideological ends and more a discovery of new affordances of Haussmannised Paris which had previously been occluded by ideological language and practice.

In ‘The Arcades Project’ Benjamin theorised Haussmannisation as the whole form of Paris’s actualised modernity with all its fantastical and unstable aspects (2002, pp. 14–26). He perceived a contradiction between the straightness of the boulevards and the crookedness of methods used to build them. Haussmannisation for Benjamin aimed to remove the revolutionary potential of Paris as a city with the widening and straightening of the streets being directly motivated by the desire to remove the possibility of insurrectionary barricades. In this conception, Haussmannisation is a monolithic agent of destruction and control; viewed in class terms it is an act of bourgeois triumphalism over the working class, destroying working class districts and redirecting their labours to the construction of a luxurious capital city. This understanding of Haussmannisation has been highly influential in critical urbanism and is predicated upon the notion of monolithic state power and the ability for planners to use architecture and urban form to determine urban experience and use.
While this is undoubtedly a powerful analysis, it is problematic for several reasons. It confuses the rationalised straight lines of the Haussmann plan as a single-minded expression of bourgeois dominance, as if the interests of a class are so readily schematised. It is an analysis which can be applied to outline conditions for resistance and the imagining of other urban possibilities. However, in doing so it locks urban development into a deterministic logic which can only be thoroughly overturned. Benjamin interpreted the Paris Commune in 1871, which saw a radical alternative arising at the height of Haussmannisation, as a movement which exposed unsustainable contradictions in the design of the city. This need not have been the case – the forces which produced the new city were complex and although the guiding minds of Haussmann and Napoleon III were clear in their narrative about what they want to achieve, their attempt at determining Paris’s direction need not be accepted as rigidly followed through.

Using Haussmann’s work as a reference point for the development of the modern European city has its benefits and limitations. On the one hand, the scale of the Haussmann project and the fact that it is a relatively early example of modernisation. Earlier examples in London were on a much smaller scale, for example Nash’s Regent Street master plan which does not have quite the same overwhelming effect on the experience of London. With Haussmannisation, the new boulevards did not have their use determined; ideologues could perceive what they afforded and attempt to make use of those affordances.

The concept of Haussmannisation can be used as a kind of shorthand to understand a phenomenon which affected many European cities during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More than anything else this phenomenon is indicative of the application of new technologies, enabled by industrialisation, to the
urban setting. Haussmannisation is taken one step too far perhaps when it is stretched to understand some of the ideological constructs and motivations surrounding this process of modernisation of European cities. Indeed, there is the danger of parochialism in taking the project of Napoleon III, Haussmann and the French Second Empire Paris to be a rigid template. Despite the fact that many cities can be demonstrated to have been influenced by Haussmann’s Paris, it was neither original nor the essential template of European urban modernisation. The modernisation of Europe's streets would and could have happened without Paris. Instead a complex set of processes were already in train. These processes were ordered both by what came before in the urban setting and by wider influences and forces at an international, global level.
8. Conclusion

Urbanisation during the last couple of centuries occurred within the context of movement from traditional social arrangements to secular ones and was rendered as a desacralisation of urban space. The process by which traditional customs and institutions became modern can be summed up as a simple principle which underlies much of this project’s use of the theory of affordances: the new is afforded by the old. For example, as the authority of traditional institutions such as the Church and Monarchy waned, so space for new identities and ideologies was cleared. Yet there is an irony in this reading of the relationship of traditional authority to cities. Both of these examples of traditional institution have in the past been in some way disruptive of rural life in favour of the urban: early Christianity was an urban phenomenon and it was only in the Early Middle Ages that the Church made a concerted effort to Christianise the countryside to replace paganism. The term paganism, though there is considerable debate about its late Roman meaning, came to be associated with the countryside, with its sloppy adherence to Christian practices and even with peasant susceptibility to immorality (Le Goff, 1980, pp. 92–93). In contrast to this was the civilisation of the Church reinforced by centres of religious life and learning which were associated with urban life. Pre-modern monarchy was in some ways a more urban counterweight to the rural aristocracy. Both institutions have in the modern era made some efforts at modernisation and accommodation of industrial and urban society. This would suggest that they were institutions which could adapt to modern conditions and that could make themselves available to modern urban society as cohesive alternatives to other more novel ideological alternatives. A separation of older institutional structures from new is artificial then – nationalism did not just ‘borrow’ aspects of religion and traditionalism, it was in many ways a traditional response to modernity.
This reading of how forms interact and respond to each other in human environments and cultures addresses how modernisation and modernity in cities is gravid with ideological possibilities. Those possibilities are not necessarily the intended consequence of modernisation. Individuals like Haussmann, state administrations and entire social classes have been ascribed intent in a way that flatters the power of individuals, institutions and social classes to envisage the use of urban structures. Such structures are immediately in the reach of millions of people whose interests and desires do not necessarily align with the urban planner or controlling authorities. Urban structures, of course, can shape and direct human behaviour over time but the means by which they do this are unstable. A straight boulevard might make military interventions in times of revolt more efficient but it also provides the stage for mass demonstration and protest.

