

'British Policy towards China, with Special
Reference to the Shantung Question,
1918 -1922'

by

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ABBREVIATIONS

- C.L.A. Conference on the Limitation of Armament
- D.B.F.P. Documents on British Foreign Policy,
first series, ed. E.L. Woodward, R. Butler
and J.P.T. Bury, occasional reference to
second series.
- F.R.U.S. Foreign Relations of the United States.
- F.R.U.S., P.P.C. Foreign Relations of the United States,
Paris Peace Conference, 1919.
- Hist. of P.C. A History of the Peace Conference of
Paris, ed. H.W.V. Temperley.
- Cab. Cabinet papers, Public Record Office,
London.
- F.O. Foreign Office papers, Public Record
Office, London.

ABSTRACT

The aim of the thesis is to examine British policies towards China and the Shantung question between 1918 and 1922 with the object of establishing whether they were too indifferent to China's desiderata with the possible result that Anglo-Chinese relations were unnecessarily embittered.

Study opens with Germany's acquisitions in the Shantung province before 1914 and their administration. It proceeds to Japan's conquest of the German possessions in Shantung after the outbreak of the first world war and the actions which sought to make her occupation permanent, such as the Japanese twenty-one demands of 1915 and the Anglo-Japanese exchange of notes of 1917. The consequence of China's entry into the war, including the British pledges made to Japan before the Sino-Japanese treaty of September, 1918, are dealt with in Chapter II.

Indications that Britain would support Japan's claims to Shantung at the Paris peace conference are seen to be fairly decisive in Chapter III. The centrepiece of this study is Chapter IV which describes the negotiations at the peace council in detail and stresses the role of the British delegates, particularly Balfour, in securing recognition for Japan's claims in the treaty of Versailles. Last minute

attempts of the Chinese to reverse the decision, China's refusal to sign the treaty, and the importance of the Chinese government's action in severing negotiations with Britain over Tibet are reviewed in Chapters V and VI.

Throughout 1920, Britain's far eastern policies were dominated by the question of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and naval considerations, but Britain's suspicions over Japan's actions in China had an obvious bearing upon her relations with Japan. This is made clear by the Curzon-Chinda exchanges described in Chapter VII, which also discusses the attempts which were made by Britain to reach a better far-eastern understanding with America.

Chapter VIII describes British policy to China in detail as revealed by the cabinet meetings of May and June, 1921, in preparation for the Washington conference. The study ends (Chapter IX) with a brief account of the Shantung negotiations associated with the Washington conference in which Britain had an important, if secondary, role.

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CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SHANTUNG QUESTION, 1898-1917.

It is well known that during the 19th century China's international standing was relegated from one of lofty isolated independence to that of a semi-colonial country. In this process Britain acquired such extensive trading and political privileges, including territorial concessions, extra-territorial rights, and the control of Chinese custom duties, that Britain became the predominating foreign power in China.¹ During the last decade of the century further inroads were made upon China's sovereignty, for following China's humiliating defeat by Japan in 1895 the flood-gates were open to demands for additional concessions. As part of a process commonly referred to as 'cutting the Chinese melon', a phrase which suggests the softness of the country, Russia, Germany, and Britain, in 1898, acquired leases and economic rights at Port Arthur, Kiaochow, and Wei-hai Wei, respectively.² At one stage it seemed that China was about to disintegrate as even second and third class powers acquired privileges almost with ease.

Russia's far eastern activities in the winter of 1897-8 aroused in Britain a sense of danger that she was about to lose part of the China market, and Russia's acquisition of Port Arthur was regarded with distinct alarm.³ The international

situation at this stage was particularly unsettled by the fact that a re-alignment of the powers, especially those which were to become allies, was imminent, and in the fluid situation which existed the countries were generally extra-sensitive lest others should secure disproportionate advances. It is important to stress that in the far-eastern sphere of world politics China suffered considerably from the manoeuvres of the powers, and indeed China was generally treated as if she were of no importance at all as the powers endeavoured to improve their respective positions.

An indication of this lack of concern for China can be seen when owing to heavy pressure from Russia, the German government turned to Britain for support. Count Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador in London, hinted to Lord Salisbury, prime minister and foreign secretary, that if no Anglo-German agreement were possible upon the Kiaochow question, Germany might have to meet the objections of the other states by payment of a high price, 'possibly an anti-British alliance'.⁴ From his conversation with Salisbury, Hatzfeldt concluded that Britain was prepared for an agreement upon Samoa and New Guinea, and that Kiaochow did not clash with British interests. The ambassador also concluded that if Kiaochow proved unsatisfactory there were other places to which there would be no British objection, for Britain

was not averse to Germany taking up a position on the China coast. Her presence there would be an additional balance to Russia.^{4a} But British statesmen were anxious for a peaceful settlement of the issue lest trade with China be interrupted. It was, therefore, with British acquiescence that Germany succeeded in picking a quarrel with China which gave her the pretext to seize Kiaochow.

In view of the various interpretations which Japan made of the German rights in Shantung after she had expelled the Germans from the province in 1914, it is relevant to emphasise what Germany acquired from China by means of the Sino-German treaty of March, 1898.⁵ The second and third articles of the treaty laid down that the Bay of Kiaochow was to be leased to Germany for 99 years, and 'the Imperial Chinese Government will abstain from exercising rights of sovereignty in the ceded territory during the term of the lease....' The exact boundaries of the ceded areas were defined, and it was stipulated that 'Chinese ships of war and merchant vessels shall enjoy the same privileges in the Bay of Kiaochow as the ships of other nations on friendly terms with Germany...' Hence, China no longer had the undisputed right to the use of one of their own ports. The first article of the treaty created a type of buffer zone of 50 kilometres between the leased bay and the rest of the province, and within this zone German troops could move freely, but the Chinese emperor reserved all rights of sovereignty regarding the area.

Section II of the Sino-German treaty defined railway and mining rights in Shantung, and under its terms the Chinese government recognised Germany's right to build two lines, one from Kiaochow to Tsinan, and the other from Kiaochow to Laiwuh sien. It was recognised that in order to carry out the work 'a Sino-German Company shall be formed', and that detailed Sino-German negotiations would have to take place. But it was understood that 'the object of this agreement is solely the development of commerce, and in constructing this railroad there is no intention to unlawfully seize any land in the Province of Shantung'. This and subsequent German declarations concerning the railways were important, for in the post-war negotiations concerning Shantung ownership of the railways in the province was to prove a vital factor.

The treaty accorded German subjects mining rights along the entire length of the railway and to a width of 30 li (approximately 15 kilometres) on each side of the track. In conclusion the treaty stipulated that in the event of any foreign work being undertaken in Shantung on behalf of the Chinese government, the said work and the right of supplying capital and materials had first to be offered to Germany.

Sino-German regulations for the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway were agreed upon in March, 1900, and by their terms Germany was accorded a decisive voice in the business of the line.

Germany also acquired some extension of political influence for article 14 stated that all foreigners entering the interior of Shantung 'must be provided with passports sealed by the proper Chinese and German authorities'. Nevertheless, of great importance to the limitation of Germany's rights, and of particular relevance to later controversies, was article 16 which stated:

'Troops, eventually necessary for the protection of the railway will be stationed by the Governor of the Province of Shantung. Therefore outside the 100 li zone no foreign troops shall be employed for this purpose. The Governor of the Province of Shantung binds himself to take effective measures during the period of surveying as well as when the railway is under construction or opened for traffic to prevent any damage being done to it by the mob or by rebels.'⁷

As the Governor of Shantung was Chinese it was obvious that China was responsible for any movements of troops to protect the line.

Although the German government had obtained important gains in Shantung, they were anxious to avoid claiming exclusive rights to the province. Kiaochow became an open-port in September, 1898, and some four years later Germany denied that she had any intentions of abandoning adherence to the principle of the 'open-door'. Germany declared:

'The facts are that a German corporation has obtained mining concessions for certain strictly defined mineral lands situated in the province of Shantung; but this does in no way mean a monopoly for the whole province.'⁸

While Germany's declarations of disinterest in Shantung were undoubtedly exaggerated, her attitude and actions were in marked contrast to those later adopted by Japan.

Proof of Britain's support for Germany's actions in seizing Kiaochow, and her willingness to bargain with other powers at China's expense, can be found in a note which Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador in Berlin, handed to the German government just before Britain acquired Wei-hai Wei. It stated:

'England formally declares to Germany that in establishing herself at Wei-hai Wei, she has no intention of injuring or contesting the rights and interests of Germany in the Province of Shantung, or of creating difficulties for her in that province. It is especially understood that England will not construct any rail-road communication from Wei-hai Wei and the district leased therewith into the interior of the Province of Shantung.'

No doubt Britain would have preferred all other foreign countries to have kept out of China, but Britain's ready recognition of Germany's acquisitions at the end of the 19th century must qualify Britain's later accusations against Germany of doing great wrong to China by obtaining rights in Shantung.

Britain's fear of Russia was obvious in the terms whereby she acquired Wei-hai Wei, for the relevant Anglo-Chinese convention stated that the island of Linkung, 'and a belt of land 10 English miles wide along the entire coast of the Bay' were to be conceded to Britain 'for so long a period as Port

Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia.'¹⁰ In view of the fact that a retreat of British warships from Port Arthur in January, 1898, had been seen as an abject surrender to the Russians, some counter-measures were clearly understandable,¹¹ but one must question the wisdom of Britain acquiring Wei-hai Wei for it has been argued that:

'The place was of little value. Its harbour was not deep enough for large ships, it was expensive to fortify, and it was cut off from the hinterland by a range of hills and they [the British] had to give the Germans assurances that they would never do anything with the place that was worth doing'.¹²

One may note that as late as 1927 only 100 English people were in permanent residence in the port, and in the same year whereas the total tonnage of ships using Port Edward (Wei-hai Wei) was approximately 2 million, that for Hong Kong was some 44 million, and for Shanghai nearly 30 million.¹³ Despite its comparative unimportance, however, the question of Wei-hai Wei monotonously appears in Anglo-Chinese relations, especially during the Shantung negotiations at the peace conference at Paris and the Washington conference in 1921.

Reference has already been made to the 'open-door' policy regarding China, which also features regularly in far eastern affairs, and much credit for the expression has been attributed to John Hay, the American Secretary of State.¹⁴

But when he was questioned by a certain Mr. Parker, Lord Curzon,

who was foreign secretary from 1919-1924, had some comments on the origins of the expression which are of interest to British policy. He stated:

'It is quite true that I used the phrase "The open door in China" in Parliamentary Debates in 1898.... I must however disclaim the honour of authorship. The origin of the phrase is traceable to a speech made by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach /Chancellor of the Exchequer/ at Swansea on January 17th, 1898. In the course of his remarks he referred to a statement of the policy of His /sic, Her/ Majesty's Government in China, made by Mr. Balfour...and observed that:- "We did not regard China as a place for conquest or acquisition by any European or other Power. We looked upon it as the most hopeful place of the future for the commerce of the world at large, and the Government were absolutely determined at whatever cost, even...if necessary at the cost of War, that door should not be shut." '15

One must doubt, however, whether Britain would have risked such a war unless her interests in China were seriously threatened, and in the 20th century Britain's attitude towards the 'open-door' principle proved that she was vitally concerned with maintaining her special position, especially in relation to Shanghai and Hong Kong.

The Boxer Rebellion and some subsequent developments.

The influence of the foreign powers not unnaturally had a profound reaction upon the Chinese nation, and her history of the 19th century is full of wars against foreigners. The superiority of western arms helped to create within China movements for the reform of the system of government and the introduction of more modern methods of agriculture and industry.

Towards the end of the century the demands for reform had become widespread and such leaders as Sun Yat-sen and K'ang Yu-wei had emerged to give effective voice to Chinese nationalism.¹⁷

China's size, the character of the Manchu emperors, and the need for provincial governors left the country vulnerable to all kinds of factionalism, and often the main developments of the reform and nationalist movements were lost in a series of complicated political manoeuvres which frequently split the country. This encouraged western governments to regard China contemptuously and be misled as to the real strength of the country. Superior attitudes were often adopted by government representatives and western settlers in China who too often looked upon the Chinese people as coolies and of little importance. There were, however, some notable exceptions among the western diplomats, and undoubtedly the most outstanding were Sir John Jordan and Paul Reinsch who, for varying periods before the first world war, and during the conflict, were the respective British and American ministers in Peking. Both continued in office until just after hostilities had ceased.¹⁸

A most violent clash between the anti-foreign forces of China and the representatives of the foreign powers occurred in 1900 when the famous Boxer rebellion witnessed very bloody scenes, especially in the legation area of Peking¹⁹. Despite

the differences which existed among the powers a marked degree of unity was achieved in quickly suppressing the uprising, the details of which have been described elsewhere.²⁰ Although the Chinese scored some early victories in the uprising, especially in June, 1900, the arrival of reinforcements of foreign troops in August saw the quick defeat of the Boxers.

The defeat of the Boxer rebellion reduced China's international standing still further, increased popular dislike of the Manchu dynasty, and led to the formation of the Chinese Republic, after the revolution of 1911-1912. China was forced to agree to a heavy indemnity amounting to some £67 million to be paid at four per cent compound interest, which meant that over the forty year repayment period more than twice the original sum was to be exacted.²¹ In 1908, however, the United States decided that her claims were excessive and decided to devote half of her share of the indemnity to educating Chinese students in America and setting up a university near Peking.²² Britain's share of the indemnity was some £7½ million, and she fell in line with the United States in spending part of the instalments upon education for the Chinese. America's actions gained her some popularity in China, but as Chinese nationalism grew so this form of international control over a part of China's expenditure proved irksome to the nationalists. It may be noted that as late as 1929, Arthur Henderson, foreign

secretary in the second Labour government, was most annoyed when he learnt that indemnity money was planned for building Chinese railways instead of being spent on education.²³

During the post-rebellion negotiations Russia tended to be lenient over her financial claims and in her demands for the punishment of rebels. Russia also sought to induce the rest of the powers to withdraw from Tientsin while she remained, and these actions increased international distrust.²⁴ The unity of the powers which was established during the Boxer uprising proved very brief and the uncertain international situation helped to facilitate the Anglo-Japanese negotiations of 1901 which resulted in an alliance between the two countries early the following year.²⁵

The Anglo-Japanese alliance lasted in an amended form until the Washington conference of 1921, and it had world wide ramifications, for the possible combination of the British and Japanese fleets was of obvious importance to Russia, Germany, France, and the United States. The alliance also had a bearing upon Anglo-Chinese relations, for if Britain were indifferent to China, but an ally of Japan, it was clear that in any Sino-Japanese clash the British government were hardly likely to give serious consideration to China's desiderata.²⁶

Within a few years the Anglo-Japanese alliance was tested by the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, for by the terms of the alliance no country could come to Russia's assistance without becoming involved in a war with Britain. To the surprise of the world Japan proved the victor and this result had a marked influence upon the actions of the powers.²⁷ The importance of the war was also considerable for China, for apart from the Russian-Japanese fighting having taken place on Chinese soil and waters, article V of the resulting peace treaty stated:

'The Imperial Russian Government transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and adjacent territory and territorial waters and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease....'²⁸

Japan had thus secured a hold on the Chinese mainland with the direction pointed towards Manchuria.

While the Russo-Japanese war was in progress negotiations began not only to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was not due to expire until 1907, but to sharpen its terms and extend its scope to cover India in the interests of Britain, and to limit its relevance over Korea in the interests of Japan. The negotiations revealed that Anglo-Japanese relations were exceedingly close and that Britain welcomed Russia's pending defeat.²⁹ After the Russo-Japanese war, however, Britain became suspicious of Japan and, owing to growing fears of Japan's

increased economic and naval capabilities, dislike of the alliance developed.³⁰ But in weighing the various alternatives Sir Edward Grey, foreign secretary, recognised the rights of the Japanese on the Chinese mainland, and 'Grey was supported by most officials in the Foreign Office in his policy of allowing Japan a free hand in the Far East within reason'.³¹

Japan for her part was prepared to see Britain extend her interests in China, provided, of course, that they did not conflict with her own, and she encouraged the British to remain in Wei-haiWei. Baron Komura, the Japanese minister for foreign affairs, argued that on no account should Britain leave the port, for 'it would be quite impossible to leave the Germans holding Kiaochow and you the British not there to keep them in check.'³² China, however, had different aims and Wang Ta-hsiih, the Chinese minister in London, asked Grey to return Wei-haiWei as China wanted to develop it as a base for her future navy.³³

By the terms of the Anglo-Chinese agreement of 1898, Wei-haiWei was to remain in British hands for as long as Russia occupied Port Arthur,³⁴ and Wang argued that as Port Arthur was in the hands of a power which was an ally of Britain, Wei-haiWei should be returned to China, but Grey demurred. The Japanese government remained hostile to a retrocession and argued that:

'so long as Germany held Kiaochow, so long should Great Britain remain at Wei-hai Wei... The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs further stated that the information which had reached the Japanese Government from Peking and other sources was to the effect that China was trying to repudiate all her engagements; that if Wei-hai Wei was returned the Chinese would, in his opinion, regard it as a great diplomatic triumph for themselves; and that it would lead to further demands which would result in very serious trouble'. 35

Although Germany held Kiaochow it can be seen, however, that she was seeking to modify her position. Almost immediately after the Russo-Japanese war, Germany agreed to withdraw all her troops from the neutral zone, and she specifically stated that the railways within the Shantung province 'shall completely be under the supervision and protection of the Chinese local authorities and police officers'.³⁶ Indeed, Germany's policy in Shantung had been described as being quite liberal.³⁷

One must doubt that Japan's opinions on Wei-hai Wei had any decisive influence upon the British government for there was already marked British hostility to any proposals for retrocession, and even Sir John Jordan, the British minister who later adopted different views, argued that a surrender would assist 'the Chauvinist movement' in China. Early in November, 1906, Grey reached the conclusion that retrocession would be wrong

politically for it would encourage Chinese nationalism and, indicating that her views had been considered, that it would let Japan down. But Grey was against spending money on, or investing in, Wei-hai-wei.³⁸

If Britain were hesitant to make advances in China, Japan was not and she 'initiated plans for obtaining a foothold in Shantung Province several years before the outbreak of the Great War...'³⁹ Japan did this by developing the port of Lungkow, and the Japanese-backed Dairen Steamship company operated a triangular shipping service to three ports nearby.

It can be seen that in the first ten years of the century Japan had transformed her position in the far east and had emerged as a very strong power. She had not only inherited Russia's rights in sections of China, but by her aggressive policies had established a reputation which was causing Britain to become increasingly uneasy, but it was China who had to bear the brunt of Japan's actions.

The Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the Chinese Revolution of 1911.

Although the Anglo-Japanese alliance was not due to expire until 1915 it was renewed again in 1911, but the spirit of the renewal and the political circumstances were in marked contrast to those of 1905 when the alliance was first revised.

Owing to international agreements Russia was no longer regarded as the menace she had once been, especially to Britain and Japan, whereas Japan's annexation of Korea was indicative of an ^{ambitious} ~~forward-seeking~~ country. High in Britain's considerations, however, was the need to improve Anglo-American relations and establish the fact that a revised alliance with Japan could not be invoked against America. The details of the situation have been fully described by Dr. Lowe who points out that there were some British diplomats who were against renewal on the grounds that the uncertainty which would have been created 'would be a check to any unnecessarily forward policy on the part of Japan', who would have been apprehensive of Britain's intentions.⁴⁰

These views were opposed by Grey for not considering world wide circumstances. It was argued that Britain had to economise on her naval building, for the Victorian days of supremacy were over, and in 1911 it was Germany, not Japan, who was in need of control. 'The Times' welcomed the renewal, but British commercial interests in China opposed it, while 'Chinese opinion disliked the new agreement fearing, not without some justification, that Japanese encroachment in Manchuria would develop further'.⁴¹

If the powers in the far east had been re-grouping in the first decade of the century, changes in China were marked, and although the Chinese revolution of 1911 began with an accidental explosion the political situation had been ripening

for some time. It can be seen that three main features were working for changes within China, and they were the radical revolutionists, the constitutional monarchists, and the Yüan Shih-k'ai faction. The first group were the implacable enemies of the Manchu dynasty who sought its overthrow, the second wanted moderate reforms while retaining the Manchu line, and the third group were dominated by Yüan Shih-k'ai who was a professional politician and an expert at compromise.⁴²

It is not necessary to trace the progress of the revolution, but it may be noted that as it developed the divisions between the groups disappeared, or became blurred, and by the end of 1911 most of the Chinese people were in revolt against the Manchus. The foreign policy of the revolutionaries was based on the fear that should the powers intervene the revolution would suffer defeat, and as a result of such misgivings a provisional central government meeting in Shanghai declared:

'We have, in short, taken every possible step to protect vested interests, safeguard international obligations, secure continuance of commerce, and shield education and religious institutions; and what is even more important, striven continually to maintain law and order, sustain peace and promote a constructive policy upon sound and enduring grounds.'⁴³

The powers of the Shanghai provisional government were fleeting, but there can be little doubt that their sweeping statement reflected the revolutionaries' aims not to offend the foreign powers.⁴⁴

Initially Britain adopted an attitude of political and financial neutrality, but the impact of the revolution upon Japan was immediate for she agreed to advance the Manchu government munitions 'providing the Chinese government adopted a more cordial attitude towards the Japanese position in Manchuria'. Japan was anxious to intervene in 1911, ostensibly to protect the Peking-Mukden railway, but as this could have caused a clash with Russia, Grey warned the Japanese not to extend their influence.⁴⁵

As the revolution progressed influential British nationals gave advice to the Chinese factions concerning policy. For example, Dr. Morrison pointed out to the republican leaders in Shanghai 'that it was hopeless to expect that a leader such as Sun Yat-sen, who knew nothing about China, could obtain for the Republic early recognition from foreign powers'.⁴⁶ British policy began to change from neutrality to supporting Chinese leaders who were considered dependable, of which the most outstanding was Yüan Shih-k'ai, a war-lord, politician, and diplomat who had served the Manchu regime with distinction. Yüan had clashed with the Japanese over Korea, for which they never forgave him, and he had been in dispute with the Chinese regent during the attempts to reform the Manchu regime, but he was a practical politician who could manoeuvre adroitly and was regarded as the man most likely to achieve stability in China.⁴⁷

Consequently 'whatever the ultimate form of Chinese government, monarchical or republican, Britain felt that it could only work efficaciously if Yüan controlled it. British policy may be summarised as neutrality with a pro-Yüan bias'.⁴⁸ Britain's desires for the political stability which it was thought Yüan could introduce were undoubtedly related to hopes for an increase in trade and investment which follow automatically from an orderly regime.

Stability, however, proved elusive and it has been argued that:

'It had been a basic contradiction in the Chinese Revolution of 1911 that, whereas the aim of the young nationalist and republican revolutionaries had been to build up China as a strong modern state in place of the loosely organised archaic autocracy of the old imperial system the short-term effect of the upheaval was to strengthen the forces of provincial particularism.'⁴⁹

The unity of the Chinese factions necessary for the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty quickly proved too weak, and the revolution of 1911 was followed by further disorders in 1913. Yüan Shih-k'ai banished parliament and his clash with the militant nationalists caused Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the newly formed Kuomintang party, to flee for his life. Sun was to prove a major figure in modern China, while the Kuomintang became the main basis for the formation of a rival nationalist government at Canton.

Negotiations for the recognition of the republic involved — China in attempts to strengthen her position on such an issue as Tibet, and relations among the powers were influenced by the new situation. Britain's support for Yüan Shih-k'ai has been stressed, but Japan was very hostile to him, and as a result Britain was concerned lest Japanese actions should endanger her economic interests in China.⁵⁰ Between 1911 and 1914 international relations in the far east tended to be expressed in the actions concerning loans and the financial consortium, and this tendency brought the United States into greater prominence.

International financial consortia to control loans to China had existed earlier in the century, but that of June, 1912, was clearly different and more significant. Its scope has been thus described:

'The Consortium, however, was now called on to handle a question of finance that had nothing to do with industry but was purely political in character. The object of the proposed loan was the stabilisation of the Government of China and the Governments of the lending Powers accordingly undertook to lay down the conditions on which the money was to be lent and the purposes to which it was to be applied: sources of revenue were to be placed under foreign control; foreign Administrations were to exercise the functions of the Chinese Government; Chinese armies were to be disbanded under foreign supervision and so on. Russia and Japan had no money to lend and accordingly had no place in a Consortium whose function was the economic development of China; but when it became a question of establishing a measure of political control over China these Powers could not be left out. Russian and Japanese groups were accordingly admitted into the Consortium.....

This immediately filled the Chinese with the deepest suspicion of the policy and aims of the Consortium. It now seemed clear to them that the Consortium was the instrument by which the Powers hoped to establish a political domination over China, economic development being either a pretence or a side issue.' 51

While such a description might be extreme there can be no doubt that financial loans to China were a measure of controlling her affairs and when a loan was made outside the auspices of the consortium a minor diplomatic row ensued.⁵²

Woodrow Wilson, who was elected president of the United States in 1912, was well aware of the scope of the consortium, and one of his first actions upon assuming office was to insist on American withdrawal from its membership on the grounds that its terms seemed 'to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself'.⁵³ Even before he was president, Wilson had expressed his views on China and was generally sympathetic to the possibilities of China obtaining some restoration of lost sovereign rights. Although he did not understand all the complexities of the far-eastern situation it has been argued that Wilson,

'was correct in his judgment that the unfortunate position of that country [China] in world affairs was due in no small degree to the policies of the Western Powers and Japan. In his own Chinese policy he usually found himself alone among the world leaders.' 54

From the turn of the century the China policy of the United States had been generally liberal, and although valid criticisms

could be made of the manner in which she had championed the 'open-door', her actions had won considerable friendship from wide sections of the Chinese people, especially Chinese students who had been to the United States to complete their education. Hence, when Wilson began to give his attention to China's point of view this was a development which was to prove of considerable importance to Britain's far eastern policies.

It may be judged that Wilson's concern for China added to the dilemma into which the British government were slipping in the far east. By 1913 British fears of ^{an ambitious} ~~a forward-seeking~~ Japan were increasingly out-weighing her apprehensions regarding Russia. In addition, Anglo-Japanese economic rivalry in China, particularly in the Yangtse valley, had increased and it has already been noted that the two powers were backing different Chinese factions. Britain's aim was to compromise with moderate Chinese elements, but Wilson's aims were for the restoration of China's sovereignty. It will be shown that Britain in the first quarter of the century was not prepared to make any serious, or indeed trivial, retrocessions to China. In fact Britain was becoming involved in an impossible situation where she wanted to preserve her political rights in China, and possibly extend her economic interests, but at the same time she wanted to be on good terms with Japan and the United States.

However, unfortunately for Britain, the policies of these two countries regarding China were tending to operate in opposite directions, and bad relations between them had already developed over various Pacific problems and the question of Asian immigration.⁵⁵ It was, therefore, to prove increasingly difficult for Britain to please China, America, and Japan at the same time, and even if Britain were not unduly concerned over China, she was anxious to remain on good terms with the other two countries.

While it is possible to isolate the far east for study purposes, the governments of the powers were confronted with a world-wide situation and as the events described above were occurring all but the most outstanding were overshadowed by the growing crisis in Europe and the rise of German military power. Rather paradoxically after her seizure of Kiaochow in 1898, Germany played a comparatively minor role in the far east, and apart from such an exceptional occasion as the Boxer rebellion, Germany's actions tended to be inconspicuous. Indeed, in the far east Britain was more concerned with the actions of her future allies rather than her future enemy.

The Outbreak of the War and Japan's occupation of the Shantung province.

Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, and Japan followed suit on 23 August. Between these dates there was considerable Anglo-Japanese diplomatic activity during which

Britain tried to persuade Japan to restrict her activities to the sea and avoid any military action in China, which was the only major centre in the far east where German and Japanese troops could engage. It is clear that Japan's declaration of war was viewed in Britain with only qualified support, but as there are a number of detailed accounts which describe the events it is not necessary to repeat the story.⁵⁶ However, it is important to refer to the documents which were relevant to Britain's policy to China, especially to those which had a bearing upon post-war considerations.

On the outbreak of hostilities Bellby Alston of the far-eastern department of the Foreign Office, who later played a major role in helping to determine policy in his capacities as *chargé d'affaires* in Tokyo and minister to Peking, reviewed the situation.⁵⁷ He recognised that German shipping had to be destroyed, but he was concerned at the influence which the warfare would have upon China. Alston warned that Japan would be seeking to improve her position and that some action should be taken to minimise the loss to British trade in China. He felt that German shipping in Chinese waters could be 'neutralised' with comparative ease by the British, and this would still leave ample British naval forces free to operate for police purposes in China in order to counter-act Japan should she become too active on the pretext of safeguarding foreign

interests on the mainland. He argued: 'In other words our position vis-à-vis the Chinese Govt. should not be weakened more than is absolutely necessary and the Japanese allowed a completely free hand through force of present circumstances.' Sir Eyre Crowe, assistant under-secretary of state, entirely agreed with the political aspects of Alston's memorandum, but later in the war, however, the changed shipping position called for Japanese naval cooperation.

Jordan, the British minister in Peking, thought that Japan's entry into the war would endanger the stability of the regime in China and would have a bad effect upon Britain's influence in that country and throughout Asia generally.⁵⁸ Jordan was against possible unilateral action by Japan regarding Tsingtao, and he favoured the neutralisation of the Pacific.⁵⁹ Crowe, however, opposed Jordan's views on neutralisation and argued that they were restricted to the Chinese horizon. 'What is wanted is to strike hard with all our might in all the four corners of the world.' But Grey was uncertain over neutralisation and he realised that the United States was anxious 'lest Japan should acquire too preponderating an influence in China whilst European Powers are fighting.'⁶⁰ As Grey had supported limited Japanese expansion in China, one must question how sincere he was when he stated.. 'as any action taken by Japan will be in protection of general interests of Anglo-Japanese

Agreement, it will be a special object of Great Britain and Japan to see, as provided by the terms of their agreement, that the integrity of China is maintained, and we hope her neutrality also...'⁶¹

Alston realised that Japan was determined upon entering the war and he felt that any further British objections would only serve to antagonise her. It was vital, Alston agreed, that Germany should be crushed everywhere with the greatest possible rapidity, and he continued by describing a recent interview he had had with Katsunosuke Inouye, the Japanese ambassador in London. Of particular relevance to China were Alston's comments that Inouye,

'disclaims any desire on the part of Japan for territorial aggrandisement and proposes to meet Sir J. Jordan's apprehensions by our giving joint advice to the Chinese Govt. to rely on our maintaining peace and order on condition that China does not look for assistance elsewhere. I would go further and with a view to inspiring confidence in China and giving proof of our honesty of purpose, arrange with Japan beforehand that in the event of Kiao-chow being taken, (and we must insist that this shall only be taken by our combined forces and not by Japanese forces alone) Kiao-chow shall at once be given back to China together with Wei-hai Wei'.

'If an understanding on the above is arrived at with Japan I see no reason for any apprehensions on our part as to accepting her assistance.'⁶²

Meanwhile Jordan had reached the conclusion that Anglo-Japanese co-operation was to be preferred to separate action by Japan, but he felt that it was absolutely necessary for a public

declaration to be made that Kiaochow would eventually be restored to China.⁶³ Alston welcomed Jordan's dispatch and noted:

'Sir J. Jordan holds the same views now as we do - viz. (1) that joint co-operation with Japan will allay disturbances in China, (2) that China should be assured beforehand that if Kiaochow is taken it will be restored to her, (3) that American objection will be removed if action is confined to China and China seas...'

Hence, if the 'we' which Alston used meant the Foreign Office this was a clear statement that the British government believed that Kiaochow should be restored to China.

The Germans, of course, had not been idle, and Jordan reported that the German charge d'affaires had been seeking to negotiate the direct surrender of Kiaochow to China. The main points of the German proposals were that all military installations were to be handed to China and the German troops interned, but the question of compensation to be paid to Germany was to be arranged later.⁶⁴ When Jordan pointed out that the last proposal vitiated the arrangements, he was told by the Chinese emissary that it would almost certainly be dropped.

Sir Conyngham Greene, the British ambassador in Tokyo, reported that the Japanese government had learned of the Sino-German negotiations and as a result Baron Kato, minister for foreign affairs, had instructed the Japanese charge d'affaires in Peking to warn the Chinese government against entering

further negotiations. Kato asked if the British government would do the same.⁶⁵ Grey agreed that Greene should make such a warning if Greene saw no objection, and Grey informed the ambassador that the British government were considering a joint Anglo-Japanese communication which was to be made to China in regard to crossing Chinese territory to reach Kiaochow.

It is, perhaps, interesting to note in view of the attention which the issue of Wei-hai Wei commanded, that Japan made an offer to send reinforcements for the defence of the port if they were thought necessary. Illustrating the military insignificance of Wei-hai Wei in the crisis of 1914 were Alston's comments that:

'...the force at Wei-hai Wei consists of a marine guard of about 50 men who have standing orders to disappear in case of trouble. There are also about 100 natives employed on police duty. For the present there is no need for any apprehension in regard to these forces but we can thank the Japanese Govt. for their friendly message.'⁶⁶

In the post-war settlement, however, Britain continued to place importance upon Wei-hai Wei as a base, but continued to refrain from developing it.

Events were moving with considerable rapidity, and Jordan informed Grey that the Chinese government had realised that Kiaochow should be taken by an international force. In reply Jordan had informed Yüan Shih-k'ai, the Chinese president, that Chinese interests were being seriously considered, and that

they need have no apprehension as to the results of any joint action which might be decided upon against Kiaochow.'⁶⁷

Alston welcomed China's acceptance of the situation and he felt that it was essential that the Chinese government should be dissuaded from any attempts to open direct negotiations with the Germans lest they should reveal the allied plans. Alston continued by making some comments of particular relevance to Anglo-Chinese relations, for he stated that an opportunity had been provided whereby China would be advised to rely upon Anglo-Japanese influence to the exclusion of others.

'It is well known that the Japanese have for some time held the view that the future of China lies in the hands of Great Britain and Japan - and she has now proclaimed this view officially and made a bid for our acceptance of it in no uncertain terms. This view is based on two facts viz. (1) that while Japan is China's most powerful neighbour and has larger interests at stake there than any European Power, (2) she cannot and while the Yüan régime exists never will - owing to Japan's poor relations with Yüan/ - gain the ear and the confidence of the Chinese Govt. except through us who have it in an exceptional degree.' Britain should mediate for 'The time has now obviously arrived for a complete understanding with Japan for a future joint policy in China...'

Hopes for such a policy were, however, quickly destroyed by Japan's assertive actions, and Alston's disappointment may have helped him to develop the general hostile attitude to Japan, and friendship for China which ~~was~~ he held in the post-war years.

In mid-August Jordan was concerned over the prospects of violating China's neutrality but he felt this was unavoidable if Kiaochow were to be recaptured. Jordan felt that an Anglo-Japanese note should be delivered which should give the assurance that:

'...any Chinese territory at present occupied by our enemies which may fall into our hands will be restored to China when hostilities are concluded, and that neither Power entertains any territorial aggrandisement at the expense of China.'⁶⁸

Grey agreed, and hoped that if Japan could not associate herself with such a note as little modification as possible should be made in order to obtain Japanese agreement. Grey was also uneasy about the possible violation of China's territory and he argued that such a step ' would be exactly similar to that of the Germans in Belgium which has been the chief cause of our war with Germany...'⁶⁹

The preparations for the re-capture of Kiaochow had gone ahead while Japan was still neutral, but on 15 August, Greene reported the demands which Japan were to present to Germany as an ultimatum. She demanded that Germany was to give up Kiaochow to Japan without any conditions on compensation, 'China eventually to have the place restored to her'. All German ships in Japanese or Chinese waters were to be removed or dis-armed, and ~~these~~ the measures demanded had to be complied

with by the 23rd August.⁷⁰ Alston was alarmed at the demands and he informed Grey that it would create an unfavourable impression 'if on account of our [Alston's emphasis] conflict with Germany, Japan is to demand the unconditional surrender of Kiaochow to herself alone.' But Alston felt that if the demand were made jointly by Britain and Japan 'it will be all right'. Crowe agreed that further consideration was necessary. Grey was anxious to discuss the matter with the Japanese ambassador, and a reply was sent to Greene instructing him that Britain should be associated with Japan in any measures necessary for the capture of Kiaochow, but Britain wanted to make it clear that she had no claims to make on Kiaochow in the post-war settlement.

Suspicious of Japan began to mount when Jordan reported that increased accommodation for some 15,000 men was being prepared at Hankow. Alston stated that this was the type of action he had long feared and he felt a frank discussion should be held with the Japanese to try to reach an agreement upon a policy for China.⁷¹ Sir Walter Langley, assistant under secretary of state, argued that the action of the Japanese was likely to alienate the Chinese, and they ought to have consulted the British government before taking such a step.

News of the Japanese ultimatum caused the Chinese government to renew their efforts to secure the direct retro-

cession of Kiaochow to China, but Jordan 'informed the Chinese that his Government could not now recognise such a transfer. In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Japan and apparently acquiesced in by Great Britain, the Chinese Government dares take no official action.' China strove hard to persuade the United States to take up her cause, but the American government declined to get themselves involved.⁷²

It is not necessary to dwell upon the brief but fairly bitter military campaign for the capture of Tsingtao which lasted from September until November 1914.⁷³ One may note that the Japanese bore the brunt of the casualties, namely, 1,455 killed and 4,200 wounded to Britain's 14 killed and 61 wounded. This disproportionate sacrifice may be explained by a dispatch from John T. Pratt, consul-general at Tsinan and later adviser to the far eastern department of the Foreign Office.⁷⁴ Pratt argued that the Japanese had insisted that the Tsingtao campaign should be mainly a Japanese affair and only 1½ battalions of British troops had been used. Barnadiston, the British commanding general, had been treated by the Japanese general Kamio in a very off-handed manner, and Pratt complained that 'when Tsingtao was actually captured great pains were taken to demonstrate to all that it was a Japanese, and in no sense a British, or even an allied victory'.

There can be no doubt that Britain's policy towards China in the early stages of the war was more liberal than that of Japan, for although no joint Anglo-Japanese declaration that Shantung would be restored to China materialised, this was due only to the non-cooperation of Japan.⁷⁵ Japanese troops became extended along the railway lines well beyond the buffer zone in Shantung in a manner which seemed in excess of the demands of the military situation, and within six weeks of the German surrender at Kiaochow, 'Baron Kato....stated that whether Kiaochow would be restored to China and whether Japan would succeed to the rights of Germany in Shantung were questions for the future, but that no agreement necessitating the Japanese retrocession of the area existed with any power.'⁷⁶ Japan was to follow her initiative in China by a series of political demands which had a most profound effect upon the international diplomatic situation.

The 21 Demands of 1915

On 18th January, 1915, Eki Hioki, the Japanese minister in Peking, presented the notorious 21 demands, in secret, to Yüan Shih-k'ai, the Chinese president. The demands were divided into five groups and they constituted serious limitations upon China's sovereignty, especially the fifth group.⁷⁷ Of the first group, the first article stated,

'The Chinese Government engage to give full assent to all matters that the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions, which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses vis-a-vis China in relation to the Province of Shantung'.

The remaining four articles in the group all referred to Shantung and their terms were for Japan to have the right to build railways and secure widespread entry into the province.

British reactions to the 21 demands were sharp and Grey, who had favoured limited Japanese advances in China, expressed his disappointment with Japan.⁷⁸ The story of China's counter-proposals of February and the Sino-Japanese crisis of May, 1915, when Japan threatened war in order to force China's acceptance of the requirements has been told elsewhere,⁷⁹ but it is important to stress the inability of Britain to restrain Japan who brushed aside all attempts to curtail her actions with comparative ease.⁸⁰

At the Paris peace conference Robert Lansing, the American secretary of state, was a decided opponent of Japan's claims to Shantung. But in 1915 when he was under-secretary he was quite sympathetic to Japan, and questioned the wisdom of protesting at the infringements of American treaty rights which would occur with the implementation of the 21 demands. Lansing felt that Japan had to expand and while emigration to America was prohibited it was unreasonable to exclude the Japanese from certain areas of China. He suggested that if the American

government 'refrains from urging its undoubted treaty rights relative to Southern Manchuria and Shan Tung, it would do so as a friend of Japan who is solicitous for her welfare.' Lansing was in favour of a bargain whereby in exchange for a sympathetic attitude to Japan's actions in China, Japan would recognise the 'open-door' and end unfair monopolistic positions. He stated:

'If a bargain along these lines could be struck it would relieve us of the vexatious California land controversy, and prevent in large measure future disputes which seem almost inevitable if the "demands" of Japan are permitted at the present time to pass unchallenged.'⁸¹

One must observe, however, that the bargain which Lansing proposed was to be at China's expense once again.

~~And so~~ ^{After} Japan ^{had striven} ~~was striving~~ to secure Chinese acceptance of the 21 demands there were other developments of such consequence to Anglo-Chinese relations that the following lengthy quotation is justified:

'There were hopes [in 1915] that supplies of arms would be sent to Russia via China. But both Russia and Japan were worried lest China should want to join the war and thus upset the 1912 agreements of these powers concerning East Inner Mongolia and South Manchuria respectively'.

'In London the Japanese Government were opposing the proposal [for China to enter the war] on various grounds, such as the possibility of revolutionary trouble at Shanghai and Canton and the fear that China would ask for her reward after the war in the form of rendition of concessions and other foreign privileges. It was in vain that His Majesty's Government urged the danger of enemy intrigues against India and the desirability of expelling all enemy subjects from China. The Japanese then simulated

great indignation, and made false accusations against His Majesty's Minister of having initiated negotiations behind their back; they stated that Japanese public opinion would strongly oppose abandonment by China of her neutrality. The Japanese Government formally refused to join Great Britain, Russia and France in asking China to enter the war.....This attitude was obviously hypocritical in view of Japan's assertion that her action in presenting the twenty-one demands had been taken with the idea of binding China to the side of the Allies; but at that time the Allies were not in a position to resist pressure from Japan, and the proposal to bring China openly into the war had therefore to be abandoned.' 82

Such a report makes nonsense of the oft-repeated phrase used by Arthur J. Balfour, when Britain's foreign secretary, that China had not spent a shilling nor lost a man in any Chinese attempt to wrest Shantung from the Germans.

Whether China could have waged war effectively in 1915 was very doubtful for the country was in considerable chaos. Yüan Shih-k'ai felt he could unite the country and defeat the rival factions if he had himself declared emperor, and in the mid-summer of 1915 it was clear that such a step was imminent. But in October, the British, Japanese, and Russian representatives in Peking suggested that this step should be postponed. America, however, refused to join in the representations and declared that whether China had an emperor or not was for the Chinese to decide. 83

Although Yüan continued in his attempts to become monarch, the frustrations caused by the opposition of the powers undoubtedly contributed to his sudden death in 1916⁸⁴.

After the temporary unity of the Chinese factions following Yüan's death, discord became prominent not only between the Kuomintang section in the south and the Peking government in the north, but among the rival groups surrounding these centres. This discord became almost a permanent feature of Chinese politics which was undoubtedly made worse by the presence of foreign powers and their support of respective Chinese factions, especially by Japan, in order to further their own interests.⁸⁵

Some Important Developments in 1917.

On a world basis the Russian revolutions of 1917 were undoubtedly the most important events of the year, but their impact upon China was deferred until the 1920's, but one immediate result of the November revolution was that the Bolshevik government published the secret Russian-Japanese alliance of 1916 which restricted Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and was 'directed against America'.⁸⁶ In 1917, however, Japan began negotiations with the United States, and early in November the exchange of the famous Lansing-Ishii notes took place.⁸⁷ The precise meaning of these notes has been the subject of much controversy which need not be considered here, but there can be no doubt that, whatever Lansing intended, the Japanese derived encouragement from what they believed was American recognition of Japan's special rights in China.

In mid-February the British war cabinet decided to support Japan's claims to Shantung 'with the proviso that the Japanese Government should give a corresponding assurance of support, in the eventual peace settlement, to our claims to the German islands south of the Equator, and in our general policy elsewhere.'⁸⁸ But the cabinet were concerned at the effect such an agreement would have upon America and the dominions, and at the insistence of A.J. Balfour, who had replaced Grey as foreign secretary, the Shantung question was discussed again two days later. At the second cabinet meeting it was decided that 'It would be inexpedient and unfair to our Allies to invite Japan to give so wide an assurance' to British claims, and as a result the words 'in our general policy elsewhere' were omitted from the text given to Japan.⁸⁹

The Anglo-Japanese exchange of notes in February has been depicted as a straightforward bargain between the two countries, and Balfour maintained in later years that recognition of Japan's claims to Shantung was part of a price that Japan 'had exacted from us when we asked for naval assistance in the Mediterranean'.⁹⁰ This interpretation is, however, too harsh upon Japan, for it is clear that Britain's objective was to obtain political as well as naval support. Also Japan, under the leadership of the new ~~Imperial~~^{Imperial} Teruchi cabinet had dropped her objections to China entering the war and had agreed to the re-

requested naval assistance before Britain reciprocated by giving assurances to support the Japanese claims to Shantung.⁹¹ It was a feature of the exchange that Jordan, the British minister in Peking, was not consulted nor even informed of the bargain until later⁹². But whatever the exact purpose of Britain's aims in 1917, the attitude of her delegates to the Paris peace conference 1919 was that they were honour-bound to meet the obligations incurred and support Japan's claims to Shantung.

At a meeting of the imperial war council in the spring of 1917, Balfour associated himself with Grey's policy of allowing Japanese expansion in China. With what appears to be almost incredible simplicity in the light of events of 1915, even if the new policies of the ^{Yamamoto Teruchi} ~~Teruchi~~ government are allowed for, Balfour remarked:

'I have myself no doubt that Japan, with an eye to her own interests, is quite genuinely helping the Allies, and helping the Allies to the best of her ability'

and he concluded,

'I do not myself look forward with the least apprehension to anything that Japan is likely to do during the course of the war'.⁹³

Balfour was to maintain a sympathetic attitude to Japan and one of hostility towards China throughout the peace conference, but at the Washington conference, 1921-2, his attitude towards China became more friendly.

In February 1917, the United States and China both severed diplomatic relations with Germany and entered the war

in April and August respectively. Obviously these were events of major importance, and Reinsch, the American minister to Peking, was jubilant when he heard of China's actions. He considered that she had made a great decision:

'This was China's first independent participation in world politics. She had stepped out of her age-long aloofness and taken her place among the modern nations'. Reinsch had met Dr. Morrison who told him 'This is the greatest thing ever accomplished in China. It means a new era. It will make the Chinese nationally self-conscious.' 94

Undoubtedly Morrison was correct and as a result of China's entry into the war she had 'thus emerged as an actor in the arena of Weltpolitik'. 95

China's severance of diplomatic relations and declaration of war upon Germany, however, made very little impression upon Balfour as may be seen ^{as a sequel} ~~in the~~ ~~sequence~~ to the foreign secretary's visit to America in the early summer of 1917. A dispute arose later ^{as to} ~~concerning~~ whether Balfour had informed the United States government of the British promise to support Japan's claims to Shantung, and Balfour's answer to this query reveals his almost contemptuous attitude to China. He stated:

'It is just possible, though most improbable, that in speaking about the territorial changes we had promised to support I did not speak about the transfer of German rights in Shantung to the Allied Power, i.e. Japan, which had conquered them. The proposed transfer was not of territory... It took nothing from China which China possessed; China was not an Ally....' 96

But what is perhaps of **greater** importance than the question of communication is the indication of Balfour's willingness to support the transfer of rights and his indifference to China's position as a power. However, by declaring war China had enhanced her international standing by ensuring her place at the peace conference which was to prove an excellent medium to argue for the return of Shantung and the restoration of Chinese sovereignty. There was also the legal argument that by virtue of the declaration of war all Sino-German treaties were void and that, as China was quick to claim, there were no German rights in China which could be transferred to Japan. When the peace conference began China was to prove very skilled in the presentation of these arguments.

One may conclude that the development of the Shantung question reflected Britain's decline as an imperial power for in seeking a bargain with Japan, as distinct from maintaining her independence of all other countries, Britain had become involved in promises which limited her freedom of action and were to prove costly not only to Anglo-Chinese relations but also detrimental to a better Anglo-American understanding in the post-war world.

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2. See pp.2-7 below.
3. A. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902,
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4. Joseph, p.203. Dr. Joseph gives Die Grosse Politik,
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- 4a. Ibid., p.203.
5. See Appendix 3.
6. Regulations were agreed, 21-3-1900. J.A.V. MacMurray,
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7. MacMurray, I, p.238.
8. Memorandum of German embassy in Washington, 14-2-1900.
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9. Note to German Government, 20-4-1898. MacMurray, I,
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10. Anglo-Chinese convention, 1-7-1898, MacMurray, I,
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11. Godshall, p.38.
12. Langer, p.479.
13. China Year Book, 1929-30, (Shanghai, 1933) p.87.
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23. Henderson to Hewlett, (consul in Nanking) 26-6-1929.
DBFP II (VIII) pp.95-6.
24. Godshall, p.39.
25. Nish, chapter X, pp.204-28. Text of ¹⁹⁰² alliance given, pp.216-8.
26. For details of British dependence upon Japan for the defence of British interests in the Yangtse valley, Ibid. p.233.
27. F.Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 1911-1915 (London, 1969) pp.17-19.
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29. Terms of 1905 agreement, Nish pp.331-3. See also chapters XV and XVI. pp.298-344.
30. Lowe, pp.19-21.
31. Ibid., pp.22-3.
32. Memorandum on Wei-hai Wei, C.W.Campbell, 3-3-1921.
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33. Ibid.
34. See 10 above.
35. These exchanges took place in 1906. Campbell memorandum, 32 above.
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37. Godshall, p.52.
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44. Li Chien-nung, p.248, and Tu Jen-chung pp.178-9.
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50. Lowe, p.89. Pearl, Chapter 10, pp.287-93.

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59. Jordan to Grey, 9-8-1914, F.O.371/2016 374367.
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For full text of the Anglo-Japanese notes see
D.B.F.P.I (VI) p.563. It is important to note that
Lord Curzon, lord president of the Council, made clear
his opposition to Balfour's proposals.
90. Balfour to Curzon, 20-9-1919. Balfour papers, 49734.
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91. Lecture by Dr. Nish at Harvard University, April 1970.
Dr. Nish gives Japanese Diplomatic Documents
(NGB 6/3 no.674) as source of his information.
92. See p. 46 below.
93. Wifield, p.61.
94. F.S.Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (London 1922)
p.253.
95. Hudson, p.170.
96. In a marginal comment Balfour stated in relation to the
point whether China was an ally, 'I am not sure of
my dates'. Memorandum by Balfour. (N.D. but probably
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Vol. LII.

CHAPTER II

THE DEBATE OVER BRITAIN'S POST-WAR POLICIES TO CHINA, 1918.

At the beginning of 1918 the achievement of victory was uppermost in the mind of the British government, but as the year progressed, and allied military success became certain, attention began to focus upon post-war problems including those of the far east. In the interim between the armistice and the peace conference British policy in China was considered in letters between Sir John Jordan, the British minister in Peking, and Ronald Macleay of the far eastern department of the Foreign Office, and the conflicting views clearly expressed the problems involved. Consideration of policy was, however, complicated by Britain's secret pledges of February 1917, about which Jordan was not informed, to support Japan's claims to Shantung.¹

Early in the year proposals for Japanese military forces to occupy the Siberian railway exercised the attention of the British and American governments. Balfour, the foreign secretary, recognised that some aggrandisement by Japan was almost certain and the area most likely to be involved was the Maritime Provinces of Russian eastern Siberia.² These provinces were of considerable interest to China for their population included large numbers of Chinese immigrants, but in his review of the developing situation Balfour ignored China completely.

While it was natural that Balfour should give his attention to the possible influence of Japan's actions upon Russia and the outcome of the war, his total disregard of China may be judged as part of the contemptuous attitude which the foreign secretary took towards that country.

No doubt Balfour's attitude had been influenced by China's internal chaos and poor conduct in fighting the war. China remained hopelessly divided and the policy of Tuan Ch'i-jui, the premier, was described as 'a declaration of war abroad without fighting, and a fight at home without declaration of war.'³ Such a situation had obvious international repercussions. Tuan borrowed huge sums of money (some \$120 million) from Japan and created the so-called European War Participation Army and the New Parliament, ostensibly to participate effectively in the European war and establish order within China. But Tuan used the Japanese loans mainly in selfish schemes to defeat his rivals and as a result became dependent upon Japanese money for survival.⁴ Perhaps of greater importance than the manoeuvres of the warring cliques were the bitter Chinese protests against Tuan's actions, especially by the students from Peking university, which were a greater manifestation of widespread nationalism than the existence of a separate government in the south would have suggested.⁵

As early as June, 1917, Balfour in reviewing policy bemoaned the fact that any Anglo-American naval agreement would be regarded by Japan as ending the Anglo-Japanese alliance.⁶

Balfour praised the alliance and argued that it had conduced to stability in international relations in the far east for nearly twenty years, and therefore it should not be abandoned lightly. A possible solution to the problem was to try to associate Japan with any new arrangements which might be made for Balfour claimed that:

'This would have the triple effect of allaying Japanese fears, of engaging Japanese support, and of advertising the Treaty as a protection against Germany.'

It may be noted that China was once again not mentioned in Balfour's memorandum, and although the question of alliances of the naval powers in the post-war period was not necessarily relevant to China, she obviously stood to be indirectly affected by such matters. For example, if Britain concluded an Anglo-American-Japanese alliance, which remained her hope until the Washington conference in 1921, then any Chinese claims against Japan were hardly likely to receive active support from Britain.

In the summer of 1918, Balfour made proposals for the post-war fate of the German colonies, and he was emphatic that it would be madness to restore any colony to 'an unregenerate Germany'.⁷ Balfour argued that apart from considerations of abstract justice the security of the British Empire offered the strongest practical reason why Germany should not be permitted to regain any of her colonies in Africa, China, or the Pacific. In relation to the far east Balfour stated:

'Japan is, indeed, the heir of Germany in China, and we promised to support her claims to the Pacific Islands north of the Equator, when the subject is brought up at the Peace Conference....So far we are committed.'

The fact that this memorandum was written in June was important for it was clear that Balfour regarded Britain as being obliged to support Japan's claims to German colonies in China, of which Tsingtao and various rights in the Shantung province were of the greatest significance, before the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty of September, 1918, which, it was alleged, was a voluntary recognition by China of Japan's claims to Shantung. This treaty was referred to on several important occasions by Balfour during the peace conference in support of Japan's claims.

A further indication of Balfour's attitude to China is offered in a letter which he wrote to Captain Leopold Amery M.P. who suggested a peace settlement based on 'a world distribution of territory according to spheres based on the Monroe Doctrine'. Balfour disagreed with Amery's main proposals, but conceded:

'You would give Japan as her sphere China generally. On the whole, as far as this country is concerned, I am disposed to agree; but would the United States, or perhaps what is more important the Chinese themselves?' 8

The meanings of some of the expressions used by the two men are uncertain for it was hardly likely that Britain would have readily surrendered her interests in China, especially in such

strong areas as the Yangtse valley. But it was clear that Amery's proposals would have accorded Japan a more powerful position in China than hitherto, and Balfour had no objection to this development. Hence, before the peace conference began, Balfour, the foreign secretary, was envisaging both the creation of alliances and a China settlement which were obviously contrary to the aspirations of Chinese nationalism.

The attitude of Sir John Jordan was, however, in marked contrast to that of Balfour, which is made clear in his correspondence with Sir Walter Langley, assistant under secretary of state.⁹ Jordan referred to the efforts of the United States government to curb foreign loans to China, and he argued that it was time that some power should intervene, 'to stop the criminal folly of the Japanese'. Jordan maintained that the Japanese had had a splendid opportunity of showing a statesman-like policy to the Chinese during the war but had thrown it away in a huckstering spirit unworthy of a great nation. He felt that the record of the Japanese in China would recoil upon themselves in a very marked fashion. Reference was then made to anti-Japanese protests made by the Chinese in Shanghai, and Jordan concluded that the Chinese were no longer prepared to submit to the domineering methods of the Japanese. 'That sort of thing may do in Manchuria, but is attended with dangers when practised at a Treaty Port'.

In the latter half of his letter Jordan referred to the manner in which large quantities of opium were being imported by the Japanese into China via Tsingtao and Dalny, and he thought much of the drug came from India, 'Our hands are still, I fear, far from clean in this matter'. Jordan then questioned what a harmful effect revelations of Britain's traffic in opium would have had upon her reputation in the far east. The question of Tibet was also raised by Jordan, and he saw little hope of Reichman's mission settling the controversy.¹⁰

A further letter from Jordan to Langley in August described the situation so forcefully and raised such important points that a long quotation is justified:

'The situation in China is going from bad to worse. All power is concentrated in the hands of a number of unscrupulous military men, and Japan is taking advantage of their cupidity and of the European war to obtain a financial hold over the country which will ensure her a permanent position when peace comes. All this is common knowledge in China and admits no difference of opinion. The only question is whether a remedy can be found now or should be deferred until the war ends... With all our world wide preoccupations at present, I do not see how we can expect to do more than mark time in China. At any rate, we cannot afford to antagonize Japan and without antagonizing her, we cannot get the principles for which we are fighting in Europe extended to the Far East. But there are many forces at work which will inevitably lead to that result in the end. America will be strong enough at the end of the War to call a halt to Japanese methods in China and we shall be obliged, pace all the declarations that the political exigencies of the moment demand, to support her. Japan's own internal conditions bear an ominous resemblance to those of Russia before the war and sooner or later our alliance with her will experience the fate of that with Russia.' ll

Jordan had clearly foreseen the predicament for British post-war policy in having to choose between the United States and Japan, but Jordan was to be proved wrong in his contention that Britain would be forced to support America.¹²

Differences with America were already beginning to develop over economic matters and it may be argued that while the United States advocated the 'open-door' and equal opportunities for all foreign traders in China, Britain supported the retention of spheres of influence. Jordan had welcomed American proposals to curb foreign lending to China¹³, but Macleay adopted an opposing view. Macleay took exception to the American proposal that all options including those on industrial and railway loans should either be relinquished to China or pooled among the powers: a Japanese diplomat had told him that 'its acceptance would practically imply the renunciation of the policy of spheres of interest'.¹⁴ However, while Macleay wanted to retain spheres of influence he recognised that Britain had not sufficient capital to develop the areas which had been designated for her and he pondered upon whether the internationalisation of such concessions among Britain, America, France, and Japan might not prove the best solution. But Macleay could not envisage the Japanese agreeing to such a remedy and he could not see how the United States could expect the Japanese 'to forgo the privileges of the special position in China which the U.S.Govt. have just recognised Japan to possess by the terms of

the Lansing-Ishii agreement'. Macleay feared that Britain's special sphere of interest in the Yangtse valley was being gradually whittled down by Japanese encroachments, 'but so long as Japan is to be allowed to have large areas such as Manchuria, Shantung and Fukien exclusively reserved to her....it seems to me that we must cling on to our Yangtse Valley sphere fiction for all it is worth'.

