POWER, POLITICS AND PROGRAMMING FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN PAKISTAN

Submitted in Fulfilment of the Full Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, November 2017

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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I declare that my thesis consists of 104,645 words.

I declare that the thesis references and para-phrases the arguments of previous studies carried out by the author but does not contain empirical data from them.
Photo 1: A community leader adding his signature to state documents

Source: Author’s own photograph
Acknowledgements

This thesis was co-created with those I already knew and those I met along the way. Here I wish to briefly thank a few. It would not have got off the ground if it had not been for Khalid who welcomed me to Pakistan and helped me explore it. If nothing else, he has made a friend for life.

My partner, Sarah, was stoic throughout, never doubting, always encouraging and occasionally picking me off the floor. She was there when I first went to Pakistan ten years ago and drove me to return. Perhaps for a bit too long. I am also thankful to my mother, Helena, for showing me I could take the less well-trodden path and for being my most avid reader. Susan, who now feels like family, was a source of advice in difficult times and someone to celebrate with during the good bits. My supervisor, Mary, for trusting me to produce something, at some point, and for shaping my politics. And, way back in Afghanistan, Marika who taught me ‘fieldwork’.

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Abstract

This thesis is about development donor organisations’ enthusiasm for social accountability programmes. It argues that when they are based on neoliberal conceptions of civil society, they complement and strengthen clientelistic networks. They do this by rendering activism a technical exercise, depoliticising it and blinding donors to both its democratic and undemocratic potentials. In doing so, they displace and, sometimes purposefully, ignore actually existing civil societies’ histories as arenas for identity formation, contests and alliances over who gets what, when and how. This reduces the prospects of programmes identifying and supporting radical forms of political participation that give citizens a say in decisions that affect their lives.

To make this argument, the thesis details research on a voluntary social accountability programme in Pakistan. It explores the meanings it was given by participants, the processes they engaged in that brought it to life, and the power and politics it was embedded in. It also conducts a critical discourse analysis of the idea of social accountability in texts from the programme’s donor; the United Kingdom’s Department of International Development. It is shown how efforts to translate the programme’s ground realities into its donor’s dominant discourses wrote out the identities and aspirations of its participants, pushing the more radical to its margins and turning the most powerful into its experts. From this, a theory of ‘isomorphic activism’ is developed to account for how such programmes’ wider democratic aims can be undermined whilst still achieving their donors’ desired outputs.

The challenges the thesis highlights are important given recent calls for development programmes to change by whom and how politics is done, whilst granting local ownership to participants, reporting their impact and demonstrating value for money. They should also be of interest to those concerned by the spread of market-principles within donor organisations’ ways of working with civil society, and how they are welcomed, appropriated or simply ignored on the ground.
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Case studies and intertextual omissions
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<p>| <strong>Glossary</strong> |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| <strong>Anjuman Mazareen Punjab C</strong> | Tenants Association of Punjab |
| <strong>Chadar</strong> | Literally ‘four walls’, symbolic of social exclusion of women |
| <strong>Biraderis</strong> | Kin groups, practising endogamy |
| <strong>Chardivari</strong> | Islamic exclusion of women |
| <strong>Gora</strong> | White man |
| <strong>Khidemat</strong> | Service |
| <strong>Kacheri kee siyasat</strong> | Politics of access to the police and courts |
| <strong>Kaghaz kaaley karna</strong> | Blackening the paper |
| <strong>Kameen</strong> | Servers or artisans |
| <strong>Khudai Khidmatgar</strong> | Servants of God (name of social movement) |
| <strong>Jajmani</strong> | Agricultural labour and kinship-based patron-client system. |
| <strong>Jajman</strong> | Landowner or patron |
| <strong>Lambardar</strong> | Village head responsible for tax collection |
| <strong>Lotta</strong> | A small drinking vessel, but used to denote someone without a permanent political base |
| <strong>Madrassa</strong> | Islamic faith school |
| <strong>Mandi</strong> | Market |
| <strong>Mehndi</strong> | Stage of wedding ceremonies or henna body art |
| <strong>Muhajir</strong> | Muslim migrant |
| <strong>Mullah</strong> | Street level religious leader, often untrained |
| <strong>Numberdar</strong> | Village head responsible for tax collection |
| <strong>Nawab</strong> | Muslim prince, later respected powerful landowner or local leader. |
| <strong>Nazim</strong> | Elected representative at union council level |
| <strong>Patwari</strong> | Keeper of local land records |
| <strong>Quaid-i-azam</strong> | Great leader |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Roti, kapra, makan</td>
<td>Bread, clothing, housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sifarish</td>
<td>A favour or job got through personal contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahib</td>
<td>Sir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah-o-behbud</td>
<td>Social work</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samaji karkun</td>
<td>Social worker</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistani Taliban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulema</td>
<td>Qualified religious scholars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakat</td>
<td>Islamic charitable giving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamindar</td>
<td>Aristocratic large landowner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zina</td>
<td>Law against adultery / non-marital sexual intercourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td>Tenants Association of Punjab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWP</td>
<td>Awami Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BISP</td>
<td>Benazir Income Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Country or INGO that funds development programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCO</td>
<td>District Coordination Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>District Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department of International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDO</td>
<td>Executive District Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAFEN</td>
<td>Free and Fair Election Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRCP</td>
<td>Human Rights Commission Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFCB</td>
<td>Centre for Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRG</td>
<td>Constituency Relations Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHW</td>
<td>Lady Health Worker</td>
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<tr>
<td>MKP</td>
<td>Mazdoor Kisan Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Member Provincial Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>Muttahida Quami Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>Awami National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHA</td>
<td>National Highway Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Student Federations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PILER</td>
<td>Pakistan Institute for Labour Education and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML-N</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz</td>
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<tr>
<td>PML-Q</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTI</td>
<td>Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP-PK</td>
<td>South Asia Partnership Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCRC</td>
<td>Southern Punjab Resource Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPI</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Policy Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAEP</td>
<td>Supporting Transparency Accountability and Electoral Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAF</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMA</td>
<td>Tehsil Municipal Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Pakistani Taliban</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAPDA</td>
<td>Water and Power Development Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAF</td>
<td>Women’s Action Forum</td>
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Chapter One
Introduction

This thesis began with the problem of why civil society programmes in clientelistic states often appear to have so little impact on democracy. I answer that powerful development organisations’ attempts to harness the idea of civil society render activism a technical exercise, depoliticising it and blinding themselves to both its democratic and undemocratic potentials. To make this argument, I explore a conceptual gap between visions of civil society as a component in neoliberal models of governance and citizenship, and its history as a patchwork of local arenas for identity formation, contests and cooperation over who gets what, when and how.¹ This gap reduces the prospects of identifying and supporting ‘radical’ forms of democracy that give citizens a say in decisions that affect their lives.² In some cases, it also provides opportunities for powerful actors to capture the opportunities that arise from programmes and strengthens anti-democratic processes.

I show how this gap is being maintained by the contemporary enthusiasm for ‘social accountability’ programmes. Social accountability is concerned with raising citizens’ voices, with the goal of realising their rights, eliciting responsive governance, improving public services and state-society relations. Much of the literature suggests that with better information and regular opportunities to engage authorities, citizens can raise demands and select their leaders based on their performance (WB, 2003; DFID, 2008a; Fox, 2015). It is also often claimed that this will contribute to processes that change by whom and how politics is done, thereby, supporting ongoing democratising projects. Social accountability, therefore, is the latest in a long line of

¹ Lasswell’s (1958) definition of politics.
² I follow Della Porta and Diani’s (2006:9) exploration of ‘radical democracy’, which, drawing on the work of Claus Offe (1985), emphasises interpersonal solidarity, and the importance of ongoing critiques of mainstream notions of progress and modernism. I combine this with Block and Somers’ (2014:238) suggestion that radical democracy entails ‘parliamentary institutions elected on a territorial basis, but it also envisions an extension of democracy into the fabric of everyday life’.
ways through which donor organisations have sought to approach the interface between civil society, development and democratisation.

Social accountability programmes’ potential to contribute to democratising projects in states characterised by clientelism is relatively under-studied and under-theorised. This is puzzling given the resources increasingly devoted to such efforts and how little is known about such places. Furthermore, there is a lack of literature exploring how such ambitions sit alongside donors’ increasing emphasis on producing results that represent value for money. To unpick these issues, I show how neoliberal visions of governance and citizenship can lead to programmes that are difficult to distinguish from and, in some cases, complement clientelism in young democracies such as Pakistan. I also explore how these programmes are justified through understandings, and renderings, of activism that equate it with the operation of markets. I argue that this strips planners and evaluators of the conceptual vocabulary needed to interpret how their programmes are embedded in, and realised through, power and politics.

An exploration of such problems is important given renewed calls for development to take the political causes of poverty seriously, and a growing enthusiasm for ‘bottom-up’, ‘adaptive’, ‘politically smart’ and ‘locally led’ programmes (Ramalingam, 2013; Booth and Unsworth, 2014; Derbyshire and Donovan, 2016). It should also be of interest to those that argue development organisations seek, yet routinely fail, to affect change due to misunderstanding and, in some cases, purposefully ignoring the cultures, histories and inequalities of the places within which they work (Ferguson, 1990; Mosse, 2005; Li, 2007). More generally, the thesis adds to understandings of how powerful Western states espouse and attempt to put into practice market-based ideologies, and how they are welcomed, appropriated or simply ignored on the ground (Peck, 2013; Block and Somers, 2014; Brown, 2015).

The rest of this chapter outlines the thesis’ motivation, research design and methods, and its contributions. It then turns to some key concepts, exploring my understandings of them and how they will be used throughout. The introduction
concludes with an outline of each chapter, showing how they build the overall argument.

**Research motivation**

This research puzzle grew from a short study of a widely praised programme – Supporting Transparency, Accountability, and Electoral Process (STAEP) – I conducted in Pakistan in early 2014 (Kirk, 2014). STAEP built and supported 200 volunteer citizens’ groups, called Constituency Relations Groups (CRGs), across the country. They focused on identifying local demands and bringing them to the attention of state officials and politicians. The study explored the meaning of inclusiveness within the programme, which I described as ‘shallow’ as much of the work was undertaken by a core group of better educated and wealthier participants within each CRG.

The study also raised several questions. Firstly, I found that those connected to Pakistan’s clientelistic political networks were sometimes involved in the programme’s local activities. To paraphrase a senior staff member within the programme, had they merely created another layer of intermediaries between citizens and the state? Thus, it seemed important to conduct further research exploring whether this had occurred and, if so, to ask what the consequences may be? Secondly, there were signs that some participants were working with other associations and formal political actors and using their connections to publicly challenge local clientelistic networks. This accorded with my own, admittedly then Eurocentric, idea of civil society and seemed to contribute to STAEP’s stated aims of supporting: ‘Democratic processes in Pakistan that are more open, inclusive, efficient and accountable to citizens’. Nonetheless, such activities often did not clearly appear in programme documents describing STAEP and they were rarely emphasised as successes by those implementing it on the ground. Thus, I was curious as to why

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3 STAEP’s intended impact and outcomes are taken from the log frame used by staff to track its progress.
processes with the potential to challenge dominant ways of doing politics happened on the margins of the programme?

At the time, I had recently read Bano’s (2012) *Breakdown in Pakistan: How Aid Is Eroding Institutions for Collective Action*. It presents quantitative evidence that Pakistani civil society organisations that have received foreign funding rapidly lose local legitimacy and their effectiveness is eroded. This happens because the payments contravene societal norms that require those working for the public good to do so voluntarily and to demonstrate signs of material sacrifice. As Bano points out, it is surprising that this is often overlooked by donor organisations considering that their own definitions of civil society hold it to be a sphere of not-for-profit, voluntary activity for agreed upon public causes (ibid:49). To me and others I had met whilst working in Pakistan, STAEP’s voluntary CRGs represented an interesting and innovative attempt to address this problem, and I was keen to further explore how this played out in practice.

Whilst undertaking this study, I had also begun to read key texts from what is often called the anthropology of development or ‘aidnography’ literature (Ferguson, 1990; Escobar, 1995; Mosse, 2005; Li, 2007). Their authors showed that programmes need not be approached on their own terms or as experiments on foreign populations. Instead, they can be seen within their wider contexts and from the perspective of those they engaged. Furthermore, they explored how the discourses of powerful development organisations interpreted the meaning of progress or improvement, and what this made possible and impossible. To me, they presented a convincing argument that programmes cannot be disconnected from their planners’ identities and interests, nor from their positions within wider, often global, networks of power. I wanted to bring a similar sensitivity to my own understanding of the emerging idea of social accountability. To do so, I decided to return to the STAEP programme.

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Research design and methods

My research design combined a constructivist approach that holds knowledge and research data to be socially created, with a post-structuralist interest in how power reproduces itself through discourses and how it is challenged in specific social settings. This directed me towards powerful development organisations’ discourses on civil society and, more recently, social accountability. It also informed my revisiting of STAEP with the purpose of exploring a recent civil society focussed programme from the perspective of those that took part, unpicking the meanings they gave it and the processes it led to.

To honour this approach, the write up pays attention to how power worked to shape what was considered possible by the programme’s planners and what actually happened on the ground. This reveals how, despite vastly unequal power relations, the programme’s participants ultimately played the leading role in the democratic and undemocratic processes that brought it to life. Nonetheless, it also shows how, and explores why, their activities were translated back into the donors’ dominant discourses.

The research began with an open-ended qualitative study of the practice of social accountability through four of STAEP’s CRGs in the north and south of Pakistan’s Punjab province. They were selected through a quantitative analysis of the programme’s own activity data that suggested they would be rich research sites. A constructivist approach to grounded theory methodology was used to collect data through a mixture of semi structured interviews and ethnographic immersion. This allowed the research to be driven by emerging questions and hypotheses, with themes and social processes explored for their relevance to answering the research question. It also called for reflexivity as to my own positionality, biases and preconceived notions. Interviews were conducted with both the programme’s voluntary participants and those implementing it in partnership with the primary donor: The United Kingdom’s Department of International Development (DFID).
Following fieldwork, the emphasis switched to exploring DFID’s discourses on social accountability. The idea was to interrogate the ensemble of ideas, actors and institutions that drive its engagements with the idea and to develop an appreciation for how the programme was situated within wider power relations. This was mainly done through a critical discourse analysis of the World Bank’s and DFID’s publicly available texts that reveal the ideological contests within both organisations. An analysis of the programme’s annual reviews was also undertaken to understand the link between these wider discourses and the programme’s ground realities, including how the latter were translated into the former. To further understand Pakistan’s civil society and its relations with donors, semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior members of Pakistan’s community of professionalised non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The thesis’ main methodologies – critical discourse analysis and grounded theory – are laid out in detail directly before the presentation of the data they gathered. This is done to help readers judge their suitability and the plausibility of my interpretations. It also allows me to reflexively comment on my use of each. The write up follows a logic that first sets the wider context by exploring development organisations’ discourses and then zooms down into the practice of social accountability on the ground in Pakistan. Thus, it begins with a broad examination of civil society theory, moves onto the contemporary idea of social accountability, sets the societal context and then explores the STAEP programme. The final chapter draws the others’ arguments together, outlines a grounded theory of why civil society programmes so often fail to contribute to democracy, and comments upon the thesis’ relevance to contemporary literature.

**Contributions**

The thesis makes four main overlapping contributions. The first is a critical discourse analysis of powerful donor organisations’ ideas of civil society. This updates others’
work that has shown how ideological struggles have shaped the way it has been understood and used in programmes (Foley and Edwards, 1996; Howell and Pearce, 2001; Kaldor, 2003a; Lewis, 2010b). Specifically, I show how these struggles have continued in the current enthusiasm for the idea of social accountability. Although it has the potential to contribute to development organisations’ ongoing efforts to account for the power and politics of the places where they work, I argue that this is being eroded by the ascendance of neoliberal models of citizenship and governance. They depoliticise the idea of social accountability, conceptualising it as a technical exercise undertaken by individual actors operating to market principles. In the process, theorists that see civil society as a site for identity formation, political conflicts, activism and relationship building are side-lined, and the need for deliberative spaces and radical democratising projects is overlooked. Nonetheless, the thesis argues that this struggle is still ongoing and that exposing how it is realised in programmes can help those that wish to better support actual civil societies.

The thesis’ second contribution is a case study of a donor supported social accountability programme in Pakistan. However, I do not seek to evaluate or judge the programme on its own terms. Rather, I situate it within the historical trajectory of donors’ activities in Pakistan and I explore it from the bottom up. I show what went on within and around the spaces STAEP supported, and the meaning those participating within and implementing the programme gave it on the ground. I argue this is necessary to uncover how powerful donors’ discourses are met by pre-existing social relations, identities and interests. It also takes seriously the social accountability literature’s claim to be able to change the way and by whom politics is done (Fung and Wright, 2003; Cornwall and Coelho, 2006; Joshi, 2008). Indeed, I show that this aim was often undermined by powerful local actors, yet their contributions were still translated into official texts that described the programme’s ground realities in its donor’s dominant discourses. At the same time, I show why activities with the most potential for radical democratic outcomes were pushed to the margins.
The third contribution is an empirical study of local politics in a young democracy characterised by weak formal accountability mechanisms and what the thesis calls ‘new’ clientelism (defined below). As part of this, it explores the understandings of what Pakistanis living in the Punjab often call social work (salah-o-behbud) and how it overlaps with development programmes and politics. I show how all require periodic, transactional and often personal relationships, and bring to the fore the wider ambitions of those that engage in them. This adds to a limited, mostly ethnographic, literature on societal associations and political leadership among contemporary Pakistani communities. And it accords with a wider literature exploring forms of popular politics and clientelism elsewhere in South Asia.

Lastly, I contribute a grounded theory of ‘isomorphic activism’. It explains how the democratic potentials of social accountability programmes in clientelistic states can be undermined by powerful local actors able to mimic donors’ reductive neoliberal models of civil society for their own ends. Formally put: isomorphic activism occurs when elite participants in social accountability programmes use their positions within wider clientelistic networks to publicly adopt the form and shape of activism, whilst privately appropriating the opportunities programmes promise others to participate in public politics. I hypothesize that isomorphic activism is more likely in vastly unequal societies, and where programmes offer predefined, quantifiable templates of what civil society mobilisation and responsive governance – in short, ‘success’ – looks like. I argue this theory is better suited to understanding the pitfalls and dangers of social accountability programmes aimed at contributing to democratising projects than previous notions of elite capture and control that focus on tangible, material benefits.

The thesis concludes with a wider discussion of donors’ efforts to support actually existing civil societies and democratisation. This includes their renewed enthusiasm for taking politics seriously and making it work for development. To advance such debates, I argue a rethink of what constitutes ‘success’ in donors’ programmes is sorely needed. This requires acknowledging the political identities and aspirations of participants, and that public relationships – not information and backroom bargains –
that span the conceptual society-state divide are crucial to how civil society contributes to development. To support this, donors must find ways of minimising the operation of power within and around the spaces they support, whilst remaining alive to the more creative and unexpected processes they may be able to facilitate. I also argue that to be accountable to their participants and learn from their local expertise, programmes must find ways of allowing them to be their evaluators.

Before proceeding, I wish to make a point about the generalisability of my findings and about causality or ‘blame’. I do not claim that within every social accountability programme there will be exclusions and processes that strengthen antidemocratic networks. Rather, I am focussed on the subset of voluntary programmes implemented in states with clientelistic politics and an absence of strong formal accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, my study should be approached as an interpretation of a particular programme, in a particular time and place. Nonetheless, by connecting my observations on the ground to wider discourses on citizenship and governance, I hope to highlight a general disquiet that others may have about the direction in which these sorts of programmes are heading.

I also do not hold specific actors responsible for the processes I describe. Instead, I follow others that argue entire chains of actors – often with the best intentions – are enrolled in realising, resisting and representing development programmes in official texts, with each more or less invested in their activities, aims and worldviews (Mosse, 2005; Lewis and D. Mosse, 2006; Li, 2007). Although I do not explore in detail the incentives of all of those within the programme’s studied chain, it should be clear that I mostly locate the power to shape ways of working and meanings with powerful donor organisations, rather than their local partners or the individual staff implementing their ideas.

As they are fiercely debated, the next section outlines my understandings of key concepts used throughout the thesis.
Civil society

Civil society theory often describes semi-autonomous spaces beyond the state and the market. Thinkers argue these spaces allow citizens to form their identities and opinions free from domination by coercive state authorities or economic interests (Cohen and Arato, 1992; Young, 2004; Alexander, 2006). Once ready, organised groups or their representatives can publicly engage political society and the state in contests over the type of lives they want to lead. It is suggested that this repeated double movement complements the blunt accountability of elections, spurs more equitable policies and contributes to democratisation. For many, this latter goal amounts to an ongoing project to empower people to challenge dominant notions of progress or development. Such an understanding of civil society urges analysts to investigate the arenas within which people organise, who takes part, how deliberations among them unfold and the opportunities they have to engage powerholders.

Civil society is defined in this thesis as the actors, institutions and networks of voluntary life that are orientated towards deliberative practices and that legitimate themselves in terms of publicness. This definition suggests that in its ‘ideal’ democracy enhancing forms, civil society is characterized by processes in which actors and associations voluntarily take part in public deliberations among themselves, and with markets, political society and states. Furthermore, to legitimise their decisions, they seek to include and, when possible, persuade all those affected by whatever opinion or course of action is being debated. When one or more of these elements are not present it is likely that actors, associations and their wider networks are uninterested in ongoing democratising projects or may even be opposed to them. Thus, the thesis understands civil society as a normative goal, an aspiration, the achievement of which must be empirically uncovered and judged.

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5 This definition is a modified version of that used by Baiocchi et al. (2011:26) for their investigation of how participatory budgeting processes ‘bootstrap’ Brazilian democracy.
The definition is also premised on the argument that civil society will remain romanticised so long as it is strictly thought of as a well-defined, clearly bound and unitary reality (Foley and Edwards, 1998; Chandhoke, 2001). Although sometimes helpful, the depiction of an autonomous sphere with boundaries between it, the market, political society and state that is found in much of the literature risks side-lining the processes through which actors and institutions thought to belong to each interact with, permeate and reconstitute one another. Instead, the ‘relational’ sociological definition used here holds that civil societies are better understood as embedded in and messily connected to their broader social contexts.

**Clientelism**

Clientelism can be understood as the process by which citizens exchange their votes or other political rights in return for protection, promised material benefits, insurance, credit or access to state services (Scott, 1972; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1980). These exchanges take place between people of unequal status, resources and power, with clients often partially dependent on patrons. To set it apart from slavery or pure coercion, clientelism often contains a sense of voluntarism, obligation, duty, tradition, intimacy or even friendship. Indeed, clientelism can be viewed as a 'living moral idiom' which describes political communities, modes of leadership and ways of following that shape the outcome of elections in much of the world (Piliavsky, 2014a:4).

Anthropological interest in clientelism grew in the 1960s and 1970s in Mediterranean, Latin American and South Asian peasant studies (Alavi, 1973b; Schmidt, 1974; Silverman, 1977). It was generally seen through a Marxist lens as a form of oppression and/or ideology that enabled elites to control and misuse their subjects. Authors argued that it prevents the sort of horizontal networking and identity formations characteristic of developmentally orientated class-based politics.

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6 Clientelism is also often termed ‘patronage’ in the literature.
(Bodeman, 1988). An ancillary set of literature has also concentrated on the way clientelism links rural communities, isolated regions and social peripheries to elite politics at the centre of developing countries (Geertz, 1960; Matrz, 1997; Kenny, 2015; de Waal, 2015). Its studies often examine the interface between electoral politics, traditional modes of choosing leaders and allocating scarce resources, and violence.

Clientelism is perceived to be harmful for both ‘deliberative’ and ‘liberal’ conceptions of democracy. The former value broad participation in public deliberations over what constitutes the public interest, including opportunities to test the strength of various arguments and reach a broad consensus. The latter are concerned with how publicly available information and regular voting enables people to punish elites for their poor performance or abuses of power. Both suggest that democracy requires socialisation into civic-mindedness and notions of the public good. The private, market-like exchanges and group loyalties of clientelistic networks encourage their members to pool their votes, to bargain for their allegiance behind closed doors and to ignore the wider social consequences of their choices. Thus, they interfere with both the power of public deliberations and the accountability of leaders.

Within the literature there is a distinction between what could be called ‘old’ and ‘new’ types of clientelism (Hopkin, 2006). The old type, more akin to feudalism, involved relatively consistent face-to-face exchanges between individual patrons and generations of their clients’ families. In return for their services, clients expected what is necessary for their own basic survival, especially within non-monetised agricultural societies. Thus, the goods exchanged were often food and protection, with a moralistic element used to justify this unequal relationship as the natural or the God-given way of things.

In contrast, the new type of clientelism is often found in young democracies. It involves powerful intermediaries negotiating with political patrons on behalf of different groups for their vote. In return, targetable, excludable goods or services that often come from the state such as schools, jobs, access to the bureaucracy and
corruptible officials, are expected. However, long term allegiances are not required as both parties understand the transactional nature of the deal, clients are rarely solely dependent on patrons for their survival and there is often less of a moralistic element to proceedings. The new clientelism, therefore, is associated with the growth of political parties, capitalism, the welfare state, and extensive networks of intermediaries between buyers and sellers. The periodic fierce contests it generates have also been linked to violence and ‘mafia-politics’ (Blok, 1974; Gunst, 1995; de Waal, 2015).

**Democratisation**

It is increasingly recognized that most people value responsive and transparent governance. However, following disappointments over the trajectories of the ‘Third Wave’ of democracies established in the 1990s, observers have once again conceded that democratisation will take a variety of forms in different contexts (Hashemi, 2009; Whitehead, 2010; Hobson, 2012; Youngs, 2015). Thus, it is now argued that Western ideals of governance may not be transferable or even necessarily the best path to democracy for developing countries. Such arguments have led to calls for more nuanced understandings of how democratisation is shaped by social norms and the underlying distribution of power within societies.

In response, scholars have looked for the minimal conditions for democracy to consolidate. Many argue that successful democratising projects require state capacity and political freedoms to advance in complementary ways (Diamond, 1997; Graeme, 2000; Dryzek, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Too much capacity can cause states to turn authoritarian; too little can fragment them into autonomous power

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7 A good or service is ‘excludable’ if it is possible to prevent others from benefitting or having access to it.
8 For example, Wave 6 of the World Values Survey undertaken over 2010-14 suggests that citizens tend to believe elections matter for beneficial change. See also the United Nation’s ‘My World, The World We Want 2015’ survey, which polled over 5 million people worldwide and found that honest, effective government is among their top four priorities. http://vote.myworld2015.org/ (Accessed 02.04.16)
9 In the 1960s and 70s it was normal to talk of ‘African democracies’, ‘Latin American democracies’, and ‘Asian democracies’.
blocks. For others, democratisation entails an ongoing deliberative ‘process of bargaining between the state and organised groups in society’ that fosters legitimate institutions and allows them to select their leaders (Unsworth 2007). This enables people to pursue ‘their interest with a measure of autonomy from entrenched structures of dominance and privilege’ (Jalal, 1995:3). It also assures that citizenship is not merely an abstract legal denomination.

Nonetheless, Tilly (2007) has argued that no actual societies live up to these ideals. Thus, democratisation should be viewed as an ongoing process prone to gradual increases and rapid decreases. To explain these movements, he states:

‘Democratization never occurs without at least partial realisation of three large processes: integration of interpersonal trust networks into public politics; insulation of public politics from categorical inequalities; and elimination or neutralisation of autonomous, coercion-controlling power centres in ways that augment the influence of ordinary people over public politics and increase control of public politics over state performance.’ (2007:78)

The elimination of autonomous power in the last of Tilly’s three processes refers to the notion that statehood requires a monopoly of violence. The idea is that by centralising coercive power it can be made subject to public approval, whilst also acting as the guarantor of broad and equal participation in politics. In contrast, in states with warlords, independent local militias or politically connected mafias, violence is often used to control who has a voice and how they vote (Mustafa and Brown, 2010; Waal, 2014).

Tilly’s second process suggests that categorical inequalities that distinguish groups by gender, class, religion or caste pose a greater threat to democracy than material
inequality. This is because they enable some to exclude others from participating in public politics, both through informal and formal means. Furthermore, they can lead to ‘inequality traps’ that stall particular types of development (Rao, 2006; Heller and Evans, 2010). To illustrate, Tilly uses South Africa to show how under apartheid legally enforced categorical inequalities prevented non-whites from enfranchisement and retarded the country’s development. He also shows how even after the debilitating system’s formal end, informal social norms have hampered the ability of marginalised groups to have a political voice.

Tilly’s most interesting process for this thesis concerns his description of ‘interpersonal trust networks’. They are defined as ‘ramified interpersonal connections, consisting of mainly strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes or failures of others’ (Tilly 2007:81). As examples, Tilly offers kinship groups, religious sects, revolutionary conspiracies, credit circles, trade unions and veterans’ associations. For democratisation, these networks, herein clientelistic networks, must be partially integrated into public politics or dissolved, and new networks willing to have their interest publicly debated formed. Through these processes members consent to obligations, such as military service and jury duty, and to paying their taxes. In return, they acquire the state’s protection and the confidence that society’s collective will – discerned through public deliberations – will be carried out, including the ability to hold authorities to account.

Tilly warns, however, that such processes are far from easy. The danger is that clientelistic networks will capture the state and its institutions, or that sensing a threat they will withdraw and hoard opportunities for their members. Such outcomes reverse ongoing democratising projects. Thus, it is theorized that there are points at which clientelistic networks are ‘partially’ integrated into public politics, commit to having roughly the same opportunities for expressing their voice as their rivals and gain a stake in the state’s performance. To identify and support moves towards these

10 Houle’s (2009) study finds that material inequalities may have little effect on democratic transitions, but that they can increase the probability of democratic backslides.
points, attention must be given to contextually specific and frequently shifting relations between clientelistic networks and public politics.

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism’s beginnings have been traced to a group post-World War II European thinkers (Harvey, 2005; Jones, 2012). They worried that concessions given to labour, such as welfare and rights to unionisation, and ideas, such as planned economies and collectivism, were threatening peace and prosperity. They argued that the underlying logic of entrepreneurial freedoms and unfettered markets would better secure these ends and they set about trying to overturn the period’s Keynesian economic orthodoxy. By the 1970s and 1980s they had the ear of incumbent politicians in Britain and America that began implementing their ideas. Through a focus on their policies, neoliberalism is often framed as a revival of the classical liberal notion that the state should only concern itself with enforcing private property rights, external aggressors and the provision of a limited suite of public goods.

In an attempt to add nuance, scholars have since sought to identify what is different about this evolving ideology (Lemke, 2001; Amable, 2010; Gershon, 2011). Many argue that the neoliberal state must act on behalf of the economy. This does not involve it undertaking economic functions, providing more services or redistributing wealth. Rather, it means facilitating the spread of market values to every sphere of life. Thus, its institutions – from the police, to universities and stock exchanges – must propagate and enforce them. Accordingly, the state plays an interventionist role in society but not in markets themselves, with its raison d'État and the test of legitimacy becoming the creation of enabling environments for economic growth. This significantly differs from the liberal ideals of popular sovereignty and a minimalist state that guards against the harmful excesses of markets.
For their part, ideal neoliberal citizens must make choices based on market principles. These include notions of rational self-interest, competition, cost-benefit analyses and periodic collective action for the maximisation of individual gains. Indeed, neoliberal citizens are always, in every situation or sphere of activity, responsible for increasing their own future stocks of human capital. As Lemke (2001:202) puts it:

‘Neoliberalism encourages individuals to give their lives a specific entrepreneurial form. It responds to stronger ‘demand’ for individual scope for self-determination and desired autonomy by ‘supplying’ individuals and collectives with the possibility of actively participating in the solution of specific matters and problems which had hitherto been the domain of state agencies specifically empowered to undertake such tasks. This participation has a ‘price-tag’: the individuals themselves have to assume responsibility for these activities and the possible failure thereof.’

This differs from classical liberalism within which people use market principles to satisfy a variety of needs in the economic sphere, but may draw upon other value systems, such as culture, fraternity or the public good, in the private and public spheres. This is why neoliberalism’s proponents are often accused of suggesting that citizens must fend for themselves when unemployed or in the wake of disasters, whilst big banks – which are part of the architecture needed for markets – receive state bailouts to see them through their own crises (Somers, 2008).

Summarising, the anthropologist Wacquant (2012:72) has argued that neoliberalism ‘consists of an articulation of state, market, and citizenship that harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the third.’ However, such a move requires that ideas – such as the ‘common good’, ‘justice’, ‘legitimacy’, or the ‘stronger argument’
– which cannot be easily quantitated, measured or priced, be considered dangerous irrationalities or simply disregarded. This has led to the stronger argument that neoliberalism’s proponents are engaged in an attempt to replace political judgement or, more simply, politics with economic evaluation (Davies, 2014; Block and Somers, 2014; Brown, 2015).\(^{11}\)

In this sense, neoliberalism’s critics update Polanyi’s (1944) older thesis that Europe’s liberal elites had used the state’s power to artificially separate the economy from social relations and political contests. Indeed, they go further, arguing that neoliberalism requires abandoning the liberal idea of separate economic, social and political spheres. In its place methods for governing every sphere of human activity as if they occur within a market are called for, creating new techniques, templates and prices for what were previously thought of as contested moral or political decisions. Many also suggest that neoliberalism is constantly evolving, with its experts finding new areas of life to govern with market rationalities and new ways of measuring their success at doing so (Foucault, 2008 [1978/9]; Bourdieu, 1998; Ong, 2007; Peck, 2013).

To illustrate this, Brown (2015) offers a detailed account of how market-based understandings of governance and citizenship have spread to America’s higher education and legal systems, embedding self-interest, competition and insecurity. She argues that this is eroding citizens’ capacities to equally and substantively participate in the public sphere. Consequently, a backslide in the quality of participation in deliberative public politics has begun and the future of ongoing radical democratising projects looks bleak. Her claims rest on the premise that democracy can be undone from within, becoming essentially hollowed out, by atomised individuals acting competitively, in accordance with best practices and the letter of the law. This occurs because market rationalities, techniques and values have been imparted to activities and domains where monetary transactions are not, and should not be, the primary concern.

\(^{11}\) Block and Somers (2014) prefer the term ‘market fundamentalism’ to neoliberalism to emphasize the lack of evidence for market principles being better at organising society than alternatives such as culture, religion or democratic deliberations.
Such criticisms suggest that neoliberalism should be investigated as a constantly updated set of ideas and practices propagated and deployed by powerful organisations and states. Indeed, a growing body of sociological and ethnographic literature has sought to show how neoliberal ideas are, not always successfully, used to reshape, manage and supposedly ‘improve’ populations in diverse settings. Work that focuses on Western development organisations’ activities in developing countries is reviewed in Chapter Three. Here, it suffices to say that this thesis is interested in how far neoliberal ideals of citizenship and governance are being resisted, re-appropriated or welcomed in the contemporary enthusiasm for social accountability.

**Thesis structure**

The next chapter explores how powerful Western donor organisations understood and sought to engage civil society in the 1990s and early 2000s. A distinction is drawn between the era’s favoured neoliberal version of civil society theory and an alternative activist version. Focussing on studies from South Asia, the chapter then explores a third body of literature that has investigated how actually existing civil societies contribute to, or retard, democratisation.

Before continuing the inquiry into the use of the idea of civil society, Chapter Three reviews the critical aidnography literature which inspired the thesis’ research design and analytical concepts. It is shown how its studies juxtapose discourse analyses with ethnographies of ongoing programmes to reveal alternative ways of doing development.

Chapter Four undertakes a critical analysis of the ‘social accountability discourse’ in key texts from the World Bank and DFID. It shows how the idea largely replaced the previous era’s focus on ‘social capital’ with ‘information’ and citizens’ powers to ‘choose’ their service providers.
Chapter Five turns to Pakistan’s experience with democratisation. It shows how elites integrate threats to the status quo into clientelistic networks and argues that international donor organisations have attempted to create a technically competent, corporate and, largely, apolitical civil society.

Chapter Six justifies the thesis’ use of constructivist grounded theory and provides a rationale for the quantitative case selection method. It ends by commenting upon my own positionality and biases, and the reality of access and data analysis once I entered the field.

Chapter Seven re-introduces readers to STAEP through DFID’s annual reviews of the programme from 2011 to 2015. I argue that these texts should be read as insights into how particular actors wished the programme’s ground realities to be represented.

The ethnographic data presented in Chapter Eight shows how the CRGs generally functioned through the efforts of their most educated and wealthier members. It is also shown how these members secured their groups’ most prestigious successes. I unpick what this meant for the programme’s potential to contribute to Pakistan’s ongoing democratising project.

Chapter Nine delves into the meanings that STAEP’s non-elite participants gave to the programme. It is shown how participants took the programme’s lessons, techniques and aims, and creatively blended them with their own pre-existing identities and aspirations. However, it is also shown why outcomes with the most democratic potential were ultimately pushed to the margins of the programme.

Chapter Ten returns to the thesis’ overarching research question: Why do civil society programmes in clientelistic states have so little impact on democracy? To answer, the chapter draws together the arguments of the previous three chapters and outlines the contours of a grounded theory of ‘isomorphic activism’. This connects the thesis’ fieldwork findings to the earlier analysis of the social accountability discourse. An
argument is then made that a refocus on the micro-politics of clientelistic states, and the identities and aspirations of social accountability programmes’ participants, would help donors to redefine their notion of what success looks like. To conclude, I explore more recent literature on social accountability, commenting upon how far it engages with power and politics, and what must be done to ensure it continues down this path.
Chapter 2
Civil Society

‘At times the concept seems to take on the property of a gas, expanding or contracting to fit the analytic space afforded it by each historical or sociopolitical setting’

(Foley and Edwards, 1996:42)

This chapter shows how the amenability of the idea of civil society has allowed it to be used by powerful organisations in different models of development. To illustrate, it identifies a mid-1990s divergence between a radical activist and a tame neoliberal version of civil society theory. The former is characterised by a depiction of civil societies as semi-autonomous spaces for identity formation, with the potential for public deliberations to lead to radical democratising projects. The latter by a belief in the ability of a density and plurality of voluntary civic associations to cultivate the sorts of norms or culture needed to support good governance and market-orientated states. Although both strands have been heavily critiqued, I argue that the neoliberal version came to dominate Western development organisations’ approaches to civil society. The chapter concludes by exploring a third body of literature that would also inform the emerging idea of social accountability in the early 2000s. It investigated how actually existing civil societies form relations with states that support development. In the process, it re-introduced the necessity of and frameworks for understanding contests between unequal social groups, bringing issues of power and politics back into understandings of civil society.

Debating the good life and the state of nature

For the ancient Greeks and Romans civil society was political society. Its purpose was deliberations over the shape of the ‘good life’ and the inculcation of civic virtues
(Barker, 1946). This was understood to take place within and among men’s social fraternities, and through formal mechanisms such as citizens’ assemblies. Participation in these activities formed an overarching rule-governed politike koinona (political community) or polis (city-state). Thus, Aristotle suggested that through them men become ‘political animals’ or ‘homo-politicus’.

In the 17th century the liberal thinkers Hobbes and Locke argued that civil society arises from people’s collective need to protect themselves from the state of nature; a condition in which no legitimate political authority rules and insecurity is rife. Thus, civil society was depicted as an arena within which men exchange their natural freedoms for agreed upon laws. For Hobbes, the primary object was security, whilst for Locke it was liberty and private property. Either-way, through consent to a ‘social contract’ a state-like central authority, or ‘Leviathan’ in Hobbes’ terms, could be established to enforce them.

The Enlightenment thinkers Smith, Ferguson, Paine and Kant worried that the modern division of labour within commercial society would encourage atomised and alienated individuals to pursue their self-interest through violence and despotism (Keane, 1988). This can be broadly understood as the fear that homo-economicus (rationally acting, self-interested, economic man) would limit the space for homo-politicus. To address this, they argued that individuals can learn sentiments such as love, kindness, generosity, humour and respect through interactions and bargains made within civil society. To do so, they suggested people must form a plurality of associations, including charitable groups, clubs and professional bodies, independent from the state, which they gave the role of protecting commerce, trade and property.

Developing these ideas, Hegel framed civil society as ‘the achievement of the modern world’ or, put another way, a sphere in which the potential of creative and enterprising individuals could be realised (quoted in: Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999:3). However, he also argued that civil society is wracked by egoism, power differentials, class inequalities and prone to disintegration (Keane, 1988b:50-52). To

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12 Aristotle limited this description to ‘free’ men, excluding women, children and slaves.
address this, Hegel argued for the authority of a constitutional monarchy or state, and surveillance by its officials. He also suggested through their participation in ‘public opinion’ forming mechanisms, such as public forums and political parties, members of civil society could both legitimise and ward against over-intrusions by the state and its officials.

By the mid-19th century, therefore, civil society was generally understood as an arena for socialisation into civic values and debates over notions of the good life. Moreover, it was given the role of safeguarding against domination by economic actors or a despotic state. The state, for its part, was depicted as the guarantor of this life through negotiated consent to laws and, increasingly, mechanisms that allow citizens to participate in governance. Accordingly, it was generally understood that the state and civil society inter-penetrated one another to ensure balance.

Political contests, ideologies and democracy

Marx’s focus on power complicated depictions of the civil society-state relationship (Baker, 1998; Young, 2002). He critiqued the illusion of freedom created by Hegel’s conceptual distinction between the two and sought to show how power affects outcomes within both. This led him to argue that European states are largely subordinate to society’s dominant capitalist classes and that civil society’s deliberative forums are the tools they use to reproduce their power. This challenged the Enlightenment thinkers’ optimism over the role of private property and markets, which Marx thought would eventually be abolished by a revolutionary proletariat and replaced with communism. Moreover, it had real world implications for the way in which intellectuals on the political left, in Europe and elsewhere, viewed their struggles.

Writing in the early 20th century, the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci was concerned with why the type of popular revolutions witnessed in Russia had not
occurred in Italy. He argued that the church, in collusion with economic elites, was encouraging people to accept and internalise their subordination - effectively constituting notions of the ‘common sense’ - in return for rewards in the afterlife (Gramsci, 1999). To address this, he depicted civil society as the location of a radical long-term ‘war of position’ or hegemonic struggle, with ongoing non-violent contests to mould individuals’ mindsets and state institutions. To conduct this fight, he called for ‘exceptional qualities of patience and inventiveness’, alongside ‘enormous sacrifices by infinite masses of people’, with ‘organic intellectuals’, supported by civic associations and social movements, leading the way. Fought in such a manner, Gramsci believed deliberative contests within civil society ‘slowly builds up the strength of the social foundations of a new state’, and creates ‘alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources’ (Cox, 1983:165).

Whilst these debates animated Europe in the mid-20th century, the rediscovered writings of French theorist Alexis de Tocqueville were enshrining associations as the bearers of civic virtues in the American psyche.\(^\text{13}\) Having travelled through the young nation in the early 19th century, Tocqueville argued that civic associations were the forces sustaining its ‘great democratic revolution’ (Tocqueville, 1981:vol.1). He saw them as training grounds for participation in public politics that make citizens ‘feel the obligations which they are bound to discharge towards society and the part they play in its government’. Alongside associations he championed a strong constitution, the uniformity of laws, an independent judiciary, and political associations. Thus, for Tocqueville, American exceptionalism relied on both procedural or formal, and substantive or informal, democracy realised through an active citizenry.\(^\text{14}\)

Two World Wars and the Cold War somewhat interrupted the development of these arcs of civil society theory. As shown in the next section, it was not until the 1970s

\(^{13}\) Tocqueville never used the words ‘civil society’, only ‘associations’.  
\(^{14}\) American exceptionalism refers to the United States’ self-perception as a uniquely free nation founded on democratic ideals and personal liberty. Substantive democracy is often contrasted with procedural democracy, with the latter referring to the holding of elections, and the former as encompassing all the formal and informal institutions that work to check abuses of power by states (Rakner et al., 2007:6-7).
and 80s that dissidents in Eastern Europe and Latin America put Marx, Gramsci and, to a lesser extent, Tocqueville’s contributions into practice.\textsuperscript{15}

**Under totalitarianism**

Confronted with military dictators and totalitarian communist regimes, Eastern European and Latin American intellectuals outlined a vision of civil societies as refuges for globally connected social movements.\textsuperscript{16} They were to offer ‘islands of civic engagement’ from which citizens could retreat from oppressive states, and activists could call on the international community to put pressure on their governments for greater freedoms and rights (Pearce, 1997; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Kaldor, 2003b). To understand why this idea was so powerful, it is necessary to further explore the strategies of these dissident theorists.

Disillusioned with politicians’ attempts to reform their party-states from above and frustrated by failed revolutions, they variously described themselves as engaged in ‘antipolitics’, ‘living in truth’ or as concerned with the construction of a ‘parallel polis’ (Havel, 1985; Michnik, 1985). Broadly viewed, the shared idea was to delegitimize overbearing regimes and ‘put politics in its place’ before re-engaging political society (political party workers, politicians, state authorities etc.) and participating in formalised democratic procedures (Konrád, 1984:92). The first stage of this strategy called for the creation of autonomous spaces - sometimes termed ‘third spheres’ of social action outside of the state or market – that could be home to a multitude of voluntary self-help associations (Wolin, 1993). Within these spaces debates over the proper role of morality, ethics and civic virtue could take place. In turn, these debates would lead to agitation, bottom-up pressure and the use of political opportunity structures provided by international linkages to expose the contradictions of

\textsuperscript{15} Albeit with Eastern European intellectuals seldom directly referencing the communist thinkers (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Baker, 1998:98)

\textsuperscript{16} Tarrow (1998:4) has defined social movements as ‘collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities’.
oppressive states.\textsuperscript{17} Through such actions these states would 'begin withering away and dying off, to be replaced by the new structures that have evolved from below' (Havel, 1985:80).

In this sense, these theorists identified civil society as a sphere for politics, but not the politics practiced by communist states or the capitalist West. Rather, to paraphrase Havel (1985) they sought an:

‘anti-political politics: that is, politics not as the technology of power and manipulation [...] but politics as one of the ways of seeking and achieving meaningful lives [...] I favour politics as practical morality, as service to truth, as essentially human and humanly measured care for our fellow-humans. [...] It is becoming evident that truth and morality can provide a new starting point for politics ... Yes, anti-political politics is possible. Politics from below. Politics of the people, not the apparatus. Politics growing from the heart, not the thesis...’.

This form of politics was not merely designed to seize political power at the top of society. It was meant to redistribute power to those operating in spaces or forums that subscribe to participatory and communicative democratic norms. Indeed, writing long before his presidency (1995-2002), Brazil’s Cardoso argued that:

‘Real democratization will arrive [...] as it is crystallised in the spontaneous solidarity of the disinherited. It lives as \textit{comunitas}, experiences of common hardship which form a collective we based on

\textsuperscript{17} For Tarrow (1998:19), the political opportunity structure denotes ‘changes in opportunities that lower the costs of collective action, reveal potential allies and show where elites and authorities are vulnerable’.
the same life experience that is transformed only when, through molecular changes, the simultaneous isolation of the State and the exploiters - which will perish at the same time - comes about’ (Cardoso and Font, 2001:149).

Or, as Bernhard (1993:316-318) illustrates for Solidarity in Poland, the greater goal was ‘to affect a radical diminution in the autonomy of state from society by a program of democratization that […] made the exercise of state power directly dependent upon the support of social forces within civil society’. ¹⁹

These thinkers saw civil society’s democratising power as involving a parallel double movement; firstly, the creation of autonomous spaces that allow citizens to form their identities and opinions free from domination by authorities or vested interests. Secondly, as a place from which organised groups or their representatives can engage political society and the state in contests over the type of lives they want to lead. For some, this would make new forms of democratic politics a possibility, thereby, reducing the need for a simplistic return to liberal forms of representative multi-party politics (Baker, 1999).

It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that Kaldor (2003a:8) has called this the ‘activist version’ of civil society; Fine (1997:9) refers to it as the ‘the radical type’; and Weigle and Butterfield (1992:4) have suggested that what they were doing was akin to Gramsci’s war of position. In short, these thinkers aimed at nothing less than a re-imagination and re-negotiation of the state-society relationship or social contract.

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¹⁸ Originally written in 1983, entitled ‘Associated-Dependent Development and Democratic Theory’.
¹⁹ Bernhard (1993) shows how this idealised Polish model was not precisely replicated elsewhere.
Activist civil society theory

Enthused by these ideas and the ‘Third Wave’ of democratisation in Asia and Africa, the 1990s and early 2000s saw theorists embark on a new effort to harness the concept of civil society for radical ends (Habermas, 1991; Somers, 1993; Foweraker, 1995; Young, 2002; Alexander, 2006). Many of the themes common to these efforts were captured in Cohen and Arato’s (1992) commanding volume, *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Thus, this section draws upon it to outline the basic contours of an ‘activist civil society theory’ concerned with the deepening and widening of democracy.20

Deepening refers to the idea that civil society provides a relatively autonomous retreat within which citizens can shelter from states and markets, debate previously marginalised issues and identities, and brain-storm ways for them to have a say in governance. It is connected to the formation of associations and other ways of participating in civil society such as social movements. Widening refers to the classical focus on the way civil societies can monitor states and markets; challenging them when they overstep; and encouraging them to adopt new mechanisms and institutions that give citizens a greater voice. In this sense, widening can be thought of as the act of turning civil society’s deliberations into actions and policies by engaging political society and the state. Cohen and Arato argued that these actions require citizens to engage in deliberations with one another and to publicly participate in political society (as politically active publics, politicised associations, and oppositional political parties) (ibid:109-113).

Broadly viewed, their thesis rested on three overlapping contributions: Firstly, they compared the discourses of civil societies in France, Germany, Eastern Europe and Latin America to arrive at the conclusion that they broadly share an ongoing critique of unaccountable state power. Furthermore, instead of violent revolution, they all

20 This label refers to an identifiable continuity of ideas; it does not necessarily denote the identity or nationality of its main thinkers.
favoured gradual structural changes brought about by the energy and ideas of deliberating and politically active citizens.

Their second contribution concerns their description of their work as a ‘political translation of Habermasian critical theory’ (ibid:xvii). Accordingly, they gave a central role to the ‘public sphere’ in legitimizing modes of governance and commerce. For the most part, this refers to their use of Habermas’s theory of communicative action to portray civil society as at danger of being colonised by the rational-bureaucratic logics of the state and market, which ‘freeze social relations of domination and create new dependencies’ (Cohen and Arato, 1992:526). To avoid this and advance democratising projects, civil society must influence and temper the state and market by entering the public sphere – which stretches across both civil and political society – and participating in democratic ‘rational-critical debate about public issues conducted by private persons willing to let arguments and not statuses determine decisions’ (Calhoun, 1992:1). In this ideal, inequalities between participants in deliberations are bracketed or put aside and the strength of the better argument shapes society.

Their third advancement was to suggest that social movements with broad appeal are at the forefront of many democratising projects as they are most able to operate across divides that separate civil society, political society, the market and state. This gives them an unrivalled ability to introduce marginal identities to the public sphere, challenge hegemonic norms and engage in the politics of influence. Furthermore, where structural inequalities prevent democratic deliberations, social movements can carry out acts of civil disobedience as a reaffirmation of popular sovereignty and of the ‘self-limiting radicalism’ of civil societies that have turned their back on violent revolution (Cohen and Arato, 1992:567).
Critiquing activist civil society theory

The ideas of these thinkers undoubtedly went some way towards spreading interest in civil society’s emancipatory potential. Nonetheless, it is possible to discern two overlapping critiques of activist civil society theory. These critiques – which may more accurately be thought of as efforts at refinement – challenged its utility as a tool for describing actual civil societies, particularly in unequal societies, and sought to further develop frameworks with which to understand or evaluate the prospects of ongoing democratising projects.

The first critique involves apprehension that activist theory dangerously ‘privileges’ civil society over all other moments or spheres of social life, on the grounds that civil society furnishes the fundamental conditions of liberty in the modern world’ (Fine, 1997:9). The concern is that civil society is increasingly seen as an unquestionable good and the state or market as its antitheses. Indeed, it was argued that the era’s definitions of civil society often painted simplistic images of a sphere of activity unproblematically instilling democratic values (Baker, 1998:7). Accordingly, analysts were in danger of losing sight of the potential pitfalls of civil society depicted by theorists such as Hegel and of forgetting Habermas’s description of how it can be colonised by other, often anti-democratic, forces.

To address this, critics sought to highlight the role of ‘uncivil’ groups in civil societies. Among others, they have called for more attention to be given to mafias, religious extremists, groups with loyalties based on kingship or caste, nationalists, and brotherhoods of the sort found in militaries and secret societies (Mamdani, 1996; Keane, 1996; Tempest, 1997; McIlwaine, 1998). The problem is not always that such groups break the law or rely upon coercion to achieve their aims; it is that they generally decline to have their ideas and interests publicly debated. Indeed, their hierarchical natures, pre-given identities and immutable intra-group social ties obstruct and limit the sort of deliberative, negotiated and gradual democratising projects that activist civil society theory champions.
It has also been argued that the greatest threat to democracy may come from the ‘insecurity, rootlessness, arbitrariness, and perhaps even the social cannibalism that have come to be associated with many post-transition liberalized societies’ (Whitehead, 1997:111). This refers to the democratic principle that even sections of society with little to no interest in the wider good or participation in democratic deliberations have a vote. This gives them the ability to bend democratising projects to their own ends, and, in some cases, to stall or reverse them when their power is threatened. The election victories of anti-democratic Islamist parties in some of the Arab Springs countries, such as Egypt or Tunisia, are illustrative. To account for this, attention must be paid to how different groups or associations within civil society contribute to or block democratising projects, and to when what appears to be normal participation in the public sphere amounts to a long-run movement away from democratic principles.

The second overlapping debate concerns the possibility of an inclusive public sphere in which citizens can form their identities and have a say in events that shape their lives. This is what Benhabib (1997:2) refers to when she writes: ‘disquiet about the public sphere is at bottom anxiety about the viability of democracy in modern, complex, multicultural, and increasingly globalised polities.’ Indeed, for consensus through democratic deliberations Habermas (1984) suggested that laws must ensure that the correct communicative procedures are followed. However, there has arguably never been a constitution or law that could enforce an inclusive public sphere within which power is bracketed and disputes won through the strength of argument alone. Furthermore, holding any real life deliberative forums to such demands would surely paralyse them to the point of breakdown (Benhabib, 1990).

Accepting this, critics have argued that we must uncover how inequalities are realised through informal institutions and non-discursive practices, or embedded in hidden dependencies – a problem that is particularly acute in societies fragmented by class, caste or gender (Fraser, 1990; Young, 1996; Sanders, 1997). This amounts to an effort to ‘unbracket inequalities in the sense of explicitly thematising them’ through no-holds-barred debate and various communicative mechanisms such as voting.
agreed upon rules of argumentation or defined spaces for marginalised groups (Fraser, 1990:64). Doing so should help those participating in or trying to reform the public sphere to partially account for power asymmetries. It may also go some way towards negating the ability of dominant groups or institutions to set the terms of debate in spaces nominally marked out for free deliberations (Young, 2001).

It has also been suggested that the formation of multiple public spheres can afford subordinate groups a measure of relative freedom within which to formulate their own issues and identities, and to hone their arguments (Fraser, 1990; Keane, 1995; Mansbridge, 2000; Calhoun, 2011). Sometimes termed a ‘subaltern counter-politics’, this allows for a grace period before citizens and associations enter the wider public sphere to engage one another, political society and the state.

As these discussions suggest, the answer to the dilemma of civil society’s undemocratic potential and the practical impossibility of a Habermasian public sphere is not to dismiss such ideas as idealism. Rather, it is to adopt a focus on the power relations and inequalities that affect the agency of those seeking to participate. To begin to operationalise such an approach, Schudson (1994:543-544) suggested focussing on the internal (e.g. educational opportunities), institutional (cultural norms, political parties and electoral procedures) and informational (e.g. free press and open government) resources available to civil societies; whilst, Offe (1997) suggested analysts must explore the ‘micro-foundations of democratic politics’, which he conceptualised as citizens’ civic competence, and the background conditions and institutional frameworks that sustain them.

Civil society, development and democracy

So far, it has been argued that an activist version of civil society theory emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s. Nonetheless, by the mid-1990s much of the enthusiasm over the idea was waning. Alongside the rise of oligarchies in former Soviet Bloc
countries, one party states in parts of Africa and corruption in Latin America were a cause for concern. At the same time, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) – broadly, the shrinking of state welfare services, the deregulation of economies and the opening of domestic markets to global investments – promoted by the Western backed neoliberal Bretton Woods institutions as policies for developing countries were increasingly argued to retard growth, hit the vulnerable the hardest, and dangerously destabilise societies (Nelson, 1990; Leftwich, 1993).\(^{21}\)

In response, the West’s politicians, donor agencies and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) began to look for new policy agendas and complementary on the ground activities, with many finding their answer in an emphasis on ‘good governance’ (Carothers and de Gramont, 2013). At its core, good governance was posited as the provision of technical assistance to developing countries’ state institutions that would enable them to adopt forms, practices and laws developed in the West. This encompassed mainstreaming the principles of ‘New Public Management’, which involves the application of market principles to the administration of the state, including encouraging competition among service providers and the positioning of citizens as the state’s customers (Manning, 2001). As we will see in Chapter Four, these ideas fed into powerful Western development organisations’ understandings of accountability (Hood, 1991; Pierre, 2009). During this era, some Western powers and INGOs also began to suggest that countries were more likely to develop and less likely to pose security threats if they embraced human rights and decentralised electoral democracy (Hyden, 1997; Manor, 1999).

Sometimes termed the ‘post-Washington Consensus’, this signalled a relaxing, although by no means the challenging, of the dominant neoliberal belief in the ability of unfettered markets to drive development. Indeed, following a hiatus throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s, the state and politics were partially brought back into development organisations’ worldviews due to their perceived ability to ‘provide

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\(^{21}\) The Bretton Woods institutions contemporarily denote the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization.
institutions that make markets more efficient’ (WB, 2002:99). Foreign experts and properly trained bureaucracies were positioned to impart the laws and techniques, and to help maintain the institutions central to good governance. Financial assistance became conditional on decentralisation and improvements in quantifiable sets of performance indicators (Pender, 2001). Citizens and private firms within developing countries were accorded roles as the co-producers of public goods, which the state was to gradually stop providing. Whilst civil society organisations, such as unions and professional associations, were encouraged to become the facilitators of employment markets (Cammack, 2002). To prepare populations for these changes, governments were encouraged to make efforts to get ‘societies to accept the redefinition of the state’s responsibilities’ (WB, 1997:3).

At the same time, ‘participation’ – broadly understood as involving citizens in the planning and implementation of development programmes so as to draw on their local knowledge and gain legitimacy – rapidly became the newest development buzzword (Brett, 2003; Alejandro Leal, 2007). At the strategic level, this involved studies to capture the ‘voices of the poor’, the rise of the poverty agenda and efforts by the Bretton Woods institutions to encourage domestic ownership of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (Hickey, 2008). At the programmatic level, a host of new methodologies, such as Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRA), Participatory Learning and Action (PLA), Appreciative Inquiry (AI), Community Based Needs Assessments (CBNA) and Stakeholder Analyses, were offered as how to guides for involving donors’ recipients in programmes. Participation also became the way to ensure ‘sustainability’, ‘empowerment’, ‘equality’, and ‘democracy’, and, thereby, to avoid the corruption and irrelevance thought to have marred previous generations’ development initiatives.

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22 Following calls in the 1980s to ‘bring the state back in’ to conversations around development (Evans et al., 1985).
23 The Bank’s 1997 report also encouraged governments to prevent citizens from voting for the reversal of privatisation using constitutional reforms (WB, 1997:148).
24 ‘Voices of the poor’ was the title of a World Bank report calling upon development practitioners to seek out the perspectives of marginalised groups (Naraya et al., 2000).
The favoured in-country partners for these activities were the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that donors had been working with throughout the 1980s to fill the gaps in service delivery left by under-performing states or those shrinking due to SAPs (Edwards, 1998; Lewis, 2001). Labelled ‘civil society’, NGOs were given the additional task of organising citizens into groups that could be consulted by governments, donors and INGOs. To support these sessions, participants were often given trainings on how to read proposals, budgets and contracts. Nonetheless, in the 1990s these efforts were relatively minor in scale, only accounting for around 5 percent of all American foreign development assistance (Carothers and de Gramont, 2013:64). Furthermore, participation was not seen as a step towards extending civil and political rights. Instead, most donors explicitly steered clear of framing this suite of activities as political; instead preferring to talk of ‘good governance’ or, at most, the benefits of ‘democratic governance’.

To theoretically justify this emerging focus, many development organisations looked to Robert Putnam and his colleagues’ reformulation of the concept of social capital (Putnam et al., 1993; Putnam, 1993, 1995). It became the ‘missing link’ between civil society, good governance, economic development and democracy (WB, 1997). Accordingly, the chapter now turns to their work and the influence of what I term ‘neoliberal civil society theory’ on development.

**Neoliberal civil society theory**

In *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Putnam and his colleagues (1993) used a mixed methods study to identify the causes of Italy’s bifurcation into a civil and institutionally competent North, and an uncivil and institutionally incompetent South. Their bold argument rests on twenty years of data collected after the introduction of reforms in the 1970s and a historical explanation for the observed differences. By its end, they claim to be able to explain variations in the regions’ economies and levels of democratisation.
To do so, they argued that differences between the North and South could be discerned through the density, direction and type of allegiances and alignments in society. In the former, ‘weak ties (like acquaintanceship and shared membership in secondary associations)’ and ‘horizontal’ patterns of organisation cut across social cleavages, leading to ‘norms of reciprocity’ and the stockpiling of generalised ‘trust’ (ibid:174-175). This gave rise to mutually reinforcing, virtuous spirals of ‘brave reciprocity’ that were theorised to be the bedrock for the economic development and democratic governance the region enjoyed. In the South, however, ‘strong’, ‘vertical’ ‘interpersonal ties (like kinship and intimate friendship)’ retarded local government, economic development and, ultimately, democracy. Thus, the South was described as trapped in a ‘vicious cycle’, with clientelistic relations, corruption, greed, low-levels of political participation, and a scepticism of democratic principles (ibid:115).

In conclusion, ‘social capital’ was posited as the responsible independent variable. Cultivated by associations within civil society, it was said to consist of the ‘networks, norms and trust that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (ibid:35-36). Stocks of social capital across Italy, and through time, were measured via newspaper readerships, voting in referenda, and the density of voluntary cultural associations and sports clubs.

The claim that for ‘political stability, government effectiveness, and even for economic progress social capital may be even more important than physical or human capital’ struck a chord among many Americans (ibid:183). Indeed, the depiction of voluntary civic associations as incubators of essential moral virtues and as able to solve problems independently of the state was akin to Tocqueville’s well-known description of America democratic exceptionalism. It also fitted other popular American discourses such as culturalist narratives of the contemporary atrophy of

25 The focus on horizontal ties builds on the foundational work of Granovetter (1973).
associational life peddled by conservative communitarians (Cohen, 1997; Skocpol, 1997).  

Social capital was also appealing to many development agencies and international organisations. As Howell and Pearce (2001:6) argued, its amenability to attitudinal surveys offered them ‘a specific output that could be observed in civil society strengthening programmes and made these programmes more convincing to sceptics within donor organisations’. At the same time, its suggestion that trust built up within and between civic networks reduces the transaction costs of collective action borrowed from a language and set of ideas common to neoclassical economists. This allowed many of its proponents to frame civil societies as markets, with informational deficits or distortions hampering macro-economic and political outputs (Fine, 2001). Many sociologists also argued that social capital gave them opportunities to discuss their insights and concerns within powerful organisations, including the notoriously market orientated World Bank (Bebbington et al., 2004). It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that Putnam’s work was the most cited in the 1990s (Fine, 2001:19).

Despite the widespread enthusiasm, it is notable that Putnam et al. (1993) were far from certain about the possibility of inorganically cultivating social capital in different contexts. On the one hand, they used the idea of ‘path dependency’ to argue that societies with pre-existing high or low stocks of social capital often become locked into self-reinforcing institutional and, thereby, developmental trajectories.  

Whilst on the other, they suggested that the main lesson from Italy is that ‘institutional history moves slowly’ (Putnam et al., 1993:184). Furthermore, directly addressing programmes seeking to support civil society, they noted that ‘local organisations ‘implanted’ from the outside have a high failure rate’ [sic] (ibid:91).

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26 Communitarianism has been described as a ‘distinctive and time-specific’ political philosophy, positioning itself as a third way between the state and market, left and right (Frazer, 2000:178).

27 Path dependence suggests that the institutions that rise following critical historical junctures, such as after wars or economic shocks, play a key role in shaping and constraining future developmental trajectories (North, 1990).
Critiquing neoliberal civil society theory

Despite its favour amongst powerful development organisations, neoliberal civil society theory’s use of social capital has faced several criticisms, both as an imprecise theoretical concept and for the damage its embrace by powerful actors has done to understandings of civil society. Indeed, for many, it is a distraction from the task of conducting contextually specific investigations of actual civil societies, their relationships to other spheres of social life and, therefore, the ways they contribute to development.

In the late 1990s two high-profile journals devoted critical issues to social capital. The first, from *World Development*, began from the premise that all societies have stocks of social capital; the challenge is scaling them up (Evans, 1996; Ostrom, 1996; Heller, 1996; Lam, 1996; Burawoy, 1996; Fox, 1996). The second, from the *Journal of International Development*, sought to both expand and challenge the range of developmental outcomes that could be expected from these stocks (Fox, 1997; Beall, 1997; Putzel, 1997; Harriss and Renzio, 1997).

Many of these critics began by showing what had been omitted from or added to contemporary conceptualisations of social capital. In doing so, they drew upon Bourdieu (1977, 1986) for whom membership in, often exclusive, identity groups, associations or networks builds up social capital. Social capital, therefore, should be understood as a person or groups’ durable or institutionalised mutual relationships. Once accumulated, he argued it can be reinvested or exchanged for other types of capital, such as economic (material resources) and cultural capital (education, skills and intellectual capacities). Bourdieu (1991) also developed an idea of political capital, conceptualised as a variant of social capital ‘that is derived from the trust (expressed in a form of credit) that a group of followers places’ in leaders (Schugurensky, 2000:4). He suggested that it can be used or cashed-in to mobilise supporters and direct them towards desired ends.
Bourdieu (1977) portrayed societies as consisting of a range of overlapping, yet also relatively autonomous, ‘fields’, such as the educational, political or sporting fields. He argued that each field has its own forms of knowledge, rules and practices. Actors within a given field struggle to attain the same goal, such as academic accreditation or votes using their stocks of cultural, economic and social capitals. However, they are limited by relations of power and their own ‘habitus’, which roughly equates with their understandings of their field’s rules and the potential to subvert them.28 Furthermore, he showed that reinvesting or exchanging types of capital to gain a better position within a particular field can be a risky endeavour. For example, one’s investments may not be recognised or reciprocated, as when a gift is rejected or a claim to a position of authority dismissed.