Mass politics, ideological movements and large-scale urbanisation in the nineteenth century made for a combination of interrelated and interplaying forms. These forms had capabilities which enabled their own and others’ development and progress. The relative strength of their interactions in different contexts is indicated by the extent to which a city could be said, for example, to have ‘nationalised’. In the case studies here, it was only Budapest which could be fully designated such. The urban forms which structured, and structure, Budapest afforded a range of possibilities and the Hungarian nationalist project, broadly defined, was able to make use of these affordances. In turn, Budapest’s urban forms were themselves afforded by an ideological backdrop in which nationalist sentiment and aspiration were a significant feature. Urban forms and political projects can feed off each other. In the cases of Vienna and Venice, modernisation afforded a different set of outcomes and these outcomes were more weakly associated with nationalist programmes. This said, both
cities were to be drawn into extreme nationalist projects from the 1920s to the 1940s. Their earlier modernisations afforded their integration into nationalist narratives. In the case of Vienna, modernisation created the possibility of it becoming the cosmopolitan centre of a multi-ethnic empire and its scale enabled a mass politics, both of which were to have later unforeseen effects on German and Austrian nationalism. Venice afforded a dramatic backdrop to 1930s fascism (Ferris, 2012), the use of its imagery and myth being a potent instrument for the enforcement of Italian nationalist claims of the long persistence of an Italian genius in historical Venice.

Having expanded upon the three city cases and also demonstrated the operation of forms and affordances in many different examples, it is possible to remark upon the affordance of ideological projects for each category of form identified. Urban wholes are found to have both physical and institutional manifestations. Physically, they can be most readily observed through their external boundaries, through their internal configurations, through their vulnerability and through processes of consolidation and bridging. Institutionally, they can be observed through the overlapping of authority, through claims on urban resources, through claims on social classes and through statistical control. Physical wholes are found to afford ‘territorial integrity’ analogous to a national homeland or a component thereof. Institutional wholes afford a new kind of claim of allegiance from a population freed from traditional bonds and authority.

Physical urban rhythms are created when unpredictable or uncertain forces are brought under control to make them more predictable and safe. Regulation of watercourses and flooding is one such example. Institutional urban rhythms are created by the declaration of rules and principles. Timetables are a manifestation of a series of negotiations and decisions regarding routing, labour and capital expenditure among many other conditions which coalesce into a publicised regular plan of services.
Physical urban rhythms afford spatial control and the consequent control of city dwellers. Institutional urban rhythms afford temporal coordination – places can be linked to other places on an everyday basis.

Urban hierarchical forms impinge on cities in two ways, internally and externally. Internal hierarchies are found encoded in the material of the city. Architecture enables a hierarchy of meanings, often much contested. Morphology structures spaces and buildings and organises them hierarchically. External hierarchies place cities within a wider context. Other than being within state structures, cities find themselves within historical legal structures which position their institutional autonomy and power. Semi-official external hierarchies, such as city rankings, also position them. This crosses over with cultural hierarchies where, for example, the importance of a city can be contested. Internal hierarchies afford readings of the cityscape which can be co-opted by ideology: architectural styles and morphological arrangements provide material for narratives not just about immediate functional purposes but also for deeper imaginaries and memory. External hierarchical forms put the city in its place, so to speak. They are the forms through which cities acquire ‘status’ and such status claims afford further claims on behalf of a city's inhabitants and for wider state structures in which the city is located.

Urban networks place cities in a web of contacts with the outside world and also operate within cities, holding them together. Technical networks are built from physical infrastructure, providing the means to allow intra-city services – urban transit, power and sanitary facilities are examples. Networks also interconnect cities, transport again being a prime example. Cultural networks are critical to the everyday operation of cities, interpersonal and business relationships being the most immediate examples and deep cultural norms and formal rules structure and govern the conduct of such relationships.
Innovations in technical networks afford new social practices such as mass tourism in the case of the expansion of railways. They provide the means for growth of economic activity through trade in goods and services. They work symbiotically with cultural networks which order social practices. As technical networks expand, they afford the possibility of larger communities, communities which might seek or have imposed upon them common identities.

Physical urban wholes are observed in the demarcation of territory and in claims on a city’s identity. In Venice, a continuous process over many centuries of stabilisation of the Rialto archipelago was part of a process of creating and maintaining an urban whole. The Venetian case is instructive in showing how the whole is constructed and institutionally maintained – tied in with rhythms of decay, Venetian urban whole forms have required constant maintenance over time to sustain territorial integrity. Venice’s marginal position in the Lagoon accentuates this but it is a process that is at work in every functioning city. It is enabled by expertise and as such is a demonstration of institutional power.

The case of Budapest shows processes of consolidation of whole forms. This is demonstrated in three events: the flooding of Pest in 1838, the opening of the Széchenyi Bridge between Buda and Pest in 1848 and the unification of Pest, Buda and Óbuda in 1871. The flood afforded the opportunity to reconstitute Pest as a more modern city, the whole form was recovered and improved within previous territorial limits. An extension of this improvement came in the form of the bridge which created a permanent link with Buda and effectively afforded the formation of a new urban whole. The removal of aristocratic exemptions from bridge tolls indicated the bourgeois hold on this new urban whole spanning the Danube, the older, traditional arrangements of the old urban wholes overwhelmed by the superimposition of the new form. Official unification completed
this process but also demonstrated a further move, this time from a bourgeois civic conception of the city to one augmented with national characteristics as the new Hungarian capital.

Viennese urban wholes show something different again. The demolition of the old walls was a more violent interruption of previous urban forms as liberal bourgeois Vienna broke down the bastions of aristocratic old Vienna and created a new, expanded city to accommodate its institutions, grand residences and symbols of power.