Undoubtedly there was logic in Macleay's reasoning, even if his conclusions might be judged wrong, and the idea prevailed that British privileges in China and the question of their retrocession should be reviewed against the similar rights of foreign powers. This reasoning had a clear influence upon Britain's attitude over Wei-hai Wei.

Wei-hai Wei and its effect on British Thinking.

Although Britain had acquired Wei-hai Wei in 1898 it had never been developed as a port, and its naval and military value in 1914 had proved almost laughable.¹⁵ As the end of the war approached Britain had to determine her attitude to the territory for the retention of Wei-hai Wei, or its retrocession, would influence Anglo-Chinese relations, while its development as a base would involve very heavy expenditure. R. F. Johnstone, (later Sir Reginald) the officer administering Wei-hai Wei reviewed the situation from political and naval considerations and came to the conclusion that the territory should be retroceded.¹⁶

Apart from naval considerations, Johnstone argued that the Chinese government would be grateful for such strong proof of Britain's goodwill, 'and would welcome the indication that our future policy in China, both in theory and in practice, was to be identical with that consistently advocated by the United States - equal commercial opportunities for all, and no encroachments upon China's political rights or territorial integrity'.

Macleay, however, queried whether the Chinese would want the British to quit Wei-hai Wei while the Japanese were in possession of Shantung, and he envisaged a Japanese retention of the province in the post-war period and their development of the area to make Japanese influence 'as strong as in Southern Manchuria.' He argued that a deal should be concluded not with the Chinese, but the Japanese, and that the naval base should be used as a means of securing concessions from Japan which were favourable to British commercial interests in Wei-hai Wei. Macleay seemed oblivious of any Chinese desiderata. China, as part of her policy of seeking the restoration of her sovereignty was anxious to see the Japanese leave Shantung immediately, and therefore the Chinese did not seriously consider the desirability of Britain retaining Wei-hai Wei as a counter-weight against Japan's hold over Shantung.¹⁷

The Admiralty opposed the surrender of Wei-hai Wei, including the island and the mainland territory.¹⁸ But Jordan argued most forcibly in the months immediately before the peace

conference for a drastic revision of Britain's policies in China. However, hopes for the retrocession of Wei-hai Wei must have been dealt a severe blow when Jordan, after some equivocation, finally opposed such a step as being inadequate unless it were part of a wider scheme of concessions and reforms, which the British government refused to accept.¹⁹

Wei-hai Wei continued to attract attention at the Paris peace conference and at Washington two years later. Obviously Britain had to safeguard her interests and guard against opening the flood-gates for further Chinese demands, but one must question whether the limited extent of Britain's interests in Wei-hai Wei justified the illiberal British attitude to the concession.

The Sino-Japanese Agreement, September 24th, 1918.

In the spring of 1918, alarm was expressed at the manner in which the Japanese government and forces were extending their influence in Shantung. They had decreed a 'civil administration' code over what had been freshly designated the Shantung railway Zone. Reinsch, the United States minister in Peking, made the important point that under the previous arrangements with the German government no railway zone existed. He contended that:

'The fact that the administrative regulations deal with such matters as taxation, construction of roads, forestry and mines make it appear that permanent administrative arrangements were aimed at.'²⁰

Reinsch reported that, not unnaturally, there was widespread Chinese concern at these developments, and it was clear that Reinsch himself was alarmed. The contrast between his attitude to Japanese retention of the province, and Macleay's approach to the problem was striking.

In September the Chinese and Japanese governments concluded an agreement in which, unlike the Sano-Japanese treaty of 1915, China was widely regarded as being a voluntary party for, unlike the earlier treaty, no threats appear to have been used to secure China's signature. But one can easily challenge the idea that the Chinese government's acceptance of the September terms implied that China was a party to a bona-fide treaty. It must be emphasised that the country was hopelessly divided and the premier, Tuan Ch'i-jui, was heavily dependent upon the Japanese for financial assistance to sustain him in power, so that Japan was able to obtain the Chinese government's acceptance of the September treaty not by force, but by the bribery of the political clique who were in power at Peking.²¹

Irrespective of the character of the September treaty it can be seen that its terms meant a continuation of Japanese power over Shantung. Its opening statement was somewhat deceptive for this said that if, at the end of the war, the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay were left completely free for the disposal of Japan, 'the Japanese Government will restore the

said leased territory to China under the following conditions', and the conditions which followed gave Japan not only control of the Shantung Railway, but the right to station troops in strategic positions and a voice in the running of the Chinese railway police forces.²² Of the seven points which comprised Japan's conditions only the last was in China's favour, for this stated, 'The Civil Administration established by Japan and existing now is to be abolished', but it may be noted that no time limit for the abolition was given.

A fundamental feature of the September treaty, and the basis for considerable controversy at Paris, was that even if allowance were made for the return of the leased territory it extended Japanese control over Shantung in excess of that enjoyed by Germany resulting from the Sino-German treaty of 1898.²³ Undoubtedly the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway was a major factor in controlling Shantung, and in the Washington negotiations regarding the province in 1921-2 it was constantly referred to as being the crux of the situation. But by the terms of the September agreement the railway was to remain under Japanese control and this led to the later charges that Japan had promised to restore the shadow but retain the substance of the German interests in the Shantung province.

Balfour was one of the western statesmen who were very impressed by the September treaty. In numerous memoranda written during the peace conference, and afterwards, he differ-

entiated between the 1915 and 1918 Sino-Japanese treaties and referred to the pecuniary benefits which China had obtained from her dealings with Japan in 1918. He argued that having received such benefits, China should honour her obligations. At no time did Balfour seriously question the character of the treaty.

It was, no doubt, a serious reflection upon China's state of government that by the end of November, i.e. just two months after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty, Wellington Koo, the Chinese minister in Washington who was later one of his country's leading representatives at the Paris peace conference, presented China's peace desiderata in terms which were obviously incompatible with the September treaty. Koo asked for the restoration of China's territorial integrity, including the termination of foreign settlements, concessions, and leased territories. In addition, Koo demanded the abolition of extraterritoriality and the recognition of China's economic independence which necessitated the ending of the control of China tariffs by foreigners, and the cessation of spheres of influence.²⁴

If Britain were hoping for close post-war co-operation with the United States then progress towards this aim was rendered more difficult when H. H. Reinsch, the American minister in Peking, who was well known for his sympathetic attitude to China, made recommendations which were contrary to the principles underlying the Sino-Japanese treaty, the very treaty which Balfour supported. Reinsch argued that:

'The separatist, economic and political action of the Powers in China must be replaced by the idea of a trusteeship on behalf of an united China exercised in the general interest, that is, the foreign enterprise and expert assistance existing in China must be organised, not to support the growth of different foreign national localized interests, but to support and develop the unified process of Chinese national life.'²⁵

It may be noted that there was a striking similarity between Reinsch's views and those expressed by Jordan during December. 26

Reinsch continued his report by stating that if China's grievances were not settled the peace of the world would be in danger, for he saw that the rivalries of the powers in China would lead to armed conflict and a poisoning of the international atmosphere. In clear contradiction to Balfour's opinions Reinsch argued:

'..should Japan be given a freer hand and should anything be done which could be interpreted as a recognition of a special position of Japan, either in the form of a so-called Monroe Doctrine or in any other way, forces will be set in action which make a huge armed conflict absolutely inevitable within one generation. There is no single problem in Europe which equals in its importance to the future peace of the world, the need of a just settlement of Chinese affairs'.

Unfortunately for mankind, Reinsch's prophecies were to prove all too true.

Some British attitudes to China at the time of the Armistice.

As the armistice in Europe was about to be signed some parliamentary questions raised serious criticisms of China's failure to intern German civilians, confiscate their property, and pursue the war with vigour. Macleay prepared a reply to one such question, which was delivered by Lord Robert Cecil, assistant secretary of state, that made it clear that the British government sympathised with the criticisms. The supplementary questions and answers revealed either a hostile attitude to China, or one of complete lack of understanding. One member asked whether appropriate action would follow China's poor war-time performance, 'especially having regard to the great help we gave them in holding up the Boxer indemnity and in other ways',²⁷ to which Cecil replied that the British government would not forget the events of the case. In a different sphere it may be noted that Dr. W. Willoughby, an American citizen who was an adviser to the Chinese government, made a spirited defence of China's war efforts, but he had to conclude that they did not leave China in a strong position to demand the restoration of her sovereignty over Tsingtao at the peace conference.²⁸

While parliamentary questions were being asked in London which could have proved harmful to China's prospects at the peace conference, there were attempts by British interests

in China to prevent a reversion of ex-German concessions to that country. E.W.Carter, chairman of the British Municipal Councils urged that ex-German concessions should go to Britain, and almost simultaneously H.F.Handley-Derry, acting consul-general, Tientsin, wrote to Jordan protesting against the possibility of the restoration of ex-German rights and complaining bitterly of the behaviour of the Japanese and Chinese for trading with Germany via Tientsin.²⁹ He argued:

'If for no other reason than to make it a permanent object-lesson to the Chinese and Japanese, the occupation and administration of that area would seem to be advisable. The permanent administration of the concession by the Chinese is a solution which every foreign resident and landowner hopes earnestly may not be adopted. The foreigners bought land there and developed it because the concession was controlled by a Western people in accordance with Western ideas, and any withdrawal from that position would place the Britons there at a great disadvantage.'

Jordan's reply was that the issue would receive attention at Paris, and shortly after the peace conference had started Macleay gave his views on the matter. He thought that the internationalisation of the concession at Tientsin would afford the best solution for although there were a large number of British residents in ^{the} ex-German area, Macleay did not think that the other powers, 'especially Japan', would agree that there was sufficient ground for the administration of the former German concession being placed solely in the hands of the British. Macleay then went on to consider whether German nationals should

have the vote in the municipal elections in the concession and concluded that they should not. At no time did Macleay consider the reactions of the Chinese.

Despite Jordan's brief reply to Handley-Derry, he was very concerned indeed with both British interests and China's well-being. On the eve of the armistice Jordan claimed that such factors as leased territories, railway and mining concessions, and spheres of influence had provided a disintegrating and dangerous element in China and far eastern affairs in the past. If a conflict were to be avoided in the future, Jordan continued, it was essential that all these questions should be examined and a definite policy be made binding on all the powers.³⁰

Of importance to Anglo-American relations was Jordan's warning that the United States government seemed intent upon raising the issues at the peace conference and that several unofficial agents of the American president and secretary of state were in China collecting information in connection with the peace settlement. Jordan had obtained the unofficial information from these agents that:

'...so far as China is concerned, league of peace is to be an Anglo-Saxon combination, which shall control militarism in the Far East, and secure that resources of China are developed, not for the aggrandisement of any particular nation, but for the common benefit of all. The idea roughly is, that the Powers should disclose their concessions; put all their cards on the table, agree to make no further secret arrangements, and come to an understanding on the whole subject'.

The British minister stressed that he did not know how far these unofficial statements corresponded with the views of the United States government, but if they were reasonably accurate it seemed to Jordan that as far as China was concerned a clear choice had to be made between Japan and America, 'whose aims and policy in this country are diametrically opposite.'

A further indication of American desires for closer co-operation with Britain in the far east came from Sir Conyngham-Greene, British ambassador in Tokyo, who reported that ^{R.S.} Morris, the American ambassador had several times in recent conversations recommended an Anglo-Saxon combination for the treatment of far eastern problems.³¹ In addition, Morris had dwelt upon the importance of not permitting a severance of the re-united relations between America and Britain. Macleay noted the determination of the American government to play a new and active role in the far east, and he made the rather ambiguous comment that the United States government 'confidently expect that H.M.Gov. will cooperate with them in the policy outlined in Sir J. Jordan's telegram' (i.e. that of 30 above).

The subject of Anglo-American relations in the post-war period is very wide and complex, but a common British criticism of the Americans was that it was difficult to get them to agree to any permanent commitment. Nevertheless, in relation to the far east Macleay was being distinctly cool in the matter of an

Anglo-American understanding for if he expressed a vague statement in reaction to Greene's dispatch, Macleay's memorandum of early December was contrary to the unofficial views of the Americans and the definite ideas of Jordan, and the importance of Macleay's recommendations was considerable for he was Britain's far eastern expert at Paris.³²

Macleay began his December memorandum, which was described by Lord Hardinge, permanent under secretary for foreign affairs, as very good, by questioning the wisdom of the American proposals for the 'open-door' and the denunciation of the special interests in China.³³ He queried whether the pooling of railway and industrial schemes in China would make such ventures more profitable and Macleay was convinced that diminished profitability would result. Before Britain subscribed to the policy of open competition, argued Macleay, the British government should have some guarantee from the United States that the Americans would call upon Japan to adopt similar policies in her spheres of influence in Manchuria, Fukien, and Shantung. Also that American financial cooperation would really be forthcoming in the event of British acceptance of American government proposals, 'and, once agreed upon, will not be withdrawn'.

The memorandum continued by stating that Britain had tacitly recognised Japan's claims to a sphere of influence in Manchuria and Fukien, at least as far as railways were concerned,

on the understanding that Japan recognised Britain's similar claims to a sphere of influence in the Yangtse valley. But, Macleay argued:

'There would certainly be a great outcry from British commercial interests at home and in China if we were to renounce our claim to a sphere of influence in the Yangtse Valley at the request of the United States, thereby opening that region to unrestricted Japanese competition, and if we pledged ourselves at the same time to respect the Japanese spheres in Manchuria and elsewhere. Consequently it seems desirable that we should at the Peace Conference leave the task of forcing the Japanese door in this manner to the United States Delegates before we commit ourselves to the acceptance of the new American policy in China, so that, in the event of the United States Government failing to bring Japan into line, we shall not incur the risk of antagonising Japan to no purpose by supporting a policy directly opposed to her interests, while at the same time we renounce the privileged position in the Yangtse Valley in regard to railway enterprise which we have hitherto successfully maintained'.

It may be noted that Macleay did not even mention the question of the lack of capital required to develop Britain's interests which had worried him in the late summer.³⁴

One must conclude that Macleay's memorandum was hardly of the highest principle for, if it were agreed that there was a developing divergence between American and Japanese policies in China, Macleay's arguments were that Britain should sit on the fence and wait to see that the Americans were winning before supporting her. It may be noted that, like numerous memoranda written by Balfour, Macleay gave no consideration to China, and no doubt the country's confused political affairs obscured the developments which were occurring.

Some developments within China and their possible influence upon western reasoning.

During 1918 there was a marked contradiction in China's internal situation for while the government of Tuan Ch'i-jui was making more concessions to Japan on the one hand fairly widespread opposition was developing towards Japan on the other.³⁵ Reference has already been made to the manner in which Japan was gaining control over the Peking government by means of loans³⁶ and this control found expression in a number of one-sided Sino-Japanese military conventions concluded between March and May, 1918, aimed ostensibly against the Soviet Union, but which were regarded as constituting a further domination of China by Japan. In September the Sino-Japanese treaty was signed which furthered Japan's post-war claims against China, and by the autumn the very pro-Japanese Anfu club had obtained domination over the Peking parliament. Thus, it can be seen that during the year Japan's hold over the Chinese government tightened considerably.

In February, 1918, however, the newly founded Soviet Union published the secret war-time treaties concluded between Imperial Russia and Japan which aimed at the wresting of Manchuria and Mongolia from China, and preventing China from obtaining help from any other power.³⁷ The disclosure of these treaties exacerbated the already considerable anti-Japanese sentiments in China, especially when news of the 1918 Sino-Japanese

military conventions gradually leaked out, and reactions to the news of the conventions were particularly sharp among students. Some three thousand Chinese students in Japan resolved to return home by May 1918 in order to voice their protests, and efforts by the Japanese and Chinese authorities to prevent such action caused passions to rise to higher levels. In Peking, some two thousand students of the university and local colleges were no less militant in their response. During the summer of 1918 a link up of students' organisations on a national basis was achieved and as a result numerous magazines and various forms of anti-Japanese propaganda were issued. But:

'The significance of the student demonstrations and petitions of May 1918 did not lie in any immediate effect on the government. Of prime importance is the fact that they marked the beginning of the cooperation on a significant scale of the new intellectuals with other forces in the society, and in a sense were rehearsals for the May Fourth Incident'. 38

The Young China Association formed in June, although comprising many students, aimed at a wide intellectual, literary, and nationalist revival. But undoubtedly when the merchant and industrial classes began to ally themselves with the aims of the student movement it was clear that a new situation was developing.

The actions of the merchant and industrial classes of China were to a large extent prompted by their fears of Japan's growing economic domination which had increased considerably during the war owing to the absence of most western powers from the far east. Hence, a movement against foreigners (with different powers receiving the brunt of Chinese wrath at different times) was established between the forces of revolution and conservation which remained a feature of China's politics at least until the late 1920's.

These developments towards greater nationalism were to some extent obscured by the leader of the Kuomintang, Sun Yat-sen, quitting Shanghai for Canton in May. Sun explained his reasons for leaving thus: 'For a year I encountered immense difficulties without anybody to help me. My staying on would only evoke the regrets of my friends and the joy of my enemies.' Hu Sheng, a Chinese communist historian, gives his description of the situation as follows:

'The warlords and bureaucrats in Canton while claiming that they were defending the constitution were in reality only interested in the struggle against the northern government because they wanted to grasp some benefits from it. They were not interested in the revolution itself. In their endeavours to win favour from foreign imperialism they revealed that they and the northern government were birds of a feather.' 39

While such language is strong it clearly reflects the fact that the forces of the south were by no means united around a militant nationalist programme. With intermittent warfare occurring not only between the north and south governments, but within the various north and south factions, it was hardly surprising that Macleay, whose main service in China was limited at the time to two years as counsellor of embassy at Peking between 1914 and 1916, should have such little respect for China's claims for the restoration of her sovereignty. But if Macleay and others determining British policy had little practical knowledge of China, Jordan, of course, was ~~extremely~~ familiar with that country's developments, and it seems reasonable to claim that such knowledge made Jordan far more sympathetic to China than were his colleagues at the Foreign Office.

The Contrast between the views of Jordan and Macleay.

In a despatch to Macleay in December Jordan repeated some of his earlier arguments upon the disintegrating effect which spheres of influence were having upon China, and in respect to the spheres of influence Jordan was particularly critical of the war-time activities of Japan in increasing her share.⁴⁰

Jordan claimed that:

'People of China on the other hand look to Great Britain and America for some sign that forthcoming conference will close this phase of militarism and national disintegration in conformity with expressed ideals of Allies.

America's position in Pacific will compel her to combat danger of an impotent or militarist China....We cannot go back to prewar conditions. We must either follow Japan in her policy of dismemberment or lead with America in the formation of a new policy'.

The British minister denied that he was anti-Japanese, but he felt that the Japanese government should cease their efforts at ~~their~~ self-expansion in China and join with the other powers in schemes for the international development of China's resources. Such developments he felt were vital for the future interests of Britain's trade.

Jordan then outlined twelve clauses which he considered Britain should aim for at the peace conference. The first stated quite bluntly that 'Special privileges to be surrendered and equal opportunity recognised for all' and this idea of equal opportunity influenced Jordan's reasoning regarding railways and harbours. In relation to the railways the main theme of Jordan's proposals was that the Chinese government should control all the lines and a unified system be introduced, an international syndicate should raise loans for future developments, and no country should maintain exclusive railway rights to further a particular sphere of influence.

The fourth clause of Jordan's proposals noted that while Chinese emigration to Manchuria continued steadily, Chinese opposition to the Japanese in Shantung was growing in intensity. Jordan issued the serious warning that 'any attempt to recognise or prolong special rights in these areas would be

a great blow to our prestige. A continuation of present position would inevitably lead to war'. He continued by describing leased territories as a legacy of imperialist ambitions and the cause of the Boxer outbreak. Jordan argued 'Wei-hai Wei should be returned to China. We should then press for complete restoration of Kiao-Chow and Kuantung peninsula, former of which is vital to our commercial interests in China'.

In addition, Jordan maintained that German and Austrian concessions at treaty ports should be internationalised, and British concessions should be internationalised under guarantee. There should be no restoration of any enemy rights by virtue of any protocol or treaty. On the question of opium, Jordan thought that the powers should cooperate more effectively to stamp out illicit trading.

Extraterritoriality was of particular interest to Britain, and on this issue Jordan thought that the powers should begin to make some concessions to China, and China on her part should begin to allow easier foreign access to the interior. The tenth, and perhaps last important clause worth mentioning, was a statement that the powers should concur that all agreements relating to China which were concluded during the war should be laid on the table, and all future undisclosed agreements should be regarded as void. But Jordan's views were strongly opposed by Macleay.

Macleay stated that private consultations with Jordan had confirmed that the British minister's desires were for a complete and radical change of Britain's policies towards China, and Macleay repeated Jordan's belief that conflict in the far east could not be averted unless an end were put to the process of disintegration which spheres of influence and leased territories were causing. It was, however, Macleay's opinion that in advocating a policy of close cooperation with the United States, Jordan had overlooked the fact that:

'...Japan after all, is more directly concerned in Far Eastern affairs than Great Britain, America or any other Power and that she possesses not only special interests in certain parts of China of a political as well as a commercial character, but a special position in respect to the Chinese Govt. which she obtained as the result of two successful wars and has consolidated by treaties. Japan's acceptance of the policy which Sir John Jordan now advocates would imply the renouncement of the special position which she considers that she is entitled to hold in China and I cannot believe that anything but force would induce her to abandon that position or to surrender the Kuantung (Liaotang) Peninsula and her special rights in Manchuria, Shantung and elsewhere'.

These views of Macleay were expressed on a number of occasions during the Paris conference, and the reasoning undoubtedly had a marked influence on British policy.

The possible influence of Jordan's policy was then considered in relation to China, and Macleay argued that protests would result, for China would deeply resent a strengthening of international control over her resources. This resentment, it

was thought, would be particularly pronounced in the south and international control would be also resented by the Young China movement. Macleay thought that the United States government, 'which hitherto has been influenced by sentimental rather than practical considerations in its relations with the Chinese Republic' would support the view that international control was incompatible with China's sovereign rights. It was owing to these considerations, Macleay argued, that it would be difficult for Britain to treat the Chinese question on the same lines as that of the 'backward nations' issue which, it had been suggested, should be placed under the supervision of the League of Nations.⁴¹

Macleay thought that Jordan's ideas should only be borne in mind and concluded:

'It would appear to be unwise for us to take the initiative in advocating a policy, such as Sir J. Jordan recommends until we know exactly what the U.S. Govt. have in mind and how far they are prepared to go. We must also wait to see in what spirit the Japanese Delegates will approach the question. Japan, I think, is conscious of having abused her special position in China....and she probably realises not only that she has over-reached herself, but that she will not be able to pursue a policy of dismemberment and disintegration in the face of the growing hostility of a united China which would be assured of the economic as well as the moral support of the United States and Great Britain. Thus it may well be that we shall find that the Japanese Delegates at the Peace Conference while determined to resist any attempt to force Japan to relinquish her special position in China and the advantages which she has secured in Manchuria and Shantung, will not be averse to cooperating in a self-denying policy directed towards the internationalisation of all future Macleay's emphasis industrial financial & economic enterprise in China which although it will, as Sir J. Jordan says, "be a blow to Japan's imperial ambitions", will not impair her prestige as the Power principally interested in the Far East'.

In other words, Macleay was contending that Britain was committed to support Japan's claims for the retention of her main war-time gains in China, but that there should be no more Japanese unilateral advances in that country.

One may argue that Macleay's conclusions presupposed acceptance of Japan's advances by the United States and China, and Japan's willingness not to press any further claims. But such a presupposition seemed reasonable to MaxMuller, head of the far eastern department who expressed his 'entire agreement with Mr. Macleay's criticism of Sir J. Jordan's very radical proposals'.

In a well-known memorandum written at the end of December, Jordan marshalled all his arguments to plead once again for a revision of British policy, but although the document was lengthy it contained little that was new to reinforce the plea for the surrender of marginal interests to China, and added little to the contention that the powers should cooperate to their common advantage in the development of China's resources. ⁴² Jordan made a powerful case for a reappraisal of China's political and economic progress and argued:

'If there were solid foundation for the belief that China is a decadent and decaying nation, we might be tempted to postpone consideration of her future to a period of greater leisure and greater detachment. But no serious observer of Chinese affairs can be unconscious of the great forces that are stirring within the country. It is awakening from a long period of stagnation, realising its latent powers and determined to find its place in the world.'⁴³

But Jordan's arguments, however forceful, were rejected by the British government and they had little impact upon British deliberations at Paris. Such a rejection must be considered unfortunate for the chances of closer relations with America as well as China.

Almost at the same time as Jordan was arguing his point of view, ^{R.S.} Morris, the American ambassador in Tokyo was concerned with what he considered was Britain's indifference to Japanese actions, especially in Siberia. ^{F.L.} Polk, the American acting secretary of state, reported these misgivings to Lansing, the American secretary who was in Europe, and stated that Morris was worried that Japan's actions would strengthen her control over China. ⁴⁴ Details of the activities were given, and Polk was of the opinion that Japan was bent upon securing an exclusive hold on extensive regions in China. He added that Reinsch, the American minister in Peking, was more emphatic than Morris in his statements concerning the probable results of the actions of Japan, and of obvious interest to British far eastern policy was Polk's suggestion that:

'with the approaching visit of the President and yourself Lansing to London, the opportunity will come as perhaps never again, to reach some broad and comprehensive understanding with the British Government on the whole question of relations of the United States and Great Britain in the Far East, particularly as to whether the interests and ideals of the two nations and those of France and even Italy are not identical; and if so, whether this is not the moment to agree upon a reasonable policy and to have our respective representatives clearly so instructed'.

It has been noted that hopes for closer Anglo-American relations often foundered upon American reluctance to undertake definite commitments, and too much emphasis should not be placed upon Polk's suggestions, for his powers were obviously limited. Nevertheless, it will be shown that any hopes of progress along the lines which he advocated were destroyed by British policies at the peace conference.

Some Conclusions regarding 1918.

It can be seen that in the months before the peace conference began ~~that~~ British policy in China was subjected to quite searching examination by the British far eastern experts, and that the policy which was adopted was considered, in the given circumstances and with the known data, to have been the most suitable. Such a statement may be judged ^{valid} ~~relevant~~ in view of a Foreign Office memorandum which, in an attempt to explain the stormy years of Anglo-Chinese relations in the mid-1920's, described the result of China's claims being rejected at the peace conference in these words:

'A golden opportunity was thus lost of doing with a good grace and in a serener atmosphere what has since been wrung from us by the force of circumstances, with considerable loss of prestige. From that moment onwards our policy, instead of being one of spontaneous relinquishment of our privileged position, became an enforced retreat, necessitating endless rearguard actions, and in which our main effort is directed towards preventing it from being turned into a rout'.⁴⁵

To claim that a golden opportunity was lost suggests that indolence or a lack of knowledge and consideration of the facts caused a mistake to have been made. But the Jordan-Macleay exchanges made it clear that the main issues involved in British policy to China were reviewed very carefully, and if a golden opportunity did exist it was not apparent to the British government at the time.

In describing Anglo-Japanese relations between 1911 and 1915, Dr. Lowe concluded that a general aim of British policy in the far east was for the preservation of stability in the region as far as was feasible⁴⁶ and undoubtedly this description ~~was~~^{is} correct for the whole of the war years. Dr. Lowe also stated that British policy to Japan in the last two years of the war had been determined by Balfour as soon as he became the foreign secretary in 1917, and that Balfour had decreed: 'The British objective must be to protect her interests in China, Tibet and the areas bordering India and Tibet, and to prevent the Japanese securing a footing "where their exclusion is considered essential to British political interests".'⁴⁷

But if Britain's policy were mainly to preserve her interests while trying to restrain Japan making further advances, one must question whether this were adequate for it has been shown that China was expecting not merely that no further inroads should be made upon her, but that a start should be made in the restoration of her sovereignty.

Jordan had obviously recognised China's demands and agreed with many of her claims. On the other hand, Macleay, while not wanting to see further encroachments upon China, felt that those which had been achieved should be preserved. Of the more recent encroachments upon China, the Shantung issue was to prove highly contentious at Paris, and in accepting the general arguments of Macleay the British government had to defend a policy which was to incur bitter hostility from both China and America.

1. Evidence that Jordan was not informed of the Anglo-Japanese agreement of February, 1917, can be found in China Annual Report for 1919 F.O.405/229, and in Macleay's minute, 12-4-1919, F.O.608/210 [6974]. It is difficult to say when Jordan learned of the existence of the relevant notes. He makes no mention of the exchange in his numerous dispatches of 1918 when he referred to most of the important agreements regarding China, but when he described the news of the agreement reaching the Chinese public in May, 1919, (Jordan to Curzon, 10-5-1919, F.O.371/3695 [100265]) Jordan expressed no surprise, nor did he complain of being kept uninformed. No doubt Jordan knew something about the exchange, if only from Soviet Russia's disclosures.
2. F.O. telegram to Lord Bertie (Paris) and others, 26-1-1918, and Balfour's telegram to Sir W.Wiseman (Washington) who had direct access to Colonel House and thereby to President Wilson, 30-1-1918.
Balfour papers, 49699, Vol.XVII.
3. Li Chien-nung, p.373.
4. Ibid., p.384.
5. See p. 68 below for an outline of developments within China.
6. Memorandum submitted to the war cabinet by Balfour, 22-6-1917.
Balfour papers, 49699, Vol.XVII.
7. F.O. Memorandum, G-T.4774, Thoughts on German Colonies written by Balfour. (No specific day) June, 1918. Ibid.
8. Balfour to L.S.Amery, (no specific day) August, 1918.
FO.800/207.
9. Jordan to Langley, 2-8-1918, F.O.371/3191.
10. For Teichman's services see Appendix I.
11. Jordan to Langley, 28-8-1918. F.O.350/16.
12. See chapter 4 below, pp.121-62.
13. See p.52 above.
14. Macleay to Jordan, 22-8-1918. F.O.350/16.

15. See p.23 above.
16. Memorandum by R.F. Johnstone, 21-5-1918. Macleay's minute 1-11-1918. F.O. 371/3191 [175334].
17. For a statement of China's peace desiderata see p. 60 and pp.86-7, below.
18. Admiralty to Colonial Office, 2-12-1918. F.O.371/3191 [210259].
19. J.A.C. Tilley to Colonial Office. 6-1-1919. Ibid.
20. Reinsch to Secretary of State, 30-4-1918. F.R.U.S. 1918 pp.92-3.
21. Lowe, p.306.
22. See Appendix 5.
23. Appendices 3 and 5. See also Fifield, pp.7-10.
24. Memorandum by Breckinridge Long, third assistant-secretary of state, describing interview with Wellington Koo held 27-11-1918. F.R.U.S. F.P.C.II pp.509-11.
25. Reinsch to Secretary of State, 23-11-1918. Ibid., pp.491-8.
26. See pp.71-3 above.
27. F.O. Reply delivered 7-11-1918, F.O.371/3175 [187608].
28. Memorandum by Dr. Willoughby enclosed with Reinsch's dispatch of 23-11-1918. See 25 above.
29. Carter to Jordan, 9-11-1918. F.O.608/209 [675]. Jordan's reply 21-11-1918, Macleay's minute, 27-1-1919. Handley-Derry to Jordan, 11-11-1918. F.O.608/209 [11477].
30. Jordan to Foreign Office, 10-11-1918. F.O.371/3191 [186939].
31. Greene to Foreign Office, 12-11-1918. Macleay's minute 20-11-1918, F.O.371/3191 [187968].
32. The importance of Macleay's role can be seen during the negotiations of April, 1919. See Chapter 4, pp.121-62, below.

33. Memorandum by Macleay, 2-12-1918. F.O.371/3191 /1869397.
34. See pp. 54-5 above.
35. Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement (Stanford, 1960) pp.78-83.
36. See pp. 58-9 above.
37. Chow, p.79. See also p.37 above.
38. Chow, p.81.
39. Hu Sheng, Demokratie und Chinesen (Leipzig 1933) pp.232-3.
40. Jordan to Macleay, 4-12-1918. Minutes by Macleay, 12-12-1918 and Max Muller, 13-12-1918. F.O.371/3191 /2035067.
41. Lord Robert Cecil was an advocate of referring China's problems to the League. See his minute 14-12-1918. F.O.371/3191 /1869397.
42. Jordan to Balfour, 23-12-1918, DBFP I (vi) pp.566-83.
43. Ibid., p.567.
44. Polk to Commission to negotiate peace, 21-12-1918. F.R.U.S. P.P.C.II, p.517.
45. F.O. Memorandum, 8-1-1930, D.B.F.P.II (viii) pp.4-5.
46. Lowe, p.298.
47. Ibid., p.306.

CHAPTER III

THE OPENING ROUNDS OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE.

JANUARY-MARCH, 1919.

The Paris peace conference began on 12th January with 'an informal meeting of the Heads of the four Great Powers and their Foreign Ministers' which was 'in reality a continuation of the Supreme War Council...'¹ One day later Japan was admitted to this body which, because two representatives from each country were allowed, became known as the council of ten. This council had a powerful influence not only upon matters to be placed before the full conference but also upon the hard bargaining among the different countries.

An immediate problem facing the council was that of deciding the number of plenipotentiaries to which each power was entitled, and the character of the negotiations which ensued seems to have fallen short of the high ideals generally associated with President Wilson's name.² Wilson referred to Brazil and argued that it should be well represented lest it become prone to pro-German sentiments, and he therefore favoured Brazil being granted three delegates. But Lloyd George, the British prime minister, thought that the size of each country's delegation should bear some relation to war effort, and although Brazil had sent two or three torpedo boats she had made no

other sacrifices. Lloyd George's motives, however, were hardly altruistic for he was concerned at securing a good representation for the British Empire. In the midst of these early deliberations, Alfred Sze, a member of the Chinese delegation and the Chinese minister in London, wrote to Balfour, who was a leading figure in the British delegation, asking for the sympathetic support of Britain concerning the number of plenipotentiaries to be accredited to China.³ Although the British war cabinet had already taken a decision to support a general proposal that China, like Brazil, should have three delegates,⁴ the British foreign secretary dealt curtly with Sze's letter merely endorsing it with an instruction that a formal acknowledgment be sent, and as a result Sze was assured that the matter would 'receive due consideration'.

When the issue of representation was settled, China, whose war effort was feeble, but scarcely less than that of Brazil, was allowed two plenipotentiaries, Brazil three, and the five great powers, America, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, five each⁵. Thus, almost from the start of the peace conference, Japan, by virtue of her membership of the council of ten and her superior representation, was in a much stronger negotiating position than China.

The character of China's delegation was also influenced by the fact that it represented the rival governments of north and south China and reflected the divisions within that

country.⁶ While the peace conference was in progress the powers encouraged the Chinese to reconcile their differences, although Japan for selfish reasons continued to support certain northern Chinese factions. A conference which aimed at ending Chinese political strife was held at Shanghai between February and May but it ended in total failure.⁷ Hence, while the Chinese delegates at Paris were facing formidable opposition they had to be on their guard against sudden changes at home to a more marked degree than most other delegations.

Internal disorders did not, however, prevent China from making some far-reaching demands, and she asked for a complete revision of her relations with all foreign powers, both ex-allied and ex-enemy.⁸ China wanted all leased territories and foreign land concessions returned to her or internationalised, all railways built with foreign capital to be consolidated although foreign experts could continue to assist with their operation, foreign mining, agricultural, and industrial rights were to be drastically restricted, foreign postal and telegraph offices were to be withdrawn, extraterritoriality was to be abolished within ten years, foreign troops were to be withdrawn, all further payments of the Boxer indemnity were to be devoted to educational purposes, and subject to certain conditions China was to be granted tariff autonomy. In the face of such demands Britain had to draw her earlier deliberations to an

end and make a definite decision whether she would agree to an overall revision of China's treaties, as advocated by Jordan, or insist upon dealing only with the questions which had arisen directly from the war.

Macleay thought that China's demands were mainly irrelevant to the peace conference, but that the Chinese government would not have put forward 'such a far reaching programme' if they had not felt assured of the support of the United States. He was convinced that there would be strong opposition from Japan and France to the proposal to internationalise foreign residential concessions, but he noted that in the international settlement at Shanghai large numbers of Chinese residents had not even got a vote regarding the settlement's administration. In the circumstances Macleay thought that it would be wise to resist China's demand and restrict the internationalisation of foreign residential concessions to the ex-enemy holding at Tientsin. Macleay suggested acceptance of the withdrawal of British post and telegraph offices provided that the other interested powers did likewise. On the question of extra-territoriality Macleay did not think that China could implement the necessary judicial reforms and this view of China's inability was shared by Malkin, ^{a Foreign Office legal adviser.} It was Macleay's opinion that no concessions should be granted concerning tariff autonomy unless China abolished likin, a form of inland customs payments, but

Macleay agreed that the Boxer indemnity could be waived provided that China used the money for educational purposes. Hardinge was also of the opinion that China's demands were not concerned with the war and should not be raised at the peace conference.

Jordan, however, continued to argue for the retrocession of at least some British rights and possessions in China in order that greater stability might be achieved in that country. He contended that Britain should release its exclusive hold over the Kowloon territory for unless the powers who had acquired, or inherited, leased territories in 1898 made some sacrifices no solution of China's problem was possible. Jordan stated:

'...all these leases had their origin in imperialist aggressions of Germany and Russia; that they had all been negotiated in rapid succession within a period of 3 months and that they should either all be abrogated or none at all... we should now revert to our former attitude and endeavour to come to some arrangement for neutralization or internationalization of all leased territories under conditions which will ensure immunity from attack and render such terms as "open door", "China's integrity", realities and not meaningless expressions they too often are at present.'⁹

The British minister agreed that the security of Hong Kong was essential and if British occupation of Kowloon were vital to its safety he thought his proposal for its retrocession should be dropped. Such a reservation indicated that although Jordan was liberal in his approach to China he believed that certain British rights should be maintained, at least until political

conditions in China improved and obviated their necessity. As a step towards better international relations Jordan argued:

'if United States and we are willing to attune our minds to spirit of new principles which are to govern the world and to enforce application of those principles in China it should not be impossible to devise a scheme which would guarantee economic freedom and military security of leased territories'.

'It is no exaggeration to say that all competent observers are agreed that present conflict of interests in China constitutes a grave menace to peace of Orient.'

Unfortunately for mankind Jordan's forebodings proved a remarkable prophecy, but at the time the men on the spot saw things differently.

Curzon, who remained in London as the acting-foreign secretary, reacted extremely sharply and stated that he was not sure how far the British government had encouraged Jordan's 'altruistic speculations', which Curzon considered were misplaced. Curzon was convinced that old treaties could not be dug up and that only war issues were relevant. Without considering Jordan's reservations on the issue, Curzon thought that it was entirely out of the question to consider handing back Kowloon

Cecil thought differently from Curzon, and while stressing the point that he was not an expert on Chinese affairs he maintained that from a League of Nations point of view he agreed with Jordan. He argued that the scramble for concessions in China had caused at least one civil and one foreign war, and that further conflicts were likely. Therefore;

'To consider merely the undesirability of probing this or that concession is a very superficial way of approaching the problem. Ordered Chinese prosperity is of great value to us and freedom from danger of war is still greater. To secure these advantages we might well consider some present sacrifices.'

Cecil's views were of particular importance regarding China's internal affairs for undoubtedly western statesmen were expecting too much in their hopes for a stable and law abiding country with so much of China under foreign control.

Support for Curzon's views was expressed by Macleay who felt that a revision of China's international relations and treaty rights should be referred to the League of Nations, 'when constituted'. This was a theme to which Macleay adhered throughout the peace conference, but the character of his remarks suggested that he was using the proposed League as a convenient method of deferring the issue. In fact Britain did not agree to a major revision of China's treaties until after the turbulent scenes of the mid-twenties when the so-called 'December Memorandum' of 1926 introduced a more liberal attitude to China.¹⁰

Early Consideration of the Shantung question at Paris and before the Council of Ten.

There were various groups of Chinese living in Paris, especially students, who loudly demanded a major revision of China's treaties and the return of the Shantung province, and one such group issued a memorandum which emphasised Wilsonian

ideals and was very close to China's peace desiderata. But Macleay brushed the memorandum aside stating that there was no need to attach any importance to the views of the committee which had issued it.¹¹ Macleay then described an interview with Sze during which he gave the Chinese minister a warning that Britain would not support the main claims of the Chinese delegation. Apparently undeterred Sze had stated that the Chinese government intended to ask the peace conference for the return of Kiaochow and former German rights in Shantung. Macleay replied by asking how the Chinese were to meet the difficulties of the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1915 by which terms China had recognised Japan's claims upon the province, and Sze was temporarily at a loss for an answer, but he eventually adopted the argument that war-time agreements had been modified by subsequent events. Sze, however, admitted that he could not hope that the powers would agree to the ending of extraterritoriality, but he felt that some probationary period could be agreed upon wherein China could undertake some judicial reforms.

It would seem that Macleay was purposely using the treaty of May, 1915, to discourage the Chinese, for less than one month after his interview with Sze he seriously questioned the validity of the 1915 agreement, although he maintained that the Sino-Japanese treaty of September, 1918 was legally binding.¹²

Wunsz King, secretary to the Chinese delegation, blamed Macleay for creating a situation in which the British delegation had from the beginning of the peace conference...indicated, privately of course, their readiness to side with Japan, though discreetly on some other grounds than this specific commitment [i.e., the secret Anglo-Japanese treaties]¹³ Balfour, on the other hand, claimed that Macleay, 'hates the Japanese', and various statements which Macleay made proved that he had grave doubts about Japan's intentions. But there can be no question that from an early date Macleay had decided to support Japan's claims against China, and it would seem that he was particularly influenced by the secret Anglo-Japanese agreements of 1917, and the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918.

The question of Shantung was discussed by the council of ten on the 27th and 28th January, and the deliberations have been described in detail by Dr. Fifield.¹⁵ Macleay's account of the meetings is contained in a letter to Max/Muller who remained in London as head of the far eastern department, and he stated that Baron Makino, a former Japanese minister for foreign affairs and a member of his country's delegation, had claimed from the German government:

'The leased territory of Kiaochow together with the railways and other rights possessed by Germany in respect of the Province of Shantung'.

'All the islands in German possession in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator...' ¹⁶

Makino explained the circumstances of Japan's entry into the war and stated that his country's post-war claims aimed to prevent a revival of German military activities in the far east which would render earlier Japanese sacrifices useless. Somewhat pointedly Macleay commented that Makino 'said nothing about Japan's intention to restore Kiaochow to China' in his opening statement.

Macleay continued by saying that Wellington Koo, a representative from the Peking government, made a speech which earned widespread admiration, and 'claimed the direct restoration to China of the leased territory of Kiaochow, the railway in Shantung, and all rights which Germany possessed in that Province'. Koo's main arguments were that the territories in question were an integral part of China which had been wrung from her by force, the territories were vital to China's defences, and that the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu railway was particularly important as it led directly to Peking. Also, Koo claimed that China's declaration of war abrogated the treaty of 1898, whereby the areas in question were leased to Germany, and the terms of the treaty precluded any rights of transfer to another power. Macleay stated that Makino had replied by referring to Japan's ultimatum to Germany, which contained the eventual restoration of the area to China as one of its objectives, and the Japanese delegate ~~stated~~ stated that:

'A friendly exchange of views had taken place on the subject between the Chinese and Japanese Governments and Japan had agreed to restore Kiaochow as soon as she had free disposal of the place. Agreements had also been reached with regard to the railways. As notes had been exchanged he thought that a statement of these engagements might be worth the consideration of members of the Council'.

The Chinese delegation then countered by offering to produce copies of the war-time Sino-Japanese agreements regarding Shantung, which caused marked reactions from Japan that continued after the council had ceased its January deliberations of the Shantung question.

Undoubtedly the arguments before the council resulted in China winning sympathy for her claims for it was felt that '...from the legal point of view the Japanese could make a powerful argument, but that from the point of view of political and moral principles the Chinese had presented a strong case.'¹⁷ The presentation of the opposing claims of China and Japan before the council forced the powers to declare their attitudes over Shantung, and almost immediately differences between the United States and Britain emerged.

Dr. Fifield's conclusions on the January meetings concerning Shantung are that Japan placed much importance upon her treaties with China of 1915 and 1918, and the complementary Sino-Japanese exchange of notes of May, 1915.¹⁸ Japan also obviously placed much emphasis upon her 1917 agreement with Britain, and in the early stages of the peace conference Japan

was alarmed lest the advances which she had made in China during the war should be taken from her by an agreement among the powers who were again able to give greater attention to far eastern affairs. Naturally Japan was anxious to obtain the agreement of both China and Britain to her plans, but adding to Japan's worries were the fears that:

'..Great Britain, and especially France, though friendly to the Chinese desiderata of Japan, would not be in a position to take a strong stand because of the attitude of the United States. The Japanese delegates concluded that it did not seem probable that Great Britain and France would in the end support them if this policy resulted in impairing American friendship.'19

But Japan's fears, at least as far as Britain was concerned, were to prove groundless.

Evidence of the way that the British delegation were thinking is provided in a minute written by Macleay after Makino had made a press statement describing Japan's aims. Macleay said that the press statement:

'certainly glosses over some awkward and discreditable episodes in Japan's past policy towards China especially in reference to the presentation of the notorious 21 demands in 1915 which are naively stated to have been made "in a desire to bring about a rapprochement with China and to settle outstanding differences", but it admits that "it would be foolish to say that in the conduct of our [Japan's] political and commercial relations (with China)...serious mistakes have not been made".'

Macleay's conclusions were that:

'Whatever Japan's original intentions may have been in regard to Kiaochoo, her statesmen appear to have realised that they cannot come before the Peace Conference professing Japan's faithful adherence to the principles of China's independence and territorial integrity and at the same time claim to retain possession of the important fortress and harbour of Tsingtao and of the railway to Tsinanfu and to consolidate their position throughout the Province of Shantung by military occupation and civil administration. Japan accordingly declares her readiness to restore the leased territory of Kiaochoo to China on the understanding that it is first surrendered to them by Germany.'²⁰

It was further argued by Macleay that Japan's 'amour-propre' demanded the surrender of the previously German-held Shantung territory to her, and that when Japanese possession had been confirmed she would hand it to China in accordance with the Sino-Japanese agreements on the subject.

Macleay envisaged Japan becoming the heir to German concessions, railways, and mines in Shantung which, he argued, 'does not on the face of it appear to be an unreasonable intention'. He presumed that Japan would be prepared to compensate private German interests involved in the Shantung enterprises. Macleay recognised China's mistrust of Japan, especially her doubts regarding the 'eventual' restoration of Shantung, and that obviously China feared stalling tactics. Even if China were accepted into some form of economic partnership, Macleay realised that she was worried at the possibility of a Japanese penetration into the whole of the Shantung province, and the creation of a

situation 'little different from that prevailing in South Manchuria'. But Macleay made no comments upon these recognised fears of the Chinese, not even to give an indication as to whether he considered them ill-founded.

Macleay concluded:

'China hopes to persuade the Conference to declare the 1915 treaties and agreements with Japan invalid on the grounds that they were extorted by force, but I do not see how she can expect the Conference to admit the validity of this argument in the case of the agreements concluded in 1918 which although they may have been made for the advantages of a corrupt clique at Peking who jumped at an opportunity of making money out of a Japanese loan for railway construction in Shantung were nevertheless ostensibly bona-fide agreements between the Chinese and Japanese governments'.

The substance of Macleay's comments were to prove in keeping with the policies which Britain adopted.

Reinsch, the American minister in Peking, was of the same opinion as Macleay concerning the character of the treaty of September, 1918, but unlike Macleay he condemned the efforts which the Japanese were making to use the treaty to secure a pre-judgment of the Shantung question, and he argued strongly against Japan's attempts to dominate China.²¹ The attitudes of the two men were in marked contra-distinction, and Reinsch's comments tend to encourage the questioning of Macleay's reasoning that Britain should have stood by a treaty which he recognised as having been concluded by 'a corrupt clique'. Nor was Macleay unaware of some questionable practices which Japan was using against China owing to China lodging her claims before the

council of ten and her willingness to publish the war-time Sino-Japanese treaties. One week before Macleay had written the lengthy minute referred to above he had had an interview with Sze, the Chinese minister, Sze had informed Macleay that he had just received information that Torikichi Obata, the Japanese minister in Peking, had tried to put pressure upon the Chinese government, including threats to send troops to Shantung, in an effort to induce China to withdraw her complaints against Japan at the peace conference and curtail China's willingness to publish the secret treaties.²² Macleay concluded '...from my experience of Japanese methods and my acquaintance with Mr. Obata I have no reason to think that Mr. Sze's account is exaggerated'. Macleay was of the opinion that when the question of Kiaochow came before the council of ten again the 'highly improper' action of the Japanese minister, Obata, should not pass unnoticed. Despite official/denials Macleay had no doubts that Obata had resorted to the use of pressure and threats.

Early in March, Viscount Chinda, the leader of the Japanese delegation in Paris, issued a press statement denying reports that Japan was trying to coerce the Chinese delegation.²³ Underneath the Foreign Office's report of this statement is the pencilled comment, probably by Curzon, 'Methinks he doth protest

too much', while Macleay complained bitterly that the Japanese 'should try to make people believe that the reports which have reached Europe of the methods of intimidation employed by the Japanese Minister in Peking are unfounded and should be attributed to German propoganda'. These statements indicate that Macleay, despite his support of Japanese claims, could be quite critical of that country.

In China itself, British diplomats and officials were very much concerned with Japan's activities. Jordan reported that out of a total of 168 Japanese enterprises in Tsinanfu only 8 % were commercial undertakings and 50 % were either brothels or drug shops selling morphia. To find a parallel to such deliberate exploitation of a weaker people, Jordan argued, 'one would have to go back to the treatment of the Aztecs and Peruvians by the Spaniards'.²⁴ Just before Jordan's dispatch J.T. Pratt, the British consul at Tsinan, wrote a more detailed report on the Japanese activities in Shantung which was confirmed by Jordan.²⁵

Pratt went into great detail concerning Japan's discriminatory business methods, her unfair treatment of foreign shipping, the illegal melting down of Chinese coinage, the increase of Japan's influence, and the widespread encouragement of drugs and vice. Of particular interest to the deliberations in Paris was the observation:

'Shortly after the outbreak of war the Japanese Government gave assurances that her object in expelling the Germans from Tsingtao was in order to restore the place to China. It is safe to say, however, that in no quarter were these assurances taken very seriously and there has never been any intention to hold Japan to too literal a fulfilment of them. It would be mere folly to allow a modern up to date seaport town like Tsingtao to fall into decay under the unfettered control of the Chinese, and it was generally felt that the spirit of the promise would be adequately kept if the municipal Government of Tsingtao were left in foreign hands, on the model of, though perhaps on more liberal lines than at, Shanghai, whilst Chinese aspirations and national sentiment were satisfied by the formal recognition of Chinese suzerainty'.

These criticisms of both Japan and China were obvious support for the policy of internationalising foreign rights in China, but unfortunately, perhaps, for the outcome of the critical Shantung negotiations which took place in April, 1919, neither Jordan's nor Pratt's dispatch arrived at the Foreign Office until May when they were not submitted to the ministers.

Some miscellaneous aspects of British policy towards China.

As requested by the Foreign Office, Jordan gave his views upon China's peace desiderata, but his reply seemed to lack his usual force of argument, possibly because he had already expressed his opinions upon the need to internationalise foreign rights in China.²⁶ Upon this point it must be questioned whether the professed Chinese desire for the consolidation of foreign rights, even if granted, would not have caused a deep internal split with the Canton government for Macleay, in arguing against earlier proposals of Jordan for such inter-

nationalisation, had stated that 'the more advanced political thought of Southern China would strenuously resist such foreign tutelage'.²⁷ But on the question of foreign troops, and contrary to Macleay's expectations, Jordan was opposed to China's claim for the withdrawal of foreign forces, and he dismissed the claim as being for bargaining purposes only:

..'it would be a grave imprudence to withdraw foreign troops stationed in North China under 1900 protocol until a stable Government has been established in Peking, country reduced to a semblance of order, armies of military governors disbanded and their place taken by an efficient national gendarmerie'.

Such an expression of opinion was in keeping with Jordan's aims that in securing an improvement in Anglo-Chinese relations Britain's economic interests should be maintained and, where possible, expanded. This aim was clearly visible in the leading role which Jordan played in helping to obtain the expulsion of ex-enemy nationals from China.

Perhaps the clearest indication of Britain's motives regarding the expulsion of ex-enemy nationals from China is to be found in the correspondence between the London Chamber of Commerce and Balfour regarding a resolution which its far eastern section had passed. The resolution urged the British government to extend the acts of parliament concerning trading with the enemy for another five years regarding the Germans in China.²⁸ A separate letter stated that the British chamber of commerce in Shanghai thought that all Germans in China, and

if possible in Japan as well, should be repatriated without delay, and in support of the Shanghai body, the London chamber of commerce called upon the British government to put pressure upon China and Japan to secure the desired expulsions. Its letter concluded:

'...the business methods by which Germans in China previous to the War were able to encroach to a very appreciable extent on British Trade have always been considered unsound and objectionable, and, in effect, unfair competition. The attitude of the Germans in China during the War is notorious and for these reasons alone...justify the foregoing request'.

The Foreign Office reply stated that negotiations to expel enemy nationals had already been taking place in Peking and that the Chinese Government had agreed to the British proposals.

It seems that although Jordan faced considerable difficulties he was determined to press the issue of the repatriation of Germans to a successful conclusion.²⁹ To obtain the necessary shipping Jordan was in constant communication with the Admiralty and there were difficulties in obtaining full Chinese cooperation, for thousands of enemy subjects had to be rounded up and temporary accommodation found for them. The United States believed Britain's motives were not unselfish, and Reinsch in particular objected to Britain's actions. A brush with the Vatican occurred over the expulsion of German missionaries, and there were numerous questions of humanitarianism to be considered. There was also the point that Japan was

not expelling Germans from her territory; so why should China? Throughout these difficulties Jordan remained firm until several thousand Germans were expelled from China in the early summer of 1919. Although there were other issues which influenced China's sovereignty, such as the banning of arms imports, foreign control over Chinese customs with resulting political implications, and the maintenance of wireless monopolies, the wisdom of the British government in seeking the expulsion of Germans from China must be questioned, for it can be seen that, apart from any adverse influence upon Anglo-Chinese relations, the British government had left themselves open to charges of interested interference in China at the very time when the British delegation were to help judge Japan's claims regarding Shantung.

One must also question whether the British government were consistent regarding policy, for on a number of occasions the Chinese delegation had been informed that only issues arising from the war could be dealt with, and that the peace conference was not an appropriate occasion for a general revision of China's foreign treaties. Early in February, however, the British delegation wanted to raise the question of the opium convention of 1912 at Paris, which had a special importance for China.³⁰ But the United States was not in favour of it being raised and correspondence went on throughout

February and March on whether the opium issue should be discussed at the conference. While the object of banning illegal dealings in opium was praiseworthy the motives of the British government were not completely altruistic for Cecil Harmsworth, parliamentary under-secretary, argued:

'Both the Foreign Office and the Home Office are anxious that such a resolution [on the opium convention] should be tabled at the Peace Conference and it is pretty certain to be tabled by one Power or another. I suggest that the resolution should be tabled by us, if only for the reason that we ought to have the credit of taking a step which would be warmly welcomed by influential bodies of opinion in all countries. If we do not do it, the Americans probably will, and get all the credit(.

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Harmsworth emphasised that it would be a 'bull-point' to table such a resolution and, although he recognised that the peace conference might be too busy to deal with such secondary questions, he felt that in periods of 'marking time' the delegations would be only too pleased to do something practical. P.H. Kerr's (private secretary to the prime minister) reply to Harmsworth was cautious and he stated that preliminaries with Germany would have to be settled first. But he had asked M.P.A. Hankey, secretary to the British delegation, 'to see that if possible the British delegation move first in the matter'.

A commendable feature of British policy was the reasoning that as Germany had refused to sign the opium convention of 1912, the peace conference offered an opportunity to force Germany's hand. An answer to a parliamentary question had made the British government's proposals common knowledge

and early in April the United States dropped her objections to the matter being raised at Paris. But when the Americans changed their minds a statement by Macleay revealed a selfish approach once more:

'It is interesting to note that after having thrown cold water on our proposal...Mr.Lansing should come forward with the very proposal which we had made months before to the U.S.Government. However, as we have got in first with our Memorandum we shall not I hope lose the Kudos of having been the originators of the idea of bringing up the matter at the Peace Conference'.³²

Thus it was largely as a result of the British delegation's initiative that article 295, which made the opium convention of 1912 binding, was incorporated into the peace treaty.

Britain's attitude to China on comparatively small matters must be judged as unhelpful. For example, in mid-March the Chinese delegation submitted a claim to the peace conference for reparations for war damages against Germany. Macleay made a detailed examination of the Chinese claims which he stated would have to be decided by the reparations commission, but he expressed the opinion that some of them were absurd and others inadmissible.³³ While there were sound reasons for Macleay's criticisms of China's demands it is somewhat significant that there was a complete lack of effort on Macleay's part to suggest any equitable solution.

A further example of Britain's unhelpfulness arose when Lou Tseng-tsiang, the chief Chinese plenipotentiary, wrote

to Clemenceau, president of the council, asking that China should be accorded representation upon a commission to study the problems of aeronautics which the peace conference was about to establish. The letter pointed out that Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, Greece, and several other small powers were already represented, and it was argued that as the aeroplane was a thing of the future, and in view of the size of China, representation should be granted to the Chinese government.³⁴ A copy of Lou's letter was sent to the British delegation in Paris and prompted Major-General Sir F.N. Sykes, a military adviser, to urge Balfour that British representatives on the commission should act for China. But Balfour was most reluctant and argued:

'I do not see how we can possibly act for her China formally though something might Balfour's emphasis be arranged privately. I much doubt however the wisdom of any such attempt; the Japanese and probably the Americans would resent it'.

Balfour's rejection of Sykes' suggestion was undoubtedly correct, but it may be noted that Balfour did not urge the acceptance of China's request for representation despite the strength of her case.

Foreign Railways in China.

