The London School of Economics and Political Science

The Building of Nations

in

Habsburg Central Europe, 1740-1914

Philipp Decker

DECLARATION

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2 December 2017

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the question as to why and to what extent nationalism and national movements emerged as critical factors determining the transformation of politics and society in late imperial Austria. Drawing on debates in nationalism studies, this research will consider the instrumentalist and political modernist schools in order to unveil the determinants of nationalist politics and political crisis during this period. In contrast to the dominant treatments of nationalism as either a product of elite agitation ‘from above’ or the consequence of growing national identity and political allegiance ‘from below’, the hypothesis is that state modernisation in itself has structurally determined the growing significance of the category of nationality. This has created the conditions for new forms of nationalism as an ideology, as politics, and as a movement.

This research applies process tracing with a focus on Austrian modernisation between 1740 and 1914. Divided into five period chapters, the empirical examination will seek to explain how particular patterns of political modernisation determined the development of nationalism in the Habsburg monarchy. It argues that state policies, province-based intellectuals, and cultural institutions are critical for explaining the building of nations in Habsburg Central Europe.

Finally, the empirical results and theoretical implications emerging from the research will be summarised: First, regime transformations and state policies are critical for shaping the discursive meaning of nationality, its role in politics, and its significance as a sentiment. Second, the research identifies two politico-ideological functions of nationalism that are critical for explaining the reshaping of politics during the nineteenth and early twentieth century: a statist and a populist function. This case study seeks to contribute to the scholarly discussion on the role of nationalism in modern politics by developing a conceptual and analytical framework to serve as the basis for future comparative research.
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1. INTRODUCTION

This study argues that the building of nations in Habsburg Central Europe was intrinsically connected to the changing forms assumed by the imperial state. I situate this work at the interface of historical sociology, political sociology, and international politics. Research in this field is generally dominated by comparative works (e.g. Katzenstein 1976, Skocpol 1979, Breuilly 1994, Goldstone 2016), and supplemented by a few exceptional ‘big works’ (i.e. Tilly 1990, Mann 2012). The extensive time-span investigated in this study, reaching from the mid-eighteenth to the early twentieth century, allows for a within-case diachronic comparison of the changing ways in which imperial state and national categories relate to one other. It adopts a transnational perspective, which takes the context of international politics into account.

Peter Katzenstein (1976, xiii) has noted the difficulty of such a longue durée approach in finding a balance between historical detail and theoretical generalisation: ‘The choice of the level of theoretical abstraction, type of empirical documentation, and methods of analysis will be a source of unease – to the social scientist for its excessive preoccupation with historical detail, to the historian for its inexcusable predisposition for ahistorical generalization.’ Goldstone (2016, xxii) similarly notes in his seminal work on revolutions that, although the details of his causal model ‘apply only to the early modern period ... its basic principles may be useful in understanding even today’s (and tomorrow’s) crises.’

This is emphatically not a work of historical scholarship based mainly on primary sources although I do draw on such sources for specific subjects such as school textbooks and the writings of key political and intellectual figures. Rather this is primarily a conceptual study intended to show how modernisation in a multi-national state can promote nationalism and national identity.

1.1. The Puzzle and Research Question

The collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy itself does not make it a special case. Charles Tilly (1975, 38) has recalled that of the almost 500 sovereign units that existed in Europe in 1500 only about 20 have survived into the twentieth century, and concludes that the vanished states were ‘smashed or absorbed by other states in the making’. In the conclusion of his book Vanished Kingdoms, Norman Davies (2012, 730) quotes a rhetorical question raised by Rousseau: ‘If Sparta and Rome perished, what state can hope to last forever?’ What especially impressed Davies are the cases where major states such as the Soviet Union, the Federation of Yugoslavia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire suddenly implode.
Regarding the latter, he argues that the external factors related to the First World War are not sufficient to explain the state collapse (ibid., 733-34):

Yet the Empire survived the fighting intact, only to fall victim of the catastrophic failure of imperial authority at the war’s end. After peace had been signed on the Eastern Front in March 1918, the imperial heartland was no longer under threat from a major ‘inroad of force’. The conflict on the Italian Front, though intense, was essentially a regional affair. But in the following months the Habsburgs and their officials lost the ability to command. By October, the emperor’s writ no longer ran … Galicia, for example, did not rebel. It was deserted by an impotent Vienna besieged by Austro-German republicans. Then, lacking all guidance, it disintegrated amid the general chaos.

This brings us to the key research question at the heart of this study: What role did nationalism play as a factor in disintegration processes in late Imperial Austria? If nationalism indeed became a critical factor, then how can its increasing ideological and political power be explained? The analysis will seek to answer these interrelated questions by drawing on theoretical debates in nationalism studies and Albert Hirschman’s sociological theory of integration and disintegration.

This thesis adopts the modernist approach to interpreting the rise of nationalism. Within that modernist perspective, one can identify three different emphases. One focuses on cultural factors that contribute to ‘imagining’ the nation, leading to some process of ‘national awakening’. A second foregrounds the deliberate work of elites to use nationalism for their own interests. Henceforth I will call this approach ‘instrumentalism’. The third approach, which I will adopt, is ‘political modernism’. It argues that state modernisation in itself structurally determined the category of nationality for subjects and in turn promoted its growing significance.

This study draws on Hirschman’s (1970, 1978) sociological theory on the integration and disintegration of organisations, which seeks to differentiate between the group options of ‘exit, voice, and loyalty’. John Hall applies Hirschman’s theory at the level of states and national movements. The hypothesis is that ‘when voice is denied, exit becomes attractive, whereas the possibility of influence and the experience of participation makes for loyalty’ (Hall 1996, 70). It suggests that exclusion ‘often makes it necessary to take on the state, that is attention becomes focused at the political level’ (ibid.). It further implies that with the impact of political liberalism, formerly authoritarian and autocratic regimes allowed an ‘organising in society’, which tended ‘to diffuse social conflict’ (ibid., 71). In other words, ‘civil society when left to itself will not develop political ambitions’ (ibid.). What matters is the type of the political regime: ‘nationalism has historically habitually involved separation from authoritarian polities. Where the regime is liberal, multinationalism may be possible’ (ibid., 88).
This research examines the role of nationalism in the context of state-building, regime crises and regime transformations, and substantiates the argument that in modernity, nationalism essentially fulfils two politico-ideological functions: a statist function and a populist function.

1.2. Literature Review

In the following, I seek to exemplify particular strands within the existing literature. The period chapters of this dissertation will subsequently draw on numerous specialist studies, providing a substantial body of empirical evidence beyond this selection.

1.2.1. Contemporary and Secondary Literature before the Development of ‘Nationalism Studies’

The paradigm common to most contemporary scholars in the period before 1918 was František Palacký’s famous narrative of the Habsburg Empire as ‘a European necessity’ (Trencsény/Kopeček 2007, 327). This dramatically changed with the dissolution of the monarchy. Most of the post-1918 historiography reproduces the narrative promoted by the Entente during World War I, presenting the Habsburg Empire as an anachronistic ‘dungeon of peoples’, doomed to collapse due to the awakening of nations and their demands for self-determination (King 2003, 8; Cohen 2006, 245; Cole 2012, 97). The topos of ‘national awakening’ was central to national historiographies in support of the new state projects in Central and South-East Europe, constructing a dichotomy between the Habsburg monarchy and the newly established post-imperial states.

The works of Otto Bauer (1907, 1924) and Oscar Jászi (1918, 1929) illustrate this shift. In his 1907 work, Bauer interpreted the imperial state positively as a polity in which various nationalities were accommodated. In the introduction to the 1924 edition of his 1907 book, a shift in the narrative seems to imply that the monarchy’s dissolution was inevitable. He points out that with the beginning of the war in 1914, it was already predictable ‘that thenceforth only the dissolution of the empire could provide a solution to the Austro-Hungarian “nationalities problem”’ (Bauer 2000, 6). He adds: ‘The seventeen years of history separating this and the first edition of this book have, in particular, confirmed my contention that the awakening of the nonhistorical nations, which I described in this book for the first time as one of the most important concomitants of modern economic and social evolution, is in fact one of the forces of radical change at work in the world today’ (ibid.).

Another interesting work is the second edition of Oscar Jászi’s book on the future of the Danube states, which was published in 1918. Despite the collapsing Empire, he states in his
preface from November 1918: ‘I still believe today that the great Danube solidarity will gain victory, despite all vicious arts that are put into its way by human stupidity and hateful. Probably, it seems possible that this solidarity is a long time coming … However, the logic of the idea will be finally stronger than the logic of the humans’ (Jászi 1918, III). Jászi states that he initially supported the ‘central European conception’ and viewed the modernisation and expansion of the Habsburg Empire as a greater example for the future than that of Switzerland or the United States (ibid., 7).

Jászi’s perspective changed dramatically after WWI, as his famous book of 1929 illustrates, which presents an explanatory narrative of the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire in reference to nations. Adopting a structuralist perspective and taking nations for granted, Jászi identifies three internal centrifugal forces which contributed to the collapse of the monarchy under conditions of war: ‘growing national consciousness of the various nations’ under the conditions of a rigid ‘absolutistic structure’; the prevention of general economic modernisation through a feudal class, which rendered Vienna ‘an exploiter of the weaker nations’; and the ‘lack of any serious kind of civic education’ with the potential to overcome the alienation between nations (Jászi 1961, 451).

During the interwar period, negative judgments about the perceived backwardness and anachronistic nature of Old Austria gradually became accompanied by Habsburg nostalgia. It became visible in novels such as Joseph Roth’s The Radetzky March (1932) or Stefan Zweig’s The World of Yesterday: Memories of a European (1942). Zweig’s autobiographical novel provides a nostalgic presentation of the culture of the ‘old Europe’ and coined the phrase ‘the Golden Age of Security’, in contrast to the extremism of the ‘new era’, such as fascism and communism (Zweig 2010, 341-44). These works developed the thesis of a pre-war stability, which was similarly described by the political philosopher Hannah Arendt (Nyíri 1981, 254).

A new approach to nationalism and the ‘national question’ began with the Cold War. While in Western Europe formally sovereign nation-states were established and supported by the US-financed European Recovery Program (‘Marshall Plan’), in Eastern Europe Stalin arranged a compulsory alignment with the Soviet Union, following the so-called ‘Molotov plan’ of 1947. In the decades that followed, the established paradigm of the interwar period – that nations were natural entities that ‘awakened’ in the course of modernisation – was reproduced and took centre stage in most of the national historiography.

The growing distance from Habsburg nostalgia is noted in the preface of A. J. P. Taylor’s (1948, 7) classic, in which he makes some telling remarks about a shift in his own
perspective between 1941 and 1948: ‘Despite efforts to face reality, the earlier book was still dominated by the “liberal illusion”: many passages talked of “lost opportunities” and suggested that the Habsburg Monarchy might have survived if only this or that statesman or people had been more sensible.’ Taylor states why he took this different perspective earlier on: ‘It was difficult to escape from this approach after reading the works of innumerable contemporary writers of goodwill, who either wrote before the fall of the Monarchy or still could not believe that it had vanished’ (ibid.). He adopted the Jászian paradigm: ‘The conflict between a super-national dynastic state and the national principle had to be fought to the finish … The national principle, once launched, had to work itself out to its conclusion’ (ibid.).

Another example is illustrated by Jan Havránek’s article in the *Austrian History Yearbook* on ‘The Development of Czech Nationalism’. In his very first sentence, he highlights the antiquity of the Czech nation: ‘The Czechs have always been the Slavic nation living farthest to the west’ (Havránek 1967, 223). Regarding identities and loyalties he notes, ‘[t]he Czechs regarded themselves not as “Austrians” or “Habsburg subjects” but as Czechs. Their innermost loyalty was to the Czech nation. It was this “real” loyalty which determined their behavior during the final crisis of the monarchy in World War I’ (ibid., 259). Despite the growing influence of cultural and political history (Schorske 1981, Boyer 1981), the Jászian paradigm and the topos of ‘national awakening’ remained dominant. This is illustrated by the following remarks of Hans Kohn, a Prague-born scholar of nationalism, at the 1967 *Austrian History Yearbook* conference: ‘It seems to me that their [historians’] consensus is that the nationality problems and the difficulty of their solutions made the collapse of the monarchy inevitable. I do not share this opinion’ (Kwan 2011, 106, fn.2). Similarly, the volume on *Die Völker des Reiches* (Wandruszka/Urbanitsch 1980), chose nations or peoples as the frame for distinct chapters, which presented the histories of ‘the Magyars’, ‘the Germans’, ‘the Czechs’ and so on.

Although in the historical literature nations were still largely presented as natural entities, the 1950s and 1960s saw the development of new theories of nation-building, ‘then ascendant within American social sciences’ (Özkirimli 2017, 40). The political context was to provide scientific support for the agenda of ‘building’ a hemisphere of capitalist and democratic nation-states. Examples include the works of Daniel Lerner (1958), Almond and Verba (1963), and the following stream of works from scholars such as Lucien Pye, Talcott Parsons, Charles Tilly and Samuel Huntington (Bendix 2007a, xi-xxvi). Although today’s interdisciplinary field of nationalism studies owes much to this generation of social
scientists, it has existed in its contemporary form only since the 1980s. One notable exception among European historians has been Miroslav Hroch (1968), who examines the development of national movements within a comparative historical framework.

1.2.2. Nationalism Studies Literature

After the key texts were published in the early 1980s, with the end of the Cold War, the academic engagement with nationalism embarked upon a new chapter, marked by a global historical perspective on political development beyond the nation-state, a new focus on debates concerning globalisation and supra-national integration. This section provides an overview of the classic theoretical approaches to nationalism in order to develop the approach taken in this dissertation.

The first explanatory paradigm is that of primordialism and perennialism, which generally suggests the long persistence of nations and national identity, which are not a product of modernity. The oldest form of primordialism, dominant for some time among historians, is the ‘nationalist’ position, which suggests that nations have existed throughout history and represent organisms ‘of fixed and indelible character’ (Smith 1998, 146). In the recent literature, it takes on three principal forms. The first, ‘perennial’, strand focuses on the empirical argument that modern nations are based upon pre-modern ethnicities, attributing to some nations an ancient history (Adrian Hastings). The second, ‘culturalist’, strand involves a more complex theoretical position and suggests that national identities are primordial insofar as they felt to be natural without sociological source (Edward Shils, Clifford Geertz). The ‘neo-perennial’ strand of sociobiological approaches suggests that although social factors do play some role, nations can be explained in reference to genetics and kin selection (Pierre van den Berghe). Although there is a recent neo-perennialist and culturalist revival in the literature (Steven Grosby, Aviel Roshwald, Azar Gat), this paradigm has generally lost much of its influence in the contemporary social sciences (Özkirimli 2017, 69).

The second classic explanatory paradigm is that of modernism. This paradigm ‘achieved its canonical formulation in the modernization theories of the 1960s’ and suggests that nationalism and nations are intrinsically connected to modernity, both chronologically and structurally (ibid., 81). Here one can distinguish three major strands, which vary in terms of the weight they attribute to different factors. The most influential proponent of the cultural modernist strand is Benedict Anderson, who highlights the role of print capitalism and the creation of ‘unified fields of exchange and communication’ in the printed vernacular, most visible in the mass consumption of newspapers (Özkirimli 2017, 119). A similar explanation
has been developed by Ernest Gellner, who ‘traced the rise of nationalism to the new role of linguistic culture in the modern world’ (Smith 1998, 27). Gellner argues that nations are invented ‘where they do not exist’ and highlights the role of ‘mass public education systems in sustaining “high” cultures in modern, industrial societies’ (ibid., 28-29).

The second strand within modernism emphasises the role of political elites and can be called ‘instrumentalism’. Paul Brass, for instance, stresses the ‘instrumental nature of ethnicity and nationality’ and argues that ‘ethnic and national attachments are continually redefined and reconstructed’ in response to the interests and ‘the machinations of political elites’ (Özkirimli 2017, 97). Rogers Brubaker similarly highlights the role of ‘ethnopolitical entrepreneurs’, who seek to ‘evoke’ and reify groups by engaging in practices to create the ‘political fiction’ of unified ethnic and national collectivities (ibid., 205).

The third strand within modernism is the ‘political modernist’ approach, which is based on the Weberian emphasis on the bureaucratic state as a power organisation and focuses on institutions and forms of solidarity (Smith 1998, 70). Unlike ‘instrumentalists’, political modernists like John Breuilly, Michael Mann and Siniša Malešević do not seek the explanation of nationalism and national belonging in the actions and choices of individuals, but identify structural causes emphasising ‘the role of institutions and popular political movements’ (Özkirimli 2017, 143).

1.2.3. Subsequent Literature

For a long period, the most influential social scientific study of Austrian modernisation and nationalism has been Jászi’s account from 1929. The early revisionist approach in Habsburg studies, embodied in such works as Deák (1990), Sked (1989), Jelavich (1987) and Bridge (1990), has been described by Solomon Wank (1997, 131) as follows: ‘The current wave of nostalgia has been helped along by some recent historical works that certainly were not written for that purpose, but that contain generous assessments of the monarchy’s positive qualities.’ Deák (1990, 9) for instance states in his work: ‘I am convinced that we can find here a positive lesson while the post-1918 history of central and east central European nation-states can only show us what to avoid.’ The following assessment by Gary Cohen (2006, 274) is also indicative: ‘The evolution of constitutional, representative government in the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the monarchy and the growth of a wide spectrum of political parties and interest groups demonstrates a broad process of modern political development during the half century before World War I.’

This fundamentally revised interpretation of Austrian political development has been accompanied by a new approach to nationalism, drawing on the modernist social science
approaches developed in nationalism studies. In his review of a number of important recent works on the late Habsburg Monarchy, Kwan (2011, 89) concludes that in the ‘last three decades, the historiography has challenged all three of Jászi’s points in a way that amounts to a quiet revolution. The study of nationalism has been transformed (mostly through constructivist and cultural approaches); the political system interpreted as relatively open, flexible and participatory; and the loyalty to the Emperor and the Monarchy reassessed.’

At this point, it appears useful to briefly reflect on the historical relationship between historiography and nationalism. In fact, the ‘historical grounding of nationalism was reinforced by its close ties with the emergence of professional academic historical writing’ (Breuilly 2013, 2). The divide between historiography and the social sciences rendered the study of nationalism difficult. ‘Much of this work from Kedourie onwards remained theoretical and/or present and near-future oriented, grounded in sociology or psychology or literary criticism or political theory … All this reduced the impact of such work upon professional historians, as it appeared empirically thin and excessively speculative’ (Breuilly 2012, 22). Although this divide has become less dramatic in recent years it still survives. Sperber, for instance, wrote in the second edition of his work on the 1848 revolutions: ‘It is hard to think of a more heavily and less satisfactorily investigated topic than nationalism and nationalist movements … Historians have often turned to social scientists for explanations of nationalism, and have generally received little help of use from them’ (Sperber 2005, 288). It is indicative that he then refers to the classic work of Miroslav Hroch (1985) as ‘[p]erhaps the single best work on the topic’ (ibid.). It is striking that the Austrian historians Hanisch and Urbanitsch (2006), when attempting to apply concepts from the social sciences, bluntly use the sub-heading ‘Keine Theory’ (No theory) when it comes to the study of nationalism in imperial Austria. They paradoxically conclude that the scholarship on nationalism simply follows the paradigm shifts in ‘general historiography’ (ibid., 93).

Despite the difficulty of studying nationalism from a historical perspective, scholars like Hroch (1985), Judson (2006), who adopts Brubaker’s instrumentalist approach, and Van Ginderachter and Beyen (2012), who propose a Gramscian approach, have pointed to its feasibility. In the last two decades, a group of largely US-based historians have criticised teleological and essentialist approaches to nationalism. Jeremy King, for example, has defined ‘ethnicism’ as ‘a vague, largely implicit framework that holds the nations of East Central Europe to have sprung primarily from a specific set of mass, mutually exclusive ethnic groups defined by inherited cultural and linguistic patterns’ (King 2001, 123). In his
history of the Bohemian town of Budweis, King (2003, 11) analyses the ambivalent nature of historical nationalization processes, admitting, ‘[a] history centred on one town in Habsburg Central Europe cannot hope to explain the origins of national politics, which lie outside the region’. He notes the limitations of local studies: ‘Even national successes strictly within the town can be only partly explained through a local approach, because they form part of a global pattern in modern times’ (ibid.).

Similarly, Nancy Wingfield (2007) has shown that adopting a constructivist approach to study nationalism in Bohemia does not necessarily mean becoming less sensitive to the role of nationality. From 1880 onwards, nationalist actors seemed to have succeeded in the politicization and nationalization of public life by making ‘national claims’ which are ‘the product of strategies, stories, narratives, monuments, holidays and other cultural artefacts’ (Wingfield 2007, 14). She observes the growing role of nationalism in political struggles: ‘These confrontations transformed public culture by constructing and continually reconstructing a situation where nationality had to become the key to virtually all aspects of everyday life, and nationalism came to be critical to the exercise of power at all levels of society’ (ibid., 2).

Recent studies that focus explicitly on nation-building in Imperial Austria are rare. The few that focus on the state level are comparative analyses, such as the works of Katzenstein (1976), Mann (1993) and Kuzmics and Axtmann (2007). Other studies focus on ‘the Austrian nation’; some decades ago the historian Bruckmüller (1984) wrote a social history of Austrian nationhood, which was published in a second edition with a new focus on cultural history in 1996 (Bruckmüller 1996). Inspired by Koselleck’s conceptual history, Markus Haider (1998) has examined shifts in political language from an interdisciplinary perspective, with a focus on the concept of the ‘Austrian nation’ between 1866 and 1938. A work on Austrian nation-building that situates itself explicitly within the ‘modernist school’ is the study of Thaler (2001), which focuses on the Second Austrian Republic after 1945. Anton Pelinka (2001, 1998) has examined multiple aspects of nationhood in Imperial and Republican Austria from a historical political science perspective.

**Revisionist Accounts and the Context of European Integration**

The Habsburg Empire is often seen as between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ Europe, and its eventual dissolution often attributed to ethnic, cultural and linguistic heterogeneity and uneven development. The rise of post-colonial theory since the 1990s has seemingly confirmed the pathological case of the Habsburg Monarchy with its multiplicity of peoples
and regions, and their unique historical experiences between ‘East’ and ‘West’, ‘North’ and ‘South’. The East/West dichotomy and the in-between location of the Habsburg Empire have only become influential since the nineteenth-century, when it gradually replaced the ‘traditional perception of Europe according to a North/South axis’ (Adamovsky 2005, 598-99). This perspective was consolidated after WWI and reinforced during the Cold War. It was taken up by scholars of nationalism with a focus on intellectual history, for instance by Hans Kohn (1944) in his seminal work on an overlapping civic/ethnic and western/eastern dichotomy, which in turn built on Meinecke’s older distinction between the ‘cultural nation’ (Kulturrnation) and the ‘state-nation’ (Staatsnation). Meinecke’s work Cosmopolitanism and the National State (1908) had argued that the idea of the nation-state was fundamental to political progress (Gilbert 1970, vii-xv). After World War II, the dominant expectation, under the impression of decolonisation, was that nation-state consolidation across the world was a quasi-natural development.

Since the 1990s, hopes to transcend established nation-states by means of European integration under the roof of the European Union grew significantly. At the same time, historians began to revise their interpretations of the later Habsburg Empire, replacing the national-apologetic narrative of it as an anachronistic ‘prison of nations’ that was doomed to collapse with a new focus on multi-national coexistence and local experiences of transnationalism. John Deak, for instance, stated: ‘It is once again fitting, I think, with the return to multinationalism and supranational state ideas in Europe, to ask these questions of Europe’s past – of the past of a Europe in which the Habsburg Monarchy stood in the very center’ (Deak 2015, 380). The Habsburg Empire increasingly came to be seen as one possible way of transcending the nation-state. Although the reassessment of the Habsburg Empire in historical studies began already in the 1980s, the concept of empire in regard to a future European political order became popular in political studies only after 2000 (Zielonka 2006). As the consensus of the post-WWII order gradually eroded, ideas of neo-imperial projects gained influence. This is reflected in Jose Manuel Barroso’s official statement on 10 May 2007, when he compared the EU with the creation of Empires, describing it as a ‘non-imperial empire’.

However, most recently, and somewhat unexpectedly, the supposedly post-national era in Europe has been disrupted by the rise of populist forms of nationalism. Although many scholars argue for a positive reinterpretation of the civilizational role of the Habsburg Monarchy, others, like Alan Sked (1994, 244), view it as a ‘warning’ for the European Union to not become a second Habsburg Empire: ‘In Europe ... the Reformation split the
Church, while nation states emerged to challenge Habsburg universalist pretensions. Europe prospered because of her divisions’. The contradictory interpretations of the Habsburg case in reference to debates concerning the future of Europe highlights its relevance, especially when it comes to understanding the role of nationalism in modernity.

In the wake of post-modernism, the study of nationalism became increasingly influenced by, first, the culturalist assertions of post-colonial theory, and second, the individualism of instrumentalism. Many of the respective area studies focussed on the tracing of historical continuities on the macro-level, while constructing narratives on the micro-level that took particular varieties of ‘culture’ and ‘cultural traditions’ as independent variables. A volume edited by Barkey and Hagen (1997), for instance, examines cases of ‘multi-ethnic societies’ in the Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires. Beside contributions from Tilly and Brubaker, it included leading scholars from the various regions, such as István Deák, Solomon Wank, Serif Mardin, Caglar Keyder, Alexander Motyl and Ronald Suny. The editors concluded that while in ‘western Europe the process of nation-building went hand in hand with democratization, a constant, gradual, and always contested extension of the franchise’, in ‘the post-imperial settings, civil societies were either barely established or largely mimicked’ (Barkey/Hagen 1997, 187). The historian Evans (2006, 2) recently noted that ‘we may ask whether the monarchy was destroyed not so much by national conflicts as by linguistic diversity in itself.’ Cultural factors and a lack of ‘development’ became once again key factors in explanations.

In the case of sociologically informed studies, the growing focus on the individual suggests a dichotomy between restricting, coercive states, which attempt to impose national collective identities upon individuals, and genuinely free and pluralistic civil societies. Brubaker’s (2004) so-called ‘constructivist’ or ‘instrumentalist’ approach has left its imprint in recent specialist literature on the later Habsburg Monarchy. Pieter Judson (2006, 17) for instance follows Brubaker and argues: ‘Ethnicity, race and nationhood are fundamentally ways of perceiving, interpreting, and representing the social world. They are not things in the world, but perspectives on the world.’ He identifies activists as the driving forces behind nationalization, who ‘developed discourses – and later added behaviors – of hostile national relations in order to project the idea of age-old conflict onto such regions. These discourses and behaviors in turn became tools used to constitute those very differences in local society’ (ibid., 5-6). He draws the general conclusion that ‘the history of Habsburg Austria in the period 1867-1918 demonstrates that social, political, economic, and administrative modernization could easily occur without nationalization’ (ibid., 8). With regard to
nationalism, he proposes, ‘if we dissociate ourselves rigorously from nationalist assumptions, and if we attempt to hear what we can of the experience of the populations of those regions, we may perhaps liberate ourselves from the unnecessary discursive prisons that nationalists around us continue to re-create’ (ibid., 255). Similarly, Tara Zahra (2008, 6) argues that in Bohemia between 1900 and 1945, a number of ‘nationalists’, who ‘nourished a political culture in which the health, welfare, and education of children were believed to be the responsibility of the collective rather than the family alone’, enforced nationalist ideology upon individuals. The ‘from below’ perspective of this research programme on ‘national indifference’ found its reflection in local studies (King 2003, Zahra 2008), an issue of the Austrian History Yearbook (Judson/Zahra 2012), and in a new synthesis of the Habsburg Empire, which focuses on ‘countless local societies across central Europe’ (Judson 2016, 4).

1.3. The Political Modernist Approach of this Study

This research adopts a political modernist perspective to address the gap between the historical literature on nation-making in and with empires (Suny/Martin 2001, Leonhard/Hirschhausen 2011, Berger/Miller 2015) and accounts on nation-building in political science and historical sociology (Eisenstadt/Rokkan 1973, Tilly 1990, Huntington 1991, Mann 2012, Mylonas 2012, Wimmer 2013). With its focus on tracing processes of nation-building by confronting historical detail, this research draws on the political modernist literature (Breuilly 1994, 2001, Mann 1993, 1995, Malešević 2013). As the sociologist Wimmer (2013, 17) argues, ‘ethnic group formation and nation building are best seen as negotiated accomplishments involving both elites and masses’. While my account pays attention to both cultural and political elites seeking to influence popular opinion and action by using nationalist ideology, it highlights that they are only able to conceive of and succeed in doing this on the basis of conditions created by state modernisation.

The critical explanatory factor of nation-building is not identified in ethnicity, culture or elite agitation, but in the changing forms of the state that affect the probability of individuals to exhibit certain kinds of ‘national’ solidarity. This account investigates how state-building, political ruptures, regime transformations, and institutional changes shaped the genesis and development of nationalism and national movements in Habsburg Central Europe.
Outline

This study addresses how state modernisation created an institutional space for national identity, and how both elite and popular action filled this space over a number of stages. The stages covered by the major chapters are the beginning of Habsburg state-building by Maria Theresa in 1740, the death of Joseph II in 1790, the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the 1848 Revolution, the end of the liberal era in 1879, and the outbreak of WWI in 1914. These chapters will show how institutions that were innovated by the modernising state promoted different kinds of national identity, and empowered different political actors, including counter-elites, located in the various regions of the empire.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical and conceptual framework of the dissertation. It develops ideal types of different stages of political modernisation that are used for the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3 explores the genesis of a statist form of civic nationality and patriotism in the context of Josephist state-building.

Chapter 4 will trace how, in the course of the French Revolutionary wars and the European wars against Napoleon, Austria underwent a regime transformation with an impact on political structure and government policy.

Chapter 5 outlines the anti-Josephist state and society project of Clemens Metternich. It studies the correlation between regime transformation and changes in the state’s approach to nationality. The last section closes with an analysis of its intended and unintended effects in the short- and the long-term.

Chapter 6 discusses the evolution of Austria’s political landscape in the so-called ‘liberal era’ that was marked by the constitutionalisation of the state. It examines the growing ideological competition between a constitutional-liberal concept of citizenship and corresponding statist nationality, and a particularistic, ethno-cultural approach to nationality.

Chapter 7 addresses a shift in the ideological direction of nationalism in the context of democratisation and mass politics. This chapter traces the role of government in shaping the institutional and political cultural conditions for the populist transformation of politics and its consequences for the legitimacy of the central state.

Chapter 8 summarises the key argument of the study and reflects on how shifts in government policy shaped nation-building processes in Habsburg Central Europe.
2. NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL MODERNISATION

This chapter outlines a theory of nationalism and modernisation that provides the conceptual framework for process tracing. What characterises political modernity is the accumulation of social power by the state, the institutional inclusion of a growing number of subjects, the forging of new collective identities, and the emergence of mass politics. It is in this context that nationalism emerged as an ideology, as politics, and as a movement.

2.1. Political Modernity: Instituting State and Society

The 1960s and 1970s were marked by a reading of modernisation that centred on the formation of national states. The historian Strayer (1970, 57) for instance stated that ‘by 1300, it was evident that the dominant political form in Western Europe was going to be the sovereign state’. This reading of political history omits that ‘composite monarchies’ and ‘a myriad of smaller territorial and jurisdictional units’ were the prevailing political form before the modern era (Elliot 1992, 51). There is a growing consensus that there was no unidirectional modernisation process marked by empires giving way to democratic nation-states. Empires are a type of state that are ‘expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space’, and that ‘maintain distinction’ among their populace as a way of rule (Burbank/Cooper 2010, 8). Although nations became ‘prominent in political imagination ... since the eighteenth century, the nation-state was not the only alternative to empire’ (ibid., 10).

Recent comparative studies of state modernisation in the nineteenth century observe ‘nationalising empires’ (Berger/Miller 2015) and ‘imperialising nation-states’ (Leonhard/Hirschhausen 2011), deconstructing the traditional empire/nation-state dichotomy. Struggles for political rights and citizenship ‘took place within empires before they became revolutions against them’ (Burbank/Cooper 2010, 7). There are alternatives to the unitary nation-state such as federation, ‘a layered form of sovereignty in which some powers rest in separate political units while others are located at the center’, or confederation, which recognises ‘the distinct personality of each federated unit’ (ibid., 10). Empires can be ‘cooperative’ on the horizontal and vertical level, turning into federations (Osterkamp 2016, 134), while nation-states can become (re-)imperialising (Motyl 2001, 5).

Drawing critically on Michael Mann’s (2012) organisational materialism, the modern state can be defined as a polymorphous organisation which emerged on the basis of
institutionalised accumulation of coercive, economic and ideological power.¹ As a ‘particular form of bureaucratic social organization’, in order to understand the development of the state ‘it is of paramount importance to understand the organizational processes that underpin’ it (Malešević 2013, 10). Essentially, we can differentiate between three processes that shaped state- and nation-building over the course of the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century: 1.) The territorial centralisation of coercive power, which culminated in the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of ‘physical violence within a particular territory’ (Weber 2004, 33). The institutionalisation of an increasingly insulated military, especially a standing army, as well as the development of a police system contributed to the pacification of society. 2.) The transformation of economic power is often subsumed under the terms ‘capitalism’, ‘marketisation’ (commodification) and ‘industrialisation’. Economic modernisation transformed social structure, determined by division of labour and market dependencies. 3.) In the realm of ‘ideological power’ the state has gradually centralised social authority through its institutional apparatus, especially its monopoly on education. With organised coercion, organised economy, and organised ideology, the state has been able to exercise ‘infrastructural rule’ over a delineated territory (Malešević 2013, 8-13).

Feudal society was characterised by a high level of physical violence. ‘Legal disputes were often resolved by “trial by combat” or recourse to painful ordeals … To the extent people recognized an intersubjective social unity that linked them to people outside their immediate local surroundings, it was Christendom’ (Opello/Rosow 2004, 42). When in the sixteenth and seventeenth century towns and propertied urban segments gained influence, the feudal order gradually gave way to one in which an assembly of estates accumulated power versus the crown (Poggi 1978, 36-46). Unlike the feudal system of rule, which was largely based on a landed class of warriors, the estates constituted corporate bodies that included representatives of the towns and the clergy. Unlike the informal feudal gatherings, the constituted estates represented ‘gatherings of the Estates of a territory’ such as province, principality, county, country, or realm. These political bodies, organised into provincial diets, ‘stood over against the ruler, represented the territory to him’ (ibid., 47). The system of rule in the late feudal period was ‘constitutional’ only in the sense that ‘the crown governed with the concurrence’ of corporate representatives (Opello/Rosow 2004, 52). Rule was indirect and personal.

A military revolution that culminated in the establishment of standing armies rendered the traditional system of rule increasingly incapable of dealing with the rising costs of war.

¹ For a similar, neo-Weberian differentiation of three sources of social power, in contrast to Mann’s four-fold distinction, see Poggi (1990).
As Tilly (1990, 70) has noted, ‘[t]he link between warmaking and state structure strengthened’. While in the first half of the seventeenth century the economic base of polities was expanded primarily by adapting to commercial capitalism, by the second half economic principles shifted towards mercantile ideas. The political economic model of mercantilism and cameralism revised the earlier feudal model. While still holding an anti-market stance and containing elements of the feudal landed order, estates and hierarchy, an accumulation of coercive and economic power on the part of the political centre was becoming apparent.

Figure 1. Historical Forms of Taxation [Tilly 1990, 88]

Enlightened absolutism drew in various degrees on principles of reason of state and the new liberal doctrine (spreading from England and the United States throughout Europe), re-defining not only the function of the population as the basis of state power, but also re-constructing the state-subject relationship. The state was increasingly seen as responsible for the welfare of its population, enhancing public health, security and education. The new typical ideal of the ‘good subject’ should be educated, disciplined, commercially active and patriotic. This can be summarised as the transition from feudalism to enlightened absolutism, which will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4.

Despite restorationist responses in the wake of the French Revolution, principles of economic liberalism and a market-driven economy were generally perceived as successful and rulers saw no alternative to reform (Gagliardo 1969). After 1815, dynastic regimes began to institute what can be termed ‘restricted liberal modernity’ (Wagner 1993, 16). Changes in the form of governance accompanied the internalisation of capitalism and the market logic of commodification. Restricted liberal modernisation supported the further expansion of the bureaucratic state and of the so-called bourgeoisie, who increased their degree of organisation within what became known as ‘civil society’. This represents the
transition from corporative absolutism to bourgeois liberalism, which will be explored in chapter 5 and 6.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, sustained economic growth, population growth and urbanisation led to new challenges for regimes and states. Against this background, the ‘social question’ and the ‘national question’ were articulated, gaining resonance in the context of a crisis of restricted liberal modernity. This affected the emergence of ‘class’ as a category and collective identity, as well as the rise of populist nationalisms. Regimes responded with state extension, social reform programmes and collectivism. The liberal constitutional state became transformed into a socially integrative, nationalising or multi-nationalising state. This marks the transition from restricted liberalism to varieties of organised mass politics, which will be in the focus of chapter 7.

Although the three processes highlighted above point to three distinct sources of social power, in reality these transformations mutually influenced each other. When separating historically evolving institutional patterns of state-building, major stages in the process become apparent, each adding a new layer to the existing state apparatus: from military state to bureaucratic capitalist state, to constitutional state, to early social welfare and democratic (multi-)national state. This does not imply, however, that modernisation is either linear or irreversible.

2.2. Nationalism as an Ideology, as Politics and as a Political Movement

Having discussed the processes shaping political modernisation, this section will outline a theoretical approach to nationalism that draws on the political modernist school. It develops the argument that in the context of political modernisation, two politico-ideological functions of nationalism become evident, a ‘statist function’ and a ‘populist function’, which explain nationalism as an ideology, a form of politics and political movement. The genesis and evolution of nationalism and national movements will be explored by drawing on Gramscian political sociology (Crehan 2002, Malesevic 2006, Leon et al. 2015). In the first part of the period examined, nationalism as an ideology is shaped by a small number of intellectuals and political elites in the context of absolutist state-building. The subsequent period was marked by the growth of organisational capacities in civil society and the formation of nationalism as a largely cultural movement. The last two period chapters will explore the development of nationalist movements and parties within the constitutional state.
2.2.1. The Statist and Populist Function of Nationalism

The historically most successful ideological forms to have served as organising principles of large-scale polities were imperial, religious and territorial: universal empires, confessional kingdoms, and city-states (Lemberg 1950). The historical condition where modern quasi-national forms of collective identities could be formed was brought about by the decline of religion as an organising principle of political and social order on the one hand, and the achieved institution of modern statehood, characterised as territorial power organisation, on the other. Nationalism constructs and defines the present *demos* in reference to an imagined trans-generational nation. It is exactly this trans-generational imaginary that constitutes the unique ideological character of nationalism. It implies that ‘while from the viewpoint of objective history, today’s nations are modern creatures, in popular perceptions they are “beyond time”, “timeless”’ (Connor 2004, 45). In the words of Tom Nairn (1997, 4):

[T]hrough nationalism the dead are awakened, this is the point - seriously awakened for the first time. All cultures have been obsessed by the dead and placed them in another world. Nationalism rehouses them in this world. Through its agency the past ceases being ‘immemorial’: it gets memorialised into time present, and so acquires a future.

There are two politico-ideological functions of nationalism: First, a ‘statist function’, constructing the nation (and a national society) in relation to the state. Second, a ‘populist function’, which is essential to nationalism involved in political movements. The central ideological mechanism involved in the ‘statist function’ of nationalism is that it reverses the perception of cause and effect. The state has created the subjectivity of ‘the citizen’, and continues to do so. Modern statehood ‘has brought about an ideological transformation of common sense’ (Billig 1995, 9-10). While today nationalism is often confined to emotional, flag-waving social movements, it historically includes ‘banal’ forms that are reproduced by nation-states (‘routine flags’) and ‘ceases to appear as nationalism, disappearing into the “natural” environment of “societies”’ (ibid., 38).

The ‘populist function’ of nationalism enables a leader, a party or a political movement to temporarily establish an ideological representation of ‘the nation’ or ‘the people’. It is crucial to note that collective identifications with a leader, party or movement are to a large extent created via a top-down process, by means of activities and articulatory practices of political actors (Leon et al. 2015). However, in the so-called ‘democratic era’, the ideological mechanism of representation produces the perception that representation is generally the result of bottom-up processes (Pitkin 1967, 107-8).
2.2.2. Regimes and the Function of Intellectuals

What makes people’s incorporation in and mastery of ‘high culture’, that is ‘literate codified culture’ (Gellner 1996a, 368), possible is the modern state (Breuilly 1996, 151). The state cannot be culturally agnostic. Different configurations of states can be linked to ‘the characteristics of their historic blocs, i.e. the configurations of social forces upon which state power ultimately rests. A particular configuration of social forces defines in practice the limits or parameters of state purposes, and the modus operandi of state action, defines, in other words, the raison d’état for a particular state’ (Cox 1987, 105). When perceiving history as ‘intervals of relative stability and crises’, it is in the context of crisis that the historical conditions for regime and state transformations crystallise (Gramsci/Forgacs 2000, 199).

Historically, political crises have frequently resulted in the reconfiguration of regimes and states. Jack Goldstone (1999, 358) argues that, as a result of modernisation processes which trigger population growth, urbanisation and migration, regimes are faced with population pressures that affect ‘state capacity’, ‘elite displacement and conflicts’, and ‘mass mobilization potential’. It implies that regimes must respond in order to prevent the opening-up of space for oppositional and anti-state movements. The crystallisation of a political crisis points first and foremost to a decline of the state’s ideological base and a vacuum in political leadership, usually triggered by subjectively or objectively deteriorating material conditions. While in a rare ‘organic crisis’ the established order is challenged as such, conjunctural change predominantly takes the form of evolving regime transformations: the metamorphosis of one regime into another (Gramsci/Forgacs 2000, 201).

Political moments of crisis are crucial to explore the ‘populist function’ of nationalism within the realm of ideological power. As Laclau and Mouffe (2001, 7) point out, “[h]egemony” will be not the majestic unfolding of an identity but the response to a crisis’. Social heterogeneity can be temporarily overcome by collectively articulated ‘social demands’ on the basis of an oppositional logic. What makes certain collective identities more important than others in politics is their capacity to forge identifications on a mass level, to be invoked by political movements or regimes. It is the quality of the socially high moral value attributed to collectives represented by concepts such as ‘the nation’ or ‘the people’ (so-called ‘empty signifiers’), which makes them key players in the ideological field (Laclau 1996, 36-46).
The modern state represents a power container that stabilises the established order and the power asymmetry between rulers and the ruled. Bourdieu has highlighted the role of intellectuals in enabling ‘the dominated’ to engage in political action. He argues that the ‘only effective strategies’ for the dominated, unlike for the elites, ‘are collective ones, which presuppose strategies of construction of collective opinion and its expression’ (Bourdieu 2008, 59). Bourdieu’s comment on the central role of ideological systems, which he views as being institutionalised by the state, is important: ‘The educational system functions as a system of classification as well as a system of production of classifications, which in the final analysis are always referable to social classes, but in a more or less concealed fashion’ (ibid., 66). Gramsci has similarly traced the formation of intellectuals to ‘classes’ - ‘organic intellectuals’, with the function of constructing homogeneity and raising awareness of a collectivity - and to ‘communities’ - ‘traditional intellectuals’, functioning as mediators between the state and the public - both supposedly resulting from social preconditions (Malesevic 2006, 74, 187-91). Despite economic reductionism, these accounts cogently point to the function of intellectuals.

Instead of categorising intellectuals on the basis of predetermined structures, it seems useful to distinguish them in reference to their political function, which essentially takes on two forms. Their political role as articulators lies in (1.) the rationalisation and legitimisation of the established order as ‘traditional intellectuals’, or (2.), in its contestation through the re-interpretation of the status quo in reference to a normative political project as ‘organic intellectuals’. In any case, intellectuals are involved in ideological power struggles on the basis of articulatory practices. The intellectual is an active agent ‘within the economic, political, social, and cultural fields acting as a constructor, organiser, and “permanent persuader” in forming or contesting hegemony’ (Morton 2007, 91-2).

With regard to the ‘statist function’ of nationalism, it appears that any modern state and regime requires ‘traditional intellectuals’ to support the reproduction of ‘common sense’ and of a particular teleological interpretation of history from the hegemonic view of the present. Intellectual labour produces a societal trust in institutions and the established order. Depending on the particular representative crystallisation of the regime, the activities of ‘traditional intellectuals’ usually feed into the ‘statist function’ of nationalism, aiming at the construction of a perceived ‘natural’ relationship between the populace and the state. It amounts to ‘banal nationalism’, which tends to disappear from our perceptions when absorbed into societal common sense.
The activities of ‘organic intellectuals’, on the other hand, frequently appeal to the ‘populist function’ of nationalism and involve the articulation of normative political projects in opposition to the status quo. The activities of organic intellectuals of political projects or movements advance the potential of political leadership that is required in moments of crisis, when either spontaneous consent becomes fragile or for those moments of ‘organic crisis’ when a regime collapses and the masses are seeking an alternative.

2.3. Conclusion

The approach to nationalism adopted in this study is carefully aware of the structural processes of political modernisation, as well as of intellectuals and political elites who engage in the elaboration, promotion, and implementation of political projects. The activities of individual intellectuals have been frequently shaped by social preconditions. Many have been members of the educated bourgeoisie and received a university education. As Gramsci (1971, 192) has noted, ‘[i]deas and opinions are not spontaneously “born” in each individual brain: they have had a centre of formation, or irradiation, of dissemination, of persuasion’.

However, the ideological ‘choice’ made by many intellectuals of significance was determined neither by class, nor religion, ethnicity or mother tongue. Karl Marx, for instance, belonged to the German-speaking bourgeoisie and his uncle was the Rabbi of his hometown. He became the preeminent secular intellectual of socialism. The following chapters will show that, although many nationalist leaders in central Europe personally ‘chose’ to belong to a particular nation while, due to their family background and mother tongue they could have rationally ‘joined’ another, they acted in response to the conditions created by the modernising state.
3. THE JOSEPHIST STATE PROJECT AND CIVIC NATIONALITY (1740-1790)

This chapter argues that the Theresian-Josephine reforms aimed at the institution of a modern state and a corresponding ‘Enlightened society’, which implied a new relationship between individual subjects and the state. The Habsburg polity can be defined as an imperial state in the making (Deak 2015). Its foundation in the ‘mid- to late-eighteenth century falls within a general European pattern; in some regards the Austrian situation even seems to be in the avant-garde of developments at this time’ (Lindström 2008, 4). The reform programme involved was comprehensive and its effects manifold. It weakened the diets in the crown lands, the county assemblies in Hungary, ‘and the crown authorities also began to rationalize and modernize administration, law, public education, and economic regulation’ (Cohen 2007, 246).

Although the transformations within the realms of coercive, economic and ideological power were interrelated and mutually fortifying, their cumulative effects will be analytically differentiated. This chapter shows how the state developed a category of ‘nation’ as an element of its mode of rule, although its impact on political culture and political action became effective only in a later period. Once established, the state apparatus was intended to exercise ideological power to expand the legitimacy of its growing authority *ex post* through a secular ideology, constructing ‘a society’ in relation to the state, which has since become known as civic nationalism.

The first section introduces the European background of eighteenth-century state-building during a period of recurrent warfare, triggered by the military revolution of the seventeenth century. The Josephist\(^2\) regime aimed at the accumulation of coercive and economic power through the modernisation of the army and the institution of a bureaucratic state. It will be argued that the impact of Josephism on the particular configuration of Austria as a fiscal-military state established the basis for the reproduction of its distinctively modern social base: patriotic officers, disciplined soldiers, enlightened bureaucrats and teachers, and economically active, educated ‘good citizens’.

The second section discusses the emergence of Enlightened modernism. Although it constituted the ideological foundation of Josephism, the latter diverged into a progressive-reformist and a Jacobin direction. The subsequent section discusses the institution of the

\(^2\) While this work uses the terms Josephism/Josephist in reference to the political ‘Josephist project’, the terms Josephinism/Josephine will be used to express a historical reference to the person of Joseph II. Josephine reforms therefore took place under Joseph II, while intellectuals articulated a Josephist project at an earlier stage.
Josephist state project with a focus on policies that aimed at the government of the populace, its social disciplining, and popular ‘enlightenment’ through education of the common classes. The Josephist government was characterised by a focus on the state’s population, combining top-down efforts of social engineering with calculated effects from below, including population growth and cultural-linguistic assimilation. The central parameter for exploring the emergence of civic nationality and proto-nationalism will be the aforementioned relationship between Austrian state-building and the corresponding construction of this newly perceived society of educated individuals, interconnected within a literary mass public culture.

The fourth section discusses the impact of the state’s utilitarian approach to religion and language on collective identities, and its relationship to civic nationhood. Organised religion became reduced to a particular functional system within a general process of functional differentiation of modern institutions such as law, economy, the arts and so forth. Multiple confessions became legally ‘tolerated’ and the power of the Church was radically quashed. The last section presents a conclusion.

3.1. State-Building in the Context of Eighteenth-Century Power Politics

The institution of an Austrian state had been the result of coordinated political responses to a series of crises that began in 1733 and continued after the death of Charles VI with multiple wars between 1740 and 1763. The succession of Maria Theresa based on the Pragmatic Sanction was opposed by the rival German states of Bavaria and Prussia. The following War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) ended with Austria losing the greater part of wealthy Silesia to Prussia but Austria maintained its status as a great power. The Seven Years’ War between 1756 and 1763 had a critical impact on Austrian state-building. Besides Austria, the war involved all established and emerging great powers of the time: France, Britain, Russia and Prussia. Intensifying imperial competition contributed to a military fiscal crisis in the whole of Europe. ‘The European conflicts of the eighteenth century took on a political form, revolving around matters of alliance and succession. But these political issues seemed important in part because they bore on the control of taxation, towns, and trades’ (Bayly 1998, 30). State-building at this stage affected above all taxation and the military, ‘each of which fed upon the other in a closed symbiotic relationship’ (Holsti 2004, 36).
3.1.1. Competing Fiscal-Military States

In the context of competing fiscal-military states, Austrian statehood was to a large extent the achievement of the Theresian-Josephine reforms instituted between 1749 and 1790. The Habsburg state-building project sought to create an imperial state through the construction of a centralized set of institutions across the diverse territories of the monarchy. Judson (2016, 5) highlights that the achievement of political centralization and unification ‘were critical to project great power status and effectively withstand the military attacks of its many enemies.’

The international conditions at the beginning of Maria Theresa’s reign were extremely difficult, especially as several competing dynastic polities attempted to overcome the constraints of the Holy Roman Empire. Several dynasties had considerably increased their political power. Guelphs gained kingship in Great Britain, the Saxon Elector was elected Polish king and the Bavarian Wittelsbachs were seeking to establish close relations with France. Habsburg Austria and Brandenburg-Prussia even attempted to pull out of the Reich confederation. ‘Both countries evolved during the eighteenth century from Reich territories into modern states: the Habsburgs from the reign of Charles VI (1711-1740) by giving priority to Austrian power politics instead of the Reich; Prussia by systematically breaking the power of the ... provincial diets’ (Planert 2011, 92). The long era of the Theresian-Josephine reforms began one year after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), which ended the Austrian War of Succession, where ‘Naples, Spain, France, Sweden, and some German states fought on Prussia’s side, while Great Britain, the Netherlands, and an aspiring Russia were Austria’s allies’ (ibid., 93).

Tensions in international politics remained high: Austria insisted upon its claim to the Silesian provinces, and the colonial rivalry between Britain and France remained fierce. What followed was the Seven Years’ War between France and Great Britain, declared in 1756, and Prussia’s attack on Saxony in the same year. Anton Kaunitz, Austria’s first State Chancellor, pursued a new foreign policy and won over France, Austria’s traditional enemy in an attempt to counter Prussia (ibid.). Although contemporaries did not expect a Prussian victory over Austria, it was acknowledged that stakes were high for every power involved: ‘Pitt correctly remarked, “Canada will be won in Silesia”, where his Prussian allies were fighting ... Moreover, Prussia, faced with defeat, unexpectedly fought its way to victory. Britain and Prussia rose as allies through war, while France and its allies fell’ (Mann 1993, 269). Maria Theresa drew the lessons from Austrian defeat and became more determined
than ever to emulate successful state-building reforms within realist norms of an inter-state system that implied a balance of power (Hall 1996, 54).

Map 1. The Habsburg Monarchy between 1700 and 1810 [Roman 2003, 655]

As growing military spending required the state to expand its income, regimes that pursued economic and fiscal reforms and welcomed capitalist innovation such as ‘new banking and monetary systems’ (Bayly 1998, 30). Besides growing financial resources, modern warfare also radically increased the demand for soldiers and newly invented weaponry. Although intensifying warfare required, in principle, the building of a bureaucratic fiscal state and the promotion of an economically active, socially disciplined and ideally patriotic populace, these dependencies frequently had a mutually negative effect (ibid., 31):

[T]he sources of income open to most rulers were severely constrained, even falling, especially in the later eighteenth century. There seems little doubt that the rising population of much of continental Europe and of Ireland in the eighteenth century was keeping living standards low, or even reducing them to judge by the constant subsistence crises of the period. These damaged the ability of rural society to pay taxes to the military fiscal states.

The achievement of Josephist state-building was thus by no means inevitable, and was driven by particular political responses to pressures on the European level.

3.1.2. Rational-Legal Authority and the Bureaucratic Military State

Only after the process of state-building had been pushed forward by the political centre, comprehensive measures concerning the institutional integration of the population at large
could be undertaken by the state. The sociologist Poggi (1978, 73-74) highlights the functional role of law and institutions in the process of re-structuring power relations ‘from above’. In the mid-eighteenth century, Maria Theresa began to establish a formal, standardised bureaucratic structure centred in the Viennese capital (Heindl 2006, 37):

In the imperial seat of Vienna, the highest central agencies (Hofstellen) - predecessors of ministries - were established. These departments were in charge of all the territories of the monarchy and were headed by a powerful authority, the Directorium in Publicis et Cameralibus. Second, two additional institutions were created in the provinces (Länder): one was the Gubernium, or provincial government, later called the Statthalteterei, which was subordinated to Maria Theresa - implying the relative powerlessness of the privileged estates. The other was the subdivision of the Crownlands into districts offices (Kreisämter) with an administrator heading each office.

It was on the basis of codified law in the Roman tradition that a legal standardisation process could be fused with that of political centralisation. The process of drafting a modern civil code – the *Codex Theresianus* – began in 1753 and found its conclusion in 1786 after decades of resistance from corporate privilege groups, when Joseph II succeeded in promulgating a unitary civil code for the Austrian lands that took effect in 1787. However, it was only in 1812, when the liberal *Allgemeine bürgerliche Gesetzbuch* (ABGB), based on a non-religious theory of natural law, was introduced. This essentially Josephist achievement of legal codification, both of civil and penal law, is an indicator of political centralisation (Szabo 1994, 180-81):

Uniform laws implied uniform application, which was a further blow to local and regional particularism because such codification processes disciplined social relations in increasingly general and abstract terms, and as such were an instrument of power in developing absolutism.

In response to intensifying military struggles, Maria Theresa immediately began with the difficult task of modernising the army. This remained a focus of government activities during the reigns of Joseph II and Leopold II. A major source of weakness was not so much the size of the imperial army but rather the insufficient material support from the provincial estates, which aimed at minimising “the burden on themselves and on their particular province” (Wangermann 1973, 60). The defeats suffered at the hand of Prussia showed additionally that new technological developments and the requirement of an adequate and standardised infrastructure to facilitate a functioning mass army were becoming increasingly important for military modernisation. Maria Theresa’s modernised army (Deak 1990, 27-28),

numbered up to 200,000 men in peace-time, and it came to be supported by a fine artillery that remained the pride of the Habsburg forces until the very end. The army was divided into permanently established regiments, each with its own number as well as name; German was made the universal language of command and service; the troops were provided with uniforms and interchangeable
weapons; a military academy and technical schools were established; and drill and discipline were
standardized, as were military justice, medical care, military education, and the commissioning of
officers.

The new standardised regulations, use of the German language, and mass drills were
intended to contribute to the army’s organisational rationalisation. Soon after her
succession, Maria Theresa began to reinforce the army’s unity as an institution of her
absolutist dynastic state and to sever its symbolic relationship with the Old Reich. The black
and yellow (or gold) Habsburg colours – the dynasty being the House of Austria – were
intended to represent Austrian imperial unity and to serve as a source of identification, a
legacy that lasted into the twentieth century (ibid., 28):

No less important for the future of the army, Maria Theresa – who was obliged to wage wars against
the German princes and who personally could not become [Holy Roman] emperor – took the first
steps toward making her forces ‘Austrian’ as opposed to German. When her husband was crowned
emperor [of the Holy Roman Empire] in 1745, she ordered that her army be called ‘imperial-royal’
(kaiserlich-königliche Armee or k.k. Armee), and that the black and yellow Habsburg colors be
displayed in her forces to signify the political unity of her family possessions.

Although the first public military schools were set up in the 1750s, their ‘aim was less to
train officers than to provide for military orphans, the sons of deserving officers, and the
younger sons of the minor landed nobility’ (Deak 1990, 79). ‘This rudimentary system of
military education was subsequently expanded by Joseph II and his successors, so that by
the mid-nineteenth century there were a number of military schools with well-established
traditions’ (ibid.). The education provided followed Josephist Enlightenment principles and
emphasised mathematics, geometry, German and French, besides teaching history,
geography and natural history. Religion did not occupy a central place (ibid., 80).

Maria Theresa aimed to expand and institutionally stabilise the coercive and economic
base of the state through a number of reforms. She raised the required provincial subsidy to
the level necessary to maintain a permanent army of 108,000. For substantial reforms,
required to finance the military, a new land register was introduced, seigniorial land was
charged with a tax, and the organisation of provincial military contingents was taken over
by the central government. The increase of direct taxation required the reform of the
administrative body. ‘The function of the Estates was henceforth confined to collecting the
land-tax as apportioned by the central government and finding the number of recruits asked
for by the central government. To perform the now greatly extended governmental
functions, a complete network of provincial and local government organizations was
created, responsible to the new supreme Directorium in Publicis et Cameralibus’
(Wangermann 1973, 61).
Besides the army the reforms also tackled the modernisation of the police force, and in 1751 the traditional city guardians were replaced by quarter and district commissioners. A step towards centralisation followed in 1782, when Johann Anton Pergen became the head of the newly established central police station in Vienna. Subsequently, other police stations were established in Graz, Linz, Innsbruck, Brünn/Brno, Prague, Troppau/Opava, Pest, Sibiu/Hermannstadt and Milan (Vocelka 2004, 290).