The consolidation of the whole afforded the development of other types of urban form: the technical integration of Vienna became possible, creating networks of services for the expanding city; the Ringstrasse opened up the possibility of an architectural hierarchy under which different cultural and political imaginaries could be negotiated.

Modernising schemes such as the Ringstrasse and Haussmann’s plan for Paris make for a legible city. This legibility transfers to the citizen from the city as an ordered city organises residents and daily life in a way which make citizens’ activities more readily predictable to authorities (cf. Scott, 1998). This is also seen in the example of Barcelona where justification for the Eixample and the demolition of walls was predicated on Catalan and regional aspirations but also upon the need to regulate what was an unhealthy, enclosed city and provide clear order to the residents of the city.

These examples perhaps overstate the singularity of an urban whole and understate the possibility of the plurality of urban wholes. Rome provides a useful expression of the latter where multiple urban wholes, both secular and religious, overlapped and competed with each other in the modern city. These overlaps are characteristic of urban whole forms and the tension created by them drives a politics in which the identity of cities and their citizens are at stake.
The rhythms of the water courses around Vienna were increasingly brought under control through the application of hydraulic technologies to channel and prevent flooding. Regular water flows and seasonal fluctuations were brought under control and made predictable. This afforded both the opening up of more parts of the city to expensive development, having reduced the risks of flood damage. It was also for the model to follow in other areas of infrastructure as the hydraulic view of the city could be applied in other ways, such as to traffic circulation. The rhythmic form affords a view of the city as a dynamic system – not the only tool to enable this view but a very powerful one nonetheless.

Water features as the key agent in urban rhythms in Venice too, of course. It is its proximity to water which makes the city so susceptible to decay and rhythms of rejuvenation are governed by the principle of com'era, dov'era which place the city's development and maintenance in a cyclical form.

These water-related rhythms are efforts to control and make predictable cycles that are external and previously unpredictable. There are also examples of rhythms which are controlled from the start: the timetable of the London to Birmingham Railway is one such example. This shows the power of the manufactured rhythm as it creates empty events, pre-set times on the table to be used at will by potential passengers. Such rhythms create novel urban experiences, compressing space and time (cf. Giddens, 1990, pp. 112–150).

The desire for a city which has a moral purpose necessitates examples which are not to be followed. A hierarchy of urban moral purpose is seen in Rousseau's exaltation of Geneva over Paris and it is to be found more directly engaged in the nationalist rhetoric found in Táncsics’ call for Budapest to be the Homeland’s Altar. His contrast of this high moral purpose against the luxury of Paris is telling at the time when
Haussmannisation was in full flow in Paris which is at this time a backdrop to Budapest’s development. That Altar, though, finds its accommodated in Andrássy Avenue with the construction of the Millennium Memorial, other Hungarian nationalist monuments and the use of the new boulevards for nationalist events such as Kossuth’s funeral. The moral purpose sought after by nationalists can be afforded by modern boulevards as much as it can enable Parisian luxury.

Such hierarchical forms find their way into architecture. The historicism of the Ringstrasse takes as its underlying theme not one superior architectural style but a series of executions of different styles set in relation to one another. Though this can appear to be relativistic, some styles vie for superiority over others as, for example, the Classicism of the Parliament claims an older heritage than the Gothic of the Town Hall while the Town Hall claims a vital civic pride originating in mediaeval Europe over a moribund, sterile Classical Parliament; each building symbolising a claim to be a step above the other in a hierarchy of styles.

Internal morphological hierarchies are at play too. The example of Krakow, with Wawel Hill set apart, shows not only how exclusive space can be used to create hierarchy but also how such a layout can persist long after its original hierarchical meanings have declined. The layout of a city affords sets of spaces which can be utilised to order function and meaning hierarchically.

External hierarchical forms impinge on cities and define their relationships to other places. The inhabitant/visitor hierarchy is a key political factor in ongoing debates about the development and economy of Venice. The rights of citizens to a normal life unaffected by tourism compete with the external claim on Venice as an item of global patrimony. Cities are also ranked, or rank themselves, in tables to show off certain desirable attributes. The desire of cities such as Vienna and Budapest to become
Weltstädte meant that the relative strengths of each city were measured against positive criteria: quantity and size of cultural institutions, size of economy and size of population all featured, as well as less easily defined criteria such as the extent of their modernity, and so forth.

The construction of technical networks underpinned nineteenth and twentieth century urbanism. Railways afforded territorial expansion and control by state and colonial powers. Rail also enabled the interconnection of existing urban places and the expansion of those places through migration and commuting. In the case of Budapest, rail was particularly important with regard to Magyarisation as its rural hinterland contained a population which could be converted to Magyarised immigrants. It also afforded mass spectacle, as shown in the case of the funeral of Lajos Kossuth and the Hungarian Millennial Exhibition, both in 1896.

In Venice’s case, rail afforded the development of mass tourism and the exposure of the city to a kind of objectification in which the city became part of a global patrimony to be protected from local residents. Rail did not permeate Venice the way it did most other cities: despite several proposals the city still does not have a metro system and the railway station clings to the edge of the city. However, the railway, and later the airports at its periphery, disgorged visitors on a massive scale. As for internal transport, the vaporetti took the everyday business of ferrying people away from the gondoliers and made more regular and efficient services available. This internal network of efficient movement in Venice was a waterborne version of the omnibus service, started in Nantes. Omnibus-like services were, unlike the gondolier-provided services, depersonalised and not dependent on demand from specific customers. This afforded the compression of the city, navigable by all-comers who needed no expertise
and little money to move around. This kind of urban network became a key feature of the modern urban experience.