Bourdieu (1986) sought to show how those, herein termed elites, already endowed with large reserves of different types of capital have distinct advantages. Most importantly, they can combine their reserves into symbolic capital, which they use to conceal when they are converting one type of capital into another. For example, the educational system appears to reward natural abilities through awarding qualifications. However, it often enables those that begin with significant reserves of economic and cultural capital to have their privileged positions publicly legitimated and institutionalised through accreditation. In the process, their starting advantages are often ‘disavowed’, washed over or made to appear inconsequential (ibid:262). Elites also often appropriate and misuse social capital collectively owned by the groups they belong to. In Bourdieu’s words, networks and exclusive clubs always contain ‘the seeds of an embezzlement or misappropriation of the capital which they assemble’ (ibid:251).

Through such processes, elites enjoy unrivalled access to new opportunities to further accumulate types of capital, as well as to set the rules of the game or field for others. This is often done through imposing and naturalising distinctions, categories

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28 It has been suggested Bourdieu slips into economic determinism and is, thereby, only able to explain the maintenance of the status quo and subordination (Alexander, 2003). I side with those that argue this is an unfair critique which misunderstands ‘habitus’ as purely unconscious and ignores his later work on cultures (Potter, 2000; Gartman, 2007).
and divisions within the groups and amongst the wider populations to which they belong. This diverts attention away from elites’ actions and motives, and reduces the prospect of holding them accountable. Thus, symbolic capital can help elites entrench and legitimise subordination. This is what is meant by Bourdieu’s frequent references to ‘symbolic violence’.

Understood in this manner, social capital often becomes an important element in the reproduction and maintenance of societal inequalities. Indeed, Bourdieu was sceptical of the potential for its accumulation to lead to broader progressive outcomes. Moreover, he argued that its transferability and usefulness is generally limited to the ‘field’ within which it is cultivated. His ideas also suggest that less privileged actors, merely by trying to improve their situations, often legitimate the rules of the game within oppressive fields. In the process, they unwittingly contribute to structural forces that limit their lives.

Bourdieu’s work poses a problem for social capital’s depiction as an easily transferable developmental resource and its proponents’ suggestion that all good things go together; dense associational life, economic activity and broad political participation. Putzel (1997) argues, therefore, that we must acknowledge that in some cases ‘what has been good for capitalism at given points in history […] has not been good for democracy and vice versa’. Agreeing with the activist literature, Ostrom (1997) suggests that there is a potentially ‘dark side’ to social capital. Furthermore, it is unlikely that newspaper readership, voting levels, and the density of associations can provide an indication of whether this dark side or something beneficial to society is being cultivated.

It is in this sense that Putzel (1997:941) has suggested that there is a need ‘to carefully distinguish between what might be seen as the mechanism of trust (the operation of networks, norms etc.) and the political content and ideas transmitted through such networks and embodied in such norms’. To illustrate, he used the example of Chinese diaspora communities in South-east Asia that have built strong networks to survive abroad and facilitate intra-community trade. But for whom there
is little evidence of an interest in including or engaging with indigenous communities, let alone advancing wider democratising projects.

Putnam and his colleagues have also been criticised for their reading of Italian history (Foley and Edwards, 1998; Hooghe and Stolle, 2003). Most notably, Tarrow (1996) reveals that the North’s socialist and Catholic parties adopted political strategies that relied upon mutually supportive vertical relationships with civic associations. Similarly, Foley and Edwards (1996) draw upon Perlmutter’s (1991) work to suggest that the North’s civic associations, including its sports and cultural clubs, were organised by and for political parties. Whilst Sabetti (1996) has shown how Southern Italy suffered from external and internal colonialism, which helped maintain a feudal economy and prevented the growth of strong civic associations. These re-readings suggest that relations with broadly supportive political societies and states are important for civil societies’ potentials to contribute to developmental aims.

In support of this, a review of forty-five empirical studies using the concept of social capital concluded that it should be treated as a dependent variable, with the ‘social-structural’ factors that determine its potential for economic or democratic development uncovered (Foley and Edwards, 1999). The authors suggested that this would move the idea away from its more normative uses by political scientists and economists. It would also go some ways towards replacing the era’s misguided focus on ‘access to’ networks, with efforts to understand the ‘quality and quantity of resources’ different networks can mobilise and the ends they can pursue.

Viewed together, these criticisms pose two overarching problems for social capital: Firstly, that it champions the benefits of horizontally organised civic associations for development, whilst largely ignoring their mobilising ideologies, their willingness to engage others, and the resources they can draw upon. Secondly, that it overlooks how civil society’s own development may be affected by its vertical connections to political society and the state. Indeed, in many contexts it may be that social capital is as much the product of pre-existing developmentally orientated states, as it is the missing link for development.
Building upon this, Harris (2002:12) argued that social capital:

‘serves the political purposes of depoliticising the problems of poverty and social justice and, in elevating the importance of ‘voluntary association’ in civic engagement, of a painting out the need for political action. ‘Social capital’ is thus a weapon in the armoury of the anti-politics machine’.

Here Harris means that the idea of social capital enables issues of class, power, political conflicts and structural inequalities to be written out of development (Foley and Edwards, 1997). In their place, technical solutions can be offered that focus on tinkering with the form and density of impoverished populations’ associations.

Going further, Fine (1999) argued that social capital’s focus on civil society as a remedy to underdevelopment served the function of taming the then emerging literature on the ‘developmental state’. This needed to done because it suggested that states should pay leading roles in addressing the structural inequalities that retard equitable development through macro-economic planning, redistribution and protectionist policies; activities that the neoliberal Bretton Woods institutions have traditionally rallied against.29 As part of this taming, Fine (2007) has suggested that the sociologists that used social capital to engage the World Bank were ultimately co-opted into its institutional imperatives and interests, thereby, eroding the concept’s critical edge.

The idea of social capital has also been critiqued for enabling outsiders to equate civil society in developing countries with organisations that resemble Western ideas of associational life (Chandhoke, 2001). This has led some donors to overly focus on

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29 The idea of the developmental state has roots in studies of East Asian nations such as South Korea and Taiwan (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990).
NGOs that can represent themselves through Western communicative and professional frameworks, or that uncritically champion their ideals such as free markets. At the same time, groups with more political or cultural aims, such as unions, peasants’ movements and religious organisations have been side-lined. Commentators have since argued that this amounts to an – more or less conscious – effort to depoliticise or tame foreign civil societies (Jenkins, 2001; Kaldor, 2003b).

To further explain these trends, Foley and Edwards (2001:8) suggested that the perversion of Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1988) in the 1990s’ social capital literature was particularly detrimental:

‘Bourdieu and Coleman’s conceptions of social capital take the analogy with financial capital seriously, seeing it as instrumental in the flow of goods and services to individuals and groups. Putnam, by contrast, has popularised a notion of social capital that ties it to the production of collective goods such as civic engagement or a spirit of cooperation available to a community or nation at large’.  

This allowed social capital to morph from a context specific property that people use for personal or group gain, to something that is owned by society and unproblematically scaled up to developmental outcomes. In this sense, social capital theorists were accused of removing the ‘social’ from their arguments through an appeal to economics’ universalisation of the idea of ‘capital’. This amounted to an

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30 Coleman (1988) used social capital to provide social explanations for rational choice theory, thereby, allowing him to reject the more extreme forms of individualism it can entail. He argued that those within a social capital generating structure, such as a family, association or network, can access stocks of it alongside other individually held capitals such as skills (human capital), tools (physical capital), or money (economic capital). Thus, he did not subscribe to the idea of social capital as widely generalizable trust.
attempt to wash-over the postmodern insight that concepts need to be historically and socially grounded (Fine, 2002:797).

As these debates over social capital continued, critical commentators also began to suggest that participatory development had become another tool in the anti-politics machine (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Williams, 2004). As with social capital, the idea had its roots in an older, more overtly political, literature that had gradually been side-lined in favour of top-down approaches to the formalised consultations, and the inclusion of civil society representatives in project planning and implementation. This transformed participation from an organic process with the potential to enable citizens to debate the meaning of development and challenge the structures that underpin poverty, to a technical box ticking exercise carried out by planners keen to show they have the ‘buy-in’ of local populations. Indeed, Kothari (2005:442) lamented the ‘appropriation, technicalisation and subsequent mainstreaming’ of participatory approaches as they have been depoliticised by a development industry obsessed with process rather than politics’. Accordingly, those working on the ground were often found to be blind to how power affects participatory processes, and how it can reproduce itself in the consultative forums set up by development programmes and pushed by the good governance agenda (White, 1996; Conning and Kevane, 2000; Brett, 2003).

Pearce (1997) Baker (1999) went further, arguing that the idea of civil society had had its radical potential eroded. They suggested that ‘scientific’ theorists of democratic transitions were advocating for the demobilisation of the mass of politically active citizens once they had seized liberalising opportunities in previously authoritarian states (Linz and Stepan, 1989; Dahrendorf, 1990; Lewis, 1993). And they insinuated that some commentators were portraying politicised associations and radical democratising projects as potentially destabilising. They also argued that the democratic consolidation literature was championing a view of civil societies as merely responsible for aggregating and raising limited demands to responsive political parties and state institutions (Valenzuela, 1992; Schmitter, 1995).
These ideas amounted to a functionalist portrayal of civil society and an institutionalist view of democratisation. Nonetheless, with social capital as their methodology, they were argued to have been embraced by powerful development organisations. This left little room for the nuanced debates being had by the activist strand’s theorists, including their understanding of civil societies as places for identity formation and radical critiques of the status quo. In their place, development organisations focussed on supporting a plurality and density of horizontally organised civic associations in the assumption that they would contribute towards the accumulation of developmental norms and the consolidation of democratic institutions.

The criticisms of development’s embrace of social capital remind us that the ontologies and methodologies deployed by theorists and practitioners are rarely objective, value-free tools. Furthermore, those that adopt popular ideas and hegemonic discourses to be accepted by the mainstream may find that they unwittingly lend themselves to reductive solutions to problems rooted in power and politics.

**Actually existing civil societies**

During this era, researchers were also undertaking studies of actually existing civil societies’ roles in ongoing developmental transitions (Heller, 1996; Abers, 1998, 2002; Fox, 2007). They often began from the conclusion of Rueschmeyer et al’s (1992:50) vast comparative study that ‘it was not the density of civil society per se’ that supported successful democratic transitions, ‘but the empowerment of previously excluded classes aided by this density’. Accordingly, many sought to bridge the activist and neoliberal theorists’ notions of civil society by bringing power, social norms, identity, politics, history and the wider context back into focus. This section briefly overviews literature within this stream focussed on South Asia. It ends by
outlining a framework that will be used in Chapter Five to investigate dynamics in Pakistan.

Fitting into what Woolcock (1998:167) calls the ‘comparative institutionalist literature’ on developmental states, Heller (1996) documented how the Indian state of Kerala had supported a vigorous and dense network of civic associations, including cultural clubs and educational movements focussed on the provision of public goods. It had also instituted welfare programmes, nationalised a large percentage of the economy, and created regular opportunities for public deliberations with the political opposition and wider civil society. These complementary processes had led to social development indicators that are unrivalled elsewhere in India and almost on par with developed countries.

To explain this, Heller argued that following independence from Britain Kerala identified its most pressing challenge as overcoming the particularistic and exclusive demands India’s feudal and caste-based society makes on its states. This was begun by the incumbency of the Communist Party of India and sustained over the following decades through social movements linked to competitive mass party politics. The latter required successive governments (communist or otherwise) to be broadly responsive to popular demands (e.g. land-reforms, welfare programmes and labour laws) that broke down patron-client relations and loosened the grip of powerful vested interests on decision making. In turn, the raising of, and acquiescence to, these demands gradually changed Keralans’ dominant political identities from those based on caste to ones based on class.

Over time, these processes led state and society to understand and permeate one another, and they democratised ever greater areas of life. For example, trade union and party members came to control traditionally hierarchical panchayats (village governance institutions), and new forums were created to negotiate ‘class compromises’ between workers, the state and enterprise. Individuals also regularly

31 The foundational authors of this literature are Amsden (1989), Wade (1990) and Evans (1989).
32 Here Heller alludes to the work of Brass (1990) and Migdal (1988) on how strong, yet fragmented, societies in liberal democracies can contribute to over politicised and demand laden weak states.
moved between civil society, including numerous NGOs, political society and the state. This gradually made local governance institutions more meritocratic and, as subsequent studies have shown, responsive to the needs of citizens (Heller et al., 2007). It also tempered civil society’s more militant tendencies, thereby, making Kerala attractive to investors.

Heller’s story seemed to suggest that all good things can go together. However, compared to Putnam’s and his colleagues’ (1993) depiction of Northern Italy, it included identities, power, politics and the state in its list of things. As Heller (1996:1057) argued; a ‘high degree of associationalism in and of itself cannot explain the structural transformations that have unscored Kerala’s social development’. Rather, the ‘redistributive thrust of Kerala’s social development has carried with it a direct attack on traditional structure of power [and entails] a fundamental realignment in the balance of class forces’.

Commenting on this study and others from this era, Evans (1996:1119) argued that a ‘synergy’ between state and society based on ‘ties that cross public-private divides’ is as important for developmental outcomes as horizontal ties between civic associations. These ties create opportunities for the co-production of public goods and services, and for citizens to hold authorities to account when they fail to deliver on their promises. Indeed, Evans (1989) had long argued that the ‘embedded autonomy’ - situations in which developmental states retain enough ties with their societies to understand their problems and needs, and to feel obliged to work on them, combined with enough distance not to be captured by special interests - is central to maintaining developmental relations.

To begin to understand how these relations might be engineered, Evans (1996:1124-29) argued analysts must examine the relative weight of endowments left to each society. Drawing upon Bourdieu, he conceptualised social capital as an endowment that resides in civil society; and robust, efficient bureaucracy as an endowment of the

33 Granovetter (1985) argued that all economic action is embedded in social relations and that development brought a change in the kind, not the degree, of embeddedness.
state. Moreover, he argued that in much of the developing world stocks of social capital are not the key constraining factor. Instead, the problem is scaling up or connecting the networks that give rise to social capital with political society and the state in ways that positively affect developmental outcomes.

Evans (2002) has also called for research that uncovers the ‘myriad concrete relationships of mutual support that connect communities, NGOs and social movements with individuals and organisations inside the state who put a priority on livelihoods and sustainability’. He suggests that these relations are likely to be part of, and to develop through, cycles of conflict and cooperation among rival societal groups, and between citizens and the state. Moreover, political associations, oppositional political parties and social movements are likely to be at their centre.

Evans has recently added that deliberative and participatory institutions at different levels of governance can ensure the flow of information that can support the efficient allocation, and the co-production, of public goods (Heller et al., 2007; Baiocchi et al., 2011; Heller, 2012). Furthermore, these institutions can go some way towards addressing power inequalities between citizens, political society and the state. Elsewhere, Heller (2008) has drawn upon Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach and the institutional turn in comparative political economy to argue that to survive in a globalised economy developmental states must build institutions that encourage participatory democracy, thereby, cultivating ever greater and broader ties to civil societies.34

Contentious mobilisations

Other observers of South Asia’s civil societies have emphasized how they differ from those in Europe and, in the process, thrown doubt on the universalism of some

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34 For comparative institutional political economy literature see -North (1990), Rodrik et al. (2002) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
strands of Western theory (Dunn and Hann 1996; Lewis, 2001; Kaviraj and Khilnani 2009). Amongst them, Chatterjee (2004) drew upon fieldwork among Kolkata’s slums to describe how popular politics operates in ‘most of the world’ (as his book’s title puts it). He argued that the needs and demands of poor and marginalised citizens are often communicated through vertical relationships between community representatives or leaders, and large employers, government officials and politicians. When these relationships do not yield the desired results, communities can engage in illegal activities such as siphoning off public utilities or squatting on public land. Some may even resort to violent protest.

Chatterjee argues that state authorities do not always meet such practices with coercion and oppression. Nor do they officially recognise the marginalised groups’ demands and accord citizens their full rights. Instead, they often unofficially accommodate them through targeted payments and development programmes, or by turning a blind eye to their ongoing illegal activities. This requires the state to make frequent exceptions to normal stipulations that citizens pay taxes, have proper documentation and are law-abiding. Authorities do this because even the most marginalised population groups in post-colonial democracies have valuable votes which they can trade with politicians for concessions; transactions which Chatterjee frames as a distinctively subaltern form of democratisation.

To illustrate, Chatterjee shows how the leaders of squatters’ associations constantly reinvent the bounds of community to demonstrate their strength to political patrons. He argues that ‘communities’ are the terrain upon which negotiations, struggles and compromises between such groups play out in the post-colonial world because resource strapped states cannot afford to fairly distribute public goods across their entire populations. Through such means, Chatterjee contends that the ‘politics of democratisation’ does not occur in civil society, which is a label he only applies to small groups of metropolitan, usually wealthy, corporate elites that subscribe to Western norms (ibid:282). Rather, it takes place in the ‘much less well-defined, legally ambiguous, contextually and strategically demarcated terrain of political society’.
Chatterjee’s notion of ‘political society’ shines light onto the actual political practices of South Asia’s poor and marginalised. In the process, it highlights how democratisation is unlikely to conform to the ideals championed by Western theorists, and that people and associations are more likely to devise contentious or illegal strategies that are suited to the inequalities and lopsided distributions of power that animate post-colonial states. In this sense, Chatterjee encourages investigations of where and how negotiations between citizens, different types of authority and the state take place. Nonetheless, some have sought to refine his ideas and others have questioned their utility for grasping the prospects of widening and deepening ongoing democratisation projects. Their overlapping criticisms take two main forms:

The first holds that Chatterjee collects too much activity – from community associations, political parties, social movements, protests and illegal action – under his notion of political society, thereby, making it imprecise, whilst unjustifiably reducing civil society to the limited domain of Westernised corporate capital. This Marxian binary cannot adequately account for how actual civil societies are both shaped by and shape markets and the state. It also ignores the arguments of older theorists such as Hegel that civil societies are a creative melting pot and Gramsci that they are battlegrounds for different classes. In doing so, Chatterjee overlooks how civil societies can combine norms, idioms and practices from elsewhere with those already familiar to them to create hybrid institutions which enable citizens to raise their voices. Indeed, Chatterjee’s contention that Western civil society theory is, for the most part, an imposed or alien concept unsuited to the reality of post-colonial states appears to dismiss the creativity of those he studies.

Mannathukkaren (2010) uses an analysis of Kerala’s mid-1990s devolution scheme to add empirical weight to this critique. It shows how interactions between civic associations, corporate capital, political parties and the state gradually changed the

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35 For reasons stated later, in the rest of the thesis my use of political society is not in Chatterjee’s sense. Instead, as with the activist civil society theorists, I use it to denote those connected to or formally involved in party politics.
character of all in ways that have challenged patron-client relations. At the same
time, he reveals that elements within Keralan civil society colluded with others in
political society and the state to capture the local spoils of the scheme, such as
government construction contracts and new elected positions of authority.
Mannathukkaren’s point is that neither outcome, developmental or negative, would
have occurred without power-laden struggles, cooperation, creations and
interpenetrations that blur Chatterjee’s harsh distinction between political and civil
society. Accordingly, more complex and nuanced understanding of post-colonial
politics are required to explain its various outcomes.

The second broad criticism holds that rather than shedding light on how South Asia’s
poor contribute to wider ongoing democratising projects, Chatterjee’s (2004) notion
of political society describes their survival strategies. Thus, by valorising the ‘squalor,
ugliness and violence of popular life’, Chatterjee fails to fully grasp the ‘dark side’ of
local politics that forces the poor to rely on intermediaries located within patronage
networks (ibid:74). Ultimately, this severely curtails the prospects of identifying and
supporting radical democratising projects that could truly transform their condition.

To illustrate how this occurs, Gudavarthy and Vijay (2007) present a study of three
villagers’ associations’ struggles for justice in a pollution affected area of Andhra
Pradesh, India. Caused by local industries ignoring environmental standards, the
decades long pollution had degraded farmland, closed ancillary businesses, and made
some areas uninhabitable. When the associations raised the issue with authorities
they faced, sometimes violent, coercion by the police and organised mafias. At the
same time, the polluting industrialists and their political allies used local
intermediaries to mobilise counter associations and protests, often also offering
villagers bribes, targeted development projects and income-earning opportunities.

Gudavarthy and Vijay document how over-time the villagers came to accept these
sorts of targeted, limited ‘strategic’ demands as the ‘politics of the possible’
(ibid:3052). Many gave up on activism aimed at realising the sorts of structural
changes needed to halt the environmental damage. Some leaders also accepted low-
level positions in parties allied with the industrialists and desperation caused new
generations to increasingly accept the livelihood opportunities they provided.

Surveying these changes, Gudavarthy and Vijay argue that ‘strategic politics’ has a
‘long-term impact on the community life itself - on the trust, social fabric, social
relations, and solidarity amongst the people of a community’ (ibid:3057). And they
conclude that Chatterjee’s example of Kolkata’s squatters’ associations winning
concessions from the state is an anomaly and that they probably only won
concessions because they did not directly challenge major vested interests. In this
sense, political society and its associations are better understood as mechanisms for
limited survival strategies, rather than as drivers of ongoing democratising projects.

Further unpicking the sub-continent’s sub-national politics, Berenschot (2014) argues
that India’s poor voters are often connected to politicians by a class of brokers which
he terms ‘political fixers’.36 He defines them as ‘intermediaries who use political
contacts and knowledge of official procedures to help citizens, particularly the poor,
deal with state institutions’. And he argues that they help to explain why Dalits in
Gujarat vote for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that has traditionally worked against
their interests.

Berenschot’s research shows how the mechanisation of Gujarat’s agrarian economy
and insecure livelihoods in urban areas created room for fixers connected to the BJP
to cultivate Dalits’ votes. However, he distinguishes between fixers that can be more
accurately described as ‘party workers’ and those that are ‘social workers’. Although
both divert scarce developmental resources and job opportunities to their clients
through their connections to low level state officials and elected politicians, social
workers that have proved their ability to mobilise votes in previous elections are
more able to switch political allegiances should their political patrons fail to deliver.
This gives them a measure of leverage over politicians which Berenschot argues
makes contemporary patron-client relations less immediately exploitative than those

36 He sought to build upon an older literature that, before Chatterjee (2004), depicted such fixers as the
‘lubricants’ or ‘enablers’ of India’s democracy (Reddy and Haragopal, 1985; Manor, 2000).
described by the older literature discussed in Chapter One (Scott, 1972; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1980).

Despite this, Berenschot (2014) ultimately concludes that what India’s poor classes gain through their relations with political fixers in terms of their ability to influence the implementation of state policies and resources at the local level, they trade for their capacity to have a substantive voice in the drafting of policies at the macro level. This means that they have few prospects of influencing or challenging the structures that contribute to their poverty, nor can they change the overall distribution of power. This assessment of India’s patronage politics is shared by Harris-White (2003) for whom fixers and their clients contribute to a ‘shadow-state’ that perpetuates an inegalitarian, oppressive and, sometimes, violent polity. Their continued presence requires domestic reformers and concerned outsiders to work hard to identify parts of civil society that are interested in challenging, rather than maintaining, the status quo.

Shah’s (2010) ethnography of rural elites in Jharkhand, India, further explores the idea that a layer of intermediaries mediates marginalised groups’ relationships with the state. It shows how they often use their positions to appropriate the state’s resources and climb further up the hierarchical ladders of politicised patronage networks. Nonetheless, Shah situates intermediaries’ ambitions within local ‘moral economies’ that hold what appear to be corrupt practices (e.g. taking cuts, paying unofficial commissions and diverting development projects) to outsiders to be locally legitimate ways of furthering one’s material and social status. Furthermore, they are widely regarded as a means of ensuring that the state’s resources are put to locally appropriate ends, rather than those thought up by bureaucrats that rarely visit Jharkhand.

Shah argues, however, that this local moral economy ultimately maintains rural elites’ grip on power. Indeed, it arose as the region’s political economy gradually

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37 The argument that contemporary Indian patronage politics retains an important ‘moral’ dimension has also been recently made by Piliavsky (2014b).
changed from one based on agriculture and the domination of landowners, to one based on jobs and services provided by the state. Faced with this challenge, landowning elites propagated a discourse amongst lower castes that portrays the state as alien, oppressive and, when necessary, best engaged through intermediaries or patrons. This caused Jharkhand’s landless Adivasis to focus their energies on resurrecting and protecting a morally and spiritually superior ‘sacral polity’, thereby, leaving unaccountable rural elites to interact with the secular state from which they appropriate the bulk of resources. Accordingly, Shah concludes that Chatterjee’s (2004) idea of a democratising and developmental ‘political society’ requires stronger ethical standards that can account for the debilitating inequalities between, and norms prevalent amongst, India’s poor.38

Many of these more critical authors begin from the premise that South Asian post-colonial states can be described as ‘patronage democracies’ which Chandra (2007:86) defines as systems within ‘which the state has a relative monopoly on jobs and services, and in which elected officials enjoy significant discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state’. Within them, it is the very poor, especially in urban areas, that occupy the most precarious positions because they have few independent means of accessing state officials, institutions or politicians. Accordingly, they make a ‘Faustian bargain’ with local intermediaries and, by extension, their political patrons that puts aside collective actions that might challenge the status quo in exchange for social safety nets that allow them to weather unforeseen economic and social shocks (Wood, 2003:468).

**South Asia’s CBOs and NGOs**

de Wit and Berner (2009) use research from three Indian cities’ state welfare programmes to show how community-based organisations (CBOs) and NGOs play

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38 See Chapter Two for a discussion of Chatterjee’s (2004) notion of ‘political society’.
often play a role in maintaining this bargain. They suggest that vertical patronage relations link CBOs that have accumulated political capital and NGOs with cultural capital to politicians that, in return for votes, can ensure that some, albeit a small proportion, of programmes’ resources reach the poor. However, they argue that as NGOs must compete for lucrative contracts from these politicians and, in turn, CBOs court their favour to implement them within their communities, these organisations cannot easily challenge their patrons’ wider policy directions or ideologies. They also argue that CBOs are rarely the representatives of the communities they publicly claim to be. Instead, they are more often vehicles for kin or identity-based interest groups that have little interest in widening or deepening democracy. And their leaders often disband them once an opportunity to accrue benefits has been exhausted.

Their findings place further doubt on Chatterjee’s (2004) idea that community associations are the drivers of democratisation in South Asia. Indeed, they add to others’ arguments that the idea of the ‘community’ – which is often understood by Western development organisations to be a geographically demarcated population with shared interests – reveals little about how the poor are organised by intermediaries in developing countries (Cornwall and Eade, 2010). Accordingly, their research reminds others that they should not take the representativeness or goals of civic organisations at face value.

Authors have also explored the role of civil society organisations in Bangladesh following its independence from Pakistan in 1971 (White, 1999; Karim 2001; Devine, 2006; Lewis and Hossain, 2008). Many begin by noting the influence of foreign donors and the rise of professionalised NGOs. Such is their prevalence that by the mid-1990s the World Bank (1996:5) reported that NGOs were operating in 78 percent of villages and that one third of the population had accessed their assistance. Nevertheless, following initial optimism over their potential to provide humanitarian relief and engage in advocacy, some observers began to question their representativeness and their wider roles.
The former concern centred on how foreign funding enabled some NGOs to operate with little local legitimacy amongst, and accountability to, those they claimed to serve. It was also pointed out that many worked through personal and particularistic lines, with founders from powerful families or those engaged in party politics using them to provide favours and dish out the state’s or donors’ resources as patronage (Devine, 2006; Lewis and Hossain, 2008). The latter concern focussed on how NGOs providing services and engaging in advocacy were blurring the distinction between themselves, oppositional parties and the state in the minds of ordinary people (White, 1999; Karim 2001).

On the one hand, therefore, the NGOs activities were often found to be far removed from the open, impersonal, and pluralistic cultures promoted by the Western development organisations that were increasingly funding them. Whilst on the other, NGOs, particularly those delivering services and dominating the public sphere, were accused of reducing politicians’ incentives to serve their citizens. Towards the end of the 1990s authors also highlighted donors’ rising preference for those organisations that subscribed to the depoliticised norms of the good governance agenda, with some worrying that this was reducing the resources and space for other types of public spirited associations, such as religious bodies, women’s collectives or diaspora groups.

In a series of articles, Lewis (2010a, 2017) has further charted the evolution of Bangladesh’s NGOs. He shows how a mixture of clientelism, poor leadership, state oppression and donor taming has resulted in a depoliticization of the sector, reducing the ability of many previously radical NGOs to challenge elites. To illustrate, he has followed the histories of several large NGOs established after independence. Despite initially being under military rule, many managed to carve out space for themselves by working on humanitarian and disaster response. Influenced by Paulo Freire’s (1970) writings, some also began to spread awareness of rights, educate the poor as to the structural causes of their condition and, albeit with limited success, mobilise
them into advocacy groups. These activities contributed to the movement for the restoration of democracy in the 1980s (Uddin, 2006).

However, after a return to elections in 1991, many of these NGOs were integrated into political parties’ patronage networks, whilst others simply atrophied due to a lack of local legitimacy and charismatic leaders that failed to incubate talented successors. Then, in the early 2000s, continuing advocacy efforts by larger NGOs and accusations of political bias sparked a backlash from the ruling party and its Islamist allies. It took the form of registration procedures and regulations designed to curtail criticisms of the ruling elite. These controls were combined with rewards for those that confined themselves to service provision. NGO staff were also violently harassed and popular vocal leaders arrested.

Fearing their access would be curtailed, previously protective foreign donors often shied away from supporting the targeted NGOs. Furthermore, they began to favour those that would not overtly challenge the state and that accorded with their conceptual models of civil society organisations as vehicles for depoliticised service delivery. These moves were accompanied by a renewed focus on funding programmes that could relatively quickly report measurable changes in developmental indicators, rather than those that sought longer running norm or structural changes.

Viewed together, these commentaries on Bangladesh show how within semi-authoritarian states the internal dynamics of individual organisations, the nature of wider political relations, and international actors’ ideas and activities can combine to weaken, depoliticise and co-opt civil societies. Yet, Lewis (2017) has also highlighted how principled NGOs may be able to avoid such outcomes. In Bangladesh, this has been achieved by those that have largely rejected donor funding, remained outside of political patronage networks, focussed on mobilising and building the skills of marginalised groups, especially women, and sought to horizontally connect local level

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39 Although many were heavily criticised for not declaring their support for the movement.
organisations. For many, the hope is that such activities will leave them ready to seize opportunities to further democratising projects as and when they arrive.

To summarise, the reviewed investigations of South Asia’s civil societies reveal how they can differ from the templates laid out by Western theorists. For example, they suggest that ongoing political struggles and the creative processes they engender can lead to new activities and type of associations with the potential to drive democratising projects. However, they also show that people and communities can be connected to politicians and the state in ways that deliver them benefits, whilst maintaining debilitating status quos or eroding their own ability to participate in politics. Nonetheless, aside from Chatterjee (2004), most of the reviewed authors do not see a need to dismiss or relegate the idea of civil society. Instead, they call for nuanced studies of political dynamics in post-colonial, vastly unequal and, sometimes, oppressive clientelistic states.

A framework for analysing civil societies

Developed from his research on Mexico, Fox’s (2007) relational framework can help analysts wishing to pursue this research agenda. It aims to account for how actors and institutions belonging to different conceptual spheres - civil society, political society, the state and international sphere - interact with, permeate, support and constrain one another. Thus, it understands the evolution of civil societies as an ongoing process embedded in broader social and political dynamics, rather than assuming they will follow the trajectories documented in other states. It also moves beyond normative conceptualisations of social capital that suggest it will unproblematically contribute to developmental outcomes by grounding the idea in rich historical and relational analyses. It has three overlapping area of focus:

40 Although beyond the scope of this thesis, Lewis (2013) documents a rise in literature investigating how contemporary authoritarian states co-exist with civil societies, often tolerating their associations and service provision as long as they do not challenge them in public sphere.
Firstly, ‘political opportunity structures’ that result from contests between elites that effect civil society’s capacity to mobilise. As Fox contends: ‘Associational life does not unfold in a vacuum (ibid:56). Even within semi-authoritarian regimes, reformist elites can provide frameworks, such as through transparency, cooperation, resources or legislation, within which civil societies grow. Whilst others can use their command of the state’s services and its coercive apparatus to shut them down. Reformists and the international community, therefore, must often also protect nascent civil societies from the predation, capture by or oppression of others.

The second centres on the ‘social energy’ of motivated civil society activists and the organisations willing to bear the, often high, start-up costs of mobilisation. Here Fox (2007) purposively confronts the idea - found within Putnam and his colleagues (1993) work on Italy - that historical legacies constrain the evolution of civil societies in a path-dependent manner. Instead, as with the remoulding of caste- and class-based identities in Kerala, the suggestion is that even within unfavourable contexts societal leaders can introduce or craft new ideas, associations and institutions to challenge the status quo (Evans, 1996; Abers, 1998).

The last building block, ‘scaling up’, concerns Evan’s (1996) observation that most societies have large stocks of social capital and that the challenge is cultivating horizontal and vertical network that use it developmental aims. This involves connecting groups within civil society with sympathetic actors within political society, the state and international sphere. Once networked, civil societies theoretically pool resources and become harder to subordinate. Thus, analysts must be on the lookout for developmental networks that span multiple levels of governance and state-society divides.

This framework is drawn upon in Chapter Five’s analysis of Pakistan’s civil society and Fox’s more recent work focussed specifically on social accountability explored in the thesis’ conclusion.
Conclusion

This chapter has outlined three sets of literature that explore civil society’s perceived roles in development. Although grounded in liberal theory and influenced by the experiences of dissidents, the activist version was critiqued for overlooking the ‘dark-side’ of civil societies. This led to research agendas that sought to uncover how power permeates civil society and the public sphere, and the factors which could hold-back or support radical democratising projects. Despite this, it was shown that a neoliberal version of civil theory came to dominate thinking within some powerful Western development organisations in the late 1990s. By placing Putnam and his colleagues’ (1993) version of social capital at its centre, it introduced a focus on the density of horizontally organised voluntary civic associations. It also suggested that the stocks of trust they accumulate would unproblematically drive the reforms needed for good governance. This largely removed the role of ideas, identities, power, political contests and the state from analyses. Indeed, many speculated this was the goal.

Focussing on studies from South Asia, a third set of literature was explored that has sought to bring back into the idea of civil society issues of identify formation, power inequalities and messy political contests. It suggests that in some places broad participation in public life and coalitions that straddle the society-state divide have been key to challenging forms of clientelist politics and kick-starting developmental cycles. But it also warns that democratisation is often patchy across any given context, and likely to be mired by setbacks and reversals, and that the history and nature of citizens’ associations and vertical society-state relations must be investigated within each context to understand their potential to contribute to wider democratising projects. The chapter concluded by outlining a framework that is used later in the thesis to do this.
Chapter Three

Aidnography

‘The development discourse does change extraordinarily fast [...] it is amazing how things come and go’.

(Senior NGO Staff Member)\textsuperscript{41}

Before continuing the thesis’ inquiry into powerful Western development organisations’ use of the idea of civil society, this chapter conducts a review of recent critical literature investigating their wider activities. It argues that fruitful research occurs when organisations’ meta- and policy-discourses are juxtaposed with ethnographic investigations of the programmes they support. Such investigations can reveal the work that discourses do in terms of legitimising particular ways of seeing the world and acting within it, including their potential to uphold or challenge debilitating status quos. They also remind us that despite their evident material and symbolic advantages, development’s grand orientating ideas rarely remain intact or fulfil their intended consequences once they are put into practice. The chapter’s conclusion argues that researchers adopting discourse analyses should draw upon more rigorous methodologies to help them uncover the struggles within, and the potential alternatives to, dominant modes of doing development.

Development practice

Critical studies of development as practiced by international organisations and their in-country partners have a long history (Crewe and Axelby, 2012; Gardner and Lewis, 2015). Until the mid-1990s many researchers used individual projects or programmes

\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{41} Interview with Senior NGO Staff Member 3 24.08.15
as their units of analysis. They often framed development as a top down undertaking, or as something done to a population, group or sector by others. They also portrayed developers as outsiders, unfamiliar with the needs, institutions and cultures of those they sought to develop. Accordingly, ethnographies documented how programmes fail or have unintended consequences due to the ignorance of planners. And they routinely concluded with a list of reasons why anthropologists and those being developed should be consulted throughout programmes lifespans. Although it is beyond the scope of the thesis to review this older literature, this section uses three brief examples to set the scene for the questions and methods authors began adopting in the mid-1990s.

Amongst the older style of study, van Schendel’s (1981) retrospective examination of a rural cooperative based livelihoods programme in Bangladesh, called the ‘Comilla experiment’, is emblematic. It showed how the programme was initially praised as a potentially replicable model of inclusive development that engaged the poor and marginalised to address rural inequalities. However, subsequent ethnographic evidence suggested that the lending groups it created were gradually dominated by the same wealthy villagers that they were designed to challenge. Furthermore, many marginalised participants, such as jobless women, only engaged with the programme’s activities to accrue the per diems it offered. Despite this, the programme was rolled out to additional locations in the mid-1960s and adopted by the government as a major initiative to combat rural poverty in the 1970s.

In search of the root causes of these outcomes, van Schendel shows that the programme’s planners and managers mostly engaged with the village through its elites. Furthermore, when they did consult the poor they dismissed their scepticism of the programme’ activities as down to their ‘limited horizons’ and ‘peasant fatalism’. Instead, they trusted that their own brand of ‘enlightened optimism’ was enough to ensure it would be a success. In conclusion, van Schendel argues that the programme’s emphasis on greater rice yields, cooperatives and skills trainings were

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42 I use ‘programmes’ going forward as criticisms of the idea that development can be cultivated through bounded ‘projects’ has caused many organisations to portray themselves as engaged in programmes.
inappropriate to the context and ultimately side-lined opportunities to challenge the structures sustaining rural poverty in Bangladesh.

Porter et al’s (1991) book, *Development in Practice: Paved with Good Intentions*, critiqued Kenya’s Magarini resettlement scheme (1973-1989). The authors drew upon first-hand knowledge gained from working on it and by conducting appraisals of its internal planning documents, including cost-benefit analyses, evaluations and logical frameworks. This allowed them to show how the Australian and Kenyan governments ignored early indicators of its inappropriateness. Indeed, the programme appears to have arisen from the former’s desire to increase its national profile in Africa and an assumption that its experts had a comparative advantage in dryland farming techniques, rather than a wide search for addressable local problems. Furthermore, as it evolved, mistakes were made – such as the use of destructive farming machinery to make up for a shortage of labour – that could have been avoided if the Giriama people it sought to resettle had been consulted. Eventually managers brought in local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to add a participatory element to the programme and to ensure the sustainability its activities, but the authors’ show how the feedback managers received was largely ignored.

To explain their findings, Porter et al critique the wider international development sector, arguing that it is characterised by a ‘control-orientation’ that wrongly believes it can account for the infinite number of variables likely to affect programmes. Although sometimes suited to technical challenges, such as road or bridge building, this orientation requires more complex socio-economic programmes to ignore the historical and political structures that have given rise to whatever problem they set out to address. Furthermore, they show that as cracks begin to appear in programmes, managers often down-play them and press-on due to incentives that reward professionals that can rigidly stick to blueprints and milestones crafted in national or foreign capitals. Alongside regularly consulting those programmes seek to
help, the authors recommend that development must be wholly reinterpreted as a ‘on going, adaptive and therefore diverse process’ (sic) (ibid:199).

Other ethnographers were not simply content with conducting retrospective studies. Instead, they offered development practitioners guides as to the sorts of questions they should ask when planning or evaluating a programme. By exploring how development programmes look from the perspective of the developed, Mair (1984) argued that anthropological analyses can provide information on what is needed and what can be built upon within the societies programmes seek to steward. She suggested that knowledge of the nature of the economy, kinship and land rights ought to be sought by planners, and issues such as equality, urbanisation and resettlement carefully considered. Mair hoped that this would challenge the era’s ethnocentric assumptions about women’s roles in economic activity and reveal how the benefits of the sort of modernity favoured by developers can be unevenly distributed. Despite offering many examples of programmes’ failures to do this and even jesting that their intended beneficiaries are often considered by critical observers to be the ‘victims’, Mair’s advice reflected the generally optimistic mood of the 1980s that saw programmes as worthy endeavours that were in need of anthropological nuance (ibid:11).

In sum, critical studies of development programmes before the 1990s largely confined themselves to examining programmes and their stated aims. They often used a mixture of ethnographic evidence, programme materials and recorded blunders to show what they had missed about life in the places they were undertaken. Some pointed towards the lack of care from distant politicians and the professionalisation of the sector as a cause, whilst others lamented that anthropological knowledge was only sought once things had gone wrong. Accordingly, it was often argued that with better understandings of local cultures and the adoption of participatory methods development programmes could improve the lives of those they touched. Few, therefore, questioned the ideologies underpinning

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43 As is clear from this thesis’ conclusion, it is striking how little the conclusions of contemporary studies differ.
development programmes or the organisations implementing them, even less delved into the nature of the relationship between developers and those to be developed.

**Post-development**

In the early 1990s a growing number of authors inspired by post-structuralism began approaching and deconstructing development as a discourse (Sachs, 1992; Hobart, 1993; Latouche, 1996). Broadly, they argued that the dominant development discourse continues the historical practice of powerful Western states and organisations constructing notions of the ‘Third World’ and ‘underdevelopment’ to justify their interventions. Some even suggested that development practice must be abandoned as an outdated, unfair and ultimately harmful enterprise. As explored later, their writings caused controversy and were heavily critiqued. Nonetheless, their contributions have since been grouped under the label of ‘post-development’ and they have had a lasting effect on critical development studies.

To make their arguments, many of the post-development authors used Foucault’s (1979, 1981) ideas to portray development as an instance of ‘power-knowledge’. Foucault (1979:27) argued that:

‘Power and knowledge directly imply one another [...] there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.’

In this sense, discourses can be understood as ways of constituting permissible knowledge, including objects and subjects, and the power relations that govern their
behaviour. This idea was explored in Foucault’s ‘archaeological’ studies which outlined how discursive formations – understood as systems of rules – emanating from modern institutions, such as prisons, clinics and asylums, have made particular statements about objects, people and the wider world possible, and others impossible (Foucault, 1972). This led Foucault to accord discourses a central role in constructing, constraining and ordering modern societies, including outlining identities and social relations.

Building upon this in his ‘genealogical’ work, Foucault (1979) set about explicitly linking societal and institutional discourses to specific practices or techniques – such as interviewing, counselling, categorising, measuring or grading – that make populations ‘visible’ to governments, and sustain and legitimise constraining ‘regimes of truth’. He also introduced the idea of ‘biopower’ to capture how dominant discourses focussed on an entire population’s or group’s ‘conduct of conduct’ are internalised, causing individuals to effectively ‘discipline’ themselves, and patrol their own and one another’s utterances and behaviours (Foucault, 1979, 1981, 1982).

This led Foucault (1991:91) to propose that the modern exercise of government – which he termed ‘governmentality’ – is not simply a matter of the coercive power of a sovereign or state over others. It also encompasses the population’s internalisation, and pursuit, of ends that are convenient for both the rulers and the ruled, such as ‘the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.’ Ends that are often collected under the label of ‘development’.

Governmentality, therefore, is a productive exercise of power that discursively constitutes its subjects, encouraging them to take part in the reproduction and maintenance of the relations that govern them.44 Nonetheless, this agency does not imply that individuals can easily identify, challenge or change existing discourses or the relations they support. Rather, Foucault argued that dominant discourses are

44 As Sarup (1989:87) argues, power for Foucault is ‘much more ambiguous, as each individual has at his or her disposal at least some power’.
adept at making themselves invisible by normalising themselves, isolating individuals and producing ‘docile bodies’. The implication is that power is at once dispersed and inescapable, whilst being most insidious and effective when it manages to hide itself within received wisdom or common-sense pronouncements and practices.

The post-development’s authors adopted Foucault’s genealogical approach to trace modern development discourse to President Truman’s Four Point doctrine, which they argued articulated what would become the prevailing views of poverty, inequality and progress following World War II (Sachs, 1992; Esteva, 1991; Rist, 1997). For them, this amounted to a new strategy and related set of concepts with which Western powers could legitimise their interests, including the spread of extractive forms of free market capitalism. Central to this, neo-classical economists’ concern with rationality and market equilibriums were argued to be the techniques for categorising, measuring and, supposedly, improving the lives of those living in developing countries. To embed these discourses, alternative ways of understanding relations between the West and the rest, such as through the prism of colonialism or the destructive sides of capitalism, were made invisible or, in Foucauldian terminology, deemed ‘abnormal’.

Amongst these authors, Escobar’s (1995) book, *Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World*, was seminal. He argued that development’s discourses and the practices they support are rooted in Western economic, political and cultural thought. Thus, they often dismiss or silence complex local histories, cultures and ways of seeing the world, and they wash over developing countries’ interconnections with and dependencies upon developed countries. This entails a ‘colonialization of reality’ that prevents any objections to development by internalising powerful countries’ and organisations’ visions in the minds of their subjects; understood as both the developers and those being developed (ibid:5).

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45 Abrahamsen (2000) traces the study of developmental discourses to Said’s (1979) exploration of how European texts created representations of the Orient that justified colonialism.
Although he dismisses the idea of an organised conspiracy, Escobar’s argument strongly suggests that the purpose of development’s discourses is the maintenance of the domination of Western states over their former colonies. Indeed, he was, in part, attempting to address the orientalism of development organisations and, in part, to revive and update the out of fashion critiques made by dependency theorists that enjoyed popularity in the 1960s and 1970s (Said, 1979; Pieterse, 2000). For many, therefore, the post-development authors’ use of discourse analysis definitively undermined the notion that development is something that is neutrally or fairly done by one party to another, and it called for a radical rethinking of the role of powerful development organisations and the states that back them.

Nonetheless, the early post-development authors were heavily criticised for their emotive portrayal of development’s discourses as totalising, and for failing to acknowledge the very real debates and differences of opinion within and among development organisations (Lehmann, 1997; Corbridge, 1998; Peet, 1999; Pieterse, 2000). At best, these tendencies amount to moralistic grandstanding that neglects the material aspects of poverty and overlooks how development’s discourses play out on the ground. At worst, they encourage a dangerous relativism, strip development’s subjects of their agency and romanticise local cultures (Kiely, 1999; Storey, 2000). This has led some critics to question the ability of the post-development authors’ approach to reveal anything useful, including potential alternatives to dominant ways of understanding development (Graaff, 2006; Nustad, 2008; Kapoor, 2017).46

Aidnography

Partly inspired by the post-development authors, some ethnographers of development practice began to use discourse analyses and Foucault’s ideas to argue

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46 For example, Kapoor (2017) uses a Lacanian psychoanalytic lens to argue that some of post-development’s most prominent writers subconsciously desire relatively little to change. In his terms, they have ‘surrendered’ to global capitalism and given up transformative ‘radical’ politics.
that programmes undertaken by states and international organisations are akin to ‘anti-politics machines’. This idea was popularised by Ferguson’s (1990) study of a World Bank development programme in Lesotho. He suggested that due to the Bank’s experts writing Lesotho’s history, culture, politics and structural location within the region’s economy out of their diagnoses, the programme’s well-meaning, yet ultimately reductionist, interventions failed.

To make his argument, Ferguson combined discourse analysis with a nuanced ethnography of the Bank’s programme. The enabled him to show that contrary to the Bank’s official texts, there was little evidence that Lesotho had been an isolated subsistence economy for over 100 years or that its people were unaware of the advantages of local cattle markets. Despite this, repeated iterations of the programme concentrated on these markets, whilst side-lining evidence that many men from Lesotho found regular work in South Africa, and that they kept surplus cattle as safe investment funds and to boost their social status. To make the point that these were conscious omissions by the bank’s experts, designed to construct Lesotho as a typical ‘less developed country’ in need of foreign intervention, Ferguson’s study juxtaposed the institution’s texts with widely available academic literature that detailed these socio-economic trends.

Ferguson also argued that the programme had the unintended consequence of extending the state’s bureaucratic control. He showed that it built roads and an administrative centre that facilitated the state’s apparatus - including a post office, police station, and local branches of the Rural Ministry of Development - to gain a hold over areas of the country it had little presence in beforehand. This, he argued, was a political outcome that was likely to shape the everyday lives of Lesotho’s population far more than the programme’s misguided official goals ever could. However, he did not comment on whether this was to be welcomed or not.

47 I separate discourses and practices for conceptual clarity, whilst acknowledging that many post-structuralists would not.
In the search for explanations for the outcomes he documented, Ferguson (1990) drew upon Foucault. He pointed to development’s embrace of governmentality; which he suggested amounts to the misguided belief that ‘the main features of economy and society [are] within the control of a neutral, unitary, and effective national government, and thus responsive to planners’ blueprints’ (ibid:72). However, his critique was aimed at both the actions of development’s foreign experts who believe they can write and then engineer their desired realities into existence, and at those that view development as something brought about by states that are relatively autonomous from their societies. Thus, he poured doubt on the idea that development can be a replicable technical exercise, removed from the unique conditions of the places it touches.

In Ferguson’s wake a new research agenda began to be tentatively mapped out.48 It argued that studies must turn the lens on the developers themselves, including their thoughts and the ideologies driving the organisations that employ them. However, as these institutions are not easily accessed, methods that analyse development’s texts – including its wider policy papers, plans, pamphlets and evaluations – were called for. Not only would this help researchers to better interpret the data collected from fieldwork, it would also begin to address international programmes’ extra-local and multi-sited nature by revealing the chains of actors and ideas that enable them. In an introduction to a collected volume of such works, Gould (2004) labelled this field ‘aidnography’.

Aidnography shares the post-development literature’s conviction that words, language and representations have very real impacts on people’s lives. Accordingly, many of its authors argue that development’s failures and unintended outcomes stem from its tendency to discursively organise the world into developed and underdeveloped states and populations. They contend that this is done to denote those with the technical expertise to drive transitions towards modernity and those in need of their continued ‘trusteeship’ (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). Whilst, on the

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48 There is no single statement of this agenda, but Gasper’s (2004) essay is a good introduction.
ground, they show that this entails that programmes increasingly focus on the everyday conduct of participants and their relations with one another.

For some aidnographers, this is a continuation of development organisations’ thinly veiled attempts to legitimise the domination of the West over the rest in the post-colonial era. This includes efforts to make developing countries’ populations accept of the miseries of structural adjustment programmes, relocations and conflicts that have been wrought in the name of their improvement. For the majority, however, the greater goal is to show how development’s well-meaning yet reductionist ideologies are being appropriated and challenged, and how its programmes can improved with alternative forms of knowledge, including the voices and political practices of those its organisations aim to help (Simon, 2007; Nustad, 2008). In this sense, they are more sympathetic to the professed aims of development organisations than the post-development authors.

In his later work, Ferguson (2011) has also argued that exposing how power permeates supposedly technical interventions should not be the endpoint of Foucauldian critiques of development. Instead, as Foucault himself argued, there is no reason why analysts cannot also reveal how power can be put towards progressive or valuable ends. This includes discerning how modes of politics engaged in by development’s subjects can inspire techniques or ‘arts’ of government that offer alternatives to dominant ways of doing development. In this sense, Ferguson’s initially pessimistic view of power and governmentality evolved into a potentially emancipatory research project.

In recent years, commentators have argued that aidnography’s use of discourse analysis and Foucault’s concepts has matured (Johnson, 2008; Della Faille, 2011; Gardner and Lewis 2015). This has given rise to a body of focussed and nuanced explorations of the reductive tendencies of development’s most powerful

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49 Although he did not detail the method of his genealogies, Foucault did devote an entire chapter in one of his early works to ‘change and transformation’ within which he stresses that discourses are far from static (Foucault, 1972). He also introduced the idea of ‘reverse discourses’ to describe the way in which subjects can, partially, resist their own constitution by adopting the language of dominant discourses (Foucault, 1981:10).
organisations and their favoured ways of conceptualising reality. It has also increased our knowledge of how their programmes’ ideas and techniques are appropriated or resisted on the ground. These insights have been used to highlight the contradictions within, and to offer potential ways of improving, the practice of development. As they inform the analysis made in this thesis, the chapter now explores some of the main contributions from this literature.

**Development’s texts**

In an early example of more focussed discourse analyses, Mitchell’s (1995) study of the United States Agency for Intentional Development’s (USAID) documentation on Egypt showed how it portrayed the country’s agricultural problems as natural questions of geography and demography, thereby, ignoring issues of redistribution and power. At the same time, the texts imagined the agency ‘as a rational consciousness standing outside the country’ (ibid:195). Accordingly, it neglected to mention USAID’s own ongoing campaign to get the government to slash grain subsidies to increase the competitiveness of American imports; a policy recommendation that would have severe ramifications for Egypt’s domestic food supplies and income inequality. In this way, Mitchell reminds readers that development’s discourses must be understood as situated within, not outside of, the domestic- and geo- politics animating the places on which they focus.

Similarly, Biccum’s (2005) analysis of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development’s (DFID) in-house ‘Developments’ magazine traces the organisation’s self-representations in the late 1990s onwards. She argued that by constituting poverty as a threat to the benefits of globalisation, DFID simultaneously painted over the role of colonialism in underdevelopment, portrayed neoliberal variants of capitalism as the only solution and placed the ultimate responsibility for their own betterment on the impoverished peoples of the world. Biccum shows how this is achieved by framing poverty as a ‘lack of’ resources or education on the part of
the poor, rather than a ‘lack of control over’ the production of resources or distribution of public goods. Her study also shows how DFID’s interventions are justified through appeals to morality and United Kingdom’s self-interest. This, she argues, legitimises the ‘civilising’ mission Western nations have been engaged in since colonialism (ibid:1006).

Although the texts development organisations produce often remain unread, it is clear from such investigations that some of them have the ability to orientate the wider field (Ravallion and Wagstaff, 2012; Doemeland and Trevino, 2014). This power was recently alluded to during the launch of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2017 in London. During the panel discussion, the report’s Co-Director commented that it ‘basically legitimises bringing these [its own] issues to the table’ and adds ‘institutional back-up’ to those looking to set the development sector’s agenda. Put another way, he was arguing that the Bank’s annual reports are able to set the direction and meaning of development for others. In this regard, it is notable that the Bank has long seen its role as producing knowledge about development. Indeed, it has described itself as the ‘knowledge bank’ since the mid-1990s and devotes around 25-30% of its budget to this end (Calkin, 2014).

Exploring the Bank’s role in shaping the wider field, a recent paper draws on Bourdieu’s ideas to argue that it enjoys great symbolic capital (O’Donovan, 2017). This allows its experts to successfully disguise when they are drawing upon its stocks of economic and political capital to introduce new ideas and ways of understanding development. Attesting to the Bank’s success in this, textbooks offering broad histories of development theory and practice often do so through chronologically organised summaries of the Bank’s reports. Furthermore, a cottage industry of commentators respond, both favourably and negatively, to each new publication it

51 The Bank’s 1998/9 report was called ‘Knowledge for Development’ (WB, 1998).
52 See Chapter Two for a discussion of symbolical capital.
53 For examples see - Howell and Pearce (2001) and Carothers and de Gramont (2013).
releases.\textsuperscript{54} This includes the rush by less influential organisations to realign their publicly stated aims with the Bank’s latest ways of describing developmental challenges. Despite this, rumours about, and evidence of, conflicts during the construction of the Bank’s reports occasionally offer rare glimpses into the contested nature of their creations. They suggest that the ideas underpinning them are arrived at through negotiations between experts and powerful interests, thereby, peeling away what could be thought of as the ‘myth’ of their objectivity and political neutrality (Wade, 2001, 2002).\textsuperscript{55}

In recent years, a growing broader stream of literature has sought to trace the evolution of popular concepts, such as social capital, neoliberalism, participation and poverty, in development organisations’ grand orientating texts (Cammack, 2002, 2004; Fine, 2010). It shows how each gain in popularity and are stretched so as to explain increasingly more areas of social life, only to be dismissed once enough commentators point out that the ‘emperor has no clothes on’. This has led to the often heard lament that development is littered with the rise and fall of ‘buzzwords’ and ‘fuzzwords’ designed to raise support for powerful organisations’ latest policies and to obscure details that may undermine their claims to positions of authority (Cornwall and Eade, 2010).

Within this genre, Nielsen et al’s (2014) study of DFID’s discourses around its engagement with Rwanda stands out for its methodological rigour. Encompassing DFID’s overarching institutional policy statements and its country specific ‘strategy papers’ from 1997-2009, it highlights the inherent contradictions between professing a desire for democracy and human rights, and the reality of championing economic growth under an authoritarian Rwandan government. The study’s long view enables it to capture how new discourses are introduced to DFID’s texts as it becomes


\textsuperscript{55} For Laclau (1990), ‘myths’ are attempts by discourses’ authors to correct disturbances and contradictions caused by events that cannot be accounted for by their totalising visions of society.
increasingly clear what has been, what cannot and what may be possible to achieve on the ground. For example, the texts take a less confident tone that shifts the burden of the responsibility for development to recipient nations as discontent with globalisation and the results of structural adjustment programmes in Africa and elsewhere became clear in the mid-2000s. To do this, the authors show that DFID as turned towards the good governance discourse, its texts increasingly ignored the way debt servicing severely limits developing countries’ efforts to live up to the agenda’s principles.

The authors show that the mounting contradictions in DFID’s proliferation of discourses eventually caused it to justify its aid to Rwanda and the support it gave its authoritarian regime through the introduction of a ‘trade-off discourse’ (ibid:64). Reminiscent of the ideas propagated by sequentialist democratic theorists, this discourse put immediate economic development before democratic freedoms which it was argued might jeopardize the purported progress that the country had made since 1994’s genocide (Carothers, 2007). In this way, the authors carefully reveal how development’s discourses are often forced to adapt as they seek to counter mounting contradictions and prove unable to ignore difficult ground realities.

Other studies have unpacked development’s latest ideas to explore how they spread new forms of governmentality. For example, Abrahamsen’s (2000:133) analysis of the ‘good governance’ agenda in Africa argues that this discourse heralds an ‘exclusionary’ form of democracy that ‘cannot incorporate the majority of the population or their demands in any meaningful way’. This is because its minimalist approach to democratisation has largely concentrated on institutional forms, formal political rights and procedural multi-party elections, whilst portraying civil society as a force that spontaneously arises ‘from the liberalisation of the economy and the reduction of the state’ (ibid:65). On the ground, this has meant that support to civil society has consisted of ‘nurturing the bourgeoisie and creating an enabling environment for business’. At the same time, aims such as the ‘empowerment of the people’ have been reduced to devising mechanisms for the co-production of public goods by states and private enterprises (ibid:61-65).
Abrahamsen suggests, therefore, that development’s discourses can be explored to uncover how, since the 1990s, its leading institutions have conflated a minimalist notion of liberal democracy and an entrepreneurial conception of civil society, with a neoliberal drive to spread markets and reduce the state’s responsibilities. She contends that this has created an unsolvable paradox for many African governments in that meeting the political demands of indigenous social movements – such as calls for redistributive policies – would entail rejecting the economic reforms required by their international backers. Doing so would lead to African governments’ own downfalls as aid flows cease and foreign investors look for more favourable contexts. Abrahamsen concludes, therefore, that in much of Africa democratisation has meant the victory of a form of unresponsive and unaccountable form of governance favoured by coalitions of domestic economic elites, donor organisations and international creditors. In a similar argument, Mkandawire (1998) has suggested that good governance and the conditionalities that accompany it create ‘choiceless democracies’.

**Development programmes**

A more ethnographic stream of literature investigates how development’s contemporary discourses play out on the ground in the programmes organisations support. For example, Bryant’s (2002) research on environmental NGOs in the Philippines explored how governmentality is a defining feature of their activities. He showed that by normalising their own discourses around threats to biodiversity, foreign and state-backed NGOs persuaded peripheral peoples to view themselves as both the problem and solution to environmental degradation.

For Bryant, this can be understood as part of a wider process in which NGOs have been instrumental in constituting the country’s ‘citizens’ since the Philippines’ restoration of liberal democracy in 1986. As part of this, environmentally focused NGOs have tutored people in the art of patient and peaceful negotiations with the
state and outsiders, including transnational corporations. Whilst this undoubtedly gave them a voice with which to temper the processes of change occurring around them, Bryant argues that their internalisation of outsiders’ discourses and uptake of their practices also made an opening for ‘processes of governmentality to intrude ever more systematically into the lives of marginalized peoples’ (ibid:287).

Accordingly, Bryant understands NGOs as reflecting contradictory processes: On the one hand, they promise to represent marginalised people and to empower them to challenge the state, including its support for potentially harmful developmental schemes orchestrated by global companies. On the other, through imparting their discourses and worldviews they ensure that marginalised peoples come to view themselves as the problem and, therefore, in need of the state’s stewardship. Put another way, the NGOs encouraged them to internalise a form of ‘state control through self-regulation’ (ibid:268). In his more recent work, Ferguson set out similar ideas by arguing that development organisations and domestic NGOs often collude over a form of ‘transnational governmentality’, both by helping to make populations visible to states and other international actors, and by spreading new ways of conducting themselves and monitoring one another amongst them (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002; Ferguson, 2006).

Li’s (2007:126) influential study of colonial and post-colonial development programmes in Indonesia makes similar arguments. It shows how the programmes’ discourses simplified and depoliticised the problems – including, ‘growing landlessness’, ‘high indebtedness’, ‘vulnerability’ and ‘displacement’ – in the places their schemes represented. This allowed their planners to make visible and ‘render technical’ the challenges they faced, whilst ignoring the potential political causes and remedies for poverty and marginalisation.

Constrained by what could and could not be included within their apolitical assessments, Li shows that the programmes became increasingly focussed ‘upon

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56 An entire section of the journal _Annals of the Association of American Geographers_ (January 2010) was devoted to discussion of the themes in Li’s (2007) book.
conducting the conduct of villagers’ or, put another way, intimate social relations at the local level (ibid:267). Using Foucault’s idea of governmentality, Li argues that this required the villagers to adopt neoliberal governance discourses and practices which ‘seek to render their target group entrepreneurial, participatory, responsible and corruption-averse’ (ibid:16). This encouraged competition among villagers and persuaded them to monitor one another’s actions, whilst absolving themselves, wider society and the state of any responsibility for poverty reduction.

This process was well illustrated through Li’s exploration of the discourses deployed by the World Bank’s recent Kecamatan Development Project, which sought to use participatory practices to empower marginalised Indonesian villagers. Li argues that although the project succeeded on its own terms, even reducing measurable instances of corruption in local development projects, its focus on the villagers’ everyday conduct side-lined any chances of them mobilising to address the structural causes of their impoverishment. This taming was initially achieved by locating the project outside of the state. Some years later, once participants were socialised as to their own responsibility to monitor one another and the neoliberal state’s limited obligations the Bank transferred ownership of the project to the government. In this manner, the project constituted both responsible neoliberal citizens and a state that could never be at fault. Moreover, Li reveals that the apolitical template it spawned was exported by the Bank to East Timor and Afghanistan (ibid:278).

Li also drew upon Gramsci’s idea of hegemonic struggle, touched upon in Chapter Two, to trace the extent to which the project’s subjects stayed within or challenged the boundaries it set for them. Challenges came from those participants that questioned its rules and the limited responsibilities it gave to the state. Thus, the project’s reductive discourse both rendered problems apolitical and technical, and ‘inadvertently stimulated a political challenge’ from the very subjects it sought to constitute (ibid:25). In this way, readers are reminded that development’s subjects often retain a measure agency with which to reject debilitating discourses despite the inequalities between themselves and developers.
Similarly, Everett’s (1997) research documented how local and national elites in Bogotá, Colombia, sought to use the era’s popular mantras of ‘sustainable development’ and community ‘consultations’ to legitimate programmes that would benefit them to the detriment of the city’s slum dwellers. However, it also detailed how the re-appropriation of these discourses and activism by the slums’ residents was able halt some of the elites’ more destructive plans. To do so, Everett draws upon Scott’s (Scott, 1987, 1990) work on the variety of, often subtle, ways in which marginalised communities organise to resist the blueprints for betterment crafted by powerful groups and institutions. He notes that those subject to them are often well versed in the false promises and feints of development’s planners, yet they find themselves in such unequal positions that overt resistance proves difficult and creative alternatives that work within dominant discourses must be sought.

Robins’ (2003) study of the post-apartheid South Africa’s land restitution processes also uncovered how local populations variously resist, appropriate or hybridise the discourses of NGOs and the state. However, he shows how people’s responses to interventions cannot be easily interpreted as either wholesale rejections or as endorsements. Instead, they are more often selective appropriations of components of development schemes by people that desire control over which aspects of modernity they accept. Following others, he argues that through these actions South Africans are able to forge ‘indigenous modernities’ that allow them to begin to reconcile their own discourses and understandings of development with those imposed on them from above (Appadurai, 1991; Gupta, 1998).

More broadly, Robins (2003) suggests that through careful ethnographic studies of actual programmes, analysts will swiftly reject the totalising and agency stripping critiques of the post-development authors. This includes dispensing with the idea that development’s subjects can be easily understood as either simple ‘docile bodies’, ‘depoliticised consumer-zombies’ or ‘revolutionaries’ (Robins, 2003:291-283). In their place, nuanced investigations of how development plays out on the ground in ways that are variously welcomed, rejected and appropriated by ordinary people can occur.
A recent paper on the instrumentalization of donors’ empowerment discourses by participants in AIDS programmes in Malawi and Zambia also reveals how development’s fuzzwords can be appropriated (Anderson and Patterson, 2017). Through interviews and focus groups, the authors suggest that the malleability of donors’ ideas of empowerment means they can be used on the ground to pursue a variety of aims which are not necessarily connected to the programmes’ own. For instance, those skilled at adopting donor language position themselves as interlocutors between the programmes’ implementers and the communities they seek to engage. This allows them to monopolise opportunities to court the programmes’ resources and pursue future employment opportunities with other initiatives. The lack of definition of what counts as success within the programmes also allows entrepreneurial participants to portray themselves as empowered associations, when they are really hastily put together for visiting programme managers. However, the authors’ do not frame these appropriations as deceptions. Rather, they argue that the programmes’ own shallow understandings of what empowerment may look like within the contexts they work is at fault.

More broadly, the authors worry that the portrayal of the programmes’ participants as the ‘clients’ of its implementing NGOs mimics local understandings of the unequal patron-client relationships that structure their communities. They suggest this may be reinforcing notions of dependency between less skilled or marginalised participants and the programme. They also argue that the emphasis on competitive individualism – enabling participants to ‘stand on their own’ – within donors’ empowerment discourses undermines the ideas of solidarity and unity that people living with HIV often suggest are essential to their social, emotional and material survival. In conclusion, the authors argue that further attention must be given to how donors’ fuzzwords and buzzwords can stand in tension with more collective aims and silence bottom-up alternatives to the problems they seek to address.

