The London School of Economics and Political Science

LOVE IN A TIME OF EMPIRE

An Engagement with the Political Thought of Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus

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A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2018.

DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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ABSTRACT

Hannah Arendt once wrote, 'Love, by its very nature, is unworldly, and it is for this reason rather than its rarity that it is not only apolitical but antipolitical, perhaps the most powerful of all antipolitical human forces'. Situated in the interstices of intellectual history, international political theory and literature, this thesis is my attempt to think through this claim. I do this via an engagement with the thought of three liminal literary figures, namely, Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) and Albert Camus (1913-1960). Reading their literary work alongside their more conventionally understood political writings, I explore how they conceived, evoked and 'mobilised' love in the context of Russian, British and French imperialism. Further, I argue that political conceptions of love in this period (circa 1880-1960) were not rare. Rather, love was evoked in the political work of canonical figures associated with International Relations.

In this thesis, I aim to make love a serious object of study in International Relations. Indeed, despite the burgeoning literature on aesthetics and emotions, there is no systematic study of love in the discipline. I argue a thematic focus on love not only illuminates neglected dimensions of the thought of canonical figures, but brings to light the political work of forgotten ones. Considering the myriad of ways in which love is 'mobilised' in the works of Tolstoy, Tagore, Camus and their contemporaries, I offer an account of love as part of a social imaginary – or what Charles Taylor describes as the 'background' that enables practices and confers legitimacy – variously hospitable and hostile to empire and politics. I argue that not all loves are conducive to politics. However, to the extent that the *polis* is populated by plural loves, love is integral to the study of International Relations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have had the good fortune of being supervised and mentored by individuals whose integrity and intellect I hold in the highest esteem. I would like to thank four people in particular for making the academy such a welcoming place. I thank my supervisor, Chris Brown, for his patience, support and encouragement as I sought to juggle research with teaching and parenting. Chris' supervision helped make the writing of this thesis a joyous experience. I am grateful to him for giving me the space and the structure to write the thesis I wanted to write, and for believing in me and my project even when I didn't. There would have been no thesis on love and international political thought had it not been for my MPhil supervisor, Duncan Bell's initial support. I thank Duncan for helping me transform a rather amorphous idea into a coherent thesis proposal, for feedback on written work and conversations which helped me clarify my ideas. This thesis has been enriched by his generosity and guidance. I cannot begin to articulate the influence my Honours supervisor, Robert Manne, has had on my thought. Weekly, hour long supervisions helped me find my academic voice and form me in a vocation to think and write about politics as I understand it to pertain to people. The form this thesis has unwittingly come to take with its emphasis on literature and the twentieth century bears witness to the influence of his course on Twentieth Century Politics. Finally, I doubt I would have persisted with International Relations, let alone pursued postgraduate study had it not been for my first teacher of ethics and political theory, Renée Jeffery. Renée helped me realise my interests in political philosophy and theology were not incompatible with the study of International Relations. She also provided invaluable guidance when I decided to apply for Master's programmes and then PhDs. Years later, Renée has read and commented on written work. For all that Renée has done for me, I remain in her debt.

I gratefully acknowledge my studentship from the LSE, without which I would not have been able to write a thesis. Special thanks are due to my PhD panellists, Tarak Barkawi and Mark Hoffman, for their generosity and guidance. If this thesis at all seems relevant to International Relations, it is a credit to them. That this thesis is about empire is also entirely owing to Tarak's influence. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to Tarak Barkawi, Duncan Bell, Cian O'Driscoll, Ian Hall, Mark Hoffman, Emma Hutchison, Renee Jeffery, Henry Radice and Rahul Rao for their detailed and insightful comments on written work. I also benefited tremendously from presenting three early drafts of my substantive chapters at LSE's International Theory or IR502 seminars. I thank everyone who attended and engaged with my work. I'd particularly like to thank Kirsten Ainley, Martin Bayly, Ida Danewid, Andrew Delatolla, George Lawson, Margot Light, Aaron McKeil, Jeppe Mulich, Chris Murray, Iver Neumann, Andreas Nohr, Henry Radice, Chris Rossdale, Peter Wilson, Joanne Yao and Asad Zaidi for their incredibly helpful comments and insights on written work.

I thank my wonderful family for their love and support. Jacob Matthews accompanied me across hemispheres when I first decided to pursue postgraduate study. His love, friendship and terrible sense of humour sustains me. I thank him for being an incredible co-parent and supportive spouse even when it has meant making many personal and professional sacrifices. Although almost entirely responsible for every delay and distraction, our daughter, Grace, has brought me more joy than I could have ever imagined. I thank her for her kind words of encouragement and for sharing me her entire life with this thesis. My parents, Michael and Rosalind Hartnett, never cease to inspire me with their selflessness. August is always my most productive writing month because they spend it with us helping us meet gaps in childcare. Despite the distance, I thank my dearest friend, Molly Williams and my sister, Michelle Hartnett, for sharing my every trial and tribulation. Finally, I'd like to acknowledge the profound influence my grandparents have had on my life. I am so very thankful for their love, care and constant encouragement. With love and gratitude, I dedicate this thesis to my grandmother, Patricia Hartnett, and to the memory of my grandfather, Hugh Hartnett.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

But love, what is it? A side-issue.

- Albert Camus.

The televised sermon of Bishop Michael Curry at the wedding of the Duke and Duchess of Sussex in May 2018 caused some consternation. Central to this was his decision to focus less on romantic love and more on the assertion that all love was of the same essence, with the 'revolutionary' 'power' to end wars, poverty and injustice.[1] In fact, religious evocations of love in politics are not uncommon. Despite the differences that divide the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, and the opposition leader, Jeremy Corbyn, both chose to place 'love' at the centre of their 2017 Christmas messages. Beyond this rare moment of rhetorical unity lay two very different conceptions of what 'loving' looked like. For Mrs. May, 'love' is a Christian value exemplified in the acts of service and charity performed by the men and women of the armed forces and volunteer services.[2] For Mr. Corbyn, it entailed caring for and acting to redress the seeming inevitability of homelessness, resource cuts and war.[3] These quasi-religious evocations of 'love' in Anglo-American politics abound. Thus, following the 2017 neo-Nazi protests in Charlottesville, President Obama, quoting Nelson Mandela, tweeted,

> No one is born hating another person because of the color of his skin or his background or his religion. People must learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love. For love comes more naturally to the human heart than its opposite.[4]

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[1] Rev. Michael Curry, "Royal Wedding 2018: Bishop Michael Curry's Speech in Full." *BBC* Royal Wedding 2018 (2018): https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44186049.

[2] Theresa May, "Prime Minister Theresa May's Christmas Message." *GOV.UK* News (2017): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-theresa-mays-christmas-message-2017.

[3] Jeremy Corbyn, "Show People Love This Christmas - Corbyn." *Labour* 2017 Press Archive (2017): https://labour.org.uk/press/show-people-love-this-christmas-corbyn/.

[4] Claire Phipps, "Obama's Anti-Racism Tweet After Charlottesville is Most Liked Ever on Twitter." *The Guardian* US (2017): https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/16/barack-obama-anti-racism-most-liked-tweet-ever-charlottesville.

This, the most-liked tweet in history taps into a sentiment which Alicia Garza, one of the co-founders of *Black Lives Matter,* claims animates the movement. 'Grounded in love',[5] *Black Lives Matter's* guiding principles include a commitment to 'empathy', which it defines as 'engaging comrades with the intent to learn about and connect with their contexts' and 'loving engagement', which it defines as 'embodying and practicing justice, liberation, and peace in our engagement with one another'.[6] Characterising violence and political differences in the language of love and hate, Barack Obama, Nelson Mandela, and the *Black Lives Matter* movement appear to place their faith in the soteriology of love. The Hillary Clinton campaign turned the same sentiment into a slogan: 'Love trumps hate', which retains its popularity despite (or perhaps because of) Clinton's subsequent electoral defeat.[7] Returning across the Atlantic, we encounter a similar sensibility. Love was evoked as an antidote following the acts of terror in London,[8] Manchester[9] and the brutal assassination of the Labour Member of Parliament, Jo Cox.[10] Similarly, the lack of love was drawn on to somehow help account for the inevitability of Brexit. As Guy Verhofstadt, European Parliament's Brexit negotiator said, 'The relationship between Britain and Europe was never easy. It was never a love affair and certainly not wild passion. It was more a marriage of convenience'.[11]

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[5] Frank Leon Roberts, "Black Lives Matter is a Love Movement." (2016): http://www.blacklivesmattersyllabus.com/black-lives-matter-is-a-love-movement/. See also, Christopher J. Lebron, *The Making of Black Lives Matter* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017)., Chapter 4.

[6] Black Lives Matter, "We Affirm That All Black Lives Matter." http://blacklivesmatter.com/guiding-principles/.

[7] MJ Lee and Dan Merica, "Clinton's Last Campaign Speech: 'Love Trumps Hate'." *CNN* Politics (2016): http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/07/politics/hillary-clinton-campaign-final-day/.

[8] Rachel Pistol, "Bridging the Divide in the Face of Terror." *Huffington Post* Blog (2017): http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/rachel-pistol/london-bridge-attack_b_16949602.html.

[9] Tim MacFarlan, "Adam Hills Makes Perfect Tribute to Manchester on the Last Leg." *Manchester Evening News* News (2017): http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/tv/adam-hills-last-leg-manchester-13101217.

[10] Esther Addley, Jessica Elgot, and Frances Perraudin, "Jo Cox: Thousands Pay Tribute on What Should Have Been Mp's Birthday." *The Guardian* UK News (2016): https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/22/jo-cox-murder-inspired-more-love-than-hatred-says-husband-brendan.

[11] Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, "Brexit is Not Only About Brexit. Let's Give Rebirth to Our European Project." *News* Leaders Speeches (2017): http://alde.eu/en/news/885-brexit-is-not-only-about-brexit-let-s-give-rebirth-to-our-european-project-guy-verhofstadt/.

Even if these examples only signify something about political rhetoric in Anglo-American politics, it would seem that there is an inordinate burden placed on love. From problematic presidents to acts of terror, from racial violence to failing institutional arrangements, love will deliver, fortify and immortalise. Yet, what is love? Why ought it matter to international politics? And how may it be conceived to do justice to the myriad of ways in which it is evoked? It is with these questions that this introduction, indeed the thesis as a whole, is primarily concerned. The introduction comprises four parts. First, I query the absence of love in mainstream accounts of International Relations despite the presence of love as a concept in international political theory. Second, via an engagement with contemporary and classical 'Western'[12] political thought, I offer a schema for understanding love in international politics. Third, narrowing my focus to consider the evocation of love in the context of empire, I defend liminal literature as a vital site for theorising love. Finally, I articulate my aim, plan and method.

Love and International Relations

Love is a latecomer to the burgeoning literature on International Relations and emotions. The 1970s saw the fields of foreign policy and political psychology first engage with emotions in the discipline.[13] Since then, Neta C. Crawford and Jonathan Mercer have inspired a widespread systematic inquiry into emotions and International Relations.[14] The initial work on emotion was heavily influenced by psychology and often neo-positivist in form. It largely drew on three theoretical traditions: psychoanalysis, social psychology and neuroscience.[15] Since then, William

[12] The notion of 'Western' political thought is itself problematic. For example, Adamson suggests that 'in 10th-century Baghdad, readers of Arabic had about the same degree of access to Aristotle that readers of English do today'. It also informed, in idiosyncratic forms, the basis of Quranic exegesis.Peter Adamson, "Arabic Translators Did Far More Than Just Preserve Greek Philosophy." (2016): accessed 4 September 2017, https://aeon.co/ideas/arabic-translators-did-far-more-than-just-preserve-greek-philosophy.

[13] Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, "Theorizing Emotions in World Politics," *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014).,p.495.

[14]Ibid.,p.495.

[15] David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds. *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* 2003).,pp.188-196.

Reddy suggests social constructivists, and historians of literature and culture have each led parallel 'revolutions' in the study of emotions.[16] At the turn of the twenty first century, Roland Bleiker pioneered the aesthetic turn as a reaction against Realism's suppression of 'the aesthetic quality of politics that is the elements which are purely subjective in the representation of an object'.[17] The study of aesthetics, the embrace of emotions and the re-engagement with classics by authors from various traditions within International Relations has led to the study of fear,[18] anxiety,[19] grief,[20] trauma,[21] honour,[22] guilt,[23] pity,[24] humiliation,[25] boredom,[26] vulnerability[27] and moral sentiments.[28] It has formed the basis of empirical work on phenomenon like violence, reconciliation, 'amity and hostility, xenophobia and cosmopolitanism, trust in leadership and institutions, factors that stabilize hierarchy and those that undermine it'.[29] The 'dawn of the historiographical turn'[30] and the growing interest in the history of emotions has inspired conceptual histories on friendship and

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[16] William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)., pp. ix-x.

[17] Roland Bleiker, "The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory," *Millennium* 30, no. 3 (2001).

[18] Richard Ned Lebow, "Fear, Interest and Honour: Outlines of a Theory of International Relations," *International Affairs* 82, no. 3 (2006)..

[19] Frank Sauer, *Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-Use of U.s. Nuclear Weapons* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

[20] Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, "Grief and the Transformation of Emotions After War," in *Emotions, Politics and War*, ed. Linda Ahall and Thomas Gregory (London: Routledge, 2015).

[21] Emma Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics: Collective Emotions After Trauma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

[22] Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[23] Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje, *Collective Guilt: International Perspectives (Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[24] Gabi Schlag, "Moving Images and the Politics of Pity: A Mutlilevel Approach to the Interpretation of Images and Emotions," in *Researching Emotions in International Relations*, ed. Maeva Clement and Eric Sangar (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

[25] Evelin Lindner, *Making Enemies: Humiliation and International Conflict (Contemporary Psychology)* (Santa Barbara: Praeger Publishers, 2006).

[26] Marjaana Jauhola, "On 'Being Bored' - Street Ethnography on Emotions in Banda Aceh After the Tsunami and Conflict," in *Emotions, Politics and War*, ed. Linda Ahall and Thomas Gregory (London: Routledge, 2015).

[27] Amanda Russell Beattie and Kate Schick, *The Vulnerable Subject: Beyond Rationalism in International Relations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

[28] Renée Jeffery, *Reason and Emotion in International Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[29] George E. Marcus, "The Place of Emotion in International Relations Scholarship." *E-International Relations* (2013): http://www.e-ir.info/2013/10/02/the-place-of-emotion-in-international-relations-scholarship/.

[30] Duncan S. A. Bell, "International Relations: The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn?," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 3, no. 1 (2001).

processes of international friendship and estrangement.[31] This work has been right to emphasise that 'politics without passion or principles is hardly the politics of the world in which we live'.[32] Indeed, as Brent Sasley notes, emotion underlies most theories of International Relations: 'realists emphasize fear, institutionalists trust, Marxists greed, constructivists affect'.[33] Yet, although what we now call 'love' has been a significant component of political theorising for millennia, it has never formed the subject of a systematic study in International Relations.

Even if international relations is conceived, as Peter Wilson suggests, less as a discipline and more as a 'a socio-intellectual space' containing a variety of conversations revolving around 'how best can we go about explaining or understanding relations between the political communities and other significant actors that engage in politics…within that area that we variously call the international/world/global system/society',[34] 'love' remains side-lined. With the exception of literature, this is emblematic of the 'rejection, ridiculing, or at best marginalization of love as a topic for serious studies' across academia.[35] Writing about what they call the new and burgeoning interdisciplinary field of 'Love Studies', the feminist scholars, Anna Jonasdottir and Ann Ferguson argue that until now there has been a chasm between the significance accorded to love in human life and that in the academy.[36] For the philosopher, Simon May, the mystical reverence for love is a testament to its deification in an age of humanism.[37] For the political theologian, Eric Gregory,

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[31] Felix Berenskoetter, "Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35, no. 3 (2007)., Evgeny Roshchin, *Friendship Among Nations: History of a Concept* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).

[32] Martha Finnemore and Sikkink Kathryn, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998).,p 916.

[33] Brent Sasley, "Emotions in International Relations." (2013): www.e-ir.info/2013/06/12/emotions-in-international-relations/.

[34] Peter Wilson, "E.h. Carr's the Twenty Years' Crisis: Appearance and Reality in World Politics," *Politik* 12, no. 4 (2009).,p. 21.

[35] Ann Ferguson and Anna G Jonasdottir, "Introduction," in *Love: A Question for Feminism in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Ann Ferguson and Anna G. Jonasdottir (New York: Routledge, 2014).,p. 1.

[36]Ibid, p. 1

[37] Simon May, *Love: A History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).,p. xiii

love has been shunned for being dangerous, unwieldy and anti-liberal, associated with the excesses of the twentieth century.[38] For the postcolonial scholar, Leela Gandhi, this dismissal, in fact, arises from the need to separate 'adult' politics from the 'immature'.[39] Jonasdottir, in turn, offers multiple reasons for love's marginalisation. It is variously 'elusive';[40] 'merely a subliminated sexual energy'; 'an ideological phenomenon of the cultural superstructure (helping maintain the bourgeois hegemony)',[41] and the 'last reservoir of human social and bodily powers' to be safeguarded from exploitation by 'Power/Knowledge and Power/Science'.[42] However, if love is any of these things –godlike or violent, immature, oppressive or the last bastion of humanity – then surely its role in International Relations warrants examination. Indeed, as Amelie Rorty writes of love or Emma Hutchison writes of emotion, it is implicated in action, thought, reason and judgment.[43]

What makes the absence of love in mainstream narratives of International Relations particularly perplexing is the prevalence of love in theories of the international. To offer illustrations from the first half of the twentieth century alone – when the vast majority of historiographies concur International Relations as a discipline emerged –[44] love is evoked to

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[38] Eric Gregory, *Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011)., pp. 35-6.

[39] Leela Gandhi, *Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-De-siecle Radicalism, and the Politics of Friendship* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006)., p. 12.

[40] Owing to the positivist origins of the study of emotion, love was initially deemed too elusive for scientific study. Although an engagement with scientific accounts of emotion are beyond the purview of this study, it is worth noting that love's status remains contested. Thus, facial theorists argue love is an amalgam of emotions; appraisal theorists understand love as a 'complex emotion'; neuroscientists variously consider love a 'social emotion' or part of 'an emotional brain'. See, for instance, Carol Izard, *The Psychology of Emotions* (New York: Plenum Press, 1991)., Richard Lazarus, *Emotion and Adaptation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991)., Jaak Panksepp, *Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)., Joseph Ledeoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life* (New York: Phoenix, 1999)..

[41] Anna G. Jonasdottir, 'Love Studies: A (Re)New(ed) Field of Knowledge Interests' in Anna G Jonasdottir and Ann Ferguson, *Love : A Question for Feminism in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Routledge, 2014)., pp. 18-19.

[42] Jonasdottir and Ferguson, *Love.*, p. 2.

[43] Amelie Rorty, "The Burdens of Love," *Journal of Ethics* 20, no. 4 (2016)., Hutchison, *Affective Communtiies in World Politics.*, p. 86.

[44] Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2014)., David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005)., Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations (the United States in the World)* (New York: Cornell University

theorise empire and internationalism, war and peace, order and revolution. As I argue in the next chapter, familial love governs Alfred Zimmern's conception of the Commonwealth, the 'impossible possibility' of love shapes Reinhold Niebuhr's notion of coercion, and *caritas* (or charitable love) is central to Herbert Butterfield's understanding of practical reason. Lest love be understood as a remnant of religiosity, it is worth noting that it is also evoked by agnostics and the irreligious. Thus, love is implicated (along with hate) in Gilbert Murray's conception of the Cosmos; Arnold J. Toynbee's post-War syncretic account of civilisations; and the mature Morgenthau's theorising of power 'under an empty sky'. To whatever extent these figures are important to the traditions of institutionalism, realism and international society, love emerges a significant but neglected dimension of their political thought. A thematic focus on love promises not only to illuminate neglected connections in the work of canonical thinkers but also to bring to light the work of thinkers on the discipline's margins. To offer but a few examples of figures that fall beyond the scope of this study, Mohandas Gandhi's *ahimsa*,[45] Emma Goldman's anarchism,[46] Simone Weil's account of justice,[47] Ernesto Guevera's conception of revolution[48] and Anna Julia Cooper's Black feminist politics[49] are animated by their conceptions of love. Whatever love may or may not be, its evocations in theorising the international are not rare.

Press, 2017)., Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam, *Race and Racism in International Relations : Confronting the Global Colour Line* (London: Routledge, 2015)..

[45] Ananya Vajpeyi, "Mohandas Gandhi: Ahimsa, the Self's Orientation," in *Righteous Republic: The Political Foundations of Modern India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).

[46] Emma Goldman, "Marriage and Love." (1911): http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20715/20715-h/20715-h.htm., Lori Jo Marson, "A Feminist Search for Love: Emma Goldman on the Politics of Marriage, Love, Sexuality and the Feminine," *Feminist Theory* 4, no. 3 (2003).,pp. 305-320.

[47] Richard H. Bell, "Reading Simone Weil on Rights, Justice and Love," in *Simone Weil's Philosophy of Culture: Readings Toward a Divine Humanity*, ed. Richard H. Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[48] David Deutschmann, ed. *Che Guevara Reader: Writings By Ernesto Che Guevara on Guerilla Strategy, Politics & Revolution* (Melbourne: Ocean, 1997).. ,Ernesto Guevera, *Guerilla Warfare* (Seattle: Stellar Editions, 2016)..

[49] Vivian M. May, "Anna Julia Cooper's Black Feminist Love-Politics," *Hypatia* 32, no. 1 (2017).

On Love: A Schema

If love's absence from mainstream accounts of International Relations is not owing to its rarity, perhaps it is because there is something about love which renders it improper for politics. A proponent of this view, Hannah Arendt offers one of the twentieth century's most sustained and systematic critiques of love as a political concept. For Arendt, love 'is not apolitical but antipolitical, perhaps the most powerful of all antipolitical human forces'.[50] Arendt's thought on love was shaped by an early engagement with Augustine in her doctoral dissertation *Love and Saint Augustine*. At the crux of her critique is a conception of love as Augustinian *caritas* (a Graeco-Christian conception of *appetitus* or craving)[51] and a vision of politics, premised on freedom and plurality.[52] In *The Human Condition*, she argues this vision of politics emanates from a tripartite distinction between 'labour', 'work' and 'action'.[53] In effect, she seeks to separate with Locke 'working hands (from) a labouring body'[54], and with Aristotle *poiesis* or making from *praxis* or doing. Although 'labour', 'work' and 'action' together constitute the human condition, the *polis* is the realm of action alone.[55] An intersubjective space rather than 'the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be'.[56] What makes love anathema to the Arendtian *polis* is that it destroys her very conditions for politics. To the extent love as 'desire mediates between subject and object,…it annihilates the distance between them'.[57] To the extent that loving entails forgetting, a yearning for a 'future that destroys

[50] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998)., p. 242.

[51] Hannah Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998)., p. 9.

[52] For definitions, see Arendt, *The Human Condition*., p. 7 and 177.

[53] Arendt, *The Human Condition*., Chapter 1.

[54]Ibid., 80.

[55] Ibid., 220.

[56] Ibid., 198.

[57] Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*., p. 18,

the present', it is unworldly.[58] Arendt's discomfort with love would seem to extend to most emotion. Reduced to feeling or 'craving' it belongs to 'the twilight, which illuminates our private and intimate lives' and 'depends utterly upon appearance and therefore upon the existence of a public realm' to confirm it is real.[59] However, most emotion 'cannot stand the implacable, bright light of the constant presence of others on the public scene'.[60] Vanishing in public when it is displayed, Arendt's emotion lacks the 'realness' necessary to ground it as a form of political praxis.

To be fair to Arendt, her view on emotion was not static.[61] Her rejection of Augustine was not total.[62] Perhaps her call to eradicate *poiesis* from the *polis* was not absolute.[63] Nonetheless, her critique of love – as articulated in the late 1950s and early 1960s – captures both the 'liberal' need to distinguish public from private and the 'critical' call to curb love's potential for violence and quiescence. I argue, however, there are at least three problems with this account of love as antipolitical. First, it conflates three distinct but interrelated questions of what love *'is'*, *'ought'* and *'does'*. Second, it is reductive of the kind of contestation that surrounds these questions. Third, the interrogation of love's appropriateness for politics obfuscates the more pertinent question of whose loves and which politics are deemed legitimate. Indeed, if Augustine is right that humans are constituted by their loves,[64] the *polis* is populated by plural loves. Politics, then, necessarily entails the negotiation of plural loves. In what follows, I offer a schema for conceiving love that

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[58] Ibid., p. 10, p. 28.

[59] Arendt, *The Human Condition*., p. 51.

[60] Ibid., p. 51.

[61] Dan Dagerman, "Within the Heart's Darkness: The Role of Emotions in Arendt's Political Thought," *European Journal of Political Theory* First Published May 18, 2016

[62] For a detailed discussion of Arendt's adoption of Augustinian concepts such as 'natality', 'will' and 'community', see Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark, ""Thought Trains"," in *Love and Saint Augustine*, ed. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996)..

[63] Caroline Ashcroft, "The *Polis* and the *Res Publica:* Two Arendtian Models of Violence," *History of European Ideas* 44, no. 1 (2018).,pp.128-142.

[64] Raymond Geuss, *Reality and Its Dreams* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016)., Loc 4916; Also, Gregory, *Politics and the Order of Love*., p. 21.

is cognisant of both love's implication in 'the international' and, the kind of contestation that surrounds what love '*is*' and '*ought*' to do in international politics. For the sake of illustration, I draw on two recent evocations of love in international political theorising to illustrate how this contestation about love underpins divergent visions of fraternity and internationalism.

At first glance, the projects of Martha Nussbaum, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri appear to have very little in common. Martha Nussbaum, 'the philosopher of feelings',[65] offers her account of liberal cosmopolitan love in *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice*.[66] Hardt and Negri are committed to revolution and are variously described as 'post-Marxist' or 'anarchist'. Nonetheless, both projects draw on love's imagined role in redemption and resistance to animate their internationalisms. If *Upheavals of Thought* made the case for the intelligence of emotions and the pivotal role they play in practical judgment,[67] *Political Emotions* is a guidebook for how they ought to be properly cultivated by liberalism. Building on her work in *Love's Knowledge*,[68] Nussbaum argues that literature and music, rhetoric, festivals and architecture are central to this sentimental education. Nussbaum's emphasis on love as a liberal cosmopolitan emotion may seem perplexing. As Eric Gregory notes, liberalism as a legacy of the Enlightenment is often associated with the privatisation of emotion.[69] Or as Lester Hunt puts it, 'Politically, ratiocination tends to be progressive, emoting tends to be regressive'.[70] Respect rather than love surely is its central tenet. Nussbaum acknowledges the existence of a system of judgment grounded in principle, claims her

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[65] Rachel Aviv, "The Philosopher of Feelings." *The New Yorker* Profiles (2016): http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/07/25/martha-nussbaums-moral-philosophies.

[66] Martha C. Nussbaum, *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).

[67] Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[68] Martha Craven Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge : Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[69] Gregory, *Politics and the Order of Love*., p. 158.

[70] Lester Hunt, "Martha Nussbaum on the Emotions," *Ethics* 116(2006)., p. 533.

work is compatible with Rawls and argues on practical and utilitarian grounds that respect is not enough.[71]

> (D)emocratic reciprocity needs love…But, more deeply, the public culture needs to be nourished and sustained by something that lies deep in the human heart and taps its most powerful sentiments…[72]

Love then is that which 'gives respect for humanity its life, making it more than a shell'.[73] For Nussbaum, love is a "relationship" that

> includes a delighted recognition of the other as valuable, special, and fascinating; a drive to understand the point of view of the other; fun and reciprocal play; exchange, and what [the psychoanalyst Donald] Winnicot calls "subtle interplay"; gratitude for affectionate treatment, and guilt at one's own aggressive wishes or actions; and finally, and centrally, trust and a suspension of anxious demands for control.[74]

Placing John Stuart Mill and Rabindranath Tagore's engagements with Auguste Comte's 'religion of humanity' at the heart of the liberal canon, Nussbaum's analyses their works to retrieve and develop a template for love and internationalism for an 'aspiring yet imperfect society'.[75]

Representing a different set of political commitments, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri make their case for the centrality of love to revolutionary politics in their tetralogy, *Empire,*[76] *Multitude,*[77] *Commonwealth*[78] and *Assembly.*[79] Rooted in 'the new biopolitical demand for the reconstruction of the commons',[80] Hardt and Negri's anti-capitalist revolutionary love is unlike

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[71] Nussbaum, *Political Emotions*., p. 18 and p. 157.

[72] Ibid., p. 43.

[73] Ibid., p. 15.

[74] Ibid., p. 176.

[75] Ibid., p. 6.

[76] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

[77] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (London: Penguin Books, 2005).

[78] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).

[79] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Assembly* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[80] Jonasdottir and Ferguson, *Love*., p. 258.

solidarity because it 'extends beyond the rational calculus of interests'.[81] It rejects the public-private dichotomy, recuperates notions of the 'power of becoming defined by difference' and redefines wealth to 'extend our notion of the common and points towards a process of liberation'.[82] Drawing at once on a Spinozan conception of 'love as joy'[83] and Judaeo-Christian exegesis of 'love of neighbour' as entailing a duty to alterity,[84] they conceive of love as emancipatory power and praxis. As Hardt and Negri elaborate,

> Love – in the production of affective networks, schemes of cooperation, and social subjectivities – is an economic power. Conceived in this way love is not, as it is often characterized, spontaneous or passive. It does not simply happen to us, as if it were an event that mystically arrives from elsewhere. Instead it is an action, a biopolitical event, planned and realized in common.[85]

In addition, it is integral to their vision of a new internationalism.

> …[W]e need also to construct a new mode of life and above all a new community. This project leads not toward the naked life of *homo tantum* but toward *homohomo*, humanity squared, enriched by the collective intelligence and love of the community.[86]

Implicit in their divergent articulations of fraternity, performing such different work in their normative orders, Nussbaum, Hardt and Negri's projects illustrate the kind of contestation that surrounds the questions of what love '*is*' and '*ought*' to do in international politics.

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[81] Michael Hardt, "About Love." (2007): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioopkoppabI.. Also, cited in Eleanor Wilkinson, "On Love as an (Im)properly Political Concept," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 35, no. 1 (2017)., pp. 2-3.

[82] Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*., p. xii.

[83]Ibid., p. 184.

[84]Ibid., pp. 182-3. See also, Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*., pp. 351-2.

[85]Ibid., pp. 179-80.

[86] Hardt and Negri, *Empire*., p. 204.

What Love Is

As Alan Soble notes, 'love is…a rich phenomenon, provoking questions in ontology, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, theology and philosophy of religion'.[87] It is also 'universal', which in Sudipta Kaviraj's formulation means recognising

> (T)he idea of universality can have different forms. The kind of universality we ascribe to love is like the universality of human languages: all human beings have a language, but not the same specific language. Language is present everywhere in the human world, but not in the same form. Similarly, in all societies and historical stages, love exists; but the forms of social conduct and the conceptual system through which people think about it and represent its variations are different.[88]

To avoid the *hubris* of trying to offer analysis across multiple traditions or pretending this analysis exhausts conceptions of love across the globe, I will focus primarily on (analytic) 'Western' philosophy and theology. Indeed, the subject of 'love' has occupied 'Western' philosophy for millennia. Hesiod (c 700 BCE) wrote that if there is a god, 'it is the god Love, who…damages the mind'.[89] Similarly, Empedocles (c 492-432 BCE) thought love and strife governed the universe.[90] From the Hebrew Bible's injunction to love God and neighbour to the Johannine proclamation that 'God is love', love has also preoccupied 'ethicists and moral theologians, exegetes, philosophers and philosophers of religion'.[91] In 'Western' political thought, discussion of love converges around the ideas of *eros*, *philia* and *agape*.

In Hardt and Negri's thesis, the love that they exalt is a perplexing blend of *eros-agape*. To explore the contradictions that inhere in this combination, it might be worth clarifying how *agape*

[87] Alan Soble, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Love," in *Eros, Agape, and Philia: Readings in the Philosophy of Love*, ed. Alan Soble (St Paul: Paragon House, 1989)., p. ix.

[88] Sudipta Kaviraj, *The Invention of Private Life: Literature and Ideas* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015)., p. 161.

[89] Soble, "Introduction.", p. xi.

[90] May, *Love: A History.*, p. 39.

[91] Werner G. Jeanrond, *Theology of Love* (Bloomsbury: T& T Clark, 2010)., p. 8.

and *eros* are classically understood. *Agape,* or self-giving love, finds its basis in an exegesis of Paul and John and is imagined to be epitomised in the idea of Christ. In its Pauline formulation,

> Love is patient; love is kind; love is not envious or boastful or arrogant or rude. It does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice in wrongdoing, but rejoices in the truth. It bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Love never ends.[92]

Eros, however, finds its epitome in the figure of Socrates. It is associated with the writings of Plato, particularly the *Symposium, Lysis, Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*. Perhaps the clearest articulation of the 'essence' of *eros* is to be found in Socrates' 'encomium' of love in the *Symposium*. Diotima tells Socrates that love is the child of Poros (Plenty/Contrivance) and Penia (Poverty) conceived on the feast of Aphrodite:

> (S)ince he is the son not only of Poros but also of Penia, he is in this position: he is always poor, and far from being the tender and beautiful creature that most people imagine, he is in fact hard and rough, without shoes for his feet or a roof over his head. He is always sleeping on the bare ground without bedding, lying in the open in doorways and on the street, and because he is his mother's son, want is his constant companion. But on the other hand he also resembles his father, scheming to get what is beautiful and good, being bold and keen and ready for action, a cunning hunter; always contriving some trick or other, an eager searcher after knowledge, resourceful, a lifelong lover of wisdom, clever with magic and potions, and a sophist. His nature is neither that of an immortal nor that of a mortal, but in the course of a single day he will live and flourish for a while when he has the resources, then after a time he will start to fade away, only to come to life again through that part of his nature which he has inherited from his father. Yet his resources always slip through his fingers, so that although he is never destitute, neither is he rich. He is always between the two, just as he is between wisdom and ignorance.[93]

As the above quotes illustrate, there is much tension between these two forms of love. Thus, while *eros* seeks to acquire, *agape* seeks to give; while *eros* is unconstant, *agape* endures; while *eros* responds to the merit of the value of its object, *agape* 'creates value in its object'; while *eros* is 'sexual', *agape* is never characterised as such; while *eros* is directed at a set of properties, *agape* is directed at persons; while *eros* is ascending love, *agape* is descending love.[94] This contrast between *eros* and *agape* is

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[92] 1 Corinthians 13:4-8.

[93] C.C. Frisbee Sheffield, *Plato: The Symposium (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)., 203d-3 or p. 40.

[94] Soble, "Introduction.", p. xxiii.

perhaps most clearly enunciated in the work of Anders Nygren for whom *eros* essentially becomes not-*agape*, as summarised in the table reproduced below:[95]

Eros is an acquisitive desire and longing.	*Agape* is sacrificial giving.
Eros is an upward movement.	*Agape* comes down.
Eros is man's way to God.	*Agape* is God's way to man.
Eros is man's effort: it assumes that man's salvation is his own work.	*Agape* is God's grace: salvation is the work of Divine love.
Eros is egocentric love, a form of self-assertion of the highest, noblest, sublimest kind.	*Agape* is unselfish love, it 'seeketh not its own,' it gives itself away.
Eros us the will to get and possess which depends on want and need.	*Agape* is freedom in giving, which depends on wealth and plenty.
Eros is primarily *man's* love; God is the object of *Eros*. Even when it is attributed to God, *Eros* is patterned on human love.	*Agape* is primarily God's love; God is *Agape*. Even when it is attributed to man, *Agape* is patterned on Divine love.
Eros is determined by the quality, the beauty and worth, of its object, it is not spontaneous, but 'evoked', 'motivated'.	*Agape* is sovereign in relation to its object, and is directed to both 'the evil and the good'; it is spontaneous, 'overflowing'; unmotivated.
Eros recognizes value in its object – and loves it.	*Agape* loves – and *creates value in its* object.

Hardt and Negri's philosophy of love draws both on the *agapic* and *erosic* traditions. Therefore, they call for a return to a pre-modern Judaeo-Christian love, where 'love of neighbour' is understood as a radical openness to alterity.[96] However, they also note drawing on Plato that love as the child of 'poverty and invention' is 'deeply ambivalent and susceptible to corruption'.[97] Underscoring love's *erosic* elements, it is for them 'a will to power, that is, the ontological production of common subjectivities'.[98] Their union of *eros-agape* – despite the absence of the same metaphysics and commitment to epistemological humility – is reminiscent of Augustinian *caritas*. Consequently, Arendt's critique of Augustine, that the person is not valued for their personhood *per se* but for their instrumental value (in this case in realising the revolution), also rings true.[99]

[95]Ibid., p. 94.

[96] Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*., p. 182.

[97]Ibid., p. 182.

[98]Ibid., p. 318.

[99] Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*., p. 111-112.

Nonetheless, love in its *erosic* and *agapic* forms is compatible with the kind of universalism Hardt and Negri espouse. Yet, it is not clear how this love is generative of the subjectivity they imagine. Indeed, in Kierkegaard's formulation, 'love to one's neighbour makes a man blind in the deepest and holiest sense, so that he blindly loves every man'.[100] Or in Camus' reformulation of Scheler, 'Humanity is loved in general in order to avoid loving anyone in particular'.[101] Indeed, for all their dissimilarities, love in its *erosic* and *agapic* forms is compatible with universalism. Further, in both *erosic* and *agapic* forms, there is little value for the person *qua* person. As Neera Kapur Badhwar elaborates, in *agape*, 'every individual is *phenomenologically replaceable* by any other as the object of love'.[102] Although the person is valued as an end, it is the act of loving, which confers value on the 'Speck of Humanity among other Specks in the Ocean of Humanity'.[103] Similarly, in *erosic love* the person is 'both *phenomenologically and numerically replaceable*' and 'the object of love is *not that individual with those qualities* but rather *those qualities in any individual*'.[104]

The only love that values particularity as an end-in-itself is 'philia', upon which Nussbaum's project rests. *Philia*, according to Soble, is the love that is 'caught in the cracks' of *eros* and *agape*.[105] It is associated chiefly with the philosophy of Aristotle, but also finds articulations in the work of Montaigne and Nietzsche. *Philia* is often translated to friendship. However, for Gregory Vlastos, this 'blunts the force of Aristotle's Greek' as 'love' is the only English word that is robust and versatile enough to cover *philia*.[106] Nussbaum concurs in *Fragility*, noting,

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[100] As cited in Neera Kapur Badhwar, "Friends as Ends in Themselves," in *Eros, Agape and Philia: Readings in the Philosophy of Love*, ed. Alan Soble (St Paul: Paragon House, 1989)., p. 172.

[101] Albert Camus, *The Rebel,* trans. Anthony Bower (London: Penguin, 2013)., Loc 261.

[102] Badhwar, "Friends as Ends.", p. 169.

[103]Ibid., p. 169, p. 172.

[104]Ibid., p. 169.

[105] Soble, "Introduction.", p. xxiii.

[106] Gregory Vlastos 'The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato' in Alan Soble, *Eros, Agape, and Philia: Readings in the Philosophy of Love* (Paragon House Publishers, 1993)., p. 96.

> *philia* includes many relationships that would not be classified as friendships. The love of mother and child is a paradigmatic case of *philia*; all close family relations, including the relation of husband and wife, are so characterized…But *philia* includes the very strongest affective relationships that human beings form; it includes, furthermore, relationships that have a passionate sexual component.[107]

Although Nussbaum sees *eros* as a kind of *philia*, she notes, 'the emphasis of *philia* is less on intensely passionate longing than on disinterested benefit, sharing and mutuality; less on madness than on a rare kind of balance and harmony'.[108] Although Nussbaum calls for the celebration of polyvalent loves in her project and seeks to judge loves of their compatibility with liberalism rather than on the traditions they arise from, her thought is very much situated in the Aristotelian tradition. As she notes in *Therapy of Desire,* 'The general rubric under which Aristotle analyses loves is that of *philia*, which, strictly speaking, is not an emotion at all, but a relationship with emotional components'. Thus, Nussbaum claims,

> Love is never well imagined as a constant experience; it is a relationship involving kaleidoscopically many feelings, actions, and reactions – including intense focus on the other person, but also including the solitary cultivations of one's own personal interests, and even sleep.[109]

If we are to take Nussbaum's commitment to anthropodenial as radical evil seriously, then surely Nussbaum's project must preclude what Annette Baier calls the 'theological' (non-biological) loves of *eros* and *agape*.[110] Indeed, *Upheavals of Thought* calls for the embrace of the upside-down ladder of Ulysses over the ascent narratives of *eros*, *agape* and Romanticism.[111] However, some contradictions remain. In Nussbaum's own admission, her project wrestles with the general and the particular. Perhaps this is most clearly epitomised in the notion that Aristotelian *philia* would seem like an inadequate basis for civic love. Indeed, the intense friendship that Aristotle valorises precludes the

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[107] Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)., p. 354.

[108] Nussbaum, *Fragility of Goodness*., p. 354.

[109] Nussbaum, *Political Emotions*., p. 320.

[110] Annette C. Baier, "Unsafe Loves," in *Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996)., p. 36.

[111] Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*., See Part 3.

possibility of having too many friends. Consequently, any kind of sentimental education that leads to a project of *philia*/ 'loving in particular' writ large seems antithetical to Aristotle. Further, Nussbaum describes her civic love as unconditional. As Nussbaum herself notes, however, *philia* is not unconditional. Therefore, if any central beliefs are or become false, the love will cease unless love develops another basis.[112] For Benjamin Bagley, this may be facilitated by 'mutual improvisation' and openness to identities in construction.[113] However, the kind of intimate knowledge and interaction this hinges on is unfathomable in a polity the size of a nation, let alone the globe.

The question of whether love is constituted by three ideas that share a family resemblance or is properly constituted by one or two of these distinct ideas remains contested. However, if Simon May is right that the concept of love today is associated with unconditionally, particularity, selflessness, benevolence, eternity, perfection and redemption then it would seem that the three ideas have been conflated.[114] Indeed, recent work on love in analytic philosophy is more focused on the reasons for love, treating the essence of love as settled.[115] Nonetheless, the inherent contestation about what love *is* permeates discussions of love as a political concept, highlighting at best the follies of systematisation and at worst the incoherence of any notion of a universal love.

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[112] Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994)., p. 90.

[113] Benjamin Bagley, "Loving Someone in Particular," *Ethics* 125(2015)., p. 477.

[114] May, *Love: A History*., p.1-2.

[115] See, for example, Harry G. Frankfurt, *The Reasons of Love* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006)., J. David Velleman, "Love as a Moral Emotion," *Ethics* 109, no. 2 (1999)., Niko Kolodny, "Love as Valuing a Relationship," *Philosophical Review* 112, no. 2 (2003)., Bagley, "Loving Someone in Particular."

What Love Ought

The contestation over what love *is* is amplified by the debate surrounding what work love *ought* to perform in politics. Engaging with Nussbaum, Hardt and Negri's projects and their criticisms, I argue that envisaging love's evocation in politics has been met by a range of responses, that I broadly categorise as 'retrieval', 'rehabilitation' and 'rejection'.

Exemplifying the first approach, Martha Nussbaum's collective works, *prima facie*, call for the retrieval of love in its polyvalence. However, as Lester Hunt argues in his engagement with *Upheavals*, it is worth questioning whether the 'emotional thinking' Nussbaum endorses is compatible with her commitment to 'liberalism'.[116] Drawing on Wagner's anti-Semitic autobiographical account in *Judaism in Music*, he argues that 'other emotion-based thinking can be profoundly inimical to liberalism'.[117] Indeed, Nussbaum can only circumvent this problem by designating some emotions 'good' and others 'bad'.[118] Nussbaum does indeed elevate love, compassion, sympathy and relegate shame, resentment and disgust. In her own admission in *Political Emotions*, 'The project I envisage will succeed only if it finds ways to make humans lovable, inhibiting disgust and shame'.[119] However, this systematisation sits uneasily with Nussbaum's conception of anthropodenial as radical evil.[120] As Hunt notes, it is this 'gap that yawns between her insistence that we accept our frailty and her apparent hope that it can be wiped out altogether'.[121] Although Sara Ahmed does not explicitly engage with Nussbaum, her work 'In the Name of Love' complements Holt's critique.[122] Writing of fascist appropriation of 'hate' as love,

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[116] Hunt, "Nussbaum on Emotions.", p. 552.

[117] Ibid., p. 553.

[118] Ibid., p. 553.

[119] Nussbaum, *Political Emotions*., p. 138.

[120] Ibid., p. 182.

[121] Hunt, "Nussbaum on Emotions.", p. 577.

[122] Sara Ahmed, "In the Name of Love." *Borderlands e-journal* 2(3) (2003): http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol2no3_2003/ahmed_love.htm.

Ahmed problematizes the equation of love with goodness and its conflation with 'right action'.[123] In exploring how 'love becomes a way of bonding with others in relation to an ideal', Ahmed argues that political projects grounded in love are necessarily exclusionary.[124] Thus, '(l)ove is crucial to how individuals become aligned in collectives through their identification with an ideal, an alignment that relies on the existence of others who have failed that ideal'.[125] Ahmed suggests that making love crucial to the promise of cohesion, places the onus on the 'other' to have 'the right emotion…to pass into the community: in this case, by displaying 'my love', I show that I am 'with you'.[126] Indeed, much of Nussbaum's project is predicated on this educative, perhaps even assimilative, impulse: 'Perhaps most important, (nations) can build cultures of empathy, encouraging the ability to see the world through the eyes of others and to recognize their individuality'.[127] However, this recognition of 'others' hinges on the re-making of the other in our own image in order to transcend the Aristotlean problem of 'watery motivation'. As Nussbaum argues,

> There are two things above all that make people love and care for something, the thought that it is all theirs, and the thought that it is the only one they have…To make people care, you have to make them see the object of potential care in some way as 'theirs' and 'them'.[128]

This emphasis on education and assimilation into a hierarchy of loves would suggest that rather than embrace loves in their plurality, Nussbaum's project hinges on the rehabilitation of love.

Typifying the second approach or 'rehabilitation', Hardt and Negri's project claims to 'recuperate' love, to challenge 'the modern concept of love…(as) exclusively limited to the

[123]Ibid., paragraph 48.

[124]Ibid., paragraph 5.

[125]Ibid., paragraph 47.

[126]Ibid., paragraph 32.

[127] Nussbaum, *Political Emotions*., p. 198.

[128]Ibid., p. 219.

bourgeois couple and the claustrophobic confines of the nuclear family'.[129] In their most recent book *Assembly*, they further seek to disentangle this love from capitalist appropriation. Hardt and Negri's conception of love has been criticised by feminist and queer scholars who have sought to rehabilitate rather than reject their concept of revolutionary love. Ann Ferguson argues their disregard of gender, race, ethnicity and sexuality; their conflation of 'caring labour' with 'immaterial labour' and their failure to 'theorize the ongoing conflict between and within various forms of personal and political loves' renders their project deeply problematic.[130] Instead, she calls for the prioritisation of power-with rather than power-over relations.[131] This necessitates a love that engages

> in playful and loving practices across class, race, and national divides to create new social relationships and group solidarities to challenge old social relations of racial, ethnic, class, national and sexual domination.[132]

Similarly, Eleanor Wilkinson argues that Hardt and Negri appropriate the language of feminist and queer critique for conservative ends.[133] They extend private loves to the public sphere without ever interrogating the embeddedness of these loves in patriarchy and neoliberalism.[134] Although Wilkinson labels love 'an improperly political concept', she really seeks to challenge Hardt and Negri's prioritisation of *eros-agape* over *philia* in their articulation of 'revolutionary love'. As she notes,

> From a queer perspective, my aim is to destabilize these distinctions between friendship and love. I argue these hierarchies of love may be preventing people from imagining new ways of loving and living, and that these distinctions are exactly what needs to be challenged in order to truly rediscover the political function of love.[135]

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[129] Eleanor Wilkinson, "Love in the Multitude? A Feminist Critique of Love as a Political Concept," in *Love: A Question for Feminism in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Anna G. Jonasdottir and Ann Ferguson (New York: Routledge, 2014)., p. 239

[130] Nussbaum, *Political Emotions*., p. 259.

[131] Ibid., p. 257.

[132]Ibid., p. 255.

[133] Wilkinson, "Love in the Multitude? A Feminist Critique of Love as a Political Concept.", p. 239

[134] Ibid., p. 239.

[135] Ibid., p. 241.

Thus, Hardt, Negri, and the scholars that highlight the limitations of their project are all engaged in an attempt to 'rehabilitate' love and make it suitable for their vision of politics.

To return to Arendt, her 'rejection' of love as 'antipolitical' hinges on the reduction of love (with Augustine) to *appetitus* or craving, distinct from action or judgment. While this may not detract from Arendt's compelling critique of Augustinian *caritas* or his Pauline Christianity, it does not exhaust other formulations and evocations of love. Further, Arendt's own conception of love is implicated in her conception of politics. Arendt's human's 'essential nature' is 'a lack of self-sufficiency'.[136] To the extent that love is the *appetitus* that animates the attempt to escape from this nature, to the extent that the object of love constitutes a home, Arendt asks, 'Would it not be better to love the world in *cupiditas* and be at home?'.[137] Not only does *amor mundi* or love of the world make individuals 'denizens of the world',[138] it is the precondition of their participation in politics. Animated by respect for alterity rather than universal fraternal love, Arendt's political project rests on a Kantian-mediated reading of Aristotle's *philia politike*.[139] Distinct from the vulnerability Nussbaum places at the centre of her project, Arendt advocates friendship without intimacy or closeness, based on 'regard for the person from the distance which the space of the world puts between us'.[140] In a similar vein, Sara Ahmed's thoughtful critique of love as a 'humanist fantasy' does not negate the fact that love is still central to her praxis of politics. In her words: 'A politics of love is necessary in the sense that how one loves matters; it has effects on the texture of everyday life and on the intimate 'withness' of social relations'.[141] What Ahmed resists is the

[136] Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*., pp. 18-9.

[137] Ibid., p. 19.

[138] Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*., p. 19.

[139] Arendt, *The Human Condition*., p. 243. For a discussion of Kant's understanding of love as respect, see Baier, "Unsafe Loves."

[140] Arendt, *The Human Condition.,* p. 243.

[141] Ahmed, "In the Name of Love.", paragraph 45.

notion that 'love can provide the foundation for political action' or is a 'sign of good politics'.[142] In sum, it is a critique of the 'essentialising' of love, its equation with goodness and its reduction to a (sole) basis of right action. Recognising the propensity of love for violence and hate, Ahmed actually offers another theory of love. In this pluralist form, love does not offer ontological grounding but becomes cognisant of vulnerability and difference. And yet it continues to be a form of thinking, acting, valuing and creating.

> We need to be invested in the images of a different kind of world and act upon those investments in how we love our loves, and how we live our lives, at the same time, as we give ourselves up and over to the possibility that we might get it wrong, or that the world that we are in might change its shape. There is no good love that, in speaking its name, can change the world into the referent for that name. But in the resistance to speaking in the name of love, in the recognition that we do not simply act out of love, we can find perhaps a different way of orientating ourselves towards others. Such orientations may be about inhabiting forms of love that do not speak their name.[143]

Although framed as rejecting love as improper for politics, so many of these critiques may be seen as engaging (sometimes restating) the same classical discussions of what love *is* and *ought*. Ahmed's observations about love not equating to goodness is entirely compatible with Diotima's portrayal of *eros* as the offspring of 'Poros' and 'Penia'. Her critique of love as ideal, in turn, is really a critique of conditional love. Similarly, her openness to multiple loves and resistance to a rule-based love is compatible with the radical particularity Aristotle envisages in *philia*. Calls for an 'embodied', 'nature-affirming' love echo the concerns of Aristotle and Hume. Finally, a love that is cognisant of power, preoccupied Plato; forms the subject of Nietzschean philosophy and culminates in the German Romantic notion of *Liebestodt*. If all these critiques are but alternate theories of love, it would appear that for better or worse, love is implicated in the realm of politics.

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[142] Ibid., paragraph 48.

[143] Ibid., paragraph 48.

What Love Does

Whether retrieved, rehabilitated or rejected, it would appear love is part of the *polis*, integral to the international. To avoid the dual dangers of reductionism and *hubris*, I therefore suggest we abandon grand narratives about love altogether. This is because any engagement with love in general is ultimately an engagement with an abstraction without reference to time, space, agents and context. Instead, I propose we borrow from Duncan Bell's 'ideal-typical distinction between theory, ideology and imaginary' noting that in reality 'the three blur together'.[144] Bell defines theories as 'systematic articulated bodies of argumentation'; draws on Michael Freeden, to define ideologies as

> clusters of ideas, beliefs, opinions, values and attitudes usually held by identifiable groups, that provide directives, even plans, of action for public policy-making in an endeavour to uphold, justify, change or criticize the social and political arrangements of a state or other political community.[145]

Finally, evoking Charles Taylor he defines social imaginaries as

> the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.[146]

Essentially, Bell clarifies the system at the heart of Taylor's *Modern Social Imaginaries.*[147] Understanding theories to be nested within ideologies and ideologies within imaginaries, he argues,

> Imaginaries are more basic than ideologies insofar as they establish the background cultural and cognitive conventions that structure and animate them. Just as ideologies contain multiple and often competing theories, so imaginaries are compatible with varied ideologies.[148]

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[144] Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016)., p. 93.

[145] *Ibid*, p. 94.

[146] Bell, *Reordering the World*., p. 94.

[147] Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

[148] Bell, *Reordering the World*., p. 94.