Cultural networks can form independently or symbiotically with technical network forms. In the case of Viennese coffeehouse culture, several forms afforded this cultural network. Coffeehouses in Vienna effectively acted as distribution points for several networks, not just as outlets for the sale of refreshments and food. Newspapers were distributed to coffeehouses for patrons to read – since the sale of newspapers on the street was restricted this was a crucial outlet for the print distribution network and afforded coffeehouses being public places for the discussion of news and ideas. Since Vienna’s housing stock was of poor quality in the late nineteenth century, coffeehouses had domestic functions such as taking in laundry, receiving mail and acting as places for study. This concentration of end points in a series of distribution networks – print, laundry, postal and others – also concentrated people and afforded the development of cultural networks. Although cultural networks can form at a local level without technical innovation, it is technical networks which enable geographically widespread communities the form cultural networks. Cultural networks can conform also through the development of shared standards, rules and norms. The example of the Saharan trade network shows how permanent trade links across the Sahara were underpinned by the establishment of a shared Islamic culture. Here the cultural network was key in the enabling a technical network, camel transportation, to develop and thrive and a series of trading cities to emerge on the periphery of the Sahara.

Groups can make claims over territory only if that territory is defined. A feature of claims over urban wholes which is distinct from those over state territorial wholes is their relative lack of portability. A claim over an urban whole has a relatively fixed range of coordinates on the globe compared to that over a state territory. The modern
city of Kaliningrad is an example of this. Between 1945 and 1947 the identity of the city at Kaliningrad changed more dramatically than almost any other city in Europe ever has. Its conversion from the Prussian city of Koenigsberg to the Soviet city of Kaliningrad was accompanied by a wholesale transfer of population which entirely changed the city’s ethnic composition. The bombing of the city in 1944 all but destroyed its city centre along with key landmarks, Koenigsberg’s castle being the most symbolic. Yet Kaliningrad’s mapping on to the city of Koenigsberg has seen a retention of some kind of continuity: ontologically, the city is in some way the same place. Compare this to the change in state claims over the wider territory in which the city of Kaliningrad now sits. At the end of 1944 this territory belonged to the German Empire as part of the province of East Prussia. In 1945 it was invaded and then, after the Potsdam Conference, transferred in part to the Soviet Union (Stalin, Truman, & Attlee, 1950, p. 42). Although a similar population transfer took place in the territory around Koenigsberg also, the sense of an underlying continuity with what went before is far weaker at the state level than at the city level. The successor to the German Empire is the Federal German Republic which has not made any claim on former eastern lands. The sense that the

32 Koenigsberg today has an identity which persists in Kaliningrad and it is one that has been invoked through the name of Immanuel Kant. Its cathedral on Kneiphof, now named Kant's Island, has been restored and contains Kant's grave. Kant acts as a cypher for a Koenigsberg-Kaliningrad in which German identity of the site must not be acknowledged. Kant's name is invoked to suggest a continuity. The Kaliningrad State Pedagogical Institute was renamed Immanuel Kant Federal University of Russia in 1996. As the University's website in 2011 proclaimed:

‘The University's greatest alumnus is Immanuel Kant, the world-famous philosopher, who was a Russian citizen for some time. The name of I. Kant forever linked the city of Königsberg and the Albertina University with the spiritual heritage of humankind and the history of the region.’ (“History | IKBFU,” 2011) Thus an institution which is not continuous with the Albertina University of Königsberg from an administrative or personnel perspective can identify with a Koenigsberg identity purged of its German-ness.
German-ness of Kaliningrad’s hinterland has all but been erased is far greater than is the case with the city itself.

What is at stake with whole urban forms, then, is the identity of a place which is anchored to the land. Plutarch describes the ancient practice of establishing a city by digging a ceremonial ‘mundus’ then forming the boundaries of the city around it using a plough (2001, p. 32). This ritual emphasises the fixedness of urban wholes, even though urban whole forms might be conceived differently, overlapping each other and consolidating other territory. It also indicates the possibility of the creation of an urban whole being an act which is itself like an ideological claim: urban morphology has had and continues to maintain a ritual underpinning. The characteristics of most urban wholes include some kind of boundedness and centre. Such a geography offers the possibility of inclusion and exclusion and the affordance of naming what is included. Again, to take a comparison with a state as a way of putting this possibility into relief, the English name for the modern Czech Republic in ordinary speech can remain relatively ambiguous – attempts at naming it Czechia have so far not caught on – but the idea that Prague could sustain such uncertainty in its identity is difficult to imagine. This fixing of the identity of urban wholes affords them being the objects of ideological attention. The degree to which nationalist ideology was able to do this in the cases of Budapest, Vienna and Venice will be returned to.