Questions relating to the ownership and control of railways were to prove of maximum importance to the Shantung problem, and in the early months of 1919 there were considerable negotiations concerning the (foreign rights of) railways through-

out China. The various lines crossed territories which were disputed by the affected powers and rendered the railway question a very complicated one which is only briefly noted here in order to observe some of the political manoeuvres which were involved. For example, at the end of January the Foreign Office informed Jordan that Japan had decided to waive all claims to succeed German rights on the Tientsin-Pukow railway in order to 'give support to China in assisting her own rights against Germany...and to give China a free hand in respect to the railway...' The Japanese memorandum concluded by saying that it was hoped that the British government would note Japan's fair-mindedness on the issue.³⁵ But when Jordan replied he stated that in his opinion the Japanese government had never had any right to state how the northern section of the Tientsin-Pukow railway should be disposed. Hence, when the Foreign Office replied to Japan they thanked them for their 'fair-mindedness', but made the point put forward by Jordan.

In mid-February the British consul in Chefoo forwarded a letter from the local British chamber of commerce urging that as the proposed Chefoo-Weihsien railway was vital to British interests plans for its construction should be sanctioned at Paris,³⁶ but this was in contradiction to Jordan's warm endorsement of the railway section of China's peace

desiderata which asked for the internationalisation of foreign railways in China.³⁷ Macleay was of the opinion that there were no reasons why Britain should not go ahead with construction without any reference to the peace conference, and it may be noted that he made no suggestion to consult Jordan on the issue.

While the British were discussing their projected lines the Chinese government issued a memorandum which linked a Chinese claim for the restoration of the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway with their claim for the direct return of Kiaochow. The memorandum outlined the origins and extent of German rights in Shantung, claimed that Japanese military occupation had exceeded these rights, and gave China's reasons for asking for the direct return of the area and rights. With the memorandum were a number of documents and appendices.³⁸ A main point of appendix 6, a Chinese note of protest to Japan of 30 September, 1914, was that Japan's military possession of the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway had occurred after German troops in Shantung had been defeated and the railway was a private affair, having been built with German and Chinese capital. Japan's answer had complained of the Chinese government being 'suspicious of Japan's every movement', but British officials were not impressed with Japan's 'very poor argumentation'.

If Japan were using war-time developments concerning the railways to extend her economic and political influence over China, especially in Shantung, then such developments were obviously relevant to the peace conference, but the issue was clouded by the Sino-Japanese agreements and some British officials were against the Shantung railway question being considered at Paris. For example, C.H. Tufton, counsellor of embassy attached to the British delegation, argued that China had bartered away the ex-German railway concessions to Japan in return for a loan, and he did not see the peg on which the conference could hang its intervention in the matter. He thought that to place the railways in any country under some form of international control was precisely what the economic section of the British delegation were trying to avoid, and thus this was another British voice arguing against Jordan's proposals. Tufton concluded that the transit and transport council of the League of Nations, 'if and when set up', could examine the entire question.³⁹

In view of later developments both at Paris and Washington one must question whether the majority of British officials had realised the real significance of the Shantung railway issue and its relevance to the political situation.

Further consideration of the Shantung issue.

Following China's presentation of her claims for the restoration of Shantung at the council of ten at the end of January, her delegates continued to press her case by means of memoranda and interviews with foreign statesmen, and it can be seen that most of the issues raised by the Chinese delegation at Paris were of relevance to the Shantung question.

The use of Japanese loans to influence Chinese politicians was known to the British delegation, and in February the Foreign Office received information that Japan was threatening to stop giving China further financial aid because of the latter's demands for the restoration of Shantung. But Macleay did not believe that the Japanese had made such a threat, or if they had it was not to be taken seriously, and his reasons for this conclusion reveal a marked awareness of Japan's interference in China's affairs. Macleay argued that the Japanese government were not disposed to stop the Japanese banks from making loans to the Chinese northern military party, 'who use the money to raise troops to overawe the South and prevent a peaceful settlement of the struggle between the two parties'.⁴⁰ Such a realisation, one might have thought, would have helped to reduce the continuous British criticisms of China's internal situation, but often the question of the influence of foreign powers was completely absent from British assessments of China's internal affairs.

While this interference in China's sovereignty was occurring, Jordan, in a private letter to Lord Bryce, a former British ambassador in Washington, expressed considerable pessimism over Anglo-American-Chinese relations. His comments on the developing situation were quite scathing:

'..It is no wonder that, as you say, the very existence of China has been forgotten. For over four years there has been a rigid Press censorship [in Britain] and not a word reflecting upon Japanese action in this country has been allowed to appear in the British press. There may have been some excuse for this during the War, but there is none now and yet this deliberate suppression of the truth still continues. The "Times" devotes half a column to describing the pedigree of some obscure Japanese prince and gives two or three lines of small type to recording an important movement in China. There is no one at home who has any real knowledge of recent developments in this country and I am not sanguine enough to expect much from the Peace Conference. We and the Americans work together very closely and Anglo-American Associations have been established in Peking, Shanghai and other important centres. Their activities are doing much good and useful work, but these local efforts make little impression outside of China'.⁴¹

Obviously, care must be taken in assessing the views of men-on-the spot who claim that their part of the world has been forgotten, but Jordan's complaints about British sentiments being pro-Japanese could scarcely be dismissed as mere bias. It would seem that Jordan was accurate in describing the degree of local Anglo-American co-operation, and there was clearly a great deal in common between the ideas of Jordan and Reinsch, but whereas the American delegation in Paris were fairly sympathetic to the American minister's views, even if Reinsch did consider the support offered to be inadequate, the British delegation had

rejected Jordan's basic assumptions.

At the beginning of March, C.T. Wang, the second Chinese plenipotentiary, had a lengthy interview with Macleay that was of importance to Sino-Chinese relations.⁴² Wang informed Macleay that the Chinese delegation wanted to present the peace conference with a claim for the annulment or drastic revision of the treaties and exchange of notes which Wang claimed were extorted from China in May, 1915. The proposed revision, it was recognised, would affect not only Japan's rights in Shantung, but also Japan's special position and interests in Manchuria, eastern inner Mongolia, the leases of Port Arthur and Dalny, the terms of the south Manchuria and Antung railway concessions, and the Hanyehping mining agreement. According to Macleay, Wang wished to ascertain whether the British plenipotentiaries considered it to be politically advisable for China to make such claims, and Wang was of the impression that,

'..even if the Conference were unable to discuss the matter or to express any opinion on the validity of the treaties, it might be prepared to make some formal statement to the effect that, in its view, the claim of China to the revision of these treaties was one which should be referred to the League of Nations'.

Macleay continued by stating that it was Wang's opinion that such a declaration would greatly strengthen China's position,

and Wang had argued that unless these questions could be discussed, which were vital to China's interests and the future peace of the far east, and if China were to be left in the position resulting from the 1915 agreements, all her war efforts would have been in vain.

In reply to Wang, Macleay had stated that the Paris conference was a meeting of the allied powers which aimed at reaching a peace settlement, and that it could not be expected to decide upon matters which had not arisen out of the war and were of no concern to Germany and other ex-enemy countries. Obviously the conference 'could not constitute itself into a sort of tribunal to adjust old grievances between Allies'. Therefore, Macleay continued (in his private opinion) that it would be inadvisable for China to raise the question of the twenty-one demands and the other treaties of 1915, except those which concerned previous German rights in Shantung and the leased territory of Kiaochow. Macleay pressed his case by adding the point that if the Chinese delegation were to try to use the conference to formulate a serious indictment against Japan regarding her past policies towards China in order to obtain an expression of international sympathy it would be embarrassing to all the members present. Japan as well as China, it had to be remembered, had been an ally of Britain during the war, and Macleay thought that in the circumstances it would be

inadvisable for China to antagonise Japan in such a fashion. He questioned whether it would not be wiser to wait for the creation of the League of Nations to which disputes concerning the revision of treaties could be referred.

In reviewing the interview Macleay was of the opinion that Wang had received some kind of promise from the Americans for a revision of the 1915 treaties which made Wang the more anxious to know the possible reactions of Britain. Macleay argued that the British delegation should formally inform Wang that they considered it would be:

'..undesirable for China to raise at the Peace Conference the question of the 1915 treaties, with the exception of the Kiaochow and Shantung Agreements, as well as any other matters affecting her international relations or the past policies of the foreign Powers, which have no connection with the war and no bearing on the peace terms'.

Macleay concluded by referring to the fact that the demand for the revision of China's treaties was not in keeping with the aims of the Peking government which, being under the domination of Japan, might repudiate the actions of their own delegates if such matters were raised at Paris.

No doubt China could be criticised for making such widespread demands for the revision of her treaties, but at international conferences it is common practice for a country to demand more than it expects to receive. What is perhaps significant in Macleay's memorandum is that despite the evidence of Japan's interference there was a total absence of any

gesture of friendship or encouragement to China, however vague, ~~on the part of the~~, even though the situation would have seemed to justify such a move.

Towards the end of March a memorandum was prepared at the Foreign Office which provided the interested British officials with an opportunity to re-appraise their attitudes. The memorandum reviewed the main events in China since the mid-19th century and its tone was decidedly anti-Japanese. It described the twenty-one demands of 1915 as an unparalleled attack upon the integrity of China and the policy of the 'open door'. It stated:

'The demands caused a sensation in China. But for the war they could not have been presented without danger of complications elsewhere. As it was, Japan was given hints by the Allies to restrain her demands within the bounds of her obligations to them, but she gave little heed to these hints....

....The effect [of the twenty-one demands] was to make Japan predominant in China at the expense of the Western Powers, and to place the Chinese Government under Japanese influence in a manner which is certain to provoke dissension sooner or later'.⁴³

With the Chinese delegation at Paris pressing for the revision of the 1915 treaties, one might have thought that interested British officials would have made some relevant comments upon the memorandum, either to dispute facts presented or defend attitudes adopted. But Macleay only made the brief comment, 'There is nothing new in this'.

There were many striking similarities between the confidential memorandum of the Foreign Office and a memorandum sent to Lloyd George by the Chinese Students Union in Peking early in March.⁴⁴ This memorandum asked the prime minister to support China's case against Japan and China's struggles to obtain 'a just peace'. The students' union claimed that Japan appeared intent upon the permanent occupation of Kiaochow and the ending of the open-door policy. It claimed that:

'When that ambition of hers [Japan's] is fully realised, it will, we may safely predict, bring about another world upheaval like that which has just come to an end, a catastrophe to all mankind'.

The memorandum continued in this rather extreme language to claim that in the general interests of peace the war-time Sino-Japanese treaties, 'like the Treaties of Bucharest and Brest Litovsk', should be pronounced null and void.

Macleay's reactions were to repeat his opinion that the peace conference could not discuss China's complaints against Japan which did not arise from the war and therefore a general revision of treaties was impossible. But he continued by stating:

'There is much truth in the description of Japan's policy and considerable justification for the fears expressed in this letter as to the inevitable result of a continuance of that policy, but China's remedy would appear to be in an appeal to the League of Nations, when constituted, and not to the Peace Conference'.

No encouragement was given to the Chinese students for Max Muller argued that the prime minister's secretary should reply to the memorandum merely acknowledging its receipt and stating that it had been forwarded to the British delegation in Paris. A few days later Kerr commented that this had been done.

During the first ten weeks of the peace conference the British delegation had taken a number of steps which favoured Japan's position in China, and although the issue of Shantung had still to be decided it seemed almost certain that Britain would support Japan's claims in the settlement of the question. However, Britain was by no means unaware of some of the dangerous aspects of Japan's policies in China and the potential risks to her own interests in that country. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that the British government did not adopt a firmer attitude towards Japan, possibly by letting it be known that it would give at least sympathetic consideration to China's case if it were brought before the League of Nations. But efforts on behalf of China to obtain expressions of sympathy were either refused or ignored, and it must be seen as part of British policy that no such statement was issued.

1. Hist. of P.C. of Paris I, p.247.
2. Notes of a conversation held 13-1-1919, F.R.U.S. P.P.C.III pp.532-4.
3. See to Balfour, 14-1-1919, Macleay to See, 14-1-1919. F.O.608/211 [103].
4. 5-1-1919, Cab.297 [1-100].
5. Details of the powers' representations concerned with Shan-tung, see Appendix I for Britain & Appendix II for America, Japan and China.
6. Fifield, pp.132-4.
7. Li Chien-nung, pp.390-3.
8. Jordan in Peking; sent a summary of the demands which had been telegraphed earlier to the Chinese delegation, 17-1-1919. Minutes by Macleay, 10-2-1919, Malkin, 10-2-1919, Hardinge, 11-2-1919. F.O.608/209 [570].
9. Jordan to Foreign Office, 23-1-1919. Minutes by Curzon 29-1, Cecil 6-2, Macleay 6-2-1919. F.O.608/209 [1298].
10. For text of the December Memorandum, 1926, see Survey of International Affairs, 1926, pp.488-32.
11. Manifesto of the Chinese Democratic Committee in France, F.O.608/209 [377].
Memorandum by Macleay, 15-1-1919. F.O.608/209 [128].
12. Minute by Macleay, 12-2-1919. F.O.608/211 [1841]. For terms of the Sino-Japanese treaty of September 1918 see Appendix 5.
13. See 'Conversation with J.W.R. Macleay of the British Delegation', in Hunsz King, Woodrow Wilson, Wellington Koo and the China Question at the Paris Peace Conference (London 1959) p.13.
14. Balfour to Curzon, 20-9-1919. Balfour papers. 49734, Vol. LII.
15. Fifield, pp.125-132, and 197-9.

16. Macleay to MaxMuller, 21-2-1919. F.O.608/209 21727.
17. Professor S.K. Hornbeck, Hist. of P.C. of Paris VI, (1924) p.379.
18. Fifield, p.132.
19. Ibid., p.142.
20. Macleay's minute, see 12 above.
21. Reinsch to Acting Secretary of State, 10-3-1919, F.R.U.S., I, 1919, pp.270-5.
22. Macleay to Hardinge, 5-2-1919, F.O.608/209 16387.
23. Statement by Chinda to Havas News agency, 5-3-1919, Macleay's minute, 12-3-1919. F.O.608/209 3547.
24. Jordan to Curzon, 27-1-1919, F.O.608/209 87847. This was received at the F.O. 1st May 1919. It was acknowledged by Macleay's signature 14/5/1919, but the latter made no comment nor is there any indication of any action having been taken.
25. Jordan to Curzon, 11-1-1919, F.O.608/209 87837. It is interesting to note that although Dr.Lowe is critical of Pratt's political judgment he supports the accuracy of Pratt's reports, see Lowe pp.197-8. Macleay endorsed Pratt's dispatch which was received at the F.O. 1-5-1919 with the comment, 'This is too long for me to send in'.
26. Jordan to F.O. 10-2-1919. F.O.608/209 23127.
27. Macleay's minute, 12-12-1918. F.O.371/3191 2035067.
28. Letter from London Chamber of Commerce 16-1-1919; F.O. reply written by Tilley, 21-1-1919. F.O.371/3680 93737.
29. Details of the expulsion of ex-enemy nationals from China, F.O.371/3680.
30. 5-2-1919. F.O.608/211 16507.

31. Harmsworth to Philip Kerr, (Paris) 12-2-1919, Kerr's reply 3-3-1919. Lothian Manuscript G.D.40/17/210.
32. Macleay to MaxMuller, 3-4-1919. F.O.608/211 [4861].
33. Macleay's minute, 19-3-1919. F.O.608/209 [4549].
34. Lou Tseng-tsiang's letter 29-3-1919, Sykes to Balfour 5-4-1919, Balfour to Sykes, 7-4-1919. F.O.800/216.
35. F.O. to Jordan, 28-1-1919, Jordan's reply 31-1-1919, F.O.608/210 [2065].
36. Jordan to F.O. 14-2-1919, Macleay's minute, 19-2-1919, F.O.608/210 [2062].
37. See 26 above.
38. Memorandum from Chinese government, 17-2-1919, Minutes by Macleay 18-2-1919, and Hurst 20-2-1919. F.O.608/210 [2310].
39. Minute by Tufton, 19-2-1919, F.O.608/210 [2338].
40. Minute by Macleay, 21-2-1919, F.O.608/209 [2573].
41. Jordan to Bryce, 25-2-1919, F.O.350/16.
42. Macleay to Hardinge, 3-3-1919, F.O.608/209 [3361].
43. Memorandum on main events in the relations of China with Japan 20-3-1919. Macleay's minute, 6-3-1919. F.O.608/209 [6573].
44. Memorandum received at F.O., 1-3-1919. Minutes by Macleay 11-4-1919 (this is certain to be 11-3-1919) MaxMuller, 5-3-1919, and Kerr, 10-3-1919) F.O.608/209 [3924].

CHAPTER IV

THE APRIL NEGOTIATIONS

During April, 1919, a decision was reached by the delegates of the United States, Britain, and France which determined the Paris settlement of the Shantung controversy and resulted in articles 156-7 being written into the peace treaty.¹ These negotiations have been described in detail by Dr. Nisfield who argues that throughout the exchanges Britain regarded herself as being committed to support Japan's claims regarding the province, and there can be little doubt that his conclusions are correct.² But of obvious interest to British policy are the motives and character of such support.

In considering the negotiations it is important to recall that the controversy concerning Shantung was only one of the many problems which faced the delegates of the major western powers whose principal task was to determine a peace settlement with Germany. One may conclude that it was typical of such concern that when Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary, prepared a memorandum, which ranged wide in its considerations of how a firm but just peace could be achieved with Germany, it said very little about the influence of the far east upon international relations. Kerr's contention that the first condition for the success of the all-important peace-preserving League of Nations was an understanding that there

should be no competitive building up of rival fleets or armies among the British Empire, the United States, France, and Italy completely ignored Japan, and prompted Drummond, a member of the British delegation, to suggest that it would be wise to include her.³

In addition to the multiplicity of the problems which confronted the British principals one must consider the grasp which they had upon far eastern affairs. The British prime minister's understanding of the area was generally recognised as being limited, and Dr. Morrison, who was present in Paris as an adviser to the Chinese government, concluded that Lloyd George 'seems woefully ill-equipped for settling these important questions'.⁴ It may be argued that Balfour's knowledge of the Shantung issue was not as deep as Dr. Fifield maintains, for a current criticism, that of Sir Charles Addis, a leading banker with an extensive knowledge of far eastern affairs, was 'Quite frankly he [Balfour] admits that he knows nothing about China.'⁵ But if Addis's comments were correct it can be seen that Balfour did not act in keeping with his knowledge. Undoubtedly Macleay, who had served in the far east, had a detailed command of the issues involved, but his attitude to China has already been observed as being unsympathetic to China and during April his attitude hardened.

An indication of Macleay's hardening attitude appeared when he gave his opinion upon the course of action which he felt

should be adopted following the request of Lou Tseng-tsiang, the Chief delegate, for an interview with Balfour, the British foreign secretary. Macleay speculated upon the reasons for the requested interview and concluded that Lou Tseng-tsiang's main purpose was to seek Balfour's advice on the Shantung issue. As a result Macleay thought that '...in view of our commitments to Japan I suggest that Mr. Balfour should excuse himself from receiving Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang...' Consequently a letter written in the formal third person asked that Balfour be excused from the requested interview, '...as he has been advised by his Doctor to leave Paris for a few days', but that Balfour would be pleased to receive any comments which China might like to make in writing, 'in order to avoid delay'.⁶

Undeterred by Balfour's diplomatic illness, Sze submitted a memorandum which asked for the sympathetic support of Britain when the Shantung issue next came before the council of four.⁷ The memorandum paid tribute to Britain's friendly interest which had contributed 'in no small measure to China's rapid progress in recent years', and it went on to emphasise the importance of the Shantung issue to China as well as the foreign powers. But any hopes which China had for British support were discouraged, for after a delay of more than a fortnight during a critical phase of the Shantung negotiations a most formal reply was sent. The reply merely acknowledged receipt of the memorandum and stated that the British foreign

secretary '...has duly noted the views of the Chinese Government...' ⁸ This reply was sent only after careful consideration by Macleay whose comments might be judged as so important as to an assessment of British policy that they justify a fairly full quotation:

'This [Chinese] Memorandum shews clearly that even if Japan carries out her undertaking eventually to restore the leased territory of Kiaochow to China, her retention of the German railway and mining rights in the Province of Shantung and her possession of an exclusive Japanese concession including the port and business part of the town of Tsingtao will, from China's point of view, completely nullify the value of the restoration. Japan in fact will retain the substance and give back to China merely the shadow'.

'I think that it is more than probable that Lord Grey did not fully realise what far-reaching effects the promise which he gave to Japan in February 1917 to support her claims in regard to the disposal of German rights in Shantung at the Peace Conference would have and I believe that Sir John Jordan was not consulted. It will be remembered that the assurance was the price extracted by the Japanese for the naval assistance in the Mediterranean of which we then stood in urgent need. We could not without committing a breach of faith towards our old Ally ignore this assurance or admit the validity...of the Chinese memo. It is therefore somewhat difficult to suggest what answer should be sent to the Chinese Delegation....'

Macleay continued by suggesting that the reply be limited to a statement that China's comments would be borne in mind when the issues were next discussed, and concluded:

'If, as I anticipate from conversations which I have had with Members of the American Delegation, President Wilson strongly supports the Chinese claims, it may be possible to suggest a compromise. Until the attitude of the American Plenipotentiaries is definitely known the Japanese are not likely to accept any suggestion that they should revise the conditions on which they are at present prepared to restore Kiaochow to China, but if President Wilson refuses to agree to any settlement of the Kiaochow and Shantung questions, which he considers incompatible with the 14 Points, they might welcome our intervention'.

A brief comment by Hardinge, permanent under-secretary for foreign affairs, supported the proposal that a formal acknowledgment ~~was later~~^{be} dispatched to the Chinese delegation.

Macleay's comments were hardly a creditable reflection of the British government's treatment of Jordan in 1917, and it would seem that the main theme of Macleay's reasoning was that, even if Japan were ^{now} seeking to exact a higher price for her exertions than had been originally expected, it was a point of British honour that the price should ^{still} be fully paid, albeit at China's expense. One might judge that following the poor treatment of the British minister an even worse treatment of the country to which he was accredited was contemplated. Macleay's concluding paragraph was undoubtedly lacking in principle, for Britain was not a disinterested party to the point at issue and therefore lacked the essential quality to entitle her to arbitrate between the claims of the two countries. Indeed, the tone of Macleay's suggestion to arbitrate indicates that he was more interested in achieving a diplomatic success than securing an equitable solution of China's claims.

China's continued pressure.

While the Chinese government and delegation were seeking diplomatic support for their claims regarding Shantung they maintained a steady flow of press statements and published memoranda. Early in April they issued a semi-official statement, which was thought to have been drafted by Morrison, that

contained cogent arguments against the Japanese case.⁹ The Chinese statement began by recognising that Japan had lost some 2,000 lives in expelling the Germans from Shantung, but the attention of the Chinese people had been drawn to the fact that in the expulsion of Germans from the Alsace Lorraine area the American army had sustained losses thirty times greater than those of the Japanese at Tsingtao. But unlike the Japanese in relation to China, the United States government had not claimed 'one foot of railways or one yard of the rich mining lands of the recovered French provinces. Nor was such liberality confined to America for it was also well known that England, "who has made the fields of Flanders one vast cemetery for her youth", and incurred a tremendous national debt, had made no demands upon Belgium.' The report also defended China's war-time efforts.

Jordan praised the Chinese statement and argued that it could do nothing but good as it contained statements of facts that were historically correct and which needed emphasizing at a time when the Japanese were seeking to confuse issues. These comments referred particularly to the sections of the Chinese statement which dealt with China's actions during the war and were pertinent to the peace conference, especially in view of Balfour's repeated criticisms of China's poor performance during the conflict. Jordan argued that the Foreign Office

records did not give an adequate impression of Japan's hostility to China entering the war and the inability of the allied powers and China to overcome Japan's opposition. Japan's motives, Jordan argued, were:

'...to prevent China obtaining the prestige and influence in the Councils of the Allies which she would have otherwise gained by active intervention, and which would have given her a definite voice in the disposal of Kiaochow'.

Jordan concluded by stating that until the United States had entered the conflict, which had a direct bearing upon China's diplomatic actions, the attitude of British residents in China towards the Japanese was largely one of self-effacement in order not to prejudice the wider aspects of the war. But Balfour's actions later in April do not indicate any recognition of Jordan's case against Japan, or indeed, that he had noted the points made.

China, however, was continuing her diplomatic offensive and her next step was taken when Lou Hseng-tsiang addressed a letter to Clemenceau, president of the peace conference, asking that the peace treaties regulating Austria and Germany's relations with China should be on the basis of equality and reciprocity. The letter emphasised the importance which China attached to the principles of equity, and it expressed the hope that China's claims against Germany would not be overlooked.

But Macleay was not sympathetic to what was essentially a request for the direct return of the former German rights in Shantung, and he argued that Japan was certain to object to such a step.¹⁰ In what seems a rather cowardly fashion Macleay concluded: 'In any case the onus of explaining to the Chinese Delegation the reasons why their proposals have not been adapted seems to rest with the Secrétariat Général'. Thus, just over a week before the council of three reached its decision on the Shantung question, Macleay appeared to be of the opinion that the decision had already been made in Japan's favour.

It is interesting to note the striking contrast between the attitude of the British government towards certain South American countries and China which is offered by the fact that when Lou Tseng-tsiang was addressing his letter to Clemenceau, Balfour was proposing to raise the status of the British ministers in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to ambassador level, and argued that although none of these countries was very important they were of potential importance.¹¹ This may have been very sound reasoning, but it appears strange that Brazil, for example, whose lamentable war efforts have already been noted, should have received such favourable consideration, whilst China's potential development, despite the vicissitudes of almost perpetual civil war, seems to have received scant notice from the British foreign secretary.

If Balfour did not accord China reasonable consideration this was hardly due to any lack of Chinese pressure, for when the council of three were actively considering the Shantung controversy a conference was held in Paris of foreign based Chinese nationals which passed a resolution that called for the direct retrocession of Shantung to China. The resolution asked the powers to declare that China should cease to be bound by the Sino-Japanese treaties and relevant notes of 1915 and 1918 on the grounds that the Chinese government concluded these agreements only to expedite China's joining the war on the side of the allies. But if such an argument can be brushed aside as ridiculous, the concluding claim of the resolution that the promises of the powers to respect Japan's demands in Shantung were 'entirely in conflict with the Formula of Righteousness for which Great Britain, France, and Italy have proclaimed *urbi et orbi* that their manhood has fought and died', might be seen as deserving a reasoned answer.¹²

Towards the end of April the Italian prime minister and chief delegate, V. Orlando, temporarily left Paris in high dudgeon over the Fiume question. This event undoubtedly had an influence upon the remaining delegates, and it may be judged that Orlando's departure did not impress the other delegates with Wilson's firmness in dealing with opponents, but rather it resulted in a weakening of Wilson's position for he did not want

to see the Japanese leave Paris as well. Obviously such a step would have dealt Wilson's hopes for a League of Nations a severe if not crippling blow, and the evidence indicates that the American president was subsequently more willing to compromise over the Shantung problem. 13

In trying to assess the actions of the British delegates during the April negotiations a marked comparison can be made with American sources concerning the amount of evidence available whereby corresponding American policies might be judged. Whereas there is an abundance of American documents, a government-produced history of the peace conference which deals with Shantung in detail, and biographies of American principals which describe developments at length, there appears to be little material on this question in comparable British sources. The published biographies of British principals ignore Shantung completely or give it only scant attention. It would seem that the British principals concerned regarded the issue as largely settled and this might explain the difference in the deliberations upon the Shantung questions with American material.

On a number of occasions Macleay, at least, had spoken as if the Shantung issue had definitely been decided in Japan's favour,¹⁴ and during an important interview between Balfour and Wilson before the council^{of three} considered Shantung again, Balfour made it clear that Britain would support Japan's claims.¹⁵

It was reported that Wilson 'although reasonable, was inclined to favour Chinese claims as against Japanese', whereupon Balfour had pointed out that the Shantung issue was regarded by Japanese public opinion as being a point of honour over which it would be difficult for the Japanese government to yield. If they did not yield, it had been pointed out to Wilson, Britain regarded herself as being bound by her pledges to Japan.

After a meeting of foreign ministers on the same day as the Balfour-Wilson interview, the Japanese delegate took Balfour to one side and told him that he was anxious that the question of Tsingtao should not be discussed until the following week.^{15a} Such a request indicates that there was a marked difference in the degree of consultation between Britain and Japan on the one hand, and Britain and China on the other, for whereas the Chinese were denied an interview with Balfour to discuss Shantung, the Japanese were able, quite easily, to press for the date on which they desired the council of four to discuss the question.

Negotiations before the Council.

The council ^{of three} began its further consideration of Shantung on April 22nd when the Chinese delegation were represented. An immediate problem facing the council was the questioned validity of the relevant war-time treaties, and if Lloyd George

had a poor understanding of these agreements this did not prevent him from making proposals which Wunsz King has critically described:

'Lloyd George was well known for his skill and audacity in participating in the discussion of a subject without knowing exactly what it was all about. Thus, having admitted that he had never heard of the Japanese twenty-one demands let alone the ultimatum, he did not hesitate to put to Koo this question: Which China would prefer - To allow Japan to succeed to the German rights in Shantung as stated in the treaty between China and Germany, or to recognise Japan's position in Shantung as stipulated in the treaties between China and Japan. This sounded like an ultimatum and put the Chinese in an extremely embarrassing situation'.¹⁶

Only one day earlier Lloyd George had questioned Wilson why Kiaochow should be treated differently from other ex-German colonies regarding mandates, and it appears that Macleay had exerted pressure to induce the prime minister to respect Britain's war-time treaties.¹⁷ Whether it was Macleay's influence or not, at the important council meeting of April 22nd Lloyd George had made it clear that Britain regarded her treaties as binding and that she could not turn to Japan and say, 'All right, thank you very much, when we wanted your help, you gave it, but we now think that the treaty was a bad one and should not be carried out'.¹⁸

The Chinese replied to the question of the sanctity of treaties in a memorandum addressed to Wilson asking for Shantung to be surrendered first to the major five powers, and that after one year it be retroceded to China.¹⁹ The memorandum emphasised

that the Chinese delegation recognised the force of accepted obligations, but they questioned whether there was not a higher obligation resting upon the council, which was to remove the serious obstacles to a durable peace in the far east. In relation to Shantung, the Chinese claimed that the council could make a settlement compatible with justice which would ensure peace in the far east for at least half-a-century. But, the memorandum continued, if the council declined to make a just settlement because of certain obligations either imposed on China by threat or force, or contracted by France and Britain in entirely changed circumstances, it would probably be sowing the seeds of discord for the future. The memorandum concluded by stating that China was at the parting of the ways. China had come to the west for justice, and if she were disappointed the Chinese people would blame the west, and not Japan, for failing to give her a helping hand 'merely because some of its leading powers had privately pledged to support Japan'.

Undoubtedly China's appeal was strong, even if its concluding remarks were one-sided, and at an important stage the Chinese memorandum posed the question whether the Shantung issue should be settled according to treaty obligations, the character of which was dubious, or in accordance with the principles, however vague, of a just peace. It may be noted that this question weighed heavily on Wilson's mind.²⁰

As a result of Lloyd George raising the question of which alternative would China prefer, the transfer of German rights to ~~China~~^{Japan}, or the implementation of the war-time Sino-Japanese treaties, a panel of three experts, Macleay, Williams, and Gout, from Britain, United States, and France respectively, met to consider which alternative would be most beneficial to China. The report was ready within twenty-four hours, and its opening remarks were that 'either course presents serious disadvantages for China'.²¹

After considering the two alternatives the experts favoured the transfer of ex-German rights to Japan rather than the implementation of the Sino-Japanese war-time treaties, because the latter step would have given the Japanese greater economic power in Shantung. An important article in the Sino-Japanese treaty was for the establishment of an exclusive concession at Tsingtao, and in arguing against acceptance of the war-time treaties the experts stated:

'This concession presumably would be permanent and if, as is understood to be the case, it is intended that this exclusive Japanese area shall include the greater part of the business portion of the town of Tsingtao, the docks, quay and railway terminus, its effect, in our opinion, will be to diminish to a great extent the value of the immediate restoration to China of the leased territory'.

It has already been noted that Macleay had come to similar conclusions privately.²² Yet the recognition of the potential influence of Japan's claims did not dissuade the British delegation from playing a leading role in the April negotiations of the

council whereby international recognition was accorded to Japan's position in Shantung.

E.T. Williams, the American expert, was dissatisfied with both the alternatives which had been presented to China, and he submitted a separate report to Wilson.²³ In his report Williams advocated the adoption of a solution similar to that requested by China, namely, surrender of the province to the powers for one year and then retrocession to the motherland.

On the day following the issue of the report of the experts, the Shantung question was discussed again at the council. At this meeting a proposal was made that if Japan were to have her own way over the disposal of rights in the province she would be agreeable to the ending of all unequal treaties with China but,

'Lloyd George immediately backed away from any relinquishment of the "unequal treaties". He stated that Great Britain "could not allow other nations to cooperate in the Yangtse Kiang, although we should like to, since we had not sufficient capital ourselves for development. The reason we could not do so was because we should have to let the Japanese in." '24

These comments are a further indication that although Britain paid lip-service to the 'open-door' in China, in practice her policy was for the maintenance of spheres of interest.

The question of the maintenance of such spheres, it has been noted, had been decided upon in late 1918, when Macleay and other leading British officials opposed the surrender of privileges in China unless there were economic advantages to

compensate for any retrocessions made. Before the peace conference had started Macleay had argued that during the making of the peace treaty any forcing of the door regarding Japan's position in China should be left to the Americans, for if the Americans failed to curb the Japanese Britain would have thereby avoided antagonising the Japanese unnecessarily.²⁵ An additional consideration for British policy was the ownership of Hong-Kong and the Kowloon territory, for Curzon had recognised that while Britain held these possessions it was unrealistic to expect Japan to surrender Shantung.²⁶ As the situation developed at Paris it may be judged that not only were the British delegates leaving the forcing of the door to the Americans, but were proving reluctant to follow through once an opening seemed likely. Hence, Lloyd George's 'backing away' might be explained as a manifestation of the influence of Britain's possessions in China upon her policy.

Japan maintained her pressure for securing a prompt settlement of the Shantung question and on April 25th her chief delegate, Marquis Saionji, wrote to Clemenceau stating that the council had heard the Chinese delegates on the Shantung question, and therefore Japan was asking for another meeting of the council in order that a final decision on the province could be reached.²⁷ At the same time, Saionji's letter continued, the Japanese delegates requested that owing to the special gravity of the issue for Japan they should be kept informed, as far as possible, in all phases of progress.

A copy of the Japanese letter was sent to Hankey, secretary of the British delegation, and much to his annoyance it arrived while he was taking his morning bath. One can understand Hankey's pique at being thus disturbed but one can assume that he had time to allow his annoyance to subside before writing to Balfour concerning the essence of the Japanese letter. But after making a mistake with the date of his own letter Hankey's statement to Balfour read:

'Baron Makino has already mentioned the subject to me, and I believe to you. He attaches extraordinary importance to it for some reason that I am unable to understand. As I understand the Prime Minister wishes you to take the lead so far as we are concerned in the discussions on the Japanese claims perhaps you would bear the point in mind'.²⁸

From the varied contents of the Japanese letter it can be seen that Hankey's note does not make it clear to what subject Makino was allegedly attaching such importance, Japan's desire for a decision, Japan's request to be kept informed of progress, or the entire issue of Shantung itself. Yet whatever the subject may have been it is strange that Hankey could have found it so extraordinary for Japan to be so concerned, for they were all relevant to Japan's consistent agitation regarding her claims for the province. While too much should not be concluded from a letter written in such circumstances, Hankey's comments cast doubt on the extent to which he understood the far eastern situation. It would appear that the importance of the task which had been given

to Balfour concerning discussions with Japan had not been realised by Hankey, but possibly the importance of these discussions only emerged as they entered the decisive phase.

The Decisive Phase.

When Balfour began discussions with the Japanese delegates in late April he did so on very high authority from the peace conference, for a letter from Lloyd George stated:

'At the meeting, the President of the United States, the President du Conseil of France, and myself agreed to ask you to discuss with the representatives of Japan on our behalf the questions of Kiaochow and the German rights in Shantung which are in dispute between China and Japan. They will be glad if you can arrange to meet the Japanese Delegates as soon as possible.'²⁹

Balfour lost no time in meeting the Japanese delegates and one day after his letter from Lloyd George he issued a report on his conversations which stated that the Japanese strenuously denied that they intended to modify in their own favour the conditions which the Germans had enjoyed in Shantung, or that their own treaties with China would have the same result.³⁰ Indeed, Balfour reported that the Japanese were claiming that their envisaged military rights would be less than those enjoyed by the Germans, and that it was the intention of the Japanese to restore Chinese sovereignty within the leased territory of Shantung. The report continued by stating that the provisions whereby Japan was

to maintain a garrison at Tsinan to guard the railway were 'purely provisional', and references were made to the transitional post-war period. It was stated that it was Japan's intention to make the occupation of the garrison as short as possible, but Balfour made the observation that no date had been given for the termination of the transitional period. Nor, it may be noted, did Balfour make any statement that he had tried to secure such a date.

Balfour's special report continued by saying that the rights which the Japanese proposed to retain were economic and consisted of a concession at Tsingtao which 'does not exclude... the right also to organise an international concession, if that is desired'. However, the report gave no outline as to the size or scope of Japan's proposed concession, the size of the proposed international concession, nor the amount of Tsingtao which it was envisaged would be left to the Chinese. The report stated that the Japanese were asking also for the transfer of previous German rights regarding the Shantung railways and the mines associated with them, but the Japanese stressed that the land on which the railways lay 'is in full Chinese sovereignty and subject to Chinese law'. In addition to the existing railways, the report continued, the Japanese wanted the transfer of the concession from Germany for the building of two new lines.

The concluding ^{remarks} ~~remarks~~ of Balfour indicate his acceptance of the Japanese claims:

'The Japanese Plenipotentiaries, for reasons of national dignity which are easy to understand, are unwilling to modify the letter of the Treaties which they have made with China, but they are ready (if I understand them rightly) to give explicit and binding assurances:-

(a) That any concession which China gives them at Tsingtao will not exclude other foreign enterprise from the Port'.

(b) That the economic control of the railway, which the possession of the majority of the shares gives them will not be used in any way to discriminate between the trade facilities of different nations'.

Despite these reassurances, however, it may be judged that Japan wanted not only to retain but to extend the economic rights which Macleay had earlier recognised would largely nullify the benefits of any political retrocession to China, while the proposal for the creation of a Japanese concession at Tsingtao had been specifically condemned by the report of the three western experts who saw such a step as giving Japan a powerful grip upon the centre of the port. But if Balfour were aware of Macleay's understanding and the findings of the other two experts his report gave no indication of this fact, nor that he used any of their points in his consultations with the Japanese delegates.

Dr. Fifield has described how Lloyd George and Balfour argued with President Wilson for the acceptance of Balfour's special report, but that Wilson would not agree that the Japanese proposals were better, as far as China was concerned, than a transfer of former German rights to Japan. Balfour maintained that

China would gain advantages as a result, and 'noted that his expert, Macleay, had cross-examined the Japanese for an hour and was finally satisfied with their proposal'.³¹ But it may be judged that Macleay's acceptance of the Japanese case did not mean that he agreed that Japan's claims were not in excess of former German rights, but rather that Macleay had become convinced of the political justice of the Japanese proposals. This may be seen more clearly in the official account of the exchanges:

'Mr. Balfour said that there was no doubt whatsoever that Japan was returning these territories to China on incomparably ~~timely~~ better terms than Germany had held them'.

'President Wilson said his experts did not agree'.

'Mr. Balfour said that the United States experts had not heard the Japanese case. The same had applied to his expert, Mr. Macleay, who had signed the expert Report furnished at the request of the Supreme Council. After hearing the Japanese representatives and cross-examining them for an hour he had been entirely satisfied'.³²

Macleay had been clear in his condemnation of the creation of a Japanese settlement at Tsingtao and aware of the influence of the Shantung railways. Therefore, his acceptance of the Japanese case is surprising and, without any reasons given for his change of attitude, difficult to understand.

There is, of course, the possibility that the British foreign secretary was indulging in diplomatic manoeuvres and seeking to involve the American experts, the majority of whom were known to be hostile to Japan's claims, in protracted

negotiations so that the British delegates could be provided with an opportunity to step in and mediate, as Macleay had at one time thought possible. Yet so clear were Balfour's arguments in favour of Japan, and so precise were his statements concerning Britain's position that this line of reasoning seems doubtful. One can only regret that no record seems to have survived explaining Macleay's change of opinion, or whether Balfour was using the name of his expert merely to further his own case.

The disagreement between the American and British delegates necessitated further consultations with the Japanese, and Balfour was given the task of writing to Makino to ask the Japanese delegates to attend a further meeting of the council of *three*. After referring to the fact that the council had considered Balfour's special report, but giving no indication of the differences which had arisen, Balfour blandly concluded:

'The only points on which your colleagues expressed anxiety were the temporary arrangements with regard to guarding the line and garrisoning Tsinan. These, as they pointed out, were not merely interferences with Chinese sovereignty, but interferences in excess of anything which the Germans could claim under their Shantung arrangements. They hope you would consent to discuss this relatively unimportant aspect of the Shantung problem tomorrow at 11 o'clock. They quite recognise, and greatly regret, the inconvenience to which you may have been put... but they hoped that, inasmuch as the main doubts and difficulties connected with the surrender of the German lease appear to be already satisfactorily disposed of, you will forgive the inevitable postponement of conversations upon the purely temporary arrangement which still in their view seem to raise questions of difficulty.'33

Dr. Fifield has made the point that in the subsequent negotiations the 'relatively unimportant' aspect of the Shantung question mentioned by Balfour proved a very serious obstacle.³⁴ But of importance to British policy was the very tone of the letter, for at a crucial stage when Wilson was still undecided, and the majority of the American delegates were opposed to Japan's demands, Balfour's letter, with its implication that a settlement of the Shantung question could be obtained which would meet Japan's main desiderata if only several minor matters could be cleared away, must have been a great encouragement to the Japanese delegation. It may be noted that in these deliberations there is a marked absence of British consideration of China's desires, nor do the Chinese delegates appear to have been consulted.

When the council met on April 29th some hard bargaining took place and a draft containing three proposals, of which Balfour was the main author, was put forward as a basis for discussion. The Japanese then asked for an opportunity for their full delegation to consider the proposals and the Japanese delegates convened for this purpose during the evening. Afterwards Balfour met Makino and Chinda, and as a result Balfour wrote immediately to Wilson giving the details of the amendments which the Japanese wished to make to his earlier draft. The letter began by stating that as the proposed formula differed ^{little} from the one discussed that morning it might prove satisfactory.

Balfour then explained that the two modifications which the Japanese wished to make were underlined, and he argued that the second modification was the more important and was 'entirely in favour of Chinese sovereignty'. He enclosed a copy of the formula which with the Japanese amendments stated:

'I. The declared policy of Japan is to hand back to China in full sovereignty the Shantung peninsula and to retain only the economic privileges possessed by Germany as well as that of establishing a Japanese settlement at Tsingtao'.

'II. The intention of the clauses relating to the police on the railways is merely to give the owner of the railway security for traffic and will be used for no other purpose.'

'III. Such Japanese instructors as may be required to assist in policing the railway may be selected by the Company, but shall be appointed by the Chinese Government'. 35

Dr. Fifield has referred to this letter and seems to accept Balfour's claim that the Japanese proposals differed 'but little' from those debated that morning,³⁶ but such a claim might, on further consideration, be judged as false, and that the amendments were distinctly in favour of Japan, not China.

Of obvious importance was Japan's amendment stipulating that there should be a Japanese settlement at Tsingtao, and in face of this proposal it is difficult to appreciate Balfour's claim that the second Japanese amendment was more important than their first. It was well known that the Japanese were able very often to influence the Peking government to do their bidding, and therefore the fact that China would have the right to appoint

Japanese police instructors was scarcely a serious advantage. If the railways in Shantung were to be extended, as seemed probable, it followed that Japanese influence in the province would consequently be increased. It would appear that Balfour was going to extraordinary lengths both in his actions and in the presentation of argument to put the Japanese case in the most effective manner, and in doing so he seems to have been oblivious of any possible reactions from the Chinese.

Dr. Fifield has stated that he was unable to trace Wilson's reply to Balfour's letter in either American or British sources.³⁷ The present author was fortunate enough to find Wilson's original letter of reply to Balfour, and it can be seen that the President's letter was basically a surrender to the Anglo-Japanese arguments concerning Shantung.³⁸ Perhaps of relevance to Wilson's methods of working on matters of such importance is that he had typed the letter personally (he apologised for the quality of the typing), and it may be noted that the use of the first person was stressed rather than the reply being in the name of the United States government, for in returning the Japanese proposals, Wilson enclosed...

'...a form which I hope you will be kind enough to urge upon the Japanese. I hoped that I had made it clear to them that I could not accept a settlement based on the agreements with China, which all go back for their foundation to an ultimatum connected with the wrongful Twenty-one Demands. The whole settlement must, in my view, be based upon the German rights and our present understandings. Wilson's emphasis. What I have written is exactly equivalent in substance to their form'.

Despite these reservations, however, the formula which Wilson enclosed revealed how far he had moved in order to reach a settlement for his proposals were indeed almost identical with Japan's demands:

'The declared policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung peninsula in full sovereignty to China, returning only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao'.

'The owners of the railway will use the special police only to insure security for traffic. They will be used for no other purpose'.

'The police force will be composed of Chinese and such Japanese instructors as the directors of the railway may select will be appointed by the Chinese Government'.

Later on during the 30th April, delegates from the United States, Britain, France, and Japan accepted the formula quoted above with only minimal changes to its wording and none to its substance.³⁹

At this meeting of the powers an argument developed between Wilson and China concerning what would happen if China refused to co-operate in the implementation of the formula for Wilson wanted Japan to agree that she would apply voluntarily to the proposed League of Nations for mediation in any future dispute over Shantung. But China replied that even if such a dispute were referred to the League, Japan must retain her rights to base her case upon her special agreements with China. These comments brought a sharp reaction from Wilson, but despite considerable pressure from the American president, China

remained adamant concerning Japan's rights to fall back upon the war-time treaties.⁴⁰ It is significant that although Lloyd George and Hankey were present at the meeting neither gave their opinions on the matter. Indeed, Hankey's contribution as secretary was confined to asking what should be sent to the drafting committee. This prompted Chinda to produce drafts of articles 156 and 157 which, with small alterations in the wording, were written into the final treaty.

Some considerations of the Settlement.

The decision to allow Japan to acquire post-war rights in Shantung, whether temporarily or not, caused marked and long lasting reactions in America and China. It is well known that the Shantung question was widely blamed, but this was probably exaggerated, for the failure of the United States to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. In China the decision was undoubtedly a considerable boost to the launching of the May the Fourth movement which heralded an upsurge of nationalism. Wilson's reply to Balfour at the end of April had made the point that the American president was against a peace treaty based upon war-time agreements, which presumably included the 1918 Sino-Japanese treaty as well as that of 1915. But British policy was determined by different criteria, namely, respect for war-time Anglo-Japanese agreements to support Japan's claims at the peace conference, and the belief that China had voluntarily

conceded her rights concerning Shantung by the terms of her treaty with Japan of 1918. Undoubtedly these policies of support were complementary to Britain's determination to maintain her economic and extraterritorial rights in China, and, had the British attitude been more sympathetic to China, it seems reasonable to conclude that the British delegates would have given support to Wilson which would have resulted in a different type of settlement concerning Shantung.

It is interesting to note that when the storm broke in China over the April settlement, both Macleay and Curzon, in defending Britain's actions, placed emphasis upon the Sino-Japanese agreements rather than upon Britain's support of her own war-time obligations to Japan. Macleay argued that the 1918 Sino-Japanese treaty was definitely of a voluntary character whereby China had received over £2 million for railway construction.⁴¹ Curzon, the acting foreign secretary, was equally firm on this point and when Jordan reported how badly the Chinese students had received news of the settlement, Curzon maintained that;

'... the Powers were prevented from handing Shantung back to China by the reason that it was not theirs to give and this owing to the previous action of China herself.' 42

Yet one must question whether British policy would have been different had there been no Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918 for throughout the April negotiations the British delegates, contrar-

to their post-settlement justifications, had stressed Britain's own obligations to Japan. It has already been noted that a Foreign Office memorandum written by Balfour before the Sino-Japanese treaty was concluded in September, 1918, had stated quite clearly that Britain regarded herself as being committed to support Japan's claims regarding Shantung at the future peace conference,⁴³ and it appears that Britain's actions were consistent with that commitment.

In his account of the April negotiations, Balfour referred to Britain's obligations to Japan, and after stating that his sympathies had lain with that country, he stated:

'The real difficulty arose when an examination by the experts into the terms on which Japan was to restore Kiaochow to China, under the Treaties of 1915 and 1918, appeared to show that the rights which Japan proposed to retain after this restoration involved a greater interference with Chinese sovereignty than Germany had acquired under her lease'.⁴⁴

But, Balfour continued, as a result of discussions which he had had with the Japanese delegates he was assured that it was Japan's intention 'to surrender every privilege in the peninsula which involved an interference with Chinese sovereignty'. It may be noted, however, that if Balfour had any reservations over these assurances, or any doubts as to the possible political influence of the economic concessions which had been granted to Japan, he did not mention them. The foreign secretary then described the American hostility to the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1915

which had been manifest during the negotiations, and Balfour agreed that it was a treaty which he could not defend. But he believed that it was essential to avoid harping on the past instead of building for the future, and with this aim he defended the three points of the settlement reached by the powers. Such a reference to the past must be judged ironic, especially in view of Britain's support of her war-time treaties with Japan, and the ignoring of Wilson's emphatic plea made little more than a week earlier to take the situation from the present.⁴⁵ However, Balfour continued by stating that the Japanese delegation had given the most explicit assurances as to the 'open-door' and the equal commercial treaties of all nations, and Balfour then made some sharp criticisms of the manner in which the Chinese delegates had behaved during the negotiations which amounted to allegations of unprincipled conduct. Balfour repeated that the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918 was a voluntary agreement and concluded his statement:

'...nor did they [the Chinese delegates] ever adequately realise that, by the efforts of Japan and her Allies, China, without the expenditure of a single shilling or the loss of a single life, had restored to her rights which she could never have recovered for herself'.

In view of Britain's inability to restrain Japan from declaring war on Germany in 1914, the character of the campaign for the capture of Tsingtao from the Germans, and Britain's helplessness against Japan's opposition to China's joining the war on the

side of the allies before 1917, Balfour's statement must be considered extraordinary.⁴⁶ Even if allowances are made for the very heavy pressure under which Balfour was working, this statement, which he repeated on several occasions, indicates that Balfour had read little on the far eastern situation covering the 1914-17 period, at least as far as China's war-time situation was concerned.

In his review of the Shantung negotiations Balfour had recognised that the implementation of the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918, as well as that of 1915, would have witnessed an increase of Japanese control over China's sovereignty, and the foreign secretary's comments later in his dispatch give the impression that the settlement reached by the powers restrained such an increase. In addition, Balfour's account glosses over the subject of the quite bitter Anglo-American-Japanese bargaining which occurred during the last days of April, and, as noted, the significance of Japan's economic rights was ignored. The importance of such rights was not lost sight of by Wunsz King who, after referring to Japan's sustained economic privileges, concluded that,

'On the face of it, the settlement was based on the original Sino-German treaty and not on the subsequent Sino-Japanese arrangements, but to all intents and purposes it was a clever combination of the two sets of instruments with Wilson acceding, doubtless against his will, to this comic tragedy.'⁴⁷

While the speculation concerning Wilson's desires can be ignored, it may be thought that King's description of the Shantung agreement reached by the council, which was often referred to subsequently as the Balfour settlement, was mainly true.

Justification for King's description of the ~~settlement~~ settlement can be found in the terms regarding the Shantung railways. It has been noted that from 1900 onwards Germany agreed that she would not send her troops beyond the 100 li zone which surrounded Kiaochow.⁴⁸ But by the terms of the April settlement Japan was to have rights for the policing of the lines, while the existence of the Japanese garrison at Tsinan, although allegedly temporary, was regarded by the Chinese as a further intrusion into the province. Closely connected with Japan's rights to control railway troops was the point that whereas the former Tsingtao-Tsinan railway had been mainly a private affair as far as Germany was concerned, there was no doubt that under the new settlement the Japanese government would play a more active role in the running of the line than the German government had done. The report of the three experts in considering the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918 had stressed the advantages which would accrue to Japan by its articles concerning the railways,⁴⁹ and it seems reasonable to state that the April settlement allowed Japan to acquire the bulk of these advantages.

An assessment of the settlement regarding the Kiaochow area is more difficult, for although China stood to gain by the terms of the April agreement regarding the return of leased territories around the bay and elsewhere it has been noted that such a gain had to be considered against the possible nullifying effects which the establishment of a Japanese concession at Tsingtao would have upon the situation. The proposed Japanese concession was to be permanent, whereas the Germany lease of territory in Kiaochow was due to have ended in 1997, but of far greater importance were the methods which it was thought Japan would use to tighten her grip upon the port of Tsingtao. Under former German rule Tsingtao had been an open-port, and although the local supervisor of the Maritime Customs Union had been a German, the port was part of the international customs service. But in 1919 there were serious fears that Japan would use her position to discriminate against other nations and one may judge that the heated Curzon-Chinda exchanges later in the year justified the gravest suspicions of Japan.⁵⁰

Thus, while the April settlement offered advantages to China on the one hand, there were also some serious disadvantages entailed. Perhaps what tilted the balance against the settlement as far as China was concerned were not the legal terms involved, but the difference in the spirit between Germany

and Japan. Before 1914 Germany had not been very pressing in demands upon China and had been anxious to disclaim a monopoly of power in Shantung. But Japan's actions in Manchuria and on other parts of the mainland, and the nature of her war-time treaties were such as to give China cause for alarm when Japan acquired such extensive rights in the Shantung province.

Balfour's actions have been defended by Hankey who described the Shantung settlement in very favourable terms, stating that 'To Balfour and Wilson belongs the credit for achieving a settlement by informal good offices...'⁵¹ Unfortunately Hankey's account was written some forty years after the peace conference, and it may be judged to lack the accuracy and powers of analysis usually associated with Hankey's name, despite Hankey's statement that in writing the account he had referred to his diaries.⁵² Hankey described what a good impression Koo had made at the meeting of the council on April 21st, and continued by implying that China should be treated more sympathetically:

'After this [Koo's speech] Japan's claims for Shantung looked rather different. Especially effective was Koo's description of the so-called "twenty-one" points, which had been formulated by Japan as recently as 1918, when the Western Powers had been too busy with the final stages of the war with Germany to pay much attention to the Far East... At last a question was put to Koo whether China would be better off under the maintenance of the Treaty forced on her by Japan (the twenty-one points) than under Japan's present claims, which were supported by France and Great Britain.'⁵³

But it has been noted that the alternative put to China was, in fact, a choice between the terms of the war-time treaties or the transfer of former German rights to Japan, and not to any subsequent Japanese demands.⁵⁴ Also, as is well known, the twenty-one demands were made in 1915, not 1918, and in view of far eastern developments between 1915 and the signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918, which was assessed very differently from the earlier agreement by the British experts, Hankey's error in mixing the two agreement together must be considered as being more than a pedantic point.⁵⁵ It must be noted that although the three experts were called upon to consider the impact of both the war-time Sino-Japanese treaties their report concentrates upon the 1918 agreement, while the ramifications of the twenty-one demands are largely ignored.

When Hankey described the report of the three experts he referred to Macleay as 'Maclean'. This, of course, may have been a typographical error, and even if the mistake were Hankey's it could be dismissed as being of no importance, except that as Macleay had written so extensively on the far east one would have thought that Hankey would have been familiar with his name. Hankey's description of the report gave no assessment of the implications involved, for he merely stated:

'The report was the starting point of fresh discussions, some of them "behind the scenes" and others at the Council of Three, but it was not until Wednesday (April 30th), after a final discussion by the Council of Four, that I had the pleasure of forwarding agreed articles to the Drafting Committee.'⁵⁶

While one does not wish to be over-precise in describing such events the fourth party present on April 30th was Japan, who normally did not attend council meetings unless specially invited, and one would have thought that Hankey would have made this point clear.⁵⁷

If, as Hankey stated, Koo had placed Japan's twenty-one demands and claims for Shantung in a different light this was not obvious in the memorandum which Hankey wrote shortly after the April settlement which summarised its terms for the benefit of the Chinese delegation.⁵⁸ Nor did Hankey express an opinion whether the settlement offered China advantages greater than those of the war-time treaties or the transfer of former German rights, for the memorandum was confined to a description of the terms which had been reached, and to Japan's warning that she would resort to her rights under the war-time treaties if China failed to co-operate in implementing the April settlement.

Dr. Fifield corresponded with Hankey in the early 1950's when he (Fifield) was writing on the Shantung question, and he pays a handsome tribute to Hankey's well known qualities.⁵⁹ One can, therefore, regret that Hankey did not write more fully and at an earlier date upon the Shantung issue, for the evidence of his account of the negotiations in late April, 1919, tends to confirm an impression that Hankey's grasp on far-eastern affairs

was considerably less than that of his deep knowledge of affairs elsewhere, but such an impression could easily be wrong.

Several accounts of the Shantung negotiations have emphasised the role played by Lloyd George, and Wunsz King is particularly sharp in his criticisms of the British prime minister.⁶⁰ King did not blame the American president for the shortcomings which the April settlement had as far as China was concerned, and thought that Wilson had done all that was possible to secure a more equitable solution, But,

'Lloyd George was... in the key position... for if he could have taken a less academic view of the secret promises the British Government had given to Japan, and if he could have agreed with Koo to review the entire issue on a broader basis, he could have used his influence to counsel moderation on Makino's part... The Japanese representative would have listened to the joint urging of both Great Britain and the United States. Clemenceau would also fall in line with the others. The story of Shantung would then be a different one'.

In view of Wilson's hesitation over the April settlement it is easy to argue that King's conclusions are basically correct.

It may be noted that if King did not criticise Wilson, Dr. Morrison did. Morrison maintained that Wilson had caused the Chinese government to believe that America would support them, but owing to Wilson's personal pre-occupation with the proposed League of Nations he let the Chinese down in a very discreditable fashion.⁶¹

Undoubtedly Britain had exercised a major influence upon determining the Shantung settlement, but one must question whether it is correct to praise, or blame, Lloyd George for its terms. Of course, the constitutional position of the British prime minister rendered him responsible for the policies and actions of his country's delegation at the peace conference. But even if Lloyd George were thus constitutionally responsible, and after allowing for the active part which he did play in the April negotiations, it can be seen that the real authors of British policy concerning the Shantung settlement were Balfour and Macleay.