Conceiving love as an integral part of the social imaginary captures its *seeming* universality and implication in 'the moral order'. Indeed, love would seem central to much of Taylor's description of the 'modern' 'Western' social imaginary. As part of the 'background' or 'common understanding' shared by 'large groups of people', it is 'carried in images, stories and legends', making possible 'common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy'.[149] If we pretend it is possible to bracket the ideological commitments of Nussbaum (liberal cosmopolitanism) on the one hand, and Hardt and Negri (post-Marxism) on the other, it appears that love forms part of the social imaginary which both shapes and contains their thought. Reflecting on the continuities between Nussbaum, and Hardt and Negri's project, love constitutes part of 'the micromappings of social and political space through which we perceive, judge and act in the world'.[150] Thus, love for Nussbaum is a form of emotional appraisal;[151] 'intellectual love' for Hardt and Negri is 'the supreme form of the expression of intelligence'.[152] Nussbaum's 'civic love' hinges on the creation and extension of circles of concern;[153] Hardt and Negri's revolutionary zeal is premised on their belief that 'the creation of a new humanity is the ultimate act of love'.[154] Viewing love, thus, as part of an imaginary, helps clarify two things. First, it explains how love is compatible with the liberalism of Nussbaum and the post-Marxism of Hardt and Negri. Consequently, love is no longer imagined as some unwieldy anthropomorphic force but a source deliberately drawn on to legitimise seemingly conflictual ideologies and theories. Second, envisaging love as part of an imaginary, helps shift an emphasis away from what love *is* or *ought* to what an agent mobilises love to '*do*' in international politics.

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[149] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*., p. 23.

[150] Bell, *Reordering the World*., p. 94.

[151] See Nussbaum's summary of this reasoning in Nussbaum, *Political Emotions*., p. 399-400.

[152] Hardt and Negri, *Empire*., p. 78.

[153] Nussbaum, *Political Emotions*., p. 12, 219.

[154] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*., p. 356.

Love, Literature and Liminality

If love forms part of a social imaginary – the 'largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation' that precedes formal theorising – it follows that it is 'carried in images, stories and legends'.[155] Literature, then, would seem an appropriate site for its contemplation. Annette Baier would seem to concur when she claims that 'the ones who have taught us the most insightful things about love are poets and novelists'.[156] For Raimond Gaita, literature offers what 'political or moral philosophy that seeks universal principles abstracted from the concrete circumstances of people who are intellectually and spiritually nourished by the way they have been rooted in this or that culture' simply cannot.[157] Charles Taylor is right to admit his 'modern' 'Western' social imaginary – with its privileging of Grotian-Lockean natural law and its elevation of a 'network of agape' as sacral order – is bounded and ought to be provincialized.[158] However, engaging with literature with its embeddedness in context, contingency and cultures does not promise an Archimedean point from which to understand or transcend imaginaries. It merely offers a glimpse into concurrent ones.

Literature is not merely descriptive, it is also prescriptive. Perhaps this is most clearly articulated in the programmes of sentimental education that Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty espouse.[159] Indeed, literature and sentiments have also been implicated in 'civilizational' projects. As Margit Pernau and Helde Jordheim have sought to argue, from the time of the Scottish

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[155] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*., pp. 23 and 25.

[156] Baier, "Unsafe Loves.", p. 33.

[157] Raimond Gaita, *A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love and Truth and Justice* (London: Routledge, 2000)., pp. 284-5.

[158] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*., p. 196.

[159] Richard Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality," in *Wronging Rights? : Philosophical Challenges for Human Rights*, ed. Aakash Singh. Rathore and Alex. Cistelecan (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011)., p. 125. Martha Nussbaum, 'Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism' in Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held, eds. *Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010)., p. 158.

Enlightenment, 'emotion' along with politics and economics became 'markers' of progress.[160] Consequently, 'observing how people love' became 'a good indicator of how civilized they are'.[161] That literature is involved in this education of emotions, is evident in the postcolonial charge that it has advanced the interests of empire, operating as it were as a 'mask of conquest'.[162] Drawing on Gramscian analysis of 'cultural hegemony', Gauri Viswanathan thus elaborates,

> 'that certain humanistic functions traditionally associated with literature – for example, the shaping of character or the development of the aesthetic sense or the disciplines of ethical thinking – were considered essential to the processes of [imperial] socio-political control'[163]

Engaging with liminal figures, or thinkers who are deemed to be on the threshold of imaginaries, I seek to illuminate another history. Operating on the peripheries of the 'West' and non 'West', I posit liminal spaces are rich sites of creativity, critique and concurrence. Indebted to the work of Elleke Boehmer and Leela Gandhi, I argue that anti-imperialism as an activity was not always performed by the 'non-West' upon the 'West', that literature as a world-making activity did not always serve as a weapon of imperialism and that love was mobilised as a praxis of dissent.[164] If twentieth century narratives of the 'international' have somehow become concomitant with the history of realism and liberalism or indeed Marxism, then writing about liminal literary figures who elude classification also illuminates another kind of politics. Variously anarchist, pacifist, socialist and libertarian over their lifetimes, they are representative perhaps of what Leela Gandhi describes as an 'immature' politics expunged from the annals of international history.[165]

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[160] Margrit Pernau, Helge Jordheim, and Orit Bashkin, *Civilizing Emotions : Concepts in Nineteenth Century Asia and Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)., See generally 'Introduction'.

[161] Ibid., p. 5.

[162] Gandhi, *Affective Communities*., p. 12.

[163] Gauri Viswanathan, *Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015)., p. 3.

[164] Gandhi, *Affective Communities*. Elleke Boehmer, *Empire, the National, and the Postcolonial, 1890-1920 : Resistance in Interaction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[165] Gandhi, *Affective Communities*., p. 12.

This thesis focuses on the period that spans from circa 1880 to 1960. As already discussed, it coincides with many narratives of the emergence of the 'international'. Spanning from the high-tide of imperialism to the high-tide of decolonisation, it encompasses the imperial wars in South Africa, the Philippines and Japan, the decline of the Russian Empire, the beginning of the *swadeshi* (own country) movement in India, the First World War, the founding of the League of Nations, the Second World War, the founding of the United Nations, the rise of the Iron Curtain and the Algerian Independence Movement. The three literary figures I study, namely Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) and Albert Camus' (1913-1960) literary and political writings engage with most of these epochal events. Although love is central to all their ethics, none of these figures share the same conception of love or indeed espouse the same conception of love over their lifetimes. Nonetheless, they were all internationally renowned, politically engaged, liminal literary figures who mobilised a 'presentist' conception of love as praxis in their aesthetics and politics.

Focusing on the Anglosphere alone, at the turn of the nineteenth century, Tolstoy was the most translated author in the English language.[166] Tagore enjoyed a moment of unparalleled international celebrity in the 1910s, a period which coincided with him becoming the Nobel Laureate in Literature in 1913 and his prominence on the speaker circuit in the United States and the United Kingdom. Camus' *The Plague* was translated into nine languages within a year of publication and was a celebrated classic even before his untimely death in 1960.[167] He too was the recipient of the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1957 and was renowned both because of his proximity and distance from the French existential circle. All three literary figures were engaged in politics as activists or critics. Toward the latter half of his life, Tolstoy was an anarcho-pacifist and anti-imperialist, Tagore was critical of nationalist and imperial violence, Camus was involved in the

[166] Bartlett, Rosamund, "Tolstoy Translated." *Financial Times*, 2014.

[167] Judt, Tony, "A Hero for Our Times." *The Guardian*, 2001.

French resistance and was an ardent advocate for the equality of Arabs and Berbers in Algeria even when he failed to support a particular political model of Algerian independence.

Writing from one of the three most significant empires of the twentieth century prior to decolonisation, each figure occupies a distinct relation to it. The Russian Tolstoy was an aristocrat in the metropole, the British subject Tagore was of the landed gentry in the colonial city and *pied-noir* Camus was from the working class in Algeria. Like Michael Walzer's archetypical 'critic', then, they may be described as both ' "insiders", men…mindful of and committed to the society whose policies and practices they call into question – who *care* about what happens to it' and 'heroes' whose critical distance represents a 'wilful break with the fellowship of the city'.[168] None subaltern, the pied-noir, *pirali* Brahmin,[169] and the aristocrat of a lower echelon, have a relationship of antagonism rather than alienation to the *polis*, that Walzer (and indeed Michael Sandel or Alisdair McIntyre) sees as so central to the role of the social critic.[170] This relationship of antagonism problematizes the sharp binary Leela Gandhi imagines between *haemophilia* or love of fellow citizens and Epicurean *xenophilia* or love of strangers.[171] It also produces a political thought that is not, indeed cannot, be systematic. Between their aesthetics and activism, their engagement with and eschewal of politics, all three figures represent the contradictions that arise from the constant negotiation of what to conserve and what to challenge.

Their antagonism with the *polis* is in part formed by their liminal status. Although Tolstoy is now read as part of the Western canon, his Russia had an ambivalent, antagonistic relationship to it. Indeed, in his early career, Tolstoy subscribed neither to the Westernizer nor the Slavophile

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168 Michael Walzer, *The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and Political Commitment in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2002)., p. xi and p. 14.

169 Pirali Brahmins belong to an upper priestly caste but are considered less 'pure' owing to their historical fraternisation with Muslims.

170 Walzer, *Company of Critics*., p. 22 and Gandhi, *Affective Communities*., p.24

171 Gandhi, *Affective Communities*., p. 28.

camp.[172] In the decade and a half before his death, he increasingly identified Russia as an 'Eastern' nation.[173] Yet for all his creative engagements with Daoism, Buddhism, Sufism, Hinduism and Eastern non-conformist theology, his thought is unintelligible without recognising a debt to Rousseau, Schopenhauer and Kant. While Tagore's moment of celebrity coincided largely with his veneration as some kind of Eastern sage, for most of his life in Bengal and India he was criticised for being Western and modern. In his own admission, his work was the product of the confluence of cultures. Although Martha Nussbaum and Isaiah Berlin translate him with ease into a liberal canon, much is lost from ignoring his embeddedness in a Hindu universalism. Though few would question Camus' place in a Western canon, Camus regarded himself an Algerian and consequently 'out of place' among the French existential elite. Although fruitfully read as contributing to 'post-foundational' literature, Camus was also engaged in a distinctively *pied-noir* literary tradition of theorising a colonised Mediterranean.

None of the literary figures I study subscribe to a sharp demarcation between the Aristotelian categories of *poiesis* or the 'making' of literature and *praxis* or the 'doing' of politics or what Arendt described as the distinction between 'work' and 'action'. Thus, art is central to Tolstoy's anarcho-pacifist or rationalist Christian politics of 'truth telling'.

> Every work of art results in the one who receives it entering into a certain kind of communion with the one produced or is producing the art, and with all those who, simultaneously with him, before him, or after him, have received or will receive the same artistic impression.[174]

In his highly-prescriptive polemic *What is Art?*, Tolstoy envisions aesthetics as that which unites rather than divides. Consequently, it is 'universalist' in its celebration of Vedic hymns, Shakya muni

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[172] Alexander Burry and S. Ceilidh Orr, "The Railway and the Elemental Force: Slavophilism, Pan-Slavism, and Apocalyptic Anxieties in Anna Karenina," in *Russian Writers and the Fin De Siecle*, ed. Ani Kokobobo and Katherine Bowers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015)., p. 71.

[173] Leo Tolstoy, "Letter to a Chinese Gentleman." (1899): https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Letter_to_a_Chinese_Gentleman.

[174] Leo Tolstoy, *What is Art?,* trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Penguin, 1995)., p. 38.

(Buddha), Japanese art, Indian architecture and Arabian tales.[175] Similarly, it denounces art that breeds hierarchy and violence.[176] Tolstoy's emphasis 'on what art is' is intrinsically bound to 'what art does'. What art can or cannot be is dictated, in turn, by how the *polis* is conceived. Tolstoy's *polis* is Christian and is based on a universal conception of humanity and radical obedience to a 'law of love' characterised by non-resistance to violence. Consequently, only aesthetics which embody or advance these aims constitute 'art' in Tolstoy's frame.

For Tagore, art's role lies in the sentimental education of the citizen. Enabling 'the disinterested perception of the real', he suggests aesthetics are 'not about beauty in its ordinary meaning but in the deeper meaning which a poet has expressed in his utterance: truth is beauty, beauty truth'.[177] Drawing on Indic *rasa* tradition, Tagore suggests 'taste' is the foundation for ethical judgment.[178] He suggests it forms the portal through which the world of appearance and intimate world of sentiment interact transforming each other.[179] Rather than 'art' operating as a form of creation imposed upon the world, in Tagore's monist frame, creation entails and presupposes the recognition of 'the other'.

> When the singer has his inspiration he makes himself into two; he has within him his other self as the hearer, and the outside audience is merely an extension of this other self of his. The lover seeks his own other self in his beloved. It is the joy that creates this separation, in order to realise through obstacles the union.[180]

[175] Tolstoy, *What is Art?*

[176]Ibid., pp. 81-2.

[177] Sisir Kumar Das, *Vol.3: A Miscellany the English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore* (New Delhi: Sahitya Academi, 2008)., p. 582.

[178] Ibid, p. 353.

[179]Ibid, p. 353.

[180] Ibid, p. 317.

For Camus, art as 'creation' or *poiesis* is central to rebellion. As he notes, 'The demands of rebellion are really, in part aesthetic demands'.[181] However, in it the paradox of the absurdity of the world and one's love for it are reconciled. Camus summarises the paradox thus: 'artistic creation is a demand for unity and a rejection of the world. But it rejects the world on account of what it lacks and in the name of what it sometimes is'.[182] The novel becomes a site for rebellion. Its power lies in the fact that it offers an avenue for thinking or reasoning in the full knowledge that life is absurd and all meaning is of its creation. Recognising that there is making in the doing and doing in the making, Camus begins to see rebellion as the middle way between the 'frenzy of annihilation and the acceptance of totality'.[183] It allows him to see creativity as political and rebellion as part of the human condition. Unlike Arendt, Camus can appreciate creation as central to rebellion without assuming the artist ought to become legislator. He is explicit about this:

> This formula certainly does not authorize the ridiculous illusion of a civilization controlled by artists. It only illuminates the drama of our times in which work, entirely subordinated by production has ceased to be creative.[184]

Without calling for the artist to be legislator, as Tolstoy arguably does, Camus merely notes art can be political.

These literary figures' liminality informs their articulations of an 'ethico-politics' of love in the context of empire. Over the course of his career, Tolstoy variously advocated some form of *agape* that was affirmed in Romantic, familial or universal love. Tagore's work shifted from celebrating the ethico-political potential of plural loves in the Indic *rasa* (aesthetic) tradition to examining the extent to which freedom is a precondition to love's soteriological promise. Finally, I read Camus' life's works as an attempt to critique and rehabilitate *agape* via an engagement with

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[181] Camus, *The Rebel.*, 200.

[182] Ibid., 198.

[183] Ibid., 216.

[184] Ibid., 82.

two fellow Mediterraneans: Plotinus and Augustine. Despite their differences, what all three figures share in common is their attempt to articulate a love that is (sometimes despite their protestations) both 'presentist' and modern. Contrary to Arendt's admonitions of love as unworldly, all seemingly reject metaphysics and a concern for another world in their bid to articulate an ethico-politics for living and acting in this one. Although Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus' theorising of love in the context of empire forms the focus of this study, it is worth noting that love also creates a space for their participation in politics that transcends the binaries of coloniser and colonised. Embodying what Leela Gandhi and Michael Collins term 'the politics of friendship',[185] Tolstoy corresponded with Mohandas Gandhi, Ku-Hung Ming and Jane Addams; Tagore collaborated with Gilbert Murray, corresponded with W.B Yeats and W.E.B. Du Bois and Camus collaborated with and critiqued French existentialists and individuals who were to become members of the Algerian National Liberation Front.

Aims, Plan and Method

Setting the burgeoning literature on aesthetics and emotions in conversation, I seek to make love the subject of serious, systematic study. I argue that to the extent that plural loves populate the *polis*, love is integral to international relations. My thesis' offerings to international relations are theoretical and historical. My theoretical offering is a schema for examining love's work in international relations, cognisant both of the plurality of loves and the contestation surrounding what love *is* and *ought*. Having offered this broad framework, I turn my focus in the rest of the thesis to the period extending roughly from 1880-1960 and its twin thematic of empire and internationalism, which is increasingly understood as integral to the birth of International Relations as a discipline. My historical offering is to argue that love has played a significant role in

[185] Gandhi, *Affective Communities*. Also, Michael Collins, "Rabindranath Tagore and the Politics of Friendship," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 35, no. 1 (2012)., pp.118-142.

this period, evoked in ways variously hospitable and hostile to empire. Chapter 2 examines how love formed an important site for theorising and navigating the relationship between the imperial and the international, even for canonical figures in the academy. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 engage with the aesthetics and other political work of Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus in order to highlight how they conceived, evoked and mobilised love in the context of empire. Although there is now growing interest in Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus' contributions to political thought, the integral role love plays in their international thought in general, and in their critique of empire in particular, remains neglected. In bringing to light these neglected dimensions of their thought, I also hope to illuminate another history. It is a history where love (and emotion) was summoned to perform the work of imperialism and internationalism; where even liminal literary figures were involved as agents in theorising, conserving, resisting and transforming transnational relations in ways that the discipline's standard narratives that centre on liberalism, realism and Marxism simply do not capture. My engagement with these three literary figures and six canonical figures is not so much to endorse their thought, but to illuminate these neglected histories. The conclusion sets Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus in conversation and asks what is missed by studying these figures rather than a host of others. Understanding politics as the negotiation of plural loves, I ask in the conclusion what forms of action and what visions of politics, a large scale, thematic engagement with love might render visible.

This thesis is interdisciplinary. Arguably any work that takes emotion seriously as a human phenomenon must necessarily be so. Situated in the interstices of political theory, intellectual history and literature, my approach is interpretivist. In sum, I 'analyse the meanings that political concepts, practices and behaviours have for agents' and focus 'on the traditions, beliefs and theories that agents inherit, modify and utilise' to understand their world, their 'concepts, practices

and behaviour'.[186] My methods are historical. Broadly attuned to context, I read literary works alongside political writings, interpreting literature as (I believe these three authors intended) as forms of political action. In seeking to understand an author's interpretation, I do not rely on texts alone but read biographies, correspondence, diaries and other works by the author in the same period. In sum, I seek to follow the advice of J.G.A Pocock:

> There may be evidence, unreliable and treacherous but still usable, from the author's other writings or his private correspondence…The more evidence the historian can mobilise in the construction of hypothesis regarding the author's intentions, which can then be applied to or tested against the text itself, the better his chances of escaping from the hermeneutic circle.[187]

However, while I think these methods allow me to construct some kind of hypothesis I do not believe they offer me some kind of Archimedean viewpoint about authorial intent. Although I do not consider myself a Skinnerian, I concur entirely with his observation that

> (T)he literary historian must I think concede that [s]he can never hope, however much [s]he works with the contextual aids, to arrive simply by this process at the best reading of what a given writer might have meant. It is always for us, bringing our own experience and sensibility to bear, to say finally how we think a work must be taken.[188]

This thesis has a number of limitations. First, I read Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus in translation rather than in the original Russian, Bengali and French. Perhaps this is less significant in the case of Tagore who was a polyglot, oversaw the translation of his novels, and corresponded and delivered most of his speeches in English. Owing to the popularity of all three figures, I also think this problem is somewhat mitigated by the availability of translations that are widely regarded as authoritative. Second, although my research on Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus engages with their primary work, I draw extensively on secondary sources to understand and explain their historical

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[186] Ian Hall, "The Promise and Perils of Interpretivism in Australian International Relations," *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 73, no. 3 (2014)., p. 308.

[187] J. G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Ideas in Context)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)., p. 4.

[188] Quentin Skinner, "Hermeneutics and the Role of History," *New Literary History* 7, no. 1 (1975)., p. 228.

context. However, I note my core contribution in this thesis does not lie in the discovery of new material by established literary figures, but in the articulation and analysis of neglected themes in their work. Finally, despite my attempts to be sensitive to identity and alterity, I recognise that the three literary figures and the six canonical figures I study are all men. If I were seeking to offer a systematic definition of love based on an uncritical engagement with their thought, perhaps I could be prone to perpetuating a gendered, heteronormative, ableist theory of love. However, this is not what I am doing. In conversation with the many individuals that appear in my bibliography, I merely seek to illustrate some of the work love 'does' in international politics.

CHAPTER 2: LOVE AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 'CANON'

That Leo Tolstoy, Rabindranath Tagore or Albert Camus chose to engage with love as a site of ethico-politics is in some ways unremarkable. Perhaps owing to the lingering influence of nineteenth century 'religions of humanity'; the popularity of theosophy; the post-war rise in religiosity and the sexual and cultural revolution, love remained in the public square in the period when they wrote. Indeed, in the same timeframe, individuals deemed canonical to the discipline of International Relations also evoked love in their theorising of the international. In this chapter, I focus on three conceptual pairs and offer a brief exposition of how their understanding of love intersects with their understanding of order, history and power respectively. The figures I study are Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern; Herbert Butterfield and Arnold J. Toynbee, and Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau. Each conceptual pair is respectively associated with the traditions of institutionalism, international society and realism. Although each theorist was a prolific writer, the work I focus on in this chapter offers only a brief engagement with a specific set of their concerns at a specific moment of early twentieth century history. Thus, Murray and Zimmern's writings – much like the work I emphasise of Tolstoy and Tagore's – corresponds with the high-noon of empire. Like Camus, Butterfield and Toynbee's writings broadly correspond with the post-Second World War fracture of empires. Niebuhr and Morgenthau's post-Second World War writings, like Camus' late works are concerned with the rise of American and Soviet empires in a nuclear age. Although each of these 'canonical' thinkers conceive love differently, for all, love constitutes and/or legitimises their normative vision of international order and their related prescriptions for political praxis. Engaging with these figures' work on love not only illuminates neglected dimensions of their thought but brings to light the role love plays across disparate 'traditions' in the negotiation of the imperial and the international, the universal and the particular.

Of Cosmos and Commonwealth: Love and Order in Murray and Zimmern's Thought

Gilbert Murray (1866-1957) was Regius Professor of Greek at the University of Oxford, a classicist, an internationalist and key architect of the League of Nations Society. He was a campaigner for peace and reconciliation and an advocate of intellectual cooperation and cultural internationalism.[1] As his son-in-law, A.J. Toynbee attested, liberalism and Hellenism formed the two pillars of his thought.[2]

> (L)iberalism was the link between his public work and his scholarship. He identified both the Hellenic genius and the modern Western genius with the liberal spirit, and so identified them with each other. This was the master idea that gave unity to all his pursuits and inspiration to each of them…[3]

Indeed, Murray was a self-proclaimed advocate of what he termed 'Liberality', which was 'not a doctrine' but

> a spirit or attitude of mind, constantly changing in its outer manifestation according to the circumstances it has to meet, but always essentially the same in itself, an effort to get rid of prejudice so as to see the truth, to get rid of selfish passions as to do the right'.[4]

And, he was a Hellenist to the extent that he understood this 'liberality' to be first articulated in the example of Ancient Greece. His vision of classicism as liberalism was shared by his younger protégé, Alfred Eckhard Zimmern (1879-1957). Zimmern is perhaps best known today by E.H. Carr's errant description of him as an 'inter-war idealist' evangelising the doctrine of the 'harmony of interests'.[5] However, as Morgenthau acknowledged, Zimmern exerted considerable influence

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[1] Peter Wilson, "Gilbert Murray and International Relations: Hellenism, Liberalism, and International Intellectual Cooperation as a Path to Peace," *Review of International Studies* 37(2011)., p. 883.

[2] Peter Wilson, "Retrieving Cosmos: Gilbert Murray's Thought on International Relations," in *Gilbert Murray Reassessed*, ed. Christopher Stray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)., p. 248.

[3] As cited in Martin Ceadel, "Gilbert Murray and International Politics," in *Gilbert Murray Reassessed*, ed. Christopher Stray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)., p. 220.

[4] Gilbert Murray, *Liberality and Civilization* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1938)., p. 37.

[5] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). For a critique of Carr's reading of Zimmern, see for example, Lucian Ashworth, "Did the Realist-Idealist Debate Really Happen?," *International Relations* 16(2002). and Peter Wilson, "The Myth of the 'First Great Debate'," *Review of International Studies* 24(1998)..

on the development of International Relations as a discipline.[6] Not only was he the first professor of international politics in the world at Aberystwyth; the Montague Burton professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford; the architect of the League of Nations Covenant; co-founder of the (later Royal) Institute of International Affairs and the Geneva Institute of International Affairs, but many of his students such as Arnold Toynbee, Reginald Coupland and others went on to have a profound influence on the emergence of the discipline.[7]

For Jeanne Morefield, Murray and Zimmern subscribed to the muddled liberalism of Oxford, which bore the mark of T.H. Green's struggle 'to reconcile individualism and collectivism, spirituality and rationality, capitalism and morality, and a deep fear of the state with a belief in limited state intervention'.[8] In sum, they embraced Hegel's notion of a dialectic of spirit capable of reconciling 'individual freedom with the social and communal whole', but rejected his state theory.[9] Peter Wilson queries whether Murray could be called a neo-Hegelian in any meaningful sense,[10] and Julia Stapleton argues Zimmern's thought was more influenced by his engagement with the Jewish philosopher Asher Ginzberg (Ahad Ha-am) and his time in the Mediterranean writing *The Greek Commonwealth*.[11] Nonetheless, both Murray and Zimmern's projects are premised on the 'muddled' temporality of liberal conservatism, which entails a simultaneous moving forward, or progress, via a moving back to the example of Ancient Greece. Perhaps this is most

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[6] Jeanne Morefield, *Covenants Without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004)., p. 11.

[7] Ibid., p. 11.

[8] Jeanne Morefield, "'A Liberal in a Muddle': Alfred Zimmern on Nationality and Commonwealth," in *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations*, ed. David and Schmidt Long, Brian C. (New York: SUNY Press, 2004)., Loc 1447

[9] Jeanne Morefield, *Empires Without Imperialism: Anglo-American Decline and the Politics of Deflection* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)., p. 26 and 53.

[10] Wilson, "Gilbert Murray and International Relations.", p. 895.

[11] Julia Stapleton, "The Classicist as Liberal Intellectual: Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern," in *Gilbert Murray Reassessed* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)., p. 279-80.

evident in Murray's description of the relationship between the 'Liberality' and 'Conservatism' as one of 'complementarity'.

> Conservatism is…based upon the truth that mankind in the civilized nations has by centuries of trial and error, experiment and struggle, built up a social order which is extremely precious and whose destruction would mean the loss of all that has been painfully won by the great reforms of the past. The object of Conservatism is to save the social order. The object of Liberality is to bring that order a little nearer to what reformers aimed at and to what the judgment of a free man – free from selfishness, free from passion, free from prejudice – would require, and by that very change to save it the more effectively.[12]

Similarly, it is implicit in Zimmern's vision of liberty which emanates from custom and what he describes as the 'patriarchal system'.[13] In both instances, Murray and Zimmern seek the union of conservatism and liberalism in their theory of community.[14]

The notion of 'Cosmos' is central to Murray's vision of community and world order. He argues with his Hellenists

> (T)hat human society, rightly conceived, was not a chaos of warring interests, but a Cosmos, an ordered whole, in which every individual had his due share of both privilege and service. The whole inhabited world was by rights one great City, not a discordant jumble of Greek and barbarian, or slave and free; not, as we might now say, a mere battleground of Fascist and Communist, or a mere mob of white, yellow, and black; one Great City of which all men are free citizens.[15]

This Cosmos, this 'one great City of Men and Gods' is a 'moral and spiritual order'.[16] Constructing his tradition to include 'Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, St Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Kant and J.S. Mill, and Comte and T.H Green', he argues all 'what is good is in harmony with this Order, and what is bad is in discord against it'.[17] As Peter Wilson notes, Murray's Cosmos 'was

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[12] Murray, *Liberality and Civilization*., p. 46.

[13] Alfred Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1931)., p. 72.

[14] Morefield, *Covenants Without Swords*., p. 5.

[15] Murray, *Liberality and Civilization*., p. 43.

[16] Ibid., p. 44 and 46.

[17] Gilbert Murray, *Satanism and the World Order* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1920)., p. 9.

predominantly an Anglo-Saxon Cosmos',[18] which imagined the British Empire and Western civilisation as inextricably linked and inherently good.[19] Consequently, he regarded anarchy as anathema, naturalised the hierarchical relation of 'leader and led',[20] and saw no contradiction between 'brotherhood' and beneficence.[21] Although Murray often used liberal and rational as synonyms,[22] he suggested the emotions of love and hate were implicated in the Cosmos and its antithesis, chaos. Thus, in Murray's *Satanism and World Order*, he rightly understands 'Satanism; as the philosophical critique of entrenched order that is not incompatible with the thought of Christian evangelists and martyrs'.[23] However, he imagines it as animated, indeed indistinguishable from hatred. As he elaborates,

> (T)he spirit that I have called Satanism, the spirit which hates the World Order wherever it exists and seeks to vent its hate without further plan[24]

For Murray, this Satanism constitutes a threat to both British Empire and the League of Nations.[25] If hatred is implicated in chaos, for Murray, love 'works like a leaven transforming the whole mass', in service of the Cosmos.[26] In his Halley Stewart Lecture of 1928, *The Ordeal of This Generation,* he argued that love is neither a panacea nor synonymous with peace. Rather, it is 'a source of hope', intrinsic to the 'struggle for life'.[27]

> We are gregarious animals. And if such animals cannot live without killing, it is also true they cannot live without loving one another and sacrificing themselves for one another.[28]

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[18] Wilson, "Retrieving Cosmos.", p. 251.

[19] Gilbert Murray, *The Ordeal of This Generation; the War, the League & the Future (Halley Stewart Lectures, 1928)* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929)., p. 210. Also, Gilbert Murray, "The League of Nations and the British Empire," *The Spectator* 140, no. 5213 (1928)., p. 792.

[20] Murray, *Satanism and the World Order*., p. 40.

[21] Ibid., p. 40.

[22] Ceadel, "Gilbert Murray and International Politics.", p. 221.

[23] Murray, *Satanism and the World Order*., p. 9.

[24] Ibid., p. 43.

[25] Ibid., p. 46.

[26] Murray, *The Ordeal of This Generation*., p. 18.

[27] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

[28] Ibid., p. 17.

Consequently, 'kill to live' and 'cooperate to live' constitute two forms of strife, one is premised on 'self-protection' the other on sacrificial love.[29]

Murray writes of 'loyalty', 'sacrifice' and 'brotherhood' rather than 'sacrificial love' elsewhere, although he appears to use these terms interchangeably. Sacrificial love forms the capstone of his Cosmos. It co-opts the imperial officer who must selflessly bear the 'white man's burden', holding colonies in 'sacred trust' rather than as 'an estate to be exploited'.[30] Evoking Cobden, Macaulay, Mill, Salisbury and Gladstone,[31] he articulates his vision of equality within hierarchy.

> Above all, in our government and our administration of justice, we try to act without fear or favour, treating the poor man with as much respect as the rich man, the coloured man as the white, the alien as the Englishman.[32]

However, this condemns the colonised to accept their inferiority as natural.[33] For Murray, this inferiority was racially determined.

> It is a thing abundantly proved by experience that on the whole white men are 'superior' to black, brown, red, and yellow men – that is to say, that on the whole the first mentioned colour tends to rule and the other colours to obey[34]

Murray's conflation of moral and (constructed) racial hierarchies leads him to conclude the work of empire is ultimately good.

> The cruelties perpetrated by white men upon coloured men are, almost wherever and however they meet, stupendous. But the coloured men who are worked under definite rules and indentures are far better off than those who cannot be worked at all, or those who, under conditions of nominal equality, are forced to work, unprotected, beneath the hand of any chance master.[35]

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[29] Ibid., p. 17.

[30] Murray, *Satanism and the World Order*., p. 41.

[31] Ibid., p. 41.

[32] Ibid., p. 42.

[33] Gilbert Murray, "Exploitation of Inferior Races," in *Liberalism and the Empire: Three Essays*, ed. Francis Wrighley; Hirst, Gilbert Murray, and John Lawrence. Hammond (London: R Brimley Johnson, 1900)., p. 156.

[34] Murray, "Exploitation of Inferior Races.", pp. 133-4.

[35] Ibid., pp. 152-3.

Equating empire with Cosmos, Murray imagines decolonisation as 'Satanism', animated by hatred and concomitant with chaos.[36]

Notwithstanding Murray's imperial anxieties, he was not an uncritical imperialist. In part, this is because as Martin Ceadal argues, his political trajectory was characterised by a movement from apologia to internationalism to apologia.[37] For Ceadal this largely corresponds with his early support for Edward Grey in the lead up to the Great War, his subsequent emphasis on institutionalism and internationalism, and his later support for Anthony Eden's Suez intervention of 1956.[38] Whether or not one conceives of Murray as an imperialist, then, depends a little on where one encounters him on this trajectory. Indeed, Murray's defence of the Suez interventionism coincided with his disdain for the United Nations and its 'egalitarianism' towards the former colonies.[39] In part, however, this is because Murray maintained – at least until the 1950s – a commitment to the reform of British Empire. Perhaps this is best summed up in his admission 'at home England is Greek. In the Empire she is Roman'.[40] An Australian descendent of Irish Catholics, Murray was an ardent supporter of Irish Home Rule. Speaking to the Oxford Indian Majlis Club, he argued his Irish nationalism made him sympathetic to the cause of Indian nationalism.[41] Writing to Rabindranath Tagore in 1934, he sympathised with his decision to renounce his knighthood.[42] Further, Murray was professionally penalised for his views on Irish Home Rule and his perceived anti-imperialism. For example, although he was an eminent classics

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[36] Murray, *Satanism and the World Order*., p. 31.

[37] See, Ceadel, "Gilbert Murray and International Politics.", p. 225-237.

[38] Ibid., p. 225-237.

[39] Ibid., p. 237.

[40] As cited in Richard Symonds, *Oxford and Empire the Last Lost Cause?* (Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 1991)., p. 33.

[41] Symonds, *Oxford and Empire*., p. 92.

[42] Sisir Kumar Das, *Vol.3: A Miscellany the English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore* (New Delhi: Sahitya Academi, 2008)., pp. 342-6.

scholar, his lectures were boycotted by the majority of Oxford colleges, including his own.[43] Murray, also, did much to condemn the crimes of colonialism. Writing of ancient Greece and Rome, he likened the exploitation of colonial subjects to slavery.[44] Condemning the atrocities in Amritsar, Mesopotamia, Ceylon and Rhodesia, he expressed sympathy for colonial subjects.[45] Nonetheless, Murray's faith in the British empire led him to regard these acts of violence as exceptional rather than systemic.[46] To the extent that his dualisms of love and hate, Cosmos and chaos elevated the exoneration of empire over a critique of her crimes, his conception of love served to conserve even as it sought to reform an imperial world order.

Alfred Zimmern is credited with re-conceiving the British empire as a Commonwealth. Crucially, for Zimmern, the Commonwealth did not connote the empire from its inception. Rather the third British Empire or the Commonwealth was superior to its antecedents: the first version of empire which ended with American independence and the second version which culminated in the Great War.[47] Zimmern's Commonwealth offered a template for internationalism and nationalism. It is hard to overstate the role that sentiment in general, and love in particular played in Zimmern's conception of order. Indeed, he proclaimed that 'the commonwealth is an organisation designed with the ruling motive of love and brotherhood'.[48]The fullest articulation of this can be found in Zimmern's *The Greek Commonwealth*, which was written during the high-noon of empire. Zimmern's thought was syncretic. Although he envisaged as exemplar the Athens of

[43] Symonds, *Oxford and Empire*., p. 92.

[44] See generally, Murray, "Exploitation of Inferior Races.", p. 152-3.

[45] Murray, *Satanism and the World Order*., p. 29.

[46] Ibid., p. 39,

[47] Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009)., p. 89.

[48] Alfred Zimmern, *Nationality & Commonwealth With Other War-Time Essays* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1918)., p. 356.

Ancient Greece, he interpreted this Athens via Hegel, Kant, Zionism and evangelical Christianity.[49] For Zimmern Athens was organised around concentric circles of loyalty or love.

> The life of the early Greeks was enclosed, for political purposes, within what may be described as concentric circles of loyalty. Outside they had the nation (or what in Jewish history is called the Tribe); within that nation the tribe in the narrower sense; within that the 'brotherhood' or 'companionship' of tent and messmates; and within that the still narrower circle of immediate family….It was with these inner circles, and above all, with the family, that the individual was in closest touch in daily life; and it was here that the Greek received his first training in citizenship.[50]

As Jeanne Morefield elaborates, Zimmern's understanding of these 'distinct but interrelated spheres' – much like Hegel's conception of *Sittlichkeit* – allowed the Athenian to 'distinguish between a primordial love for family and the rational, civic love for the community.[51] It is what enabled, the 'civilized man'

> not merely in the hour of danger but in the work and leisure of every day, to set country before wife and family, or lifelong companions, or fellow-craftsmen and fellow-worshippers, 'to bring the dispositions that are lovely in private life into the service and conduct of the commonwealth', to 'spend their bodies, as mere external tools, in the city's service, and count their minds as most truly their own when employed on her behalf' [52]

Returning to his times, Zimmern imagined the British Commonwealth as a modern day Athens, similarly organised around loyalties and loves. Unlike the Germans, he noted the 'British tendency is to develop habits of service and responsibility through devotion to smaller and more intimate associations, to build on a foundation of lesser loyalties and duties'.[53] Britain was the epitome of the Burkean vision -

> 'To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society,' said Burke long ago, 'is the first principle, the germ, as it were, of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love of our country and mankind….We begin our public affections in our families. No cold relation is a zealous

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[49] These influences are variously emphasised by Tomohito Baji, "Zionist Internationalism? Alfred Zimmern's Post-Racial Commonwealth," *Modern Intellectual History* 13, no. 3 (2016)., Stapleton, "Classicist as Liberal Intellectual.", Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*., p. 22 and Morefield, "'A Liberal in a Muddle'.", pp.97-8, for instance.

[50] Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*., p. 71.

[51] Morefield, *Covenants Without Swords*., p. 74.

[52] Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*., p. 81.

[53] Zimmern, *Nationality & Commonwealth*., p. 13.

> citizen. We pass on to our neighbourhoods, to our habitual provincial connections. These are the inns and resting places…so many images of the great country, in which the heart found something with which it could fill.[54]

Thus, Zimmern concludes, 'A school, a ship, a club, a Trade Union, any free association of Englishmen, is all England in miniature'.[55]

Zimmern mobilises love to assert that the imperial and the international are co-constituted. This assertion is premised on a conception of love that at once emphasises alterity and universality, the individual and the community, the liberal and the conservative. It animates his notion of a nation which is neither a 'state nor a church nor a race nor a geographical or linguistic unity' but rather a 'body of people united by a corporate sentiment of peculiar intensity, intimacy and dignity, related to a definite home country'.[56] This emphasis on sentiment allows him to achieve what Tomohito Baji claims is his greatest achievement: the replacement of 'race' with 'nation' as the 'basic ontological category of world ordering'.[57] Much like membership of a family, Zimmern argues membership of nations are both voluntary and hereditary, governed both by marriage and natality.[58] If the former is the standard in the New World, the latter was the standard in the Old. In Zimmern's 'post-racial Commonwealth,[59] loves and loyalty rather than race or ethnicity formed the basis of community. Consequently, he claimed 'in my political philosophy the bond between London and Nigeria is closer than the bond between London and Dusseldorf'.[60] Zimmern's vision of the international is likewise predicated on the image of nations in all their diversity and particularity. As he elaborates, 'True internationalism is contact between nations in their highest

[54] Ibid., pp. 13-14.

[55] Ibid., p. 13.

[56] Alfred Zimmern, "Nationalism and Internationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 1, no. 4 (1922)., p. 120.

[57] Baji, "Zionist Internationalism?", p. 623.

[58] Zimmern, "Nationalism and Internationalism.", p. 120.

[59] Baji, "Zionist Internationalism?"

[60] Morefield, *Covenants Without Swords*., p. 69.

and best and most distinctive representatives and manifestations'.[61] Yet, for all its inclusivity and celebration of plurality, Zimmern's vision of the international and the loves that animate it are deeply hierarchical. Like Murray, Zimmern understood the rule of Athens as distinct from that of Rome's.[62] For him, it was synonymous with 'the rule of freedom' and ushered an era of liberty. Given these convictions, it is unsurprising that he saw no contradiction between the League of Nations advancing the interests of empire on the one hand, and humanity on the other.[63] This hierarchical, imperial vision emanated from Zimmern's conception of familial love, which in his own admission constitutes the foundation of the 'patriarchal system'.[64] In fact, so entwined were his conceptions of love and order that any union of fraternity and anarchy was inconceivable:

> Fraternity sits ill on the banner of the anarchist; there is no true fraternity which does not grow, as it grew in Greece, out of the plain primaeval emotions of friendship and family.[65]

For Morefield, Zimmern's fixation with familial love allowed him

> to champion a liberal doctrine based on universal equality while denying political autonomy to millions by relocating political power from the realm of liberal civil equality and positing it in the loving, but deeply hierarchical, shelter of the family.[66]

The shelter of family allowed him to cast colonial subjects as children,[67] just as it allowed him to obfuscate that imperial relations were neither hereditary nor voluntary. However, all of this was facilitated by his elision of the fact that while families might be spheres of love, they are also sometimes sites of violence.

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[61] Zimmern, "Nationalism and Internationalism.", p. 126.

[62] Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace.*, p. 69.

[63] Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace.*, p. 85. Also, G.K. Peatling, "Globalism, Hegemonism and British Power: J.A. Hobson and Alfred Zimmern," *History* 89, no. 295 (2004)., p. 391.

[64] Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth.*, p. 72.

[65] Ibid., p. 72.

[66] Morefield, "'A Liberal in a Muddle'.", Loc. 1620-4.

[67] Ibid., Loc. 1615.

Although Murray's Cosmos is an undifferentiated whole and Zimmern's Commonwealth is differentiated but integrated,[68] both their conceptions of order hinge on loves that are sacrificial or familial. In Murray's case, it animates his critique of imperial exploitation. Murray's conception of love also underscores what his frontispiece to *Liberality and Civilization* proclaims: 'the ethical basis of all politics is humanity…a new word for the old love of our fellow-men'.[69] Similarly, Zimmern attempts to mobilise an inclusive vision of familial love as a corrective to a social order based on race. However, both their conceptions of love as sacrificial and familial are ultimately hierarchical. Consequently, their visions of the international are imperial.

History and Christianity: Love and 'Civilisation' in the Thought of Butterfield and Toynbee

Herbert Butterfield (1900-1979) was a Regius Professor of History and later Vice Chancellor of the University of Cambridge. He was the chairman of the British Committee of the Theory of International Politics, which was integral to the development of the English School of International Relations. Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889-1975) was Stevenson Professor of International History at the University of London, a public intellectual and arguably one of the most influential historians of the twentieth century. As Ian Hall notes, his name 'was synonymous with the Royal Institute of International Affairs for the first half of its history'.[70] Although not part of the proceedings of the British Committee, his concept of 'civilisation' came to play a significant role in theorising 'international society'.[71] As Charles Jones notes, 'Butterfield was a Wesleyan, Toynbee was a pious agnostic'…and neither kept 'religion sequestered away from his professional

[68] Stapleton, "Classicist as Liberal Intellectual.", p. 178.

[69] Murray, *Liberality and Civilization*., See frontispiece.

[70] Ian Hall, "'Time of Troubles': Arnold J. Toynbee's Twentieth Century," *International Affairs* 90, no. 1 (2014)., p. 23.

[71] Charles Jones, "Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School," *International Relations* 17, no. 3 (2003)., p. 376.

work of thinking about history'.[72] Somewhat unsurprisingly, then, love features prominently in both their works. Evident in their engagement with history and their divergent prescriptions of political action, love for them explicates an order that transcends the demise of 'Western' civilisation.

That love was integral to Herbert Butterfield's theorising of international relations may seem surprising. Indeed, to the extent love features prominently in any of his major works, he seems preoccupied with cupidity rather than charity, *eros* rather than *agape*. However, C.T. McIntire argues that despite this focus, Butterfield was rather more interested 'in the essentials of Christianity, such as love and spirituality'.[73] As he confided in a letter to his mistress, Joy Marc:

> I regard as the very basis of life and of all ethics the Christian teaching about love – and love is the only ethical law, that the increase of love is the only ethical end…[74]

His biographer, Michael Bentley, confirms,

> Christian love dominated Butterfield's consciousness and gave his life meaning. It anchored his theology and lent it a deep sense of charity towards sinner; it illuminated his history and turned the practice of historical writing into a form of ethics; it controlled his political views in ways that took him beyond party; it told him how international relations should be configured.[75]

The pivotal role love comes to play in Butterfield's thought emanates from his belief 'that a loving God made the universe and that a historical Jesus was is earthly embodiment'.[76] God, then, for him was revealed in history as self-giving, charitable, *agapic* love. This God, this love was manifested in the normative order:

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[72]Ibid., p. 376.

[73] C.T. McIntire, *Herbert Butterfield: Historian as Dissenter* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004)., p. 211.

[74] Michael Bentley, *The Life and Thought of Herbert Butterfield: History, Science and God* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)., p. 212.

[75] Ibid., p. 68.

[76] Ibid., p. 205.

> (T)he principle of love which is the final touchstone and which reigns in the universe, keeping the planets in motion and holding the solar system in a network of harmonious relationships.[77]

Consequently, he understood love, rightly conceived, to be 'the grand and mighty exorcism',[78] redemptive and inherently good:

> If all men were to become as unselfish as St Francis, and were to do so in time to remove the present causes of stumbling, the problems would be solved, and a profound Christian message would be vindicated.[79]

Nonetheless, Butterfield's acceptance of Lapsarian theology led him to regard faith in human nature as disastrous and heretical. Although this militated against utopianism, love remained for him an important form of political action.

Much like his fellow Augustinians, variously termed Christian realists or Christian pragmatists, Butterfield's conception of love was intrinsically bound to order. Conceived such, history revealed that the relationship between God, humans and the world was ordered by love. Loving God and the world entailed acting to privilege and conserve this order. It required 'a disposition not to seek to direct affairs as though one had a right to assert a sovereign will in the world – a disposition rather to see that one's action takes the form of a co-operation with Providence'.[80] In its engagement with history, it therefore necessitated moral humility

> All of this seems to be the final effect of the reading of history upon me…The historian cannot give a judgment on particular human beings that can be admitted as final and moral judgment on their personalities, save in the sense that he can say: 'All men are sinners'.[81]

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[77] Herbert Butterfield, *International Conflict in the Twentieth Century: A Christian View* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1960)., p. 119.

[78] Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War* (London: The Epworth Press, 1953)., p. 125.

[79] Ibid., p. 7.

[80] Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1949)., p. 47.

[81] Butterfield, *International Conflict*., p. 16.

Similarly, it entailed epistemological humility to 'look upon each generation as…an end in itself, a world of people existing in their own right'.[82] Butterfield thought this disposition toward history ought to be transposed toward diplomacy. In fact, he sought to universalise this disposition altogether.

> The statesman, like the scientist or the poet, will constantly be confronted by the alternative between an act that is more moral and an act that is less moral. But we must not allow that there can be a difference in the quality of the decision in these cases, or a difference in the ethical principles involved.[83]

Butterfield's universalising impulse arose from his belief that love was an absolute, ultimate law.[84] In keeping with his non-conformism, he understood this love not to be monolithic, rigid or uniform. Rather it emphasised 'freedom', 'differentiation' and 'diversification'.[85] It was, in sum, a form of practical reason.

> Here is a law, then, which cannot really be broken up into specific injunctions, for its implications are developed anew in every fresh human situation that arises; and all that can be done even in the New Testament – even in the Gospels – is to illustrate its workings in certain types of conjecture, as in the case of praying for your persecutors or turning the other check. St Augustine could formulate the whole aspect of the resulting situation in the injunction: 'Love God and do what you like'.[86]

Abstraction, thus, was the antithesis of Christian charity. As Butterfield elaborated, the injunction 'Love of neighbour' prioritised the pragmatic and the particular.

> The pith and marrow of the injunction are in its concreteness and its immediacy – its avoidance of the abstract noun.[87]

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[82] Butterfield, *Christianity and History*., p. 45.

[83] Ibid., p. 65.

[84] Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (London: Collins, 1951)., p. 41.

[85] Butterfield, *International Conflict*., p. 17.

[86] Butterfield, *History and Human Relations*., pp. 42-3.

[87] Ibid., p. 46.

The 'neighbour', in turn, could not be construed to encapsulate state, society or mankind. Instead, it referred to 'any man as he actually comes into our orbit, however indirect the relationship that is established with him, and however momentary the contact'.[88]

For Butterfield, loving also cultivated, indeed was, the 'equivalent of creative imagination',[89] a 'thinking with our sympathies'.[90]

> And since it means thinking with our sympathies, and actually feeling with the other party – means giving something of our personalities so that we may comprehend the men not like-minded without ourselves – it is to Christian thought in particular that the problem is most likely to be presented. Little by little we may hope that Christian thought will turn into communicable knowledge those forms of intellectual exploration which are accessible only to men in a certain frame of mind, to human beings in love, human beings willing to make fools of themselves for love.[91]

Applied to the realm of politics, it's chief political implication was to emphasise human creativity in 'mundane history' by 'transcending nuclear deadlock', minimising 'the area of evil' in conflict, restricting conflict to 'merely defending the victims of attack', of making 'the world a safe place for smaller nations'.[92]

An expression of order; a call to moral and epistemological humility; a form of practical reason, and 'creative imagination', Butterfield's love was his God. This universalist, totalising conception of love as order is perhaps most evident in Regis Cabral's claim that Butterfield's life's work attests to his chief conviction that 'the meaning of history is Christianity'.[93] Perhaps

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[88] Ibid., p. 46.

[89] Butterfield, *International Conflict.*, p. 120.

[90] Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War.*, pp. 8-9.

[91] Ibid., p. 9.

[92] As cited in Roger Epp, "Power Politics and the 'Civitas Terrena': The Augustinian Sources of Anglo-American Thought in International Relations," diss., Queen's University, 1990., p. 225.

[93] Regis Cabral, "Herbert Butterfield (1900-79) as a Christian Historian of Science," *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* 27, no. 4 (1996)., p. 561.

Butterfield's faith in love as sacral order, expressed in history, is evident in his engagement with civilisation. As Kenneth McIntyre argues, Butterfield came to equate his conception of love with all he regarded best about 'European civilisation' from 'modern liberty' to a respect for 'human personality' and social reform.[94] Mirroring his Methodism, its essence lay not in institutions but in the evangelisation of 'New Testament Love'.[95] Whereas Wight initially despaired over the demise of Western (which he equated with Christian) 'civilisation', Butterfield did not share the same concerns.[96] Cabral suggests that Butterfield believed that 'agents of secularisation, as good 'lapsed Christians', kept alive the ideals and values of Christianity.[97] This faith underpinned what Ian Hall describes as Butterfield's conviction that modern Whiggish Liberalism was 'really just a secularized, political expression of Christian ethics' or in the sense of irony that secular, rationalist liberalism arose from the Christian tradition'.[98] This optimism in love betrayed a confusion of the existing order with sacral order; his Christian convictions with universalism. His prescription of a praxis of love although promoting practical reason and creativity, offered scope for little more than incremental political change. Indeed, to the extent loving was ultimately a form of reverence for order, it served to conserve the status quo.

Toynbee was raised Anglican but espoused rather idiosyncratic views about religion for much of his life. He rejected Christianity twice: first as an undergraduate and again in the 1940s after his divorce from Rosalind (Murray) Toynbee.[99] Perhaps owing to his 37-year-long correspondence with the Ampleforth monk, Columba Cary-Elwes,[100] or his self-description as a

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[94] Kenneth McIntyre, *Herbert Butterfield: History, Providence, and Skeptical Politics* (Delaware: ISI Books, 2011)., p. 111.

[95] McIntire, *Herbert Butterfield: Historian as Dissenter*., p. 229.

[96]Ian Hall, "Martin Wight, Western Values, and the Whig Tradition of International Thought," *The International History Review* 36, no. 5 (2014).

[97] Cabral, "Herbert Butterfield (1900-79) as a Christian Historian of Science.", p. 564.

[98] Ian Hall, *The International Thought of Martin Wight* (London: Palgrave, 2006)., p. 10.

[99] Ian Hall, "'All You Need is Love: Arnold J. Toynbee's Anti-Political Anti-Theology'," Unpublished Paper, p.1.

[100] Christian B. Peper, ed. *An Historian's Conscience: The Correspondence of Arnold J. Toynbee and Columba Cary-Elwes, Monk of Ampleforth* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986).

philo-Catholic,[101] Charles Jones argues Toynbee was an agnostic who 'moved easily in the thought-world of Catholicism'.[102] For Cornelia Navari, Toynbee subscribed to the 'broad church' Anglicanism prevalent at the time: 'immanentist'; unfettered by the doctrine of original sin; 'conceiving multiple paths to God and multiple revelations of God'.[103] Whatever his personal convictions, religions in general and love in particular came to play a significant role in his thought. This was not always the case. As Ian Hall notes, Toynbee's apocalyptic post-1914 anxieties about a 'Time of Trouble's' provided the impetus for his decision to privilege religion over politics.[104] As Elie Kedouri notes, religion contained for Toynbee

> The promise of overcoming discord, the promise of revealing a spiritual meaning in history, the promise of inspiring an effective ideal of conduct, and the promise of exorcising the perilousness of mimesis.[105]

The shift in Toynbee's thinking about religion is perhaps most evident in his multi-volume *The Study of History*. In sum, whereas Toynbee initially conceived civilisations as chrysalises for religions by *Volume 7*, these roles were reversed.[106] Envisaging European civilisation imperilled, his synoptic study sought to show 'that there was a "unity" between the "history of all known civilizations", culminating in the emergence of higher religions.[107] The demise of Western civilisation – indeed any civilisation – mattered little. An 'oecumenical house of many mansions' would remain.[108] If love was the foundation of this ecumenical house, the four 'higher religions' of Christianity,

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[101] Ibid., p. 168

[102] Jones, "Christian Realism.", p. 376.

[103] Cornelia Navari, "Prophecy and Civilization," *Review of International Studies* 26, no. 2 (2000)., p. 293.

[104] Hall, "'Time of Troubles': Arnold J. Toynbee's Twentieth Century."

[105] Elie Kedourie, "Religion and Politics: Arnold Toynbee and Martin Wight," *British Journal of International Studies* 5, no. 1 (1979)., p. 8.

[106] Maurice Cowling, *Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England: V1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)., p. 33.

[107] Ibid., p. 40.

[108] Ibid., p. 40.