It is with this complexity in mind that Cupples et al.’s (2007) Nicaraguan study showed how an alliance between citizens, local municipal leaders and NGOs was able to unpick dominant development discourses and to refashion them through
‘discursive activism’. To do this, the authors drew on Gramsci’s idea that ‘organic intellectuals’ can challenge hegemonic narratives or received common-sense by revealing oppressive contradictions. For the alliance’s leaders this entailed destabilising the notion that there is an adequately theorised universal model of development, with ‘projects’ as its primary technique. As part of this, they argued that people’s aspirations for development had not been, and could not be, captured in the one-off and limited consultative Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PSRP) produced for Nicaragua under the tutelage of foreign experts. And they produced their own version of the PSRP as a way to open deliberations with the government and its international backers. Through such processes the alliance began to conceive of, and practice, development as an ongoing process of pressure, negotiation, agreement and social mobilisation. Cupples et al. conclude that their actions remind us that development’s discourses are never fully settled.

Similar findings from elsewhere have been used to argue that outsiders still have a valuable role to play in carefully highlighting potential alternatives to current dominant ways of doing development (Simon, 2007; Nustad, 2008; McKinnon, 2008; Ferguson, 2011; Gardner and Lewis 2015; McKinnon, 2017). For these authors, research must go beyond the perverse pleasure of exposing ‘another example of neoliberal devastation, or neo-imperialist dispossession, or capitalist exploitation’ (McKinnon, 2017:2). In addition, it must begin to uncover how development’s subjects strive to forge their own emancipatory paths.

This requires researchers to examine programmes as potentially rich sites of experimentation within which discursive and material appropriations and transformations by development’s subjects offer potential solutions to their challenges. Of course, such research must first and foremost ensure that the outcomes of these experiments do no harm, including investigating who benefits and who is excluded from such adaptations. Doing so takes seriously the agency of development’s subjects, whilst dismissing the reductive image of development as something that is necessarily done by one party to another.
As part of this, others have focussed research on the chains of actors involved in implementing, monitoring and reporting on development programmes (Wilson, 2006; Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Mosse and Lewis, 2006; Mckinnon, 2007). They often twin the ideas of ‘translation’ and ‘brokerage’ found within Latour’s (1996) work on scientific communities and Francophone Africanist literature on local development projects (Bierschenk et al., 2002). Among them, Mosse’s (2005) ethnography of a DFID funded participatory programme in India stands out. Specifically, he sought to show how development generates:

‘mobilising metaphors (‘participation’, ‘partnership’, ‘governance’) whose vagueness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological differences so as to allow compromise and the enrolment of different interests, to distribute agency and to multiply the criteria of success within project systems.’ (ibid:230)

Mosse argued that confronted with the reality of implementing programmes in developing countries, an ever-expanding pool of terms and concepts is vital for development’s ability to justify its interventions and sustain its myths. His role as a periodic consultant on the programme he studied gave him a unique position from which to make this critique. Accordingly, he outlined how it began in typical fashion by representing ‘people and places as embodiments of those development problems which are amenable to the donors’ currently favoured apolitical, ‘technical’ solutions’, [sic] which, in his programme included both better agricultural technology and the era’s fashion for community participation (ibid:61). Yet, he showed how as DFID’s wider policy objectives changed due to political events outside of India the programme increasingly hired a range of ‘development brokers’, including consultants and technical experts, that could ‘translate’ practices on the ground into terms that ensured it remained funded.
The study suggests that to be deemed successful development programmes must often devote a lot of energy to making outsiders’ privileged knowledge and technologies the ‘authors of history’. On the ground, however, favoured ideas such as ‘participation’ or techniques such as ‘new seeds’ may be understood by participants as ‘patronage’ and ‘credit’ (ibid:232). Thus, Mosse highlighted how development’s justificatory discourses can constrain and orientate entire chains of actors by assigning them varying levels of responsibility for interpreting and representing ground realities in ways that accord with the worldviews of the powerful. He concluded that:

‘the problem is not that policy is coherent, but that a policy machinery fabricates its separation from political economy and that it becomes isolated from the local or vernacular to which it is nonetheless materially connected through fund flows, information and in other ways’ (ibid:243).

In partial remedy for such fabrications, Mosse argued that further ethnographic research that uncovers how developments’ discourses are far from politically neutral and how they play out on the ground is needed.

**The work of development’s discourses**

The point of the reviewed aidnography authors’ analyses is not to suggest that development institutions’ portrayals of the problems afflicting the populations they work among are complete fantasy. Rather, it is to show what their discourses can do in terms of normalising particular ways of seeing the world and what development’s subjects can do to retain a measure of agency over decisions that affect their lives.
Before proceeding further, it is worth summarising the major contributions of this literature that will be useful for the rest of this thesis.

Firstly, as the literature’s use of discourse analysis has matured and been connected to ethnographic studies of actual programmes, few would now argue that development is comprised of a single totalising discourse, able to oppress the agency of those it touches. On the one hand, those taking a long view have shown how new discourses are added and old ones dropped from the field to enable it to account for contradictions and failures as they arise. As we have seen, this is particularly discernible where powerful development organisations are unable to confront the political causes of the problems they face, and where their interventions have been challenged by observers or the populations they hope to help.

On the other, investigations of programmes have shown how development’s subjects can appropriate and resist its discourses. Such appropriations can be carried out by actors and organisations with very different ideas of what development looks like. Indeed, some may simply wish to use development’s buzzwords and fuzzwords to add legitimacy to their own narrow goals. Whilst others may genuinely harbour a desire for aspects of modernity championed by states and outsiders. Thus, development’s discourses should be thought of as a multitude of overlapping and, sometimes, inconsistent and conflicting attempts to legitimise the worldviews and practices of both the powerful and not so powerful. This places the idea that contests and struggles can be seen within developments’ key texts, and in the how programmes play out on the ground, at the centre of research.

Secondly, the reasons for the depoliticization of development identified by Ferguson (1990) have been expanded. Indeed, rather than simply reducing the number of variables that development’s planners consider, depoliticization is increasingly portrayed as a way to create space for the introduction of outsiders’ favoured modes of governance. The reviewed authors have shown that in some cases this transfers the responsibility for empowerment and development to the participants in programmes themselves. Within the literature, this logic has often been identified in
the rise of participatory programmes that concentrate on participants’ micro-social relations and modes of conduct.

For some, this amounts to a marketisation of development in that governance becomes the aggregation of numerous transactions among, what are assumed to be, rationally competing rights bearing citizen/subjects. It also heralds a neoliberalisation of governmentality in that the responsibility for outcomes are transferred to citizens who are taught to monitor themselves, one another and, increasingly, the state. As will be explored further in the next chapter, it could be argued that through such processes development programmes are increasingly rendering politics a technical matter of having the proper knowledge, tools and discipline.

Nonetheless, studies have revealed how those in charge of ‘doing’ development often expend considerable energy representing complex ground realities, including instances of resistance or failure, in idioms and discourses that are acceptable to those higher up the field’s material and ideational food chains. To do this, entire networks of actors and institutions that straddle the conceptual divides between society, state and the international realm are engaged in authoring development and the lives of those it touches. This raises important questions about both what they are writing, for what ends, and who they are accountable to.

**Limitations of the literature**

In a recent article examining the use of discourse analysis by development academics, Ziai (2015:16) points out that although the 1995 edition of *The Development Reader* contained one piece out of 27 using the approach, by 2008 it contained nine out of 54 (Corbridge, 1995; Chari and Corbridge, 2008). This suggests that the critique of the link between power, knowledge and practices offered by the reviewed authors has been largely accepted by development studies’ gatekeepers.
Despite this, two important criticisms remain of the contemporary literature’s combination of discourse analysis and on the ground research.

The first, less well addressed criticism, concerns a lack of methodological rigour amongst authors deconstructing the field’s discourses. For example, of the works reviewed in the this chapter only Nielsen et al’s (2014) exploration of DFID’s discourses on Rwanda substantially outlines its methodology for analysing the texts it covers.\(^5\) It has been argued, therefore, that authors’ use of discourse analysis could benefit from grounding within the methodologies and theoretical debates animating the wider discipline (Della Faille, 2011). Otherwise they risk being portrayed as ‘polemicists’ rather ‘than researchers whose ideas come from strongly empirically-grounded methodology’ (ibid:233). It may also mean they overlook the struggles and alternatives within development’s grand orientating texts themselves. Accordingly, the next chapter outlines the methodology for its own analysis of what I call the ‘social accountability discourse’.

Second, it is notable that studies such as Mosse’s (2006) have relied on development organisations providing access to programmes and their participants, often by way of authors working on or consulting for them. On occasion, this has created tensions between the interpretations of researchers and the programmes’ own ways of representing themselves. Indeed, the acceptance of Mosse’s book required arbitration between his university and his former colleagues because they argued that their work had been unfairly represented. This speaks to the difficulty of conducting studies that aim to connect development’s discourses to explorations of how actual programmes unfold. It also raises the issue of the researchers’ own claims to privileged knowledge and an unbiased position from which to comment. As this thesis unfolds, I take time to explore these issues and outline how I have sought to account for them.

\(^5\) Rist (2002) has outlined his own methodology in Les mots du pouvoir: sens et non-sens de la rhétorique internationale (Words of Power: Meaning and Non-sense in International Rhetoric) but it is not available in English.
Conclusion

This chapter has shown how since the post-development authors’ deconstructions of development’s dominant discourses, others have combined their use of discourse analysis with nuanced ethnographic explorations of how programmes unfold on the ground. Often sympathetic to broad aims of the programmes they study, they have revealed how they can depoliticise the problems they seek to address and put the focus on the conduct of participants. For some, this reduces the space for alternative forms of politics and notions of the good life, and it sustains myths about the technical solutions to impoverishment and those with the expertise to deliver them. Nonetheless, their studies have also shown that the contradictions within development’s discourses and programmes create room for observers to criticise them and, in some cases, for participants to appropriate their terms and techniques. It is within such contradictions and processes that researchers are encouraged to look for emancipatory alternatives to how development is done.
Chapter Four

The Social Accountability Discourse

‘... neoliberalism transmogrifies every human domain and endeavour, along with humans themselves, according to a specific image of the economic. All conduct is economic conduct; all spheres of existence are framed and measured by economic terms and metrics, even when those spheres are not directly monetised. In neoliberal reason and in domains governed by it, we are only and everywhere homo-economicus.’

(Brown, 2015:9-10)

This chapter investigates the ‘social accountability discourse’ within key texts from the World Bank and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID). It traces how the struggle between the 1990s activist and neoliberal civil society theorists has continued within them. Yet, it also shows how since the turn of the century information and citizens’ abilities to choose their service providers has increasingly been posited to make up for the deficiencies of both. In its extreme form, this entails a vision of civil societies as comprised of atomised citizens operating in markets of service providers, and it renders empowerment and activism a matter of choosing between a limited number of priced techniques, templates and practices. It is argued that this should be understood as part of the ongoing replacement of homo-politicus by homo-economicus within contemporary neoliberal ideals of governance and citizenship. The chapter concludes that this is reducing the perceived need for spaces for identity formation and a deliberative public sphere, thereby, limiting the potential of powerful organisations supporting radical democratising projects.

Critical discourse analysis
The chapter uses critical discourse analysis – understood as both a method and theory – to argue that the emerging field of social accountability does not merely seek to help the societies it touches but attempts to reconstitute them in its neoliberal vision of citizenship and governance. Indeed, fields of knowledge are as much about struggles to shape the world and legitimise competing ideologies, as they are about understanding reality. In preparation for the analysis, this section outlines Fairclough’s (1989, 1992, 2006), and Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s (1999), critical theories and methodologies that seek to uncover processes of change and ideological struggle in texts.

Although there are several schools, critical discourse analysts start from the premise that alongside constituting the social world, discourses are also constituted by other social practices. Analysts argue that discursive practices are partially shaped by forces that are not entirely discursive in character, such as political systems or the distribution of resources. This separates them from the encompassing poststructuralism of theorists such as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) for whom discourse is fully constitutive of the world. It also allows them to avoid the agency constricting historical materialism of Marxists that view the economy as deterministic.

The ‘critical’ element of discourse analysis focusses upon the role discourses play in the reproduction of unequal power relations. In a recent work, Fairclough (2016:91) describes this as an interest in the semiotic aspects of ‘social wrongs’. Although this encompasses the Foucauldian idea that hegemonic discourses produce their subjects and objects, critical discourse analysts also call for studies to uncover how discourses can challenge wider social orders. To reveal when this may be the case, Fairclough proposes that discourses are more or less ideological, with ideologies understood in the Gramscian sense as ‘constructions of meaning that contribute to the production, reproduction and transformation of relations of domination’ (Fairclough 1992:87, Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999:26).

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58 Breeze’s (2011) article gives a good introduction to the different schools.
This leads critical discourse analysts to argue that discourses’ subjects are ‘capable of acting creatively to make their own connections between the diverse practices and ideologies to which they are exposed, and to restructure positioning practices’ (Fairclough 1992:91). This agency can be uncovered through a combination of the systematic analyses of discursive events, such as conversations, newspaper reports, scientific texts or political propaganda; and the use of broader social and cultural theories that explain the wider, non-discursive, social practices these events are part of. In this framing, every text must be thought of as part of a discursive event that works in combination with non-discursive mechanisms to either reproduce or challenge hegemonic ideologies and, by extension, the wider social order. Critical discourse analysts, therefore, argue that they can expose and, in some cases, influence the discursive processes that change societies (Wodak and Meyer, 2016:5).

To visualise these relationships, Fairclough has provided a three-dimensional analytical model (Figure 1). It suggests that analyses of discursive events consists of three undertakings: description, which involves analysis of linguistic structures at the level of the text; interpretation, which involves analysis of the discourses articulated in both the production and consumption of the text; and explanation, which involves hypothesizing as to whether the event is reproducing or challenging dominant discourses, a discussion of which social or cultural theories may explain this, and what the wider implications for the prevailing social order may be. Fairclough suggests that different research questions will give different weights to each of these tasks, and that the order in which they are undertaken will vary.

Figure 1: A model for analysing discursive events (Fairclough, 1992:73)

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59 The label is the author’s own, the model is Fairclough’s.
For Fairclough (1992:43), the primary aim of analyses is to document hegemonic struggles over the ‘order of discourse’, which is understood as the relatively stable configuration of all the discourses routinely used within the studied institution or social field. Discerning support for or challenges to dominant ideologies requires attention to both the linguistic features of texts, and the creative ways discourses are deployed and combined within them. In terms of linguistics, Fairclough recommends focussing on the text’s choice of ‘vocabulary’, the ‘grammar’ underlying simple sentences, whether the text displays ‘cohesion’ through the repetition of words or synonyms, and the impression the broad ‘structure’ of the text conveys.

By describing such features, it becomes possible to say something about what processes the text may be engaged in or, put another way, the impression its authors are trying to leave on readers. For example, many analysts focus on how texts create particular subjects and hide others; and how they subscribe them agency and responsibility or take it away through the use of nouns over verbs, or the passive voice; processes termed ‘nominalization and passivization’ (Billig, 2008). The text’s choice of metaphors is also considered to be of importance for the work it does to
emphasize some aspects of the world it describes and to wash-over or exclude others. When combined, these elements of texts add to its ideological force.

Fairclough (1992:84) refers to the mixing of discourses within texts as ‘interdiscursivity’. He suggests that creative mixes are likely to be a sign of socio-cultural change. In contrast, conventional mixes indicate the stability of dominant ideologies and the wider social order. Thus, analysis often involves documenting the introduction of new and the omission of old discourses to an institution or social field across a range of texts.

As part of this mixing all texts draw on other texts and, accordingly, are positioned within historical ‘intertextual chains’ (ibid:103). This can be explicit, as in the case of referencing, or implicit, as when texts use lexicons and phrases common to other texts. Analysts, therefore, must also pay attention to which parts of other texts are included, omitted or modified. Drawing these elements out is particularly important for those that wish to add weight to their interpretations but are unable to analyse the large sample sizes common to teams engaged in corpus linguistics (Verschueren, 2001).

For critical discourse analysts, power is always a factor in the production and interpretation of texts. Indeed,

‘the seemingly limitless possibilities of creativity in discursive practice suggested by the concept of interdiscursivity – an endless combination and recombination of genres and discourses – are in practice limited and constrained by the state of hegemonic relations and hegemonic struggle.’ (Fairclough, 1992:137)
To account for power and add to the plausibility of their interpretations, analysts must draw upon non-discursive social theories. This involves an attempt to map the economic and institutional conditions – or macro contexts - that texts are part of, subject to or seeking to challenge. This process helps analysts to ask questions about what the ideological, political and social consequences of particular discursive events may be. Put another way, it is how ‘the research project is rendered political and critical’ (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002:87).

Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999:101ff) have argued that a focus on creativity, hegemonic struggles and the wider social context can be usefully paired with Bourdieu’s idea of ‘fields’ touched upon in Chapter Two. Discursive events within which actors (re)articulate various discourses can serve to uphold the status quo within particular fields. However, sometimes they challenge it by introducing new discourses or through creative formations of existing discourses that bend a field’s rules. Thus, discursive events can offer analysts windows onto ongoing struggles within fields as actors compete to better their position and to set the rules for others. Whether these events have an affect depends on actors’ own reserves of different types of capital; cultural, economic, social and political. Furthermore, whether they have affects beyond their own fields will be determined by how specific fields are inserted into the wider social orders.

**Approaching the social accountability discourse**

The rest of the chapter uses Fairclough’s approach to critical discourse analysis to guide an interrogation of the social accountability discourse. It asks what roles the discourse gives civil society in development, including democratisation, through an exploration of key orientating texts from the World Bank and DFID. It suggests that the authors’ creative mixing of discourses should be interpreted as signs of ongoing ideological struggles. In the conclusion, theories of the wider processes of socio-
cultural change these struggles are part of are offered to unpick their potential consequences.

Chapter Two’s exploration of the activist and neoliberal streams of civil society theory provides the broad background for the emergence of the social accountability discourse in the early 2000s. Whilst the aidnography literature reviewed in Chapter Three offers clues as to the sorts narrower processes that may be discernible in the analysed texts. At the same time, however, steps were taken to assure the analysis does not simply confirm the unproblematic continuation of these processes. Thus, it uncovers additional processes within the texts, including tensions created by the introduction of new discourses and the re-emergence of older ones.

Critical discourse analysts argue that it is easier to identify ideological struggles by analysing a range of chronologically linked texts (Breeze, 2011). However, Fairclough’s writings offer few guidelines on constructing a sample. Thus, I take inspiration from the aidnography literature’s focus on what Chapter Three called ‘development organisations’ grand orientating texts’. I am, therefore, interested in documents that provide public organisational mission statements, those that could be considered institutional think pieces and those which are clear efforts to shape wider understandings of particular issues. To select these texts, I have drawn from my own knowledge of the field. As this presents the introduction of bias, it is worth exploring this decision further.

In a recent publication, Wodak and Meyer (2016:7) argue that reflecting upon the discourse analyst’s position - although rarely done - is important because: ‘Researchers, scientists and philosophers are not situated outside the societal hierarchy of power and status but subject to this structure’. Accordingly, it is important to comment upon from where I approach the following analysis. Outside of academia I have an interest in what can broadly be characterised as left-wing politics, which for me includes issues such as the ideologies underpinning welfare and inequality. I am also often one of Mosse’s (2004) ‘brokers’ – employed to translate

60 This is why Fairclough’s (2016:106) work highlights his own political leanings.
programmes’ realities into development’s dominant discourses. I would argue that this has left me with a grasp of the general arguments within the social accountability literature and how they are likely to be consumed by people within the wider chain of development actors.

As others have commented upon, however, my political leanings and this ‘insider’ positioning makes critically reviewing the social accountability discourse’s key texts a challenging process (Mosse and Lewis, 2006; McKinnon, 2017). To add weight to my claim to be able to do so, the analysis devotes significant space to probing the chosen texts’ intertextuality. Following Ferguson’s (1990) own comparison between World Bank’s project reports and the widely available academic literature on Lesotho, this approach unpicks what evidence or, more accurately, whose voices and lived experiences the texts’ authors consciously choose to emphasize, downplay or omit. Thus, other texts and research explicitly referenced by the analysed organisational texts are explored to pre-empt the retort that their authors were unaware of alternative ways of seeing or understanding the issues they focus upon.

Attention is also given to the analysed texts’ forewords, introductions, overviews and policy recommendations. As Nielsen et al.’s (2014) study shows, these sections provide windows onto how powerful institutions want their texts to be received. This includes how they see their own roles and what they want others to do in response to their latest ideas. Thus, they are rich in ideological material and provide fertile ground upon which to make interpretations as to what their texts are trying to do.

Before proceeding, it should be mentioned that the analysis was undertaken with the aid of computer software, both for simple quantitative queries of the texts’ use of key words and phrases, and for coding the texts and organising memos. The codebook and samples of the coding process are given in Appendix 1.
The turn to accountability

The mixed results of efforts to engage civil societies in the 1990s contributed to the creation of a critical movement among development academics and practitioners in the early 2000s. It sought to refocus development on empowering civil society to engage in public politics, including interacting directly with state institutions and politicians (Blair, 2000; Dryzek, 2000; Cornwall, 2002; Fung and Wright, 2003; Gaventa, 2003). Its thinkers argued that interventions and governance reforms had a greater chance of impact and sustainability if they were partially crafted by citizens and were buttressed by popular pressure. Indeed, the emerging idea was that civil society could be supported to foster the democratic norms and sustain the political will needed for development. This represented a shift from the mid-1990s’ focus on participation in projects, to a participation in governance.

At the heart of this was a renewed focus on decentralisation and substantive citizenship (Johnson and Start, 2001; Moore and Putzel, 2001; Leftwich, 2005; Eyben and Ladbury, 2006). Thus, the ability of citizens to hold their governments to account for the provision of public goods took centre stage. To do this, tentative arguments arose that donors should not be afraid to mobilise civil society actors beyond the professionalised NGO mould, including traditionally marginalised groups and local informal powerbrokers, such as unions, professional associations and religious figures (Chandhoke, 2001; Kopecky and Mudde, 2003; Edwards, 2005).

Underpinning this was a broader effort to move development away from a narrow focus on institutional efficiency, markets and economic growth, and towards a concern for human rights and citizens’ ‘capabilities’ (Sen, 1999). In this framing, the powerlessness that stems from unaccountable governance is a constitutive element of poverty and the realisation of promised rights should be among the goals of empowerment. Green (2016:16) has suggested that this turn was also partly inspired by the ‘colour revolutions’ in Eastern Europe and the role Western European and North American development organisations focussed of civil society strengthening programmes played in them.
Western development organisations, however, did not drop their interest in ‘good governance’ as a means through which states enable markets. Rather, they grafted onto it an argument that interventions should encompass efforts to give citizens’ the means with which to advocate for better services and reforms. Signalling this change, the World Bank (2000:15) suggested that poverty is partly an outcome of ‘voicelessness and powerlessness’; whilst DFID (2000:18) began to argue that ‘development involves a process of political struggle over priorities and access to resources’.

As Moore and Putzel (2001) argued, however, major development institutions had traditionally only sought to grapple with politics to explain what had gone wrong with their interventions. This meant they routinely separated ‘development politics’ from ‘development management’, and only turned to the former to explain failures in the latter (Corbridge, 2005:191). In contrast, the emerging focus on participation in governance demanded knowledge of how civil society, political society and states engage one another in developing countries. Indeed, it appeared to take the arguments of the authors reviewed at the end of Chapter Two that has studied actually existing civil societies seriously.

Given this turn, Carothers and de Gramont (2013) argue in their book, *Development Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost Revolution*, that the first decade of the 2000s witnessed the explicit (re)introduction of political goals and methods to the development. From this emerged a focus on ‘demand-side’ programmes, of which social accountability or, as they were more commonly known in the early 2000s, ‘voice and accountability’ and ‘accountability and transparency’ programmes were a major category.
**The WDR 2004: mainstreaming social accountability**

Whereas social capital was arguably the Bank's 'missing link' between civil society, good governance, economic development and democracy in the 1990s, the publication of the *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for the Poor* went a long way towards replacing it with ‘information’ and ‘choice’ (WB, 2003). It is also now considered to be the foundational text for Western development organisations’ rethink of the relationship between civil society, service provision and accountability (ODI, 2014). Thus, we begin our exploration of the social accountability discourse with the WDR 2004. A theoretical discussion of the wider social processes animating it will be given following the analyses of all the texts.

**Accountability relationships**

Early on the WDR 2004’s authors declare that their ‘economics approach to making services work [...] is informed by the guidance on participation and empowerment that international human rights instruments provide’ (ibid:34). Accordingly, they champion the importance of citizens’ ‘voice’ and ‘mobilisation’ for ensuring accountable governance. They suggest that accountability operates through two main routes (Figure 2): firstly, the ‘short route’ which describes relationships between citizens and officials working in governance or service providing institutions. For example, a parent-teacher association provides a regular means by which citizens can directly engage schools’ staff and local authorities. Secondly, the ‘long route’ which focuses on citizens engaging elected representatives who, ideally, respond by exerting downward pressure on service providers, dispersing resources, reforming governance institutions or enacting new policies.
To activate either route the WDR 2004 argues that rights bearing citizens require information on the operation and policies of state institutions. For example, it frequently refers to the Ugandan government’s decision to make information on how schools’ budgets are spent public as pivotal to the reduction of leakages in the 1990s. Thus, poor service provision is portrayed as a problem of informational deficits or asymmetries between citizens, service providers and politicians.

Within the WDR 2004's logic, however, the relative newness of liberal democracy and elected representatives are positioned as a leading cause of poor services in many developing countries (ibid:5, 54, 81-90, 115). Thus, the long route to accountability is depicted as more often than not failing the poor. Four main reasons are offered for this: Firstly, the short-sighted voting choices of the poor; secondly, clientelism and patronage that distorts accountability relationships between politicians and service providers; thirdly, politicians’ lack of capacity and technical skills with which to monitor state services; and, lastly, politicians’ concerns for equity which can be detrimental to the state’s efficiency. Given the complexity of these challenges, the report’s emphasis is placed on the short route to accountability.

**Constituting market actors**

Alongside information, the WDR 2004 calls for the short route to be activated through decentralisation, privatisation and the implementation of user tariffs. This mix seeks to depoliticise services and improve citizens’ potential to monitor and
choose from a range of providers, thereby, creating a competitive market that incentivises reforms. However, the proposed remedies are framed as technical and administrative challenges, rather than ones of collective action or politics. This is most notable when the WDR 2004 declares that: ‘the long route of accountability involves politics’ [...] ‘Unlike the short route of accountability between clients and providers’ (ibid:78). Put another way, the report frames the society-politician relationship as political, whereas the society-provider relationship is deemed apolitical.

Furthermore, even though the report states decentralisation is about the ‘political voice’ of the poor, its choice of vocabulary to describe their empowerment leaves the reader with few reasons to believe voice should be equated with broad or collective political participation (ibid:129). Indeed, the poor are consistently labelled as the ‘clients’ of service providers or ‘consumers’ of public goods, building the idea that material and categorical inequalities between them and service providers can be addressed through ‘customer power’. It is also argued that competitive markets of state and non-state service providers will allow citizen/customers to ‘vote with their feet’ (ibid:9). In a striking metaphor, the report even compares its ideal service provision model to the periodic interactions between sandwich vendors and their customers (ibid:47).

In this sense, once informed, there is little to stop poor people from using the short route to accountability to improve service provision (ibid:64). All that is needed is for them to conduct themselves as self-interested economic actors. The WDR 2004 covers the techniques, including citizens’ scorecards, participatory budgeting, and the publication of performance indicators, that they can avail themselves of to do this. For their part, programme managers are given guides as to which of these techniques to deploy within different contexts and for the improvement of different services. Nonetheless, the report’s authors warn that even in those contexts that are broadly ‘pro-poor’, politics must be managed so as to avoid ‘unsustainable populism’ (ibid:198).
As the report itself suggests, however, this somewhat simplistic model of accountability ‘is not reality because it portrays only one direction in the relationships between actors. Rather, actors are embedded in a complex set of relationships, and accountability is not always the most important’ (ibi:51). Nonetheless, the WDR 2004 does not devote much time to exploring these relationships. Nor does it reference the widely available academic literature that could point readers in the direction of relevant phenomenon such as debt bondage, caste systems, or gender norms.\footnote{Please see Chapter 2.} Instead, in a turn of phrase that largely closes such discussions, the report’s authors talk of the 'sad consequences' of the 'social distance' between clients and providers without elaborating what this means (ibid:25).

In contrast, the WDR 2004 conducts a thorough dissection of poor people’s conduct. For the most part, this consists of using terms from neoclassical economics to describe poor people's cultures and choices as lacking rationality. For example, the choice not to spend on public goods with long term benefits, such as education, is described as a 'bias in poor families towards present consumption' (Ibid:31). At various points the responsibility for poor service provision is blamed on their 'lack of demand’, which is variously attributed to their gender or civic skills (bid:4). There are, however, only a few scattered references to their, perhaps rational, mistrust of the state, subordinate social positions or how impoverishment itself can pose a barrier to demanding or accessing services. In this regard, it is notable that in one of the few places readers get to hear the voice of a poor person they - presumably having been socialised into the Bank’s market-based logic - declare: “We will never allow the government to again give us free water” (ibid:10).

**Professionalised civil society and sceptical democrats**

Within the WDR 2004, 'altruistic' NGOs have a competitive advantage in reaching poor people, raising awareness, amplifying their voice and acting as the state’s sub-
contractors (bid:104). They are positioned as the linchpins of reform minded coalitions that straddle the state-society divide and that exert popular political pressure. Beyond NGOs, the WDR 2004 warns of the dangers of unions and interest groups that block reforms, take advantage of ill-informed voters, pressure service providers to bend the rules, or capture donors’ programmes. In economists’ language, such groups threaten to ‘subvert the incentives’ of service providers (ibid:97). Yet, where altruistic NGOs are absent, and the historical context is unfavourable, the report offers little advice as to how civil society mobilisation occurs or can be supported. Instead, a case study from Jamaica is used to suggest that in some places donors may have to settle for the ‘benevolent capture’ of their programmes by more educated or wealthy members of society (ibid:209).

Although it is argued that the absence of democracy entails 'huge downsides', the WDR 2004 retains a scepticism of liberal democracy throughout (ibid:115). This extends to worries that the citizens’ groups it recommends setting up or supporting could undermine the democratic accountability of local governments. Perhaps as a result, the report does not outline a sophisticated model for how accountability relationships translate into democratic outcomes. Indeed, it only contains a few lines on how donors should support the ‘core political processes and values, such as representation, accountability, tolerance, and openness’ required for democracy (ibid:210). This leaves readers to draw the conclusion that it is the aggregation of numerous accountability relationships - framed as multiple individualised transactions within competitive markets - that will leads to democracy.

It is worth noting, however, that the WDR 2004 often appears hesitant when giving its recommendations and regularly highlights the ambiguity of the processes it discusses. For example, it argues that decentralisation and information may cause voters to base their decisions on performance indicators, or it may simply turn them away from politics altogether. For general readers, these admissions may be received as encouraging signs of the authors’ humbleness in the face of the complex challenges they seek to address. Whilst for cynics, they could be interpreted as a response to past difficulties the WDRs’ authors have faced when making
recommendations from limited and contested research (Wade, 2002). Yet, as we will see in the next section on intertextuality, the Bank’s authors are much more certain when describing the factors and mechanisms that led to accountable governance in their chosen case studies.

Case studies and intertextual omissions

The WDR 2004 uses several key case studies to highlight accountability relationships. Amongst them is Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting scheme begun in the early 1990s (WB, 2003:201-202). However, missing from the report’s description is the documented effort of the Workers’ Party to organise citizens into associations and, to paraphrase a community organiser, the encouragements they were given to ‘politicise the pothole’ (Abers, 1998). There is also no mention of how city officials reduced the costs of participation by visiting poor neighbourhoods for meetings. Furthermore, Abers’ emphasis on how the ensuing political conflicts gradually broke down patron-client relations and eroded poor people’s long mistrust of the state is absent. In this sense, much of the politics of accountability in Porto Alegre’s scheme is missing.

The case study of Kerala’s impressive human development indicators – overviewed in Chapter Two – is similarly reductive (WB, 2003:44-45). In it, the Bank’s authors draw upon research from Sen and Dreze (1996), and Dreze and Sen (2002), to compare Kerala to Uttar Pradesh, arguing that the success of the former and failure of the latter cannot be attributed to the laws they share as members of India’s wider union. Instead, they highlight the ‘political activism’ of Keralans and their high levels of literacy (WB, 2004:45-46). They also argue that Uttar Pradesh suffered from ‘clientelist, caste, [and] class-driven politics’.

Although this explanation appears to be rooted in political processes, it washes-over the details other observers have emphasized. For example, it does not describe the
decades long and conflictual process of identity formation – specifically from a caste to a class based identity - found in Heller’s (1996, 2000) work. Central to this were demands for land reforms, social safety nets and workers’ rights, all of which changed the structural constraints on poor Keralans and facilitated their participation in political forums at multiple levels of governance.

In contrast, the WDR 2004’s authors appear to take Kerala’s political activism for granted and instead focus on literacy rates (WB, 2003:45). This effectively negates the hard-won history of synergies between the state’s social movements and political parties, and the consistent transfer of ideas from one to another. It also overlooks how ‘as politics became synonymous with popular mobilisation’ party leaders gradually learnt that they had to be responsive to broad-based demands (Heller, 2000:509). It is arguable that this allows the report’s authors to side-line discussions of the ideologies underpinning mass civil society mobilisation in Kerala. This ensures that the case study fits their broader thesis that information is the key variable in successful development.

Perhaps the WDR 2004’s most interesting intertextual omissions can be found in the setup for its fourth chapter ‘Clients and Providers’. It is worth quoting it in full:

‘This report and this chapter try to give the term “empowerment” a precise and concrete interpretation. Specifically, the chapter discusses the potential for poor people to influence services by:

Increasing their individual purchasing power.

Increasing their collective power over providers by organizing in groups.

Increasing their “capacity to aspire”: allowing them to take advantage of the first two by increasing the information needed to develop their personal sense of capability and entitlement.’ (WB, 2003:54)
Here, the report references Appadurai’s idea of the ‘capacity to aspire’ developed from his ethnographic research on the cultivation of ‘deep democracy’ among civil society activists in Mumbai’s slums (Appadurai, 2001, 2004). However, it then continues, leaving these ideas unexplored. In the spirit of an intertextual analysis, covering them further here may give readers a clue as to why.

Appadurai (2001, 2004) suggests that due to a host of personal and everyday crises - from a lack of access to basic services to illness and predation – poor peoples’ political horizons or ideas of the 'good life' can often appear limited to outsiders. Nonetheless, he argues that their aspirations must be understood as embedded within wider distributional inequalities and normative contexts that constrain what can or cannot be publicly said. Indeed, analysts that focus upon, whilst also decontextualizing, poor people’s more visible demands – such as calls to repair burst watermains or provide paved roads – risk losing sight of their broader desires for structural changes. An oversight that he warns can lead to the search for solutions in the 'science of calculations' and 'market-economics' (Appadurai, 2004).

Instead, Appadurai argues that an appreciation of how everyday interactions between ordinary people and powerholders can gradually change power relations is required. Central to this are uncovering and supporting opportunities for poor people to deliberate social, economic, and political issues amongst themselves and with powerholders in terms that challenge their prejudices. He illustrates this through the case of a global network of slum residents headquartered in Mumbai that has enabled its members to cultivate a shard identity through internal deliberations. And describes how the network’s activists engage World Bank and state officials at exhibitions they organise to showcase home-grown solutions to sanitation; something he terms the ‘politics of shit’ (Appadurai, 2001:35). In the process, he explores their bottom-up development of techniques for collecting data with which to hold authorities to account, labelling it a form of ‘governmentality from below’

62 Confusingly, the WDR 2004 quotes the phrase ‘capacity to aspire’ found in Appadurai’s similar book chapter from 2004, yet it only references his paper from 2001. I have confined the majority of my analysis to the paper form 2001.
Appadurai concludes that it is only by exploring such interactions that analysts can begin to grasp how everyday demands contribute to the deepening of democracy.

Appadurai is also clear about what is at stake when poor people raise their voice. He frames the challenge as about supporting them to find a 'way into the public sphere and visible citizenship without resort to open confrontation or public violence' (ibid:38). To do this, he argues that the first principle should be that no one knows more about how to survive poverty and hold the state to account than poor people. Thus, rather than outsiders’ monitoring techniques or models of mobilisation, the aim should be to horizontally connect poor people’s associations to one another to foster an exchange of ideas.

The second principle concerns a vision of 'politics without parties'. By this, Appadurai is not arguing that accountability is apolitical. Rather, the suggestion is that accountability requires the poor to seek to work with whoever is in power. Through such collaborations, marginalised groups gain opportunities to challenge societal prejudices, whilst presenting themselves as a political force to be negotiated with. This pragmatic approach includes building relationships with service providers, elements of the bureaucracy and politicians, not just monitoring them. It also entails a 'complex political vision about means, ends and styles that is not entirely utilitarian or functional' (ibid:30).

Lastly, he uses the example of a slum dwellers’ network to suggest that 'deep democracy' is more likely when civil society associations are transnationally networked with similar communities in other states. Following an established literature on global social movements, this can increase their capacity to operate in local contexts. Nonetheless, he warns against the ‘projectisation’ and bureaucratic demands that arise when entering into partnerships with international donors or other funding bodies (ibid:40).

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63 See Chapter Two’s section entitled ‘Civil society under totalitarianism’.
The WDR 2004 omits these principles. For example, the wider report does not cover the importance of horizontal and transnational civil society networks. Nor does it point towards the kinds of contextually appropriate opportunities, data or language that the poor require to assure their voices are heard by powerholders. Indeed, what sets Appadurai’s work apart from the WDR 2004 is his attention to how mobilisation occurs, the necessity of forming shared identities and challenging debilitating prejudices in appropriate vernaculars. He is also unambiguous about the role of politics in all accountability relationships.

**DFID’s texts**

The chapter’s analyses of DFID’s texts starts from 2006 with an exploration of a White Paper (DFID, 2006b) and a report on how the organisation engages civil society (DFID, 2006a). Broadly viewed, the White Paper re-orientates DFID following 2005’s international ‘Make Poverty History’ advocacy campaign; whilst the report provides a snapshot of how it perceives civil society at home and abroad. The section then moves onto a Briefing Note on accountability from 2008, the next departmental White Paper released in 2009, and a 2011 paper on DFID’s approach to empowerment and accountability (DFID, 2008b, 2009, 2011a). Together, they reveal the organisation’s contribution to the social accountability discourse in the years immediately after the Bank’s report and just before its funding of the Supporting Transparency Accountability and Electoral Process (STAEP) programme in Pakistan examined in the thesis’ second half.

**Activist leanings**

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64 White papers are publicly available policy documents produced by the British Government that set out their proposals for future legislation.
From the outset, the forewords of DFID’s texts from 2006 take a different tone from the WDR 2004. In them, DFID’s Secretary of State (an elected politician) frames civil society as something that he himself is part of by referencing his participation in the Make Poverty History marches. This leads to the suggestion that a globally connected civil society must ensure that the promises made in response to the campaign by politicians, states and international organisations are kept. The campaign is also presented as the latest evidence that politics can make a difference to the lives of the world’s poor (DFID, 2006b:5). In this manner, civil society is portrayed both as a watchdog of the state and as a realm of political activism.65

What could be called an activist discourse permeates DFID’s early texts. For example, the authors of the 2006 report suggest that civil societies 'provide people with the space for association, reflection and action.' (DFID, 2006a:5). They argue that from such spaces civil society can organise to represent the poor in local and national policy forums and contribute to the accountable governance. To illustrate, the £6.6 million of support DFID gave to a Bangladeshi legal-aid organisation that helps poor families claim their land rights is highlighted. The funding is said to have helped the programme’s participants find their 'strength in numbers' (ibid:7). To support such initiatives, DFID is repeatedly cast as the 'partner' of global and national civil society organisations, and as ideally positioned to build their capacities.

This wide mandate is accompanied by warnings that civil societies consist of a diverse range of actors and interests, and that many may not care for the welfare of the poor. Nevertheless, echoing Hegel, this complexity is portrayed as one of civil society's strengths, allowing it to be a source of innovative solutions to pressing problems and the co-producer of vital services with states. Indeed, where possible, DFID seems to prefer that states are the producers of public services in collaboration with civil society. It also repeatedly opposes users’ fees for basic services such as

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65 This framing of civil society builds upon the vision set out by DFID’s first Secretary of State and a White Paper from 2000 that raised the need for ‘a bigger voice for poor people in the determination of government policy’ (Short, 1999; DFID, 2000:23).
education or health, using case studies to argue that they ‘deter’ the uptake of services by the poor (DFID, 2006b:53-54).

The challenge, as DFID’s 2006 White Paper portrays it, is to understand how the politics of state-society relations plays out. Thus, donors are encouraged ‘to think more politically’, including gaining in-depth historical and political knowledge (ibid:10). To do this, it is argued that the organisation’s focus is shifting from professionalised NGOs to the political roles played by a wider range of civil society actors, which by its 2009 White Paper include voluntary groups, the media, trade unions, diaspora, faith-based groups, co-operatives and professional associations. The importance of engaging civil society organisations that have often been marginalised from mainstream funding pots or that may require additional capacity building to ensure they can demonstrate their results is also stressed. This, the paper suggests, will ensure funding reaches the people that need it most and that they have a voice in decisions that affect their lives. However, perhaps in acknowledgement of the difficulty of directly engaging in contentious politics, the paper highlights how DFID often works through intermediaries, such as INGOs or domestic networks of civil society organisations (DFID, 2006a:12).

In its early texts, therefore, DFID constructs a vision of heterogenous civil societies, able to be both ideas factories and partners for developmental states. It even argues that that interest groups can themselves be drivers of development (DFID, 2006a:9). This contrasts with the World Bank’s portrayal of a realm of, ideally, atomised market actors empowered to monitor the state and choose from competing providers.

**The politics of accountability**

The prefaces of the texts from 2006 also outline DFID's idea of development. Here the Secretary draws on Amartya Sen's influential book *Development as Freedom* and its premise that development should enhance the capabilities of the poor, not merely
stoke economic growth (Sen, 1999). As part of this, the White Paper enshrines ‘good governance’ - defined as the capabilities of states, their responsiveness to their citizens and their accountability - as one of DFID’s primary aims. Achieving it is framed as about civil societies, political parties, governments and their relationships, more than it is about building the right formal institutions. To empirically justify this focus, the Paper draws upon Kaufmann’s (2004) quantitative work on governance as an intervening variable between civil and political rights, and socio-economic development; and it references Sen’s (1981) famous argument that a lack of democracy, the absence of a free press and famines are causally related.

For further empirical support the authors refer to DFID’s ‘Drivers of Change’ studies. Initially consisting of 20 country case studies commissioned in 2002/3, this research set out to understand the structural and institutional factors framing the political contexts within which individuals and organisations organise for good governance. Its findings are used to argue that ‘beyond the formal structures of the state, civil society organisations give citizens power, help poor people get their voices heard, and demand more from politicians and government’ (DFID, 2006b:23). They are also used to describe accountability as ‘ultimately’ about ‘the opportunity to change leaders by democratic means’ (ibid:20). Later the paper adds that the key ingredient is ‘active involvement by citizens – the thing we know as politics’ (ibid:8). It also suggests that ‘popular political pressure’ from civil society organisations and the media can tackle ‘corruption’, within which DFID includes ‘clientelism’ (ibid:28). Readers, therefore, are left in little doubt that DFID sees accountability as a political process.

The clearest elaboration of DFID’s understanding of the relationship between accountability, politics and wider democratising projects is found in 2008’s Briefing Note. In it DFID fears that people living in democracies created after 1989 may have had their ‘hope’ and ‘expectations’ for ‘a better life’ dashed. It is warned that in these states everyday governance has ‘generated widespread popular disaffection with democracy as it is practised’ [sic] (DFID, 2008:2). For the causes of this democratic deficit the Note’s authors cast a wide net, pointing to everything from ‘globalisation’,
'elite dominated party machines' and 'patronage-systems', to the privatisation of state services and the informal social norms that sustain categorical inequalities such as 'ethnicity', 'kinship', and 'gender relations'. They also include a discussion of how accountability institutions can fall foul of 'capture' and 'bias' (DFID, 2008b:10).66 They draw on Diamond’s (2002) research to suggest that this will lead to ‘vicious cycles’ in which ‘impunity generates impunity’ and the legitimacy of democratic states is called into question.

To address this, the Note recommends uncovering and addressing ‘power relations’ at varying levels of governance, with a view to identifying actors from civil society, political parties and the state which can help bridge the gaps between poor people and decisionmakers. As part of this, it introduces the notion of ‘social accountability’. It is described as the ‘informal’ or ‘hybrid’ processes that involve citizens in the monitoring of state institutions, including local service providers, and those that enable them to participate in public deliberations with authorities. Furthermore, social accountability is framed as a relatively ‘new’ idea with the most potential for ‘innovative’ relationships between ‘state entities and organised groups in society’ to emerge in contexts where traditional formal accountability institutions are compromised or lacking. Readers are warned that it can be particularly ‘controversial’ because it provides opportunities for excluded or marginalised groups to participate in governance and ‘state building’. The Note’s authors conclude their discussion of social accountability by, in part, attributing the idea to the World Bank’s Social Development Department. Although they do not reference specific papers or research.

In short, DFID understands social accountability relationships as embedded in social norms, notions of ‘fairness’, and contentious politics. Unlike the World Bank’s image of citizens as consumers of services, it is unambiguous in its suggestion that civil society must be included in deliberations with both providers and their political

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66 Capture refers to situations in which elites divert resources meant for the poor for their own benefit. Bias describes those in which elites or the social groups they belong to enjoy undue influence within the decision-making processes of accountability institutions.
masters. Indeed, it views such interactions as central to good governance and democracy.

### Blending discourses

Nonetheless, 2008’s Note also began to use many of the economic and market-based terms and concepts found within the WDR 2004. For example, it consciously adopted the Bank’s framework of ‘principles’ and ‘agents’ that had been borrowed from the theoretical literature on the governance of firms (Roberts and Milgrim, 1992). Furthermore, it suggested accountability relationships must leave authorities room to ‘experiment’ and ‘innovate’, whilst ensuring they are under ‘surveillance’ and their ‘performance’ is ‘monitored’ (DFID, 2008:5-6). To illustrate the role ‘information’ can play in making authorities explain their decisions, it also used the WDR 2004’s Ugandan case study of the publication of school budgets.

By DFID’s 2011 report on ‘empowerment and accountability’ the activists’ language of ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, ‘fairness’, ‘legitimacy’ and ‘transformative social and political change’ is repeatedly used alongside concepts from the WDR 2004 and a new lexicon from institutional political economy (DFID, 2011). The latter introduced ideas such as the need to discern the inclusivity of countries’ underlying ‘political settlements’, and the ‘rules of the game’ (ibid:3).67 This way of conceptualising poor governance challenged analysts to investigate the balance of power between elites within any given context (Di John and Putzel, 2009). Although its related literature suggests that informal social norms are important, its goal has mostly been to uncover generalizable ‘doorstep’ conditions within which elites are incentivised to enter into peaceful coalitions, provide public services, and growth takes off (North et al., 2009; Khan, 2010). Accordingly, it harbours an instrumentalist view of civil

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67 It is notable that through its own funding of research centres, such as the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the Centre for the Future State at the Institute of Development Studies, DFID was instrumental in bringing these ideas to the mainstream and incorporating them into its conceptual frameworks.
society, portraying it as comprised of groups that elites call upon for support in their contests with one another. Thus, it is not overly concerned with accountability relationships. In this sense, DFID’s texts from 2008 onwards begin a blending of discourses that stand in tension with one another.

Despite these discourses inclusion, 2011’s report retained a sophisticated understanding of empowerment and accountability (see Figure 3). This included an attempt to differentiate between different forms of empowerment. In a manner reminiscent of Bourdieu’s types of capital, a discussion of the different types of ‘resources’ - including health, education, cash, self-confidence, and ICTs - people use to activate accountability relationships was included.68 It also continued to focus on addressing ‘power relations’ and suggested that identifying civil society organisations and political partners to link up should be central to programmers’ efforts.

Figure 3: ‘Empowerment and accountability – step changes to enabling poor men and women to exercise greater choice and control over their own development’ (DFID, 2011:2)

68 See Chapter Two.
Globalisation and value for money

Two further discourses come to the fore within DFID’s more recent texts. The first concerns the interdependence of developed and developing countries. Within the texts from 2006, the development of poor countries is argued to be important for the prosperity of developed countries. Furthermore, it is discussed in the context of upbeat messages about the role of globally connected civil society organisations and British efforts to reform international institutions.

By the 2009 White Paper, globalisation’s pitfalls are the defining theme. Alongside climate change, global pandemics and economic shocks, terms such as 'injustice', 'insecurity' and 'conflict' are regularly used to describe its outcomes (DFID, 2009). Moreover, the paper’s authors fear that the progress that has been made in tackling poverty in some regions may be overridden by conflicts born of 'radicalisation' and 'state failure' (ibid:15-16). In this framing, unaccountable and unresponsive states are
linked to contemporary conflicts, which due to increased interdependence are argued to threaten the safety of Britain’s streets (ibid:17).

By 2009, DFID’s texts also contained another new discourse on the need for rigorous impact evaluations, both to demonstrate results and as a form of accountability to taxpayers. DFID argues that the World Bank is a leader in this area, and highlights its ‘strong culture of innovation, evaluation and continual improvement’ (DFID, 2009a:116). Given frequent references to the 2008 global financial crisis and the pressure Britain’s governmental departments have subsequently found themselves under to justify their spending, this could be understood as the introduction of ‘value for money’ discourse.69 Indeed, promises are repeatedly made to guarantee the ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ of DFID spending, with a focus on ‘tangible’ results.

This discourse also permeates 2011’s report. Here, the capacities of civil societies, and the accountability of institutions and officials within developing countries is rolled into discussions of DFID’s own commitment to internal reviews and audits ‘to make every penny count’ (DFID, 2011:1). DFID also declares that it will seek to identify measurably successful initiatives that can be scaled up, with the overall aim of building a robust evidence base for future programmes to draw from. As if offering a clue as to how this should be done, two out of three of the report’s case studies of social accountability programmes point to randomised controlled trials as rigorous proofs of their impacts.

Emerging evidence

The authors of DFID’s 2011 report were able to draw upon a body of research that DFID had commissioned in the years leading up to its publication (McGee and Gaventa, 2010).70 Of this, the background paper produced on service delivery had the

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69 This discourse is also identified by Nielsen et al’s (2014) study of DFID texts from this era.
70 This research was unconnected to that on political settlements.
most to say about social accountability programmes (Joshi, 2013). Although the background paper is not part of this discourse analysis and the thesis is not primarily interested in ‘what works’, it is worth briefly exploring it to gain a greater understanding of DFID’s thinking in the years immediately before it funded STAEP.

Joshi’s paper reviewed qualitative and quantitative evidence supporting the theories of change underpinning social accountability programmes. This included those that had disseminated information on service delivery to citizens, trained them to monitor providers, and set up interfaces between citizens and authorities. It concluded that: ‘The overarching lesson seems to be, not surprisingly, that the context, particularly the political context, matters’ (ibid:42). Within this she included the nature of civil societies, their relations with the state, the competitiveness of politics, the role of reform minded leaders, and the need for enabling environments created by a free media.

Joshi (2013) also highlighted a major hurdle for those making connections between social accountability initiatives and ongoing democratising projects. Namely, that the era’s limited evidence offered relatively context free, static snapshots of interactions between citizens, service providers, and authorities. Part of the problem, Joshi argued, is down to disagreements over what exactly social accountability initiatives are meant to achieve; voice, state responsiveness, improved services, democracy, or a mixture of these things. This was causing most programmes to focus on measurable outputs, such as the activities undertaken, demands resolved or changes in the quality of service delivery rather than empowerment or structural changes. Put another way, Joshi’s review documented a confusion among the era’s practitioners over the means and ends of their initiatives.

These confusions are left unexplored in the reviewed texts from DFID. Perhaps explaining why, within the journal article Joshi (2013) later produced from this

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71 This reference is for the journal article that was produced from research carried out in 2010 in support McGee and Gaventa’s (2010) overview paper.
72 For example, it highlights random control trials of similar community-based information dissemination programmes in India that returned diverse outcomes, strongly suggesting that the local context was important (Pandey et al., 2009; Banerjee et al., 2010).
research, she argues that practitioners wishing to take wider contexts seriously are confronted by institutional obstacles within development organisations themselves (Unsworth, 2010; Booth, 2011). These obstacles take two main forms: firstly, that many organisations still predominantly view state-society relations through the prism of the experience of Western countries. This causes them to concentrate on the development of formal governance institutions and to overlook localised, often informal, innovations that allow citizens to engage the state. Secondly, that the era’s propositions about the power of community monitoring and information to improve service delivery had been overstated as they fed development organisations’ need for simple solutions. In the process, research suggesting that often informal, messy political coalitions between service providers and their clients are vital for improvements was being side-lined due to its complexity. These issues - which are really about the political economy of the development sector - will be returned to in the thesis’ concluding chapters.

**A contested discourse**

So far, this chapter has explored DFID and the World Bank’s texts to uncover how they attempt to constitute developing countries and their citizens, their interdiscursivity, and positions within longer intertextual chains. However, critical discourse analysis also requires analysts to link their interpretations to theories of wider social processes. The idea is to discern whether they are challenging or reinforcing unequal power relations. To do this, this section argues that as neoliberalism has triumphed over liberalism in late modernity, the space within these development organisations for programmes that can support radical democratising projects has been contested.

As Chapter One introduced, a number of critical authors focus on how neoliberal ideas of governance are reconfiguring understandings of citizenship (Gershon, 2011; Block and Somers, 2014; Davies, 2014; Brown, 2015). This is occurring because
market techniques and values are increasingly being imparted by powerful Western organisations and states to activities and domains - such as the family, education, and public life - where they have traditionally not been the primary concern. In the process, democracy is being hollowed out by atomised individuals acting competitively, in accordance with prescribed best practices, and the letter of the law.

To illustrate how this has been achieved, Brown (2015) points to the experts, technical fixes and best practices that arose with the New Public Management and the Good Governance agendas in 1980s and 1990s Britain. Both doctrines look towards grading, benchmarking, and the transfer of approved models from one industry, institution, or state to another. Both have the spread of market values, such as individualism, competition and transactional relationships at their centre. Both have the increase of stocks of human capital and economic growth as their primary aims. Lastly, due to their propagation by powerful organisations and states, both enjoy significant symbolic capital with which to legitimise themselves.

Brown contends that to make room for these doctrines much of what the older, liberal civil society theorists argued was central to ‘homo-politicus’ must be forgotten. This includes identify formation, associationalism, public deliberations and messy contests between different perspectives or groups, and it encompasses acts of civil disobedience buttressed by social movements. In the process, democratic politics is reduced to deciding between different sets of techniques, templates and best practices recommended by the evaluations of economic experts – what Brown (ibid:118-9), drawing upon Weber, refers to as ‘instrumental reason’. Accordingly, Brown declares neoliberal citizenship and governance a ‘depoliticising epistemology, ontology, and set of practices’ (ibid:131).

Brown does not discuss the ascendance of neoliberalism in powerful Western development organisations. Indeed, by the 2000s neoliberal macro-economic ideas had largely been discredited and were no longer openly propagated as catch-all

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73 See Chapter Two for a discussion of both.
74 See Chapter Two for a discussion of symbolic capital.
solutions to development (Murray and Overton, 2011). Nonetheless, adding to the arguments of the authors reviewed in the previous chapter, I argue that from its inception neoliberal ideas of citizenship have been discernible within the social accountability discourse’s take on civil society.

As was shown, the authors of the World Bank’s WDR 2004 largely confined politics to the relationship between voting, governments and state institutions, or what they called the long route to accountability. Furthermore, the cause of poor or discriminatory services was attributed to cultural deficiencies and a lack of demand, understood as rationality, from poor people in developing countries. To address this, the Bank’s authors offered techniques that they can use to gain information and encouraged the cultivation of state-supported competitive markets of service providers. These recommendations were justified with stripped-back country case studies of how contemporary civil societies have challenged clientelism and driven institutional reforms. Throughout they were underpinned by a scepticism of mass political participation and leadership in young democracies.

As they had removed much of the activity within the wider public sphere from their analyses, social accountability was framed as consisting of transactions between competing informed clients and service providers. This depicted empowered citizens as individual consumers, able to vote with their money or feet. In the process, the meanings of freedom, collective action, and popular sovereignty found within liberal political theory—the base for civil society theory’s radical activist version—were replaced with a focus on citizens’ responsibilities to monitor the state, act rationally and improve themselves. Within the report, it was argued that the tools and best practices to do this can be taught by foreign development professionals; a tutelage that substitutes for associationalism, democratic deliberations, political conflicts and disobedient social movements.

DFID’s texts initially contrast with the Bank’s report. Indeed, they frame civil society’s role in accountable governance as embedded in asymmetrical, power laden and often confrontational political relationships. Furthermore, they suggest outsiders
have a valuable role to play in networking organisations, protecting them and supporting them to form productive relationships with authorities. Yet, as DFID’s texts began to encompass discourses from the WDR 2004, the organisation’s activist leanings increasingly shared space with neoliberal ideas of citizenship and governance. Accordingly, they began to take on board the Bank’s assumptions about the causal links between information, empowerment and accountability.

New discourses on elite driven political settlements, the dangers of globalisation, and the requirement that programmes demonstrate value for money were soon added. As part of this, DFID’s texts also begun to make calls for measurable, scalable and transferable programmes, suggesting that civil society’s role in development can be paired down to sets of best practices, outputs and templates. These discourses have since been attributed to pressure on DFID from incumbent Conservative Party politicians – who introduced Britain to neoliberal ideology in the 1980s – that were keen to see the department justify its budget through an adherence to the ‘results agenda’ (Eyben, 2013; Valters and Whitty, 2017). This agenda can be broadly understood as the next step in the evolution of the principles of New Public Management, with cost-benefit analyses, performance related promotions, internal departmental competitions for resources, quantifiable results and scalable programmes as its defining features.

Siding with those that suggest neoliberal ideals seek to reconfigure contemporary notions of citizenship, I argue that what is at stake is more than just the continuation of the struggle between the 1990s’ activist and neoliberal civil society theorists. Instead, it is the replacement of liberalism’s homo-politicus with neoliberalism’s homo-economicus. In this framing, the social accountability discourse posits that entrenched dynamics, such as clientelism, mistrust of authorities and political apathy, can be overcome by suite of techniques imparted by experts to poor people who, henceforth, individually and, less often, collectively use information to act on market principles. In short, it offers an all-encompassing alternative to the competing values, identities and visions of the good life central to politics. To be clear, the suggestion is not that any single element of this discourse or the practices it propagates should be
objected to in isolation. Rather, the problem is the work they do in combination to reduce the prospects of radical democratising projects.

Conclusion

This chapter investigated the ‘social accountability discourse’ within texts from the World Bank and DFID. It suggested that whereas in the 1990s ‘social capital’ was positioned as the ‘missing link’ between civil society, good governance, economic development and democracy, by the early 2000s information and consumer choice was increasingly being posited to make up for its deficiencies. Nonetheless, it traced a discernible difference between DIFD’s earlier texts and the Bank’s original formulation over the degree to which accountability relationships are understood to be embedded in politics. And it showed how this difference was gradually eroded as DIFD’s more recent texts took on ideas from neoclassical economics and markets principles, and as the value for money and results agendas emerged as a force shaping programmes. I argue that this can be understood as part of an ongoing struggle to replace liberalism’s homo-politicus with neoliberalism’s homo-economicus within Western understanding of civil society. This renders citizenship a matter of choosing between a limited number of techniques, templates and practices imparted by experts. In the process, the need for deliberative spaces, identity formation, activism and relationships with the state is reduced, limiting civil society’s potential to be the site of radical democratising projects. To uncover how far this struggle has permeated DFID and what the consequences may be, the thesis now turns from the social accountability discourse to a programme in Pakistan.
Chapter 5

Pakistan

‘Donors have a lot to answer for [...] They encourage mediocrity, the kind of people that would not spend a day in the private sector are somehow celebrated by donors, they just learnt a few buzzwords and that was it [...] you can also say that the NGO sector is not separate from Pakistani society, so if there is nepotism in the army, there is nepotism in the NGO sector as well’

(Senior NGO Staff Member, 2015)\(^{75}\)

To set the context for an exploration of the practice of social accountability, this chapter focuses on Pakistan’s political settlement – understood as the underlying informal agreement between elites on how to allocate political and economic opportunities – since the country’s founding in 1947 (North et al., 2009; Khan, 2010). I argue that it has changed as the country has become increasingly urbanised, with a growing capitalist middle-class. Although politically engaged, this class is largely uninterested in democracy as it enjoys privileged access to the state’s services and the benefits of an informal, untaxed economy. I then examine Pakistan’s indigenous civil society, the growth of professional organisations in the 1990s, and the role of international donor organisations. I argue that the potential for radical democratising projects has been consistently suppressed. This is explained by two processes: firstly, the ability of elites that control the state to integrate threats to the status quo into clientelistic networks. Secondly, drawing from a series of semi-structured interviews with members of Pakistan’s community of professional non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the efforts of neoliberal international donor organisations to build a technically competent, corporate and, largely, apolitical civil society. It is shown that these processes have often overlapped and complemented one another.

\(^{75}\) Interview with Senior NGO Staff Member 1.
Clientelistic legacies

The analysis adopts Fox's (2007) relational framework for exploring how civil societies ‘thicken’ and contribute to developmental outcomes in semi-authoritarian states outlined in Chapter Two. I class contemporary Pakistan as ‘semi-authoritarian’ because elections are held and, at least nominally, state authorities are subject to the rule of law. However, my use of the term also encompasses Linz and Stepan's (1996:38-54) idea of ‘post-totalitarian’ states in which a degree of plurality allows for the emergence of a ‘second culture’ or ‘parallel society’ that provides a political alternative to dominant modes of governance, but that, as the chapter makes shows, is limited and routinely persecuted.

In precolonial India, control over land, cultivators and agricultural surplus was key to power (Fuller, 1989). Accordingly, the Mughal emperors governed through a network of landlords linked to them by chains of intermediaries ranging from provincial governors to local level clan leaders. In return for patronage, these networks collected revenue, quelled descent and crushed rebellions.

Over time, Indian society stratified along labour and kinship lines. Known as the jajmani system, the clearest divides were between those working the land yet landless, kameen (servers/artisans) and jajman (landowning patrons). Through the custom of endogamy - marrying only within the limits of a local community - members of each group gradually solidified their identities. In the Punjab, these occupational kin-groups became known as biraderis. Nonetheless, there is enough fluidity in the contemporary use of the term that one will often find that more affluent members of a single kameen biraderi own land or have diversified their income streams in other ways. Furthermore, some may have married outside of their biraderi or changed their name to associate themselves with a biraderi of higher social status.
Soon after the establishment of the British Raj in 1858 the colonial army began to heavily recruit from Northern Punjab and the parts of the North-West Frontier (Dewey, 1981). Muslim aristocracy from these areas had helped the British put down the previous year’s rebellion. They were rewarded with a new policy of governing with their help. At its centre was the construction of nine canal colonies between 1885 and 1940 in the areas west of the Jhelum rivers, in what is now Pakistani Punjab.

The colonies represented a top-down scheme to re-engineer the Punjab’s society. The economic domination of loyal landowners was assured through their acceptance of the state’s patronage. This included the leasing of steam driven water pumps that they charged others for access to (Ali, 1979). It was also cemented through a new loyal stratum of medium-sized landowners created by giving plots in the region to retiring military and bureaucratic personnel. When the domination of these elites was threatened by urban, mainly Hindu moneylenders, the state stepped in with the Land Alienation Act of 1900 that restricted property transfers.

These elites’ grip on political life was initially achieved by granting larger landowners positions as lambardar or numberdar (village heads responsible for revenue collection), and later through more formalised roles as state contractors, magistrates, and commissioners (Javid, 2012:130). Among these were positions on ‘District Boards’ — effectively local governments — that oversaw public works and had discretionary development budgets. The British also continued the Mughals’ practice of patronising pirs (religious leaders) through land grants that assured their loyalty (Ewing, 1983).

The gradual introduction of democracy and the threat of uprisings motivated by the Russian revolution of 1917 challenged this arrangement (Akhtar, 2006). In response, the British worked with landowners’ organisations — such as The Punjab Zamindar Association, the Jat Sikh Association, and the Muslim Association — to ensure their interests were secured. Many have argued that these arrangements militarised the
Punjab’s society and, with it, people’s understandings of democracy (Jalal, 1995; Yong, 1995; Ganguly and Fair, 2013).

**Military-bureaucracy-landed alliance**

The trauma of partition in 1947 displaced 10-12 million people and killed an estimated 1 million. It also birthed two countries: India, and the geographically separated units of East and West Pakistan. In search of power, members of Pakistan’s infant bureaucracy found an ally in the military. They called on it – as one of the few working institutions – to sort out a host of domestic challenges from civil unrest to cleaning up Lahore (Jalal, 1995). In return, it negotiated its own relationship with America which wanted a regional ally to help halt the spread of communism. This began the tradition of Pakistan’s bureaucratic and military elites renting out the country’s geostrategic position to foreign powers, and setting the army’s budgets and priorities independently of politicians (Hasan-Askari, 2003:77-81). In 1958 General Ayub Khan took over by declaring martial law as necessary to secure Pakistan from internal political divisions. He swiftly banned political parties, subordinated the judiciary and clamped down on the press. He also allowed military officers to join the bureaucracy in great numbers (Siddiqa, 2007:130).

The following 15 years are important for two reasons: The first concerns the ‘Green Revolution’ which was changing the face of agriculture across many developing nations. In Pakistan it was driven by the state offering landowners technology packages, including subsidised tractors, tube-wells, pesticides and high yield crop strains (Keefer et al., 2003). It also introduced restrictions – which were often circumnavigated by well-connected elites – on the amount of land that could be held under share-cropping arrangements (Alavi, 1973a; Ahmad, 1973). Although some new medium-sized landowners emerged, this created a set of largescale capitalist farmers, whilst reducing their need to employ large numbers of low-skilled workers.
Some of them also began channelling surplus capital into industrial enterprises, thereby, diversifying their income streams (Javid, 2011).

The second concerns the, ironically named, ‘basic democracies’ initiative. This was a system of 80,000 local government positions with developmental budgets. The basic democrats also formed the electoral college for Ayub’s bid to become president. A study at the time suggested that around 62% of them in West Pakistan were affluent landowners and the heads of biraderis (Inayetullah, 1964). Analyses have also concluded that many were retired military and bureaucrat landowners (Jalal, 1994; Cheema et al., 2006). Furthermore, the most influential positions – the chairmen of Municipal Committees – were directly appointed by the government. Thus, the initiative can be understood as an effort to formally legitimise the rule of Pakistan’s military-bureaucratic alliance, whilst ensuring that the Green Revolution’s winners were swiftly co-opted into the young state’s clientelistic networks (Friedman, 1960).

**A popularist amongst landlords**

Discontent with Ayub’s thinly veiled exclusionary politics arguably led to elections in 1970. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – a wealthy landlord from Sindh province – overwhelmingly won the West and the nationalist Awami League the East. The stark geographical division in voting rattled Western elites who responded by deploying Pakistan’s army to the East. This sparked a civil war in 1971, India’s intervention on behalf of the East’s rebels and the West’s defeat. As a result, the East gained independence and became Bangladesh.