In comparison to other similarly modernising states, the bureaucratic capacity of Austria had been successfully expanded both with regard to the number of civil servants employed by the state as well as in terms of growing public services. The historical roots of Austrian cameralist political economy reach back into the seventeenth century. Essentially it represented ‘a theory of state management that foregrounded the production of wealth’ (Vushko 2015, 25). ‘Its three most famous theorists in Austria … all Protestants from the Reich who converted to Catholicism, had begun publishing policy prescriptions from the 1660s … The cameralists particularly stressed the benefits of a prosperous peasantry, as a means to increase the human resources (population) necessary for military strength and economic self-sufficiency’ (Beller 2006, 81, 83). The theory of ‘natural law’ suggested, besides the possibility of influencing human populations (culture, quantity etc.), that the state had the potential to promote economic growth (Good 1984, 28):

Each province had its own local promotional board that was linked to the General Commercial Directorate in Vienna. The resulting governmental policy … had potential impact on all the elements associated with the emergence of this phenomenon in its European setting – on technology (the proximate source of long-term increases in output per person), on the structural shift in the economy away from agriculture, and on the institutional changes embodied in the replacement of feudal relations with capitalist relations.

State Chancellor Kaunitz attributed a central role in the modernisation of the economy to local administrators. They were to be inculcated with three basic principles. Firstly, they were to identify, report and rectify any structural or technical aspects proving a hindrance to agricultural productivity. Secondly, they were to seek the trust and confidence of the common people by spreading the conviction that the monarchy was only working in favour of its people, and to propose ‘every expedient measure … which would lead to enlightenment, relief and tranquility’ (Szabo 1994, 178). Thirdly, the abolition of the robot system was to be ‘strongly encouraged, clearly explained, and all assistance rendered to promote its widespread implementation’ (ibid.). These guidelines ‘summarized neatly Kaunitz’s policies for the transformation of rural society … and became the leitmotif of government action’ (ibid., 178-9). The active role played by the state is illustrated by
Kaunitz’s policy of establishing a system of state credits to support technological improvements and investments. He further urged *Kreis* officials to distribute model contracts and publish promotions. Under the reign of Joseph II, ‘subsidies and prizes were awarded to machine builders and inventors were given exclusive privileges for their inventions for several years. Some important sectors, such as textiles and iron making, were freed from guild restrictions. The right to set up industrial enterprise outside of guild control was extended to entrepreneurs on an increasing basis’ (Good 1984, 28-29). David Good (ibid.) concludes that Josephist economic policy,

was part of a larger plan to strengthen the Empire as a whole through regional specialization. According to this plan the western territories of the realm were to become the industrial heartland of the Empire and the eastern lands were to become the agricultural center. Such an approach reflects the earlier unified state (*Gesamtstaat*) idea.

It aimed at the institution of a market-driven economic system, which would functionally serve the Austrian ‘common good’. The cameralist political economy ‘had been designed ultimately to strengthen the hand of the Crown by forming a strong, centralized state. In so doing it also promoted capitalist, as against feudal, social relations, thereby paving the way for the emergence of capitalism in the Habsburg Empire. Economic historians are inclined to give the Habsburg Crown high marks at this level’ (ibid., 35). However, the successful initiation of economic modernisation could not avoid the prevailing financial problems of the state, especially in the context of the wars against Ottoman Turkey in 1787 and later France. Moreover, the economic reforms triggered resistance among the landed nobility.

### 3.1.3. Cameralism, the Capitalist State, and Commercial Society

The economic focus of cameralism was on the expansion of capital, trade growth, an increase in productivity and, ultimately, in general income. From 1781 onwards, Joseph II reduced the customs barrier between Hungary and the other provinces. In 1787 free trade was established for imports of industrial products into Hungary, while customs on Hungarian exports into the Austrian-Bohemian parts of the monarchy remained (Vocelka 2004, 91). Various legal reforms as well as public spending were to contribute to growing social mobility and social capital for economically active classes such as peasants, the urban bourgeoisie and merchants, stimulating more competition. Between 1781 and 1790 central government expenditure for instance increased from 65 thousand million to 113 thousand million Gulden, reflecting the massive expansion of state activities.
Another aspect was the redistribution of public spending on education away from universities and towards the expansion of primary schooling for the common people (Sonnenfels 1994, 19-21). University reforms had been crucial for the production of trained physicians for the army, lawyers and bureaucrats for the legal state, and the new economic system also required trained and educated human resources (Wangermann 1973, 73):

Village schools, especially in Bohemia, began to provide training in basic industrial techniques. Prompted by the manufacturer Weinbrenner, the government established a School of Commerce (Realschule) in Vienna. Joseph von Sonnenfels, soon to emerge as the leading economist of the cameralist school, was appointed…in the University of Vienna (1763). His most successful students were later appointed to similar chairs in the other universities. Eventually, the government helped to finance even art education through scholarships and the establishment of the Vienna Academy of Fine Art (1773), extending the policy of promoting home industries to the field of painting, architecture, and especially engraving.

From the very beginning, these reforms also had a major impact on the Church. The state ‘ceased to tolerate clerical and religious activities which appeared to impede important branches of the economy. Thus, in 1751, a complaint of the printers in Vienna about the serious obstacles created for them by the Jesuit censorship caused the government to take over the control of censorship from the Order’ (ibid., 73-74). Decrees reducing the number of religious holidays and hindering other religious activities associated with economic restraint were to follow.

What economic modernisation had contributed to, through the commodification of the countryside and the institution of profitable manufactures, was the formation of oligopolies and the expansion of rich agrarian landowners. Where individual freedoms were granted, this had often led to the emergence of a dependent, increasingly indebted and vulnerable agrarian proletariat. In times when harvests failed, states faced unrest, usually beginning in
the rural areas but with revolutionary potential for the urban centres, such as in the cases of
the revolts in Bohemia 1773-75 and the French upheaval of 1789 (Maier 2012, 64). Between 1770 and 1774 Maria Theresa planned a substantial reform of the Bohemian agrarian economy and serf-seigniorial relations. In 1775 serfs launched a revolt against the estates, claiming that the Empress had issued a patent that freed the peasants of manual labour (Wright 1966, 49). After the uprising had been defeated by the Austrian army, Joseph II gave instructions that the treatment of rebels be relatively lenient, by no means a ‘heresy hunt’, and that amnesty would be granted to all who returned home (ibid., 49).

The recurring riots of peasants led Joseph II to implement substantial reforms of the agrarian economy, leading to the growing legal emancipation of peasants and to the abolition of serfdom between 1781 and 1785, together with the institution of a new central Commission for tax regulation in 1783 (Reinalter 1980, 44). In 1789, Joseph II implemented his third major agrarian reform: he sought to partially extend the abolition of manual labour to the private estates, encountering, however, serious difficulties, as this policy was seen to ‘violate ... prescriptive rights and endanger ... immediate interests of noble landlords’ (Wright 1966, 161). This reform was reversed after his death in 1790. Furthermore, work on a land cadastral survey, which had begun in 1785, was delayed and hindered by bureaucracy and opposition from the nobility and a lack of qualified surveyors. The cadastre was completed, however, by the final year of the Emperor’s life, and the Tax and Agrarian Regulation was passed in February 1789, to be implemented in November of the same year. This radical reform (Scott 1990, 185),

decreed that a peasant, freed of all labour services, would henceforth retain 70 per cent of his annual income to support his family, to improve his own small-holding, and to pay his dues to the church and to his village. The remaining 30 per cent was to be divided between the state as taxation and the nobleman as compensation for the loss of labour services.

Noble landowners rose in opposition, perceiving this reform as a threat to their socio-economic position. Although peasants’ obligatory labour services were upheld, Joseph’s agrarian reforms had a long-lasting impact. ‘The Monarchy’s peasants enjoyed greater security of tenure, a measure of equality before the law and improved material conditions as a result of the reforms of the 1770s and 1780s. Only in Hungary was resistance complete and successful, and the condition of the serf as wretched as before’ (ibid., 186). Good (1984, 34) similarly concludes that as a result of the Josephist legislation between 1785 and 1789, ‘the capitalist bases of Habsburg agriculture were laid’. Following the Josephist rationalisation of government, the interest of the central state had generally been given priority over the corporate privileges of the estates, with positive consequences for common
subjects, including a general sense of recognition by the state. This new consciousness is illustrated by the peasants’ election of political representatives when they learned that the Bohemian Diet was to be convened in 1792 (Wright 1966, 164).

The result of an expanding customs union that soon included most of the Austrian and Bohemian lands, together with a market-driven, commercial economy, had been growing interdependencies, connecting not only geographical regions but also previously unrelated segments of the population. A new economically dependent class emerged, which had been termed in various ways ‘fourth estate’, ‘industrial class’ or ‘bourggeoisie’. However, this new structural position did not automatically lead to the spread of a bourgeois political subjectivity and the ‘awakening’ of the Austrian middle class as a collective actor.

The growth of a bourgeois stratum during the second half of the eighteenth century remained regionally limited to the centres of the secondary and tertiary sectors; that is the region of Lower Austria and Vienna, of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, as well as Trieste. The correlation between economic development and demographic transformation is illustrated by the city of Prague, where in the late eighteenth century the German-speaking upper stratum expanded substantially. ‘Prague, Vienna, and Budapest were the only cities in the Habsburg Monarchy to reach 100,000 in population by the mid-nineteenth century. The onset of industrialization contributed to this growth along with the expansion of the older commercial and administrative functions’ (Cohen 2006, 20). See for the growth of cities after 1750 Figure 3. A study estimates the proportion of the bourgeoisie in Lower Austria and Vienna in 1788 – including merchants, artisans, entrepreneurs and intellectuals – to have reached about 6.5 per cent, approximately 4 per cent in the other central Austrian provinces, around 5.5 per cent in Bohemia and Moravia, and only 2 per cent in Hungary (Bruckmüller/Stekl 1995, 173-4). The growth of bourgeois segments was intrinsic to the economic modernisation of the monarchy.

Figure 3. Growth of Cities in Comparison, 1750-1910 [Mitchell 2007]
3.2. The Josephist Project in the Context of the Enlightenment and Factional Politics

As an intellectual stream the Enlightenment had its origins in Britain and the Netherlands, and reached the German-speaking regions of Europe in the second half of the seventeenth century. The philosopher Immanuel Kant (1784) expressed the Enlightenment perspective of recognising the ability of humans to reason most famously as ‘man’s emergence from his self-inflicted immaturity’. A condition of the Enlightenment was that the Reformation broke the monopoly power of the Catholic Church and opened up public space for new ideas. This gradually attributed to ‘religion’ the modern societal function as an ideology (Luhmann 1977, 46). The Enlightenment was marked by the central belief that natural laws governing the universe can be identified on the basis of reason and scientific investigation, and that humans were rational creatures, able to change when given the opportunity of education.

3.2.1. Networks of Intellectuals and Civil Society

In the second half of the eighteenth century, public officials noted a new phenomenon in many German-speaking areas of central Europe, which they referred to as a ‘reading craze’ (Dann 1981, 9-29). It was a result of capitalist mass printing, expanding public education and relaxed censorship. While in Vienna before 1760 only about ten journals had existed, the number of newly published journals grew to thirty-five between 1761 and 1770, to seventy-nine between 1771 and 1780, and finally to 169 between 1781 and 1790, before declining again after 1790 (Vocelka 2004, 254). The key element of the emergent civil society was ‘associative sociability’, which was to be found in all urban spaces of the late eighteenth century, no matter whether in the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia or Habsburg Austria (Hoffmann 2006, 8).

The respective networks of literati and educated segments developed significant intellectual and organisational capacities, central for the elaboration of normative political projects. Besides the rather secretive masonic lodges that flourished in the last decades of the century, it was specialised associations of the educated bourgeoisie such as the Academia operosorum in Laibach (1725), the Societas ignotorum in Olmütz (1746) and the various agricultural societies that were officially promoted after 1764, all characterised by the Enlightenment spirit of modernising economy and society, and ideologically based on an early form of liberalism (Bruckmüller/Stekl 1995, 183). It was in this era that German literary culture expanded throughout the urban centres of the monarchy. In the 1760s a
vibrant German-speaking literary scene emerged. Christian Gottlob Klemm began to publish the first Viennese literary review *Die Welt* in 1762. Another example was the establishment of the liberal democratic newspaper *Pressburger Zeitung*, first published in 1764.

Two related societal phenomena discussed by contemporaries hint at the consequences of an expanding German literary culture in the second half of the eighteenth century: the so-called ‘reading craze’ and what Sonnenfels termed an ‘obsession with studying’ (*Studiersucht*) (Klingenstein 1978, 192). In terms of quantity the increase in literary production was enormous. While in 1773 the total value of books exported from Austria was 135,000 florins, a decade later it had reached more than 3,250,000 florins, overburdening the capacity of censors (Bernard 1971, 28). The growing trends of copying texts from Northern Germany and cheap mass printing had ‘brought the bulk of the German enlightenment to Austria, and ... they did provide Austrian writers, if not with the opportunity to make a living with their pens, at least with the chance to be published’ (ibid., 30-31). Historians and sociologists such as Koselleck, Hobsbawm, Habermas and Baumann agree in this regard that the late eighteenth century saw the initial consolidation of modern political language and concepts, essential for the configuration of political ideology. Modern concepts such as ‘the state’, ‘the citizen’, ‘society’ and ‘nation’ were central to Josephist thought.

Practices and experiences of associative sociability were intrinsically connected to politics and to the bourgeoisie’s intellectual function as ‘interpreters’ of the status quo. Hoffmann observes that ‘[b]eginning in the mid-eighteenth century, civic activism spread in waves, with each wave giving rise to new associational goals and making the network of civil society denser. This expansion can only be understood against the background of global migration, trade, and communication of ideas and practices’ (Hoffmann 2006, 86). This points to the trans-territorial and trans-class character of ideological power. ‘Ideas and practices like sociability are not bound to a specific class and its interests’ (ibid., 6-7). Neither was the growing public sphere linked to a distinct ideology such as liberalism. It facilitated the dissemination of a plurality of views including illiberal ones, promoting the habit of public argument. Constrained by censorship, networks of intellectuals developed ideological views that informed factions among political elites, without crystallising partisan positions.
3.2.2. The Josephist Project

As an ideological movement, Josephism represented the culmination of the Enlightenment in Austria and prepared the ground for a variety of progressive state-centred currents. While in the early eighteenth century patria referred to the province represented by the ‘provincial estates’ (Landstände), under Josephism it gradually gave way to a new concept of patria, referring to the territorial central state. Maria Theresa was already warning of the regionalist bias of provincial political figures, acting in opposition to the interest of the state, contrasting for example ‘Austrian’ with ‘Bohemian Ministries’ (Drabek 2003, 153). Joseph II referred in his political reform draft of 1781 to the entire monarchy as the ‘fatherland’, in which the ‘national spirit’ of the population was to be revived (ibid., 155). Two important intellectual figures of the Austrian Enlightenment were Ignaz von Born, a natural scientist, and Ignaz Cornova, a historian. Both were prominent freemasons and held the view that ‘the nation’ represented all subjects of the state (ibid., 162).

The most prominent Josephist was Joseph von Sonnenfels (1732/33-1817), who came from a Jewish family and whose works elaborated on the importance of the state in the creation of a modern society. For Sonnenfels the regulatory affairs of the state that concerned its fundamental functions were located in the domains of the economy, public law, penal law and culture (Acham 1994, 240). Within the domain of culture, the state was to take up the function of forging a common literary language and patriotic sentiments, enabling mutual communication and a feeling of collective belonging. In his essay ‘On the Love of the Fatherland’ (1771), he developed an argument for Austrian state- and nation-building, starting with the discussion of the statement ‘no felicity without the fatherland!’ (Sonnenfels 1994, 119). While acknowledging the logic of this statement in reference to the example of French patriotism, he highlights the subjective nature of ‘felicity’ as located in the ‘opinion of the citizen’ which, he argues, is always related to the territorial fatherland and grasped in comparison to other countries. While acknowledging that ‘not only the truth has its martyrs; delusions too have martyrs of their own’, he suggests that there remains a factual, historical interdependency between the individual and the people, which should lead any individual to contribute actively to the aggrandisement of its people, according to his or her own potential and always dependent on the state (Sonnenfels 1994, 119).

Sonnenfels recommends the utilisation of territorial or political advantages to foster patriotism. If the state does not offer significant or obvious advantages for the nation, it must create distinct advantages politically, in order to ‘implant love of the fatherland’ (Einpflanzung der Vaterlandsliebe) within its population (ibid., 120). Concerning ‘national
legislation’ (*National-gesetzgebung*) he concludes that ‘a people that should love its fatherland on the basis of its legislation, must perceive it [the legislation] as the best it could receive’ (ibid., 121). ‘Laws, drafted by the wisest of the nation, consolidated over a number of years, whose obedience nobody wishes to abscond from, because nobody wishes to abscond from his own fortune’, are viewed by Sonnenfels as ‘a precious treasure’, which ‘the people, being pleased with it, are even ready to defend with their lives’ (ibid., 123). Patriotism implies the identification with the state: ‘In every loss suffered by the Fatherland, we see our own loss; in its very gain we increase in our own advantage’ (Sonnenfels, quoted in Trencsényi/Kopeček, 2006, 131).

Although Josephists were ‘not nationalist’ in today’s sense, they can be described as ‘nationally conscious’, implying a reflexive identification as Austrian patriots (Reinalter 1993, 45). For Josephists, German literary culture constituted a major component of the ‘social ideology of the Enlightenment’, which allowed the transformation of Josephism into a ‘rooted statist Semi-Liberalism’ (ibid.). Some radical Josephists developed democratic political thought with the goal to eventually transform Austria into a representative constitutional state. What they had in common was a shared anti-aristocratic sentiment and a developmental vision that propagated the transformation from a corporate-religious to an enlightened-rationalist society under the guardianship of the welfare state. Valjavec (1944, 84) notes ‘[a]t least in theory, Josephism emphasised the “rights of humanity”, not only for the individual, but also for “a society”’.

In 1787 Joseph Richter (1749-1813), another prominent Austrian Enlightenment figure, published an essay entitled ‘Why is the emperor Joseph not loved by his people?’ The text begins with the clarification that ‘the people’ means ‘the majority of the nation’ (Richter 1988, 69). Richter argues that opposition arose due to the emperor’s modernisation reforms working against countless particularistic interests (ibid., 75):

In short, emperor Joseph has so many enemies, because he is a reformer, because any reform has to cause dissatisfaction and because even an angel from heaven, if he descends to us humans as a reformer, would make countless enemies - and still I would believe that it depended merely on our great emperor, to win back the hearts of the dissatisfied, to become the Abgott of his people.

Sonnenfels (1994, 127-29) argued that popular education to ‘enlighten’ the people, to teach them the freedom to think for themselves from an early stage, can be regarded as a requirement for patriotic loyalty and future democracy. He points out that both forms of government – monarchy and republic – have their advantages and weaknesses and suggests that a monarchic state, in order to foster patriotism, must convince its population that it serves the welfare of the people. Sonnenfels further highlights that ‘society’ had to be
created by the state. The term ‘policing’ (a fusion of *polis*/*state* and *polire*/*polish*) had been coined by Sonnenfels' (1994, 19) in his *Polizeywissenschaft*, referring to state policies (*policeys*) that aim at population management. Sonnenfels was an outspoken critic of the idea of a repressive police state, opposed strict censorship, and responded publicly (1793) in defence of democratic Josephism even when events had turned violent in revolutionary France.

Although democratisation as a long-term process of political emancipation had been within the horizons of certain radical Josephists, its contemporary means were primarily seen as direct absolutist rule. A pamphlet of Joseph II’s employee Simon Linguet illustrates how the purpose of government were argued in terms of ‘the happiness of the people’, not the glory of the ruler nor the enforcement of a supposedly right religion (Beales 2005, 295). The relativity of despotism in the self-perception of the government is also illustrated by Kaunitz’ defence of Joseph’s radical reform proposal, in which he addressed Maria Theresa (quoted in Szabo 1994, 100):

> Despotic regimes might content themselves with intimidations and punishments. However, in a Monarchy where we are dealing with civilized nations we must also take care to reward merit, not to stifle a certain spiritual progress, with its love for prince and fatherland, and not to rob ourselves of the benefits of those achievements created by thoughts and feelings. It must never be forgotten that it is a greater joy and more worthy of a noble soul to reign over free and thinking beings, than to rule over base slaves.

In contrast to the counter-reformation, when the dynastic regime had utilised Catholicism as its legitimising ideology, it was now partly replaced by a form of statist (proto-)nationalism, expressed by notions of ‘love for the fatherland’, ‘brotherly love’ and a welfare state ideal that aimed to turn ‘humans into citizens’. In August 1780, member of the State Council Tobias Philipp Gebler, who had studied in Jena, Halle and Göttingen before joining the Austrian administration in 1753, expressed his Josephist stance on nation-building as follows: ‘The state [Austria] must be mindful of gradually becoming one people’ (Gebler quoted in Burian 1982, 193-4). Despite their overlapping social theory, Josephism promoted a more bureaucratic and top-down vision of state/society-building than the less etatist and more individualist ideological stream of early liberalism in Britain (Valjavec 1944, 88). Josephism viewed ‘society’ and the right to political citizenship not as a condition but as the future culmination of political modernisation. Sonnenfels stated, the character of the Josephist state idea ‘was enlightened rational and distinctively political’, comparing his concept of ‘the people’ of the Austrian state explicitly with the ‘French concept of the state-nation (*Staatsnation*)’ (Rosenstrauch-Königsberg 1992, 165).
3.2.3. Dynastic Regime and Josephist Faction

The typical politics of absolutism can be described as factional politics, characterised by hierarchical personal networks and top-down recruitment from a pool of highly educated young men. ‘Factional politics’ had been traditionally observed in absolutist France. Although Louis XIV had founded the French absolutist state by defeating ‘the traditional obstructors of royal policy’ such as ‘municipalities, corporations, guilds, and parlements’, his son had to deal with rivalries within a politically fragmented administration (Finer 1997, 1520). In Austria, to the surprise of many contemporaries, a Josephist regime could be established on the basis of successful factional politics and a generational break within the political establishment. In fact the entire established political class of Maria Theresa’s father’s generation was extremely pessimistic. Wangerman (1973, 58) describes the disastrous situation when Maria Theresa succeeded in 1740 as follows: ‘[T]he level of morale in Habsburg governing circles was so low that nearly everyone seriously doubted the monarchy’s chances of avoiding partition. When Frederick II’s seizure of Silesia in December 1740 seemed to justify this pessimism, the leading ministers left the new, inexperienced ruler without council, because they wanted to steer a course suitable for all eventualities.’

A German-speaking ‘Austrian’ intelligentsia identified with a political state project in reference to the dynasty – the House of Austria – and its core territories, and ‘became aware of Western secular ideas largely through the mediaacy of its German counterpart, but interpreted them in the light of its own peculiar … background’ (Bernard 1971, 7). Although some had originally been immigrants, ‘[t]hese men addressed themselves to Austrian questions, [and] very quickly came to learn the Austrian style in dealing with them’ (ibid.). In the wake of the War of the Austrian succession they became increasingly active, coming to represent the ‘organic intellectuals’ of the Josephist project and the rising Josephist faction that shaped the regime gravitating around the person of Maria Theresa and her son Joseph.

Adopting at times an avant-garde modernist position, Josephists promoted Austrian state-building to fundamentally transform the feudal composite monarchy, which resembled a conglomerate of heterogeneous and often historically unrelated territories. Maria Theresa began her rule in 1740 at the age of twenty-three, and her son Joseph II became co-regent in 1765 when he was twenty-four. Similar to her son Joseph, the four major Josephist figures in the government – Haugwitz from Silesia, Gerard and his son Gottfried van Swieten from the Netherlands, and Kaunitz from Moravia – belonged to a new generation of Enlightened
elites (Klingenstein 1970, 80). These individuals were experts in contemporary state theory and new approaches to government. Having studied the political history of Britain and France, as well as the contemporary reforms in Protestant German states, they can be described as progressive reformers and leading actors of the Josephist project. In 1753 Kaunitz (1711-1794), who had previously served as Austrian ambassador in Paris (1750-53), was appointed Chancellor of State, a position that he held until 1792. Due to his outstanding political talent – he was a master of strategic thinking with a sense of pragmatism – he became the leading Austrian statesman of the era.

The German-speaking bourgeoisie, which became the bearer of the ‘Austrian state idea’, began to expand predominantly in the urban areas of the monarchy such as the capital city of Vienna, and the towns of Lemberg, Graz, Krakow/Krakau, Brno/Brünn, Innsbruck, Pest, Ljubljana/Laibach and so on (Bruckmüller 1993, 212). These urban centres saw the development of an Austrian bourgeoisie, developing a collective identity in relation to the developing Austrian state. ‘It is beyond dispute that from 1770 a new, bourgeois class was arising. It was drawn from lawyers, publishers, book printers, merchants, notaries and above all civil servants’ (ibid.). Their expansion contributed to the broadening of the social base of the Josephist project, which had originally been founded by a network of Enlightened intellectuals, gradually re-producing and re-produced as ‘patriotic’ subjects of the Austrian state in schools, universities and the bureaucracy (Heindl 2013a, 65-66).

Joseph II recurrently expressed how essential ‘brotherly love’ would be for the cohesion of the polity (Beales 1987, 212). A Council of State should be formally founded, he claimed, and the position of the State Chancellor at the beginning of the reform era should be complemented by further centralising reforms, explicitly seeking to forge some sense of common belonging to the central state. Joseph noted in a memorandum that, while the ministers and departments ascribed mistakes to the provinces, the latter blamed the departments and the Staatsrat, leading to disadvantages for ‘the peasant and worthy citizen’ (ibid., 210). He proposed that bureaucrats be recruited and promoted on the basis of merit, held responsible for their service, and take the same oaths as soldiers: Unless these reforms were achieved, and ‘virtue, love of the fatherland, assiduity and the fear of inevitable punishment implanted’, that he would ‘despair of all improvement, and the so-called indulgence of the House of Austria will always constitute the tyranny of the Austrian provinces. Ten unworthy men gain, and millions of people languish’ (Joseph II, quoted in ibid., 211).
Another reform idea was to organise special conferences in Vienna, each to discuss a key question, and ‘in each province three deputies from other regions, approved and appointed by the ruler, should watch over and report on the administration, and co-ordinate action with their own provinces’ (ibid.). This should lead to a diffusion of practices, a more objective reporting system to the political centre, and the formation of a sense of belonging to the state.

3.3. Policies of Josephist State-Building

This section discusses major aspects of state-building during the reign of Maria Theresa (1740-1780) and her son Joseph II, who served as her co-regent from 1765 and as sole ruler from 1780 to 1790. Austria’s conditions in the mid-eighteenth century largely resembled those of other European monarchies such as France, Britain or Prussia. ‘A comparison with contemporary Britain reminds us that Scotland, Wales and England had different legal systems and Ireland a separate parliament. A comparison with Prussia shows that different estate bodies governed different regions. A comparison with France reveals the presence of several linguistically diverse populations’ (Judson 2016, 49). I will analyse in the following how far the Josephist ideal of state- and society-building was reflected in policies, especially in regard to the category of civic nationality. It is worth noting that the initiation of state- and nation-building had yet not resulted in broad acceptance or in the transformation of a large scale of everyday practices.

3.3.1. The Making of the State as a Centralising Political Structure

In the view of Josephist reformers political centralisation was perceived as the rational and functional way of creating a cohesive polity, with no reasonable alternative in the context of inter-state warfare. Their chief architect, Count Haugwitz, defended the so-called ‘Haugwitz reforms’ on one reported occasion by referring to ‘the opinion of all political theorists’ (quoted in Redlich 1942, 238). The building of a centralised state via the political and bureaucratic unification of the Bohemian and Austrian hereditary lands was pursued in waves of reforms. The central organ of government, the so-called Directorium in Publicis et Cameralibus, was established in 1749 with the aim to abandon the political influence of the aristocratic estates (Vocelka 2004, 358). Although these reforms also attempted to transfer the fiscal competences of the provincial estates to the central authorities in Vienna, some of the provincial privileges remained due to noble opposition (ibid., 357). Another pillar of the centralisation reform of 1749 was the foundation of something like a Ministry of Justice, the
so-called oberste justizstelle. the state chancellery (staatskanzlei), which was established in 1742 within the framework of the ‘house, court and state chancellery’ and subject to reforms in 1754, initially dealt with foreign relations and, accordingly, took over responsibility for the majority of territories (re-)acquired by peaceful or other means between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. these territories included lombardy, belgium, hungary, transylvania, croatia and slovenia (vushko 2015, 23).

in 1753 anton kaunitz was appointed chancellor of state (staatskanzler), taking up the important office in the state chancellery. kaunitz suggested that the functional differentiation of government institutions would provide a more efficient framework than that of crude centralisation. a new kind of regional office – the gubernium – was established between the 1750s and 1770s to supplement existing central institutions and work at the more local and district level, thus acting as go-between for the larger administrative bodies such as the state chancellery or the court chancellery (vushko 2015, 23). in 1760 the council of state was established, elevating kaunitz into a powerful government position within this body. in 1760, he noted the severe disadvantages of an over-burdened directorium that lacked organisational efficiency, especially in regard to the important administration of taxation. in 1761 he convinced the empress to dissolve the directorium and to transfer its competences to newly established specialised administrative entities for fiscal administration, political administration and commercial administration (vocelka 2004, 360).

although decisions had to be finalised by the monarch, who remained the sovereign ruler, austria was increasingly transformed into the josephist ideal of a legal state. the establishment of the ‘austrian supreme court of justice and court of appeals’ and the related separation of juridical authority from the political administration prepared the ground for institutional differentiation, involving both the council of state and the supreme court. as szabo (1994, 36) notes, ‘ministerial forms of government emerged in the eighteenth century as part of the general trend towards professionalism and bureaucratization from the previously more conciliatory forms of decision-making’. between 1780 and 1782 joseph ii modernised the austrian government system and established the united court chancellery (vereinigte hofstellen) and a formal imperial government (kaiserliches kabinett). however, both reforms of the government system were reversed after his death (vocelka 2004, 359).

the political struggle between the josephist camp, the feudal clergy and landed nobility had been remarkable in the light of the habsburg’s leading role in the counter-reformation.
The new generation of Enlightened reformers, recruited and recruiting on the basis of merit, stirred opposition, especially in light of their often anti-aristocratic sentiments. ‘In the ranks of the noble opposition there was talk of an esprit de nouveauté, to which Maria Theresa had unaccountably succumbed, and bitter resentment that the sovereign should have heeded the advice of upstart secretaries and outsiders while ignoring that of her noble paladins’ (Wangermann 1973, 62). These dynamics crystallised in the formation of two opposing camps, where the ‘political conflict over the proposed reforms was fought out with resourcefulness and determination on both sides’ (ibid.). Even if the harsh opposition of the nobility and the conservative clergy remained strong, they were not yet in a position to present a coherent alternative to the Josephist reform programme.

The strategy of re-interpreting historical law in order to gain legitimacy for Austrian state-building is illustrated by the government’s efforts to erode the privileges of the Hungarian nobility. A similar long-term strategy to that pursued against the privileges of the estates was adopted in the struggle against the Church (Wangermann 1973, 67-68):

The papacy was at this time gravely weakened by its conflict with the Bourbon dynasties over the expulsion of the Jesuits, and Maria Theresa, therefore, had no difficulty in successfully asserting a right to tax the clergy … without papal dispensation … from the beginning of 1769. Nevertheless, as in the case of Hungary, great care was taken to provide full theoretical support for the monarchy’s case. Rosenthal, the Imperial Archivist, was ordered to search for historical precedents, and found some dating from as far back as the fifteenth century. These precious documents were made available to Paul Joseph Riegger, the Professor of Canon Law at the University of Vienna, to serve as a basis for a learned publication justifying the rights claimed by the crown.

In terms of political theory, Sonnenfels revised the traditional position of the clergy, disputing their right to be recognised as a distinct estate: ‘the servant of religion is in regard to the bourgeois society civil servant and citizen. What he owns in the first position is salary, in the second, bourgeois property’ (Sonnenfels 1994, 124, Fn.61).

Even though the initiated reform programme was perceived as generally successful, military defeats stood in the way of regime consolidation. In her so-called ‘Political Testament’ of 1751, Maria Theresa expressed her admiration of the achieved reforms as the ‘essential foundation of all good government’ and noted that ‘since the introduction of the new system, the provinces, instead of complaining of the excesses perpetrated by ill-paid troops, asked for the quartering of more regiments as a means of stimulating local trade’

3 As the Hungarian nobility was expected to oppose any centralising constitutional reform, Maria Theresa’s advisors were working on its legitimisation: ‘This appeared in the form of a book by the Hungarian scholar and custodian of the Imperial Library, Adam Franz Kollár, which refuted the well-known thèse nobiliaire … and asserted a full-blooded thèse royale with the help of an impressive knowledge of Hungarian history’ (Wangermann 1973, 66). However, this manoeuvre ‘did not deceive the 1764 Diet … a small increase in the subsidy was all that Maria Theresa secured’ (ibid. 67).
(Wangemann 1973, 63). The Seven Years’ War (1756-63) again revealed the military weakness of the monarchy and its still limited coercive and economic capacities. The noble opposition attacked Haugwitz and appeared to be clamouring for a restoration of the system prior to 1749, a rebellion that Kaunitz was, however, able to nip in the bud by demonstrating his intention not to revoke the reforms but to develop them further. Continued reforms included an increase in centralised control over taxation and financial affairs of the provinces, together with the establishment of the supreme Council of State (Staatsraat) in 1761, which was charged with the oversight of all internal policy matters (ibid., 65).

In the 1770s, Austria had annexed parts of northern Moldova, so-called Bukovina, as part of the Josephist state-building project. The aim was to round out Austria’s territory between Galicia and Transylvania, enhancing its geopolitical consolidation in South-East Europe in the context of an opportunity arising from the Russo-Turkish war (Ceausu 1993, 262-3). In 1783, Joseph II expressed his vision of a unitary political structure in his pastoral letter: ‘the good of the state is always indivisible, namely that which affects the population at large and the greatest number, and as in similar fashion all the provinces of the Monarchy make up one single whole with one common objective’ (quoted in Blanning 1994, 59). This letter (Deak 2015, 28), paralleled Maria Theresia’s and Joseph’s institutional and financial separation of the princely court from the state, the building of central offices to manage and oversee the provinces, the concomitant removal of local authority from the nobles and estates and fiscal reforms, and the establishment of tax offices and state tax collectors. These trends gave impetus to the centralization of authority in the prince and, later, in the state.

As a result of these political structural reforms, the pre-modern monarchic union of multiple feudal polities based on estates were transformed into a single monarchic state characterised by differentiated federalism and a certain degree of centralisation (Brauneder/Lachmayer 1989, 79-80). A major step of centralisation was achieved with Vienna’s political defeat of province-based estate constitutions, which eliminated the threshold of noble power (Drabek 2003, 154-56). These radical reforms were complemented by a rupture in dynastic symbolism and tradition. ‘Joseph refused to bow to deep-seated traditions and refused coronation in the separate kingdoms of his possessions. His desire to replace his imperial patchwork with a unified state encouraged him to go so far as to remove the Hungarian crown of St. Stephen, the Bohemian Crown of St. Wenceslas, and other coronation regalia to Vienna in 1785’ (Krueger 2009, 72). Joseph II ignored the constitutions of the individual estates, neglected the provincial Diets, and ruled by decree
(Vocelka 2004, 90). These efforts of political centralisation contributed to the gradual institution of a Gesamtstaat, formally proclaimed as the Austrian Empire only in 1804.

3.3.2. Austrian Government and Population Management

The Josephist project can be understood as a multi-layered, political response to an existential crisis of the Habsburg regime. It was influenced by successful examples of modernisation, drawing on mercantilism and early liberalism from the British Isles, the economic theory of the French physiocrats, as well as successful Prussian reforms. After all, the Habsburg monarchy had lost the greater part of wealthy Silesia to Prussia in 1745 and seen how Prussia had increased its tax output. Austrian cameralism, as a modern scientific approach to government, was developed by a number of scholars such as Giovanni Baptista Beccaria, Karl Anton Martini and Joseph Sonnenfels, all professors at the University of Vienna. It was especially Sonnenfels who developed a monarchic welfare state model that influenced government circles between the 1760s and 1780s. In his work Basics of Police, Trade, and Finance (1786-87), Sonnenfels argued that the state could exercise control over its population most effectively ‘through a balanced combination of reward and punishment’ (Vushko 2015, 26). This view of population management reveals that the notion of rationalisation on the institutional level was reflected on the level of subjects. This was most visible in the introduction of mandatory primary schooling, regulated via an official catalogue of mostly psychological and social methods of enforcing discipline, including public award ceremonies and punishments. Every school kept records in a book of honours awarded and punishments administered, and children were made to sit on specific ‘honour’ or ‘punishment’ benches (Vocelka 2004, 286).

An intrinsic aspect of state-building was represented by the introduction of new governmental methods of identifying and counting the state’s population. As an instrument of population management in urban areas, Maria Theresa introduced mandatory registration for all inhabitants of cities, including their guests, in 1746. In 1754 domestic migration regulations were reformed and the criteria for granting residency clarified (ibid., 288). Measures to systematically count the households and inhabitants were implemented in the 1770s, mostly for military and fiscal reasons: Conscription was introduced in most of the Austrian and Bohemian lands between 1770 and 1772, and from a fiscal point of view, each house was given an official number, to be painted in black on the house. The state counted the members of each household, categorised them into Christians and Jews, and registered valuable animals (ibid., 289).
Most Josephists supported reforms to foster a common standardised written vernacular for bureaucratic and public affairs by replacing Latin with the German language. When the famous philosopher and author Johann Christoph Gottsched ‘offered to supervise a general purification of spoken Austro-German’, his offer, ‘much to his surprise, was indignantly rejected’ (Bernard 1971, 20). One reason for this can be found in the traditional social capital of aristocrats and clergy on the basis of linguistic differentiation from the lower social strata. Eventually ‘a change in atmosphere becomes perceptible, if at first only slowly, after the middle of the century … [and] the Theresan reforms brought with them a change in taste’ (ibid.). For Sonnenfels the German language constituted a central component of the Josephist project. In 1761 he took up his function as a literatus, as the president of a German-language society (Die Deutsche Gesellschaft), and began to hold university lectures in the German language. Sonnenfels’ approach to culture was a ‘constructivist’ one, which would become typical of Jacobinism and the emergent Austrian Left. In 1764, Christian Gottlob Klemm founded the newspaper Der österreichische Patriot, promoting an Enlightened Austrian state patriotism and the primacy of the German language as the common means of societal communication. His defence of the German language as lingua franca suggested a ‘democratisation of culture’ that was perceived as an attack on the nobility’s notion of hierarchical cultural differentiation.

The universities and the foundation of modern legal and political studies were in the midst of state-building reforms, seen as those institutions responsible for the reproduction of Josephist cadres (Vushko 2015, 29):

The separation of public office and private domain, which would be an operating principle of Weberian rational bureaucracy, already formed a theoretical cornerstone of the new system … Nowhere does Joseph II refer to Sonnenfels, but parallels between the emperor’s ideal bureaucrat and Sonnenfels’ man without prejudice are striking. Both conceptions foreground a kind of personal self-purification, and the notion that persons thus reformed could serve as the basis of a new state under the Habsburg Monarchy.

Maria Theresa’s Dutch chief physician, Gerard van Swieten, became a prominent figure in the initiation of university reforms. Similar to Kaunitz, he had a talent for strategic reforms and considered long-term processes. The language he used in a memorandum to Maria Theresa on 5 November 1757 leaves no doubt about his convictions (quoted in Brechka 1970, 136):

Learning has languished and deteriorated in the university ever since the Society [the Jesuits] became involved there. The deplorable condition of the university at the beginning of Your Majesty’s glorious reign is only too well known, and posterity will always honor the reign of Maria Theresa as a glorious age in the restoration of the sciences … all the universities which they [the Jesuits] have
dominated have been completely ruined; Gratz, Olmütz, Tyrnau are striking proofs. Certainly it would have been infinitely better if the Society had never been brought into the university. At Louvain they have made some attempts to end such a situation but they have never succeeded. It is especially obvious from their open and covert opposition in marked disobedience of Your Majesty’s orders that the Society looks upon the progress of science with a jealous eye.

Despite the fact that intellectuals were central to the Austrian Enlightenment, the role of universities was initially modest. Due to the prevailing stagnation of Austrian universities, Kaunitz sent von Birkenstock to the Protestant University of Göttingen in 1772, to examine the reasons for its success. The report concluded that ‘the professors were without exception learned men, they were well and regularly paid, and the intellectual climate was distinguished by its cosmopolitanism - there were students of all religions and nationalities, some even from distant America’ (Bernard 1971, 16). Despite the policy recommendations drafted in Birkenstock’s report, the government rejected corresponding reforms.

In order to produce a new class of Enlightened bureaucrats, Maria Theresa founded the chair of ‘natural law’ at the University of Vienna. Based on the Josephist approach of pushing through institutional reforms in order to change ‘culture’, comprising social norms and practices, investing in the education of bureaucrats seemed only logical as it would produce the political project’s own distinct social base: the liberal-statist bourgeoisie. By replacing privilege with merit as the fundamental principle within the bureaucratic institutions ‘it was no longer rich, landowning – and therefore independent – noblemen, but rather poor – and dependent – commoners who would serve as officials as Joseph pursued his far-reaching plans for the reform of state and society – plans to which the nobility was typically opposed’ (Heindl 2006, 38). Secondary and university education with its stipend system offered opportunities for social advancement. ‘Surprisingly, officials from the middle class and lower aristocracy had dominated the higher bureaucracy as early as approximately 1780 … It was crucial for the restructuring of society that well-educated officials from the middle class gained access to public service positions and the ability to rise in the social hierarchy’ (ibid., 42). Consequently, ‘it was the seniority system, coupled with the educational requirements, that finally broke the power of the aristocracy’, paving the way for the recruitment of bourgeois civil servants (ibid., 41). The character of the provided education facilitated the connection between political theory and practice (ibid., 38):

To train this higher class of officials, reformed law faculties at the universities offered instruction on laws and statutes, as well as practical training. Central to this education was the work of Karl Anton von Martini, whose theory of natural law was the philosophical foundation of the monarchy and remained so, if in diluted form, until 1848; his textbooks were obligatory reading at the law faculties.
This new class of bureaucrats would remain the pillar of the Austrian state besides the army, reproduced by Austrian universities, especially the law department in Vienna. Joseph II continually increased the institutional pressures and regulations regarding the professionalization of the Austrian bureaucracy. ‘To get a high official post, applicants had to complete legal studies, which were adjusted to include new practical and theoretical subjects. Practical experience in the bureaucracy was also deemed important, and every official – including urbane aristocrats – had to begin their service in district courts or offices in small and unimportant provincial towns, then move to the Gubernium in an effort to expose them to as many administrative districts and regions as possible’ (Heindl 2006, 41).

The expansion of the bureaucratic state apparatus and of public education should ideally enable the governing cadres to infuse into the masses their own rational-legal vision of the world. In the context of an emerging bureaucratic state (Verwaltungsstaat), which forges the population into adopting practices according to law, ‘Law is the institution par excellence that creates, in the view of the relevant others, autonomous individuals responsible for their actions’ (Wagner 1993, 11). This sociological observation illustrates how the social theory of Josephism was reflected in the legal state, which subsequently contributed to the diffusion of elementary premises of liberal ideology.

In 1782, Joseph II addressed the Studienhofkommission in a resolution that essentially confirmed the university reform of Kressl and Martini. Besides the demand for increasing efficiency and reducing professorships in order to finance the expansion of primary education, Joseph demanded the promotion of German as the language of instruction (Joseph II quoted in Wangermann 1978, 26):

> The German language, incidentally, the true mother tongue and language of our country, which is so conducive to writing medicinal receipts, introducing syllogisms and moral principles in philosophy, and in matters of law advocates are already in the habit of using the German language for all texts, whereupon it is also spoken by judges … All other faculties without exception [excluding theology], therefore, must henceforth hold all lectures in German.

Heinke, director of the Law faculty in Vienna noted that, should any Italian, Magyar or Croat-speaking students not speak German well enough, they could study in Pavia or Ofen. In the case of Bohemian and Moravian students who were unable to follow the lectures, he stated that their ‘number is partly very small, and in part one does not lose much if a dozen young people less are studying’ (quoted in Wangermann 1978, 27). The head of the Studienhofkommission Gottfried van Swieten (the son of Maria Theresa’s physician), who had taken over responsibility for the philosophical faculties, declared that German would be introduced as the language of instruction in all philosophical subjects in the following year.
When Joseph II rejected the appointment of Peter Jordan as professor and demanded the reduction of costs in the medical faculties, van Swieten offered his resignation. In response, Joseph II apologised with the comment: ‘I am a human and can make mistakes’ (quoted in ibid., 30).

Generally, the emperor defined the function of the university narrowly in order to produce bureaucrats or doctors for the state. The government pursued a conscious political strategy to create a class of Enlightened bureaucrats, who would support the central state in its struggle to expand its power in opposition to the traditionally privileged aristocracy and clergy. ‘The graduates of the reformed universities throughout the Habsburg dominions entered the service of the state, where their training in the new political theories provided the essential ideological basis for their task of imposing the new laws and regulations’ (Wangermann 1969, 5). The reforms initiated by Maria Theresa were not only continued by her son but also intensified. This is illustrated by the fact that the number of decrees issued per year exploded from approximately a hundred in her mother’s last decade to almost seven hundred under Joseph (Beller 2006, 99-100).

3.3.3. Public Education as a Means of Reproducing Patriotic Subjects within a Literary Culture

Similar to Austria’s policy emulations in the field of bureaucratisation, the education reforms introduced in the 1760s and 1770s drew significantly on examples from France and German states, and were developed by the renowned Prussian reformer Johann Ignaz Felbiger, who was hired by Maria Theresa. Mandatory primary education that included the common people was introduced in 1774, reforming the traditional Catholic schools and establishing the ‘Trivial Schule’ as elementary school. With the ‘Normal Schule’ Felbiger de facto transplanted the successful model of the ‘Realschule’ from Berlin to the Habsburg monarchy (Wangermann 1978, 62). Felbiger himself authored most of the new Austrian textbooks, especially the important textbook for the education of teachers (ibid.). His reforms enforced modern techniques of social disciplining with a focus on children’s psychology. The official aim of public education for all classes was described as instilling in the young generation the values of ‘love, loyalty and discipline’, making them ‘good citizens’ who would ‘sacrifice property and home, blood and life in the service of the fatherland’ (quoted in Vocelka 2004, 286).

The reforms of institutions and taught content were accompanied by changes in pedagogical methods. Central was a shift from a focus on reproduction and memorizing to the promotion of individual reasoning, especially in regard to religious topics. The
educational method of ‘teaching through conversation’ was intended to stimulate a process of learning ‘to think in the common language’ (Wangemann 1978, 64). Gottfried van Swieten and his colleagues formulated a decree which defended the new model as universal, arguing that children from rural areas ‘just lack as little in healthy mind and in knowledge of the concepts necessary for their first education’ as children from cities (quoted in ibid., 65). Fierce opposition was expressed by Archbishop Migazzi, who argued that ‘children have to get used to believe what they are lectured as a Catholic truth’ (Migazzi quoted in ibid., 66). The explicit goal of van Swieten was to stimulate individual reasoning, arguing that ‘a blind people’, ‘can only serve those, who use it as a tool of their one-sided, iniquitous intentions’ (van Swieten quoted in ibid., 15).

The Josephist education system should ideally contribute to the reproduction of the state’s ‘traditional intellectuals’ at universities, of its bourgeoisie in secondary and professional schools, and of disciplined patriots in primary schools. The assumption had been that education would not only foster social discipline, patriotism and love for the state, but that it was a prerequisite for the creation of a modern society. Correspondingly, State Chancellor Kaunitz proposed a general reform of the education system on the basis of a functionally differentiated ‘society’ model, divided into three ‘orders of citizens’: the peasants and common workers, the bourgeoisie, and the upper classes. Unlike in the traditional feudal hierarchy, Kaunitz included in the ‘upper class’ alongside the nobility ‘all army officers, office holders, and rentiers’, defined by their contribution to the central state. The first track of elementary schools was seen as essential as it would affect the great bulk of the population (Szabo 1994, 191):

Pedagogical principles and content had to be ‘fixed and uniform’ in all schools of the Monarchy, and to this end it would be necessary to produce a standard set of guidelines. These should include a clear precis of religious beliefs designed to instil a ‘horror of theft, mendacity, drunkenness, ingratitude and other vices not punished by law’, and to cultivate patriotism in their stead; and, finally, a third section focusing on the ‘enlightened and skillful [sic!]’ development of the rural economy.

Regarding the second track for the bourgeoisie, such as merchants and craftsman with private property, Kaunitz ‘emphasized the need for well-supported specialized vocational schools … and the establishment of professional standards in the various trades. The best and most skilful teachers had to be employed for the purpose’ (ibid.). Concerning the third track, Kaunitz expressed the desire to see higher education reduced in its timeframe and focused on ‘more practical’ subjects rather than on ‘dead languages’ such as Latin and Greek, or on ‘speculative subjects’ such as theology and philosophy. More time, Kaunitz
insisted was to be spent on studying ‘public law, history, geography, mathematics, the fine arts, modern languages and gymnastics’ (ibid.).

In general the reform proposals were quite similar to those in France, especially in regard to the ‘same concern for government action and pedagogical uniformity at a national level’ (ibid., 191-92). After Anton Pergen had been appointed supervisor of the Oriental Academy, he wrote a memorandum for Maria Theresa in 1770, suggesting that ‘all supervision and control of the entire school system had to be assumed by the state through a central Education Directory’, demanding the complete exclusion of all religious orders from the educational process’ (ibid., 194). Similar to Kaunitz, ‘Pergen recommended the abandonment of Latin in all disciplines but medicine, and stressed the need to cultivate patriotism and “uniformity in the general way of thinking” with standardized curricula and texts’ (ibid.).

In his treatise ‘On the Relationships between the Estates’ (1771), Sonnenfels argues that every ‘estate’ – a concept which was gradually losing its feudal meaning and acquiring a new association similar to ‘class’ (Klingenstein 1978, 185) – should have access to adequate education. He argued that in higher education it was the duty of the state to select and support the most talented students. The Josephists’ focus on social policies to increase social mobility, besides mere economic growth, was assumed to contribute to the sociological formation of ‘a society’. Pergen also highlighted the importance of the education and inclusion of girls and women (Szabo 1994, 194). Space for political manoeuvre opened up due to the achievements of Kressel during the Bohemian famine crisis of 1771-72 and the successful abolition of the Jesuit order as the head of the Jesuit Commission. ‘In the Jesuit Commission a new reform plan was accordingly drafted by Martini … which proposed using former Jesuit property to finance a system of universal compulsory schooling’ (Szabo 1994, 196).

On 12 February 1774, Kressel became head of the Court Education Commission (Studienhofkommission), the conservative Archbishop Migazzi was dismissed, and the implementation of the education reform began. The Prussian school expert Felbiger was appointed to supervise the establishment of a new network of primary schools and to draft Maria Theresa’s renowned General School Ordinance for the German schools (Allgemeine Schulordnung für die deutschen Normal-, Haupt- und Trivialschulen), which was decreed on 6 December 1774 (ibid., 196-7). The legal framework for Austria’s modern education system had been largely achieved. The final step of the Josephist education reforms had been taken in 1781, with the further harmonisation of the ‘system’ as a whole. The aim was
to include the entire population in differentiated institutions from the bottom to the top and
to reach a balance between the supply created by the public education system and the
demands of the market-driven economy and the bureaucratic state. The cause of poverty had
been identified as linked to laziness or the inability to work. The pro-active intervention into
the socialisation of people via compulsory mass schooling, together with social policies,
was therefore seen as necessary for the inclusion of the masses in the emerging society.

By 1781, less than one third of children of compulsory schooling age on average
attended primary school. While in Vorarlberg and Tyrol the attendance rate was around 70
per cent, in Krain it was only 3 per cent. In 1783, the emperor proposed a resolution to
finance the expansion of primary schooling and a scholarship system for the poor, by
introducing tuition fees in secondary and higher education while abolishing fees for primary
schooling (Wangermann 1978, 43). It was noted that English and Prussian universities were
profitable, attracted foreigners and could accumulate money (for instance Halle and
Göttingen). Further, it was striking that in England there were only two universities for
seven million people (Klingenstei 1978, 167, 183). Accordingly, the number of
universities, it was suggested, should be reduced to one ‘normal university’ per region:
Vienna, Prague and the newly founded institution in Lemberg. Gottfried Van Swieten
countered this reform proposal with his own view that the 5,000 university students and
8,000 secondary school students were by no means too many. He further argued that the
cause of low attendance rates had not been the fees for primary education, which were
supplemented by stipends for the poor, but rather the fact that the conservative clergy had
agitated against the Enlightenment value of education. He demanded that the entire surplus
of income made by religious fraternities, of the Jesuit order and of the Religion-Fonds was
to be transferred to the Education Fund (Wangermann 1978, 43).

In the Council of State a majority was in favour of financing the expansion of primary
education via the introduction of fees in secondary schools. Martini rejected the idea of
introducing similar fees at the university level and Kaunitz joined van Swieten’s general
opposition to the reform proposal (Wangermann 1978, 44). Taking the criticism of Martini,
Kaunitz and van Swieten into account, the emperor presented a resolution in the Staatsrat in
August 1783. It attempted to solve the financial issues raised by van Swieten through the re-
fusion of the position of the schoolmaster with that of the sacristan, whose salary was paid
by the Religion-Fonds. All parishes were to establish the position of a schoolmaster and
provide accommodation for the latter. The priest was responsible for ensuring that all
children of compulsory schooling age were indeed attending. A secondary school with three
classes was to be established in every district town and recognised municipal town. While male pupils were required to pay only half of the fees, female pupils were charged the full amount but could be relieved from school attendance in order to work at home (ibid., 44). District officials were ordered to award stipends for secondary schools to male pupils who had proved their ambition and talent in primary school. This was to facilitate free education for outstanding talents from all classes, including peasants (ibid., 45). Fees were to be collected from secondary school students, with the exception of stipend holders. The fees from universities and lycées were to be transferred to the Stipend Fund.

Van Swieten considered this scheme for national education too narrow, especially as it only partially encouraged the emancipation of Austria’s female population. For van Swieten, the role played by mothers in the process of socialisation and education of children within their families rendered them key figures in the mission for ‘national Enlightenment’. He described them as the ‘actual teachers of the Volk’ who must themselves be educated in order not to believe ‘superstitious foolery’ and not to stand in the way of their children’s learning (Wangermann 1978, 46). Van Swieten further argued that the aim should be to build as many schools as necessary to make sure that no child would have to walk more than fifteen minutes to school. Schoolbooks should be bought by the parents themselves, in order to secure that every child gets his/her own textbook with which to do their exercises at home (ibid., 46). In his resolution of 26 September 1784 in the Staatsrat, Joseph II largely followed the position of van Swieten, against Kaunitz’ scepticism regarding financial burdens. Central elements of the vision for a general national education included the public funding of textbooks for the poor, the establishment of public schools in municipalities without a parish priest where 90 children had to walk to school for more then half an hour, and specialised district bureaucrats to oversee the success of education, especially school attendance (Wangermann 1978, 48-9).

One central aspect of Josephist policy concerned the inclusion of previously discriminated female and non-Catholic children. With the ‘patent of toleration’ and the ‘Jews patent’ non-Catholic children were allowed to attend Catholic primary schools and exempted from religious education (Wangermann 1978, 54). Additional schools were established for confessional minorities. In 1789 there were 23 Jewish schools in Bohemia, including one secondary school in Prague (ibid., 55). Due to the administration’s financial burdens during the war against the Ottomans, the construction of schoolhouses suffered a dropback. Although in central provinces like Bohemia or Lower Austria the average school attendance rate had reached some two thirds of children of schooling age by 1790, in many
of the poorer regions school expansion stagnated (ibid., 59). Despite a number of obstacles, the Josephist school reforms prepared the ground for general public education in the new provinces of Galicia and Bukovina, as public schools were to be established in every district town. Austrian textbooks were translated into Polish and Romanian, printed in Vienna and distributed among children free of charge (ibid., 60).

Josephists in government had been aware that the modern state and its education system had to be established in a fierce struggle against the Church and various other forces defending their privileges and ideological power base. They aimed at forging a distinct public perception of the central state as the requirement for defending ‘the common good’. In his famous textbook of political studies (1787), Sonnenfels explicitly argues that the purpose of the state is the ‘welfare of all’ (Sonnenfels 2003, 13):

The great society is the state. The transformation into the latter has given its members a new name, has relocated them into new relationships: people have become citizens.

This illustrates how Josephists appealed to the ‘statist function’ of nationalism to construct the imaginary of an Austrian people.

What was missing for a fully-fledged ideal-typical civic nationalism was the claim of historicity, highlighting the trans-generational character of the nation. This was to be achieved by intellectuals, who developed a civilizational theory to Austrian nationhood, rooting it in a historical ‘Austrian mission’ in reference to ‘progress’ and historical struggles, especially against French and Prussian militarism. The introduction of the Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Weltgeschichte (Textbook of General World History, 1781) illustrates a utilitarian approach to history education: ‘[History] ignores countless common and less significant events because people would derive neither benefit nor even an instructive form of entertainment from them’ (ibid., 1). The textbook author highlights the importance of reasoning as opposed to the anachronistic reproduction of facts: ‘If we wish to ponder over history, then we must repeatedly inquire as to the causes of particular conditions – What were the motives and intentions behind people’s actions? … What were the consequences and effects of those actions?’ (ibid., 3-4). In the following section the author highlights the value of history education for the fostering of patriotism: ‘It is from history that the subjects and citizens of a state become familiar with and grow to love their fatherland, by understanding its fate, the origins of its current condition, its laws, and their own duties towards the same, as well as the benefits they have received’ (ibid., 12).
3.4. State-Building and the Genesis of Statist Nationalism

A sense of Austrian nationhood first emerged under the conditions created by Josephist state-building and the corresponding efforts to create ‘a society’ as a sociological formation and collective identity in relation to the state. At this point the conception of Austrian nation was non-conflictual in regard to provincial and regional identities, which were perceived by most Josephist intellectuals (e.g. Ignaz von Born) as subordinated but complementary (Rosenstrausch-Königsberg 1992, 167-8). Collective identifications with the state should become facilitated through an expanding public literary culture and reinforced on the personal level through patriotic education and the provision of public services. In 1770, for example, Maria Theresa issued the *Normativum Sanitatis*, which represented the ‘first step toward state-regulated sanitation in the Habsburg Empire’ (Berend 2013, 268). Maria Theresa ordered the establishment of a public ‘vaccination house’ to serve the general public without distinction according to social class (Vocelka 2004, 327). Many of Joseph’s reforms ‘such as the introduction of the idea of marriage as a civil contract, rather than a sacrament, and the removal of legal disabilities from illegitimacy – were very radical … and anticipated nineteenth-century developments’ (Scott 1990, 186). ‘The Emperor not only claimed to rule in the interests of all the people; he actually tried to do so. A series of measures during the 1780s extended the provision of poor relief and established primitive welfare services, particularly in the towns. Medical education and provisions were improved, hospitals – notably the famous Vienna General Hospital – were established, giving free treatment to paupers, and homes for orphans and unmarried mothers were set up’ (ibid., 186-87). These examples illustrate how the state adopted functions that were directed at all subjects.