Mahayana Buddhism, Islam and Hinduism comprised its many mansions.[109] In his Gifford Lectures, he elaborated:

> The Prophetic Vision that has made its epiphany in the higher religions – pre-eminently, perhaps in Christianity and in the Mahayana – consists, if we are right, of two intuitions. The first of these is that Suffering is something to be accepted as the price of acting on the promptings of Love, and indeed to be embraced as an opportunity for thus following Love's lead. The second intuition is that this attitude towards Suffering is practicable. The ideal has been put into practice by a Supreme Being; and this means that a human being who tries to do the same will be swimming with the current of the Absolute Reality while swimming against the current of his own self-centredness.[110]

Toynbee's conception of Love was *agapic:* self-giving, suffering, humbled and detached.[111] In Toynbee's admission, his conception of love was Marcionite rather than Iranean, beneficient rather than omnipotent.[112] Similarly, his preferred use of "swimming" and "current" as metaphors conjures what he refers to as his preference for the Indic over the Judaic,[113] of the monist over dualist. However abstract, this Love entailed the renunciation of lesser loves of self and community, of liberalism, nationalism and empire. It is implicit in his critique of Stoic and Epicurean self-sufficiency premised on a relegation of emotion and a consequent denial of human relations.[114] Similarly, it is evident in his equation of nationalism with 'community worship', inhibiting 'any living creature that fails to break away from it loving its neighbour as itself'.[115] It also coincides with his critique of the idolatry of imperialism in *The World and the West* and his *Civilization on Trial*, and its concomitant call for atonement.[116]

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[109] Hall, "'All You Need is Love: Arnold J. Toynbee's Anti-Political Anti-Theology'." Unpublished Paper, p.1.

[110] Arnold Toynbee, *A Historian's Approach to Religion* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956)., p. 128.

[111] Peper, *An Historian's Conscience*., p. 503.

[112] Ibid., p. 537.

[113] Ibid., p. 537.

[114] Toynbee, *A Historian's Approach to Religion*., pp. 68-9.

[115] Ibid., p. 36.

[116] Ian Hall, "'The Toynbee Convector': The Rise and Fall of Arnold J. Toynbee's Anti-Imperial Mission to the West," *The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms* 17, no. 4 (2012)., pp.455-469

Toynbee's thesis of the spiritual equivalence of 'higher religions' seems less a history and more a prayer for a plural, equal, peaceful world. It betrays a hope that 'the diversity of the living higher religions would cease to be a moral stumbling block and would reveal itself as a necessary corollary of the diversity of the Human Psyche'.[117] It seeks to universalise grace,

> If we believe that the true end of Man is "to glorify God and fully enjoy Him forever", we must believe that this glorious opportunity of attaining communion with God and beholding the Beatific Vision had been open to every creature that had been ever raised by God to the spiritual stature of Humanity.[118]

Toynbee's vision of history as revealing a (right) religiosity of Love has been criticised from a number of quarters. For the historian, Pieter Geyl, the work was historically deficient, a 'pretence of an empirical investigation'.[119] In his scathing critique of *The Study of History*, he elaborates,

> But when a man comes to the past with a compelling vision, a principle, or dogma, of such a magnitude and emotional potency as Toynbee's unity in the love of God; with a system which causes him to reduce the multitudinous movement of history to one single, divinely inspired current, and to judge civilizations and generations by one single criterion, rejecting most of them, and incidentally his own, as unimportant; than man can write a work full of colour and striking theories, glowing with conviction and eloquence, but no history. *The Study of History* is no history. The student of history, as Toynbee calls himself, may know more of history than I shall ever do, but he is no historian. He is a prophet.[120]

Martin Wight opined Toynbee's account was theologically naïve.[121] Although Wight conceded a Christian would read Toynbee's exercise 'with sympathy and admiration' for seeing 'all Higher Religions sub specie aeternitatis', he took umbrage at Toynbee's reductive reading of Judaism and Christianity, his misrepresentations of the Christian doctrine of God and his exaggeration of the similarities between higher religions' aims and contents.[122] Wight argued,

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[117] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954)., p. 443.

[118] Toynbee, *A Study of History*., p. 565.

[119] Pieter Geyl, "Toynbee the Prophet (Book Review)," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 16, no. 2 (1955)., p. 261.

[120] Geyl, "Toynbee the Prophet (Book Review).", p. 269.

[121] Kedourie, "Religion and Politics: Arnold Toynbee and Martin Wight.", p. 8.

[122] Martin Wight, 'The Crux for an Historian Brought Up in the Christian Tradition' in Toynbee, *A Study of History*., p. 739.

> The central declaration of Christianity is not that God is something, but that God has done something. He has acted in history to show the meaning of history.[123]

For the conservative, high-Anglican historian Maurice Cowling, Toynbee was

> one of the most significant monuments to that resentful, self-destructive, post-Christian Liberalism which, though designed to absorb the idolatry of parochial religion into a properly constituted oecumenicity, succeeded only in replacing the one sort of religion that is possible in a disordered world by the oecumenical requirements of social justice.[124]

Yet for all this emphasis on ecumenism, and despite his own claim that 'any existing higher religion that aspires to become *the* Universal Religion is doomed to disappointment',[125] Toynbee's vision of unity overwhelms his commitment to alterity. Much like his conception of history, propelled by a relationship of 'leadership and deference – of leadership on the part of the creative genius or minority, of deference on the part of 'ordinary human beings',[126] his conception of civilisations and the religions they bore are hierarchical. Reminiscent of 19th Century religions of humanity, Toynbee's God as the 'relation between each human member and Himself' and 'the relation between each human member and every other human member' is reduced to Love.[127] Further, in a manner reminiscent of Tolstoy, Toynbee's turn to religiosity entailed a retreat from politics.

For all their differences, Toynbee and Butterfield's conception of Love as the order revealed in history impelled them to prescribe love as a form of – even as Toynbee eschewed the realm – political action. Even as he imagined it as a form of atonement, this faith in love as the order of history abated Toynbee's apocalyptic anxieties about the demise of Western civilisation and rendered Butterfield largely unperturbed by it. For Butterfield, this was because Europe and modern Whiggish liberalism were premised on a secularised Christian ethics. For Toynbee, this

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[123] Ibid., p. 737.

[124] Cowling, *Religion and Public Doctrine*., p. 43-4.

[125] Toynbee, *A Study of History*., p. 734

[126] Cowling, *Religion and Public Doctrine*., p. 22.

[127] Toynbee, *A Study of History*., p. 510.

was because all 'higher religions' and civilisations they gave rise to proclaimed the same message. Similarly, both their conceptions of love shape their understanding of history. Although this is more evident in Toynbee's quest to narrate a history that accords with his revelation of love, for Butterfield, it is evident in his emphasis in the Protestant privileging of 'individuals, personalism, voluntary choice, interior spirituality, and dissent'.[128]In both instances, their conception of love and their understanding of history was made in the image of their religiosity.

Between Agape and Eros: Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau on Love and Power

Reinhold Niebuhr was a pastor and one of the most influential public intellectuals and political theologians in America in the first half of the twentieth century.[129] In fact, George Kennan once described Niebuhr as the 'father of us all'.[130] Along with Hans Morgenthau – whose influence on post-WWII International Relations needs little introduction – Niebuhr is widely regarded as one of the founding figures of political realism. Niebuhr and Morgenthau met in 1944 and shared a 'profound intellectual kinship'.[131] As Daniel Rice recounts, Morgenthau referred to Niebuhr as 'perhaps the greatest living political philosopher in America', Niebuhr referred to Morgenthau as 'the most brilliant and authoritative political realist' and both confessed themselves unable to disentangle each other's thoughts from their own.[132] Yet, Morgenthau once claimed, 'I do not need all his (Niebuhr's) metaphysics to get where we both get' highlighting that for all their similarities,

[128] McIntire, *Herbert Butterfield: Historian as Dissenter*., p. 228.

[129] As late as 1956, Time Magazine proclaimed him among three most influential intellectuals in America. See, Martin Halliwell, *The Constant Dialogue: Reinhold Niebuhr and American Intellectual Culture* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005)., p. 3.

[130] This quote is attributed to a conversation George Kennan had with Kenneth Thompson. It appears in Kenneth W Thompson, "The Limits of Principle in International Politics: Necessity and the New Balance of Power," *The Journal of Politics* 20, no. 3 (1958)., p. 447.

[131] Daniel Rice, *Reinhold Niebuhr and His Circle of Influence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[132] Ibid., p. 145.

their differences were understated.[133] Perhaps this is most evident in Niebuhr and Morgenthau's differing conceptions of love, power and the desirability of world state.

Over the course of his fifty-year career, there were several radical shifts in Niebuhr's thought. Ronald Stone summarises these as a movement from liberalism to socialism to Christian realism to liberal pragmatism.[134] Even if this is somewhat of an oversimplification, it accords well with the many positions Niebuhr held over his lifetime from pacifism to advocacy of American involvement in World Wars, his staunch anti-communism, his architecture of vital-centre liberalism, his early support and later critique of American involvement in Vietnam.[135] Although Niebuhr claimed to detest consistency,[136] his post-1930s writings reveal a discernible theological 'system', which centred on the dialectic between love and justice. Niebuhr's theology is shaped by a Christian commitment to paradox, which permeates his understanding of love and justice, anthropology and history. Thus, in his Gifford Lectures, he describes humans as 'both strong and weak, both free and bound, both blind and far-seeing…at the juncture of nature and spirit',[137] equal in sin but unequal in responsibility.[138] This conception of anthropology is premised on his acceptance of both the doctrines of *imago dei* and 'the doctrine of man as creature'.[139] If the former offers the promise of self-transcendence, denial of the latter is the source of 'sin'. This conception of anthropology, in turn, shapes his view of history. If the capacity for self-transcendence provides

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133 Ibid., p. 154.

134 Ronald H. Stone, *Professor Reinhold Niebuhr: A Mentor to the Twentieth Century* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992).

135 Gary Dorrien 'Introduction', Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011)., pp. ix-x and Andrew J. Bacevich 'Introduction', Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008)., pp. ix-x.

136 Niebuhr claimed, "The writer abhors consistency as a matter of general principle because history seems to prove that absolute consistency usually betrays into some kind of absurdity". Reinhold Niebuhr, *Love and Justice: Selections From the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1967)., p. 276.

137 Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press, 1996)., Volume 1, p. 181.

138 Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*., Volume 1, p. 219.

139 Ibid., p. 166.

the basis for being a co-creator of history,[140] human finitude makes it impossible to fully discern or fulfil the meaning of the historical process.[141] Evil, again, arises not from this finitude but its denial. For Niebuhr, this has epistemological consequences. Consequently, all knowledge claims are partial:

> All human knowledge is tainted with an 'ideological' taint. It pretends to be more true than it is. It is finite knowledge, gained from a particular perspective; but it pretends to be final and ultimate knowledge.[142]

Similarly, all universalisms contain the seed of evil:

> The explicit character of this pride is fully revealed in all cases in which the universalistic note in human knowledge becomes the basis of an imperial desire for domination over life which does not conform to it.[143]

For Niebuhr, these factors coalesced to amplify human finitude rather than the capacity for self-transcendence in groups. This hinged partly on Augustinian conviction: 'To the end of history the peace of the world…must be gained by strife',[144] and partly on empirical observation that:

> For all the centuries of experience, men have not yet learned how to live together without compounding their vices and covering each other with mud and blood .[145]

Niebuhr's engagement with human nature and history is grounded in a religious conviction that the Cross, or the crucifixion of Jesus, reveals something about the possibilities and limits of history. Consequently, it becomes central to his articulation of what role love – 'the end term of any system of morals' – [146] could play in politics. Niebuhr's argument about the significance of the Cross proceeds in three parts. First, the sacrificial or *agapic* love of the Cross underscores the

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[140] Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*., Volume 2, p. 1.

[141] Ibid., Volume 2, p. 3.

[142] Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*., Volume 1, p. 194.

[143] Ibid., p. 198.

[144] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press, 2013)., p. 256.

[145] Ibid., p. 1.

[146] Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*., Volume 1, p. 295.

limitations of mutual love or *eros*.[147] To the extent that mutual love emphasises reciprocity and conditionality, it is limited. What *agape* offers the world is a vision of universal love, which 'makes it impossible to set any limits of race, sex, or social condition upon the brotherhood which may be achieved in history'.[148] It also affirms secular and religious hopes and aspirations across the political spectrum that

> There are no limits to be set in history for the achievement of more universal brotherhood, for the development of more perfect and more inclusive mutual relations.[149]

Second, the Cross 'defines the limits of what is possible in historic development'.[150] *Agape* appears in history, 'only to be crucified'.[151] Consequently, it acts as a corrective to the notion that

> Sanctifying grace (as in sectarian interpretations) or by the cumulative force of universal education (as in secular liberalism) or by a catastrophic reorganization of society (as in Marxism), it is possible to lift historic life to the plane upon which all distinctions between mutual love and disinterested and sacrificing love vanish.[152]

Finally, to the extent that it highlights the stark contrast between the egoistic and the *agapic*, between the will-to-live and sacrificial love, it 'contradicts the false pretensions of virtue'.[153]

Although Niebuhr envisaged a role for love in interpersonal relations, his distinction between group and individual morality rendered love an entirely impossible, inappropriate ethic for groups. As he elaborated,

> Nations, classes, and races do not love one another. They may have a high sense of obligation to one another. They must express this sense of obligation in the desire to give each one his due.[154]

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147 Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*., Volume 2, p. 82.

148 Ibid., Volume 2, p. 85.

149 Ibid., Volume 2, p. 86.

150 Ibid., Volume 2, p. 86.

151 Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*., Volume 1, p. 147.

152 Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*., Volume 2, p. 86.

153 Ibid., Volume 2, p. 89.

154 Niebuhr, *Love and Justice*., p. 25.

Rather than reject love as entirely inappropriate for politics, Niebuhr calls for its approximation: justice. Niebuhr contends that justice is more suitable for political ethics for three chief reasons. First, to the extent that it 'admits the claims of the self, it is something less than love'.[155] Second, it is inherently social because it 'arbitrates not merely between the self and the other, but between the competing claims upon the self by various 'others'.[156] Finally, it necessarily belongs to 'the realm of tragic choices'.[157] However, the embrace of justice does not negate the need for love in politics. Instead, Niebuhr claims love remains relevant both as a motive and a form of judgment,[158] without which 'justice always degenerates into something less than justice'.[159] Hence, love 'which is at once the negation and fulfilment of justice' must constantly inspire justice to reach greater heights.[160]

Niebuhr understood *animus dominadi* or the will to power as universal but not final.[161] Intrinsic to this, is his conviction that whatever the commonalities between Christianity and tragedy, Christianity always transcends it.[162] The role of love as leaven, the human capacity for self-transcendence while not sources for utopian hope made justice possible. However, this conception of justice – to the extent that it was worldly and possible – did not preclude power. In fact, as Niebuhr articulates, the balance of power was the 'organising centre' or foundation upon which justice ought to rest.[163] Niebuhr expresses the relationship between these three notions as follows:

> A balance of power is something different from, and inferior to, the harmony of love. It is a basic condition of justice, given the sinfulness of man. Such a balance of power does

[155] Ibid., p. 28.

[156] Ibid., p. 28.

[157] Ibid., p. 29.

[158] D.B. Robertson 'Introduction', Niebuhr, *Love and Justice*., p. 11.

[159] Niebuhr, *Love and Justice*., p. 28.

[160] Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*., Volume 2, p. 246.

[161] Rice, *Reinhold Niebuhr and His Circle of Influence*., p. 158.

[162] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Beyond Tragedy* (London: Nisbet, 1941)., 'Christianity and Tragedy', Part III.

[163] Eric Patterson, *The Christian Realists: Reassessing the Contributions of Niebuhr and His Contemporaries* (University Press Of America, 2003)., Ch 2.

> not exclude love. In fact, without love the frictions and tensions of balance of power would become intolerable. But without the balance of power even the most loving relations may degenerate into unjust relations, and love may become the screen which hides the injustice.[164]

For Niebuhr, maintaining the balance of power is integral to the striving for justice. It forms the crux of Niebuhr's prescriptions on coercion, the use of force and I suggest the desirability of world government. As Or Rosenboim notes, despite Niebuhr's interest in world democratic federation, Niebuhr's vision of world order, much like Butterfield's, 'was minimalist and pluralist'.[165] Despite his early involvement in the Chicago Committee to Frame a World Constitution, he remained deeply cynical about the project.[166] In part, Niebuhr's resistance was animated by his scepticism about 'the moral ability to mankind to create a world government by an act of will' and 'the political ability of such a government to integrate a world community in advance of a more gradual growth of the "social tissue" which every community requires".[167]In part, however, Niebuhr's resistance was animated by a concern about the totalitarian or imperial tendencies of world government. Thus, rightly recognising the Chicago Committee's intellectual debt to the American Constitution and Federalist papers, he had misgivings about what he saw as the expansion of American constitutionalism masquerading as universalism.[168] In any case, the realities of the Cold War, for Niebuhr further revealed the ideological stakes of such a project:

> The unity of Greece was finally achieved under Philip and Alexander of Macedon. But this imperial unity was also a tyrannical nemesis for Greek culture. The analogy in present global terms would be the final unification of the world through the preponderant power of either America or Russia, whoever proved herself victorious in a final global struggle. The analogy teaches us nothing about the possibilities of a constitutional world state. It may teach us that though the perils of international anarchy are very great, they may still be preferable to international tyranny.[169]

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[164] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christianity and Power Politics* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1967)., p.26-7.

[165] Or Rosenboim, *The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939-1950* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017)., p. 170, p. 178.

[166] Ibid., p. 178.

[167] Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Illusion of World Government," *Foreign Affairs* 27, no. 1 (1948)., p. 380.

[168] Rosenboim, *Emergence of Globalism*., p. 178.

[169] Niebuhr, "The Illusion of World Government.", p. 384.

Unlike Niebuhr, love does not feature as prominently in Morgenthau's thought. In fact, his most sustained engagement with the topic is to be found in his 1962 *Commentary* essay, 'Love and Power'. When first published, the essay was deemed somewhat of an aberration, irrelevant to Morgenthau's larger corpus on the *realpolitik*.[170] However, I argue that Morgenthau's more renowned writings are, in fact, not bereft of references to emotion. Further, to the extent that Morgenthau was a contextual rather than systematic thinker, his 1962 essay offers insight into what Alison McQueen describes as a shift in his preoccupation in the 1960s from the tragic to the apocalyptic.[171] Perhaps, this is most evident in his hope that power constituted by love might offer the basis for a world community.

Morgenthau's American writings reveal that he did not conceive of the relation between reason and emotion in stark terms. His earliest English work, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, is primarily a critique of the 'disease' of rationalism and its misunderstanding of the political and ethical.[172] Morgenthau's *Commentary* essay would appear to arise from the same critique of rationalism, which 'misunderstood the nature of man; the nature of the social world, and the nature of reason itself'.[173] In addition, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, sought to highlight the importance of philosophy that recognises how emotion animates reason. He argued, philosophy which elevates the purity and primacy of reason was inherently flawed, because

> (r)eason is like a light which by its own inner force can move nowhere. It must be carried in order to move. It is carried by the irrational forces of interest and emotion to where those forces want it to move, regardless of what the inner logic of abstract reason would require. To trust in reason pure and simple is to leave the field to the stronger irrational

[170] Ty Solomon, "Human Nature and the Limits of the Self: Hans Morgenthau on Love and Power," *International Studies Review* 14(2012)., p. 202.

[171] Alison McQueen, *Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017)., p. 148.

[172] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics* (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago press, 1946)., p. 5.

[173] Ibid., p. 5.

> forces which all reason will serve. The triumph of reason is, in truth the triumph of irrational forces which succeed in using the processes of reason to satisfy themselves.[174]

Animating reason, emotion in general, and love in particular, operate as categories of explanation in the political world. In *Politics Among Nations*, for example, Morgenthau draws on love to explain phenomena like the stability of institutions and leaders.

> Without taking into account the charisma of a man, such as Napoleon or Hitler, or of an institution, such as the government of the United States Constitution, evoking trust and love through which the wills of men submit themselves to the will of such a man or institution, it is impossible to understand certain phenomena of international politics that have been particularly prominent in modern times.[175]

This is evident again when he endorses the analysis of John Durie in a 1632 letter to British Ambassador, John Roe, explaining the decline of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.

> The increase of his authority is the ground of his abode; and love is the ground of his authority; it must be love; for it cannot be through power; for his power is not in his own subjects but in strangers; not in his money, but in theirs; not in their good will; but in mere necessity as things stand now betwixt him and them; therefore if the necessity be not so urgent as it is, or if any other means be shown by God (who is able to do as much by another man as him) to avoid this necessity; the money and the power and the assistance which it yieldeth unto him will fall from him and so his authority is lost, and his abode will be no longer; for the Love which was at first is gone.[176]

Morgenthau's *Commentary* essay develops both his critique of rationality and the political promise of power constituted by love. For Morgenthau, the liberal faith of rationalism and the Marxist faith in history represents as an evasion of what he understands to be 'human nature'.[177] He argues that while these philosophies betray a lack of understanding of the pervasiveness of power in human life, they demonstrate ignorance of love altogether.[178] Situating the problem in modernity, he argues, 'What the modern understanding misses is the totality of the commitment

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[174] Ibid., p. 155.

[175] Hans J Morgenthau, Kenneth W Thompson, and David Clinton, *Politics Among Nations* (McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2005)., p. 32.

[176] Ibid., p. 35.

[177] Hans J Morgenthau, "Love and Power," *Commentary* 33, no. 3 (1962)., p. 247.

[178] Ibid., p. 247.

that characterizes the pure phenomenon of love'.[179] Demonstrating his debt to Nietzsche, Freud and indeed, his close colleague, Hannah Arendt, he understands love and power as 'organically connected', arising from the 'same root of existential loneliness'.[180] He characterises them both as 'psychological relationships', driven by the realisation that man 'cannot fulfil himself…cannot become what he is destined to be, by his own effort, in isolation from other beings'.[181] Despite this interrelation, he suggests love and power are conceptually distinct. Whereas love 'volunteers', power 'dominates; while love is pleasurable, power is painful; love 'discovers' and power 'creates'; love is marked by 'mutuality', power by 'unilateral imposition'.[182] Nonetheless, as human phenomena, power and love are paradoxically bound. Thus,

> It is the common quality of love and power that each contains an element of the other. Power points toward love as its fulfilment, as love starts form power and is always threatened with corruption by it. Power, in its ultimate consummation, is the same as love, albeit love is corrupted by an irreducible residue of power. Love, in its ultimate corruption, is the same as power, albeit power is redeemed by an irreducible residue of love'.[183]

Evident from his references to Shakespeare's Richard III and Wagnerian *Liebestod*, Morgenthau's conception of love is *erosic*. In the final analysis, this love is also tragic. Thus, Morgenthau concludes his essay with the line: 'Yet whatever he expects of the other world, he must leave this world as he entered it: alone'.[184] As Alison McQueen notes, Morgenthau's post-war thought represents a shift in his concern from the tragic to apocalyptic.[185] His *Commentary* essay, 'Death in the Nuclear Age', written only a year prior to 'Love and Power' indicates this transition is complete. In it he argued, 'The significance of the possibility of nuclear death is that it radically affects the meaning of death,

[179] Ibid., p. 247.

[180] Ibid., p. 247.

[181] Ibid., p. 247.

[182] Ibid., p. 247 and p. 248.

[183] Ibid. , p. 248.

[184] Ibid., p. 251.

[185] McQueen, *Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times*., p.148.

of immortality, of life itself'.[186] Living in this apocalyptic age called for a 'radical transformation of…thought and action'.[187] McQueen argues this coincided with his commitment to a world state.[188] Like Niebuhr, Morgenthau argued that absence of the conditions for a world state rendered its realization a tragic impossibility. Like Niebuhr, Morgenthau argued the existence of a world community was a precondition for a world state.[189] However, unlike Niebuhr, he asserted the creation of these conditions in an apocalyptic age was a moral necessity.

> There is no shirking the conclusion that international peace cannot be permanent without a world state, and that a world state cannot be established under the present moral, social, and political conditions of the world…(I)n no period of modern history was civilization in more need of permanent peace and, hence, of a world state, and that in no period of modern history were the moral, social, and political conditions of the world less favourable for the establishment of the world state.[190]

Albeit ill articulated and poorly developed, what Morgenthau's essay on 'Love and Power' does is offer insight into how this community may be constituted. People inhabiting Morgenthau's apocalyptic age might see the World State or 'the promised land' only 'in their longing's imagination'.[191] Nonetheless, to the extent that love facilitates political order and stability through the spontaneous duplication of will, 'not through inducement from without but through spontaneous consent from within',[192] it would seem that Morgenthau's vision for world community, much like the Arendtian vision of *amor mundi*, rests on a conception of power sustained by love.

While Niebuhr's love idealises *agape*, Morgenthau's thought idealises *eros*. Daniel Rice

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[186] Hans J. Morgenthau, "Death in the Nuclear Age." *Commentary* (1961): https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/death-in-the-nuclear-age/., no page numbers.

[187] Morgenthau, "Death in the Nuclear Age.", no page numbers

[188] McQueen, *Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times*., p. 178.

[189] Ibid., p. 179.

[190] Hans J Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948)., p. 402.

[191] Morgenthau, "Love and Power.", p. 251.

[192] Ibid., p. 249.

argues that Morgenthau's conception of love leads him to understand power as final and destructive, in contrast to Niebuhr, who understood love to act as a leaven to power.[193] Morgenthau's 'apocalyptic' anxieties articulated in his advocacy of world community, however, reveal he came to espouse a distinct – perhaps Arendtian – conception of power. This emphasis on world community might seem uncharacteristic, even utopian, for a classical realist. However, it is worth questioning to what extent this was necessitated by his metaphysics. Niebuhr's thought allowed for the possibility of redemption, for Christianity to transcend tragedy. Consequently, he could defer what may be either regarded as utopianism or political action in a way that Morgenthau's secular thought manifestly could not. Morgenthau's shared concerns with Niebuhr about human nature might have led him to advocate world community rather than a world state. Contrary to popular wisdom, however, living 'under an empty sky' meant his notion of *erosic* love did not merely make power total, it animated and transformed it.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to illustrate that despite its neglect, love has played a significant role in International Relations theorising in the first half of the twentieth century. This chapter's focus on six 'canonical' figures in no way presents an exhaustive survey of the loves evoked in international politics or indeed the complexity of their work on love. Rather, they serve to illustrate four points. First, there are a multitude of loves, variously theological and secular, that populate international politics. Second, in the period extending from the fin-de-siecle to 1962, the evocation of these loves in international theorising was not uncommon. Third, Murray's Cosmos, Zimmern's Commonwealth; Butterfield and Toynbee's faith in post-civilisational order, and Niebuhr and Morgenthau's engagement with the question of the world state illustrate how different loves are drawn on to theorise, negotiate and legitimise visions of international order. Fourth, these thinkers evoke love to legitimise visions of world order that are not simply imperial

[193] Rice, *Reinhold Niebuhr and His Circle of Influence*., pp. 158-161.

or anti-imperial. Rather, Murray's simultaneous defence and critique of empire, Zimmern's post-racial imperial internationalism, Butterfield and Toynbee's religious pluralisms, Niebuhr's anti-imperial defence of the status quo and Morgenthau's utopian and universalist defence of world community highlight the utility of thinking of imperialism and anti-imperialism less as binaries and more as a continuum.

The next three chapters offer a detailed engagement with how three liminal literary figures evoke and mobilise love in the context of imperialism and internationalism in ways this chapter anticipates. Tolstoy's thought shifts from an emphasis on familial love to love conceived as a law, in ways that are profoundly different from both Zimmern and Butterfield. It animates his pacifisms in ways Niebuhr finds deeply problematic, and facilitates a retreat from politics in ways echoed in Toynbee. Camus like Morgenthau seeks to theorize 'love under an empty sky', returning like Murray and Zimmern to the utopia of 'Ancient Greece' to advocate a love that looks very much like a Niebuhrian *via media* between nostalgia and nihilism, tragedy and hope. Tagore's vision of love resembles Murray's monism and Toynbee's syncreticism. However, anticipating themes in Morgenthau he interrogates both love's propensity for violence and power. For all their differences, the six canonical figures I studied would appear – in their reproducing the imperial as international; their reverence of order, and their retreat from politics – to evoke love to ultimately privilege the status quo. The next three chapters ask if Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus seek to do otherwise.

CHAPTER 3: TOLSTOY'S LAW OF LOVE

Government is violence, Christianity is meekness, non-resistance, love.

- Leo Tolstoy.

Leo Tolstoy's career is characterised by contradiction. Whether as Apollon Grigore'ev's nihilist in search of meaning;[1] Isaiah Berlin's fox who sought to be a hedgehog;[2] Richard Gustafson's resident and stranger;[3] Gary Saul Morson's systematising pluralist[4] or Donna Tussing Orwin's literary realist in search of metaphysical ideals,[5] Tolstoy studies are replete with analyses of his divided self. Perhaps nothing bears greater testament to this division than the tension between Tolstoy's role as 'artist' and 'prophet'.[6] If the former elevated Tolstoy to the company of 'Homer, the Yahwist, Dante and Shakespeare',[7] the latter saw his dismissal as a 'holy fool'. Tolstoy's religious 'conversion' to a practical Christianity around 1880 and his purgatorial theory of aesthetics that entailed the denunciation of (most of) his own literary works further consolidated the divide. For many, the prophet thus annihilated the artist. Although it would be erroneous to claim that Tolstoy's views remained static over his fifty-eight-year career, imagining Tolstoy's legacy as so sharply divided ignores the confluence of politics, theology and aesthetics in his life's works. It also disregards his abiding concern with love on the one hand, and violence and empire on the other. Tolstoy's early concerns, in fact, are implicated in his post-'conversion' political legacy: his espousal and evangelisation of anarcho-pacifism and anti-imperialism; his association with the Russian Revolution and, his role in inspiring the transnational 'Tolstoyan' movement that

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[1] Donna Tussing Orwin, *Tolstoy's Art and Thought, 1847-1880* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993)., p. 4.

[2] Orwin, *Tolstoy's Art and Thought*., p. 5.

[3] Richard Gustafson, *Leo Tolstoy: Resident and Stranger* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014).

[4] Gary Saul Morson, *Narrative and Freedom : The Shadows of Time* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

[5] Orwin, *Tolstoy's Art and Thought*.

[6] This terminology is from Steven Marks, *How Russia Shaped the Modern World : From Art to Anti-Semitism, Ballet to Bolshevism* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003)., p. 109.

[7] Harold Bloom, *The Western Canon : The Books and School of the Ages* (London: Papermac, 1996)., p. 335

'emerged in Britain, the United States of America, the Netherlands, Finland, Hungary, Japan, South Africa and Chile'.[8]

In this chapter, I read Tolstoy's literary works alongside his more conventionally understood political and religious writings in order to provide an account of Tolstoy's understanding of love and the role it plays in his political thought. The chapter comprises three sections. The first section provides an overview of Tolstoy's international influence and offers a method for approaching the continuities and discontinuities in his work. The second section offers an account of Tolstoy's shifting conception of the object and praxis of love, focusing on his representation of love in the context of Russian imperial projects in *The Cossacks*, the epilogue in *Anna Karenina* and, *Hadji Murat*. The last section examines how Tolstoy's 'law of love' animates his political thought in general and anti-imperialism in particular, in his post-1880 works.

A Tale of Two Tolstoys?: Tolstoy's Political and Literary Influence

At the turn of the twentieth century, Tolstoy was the author whose works were most read in translation across the world.[9] After the death of the American economist and social reformer, Henry George, he was the most prominent proponent of Georgism globally.[10] Tolstoy's writings about love and non-resistance offered a template for pacifist political action that continues to be deployed in anti-imperial struggles internationally.[11] In his homeland of Russia, Tolstoy's influence

[8] Charlotte Alston, *Tolstoy and His Disciples: The History of a Radical International Movement* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2013)., pp. 1-2.

[9] Rosamund, Bartlett "Tolstoy Translated." *Financial Times*, 2014.

[10] Kenneth C. Wenzer, "Tolstoy's Georgist Spiritual Economy (1897-1910): Anarchism and Land Reform," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 56, no. 4 (1997)., p. 639. Henry George's proposals for political economy are sometimes referred to as 'the single tax'. The 'land belongs equally to all,…[and since] land values arise from the presence of all, …[it] should be shared among all'. For more on Georgism, see Kenneth C. Wenzer, "The Influence of Henry George's Philosophy on Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy: The Period of Developing Economic Thought (1881-1897)," *Pennsylvania History* 63, no. 2 (1996)., p. 234.

[11] Alston, *Tolstoy and His Disciples*., pp. 208-9.

was so great in the early twentieth century that he was known colloquially as the Second Tsar.[12] Whatever the merits for emphasising Tolstoy's pre-'conversion' writings for studying his literature or his post-'conversion' writings for studying his anarcho-pacifism, I argue such a distinction is entirely unhelpful for explaining Tolstoy's international political influence or understanding his thought on love and empire. Partly, this is because Tolstoy's international political influence is inextricably linked to his literary success. Moreover, for all the discontinuities in Tolstoy's thought, his life's works bear witness to an attempt to articulate an ethico-politics of love in the context of empire.

George Orwell held that but for *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*, Tolstoy's pamphlets would be largely left unread.[13] Orwell was quite right to insist that Tolstoy's political influence stemmed from his literary success. However, owing to an accident of history, Tolstoy's prominence as a literary figure in the 'Anglosphere' coincided with his turn to religiosity. As Russia did not subscribe to the 1887 Berne Convention on copyright, publishers were able to respond to the growing interest in Russian literature by printing a mixture of Tolstoy's pre- and post-'conversion' writings.[14] As Charlotte Alston elaborates,

> in the 1880s and 1890s, just as literary critics introduced Tolstoy's works as a package, his philosophical tracts appeared alongside his literary works in publishers' catalogues. T.Y. Cromwell of New York produced a slew of Tolstoy editions, including *Anna Karenina* and *Childhood, Boyhood, Youth* in 1886; *My Confessions* and *What to Do?* in 1887; and extracts from *War and Peace* and *On Life* in 1888. In Britain, the most prominent publisher of Tolstoy's works in the late 1880s and early 1890s was Walter Scott. In 1899 alone Scott put out editions of *Anna Karenina*; *War and Peace*; *Childhood, Boyhood, Youth*; *If You Neglect the Fire, You Don't Put it Out*; *The Two Pilgrims*; *On Life*; *What I Believe*; *What Men Live By*; and *What to Do?* [*What Then Must We Do?*] – a real mixture of Tolstoy's novels, stories and philosophical tracts.[15]

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[12] A. N. Wilson, *Tolstoy* (London: Atlantic Books, 2014)., Loc 8304; Also, Rosamund Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life* (London: Profile Books, 2013)., Loc7282.

[13] George Orwell, "Lear, Tolstoy and the Fool." http://www.orwell.ru/library/essays/lear/english/e_ltf.

[14] Alston, *Tolstoy and His Disciples*., p. 53.

[15] Ibid., p. 53.

Consequently, for many of Tolstoy's Anglophone readers, the boundaries between his pre- and post-conversion work were blurred. That Tolstoy's moment of celebrity coincided with his conversion proved rather fortuitous for him. It offered him a global platform for political critique.

While Tolstoy's literary celebrity offered him a platform to proselytise about politics, he was an important national and international political figure in his own right. Tolstoy's biographer, A.N. Wilson's account of Tolstoy's funeral offers a jarring contrast to Orwell's thesis:

> It was one of the most extraordinary demonstrations of public sympathy in the history of the world. No novelist has ever been given such a funeral, but it was not for his novels that they honoured him. It was for the deeds which now seem to us half mad and half quixotic, it was for those volumes of his work which most readers now left unread. Of the thousands of people who stood and watched as Tolstoy's coffin was carried through the glade and buried in his famous childhood spot, no more than a handful had so much heard of War and Peace.[16]

Tolstoy was also reluctantly one of Russia's great humanitarians. He sought to educate 'his' peasants and redistribute his land. Despite his disdain for philanthropy as a 'cheap means for the wealthy to ease their conscience'[17] and his conviction that 'it was more important to love than feed',[18] Tolstoy set aside his abstractions and worked with his family to provide famine relief. Along with his family, he raised nearly 2 million roubles and 344 kilograms of grain,[19] and 'set up two thousand and forty-six kitchens feeding three thousand daily'.[20] He set up makeshift hospitals, kindergartens and dining homes, all the while writing scathing critiques of the government for international audiences.[21] While his international reputation protected him from exile, his 1899

[16] Wilson, *Tolstoy.*, Loc 9251.

[17] Henri Troyat and Nancy Amphoux, *Tolstoy* (London: W.H. Allen, 1968)., p. 493.

[18] Wilson, *Tolstoy.*, Loc 7137.

[19] Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life.*, Loc. 4021.

[20] Wilson, *Tolstoy.*, Loc 7191-7194.

[21] Ibid., Loc. 7174-7177.

publication of *Resurrection* – which he wrote to fund the exile of 7,000 religiously persecuted Dukhobours to Canada – provided the grounds for his excommunication.[22]

So great was Tolstoy's political influence, that the Russian revolution of 1917 was often (wrongly) interpreted as a victory of Tolstoyanism.[23] As Soviet critic and novelist, Dmitry Merzshovsky, declared 'Tolstoy began it, and Lenin finished it off'.[24] Likewise, in England, Tolstoy's translator and biographer Maude had no doubt about Tolstoy's role in the defeat of the Romanovs.[25] His view was echoed in the U.S. where Tolstoy was heralded as the 'Great Patriarch of the Bolsheviki Family'.[26] Lenin himself wrote several articles about Tolstoy, the most famous of which saw Tolstoy as a mirror of the Russian revolution.[27] However, Tolstoy's doctrine of non-resistance to evil was in fact anathema to the revolutionaries. In fact, in 1924, over a decade after Tolstoy's death, Tolstoyanism was considered 'one of the greatest threats facing the fledgling Communist state'.[28] Lunacharksy, the Soviet People's Commissar for Education, claimed that Tolstoyanism and Marxism were the two ideologies dividing the Russian people.[29] Constrained by Tolstoy's international celebrity, the Bolsheviks sought to appropriate his works. Around the time of Tolstoy's centenary, a list of Tolstoy's acceptable fiction was drawn up and articles by political figures like Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky were published to portray Tolstoy's thought as compatible with the regime while condemning his philosophical views.[30] Tolstoy's accommodation and misappropriation, in fact, 'marked a shift from Trotskyist schemes for world revolution to a

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[22] Marks, *How Russia Shaped the Modern World*., p. 106 and 108.

[23] Wilson, *Tolstoy*., Loc 9223.See also, Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life*., Loc 7876.

[24] Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life*., Loc 7876.

[25] Ibid., Loc 7882.

[26] Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life*., Loc 7887.

[27] Vladimir Lenin, "Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution." (1908): https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/sep/11.htm.

[28] Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life*., Loc 8080.

[29] Ibid., Loc 8077.

[30] McKeogh, *Tolstoy's Pacifism* (Amherst: Cambria Press, 2009)., p. 215.

strategy of building socialism in one country'.[31] In Stalinist Russia, Tolstoy's works were mobilised in the war effort against the Nazis. As Colm McKeogh elaborates,

> Within weeks (of the Nazi invasion), 15,000 copies of *Tales of Sevasatpol* were reprinted, along with 100,000 copies of *War and Peace's* description of the Battle of Borodino, and 200,000 copies of an extract from *War and Peace* describing the peasant guerrillas of 1812. In 1941, with Leningrad under siege and its population starving, it was not speeches that were broadcast from the loudspeakers in Palace Square to mark the twenty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution and to rally the people to even greater sacrifices in defense of motherland and revolution, but extracts from Tolstoy's takes of heroism in the Crimea.[32]

By the end of the war, the Soviets effectively elevated Tolstoy's nationalism burying his work on anarchism and pacifism.

Internationally, Tolstoy's legacy fared better. He inspired, but did not approve of, the transnational 'Tolstoyan' movement that 'emerged in Britain, the United States of America, the Netherlands, Finland, Hungary, Japan, South Africa and Chile'.[33] Amongst prominent individuals who claimed to be influenced by Tolstoy's thought were Jane Addams, Ernest Crosby, W.E.B DuBois, Mohandas Gandhi, Vincent Van Gogh, Stephen Hobhouse, Romain Rolland, Robert Louis Stevenson, Alfred Tennyson, Booker T. Washington and Ludwig Wittgenstein.[34] Although a detailed account of this influence is beyond the scope of this chapter, Tolstoy made a profound contribution to anti-imperialist, civil rights and anti-war movements via some of these individuals.

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[31] Ibid., p. 216.

[32] Ibid., p. 216.

[33] Alston, *Tolstoy and His Disciples*., p. 1-2.

[34] For fuller accounts, see, Jane Addams, 'Introduction', Leo Tolstoy, *What Then Must We Do?,* trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1934). James Cracraft, *Two Shining Souls : Jane Addams, Leo Tolstoy, and the Quest for Global Peace* (Lanham, [Md.]: Lexington Books, 2012). Donna Tussing Orwin, "Introduction: Tolstoy as Artist and Public Figure," in *The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy*, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)., p. 57. Cynthia Wachtell, "Ernest Howard Crosby's Swords and Plowshares: A Lost Anti-Imperialism, Anti-Militarism and Anti-War Classic," *South Central Review* 30, no. 1 (2013). Thomas Weber, *Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2004). Alston, *Tolstoy and His Disciples*. Marks, *How Russia Shaped the Modern World*., Chapter 5. Stuart Greenstreet, "Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Folly of Logical Postivism." *Philosophy Now: A Magazine of Ideas* (2014): https://philosophynow.org/issues/103/WittgensteinTolstoy_and_the_Folly_of_Logical_Positivism.. Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life*., Loc. 5435, G.H. Von Wright, "A Biographical Sketch," in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, ed. Norman Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001)., p. 10. Caleb Thompson, "Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Meaning of Life," *Philosophical Investigations* 20, no. 2 (1997)., p. 97.

Thus, the young Mohandas Gandhi claimed the influence of reading *A Kingdom of God is Within You* was total:

> When I went to England, I was a votary of violence, I had faith in it and none in non-violence. After I read this book, that lack of faith in non-violence vanished. [35]

Indeed, Gandhi's first *ashram* in South Africa was aptly named, 'Tolstoy Farm'.[36] According to Thomas Weber, it 'formed the prototype for his future ashrams and contributed to his future methodology'.[37] Gandhi may have transmuted Tolstoy's doctrine of non-resistance to non-violent resistance and modified Tolstoy's anarchist teachings in service of a nation-state, but it was Tolstoy's influence that led to Gandhi's adoption of non-violence as a strategy against British imperialism in India. Via Gandhi and figures like Booker T. Washington, W.E.B DuBois and American Christian clergy, Tolstoy's doctrine of non-resistance was introduced to the U.S. civil rights movement.[38] Tolstoy's writings also inspired Ernest Howard Crosby, the American judge of the Court of First Instance in Alexandria.[39] After reading a French translation of *On Life* while stationed in Egypt, he resigned from his post. Upon his return to the U.S., he became a fervent advocate on Tolstoy's writings and ideals. In addition to working with democratic and labour organisations on social reforms,[40] Crosby was the founding president of the New York Anti-Imperialist League, member of the American Peace Society and the most prolific ant-imperialist writer of his era.[41] Conscientious objection in the first half of the twentieth century appears indelibly indebted to Tolstoy's work. In 1919, Cherktov presided over the Congress of Religious

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[35] Weber, *Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor*., pp. 41-2.

[36] The decision to name the colony 'Tolstoy farm' was made by fellow Tolstoyan, Hermann Kallenbach in consultation with Gandhi., Weber, *Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor*. p. 76.

[37] Ibid., p. 80.

[38]Marks, *How Russia Shaped the Modern World*., pp. 134-139. See also, Alston, *Tolstoy and His Disciples*., pp. 208-9.

[39] Alston, *Tolstoy and His Disciples*., p. 60. See also, Orwin, "Introduction: Tolstoy as Artist and Public Figure.", p. 57.

[40] Alston, *Tolstoy and His Disciples*., p. 103

[41] Wachtell, "Ernest Howard Crosby's Swords and Plowshares: A Lost Anti-Imperialism, Anti-Militarism and Anti-War Classic.", p. 133.

Sects which had considered applications from over 40,000 conscientious objectors.[42] In fact, so great were the number of objectors who identified as Tolstoyan that in 1923, the Bolsheviks no longer classified Tolstoyans as a religious sect.[43] In England, even the pro-war Gilbert Murray noted that the conscientious objection clause in the *Military Service Act 1916* failed to appreciate Tolstoy's influence.

> More important still, though perhaps not quite appreciated in War Office circles, the greatest of all modern men of letters, whose books sold by the hundred-thousand in almost every country in Europe, and devoted himself to a spiritual crusade against war and violence in any shape. Tolstoy's doctrines were so extreme that actual Tolstoyans were rare; but almost every young man and woman in Europe who possessed any free religious life at all had been to some extent influenced by Tolstoy.[44]

If Tolstoy was a significant figure in his own right, the question remains why any study of his post-'conversion' politics necessitates an engagement with the aesthetics he sought to renounce. Indeed, in 1897 – eighteen years after Tolstoy's 'conversion' – he articulated a theory of aesthetics which was marked by an emphasis on moralising rather than mimesis. Given Tolstoy's vociferous repudiation of (most of) his early works, this might endorse the carving up of Tolstoy's literary canon to coincide with his pre- and post-conversion thought and activism. However, I argue that such an exercise is limited for at least three reasons. First, the periodisation of Tolstoy's work is largely arbitrary. Second, for all the discontinuities in Tolstoy's thought, all his works are animated by a quest to enunciate an ethico-politics of love. Third, ignoring Tolstoy's early aesthetics effectively reduces a lifelong engagement with the ethics of empire to a mere footnote to his post-'conversion' writings on 'anarchism' and pacifism.

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[42] Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life*., Loc 8010.

[43] Ibid., Loc 8010.

[44] Gilbert Murray, 'Introduction', Henry Mrs. Hobhouse, *'I Appeal Unto Caesar' the Case of the Conscientious Objector* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917)., p. 5

Inessa Medzhibovskaya has persuasively argued that Tolstoy's conversion was both long and gradual, commencing in 1845.[45] Indeed the literary historian, Boris Eikhenbaum rightly notes that Tolstoy's life was in fact dominated by a series of 'crises'.[46] The tendency to view Tolstoy's conversion as a sudden, dramatic moment coinciding with the publication of his *Confesssion*, tends to understate the extent to which Tolstoy's *Confession* was also a planned literary work modelled on the *Confessions* of Rousseau and Augustine and the *Autobiography* of Mill.[47] Imagining a stark 'conversion' also obscures the many continuities in Tolstoy's thought. A common anecdote about Tolstoy's life is his metaphorical quest for 'the green stick', which contained the secret to happiness and peace.[48] As a child, Tolstoy's older brother Nicholas told him that there was a green stick in the woods in their family estate that contained this secret. Finding it would end war and illness, and unite the world. So captivated was Tolstoy by this tale that he requested to be buried, and is in fact buried, alongside where this stick supposedly lay. Tolstoy's aesthetics are animated by the same sort of preoccupations. As Alston notes,

> In *The Cossacks*, published in 1861, the character Olenin undergoes a moral awakening in which he realizes that happiness consists not in 'seeking wealth, fame, comforts of life, and love', but in living for others. In *War and Peace*, the simple and unquestioning peasant Platon Karataev inspires Pierre Bezukhov with calm and certainty in place of his misery and confusion. And in *Anna Karenina*, the reader follows Konstantin Levin's spiritual development as he searches for happiness not in high society but through his family and on the land, and he concludes that such happiness can only be achieved by living for others and not for one's selfish desires.[49]

In sum, Tolstoy's literary works bear witness to his faith in the soteriology of love and his conception of this love as *agapic* or self-giving.

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[45] Inessa Medzhibovskaya, *Tolstoy and the Religious Culture of His Time: A Biography of a Long Conversion, 1845-1885* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009).

[46] As cited in McKeogh, *Tolstoy's Pacifism*., p. 19.

[47] Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life*., Loc 5360. For parallels with Mill's autobiography, see Medzhibovskaya, *A Biography of a Long Conversion*., p. xxv

[48] See for instance, Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life*., Loc. 1033, 1045 and 7674. Also, Alston, *Tolstoy and His Disciples*. p. 12 and Alexandre Christoyannopoulous, "The Golden Rule on the Green Stick: Leo Tolstoy's International Thought," in *Towards a Postsecular International Politics: New Forms of Community, Identity, and Power*, ed. Luca Mavelli and Fabio Petito (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)..

[49] Alston, *Tolstoy and His Disciples*., p. 11. Also, please note that *The Cossacks* was in fact published in 1863.

Acknowledging continuities is not tantamount to W.B. Gallie's claim that there is a fundamental unity to Tolstoy's work that spans from *War and Peace* to *The Kingdom of God is Within You*.[50] Tolstoy did, in fact, change his mind about the legitimacy of violence, patriotism and the state in rather dynamic ways. Over the course of his life, he also found divergent philosophies compelling. A brief survey of Tolstoy's three best-known works reveals as much. The classically Rousseaunian *War and Peace* denounces Hegelian progress and determinism, expresses its faith in natural law and understands romantic love as an extension of divine love.[51] *Anna Karenina* is Tolstoy's conservative treatise on the "woman question" and a response to Madame Bovary. Written under a Schopenhauerian spell,[52] the novel is about the dangers of *eros* and the redemptive promise of familial love. Finally, Tolstoy's post-'conversion' classic, *The Death of Ivan Il'ich* testifies to his embrace of a Kantian Christianity and his understanding of the supreme importance of an 'unconditional ought', which paves the way for his conception of love as duty.[53] Although Tolstoy's conception of what loving entails shifts rather dramatically over his career, the fact remains that 'the fundamental action and value in Tolstoy's fiction is the quest for love'.[54]

Partly because of Tolstoy's abiding concerns and partly because of the time in which he wrote, Tolstoy's work was always manifestly political, theological and concerned with empire. There was nothing, in fact, particularly unique about this convergence in Tolstoy's literature. The climate of censorship in imperial Russia and the increasing state control of the Russian Orthodox

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[50] W. B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War : Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)., p. 101.

[51] For Tolstoy's denunciation of Hegelian progress in 1862, see Morson, *Narrative and Freedom*., p. 156. For a discussion of the influence of Rousseau on Tolstoy and how it shapes his understanding of the unity of humanity and nature in *War and Peace* see Orwin, *Tolstoy's Art and Thought*., pp 36-50 and Chapter 5.

[52] See Tolstoy's letter to Fet (1870), 'Do you know what the past summer has been for me? Constant ecstasy at Schopenhauer and a series of spiritual pleasures which I have never before experienced. I've ordered all his works and I've read them and am reading them (I've read Kant too)….I don't know if I'll ever change my opinion, but right now I'm convinced that Schopenhauer is the greatest genius of all'.Orwin, *Tolstoy's Art and Thought*.,p.150.

[53] Medzhibovskaya, *A Biography of a Long Conversion*., p. 288.

[54] Gustafson, *Resident and Stranger*., p. 22.

Church made literature a creative outlet for dissent, heterodoxy and political commentary. In modernising, Westernising Russia where iconography was in decline; where the slightly dressed up version of Western Catholicism and Protestantism were found wanting and, where a distinctively Orthodox systematic theology was yet to take root, Russian literature was read as political theology.[55] This context of a modernising, Westernising Russia and an increasingly state controlled Church are integral to Tolstoy's shifting understanding of the legitimacy of empire and the object and praxis of love. To be clear, 'empire' forms the context of Tolstoy's work, rather than a structure he interrogates. Nonetheless, Tolstoy's diaries and correspondence evince his deep sympathy for the plight of the colonised. As far back as April 1857, when travelling through England, Tolstoy became embroiled in an altercation about the British treatment of the Chinese.[56] It was not until the turn of the twentieth century, however, that Tolstoy became very vocal in his criticism of British imperialism in China, South Africa, India and American imperialism in the Philippines.[57] Yet, as I posit in the next section, even before Tolstoy's 'conversion', the high-noon of Russian empire forms his aesthetics. Thus, *The Cossacks* (and indeed, *The Prisoner of the Caucuses*) are Rousseaunian engagements with love and empire. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter, *War and Peace* is a Rouseaunnian affirmation of 'natural law' and Russian resistance to Napoleonic imperial expansion. *Anna Karenina* is an ode to Schopenhauerian subjectivism and contains an epilogue with Tolstoy's critique of the Balkan Question and the Russian Volunteer Movement. That the anti-imperialist writings of Mahfouz, Premchand, Woolf and Joyce draw inspiration from these literary works suggests that both the substance and style these works mattered.[58] That Tolstoy's museum and statute still stand unscathed after two wars in modern day Chechnya suggest

[55] Ibid., p. xi.

[56] R. F. Christian, *Tolstoy's Diaries Volume I:1847-1894* (London: Faber and Faber, 2015)., p. 134.

[57] Christian, *Tolstoy's Diaries Volume I:1847-1894*., see p. 221, p. 475. R. F. Christian and Leo Tolstoy, "Tolstoy's Diaries Volume 2: 1895-1910 (Leo Tolstoy, Diaries and Letters)," (2015)., p. 554

[58] For Tolstoy's influence on Mahfouz and Premchand, see John Burt Foster, *Transnational Tolstoy : Between the West and the World* (2013)., Ch. 11. For Tolstoy's influence on Joyce and Woolf, see Marks, *How Russia Shaped the Modern World*., Ch. 4.

that Tolstoy's representation of the Caucasus did as much to bolster his standing as an anti-imperialist figure as any of his essays or correspondence.[59]

From *Amour De Soi* to The Law of Love: The Aesthetics and Ethics of Empire

In 1922, Boris Eikhenbaum, the pre-eminent Russian formalist and literary critic, argued that Tolstoy's preoccupation with representing the Caucasus was predominantly aesthetic. Inspired by Stendhal's realism, he claimed Tolstoy's affinity for Rousseau led him to turn to the 18th Century to refute the Romanticism of the 19th Century.[60] Tolstoy acknowledged Stendhal's influence on his works in a 1904 interview with Paul Boyer, where he said,

> More than anyone else I am obliged to Stendhal for a great deal. He taught me to understand war….Who before him described war that way, i.e., the way it actually is? …Later my brother, who served in the Caucasus before me, confirmed to me the veracity of Stendhal's descriptions…Shortly after this in the Crimea it was easy for me to see all this with my own eyes. But, I repeat to you, all that I know about war I first of all learned from Stendhal.[61]

Almost a century later in the seminal work, *Russian Literature and Empire*, Susan Layton largely affirms Eikhenbaum's reading. Categorising his early Caucasian works as part of his 'politically non-committal ouevre', she argues that over the course of Tolstoy's career, his concern with empire shifts from the realm of aesthetics to political ethics.[62] My contribution to this literature is to offer an account of how Tolstoy's conception of the legitimacy of empire is intrinsically linked to his shifting conception of the object and praxis of love. In this section, I examine, *The Cossacks* (1863), *Anna Karenina* (1879) and *Hadji Murat* (completed in 1904, published in 1912). I have selected these texts because they were written at key moments of Russia's imperial history: during

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[59] Sophia Kishkovsky, "Chechnya's Favourite Russian: Leo Tolstoy." (2009): http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/29/arts/29iht-tolstoy.html.