Back in Pakistan, Bhutto’s rise was significant because his popular platform pledged ‘Islam, Democracy and Socialism’. It courted the poor with promises of land reforms, home ownership and the nationalisation of major industries. Jones’ (2003:2) analysis suggests that:
‘by galvanising the common man behind his programme of Islamic Socialism and promise of roti, kapra, makan (‘bread, clothing, housing’). Never before had the rural peasant or urban worker so broken with his customary leadership, the rural landlord and the urban union godfather, to assert his independent political rights as he did in 1970.’

Bhutto’s messages gained ground level legitimacy through a widespread campaign by the ‘Punjab Left’ in villages. This movement countered the authority of powerful landlords and it encouraged emerging peasant leaders to run for office. To start afresh, Bhutto also pledged to abandon Ayub’s system of basic democrats. So successful was this strategy that some observers tentatively suggested that the rule of the rural landed elite in the Punjab might be over (Baxter, 1974).

Nonetheless, a body of research has since shown that the PPP failed to institute mass political participation and that it did not push through the changes needed to rework Pakistan’s political settlement (Burki, 1980; Jones, 2003; Khan, 2009). For example, the party quickly rowed back on sweeping land reforms. Instead, it turned to landed elites to prop it up as opposition grew amongst industrialists dispossessed by nationalisations, ethno-linguistic political parties and army officers worried about Bhutto’s overtures to India. These elites jettisoned the PPP’s more radical proposals and assured that those that did pass contained loopholes that they could exploit. According to Alavi (1983), the mistake that led to rioting, a military coup and Bhutto’s hanging in 1979 was the decision to nationalize the agro-processing industries (flour, cotton and rice mills).
Engineering a praetorian-religious state

Whatever Bhutto’s failings, his replacement, General Zia ul Haq, was no friend of liberal democracy. According to Talbot (1999:256), ‘Zia was of the opinion that a Western-style democracy was unsuitable for Pakistan ... a presidential form of government was ‘nearest to Islam’... [and that] political parties were non-Islamic’. He was also determined to crush civil society, whilst making sure that the military was embedded in all areas of life - social, economic and political – so that its interests could never again be threatened by a popular politician. However, Zia knew that he had to accommodate the ambitions of the capitalist classes that had arisen in Pakistan’s growing urban and peri-urban areas, and the newer mid-sized landowners in rural regions.

To achieve his goals, Zia began by imposing martial law. He also rolled back some of the land reforms instituted by Bhutto, thereby, winning the allegiance of large landowners. He banned political parties and repressed anything that looked like political activity, such as student and labour organisations (Oldenburg, 2010:143). To further ward-off mass political mobilisations, Zia undertook a battle for Pakistanis’ hearts and minds (Daechsel, 1997). It was pursued through a wide-ranging Islamisation programme which included adding conservative ulema (religious scholars) to government bodies, setting up a system of Sharia courts, instituting blasphemy laws, abolishing interest, supporting a madrassa (religious school) building programme, changing the national curriculum, purging universities of Marxist academics and requiring an annual 2.5% zakat (Islamic charity) donation. He also developed closer ties with Saudi Arabia, allowing migratory workers to flood to the state, and its influence, wealth and ideologies to return to Pakistan. Much of this took on a sectarian tone, emphasising already present political divisions between Sunnis and Shias (Nasr, 2000).76

The era’s reforms also introduced laws that institutionalised the idea of women as in need of protection, as the repositories of family honour and as the property of men.

76 75-85 percent of Pakistanis are Sunni and 15-25 percent Shia.
Of these, 1979’s *Zina* Ordinance made extra-marital sex punishable by death, decriminalised rape, and introduced public lashings and stoning. Through advertising and social pressures, the *chadar* and *chardivari* (seclusion and veil) were championed as symbolic of the differences between good and pious Islamic, and decadent and immoral Western societies. In large part, therefore, Zia’s plans were realized through the control of women (Afzal-Khan, 2007).

Under Zia the military emerged as Pakistan’s biggest corporate conglomerate. New welfare organisations for military families, further land grants for retirees and secure jobs in military owned companies were all part of this process. Furthermore, the award of government contracts to a growing middle-class of smaller traders, merchants, *aatthis* (middlemen in agricultural inputs) and builders ensured that the military’s patronage networks extended into urban and peri-urban areas (Jalal, 1994:173). Siddiq (2007) argued that this was justified within public rhetoric that painted the military as efficient, capable and the country’s moral guardians. Zia’s state was also bolstered by the support it received from America in return for making Pakistan a staging post for the its proxy war with Russia in Afghanistan (1979-1989).

Like Ayub before him, Zia also sought a measure of electoral legitimacy. To get it he held local elections in 1979-1980 and 1983, and national elections in 1985. Both were conducted on a non-party basis. This, once again, meant they were largely fought along the lines of biraderi networks and the influence of the landed elite. This weened potential political opponents away from the parties they had associated with under Bhutto and into the auspices of the military led state from which they were keen to secure patronage (Cheema and Mohmand, 2004). It also enabled the regime to co-opt a new emerging class of urban small business owners keen to enter local government from which they could offer their followers state patronage.
Controlled democracy

Following Zia’s mysterious death in a plane crash, Pakistan returned to democracy. Beginning with the election of Benazir Bhutto’s PPP in 1988, this period saw an era of two-party electoral politics fought between the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) led by the conservative industrialist Nawaz Sharif. From the outset, Benazir faced a covert operation to discredit her orchestrated by the military and fronted by president Ghulam Ishaq Khan whom eventually dismissed her government in 1990. Helped by the IJI, Nawaz became prime minister. However, he was forced to resign under pressure from the military in 1993 after he tried to curb presidential powers to dismiss elected governments. Elections once again brought Benazir to power. Although she courted the favour of the military this time, allegations of corruption led to her government’s downfall in 1996. The PML-N then won a landslide in 1997’s elections. However, its term was cut short by a military coup in 1999.

Pakistan’s democratic politics in the 1990s could be described as zero-sum. Political elites sought to punish their rivals upon assuming office, to strip the state of its assets and to reward their supporters through targeted patronage. The latter took the form of quick, tangible development projects, such as the building of schools or roads, and it included the provision of public sector jobs or help in accessing corruptible state institutions. Punishments were dished out by using the judiciary to exile or jail opponents, and, failing this, rivals were bogged down with expensive litigation. Allegations of corruption also became a popular way for national level politicians to publicly shame and occupy one another’s time.

Wilder’s (1999) research on the Punjab suggests that these dynamics were mirrored locally, with voters increasingly responding to material inducements and the politics of thana kacheri kee siyasat (access to the police and courts). He argued that this reflected the practice of both the PPP and PML-N allocating ever larger discretionary development budgets to provincial and national level politicians, which by 2013 had
reached around $200,000 per representative.\textsuperscript{77} Martin’s (2015) ethnography of conflicts between powerful landlords in a village in Northern Punjab is illustrative. It shows how they appropriated state services, such as local health centres and schools, when their political patrons are in power. At the same time, they used the courts and the police to pursue local rivalries, harassing and stripping one another’s assets with an impunity brought through political connections.

Despite initially being a cause for concern for Western observers, General Musharraf’s 1999 coup was given cover by the events of September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001. Famously, the Americans asked him whether Pakistan was with them or against them, with the latter entailing being bombed ‘back to the stone age’.\textsuperscript{78} Opting for an alliance, the military once again became the recipient of American patronage. This took the form of aid, amounting to roughly $19 billion between 2002-10, of which 75\% was explicitly for military purposes (Zaidi, 2011). Only in 2009 did America’s Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill seek to ensure some of its assistance went to non-military causes and that, in return, Pakistan reigned in its clandestine support of jihadists. At the same time, as America’s main geo-strategic ally, British aid spending in Pakistan was dramatically scaled up from £15 million in 2000-01 to £66 in 2003-04, £87 million in 2007-08 to £267 million in 2011-12 (ICAI, 2012:3).\textsuperscript{79}

To legitimise his rule and solidify his patronage networks, Musharraf enacted constitutional amendments which turned Pakistan towards a presidential system, disqualified dissenting politicians and created a pro-military party; the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam Group (PMLN-Q). He also continued the trend of dictators holding non-party based local elections and giving new powers to the created local bodies (Cheema et al., 2006; Mohmand and Gazdar, 2007). Only this

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{79} ‘DFID’s work in Pakistan’, \url{www.parliament.uk}, 4\textsuperscript{th} April 2013. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmintdev/725/72506.htm (Accessed 01/09/17)
\end{footnotesize}
time, these elections were termed a ‘devolution of power’ to accord with Western countries’ and international donor organisations’ growing enthusiasm for the idea. Throughout his time in power, therefore, Musharraf, the reformer, could publicly appear to be the partner of the liberal West’s ‘War on Terror’ (Nazir, 2010).

The ‘new’ clientelism

In the post-independence era described above, Pakistan’s politics transitioned from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ type of clientelism discussed in Chapter One (Hopkin, 2006). Whereas in the past biraderis had been the primary units for stable long-term personal allegiances, they increasingly became the vehicles for short-term political transactions. Furthermore, these transactions are now routinely conducted by brokers for extensive networks of linked biraderis and interest groups, sometimes termed ‘vote blocs’. In support of this, Wilder’s (1999:209) research shows that politicians’ familial linkages to individual biraderis did little to stop large vote swings between the two main parties over the course of 1990s.

Mohmand (2011, 2014) explains this transition by focussing on Pakistan’s brokers, detailing their privileged access to politicians and the state. They include unelected landlords, union bosses, the heads of biraderis and other types of community leader, such as mullahs (local, often informal, religious leaders), patwaris (keepers of local land records), and nawabs (local notables). Each understands the short shelf-life of Pakistan’s experiments with democracy and each is unafraid to switch their allegiances for a better deal. Furthermore, due to politicians’ needing to gain the votes of multiple biraderis, brokers can demand quick, excludable benefits for their networks.

The transition to this mode of clientelism has also been underpinned by the growing number of Pakistanis that are no longer solely reliant on patrons for their livelihoods or access to services. For example, Shami’s research (2012) found that the proximity
of roads to villages in central Punjab enables some villagers to circumvent and challenge landlords exploitative practices. Key to this is the ability to turn to informal, private providers of goods such as education or health. Similarly, Chaudhry and Vyborny's (2013) research suggests that a small number of wealthier rural Pakistanis are increasingly likely to approach local state officials and politicians themselves for specific benefits or public goods, thereby, relying less on landlords as brokers.

However, it can also be partly attributed to the mechanisation of agriculture and landlords’ diversified revenue streams. Both mean that some patrons have little need for long-lasting personal relationships with large numbers of clients or their wider families. This is reflected in ethnographic studies that suggest some rarely visit the areas from which their votes come, no longer know their clients’ names, and are only responsive to their requests for help in the run up to elections (Lyon, 2002; Martin, 2015a). These studies also suggest that some patrons have become crueller to their poorer and, therefore, more dependent clients. This involves using social pressures, debt, threats and violence to ensure the most vulnerable remain subordinate.

Although it is difficult to put numbers to how many Pakistanis have been involved in either aspect of this transition, a recent report uses a ‘combination of relative and absolute approaches’ to estimate the country’s class composition (Nayab, 2011). It describes 42% of Pakistanis as among a ‘vulnerable’ lower-class and 11% as members of Pakistan’s urban professional middle-class. Another 23% of the country’s population are described as middle-class ‘aspirants’ (22% urban and 24% rural), 16% as middle-class ‘climbers’ (21% urban and 12% rural), and 8.5% as the ‘fledgling’ middle-class (12.5% urban and 6% rural). This is within an estimated population of 187 million (40% urban and 60% rural). Nelson (2016) has suggested that the rising wealth of the last three groups are likely to concern elites with an interest in maintaining the status quo.

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80 For an introduction to the contested discipline of defining and measuring class see Table 1 in Nayab (2011:8) and for a discussion of the schools of thought see Wright (2003).
The Green Revolution and the rise of small-manufacturers partially explain the growth of Pakistan’s middle-classes (Ali, 2002; Zaidi, 2005; Hasan, 2009). Rising remittances, especially from the Gulf states, have also allowed many Punjabi families to buy land or to open small businesses (Mughal and Makhlouf, 2013; Siddiqui, 2017). At the same time, encouraged by the Bretton Woods institutions, Pakistan has kept taxes on exports low and encouraged the private provision of public goods (Brown, 2016). With the tacit approval of political elites, much of the resulting activity takes place in the vast informal, and thereby untaxed, economy.\(^{81}\) It provides those that can afford it with everything from material goods and electricity, to education and health.\(^{82}\)

Nonetheless, it is also clear from this research that Pakistan’s middle-class is largely an urban phenomenon.\(^{83}\) Yet, as Qadeer (2000) argues, it is increasingly difficult to differentiate urban from rural areas in much of the country. Coining the term ‘ruralopolises’, he argues that areas either sides of major roads, such as those connecting Multan to Gujrat, and Lahore and Islamabad, are covered by settlements of urban-level population densities that are intertwined with major cities. Most of these settlements are also built around agricultural production.

Although the new type of clientelism makes political parties and access to the state more important, it does not lead to substantive political participation. Brokers – who tend to be richer and better connected – negotiate on the behalf of their networks, thereby, limiting the voice of voters, especially women and members of marginalised ethnic or religious groups (Javed and Rehman, 2016). Zaidi (2015) also argues that successive governments have fragmented and localised political issues, whilst turning a blind-eye to the untaxed economy that benefits the industrious middle-classes. This

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\(^{81}\) 0.3 percent of the population files an income tax return, which is one of the lowest ratios worldwide. Sherani, A. ‘Pakistan’s Taxation Crisis’, *Dawn*, August 7\(^{th}\), 2105. https://www.dawn.com/news/1198899 (Accessed 01/05/17)

\(^{82}\) Estimates suggest that the size of the informal economy was 91% of the formal economy in 2007-08 (Kemal and Qasim, 2012). But it is likely the figure exceeds this greatly.

\(^{83}\) In a recent paper Zaidi (2014:n16) suggests that: ‘Reza Ali’s seminal, though sadly unpublished, work shows [...] approximately 74% of Punjab was urban, Sindh 53%, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 45%, and Balochistan, mainly Quetta, 12%.’
negates forms of politics based on broad appeals to universal policies or debates over the notion of the public good. He suggests, therefore, that:

‘there is no substantial real and concerted constituency in Pakistan for democracy, and people in general, and the urban middle-classes in particular, have largely been interested in fulfilling their narrow, economistic goals and interests’. (ibid:797)

There is also little evidence that 1990’s democratic experiments have done anything for the accountability of or improvements to public services. Indeed, scholarship on Pakistan’s human development indicators uses clientelism as an explanation for why a country which has enjoyed good economic growth – of around 6 percent for most periods – consistently lags behind its neighbours (Hasnain, 2008; Giunchi, 2011; Kalia, 2015).84 Research conducted by development organisations and ethnographers also argues that the efficiency of state service providing institutions has been eroded from the inside by politically driven appointments, a lack of funding and elite capture (Cheema, 2007; Mohmand and Cheema, 2007; Martin, 2015b). Governmental spending also did not change much under democracy, with a consistent average of around 1 percent of GDP on health and around 2 percent on education (UNDP, 2013).

Summarising, Easterly (2003:465) has argued that ‘Pakistan is the poster-child for the hypothesis that a society polarized by class, gender, and ethnic group does poorly at providing public services’. Similarly, the founder of the United Nation’s Human Development Reports, Mahbub ul Haq (1997:38), has pointed out that Pakistan suffers from ‘political domination by a rentier class that pre-empts the patronage of the state in its own favour; and a very corrupt ruling elite’. The term ‘rentier’ is used by Haq to denote the periodic selling of Pakistan’s geo-strategic position to foreign

84 For instance, in 1997 its real per capita income was around 75 percent higher than India, yet it lagged behind in most social indicators (Haq, 1997).
powers in return for financial gains that make elites in control of the state unaccountable and, therefore, largely uninterested in the concerns of ordinary people.

Ethnographic research amongst these national level ruling elites by Armytage (2015, 2016) further shows how the country’s exclusionary political settlement is maintained and threats absorbed. She traces the stability of a core group of extended families, with estimated net worth’s of over $100 million, that have dominated the top of the political, business, military and bureaucratic spheres since partition. Although there have been some new entrants into this group due to the Green Revolution and industrialisation, it is shown that through marriages and instrumental ‘friendships’ it has remained remarkably constant. Indeed, the information and favours shared amongst these elites prevents aspiring entrants from the wrong families from accumulating the necessary, in Bourdieu’s sense, capitals to upset the status quo. Armytage also argues that as Pakistan’s middle- and lower- classes have fractured along ethno-linguistic and religious lines, its elites have largely remained above such conflicts whilst symbolically referencing them to ensure they retain followers.

Attempts within this era to set up local anti-corruption institutions such as Nawaz’s Khidemat (service) Committees or Musharraf’s efforts to create participatory development forums known as Citizens’ Community Boards were ineffectual. Ethnographic evidence suggests that local elite members of the former felt unable to hold state officials to account due to their shared adherence to prevailing social norms that require them to disperse resources to their kin (Lyon, 2002). Whilst a qualitative study of the latter found that due to members having to partially fund projects the Boards were quickly dominated by small cliques who used them to pursue development plans with gains for themselves and allied local state authorities (Gazdar et al., 2013). The studies’ findings suggest, therefore, that there remain significant obstacles to formalised social accountability mechanisms and participatory initiatives that require citizens to co-produce services with the state.
Nelson’s (2016) recent analysis observes that Pakistan’s politics is now marked by low-level violence, with the potential for broader instability. At its root, he identifies new links between what he calls the ‘petty bourgeoisie’, the ‘petty ulema’ and ‘petty parliamentarians’. The first refers to the middle-classes described above, the second to informal local religious leaders and the third politicians. Nelson describe how the latter have increasingly sought to incorporate urban mafias and rural mullahs into their clientelistic networks. He worries, however, that sectarian identities, the trading of votes for patronage and the need to consistently undermine the rule of law, such as through bribes and by corrupting courts, dangerously reduces the legitimacy of the state and democracy. Indeed, he suggests these dynamics have led to a culture of impunity and state failure that is partially responsible for the rise of insurgent groups such as the **Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan** (Pakistani Taliban).

### The intermediate-class

Akhtar’s (2008) thesis more directly explores what the new type of clientelism means for Pakistan’s democratising project. He starts with the argument that a less dependent ‘intermediate-class’ has gradually arisen.\(^{85}\) In contrast to others, he avoids terming them the ‘middle-class’ – with its connotations of a liberal bourgeoisie – to emphasize that this group has largely been uninterested in challenging the illiberal status quo. This is because its members, whether they be capitalist farmers, *mandi* (market) town merchants, urban business owners or militant Islamists, have been steadily co-opted into the state’s patronage networks by successive governments. As we have seen, this has been achieved through local government schemes that provide a veneer of democracy, the provision of public sector jobs, privileged access to state institutions, the informalisation of the economy, and the tacit approval of the activities of fundamentalists.

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\(^{85}\) The idea of an ‘intermediate class’ was originally developed to explain how economic stagnation can result from a class that seeks to entrench its power rather than pursue inclusive growth enhancing policies (Baran, 1957).
To this he adds an explanation for why those at the bottom of clientelistic networks, Pakistan’s lower-classes, have not engaged in mass class-based politics since the 1960s. He argues that urban workers and landless peasants have succumb to what he calls ‘the politics of common sense’. This is not the Marxist idea of a ‘false consciousness’. Rather, it involves the subordinate classes learning to view politics as about what short-term gains they can get from negotiations and transactions that they are not privy to, rather than risk raising their own voices or challenging power. Akhtar describes this as ‘highly pragmatic, even cynical, as it means resigning oneself to the existing reality and manoeuvring within it’ (ibid:204). Discussing the relationship between politics and ordinary Pakistanis, one of my interviewees expressed a similar concern:

‘what difference does it [politics] make. They don’t have education, they don’t have roads, they don’t have public transport, their kids don’t have a decent meal. For them, what? Because their political relationship is through an intermediary. That doesn’t change. You may have the People’s Party in power or Nawaz Sharif in power or the military in power, the relationship is facilitated, moderated by intermediaries. Those intermediaries remain the same. So why should they bother? [...] In terms of your desire or urge to express yourself, it is through intermediaries. So, it doesn’t matter.’86

To illustrate how this plays out in everyday settings, Akhtar uses case studies of workers from different sectors of Pakistan’s informal economy. They show how the subordinate classes are locked into vertical patronage networks that ultimately leave them vulnerable to the whims of those higher up the chain. However, he suggests that in many instances the poor have accepted their insecurity and lack of rights. This

86 Interview with Senior NGO Staff Member 4 16.08.15
problem is particularly acute among subcontractors and day labourers, many of whom view work as *sifarish* (a favour) granted to them by members of the intermediary classes (ibid:222). Akhtar suggests that unequal relationships between workers and their bosses, combined with their distance from members of political society, effectively mitigates the chances of what he calls an organised ‘politics of resistance’ emerging in Pakistan.

In this sense, Akhtar’s thesis suggests that the transition to the new type of clientelism is confined to what he calls the intermediate-classes and others the middle-classes. It, therefore, holds out little prospect of stoking the kind of broad participation in public politics that is central to democratisation. If anything, the incorporation of the intermediate-classes has steadily proliferated patronage networks that have little interest in how the state’s institutions function for the majority or in public deliberations over the country’s future. At worst, it is forcing those at the bottom of these networks into even more precarious and arbitrary positions.

So far, it has been argued that as Pakistan’s capitalist middle-class has grown, the state has failed to broadly connect its members to organised politics through a tax system that can underpin a hypothetical social contract. Instead, they are connected to political society and the state through clientelistic networks that periodically allow them to bargain their own and their dependents’ votes to brokers linked to politicians in charge of a rentier state. Thus, although politically engaged, this class is largely uninterested in democracy as it enjoys privileged access to the state’s resources and the benefits of an informal economy.

**Indigenous civil society**

Although Akhtar’s (2008) idea of the intermediate-class is important, it does not explore the evolving role of Pakistan’s civil society in detail. To address this gap, the
following sections make a rough analytical split between what could be termed indigenous and professionalised civil society associations and networks. This distinction arises in the late 1980s and accelerates in the 1990s with the increased presence of international donor organisations.

In the colonial period three broad types of organisations characterised indigenous civil society. The first were religiously orientated madrassas (Islamic schools) and khankahs (family run shrines of Sufi saints with attached mosques). Madrassas provided education for elite Muslim children earmarked to serve in the Mughal empire’s administrative institutions. However, this function became increasingly less relevant as a secular, British style of education delivered in boarding schools replaced them. In response, madrassas begun to educate poorer members of society, whilst Khankahs fed the poor and offered free accommodation for travellers. However, under colonialism they too began to change. Through increased state patronage, including land grants, and the practice of passing their management from father to son, they became vehicles for landed power and biraderi based political allegiances (Gilmartin, 1979; Epping, 2013). Accordingly, wealthy pirs attached to khankahs were important allies for both the British and, later, Pakistan’s leaders.

The second were non-religious, nominally apolitical voluntary associations, particularly in urban areas. They could take a variety of forms, including literary societies, professional associations and an active press. Many of them sought to improve the status of Muslims vis-à-vis Hindus through the sponsorship of schools and health clinics. To do this, they were often funded by wealthy patrons with social or political ambitions (Bayly, 1971; Haynes, 1992).

Thirdly, following exposure to socialist ideologies, the children of some wealthy families began establishing new, often more overtly political associations towards the end of the colonial era (Ali, 2011). These organisations often shared members with left leaning parties such as the Communist Party of India and non-violent ethnic nationalist movements such as the Pashtun’s Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God).

87 This section does not focus on Hindu civil society.
And many participated in the Progressive Writers Movement that advocated for independence, radical social change and the improvement of the condition of the poor.

After partition new associations, such as the Women’s Voluntary Service founded by the wife of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister and various muhajirs’ (term for Muslim migrants) associations, were established. Pakistan’s own Communist Party was setup in 1948 on the belief that the country was, given its size and newness, ripe for revolution. However, the displacements and migrations of independence largely meant that the organised left, such as trade unions, had to build itself up again.

Amongst commentators there appears to be a difference of opinion between those that saw the 1950s and 1960s as fostering ‘a vibrant intellectual culture’, and those that saw it as the beginning of more malign trends (Bano, 2012:43). The former often point to the activity of student unions, literary circles, the press, Rotary and Lions clubs, and professional associations (Qadeer, 2006). They also celebrate the progressive debates around issues such as the Muslim Family laws and socialism that were had in tea rooms across the country (Ali, 2011). This, they argue, illustrates the era’s plurality of associations and its relative liberalism.

Others suggest that Ayub’s military-bureaucratic alliance quickly established mechanisms with which to monitor and control civil society (Mohmand, 2014). As an interviewee explained, it began funding loyal organisations, including local bar associations, the Chamber of Commerce and press clubs by giving them grants.88 ‘In that way, the state became the regulator of these organisations and civic spaces’. To further monitor the public sphere, Ayub also introduced the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies Ordinance and opened offices of the Social Welfare Department in all four provinces. He also offered awards to pro-regime associations and journalists.

More coercively, the state’s security apparatus banned several political parties, dissolved the national and provincial assemblies, and began prosecuting Ayub’s rivals.

88 Interview with Zafarullah Khan (Head of NGO) 24.08.15
It also made some peasants, labour and students’ organisations illegal, and took over chains of newspapers that were considered subversive. To secure the loyalty of religious leaders, property upon which madrassas and khankahs sat was put under the state’s management. Much of this was justified through rhetoric around the threats supposedly posed by India and Afghanistan (Oldenburg, 2010:111). Thus, a mixture of regulation, co-optation and nationalism was used to oppress broad political participation and to yoke civil society to elite interests. As Shah (2004:360) puts it; ‘the ruling elite purposefully depoliticised the public sphere to make it subject to the exigencies of an authoritarian state’.

Nonetheless, some civic associations managed to serve as venues for rising discontent throughout the 1960s (Ahmad, 1973; Alavi, 1973b). In the cities, this was led by students, such as those in the National Students Federation, and organised labour that had begun calling for a return to democracy. In the countryside it took the form of an emerging class-based associations amongst peasants calling for land reforms and rights (Akhtar, 2008:196-197). They were inspired by independence movements in Africa and the rise of socialist governments South America. Indeed, with little outside help, civil society essentially morphed itself into a political protest movement that brought down Ayub’s regime ‘like a house of cards’ (Qadeer, 2006:213).

Although Zulfikar Bhutto’s PPP capitalized upon this mobilisation to win power, the party was no friend of civil society. Fearing its radicalism, it quickly moved to crush its more militant socialist supporters among urban labour organisations (Akhtar, 2008:199). It also distanced itself from student associations that were arguing for vast ranging structural changes. Then party then neglected to build alternative local organisations with which to challenge the biraderis linked to the ‘politicised’ layer of retired bureaucrats and military personnel empowered by Ayub’s basic democracies scheme (Javid, 2012:208-309). In the case of Sindh, it even relied on them to retain its powerbase (Jalal, 1994:162).
Zia’s dictatorship arguably spelt the end of civil society’s ability to mobilise large numbers of people behind a political party or platform. Indeed, alongside the aforementioned scheme to Islamise Pakistan’s hearts and minds, Zia ran a largely successful campaign to oppress any organised opposition. Most notably, he accused the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) - an alliance of opposition parties and civic associations led by the PPP – of being supported by India and Russia. And he deployed the military to harass his opponents and violently crush a popular uprising in Sindh in 1983 (Jaffrelot, 2015:333).

Over the course of the 1980s resistance once again slowly gathered steam. This time, however, women, who had arguably lost the most under Zia, were at its forefront. For example, the Women’s Action Forum (WAF) was established by foreign educated and upper-class women in 1981 in Karachi. It soon had branches in Lahore, Islamabad and, for a period, the culturally conservative Peshawar. It sought to draw attention to zina (pre-marital sex) cases and to advocate on behalf of the most vulnerable. To do so, it framed violence against women as a matter of human rights and it strategically used scripture to argue that harmful or discriminatory laws had little basis in Islam (Shaheed and Hussain, 2007). WAF had some success in restricting the ‘Law of Evidence’ (that the testimony of two women is equal to a single man) to financial matters, and in securing media coverage for its various activities and viewpoints. Nonetheless, Jafar (2005) argues that it was ultimately restricted by laws against political protests and the heavy informal penalties, including social sanctions, lost income, violence and rape, faced by women from lower socio-economic backgrounds that raised their voice.

Alongside the WAF, other organisations were also established in the 1980s and early 1990s, such as Aurat Foundation, Ajoka, Simorgh, Rozan, the Sungi Development Foundation, the Pakistan Institute for Labour Education and Research (PILER), and the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SPDI). Many of their leaders were trying to stem the widespread disillusionment amongst the left resulting from both General Zia’s dictatorship and the collapse of the Soviet Union. They were also seeking alternatives to political parties, such as the PPP, that had failed to live up to
their ideals. As described by my interviewees, they viewed establishing NGOs as a new way to continue old struggles.

Organisations such as the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) used the opportunity structures provided by the state’s adherence to various international treaties to pursue a rights-based agenda and to advocate in the courts for members of the country’s marginalised groups. Others, such as Shirkatgah, combined legal advice to vulnerable citizens with research and analysis on the status of marginalised groups that could be used for advocacy. As these examples suggest, lawyers were often central to many of these organisations. Worried about surveillance, however, many would declare that they were apolitical at the start of every meeting.89

In the late 1980s and 1990s, NGOs also began to emerge that were, at least publicly, primarily focused on service delivery and emergency relief. As with Pattan, many saw these activities as subtle routes into the communities amongst which they wished to deliver more rights-based and, for a few, politically focused work.90 For example, flood relief efforts could be combined with workshops on the political causes of poverty and poor services. As Pattan’s website now delicately puts it:

‘The lessons learnt during this work enabled Pattan to realize that the community development work at the local level alone does not address the underlying causes of vulnerabilities of the riverine communities. Hence, harnessing the unleashed social and political potential of the marginalised riverine people became an integral part of Pattan’s work. This enables them to become an essential part of the decision-making processes that impact their lives. Since then, Pattan has been addressing governance and democracy deficiencies through research and awareness

89 Interview Senior NGO Staff Member 4 16.08.15
90 Interview with Sarwar Bari 18.08.15
raising, social mobilisation and capacity building of society’s marginalised.”

This period also saw the rise of several large organisations funded by voluntary donations that provide public services or organise citizens to resolve local issues. Of the former, the most well-known is the Edhi Foundation founded in 1951. It provides everything from ambulance services to shelters for the destitute and free healthcare. Whilst of the latter, the Orangi Pilot Project begun in the 1980s organises Karachi’s slum dwellers into self-help groups to improve housing conditions, form micro-finance clubs and interact with officials.

There is a limited literature on the contemporary dynamics of Pakistan’s more localised civil society or community-based organisations (CBOs). It suggests that charitable and philanthropic giving, sometimes termed ‘social work / social development’ (salah-o-behbud), has long been an informal social safety net for those at the bottom of Pakistan’s stratified society. Furthermore, to be known as a ‘social worker’ (samaji karkun) is also a powerful symbolic means through which some justify their privileged positions, bring new followers into their orbit, and mark themselves as worthy of patronage by those socially and politically above them.

For example, Werbner’s (2015) long running ethnographies of Pakistanis that have emigrated to urban Manchester, England, shows how wealthy community members claim roles as leaders through the public sponsorship of local causes, such as financing the construction of mosques. She suggests that these elites are adept at forming associations that win them reputations for leadership and that connect them to British political society, but that their exclusivity ultimately gives them little capacity for broader political mobilisations. She also shows how non-elite Pakistanis form self-help groups to collect and pool community funds. These are used to pay for

\[91\] Pattan Development Organisation https://pattan.org/index.php/about-pattan/ (Accessed 15/05/17)
expensive unforeseen events, such as funerals, and to maintain socially important links to Pakistan through the provision of emergency funds during crises.

Undertaken in the 1990s, Lyon’s (2002) ethnography of rural northern Punjab suggests elites compete to win voluntary positions within local associations, such as zakat and the khidemat committees. Lyon (2002:135-7) also describes how the ‘Gujar Youth Foundation’ he uncovered in Rawalpindi acted as a ‘favour-brokering’ club for men that do not have sufficient personal resources or connections. Nonetheless, he argues that favours conducted within such associations are made up or down, thus the two parties commit to an asymmetrical relationship. Accordingly, over the long-run the only party that truly seems to benefit within such associations is the broker/leader who gains connections to the state and leverage over the favour’s recipient.

More recent work by Martin (2015a) details how the Punjab’s landlords seek to cultivate a pious image through building mosques, sponsoring Islamic education and providing shelter to travellers. Skilfully done, this can symbolically place them above the earthly and often dangerous rivalries of village politics, whilst accruing them izzat (honour) that can build followings. However, Martin also suggests that through these actions elites seek to wash over or obscure local forms of oppression, such as their use of the community’s resources as their private property or the debt bondage within which they keep their workers.

**Professionalised civil society**

During the 1980s some of Pakistan’s larger civil society organisations sought funding from the national development agencies of Canada and northern European countries, including the United Kingdom. However, during the 1990s a new set of neoliberal donor organisations, including arms of the Bretton Woods institutions, further UN agencies, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and state-backed international non-governmental organisations, such as the Asia Foundation,
began to increase their activities in Pakistan. In contrast to the older donors focused on democracy and women’s rights, the newer donors focused on service delivery for its own sake, building markets, and direct support to the government in the form of funding and institutional reforms. For them, democracy could largely be approached through the prism of support to the procedural aspects of elections and political party strengthening programmes. According to interviewees, these organisations were also stricter about sticking to the terms of their mission statements, thereby, giving indigenous organisations less room to (re)interpret their agendas.

Taking advantage of the money that came with these donors, interviewees contend that there was a significant increase in the number of NGOs in the 1990s. Ambitious educated Pakistanis also increasingly saw the development sector as a viable option for employment. Many were highly motivated by social causes and set up their own organisations. They generally took one of three roles: firstly, service orientated NGOs that implement short-term projects that provide public goods such as health and education or engage in disaster relief. Secondly, ‘resource centres’ or think tanks that focus on providing information and research to aid advocacy efforts. Thirdly, rights-based and advocacy focussed NGOs. Nonetheless, many of the advocacy orientated NGOs also undertook service delivery projects funded by donors.

For some of my interviewees this duality was not a problem. It earned NGOs the money with which to carry out advocacy activities around their core issues and allowed them to train full-time activists from poorer communities. Some even considered it novel that you could be paid to be an activist. Others relished the opportunities donor money gave large NGOs to become grant making bodies, able to financially and intellectually support CBOs with good ideas and a passion for their local areas. Some also celebrated how donor money enabled some NGOs to support

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92 In 2001 the Aga Khan Foundation, in coordination with Civicus, put the number of active NGOs at somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000 (Baig and Sattar, 2001). Another report from an indigenous think tank suggested that the number of private, voluntary non-profit organisations (which includes non-registered CBOs) was around 45,000 (Ghaus-Pasha and Iqbal, 2002).

93 For example, the Aga Khan’s NGO Resource Centre and the Indus River Resource Centre.
social movements, such as Pattan’s mentoring and training of members of the Brick Kiln Workers’ Movement.

However, there were also criticisms. Many interviewees saw this period as the beginning of civil society’s fracturing, its corporatisation and its depoliticization. This contributed to a loss of legitimacy that they argued still plagues the professionalised sector today. The processes underpinning this set the scene for donors’ interest in social accountability programmes in the late 2000s, thus they are explored further below.

The first concerns how some of the organisations established in response to General Zia’s dictatorship began to fracture, losing their focus and legitimacy once he no longer provided a target. Interviewees suggested that this turned individuals and organisations with clear messages around the status of women and democracy, into vehicles for the narrow interests of liberal elites in Pakistan’s major urban enclaves, such as Karachi and Islamabad. Accordingly, it lost them support and connections amongst those they claimed to speak for. It also encouraged their increasingly wealthy leaders to remain in these urban enclaves, close to donors’ offices.

The fierce debates around the trajectory of women’s NGOs are illustrative. For example, Zia (2009) has argued that the decision of the WAF to announce its secular credentials in 1991 was a pivotal moment. It paved the way for the dilution of the wider Women’s Movement as many senior members left to found non-secular NGOs with the financial backing of donors. This, she argues, gave rise to a new tame form of ‘non-confrontational, privatized and personalized’ feminism, whose objective is to ‘empower’ women within Islam’ (sic) (ibid:29). Activists’ traditional focus on men, money, mullahs and the military state has since gradually been side-lined by false claims of the possibility of an Islamic feminism.94 This argument has been added to by Jafar (2007) who suggests that women’s NGOs currently suffer from an inability to network amongst one another. Paradoxically, this problem has arisen both due to a

94 For an alternative viewpoint on the emancipatory potential of Islamic feminism see Jamal’s (2006, 2010) work.
lack, and because, of donor funding. On the one hand, funded networks often fall apart following the end of a programme or campaign. On the other, the competition for contracts disincentives NGOs from sharing information and forming collaborative networks. These sorts of criticisms are now common across NGOs focussed on all issues areas.

Some that made these critiques during interviews are likely to have been indulging in the well-known activists’ pass-time of insulting rivals’ ideological purity, their appetites for confrontation or their grassroots credentials. Moreover, numerous civil society networks, such as the Advocacy Development Network and the Punjab NGO Coordination Council, were established without donor funding in the 1990s. Nonetheless, my conversations with heads of contemporary NGOs confirms that many were previously members of larger outfits established in the 1980s, before setting up on their own in the 1990s and 2000s. There is also robust evidence that civil society organisations that have received donor funding in Pakistan rapidly lose legitimacy amongst those they claim to work for. Through a study of 40 NGOs, Bano (2012) has shown that foreign funding contravenes societal norms that require those working for the public good to do so voluntarily and to demonstrate signs of material sacrifice. This results in drops in both the memberships of organisations and the efficiency of their efforts to act collectively to address issues.

The second major process in this period concerns the corporatisation of civil society. As previously mentioned, some larger NGOs began to turn themselves into grant making bodies. This involves awarding donor funding to smaller NGOs and CBOs that compete for it. The grants are often for short-term projects with clearly definable outputs, such as the delivery of services, building of infrastructure or the holding of workshops. According to one interviewee, this gradually created the existing ‘class’ system amongst Pakistan’s NGOs, with those empowered by donors to fund smaller organisations calling themselves ‘national NGOs’ despite often only having offices in one city. It is also notable that the phrase ‘mom and pop NGOs’ is now commonly used to describe the rise of the short-lived, money orientated organisations that were established to compete for grants. The ability of their staff to survive off the
stipends and food provided at workshops and seminars held by larger organisations is now a sector-wide in-joke.\textsuperscript{95}

An interviewee further explained the form the sector’s corporatisation took in the 1990s through the example of the requirements for those applying to the South Asia Partnership Pakistan’s (SAP-PK) grant making programme.\textsuperscript{96} Hopeful organisations had to complete a year of ‘capacity building’ trainings. These taught their leaders how to write proposals, keep budgets and monitor the impact of their work to international standards. The idea was that they would become equipped to enter the fierce bidding wars for donor money that increasingly characterised the space they operated in. Put another way, they could sustain themselves in a developing market for NGOs. Such trainings also meant that skilled staff were increasingly in demand. This has driven up the sectors’ wages, created significant barriers to entry for those unable to use donors’ languages or favoured discourses, and established a competitive employment market from which interviewees argued INGOs take the best talent. Lastly, corporatization has also often meant that those with the skills leave older NGOs to start their own initiatives.

When applying for SAP-PK’s grants smaller NGOs also had to register themselves under Pakistan’s various laws for civic associations. This arguably contributed to the third major process effecting Pakistan’s professionalised civil society in this era; their depoliticization As the interviewee explained:

‘These organisations were also trained on how they should go about registering themselves, the steps, the laws, ordinances and templates to it. [...] Each law required them to be asked that they are not political. Social Welfare Law. Companies Act. Your Trust Act. They will require you

\textsuperscript{95} As Duncan Green pointed out, the joke ‘carpe per diem’ sums this up.
\textsuperscript{96} Interview with NGO / INGO Worker 26.08.15
to be a non-partisan, non-political organisation. [...] This is why Nawaz Sharif’s government was able to crackdown on NGOs in the 1990s.’

This requirement, then, was not about NGOs being seen or protected by the state. Rather, it was so that when they advocated for reforming discriminatory laws or against the era’s mass privatisations – actions that might challenge the status quo – the government could easily shut them down. In this regard, it is also notable that throughout the 1990s Nawaz Sharif courted conservative supporters by publicly decrying the supposedly immoral practices of NGOs, even claiming female workers slept with foreigners in return for contracts. His government also disbanded 2,500 NGOs based in the Punjab in an effort to further appeal to conservative supporters (Jaffrelot, 2015:428).

The depoliticization of Pakistan’s NGOs also occurred in more subtle ways. On the one hand, many interviewees pointed out that the service delivery programmes favoured by donors and the state had very little to do with politics unless they also told ordinary people why services are poor and who they should complain about it to. On the other, it was suggested that donors’ willingness to fund rights-based NGOs was not about encouraging the public’s broad participation in politics or the creation of transformational social movements. Rather, it provided a relatively safe activity that donors could support without drawing the attention of the state. As one interviewee argued, donors were interested in:

‘allowing people the space to air their grievances but not in helping them to get organised, or in organising them. So, the whole NGO world had a very kind of narrowly defined agenda and interest. Which works both for
the state and NGOs [...] there was no real challenge for the state the entire 90s.\(^97\)

For many, a donor led change in NGOs’ focuses and ways of working from the 1980s and early 1990s was palpable. Indeed, there was a general feeling that many began working to agendas and standards set by someone ‘writing in Manila’ with little understanding of the challenges facing the country’s democracy. Looking back to the beginning of a career in activism, one interviewee suggested:

‘Now it seems everything is tagged. If you want to do something there is a price tag. You have to make your project plan, you have get the funding, you have to monitor, you have to measure, to justify value for money. Back in the 1990s we weren’t worried about it. I was working as a research assistant doing qualitative interviews [...] I had the time to do what I wanted to do, and the office encouraged me’.\(^98\)

Some interviewees argued that the state did not mind these developments. This was because everybody knows that substantial politics in Pakistan is done through brokers. Ordinary people neither approach state officials or politicians as individuals or in groups. Instead, as outlined, they are part of patronage networks headed by powerful individuals that sell their votes for short-term excludable gains. Accordingly, doing project-based work, fighting court cases and engaging in rights-based educational programmes does not register as a threat to the interests of those in charge. Put another way, because such work is sporadic and rarely leads to mass

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\(^97\) Interview with Senior NGO Staff Member 4 16.08.15
\(^98\) Interview with NGO worker 23.08.15
social or political mobilisations, and because it does not overtly question the status quo, it is ultimately inconsequential.

Larger donor funded grant making organisations were, therefore, part of a process within which some smaller NGOs and CBOs increasingly corporatized and came under the state’s bureaucratic control. They learned to discipline themselves by sticking to practices and agendas set by international donors and sanctioned by domestic authorities. Those that could not risked making themselves uncompetitive market actors or being shut down. At the same time, donors’ interest in service delivery and the cultivation of rights-based NGOs had little effect on Pakistan’s democracy, changes in the way politics is done or by whom. An uncharitable interpretation might argue that Pakistan’s civil society was subject to the sorts of taming processes others have suggested some powerful donor organisations were engaged in elsewhere (Jenkins, 2001; Kaldor, 2003b; Lewis, 2004, 2017).99

The state-donor accord

Two episodes that were repeatedly highlighted by interviewees illustrate these processes. The first concerns the Anjuman Mazareen Punjab (AMP) (Tenants Association of Punjab) that formed among peasants working on military run farms in Okara district in the early 2000s. Upset that the military had decided to switch their payment from a share cropping arrangement to a contracted daily wage and to allocate itself the power to evict them, they organised to contest the ownership of the land.

Within months the AMP’s movement had spread into nine other districts of the Punjab. As Akhtar (2006) points out, the relative absence of landlords and other types of coercive actors on military farms probably allowed this to happen. He goes on to explain that ‘gradually they became aware of the fact that they could generate panic

99 Although Kaldor (2003) does not argue that this is a deliberate process.
within the state machinery simply by virtue of the numbers involved in the movement’ (ibid:483). Thus, following the failure of arbitrations, they have occasionally engaged in acts of civil disobedience. At the same time, they have taken the military to court.

For our purposes, the AMP is interesting as the British INGO ActionAid soon approached its leaders to offer their support (Bano, 2012:149-150). This came in the form of models for the movement’s institutionalisation, capacity building trainings and funding. However, its attention fractured the AMP along religious and ideological dividing lines. For example, ActionAid was particularly interested in supporting the Christians amongst the religiously diverse movement. This elevated their leaders and caused resentment from those it ignored. Some of the newly trained leaders also broke away to establish their own NGOs in the hope of courting further donor funding. As an interviewee described:

‘now you go to the leadership of these peasants’ movements and you insist on going to their homes and you will realise that this is an upper middle-class home. Where is the peasantry? They have created a class among the peasants. These peasants, who were just fighting for the rights, now they realise you just raise your voice or make an NGO and you can get money’.100

Observers suggest that the AMP remains fractured, with various groups supported by INGOs focussed on the rights of the movement’s minorities and a separate faction mentored by an indigenous NGO comprised of activists that do not take donor funding (Bano, 2012; Ali, 2015). The former’s interest in minorities is described as largely a donor driven imperative, with little legitimacy amongst the movement’s

100 Interview with NGO / INGO Worker 26.08.15
members. Whilst the latter is said to be using the indigenous NGO’s links to
international journalists and embassies to give its leaders a modicum of cover from
the state’s oppression. It is also drawing upon their knowledge for its court battle
with the military. The implied accusation is that alongside money wealthy donors
bring their own divisions, bureaucratic procedures and agendas to the table.
Moreover, they often have little interest in transformational potential of the
peasants’ struggle. In my interviewee’s words, they are ‘killing the spirit of activism’.

The second incident concerns the split within civil society between those that
supported General Musharraf’s ‘bloodless coup’ and those that were dismayed at
Pakistan once again becoming a military dictatorship. In the years leading up to the
coup, Nawz Sharif’s increasingly intrusive regulations, his rhetoric on donors’ anti-
Pakistan agendas, and his ties to religious groups were looked upon with worry by
much of civil society. Their concerns were confirmed when he tried to declare Sharia
the law of the land in 1998. Accordingly, when Musharraf disposed of Nawaz many
were happy.

Although it is highly unlikely that Musharraf’s coup would have lasted as long as it did
without American patronage, he, like dictators before him, had to build a domestic
constituency. This was partly achieved through holding of a, reportedly widely rigged,
referendum on his leadership in 2001 and, in time-honoured fashion for military
dictators, local government elections. However, Musharraf also sought to court
Pakistan’s professionalised civil society. To do so, he held regular dialogues, offered
government contracts to NGOs and allowed the entrance of some its leaders into his
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As many interviewees argued, Musharraf was seen by those that joined him as a
liberal able to reverse the country’s slide towards religiosity. Indeed, in his own
memoirs, Musharraf (2006) un-ironically justifies his coup as saving Pakistan from
Nawaz’s ambition of becoming the ‘commander of the faithful, with dictatorial
temporal and religious powers’. Perhaps as importantly, however, he spoke the
technocratic development discourse. As one interviewee explained:
‘I realised so many of them were not pro dictatorship, they were pro Musharraf because they thought he was a progressive man. For them, Nawaz Sharif’s democracy was just an extension of Zia-ul-Haq [...] So when he was ousted by Musharraf, who came up with the same vocabulary as spoken by the NGOs, enlightened moderation, oh dear monitoring should be done, oh dear this should be you know a participatory management blah blah blah. So, all that fascinating terminology that these NGOs had been using for all those years in their documents and project proposals and reports, suddenly they were hearing from a dictator. And suddenly they were eased out of the tensions that Nawaz Sharif, the democrat, had put on them. And Suddenly they saw a very liberal state. And suddenly they saw that on New Year no one would stop you and ask if you’re drunk [...] because the liberals mostly are from the upper class or privileged class, the upper middle-class, these things resonate with them. It’s a very, very urban phenomenon. And suddenly this dictator is offering them to join him. That was new, that was original, no other dictator had done that.’

Musharraf was skilled at cultivating this image amongst donors. For example, at the risk of upsetting religious groups, he made much publicly of his local government programme’s reserved seats for women and minorities. He was also a regular at parties and ceremonies attended by donors and foreign diplomats. Suggestive of the success of this strategy, the writers of a volume entitled *Power and Civil Society in Pakistan*, with contributions from academics and NGO leaders, declared:

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101 Interview with NGO / INGO Worker 26.08.15
‘after a dozen years of floundering democracy, a new breed of military rule seems to have emerged, hindered not by the politics of selfishness but by the sentiment of love of country and compatriots […] the military seems to be breaking new ground by assigning capable, qualified people to hold key positions in government.’ (Weiss and Gilani, 2001:ix)

It is also notable that in his memoirs Musharraf saw himself as much more than the necessary savour of Pakistan. Indeed, he was a reformist and the true progressive force, particularly compared to the PPP under Benazir which he described as ‘a family cult that practiced fascism rather than liberal democracy’ (Musharraf, 2006). As shown earlier, this self-belief paid off in the form of increased donor funding and, for a while, a blind-eye to the military’s clandestine support of jihadi groups.

Many interviewees were upset at the ease with which some of their colleagues in civil society could support Musharraf. They argued that for much of his time in power it was impossible to get them out on the street to demonstrate against state oppression, with some even speculating that they did not want to compromise their lucrative contracts. Others were angry at America for once again putting geostrategic imperatives ahead of their country’s democracy. A few even spoke in hushed conspiratorial tones of the fate of civil society leaders that had allied themselves with Musharraf only to be side-lined or, in some cases, violently silenced. The most frustrated even left NGOs and sought work within INGOs, in the private sector or the civil service.

As Zaidi (2008) has argued, in the wake of Musharraf’s era all types of Pakistani NGO now routinely look to derive contracts from the state alongside international donors. This is increasingly important as they struggle to pay large staffs built up in the mid-2000s and as they face a state willing to clamp down on those it deems a problem. Indeed, Pakistan, despite once again being under democratic rule, is amongst
countries currently closing the space for autonomous civil society activity.\textsuperscript{102} For many, state contracts are also likely one of the few options in a contemporary environment in which many foreign donors’ have increasingly advanced procedures around demonstrating impact and value for money.\textsuperscript{103} Many also remain unwilling to fund advocacy initiatives that risk upsetting their country’s diplomatic ties or do what they perceive the private sector can do better.

These episodes illustrate donors’ contributions to the fractured nature of Pakistan’s professionalised civil society. They suggest that with their help it has transitioned from a broadly unified opposition to Zia’s Islamisation programme and a general support for democracy, to an ideologically fractured sphere that contains organisations willing to work with a military dictator. Moreover, it currently finds itself dominated by large corporatized NGOs that act as patrons for smaller NGOs and CBOs which operate in a competitive, largely donor-created yet state-supported, market. Competitors must increasingly submit themselves to donors’ favoured ways of working and the state’s surveillance. Failure to do so risks being financially starved or worse. In this sense, civil society in Pakistan should largely be understood as embedded in the country’s wider political tradition of compromise and co-optation in the service of survival, rather than as a source of confrontation and radical democracy.

Post-Musharraf developments

Before concluding, it is important to note that those seeking accountable democratic governance were likely emboldened by developments in 2008. Most notably, Musharraf stepped down and national elections were held. This followed mass protests to reinstate the Chief Justice he had sacked led by lawyers’ associations. As

\textsuperscript{102} “Civil Society Space” Hansard, UK parliamentary debate, 26 January 2017. https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2017-01-26/debates/1CD71CEA-045B-4C93-9558-9788416EDD6C/CivilSocietySpace (Accessed 01/06/17)

\textsuperscript{103} See Chapter Four.
part of this agitation, a functional alliance between the PPP and PML-N was formed to threaten Musharraf with impeachment. These developments rode the wave of an increasingly vocal independent media, which added to the cacophony of calls for a return to democracy.

Furthermore, suggestive of growing widespread interest in democracy, the 2013 elections witnessed a 15% increase in voter turnout and the country’s first hand over of power from one civilian government to another. A civilian-led devolution plan was also set in motion that year which has accorded significant fiscal powers to the federation’s four provinces and led to local government elections in 2015. The monopoly of the country’s older dynastic political parties was also challenged by the electoral gains made by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s (PTI). It ran on an anti-corruption message, which fed into a rising public discourse around topics such as Pakistan’s ‘VIP culture’ or the impunity of influentials and, more tentatively, the civil-military balance of power.

It is also notable that in the run up to 2013’s elections Pakistan’s major political parties pledged to provide broad public goods. For example, the PML-N vowed to increase health spending as a proportion of GDP to 2% and to introduce a National Health Service (PML-N, 2013). Whilst the insurgent PTI ran a campaign that framed previous governments’ health policies as ‘for the elite, with people missing from the equation’. Broad policies of this sort arguably represent a new battleground for this generation of Pakistani politicians. Nonetheless, observers remain unsure as to whether this is the beginning of an ongoing sea-change in the way politics is done or if behind the scenes it is business as usual.

Conclusion

This chapter has portrayed Pakistan as a semi-authoritarian clientelistic state. It was shown that it is prone to dictatorship and that its experiments in democracy have often been controlled by the military. Nonetheless, since its founding Pakistan has undergone significant socio-economic changes that have seen the rise of a growing capitalist middle-class. In response, those in charge of the state have sought to incorporate this class into the prevailing political settlement. This has largely been achieved through a thin veneer of democracy at the local level, the transfer of state wealth and property to local elites, the informalisation of the economy, and the creation of a public sphere characterised by religious-nationalism. In turn, it has caused Pakistan’s patron-client relations to gradually transition to the ‘new’ type found in young democracies.

At the same time, it has been argued that Pakistan’s more activist and politically orientated civil society organisations have been consistently crushed. This has occurred through political leaders that have drawn upon their rhetoric to win power before abandoning and silencing them once in office. Alongside them, military dictators have banned their activities, de-linked them from political parties and sought to re-engineer the public sphere in ways that discourages broad political participation. Furthermore, at various points members of civil society have been co-opted by the state so it can portray itself as liberal to its international backers.

More recently, neoliberal donors’ financial support and agendas have led to civil society’s corporatisation, fracturing and depoliticization. This has created a competitive market within which organisations willing to discipline themselves and to avoid confrontations with the state benefit. With the notable exception of lawyers, therefore, Pakistan’s civil society was largely unable to contribute to growing calls in 2008 for a return to democracy. Indeed, many NGOs had lost their links to CBOs, reformist members of political society and the media. Insiders had even begun to suggest that some were merely contract implementers with little in the way of political ideas or transformational objectives. In this sense, some donors have helped
to ensure the survival of the new clientelism in Pakistan. Nonetheless, by 2009 some of them were beginning to explore the idea of social accountability programmes as a way of bucking this trend. The thesis now turns to the empirical investigation of one of these efforts.
Chapter Six

Methods and Case Study Selection

This chapter introduces readers to the principles of constructivist grounded theory. It was used to collect and analyse data from staff and volunteers within the Supporting Transparency, Accountability, and Electoral Process (STAEP) programme. I overview the implications of its argument that data is co-constructed by researchers and research participants, including what this means for issues of bias, theoretical sampling and theory building. The claim that constructivist grounded theory can begin to account for how power affects the micro social processes studied by researchers is also explored. I argue that the approach it is suited the thesis’ aim of revealing how development’s discourses and practices can restrict or enable wider democratising projects. I also explore the reality of access and data collection once I entered the field, and comment upon the limitations of the method. The chapter ends by providing a rationale for the case selection methodology.

Grounded theory

To guide my investigation of the citizens’ groups raised and mentored by STAEP – herein called Constituency Relations Groups (CRGs) –, I adopted Charmaz’s (2000, 2006, 2008a) formulation of constructivist grounded theory. I was drawn to her suggestion that it is suited to the critical stance of social justice research (Charmaz, 2005). Arriving at Charmaz’s ideas was, however, something of an accident. Indeed, I began my search for appropriate methodologies with criticisms of grounded theory’s positivist roots and its difficulties with accounting for power. Only later did I conclude that a constructivist lens helps grounded theory to include both the insights of poststructuralists and the messy realities of fieldwork.
Grounded theory has its roots in Glaser and Strauss’ (1965, 1967) efforts to accord theory generation the same level of attention as theory testing. To do this, they sought to codify systematic methods for generating hypotheses and theories from data collected during evolving qualitative research, rather than logically deducing them from a priori assumptions. Broadly, they argued that researchers should enter the field with research problems that orientate their investigations and without testable hypotheses derived from existing literature, with the aim to have as few preconceived ideas as possible. Once there, they should simultaneously collect and analyse data, returning to the field time and again with new questions. In the process, false leads are checked-off and emergent theories are refined.

Four techniques from Glaser and Strauss characterise the method. Firstly, early analysis of collected data, beginning with line-by-line coding. Codes describe the social processes and meanings given to them that are being discussed in an interview or observed in the field. Codes are later grouped into context-specific analytic categories that move an analysis from description to interpretation. Glaser and Strauss (1967:37) define categories as conceptual elements of theories. However, emergent categories ideally do not use concepts from existing theories. If they do, grounded theorists argue they must ‘earn’ their place in new analyses through clear connections to raw data (Glaser, 1978; Charmaz, 2006).

Secondly, grounded theory calls for constant comparison. Codes should be compared with codes, codes with emerging categories, categories with one another, and towards the end of a study theories with literature. Put another way, one may compare participants (their actions, meanings and accounts), a single respondent’s answers over time, or one’s own evolving interpretations. This ensures that analyses have momentum and that false-leads are dropped. It also allows for the identification of sub-categories and variation within emerging analytical categories. Constant comparison, therefore, helps to ensure the thickness of descriptions and that studies account for the complexity of the phenomenon under investigation.
Thirdly, grounded theorists are encouraged to theoretically sample from among their population of interest. This means that research should be guided by emerging hunches, gaps in the data and the questions they pose. Thus, a study’s sample cannot be random or predefined. Instead, researchers seek out new participants (or return to existing participants) and further observations as their own understandings evolve. This helps researchers tease out difficult areas of interest and test micro-hypotheses.

Lastly, grounded theory encourages memo writing. Memos serve as written evidence of a researcher’s evolving ideas, ideally justifying interpretations and supporting emerging theories. They often begin as the private thoughts of researchers, including their reflections, deliberations and conjectures. Once they have been sufficiently developed and tested against data, memos form the base for chapter sections and they become the component parts of concluding theories. In their finished public form, memos derive their force from a combination of analytical insight and clear connections to raw data. Whilst their positioning within a study’s broader argument speaks to their relevance.

After their first book Glaser and Strauss never published together again. Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) later suggested modifications to grounded theory: firstly, they provided a four-staged procedure for coding data and deducing theory. In the process, they partially undermined the idea that theory was already in the natural world to be ‘discovered’ by researchers and, instead, suggested that they ‘create’ it through technically rigorous analyses that account for complexity. Secondly, they argued that creative interpretations of data can arise from engaging relevant literature at all stages of a study. Glaser (1992) argued that their modifications abandoned the idea of emergence at the heart of grounded theory. Accordingly, his subsequent writings have concentrated on keeping grounded theory as close to their original formulation as possible (Glaser, 2002; Glaser and Holton, 2004).
Constructivist grounded theory

Charmaz, a former student of both Glaser and Strauss, sought to critique and update their grounded theory formulations by including the overlapping insights of constructionism and post-modernism. Her goal was to make it better suited to studying issues of power and inequalities, links between micro-contexts, discourses and structures, and social justice research. Although Charmaz is not the only constructivist grounded theorist, I concentrate on her work as the most complete formulation of such an approach (Denzin, 1994; Madill et al., 2000; A. Bryant, 2002; Clarke, 2014).

Charmaz’s argues that both Glaser and Strauss hold positivistic premises (Charmaz, 2008a:400). Indeed, within their work she identifies assumptions about researchers’ abilities to have unmediated contact with the world, to easily replicate one another’s studies by following the same methodologies, that they share the same meanings as their studies’ participants, and that they can approach the field unclouded by their previous experiences. She also worries that their write-ups are overly decontextualized by the efforts to generalise through abstract theories (Charmaz, 2006:402).

Charmaz does acknowledge a distinction between Glaser’s (1993, 2004) belief in the idea of researchers discovering theory, and Strauss and Corin’s (1990, 1998) argument that methodological rigor enables researchers to create theory. However, the distinction is largely meaningless for her interest in rejecting positivist premises because it rests on how much emphasis each place on the potential of technical methods to lead to theory development. Thus, it does not question their underlying epistemological frameworks. She has also suggested that Strauss and Corbin’s (1990, 1998) mechanistic coding steps and scientific terms often ‘distance’ readers from the experiences of both researchers and research participants (Charmaz, 2000:525). An issue which can lead to ‘mundane data and routine reports’ (Charmaz, 2006:15).
In contrast, Charmaz’s guidelines for grounded theory begin from the premise that researchers co-construct theories with their research participants. This suggests that both bring their biases, morals, priorities, experiences, and wider contextual constraints to every interaction. Subjectivities and power inequalities, therefore, are embedded in data collection and analyses, theories can only ever be interpretations of the phenomenon under study and they always reflect value positions. The main problem for researchers is in ‘identifying these positions and weighing their effect on research practice, not in denying their existence’ (Charmaz, 2008a:402).

To make these claims, Charmaz draws upon the principles of constructivism and the insights of post-modernism. Constructivism assumes the relativism of multiple social realities, the social creation of knowledge, and the impossibility of researchers ever fully grasping participants’ meanings (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Post-modernism has done much to highlight the effects of power, especially in terms of the discursive construction of the world. Thus, she has described her goal as reclaiming grounded theory from its ‘positivist underpinnings to form a revised, more open-ended practice [...] that stresses its emergent, constructivist elements’ and to use its ‘methods as flexible, heuristic strategies’ (Charmaz, 2000: 510).

Within her methodological guidelines, Charmaz places a strong emphasis on in-depth interviewing. She recommends repeated engagements with the same participants, with questions that explore the meanings they attribute to different social interactions and wider processes. This reflects the principal argument of symbolic interactionists that ‘society, reality, and the self are constructed through interaction and thus rely on language and communication’ (ibid:7). And it suggests that research participants’ meanings are never fixed and that they will change over time, often in response to new social interactions, experiences or conditions. Charmaz’s

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105 For many, post-structuralism and post-modernism are interchangeable terms (see Chapters One, Three and Four). Indeed, Fox (2014) writes: ‘Postmodernism is closely associated with post-structuralism, and might be thought of as the “political wing” of the latter perspective, in the sense that is suspicious of, and seeks to undermine the grand narratives of modernist social organisation and domination including capitalism, patriarchy, colonialism and heteronormativity’. 
constructivist grounded theory, therefore, specifically seeks to account for the fluidity of the meanings participants’ give to things and to show how they change.

Charmaz cautions, however, that what participants tell researchers reflects their own biographies, their desires to shape others’ understandings of their worlds and the hidden contextual constraints they are subject to (ibid:68). Accordingly, what is left unsaid can often be as important as what is said and researchers should not be shy of suggesting how the context within which data is collected may have affected it. Charmaz also argues that the actual research one conducts will often differ from what was written in proposal documents (ibid:46). This is necessary if researchers are following emergent ideas, seeking to close identified gaps and theoretically sampling.

In terms of coding, Charmaz (2008:168) adheres to the principles of flexibility and fluidity and encourages analysts to ‘tolerate ambiguity’ within their data. Thus, she proposes a loose two-stage technique of ‘initial’ and then ‘refocused’ coding. In the first, researchers occupy themselves with answering Glaser’s (1992) two key questions, ‘what is the chief concern of participants?’ and ‘how do they resolve this concern?’. This focuses analyses on the social processes participants are engaged in or describing, and the meanings they give to them. To aid thinking in terms of processes, Charmaz encourages codes to make use of gerunds (e.g. running, justifying or obfuscating) and the terms or phrases used by participants (e.g. showing off or plotting).106 The second stage involves elevating those codes with explanatory power over others to provisional theoretical categories. Further recoding, comparisons, theoretical sampling and memo writing are then used to explore their potential to contribute to theory generation. Charmaz (2006:17) also suggests researchers may use ‘sensitising concepts’ that draw from others’ work and theories as ‘points of departure’ for investigations and initial questions. However, researchers should seek to be as up front as possible about when they are drawing upon or importing concepts from elsewhere (ibid:76). Furthermore, attention should be devoted to identifying new processes and

106 Using a participant’s terms is often called ‘in vivo’ coding.
developing fresh concepts as soon as possible or, failing this, refining and justifying the place of others’ concepts in the final theoretical analysis. Accordingly, she echoes others’ suggestions that researchers enter the field with a ‘open mind’, informed by existing literature and their previous experiences (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Kelle, 2005; Giles et al., 2013). Nonetheless, to remain open, literature reviews should still be left until after data collection and initial analyses have been completed (Charmaz, 2006:166).

Turning to writing, Charmaz and Mitchell (1996) sought to expose the ‘myth’ of the detached social science author and, instead, called for researchers’ voices to be heard. This accords with the constructivist position that researchers and participants co-create data, and that reflexivity should be used as a way of acknowledging and, as much as possible, avoiding potential biases. As part of this, researchers’ important decision-making processes, conjectures and ‘moral’ choices over whose voices are given space should be explained. Furthermore, researchers should not be afraid to express their perplexity at unanswered questions, dead-ends in their research strategies or ambiguous data. All add to the plausibility of their arguments.

Following others, Charmaz (2000:526) also repeatedly describes her studies as ‘stories’, and encourages writers ‘to balance theoretical interpretation with an evocative aesthetic’ (Jackson, 2002; Hastrup, 2004). This refers to efforts to weave explanations of the processes researchers observe and the theories they generate into the narrative. In doing so, she argues that theory becomes more accessible to readers and research can serve audiences from multiple disciplines or those outside of academia (Charmaz, 2008a:406). Thus, Charmaz recommends a style of writing far removed from the scientific, impersonal and often decontextualized reports common to positivist social science. To paraphrase Hastrup (2004:469), I would also argue that careful storytelling can locate and explain human agency in the face of disempowering discourses.
Social justice research, power and context

So far, I've explored the evolution of grounded theory from its positivist beginnings to its contemporary constructivist renderings. However, Charmaz (2005) has also argued that constructivist grounded theory is suited to the goals of social justice research. Social justice research implies an interest in fairness, equity, equality, democratic process, status, and hierarchy, and individual and collective rights and obligations. And it requires a critical stance towards discourses, actions, organisations, institutions and wider structures. It also seeks theories with implications for concrete policy proposals. However, as this often cannot be done without making value judgements and drawing upon ideals, it is acknowledged that researchers will bring their ‘shoulds’ and ‘oughts’ into analyses (Ibid:5).