3.4.1. The Power Struggle against the Church

In the course of the counter-reformation, the Catholic Church had consolidated its social power and Catholicism had become the basic ideology of the monarchy. The Josephist project challenged not only the Church as a power organisation, but also undermined its version of Catholicism. Besides economic reasons (to finance state-building), this was also crucial for the implementation of a new society project. The examples of state-building by Britain, France and Prussia placed Maria Theresa and her government under pressure to modernise. In the words of Wängermann (1973, 16), ‘if the Habsburg monarchy was to survive … it was necessary to create “Austria”’. 
The philosophy of the Enlightenment, based on natural law and scientific theory, contributed to the ‘disenchantment of the world’ (Max Weber). The court, especially Maria Theresa’s husband Francis Stephan, was a key player in the promotion of Vienna as a rising capital of the sciences, driven by prominent figures like Gerhard van Swieten and Ignaz von Born (Vocelka 2004, 256). It does not come as a surprise that the struggle between the Josephist state and the Catholic Church was perceived by many as the dominant political antagonism of the era (Beales 2005, 11). Although Maria Theresa was a pious Catholic, the new perception of the state as the centre of organising social order and curbing the privileges of the Church left its imprint in her so-called ‘Political Testament’ of 1751 (quoted in Wangermann 1973, 74, 76):

Here I shall say a few words about my predecessors. Their great piety led them to donate many, indeed most, of the Crown estates and revenues, which at that time served a good purpose in supporting religion and improving the position of the clergy. Since, however, God has now so blessed us in the German Hereditary Lands that both the Catholic religion is most flourishing and the clergy is sufficiently and well endowed, this principle is no longer valid ... For on the one hand they do not need it, and on the other they do not, unfortunately, utilize what they have in the way they should, while being a heavy burden on the public, because no monastery remains within the limits set out in the terms of its foundation, and many idlers are admitted. All this will require a great remedy, which I intend to undertake some time after due consideration.

It was above all a utilitarian argument linked to the interest of ‘the public’ which suggested a radical reform of organised religion. However, the struggle against censorship regulated by Jesuits could only be won in the long term. ‘It was not until 1759 that the Jesuits went too far. They attempted to restructure the [censorship] commission without first consulting the highest authority, and the liberals were now able to convince Maria Theresa that her powers were being challenged. This led to a considerable shake-up’ (Bernard 1971, 24). Gerhard van Swieten was appointed new president of the new commission, comprising four secular and three ecclesiastical members. Joseph’s view of religion led to various disputes with his mother, which at one point provoked him to argue for complete freedom of religion (quoted in Beales 2009, 176):

Half-measures don’t square with my principles. There must either be complete freedom of worship, or you must expatriate everyone who doesn’t believe as you do ... So that their souls may not be damned after their death, is one to expel, and lose all benefit from, excellent cultivators and good subjects while they’re alive? By what authority? ... So long as the state is served, the laws of nature and society observed, your Supreme Being in no way dishonoured but respected and adored, what ground have you for interference?
The revolutionary break with the legacy of the counter-reformation occurred on 16 June 1781 when Joseph II issued an order ‘rescinding the entire Religionspatent of 1778 and declaring that “in no matter, except with regard to public religious worship, is a distinction to be made any more between Catholic and Protestant subjects”’ (Beales 2009, 168). Joseph’s Tolerance Edict of 1781/82, which abolished legal discrimination, firstly against Protestants, then also against Jews, reflected the tendency of Josephism to expand the state’s inclusion of the population (ibid., 170). Joseph’s Patent repealed the earlier conservative counterpart of 1778, which had reaffirmed the commitment of the government to the Counter-Reformation. For the Catholic Church it represented a major indicator of its losing power: ‘It was to have lasting influence on the history not only of the Monarchy but of all Europe. Together with other measures and the burgeoning publication of anti-clerical brochures under the new censorship system, it led the nuncio on 20 July to tell the papacy that the Church was now facing threats as great as at the time of the Reformation’ (ibid., 168-69).

The question of censorship had been submitted to the State Council and Kaunitz had pointed out that the previously strict censorship had presented significant obstacles to such important developments as the Enlightenment of the people and scientific progress, while failing to prevent the spread of undesired literature (Bernard 1971, 61). As an immediate consequence of the attack on the influence of the Church, censorship was taken over by Josephists, giving rise to a new wave of publications (Beller 2006, 96). In 1782, the necessity for financial restraint led to the abolition of the Censorship Commission, its task then being taken over by the Educational Commission, led by Gottfried van Swieten (ibid., 62). Baron Alois Locella, a ‘liberal-minded admirer of the enlightenment’ was appointed chief censor for political literature, and in 1784 the number of censors was reduced to nine, subsequently even to six (ibid.). Censorship was relaxed even further with the appointment of Joseph Retzer, a ‘Mason and Voltaire enthusiast’, in charge of foreign publications. In consequence, the catalogue of prohibited books was reduced from 4,476 in 1774 to only 900 (ibid., 63).

The legal emancipation of religious minorities was intended to contribute to their societal integration as equal citizens. Joseph’s objective in relation to Jewish people, for instance, had been ‘to make the totality of Jewry harmless, but the individual useful’ (Beller 2006, 97). The concept of ‘usefulness’ was also a guiding factor for Joseph in his general overhaul of the religious establishment. ‘In the realm of the Habsburg Monarchy approximately 800 religious houses, or slightly over a third of the total number of monastic
foundations, were closed down. For Bohemia, this meant 61 monasteries and 13 convents, or a total of over 1,300 clerics’ (Krueger 2009, 72). Joseph’s secularisation policies had a tremendous impact on the accumulation of social power by the state. ‘Religious institutions were replaced by useful, secular correlates. In Vienna, the Allgemeines Krankenhaus (General Hospital) opened in 1784 as the largest and most modern medical centre in the world. On the local level the changes were less grand, but still significant. In 1783 money from dissolved religious fraternities and societies was put into a fund to build and expand schools’ (Beller 2006, 98). The ‘dismantling of the confessional state’ (Szabo 1994, 229) did not aim at a general ‘de-Christianisation’ but rather at the acquisition of social power by the state. What illustrates the ideological success of Josephism is the fact that believers and clerics themselves attempted to establish a reformed ‘new Catholicism’.

The transformation of Catholicism according to Josephist ideology implied some form of ‘protestantisation’ and the institutional foundation of a ‘state Catholicism’, characterised by state-paid priests, standardised education and training, and the central authority of the state at the expense of the papacy. Catholicism was not to be abandoned but institutionalised religion needed to be transformed. While in the early phase the Church’s negative impact on economic life, scientific progress and universities was to be decreased, in a later phase the Church would be stripped of its own economic base and subordinated to the state (ibid., 225-231). The creation of a state church, ideally converging with Austria’s political-territorial structure, was a major component of Josephist state-building.

The ‘organic intellectuals’ of the Josephist project can be related to a certain degree to freemasonry (Jacob 1991, 224). Although the founders of the Viennese lodge Zur wahren Eintracht (1781) were not men of great connections, they were joined by Ignatz von Born and eventually included figures like Francis Stephen of Lorraine (husband of Maria Theresa), Sonnenfels, Kaunitz, Schwarzenberg and Windischgrätz (Bernard 1971, 10). When in 1782 a new law emancipating Jews in the conservative province of Lower Austria (including Vienna) had been announced, it was Sonnenfels, a baptised Jew and Freemason, who was selected to write an Enlightened preamble to garnish the law (Beales 2009, 203-4). Many Josephists were members of masonic lodges and principles built on reason and merit guided their vision of an ‘enlightened society’ of equal citizens, loyal to state and nation (Jacob 1991, 7). The fact that the persons leading political debates were central figures of the government illustrates a change in political culture. The relaxation of censorship and the development of a non-clerical and anti-aristocratic political public contributed to a secular
shift in the realm of ideological power: from religious and corporate institutions to the state and its ‘civil society’.

3.4.2. The Functional Relocation of Religion as a Determinant of the Genesis of Nationalism

The wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth century not only led to the breakdown of the unity of Latin Christianity, and hence to the fragmentation of the previously universal identity of Christendom, but also to its (varying) institutionalisation through the confessionalisation of principalities and kingdoms, especially of the Habsburg monarchy in the course of the counter-reformation. It was the achievement of Leopold I that by 1700 the Habsburg monarchy had been able to communicate its power ‘through a heightened ‘baroque’ repertoire of imperial symbols, rituals and ceremonial’ (Evans 2009, 119). In the late eighteenth century, religious universalism and dynastic confessionalism was increasingly replaced by political and territorial particularisms, reflected in new state-nation projects. They built on the ancient tradition of the polis, the city-state as territorial polity, as well the republican idea of a political public (res publica) and provide the context against which this chapter’s argument of the relationship between nationalism and modern statehood can be articulated. It seems useful to quote Hans Kohn’s (2005, 191) interpretation of a correlation between secularisation and nationalisation:

Without this disassociation of State and religion the coming close association of State and nationality would have been impossible. Through it the absolute monarchs contributed negatively to the coming of the age of nationalism; positively they did it by creating the centralized State with its equality of all subjects before the king, with its tendency towards the uniformity of law and economic life, with its elevation of the parochial State over all universal allegiance.

Kohn’s argument seems to be that a prior process of secularisation of the state rendered its succeeding nationalisation possible. The underlying assumption seems to be as obvious as it is consequential: polities need to forge collective identities in order to legitimise the political and social order. A common argument is that if an established identity is lost or in some way destabilised, a societal ‘identity crisis’ emerges which can only be resolved by supplying an alternative collective identity (Hroch 2005, 34).

Although the Austrian case illustrates a correlation between the decline of the Church and the emergence of statist nationalism, the proposed causal explanation on the basis of a prior secularisation process tends to neglect the fact that organised religion, both as an institution and an ideology, was itself transformed within the process of state-building. Further Kohn identifies the absolutist monarch as the main actor contributing to secularisation. On the basis of this chapter’s exploration, two questions emerge and help to
shed light on the origins of modern nationalism: First, can the agency behind ‘the dismantling of the confessional state’ be reduced to the absolutist monarch or was this merely one aspect of a more fundamental structural transformation intrinsic to modernisation? Second, why was nationalism chosen to play this particular role for the state and not religion?

Regarding the first question, the study of Josephism indicates that it was not so much the personal conviction of the ruler himself but rather the evolution of political modernisation, shaped by a particular political project, which determined Austrian state-building in an environment of inter-state rivalry. Josephism propagated an ideal order of a unitary state with direct relationships to individual subjects, who were to be educated in and able to communicate through a literate public culture. Josephism transformed Catholicism in order to utilise it for its state project and then, on the basis of a new general approach to religion, was able to open up to other confessions to be included within its ‘society’. Secularisation is therefore not a unitary process that implies the ideological decline of religion as such, but rather refers to its transformation in the context of the territorial state’s accumulation of social power.

The second question regarding the unique role of nationalism in modernity can be answered in reference to a new, secular type of political legitimacy. The newly instituted Austrian state was characterised by territoriality and an increasingly direct relationship with individual subjects. This had inevitably resulted in a new subject position besides the non-territorial religious and narrow local identities: civic nationality. Austrian patriotism, as elaborated by Josephist intellectuals, was to legitimise the polity in reference to the interest of its population as a collectivity. Sonnenfels argued that the purpose of the central state was ‘the welfare of all’ and to serve the interest of ‘the people’. While religion and nationalism both ultimately refer to a de facto absentee as the sovereign (‘God’ and ‘nation’), nationalism makes the empirical claim of a distinct human population, the collectivity of ‘the people’, physically representing ‘the nation’ (defined as a trans-generational peoplehood) in the present. The Josephist project had contributed to the articulation and dissemination of the respective subject position in relation to the ‘serving state’ or ‘welfare state’.

3.4.3. Enlightened Bourgeoisie as Social Base of the Josephist State

Imperial bureaucrats, besides teachers, lawyers and scholars, were ideally fulfilling the function of ‘traditional intellectuals’ of the Austrian state idea. These protagonists and products of the Josephist project were educated to connect political theory to practice, many
of them rising high in the ranks of the government and bureaucracy. The sustainability of the Josephist project required an institutional pillar, which secured the reproduction of its cadres. After struggling against the influence of the clergy and establishing faculties that guaranteed the reproduction of Enlightened bureaucrats, it was this new class of civil servants who became ‘state-loyal intellectuals’ acting both from within and through the state apparatus (Dvorak 2011, 20). The function of bureaucrats was also reflected in assignment practices (Vushko 2015, 13-24):

Typically, officials were assigned to regions where they were not native ... They all shared a common background of professional training, and all performed their work in German, the mandatory language of education and administration...These new bureaucrats infiltrated the various branches of the provinces’ administration so that, to a large extent, political and economic control of Habsburg holdings no longer required the consensus of local elites.

In their function as ‘traditional intellectuals’, civil servants contributed to the legitimation of the Josephist state through a rationalist and civilizational form of statist nationalism.

Joseph von Sonnenfels grasped the importance of expanding the social base of the Josephist state. Accordingly, he outlined a reorganisation of the Austrian provincial estates from the feudal tripartite model to a four-estates model, adding to the clergy, nobility and peasants a ‘fourth estate’ representing the bourgeoisie: ‘[I]f the diets are to fulfil their fundamental purpose adequately, all classes of the nation must be entitled to send representatives to it’ (quoted in Wangermann 1969, 75). Before the ideal-typical absolutist state had been achieved sovereignty had been held privately by feudal lords, which had resulted in pyramidal and ‘parcelized’ sovereignties with a weak political centre (Anderson 1974). Josephist reforms sought to dissolve seigniorial authority in order to concentrate political power at the top. Divided private sovereignty became unified and public, invested in the modern state, without substantially changing the economic position of the landed nobility in the short term.

The ideological vehicle for political centralisation was found in rational-legal authority, realized with the revival of Roman Law: ‘Roman law, with its emphasis on sovereignty from above and absolute and unconditional private property from below, was encouraged by absolutist states and by the urban bourgeoisie at the expense of parcelized sovereignty and conditional property characteristic of classic feudalism’ (Resch 1992, 154). Unitary public sovereignty found its expression in the absolutist principle of raison d'etat, which rooted the state’s claim to power within the existence of the state itself. Military success, which required economic resources, was the sine qua non of successful state-building and only
modernising states were able to organise and finance large standing armies. Cameralist reforms, pursued through Josephist bureaucrats, were to contribute to the expansion of the state’s economic and ideological base. And it was indeed Austrian civil servants and officers who constituted the core of an ‘Austrian society’ in the Josephist tradition until the monarchy’s end (Bruckmüller 2006).

3.5. Conclusion: Civic Nationality and Public Culture

The institution of the modern state and the emergence of an early form of civic nationhood did not imply that religious sentiments were simply replaced by national ones. Just as nationalism utilised the existing historical material of populations and political entities preceding the modern state, religious elements (for instance myths of a golden age, election or sacrifice) represented resources for national ideologies (Smith 2008, 40-46). While nationalism as the more particularistic ideology can incorporate religious elements, religion as an in principle universalist ideology cannot incorporate nationalism. In the Habsburg monarchy, forms of public rituals often maintained traditional religious elements. As sociologist Bryan Turner (2013, 83) notes, ‘[c]oronations, and related rituals of monarchy, are public liturgies combining religious and secular elements’. The ‘privatising’ of religion does not imply that organised religion lost its potential as a source of collective identifications. The societal function of religion remains a fact, although in varying degrees and relations, depending on the respective hegemonic state/society project. What religion cannot do is replace nationalism as an ideology which articulates ‘the nation’ as its sovereign and constructs a present ‘people’ in relation to an existing or to be established state.

Although civic nationhood was expressed and promoted by Josephist elites ‘from above’, the absence of a penetrative state apparatus forging a codified public culture made it difficult to instil patriotism. In the eighteenth century, linguistic heterogeneity based on local dialects, which were often indicators of social hierarchy, had been the norm. As late as 1827 a Prussian grammarian wrote that ‘[i]n no province of Germany has Hochdeutsch ever been spoken nor ever will be’ (quoted in Evans 2006, 6). Josephists perceived written language not as something natural but as developing historically, to be shaped by the state. In the context of a largely illiterate, agrarian population communicating on the basis of heterogeneous local dialects, the promotion of a standardised written language constituted a

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4 What is meant by ‘religion’ here is the category of historically successful ‘world religions’, which were invented between the 6th century BC and the 7th century AD. They ‘are universal by definition, and therefore designed to fudge ethnic, linguistic, political and other differences’ (Hobsbawm 1992, 68).
central element of Josephist state-building efforts from the 1760s onwards. The foundation of the National Theatre in Vienna illustrates the regime’s promotion of a particular public culture which would also back its ideological struggle. ‘In the world of German drama, Sonnenfels restyled the Burgtheater, opened in 1741, as the “German National Theatre” in 1776, and made it an ideological weapon in his Enlightened fight against the traditional, popular comic Hanswurst theatre that he saw as part of the Baroque past’ (Beller 2006, 95).

Joseph II, the first Habsburg to have been tutored in standardised German, left no doubt concerning the central role of the written German language for state-building, calling it ‘the universal language of my empire’ (Evans 2006, 7). In the context of the Josephine push for nation-building in the 1780s, the ‘language decree’, which declared German the official language of the state, was justified in a preamble. The argument besides practical administrative reasons was explicitly the function of the German language to connect and stimulate the inhabitants in their commercial activities and to pull them together ‘through a stronger band of brotherly love’ (quoted in Rosenstrauch-Königsberg 1992, 179). A standardised literary language was recognised as a necessary vehicle for the production of a societal culture on the state level (Blanning 1994, 70):

> In 1784 he [Joseph] decreed that German was to become the official language in all parts of the Monarchy except the Netherlands, Italy and Galicia. In Hungary … the German language was to be introduced to the central authorities immediately, to the counties after a year and to other local offices and courts within three years. Any public employee unable to master it within the allotted period would be dismissed. Knowledge of German also became a condition of admission to the Hungarian parliament and the sole language of instruction in schools.

> In his decree of April 29, 1790, Joseph II ‘designated German the official language for the Italian or “Welsh confines”’ although ‘this decision had no bearing on Lombardy’ (Boaglio 2003, 202).

In response to Josephist reforms, a number of restorationist movements emerged in the late 1780s and 1790s: ‘[T]he Belgian insurgents of 1787 asked for a return to the position of two hundred years before, and the Hungarians in 1790 insisted on the restoration of Latin as the language of administration’ (Beales 2005, 10). Hungarian nobles defended the use of Latin but did not propose its replacement by Magyar. To the Hungarian chancellor Esterházy Joseph pointed out that a single written language would foster a ‘sense of fraternity among all the inhabitants’ and referred to the examples of France, Britain and Russia (Blanning 1994, 71). Slavic languages such as Czech and Slovene had not yet been developed into standardised literary languages (Rosenstrauch-Königsberg 1992, 179). While the German literary language constituted a central feature of the Josephist civilizational
nation-building project, such cultural and linguistic elements were absent from the ideologies of the clerical and noble opposition.
This chapter argues that the evolution of nationalism in imperial Austria was shaped by the Vienna-led reaction to the events following the French Revolution. A regime transformation contributed to a new pattern of modernisation which accommodated capitalism. The new regime engaged in a partial refederalisation of the monarchy and advocated a conservative conception of culture. This ‘conservative turn’ resulted in the abandonment of the Josephist state-nation project and initiated a number of national projects in their ‘cultural-private’ founding phase. During this era networks of intellectuals emerged who formed the base for embryonic cultural national movements.

The first section discusses the historical background. It begins with perceptions and responses to the French Revolution and the death of Joseph II in 1790, ending with the Congress of Vienna in 1815. It further outlines changes in the realms of coercive and economic power, and how this correlates with Austrian state modernisation. The second section deals with competing ideological camps, ranging from radical democratic through moderate Josephist to conservative and restorationist streams. The pan-European crisis that emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution ushered in a domestic regime crisis and intensified factional politics associated with these ideological divisions. The third part discusses changes in governance and policy. The Josephist state was converted into the institutional base of an emergent conservative regime, facilitating its own distinct version of modernisation. The last section examines the implications of the regime transformation, especially governmental and institutional changes, for the development of ‘nationality’.

4.1. The Napoleonic Wars as Catalysts for a Conservative Turn

The revolutionary and Napoleonic wars served collectively as catalysts for a regime transformation, with consequences for the state’s approach to nationality. The consequent ‘conservative turn’ was triggered by Austria’s leading role in the coalition wars against revolutionary France under conditions of a global military-fiscal crisis. The corresponding manoeuvres at the government level illustrate the shifting conceptual ideal of state/subject relations among political actors.
4.1.1. Historical Background

With the so-called ‘democratic revolutions’ in North America (1776) and France (1789), the ideology of nationalism, as an element of liberal and radical democratic doctrine, gained momentum against dynastic absolutism (Sperber 2011, 147-54). Due to the radical reform programme of the Josephist era, Austria had been widely perceived as an avant-garde modernising state, praised publicly by leading Swiss and Prussian Enlightenment reformers (Palmer 2014, 78). Correspondingly, Joseph II ‘regarded early reforms of the French Constituent Assembly as an imitation of what he himself and his mother before him, had tried to implement’ (Hochedlinger 2003, 416). For Josephists it seemed coherent to interpret revolts such as the Belgian revolution of 1789/90 and the unrest in Hungary as expressing ‘anti-absolutist and ultra-conservative resistance against excessive standardization and modernization’ (ibid.).

During the final years of Joseph II, intensifying warfare was becoming both economically and militarily enormously costly for the state. Austria waged war against the Ottoman Empire in the so-called Austro-Turkish War of 1788, lasting until 1791 (in the larger context of the Russo-Turkish War of 1787-1792). When Joseph died in 1790, peaking internal and external pressures had already forced him to revoke some of his radical reforms. Joseph’s alliance system had broken down immediately after the French revolution. Sweden and the Porte had signed a treaty, which prepared the ground for an offensive alliance between Prussia and Ottoman Turkey. Further, Poland, as soon as it had been freed from Russian troops, signed a treaty of alliance with Prussia in March 1790: ‘Taken together, a Prussian barriere de l’Est against Austria and Russia seemed in the making, stretching from Sweden via Poland to the Hungarian malcontents and the Ottoman Turks … Austria’s desperate plight called for a major counter-offensive. In Hungary, most of Joseph’s reforms were revoked at the end of January 1790’ (Hochedlinger 2003, 391). Even though Austria could buy some time through diplomacy, its old alliance system was effectively eliminated. Attempts to revive an Austro-British alliance against Berlin failed.

When Joseph II died in 1790, his brother Leopold adopted a new foreign policy, which diverged from the strategic plans of Kaunitz, the central government figure of the Josephist regime. The accession of Leopold II marks the end of the Kaunitz era and the beginning of the dissolution of Josephism as a distinct regime. ‘The almost 80-year-old state chancellor could never put up with Leopold’s new style and was even less pleased with the gradual Austro-Prussian rapprochement’ (ibid., 392). Leopold was sceptical towards Russia and favoured reconciliation with Berlin, rejecting Kaunitz’ geo-political agenda of ‘rounding-
off” the state by incorporating new territory, especially Bavaria. The 81-year-old Kaunitz retired in August 1792, after almost four decades in office, and died two years later. Leopold II concluded peace with the Ottoman Empire in 1791 and established the Fürstenbund, an alliance of dynastic rulers including Prussia, in order to aid the French King Louis, and to contain the revolutionary dynamics spreading from Brussels and Paris.

Domestically, Leopold began to rebalance socio-political alliances. Although the counter-revolutionary camp was able to increase its influence, it was only in the years after Leopold’s death that an explicitly anti-Josephist camp materialised. Under Emperor Francis (1792-1835), Josephist modernisation was reinterpreted as the cause of contemporary problems, especially the rise of liberal and democratic demands. As Beller (2006, 103) sums up, ‘Joseph II, predictably, had greeted the initial French Revolution in 1789 as confirmation of his principles. Leopold II, who might have been prepared to compromise with the revolutionary French authorities, died unexpectedly on 1 March 1792. With his son Francis II, a new era began, in which not reform, but responding to the forces unleashed by the French Revolution became the Habsburgs’ imperative’.

The following period was characterised by warfare between France, with its clients and allies, against a counter-revolutionary alliance led by Austria and Britain. The war of the first coalition lasted from 1792 until 1797; Austria joined the war in 1793. Austria played a leading role in the second (1799-1802) and third coalition wars (1805-06), participating in more wars against France than any other state, and hoping to lay claim to Bavaria (Planert 2011, 102). The way in which events unfolded was complex, especially as domestic struggles between factions intensified in the context of increasing military and financial pressures. Austrian factional politics took place largely within the ranks below the monarch, who was never questioned as such. This explains to some extent the ambiguous role of Leopold II. Although he was influenced by Enlightenment ideas, his political ideological position was shaped by both domestic factional power struggles and European geopolitics. This led to contradictory interpretations of his actions, ranging from an Enlightened moderniser to pragmatic Machiavellian strategist to hidden counter-revolutionary.

Kaunitz’ former collaborators Cobenzl and Spielmann continued to promote the plan to exchange Belgium (the Austrian Netherlands) for German-speaking Bavaria in order to ‘round-off’ the state. The plan fell apart, however, when Napoleon invaded Belgium and Poland was partitioned. Cobenzl and Spielmann were forced to retire, and in March 1793 Thugut was appointed director of foreign affairs (Hochedlinger 2003, 420):

Not unlike Kaunitz before him, he successfully monopolized control over foreign policy in close contact with the Emperor and his cabinet minister Count Colloredo, Franz’s former tutor; … and even
put his stamp on military planning in order to harmonize army operations with his own grand strategy. Under Thugut’s direction, Austrian foreign policy, even if it now regained some of its flexibility lost through Cobenzl’s and Spielmann’s fixation upon the exchange project, continued to be overshadowed by its desperate search for compensations.

Bavaria remained a primary target for Austria’s grand strategy, ‘especially since the British did not object to its exchange for Alsace Lorraine – to be conquered from France … Rumours that Vienna was planning to annex Bavaria and even secularize the surrounding bishoprics were not without some foundation’ (ibid., 421). In 1795, France offered Bavaria to Francis in exchange for Belgium, the latter to become integrated into the French Republic. In the third partition of Poland, signed in 1795, Austria gained ‘West Galicia’, which it later lost, while retaining ‘East Galicia’. In the resulting treaty, Russia agreed in principle to accept a possible Bavarian exchange, as well as Austrian expansion in Northern Italy. However, due to Austria’s recurrent military defeats, France was able to promote Bavaria as a new middle state. At the Peace of Pressburg, signed between France and Austria in December 1805, Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg gained state sovereignty (Planert 2011, 103).

The international politics of this period gravitated around the imperial rivalry between Britain and France. On the Continent, it was the ‘young powers’ of France and Prussia that openly challenged the traditional order of dynastic monarchies, with the ‘Holy’, Old Reich as its historical pillar. The Habsburg state was proclaimed the Austrian Empire (Kaisertum Österreich) in 1804, in response to Napoleon’s declaration of a French Empire and anticipating the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, which was eventually enforced by Napoleon in 1806. It implied nothing less than the abolition of the traditional, pre-modern political order: ‘Out of the 300 states that constituted the Holy Roman Empire only 38 survived its downfall’ (Planert 2016, 2).

Austria’s recurrent military defeat was linked to the success of a new, ‘young’ generation. The French revolutionary army was not only fighting in the name of a revolutionary ideology; it was literally a young one. ‘Most of its leading generals were born in the 1760s and were in their twenties or thirties when promoted to army commands’ (Hochedlinger 2003, 438-39). Napoleon Bonaparte himself was born in 1769. The Austrian generals were at least one generation older, born in the 1720s or 1730s, one even in 1713. Napoleon’s military success was based on an organisational achievement that mobilised all three forms of social power, linking ‘officer morale, agrarian surpluses, and divisional tactics and mobility into a distinctive campaign strategy’ (Mann 1993, 273). Napoleon defeated greater military forces and economic power ‘by superior concentration and
mobility of military power’, as well as by imperially integrating and restructuring defeated states (ibid.). Despite Austria’s military failures and massive fiscal pressures, it was eventually successful in defeating France as part of a grand alliance in 1814 and 1815. This was primarily a result of the diplomatic strategy of Metternich, who had replaced Stadion and taken over Austrian government in 1809. A crucial factor was Metternich’s pragmatic arrangement of a temporary strategic alliance with Napoleon between 1809 and 1813.

It is in the context of this transformative period, shaped by more than two decades of warfare with 3.5 to 5 million fatalities, that a new European state system was formed, proclaimed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. This era saw the strengthening of state-building ‘at the expense of small dynastic, religious and territorial entities’ (Planert 2016, 2). The new map of central Europe, marked by the accelerated reform programme in Prussia, was accompanied by the victory of the reactionary camp in Austria, whose state project differed substantially from its Josephist counterpart. ‘Austrian withdrawal from territorial claims in western Europe and expansion to the south and east, strengthened Prussia’s geopolitical and economic claim to hegemony in the German Confederation’ (ibid., 4). As Austria’s geopolitical focus shifted to the south-east, it had ‘diminished its presence in German-speaking central Europe’ (ibid., 5).

4.1.2. Coercive and Economic Modernisation in the Context of a Military-Fiscal Crisis

While the period after 1760 was generally characterised by the rise of global capitalism, which ‘like the modern state, emerged out of the skin of military fiscalism’ (Bayly 1998, 41), intensified warfare between 1793 and 1815 triggered an international fiscal crisis (ibid., 31). One achievement of this era was the reorganisation and professionalisation of the Austrian army, the creation of a modern police system and of fiscal institutions. This required the expansion of state capacities. Processes of industrialisation and urbanisation had not yet taken off in the Habsburg realms, which implied that the population did not yet ‘come to the state’ where it had its strongest institutional presence, nor did the people migrate to centres of production, even if wage-labour existed there.

By 1790, Austria was ‘a highly militarized war machine, second only – if at all – to Prussia, and with a population of some 25 million people, almost as populous as France’ (Hochedlinger 2009, 56). In its war against revolutionary France, Austria was able to organise a large standing army and played the leading military role up until 1801, and again in 1805, 1809 and 1814/15 (Storrs 2009, 52). To be sure, the process of political centralisation was not a linear one, rather taking the form of waves, usually in the context of
war preparations. What evolved during these years was ‘an uneasy compromise between étatisme and administrative centralization, on the one hand, and seigniorial privilege and private proprietary rule, on the other’ (Blum 1978, 199).

The modernising state represented a territorial power organisation that monopolised coercive power but continued to struggle for the accumulation of economic power in connection to developing markets. There remained a ‘tension between market and territory, capitalism and geopolitics’ (Mann 2012, 33). One way to grasp this spatial dimension of market capitalism is with Wallerstein’s world system theory, which proposes a core-periphery model. Accordingly, a struggle for hegemony becomes apparent in the capitalist core, taking place between Britain and France from 1763 onwards (Wallerstein 1989, 81):

There were basically two solutions discussed: strengthen the French state – financially, socially (vis-a-vis centrifugal forces, whether geographical or class based), and militarily – or ‘open’ the country economically. Both were seen as movements of ‘reform.’ The one proposed using state resources to strengthen France’s economic position by supporting its entrepreneurs and the other proposed using state resources to strengthen France’s economic position by forcing France’s entrepreneurs to be more ‘competitive’ … It is the debate between the protectionist interventionists and the ‘liberal’ interventionists.

While Britain adopted the ‘liberal interventionist’ model, France oscillated between the two, engaging in imperial rivalry with Britain. This, together with the rise of Russia and Prussia as new ‘challengers’, provided the competitive context for Austrian modernisation at the turn of the century. Although certain parameters of Austria’s economic programme such as external protective tariffs remained intact after 1790, its government attempted to shift from a mercantilist towards a liberal political economy. The following quote from a report of the Hofkammer to Emperor Francis I in 1806 is indicative (quoted in Reinalter 1993, 47):

All types of coercion, all kinds of fetters are the mortal enemies of industry. It is only where a liberal public administration allows entrepreneurship some latitude; only here that it can look up to take spirited flight. It is only here that we see creation, diligence and industry prospering in manifold variety. This principle is confirmed by the example set by all states which have become rich and powerful through trade and commerce.

This position was similarly reflected in the government’s refusal to emulate French etatist policies such as universal conscription or large-scale mass taxation enforced by the central state. Although the years between 1806 and 1809 were marked by Austrian military reforms, including the introduction of a regular militia, the so-called Landwehr (Vocelka 2004, 180), it still did not represent a levee en masse, although many Austrian officers demanded such after 1796 (Hochedlinger 2003, 442). Instead of military-fiscal centralisation, the government attempted to secure traditional allies such as the landowning
nobility: ‘Its policy-makers … feared the kind of domestic political and social upheavals which its enemy was undergoing. They therefore funded the struggle through renewed and large-scale borrowing (including forced loans), and eventually by printing a paper currency which held its value only as long as its armies remained undefeated’ (Storrs 2009, 52). Ultimately, Austria’s finances collapsed, culminating in state bankruptcy in 1811 (ibid., 53).

Available data suggests that in 1796, revenue officials, employees in mines, the coinage department and the postal service accounted for the greatest number of state employees with approximately 9,000, a number that continued to grow (Dickson 1995, 341-343). This expanding group of tax collectors and inspectors were the type of public employees whom subjects were most likely to encounter: ‘Taken together, these “Diener, Wächter, Aufseher”, [servants, guardians and supervisors, to use the classification of the Meternich era] formed the solid base of the bureaucratic pyramid, at whose apex monarch and councillors presided like overworked Platonic guardians’ (Dickson 1995, 343). Financial problems remained an obstacle to state growth. One consequence was that the government halted the expansion of the high-level bureaucracy (councillors) in an attempt to increase efficiency. Even though Francis rejected the institution of a modern government system at the top, the state represented the typical structure of a military-fiscal state.

The post-1790 period further saw the establishment of a modern, centralised police system, exercising systematic policing and surveillance. The central figure behind these reforms was Johann Anton Pergen (Bernard 1991). Already in 1784, Pergen had recommended the introduction of a centralised registration system to Joseph II with the aim to overtake Prussia and France in this domain. Having initially received positive feedback from Joseph, Pergen extended police practices, established a secret police, and ‘directed the attention of the new police to the politics of Hapsburg subjects’ (Emerson 1968, 14). This led to fierce opposition from Josephist officials and provincial actors, and the suspension of his centralisation reform (ibid., 11). When in 1791 Leopold II continued to disregard his reform proposals and gave directions towards increasing the judicial rights of the citizens, Pergen resigned.

For Leopold, public opinion was to be altered and ‘won over’, not to be shut down. Leopold assigned Sonnenfels the task of drafting a reform proposal for the reorganisation of the police in Vienna. Sonnenfels wrote the following (quoted in Emerson 1968, 19):

The best way to forestall arbitrary measures and oppression is to make publicly known the duties and rights of each authority … [A]ll those dubious methods, through which a number of police organizations have been diverted from their true task of protecting the welfare of the citizens, and
debased into the frightful tool of an odious system of spying and oppression … have been banned from this organization.

New momentum was gained with the formation of a counter-revolutionary camp in the context of war against revolutionary France: ‘Denouncing the paralysis of the “registration system” by Sonnenfels’ arrangements, he [Pergen] warned that authorities needed to watch for French agents among foreigners. Mentioning domestic defenders of the French Revolution, he requested a watch over all actions and people likely to become dangerous to the state, over all public places such as coffee houses and inns, and especially over all secret organizations and societies’ (ibid., 21-22). When the Austrian military prepared to take on Paris in the summer of 1792, the new emperor Francis II asked his governor to reform the police. As a result, the Ministry of Police was established in January 1793, representing the foundation of a centralised police system that included a secret police (Vocelka 2004, 290).

The following statement illustrates Pergen’s arguments for a ‘law and order’ policy (Pergen quoted in Emerson 1968, 22-23):

In the present conditions when the freedom swindle has gained so much ground and all monarchical governments face great unrest, the ordinary arrangements for peace and security are inadequate. Every government must secretly set all forces in motion for the good of the state, in order to convert those in error and to wipe out through effective countermeasures all dangerous impressions which might have been instilled in any class of subjects by sneaking agitators.

Although the censorship bureau still remained separate from the police, its Josephist staff were replaced. The same state institutions that had once been established in order to implement the Enlightenment project were turned into instruments of anti-Josephist struggle. The confrontation peaked in May 1794, when Pergen was determined to supervise theatre performances. The heads of the domestic administration appealed to the emperor, who ordered Sonnenfels ‘to delineat[e] the roles of the police and the political administration’ (ibid., 23). Before Sonnenfels could enter the scene, it was announced that a ‘Jacobin conspiracy’ had been discovered. The death penalty was reintroduced and the Police Ministry engaged in extended censorship practices, including reports on theatre plays taking place in the suburbs of Vienna (ibid.). By 1795, Sonnenfels’ position within government circles had further declined and leading radical Josephists and democrats had been executed or imprisoned. When in the aftermath of the Jacobin trials Sonnenfels took a public stand in defence of Enlightenment conceptions of justice, one of his conservative opponents in the Hofkanzlei attacked him as follows (ibid., 26):

When peace comes and public security is again protected by an army with which one can defy the turbulent dispositions of the reformers and the swindlers, then the philanthropists can renew their
proposals that disturbers of the peace be exempt from punishment, the way it is under the English constitution and the glorified *Habeas Corpus* Act.

In 1798 the police ministry ‘had a staff of forty-eight plus a “military police-watch” of three hundred fifty-four men’ (ibid., 26). In 1801, the task of censorship was officially transferred to the police. In a memo sent to Stadion in February 1806, the endurance of Enlightenment ideas among the Viennese population was reported as being caused by the encouragement of the French occupiers and by a group of ‘untrustworthy friends of humanity’ (quoted in ibid., 28). The reactionary regime redefined intellectuals as subversive, in contrast to the previous Josephist notion of mutual empowerment between Enlightened subjects and the state.

### 4.1.3. Socioeconomic Aspects of Modernisation after the Conservative Turn

The conditions created by the Josephist state were key factors in the growth of the *petite bourgeoisie*, ranging from small capitalist ventures and independent artisans to teachers, lawyers, journalists and university students. It was this social stratum that the Josephist regime had aimed to expand and render the carrier of the Austrian state idea. After 1790, when the Josephist camp was experiencing a serious crisis, it soon became clear that the socioeconomic position of the bourgeoisie did not determine individuals’ political views. The Josephist camp, the radical democratic camp, as well as the restorationist camp were led by intellectuals who often shared a common socioeconomic background while identifying with competing political projects.

The question as to whether the ‘conservative turn’ after 1790 had consequences for the state in terms of recruitment within the bureaucracy deserves a brief answer. In fact, the proportion of the bourgeoisie among the ranks of councillors declined. If the top social categories such as princes, barons, counts and bishops are taken into account, their proportion increased from 18.3 per cent in 1781 to 18.5 per cent in 1789, and to 27.2 per cent in 1796. The bourgeois component of central government fell from about 23.5 per cent in 1781 to approximately 10 per cent by 1790, and then further to about 9 per cent in 1796 (Dickson 1995, 345).

On the administrative level of the Bohemian-Austrian *Gubernien* the situation differed slightly. After the proportion of the higher nobility had declined under Joseph II, this trend only partially slowed and a process of professionalization emerged, marking the beginning ‘age of the specialist career official’, which created new upward mobility for the bourgeoisie and put different educational pressures on the nobility (Dickson 1995, 347).
This aspect is noted by Heindl (2013a, 163-64), who argues that, in the long run, the high aristocracy lost its monopoly on the highest offices, was visible in its decline in the Council of State and the Supreme Court. For the standardisation of his ‘bureaucratic corps’ and its ‘provincial extensions’, Joseph had introduced conduct lists and personal files. While Emperor Leopold ended this system, his son Francis restored these regulations (1799/1803). He elaborated a system of ranks (1807), introduced uniforms (1814), and qualifying examinations (1819-25) (ibid., 337).

Although the classic narrative of Anderson (1974, 321) that one ‘instrument of royal renovation in the Habsburg Empire was … a bureaucracy … recruited primarily from the German upper-middle class of the towns, culturally and socially separate from the landowning class’ is based on some evidence, the figures mentioned also indicate some degree of restructuring on the higher levels of government. Developments at the university level indicate that there was a notable shift in the number of doctorates granted by faculty. While the numbers of graduates in theology and philosophy declined, those in law and medical studies increased significantly, correlating to the demands of the bureaucratic military state.

Figure 4. Doctorates at the University of Vienna (by Faculty) [Dickson 1995, 339]

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty</th>
<th>1785</th>
<th>1796</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>Theology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical Studies</td>
<td>257</td>
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While Cameralist reforms had initiated the gradual transformation of traditional socioeconomic relations, the industrialisation of the monarchy would only take off in the context of the second wave of industrialisation in the 1830s (Good 1984, 42-48). Regarding the private sector in Vienna, it is noteworthy that the number of major firms trading abroad (Großhändler) increased from 16 in 1781 to 70 in 1796. It followed the so-called Bürgerliche Handelsstand (the bourgeois trading estate), representing 441 firms of local dealers (from clothes to wax), and the ‘privileged manufacturers’ with 268 (Dickson 1995, 339). The contemporary Austrian ‘middle class’ maintained its focus on employment in the realm of the state. From 1781 to 1796 the overall number of Austrian officials increased by a fifth (ibid., 338).
Even though Austria adopted a pronounced counter-revolutionary ideological approach, the military success of the French state, which underwent radical modernisation connecting the central state directly to its population as citizens and soldiers, had an impact across Europe. Intensifying warfare forced regimes to deal with military and fiscal pressures, spurring waves of state modernisation along the path initiated by absolutism. In Austria, the regime responded with a temporary expansion of military mobilisation and the required expansion of administrative capacities. Two decades of warfare had frequently had the effect of uprooting people from traditional life, forcing many into the position of belonging to a distinct state (Mann 2012, 215).

4.2. Public Opinion and Competing Ideological Camps

The expansion of public education and the spread of commercial and popular print media contributed to the growing inclusion of the population within literary culture. This process had an impact on ideological power, especially due to the potential of an expanding reading public. The expanding German-speaking bourgeoisie, primarily located in the ‘Austrian’ core provinces as well as in towns of central Europe such as Prague and Budapest, stimulated a process of acculturation initially enforced by the Josephist state. At the turn of the century, the pre-dominantly German-speaking newspapers served as the main media of communication for various bourgeois segments. The Wiener Zeitung, for instance, had been founded by the Austrian government in 1703 and represented the official newspaper of the central state. From the 1760s onwards, certain intellectually elaborate commentaries and sections were developed, focusing on some notion of a public high culture. Under the conservative Metternich regime, cultural topics were to be strictly avoided before the political climate was reliberalised in 1848 (Schlösser 2000, 415-17).

It seems somewhat paradoxical that the very success of Enlightened state-building created the conditions for the spread of new particularistic ideological streams that propagated cultural or religious ‘revival’ movements. For instance, after 1793 ‘Goethe no longer looked to the Holy Roman Empire, but to the German Volk after the experiences of the defeat of the German states by the French’ (Bayly 2004, 113). Similarly, the partition of Poland in 1795 gave impetus to a new cultural movement advocating a Polish ‘national’ literary culture, with pronounced Catholic elements in opposition to Russian imperialism and Orthodoxy. In Ireland, ‘the Protestant Irish patriotism which had given rise to an Irish Parliament in 1780 had been supplanted by a sense of specifically Catholic Irish identity’ (ibid.). ‘In North Africa, India, and Ceylon, the wars of revolution and global imperialism’
strengthened oppositional collective identities, ‘sometimes injecting them with a sense of religious revival’, crystallised in notions of Jihad or holy wars (ibid.). It appeared that expanding state apparatuses not only fostered mass education and integrative societal cultures but also enabled educated bourgeois intellectuals to engage in oppositional agitation.

While in the past the intellectual function of ‘interpreters’ had been largely reserved for the clergy organisationally bound to the Church, Josephists had consciously promoted the production of a new stratum of secular thinkers, ideally serving as ‘traditional intellectuals’ of the state. In practice, bourgeois segments were often beyond the control of the political centre, especially as the regime itself entered a process of transformation after 1790, which involved a changing approach to nationality.

4.2.1. Austrian Democrats and the Impact of the French Revolution

In his study of eighteenth-century political culture, Blanning (2002, 442) concludes that the French ancien regime, overthrown by the 1789 revolution, had been itself perceived as ‘old’ by the modernising British, Prussian and Austrian regimes. Josephists ‘viewed the Revolution of 1789 with majestic complacency, as a belated and bloody attempt to emulate their own achievements’ (ibid.). It is important to note that the Josephist political current had in principle agreed with the prospect of constitutionalism in the future and acknowledged among other things the necessity of an autonomous legal system in order to develop a Rechtsstaat. A major Josephist ideal was the promotion of ‘love of the fatherland’ or ‘love of the nation’ (Nationalliebe), a statist form of nationalism with liberal-egalitarian underpinnings. It refers to a particular type of political subjectivity that ‘reflects an attempt to express someone’s political status, not in the usual “vertical” or feudal terms of the lord whose subject one was, but rather in the “horizontal” terms of a society of equals, freemen, to which, or to whose geographic area, one belonged’ (Leersen 2006, 75).

In the light of growing democratic demands since the French Revolution, Josephists such as Sonnenfels (1793) and Andreas Riedel, an unofficial advisor of Leopold II, publicly defended their articulation (Bernard 1971, 32). Martinovics and Riedel, two political theorists and activists, were joined by other radical Josephists in important positions such as the Prague-born Franz Hebenstreit, who became deputy site commander (Platzkommandant) in Vienna in 1791. Supported by Riedel, Hebenstreit developed an elaborate programme for a new world order, which was to begin with the French Revolution. His father was director of the philosophical faculty in Prague, and Hebenstreit himself was a student of Sonnenfels. Andreas Riedel termed Hebenstreit’s socialist democratic theory ‘communism’. Riedel, who
had been one of the educators of Emperor Francis, proposed the foundation of a representative democratic institution, the ‘People’s Council’ (*Volksrat*), to be elected on the basis of universal male suffrage. In his draft of an Austrian constitution, he recognised ‘the people’ as one collective political actor and refers positively to the French Revolution (Riedel, quoted in Wangermann 1969, 76):

> Our beloved and faithful people need not be afraid of facing the difficulties involved in the administration of the State, because (1) thanks to the fortunate example of our neighbours, the path it has to follow is no longer doubtful, and there is no need to grope in the dark, (2) it can make use of the positive achievements of the French nation and improve on the latter’s shortcomings.

Many members of the Austrian democratic movement were linked to Freemasonry. While Josephists initially viewed Enlightened absolutism as the condition for progress, the events following the French Revolution, especially the formation of a counter-revolutionary alliance, contributed to their radicalisation. The common ground of most progressive Austrian political theorists, whether liberal bourgeois or Jacobin, was their opposition to aristocratic privileges, which they interpreted as a manifestation of artificial inequality. Riedel developed his theory in the Josephist liberal bourgeois and not in the French Jacobin tradition. According to him, revolution occurs when the people have turned away from the basic principles on which societal cohesion is based, and revolution is legitimate if the old principles are opposed to the welfare and happiness of the people. This stream was normatively centred around the empowerment of the people in the Enlightenment tradition and it lent them political agency (Reinalter 1988, 139-61).

Austrian political elites and intellectuals closely followed the American and French Revolutions. A key element of the perception of the American War of Independence was the articulation of a democratic deficit, represented by the slogan ‘no taxation without representation’, feeding into an ideological position supported even by some moderate reformists. Enlightened absolutism culminated in the state-nation project of revolutionary France, which represents a radical secularist version of the Josephist pattern. This event, which was both ideologically and economically closely linked to the American War of Independence, contributed to the increasing contestation of the dual principle of monarthism: dynasticism and religion. French Jacobins wanted to create a new society and polity by eradicating all traditional institutions, such as geographic names, historical provinces, social and guild distinctions, and even everyday terms referring to seasons, time and history. ‘It launched its fateful attack on the Church which was to invest the counter-revolution with the characteristics of a Holy War’ (Finer 1997, 1533).
The emergence of an Austrian democratic camp was related to the articulation of these arguments, based on the premise that if despotic absolutism lost the ‘consent of the governed’ it should be replaced by constitutionalism (Leersen 2006, 74-5). The impact of this ‘democratic’ strain in Austria remained largely limited to elites, who were not able to mobilize a larger movement. The impediment of their ideological position fed into a sharp decline in optimism among Josephists regarding the feasibility of the ‘Enlightenment’ of the masses and gave way to a pessimistic view of the ‘uneducated masses’ (Valjavec 1944, 87-8). Rationalist assumptions of spillover effects of modernisation such as acculturation processes towards a German-speaking bourgeoisie and a corresponding collective identity of ‘patriotic Austrians’ were increasingly cast into doubt.

### 4.2.2. Conservatism as a Response to the French Revolution

The ‘rule of terror’ and the execution of Emperor Leopold’s sister in Paris lent weight to the arguments of Austrian conservatives that a true democracy, the rule of the common masses, was neither possible nor desirable. When revolutionary France began to challenge the established order beyond its borders, the formulation of a new conservative ideological current found new momentum. The two ‘democratic revolutions’ represented the contemporary political context of what Koselleck (1972, XVIII) has termed ‘the ideologisation of concepts’ and the ‘enforcement of politicisation’. In 1796 the French philosopher Antoine de Tracy supposedly coined the concept of ideology, describing it as ‘a science of the human mind’ (Eatwell 1993, 2). The conservative intellectual Friedrich Gentz published a comparative study of the two revolutions, which was translated into English and published in the United States in 1800. He argued that the American Revolution had served as a model for the French revolutionaries, who imitated political language and principles (Gentz 1800). In the contemporary context, Gentz decided to challenge the ideological foundation of these revolutions.

Another prominent intellectual of the period was the Jesuit-educated Leopold Alois Hoffmann, who began his career as an active member of the Masonic lodge *Zur Wohltätigkeit* and in 1785 became professor of German philology in Budapest. In his piece ‘On church services and religious education of the Austrian states’ (*Über Gottesdienst und Religionslehre der österreichischen Staaten*, 1784), Hoffmann expressed his identification with a new ideological faction, which he described as a still quite ‘small party … of reasonable Catholics’ (quoted in Lettner 1988, 26). In the context of 1790, he officially broke with Josephism and contributed to the counter-revolutionary stream of Austrian conservatism. He became the editor of the *Wiener Zeitschrift*, a quarterly paper published
between 1791 and 1793 that agitated against leading Josephists. Although the first issue, published in January 1792, originally had only 13 subscribers, it ultimately sold 500 copies. Due to the official support of Emperor Leopold, its influence grew steadily and it eventually ran 2,000 copies, illustrating the successful reception of this ‘first explicitly conservative journal in German history’ (Rumpler 1997, 81). It was Hoffmann’s colleague Heinrich Watteroth who performed a series of public assassinations of Sonnenfels’ character in the Wiener Zeitschrift.

Supported by Leopold, Hoffmann took up Sonnenfels’ chair at the University of Vienna. When Hoffmann attempted to propagate the new conservatism through curricular reforms, however, this was challenged by protests from the rector, professors and students alike. Sonnenfels’ colleague Josephist Alxinger published a piece under the title ‘Anti-Hoffmann’ in which he contrasted the Josephist concept of Enlightened patriotism to that of the conservative concept of Gottesgnadentum, indicating the former’s function in strengthening the political position of the Enlightened subject of the state, able to evaluate and criticise the actions of the monarch (Lettner 1988, 159-60). In contrast, Hoffmann supported the production of pious and loyal subjects of the Catholic, dynastic state, ideally rooted in a hierarchical corporate order (ibid., 27-28).

Adam Müller, a close friend of Friedrich Gentz and also from Prussia, articulated the vision of a patriarchal, Catholic polity most clearly. Müller’s political thought represented the antithesis to the productive society of Cameralism as the sum of individual subjects, and its competitive inter-state context. Instead of competitors, states and their communities were to be seen as trans-generational, organic ‘alliances’, not only in the present but throughout history, transcending the horizon and self-interest of individuals and states (Rumpler 1997, 93). In response to Adam Smith’s thesis of competition on the level of states and individuals, he proposed the restoration of a corporative society characterised by solidarity, an ideal supposedly found in medieval feudalism. This vision rooted individuals ontologically in trans-historical communities of solidarity and legitimised hierarchy on the basis of a religious ideal of the good society (Adam Müller, quoted in Rumpler 1997, 93-4):

The older European constitutions were based on a religion of love and community, and thus of true allegiance to the nation. The consequence was a grand system of mutual constraints to be considered indispensable if the entire purpose of being together and acting together was to be accomplished: the system that we call feudalism. The basic principle of egoism: the principle that each one of us should hold and pursue strictly segregated and isolated rights for himself; that God, the world, the state and the past have existed solely for this individual, present human being and are thus at his unconditional disposal, has come to this world and taught us sufficiently fruitful lessons. We call it [the principle] in opposition to feudalism: revolution, or with a more modest name, reform or reformation.
For the Habsburg monarchy, this model defined the emperor as the ‘father’ of his multiple peoples, defined as organic collectives rather than the traditional categorisation along estate lines (e.g. peasants, guild workers or gentry). They had the collective duty to contribute to the harmonious network of solidarity.

4.2.3. The Formation of a Political Frontier between Constitutionalists and Counter-Revolutionaries

In the European context of the revolutionary wars, a new political antagonism crystallised with the consolidation of a counter-revolutionary, conservative, partially restorationist camp, opposing the radical Josephists, which in principle shared the French revolutionary vision of centralism and constitutionalism. In the context of the execution of Louis XVI and his Habsburg wife in 1793, together with the rise of a ‘war party’ in Paris, Austrian conservatism materialised in a precarious alliance of restorationist and moderately modernist factions. It resulted in the marginalisation and alienation of previously patriotic Josephist cadres and intellectuals, many emigrating and joining new modernising German states and respective national projects.

The agitation of the Austrian Josephist camp in the context of its fading influence fed into the counter-revolutionary camp’s strategy to diffuse the narrative of a ‘conspiracy’, supposedly driven by hidden networks of secular democrats associated with Freemasonry (Reinalter 1980, 186). As a result of the so-called ‘Jacobin trials’ of 1794/95, Hebenstreit, Martinovics and many other radical Josephists were executed. Riedel was sentenced to 60 years in prison, was freed by the French in 1810, and died as an emigré in Paris in 1837. Francis is said to have written in the context of the Jacobin trials: ‘We must extinguish [ausrotten] them all’ (Winter 1969, 17).

Since the mid-1790s, many convinced Josephists had become alienated from the repressive regime and the state. Johann Baptist Alxinger (1755-1797), one of the most prominent Josephist literati, serves as a striking example. Born in Vienna, the Jesuit-educated Alxinger became a student of Martini at the University of Vienna and completed his studies with a doctorate in 1780. He was said to have been the ‘ablest of the Josephinian poets’, engaging in Masonic activities and marrying the daughter of a converted Jew. He supported Joseph II’s edict of religious tolerance, and openly argued for even more liberal reforms, such as recognising faiths beyond the major confessions (Bernard 1971, 84-5). Despite his criticism of Catholicism and his deep respect for German Protestant intellectuals, Alxinger acted publicly as a staunch ‘Austrian patriot’, identifying with the Austrian state as the foundation for reforms and societal modernisation (ibid., 86). In 1790,
when a former Josephist began to attack the more progressive writers and openly warned Leopold II that Masonic circles were fomenting a conspiracy, Alxinger courageously took a public stand, rejecting allegations that he or other liberals opposed Leopold’s monarchic rule (ibid., 92).

By the mid-1790s, the optimism and pronounced Austrian patriotism expressed publicly during the 1780s had given way, first to ideological alienation and finally to the political resignation of many Josephists. As the state turned illiberal and the regime restorationist, Alxinger ultimately decided to break with Austria, to give up his ‘Austrianness’ and to identify as a German instead. In 1796 Alxinger wrote to the Prussian Enlightenment intellectual Nicolai, who was close to the Prussian ruler (quoted in Bruckmüller 1993, 213):

[T]he banning of books and clericalism [Pfaffentum] are the only defences which we erect against the feared revolution, although our fears are groundless. After much heart-searching, I have eventually reconciled myself to no longer being an Austrian, but simply a German. While this officially inspired feud with the sciences persists, how can a scholar identify with his country […].

The phrase ‘after much heart-searching’ indicates that it was a difficult step for the former patriot to cease identification with the Austrian state. While in the 1780s Josephist intellectuals had rejected Prussian criticism of ‘their state’ in an act of Austrian patriotic solidarity – such as on the occasion of Friedrich Nicolai’s attacks discussed in the previous chapter – this changed radically during the 1790s. Having lost hope, Alxinger left Austria in 1796, and many progressive and even some conservative ‘Austrian patriots’ followed his example (e.g. Hormayr after 1813). The retreat of the patriotic Josephist camp triggered a shift in progressive ideology, its focus shifting away from ‘the state’ towards ‘civil society’, crystallising in a form of early liberalism that distanced itself from radicalism (Valjavec 1944, 89).

After this intense phase in the 1790s, the counter-revolutionary camp set in train a regime transformation. While Josephists in the censorship commission had intervened primarily against the dissemination of anti-Josephist writings, the new staff reversed censorship into an anti-Josephist direction. In 1801, censorship was not only significantly extended but was also transferred to the police. In 1803, ‘a “recensoring commission” was formed and in two years had banned twenty-five hundred books. The secret police was strengthened and its spying network enlarged to provide surveillance of foreigners and middle-class intellectuals’ (Good 1984, 38). As a result of repression, censorship and anti-Josephist propaganda, as well as perceptions stirred by external events, public opinion
seemed to shift in favour of the counter-revolution. In 1801, a report of the Ministry of Police stated its success as follows (quoted in Wangermann 1969, 190):

The French Revolution had first been depicted in such attractive colours by writers and journalists … that young men were swept off their feet in admiration of it – young men who were not otherwise fundamentally ill-disposed. If the welfare of the State at that time inexorably demanded ruthless measures to prevent the spread of the pernicious disease, the firm application of these measures has had the desired effect – so much so that since then no more revolutionary movement was to be perceived in any part of the Monarchy […].

In terms of ideological capacity, the conservative camp expanded successfully beyond the restorationist circles, and was even joined by some former Josephists such as Hoffmann and, temporarily, Hormayr. For democrats such as Schedel and Menz, who had received long prison sentences in 1796, these developments meant that their harsh sentences were upheld. In 1802, Pergen, a key figure in the Ministry of Police, retired and expressed his conviction that his counter-revolutionary mission had been accomplished (Wangermann 1969, 191). Ironically, the success of the counter-revolutionary camp was fuelled further by Austria’s humiliating military defeat by France and the Treaty of Pressburg (26 December 1805). Emperor Francis seized the opportunity to restructure the army, the government and the upper ranks of the bureaucracy. Instead of a Josephist revival this state crisis accelerated the institution of a new regime: ‘[T]he first sign of the new departure was the resignation of Count Ludwig Cobenzl as Foreign Minister … With him went other members of the Imperial Council … No less than twenty-five generals were retired’ (Langsam 1930, 31-32). With the new foreign minister, Count Philipp Stadion, a new conservative era began, which would become most famously represented by Metternich, who replaced Stadion in 1809 after another military defeat by France.