[60] Boris Eikhenbaum, *The Young Tolstoi.* (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1972)., p. 79.

[61] Eikhenbaum, *The Young Tolstoi.*, p. 78.

[62] Susan Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus From Pushkin to Tolstoy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)., p. 237 and p. 263.

the Crimean War, the Russian Volunteer Movement and the imperial wars of the fin-de-siècle, respectively. In addition, each text's engagement with empire is shaped by a distinct conception of the ethico-political category of love. By including *Anna Karenina* in this analysis, I suggest that Tolstoy's concern with Russian imperialism was not merely limited to the Caucasus but extended to Russia's Eastern-Slavic neighbours. As my primary aim is to offer an account of Tolstoy's ethical engagement with Russian imperialism, I do not examine *War and Peace*. Nonetheless, considering *War and Peace* recounts Russia's triumph over a Napoleonic (imperial) invasion, it becomes evident that the question of empire preoccupied Tolstoy for much of his literary career.

The Cossacks

Tolstoy's *The Cossacks*(1863) is set in a Cossack village along the Terek across from the Chechen highlands. Tolstoy began writing the novel when he was a military volunteer in the Caucasus and continued to re-write the work over the 1850s when he was stationed by the Danube and in Crimea.[63] The novel is part bildungsroman and part parody of Russian Romantic literature and its representation of the Caucasus. Originally intended to form the final part of Tolstoy's autobiographical triology *Childhood, Boyhood and Youth*,[64] *The Cossacks* tells the tale of Dmitry Andreich Olenin and his self-imposed exile as a military volunteer in what he imagines to be the 'utopia' of the Caucasus. I agree with Eikhenbaum and others that Tolstoy's preoccupation with empire in *The Cossacks* was predominantly aesthetic. Therefore, whatever political or ethical function his parody of Orientalist representations of the Caucasus might serve is ultimately undermined by his ethics which rest on the objectification of the 'noble savage'.

As Boris Eikhenbaum notes, Tolstoy's aim in his early Caucasian works was to:

[63] C.J.G Walker, "Tolstoy's "the Cossacks": The Question of Genre," *The Modern Language Review* 73, no. 3 (1978)., p. 564.

[64] Orwin, *Tolstoy's Art and Thought*., p. 93.

> (follow) in the footsteps of the romantics with the conscious intention of thoroughly destroying their poetics. He happens in the Caucasus for the apparent purpose of confronting Marlinsky and Lermontov, exposing their 'untruth' and liquidating the romantic contrivance'[65]

That Tolstoy was animated by this aim, is evident in his 1852 essay 'Notes on the Caucasus', where he laments the lost poetry of his youth:

> …it happened so long ago that all I remember is the poetic feeling which I experienced while reading, and the evocation of poetic images of bellicose Circassians, sloe-eyed Circassian women, mountains, cliffs, snows, rapid streams, the plane tree…The burka, dagger and sword also held a far from peripheral place in my mind. These images took shape in my imagination in an extraordinarily poetic way, being embellished upon each recollection. I had already forgotten the poems of Bestuzhev-Marlinsky and Lermontov long before, but each time my mind returned to the images, new poems came into being, each one a thousand times more alluring than the last….For a long time the Caucasus for me was that poem in an unknown language; and when I delved into its actual significance, I regretted the loss of the invented poem in many respects, while in many other ways I became convinced that reality was better than what I had imagined.[66]

Consequently, in *The Cossacks*, Tolstoy subverts the 'stock characters of the Caucasian Romantic tale, namely, the local girl, her lover and the village elder'.[67] Instead of the submissive Circassian 'concubine' he yearns for, Olenin encounters the strong-willed Maryana who regards him with bemusement. Instead of the loyal *kunak* to educate and patronise, he encounters Lukashka, a Homeric hero who treats him with distrust and disdain. Instead of the figure of the sage, he encounters the hedonist Uncle Yeroshka who smells of 'wine, vodka, gunpowder and congealed blood'.[68] A naïve at best, and ethnocentric and egotistical at worst, Olenin embarks on his journey somewhat convinced 'these people…are *not* people'.[69] And yet, in the station in which he is billeted, he is surprised to discover that he is not even regarded as 'human'.[70] Miscommunication and misunderstanding pervade the text. Notably, Olenin moralises about the ease at which Cossacks

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[65] As cited in Katya Hokanson, *Writing At Russia's Border* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008)., p. 202.

[66] Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire*., pp.239-240.

[67] Hokanson, *Writing At Russia's Border*., p. 214.

[68] Robert L. Jackson, "The Archetypal Journey: Aesthetics and Ethical Imperatives in the Art of Tolstoy," *Russian Literature* XI(1982)., p. 401.

[69] Leo Tolstoy, *The Cossacks and Other Stories,* trans. David McDuff and Paul Foote (London: Penguin Books, 2006)., p. 14.

[70] Tolstoy, *The Cossacks and Other Stories*., p. 55.

kill entirely impervious to their indictment of the excesses of Tsarist violence and war-time infanticide. Consequently, despite Olenin's romantic beliefs about his oneness with the Caucasus or his revelation about love, he is at the very least confused about the nature of his transformation. At the novel's denouement, he is under no illusion that any of the characters he encounters in the Caucasus understand him or regard him as having any significance.

Tolstoy initially intended for *The Cossacks* to expound 'that the good is good in every sphere, that the same passions exist everywhere and that the primitive state is good'.[71] Towards the end of August 1857, as the standard narrative goes, Tolstoy was reading Homer's *Illiad* alongside drafting *The Cossacks*. Upon completing the *Illiad*, he re-read the Gospels and wrote in his diary 'How could Homer not have known that goodness is love! It's a revelation! There is no better explanation.'[72] Following this, Tolstoy re-wrote the character of Lukashka depicting him as a Homeric hero, removing any reference of his romantic love for Maryana.[73] Albeit an important account of Tolstoy's need to depict the Homeric and Christian worlds as distinct, it largely excludes the intervening influence of Rousseau. Indeed, when the plot for *The Cossacks* was first conceived in 1852, Tolstoy was re-reading Rousseau and was particularly moved by the *Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar* in Book 4 of *Emile*.[74] So profound was the impact of Rousseau on the young Tolstoy that he wrote a letter to his Aunt, which many interpret as foreshadowing his subsequent conversion and pursuit of practical Christianity,

> And everything that I discovered then will remain my belief forever. I cannot do otherwise. From two years of mental work, I discovered a simple, old thing, but one which I know as no one else knows it; I discovered that there is immortality, that there is love, and that one must live for another in order to be eternally happy. These discoveries amazed me by their resemblance to the Christian religion and instead of uncovering them myself I began to search for them in the Gospels, but I found little. I found neither God, nor the Saviour,

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[71] Orwin, *Tolstoy's Art and Thought*., p. 97. Also, Christian, *Tolstoy's Diaries Volume I:1847-1894*., p. 141.

[72] Christian, *Tolstoy's Diaries Volume I:1847-1894*., p. 142. See also, Orwin, *Tolstoy's Art and Thought*., p.97 and Jackson, "The Archetypal Journey.", p.390.

[73] On Rousseau's influence on Tolstoy in the 1850s, see Orwin, *Tolstoy's Art and Thought*., p. 39.

[74] Orwin, *Tolstoy's Art and Thought*., p. 97.

> nor the mysteries, nothing; and I searched with all, all, all the strength of my soul, and I wept, and I tortured myself, and I wanted nothing but the truth.[75]

Rousseau profoundly shaped Tolstoy's ethics in *The Cossacks* from his understanding of time and progress to the relation between nature and culture. However, this understanding ultimately derives from Tolstoy's engagement with Rousseau's conceptions of self-love as *amour de soi* and *amour propre*. As Rousseau elaborates in his *Discourses*

> *Amour-propre* and love of oneself [*amour de soi*], two passions very different in their Nature and their effects, must not be confused. Love of oneself is a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to watch over its own preservation, and which, directed in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. *Amour-propre* is only a relative sentiment, artificial and born in Society, which inclines each individual to have a greater esteem for himself than for anyone else, inspires in men all the harm they do to one another, and is the true source of honour.[76]

Indeed, Rousseau is famous for his association of civilisation with regress rather than progress. For him, 'humanity's task is not to move forward but to move back'.[77] Central to this narrative is Rousseau's Orientalist exaltation of the 'noble savage' and his/her inherent goodness in the state of nature. However, as Simon May notes, Rousseau

> is not advising us to 'return' to a primitive state and abolish all society. Nor is he saying that amour propre is always bad or that it cannot fruitfully coexist with amour de soi. Instead he wants to build a society on the basis of a rediscovery of our natural goodness and its uncorrupted will.[78]

This 'rediscovery' rests on a metaphorical movement back in time, which Olenin assumes he embarks on when he leaves to live with the 'noble savages' of the Caucasus.

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[75] Ibid., p. 40.

[76] Simon May, *Love: A History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011)., p. 156.

[77] Caryl Emerson, "Tolstoy's Aesthetics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy*, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)., p. 246.

[78] May, *Love: A History*., p. 156.

That Tolstoy might be engaging in this Rousseaunian exercise is evident in Olenin's three shifting conceptions of love from *amour propre* to *amour de soi* to a form where they are reconciled. Thus, the novel begins with Olenin, surrounded by Russian high society, moved to tears by *amour propre* or the self-love inspired by others' estimation of him.

> I love them! Love them dearly! They're splendid! First-rate!' he kept repeating and felt like crying. But why did he feel like crying? Who were splendid? Whom did he love so dearly? He did not really know…He remembered all the sincere – so it had seemed to him – words of friendship that had been shyly, almost spontaneously uttered to him before his departure. He remembered the handshakes, the glances, the silences, the sound of a voice saying: 'Goodbye Mitya!'….He remembered his own determined, frank sincerity. And it all had a touching significance for him….But it was not love for his friends that softened and exalted his heart to a point where he was unable to repress meaningless words that uttered themselves of their own accord, and it was not love for a woman (he had never yet been in love) that had put him into this state of mind. Love for himself, ardent, full of hope, a young love for all that was good in his soul (and now he felt that there was nothing but good in it), made him weep and mutter incoherent words.[79]

Living in the Caucasus, Olenin spends time with Uncle Yeroshka and is moved by his natural morality. 'In other words, everyone has his own law. And in my opinion it's all the same. God made everything for the delight of man. There's no sin in anything'.[80] Desperately seeking meaning in a simpler love, *amour de soi*, Olenin has a transient experience of it in a stag's (*olen*) lair. For a brief moment, his self-love and the self-love he attributes to the Cossacks are one.

> He felt cool, comfortable; there was nothing in his mind, he had no desires. And suddenly he was assailed by such a strange feeling of causeless happiness and love for everything that, following an old habit from childhood, he began to cross himself and thank someone. It suddenly occurred to him with great clarity that 'here am I, Dmitry Olenin, a being so separate from all others: now I lie alone, God knows where, in the place where a stag lived, an old stag, a beautiful one, that may never have seen a human being, and in a place where no human being has ever sat and thought this. I sit, and around me stand trees young and old, and one of them is twined with a lattice of wild vines; around me pheasants are moving,….And it became clear to him that he was not a Russian nobleman at all, a member of Moscow society, the friend and relative of such and such a person, but just a gnat, or a pheasant, or a stag, like the one that were living now, all around him. 'Like them, like Uncle Yeroshka, I shall live and die. And what he says is true: 'the grass will grow on your grave, and that's it'.[81]

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[79] Tolstoy, *The Cossacks and Other Stories*., pp. 7-8.

[80] Ibid., p. 67.

[81] Ibid., pp. 92-3.

However, that moment of abandon was short-lived. Interrupted by his self-consciousness, he returns to the village with a renewed fervour for self-sacrifice. In a grandiose gesture, he gifts a horse to Lukashka ostensibly as a symbol that he has relinquished his interest in Maryana. In the course of time, however, Olenin comes to abandon his initial self-sacrifice as a rational abstraction and delusional form of self-love. In an epiphanic moment that speaks more of his Rousseaunian sentimentalism than Christian charity, he comes to see Maryana in Layton's reading as 'the embodiment of the wilderness which the civilized man ambivalently yearns to merge'[82]

> Perhaps in her I love nature, the personification of all that is beautiful in nature; but I do not have a will of my own, and what loves her is some elemental force passing through me; all of God's world, all of nature presses this love into my soul and says: "Love". I love her not with my mind, not with my imagination, but with all my being. Loving her, I feel myself to be an inseparable part of all God's happy world. I wrote earlier about my new convictions, which I derived from my solitary life; but no one can know the toil with which they were elaborated in me, with what joy I became conscious of them and saw a new, open path in life. Nothing was dearer to me than those convictions…Well…Love has come, and they are no longer here, nor even any regret for them. Even the thought that I could have prized such a cold, one-sided, cerebral state of mind is difficult for me to entertain. Beauty came and scattered into ash the whole of the Egyptian labour of my inner world. And I have no regret for what has gone! Self-denial – all that is nonsense, rubbish. It is all pride, a refuge from deserved unhappiness, a running away from envy of the happiness of others. Live for others, do good! Why? When in my soul there is only love for myself and the desire to love her and live with her, with her life. Not for others, not for Lukashka do I now desire happiness. Now I do not love those others. Before, I would have told myself that this is wrong. I would have tormented myself with the questions: 'What will become of her, of myself, of Lukashka?' Now I don't care. I live not by my own, and there is something stronger than me that is leading me. I am suffering, but before I was dead, and only now I am alive'.[83]

The cultural gap between Maryana and Olenin remains unbridgeable and she spurns him. This was inevitable in Rousseau's frame. As Kimberly Hutchings notes, for Rousseau, any exaltation of the 'noble savage' rests on the notion that because they are 'undeveloped – their human potential has yet to, and may never, be realised'.[84] Maryana cannot understand or love

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[82] Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire*., p. 244.

[83] Tolstoy, *The Cossacks and Other Stories*., pp. 148-9.

[84] Kimberly Hutchings, *Time and World Politics : Thinking the Present* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008)., p. 37.

Olenin the way he imagines he understands and loves her. Either owing to Olenin's self-consciousness or the incommensurability of nature and culture, he is expelled from his imagined Eden. Indeed, in seeking to counter Russian Romanticism with Rousseaunian sentimentalism, Tolstoy fails to interrogate the basis of his ethics. In part this is because Rousseaunian sentimentalism does not necessarily preclude Russian Romanticism.[85] As Carol Anscheutz elaborates, 'When Tolstoi parodies the romantic situation of the European among savages, he merely disguises his ideological affinity, if not for the individual romantics he parodies, at least for the myth of exile to which the traditional romantic situation respond'.[86] The Cossacks then betrays a two-tiered moral system.[87] The Cossacks of a Homeric world with their capacity for *amour de soi* are represented as possessing a natural morality attuned to the law of necessity, of moderation and self-restraint. However, the 'civilised' Christians of the metropole albeit bereft of *amour de soi* have access to the higher morality of self-sacrifice. Via Olenin's 'return' to the past, his Christianity enables him to learn from the Cossacks (in a way he suggests they *cannot*) rehabilitating his *amour propre* and placing it in right relation with his *amour de soi*. The gap between the naïve Olenin and cynical narrator leaves the reader ambivalent about what normative significance Tolstoy attributes to this conclusion. Nonetheless, Tolstoy developed these themes in *War and Peace* where he argued that Christian 'revelation' can harmonise the relationship between nature and civilisation via natural law.[88]

Anna Karenina

The epilogue or Part VIII to *Anna Karenina*, which offers Konstantin Levin's thoughts on the Russian volunteer movement and the Slavonic question, might seem at first an out-of-place, if

[85] Carol Anscheutz, "The Young Tolstoi and Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality," *The Russian Review* 39, no. 4 (1980)., pp. 402-5.

[86] Anscheutz, "The Young Tolstoi and Rousseau.", pp. 405-6.

[87] Orwin, *Tolstoy's Art and Thought*., 85.

[88] Ibid., 96.

not self-indulgent conclusion to a novel that was seemingly about marriage, adultery and the parallel portraits of Anna and Levin. The conservative, pan-Slavist editor, Mikhail Nikiforovich Katov, claimed to think as much when he refused to print the final instalment of *Anna Karenina* in his journal, *Russkkii Vestnik*.[89] Tolstoy, for his part, argued that the novel was held together by a 'labyrinth of linkages'.[90] I read *Anna Karenina* as organised around the theme of familial love. If its conservation is central to Tolstoy's Slavophilism, its erosion is associated with his apocalyptic fin-de-siècle anxieties.[91]

That familial love is the central motif of *Anna Karenina* is evident in the opening sentence 'All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way'.[92] Indeed, around the time of the novel's completion, Tolstoy's wife, Sofya recorded his words 'In order for a work to be good, one must love its main basic idea, as in *Anna Karenina* I love the idea of family'.[93] In what I read as a conservative morality tale, the tragic fate of the adulterous Anna and Vronsky are contrasted with the happy, fulfilled marriage of Kitty and Levin. *Anna Karenina*, therefore, expresses what Irving Singer describes as Tolstoy's disdain for the ideology of romantic love or,[94] what Gary Saul Morson depicts as the elevation of prosaic love over the passionate.[95] Given Tolstoy was reading Schopenhauer and Kant at the time, it is not surprising that the novel articulates the evils of *eros* on the one hand, or distinguishes between a love that is pathological

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[89] Tatiana Kuzmic, "Serbia - Vronskii's Last Love: Reading *Anna Karenina* in the Context of Empire," *Toronto Slavic Quarterly* 43(2013). , pp. 40-41. Also, Barbara Lonnqvist, "The Role of the Serbian War in *Anna Karenina*," *Tolstoy Studies Journal* XVII(2005)., p. 36

[90]Barbara Lonnqvist, "Anna Karenina," in *The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy*, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)., p. 81.

[91] On Tolstoy's Slavophilism and the fin-de-siecle, see: Alexander Burry and S. Ceilidh Orr, "The Railway and the Elemental Force: Slavophilism, Pan-Slavism, and Apocalyptic Anxieties in Anna Karenina," in *Russian Writers and the Fin De Siecle*, ed. Ani Kokobobo and Katherine Bowers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[92] Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina,* trans. Larissa Volkonsky and Richard Pevear (London: Penguin Books, 2006)., p. 1.

[93] Lonnqvist, "Anna Karenina.", p. 80.

[94] Irving Singer, *The Nature of Love: The Modern World* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009)., p.

[95] Gary Saul Morson, *Anna Karenina in Our Time: Seeing More Wisely* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007)., 'Chapter 3: Part 1: Anna and the Kinds of Love'. See, also, Morson, *Narrative and Freedom*., p. 72.

and practical, on the other. I argue, however, that the conservative family unit operates as a shibboleth in Tolstoy's thought distinguishing 'good' loves from 'bad'. Rather than being restricted to the private sphere, Tolstoy's Slavophilism leads him to imagine Russia as a family. Anna's affair with Vronsky which led to the disintegration of her family and her own dismemberment then comes to represent Tolstoy's fin-de-siècle fears about the fate of Russia whose private citizens chose to fund and partake in the Balkan war against the Ottoman empire.[96]

Anna Karenina may be Tolstoy's conservative riposte to Zola, Dumas and Flaubert about the 'woman question'.[97] It may have begun with Tolstoy's engagement with the theme of adultery and family, but it soon morphed into 'a full-fledged ideological statement suffused with political commentary on the most urgent contemporary events of the decade'.[98] Although the plight of fellow Orthodox Slavs under Ottoman rule was ostensibly a source of concern to Russians since the Crimean war, these anxieties became pressing in the 1870s.[99] Following the threat of famine and growing awareness about the decline of Ottoman power, there were uprisings in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria. Serbia and Montenegro, in turn, declared war on Turkey in 1876. The outbreak of war led to the rise of the Russian volunteer movement which saw churches partake in a war appeal and private citizens finance and participate in the war effort, without state sanction or involvement. Caving to public pressure, the Russian state finally declared war on the Ottoman empire a month before Tolstoy's epilogue was due to be published. *Anna Karenina*, then, expresses Tolstoy's anti-war stance and his vehement denunciation of the Russian Volunteer Movement. At the heart of Tolstoy's critique is his Slavophilism. Although Tolstoy remained largely agnostic in

[96] For a reading of Russian Volunteer Movement as adulterous, see Kuzmic, "Vronskii's Last Love.".

[97] Ibid., Loc 4148.

[98] Burry and Orr, "Apocalyptic Anxieties in Anna Karenina.", p. 86. Boris Eikhenbaum, *Tolstoi in the Seventies* (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1982)., pp. 111-126.

[99] I have drawn on the historical account of Russia's involvement in the Ottoman-Balkan conflict from, Kuzmic, "Vronskii's Last Love.",43-45.

the Westernizer-Slavophile debate in his early career, his celebration of Russian peasantry in *Anna Karenina* is generally read as signifying his commitment to the Slavophile cause.[100] Whereas Slavophilism subscribed to an 'ahistorical, peaceful and circular worldview', the Pan-Slavism that animated the Russian Volunteer movement took a 'more outward-looking, aggressive, and linear approach to Russian history'.[101] Consequently, each interpreted family differently. Konstantin Levin's conversation with his half-brother, Sergei Ivanovich and his father-in-law, Prince Shcherbatsky, sheds light on these two competing conceptions of kinship and is worth reproducing at length

> …There is no declaration of war here, but simply the expression of human, Christian feeling. They're killing our brothers, of the same blood, of the same religion. Well, suppose they weren't even our brothers, our co-religionists, but simply children, women, old men; indignation is aroused, and the Russian people run to help stop these horrors. Imagine yourself going down the street and seeing some drunk beating a woman or a child, I don't think you'd start asking whether war had or had not been declared on the man, but would fall upon him and protect the victim.
>
> But I wouldn't kill him, said Levin.
>
> 'Yes, you would'.
>
> 'I don't know. If I saw it, I would yield to my immediate feeling, but I can't say beforehand. And there is not and cannot be such an immediate feeling about the oppression of the Slavs.;
>
> 'Maybe not for you. But for others there is,' said Sergei Ivanovich, with a frown of displeasure. 'There are stories alive among the people about Orthodox Christians suffering under the yoke of the "infidel Hagarenes". The people heard about their brothers' suffering and spoke out'.
>
> 'Maybe so,' Levin said evasively, 'but I don't see it. I'm the people myself, and I don't feel it'.
>
> 'Neither do I,' said the prince. 'I was living aboard and reading the newspapers, and I confess, before the Bulgarian atrocities I simply couldn't understand why the Russians all suddenly loved their brother Slavs so much, while I felt no love for them. I was very upset, thought I was a monster, or that Karlsbad affected me that way. But I came here and was

[100] Burry and Orr, "Apocalyptic Anxieties in Anna Karenina.", p. 71.

[101] Ibid., p. 70.

> reassured – I see there are people interested just in Russia and not in our brother Slavs. Konstantin for one'.[102]

Levin – who Dostoevsky disdainfully dismissed as a mouthpiece for Tolstoy – espouses a narrow conception of family. If as Liza Knapp notes, the novel is Tolstoy's grappling with the question, 'who is my neighbour?',[103] Levin (and therefore the Tolstoy of *Anna Karenina*) would seem to respond, 'my family'. There is much in the epilogue to support this. Levin understands his happiness with Kitty and their infant's innate ability to recognise his own as supporting his belief that what is moral is intuitively known. Together it affirms his view of Russia's kinship with the Balkan states. For the Tolstoy of *Anna Karenina*, the Balkan states are too remote and too abstract to legitimise military action by private citizens. Years later in *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, Tolstoy develops this argument to critique a love of humanity or 'fraternity' as abstract and meaningless.

> The social conception of life has led men, by a natural transition from love of self and then of family, tribe, nation, and state, to a consciousness of the necessity of love for humanity, a conception which has no definite limits and extends to all living things. And this necessity for love of what awakens no kind of sentiment in a man is a contradiction which cannot be solved by the social theory of life.[104]

Levin's inward gaze also reflects the novel's association of the modern, foreign or unrooted as threatening. Thus, a certain anxiety of 'rootlessness' and 'otherness' permeates *Anna Karenina*. As Tatiana Kuzmic argues, an affair with a *French* woman leads to the disintegration of Prince Oblonsky's marriage; an *English* governess is the source of household strife in the Oblonsky household; Betsy seeks to ease Anna's conscience by introducing her to 'adulterous' foreign

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[102] Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*., pp. 805-6.

[103] Liza Knapp, *Anna Karenina and Others* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2016)., Ch. 4.

[104] Leo Tolstoy, "The Kingdom of God is Within You." (2011): accessed 21 July 2018, http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4602/pg4602-images.html.

(Turkish and Graeco-German) women.[105] Similarly, while Levin's stability is traced to his aristocratic roots, Vronsky is depicted as 'common', lacking a clear family lineage.[106] At the centre of the novel's anxiety about the disappearance of boundaries is the symbol of the railway. Mentioned no less than 32 times in the novel,[107] it is the 'site of death, disfigured bodies and the disruption of family life': 'it plows blindly over Anna's body and the watchman's, it brings adulterous lovers together, and it carries soldiers toward possible death on the battlefield'.[108]

Anna Karenina may articulate Tolstoy's elevation of the 'familial' over the 'foreign', but it also gives voice to his incipient pacifism. Levin's critique of the Russian Volunteer Movement was not a critique of state-sanctioned military intervention. As he clarifies,

> '…war is such a beastly, cruel and terrible thing that no man, to say nothing of a Christian, can personally take upon himself the responsibility for starting a war. That can only be done by a government…'.[109]

Nonetheless, this distinction highlights what Tolstoy came to see as a fundamental dissonance between the pursuits of 'politics' and 'religion', of 'the state' and 'the soul'. It came to underpin his philosophy of non-violence: 'The people sacrifice and are always prepared to sacrifice themselves for their soul, not for murder'.[110] The reasons Levin offers for his latent pacifism shed light on Tolstoy's seemingly contradictory commitments to metaphysical idealism, epistemological humility and universalism.

> He could not agree with it, because he did not see the expression of these thoughts in the people amongst whom he lived, nor did he find these thoughts in himself (and he could not consider himself anything else but one of those persons who made up the Russian people), and above all because, while neither he nor the people knew or could know what

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[105] Tatiana Kuzmic, "Adulterous Nations: Family Politics and National Identity in the European Novel," diss., University of Illionois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008)., pp. 110-116.

[106] Kuzmic, "Adulterous Nations.", pp.116-119

[107] Gary R. Jahn, "The Image of the Railroad in Anna Karenina," *Slavic and East European Journal* 25, no. 2 (1981)., p. 1.

[108] Burry and Orr, "Apocalyptic Anxieties in Anna Karenina.", pp. 78-79.

[109] Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*., p. 805.

[110] Ibid., p. 809.

> the common good consisted in, he knew firmly that it was only possible to attain that common good by strictly fulfilling the law of the good that was open to every man, and therefore he could not desire war and preach it for any common purposes whatsoever.[111]

This faith that even in the absence of a knowable 'common good', the self could somehow discern 'the law of the good' formed the basis of what was to become Tolsoy's 'law of love'.

Whereas *The Cossacks* articulated the Rousseaunian need to rehabilitate *amour-propre*, *Anna Karenina* was shaped by a Schopenhauerian suspicion of *eros*. It is no coincidence then that the novel opens with Vronsky's quest to seduce Anna and closes with Vronsky financing and leading a squadron in the Balkans. Tolstoy's association of *eros* with evil was to culminate in the misanthropic *Kreutzer Sonata*, where echoing Augustine and Tertullian he comes to commend celibacy and chaste marriages.[112] However, Levin's curiosity about revelation and the relation of 'the Deity' and 'the laws of the good' to the 'Jews, Mohammedans, the Confucians, the Buddhists',[113] culminated in his masterpiece, *Hadji Murat.*

Hadji Murat

Between the writing of *Anna Karenina* and *Hadji Murat* much had changed in Tolstoy's life. His novel *Resurrection* had called into question the virgin birth, the divinity of Christ and the doctrines of resurrection and transubstantiation.[114] It denounced the judiciary, the penal system, war, lampooned the Russian Orthodox church and led to Tolstoy's excommunication. The period also coincided with Tolstoy's renunciation of money, property, 'high art' and his gradual embrace of vegetarianism, chastity, temperance and absolute non-violence. That the Christian anarcho-

[111] Ibid., pp. 809-10.

[112] Leo Tolstoy, "The Kreutzer Sonata," in *The Death of Ivan Ilyich and Other Stories*, ed. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volkhonsky (London: Vintage, 2010).

[113] Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina.*, pp. 814-816.

[114] Leo Tolstoy, *Resurrection (Penguin Classics)* (Penguin Classics, 2009).

pacifist who decried his own literary works chose to celebrate 'the archaic hero, combining in himself all of the virtues and none of the flaws of Odysseus, Achilles and Aenas'[115] in the style of *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina* may seem perplexing. *Hadji Murat*, after all, is a semi-fictional novella that celebrates the Avar chief and his ghazavat (holy war) against the Russians. Yet, the imperial wars of the fin-de-siècle – which saw Tolstoy sympathise with the Boxers and Boers –[116] form the backdrop to this novella. In addition, there is a growing body of literature which reads Tolstoy's religiosity, ecumenism and aesthetics as entirely consonant with *Hadji Murat*.[117] Building on this work, I argue that the anti-imperialism of *Hadji Murat* is animated by a shift in Tolstoy's conception of love.

Hadji Murat is set in 1851 which happens to coincide with Tolstoy's time as a junker (volunteer of noble birth with private's rank) in the Caucasus. During that time, Tolstoy had visited Tiflis and was acquainted with many of the historical characters that feature in his novella including the Viceroy Vorontsov and Bariatsky.[118] In the 1850s, Tolstoy was aware of Hadji Murat and judged him for defecting to the Russians. In a letter to his brother, he wrote,

> If you wish to show off with news from the Caucasus, you may recount that a certain Hadji Murat (the second man in importance to Shamil himself) surrenders a few days ago to the Russian Government. He was the leading daredevil and "brave" in all Circassia, but was led to commit a mean action.[119]

There is no evidence to suggest that Tolstoy thought deeply about Hadji Murat or Russian imperialism at the time. Whatever discomfort Tolstoy expressed about violence and war in the 1850s did not appear to extend to the question of empire. Thus, in *The Cossacks*, Tolstoy's primary

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[115] Bloom, *The Western Canon*., pp. 336-7.

[116] See for example, Christian and Tolstoy, "Tolstoy's Diaries Vol 2.", p. 449, 475, 542.

[117] Particularly, Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire*., Ani Kokobobo, "Tolstoy's Enigmatic Final Hero: Holy War, Sufism, and the Spiritual Path in *Hadji Murat*," *The Russian Review* 76(2017). and Foster, *Transnational Tolstoy : Between the West and the World*..

[118] Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire*., p. 267.

[119] Bloom, *The Western Canon*., p. 338.

concern is the parodying of the romantic trope. In *Anna Karenina*, Tolstoy posits that *eros* rather than an *agape* (or self-giving love for an abstract Slavic neighbour) animated the Russian Volunteer Movement. Nonetheless, the novel remains ambivalent about whether such an intervention would be justified if sanctioned by the State. In *Hadji Murat*, however, Tolstoy's condemnation of empire is unequivocal. Whereas in the 1850s he saw Hadji Murat as a defector, at the turn of the twentieth century he understands him as entrapped. His shifting loyalties from the khans of Khunzakh to the imam Hamzat to the Russians to the Imam Shamil to the Russians again is sympathetically portrayed as a function of self-defence and self-preservation. Beyond illuminating the plight of the Avar hero, the novella also operates to implicate Tolstoy and the reader in the 'sin' of imperialism. For Susan Layton, Tolstoy achieves this stylistically in two ways. First, he juxtaposes the image of a Tartar thistle (representing Hadji Murat) despoiled by a farmer mowing a field and a Tartar thistle despoiled by a narrator in his assembling of a bouquet. If 'the wanton plunder of wild fields' is the 'analogue of Russia's war against the Caucasian tribes', the author's 'despoilment, followed by atonement' becomes 'a confessional action which puts him in the position of a reformed sinner who has won the right to preach to others in the hope of prodding them into a similar experience of guilt and moral conversion'.[120] Second, given Tolstoy's recognition of 'language's embedment in imperial power', his decision to return to the stylistic conventions of *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina* represents his commission of 'aesthetic sin' in order to turn book culture against itself.[121] The novella, set during the high-tide of Russian imperialism in the Caucasus and written during the high-tide of Russia's imperialism in the East, thus seeks to morally and aesthetically implicate those that participate and benefit from Russian imperialism.

[120] Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire*., p. 282 and 284.

[121] Ibid., pp. 264.

Tolstoy's denunciation of empire, however, is largely tied to his shifting ethico-politics of love. Central to this is Tolstoy's rejection of Schopenhauer and embrace of Kant. In *Confessions*, Tolstoy begins to acknowledge his conversion or faith entailed a movement away from Schopenhauer.

> The…method of escape is to live like Solomon and Schopenhauer, knowing that life is a stupid joke being played on us, by nevertheless continuing to live, to wash, to dress, to eat, to talk, and even to write books. Although I found it offensive and painful I remained in this position[122]

However, by the time he begins *Hadji Murat*, he 'shuts the door forever on Schopenhauer'.[123] By 1889 in the midst of drafting his work on aesthetics and *Hadji Murat*, Tolstoy comes to regard Schopenhauer's aesthetics as 'flippancy' and 'trash'.[124] Tolstoy's interview with Paul Boyer around the time he finished *Hadji Murat* suggests Rousseau remained a constant influence.

> I have read all of Rousseau, all twenty volumes, including the Dictionary of Music. I did more than admire him – I worshipped him. When I was fifteen, I wore next to my skin a medallion with his portrait rather than a cross. Many of his pages are so close to me that it feels like I wrote them myself. [125]

And yet later in his diary, he was able to more clearly articulate how he differed from Rousseau.

> They compare me with Rousseau. I owe much to Rousseau and I love him, but there is a great difference between us. The difference is that Rousseau rejects all civilization whereas I reject pseudo- Christian civilization.[126]

Rousseau inspired Tolstoy's practical Christianity and its 'rejection of organized religion in favour of belief based on personal conscience'.[127] However, the form this Christianity came to take was ultimately Kantian. Perhaps the greatest testament to the influence of Kant is the role

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[122] Leo Tolstoy and Jane Kentish, *A Confession and Other Religious Writings* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987a)., p. 47.

[123] Medzhibovskaya, *A Biography of a Long Conversion*., p. 307.

[124] Christian, *Tolstoy's Diaries Volume I:1847-1894*., p. 259.

[125] Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life.* , *Loc 1290.*

[126] Christian and Tolstoy, "Tolstoy's Diaries Vol 2.", p.539.

[127] Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life.* , *Loc 1441-Loc 1462*

rationality comes to play in Tolstoy's later thought. In Tolstoy's articulation of Christianity, reason becomes the essence of human life.[128] In his re-writing of the Bible, reason or knowledge of life as *razumenie* is literally deified. Rosamund Bartlett's description of his reworking of the first line of the Gospel of John 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God' is particularly revealing:

> Tolstoy "fairly swiftly decided to interpret the Greek logos as "reasoning" rather than "the word" (the Russian word *razumenie* implying both rational enquiry and understanding), but then he came up against the problem of translating *pros ton theon* (with God), which the first Church Slavonic Bible renders as "from God". Dismissing the literal meaning of "towards God" as meaningless, and condemning the Vulgate '*apud Deum*' and Luther's '*bei Gott*' as meaningless and also inaccurate, Tolstoy's far more radical version, on the basis of a lengthy discussion of the preposition pros was "and reasoning replaced God".[129]

In Tolstoy's *The Gospel in Brief*, it is rendered,

> In the beginning stood the knowledge of life, as the foundation of all things. Knowledge of life stood in the place of God. Knowledge of life is God. According to Jesus' proclamation, it stands as the source of all things, in the place of God.[130]

Even Tolstoy's conception of, 'resurrection' becomes 'the survival of reasonable consciousness' in eternal time.[131] Tolstoy's embrace of Kantian rationalism led to his embrace of his Categorical Imperative. 'After a long history of rejecting the Categorical Imperative for fear of its abstraction', Tolstoy 'embraced Kant's moral law and reinforced John's…injunction to love each other'.[132] In his essays on *Religion and Morality* and *The Law of Love and The Law of Violence,* religion's offering to morality therefore becomes the 'law of love': 'to do unto others as you would have them do unto you'.[133] Tolstoy's Kantian turn led to an ecumenism which sees all 'true' religion as rational, self-

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[128] Orwin, *Tolstoy's Art and Thought*., p. 193.

[129] Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life*. , Loc 5386

[130] Leo Tolstoy and Dustin Condren, *The Gospel in Brief: The Life of Jesus* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2011)., p. 4.

[131] Caryl. Emerson et al., *Word, Music, History : A Festschrift for Caryl Emerson* (Stanford: Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Stanford University, 2005)., p. 376.

[132] Medzhibovskaya, *A Biography of a Long Conversion*., p. 340.

[133] Leo Tolstoy and Jane Kentish, *A Confession and Other Religious Writings* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987b)., pp. 120 and 215.

denying articulations of this 'law of love'. For Tolstoy, at the base of all religions were a series of 'very simple, comprehensible and uncomplicated' principles.

> They are as follows: that there is a God who is the origin of everything; that there is an element of this divine origin in every person, which he can diminish or increase through his way of living that in order for someone to increase this source he must suppress his passions and increase the love within himself; that the practical means of achieving this consist in doing to others as you would wish to do to you. All these principles are common to Brahmanism, Hebraism, Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Christianity and Mohammedanism.[134]

Tolstoy's Kantian Christianity eradicates an ambivalence that categorises his early engagements with the question 'Who is my neighbour?' In *The Cossacks*, the 'noble savage' is the object rather than subject in the morality tale. Despite Olenin's best intentions, nature renders them beyond the reach of Christian morality. Although the tragic and tenuous conclusion might create some ambiguity about Tolstoy's intention, the love of abstract humanity is portrayed as inherently problematic. At best, we are left with what Carol Anschuetz describes as Rousseau's reworking of the Categorical imperative: *Do what is good for you with the least possible harm to others.*[135] In *Anna Karenina*, Tolstoy asserts both that the killing of an unknown Ottoman is murder and that any sacrificial or self-giving love for an unknown Slav is an abstraction. Instead, he seems to prescribe a prosaic, particular love that is grounded in intuition. By the time he writes *Hadji Murat*, there is no ambiguity about the love or duty owed to the Avar tribesman. As Tolstoy noted in his diary, in the year of his death,

> I thought how necessary it is to preach to people an equal love for ALL, for negroes, savages and one's enemies, because if you don't preach that, there won't be and can't be any deliverance from evil, there will only be what comes most naturally: one's fatherland, one's people, its defence, armies, and war. And if there are armies and war there will be no limits to evil.

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[134] Tolstoy and Kentish, *A Confession and Other Religious Writings*.,pp. 119-120.

[135] Anscheutz, "The Young Tolstoi and Rousseau.", p. 421.

In *What is Art?* which was drafted alongside *Hadji Murat*, Tolstoy comments that the purpose of religious art is to convey 'positive feelings (the love of God and one's neighbour) as well as negative ones (indignation, horror at the violation of this love)….[136] That the story was told to promote judgment and indignation is reflected in the horror of Marya Dimitrievna when she hears of Hadji Murat's death and beheading: 'You're all butchers….Real butchers'.[137] It is also intimated in Tolstoy's diary entry from when he wrote *Hadji Murat.* At the time it occurred to him to write a 'pendant [counterpart] to *Hadji Murat*…about another Russian brigand – Grigory Nikolayev – in such a way that he should see the whole lawlessness of the life of the rich'.[138] Considered together, Tolstoy's anti-imperial sympathies, his diary entries and, aesthetic theory suggest that perhaps *Hadji Murat's* primary purpose was to illustrate the Russian violation of the 'law of love'. While the Tolstoy of *Anna Karenina* might have regarded love for Hadji Murat too remote, Tolstoy's Kantian turn transforms loving into a general duty.

Hadji Murat meets his end in a battle to the death. That Tolstoy should sympathetically portray a man who resorted to violence until the very end raises questions about Tolstoy's pacifism and the moral status of the protagonist in the story. The problem is that it is particularly hard to discern what Tolstoy made of his 'hero'. Indeed, unlike *War and Peace* or *Anna Karenina*, neither the narrator nor the protagonist moralise. Consequently, a number of literary theorists read the text in seemingly opposing ways. For Inessa Medzhibovskaya, *Hadji Murat* is an exceptional case in Tolstoy's denunciation of political violence and terrorism.

> Hadji Murad fighting against other treacherous warlords and Russian colonizers who betray him is no terrorist; he is a "wild thistle" never to be uprooted from his native soil or interfered with – his retaliation to the Russian patrol during armed escape is not for the

[136] Leo Tolstoy, *What is Art?,* trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Penguin, 1995)., p. 132.

[137] Leo Tolstoy, *Hadji Murat,* trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Vintage, 2012)., p. 109.

[138] Christian and Tolstoy, "Tolstoy's Diaries Vol 2.", p. 449.

> sake of coercive intimidation. This is not terrorism but a form of partisan defense against the aggressor.[139]

For Ani Kokobo, Tolstoy's parallel project on the study of world religions, *Path to Life*, underscores Tolstoy's commitment to pluralism in general and his sensitivity to Sufi mysticism in particular.[140] Indeed, the story tells of Hadji Murat's journey from a self-preserving love of 'honour' to a self-giving, sacrificial love for family. This movement from love of 'self' to 'other' would seem to mirror the movement through Tolstoy's *schema* in *The Kingdom of God is Within You* from a 'personal' stage characterised by love of self to a 'social' stage characterised by love of other (family, tribe, race, State or humanity) to a 'universal' stage where 'understanding of life is found, not in the individual personality or in a group of personalities, but in the 'source of eternal, undying life, God'.[141] In fact, writing of Tolstoy's early works, Gustafson suggests all of Tolstoy's major (male) characters, including Olenin, are subjected to this movement. They enter life at the 'personal' stage, move to the 'social stage' and experience conflict before transcendence or 'rational' resurrection.[142] However, whether Hadji Murat comes to epitomise this resurrection remains in question. Reading *Hadji Murat* through Ani Kokobobo's ecumenical lens would suggest that Hadji Murat's movement from self love to sacrificial love mirrors his journey from the 'lesser jihad of the sword' (ghazavat) to the 'higher jihad of the spirit'.[143] As Kokobobo elaborates, Murat's decision to emulate 'Hamzat's legendary fight to the death is so obviously spiritual that it brings us into the territory of the greater jihad of the spirit'.[144] This disinterested spirituality is conveyed in Hadji Murat's last thoughts before his death:

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[139] Inessa Medzhibovskaya, "Tolstoi's Response to Terror and Revolutionary Violence," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 9, no. 3 , p. 531.

[140] Kokobobo, "Tolstoy's Enigmatic Final Hero."

[141] Leo Tolstoy, *The Lion and the Honeycomb: The Religious Writings of Tolstoy,* trans. Robert Chandler (London: Collins, 1987)., pp. 80-86. Also, Gustafson, *Resident and Stranger*., pp. 83-87.

[142] Ibid., p. 87.

[143] Kokobobo, "Tolstoy's Enigmatic Final Hero.", p. 46.

[144] Ibid., p. 46.

> And all these memories ran through his imagination without calling up any feeling in him: no pity, no anger, no desire of any sort. It all seemed so insignificant compared with what was beginning and had already begun for him.[145]

For Donna Orwin, however, Hadji Murat remains like the characters in *The Cossacks*, 'a noble savage'.[146] His heroism is the embodiment of Tolstoy's celebration of the 'spontaneity and confidence inherent' in war or *molodeschestvo*.[147] However, beyond the reach of 'revelation', he sacrifices himself for his 'family' rather than 'humanity'. The insinuation that post-conversion Tolstoy thought the 'noble savage' to be beyond the reach of revelation is questionable. It sits uncomfortably with Tolstoy's thought about the universality of reason and revelation. It would also seem to be contradicted by the text, which celebrates the Imam Mansur and his 'Tolstoian' conception of love and non-violence.

> That was a real holy man. When he was imam, all the people were different. He went around the aouls, and the people came out to him, kissed the skirts of his cherkeska, and repented of their sins, and swore not to do bad things. The old men said: Back then all the people lived like holy men – didn't smoke, didn't drink, didn't miss prayers, forgave each other's offences, even blood offences'.[148]

Nonetheless, Orwin's reading supports late post-'conversion' Tolstoy's critique of the limits of 'familial' love. Seeking to sacrifice himself for his 'family' rather than 'humanity', *Hadji Murat* offers Tolstoy the opportunity to clarify a contradiction at the heart of *Anna Karenina*. No matter how 'family' was conceived, the glorification of 'familial love' perpetuated rather than prevented violence. The text seems to support this reading. Thus, Avdeev joins the military to spare his brother from war, a desire to protect his family leads Hadji Murat to kill Nazarov who himself works as a soldier to be the sole support of his poor family. It would seem Tolstoy concludes that no matter how self-giving, the elevation of familial love must end in murder.

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[145] Tolstoy, *Hadji Murat*., p. 115-6.

[146] Donna Tussing Orwin, "Nature and Narrator in Chadzi Murat," *Russian Literature* 28, no. 1 (1990).

[147] Donna Tussing Orwin, *Anniversary Essays on Tolstoy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)., p. 79.

[148] Tolstoy, *Hadji Murat*., p. 424.

I understand the divergent readings of *Hadji Murat* to illuminate the contradictions that inhere in the late post-'conversion' Tolstoy's thought. If *Anna Karenina* betrays a totalitarian tendency which enunciates a law for society that is legislated by the self, *Hadji Murat* reveals a rational hierarchy that orders ecumenism, a pluralism that prioritises unity. It matters little then whether a 'noble savage' may experience resurrection. What matters is that he must become rational first. In *Hadji Murat,* rational, disinterested love of humanity becomes the goal of human striving. It also becomes the standard for moral judgment which implicates individuals in the 'sins' of imperialism. For any discussion of what this form of loving entailed for the soldier and subject of empire requires an engagement with Tolstoy's non-fiction.

Love as Non-Violence: Tolstoy's Anti-Imperial Epistles

In a time of empire, Tolstoy's 'law of love' calls everyone to the task of introspection and non-violence. Grounded in his articulation of practical Christianity and his comparative study of world religions, 'the law of love' is 'the means of deliverance' from its anti-thesis: the 'law of violence'.[149]Derived from the Sermon on the Mount, which Tolstoy placed at the centre of his Christianity, the 'law of love' necessitates non-violence. In this section, I examine Tolstoy's three major anti-imperial epistles: 'A Letter to a Chinese Gentleman' addressed to the Confucian scholar Ku Hung-Ming following the Boxer revolt in 1899,[150] 'Bethink Yourselves' published during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904,[151] and 'A Letter to a Hindu' addressed to the Indian revolutionary, Taraknath Das following the 1908 Bengali *swadeshi* movement.[152] Reading these letters alongside Tolstoy's diaries and religious writings, I argue Tolstoy evokes the 'law of love' to both critique

[149] Tolstoy and Kentish, *A Confession and Other Religious Writings*., p. 154.

[150] Leo Tolstoy, "Letter to a Chinese Gentleman." (1899): https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Letter_to_a_Chinese_Gentleman.

[151] Leo Tolstoy, *"Bethink Yourselves": Tolstoy's Letter on the Russo-Japanese War* (Boston: The American Peace Society, 1904).

[152] Leo Tolstoy, "A Letter to a Hindu: The Subjection of India - Its Cause and Cure." (1908): https://www.gutenberg.org/files/7176/7176-h/7176-h.htm.

political violence and prescribe the praxis of non-resistance to evil. Together they form the cornerstone of his doctrine of non-violence. However, for reasons forecast in the previous section, I conclude Tolstoy's 'law of love' is anti-political, in an Arendtian sense. Consequently, his bequest to International Relations is inconsistency and paradox: an international praxis of radical individualism; a subversive form of politics that eschews politics, and a global movement of dissension with no room for the dissenting other.

The 'law of love' operates in Tolstoy's thought as a standard against which all action is assessed. In the fin-de-siècle years, Tolstoy mobilises this 'law of love' to critique imperial violence. His critique extends to imperialism, its wars and the resistance it provokes. It extends to all who abet and condone this violence: politicians, soldiers, ministers, journalists, and citizens.[153] It also extends to imperial subjects who seek to resist it. As Tolstoy elaborates in 'Bethink Yourselves', the 'law of love' demands

> that I should submit to the will of God, and fulfil that which it requires of me, that I should love my neighbour, serve him, and act towards him as I would wish others to act towards me. Am I doing this, while ruling men, prescribing violence, executions, and, the most dreadful of all, wars?[154]

For Tolstoy, the 'law of love' and its concomitant call to non-violence are synonymous with 'religiosity'. He argues this lack of 'religiosity' is the only causal explanation for all violence, and thus the only antidote to it. As he confirms in 'Bethink Yourselves': 'The evil from which the men of the Christian world suffer is that they have temporalily lost religion'.[155]Empire, is thus, the product of a lack of 'religiosity'.

> Christian nations have conquered and subdued the American Indians, Hindus and Africans. They are now doing the same to the Chinese and are proud of it. But these conquests and subjugations really arise, not through the spiritual superiority of the

[153] Tolstoy, *"Bethink Yourselves"*., p. 18.

[154] Ibid., p. 18.

[155] Ibid., p. 29.

> Christian nations, but on the contrary, because on a spiritual level they are far beneath the others….Rome conquered the world when it had freed itself from all religions. The same is happening, only to a greater extent, among the Christian nations. They all share in common an absence of religion and consequently, despite internal dissension, are united in one federate band of criminals where theft, plunder, debauchery, individual and mass murder are performed without the slightest pang of conscience and even with utmost self-complacency….[156]

Similarly, a return to 'religiosity', whether Confucian, Taoist, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim or Christian, is anti-imperial remedy. In what reads as apologetics rather than ecumenism, he counsels both Ku Hung-Ming and Taraknath Das,

> If only the Chinese people were to continue to live as they have formerly lived, a peaceful, industrious, agricultural life, following in their conduct the principles of their three religions: Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. All three coincide in their basics: Confucianism in the liberation from all human authority, Taoism in not doing to others what one does not wish done to oneself, and Buddhism in love towards all men and all living beings. Then of themselves all those calamities from which they now suffer would disappear, and no powers could overcome them.[157]

> Love is the only way to rescue humanity from all its ills, and in it you too have the only method of saving your people from enslavement. In very ancient times love was proclaimed with special strength and clarity among your people to be the religious basis of human life….If the people of India are enslaved by violence, it is only because they themselves live and have lived by violence and do not recognize the eternal law of love inherent in humanity.[158]

As earlier outlined, this conception of 'religiosity' privileged rationality over dogma, a love of humanity rather than bounded community. Tolstoy clarifies that he prescribes,

> not that religion which consists in belief in the dogmas, in the fulfilment of rites which afford a pleasant diversion, consolation, stimulant, but that religion which establishes the relation of man to the All, to God, and therefore gives a general higher direction to all human activity…[159]

Similarly, he elevates example over evangelisation.

> To love the yellow people, whom we call our foes, means, not to teach them under the name of Christianity absurd superstitions about the fall of man, redemption, resurrection,

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[156] Tolstoy and Kentish, *A Confession and Other Religious Writings*., p. 102.

[157] Tolstoy, "Letter to a Chinese Gentleman."

[158] Tolstoy, "Letter to a Hindu."

[159] Tolstoy, *"Bethink Yourselves"*., p. 19.

> etc., not to teach them the art of deceiving and killing others, but to teach them justice, unselfishness, compassion, love, and that not by words, but by the example of our own good life.[160]

Seemingly subscribing to the mythology of Max Meuller that equated 'the East' with spiritual superiority and 'the West' with political and scientific superiority, Tolstoy's 'religiosity' rejects 'modernity' and the 'the West' that he imagined invented it. In so doing, he ironically perpetuates the same myth which sanctioned 19th Century imperialism. Whatever Tolstoy's early ambivalence about the Westernising and Slavophile 'camps' in Russian thought, he comes to view Russia as an Eastern nation in the fin-de-siècle years.

> The vocation of the Eastern nations – China, Persia, Turkey, India, Russia, and perhaps Japan, if she is not yet completely enmeshed in the net of depraved European civilization – consists in indicating to all nations the true way towards freedom.[161]

Ironically, his denunciation of 'the West' and its modernity is both Western and modern. Drawing on traditions of Rousseaunian anti-modernity and Kantian rationality, he cautions the Chinese and Indians against emulating Western modernity.

> To organise such a constitution, such an army, such a conscription, and such an industry as the Western nations have got, would mean to renounce all that by which the Chinese people have lived and are living. It would be to renounce their past and to renounce their rational, peaceful, agricultural life, that life which constitutes the true and only way of Tao, not only for China, but for all mankind.[162]

> What are wanted for the Indian as well as for the Englishman, the Frenchman, the German, and the Russian are not Constitutions and Revolutions, nor all sorts of Conferences and Congresses, nor the many ingenious devices for submarine and aerial navigation, nor powerful explosives, nor all sorts of conveniences to add to the enjoyment of the rich ruling classes, nor new schools and universities with innumerable faculties of science, nor an augmentation of papers and books, nor gramophones and cinematographs, nor those childish and for the most part corrupt stupidities termed art. Only one thing is needful: the knowledge of the simple and clear truth that finds place in every soul that is not stupefied by religious and scientific superstitions. This is the truth that for our life one law is valid: the law of love…[163]

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[160] Ibid., p. 27.