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33 Ambiguity about identity might be a sensible strategy in a naming dispute, however. Derry-Londonderry currently has extraordinary multiple administrative identities. A local planning document from 2017 contains this introductory paragraph which touches on sensitivity about the name of the city: ‘Derry City and Strabane District Council area comprises the second largest city in Northern Ireland / fourth largest city on the Island of Ireland. Derry-Londonderry is the ‘Capital of the North West’ and is at the core of the only functional economic city region of its scale which straddles the border into the Republic of Ireland.’ (Derry City & Strabane District’s Inclusive Strategic Growth Plan 2017-2032 Our Community Plan, 2017, p. 6)
Some basic, unmodified rhythms afford possibilities for cities; weather influences ambient conditions necessary for the production of textiles and inhabitants of more humid regions, governed by the rhythms of the water cycle, may take advantage of this by building mills there. What has been of particular interest in the case studies, however, is the modification and control of human made rhythmic forms: timetables, the regulation of water flows and longer-term cycles of decay and renewal. Such rhythms are closely associated with engineering regularity, making everyday urban processes more predictable. Although it is through technology that such rhythms are engineered, it is human behaviour that ultimately becomes regulated and ordered by these rhythms.

Institutional rhythms, such as regular performances in theatre, afford not only the opportunity for the dissemination of particular ideas but also animate an institution. The schedule of events is performative in its own right. The formal existence of institutional schedules is separated from the content. A city can have cultural institutions whose programming is obscure and unpopular whilst at the same time laying claim to a cultural ‘life’ by virtue of the existence of such programmes. Accordingly, this effect works with institutional hierarchies governing reputation. It is a powerful combination: the proceedings of The Hungarian Academy of Sciences are not only important because of scientific findings they facilitate but also because the institution is seen to be alive by virtue of its regular output and its place on a reputational scale relative to other institutions. Obviously without content these rhythmic and hierarchical forms are insufficient but content is operationalised in service of the institution by these kinds of form. What they also do is permit a city to lay claim to this institutional output and in the case of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest its very identity puts it at the service of nationalist aspiration.
Control of environmental conditions is critical to the maintenance of a stable urban system. Regarding water, cities must contend with the ebb and flow of rivers, oceans and the water table to create stable land for building and to prevent chaotic ingress. Simultaneously, they must harness water to provide sustenance and sanitation. The means by which this double challenge is tackled inevitably gives rise to changes in how the water cycle impinges on urban territory and, if they are to be applied successfully, need to ensure that these rhythms are, as far as possible, predictable. Control of these rhythms affords the consolidation of territory, as was the case with Vienna and the example of Amsterdam. Such hydraulic schemes inspired other kinds of systematic integration in modern cities as the dynamics of water circulation apply to traffic and public transport. The required technical competence in producing predictable rhythms increased the prestige and power of city authorities and underpinned the effort to make cities clean and healthy.

Institutional and environmental rhythmic forms combine in the case of Venice and its principle of com'era, dov'era – as the waters of the Lagoon corrode the Venetian urban fabric, the city needs to be constantly maintained. Should any large scale construction be required – the rebuilding of the Campanile being a good example – this principle ensures the city returns cyclically to how it was prior to modernity. The rhythmic form affords a conservative approach to the development of the city, one which in turn reinforces social structures in the city.

As technology has developed to provide services to cities, so rhythms afford the creation of new ways of life. Motorised transport compresses space and time not just because of its facilitation of speedy journeys but also because such journeys are regular – they are governed by timetables. The reliability of these rhythms means that new and stable communities are afforded both within cities as larger populations are sustained
and through opening up cities to outside visitors and trade. Rhythmic forms combine with networks to enable communities that are not immediately visible to each other to be maintained. If combined with print technology (Anderson, 1991), for example, this could be a potent force for nationalism to tap through rapid distribution of political publications through a national territory.

Particular nationalisms embed themselves within hierarchies of people grouped as nations. Even ‘civic’ nationalism has an understanding of itself as superior to more chauvinistic nationalisms. Political programmes which structure themselves within the concept of nation are entered into competition with other nations. The nation in this scheme must acquire characteristics which distinguish it from others. Hierarchies of cities afforded nationalisms the opportunity to claim cities as national accomplishments. In expressing the desire for Budapest to become the Homeland’s Altar, Táncsics not only looked to the city to provide a moral centre to Hungarian nationalism but also to place the city above others, such as Paris, which in his view took luxury as a guiding principle. The development of the modern city with all of its facilities and conveniences not only afforded a kind of output legitimacy for urban authorities but also produced a symbolic excess which could be soaked up for ideological use.

Hierarchical forms which place the city within a wider context, as opposed to hierarchies which are internal to each city, are essential in structuring cities’ relationships with each other, with other types of community and with larger state-like structures. The ‘rights’ available to particular city authorities and their citizens are governed by a historico-legal order, as seen in the case of emergent cities of northern Italy set within the context of imperial and papal power. This order can be contested and urban identity can be shaped by the conflicts and benefits which accrue through it. The urban identity which is consequently afforded can be applied to ideological
programmes. Venice's identity formed at the margins of the Byzantine and the Holy Roman Empires was later available to modern Italian nationalism for co-option: Venice could be held up as a continuous ‘Italian’ polity which could be seen to counter the Italian peninsula’s domination by external powers.

Internal hierarchical forms structure and reinforce everyday urban experience. The architecture and morphology of cities embed hierarchical assumptions and conflicts, most readily seen in ‘Battle of the Styles’ type building collections in places like the Ringstrasse, in relative building sizes (for example, London's national parliament buildings had been much larger than the accommodation of its various city authorities for many centuries whilst Vienna’s national parliament building, in contrast, is on equal terms with its Town Hall) and morphology creates an ordering of space which affords displays of power both permanent – castles on hills – and temporary – processions in squares and boulevards.