1. For the terms of these articles see Appendix 7.
2. Fifield, Chapter 5 pp.218-87.
3. There is no date upon Kerr's memorandum, but Drummond's amendment was in a letter dated 25-3-1919, Lothian Manuscript, GD 40/17/61.
4. Pearl pp.380-1.
5. Ibid., p.381.
6. China's request and Macleay's minute, 7-4-1919, British reply 9-4-1919. F.O.608/211 [5541].
7. The Council of four comprised the political heads of state of America, Britain, France, and Italy. As Japan's prime minister was not present in Paris, Japan was excluded. This council became operative in mid-March. See Hist. of P.C. of Paris I, p.250. Orlando of Italy left Paris on April 25th, hence the council was reduced temporarily to three.
8. China's memorandum, 9-4-1919, Macleay's minute, 12-4-1919, British reply 26-4-1919, F.O.603/210 [6974]. It was Balfour, not Grey, who was responsible for the February exchanges. Macleay seems unaware of Balfour's aims in February, 1917. See pp.38-9 above.
9. Chinese article in 'Peking Leader', 12-4-1919. Jordan to F.O. 22-4-1919. F.O.371/3683 [90965].
10. Lou Tseng-tsiang to Clemenceau, 16-4-1919, Macleay's minute, 22-4-1919. F.O.608/209 [7940].
11. Memorandum by Balfour, 16-4-1919, Balfour Papers 49699, Vol.XVII.
12. Claims of Chinese Societies abroad addressed to peace conference, 23-4-1919, F.O.608/209 [8589].
13. For the attitudes of the U.S. delegates over Japan's threat to leave Paris, Fifield, p.256.
14. See p. 128 above.
15. The interview was held in the morning of 15th April 1919, Drummond gave a report, based on a discussion with Balfour, to Kerr in a letter of the same date. Lothian Manuscript, GD 40/17/55.
- 15.a. Drummond did not specify which Japanese delegate, no doubt it was either Makino or Chinda, Ibid.

16. King, p.15

Paul Mantoux, the French interpreter at the Paris conference, has pointed out that in a conversation mainly between Lloyd George and Wilson on 18 April, 1919, (the French and Italian chief delegates being also present) the prime minister's suggestion that Kiaochow should be subject to mandatory control similar to other former German colonies was adopted. At the same time Lloyd George agreed in principle to the renunciation of British spheres of interest in China. P.Mantoux, Les Deliberations du Conseil des Quatre 11, (Paris, 1955) pp. 270-4. At a meeting of the council of three during the morning of 22 April, Lloyd George argued with the principal Japanese delegates, who had been invited to attend, that to treat Kiaochow differently from the other German colonies would cause the Australian government to demand the direct acquisition of New Guinea (p.323). But Lloyd George did not contest seriously Japan's claim that her case concerning Shantung was different from the general problems relating to the distribution of German colonies. In the afternoon session of the council when the Japanese delegates had withdrawn in favour of the leading Chinese representatives, Lloyd George asked Wellington Koo if German forces had policed the whole of the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway, and he received a firm reply that the line in the past had been policed by Chinese forces. This answer prompted Lloyd George to query whether the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918 accorded Japan greater rights than Germany had enjoyed, and whether China would prefer to see the former German rights transferred to China or the Sino-Japanese treaty implemented, (p.332). Mantoux demonstrates the influence of the dominions upon Lloyd George's original aims, but his account does not explain the change in the prime minister's attitude to Japan's proposed acquisitions in Shantung, nor his later reluctance to renounce British privileges in China in contrast to his earlier readiness to make surrenders. The British Empire delegation in Paris had privately discussed the problem of mandates on several occasions earlier in the year but the relevant implications of the Shantung issue were not discussed either before or after the council of three reached its decision concerning the province at the end of April (for terms of which see p. 146). When Lloyd George reported to the delegation on 5 May, 1919, upon the draft treaty with Germany he stated: 'The Shantung settlement had caused much trouble. On the whole it seemed fair to China, and while it might have been better, yet we were bound by our Treaty with Japan' (Cab. 29/28) These remarks caused no reaction from any Empire delegate, even Hughes of Australia who was present.

- ~~16. King, p.19.~~
17. Fifield, pp.244 and 247.
 18. King, p.19.
 19. King, p.20.
 20. Fifield, pp.248-9.
 21. Report was presented 24-4-1919. Lothian Manuscript G.D.40/17/74.
 22. See p. 124 above.
 23. Fifield pp.257-60.
 24. Fifield, p.263.
 25. Minute by Macleay, 2-12-1918. F.O.371/3191 /186939/.
 26. Memorandum by Curzon 17-2-1919. F.O.608/209 /3037/.
 27. Saionji to Clemenceau, 25-4-1919 Lothian Manuscript, GD 40/17/74.
 28. Hankey to Balfour. The date is given as April 21, 1919, but there is evidence of an alteration. As Saionji's letter was dated 25-4-1919, and Hankey received his copy at 8 in the morning it is not clear whether it was the 25th or 26th when Hankey wrote to Balfour. Lothian Manuscript GD 40/17/74.
 29. Lloyd George to Balfour, 26-4-1919. Lothian Manuscript GD 40/17/74.
 30. Memorandum, April 27th, 1919. Balfour papers. 49751 Vol. LXIX. Also Fifield pp.267-8.
 31. Fifield, pp.268-9.
 32. Notes of a Meeting held 28-4-1919. Paris Peace Conference V pp.317 - 8.
 33. Balfour to Makino, 28-4-1919, Balfour papers, 49751 Vol. LXIX.
 34. Fifield p.275.

35. Balfour to Wilson, 29-4-1919, Balfour Papers. 49751 Vol. LXIX.
36. Fifield, pp.277-8.
37. Fifield, p.278.
38. Wilson to Balfour, 30-4-1919. Balfour papers 49751. Vol.LXIX.
39. Notes of meeting 30-4-1919. F.R.U.S. F.P.C.V., p.363.
40. Ibid., pp.364-465.
41. Minute by Macleay, 7-5-1919. F.O.308/210[9213].
42. Minute by Curzon, 12-7-1919. F.O.371/3695 [100265]
43. See pp.50-51 above.
44. Balfour to Curzon, 8-5-1919, D.B.F.P.(1) VI pp.564-6.
45. See pp.145-6 above.
46. See pp.23-33 above.
47. Munsz King, Woodrow Wilson, Wellington Koo and the China question at the Paris peace conference. (Leyden 1959), p.2
48. See Appendix 3.
49. See p.134 above. See also discussion on railway rights and Chinese sovereignty at meeting of council of three, which Japanese delegates attended. 29-4-1919. F.R.U.S. P.I.C.V. pp.327-35.
50. Iratt's dispatch of 11-1-1919, see pp.99-100 above, was a most damning indictment of Japanese behaviour at Tsingtao. See also Jordan to Curzon, 28-6-1919 and 17-8-1919. D.B.F.P.I. (VI) pp.583-92, and 682-4. For Curzon-Chinda exchanges see pp.203-7, below.
51. Hankey, Lord. The Supreme Control at the Paris peace conference. (London, 1963), p.133.
52. Ibid., p.194.
53. Ibid., p.132.

54. Text of report of the three experts, F.R.U.S. P.P.C.V., pp.227-8.
55. For the terms of the two agreements see appendices 4 and 5.
56. Hankey, p.133.
57. Notes of meeting, 30-4-1919, at 12.30 p.m., F.R.U.S. P.P.C. V., pp.363-5.
58. See pp.178-9 below.
59. Fifield, pp.218-9 and p.254.
60. King, 'Woodrow Wilson...at the Paris Peace Conference', p.22.
61. Pearl, p.385.

CHAPTER VCHINA AND THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

When the council of three reached a decision on the terms of the Shantung settlement at its meeting on April 30th no Chinese delegate was present, but it has been noted that Japan was represented and that it was the Japanese delegate Chinda who produced the drafts for articles 156 and 157 which were accepted in substance for inclusion into the peace treaty.¹ Obviously, the Chinese delegation were anxious for information on such a vital issue to them, but it was necessary for Lou Tseng-tsiang, the chief Chinese delegate, to write to Balfour, the British foreign secretary, stating that reports were circulating that a decision had been reached, and he requested ~~that~~, if this were the case, to be informed of the terms of the proposed Shantung settlement.² At this stage of the peace conference the council of three were confronted with a wide variety of problems but, even if allowances are made for the heavy pressures of business, it seems an act of disrespect that no official communication was made to the Chinese delegation immediately after the settlement had been concluded.

Following receipt of Lou Tseng-tsiang's letter, however, Balfour lost little time in meeting the Chinese delegation, and he informed them, verbally, what the council of three and the Japanese delegates had decided. The Chinese reactions

to Balfour's information were of marked dissatisfaction, and Sze asked for written details of the proposed articles and for a copy of the council proceedings which had determined them.³ However, it was not until June that the Chinese government received a reply to their request for information regarding the council proceedings, although Makino made an immediate press statement which declared that Japan's policy was to hand Shantung back to China with full sovereignty, retaining only the former German economic privileges in the province, but claiming Japan's rights to establish a settlement 'under the usual conditions', at Tsingtao.⁴

The Chinese delegation continued to argue their case for Shantung, and Lou Tseng-tsiang informed Clemenceau, the president of the peace conference, that they were disappointed at Balfour's verbal report, for the Chinese delegation could not appreciate on what grounds rights formerly possessed by Germany could be legally transferred to Japan. It was contended that the agreements of 1915 and 1918 were concluded with Japan only under the menace of war, and the Chinese claimed the direct return of former German rights rather than agree to their being handed to Japan who, it was understood, 'voluntarily engages' to restore them to China.⁵ These arguments were not new, and Macleay merely referred to the financial benefits which China had derived from the 1918 agreement, while Hardinge made the

unhelpful observation that 'It looks as though the Chinese intend to be troublesome', which was scarcely indicative of an attempt to understand the Chinese point of view.

Further Chinese protests over the Shantung settlement were made at a meeting of the preliminary peace conference early in May. China was admitted to the conference only after pressure from America, for China's status was considered to be less than that of an 'effective belligerent' in contradistinction to Brazil, whose delegates were readily accepted and whose country's war effort of sending two or three torpedo boats had been noted by Lloyd George.⁶ At the conference Lou Tseng-tsiang, who had just received his copy of the treaty of Versailles which was but one day before the German delegation received theirs, complained that the proposed Shantung settlement had been formulated without sufficient consideration being given to the principles of justice and the problems of China's national security. But it would appear that no delegate from any other country expressed sympathy for China's claims, and obviously China was sustaining a series of diplomatic defeats.

Owing to the rebuffs which China was receiving it would undoubtedly have been advisable, especially in view of the upsurge of Chinese nationalism which the news of the Shantung settlement was provoking, for the British government to have adopted placatory tactics, at least on small issues, and

allowed China some 'saving of face' so important to the oriental mind. Therefore, when China requested a revision of her foreign treaties, the wide range of the topics covered by the relevant agreements offered an opportunity for minor adjustments to be made in China's favour.⁷ But Macleay's reactions to the Chinese memorandum which had requested the revision were hostile, and he stated that he had repeatedly impressed upon the Chinese delegation that their government's desiderata regarding the abolition of extraterritorial rights and all forms of special privileges in China were not matters for the peace conference as they had not arisen from the war. Macleay thought that the Chinese delegation were hoping to elicit an expression of support from the powers but he argued:

'...that we are not called upon to express any such opinion or to give any promise of support and that all we need to do is to acknowledge the receipt of the Memorandum with thanks. Some day, no doubt, these questions will have to be seriously considered, but China must find a more suitable opportunity for raising them; the establishment of the League of Nations may afford such an opportunity.'

As a result of Macleay's recommendations only a brief formal note was sent to Lou Tseng-tsiang thanking him for the Chinese memorandum.

This cold treatment of China was in marked contrast to Clemenceau's handling of a similar memorandum which was sent to him in his capacity as president of the conference.⁸

Clemenceau's acknowledgment of the Chinese claims was warmly phrased, and he continued by saying that although the powers fully recognised the importance of the questions which China had raised it was considered that they did not fall within the province of the peace conference. But, Clemenceau concluded, the claims should be brought before the League of Nations 'as soon as that body is able to function'.

Macleay's reactions were immediate and he suggested that Clemenceau's reply should be telegraphed 'in extenso' to Peking for:

'If the Chinese Govt. publish this letter....it should go far to allay the dissatisfaction which the settlement of the Shantung and Kiaochoo questions has caused in China, as by showing clearly that the question of the abrogation of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of May 25th 1915 was not within the scope and competence of the Peace Conference while suggesting that the matter should be brought before the League of Nations, it removes all possible grounds for the assertion which the Chinese have made that they have not received justice at the hands of the Conference'.

Such a reaction from Macleay seems to be strange and illogical in the light of his earlier views. It can be seen that there was little difference, if any, between what Macleay had argued in private from what Clemenceau had said to the Chinese; namely, although China's claims for treaty revision were important it was for the League of Nations, and not the peace conference, to settle such matters. But while Clemenceau was willing to communicate his views to China, Macleay evidently was not prepared to do so,

and the reasons for his reticence are difficult to understand. Clemenceau's reply, although friendly, was vague, ^{long-term} ~~fatalistic~~, and gave nothing away, and if Macleay considered that Clemenceau's message was so important it is hard to see why he could not have said something equally non-committal, but in friendly terms, about the attitude of the British government.

One can scarcely believe that Clemenceau's reply was so brilliantly conceived as to be beyond the scope of the Foreign Office, unless the writing of polite replies to China was so unusual that such an answer was indeed too much for British authorship. Despite Macleay's claims, it must be questioned whether Clemenceau's reply had repudiated China's assertions that she had not received justice, for although reference to the League was possibly a step forward as far as China was concerned this was hardly a guarantee that China's grievances would be dealt with sympathetically when the League began to function.

Macleay's failure to make a reply similar to Clemenceau's may be judged as illustrative of the unnecessarily abrupt manner which was prevalent in Britain's dealing with China, which was an obvious obstacle to Anglo-Chinese relations.

Breakdown of the Shanghai Peace Conference.

From the end of February, 1919, a conference between the northern and southern Chinese factions had been meeting at

Shanghai with the object of resolving their differences, but there existed harsh feelings among the delegates over the degree of the Peking government's cooperation with Japan, which was criticised for being too close. After a temporary breakdown of the talks in April, the southern delegation made a number of proposals which included the cancellation of the Peking government's military agreement with Japan, the liquidation of the war participation loan which Japan had granted, and the joint use by both the north and south of all war loans for reconstruction purposes.⁹

Already a nationalist movement of cultural as well as political life was in being, but when news of the Shantung settlement reached China it was given new force, and the high wave of militancy created the famous 'May the Fourth Movement'.¹⁰ Henceforth, rioting, attacks upon foreign legations, political strikes, and the boycotting of foreign goods, became far more formidable weapons in the hands of the Chinese, and their effective use had a definite influence upon international developments in China throughout the 1920's.

When the news of the April settlement broke in China marked hostility was expressed to the northern delegation to the Shanghai conference, who were regarded as having facilitated Japan's diplomatic success at Paris, and some three thousand students paraded in Peking 'as a mass protest against the

Shantung decision and the presence in Peking of three pro-Japanese traitors...¹¹ In addition to the news of the Shantung settlement the hitherto secret Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1917, which had pledged British support for Japan's claims, was disclosed. This information was almost certainly 'leaked' by the Japanese delegates at Paris,¹² and whether this act was intentional or not a feature of Japanese tactics developed that when Chinese wrath was aroused against her, Japan would seek to divert attention from herself by raising contentious issues which cast blame upon Britain and western countries in general.

Jordan was concerned at the amount of criticism of Britain which the disclosure of the secret Anglo-Japanese treaty had aroused, and it was his opinion that unless former German rights in Shantung were restored, China's confidence in western justice would be destroyed and a League of Nations resting upon a foundation that included the proposed Shantung settlement would be as meaningless as all the past declarations concerning China's integrity.¹³ Jordan also reported that Reinsch, the American minister in Peking, foresaw the possibility of a popular outbreak in China, and the British minister stated that he would not be surprised if this forecast came true. But Macleay did not seem perturbed by Jordan's comments, and argued that a Chinese boycott of Japanese goods would only delay the

restoration of Kiaochow, and he hoped the Chinese would not be so 'foolish' as to refuse to sign the peace treaty. Macleay stated that he had informed Sze that if China did not sign the treaty she would not become a member of the League, and Macleay noted that neither Koo, nor Wang, were taking advantage of the opportunities offered by preliminary League discussions to make provocative speeches against Japan.

The political turmoil in China showed no signs of abating and Jordan reported that Chinese patriots had looked to Great Britain to see that China received fair play concerning the retrocession of former German rights in Shantung. Therefore, the news that China was expected to honour her treaties of 1915 and 1918 with Japan had come as a shock. Jordan continued:

'Up to this time it had been the hope of all Chinese that the Great Powers would in the long run extricate the Chinese Government from the hopeless pass into which they had fallen, through their own folly in signing away their rights to Japan as late as September last. All the more bitter, then, the disappointment when it was realised that they were to be held to their plighted word'.¹⁴

One may argue, of course, that the British government were being perfectly reasonable in holding the Chinese to their words, and the Chinese government were being unreasonable if they expected the western powers to assist China to dishonour her commitments to Japan. Obviously much depends upon an accurate assessment of the character of the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918, and whether it was really a voluntary agreement, or concluded between the

Japanese government and only a corrupt Chinese 'clique', before the Chinese expectations can be judged fairly.

China's indignation at the Shantung settlement continued to mount and an example of outraged feelings is offered in a protest made by the Chekiang provincial assembly to the Paris delegates of Britain, America, France, and Italy.¹⁵ It was stated that the assembly was surprised to learn that Tsingtao had been disposed of in the manner which the Japanese desired, especially in view of the allied victory over autocracy, and the high motives of the allies regarding humanity and justice. The protest concluded by saying that street demonstrations were taking place throughout China with the object of securing a reversal of the Shantung proposals in order that '...the seed of endless disaster may not be sown in the Peace Conference...'

A few days after this protest Jordan reported upon an interview with the Chinese minister for foreign affairs when the internal situation of the country was discussed.¹⁶ The Chinese minister had stated that there was no prospect of the Shanghai conference reaching an agreement except on the basis of a military government being formed in China. The minister continued by arguing that the terms of the Shantung settlement had convinced China that might was still right, and this had cemented an alliance between the military forces of China and the military party in Japan. He claimed that a great wrong had been

done to China and that the country felt deeply aggrieved. President Wilson had held out hopes for alleviating China's position through the League of Nations, but the minister felt that the League was a sham. The minister felt that his country was in a difficult position for if China signed the peace treaty there would be an outcry throughout the country, but if she did not sign, which was her intention, she would remain technically at war with Germany and thereby be left isolated.

Further British reactions to China's threatened refusal to accept the Shantung settlement were of almost incredulity, and MaxMuller in the Foreign Office, like Macleay in Paris, could hardly believe that the Chinese would be so silly as to refuse to sign the peace treaty 'though they have certainly been harshly treated'. In reply to some of the points which the Chinese had raised, Curzon argued that a refusal to sign the treaty would not only be foolish but would alienate the sympathies of the allies. Curzon claimed that the best way of mitigating the evils of the presence of Japanese in Shantung consisted not in a military Chinese government, which would only mismanage affairs and give the Japanese an excuse for remaining in the province, but in the formation of a government 'which will leave foreigners no excuse for interference'. While too deep an interpretation must not be placed upon Curzon's remarks it is

interesting to note that he should refer to Japanese presence in Shantung as an evil and suggest ways whereby such presence could be removed as soon as possible. No comment, however, was offered regarding the contribution which Britain had made to enable Japan to remain in the province and it may be argued that Curzon's advice was scarcely helpful, for it was the influence of the foreign powers, especially Japan, which was largely responsible for disorders among the Chinese political factions and aroused serious internal controversy concerning what policies were essential for the re-establishment of China's sovereignty.

Although the Shanghai conference continued spasmodically until the autumn of 1920, in May, 1919, it experienced a major breakdown from which it never really recovered.¹⁷ Jordan reported upon some of the assessments of the situation by the different factions and his remarks make it clear that foreign interference was largely blamed for China's unrest:

'While admitting that China herself is not entirely free from blame for the unfortunate position in which she is placed, the local press strongly criticise the action of the Allies in disregarding the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese people for control of their own territory. They accuse the Allies of having failed to live up to their professions of justice...and they cast on them responsibility for the consequences to tranquility of the Far East and future peace of the world. It is even stated that China in her desperation may be goaded to another outburst of violence like that of 1900. A boycott against Japanese goods has already begun in Shanghai, and fear is felt in some circles of more violent manifestations of anti-foreign feeling.¹⁸

But the response of the British government to the situation created by China's internal friction was undoubtedly inept.

After considering Jordan's report MaxMuller, the head of the far eastern department, stated that he deplored the break up of the Shanghai conference and suggested that the British minister should be instructed to inform China of the disappointment of the British government about the breakdown, and urge the Chinese to do all within their power to prevent a permanent cessation of negotiations. MaxMuller continued by stating that he was going to ask the American and French governments to take similar action, but 'Under present conditions it might appear ironical to ask the Japanese Govt. to join in such representation'. It may be noted that MaxMuller made no attempt to analyse China's internal situation, nor to deal with the claims that foreign interference was the cause of China's unrest. Also, no consideration was ^{given to the idea} ~~made~~ that Britain should offer some concessions to China, such as giving way on minor points concerned with extraterritoriality or even retroceding Wei-hai Wei; and in the circumstances the proposed request to China to resolve her differences must be viewed critically.

Despite MaxMuller's reservations, Japan was included when Britain, France, Italy, and the United States presented an aide-memoire to China which viewed the adjournment of the Shanghai peace conference 'with deep concern'.¹⁹ The powers stated

that they did not think that the differences separating the different parties were very great and their memoire concluded:

'...the Representatives of the Powers desire to assure the Chinese People and Authorities of the continued good-will and friendly interest of their Governments and nations who will welcome with the greatest satisfaction the restoration of union and concord throughout China, with her Government in the full exercise of its powers organised to promote the general welfare of the people'.

Some indication of the inappropriate character of the memoire can be drawn from a report in the 'Canton Times' that the statement of the powers had created a furore and exacerbated anti-foreign sentiments.

Almost at the same time as MaxMuller was initiating this rather one-sided approach to China, a dispatch was received from Jordan who reported that the Canton government was in financial difficulties and was asking for any surplus from the Maritime Customs Union.²⁰ There was, however, no such surplus, for all incoming revenues were being spent upon construction works and repaying the instalments on foreign loans. But, Jordan argued, ^{that} if the Canton government were to attempt to seize any revenues, ~~such~~ forceful measures should be used against them if necessary. Jordan's dispatch was written well before the breakdown of the Shanghai conference, and it is possible that if it had been of a later date Jordan's attitude may have been different, but no attempt appears to have been made to use the customs revenues in a more equitable manner in order to induce the Chinese political factions to co-operate instead of indulging in warfare.²¹

The April Settlement confirmed.

In mid-May Balfour wrote to Lou Tseng-tsiang refusing to make any supplementary statement to the Japanese press release issued earlier in the month concerning the Shantung settlement which, Balfour claimed, covered all the points of interest essential to China.²² Balfour noted that China wanted the restoration of her sovereignty over leased territories in the province and he maintained that:

'...the broad policy embodied in the final arrangement, namely that Germany should surrender all her rights to Japan, and that Japan should restore to China her full sovereignty over the leased territories was always part of Japan's declared policy. I venture to hope that it is a policy which will commend itself to enlightened public opinion, both in China and Japan'.

No reference was made to the contentions political issue of the Shantung railways, nor to the influence of an exclusive Japanese concession at Tsingtao, and Balfour denied that any pressure had been put upon Japan to induce her to agree to the settlement, although 'There was in this, as in all similar cases, a certain amount of debate and discussion...' In view of the bitter wrangling that had occurred before the agreement had been reached, Balfour's comments must be considered as misleading for they conveyed the idea that the agreement had been reached fairly easily, which was not true.

At the end of May the Chinese delegation again requested information on the April settlement and the relevant council proceedings, and it is obvious that their request would

have been refused but for the insistence of Wilson who refused to accept objections raised in the council that information concerning the proceedings could not be conveyed to a third party.²³ As a result of Wilson's pressure, Hankey prepared a memorandum for the confidential use of the Chinese delegation.

The Hankey memorandum contained an accurate summary of the Shantung settlement but it said little about the council proceedings even though it revealed that differences had taken place between America and Japan.²⁴ It is not necessary to describe the memorandum in detail for it dwelt upon the formula reached at the council meeting on April 30th and the draft of articles 156 and 157.²⁵ The memorandum, however, did stress that the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway was to become a mixed Sino-Japanese enterprise, and the owners of the railway would use the special police only for the security of traffic. The memorandum also stated that Japan was to surrender all military control over the Shantung peninsula and there would be no military interference in civil administration. The maintenance of a garrison at Tsinan was a provisional measure 'Although no date was named for this transitory arrangement...' It was then stated that the fortifications built by Germany would not be included in the area of the residential concession granted to Japan. A feature of the April negotiations had been Japan's insistence upon her right to fall back upon the agreements of 1915 and 1918 if China refused

to co-operate in making the settlement work, and the Hankey memorandum concluded by emphasising this development to the Chinese, adding that despite American disapproval Japan would 'reserve her right in the last analysis to base herself on the Agreements'.

China was, thus, left in no doubt of the position of the main powers regarding Shantung, and the presentation of the Hankey memorandum made it clear to the Chinese government that there was little chance of securing any amendment of substance to the Shantung settlement. Henceforth the Chinese could place no hopes upon the United States to secure the direct retrocession of the province, and it was clear that the terms which had caused such sharp Chinese reactions when they had become known early in May were irreversible, at least as far as the peace conference was concerned, unless there were a major diplomatic upset.

The arrival of the Hankey memorandum on the same day as the powers presented their aide-memoire giving their advice concerning how a permanent breakdown of the Shanghai peace conference dealing with China's internal affairs could be avoided was unfortunate timing by the British delegation.

Some Reactions to the Shantung Settlement.

While the victorious powers had been deliberating upon the settlement of the Shantung question, Germany agreed to the

surrender of Kiaochow, though they demanded indemnification for their public property in general.²⁶ This demand for indemnification was curtly refused, and the allied reply stated that they recalled the fact that Kiaochow, which had been 'unjustly torn from China', had been used by Germany as a military base in pursuance of a policy which had been a perpetual menace to the peace of the far east. As far as Britain was concerned this criticism of Germany's obtaining Kiaochow was somewhat hypocritical for it has been noted that the British government gave their agreement to Germany's acquisition and took similar action, but with much less fruitful results, in seizing Wei-hai Wei.²⁷ One might have thought that if Kiaochow were 'unjustly torn from China' in 1898, then the correct step was its retrocession to that country when such an opportunity as a peace conference occurred, especially when the military aspects of Japan's policies were such as to command attention and which raised fears for the preservation of peace in the far east.

Consideration of the military aspects of Japan's policies was prompted by a memorandum written by the British military attaché in Peking.²⁸ This stated that the Japanese claimed that their policy in China was defensive, for the Japanese feared European intervention in China by the western use and further construction of foreign owned railways. Macleay's reactions were particularly bitter and in view of his rôle in the

April negotiations his comments are given at length:

'There is, I think, practically no limit to the aims and ambitions of the military party in Japan. That party might possibly allege the fear of Europe obtaining domination over China and eventually over Japan as a justification of their policy of aggression in China, but since the defeat of Russia in 1905 and more especially since the collapse of that Power in the great war the excuse can no longer hold water.'

'Speaking generally I believe that the Japanese General Staff supported by the Chauvinist parties aim at securing Japan's hegemony of the Far East and the conversion of China into a Japanese Protectorate. Now that the fear of Russian aggression has been removed Japanese policy in the matter of railway construction in China is principally directed towards obtaining control over all railways in Manchuria and Mongolia which would enable the Japanese whenever necessary to move troops against Peking...'

It must be judged surprising that Macleay could have written such a strong indictment of Japan so shortly after the Shantung negotiations and before the April settlement had been signed as part of the peace treaty. Undoubtedly his comments indicate that a revision of the settlement was justified, but what possibly deterred Macleay from taking any action was the manner in which he differentiated between the military party and civilian government of Japan. Such a distinction was, of course, necessary, but there was the possibility, as eventually occurred, that the military party in Japan would gain power, and with this very real danger existing it would seem that it would have been wiser for Britain to have adopted a more conciliatory policy towards China.

A plea for such a policy was made when Jordan wrote to Curzon giving details of the deliberations of the various Anglo-American associations in China and their misgivings regarding the Shantung clauses.²⁹ Jordan stated that the Anglo-American association of Peking was particularly distinguished for its leading members in many spheres of activity, and there was complete unanimity of opinion that the decision of the powers regarding Shantung was not only unjust to China, but was fraught with grave peril to the future peace of the far east. He continued by stating that the association had passed a resolution, a copy of which he forwarded, that maintained the Shantung clauses were not only subversive to the principles of national self-determination, but a denial of the policy of the open door and equality of opportunity. The resolution concluded by arguing very strongly that because of Japan's proximity to China she might prove a greater danger to the peace of the far east than had Germany. But there is no obvious evidence that the British government's policies were influenced by such a resolution.

While there were British residents in China who sought to prevent an increase of Japanese influence, there were those who did not want to see an increase in Chinese power over the ex-German concessions. For example, the British municipal council of Tientsin argued strongly that the ex-German area should be internationalised, and it presented a memorandum which gave details of how such an international scheme could work,

which, if implemented, would have given considerable power to the British council.³⁰ J.W.O. Davidson, a member of the far eastern department, argued that, as the Chinese felt so aggrieved over the Shantung decision, there was not the slightest chance that they would consider what amounted to a British administration of the ex-German concession. He thought that it would be better if the initiative to secure British control did not come from the municipal council but from the residents of the ex-German area. There would be a greater chance of success, Davidson argued, if such initiative were left until after the Chinese administration had been in force for a short period and its shortcomings had become apparent. While too much must not be made of a comparative minor incident, such an outlook was in keeping with Britain's aims of maintaining, and possibly extending her privileges in China.

Dr. Fifield has described the deep influence which the Shantung settlement had upon the American delegation and that it caused the resignation of Reinsch, the United States minister in Peking.³¹ There was no comparable reaction among the British delegation, even if one allows for Macleay's outburst against the Japanese military party, nor does it seem that Jordan, who was reasonably sympathetic to China, ever considered resigning in protest against his government's policy. Indeed, the observation may be made that the Shantung settlement seems to have had very little influence upon the British delegation in Paris and the appropriate officials in the Foreign Office.

At the beginning of April, 1919, Beilby Alston was appointed the British charge d'affaires at Tokyo and he adopted a markedly sympathetic attitude towards China almost from the moment he arrived in Japan. Dr. Morrison had formed a very unfavourable opinion of Alston and described him as an 'incompetent noodle'.³² No doubt Morrison had his reasons for making such derogatory remarks, but Alston, who succeeded Jordan as British minister in Peking the following year, was consistent in his opposition to the Shantung settlement until the Washington conference revised the situation.

It may have been thought that with such aims Alston would have had no clash with Jordan, but in early June, at a time when it was still possible, even if difficult, to alter the Shantung settlement, the two British representatives in the far east had a difference over tactics. An indication of Alston's feelings is offered in a dispatch in which he stated that since his appointment in ~~Japan~~ he had not hesitated to argue in the strongest terms that there could be no peace in the far east until Japan retroceded Shantung, and he compared the Japanese occupation of the province with the German occupation of Alsace-Lorraine.³³ Possibly it was the intensity of such feelings which caused Alston to ask the Japanese vice-foreign minister whether he would like 'a frank conversation with me on the subject of China and our respective policies there' with a view to

reducing suspicion of each other.³⁴ The Japanese vice-minister had welcomed the suggestion and Alston enquired of Curzon whether the time was not ripe to pursue the conversations further.

Alston's suggestion for Anglo-Japanese discussions of the situation in China caused sharp reactions from Max Muller and Curzon, in London, and Jordan in Peking, when some British far eastern policies were considered in a series of exchanges which did not include Balfour and Macleay who were still in Paris. Jordan was hostile to Anglo-Japanese talks on the grounds that they would cause the Chinese to mistrust the British. He described the British position as being particularly delicate for owing to China's deplorable internal chaos it was important that Britain should help China by trying to improve China's international standing. But, Jordan argued, Britain ought to act in harmony with Japan who was her ally although such a step would incur unpopularity and the risk of a boycott of British goods by the Chinese. Jordan argued that by tradition Britain sympathised with people who were struggling to improve their conditions, but to do so in the case of China would expose Britain to Japanese charges of being disloyal to an ally. He concluded:

'I hold that Chinese problem is now a world one, solution of which can only be found in free and open discussion between Powers concerned, and not by negotiations with another single Power, which can only add to our difficulties here'.³⁵

MaxMuller shared Jordan's hostility to Anglo-Japanese talks and wondered if Britain should not take the lead in initiating international discussions which MaxMuller felt should be in Peking. But Curzon ignored this suggested venue.

Curzon stated that he did not understand what Jordan wanted the British government to do. It was all very well, Curzon continued, to suggest a free and open discussion of a world problem, but where was it to take place? Jordan had ruled out Tokyo as improper, and it could not take place in London as the principals were all elsewhere. Paris, Curzon, concluded, was the most suitable, but the powers were either 'too busy or too indifferent' to consider China. Curzon then stated that the only great power with similar interests to Britain in China was America, and he asked whether any steps had been taken to ascertain what America was thinking or doing about the situation. This was an important question which might be seen as an indication of the subsequent attempts to improve Anglo-American co-operation in the far east that took place between the summer of 1919 and the Washington conference.

Alston continued to argue in favour of Anglo-Japanese discussions, not in order to be involved in a conspiracy, but:

'If it be admitted Japan's attitude towards China is important factor in maintenance of tranquility of the Far East friendly cooperation with Japan in a common policy is surely best means of attaining that object. In other words our endeavour should be to convert Japan from a

policy of which we do not approve to our own. Nothing could be more desirable than willing association of the United States in pursuance of this object.'³⁶

But in a very long statement MaxMuller emphasised that Anglo-Japanese discussions in Tokyo could only do harm, and he agreed with Jordan that the only question that mattered was that of Shantung and that until a really satisfactory solution were reached 'no amount of general assurances respecting China's sovereign rights will be of any value'.

Curzon argued that although the Shantung decision had, in general terms, gone in favour of the Japanese, they had accepted qualifications of the rights given to them and had made undertakings concerning the future. Hence, Curzon maintained that 'Before we settle when to discuss with either Japan or China let us be clear what to discuss'. [Curzon's emphasis]. As a result of these deliberations instructions were sent to Alston stating that while Britain did not want to appear anti-Japanese in outlook, no conversations regarding China were to be held in Tokyo, but that future discussions should be held in London between the foreign secretary and the Japanese ambassador.

From the exchanges prompted by Alston's suggestion for Anglo-Japanese talks it was clear that although Britain was an active party in helping to secure the Shantung settlement, reservations remained concerning Japan's policy to China. As the peace conference drew to a close, Curzon began to replace Balfour in determining British policy even though there was not an official change of office until October.

China refuses to sign the Treaty of Versailles.

During May, it has been noted, the British government had received clear intimations that owing to the proposed Shantung clauses China would refuse to sign the peace treaty, but at the end of May Jordan reported that the Chinese minister for foreign affairs had told him that the Chinese delegation had been instructed to sign.³⁷ Shortly after this interview Jordan began preliminary negotiations with the Chinese government concerning rights in Tibet, but progress was threatened by the actions of Japan, for Jordan stated that:

'Japanese papers are publishing the most sensational accounts of our demands with view of diverting attention from Shantung question. If negotiations about latter question are allowed to take precedence of ours in regard to Tibet it is morally certain that we shall fail to reach a settlement'.³⁸

In the summer and autumn of 1919, Tibet was to prove a contentious issue in Anglo-Chinese relations, and China placed much blame upon the Shantung agreement for her refusal to negotiate a Tibetan settlement with Britain.³⁹

It may have been the intention of the Chinese government to sign the peace treaty, but during the crucial month of June the Chinese delegation in Paris became subjected to heavy pressures both from home and vociferous Chinese groups in the French capital, which made the delegation undecided. Jordan reported that the Chinese delegation had received some 7,000 telegrams, many of them very hostile, and it was Jordan's opinion

that such opposition caused the delegates to decide that it was safer to comply with the expressed wishes of their countrymen than heed a weak and vacillating government.⁴⁰

The known indecision of the Chinese delegation in Paris prompted the Japanese minister in Peking to seek information about the attitude of the Chinese government. At the same time the minister promised that if China were to agree to sign the treaty without reservations concerning the Shantung clauses the following statement would be authorized;

'Japan in accordance with the repeated declarations of the Japanese Government and with the agreements between Japan and China is resolved to restore to China the leasehold of Kiaochow when that leasehold shall have been conceded to Japan by Germany under the Peace Treaty. Accordingly, if the Chinese Government has no objection, negotiations between Japan and China as to the details of the Kiaochow Leased Territory will be opened as soon as the Peace Treaty, now presented by the Allied and Associated Powers to Germany, has been signed and has become operative in respect of Japan and China and Germany'.⁴¹

It was obvious that the treaties of 1915 and 1918 were involved in Japan's reference to her agreements with China, and it was a further indication that, despite American disapproval, Japan was not prepared to abandon completely her claims ^{under} ~~to~~ these treaties. The Japanese minister, however, elicited a promise from the Chinese vice-minister for foreign affairs that if the Chinese delegates in Paris were to refuse to sign the treaty, the Chinese minister in London would do so. But it was not long before the

Chinese government were also influenced by the pressure of public opinion and began to waver in their instructions to their delegation.⁴²

Only a few days before the arranged date (28th June) for the signing of the peace treaty, Clemenceau reported at a meeting of the council of four that the Chinese delegation had written to him stating that they would not sign unless reservations were allowed which specifically stated that China did not accept the articles referring to Shantung.⁴³ Wilson made a half-hearted attempt to support the Chinese claims but, according to Dr. Fifield, the president was hesitant about reservations lest the United States senate should use the precedent to secure American qualifications to the treaty.⁴⁴ Lloyd George argued that the Italian government had reservations upon certain issues, but they were prepared to sign the treaty without any written qualifications, although possibly the British prime minister's praise of Italy was prompted by the dispute he was having with M. Tittoni, the Italian minister of foreign affairs, concerning the latter's public criticisms of Britain's actions regarding African colonies.⁴⁵ The British prime minister also felt that if reservations were allowed this would be a bad example to Rumania and Germany. Hence, it would seem that, as with other issues, proper consideration of China's claims was precluded by the global interests of the major powers.

Undoubtedly Britain had loyally carried out her treaty obligations to Japan. Indeed, it could be argued that the British government had been too conscientious in this direction, but, while Britain was supporting Japan regarding Shantung, the Japanese intensified their efforts to divert hostile Chinese feelings from themselves to westerners in an extremely questionable fashion. Alston reported that ten members of a Japanese secret society were to have gone to Shanghai dressed as Chinese where they were to have assassinated foreigners in an attempt to show that Chinese sentiments were anti-foreign rather than anti-Japanese, but the plot was discovered.⁴⁶ Jordan reported that Japanese efforts to use the Tibetan negotiations to distract attention from the Shantung issue had partially succeeded, and the Japanese had issued pamphlets accusing Britain of wanting to annexe large areas of western China. Such developments were scarcely encouraging for hopes of sound Anglo-Japanese relations in the post-war period and indicated that future British actions in China were susceptible to Japan's arousing the hostility of the Chinese population.

Lansing, the American secretary of state, has described his interview with Makino on the morning of the day when the peace treaty was signed, and he referred to the fact that the Japanese would not issue a statement expressing their liberal intentions for the early retrocession of Shantung.⁴⁷ No mention was made of the proposed Japanese declaration concerning an early

retrocession which had earlier been offered to the Chinese government,⁴⁸ and one must question why Makino was so reticent. Possibly he was encouraged to believe that China would sign the peace treaty unconditionally, which Lansing said was Makino's opinion, by the support which Japan had received from the powers, especially Britain. Indeed, on the whole question of Shantung the Japanese delegates 'were satisfied that France and Great Britain would stand by their engagements',⁴⁹ and with such support Japan could afford to be somewhat indifferent to China's wishes.

China, however, did refuse to sign the treaty of Versailles, and ~~her~~^{her} letter to Clemenceau giving ~~their~~^{her} reasons reflects the bitterness of Chinese feelings. It read:

'The Supreme Council of the Conference, having made it a rule not to admit any reservations of any kind whatever either in the text of the Treaty or elsewhere, and having refused to accept before the signature of the Treaty any compromise compatible with their idea of right and justice - even a declaration to the effect that the signature of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries should not be considered as preventing China from demanding at a suitable time a new examination of the Shantung question - the Plenipotentiaries of the Chinese Republic have the honour to inform you that they do not consider themselves qualified to sign the Treaty of Versailles today'.⁵⁰

This refusal, it may be judged, was weakened by the inclusion of the last word, 'today', for it indicated that a change of mind was possible and reflected some of the uncertainties felt by the Chinese delegation and government.

The signing of the Treaty of Versailles by the other powers did not, of course, bring the Shantung controversy to an end, but China had lost an important round in her struggle to secure the retrocession of the rights granted to foreigners in the province. However, as a result of the peace conference China had gained world wide publicity for her case, and won at least some sympathy for her claims. In such a situation one might have thought that Britain, having honoured her obligations to Japan, would have become more friendly disposed towards China, but little progress, if any, was made in this direction, despite some early promises that such developments would occur.

1. See pp. 146-7 above.
2. Lou Tseng-tsiang to Balfour, May 1919 (no specific day given, but almost certainly the 1st).
Balfour papers. 49750 Vol. LXVIII.
3. Sze to Balfour, 1-5-1919, F.O. 608/210 100707.
4. Makino's press statement, 5-5-1919, Hist. of P.C. of Paris VI, pp. 386-7.
See also, Fifield p. 279.
5. Lou Tseng-tsiang to Clemenceau, 4-5-1919, Minutes by Macleay 7-5-1919, and Hardinge (N.D.), F.O. 610/210 92137.
6. Fifield, pp. 308-9.
Meeting was held 6-5-1919, FRUS P.P.C. III, p. 383.
See pp. 84-6 above.
7. China's memorandum 6-5-1919, Macleay's minute 13-5-1919, reply 14-5-1919, F.O. 608/209 92167.
8. Clemenceau to Lou Tseng-tsiang, 14-5-1919, Macleay's minute 15-5-1919, F.O. 608/209 100337.
9. Li Chien-nung, p. 391.
10. Chow Tse-tsung, p. 1. See also chapter 4, pp. 84-116.
11. Li Chien-nung, p. 392.
12. Chow Tse-tsung, pp. 86-7.
13. Jordan to F.O. 3-5-1919,
Macleay's minute 16-5-1919. F.O. 608/210 99587.
14. Jordan to Curzon, 10-5-1919, F.O. 371/3695 1002657.
15. Telegram from Chekiang provisional assembly, 10-5-1919.
F.O. 608/209 97837.
16. Jordan to Curzon, 14-5-1919. Jordan did not specify who he had met and in view of the rapidity of changes in the Chinese government it is a reflection on the situation that it is not easy to say for certain who he actually saw, it was probably Ch'en Lu, the acting minister.
~~Max Muller's~~ minute 19-5-1919, Curzon's dispatch 21-5-1919, F.O. 371/3683 756147.

17. Li Chien-nung, p.394.
18. Jordan to Curzon, 17-5-1919.
Max Muller's minute, 23-5-1919, F.O.371/3683 [77728].
19. Aide Memoire to Chinese government, 5-6-1919, F.O.371/3683 [111298].
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28. Memorandum by British military attache in Peking, 14-3-1919. Macleay's minute 17-6-1919, F.O.608/211 [12410].
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33. Alston to Curzon, 27-6-1919, F.O.371/3695 [97138].
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36. Alston to Curzon 17-6-1919, Minutes by MaxMuller, 21-6-1919, and Curzon 22-6-1919, instructions to Alston 2-7-1919, F.O.371/3694 /90722/.
37. Jordan to Curzon, 7-7-1919, D.B.F.P(1) VI, p.600.
38. Jordan's telegram, 1-7-1919. D.B.F.P(1) VI, p.598.
39. See p. 225-32 below.
40. See 37 above.
41. F.O. memorandum regarding Japanese policy in Manchuria, 11-7-1919. D.B.F.P.(1) VI, pp.604-5.
42. Fifield, p.325.
43. Council meeting, 25-6-1919, F.R.U.S. P.P.C.VI, pp.674-5. For references to Rumania and Germany see p.710.
44. Fifield, p.329.
45. Council meeting 26-6-1919. F.R.U.S. P.P.C.VI, pp.697.
46. See F.O. memorandum, 41 above.
47. Fifield, p.331.
48. See 41 above.
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50. Balfour to Curzon 29-6-1919. D.B.F.P.(1) VI, pp.592-3.

CHAPTER VIA SUMMER OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES,
JULY-SEPTEMBER, 1919.

During the three months which followed the signing of the treaty of Versailles it was natural that affairs in the far east, as elsewhere, should be unsettled. In China the main aim of Britain's policy was the safeguarding of her economic interests, and in the immediate post-war period consideration had to be given to the proposals for a new international financial consortium. Shantung continued to be an important issue, while other questions such as the Anglo-Chinese negotiations regarding Tibet, the changed international position of Russia, Japan's activities in Siberia and the South Pacific, the possibilities of a recurrence of German militarism, and the continuing rise of Chinese nationalism, also commanded attention and helped to determine the pattern of far eastern politics.

China had declared that her reason for not signing the treaty of Versailles was the refusal of the powers to allow her to make reservations regarding the treaty's articles concerning Shantung. Subsequently Jordan, the British minister in Peking, feared that an estrangement of China from the rest of the allies would lead to a Sino-German rapprochement. For reasons which were not unselfish to British interests, Jordan had worked during

the Paris peace negotiations for the elimination of German influence in the far east and this may have made him sensitive to the possibility of a German revival which, he thought, might be achieved by a Sino-German agreement whereby Germany would regain her properties in China in exchange for a voluntary surrender of her extraterritorial rights.¹ Jordan believed that German officers would begin to train the multitudinous Chinese troops, and he argued that China should not be treated as a truant, for the allies could not afford to see the establishment of a military hegemony in the far east which was hostile to allied interests. Jordan recognised the growth of Chinese nationalism, and claimed that it was the weight of hostile Chinese public opinion to the Shantung settlement, and not merely the diplomatic manoeuvring of her statesmen, which had proved decisive and caused the Chinese delegation to refuse to sign the peace treaty.

Macleay, the British expert on far eastern affairs, thought that Jordan's fears were exaggerated, and argued that as a result of British pressure the Japanese had agreed to modify the conditions by which they said they were prepared to restore Kiaochow to China. There appeared to be reason, Macleay claimed, to hope that the Chinese and Japanese governments would reach an understanding which would enable China to sign the peace treaty. But Macleay feared that such hopes were endangered by

the resolution which had been adopted by the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, proposed by Senator Lodge, which aimed at amending the peace treaty to make China, and not Japan, the recipient of former German rights in Shantung.² Such a resolution, Macleay concluded, 'will encourage the Chinese to maintain their present attitude'.

British policy towards Japan and China was examined in a Foreign Office memorandum which described Japan's actions in China as 'largely opportunist', but claimed that Britain could draw comfort from the fact that a more moderate party was in power in Japan.³ The Japanese government had given certain assurances to China which were thought satisfactory 'as they provide for the surrender to China of the sovereign rights over every part of Shantung including Kiaochow, the Japanese retaining only certain economic rights in that area'. But this statement must be judged ambiguous for it does not make clear whether the retention of economic rights applied only to the concession area in Kiaochow, or throughout Shantung, or to both, and the political influence which the rights carried is minimised with no reference being made to the Japanese-dominated railway police force. The memorandum did, however, question the value of Japanese promises, especially concerning Japan's end-of-war actions in Manchuria. In view of the importance attached to Japan's promises during the peace negotiations, the raising of

such a question less than one month after the conclusion of the treaty was undoubtedly a reflection upon British judgment at Paris.

The memorandum then traced the steps which had led to the peace settlement and in doing so the Chinese delegation were blamed for starting anti-Japanese propaganda which 'threatened to convert a simple question [the Shantung issue] into a serious problem of Far Eastern politics'. After further adverse comments regarding the Chinese representatives, the memorandum concluded by stating that it was too early to judge whether China's 'foolish refusal' to sign the peace treaty would be seized upon by the Japanese to defer opening negotiations for the surrender of Kiaochow. The Shantung issue was, of course, a very complex affair and to refer to it as a simple question was incredible, and it must be noted that no attempt was made in the memorandum either to understand or refer to the Chinese point of view.

Despite this memorandum, more sympathetic views towards China were beginning to be expressed by a number of British statesmen and officials of whom, Curzon, the acting foreign secretary, was undoubtedly the most important. But in the numerous contacts which were made with Chinese representatives no indications of greater friendship for China were expressed, nor even hints dropped of Britain's growing suspicions of Japan.

An example of the inept handling of an interview with a Chinese representative which did not do justice to British policy is offered when Sir John Tilley, an assistant secretary, met Alfred Sze, the Chinese minister, at the Foreign Office.⁴ The interview began by Sze informing Tilley of a number of proposals which Lansing, the American secretary of state, had put to the Japanese peace delegation. It was proposed that the Japanese should put their verbal assurances regarding Tsingtao into writing, agree to the concession in the port being international, not just Japanese, and that the concession should be retroceded to China within two years. Tilley stated that he would inform Curzon of these proposals, but he doubted whether Curzon would accept them for it was unlikely that Japan would agree to an international settlement, which was a far wider proposal than merely fixing a time limit for retrocession. Although he did not inform Sze, Tilley recorded after the interview that he was of the opinion that two years was an unnecessarily long period for occupation, and the Japanese ambassador should be asked only if his government would address a note to the allies embodying the Japanese assurances regarding Shantung and stating when they would be carried out. Obviously, Tilley had reservations about Japan, but he did not give any indication of them to Sze. Instead, he may have given the Chinese minister the impression that Curzon was frightened of offending Japan and

therefore would not support Lansing's proposals. As events proved Curzon did approve of many of Lansing's main suggestions and he acted upon them with vigour, but there is no immediate evidence that the Chinese government were ever informed. It may be noted that early in August there was some concern in the Foreign Office that nothing in writing had been received concerning Lansing's proposals.⁵

When it became known that Curzon was about to have an interview with the Japanese ambassador to discuss affairs in China, Max Muller, head of the far eastern department, suggested that Curzon might be able to refer to the 'wholly selfish' policy which Japan had pursued in China while her allies were pre-occupied in Europe, 'a policy aiming at securing her political and commercial supremacy to the exclusion of other powers and at the cost of China'.⁶ Max Muller continued by sharply criticising the military party of Japan which he claimed had devoted all its energies to the exploitation of China and very little to helping the allied cause. He pinned his hopes, however, on the fact that the Japanese government had recognised that the means which they had hitherto adopted to gain their aims in China would bring them into the direct opposition of Great Britain and the United States.

Meanwhile Philip Kerr, who was still in Paris, was considering what should be said publicly about 'the Shantung affair'.⁷ Kerr referred to Japan's promises to China as con-

tained in the Hankey memorandum of 5 June which had been handed to the Chinese government and which stated that the terms of the Shantung settlement reached by the peace council on 30 April would be implemented. It was Kerr's opinion that publication of this document 'would undoubtedly allay excitement in China and satisfy misgivings in Great Britain and America'. Kerr claimed that Britain had the right to publish the document if Japan refused to do so, but he reported that it was the opinion of Balfour, the British foreign secretary who was also still in Paris, that the British government should not put Chinda, the Japanese ambassador to London and a leading Japanese delegate, 'in the position of vetoing any action we think it is necessary to take'. Balfour, Kerr stated, was in favour of trying to gain Japan's co-operation rather than invite a clash. However, one can easily question whether publication of the April settlement would have achieved the placatory effect which both Balfour and Kerr anticipated, and it must be considered surprising for any British government action being subject to a veto from Japan.

If Balfour and Kerr were advocating a policy of an appeasing character, Curzon's interview with Chinda was blunt.⁸ The interview began by Curzon stressing the importance of the Shantung issue for future far eastern relations, and he continued by referring to Japan's policy on the Chinese mainland. He

claimed that the object of Japan, especially during the war, had been to establish a mastery over China, and she had pursued her aims in a manner which had aroused widespread Chinese hostility and a boycott of Japanese goods. America had been antagonised, and this step had dangers for the Anglo-Japanese alliance and could result, possibly, in Japan's isolation. Although China was temporarily helpless, Curzon foresaw a difficult situation should China take her grievances to the proposed League of Nations.

Curzon then described the events at the turn of the century when many powers had been keen to join in the dismemberment of China in an imperialist fashion, and argued that in the different post-war situation it was essential for the powers to co-operate in helping China rather than perpetuate dangerous inter-power rivalries. These comments led Curzon to review the steps leading to the peace settlement, and he described several British war-time treaties, including the Anglo-Italian treaty of 1915, as 'stupid and short sighted'. He claimed that the post-war situation had revealed the folly of treaties which could scarcely be implemented and he claimed...

'...it was unwise of Japan to insist upon the technical rights secured to her by her agreements with China in respect of Shantung....If Japan was actuated by the friendly sentiments which she professed; if she meant to adhere to her earlier pledges to give up Tsingtau and Shantung; if she was prepared to withdraw the whole of her troops, civil administrators, and police; if, in fact, she was prepared to make a "bona-fide" restitution of whatever she had acquired from Germany to China, why should she not come out into the open and say so? Why allow the atmosphere to be further poisoned by long concealment and delay?'

These remarks provoked Chinda to defend his country in a fervent fashion, and possibly caused the ambassador to be rather indiscreet.

At first Chinda maintained that it was the intention to evacuate Tsingtao for Japan had never failed to honour a pledge. But Chinda then argued that China had willingly signed a treaty consenting to Japan's claims in Shantung, so why should Japan who had thrown herself into the war not reap some of the profits to which her sacrifices entitled her? What Japan was 'proposing to take or keep' was not a Chinese but a German possession, Britain was proposing to retain former German possessions, why should Japan not do the same? Why should China be allowed to tear up a treaty which she had voluntarily concluded with Japan less than one year previously? Chinda claimed that Japan was prepared to evacuate Shantung in her own time, 'But the economic rights which she had inherited from Germany she proposed to retain'. The ambassador concluded this part of his case by stressing the importance of the Shantung issue to Japan's sense of national honour.

Curzon countered these remarks by stating that the situation demanded not only concern for national honour but large-minded statesmanship. If Japan were to continue with her policies in China she might succeed in the short-run but at the long-term cost of antagonising the Chinese and creating a most

bitter situation. To these remarks Chinda replied, surprisingly, by asking Curzon's advice as to what Japan should do. After paying suitable compliments to such a request, Curzon stated that if it were the intention of Japan to evacuate Shantung she should say so openly and announce the date. He asked why the Japanese commissioner of customs at Tsingtao should not be withdrawn and the Maritime Customs Union be empowered to appoint a successor, which would make Japan's intentions appear less selfish.

In view of the economic privileges which were accorded to Japan by the April settlement Curzon's comments on this issue were significant for he suggested that economic privileges...

'...seemed to be another way of perpetuating the era of spheres of influence, which the Ambassador concurred with me in deprecating. Every one protested against Germany when she insisted on seizing this preferential position in Shantung. Why was it any better in the case of Japan?'

Curzon argued that preferential positions were not in harmony with the spirit of the times and this applied particularly to railway rights. But instead of Japan supporting moves to internationalise the railways she was claiming exclusive rights for her present lines and she envisaged an extension of them on the grounds that they lay within Japanese spheres of influence. In conclusion Curzon stated that he did not think it would be humiliating for Japan to make a series of concessions to China public knowledge.

It is clear that Curzon's remarks were a serious reflection on the wisdom of British policy during the peace negotiations when so much support had been accorded to Japan, while Chinda's comments pointed to a Japan determined to hold on to her war-time advances, so it seemed that some Anglo-Japanese friction was inevitable. Diplomatic use of the interview was envisaged, for MaxMuller gave instructions for copies of the reports of the exchanges to be sent to Peking, the peace delegation in Paris, and to Washington 'for the confidential use of the American government'.⁹

Alston, the British charge in Tokyo, Jordan, and Max Muller who were all sympathetic to China were delighted with Curzon's arguments and welcomed them.¹⁰ One must question, however, whether Curzon was not being sanctimonious for it was easy to condemn the imperialist division of China, but Britain had not announced any intention of surrendering the gains which she had made at the beginning of the century, and she was holding tightly to her interests in the Yangtse Valley, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Tientsin. Britain had not retroceded even places of marginal value such as Wei-hai Wei, nor agreed to a revision of China's international treaties whereby at least minimal changes could have been made in China's favour. Even if all the criticisms of Japan's policies were valid, Curzon would have been in a stronger position to admonish Japan if Britain's standing in

China had been on a more equitable basis. This point was not lost upon the Japanese, for from Tokyo Alston reported that they really believed that none of their deeds was as guilty as the earlier British acts of aggression in China.¹¹ In presenting some deliberately biased arguments in favour of Japan, Alston queried whether the Japanese occupation of Shantung was worse than that of Germany, and he referred to the difficulties in which Britain would have been placed had Japan joined the side of the central powers during the war. It was Alston's sincere opinion that both Britain and Japan should honour their obligations to respect China's integrity. Alston, however, soon ceased to play the role of a Japanese advocate for almost immediately he submitted a further dispatch in which he stated that Japan was placing more importance upon her armed strength in order to secure a solution of her problems than relying upon the future decisions of the proposed League of Nations.¹² It was all very well, Alston concluded, for Japan to talk about resuming her natural role, but he questioned whether this implied further steps against China.

British policy towards China was in some difficulty for Britain was trying to restrain a ^{seeking} forward-looking Japan, while at the same time she was ^{trying} ~~seeking~~ to retain benefits from actions similar to ^{those} which she was admonishing Japan for taking.

The position was made worse by the fact that Britain still had two major spokesmen, Balfour and Curzon, who had different attitudes to the far eastern situation which are not explained by the tactical variations of emphasis which mediators must make in order to draw opposing parties closer together. While Curzon was speaking very sharply indeed to the Japanese ambassador in London, in Paris Balfour had an interview with Wellington Koo in which the British foreign secretary was sympathetic towards Japan in a manner which clearly went beyond seeking to induce the Chinese delegate to appreciate the Japanese point of view. Koo argued that his delegation had not signed the peace treaty owing to China being debarred from making any reservations concerning the Shantung clauses.¹³ Balfour replied that he understood the reasons for Chinese agitation over Shantung, but the Chinese government had not informed their people that 'the Treaty clauses as published were not all that had been agreed to in regard to Shantung, but that there was a supplementary understanding between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Japanese...' which was clearly a reference to the April settlement. It was Balfour's claim that this agreement modified the situation, and he queried why China had not published its terms. He then asked what China objected to in the peace treaty.