[161] Tolstoy, "Letter to a Chinese Gentleman."

[162] Ibid.

[163] Tolstoy, "Letter to a Hindu."

Tolstoy's evangelisation of the 'law of love' and his call to return to religiosity did not merely entail a retreat to an inner, spiritual world. His conception of non-violence as 'non-resistance to evil' also necessitated a form of conscientious non-action that we now term, 'civil disobedience'.

> All the seizures and plunder you are subject to from European nations take place only because there exists a government of which you recognize yourselves as subjects. If there were no Chinese government, foreign nations would have no pretext to commit their atrocities under the guise of international relations. And if, by refusing to obey your government, you will cease to encourage foreign powers in their acts of violence against you: if you do not serve the government in private, state, or military service: then there will not exist all those calamities from which you suffer.[164]
>
> As soon as men live entirely in accord with this law and hold aloof from all participation in violence, not only will hundreds be unable to enslave millions, but not even millions will be able to enslave a single individual. Do not resist the evil-doer and take no part in doing so, either in the violent deeds of the administration, in the law courts, in the collection of taxes, or above all soldiering, and no one in the world will be able to enslave you.[165]

Tolstoy's philosophy was expressed in his aphorism: *Government is violence, Christianity is meekness, non-resistance, love.*[166] This doctrine of love as non-resistance to evil has been interpreted as Tolstoy's articulation of Christian anarchism.[167] That Tolstoy was profoundly influenced by Proudhon, admired and corresponded with Kroptkin and equated government (and all forms of political organisation) with violence, would seem to support this claim.[168] Yet for all his agreement with anarchist assessment of the evils of political organisation, Tolstoy abjured the label for three reasons. First, he found an anarchist commitment to violence and revolution problematic because it relegated means to ends. Second, he thought any claim to build a better order was grounded in

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[164] Tolstoy, "Letter to a Chinese Gentleman."

[165] Tolstoy, "Letter to a Hindu."

[166] Leo Tolstoy, *Tolstoy's Writings on Civil Disobedience and Non-Violence* (New York: Bergman Publishers, 1967)., p. 129.

[167] See, Alexandre Christoyannopoulous, "Leo Tolstoy on the State: A Detailed Picture of Tolstoy's Denunciation of State Violence and Deception," *Anarchist Studies* 16, no. 1 (2008)., Terry Hopton, "Tolstoy, History and Non-Violence," *Anarchist Studies* 18, no. 2 (2010).,Leo Tolstoy and David. Stephens, *Government is Violence : Essays on Anarchism and Pacifism* (London: Phoenix Press, 1990).

[168] Tolstoy and Stephens, *Government is Violence*., pp. 9-13.

hubris.[169] Instead, he saw his thought on state (and empire) as an extension of his practical Christianity:

> I am counted among the anarchists, but I am not an anarchist, but a Christian. My anarchism is only the application of Christianity to human relationships. The same is true of anti-militarism, communism, vegetarianism.[170]

Third, Tolstoy claimed not to share the same political aspirations as anarchists. The fact that he neither foresaw nor cared for the political consequences of non-resistance is evident in his diary entry from 1910:

> It is not anarchism, the teaching by which I live. It's the fulfilment of the external law which doesn't permit violence or, the participation in it. But will the consequences be either anarchism, or, on the contrary, slavery under the yoke of the Japanese or the Germans? That I don't know and don't wish to know.[…][171]

Tolstoy's *faith* in non-resistance to evil as dictated by the law of love has been variously interpreted as a 'form of the sybaritic Bohemianism of a wealthy count'; Burkean humanitarian scepticism; German historical determinism; a Doaist inspired faith in a self-correcting universe; 'a scrupulously empirical, rational, tough-minded realism'.[172] His disregard for consequences, however, had less to do with faith in an interventionist God or order and more to do with his Kantian commitment to epistemological humility and radical deontology. Although Tolstoy often wrote of assured 'deliverance' from following this path of non-resistance, this 'deliverance' referred to that of the conscience in *this* world.

> The real question is not whether it will be good or bad for a certain society that people should follow the love and the consequent law of non-resistance. But it is this: Do you, who today live and tomorrow will die, you ware indeed tending deathward every moment, do you wish now, immediately and entirely, to obey the law of Him who sent you into life,

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[169] Christian, *Tolstoy's Diaries Volume I:1847-1894*., p. 284.

[170] Christian and Tolstoy, "Tolstoy's Diaries Vol 2.", p. 555.

[171] Christian and Tolstoy, "Tolstoy's Diaries Vol 2.", p. 647.

[172] See Michael Denner, "Tolstoyan Nonaction: The Advantage of Doing Nothing," *Tolstoy Studies Journal* XIII(2001)., p.11 and McKeogh, *Tolstoy's Pacifism*., p. 211.

> and who clearly showed you His will, alike in tradition and in your mind and heart; or do you prefer to resist His will?[173]

Tolstoy's 'law of love' does not cleave to the hope of another world, whether that of anarchism or an after-life. Nonetheless, his thought is emblematic of much that Arendt asserts renders love anti-political. This is because his construction of 'religiosity' makes his prescriptions for praxis problematic. Reinhold Niebuhr argued Tolstoy's thought represented a religious idealism that did not 'relate the religious ideal of love to the political necessity of coercion'.[174] Niebuhr is right that Tolstoy subscribes to a dichotomous logic which understands love as constitutive of 'religiosity' and violence as constitutive of 'politics'. As Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings attest, for Tolstoy,

> Politics is coextensive with violence – because the basis of political rule and government is the idea that: it is possible, through violence, to unite people in such a way that everyone submits, without resistance, to the same structure of life and guidance for conduct that results from it.[175]

Tolstoy's equation of politics with violence renders it anathema to religion and its 'law of love'. Further, his problem with 'politics' appears to extend to all forms of assemblages and organisations. That the lifelong Rousseaunian should find in any form of human association a threat to freedom and human goodness is perhaps unsurprising. However, its effect is that Tolstoy's 'law of love' neither imagines individuals coming together to dismantle a violent order nor to construct anything in its place. Camus would argue this is an inevitable outcome of Tolstoy's Christ not being a rebel.[176] Perhaps, however, it is because Tolstoy's Christ was also a recluse. This is most evident in Tolstoy's fixation with the inner life of self.

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[173] Tolstoy, *Tolstoy's Writings on Civil Disobedience and Non-Violence.*

[174] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press, 2013)., p. 269.

[175] Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings, "Anarchist Ambivalence: Politics and Violence in the Thought of Bakunin, Tolstoy and Kropotkin," *European Journal of Political Theory* Online First(2016)., p.9.

[176] Albert Camus, *The Rebel,* trans. Anthony Bower (London: Penguin, 2013)., p. 42.

> Jesus said, 'Bethink yourselves,' that is, 'Let every man interrupt the work he has begun and ask himself: Who am I? From whence have I appeared, and in what consists my destination? And having answered these questions, according to the answer decide whether that which thou doest is in conformity with thy destination'.[177]

Tolstoy's emphasis on personal responsibility and moral agency is admirable. It lays the foundation for conscientious objection to military service. It pre-empts by four decades, the repudiation of the Nuremberg defence. However, for a system seemingly predicated on the love of the neighbour, one does not encounter an actual concern for the neighbour. If anything, the neighbour exists as an abstract object to be bestowed with beneficence rather than as participant in any kind of transformative political, or for that matter religious, encounter. Tolstoy's privileging of the life of self does not imply a love of self. In fact, Tolstoy went to painful lengths to emphasise the abnegation of self and the reduction of self to spiritual abstraction. The absence of a particular neighbour and the erasure of an embodied self effectively depopulates Tolstoy's world. Teamed with his lack of care for consequences, his thought appears eerily reminiscent of the misanthropic undertones of a conversation in *The Kreutzer Sonata.* This conversation ensues when the protagonist (espousing Tolstoy's own view) argues humans ought to be celibate.

> 'You say, how will the human race go on?' he said, sitting down again across from me, with his legs spread wide and his elbows resting low on them. 'Why should it go on, this human race?' he said.
> Why? If it didn't we wouldn't exist'.
> 'And why should we exist?'
> 'Why? In order to live'.
> 'And why live?...'[178]

For Tolstoy, the end of the human race – proclaimed by science and religion – was 'as unquestionable as death'.[179] As the life of the self was the only life that mattered, concern for people *qua* people or the world *qua* world was rendered irrelevant.

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[177] Tolstoy, *"Bethink Yourselves"*., p. 16-7.

[178] Tolstoy, "The Kreutzer Sonata.", p. 114.

[179] Tolstoy, "The Kreutzer Sonata.", p. 116.

In his unworldliness, Tolstoy exemplifies what Hannah Arendt describes in *The Human Condition* as the violence wielded when the *homo faber* – as artist or philosopher – becomes legislator. For Tolstoy, this is a result of an emphasis on freedom that precludes plurality. It emanates from Tolstoy's privileging of metaphysical idealism. As anticipated in *Anna Karenina*, the self becomes the site for legislating a law for society. Although seemingly predicated on the universality of reason and the plurality of revelation, it would seem upon closer analysis, that both these claims by Tolstoy are in fact qualified

> It is comprehensible that a heathen, a Greek, a Roman, even a medieval Christian, ignorant of the Gospel and blindly believing all the prescriptions of the Church might fight, and fighting, pride himself on his military achievements; but how can a believing Christian, or even a skeptic, involuntarily permeated by the Christian ideals of human brotherhood and love which have inspired the works of philosophers, moralists and artists of our time, - how can such take a gun, or stand by a canon, and aim at a crowd of his fellowmen, desiring to kill as many of them as possible?[180]

Tolstoy would appear to ultimately understands revelation as Christian. Along with his emphasis on rationality and interiority, it reveals a hierarchy with an atomistic, disembodied, rational, Christian man at its apex. This hierarchy is evident in his conception of 'rational resurrection' and in the schema at the heart of *The Kingdom of God is Within You*. For all his proclamations of plurality, this commitment only extends to 'religiosity' that conformed with his conception of 'Christianity'. There are echoes of this in Tolstoy's anti-imperial epistles and his sense that Doaoism (Confucianism and Buddhism) were closer in spirit to his 'Christianity' than Hinduism. Thus, the embrace of Western democracy in China would mean the renunciation of the 'rational, peaceful, agricultural life, that life which constitutes the true and only way of Tao, not only for China, but for all mankind.[181] Whereas, for Hindus, the prescription was to 'free (their) minds from those overgrown, mountainous imbecilities' and 'pseudo-religious nonsense'.[182] As he argued in 'Bethink

[180] Tolstoy, *"Bethink Yourselves"*., p. 9.

[181] Tolstoy, "Letter to a Chinese Gentleman."

[182] Tolstoy, "Letter to a Hindu."

Yourselves', without his 'religiosity', 'people stand on the plane of animals and even lower than they'.[183]

At his finest, Tolstoy critiqued the violent foundations of empires, their perpetuation of war, and offered as antidote a doctrine of non-resistance grounded in universalism and ecumenism. Through the people he inspired, he has contributed to anti-imperial, civil rights and pacifist movements globally. Yet, for all Tolstoy's seeming commitments to plurality and epistemological humility, his project is undermined by his moral certitude.

> I'm not saying that anyone ought to take my path. It's not a question of how one arrives, but where. But if we have come to Christ and want to live by Him alone, we shall not quarrel.[184]

To the extent that Tolstoy's 'law of love' is not open to the participation of the other, it becomes bereft of politics.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to illustrate that Tolstoy's political and literary legacies are intertwined. A concern with the ethico-politics of love in the context of empire animates Tolstoy's aesthetic works across his career. There is a certain artistic symmetry to the fact that much like the movement Tolstoy imagines in his political works between the individual, social and universal stage, his prescription of the object of love shifts from self, to family to the universal in his aesthetics. Thus, in *The Cossacks*, Olenin's ethical quest ultimately centres on how best to love oneself, *Anna Karenina* exalts Levin's love of family, and *Hadji Murat* offers indictment for a failure to love the unknown, Avar other. However, Tolstoy's contribution to political theory is paradoxical and problematic. For all Tolstoy's sensitivity and care representing the Cossacks, the

[183] Tolstoy, *"Bethink Yourselves"*., p.19.

[184] As cited in McKeogh, *Tolstoy's Pacifism*., p. 89.

capacity to love operates as a shibboleth rendering Homeric Lukashka and Christian Olenin's moral worlds not just incommensurate but unequal. Despite his sensitive portrayal of Anna, the morality tale privileges the sanctity of her marriage over her agency; elevates the rational, prosaic love of Levin over the emotional, passionate love of Anna; privileges the love of a 'small' family of Russia over a larger vision family however conceived. Hadji Murat seemingly became the subject rather than object of a story. Yet, his moral status is ultimately linked to his capacity for 'rational resurrection'. These contradictions in his aesthetics permeate his non-fiction. Hence, his critique of imperial violence and his affirmation of individual agency is prescient. However, to the extent that his law of love allows no room for collaboration or dissent, it is in itself violent. His attempt to articulate a plural, ecumenical, non-violent vision of conscientious political action is admirable. However, it was ultimately couched in a universal, hierarchical articulation of an idiosyncratic religion that regarded itself as antithesis of politics. Imbuing ethics with asceticism, anti-imperialism with imperial undertones, non-violence with violence, Tolstoy's law of love's offerings to politics are thus full of promise and peril. This chapter began by noting the claim that, for some, Tolstoy the 'prophet' eventually annihilated the 'artist'. Perhaps, however, there was never much distance between them.

CHAPTER 4: RABINDRANATH TAGORE ON LOVING IN THE PARTICULAR

Love is not mere sentiment; it is truth; it is the joy that is at the root of all creation.

- Rabindranath Tagore.

Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) is perhaps best known for being the first non-European to win the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1913. A polymath rather than just a poet, Tagore was also a playwright, composer, artist, educator, essayist and ecologist. Despite the proliferation of work on Tagore around his 150th anniversary in 2011, Tagore's contributions to international political thought remain relatively unexplored. In part, this is because Tagore's political legacy is complex and contested. On the one hand, he is celebrated alongside Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar on the Mount Rushmore of India.[1] Ezra Pound once quipped that he probably did sing Bengal into a nation.[2] Indeed, Tagore occupies the rare honour of having composed the national anthems of both India and Bangladesh. On the other hand, the latter half of Tagore's career saw his fervent denunciation of nationalism and the nation-state. Despite once leading the *swadeshi* (own country) movement in 1905 and attempting to renounce his knighthood in 1919 in protest of the Jallianwala Baug massacre in Amritsar, Tagore eschewed politics. In his own admission, he was 'nothing but a poet'.[3] Internationally, Tagore suffered a similar fate. Although he enjoyed a moment of international celebrity on par with Tolstoy's after being championed by the likes of William Rothenstein, W.B. Yeats and Ezra Pound, this was relatively short-lived. Garbed in silk, with his flowing white beard and his archaic translation of the Gitanjali he was appropriated – perhaps not unwillingly –into the Orientalist tradition of message seeking from the East only to be cast aside

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[1] Amit Chaudhuri, *On Tagore: Reading the Poet Today* (Peter Lang AG, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2012). , p. 171. Also, see the work of Ananya Vajpeyi who adds Abanindranath Tagore to this list. Ananya Vajpeyi, *Righteous Republic* (Harvard University Press, 2012).

[2] As cited by Anita Desai, 'Introduction', Rabindranath Tagore, *The Home and the World (Penguin Classics)* (Penguin Classics, 2005)., p. xxii.

[3] Chaudhuri, *On Tagore: Reading the Poet Today*., p. 170.

when he failed to live up to the expectations of an Eastern Christ.[4] Indeed, he disappointed audiences in the U.S. and East Asia by delivering lectures not on esoteric Eastern philosophy but nationalism, war, race and internationalism.[5] Tagore's perplexing legacy defined by the antinomy imagined between poetics and politics is perhaps best described by E.P. Thompson who argues Tagore was perhaps the first theorist of 'anti-politics'.[6] By this, Thompson did not mean Tagore's thought was anti-political in an Arendtian sense. Rather, Tagore mobilised another vision of politics focussed predominantly on 'civil society', understood 'as something distinct from and of stronger and more personal texture than political or economic structures'.[7]

In this chapter, I argue that Tagore's philosophy and praxis of love is central to this commitment to re-conceive politics in his post-*swadeshi* (post 1907) writings. It comprises three sections. The first section provides some background on Tagore in a bid to contextualise his many contradictions. The second section focuses on the period from Tagore's renunciation of *swadeshi* in 1907 to his renunciation of his knighthood in 1919. Focusing on Tagore's three political novels from this time, namely, *Gora*, *Chaturanga (Quartet)* and *Ghare Baire (The Home and the World)*, I argue they enunciate Tagore's understanding of the intimate as international. The final section examines how Tagore's distinction between abstract and particular loves shapes his dual critique of imperialism and internationalism, and underpins his commitment to a 'politics of friendship'.

Contextualising Tagore

It is my contention that Tagore is an important and neglected figure in the study of international relations. What makes Tagore's neglect perplexing is his impressive, international

[4] Amartya Sen, *The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity* (Penguin, 2006)., pp. 93-4.

[5] Krishna. Dutta and Andrew Robinson, *Rabindranath Tagore : The Myriad-Minded Man* (London: Bloomsbury, 1995)., p. 210.

[6] E.P. Thompson, "Introduction," in *Nationalism: Rabindranath Tagore* (London: Papermac, 1991)., pp. 14-5.

[7] Ibid., pp. 14-5.

career. As earlier mentioned, he was celebrated internationally after winning the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1913. A true transnationalist, he then travelled to all the (inhabited) continents, but for Australasia, delivering lectures and disseminating work. He corresponded and communicated with key figures of the twentieth century, including Albert Einstein, H.G. Wells, Romain Rolland, Mohandas Gandhi, W.E.B. DuBois and Yone Noguchi. Further, most of his post-1910 work is either in English or easily available in translation. Perhaps one of possible reason for Tagore's neglect is his elusiveness and evasion of easy classification. Oscillating between the poles of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, he rejects both labels. Offering astute critique of essentialism in his Indian works, he succumbs to self-Orientalising on the international stage. At the helm of the *swadeshi* (own-country) movement, he remained an Anglophile for much of his life and an apologist of the British empire for at least some of it. Tagore's modest reception in international political theory is even more perplexing. His astute critique of imperial violence and the co-constitution of race, caste, religion and gender would suggest an affinity with postcolonial studies. Yet, he is eschewed for his apparent elitism. His critique of the rational, atomistic individual would portray him an unlikely ally of liberalism. Yet, he is championed by Martha Nussbaum who places him at the centre of her liberal canon. Tagore was a complex and contradictory figure which understandably allows for his work to be appropriated and mobilised for a number of incongruous political projects. In this section I do not seek to systematise Tagore's thought but to offer some background to help contextualise his many contradictions.

An account of Tagore's legacy is incomplete without reference to his birth into the 'first family of Bengal'.[8] The Tagores rose to prominence as middle-men in the British Empire. Tagore's grandfather, 'Prince' Dwarkanath was a *zamindaar* or landowner whose Bengal estates were at the

[8] Vajpeyi, *Righteous Republic.*

centre of the silk and indigo trade during the high noon of empire.[9] Dwarkanath Tagore founded the Union Bank, which was the central commercial structure in Calcutta for over two decades; he pioneered tea-growing in Assam and supported ventures to industrialise and modernise Bengal. Ignoring conventions prohibiting (the priestly caste) *Brahmins* from overseas travel, Dwarkanath met the Pope, Sir Robert Peel and enjoyed several invitations from Queen Victoria and Prince Albert. He was the first Indian to be granted the Freedom of the City of London. A patron of arts and culture, he was well-acquainted with the German Orientalist and philologist Max Muller and the contributors of *Punch*. After his death, he was remembered by Charles Dickens as 'the Oriental *Croeses*', well-known across England. Not defined by the aristocratic company he kept, Dwarkanath fraternised with radicals and social reformers attending a march with the Chartists in Glasgow. His son, Debendranath Tagore, cut a much more conservative figure. He was a founding member of the *Brahmo Samaj*, an 'Upanishadic Unitarian' movement originally conceived by his father's best friend, Rammohun Roy.[10] Brahmoism, at its core, is a Hindu reform movement. Albeit a fairly small component of the religious matrix of India today, *Brahmoism* was to play a significant role in the shaping of Nehru's – and by extension the Indian Constitution's - conception of secularism.[11] Elevating the monotheism of early Hinduism over the polytheism of middle and late Hinduism, *Brahmoism* revived scholarship of the *Vedas* (ancient Hindu Scriptures) and denounced rituals, idol worship and the caste-system as anachronisms.[12] Elaborating on the historical and theological affinities between Brahmoism and Unitarianism, David Kopf suggests that they both share a commitment to a 'liberal' or 'rational faith'; the values of a Social Gospel and the idea of 'universal

[9] All biographical detail on Dwarkanath Tagore is from Dutta and Robinson, *Rabindranath Tagore : The Myriad-Minded Man.*, pp. 27-33.

[10] For a detailed discussion of the collaboration between Rammohun Roy and Debendranath Tagore and their differences of theological opinion, see Michael Collins, *Empire, Nationalism and the Postcolonial World : Rabindranath Tagore's Writings on History, Politics and Society* (London: Routledge, 2012)., pp. 26-34.

[11] Chaudhuri, *On Tagore: Reading the Poet Today.*, p. 35

[12] Ibid., p. 83.

theistic progress'.[13] However, whereas Unitarians emphasised the emancipation of slaves, the Brahmos' emphasised the emancipation of women.[14] Within Debendranath's lifetime, a schism formed between the more conservative and Hindu, *Adi* (original) *Brahmo Samaj* and the more heterodox and universal, *Sadharan* (Common) *Brahmo Samaj*.[15] This schism was to have a profound influence on his young son, Rabindranath Tagore, whose life's works attest to his division between these camps.

Rabindranath Tagore was a remarkable figure in his own right. The author of over 200 books, creator of over 3000 artworks, he set up an art school, a university and a rural development institute.[16] Indeed, he was a household name in Bengal long before he set sail to England in 1912 to launch his bilingual career. That Tagore was subsequently celebrated by Wilfred Owen, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Amartya Sen, Jawaharlal Nehru and Isaiah Berlin attests to the reach of his literature, philosophy and political thought. Nonetheless, Tagore's family history remains relevant for a number of reasons. It afforded him the privilege and platform to create and promote his work. The Tagores were at the centre of the so-called Bengal Renaissance and Rabindranath Tagore's legacy is often understood in the context of his father's and grandfather's. What Dwarkanath Tagore accomplished in facilitating cross-cultural dialogue via trade and what Debendranath Tagore accomplished for humanism via theological reform, Tagore sought to accomplish via aesthetics.[17] Indeed, for Amit Chaudhuri, the breadth of the Tagorean project was 'a precursor to Beuy's vision of "total art"…and a successor to the Wagnerian *Gesamtkustwerk'* minus the messianism.[18] Further, the syncreticism so central to Tagorean philosophy and politics emerges

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[13] David Kopf, *The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind (Princeton Legacy Library)* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015)., p.3.

[14] Ibid., p.3.

[15] Collins, *Empire, Nationalism and the Postcolonial World : Rabindranath Tagore's Writings on History, Politics and Society*., p. 34.

[16] Vajpeyi, *Righteous Republic*., p. 89.

[17] Chaudhuri, *On Tagore: Reading the Poet Today*., pp.114-5.

[18] Ibid., p. 128.

less as idealistic contrivance and more a reflection of Tagore's cosmopolitan upbringing. In Tagore's own words, his 'was the confluence of three cultures: the Hindu, the Mohammedan and the British'.[19] In many ways, Tagore's family history is also central to his conflicted legacy in international political thought. If too much emphasis on this history has led to Tagore being dismissed by postcolonial theorists, too little has led to Tagore being misunderstood by the liberals who champion him.

Tagore was not a subaltern, which makes him a somewhat problematic figure for postcolonial study. As Michael Collins notes, 'the type of historiography undertaken by the *Subaltern Studies Collective,* has – almost by definition – been unable to elucidate the historical significance of figures who do not easily fit into the Subaltern category; of which Tagore is a prime example'.[20] Despite pioneering representation of the 'clerk', 'postman' and 'maid' in his aesthetic works, much of Tagore's legacy is characterised by the accusation that he lacked a sense of the 'bastaab' or 'the real'.[21] His seeming ambivalence about imperialism appears to consolidate this view. As was common of men of his social class, Tagore regarded the British colonisation of India as 'providential' at least until 1910.[22] Somewhat perplexingly, he seemed to subscribe to this view even as he led the *swadeshi* movement which emphasised indigenous enterprise. In part, this was because Tagore like Tolstoy subscribed to Max Muller's mythology about the innate political superiority of the 'West' and spiritual superiority of the 'East'. Much of his career was thus dedicated to promoting dialogue and change along these essentialist lines. In part, however, this was because Tagore rejected the (still popular) thesis that there was a natural affinity between

[19] Sisir Kumar Das, *Vol.3: A Miscellany the English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore* (New Delhi: Sahitya Academi, 2008)., p. 156.

[20] Collins, *Empire, Nationalism and the Postcolonial World : Rabindranath Tagore's Writings on History, Politics and Society*., p. 9.

[21] Dipesh. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000)., p.156.

[22] Dutta and Robinson, *Rabindranath Tagore : The Myriad-Minded Man*., p.1.

liberalism and imperialism. For Tagore, imperialism was not the culmination but the contradiction of liberalism. Unlike Tolstoy, he also did not regard 'empire' as undifferentiated across time and space. Consequently, he argued there was a qualitative difference between the imperialism of the Moghuls who remained in India and adopted local customs and the British who administered from afar and transferred Indian wealth to the metropole. [23] Yet, for all of Tagore's seeming ambivalence about nationalism and empire, he was the only Indian to renounce his knighthood in protest of the Jallianwalla Baug massacre in Amritsar. As his letter to Viceroy Chelmsford attests, his ambivalence about empire did not quell his capacity for critique.

> Knowing that our appeals have been in vain and that the passion of vengeance is blinding the noble vision of statesman-ship in our Government which could so easily afford to be magnanimous as befitting its physical strength and moral tradition, the very least I can do for my country is to take all consequences upon myself in giving voice to the protest of the millions of my countrymen, surprised into a dumb anguish of terror. The time has come when badges of honour make our shame glaring in their incongruous context of humiliation, and I for my part wish to stand, shorn of all special distinctions, by the side of my countrymen who, for all their so-called insignificance, are liable to suffer a degradation not fit for human beings.[24]

Tolstoy's ambivalent stance on imperialism and his critique of nationalism seems to place him beyond the pale of postcolonial veneration. Neglecting his work, however, does a great disservice to a thinker who made a significant contribution to the critique of nationalism, imperialism and social hierarchies. In fact, it is for some of these reasons that Martha Nussbaum places him with J.S Mill at the centre of her cosmopolitan, liberal canon. Given Nussbaum is the most prominent international political theorist offering the most extensive engagement with Tagore's corpus, her understanding and representation of Tagore warrants some discussion. That Nussbaum champions Tagore's political thought perhaps ought not be surprising. Both their philosophies centre on the political promise of love. Nussbaum understands love as a 'cognitive

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[23] Sisir Kumar Das, *Vol.2: Plays Stories Essays (the English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore)* (Sahitya Academi, New Delhi, 2008)., p. 421.

[24] Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, *The Mahatma and the Poet: Letters and Debates Between Gandhi and Tagore 1915-41* (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 2006)., pp. 187-8.

appraisal', Tagore understands the mind or *manas* as the 'centre for reason and judgment and emotion'.[25] Nussbaum emphasises the importance of sentimental education for the cultivation of the cosmopolitan citizen, Tagore's work is embedded in the Indic *rasa* tradition which understands aesthetics and the cultivation of emotion as intrinsically linked. As liberalism is protean, perhaps even Nussbaum's reading of Tagore as a liberal is justified. Indeed, in Duncan Bell's estimation a liberal is merely someone who has been understood as such for two generations of thinkers. [26] In Tagore's instance, then, his celebration by the likes of Isaiah Berlin and Martha Nussbaum, however errant would be enough to shore up his liberal credentials.

In *Political Emotions* Nussbaum understands Tagore 'a morally satisfactory type of national unity',[27] conducive to cosmopolitanism. Nussbaum is not the only theorist who seeks to systematise or synthesise Tagore' thought on nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Indeed, Tagore is variously read as a nationalist[28] or cosmopolitan,[29] both[30] or neither.[31] Like Tolstoy, changed his mind often over his sixty four year career. Over the course of this career, his views appear to oscillate between the endorsement of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Indeed, if Tagore's *swadeshi* phase is concomitant with nationalism, his post-swadeshi (and some pre-swadeshi phases) are entirely consistent with the advocacy of 'sentimental' cosmopolitanism,[32] 'embedded'

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[25] Lynch, *Divine Passions: The Social Construction of Emotion in India* (University of California Press, 1992)., 19

[26] Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016)., Chapter 3: 'What is Liberalism?'.

[27] Martha C. Nussbaum, Martha C. Nussbaum, *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).

[28] See generally, K. L. Tuteja and Kaustav Chakraborty, *Tagore and Nationalism* (Springer, 2017).

[29] Nussbaum, *Political Emotions*., Also, Sarindranath Tagore, "Tagore's Conception of Cosmopolitanism: A Reconstruction," *University of Toronto Quarterly* 77, no. 4 (2008).

[30] Sugata Bose and Kris Manjapra, *Cosmopolitan Thought Zones : South Asia and the Global Circulation of Ideas* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

[31] Rahul Rao, *Third World Protest: Between Home and the World* (Oxford University Press, Usa, 2012)., Also, Michael Collins, "Rabindranath Tagore and the Politics of Friendship," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 35, no. 1 (2012)..

[32] Renée Jeffery, *Reason and Emotion in International Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

cosmopolitanism,[33] 'postcolonial' cosmopolitanism and perhaps even 'coloured' cosmopolitanism.[34] Any insight to be offered about Tagore is always an insight about Tagore at a particular moment in his career. To the extent that Nussbaum's interest in Tagore centres on his post-*swadeshi*, 'internationalist' period, it is worth noting that any attempt to categorise him as nationalist or cosmopolitan is misleading. Tagore rejected both terms as he understood them. In his words, 'neither the colourless vagueness of cosmopolitanism, nor the fierce self-idolatry of nation worship is the goal of human history'.[35] To associate Tagore with nation-building as Nussbaum, or the Indian Academy of Letters, does is antithetical to his work in this period. Tagore's interests in his own admission lay with society rather than the state. While reading Tagore in his post-*swadeshi* career as a cosmopolitan is valid, it is worth noting that Nussbaum renders Tagore's cosmopolitanism rather 'thin'. Perhaps in a bid to reach a wider international audience, Nussbaum decontextualises Tagore's thought. His syncretic theory of sentiment, rooted in Hindu universalism, is reduced to a universal theory about love. In the process, Tagore's embeddedness in non-Western debates is erased. While Nussbaum is quite right to mobilise Tagore's thought to offer a critical revision of Comte, she fails to do justice to his engagement as a colonial subject with both 'Western' and 'non-Western' political thought. A decontextualised and dehistoricised account of Tagore effectively depoliticises him, reducing his espousal of internationalism to the very colourless variety of cosmopolitanism he sought to critique.

In what follows, I attempt to provide a contextualised reading of Tagore's three political novels written in the period roughly extending from 1907 to 1919. It is a key moment in Tagore's anti-nationalism and 'anti-imperialism', extending from his renunciation of the *swadeshi* movement

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[33] Toni Erskine, *Embedded Cosmopolitanism : Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of "dislocated Communities"* (Oxford: Published for The British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2008).

[34] Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Harvard University Press, 2012).

[35] Das, *Vol 2*., p. 120.

to the renunciation of his knighthood. I argue Tagore's concern shifts from proclaiming the ethico-political promise of love to examining the political conditions of loving. To the extent that an openness to alterity and 'selves' in construction is central to his understanding of loving, I argue it comes to underpin his vision of amity and internationalism.

The Intimate Is International: Tagore's Post-Swadeshi Novels

Tagore's three political novels, *Gora*, *Chaturanga (Quartet)* and *Ghare Baire* (*The Home and The World)* are variously read as his engagement with nationalism and cosmopolitanism and the complex co-constitution of religion, caste, race, class and gender in the context of empire. Although they engage with all these themes, they represent Tagore's reckoning with the *swadeshi* movement. *Chaturanga* and *Ghare Baire*, in turn, reflect Tagore's growing concern about nationalism following the outbreak of the Great War. In what follows, I offer a reading of Tagore's three novels as a critique of abstract loves and their propensity to wield violence in social movements and by extension politics. I argue the novel's representation of the private lives of people reveals Tagore understood the intimate and international as co-constitued. Moving beyond the emphasis on indigeneity and isolationism in Tagore's *swadeshi* writings, these novels advocate a loving in the particular which emphasises an openness to alterity, agency and dialogue. Together, they affirm relationships as sites for personal and political transformation.

To provide some context about the *swadeshi* movement, it was precipitated by Lord Curzon's decision to partition Bengal in 1905.[36] Although the decision was ostensibly made on grounds of administrative expedience, it was also consistent with the British imperial policy of 'divide and rule'.[37] Indeed, the vast majority of the population of the new state of East Bengal were

[36] Sumit Sarkar, *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2013) Ch. 1 'Partition of Bengal'.

[37] Ibid., Loc 484.

Muslim. The *swadeshi* movement had several elements. The foremost *swadeshi* historian, Sumit Sarkar, suggests a 'fourfold classification' that comprised

> Moderates; the trend towards self development without inviting an immediate political clash (which I have decided to call 'constructive swadeshi' for want of a better name); political extremism using 'extended boycott' or passive resistance in addition to self help efforts; and terrorism[38]

Despite their differences, Sarkar notes that in the period extending between 1905 and 1908, all four groups

> opposed partition, supported boycott at least for a time and economic swadeshi throughout, participated to some extent in the national education movement, and talked (even if many often did not act) in terms of economic self reliance'[39]

The significance of the *swadeshi* movement is that it provided a template for Gandhian politics, albeit without the commitment to nonviolence.

Rabindranath Tagore was initially at the forefront of the *swadeshi* movement. Unsympathetic to moderates who sought rights and freedoms from the British, Tagore instead emphasised a 'constructive' programme which focused on indigenous enterprise, education and village reform long before the *swadeshi* movement took root.[40] Sarkar suggests the movement's appeal to indigeneity became conflated with Hindu revivalism.[41] It led to an alliance between the upper-caste, upper-class, Hindu landholders or *bhadralok* which came to monopolise the movement.[42] That he got swept up in a wave of religious revivalism is evident in the uncharacteristic ideas the once modern, anti-traditional, reformist Tagore came to espouse.

> We are now informed about the essential distinctness of oriental civilization and its superiority over the European; the traditional samaj is hailed as the real centre of Indian life, not the state; the Hindu past is invoked in poetic language; child marriage and

[38] Ibid., Loc 893-897.

[39] Ibid., Loc 923-927.

[40] Ibid., Loc 883.

[41] Ibid., Loc 227.

[42] Ibid., Loc 115.

> restrictions on widows are declared to be not unjustified in the context of Hindu society; virtues are discovered in the functional specialization through caste; and even sati gets an honourable mention [43]

Tagore's own break with the movement was gradual. In 1906, he began to disengage with the organised political elements of the *swadeshi* movement focusing instead on the development of institutions namely education initiatives and village reconstruction.[44] His ashram in *Shantiniketan*, founded in 1901 was at the centre of this mission. Later he was to found the university *Visva Bharati* and the rural development institute that provided the blueprint for Elmhirst's Darlington Trust, *Sriniketan*. That his education initiatives remained central to Tagore's philosophy is evident in his letter to Gandhi in 1940 where he described Visva-Bharati as the 'vessel which is carrying the cargo of my life's best treasure'.[45] In mid-1907, the outbreak of communal violence and the *swadeshi* movement's growing association with terrorism saw Tagore distance himself from the movement. For Sarkar, however, this was an inevitable result of Tagore's turn in 1906 to 'deeds rather than words'.[46] Tagore's decisive break with *swadeshi* coincided with a period of silence and a return to literary work, notably the writing of *Gora.*[47]

Gora

Gora is the eponymous protagonist of Tagore's first political novel. 'Gora' literally translates to 'fair-skinned' or 'white'.[48] A shortened version of the name 'Gourmohan', it evokes the medieval Bengali saint, Chaitanya Gourango (fairbodied) who advocated a spirituality based

[43] Ibid., Loc 1166.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Bhattacharya, *The Mahatma and the Poet: Letters and Debates Between Gandhi and Tagore 1915-41*., p. 178.

[46] Sarkar, *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903-1908*., Loc. 1283.

[47] Dutta and Robinson, *Rabindranath Tagore : The Myriad-Minded Man*., p. 151.

[48] Nandini Bhattacharya, "Introduction," in *Rabindranath Tagore Gora: A Critical Companion*, ed. Nandini Bhattacharya (Delhi: Primus Books, 2015)., 2.

on 'love and equality rather than hierarchized differences'.[49] Based on how 'Gora' is pronounced in Bengali 'it is fairly close to *goda* meaning *root*, or *gnoda*, adjectivally *orthodox, conservative, reactionary*'.[50]As the title intimates, *Gora* is Tagore's engagement with love, imperialism and orthodoxy. Although celebrated as a foundational text in India, *Gora* has not been the subject of international acclaim, but for two exceptions. When the text first appeared in (poor) English translation, Leonard Woolf wrote

> The subject of Gora is intensely interesting to me, and Mr. Tagore's handling of it kept me absorbed throughout the book. His thesis is the social, political and psychological problems which confront the educated Bengali in Calcutta today.[51]

In 2013, Martha Nussbaum placed *Gora* at the centre of her engagement with the cultivation of sympathy in just, liberal nations.[52] Woolf and Nussbaum were both correct and mistaken. Serialised between 1907 and 1909 in a journal called *Prabasi* (Exile) and published in book form in 1910, *Gora* represents Tagore's first novelistic engagement with his brief foray into the *Swadeshi* movement. However, the action of the novel commences in 1857 with the Indian War of Independence/Sepoy Mutiny and is set during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. This timeline allows Tagore to comment on a period that saw the passing of a civil marriage bill,[53] oppression in the indigo fields,[54] racial anxieties surrounding a Bill that allowed Indians to preside over criminal trials involving Europeans,[55] a census that ossified the category of caste,[56] and the rise of Hindu

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[49] Bhattacharya, "Introduction.",p.2. See also, Supriya Chaudhuri, "The Nation and Its Fictions: History and Allegory in Tagore's Gora," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 35, no. 1 (2012)., 106.

[50] Chaudhuri, "The Nation and Its Fictions: History and Allegory in Tagore's Gora.", 106. Also, Bhattacharya, "Introduction.", 2

[51] Dutta and Robinson, *Rabindranath Tagore : The Myriad-Minded Man*., p. 155.

[52] Nussbaum, *Political Emotions*., pp. 186-190.

[53] Bhattacharya, "Introduction.", pp.8-9

[54] Patrick Colm Hogan, "*Gora, Jane Austen*, and the Slaves of Indigo," in *Rabindranath Tagore: Universality and Tradition*, ed. Colm Hogan Patrick and Pandit Lalita (London: Associated University Presses, 2003)., p. 192.

[55] Sunayani Bhattacharya, "Reading Gora's Body: Tagore and the Discourse of Race and Caste in Nineteenth-Century India," in *Rabindranath Tagore Gora: A Critical Companion*, ed. Nandini Bhattacharya (India: Primus Books, 2015)., p. 122.

[56] Ibid., p. 124.

nationalism.[57] Similarly, while Nussbaum's reading is seemingly endorsed by the Sahitya Akademi's – or India's National Academy of Letters' – decision to reprint Gora at moments of communal violence,[58] the idea of nation-building is deeply antithetical to Tagore's novel. A thorough engagement with this rich and dense dialogical novel is beyond the purview of this text. In what follows, I offer a reading of the text as Tagore's espousal of a politics of love as refuge and resistance to the violent co-constitution of religion, race, caste, class and gender.

To offer a brief and selective summary, *Gora* is about an Irish foundling born in the midst of the 1857 Indian War of Independence/Sepoy Mutiny. After an Irish officer is killed by sepoys, his pregnant widow seeks refuge with a Brahmin family and dies in childbirth. Their son, Gora, is adopted by the family and 'passed off' as Brahmin. A brief reference to the second Anglo-Afghan war situates the novel in the late 1870s.[59] When the action of the novel begins, Gora is the president of the Hindu welfare society,[60] a social activist, a writer and neo-Hindu proto-nationalist. Western educated and unaware of his roots, he espouses a hyper-masculine, rational, orthodox Hindu nationalism grounded in caste-observance to combat the hierarchical and racialised imperial order. He equates his return to orthodox Hinduism with the decolonisation of his mind,[61] a necessary step towards the mobilisation of the masses into realising "Bharatvarsha", a Hindu mythological imagining of India. To the extent that Gora understands the self-fashioning of his religious identity in the context of larger questions of nationalism and imperialism, he is variously read as mirroring

[57] Chakravarty (2014), p. vii

[58] Bhattacharya, "Introduction.", pp.10-11.

[59] Tagore (2014b), p. 279.

[60] Rabindranath Tagore, *Gora, (Pb) (Modern Classics)* (Penguin Books India Pvt Ltd, 2010a)., 8.

[61] Lalita Pandit, "Caste, Race and Nation: History and Dialectic in Rabindranath Tagore's *Gora*," in *Literary India: Comparative Studies in Aesthetics, Colonialism, and Culture*, ed. Colm Hogan Patrick and Pandit Lalita (New York: SUNY, 1995)., 220.

the life of Brahmabandhab Upphadyay,[62] Sister Nivedita,[63] Swami Vivekanada,[64] or indeed, Tagore's *swadeshi* self.[65]

Gora's abstract love for *Bharatvarsha* and his fellow *Bharatvarshis* (Indians) leads to fraught relations with his loved ones. He refuses to dine with his mother who 'threw orthodoxy to the winds' and rejected caste the moment she fostered him.[66] He calls for the dismissal of his *Kristani* ('Christian-like', pejorative for low-caste convert) maid, *Lacchmia*, who nursed him back to health when he had small pox as child.[67] He parts company with his best-friend, Binoy over his decision to marry a Brahmo woman, Lalita.[68] Finally, in pursuit of his perceived *dharma* (duty) to be an ascetic, he denies his love for the Hindu turned-Brahmo turned-Hindu orphan Sucharita (Radharani).[69] Gora seeks to embrace the Brahman's revival mantra,

> I must be extremely pure and clean…I do not occupy the same ground as everyone else. Friendship is not necessary for me. I do not belong to that ordinary category of people who delight in the company of women. And I must completely reject close intimacy with the base commoners of this land. They look up to Brahmans as the earth gazes at the sky in the hope of rain. If I come too close, who will save them?[70]

Consequently, he occludes the many modes of love celebrated in the Hindu tradition, including the *prema* (love) linked to the rasa of *vatsalya* or parental love, the *prema* of *dasya*, humility of servant

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[62] Ashis Nandy, *The Illegitimacy of Nationalism: Rabindranath Tagore and the Politics of Self (Oxford India Paperbacks)* (OUP India, 1994)., Also Pandit, "Caste, Race and Nation: History and Dialectic in Rabindranath Tagore's *Gora*."

[63] Pandit, "Caste, Race and Nation: History and Dialectic in Rabindranath Tagore's *Gora*."

[64] See, Meenakshi Mukherjee, 'Introduction' in Sujit Mukherjee, *Rabindranath Tagore Gora* (New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1997)., ix-xxiv

[65] Pandit, "Caste, Race and Nation: History and Dialectic in Rabindranath Tagore's *Gora*.", Nandini Bhattacharya, "'No Longer At Ease': Religion, Colonial Modernity and Gora (1880-1910)," in *Rabindranath Tagore Gora: A Critical Companion*, ed. Nandini Bhattacharya (Delhi: Primus Books, 2015).

[66] Rabindranath Tagore, *Gora,* trans. Radha Chakravarty (New Delhi: Penguin Books India Pvt Ltd, 2009)., p. 16.

[67] Tagore, *Gora*., p. 15.

[68] Ibid., p. 410.

[69] Ibid., p. 495.

[70] Ibid., p. 482.

to a master, the *prema* of *sakhya* or friendship and the *prema* of *shingara* or erotic love.[71] Gora, however, seems impervious to the exclusionary nature of his abstract love of *Bharatvarsha*, a fact that creates a sense of foreboding given the novel's publication date and corresponding administrative redefinition of "community" along religious lines in the Morley Minto reforms.[72]

Seeking contact with the 'real' *Bharatvarsha*, Gora embarks on a peripatetic tour of Bengal. He witnesses brutal oppression in the indigo fields in Chor-Ghoshpur, a reference to the indigo revolt of 1860.[73] There he is confronted with two stark moral decisions, which as Ana Jelnikar notes, centre on the acceptance of hospitality.[74] First, Gora chooses integrity over caste-purity and stays with a 'heretic' Hindu barber who adopts a Muslim child rather than a corrupt Brahman involved in the oppression of the indigo farmers. He observes:

> What a great heresy we are committing in Bharatvarsha, making purity a matter of appearances alone! It would save my caste purity to dine at the home of a man who torments Muslims by creating all sorts of trouble, but I would lose my caste status in the home of a person who accepts such a torment to protect a Muslim boy, and is even ready to suffer social condemnation for it.[75]

Next, Gora declines bail and legal representation when he is unjustly sentenced to a month's imprisonment for a petty offence because the Magistrate assumes he is associated with instigating the indigo revolt.

> 'I don't want to be free of lockup and handcuffs simply because I'm fortunate enough to have money and friends' declared Gora. 'According to our nation's religious law, we know it is the ruler's responsibility to ensure justice; it's the ruler who must be blamed if his subjects suffer injustice. But in this kingdom, if subjects must rot in the lockup and die in

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[71] Sudipta Kaviraj, *The Invention of Private Life: Literature and Ideas* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).. See also, Owen M. Lynch, *Divine Passions: The Social Construction of Emotion in India*., p. 18.

[72] Bhattacharya, "Introduction.", 8.

[73] Colm Hogan, "*Gora, Jane Austen*, and the Slaves of Indigo.", 192.

[74] Ana Jelnikar, "Waiting for the Second Cup of Tea: Unconditional Hospitality in Rabindranath Tagore's Gora," in *Rabindranath Tagore Gora: A Critical Companion*, ed. Nandini Bhattacharya (Delhi: Primus Books, 2015)., p. 112 and 114.

[75] Tagore, *Gora, (Pb) (Modern Classics)*., p. 185.

> jail because they can't afford the lawyer's fee, if even under a king's rule one must go bankrupt trying to buy a fair verdict with money, I wouldn't spend a paisa on such justice'[76]

Gora represents both Tagore's (self) critique of the upper-class idealism that came to animate the *swadeshi* movement and the transformative potential of stepping outside that world. He does this via his engagement with Kipling's *Kim*. Indeed, as Mehta notes, for all Gora's differences from Kim, his most Kiplingesque moment is when he assumes the Brahmanical burden of enlightening the masses despite his lack of comprehension of the lives of his countrymen.[77] Gora's work in the villages helps him realise the shortcomings of his abstract love of (Hindu) community:

> But in the total passivity prevalent in the villages, where external pressures did not work in the same way, Gora saw his nation's profoundest weakness completely exposed. The dharma that gave everyone strength, energy and wellbeing in the form of service, love, compassion and self-sacrifice, was nowhere in evidence. The practices that only drew boundaries, divided people and tormented them, that would even deny the intellect and keep love at arm's length, were the ones that constantly hindered everyone in every respect, in every movement and activity…. it became impossible for him to continue deluding himself with the illusion of abstract thought.[78]

Rather than assert the incommensurability of classes, races or castes, Gora's work in the countryside speaks of the transformative potential of the encounter. Exemplifying a proto-postcolonial historiography, Gora in fact discovers a history other than 'Marshman saheb's *History of India'*.[79] Indeed, as Patrick Colm Hogan notes, his experiences in the countryside comes to embody those of figures like Ram Gopal Ghose who travelled through indigo fields drawing attention to the atrocities he witnessed or that of the Irishman, Reverend James Long, who was imprisoned for a month after he arranged the translation and publication in 1861 of Dinabandhu Mitra's controversial play on the indigo revolt, *Nil-darpan*.[80]

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[76] Ibid., p. 195.

[77] Jaya Mehta, ""Some Imaginary 'Real' Thing": Racial Purity, the Mutiny, and the Nation in Tagore's *Gora* and Kipling's *Kim*," in *Rabindranath Tagore: Universality and Tradition*, ed. Colm Hogan Patrick and Pandit Lalita (London: Associated University Presses, 2003).,203.

[78] Tagore, *Gora, (Pb) (Modern Classics)*., p. 463.

[79] Ibid., p. 21.

[80] Radha Chakravarty, *Novelist Tagore: Gender and Modernity in Selected Texts* (Routledge India, 2016)., Loc 1287.

Despite Gora's moral evolution in this bildungsroman, he continues to suffer cognitive dissonance about caste until he learns the secret of his birth. This *anagnorisis* leaves *Gora* without an identity:

> What he was, where he was, he did not seem to understand. As if behind him there was nothing called a past, and before him, the future, so purposeful and clearly determined for such a long time, had completely vanished. As if he was simply floating like a momentary dewdrop on a lotus leaf. He had no mother, no father, no country, no caste, no name, no family gotra, no deity. All he had was a 'No'.[81]

Yet this news strangely emancipates him. He concludes 'at dawn today, with my naked soul, I was born directly in Bharatvarsha's lap'.[82] Realising his former idea of *Bhartvarsha* was an abstraction, he observes,

> Creating an untroubled, unblemished abstract image of Bharatvarsha, how I battled on all fronts to keep my devotion safe within that impenetrable fortress! Today in a single instant my imaginary fortress has evaporated like a dream. Set completely free, I have suddenly arrived at the heart of a great reality! All Bharatvarsha's virtues and flaws, joys and sorrows, knowledge and ignorance, have come directly close to my heart. Today I have gained the right to true service. The real field of action now lies before me. It is not in the arena within my heart, but the actual site for promoting the welfare of those hundred crore people in the world outside.[83]

Gora is a dense dialogical novel. Characteristic of Tagore's other works, it is open-ended. If the novel has a thesis, it is about the ethico-political potential of love.[84] Indeed, Gora's love for the universal remains abstract and stalled until he realises the particular loves of mother, friend and lover. In setting up a tension between abstract and particular, Tagore casts aside race, (at least a biologically immutable conception of) caste and gender as social construction. The most optimistic of Tagore's political novels, *Gora* bears witness to Tagore's belief in the soteriology of love. For Pandit, the central rasa is *shingara*, which is to say the novel is organised around the

[81] Tagore, *Gora, (Pb) (Modern Classics)*., p. 502.

[82] Ibid., pp. 506-7.

[83] Ibid., p. 505.

[84] Chakravarty (2014), p. xix.

aesthetic of the romantic love of Gora and Sucharita.[85] Albeit evoking the Vaishanvite motif; Sudipta Kaviraj notes that Tagore is engaged in the very modern project of promoting the interiority of romantic love.[86] Kaviraj establishes this via a conceptual history of love that traces the divesting of *shingara* (the erotic) from associations with the romantic in Tagore's celebration of the interiority and moral development of characters.[87]Indeed, Gora and Sucharita are less concerned with each other's physicality and more interested in the selves they are constructing in conversation with the other. In many ways Tagore's depiction of romantic love in the late nineteenth century is not very different from Benjamin Bagley's account of love.[88] As Simon May observes 'when it comes to love, the "long nineteenth century" extends not only into the twentieth…but well into the twenty first'.[89] This is not to suggest romantic love was a colonial imposition or an entirely modern construct.[90] Nonetheless, both Tagore and Bagley defend 'a model of agency on which people can love each other for identities still being created, through a kind of mutual improvisation'.[91] Gora and Sucharita's love for each other as they mirror each other and transition from Brahmo-to-Hindu-to beyond reflect this. Tagore's innovation, however, is his syncretism: to take elements of modern romantic love and root them in a tradition of rebellious Hinduism.[92]

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[85] Pandit (2003), p. 147.

[86] Kaviraj, *The Invention of Private Life: Literature and Ideas*., pp. 172-6.

[87] Kaviraj, *The Invention of Private Life: Literature and Ideas*. See also, Sudipta Kaviraj 'Tagore and the transformations in the ideals of love' in Francesca Orsini (ed.) *Love in South Asia: A Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 162-7.

[88] Benjamin Bagley, "Loving Someone in Particular," *Ethics* 125(2015).

[89] Simon May, *Love: A History,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), p. xii

[90] See generally, Lalita Pandit, "The Psychology and Aesthetics of Love: Sringara, Bhavana, and Rasadhavani in Gora," in *Rabindranath Tagore: Universality and Tradition*, ed. Colm Hogan Patrick and Pandit Lalita (London: Associated University Press, 2003).and Tapan Tapan Raychaudhuri, "Love in a Colonial Climate: Marriage, Sex and Romance in Nineteenth Century Bengal," *Modern Asian Studies* 34, no. 2 (2000).

[91] Bagley, "Loving Someone in Particular." p. 477, also pp. 501-507.

[92] Drawing on the figures of Parvati and Draupadi from Hindu mythology, Lalita Pandit notes 'the demure, silenced, decorative Indian woman of the inner quarters and courtyards…seems like a historical absurdity' Pandit, "The Psychology and Aesthetics of Love: Sringara, Bhavana, and Rasadhavani in Gora.", p. 149.