Social hierarchies, such as social class, have not featured directly in this analysis but they are implicated in all of the internal and external hierarchies tackled. The simple hierarchy of inhabitant/visitor comes most close to describing a social hierarchy even if it is by definition temporary. The distinction of inhabitant and visitor is important to political programmes for several reasons. First, it helps define who is an acknowledged political actor – the inhabitant, with other qualifications – and who has not earned the right for political participation in the life of the city – the visitor. This noted, the visitor’s role in shaping the city should not be underestimated, as the example of Venice has shown. This hierarchical form affords, then, not only a participatory community but also affords observation and judgement of an outside world, reinforcing the hierarchy of all cities, for example. The visitor is the subject to be convinced of the excellence of a city, one to whom the best face of the city must be shown. The inhabitant/visitor
hierarchy, along with the economic logic which sustains visitors, affords the
development of urban centres that are fit for visitors, and makes possible the city acting
as a showcase of national achievement and pride.

Large technical networks which provide the infrastructure and services of the
modern city, and indeed the modern economy, created vast and complex connections
that are difficult for individual citizens to perceive. Successful technical networks,
however, are not dependent on their individual participants perceiving their complexity
but seek to make themselves easy-to-use. Further, the use of technical networks
transforms social relations. Giddens refers to this transformation as ‘disembedding’ in
which social relations are taken from their local context and abstracted to ‘infinite
spans of time-space’ (Giddens, 1990, p. 21). For Giddens, what underpins this
transformation in modern society is the concept of ‘trust’, applied in a technical network
as the user’s confidence that the system will reliably produce the desired result of its
intended design whilst mitigating ‘risk’ (1990, pp. 29–36). The example of the Saharan
caravan trade shows how this mechanism could exist prior to modernity though Giddens
might contend that what also marks out the modern condition is its incompatibility with
the religious forms which permeated the pre-modern Saharan network (1990, p. 109).
Modernity would depend instead on rational consideration of the efficacy of technical
networks. What the example of rail in Budapest shows, however, is a more complex
association of modern technology and ideology. Trust in the Hungarian rail network
rested on something more than bare, rational calculation. It built on cultural norms that
preceded it and it afforded the development of ideological forms in terms of national
and nationalist spectacle in the city setting. In other words, modern network forms are
not so much underpinned by a radical break with tradition as by an evolution of social
phenomena. They do not exist independent from culture but are deeply implicated in modern social practices.

The scale and complexity of modern network forms afford an experience of anonymity which was unavailable in most pre-modern settings. This experience might suggest that modern networks also afford a divorce from ideology as social bonds are occluded and the individual becomes the subject-user of the network. Modern networks stretch and regulate social bonds in ways that would have been previously unimaginable. However, they continue to facilitate communal experience even if it is radically transformed. Further, the social aspect of the modern network form is open to ideological co-option. The effect of depersonalisation in modern networks is not a final atomisation of human relations but their reconfiguration.

This survey of modern urban forms has made use of a separation of categories which in practice cannot be readily perceived. The experience of the Viennese Ringstrasse is not a series of separate transactions with an expanded urban whole, the regulation of water courses, an architectural melange and the technical integration of urban services and infrastructure but rather an experience of the synthesis of the whole, rhythmic, hierarchical and networked forms. This synthesis in itself is a kind of urban whole form which is critical to the identification of an experience of the Viennese Ringstrasse. Forms are constantly subject to adjustment both within themselves and in relation to each other. Their interplay is distinct to each place and is what underlies that uniqueness. It is what opens up cities as places in which political and ideological projects can be sustained but also what prevents the final domination of particular ideologies or, indeed, prevents attempts to eliminate ideological interventions.

It is this formal synthesis which was, perhaps, first perfected by Haussmann in Paris. Haussmann’s personal motivations, or those of Napoleon III’s regime for that
matter, have a limited bearing on understanding what Haussmannised Paris afforded and affords to political projects. The observation that the straight lines of the new boulevards might remove insurrectionary potential is telling: it at once contains a concern that the modern city as conceived in Paris can afford the enhancement of power and bourgeois ideology and also fatalism about what architecture and urban morphology do to dominate citizens. Rather than reading class dominance as solidified in the urban fabric, Haussmann’s Paris is better understood as the wholesale creation of a new urban world in which multiple possibilities are afforded. The arc de triomphe in Etoile has afforded the celebration of Bastille Day by the French state military, the victory of the Prussians over France in 1871, the French victory over the German Empire in 1919, the German invasion in 1940, the Allied victory in 1945, student protests in May 1968 where initial demands were presented (Schulz –Forberg, 2009, p. 137) and many other processions, marches, demonstrations and acts which have utilised the space and symbolism around the arch. What has been emulated elsewhere is not just the technologies of a new, modern urban system but more widely a synthesis of urban forms which create new sets of affordances. Those affordances can be controlled by ideological narratives and social norms but the modern urban world embodied in a Haussmannised city always has the potential for excessive affordances to break through.