4.3. Regime Transformation Reflected in State Reform and Policy

This section examines state reforms and governmental policies. For contemporary Europe after 1789, David Good (1984, 38) has identified two possible regime responses:

The new forces of liberalism found some supporters within the ranks of the aristocracy and the centralized bureaucracy. These groups urged the Crown and their more conservative counterparts to institute moderate reforms within the existing framework as a way of forestalling a full-scale revolution along French lines. The more common response was unabashedly conservative and involved explicit policies designed to seal off the more traditional societies in the east from the revolutionary and liberal ideas stirring in the west.

This section shows how the second, reactionary approach was chosen and contributed to the formation of a new regime in Austria.
4.3.1. A Conservative State as Prerequisite for Conservative Subjects

The period between 1790 and 1815 was a most important one in terms of state modernisation. During this time, France and Prussia, unlike Austria, largely succeeded in achieving modernisation towards a national state. Deak (2015, 279) notes that the dominant readings of nineteenth-century German history rest on this historical moment, ‘when the eventual victor in Germany (Prussia) committed itself to reforms and the eventual loser (Austria) did not’. Josephism had imposed bureaucratic rule by curbing the power of provincial diets: ‘With the exception of Hungary, the dynasty achieved an almost complete liquidation of the power of the noble lords at the provincial level. Joseph II went as far as abolishing the provincial diets altogether [...]’ (ibid., 45). It appears that, although by 1789 ‘magnate participation had collapsed’, it recovered after Joseph’s death (Dickson 1995, 349). Initially, Sonnenfels continued his work on the codification of law and drafted a proposal for some form of constitutionalism (politischer Kodex: a political legal framework). While his proposal of a new penal code was implemented in 1803 and a modern civil code (ABGB of 1811) was introduced in 1812, the proposed reform of the government system, pushed forward by a number of reformists including the archdukes Johann and Charles, was abandoned. Similarly, the emperor rejected Sonnenfels’ proposals for constitutionalism (ÖBL 2005, 422-23).

Austria’s ‘conservative turn’ was reflected in a partial reversal of Josephist state-building reforms. For instance, Leopold reinstated provincial diets and the Hungarian lands regained their autonomy from the central government (Dickson 1995, 341). ‘With a desire to avoid tumult, whether as revolution from above or from below, Francis had quickly decided upon assuming the throne in 1792 that he needed to make peace with the very element of society whose power his uncle Joseph had fought to destroy: the nobility’ (Deak 2015, 33). Estate constitutions were introduced or revived, securing provincial autonomies and local rights (Drabek 2003, 157). Provincial diets were legally empowered as intermediary political institutions between the central state and the populace.

The Josephist ideal of a unitary state and a corresponding state-nation was replaced by a new province-based concept of the nation that transformed the traditional feudal representation exercised by the political body of the provincial estates. This approach to state and society was reflected in newly introduced guidelines of government. The protocol of the meeting of the Bohemian-Austrian Hofkanzlei on 26 March 1791 under Leopold Kolowrat illustrates the changing political model. Beside general guidelines concerning
government as such, the protocol noted the recognition of ‘political and physical’
differences, to be taken into account in the rule of particular provinces as they ‘lead to some
sense of local difference’ (quoted in Drabek 2003, 157). It stated that, although an equal
treatment of the population would contribute to the ‘autonomous power of the government’,
such an ‘eradication of all traces of diversity among the provinces’ represented neither the
intention nor the conviction of the emperor (ibid.).

The new governmental focus on ‘local diversity’ (Lokalverschiedenheit) became
connected to a new cultural, linguistic and province-based understanding of the ‘nation’. Emperor Leopold asked for the feedback of every province concerning their stance on the
‘application or … particularisation’ of the discussed guidelines of government, which
should form a new legal framework for the state (Drabek 2003, 157). The members of the
reform commission based their argument for provincially fragmented and federalised
political legal structures on an ideologically conservative presumption: that it was due to
‘nature’ and the corresponding predetermined cultural diversity of provinces and peoples,
visible in their characters, traditions, climates, productions and demands, that any attempt to
change peoples and ‘melt them into one body’ was impossible (ibid.).

In preparation for the political structural reform, Leopold had asked the Bohemian
estates for their position in May 1790. The estates responded with demands for a
‘constitution’ for their ‘state’, attempting to reconstitute political order based upon a
‘contract’ between the provincial estates, defined as a ‘nation’, and the sovereign (emperor).
It represented an attempt to reverse political centralisation by devolving power to the
revived political body of the provincial estates. The Bohemian estates described themselves
not only as a ‘nation’ but further as the ‘voice of the whole country’ and the ‘voice of the
people, which is according to an old and wise saying the voice of god’ (Drabek 2003, 158).
The Bohemian aristocrat Count Johann Rudolf Chotek stated similarly that the Bohemian
Diet would represent all parts of the nation. In the same vein, another aristocrat, Count
Johann Nepomuk Buquoy argued that in the future no legal decision concerning Bohemian
provinces should be made without the agreement of the Bohemian estates (ibid.).

While the Josephist regime had articulated a concept of the nation that included in
principle all subjects of the state, the estates attempted to promote a new province-based
concept of nationality (ibid., 159). The protocols of the Bohemian diet of 10 March 1791
report that the estates referred to themselves as ‘national representatives’ (Nationalrepräsentanten), supposedly defending the welfare of ‘the different classes and of
the state’, referring to a narrow, province-based conception of people and polity. They
promised the monarch that federalisation under the political bodies of the estates would revive ‘patriotism in the breast of every citizen’ (ibid., 158).

The political structural reform, which contributed to the empowerment of provincial political institutions, was further reflected in three symbolic acts in the early 1790s. The first was the official return of the Bohemian Crown Jewels, which had previously been brought to the capital, Vienna, by Maria Theresa in the context of Austrian state-building and political centralisation. Their return symbolised the transfer of political power from Vienna to the institutions associated with the ancient Bohemian kingdom. This was followed by the two inauguration ceremonies of Leopold II (1791) and his son Francis II (1792) as kings of Bohemia (Hroch 2003, 196). What Vienna supported was aristocratic-led province-based patriotism, an expression of the corporate interests of the estates. While in the early eighteenth century the natio Bohemica referred to the Bohemian provincial estates and the natio Moravica to the Moravian provincial estates, after 1790 a new Bohemian-Czech understanding of nationality and fatherland was developed by aristocrats and their sponsored scholars. This merged these distinct provinces into a new concept of the homeland of a Bohemian nation. Under the reign of Leopold II this new understanding of provinces as feudal estate polities found its expression even in official documents (Drabek 2003, 153).

Some of Leopold’s reforms were not anti-modernist or restorationist per se. However, under the conditions of an external and internal crisis, Leopold abandoned the centralist and unitary direction of political modernisation. Although some advisors of Leopold II sought to convince his successor Francis to continue his father’s supposedly moderately modernist stance and to abandon his plans to lead a war against France, the new emperor adopted a staunchly counter-revolutionary stance (Reinalter 1980, 156-57). The counter-revolutionary alliance became ideologically united by drawing on the already widely disseminated conservative argument that contemporary problems were caused by dynamics triggered by Josephist modernising reforms. The solution was identified in anti-Josephist reforms that were programmatically directed against Roman law and political centralisation, both associated with rationalism and individualism. The arguments of conservative federalism instead drew on the German historical school of law: ‘The concept of Roman Law was associated with adjectives such as capitalist, individualistic, rationalistic, liberalistic and

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5 Similarly, Samuel Huntington (1968) has argued that modernisation leads to a ‘king’s dilemma’. Essentially, he suggests that, by implementing social and economic reforms, traditional monarchies face subsequently rising demands for political participation.
foreign, in contrast to the German law, which was considered as communitarian, social and warm-hearted’ (Burgdorf 2006, 325).

Francis reintroduced and strengthened aristocratic and provincial privileges, and reduced civil liberties through the extension of censorship, the establishment of a secret police and the abolition of bourgeois associations. Criminal and economic laws were amended to pursue the assault on the Josephist ‘Austrian’ bourgeoisie within the framework of the legal state (Wangermann 1969, 173-88). With the criminal persecution of Josephist liberals and radicals, the regime altered its recruitment and attempted to reform the character of the university-educated higher bureaucracy. These reforms were perceived as a prerequisite for politically passive, devoted and pious subjects of the dynastic monarch, who was believed to be legitimised by God. The following table of decrees shows that, from a diachronic comparative perspective, the government focus after 1790 ‘was no longer on “Josephine” subjects’ (Dickson 1995, 353).

Figure 5. Government Decrees, 1781-1795 [Dickson 1995, 354]

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<th>1793</th>
<th>1794</th>
<th>1795</th>
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<td>2. Appellate etc. (Appeal courts)</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>3. Anzeigen (Police)</td>
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<td>4. Beamter (Officials)</td>
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<td>5. Censura (Bankruptcy)</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>9. Juden (Jews)</td>
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<td>10. Kanzler (Cabinet officers)</td>
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<td>18. Strafe etc. (Penal measures)</td>
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During the Josephist era, it was ‘clear that financial matters were important … However, other headings were more important. Most striking is the huge number of clauses concerning the Catholic Church … This weighting persisted later. Second only to this is the prominence of military affairs … The administration of an army forming a state within a state, constantly impinging on civil life, but impervious to civil jurisdiction, was clearly a factor as important in an Austrian, as in a Prussian context’ (Dickson 1995, 353-55).6

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6 Interestingly, Dickson refers at this point (‘a state within the state’) to the interpretation and wording of an important bureaucrat of the Metternich government, whose posthumous memoir is described by Dickson as ‘a lament against Josephinism’. It illustrates the consciousness of the actors involved in the anti-Josephist ‘conservative turn’ and the attempted reinterpretation of the Josephist modernisation era by succeeding generations.
This figure, which presents government decrees by policy issue, shows that, alongside religious affairs, the education system had played a central role in Joseph II’s ambitious reform agenda. It appears that he ‘really did believe that repeated coercion and menaces could drive reluctant peasant masses into literacy’ (ibid., 355). Moreover, it is observable that his institutional reforms aimed at the creation of a legal state which ‘extended from judicial appeal through the mechanisms of bankruptcy to courts and their procedures, magistrates and, with punishment, the labyrinth of criminal law. It is no coincidence that nineteenth-century lawyers looked back to Joseph … as the true founder of the Austrian legal system’ (ibid.). While in the Austrian-Bohemian core lands the modernisation policies were largely successful and led to sustained institutions, in Hungary the impact of radical reform was limited. Curiously, although many conservatives despised the supposedly ‘foreign’ idea of a division of labour and capitalism, associated with rationalistic individualism and materialism, in practice the government did not oppose capitalist economic modernisation. These ideas, which were central elements of the Enlightenment and the Josephist project, became increasingly reinterpreted as culturally alien and ‘foreign’, French or Welsh (Burgdorf 2006, 324).

One component of the conservative vision of society-building was the rejection of linguistic acculturation processes, associated with the Josephist, civilizational ideal of a continual expansion of the German-speaking bourgeoisie. Many educated intellectuals apparently perceived such an approach to society as a feasible strategy of conservative
modernisation, which illustrates the varying sets of logic underlying the realms of economic and ideological power. Although the Austrian civil code of 1811 was similar to the French Code Civil (1804), designed to guarantee equal rights for private property owners as free participants of a market-driven economy, it did not affect Hungary, nor did it contradict the regime’s conservative approach to culture. The regime established a police state, weakened Josephism ideologically, and prevented the active promotion and institutionalised expansion of an ‘Austrian’ bourgeois identity and common literary culture. The conservative assumption was that a restoration of elements of indirect rule would contribute to a political equilibrium and ensure political stability.

The central government figure Philipp Stadion supported the reversal of Josephist nation-building efforts from the very beginning. The government forbid and sanctioned all intellectual activities that seemed overly patriotic and ‘Austrian’. Stadion’s clearly anti-Josephist political agenda was recognised by his colleague Hormayr, who was a federalist like Stadion but assumed that Austrian state patriotism could coherently draw on the ideological power of ideally complementary province-based patriotism. Hormayr began to work on the ‘Austrian Plutarch’ from 1807 onwards, in which he collected biographies of famous Austrian statesmen and military leaders, and was appointed head of the Austrian state archive in 1808. A similar ideological motive guided the ‘Patriotic Papers for the Austrian Imperial State’ (Vaterländische Blätter für den österreichischen Kaiserstaat), which was published from 1808 onwards by the journalist Johann Michael Armbruster, who came from Breisgau in southern Germany (Rumpler 1997, 89).

Leading conservative actors assumed that culturally and provincially segregated peoples would be appealed to by a traditionalist ethos, drawing on federalism, Catholicism, and a form of multi-culturalism. They abandoned the Austrian-centralist, civilizational state-nation project of Josephism and replaced it with a multiculturalist vision of an imperial society. European history supposedly provided them with answers to contemporary problems. Hormayr described Stadion’s conservative convictions as follows (Hormayr quoted in Rumpler 1997, 89):

One of Stadion’s secret, dearest wishes was the revival of feudal constitutions … an Epimenides awakening of the old, historical, aristocratic estates, redistributed with every change of government, with consideration for the weight of the third estate, which has increased in geometrical fashion, and of finance, with diligent care that that which is steadfast within the state does not become outbalanced by and swept away with the current tide.

Stadion saw the Austrian state as the sum of distinct historical provinces, to be recognised and accommodated on the basis of their differences, and to be represented politically by
provincial diets. The Viennese government consciously struggled against any policies that would continue the Josephist state-nation project. In the context of the military and fiscal crisis after 1805, Francis strengthened his support of Stadion’s policies that aimed at creating a conservative alliance with the expectation to gain financial support from the provincial diets. As a result, even the Hungarian diets of 1807 and 1808 accepted new taxes and an increased recruitment contingent for the army (Rumpler 1997, 90).

At the time, Gentz was elaborating on the idea of a new ‘political equilibrium in Europe’ (Rumpler 1997, 88). When Gentz met the Prussian Freiherr von Stein in Prague in 1808, a refugee from Napoleon, he was confronted with von Stein’s idea of a German revolution, following the example of France and combining nationality with claims to political rule. Gentz’ response was the development of an alternative plan intended to prevent such a ‘national Germany’ and a political conception of nationality. The new Austrian model of empire was intended to serve as a model for a conservative European order and a future German confederation. After finishing his draft, Foreign Minister Stadion sent him an invitation to return to Vienna. Stadion appealed to his sense of patriotism when he announced in 1808: ‘We have constituted ourselves as a nation’ (quoted in Bruckmüller 1996, 228).

At first glance, it seems to be an attempt to invoke some form of national sentiment in preparation for the war against Napoleon in 1809. Confronted with the military success of the French levee en masse, the Spanish insurrection beginning in 1808 and unrest in Tyrol, Stadion recognised that appeals to ‘national uprising’ could serve the state militarily, would be more effective, and less costly. French examples such as the introduction of a national hymn (Marseillaise) and the militarisation of the common people were imitated and took the form of the Kaiserhymne (the British ‘God save the King’ became the Austrian ‘Gott erhalte unsern Kaiser’) and rural militias (Landwehr). Mobilisation effects of patriotism had been noted in Vienna, Linz, Tyrol and Pest. Stadion’s governmental policies were generally directed against fostering any form of patriotism and Austrian nationhood in the political sense, which suggests that this was actually a situational statement of propaganda with the task to support mobilisation for the upcoming war against France. After the military defeat of 1809, the authorities abruptly turned down this brief phase of ambivalent propaganda and Metternich succeeded Stadion (Langsam 1930).

Hormayr, a leading proponent of a conservative Austrian state idea, attempted to shift the construction of Austrian nationhood away from the Enlightened rationalist tradition of Josephism to the ascending historicist streams. While the state was to be based on an
Austro-German centre like in Josephism, he proposed to recognise various ideally complementary provincial patriotisms (Bruckmüller 1996, 228, fn.239). It represented an attempt to initiate a new phase of Austrian nation-building, and to produce a perception of continuity by shifting nationalism into a ‘statist’ direction, viewed as complementary to provincial patriotisms. However, under Metternich the remaining Josephists and ‘patriots’ remained the primary targets of the regime. Another factor that contributed to a somewhat different context of Metternich’s anti-Josephist and anti-patriotic interventions was his temporary alliance with Napoleon. In this context, Hormayr was imprisoned on 7 March 1813.

Francis’ brother Charles attempted one last time to push for a Josephist revival in 1807, the year when a huge statue of Joseph II was erected in front of the royal library. The primary target of the proposed state reform was the Council of State (Staatsrat), which had been initially established by Kaunitz to facilitate the centralisation of government. In the meanwhile, it had become a passive institution of mediocre bureaucrats rather than the highest council of political leaders. Due to the increase in province-based noble influence, it could not exercise authority over the Hof- and Länderstellen. The plan was to replace the Council of State by a single government, redefining the position of the emperor. This implied a transfer of power away from noble and provincial privileges towards the central state through the reorganisation of the government system, with the executive led by a prime minister, heading a number of accountable ministers. Instead of carrying out a fundamental reform of the state structure and its government system, Stadion prioritised war against France and gave low priority to this reform attempt. With the inefficient Council of State the emperor remained the personal ruler of the state. While for Joseph II ‘personal despotism was a means to change the nature of Austria’s state system and organization, so that the state would eventually follow his ethos of service for the greater good of its own accord’, for Francis, ‘personal rule was not a means but an end in itself’ (Deak 2015, 36).

4.3.2. A Governmental Shift from Public Culture to Private Cultures
After Joseph’s death, Leopold II was still surrounded by a circle of Josephist advisors, such as the academics Martinovics and Riedel, who argued for the empowerment of peasants and the bourgeoisie in order to support the struggle for centralisation against the landed nobility (Winter 1969, 12). Beside the institution of a unitary constitutional state, their reform plans put political representation at state level on the agenda. Such a reading suggests that the central issue for Leopold was the concrete timing of democratic reforms. Leopold’s actions and policies appeared at times ambiguous, seemingly part of a strategic
plan to overcome Austria’s political crisis. Although Leopold supported various political
camps, for instance a liberal reformist camp in Hungary, intended to weaken the Hungarian
magnates, in the capital he intervened in favour of an emergent conservative camp
(Valjavec 1963, 331-42).

The emperor lent his support to Leopold Alois Hoffmann and the so-called ‘friends of
the monarch’ with the aim to strengthen the conservative camp, which was opposed to
Josephism and constitutionalism. Hoffmann argued that his ideal ‘conservative subjects’
were to be rooted in a hierarchical, supposedly ‘organic’ social order of estates, as opposed
to reasoning and socially mobile future ‘Austrian citizens’ (Lettner 1988, 27-28). Although
Austria’s external and internal crisis consumed most of Leopold’s political energy, the
emperor clearly favoured the idea of instituting a new type of regime marked by a
conservative vision of society (ibid., 40).7 This explains why the emperor supported
Hoffmann in his effort to take over Sonnenfels’ chair at the University of Vienna in 1791.
The Josephist-dominated faculty and rectorate vetoed Hoffmann’s appointment, as he was
perceived as a fanatic reactionary who lacked academic qualifications. University
regulations forced him to base his teaching strictly on the textbook edited by Sonnenfels,
whose three volumes of 1765–76 (Grundsätze der Polizey, Handlung und Finanz) remained
in use until 1848.

Leopold’s successor Francis identified the Josephist bureaucracy as a major target of the
counter-revolution. Sonnenfels had edited and published an official dictionary of the
standardised German language (Amtsdeutsch), to become the public language of the state
apparatus that was intended to serve as diffusor of Josephist state ideology. In contrast, for
Emperor Francis, ‘loyalty to [modern] ideas was a path to revolution, which led him to
attack how this imperial idea was transmuted to the civil service – the juridical education at
university’ (Deak 2015, 34). Consequently, he ‘removed the historical and statist emphasis
from legal training, which had been used to inculcate jurists with a state-serving ethos.
Francis intended this “reform” as an assault on the Josephinist ethos of the bureaucracy,
which encouraged service to the abstract notion of the state through an education with a
strong sense of history and an ideology of “love for the fatherland”’ (ibid.). By 1810, most
of the historically grounded courses in legal studies had been removed from the curriculum.

As the conservative regime took the lead in the European counter-revolution, Vienna
attracted many Romantic intellectuals, who contributed to a shift in the conception of
culture. Their activities gained new momentum with the dissolution of the Old Reich in

7 For a critique of Lettner’s anti-Josephist interpretation of Leopold, which appears centred on her analysis
of his interventions in Vienna, see Evans (1990c, 341-2).
1806, when ‘the government had lost confidence ... in the Josephinist ideal of patriotism, in such a degree of self-definition as the Monarchy had yet been able to generate’ (Evans 2006, 73). In Prussia, Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* (1795) lent ideological support to the Prussian political plan of participating in the French-led reconstruction of European order, while German Romantics were to be kept silent. Their impact on Austria, however, grew significantly. While on the one hand Vienna tightened censorship with a censorship commission (*Rezensurierungskommission*) established in 1803, which expanded the list of banned books to 2,500, at the same time the government stimulated the influx of Romanticist intellectuals.

The government recruited conservative writers and intellectuals such as Friedrich Gentz and Johannes Müller from the German states. Consequently, a network of Romantic poets, literati, and prominent political figures evolved in Vienna. Müller soon found himself connected to the highest circles of the establishment such as to Count Moritz Fries, the richest Austrian of the time and, as of 1801, the head of a trading group and banking house. Fries offered his *palais* and its huge library opposite the royal library to be used by literati. As Müller became a respected intellectual in Vienna, he influenced figures such as the Hungarian poet Janos Batsanyi, who shaped a ‘new Hungarian’ literature. Although he had been a member of the Hungarian Jacobin movement and was imprisoned in Tyrol, as a province-based patriot his work rather followed the ideology of Romanticism. He was employed by the finance department of the imperial administration in Vienna, where he introduced Müller to the poet Heinrich Joseph von Collin, who was a finance officer in the Imperial Council. Another example is Müller’s friendship with Johann Melchior von Birkenstock, who was a member of the *Studienhofkommission* and acted against Josephists such as van Swieten and Sonnenfels (Rumpler 1997, 84-5).

Müller spread Herder’s Romanticist ideas and appraisals of ‘the small peoples’ of central Europe in Vienna (drawing on his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, 1784-1791) and contributed significantly to a research programme that aimed at the study of provincial histories and the ‘rediscovery’ of national cultures. He was employed by the Austrian foreign minister Thugut to write critical pamphlets against Prussian policies and, subsequently, anti-French leaflets. In 1800, he became first *Custos* in the royal library. One of the underlying narratives Müller attempted to spread through his historical works, beginning with his *Swiss History*, was the historical importance of the plurality of small European nations and their distinct cultures: ‘The greatest things have been brought about by small peoples’ (Müller quoted in Rumpler 1997, 83). Müller further
supported Johann Christian von Engel in his endeavours to publish works that narrated distinctive Hungarian, Serbian and Bosnian histories, and Müller himself collected Southern-Slavic folksongs (ibid., 85).

Other major intellectuals of Romantic conservatism who moved to Vienna after 1800 included Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel, Adam Müller, Ludwig Tieck, Zacharias Werner, August Kotzebue, Heinrich Kleist, Theodor Körner and Joseph von Eichendorff (ibid., 91-2). Hammer-Purgstall enjoyed a similar level of influence to Johannes Müller, and made Vienna a leading centre of ‘Oriental Studies’. Hammer-Purgstall acknowledged that he owed his scientific research programme on ‘Orientalism’ to Müller: ‘He has exercised the largest influence on my scholarly development and directed my best skills towards literature’ (quoted in Rumpler 1997, 86). In 1800, Friedrich Schlegel, who studied Persian and had also come to Vienna, claimed that: ‘We must seek the highest form of Romanticism in the Orient’ (ibid., 85). This illustrates how ‘the Orient’ was interpreted in the contemporary context as a safe haven from liberal uprooting and alienation from one’s own ‘organic’ culture and history. For Central European Romantics, it was an intellectual response to their alienation from supposedly ‘Western’ values and ideas of civilization associated with political liberalism, individualism and materialism.

The brothers Schlegel were given imperial permission to hold public lectures in Vienna, enabling them to propagate their Romantic vision of the Middle Ages. Friedrich Schlegel presented a vision of the medieval world which suggested that, in the past, a united, harmonious Europe had existed that included both Germany and Austria, and which had positively recognised cultural diversity. In the contemporary political context of revolutionary upheavals and recurrent attempts at reformation and societal transformation via modernising states, he gave Austrian conservatism a supposedly universalistic outlook and a seemingly empirical basis. When Metternich realised that Schlegel’s vision in fact promoted Fichte’s concept of cultural nationality, which overlapped with a political understanding of ‘people’, he immediately put a stop to Schlegel’s activities (Rumpler 1997, 95).

In 1805, Philipp Stadion became foreign minister, thus marking the successful ‘conservative turn’ at the top level of government. Stadion and his brother had been educated by the Romantic historian Müller, who stated in a piece published in 1787 that his function as a historian was nothing less than to revive a ‘purified’ national culture rooted in the Middle Ages, ‘to raise up in self-esteem a brave, worthy, powerful nation, away from impassibility and from an imitation of the foreigner’ (quoted in Winter 1969, 38). Later,
Stadion reconstructed his family compound in Bohemia in neo-Gothic style and named his second son Walter Wilderich, a decidedly Germanic name (Rumpler 1997, 78). A prominent figure recruited by Stadion was Friedrich Gentz, who later became the secretary of Metternich. Beginning his intellectual career under the influence of the French Enlightenment and Kant, he became, after having read Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), a leading conservative, who saw in French radicalism and imperialism a totalitarian danger. In 1802, Gentz moved to Vienna, where he got a well-paid position as a bureaucrat, although he was assigned the only task to write propaganda against Napoleon. Gentz described himself proudly as a successful agitator, who spread anti-revolutionary ideology and emotionalised the people (Rumpler 1997, 80).

Vienna’s ‘conservative turn’ attracted more Romantic intellectuals and writers. Even though some Austrian patriots such as Hormayr, who took Müller’s *Swiss History* as an example of how to construct a national history of Austria as a multi-linguistic polity, adopted some elements of this new Romanticist stream, the evolving conservatism was not only anti-French but also substantially anti-Austrian in the Josephist sense. The ideological struggle was thus not strictly aimed at defeating French-led internationalism; it equally sought to defeat the Josephist idea of a unitary Austrian state and state-nation.

**4.3.3. The Promotion of Pious Catholics and Cultural Nationalities in Education**

How the ‘conservative turn’ influenced the state’s approach to its subjects can be illustrated by the changing function of public education. ‘I]t was one of the marked peculiarities of enlightened absolutism in the Habsburg Monarchy that the integral connection between upper and lower levels of education came to be recognized quite clearly, and that the desire for educational systematization gradually produced the need to build from the bottom up’ (Szabo 1994, 189). As Joseph II had pointed out in a famous critical memorandum in 1765, public education was seen as a central pillar for the modernisation of the monarchy. ‘In his careful assessment of this memorandum for Maria Theresia, Kaunitz singled out these references to education for special attention. Since society needed minds as much as bodies, he noted, nothing was more important in their development than education. He praised the Emperor for his attention to the subject, and agreed that the function of education was to produce “virtuous citizens”’ (Szabo 1994, 190).

While the Josephist regime had aimed towards the transformation of uneducated, religiously and locally socialised subjects, integrating them into an Enlightened society via an assumed civilizational and linguistic acculturation process, this now changed radically. A
fundamental break becomes apparent in the ideologically guided forging of subjects through public education: a shift from the reasoning, patriotic, free and equal, socially mobile future citizen, towards the pious, passively obedient subject, situated within an internalised static hierarchy. According to this conservative approach to subjects and state-society relations, the government introduced new policies. On 14 September 1810 the Emperor announced a decree regarding censorship and public education (Francis quoted in Emerson 1968, 29):

In the future, no ray of light, wherever it should appear, should be disregarded and unrecognized in the Monarchy nor should it be robbed of any useful result. But the heart and the head [sic!] of the immature [Unmündigen] were to be protected cautiously from the poisonous aspirations of self-seeking seducers, and from the dangerous illusions of crazed heads.

The education system was to guard the spread of useful knowledge and the improvement of opinions and morality. Emerson (1968, 30) notes how streamlined this vision of educating conservative subjects was, concluding that the twenty-two sections ‘which specified the necessary protections indicated effective conduct to keep subjects immature’. Metternich’s secretary Gentz became ‘one of the most obnoxious Hapsburg practitioners of the wearisome and oppressive censorship’, and the Ministry of Police ‘introduced in order to strengthen the hand of an Emperor driving through extensive reforms in the Hapsburg lands, became an instrument with which another Emperor and his associates battled against reforms’ (ibid.). The Austrian police around 1800 frequently complained of ‘problems’ caused by the increased education level of peasants and by their economic emancipation, such as their engagement in speculative, capitalist activities: ‘The enlightenment is always a disadvantage for the peasants’ (quoted in Winter 1969, 19).

The regime response to these dislocations was a new vision of the educated subject, shifting away from individual reasoning towards collective disciplining and the indoctrination of religiously legitimised subordination into hierarchy. This stance is evident in a speech given by Francis, in which he addressed the teachers of the Laibach Lyceum in 1821 (quoted in Rumpler 1997, 212-13):

For the rest abide by the old, as this is good and our ancestors did well by it; why would not we? Now there is a momentum of new ideas, which I cannot and will not condone. Avoid these and remain positive, as it is not men of letters that I require, but virtuous, upright citizens. The upbringing of young men to be such is the task with which you are entrusted. He who serves me must teach what I order him. He who cannot do this, or who brings me new ideas, must leave, or else I will remove him.

Catholicism became a central ideological feature of the transition towards a new regime. In his report of 19 February 1803, the Pope’s nuntius Severoli referred to the reforms of Joseph II as the ‘demonic legislation of Joseph’ (infernali di Giuseppe), characterising them as extremely dangerous for the Catholic Church (quoted in Winter 1969, 53). In the period
between 1801 (the peace of Luneville) and 1815, Vienna became not only the centre of new Romantic cultural nationalism but also of a Roman Catholic revival led by Severoli and the director of the Theresian Academy Penkler. In 1805, the emperor restored the Catholic Church’s authority over primary schooling and, subsequently, over the entire education system. On 15 December 1806, the rule was announced that, as far as possible, pupils were to attend the Catholic mass on a daily basis as part of their education (Vocelka 1978, 25).

Conservatives eventually began to reinterpret originally liberal concepts such as those of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’, incorporating them into their Catholic vision of society. The brochure, ‘On Freedom and Equality of Citizens’ (Über die bürgerliche Freiheit und Gleichheit, 1795), published by Aleš Pařízek (1748-1822), director of the Bohemian elementary schools, constitutes an example. The text identified six attributes of ‘equality’ among subjects: 1.) Everyone is equal as subjects of the same ruler; 2.) All are subject to the same law; 3.) All make use of God’s gifts for the common good; 4.) Everyone has the same right to earn his daily bread; 5.) Citizens (Bürger) and the nobility enjoy equal status in the occupation of public offices; 6.) All practise the same religion (Hroch 2003, 195; Fn.13).

Under conditions of continual warfare and recurring fiscal crises, religious and educational affairs initially played a minor role for the regime, which reduced regulation in the domains of religion and language. Both were to be relaxed into a supposedly ‘cultural’ sphere. Consequences included, for instance, the dissolution of the famous Studienhofkommission (royal commission for studies) in 1791, the spread of textbooks in regional vernaculars, and the revival of the Jesuit order. Instead of the centralised Studienhofkommission, the newly instituted Studienkonsesse diminished the political authority of the central state in educational affairs and granted autonomy to provinces and schools. Even the task of controlling mandatory schooling was transferred to local authorities (Rumpler 1997, 111). With the reform of the ‘German schools’ in 1805, the unitary educational system that had been introduced by the Josephist Ratio educationis in 1777 was dissolved and reorganised on the basis of provincial law. The new law of 1805 regulated autonomy in education for the so-called German hereditary lands and Galicia. The Hungarian diet introduced a provincial education system in 1806, with the so-called Ratio educationis publicae, characterised by a conception of standardised national education that was intended to spread the Magyar literary language.

The education reform of 1805 represented a compromise between the conservative Birkenstock and the two Josephists Sonnenfels and Friedrich von Eger. The number of clerical teachers had been irreversibly reduced by the Josephist regime, Jesuits remained
marginal and even Birkenstock, himself a political Romantic, perceived economic modernisation as being not only in the interest of the state but also compatible with counter-revolutionary policy. A basic assumption was the idea that economic modernisation required educated and skilled labour, which would at the same time reduce the risk of revolution if individuals were integrated into the economic system. Accordingly, curricula were modernised, with a focus on ‘positive sciences’ such as mathematics, physics and economics, and with less attention to ‘speculative sciences’ such as philosophy. On the level of higher education, the reformed system was maintained until 1848, and on the level of primary schooling, until the *Reichsvolksschulgesetz* was passed in 1868 (Rumpler 1997, 112).

The various components of the education reform were shaped by the motive of the government to transform ‘the working classes of the people into sincerely good, manageable and commerce-minded humans’ (ibid., 113). The aforementioned transfer of control over educational affairs to the Catholic Church brought about a new importance placed on religious education. Another aspect of these reforms was the inclusion of the lower social strata in the education system. This meant that the obligatory schooling age, between 6 and 12 years of age, could finally be achieved, and the literacy rate was increased via the institution of Sunday and evening schools and the introduction of mobile teachers (ibid.). Despite fiscal and military crises, the government continued to invest in and expand the education system.

The reforms carried out in secondary schools, marked by the declining role of the Latin-humanist Gymnasium and the introduction of the *Realschule* and the *Lyzeum*, are particularly interesting. These new school types were perceived as crucial for forming the bourgeoisie in accordance with the requirements of a modernising economy and a conservative state. The commercially orientated *Realschule* was established primarily in the to-be economically developed periphery such as in Brünn/Brno (1811), Brody (1815), Lemberg (1817) and Trieste (1817). The *Lyzeum* remained dominated by more universal subjects such as religion, geography and history, rather than the natural sciences. At university, theology faculties remained as they were, despite the new importance of religious education in primary and secondary schools. The most substantial reforms aimed towards modernising the study of medicine and the establishment of technical studies, already planned by the Josephist *Studienhofkommission* and implemented by the government in 1806 as part of ‘the stimulation of national industry in all its sectors’ (Stadion quoted in Rumpler 1997, 115).
The second ‘restorationist’ ideological feature of the new regime was a form of conservative multiculturalism, which attributed a new meaning to the concept of nationality. The government promoted the development of various particularistic ‘national cultures’, instead of the previously promoted Austrian state-nation project that envisioned societal integration based on German literary culture. The development of new literary cultures based on provincial vernaculars was shaped by the regime’s cultural policy, corresponding to a particular vision of state and society. Once Metternich stated proudly (quoted in ibid., 201):

The practical concept of the term nationality is … in no empire more honoured than in the Austrian Empire … It has never been the approach of the Austrian monarchy to rename – or to play with words; it has never called Hungarians, Italians or Poles Germans.

Metternich condemned the Josephist approach to state- and nation-building and argued that distinct cultural particularities, which he referred to as ‘nationalities’, had to be protected against the ‘centralisation nuisance’ (Zentralisationsunwesen) (Rumpler 1997, 201). He proposed the active creation of an ‘agglomerate of nationalities’, to be kept in political equilibrium (ibid.). This is the context in which the granting of provincial autonomy in the realm of education had major implications for the incentives to develop new literary languages.

While the German-speaking bourgeoisie, currently undergoing a socioeconomical rise in status, would largely internalise the Josephist rationality behind the utilitarian approach to a common public language, represented by Sonnenfels’ standardised German dictionary (Winter 1969, 35-36), opposition to the promotion of the German language gained momentum after 1790. This was not merely the result of a plain ‘reaction’ against unpopular Josephist reforms, a narrative that was partly diffused at a later stage by nationalist actors; in fact, it was in line with the new regime. The conservative government contributed significantly to the redefinition of nationality as a social category to be located in a supposedly ‘private-cultural’ sphere. After the death of Leopold II, the state shifted towards a new governance of law and order, aiming at the repression of opposition (Boyer 1981, 126). At the same time, the government supported the diffusion of a multiculturalist conception of society, suggesting ‘natural’ divisions on the basis of primordial national cultures. Through the expansion of the education system and the growing inclusion of lower social strata, this linguistically defined multiculturalism soon materialised on the level of primary schooling. A list of educational materials used in Bohemia in 1796/97, which contained a significant number of titles in the Czech language, illustrates that the education
system in Bohemia was not used by the regime to spread the German language (Winter 1968, 51).

A comparison of selected Austrian textbooks illustrates a shift in the official presentation of history. Textbooks of the Josephist era had framed history generally as ‘global’ and tended to promote a ‘civilizational’ narrative. One example is the textbook *Weltgeschichte* (World History), 1781 or the book *Auszug von den Sitten und Gebräuchen der alten Römer* (Excerpts from the customs and traditions of the old Romans), 1782. A look at some secondary school textbooks published in the post-Josephist years hints at a more particularistic reinterpretation of history, centred on the presentation of small polities, provinces and particular peoples. As examples serve the following history textbooks: *Geschichte Mährens für die Gymnasial-Classen* (The History of Moravia for Gymnasium Classes), 1811; *Lehrbuch der alten Staaten- und Völkergeschichte* (Textbook of the History of the Old States and Peoples), 1811; *Geschichte Deutschlands und der drey Kaiserthümer* (The History of Germany and of the Three Empires), 1817; *Geschichte der Königreiche, Republiken* (The History of Kingdoms, Republics), 1819. While under Joseph II the concept of ‘fatherland’ was promoted by Vienna in its meaning of the entire territorial state, by 1808/09 the conservative government promoted a new province-based understanding of the term in the plural to be propagated by the policymakers of the provincial diets (Hroch 2003, 196).

The conservative regime forestalled all major projects seeking to write a national history of Austria and instead supported the writing of patriotic histories of the distinct provinces. Gentz, for instance, attacked the renowned professor of history in Graz, Julius Franz Schneller, for his plan to write a *Staatengeschichte des Kaiserthums Österreich von der Geburt Christi bis zum Sturze Napoleons* (History of the Imperial Austrian State from the Birth of Christ to the Defeat of Napoleon), dismissing his project as ‘Aufklärerei’, meaning (in a derogatory fashion) activities that promoted Enlightenment values. Hormayr noted that the regime objected to the legitimation of the Josephist state project, which they associated with the Enlightenment (Rumpler 1997, 213). Hormayr and Schneller eventually emigrated to southern German states, following the path that the liberal Josephist Alxinger had already taken in 1796.

4.4. The Founding Phase of ‘Cultural-Private’ Nationalisms in the context of the Conservative Reaction
In the European context of intensified warfare, Austria experienced a regime transformation. Drawing on two ideologies that were both characterised by restorationist arguments, Romantic Catholicism and Romantic multi-nationalism, the regime did not simply aim at the restoration of a previously existing ‘old regime’ in the literal sense, but rather appealed to supposedly pre-modern religious and cultural collectives under conditions of continued modernisation.

4.4.1. The Regime’s Role in the Changing Conception of Culture

The sharp break with the Josephist project was not a foregone conclusion. Increasing pessimism and resignation among many progressive Austrian intellectuals meant that even patriotic conservatives like Hormayr became sceptical of the politics of Stadion and Metternich. They felt that Metternich’s plan was, at its core, against the interests of the Austrian state (raison d'État) and driven by a European rather than an Austrian agenda. Even though Hormayr was a leading figure of the Austrian patriotic camp and had largely agreed with a federal political structural reform, he was perceived as too patriotic and imprisoned in 1813 before he was set free and emigrated to Bavaria.

This chapter has argued that the conservative government in Vienna was not merely protecting the status quo, but implemented a set of policies aimed at reshaping the interrelated processes of state- and society-building. The idea was that the repression of liberals and democrats, as well as the recognition of co-existing cultures and historical provinces would secure people’s disconnection from political affairs of the state. To be sure, at its core, Habsburg monarchism in Austria fulfilled a similar ideological function as did representative parliamentary institutions in Britain: ‘Monarchism and party democracy offered alternative forms of “representative” crystallization’ (Mann 2012, 172). The dynastic ruler was to be identified with the state. What was new in the post-Josephist era was a sharp break with the civilizational nation-building project as new national intellectuals engaged in the discovery of the ‘old’ and ‘genuine’ as opposed to ‘foreign’ influences.

The first restorationist ideological feature of anti-Josephist conservatism was Romantic Catholicism, which propagated that the ideal society was to be created through a Catholic revival. It proposed the restoration of a harmonious corporative social order, headed by the religiously legitimated monarch. The mass of the population was to be disciplined through the infusion of religious morality. If the ruler was unjust, it was up to God to intervene and to punish. In contrast to Josephism, the role of the population at large was reduced to
loyalty, discipline and piety. Its ideological content can be described in anti-Josephist terms as anti-materialist and anti-rationalist.

The plurality of ‘peoples’, as expressed in the work of Adam Müller by the metaphor of a patriarchal family or by Herder’s ‘small nations’, hints at the second restorationist ideological feature of Austrian conservatism: cultural multinationalism, a particular form of multiculturalism. Although the emergence of Romantic nationalisms in the Habsburg monarchy was not a direct result of the French Revolution, the latter had a major impact on intellectual activities as it shaped the contemporary political context. The ascendancy of a new culturalist ideology has been observed by historians over several periods and frequently described as a changing Zeitgeist: from rationalist and civilizational to culturalist and primordialist conceptions of nations. Huntington (2000, xiii-xvi) has noted that such diverging conceptions rest on different ideological premises, related to what he terms ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ approaches to culture. While the first current represents rationalist, progressive approaches in the Enlightenment tradition, the second strand is based on historicist and culturalist views of the world. While classic liberals and leftists in the Enlightenment tradition view politics and human agency as causal factors, conservatives tend to define culture as an independent variable.

Austrian conservatives promoted an ethno-linguistic variant, inferring that ‘culture’ was largely a ‘private’ affair, decoupled from state-building. The German ‘historical school’ promoted historicism at a time when the old world was becoming increasingly eroded by radical change, including the political-territorial make-up of the Continent. In central Europe, the climax came with the dissolution of the Old Reich in 1806. It was in this context that Romantic nationalism became more prominent in the German states, especially at universities such as Berlin and Jena. The political context was at times quite explicit; the German Kotzbue, for example, who was in the paid service of Tsarist Russia, was murdered by a fanatic German nationalist who accused him of being a traitor. Where the situation was more stable such as in Hamburg or Bavaria, the rationalist ideology of the Enlightenment maintained a strong presence, despite the general ascendancy of a conservative approach to culture.

The conservative Austrian government based in Vienna recruited a number of leading Romanticist intellectuals from the German states and contributed to the ascendancy of the so-called ‘historical school’. Scholarly collaboration led to the formation of research programmes based on a particular conservative vision of the world and materialising organisationally in scholarly associations. The most influential were ‘history associations’
that engaged in the so-called ‘studies of the fatherland’ (*vaterländische Studien*) (Burgdorf 2006, 290-306). There was a growing general interest in provincial history, to be explored with new methods that were transmitted through the works of Anglophone, German-speaking and Francophone scientific communities. The role of Austrian Benedictines was of central importance, as they disseminated the methods developed by their fellows in the Congregation de Saint-Maur. This trend was reinforced by the historical school in Germany, practiced at the University of Göttingen (Agnew 1993, 49). By utilising new scientific methods of historical research, philology and literary history, province-based intellectuals developed a counter-programme to the ‘civilizational’ modernisation project of the Enlightenment. In 1806, the Bohemian Jan Nejedly was still articulating a contemporary conception of a ‘Bohemian-Czech’ nation, which suggested that it could feasibly merge into another nation through processes of acculturation (Nejedly quoted in Agnew 1993, 65):

Every nation is separated from every other nation by its mother tongue and customs, and only according to these two traits is it possible to differentiate it from all other nations; thus if it changes these two basic characteristics it ceases to be the nation that it was, and, transformed into another nation, it joins onto whichever nation it was whose language and customs it has accepted.

What is striking about the intellectuals who engaged in the formulation of culturalist ideology is the fact that most of them responded to disruptive political events such as the Polish partition or the dissolution of the Old Reich. The German poets Johann Daniel Falk, Johann Christian Gretschel, Aloys Wilhelm Schreiber and Andreas Georg Rebmann, for instance, were ‘writing about Poland in the 1790s, anticipating the Romantic enthusiasm of the 1830s’ (Wolff 1994, 340-41). In the Vienna of 1794, the Polish revolutionary leader Tadeusz Kościuszko, who had previously fought in the American War of Independence, ‘was the hero of the day, his picture was everywhere, and he was celebrated under the interesting orthography of “Kutschiuzky”’ (ibid., 341). As a response to French victory and the dissolution of the Old Reich, a stream of ‘cultural’ German nationalism emerged, most famously formulated by Fichte in his *Addresses to the German Nation*. There was also a wave of migration, including conservatives from northern German states to Austria, and of progressives from Austria to the north or Paris. Burgdorf has described this phenomenon as “‘inner emigration and compensation through cultural achievement’ (Burgdorf, 2006, 200; 205). Similarly, Rabow-Edling (2006, 2) argues that Slavophiles in the late eighteenth century should not be understood as ‘conservative dreamers’ but in reference to their intellectual function, as attempting ‘to solve an identity crisis’.
4.4.2. The Political Context: Traditional Intellectuals of Empire or Organic Intellectuals of National Movements?

The noted shift in the state’s approach to nationality was fed by the influx of Romantic intellectuals to Vienna, who diffused Herder’s and Fichte’s understanding of language as containing a ‘people’s spirit’ (*Volksgeist*) and thus as means of transmitting a national culture from a supposedly ancient past to the present and future. The activities of philologists like Herder illustrate the close relationship between science and ideological power in the context of modern literary culture. Researchers such as the brothers Grimm, who collected folk songs and poems, cultivated a German ‘national culture’ on the basis of German as a literary language. Many of these research programmes influenced each other as the respective scholars shared a common ‘academic’ interest and were influenced by Herder’s so-called neo-humanism. Herder’s *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784-1791) appeared to be particularly influential.

The programmatic slogan of this founding period of cultural nationalisms was the so-called ‘awakening of nations’ or the ‘national rebirth’. In the various cultivated ‘national languages’ it was referred to as a *nationale Wiedergeburt* (German), *preporod* (Serbo-Croat), *národní obrození* (Czech), *risorgimento* (Italian) and *nemzeti újjászületés* (Hungarian). In the Habsburg Empire it represents the beginning ‘cultural-private’ phase of embryonic national movements, in which they were perceived as complementary and supportive of the new conservative regime and its vision of imperial society.

This early strand of cultural nationalism in central Europe, together with the revived influence of the provincial clergy, fed into the growing ideological power of the anti-Josephist camp. In 1810 Gentz wrote to the Romantic intellectual Adam Müller regarding the latter’s book *Elemente der Staatskunst* (Elements of Statecraft) that ‘the idea that language and nationality describe the true and only boundary of distinct state territories is one that I had already intuited, and you have convinced me of it more than ever’ (quoted in Winter 1968, 160). On this theoretical basis, Gentz divided Europe into eleven states, but strikingly did not mention Austria or Bohemia, which he saw as contingent political constructions in contrast to the supposedly culturally pre-existing entities of Germany, Italy or Illyria (ibid.).

Anti-Josephist nobles, especially large landowners from Bohemia, played a key role in the foundation of new cultural institutions. The influential aristocrat Leopold Kolowrat, for instance, ‘watched over the retreat from Josephinism – when he retired in 1806, by then as chairman of the Staatsrat, he had served for sixty-three years! His compatriots included Ignaz Chorinsky, Prokop Lažansky, ... Chotek (Johann Rudolf), and the Emperor’s close
associate, Rudolf Wrbna’ (Evans 2006, 96). High-ranking aristocrats such as Francis Sternberg, Charles Clam-Martinitz and Francis Wrbna attended the first meeting of the Society for the Patriotic Friends of the Arts on February 5, 1796 in Prague (Krueger 2009, 141-42):

In April 1796, Francis Anton Kolowrat was elected president of the committee. Under the auspices of the Society, an art academy was also to be established in Prague … By the end of 1796, the Society had managed to collect … over 500 canvasses for public display, and a considerable financial backing … The roster of committed individuals who served as constituent members of the Society’s administration is a list of the most patriotically engaged of the intellectual aristocracy, including not just Francis Sternberg, but Georg Buquoy, Friedrich Nostitz, Joseph Mathias Thun, Anton Isidor Lobkowitz, and Joseph Kinský. It is not a coincidence that many of these individuals were later members of the Society of the National Museum as well.

In another step, the Bohemian Estates bought the Nostitz Theatre and renamed it the Royal Estates Theatre in 1798 (ibid., 157). The ideological function of the newly established province-based museums, art collections and theatres was to convey legitimacy, ‘and in an indirect fashion also put forward a vision of the authenticity of the national community’ (ibid.), which was elaborated by the first generation of national intellectuals.

A prominent member of this first generation was Josef Dobrovsky (1753-1829). Originally a biblical scholar, he became a historian who engaged in the ‘re-discovery’ and standardisation of a Slavic literary culture. Born in Hungary, his mother’s native language was German, and his father’s, who served in the Austrian army as a corporal, was Czech. Initially speaking German, Dobrovsky consciously chose Bohemia as his ‘fatherland’ and developed the programme of ‘academic Slavism’. A year after he had published his classic work *Geschichte der böhmischen Sprache und Literatur* (History of the Bohemian Language and Literature) in 1792, which he wrote in German, a Chair in the study of the Czech language was established at the University of Prague (Winter 1969, 40). Dobrovsky gave an address to the emperor in the Royal Bohemian Society of Sciences in 1791, in which he had originally planned to seek Leopold’s support for his project of a comprehensive Slavic dictionary. In his speech ‘he emphasized the numerical predominance of Slavs over all other nationalities in Austria, their greatness as people … and their contribution to Austria’s military power’ (Agnew 1993, 59). In the original manuscript, which was edited before being read to the emperor, Dobrovsky had intended to request that Leopold ‘protect the Czech nation in this priceless inheritance from their forefathers, in their mother tongue, from all violent measures and hidden coercion’ (quoted in ibid.). His full speech was soon printed in both German and Czech and, as Dobrovsky commented, ‘greatly pleased our Czech Slavic patriots’ (quoted in ibid., 60).
Dobrovsky expressed demands that were in many ways opposed to the Josephist project but appeared compatible with the new conservative vision of imperial society. Under conditions of regime support, a network of ‘national intellectuals’ developed. Bandtke contacted Dobrovsky personally in 1810 and contributed to his periodical Slovanka (1814/15), after Dobrovsky’s research had influenced Bandtke’s work on Polnische Grammatik (Polish Grammar), 1808. He also influenced his article Über den reinsten slawischen Dialekte (On the purest Slavic dialect), 1815 (Agnew 1993, 209). Once the young national intellectual Linde had been elected into the Bohemian Society of Sciences due to Dobrovsky’s influence, the former ‘returned the favor in 1804, securing Dobrovsky’s admission to the Towarzystwa Przyjaciol Nauk (Society of Friends of Science) in Warsaw’ (ibid.). Similarly, Bandtke ‘sealed his scholarly friendship with Dobrovsky by sponsoring his election to honorary membership in the Krakow learned society in 1816’ (ibid.).

Herder promoted a similar linguistically defined cultural concept of ‘nation’. In 1792, Herder formulated the supposedly natural relationship between the becoming of ‘a people, a fatherland, a language’, after he had contributed in his 1791 Slawenkapitel to the famous narrative that humanism is naturally inherent in the Slavic peoples, who fulfil a civilizational mission in Europe. These narratives were powerful and contributed to the changing perception of language from being an instrument for mutual communication and thus an integrative vehicle with which to create an inclusive modern society, to the conceptualisation of language as the trans-generational basis of ‘cultural nationality’.

Alongside the circle around Dobrovsky, a network of Bohemian-Czech ‘national intellectuals’ emerged, led by the poets Václav Thám (1765-1816) and Antonín Jaroslav Puchmajer (1769-1820). Between 1795 and 1814, the latter edited five influential almanacs. In the same period, a group of ‘Romanian’ national intellectuals articulated the idea of a re-discovered ‘Dako-Romanian’ ancient cultural past. These writers included Samuil Micu-Clain (1745-1806), Gheorghe Sincai (1754-1816) and Petru Maior (1761-1821). The Dako-Romanian movement in Sibiu/Hermannstadt aimed at the production of a newspaper in the Romanian language, a project that failed. The first Romanian-language newspaper was eventually established in Vienna soon after 1790. A similar endeavour was pursued by a group of writers in the Bukovina between 1803 and 1816. One received official permission to publish under the title Chrestomaticul Romanescu (Prokopowitsch 1965, 12-15). In the Bukovina, the official languages of instruction were German and Romanian, similar to the situation in Transylvania. Romanian-speaking teachers from Transylvania began to move to the Bukovina in order to engage in the cultivation of the Romanian language. For instance,
the Romanian national leader Bojar Balsch, together with Budai Deleanu from Transylvania, brought 4,000 textbooks printed in German and Romanian from Vienna and distributed them for free. Another example is the work of the teacher Anton de Marki, who wrote several textbooks and translations in Romanian, as well as publishing a German-Romanian grammar, printed in Czernowitz in 1810 (Ceausu 1993, 269). In Moldova and Walachia, writers and officers such as Campinean, Voinescu, Magheru and Tell founded the Philharmonic Society (Prokopowitsch 1965, 16).

The focus on literary culture also reflected practical issues of assimilation, which young nationalist intellectuals such as Josef Jungmann (1773-1847) began to articulate within an antagonistic nationalist framework. In his programmatic essay, Rozmlouvání dvoje o českém jazyku (Two conversations regarding the Czech language) of 1806, he complains that, ‘Without knowledge of the German language one cannot even become a village clerk’ (quoted in Hroch 2003, 198). Another example is the following statement by Mikulas Adaukt Voigt (1788): ‘It is an unforgivable injustice of certain German writers of the Middle Ages and later eras, that they deny the ancient Slavic peoples all cultivation, order and political organization, and present them as the most unintelligent and uncivilized barbarians’ (quoted in Agnew 1993, 33). Similarly, the text of the Bohemian historian František Martin Pelcl/Franz Pelzel (1791) critiques the civlizational modernisation processes in Austria, especially the flourishing German literary culture (quoted in Agnew 1993, 51):

Thus the second generation will already be German, and in fifty years more German than Czech will be spoken in Kourim and the other cities of Bohemia; yes, it will be difficult even to flush out a Czech … One can easily conclude how far the German language must come in a hundred years, and how much Czech in contrast must lose, until it finally dies out altogether.

The aristocrat Francis Joseph Kinsky (1739-1805) and the historian Pelcl formulated rational arguments for the development of a Czech literary language. Both expressed in their works a cultural and linguistic conception of a Slavic, Bohemian-Czech nation and accentuated the advantages of Czech in comparison to the spreading German language. Pelcl was a historian and philologist and held the first Chair of Czech language and literature at the University of Prague. Like Kinsky, he tried to write a scientific history of two nations in the Bohemian lands, the supposedly genuine Bohemian nation of the Slavic-speaking ‘true Czechs’ (echte Cžechen) or ‘new Bohemians’ (in distinction to the old Celtic Bojern responsible for the name of the region Bohemia) and its ‘other’, whom he terms simply the ‘non-Czechs’ (Nichttschechen/Necžechen). While for Pelcl and Kinsky Bohemia
represents the ‘fatherland’ of the Czech-speaking population, in the case of Bohemian German-speakers they refrained from using the term (Drabek 2003, 163).

Dobrovsky adopted a similar position and defined the ‘Bohemian nation’ as one of the five Slavic nationalities. Until 1786, Dobrovsky recognised Moravian as a distinct provincial language (*Landessprache*) before he reinterpreted it and reduced it to a dialect of the ‘Czech’ language (Drabek 2003, 167). At times, Dobrovsky still used a territorial and political concept of nationality and included both Czech and German speakers in his concept of the Bohemian nation (Drabek 2003, 164 and Agnew 1993, 328). He developed a unique ‘Austro-Slavic’ national project, based on Habsburg dynasticism and on the political capital of the Austrian state, Vienna. While his national project drew on the idea of an Austrian imperial state, the respective society project changed from civilizational German-speaking to civilizational Slavic-speaking. When he referred to Slavic-speaking subjects as ‘Austrians’ he meant nothing more than subjects of the Habsburg state (Klingenstein 1995, 179-83). Although Dobrovsky promoted his Austro-Slavic national project in circles close to the emperors Leopold and Francis, the monarchs did not support any nationalism linked to the state.

Similar to the activities of Prague-centred Bohemian national intellectuals, Moravian intelligentsia began to develop a distinct ‘Moravian history’. Leading figures included the Moravian legal scholar and historian Joseph Wratislaw Edler von Monse (1733-1793) and the university librarian of Olmütz/Olomouc and Brünn/Brno, Johann Alois Hanke von Hankenstein (1751-1806). In a brief political history of Moravia (1785/88) Monse differentiates a ‘Moravian’ from a ‘Bohemian’ nation on the basis of differences in language, traditions, anatomy, clothes and fatherland (Drabek 2003, 166). Hanke describes the Moravian nation in his *Bibliothek der mährischen Staatskunde* (1786) as a specific nation divided into five groups distinguished by language, descent, folklore and traditions (ibid., 167).

Although the culturalist and historicist research programmes of the ‘first generation’ of national intellectuals, driven by a neo-humanist and scholarly ethos, lent them the appearance of ‘traditional intellectuals’ of conservative Empire, their work prepared the ground for a succeeding ‘second generation’, who fulfilled the function of ‘organic intellectuals’ of national movements in-the-making, entirely rooted in the provinces. Already before 1815, the contradictions between the ‘traditional intellectuals’ of empire such as Dobrovsky and the ‘organic intellectuals’ of new national projects such as Jungmann became apparent. After the Polish kingdom was occupied by Russia, Jungmann
stated in early 1813: ‘I am sorry for the Poles, that they have bought their subjection so dearly! But what of it? At least it will be a step to the further unification of the Slavs!’ (quoted in Agnew 1993, 243-44). In contrast, Dobrovsky expressed his sympathies to his Polish friend Bandtke, stating that ‘it would be a pity [sic!] if the Russians should swallow up not only Polish territory, but also the Polish language’ (quoted in ibid., 244).

Sonnenfels’ ‘love of the fatherland’ or Schiller’s *Vaterländisch* had meant identification with one’s territorially defined polity, implying a sense of belonging to the state and its ideal society, defined as political community. Schiller’s ‘national spirit’ (*Nationalgeist*) was similarly about ‘public-mindedness’, the collective responsibility for the welfare of the society at large. This was similar to Sonnenfels’ welfare state and should not be confused with the meaning of Fichte’s ‘spirit of the people’ (*Volksgeist*) of the early nineteenth century, a concept that reflects the shift from a civic and statist, notion of nationality towards an ethno-linguistic, ‘cultural-private’ one (Leersen 2006, 272-73). The latter obliterated much of the earlier ‘statist function’ of nationalism, while investing in it ideological power through a new ‘populist function’.