Koo replied that the agreement was objectionable for not recognising China as a principal and not going far enough to protect China's rights. A time limit had not been fixed beyond

which Japan could not maintain troops in Shantung, and Koo complained that by the treaty Japan was to have an exclusive settlement at Kiaochow instead of there being an international settlement. But Balfour was scornful of these objections and he stated that there could be little doubt that Japan would evacuate Shantung at an early date. He confessed that he was not sure of the significance of the difference between an international residential concession and a series of national concessions, but he could not believe that the difference could be so great as to justify China's refusal to sign the treaty.

The interview proceeded by Koo contending that Japan was extending her influence in Shantung by means of extensive railway building and that she aimed at a permanent domination of the province. But once again Balfour made light of China's fears, claiming that 'British policy had always aimed at the maintenance of the independence of China'. If, Balfour argued, China really did fear Japan, it was clear that her refusal to sign the peace treaty would not counter Japan's actions and he continued by stating that China had in fact recovered much of her sovereignty in Shantung. At the conclusion of the interview Koo asked Balfour whether he had seen a proposal of Lansing for Japan to make a public declaration that Japan would give effect to the undertakings which she had given to the peace council.

Balfour replied that he had discussed the matter with Lansing and he, Balfour, was anxious that Japan should make such a public statement, thus showing he had some regard for China's wishes.

It was obvious from Balfour's remarks that he believed that the April settlement was a serious modification in China's favour of the Shantung clauses in the peace treaty. Also, it was clear that if Balfour had read the report of the three experts in late April¹⁴ he had forgotten much of its findings for the report made the distinct point that the proposed Japanese concession at Tsingtao would occupy the most advantageous position in the centre of the port.

Simultaneously with Curzon's interview with Chinda, Alston in Tokyo queried whether the time was not ripe to argue with Japan that the concession at Tsingtao should be of an international character. But after referring to Curzon's interview, MaxMuller argued that Britain had done enough for the present and he would deprecate the raising of the question. He added, 'We might leave that to the others to do'.¹⁵ But of 'the others' the United States was undoubtedly the most important, and the American delegation were anxious that the British government should press Japan to declare publicly her intentions regarding Shantung. As a result C.H.Tufton, counsellor of

embassy at Paris, argued that it would be relevant to show Henry White, a member of the American delegation, the substance of the account of the Curzon-Chinda interview. But Balfour opposed this step. He claimed that White had already seen an account of his own interview with the Chinese plenipotentiary, 'Wellington Koo (if that is his name), and Balfour added 'This gives a fair amount account? of our policy. I am a little afraid of communicating this admirable but rather violent dispatch to Japan's most formidable critic s'.¹⁶

Balfour was becoming an extremely tired man and no doubt allowances must be made for his labours at Paris. Nevertheless, his arguments reveal another unusual situation. Of course, it was possible that Balfour was being merely off-handed in professing to be uncertain of Koo's name, but if he were being serious Balfour's memory was slipping badly for Koo, which is a simple name to the English tongue, had played a leading role throughout the peace conference and should have been well known to Balfour. One must also question Balfour's judgment in believing that an account of his own interview with Koo was an exposition of British policy, for Curzon had adopted a markedly different attitude in his interview with Chinda. It is interesting to note that while Balfour was against the Americans being informed of the Curzon-Chinda interview instructions had already been issued for

a confidential report to be placed at the American government's disposal.¹⁷ It would seem that some confusion was resulting from the different attitudes of Curzon and Balfour and the difficulties of one being in London and the other in Paris.

When Chinda met Curzon for the second time the Japanese ambassador stated almost immediately that as a result of Curzon's remarks at the first interview Chinda had concluded that Curzon was not in agreement with the policy of the British government, and he asked if such a conclusion were correct.¹⁸ Curzon replied that he had no desire to dissociate himself from his own government's policy, but public opinion in England, America, and China was critical of Japan's actions, and that he felt a personal sympathy for such sentiments. He had offered his advice in an attempt to help Japan to extricate herself from a difficult position. Chinda then challenged Curzon to state whether he believed that Japan would withdraw her military forces from Shantung, to which he replied that he had no doubts as to Japan's intentions but it would be better for Japan to make a public statement and to give dates. The ambassador then asked if Curzon's criticisms applied to Japan's commercial and economic concessions in China, to which Curzon replied that, broadly speaking, he felt it was undesirable for Japan to have such preferences for they carried with them 'a command of the country's China's policy and resources quite as effective in

its way as that which resulted from the presence of troops', Curzon continued by making an appeal for the principles of internationalisation of economic rights to be implemented and for Japan not to be worried about considerations of 'losing face'.

Curzon reported that in his two interviews with Chinda he had spoken very sharply to the ambassador about Japanese brutalities and atrocities in Korea. A further point was that Japan, by means of a wireless agreement, was extending her influence towards Tibet, and the British government looked unfavourably upon such a development as a possible threat to her own interests in that country and in India. Curzon was obviously concerned at Japan's activities, and the negotiations regarding the proposed international consortium which were taking place at the same time increased doubts regarding Japan's motives in China.

The Financial Consortium.

A financial consortium had existed in China before the war in order to control foreign lending to China and ensure that loans would be so placed that interest and capital repayments would be reasonably secured.¹⁹ The pre-war consortium had been weakened by the withdrawal of the United States in 1913 when President Wilson objected to the political interference which it

but implied in China's affairs, / Obviously any consortium would have political implications for the very purpose of such organisations necessitate a measure of political control. The proposals for the post-war consortium were complicated and they can be studied for their economic importance, but the political implications are reasonably clear and they centre upon Japan's self-interested attempts to secure areas of exclusion from the proposed agreements.

Plans for a new consortium had been drawn up in July, 1918, and a meeting of delegates from Britain, France, Japan, and the United States had been held in May, 1919.²⁰ However, in mid-June, M. Odagiri, a Japanese financial representative, wrote to F. P. Lamont, the principal American financial representative, asking that in the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia where Japan had special interests these areas should be excluded from the proposed arrangements.²¹ This request was made as a result of the direct intervention of the Japanese government, and the Japanese financial representatives informed Lamont that they were not in favour of such a suggestion.²² Consequently consultations among the financial representatives of Britain, France, and America ensued and it was agreed that such exclusions were contrary to the principles of the consortium. Max Fuller believed that the request was a 'try-on' by Japan, and if the other countries were firm she would give way. Curzon stated explicitly,

'I would not yield for one moment'²³ and such opposition was made official in an exchange of letters between the Foreign Office and the American embassy. France was informed of Britain's hostility towards the exclusions and of her opinion that Japan was releasing a 'ballon d'essai'.²⁴

Curzon's criticisms of Japan's consortium plans were mounting at the same time as his interviews with ~~China~~ over Shantung. But at a crucial moment Britain weakened her case against Japan by proposing to ~~loan~~^{lend} £500,000 to the Chinese government in the form of special bonds and an arrangement with the English firm of Vickers to supply China with aeroplanes.²⁵ These proposals also concerned the arms embargo on China, and arguments continued into the winter causing Britain to be criticised in excess of the supply of planes and the sums of money involved.

Jordan had been a consistent supporter of the principles underlying a consortium and the internationalising of the Chinese railways. With plans for a consortium developing Jordan became anxious lest the weak Peking government should conclude an agreement whereby Japan would gain control of a number of key Chinese railway lines before a plan for international management was reached.²⁶ As the summer progressed his comments about Japanese policy became sharper, and concern was expressed in western circles that Japan would use the pretext of intervention against Russia to gain control of the Chinese Manchurian Railway.

Alston in Tokyo shared the misgivings about Japan's ambitions, but he came to different conclusions from Curzon and Jordan. He reported that there was strong opposition in Japan against weakening her control in Manchuria, and Alston was convinced that in order to defend her interests in the area Japan was prepared to face isolation.²⁷ Therefore, Alston argued, a compromise was necessary, and he suggested that Japan should be given the undisputed economic hegemony in Manchuria and Mongolia, but that Japan should be asked for the surrender of every right and privilege which she had in Shantung. This proposal brought a sharp reaction from Jordan who deplored the suggestion. He argued that if the consortium were to succeed it would require the active co-operation of the Chinese, but the deal envisaged by Alston would antagonise them and render co-operation impossible. Jordan claimed that a struggle was taking place in China between the military and civil parties, and it was vital not to encourage the military which would result from such an agreement with Japan. The Chinese people would win in the long run, Jordan maintained, and therefore short-sighted policies should be avoided. Already some success was being achieved concerning the internationalising of the railways, and it was Jordan's opinion that if Japan did not want to co-operate she should remain isolated.²⁸ Curzon agreed with Jordan and expressed his opposition to Alston's suggestion.

Despite China's acute economic plight the consortium negotiations of the summer achieved nothing, although considerable friction arose when any of the powers were suspected of entering unilateral arrangements for a loan.²⁹

Further influence of the Shantung problem.

The question of Shantung continued to dominate the Chinese situation and quite heated exchanges occurred between the Japanese and American governments concerning the finalising of the peace treaty arrangements.³⁰ Jordan had been extremely critical of the peace treaty and when he learned of Curzon's remarks to Chinda regarding Japan's economic rights he noted:

'We are asked by Paris Conference to believe a railway running for two hundred and forty five miles from principal port in China to capital of one of most important provinces, owned, financed, policed and controlled by Japanese Government, is a mere economic privilege which does not involve interference with China's sovereign rights or impair principles of "open door" or equality of treatment'.³¹

In Jordan's opinion Japan was anxious to secure an empire and was prepared to use the railways to do so. ~~Max~~Muller agreed with the importance which Jordan was placing upon the influence of the Shantung railway, while Davidson, a member of the far eastern department, somewhat optimistically believed that consideration of economic rights would lead to an agreement between China and Japan, and result eventually in China signing the peace treaty.

At the beginning of August, Alston reported that Japan had issued the awaited public statement concerning her policies in Shantung, but that the statement contained little that was new.³² The province was to be retroceded to China, although no date was specified, and it was stated that the concession at Tsingtao would be of an international character, not merely Japanese, but the 'Area of foreign settlement is not to be limited to present area of Tsingtao'. Japan was to have preference within the province concerning capital, materials and work, and the proposed arrangements convinced Alston that Japan would be given a dominating influence in Tsingtao as the Japanese were expected to insist upon their own commissioner for customs. Alston's dispatch prompted ~~Max~~ Muller and Davidson to reflect upon the value of Japan's railway and mining rights in Shantung. As if in answer to the importance they attached to such rights Curzon briefly noted 'See my third and latest talk with Japanese ambassador'.

It is of purpose to recall that during the peace negotiations, Balfour had been mainly instrumental in securing the rejection of the report of the three experts which had specifically warned of the political importance attached to Japan's proposed economic rights in Shantung.³³ The resulting April settlement had incorporated Japan's main desiderata, and Balfour and Kerr argued subsequently that implementation of the settlement would

be to China's benefit. In the immediate post-war period, however, Curzon joined Jordan and Alston in complaining at the strength of Japan's economic rights and that the privileges were impeding an equitable solution of many of China's problems. Hence, when Curzon had a further interview with Chinda he voiced such complaints far more strongly, although with less heat, than in previous interviews.

The interview began by Curzon noting the friendly tone of the Japanese public statement of early August, but Curzon continued by voicing some of the opinions expressed by Alston, namely that the proposal for an international settlement at Tsingtao was welcome but no time limit had been fixed for the Japanese military occupation.³⁴ He then asked Chinda whether the Japanese would agree to the Maritime Customs Union appointing a commissioner for the post or would they claim such a right. Britain was vitally interested in the maritime customs, and future arrangements on this point concerned her trade with China, and it may be noted that the arrangements which had existed when Germany held control of Tsingtao were based on:

'....two agreements, signed by Sir Robert Hart and the German envoy [whereby] the Chinese customs administration, instead of being pushed outside into Chinese territory, was invited inside the Schützgebiet and established at Tsingtau. Under these arrangements the port, docks and manufacturing district were made a bonded area....in return for this Tsingtau was given the privileges of a Chinese treaty port, and one fifth of the net revenue from imports by sea was paid to the German administration. The free depot, aided by the railway, prospered, but it was a prosperity based on an English free-trade policy, and not on the policy adopted elsewhere in German territory'.³⁵

Obviously Britain was concerned lest her interests in Tsingtao should suffer, but to Curzon's question concerning the important issue of the appointment of a commissioner, Chinda could only reply that he had forgotten an earlier request to submit the matter to his government and that he would rectify his omission.

Discussion continued by dealing with the economic rights which Japan proposed to retain in Shantung, but Chinda was uncertain of his country's precise claims. Curzon then repeated his objections to Japan's railway policies which, despite various paper guarantees to the contrary, were, he claimed, 'establishing a stranglehold upon the Province which would place it eventually and for all time under her control'. At the conclusion of the interview Curzon again raised the question of Japan's policies in Korea, and stated that he was at a loss to understand why reports of the atrocities had not appeared in the British press. Curzon warned Chinda that such reports would lose Japan many friends should they be published.

Japan's economic claims in Shantung continued to give cause for concern and Miles Lampson, a first secretary at the Peking legation, reported that the Japanese were endeavouring to interpret the rights as determined by the Sino-German treaty of 1898, the essentials of which had been transferred to Japan by the peace settlement, in an excessive fashion.³⁶ Lampson enclosed a resolution which had been passed by the British

chamber of commerce at Tientsin that expressed fears at Japan's threatened domination of Tsingtao. In terms similar to the findings of the three experts in April the resolution stated that the development of the port of Tsingtao and the Shantung railways would be considerable, and it continued by claiming that such a development could out-match the facilities of Tientsin and Shanghai which were areas of vital importance to British interests. Lampson's conclusions were that Japan's activities strained still further the attempts which were being made to belittle her economic as opposed to her political rights, and prompted R.H. Clive, a member of the far eastern department, to note that Japan had abandoned all pretence about the 'open-door'.

Within China the public statement of Japan of early August created a generally unfavourable impression, and Jordan reported that many Chinese felt that the Paris peace settlement was no better than the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1915 as far as Shantung was concerned. There was marked confusion in Peking and vacillation between trusting the allies to make an acceptable agreement for the Chinese and, at the other extreme, contemplating direct Sino-Japanese negotiations.³⁷ Macleay's reactions to Jordan's report were unfriendly towards the Chinese and he stated:

'I gather.....that the U.S. Minister at Peking must have advocated in regard to Kiaochow and Shantung questions the same policy as that which the Far Eastern experts on the American Peace Delegation urged upon President Wilson, viz: that the Agreements and Treaties of 1915 and 1918 should be declared invalid and that the Peace Treaty should restore the leased territory of Kiaochow and the German rights in Shantung to China disregarding any claims which Japan might base either on the treaties and agreements or on her conquest and occupation of Tsingtao, unaided by China, long before China entered the war on the side of the Entente'.

This statement resembles Balfour's oft used phrase regarding China not having spent a shilling nor lost a man in the clearing of the Germans from Shantung, which overlooks completely the military helplessness not only of China but also of the western allies in 1914 and 1915.

With doubts growing concerning Japan's motives, as made clear by the Curzon-Chinda interviews, it would have been wiser for Britain to have begun to adopt a more friendly approach towards China, but instead a very cold attitude was maintained. An example of this coldness can be seen when Lou Tseng-tsiang called at the Foreign Office and saw Sir Ronald Graham, who was substituting for Lord Hardinge, permanent under-secretary of state, in order to discuss China's refusal to sign the peace treaty and voice a number of grievances against Japanese actions.³⁸ Lou's presence in the Foreign Office occurred in the period when Curzon was having his heated interviews with Chinda, and two such exchanges had already taken place. One would think that for

obvious reasons Curzon would have been pleased to receive Lou, but when the chief Chinese delegate expressed a wish to see Curzon, Graham 'did not hold out much hope to him', but gave no reason for Curzon not being available. In fact, Curzon was willing to see him, and in his famous blue pencil he scribbled on Graham's account of the interview 'I could see him tomorrow Saturday at 1 p.m. at F.O.', but there is no evidence that the meeting took place. Thus, the opportunity for even the most informal discussion was lost, before Lou left Europe and returned to Peking.

An indication of China's standing in the list of priorities of Balfour and Curzon is revealed in an exchange of letters between the two principals. Balfour stated that he wished to leave Paris for a six week holiday and listed a number of outstanding issues which were delaying his departure, but he made no reference to China.³⁹ When Curzon replied he made a detailed political review of the situation which, however, concentrated upon the middle-east and ignored far eastern developments.⁴⁰ Obviously too much should not be inferred from such an exchange, but one might have thought that Curzon would at least have mentioned Shantung which in the summer of 1919 was mainly responsible for bringing the Anglo-Chinese negotiations concerning Tibet to an abrupt ending.

Anglo-Chinese negotiations concerning Tibet.

Britain's interests in Tibet were mainly strategic and aimed at preventing other countries, especially Russia and Japan, from gaining a Tibetan entry point into the sub-continent of India. Tibet was a country over which China claimed suzerainty, and in 1914 an Anglo-Chinese-Tibetan dispute had occurred regarding boundaries. This dispute continued intermittently until 1918 when Eric Teichman, a British consular officer, was able to arrange a cease-fire, after which an uneasy truce ensued.⁴¹

Early in July, 1919, Jordan reported that much to his pleasure China had submitted proposals for bringing the Tibetan dispute to an end, and he argued that no time should be lost before negotiations were started.⁴² After studying the Chinese proposals Curzon agreed that such negotiations should begin, and he informed Jordan that as the Tibetan government had asked Britain to mediate with China in the dispute, it was not necessary to refer to Lhasa before a decision on boundaries could be reached.⁴³ He stated that the boundaries proposed by China were generally acceptable, and argued that China's suzerainty regarding Tibet should be recognised. Curzon did object, however, to a Chinese proposal for their commissioners to be stationed at trade marts as he thought that they would interfere unjustly with British commerce.

In mid-August Jordan reported that detailed Anglo-Chinese negotiations regarding Tibet had begun and the attitude of the Chinese was reasonable. Among other items discussed, he stated, was a possible division of Tibet into separate zones over which different powers would exercise influence.⁴⁴ The implications of Jordan's report were studied in detail at the Foreign Office, and Curzon ~~commented on~~ indicated some of his impatience on the issue ^{by his comments:} 'I thought the Chinese were supposed to be yearning for settlement'. But if the Chinese government did want a settlement, the Japanese press (and no doubt government) did not, and a propaganda campaign was waged with the object of depicting Japan's acquisition of Shantung as being a mild affair, for all Chinese who were willing to negotiate with Britain over Tibet were described as arch-traitors about to betray their country's basic interests. An example of such propaganda arrived at the Foreign Office and Max Muller noted the venom of the pamphlet received, and stated that its tone corresponded closely with the anti-British propaganda in the Japanese press about which Alston, the British charge, had informed them.⁴⁵ To this Curzon briefly noted 'It is the hand of Esau in both cases'.

Owing to the fundamental weakness of the Chinese government there was an attempt to assess the potential dangers of the Japanese propaganda campaign. R.H.Clive, a member of the

far eastern department, believed that the campaign could be ignored, and his opinion was backed by Macleay, who argued 'I do not believe that clumsy propaganda of this description will affect the negotiations which Sir John Jordan has just commenced with the Chinese Govt.'⁴⁶ But Macleay was some forty-eight hours behind events for the Chinese government had already informed Jordan that they wished to postpone the Tibetan negotiations.

Jordan, of course, asked for an explanation of China's actions and was informed that the Chinese cabinet feared popular agitation over Tibet similar to that concerning the Shantung issue. In an interview with Ch'en Lu, the vice-minister for foreign affairs, Jordan protested strongly at China's action and pointed out that it was the Chinese government which had formally asked for the Tibetan negotiations to begin.⁴⁷ Whether Jordan actually lost his temper is not certain, but it is clear that he gave every appearance of so doing for he not only informed Ch'en how badly the British government would react to the news, but added that he hoped he would soon be recalled from Peking which would relieve him of the task of dealing with such a government. Jordan insisted upon asking Ch'en that he should be allowed to see the Chinese president and any other officials responsible for the severance of the negotiations. Ch'en Lu,

however, prevaricated and confessed that another power was anxious to divert agitation from the Tsingtao issue to Tibet. At this point Jordan asked if the Chinese government were so weak that it had to conform to the slightest hint from another power, to which Ch'en replied that his government was not strong enough to stand up to popular agitation in addition to that relating to Shantung. Jordan then claimed that 'Great Britain had been China's friend in the past far more than the Chinese realised. It was an insult to the British government to break off these negotiations at the hint of another Power...' The other power was, of course, Japan, and Jordan concluded his report by arguing that Japan not only sought domination in China, but aspired to a deciding voice in central Asia.

There can be no question that China's action in asking for the Tibetan negotiations and then breaking them off as she did was ^asubject for justified criticism by Britain. But it may be argued that Japan's role in the Tibetan negotiations was more reprehensible, for if, as Jordan claimed, Britain had been a good friend to China, she had undoubtedly been a much better friend to Japan, especially regarding the Shantung issue. Not surprisingly there was some doubt as to the extent of Japan's interference, but early in September Macleay was of the opinion that:

'The Chinese Govt. will no doubt renew the negotiations, but unless we can induce the Japanese Govt. to give peremptory instruction to their Minister in Peking to cease putting obstacles in our way, I fear that there is little hope of a satisfactory issue'.⁴⁸

A few days later Jordan reported that Wang Tahsieh, a member of the Diplomatic Council, had confirmed the British minister's conclusions that Japanese interference was the cause of the interruption of the Tibetan negotiations.⁴⁹ Indeed, the breakdown of the negotiations was in keeping with the Japanese press campaigns against 'British diplomatic cunning' which had allegedly won so many diplomatic victories as a result of the peace conference. It seems that in return for her support concerning Shantung, Britain received calculated abuse ^{in the} ~~from~~ Japanese press which succeeded in its aim of causing harm to the Tibetan negotiations.

China's action caused a flurry of diplomatic activity. Jordan saw both the Chinese premier and president, but although promises were made to examine the possibilities of resuming negotiations nothing materialised. Curzon's anger out-matched that of Jordan's, and when he saw the Japanese ambassador in the Foreign Office he bluntly referred to the anti-British propaganda campaign which Japan had been waging. Curzon then asked Chinda directly if it were true that Japan had interfered in the Anglo-Chinese negotiations, to which the ambassador replied that he could not believe such a step were possible but he would seek confirmation from his government that Japan was

not implicated. Curzon stated that he hoped that this was so, but if the accusations were justified it would be a sorry reflection upon Anglo-Japanese relations.⁵⁰

Following this interview Curzon saw Sze, the Chinese minister in London, when the exchanges were decidedly one-sided.⁵¹ After making a strong protest at the breakdown of the negotiations, Curzon told Sze that he had been espousing China's cause in relation to Shantung, but he had little expected while fighting such a battle to receive 'a slap in the face of this uncalled for description', and that he would find it difficult to support China's causes in the future. Curzon had undoubtedly championed China's cause in his series of interviews with China, and from his own viewpoint Curzon's anger was justified. But there is no evidence to suggest that Curzon's support was known to the Chinese; on the contrary, it has been noted that Chinese diplomatic representatives had probably been given the impression that British policy was more pro-Japanese than it was. Thus, although China's action in severing the Tibetan negotiations may have appeared as personal insults to Jordan and Curzon, it was taken by an ill-informed China. As China felt let down by the western allies over Shantung, why should she feel that Britain would stand by her should Japan start to exert pressure regarding Tibet?

Less than a fortnight after his interview with the Japanese ambassador, Curzon complained that he had heard nothing from Japan and instructed Alston in Tokyo to make enquiries concerning Japan's role in the breakdown of the Tibetan negotiations. Meanwhile Macleay agreed with the strong tone which Jordan had adopted with the Chinese premier.⁵² In Peking Jordan saw T. Obata, the Japanese minister to China, who flatly denied Japan's implication in the negotiations' breakdown, and refused to agree, despite the evidence, that Japan was responsible for an anti-British propaganda campaign. Jordan had afterwards called upon the Chinese acting minister for foreign affairs, Ch'en Lu, and was told by Ch'en that the Japanese had exerted pressure upon the Chinese government, and Colonel Banzai, a Japanese adviser on Chinese affairs, was implicated.⁵³

When Jordan taxed Obata in Peking with the information he had received from Ch'en Lu, the Japanese minister denied all knowledge of the allegations and stated that he would make enquiries. Macleay was of the opinion that the Japanese government were involved in exerting pressure upon China.⁵⁴ Obata's enquiries, however, were limited to a call upon the Chinese minister for foreign affairs who, on the same day, sent for Jordan and told him that Obata had reproached him in very strong terms for the Chinese accusations brought against Banzai, and Obata had stated that even if the accusations were true it would have been an unfriendly act to divulge such information to

another power. Ch'en was reported to be in a dilemma, and that in ^{the} circumstances, Jordan stated, Ch'en felt he had no alternative but to 'cancel' the charges against Japan.⁵⁵ Documentary evidence had come into British hands and Macleay learned of the Chinese withdrawal of charges with regret as... '...it will preclude us from making use of Banzai's letter as evidence of official Japanese interference with Tibetan negotiations'.

Attempts were made later to induce the Japanese government to inform China that they had no desire to see a cessation of the Anglo-Chinese negotiations regarding Tibet, and the Japanese finally made such a statement.⁵⁶ Obviously, too much blame should not be placed upon Japan for the breakdown in the Tibetan negotiations, for a strong China could have resisted all interference. But the evidence, supplemented by an impressive memorandum on Japanese anti-British press cuttings compiled by ^{C.} Crow, formerly employed on United States war propaganda in China,⁵⁷ indicates that the breakdown was to Japan's liking. Anglo-Chinese negotiations were not resumed, and the Tibetan issue remained an obstacle to a better understanding between the two countries at least until the Washington conference.

Some conclusions concerning the developments of the summer.

In the months which immediately followed the signing of the peace treaty it is obvious that Curzon had doubts about the Shantung articles and the treatment of China, but Balfour

maintained his earlier views which might be judged to be based upon doubtful premises. An example of Balfour's unchanging attitude is offered when he wrote to Curzon regarding the promotion prospects of Macleay whom Balfour described as a person of only moderate ability: 'I found him in every respect both loyal and zealous. I did not, however, see any special signs of diplomatic dexterity'.⁵⁸ In giving his views on Macleay, Balfour referred to the treaty of Versailles and stated that during the peace negotiations a difficult situation had existed owing to the war-time pledges which the Japanese had obtained from the British government regarding Shantung in exchange for naval assistance in the Mediterranean. Balfour believed that the Japanese had behaved very badly towards China over the 1915 treaties, and continued by stating 'Macleay hates the Japanese, while I, on the other hand, am more moved by the contempt for the Chinese over the way they left Japan to fight Germany for Shantung...', and Balfour then repeated his phrase about China not having spent a shilling nor lost a man in securing Shantung's recapture, but had subsequently demanded its retrocession.

This letter indicates that since his dispatch to Curzon in May when he used the same phraseology, Balfour had not read any of the details of the military and naval situation in 1914-15 when Japan was so powerful in the far east, and Balfour

the used the same expressions in a later memorandum concerning/war-time treaties.⁵⁹ It is necessary to challenge Balfour's opinion that Macleay hated the Japanese for although on several occasions Macleay had spoken harshly regarding the Japanese military party, his actions during the Paris negotiations, especially in April, contradicts Balfour's judgment that Macleay was basically hostile towards Japan. One might conclude that had Balfour treated China with less contempt and shared Curzon's growing doubts about Japan, especially in relation to Balfour's dealings with Koo and the American delegation at Paris, Anglo-Chinese relations would have been placed on a much better footing.

Jordan had been a consistent supporter of a liberal approach to China, yet despite his sympathetic attitude a letter which he wrote to Tilley of the far eastern department revealed some aspects of policy which could have appeared objectionable from the Chinese point of view. He stated:

'We feel that the worst is now over and that we have passed through four weary years of War and kept our interests practically intact in spite of all the risks.. Not only that, but the British communities in China have been taught their lesson and have profited by it. The old Treaty Port prejudices have been broken down and at all the larger ports the study of Chinese is now regarded as an essential qualification for a mercantile career'.⁶⁰

Jordan continued by referring to China's internal chaos which, he argued, could be relieved by lending her first-class administrators from India.

No doubt Jordan was still upset by the rupture of the Tibetan negotiations, but it must be noted that he was rather self-satisfied concerning the preservation of British possessions and less concerned that none of the reforms which he had advocated at the end of 1918 had been implemented. One must question whether the old treaty port attitude towards the Chinese had broken down to the extent that Jordan suggested for there was marked hostility to suggestions that the Chinese should be represented upon the municipal councils, and not a single step was taken in China's favour regarding the system of extra-territoriality.

In September China ensured her future membership of the League of Nations by signing the treaty of Saint Germain with Austria, but this event scarcely influenced her relations with Britain.⁶¹ While China had advanced her position by ensuring such membership she had, however, made no progress concerning Shantung, improving her financial situation, or reducing her internal chaos. Moreover, the Tibetan affair had caused a setback to Anglo-Chinese relations and left Curzon, who was about to become foreign secretary, an embittered man on this question. Although Britain had begun to move away from Japan this was not offset by an increase in friendship with China, and it was to the United States that Britain turned in order to attempt to avoid isolation in far eastern affairs.

1. Jordan to Curzon, 7-7-1919, Macleay's minute, 25-8-1919, F.O. 371/3695 118937.
2. Fifield, pp.339-43.
3. F.O. memorandum, 11-7-1919, D.B.F.P. 1(V1) pp.602-5. There are doubts concerning the author who is stated to be either Eyre Crowe or Max Muller. A typed copy of the memorandum, but with no indication of the author is contained in the Lothian papers. In view of Max Muller's views it seems doubtful that he were the author.
4. Record of conversation, 14-7-1919 between Tilley and Sze , F.O.371/3695 106974.
5. Tufton to MaxMuller, 6-8-1919 denied that Lansing had supplied a written memorandum, Ibid.
6. Minute by MaxMuller, 15-7-1919, F.O.371/3695 106210.
7. Minute by Kerr, 17-7-1919, F.O.371/3695 104444.
8. Curzon to Alston, 18-7-1919, F.O.371/3695 106210.
9. Minute by MaxMuller, 22-7-1919, Ibid.
10. Alston to Curzon, 6-8-1919, Max Muller's minute 9-8-1919, F.O.371/3695 113362.
Jordan to Curzon, 17-8-1919, F.O.371/3695 143779.
11. Alston to Curzon, 18-7-1919, i.e. before the Curzon-Chinda interview reports had been received, D.B.F.P. 1(V1) pp.618-21.
12. Alston to Curzon, 18-7-1919, D.B.F.P.I (V1) pp.662-4.
13. Note of a conversation between Balfour and Koo, 19-7-1919, by Kerr. F.O.371/3695 107596.
14. See p. 134 above.
15. Alston to Curzon, 18-7-1919, Max Muller's minute, 24-7-1919, F.O.371/3695 106629.
16. Tufton's minute, 24-7-1919. No date for Balfour's minute but as it appears immediately after Tufton's presumably it was of the same, or near, date. F.O.608/211 16047.

17. See p. 207 above.
18. Curzon to Alston, 22-7-1919, F.O.371/3695 106793.
19. Lowe, Chapter IV, pp.120-46.
20. Balfour to Curzon, 18-7-1919, enclosing various papers on consortium ~~papers~~ ^{proposals}. D.B.F.P.I (V1) pp.624-32.
21. Enclosure 3, Odagiri to Lamont, 18-6-1919. Ibid pp.626-7.
22. Enclosure 2, paragraph 5, memorandum by Lamont, 28-6-1919, Ibid. p.625.
23. Butler Wright, counsellor in U.S. embassy, to Max Muller, 14-7-1919, MaxMuller's minute 15-7-1919, Curzon's minute 16-7-1919, F.O. 371/3691 102801.
24. Curzon to Fleuriau, French minister in London, 29-7-1919, F.O. 371/3691 106247.
25. Curzon to Jordan, 29-7-1919, D.B.F.P. I(V1) p.651.
26. Jordan to Curzon, 26-7-1919, D.B.F.P. I(V1) pp.648-9.
27. Alston to Curzon, 22-8-1919, F.O.371/3691 120554.
28. Jordan to Curzon, 26-8-1919, Curzon's minute 31-8-1919, F.O.371/3691 122086.
29. Jordan to Curzon, 17-9-1919 and 19-9-1919, D.B.F.P. I(V1) p.728 and pp.729-30.
30. Fifield pp.353-5.
31. Jordan to Curzon, 4-8-1919, Davidson and MaxMuller's minutes, 6-8-1919. F.O.371/3695 112287.
32. Alston to Curzon 8-8-1919, Minutes by Davidson, 11-8-1919, Max Muller, 12-8-1919, and Curzon, 12-8-1919, F.O.371/3695 114375.
33. See p.143-6 above.
34. Curzon to Alston, 11-8-1919, interview was 9-8-1919, F.O.371/3695 115266.

35. H.B.Morse, The International relations of the Chinese Empire, III, (Shanghai 1918) p.110.
36. Jordan to Curzon, enclosing Lampson's report, 20-8-1919, Clive's minute, 24-10-1919, F.O.371/3695 1437807.
37. Jordan to Curzon, 14-8-1919, Macleay's minute 18-8-1919, F.O.371/3695 1171097.
38. Record by Sir R. Graham of conversation, 6-8-1919, Curzon's minute, 8-8-1919, F.O.371/3695 1144447.
39. Balfour to Curzon, 16-8-1919, Balfour papers, 49734, Vol.LII.
40. Curzon to Balfour, 20-8-1919, Balfour papers, 49734, Vol.LII.
41. Teichman's account of his Tibetan negotiations, 20-11-1918, F.O.371/3688 899907.
42. Jordan to Curzon, 6-7-1919, F.O.371/3688 1009797.
43. Curzon to Jordan, 1-8-1919, F.O.371/3688 1105267.
44. Jordan to Curzon, 14-8-1919, Curzon's minute 18-8-1919, F.O.371/3688 1166837.
45. MaxMuller's minute, 6-8-1919, Curzon's comment, 7-8-1919, F.O.371/3688 1113017.
46. Clive's minute, 22-8-1919, Macleay's minute 28-8-1919, F.O.371/3688 1189187.
47. Jordan to Curzon, 28-8-1919, F.O.371/3688 1399847.
48. Macleay's minute, 2-9-1919, F.O.371/3688 1234787.
49. Jordan to Curzon, 6-9-1919, F.O.371/3689 1265117.
50. Curzon to Alston, 1-9-1919, F.O.371/3689 1239267.
51. Curzon to Jordan, 1-9-1919, D.B.F.P.I (V1) pp.703-4.
52. Curzon to Alston, 11-9-1919. Macleay's minute (N.D.) F.O.371/3689 1264447.
53. Jordan to Curzon, 16-9-1919. F.O.371/3689 1512327.
In his letter Jordan referred to the information service of Charles Crow. This was probably Carl Crow.

54. Jordan to Curzon, 19-9-1919. Macleay's minute, 22-9-1919. F.O.371/3689 132018/.
55. Jordan to Curzon, 19-9-1919. Macleay's minute, 22-9-1919. F.O.371/3689 131958/.
56. Alston to Curzon, 10-10-1919. D.B.F.P. I(V1) p.772.
57. Memorandum respecting Japanese control of news and communications. N.D. D.B.F.P. I (V1) pp.721-7.
58. Balfour to Curzon, 20-9-1919. Balfour papers 49734, Vol. LII.
59. Memorandum by Balfour (N.D., but almost certainly October, 1919). Balfour papers 49734, Vol.LII.
60. Jordan to Tilley, 24-9-1919, D.B.F.P. I (V1) pp.732-4.
61. No mention of this event appears in D.B.F.P.I (V1) covering September 1919.

CHAPTER VIIA PERIOD FOR CONSIDERATION, SEPTEMBER 1919 - DECEMBER 1920

No outstanding changes in Anglo-Chinese relations occurred between the autumn of 1919 and the end of 1920, but the activities of the powers with interests in the far east subjected British policy in China to a thorough examination. The problems and policies of the treaty settlement continued to exert their influences, while the question of whether Britain should continue to be a party to the Anglo-Japanese alliance raised a post-war problem of whether the British government should lose Japan as a committed ally in order to improve the prospects of closer friendship with the United States and China. The alliance exerted considerable influence upon naval strategy and numerous aspects of international affairs, but in this work attention is concentrated upon its bearing on Anglo-Chinese relations.¹

In common with other inter-world-war periods, British policy in the far east was affected by China's chaotic internal situation, although it is questionable whether British statesmen were aware of the divisive influence which foreign intervention had upon China's internal developments. The Shanghai conference which had sought agreement among the rival Chinese factions had broken

down in the summer,² and this was followed by attempts of liberal-minded Chinese to dissolve the parliament at Peking and replace it with another assembly based upon popular franchise. These moves were opposed by Chinese militarists who were anxious to divide the spoils of a ravaged China among themselves. Sir John Jordan, the British minister in Peking, described the situation as no longer a contest between the Chinese governments of the north and south, but between civil and military control, with Japan backing the militarists.³ However, rivalry between the two administrations continued. If the Peking government were regarded as being more vulnerable to Japanese influences the Kuomintang administration at Canton was regarded as too unstable, and it was not until 1928 ^{that} before Britain recognised the Kuomintang regime as the official government of China.⁴ One might argue that despite the uncertainties of the Kuomintang government it was more representative of Chinese nationalism and freer from the influences of Japan than was that of the government at Peking, and that Britain was slow to recognise these features. But the schisms in the south were serious and at one time the Kuomintang's leader, Sun Yat Sen, was forced to flee by the Kwangsi

invaders. This gave the Peking government an excuse to terminate the agreement whereby customs' revenues were divided between the two administrations.⁵

During the autumn of 1919 Chin Yun-p'eng, the newly appointed Chinese premier at Peking, felt obliged to tender his resignation on a number of occasions owing to the pressures placed upon him by Hsu Shu-Cheng, the leader of the Japanese-supported 'War Participation Army' and former premier during the presidency of Yun Shih-kai.⁶ But Hsu over-reached himself and provoked counter-measures from provincial leaders Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, and Wu P'ei-fu in Wuchang, with the result that civil war in the north began in July, 1920. Within some five days another Japanese-backed force, the 'National Pacification' army, was crushed, and in August Chin Yun-p'eng was asked to reorganise his government. In these circumstances of intrigues and countermeasures negotiations with the Peking government were almost impossible, but China is a huge country and in the north, as elsewhere, there were regions which had obtained a marked degree of independence.

In a report on the situation in China, Jordan, the British minister in Peking, stated that there was comparative stability in Wuchang and Nanking which had been achieved largely owing to the strong character of

the local military governors who commended respect from the different warring factions to observe neutrality in their respective areas.⁷ British influence had declined in Hankow, which Jordan attributed to a serious weakness in consular representation and the fierce political and economic rivalry of Japan, and of America to a lesser degree. In Shantung, Jordan reported that he had been given a warm welcome and he referred to the antipathy of the Chinese population throughout the province to the Japanese. Ch'u Ying-kuang, the civil governor of Shantung, had criticised the terms of the peace treaty and in a discussion with Jordan had raised the problems relating to extraterritoriality which, Ch'u claimed, were becoming more acute with the penetration by foreigners into the countryside of the province, which were causing incidents to multiply and raising various matters of principle.⁸ Jordan continued his report by arguing that the Japanese rights in Shantung were forcing the extraterritoriality issue and thereby reacting unfavourably upon British interests in the interior of China. The question of extraterritoriality was to prove of great importance to Anglo-Chinese relations in the late 1920s.

At Tsingtao the Japanese were in complete occupation and were enforcing martial law. Jordan referred to

Balfour's dispatch of the 8th May⁹ and contrasted it with the manner in which the Japanese had extended their influence in the province partly at Britain's expense. Instead of the promised 'open-door', Japan's grip had tightened upon the port's railways, wharves and land holdings. Jordan thought that pressure upon British and American firms was soon to be expected. But Jordan also criticised British mercantile interests for not getting on with the task of extending their activities in Tsingtao and for depending too much upon a political settlement with Japan.

A conference of chambers of commerce had been held at Shanghai at the beginning of November and Jordan had attended. Some eighteen items had been discussed including the development of the Chinese railway system, the suppression of piracy, and the education of Chinese on British lines. A secret resolution was passed which expressed,

'... the unanimous opinion that the restoration to China of the port of Tsingtao and of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway ... was essential to British trade interests, and [conference] pledged itself to urge His Majesty's Government to secure equal trade opportunities for all in Shantung.'

Jordan praised the Shanghai administration for its sense of responsibility, but he raised the question of

Chinese representation. He felt that some preliminary steps should be taken immediately, such as including Chinese members upon some of the sub-committees of the municipal council. Changes were taking place in China, and Jordan thought that there was promise for economic advance. In conclusion Jordan stated that the resolutions of the Shanghai conference had been widely circulated in the Chinese press, and they had gained widespread Chinese recognition that the British mercantile community was pledged to a policy to the mutual benefit of the welfare of China and the interests of foreign trade.

Undoubtedly many of the Shanghai chambers of commerce conference decisions were in the interests of the Chinese people as well as those of the British mercantile classes, but Chinese nationalists no doubt objected to many of the subjects which were discussed on the grounds that they infringed upon Chinese sovereignty. Objections could also have been raised concerning Jordan's contentions regarding the need for interdependence, for in contradistinction China was pressing for independence and the ending of all foreign treaties which controlled her internal activities. Experienced as Jordan was concerning Chinese affairs, he was

unquestionably optimistic regarding the willingness of British officials and settlers to agree to greater representation upon municipal councils. An example of the opposition to such a change is offered in the arguments of Sir E. Fraser, the consul general at Shanghai.

Fraser thought that to allow a limited number of Chinese councillors, even if their powers were restricted, was merely postponing a demand for absolute equality which such a concession would make it harder to resist.¹⁰ He concluded,

'China is wide and those Chinese who feel it derogatory to live under our regulations can go elsewhere. If they are anything like as numerous as they are noisy they should have no difficulty in outdoing this settlement in size and wealth.'

In his reply Jordan emphasised that he had no wish to disturb the smooth running of Shanghai, but China, like Egypt and India, was demanding a larger share in self-government.¹¹ He could not see how some 700,000 Chinese could be ruled permanently by a municipal council of nine foreigners, all of whom were busy men with little time to give to Chinese affairs. Fraser's views might be regarded as somewhat Blimpish, but they and not those of Jordan prevailed, for Chinese representation upon the Shanghai municipal council did not

come until 1928 after the harrowing turmoil of the mid-twenties.¹²

Despite all the internal rivalries within the country, Chinese nationalism was a force strong enough to influence China's foreign relations as illustrated by the effectiveness of the boycott of Japanese goods.¹³ The powers were aware of the potential value of the Chinese markets, and for economic as well as political reasons they were willing to advance China money. As a result there were further proposals for an international consortium.

The International Financial Consortium

Differences of interest regarding the scope of the consortium had already caused delay to its formation during the summer of 1919.¹⁴ At the beginning of September, Curzon, the acting foreign secretary, informed Chinda, the Japanese ambassador in London, that he was concerned at Japan's continued attempts to secure the exclusions of eastern inner Mongolia and southern Manchuria from a financial agreement.¹⁵ Curzon had already voiced similar objections to such proposals in August, and the American and French governments were aware of Curzon's opposition to Japan's aims.¹⁶ While the powers were debating their differences, Reinsch, the American minister

in Peking, reported that the Chinese armed forces were three months in arrears of pay and the Chinese government had been taking short term loans at exorbitant interest charges to meet their immediate expenses.¹⁷ Owing to China's pressing needs, M. de Fleuriau, the French ambassador in London, in an interview which illustrates some of the rivalry associated with the consortium, saw Macleay at the Foreign Office and informed the British far eastern expert that in order to forestall a unilateral Japanese loan to China, the Americans were proposing an exclusive American-British-French advance.¹⁸ The French government were worried, however, at the possible consequences of excluding Japan and they thought that the situation would be eased if the British government were to use their influence derived from the Anglo-Japanese alliance to induce Japan to drop her claims for exemption. The American government also wanted Britain to use the influence of the alliance for the same purpose.

Meanwhile Japan faced difficulties regarding the proposed exclusions as Baron Hayashi, whose future appointment as ambassador to Britain had been recently announced, made clear in a press conference.¹⁹ Hayashi questioned the wisdom of Japan's seeking areas of

exclusion from the proposed consortium agreement if she lacked the capital resources **necessary** to develop the options which she held. This prompted Tilley of the far eastern department to note that if Japan were so short of capital 'the position will be a curious one as the money will have to come from America. The Japanese can hardly expect the U.S.G. to agree to that...'
Hensing, the American secretary of state, considered that it was Japan's lack of capital which was probably the real reason why she was unwilling to join the consortium.²⁰

The British government agreed that every effort should be made to induce the Japanese to drop their demands for exclusions, but they argued that if their attempts at persuasion were to fail the Japanese should be allowed reservations in southern Manchuria, but not in eastern inner Mongolia. Simultaneously the British government urged the United States that no unilateral loans should be made to China, for if the Americans made such a loan this would encourage Japan to do likewise. The British government favoured a small immediate loan of £5 million to China which should be made, and the spending of it controlled, by the four main consortium powers.²¹ British objections to a unilateral loan had stemmed from the proposals of a Chicago bank

to lend \$30 million to China, and in spite of various American assurances Curzon opposed the action because of its possible influence upon Japan.²²

However, the Japanese were not without complaints concerning British financial transactions and they queried whether an advance of £50,000 by the British firm of Vickers, whereby China could purchase aircraft, did not constitute a unilateral loan.²³ MaxMuller, head of the far eastern department of the Foreign Office, denied any violation of the consortium and claimed that the money would be retained in England and spent under the supervision of Vickers. He also claimed that the aeroplanes to be supplied were unsuitable for military purposes and therefore they did not constitute a breach of the arms embargo. These arguments were very dubious for even if a sum of money were retained in a foreign country and debitted against goods supplied such a practice is very little different from a direct loan of cash. Also, one must query whether any aeroplane can have no military value, and in fact the Chinese prime minister later confirmed that the planes required were for military purposes.²⁴ The Japanese also complained about the British conditions for the proposed £5 million joint loan on the grounds that they constituted an interference into China's internal affairs.²⁵ There

were Japanese objections to the British attempt to stipulate that the loan should depend upon the disbandment of Chinese troops and the resumption of peace talks between the north and south fections. However, in view of Japan's actions concerning Shantung her professed concern at the interference in China's internal affairs must be dismissed as hypocrisy, and in the Foreign Office both Clive and MaxMuller noted the unsatisfactory behaviour of the Japanese.

While Japan was posing some awkward questions to Britain concerning the loan proposals it was learnt that negotiations for the proposed Chicago bank loan had collapsed as the Chinese could not offer sufficient security.²⁶ This news was welcomed by Curzon who instructed Lord Grey in Washington to convey his satisfaction to Lansing regarding the abandonment of the project, although it may be noted that MaxMuller was opposed to a tentative suggestion that the loan negotiations should be transferred from Peking to New York.²⁷ Lansing had already informed the British government that he did not regard the exchange of the Lansing-Ishii notes in 1917 as granting Japan the right to press for the type of consortium exclusion which she was seeking, and American opposition to the exclusion proposals had been made clear to the Japanese. Grey reported that

the American government 'cannot even in the last resort concede reservation claimed by Japan in regard to Southern Manchuria'²⁸ which indicated that the United States was more strongly opposed to any consortium concession than Britain.

At the end of October, Curzon was appointed foreign secretary, as distinct from acting foreign secretary, in succession to Balfour. In the autumn of 1919 Curzon was undoubtedly more critical of Japan than Balfour had been, and at least until the rupture of the Tibetan negotiations Curzon's attitude towards China had been more sympathetic. But it has been noted that little, if any, information had been passed to the Chinese concerning Curzon's greater sympathy, and as Curzon's attitude towards China began to harden during 1920 and the approach of the Washington conference, it may be argued that the change of office did not seriously influence Britain's policy concerning China.

When Curzon met China again in the second half of November he continued to be critical of Japan, and he informed the ambassador that regarding the exclusions Britain associated herself with America.²⁹ Curzon stated that the British government did not want any consortium agreement to undermine Japan's established

railway rights and other recognised interests. But they were against Japan gaining further spheres of influence, or areas of special preference, by means of exclusions from consortium agreements. Curzon once again criticised the sphere of influence which Japan was building up in Shantung and argued that if Japan were not included in the consortium 'her isolated position would be singularly unfevourable to her future relationships both with China and with the Powers in general'. This remark had obvious implications for the Anglo-^{Japanese} ~~Chinese~~ alliance.

The consortium discussions had been watched with anxiety by the Chinese, and Jordan stated that he was relieved that Curzon was opposing Japan's claims for exclusions.³⁰ Jordan then gave a detailed account of Japan's dependence upon China for new materials from which he concluded that even if Japan were not a party to the consortium the remaining areas of China's economy uninfluenced by Japan would leave plenty of scope for the British, American and French interests to develop concessions.

In mid-December, Viscount Uchida, the Japanese minister for foreign affairs, repeated his country's fears that the terms of the consortium would allow foreign intrusion into economic spheres and areas of

China which were regarded as of paramount importance to Japan's security. Uchida was surprised when Alston suggested that Japan could prepare a formula, which could be written into the consortium agreement, safeguarding Japan's strategic railways and vital economic interests from consortium interference. This idea had been proposed by Curzon to China in their November interview and was in keeping with Curzon's contention that while it was undesirable to use the consortium to attack Japan's established interests, it was also undesirable for Japan to use exclusions from a consortium agreement to secure a further economic and political expansion in China. Alston noted Uchida's unawareness of the proposed formula and commented that it was not the first time that the Japanese ambassador in London had failed to communicate adequately with Tokyo.³¹ On a lower level in London, MaxMuller of the far eastern department saw Nagai, the Japanese chargé, and argued that the Japanese proposals for exclusions clashed with those of France concerning the main structure of the consortium.

Owing to the attempts to relate the proposed \$5 million loan to China with the consortium agreement negotiations for the loan's approval dragged on throughout the winter. At times it seemed that the powers would

reach agreement, but on each occasion fresh objections were raised. These included American opposition to the Vickers' loan, and to repeated British attempts to stipulate loan conditions relating to the disbandment of Chinese troops and the convening of a conference of rival Chinese factions.³² Controversy over the loan came to a climax in February, 1920, when Japan threatened to make a unilateral advance of \$7 million, and in order not to be out-maneuvred Curzon authorised a similar loan a few days later.³³

A surprising defence of Japan's actions came from Dr Morrison, adviser to the Chinese government, who was in London. F. Ashton-Gwatkin of the far eastern department noted that Morrison had written to the foreign editor of 'The Times' suggesting an interview with Mr M. Odegiri of the Yokohama Specie Bank, who was also in London, and the object of the meeting 'would be the enlightenment of the British public on the subject of the Consortium negotiations'.³⁴

Ashton-Gwatkin continued:

'Dr Morrison told me that, according to Mr Odegiri, the industrial interests of Japan were in favour of Japan joining the Consortium even if she has to pool those of her concessions in South Manchuria and East Inner Mongolia, upon which work has not commenced ...'

Morrison believed that the Japanese government would not pool railway concessions essential to the defence of Korea, but:

'Other concessions, however, Japan might be prepared to pool provided that British, French and American interests were equally self-denying. /Ashton-Gwetkin's emphasis/. Mr Odagiri, however, protested that British and French interests were not playing the game.'

and details were given of the lines which the western countries were seeking to exclude from the consortium. Morrison, it was stated, had independent corroboration of these charges.

Ashton-Gwetkin continued by noting that Morrison was particularly critical of the French and British banking groups in China who were seeking to play individual roles which had drawn some particularly sharp comments:

'Dr Morrison spoke to me of the policy of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank as being "selfish and grasping". It must be remembered in this connection, that Dr Morrison's attitude is said to have been in the past, rightly or wrongly, antagonistic to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank ...'

Morrison may have been critical of the Hong Kong Bank, but he could scarcely have been ^{more} ~~less~~ critical of ~~the~~ Japanese policy, and his comments clearly indicate that if the principle of exclusion were wrong, the

western powers were not above reproach on the issue.³⁵

In April, Lord Hardinge, permanent under-secretary of state, reported that Japan was making a last attempt to secure exclusions from the consortium.³⁶ By May a compromise had been reached with the Japanese whereby assurances were given to them for the safeguarding of their railway interests.³⁷ Curzon then instructed Alston, who had replaced Jordan as the British minister in Peking in March 1920, to begin negotiations with the Chinese government, but it was not until September that the Chinese government received a joint note from the consortium powers. As late as November, 1920, Curzon had to admit that owing to Chinese opposition it was necessary that no public statement should be made regarding the consortium.³⁸

The consortium achieved very little for it can be seen that

'... the political condition of China was too chaotic, the attitude of the Chinese Government or Governments and of Chinese public opinion too hostile, and the policy of the Consortium itself too cautious, for any appreciable progress to be made in the work which the Consortium had been created to perform.' 39

The consortium negotiations are, however, important for revealing the rivalries of the powers in the far east. They also had numerous political ramifications,

and of relevance to British policy the consortium negotiations reveal the opposition of the British government to the making of any economic surrenders. One can argue that the consortium negotiations militated against British policy in Shantung for although Curzon had emphasised the need to internationalise the Chinese railways, and in particular those of the Shantung province which had considerable political significance, the consortium agreement of May, 1920, recognised the existing railway rights of Japan. Although in his November interview with Chinda, Curzon had spoken about the powers 'seeking to set China upon her legs again',⁴⁰ one must question whether a successful consortium would not have seen a reduction in Chinese sovereignty rather than an increase.

Early Considerations of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

A general aim of British policy in the post-war period was to improve relations with the United States, but the marked antipathy between America and Japan was making it increasingly difficult for Britain to be on good terms with both countries simultaneously. Hence, as the autumn of 1919 progressed the question of whether

Britain should give notice of termination of the alliance became more pressing. Apart from the relevant American and dominion considerations there was the question of whether the terms of the alliance were compatible with the proposed League of Nations covenant. Linked with the question of the covenant was the undecided issue of American League membership and obviously this matter had a direct bearing upon Britain's willingness to rely upon the effectiveness of the League. By the autumn of 1919 the British government had become critical of Japan concerning Shantung, but if Britain were to terminate the alliance she had to consider how such a step would influence her own position in China.

When Alston was still the British charge d'affaires in Tokyo he reviewed the situation and recognised that the alliance could be seen as being aimed at the United States and incompatible with the League covenant.⁴¹ But Alston continued by arguing that Britain's main aims in the far east were peace, China's rehabilitation, cooperation with the United States, and 'to preserve, if possible, friendly relations with Japan ...' Alston favoured some type of alliance with Japan even a verbal one and even at the risk of occasional misunderstandings with America, for he felt that such an alliance would

help Britain to restrain Japan. It was obvious to Alston that a tripartite Anglo-American-Japanese agreement would be the ideal safeguard for peace in the far east, but he felt that the mutual American-Japanese antipathy would prevent this.

Enclosed with Alston's letter was a memorandum from C. Wingfield, first secretary to the British embassy in Tokyo.⁴² Wingfield was more in favour of discontinuing the alliance, but in his final recommendations he hedged and argued that if adequate safeguards could be found for the consideration of League requirements, relations with the United States, and the rehabilitation of China, then the alliance should continue. Such hedging can easily be criticised as bordering upon indecision, but between the autumn of 1919 and the Washington conference the complexity of the situation and the wide range of variables rendered clear-cut opinions upon the future of the alliance rare.

If Britain were undecided over the alliance it was clear that the Japanese army wanted it to continue for Lieutenant-General Fukuda Masataro, vice-chief of the Japanese general staff, stated in his official capacity that he strongly favoured the agreement.⁴³

This prompted Hardinge to express satisfaction over the

Japanese army's desires. But while the British government were deliberating upon the alliance a number of disturbing reports reached the Foreign Office from the British legation at Peking concerning Japan's actions in Shantung. The reports were very similar in tone and content to John Pratt's dispatch of January, 1919, and caused Curzon to state that he was very concerned at the state of affairs revealed which was not only scandalous, 'but in open violation of all the Japanese assurances as one of the Powers'.⁴⁴ Curzon went on to suggest that a note summarising the position should be drawn up 'in strong but courteous terms', and its contents discussed with the Japanese ambassador.

In mid-December a note was handed to Viscount Chinda which was a damning indictment of Japanese policy.⁴⁵ It claimed that undue preference was being shown to the Japanese regarding shipping, harbour rights, warehouse accommodation, and land tenure. Customs procedure had been divorced from the maritime union and there was widespread smuggling of drugs. The 'open door' policy and the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Shantung were, it was alleged, broken promises. The note continued by complaining at the manner in which the Japanese had expended their hold upon the railways in Shantung. It stated that, 'A railway virtually owned, policed, and

controlled by Japan cannot be regarded merely as an economic concession, but rather as an instrument of territorial expansion'. In its conclusion the note expressed the hope that the promises which Japan had made concerning Shantung would soon be expedited.

Almost at the same time as Curzon was presenting the British government's note in London, Alston in Tokyo was protesting against Japanese discrimination regarding British interests in Shantung.⁴⁶ Curzon followed up his note with an interview with Chinda, the Japanese ambassador, when blunt questions were put to Chinda regarding Japan's actions at Tsingtao and her failure to reach agreement with China regarding the evacuation of Japanese troops.⁴⁷ Chinda blamed the United States for withdrawing from the peace conference and the Chinese for waging a trade boycott which made negotiations impossible, but Curzon was not impressed by these arguments. Curzon maintained that Britain had no desire to break her word regarding the Shantung railways and that Japan should enjoy the rights formerly possessed by Germany. However, for a lasting equitable solution Curzon thought that emphasis should be placed upon the internationalisation of foreign railways in China rather than indulging in national squabbling.

It is, perhaps, all too easy to agree with Curzon's

rebukes to China, but there was a one-sidedness to Curzon's criticisms of Japan. Curzon made light of Japan's difficulties over the trade boycott and her professed inability to negotiate with China, but Britain's own relations with China were extremely strained over Tibet. Obviously there were differences between the two issues but there were also similarities in China's attitude to both countries. Also the chaotic internal situation in China militated against Japanese as well as British abilities to negotiate with the Chinese government. One must stress that nowhere in China were the British making any concessions in their economic and political rights similar to what Curzon was expecting Japan to do.