Gora, however, is also about the soteriology of love in its many modes. In my reading, Tagore's project is less about constructing a hierarchy of loves and more about advocating loving in the particular. Therefore, the plot would not be possible without the *philoxenos* and maternal love of Gora's adoptive mother. Indeed, for Ashis Nandy and Martha Nussbaum, this is the central theme of the novel.[93] Similarly, it is enriched by the friendship or *philia* between Binoy and Gora who Supriya Chaudhuri suggests 'constitute a sort of composite character…a kind of rational-emotional dyad'.[94] The centrality of their friendship underscores Tagore's understanding that love necessitates realising ourselves in others (Binoy and Gora) without abnegating the self. Binoy's desperate desire to please leaves him with little self-understanding just as Gora's desire to renounce relationships sets him on a path to asceticism. Finally, learning to love in the particular transforms Gora's sense of *Bharatvarsha* or more generally what it means to belong. That he tells his mother at the novel's conclusion: *You have no caste, no discrimination, no contempt for anyone. You are the very image of goodness! It is you who is my Bharatvarsha!...*' is particularly revealing.[95] As Chakrabarti notes, *Bharatvarsha* operates as:

> a heuristic concept, an ongoing and unfinished experiment: it serves as an open gesalt, an inclusiveness that accommodates disparities and differences in its hunger for wholeness, free from the totalizing and homogenizing impulse implicit in colonialism/imperialism as well as nationalism on the imperial model.[96]

Gora finds his sense of belonging in a multiplicity of loves. However, it is worth noting this home is among exiles: orphans, outcasts and rebels. Indeed, Gora's adoptive mother, Anandamoyi, is rendered an outcast from Brahmin orthodoxy by virtue of raising an Irish orphan. His best friend, Binoy, is an ophan as is Gora's love interest, Sucharita. Binoy's wife, Lalita's anti-traditional, anti-imperial politics lead to her being disowned by most of her family and

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[93] Nandy (1994), p. 49 Nussbaum(2013), p. 188.

[94] Chaudhury (2012), p.106.

[95] Tagore, *Gora.*, p. 508.

[96] Shirshendu Chakrabarti as cited in Chakravarty (2014), p. xii.

excommunicated from the Brahmo Samaj. Her father and Gora's guru, Pareshbabu, faces ex-communication owing to his heterodoxy. Although they are all upper-class, each of the characters occupy exilic positions in society. Their embrace of Gora only stands to compound this. That Tagore was cognisant of this reality calls into question his portrayal as an unalloyed idealist. Nonetheless, Gora is essentially an optimistic text. The text is ultimately about loving as a modern, syncretic, humanist form of resistance that seeks to respond to oppression: imperial and otherwise. It creates a space that recognises and celebrates the agency of the Hindu barber, the rebellious woman and the colonised foreigner. In *Gora,* love operates as a site of refuge and resistance from the hierarchies that inhere in imperialism and orthodoxy. In its emphasis on oppression and marginalisation rather than culture or religiosity, this 'antipolitics' imagines the formation of new alliances or even communities of the subjugated and the sympathetic across religious, racial, gender, class and caste lines. Perhaps, unsurprisingly, not long after Tagore wrote *Gora*, he set sail with his collection of poems *The Gitanjali* to Europe and North America.

In 1912, Tagore's family friend, William Rothenstein shared *The Gitanjali* with W.B. Yeats and Ezra Pound.[97] In 1913, Tagore was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature and became an international celebrity. Continuing his speaking tour of US and the UK, he delivered a series of lectures in Harvard and Oxford published under the title *Sadhana* (Spiritual Stiving). *Sadhana* is Tagore's espousal of a philosophy of love. In it, he asserted love was the 'ultimate meaning of everything around us'.[98] Hence, '(Love) is not a mere sentiment; it is truth; it is the joy that is at the root of all creation'.[99] Tagore explains his philosophy of love by drawing on Vaishanavite poetry of the Gita Govinda, which centres on the love story between Krishna and Radha.

[97] Dutta and Robinson, *Rabindranath Tagore : The Myriad-Minded Man*., p. 164

[98] Rabindranath Tagore 'Sadhana' in Sisir Kumar Das (ed.), *The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore Volume 2: Plays Stories Essays* (New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 2014a), p. 321.

[99]Tagore (2014a), p. 321.

Developing the Vaishnavite allegory, it would appear as though the concepts of *viraha* or longing, *abhisar* or seeking one's lover and *milan* or union/consummation are central motifs of love.[100] For Tagore, they characterise – in a similar way to the Song of Songs – the eternal-love drama or *eros* between 'God' and person, infinite and finite, essence and appearance.

In *Sadhana*, Tagore argues that although familial and communal loves are significant, they ought not militate against a love of humanity.

> It very often happens that our love for our children, our friends, or other loved ones, debars us from the further realization of our soul. It enlarges our scope of consciousness, no doubt, yet it sets a limit to its freest expansion. Nevertheless, it is the first step, and all the wonder lies in this first step itself. It shows to us the true nature of our soul. From it we know, for certain, that our highest joy is in the losing of our egoistic self and in the uniting with others. This love gives us a new power and insight and beauty of mind to the extent of the limits we set around it, but ceases to do so if those limits lose their elasticity, and militate against the spirit of love altogether; then our friendships become exclusive, our families selfish and inhospitable, our nations insular and aggressively inimical to other races.[101]

In fact, for Tagore, civilisations were to be judged by their capacity for this love.

> Civilization must be judged and prized, not by the amount of power it has developed, but by how much it has evolved and given expression to, by its laws and institutions, the love of humanity[102]

Or again:

> Civilization can never sustain itself upon cannibalism of any form. For that by which alone man is true can only be nourished by love and justice[103]

Although Tagore's advocacy of a love of humanity may seem at odds with his critique of abstraction, it is in fact entirely consonant with his commitment to monism. Much like Tolstoy's

[100] Benoy Gopal. Ray, *The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore* (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1970)., p. 10. Tagore (2014a), p. 320.

[101] Das, *Vol 2*., p. 292.

[102] Ibid., p. 323.

[103] Ibid., p. 323.

law of love which imagines itself to be the antithesis of violence, in Tagore's monist philosophy, 'pain' or violence is the product of a lack of love.

> Want of love is a degree of callousness; for love is the perfection of consciousness. We do not love because we do not comprehend, or rather we do not comprehend because we do not love…[104]

Whereas for Tolstoy, the remedy is non-resistance to evil or a withdrawal from politics, for Tagore it entails constructive engagement or effort.

> The most important lesson man can learn from his life is not that there is pain in this world, but that it depends upon him to turn it into good account, that it is possible for him to transmute it into joy.[105]

Nonetheless, *Sadhana* is an abstract, convoluted and sometimes self-contradictory and self-orientalising text. Although Bertrand Russell dismissed *Sadhana* as 'vague nonsense',[106] Tagore's lectures captured the Orientalist imagination of Anglo-American audiences. It therefore came to them as quite a shock that when Tagore next embarked on the lecture circuit next in 1917, he spoke not about esoteric philosophy but offered a scathing critique of nationalism, imperialism and race. The major event that separates the tone of these lectures is the outbreak of the Great War, which Tagore came to see as animated by the same virulent nationalism of the *swadeshi* movement. Between these lectures, Tagore wrote *Chaturanga* and *Ghare Baire*, which offer insight into Tagore's changing views. I argue that if *Chaturanga* is about how the loves of abstract, systematic philosophy militate against loving in the particular, *Ghare Baire* highlights the violence abstract loves wreak in the intimate lives of people.

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[104] Ibid., p. 321.

[105] Ibid., p. 305.

[106] Dutta and Robinson, *Rabindranath Tagore : The Myriad-Minded Man*., p. 178.

Chaturanga

Kaiser Haq translates *Chaturanga* as *Quartet*. For the Tagore scholar, William Radice, this is apt because it conjures

> the "four limbs" or "four parts" that make up the novella – the four chapters that were originally published separately in consecutive issues of Sabujpatra (November – February, 1915-1916) but also, as in a string quartet, the interplay between the four characters that the chapters are named after. Since Tagore was always alert to the full meaning or etymology of names, perhaps we should also remember that a chaturanga in epic India was a complete army comprising elephants, chariots, cavalry and infantry….Finally, chaturanga as a name for a chess game (technically a four-player version of the game) evokes both the intellectualism of the book and its concentrated passion.[107]

As the title suggests, the novel is about four protagonists, namely Jagmohan, Sachich, Damini and Sribilash(who also acts as the narrator). Their lives are linked by the figure of Sachich, the son of an orthodox Hindu who is raised and educated by his uncle, Jagmohan. Jagmohan is variously read as being modelled on Ishwarchandra Vidyasagar or the Scottish philanthropist, David Hare.[108] He is a secular humanist and utilitarian committed to the teachings of Comte, Mill and Bentham. Jagmohan's beliefs attracts his brother and community's scorn. He rejects idol worship, the caste system and the notion of God, choosing to focus on humanity instead. As he tells his religious brother,

> Brahmos accept a formless deity who is invisible to the eye. You accept idols who cannot be heard. We accept the living who can be seen and heard – it's impossible not to believe in them[109]

When there is an outbreak of plague in Calcutta – a likely reference to the first outbreak of plague in 1899 –he decides to convert his home into a hospital for the low castes and Muslims in his community. He contracts the plague and dies, proudly acknowledging it as a badge of honour:

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[107] William Radice, "Atheists, Gurus and Fanatics: Rabindranath Tagore's 'Chaturanga' (1916)," *Modern Asian Studies* 34, no. 2 (2000)., p. 407.

[108] KH. Kunjo Singh, *Humanism and Nationalism in Tagore's Novels* (Atlantic Publishers & Distributors Pvt Ltd, 2002)., p. 63.

[109] Rabindranath Tagore, *Quartet (Chaturanga),* trans. Kaiser Haq (London: Penguin, 2011).,p. 620.

> The creed I have lived by all my life has given me its parting gift…I have no regrets[110]

Jagmohan's conception of ethics and altruism were profoundly shaped by his atheism:

> Service to humanity was an important aspect of Jagmohan's atheistic creed. The chief delight in such altruism lay in the fact that it brought nothing save financial loss – no award or merit, no promise of baksheesh from any scripture – nor did it placate any irate deity. If anyone asked, 'What is there for you in the greatest good of the greatest number?' he would say, 'The greatest thing for me is that there's nothing in it for me.[111]

In a world without grace or redemption, moral standards for Jagmohan were uncompromising:

> He would say to Sachich: 'Remember, my boy, our pride in being atheists requires us to be morally impeccable. Because we do not obey anything we ought to have greater strength to be true to ourselves'.[112]

Jagmohan's death leaves Sachich grief-stricken. He disappears for two years when his friend Sribilash discovers he has joined a cult in Chittagong led by Swami Lilananda, a figure variously read as Ramakrishna, Swami Vivekananda or the Brahmo-turned-Vaishnavite, Bijoykrishna Goswami. That Sachich was a discipline of Swami Lilananda leaves Sribilash dismayed:

> Once I couldn't imagine how someone like Sachich could be an atheist; now I couldn't understand how Swami Lilananda made Sachich dance to his tune. [113]

Indeed, the avowed positivist and humanist who had little time for ritual was found 'dancing ecstatically, singing kirtans, playing cymbals, and rousing whole neighbourhoods into a state of excitement' [114]. It seemed to Sribilash that Sachich ceased to see him as an individual:

> The 'me' whom Sachich had embraced wasn't 'me, Sribilash', it was the Universal Soul that inheres in all things, it was an Idea…Such an Idea is like wine; whoever is drunk with it will clasp anyone to his breast and shed tears; it makes no difference whether that one is me or another[115]

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[110] Ibid.,p. 628.

[111] Ibid.,p. 619.

[112] Ibid.,p. 619.

[113] Ibid.,p. 631.

[114] Ibid.,p. 629.

[115] Ibid.,p. 631.

Sachich's asceticism and celibacy are problematised by the figure of Damini, a widow bequeathed by a devotee along with his estate to Swami Lilananda. Once, Sachich attempted to rescue a widow who was seduced, abandoned and left pregnant by his married brother. He brought her to his uncle's house and in an act of chivalry decided to marry her. The widow, Nonibala, however, killed herself before she could be wed. To Sachich's consternation, Damini was no Nonibala:

> In Nonibala I saw one form of the Universal Feminine – the woman who takes upon herself the stigma of sin, who sacrifices her life for a sinner's sake, who in dying adds to the contents of life's cup of ambrosia. In Damini the Universal Feminine assumes another form. She has no truck with death, she is a celebrant of the vital force. Like a spring garden she is always brimming with waves of lovely fragrance. She doesn't want to renounce anything in life; she is unwilling to play host to the sannyasi; she has sworn not to pay a paisa in homage to the cold north wind'[116]

Sachich is disturbed by Damini's attraction for him. In part, this is because he sees widows as objects deserving of charity rather than as subjects with agency. Damini is confronting because she refuses to embody the liminal space between the living and the dead that Hindu widows were meant to occupy.[117] Prone to abstraction, Sachich identifies Damini with *Prakriti*, the 'cosmic female' or Nature and himself with *Pururshа* or 'consciousness' or reason.[118] In his quest for asceticism, he seeks to dismiss her:

> Clearly women are agents of Nature, whose dictates they carry out by adopting varied disguises to beguile the mind. They cannot fulfil their mistress's command till they have completely enslaved thee consciousness. So to keep the consciousness clear we have to keep clear of these bawds of Nature.[119]

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[116] Ibid.,p. 633.

[117] See Chandrava Chakravarty's discussion of 'widowhood' in 'The Dichotomies of Body and Mind Spaces: The Widows in *Choker Bali* and *Chaturanga*' in Chandrava Chakravarty and Sneha Kar Chaudhuri, *Tagore's Ideas of the New Woman: The Making and Unmaking of Female Subjectivity* (SAGE Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2017)., p. 125.

[118] Tagore, *Quartet (Chaturanga)*., p. 632.

[119] Ibid.,p. 643.

When Damini seeks to seduce Sachich in a cave, he fails to even recognise her as a human. Tagore's representation of Sachich's violent reaction suggest his asceticism and celibacy are forms self-involvement and misogyny.

> The darkness of the cave was like a black beast – its moist breath seemed to touch my skin. It seemed to me like the first animal to appear in the very first cycle of creation; it had no eyes, no ears, only a huge appetite. It had been trapped for eternity in that cave. It didn't have a mind; it knew nothing but pain – it sobbed noiselessly….I thought I would sleep outside the cave. But I had forgotten the way to the entrance…Finally I gave up…It seemed the primordial beast had thrust me deep into its saliva-drenched maw; there was no escape. The beast was all dark hunger, it would lick at me slowly and consume me. Its saliva was acidic, it would corrode me….At some point in that semi-conscious state I felt the touch of a deep breath close to my feet. That primordial beast! Then something clasped my feet. At first I thought it was a wild animal. But a wild animal is hairy, this creature wasn't. My entire body shrank at the touch. It seemed to be an unknown snake-like creature. I knew nothing of its anatomy – what its head looked like, or its trunk, or its tail – nor could I imagine how it devoured its victims. It was repulsive because of its very softness, its ravenous mass. I was speechless with fear and loathing. I began pushing the creature away with both feet.[120]

Sachich's conflation of cave, woman and desire represents his commitment to the *Prakriti-Purusha* binary that was commonplace at the time.[121] However, even as Damini relinquishes her hold on Sachich and acknowledges him as her *guru* who redeems her from desire, Tagore subverts the trope. Indeed, in the end, Damini rather than Sachich does the rescuing. It is Damini's caustic comment about Swami Lilananda's cult which finally enables Sachich to leave:

> Day and night you go on about ecstasy, you talk of nothing else. Today you have seen what ecstasy is, haven't you? It has no regard for morals or a code of conduct, for brother or wife or family pride. It has no mercy, no shame, no sense of propriety. What have you devised to save man from the hell of this cruel, shameless, fatal ecstasy?[122]

Although Sachich remains an ascetic in his quest for meaning, Damini challenges his capacity for moral-certitude:

> Once more the rumour went round, and the papers reported in abusive terms that Sachich's opinions had been revised yet again. He had once loudly denied religion and caste; then one day he had just as loudly proclaimed faith in gods and goddesses, yoga and

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[120] Ibid.,p. 637.

[121] Chakravarty, *Novelist Tagore: Gender and Modernity in Selected Texts*., Loc. 1579.

[122] Tagore, *Quartet (Chaturanga)*., p. 649.

> asceticism, purificatory rituals and ancestor worship and taboos – the whole lot. And yet another day he threw overboard the whole freight of beliefs and subsided into peaceful silence – what he believed and what he denied became impossible to determine. One thing was apparent: he had taken up the welfare work he had done once in the past, but the caustic combativeness was no longer in him'[123]

Damini eventually marries the narrator and Sachich's best friend Sribilash. At the time, the novel was controversial because it challenged the cultural taboos surrounding widow-remarriage. For Tagore, *Chaturanga* corrected a deficit he deeply regretted in his *swadeshi* era novel *Choker Bali* where the widow Binodini chose asceticism over remarriage.[124] Damini and Sribilash's marriage is unconventional and defies caste and gender norms.

> I haven't had time to be a householder, and – thank heaven – it's not in my temperament to be a sannyasi. That's why the woman I found as a companion didn't become a housewife; she couldn't be dismissed as maya; she was real. Till the end she remained true to her name, Damini, lightning. Who would dare call her a shadow?[125]

> There are many things I wouldn't have written, if I had known Damini merely as a housewife. It is because I have known her in a nobler, truer relationship that I can tell everything frankly, whatever others may say.[126]

Sribilash is fully aware of Sachich's hold on Damini when he marries her but chooses to accept her as she is: 'I had entered marriage into the full light of day, with full understanding of everything involved'.[127] Because he sees her as she was, that is neither as a 'clay doll nor the vibration of veena strings',[128] theirs was a happy and fulfilled relationship. Albeit shunned by society, they spend their days in service of the less fortunate. Damini dies a year from the injury Sachich inflicted on her in the cave with the words 'My longings are still with me' (or perhaps, I remain unsated). [129]

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[123] Tagore, *Quartet (Chaturanga)*., p. 650.

[124] Somdatta Mandal, "Was Tagore a Feminist? Re-Evaluating Selected Fiction and Their Film Adaptations," *Literature Compass* 12, no. 5 (2015)., p. 233.

[125] Tagore, *Quartet (Chaturanga)*., p. 652.

[126] Ibid., p. 652.

[127] Ibid., p. 652.

[128] Ibid., p. 641.

[129] Ibid., p. 663.

Chaturanga offers insight into Tagore's post swadeshi philosophy. For Radice, the coming together of four complex characters in a chess game is deeply illuminating:

> No one character in Chaturanga achieves this ideal in toto, but taken together – Jagmohan's compassion, Sachich's quest for truth, Damini's passion, and Sribilash's loyalty – they express it. This is the unity of the book. We find in it, so to speak, noble elephants in Jagmohan, perpetually questing chariots in Sachich, headstrong cavalry in Damini, and reliable infantry in Sribilash. Together they form Tagore's army 'on the field of Truth', and the battle they fight on his behalf – or the chess-game that they play – is not ultimately with each other but against the world's false gods, false gurus, and the fanatical followers of the world's false gods and gurus. The battle cannot be won: both in the personal and social spheres of life, sadh mitila na. But that is not a reason ever to abandon the struggle.[130]

Like Haq[131] and Radice, I read *Chaturanga* as Tagore's dual critique of humanism and orthodoxy. In my reading, what animates this critique is Tagore's disdain for abstraction and atomism. Jagmohan, arguably, is the most admirable figure in the novel. However, his philosophy of the greatest good for the greatest number is found wanting. Tagore uses humour to first hint at this:

> His wife died in his youth, but he had read Malthus in the meantime. He never married again.[132]

Later in the text, Tagore suggests utilitarianism offers no resources to help Jagmohan cope with his (brief) estrangement from his nephew.

> The greatest good of the greatest number, indeed! The statistical calculations of science do not apply to the mysteries of human nature. The person who is a single unit in a census is beyond the reckoning of statistics in matters of the heart. Sachich could not be categorized in terms of statistical units – one, two, three…He rent Jagmohan's heart and pervaded his whole world.[133]

There is no chapter dedicated to Swami Lilananda. Perhaps Tagore shares Jagmohan's view of the ascetic:

> Coins that ring false are discarded as counterfeit; these sannyasis are like those fake coins, useless in life's transactions. Yet they go around saying that they have renounced the world.

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[130] Radice, "Atheists, Gurus and Fanatics: Rabindranath Tagore's 'Chaturanga' (1916).", p. 424.

[131] Kaiser Haq, "The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore," *Asiatic: IIUM Journal of English Language and Literature* 4, no. 1 (2010).

[132] Tagore, *Quartet (Chaturanga)*., p. 617.

[133] Ibid., pp. 621-2.

> If one is of any use there's no way one can slip out of the world of samsara. Dry leaves fall from the boughs because the tree shakes them off – they are trash after all.[134]

Swami Lilananda is portrayed as being more concerned with affairs of the body: food, wealth and discipleship. Although Tagore commonly evoked the Vaishnavite language of love and longing in *Sadhana*, in *Chaturanga* he gives voice to his critique of the *swadeshi* movement's elevation of a Vaishnavism or religiosity that emphasised devotion over service, abstraction over particularity.

A few months prior to writing *Chaturanga*, Tagore wrote *Streer Patra* or a *Wife's Letter*, which explicitly engages with how the institution of (Hindu) marriage subjugates women from their infancy.[135] *Streer Patra* was Tagore's first systematic engagement with the 'woman question'. In *Chaturanga*, Tagore explores similar themes via the question of the agency of widows. Indeed, for all the differences between Nonibala's seeming subservience and Damini's rebelliousness, there is much they share by virtue of their shared 'widowhood'. Nonibala becomes an object for male gratification and abuse as a widow. Although Sachich and Jagmohan offer her hospitality and protection, at no stage is she recognised as an agent. Once a 'widowed daughter' to her mother, a 'mother' to her benefactor, Jagmohan, and a would-be 'wife' to her paternalistic suitor, Sachich, Nonibala's only act of self-expression as an agent is in her suicide. Similarly, Damini, for all her willfulness cannot be free. Her refusal to conform to societal norms sees her further marginalised: disdained by Swami Lilananda; dismissed by Sachich and disowned by her family. However transgressive and redemptive her marriage to Sribilash may be, Damini remains unfulfilled living life on everyone else's terms.

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[134] Ibid., p. 629.

[135] For a detailed discussion, see Nandini Bhattacharya, 'Rereading Rabindranath Tagore's *Streer Patra* (The Wife's Letter, 1914) in the Light of Epistolary Culture in Colonial India' Chakravarty and Chaudhuri, *Tagore's Ideas of the New Woman: The Making and Unmaking of Female Subjectivity*., pp.88-109.

In its emphasis on interiority, *Chaturanga* marks Tagore's narrowing emphasis on romantic love. An ideas novel, it offers insight into 'the cross-currents of religious and reformative movements that rocked the Hindu society in Bengal in the second half of the nineteenth century.[136] In Tagore's own admission, it was his attempt to offer an analysis into the psychological upheaval caused by the *swadeshi* movement and Great War. However, *Chaturanga* is a much more pessimistic text than *Gora*. Gora, a 'not-quite-white' Irish male outcast can discover his *Bharatvarsha* with exiles, but Damini in her womanhood and widowhood must remain unsated. *Chaturanga* represents Tagore's revision or refinement of his philosophy of love in *Sadhana*. Tagore appears to come to the view that love cannot be soteriological, it cannot satiate in the absence of freedom and equality. The mere act of Damini loving Sachich or Sribilash loving Damini is inadequate so long as Damini cannot be free. *Chaturanga's* focus on widowhood and the shortcomings of atomism and abstraction voice Tagore's critique of loves not cognisant of alterity and agency. His controversial masterpiece *Ghare Baire* offers insight into how politics grounded in this atomism and abstraction impact the intimate and the international.

Ghare Baire (The Home and the World)

Ghare Baire (Home and the World) was serialised in the Bengali journal *Sabuj Patra* between May 1915 and February 1916, appearing in book form in 1916.[137] Translated under Tagore's close supervision into English by his nephew, Surendranath Tagore, it was serialised in *The Modern Review* from December 1918 and published as a book shortly after the first World War in 1919.[138] *Ghare Baire* was unique in its capacity to unite feminists, revolutionaries and conservatives in their vitriol and condemnation for what they variously read as an anti-feminist, imperialist and modern text. Internationally, it fared marginally better. Admired by Rothenstein, Yeats and Lady Gregory, it was

[136] Singh, *Humanism and Nationalism in Tagore's Novels*., p. 62.

[137] William Radice, 'Preface', Tagore, *The Home and the World (Penguin Classics)*., p. vii.

[138] Chakravarty, *Novelist Tagore: Gender and Modernity in Selected Texts*., Loc 1796.

also Tagore's best known book in Germany.[139] Yet, E.M Forster dismissed it as 'a boarding house flirtation' featuring a woman who mistakes a 'West-Kensingtonian babu' for the world..[140] George Lukacs, in his woeful dismissal of or failure to comprehend context, referred to 'The Home and the World' as 'Tagore's Gandhi Novel'.[141] Reading the text as a counterrevolutionary novel lacking the skill or substance of Dostoevsky's *Possessed*, he argued,

> For a pamphlet – and one resorting to the lowest tools of libel – is what Tagore's novel is, in spite of its tediousness and want of spirit. These libels seem all the more repugnant to the unprejudiced reader the more they are steeped in unctuous 'wisdom' and the more slyly Mr. Tagore attempts to conceal his impotent hatred of freedom fighters in a 'profound' philosophy of the 'universally human'.[142]

Nonetheless, for its enduring insights into nationalism in Bengal, India and elsewhere, *Ghare Baire* endures as Tagore's best known novel internationally.

The novel centres on a love triangle between Bimala, her liberal princely husband, Nikhil and his revolutionary friend, Sandip. Determined to have a companionate marriage, Nikhil seeks to persuade Bimala to leave the seclusion of *purdah* or *zenana*. After years of persuasion, Bimala concedes after being roused by Sandip's speech on *swadeshi*. She invites Sandip to dinner, they become political allies and some kind of affair ensues. The love and longing between the three characters is set against the backdrop of the *swadeshi* movement which progresses from the advocacy of locally produced supplies to the boycott of foreign goods to communal (Hindu-Muslim) tensions, terrorism and riots. Eventually repulsed by Sandip's self-aggrandising ways, Bimala attempts to reconcile with her husband. However, the novel ends tragically with Sandip fleeing for his life, Nikhil critically wounded after riding unarmed into a communal riot and Bimala left alone to contemplate her future.

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[139] Dutta and Robinson, *Rabindranath Tagore : The Myriad-Minded Man*., p.193.

[140] Chakravarty, *Novelist Tagore: Gender and Modernity in Selected Texts*., Loc 1847.

[141] George Lukacs, "Tagore's Gandhi Novel." (1922): accessed 13 March 2018, 2018, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/1922/tagore.htm.

[142] Ibid.

Ghare Baire has been read as allegorical from the time it was first serialised. Pramatho Choudhury, the editor of *Sabuj Patra* and a close friend and relative of Tagore, claimed Nikhil represented 'ancient India', Sandip 'modern Europe', 'while Bimala 'India today' is poised between them and suffers from their opposing pulls on her life'.[143] Following the common trope where woman is personified as nation, most interpretations imagine Bimala as Bengal or India. Nikhil, however, is variously read as a patriot (as opposed to a nationalist),[144] a cosmopolitan[145] or a liberal[146] while Sandip is read as an (ethno)nationalist,[147] nationalist[148] or political realist.[149] As Supriya Chaudhuri notes, all fictional truths are plural and I think all these readings can be substantiated by the text.[150] Nonetheless, Rabindranath Tagore acknowledged that while all work bears the influence of the times, *The Home and the World* was 'merely a narrative with no conscious allegorical intention'.[151] For Supriya Chaudhuri, then, the novel is less about nationalism or swadeshi politics and more about the 'social construction of personal life'.[152] However, one reading does not preclude the other. In what follows, I offer a reading of *The Home and the World* as Tagore's tragic tale about the destruction wielded by abstract loves.

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[143] Malini Bhattacharya, 'Gora and The Home and the World: The Long Quest for Modernity' in P K Datta, *Rabindranath Tagore's the Home and the World, a Critical Companion* (Permanent Black, 2003)., p. 128.

[144] See Tanika Sarkar, "Many Faces of Love: Country, Woman and God in the Home and the World," in *Rabindranath Tagore's the Home and the World*, ed. Pradip Kumar Datta (London: Anthem Press, 2005).

[145] See Rao, *Third World Protest: Between Home and the World*.

[146] See Sumit Sarkar '*Ghare Baire* in its Times' in Datta, *Rabindranath Tagore's the Home and the World, a Critical Companion*.

[147] See Sarkar, "Many Faces of Love: Country, Woman and God in the Home and the World."

[148] See Rao, *Third World Protest: Between Home and the World*.

[149] See Sumit Sarkar '*Ghare Baire* in its Times' in Datta, *Rabindranath Tagore's the Home and the World, a Critical Companion*.

[150] Supriya Chaudhuri, 'A Sentimental Education: Love and Marriage in *The Home and the World*' in Datta, *Rabindranath Tagore's the Home and the World, a Critical Companion*., p. 60.

[151] Malini Bhattacharya, 'Gora and The Home and the World: The Long Quest for Modernity' in Datta, *Rabindranath Tagore's the Home and the World, a Critical Companion*., p. 128.

[152] Supriya Chaudhuri, 'A Sentimental Education: Love and Marriage in *The Home and the World*' in Datta, *Rabindranath Tagore's the Home and the World, a Critical Companion*., p. 46.

The novel comprises a series of biographies or diary entries which Tagore uses to adroitly highlight the perspectival nature of truth. Nonetheless, as Tanika Sarkar notes, the effect is that 'the monologic form prevails' reflecting 'the fundamental, constitutive loneliness and mutual isolation of the three individuals, each locked into worlds of very different needs and perceptions'.[153] Despite or perhaps because of Nikhil's commitment to liberalism, he spends most of his time trying to make Bimala in his own image. At the conclusion, he therefore notes, 'I have begun to suspect that there has all along been a vein of tyranny in me. There was a despotism in my desire to mould my relations with Bimala in a hard, clear-cut, perfect form'.[154] Sandip frankly acknowledges from the outset, 'I shall simply make Bimala one with my country'.[155] In the process, it would seem that no one in the novel actually loves another for who they really are. Indeed, as Chaudhuri notes, even Bimala 'wants intensely what she fears she will never have, a state of completeness or rest in her own being which she confuses now with her mother's image, now with her husband's love, now with material possessions, now with a lover's flattery'.[156] Tagore represents this expansive restlessness Bimala associates with herself and Bengal as *eros* or desire:

> In that future I saw my country, a woman like myself, standing expectant. She has been drawn forth from her home corner by the sudden call of some Unknown. She has had no time to pause or ponder, or to light herself a torch, as she rushes forward into the darkness ahead. I know well how her very soul responds to the distant flute-strains which call her; how her breast rises and falls; how she feels she nears it, nay it is already hers, so that it matters not even if she run blindfolded. She is no mother. There is no call for her of children in their hunger, no home to be lighted of an evening, no household work to be done. So; she hies to her tryst, for this is the land of the Vaishnava Poets. She has left home, forgotten domestic duties; she has nothing but an unfathomable yearning which hurries her on – by what road, to what goal, she recks not'[157]

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[153] Sarkar, "Many Faces of Love: Country, Woman and God in the Home and the World.", p. 31.

[154] Tagore, *The Home and the World*., p. 197.

[155] Ibid., p. 84.

[156] Supriya Chaudhuri, 'A Sentimental Education: Love and Marriage in *The Home and the World*' in Datta, *Rabindranath Tagore's the Home and the World, a Critical Companion*., p. 51.

[157] Ibid., pp. 93-4.

The tragedy of *Ghare Baire* is that none of the relationships in the novel thrive because of the characters' self-absorption and emphasis on abstraction. Nikhil comes to realise

> The time has come when I must divest Bimala of all the ideal decorations with which I decked her. It was owing to my own weaknesses that I indulged in such idolatry. I was too greedy. I created an angel of Bimala, in order to exaggerate my own enjoyment. But Bimala is what she is. It is preposterous to expect that she should assume the role of an angel for my own pleasure.[158]

Sandip confesses,

> Goddess, I, also set you free today. My earthen temple could hold you no longer – every moment it was on the point of breaking apart.[159]

In the process, they fail to ask what Bimala wants, evident when she reflects:

> 'But can freedom – empty freedom – be given and taken so easily as all that? It is like setting a fish free in the sky – for how can I move or live outside the atmosphere of loving care which has always sustained me?' [160]

Nikhil and Sandip's attempts to make Bimala in their image represent Tagore's deepening engagement with 'the woman question', he began in *Streer Patra*. Even Nikhil's conservative, traditional sister-in-law gives voice to this,

> I would not live my life again – not as a woman! Let what I have had to bear end with this one birth. I could not bear it over again.[161]

In the context of the early twentieth century Bengal, it represents Tagore's engagement with the inadequacy of the nationalist 'resolution' of the 'woman question' described by Partha Chatterjee, where the 'home' becomes 'the original site on which the hegemonic project of nationalism was launched'.[162] The novel's mixed imagery and evocations of multiple goddesses come to problematise the nationalist conflation of woman with 'home' and 'tradition'. Sandip's nationalist veneration of Bimala moves from 'Bande Mataram' (Hail Mother) to 'Bande Priyam' (Hail

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[158] Ibid., p. 65.

[159] Ibid., p. 17.

[160] Ibid., p. 137.

[161] Ibid., p. 190.

[162] Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton Studies in Culture/power/history)* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993)., p. 120.

Mistress/Lover). In the novel's confused Shakta and Vaishnav imagery, in the weight of expectation for Bimala to be Lakhsmi (goddess of domesticity), Kali (goddess of vengeance), Sita (virtuous wife) and Radha (adulterous wife), Tagore suggests the nationalist ideal of womanhood finds no basis even in Hindu mythology. Likewise, Nikhil's attempt to 'emancipate' his wife leads to his realisation that she not only does not desire him but that they are fundamentally incompatible. Bimala, is not a particularly sympathetic character. She is selfish and cares little for the least privileged. However at the denouement, she is free of the two men who sought to free her and is left to survey the damage. Moving beyond what her husband and lover expect from her, freed from the need to create what Dippanita Datta describes as a 'discursive third space' between her husband and lover and their politics, she is finally free amidst the chaos 'to reclaim her agency is non-normative ways'.[163]

This love triangle comes to foreground the unfolding *swadeshi* movement. Nikhil, appears much like Tagore as an early advocate of a constructive *swadeshi*. He invests in indigenous enterprises, like Indian mill-made yarn,[164]

> he sharpens his Indian-made pencils with his Indian-made knife, does his writing with reed pens, drinks his water out of a bell-metal vessel, and works at night in the light of an old-fashioned castor-oil lamp.[165]

Yet despite his personal embrace of *swadeshi*, he refuses to banish foreign goods from his estates.[166] Bimala says his main qualm lay with 'the spirit of *Bande Mataram*', the deification and worship of the nation as a Hindu mother goddess. In Nikhil's view,

> those who cannot find food for their enthusiasm in a knowledge of their country as it actually is, or those who cannot love men just because they are men – who needs must

[163] Dippanita Datta, ' "Bimala is what she is": Rereading Bimala and Gender (in)justice in Rabindranath's *The Home and the World*' in Chakravarty and Chaudhuri, *Tagore's Ideas of the New Woman: The Making and Unmaking of Female Subjectivity*., p. 175.

[164] Tagore, *The Home and the World (Penguin Classics)*., p. 102.

[165] Ibid., p. 95.

[166] Ibid., p. 95.

> shout and deify their country in order to keep up their excitement – these love excitement more than their country.[167]

In concrete terms, this manifests itself in his critique of the movement's tendency to further alienate and disenfranchise the low-class, low-caste and Muslim workers who profit from the sale of foreign goods and can ill afford to purchase locally made items. Bimala, in turn, gives voice to the upper-middle class sensibility that came to dominate the *swadeshi* movement. Casting aside *purdah* and entering political debate, she asserts

> I will tell you broadly what I feel. I am only human. I am covetous. I would have good things for my country. If I am obliged, I would snatch them and filch them. I have anger. I would be angry for my country's sake. If necessary, I would smite and slay to avenge her insults. I have my desire to be fascinated, and fascination must be supplied to me in bodily shape by my country. She must have some visible symbol casting its spell upon my mind. I would make my country a Person, and call her Mother, Goddess, Durga – for whom I would redden the earth with sacrificial offerings. I am human, not divine.[168]

However, her sense of anger and entitlement don't extend to those whose lives are impacted by the *swadeshi* movement. Bimala is apathetic to the fate of Panchu, who loses his livelihood when his foreign stock is burned. Recognising how profoundly different they are, Nikhil observes,

> The fact is, Bimala is at heart what is called a 'lady'. Though her own people are not well off, she was born a Rani. She has no doubts in her mind that there is a lower unit of measure for the trials and troubles of the 'lower classes'. Want is, of course, a permanent feature of their lives, but does not necessarily mean 'want' to them. Their very smallness protects them, as the banks protect the pool; by widening bounds only the slime is exposed[169]

Sandip is portrayed as an amoral, Nietzschean character. Often read as resembling Bipin Chandra Pal and Aurbindo Ghosh's revolutionary politics, Sandip laments people's inability to be truthful about who they are

[167] Ibid., p. 42.

[168] Ibid., p. 38.

[169] Ibid., p. 89.

> Because you have your greed, you build your walls. Because I have my greed, I break through them. You use your power: I use my craft. These are the realities of life. On these depend kingdoms and empires and all the great enterprises of men[170]

Sandip's love for Bimala which seeks to make her one with the country, emerges in the final analysis 'but a different phase of his covetous self-love'.[171] However – this self-love which seeks to create lover and politics in its own image – is a characteristic all three share. Between the liberal Nikhil, upper-class Bimala and self-aggrandising Sandip, Tagore offers his commentary on the coercive tendencies that inhered in the *swadeshi* movement, social movements and perhaps all politics. It is tempting to read Nikhil as some sort of liberal figure, as an echo of Tagore. Indeed, we hear an echo of Tagore's grievances, when he says,

> I have become unpopular with my countrymen because I have not joined them in their carousals. They are certain that either I have a longing for some title, or else that I am afraid of the police. The police on their side suspect me of harbouring some hidden design and protesting too much in my mildness.[172]

However, that there is something lacking in his brand of *swadeshi* is evident from the outset. Bimala notes, 'milk and water *swadeshi* does not appeal to anyone'. Similarly, conjuring the gendered, imperialist trope of virility, Nikhil's *viraha* (yearning, unconsummated love, feminised *eros*) for Bimala mirrors his sense of impotence with promoting his vision of politics: 'I had received the vital spark, but could not impart it to another'.[173]

Most of the action of the novel unfolds in the home, signifying all three characters conflation of home and romantic love with the world. Sandip confesses,

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[170] Ibid., p. 46.

[171] Ibid., p. 43.

[172] Ibid., p. 42.

[173] Ibid., p. 197.

> 'It does happen at times,' he said, 'that a man's whole world is reduced to a single spot. I have realized my universe in this sitting-room of yours, that is why I have been a fixture here'. [174]

Nikhil eventually realises his yearning for romantic love has consumed him:

> There are more things in life than the union or separation of man and woman. The great world stretches far beyond, and one can truly measure one's joys and sorrows when standing in its midst.[175]

However, in the meantime, he has naively housed and abated a terrorist. Bimala and Sandip betray little concern for anyone besides themselves. Nikhil, for all his philosophical emphasis on inclusiveness and the rights of the lower-castes and Muslims, never actually consults anyone. Instead, much like his relationship with Bimala, he seeks to impose his benevolence and enlightenment on the world ignoring individuals and their agency. Devoid of any grasp on reality, he rides into a riot unaccompanied and unarmed. Between his death and Sandip's disappearance, the novel ends with Bimala left alone to survey the damage. However, she is also now free to reckon with her choices and rebuild a life unfettered by the weight of her husband's and lover's abstractions and expectations. To whatever extent Bimala in her contradictions and complexity represents Bengal or India, Tagore expresses his hope that she is finally free to be what she will be.

Tagore's three post-*swadeshi* novels give voice both to the soteriological promise of politics animated by plural loves and his critique of the violence wielded by abstract loves. Tagore's most optimistic novel, *Gora*, portrays love as soteriological. In imagining a space for solidarity across racial, cultural and gender lines, it envisages a politics that resists orthodoxy and imperialism. Yet, the novel's universalism sits uncomfortably with the text's anti-imperialism and anti-traditionalism.

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[174] Ibid., p. 177.

[175] Ibid., p. 88.

When Gora decides to set down his Brahmanical burden; refuses to take up the white man's burden and chooses to be disciple, son, friend and lover, one wonders if Tagore is not actually endorsing quietism and quiescence. *Chaturanga*, Tagore's most succinct articulation of his post-*swadeshi* political philosophy, again highlights how atomism and abstraction are antithetical to his vision of politics. It does this via a dual critique of the abstractions that inhere in 'Western' philosophy and non-'Western' 'religiosity'. Further, it begins to interrogate whether love can have any soteriological promise if the least privileged individuals, in this case widows, are free to love. However, to the extent that the text is focused on the middle classes, Tagore's call to love in the particular may be construed as a call to 'service' not 'praxis'. *Ghare Baire*, via the figure of Nikhil, suggests the emphasis on charity and benevolence is ineffectual. I am not sure whether Tagore sought to criticise or identify with Nikhil. In any case, he comes to embody the conservatism in Tagore's thought that renders 'good' political loves little more than humanitarianism. I read *Ghare Baire* as an allegory about the violence of atomism and abstraction. To the extent that the three protagonists in the novel are first and foremost friends, their failure to come together in friendship to redress the root causes of the *swadeshi* movement represent the squandered political promise of love in the particular. For all its flaws, Tagore's contribution to political thought lies in his critique of abstract loves. In his dual rejection of imperialism and orthodoxy and their complicit co-construction of race, gender, class and caste, he imagines love as a space for an alternative politics. It is a space where (mostly middle class) outcasts, rebels, widows and other women can come together to critique, act and imagine another politics. Tagore's speeches and essays provide insight into how this underpins his internationalism.

Of Amity and Internationalism

Tagore's critique of the violence wielded by abstract loves animates his critique of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, politics and economics. Like Tolstoy, I suggest this emanates from a discomfort about the coercive tendencies for mass politics. Unlike Tolstoy, however, it does not lead to a disavowal of politics altogether. Rather, in Tagore's case it leads to his emphasis on two spheres: domestically, on the cultivation of civil society as a parallel *polis* and internationally, via an emphasis on the politics of friendship.

Tagore's disdain for politics and economics are similarly situated in his critique of abstraction.

> In political civilization, the state is an abstraction and relationship of men utilitarian. Because it has no root in sentiments, it is so dangerously easy to handle.[176]

Tagore's denunciation of the nation, which he comes to see as the antithesis of society and without hyperbole, the embodiment of evil, is an extension of this:

> A nation, in the sense of the political and economic union of a people, is that aspect which a whole population assumes when organized for a mechanical purpose. Society as such has no ulterior purpose. It is an end in itself. It is a spontaneous self-expression of man as a social being. It is a natural regulation of human relationships, so that men can develop ideals of life in cooperation with one another.[177]

Or again,

> When this organization of politics and commerce, whose other name is the Nation, becomes all powerful at the cost of the harmony of the higher social life, then it as an evil day for humanity. [178]

[176] Das, *Vol 2*., p. 448.

[177] Ibid., p. 421.

[178] Ibid., p. 422.

However, it is worth noting that as an imperial subject, Tolstoy's conflated the 'political' and 'economic' with the 'imperial'. His emphasis on the social, then was largely motivated less by the need to renounce politics than to redeem it as a parallel polis.

> [Society] has also a political side, but this is only for a special purpose. It is for self-preservation. It is merely the side of power, not of human ideals.[179]

His imagining of civil society as an inviolate, in large part helped him sustain the myth that it was a sphere of influence, untouched by empire. Consequently, he argued that while in the West, the state played a role and was central to the welfare of the people, in India, 'the real force of the country is concentrated in the society', which was never 'depended on the benevolence of kings and rulers, but …conducted its activities according to *dharmas* (duty/obligations)'.[180]That Tagore spent his time cultivating educational and rural development institutions in a bid to foster self-sufficiency, that he corresponded with the likes of Nehru and allowed himself to be coopted by Gandhi, suggests Tagore was far less opposed to politics than his rhetoric suggested. Similarly, Tagore's denunciation of economics, to the extent one may distinguish it from 'politics', was at best a reference to a kind of economics which equated 'growth' with 'progress'. Again Tagore's critique was not so much with 'growth' *per se* as an emphasis on growth which bore little concern with 'exploitation'.[181] Again, this disavowal of economics was not complete. Tagore's longstanding critique of boycott from the *swadeshi* period to the Gandhian non-cooperation movement; his refusal to ban foreign goods from his estates and his support and investment in indigenous enterprise demonstrate that economics was central to both his vision of the social and the political. It is telling that Tagore's former pupil, Amartya Sen credits Tagore for being central to the development of his economic and philosophic thought.[182] Tagore's rejection of a politics and

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[179] Ibid., p. 421.

[180] Kalyan Sen Gupta, *The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2005)., p. 39.

[181] Das, *Vol 2*., p. 465.

[182] Tim Rogan, "Why Amartya Sen Remains the Century's Great Critic of Capitalism." (2018): accessed 12 March 2018, https://aeon.co/ideas/why-amartya-sen-remains-the-centurys-great-critic-of-capitalism.

economics that is 'dehumanising' in its elevation of ideas over person is reminiscent of Arendtian yearning for a politics of action. In the imperial context, where the only form of agency in politics and economics was non-cooperation, Tagore conceived of civil society as an alternate, inclusive space for political praxis.

Tagore's emphasis on a politics that celebrated the plural and particular led to a commitment to what Leela Gandhi terms 'the politics of friendship'.[183] Following Derrida, Gandhi argues 'the trope of friendship…(is) the most comprehensive signifier for all those invisible affective gestures that refuse alignment along the secure axis of filialtion to seek expression outside, if not against, possessive communities of belonging'.[184] In sum, she argues, that a non-nativist conception of friendship, the creation of an affective communities are a rich and neglected source of anti-colonial activism. While it is impossible to gauge what Tagore would have made of Derrida, Michael Collins argues that 'at a trans-imperial and cross-cultural level Tagore believed that building friendships and communicating ideas from East to West was a method – if not a model – for achieving political change and progress'.[185] Tagore's friendship with W.B. Yeats and William Rothenstein; his work in India with Leonard Elmhirst, Charlie Andrews and E.H. Thompson; his collaboration in the inter-war period with Gilbert Murray on 'East and West' which saw the publication of his correspondence with Albert Einstein, H.G. Wells, Bendetto Croce, Romain Rolland and Marguerite Wilkinson is testament to this. But to quote Elleke Boehmer out of context, Tagore also swiveled 'this conventional axis of interaction laterally'[186] forming friendships

[183] Leela Gandhi, *Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-De-siecle Radicalism, and the Politics of Friendship* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

[184] Ibid., p. 10.

[185] Collins, "Rabindranath Tagore and the Politics of Friendship.", p. 119.

[186] Elleke Boehmer, *Empire, the National, and the Postcolonial, 1890-1920 : Resistance in Interaction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)., p. 1.

with Okakura Tenshin in Japan.[187] Partaking in the advocacy of what Nico Slate terms 'coloured cosmopolitanism', he formed a friendship with W.E.B. Dubois.[188] Central to these interactions was Tagore's emphasis on dialogue and a commitment to syncreticism that Isaiah Berlin describes as 'the difficult middle path, drifting neither to the Scylla of radical modernism, nor to the Charbydis of proud and gloomy traditionalism'.[189] For all of Tagore's nuance, this exercise was grounded in a somewhat essentialist view of the world, not uncommon for its time:

> Then again we have to consider that the West is necessary to the East. We are complementary to each other because of our different outlooks upon life which have given us different aspects of truth.[190]

Whatever one makes of Tagore's emphasis on an internationalism defined by fraternity, perhaps it is telling that one of his most consistent critics, Bertrand Russell wrote 'of what (Tagore) has done for Europe and America in the way of softening of prejudices and the removal of misconceptions I can speak, and I know that on this account he is worthy of the highest honour'.[191]

Much like Tagore's fiction, his vision of politics is impacted by his latent elitism. His literature offers compelling critique of social hierarchies and abstract loves, but often fails to interrogate how his own class leads him to sometimes privilege charity over collaboration. Similarly, although his critique of abstract loves that animate nationalism and cosmopolitanism, political and economic are cogent, his vision of an alternative politics do not transcend the trappings of his social class. Indeed as Michael Collins argues the emphasis of Tagore's internationalism on (often elite) individuals as representatives of culture and agents of change embodies the same bourgeois

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[187] Rustom Bharucha, *Another Asia : Rabindranath Tagore and Okakura Tenshin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

[188] Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India*., p. 99.

[189] Henry Hardy, ed. *The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and Their History* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996)., p. 260.

[190] Das, *Vol 2*., p. 423.

[191] Dutta and Robinson, *Rabindranath Tagore : The Myriad-Minded Man*., p. 178.

politics of the Bloomsbury group.[192] Entirely consistent with Tagore's disdain for mass politics, perhaps there is nothing inherently problematic about this. However, it ultimately precluded the participation of the same non-elites Tagore sought to champion.

Conclusion

Tagore's contribution to international political thought lies in his post-*swadeshi* critique of the violence wielded by abstract loves. In *Gora*, Tagore argues the exclusionary violence of nationalism and imperialism are co-constituted, militating against the love of people in the particular. In *Chaturanga*, Tagore offers a dual critique of Indic religiosity and Western humanism and their abstract loves which render persons *qua* persons invisible. Finally, *Ghare Baire*, exemplifies the violence wielded by abstraction and atomism. Courageous enough to change his mind, Tagore's post-*swadeshi* philosophy marks an engagement with the soteriological potential of a love that recognises the particularity and agency of all individuals. Committed to syncreticism, Tagore roots this fundamentally modern commitment to the individual and their alterity in Hindu universalism. It forms the basis of his critique of the nation state and a vision of politics he associates with empire. It also forms the foundation of an internationalism that emphasised amity, the transformative potential of friendships. For all the promises of his diagnosis of a lack of sympathy as the source of societal ills; for all his advocacy of a politics and internationalism grounded in particular loves; for all his commitment to dialogue and syncreticism, Tagore remained deeply sceptical about the coercive tendencies of mass politics. In concrete terms, Tagore's vision of domestic and international politics did little to promote the equal political participation of the disenfranchised lower classes. In the final analysis, while Tagore's conception of love offers a potent critique of politics that alienates and disregards human agency, his praxis

[192] Collins, "Rabindranath Tagore and the Politics of Friendship.", p. 122.

of love in its emphasis on service and its disregard of structures succumbs to his own critique.

CHAPTER 5: ALBERT CAMUS ON LOVE, REBELLION AND UTOPIA

If I had to write a book on morality, it would have a hundred pages and ninety-nine would be blank. On the last page I should write: 'I recognize only one duty, and that is to love'. And, as far as everything else is concerned, I say no.

- Albert Camus.

The Jewish French-Tunisian essayist, Albert Memmi, once wrote that Albert Camus lived 'under the sign of contradiction'.[1] By this, he meant to conjure the plight of the 'leftist' 'settler colonizer' who refuses the ideology of colonialism but lives and benefits from its actual relationships. Camus' legacy is intrinsically bound to this contradiction. On the one hand, he is celebrated for his universalism, his commentary on the human condition, his astute critique of totalitarianism and violence. On the other, he is criticised for espousing a universalism predicated on the erasure of the particularities of Arab and Berber Algerians and the violence of colonialism. An engagement with Camus' life and works bears witness to the pervasiveness of this contradiction. Camus moved to France in 1940 but never ceased to consider himself an Algerian. A *pied-noir* – the derogatory term the French used to describe Algerian settlers – Camus was the grandson of Alsace refugees on his father's side and Spanish immigrants on his mother's side.[2] A staunch advocate of Algerian civil rights, Camus' journalism on the unequal treatment of Arabs and Berbers led to his Algerian newspaper being shut down and what he came to describe as his 'exile' to France.[3] In France, Camus was a leader of the intellectual wing of the French Resistance and edited the Resistance newspaper, *Combat* whilst working in the Gallimard publishing house. After the Second World War, he became a vocal critic of communism which led to his acrimonious alienation from the French existentialist circle.[4] The battles were waged largely over the question of Algerian independence. That the once committed combatant of inequality and injustice should

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[1] Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (London: Earthscan, 2003)., p.64.

[2] Albert Camus, *The First Man* (London: Penguin, 2013)., Loc 814-815.

[3] Alice Kaplan, 'New Perspectives on Camus's Algerian Chronicles' in Albert Camus, *Algerian Chronicles,* trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013)., Loc. 304.

[4] For a detailed account, see Sarah Bakewell, *At the Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being, and Apricot Cocktails* (London: Chatto & Windus, 2016).

now deny Algerian decolonisation was understood as a betrayal. Indeed, it has become a major lens through which Camus' literary and political legacy is often assessed.