Nationalist political thinking needs to account for the presence of cities in modern nation-states. Cities are embedded in networked forms, for example, which expose them to ethnic diversity and consequently challenge monocultural conceptions of the nations that contain them. In reference to Rousseau, the city could be taken as the place which embodies a moral national project and Táncsics call for Budapest to be the ‘Homeland’s Altar’ could be seen as this logic playing out. It is notable that both Rousseau and Táncsics used Paris has the counterexample to the city with ‘moeurs’ they
sought. Rousseau, of course, was writing long before the Haussmannisation of Paris; Táncsics was to an extent responding to Haussmannisation. If the city in which amour propre and luxury prevail is to be avoided, a city which is radically altered by Haussmannisation might facilitate this. Clearly for Táncsics, a Budapest fit for a Hungarian nation is possible in a modernised city. The development which makes Budapest an integrated, modern city is one which also makes it more Hungarian, the clean lines of the boulevards reflect the ordering of ethnicity in Magyarising Hungary and Budapest.

Long term institutional evolution played its part in enabling the modern European city to emerge and, through the passage of several centuries, made possible the conditions for imagining a city of ‘moeurs’. In identifying changes in communitarian, secular and constitutional conditions, Harold Berman’s account of the eleventh century ‘Papal Revolution’ indicates an opening up of a new kind of political urban form affording many of the developments in European cities in subsequent centuries. These were innovations which created modern urban conditions. They were largely the product of relatively localised conflict but they marked something close to the commencement of a new kind of social membership, one which fed into the notion of modern citizenship. It is this urban political space in Europe which permitted, later during the Enlightenment, a much more radical reimagining of social relations in the context of modern states and cities. The interaction of technological change and this reimagining helped create the conditions in which the purpose of a city and urban life could be considered and contested. These conditions were present across the spectrum of political programmes, affording conservative, liberal and socialist responses amongst others. It is within this emerging urban order that Rousseau and Herder can be read as theorists seeking to shape an urban future, one which would be able to accommodate
new kinds of community. Their thought did not necessarily accord with cosmopolitan, Enlightened thought but nevertheless they could integrate urbanisation into their thinking. In the same way, nineteenth century nationalists appealed to concepts of nation rooted in a distant past that could make use of the modern city, not just dismissed as centres of the corruption of the nation but as the positive locations of their political programmes. In order to achieve this, though, there was a logic required which could bring together both the idea of the modern city as corrupt and also as a national achievement.

The dynamic which creates this moral tension in nationalist urban political programmes is derived from the exceptional position of cities in politics. It is an understanding of anthropological time which places the city as a special entity in human history, an entity which is deeply implicated in the formation of the idea of ‘politics’ and hence makes urbanism a unique problem to be continuously thrown up and resolved. It is an understanding that can be used narratively by political programmes and affords both emancipatory and reactionary politics. Nationalist thinking can draw on this narrative to account for the presence of cities in national territory that do not conform to more monocultural conceptions of nation, to claim urban territory for nationalist practice and display and to claim them as products of national genius. The rapidly expanding cities of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provided the demographic material for nationalist political programmes with recently uprooted populations available for co-option to political programmes both through mass politics and by claiming individuals for a particular nation group: the inclusion of Jewish migrants in Hungarian statistics making Budapest more ‘Hungarian’ is an example of this.

The means by which nationalism has been afforded by and has afforded urban forms are very diverse, as the case studies show. Further, the extent to which nationalism
and urban form have worked together varies significantly according to context. The examples of urban forms in Budapest have shown the strongest relationship with a nationalist project. The examples in Vienna and Venice are more nuanced. In Vienna, urban forms, which in Budapest were strongly associated with the nation, were quite detached from a national project, German, Austrian or otherwise. Budapest’s whole and rhythmic forms in the case study were, in part, afforded by the national project as much as they, in turn, afforded nationalist use. The creation of a unified Budapest in 1873, as well as its short-lived predecessor in 1848-49, was given impetus by the political project to give Hungary more autonomy within the Habsburg lands. Its promotion to Hungarian capital produced an urban whole which consequently afforded a project of Magyarisation.

Other institutional forms operated alongside the development of the unified urban whole in Budapest. The example of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences was one which, again, was motivated by an emerging national consciousness and which, through its continuity expressed in its rhythms, animated Hungarian cultural life and contributed to wider national cultural expression in the city. Other aspects of Budapest’s late nineteenth century development in the case study are seen in forms which were and are common across many cities, including all of the cases examined here. The hierarchical arrangement of architecture, showcasing cultural institutions and expressing priority for some, like opera houses, over others, is far from unique. Likewise, the connection of Budapest to the rail network was part of a European and then global phenomenon of railway construction. The Budapest examples were ones in which nationalist symbolism and events were afforded by the presence of these hierarchical and network forms and which contained an open set of affordances available to all political and ideological projects including nationalist ones. A synthesis of urban forms afforded the
nationalisation of Budapest and nationalist symbolism and practices. They coalesced both coincidentally and intentionally to support Hungarian nationalist aspirations. Ideology could be applied to limit what Budapest’s urban forms could afford – a modern city which was later to be a fascist and then socialist centre was in the late nineteenth century co-opted for nationalism.

Vienna’s modernisation was close in time that in Budapest and both Danubian cities shared many characteristics of large, river-based cities of medieval foundation. However, the urban forms which coalesced in Vienna were put to use in a different way. Whereas the expansion of the urban whole in Budapest was accompanied by policies to reduce ethnic diversity in the city, Vienna’s expansion was, at least initially, a more cosmopolitan affair. The demolition of the walls, the development of the Ringstrasse and the integration of the outer suburbs into the whole produced a different response: the display of bourgeois power and wealth was one.