Japan's case was argued by General Fukuda who stated that Japan was willing to give up her settlements in China, but that no country could find any means of protecting their nationals except by the existence of settlements and extraterritorial jurisdiction.⁴⁸ Whilst every power in China enjoyed such rights, Japan, it was claimed, had every right to a settlement at Tsingtao. When the right time came, Fukuda concluded, Japan would assist China to end the system of extraterritoriality. Fukuda's claims for an exclusive settlement at Tsingtao were disputable, but the criticisms which he made of

China's inability to preserve law and order were strikingly similar to those made by Britain.

The dilemma which faced the British government was expressed when J.A.C. Tilley, a superintending under-secretary at the Foreign Office, complained that owing to the irreconcilable aims of Japan and America it was difficult to pursue a policy conjointly with both countries. Tilley, who was also officially voicing the views of Curzon and Hardinge, stated that if Britain dropped the alliance Japan would fall into the arms of Russia and Germany.⁴⁹ At the same time it was recognised that there were extreme difficulties preventing an Anglo-American agreement.

As Britain began to deliberate upon the desirability of continuing with the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the contentious Tibetan issue exerted a relevant bearing upon policy considerations.

The Continued Influence of Tibet upon the Shantung negotiations

Despite hopes raised by earlier optimistic reports, no progress was made concerning a resumption of the Tibetan negotiations when Jordan met Chen Lu, the Chinese acting minister for foreign affairs.⁵⁰ It was Jordan's opinion that the Shantung settlement had made China

reluctant to sign an agreement with a further power which recognised foreign control over Chinese territory. Curzon, who had been infuriated at the Chinese disruption of the Tibetan negotiations, noted that at the end of August he had seen the Chinese minister in London and 'told him that if his Government still shallied - still more if they sought to shelve the question - my attitude towards China might undergo a ^{decisive} ~~farwide~~ and unpleasant change'.⁵¹ Towards the end of November, MaxMuller wrote a memorandum on the Tibetan situation in which he drew Curzon's attention to the failure of the Chinese government to resume negotiations and suggested, ^{as} ~~like~~ Alston had done, that Curzon should see the Chinese minister, to which Curzon scribbled, 'Please send for him immedietely'. As a result Curzon saw Sze, the Chinese minister, and told him that the British government were deliberately delaying Jordan's departure from Peking, as he was the most suitable person to handle a resumption of the Tibetan negotiations, but China's answer to this friendly gesture, Curzon complained, was to prevericete. Curzon warned Sze that owing to the Tibetan issue the Chinese government 'might find at a critical moment that they had lost a very good friend ...'⁵²

British pressure for the resumption of the Tibetan

negotiations was maintained when Jordan again met Chen Lu in Peking, but the Chinese minister took the line that the British government, in cooperation with India, were preventing Chinese forces from entering Tibet and settling their dispute directly. Jordan replied that Britain had no wish to question China's suzerainty over Tibet, but proximity to India made it impossible for the British government to be indifferent to the disorders which would arise from a Sino-Tibetan clash. Therefore, Jordan argued that there was a need for Anglo-Tibetan negotiations before either Chinese or Tibetan forces acted unilaterally.⁵³

A note refusing to negotiate was delivered by China to Britain which, in polite language, stated that the opening of the Tibetan question would exacerbate anti-foreign sentiments in China and lead to an anti-British trade boycott. Unlike earlier verbal statements, the Chinese concluded their note by saying that the re-opening of the Tibetan negotiations would not have to await the settlement of the Shantung question, but the British reactions were extremely sharp.⁵⁴ Tilley maintained that the note implied a mild threat which would anger Curzon, while Hardinge argued that the communication was unacceptable and that unless a more satisfactory attitude were adopted Jordan should be replaced

in Peking by a chargé d'affaires instead of a minister. Curzon was furious indeed and claimed that the British government were being trifled with. He supported Hardinge's suggestion that Jordan should be replaced with a chargé.

China had given Britain cause for complaint by asking for negotiations concerning Tibet to begin and then breaking them off as soon as they had started, but one must question the justification for Britain's strong reactions, for, although the situation in Tibet was potentially dangerous, it seemed reasonably calm. The Tibetan government were mainly satisfied to leave matters to the British,⁵⁵ and in the immediate post-war period there was an absence of reports of Sino-Tibetan clashes. It was not until the summer of 1921 that Britain began to urge restraint upon the Tibetan government.⁵⁶

The Chinese government were, of course, still vitally concerned with the Shantung settlement, and Sze, the Chinese minister, asked Tilley in an interview at the Foreign Office whether China should commence negotiations with the Japanese on this question. But in view of the Tibetan situation Curzon doubted whether the British should be 'hobnobbing' with the Chinese, 'Surely it is time for the cold shoulder'.⁵⁷ Tilley's

reply was more far-sighted for he argued that 'the problem is how to cold shoulder the Chinese without detriment to our interests. In this particular case - Shantung - it is detrimental to our interests that the Japanese should remain in possession ...' He continued by stating that the India Office would not agree to the non-appointment of a British minister to Peking, and Sir Charles Eliot, who was about to take up duties as British ambassador in Tokyo, had urged that Alston should immediately replace Jordan when he left China. Tilley explained that:

'We have compromised by saying Mr Alston will not go till Sir C. Eliot reaches Japan and will come home on leave soon afterwards. In some small matters the Chinese both here and at Peking have been told that Lord Curzon would not be zealous to meet their wishes.'

As the evidence was mounting to support Tilley's contention about the harmful influence of the Japanese occupation of Shantung, it may be judged that the suggested compromise was extremely petty.

In the spring of 1920 China achieved some success in exerting authority in Mongolia and other outlying provinces, and Curzon realised that the upsurge of nationalism made it useless to try to push the Chinese government into negotiations regarding Tibet.⁵⁸ But the Tibetan issue continued to exert its influence until

the eve of the Washington conference, and invariably the results were harmful to Anglo-Chinese relations. It can be argued that Britain's interests in India justified her concern for Tibet, but one must question whether such concern was not magnified by indignation at China's attempts to adopt independent lines of action. Possibly the estrangement in Anglo-Chinese relations caused by the Tibetan issue was a reflection of Britain's attitude to China, and if she had been more sympathetic to China on this matter she would have been more sympathetic over a wider range of issues.

Further Considerations of Policy, Spring and Summer, 1920

Before he left ^{London} ~~Tokyo~~ for ^{Tokyo} ~~London~~, Eliot saw Chinde, ~~designate~~ the Japanese ambassador, and told him that the policy of the British government was to amend the Anglo-Japanese alliance to conform with the League covenant, but that the alliance should be continued. 'This was obviously pleasing to the Japanese.'⁵⁹ Almost at the same time as Eliot's departure, C.H. Bentinck of the far eastern department prepared a draft memorandum explaining how Britain's fundamental interests in China would be influenced by the termination of the alliance, but before he would agree to its acceptance as a Foreign Office memorandum Curzon insisted upon its revision as

he felt that the original draft was too critical of Japan. The accepted memorandum recognised the old dilemma that while the alliance had advantages for Britain they were at the expense of a better understanding with America and China, but its conclusions were that, on balance, Britain should remain a party to the agreement.⁶⁰

The harmful influence of the alliance upon Anglo-American relations was made clear when Sir Auckland Geddes, the British ambassador in Washington, reported that news of its renewal would be a contentious issue in the pending American presidential elections. Geddes felt that both the British and Japanese governments should issue a joint declaration that renewal of the alliance was deferred in order to allow the creation of a League of Nations machinery which would render such agreement superfluous. But this recommendation avoided the question of whether Japan would be satisfied with a general agreement in exchange for losing Britain as a firm ally. Although this was an important issue, Curzon stated that he was against referring it to the cabinet, and it may be noted that Curzon's attitude of favouring the continuation of the alliance hardened against various Foreign Office officials who were sympathetic to its termination.⁶¹ However, a

postponement of the renewal question was achieved when both the British and Japanese governments agreed that as the alliance was not strictly in conformity with the proposed League covenant they were giving the League notice that their agreement would be continued after July, 1921, 'in a form not inconsistent with that Covenant'.⁶²

It had been the intention of the British government to refer the question of the alliance to the Imperial conference proposed for the autumn of 1920, but this event was postponed until July, 1921.⁶³ In the breathing space thus afforded, Victor Wellesley, an assistant secretary, prepared a memorandum in which he agreed with Jordan's well-known dictum that the far eastern problem was Japan's position in China.⁶⁴ Wellesley was critical of Japan's policies and he questioned what would happen if the Chinese rose in revolt against the Japanese and appealed to Britain for help. What would then become of Britain's professed respect for China's integrity? Wellesley saw the difficulties for Britain which were resulting from the mutual American-Japanese antipathy and he emphasised the marked influence which Americans in China ^{were having} / upon Chinese affairs. In such a situation Wellesley favoured a rather vague tripartite American-British-Japanese

'understanding', and it was significant that Wellesley placed a great deal of importance upon a hint from Morris, the American ambassador in Tokyo, that such an understanding might be possible. But in answer to a suggestion that he should have preliminary discussions with Butler Wright, counsellor of the American embassy, Hordinge, who was conscious of Curzon's attitude, replied that Wellesley 'Better wait for the present'.⁶⁵

Early in June the Chinese Foreign Office issued a press communique which contained a historical review of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and its consequences for China. The communique voiced the claim that as China was a member of the League, for she was a signatory to the Austrian treaty, article 10 of the proposed League covenant would preclude a renewal of the alliance on the grounds that China's territorial integrity had to be respected.⁶⁶ Alston believed that much of China's agitation against the alliance embodied a genuine feeling that its renewal would condone Japan's past policy to China. He maintained that American residents in China were inciting anti-Japanese sentiments and their motives were partly explained by American commercial interests being in opposition to the alliance.

In Tokyo Eliot's enthusiasm for the continuation of the alliance had not diminished, and he referred to

the assistance which Japan had rendered the allies during the war.⁶⁷ Eliot ranged over the far eastern situation and argued that Britain would be in a weak position in the east if in a future conflict Japan were on the opposite side. He concluded by arguing that even if Japan were discriminating against British trading interests there was something to be said from the Japanese point of view. Sir Eyre Crowe, permanent assistant under-secretary of state, was of the opinion that Eliot's dispatch carried conviction, but Curzon argued that it was 'a good statement of the case but says little or nothing about China or India'. This was undoubtedly an accurate reflection, for Eliot seemed oblivious of China's existence.

As the summer progressed Alston, the newly appointed British minister at Peking, emerged as one of the most active opponents of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and greater concern for China became one of his principal guide lines. It is interesting to note that when Alston was serving in the Foreign Office in 1915, and the first four groups of Japan's famous twenty-one demands became known, his reactions were that the Japanese 'were moving to assert exclusive control over China but the opportunity was provided for discussing matters in a friendly fashion and perhaps reaching

some basis for future co-operation'. Shortly afterwards Alston prepared a memorandum which recognised:

'that Japan was bound to receive some compensation for her war efforts but Britain must act cautiously, "All that we can do is to hedge her off into channels where British interests are least affected, and endeavour to prevent her closing those channels altogether". Alston warned that American opinion could be alienated by Japan's action and this might recoil on Britain.' 68

Alston's attitude towards Japan began to harden shortly afterwards, but he had remained in favour of the continuation of the alliance.

Within a few months of his arrival in Peking, however, Alston's attacks upon Japan became harsher, and he argued that 'The only way to regain the confidence of the Chinese and the rest of the world is to lay the axe at the root of the present policy of Japan in China which is deep rooted in the great injustice of the 21 Demands of 1915.'⁶⁹ Alston gave considerable details of Japan's advances into China and the unfair practices in which Japan had indulged, and stated that a basic question was whether Britain was to recognise these advances or insist upon a return to something like the pre-1914 situation. The alliance, Alston claimed, had failed to protect China from the aggression of one of the parties to it, and one-sided commercial agreements

in favour of Japan had been concluded at China's expense. It was true that it was difficult to accord concessions to China owing to her internal chaos, but Alston queried how far China's disorders could be attributed to the intrigues of Japan.

During the summer of 1920 Alston visited the United States, and while in Washington he dined with R.S. Morris, the American ambassador to Japan, and B. Colby, who had replaced Lansing as the American secretary of state, and Alston emphasised the need for a close Anglo-Saxon policy for the far east.⁷⁰ Morris agreed and stated that he would do all within his power to work for such a policy. Alston also saw J. MacMurray, head of the American far eastern bureau, and both men agreed that the policies of their respective countries had become discredited in recent years. American discredit had resulted from the unfulfilled hopes which her statesmen had aroused regarding aid for China, while Britain's discredit had arisen from her war time commitments which had bound her to support Japan. Alston concluded his report by stating that the United States was incensed at a Japanese proposal to occupy the northern part of Sakhalin, a Russian-held island off the east coast of Asia, as Japan eventually did in the autumn of 1920 after a massacre of Japanese soldiers and

civilians at Nikolaievsk.⁷¹

While Alston was in America a parliamentary question asked whether Japan was not taking advantage of the military situation in China to discriminate against foreign commercial interests and thereby undermine the 'open door' policy. In considering what reply should be delivered Bentinck ^{of the far eastern department} agreed that Japan had violated the principle of equal opportunities for trade in China which was specified in the preamble of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In such circumstances, Bentinck argued, a non-committal reply 'would be a good thing', and Wellesley agreed.⁷² The reply which was delivered stated that if and when negotiations for the renewal of the alliance began the points which the questioner had raised would be ^{before} ~~in~~ ^{some} ~~the~~ ^{mind}. This reply must have been considered as at least a minor affront to the Japanese government, but it is questionable whether it was sufficiently strong to be an encouragement to the Chinese.

When Alston returned to China from America he denied that he was anti-Japanese, but he continued his comments by making some sharp remarks about Japan's policies in China.⁷³ He criticised the United States for having been flabby and uncertain, but Alston placed all hopes for the future peace of the far east upon

Anglo-American cooperation. Within the Foreign Office, however, there were doubts concerning the suggested Anglo-American policy, and Crowe, permanent under-secretary of state, tersely commented that he wished he could share Alston's 'robust faith in American cooperation in China or elsewhere'. Ashton-Gwatkin argued that Japan would never consent to give up her position in south Manchuria and the Liaotung peninsula and to do so was like asking Britain to give up Hong Kong. Bentinck maintained that Britain could not get Japan to revert to the pre-1915 situation and this had been stated publicly, but Bentinck felt that to ease the situation the restoration of Wei-hei Wei to China should be considered. If an international agreement concerning China were thought possible, Bentinck believed that China should be consulted but she 'should not be invited to become a party unless and until America has become one'.⁷⁵

Alston's visit to the United States aroused speculation concerning what the American and British governments were planning in reference to Japan. An article appeared in 'The Times', and a question was put down in the house of commons.⁷⁶ Bentinck argued that nothing should be said to arouse Japan's suspicions that any change of policy was contemplated, and the parliamentary

reply merely confirmed that Alston had met members of the American government. Japanese suspicions were, however, aroused, and Negai, the Japanese chargé, questioned Bontinck in an interview at the Foreign Office. In reply to enquiries concerning policy, Bontinck replied that the British government 'had not lost sight of the fact that we were allies of Japan', and that both countries were vitally interested in all matters affecting the far east.⁷⁷ He continued by praising the Anglo-Japanese consultations which had taken place regarding Japan's actions in Siberia and 'I told him the American press had issued greatly exaggerated reports about Sir Beilby Alston's visit to Washington ... Mr Negai appeared to be satisfied ...'

Almost a week earlier Hardinge, the permanent under-secretary of state, had informed Chinda, the Japanese ambassador in London, that the United States had invited Britain to make joint representations in protest against Japan's actions in Sakhalin, but that Britain had declined to do so. Not unnaturally, Chinda thanked Hardinge warmly.⁷⁸ But Alston had already informed the foreign secretary of the American dislike of the Japanese proposals concerning Sakhalin,⁷⁹ and therefore Hardinge's remarks to Chinda were scarcely helpful to Anglo-American relations. With Japan's actions in China becoming more

menacing to Britain's interests one may argue that Alston's efforts to improve cooperation with the United States should have received better support. If Alston's actions were contrary to the aims of the British government it is difficult to see why he was not rebuked, and one must conclude that the situation whereby Alston could pursue one line of policy while Hardinge pursued another reflects some of the uncertainties in British thinking concerning how Japan could be retained as an ally, but her actions be restricted. This dilemma is apparent in the reasoning of Bentinck, who was a supporter of the Anglo-Japanese alliance but believed that 'We must be careful that the wording of the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty does not in any way appear to sanction Japan's temporary position in Tsingtao and Shantung'.⁸⁰

In mid-August the Japanese government finally replied to Curzon's note of December, 1919, which had complained of discrimination against British commercial interests, but the Japanese reply was considered unsatisfactory. H. Fox of the Department of Overseas Trade argued that because the Japanese had no answer to Curzon's charges they were compelled to resort to generalities about their policies which were divorced from practice.⁸¹ In a further report J. Pratt, the

consul general at Tsinan, referred to his dispatch of January, 1919, and then described the continued expansion of Japanese interests in Shantung, the wide degree of drug peddling, and the increase of economic discrimination against Britain. Pratt enclosed a report from H.A. Archer, vice-consul at Tsingtao, which gave a most detailed account of Japan's discriminatory actions.⁸²

As the summer drew to its close Jordan, the former minister at Peking, and Wellesley of the far eastern department, wrote separate memoranda urging the drastic modification of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Jordan argued that:

'The independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity ... are in a far more unstable and unsatisfactory state today than they were some twenty years ago ... and it would not be difficult to show that the alliance has been largely responsible for this result.'⁸³

While Jordan agreed with the need for greater cooperation with the United States he doubted whether the Americans would agree. In the circumstances Jordan felt that the British government should send identical notes to the United States and Japan stating the problems arising from American-Japanese mutual antipathy and urging the need for an Anglo-American-Japanese agreement.

Wellesley advocated that Britain's main line of action should be direct negotiations with Japan when the British government should seek the drastic revision of article 156 of the peace treaty which transferred former German rights in Shantung to Japan.⁸⁴ Even if such a policy were unsuccessful, Wellesley argued, it would be evidence of Britain's desire to redress the wrongs resulting from the actions in which Britain had been bound and would help to restore Britain's reputation for justice.

In such a complex situation it was hardly surprising that Curzon, the foreign secretary, should announce the setting-up of a special committee to consider the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and it was somewhat significant that he should follow such an announcement by asking for examples of Japanese perfidity.⁸⁵

Britain, China and the League of Nations

The continued unsatisfactory attitude of Japan towards British commercial interests and China necessitated the making of statements which reflected publicly upon British policy in the far east. For example, a petition addressed to Lord Curzon from the Association of British Chambers of Commerce in China and Hong Kong protesting at Japanese discrimination, received a reply

that the matters raised would receive 'due consideration'.⁸⁶ Hence, it is fairly clear that the British government was hesitant, but a further protest at Japanese actions achieved a more serious consideration of British policy, although no public statement resulted.

This additional protest was made by E.C. Little, a missionary in China, who sent Lloyd George a memorandum which contained harrowing details of Japanese actions such as the unnecessary occupation of Chinese territory, ill-treatment of Chinese peasants, the use of Chinese and Japanese criminals to intimidate law abiding citizens, forced loans, heavy taxation, and many other irregularities.⁸⁷ Miles Lampson of the far eastern department considered that although the memorandum contained exaggerations it had confirmed what had already been known about Japan's actions. He recommended that the Foreign Office should publish the memorandum as a confidential print and this was done. Wellesley, an assistant secretary, believed that the report was basically accurate and he compared the Japanese behaviour with the Congo and Put Mayo atrocities. However, a more cautious approach was urged by Eyre Crowe, who argued that Britain should not be held responsible for any Japanese abuses because of the alliance. He

maintained that the pre-war agreements which France and Germany had with Russia in no way involved these countries in any responsibilities for the Siberian convict system. Curzon, the foreign secretary, asked to be supplied with copies of all the relevant papers, and somewhat significantly he made the point that Balfour, 'who is very much concerned at our apparent partiality to the Chinese case in Shantung', might like to see the memorandum sent by Little.

Balfour was in Geneva leading the British delegation to the first assembly of the League of Nations which convened in December, 1920. As the assembly approached, it was necessary to give consideration to what support should be accorded to China should she raise her complaints against Japan concerning Shantung. The Chinese minister for foreign affairs was reported as saying that as England, France and Italy were already pledged to support Japan at Geneva, China's case was hopeless, but most of the officials at the Foreign Office denied the existence of any such pledge. Nevertheless the situation was delicate for, as C.J.B. Hurst, a legal adviser, argued, Britain could hardly support Japan on the issue of Shantung at the peace conference and then oppose her on the same matter so shortly afterwards.⁸⁸ Hurst thought that it would be

wiser to oppose Japan on the grounds that Japan had continued to make difficulties for the British dominions to obtain possession of former German islands and thus had failed to honour her obligations to the peace treaty. Bentinck, a member of the far east department, was of the opinion that no pledge had been given to support Japan before the League, and while he thought that it was not conclusive that Britain could only oppose Japan because she had not kept her part of the peace treaty bargain, he felt that the points raised by Hurst should be kept in mind. F. Ashton-Gwatkin, a first secretary, argued that Article 20 of the League covenant precluded the possibility of such a pledge to Japan and he thought that the Chinese minister was fishing for an indication of Britain's attitude. As a result a reply was sent to Clive stating that although the British government were pledged to support Japan's claims regarding Shantung at the Peace conference they were under no such obligations before the League.

China continued to press for an indication of the British attitude and interviews took place in both Peking and London. When Clive, the counsellor of the embassy at Peking, reported that he had been questioned further, Miles Lampson argued that the matter was complicated and owing to her past policies Britain

was not a free agent. Lampson stated that Chinese passions were aroused to a white heat over Shantung and that it would be unwise to ~~take~~ risking a boycott of British goods and incurring further Chinese disapproval if China raised the Shantung issue at Geneva. 'Even admitting that our action of 1917 was dictated by military necessity, ... it has certainly redounded to our national discredit.'⁸⁹ Wellesley made a strong case against Japan and in unequivocal terms he condemned the Shantung settlement as 'a grave injustice to China'. He argued that the restitution of sovereign rights without economic rights was a mere euphemism, and concluded by saying that while Britain had endeavoured to eradicate irredentism from Europe she had sown its seeds in Asia on an almost unprecedented scale. A rather cryptic comment from Curzon stated that he had met the problems before, and 'I was the only person in Cabinet who opposed the decision of Feb. 1917 which was strongly urged by Mr Balfour'.

Sze, the Chinese minister in London, called upon Ayre Crowe and stated that the Chinese government recognised that Britain had been compelled to support Japan's claims at the peace conference. However, China thought that such obligations should not impede Britain's

choice of action at Geneva, but Crowe gave an evasive reply.⁹⁰ As a result of the representations and deliberations instructions were sent to the British delegation in Geneva that are such a reflection upon British policy that they deserve a full quotation,

'After reviewing all the circumstances and having regard to scant consideration given to China's case at Versailles in 1919, it will be justifiable to claim liberty of action should the question come up for discussion before the League. You should be careful therefore to avoid any action which might be construed as committing us to support of any arguments Japan may now adduce.

'Our pledge to Japan in 1917 and action at Versailles in 1919 as they were dictated by necessity have undoubtedly affected British prestige in China very adversely. We must avoid any action calculated to prevent China from at least obtaining the fair hearing before the League to which she is in equity entitled.'

The instructions were initialed by both Curzon and Crowe and were therefore made with high British authority.

However, if British actions in 1917 and 1919 were dictated by the necessity of honouring treaty obligations to Japan it is difficult to understand why Britain had treated China so coldly during the peace settlement negotiations. On a number of occasions Britain had refused China's requests for interviews,

consultations with Chinese representatives had been comparatively rare, and Britain had failed to make any concessions to China regarding her commercial, territorial, and extraterritorial rights. Such actions were not dictated by Japan but had resulted from assessments that in the existing situation in China it was in Britain's main interests to adopt such tactics. One may judge that Curzon was trying to blame Japan too much for the shortcomings of British policy, and it must be stressed that although Curzon was advocating a fair hearing for China, he was not arguing for a reversal of the Shantung settlement which had been demanded by China.

Hardly surprisingly Curzon's instructions brought a marked reaction from Hankey and Balfour who were both in Geneva. Hankey, who had played a leading role in the Shantung settlement of April, 1919, strongly denied that scant consideration was given to the Chinese case at Versailles. On the contrary, he stressed the point that there were several meetings at which Chinese and Japanese delegates were heard at great length.⁹¹

Balfour was very indignant, and he argued that Curzon's instructions suggested that any modification in the Shantung settlement must take the form of throwing over the Japanese and withdrawing from the position Britain

had adopted in 1917 when Japan's assistance was considered vital.⁹² Balfour stated that he was at a loss as to how such a reversal of policy could be justified for even if Britain's prestige had declined in China since 1917, such a reversal of policy could only be followed by a decline in prestige in Japan. He did not agree that only scant consideration was given to the Chinese case at Versailles and he then went on to ask for 'any arrangements made in Paris in 1919 which are not contained in the printed treaty ...' He also asked for any information with regard to the misuse which Japan had made of her treaty rights.

The fact that these questions were put must be judged extraordinary for on the first query Balfour had been a leading party to the supplementary April agreement concerning Shantung which was often referred to as the 'Balfour settlement' that was purposely not written into the treaty of Versailles. In a conversation with the Chinese delegate Wellington Koo, Balfour himself had specifically referred to the exclusion of the supplementary settlement from the printed treaty.⁹³ Throughout the peace treaty negotiations Balfour had been in Paris as a leading British delegate while he retained the office of foreign secretary. Therefore, if there had been any arrangement as suggested by Balfour

a most peculiar constitutional development would have been revealed. It is true that Balfour had ceased to be Foreign secretary in October, 1919, but he became Lord President of the Council shortly afterwards, and for him to go to Geneva to lead the British delegation unaware of the growing evidence of Japan's activities in China must also be considered strange.

Lampson made a detailed case against Balfour's arguments.⁹⁴ He stated that it was essential that Britain's actions at Geneva should not be prejudiced by any past agreement with Japan, and if the Shantung issue were raised the British delegation should be sympathetic to any proposals which the Chinese delegates might make which could lead to a settlement rather than take sides in an argument. It was possible that Japan would strive to prevent China from gaining a hearing, but there should be no action on the part of the British delegation to support such an exclusion. Upon the point concerning Japan's past record in China, Lampson was somewhat scathing and he attached a number of memoranda and reports with the comment that, 'If Mr Balfour could afford the time to read these documents, they may perhaps afford him the material he desires.'

It was admitted by Lampson that Balfour was in a very strong position to judge whether China's case had

received scant consideration in Paris. Nevertheless, Lempson argued that, 'there is a strong opinion in many well-informed circles that China's arguments did not [Lempson's emphasis] receive the consideration they deserved at the hands of the Council of Four; on the facts, China's arguments certainly seem strong.'

Wellesley argued that whatever the legal strength of China's case was it could not be gainsaid that Britain liquidated her debt to Japan in Chinese currency. He continued by stating that Britain was faced with the evils of either breaking faith with Japan, or China, and that each alternative was undesirable. Nevertheless, as the bargain with Japan should never have been made, Wellesley favoured reaching agreement with China.⁹⁵ Eyre Crowe agreed in substance with Lempson that fresh attempts should be made to start Sino-Japanese negotiations, and Crowe made the point that Japan should be encouraged to see that she had more to gain from reaching an agreement with China ~~than~~ *from* insisting upon her treaty rights. However, if there were a clash between the two countries Crowe thought that Britain had to redeem her pledge to Japan, but that Britain might use the renewal of the Anglo-alliance as a weapon to induce Japan to modify her demands.

To these lengthy deliberations Curzon made one of his well known blue pencilled comments, 'I am still not quite clear what papers it is proposed to send to Mr Balfour. I am afraid that it is useless to unload a heavy batch upon him.'⁹⁶

When the League Assembly finally met, Wellington Koo, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, stated that although he was not going to raise issues concerning China immediately he would do so at a more appropriate time.⁹⁷ Hence, it may be judged that all the arguments concerning the assembly were but a storm in a Chinese tea-cup. But the exchanges must be judged important for revealing the division of opinions among both Foreign Office officials and between Curzon and Balfour. Obviously, by the autumn of 1920 most had had second thoughts upon the justice of the Shantung settlement of 1919 and that China had been treated rather shabbily. However, with the close of 1920 there was no clear way forward envisaged whereby Britain could modify her policy to China while remaining friends with Japan and the United States.

1. For details of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1911 see Lowe, pp. 49-50. If the alliance were to be terminated by 1921, either country had to serve notice by 13 July, 1920. Otherwise the agreement would remain in force subject to 12 months' notice of termination. But if either country were involved in a war the alliance would remain binding until the end of such hostilities. See article VI, Ibid., p. 50.
2. See p. 168-75 above.
3. Jordan to Curzon, 14-10-1919 D.B.F.P.I (VI), pp. 777-9.
4. For a review of Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1920s see Foreign Office memorandum, 8-1-1930, D.B.F.P.II (VIII) pp. 1-26.
5. These events took place in the spring of 1920, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, II, p. 312.
6. Id Chien-nung, pp. 393-7.
7. Jordan's report of a tour which he made to the main Yangtse ports and the three political centres north of the river, 22-11-1919, D.B.F.P.I (VI) pp. 847-56. Only R.H. Clive, of the far eastern department commented upon Jordan's report, when he agreed with Jordan's assessment of the influence of Shantung, 16-1-1920 F.O. 371/3696 [170011].
8. Ibid., pp. 848-9.
9. Ibid., pp. 849-50.
10. Fraser to Jordan, 19-1-1920 F.O. 405/208 [p. XXXIX].
11. Jordan to Fraser, 23-1-1920 F.O. 405/208 [p. xli].
12. For a description of the problems of Shanghai see Lampson to Foreign Office, 7-6-1929, D.B.F.P.II (VIII) pp. 68-81.
13. Jordan to Curzon, 29-10-1929, F.O. 371/3696 [164864].
14. See p. 214-18 above.

15. Curzon to Alston, 1-9-1919, F.O. 371/3691 [123925].
16. Davis (U.S. ambassador in London) to Secretary of State, 15-8-1919, F.R.U.S.I., 1919, pp. 476-8.
17. Reinsch to Secretary of State, 7-9-1919, Ibid., pp. 483-4.
18. Record by Macleay of a conversation with de Fleuriau, 29-9-1919, D.B.F.P.I(VI) p. 737. Lansing to Davis, 11-10-1919, F.R.U.S.I., 1919, p. 495.
19. Alston to Curzon, 8-10-1919, Tilley's minute 13-10-1919, F.O. 371/3691 [140187].
20. Lansing to Morris (U.S. ambassador in Tokyo) 6-11-1919, F.R.U.S.I., 1919, p. 500.
21. British embassy to Department of State, 29-10-1919, Ibid., p. 499.
22. Curzon to Grey, who was H.M. Ambassador Extraordinary, 25-10-1919, D.B.F.P.I(VI), pp. 801-2.
23. Record of conversation between MaxMuller and Nagai, Japanese counsellor, 1-11-1919, D.B.F.P.I (VI) p. 815.
24. Jordan to Curzon, 24-1-1920, D.B.F.P.I (VI) p. 966.
25. Alston to Curzon, 31-10-1919, Minutes by Clive and MaxMuller, 4-11-1919, F.O. 371/3691 [148222].
26. J.J. Abbott, vice-president of the Continental and Commercial Trust and Savings Bank of Chicago, to J. MacMurray, chief of the American for eastern department, 30-10-1919, F.R.U.S.I., 1919, pp. 530-2.
27. Curzon to Grey, 6-11-1919, MaxMuller's minute, 3-11-1919, F.O. 371/3691 [147970].
28. Lansing to Davis, 11-10-1919) F.R.U.S. pp. 493-7.
U.S. memorandum to Japan, 28-10-1919) I., 1919 pp. 497-9.
Grey to Curzon, 13-11-1919, F.O. 371/3691 [151684].
29. Curzon to Alston, 20-11-1919, D.B.F.P.I (VI), pp. 839-43.

30. Jordan to Curzon, 4-12-1919, F.O. 371/3692 [177332].
31. Alston to Curzon, 18-12-1919, MaxMuller's minute, 20-12-1919, F.O. 371/3692 [163321].
32. Jordan to Curzon, 9-1-1920, D.B.F.P.I (VI) pp. 925-6.
33. Jordan to Curzon, 12-2-1920, F.O. 371/3692 [178796]; Curzon to Jordan, 16-2-1920, F.O. 371/3692, [179980].
34. Minute by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, 19-2-1920, F.O. 371/3692 [179830].
35. For Morrison's views on Japan see Pearl, pp. 331-2.
36. Hardinge to Alston, 21-4-1920, D.B.F.P.I (XIV) p. 12.
37. Memorandum from Japanese embassy (Washington) to Department of State, 8-5-1920, F.R.U.S.I, 1920, pp. 539-41.
38. Clive (counsellor at embassy, Peking) to Curzon, D.B.F.P.I(XVI), pp. 143-4; Curzon to Clive, 19-11-1920, ibid., p. 179.
39. Survey of International Affairs, 1920-3, p. 451.
40. See footnote 29 above.
41. Alston to Tilley, 7-10-1919, D.B.F.P.I (VI), pp. 761-9.
42. Ibid., pp. 765-9.
43. Report of Brigadier-General Woodroffe, military attache at British embassy, Tokyo, 5-10-1919, D.B.F.P.I (VI), pp. 772-5.
44. 'Japanese Policy at Tsingtao, Precis of certain Reports', 25-11-1919, Curzon's minute, 27-11-1919. Memorandum was drawn up by MaxMuller, 8-12-1919, F.O. 371/3696 [160794].
45. British memorandum, 13-12-1919, Ibid.

46. Alston to Curzon, 14-12-1919. Herdinger approved Alston's language and said Curzon could take up the issues with the Japanese ambassador, 17-12-1919, F.O. 371/3696 [161981].
47. Curzon to Alston, 30-12-1919, F.O. 371/3696 [166554].
48. Jordan to Curzon, 13-1-1920, D.B.F.P.I. (VI), pp. 933-5.
49. Letter from Tilley to Alston, 11-12-1919, D.B.F.P.I. (VI), p. 880.
50. Jordan to Curzon, 23-10-1919, F.O. 371/3689 [146345].
51. Curzon's minute (N.D.), Ibid.
52. Curzon to Jordan, 26-11-1919, F.O. 371/3689 [156077].
53. Jordan to Curzon, 4-12-1919, F.O. 371/3689 [159391].
54. Note from Chinese minister to Curzon, 6-12-1919. Minutes by Tilley, Herdinger and Curzon, 6-12-1919, F.O. 371/3689 [160537].
55. Curzon to Jordan, 1-8-1919, D.B.F.P.I (VI), pp. 654-6. See footnote 1, p. 654.
56. See pp. 307-9 below.
57. Record of conversation between Tilley and Sze, 3-2-1920. Curzon's minute, 5-2-1920. Tilley's minute, 6-2-1920, D.B.F.P.I (VI), pp. 976-7.
58. Foreign Office letter to India Office, 9-4-1920, D.B.F.P.I (XIV), pp. 4-5.
59. I.H. Nish, 'Japan and the ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance', contained in Studies in International History, eds. K. Bourne and D.C. Watt (London), 1967), p. 372.
60. Foreign Office Memorandum, 28-2-1920. Curzon's minute insisting on amendments, 8-3-1920, but date of memorandum remained unchanged. F.O. 371/5358 [199].

61. Geddes to Curzon, 30-4-1920, Curzon's minute, 29-5-1920, F.O. 371/5359 [329].
62. Eliot to Curzon, 8-6-1920, F.O. 371/5359 [1062].
63. Curzon to Eliot, 25-7-1920, D.B.F.P.I (XIV), pp. 74-5.
64. Memorandum by Wellesley, 1-8-1920, D.B.F.P.I (XIV), pp. 32-6.
65. Hardinge's minute (N.D.) ibid., p. 36.
66. Alston to Curzon, 8-6-1920, F.O. 371/5360 [1884]. See also article in Chinese newspaper 'Wei I Jih Pao', 12-6-1920, D.B.F.P.I (XIV), pp. 54-6.
67. Eliot to Curzon, 17-6-1920. Minutes by Crowe, 31-7-1920 and Curzon 1-8-1920, F.O. 371/5360 [1559].
68. Lowe, pp. 229-30.
69. Memorandum by Alston, July, 1920, F.O. 371/5360 [1783].
70. Alston to Curzon, 1-8-1920, F.O. 371/5312 [1740].
71. Survey of International Affairs, 1920-23, p. 441.
72. Bentinck's minute, 24-7-1920; parliamentary reply, 29-7-1920, F.O. 371/5360 [1671].
73. Memorandum by Alston, 1-8-1920, D.B.F.P.I (XIV) pp. 81-6.
74. Crowe's minute, 9-8-1920, ibid., p. 86.
75. Ashton-Gwatkin's minute, 20-8-1920; Bentinck's minute, 17-8-1920. F.O. 371/5360 [1783].
76. 'Times', 30-7-1920; Bentinck's minute 6-8-1920; parliamentary reply 10-8-1920, F.O. 371/5312 [1797].
77. Memorandum by Bentinck, 24-8-1920, F.O. 371/5312 [1957].
78. Record by Hardinge, 18-8-1920, D.B.F.P.I (XIV) p. 95.

79. See pp. 275-6 above.
80. Bentinck's comments on a pamphlet, The Problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 31-8-1920, F.O. 371/5360 [1812/].
81. Memorandum communicated by Japanese ambassador, 18-8-1920, D.B.F.P.I (XIV), pp. 98-103.
82. Pratt to Clive, counsellor of embassy,eking, 4-9-1920; Archer's report, 30-8-1920, F.O. 371/5321 [2646/].
83. Memorandum by Jordan, 24-8-1920, F.O. 371/5360 [2677/].
84. Memorandum by Wellesley, 1-9-1920, D.B.F.F.I (XIV), pp. 106-11.
85. Curzon to Eliot, 21-10-1920, D.B.F.F.I (XIV), pp. 158-9; Curzon to Clive, 23-10-1920, ibid., p. 162.
86. Minute by Bentinck, 7-9-1920, F.O. 371/5360 [1884/].
87. Little to Lloyd George, 22-10-1920; Minutes by Lempson, 4-11-1920, Wellesley, 25-11-1920, Crowe and Curzon, 29-11-1920, F.O. 371/5321 [2518/].
88. Minute by Hurst, 14-9-1920; Bentinck's minute, 15-9-1920; Ashton-Gwatkin's minute, 14-9-1920, F.O. 371/5321 [2087/].
89. Clive to Curzon, 2-11-1920; Minutes by Lempson, Wellesley and Curzon, 10-11-1920, F.O. 371/5321 [2697/].
90. Minute by Crowe, 12-11-1920; Curzon and Crowe's instructions, 24-11-1920, F.O. 371/5321 [2823/].
91. Hankey to Crowe, 27-11-1920, F.O. 371/5321 [2947/].
92. Belfour to Hankey, 26-11-1920, ibid.
93. See p. 209 above.

94. Minute by Lampson, 1-12-1920, F.O. 371/5321,
[2947].
95. Minute by Wellesley, 3-12-1920, ibid.
96. Minutes by Crowe and Carzon, 3-12-1920, ibid.
97. Statement by Koo, 18-12-1920, F.O. 405/230,
p. 43.

CHAPTER VIIITHE APPROACH OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, JANUARY -
OCTOBER, 1921

The Shantung question had lain dormant for nearly the whole of 1920, but in 1921 it again became an important issue, especially when proposals were accepted by nine powers for an international conference on far eastern affairs and naval disarmament to be held at Washington at the end of the year. Undoubtedly Britain's far eastern policies were concerned mainly with the Anglo-Japanese alliance and naval strategy, but as the Washington conference drew near the question of Shantung had a marked influence upon Britain's far eastern relations and largely determined her policy to China.

It has been noted that at the first session of the League of Nations in December, 1920, Dr Wellington Koo, the Chinese delegate, stated that he would not press his country's claims regarding Shantung on that occasion but added, 'We do not waive any right to which we may be entitled.'¹ Possibly Koo's statement at Geneva had an influence upon the Japanese government, for early in 1921 Baron Hayashi, the Japanese ambassador to Britain, gave an interview to the London 'Evening

Standard' in which he denied that Japan was seeking to retain the province. He stated that:

'The Chinese Government was requested nearly a year ago to make arrangements to commence the necessary formalities for receiving back the Shantung territory, but unfortunately nothing has been done; so that, although the Japanese Government maintains its firm intention to restore this territory, it is not its fault that no progress has been made.'

Hayashi continued by stating that it was Japan's policy to support the 'open-door' in China and the international financial consortium,² and naturally such an interview was noted by the Foreign Office.

Throughout 1921, Japan was determined to negotiate directly with China regarding Shantung free from interference from third parties, and this influenced the organisation of the Washington conference. But at the beginning of the year there were still expectations that the League would provide the setting for resolving China's claims, and this was clearly in the mind of Alston, the British minister in Peking, when he reported upon the current attitudes in China.³ Alston stated that it was clear that China was not prepared to abolish her established policy of playing one foreign power off against another, and that this was particularly resented

by the British government '... in view of the long record of practical work done by British subjects and capital in China to the mutual benefit of both countries'. The minister then referred to various manifestations of Chinese mistrust of Britain, and to China's breaking off negotiations regarding Tibet. But Whitehall replied that Britain 'had no intention of restricting the liberty of action of the British delegates to the League of Nations in the event of the Shantung issue being raised by the Chinese Government, in order to ensure China's obtaining at least a fair hearing ...' China, however, was determined to obtain far more than a fair hearing to her claims for the restoration of Shantung.

Japan's occupation of Shantung raised two issues for Britain, namely, the influence which such occupation had upon British interests, especially in Tsingtao, and of much greater importance, its influence upon international relations. Complaints against Japanese discrimination regarding British shipping prompted Ashton-Gwatkin, a second secretary at the Foreign Office, to argue that the Japanese were 'organically unfitted to administer any country under an "Open Door" system, owing to the "very different conceptions of the functions of Government" entertained by them'.⁴

In the summer of 1921, Lempson, a member of the far eastern department, criticised the Japanese, saying, 'they have shown both inefficiency and discrimination in their administration of Tsingtao, but that was only what we knew from experience would happen'.⁵

Consideration of Japan's administration of Shantung led to considerations of her intentions concerning the future ownership of the province. In February, George S. Moss, a vice-consul in Tsingtao home on leave, submitted a memorandum which Lempson summarised as follows:

"The Japanese do not mean to clear out of Shantung where they have so consolidated their position that they are to all intents and purposes planted there for good. He is clear, however, that the only true solution of the problem is the evacuation of the Japanese garrison, and the abolition of both their military and civil administrations. In their place, he advocates the establishment of one single international concession under proper international municipal Government."

Lempson did not agree with Moss that Britain would do well to negotiate for a settlement between China and Japan, and thought:

'We should get all the kicks and none of the half-pence from both sides. The right policy for us to follow is to wait upon events, which is possibly unoriginal, but is certainly sound in a matter where national sentiment on

both sides is involved and where our previous record is against us.' 6

Lampson continued by referring to Moss's idea that Wei-hai Wei should be surrendered by Britain as an inducement to Japan to do likewise to Tsingtao. But '... it is not evident why Great Britain should buy China a satisfactory settlement of the Shantung question at the price of the return of Wei-hai Wei.'

Jordan, the British ex-minister to Peking, also opposed the ideas of Moss and thought that any attempt on the part of Britain to re-open the Shantung question would only arouse Chinese resentment. Jordan noted that Japan was enjoying ex-German rights in Shantung, much to China's annoyance:

'We shared the responsibility for the Shantung settlement with the United States and other Powers and I see no reason why we should go out of our way to court further odium by entering upon independent negotiations. If the Paris decision needs revision, as it certainly seems to do, the revision should be undertaken either by all the Powers who were parties to it, or by Japan and China negotiating directly.'

Jordan concluded by saying that it was possible that Wellington Koo's transfer as Chinese minister to Britain was to facilitate arrangements for direct negotiations with Baron Heyashi, but it was doubtful if Chinese public opinion would allow such developments

Wellesley, an assistant secretary at the Foreign Office, agreed with Jordan's conclusions.

A further report upon Japanese administration, written by A. Archer, the vice-consul in Tsingtao, was not received in the Foreign Office until May,⁷ and ^{B.C.} Newton, a member of the far eastern department came to the conclusion that Archer's report indicated that an early settlement of the Tsingtao question was not anticipated by the Japanese. Wellesley expressed the hope 'that the Americans will take up the Shantung question shortly'. Wishes that America would exert diplomatic pressure concerning Shantung were to be repeated by Wellesley and other officials several times during 1921, and it stemmed from a belief that because Britain had backed Japan at Paris this limited her own range of action, for British policy could not be reversed so quickly.⁸

Thus, in the first part of 1921 both Britain and Japan were considering the Shantung question again, and there can be no doubt that if China had been united she could have exerted a marked influence upon the situation. But extreme disorders in China's internal affairs continued, and as a result the contemptuous attitude of the powers towards her persisted. Yet behind a most complex situation created by the

innumerable wars of the provincial leaders there were political movements, such as federalism, which indicated the potential strength of Chinese nationalism and possible independence from foreign loans.⁹

All efforts to establish unity within China broke down, and in July warfare recommenced between the Anhwei and Chihli factions over the right to control the province of Hupeh.¹⁰ There were also marked divisions in south China, and early in the year a Cantonese request for a share of the revenues of the Maritime Customs Union was curtly refused.¹¹ Britain was hostile to Canton, and Alston argued that there was no justification for a separate government in the south. He reported that he was using his influence with the representatives of the powers to induce them to work for the re-unification of China by supporting the parliamentary reforms proposed by the Peking government.¹² Later in the year southern threats to obtain a share of the customs revenues by force were met with British proposals for the international use of gun-boat tactics.¹³

In the winter of 1920-1921 China's internal disorders led to a clash with Japan when Chinese bandits on the borders of Korea launched a series of attacks

upon Japanese property, and burnt down the Japanese consulate at Hunchun.¹⁴ This brought sharp retaliation from Japanese troops, and the subsequent Sino-Japanese negotiations to settle the dispute lasted for six months. E. Teichmen, second secretary at the British legation in Peking, recognised that the Japanese troops had behaved very badly, but maintained that the Japanese had to protect their nationals, and he placed most of the blame for the dispute upon the Chinese, 'Were a British Consulate to be burned by bandits, with Chinese troops standing idly by, we should land bluejackets, etc.'¹⁵

Teichmen's arguments were no doubt justified from the viewpoint of British interests but, as with Alston's failure to see the need for a southern Chinese government, they did not take account of the growing strength of Chinese nationalism, and no doubt Britain antagonised Chinese nationalism when she sought to influence China's internal affairs by insisting upon certain conditions before agreeing to financial loans. At the beginning of 1921, consideration was given to ~~was~~^{using} a loan agreement as a means to secure the disbandment of a number of Chinese troops, but the proposals were opposed by Lempson on the grounds that they were impracticable and the suggestion was dropped.¹⁶

Tibetan considerations

In the post-war period, Anglo-Chinese relations had suffered particularly from the differences arising from the Tibetan question. For most of the period the Tibetan authorities were prepared to allow Britain to take the initiative in relations with China, but in the late spring of 1921 there were signs that the Tibetans were about to act independently and attack the Chinese troops on Tibetan soil. The position was delicate for although Britain recognised China's suzerainty over Tibet, Britain did not want to see a large scale movement of Chinese troops into that country. Hence, when the Tibetans threatened unilateral military action, Wellesley asked the India Office to counsel moderation upon the Tibetan government, urging them to remain on the defensive.¹⁷ Tibetan military action could easily have inflamed the situation and thereby worsened Anglo-Chinese relations.

Owing to the failure to obtain an Anglo-Chinese agreement concerning Tibet, for which Britain blamed China, Teichman argued for a more active British policy, especially since Tibetan impatience was growing. Teichman declared that '... we should make friends openly and definitely with the Tibetans ... if necessarily independently of the Chinese ...'¹⁸ Shortly afterwards

Teichman also argued that the exporting of arms to Tibet should be allowed and he claimed that Tibet was de facto an independent country and therefore outside the scope of the arms embargo against China. He was aware of the dangers of Chinese reactions, but he thought that a boycott of British goods could be avoided if Britain proceeded tactfully. Of course, Teichman's influence as a second secretary was limited, but his views assumed much greater importance when Curzon, the foreign secretary, stated, 'I have all along held this view and have never sympathised with F.O. objections which I am glad to see are at last beginning to thaw.'¹⁹ However, Curzon's attitude towards China in relation to Tibet was almost certainly too touchy.

During the summer the Tibetan question played little part in Anglo-Chinese relations, but at the end of August the British government decided to ask China to resume negotiations for a Tibetan settlement.²⁰ The British government's approach was not conciliatory for they threatened that if negotiations were not resumed they would negotiate directly with the Tibetan government. As the Washington conference was so near one must question whether the time was opportune to raise such a difficult issue in such a manner.

China easily avoided the pressure which Britain was seeking to exert by stating that the extra work which the Washington conference entailed prevented her from considering the Tibetan question, and she asked that the matter be deferred until after the conference.²¹ But it was not until the latter half of October, and with ill-grace, ~~before~~ ^{that} the British government agreed to a postponement.²²

Cabinet Deliberations upon the Far East

The events relating to the report of the British government's ad-hoc committee to recommend upon the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and the attempts of the Canadian government to secure the alliance's termination have been described in detail elsewhere.²³ It is, perhaps, sufficient to recall that Curzon was not in favour of the ad-hoc committee's proposals to make the Anglo-Japanese alliance a tripartite agreement which included the United States, and that Lloyd George, the prime minister, persuaded the Canadian government to defer any action until after the imperial conference had met in the summer of 1921.

The imperial conference was due to meet in June and at a cabinet meeting at the end of May the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the far east were examined in

great detail and many points were made which were of fundamental importance to British policy in China.²⁴

Curzon began a review of the situation by praising the past influence of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, stating that it:

'provided for the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by ensuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.'

But in view of the inroads which had been made upon China's sovereignty following the formation of the alliance, such as the fighting of two foreign wars upon Chinese territory, Japan's twenty-one demands, and the growth of spheres of interest this claim was specious. One may also judge that the critical comments which Curzon made the following October concerning the 'open-door' must cast serious doubts upon the sincerity of his cabinet statement.²⁵

Curzon continued his review by outlining the arguments against renewal of the alliance, and he was aware that the alliance was alienating Britain from the sympathies of China and rendering British tasks in that country more difficult. He repeated that British policy in China had always been that of the 'open-door' and drew attention to the developments whereby China had

become an unwieldy and helpless country. Curzon stressed that it was the desire of the British government to see China built up again, 'and some sort of cohesion arrived at in that country'.

At the door of China, Curzon argued, there was Japan who had imbibed the German spirit of disciplined aggression. As Japan could not support her growing population it was natural that she should look to China for expansion, and Curzon stated that:

'... he would like to remind his colleagues of the degree to which, by her action in Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, Manchuria and Shantung, Japan was already forming a ring round China.'

But Curzon then argued for a renewal of the alliance on the grounds that it had been successful, it had assisted Britain during the war, there were dangers of Japan becoming involved in a new Russian-Japanese-German agreement if she were abandoned by Britain, Japan would feel slighted, and both Australia and New Zealand favoured renewal.

Obviously Curzon had examined the situation very carefully, but any sympathy for China was outweighed by greater considerations for Britain's strategic position and interests. It must be noted that Curzon had recommended nothing to assist his professed desires to see greater cohesion in China.

Winston Churchill, the colonial secretary and member of the cabinet, argued that the differences of opinion between America and Japan had arisen from the situation in China and the different ambitions of the two powers in that country. He stated that 'It would, indeed, be an enormous advantage if anything could be done to get the United States and Japan to come to some agreement.' Churchill then advocated that an international conference be held which, it must be noted, did not contradict Curzon's arguments for the renewal of the alliance.

The wisdom of Churchill's argument for Britain to support an international conference was questionable, for if a main cause of the far eastern problems were American-Japanese rivalry in China, Britain would be forced to take sides when the issues were debated, and this was exactly what Britain did not want to do. Britain wanted to remain friends with Japan, while at the same time it was hoped that the United States would help to curb some of the Japanese excesses in China, especially in regards to Shantung. Obviously the considerations which had prompted Curzon to favour the Anglo-Japanese alliance did not apply to the United States, and if a clash were to have occurred between the United States and Japan it was doubtful if Anglo-American

relations could have borne a repetition of the situation which existed at Paris without serious repercussions either to Anglo-Japanese or Anglo-American affairs .

No voices, however, were raised in the cabinet in opposition to the suggestion for a conference of the interested powers. Austen Chamberlain, lord privy seal, supported the idea that the conference should be convened by the president of the United States, while Balfour, lord president of the council, wanted to see a combination of the Curzon-Churchill proposals:

'He [Balfour] was in favour of the renewal of the Alliance, but it should only be for a short term, and at the same time His Majesty's Government should say that they wished to have a Conference about the Pacific. At different times he had talked a great deal to Lord Grey about the question, and the latter had always taken the view that His Majesty's Government must be very careful as to how far they tried to keep Japan out of China. It had to be remembered that the Japanese were not allowed to go to ... any place where there was a white population. It was, therefore, somewhat unreasonable to say she was not to expend in a country where there was a yellow race.'

Despite Curzon's claims regarding his respect for the integrity of China there is no indication in the account of the cabinet meeting to suggest that Balfour's comments were unacceptable. Indeed, such ideas were later expressed by Curzon to the Chinese minister.²⁶

In summing up the discussion of the cabinet, Lloyd George did so without making any reference to China, and his main concern was that by dropping Japan she might turn to a resuscitated Germany. The main conclusions of the cabinet were that at the forthcoming imperial conference, the British government should support a proposal for the president of the United States to convene a Pacific conference, but only after it had been made clear to Japan that it was not proposed to drop the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Growing Hostility to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

Opposition to the Anglo-Japanese alliance both widened and deepened in the summer of 1921. Alston reported from Peking that the Chinese government and the British legation had received protests from provincial organisations against excluding China from consultations should a renewal of the alliance be decided upon, and there was talk of a boycott of British goods if China's claims to be heard were ignored. Alston also reported that it was clear that the United States legation was helping to arouse hostility to the alliance, and that a leading British newspaper in China was advocating a conference of a number of powers to realise the integrity of China and the 'open-door' policy.²⁷

Within Britain a parliamentary question asked what China's objections were to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in its existing form, and a draft reply stated that China objected to any reference to herself in a treaty unless she were first consulted.²⁸ But this draft which at least indicated that China might have a valid point for consideration was discarded in favour of a formal reply which stated that as the alliance was under review no comment could be made.

A more sympathetic attitude was adopted by the British government in reply to a letter it had received from the China Association in Great Britain, a body representing trade and commercial interests. In a letter to Curzon, the Association protested that the Anglo-Japanese alliance had not witnessed the honouring of the integrity of China, and that Japan's actions had been contrary to the principles of the 'open-door'. It concluded by saying that 'a development of the Japanese Alliance into an agreement between the four Great Powers would do much to consolidate and maintain the general peace of the Far East for many years to come.'²⁹ The Association's letter was published in 'The Times' and on the following day the same newspaper published a letter from Wellesley in which the Foreign Office quite

exceptionally rose to its own defence. After referring to the importance of the issues which had been raised, Wellesley stated that the British government had publicly announced that the representations of the Chinese government concerning the renewal question would receive 'due consideration at the hands of the Imperial Cabinet, as will those of the various Governments and parties concerned'.³⁰ Wellesley then praised the financial consortium as being a good example of international cooperation, and he concluded by stating that the China Association could rest assured that its desire for greater international cooperation in China was a matter to which the British government were fully alive.

Wellesley was generally sympathetic towards China, and his letter to 'The Times' might be seen as a sequel to a memorandum which he had written a few weeks earlier in which he had reviewed the far eastern situation.³¹ He stated that Britain's relations with China were not satisfactory, for Britain, like other European powers with interests in the far east, had lost prestige as a result of the war, and

'... the attitude of His Majesty's Government over the Shantung question and the impending renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance are the two factors most responsible for the alienation of China's traditional sympathies for this country which is

finding practical expression in her truculence and intractability over the Tibetan frontier negotiations. In addition she is resentful of the Consortium policy which in effect amounts to a financial blockade, but this is quite unjustifiable.'

Wellesley's memorandum concluded by referring to the very real dangers which existed regarding a boycott of British trade.

One may judge that Wellesley's letter to 'The Times' had two main objectives. The first was to defend the consortium in which Wellesley believed, but which he recognised was not popular in China, while the second was to take some of the sting out of China's criticisms of Britain by promising to consider carefully China's objections regarding the alliance and Shantung. In the same dispatch in reference to Japan, Wellesley made the surprising statement that apart from the renewal issue there was no question which called for special comment, 'Anglo-Japanese relations for the past two years may be said to have been normal and to have undergone no material change'. But in view of the Curzon-Chinda exchanges of 1919, and the growing suspicions of Japan's motives in China, such a remark must be questioned.

Towards the end of June, Sir Auckland Geddes, the

British ambassador in Washington, reported that stories concerning the alleged attitude of the imperial conference to the Anglo-Japanese alliance were causing considerable American antipathy towards Britain.³²

Geddes also reported that it was common to hear such a remark as, 'England has to make her choice as to whether America is to be her friend or enemy depending on whether she makes Japan her enemy or friend.'³³

Almost at the same time Lampson reported that the Foreign Office was receiving showers of telegraphic communications from organisations and individuals in China protesting at the prospects of a renewal of the alliance, and that some of the protests were particularly bitter against Japan.³⁴

Hence, it was against quite formidable foreign opinion that the imperial conference had to decide its policies.