In putting forth her argument, Charmaz took on Burawoy’s (1991) criticisms of grounded theorists. He accused them of largely bracketing the context through their eagerness to move to abstract renderings and theoretical models. He suggested, therefore, that they are often blinded to how power affects the social processes and micro-contexts they study. This severely limits the prospects of identifying pathways to desired changes. For Charmaz (2005), however, these issues can be overcome through constructivist, as opposed to positivist, grounded theory.

Firstly, Charmaz argues that constant comparisons between research participants’ own definitions of issues such as race, class and gender, and those found in the academic or sociological literature used by analysts can be fruitful. Indeed, as these issues – or categories in the grounded theorists’ language – are socially constructed, participants’ meanings cannot be assumed. Instead, by investigating how they are understood and experienced by participants, researchers can gain insights into how inequalities are maintained, subtly undermined or directly challenged within micro-contexts.

Secondly, Charmaz suggests that constructivist grounded theory can attend to the societal and global contexts within which people experience injustice. This requires
that grounded theorists link the basic social processes they identify to wider structures, which can include non-material factors such as hidden status inequalities, cultures, dominant discourses and important surrounding events. To do this, Charmaz (2005, 2006) points to Clarke's (2003:556) commitment to ‘situating interpretation’ and her use of situational maps.

For Clarke, the methodological implications of post-modernism require reversing social sciences’ commitment to simplifying and erasing the context. Instead, she seeks to combine a concentration on research participants’ actions and meanings with analytic approaches that as far as possible account for ‘the full situation of enquiry’. In practice, this means mapping out the relationships between all the human, nonhuman, discursive and other elements in a research situation. And including the researcher’s interpretations of the direction of influence and causality between them.

To do this, studies may use situational maps. They begin as unstructured collages of emerging categories from ongoing data analysis. As studies evolve, researchers gradually make connections between different categories and theorised contextual factors, many of which may lay outside of the studied micro-contexts. Indeed, one may connect a category emerging from collected data to a broader structure uncovered through previously reviewed historical materials, others’ theories or critical discourse analyses (ibid:559).

For example, in my own research I might postulate that participants’ mistrust of money paid to NGO staff members is intimately connected to Pakistan’s historical experience with monetised social work and foreign agendas. The idea behind these visual aids, therefore, is to form hypotheses over the conditions and wider structures that shape the power and politics of studied social processes and the meanings given to them. This allows analysts to move from micro to institutional, organisational and macro levels of analysis. And it aids them to make visible previously hidden

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relationships between these levels. From a social justice perspective, it also enables analysts to grasp how things could be different given different relationships.

Thirdly, it is suggested that constructivist grounded theory can attend to the contradictions between research participants’ accounts of their actions and meanings, what they actually do, and how others perceive them. For example, a wealthy research participant may declare that he gives medical goods to the local community free of charge. I might later discover that when he does so he is also using the dispensary as a place to canvass for votes for his political patron. Charmaz (2005) argues that through the careful triangulation of emerging stories such contradictions can reveal the unstated priorities and hidden practices of research participants. And they likely reveal something about how they wish to represent themselves to researchers.

Lastly, Charmaz’s (2005:9-10) approach to social justice research encourages analysts to focus on the resources, hierarchies, and policies and practices at play within studied micro-contexts. Resources can be economic, social, or personal, and they include information and access to networks. And they enable actors to control meanings. Accordingly, it is important to ask how resources are dispersed and used. Hierarchies refer to the norm that any social group will be ordered according to members’ access to resources. However, it is important for analysts to discern how hierarchies lead to injustices, such as through silencing people’s political voices and barring them from economic opportunities. Or, conversely, how they may underpin collective action, such as when leaders mobilise others to protest for their rights.

Nonetheless, both the use of resources and the importance of hierarchies will be circumscribed by wider norms and practices. Charmaz conceptualises these as akin to the institutional ‘rules of the game’ and suggests that research participants will have different interests in upholding or challenging them. She also sees them as the bridge between studied social processes and wider structures. Thus, it is important to ask where participants are situated in relation to these rules. This has clear parallels with
Bourdieu’s ideas of overlapping social fields, different types of capital, and individuals’ abilities to bend the rules explored in Chapter Two.

So far, I have shown that constructivist grounded theory lends itself to social justice research that is interested in accounting for how power affects studied social processes. In the rest of the chapter, I locate myself within this methodology and reflexively explore how I co-created data with my research participants.

**Access**

As covered in Chapter One, I first gained access to STAEP as a researcher jointly employed by The Asia Foundation (TAF) and the Justice and Security Research Programme (JSRP) based at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). I arrived in Pakistan in early 2014 to conduct three months of research on the programme’s ‘Theory of Change’. By the time I finished this short project, I was curious and politically stimulated by the STAEP programme. Accordingly, I secured permission from both TAF and FAFEN’s leadership to work on it as a PhD project. However, I made it clear that this time I wanted as much as possible to be independent from DFID and TAF. Thus, I shared my research puzzles with FAFEN’s senior staff, who were supportive of my project, giving me a desk in their office for several months, letting me access their data and initially connecting me with the CRGs’ mentoring NGOs.

Nonetheless, my previous experiences and new positionality raised a number of issues discussed by Mosse’s (2006) exploration of ethnographies of professional communities. Mosse has pointed out that higher education funding squeezes in the 1980s meant many researchers now also work in the fields they investigate. Although this can help to secure access, ‘professional insiders’ face the problem of mentally

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108 Theories of Change are explicit evolving narratives of how and why programmes understand themselves to be able to effect desired changes. They are increasingly required by donor organisations as part of business cases, and within monitoring and evaluation efforts (Valters, 2014).
exiting the fields in which they work to critically study them. As Mosse (ibid:937) comments, this includes the ‘exit from the templates of our younger ethnographic or professional selves’.

For me, this problem was compounded by picking up short consultancies during my time in Pakistan that required me to think and report my observations of ongoing social accountability programmes in ways that accord with development’s dominant discourses. This includes focusing on measurable programme outputs, rather than the meanings participants give them, and as much as possible bracketing the power and politics of programmes, rather than explicitly confronting them. Indeed, although paid work gave me a broad understanding of social accountability programmes, it taught me to approach them as either formalised theories of change, or sets of inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes. As will further be outlined below, such struggles meant I spent a long time convincing myself that the puzzles I wished to explore were legitimate lines of enquiry.

Case selection

My selection of CRGs to study was guided by security considerations and a detour into quantitative analysis of the CRGs’ activities spurned from my reading of the ‘grey literature’ on social accountability. For the purposes of due diligence, evaluation and learning, STAEP took efforts to record the minutes from the CRGs’ ad-hoc meetings on an online database. Collected by FAFEN’s mentoring NGOs, this qualitative information provided an opportunity to quantitatively get a handle on the CRGs’ activities. Indeed, I was curious to see what it would tell me about the groups’ activities. Thus, a codebook was developed to record the number and categories of

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109 Mosse (2006) discusses this problem with regards to anthropologists working as development professionals. However, it is now commonly understood that this problem affects a wide range of disciplines, such as economics and even the hard sciences.

110 ‘Grey literature’ is the name given to publications from the development sectors’ donors, companies, think tanks and NGOs.

111 Meetings were meant to be regular, but were ad-hoc in practice as members’ other commitments allowed.
issues identified by each CRG, how many of these were raised with state and non-state authorities, and how many were satisfactorily resolved. It is presented in Appendix 3. To carry out the coding I employed and trained research assistants who had previously worked on the online database for FAFEN during the programme’s lifespan.

However, simply ranking the CRGs by how many demands they resolved would tell us little about their experiences. Furthermore, the different contexts each group operated in across Pakistan and the varying issues they may have deemed important rule against straight comparisons. To move forward, a ranking that captures both CRGs’ participation in the processes deemed to be central to social accountability and their supposed success at them was needed. Thus, for each CRG a composite score was calculated that gave equal weight to the ratio of demands they identified that they then raised with power-holders and the ratio of raised demands they considered to have been satisfactorily resolved. This subjective weighting sought to capture the members’ ability to act in support of social accountability, as much as it did the outcomes of their actions. I call this the CRGs’ ‘activism’ scores.

The coding revealed that CRGs located in the central and northern Punjab, in districts such as Gujranwala, Lahore, Gujrat and Sialkot, had high activism scores. While not quite as high scoring, many CRGs from Pakistan’s northern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also fared well. However, CRGs from Sindh province and those from southern Punjab, such as Muzaffargarh, Multan and Bahawalnagar, were found to have low activism scores. Although there was a clear provincial hierarchy, the variation within the Punjab also suggested that the sub-provincial factors may have been important.

112 To test for the possibility that CRGs’ raised demands to give the appearance of activity when in actual fact they put little substantive pressure on authorities to resolve them, the weighting of both parts of the indicator were experimented with to assure that minor changes did not significantly affect the overall ranking of most of the CRGs.

113 A focus on agency follows the work of Sen (1999:152) and others who observe that the poor often place a high value on ‘unrestrained participation in political and social activities’ (Narayan et al., 1999; Appadurai, 2004). It also accords with Tilly’s (2007) focus on participation in public political life.
In an effort to further unpick this, the second phase turned to contemporary grey literature that offered broad lists of potentially relevant contextual factors for social accountability programmes (Foresti et al., 2013; O’Meally, 2013; Harris and Wild, 2013). It also returned to the literature on civil society, governance and service delivery in Pakistan that I had reviewed for my initial study of STAEP (Kirk, 2014). Together, they provided hypotheses for the sub-national contextual variables that may have affected the CRGs’ activism scores. However, relevant constituency level socio-economic data is, in large part, lacking in Pakistan. Thus, the range of potential variables to correlate with the CRGs’ activity scores was limited to those with plausible proxies. The final five variables chosen for regression analysis were: *multidimensional poverty, violence, political competition, the number of political parties present, and land inequality*. A fuller explanation for their choice and for how they were constructed is given in Appendix 3.

Ordinary least squares regression was then used. Column 1 of Table I shows that the overall explanatory power of the five variables used to model the contexts in which the CRGs operated was low: the $R^2$ is only 0.77. However, it did reveal that multidimensional poverty and land inequality were significantly, and negatively, related to the CRGs’ activity scores. The findings somewhat conformed to the hypothesis that the CRGs’ are more effective in areas with less poverty and inequality. However, counter to expectations, poverty and land inequality were only significantly negatively related to the CRGs’ activism scores in urban areas, not in rural ones (compare columns 2 and 3 of Table I).$^{114}$ For their part, violence, political competition and the effective number of parties were not found to be related to CRG activity.

$^{114}$ This was particularly surprising given the smaller number of observations for urban constituencies.
Table I: CRGs’ activism and sub-national contextual factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Activism Score</th>
<th>(2) Activism Score</th>
<th>(3) Activism Score</th>
<th>(4) Issues Resolved</th>
<th>(5) Issues Resolved</th>
<th>(6) Issues Raised</th>
<th>(7) Issues Raised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>-43.35**</td>
<td>-93.65**</td>
<td>-30.31</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>-0.620</td>
<td>-247.7***</td>
<td>-91.76***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(18.62)</td>
<td>(38.07)</td>
<td>(22.07)</td>
<td>(1.360)</td>
<td>(0.713)</td>
<td>(86.41)</td>
<td>(45.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>-12.75</td>
<td>-26.89</td>
<td>-8.387</td>
<td>1.924</td>
<td>-0.0750</td>
<td>-63.49</td>
<td>-9.437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.37)</td>
<td>(32.28)</td>
<td>(13.88)</td>
<td>(1.153)</td>
<td>(0.449)</td>
<td>(73.27)</td>
<td>(28.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political competition</td>
<td>0.00771</td>
<td>0.0256</td>
<td>0.0111</td>
<td>0.000401</td>
<td>-0.00101</td>
<td>-0.0455</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.00477)</td>
<td>(0.00459)</td>
<td>(0.303)</td>
<td>(0.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of parties</td>
<td>2.011*</td>
<td>2.864</td>
<td>1.448</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>-0.0634</td>
<td>7.507</td>
<td>3.415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.179)</td>
<td>(2.406)</td>
<td>(1.407)</td>
<td>(0.0860)</td>
<td>(0.0455)</td>
<td>(5.461)</td>
<td>(2.903)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land inequality</td>
<td>-0.109*</td>
<td>-0.273**</td>
<td>-0.0150</td>
<td>0.0123***</td>
<td>-0.00135</td>
<td>-0.469</td>
<td>-0.0615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0642)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.0839)</td>
<td>(0.00439)</td>
<td>(0.00271)</td>
<td>(0.279)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>44.69***</td>
<td>67.44***</td>
<td>35.17***</td>
<td>2.516***</td>
<td>1.214***</td>
<td>119.6***</td>
<td>68.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.697)</td>
<td>(16.85)</td>
<td>(10.41)</td>
<td>(0.602)</td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
<td>(38.25)</td>
<td>(21.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRG sample</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>117</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To further explore these results, the CRGs’ activism scores were broken down into their constituent parts - the ability to raise demands with power-holders and having them satisfactorily resolved - (see columns 4 to 7 of Table I). This exercise found that poverty was negatively related to the CRGs’ abilities to raise issues with power-holders across all constituencies; whereas land inequality is not significantly related to raising demands in either constituency (columns 6 and 7). Furthermore, land inequality only seemed to affect the ability of CRGs to have their issues satisfactorily resolved in those constituencies with large urban areas (column 4). These findings go against what much of the literature on patron-client relations, collective action and rural populations’ dependencies might predict.
At the time of this analysis I had not conducted the in-depth review of Pakistan in Chapter Five which suggests that land has become less of a factor in the political empowerment of Pakistanis in the last two to three decades. By way of explanation, therefore, it may be that citizens’ contemporary capacities to engage in social accountability are hampered far more by a combination of their general economic condition and social status, than from their lack of land. However, propositions of this nature cannot be confidently investigated or made from presented evidence and likely contain many more nuances. It should also be stressed here that the CRGs’ memberships were not chosen at random. Instead, as described later in the thesis, members were purposively selected by the mentoring NGOs and one another in ways that I argue ultimately shaped their groups’ capacities. Thus, I hypothesize that contextual studies of this sort would have more utility for programmes with randomised participants, and treatment and control groups.

It is arguable, therefore, that the model of sub-provincial contextual factors presented here could only take me so far into the messy and difficult to grasp reality of social accountability in Pakistan. Accordingly, it should give way to hypothesis and theory generating qualitative work (which may in turn uncover further quantifiable variables). In this sense, although limited, it helps to justify my qualitative approach to exploring the processes animating the studied social accountability programme.

Rather than completely abandoning the model, however, I used its insights and rationale as a method of choosing CRGs for investigation. Accordingly, a matrix was used to plot the model’s fitted values (the predictions of how active the CRGs should be in each different constituency context), against the residuals (how far they deviated from these predications). The matrix guided me towards a focus on the Punjab’s sub-provincial variation in context and helped me to select CRGs that had been particularly active in hypothetically favourable and unfavourable contexts. Indeed, I was still not sure that the context did not broadly condition the agency of CRGs, so I sought variation. I also hoped that CRGs’ with high activism scores would provide rich data. Lastly, within grounded theory variation is a means of adding plausibility to generated theories.
Accordingly, I selected a CRG in a predominantly rural constituency that, given my modelling of the context, had a higher activism score than predicted. To maintain a level of anonymity, it shall be called ‘Rural Gujrat’. I also selected a CRG in a predominantly urban constituency that had a higher activism score that was predicted: ‘Urban Gujrat’. Both are in the middle of northern Punjab and, theoretically, represent CRGs that were particularly active in contexts that the grey literature suggests should be conducive to social accountability. Thus, it was hoped that they would be rich sites of data. For comparability, these CRGs were mentored by the same NGO from within FAFEN’s network.
I also selected a CRG in a predominantly rural constituency that, given my modelling of the context, should have had a low activism score, but scored particularly high: ‘Rural Multan’. And one from a predominantly urban constituency that should have had a low activism score, but scored particularly high: ‘Urban Multan’. Both are in southern Punjab, close to its border with Sindh and in areas that theoretically should be unconducive to social accountability. Thus, they held promise as potentially rich sites for data collection. Again, for comparability, both CRGs were mentored by the same NGO from within FAFEN’s network.

As explored further in the next chapter, the CRGs chosen in the north of the Punjab are representative of regions that have benefited from the socio-economic changes underpinning the rise of the middle-classes covered in Chapter Five. In contrast, the CRGs selected in the south are in areas that are popularly thought to have largely remained static in terms of their social-economic development. Thus, the case selection methodology achieved three theoretically relevant purposes: it allowed me to be reasonably sure that relatively easily quantifiable contextual variables could not solely explain the CRGs’ activism, it narrowed my focus to contextual variation within Punjab province and it helped me to choose CRGs with the potential of providing rich data. My final selection of CRGs was also shaped by security considerations.

**Entering the field**

I lived in Pakistan for two years. Of this, I spent just under four months across 2014 and 2015 in my research locations. However, before this I also spent the two weeks interviewing members of a fifth urban based CRG in the city of Gujranwala in northern Punjab. This allowed me to familiarise myself with fieldwork again, train my initial research assistant and trial interview questions.

Many of the processes described by the aidnography authors (e.g. governmentality, depoliticization, resistance, bureaucratisation) were in my mind when I entered the
field. As were the concepts used by much of the donor literature to understand civil society (e.g. social capital, bridging and bonding capital, and vertical and horizontal links) and clientelism (e.g. vote buying, incumbent bias, patronage networks). I was also familiar with some of the older anthropological literature on Pakistan (Barth, 1965; Asad, 1972; Lindholm, 1972). Much of it focusses on how powerful landlords built political followings through their clients’ dependencies and coercion, and how bouts of democracy, capitalism and class based identities were beginning to change these relationships. In this sense, it described the very beginning of the end of the ‘old’ type of clientelism covered in Chapter Five (Hopkin, 2006). These ideas all served as my sensitising concepts.

The reality that I am a young, white male from a well-known Western donor country was also carried with me. This often meant that research participants assumed I was there to assess them. Thus, initial meetings were spent explaining my purpose, reassuring them that I was not monetarily connected to FAFEN or DFID, and that I was not only interested in gathering ‘success stories’. Despite this, it was quickly apparent that some of the more powerful CRG members and NGO staff were often keen to control whom I spoke to. As has been pointed out, this is a common occurrence in elite interviews (Smith, 2006; Costa and Kiss, 2011; Jabeen, 2013). Overcoming this required gathering detailed explanations of important events from the CRGs’ histories and mapping relationships between members, often with a view to triangulating data, and uncovering contradictions and gaps. I was fortunate in that my youth, status as a foreigner and lack of language skills (interviews were conducted in English, Urdu, Kashmiri, Punjabi and Saraiki) allowed me to ask seemingly mundane questions about participants’ social statuses, political allegiances and power bases. Moreover, a combination of perseverance and rapport built up with

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115 See Chapter Three.
116 As others have found, some participants also suspected I had an anti-Pakistan agenda or was linked to Western security agencies (Jabeen, 2013; Martin, 2015a). There is little one can do to prove them wrong.
117 A term frequently used by NGOs wanting to highlight impact in civil society strengthening programmes.
118 Efforts were made to learn Urdu but due to the number of languages the study required, time, money and my poor progress did not get past pleasantries.
research participants enabled a snowballing approach that encompassed a wide range of perspectives within each case study location.

I also often used FAFEN’s databases to track down some of those that had participated in the programme, but that were not identified by their colleagues as worth interviewing. Thus, as rivalries and fractures within both the CRGs and their mentoring NGOs revealed themselves, they guided my theoretical sampling strategy. Indeed, rather than taking research participants’ obstructions and attempts to control my fieldwork as a flaw with the chosen methodology, I sought to interpret such incidents as signifiers of power relations (Cramer et al., 2016).

**Interviewing**

The collection of qualitative data through interviewing is suited to studies that seek to grasp the meanings people give to social processes, relationships, events and structures. Moreover, interviews are especially useful in exploratory research that aims for hypothesis and theory generation. Accordingly, I sought to conduct interviews with members of the selected CRGs that would allow me to understand both what they did and under what conditions, and the meanings they gave their participation. I also interviewed staff from the mentoring NGOs in each research site and journalists to further understand local politics.

For the programme’s participants, an interviewing guide was developed and internalised that moved from their socio-economic backgrounds and previous experiences of engaging in social work or activism, to their involvement with the STAEP programme, relationships with other CRG members and reflections on their experiences. All interviews began with an explanation of the purposes of the study, which was framed as aimed at understanding the experiences of those participating in the STAEP programme and local politics. Participants were also informed that their identities would be an anonymised and how interviews would be used for my thesis.
All interviews were recorded, however, participants often asked for the machine to be switched off when recounting details of events or relationships considered to be sensitive. Thus, written notes were also taken. In total 89 people were interviewed, with some participants interviewed a second or third time, and others informally met again at public venues, houses and over dinner. Often interviews would be conducted with more than one CRG member present, but recorded as a single interview.

Table 2: Interview guide

| Introduction to my research, rights, process and consent |  
| --- | --- |
|  
| |  
|  
| |  
| **1. Can you please tell me about your own circumstances before joining the CRG?** | Family background  
Education  
Occupation  
Affiliations  
Previous social work  
Connections to mentoring NGO  
|  
|  
| |  
| **2. Please can you tell me why you joined the CRG?** | Connections  
Motivations  
|  
|  
| |  
| **3. What were the other active members of the group like?** | Occupations  
Positions within society  
Positions within CRG  
|  
|  
| |  
| **3. Can you recall an issue that the CRG resolved that you were particularly proud of?** | Why was this issue chosen  
What was your involvement  
Who else was involved  
What were the detailed steps taken  
Surely it was not that easy  
Who benefitted from the issues' resolution  
Why did the authorities respond to the CRG  
Other issues of this nature  
|  
|  
| |  
| **4. Can you recall an issue that the CRG tried but failed to resolve?** | Why was this issue chosen  
What was your involvement  
Who else was involved  
What were the detailed steps taken  
Why did you not try official / politician  
<p>|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Additional Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who benefitted from the issues' resolution</td>
<td>Who didn't the authorities respond to the CRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why didn't the authorities respond to the CRG</td>
<td>Other issues of this nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What do generally you think of the CRGs’ ways of working and aims?</td>
<td>Its ways of working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Its resolution of disagreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The inclusion of marginalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Its benefits to the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Its benefits to you</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Its wider aims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. What was the relationship between local politics and the CRG?</td>
<td>What's local politics like</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How does social work fit in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Which politicians helped or hindered the CRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Were CRG members affiliated with politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did the impending elections change anything for better or worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Why do politicians help such groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Were there rivalries amongst members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. What was the CRGs' relationship with the mentoring NGO like?</td>
<td>Trainings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aims or instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interlocutors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General perceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Their interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Verifying points raised by other interviewees and interpretations</td>
<td>e.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can you tell me about issue X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What was X's role in the CRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Why was authority X particularly helpful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I heard that, what do you think</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. What are people's opinions of NGOs in Pakistan?</td>
<td>Draw back to previous answers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. What is your opinion of national politics?</td>
<td>Draw back to previous answers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. How do the CRGs or associations like them fit into this?</td>
<td>Draw back to previous answers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. What do you think the CRG achieved overall?</td>
<td>Draw back to previous answers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the primary challenges of grounded theory is for interviewers not to force their own concepts and understandings on participants. By first focusing on participants’ backgrounds and then how they came to be involved in the STAEP programme, I gained an understanding of their own biographies and frameworks. This also allowed further questions to be asked in the framings used by participants and for me to gain an understanding of their motivations. For questions focused on relationships between CRG members I often introduced information learnt from other interviews and asked participants to comment upon it. For example, I would inform them that I knew that the CRG worked on the resolution of an issue and ask them to tell me how things played out. Such questions were often followed up by asking participants to reflect on such episodes, what worked and didn’t, and what this meant to them.

In the latter stages of interviews, I also occasionally asked participants to comment upon my own evolving interpretations of their experiences. This was particularly important as interviewees’ answers often challenged my own understanding of civil society as a bounded sphere of voluntary action aimed at debating and realising the public good. Upon reflection, I suspect that this was gained from readings of shallow and idealistic development sector literature. In this sense, I followed a constructivist path that deliberately sought to co-construct data and interpretations with participants (Lynch, 2008). Most interviews ended with wider discussions about participants’ perspectives of civil society, NGOs, politics and democracy in Pakistan, and with them telling me what they wanted from future donor initiatives.

Although I estimate that close to 50 percent of my interviewees spoke English, especially those within the CRGs’ core active groups, most interviews were
conducted in participants’ primary languages. Accordingly, I separately worked with two Pakistani research assistants in their mid-20s found through contacts at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad. So as not to interrupt the flow of interviews, this required that my assistants paraphrase participants’ answers, rather than directly translate. To get to this stage, the two research assistants were fully immersed in the research aims and my evolving interpretations were discussed with them at length. This was possible as we lived and travelled together whilst in the field, only parting company to sleep. Indeed, they became more than assistants and co-constructed interpretations and theoretical sampling strategies with me, often bringing new perspectives to the table, telling me what was being left unsaid or alerting me to emerging themes. They also helped me keep abreast of the evolving security situations in the localities we worked. Both roles were invaluable. Towards the end of the fieldwork I could confidently rely on them to lead interviews.

The two assistants’ ages also helped as older men were especially keen to impress on them the ways of the world or to get them to tell the gora (white man) how things really are. Indeed, many interviewees would ask my research assistants whether they were meant to speak like Pakistanis or to give us sanitised versions of events retained for outsiders. Much of this was because particularly active CRG members had long worked for NGOs and were used to recounting cookie-cutter success stories for evaluators and visiting programme managers. In stark contrast, many of the interviewed women were much less instructive and often seemed keen to confide in someone that was interested in their experiences. Thus, they were particularly rich interviewees.

My positionality also posed difficulties for my ability to co-construct shared meanings around the concepts and nature of volunteering and altruism in Pakistan. As has been extensively commented upon, researchers have ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ identities in relation to those groups they engage, with each bringing different challenges and advantages (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009; Gair, 2012). As my research progressed, I noticed that for those I met within the professional development sector I was often considered an insider. Accordingly, it was assumed that I shared certain assumptions
about the importance of volunteerism and altruism for cultivating empowerment, and that I was broadly onboard with the programme’s chosen modes of social mobilisation. This was good for quickly building rapport, but on occasion stilted critical conversations.

In contrast, for those voluntarily participating in the CRGs I was an outsider. At first, this often meant I brought my own assumptions as to why people participate in such programmes to the table, which largely fell on the side of altruism. Later, once I had learnt that this was too simplistic, my outsider position meant I was often left frustrated when interviewees would not quickly or directly link their participation in the programme to their wider ambitions, such as gaining work experience or building a local reputation. This problem was exacerbated by my occasionally unskilled probing of interviewees which caused them to effectively shut down and to stick to declarations that they were involved for purely altruistic reasons. Retrospectively, I feel this was also often due to participants’ fear that I was judging their answers or in position to deny them future opportunities to participate in similar programmes.

Overtime I learnt to build ‘semi-insider’ positions for myself and my research assistants. With non-elite participants, this could be achieved early in interviews by hinting that I fully understand that there are a multitude of reasons – altruistic and self-interested – for why people participate in what are often unsustainable programmes and that we, therefore, want to hear about theirs. As part of this, I would also sometimes mention that I too had engaged in voluntary activities to gain experience or get a foot in the door of some perceived opportunity. This strategy helped me to better reveal the relationships between participation, social work, economic benefits and political careers explored later in the thesis. In this sense, I accord with others that argue insider/outsider research positions can become fluid as more is learnt and interviewing techniques refined (Hayfield and Huxley, 2015).

119 Ambitions explored in Chapters Seven and Eight.
120 This mixture is highlighted in Arvidson’s (2014) study of Bangladeshi NGO workers which concludes that altruism is both unsustainable over the long-run and that individual motivation must be understood as multifaceted.
121 As discussed in Chapter Eight, my strategy for interviewing elite programme participants differed.
Coding, interpreting and theory generation

The early and iterative coding of interview data was somewhat hampered. Firstly, I could rarely complete coding passes in the field due to living in accommodation that, as is normal, suffered from severe power outages of sometimes up to 18 hours a day. This was partially overcome by periodically returning to Pakistan’s capital city for the weekends and England for visits over the summers of 2014 and 2015. Secondly, the quality of some of the transcripts I received early on was very low. This required me to source additional transcribers and have them periodically check one another’s work, often delaying transcripts for many months. Thus, some of the coding bled into my literature reviews. Nonetheless, I feel that the long gaps between bursts of fieldwork allowed me to test my evolving ideas and, more generally, understand the wider context within which I was working.

Following Charmaz’s (2008) guidelines for a two-stage coding technique, initial in-depth coding was carried out on over half of the collected data, before a second pass that looked to verify emerging categories and processes was undertaken on all the data. The initial stage produced a long and unwieldy list of what could be called primary codes. Some were collated into broader categories in the second stage, producing a finalised codebook. The codebook and an example of a transcript coded using NViVo software are provided in the Appendix 4.

Memos and situational maps were used during the analysis. The former began early, with memos taking coding labels as their preliminary names, including ‘According Credit’, ‘Somasas and Soft Drinks’ and ‘Maintaining Boundaries’. They consisted of collections of quotes and my emerging thoughts as to how they related to the observed social processes. For example, it was quickly clear that some interviewees were keen to maintain boundaries between what they described as social and political work, whilst others, saw little need to. Gradually it became clear that the more powerful were keener to maintain the distinction. Situational maps were often used later to help think through the relationships between categories, and connect
my interpretations of interviewees’ meanings and the uncovered social processes they were part of to the broader country context and the social accountability discourse. An example derived from my notes is given below:
A theory of ‘isomorphic activism’ derived from these techniques is given in the final chapter. To accord with a constructivist approach to generating theories, the contours of or conditions for isomorphic activism are grounded in my research on both the discourse and practice of social accountability. Thus, they focus on how the meanings and actions of participants in programmes are shaped by ‘large and, often, hidden positions, networks, situations, and relationships’, and they seek to make visible ‘hierarchies of power, communication, and opportunity that maintain and perpetuate differences and distinctions’ (Charmaz, 2006:130-131).

**Limitations**

Many CRGs, such as all those in Baluchistan, were excluded from the case selection’s coding process due to a lack of data or because local insecurity prevented collection.
This reduced the total number of analysed CRGs to 115 from STAEP’s 200. It was also notable that the CRGs’ advocacy efforts stretched over long periods, with demands often lying dormant for many months only to resurface at opportune moments. Thus, coding was an investigative endeavour, with the coders carefully following advocacy efforts to their end and periodically checking one another’s interpretations of randomly chosen CRGs’ ‘stories’.

Given more time and an extended budget I would have also studied CRGs that were less active than my contextual model predicted in differing contexts. However, from my initial study and the literature, I could be reasonably sure that inactive CRGs either lacked the capacities of empowered activists, including resources and skills, or were comprised of members from identity groups whose political patrons were out of power (Kirk, 2014). Furthermore, STAEP, and the idea of social accountability, are premised on some level of citizen-state engagement. Thus, conducting research amongst groups that got very little done would tell me a lot about the exclusionary processes in Pakistan, but little about the nuances of donor supported social accountability programmes.

I took the decision not to interview those on the ‘supply side’ of the governance equation that the CRGs’ members had engaged, including state authorities and elected representatives. My experiences during the initial study and within consultancy projects revealed that access to these individuals was difficult, often requiring negotiations with lengthy chains of intermediaries. Furthermore, they would routinely provide similar stories about how they came to view civil society organisations as their ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground, and how they did not consider the CRGs to be ‘political’ but instead engaged in ‘social work’. The limited time such elites allowed for interviews meant it was difficult to move past such platitudes to more substantive issues.

**Conclusion**

This chapter outlined the rationale for the thesis’ use of constructivist grounded theory. I argued that it provides a useful method for studying the social processes,
relations and meanings animating micro-contexts. Charmaz’s (2005) claim that it can help analysts interpret how power affects micro contexts was also explored. The choice of cases for qualitative study was justified through a mixture of a quantitative analysis of the CRGs’ activities and the practical considerations of conducting research in a difficult context. The former helped to rule out contextual variables common to the literature on social accountability as sufficient explanations for the CRGs’ levels of activity. It also guided my choice towards potentially rich research sites. The latter brought in issues of the feasibility of carrying out qualitative research and the comparability of the findings. Lastly, issues of access, data analysis and bias were explored from a constructivist lens, and the limitations of the research methods commented upon.
Chapter 7

STAEP and the Punjab

This chapter re-introduces readers to the Supporting Transparency, Accountability, and Electoral Process programme in Pakistan (STAEP). This is done through a reading of the Department of International Development’s (DFID) annual review documents for the programme from 2011 to 2015. Following the insights of the aidnography authors covered in Chapter Three, these texts are approached as translations of the programme’s ground realities into development’s dominant discourses. In this sense, they are not simply records of decisions made over the programme’s lifespan, or even independent appraisals of its success and failures. They are insights into how particular actors wished it to be represented. To add another perspective, a study into the programme’s impact commissioned by DFID is also discussed. The chapter ends by further introducing the sub-national contexts within which the citizens’ groups selected for fieldwork resided.

STAEP’s aims and structure

Although STAEP ran from 2011-2014, its roots lie in the political atmosphere of 2009. As noted in Chapter Five, General Musharraf had recently stepped down and national elections had been held following mass protests. There was also talk of constitutional amendments to devolve power to the local level. Many donors were excited about the new possibilities under democracy. However, they were also looking for ways to respond to a recently defeated insurgency by the Pakistani Taliban that their governments worried threatened the country’s overall stability, including its ability to act as an ally for the West’s ongoing war in neighbouring Afghanistan. Research to identify possible uses for a pool of emergency donor funding found that poor citizen-state relations and the performance of state institutions were a major underlying
cause of the unrest (GoP, 2010). Accordingly, many donors sought ways of strengthening this compact, included through empowering citizens to hold authorities accountable for the delivery of basic services.

Leading up to 2008’s elections, DFID, the Embassy of the Netherlands, the Canadian International Development Agency and the Swiss Agency for International Development had all been funding and working with Pakistan’s Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) to deploy monitors to polling booths and increase voter turnout. FAFEN had been established in 2006 with support from The Asia Foundation (TAF) - an American led international non-governmental organisation with a long presence in Pakistan - and the British Council.\(^\text{122}\) It originally comprised of a network of 30 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from across the country, with a central coordinating secretariat in Islamabad staffed by a core group of development professionals with backgrounds in journalism and activism. For example, before working for FAFEN, one of its senior staff members had transitioned from journalism to helping small farmers’ associations to advocate for their land rights. Another had experience of working for a regional human rights network, domestic women’s organisations with roots in the 1990s’ proliferation of NGOs, and well-known international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) operating in Pakistan.\(^\text{123}\)

In 2011, DFID funded TAF and FAFEN to increase and expand on the latter’s core activities under the new umbrella of STAEP. Running from 2011-14 with a budget of £11.6 million, STAEP portrayed itself as an elections monitoring, and voice and accountability programme.\(^\text{124}\) It had the broad stated target of ‘More effective, transparent, and accountable governance that addresses the critical challenges facing Pakistan today’, which it hoped would lead to ‘Democratic processes in Pakistan that are more open, inclusive, efficient and accountable to citizens’ (TAF, 2011). Running through much of STAEP’s documentation is the idea of increasing trust between

\(^\text{122}\) For more information see: http://fafen.org/ (Accessed 12/05/17)
\(^\text{123}\) See Chapter Five for more on the centrality of women’s NGOs to professional civil society in Pakistan.
\(^\text{124}\) Here I use DFID’s timescale, however, on the ground many FAFEN staff speak of STAEP as if it had been running since 2009 when the Dutch still funded many of the network’s activities.
citizens and the state, which initially was to be achieved through five overlapping outputs:

Output 1: Citizens’ groups monitor performance of elected representatives and public institutions, and raise demands which are increasingly met.

Output 2: Elections are better managed and more inclusive and peaceful, and political parties are better organised and more responsive to citizens.

Output 3: Disenfranchised groups and religious leaders are increasingly engaged in civic affairs and political parties.

Output 4: Media reporting is more balanced, and has greater outreach and use of communication maximised.

Output 5: FAFEN organisations and associates have increased capacity to monitor governance issues, manage systems and accounts, access new funding, and have improved credibility.

Although this thesis is mostly concerned with the first output, it is notable that the second largely represents a continuation of FAFEN’s previous work and the fifth a continuation of TAF’s. Indeed, in 2011 FAFEN enjoyed a good reputation among donors as a credible and independent voice, able to monitor elections, to contribute to the public discourse on Pakistan’s return to democracy, and to engage civil society in difficult to reach areas of the country. Many were, therefore, keen to find ways of continuing to see it flourish. Furthermore, it is arguable that STAEP’s focus on advocacy was a natural fit for FAFEN’s expanding staff of long-time political activists, journalists, lawyers and social science graduates. Accordingly, TAF was tasked with continuing to build FAFEN’s secretariat and its network members’ capacities to conform to Western donors’ professional standards and norms. TAF also acted as the
financial hub for STAEP, receiving and dispersing DFID’s funding. In this sense, STAEP represents both the endorsement of FAFEN by a powerful international donor and an effort to further bring it into line with its evolving priorities.

It is notable that members of both TAF and FAFEN’s leadership felt that the programme’s aims were the product of a mutual understanding between themselves, a key supporter within DIFD’s Pakistan office and another from its British headquarters. Together, they carved out a vision for STAEP that sought to advance Pakistan’s turn to democracy and put accountability at its heart. As one of them put it:

‘There was this understanding about democracy, especially among people who had been in Pakistan for a while, that if you want to do anything that isn’t just about making elections all squeaky clean, that its, you know, about helping people to understand that government is there to serve them. And helping people to understand what legitimate claims they have on government. How to go about identifying who can help them and how to hold them to account. You know, at the local level, there isn’t much engagement with the state’. 125

Indeed, it was repeatedly stressed during interviews that a few key personalities pushed the programme’s focus on the realisation of substantive democracy through voluntarism. Moreover, it was argued that such an approach was little understood outside of this group and had rarely been tried in Pakistan. In this sense, from its inception STAEP was considered experimental.

DFID often referred to the large programme as a ‘partnership’. In practice, this meant that TAF was paid based on the achievement of measurable results that it had pre-

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125 Senior NGO Staff Member 3 24.08.15
agreed with DFID. Whilst FAFEN was paid by TAF on its achievements of its own pre-agreed milestones. This required that both implementing partners demonstrate STAEP’s impact on a regular basis, effectively instituting a structure that passed responsibilities for activities and outputs down to FAFEN and the NGOs within its network, and for reporting on the programme’s progress upwards through FAFEN’s network and eventually to TAF. The final programme was rumoured to be the largest ‘accountable grant’ of this kind in DFID’s history.

To increase the department’s own accountability, since 2011 DFID has routinely published annual reviews online.126 These documents detail a programme’s costs, and its progress towards agreed upon milestones and targets. They also contain narrative elements detailing observations from evaluators and their recommendations. Programmes are scored both during and after their implementation. They are ranked from ‘A++’, through ‘A+’, ‘A’, ‘B’ and to ‘C’. Those meeting expectations will score an ‘A’ grade (DFID, 2011b). Whilst those consistently scoring low will be put under special measures and regularly probed or audited by DFID. Annual reviews are usually carried out by consultants hired for their expertise on the issue areas under study. Often DFID makes efforts to contract those from the country in which the programme is being implemented.

A recent analysis of 600 randomly selected reviews found that during their implementation programmes are more likely to be scored A grades and less likely to be scored high or low grades.127 The study’s author speculated that this may be due to fear of the implications of extreme scores. It also found there is substantial grade inflation over time. Indeed, if current trends continue by 2018 95% of DFID’s completed programmes will consistently receive an A or higher. Casting doubt over the goals of the review process, the author further suggested that this might be because as they progress programmes’ get better at setting annual targets they can meet.

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126 See https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/
127 Aidleap ‘I analysed 600 of DFID’s Annual Reviews. Here’s what I found’ Aid Leap, 4th March 2017. (Accessed 22/05/17)
DFID’s annual reviews, therefore, cannot be easily treated as apolitical representations of a programme’s ground realities. Rather, at least in part, they should be approached as representations or, in Mosse’s (2005) framing, ‘translations’ of programme’s experiences into development’s dominant discourses and needs. Indeed, they are carried out by the sector’s ‘brokers’. Thus, they are designed to achieve the purpose of justifying, albeit often with recommended modifications, a programme’s practices. The following section adopts such a lens to examine STAEP’s annual reviews.

Exploring STAEP through annual reviews

STAEP aimed to use its inception phase to build a cadre of motivated and skilled citizen activists at constituency level that would enliven anticipated local elections. To do this, NGOs within FAFEN’s network recruited volunteers for constituency relations groups (CRGs). Despite their name, they were never intended to be representative of the make-up of constituencies, some of which had over half a million inhabitants and stretch across vast geographical areas. Instead, the mentoring NGOs were largely given a free hand in their original compositions, with many of the CRGs’ founding members having already worked with the NGOs on various projects. The only major stipulation was that they encompassed locally influential citizens, able to get things done, whilst avoiding people with overt political allegiances. To assure this, participants were often made to sign declarations of their independence and commitment to the programme’s values.

Over the course of 2011, however, it became apparent that the local elections were bogged down in political-infighting and unlikely to be held anytime soon. Thus, in consultation with DFID, STAEP’s leadership focussed the CRGs on social accountability, which was operationalised as identifying citizens’ demands and bringing them to the attention of frontline service providers, state authorities and, when necessary, elected representatives. To support this, TAF and staff from within
FAFEN’s network of NGOs mentored the CRGs and provided them with trainings in the skills of activists. This included how to consult their wider communities, lessons on the responsibilities of different governance institutions, engaging the media and procedures for getting the attention of authorities. The latter focussed on letter writing, registering formal complaints and meeting authorities. Theoretically, these are activities that any citizen can engage in. STAEP also intended that the CRGs’ advocacy efforts would be enhanced by governance monitoring data on the performance of local service providing institutions that was to be collected by FAFEN’s member NGOs and, eventually, the CRG members themselves.

The mentoring NGOs were tasked with monitoring the CRGs’ activities and, when needed, helping them. It was assumed that eventually their members would have the ability to engage frontline service providers, such as teachers or bureaucrats, themselves. Furthermore, they would form working relationships with them and their political masters, such as members of the provincial and national assemblies. Eventually, at an undefined time, it was presumed that the NGOs would be able to step-back and groups would essentially be sustainable beyond the programme’s life-span.

The majority of CRGs had around 25 to 40 registered members at any given moment. For the most part, they were given a free reign to demand what they wished. Over the course of the programme, they identified 45,974 citizens’ demands, of which 26,214 were – in the language of the annual reviews – deemed to have been ‘met’. These demands included everything from fixing overflowing sewage pipes and erecting new school walls, to resolving local cases of land grabbing, improving security in public areas and establishing women’s desks in police stations. On occasion, they would also focus on procedural issues such as the issuing of national identification cards, the payment of state employees or the implementation of right to information laws. Nonetheless, the first annual review in late 2011 revealed that the volunteers were more interested in local problems than district, provincial or national level issues (DFID, 2011c). Moreover, they preferred the resolution of tangible problems as opposed to issues of political or bureaucratic process.
The first annual review is also notable for a number of other reasons (DFID, 2011d). Firstly, the reviewing consultants – the sector’s ‘brokers’ – recommended that STAEP redevelop or abandon outputs three and four as their rationales for inclusion were deemed unclear and progress towards them slow. Secondly, they identified that the information generated by the governance monitoring initiative was not being used by the CRGs to lobby authorities. Thirdly, although they acknowledged that the CRGs were never intended to be representative, they expressed concern that they were not doing enough to include women and members of marginalised groups, such as transgender people or religious minorities.

Most importantly for our purposes, however, there is a significant difference between a draft of the first annual review I obtained and the final review publicly available online. In a number of places, the draft highlighted the tension between the CRGs’ efforts to direct politicians’ discretionary development budgets towards identified local issues and the nature of Pakistan’s clientelistic politics. A small section devoted to this issue was entitled: ‘Implied endorsement of patronage-based system of governance’ (DFID, 2011:19). It argued that programme staff and the CRGs’ members regarded these budgets as legitimate targets for advocacy efforts and the resolution of local issues important achievements. But it warned that such successes may simply denote the continuation and tacit endorsement of Pakistan’s clientelistic politics. Moreover, with respect to the attribution and value of resolved demands, the reviewers’ worried that the programme did not adequately acknowledge that at a local level the CRGs’ gains implies ‘someone else’s loss’ (ibid:3). Put another way, with respect to the allocation of district’s meagre development budgets, the CRGs were entering into a zero-sum game. In the final, public version of the first annual review, however, there is no mention of these tensions.

Intrigued by this I interviewed two of the consultants responsible for authoring the review.\textsuperscript{128} Although they could not remember the exact reasons as to why these concerns were removed from the final publication, they both shed light on how

\textsuperscript{128} Consultant 1 interviewed 18.08.17, Consultant 2 interviewed 23.08.17.
annual reviews are produced. They suggested that, in this case, they were given a free hand to interrogate the programme however they saw fit and effectively told not to hold back. Nonetheless, it was argued that the construction of annual reviews is always a negotiation between consultants and their clients, which in this case was TAF and ultimately DFID. Moreover, the onus is often on providing something constructive, rather than completely undermining the premise of an ongoing programme. This accords with my approach to annual reviews as representations or translations of programme’s experiences on the ground into development’s dominant discourses.

In both the draft and public versions of STAEP’s first annual review the consultants framed many of the problems they had identified as an outcome of FAFEN’s rapid expansion in size and activities. As part of this, they suggested that it had not adequately socialised its members into its new focus on substantive democratic governance processes and that they were still mostly devoted to its long-running (and still ongoing) concentration on electoral procedures. Accordingly, they recommended that further trainings for FAFEN’s members be undertaken. This was to be combined with efforts to include members of marginalised communities, especially women, in the CRGs and a rethink of the STAEP’s internal ratings for the successful resolution of different types of issues through their activism. Overall, the first annual review scored STAEP a ‘B’ on DFID’s programme rating scale.

By the second review in late 2012, STAEP had dropped outputs three and four, redoubled its efforts around the CRGs’ trainings, and devoted more resources to capacity building FAFEN’s network (DFID, 2012). The review was also positive about new efforts to include members of marginalised groups and it praised a collection of success stories that suggested some CRGs were lobbying for the resolution of demands that would bring benefits to wide sections of their communities (TAF, 2013a). It is also notable that the end of programme targets for the CRGs’

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129 The referenced draft of STAEP’s first annual review was given to the author by STAEP staff during the initial study carried out in 2014, but the differences were not noticed until July 2017.
identification, raising and the meeting of demands had already been met by this point.

In terms of recommendations, STAEP was encouraged by the new reviewers to provide further trainings for CRG members, to find alternative ways of using the governance monitoring data it generated, and to begin to think of ways of sustaining the CRGs beyond the programme’s lifespan. Nonetheless, concerns were expressed that STAEP had still to articulate a ‘vision’ for the CRGs and that it did not have data to show how their activities contribute to improvements in democratic processes (ibid:6, 23). Overall STAEP scored an A.

Similar concerns were expressed within a mid-term review conducted later that year (DFID, 2012). The reviewing team described the CRGs’ emerging focus on resolving local service delivery issues, as opposed to larger governance process issues, as ‘depoliticised activism’ (ibid:17). Although they praised the likely positive impact of some of the issues the CRGs were resolving on local communities, they felt that both the CRGs and their mentoring NGOs were not working on improving the processes that had led to the issues in the first place. They suggested that this was likely the result of the trainings given to both the CRGs and the NGO, and also to the latter’s desire for ‘quick wins’ (ibid:16).\footnote{130}

By the end of 2013, however, the third review’s single consultant appeared to feel that there was a clearly defined rationale for the CRGs’ local focus and held up their activities as an example of STAEP’s value for money.\footnote{131} With respect to the former, the CRGs were portrayed as a ‘new type of popular institution’ that operate ‘quite differently’ from other NGO supported community organisations in Pakistan that pay members (DFID, 2014:23). Furthermore, the reviewer argued that they enable local communities to engage in ‘democratic discourse’, and suggested that ‘their very activism and voluntaristic drive against a background of acute need and weak state

\footnote{130} Interestingly, a text box within this review quoted a man as saying that he, like his fellow community members, would want the CRG to work towards blasphemy laws and direct elections (DFID, 2012:14). However, he was not a CRG member and had not heard of it before meeting the consultant that interviewed him.

\footnote{131} In contrast to the others which had two or more consultants.
institutions has led to astonishing successes in raising demands, facilitating CNICs and voter registration’ (ibid:8).\(^{132}\) It was also shown how the cost of raising and resolving the CRGs’ demands had steadily decreased as the programme matured and, presumably, the CRGs gained in confidence and skill as activists.

Nonetheless, it was noted that the CRGs were neither horizontally networked with one another or vertically linked to other civil society organisations (ibid:19). This, it was argued, kept them focussed on local issues. The need to build and to link the CRGs to new bodies at the district and provincial level that could communicate their demands upwards, and to mobilise their members to stand in the anticipated local elections justified an eight-month extension phase until September 2014. Overall STAEP scored an A+.

STAEP’s completion report served as both a celebration of the programme and a chance to draw lessons (DFID, 2014a). As before, the voluntarism of the roughly 10,000 people that participated in CRGs was held up as a significant achievement. Moreover, with each of the 45,974 raised demands costing £75, the reviewer was happy to report that this was about half of what the programme had originally expected (ibid:2). Much was also made of STAEP’s efforts to encourage CRG members to use ‘right to information’ legislation to uncover information on state institutions and the spill-over effects this would have on their performance.\(^{133}\) The authors declared:

‘STAEP has ushered in a new dynamism in citizens’ action at the local level, introducing the unique idea of research-based advocacy for improved governance by strengthening the culture of accountability and transparency at the lowest tier of administration responsible for the

\(^{132}\) Although not a focus of this thesis, helping marginalised groups, such as women and transgender people, to register for Computerized National Identity Cards (CNICs) that allow them to access some important public services and vote was a major component of STAEP. It built on FAFEN’s identification of almost 8 million missing women from electoral rolls and was widely praised within all the annual reviews.

\(^{133}\) These requests can be made to all federal institutions by interested citizens and are in the process of being instituted at the provincial level.
delivery of most public services. STAEP has enabled citizens through mobilisation and intensive training to develop direct engagements with the state, as opposed to seeking services through social and political intermediaries, which is the traditional model that has inhibited any culture of public accountability. The demands met as a result of this drive to mobilise citizens shows that the services being demanded carry some significant benefits for a wider range of people.’ (Ibid:5)

The report argued that many of the CRGs successes arose due to members who are also active in other civil society organisations within their localities. It also argued that greater synergies between the CRGs and other local associations, such as trade unions and professional bodies, helped some to move away from a pure focus on local issues and towards national level issues. Turning to the numbers underpinning the CRGs’ activities, the programme found that the demands raised and met by authorities increased year-on-year (ibid:8). As before, this was interpreted as evidence that the CRGs’ were gaining in their abilities as activists. However, it was found that the number of their demands debated in the provincial and national assemblies by politicians was consistently below expectations. They also declined sharply in the run-up to the 2013’s general election. This was attributed to the assemblies meeting infrequently in this period. Nonetheless, the review was clear that this did not affect the overall positive assessment of Output One as both the number and low costs of demands raised, and citizens mobilised, far exceeded the programme’s expectations.

In terms of how things should be done differently in future programmes, it was suggested a focus on socially excluded groups should begin from the start and that youth should be engaged through new social media tools. It was also recommended that regular induction sessions be conducted for new CRG members as groups were found to have a high volunteer turnover rate (80 percent), with many inactive members (40%). Nonetheless, it was noted that FAFEN’s CEO expressed reservations
about the inclusion of marginalised groups within the CRGs, arguing that they would reduce their effectiveness (ibid:9).

As it is key to understanding how power worked within the programme, it is also worth briefly commenting on the completion report’s assessment of Output Three. It focussed on ensuring that FAFEN and its network members had the systems and skills with which to monitor governance issues, manage accounts, access new sources of funding after the programme’s end and improve their credibility. It found that the expectations for the Output had broadly been met. FAFEN’s continuing credibility and its attraction of new sources of funding was praised. And it was declared that they had made the transition from a single purpose organisation to a broad network focused on democratic governance.

The report was less upbeat about FAFEN secretariat’s relations with the NGOs in its network, arguing that there was little feedback from one to another and that the prospects of some of the NGOs’ continuing to operate past STAEP’s lifespan was in doubt. It was also suggested that those outside of FAFEN often did not know that it was a network rather than a single organisation. Nonetheless, it was concluded that the three-way partnership between DFID, TAF and FAFEN had worked well, with TAF able to take swift disciplinary action when FAFEN members were found wanting - such as for financial irregularities - and to ensure value for money through capacity building efforts.

In September 2014, an impact evaluation of DFID’s electoral programmes in Pakistan, which included STAEP, was published (Balagamwala and Gazdar, 2014b). It used a combination of quantitative analysis and qualitative research. The organisation that carried it out was also responsible for STAEP’s first annual review. Although much of the impact report focused on the programme’s contribution to increasing voter turnout in 2013’s elections, it is also interesting for three reasons directly related to the wider activities of the CRGs:
Firstly, the authors again mentioned STAEP’s implied endorsement of Pakistan’s clientelistic politics raised in the unreleased draft of the first annual review. Although they argued that clientelism far from defines all of Pakistan’s political allegiances, they suggested that it remains an issue. Indeed, they found that it was often used in combination with considerations of kinship and identity by voting bloc members in 2013’s elections. However, they did not assess whether the CRGs challenged clientelistic behaviour or strengthened it through their pursuit of elected representatives’ discretionary funds.

Secondly, the evaluation suggested that the NGOs within FAFEN’s network ‘were predisposed towards creating CRGs which would undertake lobbying for local public goods’, as opposed to focusing on wider issues democratic procedures (ibid:38). They argued this was because many of them were already established within Pakistan’s ‘development sector’ before becoming part of STAEP. But they did not say how this could be avoided.

Lastly, the evaluation suggested that the CRGs may have contributed to a ‘strengthened democracy’ in three ways: increasing the range of voluntary citizens’ associations, citizens’ participation in voluntary public activities, and women’s participation in public life (ibid:29). However, beyond commenting on the problems with the CRGs’ inclusion of marginalised groups, especially women, it did not investigate these possibilities in any depth.134 As the report suggested, this may be because STAEP did not know it would be evaluated against such measures so therefore there was insufficient programmatic data (ibid:38).135 This left these potentially major contributions of the CRGs underexplored.

Although this section has reintroduced readers to the STAEP programme and overviewed its official, public history, it has arguably raised more questions than it answered. Most importantly, why if there were concerns about the CRGs’ activities

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134 The evaluators studied eight constituencies, interviewing at least one CRG member in each. For further details see - (Balagamwala and Gazdar, 2014a)
135 The evaluation used the ‘free and fair elections’ and ‘political participation’ scores in the IDEA framework for assessing democracy (PILDAT, 2012).
from the very beginning of the programme were they largely left unaddressed? Furthermore, why did the programme’s evaluators and implementers seem to be working to different aims? Before attempting to answer some of these questions through an exploration of how the programme played out on the ground, the chapter further introduces readers to the sub-national contexts within which the studied CRGs operated.

The Punjab

Within Pakistan’s federal system, the province (e.g. the Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh etc.) is the first subnational level of governance. Provinces comprise of numerous districts. Within each district are numerous tehsils (sub-districts containing many villages or urban neighbourhoods). Below the tehsils are union councils (the state’s lowest level of administration).

Should the promised local elections have been held in 2014, union councils (called ‘municipal councils’ in urban areas), with reserved seats for women, workers, youth and minorities, would have been the focus of the CRGs’ demand raising activities. Furthermore, unlike under military regimes, these councils would have been elected on a party basis, thereby, linking them directly to provincial and national level policymakers. Theoretically, this would have given the CRGs additional opportunities to have their issues communicated up Pakistan’s governance architecture.

However, arguments over the devolution of funding and responsibilities, and the delimitations of constituencies and compositions of local councils delayed the establishment of local government in the Punjab until 2015. Thus, for STAEP’s duration the CRGs’ members were, at least in official programmatic representations of their activities, focused upon engaging frontline service providers, municipal and

136 It is important to note that despite reviewing some of these documents for my initial study of STAEP, it is only after fieldwork for this thesis that I realised the full extent of some of their implications.
district officials. As outlined in Chapter Four, this is what the World Bank calls the ‘short route’ to accountability (WB, 2003). As we shall see in the next two chapters, however, such engagements were only a small part of how they resolved demands. To prepare for this, further context is added to the research sites below.
Figure 6: Map of Punjab, Research Locations

Source: Modified from World Food Programme

Gujrat District

The two active CRGs selected for study in Gujrat District in Northern Punjab were hypothetically located in a context more conducive to activism. Most notably, of the 122 analysed constituencies, those within Gujrat were within the ten with the lowest multidimensional poverty scores.

Members in the urban CRG mostly resided in Gujrat city. Located on the Grand Trunk (GT) Road, it lies between the Chenab and Jhelum rivers. They have long made the region a hub of agricultural activity, including during the colonial era in which nearby Jhelum was made into a canal colony. Nonetheless, the city is also famous for pottery and woollen shawls, and has rapidly grown since the 1970s with large commercial neighbourhoods of small industrial manufacturing businesses (e.g. metal work and machine parts). Although the last census in 1998 suggested it had a population of just under 3 million, this figure is likely to have increased.

Participants within the rural CRG either lived in or around the town of Kharian. Located roughly 25 kilometres north of Gujrat on the GT Road, it is known for its large military cantonment (a base with family accommodation). Kharian is undoubtedly what Qadeer (2000) refers to as one of South Asia’s ‘ruralopolises’. Indeed, it comprises of tightly packed settlements located either side of the GT Road and is home to a variety of businesses that support the agricultural sector. It is also popularly known as a wealthy area, having benefitted from both the Green Revolution and many economic migrants’ remittances. Kharian’s wider tehsil (administrative unit below the district level) recorded a population of around 80,000 in the 1998 census.

The bulk of the two CRGs’ activities were conducted before 2013’s elections. During this period, two of Gujrat district’s four members of the national assembly (MNAs) belonged to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), one to the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) and one to the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam Group (PML-Q); a party created by local elites to lend legitimacy to Musharraf’s 1999 coup. As a famous journalist put it, however, local politics is really about ‘Jat vs Gujjar, and
Chaudhry vs anti-Chaudhry’ rivalries. The latter pairing refers to old, aristocratic landowning families, popularly called Chaudhries, with considerable estates and those, often from newer money, that oppose them. The dichotomy between Jats and Gujjars roughly equates with biraderis that have members that own medium to small plots of land, and those that work on it or own small businesses.

This does not mean that the district’s politics is predictable. Rather, politicians regularly switch political parties, often taking their biraderis with them. Many of my interviewees also suggested that Gujrat’s politicians must work hard for their votes. This requires that they deliver local development projects, government jobs and that they intervene in potentially destabilizing disputes. Participants also argued that Gujrat city’s relatively recent expansion means that amongst the elite everyone knows everyone. This requires politicians to be regular attendees at local leaders’ funerals and marriages. Although such sentiments probably unrealistically exceptionalise Gujrati politics, they were another way of saying that local leaders have not completely lost touch with the needs of their followers. Cross-cutting religious identities have also become more salient as sectarianism has created another fracture in recent years (Zaman, 1998; Nelson, 2016).

**Multan District**

The particularly active CRGs selected for study in Southern Punjab were in constituencies located within Multan district that is hypothetically less conducive to activism. Indeed, they were within the worst 40 for multidimensional poverty scores and the worst 50 for land inequality scores.

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139 Confusingly, however, many of those that had more recently come into money through means other than land also took on the name Chaudhry, putting it above their shops or on their business cards. Chaudhry is also often used as an insult for someone that acts as though they have local influence or wealth, but who are really considered to be social climbers.
140 Within this rivalry’s contemporary manifestation other biraderis are also subsumed, such as the Arians and Butts (also described as landowners), Rehemanis (originally potters) and Ansaris (urban businessmen).
Whereas Gujrat’s political dynasties are based on a mixture of land ownership, patronage from military regimes and a newer class of businessmen, in Multan old, rich landowning families have dominated. Furthermore, many of them combine their political personas with statuses as Makhdooms (descendants of saints) (Epping, 2013). As with the Qureshis and Hashimis, these families symbolically perform their lineage through the maintenance of large shrines to their ancestors. The shrines are places of pilgrimage for thousands of worshippers every day, some of which are fed as a form of religious charitable giving. Although this is said to give them relatively stable vote banks, Multan’s political ‘shrine families’ must also assure their followings are converted to votes through patronage in the form of money, government jobs, development projects and services. Indeed, most people I spoke to talked fondly of a local politicians’ recent efforts to build numerous flyovers and a metro service across the city.

In the 1970s, Multan district was a hotbed of support for the PPP’s rise to power. 141 Although many of the locals I met only had a vague idea of the socialist ideology that animated that era, they often still talked of Bhutto with reverence. Furthermore, some also added that they, as saraikis (ethnolinguistic group found in southern Punjab), could never support politicians from what they saw as northern Punjabi parties, such as the PML-N. Whilst sincere, these allegiances did not bear fruit in 2013’s elections after which the PPP went from holding three of the district’s six national assembly seats to none. Furthermore, the election ushered in two Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) MNAs, one of which was former PPP politician, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, and the other, Abdul Ghaffar Dogar, a new face from a family that had previously supported the PPP. This suggests that during the period that the CRGs’ were most active Multan’s old order was being challenged. 142

This challenge, however, cannot easily be taken as an indication of the break-down of clientelistic networks. Instead, the general perception of Southern Punjab and the

141 See Chapter Five.
142 Zaidi, B. ‘A Look at Pre-Election Theories from the Comfort of Hindsight, or What Were We Thinking?, Tanqeed, 22nd May 2013. http://tafaddal.tech/tanqeed2/2013/05/a-look-at-pre-election-theories-from-the-comfort-of-hindsight-or-what-were-we-thinking-bushra-zaidis-blog-elections-2013/ (Accessed 03.05.16).
neighbouring province of Sindh is that they largely remain in the grip of large landed families (with the exception of Karachi). Alongside their aforementioned religious followings and patronage, these families gain votes from the thousands of dependents they employ as daily wage labourers, those that live on their land and those that have outstanding inter-generational debts with them (Martin, 2009). For these dependents, landlords are often their only route of access to state institutions, loans or informal dispute resolution mechanisms.\textsuperscript{143}

Members of Multan’s urban CRG were mostly located in and around a dense neighbourhood on the outskirts of the city known for its Bihari community. Biharis are Urdu speakers that migrated to Pakistan following partition in 1947 and again in 1971 following Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan. The first wave has established businesses and joined the civil service, whilst the latter are often said to have struggled to settle or climb out of the lower-classes due to the state’s reluctance to take them. As we shall see in the following chapters, there was tensions between these two groups of migrants. The members of the rural CRG were spread across a vast – over 50km – area containing many difficult to reach villages dotted along the district’s canals. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most active members lived in settlements closer to Multan city.

In sum, the two Punjabi regions are both popularly considered to be in the grip clientelistic politics. However, they are divided by their levels of poverty and the dependencies of their lower-classes. Furthermore, Multan’s politics is characterised by the opposing legacies of class-based mobilisations and the continuing influence of landed power buttressed by religious followings. Whereas Gujrat’s concerns a mixture of local enmities between small land and business owners, and what happens in Islamabad (Pakistan’s capital) and Lahore (the Punjab’s capital). Broadly, therefore, it could be further hypothesized that Multan is closer to older forms of

\textsuperscript{143} During my research, I was generously hosted on the estate of one of Multan’s political shrine families. Every morning I would awake to the sound of large groups of men petitioning the landlord’s right-hand man to resolve their issues under a large tree outside my bedroom window. These debates would extend into the night, with both sides periodically fed. The landlord or members of his family would only appear to greet particularly important petitioners or to intervene in seemingly intractable pursuits. Fortunately, my research was not located in areas under their influence.
clientelism based on personnel relationships, long-standing allegiances and dependencies, whilst Gujrat is representative of the more transactional new form of clientelism found in young capitalist democracies described in Chapter Five.

Conclusion

This chapter reintroduced readers to STAEP. This was done through a reading of its publicly available annual review documents from 2011 to 2015. These texts were approached as translations of the programme’s ground realities into development’s dominant discourses. In this sense, they were not simply treated as records of decisions made over the programme’s lifespan, or even independent appraisals of its success and failures. They were analysed as insights into how particular actors wished the programme to be represented as it evolved. This uncovered a tension between the programme’s aim of improving democratic processes in Pakistan and the CRGs’ focus on resolving tangible development problems within their members’ immediate localities. Nonetheless, as the programme progressed these doubts about the purpose of the CRGs were gradually replaced with praise for their inclusivity and their value for money. To add another perspective, a study into the programme’s impact commissioned by DFID was also discussed. It continued to highlight the tensions addressed within the early reviews, but ultimately appeared to hold the programme to outcomes it was not designed to fulfil. The chapter concluded by further introducing the sub-national contexts within which the CRGs selected for study operated.
Chapter Eight

Getting Things Done

‘I am not an ordinary man and since I belong to the business community, as the president, I have to stay in touch with all these people. They also know that if they refuse something that I say, it can result in strikes in front of their offices or we could go to DPO or file a complaint against them. This is the reason they give respect to me. If I was an ordinary person, they would pay no heed to whatever I have to say.’

(Chaudhry Jahanzaib Derawal, CRG Member)\(^1\)

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This chapter begins to explore the practice of social accountability through the Supporting Transparency Accountability and Electoral Process (STAEP) programme. It shows how the programme’s Constituency Relations Groups (CRGs) generally functioned with most of their activities undertaken by a core group of wealthier and educated volunteers. For them, social accountability involved pooling their pre-existing identities in attempts to access, pressure and form relationships with authorities. It had little to do with the sanctioning power of information. To increase their potentials and make them known to local authorities, some members also sought to institutionalise their CRGs as local associations distinct from their individual identities. However, I argue that such ambitions were ultimately unsuited to the programme’s projectized vision of civil society mobilisation. Through three vignettes, I then reveal how some of the groups’ most elite members used their privileged positions within political networks to secure some of the CRGs’ most prestigious successes. However, these actions were often undertaken in private, out of sight of both their fellow programme participants and the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) mentoring them. This gave them opportunities to further legitimise their roles as local leaders and to augment their power by appropriating their colleagues’

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\(^1\) Chaudhry Jahanzaib Derawal, male, 40-50, member rural Gujrat (29/03/2015 & 17/06/2015).
efforts. Thus, I argue that through their involvement, the studied CRGs often came to reflect the clientelistic politics that characterises much of Pakistan.

Elites and elite interviewing

To aid this chapter’s analysis of how the CRGs functioned, I draw on Chapter Two’s discussion of social capital. There it was shown that the idea was embraced by powerful donor organisations’ in the 1990s. Critics argued, however, that they decontextualized and depoliticised the concept to position it as the ‘missing link’ in development (Harriss and Renzo, 1997; Fine, 2010b). To reverse these trends, many have since focussed on Bourdieu’s (1977, 1986) older, more complex vision (Bebbington, 2007; Coburn, 2011; Baiocchi et al., 2011). For them, social capital allows individuals and groups to draw upon the cultural (education and skills), economic (material resources) and political (mobilizable followers) capitals of those they have durable or institutionalised relationships with. I follow them by showing how the CRGs’ members used their reserves of various types of capitals to access authorities and resolve local issues. In the case of elites, I argue that this did not advance Pakistan’s wider democratising project.