The next chapter will show that it was only with the premise of pre-existing national cultures, an assumption that had been created by the ‘first generation’, that Bohemian scholars such as Palacký (1798-1876) could subsequently teach fifteenth-century ‘Czech philosophy’, for example, arguing that the Czech ‘national philosophy’ of the Middle Ages offers an older alternative to contemporary German philosophy. The motive, corresponding to his role as an ‘organic intellectual’ of a Bohemian-Czech national project, was to achieve dichotomising effects for the contemporary political context. It appears coherent to date the origins of what was later termed the first stage of emerging sub-state ‘national movements’ within the period between 1790 and 1815 (Winter 1969, 34).

**4.5. Conclusion**

Despite the fact that, after 1790, a reactionary regime emerged that was ideologically opposed to the statist and patriotic society project of the Josephist era, the promotion of the category of nationality remained a component of state modernisation. The sections on international politics highlighted the growing pressures on policy preferences and military-fiscal centralisation during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The competition between ideological camps and political factions after the French Revolution represented the context within which a new conception of cultural nationality was projected and practiced by the regime. The ideas and practices developed within the regime’s
governmental domain can be interpreted as ‘reactions’ to radical democratic and Jacobine conceptions of nation and nationality. They represented the basis for the promotion of practices and projects of non-state conceptions of nationality.

The government in Vienna supported the influx of Romantic intellectuals from German states as part of a conservative imperial project, drawing significantly on two restorationist ideologies, which were shaped by religious and cultural Romanticism: culturalist multinationalism, and a compromise between Austrian and Roman Catholicism. While multinationalism structured the populace symbolically into culturally defined ‘peoples’, often associated with historically defined regions or provinces, Romantic Catholicism legitimised a traditionally hierarchical social order and dynastic rule.

Although at the time only a marginal segment of bourgeois intellectuals existed who were rooted exclusively in a province and the local vernacular, the era saw the emergence of a dichotomy between ‘traditional intellectuals’ of empire and ‘organic intellectuals’ of embryonic province-based national movements. While the bourgeois intellectuals based in Vienna wrote about provincial ‘cultures’ from a dominant position within the regime, usually communicating in German and upholding a cosmopolitan identity, the younger generation of ‘organic intellectuals’, who were frequently of humble origins and rooted in the local dialect and social milieu, can be grasped in Gramscian terms as ‘subaltern intellectuals’. This dichotomy reflected the asymmetric relationship between political and cultural centre (German-speaking Vienna) and periphery (province), which prepared the ground for the oppositional and antagonistic phases of provincial national movements. These will be explored in the next chapter.
5. THE METTERNICH ERA: NATIONALITIES WITHOUT NATIONALISM? (1815-1848)

In response to revolutionary challenges, Metternich developed a vision of governance that was intended to preempt the demand for popular representation by providing non-political means of expression, such as forms of cultural autonomy. This chapter will critique dominant explanatory narratives concerning the Metternich era, which suggest that so-called ‘national revivals’ emerged organically ‘from below’ in opposition to the absolutist regime. Instead it argues that Metternich’s anti-Josephist ideology and policies are critical factors explaining the growing ideological and organisational capacities of province-based national movements in-the-making. Although the regime promoted continued state-building and modernisation, and pursued a grand strategy visible in the ‘rounding-off’ in 1815 (Vocelka 2004, 100-1), its normative society project differed radically from that of the Josephist era.

The first section provides background, beginning with a discussion of the European Concert and the transformation of international politics. It will further outline changes within the realms of coercive and economic power, and how they correlated with the development of the state. Finally, structural socioeconomic transformations will be discussed in regard to the expansion of the bourgeoisie. The second section outlines ideological developments. It discusses the ideological configuration of conservatism, the evolution of Austrian liberalism, and the emergence of new nationalist ideologies.

The third section addresses the regime’s approach to nationality in reference to four domains: 1.) the reconstruction of the state; 2.) state practices involving modes of categorisation in reference to ‘cultural nationalities’ and ‘national languages’; 3.) cultural and educational policies; and 4.) government responses to political crises. The fourth section argues that continued state-building had positive effects on the production of nationality difference and on the increasing public significance of the officially ‘private’ category of nationality. The final section presents a conclusion.

5.1. Austria’s Conservative Modernisation and the Age of Metternich

The so-called European Concert referred to a conservative international order based on a compromise between conflicting interests of the major European states. While under conditions of peace the coercive and economic dimensions of modernisation contributed to the continued institution of the bureaucratic state and the expansion of bourgeois segments, they are not sufficient to explain the evolution of nationalism. The reconstruction of the
state after the dramatic experiences of total military defeat in 1809 and state bankruptcy in 1811 need equally to be taken into account. It was a distinctive conservative form of modernisation, institutionalised between 1815 and 1848, which marked Austria’s path towards the era of ‘restricted, liberal modernity’ (Wagner 1993, 16).

5.1.1. The European Concert

In 1815, the Congress of Vienna established a new form of international politics marked by cooperation. After two decades of warfare, the European Concert replaced the eighteenth-century ‘power politics’ of territorial military struggles, which had been instrumental in the consolidation of states (Schroeder 1994). The negative experiences of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars changed the perception towards war (Duchhardt 2012, 367-71). Under the leadership of the conservative statesmen Metternich and Castlereagh ‘a consensus evolved among the dominant political elites in Europe that (1) no one state in Europe could predominate within the continent and (2) Europe-wide wars were best avoided because of their potential for unleashing revolutionary forces’ (Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 26). ‘Implicit in all the negotiations, proposals, treaties, and formulas was the notion of the good of all taking precedence over the interests of each’ (Holsti 2004, 314-15). The ‘Congress system’ was based upon ‘norms prohibiting territorial revision’ (ibid., 317).

Essential for the functioning of the European Concert was its settlement in Central Europe. To avoid a revival of ‘power politics’ there would not be a hegemon in Europe’s centre, and only a divided hegemony at its edges, France and Russia in Europe’s West and East, and Britain in its North West (Schroeder 1994, 592):

The states in the centre would have to unite against pressure from the too-powerful flanks; some outside states would have to support this unity and the flank powers themselves would have to accept it; and institutions would have to be constructed to sustain that independence, particularly a confederate organization for Germany.

The post-war order was confirmed at the Congress of Aix-La-Chapelle in 1818 (Jarrett 2014). It was dependent on a ‘cosmopolitan generation’ of statesmen, who all re-affirmed the monarchic principle (Siemann 2016, 491). The consensus to defend the 1815 order fed the great powers’ legitimacy in their policy towards client states: ‘Peace, according to this paradigm, depended on the powers recognising one another’s spheres of influence and refraining from challenging the predominant power in each’ (Sked 2008, 100). Although the

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8 Examples were Wilhelm von Humboldt, born in 1767, Emperor Francis (1768), Castlereagh and Wellington (1769), Friedrich Wilhelm III and George Canning, born in 1770, Schwarzenberg (1771), Metternich and Dalberg (1773), as well as Tsar Alexander (1777). Slightly older were only Hardenberg (1750), Talleyrand (1754), Stein (1757) and Gentz (1764).
Vienna settlement reflected first of all compromises among the major states, it also incorporated Metternich’s vision of a reconstructed Europe. Metternich promoted the ‘confederative’ model of the *Old Reich* in which he had grown up as a member of its highest aristocratic ranks (Siemann 2016, 78). In the *Old Reich* the monarchical ruler had taken on the role of the ‘father of the house’, which was different from the absolutist concept of the ‘glorious ruler’. Metternich’s European policy found the acceptance of Britain, Russia and Prussia, and was implemented thanks to the laborious diplomacy of Metternich and his secretary Friedrich Gentz,\(^9\) and to the fact that it created the conditions for Britain to establish a profitable trade system (Planert 2016, 12).

Metternich’s grand strategy was to prevent the conditions materialising for the ‘power politics’ of the eighteenth century, which he related to ‘national’ forms of state-building. During the Napoleonic Wars, integrating states consolidated several European regions, following the French model. Metternich was strictly opposed to Josephist ideas of Austrian geopolitical consolidation by expanding towards southwest German and eastern French territories. Instead of a ‘rounding-off’ and the expansion of a German-speaking ‘national core’, Metternich aimed at the compensation of Habsburg losses through the incorporation of Lombardy, Venetia, and Illyria. Metternich viewed Austrian membership in the German Confederation mainly as a pillar of his new European security architecture. The Austrian-Bohemian provinces became part of the German Confederation, whose members were legally forced to reject representative constitutionalism and to revive estate constitutions (*Ständevertassungen*). The fragmentation inherent in this political structure ultimately restricted the ambitions of Austria and Prussia as competing Great Powers (Siemann 2016, 78-81).

The revolutionary wave of 1820, which began with demands for constitutionalism and a military revolt in Spain, represented a first challenge to the Concert and evoked the congress system’s principle of intervention. In Italy there was evidence of a growing ‘general resistance to Metternich’s schemes … the Lega Italica, postal and customs unions, police co-operation and co-ordination against revolution, all designed to enhance Austrian control’ (Schroeder 1994, 606). When revolution broke out in Naples, it ‘endangered the whole labile edifice of Austrian hegemony in Central Europe, threatening to spread revolution and constitutionalism to northern Italy and Germany and raising the spectre of Russian or French intervention in Italy, or both’ (ibid., 608). ‘Austrian intervention was proclaimed and justified in the Troppau Protocol of 19 November [1820], inspired by [Tsar] Alexander, accepted and exploited by Metternich, and jointly adopted by the three Eastern powers’ (ibid., 610-11). Revolutionary dynamics gained pace on 10 March 1821, when Piedmontese troops seized the fortress of Alessandria and called for a constitution. Although Austria easily crushed revolts in Italy, it did not revert to the territorial power politics of the Josephist era. Instead, Metternich demanded financial compensation for military expenses and the political reorganisation of Piedmont and Naples. ‘Haggling over these issues between Vienna and Turin lasted into the late summer of 1821; between Vienna and Naples,
to 1827. Meanwhile refugees from both Italian revolutions gathered in Switzerland and elsewhere to keep their cause alive. This meant that the suppression of the Neapolitan and Piedmontese revolts, while ending the immediate threat to Metternich’s system in Italy, left its endemic problems unsolved or marginally worse and did Austria’s general reputation no good’ (ibid., 613-14).

Another revolutionary wave began in 1830 and resulted in the establishment of Belgium as a constitutional monarchy, gaining independence from Austria. It represented a breach of Metternich’s principles and indicated the beginning of a shift in international politics, evident in the so-called ‘Eastern Question’ (Roider 1982). In 1831, Egypt invaded the Ottoman Empire and Russia attempted to exploit the situation. The challenge this meant to the Concert was similar to that presented by the previous Balkan crisis of 1821, which had been triggered by the Greek uprising. At the beginning of the 1830s, Metternich attempted to organise a conservative league to defend the Vienna order, to crush a ‘Polish uprising’, and to arrange a compromise between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The central problem for Metternich’s order appeared to be the growing distance between Britain and Austria, which created opportunities for France. At the same time, the great powers became reluctant to intervene due to the enormous costs and unforeseeable consequences, which made intervention ‘a policy “of last resort”’ (Sked 2008, 102).

In 1834, an alliance of Western European states was established, comprising Portugal, Spain, France and Britain, which contested the very principles of the 1815 order, still upheld by the Holy Alliance. After 1835, under its new Foreign Minister Palmerston, Britain began to further challenge the norms of the European Concert. From a realist’s perspective, it was ‘laborious diplomacy, the skilful exploitation of Russo-French rivalry and the mutual exhaustion of the local protagonists’ that ultimately brought about Palmerston’s successful foreign policy (Darwin 2009, 28). Similarly, it can be argued that ‘Palmerston used the hostility of the “Eastern Powers” (Prussia, Austria and Russia) towards France to entrench the independence and neutrality of the new Belgian state ... The tense diplomacy of 1830-41 showed that British prestige and security ... depended upon an active diplomacy in Europe’ (ibid.). Although Britain demonstrated its ambition as an imperial power in the Near East with its Ottoman policies, it maintained equilibrium on the Continent. In France, Guizot became Foreign Minister (1840-1848) and avoided the resurgence of Anglo-French rivalry, adopting an ‘anti-Austrian, not anti-British’ position (Schroeder 1994, 857). He aimed to win ‘Naples away from Austria’, to ‘establish a French-led league of constitutional governments in the Mediterranean, and undermine Austrian influence in Italy’ (ibid.). While
the British Secretary of State Lord Aberdeen remained neutral, Metternich fiercely opposed Guizot’s foreign policy.

It seemed that the decline of the ‘cosmopolitan generation’ of statesmen was hinting at the upcoming challenges to the Vienna order, which would later collapse in the wake of the Crimean War. Despite the ideological divergence between a ‘Western’ liberal camp, led by the constitutional states of Britain and France, and an ‘Eastern’ conservative camp, led by Russia, Austria and Prussia, it remained in the interests of Palmerston to uphold the European Concert. Palmerston was aware of the danger represented by a rising France, especially as Guizot had turned to Metternich between 1846 and 1848 (Sked 2008, 104).

After having successfully overcome a wave of national movements in the wake of the French July Revolution, Austria’s ‘national problems’ re-emerged in the 1840s with Mazzini’s growing Italian Risorgimento movement and a Polish nationalist insurrection in Galicia, although both failed (Schroeder 1994, 775). Austria’s problems in the 1840s were predominantly political in nature and related to the paralysed Viennese government after the death of Emperor Francis in 1835. Under his incapable successor Ferdinand, who suffered from mental deficiencies, the crisis culminated in the so-called March Revolution of 1848, which ousted Metternich from office and marked the end of his era.

5.1.2. From a Military-Fiscal to a Civilian Bureaucratic State

One major consequence of the sustained peace after 1815 was the reconfiguration of the state’s most urgent functions, shifting its focus from territorial military struggles to economic development and engagement with its population. As Agnew and Corbridge (1995, 44) argue, ‘the mutual recognition of states inherent in the state system after 1815 is taken as an important attribute in dating the beginning of the modern international political economy. After this date … a framework arose for inter-state definition of the rules of economic and political competition.’ Under these conditions, the Austrian state continued to institutionalise the rule of law, the professionalisation of its bureaucracy, and the latter’s expansion into the country’s peripheries. It was a distinctive feature of Metternich’s envisioned ‘conservative modernisation’ that economic modernisation was to be kept separate from political modernisation, the former pursued by policies following capitalist, economic-liberal principles, all the while, however, upholding restrictions on occupational and other freedoms.

As a consequence of demobilisation following the peace of 1815, the military became the target of increasing rationalisation. The Austrian Empire was to be secured militarily by
twelve garrison cities, Vienna, Prague, Graz, Brno (Brünn) and Budapest (Ofen) in its centre, and with Agram (Zagreb), Hermannstadt (Sibiu), Zadar (Zara), Verona, Petrovarasdzdin (Peterwardein), Temesvar (Timișoara) and Lemberg (Lvov) in its periphery (Basset 2015, 293). The altered focus of the civilian government and its bureaucracy reduced the military’s political influence and financial resources. Although Metternich implemented general conscription in 1815 and planned to make Austria a great military power, his plans fell victim to austerity policies and the demobilisation trend in Europe (ibid.).

By 1821, the consolidation of measures in the conscription regulations saw the final dismantling of most of the recruitment innovations brought in by the Archduke Charles. There were now numerous categories of people exempt from service, including clerics, all doctors of law and medicine, most government officials, teachers and artisans. This left a rather modest group of ‘arme Teufels’ (poor devils) available for recruitment. This number could be supplemented by village and town authorities banishing individuals to military service on account of their general undesirability.

Similarly, Rothenberg (1998, 9) concludes that ‘there existed severe shortcomings in finances, administration, leadership, and training’, which in large part ‘could be traced to the political conservatism of Austria’s rulers that was matched by an equal hostility to military innovations.’ While in 1817 the Austrian army received some fifty per cent of the state’s revenues, by 1830 its share was reduced to twenty-three per cent, and fell further to twenty per cent by 1848 (ibid., 10). It is also indicative that the proposal of the outstanding General Radetzky, ‘who kept urging the establishment of an advanced military college, a Kriegsschule’, was not implemented before 1852 (ibid., 12).

The conservative regime not only evaded the challenge of modernising the army; it also opposed any notions of fraternisation between the army and the population. The officer corps in particular was characterised by a supranational composition. Although ‘the majority was of German descent, both from the Habsburg provinces and from the Germanies’ there were also ‘officers of Spanish, French, Walloon, Danish, Irish, and English derivation … At the same time, the number of bourgeois officers declined. At the end of the Napoleonic wars, bourgeoisie constituted nineteen percent of the generalcy, but by 1848, out of 253 generals on active duty, only 20 did not possess a patent of nobility’ (Rothenberg 1998, 11). Similarly, ‘the army discontinued without much delay the last remnants of the people’s army, the Landwehr, introduced during the Napoleonic wars … [I]t was progressively dismantled and completely shelved in 1831’ (ibid., 13). In contrast, in 1808 the Hungarian Diet had ‘requested that Hungarian recruits serve only in national units and under Hungarian officers. Similar claims were made during the sessions of 1832-36 and
again in 1840’ (Rothenberg 1967, 72). The Viennese government stationed troops in areas where fraternisation with the local population was deemed unlikely (ibid., 72-3):

Thus, late in 1847, of the thirty-five so-called ‘German’ infantry regiments in Cisleithania, six were stationed in Italy and four in Hungary; while of the fifteen Hungarian regiments, six were located in Italy, four in Hungary, and the remainder in Inner Austria, Upper Austria, and Bohemia. As for the twenty-five Cisleithanian cavalry regiments, thirteen were garrisoned in Hungary, while of the twelve exclusively Hungarian hussar regiments, only six remained in the country. This policy of holding the troops in areas loyal to the monarch proved its worth when the great wave of revolutions rolled over the empire [in 1848]. The Hungarian troops in Italy remained faithful, as did the Italian troops in Hungary. On the other hand, Magyar formations at home, including the Szeklers of the Military Border, joined the insurgents. As for the ‘German’ units, only one battalion, the Richter Grenadiers in Vienna, went over to the revolution.

Drawing on his experiences of the revolutionary period, Metternich planned to reorganise the police and to establish an intelligence system that would serve as an important pillar of the regime. Like any government, the regime resorted to three basic means of policing to enhance security: ‘its own watchfulness at home and abroad, with or without the support of subjects; its controls on persons, above all at home; and cooperation with other governments’ (Emerson 1968, 36). Since coming to office, Metternich supported the establishment of a central Ministry of the Interior as well as a mandatory registration system of residence (Meldesystem). All subjects, foreigners and even guests staying at hotels and lodges had to be registered at the local police station (Liang 2002, 18-23). After 1810, Metternich’s fears were seemingly confirmed by a number of assassinations and he established an intelligence agency (Siemann 2016, 778-779). In 1816, Count Sedlnitzky became Minister of the Police, heading the ministry with its sections of ‘public police’ and the ‘higher state police’ until 1848.

Like Metternich, Sedlnitzky was a conservative who fiercely defended the privileged position of the aristocracy. He ‘believed that Joseph II’s system, to which he had received some introduction during his legal studies at the University of Vienna in the 1790s, had begun the undermining of the Monarchy and of religion’ (Emerson 1968, 35). Within the ministry, it appeared difficult to distinguish clearly between everyday policing and political policing. ‘The fact that the same measures or the same police forces could be used for such different purposes as individual safety, public or private welfare, or the security of the state provided some substance for Count Pergen’s repeated claim ... that the secret state police depended on the public police and the latter on the former’ (ibid., 36).

Fiscal austerity prevented Metternich from expanding the police force. Although there were offices in the provincial capitals and district commissariats such as in Venice, Linz,
Graz and Brünn, the expansion of the police stagnated (ibid., 38). The lack of reform was evident in the rural areas, where noble landowners still held juridical and executive privileges and faced a number of peasant uprisings, especially in Galicia. Its effects in the urban areas were more critical. When the revolution of 1848 erupted in Europe’s capitals, Louis Philippe had 3,000 municipal guards, 84,000 national guards and about 30,000 troops in Paris. Queen Victoria had 3,000 ‘bobbies’, between 150,000 and 180,000 ‘special constables’ as well as 50,000 troops in London. In Vienna, the Emperor and Metternich had only about 1,000 policemen, 14,000 municipal guards, which included numerous brass bands, and 14,000 troops (Sked 2008, 126). Unlike Austria, Britain, France and Prussia did not abandon their endeavours of forging modern fiscal apparatuses, which enabled them to finance expanding state functions.

**Economic Modernisation**

From an economical point of view this period was fairly successful as Austria was able to achieve a certain level of sustained growth. As Blum (1948, 41) sums up, the ‘Vormärz was a time of beginnings’, including ‘a revolution in the techniques of agricultural production’, which gradually transformed the rural economy. Although the agrarian regime was upheld until 1848, the agricultural transformation showed its effects (Good 1984, 48):

> In Bohemia] the share of the agricultural sector in total population was 78 percent in 1756, fell to 64 percent on the eve of 1848, and declined to almost 49 percent by 1869. In the territory of the post-World War I Austrian Republic the share of the economically active population in agriculture was over 54 percent by 1869. This figure points to a structural transformation in the pre-1848 economy of Alpine Austria on the same scale as that of Bohemia.

The impact of economic modernisation on changes in class balance in the rural areas eventually became visible in the 1848 Revolution, which provides the starting point for the next chapter. The government suspended Josephist reform plans to transform the rural ‘seigniorial form of society’ (ibid., 22). The two politically dominant ‘estates’ remained the Herrenstand and the Ritterstand, holding privileges of land ownership and ‘the right to sit and vote in the provincial estates’ (ibid., 22-23). In 1836, the government enacted a moderate legal reform that expanded the right to private property and abolished ‘several feudal fees’ (Berend 2013, 91). Although Austria had generally accomplished ‘the transition to a commercial, market economy’ by 1847 (Komlos 1983, 111), ironically, the political base for the establishment of a modern fiscal state was eroded by anti-Josephist policies, undermining the administration’s direct access to income (Rumpler 1997, 248).
Decentralisation policies enhanced noble resistance against agricultural reforms, prevented economic integration, and perpetuated the state’s chronic fiscal problems (Mann 2012, 263). The Franciscean Cadastre, an important reform project in the Josephist tradition with fiscal (i.e. taxation) and legal (i.e. land ownership) implications, did not enjoy priority, although ‘the Land Tax Act’ was issued in December 1817 and ‘foresaw the land survey of each land plot, graphically presented on the cadastral maps for the individual cadastral community (Germ. die Katastralgemeinde): the old administrative units introduced by the Theresian Cadastre’ (Lisec/Navratil 2014, 484). The Minister of Finance, the Bohemian aristocrat Kolowrat, who rose to power in 1829, promoted austerity and blocked fiscal reforms (Radvany 1971, 60-67). It was not before 1861 that ‘the whole territory of the former Austrian part of the empire was surveyed, which comprised the area of 300,083 km2 and approximately 30,000 cadastral communities’ (Lisec/Navratil 2014, 485).

As a result of economic-liberal reforms, the mobility of labour and capital increased (Siemann 1995, 174-77). The growing usage of steam power indicated a trend towards more capital-intensive technologies in production (Komlos 1983, 106). ‘The sectors of mining, iron production, textiles and foodstuffs experienced rapid aggregated growth between 1830 and 1845: the mining sector grew at a rate of 6.9 per cent, the iron industry at 4.3 per cent, the aggregated engineering index grew at 4.2 per cent and food stuffs at 2.1 per cent’ (Good 1984, 49). In the same period, the estimated industrial output per capita grew between 1.8 and 2.6 per cent (ibid.).

Figure 7. Industrial Production in Austria, 1830-1848 (Komlos estimate; millions of Crowns, 1913 prices) [Komlos 1983, 146]

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<th>Year</th>
<th>1830</th>
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<td>165.08</td>
<td>166.41</td>
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<td>167.80</td>
<td>183.05</td>
<td>183.50</td>
<td>194.82</td>
<td>204.54</td>
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<td></td>
<td>213.74</td>
<td>220.71</td>
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<td>224.11</td>
<td>235.82</td>
<td>240.44</td>
<td>263.61</td>
<td>248.91</td>
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In 1830, the national share among the major European states in total European gross national product represented the following: Russia 18.1 per cent, France 14.8 per cent, United Kingdom 14.2 per cent and Austria 12.4 per cent (Mann 2012, 262). ‘Between 1817
and 1845 the Austrian population grew at an annual rate of 1.0 percent. By historical standards this was a rapid growth rate. Without expansion of a society’s resource base and improvements in the productivity of resources such a high growth rate could not be sustained’ (Good 1984, 45). Similarly, the increase in trade was significant. In 1831, the agricultural products exported from the Hungarian provinces to the Zollverband of the Austrian-Bohemian-Italian provinces were valued at 16,243,909 florins. By 1845, this value had almost doubled and reached 32,266,510 florins (Blum 1948, 91). The first downturn occurred in 1845, when an agricultural crisis led to higher inflation and unemployment, followed by a European crisis in 1847 (ibid., 77).

Figure 8. Mid-year Population Estimates (in thousands) [Mitchell 2007]

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Russia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1818</td>
<td>29.81</td>
<td>29.88</td>
<td>47.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>30.50</td>
<td>30.25</td>
<td>48.6</td>
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<td>1824</td>
<td>31.97</td>
<td>31.19</td>
<td>51.5</td>
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<td>1827</td>
<td>33.21</td>
<td>31.80</td>
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<td>1831</td>
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<td>35.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>A: 16.8</td>
<td>34.08</td>
<td>62.9</td>
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<td></td>
<td>H: 13.7 (including Croatia-Slavonia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>A: 17.52</td>
<td>35.16</td>
<td>65.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>H: 14.2 (including Croatia-Slavonia)</td>
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Demographic and economic growth and state expansion were mutually reinforcing: ‘Most important from the viewpoint of the creation of markets, the ratio of the population increase in the cities was much greater than the ratio of increase of the population as a whole. Between 1818 and 1846, the population of the Monarchy had grown by over 25 per cent. In the same years the population of the twelve largest cities of the Monarchy had increased by almost 54 per cent’ (Blum 1948, 43). Although the expansion of primary schooling was continued, the monarchy’s eastern provinces and its borderlands were less penetrated by the modernising state, resulting in centre/periphery disparities, reinforced by austerity (Berend 2013, 439). In 1841 primary school attendance in Tyrol was officially at 100 per cent, in Lower Austria 98, in Upper Austria 96, in Moravia 95 and in Bohemia 94 per cent, compared to 14 in Galicia, 18 in the Littoral, 29 in Dalmatia, and 33 per cent in Carinthia and Carniola (Rumpler 1997, 157). Austerity policies contributed to declining enrolment in Gymnasia and universities (Judson 2016, 108). Similarly, road-building lagged behind that of states such as France and Prussia (Good 1984, 65):
In the Vormärz period the government laid down over 2240 kilometers of primary road. More significant were the 46,400 kilometers of primary road built at local government and private expense. In the same period the length of secondary roads more than doubled. By 1847 Austria was served by a primary road system over 96,000 kilometers in length.

Another project was the foundation of the Danube Steamship Company, starting with a licence granted by the government in 1818, but only established in practice in 1830 when two Englishmen founded it as a joint-stock company. Its freight and passenger service began between Vienna and Pest in 1831 and expanded to Vienna and Linz a few years later. ‘By 1847 forty-one steamships were carrying over eight hundred fifty thousand passengers and almost two hundred thousand tons of freight annually’ (Good 1984, 64). In 1833, the Austrian Lloyd was founded in Trieste, which, a decade later, was already among the ten largest ports in the world (Judson 2016, 115). The government further encouraged the introduction of the steam railroad, cooperating with Salomon Rothschild, who was influenced by Nathan Rothschild, based in London. By 1848 ‘the government had built 397 kilometers and the Empire’s network as a whole consisted of 1,622 kilometers of track’ (Good 1984, 66). The close relationships between individuals of the conservative regime and representatives of capital is illustrated by the financial support given to Gentz and Metternich by branches of the Rothschild banking family (Siemann 2016, 745-6; 750; 835).

Although Austrian economic modernisation was continued, especially in its western half with its industry soon gaining on that of France, it eventually stagnated. ‘By 1840, when France and [what would become later] Germany attained a total steam engine capacity … of 90,000 and 40,000 horsepower respectively, the Habsburg Empire … could claim only 20,000’ (Berend 2013, 202-3). In contrast to the Josephist era, when (proto-) industrialisation efforts had been driven by a number of entrepreneurs close to Austria’s political elite, such efforts became dependent on a few individuals from abroad (Berend 2013, 230).

It is striking that ‘[a]s late as 1844, during his visit to Austria and Hungary … [Friedrich List] had to argue against the disbelief of his audiences that industrialization was indeed “a means of promoting economic growth”’ (Greenfeld 2001, 210). Metternich gave in to Bohemian and Hungarian landed interests and withdrew plans for Austrian economic integration, whether as part of the German Confederation or on the state level (Siemann 2010, 103-4). Bohemian landed interests and especially sugar producers would have suffered from Austria’s accession to the German Zollverein. Similar opposition arose from Hungarian magnates in the 1840s, when Metternich attempted to curb Hungary’s economic privileges (Siemann 2010, 99). A pamphlet published in 1844 illustrates how Metternich
even began to support Szécheny’s plan for Hungarian ‘national economic development’ (Siemann 2016, 852). While Prussia already abolished internal tariffs in 1818 and Switzerland followed suit after its civil war in 1848, Austria began to catch up with reforms comparatively late in the 1850s and 1860s (Berend 2013, 289).

5.1.3. The Expansion of the Bourgeoisie

During the first half of the century, the growth of an educated bourgeoisie in urban areas had become a Europe-wide phenomenon. ‘With growing urbanization and innovations that revolutionized commerce, transportation, and communications, merchant capitalism gained enormously in importance … Little could be accomplished without finance capitalism … now expanding and increasingly differentiated, initially with banks, stock exchanges, and insurance companies’ (Kocka 2016, 96). Before proto-industrialism gave way to industrial capitalism, it was mainly these two noted types of capitalism that were responsible for the socioeconomic transformation underlying the expansion of the bourgeoisie. A pattern in central Europe was the growth of provincially spreading mid-sized towns (Hobsbawm 2000, 24). Especially since the 1840s, the dynamics of urbanisation had triggered significant growth in cities, accelerating again after the 1870s with new pull factors such as public infrastructure and employment opportunities (Siemann 1995, 94-96).

Bourgeois elements were characterised by individual economic and social capital, as well as by collective conventions. Their status was historically derived from the legally emancipated burghers of the ‘free cities’, the ‘old’ bourgeoisie. The expanding professions and the ‘new’ bourgeoisie were defined by employment, education, and property (Kühschelm 2010, 850-54). The characteristics of the bourgeoisie as a social formation were its public education, professional career aspirations, and a new family ideal (Kocka 1995, 20-21). Bourgeois expansion included the ‘bourgeoisification’ of parts of the nobility (ibid., 22). A factor of expanding bourgeois literary culture was technological progress that led to a substantial drop in the costs of mass printing. As Berend (2013, 95) notes, it was an era that saw ‘[i]nnovations in printing from the invention of the revolving cylinder in 1812 (quickly followed by the rotary press) to the development of the steam-powered mechanical press in the 1830s.’ Mass printing represented an important commercial sector, complementary to rising literacy rates.

Figure 9. Elementary school education in Austria 1830-1841 (school attendance in per cent) [Rumpler 1997, 249]
In Austria, unlike in Britain, the USA or France, it was the bureaucratic state which represented the major factor contributing to the growth and employment of the Bildungsbürgertum (Kocka 1995, 50-51). The state was dependent on the institutional reproduction of an educated bourgeoisie (e.g. bureaucrats, physicians, professionals, teachers), which had been initiated by the Josephist regime (Bruckmüller/Stekl 1995, 167).

‘The new norms in civil service not only favored the infiltration of the bureaucracy by the bourgeoisie, but also a general rise of an educated middle class ... In the towns of the Austrian monarchy, bureaucrats sustained the middle class until 1848’ (Heindl 2006, 42). State institutions tended to extend successfully within Austria’s central provinces, but less so in its peripheral Eastern and South-eastern provinces, except in their capitals. This had an impact on the linguistic structure of the bourgeoisie in towns, where it was primarily based on artisans and professionals. Bruckmüller and Stekl (1995, 174) estimate a figure of 750,000 bourgeois families and of about 3 million persons or 7.5 per cent of the total population as belonging to the bourgeoisie (ibid., 174).

Figure 10. Bourgeoisie Estimates on the Basis of Occupation, K. Schwarzer 1857 [Bruckmüller/Stekl 1995, 174]
During the 1830s and 1840s, when economic conditions in agriculture deteriorated, many nobles joined the civil service and pressures on bourgeois university graduates increased significantly, contributing to rising unemployment (Heindl 2013a, 169-70). This led to growing dissatisfaction among the young, ‘new bourgeoisie’, who suffered from relative poverty.

Figure 11. Social background of Vienna bureaucrats (Wiener Zentralstellen) in per cent [Heindl 2013a, 161]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>bourgeoisie/ lower aristocracy</th>
<th>higher aristocracy</th>
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<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>82,69</td>
<td>17,31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821</td>
<td>77,50</td>
<td>22,50</td>
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<td>1831</td>
<td>76,44</td>
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<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>76,44</td>
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This represented the conditions leading up to the 1848 Revolution. The key to forming a collective political actor was the intellectual and organisational capacity attributed to educated individuals. The expansion of the Austrian bourgeoisie, which included the ‘old bourgeoisie’ of the cities and the ‘new bourgeoisie’, the so-called Mittelstand, was reflected in the foundation of organisations that represented the interests of industrials and the upper bourgeoisie (Bruckmüller/Stekl 1995, 172). Examples include the Committee of the Lower Austrian Cotton Producers (1817), the Bohemian Commercial Club (1833), the Inner-Austrian Commercial Club (1837), the Lower Austrian Commercial Club (1839) and the Reichenberger Commercial Club (1845).

5.2. Ideologies: Conservative, Liberal, National

While Austrian liberalism largely built on the legacy of the Josephist project, Austrian conservatism had emerged in opposition to it. New cultural nationalisms broke with the humanist tradition of the preceding cosmopolitan generation of intellectuals and took on increasingly antagonistic forms. These distinct ideologies materialised in informal networks of intellectuals and political actors, restricted by censorship. According to police statistics, some 20 per cent of all submitted books were banned, which represented more than 5,000 titles for the period between 1835 and 1848 (Höbelt 2000, 218). In Vienna, the preeminent place of political discussion beside student fraternities was the Juridical and Political Reading Club (Stimmer 1997, 147). Further, Masonic Lodges, a legacy of the Enlightenment era, served as the loci of political debate. While in a constitutional monarchy like Britain ‘the combination of these informal groups with parliamentary debates and their reporting in the press … created loose political networks in the entire country’, in Austria
‘these links between different levels of political life did not and could not exist’ (Sperber 2005, 63). Much the same as in the United States, the 1830s and 1840s in many German states were characterised by ‘the powerful emergence of a partisan political culture’ (Nolte 2002, 198). In Austria there was the peculiar phenomenon that individuals across the politico-ideological spectrum joined the same clubs for debate. Metternich’s father, for instance, was a Catholic aristocrat and picked the progressive Protestant Johann Friedrich Simon as Clemens’ educator as he knew him from their common Masonic Lodge (Siemann 2016, 64). Similarly, the members of the Viennese Leseverein ranged from conservatives to liberal democrats.

5.2.1. Metternich’s Conservatism

The foundation of Metternich’s political vision was its anti-Josephism, as he blamed radical reformers and their ideology for the emergence of revolutionary movements. Metternich promoted the preservation of the patchwork of German principalities, ‘which was believed to constitute an artificial check upon expansion of any islands of liberal (or messianical or nationalistic) sentiment’ (Smith 1981, 214). Ideologically Metternich had been shaped by his professors in Strasbourg and Mainz, as well as by the British conservative Edmund Burke, and at the University of Strasbourg Christoph Wilhelm Koch had deeply influenced Metternich’s worldview (Siemann 2016, 71). Koch saw the study of history as an instrument for governments to explore causal relationships and Metternich clarified his self-identification as a cosmopolitan interested in how to maintain peace between states (ibid., 73).

Another scholar who influenced Metternich was Niklas Vogt, professor of ‘universal history’ at the newly established ‘historical-statistical faculty’ in Mainz. Vogt was a convinced Kantian and lectured on the importance of public communication. Being among his favourite students, Metternich was invited to his salon for discussions. Vogt argued in his lectures that the study of history must always be connected to contemporary problems. What Metternich learned from Vogt was that the German imperial constitution was a federalist ‘mixed constitution’ (Siemann 2016, 75-77). In his work of 1787, Vogt argued on the basis of Montesquieu’s principle of the separation of powers that also on the European level states have to be forced into a common ‘Concert’: ‘One needs to let every community, every province, every country retain laws and institutions which have worked well, if they do not explicitly contradict the common welfare’ (Vogt, quoted in ibid., 77). He taught Metternich that federalism and ‘composite states’ limit the power both of demagogues and of states (ibid., 78).
Metternich wanted to understand why educated people like his teacher Johann Simon were passionate about radical ideology. He knew that in August 1792 Simon was involved in the planning of the revolutionary events in Paris led by Jean-Paul Marat and Maximilien Robespierre (Siemann 2016, 90). In the years between 1789 and 1794, Metternich became convinced that the drivers of revolutionary movements were bourgeois intellectuals and agitators, comprising teachers, students, professors, lawyers and journalists, who were not constrained by fears of material loss. From such a perspective, he saw political slogans expressing demands for ‘democracy’ or ‘freedom’ as empty terms constructing illusions (ibid., 485). As lawyers could grasp the meaning of property but did not enjoy the privileges of the nobility, Metternich identified them as dangerous agitators for social revolution (Siemann 2016, 106).

The terror and despotism that followed in the wake of the French Revolution confirmed his negative view of radical ideology and reaffirmed him in his positive view of the Old Reich (ibid., 95). Metternich’s experiences of his father’s policies when the latter had been governor in the Austrian Netherlands, where he had assisted him as secretary until the French occupation in 1794, gave him the opportunity to connect theory with practice (ibid., 123). For Metternich, his father’s restoration of the privileges of the estates and the granting of provincial自主权 had achieved the ‘moral pacification of these provinces’ (Metternich, quoted in Siemann 2016, 124). When Metternich began his political career in Vienna, he hired two leading conservative ideologues, Gentz and Friedrich Schlegel. The first became his secretary and the latter was sent to Frankfurt to write articles for various influential newspapers in the German Confederation. Gentz elaborated on the ‘constitutions of the provincial estates’ (landständische Verfassungen), which Metternich sought to promote by Article 13 of the Bundesakte of the German Confederation in an attempt to counter representative constitutionalism (Gentz, quoted in Ucakar 1985, 46):

Provincial estates constitutions are those in which members or representatives exercise the right to participate in the legislation of the state or in some of its parts, to co-advise, to agree, to present an alternative or to exercise this right in other constitutionally legitimate forms through existing bodies. Representative constitutions are, in contrast, those where the persons admitted to participate directly in legislation and the most important issues of administration do not represent the just and the interests of particular estates or do not represent these exclusively, but are called upon to represent the entire mass of the people.

In his articles, Schlegel defended restrictions on the freedom of the press and supported the revival of the ‘provincial estates’ and ‘estates constitutions’. After his public post expired, Schlegel contributed to conservative organs such as the Jahrbücher and the Beobachter (Kraus 1999, 44-5). Another representative of the conservative stream was
Andrian-Werburg, who attacked the legacy of the Josephist reforms in his book *Austria and its Future* (1840). After he had failed to become ambassador, Andrian-Werburg ‘spoke for resurgent conservatism, one that recalled the estates in their resistance to Joseph’s state reforms in the 1780s … Andrian-Werburg’s idea of freedom from the bureaucracy meant more freedom for the landed nobility at the level of government’ (Deak 2015, 51). He argued that provincial self-government, based on estate constitutions, was the only way to secure political order. ‘A rich and independent nobility … with political rights founded upon a constitution, will furnish the monarch, as well as the people, with a puissant principle of stability and thoughtful progress’ (Andrian quoted in Blum 1948, 33).

Metternich’s vision of empire represented a conservative solution to the political problematic triggered by Josephist modernisation, especially its feature of nation-building and the prospect of representative constitutionalism. Conservatives envisioned the state’s reconstruction into an ideal-typical empire, based on three ideological pillars: 1.) Habsburg dynasticism, traditionally associated with Catholicism; 2.) federalism based upon provincial ‘estates constitutions’ and assemblies; and 3.) multiculturalism in reference to ‘nationalities’ (Siemann 2010, 55-61). While the first ideological pillar, Habsburg dynasticism and reformed Catholicism, was not significantly contested by any political stream (Vocelka 1978, 25 and Srbik 1957a, 306-315), the proposed reforms involved primarily the second and the third pillar.

Metternich developed his reform plans in some detail between 1813 and 1817. On 14 December 1817 he published an article in the semi-official *Wiener Zeitung* in which he proposed the decentralisation of the state on the basis of ‘principled confederalism’, recognising the ‘historical rights’ of provinces and the ‘cultural rights’ of nationalities (Haas 1963, 118). This was to be achieved through the political and territorial reorganisation of the monarchy, ascribing to every province one dominant ‘cultural nationality’, strong enough to accept the languages of national minorities. Metternich despised the idea of a nationalising Austrian state due to its linguistically homogenising character (Siemann 2010, 57). He warned the emperor that the Josephist model of modernisation would lead to the dangerous democratic demand ‘for a central representative assembly’ (Haas 1963, 128). In a written statement to the emperor on 27 October 1817, Metternich declared the following (ibid., 179):

> My premise is that the fusion system, in which the very first rule concerns the naming of the kingdoms and provinces, a necessary means at the beginning of the French Revolution when it was considered the most inevitable means to an end, must be removed, as it is excluded from any calculation.
Metternich argued that, in contrast to the Josephist and French ‘system of fusion’, ‘the empire’s full strength was to be developed by an inner political balance resulting from equal treatment (not equalization) of all ‘nations’ of the Austrian Völkerfamilie … The idea unity in diversity and the equality of all regions was to be demonstrated by equally ranked chancelleries, designed to represent each area’s special regional-national interests’ (Haas 1963, 148). Metternich ‘sought to channel the idea of nationality into politically suitable reservoirs: regional nationality. Thereby, all major entities of the empire were to be given an equal opportunity to develop their unique “national” stamp and an inner balance was to be achieved within the Monarchy by arranging such new “nations” as Inner Austria, Illyria, Galicia and Lombardy-Veneta alongside such as historic ones as the all-too-mighty Hungary, Bohemia and Transylvania’ (ibid., 15). Metternich distinguished liberal democratic demands, which he fiercely opposed, from legitimate cultural demands, expressed in reference to nationality.

This differentiation contradicts traditional interpretations such as the reading by Seton-Watson (1977, 147), who argues that ‘[t]he concept of nationality was, however, rejected by Metternich and his successors as a part of the body of liberal democratic doctrine.’ For Metternich, nationality was a category referring to primordial cultures, signified by cultivated regional literary languages which he sought to promote. Metternich’s reification of cultural nationalities represents a ‘bottom-up’ approach to culture that is in striking contrast to the modernist tradition of the Josephist era (Siemann 2016, 625). It is also striking that, in the context of the Crimean War, Metternich argued for the apolitical nature of ‘islamism’, which he recommended be supported (Siemann 2010, 114). At the same time, Metternich fought fiercely against ‘nationalism’, which he associated with democratic principles of political legitimacy. Metternich ‘pointed out that Austria had never declared Hungarians, Italians or Poles to be Germans, as Napoleon had called “ten to twelve million Germans and Italians’ French” and further called centralization “the most absurd of all the tyrannies”’ (Radvany 1971, 36). Federalisation on the basis of provincial estate constitutions was intended to accommodate ‘diversity in administration, with the latter adapting to and respecting the geographical, historical and cultural differences of the provinces’ (ibid., 36-37).

5.2.2. Post-Josephist Liberalism

The current of early Austrian liberalism has been largely neglected by historical studies. One reason for this lacuna was the prevailing dominance of anti-liberal conservative and anti-Austrian nationalist historiography, which undermined the memory of Austrian
liberalism in the twentieth century (Judson 1998, 11). Ironically, even ‘liberal’
historiography, which wished to explain the ‘failure of liberalism’, had the same tendency. The ascendancy of German nationalism since the late nineteenth century tended to erase the memory of the role played by Austrian liberalism in the modernisation of central Europe (Kwan 2013, 2-4). The success of anti-liberal regimes in cracking down on liberal movements after 1815 contributed to what has become described as a German Sonderweg, suggesting a divergence from the path of the ‘liberal West’ (Mommsen 2011, 409). In the 1840s, various strands of the liberal movement in the German states ‘began to coalesce, pulled together by what was referred to as the national idea’ (ibid., 414).

Although heterogeneous and fragmented, ranging from a civic-democratic to a centralist-statist strand, Austrian liberalism was distinctive as it was associated with the radical Josephist project and became identified by the regime as its principal ideological enemy (Valjavec 1944, 82-83). Unlike the Prussian case, where ‘[i]n principle two different strands of liberal politics had emerged: moderate liberalism and democratic radicalism’ (Mommsen 2011, 418), the Metternich regime with its distinctively multiculturalist and federalist strategy of containment and its repression against political liberalism had successfully eroded both the moderate Austrian liberal and the radical democratic camp. The so-called ‘early liberal’ camp identified the state apparatus as the prime vehicle for modernisation beyond the narrow horizon of provincialism and beyond the principal expression of constitutionalism in opposition to authoritarian government (Judson 1998, 24). What began to emerge after 1815 and was consolidated between 1835 and 1848 was a post-Josephist liberal current, which diverged from radical Josephism due to its emancipation from top-down absolutism, its growing distance from radical visions of state-and nation-building, and its shift from mercantilist to economic liberal principles.

Politically, the central demand of the liberal camp became constitutionalism, referring to ‘a body of rules which regulate and authorize the rules embodied in the various subordinate institutions of the political system’ (Beer 2006, 701). ‘[A] constitutional monarchy, that is a regime in which a legislative and executive branch of government existed independently of each other, and whose actions would be mutually restrictive … would be the form of government most likely to safeguard these [liberal] freedoms’ (Sperber 2005, 66). Many Austrian liberals, such as the so-called ‘Young Austria’ movement, began to engage in criticism against the autocratic regime (Rumpler 1997, 213). The vast majority of post-Josephist liberals rejected radicalism and promoted ‘a politics of property owners’ (Sperber
maintaining that the emancipation of the lower social strata was to take place first of all through public education and peasant emancipation (Hanisch/Urbanitsch 2006, 25).

In the 1830s, when Austrian liberals began to seek emancipation as a collective actor, the government rejected applications for the establishment of ‘Austrian’ clubs and associations. Similarly, Metternich attempted to keep the (informal) editorial control in important ‘scientific’ journals, which he saw as related to the liberal-leaning German-speaking bourgeoisie (Sutter 1980, 162). Although the intellectual and organisational capacity of the Austrian liberal movement became visible only with the institution of a multi-party system in the 1860s (Stimmer 1997, 256), the background of their political leaders sheds light on the 1830s and 1840s. Eduard Herbst, university professor in Lemberg and Prague, and eventually leader of the Austrian liberals in the 1860s, recounts his experiences as a patriotic civil servant in the early 1840s (Herbst quoted in Kwan 2013, 9):

> Our study lay in the files, where the handwritten notes of Joseph II and Maria Theresia were scattered like rich deposits of gold dust. We believed in them like the Gospel … these letters preached the task of the State … they explained to us the State idea … we learnt at this time that the meaning of the Empire as a whole is in reverse relation to the power of the provinces … therefore we became Josephinists in the practical service of the Finance Procurement Office; so the Austrian idea matured in us, we saw in our hopes a unified Austria as a powerful state structure of the future.

Alongside Herbst, many Austrian liberals came from the lower ranks of the Finance Procurement Office and identified with the Josephist legacy. Several of his colleagues working there in the 1840s, including Alexander Bach, Leopold Hasner, Josef Lasser and Carl Giskra, became ministers at some point, like Herbst himself (Minister of Justice, 1867-70). Another liberal politician who had worked in the civil service in the 1830s and 1840s was Anton von Schmerling, who became Minister of the Interior (1860-65) and proposed the establishment of a representative constitution and an Austrian parliament (Rumpler 1997, 268-76).

Although censorship and repression did not eliminate Austrian liberal and patriotic intellectuals, it reduced their movement capacity. An early example was Metternich’s feud with Hormayr, who continued his agitation in Bavaria (Siemann 2016, 18; 380 and Srbik 1957a, 8-9). Metternich succeeded in segregating the Austrian liberal camp from its progressive southern German counterparts by cutting the networks of mutual communication (Katzenstein 1976, 41-2). This contributed to the decline of the Austrian Jacobin and radical Josephist strand as an organic political movement. In other South German regions, the dominant stream became parliamentarian liberalism, led by Karl von Rotteck, Professor of General World History at Freiburg University. It is worth noting that
his father was a doctor who had been ennobled by Joseph II (Siemann 1995, 237-8). The regime’s continuous attacks against the ‘liberal’ and ‘patriotic’ intellectual establishment at Austrian universities fuelled anti-status quo sentiment (Jászi 1961, 76-83). With the government crisis after 1835, a new wave of anti-regime publications set in, often printed abroad (Marx 1969, 13; 25). In 1845, tensions grew with rising inflation and unemployment, feeding into the formation of an Austrian constitutionalist movement. It culminated in the March Revolution of 1848, which was led by professors, students, bureaucrats, and young aristocrats alike (Srbik 1957b, 274-80).

In the revolutionary context of 1848, the factionalism between radical centralists in the Josephist tradition and conservative liberals dominating the provincial estates turned out to erode the unity of the opposition movement. The Austrian liberal Ludwig Löhner declared on 1 March 1848 that it was necessary to engage in revolutionary politics. He demanded a representative assembly in Vienna for the whole monarchy, religious tolerance, a reform of the education system and the right to petition (Judson 1998, 42). Austrian constitutionalism was opposed to the demands of the conservative-liberal factions that dominated the estates, who based their ‘claim for constitutional rule on historical premises, namely the alleged status of free communities in early medieval times’ (Mommsen 2011, 413). They strictly opposed a Josephist revival and demanded the empowerment of the provincial estates in legislative and fiscal matters (Judson 1998, 42-43).

5.2.3. Cultural Nationalisms of Province-Based Intellectuals

The development of embryonic national movements after 1815 correlated with the emergence of a new generation of provincial intellectuals who suffered from the shortage of public jobs as Proletariern der Geistesarbeit (Siemann 2016, 644-45). Especially students from comparatively ‘backwards’ German-speaking regions of central Europe, for whom the points of reference were France and Great Britain, organised themselves in student fraternities. Their ‘compensatory’ nationalism was reflected in the publication of radical pamphlets and culminated in a number of assassination attempts during the first wave of national movements between 1819 and 1825 (ibid., 646-47). A second wave was triggered by the French July Revolution 1830 and found some resonance in Italy. From his exile in Marseilles, Giuseppe Mazzini organized his ‘Young Italy’ movement, which in the early 1830s ‘counted perhaps as many as 50,000 members throughout the entire peninsula, most concentrated in the center, in Tuscany and the Papal States’ (Sperber 2005, 63). The third wave culminated in the 1848 Revolution and the Hungarian War of Independence. Against
this background, it seems paradoxical that the ideology of many contemporary nationalist intellectuals was to some extent complementary to Metternich’s empire project.

The inter-generational dimension was key for the genesis of province-based national movements. The ideal-typical ‘first generation’ of national intellectuals, who had initiated historical and linguistic studies in the late eighteenth century, were characterised by a cosmopolitan humanist ethos, exemplified by scholars like Herder (1744-1803) and Dobrovsky (1753-1829). In contrast, the younger ‘second generation’ that emerged after 1815 developed antagonistic forms of nationalism. It included intellectuals and agitators such as Jungmann (1773-1847), Sand (1795-1820), Kossuth (1802-1894) and Mazzini (1805-1872). The growing resonance of this ‘second generation’ of nationalist intellectuals among certain bourgeois segments can be partly explained by their ‘compensatory nationalism’ (Siemann 2016, 646-7), which was elaborated as an intellectual response to perceptions of ‘falling behind’ and socio-economic ‘backwardness’. Particularly students who studied abroad were able to reflect on the conditions of their own native provinces from a comparative perspective. Some of them articulated normative narratives such as ‘Risorgimento’, ‘rebirth’ or ‘revival’ of the nation, in order to overcome a contemporary state of crisis. The growing dynamism among nationalist intellectuals in the 1820s and 1830s was related to the competitive atmosphere in which the cultivation of ‘national’ literary languages was pursued: ‘The inferiority complex, a result of confrontation with the standards of other languages, supplied a powerful dynamic for elevating respective vernaculars to the status enjoyed by other tongues’ (Baar 2010, 137).

The respective new generation of students, historians, linguists, writers and journalists positioned themselves in sharp opposition to the cosmopolitan ‘first generation’, consolidating the ideological and organisational base of their national movements in-the-making. This represented the context in which a growing number of historians began to fulfil a function as ‘national intellectuals’, illustrated by the case of Palacký. His plans to write a Bohemian history were first perceived by his own Bohemian friends as misguided and useless efforts. Palacký decided to follow the example of the historian William Robertson, who wrote a supposedly ‘provincial’ Scottish history and became recognised as a major historian (ibid., 116-17). Robertson’s approach to historiography was similarly praised by the ‘Polish-national’ intellectual Lelewel and his students, as well as by ‘Hungarian-national’ historians like Horváth, whose essay Párhuzam (Parallel) contains several references to Robertson (ibid., 114-16). It is worth noting that Horváth and others of
the Central European ‘learned public’ gained access to Robertson’s work via the German translation by a Göttingen historian (ibid., 114).

The intensification of personal antagonisms between the two generations of national intellectuals was followed by sharpened articulations of the antagonistic nature of cultural nationalities. In terms of ideology, this generational break corresponds to a transition from ‘vernacular humanism to linguistic nationalism’ (Surman 2012, 59-107). ‘Between the 1790s and the 1830s the bases for political operations changed little, but wider, more fervent audiences were won, and severer levels of animosity generated, partly the very effect of the charged vocabulary in which Romanticism indulged’ (Evans 2006, 108). Important for the diffusion of an antagonistic concept of nationality was the reproduction of ‘national’ dichotomies in scholarly discourse. Palacký for instance began to teach a particular ‘Czech philosophy’ of the fifteenth century, as a supposedly coherent alternative to the dominant ‘German philosophy’ of the Enlightenment. Jungmann systematically spread the narrative of a historical struggle between ‘Czechs’ and ‘Germans’, which had been already introduced earlier by Herder, aside the narrative of a Magyar nation in a ‘Slavic sea’. It was projected back onto the history of the eighteenth century, especially by Ranke in the German states and by Palacký and Havlíček in Bohemia.

Instead of a teleological explanation of cultural nationalisms as being responses to Josephist centralisation efforts in the preceding century, narratives of ‘Germanization’ can be identified as a product of the 1820s and 1830s. Evans (2006, 107) highlights, ‘it was precisely rising ethnic consciousness’ raised by intellectuals, ‘which made state building look “Germanic”’. In fact, ‘[t]he sponsors of protean cultures felt a continuing need to fabricate ancient rights, whether links with Dacians and Roman colonists, or Slavic empires, or voluntary contracts with conquering Magyars and Poles. Altogether, the intellectual propagators of national identity were a comparatively homogeneous breed, which only sharpened their sense of mutual rivalry’ (ibid.). Although Palacký began to write his History of the Czech People in Bohemia and Moravia in 1832 in the German language, he published it in 1848 in Czech as Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a v Moravě. Jungman agitated with polemics against cosmopolitanism and spread the narrative of an asymmetrical historical relationship between ‘Slavs’ and ‘Germans’, expressed by the question: ‘Who commits and who suffers from injustice?’ (Rumpler 1997, 182).

That Metternich perceived most provincial nationalisms in the respective period as being in line with his empire project can be explained by two ideological developments that involved the statist and populist function of nationalism; first, the nationalisation of
territorial provinces through ‘history’, and second, the nationalisation of regional human groupings through ‘language’. Both blended into a primordial conception of ‘cultural nationality’, sharing historicist and culturalist assumptions with Metternich’s conservatism. Prominent examples are Istvan Széchenyi’s Hunnia (1835), Jan Kollar’s The Daughter of Slava (Slávy dcera, 1821), Ljudevit Gaj’s Proclamations (Proglas, 1835), Karel Havlíček’s The Slav and the Czech (Slovan a Čech, 1846) and Petition to the Emperor against the unification of Bohemia and Moravia (originally in German, 1848) (Trencsényi and Kopeček 2007, 205-276).

In Vienna, Greek intellectuals began to influence circles of South-East European intellectuals, supporting their focus on the cultivation of ‘national languages’. In 1815, Neophytos Doukas sent a letter from Vienna to the Patriarch of Constantinople Cyril VI, in which he ‘urged, to initiate a new cultural crusade’ (Kitromilides 1989, 156). This influence can be observed in the Rumanian case of Naum Râmniceanu’s (1764-1839) Tratat important, which was published by the clergyman, teacher and historian originally in Greek in 1822. Râmniceanu’s ‘ideas about the “Dacian” origin of Romanians, had a lasting impact on Romanian discourse about national identity’ (Trencsényi/Kopeček 2006, 324). The so-called ‘national rebirth’ literature was spread by the second generation of Daco-Romanian nationalist intellectuals such as the writers Gheorghe Lazar, Ioan Eliade Radulescu, Gheorghe Asachi and Simion Barnutiu. In Transylvania appeals to a Dako-Roman ‘national awakening’ triggered opposition by Magyar national intellectuals and German-speaking historians. Further examples of a ‘culturalisation’ of nationality in reference to language can be found in Josef Jungmann’s Second conversation concerning the Czech language (1806), Vuk Stefanović Karadžić’s Little Slavo-Serbian song book of the common people (published in Vienna in 1814), Ferenc Kölcsey’s National traditions (1826) and Hymnus (1829), and Őudovít Štúr’s The Slovak dialect, or the necessity of writing in this dialect (1846) (Trencsényi/Kopeček 2007, 103-193). The Hungarian-Magyar nationalist aristocrat István (Stefan) Széchenyi, gave Magyar - a language he had to learn when he was already an adult - an explicitly public meaning for the first time (Rumpler 1997, 173).

Examples of the ‘historicising’ feature can be observed in Joachim Lelewel’s Legitimacy of the Polish Nation (1836), Dániel Berzsenyi’s To the Hungarians (1813), Mihail Kogalniceanu’s Speech for the opening of the course on national history (1843) and František Palacký’s A History of the Czech people in Bohemia and Moravia. In the case of Croatian nationalism it is illuminating that, when Gaj re-published his famous ‘Croatia has not yet fallen’ (Još horvatska ni propala) in 1835, he replaced most references to Croatia
with Illyria, having realised that ‘Croatian traditions were mostly irrelevant outside of Provincial Croatia whereas Illyrian national thought had some traction amongst the educated speakers of South Slav vernaculars’ (Stergar 2016, 115).