The Main Conclusions of the Imperial Conference

The imperial conference began on 20th June, and ten days later the British cabinet again discussed its far eastern policy. After recognising that Japan would resent being rejected as an ally the prime minister

summed up the situation maintaining 'there were certain fundamental points which had to be adhered to, viz.:

- '(i) Great Britain could not quarrel with the United States of America.
- (ii) It was essential not to insult Japan by doing anything which would be tantamount to casting her aside after the loyal way in which she had observed the Treaty in the past.
- (iii) China must be carried with us and be a party to any conversation.'³⁵

The first two points of the cabinet's desiderata were perhaps obtainable, but, especially in view of the Shantung issue, it is difficult to see how the third point could be achieved without excluding the second. Lloyd George, however, emphasised the importance of the second point by referring to the remarks made at the imperial conference of 1911 when Sir Edward Grey, the foreign secretary at that time, had pointed out the harmful effect which the termination of the alliance would have upon Anglo-Japanese relations. Lloyd George then praised Japan's war time efforts and was generally complimentary to Japan. But it was clear that the third point of the desiderata was not a mere platitude for Lloyd George referred to the enormous potential of China's economic growth and argued, 'It was essential, therefore, that we should not leave China to be walked over by America and for the latter country to get the whole benefit of China's trade'. Thus, the British

cabinet had adopted a policy which aimed at accommodating the United States, Japan, and China that was almost impossible to achieve.

Despite Canada's desires for immediate action the imperial conference accepted the general line of the British cabinet to seek a compromise solution of the contentious issues, and Dr Lowe has described the main developments within the conference.³⁶ Dr Lowe concluded that as a result of the conference, 'the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was left to the Washington Conference to determine'. Consideration for China's desiderata, however, as distinct from the China situation does not appear to have commanded much attention, but while the conference was still in ~~session~~ session the Shantung question was raised in a number of ways.

In mid-July, a parliamentary question asked the prime minister if he could state 'whether the Washington Conference will be able to discuss all the questions which have a vital bearing on the peace and tranquility of the Far East, such as the question of Shantung'.³⁷ But the reply was evasive, merely stating that it would be inopportune to make any comment. Eliot, the British ambassador in Japan, reported that there were good reasons to believe that the Japanese government were

anxious to settle the Shantung question before the Washington conference, and the Chinese minister in Tokyo welcomed this procedure because he felt that Japan would offer very favourable terms to secure a speedy settlement.³⁸ Vice-Consul Archer reported from Tsingtao that all sections of Japanese opinion in the port expected Britain to surrender Wei-hai Wei as an inducement for them to leave Shantung, 'If they give up Tsingtao they expect us to give up Wei-hai Wei, and they seem to expect us to make the first move!'³⁹ As the summer ripened it became clear that if the Anglo-Japanese alliance were to prove a major item for British policy at Washington, the Shantung question was also going to play an important role.

Summer Diplomacy

Early in July, Curzon informed Colonel Harvey, the United States ambassador in Britain, that the idea of a far eastern conference had found favour with the imperial conference, and that he (Curzon) had been charged with the task of inviting the American government to convene such a gathering, and the obvious states to be invited were America, Britain and the Dominions, Japan, and China. Curzon then explained his views upon the agenda which were that first, the peace of the far east should be

settled, and second an agreement on the future development of China should be reached. Consideration for China, Curzon maintained, had a foremost place in the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and it would be in the interests of Britain and the United States if the integrity, independence, and 'open-door' policy regarding China were respected.⁴⁰

In the summer of 1921, however, differences developed between Britain and America concerning whether there should be one conference to discuss naval matters and another to discuss China, or whether one conference should consider the full range of far eastern affairs. America favoured one conference, while Britain felt that two conferences should be held. Dr Nish has described Curzon's displeasure over the matter and the minor diplomatic row which ensued, and it is only necessary to emphasise those aspects of the affair which are relevant to British policy in China.⁴¹

When Curzon received the American proposals for the Washington conference's agenda he was horrified to note that it was envisaged to devote four out of five major items to China, and he made some scathing remarks about the 'open-door':

'The Open Door in China by which is meant the creation of Equal Opportunity will at once raise the question

of all the encroachments upon or statements of that principle which have taken place during the last 30 years. The "integrity of China" involves an examination of her territorial frontiers, and raises the question ... of leased territories and harbours. The question of the ... independence of China cannot be pursued for an hour without entailing an examination of the present internal position of China, which is one of administrative chaos and governing ineptitude ... When we come to Shantung, we embark upon a whole field of embittered controversy, involving questions of ports, railways, customs, gendarmerie, economic rights and privileges and so on ...' 42

Curzon continued by attacking the idea of making surrenders of leased territories or of making any concessions to China whatsoever, and this statement of the foreign secretary must cast grave doubts upon Britain's declared policy of respect for the 'open-door' and China's integrity.

Curzon asked Wellington Koo, the Chinese minister in London, to sound his country's reactions to the invitations which were pending to attend the Washington conference. As was expected, Koo replied that he thought his government would be delighted to be represented, and he took advantage of the occasion to state that a real improvement in Sino-Japanese relations would be possible only if Britain ended her alliance

and used her new found freedom to restrain Japan.⁴³ Curzon disagreed with Koo's assessment of the situation and countered by making some sharp remarks concerning China's internal situation.

Shortly afterwards Curzon also saw Baron Hayashi, the Japanese ambassador, and explained that although Britain was well disposed to Japan there was a need, owing to Chinese and American opposition, to review the far eastern situation. Curzon therefore asked Hayashi if Japan would agree to be represented at Washington.⁴⁴ In discussion Hayashi stated quite frankly that he thought that his government had been fundamentally wrong concerning Shantung, and that a fairly drastic modification of Japanese policy would be made shortly, but his comments were not official.

In mid-July widespread publicity was given to the invitations which President Harding had issued for the Washington conference, which helped to focus attention upon the main objectives of British policy. For example, 'The Times' contained an enthusiastic report of events in parliament when Lloyd George, 'as the spokesman of the British Empire ... welcomed the wise and courteous initiative of the United States' for convening the conference.⁴⁵ Lloyd George emphasised that the imperial conference had been guided by three main considerations

which were loyalty to Japan, 'an old and proved ally', agreement with whom had been of great benefit 'not only to ourselves, but the peace of the Far East', consideration of China, and friendship for the United States with whom there was 'a deeply rooted instinct to consult and cooperate'. Thus, the British government had made clear their desire to advance on a broad front.

Shortly after Lloyd George's parliamentary statement the dispute between Curzon and the American government sharpened, and Curzon having failed to get his own way over the conference organization, decided to 'leave the exclusive responsibility for the Conference to the Government who initiated it'.⁴⁶ But it was just not true that the United States had initiated the conference, even if it had issued the invitations and the venue were Washington, and one must conclude that Curzon was trying to cover the fact that the British government were committed to attend an international conference which was taking a shape that Curzon disapproved. A public hint of this lost control was made in answer to a parliamentary question which asked whether there would be any bar to the Washington conference considering the revision of the Shantung clauses of the Versailles treaty.⁴⁷ The reply stated that, 'The initiative as regards the subjects to be discussed at the Washington

Conference must be with the American Government, by whom the conference has been summoned.'

Hopes for the success of the Washington conference must have been depressed when Alston reported from Peking upon the bitterness of Americans in China, as well as the Chinese, to the possibilities of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.⁴⁸ American newspapers in China were alleging that Britain would welcome an American-Japanese conflict, and anti-British remarks were not confined to unofficial sources for a prominent member of the American legation had written:

'It is therefore decidedly to England's advantage to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided that it can be practised as in the past, namely, England will condone and wink at any Japanese aggression in China and Siberia provided of course that Japan will keep her hands off India and Australia.'

The same American also alleged that as England realised American trade in China was increasing why should not the English sit back and wait for the inevitable American-Japanese clash, which would have obvious advantages for England. These allegations may have been expressed crudely, and there was no truth regarding Britain desiring an American-Japanese conflict, but in view of Britain's wartime agreements with Japan, and Britain's support of Japan at Paris, some of the other allegations

were not without foundation. Irrespective of the substance of the charges, however, was the fact that their being made at all was a blow to British hopes for a broad agreement.

Curzon thought that the American government had two main objectives in relation to the Washington conference. The first was the securing of an international statement of general principles which would enable Britain to terminate her alliance with Japan, and the second was that China had to be saved from what America regarded as the dangerous clutches of Japan not only for China's sake but also in the interests of American trade. He continued:

'Both these subjects of discussion involved great difficulty, because the first brought up indirectly the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. The second, on the other hand, opened the door to almost interminable controversy, complicated at the start by Japan's decision not to allow Shantung to be discussed.' 49

Despite Japan's desires for direct negotiations with China regarding Shantung, the issue involved the British government in some important diplomatic activities in the late summer and autumn of 1921.

The Prospects for Direct Sino-Japanese Negotiations

In mid-August there were reasons to believe that

Japan was not going to press China to begin separate negotiations on the Shantung issue. The Japanese minister in Peking informed Alston that he had no special instructions regarding Tsingtao, except that he was prepared to discuss the matter whenever the Chinese cared to do so.⁵⁰ He had been authorized to offer the withdrawal of military guards on the railway as soon as Chinese guards could be substituted, but the authority of the Chinese government was so shaky that it was scarcely worth negotiating with them. But within a month of this interview with Alston, the Japanese government advanced detailed proposals for a settlement of the Shantung question.

The Japanese proposals offered concessions to China on a number of issues, but they involved the continuation of a considerable amount of Japanese influence in the province.⁵¹ They stated that the leasehold of Kisocho and all the rights regarding the 50 kilometre zone should be restored to China. The Japanese government would abandon any claim for an exclusive settlement at Tsingtao if the Chinese would open the leased territory of Kisocho as a port, and permit nationals of all foreign countries freely to reside and to carry on commerce, industry, agriculture or any other lawful pursuits '... China shall likewise

carry out ... the opening of suitable cities and towns within the province of Shantung for residence and trade of the nationals of all countries.' Japan's proposals continued by stating that the Kiaochow-Tsinaifu railway and the appurtenant mines should be worked as a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise, and that Japan would renounce all preferential rights concerning economic developments as stipulated in the Sino-German treaty of 1898, while extensions of the Kiaochow-Tsinaifu railway should be offered to the financial consortium. Separate negotiations should begin 'to promote the efficiency of the Chinese police force guarding the railway'. Japan also proposed that the customs house at Tsingtao should become part of the customs system of China, and that public property formerly possessed by Germany should be transferred to China. Both Japan and China should appoint their respective commissioners as soon as possible to arrange the necessary detailed planning.

A number of Foreign Office experts on the far east studied the Japanese proposals and their implications. C.W. Campbell began his consideration of the Japanese case by referring to the rights accorded to Japan by the Paris peace settlement and to the 'Balfour Settlement of 1919' which he quoted in full.⁵² He argued that the Japanese proposals seemed to offer more than a

fulfilment of the Balfour settlement, especially concerning the dropping of the claim to a settlement at Kisocho. But Campbell warned that it had to be remembered that the Japanese had been acquiring property in Shantung for the previous seven years and the inclusion of agriculture in the proposed activities which were to be open to foreigners would benefit the Japanese almost exclusively. Campbell claimed that the proposals would give Japan a position in Shantung analogous to her position in South Manchuria and the Chinese would not welcome this. He concluded, 'On the whole the side-memoire strikes me as a studiously moderate document'.

Wellesley agreed with Campbell that the Japanese terms were moderate, but he emphasised that the crux of the Shantung problem was control of the railway and upon this point there had been no abatement of Japan's demands. Wellesley argued that the railway 'is the only thing that matters because it is the main instrument of peaceful penetration', and he pondered upon what could be done to induce Japan to relax her grip. He thought that Britain should not try to intervene but 'a little pressure from America would, I think, do the trick'.

Tyrrell thought that China would be unwilling to settle the Shantung issue by direct negotiations with Japan for she was expecting to do better by raising the matter at Washington where she would get American support. He concluded, 'We should I think watch for a favourable opportunity to advise the Japanese to do their utmost to prevent this'.

Just before the Japanese presented their proposals, Alston was questioned by the Chinese minister for foreign affairs on the attitude of the British government towards Sino-Japanese negotiations regarding Shantung. Alston had replied that while the matter had not been discussed specifically, it was felt that it was unwise for China not to have listened to the Japanese overtures and ascertained what their offers were.⁵³ A few days after this interview, Eliot in Tokyo reported that the Japanese government would be very pleased if the British would use their influence to induce the Chinese government to consider the Japanese proposals for Shantung in a reasonable spirit.⁵⁴

Britain's advice to China must, however, be considered as being very unfortunate, for when Chu, the Chinese charge d'affaires, called at the Foreign Office, Wellesley replied to Chu's request for guidance with the reply that '... we regarded the Shantung question

as a matter which concerned the Governments of China and Japan and them alone.'⁵⁵ These remarks were in direct conflict with numerous memoranda which Wellesley had written in 1920, and they prompted Curzon to note, 'I would not have said that' and, 'I agree that we should encourage them to talk. [Advice which Wellesley had offered Chu.]⁷ But when I recall my heated discussions with Viscount Chinda about British interests in Shantung I cannot subscribe to the proposition that it is a matter which concerns China and Japan alone.' But there is no evidence that the Chinese were ever informed of the repudiation of Wellesley's comments.

By the end of September, Wellesley did not think that the Chinese would begin negotiations with Japan before the Washington conference and he argued that:

'... there is one advantage in it coming up for discussion at Washington and that is it offers an opportunity for the railway question to be settled on a more satisfactory basis than is proposed in the latest Japanese offer. It is the crux of the whole matter and we cannot speak of a settlement of the Shantung problem so long as the control remains in Japanese hands.'⁵⁶

At the same time Tyrrell stated that he had never had great hopes for China consenting to direct negotiations with Japan with the Washington conference so near. This impression had been confirmed when he noted the

as agent to the Chinese delegation
 appointment of Lansing, the American ex-secretary of
 state, ~~as agent to the Chinese delegation~~, 'whose views
 on the Shantung question are very pro-Chinese'. Curzon
 merely noted that the Chinese expected to get better
 terms at the conference.

Some Last Considerations before Washington

Although the British cabinet were meeting frequently,
 the far east was rarely discussed for such items as
 Ireland, Egypt, India and unemployment dominated the
 agendas. Early in October, however, the cabinet met
 when it:

'... discussed the question at some
 length in all its aspects: e.g.
 the success of the Conference itself;
 the financial position between Great
 Britain and the United States (which,
 though not part of the Agenda on the
 Conference, has an important bearing);
 the demands on Ministers, and more
 especially the Prime Minister at home.'

'The general trend of the Cabinet's
 opinion was very strongly to the effect
 that, in view of the paramount impor-
 tance of the Conference and the vital
 issues at stake - issues of peace and
 war - it was indispensable that the
 Prime Minister should if possible be
 present at the outset, even though he
 could not be absent from home for more
 than a few weeks.'

'The question was adjourned for further
 consideration.' 57

At a further meeting of the cabinet held some ten

days later it was agreed that the prime minister should go to Washington, 'as soon as the Parliamentary and general situation renders this possible'.⁵⁸ The cabinet then named its full delegation of which Balfour was to prove the most important for he in fact led the Empire's team.⁵⁹ Apart from a discussion on far eastern naval strategy held at the beginning of November it would seem that no further consideration of the Washington conference was made by the cabinet before Balfour left for America.

Outside the cabinet, however, discussion concerning Shantung intensified when the Chinese government replied to the Japanese proposals.⁶⁰ The Chinese written reply denounced Japan's offer of the 7th September as completely unacceptable as it did not restore China's sovereignty and the reply listed Japan's envisaged economic and political controls in detail. In particular the Chinese reply denounced Japan's continued rights over the Shantung railway.

Wellesley's reactions were sharp and he told Chu, the Chinese chargé, that '... it was a deplorable attitude for the Chinese Govt. to take up and that if they thought they were going to get better terms at Washington they would probably be sorely disappointed. This memo ... has no doubt been written with an eye to Chinese

propaganda in the U.S.' Tyrrell agreed that there was a propaganda motive and he made the rather significant remark that, 'The Chinese seem to be entirely oblivious of the terms which they granted to the Germans in Kisochow and do not appear to think that what is sauce for the German may be sauce for the Jap.' Curzon's reactions were different and he merely noted that 'From a Govt. on the verge of complete collapse the reply is almost humorous.'⁶⁰

The Japanese did not appreciate any humorous aspects to the situation and Eliot reported that the Japanese cabinet were upset by the Chinese reply and they would be glad if Britain or the United States would "'proprio motu" advise Chinese to negotiate'.⁶¹ Wellesley, however, opposed intervention and he argued that if Britain did interfere she would reap the odium of one, if not two, sides to the dispute. He stated with considerable optimism that:

'Now that Japan is showing a readiness to make concessions the Shantung question becomes a less dangerous subject for discussion at Washington and I am inclined to think that, if handled with tact and judgment, the problem is capable of settlement there not only amicably; but, with the application of a little gentle pressure from America coupled with friendly advice from ourselves, on a more satisfactory basis than is likely to be achieved by direct negotiations especially in the matter of the Tsingtau-Tsingtee railway.'

'In any case our attitude over this question at Versailles unfits us for the role of mediator.'

Tyrrell agreed with Wellesley, but with great accuracy Curzon forecast that there '... will be a settlement of the question outside the Conference with the Americans and ourselves acting as friends of the two parties'. Curzon agreed that there should be no interference and instructions to this effect were sent to Alston.⁶²

On the same day that the Chinese replied to the Japanese proposals, Lempson wrote a very long memorandum upon the Shantung question. Lempson was a member of the British delegation to Washington where he sat as an observer upon the separate Sino-Japanese negotiations, and therefore his views upon Shantung were important.⁶³ Much of Lempson's memorandum was historic and he began by claiming that if China ever became 'a united self-conscious nation, the beginning of such a development will date back to the Shantung question'. In reviewing the peace conference developments, Lempson expressed decidedly pro-Chinese sentiments and he argued that events had vindicated China's refusal to sign the peace treaty. Lempson attacked many of the methods adopted by the Japanese to increase her influence in Shantung which were detrimental to British as well as

Chinese interests. Nevertheless, Lempson regretted that China should have refused to negotiate with Japan on the basis of her September offer, 'The incident bodes ill for the tranquility of the conference.'

Lempson then outlined what he thought might happen at Washington. He thought that China would certainly seek a reversal of the peace treaty clauses referring to Shantung, and that Britain, 'Having been a party to that decision, our attitude must at least be neutral'. He recognised that by the Shantung settlement at Paris, Japan 'agreed to restore the shadow and retain the substance', and that a reversal of the settlement was desired. Of great importance were his points:

'It would be politically unwise for His Majesty's Government to attempt to act as mediator between China and Japan on this subject, but should the discussions at the Conference wax hot, an opportunity may present itself for pressing for a settlement on the basis of: (1) Surrender by Japan of control over the Tsineifu-Tsingto Railway; (2) an international settlement at Tsingto itself. These two points constitute the crux of the problem.'

The lines of action suggested by Lempson are a good indication of British policy at Washington.

While Lempson was arguing for a less sympathetic policy to Japan, Curzon was discouraging to Wellington Koo, the Chinese minister in London who was to help represent his country at Washington. Curzon asked Koo

'Would it not be sound statesmanship to steer Japan away from the great industrial areas of China proper, and push her - so to speak - to the north? Manchuria was not a part of China proper ...'⁶⁴ Earlier in the interview Curzon had refused to give Koo any kind of encouragement or hope concerning Britain's attitude to Shantung at the Washington conference. Somewhat surprisingly Curzon told Koo that much would depend on 'how far Mr Balfour, who would be representing Great Britain might be bound by decisions arrived at at the Paris Conference ... but that he would enter into the negotiations in the most friendly spirit, I felt sure.' Koo undoubtedly did not share Curzon's assessment of Balfour's attitude.

The question of Britain's obligations under the terms of the peace treaty was a contentious issue and notice of a parliamentary question asked 'whether the British Government is still bound by the secret agreement entered into with Japan which declared its policy at Paris in respect to Shantung; and whether the changed circumstances have modified the British attitude on the matter?' In considering the reply Ashton-Gwatkin pointed out that by the Versailles treaty Japan promised to restore all political rights to China but

to retain the economic privileges originally accorded to Germany. A difficulty was the Shantung railway which was a political factor. Ashton-Gwatkin was convinced that Britain was no longer bound by the secret assurances of 1917 but was bound by the Paris treaty, '... and that amounts to the same thing, viz. that in getting any further concessions for China with regard to Shantung, we can only appeal to Japan's sense of equity and good policy'. Lampson agreed with Ashton-Gwatkin arguing that

'... we clearly cannot go back on those obligations Verailles treaty by word or deed, save with the consent of Japan'.

The reply which was given by Austen Chamberlain on behalf of the government stated, 'So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, the Shantung question was settled by the decision embodied in the Treaty of Versailles.'⁶⁵

Alston reported that this reply had caused considerable bitterness in Peking. He stated that the Chinese government had hoped the British government would no longer have felt bound to their commitments to Japan which had restricted British action at Paris, and 'it was a great disappointment to them to read so brusque an announcement' which the Chinese government felt was

rather hard upon them.⁶⁶ Alston added as a post-script to his despatch a statement from ^{W.P.} Turner, vice-consul at Tsingtao, which said that the Japanese were firmly consolidating their position and insuring the continuation of their interests in Shantung. In these circumstances the Chinese description of the September offer of the Japanese as being similar to the return of a cigar box after all the cigars had been taken out 'may not be so wide of the mark'.

If the Chinese were being discouraged by Britain, Eliot reported that the Japanese government were 'pleased with the language of American officials both here and at Washington on the subject of Shantung. They have reason to hope that the United States will handle this question at Conference in a way agreeable to Japan'.⁶⁷ Newton of the far eastern department observed that obviously the matter could not be settled before Washington and that it was satisfactory to note that the Japanese were pleased with the official attitude of the Americans on the subject.

As Curzon had indicated to Koo it was Balfour who was to lead the British delegation to Washington, but hopes persisted that Lloyd George would make an appearance. While on the ship to America, Balfour scribbled some ideas for consideration at the conference. He stated:

'I am disposed to think that our Far Eastern arrangements should be embodied in two treaties rather than one. The first of these would deal with the preservation of peace and the maintenance of the territorial status quo ... The second would deal with China.' 68

The draft which Balfour proposed concerning China, however, may be judged as a collection of platitudes which, while stating that the powers agreed to 'the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Chinese Republic', said nothing about the return of Shantung or the restoration of Chinese sovereignty.⁶⁹

Conclusion regarding Pre-Conference deliberations

It can be seen that in 1921, Britain was faced with problems concerning Japan, America, and China, many of which were similar to those which had existed in 1919. As far as the first two countries were concerned Britain's aims were fairly simple, namely, she wanted to please both of them, but as far as China was concerned the British government was often torn between what was equitable and what suited Britain's interests best. Undoubtedly Britain's task was complicated by China's incessant internal strife, but it can be argued that China's tasks of governing were made infinitely more difficult by the presence of foreigners on her soil claiming all kinds of extraterritorial rights and exemptions from Chinese sovereignty.

1. See pp. 291 above.
2. 6-1-1921 'Evening Standard', see also F.O. 371/6619-[132].
3. Report by Alston, 8-1-1921, F.O. 405/230, p. 312.
4. Ashton-Gwatkin's minute, 19-2-21, F.O. 371/6619 [465].
5. Lempson's minute, 14-7-1921, F.O. 371/6619 [1536].
6. Moss's memorandum, 4-2-1921, Minutes by Lempson, 3-3-1921, Jordan, 11-3-21, and Wellesley, 17-3-1921, F.O. 371/6619 [468].
7. Archer's report, 22-2-21, Minutes by Newton, 17-5-1921 and Wellesley, 18-5-1921. F.O. 371/6619 [1548].
8. See below, footnote 62.
9. Li Chien-nung, see Chapter XIII, 'A Federal government movement and melee among the war lords', pp. 401-35.
10. Ibid., pp. 405-6.
11. Curzon to Alston, 28-1-1921, DBFPI(XIV), pp. 232-3.
12. Alston to Curzon, 16-1-1921, DBF.PI(XIV) pp. 215-6.
13. See pp. 366-7 below.
14. Eliot (Tokyo) to Curzon, 13-10-1920, DBFPI(XIV) pp. 153-4.
15. Teichmen's minute 17-5-1921, F.O. 371/6586 [1803]. Teichmen makes no reference to this incident in his book, 'The Affairs of China', London, 1938.
16. Lempson's minute, 6-2-1921 F.O.371/6640 [409].
17. F.O. to India Office, May 1921, F.O.371/6608 [1615].

18. Teichman's minute, 4-5-1921 F.O. 371/6608 [1624].
19. Minutes by Teichman, 18-5-1921 and Curzon, 20-5-1921, F.O. 371/6608 [1854]. Again, Teichman says little on how the Tibetan question influenced Anglo-Chinese relations in his book. See footnote 15 above.
20. Curzon to Alston, 26-8-1921, DBFPI (XIV), pp. 384-6.
21. Alston to Curzon, 31-8-1921, DBFPI(XIV), p. 389.
22. Alston to Curzon, 20-10-1921, DBFPI (XIV), p. 433.
23. I.H. Nish, 'Britain and the Ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance', in Japan Society of London Bulletin 53(1968) pp. 2-5, and M.G.Fry, 'The North Atlantic Triangle and the Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance', in Journal of Modern History, Vol. 39 (1967), pp. 46-64.
24. Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, 30-5-1921, Cab 23-25, pp. 297-313.
25. See below footnote 42.
26. See below footnote 64.
27. Alston to Curzon, 3-6-1921, DBFPI (XIV), pp. 299-300.
28. 13-6-1921 F.O. 371/6674 [2236].
29. Letter received at F.O. 22-6-1921, F.O. 371/6674 [2267].
30. 9-7-1921, 'The Times', The Association's letter was published one day earlier.
31. Memorandum by Wellesley, 13-6-1921, F.O. 371/6674 [2201].
32. Geddes to Curzon, 25-6-1921, F.O. 371/6674 [2300].
33. Geddes to Curzon, 6-6-1921, DBFPI(XIV), pp. 300-1.
34. Minute of Lempson, 4-7-1921, F.O. 371/6675 [2426].
35. Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, 30-6-1921, Cab 23-26, pp. 101-5.

36. Lowe, see Appendix VIII, pp. 294-7. The imperial conference set from 20th June - 5th August, 1921.
37. 14-7-1921, F.O. 371/6619 [2608].
38. Eliot to Curzon, 28-7-1921 F.O. 371/6619 [2807].
39. Archer to Alston, 12-7-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [3452].
40. Curzon to Geddes, 5-7-1921, F.O. 371/6675 [2461].
41. See 23 above.
42. Memorandum by Curzon, 24-7-1921. D.B.F.P.I(XIV), pp. 348-9.
43. Curzon to Alston, 4-7-1921, F.O. 371/6675 [2457].
44. Curzon to Eliot, 8-7-1921, D.B.F.P.I(XIV) pp. 331-4.
45. 12-7-1921, 'The Times', p. 10.
46. Curzon to Geddes, 1-8-1921, D.B.F.P.I(XIV), p. 363.
47. 18-8-1921, F.O. 371/6619 [3083].
48. Alston to Curzon, 13-8-1921, D.B.F.P.I.(XIV) pp. 373-7.
49. Memorandum by Lempson, 18-8-1921, D.B.F.P.I.(XIV) pp. 380-2.
50. Alston to Curzon, 11-8-1921, F.O. 371/6619 [2971].
51. The Japanese proposals dated 7th September, 1921, were handed to Eliot on the 12th. They were received at the F.O. on the 15th September. F.O. 371/6620 [3431].
52. Minutes by Campbell, 14-9-1921, Wellesley and Tyrrell, 16-9-1921, F.O. 371/6619 [3399].
53. Alston to Curzon, 9-9-1921, F.O. 371/6619 [3390].
54. Eliot to Curzon, 12-9-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [3430].

55. Record by Wellesley, 23-9-1921, DBFPI(XIV)
pp. 406-7.
56. Minutes by Wellesley, Tyrrell, 30-9-1921 and
Curzon, 2-10-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [3604].
57. Conclusions of a meeting of the cabinet held on
7-10-1921. Cab 23-27.p. 54.
58. Conclusion of cabinet meeting held on 17-10-1921,
Cab 23-27.p. 86.
59. For details of British delegation, see below, pp.398-407.
60. Memorandum communicated by the Chinese minister,
10-10-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [3734]. Wellesley,
Tyrrell and Curzon's minutes, 11-10-1921.
61. Eliot to Curzon, 11-10-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [3765].
62. Minutes by Wellesley, 14-10-1921 and Curzon (his
emphasis), 16-10-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [3768].
63. 'Shantung', a memorandum by Lempson, 10-10-1921,
F.O. 371/6620 [4199].
64. Curzon to Alston, 24-10-1921, D.B.F.P.I(XIV),
pp. 451-2.
65. P.O. 25-10-1921. Ashton-Gwatkin and Lempson's
minutes 22-10-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [4034].
66. Alston to Curzon, 26-11-1921, F.O. 371/7989 [191].
67. Eliot to Curzon, 29-10-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [3990].
68. 'Nov./21 Empress of France' Belfour Papers 49749,
Vol. LXVII.
69. Draft by Belfour of a treaty between the British
Empire, China, France, Japan and the United States,
7-11-1921. F.R.U.S.I. 1922, pp. 271-2.

CHAPTER IXTHE INFLUENCE OF THE SHANTUNG QUESTION UPON THE WASHINGTON
CONFERENCE

The Washington conference lasted from the 12th November, 1921, until the 6th February, 1922, and it achieved limited naval disarmament, a re-alignment of far eastern alliances, and a restricted revision of China's foreign treaty rights. Of the three major treaties which were signed, the Four and Five power agreements covered the main naval decisions and brought the Anglo-Japanese alliance to an end, while the Nine power treaty had the declared object, even if its means of implementation were unspecified, of securing wider international respect for China's sovereignty. In addition to the treaties, twelve resolutions were passed which had a bearing upon the powers of the foreigner in China and ordered the establishment of two commissions, one to examine China's tariff question, and the other to report upon the problems relating to extraterritoriality.¹ Independently of the main conference, the Japanese and Chinese delegations agreed to negotiate upon the Shantung question, and as a result a Sino-Japanese agreement upon this issue was reached.²

The powers which were represented at Washington

were the British Empire, the United States, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, and China. The south China government was not represented as it had been at the Paris conference, but this omission was not an indication of China's unity as her internal situation remained chaotic.³ Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India sent representatives who were included in the British Empire delegation, but it was the British government, and Balfour in particular, who decided British policy regarding Shantung.⁴

Within its first week the Washington conference divided into two main committees, one to consider the limitation of armaments, and the other to deal with China and Pacific affairs.⁵ The first independent Sino-Japanese meeting was held on the 1st December, 1921, when it was accepted that Britain and America should attend as observers. France also wanted to attend, but an objection from Japan proved strong enough to prevent this.⁶ Until the conclusion of the conference Sino-Japanese meetings were almost a daily occurrence as attempts continued to solve the Shantung problem.

Early Conference Considerations

Before the Washington conference began, Balfour,

lord president of the council and leader of the British delegation, outlined what he considered were Britain's main aims. He stated that he would try to retain some form of the Anglo-Japanese alliance without offending either America or Japan. With reference to China he claimed that he would seek the 'preservation of the independence and integrity of the Chinese Republic', and the principle of equal opportunities for the foreign trader.⁷ Shortly afterwards Balfour was more specific and he asked in particular to be allowed to adopt a generous attitude towards retroceding Wei-hai Wei and surrendering Britain's share of the Boxer indemnity.⁸

Lord Curzon, the foreign secretary, did not agree with Balfour, and he thought that Wei-hai Wei might prove valuable in the future. He argued:

'Neither is it a concession on the part of Japan to offer to evacuate Kiao-chow which she promised to return to China when she took it from the Germans. Further, we must be careful not to make any offer except for an adequate return. If mutual surrenders are to be made let them be aggregated together as part of a definite concession to a China that deserves the favour and is able to take advantage of it. To hand back any territory to a government that is devoid of authority and is all but bankrupt would appear to be an act of pointless generosity.' 9

Curzon applied the same arguments to the Boxer indemnity.

The comments of Curzon were scarcely helpful to Belfour, for Curzon was arguing that whereas Japan should surrender Kisochow, which was of major importance to her, Britain should not surrender Wei-hai Wei which was of insignificant interest. Throughout the Washington deliberations the question of Wei-hai Wei recurred, but it was not until the very end of the conference ~~that~~ ^{that} Britain announced that she would retrocede it, and it was not until April, 1930, ~~that~~ ^{that} the surrender was effected.¹⁰

Japan also placed much blame upon China's chaotic internal situation and at the second meeting of the Pacific committee Baron Kato, one of the Japanese delegates, argued that 'existing difficulties in China lie no less in her domestic situation than in her external relations'.¹¹ Kato continued by paying tribute to the principles of the 'open-door' and asserting his country's respect for China's integrity. The British and Belgian delegates expressed similar sentiments, but this platitudinous discussion was brought to an end when Elihu Root, one of the American delegates, stated that international assurances concerning respect for China had been frequent since 1902 and he asked why

such repetitions were therefore necessary.

It has been argued that at both Paris and Washington, the United States was seeking to end 'particularistic arrangements' and to place far eastern diplomacy 'on the basis of an overall international agreement participated in by all the major countries, including China'.¹² Possibly as a step in this direction Root maintained that, although a new agreement on China should witness no immediate interference with the existing treaty rights of the foreign countries, it left to the possessors of these rights 'the power of making changes in them for the benefit of China; but these limitations on China should be known'.¹³ Root continued by stating that it was desirable to distinguish between China proper and those countries over which China exercised suzerainty. These remarks brought a swift reaction from Wellington Koo, one of the leading Chinese delegates, who fiercely contested the rights of the powers to make such a distinction and claimed that China's territories were specified in her constitution. But Root stated that Koo had misunderstood him and Koo accepted the explanation which the American offered.

Belfour, however, was very displeased with Koo and he reported to Curson what a bad impression the Chinese diplomat was having upon the conference. There

were suspicions, Belfour argued, that Koo might be contemplating the raising of the Tibetan issue, and Belfour thought that it would be desirable that hints should be dropped at Peking to restrain Koo.¹⁴ This suggestion was met with a rebuff from Alston, the British minister in Peking, who reported that although the Chinese government were pleased with the promises which were being made to them, there was talk of the Chinese delegation leaving Washington if Britain persisted with what was alleged to be an anti-Chinese attitude. Any attempt, therefore, to put pressure upon Koo would be bitterly resented.¹⁵

While the Chinese government were speaking firmly, Koo adopted a bold approach in an interview with Belfour in mid-November. Koo sought to ascertain whether Britain had any intention of advocating a plan for the financial control of China's internal affairs and confirmation that it was not the intention of the British government to support any attempt by the Japanese to increase their influence in Manchuria.¹⁶ Belfour readily gave a negative reply on the first point, but on the second he stated that 'no suggestion had reached me that Japanese intended to bring forward any specific proposals of this nature'. But in view of Curzon's advice to Koo upon the eve of the conference, Belfour's

reply must be considered evasive.¹⁷ Balfour stated that Koo's attitude throughout the interview had been reasonable, and at times conciliatory, but Koo had warned him that an unsatisfactory British approach to the Manchurian question 'might be prejudicial to our commercial interests in China and to forthcoming Tibetan negotiations'.

Charles Evans Hughes, the American secretary of state, made a further attack upon particularist arrangements when he argued at a meeting of the Pacific committee that:

'China was a sovereign and independent State, and had her administrative autonomy except as limited by restrictions which may have been placed upon it through valid engagements; that it might be possible for the committee to remove or modify some of these restrictions, but that these would be particular questions.'¹⁸

These remarks must have been encouraging to Chinese hopes for treaty revision and a week later Alfred Sze, a leading Chinese delegate, made a lengthy attack upon the infringements upon China's sovereignty.¹⁹ Sze complained bitterly against various actions of Japan, the presence of foreign legation guards, foreign post-offices, and extraterritoriality. As a result the

Pacific committee agreed to set up a commission to examine the latter issue.

In London, however, Curzon objected to the use of the word 'sovereignty' in relation to China and he argued:

'In the face of this expression we might find it difficult in the future to maintain against China's will the arms embargo or even legation guards or troops on the Peking-Tientsin line. Incidents may moreover occur in which it would be necessary to resort to force in order to protect British lives and property involving a technical violation of Chinese sovereignty.'²⁰

The matter was discussed in the Foreign Office, and Newton, a member of the far eastern department, argued that although he was 'not convinced that the promise to respect China's "sovereignty" will not prove embarrassing, its omission or formal qualification now would probably be even more embarrassing.' Wellesley, assistant secretary, concluded that there was much ambiguity concerning such words as 'guarantee', 'respect', and 'observe' in relation to China's sovereignty.²¹ But despite any misgivings on the part of the British government, the first article of the Nine-power treaty when it was concluded in February began by stating that the contracting powers, other than China, agreed 'To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and

administrative integrity of China'.²²

One may claim that the argument concerning sovereignty was more than a question of phraseology, and reflected the opposing aims of British and American policies over particularistic arrangements. It may also be said that if the British government had readily respected the 'open-door' her relations with the United States and China would have improved, although possibly at the cost of Anglo-Japanese relations. But if there were Anglo-American differences over respect for China's sovereignty it can be seen that there was a marked degree of cooperation in the way the two delegations worked for a settlement to the Shantung question.

The Beginning of the Sino-Japanese Shantung Negotiations

Towards the end of November, Hughes and Balfour together saw the leading Japanese and Chinese delegates and told them that it would be preferable if negotiations for a Shantung settlement were to take place outside the conference. They agreed that the conference could endorse any agreement which was reached, and Balfour asked that Alston in Peking be instructed to try to persuade the Chinese government to consent to such a procedure.²³ Similar instructions were sent

by Hughes to J.G. Schurman, the United States minister in Peking.²⁴ Alston replied that the Chinese government were of the opinion that as they had had the last word in the recent correspondence with the Japanese government regarding Shantung it was 'for the latter to approach Chinese Government with offer of some concessions'. The British minister also reported that his American colleague had encountered a very stiff attitude from the Chinese government.²⁵

At a meeting of the Pacific committee at the end of November, the Japanese delegate Kato thanked Hughes and Balfour for bringing the two parties together for negotiations. But the attitude of the Chinese was very different:

'Chinese delegation made a reply to the effect that they had not solicited or asked for such a meeting, as the Government and people of China had always hoped to bring the matter before the conference with a view to obtaining a fair and equitable settlement. Whilst accepting with gratitude our good offices, they did so without prejudice to their ultimate action in the unfortunate event of no such settlement being attained.' 26

Balfour then commented upon the marked differences between the attitudes of the two countries and the difficulties which lay ahead.

Despite her misgivings, China agreed to attend the

negotiations which began on the 1st December. Belfour reported that he and Hughes were to attend the first meeting and leave Jordan and Lampson as British observers, and MacMurray and Bell as American observers.²⁷

Newton of the far eastern department stated that this development was promising, and that the Americans seemed ready to take a firm line with the Chinese in order to obtain a settlement, and Wellesley argued that:

'After the considerable concessions which Japan is now prepared to make it ought not to be beyond the powers of the Conference to reach a satisfactory settlement. The railway remains the crux of the problem but Mr Belfour has told us that there is some prospect of a solution. A little tactful pressure on Japan and face saving services for China ought to do the trick.'

To this Tyrrell, under secretary of state, advocating pressure by America on China, added whimsically that 'Senator Lodge is now called upon to undo the mischief done in China by his violent and unreasonable opposition to the Shantung settlement made by Mr Wilson.' Tyrrell's reference to the treaty of Versailles was appropriate for it was clear that the Washington deliberations were to be another round in the struggle to settle the Shantung issue.

Almost immediately some of the arguments heard at Paris were repeated for at the second Sino-Japanese meeting:

'China adopted the attitude that all existing treaties and arrangements made abroad must be completely disregarded in approaching the subject owing to the highly charged state of public feeling in China. Mr Hanihara [a Japanese delegate] agreed to confine the question to its practical aspects, but in fairness to his own country he must point out that China had, in fact, actually received pecuniary advantage from her agreement with Japan of 1918, not to mention the fact that she had solemnly plighted her word to Japan in 1915 to recognise any transfer to Japan of ex-German rights.' 28

A further similarity to the Paris situation was that Chinese students were again putting pressure upon the Chinese delegation.

One week later Lansing sent the Foreign Office copies of the confidential correspondence with which he had just been supplied, which had originally been exchanged between the State Department and the Japanese embassy in the summer of 1919 concerning the understanding reached at Paris in relation to Shantung.²⁹ In a letter to the Japanese charge d'affaires, Lansing, then secretary of state, argued that his government had agreed to articles 156, 157 and 158 of the peace treaty only on the basis that 'the Japanese Government should agree that the Sino-Japanese Agreements of 1915 and 1918 should not be relied upon or referred to in the negotiations for the return to China of Kiao-chou and the German

rights'. But the Japanese reply denied that they had ever surrendered their rights under these treaties, and this denial is supported by Dr Fifield's conclusions.³⁰ Lampson's acquisition of the correspondence was an indication that such considerations would again be exerting an influence upon the deliberations of the powers.

There were, however, features of the Shantung controversy at Washington which were different from those at Paris. These differences included an attitude of greater willingness on the part of Japan to make concessions, even if the concessions were judged by some to be insufficient and more apparent than real, and a less sympathetic approach to China by the United States. Although the Washington conference witnessed as its starting point a repeat of some of the main arguments heard at Paris these were pushed into the background by the turn of developments.

Early in December reports from Washington indicated that progress was being made on some of the smaller issues. Newton noted that a compromise over foreign property seemed possible, namely, that all former German property in Shantung should revert to China without compensation, but that China should pay Japan for any property acquired or constructed by Japan during her occupation.³¹ The situation was reviewed by Wellesley

who somewhat optimistically stated that one of the difficulties which the Japanese government were facing was how to give way gracefully over the Shantung railway, and he thought that Jordan's original proposals to internationalise China's railways was the only satisfactory one.³²

Despite its importance, the Washington conference was not discussed by the British cabinet at any great length, and events in Egypt and Ireland, and the incidence of unemployment continued to dominate cabinet agendas. When the far east was discussed in the second half of November attention was concentrated upon naval disarmament, and as a result of the cabinet meeting, instructions were telegraphed to Balfour not to allow France to become too strong.³³ The question of far eastern security was deeply influenced by the conclusion of the Four power agreement in December, and undoubtedly this was a major feat of the conference.³⁴ But the powers had to ratify the agreement and while the conference was still proceeding it was realised that its deliberations would be in vain unless a satisfactory solution were found to the Shantung problem for failure on this issue could impede ratification of the Four power treaty.

By mid-December, Sino-Japanese negotiations were concentrated upon the Shantung railway, and Balfour

reported that the Japanese had put forward an alternative scheme to the earlier proposals for a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise.³⁵ This apparent conciliatory move on the part of the Japanese was probably the result of American pressure, for Tyrrell had sent a confidential telegram to Lempson stating:

'We learn from a secret source that although Tokio Government have instructed their Delegates to make every endeavour to secure recognition of their claim to work jointly Shantung Railway ... they realise that Mr Hughes is opposed to joint working, and that proposal may be also exercising public opinion outside the U.S.A. If therefore a settlement of the Shantung Question as a whole would be hindered by insistence on claim, they would be prepared to consider compromise.' 36

But the information which the British government had was incomplete for in a secret telegram to Tokyo the Japanese delegation stated:

'We therefore think it is advisable not to persist in nominal questions, but rather to adopt the policy of throwing away the name and keeping the fact, and to facilitate the solution of the whole question by not refusing, as circumstances may demand, to withdraw with a good grace the joint administration proposal.' 37

Balfour continued his report by giving further details of the Japanese proposals and even without the knowledge of the Japanese delegation's real purpose it was clear

that Japan wished to retain strong measures of control over the railway, for a Chinese offer to obtain a loan to settle ownership by one immediate cash payment was refused. In addition to misgivings over the financial aspects of the question, Newton was 'rather afraid that appointment of a Japanese Chief Engineer, Manager and Chief Accountant would leave the Railway in the effective control of Japan', and he presumed that 'we should leave it to the Americans to take the lead in objecting to any features of the settlement which are unsatisfactory to China'. Later in December Balfour sent Curzon the full details of the Chinese and Japanese proposals to settle the railway issue and while they were complicated they clearly revealed the clash between China's desire for a quick settlement and Japan's wish to retain control.³⁸

Hughes, the American secretary of state, was aware of the Sino-Japanese arguments and he advised C.B. Warren, the American ambassador in Tokyo, accordingly. But Warren reported that China had no securities to offer for any loan to purchase the Shantung railway, and that China was already overdue with war-loan repayments.³⁹ China's internal weaknesses were undoubtedly reflected in the desperate conditions of her finances, and at the

beginning of the Washington conference Alston reported from Peking that a run had started upon the Chinese banks and the Chinese government were at the end of their resources.⁴⁰ Almost simultaneously, rivalry erupted within China among the Gihli, Anhwei, Fengtien and Communication cliques, and largely owing to the influence of Cheng Tso-lin, the Manchurian leader, the premiership of the country passed to Lieng Shih-i.⁴¹

In the hope of gaining some Japanese money, Lieng cabled the Chinese delegates in Washington instructing them to yield ground in the Shantung negotiations. But Wu P'ei-fu, a provincial leader who was mainly independent of the rival cliques, learnt of Lieng's actions and cabled the Chinese delegates criticising the premier in the sharpest terms.⁴² Wu also published his allegations that Lieng had betrayed China's rights in Shantung by seeking Japanese loans which entailed the perpetuation of Japan's grip upon the railway, and Lieng Shih-i was compelled to quit office, despite the efforts of Cheng Tso-lin to save him. Civil war recommenced in north China in January, 1922, ^{and} ~~which~~ lasted for some five months.

Possibly as a consequence of her internal divisions, China was not hesitant to discriminate against foreigners, and at the end of 1921 Alston was complaining bitterly against the boycott of British goods at Amoy.⁴³ In

addition to the trade boycott, a bridge connecting the foreshore with the concession lot of Messrs Butterfield and Swire had been damaged, and Alston spoke to the Chinese premier in very strong terms and refused to attend the President's new year's ball.

While Alston was endeavouring to safeguard British interests in China, opposition was voiced in the Foreign Office to the linking of Wei-hai Wei with the Shantung problem. With obvious reluctance Campbell of the far eastern department argued that if a settlement of the Shantung problem were reached Britain could hardly retain the territory, but Newton claimed that 'it seems unreasonable that we should be called upon to surrender Wei-hai Wei to China as the price of a settlement, the main advantages will accrue to China and the main credit for which will accrue to the United States of America'.⁴⁴ Winston Churchill, colonial secretary, argued for retention of the territory, and drew the Foreign Office's attention to a letter he had received from a far eastern businessman which stressed the importance of Wei-hai Wei as a port free from Chinese customs duties and the means whereby considerable goods were smuggled in and out of China.⁴⁵

Towards the end of December the British delegation was becoming increasingly concerned with the possible

influence of the Shantung problem upon American ratification of the Four power agreement which had already been reached, and the ultimate success of the conference, / Henkey wrote ^{and} in these terms to Lloyd George, the prime minister. ^{Also} 46 / Lempson warned Tsuneo Matsudaira, the secretary-general of the Japanese delegation, of the consequences of American failure to ratify, and reported that he had been informed that:

'Beron Shidehara was well aware of this and that Delegation were doing their best to find some way out. I then hinted that if unfortunately there was a permanent hitch over Shantung resulting in complications over ratification of the Quadruple Treaty I was personally very much afraid that there would be a repercussion upon public opinion which would find utterance in Parliament. I fancy this made some impression upon him for he said he perfectly understood the point and realised that this was so.' 47

But one day later Belfour encountered a difficult

Shidehara, the Japanese ambassador to Washington and a leading Japanese delegate.

Shidehara informed Belfour that Japan had rejected the Chinese proposals for the Shantung railway and was insisting upon a Japanese traffic manager and consulting engineer. 48 Japan opposed immediate payment for the railway by China because Japan felt 'that any attempt on the part of the Chinese to raise money would necessarily be accompanied by an appeal to anti-Japanese feeling throughout China'. But Belfour denied that this was

likely and sought to lower the temperature. He told Shidehara that it would be better if an arrangement were reached without the intervention of Hughes and himself, and he deprecated any step likely to lead to the breaking of the negotiations.

Hence the situation as the year ended was almost a stalemate over the question of the railway which had been described repeatedly as constituting the crux of the Shantung problem, although progress had been made concerning other matters involved in the province.

The January Negotiations

At the beginning of the new year, Tyrrell advanced another possible motive for Japan's hostility to China's proposals for an immediate payment for the railway. He argued that in the existing state of China's indebtedness the whole, or part, of the cost of the railway would have to be found by foreign countries who would thereby acquire influence in Shantung instead of Japan.⁴⁹ Japan was still insisting upon making a loan to China and there were signs that China would accept. Meanwhile, it had been 'impressed upon Japanese and Chinese delegations that it will be most unfortunate if they fail to reach a settlement prior to Mr Belfour's departure on 14th January'. To these developments Newton made the

point, 'There is still hope'.⁵⁰

In the second week of January, Balfour reported that the Shantung question was still in the melting pot, but if an agreement were reached it was almost essential that Britain should show her good faith by evacuating Wei-hai Wei. Both Newton and Tyrrell agreed that it was entirely up to Balfour to decide upon retrocession or not.⁵¹ While Balfour was arguing for a liberal attitude to China, Alston in Peking continued to be on bad terms with the Chinese government. He reported that the Chinese fleet was in arrears with pay and threats were being made to the salt administration near Chinkiang. Alston argued:

'My Japanese and French colleagues and I consider it desirable to ask for early authority from our governments to send a gunboat each to protect interests of bondholders of reorganization loan by upholding the authority of the central salt administration.' 52

Curzon agreed to the use of gun-boat tactics,⁵³ but before anything was done the Sino-Japanese negotiations over Shantung influenced the position.⁵⁴

Balfour reported that an impasse had been reached in the Sino-Japanese negotiations, and Tyrrell argued that it was only American pressure which was likely to bring the Chinese into line. But after a few days

Balfour stated that the negotiations had recommenced with all considerations of the railway being excluded and Japan had repeated her promise to withdraw her troops from Shantung as soon as China was capable of providing substitutes.⁵⁵

While the situation was beginning to look a little more hopeful at Washington, Warren, the United States ambassador, was exerting considerable pressure upon the Japanese government to reach an agreement concerning Shantung. He pointed out that the attitude of the Japanese at the conference had produced a most favourable impression in America, but this would be destroyed if no decision were reached. In such an event '... the question of Shantung would not be allowed to rest quiet but would be taken up again'.⁵⁶ Eliot, the British ambassador in Tokyo, saw the Japanese vice-minister for foreign affairs and was told that Japan was ready to go on trying to reach an agreement with the Chinese in order to facilitate ratification in the American senate, but 'whatever agreement may be made in Washington some powerful faction in China will refuse to accept it'.⁵⁷ The British ambassador concluded by reporting how active Warren was in his efforts to find a basis for a settlement.

In the third week of January, Belfour reported that practically all the points enumerated in the Japanese note of September 7th, 1921, had been disposed of except the railway and salt issues, and some minor details.⁵⁸ Almost at the same time Hughes argued that China stood to gain from an agreement for Japan had moved away from her ideas of joint ownership of the railway:

'The study which Mr Belfour and I have given to this question gives us reason to believe that there is within the reach of China the possibility of a settlement far more favourable than I had judged feasible when first studying this problem last summer.' 59

Negotiations on the railway issue had, however, reached a very difficult stage.

When Belfour and Hughes met on the 18th January they were concerned at the lack of Sino-Japanese progress towards a final settlement.⁶⁰ Hughes stated that Japan was reluctant to make a final offer, and there was a possibility of Japan wanting to benefit from China's chaotic state, but Hughes thought that the Chinese would not take the decision to bridge the gap between the two parties without some help from himself and Belfour. There was, however, a danger that any action undertaken might lead to Chinese accusations of Anglo-American interference, but Hughes thought that this was a risk

which should be faced. The American secretary commented upon the offers which Japan had made and recognised that the whole problem centred around a financial settlement for the railway, and he realised, as Balfour did, that there was Japanese suspicion of America and Chinese dislike of Britain. After further discussion it was agreed that Balfour should invite the Japanese delegates for an informal exchange of views on Shantung and that he should let them know that Hughes would be present. It was also agreed that Hughes should invite the Chinese delegates to a similar discussion and they be informed that Balfour would be present. 'At the interview with the Japanese, Mr Balfour should take the lead and in the interview with the Chinese, this role should fall upon Mr Hughes.' Within two days the first meeting was held with Shidehara of the Japanese delegation.

Both Balfour and Hughes made numerous suggestions to Shidehara in an effort to reach a compromise solution.⁶¹ Among the problems involved was the question of the nationality of the traffic manager, and it was proposed that joint managers be appointed. It was also suggested that the relevant appointments could be timed to satisfy both China and Japan.

When Hughes and Balfour met the Chinese delegates

shortly afterwards they exerted considerable pressure to induce the Chinese to modify their objections to the appointment of leading railway executives. Hughes argued that the Japanese were to a certain extent entrenched in Shantung by force and the Chinese were not strong enough to drive them out. Hughes also maintained that the Japanese 'were also to some extent entrenched legally', and if the present attempt failed to produce an agreement 'there could be no more Conferences on that question', and the chance which was offered 'was a great one for China to obtain results'.⁶² Hughes' comments must be considered somewhat remarkable for an American secretary of state to have made, but Balfour's associating himself with the views expressed was in keeping with British policy. Balfour begged the Chinese not to risk so much over the appointment of a subordinate official, and Wellington Koo agreed on behalf of China that Japanese apprehensions were understandable. But Koo asked whether such fears could not be reduced by the appointment of an associate traffic manager, 'After all, the Chinese had 37,000,000 people in Shantung against Japan's 20,000, and were entitled to the management of the railway'.

After the Chinese delegates had left the meeting, Hughes continued to discuss the situation with Balfour

and mentioned that even prominent Democrats who had very great sympathy for the Chinese people were convinced that they ought to accept the proposed agreement.⁶³ On the same day, Hughes sent a telegram to Schurman, the American minister in Peking, instructing him to put pressure upon the Chinese government to induce them to accept the proposed settlement for Shantung.⁶⁴

In London, Wellesley recognised that the Chinese government were under considerable pressure, and he debated whether a naval demonstration would persuade the Chinese to act more reasonably or if 'at this critical juncture [the demonstration] might possibly lead to a repetition of the truculent attitude which China adopted over the Tibetan negotiations when the Versailles decision about Shantung became known.'⁶⁵ In the circumstances advice was sent to Alston in Peking that naval action was undesirable.

At his own request, Sze, the Chinese delegate, had an interview with President Harding on the 25th January. It would seem that the interview was friendly but Harding reiterated the warning which Hughes had given the Chinese delegation a few days earlier, saying that:

'it would be a colossal blunder in statecraft if China were not to take

advantage of the opportunity now offered her for the settlement of the Shantung question as the alternative might involve a risk of losing the Province.' 66

Balfour was informed of the meeting and his report upon developments made it clear that he was well aware of the sharp tones which the United States government were using.⁶⁷

Within a few days of this interview, Balfour reported that, with the exception of the railway, a Sino-Japanese agreement upon Shantung had been reached. He forwarded a text of the agreement which was quite detailed and covered such matters as property transfers, mining rights, and wireless and telegraphic communications.⁶⁸ But when Balfour began to address the 73rd conference of the British Empire delegates on the last day of January, already more than a fortnight after Balfour's intention to leave for home, his tone was very pessimistic. He stated that both he and Hughes had sent very strong telegrams to their respective representatives in China and Japan, but that the Chinese government were still not agreeing to terms regarding the railway.⁶⁹ However, while the British conference was still in session, Balfour announced that an agreement on the railway problem had been reached which completed the terms for a Sino-Japanese treaty con-

coming Shantung.

Hughes announced the terms of the Sino-Japanese treaty to a plenary session of the Washington conference on the 1st February and from its main points it may be judged that although Japan retained measures of control, the agreement marked a considerable advance for China.

The main points were:

'Japan will, within six months from the date of the Treaty, restore to China the leased territory of Kiao-chow, and all public properties therein, without charge except for such additions and improvements as may have been made by Japan during the period of her occupation;

'All Japanese troops are to be withdrawn as soon as possible - from the line of the Railway within six months at the latest, and from the leased territory not later than 30 days from the date of its transfer to China;

'The customhouse at Tsingtao is at once to be made an integral part of the Chinese Maritime Customs;

'The Shantung Railway (Tsingtao-Tsinsufu) and appurtenant properties are to be transferred to China, the transfer to be completed within 9 months, at the latest, from the date of the coming into force of the Treaty; the value fixed being paid by China to Japan by Chinese Government treasury notes, secured on the properties and revenues of the Railway, and running for a period of 15 years, but redeemable either in whole or in part at any time after 5 years from the date of payment ... the Chinese Government to employ a Japanese subject as traffic manager, and a Japanese subject as one of two

chief accountants, under the authority and control of the Chinese managing director of the railway;' 70

There were other articles to the treaty some of which handed exclusive Japanese rights to the international consortium, a measure which was probably not very welcome in China. When the terms of the Shantung treaty were announced to the conference, Balfour stated that Britain would retrocede Wei-hai Wei and he made it clear that this step was closely linked to Japan's decisions concerning Shantung.⁷¹

Naturally Balfour reported the terms of the Sino-Japanese treaty to the Foreign Office immediately.⁷² Both Wellesley and Tyrrell were very pleased and argued that the agreement was the best guarantee for American ratification, but it is strange that Curzon's reactions are difficult to find. When the British cabinet met early in February they were informed by Curzon that the Washington conference had practically completed its task and they agreed that Curzon 'should telegraph to Mr Balfour the congratulations of the Cabinet to him upon the successful conclusion of the Washington Conference'. This Curzon did in quite handsome terms although one must question whether such a message was a mere formality.⁷³ Curzon seems to have been upset by the proposal to retrocede Wei-hai Wei for immediately

after the terms of the Sino-Japanese treaty were announced he commented that 'Mr Balfour has now given up Wei-hai Wei (as he evidently always meant to do) without even stipulating that the French should give up Kwangtung!' Moreover, in reply to the suggestion of his officials that it would be 'a graceful reference to express H.M. Government's full confidence that Mr Balfour has used his discretionary power to restore Wei-hai Wei to China in the best spirit of true statesmanship', Curzon said that he could not send another telegram 'congratulating him upon the one weak spot'.⁷⁴

It might be judged that at the Washington conference, Balfour and Curzon had reversed their standpoints in relation to China which they had taken up in 1919. In 1919 Balfour had been very critical of China, whereas Curzon had been more sympathetic, but at Washington the reverse was true.

The End of the Conference and some of its Consequences

On the day that the Sino-Japanese treaty was signed Balfour sent a very long dispatch to London reviewing the Shantung negotiations and the final settlement.⁷⁵ In Balfour's opinion there would be an end to a controversy which had embittered far-eastern relations and been a source of irritation between America and Britain,

provided that the terms of the agreement were faithfully carried out. He argued that:

'Although Shantung has been discussed outside the conference, it is to the influence of the conference that the settlement is due, and the disposal of this urgent and dangerous problem may be credited to the conference as one of its principal achievements.'