Before beginning, it is also necessary to explain what I mean by elites. I build upon Woods’ (1998) argument that elites possess the following characteristics: privileged access to or control over resources, links to one another through, often purposively obscured, networks of social and professional relations, and that they are discursively constructed as elites by themselves or others. I pair these characteristics with Bourdieu’s capitals, allowing research participants to be further understood as social, cultural, economic and political elites, or as a mixture of these (Musgrave and Wong, 2016). This focuses my analysis on how they maintain, use and build upon their advantages through different activities and for different ends.
Lastly, a note on interviewing STAEP’s elites. Broadly, I agree with Smith’s (2006) argument that the challenges of ‘interviewing up’ are likely to be contextually specific. As alluded to in Chapter Six, many of my elite interviewees initially viewed me as connected to centres of power, such as national level NGOs or the Department for International Development’s (DFID) country office. Thus, depending on their interests, I was variously considered a threat or a possible source of future opportunities. To address this, I would inform them that the thesis would be publicly available, and all were told that their identities and affiliations would be an anonymised.

Two other factors shaped my interviews: Firstly, STAEP required its participants to commit to not working in the interest of political parties. Secondly, as the anthropological literature documents, Pakistan’s local leaders often seek to cultivate images as apolitical men of modest means (Lyon, 2002; Werbner, 2015; Martin, 2015a). These factors made some elite interviewees hesitant to link their statuses and advantages to their voluntary roles as CRG members. As mentioned in Chapter Six, for non-elite interviewees I sought to adopt an semi-insider position by discussing my own reasons for undertaking voluntary work. However, for elites this strategy did not suffice, and I often had to conduct multiple interviews. I believe that this gradually disassociated me with their interests. Thus, over time they revealed more about their involvement in the programme and wider society, and the meanings they gave it. To help my interpretations, I also triangulated data from other interviewees.

The CRGs’ activities and compositions

I first explore how the CRGs generally functioned. As shown in Chapter Four, much of the literature describes social accountability as raising citizens’ voices, with the goal of realising their rights, eliciting responsive governance, improving public goods provision and state-society relations (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012). I unpick how the
CRGs’ members went about this, the obstacles and risks they faced, and how they sought to overcome them.

STAEP’s 200 CRGs identified 45,974 citizens’ demands, of which 26,214 were – in the language of the annual reviews – deemed to have been ‘met’. Although ‘met’ was never defined, my own coding of STAEP’s meeting minute database suggest that 122 CRGs had 416 of their raised demands resolved.\footnote{See Chapter Five.} To be considered ‘resolved’, evidence that a demand had been satisfactorily addressed by authorities was sought. This could mean that an explanation as to why it could not be resolved was accepted or something tangible took place, such as the building of a footbridge, the release of funds or an increase in police patrols.

Apart from one outlier, no CRG had more than 14 demands resolved. Yet, their abilities to do this varied greatly, with many resolving none or only 1 or 2 demands. Of the four particularly ‘active’ groups studied for this thesis, all resolved 13 or 14 issues. However, Multan city’s CRG resolved 18 percent of the issues it raised, whilst the others only resolved 4 percent. Across all the studied CRGs, infrastructure, such as roads, street lighting or parks, accounted for around half of the issues they raised. Whilst, usually unresolvable, issues marked as miscellaneous, such as local divorce rates or the poor image of Pakistan in the international press, accounted for just under the other half. Beyond this, the CRGs rarely raised issues of security or health and they did not often use Pakistan’s Right to Information laws. Only Gujrat’s CRGs devoted just under 10% of their raised demands to educational issues, such as missing teachers or poorly equipped schools.

Although the four studied CRGs’ groups waxed and waned, it is possible to broadly characterise them by their most active members: Gujrat’s urban CRG was led by a mixture of businessmen, lawyers, teachers and political party workers. Many had established their own welfare organisations before joining and there was clear cohort from a common biraderi. In contrast, Gujrat’s rural CRG was dominated by the rival heads of two local trade unions and their allies, which included members of their...
unions, teachers, the owner of a prominent community-based organisation (CBO) and an influential currency trader. Within both of Multan’s CRGs former local government Councillors during Musharraf’s era were the most active participants. In the urban CRG these were mostly women with long established relationships. Nonetheless, as explored in the next chapter, the CRG eventually fractured along geographical and identity lines. In contrast, in Mutlan’s rural CRG the former ex-Councillors were mostly men, with the most active located in a union council on the edge of the city. This CRG also had a lot of younger members who were former students of one its senior members.

As covered in Chapter Seven, STAEP was not originally designed to directly empower Pakistan’s marginalised groups, such as labourers, women, non-Muslims and transgenders. Rather, it sought to engage influential locals, training them in the skills of activists and data collectors, and linking them to authorities with responsibilities for service provision. Whilst many of the mentoring NGOs publicly advertised the CRGs’ formation and conducted interviews with applicants, they also drew upon pre-existing relationships with locals they had worked with or employed on other programmes. The informally held theory of change was that these actors would be best placed to identify and raise demands; they merely needed the guidance or ‘trusteeship’ of experts from the world’s wider professional development sector (Cowen and Shenton, 1996).

The CRGs’ activities usually began with all the members, including the marginalised they engaged in the programme’s second year, participating in regular meetings to identify demands to raise with authorities. This would most often be done on the basis of union councils, with votes taken to decide which issues to work on. Although uncovering the hidden power dynamics in these meetings would require a separate study, some interviewees described them as cordial and as giving participants opportunities to talk freely. For example, a young woman told of how she grew in confidence, eventually feeling able to converse with the men and later working for

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146 I attended three of these meetings, but they were organised by the mentoring NGOs as check-ins and trainings. Thus, they were quite different to the bulk of the CRGs’ ad hoc meetings organised by members.
the CRGs’ mentoring NGO. Some also described broader enlightening discussions, such as debating the political role of Pakistan’s military with a retired army officer.

Nonetheless, especially in the rural CRGs, younger members often suggested it was difficult to publicly disagree with their elders. Furthermore, some from marginalised groups said they did not understand why they were in these meetings, what was being discussed or, in a few cases, even what the CRG was for. As a young man that periodically went to rural Gujrat’s CRG meetings declared:

Yes, I was interested but whenever I asked Abby to explain to me the work the CRG was doing she would tell me that “It is just a formality nothing else, you just have to show up to the meeting, spend some time there and go home”.

Questioned about this, staff from the mentoring NGOs argued that they were under pressure to make up the meetings’ numbers due to the CRGs’ high participant dropout rates. The suggestion was that regular members would bring acquaintances along without telling them what was going on. One lady also argued that:

 [...] there were about eight to ten people who were the most active. The rest of the people who came were uneducated and it was harder to explain things to them. The ones who had passed at least their matric [qualification] could understand quicker and easily. Every class of person was involved in CRG, which included illiterate people, transgenders, day labourers. It was very difficult to explain things to these people and I think

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147 Abby Bajwa, female, 30-40, member rural Gujrat and later staff (17/06/2015).
148 Babar Kirmani, 20-30, member rural Gujrat (24/03/2015).
they used to attend two to three meetings but could not grasp the concept of what was being explained so they weren’t very active.\textsuperscript{149}

Within the studied CRGs, therefore, attempts to include those from marginalised groups proved difficult. Indeed, with the notable exception of wealthier women, their involvement in the programme was confined to the identification and debate of demands, and could be described as ‘shallow’ (Kirk, 2014).

**The core groups and the ‘proper procedures’**

Following the identification of demands, a small core active group of six to ten members with the time, means, and skills led advocacy efforts. Skills deemed relevant included an understanding of the chosen issue, the legislation and bureaucratic procedures needed to resolve it, links to the media and confidence.

As trained by the programme, these core groups would begin by pursuing the World Bank’s (2003) ‘short-route to accountability’.\textsuperscript{150} This meant formally putting their demands to frontline service providers and bureaucrats, something they referred as ‘the proper procedures’. Many interviewees described repeated letters, phone calls and attempts to meet authorities in their offices. They also suggested that they often sought to prepare the ground for their advances by creating a buzz around issues through newspaper articles:

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\textsuperscript{149} Ayesha Nanda, 30-40, member and staff rural Gujrat (17/06/2015).

\textsuperscript{150} See Chapter Four.
When it’s published in the newspaper, pressure is built up. Even if they [authorities] don’t respond, at least they behave properly. Whether or not they solve the problem, at least they meet you on time.\footnote{Ayesha Nanda, 30-40, member and staff rural Gujrat (17/06/2015).}

This work was usually carried out by the mentoring NGOs and educated members that could not attend meetings with authorities for economic or cultural reasons, such as a lack of money for transportation or purdah [Islamic seclusion of women]. Although mundane and often frustrating, some saw it as a valuable learning experience. For example, a young female that joined the CRG with an older relative argued that:

\begin{quote}
It was a really good experience for me, I learnt a lot from the CRG members. I learnt a lot from them as they inspired and motivated me to work for the society. Previously, I was just running after a job but then after I started working here, I realized that it is good for me. I wrote many letters, made calls, wrote articles.\footnote{Abby Bajwa, female, 30-40, member rural Gujrat (17/06/2015)}
\end{quote}

Later she added that she now knew that authorities often had to be ‘shocked’ into action through media coverage.

Despite the help of the mentoring NGOs, the proper procedures often failed to secure meetings or pry information from institutions. When this happened the CRGs generally turned to members with active relationships with relevant authorities. The closer and more personal the relationship the better. As an older, male member of
northern Punjab’s rural CRG explained:

The Free and Fair Election Network [FAFEN] and the CFCB [Centre for Capacity Building – the local NGO mentoring the CRG] organized a programme here in a Kharian. They explained the basic aim of the work they were planning on doing. I told them that no one would let you do anything like this here. Unless there is an identity that people can associate with. If I want to go find out crime rates at the police station or records of the hospital, they won’t give it to me. They will abuse me. Same with rates at the market - you only find out the real rate of things when you bargain and buy something. I told them they won’t be successful. Without contacts or relationships, you can’t do any of this. After I pointed out all of these things they started having monthly meetings. Members from FAFEN or the CFCB would come to me and I would help them with hospital visits or other department visits. I had an identity in the area.153

A younger member that went on to work for the mentoring NGO also suggested that the strategy was often to use personal connections:

When I joined CRG, the CFCB was also looking for such people who had access to information that could only come from being a certain political party worker. This was a strategy CFCB was using because if they did not do this, it would become really difficult to get the issues heard and resolved. You need to have an inside person to get things running. Every

153 Jahanzaib Derawal, male, 40-50, member rural Gujrat (29/03/2015)
CRG group did this to overcome difficulty. In Gujrat, this was easy for us.154

Within the studied urban CRGs it was often suggested businessmen were key to brokering introductions to state authorities:

All the businessmen in the city are similarly connected. Any new appointee on the post of District Coordination Officer (DCO) or District Police Officer (DPO) in Gujrat will first be introduced to businessmen. Businessmen just go to the government official and give them their business cards and introduce themselves. Then when they want to get something done it is easier for them to have a subsequent meeting. They start the conversation by referring back to the original meeting. This is a small city, so contacts are well-developed.155

Whilst in rural locations members that had previously been Union Councillors during Musharraf’s era or that were active in state mandated bodies often fulfilled this role. For example, one of the CRG’s main interlocutors in Kharian had long served as the voluntary Chairman of the wider district’s senior School Council body. Over the years, he had built strong personal working relationships with a variety of district level bureaucrats concerned with education.156 These were repeatedly drawn upon by his CRG which raised over 20 education related issues over STAEP’s course.

154 Wasif Wassan, male, 20-30, member urban Gujrat, later staff CFCB (22/05/2015)
155 Subhan Sarpara, male, 40-50, member urban Gujrat (01/04/2015)
156 Since the early 1990s, the Punjab government has, with mixed results, supported a system of School Councils with the idea of involving communities in schools’ management (Asim and Dee, 2016). This includes the handling of budgets, the raising of additional funding and monitoring performances.
In practice, therefore, the programme’s attempts to use official channels theoretically open to the public only got so far. Instead, members with relevant backgrounds and existing networks often played a leading role in shaping the CRGs’ focus and early relationships with authorities.

**Acting collectively**

Most CRGs arrived at meetings with authorities with anything from a few to ten or so members, with staff from the mentoring NGOs often joining them. Together, they would apply pressure on those they met. Interviewees described this as consisting of several elements: firstly, the sheer numbers that went to meetings would make them physically hard to ignore. Secondly, they often made it clear through articles published in the weeks beforehand that the issue was known to the wider community and that the CRG had the ability to ‘spread bad publicity’.\(^{157}\) Lastly, each would lend their identities to the engagement.

This last element required members to pool their capitals. Indeed, it often involved a performance within which each member would layout their personal business card on the desk of whichever authority they met. As the programme’s original design intended, most were also members or heads of other more established and well-known local organisations, some of which were also active at the national level. For example, within Gujrat city’s CRG, some members also served on Zakat Committees, another was associated with the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HCRP), another with the local Journalists’ Association, and another with the Association of General Councillors.\(^{158}\) As explored further in the next chapter, across all the studied groups many were also political party workers. As a CRG member who was later employed by Gujrat’s mentoring NGO explained:

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\(^{157}\) Anam Bhatia, female, 40-50, member urban Gujrat (01/04/2015).

\(^{158}\) More accurately ex-councillors.
The group doesn’t really have any real authority. It gets its legitimacy from people gathering together and working, as well as getting influential people together. [...] These people already had access to power, we tried to combine these people’s power and use it to address our problems. On a district level, there is a committee that allocates funds. They devise schemes annually that are not made keeping in mind the needs of the people. Some influential person or a politician who is abroad directs people to use funds to build some road somewhere instead of an area which needs it the most. Our aim was to involve and motivate those people to use their power to reset the priorities of fund allocation by combining these people’s influence and power. They already have access to these places. If we motivate them they will benefit people.\footnote{Jarrar Shaikh, male, 50-60, member urban Gujrat and later staff (06/06/2015)}

The importance of these pre-existing identities and memberships was also confirmed by interviewees who gave me their own business cards. Most had more than four or five titles and affiliations. In one case, a member’s card had over ten on it.
Publicly displaying one’s affiliations to get things done is common to Pakistanis. Indeed, political billboards, bumper stickers, identification cards and officially headed stationary act as a form of cultural currency. Without them, one must often resort to paying an informal broker or *wallah* (a person involved with a specified thing or business) to open doors, make introductions or smoothen bureaucratic processes.\textsuperscript{160} This was illustrated by two female CRG members who suggested that should the Prime Minister’s son attempt to meet with state authorities in Gujrat without someone vouching for his credentials, he would be ignored and accused of being an imposter.

As my research progressed, it became increasingly clear that to members ‘acting collectively’, as they often put it, was as much about combining their capitals as it was the physical act of attending a meeting or rally. Indeed, each brought their pre-existing identity to meetings with authorities, including the external, non-CRG related

\textsuperscript{160} Such everyday necessities are arguably at the root of the new clientelism that characterises Pakistan.
networks they were part of and the followers they could potentially mobilise. Clearly, much of this was symbolic and relied on efforts to present a united front:

[...] all these people had good connections and good reputation in the society. We always worked in a team, older people were there, and younger people were there, people with medium age, so it was easy for us to work. We always go to meetings as a team. If we had a meeting with a government representative or a local representative, we would go as a team with one another. Every person knew that we all belonged to different parties, but everyone was clear that we were working on the CRG platform.¹⁶¹

Some members even paid for others to attend meetings with authorities or held them on their properties. This was necessary as, for the most part, the voluntary programme did not cover such costs. By doing so, these members added to the numbers that could attend meetings and provided learning opportunities to less fortunate participants. As a young member of urban Gujrat’s CRG described:

[...] I came to know how to speak in front of government officials, public representatives, MPAs, MNAs and how to speak with other influential people. The credit goes to the CRG. This is the reality. The CRG teaches us to speak openly on every platform. Before joining the District Youth Assembly and the CRG, I didn’t have concept of governance, democracy, transparency, accountability – I didn’t even know these words, I didn’t know about human rights either. After joining, I learnt all these things.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member urban Gujrat, later staff CFCB
¹⁶² Ibid
In short, acting collectively often meant CRG members pooling their identities and capitals during efforts to engage authorities. This was intended to increase the ability of the CRGs to have their voices heard by establishing the groups’ embeddedness in wider networks of power and influence. It also provided some members valued opportunities to learn from one another.

**Between information, homework and relationships**

As Chapter Four illustrated, ‘information’ somewhat replaces social capital in the social accountability discourse’s take on civil society. Citizens able to extract and interpret data on the performance of their local institutions and politicians are posited as having the leverage to illicit responsive and accountable governance. In the studied CRGs, however, the role of information obtained through the CRGs’ extensive monitoring of local service providers was notable for its absence. Indeed, when asked what led to the successful resolution of issues, it was rarely mentioned.

Undoubtedly, however, the *exercise* of gathering information occasionally began the train of events that led to the resolution of issues. For instance, interviewees would often recount how governance monitoring made them aware of issues, such as missing staff or poor facilities in schools, that were later taken up by the CRGs. Yet, the information members collected was quickly subsumed within the more complex stories of the own capacities and relationships, and the wider power and politics of their communities. It was not used as evidence or as a threat. Indeed, what seemed to matter more for getting things done was congenial relationships between individual CRG members and authorities.

It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that many interviewees were more interested in recounting when this occurred, often fondly talking of specific officials. Some even
argued that they would help one another to understand the bureaucratic and political obstacles preventing the resolution of issues and what to do to overcome them:

So, we were just highlighting the issues which related to his department. When there was the issue of a pavement or any road or the construction of any wall, like there was the problem of the wall of the park, we highlighted it. He would say when he didn’t have funds and tell us when to connect with any MPA [Member Provincial Assembly] or MNA [Member National Assembly]. So, he would always guide us as to what to do.163

Interviewees also argued that they needed good relationships with authorities after the programme ends:

It’s not like we just bash them. If they do something good, we praise them as well and give them the courage to do further good work. Basically, our aim is to coordinate and collaborate with them. We raise the issues with them through the media and we thank them when they do something about it through the media as well. We don’t want to use newspapers as a threat because we have to live here as well. They can kick us out whenever they want. [Laughs]164

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163 Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member urban Gujrat, later staff CFCB.
164 Abby Bajwa, female, 30-40, member rural Gujrat and later staff (17/06/2015).
Towards the end of the programme there was a drive to encourage the CRGs to use Pakistan’s Right to Information laws. However, this did not feature in many accounts. Only one suggested that it would occasionally be deployed as a threat, whilst another argued that any evidence they might have uncovered of corruption or malpractice was unlikely to lead to any sanctions.

In contrast to extracting information from state institutions, one CRG came up with the idea of ‘Problems Camps’, which were opportunities for members of the public to openly discuss local issues with CRG members. Although this identified issues they felt unable to work on, such as local divorces, it also led to some they were, including local gas shortages. Others talked of doing their ‘homework’. This usually meant collecting additional information or evidence once a problem was identified through citizens or governance monitoring efforts. For example, women from Multan’s CRG collected statements from people that had been unfairly dismissed from government paid jobs. These were combined with letters they had written to the concerned departments and newspaper clippings of rallies they had organised, and presented to a politician they engaged to ensure he had no excuse to delay action. Doing one’s homework, creating a file on an issue and not having overt allegiances to the rival of whoever you were engaging was a model divulged in several stories. (Asim and Dee, 2016) As an interviewee remarked: ‘[…] if you have a file and are clean people would listen to you’.

This re-contextualises the role of information in social accountability programmes in countries such as Pakistan. Rather than being data upon which poor performance or malpractice is proved and sanctions based, it suggests information can be used to create the space for productive conversations and relationships with authorities and wider communities. Indeed, its use as a threat may be counterproductive in states.

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165 Tariq Langah, male, 30-40, member urban Gujranwala (18/03/15).
166 The frequency of this phrase suggests it must have featured in the trainings CRG members received.
167 Asad Kharal, male, 40-50, member rural Multan (04/10/2015). Positing colonial legacies as a possible explanation, Hull’s (2012) ethnography of the materiality of Pakistan’s urban bureaucracy highlights the symbolic importance of signatures, paperwork and files to getting things done, dispersing responsibilities and maintaining power in Pakistan.
with few formal accountability mechanisms, and in societies within which authorities and activists often personally know one another.

**Appropriation and institutionalisation**

Interviewees often argued that they aimed to build their CRGs’ ‘reputations’ as local associations. They wanted institutional identities that authorities would recognise and around which productive relationships could be built. However, the repeated pooling of participants’ capitals necessary to do this could be a risky process. For example, activating one’s existing relationship with an authority on behalf of a CRG has the potential for efforts to be dismissed, creating a loss of face. Collective efforts may also be effectively appropriated by other members or authorities that seek to take the credit for successes. This could be done by monopolising relationships with authorities or through publicly claiming credit in the media.\(^\text{168}\)

Most of the bad words members had to say about one another and STAEP’s aims stemmed from such attempts. Some directly named their colleagues as undertaking the CRGs’ work for themselves and others generally complained that their groups were spoiled by such things. As one disgruntled participant argued:

> If you want to bring change, you have to bring change in the society, in the hearts of the people, in the hearts of the CRG members. Many times, it happened that CRG members, you know the wealthy people, they never demanded this change because they were using other CRG members for their sake, to show their power. This is reality. If anybody would say that this is not true, they would be lying because it is true that every person

\(^\text{168}\) This is what Bourdieu (1986:251) meant when he wrote that associations always contain ‘the seeds of an embezzlement or misappropriation’.
was using it for themselves.\textsuperscript{169}

Turning to the role of politicians, another interviewee argued that:

They want credit because they want votes and publicity. This is the sad reality in Pakistan that politicians want to take credit for things even if they have not done anything. This is a huge issue. The politicians want to be credited for the smallest of things.\textsuperscript{170}

She illustrated this through the example of a woman the CRG had helped during a court battle with her neighbour who has siphoned off electricity from her connection. After the case’s successful resolution, a local politician tried to claim the credit for helping the woman when ironically it was his influence on the electricity department that had landed her with the bill in the first place. As the interviewee put it:

What I am trying to say is that the politicians are involved in even small issues like these. Their connections are everywhere, and they take credit for everything. Since they have power no one raises a voice against them.

During interviews such problems would often be raised. The previously quoted member even described them as arising from Pakistani culture:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{169} Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member and staff urban Gujrat (16/06/2015 & 22/05/2015) \\
\textsuperscript{170} Minahil Khan, female, 40-50, Gujranwala (20/03/2015)
\end{flushright}
Arif: Look, I think that it is human instinct. In Pakistan, we don’t like to share credit.

Tom: [Laughs] It’s not just Pakistan.

Arif: I know, but I am just talking about Pakistan as it is where my experience lies. I am just talking about my localities. We want shortcuts and we want to take credit off each other. Like for example, he will do the work, but I will say that I have done it because I want to be known as the good person in the society.\textsuperscript{171}

One woman bluntly argued that: ‘Obviously, everyone wants to get credit for things’.\textsuperscript{172} Whilst another suggested that the risks of having the groups’ collective efforts appropriated arises from the patriarchy: ‘In the men, they have this tendency to want to do things on their own and take the credit for them.’\textsuperscript{173}

Some CRGs sought to address such issues through membership cards. Theoretically, they had two purposes: They would help the groups carve out reputations as local associations and they would arm less well-known members with clear markers of their newly obtained social capital. In this sense, the cards also sought to work with wider norms that require Pakistanis to display their affiliations. However, FAFEN worried that members with cards risked bringing their entire nation-wide network into disrepute. This was a legitimate concern given FAFEN’s other activities include monitoring elections and scrutinising Pakistan’s assemblies.

Of my studied research sites, therefore, only urban Gujrat’s and Gujranwala’s GRGs had them. A member from the latter argued that the cards brought them a modicum

\textsuperscript{171} Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member and staff urban Gujrat (16/06/2015 & 22/05/2015)
\textsuperscript{172} Rue Khokhar, female, 40-50, member rural Multan (14/10/2015).
\textsuperscript{173} Mariam Bhatia, female, 30-40, member urban Gujrat (01/04/2015).
of respect when visiting authorities. Whilst, a NGO staff member mentoring the former argued they fell-foul of misuse:

Some members would use their cards to get help for their personal problems as well, according to me. For example, if in your local area you are unable to get your gutter line fixed, we would request MPAs to divert their funds to those areas. Some sharp members, using the privilege provided by their cards used them to get personal matters resolved. An ordinary person’s induction caused these problems. Although, the problem of recognition was resolved, people began widely using membership information in their biographies.¹⁷⁴

As shown in the next chapter, the cards also became a contentious issue between rival groups in urban Multan’s CRG, with one side accusing the other of trying to protect their monopoly of relationships with authorities by blocking the issuing of cards.

Several interviewees also complained that, as part of an effort to institutionalise their groups, they should not have had internal elected positions. Indeed, most were aware of the power differentials between members. Thus, some wanted the CRGs to make them indistinguishable from one another, thereby, creating an even playing field and mitigating the risks of the groups’ efforts being appropriated:

They should have an authority letter to reach institutions. The authority should have influence. It should not be that you just go to an institution and say you are so and so, and they ask you what is the CRG. It should

¹⁷⁴ Maqbool Ahmed, male, 40-50, mentoring NGO staff Multan (06/06/2015).
have had enough recognition and people should have known it was doing work. People only take interest in things when they see them working. It should be apolitical. There should be no hierarchical positions, president, etc.  

This is also perhaps unsurprising for a country in which elected offices are widely thought to be inherited, brought or bargained.

More generally, members suggested that the best way to overcome the risks of appropriation that come from creating an association was time. For example, a member from urban Gujrat’s CRG explained how in STAEP’s first few years some of his colleagues used their personal and political connections to secure meetings with authorities. Although this initially unfairly accorded them credit for any of the group’s resulting successes, it was tacitly approved by their mentoring NGO and other members as they lacked confidence. He argued that overtime – and presumably through such processes – other members grew in confidence and the CRG itself gradually came to be recognised by authorities as a local association. He continued:

Then a time came when even though around five or six of us had personal relations with people in the government, we agreed amongst ourselves that we will not use these relations. We had to establish a system that anyone of us can go and get information or approach government officials. And if we don’t get the information then we would go to the court. Instead of using personal relations, we established a system and became successful in that.

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175 Momna Nizamani, male, 40-50, member rural Multan (17/10/2017).
176 Arif Ramy, male, 20-30, member urban Gujrat (30/03/2015 & 12/08/17)
The member’s suggestion was that his CRG needed time to become an institution, distinct from its members’ individual identities and distinct from its mentoring NGO. As a woman from the same CRG put it:

**Basically, the motto for CRG was that it shouldn’t just operate for the CFCB, like there was an organisation called Lukaati Group, we wanted us to be like that group, one that can operate without the CFCB, Aurat Foundation or any other [NGO] for that matter, to resolve their issues.**\(^{177}\)

Others also added that it took their CRGs a few years to weed out those with malign intentions, which can be understood as a process of becoming distinct from their individual interests. However, most suggested that they did not get to this stage until programme was ending:

**The people who made the platform, they lost interest and stepped back. When the CRG finally became recognized, that’s when they stepped back. Like this solid waste management issue that comes under the Municipal Corporation, there came a time [near to the end] that whenever we would point out to the officials where to clean they would immediately clean it.\(^{178}\)**

This members’ analysis is supported by the programme’s annual reviews that found that the CRGs were not widely known within their constituencies by either ordinary citizens or authorities (DFID, 2014:8).

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\(^{177}\) Aafea Kathia, female, 20-30, member urban Gujrat and later staff (16/06/2015).

\(^{178}\) Sana Mirani, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (06/10/2015 & 09/10/2015).
The reasons some sought to appropriate credit for their CRGs’ actions will be explored further in the next chapter. Here the point is that efforts to build public associations that can productively interact with clientelistic states are difficult and prone to appropriation from within and without. Where they manage to overcome such risks, it is likely to happen through innovative and contextually specific methods such as the CRGs’ identity cards. It is also likely to be a lengthy process of institutionalisation, unsuited to the average four- or five-year ‘projectized’ programme span.

The role of elites

So far, I have explored how the CRGs generally functioned, the limits of the programme’s proper procedures, the risks of collective action and members efforts to overcome them. Nonetheless, Gujrat district’s CRGs also contained elites. They were distinguished from their fellows by their leadership roles within far larger, politicised networks and by their wealth. The former gave them pre-existing connections to authorities and political capital to leverage in meetings with them. The latter the ability to physically host the CRGs’ and mobilise their members. These elites also brought their local allies into the groups to bolster their positions and continue external rivalries.

Despite this, the CRGs’ elites were consistently referred to in deferential terms by other members and staff from the mentoring NGO. They were described as ‘good men’, ‘great social workers’, ‘nawabs (Muslim prince or respected powerful landowner)’ and ‘sahibs (sirs)’. For much of the programme, they also won internal votes that allowed them to occupy their CRGs’ honorary positions. This positioned them as interlocutors between the groups, the mentoring NGO and the authorities they sought to engage.
In interviews the elites often suggested that they stood apart from or above the CRGs’ day-to-day activities. Indeed, they framed their participation as a favour to other members and the mentoring NGO and were only actively involved with a small number of issues that they were confident their interventions could resolve. However, they were the two CRGs’ most talked about, public and, therefore, prestigious successes. Moreover, they required the extraction of funds from local politicians’ discretionary development budgets and took the form of targeted infrastructure.

Although the elites rarely directly linked these successes to formal politics, through an examination of their backgrounds, what they did and the meanings they gave to it, I show how they brought Pakistan’s clientelistic mode of politics into STAEP. In the process, they used their powers in private ways that contravene the requirements of publicness common to visions of civil society and democratisation. Furthermore, due to elites’ desires to maintain and augment their own positions, they limited what their respective groups worked on. Thus, their involvement stood in direct tension with the efforts of the other members to institutionalise the CRGs and curtailed the groups’ overall potentials.

Before proceeding, a note on Multan’s CRGs: Although some of their most active members also had considerable wealth and political connections, they did not have large followings that were of use during their time within the STAEP programme and they did not have clear political patrons. Furthermore, their fellow members did not suggest that they were particularly powerful. Instead, as explored in the next chapter, their efforts to get things done were often unsuccessful and challenged by their rivals within the CRGs.

Vignette one: Noman Riasani
We first turn to one of the two elites within urban Gujrat’s CRG, Noman Raisani. I met Noman three times. He described himself as a martial arts educator, a homeopathic doctor, and a social worker. He was the founder of the district’s Sports Excellence Society and its Voluntary Medics Association. He was also the Chair of the Society for Islamic Youth. Alongside these roles, Noman was a leader within Gujrat’s local branch of an Islamic political party that won 3.2% of the vote at 2013’s elections and the long-running Vice President of the city’s Rehmani Association, a large biraderi based organisation. Despite these roles, he described himself as a ‘lotta’ (literally a small drinking vessel – but used to denote someone who is without a permanent political base).

Noman was invited by the CFCB – STAEP’s local mentoring NGO – to be amongst Gujrat city’s CRG’s founders. He attributed this to his local connections and influence. For these, he highlighted two main sources: the first was his Sports Excellence Society. As he explained, it acts as an umbrella organisation for Gujrat’s various specialised sporting Associations:

There are twenty-four sports associations in Gujarat. Weightlifting, football, cricket, hockey, etc. So, we have made heads in each of these. President and General Secretary. All these associations have members from every walk of life. All the people who play sports are members of their respective sporting associations. So, if there is a problem we just need to call the President and he can gather all the members at one time. This is a private organisation. Members of these organizations have connections and are members of different organizations.

Flipping through a registrar of the Society’s affiliates, Noman explained that honorary positions within each organisation were often filled by locally powerful people. Furthermore, the Society gave him a say in how they were awarded. For example, he
declared that he made Gujrat’s Executive District Officer (EDO) for the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) the President of the tehsil’s Badminton Association. The Society also gave Noman a platform from which to invite them to events at which they would be the guests of honour and receive publicity. Noman suggested that through these apportionments and activities they eventually became his friends. Thus, Noman was also a cultural elite.

The second, more overtly political, source of Noman’s local influence came from his seniority within Gujrat’s Rehmani Association. As with most Pakistani cities, Gujrat has several large biraderi based associations. Noman argued that the majority of Rehmanis are landless workers, with many making a living as Gujrat’s famous potters. Furthermore, he distinguished them from Arians, which he suggested are mostly landowners and investors, adding that although they are sharp and intelligent, local wisdom suggests you should never trust them in business.

Gujrat’s Rehmani Association was founded relatively recently by rich men from within the community and it had a large sister organisation in nearby Gujranwala. On the societal level, it engages in what Noman refers to as ‘social work’. This includes dispensing money and everyday household items to poor Rehmani families, funding their weddings, sending children abroad for education, and finding good jobs for those returning to Gujrat. For Noman, these ‘little things’ are worthy causes and should be contrasted with the ostentatious events put on by the Arian’s Association.

Whilst on a more overtly political level, when necessary, the Association’s members mobilize en masse to address community wide issues. For example, Gujrat’s potters had recently been hampered by a lack of Sui gas supplies. To resolve this, the Rehmani Association held joint strikes and blocked the GT Road with the Potters’ Association. This built up pressure for local Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA) Haji Imran Zafar’s trip to Lahore to

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179 Sui gas field is the biggest natural gas field in Pakistan. It is located near Sui in Baluchistan.
180 An extremely common occurrence on Pakistan’s major roads.
discuss the problem with the Punjab’s Chief Minister. Noman added that Imran was particularly keen to do so as his own investments were also suffering.

Somewhere in-between these levels, the Association’s senior members also act as interlocutors between individual Rehmanis, state officials and politicians. For example, Noman recounted how he had recently visited Haji Imran Zafar to get a young community member’s Rs 25,000 (£180) fine quashed. He declared that ‘he saw me and saw the papers, and just signed without asking a question’. This last purpose is reminiscent of Lyon’s (2002) description of the favours powerful members of Rawalpindi’s ‘Gujar Youth Foundation’ do for their less fortunate members.

Over the course of our interviews, it became increasingly clear that Haji Imran Zafar and his family were the Rehmani Association’s political patrons. They are themselves Rehmanis and Zafar’s uncle Haji Nasir Mehmood was the Association’s Chairman. Noman argued that this meant the Association’s members always lent them their political support. It would be unusual if this did not mean votes. It is also notable that Noman referred to the MPA as ‘his chief patron’ and suggested that he had built up a good relationship with his family. Indeed, in Pakistan relationships between elites and their political patrons generally contain a personal element. In this sense, Noman was also a political elite.

The resolution of two issues illustrate how Noman harnessed these relationships in pursuit of the CRG’s aims. The first concerns an accumulation of electricity cables on a pole in a residential area. In Pakistan, it is quite common to see electricity poles heavy with cables as they are added to by the state or, just as likely, those looking to illegally siphon off energy. However, the poor workmanship of both can pose a danger to those living nearby.

To resolve the issue, the CRG’s members first approached staff within the district’s WAPDA office. Following several failed requests, Noman activated his aforementioned connection within the office to secure a quote for the required work. However, rather than waiting for WAPDA to do it, Noman took the quote to
Haji Imran Zafar. The MPA immediately instructed one of his political workers to pay for the pole’s modifications from his own pocket. As Noman argued; ‘Our problem was resolved. If we went to the government, it would have been a lengthy thing. If we had done it like that, it may not have gotten done. There may have been arguments.’ For Noman, therefore, drawing upon his connections was the rational thing to do.

The second issue concerns the placement and construction of a major public park. The issue was repeatedly highlighted by other CRG members as their most notable achievement. Although the park was not originally the CRG’s idea, they suggested that they had been influential in finding a suitable venue and lobbying the district administration to see the project through. This required members’ repeated visits to local authorities within both the military, who own much of the district’s land, and the rail department that owned a possible alternative site, and it included directing the media’s attention towards the issues.

Once again, however, Noman suggested that his relationship with Haji Imran Zafar was the pivotal factor. He recounted how the MPA lives near to one of his sports clubs and he would often sit with him to discuss various development projects. Noman argued that it was during one of these occasions that he suggested to him where the park should be placed and persuaded him to find the funds to complete the project.

It is highly unlikely that Noman, even given his considerable reserves of social and political capital, could solely influence such a decision. Indeed, other Gujratis suggested that a lot more was at stake than the park’s placement. For instance, the contract to build it was awarded to a local businessman who had recently defected from the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) to the PML-N. The park was also named after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s brother Shahbaz Sharif and opened by his son. For powerful members of Gujrat’s political society, therefore, the park represented a project with high economic and symbolic stakes. Indeed, its construction attached Noman and the CRG to centres of power beyond the city.
Nonetheless, it is notable that Noman chose to highlight his own private efforts and connections as the reason for the resolution of this issue. He did not mention the repeated visits to bureaucrats other CRG members had made to locate a suitable venue for the park. Nor did he discuss how they had kept the issue alive through the local media. In this sense, Noman effectively hijacked the efforts of his fellow members. Indeed, it is arguable that, as before, he drew a collective, public struggle into the private and personal realm. In the process he associated himself with the park’s construction and prevented the CRG from capitalising upon an opportunity to build a public relationship with the politician who pushed it through. Discussing his involvement in the CRG’s work more broadly, Noman suggested:

We never had to struggle too much. It is due to these links as I have told you before. We never had to put in too much effort because either the work that was doable would get done right away or if it was not, it would not.

Later I uncovered that the Punjab government made up for a shortfall in the park’s construction costs through offering private contracts to run it. Furthermore, an interviewee revealed that Noman owned a business that operates facilities, such as public rides and confectionery stalls, in the city’s other parks. However, I could not connect this to the issue of the park’s placement or its construction. Nonetheless, in a sign that most accepted Noman’s leadership of the CRG, other members repeatedly argued that he did not work in his own interests and that his power was due to his social work, rather than his cultural, political or economic capitals.

Noman eventually fell out with the CFCB and left the CRG in 2012. An episode that contributed to this illustrates how his willingness to use his connections for the CRG’s aims was ultimately limited by his interest in maintaining his position within Gujrat’s wider patronage networks:
It occurred in 2010 following a by-election that was held following Haji Nasir Mehmood’s disqualification from his seat as an MPA due to forging his degree. On the day of the by-election, FAFEN mobilised local CRG members to monitor voting booths. They reported numerous issues across the district, prompting FAFEN to release a damming preliminary report that suggested all sides were involved. Despite winning and the accusations of misconduct eventually leading nowhere, Haji Imran Zafar declined several post-election invitations to meet with the CRG’s members to discuss various issues. Furthermore, when he eventually did, he gave FAFEN and Noman a ten-minute public dressing down.

Although Noman was highly respected by his fellow CRG members and he secured their most prestigious success, the programme’s wider ambition to improve democratic procedures ultimately clashed with his wider interests. This eventually placed him in an awkward position, forcing him to choose between his various identities. In the end, his pre-existing allegiances to his political patron won out. Perhaps further indicative of how Noman viewed his involvement with the CRG, during one of our interviews I asked him whether the skills required of a senior Rehmani Association member made him a good choice for its leader. He replied: ‘I wouldn’t say that skills matter, I think it is your relationships that matter.’

**Vignette two: Umer Mirza**

Urban Gujrát’s CRG’s other elite member, Umer Mirza, stood out for the skill with which he managed to get things done for the group. At the same time, however, he appropriated credit for some of their achievements. This increased his ability to occupy positions within wider economic and political patronage networks, whilst reducing the CRG’s own efforts to institutionalise.

Umer’s business bought and sold urban real estate from a small air-conditioned office in a half-built, upper-middle class neighbourhood on the outskirts of Gujrát. As I

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waited with three or four other men on one side of a partition designating a reception area, newcomers would enter and everyone would quietly shake hands. Formalities over, some would give their seats to the arrivals and retreat without discussion to benches outside. When we were eventually beckoned to the other side, I found Umer behind the sort of large, heavy wooden desk common amongst the bureaucrats I had encountered. Furthermore, the walls were adorned with pictures of him with various local influentials, including army officers and politicians.

Umer explained to me that as a young man he had first got involved in social work following 2005’s Kashmir earthquake. This involved collecting supplies from his community to send to those in need. It was commonly argued that the state reacted slowly to this tragedy and that citizens such as Umer had risen to meet its failure. To Western commentators’ horror, many were mobilised by Pakistan’s well run religious parties. However, Umer was not fond of them and considered himself to be an educated liberal.

In the run-up to 2008’s elections, Umer was contacted by a member of the PML-N to put his degree in Mass Communications to work for them. As he put it:

> Basically, you see I have a lot of contacts in the community so what happens is that all these politicians need people like us who have good ties in the community so that they can get votes. It was around 2008. You can see some pictures as well on the wall. I was a supporter of PML-N. I believed in their projects like the motorway etc. So, they approached me.

Umer described his work during this period as organising physical meetings between politicians and potential voters and as running the party’s local social media

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campaign. His efforts helped his cousin and the Rehmani Association’s Chairman, Haji Nasir Mehmood, to win a seat as the PML-N’s MPA. They also catapulted Umer up the ranks of the party’s local political workers, earning him the position of the PML-N’s ‘Secretary Information’ for all 15 of Gujrat’s municipal union councils.

A few years later, Umer was approached by his sister’s husband who needed someone to help run the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) in Gujrat. Partly funded by DFID, BISP is the state’s direct cash transfer programme that targets women. It uses data collected through poverty scorecards to identify beneficiaries and, thereby, aims to bypass the patron-client relations that have dogged other social welfare initiatives. Nonetheless, in popular discourse, the BISP is said to be a way that the Pakistan’s People’s Party, who started it, buy votes. Umer was to be paid to establish a team to collect this data. Once again, he attributed this invitation to his social and political connections, and his ability to collect the data the programme required. Thus, by this time, he could be considered both a cultural and emerging political elite.

Umer became a member of the CRG after learning of it from people within his social circle. Like many of those I met, he was frustrated with his experiences and confused as to why I would want to study it. His frustrations were not with the other members but with the CFCB’s management. He argued that they were only interested in filling in paperwork and data collection. Moreover, he suggested that the CFCB’s staff did not work towards the resolution of members’ identified issues. Instead, they preferred to hold meetings in expensive hotels. Despite this, it became clear that Umer had greatly benefitted from his time with the CRG.

The episode that best illustrates this concerned the state of a local school that had neither drinking water or a washroom. Umer explained the problem as one of fear rather than straightforward corruption. As he saw it, school staff and members of its governing council were afraid to approach state authorities for missing funds. Furthermore, bureaucrats within the district’s administration avoided spending funds
allocated for schools’ infrastructure as it would attract the wrath of those above them who wanted to use them for patronage.

Umer, who by this point was the CRG’s Vice-Chairman under Noman, began by holding meetings between its members, teachers, the School’s Management Association and the school’s Council. They decided that they needed to approach the EDO for Education and, his senior, the District Coordination Officer (DCO). By this time, Umer argued that his continuing role as Information Secretary for the PML-N in the run-up to 2013’s elections enabled him to ask Haji Nasir Mehmood to secure these meetings.

As mentioned above, Nasir had recently been disqualified from his seat as an MPA due to forging his degree. Despite this, he still commanded significant clout within Gujrat and called the bureaucrats to meet Umer within his own offices. During this private meeting, he promised something would swiftly be done and committed to visiting the school the following morning. After this some funding was swiftly realised, but the CRG had to look to other sources to make up the shortfall.

It was around this time that Umer established and officially registered his own NGO called the People’s Welfare Organisation (PWO). As this is a difficult and lengthy process, Umer reactivated a dormant local NGO, changing its name and those of its office bearers on government records. He filled its wider membership with a mix of his old colleagues from BISP and members of the CRG he had introduced after joining. He also made Noman one of WPO’s board members. Umer estimated that by the time he left the CRG around two thirds its members belonged to both organisations.

Umer argued that: ‘if my business is booming then so is PWO, if not, then things are slow at PWO too’. As business was good, Umer and some other PWO members contributed their own funds to the shortfall in the school’s renovation. Following this, they attended its annual prize giving ceremony at which they awarded certificates to teachers and pupils. They also gave out uniforms and money which Umer repeatedly
informed me came from his own pocket. To ensure both Umer and his political patron received the credit for the school’s renovation, the event was publicised through the local press. In clippings Umer showed me a banner made for the ceremony was clearly branded with the PWO’s logo, but there was no indication of the CRG’s involvement. Shortly after 2013’s elections Umer declined an offer to become the CRG’s Chairman and promptly left the group, telling the CFCB that he needed to look after his business.

Accounts by other CRG members leave little doubt that Umer’s involvement greatly benefited some of the poorest members of his union council. However, when asked, they knew nothing of the private relationship with Nasir he had activated to secure funds for the school’s renovation. Instead, many discussed the issue’s resolution as if their efforts at the ‘proper procedures’ had paid off. This, once again, shows how well-connected elites can privately appropriate the CRG’s efforts.

Another member revealed that after this episode the PWO swiftly moved from voluntary social work to bidding for paid projects from larger NGOs. This arguably completed Umer’s transition from a social worker to a politically connected NGO owner. In this sense, his story is also illustrative of the extra opportunities that can accrue to powerful members of programmes when social accountability is narrowly conceived of as getting things done.

**Vignette three: Chaudhry Jahanzaib Derawal**

The chapter’s last vignette focuses on Gujrat’s rural CRG. It shows how rivalries between powerful elites can seep into the associations the programme created and how this shaped the activities they undertook. Furthermore, it suggests that where the mentoring NGOs had few prior links, elites could mediate their understanding of the local context and, thereby, dominate the CRGs.

I first met Chaudhry Adnan Bhutta on the forecourt of a petrol station on the side of the GT Road as it entered Kharian. Next to the forecourt was a small busy tyre
changing shack. As I would discover later, it was one of many that the sixty plus years old owned over the next three or four kilometres. As we talked, groups of people would approach Adnan. Often there would be handshakes and pleasantries before they would depart, but sometimes he would take them off to one side where they would engage in animated discussions and exchange documents. Confused as to what was going on, I asked Adnan whether he was also an official of some kind, perhaps a village head or land registry officer? He laughed and explained that he was merely a well-known local social worker whose signature held weight with state authorities.

Adnan declared his social work began at an early age and that it consisted of resolving issues in his village outside Kharian, such as gas and electricity shortages, and registering villagers for national identification cards. In the 2000s, under Musharraf’s devolution scheme, Adnan successfully fought local elections to become a Councillor. As a Councillor, he specialised in education. He described his role as collecting data on schools’ performance and taking their issues to the responsible EDO, a task that he argued won him a wide reputation for social work. After Musharraf, Adnan sought to continue his social work through his Presidency of a friend’s local NGO and through his role as the Chairperson of the district’s School Council body.

Long before this, in 1986, Adnan had been one of the founders of the GT Road Business Owners’ Union. He described the Union as providing physical security to businesses along Kharian’s portion of the GT Road, negotiating rent rates and helping owners during engagements with tax authorities. Indeed, he saw the road’s small business owners as ‘workers’ that should not pay taxes, which he contrasted with ‘investors’ that should. In his own words: ‘I have saved them from the oppression of income tax; I have protected them from the abuse of the administration’. By the time I met him, Adnan had enjoyed an uninterrupted sixteen-year incumbency as the Union’s President and his son had recently been made its General Secretary.

183 Chaudhry Adnan Bhutta, male, 50-60, rural Gujrat (15/03/2015, 25/03/2015 & 29/03/2015)
Questioned about his experiences within the CRG, Adnan made it clear that although he approved of its aims, it got very little done. Over the course of our three interviews, it became apparent that Adnan was most frustrated by the CRG’s inability to resolve issues pertaining to the areas within his sphere of influence. For instance, he complained that much of the stretch of the GT Road where his union’s members had businesses was missing a service road (narrow roads that run either side of the main road). It also needed street lighting and the removal of a dangerous u-bend. Furthermore, he wanted signs upon which local politicians announced their good deeds taken down.

Despite approaching state authorities and politicians to address these issues in the name of the CRG, for Adnan and his close allies within the group their repeated failures were due to unspecified corruption, which went ‘from top to bottom’. However, other members revealed that addressing many of them would have directly conflicted with a local politician’s stake in a mall located on the aforementioned stretches of the GT Road. For much of STAEP’s duration, therefore, Adnan and his allies within the CRG were locked out of productive relationships with authorities. Accordingly, he spent most of his time raising educational issues with relevant members of the district’s administration that he had long had a good relationship with through his previous roles on state mandated bodies and within a nationwide educational NGO.

As I met the CRG’s other members, however, other successfully resolved issues kept being mentioned. Furthermore, another name was consistently associated with them: Chaudhry Jahanzaib Derawal. Interviewees variously described him as a great social worker, as the powerful head of another of Kharian’s union and as the CRG’s politically connected leader. It occurred to me that Adnan had not mentioned Jahanzaib or any of his close allies during our first meeting. Thus, towards the end of our second I asked him about Jahanzaib. He replied:
Jahanzaib Derawal is also a shopkeeper but his place is at the market. He is the President of the Market Stallholder’s Union. I was the one who created the GT Road Business Owners’ Union. Jahanzaib Derawal kind of conspired. He sat with eight guys in a room and created a Central Union of Kharian [effectively an umbrella union for all Kaharian’s unions] without any kind of elections and called himself the President of that as well. Whilst we, on the other hand, did a complete electoral process for the GT Road Trade Union. I have contested it not just once but many times. The shopkeepers love me. Whatever kind of elections there are, I am not worried as I don’t have an issue. Even in the Market Stallholder’s Union he didn’t contest any elections and just became the President. It’s funny because the Vice President of his Central Union lost in the elections for the GT Road Business Owners’ Union.

Adnan also denied any knowledge of Jahanzaib’s contributions to the CRG or his leadership of it. Furthermore, he suggested that whatever I’d been told must be a lie. To further understand this rivalry, it is necessary to explore Jahanzaib’s position with Kahrian’s society and his contributions to the group.

As the quote at the chapter’s beginning illustrates, Jahanzaib attributed his local influence and connections to his leadership of the Market Stallholder’s Union and his later creation of a Central Union for Kharian. Indeed, he boasted of how he had occasionally led their memberships to strike. He argued, however, that usually the mere threat of mobilisation was enough to resolve most of the issues they faced. As we spoke further, it also became clear that Jahanzaib was the interlocutor between his union’s members and politicians. He explained that:

There is an office of PML-N on the road my union is located around here in Kharian. The MNA had a meeting there where he asked the people to highlight the issues they were facing. The people that went to that
meeting told him that our President will tell you the issues, which is me. The MNA invited me to the office and inquired about the problems. He said people told me you had some problems to share with me.

When pressed on the extent of his power, however, Jahanzaib would frequently deny having any. He even declared that he does not really want to be the President of the Stallholder’s Union but that the members kept voting for him. Instead, he would describe his role as helping them to understand the worth of their vote and the rights they had to hold authorities to account. Indeed, using the programme’s language of voice, votes and citizenship, he depicted his union as fulfilling a similar role to the CRG.

Turning directly to his involvement with the CRG, Jahanzaib described how he used his own political connections to get things done. For example, he was routinely able to get district level state authorities and local politicians to physically accompany him on visits to run down schools or to inspect faulty electricity transformers. Shortly after they would address the issues he had highlighted. When they would not, he would personally go to Gujrat or Gujranwala to track down those he deemed responsible. Jahanzaib also declared that he would not involve himself in issues that he was not sure he could resolve. As he described:

[...] we never got involved in any issues that we knew we could not get resolved. I knew my limits, so I never tried to tackle something that I could not. I would not go and try to break down a mountain by banging my head against it. As far as the local government or federal government is concerned, the MNA and MPA were both acquaintances. The MPA has come in our CRG meetings as well. Even the MNA has also come once or twice.
As another member of his CRG revealed, Jahanzaib also personally handled the groups’ relationships with authorities:

He is a well know person. He is a member of the Chamber as well. Also, he is popular in his village. As far as other members are concerned, they were just like me, they were not really doing anything because Jahanzaib would handle everything. You need members when there was an issue that could not be solved but Jahanzaib was able to solve all the problems very easily. So, the members would just show up on meetings and mark their attendance.184

Although the CRG did raise many unresolved issues, in this way Jahanzaib’s involvement limited the group’s horizons, and shaped its relationships and local identity. It was also notable that many of the issues Jahanzaib declared that he worked on were in his village or the part of town where members of his union have businesses. Moreover, apart from one issue to do with the local motorway rescue service that his rival, Adnan, addressed, there were no examples of successfully resolved issues he was not somehow personally involved with.

Jahanzaib’s grip on the CRG and his significant political capital was confirmed by several other interviewees. As a staff member from the CFCB explained:

So, every person wanted to get credit. But, on the whole, the practice in Kharian was that Jahanzaib Derawal had all the power and he was dealing like a commander there. This was the reality. Whenever there was any

184 Ameer Paracha, male, 60-70, member rural Gujrat (28/03/2015)
issue, he would call the MNA or MPA and get it sorted. It is even going on right now.  

The interviewee added that Jahanzaib’s good relationships with local politicians stemmed from his ability to mobilise his union’s members on their behalf. For example, should one want to hold a rally or strike in the tehsil Jahanzaib is who they call. The worth of such mobilisations – which are often rumoured to be paid for – cannot be underestimated in Pakistan. Indeed, I spent much of my time on the GT road waiting for the police to disperse protestors staging sit-ins on the behest of some politician’s pet issue.

When asked how he worked with others, Jahanzaib claimed he had mobilised his union to march alongside Adnan’s to raise awareness of Pakistan’s newly enshrined Right to Information law. However, this was the only instance of collaboration I could uncover. Moreover, it was denied by Adnan. Instead, Adnan suggested that throughout he had no support from Jahanzaib who purposively made it difficult for him and his allies to attend the CRG’s meetings by locating them in his own house. Although I saw pictures of the two sitting together at the CRG’s early trainings, if, as my research suggests, Jahanzaib dominated the CRG, he would have little reason to visit or hold meetings in Adnan’s union council.

It was also clear from other members that – beyond Adnan and his allies – Jahanzaib had largely built the CRG’s membership. He himself attributed this to CFCB’s lack of local knowledge when the programme first began in Kharian and its failure to properly research who is who within the tehsil. This put him in the advantageous position of an interlocutor between its staff and Kharian’s society. This was demonstrated in three ways: Firstly, interviewed staff from CFCB confirmed that Jahanzaib was their main point of contact. Secondly, it was implied that he had got one of the CRG’s members a job within CFCB in return for his continued support of

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185 Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member and staff urban Gujrat (16/06/2015 & 22/05/2015)
the programme. Thirdly, Adnan claimed that shortly after 2013’s elections CFCB effectively cut him off, whilst Jahanzaib continued to enjoy a relationship with them until the STAEP’s end in late 2014.

The rivalry within rural Gujrat’s CRG did not so much hamper its work, as it skewed it towards the more powerful Jahanzaib’s interests and what he thought he could expect to get done. Indeed, he was responsible for its major successes and as the programme progressed he found ways of marginalising Adnan. It is also notable that this was, in part, attributable to the mentoring NGOs’ lack of local understanding. This suggests that failures to first understand Pakistan’s local power and politics allows it to seep into spaces donors nominally create to change it.

Conclusion

This chapter showed how the CRGs generally functioned through the efforts of their most educated and wealthier members. They led their groups’ attempts to follow the ‘proper procedures’ laid down by STAEP. Many also used their personal connections to authorities to create opportunities for their groups’ voices to be heard. As these moments of collective action were prone to appropriation, some members also aimed to gradually institutionalise their CRGs and to make them known to local authorities. I argued, however, that such ambitions were ultimately unsuited to the programme’s vision of projectized civil society mobilisation.

Through three vignettes it was also shown how elite members of Gujrat’s CRGs used their positions within political networks to influence the spending of politicians’ discretionary development budgets. Although this secured their CRGs’ most prestigious successes, I argue that their private actions meant that they effectively appropriated the programme’s opportunities to participate in public politics, and the relationships and credit that can arise from doing so. Moreover, their groups came to reflect the clientelistic politics that characterises much of Pakistan, with local political
rivalries even seeping into rural Gujrat’s CRG. In this way, the elites’ involvement limited their groups’ scopes and potentials, and strengthened local undemocratic networks. Despite this, their actions were often legitimised by both their fellow CRG members and by the mentoring NGOs that needed them to get things done.
Chapter Nine

Competing Visions

About your question, a nation’s life isn’t made in two to three years. Look at the Western countries that they [donors] represent, they have had years of history and different experiments that they have done. From this they learned that democracy is there, there is a code of conduct, everyone is equal. They learned this after a long practice. In Pakistan, there are gaps and breaks in democracy. If we say that we are in our thirteenth or so year of democracy, we need to understand it needs a long period of time. At least thirty years to learn that some policies weren’t effective or were biased. We will only understand after practice. Similarly, after three to four years there can’t be revolution.

(Jarrar Shaikh, CRG Member)

The previous chapter explored the role played by elites in the Supporting Transparency Accountability and Electoral Process (STAEP) programme. This chapter switches the focus back to the most active, non-elite participants. It begins by drawing out the meanings they gave to the programme; examining it in their vernaculars. I argue that many did not distinguish between its aims and prevailing understandings of social work. Accordingly, their Constituency Relations Group (CRGs) often became platforms through which they also sought places within local social and political networks. However, tensions arose when members believed their colleagues were appropriating their collective efforts for their own gains. I argue that this problem was compounded by the programme’s contradictory stance towards harnessing private political relationships. The chapter then turns to three vignettes that suggest some participants sought to shape the programme in ways that countered these trends. They did this by taking its lessons, techniques and aims, and creatively blending them with their own pre-existing identities and aspirations. This resulted in public efforts to resolve issues with broad impacts across the constituencies their CRGs served. I argue that this demonstrated that the CRGs could

186 Jarrar Shaikh, male, 50-60, member urban Gujrat (06/06/2015).
be vehicles for radical democratising projects. Nonetheless, their visions were pushed to the margins of the programme as they had to compete with its dominant image of depoliticised, non-confrontational social accountability.

The CRG’s non-elites

Chapter Eight showed how STAEP’s elite participants used their privileged positions within wider patronage networks to get things done. This gave them opportunities to dominate some of the CRGs, whilst legitimating their roles as local leaders. Much of this activity took place in private, out of sight of both their fellow programme participants and the NGOs mentoring them. Thus, the elites’ involvement contravened norms of publicness, debate, persuasion and collective action common to ideals of civil society and democratisation. This allowed Pakistan’s clientelistic mode of politics to seep into STAEP.

In contrast to elites, the programme’s most active non-elite participants did not have vast reserves of capitals (economic, cultural, social or political). Furthermore, they were not defined by their memberships within exclusive patronage networks and they regularly had their claims to leadership or authority contested by others. In this sense, they had more to gain from their participation within STAEP than elites. In order to re-politicise understandings of social accountability, this chapter shows that alongside doing social work to benefit their communities, members also aspired to build their personal political reputations and networks. This also helps to avoid romanticising their reasons for partaking in the programme and acknowledges the multifaceted nature of their motivation.

Lastly, a note on interviewing STAEP’s non-elites. Compared to elites, they often appeared to be less interested in overtly shaping my understanding of the

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187 See Chapter Two.
188 Ibid.
programme and I soon learnt to adopt a semi-insider position to build rapport. Reading interview transcripts back, however, in some instances my research assistant and I unwittingly fell into the role of their fellow travellers, pre-empting their views and sympathising with their positions. This speaks to Charmaz’s (2006) argument that researchers and the researched co-construct data, and is an eminent pitfall of immersing oneself in intense periods of fieldwork. ‘Saturation’ – understood by grounded theorists as the point at which research participants regularly give similar or no new answers to questions – somewhat mitigated this bias (Kenny and Fourie, 2015).

Politics and patronage

Chapter Five discussed Pakistan’s transition to the ‘new’ type of clientelism through the creation of a capitalist middle-class. Although politically active, commentators have argued that its members are largely uninterested in democratising projects that threaten to redistribute political and economic opportunities. The chapter also argued that the state and some powerful donor organisations have unwittingly colluded over the depoliticization and taming of Pakistan’s civil society. The former by weakening its links to political parties and the latter through the creation of professionalised foreign funded non-governmental organisations (NGOs). To setup the argument that two broad competing visions of CRGs’ potentials were discernible within the studied groups, this chapter’s first half examines these themes through their members’ vernaculars. It begins with the meanings they gave to politics and patronage.

As one interviewee put it: ‘no one in Pakistan can be apolitical, be it poor or rich’. Amongst my interviewees, however, being political placed one on a spectrum. At one end are those that merely follow and debate politics. This often included the

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189 Ismail Samejo, male, 40-50, member and later staff urban Multan (07/10/2015).
190 Of course, it is likely more ‘politically minded’ citizens were interested in the programme.
younger CRG members that were particularly interested in the *dharnas* (protests) held by Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) which the media portrayed as public parties for glamorous and rebellious youngsters of both sexes. It also included those that claimed they had never been interested in supporting a specific party.

For slightly older members of the CRGs being political meant working in the interests of the local branch of a party. Often this consists of canvassing family and kinship networks for support. More formally, it means being a party worker, organising events, asking one’s social and professional networks to publicly pledge their allegiance, and collecting information on local issues that could win over potential supporters. It was also widely argued that although political party workers can often access and, in some cases, socialise with politicians, only a few ever run for provincial or national offices. As an interviewee described:

[...] a politician is one whose father can further his political purpose. If I want to become a politician, I would have to face thousands of problems if I don’t have power, I don’t have money or people as my support.\(^\text{191}\)

At the other end of this spectrum were even older CRG members that had last been politically active in the 1970s and 1980s. Many now saw themselves as unaligned democracy or human rights activists. They argued that due to historical experiences of oppression, disaffection or simply their age they preferred to comment from the side-lines through roles as journalists or as advisors to NGOs. Multan’s urban CRG had a close cohort of these older activists, many of whom had once been leading members of Pakistan’s various disbanded socialist parties in the 1970s.

\(^{191}\) Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member and staff urban Gujrat (16/06/2015 & 22/05/2015).
Across all age groups, few of my interviewees held positive views of contemporary politicians. For most, running for political office was about individual self-interest, requires being a member of Pakistan’s famous dynastic political families and entails corruption. As a CRG member put it:

In Pakistan, if you have your political background, a political family, then you can get many feathers in your cap, there is no problem. But if you do not have any political background, you suffer in many ways.  

Thus, interviewees would regularly argue that Pakistanis had lost faith in national-level party politics and that ideologies, of all stripes, were not a factor. Indeed, beyond some of Multan’s diehard supporters of the Pakistan’s People Party (PPP), few of those I met valued the idea of long-term political loyalties. Furthermore, identifying as a socialist was understood to be short-hand for opposing landlords, rather than subscribing ant specific distributional policies. This meant that even for many of my younger interviewees, one’s political attentions were, and should be, largely confined to one’s locality:

**Asad:** [...] If they have voted for PTI, it is because they are voting for Imran Khan and are not seeing that his local candidate is someone like Aleem Khan. We have no relationship with anyone. We have not gotten any benefits from Imran Khan, Nawaz Sharif or Zardari.

**Sajid:** Nor will we ever receive any benefit from them.

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192 Azeema Karlal, female, 40-50, member urban Gujrat (04/06/2015).
193 A local politician believed to have unduly benefited from sales of government owned land.
Asad: Everyone is selfish, so we voted based on our area.\textsuperscript{194}

However, local politics was not widely considered to be much better than national. As Martin’s research (2015) also found, it was understood as a zero-sum game. Areas that support the party in power were thought to be the recipients of development projects and other benefits such as jobs, whilst those that do not are known to be locked out of productive relationships with the state’s institutions until the next election. Interviewees argued that these exclusions even extended to the ability to approach or raise issues with politicians from rival parties:

Hatred and biasness is there. Suppose I belong to PML-N and we want to raise an issue about an area which belongs to PPP or PTI, if I speak with them, it is possible that they will not speak to me, in my experience. What I have learnt is that only a person belonging to the same party will be able to speak with that person. If I go, it will be difficult for me to get that work done.\textsuperscript{195}

For their part, contemporary political party workers were often contrasted with those of the past that fixed people’s problems for little or no personal gain. Although this was likely a romantic retrospective, older interviewees often attributed this change to General Zia’s era in which parties’ local branches were crushed:

[...] the motives of today’s political workers are different. Previously they used to fight for the public, but today they are only interested in their personal gains. All the political parties are drowned in corruption from

\textsuperscript{194} Asad Khan, male, 20-30, member rural Mutlan (15/10/2015).
\textsuperscript{195} Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member and staff urban Gujrat (16/06/2015 & 22/05/2015).
top to bottom. The leadership and workers, everyone is involved in it. [...] So now the public also prefers to take their issues to these guys instead of coming to people like us. They know that the political party worker may charge them for his services, but he will get the job done. In this situation what can we do? Today all the political workers are busy filling their own pocket and they are least bothered about public issues.196

Further suggestive of a broad cynicism of contemporary party politics, interviewees would often laugh when I raised topics such as targeted development projects, voting with one’s landlord or how biraderis fitted in, intimating that I was either naïve or new to Pakistan. Some would also declare that they would happily tell me how everything worked locally, but only with the recorder off.197 Nonetheless, as a middle-aged lawyer explained for the population of the neighbourhood in which urban Multan’s CRG did most of its work:

They vote like a kinship. The head of the family will cast the votes for all of the family to one party. [...] For these people the criteria to vote is that the candidate comes to them and lets them present their demands. This is a poor class and they don’t have roads or sewerage or schools. They demand that roads are made or tiles are given. ‘Give us a primary school for the children. Even if you are not in the government you do it now and if you do it now then we will give you our votes’. It is up to the politician to continue doing it when they win. So, they will fulfil their needs before the elections and then the whole kinship gives votes to them. It is same in all of the Pakistan.198

196 Salman Malik, male, 60-70, member urban Gujrat (21/05/2015)
197 These conversations inform my analysis.
198 Sobel Nanda, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (08/10/2015).
There was also a distinct fatalism about this way of conducting politics, as if things were ingrained or the natural order and, therefore, beyond any reasonable expectations of change:

Our problem is that we are too political. We have no strategies and no plans. We can only talk the talk but when it comes to walking the walk we fall short. Even if we do one thing for people, we publicize it so much that we have done such a big thing but at the end of the day it is just chatter, there is no enforcement.  

At the same time, many interviewees were clear about the causes and sources of their disempowerment. Indeed, they often framed them in the social accountability discourse’s focus on voice and opportunities to engage authorities:

Many people want to bring some change in the society, they want to speak but they don’t know how to. They don’t have a forum where they can raise their voices and speak in front of people because the European or American system is entirely different. The Pakistani system is feudalist. Landlords are always dominant over people. Sometimes, in our villages the Chaudhry, feudal and the landlord own the lives of the people.