5.3. Governmental Policies and Practices Signifying Nationality Difference

The regime attempted to reconcile pressures for political modernisation; that is, continuing the expansion of state institutions and infrastructural rule with counter-revolutionary policies through a governance of empire. From a historical sociological perspective the concept of ‘empire’ can be applied to explore patterns in inter-state relations as well as in the study of particular systems of rule (Go 2011). Historically, empires were polities that pursued governmental strategies and repertoires to incorporate ‘diverse peoples into the polity while sustaining or making distinctions among them’ (Burbank/Cooper 2010, 2). Barkey (2008, 10) describes the political form of the Ottoman Empire as one of indirect rule, differentiating it from the modern state:

Imperial state-periphery relationships are not direct relationships between state and individual subjects; rather, intermediate bodies, networks, and elites mediate the relationships … Imperial power, then, has a crucially negotiated character, where different negotiations emerge from sets of relations in which state actors and elite groups are engaged.

Under Metternich, continued state modernisation expanded infrastructural rule and reduced remnants of despotic rule. As Mann (1993, 61) noted, modern statehood is dual, as is ‘infrastructure and despot … concerning both a center, with its multiple power particularities, and center-territory relations, with their own power particularities’. The regime’s governance of empire was opposed to the Josephist ideal of direct rule and enhanced the position of provincial assemblies. Governmental policies had a critical impact on the rise of province-based power actors and the decline in central government authority.

Figure 12. Type of Governance and Form of Rule [Mann 1993, 60]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Despotic power</th>
<th>Infrastructural power</th>
<th>Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Feudal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Bureaucratic-democratic</td>
</tr>
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Figure 13. Political Structure and Degree of Infrastructural Power [Mann 1993, 85]
5.3.1. Reforms of Political Structure

This section examines the reconstruction of the relationship between political centre, provinces, and the local level. Although some evidence can be found in support of the centralisation thesis (Sked 2008, 107-22), the same seems true for the federalisation argument (Haas 1963, 118-48; Siemann 2010, 60-107; Siemann 2016, 607-26). The question will be resolved by focusing on the regime’s governance of empire. Federalism can be described as the result of a process in which ‘the powers of the central government are devolved upon the subordinate bodies in such a way that both central and regional units are thenceforth endowed with certain powers and functions of which neither can be deprived by the other’ (Livingston 1952, 81). Although a federative arrangement to be stable usually requires a form of constitution, which assigns competencies and functions of central and regional governments, the conservative regime rejected such a solution. If one assumes, as Metternich did, the cultural qualities of provinces and human populations as a given, federalism can be interpreted as a necessary political reflection of historical and cultural differences. According to such a perspective, ‘[f]ederal government is a device by which the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected. Every society … is more or less closely integrated in accordance with its own peculiar historical, cultural, economic, political and other determinants’ (ibid., 84).

Hans Sturmerberger (1969, 97), a historian with a pro-federalism stance, argues that, under Metternich, the political competences of provinces and the estates remained restricted. Yet he also notes that the revival of estates constitutions was a condition for the development of Austrian federalism, which he associates with ‘self-government’. He highlights the contrast between the historically unique and diverse provinces of the monarchy and the artificially constructed departments of a decentralised unitary state (ibid.). The assessment of changes in political structure appears ambiguous due to two seemingly contradictory processes: The bureaucratic state continued to expand, as did consequently the penetration of infrastructural rule in the provinces. At the same time, Metternich abandoned
the Josephist state project in the unitary-centralist tradition and pursued a policy of devolution, empowering the provincial diets as collaborating power actors within his conservative alliance.

Metternich’s quite centralist reform proposal of 1811 represented a response to the state’s existential crisis after two decades of warfare, recurrent military defeat, substantial territorial losses, and state bankruptcy. He aimed at fostering urgently needed political authority for himself as State Chancellor, anticipating war between France and Russia (Sked 2008, 107-8). In contrast, Metternich’s reform plans after 1815 must be considered in the context of peace and reconstruction. In 1817, he proposed the reorganisation of the monarchy into a federalist state (Föderativstaat), characterised by a composite political structure. After the Josephist state-building reforms, the provincial diets were initially only allowed to convene temporarily to examine laws and taxes ‘which the central government submitted for their inspection’, having no right to reject a law or a tax, but only to submit advice or a petition to the monarch (Blum 1948, 24). This marginal role of the diets was radically transformed through new estates constitutions. Austria was divided into twelve large administrative units (Gubernien), which were subordinated directly to the central government in Vienna. They were again divided into ‘historical regions’ (Landschaften), to be administered and governed by provincial assemblies (Landtage), limiting the power of the central state and the monarch (Siemann 1995, 72, 78-9). Under the reign of Joseph II (Blum 1948, 29),

> the power of the nobility had been ... severely limited and its privileges threatened with extinction.

Destruction of the influence of the nobility in the government was fundamental to Joseph’s theory of government.

Metternich and Emperor Francis enforced elements of indirect rule by reviving the provincial assemblies’ function from the pre-Josephist era, ‘designed to serve as the organ through which the nobility as a unit participated in the government of the province’ (ibid., 28). As many provinces had been already granted estates constitutions after 1790, the re-incorporated provinces of Salzburg, Tyrol and Vorarlberg became the target of reforms. Tyrol received an estates constitution in 1816. In the same year, the decree of a constitutional draft for Vorarlberg followed, which was not implemented. Similar preparatory works took place in the case of Salzburg, although its restored estates constitution was only published in 1827.

The provincial assemblies were generally comprised of three estates: the clergy, the nobility, and the third estate of the burghers (Blum 1948, 25). Before 1848, the third estate played only a minor role in the provincial assemblies. In 1847, one year before the liberal
revolution, they were for the first time ‘invited by the nobles to participate in the deliberations and debates’ (ibid., 27). In Tyrol, the diet included also peasant delegates. In the early 1840s, members of the provincial parliament of Lower Austria, which included the capital city of Vienna, expressed demands for the empowerment of their representative body. On 3 May 1844, the Diet passed a corresponding constitutional draft, which was rejected by the emperor. The proposed draft was still based on the representation of four distinct estates, which were again divided into the three powerful lordly estates and the ‘fourth estate’ of the commons (Reiter et al. 2005, 111-18).

Although Hungary was not part of the German Confederation, Metternich supported the revival of its Diet. Between 1825 and 1828, it attained a political status that represented a full recovery from the Josephist reforms (Blum 1948, 29). The constitution Bulla Aurea of 1222, which had been revised in 1687, served as historical point of reference. The Hungarian Diet ‘was supposed to be convened at the call of the King every three years, or more frequently if the welfare of the nation demanded it. During most of the eighteenth century and until 1825, this requirement was mostly disregarded. Beginning with the Diet of 1825, however, meetings were held at the appointed interval until the end of the Vormärz’ (ibid., 39). Unlike their peers in the Austrian-Bohemian provinces, the Hungarian nobility gained the right to reject royal propositions. The peasantry ‘did not stand directly under the lordship of the king’, something the Josephist regime under Kaunitz had attempted to change (ibid.). Although some ‘politically active individuals in the region … claimed that Hungary was not just another province but a sovereign kingdom within the empire … the public influence of the diet was restricted by the tradition of carrying on its debates in Latin’ (Sperber 2005, 58-9).

Metternich’s policy of ‘estates liberalism’ was similarly implemented in Galicia, where an estates constitution granted provincial autonomy and reinforced the political dominance of the Polish-speaking aristocracy. The territorial concept of ‘Galicia’ and its constitution were both invented by Habsburg Austria after its acquisition in the late eighteenth century (Sutter 1980, 161-62). Leopold II had granted an ‘estates constitution’ in 1790 (Charta Leopoldina) and Metternich supported the expansion of provincial autonomies, illustrated by his appointment of the sympathiser with Polish patriotism August Lobkowitz as the governor of Galicia in 1826 (Rumpler 1997, 159). Similar political demands for provincial constitutions were expressed in Lombardy, Venetia, Bohemia, Transylvania and Illyria-Croatia. Many of these claims to provincial autonomy drew on an anti-Josephist tradition among aristocrats, who were defending their privileges (Judson 2016, 87-89).
After the July Revolution of 1830, when German states, excepting Austria, Prussia, Hesse-Homburg and Oldenburg, introduced representative constitutions (Siemann 2010, 87), Metternich responded with exactly the opposite strategy and intensified policies of decentralisation, so-called ‘estates liberalism’, and repression of liberal-centralist actors. His anti-Josephist federalisation policy was also reflected symbolically in Ferdinand’s coronation ceremonies as king of Hungary in 1830, as king of Bohemia in Prague in 1835, and as king of Lombardy-Venetia in Milan in 1838 (Deak 2015, 37). Metternich ‘identified the anti-revolutionary interests of the great nobles with those of the throne’ (Blum 1948, 29). As the role of the permanent council of the provincial assemblies changed, they became increasingly autonomous from the political centre. This shift is geographically reflected by the relocation of the Hungarian Diet from Pressburg to Buda-Pest. The noble presidents who headed these councils ‘viewed the members as their personal councillors, rather than the Emperor’s’ (ibid., 32). In this context Karl Kübeck notes, whoever ‘has the misfortune to contradict the president will be denounced by the latter to the Emperor as infected with the spirit of the revolution, with liberalism and Jacobinism’ (quoted in Blum 1948, 32). When the Bohemian aristocrat Kolowrat became minister of finance in 1826, he ‘made no pretence of the fact that he was in complete sympathy with the aspirations of his peers, and the policy of favouritism of the high nobility was reinstated’ (ibid., 30). Some contemporary bureaucrats of non-noble birth noted the impact of regime transformation and identified a ‘conversion - or perversion - of the form of the Monarchy’s government from an absolute monarchy to an aristocracy’ (ibid.).

The two elements of indirect rule, the provincial Diet and the patrimonial administration on the local level, created a dilemma for the authority of the ‘Governor’, who in principle represented the central state. By the 1840s (Deak 2015, 46-7),

the patrimonial administration of the landed nobility had become the base of ‘the pyramid of Austria’s administrative structure’ … Although this system of provincial administration allowed for the smooth continuance of local customs and forms of public law, it also translated into a lack of administrative uniformity and a complexity in the way the parts related to the whole - precisely what Emperor Joseph tried to change.

Figure 14. The Political and Administrative Structure of the Austrian Empire, 1840 [Deak 2015, 44]
Metternich’s governance of empire was at the root of Austria’s dysfunctional government system, reducing central authority without setting up a constitutional arrangement on the state level. It created political space for the revival of traditionalist Habsburg dynasticism, as well as for the privileges of the provincial estates. The modernisation of the central government system failed entirely. ‘Below the emperor’s advisory, the Austrian administration was not divided into specialty sections, or ministries, which covered qualitative aspects of governance’, but it remained ‘organized into three geographically defined Hofstellen, or court offices, which supervised all areas of government in the provinces’ (Deak 2015, 41). Metternich’s so-called ‘estates liberalism’ empowered provincial actors and reduced the central authorities’ resources for brokerage (Taylor 1990, 55-60). From a traditionalist perspective the restoration of historical privileges that were rooted in estates on the provincial and local level was intended to enhance ‘private powers’, held by the nobility. However, the provincial power actors’ embedment within the institutional framework of provincial diets and local administrations linked them intrinsically to the state’s expanding ‘public’ infrastructural power, consolidating political authority within provinces.

Metternich attributed the 1846 uprising in Galicia to the administration’s inability to control its extensive territory and ordered Galicia’s division into a Polish and a Ruthenian
province. Its governor Stadion advised to keep Galicia as a single province (Vushko 2015, 226-27):

If granted a separate province, the governor maintained, the Ruthenians might succumb to Russian propaganda, and might one day wish to join the Russian Empire … Just as Poles could be drawn to Warsaw, Ruthenians could find themselves politically attracted to St. Petersburg. A pro-Russian turn in Ruthenian politics could have devastating consequences for Vienna; so it would be best from Austria’s point of view if, within one province, Ruthenians and Poles could balance each other’s separatist proclivities.

In their study of Tyrol, Cole and Heiss (2007, 40) note, ‘the neo-corporatist structure of the Landtag failed to adjust to the revised territorial map of the region.’ These recurrent issues were caused by the regime’s failure to systematically reorganise the state’s political-territorial structure and political system, and reappeared on the agenda in the 1860s (Siemann 1995, 81).

5.3.2. Public Administration between Restriction and Empowerment

After 1815, state functions shifted from the demands of dynastic warfare to those of an emergent mass society. As the bureaucratic state apparatus was further professionalised and its range substantially expanded (Heindl 2013a, 84-85), so it saw the introduction of new governmental tools such as maps, censuses, gazetters and handbooks (Bayly 2004, 274-76). Especially in the domains of public health and education, statistics were introduced to produce data for efficient government (Metz 1987, 342). State regulations and interventions involved the preservation of ‘public health’ and in some instances even the maintenance of ‘emergency food-depots as a means of preventing uprisings’ (Smith 1981, 215). This diverged to some extent from the ‘liberal’ path of Britain, where the state withdrew from several areas, illustrated by its response to the Irish famine of 1846. However, unlike in the Josephist era, the regime aimed at preventing the growth and empowerment of an Austrian liberal bourgeoisie. Its type of governance involved the control of power actors through various methods of restriction. In her study of Ottoman rule, Barkey (2008, 10) highlights the central government’s brokerage function as the key for imperial governance:

Divide and rule, ‘brokerage’, segmentation, and integration become the basic structural components of empire … Particularly when the state has captured the brokerage functions between elites, it can use such structural advantage to separate, integrate, reward, and control groups.

In the aftermath of two waves of nationalist campaigning in 1820 and 1830, Metternich adopted a cooperative strategy and granted amnesty to a number of radical nationalists, based on the premise that they would retreat to ‘cultural’ activities. How seriously Metternich took ‘political’ forms of national movements becomes clear in his admission of
Jewish migrants who feared cultural persecution, while strictly rejecting the immigration of Greek revolutionaries who fled from the Ottoman Empire. ‘Prince Alexander Ypsilanti, the leader of a revolt in the Principalities which took place on the eve of the Greek War of Independence, was held prisoner by the Austrians for years after he fled to Hungary in 1821’ (Sked 2008, 128). Similarly, the German national movement, thriving in the organisational form of student fraternities, was identified as a dangerous influence. Gentz noted in 1818: ‘We are completely convinced that of all evils afflicting Germany today, even including the licentiousness of the press, this student nuisance is the greatest, the most urgent and the most threatening’ (quoted in ibid.).

In the wake of the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819, the Austrian police expanded its censorship and intelligence network into university faculties. As academic communities tended to transcend state borders, Metternich cooperated with Russian and Prussian authorities to spy on various student bodies (ibid., 129). Print capitalism contributed generally to expanding information networks throughout central Europe. In 1820 there were 519 bookshops in 163 cities in Austria, Switzerland and the German states. By 1840 there were 1,340 bookshops operating in 385 towns (Brophy 2017, 405). The spread of these illustrates how modernisation influenced all three sources of social power as they ‘constituted a site that entangled all three in a matrix of profit, state regulation and the circulation of knowledge’ (ibid.). Julius Marx (1969) observed in his study that censorship, targeting radical Josephist, communist and liberal publications, was tightened after 1830. The regime was not opposed to knowledge production as such. Francis even gave his consent for an international congress of ‘the Society of Scientists and Physicians’ to be held in Vienna after the outbreak of the July Revolution. Metternich believed that the centre of democratic student movements was located in Paris. In 1833 Metternich told one of his agents the following: ‘For many years all those who pointed to the existence of a comité directeur working secretly for universal revolution were met everywhere only by incredulity; today it has been shown that this infernal propaganda exists, that it has its centre in Paris and that it is divided into as many sections as there are nations to regenerate’ (quoted in Sked 2008, 130). This statement hints at his fear of a potential instrumentalisation of ‘cultural’ nationalities by political movements.

**The Tabooisation of the State**

The regime attempted to change the ideology of the bureaucracy from patriotic Josephist to conservative federalist. Emperor Francis aimed at the erosion of Austrian patriotism and a
‘statist’ conception of nationhood, which had been predominant among the Josephist-educated bureaucracy. Sonnenfels’ famous ‘love of the fatherland’ had become associated with Jacobinism and was to be removed from official state ideology. In official discourse, Francis initially replaced ‘state’ with the term ‘fatherland’, which he ultimately also dropped due to its association with Austrian patriotism. However, ‘Francis and Ferdinand were not able to reconcile their need for the bureaucracy’s ability to collect taxes and its potential to strengthen the crown’s authority with their desire to steer it away from policies which promoted social and political change’ (Deak 2015, 62).

The tabooisation of ‘the state’ aimed at the replacement of the Enlightenment ideology of ‘reason of state’ with the ideology of Habsburg dynasticism, transforming the ideal-typical collective identity of bureaucrats from ‘servants of the state’ into ‘servants of the emperor’ (Heindl 2013a, 67). The regime broke with the Josephist tradition of educating and socialising civil servants within a patriotic ethos (ibid., 68). In contrast, the regime intended to erode the Josephist ‘state myth’ (ibid., 76). The university education of civil servants was to take place without ‘political theory’, avoiding any notion of the state. While in the Josephist tradition the idea of civilizational progress was closely associated with state- and nation-building, the conservative vision to be disseminated among students of law and political economy became characterised not only by a lack of ‘state ideology’ but by the absence of normative political theory as such (ibid., 126). The emperor himself fiercely opposed the recruitment of ‘patriots’, ‘friends of literature’, ‘Projektmacher’, and ‘critics’ (ibid., 80). Francis expressed his conviction in a speech in 1833, arguing that men of talent, ‘so-called geniuses and intellectuals’ were useless for the civil service (ibid., 81). Similarly warned Kübeck of ‘liberals’ within the bureaucracy. ‘A liberal’, he describes as ‘a monster, an enemy, a human who is capable of everything, a busy mind, a renewer, in short a dangerous human’ (Kübeck 1831, quoted in Heindl 2013a, 227).

Although conservative intellectuals such as Adam Müller and Carl Ernst Jarecke attained prominent roles in the capital, they were unable to connect to the institutional level of the University of Vienna (Heindl 2013a, 75). Despite ambitious plans to reform the education of civil servants and to separate ‘academic’ from ‘professional’ education, these proposals were not fully implemented. Three older philosophical courses were maintained until 1848: The ‘natural private law’ of Zeiller, ‘natural public law’ of Martini, and Sonnenfels’ ‘political sciences’ (ibid., 129-130). The Josephist legacy of non-religious ‘natural law’ provoked recurrent criticism of conservative scholars who identified ‘God’ as the source of
order and promoted students’ education as Catholic ‘moralists’ instead of Enlightened ‘scientists’ (ibid., 131).

Bureaucrats’ reduction in function was accompanied by socio-economic deterioration. Between 1799 and 1848 the basic salary of civil servants stagnated, except for that of ministers (Heindl 2013a, 186-7). The number of civil servants grew from 71,045 in 1828 to 140,247 in 1846 (ibid., 151). Overcrowded Austrian universities, which did not introduce reforms to increase their exclusivity as Prussia had done, reflected increasing competition among the bourgeoisie (ibid., 202-3). Despite the substantial growth of educated bourgeois bureaucrats in the period between 1815 and 1848, the proportion of aristocrats in the bureaucracy remained stable at about 20 per cent (ibid., 225). In the decades after 1815, the ‘seniority-based hierarchy of officialdom - originally a progressive development - now resulted in a narrowing and hardening within officialdom … as bureaucrats were primarily recruited from their own class’ (Heindl 2006, 43). Only from the 1840s did the recruitment of civil servants from lower socio-economic background begin to increase again (Heindl 2013a, 210).

The material decline and relative poverty of a growing number of students and bureaucrats contributed to a rise in publications criticising the status quo. The regime responded within the framework of its governance of empire, brokering between group interests, and extending censorship (ibid., 206-7). As a long-term consequence, many Austrian bureaucrats began to identify with particularistic collective identities, whether articulated in corporate, class, provincial or national-linguistic terms (ibid., 209). The incentives for integration into the Austrian German-speaking bourgeoisie began to decline for the first time (ibid., 211).

Religion and Language

Having identified ‘anti-statism’ as an element of the regime’s conservative ideology and practice, two further components shed light on its approach to reconstructing state/society relations: the roles attributed to religion and language. The regime’s positive stance towards Catholicism remained largely symbolic. The Austrian conservative idea of an alliance between ‘crown and altar’ served above all the expansion of the regime’s ideological base by drawing on an anti-liberal source (Breitenstein 1959). In 1819, Francis and Metternich visited the Pope in Rome, which represented a symbolic break with the Josephist past (Vocelka 1978, 25). In 1827, Francis even allowed Jesuits, once Josephism’s biggest
enemy, to return to Galicia (ibid., 24). Despite extensive negotiations between Metternich and the Pope’s representative Consalvi, beginning in 1815, no Concordat was signed.

One of the few religious aspects in policy was that the government upheld the law declaring that only Catholics were legally entitled to become civil servants (Heindl 2013a, 73). This confessional dimension of public recruitment ran against Enlightened liberal principles. In a modification of the curriculum of juridical studies at university, religion was added in 1805. Its weight increased further in another reform in 1824, which added courses on moral philosophy, science of religion and metaphysics (ibid., 143). ‘The most important prerequisites for a bureaucratic career were ‘excellent morality and religiousness’ … which, according to the government, could best be shown through regular attendance at church services. These characteristics were at the heart of a bureaucrat’s perfect relationship with the state of Francis and Metternich’ (Heindl 2006, 43).

In terms of language policy the anti-Josephist reforms initiated by Emperor Leopold were continued. Metternich’s ‘cultural’ nationality policy had an impact on linguistic practices in the areas of administration, the judiciary and education. Quite generally, the ‘interactions between the regional and the central institutions would take place in German whereas interaction between a regional institution and a citizen could be in local languages’ (Rindler Schjerve/Vetter 2007, 59). While on the level of the central state the German language remained the universal language of the public domain, its usage as the lingua franca on the provincial and local level was not legally enforced by the regime. Instead, the bureaucratic state increasingly attempted to regulate the use of multiple literary languages. Metternich supported the institutionalisation of Magyar as the public language in Austria’s Hungarian provinces and of a newly standardised Italian language in the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia (Sutter 1980, 162). ‘Hungarian was adopted instead of Latin as the official language of the Hungarian diet in 1840, though Budapest University, controlled from Vienna, did not abandon Latin lectures until 1844’ (Hobsbawm 1996, 136). As two-thirds of the population in the Hungarian provinces were non-Magyar speakers, all decrees in the Diet were to be translated into Latin and regional vernaculars.

Metternich explained his nationality policy, designed as a safeguard against political liberalism (Siemann 2010, 106-7), in the context of bureaucratic modernisation in the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia (quoted in Haas 1963, 117-18):

From a political point of view, the faults and weaknesses of the administration in this interesting part of the Monarchy must be remedied as quickly as possible; the course of affairs must be made more active; national esprit and national self-consciousness must be met half-way in that these provinces receive a
form of administration which proves to the Italians that no one wishes to treat them in just the same manner as the German provinces, and thus, so to say, to amalgamate them with [the German provinces].

Metternich insisted that his government ‘would fulfil the just wishes of a nation’ and attributed to the inhabitants of Lombardy and Venetia a linguistically defined Italian nationality (ibid., 118). Linguistic minorities such as German-speakers in Venetia or Friulian-speakers ‘were simply ignored’, and the latter ‘thrown together with the Italian speech communities’ (Boaglio 2003, 205). The government promoted a particular variant of Italian as the language of the public education system (ibid., 207). Even in the linguistically most diverse harbour city of Trieste, which enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy as part of the monarchy’s South-Slavic provinces, there were only minor legal changes with limited and slow impact on the pre-dominant usage of the Italian language in legal and juridical affairs. ‘From the 1820s onwards there are a few changes … of the kind that German was more frequently used in the context of internal communication within the judiciary and between different administrative authorities of Triest. Yet there is still a total lack of Slovene documents’ (Rindler Schjerve/Vetter 2007, 62-63). Although some German terms entered the Italian dialects in Lombardy and Venetia, they disappeared again in the second half of the nineteenth century (Boaglio 2003, 205).

In Bohemia, the production of a Slavic literary language saw first major results in the 1830s. An example was the publication of the first natural science textbooks in the Czech language. Vaclav Matej Kramerius founded the first private Czech-language newspaper, which published counter-revolutionary propaganda in cooperation with the Vienna government (Hroch 1993, 232). The anti-liberal position of Czech nationalists secured regime support, most importantly the foundation of the Chair of Czech language and literature at the University of Prague (ibid.). Having reached this level of official support, the institutionalised reproduction of a distinct academic version of a ‘Czech national’ literary culture was achieved. German, which had previously replaced Latin as the language of the state, became replaced by local vernaculars as the language of instruction in elementary schools. The small group of Bohemian-Czech nationalist intellectuals succeeded in convincing the Vienna government that beside the University Chair in Prague it should also grant the right to teach the Czech language as a facultative subject in secondary schools, creating teaching positions for graduates. During the 1830s, the Vienna government expanded the Bohemian-Czech language classes in secondary schools and permitted the publication of two Czech weeklies and a number of scientific journals. Further, a Catholic foundation was established that financed the publication of Czech-language books for common readers (ibid., 234). This was linked to the organisation of the Church as
*Landeskirche*, which overlapped with Bohemia’s political territory. As the theological seminars offered a socially open and provincially rooted way to academic education, especially as they promoted the Czech language for pastoral reasons, they became important institutions for the local reproduction of Bohemian-Czech nationalist intellectuals with no organic links with German-speaking Vienna and its institutions of higher education.

In Galicia, the Josephist legacy contributed to the growing significance of German in public affairs, beside the traditionally important Polish (Fellerer 2003, 141). Despite the neglect of Ruthenian in the communicative context of administration, which was contributed to by the absence of a standardised Ukrainian literary language, the Metternich era was marked by its cultivation. ‘The Austrian legislature and its executives launched initiatives which aimed at improving the education of the Greek Catholic clergy. Subsequently, these initiatives were directed at the development of ecclesiastical schools, which provided elementary education for Greek Catholic children. Take for example the law which the Emperor enacted in 1818. It stipulated the use of Ruthenian at Greek Catholic elementary schools...[which] brought about early steps in corpus planning’ (Fellerer 2003, 142). The introduction of Ruthenian for teaching purposes enabled the Greek Catholic clergy to educate Ruthenian-speaking intellectuals, who were ‘the backbone of the Ruthenian … cultural awakening’ (ibid., 143). Another example of a newly institutionalised language of instruction was the Croatian-Illyrian case, in which the provincial autonomy of Croatia and Slavonia enabled the Diet to introduce ‘the new Illyrian standard language -based on the Štokavija’ as official language in schools (Stergar 2016, 115).

Although Metternich proudly announced his official support for the cultivation and spread of multiple ‘national literary languages’, Jewish Yiddish and Hebrew-speakers were not recognised as a ‘cultural nationality’ (Rumpler 1997, 160-61). Neither were they generally accepted by provincial nationalists to ‘join’ their cultural nations and remained associated with assimilation into the German-speaking ‘Austrian’ bourgeoisie (Baar 2010, 268-70).

**Statistics and Categorisation**

Two influential statistical publications of that period illustrate the state’s categorisation of its populace, shifting from a focus on religion to nationality. The first one is Moritz Lucam’s *Tafeln zur Statistik der Oesterreichischen Monarchie*, published by the Directorate for Administrative Statistics in 1839/40. In the first part the author presents population estimates for each province. In the next section, under the heading ‘confessional difference’
(Religions-Verschiedenheit), the inhabitants were divided into Catholics, Greeks (Uniate/Non-Uniate), Protestants (Augsburg/Helvetian/Unitarian), ‘other sects’ and Jews. While language was not yet being used as a category for classifying the population, religion still played a role in the way the state approached different segments of its populace. Examples were the direct taxation in the case of the ‘Jew tax’ and the differentiation between Catholic and non-Catholic schools. In the last part the work presents statistical overviews of fifteen provinces: 1) Lower Austria; 2) Upper Austria and Salzburg; 3) Styria; 4) Carinthia and Carniola; 5) the Littoral; 6) Tyrol and Vorarlberg; 7) Bohemia; 8) Moravia and Silesia; 9) Galicia and Bukovina; 10) Dalmatia; 11) Lombardy; 12) Venice; 13) Hungary; 14) Transylvania; 15) the Military frontier. Strikingly, the author does not present any data on language, ethnicity or nationality. The only data he adds in this section on ‘the population’ is on migration, marriages, and on birth and death rates.

The dissemination of the concept of ‘cultural nationality’ is reflected by a shift in the statistical representation of Austria’s population. The Directorate of Administrative Statistics, under its new director Carl Czoerning, introduced the category of nationality in the census of 1846. Nationality was linguistically defined and became the new central category used for classifying the population, replacing the previously dominant religious denominations. The noted shift in the official approach to the population from a confessional to a cultural-linguistic one corresponded first to the Josephist pattern of secularisation that included religious pluralism, and second, to the subsequent promotion of a culturalist concept of nationality in opposition to the previous Josephist concept. The implication of the promotion of ‘cultural nationalities’ was that standardised vernaculars should become able to functionally replace the German language in the future. This required first the elaboration of standardised literary languages, which subsequently could become institutionalised within the provincial and local administrations, and in education. It had the effect of enforcing language as a seemingly objective category of practice that signified nationality difference. Such linguistic categories could then be used by the state to regulate access to public jobs, to set up linguistic criteria in the civil service, and to decide on the language of instruction in schools (Rumpler 1997, 249).

Another indicator of the anti-Josephinist character of Metternichan policy was the comparatively late foundation of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in 1847. Metternich defined its ‘scientific’ function as being clearly separated from any normative political or cultural mission. This was in striking contrast to the function attributed to provincial institutions in Hungary, Bohemia, Croatia, Italy and Galicia, which had been established
much earlier and with the explicit mission to develop the scientific base of ‘national cultures’ (Rumpler 2010, 1127). The regime supported the transformation of ‘regional clubs’ into provincial ‘national associations’ (Siemann 1995, 226-228). The ‘Orientalist’ Hammer-Purgstall became the first president of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, after many (quasi-)academies had been established in the provinces. An example was the Royal Bohemian Society of the Sciences in Prague. Palacký became its scientific secretary in 1841, after having been appointed the ‘Bohemian Provincial historiographer’ by the estates in 1831. Supported by Šafarik, he managed to position Prague as the emerging centre of scientific ‘Slavism’ (Winter 1969, 251-52). While the government established a chair for Czech language at the University of Vienna, it rejected demands for an Austrian-German one. Until 1849 there did not even exist a single university chair for German literature in Austria (Heindl 2013a, 212). While Hammer-Purgstall’s ‘Oriental studies’ were officially promoted, Sonnenfels’ track of Austrian-German literary language, associated with a civilizational ideal of bourgeois literary culture linked to the modernising state, was suspended. On one occasion, the government even rejected Hammer-Purgstall’s proposal to develop an official Austrian-German dictionary, supporting a ‘Czech’ language project instead.

Regulations regarding language criteria in public administration did not merely reflect multi-national ideology, but also changed the socio-economic incentive structure for linguistic assimilation. A consequence was the emergence of a new linguistic cleavage in the growing provincial urban centres, fragmenting the educated bourgeoisie linguistically, and intersecting with political centre-periphery relations. They became articulated by the ‘second generation’ of nationalist intellectuals as representing national antagonisms. Being ‘German’, as a traditional category of class, initially feeding into the Josephist-liberal ideal of an integrative German-speaking middle-class society, became re-interpreted as being a cultural-linguistic category in relation to other such ‘nationalities’.

5.3.3. Cultural and Educational Policies

The major factor for the transition of national movements from a ‘cultural-private’ to a ‘cultural-public’ phase was governmental policy. Besides the rise of a vernacular press, it was the newly established cultural and scholarly institutions entirely rooted in the provinces that provided nationalist intellectuals with jobs and enabled them to increase their capacity as knowledge producers. The Bohemian Landesmuseum in Prague was founded in 1818/19, following the example of the museum of Moravia and Silesia that was established in Brno
(Brünn) in 1817. Further examples were the Széchenyi National Library, the Hungarian National Museum, and the National Theatre in Pest. The first Slavic Matice had also been founded previously in Pest, as was the Matica Srbksa in 1826, one year after the establishment of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. These institutions were emulated, producing a particular version of public ‘national culture’. Further examples were the establishment of Slovak, Moravian, Slovenian and Dalmatian, Croatian, and Polish Matices (Baar 2010, 81). As Baar concludes in regard to the Czech Matice, ‘[i]t subsidized and published seminal works of the Czech national revival … It occupied an authoritative position on theoretical issues relating to the Czech language and in regard to the production of schoolbooks in Czech’ (ibid.). Provincial museums were further founded in Tyrol (1823), in Upper Austria (1833), in Salzburg (1834), in Carinthia (1844) and in Styria (1849) (Bruckmüller/Stekl 1995, 184). While ‘national’ associations such as the Matice Česka (1831) enjoyed government support in their promotion of a standardised, ‘national’ literary culture and historiography, similar projects on the state-level such as the foundation of an Austrian national museum in Vienna were suppressed (ibid., 187-88).

These newly established cultural institutions were directly linked to the regime’s conservative alliance. The case of the Bohemian national museum illustrates that the founders did not only have the sanction of the Vienna government, but enjoyed the support of the nobility and the clergy (Krueger 2009, 173):

The founding committee kept in relatively close contact with the Viennese authorities, and made sure to keep Chancellor Metternich abreast of their plans - what the museum would look like and hope to accomplish. In a letter to Metternich in the spring of 1818, the committee wrote that it had enough money and material to ensure the ‘imminent execution of this institute’. The committee constantly framed the museum project in terms of the good that the museum would accomplish for the state and the community, goals the committee insisted were synonymous with those of the government in Vienna itself. The successful establishment of the museum would support ‘not only purely scientific purposes’, but more importantly further ‘the stated goal of the wise Austrian government, namely the general intellectual tendency of the nations to guide education and use the fruits of peace […]’.

An argument developed by the museum committee to secure the support of the Viennese court was that the museum, ‘like other cultural endeavors, would serve to preoccupy men whose public activities might otherwise turn to political opposition’ (ibid., 174). Accordingly, these ‘cultural’ projects and activities gained legitimacy within the framework of Metternich’s governance of empire. They also hint at the new intellectual affinity between provincial aristocrats and non-noble educated scholars. ‘Ultimately, learned societies and the friendships and intellectual connections formed within them eroded the Estates-based society at the same time that they provided a crucial institutional hub from
which the activity of the national movement radiated’ (Krueger 2009, 125). In April 1818, Count Berchtold and Joseph Jungmann, submitted their plan for the establishment of the *Nazional Museum*. ‘Although a more conservative vision for the National Museum ultimately won out over the Berchtold/Jungmann plan, it is clear that the museum … was part of a process whereby a cohesive and apparently seamless history and cultural past was grafted onto political territory’ (ibid., 176).

At this point one can note a material dimension of the correlation between secularisation and nationalism. A major condition for the success of the new province-based cultural institutions was that Josephism had previously dissolved numerous Catholic monasteries, the primary institutions holding libraries, collections and stocks reaching back to the Middle Ages. Thus, affluent aristocrats could get hold of these, in many cases donating them to newly established first provincial, then ‘national’ libraries and historical research institutions. One of the oldest examples is the *Biblioteca Nazionale* in Milan, founded by Maria Theresa, who donated collections after the dissolution of the Jesuits in 1773. The *Prager Zeitung* (22 May 1818) reported in detail which collections had been donated to the Bohemian museum by aristocrats such as Kolowrat, Prokop Hartmann, Kaspar and Joachim Sternberg, and August Lobkowitz (ibid., 184-85):

Censorship and money remained a problem for those outside such official institutions, but within them various obstacles could be avoided … Czech publications, which could be viewed as subversive given their intended effect, were provided with the smoke screen sanction of the museum as an officially accepted institution run by aristocrats who were often friends or acquaintances of Chancellor Metternich … Metternich had given money to the museum, after all, and in its form and original public intent, it resembled other provincial institutions.

The desire to construct a unified picture of Bohemia to be disseminated among the public was highlighted by the museum’s sponsoring of a new topography of Bohemia in the 1820s. ‘The method of collecting information for topographies reinforced the connections among the disparate parts of Bohemia, as the topographies dealt in what was similar, rather than different, about Bohemia’s citizens and their customs’ (ibid., 184). In 1823, Dobrovský proposed to the museum to work on a new volume of *Scriptores Rerum Bohemicarum* in Czech, collecting ancient rights associated with Bohemia. The ‘second generation’ of nationalist intellectuals was increasingly able to exercise intellectual leadership, illustrated by the changing references concerning the museum in its documents such as Fatherland’s Museum, Patriotic Fatherland’s Museum, Fatherland’s National Museum, National Bohemian Museum, National-Institute and National Museum (ibid., 172).
A prominent example that illustrates the central role of functionaries is that of Palacký, who was appointed historiographer of the Bohemian estates and enjoyed leading positions in the *Bohemian Museum*, the *Royal Bohemian Society of Sciences* and the Czech Matice (Baar 2010, 32). He was the chair of a committee that organised the collection of funds for the construction of the National Theatre in Prague, which was eventually built in 1868. It is worth noting that most nationalist intellectuals of the ‘second generation’ did not play a significant role in Austrian academia, where the conflicts between the ‘first’ and ‘second generation’ of nationalist intellectuals was largely ill received by senior scholars. Drawing on their own scholarly institutions these actors were able to control recruitment (ibid., 84-89). Due to the regime’s ideological stance, it is not surprising that ‘Palacky was among the first scholars to be elected to the Austrian Academy of Arts and Sciences’ (ibid., 82). The Hungarian nationalist intellectual Horvath was similarly elected to the Hungarian Academy in 1841 (ibid., 83).

The government supported the publication of scientific journals in Italian, which were intended to diffuse the newly standardised literary language and to enhance economic modernisation of the respective provinces. Many of these journals became vehicles to avoid censorship and to disseminate nationalist ideology (Gernert 1993, 70). Metternich supported the foundation of the *Biblioteca Italiana* in 1816, an Italian-speaking newspaper that was joined by oppositional figures (Rumpler 1997, 165). Already in November 1815 the Austrian governor in Milan, Franz Sarau, had ‘proclaimed the foundation of a new official Milanese newspaper, the *Gazzetta di Milano*, which was subscribed by all public institutions (Boaglio 2003, 209).

In Galicia, Metternich supported both Polish and Ruthenian cultural activities. Emperor Leopold had granted an estates constitution to a delegation led by the aristocrat Jozef Maksymiljan Tenczin-Ossoliński. After consulting with the censorship office in Vienna, Ossoliński was later granted permission to publish the first Polish-nationalist newspaper *Yearbook of Polish Patriots* and was appointed by Metternich into a leading position in the Royal Library. Under his patronage, the *Dictionary of the Polish language* was published in Vienna in 1814, where also the ‘Monuments of patriotic history’ were collected and the approval for the foundation of a Polish National Institute in Lemberg (*Ossolineum*, the Ossoliński library and research institute) was granted in 1817 (Rumpler 1997, 158). During the 1820s, ‘Vienna ‘courted’ Galician Poles through a number of pro-Polish gestures’ (Vushko 2015, 111). Especially the young governor of Galicia Alexander Lobkowitz, an influential Bohemian aristocrat and protégé of Francis II, ‘supported the general
liberalization of Austrian policies toward Galicia’ (ibid.). As a result of his lobbying, the government created a chair for Polish language and literature at Lemberg University in 1826. In the following year, ‘he financially supported the construction of the Ossoliński Library, which eventually became a major center of Polish cultural and political life in Galicia’ (ibid.).

Following Count Stadion’s engagement for the promotion of a distinct Ruthenian national culture, the government had already earlier supported the transfer of the Ukraine-Uniate theology faculty (Slavic Catholicism) from the University of Vienna to Lemberg in 1808, in order to root it regionally and to promote a Ruthenian nationality (Siemann 2010, 106-7). In 1819 the first chair of Ruthenian language and literature was founded at the University of Lemberg and Ruthenian became the official language of instruction at the theology faculty. In a speech of the rector, in which he addressed the governor in Lemberg 1818, the former spoke explicitly of a ‘Ruthenian university’ (Remer 1993, 279). In 1834, Joseph Lewyckyj published the first draft of a standardised Ruthenian grammar (ibid.). The Vienna government generally supported activities that aimed at the creation of Catholic-Slavic nationalities, implicitly opposed to Orthodox-Slavic national projects that gravitated around imperial Russia. There were several Austrian attempts to support Southern Slavic national projects, most remarkably the Croatian/Illyrian example (Hobsbawm 1996, 143).

State authorities turned to the province-based institutions regarding questions of language of instruction and schoolbooks. Correspondingly, one can identify a new strand of textbooks that reproduced nationality as a cultural-linguistic concept and naturalised it by drawing on census data and new historiographies. The older modernist narratives of universal ‘civilizational progress’ were replaced by a new perspective that focussed on primordial nations. An example represents the ‘Literary Collection of Historical Classics of all Nations’ of 1817. The ‘naturalisation’ of national cultures can also be observed in a contemporary textbook for Physical and Political Geography by Johann Gottfried Sommer, published in 1839. When discussing Austria’s population, the author highlights its diversity, which he compares to that of the Russian empire. The author refers to statistical census data of 1830 and differentiates four ‘main peoples’ (Hauptvölker) among a total population of 33.4 millions. The ‘Germans’ he accounts for 6.2 millions, the ‘Slavs’, which he differentiates into Tschechen, Hanaken, Slowaken, Polen, Rusniaken, Wenden/Winden/Slowenen, Kroaten, Slavonier, Serben and Morlaken, he accounts for 15.65 millions. The ‘Hungarians or Magyars’ he accounts for 4.5 millions and the ‘Italians’ he accounts for 4.65 million. As ‘minor peoples’ (Nebenvölker) he refers to Walachen (1,82
millions), ‘Greeks’ (4,000), ‘Armenians’ (13,500), ‘Jews’ (475,000), ‘Albanians’ and ‘Romani’ or Zigeuner (110,000) (Sommer 1839, 5-6).

This presentation suggested an essentialist conception of nationalities as measurable groups. With such scientific representations in textbooks, the conservative regime promoted the dissemination of its multiculturalist ideology among schoolchildren and students. Consequently nationality lost its voluntaristic and statist meaning of the Josephist project, which had propagated the civilizational development of a public language, facilitating mutual communication and collective identification.

The publication of newspapers represented a growing commercial sector that contributed to the spread of standardised literary languages, often accompanied by nationalist ideological content. An indicator of the regime’s nationality policy was the rising number of journals and newspapers published in Vienna in other languages than German, which included Greek, Serbian, Croatian, Magyar and Czech. The Croatian language was first cultivated as a modern literary language in Vienna, where Antun Mihanović, who studied Law at the University of Vienna until 1817, wrote a piece in 1815, which articulated a linguistically defined concept of Croatian (Illyrian) nationality. He further composed the famous song ‘Our beautiful fatherland’ (Liepa nase domovina) and attempted to establish the Croatian-speaking newspaper Oglasnik ilierski in 1818 (Winter 1969, 97). The Illyrian/Croatian national intellectual Gai, who came to Vienna in 1828, founded the Croatian-speaking cultural associations Illirske noviny and the Illirski klub, which was also established in Graz (ibid., 175). From 1835 onwards Gai published the Croatian language newspaper Croatian Gazette (later called Illyrian National Gazette) in Zagreb, representing an attempt to produce a standardised Croatian literary language beyond local Slavic dialects (Hobsbawn 1996, 136). Vienna had been similarly important for the cultivation of a Serbian literary language, which contributed to rising Serbian cultural nationalism. Dimitrije Davidovic, for instance, had founded the first ‘Serbian Newspaper’ (Novine serpske iz carstvujuscega) in Vienna in 1813. Similarly, the first Greek language newspapers were founded in Vienna, which was inhabited by Greek merchants, who had their own schools as a minority outside the Ottoman realm (Rumpler 1997, 154-215).

In the Romanian case a number of writers engaged in the development of a Romanian literary culture, which they linked to the idea of an ancient Daco-Romanian nation and a ‘national rebirth’. The Daco-Romanian movement gained ground in Transylvania, especially in its urban centre of Hermannstadt (Sibiu/Nagyszeben) that was inhabited by a significant German-speaking bourgeoisie, although first attempts to establish a newspaper in
the Romanian language still failed due to limited demand. One of the first Romanian-language newspapers was eventually founded in Vienna. Similar projects were promoted in the Bukovina by a group of writers between 1803 and 1816. One received the official permission of the Austrian authorities to be published under the title ‘Chrestomaticul Romanescu’ (Prokopowitsch 1965, 12-15). In Moldova and Walachia the so-called ‘Philharmonic Society’, led by writers and officers such as Campineanu, Voinescu, Magheru and Tell, became the centre of ‘cultural-private’ activities (ibid., 16). Lajos Kossuth’s agitation for a Hungarian-Magyar state-nation project that included Transylvania stimulated the development of a counter-project by Romanian national intellectuals. The anti-Josephist policies of the Vienna government led to a quite positive re-interpretation of Austria as an empire that protects the ‘Romanian people’. This narrative, which had its roots in a proposal made by a Romanian delegation to Leopold II, began to spread after 1821 (ibid., 18). However, the goal of nationalist intellectual circles to create a formal Romanian province in order to receive protection and autonomy against Hungarian-Magyar domination was not achieved (ibid., 19).

After Kossuth was released from prison under an amnesty in 1840 and became editor of the Hungarian-Magyar nationalist newspaper Pesti Hirlap, he asked Metternich for financial support in 1841. When Metternich offered Kossuth only moderate payments for articles propagating a conservative position, Kossuth left even more passionately nationalist, soon turning the Pesti Hirlap ‘into a powerful organ by the brilliance of his invective against everything emanating from Vienna’ (Palmer 1972, 285). The paper’s aggressive oppositional stance led Szechenyi to urge the authorities to reinforce censorship. Metternich attempted to counter Kossuth’s agitation against Vienna by supporting ‘moderate’ nationalists like Szechenyi and by organising an Austro-Hungarian Committee of supposedly reliable, conservative magnates (ibid.). A similar case was that of the Hungarian newspaper Tudományos Gyűjtemény (Scientific Collection), which received its licence to be published in Pest from 1817 to 1841, despite severe warnings by the Viennese police in 1820. With its nationalist agitation, it contributed substantially to growing anti-Austrian sentiments. Vienna also supported Ljudevit Gaj’s nationalist newspaper Danica Ilirska founded in 1834/35, which was only shut down by authorities in 1843, when the national project of ‘Greater Serbia’ in association with the famous Načertanije led to concrete forms of a ‘Slavic politics’ (Rumpler 2006, 7-8).
5.3.4. Government Responses to Crises Involving Nationality

The period was generally characterised by indifference towards nationality. As Langsam (1930, 182) notes, ‘[a] few nationalists continued to spread their ideas in word and deed, but their number was surprisingly small. Perhaps the indifference of the masses made the few apostles all the more fervent in their prosecution of the cause.’ As a result of Vienna-led bureaucratic and legal reforms, the provincial elites in Lombardy-Venetia became increasingly alienated. This had only little immediate effect ‘on the ground’ due to the provinces’ fragmentation and diversity (Rumpler 1997, 164). From 1819 onwards a radical nationalist camp evolved among Italian intellectuals and Metternich adopted his typical strategy of responding first with strict police measures, to be followed in a second step by granting amnesties and offering cooperation. In 1820, a wave of arrests resulted in the imprisonment of many nationalist intellectuals, 19 of whom faced death penalties for treason and 40 were sent to a high security prison in Styria. Strikingly, all of the prisoners were granted amnesty between 1830 and 1832 (ibid., 167). The limited appeal of national projects and the lack of national sentiments among the lower social strata are illustrated by the events that took place in the wake of the French July Revolution in 1830 and the upheavals of 1846. The year 1830 saw ‘a wave of attacks on nobility and noble privileges in many parts of central and eastern Europe, most drastically the following year in northern Hungary, today’s Slovakia’ (Sperber 2005, 43). These conflicts lacked any significant articulation as national antagonisms. Similarly, the repercussions of attempted anti-Austrian insurrections in Italy remained limited (ibid., 63):

Some of the larger and the more serious of these efforts include one carried out by German student conspirators in Frankfurt am Main in 1833; a major attempt by Mazzini’s Young Italy the following year; one in Paris under Blanqui’s leadership in 1839; one in the Austrian province of Galicia by Polish activists in 1846; and one in southern Italy that year. All were dismal failures.

Particularly worthy of attention is the stance of Vienna, which did not use socioeconomic conflicts between peasants and noble landowners to expand the state’s leverage by playing the ‘peasant card’. In the Polish case, Metternich’s response was characterised by cooperative practices and an affirmative nationality policy. In 1830 the Austrian governor of Galicia Alexander Lobkowitz, a Bohemian aristocrat with close ties to Kolowrat and the Schwarzenberg family, ‘gave assurances that, in the event of a Polish revolution therein, Vienna would extend its support to independence-seekers against the tsar’ (Vushko 2015, 106). Already in 1828, when ‘he saw the war in the Balkans as a chance to … reconstruct an independent Poland … he opened a session of the Galician Diet in Lemberg wearing traditional Polish apparel and giving a speech in Polish’ (ibid., 113-14).
The Polish insurrection of 1830 demonstrated that the Ossolineum had become a centre of nationalist activities, evident by its 49 secret publications, including Mickiewicz’ *Books of the Polish People and the Polish Pilgrimage*. Metternich decided to shut down the institute’s library and printing press (Rumpler 1997, 160). ‘By January 1831, the disagreement between Lobkowitz and Metternich had come to a head: the former insisted that an independent Poland would serve Austria as a key security buffer against Russia, while Metternich feared, with reason, that any independent Polish state could lay claim to Austrian Galicia, and thus endanger the integrity of the Habsburg Monarchy’ (Vushko 2015, 118). Vienna decided to isolate the Polish revolutionaries in order not to harm its alliance with Russia. However, Lobkowitz rescued Polish revolutionaries with the support of the Austrian embassy in Warsaw. ‘Some of the Polish refugees remained in Galicia after 1831, while many others travelled farther west, to Paris, which during the 1830s became a center of Polish emigration and political conspiracies. Refugees in the French capital would prepare a new uprising that would bear even more directly on Galicia’ (ibid., 121).

After the insurrection in Russia’s ‘Congress Poland’ in 1830/31, the Tsar realised that his support for Polish cultural and political rights on the basis of its ‘historical constitution’ had failed to prevent the development of a Polish political movement. Prussia and Russia agreed to offer the Republic of Cracow to Austria, hoping that this move would help to solve their own ‘Polish problem’ (Rumpler 1997, 161). In response to the renewed alliance of Russia, Austria and Prussia, various oppositional movements such as the ‘Young Poland’ and the ‘Union of the Polish People’ gained popularity. Even the Austrian liberal camp declared their support for the Polish cause, joined by patriotic writers such as Lenau and Grillparzer. By the same token Kossuth held a speech in 1831, declaring, ‘the Polish cause is the cause of the whole of Europe’ (ibid., 160).

The Austrian response was according to its idiosyncratic governance of empire. After Metternich had ordered the detention of leading Polish nationalist agitators such as Dr. Franciszek Smolka and Dr. Florian Ziemalkowski, both facing death penalty for treason against the Austrian state, he eventually offered cooperation. Both were granted amnesty and rose in Austrian politics in the post-Metternich era. Smolka became first president of the Austrian parliament in 1848, and later, president of the imperial council in Vienna (1881-1893). Ziemalkowski was appointed Imperial Minister, serving in the cabinet between 1873 and 1888 (Rumpler 1997, 160). Metternich also maintained some connections with the Polish nationalist emigration in Paris, which illustrates his cooperative approach. One factor that supported the success of Metternich’s politics was the internal class conflict.
within Galicia, where rebellious peasants confronted the Polish noble Szlachta (Taylor 1990, 60-61). The mismatch between the regime’s category of ‘nationality’ and the subjectivity of peasants came to the fore in the context of the 1846 uprising. Galician peasants joined the counter-revolutionary camp and massacred hundreds of nobles and estate managers, whom they described as ‘Poles’, using it as a category of class. A Habsburg official recalls the following dialogue taking place in Vienna (Sperber 2005, 43):

‘We have brought Poles.’
‘Poles, how could that be,’ I answered, ‘what are you?’
‘We aren’t Poles, we are the emperor’s peasants.’
‘Who are the Poles then?’ ‘Oh - the Poles!
They are the lords, their estate managers, their clerks, the
learned men, the well-dressed gentlemen.’

In 1848 Polish nationalists attempted to stage another uprising but again faced fierce resistance among peasants. They complained that Austrian government officials supported the establishment of a ‘Ruthenian Council’ in Lemberg and had promoted the idea that the Eastern part of Galicia was inhabited by Ruthenians. Polish nationalists asked supposedly ‘[h]ow many nationalities have they [the Austrian government] left to invent?’ While defending their own Polish national project, they attempted to deconstruct Ruthenian nationality through an instrumentalist lens, describing Ukrainians as ‘Russian Austrians, alias Ruthenians, invented in the laboratory of Count Stadion’ (quoted in Sperber 2005, 143). The complexity of intersecting issues of class, language and confession is illustrated by the situation of Galicia’s Jewish inhabitants (Baron 1951, 63):

Jewish public opinion was understandably divided and … caught the spirit of extreme Polish nationalism only in the former Republic of Cracow. In other parts of the country, particularly in eastern Galicia, Jewish espousal of the Polish cause was mitigated by staunch Habsburg loyalties and consideration of the Ruthenian problem. The linguistic aspects were no less significant, inasmuch as only a small minority spoke Polish, whereas the majority spoke Yiddish and studied Hebrew. A small layer of the intelligentsia turned to German.

Metternich’s response to the Hungarian crisis in the 1840s shared the central traits of his Italian and Polish policies, reflecting the regime’s governance of empire. While some moderate Hungarian nationalists such as István Széchenyi planned to modernise Hungary in cooperation with Vienna, the radical camp led by Kossuth succeeded in expanding its ideological and social base. Metternich’s support of cultural and economic development failed to absorb rising discontent among the Hungarian gentry and bourgeoisie. Metternich had supported the empowerment of the Hungarian Estates, which gave the Hungarian-Magyar national movement an institutional point of reference to project historical continuity
back to the *Bulla Aurea* (1222) and the *Opus tripartium* (1514). Although the Hungarian Diet had not been constituted after 1811, it was the court in Vienna that called for its constitution in 1825. The conditions were prepared for the rise of a province-based political movement, co-opted by Hungarian-Magyar nationalists, who declared the ‘age of reform’ (*reformkor*) (Rumpler 1997, 172). As the Magyar-speaking urban bourgeoisie was still insignificant - the inhabitants of the main cities were still substantially German-speaking, as was Hungary’s higher aristocracy with links to Vienna - its primary social base was the gentry (ibid., 170).

The short-term success of Metternich’s anti-Josephist programme towards Hungarian political empowerment was linked to its ability to meet the landed interests of the Hungarian magnates in their opposition to the German-speaking urban bourgeoisie and the peasants. Beside this economic dimension, Vienna also supported the development of a ‘Hungarian-Magyar’ national culture. In 1837, a Hungarian National Theatre was established in Pest, funded by donations. In 1844, the Hungarian National Opera was opened, staging works with nationalist ideological content like the *Hymnus*, which eventually became Hungary’s national anthem, and the *Bank Ban*, which would become Hungary’s classical national opera, strikingly centred on the execution of a tyrannic foreign queen (Rumpler 1997, 173).

Despite his efforts of brokerage, Metternich’s ‘attempts after 1839 to find a workable compromise between the demands of Hungarian nationalists and Vienna’s insistence on control’ failed (Schroeder 1994, 775). The conservative Hungarian ‘reform party’ dissolved and split into two camps. While some magnates and moderate nationalists remained within Metternich’s conservative alliance, there emerged a nationalist anti-Austrian political movement under the leadership of Kossuth, who was ideologically influenced by Mazzini’s *Risorgimento* movement and was joined by influential aristocrats such as Istvan Deák. Kossuth’s ‘Young Hungary’ used the newspaper *Pesti Hirlap* for agitation, spreading the movement’s programme that articulated demands for a representative parliament, a pro-Magyar electoral system and legal equality of all citizens. In 1842 Kossuth won over the ‘moderate’ reform party and the majority of the Hungarian Diet (Rumpler 1997, 175).

Increasing government paralysis after 1835 reduced Vienna’s capacity for brokerage in the light of empowered provincial actors. From the viewpoint of the regime, nationalities were initially perceived as complementary components of imperial society. However, after 1835 Metternich’s ‘policy towards national minorities reflected tensions within the Conference of State. Kolowrat was a warm champion of both Palacký and Gaj, and Archduke John had shown a sympathetic interest in Illyrianism’ (Palmer 1972, 287).
Metternich’s distinction between cultural nationality and political nationalism became increasingly difficult to maintain (ibid.):

He distrusted Magyar nationalism as exemplified by Kossuth and he also regarded three of the Slav movements as dangerous, ‘Polonism’, ‘Czechism’ and ‘Illyrianism’, which he had earlier patronized … [H]e had turned finally against Polish national sentiment at Münchgrätz in 1833, and he remained convinced of the rightness of his decision. Czech sentiment he had discounted so long as it was largely cultural … ‘Illyrianism’ was too pan-Slavonic to be any longer acceptable in the Chancellery, for Metternich had no wishes to see Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and perhaps even the Bulgars united under the Tsar’s patronage, especially when he found that during the Eastern Crisis of 1840 Ljudevít Gaj, the Illyrian messiah, was fomenting trouble in Turkish Bosnia and taking money from Russian agents. Yet, while frowning on these three ‘advanced’ forms of Slav national-consciousness, Metternich was still ready to encourage in 1843 the specifically Croatian national revival (even under Gaj) and he also found much to commend in the virtues of the Slovaks, among whom national sentiment was yet hardly vocal.

In Hungary, like in Lombardo-Venetia and Galicia, regime policies solved urgent problems in the short term, while turning out to create new problems for the state in the long term. Metternich’s governance of empire succeeded in rendering ‘[o]ppositional political activity in or out of the Estates … virtually nonexistent in the decades after the Napoleonic Wars’ (Krueger 2009, 192). Regime responses to crises were generally moderate, rarely depending on the army (Rumpler 1997, 200-2). When the central state was challenged in 1848/49, Metternich’s governance of empire fulfilled its conservative function by setting the regime’s Illyrian-Croatian and Bohemian-Slavic allies against the Austrian-liberal constitutional movement and Kossuth’s Hungarian-Magyar separatist movement. The regime’s recurrent reliance on cooperation as a method of government is illustrated by its decision to abandon Apponyi’s plan to dissolve the Hungarian parliament, giving in to Széchenyi’s protests despite the dangerous rise of Kossuth’s militant camp (Srbik 1957b, 258).

5.4. Anti-Josephism and the Transformation of Nationalism

In 1831 Karl Friedrich Kübeck described Metternich’s mission in his diary as follows (quoted in Blum 1948, 31): ‘The Prince [Metternich] believes himself … called to combat the demon of democracy in Europe. It will only be possible for the judgement of an unbiased future to decide whether, how far, and through what means he accomplishes this task.’ The regime’s idiosyncratic governance of empire tackled two major political problems in opposition to radical Josephist and Austrian-liberal modernisation: 1.) In terms of social structure it facilitated the development of bourgeois segments that were
provincially and linguistically demarcated. 2.) In terms of political collective identity it aimed at preventing any organisation and representation on the ‘Austrian’ state level, which it associated with demands for representative constitutionalism.