Balfour then began a historical review which in the light of his own role in the events which he describes is particularly interesting.

At the peace conference, Balfour stated, the Chinese discovered that all the powers except the United States 'were bound by understandings given in 1917 to support the Japanese claims to everything in Shantung which Japan had conquered from the Germans'. It is somewhat significant to note that Balfour did not refer to the Sino-Japanese treaties of 1915 and 1918 by which China was alleged to have 'voluntarily' surrendered Shantung to Japan. Indeed, Balfour went on to describe China's marked reactions against Japan in the early peace period and how apart from anti-Japanese boycotts, China brushed aside offers in January, 1920 and September, 1921 to negotiate over Shantung, 'The first offer was barely acknowledged; the second offer was refused in terms which amounted to discourtesy'.

Balfour continued by stating:

'Fortunately, during the three years which have followed the Paris Conference, the Japanese Government and people have learned that a policy of military aggressiveness is of doubtful advantage, and that it is a mistake to antagonise their nearest neighbour and one of their best customers.'

Balfour's description of the war-time and peace conference developments ^{is} ~~are~~ in glaring contrast to his earlier oft repeated criticisms of China not having spent a shilling nor lost a life in her efforts to regain Shantung.

Balfour then described how the Sino-Japanese negotiations began in December and his account makes it clear that very good Anglo-American cooperation prevailed. He stated that between the 11th and 26th January initiative was left to MacMurray of the American delegation, who did much to secure a settlement of all the issues except the railway, and on this latter issue both Balfour and Hughes had exerted pressure when the situation was in the balance.

When the terms of the Sino-Japanese treaty were agreed, Balfour continued, he and Hughes assured the Chinese delegates 'that the agreement reached would be spread on the records of the Conference. They were thus assured of a powerful moral guarantee, on which they set great store.' But Japan objected, and it was

left to the Japanese and Chinese delegates to report separately to the American and British representatives who were entitled to use the information as they thought fit. As already stated, when Hughes received his report he announced its terms to a plenary session of the conference.

It is clear that as all the major treaties and resolutions had been completed, or their main terms agreed to, the termination of the Washington conference was awaiting the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese agreement regarding Shantung, and two days after the agreement was signed on the 4th February, 1922, the conference closed. Belfour's account of the last full session indicates how much was achieved and what promise there was for better international relations in the future.⁷⁶

If the work of the Washington conference were considerable it must be noted that very little was surrendered by the powers as far as China was concerned, with the exception of Shantung, although they made numerous promises to modify their position. It has been argued by Dr Iriye that as a result of post-conference pessimism by the powers in implementing their promises, Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the Kuomintang transferred his hopes for help in China's reunification from the western powers, which resulted in considerable trouble

for British interests in China in the mid-1920s including rioting and a trade boycott.⁷⁷ Though such considerations are beyond the scope of this work, one can observe that except in the immediate post-Washington period the Shantung question ceased to exercise public opinion, and the British became an increasingly important target for anti-foreign activities, especially at the time of the Shanghai and Shemeen incidents of 1925. The question therefore arises whether Britain by helping to solve the Sino-Japanese dispute regarding Shantung did not succeed in making a rod for her own back.

There were, however, immediate Chinese doubts whether the Japanese had really surrendered their control over Shantung for the agreement still granted them at least important rights concerning the railway for a minimum period of five years. An article written by an American journalist, J.E. Baker, which sought to allay Chinese fears and had some obvious American high powered backing, was released to the Chinese press. The reactions of Ashton-Gwetkin and other members of the British delegation were that the article was 'An able exposition of what Japan has given up in Shantung to regain the good-will of China and the world. Mr Baker shows that in regard to Shantung, China has really

gained everything she could want.⁷⁸ But at the end of the year Sino-Japanese negotiations were still in progress for the transfer of the railway under the terms of the February agreement when the handover date was finally arranged for March, 1923.⁷⁹

It does not appear that the British cabinet discussed China when Balfour returned to Britain after the conference, although the far east was considered in relation to disarmament, and Balfour made the point that Britain had to choose 'between a naval peril and a financial peril'.⁸⁰ While it was natural that the disarmament aspects of the conference should be uppermost in the considerations of the cabinet, the ^{failure} ~~omission~~ ^{to discuss} of discussing China must be judged strange.

Early in March, 1922, Alston reported from Peking that there were fears that the Sino-Japanese agreement would prove detrimental to British interests in Tsingtee and that discrimination against British shipping would continue. Ashton-Gwetkin, who had returned to the far-eastern department, argued:

'Two dangers seem to threaten a satisfactory outcome of the Shantung Settlement. (1) That the Japanese may square the Chinese and remain in virtual control.

(2) That the Chinese, after assuming control, may prove themselves incapable of maintaining a decent administration.'

To this exposition Wellesley stated that he thought the first possibility to be more likely than the second.⁸¹

A dispatch which was revealing regarding Britain's attitude towards China was prepared by C.W. Campbell of the far eastern department when he considered the implementation of the Sino-Japanese agreement. He stated:

'The failure of the Japanese to insist on foreign representation in the future municipality at Tsingtao is inexplicable. Until China is fit for the abolition of extraterritoriality the municipal services of foreign settlements should be controlled by foreigners. It is absurd to attach importance to any statement such as was made by the Chinese Delegation at Washington that China intends to introduce a uniform system of regulations for foreign settlements. Let the Chinese reform the administration of their own numberless cities and towns, and show that they can manage public services of this kind efficiently by their own efforts ... before they are allowed to play about with the few square miles of foreign settlements in their large country. The mere fact that foreign settlements are still considered necessary has to be overcome before they can rationally propose to undertake the municipal affairs of our people. I agree entirely ... on the point of cooperation with the Americans on this question.'

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To these comments Archer, previously a vice-consul in

Tsingto, made the point that at the earlier Sino-Japanese discussions held on January 12th and 13th, MacMurrey and Jordan, who were present as observers, insisted that in the event of China gaining control of Tsingto, American and British subjects would not be liable to Chinese taxes.

Undoubtedly Campbell's description of China's internal conditions was correct, but the conclusions which he drew were contrary to the spirit of the Nine power treaty, to which Britain had only recently become a signatory, which promised respect for China's sovereignty.⁸³ In addition, Archer's comments make it clear that while the British and American delegates were putting pressure upon the Japanese representatives to yield ground, the western delegates were at the same time seeking to increase their own country's rights in the Shantung province.

1. C.L.A., gives a detailed account of the sessions and committee meetings. It contains a copy of [Cmd 1627] which gives the text of all the treaties and resolutions which were passed. See also Survey for International Affairs, 1920-1923, Part VI and relevant appendices. A Foreign Office memorandum, 8-1-1930, D.B.F.P.II(VIII) pp. 5-8 gives a short summary of main agreements reached.
2. C.L.A. pp. 827-8, gives text of Sino-Japanese agreement.
3. See Appendix 2 for the details of the delegations and their staffs.
4. At the conclusion of the conference, Newton of the far eastern department minuted, 9-2-1922, 'I doubt whether it is worth while writing to the Colonial Office, as, so far as I know, the Dominions Delegates played no part in the settlement of the Shantung question.' F.O. 371/7990 [588].
5. Balfour to Lloyd George, 17-11-1921, D.B.F.P.I. (XIV) pp. 482-4.
6. Balfour to Curzon, 1-12-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [4443].
7. Balfour to Curzon, 11-11-1921, D.B.F.P.I. (XIV) pp. 466-9.
8. Balfour to Curzon, 17-11-1921, D.B.F.P.I. (XIV) pp. 479-80.
9. Curzon to Balfour, 24-11-1921, D.B.F.P.I. (XIV) pp. 501-2.
10. See pp. 55-7 above.
11. 19-11-1921, C.L.A. pp. 447-8.
12. A Iriye, After Imperialism (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965), p. 18.
13. C.L.A. pp. 450-1.
14. Balfour to Curzon, 19-11-1921, D.B.F.P.I. (XIV) p. 488.

15. Alston to Curzon, 28-11-1921, D.B.F.P.I.(XIV)
p. 518.
16. Belfour to Curzon, report of discussion held on
17-11-1921, D.B.F.P.I.(XIV), p. 487.
17. See pp. 338 above.
18. Report of meeting, Committee for Pacific Affairs,
21-11-1921. C.L.A. p. 456.
19. Report of meeting, Committee for Pacific Affairs,
29-11-1921, C.L.A. pp. 502-17. See also F.O.
371/6662 [4717].
20. Curzon to Belfour, 17-12-1921, D.B.F.P.I.(XIV)
pp. 563-4.
21. Minutes by Newton and Wellesley, 30-12-1921.
F.O. 371/6662 [4855].
22. 6-2-1922, C.L.A. p. 895.
23. Belfour to Curzon, 25-11-1921 D.B.F.P.I.(XIV)
p. 511.
24. Hughes to Schurman, 25-11-1921, F.R.V.S.I, 1922,
pp. 934-5.
25. Alston to Curzon, 1-12-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [4437].
26. Belfour to Curzon, 30-11-1921, F.O. 371/6620
[4429].
27. Belfour to Curzon, 30-11-1921, Minutes by Newton,
Wellesley and Tyrrell, 1-12-1921, F.O. 371/6620
[4436].
28. Second meeting had taken place, 2-12-1921.
Belfour to Curzon, 4-12-1921, F.O. 371/6620
[4479].
29. Lempson to Curzon, 9-12-1921; Lansing's letter,
27-8-1919, Japanese reply 22-9-1919, F.O. 371/7989
[141].
30. Field, p. 280.

31. Newton's minute, 9-12-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [4548].
32. Wellesley's minute, 8-12-1921; F.O. 371/6620 [4524].
33. Cabinet meeting, 22-11-1921, Cab. 23-27, p. 191. It is important to note that China was discussed by a meeting of ministers which included Curzon, 24-11-1919, when marked opposition was expressed to retroceding Wei-hai Wei and the surrender of Boxer indemnity payments. Cab. 23-27, pp. 258-60.
34. Belfour reported that the Japanese delegates recognized the Anglo-Japanese alliance was ended and they thanked Belfour for all his work for Anglo-Japanese relations. Belfour to Curzon, 19-12-1921, D.B.F.P.I. (XIV), pp. 566-7.
35. Belfour to Curzon, 16-12-1921, Newton's minute, 19-12-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [4726].
36. Tyrrell's telegram to Lempson, 12-12-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [4691].
37. H.O. Yerdley, The American Black Chamber, (Indianapolis, 1931), p. 316.
38. Belfour to Curzon, 20-12-1921, F.O. 371/6620 [4764].
39. Warren to Hughes, 26-12-1921, F.R.U.S.I. 1922, pp. 938-9.
40. Alston to Curzon, 16-11-1921, D.B.F.P.I. (XIV) pp. 477-8.
41. Li Chien-nung, pp. 410-11.
42. Ibid., pp. 411-12.
43. Alston to Curzon, 24-12-1921 and 31-12-1921, D.B.F.P.I. (XIV), p. 576 and pp. 580-1.
44. Campbell and Newton's minutes, 21-12-1921, F.O. 371/6646 [4739].
45. Churchill's letter to F.O. 12-12-1921, F.O. 371/6611 [4602].
46. Letter from Hankey to Lloyd George, undated, probably 22-12-1921, D.B.F.P.I. (XIV), p. 570.

47. Lempson's interview with Matsudeira, 27-12-1921, F.O. 371/7989 [135].
48. Belfour met Shidehara, 28-12-1921, F.O. 371/7989 [137].
49. Tyrrell to Lempson, 4-1-1922, F.O. 371/7989 [103].
50. Belfour to Curzon, 5-1-1922, Newton's minute, 6-1-1922, F.O. 371/7989 [105].
51. Belfour to Crowe, 8-1-1922, Minutes by Newton 9-1-1922 and Tyrrell 10-1-1922, F.O. 371/7989 [127].
52. Alston to Curzon, 9-1-1922, D.B.F.P.I.(XIV) p. 591.
53. Curzon to Alston, 14-1-1922 D.B.F.P.I.(XIV) p. 609.
54. Belfour to Crowe, 10-1-1922, Tyrrell's minute 11-1-1922, F.O. 371/7989 [166].
55. Belfour to F.O., 12-1-1922 F.O. 371/7989 [189].
56. Eliot to F.O., 12-1-1922, F.O. 371/7989 [235].
57. Eliot to Curzon, 16-1-1922 F.O. 371/7989 [268].
58. Belfour to Curzon, 19-1-1922 F.O. 371/7989 [297].
59. Hughes to Schurman (Peking) 22-1-1922 F.R.U.S.I 1922, pp. 941-2.
60. R.A.C. Sperling, secretary to the British delegation, to F.O., 22-1-1922 F.O. 371/7990 [480].
61. Sperling to F.O., 20-1-1922, F.O. 371/7990 [545].
62. Memo of conversation held on 22-1-1922, F.O. 371/7990 [549].
63. Belfour to Curzon, 22-1-1922, F.O. 371/7990 [550].

64. Belfour to Curzon, 22-1-1922 F.O. 371/7990 [673].
65. Curzon to Alston, 24-1-1922, Wellesley's minute 23-1-1922, F.O. 371/7989 [313].
66. Hughes to Schurman, 25-1-1922, F.R.U.S.I 1922, p. 945.
67. Belfour to Curzon, 26-1-1922, F.O. 371/7990 [402].
68. Belfour to Curzon, 27-1-1922, F.O. 371/7990 [413].
69. Belfour to Curzon, 31-1-1922, F.O. 371/7990 [709].
70. Treaty was signed 4-2-1922, C.L.A. pp. 827-8.
71. Belfour to Curzon 2-2-1922, D.B.F.P.I.(XIV) pp. 627-8.
72. Belfour to Curzon, 31-1-1922, Wellesley and Tyrrell's minutes, 1-2-1922, F.O. 371/7990 [465].
73. Conclusions of Cabinet meeting, 2-2-1922, Cab 23-29. Curzon to Belfour, 3-2-1922 D.B.F.P.I.(XIV), p. 634.
74. Curzon's minute 3-2-1922, D.B.F.P.I.(XIV), pp. 625 and 628.
75. Belfour to Lloyd George, 4-2-1922 F.O. 371/7990 [716].
76. Belfour to Curzon, 6-2-1922, D.B.F.P.I.(XIV) pp. 643-5.
77. Iriye, pp. 48-50.
78. Joint minute by Ashton-Gwetkin, Archer and Tyrrell, 16-3-1922 and 17-3-1922, F.O. 371/7993 [863].
79. Statement of Japanese Foreign Office, 2-12-1922, F.R.U.S.I., 1922, pp. 968-9.
80. Cabinet meeting, 17-2-1922, Cab. 23-29, p. 134.
81. Alston to Curzon, 1-3-1922. Minutes by Ashton-Gwetkin, 20-4-1922 and Wellesley, 22-4-1922, F.O. 371/7995 [1420].

82. Minutes by Campbell, 30-3-1922 and Archer,
29-3-1922, F.O. 371/7995 [1229].

83. See pp. 352-3.

CONCLUSION

The Paris and Washington conferences which followed the first world war offered the British government two opportunities of establishing a more equitable basis for Anglo-Chinese relations than that whereby China was treated as a colonial country. But at these conferences no attempt was made to consider China's political aspirations sympathetically; and undoubtedly the policies which Britain pursued helped to generate Chinese hostility which was especially directed against British settlements in the mid-1920s.

In 1919 it was natural that the British government were more concerned with the far-eastern actions of America and Japan, who were powerful countries, than of China, who was lamentably weak. War-time developments had given Britain abundant cause to fear the political advances of Japan, but it was equally recognised that the economic strength of America could endanger Britain's position in China. Therefore, Britain apparently did not want to increase the number of variables in the far eastern situation by seeking a new understanding with China whose internal disorders would have rendered any agreement of doubtful value. But from British representatives in China like Alston,

Jordan and Pratt came numerous reports that China was resenting her position of international inferiority, while the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods and the May the Fourth movement supported their contentions that China should not be ignored. The continued absence of an effective central government, however, obscured the strength which China was deriving from growing nationalism, with the result that she was not accorded the respect that her position and potential power warranted.

Between 1919 and 1922 there were warnings from Foreign Office staff like Ashton-Gwatkin, Macleay and Wellesley concerning Japanese perfidity and speculations of Japan proving the 'Russia of the far east'. The Curzon-Chinde exchanges in the second half of 1919 may be seen to reflect apprehension at the extent to which Japan's activities could endanger British interests in China. But if Japan were recognised as being potentially dangerous one might think that an obvious counter-measure would be for Britain to adopt a more friendly attitude towards China. Hopes for such an outcome were, however, frustrated by Britain's assessment of China's internal position.

The Foreign Office had realised from the beginning of the Paris conference that the peace settlement would restore some of China's sovereignty by ratifying the

surrender of the extraterritorial rights and Boxer indemnity claims of Austria and Germany, while it was known that Soviet Russia had also forfeited these privileges. Even if the negative features of the Shantung settlement are considered, there is no doubt that China gained a stronger international position as a result of the treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless, her internal situation remained chaotic, and it was widely thought in London that China should show clear evidence of stability before further retrocessions were made. But whether it was possible for China to achieve stability while the powers enjoyed their degree of control over China's political and commercial centres must be questioned. It can be seen that the victorious powers surrendered very little. After careful deliberations the more generous policies advocated by Jordan in December, 1918 were rejected, and with only minor exceptions Britain decided to retain her rights and possessions in China. The records also show that in the Paris negotiations there was a contemptuous British attitude towards China.

These developments appear to justify the later Foreign Office memorandum in 1930 that the failure to adopt more liberal policies resulted in a golden opportunity to place Anglo-Chinese relations upon a sounder

footing being lost.¹ But such a comment, in addition to implying charges of incompetence and indifference, tends to obscure the reasons why a reappraisal of policy did not take place. As the British principals have not given their reasons, the answer may perhaps be found in the dispatches which show that, first, there was reluctance, despite growing misgivings, to break with Japan who had proved a 'loyal and trusted ally'; second, there was an awareness, especially by Curzon, that America would not enter into any form of firm alliance with Britain; third, there were hopes that Britain would extend her economic interests in China which militated against voluntary retrocessions; and finally there was Curzon's extreme annoyance with the Chinese government, at a fairly important stage of policy formulation, for their daring to sever negotiations with Britain for a settlement of the Tibetan question.

It was outside the scope of this work to review the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but it was observed that numerous British diplomats were either impressed with Japan's record as an ally, or apprehensive at the prospect of her becoming an enemy. Britain was interested in Japan mainly owing to naval considerations, but for various reasons it was felt that Japan should be allowed to maintain spheres of interest in China, and it was

argued that if Japan were approaching too close to British possessions she could be deflected fairly easily to Manchuria and other parts of the mainland where Britain had no interests. In 1919 it would seem that nobody envisaged a Japanese occupation of the whole of the Chinese coast which made an Anglo-Japanese conflict inevitable only some twenty years later. A more important question at the time was why Britain should risk upsetting Japan over China, especially as there were naval matters to be discussed which had an obvious influence upon a wide range of Anglo-American-Japanese relations.

American policies towards China, particularly those of Wilson, were generally liberal and sought the right of free movement of capital and goods into China, and opposed the concept of individual countries possessing exclusive spheres of interest. Such policies brought about friction with expansionist Japan, but America was also cool, and at times unfriendly, towards Britain for pursuing particularist aims. When Alston visited America in 1920 there was close informal talk of the need for an Anglo-Saxon understanding in the far east, but as the British cabinet deliberations of 1921 may reveal there was nothing like a definite offer from

America which could have led to an Anglo-American agreement concerning China, and fears regarding unilateral action on the Chinese mainland remained. The Nine Power Treaty which was concluded at Washington was regarded as a guarantee by the western powers against further encroachments upon Chinese sovereignty, but its terms proved ineffectual, as was proved in 1937. There can be little doubt that if Anglo-American relations had been closer China would have benefited, for Britain was prepared to upset America over China even less than she was Japan, and American policy towards China was clearly more sympathetic than Japan's.

The main purpose of Britain's acquisitions in China before 1914 was to further her economic interests in that country. Therefore, in the post-war period when Chinese nationalism was increasing the lesser concessions should have been surrendered to help prevent anti-British feelings gathering. But at a time when such conciliatory action might have proved effective, Carzon considered that to make surrenders to a Chinese government which was bankrupt and lacking in control was the height of lunacy. Consequently the reasoning which determined British policy was that China had to make reciprocal offers which would prove of economic advantage to Britain before concessions were made, or

territory retroceded. Such a policy overlooked the point that it is almost impossible to improve economic relations between two countries if political relations are bad, and it ignored Jordan's repeated claims that a bold unselfish approach to China would prove more advantageous to Britain than a rigid adherence to treaty rights. If Britain were obliged to consider China only after studying the interplay of American and Japanese actions, it was surely necessary to be able to manoeuvre concerning treaty rights and concessions, and the value of some of the marginal privileges indicates that a generous attitude in an attempt to improve Anglo-Chinese relations would not have been too venturesome. Undoubtedly Curzon's policy concerning treaty rights was a mistaken one, as the famous December Memorandum of 1926 which sought to reverse it shows; its adoption in 1919 limited Britain's actions in the one main field where she was free to be flexible to China. This uncompromising attitude may be judged to have stemmed from the British government and officials regarding China still as a type of colonial country whose political aspirations were of small concern.

Obviously, some consideration of the statesmen is relevant to an assessment of policy, especially Balfour and Curzon who were the main British principals

involved. While foreign secretary Balfour was undoubtedly inadequately briefed concerning far eastern affairs, but later when Balfour led the British delegation to the Washington conference he exercised an adequate command over the situation. Curzon displayed a good knowledge of far-eastern affairs from the moment that he took over Balfour's desk at the Foreign Office in January, 1919, but in the second half of the year his growing sympathy for China was turned into antipathy by the action of the Chinese government in severing negotiations with Britain over Tibet. China's actions were reprehensible, but Curzon with his service in India was obviously too sensitive, and he tended to regard China's breaking-off ^{of} the negotiations as much as an act of impertinence as bad faith. The Tibetan issue was unfortunate and untimely for Anglo-Chinese relations, for it made Curzon less prepared to try to understand the Chinese point of view.

Thus, while there were weaknesses in Britain's policy to China and her handling of the Shantung problem, there can be no doubt that the policies which were decided upon were the result of careful deliberations, and if a golden opportunity had been missed to establish better relations it was not apparent to the Foreign Office at the time. The Shantung problem was of

considerable importance for it presented a fundamental dilemma in a limited form: whether Britain would line up with America and China on ~~the~~ one hand, or remain close to her ally Japan on the other. From the evidence my own conclusion is that Britain had clear warning that China, despite her chaos, should be treated with more respect, and by disregarding the growth of Chinese nationalism Britain took the first major step towards the destruction of her interests in China.

Footnote

1. Foreign Office memorandum, 8-1-1930, D.B.F.P. II (VIII), p. 5.

APPENDIX ITHE MAIN BRITISH STATESMEN, DIPLOMATS AND OFFICIALS
CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM OF SHANTUNG

The biographical details which are given below are generally restricted to those that are relevant to an assessment of the Shantung issue; only limited reference is made to details which have a bearing upon other far eastern and foreign affairs.

Individuals who attended the Paris peace conference or the Washington conference, or both, either as delegates or officials are marked with an asterisk.*

Alston, Sir Beilby Francis. B. 1868.

Acting counsellor at Peking. January-July, 1912.

APPENDIX ITHE MAIN BRITISH STATESMEN, DIPLOMATS AND OFFICIALS
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Alston, Sir Beilby Francis. B. 1868.

Acting counsellor at Peking, January-July, 1912.

Employed in Foreign Office, September 1912-April, 1913.

Acting counsellor and charge d'affairs at Peking, June-November, 1913.

Service in China, 1916-17.

Minister plenipotentiary at Tokyo, April, 1919-March, 1920.

Minister plenipotentiary at Peking, March, 1920-August, 1922.

Archer, Henry, Allen, Fairfax, Best B. 1887

In charge at Tsingtao, vice-consulate from
August, 1919.

Employed in Foreign Office as 2nd class assistant,
March-August, 1922.

*Ashton-Gwetkin, Frank, Trelewny, Arthur. B. 1889

Employed on special service at Singapore, 1918

1st Assistant, January, 1920.

2nd Secretary, January, 1921.

Attended the Washington conference, 1921-22.

*Balfour, Arthur, James. B. 1848.

Prime minister, 1902-5.

First lord of the Admiralty, 1915-16.

Secretary of state for foreign affairs, December,
1916-October, 1919.

A leading member of the British delegation to Paris
peace conference, 1919.

President of the council, 1919-22.

Led British delegation to Washington conference,
Crested an earl, 1922.

Barclay, Colville, Adrien, de Rune. B. 1869.

Periodically charge d'affaires at Washington,
1914-19.

Campbell, Charles, William. B. 1861.

Extensive service in China as consul-general and

first secretary level until he retired in 1911.
Re-appointed a temporary clerk in the Foreign
Office, March 1918.

*Cecil, Lord Edger, Algernon, Robert. B. 1864.

Parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign
affairs, 1915.

Assistant secretary of state for foreign affairs
to rank directly after the secretary of state,
July, 1918.

Attached to the Paris peace delegation but resigned
14 January, 1919.

Attended first Assembly of the League, 1920, as
one of the delegates from South Africa.

Clive, Robert, Henry. B. 1877.

Employed in Foreign Office, May 1919 after having
been a charge d'affaires.

Counsellor of embassy at Peking, January, 1920.

*Crowe, Sir Eyre. B. 1864.

Assistant under-secretary of state, 1912.

Minister plenipotentiary at Paris peace conference.

Permanent under-secretary of state, 1920.

Curzon of Kedleston, (George Nathaniel Curzon) B. 1859.

Parliamentary under-secretary, 1895-98.

Governor-general of India, 1898-1904.

Lord president of the council, December, 1916-

October, 1919.

Acting foreign secretary in Balfour's absence at the Paris conference.

Foreign secretary, October, 1919-January, 1924.

Davidson, John, Wallace, Ord. B. 1888.

Acting vice-consul, Canton, 1915.

Active in France with the Chinese Labour Corps, 1917-18.

Resumed work in the consular service, November, 1918.

Acting consul at Hengchow, February, 1920.

*Drummond, Sir James, Eric. B. 1876.

Private secretary to Balfour, December, 1916.

Promoted senior clerk, February, 1918.

Attached to British delegation to Paris peace conference delegation.

Appointed first secretary-general of the League of Nations, May, 1919.

*Geddes, Sir Auckland, Campbell. B. 1879.

British ambassador at Washington, March, 1920-February, 1924.

Attended the Washington conference.

Graham, Sir Ronald, William. B. 1870.

Assistant under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1916.

Acting permanent under-secretary of state during the absence of Lord Hardinge at the Paris peace conference.

Greene, Sir William, Coyngem. B. 1854.

Ambassador at Tokyo, 1912-19.

Gregory, John, Duncan. B. 1878.

Acting first secretary in diplomatic service, 1914.

Assistant secretary in Foreign Office, 1920.

Grey, Viscount of Follodon (Edward Grey). B. 1862.

Secretary of state for foreign affairs, December, 1905-December, 1916.

Ambassador extraordinary on special mission to United States, August, 1919-March, 1920.

Handley-Derry, Henry, Forster. B. 1879.

Acting vice-consul at Tientsin at various times, 1916-18.

Promoted a vice-consul in China, April, 1919.

*Hankey, Lord (Maurice Pascal Aelfs Hankey). B. 1877.

Secretary: Committee Imperial Defence, 1912-38.

War cabinet 1916

Imperial war cabinet 1917-18.

Cabinet 1919-38

Secretary of the British Empire delegation to Paris peace conference.

Attended the Washington conference.

*Hardinge of Penhurst (Charles Hardinge). B. 1858.

Permanent under-secretary for foreign affairs,
June, 1916.

Superintending ambassador, Paris peace conference
delegation.

Harmsworth, Cecil, Bishop. B. 1869.

Parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign
affairs, January, 1919.

*Hurst, Sir Cecil, James, Berrington. B. 1870.

Legal adviser to Foreign Office, August, 1918.
Attached to Paris peace delegation.

*Jordan, Sir John, Newell. B. 1852.

Minister plenipotentiary in Peking, May, 1906-
March, 1920.

Attended the Washington conference as a member
of the British delegation.

*Lampson, Miles Wedderburn. B. 1886.

Acting second secretary at Tokyo, 1908.

Acting first secretary at Peking, 1916-1919.

Attended the Washington conference.

Counsellor in Foreign Office, 1922.

Minister plenipotentiary at Peking, 1926-1933.

Crested Baron Killearn, 1943.

Langley, Sir Walter. B. 1855.

Assistant under-secretary of state, 1907-1918.

* Lloyd George, David. B. 1863.

Prime minister, December, 1916-1922.

Led British delegation to Paris peace conference.

Was appointed a delegate to the Washington conference but did not attend.

Crested an earl in 1945.

*Lothian, Lord (Philip Henry Kerr). B. 1882.

Secretary to the prime minister, 1916-21.

Attended the Paris peace conference.

MacDonald, Sir Claude, Maxwell. B. 1852.

Ambassador in Tokyo, 1906-1912.

*Maclesy, Sir James, William, Ronald. B. 1870.

Promoted 1st secretary, 1908.

Counsellor of embassy, Peking, 1914.

Transferred to Foreign Office, 1916.

Attached to Paris peace delegation.

Appointed minister plenipotentiary to Argentine Republic, January, 1920.

Transferred to Peking, September, 1922.

Appointed chief delegate to special China tariff conference at Peking, September, 1925.

*Malin, Herbert, William. B. 1883.

Assistant legal adviser in Foreign Office, 1914.

Given rank of 1st secretary in diplomatic service while in attendance at Paris peace conference.

Attended the Washington conference.

MaxMuller, William, Grenfell. B. 1867.

Counsellor of legation at Peking, 1909.

Returned to Foreign Office, 1910.

One time consul-general at Budapest.

Returned to Foreign Office, 1914.

Appointed minister plenipotentiary in diplomatic service, 1918.

Prett, Sir John, Thomas. B. 1876.

Student interpreter in China, 1898.

Promoted out of H.M. vice-consuls in China, 1910.

Consul at Tsinsu, 1913.

Consul-general at Tsinsu and other posts in China, 1919-26.

Acting counsellor in Foreign Office, 1929.

Reading, Earl (Rufus Daniel Isaacs). B. 1860.

Ambassador extraordinary on special mission to the United States, January, 1918-May, 1919.

*Sperling, Rowland, Arthur, Charles. B. 1874.

Senior clerk in Foreign Office, 1913.

Attached to Paris peace delegation.

Attended the Washington conference.

Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil, Arthur. B. 1859.

Ambassador to Washington, 1913-18.

Teichmen, Sir Eric. B. 1884.

Attached to legation at Peking as senior chancery assistant, 1913-17.

On special service on Tibetan frontier, September, 1917-May, 1919.

Appointed second secretary in the diplomatic service, May, 1920.

Employed in Foreign Office, 1921.

Acting assistant Chinese secretary, 1922.

Attached to China tariff conference, Peking, 1925.

Counsellor of embassy, 1927.

Tilley, Sir John, Anthony, Cecil. B. 1869.

Acting assistant under secretary of state for foreign affairs, January, 1919.

Assistant secretary in Foreign Office, April, 1919.

Ambassador to Tokyo, February, 1926.

* Tufton, Charles, Henry. B. 1879.

Parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, July, 1910.

Assistant clerk, 1911.

Senior clerk, 1918.

Counsellor of embassy while in attendance at Paris peace conference.

Assistant secretary in Foreign Office, January, 1920.

*Tyrrell, Sir William George. B. 1866.

Private secretary to Sir Edward Grey, 1907-15.

Assistant under-secretary of state, October, 1918.

Minister plenipotentiary at Paris peace conference.

Wellesley, Sir Victor, Alexander, Augustus, Henry. B. 1876.

Senior clerk, 1913.

Assistant secretary, April, 1919.

Assistant under-secretary of state, February, 1924.

Deputy under-secretary of state, May, 1925.

APPENDIX II

THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED STATES, CHINA AND JAPAN CONCERNED WITH THE SHANTUNG PROBLEM WHO ATTENDED THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, 1919 AND/OR THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, 1921-22

The political representatives and officials from the United Kingdom who attended the conferences are shown in Appendix I. While delegates from the British Empire, namely, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India, attended the two conferences, the records show that they played no part in deciding the Shantung settlements and their names are therefore omitted.

Paris Peace Conference

United States

W. Wilson, President	} Pleni- potentiary Delegates (5 places)
R. Lansing, Secretary of State	
E. House, President's Secretary	
H. White, former U.S. Ambassador at Paris and Rome	
J.H. Bliss, military expert.	

Officials and Advisers

E.T. Williams, former Chief of Far Eastern Division, State Department.

D.H. Miller, legal adviser.

J.W. Lemort, financial expert.

S.K. Hornbeck, for eastern affairs adviser.

R.S. Baker, press officer.

Dr J.T. Shotwell, historical questions.

China

Lo o Tseng-tsiang, Minister of Foreign Affairs	} Plenipotentiary Delegates (2 Places)
Cheng-ting T. Wang, former Minister of Agriculture and Commerce.	
V.K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Minister at Washington.	
So-Ke Alfred Sze, Chinese Minister at London	
Suntchou Wei, Chinese Minister at Brussels.	

Officials

Lin Chung-Cheh, Counsellor of the cabinet.

Wang-Chin-chun, Director of the Peking-Hankow railway.

C.C. Wang, Counsellor of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce.

Sir John MacLeavy Brown, Counsellor of the Legation of China at London.

^G
Dr ~~S.~~E. Morrison, Political Counsellor of the
Presidency of the Republic of China.

Wun~~g~~ King, Assistant Secretary.

Japan

Marquis Saionji^A, former President of the
Council of Ministers.

Baron Makino, former Minister of Foreign
Affairs.

Viscount Chinda, Japanese Ambassador at
London.

M.K. Matsui, Japanese Ambassador at Paris.

M.H. Ijuin, Japanese Ambassador at Rome.

} Pleni-
potentiary
Delegates
(5 places)

Officials

Colonel Negai, Military Attache.

K. Nishihara, general staff.

Sadao Saburi, Secretary.

M. Arita, Secretary.

Washington Conference

United States

C.E. Hughes, Secretary of State.

H. Cabot Lodge, Senator.

E. Root, former Secretary of State.

O.W. Underwood, Senator.

} Delegates

Officials

E. Bell, Counsellor of Embassy.

J.V.A. MacMurray, Chief of Far Eastern Division,
State Department.

S.K. Hornbeck, Department of State.

E.T. Williams, formerly Chief of Far Eastern
Division, State Department.

China

Seo-Ke Alfred Sze, Chinese minister at
Washington.

V.K. Wellington Koo, Chinese minister
at London.

Dr Chung-Hui Weng, Chief Justice of
China.

Cheo-Chu Wu.

} Delegates

Officials

Vice-Admiral Ting-Ken Tsei.

Wunsg King, Secretary.

Dr Hawking Yen, adviser.

Japan

Admiral Baron T. Kato, Minister of the
Navy.

Baron K. Shidehara, Japanese Ambassador)

} Delegates

at Washington.

Prince I. Tokugawa, President of the
House of Peers.

M. Henihara, Vice-Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

} Delegates

Officials

K. Debuchi, Counsellor of Embassy.

Sadso Seburi, Counsellor of Embassy.

Yameto Ichihashi, First Secretary of Embassy.

Kihashi Kensi, Secretary of the Department of
Imperial Railways.

APPENDIX IIIGERMANY AND CHINACONVENTION RESPECTING THE LEASE OF KIAOCHOW - MARCH 6, 1898.

The incidents connected with the Mission in the Prefecture of Tsoo-chau-foo, in Shantung, being now closed, the Imperial Chinese Government consider it advisable to give a special proof of their grateful appreciation of the friendship shown to them by Germany. The Imperial German and the Imperial Chinese governments, therefore, inspired by the equal and mutual wish to strengthen the bonds of friendship which unite the two countries, and to develop the economic and commercial relations between the subjects of the two States, have concluded the following separate Convention:-

SECTION I

ARTICLE I. - Rights ceded to German troops. - His Majesty the Emperor of China, guided by the intention to strengthen the friendly relations between China and Germany, and at the same time to increase the military readiness of the Chinese Empire, engages, while reserving to himself all rights of sovereignty in a zone of 50 kilometres (100 Chinese li) surrounding the Bay of

Kiao-chau at high-water, to permit the free passage of German troops within this zone at any time, as also to abstain from taking any measures, or issuing any Ordinances therein, without the previous consent of the German Government, and especially to place no obstacle in the way of any regulation of the water-courses which may prove to be necessary.

Rights reserved. - His Majesty the Emperor of China, at the same time, reserves to himself the right to station troops within that zone, in agreement with the German Government, and to take other military measures.

ARTICLE II. - Territory leased. - With the intention of meeting the legitimate desire of His Majesty the German Emperor, that Germany, like other Powers, should hold a place on the Chinese coast for the repair and equipment of her ships, for the storage of materials and provisions for the same, and for other arrangements connected therewith, His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Germany on lease, provisionally for ninety-nine years, both sides of the entrance to the Bay of Kiao-chau. Germany engages to construct, at a suitable moment, on the territory thus ceded, fortifications for the protection of the buildings to be constructed there and of the entrance to the harbour.

ARTICLE III. - Limits of territory leased. - In order to avoid the possibility of conflicts, the Imperial Chinese Government will abstain from exercising rights of sovereignty in the ceded territory during the term of the lease, and leaves the exercise of the same to Germany within the following limits:-

(1) On the northern side of the entrance to the bay:

The peninsula bounded to the north-east by a line drawn from the north-eastern corner of Potato Island to Loshen Harbour.

(2) On the southern side of the entrance to the bay:

The peninsula bounded to the south-west by a line drawn from the south-westermost point of the bay lying to the south-south-west of Chiposen Island in the direction of Tolosen Island.

(3) The Island of Chiposen and Potato Island.

(4) The whole water area of the bay up to the highest water-mark at present known.

(5) All islands lying seaward from Kiao-chau Bay, which may be of importance for its defence, such as Tolosen, Chelienchow, &c.

Delimitation. - The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves to delimit more accurately, in accordance with local traditions, the boundaries of the territory leased to Germany and of the 50-kilometer zone around

the bay, by means of Commissioners to be appointed on both sides.

Rights of Chinese ships in Kiao-chau Bay. - Chinese ships of war and merchant-vessels shall enjoy the same privileges in the Bay of Kiao-chau as the ships of other nations on friendly terms with Germany; and the entrance, departure, and sojourn of Chinese ships in the bay shall not be subject to any restrictions other than those which the Imperial German Government, in virtue of the rights of sovereignty over the whole of the water area of the bay transferred to Germany, may at any time find it necessary to impose with regard to the ships of other nations.

ARTICLE IV. - Navigation signals. - Germany engages to construct the necessary navigation signals on the islands and shallows at the entrance of the bay.

Port dues. - No dues shall be demanded from Chinese ships of war and merchant-vessels in the Bay of Kiao-chau, except those which may be levied upon other vessels for the purpose of maintaining the necessary harbour arrangements and quays.

ARTICLE V. - Return of leased territory. - Should Germany at some future time express the wish to return Kiao-chau Bay to China before the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expenditure

she has incurred at Kiso-chsu, and to cede to Germany a more suitable place.

Germany engages at no time to sublet the territory leased from China to another Power.

Chinese in leased territory. - The Chinese population dwelling in the ceded territory shall at all times enjoy the protection of the German Government, provided that they behave in conformity with law and order; unless their land is required for other purposes they may remain there.

If land belonging to Chinese owners is required for any other purpose, the owner will receive compensation therefor.

Customs stations. - As regards the re-establishment of Chinese customs stations which formerly existed outside the ceded territory, but within the 50-kilometer zone, the Imperial German Government intends to come to an agreement with the Chinese Government for the definitive regulation of the customs frontier, and the mode of collecting customs duties, in a manner which will safeguard all the interests of China, and proposes to enter into further negotiations on the subject.

SECTION II - RAILWAY AND MINING AFFAIRS

ARTICLE I. - The Chinese Government sanctions the construction by Germany of two lines of railway in Shantung. The first will run from Kiao-cheu via Weihsien, Tsingchofu, Poshen, Tzechwen and Tsoeping to Tsinen and the boundary of Shantung. The second line will run from Kiao-cheu to Ichowfu, and from there to Tsinen via Liwuhsien. But the construction of the extension from Tsinen to the boundary of Shantung shall not be begun until the railway is completed as far as Tsinen in order that further consideration may be given by the Chinese as to how they will connect this with their own trunk line. The route to be taken by this last branch will be definitely determined in the regulations which will be drawn up hereafter.

ARTICLE II. - In order to carry out the above-mentioned railway work, a Sino-German Company shall be formed. This Company may have offices in one place or in several places, and both German and Chinese merchants shall be at liberty to invest money therein, and share in the appointment of directors for the management of the undertaking.

ARTICLE III. - Germany and China shall in the near future draw up a further agreement relative to the

management of the railway by the Company, and all matters pertaining thereto shall be discussed and decided upon by these two countries alone. But the Chinese Government shall afford every facility to the Sino-German Company in the construction of the road, and it shall enjoy all the advantages and benefits extended to other Chinese-foreign companies operating in China. It is understood that the object of this agreement is solely the development of commerce, and in constructing this railroad there is no intention to unlawfully seize any land in the Province of Shantung.

ARTICLE IV. - The Chinese Government will allow German subjects to hold and develop mining property for a distance of thirty li from each side of those railways and along the whole extent of the lines.* The following places where mining operations may be carried on are particularly specified: Weihsien and Poshen along the line of the northern railway from Kiao-chau to Tainan, and Ichow, Leiwhsien, etc., along

* By a subsequent agreement dated July 24, 1911 (attached to the Mining Regulations of 1900, No. 1900/4 post), Article IV was modified by the substitution of specific mining areas in lieu of the general grant of mining rights within 30 li (approximately 10 miles) on either side of the line of the Shantung Railway.

the southern or Kiao-chau-Ichow-Tsinan line. Both German and Chinese capital may be invested in these mining and other operations, but as to the rules and regulations relating thereto, this shall be left for future consideration. The Chinese Government shall afford every facility and protection to German subjects engaged in these works, just as provided for above in the article relating to railway construction, and all the advantages and benefits shall be extended to them that are enjoyed by the members of other Chinese-foreign companies. The object in this case is also the development of commerce solely.

SECTION III - COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS IN SHANTUNG

The Chinese Government binds itself in all cases where foreign assistance, in persons, capital or material, may be needed for any purpose whatever within the Province of Shantung, to offer the said work or supplying of materials in the first instance to German manufacturers and merchants engaged in undertakings of the kind in question. In case German manufacturers or merchants are not inclined to undertake the performance of such works, or the furnishing of materials, China shall then be at liberty to act as she pleases.

The above Agreement shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both the Contracting States, and the ratifications exchanged in such manner that, after the receipt in Berlin of the Treaty ratified by China, the copy ratified by Germany shall be handed to the Chinese Minister in Germany.

The foregoing Treaty has been drawn up in four copies, two in German and two in Chinese, and was signed by the Representatives of the two Contracting States on the 6th March, 1898, corresponding to the 14th day of the second month in the twenty-fourth year Kuang-hsu.

(Great Seal of the Tsung-li Yamen.)

(Signed)

BARON VON HEYKING,

The Imperial German Minister.

LI HUNG-CHANG (in Chinese),

Imperial Chinese Grand Secretary,

Minister of the Tsung-li Yamen, &c., &c.

WENG TUNG-HO (in Chinese),

Imperial Chinese Grand Secretary,

Member of the Council of State,

Minister of the Tsung-li Yamen, &c., &c.

APPENDIX IVDOCUMENTS REGARDING JAPAN'S TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS OF 1915*

A. JAPAN'S ORIGINAL DEMANDS AS HANDED TO THE PRESIDENT,
YUAN SHIH-K'AI, BY MR HIOKI, THE JAPANESE MINISTER,
JANUARY 18, 1915.

(Japanese Translation)

Group I

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous to maintain the general peace in the Far East and to strengthen the relations of amity and good neighborhood existing between the two countries, agree to the following articles:

ARTICLE I. The Chinese Government engage to give full assent to all matters that the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions, which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses vis-a-vis China in relation to the

* The Sino-Japanese Negotiations of 1915, Japanese and Chinese Documents and Chinese Official Statement, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet No. 45.

Province of Shantung.

ARTICLE II. The Chinese Government engage that, within the Province of Shantung or along its coast, no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any other Power, under any pretext whatever.

ARTICLE III. The Chinese Government agree to Japan's building a railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkow with the Kiao-chou-Tsinsenfu Railway.

ARTICLE IV. The Chinese Government engage to open of their own accord, as soon as possible, certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung for the residence and commerce of foreigners. The places to be so opened shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.

Group II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that the Chinese Government has always recognized the predominant position of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

ARTICLE I. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Deiren and the term respecting the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended

to a further period of 99 years respectively.

ARTICLE II. The Japanese subjects shall be permitted in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to lease or own land required either for erecting buildings for various commercial and industrial uses or for farming.

ARTICLE III. The Japanese subjects shall have liberty to enter, reside and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and to carry on business of various kinds - commercial, industrial and otherwise.

ARTICLE IV. The Chinese Government grant to the Japanese subjects the right of mining in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards the mines to be worked, they shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.

ARTICLE V. The Chinese Government agree that the consent of the Japanese Government shall be obtained in advance, (1) whenever it is proposed to grant to other nationals the right of constructing a railway or to obtain from other nations the supply of funds for constructing a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and (2) whenever a loan is to be made with any other Power, under security of the taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

ARTICLE VI. The Chinese Government engage that whenever the Chinese Government need the service of political, financial or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or in Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan shall first be consulted.

ARTICLE VII. The Chinese Government agree that the control and management of the Kirin-Chengchun Railway shall be handed over to Japan for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this Treaty.

Group III.

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, having regard to the close relations existing between Japanese capitalists and the Hen-Yeh-Ping Company and desiring to promote the common interests of the two nations, agree to the following articles:

ARTICLE I. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hen-Yeh-Ping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and that, without the consent of the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government shall not dispose or permit the Company to dispose of any right or property of the Company.

ARTICLE II. The Chinese Government engage that, as a necessary measure for protection of the invested

interests of Japanese capitalists, no mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Hen-Yeh-Ping Company shall be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by anyone other than the said Company; and further that whenever it is proposed to take any other measure which may likely affect the interests of the said Company directly or indirectly, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.

Group IV.

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China, agree to the following article:

The Chinese Government engage not to cede or lease any other Power any harbour or bay or any island along the coast of China.

Group V.

1. The Chinese Central Government to engage influential Japanese as political, financial and military advisers;

2. The Chinese Government to grant the Japanese hospitals, temples and schools in the interior of China the right to own land;

3. In the face of many police disputes which have hitherto arisen between Japan and China, causing no little annoyance, the police in localities (in China), where such arrangements are necessary, to be placed under joint Japanese and Chinese administration, or Japanese to be employed in police offices in such localities, so as to help at the same time the improvement of the Chinese Police Service;

4. China to obtain from Japan supply of a certain quantity of arms, or to establish an arsenal in China under joint Japanese and Chinese management and to be supplied with experts and materials from Japan;

5. In order to help the development of the Nancheng-Kiukiang Railway, with which Japanese capitalists are so closely identified, and with due regard to the negotiations which have for years been pending between Japan and China in relation to the railway question in South China, China to agree to give to Japan the right of constructing a railway to connect Wucheng with the Kiukiang-Nancheng line, and also the railways between Nancheng and Hangchow and between Nancheng and Chsochou;

6. In view of the relations between the Province of Fukien and Formosa and of the agreement respecting the non-alienation of that province, Japan to be

consulted first whenever foreign capital is needed in connection with the railways, mines and harbour works (including dockyards) in the Province of Fukien;

7. China to grant to Japanese subjects the right of preaching in China.

B. COUNTER-PROJECT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, HANDED TO MR HIOKI ON FEBRUARY 12, 1915.

(Japanese Translation)

Group I

The Governments of China and Japan, being sincerely desirous to maintain the general peace of the Far East and further strengthen the friendly relations and good neighborhood subsisting between the two countries, have concluded the following articles:

ARTICLE I: The Chinese Government declare that they will give full assent to the dispositions that may hereafter be agreed upon between the Japanese and German Governments in regard to all interests which Germany possesses in the Province of Shantung by virtue of treaties or recorded cases (excepting the provisions of Section I of the Convention for the Lease of Kiao-chow to Germany).

The Japanese Government declare that, when the assent of the Chinese Government in regard to the interests above referred to has been given, Japan will restore Kiao-chow to China, and they recognize the right of the Chinese Government to participate in the negotiations mentioned in the preceding clause between the Japanese and German Governments.

ARTICLE II. The Japanese Government agree that they will be entirely responsible in regard to indemnification for losses of all kinds occasioned by Japan's military operations in Kiao-chow; and although the Customs, telegraphs and posts within the leased territory of Kiao-chow will, pending the restoration of Kiao-chow, be administered for the present as heretofore, the military railways and telegraphs which were constructed for the use of the Japanese troops will be immediately removed; and the Japanese forces remaining outside the leased territory of Kiao-chow will first be withdrawn at the time of the restoration of Kiao-chow to China.

ARTICLE III. In case the Chinese Government propose themselves to construct a railway from Chefoo and Lungkou to connect with the Kiao-chow-Tsinan Railway and raise a foreign loan for the purpose, they agree, provided Germany is willing to abandon the right to

furnish capital for the Chefoo-Weihsien line, to negotiate first with Japanese capitalists.

ARTICLE IV. The Chinese Government agree, for purposes of foreign trade, to select suitable places in the Province of Shantung and open them as ports; and the regulations relating to such ports will be determined by China herself.

Group II.

The Japanese Government declare that they will always respect the complete sovereignty of China in the Three Eastern Provinces, and accordingly the Chinese and Japanese Governments have, with a view to the development of their commercial relations in the southern portion of the Three Eastern Provinces, agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE I. The Chinese Government agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dairen shall be extended to ninety-nine years, expiring in the eighty-sixth year of the Republic or in the year 1997 of the Christian era, and that the time for the restoration of the entire South Manchuria Railway to China shall be extended to ninety-nine years, falling due in the ninetieth year of the Republic or in the year 2001 of the Christian era, and further that in all other matters the provisions of

the respective original treaties shall be adhered to.

ARTICLE II. The Chinese Government consent, upon the expiration of the term of the Japanese management of the Antung-Mukden Railway, to negotiate with Japan respecting the manner of extending the said term and to continue to carry into effect all other provisions according to Art. VI of the Annex to the Agreement relating to Manchuria concluded between Japan and China.

ARTICLE III. The Chinese Government shall select places, in addition to the ports already opened, in the Three Eastern Provinces and of their own accord open them to trade, and after fixing the boundary lines, permit merchants of Japan and other countries freely to reside, trade, and carry on commercial and industrial business of all kinds, and also to rent land, after fair negotiation with the respective owners of such land with regard to rental, for the erection of buildings required for commercial and industrial purposes. Such merchants, however, shall equally pay taxes and contributions imposed upon them.

ARTICLE IV. If, not later than one full year from the day on which the present Agreement is signed, any Japanese syndicate desires to engage in mining in the southern portion of the Three Eastern Provinces, the

Chinese Government shall consent to grant to such syndicate for the term of one year only the privilege of prospecting mines in that region with the exception of those on which prospecting or mining has already been commenced. Of the mines which have been examined, permission shall be granted to work one-half the number according to the provisions of the Chinese Mining Law; and the remaining mines shall be disposed of by China herself.

ARTICLE V. The Chinese Government agree that if it is found necessary hereafter to construct railways in the southern portion of the Three Eastern Provinces, they will construct them with capital provided by China herself; and if foreign capital is required, they will first negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists.

ARTICLE VI. The Chinese Government declare that if it is proposed hereafter to employ foreign advisers in regard to political, financial, and military affairs of the southern portion of the Three Eastern Provinces, preference will be given to Japanese.

ARTICLE VII. The existing treaties between China and Japan in regard to the Three Eastern Provinces shall remain in force as heretofore except as otherwise provided for in the present Agreement.

Group III

Notes to be Exchanged Respecting the Han-Yeh-Ping
Company.

As the Han-Yeh-Ping Company, being a Chinese commercial concern, has undoubtedly, according to the laws of China, the right to preserve its property and conduct and supervise its business, the Chinese Government do not find it proper to take measure immediately in its behalf without first consulting the Company. If, however, the Company desires on a future occasion to come to agreement with Japanese capitalists for the joint management of its present business, the Chinese Government will give permission in so far as such step does not conflict with the laws of the country.

C. EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN RESPECTING
THE RESTORATION OF THE LEASED TERRITORY OF KIAOCHOW
BAY, OF MAY 25, 1915.

(Japanese Text)

Peking, May 25, 1915.

Monsieur Le Ministre:

In the name of the Imperial Government, I have the honour to make the following declaration to your Excellency's Government:

If, upon the conclusion of the present war, the Japanese Government should be given an absolutely free disposal of the leased territory of Kiao-chou Bay, they will return the said leased territory to China subject to the following conditions:

1. Opening of the whole of Kiao-chou as commercial port;
2. Establishment of a Japanese settlement in the locality to be designated by the Japanese Government;
3. Establishment, if desired by the Powers, of an international settlement;
4. Arrangements to be made, before the return of the said territory is effected, between the Japanese and Chinese Governments, with respect to the disposal of German public establishments and properties and with regard to the other conditions and procedures.

I avail, etc.

(Signed) Eki Hioki

His Excellency

Mr Lu Cheng-Hsiang,

Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Chinese text)

Peking, May 25, 1915

Excellency,

In the name of my Government I have the honour to make the following declaration to the Chinese Government:

When, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kisochow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China under the following conditions:

1. The whole of Kisochow Bay to be opened as a Commercial Port.
2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.
3. If the foreign Powers desire it, an international concession may be established.
4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and properties of Germany and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before the restoration.

I avail, etc.

(Signed) Hioki Eki

His Excellency

Lou Tseng-Tsiang, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

APPENDIX VSINO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 24, 1918, WITH
REGARD TO SHANTUNG*

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Goto) to the
Chinese Minister in Japan (Cheng Tsung-hsiang)

Tokyo, September 24, 1918

Sir: In view of the neighbourly feelings of
friendship between our two countries, the Government of
Japan, being desirous of arranging matters in a spirit
of harmony, has drawn up an agreement which it regards
as a satisfactory settlement of all outstanding questions
relating to the Province of Shantung, and I now have the
honour to bring this proposal to the notice of your
Government. The terms of the proposed agreement are
as follows:

1. All Japanese troops stationed along the
Shantung Railway - with the exception of one Company
which will be left at Tsinsen - will be withdrawn to
Tsingtao.

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Vol. I,
pp. 571-72. (Included in the dispatch from the
Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary
of State, No. 2534, Peking, February 20, 1919.)

2. The Chinese Government may establish a Police Force which shall take over the duty of guarding the railway.

3. The Administration of the Shantung Railway shall set aside a sufficient sum to meet the expenses of the Police Force.

4. Japanese subjects are to be employed at the Headquarters of this Police Force and at all important stations and in the Police Training School.

5. Among the employees of the Shantung Railway posts shall be given to Chinese subjects also.

6. After it has been definitely decided to whom the Shantung Railway is to belong the railway is to be placed under the joint management of China and Japan.

7. The Civil Administration Offices now in existence are to be abolished.

I have the honour to request that you will communicate to me the views of your Government with regard to the above proposal.

I have (etc.)

BARON GOTO

The Chinese Minister in Japan (Cheng Tsung-hsiang) to
the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Goto)

Tokyo, undated

Sir: I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of
your letter couched in the following terms:

(Quotes in full letter from Minister for Foreign
Affairs of September 24, 1918.)

I have the honour to inform you that the Govern-
ment of China accepts with pleasure the proposal con-
tained in the letter quoted above.

I have (etc.)

Seal of Cheng Tsung Hsiang

APPENDIX VI
THE APRIL SETTLEMENT

The formula decided upon by the representatives of America, Britain, Japan, and France on April 30th, 1919, regarding the Shantung province was:

'The policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty of China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao.'

'The owners of the railway will use special police only to ensure security for traffic. They will be used for no other purpose.'

'The police force will be composed of Chinese, and such Japanese instructors as the directors of the railway may select will be appointed by the Chinese Government.'

D.B.F.P.I.(VI) p. 565.

APPENDIX VIITREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATE POWERS
AND GERMANY, JUNE 28, 1919

Article 156.

Germany renounces in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and privileges - particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaschow, railways, mines and submarine cables - which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung.

All German rights in the Tsingtee-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branch lines, together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plants and material for the exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto.

The German State submarine cables from Tsingtee to Shanghai and from Tsingtee to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.

Article 157.

The movable and immoveble property owned by the German State in the territory of Kisochoh, as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.

Article 158.

Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the archives, registers, plans, title deeds, and documents of every kind, whatever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or other, of the territory of Kisochoh.

Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles.

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(b) Cabinet Office Records

(i) War cabinet papers and memoranda are contained in Cab/24 series.

(ii) Cabinet minutes and decisions are indexed Cab/23.

(References to China in memoranda and at meetings are rare.)

(iii) Minutes of the British Empire delegation to the

Paris peace conference and the Washington conference are to be found in the Cab 29/28 file. (These minutes indicate the paucity of discussion concerning Shantung by the British delegation at such crucial stages as April, 1919, and late January, 1922.)

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Alston, Public Record Office, F.O. 800/248-9

Alston's main comments on the Shantung question are to be found in the F.O. 371 and F.O. 608 files.

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Curzon, Public Record Office, F.O. 800/150.

Limited regarding far eastern affairs.

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
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
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MAP OF THE EASTERN PORTION OF SHANTUNG PROVINCE
 SHOWING THE TERRITORY LEASED TO GERMANY
 AT KIAOCHOW BAY
 (INCLUDING THE NEUTRAL ZONE)
 AND TO GREAT BRITAIN AT WEIHAIWEI.
 (From Ch. Warber's Map of North Eastern China, 1904)



UNITED STATES DEPT OF COMMERCE
 BUREAU OF FOREIGN & DOMESTIC COMMERCE
RAILWAY MAP OF CHINA
 PEKING, OCT. 1918 PAUL P. WHITHAM
 CONSULTING ENGINEER
 TRADE COMMISSIONER

110° East from 115° Greenwich 120° 125°