In this chapter, I argue that Camus' conception of love, rebellion and utopia reveal an abiding interest in the relationship between the universal and the particular. This chapter comprises four sections, each chronologically representing four stages in Camus' career. Unlike my previous chapters, I do not offer a detailed account of Camus' political influence or seek to establish that his literary and political work was somehow linked. This is chiefly because there is a certain unity and coherence to Camus' literary and political work. It is reflected in what he described as his planned 'cycles', each comprising a novel, a philosophical essay, and play that collectively explore a philosophical theme. Instead, in the first section, I offer a contextual engagement with Camus' Algerian writings. Largely coinciding with the latter half of the 1930s, this encompasses his lecture on 'Indigenous Culture'; his dissertation *Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism* and his journalism for the *Alger Republicain*. This period is important to understanding Camus as part of a distinctive *pied-noir* literary tradition. In these Algerian writings, he espouses a Mediterranean utopia where Greece triumphs over Rome, Hellenism over Christianity. I argue these themes not only animate Camus' subsequent 'cycles' but form the context of his various attempts to rehabilitate love to render it proper for politics. The second section engages with Camus' understanding of love as *eros* in what he described as his first 'cycle' on the theme of absurdity. Exemplified by the figure of Sisyphus, it comprised the philosophical essay *The Myth of Sisyphus*, the novel, *The Outsider* and the play, *Caligula*. The third section explores how Camus came to understand rebellion as a kind of love. Centred on the figure of Prometheus, the 'cycle' on the theme of rebellion comprised the philosophical essay *The Rebel*, the novel, *The Plague* and the play, *The Just Assassins*. Given my focus on Camus' planned 'cycles' and his representation of Algeria, I do not engage with his novel *The Fall*. The novel did not form part of his planned works. Unlike all his major works, it is also set in Amsterdam rather than Algeria. Camus never completed his third 'cycle' on love that was devoted

to the figure of Nemesis. Rather than extrapolate from his diaries and notebooks what this would contain, I focus instead in the last section on the vexed question of whether Camus' thought allowed for Algerian rebellion. Phrased differently, I ask whether Camus' conception of a Mediterranean utopia placed limits on who may love. What this chapter contributes is an engagement with the important role love plays in Camus' political thought. In situating his thought in a distinctive *pied-noir* tradition and in reading his literary work alongside his journalism, I hope to demonstrate that the 'particular' question of Algeria was never severed from his 'universal' concern with love and rebellion.

Mediterranean Utopias, or Hellenism contra Christianity

On 8 February 1937, Albert Camus gave a lecture entitled 'Indigenous Culture: The New Mediterranean Culture' to inaugurate a new *Maison de la Culture* in Algiers.[5] Exalted for its espousal of 'Mediterranean humanism' and condemned for its latent coloniality, the lecture and its reception following the Algerian war of independence represent all the contradictions that have come to categorise Camus' legacy. Indeed, Camus emerges from the lecture as both the disciple of 'Saint Simoniens of the 1830s, whose idea of the Mediterranean can be broadly described as inclusive, multicultural and progressive' and as (unwitting) evangelist of Eurocentric narratives of the '*mission civilisatrice*'.[6] In this section, I argue that the tension between humanism and colonialism, subsumed in (or emanates from) the wider opposition Camus imagines between 'Greece' and 'Rome', 'Hellenism' and 'Christianity'. Permeating Camus' works from the 1930s, I argue it is central to his subsequent, shifting reflections on the relationship between love, rebellion and utopia.

[5] Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc 2067.

[6] Neil Foxlee, "Mediterranean Humanism or Colonialism With a Human Face? Contextualizing Albert Camus' 'the New Mediterranean Culture'," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 21, no. 1 (2006)., p. 78 and 81.

In 'Indigenous Culture', Camus argues that 'the Mediterranean' as a category ought to be rehabilitated and reclaimed 'from those who have unjustly appropriated it'.[7] Camus' reformulated 'Mediterranean culture', in turn, is premised on the shared phenomenology of 'sun' and 'sea', and more problematically on linguistic and historic unity. His lecture was an 'informal manifesto' of the 1930s literary movement Gabriel Audisio described as '*E'cole d'Alger*'.[8] Evoking Audisio and Grenier, it sought to challenge *Algerianisme*: the literary school founded in 1921, which mobilised Louis Bertrand's colonial ideology.[9] The concept of 'Latinity' was central to this. As Patricia Lorcin elaborates, 'Roman Africa' was 'at the centre of colonial cultural configurations'.[10] Indeed, the link between Rome and France had acquired the status of a foundational myth in Algeria.[11] The birth of a new race, 'the Latins of Africa', formed part of this mythology.[12] It comprised the children of 'Spaniards, Sardinians, Italians, Corsicans and Maltese' who were, coincidentally, granted French citizenship two years prior to emergence of this new race.[13] This naturalisation of the children of European settlers, in turn, was a bid to both increase the French element of the population, and counter the Crimieux Law of 1870, which naturalised Algerian Jews.[14] For the French republic, which sought to follow Tocqueville's insight and 'conquer' Algeria by replacing 'the indigenous people by the conquering race',[15] the politics of naturalisation and colonisation were intrinsically bound.

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[7] Patricia M.E. Lorcin, "Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria's Latin Past," *French Historical Studies* 25, no. 2 (2002)., p. 309.

[8] Azzedine Haddour, *Colonial Myths : History and Narrative* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000)., p. 16.

[9] Ibid., pp. 27-9.

[10] Lorcin, "Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria's Latin Past.", p. 309.

[11] Ibid., p. 296.

[12] Ibid., p. 312.

[13] Ibid., p. 312.

[14] Ibid., p. 312.

[15] As cited in Haddour, *Colonial Myths*., p. 5.

Camus' critique of 'Latinity' in the lecture was clearly directed at the literary and political figure, Charles Marie Photius Maurraus, who, along with others, mobilised the concept to legitimise Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia.

> For some, the culture of the region is a reflection of Latin antiquity, the antiquity that the Renaissance sought beyond the Middle Ages. It is this Latinity that Maurraus and his friends are trying to appropriate. Following the Ethiopian invasion, twenty-four Western intellectuals sought to defend this Latin order by signing a degrading manifesto extolling Italy's effort to civilize the barbarian African land.[16]

Camus' discussion of fascism in the Mediterranean was animated by his concern for its consequences for Algerian Jews. Given the historical context of 'Latinity', his lecture cannot be understood in isolation from French colonialism in Algeria. Camus' attempt to reimagine the Mediterranean, as distinct from 'Latinity' bears witness to this acknowledgment.

> The Mediterranean is elsewhere. It is the very negation of Rome and of the Latin genius. It is a vibrant culture, which has nothing to do with abstraction. One can readily assent to Mussolini's claim that he is the worthy successor of the Caesars and Augustus of antiquity, if by that one means that he, like them, sacrifices truth and grandeur to soulless violence.[17]

Or again:

> There is only one culture: not the culture that feeds on abstraction and geometry, not the culture that condemns, not the culture that justifies the abuse and killing in Ethiopia and legitimates the lust for brutal conquest. We know that culture well and want no part of it.[18]

Or perhaps most explicitly, in his expression of solidarity: 'We stand here with the Mediterranean against Rome'.[19] Camus, instead, posits that the 'new Mediterranean' 'began in Athens'.[20] Drawing on Weberian ideal types, Camus seeks to evoke the art, democracy and pluralism of early 'Greece'

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[16] Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc 2113.

[17] Ibid., Loc. 2123.

[18] Ibid., Loc. 2163.

[19] Ibid., Loc. 2150.

[20] Ibid., Loc. 2074.

to negate the violence and imperialism of 'Rome'. Indeed, 'Rome's position as colonizer and subjugator…(is) reinforced by the fact that it had colonized Greece itself'[21]:

> What Rome took from Greece was not the life but rather the puerile abstraction and reasoning.…What we take from Mediterranean culture is not the taste for reasoning and abstraction but the life – the streams, the cypresses, the bouquets of colour. It is Aeschylus, not Euripides, the Doric Apollos, not the copies in the Vatican. It is Spain in the sun, not the theatrical backdrops in front of which a dictator gets drunk on the sound of his own voice and subjugates the mob. What we want is not the lie that triumphed in Ethiopia but the truth that is being murdered in Spain[22].

Camus' 'new Mediterranean culture' actively denounces nationalism as decadent and 'condemned by its deeds'.[23] As a self-proclaimed internationalist, the only nationalism he allows scope for is phenomenological: 'the nationalism of sunshine';[24] 'a certain smell, a fragrance that can't be put into words',[25] the presence of 'smiles, sun and sea'.[26] The emphasis on shared phenomena allows Camus to imagine the Mediterranean as distinct from the racially exclusive, anti-Semitic construction of 'Latinity'. In somewhat romantic – what Edward Said might have subsequently labelled Orientalising – terms, he describes it as a region marked by the confluence of cultures:

> An international zone traversed by many currents, the Mediterranean is perhaps the only region in the world that brings together the great eastern philosophies. It is not a classical and orderly place but a diffuse and turbulent one, like the Arab quarters of any of its cities or the ports of Genoa and Tunisia. The triumphant zest for life, the sense of oppression and boredom, the deserted squares of Spain at noontime, the siesta – that is the true Mediterranean, and it is closer to the East than to the Latin West. North Africa is one of the only regions in which East and West cohabit. At this crossroads, there is no difference between the way in which a Spaniard or Italian lives on the Algerian waterfront and the way Arabs live in the same neighbourhoods. What is most essential in the Mediterranean genius may well emerge from the unique encounter of East and West.[27]

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[21] Luke Richardson, "Sisyphus and Caesar: The Opposition of Greece and Rome in Albert Camus' Absurd Cycle," *Classical Receptions Journal* 4, no. 1 (2012)., p. 84.

[22]Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 2126.

[23] Ibid., Loc. 2078.

[24] Ibid., Loc. 2078.

[25] Ibid., Loc. 2098.

[26] Ibid., Loc. 2160.

[27] Ibid., Loc. 2130-2134.

However, as one of Camus' staunchest critics, Conor Cruise O'Brien notes,

> At the very moment when he wishes to affirm the unity of the Mediterranean world, the marriage of East and West, he reveals himself as incapable of thinking in any other categories than those of a Frenchman[28]

Indeed, for all the seeming inclusiveness of a phenomenological nationalism and cultural confluence, Camus reveals his 'Mediterranean truth' is evident in 'linguistic unity: the ease, when one knows one Latin language, of learning another' and 'unity of origin: the prodigious collectivism of the Middle Ages, chivalric orders, religious orders, feudalisms, etc'.[29] Camus' categorisations, whatever his intent, seem therefore to radically exclude the Arabic speaking, Muslim. Camus' Mediterranean emerges, in the final analysis, premised on an internationalism and humanism that is 'Western'

> Internationalism is now attempting to restore the Western world's true meaning and vocation. The principle is no longer Christian, however. It is no longer the papal Rome of the Holy Roman Empire. The principle is man .[30]

Camus' 'new Mediterranean', in addition, has a problematic spatio-temporal configuration. For Azzedine Haddour, Camus' emphasis on phenomenology and the 'perpetual present' effectively erases or renders unimportant the historic injustices of settler colonialism.

> The E'cole d'Alger posed 'the nondisjunction of opposites'; it projected a vision of a reconciled Algeria negating the initial antagonisms between colonizer and colonized. The writers of 'Ecole d'Alger envisaged a Mediterranean Algeria free from racial tension. However, their 'aesthetic of sun' obfuscated colonial tension with the consequence only of perpetuating colonial formation .[31]

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[28] Conor Cruise O'Brien, *Camus* (London: Faber and Faber, 2015)., p. 12.

[29] Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc.2134-2138.

[30] Ibid., Loc. 2081.

[31] Haddour, *Colonial Myths*., p. 24.

In Camus' lecture and mid-1930s literary works, *Noces*, Algeria is reimagined as a utopia: 'a flight into unreality'[32] beyond 'history and politics'.[33] It emerges, in effect, a *terra nullius* to be populated by a 'new' indigenous culture that assimilates rather than integrates.

A commitment to assimilation, in fact, formed the cornerstone of Camus' Algerian politics in the 1930s. He was an advocate of the Blum-Violette plan which proposed to offer Algerians with educational qualifications and/or French military service full French citizenship alongside their right to retain their 'personal status' as Muslims. Albeit narrow in scope, the plan was to gradually expand franchise to all Algerians over time. As Foxlee notes of its accompanying manifesto, *Projet Violette:*

> Following the official line of not only the Algerian Communist and Socialist parties, but also of the Muslim Congress, the manifesto described the Violette proposal as 'a stage in the complete [integrale] parliamentary emancipation of Muslims [34]

It is worth noting that Camus' biographer, Olivier Todd claims that *Projet Violette*, was in fact written by Camus.[35] There is a risk, however, of subscribing to the same presentism Camus is accused of. However potent the critique against assimilation is today, in the 1930s advocating for the legal equality of Muslims was a deeply subversive act. In fact, the Blum-Violette plan was defeated not by the 'left' but by European settlers who opposed Arab-Berber franchise. For all his colonial contradictions, Camus was a consistent advocate of civil rights for the indigenous majority. Indeed Neil Foxlee argues that by the mid 1930s, Camus had been a member of the group which campaigned for the end of 'special and discriminatory legislation for the indigenous majority'; helped edit the newspaper of the Muslim group, *ENA*; collaborated with the reform

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[32] Ray Davison, "Mythologizing the Mediterranean: The Case of Albert Camus," *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 10(2000)., p. 78.

[33] Haddour, *Colonial Myths*., p. 29.

[34] Foxlee, "Contextualizing Camus.", p. 89.

[35] Olivier Todd, *Albert Camus: A Life* (London: Vintage, 1998)., p. 150.

group, Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema, and founded the Franco-Muslim wing of the *Maison de Culture*.[36] Prior to the Communist Party's dissolution of the ENA, Camus was tasked with recruiting Arab nationalists and militants. In fact, when the Communist party's allegiances took a pro-Soviet turn, Camus was expelled for refusing to tow the party line and denounce these same 'nationalists and militants' as 'provocateurs and even fascists'.[37]

A singular emphasis on Camus' speech or literary works might support the claim that Camus' mythopoetics of the 'Mediterranean' in its recourse to abstraction is the twin of the *Algerianisme* it sought to repudiate. Whereas 'Latinity' sought to 'entrench the colonialist position,…the Mediterranean served to transcend colonial specificities'.[38] It is implicit in the tension Camus constructs between 'Greece' and 'Rome' which perpetuates a 'mythic image of an Algeria untainted by mythos; …a myth in an ideological vacuum working to absorb Western mythos'.[39] However, an engagement with Camus' journalism and the political function of his elevation of 'Greece' over 'Rome' and Christianity renders these claims simplistic. Perhaps this is clearest in his eleven articles on the famine in the Kabylie, published in 1939 in the radical newspaper, *Alger Republicain*. The articles were based on extensive fieldwork in a remote area of Algeria not traversed by Europeans. Gently humanitarian today, at the time they impelled the Algerian Governor General Le Beau to visit Kabylie.[40] They also led to the *Alger Republicain* being shut down, Camus being blacklisted as a journalist and what he described as his 'exile' to France.[41] Instead of abstraction, the articles are full of particulars; 'statistics on food supplies, nutrition,

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[36] Foxlee, "Contextualizing Camus.", pp. 88-89.

[37] Foxlee, "Contextualizing Camus.", p. 89.

[38] Ena C. Vulor, *Colonial and Anti-Colonial Discourses: Albert Camus and Algeria (an Intertextual Dialogue With Mouloud Mammeri, Mouloud Feraoun, and Mohammed Dib)* (Lanham: University Press Of America, 2000)., p. 34.

[39] Haddour, *Colonial Myths*., p. 32.

[40] Todd, *Albert Camus*., Ch. 15

[41] Alice Kaplan, 'New Perspectives on Camus's Algerian Chronicles' in Albert Camus, Arthur Goldhammer, and Alice Kaplan, *Algerian Chronicles* (Harvard University Press, 2014)., Loc.304.

famine and education'.[42] They critique the European origins of the *caid* system;[43] the 'artificial barrier between European and indigenous schools';[44] 'the unpardonable self-interest'[45] of European settlers which give rise to the 'slave labour' of the people of Kabylie.[46] Appealing against 'charity, limited experiments, good intentions, and idle words,'[47] Camus calls for justice cognisant of the fact that:

> We managed to come with the money to give the countries of Europe nearly 400 billion francs, all of which is now gone forever. It seems unlikely that we cannot come up with one-hundredth that amount to improve the lot of people whom we have not yet made French, to be sure, but from whom we demand the sacrifices of French citizens.[48]

None of this is to suggest Camus' articles on Kabylie are without limitation. Camus' work in the 1930s are paternalistic and riddled with all the contradictions of an anti-imperialist settler-colonial. Thus, in the same set of articles, he proclaims:

> It was there that I discovered the meaning of my investigation. If there is any conceivable excuse for the colonial conquest, it has to lie in helping the conquered peoples to retain their distinctive personality. And if we French have any duty here, it is to allow one of the proudest and most humane peoples in this world to keep faith with itself and its destiny.[49]

Unable to abandon recourse to the civilising mission even as he seeks to subvert hierarchies, Camus urges his readers:

> Let us learn, at least, to beg pardon for our feverish need for power, the natural bent of mediocre people, by taking upon ourselves the burdens and needs of a wiser people, so as to deliver it unto its profound grandeur.[50]

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[42] Ibid., Loc.291.

[43] Camus, Goldhammer, and Kaplan, *Algerian Chronicles*., see Loc. 721, 921, 922, 961, 975, 1236, 1238.

[44] Ibid., Loc.883.

[45] Ibid., Loc.805.

[46] Ibid., Loc.765.

[47] Ibid., Loc.1107.

[48] Ibid., Loc.1010.

[49] Ibid. , Loc.1119.

[50] Ibid. , Loc.1122.

Camus never offered a systematic, structural critique of colonialism like his Jewish Tunisian contemporary Albert Memmi did some two decades later.[51] Despite his paternalism, however, his journalism evinces a profound concern with the implications of what he effectively describes as economic, educational and racial apartheid. This diagnosis emanates from rather than is obfuscated by his 'humanism':

> It is despicable to say that these people don't have the same needs we do. If they don't, then it is high time we showed them what they are missing. It is curious to note how the alleged qualities of a people are used to justify the debased condition in which they are kept, and how the proverbial sobriety of the Kabyle peasant lends legitimacy to his hunger. This is not the right way to look at things, and it is not the way we will look at things, because preconceived ideas and prejudices become odious when applied to a world in which people are freezing to death and children are reduced to foraging like animals even though they lack the instincts that would prevent them eating things that will kill them. The truth is that we are living everyday alongside people whose condition is that of the European peasantry of three centuries ago, and yet we, and we alone, are unmoved by their desperate plight'[52]

Camus' entire corpus hinges on the mythic and Eurocentric tension he constructs between Rome and Greece. Paul Archambault rightly questions the veracity of Camus' classical sources.[53] He might add Camus' work was ahistorical too. Nowhere is there reference to Greece's military imperialism or Rome's Republic. Camus' objective, however, was not to provide historical commentary but to imagine a triumphant Greece as the basis of his 'new Mediterranean'. His passage from *Noces* sums this up.

> Yes, it is true. Men and societies have succeeded one another in this place; conquerors have marked this country with their noncommissioned officer's civilization. They had a vulgar and ridiculous idea of greatness, measuring the grandeur of their empire by the surface it covered. The miracle is that the ruin of their civilization is the very negation of their ideal. For this skeleton town, seen from high above as evening closes in and white flights of pigeons circle around the triumphal arch, engraved no signs of conquest or ambition on the sky. The world always conquers history in the end'[54]

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[51] Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*.

[52] Camus, Goldhammer, and Kaplan, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 750-6.

[53] Paul Archambault, *Camus' Hellenic Sources* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972).

[54] 'The Wind at Djemila' in Albert Camus, *Lyrical and Critical Essays* (London: Vintage Books, 1970)., p. 79.

As Alfred Zimmern's *Greek Commonwealth* would attest, the 'utopia' of Ancient Greece had been previously evoked to legitimise imperial order. However, unlike Zimmern, Camus mobilises this mythic Greece to critique rather than justify. In December 1937 – about six months after his speech on the Mediterranean – Camus began drafting his articles on Kabylie. His first piece, entitled, 'Greece in Rags' begins with a description of Kabylie – much like the opening of *Noces* – evoking a Greece he was yet to visit. However, the article soon 'turned travelogue into social protest: In no other country is the human body more mutilated that Kabylia'.[55] Rather than (indigenous) Algeria being annihilated by a Mythic Greece, Camus returns to it to indict France.

The abstractions of Greece versus Rome, Hellenism contra Christianity play a particular political function in Camus' thought. Perhaps this is most clearly articulated in Camus' 1936 dissertation, *Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism*. An intellectual history of sorts, its main aims were to explore the 'relations between Christianity and Hellenism' and to 'deal with the role of Neoplatonism in the evolution of Christian thought'.[56] Camus' classical scholarship is often flawed, but what emerges from his thesis is the conviction that the 'principle themes of Christianity – Incarnation, Philosophy according to history, the misery and sorrow of the human condition' substitute a '"Christian Man" for a "Greek Man"'.[57] Much like Hellenism and Latinity, the 'Greek' is the antithesis of the 'Christian'. Whereas 'all Greek philosophy makes its sages God's equals', 'the irreducible originality of Christianity is the theme of Incarnation'.[58] Whereas Greek time is cyclical, Christian time is linear.[59] Whereas 'moral evil is ignorance or error' in Greek thought, in Christianity it becomes sin.[60] Whereas the 'Greek' seeks to cultivate virtue; the Christian relies on

[55] Todd, *Albert Camus*., Ch. 15.

[56] Albert Camus, *Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007)., p. 131.

[57] Camus, *Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism*., p. 132.

[58] Ibid., p. 44.

[59] Ibid., p. 29.

[60] Matthew Sharpe, *Camus, Philosophe* (Leiden: BRILL, 2015)., p. 203.

the divine arbitrariness of salvation and grace.[61] Whereas Greek reason is embodied, passionate, alive and inheres in Beauty; in Christianity it is reduced to its role as 'logical legislator'.[62] For Camus, they constitute fundamentally different sentimental postulates.[63] Epitomised in the differences he enunciates between his fellow North Africans, Plotinus and Augustine, this tension animates all of Camus' works. Ronald Srigley is persuasive in his claim that all Camus' works were versions of *Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism*.[64] Indeed, over his short and productive career, Camus described the 'passage from Hellenism to Christianity' as 'the true and only turning point in history'.[65] He described himself as 'the son of Greek philosophy'; as being 'born in a pagan land in Christian times'; as 'closer to the values of the classical world than to those of Christianity'.[66] In fact, this opposition between Greece and Rome, Hellenism and Christianity animate Camus' three meticulously planned 'cycles' of work organised around the themes of Absurdity or 'Sisyphus'; Rebellion or 'Prometheus' and Love or 'Nemesis'. Camus argued Christianity's chief accomplishment was to 'intellectualise' and 'humanise' 'sentimental themes' [67] thus paving the path for the acceptance of its 'providentialism, creationism, philosophy of history, a taste for humility'.[68] Given his contention that the fundamental difference between Greek and Christian thought exists on the 'affective' or 'sentimental' plane,[69] it is only fitting that the rest of chapter should focus on Camus' attempt to reclaim and rehabilitate 'love' for politics.

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[61] Ibid..

[62] Ibid., pp. 90-91.

[63] Ibid., p. 87.

[64] See 'Translator's Introduction', Camus, *Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism*., pp. 1-2.

[65] Albert Camus, *The Rebel,* trans. Anthony Bower (London: Penguin, 2013)., p. 305.

[66] Matthew Sharpe, *Camus, Philosophe* , p. 31.

[67] Camus, *Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism*., p. 65.

[68] Camus, *Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism*., p. 130.

[69] Camus, *Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism*., p. 39 and 65.

Sisyphus, Christ and the Arab

Camus organised his first 'cycle' on absurdity around the Homeric-Hesiodic figure of Sisyphus. Published between 1942 and 1944, the 'cycle' comprised the philosophical essay *The Myth of Sisyphus*, the novel *The Outsider*, and the play *Caligula*. In this 'cycle', I argue that the love Camus idealises is *eros*. It entails an affirmation of life Camus deemed so central to living lucidly in an absurd world. However, this Greek *'eros'* is anathema to Latin totalitarianism. Dissatisfied with its transience, its leads the (Roman) Caligula on a murderous rampage. The antithesis of *agape*, it is repugnant to the kind of Christian morality Camus claims underpins the French judicial system in *The Outsider*. However, to the extent that it appears indifferent to the murder of an Arab in *The Outsider*, I ask whether this *eros* is altercidal.

The Myth of Sisyphus

The Absurd 'cycle' emerged 'amidst the French and European disaster'.[70] This historical context is relevant to the content of *The Myth of Sisyphus* which questions whether 'within the limits of nihilism it is possible to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism'.[71] In sum, the text is an engagement with the question of whether suicide is legitimate. Accepting the absurd as his 'sole datum',[72] Camus seeks to proceed within the limits of lucid reason.[73] Absurdity, for Camus, means 'it's impossible' but also 'it's contradictory'.[74] It is born from the confrontation between 'desire' and 'disappointment', between 'the wild (human) longing for clarity' and the 'unreasonable silence of the world'.[75] Remaining lucid – the absurd 'method' – requires the acknowledgement both of 'the appetite for the absolute and for unity and the impossibility of reducing this world to a rational

[70] Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus,* trans. Justin O'Brien (London: Penguin, 2013)., 'The Preface', p. ix.

[71] Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*., 'The Preface', p. ix.

[72] Ibid., p. 24.

[73] Ibid., p. 38.

[74] Ibid., p. 23.

[75] Ibid., p. 24 and p. 37.

and reasonable principle'.[76] As Hochberg notes, there is nothing inherent about this tension.[77] The *eros* for the absolute, he argues, really betrays Camus' monism, which in turn is premised on a Plotinian presumption of 'unity'.[78] Similarly, it highlights Camus' privileging of this methodological empiricism over his commitment to monism, evident when Camus declares:

> I can refute everything in this world surrounding me that offends or enraptures me, except this chaos, this sovereign chance and this divine equivalence which springs from anarchy. I don't know whether this world has a meaning that transcends it. But I know that I do not know that meaning and that it is impossible for me just now to know it. What can a meaning outside my condition mean to me? I can understand only in human terms. What I touch, what resists me – this is what I understand.[79]

Living lucidly, for Camus,

> implies total absence of hope (which has nothing to do with despair), a continual rejection (which must not be confused with renunciation), a conscious dissatisfaction (which must not be compared to immature unrest). Everything that destroys, conjures away, or exercises these requirements (and, to begin with, consent which overthrows divorce) ruins the absurd.[80]

Its chief implication is a rejection of Christian metaphysics, which for Camus finds expression in theological and secular forms of nostalgia (or escapism) and eschatology (end of history/final judgment narratives). Modifying Kierkegaard's conception of sin, Camus says the absurd is 'sin without God'.[81] Returning to Augustinian imagery of his Master's dissertation, he argues, living lucidly necessitates a belief in the spatio-temporal enclosure of the *saeclum* (or the plane where the City of God and Man comingle). In what I read as an explicit evocation of Chapter 9 of *The Confessions*, Camus asserts:

> There is God or time, the cross or this sword. This world has a higher meaning that transcends its worries or nothing is true but those worries. One must live with time and die with it or elude it for a greater life.[82]

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[76] Ibid. ,p. 38.

[77] Herbert Hochberg, "Albert Camus and the Ethic of Absurdity," *Ethics* 75, no. 2 (1965)., p. 90.

[78] Ibid., p. 90.

[79] Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*., p. 38.

[80] Ibid., p. 24.

[81] Ibid., p. 87.

[82] Ibid., p. 63.

Rather than result in a rejection of ethics, Camus' acknowledgment of absurdity merely rejects the possibility that any ethical system can derive from metaphysics. It gives rise to an epistemological humility which entails a recognition of moral equivalence, which is not the same as moral sanction.

> The absurd does not liberate, it binds. It does not authorize all actions. Everything is permitted does not mean that nothing is forbidden. The absurd merely confers an equivalence on the consequences of those actions. It does not recommend crime, for this would be childish, but restores to remorse its futility. Likewise, if all experiences are indifferent, that of duty is as legitimate as any other. One can be virtuous through a whim.[83]

Camus' rejection of metaphysics and consequently the theological concepts of Incarnation and Redemption, would seem to entail a rejection of any faith in the soteriology of love. In a world where all meaning is made, a prescriptive ethico-politics of love is inherently problematic. As he elaborates in *The Myth of Sisyphus*,

> What we call love binds us to certain creatures only by reference to a collective way of seeing for which books and legends are responsible. But the love I know only the mixture of desire, affection and intelligence that binds me to this or that creature. The compound is not the same for another person. I do not have the right to cover all these experiences with the same name.[84]

Rather than reject love as irrelevance, his idolisation of Ancient Greece leads to his embrace of love as *eros*. Camus conceives of *eros* as a form of knowing, and (somewhat inconsistently) the life-affirming basis of lucidity. For Camus, *eros* is a form of knowing because it mirrors the absurdity of life. In his *Notebooks*, he thus observes: 'Death gives shape to love as it does to life'.[85] In the play *Caligula,* the eponymous dictator devastated by the death of his lover (and sister), Drusilla, despairs, 'I've learnt the truth about love; it's nothing, nothing!'.[86] *Erosic* love is too fleeting, too unwieldy to be prescriptive.

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[83] Ibid., p. 50.

[84] Ibid., p. 54.

[85] Albert Camus, *Albert Camus Notebooks 1942-1951,* trans. Justin O'Brien (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 2010)., p. 68.

[86] Albert Camus, *Caligula and Other Plays: Caligula; Cross Purpose; the Just; the Possessed,* trans. Stuart Gilbert (London: Penguin Classics, 2006)., p. 14.

> On what should the heart base its actions? Love? Nothing is less reliable. We can know what the pains of love are like, but not love itself. Here, it is deprivation, regret and empty hands. I shall never have the courage; I am left with anguish. A hell where everything presupposes paradise. It is hell, nevertheless. What I call life and love is whatever leaves me empty. Departure, constraint, breaches of love or friendship, my heart scattered in darkness within me, this salt taste of tears and love.[87]

Writing about Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* in the early 1940s, Camus again reflected, 'Nothing can be based on love: it is flight, anguish, wonderful moments or hasty fall'.[88] *Eros* in its mirroring of absurdity entails for Camus an affirmation of life. For Camus, his mythological Mediterranean man, Don Juan, exemplifies *erosic* love. Don Juan's appeal to Camus lies in the fact that 'the love (that disturbs) Don Juan…knows itself to be mortal. Don Juan has chosen to be nothing'.[89] Cognisant of the impossibility of love and knowledge, the totalitarian Caligula goes on a nihilistic rampage. In contrast, Don Juan, embraces *eros*, 'Loving and possessing, conquering and consuming – that is his way of knowing'.[90] Camus was a polyamorist and this celebration of Don Juan had an obvious romantic dimension. However, for Camus, Don Juan also endorses an 'ethic of quantity' rather than 'quality', [91] an affirmation of life as the only good. To turn to Camus' central figure of Sisyphus, damned to roll a rock up a hill for choosing this life over an after life, *eros* entails the lucid affirmation of an absurd life.

> He is, as much through his passions as through his torture. His scorn of the gods, his hatred of death, and his passion for life won him that unspeakable being is exerted towards accomplishing nothing. That is the price that must be paid for the passions of this earth.[92]

In Camus' novel *The Outsider* he imagines this ethic embodied in the protagonist, Meursault.

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[87] Albert Camus, *Notebooks 1935-1942,* trans. Phillip Thody (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 2010)., p. 192.

[88] Camus, *Albert Camus Notebooks 1942-1951*., p. 91.

[89] Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*., p. 54.

[90] Ibid., p. 55.

[91] Ibid., p. 53.

[92] Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*., p. 87.

The Outsider

As Sandra Smith observes, the French title '*L'etranger*' conjures up the notion that the novel's protagonist 'Meursault is a stranger to himself, an outsider to society and a foreigner because he is a Frenchman in Algeria'.[93] Illuminating Camus' thesis on absurdity, the novel juxtaposes the lucid man, Meursault, alongside a judicial system that turns to metaphysics for morality. It declines, as Camus' absurd man does in *The Myth of Sisyphus* 'to explain the world, it wants to be merely a description of actual experience'.[94] Thus, it tells of Meursault's mother's death in an old-age home, of Meursault's interactions with Salamano, Raymond and Marie, Meursault's murder of an Arab and his subsequent trial and execution through a first-person narrator whose 'physical sensations often got in the way of (their) emotions'.[95] The entire plot hinges on the absurdity that 'accused of murder (Meursault) was executed for not crying at his mother's funeral'.[96] Meursault appears to be the man Camus' Mediterranean mythologises. Until the moment of his execution, his love of life exemplifies what Camus described in *The Myth of Sisyphus* as the 'ethic of quantity'. To the extent that the French judicial system finds his lucid love objectionable, or incomprehensible, Camus mobilises *eros* as a form of political critique. To the extent that this critique is predicated on the murder and the erasure of the Arab, it is worth questioning to what extent this exaltation of *eros* was 'altercidal'.

One of the greatest ironies of *The Outsider* is the judicial system's inability to recognise that Meursault 'undoubtedly loved (his) Mama very much', just 'that it didn't mean anything'.[97] Indeed aside from his love of life, Meursault's only certainty was his love for his mother. He returns to

[93] 'Translator's Note', Albert Camus, *The Outsider,* trans. Sandra Smith (London: Penguin Classics, 2013)., p. v.
[94] Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*., pp. 32-3.
[95] Camus, *The Outsider*., p. 58.
[96] Ibid., p. 109.
[97] Ibid., p. 58.

her memory in his apartment,[98] when he hears Salamano cry,[99] on that fateful day on the beach,[100] in prison and before his execution.[101] It is expressed in his passionate cry: 'No one – *no one* – had the right to cry over her'.[102] Meursault's verdict then ultimately hinges not on his actions, not even on his emotions, but the extent to which these emotions conformed to the form prescribed by Church and State. Camus claimed Meursault was 'the only Christ we deserved'.[103] He elaborated that Meursault was willing 'to die rather than lie'. In sum, he refused to 'play the game'.[104] Perhaps this was a bit disingenuous. Meursault was willing to lie and play the game when he deemed a matter to be of no consequence, for example, Raymond's Arab mistress and her subsequent assault. Meursault merely did not lie when it came to metaphysics. Consequently, he repeatedly refuses redemption first from the Judge and then from the priest. Bearing witness to moral equivalence, he tells the priest

> Everyone was privileged. There was no one who wasn't privileged. All those others, they too would one day be condemned to death. He as well, he too would be condemned to death. What did it matter if accused of murder he was not crying at his mother's funeral? Salamano's dog was as important as his wife. The little robotic lady was just as guilty as Marie, who wanted me to marry her. What difference did it make if Raymond was my friend as well as Celeste, who was a better person than him?[105]

However, it is worth noting that while the knowledge of moral equivalence leads Caligula to murder with impunity, for Meursault it inhibits regret but not a sense of responsibility.

> I would have liked to explain to him, politely, almost with a hint of emotion, that I have never truly been able to regret anything. I was always preoccupied by what was about to happen, either today or tomorrow. But given the position I was in, I couldn't actually speak to anyone that way. I didn't have the right to show I had feelings or good intentions [106]

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[98] Ibid., p. 19

[99] Ibid., p. 36.

[100] Ibid., p. 53.

[101] Ibid., p.102, p. 109.

[102] Ibid., p. 109.

[103] 'Translator's Note', Camus, *The Outsider*., p. vii.

[104] Ibid., p. vii.

[105] Camus, *The Outsider*., p. 108

[106] Ibid., p. 91.

Or again,

> When I was leaving, I was even going to stretch out my hand to shake his, but I remembered just in time that I'd killed a man[107]

The Outsider critiques a judicial system which – unable to detect a sense of responsibility in the absence of regret – executes a man not for murder but for a failure to appropriately emote. For Conor Cruise O'Brien and generations of postcolonial scholars who followed suit, the novel can only articulate this absurdity by rendering the Arab irrelevant.

> But it is not easy to make the killing of the man irrelevant; in fact it can hardly be done unless one is led in some way to regard the man as not quite a man. And this is what happens. The Europeans in the book have names…The man who is shot has no name and his relation to the narrator and his friends is not that of one human being to another….When the narrator shoots down this blank and alien being and fires…the reader does not quite feel that Meursault has killed a man. He has killed an Arab.[108]

The more invisible and insignificant the Arab becomes, the more Camus partakes in the settler colonial crime of erasure. Haddour, building on this reading, suggests this Camus' 'zero degree writing' perpetrates this violence.[109] It operates as an extension of a self-involved, hyper-present Mediterranean utopianism that must exterminate whatever transgresses the sanctity of sun and sea, be it 'beggar, dog or Arab'.[110] To the extent that Meursault embodies the aforementioned 'ethic of quantity', the Mediterranean myth triumphs – however briefly – and reveals itself to be 'altercidal'. After all, Meursault facilitates a series of events that leads to the entrapment and abuse of an Arab woman, the exoneration of her assailant and *then* the murder of her brother. The text can only succeed in eliciting sympathy for Meursault as the universal, absurd man via the forgetting of this

[107] Ibid., p. 58.

[108] O'Brien, *Camus*., p. 25.

[109] Haddour, *Colonial Myths*., p. 42.

[110] Edward J. Hughes, ed. *From Noces to L'etranger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)., p. 153.

sequence of events.[111] The sympathetic reader therefore emerges with Meursault, and by extension with the author of *The Outsider,* as complicit in the crimes of colonialism.

For David Carroll, there is much that is problematic about this narrative. For one, it fails to recognise that

> Everything depends on what it means in the novel to be a stranger to society, an Other – and perhaps even more important, on the significance of the fact that Meursault is condemned to death in the novel not for the murder of an anonymous Arab but for occupying the place of the Other.[112]

Meursault's repeated refusal of Christian salvation cast him in the place of the unassimilable Arab.[113] Thus while the murder of the Arab elicits no interest from the metropolitan press, the deicide by 'this Anti-Christ' does. Carroll's reading is compatible with a Camusian Mediterranean mythology that seeks ultimately to reimagine citizenry in solidarity with the alienated Muslim (and Jew). Indeed, Meursault occupies the often problematic, Orientalised, 'shadowy' world of the Arab that is populated in the novel by the sex worker, leper and prisoner. Camus appears to acknowledge as much, in an earlier journalistic piece, where he describes Arab prisoners being transported as being 'stricken off the list of humanity'.[114] Contrary to the popular claim that no Arab speaks in the novel, this reading is lent credence by the fact that Arabs *do* speak in the novel but only when they mistake Meursault to be on equal footing with them.

> The day I was arrested, I was locked up in a room with several prisoners, most of them Arabs. They laughed when they saw me. They asked me what I'd done. I said I'd killed an Arab and they all went quiet.[115]

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[111] This is Haddour's argument in Haddour, *Colonial Myths*., Chapter 3.

[112] David Carroll, *Albert Camus the Algerian: Colonialism, Terrorism, Justice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008)., p. 25.

[113] Carroll, *Albert Camus the Algerian: Colonialism, Terrorism, Justice*., p. 33.

[114] See 'Men Stricken from the Rolls of Humanity' (1938) in Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 2183-2243.

[115] Camus, *The Outsider*., p. 63.

Perhaps, it is expressed most poignantly in the parallel physical positions Meursault and the murdered Arab occupy when they lie down on their backs with their hands under their head contemplating the sun before their respective deaths.[116] In my reading, this sun neither illuminates a perpetual present nor facilitates an evasion of responsibility. Rather, it evokes what Camus previously articulated as a phenomenological basis for solidarity. Indeed, it is the one experience in the novel that links Meursault to his mother, lover, and the man he murders.

In his marginalia, Camus wrote the Arab in *The Outsider* was to act as a cipher.[117] Indeed, in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, he argued 'The only conception of freedom I can have is that of the prisoner or the individual in the midst of the State'.[118] The trial for the murder of the first nameless then forgotten Arab incarnates the murderous logic of a justice and colonial system that like Meursault renders the Arab irrelevant. This is central to the plot, but I argue it is not in the way that O'Brien and his followers attest. Instead, to whatever extent Meursault occupies the place of the Arab when he is imprisoned and executed, to whatever extent the Arab is central to the narrative as cipher, the universal man is not Meursault. The universal man is the Arab that Meursault first kills and then dies like. If the absence of metaphysical certainty led the (Roman emperor) Caligula to murder, an embrace of metaphysical certainty resulted in the same murder by the (Christian) colonial State. The question of how to act in a totalitarian system born of either logic forms the basis of Camus' next 'cycle' on 'Rebellion'.

[116] Compare, Camus, *The Outsider*., p. 52 with p. 98.

[117] Quillot as cited in Haddour, *Colonial Myths*., p. 48.

[118] Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*., p. 42.

Prometheus, Saints and Men

Camus came to conclude that the absurd taught nothing.[119] His 'cycle' on rebellion published between 1947 and 1951, therefore embraces the figure of Prometheus. The 'cycle' comprises the philosophical essay *The Rebel*, the novel *The Plague* and the play *Just Assassins*. Some read this 'cycle' as signifying a radical break in Camus' thought. Indeed, it coincided with his *volte face* on capital punishment for war-time collaborators and his growing disillusionment with communism. Understood as the articulation of his newfound moralism following the Second World War, *The Rebel* led to Camus' estrangement from Jean Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and Merleau Ponty and his embrace by Simone Weil, Hannah Arendt and Martin Buber. While I suspect Matthew Sharpe's representation of Camus as a systematic philosopher and virtue ethicist is perhaps overstated, I suggest there are more continuities than discontinuities between both 'cycles'. As Camus affirms, absurdity is about understanding suffering in the singular, rebellion is about resisting it for the plural.

> In absurdist experience suffering is individual. But from the moment that a movement of rebellion begins, suffering is seen as a collective experience – as the experience of everyone.[120]

Similarly, if the absurd 'cycle' exalts *eros* as the affirmation of one's own life, as Thomas Merton argues its logic lays the premise for the love of other.[121]

<u>The Rebel</u>

For Camus, rebellion against the 'irrational', 'incomprehensible' and 'unjust' is the sole datum of the absurdist experience'.[122] He defines rebellion as a 'refusal (that) does not imply a

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[119] Camus, *Albert Camus Notebooks 1942-1951*., p. 24.

[120] Camus, *The Rebel*., p. 9.

[121] Thomas Merton, *The Literary Essays of Thomas Merton* (New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation, 1985)., pp.224-5.

[122] Camus, *The Rebel*.,p. xii.

renunciation'.[123] In sum, it comprises both a 'no' and a 'yes'.[124] While the 'no' attests to the existence of 'limits', the 'yes' affirms 'the existence of certain things beyond limits' the rebel wishes to preserve.[125] Camus did not consider himself an existentialist because he believed, with the Greeks, that essence preceded existence. For him, rebellion revealed this 'essence'.

> Rebellion, though apparently negative since it creates nothing, is profoundly positive in that it reveals the part of man which must always be defended[126]

Rebellion thus affirms a common humanity and forms the foundation for fraternity.

> In our daily trials, rebellion plays the same role as does the 'cogito' in the category of thought: it is the first clue. But this clue lures the individual from his solitude. Rebellion is the common ground on which every man bases his first values. I rebel – therefore we exist.[127]

Yet, this rebellion gave rise to a paradox: 'I rebel, therefore we exist' but when 'one single human being is missing in the world of fraternity then this world is immediately depopulated. If we are not, then I am not…'[128] Camus claimed *The Rebel* proposed 'to follow, into the realm of murder and revolt, a mode of thinking that began with suicide and the idea of the absurd'.[129] Indeed, if *The Myth of Sisyphus* questioned the legitimacy of suicide, *The Rebel* questions the legitimacy of murder and suggests both questions are inextricably linked.

> The moment life is recognized as a necessary good, it becomes so for all men. One cannot find logical consistency in murder, if one denies it in suicide.[130]

Camus' preoccupation with murder, in turn, is premised on his tragic acceptance that to rebel is to seek to transform, 'but to transform is to act, and to act, nowadays, is to kill'.[131] In *The Rebel*,

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[123] Ibid.,p. 1.

[124] Ibid.,p.1.

[125] Ibid.,p. 1.

[126] Ibid.,p.7.

[127] Ibid.,p. 10.

[128] Ibid.,p. 224.

[129] 'Author's Introduction', Camus, *The Rebel*., p. viii.

[130] Ibid., p. x.

[131] Ibid, p. xii.

Camus thus asks whether political action is possible in an absurd world. He argues this question is of utmost importance:

> We shall be capable of nothing until we know whether we have a right to kill our fellow-men, or the right to let them be killed. Since all contemporary action leads to murder, direct or indirect, we cannot act until we know whether, and why, we have the right to kill.'[132]

If Camus posits absurdity as the mean between nihilism and nostalgia, he posits rebellion as the mean between the utopianism of 'absolute non- violence' and 'systematic violence'.[133] He rejects both forms of utopianism as forms of 'religiosity' and 'violence'. He argues this is reflected in their orientations towards time: in their 'the philosophy of eternity' and their attempt to replace 'God by the future'.[134] This faith in a kingdom to come or 'eternal city' renders time and suffering irrelevant, punishment permissible.[135] It leads what he describes as the 'oscillation' between 'sacrifice and murder'.[136] Instead he posits rebellion affirms a limit:

> Heraclitus, the inventor of the constant change of things, nevertheless set a limit to this perpetual process. This limit was symbolized by nemesis, the goddess of moderation and the implacable enemy of the immoderate. A process of thought which wanted to take into account the contemporary contradictions of rebellion should seek its inspiration from this goddess.[137]

However sympathetic Camus may have seemed following the Second World War to pacifism, he ultimately saw it as a form of nostalgia, the negative basis of slavery. Defending himself against the charge of pacifism, he claimed,

> I preach neither nonviolence…nor, as the jokers say, saintliness. I believe that violence is inevitable, the years of Occupation taught me as much…So I shall not say that we must do away with all violence, which would be desirable but is actually utopian. I say only that we must refuse all legitimization of violence, whether this legitimization of violence, whether this legitimization comes from absolute reasons of state or from a totalitarian philosophy. Violence is inevitable and at the same time unjustifiable. I think we should set a limit to

[132] Ibid., p. vii.

[133] Camus, *The Rebel*.,p. 233.

[134] Ibid., p. 228 and p. 157.

[135] Ibid., p. 156.

[136] Ibid.,p. 222.

[137] Ibid., p. 238.

> violence, restrict it to certain quarters when it is inevitable, dampen its terrifying effects by preventing it from going to the limit of its fury. I loathe comfortable violence[138]

Camus' similarly invoked rebellion to critique 'systematic violence'. In *The Rebel*, he elucidates this via the contrast he constructs between 'rebellion' and 'revolution'. Thus rebellion seeks 'unity', revolution 'totality'; rebellion is 'creative', revolution is 'nihilist'; rebellion is 'dedicated to creation', revolution negates it;[139] rebellion elevates the means, revolution the ends.[140] Fundamentally different orientations towards time, rebellion prefers 'We are' to the 'We shall be'.[141] Fundamentally different orientations towards knowledge: 'If…rebellion could found a philosophy it would be a philosophy of limits, of calculated ignorance, and of risk.[142] Ultimately however, rebellion is distinct from revolution because it is animated by a different kind of love and thus affirms a different fraternity.

> He who loves his friend loves him in the present and revolution only wants to love a man who has not yet appeared. To love is, in a certain way, to kill the perfect man who is going to be born of the revolution.[143]

Camus' play, *The Just Assassins*, attempts to articulate how the different loves of the rebel and the revolutionary affirm different visions of fraternity. Set in Moscow in 1906, it tells the story of a terrorist cell tasked with killing the Grand Duke. Albeit both committed to the cause, Stepan Federov is the quintessential revolutionary and Ivan Kaliayev (Yanek) the quintessential rebel. Stepan Federov in his yearning for future, understands the ends justifying the means. He would kill two children to save thousands of children, he would 'blow the world to pieces' for his love of justice.[144] Yanek in contrast, loves life, prioritises the present, and understands the means as

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[138] As cited in Patrick Hayden, *Camus and the Challenge of Political Thought: Between Despair and Hope* (London: Palgrave Pivot, 2015)., 72

[139] Camus, *The Rebel*., p. 197.

[140] Ibid., p. 234.

[141] Ibid., p. 224.

[142] Ibid., p. 231.

[143] Ibid., p. 185.

[144] Camus, *Caligula and Other Plays*., Loc.2661 and Loc. 2900.

justifying the end. He kills the Grand Duke but refuses to do so when there is a risk he might kill two children. He kills the Grand Duke for the love of his fellow men but demands the gallows, choosing 'death to prevent murder from triumphing in the world'.[145] Articulating the ethic of the rebel, he says,

> I love the men who are alive today…and who walk on the same earth as I do! It is for them that I am fighting, and it is for them that I am ready to lay down my life! I shall not strike my brothers in the face for the sake of some unknown…distant city! I refuse to add to the living injustice around me for the sake of a…dead…injustice.[146]

Although Camus' conception of rebellion seemingly denounces utopianism, it continues to affirm his vision of a 'Mediterranean utopia'. Returning once again to the opposition between 'Greece' and 'Rome', 'Hellenism' and 'Christianity', 'Nature' and 'History', Camus clarifies, 'Thought at the Meridian' privileges the world over history, men over divinity, the means over the ends.[147] It is embodied in Camus' conception of a rebellious love.

> Then we understand that rebellion cannot exist without a strange form of love. Those who find no rest in God or in history are condemned to live for those who, like themselves, cannot live: in fact, for the humiliated.[148]

Underpinned by presentism and an affirmation of life and the world, it is hardly surprising that *The Rebel* was warmly received by Arendt who had just completed *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and was about to embark on *The Human Condition*.[149] Although Camus' characterisation of this ethic of love is resonant with Arendt's privileging of *cupiditas* over *caritas*, although his affirmation of the world over history finds echoes in her notion of *amor mundi*, Arendt's thought precludes emotion while for Camus the two are inseparable. Rather than reject love (as *caritas* or *agape*) as the most

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[145] Ibid., Loc. 2710

[146] Ibid., Loc. 2692-6.

[147]Camus, *The Rebel*., See generally, Ch. 5 'Thought at the Meridian'.

[148] Ibid., p. 246.

[149] On Arendt's admiration for Camus, see Tony Judt, *The Burden of Responsibility: Blum, Camus, Aron, and the French Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007)., p. 87.

'antipolitical' of human emotions,[150] in his 'cycle' on rebellion, Camus therefore seeks to rehabilitate it. Much like the love of Prometheus, it is self-giving without being soteriological. In other words, it rejects the injustice of grace (and in fact, all eschatology). Consequently, Camus substitutes 'Pisarev's truth' for the Pascalian wager:

> If man is the image of God then it does not matter that he is deprived of human love; the day will come when he will be satiated with it. But if he is a blind creature, wandering in the darkness of a cruel and circumscribed condition, he has a need for his equals and of their ephemeral love.[151]

Camus writes of 'a holy man…unable to endure the idea that a single soul was damned, he wanted to be damned too'.[152] Modifying Johannine scripture, he writes, 'It involved the love that is greater than all: the love of the man who gives his soul for a friend'.[153] Camus' reworked grace resembles *philia* –

> When I was young, I expected people to give me more than they could – continuous friendship, permanent emotion. Now I have learned to expect less of them than they can give – a silent companionship. And their emotions, their friendship, and noble gestures keep their full miraculous value in my eyes; wholly the fruit of grace[154].

Camus' masterpiece *The Plague* articulates what he understood this praxis of *philia* to entail.

The Plague

The novel *The Plague* is about the disease's outbreak in the Algerian town of Oran. *The Plague* celebrates the momentary triumph of what Camus describes as 'the strange kind of love' that animates rebellion. However, the metaphor of the 'plague' has attracted some criticism. It is variously read as a turn to metaphysics that absolves humans of moral responsibility or as an

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[150] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998)., 242. See also Arendt's doctoral dissertation, Hannah Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

[151] Camus, *The Rebel*.,p.106

[152] Albert Camus, *Notebooks 1951-1959,* trans. Ryan Bloom (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 2010)., p. 166.

[153] Ibid., p. 166.

[154] Camus, *Notebooks 1935-1942*., p. 7.

abstraction which in its seeming expansiveness entails the forgetting of Algerian colonialism. In what follows, I argue that if Camus' expansive construction of 'the plague' bears witness to a humanist concern for the universal, his bounded construction of love bears witness to a political praxis which prioritises the particular.

The Plague is about a rebellion against 'the irrational', 'the incomprehensible' and 'the unjust'.[155] Reading the 'plague' as a metaphor for *Nazism*, Susan Neiman, like Simone de Beauvoir before her,[156] takes umbrage with Camus' suggestion that "What is natural is the microbe".[157] The notion that

> the plague bacillus never dies or vanishes entirely, that it can remain dormant for dozens of years in furniture of clothing, that it waits patiently in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, handkerchiefs and old papers, and that perhaps the day will come when, for the instruction or misfortune of mankind, the plague will rouse rats and send them to die in some well-contented city[158]

for Neiman 'comes perilously close to absolving particular human beings of responsibility'.[159]However, this reading ignores that Camus' consistent commitment to the tragic entailed a refutation of an Augustinian conception of evil. Understanding evil as 'the ignorance that thinks it knows everything and which consequently authorizes itself to kill',[160]for Camus 'what matters…is not to follow things back to their origins, but, the world being what it is, to know how to live in it'.[161] It is expressed in Dr Rieux's protestation to the Health Commission: '…it doesn't matter whether you call it plague or growing pains. All that matters is that you stop it killing half

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[155] Camus, *The Rebel*.,p. xii.

[156] Tony Judt, 'Afterword' in Albert Camus, *The Plague* (London: Penguin Classics, 2013)., p. 246.

[157] Camus, *The Plague*., 195.

[158] Ibid., p. 237.

[159] Susan Neiman, *Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton Classics)* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004)., p. 294.

[160]Camus, *The Plague*.,p. 101.

[161] Camus, *The Rebel*.,p. viii.

the town'.[162] To understand Camus' terminology of 'the plague' as evading questions of human agency is to fundamentally misunderstand Camus' philosophy. It ignores the Pelagianism that underscores Camus' thought. Camus understands absurdity as presenting us with a choice. "1) if the basic concern is the need for unity; 2) if the world (or God) cannot suffice. It is up to man to forge a unity for himself, either by turning away from the world, or within the world".[163] This interpretation suggests that Camus transposes 'evil' into the 'tragic' and 'earthly' questions of life, death and human agency. Therefore, while Camus might believe the plague is 'natural', he also states that 'the rest – health, integrity, purity, if you like – are an effect of a will and a will that must never relax'.[164] This makes Germaine Bree's reading of the Plague compelling:

> The plague, therefore, in whatever context we consider it, symbolizes any force which systematically cuts human beings off from the living breath of life […] In a very general way it is death and, in human terms, all that enters into complicity with death: metaphysical or political systems, bureaucratic abstractions, and even Tarrou's and Paneloux's efforts to transcend their humanity.[165]

Affirmed by Merton, in his reading the plague is a

> death dance, this propensity to pestilence, is something more than mere mortality. It is the wilful negation of life that is built into life itself: the human instinct to dominate and to destroy – to seek one's own happiness by destroying the happiness of others, to build one's security on power and, by extension, to justify evil use of that power in terms of 'history,' or of 'the common good,' or of 'the revolution,' or even of 'the justice of God'.[166]

Or in the words of Dr Rieux's Spanish asthmatic: 'But what does it mean, the plague? It's life, that's all'.[167]

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[162] Camus, *The Plague*., p. 39.