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199 Abby Bajwa, female, 30-40, member rural Gujrat (17/06/2015).
200 Ayesha Nanda, female, 30-40, member rural Guhrat (17/06/2015).
These findings suggest that STAEP’s participants generally had the same diagnosis of Pakistan’s political problems as many of the commentators discussed in Chapter Five. They depicted politics as about self-interest and parties as family-controlled businesses. They were also under few illusions as to how the structure is maintained through politicians’ local, informal representatives and the ways they gather votes. For the most part, their solution was to confine their political attentions to the local, both directing their expectations towards local politicians and advocating for more chances to engage them. In this sense, they broadly agreed with STAEP’s theory of how to change the way Pakistan’s politics is done and by whom. Yet, as we shall see, they saw little reason not to combine it with their own identities and aspirations.

Social and political work

As in most societies, civil and political society permeate one another in Pakistan. Indeed, the anthropological literature is full of examples of Pakistanis using ‘social work’ (salah-o-behbud), such as funding local mosques, holding feasts or contributing to poorer families’ funerals, as a way to claim party-political leadership roles (Lyon, 2002; Werbner, 2015). However, there are no clear rules for those wishing to use their gains or reputations in one field in another. For example, after years of trying, the well-known philanthropist and sports star Imran Khan has recently become a populist party leader. Whereas the deceased human rights activist and charity owner Abdul Sattar Edhi failed at his various attempts to enter politics at the local and national levels (Durrani, 1996).²⁰¹

Nonetheless, the close relationship between social and political work was reflected in interviewees’ own narratives. For many of the wealthier CRG members, especially those from rural areas, social work was often something they learnt from their

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²⁰¹ Thanks to Haris Gazdar for pointing this out to me.
fathers long before their involvement with STAEP:

My father was also a very well-known social worker and the people in our village trusted him. I believe this was passed down to me from my father. I had a drive to make a difference for the community I live in.  

This often took the form of helping their kin and members of their immediate communities with the expenses of funerals and weddings, or through offering low-interest loans during times of hardship. They also mediated disputes and acted as interlocutors between the poor and authorities, helping them to obtain national identification cards or to renegotiate utility bills. As an interviewee from rural Multan’s CRG argued:

People don’t understand that for rural dwellers getting an ID card or a birth certificate is a big and difficult task. Helping out the common villager with these things is social work. Getting a marriage certificate is also painfully complicated.

Less often, some would describe collecting donations from wealthy community members to pool for small public projects, such as repairing drains or roads. They would reason that this was an easier and quicker route to solving problems than turning to the responsible authorities.

202 Chaudhry Jahanzaib Derawal, male, 40-50, rural Gujrat (29/03/2015 & 17/06/2015).
203 Bilal Tiwana, male, 40-50, member rural Multan (17/10/2017). It is perhaps notable that of the few activities prescribed by STAEP to the CRGs, securing national identification cards for marginalised groups was one.
Interviewees generally framed these activities as a form of duty and loyalty to their localities, and described their work as a ‘passion’, motivated by a ‘soft spot’ or due to a ‘weakness’ they have for others. When describing those they admired, they would sometimes conjure the image of the lone, older social worker helping his community and standing up to impersonal, distant state authorities:

He was a very active man who only did social work. He did a lot of work for his union council. He didn’t ask for anyone’s help. He established a sewing school in a village called Jindhawala which is right next to Kharian. He was retired but I don’t know if he was from the army. He did not have any paying job, he only did social work. He would go wherever he had to, even to Islamabad to get his work done.204

Such descriptions were often given to the CRGs’ most active and senior members, with emphasis placed on their dedication to social work and their major local achievements. However, several younger interviewees also directly linked their own social work to the accumulation of political capital. As one from a landed family described:

I was doing this from before. I was working in my area from the beginning. It has been about thirty-five to forty years. We know about every household. How many members live there and what their problems are. […] My maternal uncle was a numberdar [village head responsible for tax collection] and my other maternal uncle was a Councillor. We had to work for them to help them secure votes. He just got elected.205

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204 Ayesha Nanda, female, 30-40, member rural Guhrat (17/06/2015).
205 Nazar Abbas, male, 20-30, member rural Multan (16/10/2015).
Similarly, another described how her localised social work had led to competing in elections under Musharraf:

Basically, I had been working at a bank and doing this side by side. I have lived in Lahore and Muzaffarabad. Over here I started helping out in my neighbourhood, like asking one girl to live with another who is alone. These were the small things that I started doing, which resulted in people coming to me over time. It gave me confidence when people started saying ‘oh, she does social work’. So, if some girl is getting married I would go and help out in the wedding, buy things and give her them. These small things resulted in 2001’s election.²⁰⁶

More generally, it was argued that well-known social workers (samaji karkun) act as intermediaries between politicians and communities in the run-up to elections. They were said to be familiar with the needs of those they live amongst and to be able to communicate them to politicians:

The social worker, they sit with the local representatives and the local people as they know their problems. They put the problems of people in front of them. So, if a layman cannot present their problems, they can present their problems better. They can also guide the people as to which party would be better for them: ‘This candidate will be better for you’ and ‘what are the problems of your area?’ and ‘these are the people who we have already voted’ and ‘these did not’ and ‘you should change the faces’

²⁰⁶ Hajra Mirwani, female, 30-40, member urban Gujrat (03/06/2015).
and ‘you should change your party’ etc. The social worker has a very vital role and gives awareness.\textsuperscript{207}

Interviewees also argued that in these periods well-known social workers with connections to politicians would be given resources to disperse in return for votes. As three female members of Multan city’s CRG explained:

\[\ldots\] what these parties do is that during elections they hire women just like us. They use influential women or local social workers. Most often social workers. They go there and meet the social worker and give them rations and food items to distribute to the poor in the area. This will make them famous and the party can get their votes. The candidate will say to them ‘you are my elder sister, I want your vote.’ He will bring gifts that could be money or other gifts. Normally they would give them some funding or arrange medical camps or food rations. The social workers will do the social work and get famous, and in return they will advocate for votes for their benefactors.\textsuperscript{208}

For the most part, those that undertook such activities on behalf of politicians were still considered to be social workers. Indeed, few objections were raised to harnessing one’s identity as a social worker in this way. It was notable, however, that a journalist from Multan suggested that when similar activities are undertaken by those with direct family ties to politicians, they fall outside of people’s general understandings of social work:

\textsuperscript{207} Rana (Advocate / Multan)
\textsuperscript{208} Sana Mirani, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (06/10/2015 & 09/10/2015).
In Ramzan they will give flour bags to the needy at the private level. They would not say that it is some kind of social work. Like in Multan the former district nazim’s [elected mayor] mother has a list of all the poor households and she would send food to them for the month.\textsuperscript{209}

Turning to the role of community-based organisations (CBOs), some argued that alongside providing social and welfare functions, they are often platforms upon which the ambitious launch political careers. For example, a CRG member told of how a Multani politician had built a following through his sponsorship of cricket clubs for poorer community members. Whilst another recalled how he had once tested the size and allegiance of the following he believed he had built through running his own CBO by competing in local elections. Although he lost, he was happy to find that his efforts could be translated into votes:

\begin{quote}
I wanted to see the result of my work. Do people like me or not? And people did like me, just because of my work. My camps and the services I rendered for them and for the poor children to whom I have done admissions to university.\textsuperscript{210}
\end{quote}

It was also often suggested that state mandated welfare organisations, such as Musharraf’s Citizens’ Community Boards or the Benazir Income Support Programme established by the PPP, were politicised. As an interviewee explained, her own roles within such organisations indicated her involvement in political society:

\textsuperscript{209} Imrana Sharif, female, 30-40, journalist, Multan (04/10/15).
\textsuperscript{210} Asad Kharal, male, 40-50, member rural Mutlan (04/10/2015).
I am a member of District Zakat Committee and that is only because I was in politics. That is only a political seat, if you are not in politics you can’t get a seat. It does not matter if you are working for poor people or not, this is only a political matter. Secondly, I am member of District Peace Committee because I am District President from PML-N District Gujrat. So that’s why I can do many things with my own power being District President.211

Further illustrative of the links between CBOs and politics, after the recorder was off, a female interviewee from Multan city revealed that in the run up to the 2013’s elections she had been approached by the PTI party to run on their ticket. They asked that in return she give up her own CBO and work in a new one established by the party. She refused, telling them that this was simply a political stunt on their behalf and that they would close the organisations they have established soon after the elections.212

There was, however, little in the way of animosity towards those that used social work, whether undertaken as an individual, through CBOs or state bodies, to build their political reputations. Rather, it was generally understood as fulfilling multiple purposes. As suggested in the previous chapter, it was only when those claiming to be social workers sought to appropriate the efforts of others that they were criticised. This may partly explain why some members of Urban Gujrat’s CRG disparagingly linked the organisation established by Umer Mirza to his political ambitions:213

211 Azeema Karlal, female, 40-50, member urban Gujrat (04/06/2015).
212 Nabila Anjum, female 30-40, member urban Gujrat (23/05/2015).
213 See Chapter Eight
[...] People’s Welfare Organisation? It belonged to one of our CRG members, Umair Mirza, he used to take the assistance of the CRG a lot and take the credit for it. There were some issues that we, the CRG, resolved, but when this was reported in the newspapers, it would have the name of WPO on it. He used to be with us in the meetings [with authorities] obviously.214

Through my research, therefore, the contours of the relationship between civil and political society began to reveal themselves. On the one hand, it was clear that for many social work consists of helping one’s kin and immediate community through the provision of tangible goods and access to the state. Whilst on the other, being widely known as a social worker encompasses owning CBOs and periodically acting as politicians’ local representatives, including gathering them votes. Interviewees also acknowledged that social work could serve as launch pads for one’s own political careers. Yet, there was little in the way of rules or animosity for those doing it unless they sought to appropriate others’ efforts. This point is returned to below.

**Donors, NGOs and volunteerism**

Across all the studied CRGs participants had a cynical attitude towards donor funded NGOs. As with politics, it was suggested that they were essentially self-interested businesses staffed by the same small cliques of well-connected people. They were also generally thought to be riddled with corruption and beyond salvation:

214 Afea Kathia, female, 20-30, member urban Guhrat (16/06/2015).
Another thing I have noticed at these meetings is that every single NGO that you go to, you will see the same people at their meetings. That is their problem, they do not attract new people. They are merely going through the motions so that they can show that they organized a meeting to their donors. [...] I know what exactly goes on in this NGO business in Pakistan, having run my own organization for such a long time. Here’s the thing, even if Americans themselves come here and audit these NGOs, they would still not be able to find out where the money is going because the web of corruption here is so dense.215

For many, NGOs were assumed to be blindly following their donors’ agendas, which were often portrayed as subversive to local cultural norms or harmful to Pakistan. NGOs were also argued to be largely unaccountable to the people they claimed to serve:

[...] people who send money to Pakistani NGOs they have their motives. They use these NGO’s for their benefits. In this way, the NGO does not remain independent. They follow the orders from the donors. For example, NGOs will only work on those issues which their donor wants them to work and they will not work on any other issue.216

Although not a view expressed by others, an older interviewee even argued that the proliferation of donor funded NGOs in Pakistan was a plot by Western powers to reduce the power of the nation’s political parties. These views would be familiar to anyone acquainted with the conspiratorial public discourse around NGOs in Pakistan.

215 Babar Kirmani, male, 20-30, member rural Gujrat (24/03/2015).
216 Salman Malik, male, 60-70, member urban Gujrat (21/05/2015)
They also accord with Bano’s (2012) finding that donor funding delegitimises Pakistani NGOs by contravening social norms that require social workers to display material sacrifice.

Despite this general negativity, some participants suggested that NGOs still attract people as they provide opportunities that are rarely found elsewhere. For example, for older, disaffected former political party workers, the donor money and symbolic protection provided by NGOs was framed as a way to maintain their oppositional political activities. Whilst for younger people participating their programmes present exciting opportunities to socialise and explore life outside of one’s immediate kin or community. For others still, they are a source of money and future employment, with many CRG members later occupying paid roles with the mentoring NGOs. As an interviewee put it: ‘Our culture is that people think that in NGOs there will be girls and fun, and there will be programmes and tours and money’.

Within STAEP, however, such enthusiasms often did not extend to the programme’s mentoring NGOs. Instead, across all the research sites, it was often argued that they did little of substance and only engaged in endless discussions. As one interviewee complained:

Yes, they did nothing, their only thing was tea, samosas and cold drinks. They were getting money and they had no worries as they were using cars, but I feel pain. I am a social worker. I do people’s work. You [NGO staff] should take care of me, you have been given a thing you have to support, you have money, but you still don’t work. I got nothing, I don’t lie, I am a worker. Whatever the thing that was given to me or the work asked of me, I gave them a report, then what did they do with it?

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217 Hassan Qureshi, male, 30-40, member urban Multan (04/10/2015).
218 Asad Kharal, male, 40-50, member rural Multan (04/10/2015).
Another interviewee also proudly recounted how she had confronted a foreign trainer about such things, asking him why he doesn’t donate his flight and hotel money to the participants who need it more than his lessons.

For many, there was an unexplained and, therefore, often unjustified discrepancy between the programme’s expectation that they voluntarily undertake social work, whilst staff from the mentoring NGOs are paid. This manifested itself in the often-heard complaint that the staff are only interested in data collection and paperwork or ‘kaghaz kaaley karna’ (blackening the paper). Many also suggested that NGOs, including the CRGs’ mentoring organisations, fake their reach and ability to mobilise people. As an old former political activist explained:

A lot of societies and NGOs, when they are keeping their meetings, keep them at five-star hotels and invite their laborers, people who are working day and night to make ends meet, to attend. This is wrong because they are just doing it to show the people that they have so many people working through pictures and videos. What is this nonsense? 219

As asked to sum up their thoughts on STAEP, many praised the programme’s ambitions, but suspected its implementers’ real aims lay elsewhere:

[...] you can change the mindset of the society when a worker goes with you shoulder to shoulder. You appreciate him and so this brings the change in the society. But they did not need such a change, they just

219 Shahid Fiaz, male, 60-70, member urban Gujrat (21/05/2015).
needed the reports. I was really straightforward with them, when they came I said to them that ‘you should be sincere if you really want to solve the issues of people. We do not ask for money from you. You are on salary, we are not on salary, we are simple, but you do not give attention to this.’

As another participant summarised: ‘The final impression of CRG was that they used us. They just used us for their paperwork.’

I suggest that this was, in part, attributable to the common practice of paying participants in donor funded programmes and, in part, STAEP’s own misguided attempts to inculcate its voluntary, citizen-led spirit. Indeed, the reoccurring criticism of the programme was that it held meetings in expensive hotels and took data from participants, whilst not paying for their travel or leading efforts to resolve raised issues. In this sense, the programme failed to create an identity for the CRGs as either collectives of social workers with legitimate political ambitions, CBOs or as NGOs. Instead, they occupied an ambiguous grey area, disconnected from wider societal norms. Below I further explore the affects this had.

Contradictions and tensions

For most of the programme’s duration, the Punjab was expected to hold local elections on a party basis. This meant that many of the CRGs’ most active members were in a constantly preparing to run for office. Indeed, one interviewee confided that he was encouraged by his uncle to continue his social work under the banner of the CRG to gather ‘more of a name’ for the anticipated contest. This was

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220 Asad Kharal, male, 40-50, member rural Multan (04/10/2015).
221 Waqas Kalwar, male, 40-50, member urban Multan (07/10/2015).
222 Bilal Tiwana, male, 40-50, member rural Gujrat (17/10/2017).
particularly notable in Multan where the local mentoring organisation had called upon former Councillors it knew when forming the CRGs, many of which intended to return to politics.

Unlike with the everyday social and political work described above, however, when members mixed their roles within the CRG with their political ambitions it often caused anxieties and resentment. Indeed, they would accuse one another of only taking part in the programme to build their political reputations and connections. For example, one participant from urban Multan argued:

The CRG wanted to be the bridge between the political government and local areas. Some people in the CRG wanted to use this and become a part of the politics. They wanted to take political advantage of it. But our purpose was to instil awareness in ourselves and create awareness in others.\(^{223}\)

He explained that politically ambitious members with money or links could pervert the programme’s ways of working:

The problem with CRG was that it wanted to get things done legally through public pressure. But there were some people in the CRG who were [ex] Councillors. They used to tell us that we can get it done for you. It’s not difficult to get things done if you use influence or bribes. But CRG wanted the public to become aware of how to get their problems

\(^{223}\) Waqas Kalwar, male, 40-50, member urban Multan (07/10/2015).
resolved and how to demand their rights. You can always bribe someone but it is not your right.\textsuperscript{224}

An interviewee from rural Gujrat’s CRG declared that some of his colleagues had ‘blurred the distinctions between what is appropriate and what is inappropriate’.\textsuperscript{225} Although he claimed the older and more educated amongst his group considered this to be their personal matter or choice, others suggested it caused rifts and fractures. For example, a member in Multan city’s CRG told of how his group had been effectively split by another’s political ambitions:

She wanted to make herself known politically for future elections. She thought if the meetings were held there, her area would get more benefit. After separating, her group used the CRG to get benefits for their area.\textsuperscript{226}

Asked how participation in the programme helps the politically ambitious, an interviewee highlighted how her colleague’s bid to become the CRG’s Chairman would build her local political reputation:

Politically speaking it has the benefit that if she stands next time she would have people she knows in every department and links with the ordinary people. She would find it easy to ask for votes. Also, there is a dignity in the designation. It counts in the area. She held the [CRG’s]

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{225} Bilal Hanif, male, 30-40, member rural Gujrat (29/03/2015).
\textsuperscript{226} Umair Minhas, male, 30-40, member urban Multan (05/10/2015)
meetings in her school so it also would give popularity in the area. So, these four, five things mix.\textsuperscript{227}

Such benefits were also present in the stories of members of Gujranwala’s CRG that I tested interview questions with before studying my four selected cases:

There are also a lot of people in the CRG who are members of political parties. So, when the CRG gets something done, these members try to pass it on as something their political party did instead of the CRG.\textsuperscript{228}

Nonetheless, it was also apparent that some of the CRGs were actively courted by local politicians who sought to use their members as their intermediaries. As one participant explained:

They used to meet us because they saw us not as a group who could do work for the area but as a group who could get votes for them in the future. We met the MNA Rana Mahmood-ul-Hassan. We told him that you do not come to the area ever since you got elected. He said he will come and he was eagerly waiting for someone to take up the issues of this area, although, it is his own task to come and address the issues. He told us to arrange a meeting or a small rally and ‘I will attend it’. His aim was to have a rally.\textsuperscript{229}

\textsuperscript{227} Subhan Mirani, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (06/10/2015 & 09/10/2015)
\textsuperscript{228} Tariq Langah, male, 30-40, member urban Gujranwala (18/03/15).
\textsuperscript{229} Waqas Kalwar, male, 40-50, member urban Multan (07/10/2015).
As other interviewees argued, the concern was that their fellow members used the CRGs’ growing reputations to directly collect votes for local politicians, thereby, further perverting the groups’ aims:

**Arif:** [...] some CRG members used their influence to bargain votes for political parties, bringing in members of such parties. You know I was an observer at that time, I think two or three members were involved in such activities.

**Tom:** What do you mean? I am a little confused.

**Arif:** You know they were just bargaining for votes for special parties.

**Tom:** Their own votes or their communities?

**Arif:** Yes, they were convincing everyone to vote for certain parties. Actually, they knew each and everything about the political system, they knew the democratic system, they were well known about all of these things. So, they played such a role. But we stopped them, we kicked them off of the programme because they were compromising our Free and Fair Election Network.\(^{230}\)

It was also notable that the sense that Pakistan is locked into a selfish and monetised form of patronage politics often extended to members’ own political ambitions. For example, when one CRG member from urban Multan was questioned about her plan to compete in local elections for a general seat she argued that ‘the vice-

\(^{230}\) Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member and staff urban Gujrat (16/06/2015 & 22/05/2015). The reference to Free and Fair Election Network is indicative of how many participants also saw themselves as FAFEN’s representatives.
chairmanship is not affordable to me’. When another was asked about her decision to run as an independent, she calmly explained the bargaining process that begins between independents and parties seeking their allegiance if they win. As she put it: ‘If everyone is going to earn, then why would I not earn’. In this sense, within the studied CRGs, there was not widespread evidence that the programme had changed participants’ pre-existing understandings of the routes into and benefits from political participation.

These issues forced the CRGs’ mentoring NGOs to remain vigilant. Indeed, they had to assist their members to engage politicians to activate the ‘long-route to accountability’, whilst avoiding being perceived as vehicles for the interests of specific members, politicians or parties (WB, 2003). STAEP’s policies sought to do this by officially disavowing its members’ political identities. For example, the programme required those with political affiliations to publicly denounce their allegiances upon joining the CRGs. Whilst those that subsequently become involved with formalised politics, such as in the run up to 2013’s elections, had to leave.

In practice, however, these measures were unworkable. Indeed, as the last chapter suggested, much of the programme’s activity took place outside of the CRGs’ official meetings. Furthermore, staff members from the mentoring NGOs argued they could not monitor the CRGs at such a granular level. This created problems:

[...] after we profiled CRG members, we found out that the active members of political parties lied and didn’t disclose. They signed the declaration that they aren’t political party members. [...] Some people would say I’m some local coordinator with some union council for the PML-N and then a woman sitting next to them would say oh no you aren’t supposed to disclose that. Similarly, the same thing happened in

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231 Rafa Memon, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (05/10/2015)
232 Subhan Mirani, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (06/10/2015 & 09/10/2015)
Gujranwala. I had a chance to learn and teach people that you can be affiliated with political parties because it benefits us and helps us pressurize them so don’t hide this fact. But this became a problem as these things were hidden from the CRGs’ leaderships. People were selective about what to disclose to whom. It could be that if some observer comes, for example if Tom [the author] comes, they would disclose selectively.  

To address them, some programme staff unofficially encouraged members to keep political affiliations out of the deliberative spaces STAEP directly supported and to only use them as a last resort to gain access to authorities. Others suggested that the CRGs actively threw out overtly political members themselves and refused the symbolism of accepting invitations to attend meetings with politicians. Whilst the general idea was to depoliticise the CRGs, this unofficially endorsed the use of personal pre-existing political relationships if they were activated outside of the programme’s gaze, in private. Perhaps indicative of the difficulty of operating with this contradiction, during STAEP’s second year FAFEN fired one of the CRGs’ mentoring NGOs from the programme for being too close to a political party. 

This section has shown that the ambiguous relationship between social and political activities within the CRGs, their internal hierarchies, and the wider programme’s official policies and unofficial ways of working caused tensions. I surmise that this was the main reason why the appropriation of credit for the CRGs’ successes and the forging of relationships with politicians was a cause of anxiety for many participants. Indeed, they were paradoxically required to publicly separate their social and political work, including their own aspirations to run for office, whilst still occasionally using private political relationships to get things done. Although such tensions were the norm within the studied CRGs, the remainder of the chapter

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233 Maqbool Ahmed, male, 40-50, mentoring NGO staff Multan (06/06/2015).
234 See Chapter Eight.
argues that some members did not allow them to dilute their own visions for their groups.

**Radical visions**

So far, it has been shown that the overlap between social and political work is generally not a problem in Pakistan. However, within the programme it often caused tensions between the CRG’s most active, non-elite members. Many were anxious that their colleagues would effectively appropriate their groups’ efforts to fulfil their political ambitions. The programme’s policy of disavowing participants’ political identities compounded such problems, forcing members’ to privately use their political connections to kick-start the resolution of issues.

The chapter now turns to three vignettes. They show how some participants took the programme’s lessons, techniques and aims, and creatively blended them with their own pre-existing identities and aspirations. Through the public ways they worked and the issues they sought to address, they resolved injustices with broad impacts across their constituencies. They also challenged the CRGs’ dominant way of privately getting things done through personal and political relationships. In this sense, they showed that there are alternatives to the programme’s paradoxical efforts to depoliticise social accountability and that the CRGs could be vehicles for radical democratising projects.235

Nonetheless, my findings suggest that their visions had to compete with the local political struggles the CRGs were embedded in and the wider political economy of professional development programmes in Pakistan. Indeed, in one case, the members’ vision for their CRG threatened the interests of other, more powerful participants and their actions proved too risky for their mentoring NGO. Thus, those

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235 See Chapter One, Note 3.
propagating such visions were often pushed to the margins of the CRGs or outside of the programme altogether.

Vignette one: Anam Bhatia and Mariam Kharal

Sisters Mariam Kharal and Anam Bhatia live in the heart of Gujrat city in a large family house nestled behind a busy commercial street. They declared that most of the district’s prominent politicians kept properties in the old neighbourhood and that everyone knew everyone else’s business. Like others I met, they claimed that this was still the case despite Gujrat’s recent expansion into a city. As they spoke they would often finish off one another’s sentences, adding details to explanations or embellishing stories:

**Mariam:** Candidates win based on biraderi. It is not that we think one party is better than the other.

**Anam:** They are all bad.

**Mariam:** Whoever gains power begins to abuse it. We tried to do a lot of things from our end.

This synergy was also reflected in their biographies. Both had long worked for the state’s school system, local and national NGOs. The older sister, Anam, owned a private school within which the other often taught. Whilst Marian owned a beauty salon that specialised in *mehndi* (henna) body-art. She had also established her own, self-funded CBO that put on free mehndi classes for women wishing to go into business. This was a source of pride for both sisters who remarked that they did not
mind that their revenue was falling year by year as their former students’ set up rival salons.

Throughout our discussion the sisters thought little of openly deriding politicians and the country’s political system. For instance, they suggested that the President of the one of the major party’s Women’s Wing, whom they argued may be ‘mad’, had inherited the position instead of gaining it through merit. This instigated a lengthy explanation of the Pakistani saying; ‘The son of a politician is a politician’. More widely, they suggested that the form of democracy imposed on Pakistan in the colonial era and contemporarily maintained by America encourages nepotism and greed.

Both sisters were also keen to speak of their fifteen year-long associations with the Aurat Foundation. As mentioned in Chapter Five, Aurat is one of the nationwide NGOs established during General Zia’s era to fight against his patriarchal social engineering project. Since then Aurat has taken on a variety of initiatives to empower women, including training them to compete for local council seats and the creation of a national network of activists. The sisters described Aurat as the platform from which they first learned to work for the betterment of women. As Anam put it: ‘Whatever we could do for women to help them legally we did.’ Marian also impressed that she had been Aurat’s District Coordinator for many years.

Although Anam and Mariam were involved in many of the CRG’s activities, they took the lead on the successful resolution of one of the demands most often highlighted by interviewees.\(^{236}\) The CRG’s governance monitoring activities uncovered that state schools within the sisters’ union council suffered from several issues. Some were using children to clean classrooms and others were pressurising their families to contribute to the costs of furniture. The schools were supposed to have budgets for both.

\(^{236}\) Separate from that resolved through Umer’s contacts in Chapter Eight.
Due to the good relationships that the sisters had built up over the years prior to and during the CRG with the heads of local schools they decided to ask them how they could help. This was considered a better course of action than pursuing potentially unprovable and socially destabilising allegations of malpractice. Accordingly, they arranged meetings between themselves, the schools’ staff and the schools’ Councils. Rather than embezzlement by staff, it was soon discovered that they were not getting the correct level of funding from the Education Department.

Given the absence of local government, the nearest tier of responsible state authorities was at the district level. Following the ‘proper procedures’ passed down in STAEP’s training sessions, the sisters decided to first document the missing staff and furniture. They did this themselves and then approached the responsible authority with other CRG members. Nonetheless, the Executive District Officer (EDO) for Education told them that they should take their issue to the more senior and powerful District Coordination Officer (DCO). After several failed attempts to meet with the DCO, the sisters knew they had to come up with an alternative plan.

Using personal connections to lesser bureaucrats within the district’s administration, one of whom was the President of Mariam’s CBO, they persuaded the aforementioned EDO to attend a planned ‘walk’ (peaceful march). He was told it was to raise awareness for Aurat Foundation’s general aims, such as the enrolment of girls in schools, and that it would end outside the DCO’s office which was located opposite Gujranwala’s Press Club. Across Pakistan, Press Clubs act as venues for political campaign launches, press conferences and protests, and in-between are used by journalists to rest, gossip and work. For the most part, they are also open to ordinary citizens that wish to contact a journalist. In this sense, compared to the state’s institutions, they serve as one of the few public arenas within which citizens, elites and their go-betweens meet.

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237 Female education is no longer a controversial topic in parts of the urban Punjab. Gujranwala is home to much of the Gujrat district’s administration.
238 Perhaps alongside mosques and political rallies.
On the day of the walk, the sisters rounded up their fellow CRG members, local Aurat
Foundation activists and the EDO. Once they arrived at the DCO’s office they unfurled
hidden banners that highlighted the issue of the missing school facilities and children
working as caretakers. This, they argued, publicly put pressure on both the EDO that
had walked with them and the DCO that had emerged to meet them outside the
Press Club. Although it did not immediately illicit resolutions, the situation generated
newspaper coverage and linked the DCO to the issues.

The sisters sought to swiftly capitalise on this momentum by turning to the long-
route to accountability. Firstly, they secured a meeting with Haji Imran Zafar, a local
Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) Member Provincial Assembly (MPA). This
was achieved through his wife who is friends with their youngest sister. However, he
told them that as they were not workers for his party, and as it was close to 2013’s
elections, he would be unable to help. Next, they turned their attentions to inviting
Khadija Farooqi, a MPA for the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) and
the President of the party’s Women’s Wing, to a meeting at their house.239

In response to my surprise at the ease with which they contacted another MPA,
Mariam informed me that she is an active worker for the PML-Q and that Khadija was
known to be a friend of Aurat Foundation. Furthermore, she proudly declared that
she is regularly invited to family events of local senior party members, such as a
recent wedding. She argued that it was because of these links that Khadija was willing
to meet with them. The sisters also sought the assistance of a member of the CRG
who was a local journalist that often favourably covered events Khadija attended.

On the day of the meeting, Mariam again mobilised Aurat’s local network. This time
she arranged for over 30 women and CRG members to be present at her house. She
told the women that if they were considering voting this was their chance to engage
Khadija and another PML-Q politician that was due to attend. On the sides of the
wider meeting the CRG members petitioned Khadija for help resolving the schools’
issues. Their efforts were successful and shortly afterwards the CRG was informed

239 Actually ‘Khadija Umar’, but the sister’s used her mother’s surname.
that the schools’ problems would be taken care of. This also led to a productive relationship with the EDO who attended some of the CRG’s subsequent meetings and helped resolve future issues.

Explaining their success, the sister’s offered several contributing factors:

Mariam: Women get ignored in this society unless we take people along with us. Nobody wants to give women credit for anything. No matter what we would have done, the matter would not have been resolved without Khadija Farooqi’s intervention. This was a women’s success. When we were making our group, we knew there had to be women in it. Without women the meeting would not have taken place.

Anam: When Khadija saw us, she knew some of those people were workers of her own party. Now let me tell you, political parties will never give credit to a CRG or any other organization.

Both: All the work that is meaningful is the work we did together.

Anam: The work we do with each other, like stitching or cooking, we acknowledge that this is our individual work. We don’t say this is a collaborative. But if something is a collaborative effort we acknowledge it to be so.

The sisters also stressed the importance of timing, arguing this would never have happened after the election and was a direct result of the politicians’ need to court potential voters.

It is arguable that a creative combination of personal and political links, and collective and public pressure enabled the sisters to resolve the schools’ issues. To do this, they used members of the CRG and their pre-existing networks to physically show their
numbers and links to potential voters. Furthermore, through the CRG’s journalist they incentivised the politicians they engaged with the promise of favourable publicity at a crucial time. In the process, they blended their existing identities as programme participants, activists for the Aurat Foundation and as party workers. Perhaps most importantly, they did not seek to keep their relations with politicians private and gave their fellow members opportunities to meet them. Indeed, it was notable that the sisters were not accused by any of their colleagues of abusing the CRG.

Vignette two: Arif Ramy

Arif Ramy joined urban Gujrat’s CRG in his mid-twenties having recently moved to the city from a nearby village. He diligently learnt its data collection techniques and proper procedures. He formed lasting bonds with other members and was involved in some of the group’s major successes. He also established his own organisation to continue his social work. Indeed, Arif’s involvement in the CRG appeared to be a textbook case of the social accountability discourse’s depoliticised notion of empowerment. However, exploring it further suggests he also learnt valuable lessons on how to skilfully tread the line between social and political work.

Like the other members of his CRG’s core, active group, Arif was privileged in comparison to the marginalised citizens STAEP eventually sought to mobilise. As he put it, his farming family were amongst the wealthiest landowners in his village. He suggested they had, in part, maintained this position for over 300 years by staying out of local politics. Elaborating, he argued that politics requires a level of cruelty that they could not tolerate. Furthermore, through this strategy they sought to avoid the

240 See Chapter Two.
'jealousies and enmities’ common to the landed. Instead, Arif argued that his family were avid social workers, dedicating their spare money and time to the poor:

[...] my family went in the other direction where we chose to give back and do social work. We would give parts of the land to the poor and tell them they can use it to grow crops and consume them. We help orphans and give charity. We built the mosques and help out poor people in funerals.

As a teenager, Arif and his friends in the village had founded a CBO named the Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) Welfare Society. Through collecting money from wealthy households, it conducted small local projects such as fixing the village’s bus shelter. To legitimise its work, Arif gave locally influential men positions within the organisation such as Chairman and Vice-Chairman. He argued that it made them ‘feel honoured and respected, and hence motivated’. However, Arif decided not to involve his own family’s money, suggesting it would make his organisation unsustainable.

Although initially sceptical of the CRG’s connections to foreign donors, Arif joined after discovering it was about holding the state to account and compelling it to act. Furthermore, he came to view the CRG as a way through which he could settle into his new life. As he put it: ‘[...] when I came from the village I had a passion for social work, but I didn’t have a platform and I didn’t have any networks’. By the time I met him, Arif argued that the CRG allowed him to address the ‘root causes’ of the problems its members identified without involving the ‘personal greed’ of wealthy influentials.

241 Such enmities are found within much of the ethnographic literature on rural Pakistan (Barth, 1959; Lyon, 2002; Martin, 2015a).
242 ‘Great Leader’ is an epithet often used to refer to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s first leader.
Soon after joining the CRG, Arif also became involved with Umer Mirza’s People’s Welfare Organisation (PWO) described in Chapter Eight and quickly rose to become its General Secretary. Indeed, he oversaw its growth from a self-funded CBO, to an NGO that competed for development contracts from larger national level organisations funded by donors. Arif was keen to impress upon me that the PWO’s success stemmed from its ability to keep ‘proper records of everything’ and its professional internal procedures. As he described:

\[\ldots\] we have elections, meetings, media coverage, everything. We have project plans and make reports, which are verified, and then we also get audited and then submit them to the government. So, whenever some other organization comes, they require these things. In Gujrat, there are over 225 organizations but very few that do proper documentation. Around 10-15 organizations and we are one of them.

However, when asked, Arif had little knowledge of how Umer had ultimately leveraged his political connections to get things done whilst a CRG member. Nor did he know how he had sought to publicly claim the credit in the name of the WPO. He also appeared to be unaware of how the CRG’s Chairman, Noman Riasani, had called upon his biraderi’s political patron to push through the construction of Shahbaz Sharif park.\(^{243}\) Nonetheless, he confided that he knew some individuals within the CRG used such connections, but he had never been privy to such practices. Instead, he described the CRG’s operations as ‘democratic’ and enthusiastically recounted the opportunities he had to debate national level politics with the group’s elders. Put another way, despite being one of the CRG’s most active members, engaging in the proper procedures, visiting authorities and taking part in its election monitoring

\(^{243}\) For both see Chapter Eight.
efforts, Arif, like most his colleagues, was barred from the meetings in which its most prestigious successes were secured.

Despite this, in the CRG’s final year Arif established his own NGO called New Fields. New Fields conducts workshops among the Punjab’s farming communities on the latest techniques for small landowners wishing to keep profit and loss records. At the same time, it teaches them how to approach state authorities to demand improvements to local services. Arif had learnt to run the workshops whilst working for a multinational farming supplies company. Whilst the idea behind New Field’s advocacy trainings came from his time in the CRG. Arif declared that he had spent a year thinking about how he could run his NGO without seeking funds from donor organisations which he mistrusted. His solution came when he realised that he could approach village heads, which he described as powerful landlords, to host his hybrid workshops. Using his own knowledge of the power and politics of rural communities, he suggested that this drew upon their desires’ to be perceived as benevolent leaders.

In short, Arif combined the things he had learned within the CRG with his own background as a wealthy landlord’s son. Specifically, he creatively mixed the CRG’s focus on accountability, Umer’s organisational skills and his own knowledge of rural power structures. In this sense, the CRG could be thought of as a finishing school for the young and motivated Arif. Indeed, he entered it looking to learn about holding the state to account and to make connections in Gujrat city, and he left it with new social networks and his own organisation.

However, I felt Arif’s story was incomplete. I wondered how someone under the tutelage of Umer could have so little to say about the overlap between social work and politics. I also knew from our original interviews and Arif’s social media accounts that they had both remained close friends and become party workers for the PTI following 2013’s elections. Accordingly, two years later in 2017, I conducted a follow up interview to further explore Arif’s time with and since the CRG.
Since we had last spoke, Arif’s activities with Umer’s PWO had decreased as it had relocated outside of Gujrat. However, New Fields had begun taking on contracts from the district government. As he put it: ‘we try to extract as much as we can from them. But we are not dependent on them’. This had allowed him to hire additional personnel. Nonetheless, New Field’s still generally relied on the model of incentivising local landlords to host their meetings: ‘So in simple words, you can say that we use them to reduce expenses’. Arif also informed me that, despite offers, he still avoids donor funding because the sector is notoriously corrupt, and, first and foremost, he and his colleagues ‘believe we are social workers’.

Asked about his political activity, Arif declared that he had become increasingly inspired by Imran Khan’s fiery speeches. Thus, he had joined the PTI’s Youth Wing, even taking up positions on its local policy council. Without prompting, he directly linked these roles to his continuing social work:

The first thing I will tell you is that no one from my family ever went into politics and I am the first person who ever took this step. The reason behind this is that until one joins politics or some power-game no one will hear you. You can become a professional social worker and do the whole nine to five thing, and you can go to all the government offices and put in requests and run after government officials, but I am not a full time social worker because I don’t have the time and I don’t take a salary. All I can do is pursue something for a few days. Hence, it becomes a necessity that one needs to be part of a power-game because otherwise your work doesn’t get done or it is very challenging to get things done in time.

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244 Sadly, Umer had also fallen ill and had to resign his stewardship of PWO.
245 I am being deliberately vague here to preserve Arif’s anonymity.
Arif also suggested that he had been in line for the party’s ticket to run in 2015’s local elections. However, he confided that he had no real intention of standing. Rather, it had all been part of a strategy to support his social work:

In our society, political affiliations matter a lot, especially for social workers. Often people, friends or relatives fight with each other or end relationships based on party affiliations. That’s how important they are. So even for a social worker it is a natural that at one point he or she will need a party affiliation.

For Arif, politics had become part of the game social workers must play to ensure they get things done. Explaining this, he distinguished between political parties’ various wings – Youth, Women, Labour etc. – and what he called the ‘mother party’ that put candidates forward for the provincial and national elections. He argued that the mother party was only open to those from the right families and with the resources to run an election campaign. In contrast, parties’ wings are where they put social workers such as himself so that they can control them. Entering required proving that you have the potential to cause problems if you were to work against a party’s local interests.

Given his new-found cynicism, I asked whether he still viewed his time in the CRG as the positive experience he once did: He replied:

[…] I told you that the work we are doing is that we tell people which government department to approach and how and what are the processes. How to build pressure to get these things done. I learnt all of that from CRG only. The CRG has mentally groomed us and enabled us in
securing our rights without fighting. So, I believe that the impact of CRG has been great for me.

Broadly viewed, Arif’s story is illustrative of the types of education that can take place within and around social accountability programmes such as STAEP. Through those he met within his CRG and the experiences he had, he learnt what it means to be a social worker in the Punjab. Broadly, as with the first vignette’s sisters, it means skilfully straddling the line between social and political work. Not shying away from it. Nonetheless, it is also notable that for Arif, social work should, as much as possible, remain disconnected from outside influences, whether that be from politicians, the state or donors. This is a far more complex picture than the idea that information and tutelage on the proper procedures will lead to depoliticised activism and responsive governance.

**Vignette three: the ex-Councillors**

On the surface, urban Multan’s CRG accorded with the general model outlined in this and the previous chapter. Indeed, a core group conducted most of its activities and its members often sought to simultaneously build their political reputations. However, its story is interesting for three additional overlapping reasons: firstly, its core group of active participants was largely comprised of female former Councillors that were already politically savvy. Secondly, none of them had strong relationships with provincial and national level politicians that they could rely upon to resolve the issues they took up. Lastly, over the course of the programme a clear rivalry emerged amongst them over competing visions for the CRG, not just its appropriation for political purposes. Exploring them further provides insights into the potential and limitations of social accountability programmes in clientelistic states.
I met three of the members from the CRG’s core group together in late 2015, a year after STAEP’s end. Nonetheless, they still introduced themselves as its President, Secretary General and Secretary General Finance, and they all spoke as if the group was still a functioning entity. It also transpired that they all lived in the same neighbourhood and were from families that had fled India during the chaos of partition. The President, herein Sofia, had been a General Councillor under Musharraf’s regime from 2001-2005 and then a Town Councillor until 2008. Although the elections were conducted on a non-party basis, she was then affiliated with the PML-N and Jamiat Ulema-e Islam parties. One of the other ladies was a teacher in a school owned by Sofia and another worked in security.  

By their own and others’ admissions, the three had been central to the CRG’s most talked about achievement: the construction of a pedestrian bridge across a busy road bordering their neighbourhood. The issue had first been raised in 2008 before the CRG’s establishment and following the death of several locals on the road, including a senior Jamiat Ulema-e Islam leader. According to CRG members, the bridge had not been completed since as it was at the intersection of three national level politicians’ constituencies. Thus, its resolution was unlikely to attract a sizable vote bank for whoever saw the work through.  

Consulting a folder stuffed with records, Sofia and her two friends argued that with the help of the CRG’s mentoring NGO – the Southern Punjab Resource Centre (SPRC) – they had pressured the National Highway Authority (NHA), a federal body, to release funds for the bridge. They also contacted local politicians to ensure things kept moving. However, no single politician was identified as instrumental; an element of the story corroborated by others. In the end, the bridge’s construction took two years and was completed in the months immediately before 2013’s elections. One of the three ladies summarised that:

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246 Owning schools was a common theme amongst the CRGs’ active women.

247 The delimitations of provincial and national constituencies have changed frequently in Pakistan and are a source of significant disputes.
One thing that we learnt from the CRG, which you can say was part of our training, was which issue is related to which department. This thing we really learnt from them, although we had a little bit of knowledge before. They would also tell us the right procedures, like who to phone, who to meet again and again. It is clear that if you take time and go, sometimes they meet and sometimes they don’t, but overall it was good for us.248

On the surface, this looked like a text-book story of social accountability enabled and supported by STAEP. However, during preparations for the bridge’s opening ceremony tensions within and from outside of the CRG surfaced. From without, a local MPA tried to take credit for the bridges’ construction and a politically ambitious headmaster began telling community members he’d been instrumental to its completion. Reflecting on this, Sofia’s group complained that the SPRC and FAFEN would not let them hang banners from the bridge highlighting their efforts to get it built. To resolve the problem, Sofia and her allies within the CRG cancelled the official opening ceremony they had planned.

From within, Sofia’s group argued that their success was resented by other members whom were jealous that they had worked towards the issue’s resolution. This resentment was said to have been compounded when Sofia’s and her friends won the CRG’s internal elections. They argued that their opponents were ‘lazy’ ‘illiterates’ that were only interested in stirring trouble in the courts and though protests. Some of their allies also suggested that Sofia’s rivals they had constantly complained to the SPRC, pestering them for membership cards. This, they argued, was really a delaying tactic to excuse their own lack of effort and connections.

248 Bisma Longi, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (02/10/2015).
Asked about these tensions, they argued that Sofia and her supporters did not want to build up an independent identity for the CRG and feared the empowerment of other members through the issuing of membership cards. To back up their claims, they suggested Sofia’s group had used some of their own money to fund the bridge’s construction and pointed to her past use of a position on a local Zakat Committee to effectively buy votes in Musharraf’s era. One also accused her of being a ‘drawing-room politician’ that would sell her allegiance to the highest bidder, as opposed to a social worker that moves amongst the community.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, unaligned interviewees argued that both Sofia’s group and her rivals had used the CRG to further their local political ambitions. They described how each would try to ensure meetings were held in their homes and compete over providing refreshments. They also overruled one another’s decisions – in their words, ‘leg-pulling’ – as to which issues to take up. Some accused them of being more interested in seizing the CRG’s internal positions than getting things done and suggested they often tried to introduce new members to meetings to ensure they won votes. As an interviewee put it; both groups were really ‘making themselves strong instead of the CRG’.

With SPRC’s endorsement, the CRG’s internal rifts were addressed by splitting it into two groups with separate activities and hierarchies. After this SPRC gradually stopped contacting Sofia’s rivals. Whilst, for their part, Sofia and her allies continued to convene the CRG, and were invited to join the district and provincial level organisations STAEP sought to establish in 2014. This essentially made them the ‘official’ CRG.

As I analysed my transcripts of interviews with Sofia’s rivals, however, it became clear that the division was about more than just their personal political ambitions. They were also led by three women, two of whom were sisters. One of the sisters had been a General Councillor during Musharraf’s era and the other was a young lawyer. The third lady, Rafa, had also been a Councillor and was now doing ad-hoc project work for national level NGOs. Rafa lived in Sofia’s neighbourhood, yet, unlike her, she
belonged to a community of refugees that had fled to Multan from East Pakistan (Bangladesh) following 1971’s civil war.

For much of the period before the CRG’s split, these ladies had worked towards securing the reinstatement of 446 local Lady Health Workers (LHWs) that had been told to stop reporting for duty. Created in 1994, Pakistan’s state run LHWs programme is its flagship healthcare initiative at the primary level. Research suggests it has had good results in treating women and children in their homes where conservative social norms and a lack of services limit their options (Zhu et al., 2014). As with other public-sector jobs, however, anecdotal evidence also suggests that roles as LHWs are often handed out by politicians as patronage. Indeed, the three CRG members argued that a local MPA had stood Multan’s LHWs down as he wanted to replace them with those he had selected.

To address this, the group’s lawyer first registered the issue with the local courts, arguing that the new crop of LHWs did not receive their roles on merit. Together, following the programme’s proper procedures, they also wrote formal letters to the Punjab’s Chief Minister and did their own ‘homework’, collecting statements from laid off LHWs. At the same time, they held protests and press-conferences across the city, and organised the LHWs into an association that they connected to those in other districts.249

Fearing the consequences, however, many of the LHWs were too afraid to attend public gatherings. In a creative act of deception, the two sisters drew upon CRG members and other lawyers they knew to play their parts, even getting them to wear the LHWs’ white uniforms at rallies and press conferences. The issue was eventually resolved with the LHWs’ reinstatement and a pay-rise. Reflecting on their success, one of the ladies commented that ‘there was power in the CRG’. Nonetheless, throughout this struggle, the group argued that they got little help from other CRG

249 Unionisation is against the law for most government employees.
members or from the SPRC. They added that the other members were ‘scared’ of the being arrested, whilst the NGO preferred to ‘stay silent’ on the issue.

In 2013, around the time of the CRG’s split, this group of ladies and members of Multan’s branch of Aurat Foundation encouraged Rafa to run for MPA as an independent candidate. Although Rafa had previously successfully contested local elections, she argued that she knew she never had a real chance of becoming an MPA. Rather, as she put it:

[...] I wanted to win without using money to back me up, my approach was if you want to give me the votes on your own then great, otherwise I don’t care. I will follow the laws and do things properly. I said I’ll run for MPA, get their work done but have no money to back me up. Instead, I said [to her friends in the CRG] spend money on my campaign, make my advertisements and campaign posters – you all are rich farmers and doctors, what are you all doing?  

Rafa also revealed that she ran to protest the treatment of her fellow refugees that had fled from East Pakistan to Multan in 1971. She explained that the majority – who lived in the neighbourhood Rafa shared with Sofia and her allies – had not been given property rights to their homes despite a government order in 2006. She attributed this to ongoing arguments between local politicians’ that wanted to monopolise the credit for the issue’s eventual resolution.

To make her point, Rafa sought to pry votes away from a local MPA whom had ignored the plight of her fellow refugees. As she put it: ‘He did not resolve our issue. He promised us and humiliated us for five years.’ Although she lost, she argued she

250 Rafa Memon, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (05/10/2015).
was happy as the MPA failed in his bid to be re-elected. As with the LHWs issue, once again SPRC did not involve itself in her scheme as it was STAEP’s policy for CRG members to exit the programme if they ran for election. Furthermore, Sofia and her faction did not lend Rafa their help. Indeed, by this time, they were rumoured to be allies of the MPA she had targeted.

As mentioned, after 2013’s elections SPRC stopped contacting the break-away group. Nonetheless, their attentions had turned to another broad cause: this time they sought to organise Multan’s home-workers (women that work in the garment industry from home) into an association to demand their rights to old age benefits. In this struggle, they were being symbolically supported by a global network of Mill Workers and shortly before we met in 2015 they had been visited by a representative from Japan.

Rafa had also once again been persuaded by her friends to compete in the forthcoming local elections.251 This time she was to directly take on Sofia as both were courting the PTI’s ticket. Although she was unsure of her prospects and believed Sofia to be using money from the area’s Zakat Committee to buy votes, she framed this as a continuation of her struggle for refugees from 1971. Furthermore, she suggested that due to her time within the CRG local market traders she had met during governance monitoring exercises were backing her.

Summing up their thoughts on STAEP and the NGO’s that implement donor funded programmes, one of Rafa’s group remarked:

> These people only work according to their project period and then they close their programmes and run away. The work should be done in such a manner that even if you do a small project you complete it and they

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251 During its 2014 extension year, STAEP trained 20,000 women to compete in the elections. However, none of my interviewees mentioned their participation.
should be in touch regularly. Even SPRC closed this project. They should have told the high command [donors] that in Pakistan we need the kind of projects that continue for some time, as recently all the institutions have started to know and understand us [the CRG]. It was when things started to work that they closed the project.²⁵²

It is difficult to doubt that achievements such as the footbridge helped many of Multan’s residents. However, it is arguable that the split represented different visions for the CRG and, by extension, the programme. One sees them as platforms for extracting resources from the state for use on local development projects. Adherents view such aims as both worthy social work and an expression of loyalty to their communities. Moreover, if it helps the individuals leading the efforts to forward their own political ambitions, then that is, depending on whether you’re a participant or staff within a mentoring NGO, either an added benefit or the inconvenient price of getting things done.

The other sees the CRGs’ as vehicles through which to address broader injustices. As part of this, members find creative ways to blend their own identities with the programme’s lessons, and to work with others to give them identities and voices. Where possible, they also aim to depersonalise and institutionalise the CRG through tools such as membership cards and the use of formal accountability mechanisms such as the courts. If opportunities to publicly engage political society or to enter party politics arise, they seize them as another means for affecting wider changes in the way and by whom politics is done.

Although it would be disingenuous to declare that any of the actors within my vignettes fully represent either vision, I have sought to show that their disagreements and fractures were often about more than just their political ambitions or allegiances. They were about the types of issues to work on and the ways of doing so. Ultimately,

²⁵² Sana Mirani, female, 30-40, urban Multan (06/10/2015)
however, Rafa and her group’s vision was side-lined by the CRG’s mentoring NGO through a mixture of the programme’s own policies and its own silences. Although it was difficult to ascertain precisely why, I surmise that this was in part because their activities did not fit the depoliticised and projectized model of social accountability propagated by donors.

Conclusion

This chapter delved deeper into the meanings that STAEP’s non-elite participants gave to the programme. It was shown that many did not distinguish between its aims and dominant ways of understanding social work in Pakistan. In practice, this meant their CRGs often became platforms upon which they sought to build their political reputations. However, tensions arose when members believed their colleagues were appropriating their groups’ efforts or building private relationships with politicians. They were compounded by the programme’s paradoxical attempt to both deny and harness members’ political identities to get things done. The chapter then turned to three vignettes that suggest some participants countered these trends by taking the programme’s lessons, techniques and aims, and creatively blending them with their own pre-existing identities and aspirations. In some cases, this dragged the resolution of issues back into the public domain and gave voice to oppressed groups, in others it harnessed political relationships to work towards the resolution of injustices with broad, non-targetable impacts. In this way, they showed that the CRGs could be vehicles for radical democratising projects. Nonetheless, it was argued that their visions were pushed to the margins of the programme as they did not fit within its dominant image of depoliticised, non-confrontational social accountability.
'You can see that in the modern world, in the world we have known since the 19th century, a series of governmental rationalities overlap, lean on each other, challenge each other, and struggle with each other: arts of government according to truth, art of government according to the rationality of the sovereign state, and art of government according to the rationality of economic agents, and more generally, according to the rationality of the governed themselves. And it is all these different parts of government, all these different types of ways of calculating, rationalising, and regulating the art of government which, overlapping each other, broadly speaking constitute the object of political debate from the 19th century.'

(Foucault, [1978/9] 2008:313)

This chapter returns to the thesis’ overarching research question: Why do civil society programmes in clientelistic states have so little impact on democracy? In response, I argue that powerful development organisations’ attempts to harness the idea of civil society render activism a technical exercise, depoliticising it and blinding themselves to both its democratic and undemocratic potentials. To unpack this, the chapter first explores the limits of the Supporting Transparency Accountability and Electoral Process (STAEP) programme’s efforts to engage in depoliticised activism in Pakistan. I argue that this ultimately failed under the weight of its own contradictions. This allowed powerful actors to strengthen their clientelistic networks and pushed processes with radical potentials to the programme’s margins. Furthermore, by translating these ground realities into its donor’s discourses, the programme missed opportunities to re-politicise the emerging idea of social accountability.

To begin to salvage them, I use this discussion to outline the contours of a theory of isomorphic activism. I argue it is needed to account for how elites can appropriate the opportunities such programmes provide to participate in public politics. I then build an argument that a refocus on the aspirations of programme participants and the micro-politics of clientelistic states would help donors to redefine their notions of
what counts as success. In conclusion, the chapter turns to the more recent literature on social accountability, commenting on how far it accounts for the issues the thesis highlights. I argue that to ensure programmes productively and sensitively engage the power and politics of the places in which they are implemented, analysts must continuously uncover and challenge neoliberal understandings of civil society.

**Depoliticised activism**

The authors of STAEP’s mid-term review argued that the Constituency Relations Groups (CRGs) were limited by the programme’s efforts to engage in ‘depoliticised activism’ (DFID, 2012:17). They suggested that this was the reason participants preferred to focus on resolving tangible, local demands, rather than wider problems with service delivery or democratic process. In contrast, I argue that the CRGs were far from depoliticised. Indeed, despite the best efforts of STAEP’s official policies, they were vehicles for their participants’ political ambitions and their conflicts. Thus, depoliticised activism is a fallacy. Acknowledging this will help social accountability programmes to begin to address the power inequalities that permeate them, and to distinguish between the democratic and antidemocratic processes they support.

Chapter Eight showed how the CRGs generally got things done. Most of their activities were undertaken by a core group of better educated and wealthier members that used the ‘proper procedures’ taught by the programme to raise and, in some cases, resolve demands. Although these core groups were not large, often with around ten active members, they understood that the idea was to challenge the corruption, nepotism and personalisation of Pakistan’s clientelistic politics by engaging and pressuring authorities through channels theoretically open to ordinary citizens. For them, acting collectively to secure accountable governance meant periodically pooling their identities as locally influential members of their communities. Many also sought to gradually depersonalise and institutionalise their
CRGs by appearing at meetings with authorities en masse, using membership cards and by conducting their advocacy efforts in public.

Nonetheless, politics was often instrumental to their efforts. Indeed, interviewees regularly told of how they had used personal and political connections to access authorities, to assure communications reached the correct office or to expedite the release of state funds. One reason this occurred was because the CRGs’ members knew they were unlikely to change Pakistan’s political system overnight. However, as this went against the spirit of the programme, the studied mentoring non-governmental organisations (NGOs) turned a blind eye to such practices if they took place outside of the forums STAEP directly supported. Moreover, as one interviewed member of staff explained: ‘We have had such examples, but we couldn’t document them because a detailed investigation would have to be carried out’.\(^{253}\) For their part, CRG members also often reasoned that using their political connections was better than suffering repeated frustrations and failures, and that it kick-started their paths to being recognised as local associations.

As shown in Chapter Nine, another, more quotidian, reason politics seeped into the CRGs concerned the overlaps between social and political work in Pakistan. As interviewees made clear, social work is a means through which the politically ambitious build their reputations as individuals concerned for their communities and, most importantly, that can get things done. Furthermore, much of what social workers do – helping people to navigate corrupt bureaucracies and persuading authorities to undertake small local development works – was what STAEP asked of them. However, because such work often requires engaging the state and securing its resources, many of the CRGs’ most active members were already affiliated with politicians before joining the programme. In return for their local reputations, information, and, in some cases, gathering votes, these relationships helped them to continue their social work on a grander scale. They also enabled some of them to prepare for the anticipated local elections.

\(^{253}\) Maqbool Ahmed, male, 40-50, mentoring NGO staff Gujrat (06/06/2015).
As it is difficult to distinguish such relationships from clientelism, STAEP’s official policies tried to deal with them by asking participants to declare their political neutrality upon volunteering for the programme or to leave when they sought to run for office. The idea was that depoliticised participants would not activate their political connections or work in the interests of a politician or party whilst raising and trying to resolve the CRGs’ demands. Yet, I found little evidence that this worked for anything other than the most overt attempts to politicise the CRGs.

Instead, the overlaps between social and political work, and the mentoring NGOs’ paradoxical attempts to both officially deny and unofficially harness them, caused significant tensions. Thus, bad comments about other participants and fractures within the CRGs generally concerned members’ attempts to build political reputations, especially in the runup to 2013’s elections. However, it was not so much that participation in the programme should not be used for this purpose. Indeed, social work, community based organisations (CBOs) and NGOs are all understood to legitimately serve dual roles. Rather, CRG members objected to their colleagues’ efforts to appropriate the credit for what were believed to be collective successes and the opportunities the platform provided to engage authorities. This is why issues such as membership cards, the CRGs’ internal elections, publicity in the media and the location for the groups’ periodic meetings were of such importance to some members.

These findings support the aidnography authors’ arguments that programmes’ discourses, favoured ways of working and even their aims are often appropriated by participants. Indeed, it is arguable that STAEP’s ideals were largely confined to CRGs’ efforts to use the proper procedures and that, beyond this, local norms, participants’ identities and political realities took over. This is not to say that the groups never got things done through the proper procedures; there were many examples of authorities with which they formed productive, working relationships that led to resolved demands that would benefit their communities. Nor is it to claim that every raised demand was designed with the dual purpose of enhancing a member’s political profile. The point is that the programme often had to fit into dominant ways
of accessing authorities, its participants’ understandings of what they were being asked to do and their wider interests. In development discourse, the programme had to ‘work with the grain’ of local power and politics (Booth, 2011; Levy, 2014).

Officially, however, the programme disavowed both Pakistan’s prevailing understandings of social work and its participants’ political identities. Instead, it sought a mythical version of civil society. Indeed, despite casting its net to community leaders, members of professional associations, unions and former elected councillors, STAEP’s policies sought to reinforce the debunked image of civil society as a bounded realm of apolitical and, in the language of the World Bank, ‘altruistic’ activities (WB, 2003:104). On the ground, this had the effect of officially denying much of the potentially useful capitals (social, cultural, economic and political) CRG members brought to the programme and it often forced their use of them into the shadows. This caused animosities to arise and some of the CRGs to fracture along political lines.

It might be suggested that it is reasonable to expect participants within social accountability programmes to put aside their political identities and relationships whilst undertaking activities. I argue, however, that in clientelistic states such as Pakistan with few or compromised formal accountability mechanisms, and with long histories of personalised bureaucracies and political systems, it is simply unrealistic. Such calls are also premised on individualistic Western notions of political identity alien to a culture within which kinship is a primary organising unit. They are also likely unworkable as liberal understandings of society as comprised of separate spheres (economic, social or civic, political and private) are uncommon in Pakistan. Most importantly, however, they contradict the very notion of the ‘social’ in the idea of social accountability as formulated in the Department for International Development’s (DFID) 2008 Briefing Paper (DFID, 2008).

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254 See Chapter Two.
255 As elsewhere.
256 See Chapter Five.
257 See Chapter Four.
power relations, and, often contentious, politics. The idea was not that programmes could immediately overcome this, but to acknowledge and use this reality in gradual, contextually sensitive processes that lead to the depersonalisation of politics, increased political participation and institutional reforms. In this sense, depoliticised social accountability falls foul of the same criticisms levelled at its predecessor; social capital. 258

If this is accepted, the challenge becomes acknowledging participants’ political identities and aspirations. I argue that doing so requires returning to ideas of identity formation, public deliberations, debate and the strength of the better argument at the heart of what Chapter Two called ‘activist’ theories of civil society. In them, emphasis is placed on a double movement: First, the creation of shared identities and opinions free from domination by coercive authorities or economic interests. Second, the public engagement of political society and the state by organised groups or their representatives. The emphasis on the publicness of the second movement is what ensures young associations’ identities and energies are not appropriated or dismissed by more powerful actors negotiating privately amongst themselves. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that when the activist theorists talked about rejecting politics, they did not mean that politics should be denied altogether. Rather, they sought alternatives to dominant modes of politics that they perceived as oppressive and unjust. In this sense, they were calling for radical democratising projects that challenge prevailing notions of progress or development.

In practice, welcoming programme participants’ political identities into the spaces donors support risks further introducing power inequalities and entrenching opposed identities. This is especially true in clientelistic states where the lines between social work, politics and clientelism are blurred, and power inequalities are often hidden. Methods and ways of addressing this must ensure that all participants have a voice, including the opportunity to scrutinise and challenge one another’s actions. However, they are likely to be contextually specific. Indeed, my findings suggest that within the

258 See Chapter Two.
studied CRGs less powerful members wanted the groups’ internal elections to be abolished, meetings to be held in neutral locations, the groups to be organised along the lines of union councils, and their travel expenses to be paid. These ideas were all aimed at creating a more even playing field and drawing members’ activities into the public sphere. Thus, the search for suitable ways to address power inequalities should begin from the insights of programmes’ participants. They are best placed to identify when power is negatively permeating the supposedly democratic spaces programmes support.

Rendering technical

Aidnography authors often argue that development programmes depoliticise the problems they face by framing them in technical terms, making them amenable to measurement, assigning them values, prices and targets (Ferguson, 1990; Abrahamsen, 2000; Li, 2007). These practices also define who are the experts, able to make other cultures visible and intelligible, and to render ground realities technical, and who is in need of their tutelage. In the case of the voluntary STAEP programme, however, I argue that the usual responsibilities for such efforts shifted from development’s professional experts to the programme’s most powerful participants. This helped it to maintain what could be termed an ‘official fiction’ within its annual reviews. In the process undemocratic practices were obscured and, in some cases, legitimised.

As indicated in the programme’s annual reviews and through my own research, The Asia Foundation (TAF) and the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) were not in favour of what they called ‘paid activism’ (DFID, 2014:9). They reasoned that it both ruins the chances of sustainability and attracts the wrong sort of self-interested

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259 Some of these were tried, but not all.
260 As Chapter Three’s discussion illustrated, power can also be put to progressive ends.
261 The phrase ‘rendering technical’ was used extensively by Li (2007) who adapted it from Rose’s (1999:79) discussion of 20th century governments’ attempts to social engineer workers’ ‘bonds of solidarity’ through processes that make them ‘amenable to technique’.
participant. Instead, they paid members of FAFEN’s existing network of NGOs to persuade citizens of the worth of its activities and aims. These NGOs were also to be their eyes and ears on the ground, and to help ensure that STAEP fulfilled the milestones and goals it had agreed with DFID.

From the beginning local politics proved central to these tasks. For example, the programme often sought to build CRGs in places the mentoring NGOs had little experience of. Accordingly, the studied groups were in large part the creations of influential members who were already embedded within political networks. Gujrat’s mentoring NGO heavily relied on the efforts of the heads of two local unions, a former spokesman for the party in power and a biraderi leader. Although there were no clear elites in Multan’s CRGs, they were led by groups of allied ex-councillors that the mentoring NGO had last engaged during Musharraf’s era. These members often saw themselves as the gatekeepers to their communities and, in some cases, as working for the mentoring NGOs. Due to the programme’s high drop-out rate, they increasingly took on these roles as they were called upon to find new participants to attend meetings and carry out activities. To do this, they often called upon their relatives, business acquaintances and political allies. By the end of the programme they had also occupied the CRGs’ internal hierarchical positions. Nonetheless, STAEP’s completion report declared that it had built a ‘support base of citizen volunteers numbering more than 10,000’ (ibid:5).

The second major way politics proved useful in rendering the programme technical was through efforts to collect governance monitoring data; the ‘information’ that is central to much of the social accountability discourse. Here too the responsibility for generating this data was, following training, passed down to participants. In practice, however, the difficulty of doing so once again meant that powerful, politically connected members of the CRGs played a pivotal role. As rural Gujrat’s elite Jahanzaib suggested, this started early:
If the CRG members had to check market rates, I already had the rate lists of the market committee through TMO [Tehsil Municipal Officer] office because I am the President of Trade Union. The rates that were required by the CRG members, I would go to any of the shops and get the rates for them. If they wanted to go to the District Headquarter Hospital, I would call the relevant MS [a qualified health worker] and tell him to provide the information required by the CRG members. If they wanted to meet someone in the police station, I would call the relevant SHO [Station House Officer] and get the CRG members whatever information they required.262

STAEP’s first two annual reviews expressed concerns over whether the information the programme generated was being used to lobby authorities (DFID, 2011d; DIFD, 2012). My own research also found that the act of collecting information and subsequent relationship building was more important than its use in holding authorities to account. However, beyond a limited qualitative study and tracking of ‘Right to Information’ requests, the programme did not track when or how governance monitoring information led to raised or resolved demands (TAF, 2013b). Instead, its generation was mostly used as a way of monitoring the CRGs and ensuring they were doing something. Within the completion report STAEP was praised for introducing ‘the unique idea of research-based advocacy for improved governance’ (DFID, 2014:5).

The last major way in which politics was useful for rendering the programme technical was in getting things done. Indeed, members often drew upon political relationships to access and pressure authorities. In some cases, this ensured the CRGs members could lobby them en masse, in others advocacy efforts took place in private, between powerful members and authorities, and out of sight of the majority of the programme’s participants. When elites were involved this often led to

262 Chaudhry Jahanzaib Derawal, male, 40-50, member rural Gujrat (29/03/2015 & 17/06/2015).
the CRGs’ most prestigious successes, winning them publicity and recognition amongst their communities. As the draft of STAEP’s first annual review and my own interviews with staff from the mentoring NGOs suggest, however, the private nature of their relationships risked the; ‘Implied endorsement of patronage-based system of governance’ (DFID, 2011:19). Nonetheless, by STAEP’s completion report, such processes were collated and represented as value for money:

[The] CRGs were able to raise 45,974 demands with government for improved service delivery and reforms (almost 60% met) at a cost of £75 per demand (significantly lower than the £144 per demand anticipated in the original budget). (DFID, 2014:2)

Taken together, this suggests that some of the CRGs’ most powerful politically connected members were crucial to DFID’s ability to render STAEP’s ground realities technical. Indeed, their voluntarism was drawn upon to build the CRGs, and to produce reams of data and figures that were used to monitor them and represent STAEP’s ‘pioneering and successful model’ in the DFID’s public texts (ibid:5).