5.4.1. Organic Intellectuals of National Projects Pushing for a ‘Cultural-Public’ Phase

The 1830s were characterised by the transition of several provincial national movements from a ‘cultural-private’ to a ‘cultural-public’ phase. The major incentives for non-noble scholars to engage in nationalist endeavours were immediate socioeconomic opportunities and a potentially rising social status in the near future. That many of the discussed intellectuals did not speak their ‘national language’ as their mother tongue but decided to do so at some point in life indicates that it was a matter of personal choice. The political context of this reorientation was the retreat of the central state from its function as the guardian of German-speaking Austrian bourgeois culture.

The case of the Austrian governor of Galicia, August Lobkowitz, ‘is the most prominent example of an imperial official who “went local”’ (Vushko 2015, 106). ‘By the late 1820s, the governor was boasting of his Polish roots, even claiming to be a descendant of the Piast family that had ruled medieval Poland, and that his ancestors had moved to Bohemia only in the fifteenth century. Lobkowitz seemed to have forgotten his Bohemian ties - his only actual verifiable aristocratic pedigree - and decided to become a Pole’ (ibid., 112). After returning to Vienna and entering the domain of finance, his engagement for the Polish national cause quickly disappeared from his agenda. A personal factor contributing to the growing number of Austrian bureaucrats who joined the ‘Polish cause’ was that many wed Polish women and felt attracted to the Polish aristocracy. ‘These bureaucrats, one must remember, had arrived in the province tasked with bringing German culture, politics, and civilization into formerly Polish terrains. By marrying Polish women, hence involving themselves in Polish cultural and political life, these officials accomplished, in effect, the opposite of their purported mission’ (ibid., 128).

Another factor contributing to the socio-economic incentives as well as to the growing public perception of nationalist intellectuals was the contemporary rise of newspapers and journals. Similar to other nationalist intellectuals of the second generation, the Bohemian-Czech intellectuals Palacký and Havliček began to enter the public realm in the function of ‘organic intellectuals’ of their national project through the media of popular historiographical and journalistic works in the 1830s, when Austrian civic life - still facilitated through the German language - became increasingly politicised. It is worth
highlighting ‘the lack of facility of many of the Slavic nationalist leaders of the 1830s and 1840s in their “own” language. Prominent Czech nationalists spoke and wrote German far better than they did Czech. Ukrainian nationalists of the 1840s often spoke Polish far better than they did Ukrainian. During the revolution of 1848, the leading Croatian nationalist newspaper would be the Italian-language L’Avvenire, published in the Adriatic port city of Dubrovnik, or as its Italian-speaking inhabitants called it, Ragusa’ (Sperber 2005, 100). There are numerous further examples that confirm the noted pattern (Evans 2006, 110):

Take the Magyar leadership in the 1830s and 1840s: Széchenyi, Kossuth, Eötvös, Petőfi. Take the Poles of the generation of Lelewel and Mickiewicz, tensed by the extra dynamic of emigration, as they clung to Polish values in a foreign environment. Take the musical trio of Liszt, Chopin, and Smetana. Take the many cases among Austrian Slavs. There, too, we find a large number of ‘converts’: from Dobrovský [1753-1829, part of the first generation], who taught himself Bohemian but always wrote, and usually spoke, in German, to the next generation of Czechs by deliberate choice; the circle around František Palacký [1798-1876], a sort of amphibious Czechoslovak, perfectly at home with Hungarian, and sufficiently Germanic for the parliamentarians at Frankfurt in 1848 notoriously to account him one of their own; the men around Ljudevit Gaj, the more-or-less German-born founder of a movement which persuaded Croats to abandon Latin in favour of a quasi-Serbian patois.

Even Palacký continued to use the German language within his family until the 1860s. The historian Evans (2006, 109) asks accordingly, ‘Why … should they deliberately create enclaves, and by writing serious works in the vernacular, a vernacular often modelled on the pedantries of the Latin or German schoolroom, make a conscious virtue of provincialism?’ It seems to make sense in the context of a growing educated bourgeoisie rooted in the provinces, seeking social upward mobility, while the state was in permanent fiscal trouble, unable to provide sufficient public jobs. Many young intellectuals hoped that their respective national projects would become ‘the platform for greater influence, if reconstituted in terms of language and history, which scholars - rather than the traditional hierarchy, social or religious - would determine’ (Evans 2006, 109). This ‘second generation’ of aspiring nationalist intellectuals, who ‘did not act under the constraint of a preordained ‘mother tongue’” (ibid.), engaged in the systematic articulation of a cultural antagonism between centre and periphery, Vienna and the province (Gellner 1996b, 120):

Nationalism presents itself as the reaffirmation of the culture of the village green against the cold putative universalism of some courtly or industrial or bureaucratic language: the village against Versailles or the Hofburg and the Viennese coffeehouse … But in fact, villagers themselves seldom if ever have the confidence, the resources, the organizational or conceptual means, or even the inclination, to fight for their own culture against city, court, or industrial complex … The people who do organize and agitate for a culture are the atomized, anonymous members of an industrial or
industrializing society, eager not to be disadvantaged in the new world ..., so as to give them maximum professional prospects and psychic comfort.

Identifying with a ‘cultural nationality’ remained a socially limited and predominantly bourgeois phenomenon, which at that stage represented a contingent choice.

5.4.2. Connecting Top-Down and Bottom-Up Dynamics

The regime’s nationality policy indicates a shift in the state’s approach to subjects and facilitated two seemingly contradictory processes: the state’s expanding infrastructural power over its subjects, as well as the growing organisational and intellectual capacities of province-based nationalist actors, who engaged in the writing of provincial histories and the cultivation of newly standardised ‘national’ literary cultures. While Josephism had aimed at reducing the complexity of political rule through the structure of a unitary state, Metternich’s reform plans reinstated principles of ‘divide and rule to secure particularistic segmental allies, political insiders, and to encourage ‘outs’ to moderate their opposition in the hope of getting back in’ (Mann 1993, 64). Although the regime attained moderate insulation, under modern conditions ‘the balance of power contained in this alliance may work in the opposite direction: The particularistic civil society group may effectively “colonize” part of the state, using it against other state elites or more general power actors’ (ibid.). It was precisely this ‘two-way’ street of infrastructural power that rendered Metternich’s nationality policy ineffective in terms of containment in the long-term. The regime’s governance enabled the transformation of province- and language-based clubs and ‘cultural-private’ associations into ‘cultural-public’ national organisations (Siemann 1995, 226-28; Rumpler 1997, 157-60).

Regime policy affected the development of provincially rooted bourgeoisies, whose position towards Vienna was ambiguous. While Austrian bourgeois organisations on the state level were suppressed, province-based organisations enjoyed official support (Drobesch 2006, 1029-32). In 1816, the Viennese entrepreneur Heinrich Hopf followed French and English examples and attempted to establish an ‘association for the promotion of national [vaterländisch] commerce’, which was vetoed by the royal commission of commerce. In contrast, strictly province-based organisations such as the ‘association for the promotion of industry in Bohemia’, which was founded in 1834 with the function to support the Czech-speaking bourgeoisie against the German-speaking one, were officially supported (Hroch 1993, 234). Another example is the ‘Lower Austrian Commercial Club’ (1839), which was initially founded as supra-regional Österreichischer Gewerbeverein (1838) and prohibited. After it accommodated itself within the province-based federal structure, it
developed significant political influence, counting 1,129 members in 1846 (Drobesch 2006, 1034-35). The Innerösterreichische Gewerbeverein (Inner-Austrian Commercial Club) is another example of an originally ‘Austrian’ organisation that represented the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie. Founded in the pre-dominantly German-speaking Austrian ‘core’ provinces in 1837, it soon established branches in Slovene-speaking regions such as in Laibach/Ljubljana and grew from 357 members in March 1838 to 2,391 in 1847. In line with regime policies, its membership structure regressed into a purely German-speaking one (ibid., 1032).

Figure 15. Members of the ‘Inner-Austrian-Commercial Club’ by Province, 1838/1847 [Drobesch 2006, 1033]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1838</th>
<th>1847</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Styria</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carniola</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Austria</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Austria</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Littoral</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohemia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moravia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalmatia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrol</td>
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</table>

The government’s language policy affected socio-economic incentive structures and undermined the traditionally dominant position of the German-speaking bourgeoisie, which had been unevenly spread across the monarchy, often concentrated in cities. ‘Prague, the capital of Bohemia, was much like Brno (Brünn) and Olomouc (Olmütz) in Moravia, Opava (Troppau) in Silesia, and Ljubljana (Laibach) and Maribor (Marburg) in Carniola: each had a substantial German-speaking population despite the large majority of Czech- or Slovene-speaking peasants in the immediate hinterland’ (Cohen 2006, 18-19). One reason was that middle class segments like ‘aristocrats, state officials, army officers, higher clergy, professionals, the wealthier merchants, and manufacturers in Prague … were educated exclusively in German and conducted their business and professional affairs in German’ (ibid., 19). As both the Listian model of economic integration as well as the liberal-constitutional political model was rejected, neither the subject position of the individual ‘citizen’ nor the ideal of societal and economic participation was reinforced by the state. Instead, subjects were collectivised in reference to seemingly ‘natural’ regional vernaculars and historical provinces.
On the basis of Metternich’s estates constitutions the regime’s conservative alliance had the effect of bringing together aristocrats, the clergy and eventually certain bourgeois segments as representatives of the political-territorial provinces. The ‘bourgeoisification’ of the provincial estates became visible in the growing inclusion of non-nobles as members of the estates on the basis of ‘property and education’, economic, bureaucratic or intellectual influence. This so-called ‘honourable membership’ accounted for 13 per cent of new members in Lower Austria, 38 per cent in Upper Austria, and 49 per cent in Styria (Bruckmüller/Stekl 1995, 187). Metternich’s conservative alliance reinforced ideological assumptions regarding national cultures, as well as provincial autonomies, both representing the common ground for cooperation between the province-based nobility, nationalist intellectuals, and Vienna. The conservative aristocrat Andrian-Werburg expressed his observation of a culturally divided population as follows: ‘There is no such thing as Austrians or an Austrian nation … there are only different nationalities’ (quoted in Sked 2008, 185). Nationalist intellectuals like Palacký or Kogalniceanu similarly shared Metternich’s multi-culturalist ideology (Baar 2010, 216-18). Palacký’s support for Austria as a multinational empire was famously expressed in his letter to the Frankfurt parliament in 1848 (quoted in Sutter Fichtner 1997, 138-39):

This nation [Czech] is small, it is true, but from time immemorial it has existed independently with its own identity … The entire world knows that the German emperors … had very little throughout the centuries to do with the Czech nation, that they had no legal, political, or executive competence within Bohemia nor over the Czechs [...].
Certainly, if the Austrian state were not already in existence from long ago, it would have been in the interest of Europe, indeed of humanity itself, to begin work as soon as possible to create it … Because in the lamentable blindness of long duration, it has not recognized the real legal and moral basis of its existence and has denied it: that is, the fundamental precept that all the nations unified under its scepter and all religious faiths together enjoy equal rights and nurturing.

Especially in Prague, Bohemian-Czech nationalist activities contributed to the growth of national identifications among urban Czech-speaking segments. While in the 1820s Palacký’s Czech-speaking museum journal could hardly find any subscribers among the bourgeoisie and was dependent on donations from aristocrats who feared the extinction of the Czech language, in the 1840s the Matice Česká already received contributions from hundreds of people. Another achievement was the successful campaign for the establishment of a distinct Bohemian-Czech ‘industrial school’, in analogy to Metternich’s German-speaking Polytechnical schools (Hroch 1993, 234). Similar to Polish nationalists’ focus on artisans in small towns as a means of building up an organic bourgeoisie during the
1830s, the Bohemian Czech national movement supported the foundation of institutions and organisations that satisfied new economic and educational demands.

The Czech language increasingly became a category of ‘national’ inclusion/exclusion. Hroch (2003, 201) for instance notes that Jungmann articulated various social and economic issues in linguistic terms as ‘Czech’ versus ‘German’. By connecting linguistic difference to notions of social inequality and economic backwardness, he offered an alternative to the miserable status quo: a new ‘national’ path to modernisation through autonomous development in opposition to the German-speaking ‘society’ associated with Vienna. One must keep in mind that the prestige and authority of nationalist intellectuals such as Jungmann and Palacký was still low and they were sometimes perceived as engaging in a hopeless dream (Hroch 2003, 202). Only several decades later some of these intellectuals would become celebrated as ‘saviour of the nation’ (Jungmann) or ‘father of the nation’ (Palacký). In the Austrian-Bohemian provinces, the dominant political antagonism was still articulated between the Catholic clergy and privileged nobility on one side, and the Austrian centralist Josephists and political liberals on the other side. The clergy was disappointed as the government rejected to return secularised Church property and the nobility feared the abolition of the agrarian regime (ibid.). Bohemian-Czech nationalists maintained a cooperative relationship with various conservative forces, both in Vienna and on the provincial level (ibid., 203).

In the 1840s it was again the Vienna government that financed the single Czech-speaking newspaper of the time as an official government organ. The paper’s outstanding success was related to its editor Karel Havlíček (1821-1856), a close associate of Palacký. Havlíček succeeded in reaching out to wider social strata among the Czech-speaking population and made the newspaper the central organ of the Bohemian-Czech national movement. As Moravia remained oriented towards Vienna and the German-speaking bourgeoisie, its impact remained largely limited to Prague and small Bohemian towns (Hroch 1993, 235). When the revolution broke out in 1848, a group of Bohemian-Czech nationalist activists, comprising predominantly students, lawyers and writers, organised a public assembly (Polišenský 1980, 109-10). Despite their agitation, these nationalist activists remained without much resonance. Hroch (1993, 236) notes that in Moravia the Bohemian-Czech national movement succeeded in reaching a mass basis only in the 1880s.

The Hungarian-Magyar national movement entered a ‘cultural-public’ phase in the 1830s, before entering a ‘political phase’ in the late 1840s (Evans 2006, 203-4). In a letter
of June 1840, a Jewish Rabbi reported growing assimilation pressures to his friend Löw (Baron 1951, 93):

Schwab explained that he had used Hungarian, rather than German, first, because censorship was less rigid in the case of Hungarian publications, and secondly, because the rise of Hungarian nationalism made it increasingly inadvisable to use even German prayers and songs in the synagogue … Löw, too, soon became engrossed in the study of the Hungarian language and literature.

It is important to note that the Hungarian nationalist Széchenyi, who was part of Metternich’s conservative alliance, promoted a national economic development programme with an intrinsically political dimension as part of the ‘age of reform’. As Palmer (1972, 273) notes, ‘Metternich was suspicious of the political undertones which accompanied each of Széchenyi’s ideas; for was not even the [the toll] bridge [to link Buda and Pest] intended as a weapon against feudalism, since it declined to provide exemption for the nobility from paying a toll on crossing…?’ In 1844 Metternich organised a group of ‘progressive conservatives’ and proposed a policy of economic integration, as well as ‘a comprehensive public works programme’ (ibid., 286). This proposal did not only fail to distract from Hungarian political objectives but even gave Kossuth new material for his agitation against ‘a Vienna dominated Zollverein’ (ibid.). The Hungarian national movement began to enter a ‘political’ phase to the loss of ecclesiastical interests (Evans 2006, 166) and eventually turned into a separatist movement in the course of the 1848 revolution.

The Slovak national movement entered a ‘cultural-public’ phase only in response to major achievements of the Hungarian-Magyar national movement. This period saw the ideological decline of a historical territorial concept of Hungarian aristocratic nationality (Natio Ungarica), gradually replaced by a cultural-linguistic concept of Hungarian-Magyar nationality (Natio Magyarica). As Eva Kowalská (1993, 241) highlights, it was only with the exclusion of the Slavic-speaking population from the ascending ‘Hungarian-Magyar’ national project, which rendered the agitation of Slovak nationalist intellectuals meaningful for a larger social stratum. Drawing on the resources developed by pan-Slavic and Czecho-Slovak national intellectuals, Slovak nationalism became visible as a cultural-public movement in the mid-nineteenth century (Maxwell 2009).

In Galicia, the Polish national movement itself described the period between 1815 and 1830 as ‘the silent years’, characterised by intellectual activities. Scholars engaged in the systematic research of ‘Polish’ literary culture and history, from the pre-Christian period to the present (Brozek 1993, 82). This ‘cultural-private’ phase of intellectual activities prepared the foundations for the ‘cultural-public’ phase that began in the 1830s (Brock 1969, 316). The Polish uprising in Galicia in 1830/31 was limited to the nobility, whose
economic interest was opposed to that of the peasants. A central issue in discussions of peasant emancipation since the Josephist era was the abolition of the Fron (pańszczyzna) - peasants’ mandatory service to the lords - and land redistribution. The Polish aristocracy opposed both. The peasants’ lack of national sentiment led to resignation among Polish nationalists, many emigrating to France and England. In Galicia the economic antagonism between ‘Ruthenian’ peasants and ‘Polish’ lords remained a stabilising factor for the Vienna government, which supported both Polish and Ruthenian cultural activities. Metternich’s Ruthenian nationality policy was a cornerstone of his 1815 order, countering Russian influence and Polish political ambitions.

Crucial for the transition into a ‘cultural-public’ phase was the establishment of institutions that provided material and ideological resources for the education of a Polish bourgeoisie (Brozek 1993, 80). The new assimilation trend from German-speaking Austrian to Polish-speaking Galician is illustrated by the brothers Karl and Philipp Krauß, who were born into the family of a German-speaking Austrian civil servant in Lemberg. Karl held lectures at the University of Lemberg and eventually became Minister of Justice in Vienna 1851, and president of the Austrian parliament in 1867. His brother became Minister of Finance in 1849. While Karl maintained his ‘Austrian’ identity and developed an additional sense of Galician, regional identity, his brother’s family rejected the German language and a trans-regional Austrian identity, becoming fully ‘Polonised’ in the next generation (Rumpler 1997, 160).

Exemplary for the personal and ideological connections among the increasingly ‘cultural-public’ national movements of the 1830s and 1840s is the collaboration between the Italian Carbonari organisation, Giuseppe Mazzini’s Young Italy movement, and prominent Polish nationalist figures such as Lelewel, whose supporters got organised in the Komitet Narodowy Polski and subsequently as emigrants in the Zjednoczenie Emigracji Polskiej (1837-1846). This Polish movement largely accepted the established social order and proposed ‘a Polish society’ led by aristocrats and intellectuals. It incorporated a seemingly ‘liberal’ claim to restore the freedom of peasants in an independent Polish Republic on the territory of the pre-partitioned kingdom. While many provincial national movements presented feudalism as something alien to their originally free and equal societies, in reality, even ‘leftist’ nationalist organisations such as the Towarzystwo Demokratycyne Polskie (1832) did not touch upon the nobility’s monopoly on

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10 Mazzini attempted to organise Italians in exile, first in Marseille through his organisation Federazione della Giovine Italia, then in 1834 in Bern the Giovine Europa. This ‘Young Europe’ had beside the Italian section also a Polish and a German one (Gernert 1993, 58).
landownership (Podraza 1993, 99). The discussed Polish, Bohemian, and Hungarian province-based national movements that entered a ‘cultural-public’ phase in the 1830s were characterised by social conservatism, reflecting the ideological base of the conservative bloc. Lelewel, Palacký as well as Hungarian-Magyar nationalist intellectuals refrained from playing the peasant card and defended the interests of the landowning nobility.

The contemporary Italian national movement was fragmented between the various Italian states and concerned with theoretical debates. Three major camps can be distinguished within its larger network of intellectuals. First, a circle of literati, philosophers and writers, who included among others Vittorio Alfieri, Vincenzo Monti, Vincenzo Gioberti, Ugo Foscolo, Alessandro Manzoni and Madame de Stäel; second, a number of political revolutionary secret societies, especially the Carboneria (including Mazzini); and third, authors and journalists who engaged in the dissemination of a standardised Italian literary language and nationalist content (Gernert 1993, 57). Carlo Cattaneo, who propagated a federalist model of Italy, led the Italian national movement that entered a ‘cultural-public’ phase in the 1830s. His national project recognised the particularity of the Lombard region, similarly to the schemes of Manin, who defended Venetian particularism (ibid.). One common ideological thread was the narrative of an Italian Risorgimento. In his article ‘Dell’Unità Italiana’ (1834), Mazzini outlined his Republican nation-state project, in explicit opposition to Metternich’s European Concert. The Mazzinian programme represented a reversal of Metternich’s principles and suggested the fusion of cultural nationality with centralised political rule (Mazower 2013, 48-54). He argued that federalist constitutions protected feudal and aristocratic particularistic interests, while Republican, centralist constitutions enabled the formation of a volonté générale. The 1840s saw an intensification of debates on ‘national forms’ of political rule, economics and education. For Mazzini and Gioberti education had the function to form ‘the people’ (Popolo) (Gernert 1993, 65-66).

Compared to other regions, the Bukovina, a district of Galicia, appeared unsuitable for the application of Metternich’s multi-nationalist model. Instead, the previous Josephist state project had been quite successful under the conditions of the Bukovina’s linguistic diversity with its Rumanian, Ruthenian, German and Yiddish-speaking inhabitants. Many German- and Yiddish-speakers tended to identify economically as bourgeois subjects and politically as citizens of the state, rendering the ascription of ‘cultural nationality’ insignificant. Under Francis II, Rumanian nationalist activities in the Bukovina took largely place under the label of ‘culture’ and ‘schooling’, avoiding public expressions of political demands for autonomy.
In 1815, the education system in the Bukovina became integrated into the one of Galicia, with the consequence of a change in language of instruction from Rumanian to Polish, accompanied by attempts to Catholicise the students. This policy was linked to the government’s official recognition of the province’s supposedly dominant Polish nationality. A result was the emigration of Rumanian teachers and the withdrawal of many Rumanian-speaking students from school, making the autonomy of the Bukovina education system a key demand of the Rumanian national movement (ibid.). The societal coalition on which the Rumanian national movement in the Bukovina drew on was common to other discussed cases. It represented a network of intellectuals, aristocrats and priests, sharing a common view of a national project, to be pursued through cooperation with the government in Vienna that offered protection against the Russian and Ottoman empires.

In Transylvania, a Rumanian national movement first emerged in response to Hungarian-Magyar nationalist activities. The scholarly and literary activities during that period enabled the Rumanian national movement to enter a ‘cultural-public’ phase by the 1830s. Between 1800 and 1830 the selection of books printed in the Rumanian language, especially for Transylvania, Moldova and the Banat, reached the significant number of 693 (Ceausu 1993, 270). After an application for the publication of ‘a newspaper in the Moldavian language’ was still rejected by the authorities in Vienna in 1803, the conditions for ‘cultural’ activities became more favourable. Between 1811 and 1820, the teacher and alumni of the Orthodox theology seminar Vasile Tintila printed the first calendar in the Rumanian language, spreading poetry and literature fragments. In 1816 Teodor Racocoa, the son of a Rumanian lower aristocrat who got a position in the administration in Lemberg, finally succeeded to get permission for publishing an organ with economic and political content in the Rumanian language, explicitly, as he stated in his application, for the ‘Moldavian or Walachian nation’, whose members all share the Rumanian language (ibid., 270). With the beginning ‘cultural-public’ phase, the movement formulated demands for the public recognition of subjects’ ‘national language’ and ‘national history’. Depending on international context, it could swift between ‘cultural-public’ and ‘political’ phase. In 1843 various Rumanian nationalist activists demanded the national unification of Transylvania, the Bukovina, Walachia and Moldova under Habsburg rule (ibid., 271).

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter suggests that the regime created conditions for growing ‘cultural’ engagement in public life, which enabled a number of national movements to move into a
‘cultural-public’ phase. Regime policies largely succeeded in satisfying growing collective demands for public recognition and prevented major spill-over into oppositional politics. The following statement by Adolf Fischhof, a leading Austrian-liberal politician, taken from his speech on 13 March 1848, illustrates his awareness of the regime’s governance (Fischhof quoted in Malfer 2000, 31): ‘An ill-advised statecraft had divided Austria’s peoples so far; now they must brotherly unite and strengthen their forces through unification.’ The impact became subsequently evident in the Kremsier delegates’ consensus that ‘nationality’ represented a ‘cultural’ issue (Taylor 1990, 87). Another example that illustrates the ascendancy of a culturalist concept of nationality is that of the Austrian writer Adalbert Stifter (1805-1868), who, as a student in Vienna, began to identify as belonging to a ‘German nationality’. His ‘cultural ideology’ became later reflected in a reader, which he edited for high schools. Among the large number of selected writers and poets he included only five native Austrians (12.5 per cent), neglecting famous ones such as Grillparzer and Nestroy, while focussing on proper ‘German’ ones such as Goethe and Herder (Heindl 2013a, 216).

While the expansion of an urban bourgeoisie, linked to economic modernisation, was a necessary condition for the development of new cultural and political movements, Austrian government and state agency were shapers of the ideological, organisational, and institutional capacity of national movements, and determined the evolution of the bourgeoisie. As the conservative regime abandoned the Josephist mission of the state as the guardian of the Austrian German-speaking bourgeoisie and corresponding ‘high culture’, it created space for national movements to take up the function of guardianship towards their own particular ‘national cultures’. While ‘from above’ nationality became utilised by the regime’s governance of empire, provincial actors took up the ascending concept of ‘cultural nationality’ as a vehicle for expressing emancipation ‘from below’. Organisational forms that were imitated across central Europe included student fraternities, scholarly associations and choirs, providing models for the study and practice of ‘national community’. A consequence was the pluralisation of bourgeois ‘high culture’ in the sense of a ‘literate codified culture’ (Gellner 1996a, 368), and its official dissociation from the Habsburg state.

What this chapter has termed the ‘second generation’ of national intellectuals has not crystallised synchronically. The ideology of the ‘first generation’ was not competitive in terms of small and big nations nationalism. Miroslav ‘Hroch observes that this national agitation started very early in some cases, that is around 1800 (the Greeks, Czechs, Norwegians, Irish), one generation later in others (the Finns, Croats, Slovenes, Flemish,
Welsh), or even as late as the second half of the nineteenth century (Latvians, Estonians, Catalans, Basques) (Özkirimli 2017, 123). Hroch has argued that by 1800 there existed seven ‘state-nations’, England, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal and the Netherlands. At a later stage there also developed a Russian one, as well as a national unification project among Italian and German-speaking intellectuals, drawing on a developed literary language and commercial bourgeoisie. Although it became a common narrative that ‘ethnic groups’ were primarily located in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, especially in the particularly heterogeneous Austrian and Russian Empires, there were more than thirty ‘non-dominant ethnic groups’ located across nineteenth-century Europe, including many in Western Europe (Hroch 1993, 5).

In reference to the work’s phase model, this chapter has shown that neither the private-cultural nor the public-cultural phase of provincial national movements were caused by popular pressures against the modernising state but were initiated by a conservative alliance comprising aristocrats, the landed nobility, and bourgeois intellectuals. The two politico-ideological functions of modern nationalism, ‘statist’ and ‘populist’, help to explain the involved ideological processes in the construction of ‘national’ territories and populations in the provinces, as well as Metternich’s growing difficulty to maintain a clear distinction between positive cultural nationality and dangerous political nationalism as a resource of oppositional politics. For instance, some of the ideas of Naum Râmniceanu, ‘such as the restoration of political power to the boyars, came to fruition after the revolt of Tudor Vladimirescu in 1821’ (Trencsényi/Kopeček 2006, 324). Similarly, Adam Mickiewicz’ nationalism bore such elements. In his Pan Tadeusz (1834) for example the heroic general Dabrowski proclaimed the following: ‘Hail the rule … the citizens, the free, / The equal, the Polish! … Hail the generals! The army! The people! Hail all estates!’ (quoted in Rumpler 1997, 155-56). It reflected a political project that propagated the establishment of a Polish national state. The ambiguity of nationalist intellectuals was rooted in their at times contradicting functions as ‘traditional intellectuals’ of Metternich’s empire project and as ‘organic intellectuals’ of national movements.
6. THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF EMPIRE (1848/49-1879)

In the second half of the nineteenth century, major European states were transformed into nation-states, whether this involved the nationalisation of an existing state (Britain, France, Russia) or the formation of a new state and its subsequent nationalisation (Germany, Italy) (McNeill 1999, 420). The great exception was the Habsburg Monarchy, which underwent these modernising changes while remaining a multinational empire. The key question is, therefore, how such changes shaped nationalism and national identity. I will argue that the regime sought to extend the popular base of its legitimacy through a constitutional process addressed to the multiple nationalities of the empire rather than to the state citizenry as a whole. This was an attempt to incorporate citizens on liberal and democratic principles but at the level of particular provinces and in terms of nationality instead of at the level of state and in terms of state citizenship. This in turn shaped the development of national identities.

The first section begins with the 1848 Revolution and discusses the replacement of the European Concert by a new international system of nationalising states. It furnishes the European context of the emerging ‘national questions’ affecting Imperial Austria, which in 1867 was constitutionally divided into an Austrian and Hungarian half in the form of the dual monarchy. It also provides an overview of structural changes in the organisation of social power. The second section considers the principal political ideologies. The third section examines reforms, policies and state practices related to nationality in three areas: 1.) political structure; 2.) governmental policies aimed at population management; 3.) ideological content in textbooks. The fourth part examines the effects of these policies on the evolution of national movements. Finally, I draw some conclusions.

6.1. Austrian Conservative-Liberal Modernisation

The revolutionary events of 1848 were marked by a collective attempt to overthrow the Metternich regime and to establish representative constitutionalism. Although the divisions amongst the delegates in the first Austrian parliament had the effect of slowing down democratic processes, the immediate success of the revolution was significant. It included the declaration of equality of citizens before the law, peasant emancipation, a consensus to establish representative bodies on the municipal level, and an agreement that science represented the fundamental means for progress (Hanisch/Urbanitsch 2006, 34). The reversal of Josephinist centralisation had made regime change more difficult: ‘Austria was
different from France and even from Prussia in one respect: it lacked an effective capital city which either a government could use for vigorous centralized control, or rebels capture in a swift bid to seize power’ (Liang 2002, 24). Ultimately, the leading revolutionary forces in Vienna and Budapest were defeated militarily, which was followed by the formation of a conservative-liberal alliance, instituting a neo-absolutist regime. This regime drew on various conservative reformist segments from the aristocracy and clergy, as well as from the upper bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy (Rumpler 1997, 305). Its programme was marked by Habsburg dynasticism, authoritarian rule and economic development policies.

6.1.1. The Unintended Consequences of Austrian Foreign Policy

Although the revolutions of 1848 had ultimately failed, they enabled the transformation of ideological nationalism into nationalist movements and decisively transformed the political landscape of central Europe. What is significant from the viewpoint of the imperial state is that the antagonism between ‘revolutionary’ and ‘counter-revolutionary’ national movements (Rodsolsky 1986, 85-93) was also perceived in terms of the opposition between ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ national movements. The latter tended to collaborate with the regime in defeating the revolution and sought to secure their position within the newly formed power bloc. In contrast, the ‘political’ national movements (Austrian-German, Polish, Hungarian-Magyar and Italian) were crushed by military force controlled by the princes.

Map 3. Revolutions in the Austrian Empire, 1848-49 [Roman 2003, 657]
Political National Movements

The first political national movement to be discussed is that of the Polish context. Due to the fact that on the trans-state level it faced the opposition of three ancien regimes – of Habsburg Austria, Prussia and Russia - it never had much chance of success. In Galicia its revolutionary potential had already vanished with the failed insurrection of 1846. When in 1848/49 the counter-revolution was seeking a popular base through peasant emancipation, Polish aristocrats joined a revived conservative alliance. Most peasants, both Ruthenian and Polish-speaking, were opposed to the Polish National Committee (Rada Narodowa) - which engaged in nationalist agitation and organised ‘national guards’ in towns - and openly demanded the monarch’s protection from what they termed ‘Polish rule’ (Rosdolsky 1976, 212, 216). The Ruthenian National Committee (Rada Ruske) based in Lemberg and led by members of the Greek-Catholic clergy, won support among the anti-aristocratic rural peasantry (ibid., 218). The perceived intersection between Polish nationalism and aristocratic class interests contributed to growing anti-aristocratic sentiments.

The second political national movement, ultimately defeated with the help of Russian troops, was that of the Hungarian-Magyar context. In Hungary, the aristocracy, the landed nobility and some segments of the urban bourgeoisie formed an alliance, drawing on institutional infrastructure such as the province-based church, local administrations, and provincially rooted units of the imperial army. Furthermore, the radical nationalist Kossuth succeeded in taking up the position of a national leader, temporarily unifying his heterogeneous alliance. A central element in the ‘populist’ strategy of the Hungarian national movement, which clearly differentiated it from the Polish case, was that it appealed directly to the peasant card. The regime response to the liberal demands of the revolutionaries in Vienna, which was to decree peasant emancipation in September 1848, was followed by similar promises by the Hungarian national movement. Although it constituted the most considerable threat to the state by actually initiating a ‘war of independence’, its supposedly moderate leaders Deák and Andrássy, the latter originally facing capital punishment, subsequently became included into the conservative-liberal alliance, supporting the narration of a ‘lawful revolution’ (Deak 1979).

In the Italian case, the national movement was crushed by Austrian, French and other troops. Radetzky defeated Piedmont in war and restored order in the Habsburg provinces of Lombardy and Venetia. France’s Napoleon III pursued a determined counter-revolutionary policy in Italy, repressing the Roman Republic and restoring papal power in Rome under Pius IX, supported by troops from the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Unlike the liberal
establishments in France and Britain, who actively supported and hosted Italian as well as Polish and Hungarian nationalist leaders (Mazower 2013, 50), Louis Napoleon, who declared himself emperor in 1852 after a coup d’état, became one more agent of counter-revolution. The Crimean War beginning in 1853 marked the end of the alignments of 1814-15, as France and Britain became allies and the Habsburg Monarchy turned against Russia. Louis Napoleon enforced France’s territorial ‘rounding off’ as well as actively supporting Italian national unification, most visible in the war of Piedmont-Sardinia against Austria in 1859.

The third political national movement to be defeated in the course of the counter-revolution was the heterogeneous German variant, drawing on competing national projects that saw Austria, Prussia and the middle states in varying constellations (Breuilly 2002, 57). As a contingent result of Prussia’s historical success and Austria’s decline in the era of national reconstitution, ‘the role of the Habsburg state in the nation-building process in central Europe is usually ignored entirely’ (Buschmann 2007, 158). While the Metternich regime had aimed at the weakening of German nationalism and Austrian liberalism, political conditions changed after 1848, when both a kleindeutsch (lesser German) and a großdeutsch (greater German) movement developed. Although leading Austrian liberals initially joined the German parliament in Frankfurt and supported a großdeutsch project, they soon retreated to a restricted Austrian position (Rosdolsky 1976). The various ‘cultural’ national movements will be discussed in the next section on competing ideological camps.

**International Politics**

On the inter-state level, the intense conflict between Prussia and Austria in 1849/50 came to an end as a result of the climb-down by the Prussian state, which, together with the German middle states, joined the counter-revolution (Breuilly 2002, 56). When Prussia attempted to pursue an anti-Austrian policy, which would also draw on liberal support in 1849, this was successfully challenged by the medium states and Austria. The Austrian-Prussian conflict was stirred up in late 1850, when Prussian troops were deployed to Hesse-Cassel to defend Prussia’s ‘constitutional’ union policy against intervention by Bavaria, which was supported by Austria and Württemberg (ibid., 57). The Austrian government, backed by Russia, was determined to go to war and force the Prussian government in Berlin to abandon its nationalist union policy, as formally declared in Olmütz (Buschmann 2007, 158):
For the vast majority of southern Germans, a national state without Austria was unimaginable for historical, cultural, confessional and political reasons, quite apart from the fact that a centralistic solution to the German Question … was highly unpopular, irrespective of whether the putative capital might be Berlin or Vienna.

Austria too failed to expand its influence over the German states and the Bund was restored in its pre-1848 form (Breuilly 2002, 58). Austria’s minister of finance proposed to join the Zollverein, unifying central Europe as a customs union and limiting the potential for Prussian domination. When Austria failed to join the expanding Zollverein as a full member, however, Prussia succeeded in gradually instituting a kleindeutsch national unification project that gained pace after 1858.

In the context of the Crimean War, Minister of the Interior Bach and Foreign Minister Buol convinced the emperor to reject the Russian offer to divide Southeast Europe into a Russian and an Austrian sphere of influence. Instead of a cooperative move by the Tsar, it was interpreted as a challenge to the 1815 order, paving the way for a Russian pro-Slavic nationalist foreign policy in the Balkans. Austria gave indirect support to the Anglo-French ‘liberal’ alliance (including the Kingdom of Sardinia, the leader of subsequent Italian unification in 1861), which intervened on the side of Ottoman Turkey against Russia. This ‘active neutrality’ turned out to be highly costly for the Habsburg Monarchy, first in terms of finance and second in terms of alienating its former ally Russia. One can find part of the explanation in a new Austrian grand strategy for Mitteleuropa, based on a revived civilizational Austrian state project that was intended to dominate the lands of the German Confederation (ibid., 57). The idea of an ‘Empire of the 70 million’ was originally developed by Bruck and Schwarzenberg in the 1850s, with the aim to secure Austria’s position as a Great Power by expanding trade and economic integration (Taylor 1990, 94). Far from being a principled conservative, Schwarzenberg was above all a realist. His aim was to free Austria from the constraining alliance with Russia (Rumpler 1997, 365). After Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War, France dictated the conditions of the Peace Treaty of Paris in a way which channelled the entire hatred of Russia onto Austria (ibid., 368-9).

In 1859, Austria was defeated by an alliance between Piedmont-Sardinia and France, loosing its rich province of Lombardy. The consequences, after the conservative emperor sued for peace following a setback in one battle, proved to be a heavy burden. Austria’s fiscal crisis, which began with the Crimean War when it kept its army in a state of mobilisation, deepened with its loss of Lombardy. Although the Austrian government was disappointed over Prussia’s ambitions to exploit Austria’s weakness through the expansion of its military arrangements among the German states, it joined Prussia in its operation
against Denmark in 1864, initially launched by the Confederation to defend the settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question of 1850 (Breuilly 2002, 65). While the war of 1864 may be interpreted ex-post as the beginning of Prussian-led German national unification, it was at the time perceived by Austria as a dynastic coalition to control developments (Goddard 2008/09, 127-28). In an Austrian government meeting to set up the Prussian-Austrian alliance in January 1864, ‘only one minister raised the possibility that Prussia … might not really be constrained by the treaties’ (ibid., 131).

In 1866, Bismarck was openly breaking with the tradition of a confederal Germany and extended the regime’s popular base through franchise extensions for parliamentary elections. Disputes over Schleswig-Holstein not only helped Prussia ‘to build support among German nationalists’ but also provided Prussia ‘with its pretext for war against Austria in 1866’ (ibid.). After Austrian defeat against Prussia at Königgrätz in 1866, Bismarck refrained from demanding territorial concessions. ‘Instead, he annexed Hannover, Hesse, and a few other German states, replaced the old German Confederation with a Prussian-dominated North German Confederation, and forced the South German states to enter into a military alliance with the king of Prussia. The centuries-old Habsburg presence in Germany had come to an end’ (ibid., 51). In Italy, Austria was able to deal with guerrilla incursions but the cautious emperor decided to put an end to warfare, ‘a decision strongly influenced by the Vienna municipality’s request that the capital be declared an open city’ (Deak 1990, 53). Francis Joseph ‘ceded Venetia to the French, who, in turn, ceded the province to Italy’ (ibid., 51).

Unlike other states like France, Russia or Prussia, at critical moments such as 1859 and 1866 Austria lacked military commitment. The country seemed ‘unprepared to adopt a policy of forthright state egoism … despite the fact that everywhere else in Europe restored governments were preparing for solutions to unresolved national or social problems by unilateral action from the top, and at the expense of their neighbors if necessary’ (Liang 2002, 34). This can be partly explained by the interrelatedness of nationalisation and militarisation. A costly war policy required an efficient fiscal state and the expansion of the state’s ideological base for securing popular support. The regime’s multinational state policy and its conservative government system undermined both. The return of power politics and state-building resulted in the abolition of the remaining city-states in Germany and Italy, as well as in demands for the establishment of ‘national governments’ (Holsti 2004, 143-49). Having failed to rearrange Austria within the emerging framework of national states in time, Francis Joseph shifted the monarchy’s geopolitical focus towards the
Balkans, contributing to the fusion of the internal ‘Slavic question’ with external geopolitics, and encroaching upon the Russian sphere of influence in the Balkans (Jelavic 1991, 152-78). The completion of unification in Germany and Italy in 1871 represented the final blow to Austria’s Great Power politics, paving the way for its alliance with the new German state in 1879.

6.1.2. The Dynamics of Coercive and Economic Power

Although many neo-absolutist reforms during the 1850s were still driven by the rationality of absolutist military states, they were complemented by the economic-liberal notion of private property protection, the investment in state infrastructures, and the establishment of a monetary system that satisfied demands for capital (Heindl 2006, 44):

> From the center to the outermost periphery of the empire - including the Kingdom of Hungary - the institutions of justice and administration were synchronized and again subordinated to strong central control. All Crownlands were newly subdivided into consistent administrative units, including the Gemeinde, Bezirk, Kreis, and Statthalterei. The jurisdiction of the first instance, which had belonged to land-owning nobles, was now taken over by the state ... [and] the entire administration was now under state control.

Many high-level bureaucrats ‘understood the connections between capitalism, civil society, and the modern constitutional state ... Support for the foundation of banks, construction of railroads, and modern trade regulations, for example, was due in large part to officials with modern attitudes’ (ibid., 46). At the time, it was common sense among economists and political elites that the central state ‘was designed precisely to create an economy which could support a technologically efficient military power’ (Bayly 2004, 278). In the period under consideration, the cooperative model of ‘liberal internationalism’ became gradually replaced by ‘state monopolism’, corresponding to a statist political economy (Agnew/Corbridge 1995, 19).

Despite the erosion of the European Concert, Austrian military expenditures did not adjust to the new circumstances. ‘Aside from the creation of the Gendarmerie [as a paramilitary force], the 1850s saw few military reforms. Universal military service was introduced in 1858, but only in theory. A general staff school, the Kriegsschule, was created in 1852, and the higher military commands were reshuffled repeatedly, but ideology, training, and living conditions remained essentially the same’ (Deak 1990, 47). The February patent of 1861 vested the Vienna parliament with competencies to exercise control over the military budget (ibid., 50). Within four years the cabinet of Anton Schmerling achieved an almost balanced budget, the result of ‘cutting military expenditures, from 179 million gulden in 1861 to 96 million in 1865’ (Deak, 1990, 50). The table below indicates
that while the armies of Britain, Prussia and France generally rose in manpower, in Austria numbers declined. Unlike Prussia, the Austrian monarchy was facing the burden of its massive debt. After its costly ‘active neutrality’ during the Crimean War and its military defeat in 1859, Austrian debt amounted to 1.67 billion Thaler in 1865/66, compared to the 290 million of Prussia. And Austrian state revenue amounted to 292 million Thaler, compared to the 240 million of Prussia (Breuilly 2002, 102).

Figure 16. Military Personnel in Thousands, 1850-1879 [Flora et al. 1983, 250]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany (Prussia until 1870)</th>
<th>Italy (Sardinia until 1860)</th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany (Prussia)</th>
<th>Italy (Sardinia)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>223</td>
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<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>394</td>
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<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1868</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>294</td>
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<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>318</td>
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<td>540</td>
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<td>139</td>
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<td>1870</td>
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<td>452</td>
<td>319</td>
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<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>400</td>
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<td>1856</td>
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While Prussia invested in its military power throughout the 1850s and 1860s, as did Russia after its defeat in the Crimean War, Austrian military modernisation regressed. Rothenberg (1998, 55) concludes that the defeat of 1859 ‘was the result of ten years of misadministration for which the emperor must bear a large share of the responsibility’. After Austrian defeat at Solferino in 1859, Francis Joseph became even more reluctant to invest in the modernisation of the army. This was crucial to Austria’s defeat against Prussia in 1866, which represents a historical turning point in central Europe (Deak 1990, 51):

[Initially,] most German states sided with Austria against Prussia, but their military assistance, except for that of Saxony, was useless. Meanwhile, Bismarck had secured the active intervention of Italy on his side … In terms of population, Francis Joseph had the upper hand: his empire of 35 million, supported by numerous allies, faced 18 million Prussians. But the combat forces were roughly equal. Since over 100,000 Austrians had to be kept in the South to face the Italians, only some 175,000 Austrians and 32,000 Saxons met the 254,000 Prussian invaders in Bohemia.

As far as the Austrian liberals were concerned, it is striking that they pushed for cutting military spending, although ‘for Schmerling a central role for Austria in Germany was essential to maintaining a central position for Austrian Germans in the Empire’ (Breuilly
Austrian political and military decline in relation to Prussia set the conditions for the domestic decline of Austrian-liberals.

After Austrian defeat in 1866 the constitutional Compromise with the revived Kingdom of Hungary in 1867 set the legal framework for moderate military reforms, ‘formulated into an Austrian and a Hungarian law, both adopted in 1868’ (Deak 1990, 55). They provided for a joint army, a joint navy and one minister of war, leaving the army under the personal authority of the monarch and revoking the authority of the parliament in military affairs, except with regards to the budget. They also introduced universal conscription, which was only gradually implemented (Melichar/Mejstrik 2010, 1263-83). The dynastic ideology of the army, which fostered an ideal identification of the soldiers with the Habsburg emperor, was continued from the Metternich era (Heindl 2013a, 67-68). A gradual retreat of the Austrian military from politics becomes apparent as professionalization contributed to the structural transformation of civil-military relations. Deak’s (1990) famous description of the officer corps as a surprisingly supranational institution can be partially explained by a professionalization process, making it an autonomous institution. Within a general process of functional differentiation, military power became institutionalised within the modern state apparatus, subordinated and restricted under civilian authority.

Map 4. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise, 1867 [Roman 2003, 658]

Although the traditionalist emperor prevented the nationalisation of the army, which he kept strictly dynastic, the modernisation of the military required the production of a standardised literate culture. Despite minor reforms, it soon became clear that the monarch’s conservatism undermined the military’s capabilities in modern warfare. ‘[I]t should be remembered that the army was made up largely of illiterate peasants, who could hardly be
taught to employ individual initiative or take part in complex maneuvers. In Denmark in 1864, and again in the war of 1866, Austria paid a heavy price for having exempted the moneyed and educated classes from conscription’ (Deak 1990, 51). It is estimated that in 1865 the proportion of literate recruits in Austria was less than 10 per cent while in the Prussian army the proportion is estimated to have reached over 90 per cent (ibid.).

In 1868, the emperor granted the establishment of three national guards, an Austrian, a Hungarian, and a Croatian-Slavonian unit. As the last of these was de facto part of the Hungarian national guard, there were only two national ministers, a Hungarian and an Austrian. ‘The National Guards wore a modified version of the Joint Army uniform, but the Hungarian and Croatian National Guards displayed their own national insignia and swore allegiance not to the emperor but to the king and constitution’ (ibid., 56). The official language of the Landwehr was German, that of the Hungarian honvédsg was Magyar, and that of the Croatian-Slavonian Hrvatsko Domobrantsvo was Serbo-Croat. Two progressive Austrian liberals, General Baron Franz John, Minister of War (1866-1868) and chief of the general staff, and General Franz Kuhnenfeld, Minister of War (1868-1874), led the reforms of 1868. Although they faced significant opposition from conservatives such as Archduke Albrecht, they achieved some improvements such as ‘making the soldiers’ uniforms more practical, modernizing their equipment, and setting up a number of new arms’ manufactures’ (Deak 1990, 59). The establishment of the ‘national guards’ can be described as a form of ‘multinationalisation’ in terms of language, symbols and collective identity. What is clear is that Habsburg policies did not aim at transforming the army into a common nationalising, ‘Austrian’ institution and that its structure and ideology remained linked to the monarch.

The reluctance to invest in the military and police forces led to the gradual decomposition of the so-called Metternich ‘system’. In terms of military discipline, the state’s attitude toward army deserters and draft evaders ‘suggests a softening of views about the war duty of Habsburg subjects’ (Liang 2002, 29). ‘By an imperial decree of 1857, Emperor Franz Josef ordered the razing of Vienna’s defence walls and their replacement with magnificent boulevards - the Ringstrassen - adorned by public buildings, parks, and monuments’ (ibid., 26). It seems plausible that considerations of riot control played a major role in the redesign of the capital, similar to the so-called ‘Haussmannisation’ of Paris under Louis Napoleon. Vienna became a public city and at the same time underwent strategic urban transformation, facilitating the geographical and social segregation of the population. It was hoped that this process would enable the regime to deal more efficiently with the
growing masses inhabiting the potentially rebellious capital city. This aspect of urban transformation was complemented by the introduction of new policing techniques (ibid., 30):

Rather than preparing for future wars, Austria after 1848 tightened control over its territory through closer border surveillance and more police contacts to other countries. This involved better protection for the newly established telegraph lines as much as frequent checks on all travellers at railway stations and on country roads near the border.

The effect of the expanding and modernised police apparatus is reflected by a sharp rise of arrests. While in 1850 ‘state security forces made 62,909 citations or arrests, by 1854 that number had increased to over 900,000’ (Deak 2015, 130). The civilian character of the state was reinforced by the introduction of a new police force in Vienna, the so-called Civil-Polizeiwache. ‘In the spirit of the city’s commitment not to advertise the military confrontation of government and people, but rather to promote a reconciliation of state and society in a common Habsburg culture, Vienna in 1867 also introduced a new civil police, the Sicherheitswache’ (Liang 2002, 27). ‘In keeping with the liberalization of its domestic administration ... the Vienna government even cut back on domestic political espionage in favor of more conventional detective services to protect the Empire against treason and sedition’ (ibid., 28). These reforms of Austria’s police system can be seen as a way of accommodating bourgeois liberal demands.

6.1.3. Austrian Capitalism and Bourgeoisie Expansion

In this period, Austrian capitalism developed in three phases. Neo-absolutist reform between 1848/49 and 1866 was responsible for the transformation of the ‘agrarian regime’ and set the conditions for sustained economic growth. It was shaped by economic liberal reforms dominated by the haute finance based in Vienna (Rumpler 1997, 347-357). The second sub-era between 1867 and 1873 was a capitalist boom era, visible in the architectural transformation of Vienna (ibid., 457-65). Despite the general rise in production, increasing from 253 million crowns in 1849 to 621 million crowns in 1879, there were recurrent economic crises, especially in the third phase between 1873 and 1879 (Good 1984, 148-56).

Figure 17. Industrial Production in Austria, 1849-1879 (Komlos estimate; millions of Crowns, 1913 prices) [Komlos 1983, 146]
Similar to the fluctuations in production, the 1850s and 1860s were characterised by monetary instability. ‘The years from 1861 to 1865 were years of sharp monetary contraction, 8.0 percent per year, which is consistent with the severe contraction of output experienced in the early to mid 1860’s. The 1867-1873 economic boom was accompanied by an acceleration of monetary growth at an annual rate of 8.9 percent. In contrast, the money supply contracted during the subsequent great depression at an annual rate of 1.8 percent’ (ibid., 89-90).

Figure 18. Mid-Year Population Estimates (in Thousands) [Mitchell 2007]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>A: 17.79</td>
<td>35.95</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H: 12.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>A: 18.53</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H: 13.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>A: 19.74</td>
<td>38.23</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H: 13.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>A: 21.71</td>
<td>37.32</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H: 13.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After 1848, the Habsburg regime could not simply defend the status quo of the Metternich era. The bourgeoisie had evolved into an important socioeconomic stratum, which had not only internalised capitalist principles but also recognised the symbiotic relationship between the expansion of the bureaucratic state and the growth of a capitalist, market-driven economy. The peasant emancipation of September 1848 initiated agricultural reforms that were completed in the various provinces between 1853 and 1859. The legislation of 1849, which regulated the indemnification of the lords, was fairly favourable to the peasants as the state supported them financially. ‘Previously the peasants had performed labor services and paid dues in money and kind for the right to cultivate their
portion of the lord’s estate. Accordingly the lords received compensation for this loss of income’ (Good 1984, 78). The enormous scale of the reform is illustrated by the fact that, in the Austrian-Bohemian core provinces, 54,267 landowners were indemnified as compared to 2,625,512 peasant households (Blum 1978, 404).

Although the economic impact of these reforms can be deemed insignificant (Komlos 1983, 11-12, 48-49), from the viewpoint of social power relations, they transformed the agrarian regime and removed the barrier between the central state and the peasant population. The socioeconomic emancipation of the peasants was complemented by political reforms on the level of municipalities, resulting in the formal loss of the nobility’s political privileges in local affairs. While ‘seigneors could participate freely and fully’ in the local assemblies, ‘their vote counted for no more than did that of a peasant, and they had to abide by the decisions of the peasant-dominated local administration’ (Blum 1978, 416-17). The peasant emancipation, the autonomy of municipalities and the good agrarian conjuncture up to 1875 led to relatively stable conditions in the countryside (Bruckmüller 2010, 783). In the context of state-building, the reforms related to peasant emancipation ‘ended the fragmentation of public authority that had characterised the old order’ and opened the way ‘for the state to expand its control over local government’ (ibid., 412). These reforms transformed social power relations in favour of the state’s ‘infrastructural power’ by abolishing the intermediary governmental function of the landed nobility.

At the urging of Minister of Commerce Karl Bruck, the remaining internal tariff barrier was lifted on 1 October 1850 (Komlos 1983, 5). At the same time, Austria’s attempt to join the Zollverein was blocked by Prussia. Although negotiations began again in 1860, they were abandoned in 1865, before Austria’s defeat against Prussia in 1866 put an end to the project (Breuilly 2002, 59). The abolition of the internal customs boundary between the Austrian and the Hungarian halves of the monarchy contributed to the establishment of a free trade zone. Despite the impact of these policies on societal transformations, the immediate economic effects must not be exaggerated. ‘After all, even prior to 1850 there was already considerable mobility of labor, and the evidence seems to indicate that the market was able to adjust to the system of property rights that prevailed’ (Komlos 1983, 26). In the context of the 1870 depression, it was initially Austrian industrialists who returned to protectionism, most visible in the growing strength of a cartel movement in iron and sugar (Good 1984, 229).

The reforms accommodated a structural transformation of society within the framework of a market-driven economy and a corresponding division of labour. Consequently, no less
than 30 per cent of the population in the provinces of Lower and Upper Austria, and 36 per cent of the agrarian Bohemian population became wage labourers during the second half of the nineteenth century (Berend 2013, 127). ‘The abolition of the servile dependency of the peasantry necessarily involved the dissolution of the organic concept of society, the hierarchical arrangement of the estates, and the structure of hereditary privileges … [It] allowed the reconstruction of the social order upon the very different institutional arrangements of the class society’ (Blum 1978, 417). As a requirement of the capitalist economy, Austria’s banking system expanding rapidly during the 1850s, resulting in a ‘sixfold increase in credit’ that boosted modernisation under conditions of the beginning mechanisation, at least in the Western half of the monarchy (ibid.).

A major factor of growing urbanisation in the mid-nineteenth century included economic transformations linked to the so-called ‘second industrial revolution’ and state-led infrastructural projects such as railway construction. It is striking that all cities integrated by the emerging railway networks in Austria grew massively, while Cracow and Zagreb, two major cities that were excluded, stagnated. Both cities would undergo accelerated growth in the late nineteenth century, however (Banik-Schweitzer 2010, 187-88).

Figure 19. Length of Railway Lines (in kilometres), 1837-1910 [Mitchell 2007, 737-40]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria (incl. Hungary)</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>2,004</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>2,915</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>1,588</td>
<td>5,037</td>
<td>1,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>2,927</td>
<td>9,167</td>
<td>2,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>3,698</td>
<td>13,227</td>
<td>4,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>6,112</td>
<td>15,544</td>
<td>6,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>10,331</td>
<td>19,357</td>
<td>8,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>11,429</td>
<td>23,089</td>
<td>9,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>13,329</td>
<td>29,839</td>
<td>11,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>15,273</td>
<td>33,280</td>
<td>13,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>16,420</td>
<td>36,240</td>
<td>15,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>19,229</td>
<td>38,109</td>
<td>16,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>21,002</td>
<td>39,607</td>
<td>17,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>22,642</td>
<td>40,484</td>
<td>18,090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ‘second Industrial Revolution’, which set in in the 1860s, was marked by four distinct technological advances that contributed to the growing requirement for states to secure the mass education of its citizens. These advances were 1.) ‘Formation, diffusion,
and standardization of electric systems;’ 2.) ‘Invention and adoption of internal combustion engines;’ 3.) The introduction of ‘new, high performance materials and new chemical syntheses;’ 4.) ‘Birth of a new information age’ (Smil 2005, 29). A correspondingly appropriate expansion of state functions was demanded and promoted by civil servants, capital, the bourgeoisie, and also by many emancipated peasants. Modern armies, bureaucracies, and market-driven economies required standardised education, ‘insisting on certain shared qualifications: literacy, numeracy, basic work habits and social skills, familiarity with basic technical and social skills’ (Gellner 1983, 28). The division of labour in market-driven economies obliged their participants ‘to be able to communicate contextlessly and with precision with all comers … The maintenance of this kind of inescapably high (because literate) culture requires protection by a state’ (ibid., 141).

The expansion of state infrastructures and public services remained geographically uneven, with a focus on urban areas. In the western provinces of the monarchy, population growth between 1850 and 1910 was about 62 per cent, while in the Hungarian half it was about 43 per cent (Blum 1978, 418, Fn.1). The figure below illustrates the general growth in literacy among the Austrian population during the nineteenth century. It indicates disparities within the attained level of mass education, categorised in reference to language, although in reality this was related to the spatiotemporal dimension of the state’s institutional expansion.

Figure 20. Literacy Rate in Per Cent (by Recognised Language Group) [source: Flora, 1983, 70]
Before the effects of the ‘second Industrial Revolution’ led to the growth of industrial cities, the established urban centres maintained their positions due to their multifunctionality in administration, education, banking, trading and so forth. These were the seven major cities in the Austrian half of the empire, Vienna, Graz, Trieste, Prague, Brno/Brünn, Cracow and Lemberg, and the two major cities in the Hungarian half, Budapest and Szeged/Segedin. The case of Vienna illustrates how economic transformation and expanding mass education contributed to the growth of new urban groups. When in the mid-nineteenth century its textile industry lost competitiveness, new jobs emerged in knowledge-based sectors and in engineering and electrics (Banik-Schweitzer 2010, 220-21). These new jobs required an educated class, which became known as the new bourgeoisie. Although the massively expanding public sector remained a primary vehicle for upward social mobility, enabling in many cases ‘training on the job’, the upward social mobility of unskilled (domestic) migrants would only become possible in the second generation (ibid., 222-23).