[163] Camus, *Albert Camus Notebooks 1942-1951*., 41.

[164] Camus, *The Plague*., 195.

[165] Germaine. Bree, *Camus.* (Rutgers University Press, 1951)., 128.

[166] Merton, *The Literary Essays of Thomas Merton*., 181.

[167] Camus, *The Plague*., p. 236.

Conor Cruise O'Brien argues this very expansiveness conceals the erasure of Algerian colonialism. O'Brien's entire thesis rests on emphasising absences. Consequently, he contends, *The Plague* performs an 'artistic final solution of the problem of the Arabs of Oran'.[168] For other commentators, whatever might be admirable about Camus' rhetoric about fascism and Nazism, it could not have possibly extended to the question of colonialism because Camus renders an Algerian town a European one, devoid of Arabs.[169]In fairness to Camus, he intended to use the plague as a metaphor that applied to all forms of what he would term 'systematic violence'. The prelude to the book, from Daniel Defoe, makes this clear enough:

> It is reasonable to represent one kind of imprisonment by another, as it is to represent anything that really exists by that which exists not.[170]

In fact, the question of Algerian colonialism is not only mentioned in *The Plague* but the novel's rich metaphor of 'health' is used to signal that the 'disease' of Algerian colonialism predates those of the twentieth century. Thus, when the French journalist, Rambert interviews Dr Rieux about 'the living conditions of the Arabs…and their state of health, Dr Rieux told him that their health was not good'.[171] In fact, Dr Rieux refuses to further cooperate with Rambert when Rambert reveals he is unable to 'countenance a report without reservations'.[172]

That Camus' concern with the questions of Nazism or Fascism in *The Plague* or indeed Communism in the *The Rebel* created some cognitive dissonance about colonialism cannot be sustained. His journalism, in fact, critiques the very erasure Camus is accused of. Thus, in May

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[168] O'Brien, *Camus*., p. 48.

[169] Vulor, *Colonial and Anticolonial Discourses*., Ch.4 and Haddour, *Colonial Myths*., Ch. 6.

[170] Camus, *The Plague*., p. 3.

[171] Ibid., p. 11.

[172] Ibid., p. 11.

1945, before the end of the Second World War, long before the French intellectual elite took interest in the question of Algeria, Camus wrote in *Combat*

> As for the political dimension, I want to point out that the Arab people also exist. By that I mean that they aren't the wretched, faceless mob in which Westerners see nothing worth respecting or defending. On the contrary, they are a people of impressive traditions, whose virtues are eminently clear to anyone willing to approach them without prejudice.
>
> These people are not inferior except in regard to the conditions in which they must live, and we have as much to learn from them as they from us. Too many French people in Algeria and elsewhere imagine Arabs as a shapeless mass without interests.[173]

In *The Rebel*, Camus argued 'The land of humanism in Europe has become the land of inhumanity'.[174] In fact, in an article entitled 'Contagion', written a month after *The Plague* was published, Camus drew a direct comparison between the German occupation of France and French racism in the colonies.

> One year ago in Algeria, methods of collective repression were used. And Combat recently revealed the existence of the "spontaneous confession chamber" in Fianarantsoa…. (Madagascar)
>
> Three years after being subjected to a policy of terror themselves, Frenchmen are reacting to this latest news with the indifference of people who have seen too much. Yet the facts are there, the clear and hideous truth: we are doing what we reproached the Germans for doing….
>
> In fact, the true explanation lies elsewhere. If the Hitlerians applied their shameful laws to Europe, the reason was they believed their race to be superior, hence the law for Germans could not be the same as the law for enslaved peoples. If we French revolted against their terror, it was because we believed that all Europeans were equal in rights and dignity. But if Frenchmen can now hear of the methods used in some instances by other Frenchmen against Algerians and Malagasies and not react, it is because they are unconsciously certain that we are in some way superior to those people and that it makes little difference what means we choose to demonstrate that superiority.[175]

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[173] Camus, Goldhammer, and Kaplan, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 1151-1154.

[174] Camus, *The Rebel*., p. 193.

[175] Albert Camus, *Camus At "Combat": Writing 1944-1947* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006)., p. 291.

Nonetheless, for Camus, accurately diagnosing 'the plague' pales in significance to the need to cure, combat and not spread it. Reiterating Camus' ethic of rebellion and voicing what was to become Camus' argument in *Neither Victim Nor Executioners,* Tarrou says,

> Consequently, I say that there are pestilences and victims, and nothing more. If in saying this I become a pestilence myself, at least I am not a consenting one. I am trying to be an innocent murderer…Of course, there should be a third category, that of true healers, but it's a fact that one does not meet many of those, because it must be hard to achieve.[176]

It is no coincidence then that the novel's narrator and 'hero' is a doctor. Camus' quintessential rebel, Dr Rieux, struggled 'against the world as it was'[177] in the full knowledge that all his 'victories are temporary'.[178] His rebellion is affirmed in his presentism,

> I don't know what awaits me or what will come after all this. For the time being, there are patients who have to be cured. Afterwards, they can reflect on it all so can I. But the immediate task is to cure them. I am defending them as best I can, that's all.[179]

It is evident in his renunciation of 'heroism' and 'sainthood',

> Salvation is too big a word for me. I don't go that far. What interests me is man's health, his health first of all.[180]

Or again,

> But you know, I feel more solidarity with the defeated than with the saints. I don't think I have any taste for heroism and sainthood. What interests me is to be a man.[181]

Like Camus' rebel, he is also animated by a 'strange form of love'. Dr Rieux understood this love to be distinct from and more powerful than solidarity.

> And from distant parts of the world, across thousands of miles, unknown but fraternal voices tried awkwardly to express their solidarity – and did, indeed, express it, while at the same time exhibiting the dreadful powerlessness of all men who truly endeavour to share a pain they cannot see. 'Oran, Oran!' In vain the appeal crossed the seas and in vain Rieux

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[176] Camus, *The Plague*., p. 196.

[177] Ibid., p. 97.

[178] Ibid., p. 98.

[179] Ibid. , p. 97.

[180] Ibid., p. 169.

[181] Ibid., p. 197.

> stood by, waiting; then, soon, eloquence would well up and make still plainer the fundamental division that made Grand and the speaker strangers to another. 'Oran, yes, Oran! But no,' thought the doctor. 'To love or to die together, there is nothing else to be done. They are too far away[182]

As previously discussed, this emphasis on loving and dying together, reveals Camus' privileging of a political praxis of *philia*. It is premised on the coming together of people in their plurality. It is evident in the diverse composition of the health team and the text's interweaving of the factual record of Rieux and the diaries featuring the moralistic testimony of Tarrou. This *philia,* in deeming both transcendence and totality irrelevant, appears the anti-thesis of the other-worldly *agape* of Father Paneloux. Therefore, despite Rieux imagining his experience in the health teams with Paneloux unites them 'at a higher level than prayer or blasphemy', despite Rieux's offer to remain at his side while he died, Paneloux refuses stating: 'Priests have no friends. They have given everything to God'.[183] Or perhaps, more succinctly, 'If a priest consults a doctor, there is a contradiction'.[184] For Rieux, Paneloux's 'religiosity' did not preclude the possibility of *philia*. Like Epicurean *philia*, this friendship was characterised by an openness to all in the *polis* including the Italian 'exile', Tarrou, and the self-proclaimed 'stranger', Rambert. What defined this *philia* for Rieux was the existence of a 'common ground'. In sum, this loving was a form of shared valuing of the world and all its people. This *philia* privileges particularity over abstraction, a love of friends rather than a love of humanity. Camus, in fact, thought a love of humanity impossible. He understood it as 'an impossible love which is the contrary of love'.[185] This did not, however, preclude a concern for humanity. In fact, this concern emanates from an understanding of loving as human essence.

> Rieux: "Man is not an idea, Rambert"
> Rambert: 'He is an idea and a very brief one, just as soon as he turns away from love.'[186]

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[182] Ibid. p. 106.

[183] Ibid. , p. 180.

[184] Ibid., p. 177.

[185] Camus, *The Rebel*., 81.

[186] Camus, *The Plague*., 124.

To borrow from Michael Walzer, Camus' ethicopolitics of love affirms, 'reiteration and not…abstraction'.[187] As Camus corroborates,

> Humanism. I do not like humanity in general. In myself I sense primarily solidarity with it, which is not the same thing. And then I love some men, alive or dead, with so much admiration that I am always jealous or anxious to protect or defend in all the others that which, by chance or on some day that I cannot foresee, has made or will make them like the former".[188]

In the next section, I ask whether Camus' refusal to participate in or endorse the Algerian War of Independence contradicted his commitment to rebellion, and its praxis of *philia*.

Can an Arab Rebel?

In the 1950s Camus supported the Hungarian Revolution and condemned the Algerian Revolution indicating for some a dissonance on Camus' thought on rebellion. Camus, in fact, maintained the two contexts were distinct. He argued that while Algeria was in the last throes of nineteenth-century French colonialism, Hungary was about to be colonised by a Russian empire.[189] Further, unlike Hungary, Algeria had a large, hundred-year-old settler population to contend with.[190] Nonetheless, for his detractors, Camus' position on Algeria was tantamount to the denial of Arab rebellion. It was the culmination of twenty years of literary erasure of the Arab. Previously, I argued that Camus' philosophy of rebellion affirms a common humanity, the foundation of fraternity. I also argued that Camus understood the praxis of rebellion to be animated by 'a strange kind of love'. In this section, I therefore ask, did Camus think an Arab could rebel, or love? Or is there something about his conception of rebellion that precludes the Arab from being human or friend?

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[187] Michael Walzer, *The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and Political Commitment in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).,p. 146.

[188] Camus, *Notebooks 1951-1959*., p. 58.

[189] Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 2293.

[190] Ibid., Loc 2296.

The question of whether Camus thought an Arab could rebel is first a question of anthropology. Raimond Gaita, for instance, suggests that the acceptance of a person's humanity hinges on the recognition that they share the same complexity and interiority as one's self.[191] There is much in Camus' literature which would seem to deny the humanity of the Arab. *Eros* and its affirmation of life in 'the absurd cycle' is seemingly premised on the promise of a Mediterranean Utopia which forgets or erases the history of settler colonialism in Algeria. This forgetting culminates in the murder of a nameless Arab, who much like French colonialism, is also forgotten in an absurd trial which renders the murderer the victim of an unjust legal system. Even a sympathetic reading of the text, like the one I provide, at best offers commentary about an unjust colonial system and its tyranny of prescriptive 'love' or 'affect' which judges the 'absurd man' a transgressor, an outsider, an Arab. However much the novel indicts the colonial legal system, the Arab remains at best an object or 'cipher'. Similarly, in the 'cycle' on rebellion, the characteristic of the rebel is his/her capacity for 'thought at the Meridian'. Rebellion seeks to establish a Mediterranean Utopia and the kind of affirmation of life the reader encounters in the absurd 'cycle'.

> In the light, the earth remains our first and our last love. Our brothers are breathing under the same sky; justice is a living thing. Now is born that strange joy which helps one live and die, and which we shall never again renounce to a later time.[192]

Conjuring all the criticisms of historical myopia, this presentism seemingly emphasises the ills of the European experience over those of Algerian colonialism, in *The Plague*. The 'plague' must be addressed first, the health of the Arabs can remain a conversation deferred. Again, reading Camus' journalism from the same period alongside his literature, I have sought to argue this is inconsistent with his advocacy and intent. Nonetheless the fact remains that aside from a scarce reference to an 'Arab quarter', there is no reason for the reader to believe that any of Dr Rieux's

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[191] Raimond Gaita, *A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love and Truth and Justice* (London: Routledge, 2000).

[192] Camus, *The Rebel*., p. 248.

patients or friends are Arab. This literary erasure of the Arab is seemingly contained in Camus' denial of the existence of an Algerian nation.[193] In *The Rebel*, more problematically, he argues, rebellion is a product of the 'Western' world:

> It is obvious that a Hindu pariah, an Incan warrior, a primitive native of Central Africa, and a member of one of the first Christian communities had quite different conceptions of rebellion. We could even assert, with considerable assurance, that the idea of rebellion has no meaning in those actual cases. However, a Greek slave, a serf, a condottiere of the Renaissance, a Parisian bourgeois during the Regency, and a Russian intellectual at the beginning of the nineteenth century would undoubtedly agree that rebellion is legitimate, even if they are differed about the reasons. In other words, the problem of rebellion only seems to assume a precise meaning within the confines of Western thought'.[194]

Even in this example, it would seem that Camus excludes reference to the Arab and the long and rich history of Arab rebellion. In any case, rather than offering insight into an unequal anthropology, I understand Camus' claim as being based on two overly general and unsubstantiated premises. First, Camus seeks to argue that *all* non-Western societies are dominated by myth rather than metaphysics.[195] Second, he argues that non-Western traditions either owing to their bestowal of complete equality, or their legitimisation of inequality, *cannot* offer the conditions for rebellion.[196] In Camus' narrow frame, a necessary condition for rebellion is the existence of 'theoretic equality (that) conceals great factual inequalities'.[197] The problem with Camus' argument is that it would seem to radically undermine his own seemingly universal claim about the human potential for creativity in an absurd world. Nonetheless, despite Camus' lack of imagination in this instance, the fact remains that the chasm between 'theoretic equality' of the universal person and the 'factual inequality' of Arabs and Berbers in French Algeria, formed the basis of Camus' critique of the French Republic. To return to the language of *The Rebel*, the inequality 'revealed the part of man which must always be defended'.[198] Hence, in the 1930s, Camus campaigned for Arab

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[193] Alice Kaplan, 'New Perspectives on Camus's Algerian Chronicles, Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 140.

[194] Camus, *The Rebel*., p. 7.

[195] Ibid., p. 8.

[196] Ibid., p. 7.

[197] Ibid., p. 7.

[198] Camus, *The Rebel*., p. 7.

franchise and for the 'capacity' of the people of Kabylie to self-govern. In the 1940s, even during the War, he wrote articles condemning French violence and racism in the colonies. This commitment to a common humanity animated Camus' critique of economic, educational and racial apartheid in Kabylie in the 1930s, just as it came to inform this critique of racism and police reprisals in Setif in 1945:

> When one discovers in addition that most newspapers (not including yours) applied the rather discreet term "disturbance" or "incident" to a minor police operation that cost the lives of seven people and left more than a hundred injured, and when one sees our legislators, in a hurry to get away on vacation, hastily dispatch the embarrassing corpses, one is justified, I think, in asking whether the press, the government, and Parliament would have been quite so nonchalant if the demonstrators had not been North Africans, and whether the police would have fired with such confident abandon if that had been the case. Surely the answer is no, and the victims of July 14 were to some extent the victims of a racism that dares not speak its name.[199]

It also animated his many different positions on the Algerian question from the 1930s to his death in 1960. Indeed, he moved from advocating assimilation to a federation that recognised the dual legitimacy of Sharia and French law.[200] If Camus' position when he was living in Algeria in the 1930s was subversive, perhaps his position in the late 1950s was out of touch with Algerian reality. Nonetheless, it was entirely consonant with anti-imperial activism in North Africa in the corresponding period. [201]

Camus' position on Algeria was also shaped by geopolitical concerns. His countenancing of French empire in the form of his advocacy of an increasingly autonomous Algeria incorporated into a federal France, was in large part the result of a Cold War concern about the rise of the USSR and its meddling in the Middle East and North Africa. Camus' sensitivity to imperial crimes made him particularly cynical about condemnation of French imperialism by another imperialist nation.

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[199] Camus, *The First Man*., Loc 2254.

[200] See, 'The New Algeria' in Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*.., Loc. 2019-2064.

[201] See, for example, Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship Between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016)..

> The Russian strategy, which is apparent from a glance at any world map, is to insist on the status quo in Europe – that is, recognition of its own colonial system – while stirring things up in the Middle East and Africa in order to encircle Europe from the south. The freedom and prosperity of the Arab peoples have little to do with Russia's aims. Think of the decimation of the Chechens or the Tartars of Crimea, or the destruction of Arab culture in the formerly Muslim provinces of Daghestan. Russia is simply making use of these imperial dreams to serve its own ends. In any event, these nationalist and imperialist demands are responsible for what is unacceptable in the Arab rebellion, first and foremost the systematic murder of French and Arab civilians, who have been killed indiscriminately simply because they are French or friends of the French[202]

Camus' many shifting stances on Algeria also reveal that he prioritised the redressal of the injustice of French colonialism rather than a particular outcome. It many ways it betrays the logic of *The Plague*, which dismissed 'vocabulary' for action. In fairness to Camus, this extended to what was at least then a radical call for colonial reparations.

> The injustice from which the Arab people have suffered is linked to colonialism itself, to its history and administration. The French central government has never been able to enforce French law uniformly in its colonies. Finally, there is no question that the Algerian people deserve substantial reparations, both as a means of restoring their dignity and as a matter of justice[203]

Nonetheless, Camus' emphasis on 'action' over 'vocabulary', suggests for some an evasion of historical responsibility. Perhaps, this is most clearly reflected in his controversial claim that the *pied-noir* were in fact not colonisers but victims of French imperialism.

> The true responsibility for the current disaster rests primarily with a series of French governments, backed by the comfortable indifference of the press and public opinion and supported by the complacency of lawmakers. In any case, they are more guilty than the hundreds of thousands of French workers who scrape by in Algeria on their miserable wages, who responded three times in 30 years to the call to take up arms on behalf of the metropole, and who are rewarded today by the contempt of the very people they helped.[204]

I read this less as an evasion and more as laying emphasis on an ethic of ambiguity amplified by Camus' subject position as a *pied-noir*. Indeed, Camus' personal experience of poverty and disadvantage may have coloured his perspective. Having lost his father to the First World War,

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[202] Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 1980-7.

[203] Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc 1958.

[204] Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc 1513.

Camus grew up in a three room home with his grandmother, his mother, his uncle(s) and his brother. His mother had a hearing impairment, was largely non-verbal, illiterate and worked as cleaner. In his semi-biographical *The First Man*, Camus underscores this conflicted sense of identity in his (Jacques') encounter with a student from the French metropole:

> When (Didier) spoke of France, he would say 'our country' and he accepted in advance the sacrifices that country might demand ('your father died for our country,' he would say to Jacques…), whereas this notion of country had no meaning to Jacques, who knew he was French, and that this entailed a certain number of duties, but for whom France was an abstraction that people called upon and that sometimes like that God he had heard about outside his home, who evidently was the sovereign dispenser of good things and bad, who could not be influenced, but who on the other hand could do anything with the people's destiny. And this impression of his was even stronger among the women who lived with him. 'Maman, what is our country?' he asked one day.
> She looked frightened as she did each time she did not understand. 'I don't know,' she said. 'No'.
> 'It's France'.
> 'Oh, yes.' And she seemed relieved.[205]

Much like his Mediterranean Utopia, Camus' vision for what he described as a 'Just Algeria' gave voice to his hope that the *pied noir*, Arab, Berber and Jew could be indigenous Algerians and French citizens together. Thus, he remained until the very end an ardent critic of French imperialism even as he denounced the tactics employed by the FLN.

> "Everyone must choose sides," shout the haters. But I have chosen. I have chosen a Just Algeria, where French and Arabs may associate freely. And I want Arab militants to preserve the justice of their cause by condemning the massacre of civilians, just as I want the French to protect their rights and their future by openly condemning the massacres of the repression[206]

His torment over the question of Algeria is most evident in his denunciation on the one hand of the FLN and his secret advocacy efforts to have over 150 death sentences of the same activists commuted.[207] Camus' denunciation by the left and the right and his fear of lending credence to either one of their justifications of violence led to his silence on the Algerian question.

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[205] Camus, *The First Man*., Loc. 2341.

[206] Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 1631-5.

[207] Alice Kaplan, 'New Perspectives on Camus's Algerian Chronicles, Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 346.

> When the fate of men and women who share one's own blood is linked directly or indirectly to articles that one writes so effortlessly in the comfort of one's study, then one has a duty to weigh the pros and cons before taking up one's pen. For my own part, while I remain sensitive to the risk that, in criticizing the course of the rebellion, I give aid and comfort to the most insolent instigators of the Algerian tragedy, I am also afraid that, by retracing the long history of French errors, I am, with no risk to myself, supplying alibis to the criminal madmen who would toss grenades into crowds of innocent people who happen to be my kin.[208]

His literature from the same period bears witness to his dual and conflicted loyalties. Thus, in *The Artist*, it is hard to distinguish whether Jonah's last piece of art spells 'solitary' or 'solidarity'.[209] In *L'Hote*, which signals both 'guest' and 'host', the pied noir teacher Daru offers hospitality and freedom to an Arab prisoner. His decision to neither *explicitly* set him free nor take him, as instructed, to the colonial authorities leads to his condemnation from both communities.[210] Perhaps, however, it is expressed most vividly in his anguished hope of a reconciled Algeria in the posthumously published *The First Man*

> 'Oh, me, I'm staying, and to the end. Whatever happens, I'm staying. I've sent my family to Algiers, and I'll croak here. They don't understand that in Paris. Besides us, you know who're the only ones who can understand it?'
> 'The Arabs'.
> 'Exactly. We were made to understand each other. Fools and brutes likes us, but with the same blood of men. We'll kill each other for a little longer, cut off each other's balls and torture each other a bit. And then we'll go back to living as men together. The country wants it that way…[211]

Camus broke his silence on the question of Algeria briefly after he accepted the Nobel Prize in Stockholm. In a heated exchange between Camus and a young Algerian student who supported the FLN, Camus was reported to have said

> I have always condemned terror. I must also condemn the blind terrorism that can be seen in the streets of Algiers, for example, which someday might strike my mother or family. I believe in justice, but I will defend my mother before justice.[212]

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[208]Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 449.

[209] Rendered 'independent' or 'interdependent' in Albert Camus, *Exile and the Kingdom: "the Adulterous Woman"; "the Renegade"; "the Silent Men"; "the Guest"; "the Artist"* (London: Penguin Classics, 2002)., p. 80

[210] Camus, *Exile and the Kingdom*., See 'The Host'.

[211] Camus, *The First Man*., Loc 2073-77.

[212] Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 2360-3.

However, Camus, in fact said:

> People are now planting bombs in the tramways of Algiers. My mother might be on one of those tramways. If that is justice, then I prefer my mother.[213]

Somehow, that sentence has been rendered 'Between justice and my mother, I choose my mother'.[214] There is a substantive difference in the meaning of Camus' actual comment and the comments attributed to him. Nonetheless, despite this misconstrual, in all its meanings, Camus appears to privilege the love of his mother over some conception of justice. For Michael Walzer, Camus' comment affirms his commitment to the particular rather than the abstract. Avowing his love for his mother and their poor *pied-noir* community, it epitomises the logic of the 'cycle' of rebellion and its message of 'reiteration…not abstraction'. Indeed, such a reading is entirely compatible with Camus' proclamation of the conditionality and boundedness of *philia*. It is also compatible with the emphasis on the particularity and plurality of human rebellion upon which Camus' conception of politics rests. While Camus unquestionably loved his mother very much and cared for the wellbeing of his poor *pied-noir* community, this did not preclude a concern for the Arab or other indigenous Algerians. As Camus himself asserted in 1958, to subscribe to this view is to subscribe to a false dichotomy:

> The first group of people wants the universal at the expense of the particular. The second wants the particular at the expense of the universal. But the two go together.[215]

Camus' position on the Algerian question was never about the incapacity or illegitimacy of Arab rebellion. Rather it was a condemnation of revolution. Entirely consonant with his play *The Just Assassins*, his comment to the Algerian student reflects his elevation of the rebellious love of life over the revolutionary love of justice. Rather than proclaim an antinomy between love and justice, Camus emphasised two dissonant forms of love, fraternity and valuing. This dissonance

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[213] Ibid., Loc. 2379.

[214] Alice Kaplan, 'New Perspectives on Camus's Algerian Chronicles' in Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 304.

[215] Ibid., Loc. 509.

manifested itself in a choice of means, which Camus believed indiscriminate and disproportionate. It culminated in a vision of Algeria without the *pied-noir* other. Camus' ethic of rebellion and his vision of a Mediterranean Utopia that underpins it might be what is in the final analysis problematic. Perhaps, its privileging of a love of life and the world may seem prescriptive and violent to individuals, who disinherited from the world, do not deem life worth living. It might be that it was blind to the power differentials. It might be that 'the strange form of love' that animates rebellion was 'altercidal' in its exclusion of the dissenter.[216] It might even be that this ethic was inherently conservative. However, it was not an aberration in Camus' political thought. An Arab could rebel, but revolt was always illegitimate.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to argue that Camus' anti-utopian thought is animated by his vision of a Mediterranean utopia which privileges 'Greece' over 'Rome', 'Hellenism' over 'Christianity'. Perhaps this would not have seemed antithetical to Camus. Indeed, he once wrote,

> In practical terms, it follows that the battle that will be waged in years to come will not pit the forces of utopia against the forces of reality. Rather, it will put different utopias against each other as they try to gain a purchase on the real, and the only choice remaining will be to decide which form of utopia is least costly.[217]

As evident in his dissertation and each subsequent planned 'cycle', this exercise has an affective dimension that entailed Camus' engagement with *agape* or Christian love. Thus, in his first 'cycle' on absurdity, he casts an *eros* for life and the world as the only 'good'. In his second 'cycle' on rebellion, he recasts *agape* as *philia:* self-giving without being soteriological, particular rather than abstract, plural but not conditional. In its ultimate valuing of life and the world, Camus' love both animates rebellion and limits it. If Tolstoy epitomises what Arendt describes as antipolitical love,

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[216] Colin Davis, "Violence and Ethics in Camus," in *The Cambridge Companion to Camus*, ed. Edward J. Hughes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).,pp.106-117.

[217]Camus, *Algerian Chronicles*., Loc. 509.

Camus' worldly, life-affirming life appears to be its antithesis. Nonetheless, Camus' universal, presentist utopia is subject to valid critique owing to its latent paternalism and Eurocentrism. I have sought to demonstrate that despite its limitations Camus is always cognisant and engaged with the problem of Algerian colonialism. In my view, Camus' refusal to support the FLN's vision of an Algerian revolution is entirely consonant with his political thought. A keystone of Camus' post-war vision of rebellion is its insistence upon the proportionality of means and ends, its recognition of life as an inherent good. Indiscriminate violence – however noble the intent – was therefore anathema to him. Perhaps Camus' vision of the integration and 'indigenising' of the settler colonial is more problematic. Perhaps what makes it so is that Camus' vision of love, justice and rebellion emanate from a Mediterranean utopia, a 'Just Algeria' that for all its concerns for freedom, equality, fraternity and justice was ultimately prescriptive. Perhaps it was this recognition that led to Camus' hopeless silence.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Love is the beginning of philosophy: it commands a quest, an inquiry into the sort of life that might be best for the beloved.

- Heuristicus

'…Especially all lovers of the world are called the world'

- Augustine

In this thesis, I have sought to argue that to the extent that plural loves populate the *polis*, the examination of how these loves are conceived, evoked and mobilised ought to be integral to the study of international politics. My contention that plural loves populate the *polis*, in turn, is premised on an empirical and anthropological claim. The empirical claim is that love is a pervasive human phenomena that is accorded tremendous importance – at least since modernity – in theological and secular contexts. The anthropological claim is (partly) Augustinian: whatever humans may or may not be, they are constituted by their loves. Further, they deem the objects of their love to be valuable or good. The existence of multiple conceptions of love and indeed the good suggests that politics necessarily entails the negotiation of plural loves. If politics is inescapably about loves, it follows that what, how and why we love is inherently political. In the first chapter, I sought to argue that the assumption that love is monolithic, irrelevant or somehow improper for politics obscures the kind of contestation that surrounds what love *is*, *ought* and *does*. It conceals that for better or worse, loves are not only already part of the *polis* but that conceptions of politics already privilege and legitimise some loves over others. In a bid to render visible the kind of work love is already mobilised to do in international politics, I posit it may be helpful to conceive of love as neither anthropomorphic nor monolithic but as a part of a social imaginary hospitable to various (conflicting) ideologies and theories.

The rest of the thesis was focused specifically on some of the ways in which love was evoked in the period extending from the fin-de-siècle to circa 1960. The period itself is consonant with the rise and fall of empires, world wars, emerging international institutions and arguably the

emergence of the study of International Relations itself. To the extent that twin thematic of empire and internationalism are understood as constitutive of early twentieth century International Relations, I argue that love was an important part of this conversation. In this period, love was employed to theorise the international. Perhaps the legacy of nineteenth century 'religions of humanity'; then fashionable theosophy; the post-war rise of religiosity and the beginnings of the cultural and sexual revolution helped make it so. Whatever the impetus, love was evoked – even in the academy – by 'canonical' figures like Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern; Herbert Butterfield and Arnold Toynbee; Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau. It was implicated in their articulation of order, history and power and their engagement with questions of internationalism, civilizational decline and the viability of the world state. Although each conceived of love differently, all represented love as a site for the negotiation of the universal and the particular, the imperial and the international. Despite Butterfield's concern with humility, Niebuhr's critique of imperial *hubris* and Toynbee's call for anti-imperial atonement, however, all six figures appear to mobilise love to do little more than conserve the *status quo*. Turning to three liminal literary figures, each occupying a distinct subject position in one of the three most significant empires of the twentieth century, I examined whether and how they sought to animate love otherwise. In this chapter, I imagine and engage in conversation with Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus on this very question. Returning to the schema I proposed in the first chapter, I explore how their conception of what love *is*, *ought* and *does* was intrinsically bound to their disparate understandings of politics in a time of empire. Further, I query what is obscured by focussing on these three figures rather than a host of others. Finally, I return to the general premise of this thesis that love matters to the study of international politics to illuminate how a research agenda that centres on love(s) might contribute to the study of International Relations.

Love and Politics in a Time of Empire: An Imagined Conversation

Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus never corresponded. Tolstoy was a profound literary influence on Camus, but died three years before he was born. In fact, Camus wrote with an image of Tolstoy on his desk and often measured his literary output against that of Tolstoy's. Tagore was familiar with Tolstoy's work. Yet although their educational endeavours shared much in common, Tagore was deeply critical of Tolstoy's philosophy of celibacy and self-abnegation. Tolstoy's son, Michael, corresponded with Tagore but there is no evidence that Tolstoy either knew Tagore or thought very much of him. Camus rose to prominence after Tagore's death so there is little reason to believe Tagore would have known his work. However, they were both close friends and beneficiaries of the arts patron and publisher, Victoria Ocampo (1890-1979). Camus was also an avid reader of Andre Gide and would have had access to his translations of Tagore's works. All of this is to suggest that although it is likely their lives intersected, any conversation between them on love and politics in a time of empire would have to be imagined.

What Love Is

Leo Tolstoy, Rabindranath Tagore and Albert Camus each understood love differently, even across their own careers. In the literary works I examine, Tolstoy emphasises Rousseaunian romantic love in his early career in *The Cossacks*, familial love in *Anna Karenina* in the 1870s and *agape* in his late career in *Hadji Murat*. Despite these shifts, I argue that these three literary works attest to Tolstoy's commitment to *agape* or charitable or self-giving love as ideal. In *The Cossacks*, this was evident in his equation of goodness with the capacity for *agape* or sacrificial love. Thus, the pre-Christian 'noble savage' may have the capacity for *amour de soi* and natural morality but only the 'civilised' Christian Olenin is able to rehabilitate his *amour propre* and place it in right relation to *amour de soi*. In *Anna Karenina*, *agape* is idealised via an emphasis on its antithesis: *eros*. Much like Anders Nygren, Tolstoy would seem to understand *eros* as not-*agape*. In its incarnation of

passionate love, Tolstoy imagines it as destructive of the metaphorical and literal family unit. Destroying Anna's family first with Karenin and then Vronsky, Tolstoy imagines the same *erosic* love to animate the Russian Volunteer Movement he deems so dangerous to the Russian nation. This idealisation of *agape* is not solely via an emphasis on its absence. Rather it is exemplified in the actions of Levin in his compassion for his peasants, his sympathy for Anna and his growing commitment to universalism and non-violence. Nonetheless, this idealised love is bounded by the particular. Foreshadowing the mid-century Herbert Butterfield, Tolstoy conceives of the neighbour as the person who enters one's orbit. Governed by a narrow conception of the family, the object of love is what Martha Nussbaum would describe as a narrowly conceived Eudaimonia or 'circle of concern'. A year after the publication of the final instalment of *Anna Karenina*, Tolstoy wrote *The Confessions* which many regard as the beginning of his post-'conversion' work. Yet, even in these works Tolstoy's conception of love is far from settled. Indeed, between the writing of *The Kingdom of God is Within You* and *Hadji Murat* or any of Tolstoy's anti-imperial epistles, Tolstoy changes his mind about love and abstraction. Whereas *The Kingdom of God is Within You* denounces abstract loves as delusional, Tolstoy's later embrace of Kant saw him overcome his reservations about the abstraction that underpins the Categorical Imperative. So committed was Tolstoy to Kant that he fused the Categorical Imperative with the Johannine Gospel, producing his law of love. As the incipient pacifism of Levin foreshadowed in *Anna Karenina*, *agapic* love was the antithesis of *erosic* violence. In fact, this love was nothing more than a duty (or law) of non-violence. Much like Kantian practical love, it entailed beneficence. As a duty, it extended to all: individuals were phenomenologically replaceable by other individuals as objects of love. Further, this love of abstract neighbour was no longer moored by a love of self. Rather, as evident in the great lengths Tolstoy went to conceive of himself as "I" and "not-I", this *agape* was not only imagined to be self-giving but self-emptying.

Tagore's three post-*swadeshi* works do not denote a shift in his conception of love as much as shift in a concern from love's political promise to the political conditions for loving. *Gora* was Tagore's first and most optimistic political work. It proclaimed the soteriological promise of plural loves: romantic, filial and familial. In *Gora*, Tagore idealises loving in the particular, that is, loving as a valuing relationship. This love does not negate the possibility of abstract loves of nation or humanity. Rather, it is the condition for loving in the abstract. Thus, Gora's *Bharatvarsha* (mythological India) remains abstract and untenable until he overcomes his casteism, sexism and religious orthodoxy and learns to love his mother, friend and lover. Tagore's broader political writings and activism suggest he never relinquished his faith in the transformative potential of loving relationships. Indeed, the tragedy of *Chaturanga* and *Ghare Baire* ensue from a failure to love in the particular, or value individuals *qua* individuals in the context of relationships. These next two novels, however, indicate a shift in Tagore's concern away from plural loves to romantic love. For Sudipta Kaviraj Tagore's preoccupation with romantic love was already present in *Gora*. Yet, I argue the worlds of *Chaturanga* and *Ghare Baire* are distinct, bearing little resemblance to the world of *Gora*. Written following the outbreak of the Great War, the world the protagonists inhabit in both novels are solitary and decidedly modern. As Tagore's many debates with Gandhi attest, the post-*swadeshi* Tagore was not anti-modern. As the centrality of the *Vaishanvite* (romantic imagery from Hindu theology) motif to his life's works would suggest, Tagore never regarded romantic love – as Tolstoy did – to be inherently dangerous or destructive. His narrow emphasis on romantic love – in the confines of heterosexual marriage – instead operate to perform a critique of some forms of loving. In stark contrast to Tolstoy, Tagore's three, post-*swadeshi* novels problematize love conceived of as beneficence. This is because love understood in the context of a valuing relationship is predicated not merely on the freedom to love but on the equality of all agents (particularly women) in the relationship. Thus, in *Chaturanga,* Damini remains unsated because owing to her 'inferior' status as a widow, she is not free to love as she pleases. Similarly, in *Ghare Baire*, tragedy ensues when Nikhil and Sandip misconstrue loving and 'liberating' Bimala

with attempting to mould her to conform to the needs of their political projects. Unlike Tolstoy and Camus, Tagore does not engage in the same exercise of distinguishing or prioritising loves. In Tagore's three novels, elements of *erosic*, *agapic* and *filial* love constitute most loving relationships. His emphasis, then, is less on prescribing what love is and more on detailing what loving entails.

The kind of love Camus valourises in his absurd cycle mirrors the absurdity of life. This love is tragic, fleeting, *erosic*. It entails an affirmation of life. In *The Myth of Sisyphus*, it is exemplified in the figures of Don Juan and Sisyphus, each regarding every moment to be 'short lived and exceptional'. Repugnant to what Camus seemingly describes as Christian colonial structures of love in *The Outsider*, it is the antithesis of *agape*. In fact, *erosic* love is so transgressive that the French judicial system cannot even recognise (or value) Meursault's loves in *The Outsider*. Distasteful to the dictator, Caligula, he despairs 'love is nothing'. Whereas late post-'conversion' Tolstoy elevates *agape* over *eros*, Camus in the absurd cycle would seem to do the opposite. The embrace of *erosic* love becomes central to absurdity's emphasis on leading a lucid life. However, Camus came to conclude that the absurd cycle taught nothing. His next cycle focussed on rebellion. Although Camus never quite relinquished his conception of love as tragic or *erosic*, his cycle on rebellion denotes a shifting concern with love as *agapic* and *filial*. Epitomised in his conception of rebellion in *The Rebel*, this love is *agapic* to the extent that it entails a willingness to lay down one's life. It is *filial* to the extent that this willingness to lay down one's life only extends to one's friends. It is this emphasis on 'living with' and 'dying with/for' which Camus distinguishes rebellious love in *The Plague* from solidarity. Epitomised in the figure of Prometheus in *The Rebel* and 'the healer' in *The Plague*, this love is worldly and rejects all other worlds and lives for this tragic one.

What Love Ought

In the first chapter, I proposed that theories on the role love ought to play in politics largely centre on three ideal-typical positions: retrieval, rejection or rehabilitation. The first position is consonant with the embrace of loves in its plurality; the second with the rejection of love(s) and the third with the alteration of love(s) to somehow render it proper for politics. Tolstoy and Tagore's conception of love and the role it ought to play in politics would seem to resemble the 'rejection' thesis. Wholeheartedly concluding that love is improper for politics, however, what they reject is politics rather than love. For Niebuhr, this was an inevitable result of the privileging of purity over praxis. It amounted to a realisation and rejection of the kind of coercion all forms of assemblage are premised on. Niebuhr offers an apt description of Tolstoy's equation of politics with violence. To the extent that Tolstoy equates love with non-violence, it must necessarily abjure politics. Unlike Camus who seeks to mobilise love to imagine politics otherwise, Tolstoy's evangelisation of the law of love is not animated by the same intent. A radical deontologist, Tolstoy's commitment to individualism led to his disdain for the kind of speaking and acting together that Arendt imagines to be constitutive of politics. Tolstoy's thought might have inspired Tolstoyan communes and Cherktkov might have campaigned to turn Tolstoy's thought into a political programme of anarchopacifism. However, neither activity was espoused nor endorsed by Tolstoy. Tolstoy understood the coming together of people for political purpose as necessarily entailing the relinquishing of individual conscience. His law of love thus categorically entailed the rejection of politics. Yet, in practice, Tolstoy's rejection of the *polis* was far from total. Indeed, despite the antipolitical elements of his thought, his conception of love as necessitating the rejection of politics remains pertinent to the *polis* for two reasons. First, this turning away from politics was premised on an assessment of the *polis* which he communicated and disseminated to the masses. Second, this critique was coupled with a form of non-action, which despite Tolstoy's own intentions, inspired the political praxis of love as non-violence.

But for two brief forays into politics, Tagore like Tolstoy would seem to mobilise a conception of love that entailed a disavowal of politics. So much is implied in his need to carve the world up into social and political spheres and confine love's work to the former rather than the latter. Yet a consigning of Tagore's conception of love as antipolitical ultimately hinges on what one deems to be politics. The politics Tagore disavows are the political structures and processes he associates with the state and late British imperialism. His vision of individuals speaking and acting together in civil society, however, are entirely compatible with an Arendtian vision of politics. His vision of 'politics' would appear to be premised on the retrieval or embrace of love in its plurality. Indeed, it does not preclude abstract loves of community or humanity. Unlike Tolstoy, he does not deem *erosic* loves violent. Unlike Camus, he does not deem utopian loves murderous. However, plural loves for Tagore only contain political promise when they are conceived of in the context of a valuing relationship. The political promise of valuing relationships, in turn, rests on two convictions. First, for Tagore, loving relationships contain the promise of political power and transformation. The affective community in *Gora*; the missed opportunity to create them in *Chaturanga* and *Ghare Baire*; the promise of dialogue between the (sometimes Orientalising caricatures) of an abstract 'East' and 'West' are all evidence of this. Tagore's efforts to cultivate transnational friendships, his educational endeavours including the founding of a school, university and rural re-development institute were also premised on this logic. Second, the very existence of relationships across racial and religious lines and (Indic) gendered spaces are a form of political resistance. However, these two premises co-exist uncomfortably in Tagore's thought. There is a seeming tension between inclusion and resistance. For instance, it is unclear whether this ethic of inclusion ought to be extended to the perpetrator of religious/gendered/caste-based/racial violence. Further, in the absence of a fully articulated theory of non-violence, power or indeed sacrifice, Tagore's praxis of love seems to rest only on a faith in love's potency to overcome structural violence.

In the Absurd Cycle, Camus understood love as motivating political action but argued it ought not prescribe political praxis. Camus may have understood *erosic* love as essential to leading a lucid life, but this love as highly individuated could not provide a foundation for politics. Foreshadowing the arguments of Sara Ahmed, pre-war Camus asserted that the acceptance of plurality precluded prescriptive politics. However, Camus' cycle on rebellion denoted a shift in his thought about the role love ought to perform in politics. To be fair to Camus, he never ceased to classify love as tragic. However, in the cycle on rebellion, he began to articulate how even in a tragic world, self-giving love and friendship were sites of meaning and resistance. Perhaps this is most clearly demonstrated in *The Plague*. In contrast to most of Camus' solitary protagonists, Rieux and Tarrou are friends. As the form of the novel as memoir beautifully illustrates, although the two retain their voices and differences throughout the text, the intermingling of Rieux's testimony with Tarrou's demonstrate the world they see is shared. Much like Tagore, he conceived love in *philia* as a valuing, transformative relationship. However, Camus attempts to rehabilitate loves to attune them to this world in a way Tagore does not. Camus' 'world' in turn prioritises a commitment to the valuing of human life in/and the present above all else. As Camus argued in his thesis on *Neoplatonism*, this required a movement away from the Christian toward the Hellenic. Despite both their preoccupations with the present, the disparate movements Tolstoy and Camus emphasise is illustrative. Tolstoy's present was the 'eternal' present. His emphasis on action in a 'rational', 'disembodied' world cared not for the consequences on embodied individuals. Camus' present in contrast was absurd, embodied and populated by people. While loving in Camus' present affirmed life and was a form of rebellion. Loving in the future was revolution and anathema to his project.

Love as Critique

Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus each mobilises love as a form of anti-imperial critique. They achieve this mainly via a critique of imperial violence. Thus, Tolstoy's anti-imperial epistles categorise imperialism and its endless wars as embodying the 'law of violence'; Tagore associates the violent, abstract loves of the nation state with late British imperialism and, Camus' post-war theory of political violence emanates from a conception of common humanity constituted by a capacity to love. In fairness to Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus, they mobilised their conception of love to critique violence perpetrated by both agents and subjects of empire. Thus, Tolstoy urges Chinese and Indian imperial subjects to embrace the 'law of love' and its concomitant code of non-violence. Tagore echoing Tolstoy's sentiments on mimesis, critiques nationalist and cosmopolitan violence. Further, he argues casteism is akin to racism; religious orthodoxy perpetrates violence much like the structures of imperialism. As the post-war Camus went to lengths to clarify, he was not a utopian and therefore not a pacifist. However, he increasingly mobilised love as a critique of indiscriminate (rather than targeted) killing in the context of the Algerian war of independence.

This 'use' of love as critique is facilitated by all three literary figure's understanding of love as a standard and/or site of judgment. The late post-'conversion' Tolstoy understands love, in effect, as a law of non-violence. In sum, it forms the standard against which all action is judged. For Camus, rebellious love is presentist and life-affirming. Against this standard, particularly in his post-war work, all forms of killing are understood as murder. As he articulates in *Just Assassins* and *The Rebel*, whether this murder is just or unjust hinges ultimately on the willingness of the murderer to atone and lay down his life for his crime. To turn to his metaphor of 'health' in *The Plague*, the ethic which he exalts instead is that of 'the healer' who combats pestilence and cures victims. For

Tagore, love operates both as a standard and site of judgment. It is a standard of judgment to the extent that his conception of universalism embraces distinct wholes. It is a site of judgment to the extent that what loving entails is not prescribed but determined in the context of a loving relationship. This universalism, this form of judgment underpins Tagore's critique of 'abstract', unmoored, exclusionary loves of casteism, racism, sexism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

Love as Resistance

Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus conceive love not merely as critique but also as a form of action. Consequently, their work sought not only to dismantle but also to create. Partaking in what Anna Jonasdottir describes as love's 'world-creating capacities'[218], this entailed first imagining and creating of a space for their vision of politics. Unsurprisingly for three literary figures, this act of 'making' takes the form of art and internationalism. As previously articulated, late post-'conversion' Tolstoy understands aesthetics as a form of communion; a medium for evangelising *agape*. Tagore's artistic endeavours mirrored his political endeavours, interrogating exclusionary structures of gender, caste, religion and race (but seldom class) to inspire and normalise what were deemed transgressive relationships. Camus saw the demands of rebellion and love as partly aesthetic. His literary work explored the possibility of meaning making, and thus love and action, in an absurd world.

Their experiments in art often mirrored their internationalist or regionalist efforts. For Tolstoy, this took the form of his study of world religions and was expressed in his attempt to imagine Russia a part of a spiritual, non-violent East in contrast to a decadent, industrialised West. This vision, much like the one Tagore articulates in the inter-war years, was deeply problematic.

[218] Jonasdottir and Ferguson, *Love : A Question for Feminism in the Twenty-First Century*., p. 14.

In the case of Tolstoy, it necessitated little else than the 'East' refusing to succumb to the 'law of violence' of the West, all the while perpetuating the same mythology that sanctioned nineteenth century colonialism. Tagore's vision of international dialogue rested on a similar essentialised premise. Its chief difference was that it sought not just for the 'East' to be some kind of spiritual exemplar, but also a participant in the kind of relational dialogue that lies at the heart of the Tagorean project. This 'world-making' also extended to what Michael Collins – borrowing from Leela Gandhi – describes as his politics of friendship. Cultivating relationships across the 'East'-'West', colonised-coloniser, and other structural binaries, Tagore sought to imagine and create spaces of resistance. To be fair to Tolstoy, he also partook of a similar project. His spatio-temporal engineering, however, emphasised rational or spiritual 'interiority', the fusion of eternal time with the present. The kind of 'action' or 'resistance' in this time and space, however, essentially resembled a flight from politics and the world. Camus' work sought less to engineer a world than describe one. This act of description, however, was also very much an act of creation and valuation. Prioritising the empirical above all else, it affirmed a world that was embodied and absurd. Further, the kind of life-affirming love Camus' ethics endorsed reifies a mythological Mediterranean. Camus' vision of a 'Just Algeria' and his early attempts to re-conceive 'Mediterranean' culture illustrate the centrality of this imagined space to his art and activism.

The resistance Tolstoy's conception of love facilitates would appear to be deeply antipolitical. This is because his conception of cosmos does not allow for community and, in any case, his embrace of a rational, disembodied world effectively depopulates it. Nonetheless, his conception of love as non-action – divorced from the system that sustained it – became the lynchpin of non-violent resistance. Tolstoy might have conceived it as non-resistance to violence, but his endorsement of a refusal to partake in war or perpetrate violence or pay taxes proved tremendously important to civil disobedience movements in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Just as Tagore's early vision of *swadeshi* was what Sumit Sarkar describes as 'constructive',

so too was his post-*swadeshi* understanding of the role love ought to play in politics. This resistance, as he understood it, was embodied in relationships across caste, race, gender (though not across class) lines. It provided the impetus for institutions which sought to promote and normalise them. Camus' conception of rebellion as a kind of love saw him participate in the French Resistance. It also animated his efforts to imagine Algeria part of a federal France. However, much like Tolstoy, this love did not always necessarily involve doing. Although Camus never quite retreated into himself – he campaigned behind the scenes to commute the death sentences of over 150 FLN activists – he realised his praxis of life-affirming (or preserving) love sometimes necessitated silence.

Whose Love? Which Politics?

In a bid to fairly represent the work of Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus and to illuminate the neglected history of love in international politics, this chapter has largely offered sympathetic expositions of thought. However, these three thinkers – or any three thinkers for that matter – cannot be representative of the kind of diverse conceptions of love and politics that populate the *polis*. Focusing on literary work in the same period, an engagement with Emma Goldman's work on sexual love; Simone Weil's work on sacrificial love and Anna Julia Cooper's conception of love-power would no doubt enunciate different visions of politics. The emphasis on Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus, is neither meant to endorse their conceptions of love nor their visions of politics. In fact, their political thought is far from unproblematic. Tolstoy's attempt to portray his conception of love as non-violence, for instance, is misleading. His understanding of *agape* as self-emptying, self-abnegating love is violent. His commitment to deontology led to little regard for how such prescriptions of non-violence disproportionately harmed individuals at the bottom of social hierarchies. His radical individualism did not allow for the kind of solidarity or political power that arises from working together. Further, for its seeming inclusivity, Tolstoy's entire vision of politics

was deeply hierarchical. His cosmology which imagines the unity of creation effectively has at its apex the rational, disembodied man. Although Tolstoy claimed he understood his Christian theology to be universal and inclusive of world religions, this was only true insofar as these religions were compatible with the rationality and self-abnegation at the heart of his project.

Tagore's vision of 'politics' – even as he disavowed the term – was far more plural than Tolstoy's and Camus'. Although he identifies loving in the particular, or in a valuing relationship as the site of political transformation, he does not seek to preclude other loves from the *polis*. Similarly, he would seem to promote loving in its multivalence. This commitment to plurality, his conception of the intimate as international allows for Tagore to understand love as political even as he interrogates and advocates freedom and equality as conditions of loving. Nonetheless, Tagore's vision of politics is not without limitation. First, it fails to resolve or address the tension between an ethic of inclusion and loving as a form of resistance. Second, despite its sensitivity to caste, gender, race and religion, it is largely indifferent to class. Although Tagore's many educational initiatives focussed on rural uplift, the lower classes were effectively imagined as objects of charity rather than subjects in the kind of transformational relationships Tagore understood as the locus of politics.

Camus' vision of love and politics was post-foundational, presentist and largely unconcerned with metaphysics. Consequently, he re-imagined *agape* as earthly, grace as *philia*. Camus' commitment to worldliness, led him to prioritise human life as inherently (and perhaps the only) good. However, this vision of politics as presentist and life-affirming was premised on a contradiction. As intimated in much of his literature, this ethic was facilitated by the erasure and the forgetting of colonial violence. I have sought to argue that Camus' journalistic work and advocacy for the equality of Arabs and Berbers is unjustly forgotten in the need to caricature him

as an imperialist. Nonetheless, Camus embodied all the contradictions of a settler-colonial anti-imperialist. Consequently, his mythological Mediterranean – although far more just and inclusive than the existing French imperial order - enshrined a hyper-presentist ethic that enabled absolution. This world elevated the needs, values and priorities of the European settler over the indigenous subject. Consequently, Camus' ethic unwittingly exalted a conception of life and order that radically excluded the dissenter.

Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus' disparate visions of 'politics' each privilege some loves over others. My own assessment of the limitations of their political thought privileges a particular conception of politics. This conception of politics is (partly) Arendtian in that it values plurality and understands the coming together of individuals to think, speak and act together as the site of political power. However, I diverge from Arendt in valuing freedom *and* equality as preconditions for politics. I also find Arendt's privileging of a Kantian rational, autonomous individual wanting; just as I find her vision of politics bereft of emotion illusory. To the extent that all Tolstoy, Tagore and Camus imagine love entailing 'making' and 'doing', 'poiesis' and 'praxis', 'philosophy' and 'politics', I also question whether her vision of a *polis* that precludes the work of the hands and the body is not in fact utopian and perhaps even, violent. Arguably loving the world entails imagining it large enough to accommodate competing visions of love and politics.

This thesis has sought to argue that love ought to be significant to the study of international politics. Engaging with the work of three literary figures and to a lesser extent, six 'canonical' figures associated with the discipline, I attempted to highlight how love has been imagined as part of the order that sustains the *status quo,* and as a form of critique and resistance in the period extending from 1880-1960. It has been evoked to endorse murder and self-sacrifice; hierarchies and equality; action and non-action; imperialism and atonement. To this extent, it is an important

part of the history of the early twentieth century and the emergence of International Relations. This thesis, however, only begins to illuminate the kinds of work love 'does' in international politics. Treating love as a serious subject of systematic study might highlight love's imbrication in other aspects of contemporary international politics. It might illustrate how love as a basis for regionalism and/or internationalism shapes foreign policy, humanitarian aid and military interventions. A conceptual history of love in various cultural contexts might emphasise shifts in understanding sociological structures like childhood, marriage, family and citizenship. These shifts might be reflected in the kinds of loves that international conventions pertaining to partnerships, children and guardianship, or laws pertaining to immigration prioritise. Comparative studies of constitutions and manifestos might reveal them to be underpinned by divergent understandings of love and fraternity. Similarly, there is scope to study the kinds of loves social movements and political campaigns, such as Black Lives Matter, the Australian campaign to legalise same-sex marriage #EqualLove, and the Irish anti-abortion campaign #LoveBoth mobilise. Taking love seriously might lead to interrogating whether it may offer a post-foundational, post-humanist site for theorising human rights. In any case, the avenues to study love's work in international politics, much like the conceptions of love and politics that populate the *polis*, are abundant.

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