It was later in Vienna when nationalism became enmeshed in city politics. The decline of Liberal politics in Vienna and the rise of the Christian Socials under Mayor Karl Lueger in the 1890s was accompanied by the increasing deployment of nationalist rhetoric mixed with social concern for the urban lower classes. The form of nationalism associated with this made use of increasing antisemitism in Europe from the 1880s onwards. (Schorske, 1981, pp. 140–146) The ethno-nationalism of Lueger was predicated less on a call to make the city a ‘German’ city – though this did feature – than on the demonisation of an Other could be used to consolidate German votes and instil ‘Christian’ principles in the politics and life of a city which would remain ethnically diverse (Beller, 2006, pp. 155–157; Johnston, 1983, pp. 63–66). Monumentalising ethnic German achievement in the city was, in this context, less politically potent than the exclusion of competing influences of non-Germans; this was
a Viennese and Austrian context which subsequently meant that late nineteenth and early twentieth century nationalism has left a more obvious mark on Budapest than on Vienna. The rapid growth of Vienna, nevertheless, afforded a mass political domain which populist politicians like Lueger could exploit.

Venice's incorporation into a national project was quite different again to the other two cases. Budapest, Vienna and Venice in 1815 were all in a multi-ethnic Austrian Empire under the Habsburgs. Despite having been a significant power with Italian affinities until 1797, Venice's entanglement with a nationalist project was marginal, at least at first. Of the three cases, the city is also an exception in that its population level was relatively static during its modernisation.

What the case of Venice does is produce an example of a city as what might be referred to as an ‘ideological object’ against examples of cities as ‘ideological subjects’. An urban ideological object would be an urban form which could act as a goal or the backdrop to an ideological narrative. The everyday content of this form would be peripheral to this narrative. Another city example of an ideological object would be Jerusalem, the object of desire to different religious and ideological powers and movements over many centuries. The narratives of these ideologies do not necessarily regard the content of the city, its population, its contemporary institutions, or even its morphology and architecture to be of primary importance but rather the idea of the city and its possession are their goal. Venice was an object of desire for Italian nationalists and Venetian urban forms in the case study all afforded the positioning of Venice as an urban object. This is not to exclude the possibility of active nationalism within the city of Venice but to show how ideology might interact with urban form independent of this internal activity. A contrast with Budapest highlights this further. Budapest was, of course, the object of nationalist desire but the internal configuration of urban forms was
vital to making it a ‘Hungarian’ city. In Venice it was more a case of claims over its identity than change to its internal configuration which made it ‘Italian’, the principle of com’era, dov’era making such internal reconfiguration difficult anyhow.

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‘If you ask the people you meet, “Where is Penthesilia?” they make a broad gesture which may mean “Here,” or else “Farther on,” or “All around you,” or even “In the opposite direction.”

“I mean the city,” you ask, insistently.

“We come here every morning to work,” someone answers, while others say, “We come back here at night to sleep.”

“But the city where people live?” you ask.

“It must be that way,” they say, and some raise their arms obliquely towards an aggregation of opaque polyhedrons on the horizon, while others indicate, behind you, the specter of other spires.’ Invisible Cities (Calvino, 1997, pp. 141–142)

In contrast to Zora, Penthesilia’s inhabitants appear uninterested in the layout of the whole city but rather their interaction with what they unquestioningly identify as the city of Penthesilia. Penthesilia’s identity is entangled in the lives of its inhabitants and, although Marco Polo is tormented by the idea that it is wholly owned constituted by ‘the outskirts of itself’, it offers the possibility of a city which at once manages to be subjectively defined by the individual experience of its inhabitants and also to have a strong shared identity. It is a city of many, overlapping urban wholes. It is not frozen in time like Zora but a city which is lived in.
Cities which are lived in do not just provide a neutral stage for the performance of citizens but are instead in constant dialogue with those citizens, each shaping the other. The framework of urban forms and affordances offers one way to think about how this dialogue proceeds. Cities are complex systems whose multitude of processes and parts interact with the actions of the animals which inhabit them and as such are beyond complete comprehension. Analysing their forms offers a pragmatic way to enhance understanding of this interaction of the politics and material of cities without succumbing to a simple determinism.

The framework of forms and affordances has been applied to cases of cities which started the process of modernisation with some common state-territorial context, cities which have core morphologies initiated in medieval Europe and which were all open to multiple ethnic influences but which, by 1919, had become part of ethnocentric states. By taking examples of different categories of urban forms within each case it has been possible to explore how the physical city and political projects. Wider examples from other European cities and beyond have helped deepen this analysis by showing the context within which urban modernisation was taking place. The political philosophy and thought influencing nationalism has been interrogated to show how ideology can make intellectual space for the physical city and how nationalism came to terms with and made use of modern urbanisation.

In the current era, Budapest, Vienna and Venice continue to accommodate urban forms which afford ideology. In the case of Budapest, a resurgent nationalism under the government of Fidesz has had its impact on Budapest’s urban forms, boulevards continuing to be sites of official procession and oppositional protest, institutions like the House of Terror museum on Andrássy Avenue highlighting the victimhood of the Hungarian nation and academic institutions in Budapest under suspicion of malevolent
influence from outside Hungary. Vienna remains a morality tale for liberals about the abandonment of liberal values for populism. Venice retains its place as the exceptional city, always under threat and an object of concern from art historians and environmentalists concerned about rising sea levels and the levels of consumption caused by tourism. Urban forms continue not just to be containers in which politics takes place but are themselves enmeshed in politics.
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