In this way, the programme’s most powerful participants became its ‘experts’, occupying pivotal positions amongst the chain of actors responsible for both enacting the programme’s solutions to poor governance and translating its messy ground realities into DFID’s technical discourses (Kothari, 2005). In the process, however, difficult questions around the clientelistic practices they were involved in were obscured. My thesis, therefore, contributes to the aidnography literatures’ understanding of how programmes are rendered technical and depoliticised. Specifically, it suggests that powerful and politically connected participants may take part in such processes. Moreover, in doing so, they may gain opportunities to further legitimise their positions within undemocratic political networks, whilst undermining programmes’ wider democracy enhancing aims.
I would add, however, that interviewed CRG members’ repeated disdain for the mentoring NGOs’ reporting procedures or, in their terms, ‘paperwork’, their requests for additional participants, and the identification of ever more issues points to a deeper malaise. It concerns the need to maintain an official fiction that substituted attendance for mobilisation, identified and raised issues for voice, and generated information for local political insight. This fiction washed over the difficult questions raised in the programme’s formative years and by its end was used to justify the replication, albeit with ‘adaptations’, of STAEP’s model within other initiatives in Pakistan (DFID, 2014:5).

Neoliberalism and new clientelism

Chapter Four argued that the struggle between an activist and neoliberal version of civil society theory is discernible within the social accountability discourse. Broadly, the former concerns itself with issues of identity, power relations, contentious politics and alliances that straddle conceptual state-society divides; the latter with the accumulation of transactions between informed, rationally acting clients and competing service providers. However, I also argued that the social accountability discourse – as seen through texts from the World Bank and DFID – is part of wider, more recent attempts to impart a depoliticised, market based notion of citizenship to people in the West and elsewhere (Block and Somers, 2014; Davies, 2014; Brown, 2015).

To some degree, the local elites that helped bring STAEP to life both on the ground and in its technical annual review documents became part of this. However, for most participants little changed. Indeed, they did not become the neoliberal theorists’ ideal citizens, making decisions based on cost-benefit calculations and looking from the state’s inefficient services to those provided by the private sector. Rather, they saw the programme as an opportunity to continue their social work and build their political reputations. This was not so much an act of resistance as the some
aidnography authors understand it, as it was an attempt to live ‘side by side’ with the programme’s neoliberal vision of citizenship, civil society and governance (Peck, 2013:135). In Foucault’s terminology, the programme’s attempt to change its participants’ ‘conduct of conducts’ was clearly limited.263 Moreover, many CRG members dropped out or decided that they were unwilling to spend their capitals monitoring either the state or one another. As my case studies suggest, many also grew frustrated with the domination of their groups by powerful and politically connected members.

Participants’ reactions to the programme ranged from angry and disappointed, to emboldened by what they had learnt and the new networks they had formed. However, there is a wider danger that the official fictions found within programmes’ annual reviews become the standard way of assessing them. The risk is that through sanitised, technical documents with impressive figures and depictions of year-on-year progress, organisations such as DIFD institutionalise the idea that holding meetings and getting things done are sufficient proxies for empowerment and accountability. In this sense, the problem may be less about neoliberal development programmes limiting their participants’ political horizons and more about entrenching a market-based logic amongst those that fund them. As Mosse (2004:14) suggests it is often ‘donors who are disciplined by their own discourse’. I join others that have argued this issue has been compounded in recent years through political pressure on DFID to demonstrate ‘value for money’, reducing every action it supports on the ground to a price and, in the process, washing over the power and politics in the places it works (Eyben, 2013; Bächtold, 2014; Valters and Whitty, 2017).

Given this, it is arguable that an additional reason the appropriation of STAEP’s opportunities went unchallenged by donors is that neoliberal models of citizenship and governance are difficult to distinguish from the ‘new’ mode of clientelism that characterises young democracies such as Pakistan (Hopkin, 2006).264 Both understand democracy as about, sometimes monetised, transactions between citizens and

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263 See Chapter Three
264 See Chapter Five.
political elites. Both also view service provision as the result of competitions between citizens vying for the attentions of authorities, with collective action as periodically necessary for the maximisation of individual gains. Accordingly, they both pass the responsibility for welfare to individual citizens that must either make the right choices in markets of service providers or position themselves within the right networks. In this sense, neoliberalism and new clientelism can both be understood as totalising ideologies as to how politics should be done.

Although they accord important roles for information and state-society interactions, there is little room for the meanings of freedom and popular sovereignty found within liberal political theory. Furthermore, gone are the processes of public deliberations, identity formation, civil disobedience and society-state coalition forming at the base of activist understandings of civil society. The danger is that analysts of programmes’ potentials to contribute to wider democratising projects are stripped of a conceptual vocabulary with which to explore them. This further reduces them to the sorts of quantitative assessments I have argued characterised STAEP’s annual reviews.

Even if this critique is accepted, it remains important to be able to identify the spread of neoliberal models of citizenship and governance, and to distinguish it from the forms clientelism takes in different contexts. This is not because one is imposed by developed countries on developing, or even because each may require different solutions. Rather, this thesis has shown that it is because they complement one another, eroding citizens’ abilities to participate in the public sphere in subtle ways that are often written out of donors’ dominant discourses. This can help powerful actors and networks to maintain and legitimise their privileged positions, and it justifies reductive visions of civil societies that misrepresent how they have historically contributed to ongoing democratising projects through processes that are embedded in power and politics. The challenge for analysts is to consistently uncover how and why this occurs in different programmes.
Radical potentials

The aidnography authors argue that researchers must go beyond the perverse pleasure of exposing ‘another example of neoliberal devastation, or neo-imperialist dispossession, or capitalist exploitation’ (McKinnon, 2017:2). In addition, they must view development programmes as sites of experimentation and uncover how participants strive to forge their own emancipatory paths. Chapter Nine sought to do this by outlining two competing visions that were discernible within the CRGs. In one, members saw them as platforms upon which to build political reputations and for extracting resources from the state for use on targeted local development projects. Put another way, business as usual. In the other, as vehicles through which to challenge broader injustices. Adherents to this vision sought to organise and raise the voice of oppressed groups. They also used their personal political connections to create opportunities for others to publicly engage members of political society, and they entered election races as another means through which to challenge Pakistan’s clientelistic politics.

As Chapter’s Two’s discussion of case studies of ‘actually existing’ civil societies showed, there is already a body of literature that explores how clientelism has been eroded in diverse South Asian contexts. Taking the long view, much of it focuses on ‘synergies’ between citizens and states that arise from ties and coalitions that cross society-state divides. The suggestion is that these are as important for the formation of new identifies, and economic and political outcomes as the density of and horizontal links between civic associations. This is because they create opportunities for each to learn about the others’ needs and wants, permeate one another organisations, and for citizens to hold authorities to account. Adherents to this idea call for research that uncovers instances and arrangements that connect communities, NGOs and social movements with reformist individuals and organisations inside the state. Furthermore, they are clear that they are likely to be part of, and to develop through messy and often regressive cycles of conflict and cooperation among rival political groups.
More recently, Tilly (2007) has argued that in young democracies clientelism can have an ambiguous relationship to democracy over the long-run. To illustrate, he turns to mid-19th century America. He shows how a proliferation of fraternal orders, benefits societies, fire companies and ethnicity based immigrants’ clubs advanced parochial and special interests within the growing nation. Furthermore, they used violence and intermediaries to displace rivals and to sell their votes to the highest bidder. Nonetheless, as these associations and their wider trust networks had more public dealings with the state’s bureaucracy and political parties these characteristics were gradually eroded.265

Through such interactions, previously exclusionary associations began to frame themselves as unexclusive official membership organisations, aligned their practices with the rule of law, and started to rely on public services. Gradually, this gave them ever greater stakes in the state’s functioning. This included an interest in the health of its ongoing democratising project, which provided them with a public sphere within which to non-violently engage their rivals, a voice in decisions that would affect them, and confidence that underperforming institutions or politicians would be held accountable. In some cases, they even disbanded to join or create newer associations and networks that could further legitimise their participation in such public processes.

Tilly shows that these processes were somewhat paradoxically facilitated by existing clientelist networks (Tilly, 2007a:98). They gave reformist leaders in political society a plethora of ready-made and well organised associations to interact with. They also gave potential civil society leaders wishing to establish newer, less exclusive and more public networks the initial identities, skills and connections to do so rapidly. Tilly, therefore, challenges the view found within much of the donors’ social accountability discourse that clientelistic networks are artefacts of previous eras or distortions of market-based rationalities to be brushed aside on the way to liberal or neoliberal governance models. Instead, he argues that ‘however much we may

265 This process is told through the protagonist’s story in the film *Gangs of New York*. 

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deplore political participation on the basis of personal ties and group prejudice, the absorption of newcomers into politics through patronage facilitated the integration of previously segregated trust networks into public politics’ (2007a:104).

Although Tilly’s nuanced vision complicates investigations of civil society’s relationship to clientelism and democratisation, it accords with others’ macro and historical visions of how clientelistic democracies operate, and how they can gradually begin to change through broad, public political participation (North et al., 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; WB, 2016). Furthermore, it joins recent state and city level relational studies that explore how societal groups, including NGOs, are connected to one another, political society and the state, and why they may choose to take-part in, capture or exit deliberative public processes that contribute to democratising projects (Heller and Evans, 2010; Baiocchi et al., 2011; Boulding, 2014).

There is not, however, a vast complementary body of literature that illustrates what such processes look like inside donor funded development programmes, at the local level, between individuals, small groups and political society in young clientelistic democracies. Indeed, the aidnography literature tends to offer critiques from the perspective of social justice and to uncover acts of resistance to imported modes of governance, but it does not often theorise challenges to or the breakdown of clientelism. Whilst the contemporary social accountability literature (explored further below) is mostly quantitative, approaching programmes as experiments in which information and/or citizens forums are conceptualised as the ‘treatment’, and improvements in service provision or perceptions of the state the desired outcomes. Thus, neither uncover the micro-processes programmes, intentionally and unintentionally, support that could be said to challenge clientelism or to contribute to wider democratising projects that change how politics is done and by whom.

My thesis, therefore, contributes a case study of how participants within a social accountability programme challenged the power relations that sustain Pakistan’s clientelistic politics. Although this is most clear in the cases of Multan’s ex-councillors and their protests on behalf of those wronged by patronage politics; it was also
discernible through the way in which the sisters in Gujrat city publicly drew upon their private political connections to get things done and gave opportunities to others to engage those authorities for their own ends. The difficulty of both within a country in which women are *de facto* barred from the public sphere should not be underestimated. However, I also argue that the education Arif received from the programme and his fellow CRG members in how to skilfully straddle the line between social and political work, neither succumbing to patronage politics or rejecting political participation altogether, constitutes a challenge to clientelism. Indeed, if there were more Arifs in Pakistan the route from social work to patronage politics would begin to look less like an accepted cultural norm and more like an illegitimate perversion of democracy. Additional research would be needed to gauge the lasting impacts of these challenges.

The next two sections aim to further aid future thinking on social accountability programmes in clientelistic states. The first outlines the contours of a theory of elite capture that is needed to refine understandings of how the radical democratic potential of programmes is undermined. The second comments on the idea of empowerment within the social accountability discourse to better help practitioners recognise and support it.

**Isomorphic activism**

The problem of elite capture came to the fore in the early 2000s through evidence reviews of participatory and community driven development programmes (Bierschenk et al., 2002; Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Beard and Dasgupta, 2007). It was argued that these programmes – which often seek to

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266 A recent paper from Collier (2017) explores ways changes in political cultures can be quantitatively modelled.

267 Bierschenk et al. (2002) do not use the term ‘elites’. Instead, they create the category of African ‘development brokers’, which denotes local entrepreneurs with the skills and connections to drain off rents from what they call ‘decentralised aid’ projects. Beyond commenting on the fracturing of power at the local level, they do not explore what the rise of these actors may mean for programmes’ wider aims.
provide part of the funds for communities to engage in collectively agreed local development projects – can effectively be dominated by elites who target the material benefits towards themselves and their supporters. This can occur through their control of decision-making processes, embezzlement or the awarding of jobs and contracts.

More recently, a distinction has been drawn between elite capture and elite control (Lund and Saito-Jensen, 2013; Warren and Visser, 2016). The latter is portrayed as situations within which elites’ monopolisation of processes does not necessarily make other programme participants or community members materially worse off and may even be deemed legitimate by them. For some, elite control is necessary in contexts within which only the better off and connected can contribute money, navigate local bureaucracies or mobilise others. This is perhaps what the authors of 2004’s World Development Report had in mind with their suggestion that in some cases donors may have to settle for the ‘benevolent capture’ of their programmes (WB, 2003:209).

I argue that notions of elite capture and control that focus on the material benefits and quantifiable aspects of social accountability programmes are inadequate for exploring their potentials to contribute to wider democratising projects. Instead, I propose a theory of ‘isomorphic activism’ that describes how elites reduce programmes’ democratic potentials by appropriating the opportunities for other participants to engage in public politics. Before formally exploring the theory, it is necessary to outline the meanings and use of its constituent words. This should also give readers a better idea of my inspiration for this turn of phrase.

‘Isomorphism’ and ‘isomorphic mimicry’ have been terms used in biology since the 19th century. They denote ‘the process by which one organism mimics another to gain an evolutionary advantage’ (Krause, 2013:1). They have since been taken up within other fields to describe situations in which individuals, organisations or entire systems take on similar shapes, forms and sizes to others. Within development, the idea of isomorphic mimicry has been used to cast doubt on the success of large,
donor funded top-down institutional reform programmes (Pritchett et al., 2010; Andrews, 2012). Critics’ research suggests that recipient states are often incentivised to take the forms prescribed by experts without adopting the attendant mind-sets or developing contextually sensitive practices. This, they argue, is why years of development programmes aimed at institutional reforms have had ambiguous results. Such arguments have given rise to calls to ‘do development differently’ by acknowledging and carefully working with the social and political norms that animate societies (Ramalingam, 2013; Levy, 2014). These calls are explored further later.

Perhaps due to its overtly political or disruptive connotations, ‘activism’ is not currently a popular term amongst Western state based and multilateral development organisations. I use it here instead of social accountability as it better captures what programme participants actually do in young clientelistic democracies with few or compromised formal accountability mechanisms. Indeed, as my research suggests, rather than using information to activate formal procedures or blindly trying unresponsive official channels, they engage in an assemblage of practices. These will often include creative combinations of actions that draw upon their existing identities, aspirations, networks and political connections, and, in some cases, will encompass civil disobedience. This enables them to build new collective identities, raise their voice and publicly engage authorities. The common thread is a shared idea of the public good and a commitment to realising it through actions in the public sphere. The longer-term goal is often building public relationships with state-based and political authorities that enable them to consistently have a say in types of lives they want to lead.

I theorise that: *isomorphic activism occurs when elite participants in social accountability programmes use their positions within wider clientelistic networks to publicly adopt the form and shape of activism, whilst privately appropriating the*

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268 This does not include international non-governmental organisations, such as Oxfam or ActionAid, who routinely describe their activities as activism.

269 A similar point is made by Boulding (2014) in her study of Bolivian NGOs.

270 In this sense, social accountability in states such as Pakistan is, albeit on a micro-level, much closer to what civil society theorists described as happening in Eastern Europe and South America in the 1970s and 1980s. See Chapter Two.
opportunities programmes promise other participants to participate in public politics. Furthermore, I hypothesize that isomorphic activism is more likely in vastly unequal societies, when programmes rely on a small number of intermediaries to act as interlocutors with participants, and when they have predefined, often quantifiably measurable, templates of what civil society mobilisation, responsive governance and democratic political participation – in short, ‘success’ – looks like.

The conditions for isomorphic activism outlined below do not need to occur in a specific order and they will be present in different contexts to different degrees. However, all should be understood as limiting the potential of social accountability programmes to contribute to democratising projects in clientelistic states.

The first condition of isomorphic activism concerns the ability of one or a group of powerful programme participants to build associations within which most members are connected to them in some way.\textsuperscript{271} This can hinder the idea of identity formation central to activism. In STAEP this process occurred from the start and accelerated as the programme sought new entrants to fill its targets for mobilisation. It was also aided when some of the CRGs split due to rivalries.

The second concerns the ability of elites to drive the processes, bargains and decisions that lead to desired outcomes or successes into the private sphere.\textsuperscript{272} This contravenes the requirement of publicness common to visions of activism and democratisation. Within STAEP, this was most clearly demonstrated by the way some elites used private meetings with politicians to gain their CRGs’ most prestigious successes. This was confirmed by other participants’ lack of participation in these meetings or knowledge of what went on.

The third condition of isomorphic activism is the ability of elites to convince others, including programme participants, implementing organisations and donors, that they are not engaged in the previous two activities.\textsuperscript{273} Within STAEP this was discernible.

\textsuperscript{271} Drawing from Bourdieu’s ideas of different sorts of capitals.
\textsuperscript{272} Drawing from Bourdieu’s idea that some will have the ability to bend the rules.
\textsuperscript{273} Drawing from Bourdieu’s idea of symbolic capital.
through the way in which other participants would speak of the CRGs’ elites in reverent terms and when the mentoring NGOs rubber stamped their positions as the groups’ leaders. It was also evident from the annual reviews’ official fictions.

The last condition concerns the ability of elites to appropriate the energies of, and opportunities intended for, other programme participants. This distinguishes isomorphic activism from theories of elite capture or control that concentrate on material benefits. Instead, the emphasis is on the political reputations participants can individually and collectively accrue through their efforts to raise their voices, and the public relationships they can form with authorities through repeated engagements. This recognises that challenging clientelism and the advancing democratising projects requires the formation of new individual and collective political identities, and of new mutually supportive public relationships that straddle the conceptual society-state divide. Indeed, I argue that this double movement is more important for democratic outcomes than the provision of information or getting things done.

Before moving on, a brief comment on my hypotheses. They all suggest that the more powerful an elite relative to other programme participants the easier they will find it to dominate associations and drive crucial engagements into the private sphere. Moreover, the less likely they are to be challenged when doing so. However, I would add that my research indicates that some donors’ continued enthusiasm for rendering what are political programmes technical provides additional opportunities for elites to engage in isomorphic activism. Indeed, where programme’s reporting routines and outcomes are reduced to quantifiable activities, wealthy and educated elites will have an advantage in occupying positions as their frontline ‘experts’, able to fulfil donors’ reductive images of what civil society activism looks like. This problem will likely be compounded when they are also the primary interlocutors between a programme’s implementers and the communities it seeks to work in.

Although isomorphic activism is always likely to be an issue, efforts to address it require better understandings of local politics, including individual programme
participants’ positions within political networks. The first requires programmes to conduct thorough appraisals of the places they work, at both the societal and governance levels they want to work at (e.g. neighbourhoods and district administrations). Here I join others that argue that the context matters and that tools such as political economy analyses must be mainstremed, that they cannot just be conducted at the national level, that they are best conducted by locals, and that they must be updated throughout a programme’s lifespan (Menocal and Sharma, 2008; O’Meally, 2013; Grandvoinnet et al., 2015). However, I also argue that programmes that seek to engage and draw upon the capacities of locally influential non-state actors have an additional responsibility. They must be able to account for how their participants are positioned within wider, potentially clientelistic, networks and how they may be able to use these positions to subvert the programme’s broader aims, whilst still achieving its measurable outputs.

The use of Bourdieu’s ideas of capitals (social, economic, cultural, political, and symbolic) in Chapter Eight suggests that those with the potential to drive the processes underpinning isomorphic activism are likely to derive their power from a range of contextually specific sources. This makes cut-off points based on indicators such as wealth or political party membership for who is and is not allowed to take part in programmes arbitrary. Moreover, there is no predefined reason why one elite would use his or her power in such ways and another not. Instead, I would argue that alongside political economy analyses, three overlapping things can be done to detect and limit the chances of isomorphic activism:

Firstly, very rough and ready social network analyses. Although the methodology has long been used to model elites and their relations, I do not think statistical analyses are required (Lauman and Pappi, 1976; Knoke, 1990). Rather, simply asking participants in programmes about their backgrounds, memberships and affiliations, and combining their answers with political economy analyses should give astute programmers an idea of their potentials to engage in isomorphic activism. This will also allow for an understanding of the political representativeness – whichever way that is defined – of the groups programmes support. Employing NGOs and
programme managers from the places in which programmes are implemented can greatly help these aims.

Secondly, if outsiders aim to support people to engage authorities, a minimum requirement must be that they do so in public. As stressed, by driving advocacy efforts and negotiations into the private sphere elites both undermine and gain opportunities to appropriate others’ collective efforts. They also deny them opportunities to object to their actions, to engage authorities, and to form their individual and collective identities. In this regard, it is notable that Chapter Nine’s vignettes showed how personal political relationships may still be drawn upon to create opportunities for other members to publicly engage authorities. Alongside such opportunities, I suggest that the wider group must be told what occurred in private meetings and given the opportunity to overturn decisions.

Lastly, Joshi (2014) has called for programmes to adopt a ‘causal chain’ approach to understand how the context affects desired outcomes. Broadly, this means unpicking each step of a programme’s theory of change, asking questions such as: Is the information provided to participants useful? Is the information credible? Can citizens mobilise? Which citizens mobilise? Will their actions have any impact? Who will be their allies and opponents outside of and within the state? Who benefits from the outcomes? What are the likely long-term results? I suggest social accountability programmes could usefully adopt such a strategy to follow participants from an issue’s identification to its resolution. This could be done randomly or be targeted at specific groups. These ideas might seem like a high bar for programmes, but without them there is a significant risk of missing opportunities to contribute to ongoing democratising projects or strengthening undemocratic networks.

274 Not all of these are Joshi’s (2014) questions. I have added some to address the problem of isomorphic mimicry in social accountability programmes in clientelistic states. Moreover, the list is by no means exhaustive.
Politicised empowerment

This section uses the thesis’ empirical research findings to argue that deeper understandings are needed of people’s reasons for participating within donors’ programmes, including their political aspirations, and how these are embedded within the wider power and politics of the places they live. Doing so should encourage a rethink of what success looks like in voluntary programmes implemented in young clientelistic democracies with few formal accountability mechanisms.

In its chapter on empowerment, 2004’s *World Development Report* referenced Appadurai’s (2001, 2004) idea of the ‘capacity to aspire’. However, I took it to task in Chapter Four for leaving his work unexplored. Had the report’s authors not done so, they may have seen his suggestion that to support the empowerment of people in developing countries outsiders should think in terms of a ‘cultural map of aspirations’. These maps detail the social norms that either limit or expand what people view as possible. Appadurai argues that, when directly asked by researchers or authorities, poor people’s maps will mostly be concerned with very immediate and day-to-day needs. Furthermore, if these maps remain unconnected to wider structures, such as discourses and status inequalities, outsiders are likely to incorrectly assume that they have little desire for transformational changes. This risks an undue focus on the ‘science’ and ‘calculation’ of poverty and disempowerment, and it can limit support to efforts to change participants ‘conduct of conduct’s’. To avert this, he concludes that development programmes should place their proposed ‘techniques’ or ‘material inputs’ inside their participants’ aspirational maps and view them against their wider contexts. In what follows, I use my research to do this, drawing out the meanings of empowerment for STAEP’s participants.

Before proceeding, a caveat: aside from women, STAEP tried but, in practice, often failed to include those belonging to Pakistan’s marginalised groups. Furthermore, my research suggests that unless programmes seek to raise small groups of activists by paying for their time and expenses, especially in the country’s vast rural regions, they
are unlikely to be able to include poorer participants in any substantive way. Thus, I do not claim any broad generalisability for the following observations. Instead, I provide a snapshot of members of Pakistan’s middle-classes that volunteered for a largely experimental programme, at a particular time in the country’s history. Nonetheless, I hope it will be of use to others working in similar contexts.

My research highlighted that participants join voluntary programmes such as STAEP for a variety of reasons, many of which have little to do with its declared aims. For example, within the studied CRGs some participants joined out of curiosity about what goes on within NGOs, some valued the opportunity the programme provided to socialise, and others were persuaded by their kin and acquaintances to attend a few meetings as a favour to them, to make up numbers. There was also a significant element that saw the programme as an opportunity to gain skills and contacts that could lead to future employment. Indeed, many went on to work for the CRGs’ mentoring NGOs. In this sense, my interviewees’ reasons for joining the voluntary programme were as diverse as one would expect them to be in other contexts.

However, I also found that many of the most active participants saw the CRGs as an opportunity to continue their localised social work and to realise their political ambitions. With regards to the first, my research suggested that within Pakistan there is a section of society, often referred to as ‘social workers’, that play a valuable role helping the less fortunate and less educated to engage and navigate the state’s bureaucracy. This, many suggested, is a necessary feature of life under a state with opaque institutions and procedures, and prone to everyday exclusions and corruption. The most respected social workers were often talked of in reverential terms, with interviewees praising their lack of other motives, personal or political. Amongst some of the programme’s participants, there was a desire to learn how to become social workers, which it was generally suggested requires free time, a familiarity with the state’s institutions and relationships with authorities.

The social accountability discourse’s promise of depersonalised, efficient state and private services seeks to do away with the need for such actors. However, within
states such as Pakistan this is a long-term, generational goal. Thus, programmes that want immediate, quantifiable impacts should support those that wish to become social workers ‘in the meantime’. Broadly viewed, STAEP did this, providing trainings on the workings of the state, including such basic information as different departments’ responsibilities, bureaucratic procedures and their internal hierarchies. Many interviewees spoke of the value of such knowledge, which should not be confused with efforts to make people aware of their rights. However, the link between the everyday work of social workers and wider democratizing projects is far from clear.

Providing the start of an answer, it was notable that many of the CRGs’ most active members saw their participation in STAEP’s social work as a way to build their political reputations and relationships. As long as they did not attempt to appropriate collective efforts or credit, this was not widely considered to be a problem by others. Nonetheless, donors often view political parties or politicised associations as something to be avoided or denied. Although part of the reason may be fear of being seen to interfere in foreign countries’ affairs and laws that prevent them from doing so, I have argued that another is due to their unpredictability and the difficult of quantifying their activities. Indeed, there is little room for political ideas or identities within neoliberal ideals of citizenship and governance. Thus, even when they aim to change how it is done, programmes often proceed with an official fiction that they stop where politics begins.

Despite this, towards its end, STAEP sought to acknowledge its participants’ political aspirations. This was done in a number of ways, such as through the creation of Citizens’ Charters that presented lists of local demands and wider policies to candidates in 2013’s national elections, and the training of 20,000 women to compete in the anticipated local elections. Although these initiatives are to be welcomed, I argue that to fulfil their claims to support ongoing democratizing projects, programmes must acknowledge participants’ ‘day-to-day’ political

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275 Upon reflection, I suspect that one of the reasons this was initially difficult for me to grasp is that Western conceptions of charity and the third sector call for such overlaps to be masked or denied.
aspirations and identities. Indeed, rather than denying politics and, thereby, giving powerful actors opportunities to capture programmes, it should be embraced as the primary means of affecting change.

On the one hand, this would require that the spaces donors support allow these aspirations to be publicly aired and debated, with rules devised to minimise the operation of overt and hidden power. As Chapter Two’s discussion of the 1990s civil society theorists suggested, this requires an effort to ‘unbracket inequalities in the sense of explicitly thematising them’ through no-holds-barred discussions and various levelling mechanisms such as voting, agreed upon rules of argumentation or defined spaces for marginalised groups (Fraser, 1990:64). Nonetheless, as already argued, such efforts must be contextually specific, with participants’ preferences and innovations generally given precedence over Western normative ideals of internal elections, transparency or communicative procedures.

On the other hand, it would mean acknowledging that political identities and aspirations will be leveraged in efforts to get things done. What is important is that this occurs in public or, failing this, that it leads to opportunities for others to publicly engage political authorities. Some of the CRGs’ members suggested that the programme encouraged them to create the latter. For example, a female participant from Multan city described how her CRG held ‘corner meetings’ for which politically connected members invited politicians from different parties. At the gathering, members of the public were given opportunities to make demands of the politicians. The same CRG would also find out where politicians planned to hold their own gatherings and turn up en masse with local women and the press to raise issues. It is perhaps no coincidence that this interviewee was part of the group of female ex-councillors that encouraged one of the CRGs’ members to publicly challenge a local politician by running for his provincial assembly seat despite having little reason to believe she would win.

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276 Sana Mirani, female, 40-50, member urban Gujrat (06/10/2015 & 09/10/2015).
The role of information in social accountability programmes in clientelistic states with few formal accountability mechanisms should also be re-examined. My research found that the participants’ use of ‘information’ was less about sanctioning authorities or even tracking improvements in service provisions, and more about beginning conversations that could lead to the resolution of specific demands and relationships with authorities. Furthermore, governance monitoring data was often augmented with CRG members’ own efforts to do their ‘homework’ and create a ‘file’ on specific issues containing additional information, statements and press clippings before approaching authorities. This detective like work is much closer to what activists do when campaigning on local issues.\textsuperscript{277} It is also far more political in the sense that it often points to the specific causes of problems and highlights those that are suffering in more granular ways than institutional performance measures. It is notable that a raft of state institutions in Pakistan are now producing publicly available performance data. However, this data is rarely linked to political decisions in the press and quite difficult for most to interpret. Thus, there is a danger of information overload, with programmes and states producing data that is rarely used to hold them to account. Donors could support both the more detective type of data collection and the use of state produced data with trainings in basic analysis techniques to activist groups and the media.

Amongst the most active members of social accountability programmes in states such as Pakistan, many are likely to already be close to or positioned within political networks. As Tilly (2007) suggests, these identities can paradoxically lead to opportunities to have their members interests debated and challenged in the public sphere; essentially, put to the test. If this was the goal of social accountability programmes, indicators that track their progress and evaluate them would not just focus on demands raised through official channels or, as is increasingly common, institutional performance. Instead, they may be assessed on creating opportunities for public deliberations, the formation of public relationships with reform minded authorities, or the politicisation of issues and institutions that were previously

\textsuperscript{277} The frequency with which this occurred across research sites leads me to believe this was part of the CRGs’ training but I could not confirm this.
dominated by networks of power and privilege. They may also directly seek to support new entrants into political society and track their progress, whether that is informally as leaders of their own associations or formally as candidates in elections. These are difficult suggestions that require more complex and contextually situated understandings of what empowerment and democratic ‘successes’ might look like at the micro-level in clientelistic states and from the perspective of programmes’ participants. They are also unlikely to be achieved within the average span of development programmes which often begin and end over a single parliament.

Acknowledging the political identities and aspirations of participants would further help counter reductive visions of civil societies as somehow apolitical or as tabula rasas that programmes are implemented upon. Instead, those that seek to contribute to wider ongoing democratising projects may devote more energy to supporting existing networks that are already struggling to create opportunities for people to participate in public politics, addressing political injustices and challenging clientelism by exposing its moral and material foundations. My research suggests that in Pakistan women that were affiliated with groups, such as the Aurat Foundation, that grew out of struggles for rights and democracy in the 1980s provide a promising start. Indeed, those connected to them had more radical visions for their CRGs’ than their fellow participants and were already plugged into political networks that helped them achieve their aims.

Efforts to identify and work with such participants and networks may be particularly important for voluntary programmes and for those that want to see ‘new’ faces enter formal politics. International actors may also help to link them with others working on similar issues at home and abroad, and play a protective role when allies cannot be found within the state to shield groups from coercive opposition (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Appadurai, 2001; Kaldor, 2003a). Such an approach also seems far more realistic than efforts to artificially create civil society from the top-down in places that outsiders know little about. However, a note of caution: As discussed in Chapter Five, in countries such as Pakistan foreign fingerprints have, on occasion, proved harmful to civic organisations and nascent social movements (Akhtar, 2006;
Bano, 2012). Thus, the form and visibility of outsiders’ support must be carefully negotiated on a case by case basis, with locals setting the agenda and identifying windows of opportunity to push for desired changes.

It may be argued, however, that stories such as those in the Chapter Nine’s vignettes are too contingent on seemingly uncontrollable factors, such as participants’ pre-existing identities and the availability of ‘worthy’ causes, for donor organisations to support. Moreover, this makes throwing their expertise and symbolic weight behind them a risk that could end in failure or embarrassment. It might also be argued that their sporadic, localised nature means they are unlikely to have broader or lasting impacts in clientelistic states. In response, I reply that if donors wish to social engineer state-society relations, in any way, they have a duty under the ‘do no harm’ principle to understand their programmes’ participants’ identities and aspirations. This includes understanding how the processes they support play out in the long-run, after funding has ceased. Doing otherwise risks contributing to unintended processes such as isomorphic activism.

Before moving on, it is necessary to briefly further comment on the challenge of mobilising poorer voters to participate in programmes that seek to raise their voice. Addressing this, Blair (2005) argues that in ‘patronage democracies’ such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, where Wood’s (2003) ‘Faustian bargain’ characterises the lives of large numbers of poor voters, efforts to support civil society advocacy programmes should proceed with caution. For the most part, they should seek to mobilise coalitions of more secure poor and middle-class activists to advocate on issues that have universal appeal and are unlikely to induce immediate repression from elites or the state. For example, Blair argues that advocacy organisations focused on improvements to education services and, perhaps, crime could unite voters across Bangladesh, whilst also avoiding issues with elite capture due to the minimal rents that can be accrued in the sector. Only later, when such campaigns have provided safe training grounds for poorer voters and forged working

278 See Chapter Two for detail on patronage democracies (Chandra 2007).
relationships across class divisions can issues which more directly affect the poor’s welfare be taken up, such as labour rights or land reforms. Such an approach seems sensible, but it calls for programmes to play out over decades and successive governments rather than the four- or five-year life spans that are currently common to the international development sector.

In findings that echo my own, Blair (2018) has recently used a review of social accountability initiatives in India argue that civil society advocacy efforts should be combined with more formalised, tools-based (e.g. scorecards, right to information and participatory budgeting) programmes, especially when policy changes are the goal. Indeed, he argues that the country’s ongoing democratisation project has benefited from the ‘rise of the plebeians’ by which he means a new strata of lower caste political activists and politicians able to use such tools and raise their voices to hold authorities to account (Jaffrelot and Kumar, 2009). He warns, however, that when focussed on local-level goals or service provision, the middle-classes and elites will often still dominate the public sphere and, thereby, disproportionately accrue benefits of the plebeians’ efforts. Blair concludes, therefore, that more research is needed to discern which combination of social accountability tools and modes of advocacy are most effective at helping the poor. Whilst I agree with this call, there is little sign of a similar ‘plebeian’ class in contemporary Pakistan.

**Enabling what?**

This section briefly comments upon the implications of my research for the contemporary literature on social accountability. Broadly characterised, the field is grappling with a growing consensus that information is not sufficient for accountability relationships or for wider desired changes, such as institutional reforms or democratisation. It is also coming to terms with the difficulty of engaging the power and politics of the places within which programmes are implemented. I argue that the recent focus on supporting ‘enabling environments’ for accountability
must mean more than reforming or establishing state institutions. I also suggest that efforts to ‘vertically integrate’ programmes by connecting them to different levels of governance risks falling foul of isomorphic activism. Lastly, I comment on the accountability of programmes themselves.

In a recent paper on social accountability programmes, Fox (2015) – a long proponent of the idea that accountability relationships are embedded in politics – argues that calls for an expanded evidence base as to ‘what works’ are largely misguided. His argument is premised on systematic evidence reviews that all broadly conclude that the context is as important, if not more important than, the types of accountability tools programmes adopt and the information they provide (O’Neil et al., 2007; O’Meally, 2013; Grandvoinnet et al., 2015). He supports his argument with re-readings of influential impact evaluations of programmes in Indonesia and India that suggest that practitioners often miss or overlook the unique contextual factors that lead to or block accountability (Olken, 2007; Banerjee et al., 2010). These often include ongoing efforts by states to improve services and to institutionalise formal accountability mechanisms, and the establishment of regular, public interfaces between citizens and responsible authorities. Fox concludes that we need deeper analytical concepts and tools to understand programmes’ prospects in any given context.

In many ways, Fox’s work is an effort to take seriously the World Development Report 2004’s suggestion that its own somewhat simplistic foundational model of accountability relationships ‘is not reality because it portrays only one direction in the relationships between actors. Rather actors are embedded in a complex set of relationships, and accountability is not always the most important’ (WB, 2003:53). Indeed, even at the time, some were quick to argue that it had little to say about how the ‘chain of delegation’ that links citizens and authorities is often more complex in clientelistic states (Joshi and Moore, 2004). Thus, much of the subsequent literature has sought to show how accountability programmes are affected by a limitless list of contextual variables.
Amongst it, a recent effort from the World Bank stands out for according ‘information’ equal importance alongside opportunities for ‘citizen-state interfaces’ and ‘civic mobilisation’ (Grandvoinnet et al., 2015). It views these three elements as the ‘levers’ for encouraging collective and collaborative state and citizen actions. It also recognises that coalitions of state and non-state actors have proved central to successful transitions towards accountability in many developing countries. This includes the role played by political parties, trade unions, professional associations, social movements, and CBOs that are able to work towards the improvement of state-society relations and, importantly, across the state-society divide. However, in an acknowledgement of the way power is often spread in developing countries, the framework places the state above citizens, and suggests that developments in any one of its three elements will constrain or enable opportunities in the others. For example, mobilisation might result in a backlash from the state constraining opportunities for interfaces. Thus, the framework seeks to provide an understanding of the power and politics of accountability grounded in historical experiences, rather than the reductive governance models long favoured by Western development organisations.

My research is broadly supportive of efforts to unpick contextual conditions. However, it suggests that in states such as Pakistan where politics is often highly localised, with different dynamics from union council to union council, the focus on the context must also be situated at this level. Indeed, although limited by a small number of cases, my quantitative analysis of the CRGs’ activities suggested that even district level contextual features, such as violence and political competition, were not that influential for their abilities to engage in activism. Instead, my qualitative research found that they were enabled or restricted by the localised forms politics and clientelism takes across Pakistan, and by the identities of individual programme participants.

Given this, Joshi’s (2014) ‘causal chain’ studies may have to be carried out at the sub-national, local level. They will also have to account for the evolving range of actors involved in potentially hidden clientelistic processes, from union bosses to leaders of
CBOs, and those in potentially democratic processes, such as women’s networks and energetic youth. This requires fine-grained understandings of local contexts, with assumptions as to the democratic or undemocratic intentions of different actors and associations consistently tested. Some programmes are approaching such challenges by slowly rolling out their activities, rather than beginning at scale. Nonetheless, there remain great incentives for many to expand fast by seizing upon evidence of what works to create replicable models. I would suggest this is unwise in diverse and fast changing places such as Pakistan and, instead, programmes of this sort should be afforded longer durations to understand each new context they wish to work in.

Fox’s (2015) work also distinguishes between ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’ social accountability programmes. Tactical programmes are bounded interventions that assume citizens will be spurned into collective action by the provision of information or what could be called the old way of thinking about social accountability. Thus, they are limited to society- or demand-side efforts to amplify citizens’ voices and often focus on the generation of information through specific accountability tools, such as citizens’ score cards or participatory budgeting. In contrast, strategic approaches ‘deploy multiple tactics, encourage enabling environments for collective action for accountability and coordinate citizens’ voice with governmental reforms. This often involves the use of coordinated activities, such as efforts to combine media campaigns and information on service provision with activist trainings to citizens and the enshrining of new legislation. Strategic programmes are posited as more promising than tactical because they work on both vertical accountability or citizens’ ‘voice’, and the mechanisms and institutions able to sanction underperforming authorities, which Fox terms ‘teeth’. However, it is worth exploring these sorts of programmes further.

Firstly, they call for the creation of enabling environments for social accountability within which citizens’ have reasons to believe that the benefits of challenging the status quo outweigh the potential costs. This is crucial to broader democratising projects because the decisions, actions and risks citizens that participate in public politics face vary from country to country, province to province, or, even, from village
to village. For example, studies of India’s right to information laws have shown that voice can be fatal in some contexts, whilst in others it can expedite access to welfare programmes (Peisakhin and Pinto, 2010; Pande, 2014). At the same time, authorities’ willingness to respond to citizens’ issues differ, with some seemingly incentivised by reforms that stand to materially benefit themselves or their supporter base, and others fearful of potential sanctions for poor performance or abusive behaviour. This has caused programmes to begin exploring ways that they can combine mobilisation efforts with the establishment or reform of formal accountability institutions, such as by working with local police forces, ombudsman or right to information laws. As my research suggests, the lack of such institutions and a belief that they were compromised was a major reason STAEP’s participants did not pursue sanctions against authorities. Thus, if programmes can avoid the pitfalls of institutional reforms, such efforts seem well judged.

Other commentators have sought to expand the meaning of an enabling environment. For example, Hickey and King (2016) argue that awareness of how social norms and political ideologies shape social accountability initiatives is needed. As my research suggests, this can be particularly important in states where clientelistic practices are broadly considered legitimate. Understanding social accountably programmes in such contexts as efforts to (re)negotiate a community’s, administrative unit’s or country’s hypothetical ‘social contract’ is one way of combating such norms (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012; Hickey and King, 2016). This requires programmes to be as much about fostering societal discourses around citizens’ entitlements, the state’s obligations, its legitimacy and the way politics is generally done, as they are about the technical tools of accountability, information, and institutional reforms. Furthermore, as part of the former, programmes should seize opportunities to politicise – by attaching them to politicians, policies or clientelistic networks – citizens’ demands and issues when they arise. I argue that programmes that acknowledge and seek to harness their participants’ political identities in the ways already outlined would have an advantage in such efforts. Indeed, studies of actually existing civil societies suggest individuals and groups with links to political parties that publicly ‘politicise the pothole’ are able to turn local
issues into healthy contests with broader ramifications and spill-over effects (Abers, 1998, 2002).

Secondly, it has recently been argued that strategic programmes require the creation of vertically integrated citizen-state interfaces at multiple governance levels, such as with front line service providers, departments responsible for service delivery and national oversight institutions (Fox and Aceron, 2016). In its last year, STAEP sought to vertically integrate its CRGs with similar, but smaller, citizens’ groups created at the district and provincial levels. These groups consisted of the most active and influential members of the existing CRGs who were elected by their colleagues to participate in the new forums. The idea was that they could act as conduits, allowing identified demands and issues to be passed up and pressure applied at higher levels of the state’s administration. It was also hoped that this would encourage the programme’s participants to take up issues of legislation, democratic process and the efficient provision of broad, non-targetable public goods. However, the programme ended shortly after the groups were established, providing little time to see how they would function in practice. Nonetheless, the model has been adopted by similar programmes in Pakistan (Kirk, 2017).

I would caution, however, that efforts to build vertically integrated forums at different levels of a state’s governance apparatus risk the creation of additional channels for existing patronage networks. Indeed, using my theory of isomorphic activism as a model, it is possible to imagine situations within which powerful and politically connected actors dominate entire chains of citizen-sate interfaces, ensuring who participates, on what terms, and which issues are tabled. Moreover, if the success of these structures is measured in terms of what they get done, rather than the opportunities they create for broad participation in public politics, programmes that create them risk taking anti-democratic processes and networks into the heart of the state. In this way, the promise of the social accountability discourse to contribute to democratising projects would be given over to the same sort of searches for replicable models that programmes devoted to institutional reforms are now widely understood to have succumbed to. Avoiding this requires
nuanced, contextually grounded understandings of the overlaps between power, clientelistic politics, and donors’ programmes.

Lastly, my thesis contributes to ongoing debates within a movement amongst development practitioners that proposes to ‘do development differently’. Its members call for a rethink of how the political determinants of persistent underdevelopment can be tackled (Hickey, 2012; Carothers and de Gramont, 2013; Devarajan and Khemani, 2016). They begin from the aforementioned studies that argue that a long succession of top-down, donor driven institutional reform projects have failed because of states’ abilities to mimic donors’ prescribed forms (Pritchett et al., 2010; Andrews, 2012). However, echoing the aidnography authors, they often add that donors seek to define the problems their programmes address without understanding the cultures or histories of the societies they intervene in. This leads to a lack of ownership and, in some cases, unintended consequences. Some voices within this movement suggest that a major part of the remedy is a renewed focus on ‘bottom-up’, ‘adaptive’, ‘politically smart’ and ‘locally led’ projects (Booth and Unsworth, 2014; Wild et al. 2015; MC and IRC, 2016).

Proponents of this way of working often argue that the citizens closest to the actors and institutions responsible for service delivery are best placed to identify the enablers and obstacles to the problems they face. Furthermore, they are more likely to act collectively, to form synergistic coalitions with power-holders, and to challenge the status quo if they have a say in which problems to tackle first. They suggest that such an approach requires both a hard-nosed realism as to what may be possible and when given the way power is spread within each society, and a measure of idealism that encourages issues of social justice to be addressed and that supports the advance of radical democratising projects. In many contexts they also argue that such goals are likely to require that outsiders be willing to work at ‘arm’s length’ so as not to delegitimise the actors and processes they seek to support (Booth, 2013).


For more on this see: ‘The Sidekick Manifesto’ http://sidekickmanifesto.org/ (Accessed 20/10/16)
Strategic social accountability programmes that seek to generate information that is actionable and to create an enabling environment for well-timed collective action accord with many of these principles. Indeed, they aim to empower citizens to mobilise and identify their own problems, thereby, promising to address the accusation of neo-imperialism or trusteeship levelled by some commentators. In doing so, they seek to change how politics is done and by whom in clientelistic states. These are lofty goals that this chapter has argued require both more empirical evidence of how such efforts are met by actors on the ground, and better understandings of the roles donors’ programmes play in opening or closing opportunities for radical democratising projects.

I argue, however, that beyond participants identifying problems, local ownership requires creating opportunities for them to have their voices heard in monitoring and evaluating efforts. This is not new, with calls for self-assessments, stakeholder evaluations, and joint evaluations arising in tandem with the turn to participatory projects (Campilan, 2000; Fawcett et al., 2003; Chouinard and Cousins, 2015). They suggest programmes should harness tools that allow participants to assess them in their own vernaculars, such as through story-telling, social mapping exercises and diagramming. The idea is to overcome the distance between participant and expert discourses. They also seek to create room for the identities and aspirations of participants to sit alongside the goals of donors. My research suggests that given the way social accountability programmes’ opportunities to participate in public politics can be appropriated by hidden power inequalities such calls must be heeded. Indeed, they are likely to be the best way programmes can identify issues such as isomorphic activism and they are the only way they can claim internal accountability. Including participants’ voices in monitoring and evaluation efforts will also challenge the domination of quantitative measures that I suggest blind donors’ programmes to their full democratic potentials.

Efforts to allow participants to evaluate programmes could be usefully complemented by Bair’s (2004) ‘advocacy scale’ for measuring the impact of civil society focussed democracy programmes. Aimed at addressing the limits of
programme assessments that count outputs, it judges when participation (indicated by mobilisation, voice and representation) leads to accountability (by transparency, empowerment and constituency benefits) and finally contestation (understood as a systemic increase in the plurality of competing political actors). It does this by asking evaluators to use qualitative methods, including participant and key informant interviews, to assess when these three components of democratisation are plausibly being added to. Blair’s scale also draws a distinction between mass-based civil society organisations or movements and trustee-based organisations, recognising that the latter may not always be representative of those they claim to speak for. Thus, they may have success at securing their constituencies’ benefits, whilst doing little to increase participation and, ultimately, plurality.

Blair’s scale allows for rough comparisons of individual organisations and the diverse range of advocacy activities they may engage in that may contribute towards democratisation. It may also help outsiders to identify areas within which their programmes can have added value, such as when a well-intentioned elite dominated association is found to lack connections to the poor, or a CBO is struggling to forge its own connections with state and political authorities. This will assure that programmes offer support that is appropriate to the environments they work in and the challenges actual civil societies face. Although Blair’s scale is over a decade old, the prevailing trend in assessments of civil society and democracy programmes remains quantitative. Moreover, there appears to be little appetite within large development organisations for the sort of contextually sensitive research it requires of evaluators.

Before concluding, I want to address a question that some readers may by now have: put simply, is the idea of social accountability the latest of development’s long list of Deus ex Machinas? My answer is that it could be. Whilst at first this may seem weak,

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281 Blair (2004) frames this problem as arising in programmes implemented by the United States Development Agency following a general drive to quantify government departments’ performances in the mid-1990s (the British experience with the managing for results agenda is discussed in Chapter Four).

the point, which I hope this thesis has shown, is that that the ideas development organisations espouse are often battle grounds for ideological struggles. Indeed, I have argued that the idea of social accountability is at risk of being subsumed within reductive neoliberal notions of governance and citizenship. Analysts can only get rough handles on the state of these struggles by exploring both the discourses and practices underpinning them. Doing so can uncover how certain ways of seeing and understanding the world are propagated and who benefits from them. It can also show how experts’ plans and techniques often have little effect on how people actually behave and what they aspire to. Yet, perhaps most importantly, it can reveal radical democratic alternatives that are grounded in the power and politics of actual civil societies.

Conclusion

This chapter argued that donors’ attempts to harness the idea of civil society as a component within neoliberal visions of governance and citizenship render activism a technical exercise, depoliticising it and blinding themselves to both its democratic and undemocratic elements. I used my research on the STAEP programme to illustrate this in a contemporary clientelistic state. I argued, however, that due to a combination of the programme’s own contradictions, and its participants’ identities and aspirations, its efforts to depoliticise its activities were limited. Nonetheless, by harnessing the energies of its most powerful and politically connected members, the programme was able to translate its ground realities into its donor’s reductive discourse. This created an official fiction that is represented in its annual review documents.

I theorised this process, terming it isomorphic activism. I argued that it results in the strengthening of undemocratic networks on the ground in places such as Pakistan, and that it risks the entrenchment of counter-productive neoliberal understandings of citizenship and governance within donor organisations. I then built an argument
that a focus on the aspirations of programme participants, how they actually use information and mobilise for change, and the micro-politics of clientelistic states would help donors to redefine their notion of what counts as success. In conclusion, the chapter turned to the more recent literature on social accountability, commenting upon how far it engages with power and politics. I argue that if development organisations wish to continue down this path, they must continuously challenge neoliberal understandings of the role of civil society in development and accord participants greater roles in evaluating their programmes.

**Thesis limitations**

Closing the distance between the thesis’ discourse analysis and fieldwork has been challenging. Indeed, it was not until the write up that I realised that approaching the programme’s annual reviews as representations of its donors’ discourses was a potentially valuable endeavour. As others have pointed out, this speaks to the difficulties faced by those studying and trying reconcile neoliberalism as a discourse and as bundles of practices with its observed effects in specific contexts (Peck, 2013). Indeed, even with two rigorous methodologies, analysts must often make a conceptual leap from one to another. They then face the additional challenge of bringing readers with them. I am interested to know how far the annual reviews represent a bridge for my readers. Given further time, I would also be interested to explore what other texts, perhaps including DFID’s brochures or write-ups of the programme in other material, could add to my analysis and further fill the interpretative gap.

Although I stand by my early decision not to interview the authorities responsible for service provision - they often have little time and are unwilling to give their candid views - there is perhaps other ways to capture their perspectives. For example, it may have been possible to speak to those in their inner circles, such as political party workers, rather than the authorities themselves. Alternatively, I found local
journalists a wealth of information on local politics. Such methods are something I
would like to explore as a way of understanding further why those within clientelistic
networks may choose to have their interests publicly debated and why they may
withdraw from such opportunities.

It may be clear from the fieldwork chapters that I did not obtain as good an
understanding of the story of rural Multan’s CRG. I attribute this to three main
factors. Firstly, I failed to impress upon my research assistant for this stage the style
of interviewing that gives participants the space to tell their stories. I take this as a
lesson for future projects. Secondly, the group was located across a large rural area,
with some interviewees taking several hours drive to reach. This cut down the
number I tracked down and interviewed. Lastly, an unfolding security situation meant
I could not return to Multan after my initial research stint. This was a major barrier as
my best data came from conducting multiple interviews with those I identified as
pivotal to the CRGs’ activities, often through going to dinner or simply hanging out
with them.

As befits a constructivist approach, I have sought to reflexively comment on my own
positionality as a researcher throughout the thesis. Nonetheless, it is important to
once again state that I consider my interpretations to be co-constructed with my
research participants. Furthermore, they are of a particular programme, in a
particular time and place. This means that my theory of isomorphic activism and
comments on politicised empowerment are to be tested and judged by others. I
sincerely hope that this would prove to be a useful exercise.

**Future research**

I would be interested in conducting further research in states characterised by
clientelistic politics with weak formal accountability mechanisms, such as Nigeria or
Afghanistan. Two areas would be of interest to me: Firstly, exploring the evolution
their civil societies, with a view to how donors’ discourses have shaped them. I believe the influence of decades of donor engagement of civil societies in such states is not very well understood, including the incentive structures they put in place and the opportunities they open or close down for radical democratising projects.

Secondly, turning to activists themselves, I would like to conduct more work on how they see the political opportunity structures in the places they live, with a focus on how they use information and existing alliances with political actors to draw clientelistic networks into the public sphere. I believe that too often programmes assume that civil society actors are in need of instruction or techniques, rather than uncovering what they are already doing. In Pakistan there is a movement of Brick Kiln Workers and in recent years a few new political parties connected to civil society associations have emerged.

I am also aware that there is an effort by researchers in Sussex University to use diaries to understand how people gain accountability relationships in developing country contexts. The idea is that people keep records of their efforts to demand responsive and accountable governance over extended periods. I believe it is theorised this will give researchers a better understanding of the ‘causal chains’ between citizens and governance, hopefully avoiding the problem of peoples’ reluctance to discuss the power and politics of the places they must live in with outsiders (Joshi, 2014). I would be keen to do something similar with participants in an ongoing social accountability programme. Such research could, I hope, reveal the inner workings of programmes, what happens outside of the gaze of implementers or foreign experts. It could also better understand the aspirations people actually have when they participate in programmes, as opposed to assuming their versions of the good life approximate those of its planners.
Personal reflections

Researching and writing this thesis was in equal parts testing and rewarding. It was undertaken part-time over seven years. During this time, I fell ill and I spent the best part of two years away from my partner. Those around me picked me up time and again, despite the distance, self-doubt and introversion the process led to.

I also feel I grew to understand my chosen industry – I use that word on purpose – in ways that a more idealistic, younger me did not. For the most part, this encompasses the realisation that development is not an altruistic calling, engaged in by a subset of enlightened people. Indeed, like all sectors, it is embedded in the interests and ideologies of wider networks, and those that work in it at all levels often have more immediate and pressing interests than radical democratising projects. This realisation has at times both depressed and motivated me, and I look forward to where it will take me in the future.

Lastly, I have developed an affinity with Pakistan and its people. Throughout my research I did not experience the kinds of horror stories the Western press seems to enjoy printing about them. Instead, I often found myself wondering why so much attention is given to a few thousand violent extremists when there is a country of over 188 million inhabitants to understand. At the same time, however, I have come to realise that power really can be all pervasive, limiting the chances of the vast majority in overt and hidden ways. Despite this, I firmly believe that challenges to it will only come from the bottom-up and that outsiders that wish to support them should be both curious and humble.
Appendix 1 – Codebook developed for critical discourse analysis and coding samples

Below is the codebook developed for the critical discourse analysis of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2004 and the texts from the Department of International Development (DFID). It includes the primary identified discourses and their subcategories. Not all of the discourses appeared within all of the analysed texts, but they represent the most forceful in my reading.

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<td>Democracy Discourse\Substantive Democracy</td>
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<td>Making Markets Discourse\Limits of Markets</td>
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<p>| Uniqueness of DFID |</p>
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<th>WDR 2004 Discourse in DFID</th>
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<tr>
<td>Welfare State Discourse</td>
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</table>
NVivo coding sample

Below is an example of NVivo coding of DFID’s texts. It shows highlighted pieces of text and their codes on the right-hand side of the page.
Appendix 2 - Codebook for CRGs’ meeting minutes data

This represents the codebook (next page) developed to investigate the CRGs’ meeting minutes. The purpose was to gain a quantitative and comparative understanding of their activities. This was done by coding the categories of issues identified by the CRGs, how many of these were raised with authorities, and how many were resolved to the satisfaction of the groups’ members. Only 122 of STAEP’s CRGs were coded. Those with incomplete data or located in Baluchistan were excluded from the analysis. The data was coded by research assistants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>BREAKDOWN</th>
<th>ACTUALS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue raised with authority</td>
<td>Education Department</td>
<td>9689</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health Department</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>District Police Officer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Community Development Authority</td>
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<td>IT Department</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Works and Services</td>
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<td>District Coordination Officer</td>
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<td>Social Welfare</td>
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<td>Revenue</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tehsil Municipal Officer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Town Municipal Administration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agriculture department</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member National Assembly</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Member Provincial Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water and Power Development Authority</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Trade Union Representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finance and Planning Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Repairing of facilities</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absenteeism of staff</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of basic facilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Appointment of staff</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cleanliness</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Repairing of boundary wall</td>
<td>1281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction / renovation of facility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teachers / student absenteeism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upgrading of facility</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other issues regarding facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electricity</td>
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Construction and repairing of roads / paths near facility

Security
- Provision of mechanism for the implementation of law and order
- Issues of women harassment
- Street crimes

Right to Information
- Issues faced while getting information from state institution

General Infrastructure
- Construction / Repairing of roads
  - Pavement or streets
  - Irrigation channels
  - Sewage issues
  - Bridges

Elections
- Issues related with identity card and voter registration

Miscellaneous
- Removal of garbage
- Sewerage issues
- Encroachment issues
- Installation of water filtration plants
- Cleanliness and renovation of parks
- Installation of street lights
- Provision of transformers and connections of electricity
- Display of price list on shops
- Low wages of labours
- Appointment of sanitary works
- Absenteeism of sanitary workers
- Committee for monitoring

Resolved
- Total no of issues resolved satisfactorily
  - 416

Unresolved
- Total no of issues not resolved satisfactorily
  - 9273

The coding did not record meetings with members of civil society (e.g. other citizens associations or local leaders). Furthermore, only meetings in which identified issues were clearly raised or discussed were recorded. Thus, general meetings, such as
courtesy calls between CRG members and authorities or those with mentoring NGOs, were not recorded.
Appendix 3 - Operationalising the CRGs’ contexts

At the time of my research, it was increasingly being recognised that the local context - whether it be the village, constituency, or district - is particularly important to the prospects of social accountability initiatives. Indeed, national-level governance factors, such as constitutional frameworks, can only reveal so much about the enabling conditions for civil society within clientelistic or young democracies. Furthermore, mainstream comparative tools, such as the World Governance Assessment (WGA) and Strategic Governance and Anti-Corruption Assessment (SCAGA), tell analysts little about within country differences in service delivery or the accountability of responsible state institutions.

To fill such gaps commentators were increasingly seeking methodologies that can help analysts to identify the sub-national factors that affect developmental outcomes (Snyder, 2001; Woolcock, 2013). In this vein, two efforts from development think tanks surveyed the pool of available literature and evidence on social accountability initiatives to create broad lists of potentially relevant contextual factors (O’Meally, 2013; Foresti et al., 2013; Harris and Wild, 2013). While they were by no means exhaustive, but they informed the contextual variables chosen to interrogate the CRGs ability to engage in activism:

O’Meally’s (O’Meally, 2013) report for the World Bank identified six broad ‘contextual domains’ that matter for social accountability: i) civil society; ii) political society; iii) inter-elite relations and the political settlement; iv) state-society relations and the social contract; v) intra society relations and issues of social inclusion; vi) and global factors. These are further broken down into features that constrain or enable the potential for social accountability. For their part, researchers at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) identified six relevant ‘governance factors’: i) the

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283 The importance of context has long been understood. Indeed, there are many frameworks that attempt to identify which contextual factors, and at which level analysis, are relevant to the success of development interventions. While they have different names that suggest their focus, including ‘drivers of change’, power analysis, and political economy analysis, they share a concern with how social, economic and political factors interact to impede or support development. For a good overview see: Hudson and Leftwich (2014). For an example of ‘drivers of change’ analysis for Pakistan, with a focus on civil society, see Khan and Khan (2004).
credibility of political settlements, which refers to the ability of politicians to make believable promises; ii) the strength of oversight systems, such as audit commissions and the judiciary; iii) the degree of coherence in policies and processes for implementation, meaning how clearly roles and responsibilities of governance institutions are defined; iv) capacities for local problem solving and collective action, or the ability of civil society actors to organise; v) the presence or absence of moral hazard, as when states neglect to provide services because NGOs do it for them; vi) and the presence or absence (and severity) of rent seeking, which can divert or erode services (Foresti et al., 2013; Harris and Wild, 2013).

The growing literature on civil society, governance and service delivery in Pakistan also suggests sub-national contextual variables that may have affected the agency of the CRGs to engage in the activities central to social accountability. However relevant constituency level quantitative data on factors such as land inequality, informal societal structures and institutional performance is, in large part, lacking. Thus, the range of potential variables to correlate with the CRGs’ activity scores was limited to those with plausible proxies. This section briefly overviews the rationale for the five chosen:

i) Multi-dimensional poverty: The literature on social accountability reveals that multidimensional poverty, encompassing levels of education and health, living conditions and asset ownership, can be vital to citizens’ capacities for collective action. At its most basic, citizens that are less concerned with their livelihood have more free time to organise to demand their rights. Indeed a previous study of the CRGs found that many of less economically secure members struggled to regularly commit to group activities (Kirk, 2014). Thus, it was hypothesized that constituencies with higher multidimensional poverty scores would be less favourable contexts for the CRGs’ activities. This variable took advantage of a new dataset that looks at multidimensional poverty at the district level in Pakistan (Naveed and Ali, 2012).

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284 For an exploration of this literature and how it is related to social accountability please see Kirk (2014).
ii) **Violence**: While civil society plays a vital role in challenging violence, collective action in public spaces, to some extent, requires contexts in which the fear, and actual incidence, of violence is low (Pearce, 2004; Dörner and List, 2012). Furthermore, although the thesis does not include CRGs’ from war-torn Baluchistan or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, my original study of STAEP had uncovered that ongoing conflict, terrorism and political violence were key concerns for CRG members and reportedly hampered their work (Kirk, 2014). Thus, it was hypothesized that levels of violence ad insecurity would affect the CRGs’ activities. This variable used data from recent research that quantitatively codes newspapers to record incidents of political violence at the district level from 1998-2011 and population estimates of corresponding districts to arrive at violence per capita figures (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2014).

iii) **Political competition**: Key (1949) long ago wrote of how ‘anxiety over the next election pushes political leaders into serving the interests of the have-less elements in society’. Following an established political science literature, this anxiety was operationalised by examining changes in political competitiveness – investigated through changes in vote share – between the 2008-2013 elections (Holbrook and Dunk, 1993; Donovan et al., 2010; Christensen, 2011; Afzal, 2014). Data from 2008 and 2013 elections was used to calculate the changes in vote shares. It was hypothesized that decreasing political competitiveness in a constituency would have created a harder context for the CRGs’ activities as representatives confident of their election victories would have been less likely to have entertained the CRGs’ issues. This hypothesis was inspired by suggestions from CRG members in the first study that the 2013 election created a window of opportunity for their lobbying activity as candidates fought to engage voters.

iv) **Number of parties**: This variable used the effective number of political parties competing for each constituency in the 2013 elections to capture the CRGs’ potential options for playing power-holders off against one another (Greene and Benvan, 2013). Drawing upon anecdotal evidence from the previous study of the CRGs and ethnographic evidence of local politics in Pakistan, it was hypothesized that
citizens would have more bargaining options, or, at the very least, opportunities to engage in the activities central to social accountability, in contexts with more effective political parties vying for power. In this respect, the variable seeks to account for the health of constituency’s political society.

v) Land inequality: Those interested in Pakistan’s developmental potential have often focussed on the willingness of landowning political elites to equitably provide public goods. Indeed, a common refrain suggests that rural Pakistan’s agrarian society is ‘feudal’. Although this is an un-nuanced characterisation, over 70% of the national assembly have consistently been held by large landowners and in some areas studies suggest village politics remains dominated by a hereditary landed elite (Shafqat, 1998; Cheema et al., 2008; Javid, 2012). Evidence also suggests that rural populations are often socially excluded through dependencies on this elite for their livelihoods and access to state services (Mohmand and Cheema, 2007; Shami, 2010; Chaudhry and Vyborny, 2013). Therefore, it was hypothesized that in areas with high land inequality civil society groups, such as the CRGs, may have been less willing or able to demand to engage in activism. Land inequality is often measured by the Gini index, however, it has been criticised for being unable to show ‘patterned’ or ‘bifurcated’ inequality, conceptualised as land concentration patterns between large and small landholders (Brockett, 1992). Thus, I use Brockett’s measure (% of land with large land holders + % of land with smallholders / average size of smallholding).

While these five variables are far from exhaustive, they sought to capture sub-provincial contextual factors that may have affected the ability of the CRGs to engage in activism. Following Hudson and Leftwich’s (2014) call for analysts to draw upon a

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285 Mohmand (2011:n6) describes ‘feudal’ as a ‘term used in public rhetoric in Pakistan to signify a multifaceted relationship of extreme social, political and economic inequality between landlords and other rural classes’. However, she finds that feudalism do not adequately explain voting behaviour in the Punjab, rather the need to access public services and other social relationships are more important factors. For a contemporary example of the continuing use of this term see: Mustafa, A. ‘Pakistan’s fight against feudalism’, Aljazeera, August 2014. (Accessed 20/04/15)
range of disciplinary techniques, they were constructed using established ways of interrogating contexts from the political science and development literatures.
Appendix 4 - Codebook for interview data and coding sample

This represents the codebook developed from the analysis of CRG participant and NGO staff interviews.

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<td>Activism</td>
<td>Acting Collectively</td>
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<td>Activism as Opposite of Patronage</td>
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<td>Civil Disobedience</td>
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<td>Cost of Activism</td>
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<td>Following Activism Procedure</td>
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<td>Incentivising Activism</td>
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<td>Learning Activism</td>
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<td>No Space for Activism</td>
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<td>Brokers</td>
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<td>Building Reputation</td>
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<td>Capitalism Harmful</td>
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# Appendix 5: Interviewees

## Urban Gujranwala

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<td>Amer Siddiqui</td>
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<td>Ahmed Khokhar</td>
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<td>Asad Khan</td>
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<td>Sajid Shanif</td>
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### Civil society leaders

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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Senior NGO Staff Member 1</td>
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<td>Sarwar Bari (Founder PATTAN)</td>
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<td>Naheed Aziz</td>
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<td>Zafarullah Khan (Head of NGO)</td>
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### Annual review authors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
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<tr>
<td>Haris Gazdar</td>
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<td>Ben Schonveld</td>
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