The Austrian capitalist class of the period consisted of members of the high aristocracy and the upper bourgeoisie. It is illustrated by the list of those involved in the establishment of the Austrian Credit-Anstalt in 1855: the Princes Fürstenberg, Schwarzenberg and Auersberg, the Count Chotek, and three bourgeois bankers, S.M. Rothschild, L. Lämel and L. Haber. The pool of stakeholders involved in the foundation of the Austrian syndicate for
Chemical and Metallurgical Production as well as the board members of railroad companies founded since 1866 were similar (Blum 1978, 423). Governmental modernisation policies supported trends such as population growth, domestic migration and urbanisation. The state invested in infrastructure and technology, and actively supported the establishment of banks, increasing the availability of loans.

A closer look reveals that the growth of the bourgeoisie was related to the expansion of the bureaucratic state. While the military personnel was reduced between 1850 and 1900, the state’s civilian personnel at the central state level rose from approximately 72,000 to 297,000 (Mann 2012, 804-10). At the same time, its social composition became almost entirely bourgeois and the number of aristocrats within the bureaucracy declined (with the exception of the foreign ministry). After 1867, the higher aristocracy accounted for less than two per cent of the personnel within the ministries (Stimmer 1997, 406). A similar trend can be observed within the higher military posts. While ‘bourgeois’ elements in the general staff accounted for only 2 out of 37 in 1804, this changed to 20 out of 39 in 1908 (Blum 1978, 421). It has been estimated that in 1857 about 7.5 per cent of the entire Austrian population was bourgeois in terms of occupation, including small commerce and artisans. This represents about 750,000 families or 3 million people (Kühschelm 2010, 853). State employment and related private sectors such as construction, engineering and finance, as well as the free professions and trade, remained their main fields of occupation. During the economic crisis following Black Friday (1873), when unemployment rose rapidly and general income declined, the legal status of bureaucrats secured them a safe income and several small but valuable privileges (Heindl 2010, 1186-8).

Gradually, the German-speaking bourgeoisie lost much of its formerly dominant position. One factor was democratisation and the establishment of a multi-party system. It eroded its previous hold as broker between the government/state and the population. Competing political camps, developing into modern parties, came to take on the representative function (Heindl 2006, 47):

> From this point on, parliament, a government responsible to parliament and sworn to uphold the constitution, and the highest courts took over the duty of being custodians of the constitution and the constitutional state. This function had previously provided officials with their self-conception, and they suffered from these new, identity-eroding circumstances … Moreover, bureaucrats’ previous special social position as the most important group within a cultivated, if not wealthy, educated middle class was jeopardized.

The bourgeoisie diversified not only in terms of occupations, language and geographic location but also with regard to normative political projects and identities. There were
several nationalist initiatives to provide capital for the newly emerging ‘national’
bourgeoisies in the provinces, which would then be empowered as counter-elite in
opposition to the German-speaking elite. The Austrian constitutions of 1861 and 1867
delegated the domain of agricultural policies to the provincial level rather than to the central
state (in contrast to Hungary). Nevertheless, a ministry of agriculture was re-established in
December 1867 with the task of producing statistics and distributing modest subsidies
(Bruckmüller 2010, 787, 789). An example of some form of ‘national economics’ on the
provincial level was the foundation of rural banks in Bohemia, intended to provide capital
for the Czech-speaking population. ‘Strengthening the economic position of small
agricultural producers fitted in with both the socioeconomic and national motives of local
financial institutions in the 1860s and 1870s’ (Albrecht 2004, 317).

Interestingly, in Hungary the politically leading stratum did not represent a modern
bourgeoisie in economic terms as it lacked the substantial accumulation of capital, which
was still significantly concentrated in Vienna, or within Hungary held by German-speaking
and Jewish urban bourgeois groups, who did not easily join a newly emerging ‘national
bourgeoisie’ (Halmos 2010, 910-12). What emerged was a ‘Hungarian-Magyar’ collective
identity, which drew on the estate identity of the lower, landed nobility. The category of the
dzsentri (gentry) served as a central marker for this new collective identity of a political
class, imported from Britain and essentially referring to the Magyar-speaking rural upper
class.

6.2. The Genesis of Austria’s Modern Political Landscape

Although many democratic achievements were destroyed by the counter-revolution
during the 1850s, parliamentarism was revived on the state level in 1867. The parliament’s
new name, Reichsrat (imperial council)\textsuperscript{11}, indicated an attempt to avoid the construction of
a liberal-constitutional tradition in reference to the Reichstag of the 1848 Revolution
(Kořalka 2000, 142). The so-called ‘parties’ still resembled informal associations of
political elites that can be better grasped as alliances or blocs. Liberal reforms of the 1860s
and 1870s contributed to the development of political life within ‘bourgeois society’ (ibid.,
143). The growing number of secular intellectuals, coming from the expanding bourgeoisie
and the adapting lower nobility, took over a central sociopolitical function that emanated
from the emerging multi-party system. Most contemporary intellectuals in Austria came

\textsuperscript{11} The Austrian parliament was termed Reichsrat in German, Říšská rada in Czech, Rada Państwa in
Polish, Consiglio Imperiale in Italian and Državni zbor in Slovene.
from the upper and middle bourgeoisie, as well as from the lower social strata in the rural provinces, mostly from a non-German speaking background (Rumpler 2010, 1136). This is significant for the analysis of evolving national movements, as it highlights the expansion of non-German speaking bourgeois groups who gradually became politically emancipated.

6.2.1. Conservatives in the Anti-Josephist Tradition

The era’s predominant political struggle regarding the reconstitution of state/society relations is exemplified by the case of the Swiss confederacy, where secular Protestant centralist-liberals won the civil war against conservative-religious federalists in 1847. It represents the general pattern of that era, when ‘the continental European nation-state … would be reconstructed, centralized, and secularized’ (Maier 2012, 114). In Austria, this antagonism found its expression in the opposition between religious conservative federalists and secular liberal centralists. Between March and October 1848, Austrian liberals failed to establish a broad societal alliance, while after 1849 conservatives succeeded in taking the lead towards consolidating a new regime, which veered between absolutist rule and conservative federalism.

Francis Joseph revived the anti-Josephist tradition of the preceding era, which had the effect of reducing government to bureaucratic rule, supervised by the monarch. The circle of advisors surrounding the emperor was characterised by an absence of figures with political vision. This became increasingly visible after the death of Felix Schwarzenberg in April 1852. Francis Joseph was shaped by Metternich’s variant of conservatism, defining ‘society’ in multiculturalist and apolitical terms (Siemann 2010, 113-14). The ideological coherence of the otherwise quite heterogeneous conservative-liberal regime was fed by works of the so-called ‘historical legal school’ in the ‘juridical-political reading club’ in Vienna. Some of its conservative scholars took the Tyrolean corporative constitution of 1816 as a model and argued for the expansion of provincial autonomies. Each provincial parliament should be comprised of representatives of four estates: the clergy, aristocracy and landlords, cities, and the rural population. Reform proposals in 1856 were based on historical considerations as set out by the so-called Organic Statute of 1854. Even if the emperor did not ratify it, it illustrated the federalist direction of reforms. This new political project referred to a ‘constitutional organism’, together with an ‘imperial organism’, to be implemented by taking into account the conditions ‘from below’ (Brauneder 2000, 144).

The social base of conservatism was principally that of the higher aristocracy, the landed nobility, and the clergy. Its central ideological features - dynastic Catholicism and multinationalism - represented a continuity from the Metternich era. When the Catholic Church
regained many of its privileges in the important educational realm, the new regime’s anti-Josephist orientation became evident. It culminated in the Concordat of 1855 (Rumpler 1997, 344-7). Francis Joseph supported a Catholic revival in education. By building on religious-conservative values, symbols and traditions, the regime aimed at ideologically unifying heterogeneous groups (Rumpler 2010, 1133-36). Friedrich Kübeck, the architect of Austrian neo-absolutism, developed an alternative plan to the ‘national model’, which was a conservative monarchic concept based on three institutional pillars: the dynastic army, the dynastic bureaucracy and the Church (Rumpler 1997, 341). None had been attributed a nationalising function.

In the context of Austria’s struggle against Prussia, Catholicism represented a major ideological source for projecting Austrian influence onto central Europe. ‘On one level, the anti-Jesuitism of Prussian state authorities during the period of reaction represented anxieties about un-German or anti-Prussian ‘ultramontanism’ and the reassertion of Austrian influence in central Europe’ (Gross 2004, 68). According to a Prussian police report of 1856, ‘the Jesuits were inculcating pro-Austrian grossdeutsch sentiments among the population’ (ibid., 69). The beginning of the constitutional era in 1867 coincided with a fierce struggle of Austrian liberals against the Catholic Church, which the liberal press articulated as ‘constitution or concordat’ (Vocelka 1978, 95-102). The liberal-bourgeois press propagated secularism and attacked the Jesuits for preventing the education of ‘reasoning individuals’, while the clerical Ultramontane party attacked the liberal camp as being anti-Catholic and comprising Jews, Protestants and freemasons (Vocelka 1978, 178).

This reinvigoration of the historical struggle between Austrian liberals and conservative Catholics came to an end with the imperial law on elementary schools (Reichsvolksschulgesetz) of 1869 and the suspension of the Concordat in 1870. This new law represented a compromise between demands for non-religious and for strictly confessional schools, and followed liberal demands for state-controlled and mandatory public primary schooling, including the strictly regulated education and status of teachers as civil servants. Teaching religion, for example, was in part for the education of subjects who accepted the existing order on the basis of a spiritual worldview (Vocelka 1978, 166-68). When the conservative Catholic delegates from Tyrol, Galicia and Slovenia left the imperial council under protest, the draft law passed over to the upper house (ibid., 167). A number of new laws regulating religion were passed in 1874, indicating that Francis Joseph had partially given in to liberal demands despite the Pope’s fierce opposition.
In contrast to the secular and centralist nationalising policies in Switzerland and Prussian-Germany, the Austrian case was one marked by compromise, maintaining Catholicism and federalism as major pillars. The break with Josephist ‘state Catholicism’ was based on conservatives’ perception of their failure to prevent the 1848 revolution and culminated in the Concordat of 1855, which empowered the clergy (Valjavec 1944, 55). This pro-Catholic policy was in contrast to the German Second Empire, ‘where political life in the 1870s centred on the confrontation between the government and the Catholic Church, a politics dubbed by Germany’s liberals a *Kulturkampf*, a struggle for civilization’ (Sperber 2009, 166). It even led to the arrest of Catholic bishops and hundreds of priests. A similar anti-clerical policy was pursued in Switzerland, resulting in both cases in the defeat of the Catholic Church and the consolidation of a national state (ibid.). Also in France, the Catholic Church adopted a stance against the nationalising state and ‘generally supported the dialects and non-French languages, with priests preaching and catechizing in them, and even viewing them as a bulwark against the liberal policy of secularization’ (ibid.). In Imperial Austria, the Catholic revival was similarly accompanied by demands of priests to preach in the local vernacular (Valjavec 1944, 54).

An essay written by the prominent Austrian conservative Helfert in 1850 illustrates a temporary shift in the Austrian conservative stance towards centralism. In his essay, Helfert first recalls Palacký’s line of argument in 1848, which presented the Austrian Empire as a European necessity in order to prevent growing Russian influence in central Europe. However, in the following sections Helfert contrasts this pro-Austrian Palacký against the latter’s increasingly anti-Austrian, Bohemian-Czech nationalist stance. Helfert states that through his articulate letter of rejection of the Frankfurt parliament’s programme of integrating the German Confederation into a German *Bundestaat* in 1848, Palacký had defended the Vienna-based European order, upheld by Austria with its ‘provinces and peoples’ (Helfert 1850, 13-14). It is worth noting Helfert’s accentuation of Palacký’s defence of Austria as an empire in reference to Switzerland, as the small Republic had recently become a ‘nationally reconstituted’, modern constitutional state (ibid., 14-15):

> Austria - you wanted to argue - cannot become a Switzerland with her sovereign Cantons … The mountains with their eternal snow surround the territory of the free Switzerland as loyal guardians … But Austria - … fragmented into a conglomeration of loosely bound provinces and counties, distributed among only loosely connected peoples and tribes - Austria would immediately stop being Austria, it would face inevitable dissolution.

What Helfert developed here was on the one hand a case against the liberal constitutional Kremsier draft of 1849, which was based on the idea of one single,
reconstructed federal state, ruled by one common Austrian, bicameral parliament as a representative legislative body. Turned down by leading Austrian conservatives and the emperor, who feared the loss of his sovereignty, this liberal constitutional draft would remain the last attempt to re-construct the entire Habsburg monarchy into one constitutional state. A less liberal but fairly multinational constitution, drafted by the conservative reformers Stadion, Schwarzenberg and Kübeck, was formally announced in March 1849. In practice, it bore a ‘neo-absolutist’ character and failed to modernise Austria’s antiquated political system. In his essay, Helfert openly attacked Palacký’s nationalist position, which the latter had articulated in an essay published on 21 December 1849. Helfert (1850, 15-16) noted Palacký’s nationalist agenda of Bohemian-Czech national autonomy on the basis of historical state rights, seeking ‘the disintegration of Austria into a multitude of [national] groups and communities’ (ibid.).

In contrast to Helfert’s moderate centralist position of 1850, which was at the time coherent with neo-absolutism, the years after 1859 became characterised by the ascent of Palacký’s vision of 1849. In the period of crisis between 1859 and 1866, Emperor Francis Joseph was increasingly influenced by a circle of conservative aristocrats (Clam-Martinic, Deák, Andrássy), who supported decentralisation (Rumpler 1997, 374). Another example was Adrian-Werburg, who had engaged in the intellectual elaboration of a federalised multinational empire. In 1848 he became an active politician, supporting ‘small nations’ such as ‘the Czechs’ against centralist-statist neo-Josephism. Many of his ideas were reflected in the October Diploma introduced by Francis Joseph’ in 1860, as well as in the following constitutional reforms (Trencsényi/Kopeček 2007, 315).

### 6.2.2. From Neo-Josephists to Austro-German Liberals

Much of the classical scholarly work on Austrian liberalism was written in the early twentieth century by the ‘third generation’ of liberals, who blamed liberals’ ideological conservativism, German chauvinism and political elitism for their decline. Later, scholarship even began to doubt the existence of a genuine Austrian liberalism as such. The Austrian liberals of the mid-century started with ambitious and optimistic visions of a reformed state and society (Kwan 2013, 4):

In general, liberalism was striving for a meritocratic society … [A]ccording to the liberals, education and economic independence … were required for voting rights and the process of assimilation - so important to liberal goals and its belief in universalism … While elitist, the liberals provided for and encouraged a theoretically possible homogeneous bürgerlich (middle class) society. By contrast, the later German nationalists discouraged any assimilation or acculturation, especially for the Jews who, in general, had been staunch supporters of Austro-German liberalism.
The linguistic and civilizational nationalism of the Austrian liberal-centralist camp was linked to the liberal bourgeois ideal of a literate high culture, enabling each individual, at least theoretically, to participation in society in equal measure. Among the Austrian liberal members of parliament in 1848 there was support for a collective ‘Austrian’ identity, as illustrated by a speech given by MP Wildner, in which he referred to ‘citizens of the state’ (Staatsbürger) as ‘Austrians’ (Malfer 2000, 31). Although in 1848 Austrian liberalism was still strongly represented with its vision of a welfare state and representative government, it soon found itself in the shadow of the emerging conservative-liberal regime. The capital-owning upper bourgeoisie joined Austrian conservatives as ‘liberal’ allies in defeating neo-Josephists and democrats, who had fought for representative government (Grab 1998, 10-11). The divergence between the so-called Bildungsbürgertum and Besitzbürgertum became a central factor contributing to the failure of the 1848 Revolution. While in 1848/49 the Austrian bourgeoisie itself became fragmented, the growing anti-clericalism of the Austrian liberal camp during the 1860s and 1870s contributed to its elitism. It sharpened the Austrian liberal collective identity of the German-speaking bourgeoisie but put them in a defensive and particularistic position that undermined the expansion of their social base.

Crucial for the conservative-liberal alliance was the fact that the upper bourgeoisie shared the emperor’s distrust in regard to the supposedly immature common masses. While Austrian conservatives saw the expansion of Catholicism as necessary for keeping the masses orderly and to stabilise the status quo, Austrian liberals tended to blame religion and religious actors, especially Catholic priests, for the lack of enlightened maturity among the masses (Valjavec 1944, 67). This development is important as it hints at the regime’s break with the Josephist ideal of an Austrian ‘state church’ and with the formerly statist policies in the realm of religion, which previously had been perceived as necessary for enlightened state- and nation-building (ibid., 69-71). The impact of Josephism as a major stream within the Austrian clergy, upheld by Benedictian or secular priests, largely ended in the late 1850s (ibid., 89). The growing anti-clericalism of the Austrian-German liberal camp contributed to the consolidation and rise of provincial alliances between religious and nationalist actors.

In contrast to Höbelt (1993, 353), who suggests that there was a ‘German-national’ continuity between the 1860s and the 1880s, Kwan (2013, 4) identifies quite distinct political projects:

While concentrating on the political minutiae and machinations in the construction of the German national movement, Höbelt emphasises the continuity with liberalism, especially the desire to maintain German hegemony. Yet the 1860s were very different from the 1880s and afterwards. Early liberalism was more idealistic, less entrenched and more prepared to fight larger battles - for a
constitution, against the Church - rather than the desperate defence and pragmatic political deals that characterised the turn of the century.

A similar tendency can be observed in other historical studies that confuse the propaganda of Hungarian and Czech nationalists, who declared themselves to be ‘liberals’ in the context of a changing political opportunity structure, with political substance. While the linguistic ‘German’ element represented essentially a rational and utilitarian component of the civilizational Austrian liberal nation-building project, it was neither the central aspect nor was it associated with ethnicism or essentialism. For Austrian liberals in the 1850s and 1860s, the reform process towards ‘an integrated state and the securing of a progressive, functional constitutional system … regardless of nationality, hence the generic term of ‘Constitutional Party’ for the liberal parliamentary fractions’ (Kwan 2013, 5) played a key role.

The political debates concerning the concept of an ‘Austrian nation’ in 1866 illustrate growing ideological difficulties for Austrian liberals referring to ‘civic nationality’ with regard to the central state, which was supposed to utilise the established German literary language. It is striking that, even in many German states, the concept of Volk remained a difficult one for German liberals to use in their discourse. This was a consequence of the Metternich era, the failed 1848 Revolution, and the absence of a ‘liberal state’ (Sheehan 1978, 107). Although German liberals were granted a ‘German’ national state after 1870 under the leadership of Bismarck, their relationship to the state and to ‘the people’ remained a difficult one (ibid., 121). Bismarck’s success itself raised serious doubts about basic assumptions propagated by German liberalism, especially its progressive strands, as it had previously articulated its opposition to Bismarck as representing ‘the reaction’ and authoritarian militarism.

Since the mid-1870s, an ethno-cultural conception of nationality had been on the rise, with fatal consequences for Austrian liberalism. ‘[T]he exclusion from the emerging German national state was not accepted with relief or resignation by the Austro-Germans. Instead, it led to the intensification of their until-then largely self-evident but not necessarily urgent sense of German identity’ (Thaler 2001, 68). While in the Josephist tradition the German language had not been central to Austrian liberal identity, its role as a signifier of ‘cultural nationality’ gradually began to dominate discourse. In December 1866, at a meeting of German-speaking Bohemian liberals, Eduard Herbst articulated the ideological core of Austro-German liberalism in reference to the principles of ‘Austria, German nationality and freedom’. In 1873 and in 1885 ‘he made similar assertions in crucial speeches … First, there was the idea of a powerful, central state; second, a belief in the
universality and civilising power of German cultural achievements; and third, the concept of constitutionalism that emphasised the erection of a liberal institutional and legal framework’ (Kwan 2013, 7). In 1874, Austrian liberal MP Göllerich was still arguing for the necessity of a modernising Austrian state in the Josephist tradition, which he defined as complementary to autonomous administrative units on the municipal level. He presented a motion in parliament that proposed the reform of local and central administrative authority in order to allow the central state to ‘fulfil its mission of instruction and enlightenment - which although it cannot be found in their office manuals, lies in the heart of every constitutionally loyal bureaucrat and friend of the people’ (quoted in Deak 2015, 188).

Austria’s defeat in 1866 was followed by ‘the astonishingly rapid decision by the Habsburg elite to withdraw from Germany after just one lost battle’ (Buschmann 2007, 170). Sperber notes that in 1848 ‘pro-Prussian constitutional monarchists represented a minority among German nationalists. They were noticeably outnumbered by the democrats, with their pronounced leanings towards republicanism, and their strong hostility towards the Prussian monarchy, and by Catholics and south Germans, suspicious of Prussia, and pro-Austrian, all of whom were cool or downright hostile towards a monarchical little German national state of the kind that Bismarck brought into existence’ (Sperber 2005, 275). The project of a kleindeutsch nation-state was not only rejected by Catholics but ‘the reform policies embarked upon by the Vienna government held out more hope for democratic circles than the situation in Prussia’ (Buschmann 2007, 173). Bismarck’s ‘German national unification’ created an ideological dilemma for Austrian liberalism, with its intrinsic connection with German bourgeois literary culture. On 9 February 1871, the liberal Neue FreiePresse warned of a possible split within the Constitutional Party due to a potential new political movement described as German-national (quoted in Haider 1998, 136):

Never, we hope, will the German-Austrians place their national feeling above their Austrianness … that one brings close to them a comparison of their own situation with that of their tribal kin outside … A German-National Party would be one misery more for the empire!

Another indicator of this dilemma is the publication of the first volume of a collection on the uniquely ‘Austrian’ variant of the German language in 1875 (Haider 1998, 187). The defeat of the Austrian liberal camp in the general elections of June 1879 signalled the victory of conservatives (Taylor 1990, 168). In 1879, German liberals in Prussia had similarly lost support among the bourgeoisie, while ‘Conservatives’ and ‘Free Conservatives’ increased their share significantly (Sheehan 1978, 190). In Austria, the liberal Left achieved accommodation with an emerging worker’s movement that became the target of anti-socialist policies. Crucial for the crisis of Austrian liberalism was the
perception (and reality) of a demographic, cultural and thus also political decline of the German-speaking bourgeoisie in Austria’s four large metropolitan cities (Smith 1981, 217). It illustrated the flawed liberal-rationalist assumptions of a supposedly inevitable process of historical assimilation and acculturation, accompanying economic modernisation and urbanisation. As a result of the polarisation between secularist Austrian liberalism and the religious ‘conservative bloc’, sympathies for conservatism grew (Valjavec 1944, 98-99). Austrian conservatism was able to appeal to segments of the educated bourgeoisie that had previously identified as Austrian liberal patriots and also resonated among rural and newly urban lower social strata (ibid., 99). A similar pattern can be observed on the ‘left’, where many formerly Austrian liberals joined the newly emerging anti-clerical movement (ibid., 108; 110-11).

Beside ideological factors, the liberal camp was also suffering from substantial problems with its organisational capacity due to the comfort it had enjoyed in the federalist, indirect electoral system until 1873. As there was no incentive to establish a central party organisation on the state level and to attract membership, the Austrian liberal camp lacked rudimentary organisational infrastructure and faced problems recruiting political talent and drafting commonly agreed programmes. After 1873, the so-called Constitutional Party experienced further fragmentation and the ideology of liberalism itself became the target of growing criticism. The crucial weakness of Austro-German liberalism was its over-reliance on the framework of the bureaucratic legal state and, correspondingly, its failure to actively promote the expansion of an industrial German-speaking bourgeoisie through the means of the state apparatus. The movement’s difficult position against the conservative bloc and the growing national movements in the provinces led liberals to support the status quo, supposedly upheld by the bureaucratic state (Kwan 2013, 3).

6.2.3. The Emerging Workers Movement

The Austrian workers movement represented a new progressive-leftist alternative to the declining Austrian liberal movement, emerging under conditions of the liberal reforms in the 1860s. The granting of civil rights and freedoms in 1861, of the constitution in 1867, and the establishment of a multi-party system all represented the institutional accommodation of major liberal demands by the regime. At the fifth ‘workers day’ organised in Vienna in 1868, the manifesto declared (Berchtold 1967, 110):

The era of national differentiation is over, the nationality principle today is only on the schedule of reactionaries … The national restoration of Poland was partly prevented by the special status of the
current aristocracy … the campaigners of the Czech nationality walk hand in hand with the self-indulgent and imperious clergy.

Intellectually, the Austrian ‘left’ drew on non-Austrian, German-speaking figures such as Karl Marx (1818-1883), Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864) and August Bebel (1840-1913). The universalist and civilizational character of the political project developed by the ‘left’ contributed positively to the trans-border reception of socialist and social democratic thought in central Europe, including Austrian Social Democracy. The corresponding civilizational-statist theory of nation-building in the Enlightenment tradition saw the centralising, educational state as the basic condition for the emancipation of the common masses.

Friedrich Engels’ essay *The Magyar Struggle* (1849) identifies three major revolutionary nations in Habsburg Central Europe which were at odds with small reactionary nations. Engels describes the Austrian-German, Magyar and Polish nations as those historical actors who struggled for civilizational progress (Bollinger 2009, 46). He makes the argument that, in every European country, countless past tribes and languages exist which could all be theoretically revived as cultural elements of potential small nations (ibid., 46). Engels contends that the invention or revival of such provincial nations does not serve civilizational ‘progress’ as they mainly serve the function of counter-revolutionary allies of reactionary, anti-democratic and anti-statist forces. He identifies various regionalisms that similarly turned against the progressive movement of the modernising political centre, as the Bohemian-Czech and Illyrian/Croatian ‘nations’ supposedly did in Austria in 1848. He recalls the historical cases of Scotland with the Celts, who supported the Stuarts from 1640 to 1745, the Bretons in France, who supported the Bourbon dynasty from 1792 to 1800, the Basques in Spain, who supported Don Carlos, and finally in Austria the Pan-Slavic movement and the Southern Slavs. He closes with the comment that it also counts as ‘progress’ if such small provincial nations vanish. In another piece of that year, *The Democratic Panslavism* (1849), Engels argues similarly that the various Slavic nationalities in Austria, which oppose political centralisation, were modern inventions without history, serving the ‘reaction’ as allies (Bollinger 2009, 49).

At the Eisenacher Congress in 1869, the Austrian workers’ movement decided to adopt the ideological strand that had been developed by a group within the German Social Democratic Party, led by August Bebel and Karl Liebknecht. Accordingly, Austrian Social Democracy shared with Austrian liberalism a common civilizational, Austrian-statist vision of modernisation, which incorporated German literary culture on utilitarian and rationalist grounds (Hanisch/Urbanitsch 2006, 80). As the liberal government with its conservative
allies had alienated most of its ‘liberal-leftist’ segments, an alliance of Austrian liberals and Austrian social democrats became increasingly impossible, especially as the government’s fear of the lower masses reached a new peak. Their alienation culminated in the government-initiated trials against leftists groups in the so-called ‘Viennese trial for treason’ (*Wiener Hochverratsprozess*) in 1870, and the so-called ‘trial of socialists’ in Graz 1874/75 (ibid., 81). In the early 1870s, 44 per cent of all formally organised workers were based in Vienna, where they engaged in mass meetings, marches and strikes (ibid.).

The founding congress of the Austrian Social Democratic Party finally took place in 1874. In the *Neudörfl Programm* the party was defined as the ‘Austrian Workers Party’, but largely avoided addressing the practical dilemma between the right of peoples to self-rule and the ‘brotherly association’ of all workers of all nationalities (ibid., 116). The programme of the Wiener Neustädter Worker’s Day of 1876 readdressed the issue more clearly and put ‘the Austrian workers’ and the polity of the Austrian state at its centre: ‘We recognise neither artificial antagonisms nor political hostility; the word nationality represents for us merely empty sound, fading away in the face of the community of interests that knots us together’ (ibid., 120). The problems in establishing a unitary party organisation on the state level were explicitly depicted as resulting from anti-socialist policies.

### 6.2.4. Nationalist Doctrine, Programme and Projects

In the middle of the century, the positioning of the various national movements largely conformed to the fundamental structure of the Austrian political landscape, constituted by the liberal-progressives (centralist) versus conservative-religious (federalist) antagonism. In the context of the 1848 revolution, the movements of the so-called ‘small nations’ tended to side with the counter-revolutionary regime, while the Austrian-German, Hungarian-Magyar and Italian ‘big nation’ nationalist movements tended to oppose the absolutist conservative regime and to challenge the political status quo. When the Habsburg counter-revolution engaged in a revival of Metternichian conservatism, this was to be implemented under new European conditions. Richard Cobden, a Member of the British Parliament and advocate of free-trade internationalism reflected on his meeting with Metternich 1847 as follows (quoted in Mazower 2013, 40):

> [Metternich] is probably the last of those State physicians who, looking only to the symptoms of a nation, content themselves with superficial remedies from day to day, and never attempt to probe beneath the surface to discover the source of evils which afflicting the social system. This order of statesmen will pass away with him, because too much light has been shed upon the laboratory of Governments, to allow him to impose upon mankind with the old formulas.
In Cobden’s view, nations, united by ‘race, religion, language’ were to become the basic entities of a new world order (ibid., 41). Free-trade internationalism shared a common belief with other types of internationalism that the spread of nationalism was linked to representative government and resulted in peace (ibid., 45). In reality, the ascendancy of nationalism soon resulted in a clash between competing national projects. The split between a ‘nationalist right’ and an ‘internationalist left’ is illustrated by the controversy between Marx and Mazzini. In April 1846, Mazzini launched his attack on communist as well as modern materialist principles in an English newspaper, arguing that it was directed against moral development, endangering the natural institution of the family (ibid., 53). Marx responded in a speech held in London in late 1847: ‘Union and brotherhood of nations is an empty phrase which today is on the lips of all bourgeois parties’ (quoted in ibid.). For Marx, the constitutive antagonism of the political arena was that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. For liberals it was the discord between the citizens on the one hand and the absolutist monarch with the privileged aristocracy and clergy on the other.

The core of contemporary nationalist ideology can be referred to as the Mazzinian doctrine, the so-called ‘principle of nationality’. It was based on a moralist argument of viewing large, ‘political’ nations as the highest human collectives on earth, with the duty to fight against monarchical states and to found their own republics. Mazzini made the argument for Italians, Hungarians, Poles and Germans, challenging the Habsburg monarchy, but refused to attribute this right to minor ‘cultural’ nations. He also remained silent regarding the consequences for linguistically heterogeneous states, which were factually the norm, including France, Britain, Russia and Spain. Mazzini and his Hungarian counterpart Kossuth became passionate public activists, promoting the ‘nationality principle’ in London. Due to Mazzini’s friendship with public intellectuals such as Mill and Carlyle, ‘Mazzinianism circulated widely in Britain and thence across the continent and the Atlantic’ (Mazower 2013, 50). By the mid-nineteenth century, the socioeconomic conditions of the petit bourgeoisie and an increasingly radical artisan culture in metropolitan cities such as London and Paris represented a fertile ground for the reception of nationalist ideology.

It was nationalist and internationalist intellectuals who advanced the liberal democratic principle of representative constitutionalism, which challenged the dynastic principle and propagated the empowerment of the growing lower bourgeoisie. The respective nationalist doctrine articulated political demands for popular sovereignty, defining ‘the people’ in reference to a trans-generational, cultural-linguistic nation. As a prominent supporter of this new ‘nationality principle’ John Stuart Mill argued eloquently in 1861: ‘Where the
sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a *prima facie* case for uniting all the members of nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed’ (quoted in Mayall 1990, 27). He defined ‘nationality’ as the category that supposedly signifies the respective human collective body destined to exercise self-government, thus apparently moving the locus of political rule (sovereignty) from the territorial state to the nation. Similarly to other liberals and also progressive theorists of the ‘left’, Mill showed no sympathy for so-called ‘small nations’ and argued for a pragmatic and utilitarian application of the nationality principle (Benner 2013, 49):

One condition for national independence was geographical, and called for the integration of diverse populations into one national state. Since countries such as Hungary had populations ‘so mixed up as to be incapable of local separation’, they must try ‘to make a virtue of necessity, and reconcile themselves to living together under equal rights and laws’ … The principle of nationality should not hold out vain hopes of survival to peoples who formed ‘an inferior and more backward portion of the human race’ such as Bretons, Welshmen, and Basques, who could only benefit from assimilation to larger, more powerful nations.

Many bourgeois intellectuals, especially young academics and journalists, were receptive of the Mazzinian doctrine as it represented a vehicle for the expression of political demands for (a type of) democracy. Such an approach to defining the legitimacy of certain nations was ‘proposed by republicans such as Giuseppe Mazzini, liberals such as John Stuart Mill, and socialists such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ (ibid.).

When confronted with the Austro-German, Hungarian-Magyar and Italian national movements, entering a ‘political phase’ in 1848/49, the neo-absolutist Habsburg regime of the 1850s revived a counter-revolutionary strategy in the Metternichan tradition. The alliance between the conservative dynastic regime and certain provincial ‘small nation’ movements was formed, albeit precariously, via a common opposition to the Austrian-German and Hungarian-Magyar centralist movements (Sperber 2005, 104-5):

Count Kolowrat, in charge of domestic affairs, looked favorably on the Slavic nationalist movements, seeing them as a counterweight to liberal demands, raised by Hungarian and German nationalists, for constitutional government and the abolition of feudalism. Croatian nationalism enjoyed particular favor. While prohibiting the use of the term ‘Illyrian,’ invented by Ljudevit Gaj, the government provided him with a large cash subsidy to continue his activities and bedevil Hungarian liberals. In Hungary, conservative nobles, opposed to the abolition of feudalism, whether their native language was Magyar, German or Croatian, and the Catholic clergy, opposed to liberal demands for civic equality for Protestants, ostentatiously supported the Croatian nationalists.

As a consequence of the successful counter-revolution, even the most developed provincial nationalist movement such as the Hungarian-Magyar example, remained largely
within the conservative-liberal alliance, which was opposed to democratisation in the centralist-individualist tradition. The Hungarian-Magyar nationalist intellectual Eötvös, for example, had argued in the post-1848 context that individuals and nationalities - which he viewed as linguistically defined but per se striving for territorial political rule - need to be protected from a democratic and constitutional central state. He viewed monarchical absolutism as more protective of personal liberty than ‘democratic absolutism’ (Stourzh 1989, 221-23). Another province-based, nationalist counter-argument to that of statist-centralist writers of the Austrian liberal camp as well as of the Left (such as Engels) can be found in Palacký’s article *On Centralisation and National Equality in Austria*, published in December 1849 (reprinted in 1872). Palacký argues that decentralisation is an inevitable counter-process to centralisation. He describes the formation of the Czech nation as a natural process, to be grasped within a Darwinian framework of a historical ‘battle between races’: between Slavs and Germans. In his argument against what he terms ‘communism’, Palacký (1872, 19) argues that a statist civilizational modernisation project would ‘directly reverse Darwin’s idea’. He even states explicitly that the Austrian state would not last (ibid., 24-25):

> [N]ot that the same would not be desirable or per se impossible, but rather because the Germans and Magyars had been allowed to take over political rule and to establish in the monarchy a single-sided race-despotism, which, as political nonsense (contradictio in adjecto), cannot last for long in a multi-linguistic and constitutional state; the Germans and Magyars however do not want another Austria, except for such despotism. Due to the fault of these two tribes, which (as in the year 1848) attempt to tear apart the empire, it [Austria] has gone already too far on an inclined plane directed towards abyss. Concerning my nation I do not entertain too much fear.

Palacký (1872, 32) constructs the narrative of a supposedly ancient democratic tradition and continues that,

> they would never forget that on the basis of ancient historical law they should only be subjected to themselves, that is to their own government and their own ruler. The Prussians, due to their Germanicist furore, would be perceived by the Bohemians merely as sworn foes and murderers of their nationality. Concerning the Russians on the other hand, quite the opposite would happen; as our natural relatives by blood, friends and supporters, they would find in us the most loyal - not subjects, but - allies and according to necessity also an avant-garde in Europe.

This radical nationalist interpretation of Slavic-German relations questioned not only the future of the empire but also expressed opposition to the Austrian liberal project. The self-description of Bohemian-Czech nationalists as ‘liberal’ is somewhat misleading at this stage as their multinationalist framework divided the population into culturally or racially defined collectives.
In terms of the growing public recognition of national intellectuals, the era of neo-absolutism was a most productive one. In Hungary, Petőfi wrote his famous radical and revolutionary *The Apostle* (1851) and Imre Madách his dramatic poem *The Tragedy of the Human* (1860). In 1850, dramaturg Josef Kajetan Tyl began to organise the construction of a Czech national theatre in Prague, which staged its first play in 1862. The novel *Grandmother* (*Babička*, 1854) by Božena Němcová and the *Little Quarter Stories* (1867) by Jan Neruda were both of great cultural significance for the rural Czech-speaking population. Petar Preradović achieved a similarly recognised national literature in Croatian, and France Prešeren in Slovene, although both wrote initially in German (Rumpler 1997, 338). The Austrian capital of Vienna still fulfilled a central function in the promotion and development of various minor ‘national’ literary cultures. After Ján Kollár’s death, the Slovene Franz Miklosich revived the influence of the Chair of Slavism at the University of Vienna. He further took up Kollár’s position in the commission of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in 1851. Under Miklosich, the Viennese academic *Slavistik* became the centre of European Slavic Studies, replacing Prague. It is indicative that the most popular German-speaking Austrian writers, such as Franz Grillparzer in his *Bruderzwist* and *Libussa* (1847-51) and Adalbert Stifter in his *Nachsommer* (1857), openly promoted the recognition of other national cultures (ibid., 338-39). As national intellectuals, these authors thus contributed to a process of vernacularisation (Eisenstadt 2002, 56-57):

> [It] comprises in the first instance the communicative enhancement of a language perceived to be local, for purposes of new text production … and eventually political governance. This enhancement … will show variation in different cases, but it often proceeds with the appropriation of the symbolic capital of styles and genres from the superposed ecumenical language [which in that case was usually German]…In the political sphere…the critical transformation appears to be a contraction of the domain of governance. This comprises a vision of a smaller world within which power is to be consolidated and exercised, a vision in some cases given shape by a new territorialisation of political space and a new construction of that community that inhabits it.

Although the ‘small-nation’ ideas promoted nation-building projects that were explicitly opposed to the superior claim of Austro-German high culture, their own values and programmes were formed and developed in relation to such a concept.

### 6.3. Conservative-Liberal Governance Involving Nationality

The neo-absolutist regime, in its various configurations between 1849 and 1866, contributed substantially to the growing intellectual and organisational capacities of
provincial national movements by accommodating ‘cultural’ demands while attacking the remnants of Josephism. The Austrian liberal constitution of 1867 itself represented a manifestation of the conservative-liberal approach to nationality, guiding governmental policies to accommodate modern nationalism in a supposedly liberal ‘multi-’ and conservative ‘culturalist’ form.

6.3.1. From Neo-Corporate to Liberal-Constitutional State

The Habsburg court responded to the initial success of the revolution in 1848 with a distinct strategy of distancing itself geographically from Vienna (Langewiesche 1998, 17):

As the Habsburg court wanted to elude the pressure of the Viennese revolutionary centre, it moved to Innsbruck. The geographical distance between the Habsburg metropolis and the provincial city decreased the pressure to act, to which the head of state had been permanently exposed ... The options available to the revolutionaries were enormously reduced, while the position of the old regime was strengthened. The latter could wait as their position within the state was institutionally established; the revolutionaries on the other hand were forced to act, as they needed to create new institutions or to reform old ones if they wanted to make the revolutionary achievements durable.

This temporary measure to counter the political impact of the revolution in Vienna can be described as a conscious relocation of political power to multiple centres. What began as a counter-revolutionary response developed into a structural feature of conservative-liberal governance. The state reforms between 1852 and 1866 can be described as having promoted an ‘anti-constitutional system’ (Brauneder 2000, 158), as they were neo-corporatist in character and changed the power relations between centre and periphery. While until the mid-nineteenth century the capital of Vienna represented the indisputable political, cultural and financial centre of the monarchy, this began to change in the 1860s, when Buda-Pest, which represented the new capital city of Hungary (becoming one city in 1873), and Prague began to expand their political, economic, and cultural influence. The pattern characterising the development of these two growing cities in Hungary and Bohemia, challenging the multi-dimensional hegemony of Vienna, affected to a smaller degree urban centres like Cracow, Lemberg, Klausenburg/Kolozsvár/Cluj, Trieste and Zagreb (Hanisch/Urbanitsch 2006, 20).

Two reforms concerning the legal status of municipalities in 1849 and 1862 were central to the conservative-liberal approach to state/society relations and changed the conditions for national movements on the local level. While the constitution of March 1849 declared the ‘free municipality’ as the basis of the liberal ‘free state’, following the British model of ‘self government’, their establishment remained limited to the Austrian and the Bohemian lands. The bureaucratic centralisation process at the top level of the state during neo-absolutism
gradually granted various autonomies at the provincial and local levels, culminating in the establishment of the autonomous, unitary municipality in 1862. The Habsburg legal scholar Redlich (1910, 32) described its function as to manage the supposedly ‘cultural’ affairs of nationalities through local self-government, ‘creating a most extended life sphere freed of the state’, which represented ‘the foundation of civic freedom’. He concludes: ‘The Austrian municipality has, through the constitution of its territorial space, freed itself from the power of the state’ (ibid., 32-33). Redlich highlights that it constitutes its organs on the basis of free elections and local, representative constitutions. Although the constitution of 1867 granted legislative powers over the municipalities to the provincial diets, citizenship rights such as freedom of movement, the right to property and to vote in local elections remained bound to the residency and taxation in the municipality (Redlich 1910, 33, fn.1). As municipalities were granted autonomy, they ‘emerged as more or less uniformly organized local public administrative units, their councils elected by citizens of substance and endowed with considerable powers of self-government - yet triply checked by higher self-governing bodies, by the state administration, and by individuals defending their rights through appeals to the courts’ (King 2011, 92). During the 1860s, the political autonomy of local municipalities reached their peak, declining in the following decades when new mass parties focussed on the provincial level (Siemann 1995, 108).

After the death of the Austrian-centralist Schwarzenberg in 1852, Kübeck and Metternich convinced Francis Joseph that monarchical absolutism and Bach’s position as Prime Minister were incompatible, and Bach was made Minister of the Interior (Taylor 1990, 98-99). The revived autocratic system of monarchical rule, taking place largely outside the institutional framework, abandoned liberal attempts to modernise Austria’s government system (Waldenegg 2002, 120). The neo-absolutist regime’s approach to imperial rule became explicit in the name of its 1852 programme: ‘The principles for organic institutions in the Crownlands of the Austrian imperial state’ (Brauneder 2000, 138). The reforms of neo-absolutism were in ‘conscious opposition’ to the ‘logical construct of constitutionalism’ (ibid., 139).

In response to the political crisis of 1859, the emperor and various province-based political actors reinforced federalisation. Francis Joseph was influenced by the conservative aristocrat Heinrich Clam-Martinic and Hungarian nobles Antal Szécsen and József Eötvös, the latter supporting the recognition of both ‘national historical political-territorial rights’ as well as ‘national cultural linguistic rights’ (Rumpler 1997, 374-75). The Oktoberdiplom of 1860 aimed to federalise the Austrian state, as did the 1861 ‘Imperial Constitution’ with its
provincial state laws (Landesordnungen) (Brauneder 2000, 156). The constitutional and legal basis of the provinces, the so-called Landesständische Verfassung represented a similar type to that developed by Friedrich Gentz for the German Confederation in 1819 (Siemann 1995, 30-31). Szécsen convinced Francis Joseph to prevent the loss of his sovereignty by granting provincial autonomies, thus transferring political power not to a liberal-bourgeois dominated Austrian parliament but to the provincial diets, dominated by the landed nobility (Rumpler 1997, 375). This plan largely followed the anti-Josephist proposal of Andrian-Werburg (ibid., 373-4).

In the following year, the February Patent of 1861 represented a ‘compromise of bourgeois constitutionalism and aristocratic autonomism’ (Rumpler 1997, 377). The electoral system of the provincial diets, which sent their delegates to the Austrian parliament, was reformed to include property-owning bourgeois groups. It reaffirmed the position of the traditional political elites consisting of landed and noble interests, finance, industry and the bureaucracy while formally including for the first time the new middle class, such as the property-owning bourgeoisie and wealthy farmers. Schmerling used the electoral reform to strengthen the political representation of German-speakers, including the traditionally German-speaking aristocracy in the House of Lords (Herrenhaus) and the most powerful curia of the House of Delegates, the German-speaking bourgeoisie with its dominant position in trade and industry, as well as the curia of the cities (Rumpler 1997, 378).

Hungarian nationalist politicians responded by obstructing the Vienna parliament, defending their political autonomy granted in October 1860. The result of these reforms had been a power shift within the provinces in favour of the lower nobility and the bourgeoisie. In Bohemia, it was especially the ‘bureaucratic, intellectual, and entrepreneurial class’, and in Hungary ‘the county gentry, whose preponderance was actually boosted by the neutralization of the magnates’ (Evans 2006, 204). Schmerling’s plan appeared to be successful by achieving Austro-German dominance within the Austrian parliament in Vienna, the Constitutional Party holding a majority of 130 seats against the 70 seats of the federalist and conservative-clerical opposition. Despite the replacement of Schmerling’s constitution and the separation of Hungary from Austria in 1867, his reform of the Austrian and provincial parliaments remained in effect (Rumpler 1997, 378). The growing bourgeoisie achieved political representation and expanded their power as political actors. The traditionally conservative, province-based national movements were able to draw on
this expanding, linguistically defined and regionally rooted social base. In the municipal elections, the cities of Prague and Pilsen both elected a Czech-speaking mayor.

After the resignation of Schmerling in 1865, Francis Joseph appointed Belcredi, a religious conservative aristocrat from Moravia, as Prime Minister. He was an outspoken anti-liberal, originally determined to grant provinces far-reaching autonomy in order to establish a constitutionally reconstructed empire. Moreover, the plan was to strengthen the conservative-federalists. His older brother Egbert was a Bohemian patriot who lobbied for Bohemian self-government, and also a co-founder of the conservative Viennese newspaper Vaterland (1860). Richard Belcredi attended a meeting between the emperor and various Slavic nationalists from Bohemia, Poland, Moravia and Croatia, who were seeking political power at the expense of Vienna. This encounter with leading nationalist figures such as Palacký and Rieger, the Moravian Strossmayer and the Polish Gołuchowsky, convinced him that ‘[u]nmistakably there lies a grave danger for the existence of Austria, to attribute to the nationalities principle a political-constitutive function’ (quoted in Rumpler 1997, 407). As a consequence of Belcredi’s opposition to Hungarian demands for dualism and Slavic appeals for a multinational federation, the former already accepted by the emperor, the pragmatic Beust became the new leading government figure.

After the defeat against Prussia in 1866, Francis Joseph sought a compromise by drawing on ‘moderate’ Hungarian nationalists like Deák and Andrássy, who were familiar aristocratic figures at court, and the conservative nobility. He despised the Austrian liberal figures, who were predominantly German-speaking bourgeois lawyers, and decided to exclude them from the negotiation process (Deak 1990, 54). Dualism found support among Magyar elites as well as among German-speaking aristocrats and the bourgeois, who sought to dominate the ‘western half’ (Rumpler 1997, 410). Beust described the dualist reconstruction of the monarchy to the emperor in January 1867 as ‘the merging of the German and the Hungarian element against Panslavism’ (quoted in Rumpler 1997, 410).

With the December constitution of 1867, Austria became a constitutional state, composed of sixteen Crownlands, each with its own parliament and restricted autonomies. Hungary became a unitary state with Budapest controlling its regions, with the exception of Croatia-Slavonia, which was granted certain autonomies in 1868. In Austria, the federalist ‘estates model’ (Siemann 1995, 30-31) was preserved to a certain extent and complemented by the new Imperial Council in Vienna, consciously avoiding the term Reichstag of 1848. It

12 The 236 members of the Bohemian Diet included only 79 representatives of the Bohemian-Czech national party and in Vienna, the Bohemian, Moravian and Silesian delegates included only 24 ‘Czechs’ (Rumpler 1997, 383-4).
represented Austria’s ‘conservative-liberal’ response to growing liberal and democratic demands, which were further channelled into political bodies and civil society organisations on the level of provinces and municipalities through federalism and municipal autonomy on the one hand, and through culturally and linguistically defined ‘nationalities’, to be accommodated in the fields of administration, education and civic life on the other. Article 19 of the 1867 Fundamental State Law guaranteed the equal treatment of all nationalities (Sutter Fichtner 1997, 156):

All nationalities [Volksstämme] of the State shall have equal rights, and each nationality shall have the inviolable right of maintaining and cultivating its nationality and language. The State recognises the equality of the various languages in the schools, public offices, and in public life. In the countries populated by several nationalities, the institutions of public instruction shall be so organised that each nationality may receive the necessary instruction in its own language, without being obliged to learn a second language.

The December constitution ‘offered a certain liberalism even in national affairs, and postulated a rather vague language equality in schools and public offices’, which left ambiguities to be disputed ‘for it spoke both of the “provincial language” and of the “language usual in the province”’ (Taylor 1990, 151). In the negotiations between Francis Joseph and Deák - who published his programme of an Austrian-Hungarian Compromise in articles between April and May 1865 - the traditionalist stance of the Habsburg ruler became apparent. ‘[H]e was determined only to maintain the greatness and armed might of the dynasty, and was indifferent as the doctrine on which this greatness should rest’ (ibid., 132). As a symbol of the revival of Hungarian semi-autonomy as a kingdom, Francis Joseph visited Budapest, where ‘for the first time he behaved strictly as King of Hungary, avoided all mention of Empire, and declared his intention of meeting the legitimate wishes of the Hungarian people’ (ibid.). With Beust, Francis Joseph revived a traditionalist type of governance and personally decided on the appointment and resignation of ministers (Rumpler 1997, 413). The Constitution of 1867 allowed the monarch to exercise autocratic dynastic rule in the case of emergency. The first Article of the Law Concerning the Exercise of Administrative and Executive Power declared the Emperor inviolable and not accountable to any other body (Sutter Fichtner 1997, 157).

The political influence of the Hungarian-Magyar national movement materialised in the recognition of Hungary as a national political body. At the coronation in Budapest Francis Joseph wore a Hungarian national costume and was crowned by Gyulay Andrássy, who had initially received the death penalty in 1849 (Leonhard/Hirschhausen 2011, 34). It becomes also evident in the official terminology used by the court. While the Hungarian half of the
Dual Monarchy was named ‘Hungary’, the Austrian half was officially referred to only as ‘the lands represented in the Reichsrat’. In legal language, the term ‘Empire’ was avoided through the description of ‘the common monarchy’. Opposition came from the Bohemian-Czech camp, which responded to the 1867 Compromise with ‘an outbreak of rage, memorably articulated by the aged and now fiercely Magyarophobe Palacký; then they launched a (for the moment) concerted campaign for similar concessions to be made to the lands of the Bohemian crown’ (Evans 2006, 207). In the context of the international upheaval of 1871, Francis Joseph responded to growing dissatisfaction with the removal of the liberal government in Vienna and appointed the Moravian magnate Hohenwart as Minister-Präsident. He further ‘embarked upon substantive talks with Czech leaders’, which are customary called ‘an attempt at “trialism”, but in reality … would have amounted rather to a Hungaro-Bohemian dualism’ (ibid.). The new federalist government represented ‘a ministry above the parties’ and was influenced by the intellectual leader Schäffle, a Protestant from Germany who was professor of political economics at the University of Vienna. Schäffle persuaded Francis Joseph to extend the franchise to a degree, which enabled the Czech-speaking rural population to win over the Bohemian Diet against the German-speaking elites.

Despite its parliament, Austria’s ideological base remained linked to Habsburg dynasticism and multinationalism. Francis Joseph appealed to the ambivalent - and religiously gradually pluralised - dynastic ‘hybrid legitimacy’, defining his position as a political ruler in conservative-liberal terms, protecting the constitutionally recognised rights of Austria’s multiple confessions and nationalities. The position of the emperor became symbolically elevated above the actual political arena, contributing to his image as the father of the monarchy’s peoples or nationalities. In practice, it ‘limited the possibility of “nationalizing” the person of the emperor in the same way that could occur in Britain or Germany’ (Wolf 2007, 210). It also led to the fact that almost anyone could identify with the emperor as his/her representative.

6.3.2. Nationality as a State Practice of Population Management

Building the liberal constitutional state implied the expansion of infrastructural rule. The state took up new functions, ranging ‘from the development of physical and institutional infrastructures (roads and railways, territory-wide systems of measures, the diffusion of literacy) necessary for industrialisation, to legislative and police measures to tackle the problems posed by a growing, mobilised, increasingly urbanised population’ (Poggi 1990, 61). In consequence, the importance of the state’s legitimacy increased. ‘Passports, military
service, rituals of state and nation, public statues of national heroes, and great commemorative buildings attempted to achieve the same standardized patriotism in more subtle ways’ (Bayly 2004, 280). In her study of ‘the legal discourse on aliens’ and the ‘legislation concerning legal rights of aliens’, Baader-Zaar (2003, 138) identifies ‘a gradual widening of the gap between citizens and foreigners’ and concludes that ‘[o]nly in the “constitutional” period of the 1860s did the definition of citizen rights as political rights attempt to clearly mark foreigners as outsiders.’ This hints at the institutionalisation of the direct relationship between state and subjects qua citizens.

Article 3 of the 1867 fundamental state law defined the Crown as the highest authority of the bureaucracy (Heindl 2010, 1174). As high-ranking bureaucrats represented a major segment of the political elite, the monarch’s interventions to remind them of their obligatory dynastic loyalty prevented them from fulfilling their ideal political function in the Josephist tradition. In contrast, it supported a politically passive orientation, reflected in the university curriculum. For the bureaucracy it implied conflicting collective identities: loyalty to the state, the emperor, or political camp (Heindl 2013b, 90-103). The emperor aimed to prevent the bureaucracy from identifying with normative political projects and intervened against political activities. In fact the ‘reforms of the 1850s were the last the Austrian bureaucracy underwent until the end of the monarchy’ (Heindl 2006, 46). Its function had changed from being a political force of change towards a force defending the status quo through policies of institutional accommodation, taking up new functions without substantially changing bureaucratic regulations (ibid., 48). In terms of collective identity, the opposition between a constitutional, liberal-statist bureaucracy and the traditionalist role of loyal, pious servants of the monarch represented an unresolvable conflict (Heindl 2013b, 45-120). Although Austrian bureaucrats remained legally protected from partisan and royal intervention, many civil servants who were perceived as too liberal were transferred to minor posts in the periphery.

In the 1860s and 1870s the pressure from conservatives and the monarch increased, leading to a further decline of ‘liberal’ elements within the government and the bureaucracy (Heindl 2013b, 102-3). This decline undermined the bureaucracy’s original role as the institutional body accommodating and incubating ‘traditional intellectuals’ of the Austrian state idea. Instead of a bureaucracy that functioned as the guardian of the ‘liberal state’, Francis Joseph demanded the loyalty of the bureaucracy towards his person, demonstrated by the oath taken by civil servants that focused entirely on dynastic loyalty. As was the case for Prussian state-builders, in post-Josephist Austria ‘the idea of enlightened, technically
competent rule by highly placed governmental officials was associated … with the endeavour to curb the arbitrary rule of a royal autocrat and with the promotion of reforms in opposition to the established privileges of the nobility’ (Bendix 2007b, 148). The revival of autocratic patterns of dynastic personal rule and the corresponding barrier for the establishment of a modern government system constituted major obstacles to developing a statist ethos that promoted Austrian patriotism.

**Statistics**

After the 1850s, new administrative practices and data collection became increasingly important as part of an inclusive approach of states towards their population. ‘Whether on the left or the right … the new state possibilities of intervention depended on postulating an organic society that could be measured and shaped. This new confidence in the measurability of social relationships took its name from Auguste Comte’s doctrine of positivism - a confidence in the observability of natural and social phenomena that characterized the statesmen and intellectuals’ (Maier 2012, 164). Many innovations in government involved state agencies that introduced new practices of classification and quantification. In Austria too, statistics, the discipline of accounting and a new scientific form of political geography was to help guide modernisation, coordinated and implemented by its government and facilitated through the bureaucracy (Storrs 2009, 41).

In 1853, the international statistics conference was founded and took place regularly until 1878. The participants consisted of 230 members from a variety of countries, including the United States, Egypt and Argentina, and from Austria the director of the Vienna Statistical Central Commission, Karl-Theodor Inama-Sternegg, took part. Many of them played key roles in providing scientifically informed policy advice for governments (Westergaard 1932, 172-90). The principal instrument for the statistical quantification of the population became the census, which for methodological and comparative reasons was given standardised formal criteria and intervals of ten years, following the British example (Leonard/Hirschhausen 2011, 57). During the London meeting of 1860, questions regarding ‘nationality’ and whether or not it was a useful category became central issues of debate. While the British and French statisticians saw nationality as representing merely citizenship, their Austrian colleagues (as did the Russians) argued that nationality was a category signifying ethnic belonging. At the 1872 conference in St. Petersburg, it was finally agreed that the category of ‘spoken language’ was a useful criterion and that it should be up to the respective governments to decide whether it was included (ibid., 57-58). Although in the
1860s the Austrian bureaucracy refused to include ‘nationality’ in the census, the census of 1869 was crucial for setting the criteria of the state’s categorisation of the population within administrative statistics (Göderle 2016, 212-13). Although prominent statisticians such as Adolf Ficker saw the scientific measurement of nationality critically, the period between 1869 and 1880 was characterised by the growing acceptance of ‘spoken language’ as the signifier of ‘nationality’ (Pammer 2010, 1556, 1562).

In 1858, Karl Czoernig, the founder of modern Austrian statistics (Tafeln zur Statistik 1828-1865) and Austrian ethnography (Ethnographie der oesterreichischen Monarchie, 3 volumes 1855-1857), wrote a programmatic piece of the neo-absolutist era, which illustrates the regime’s multinational approach to the population (Oesterreichs Neugestaltung 1848-1858). In the introduction to one of his statistical works of 1861 (Czoernig 1861, VII and 37), he refers to the entire state as the ‘Austrian Monarchy’, while dividing the population into supposedly scientifically measurable, linguistically defined ‘nationalities’, which he approaches via a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods (Göderle 2016, 206). Another example is Josef Jireček’s Ethnographic Survey of the Bohemian Kingdom (1850). Jireček was a scholar and politician who became a member of the Austrian parliament in 1879 and promoted education in the Czech language. Unlike Czoernig’s work, his survey was based on data from 1829, collected by parish priests. In the first paragraph he equates language with ‘nation’ (národ), and argues that the state has the duty to collect data in order to devise language policies that serve the population. He explained that he had classified communities as ‘Czech’, ‘German’, or ‘mixed’, according to the language used by residents in their daily communication. Yet he barely used his third category (mixed), and rather tended to gloss over bilingualism.

**Education**

The 1850s were marked by a ‘counterrevolution in education’ (Cohen 1996, 23), resulting in the ‘re-Catholisation’ of the education system and the diffusion of a linguistically defined form of multinationalism (Sutter Fichtner 1997, 50):

Franz Joseph’s reign had also begun with ringing declarations of the right of all peoples to cultivate their own language and culture. This principle had especially far-reaching consequences for the educational system of the empire. Classes in primary schools were conducted in the tongue of the majority of the people in the area. The language of instruction for a high school or Gymnasium remained the subject of dispute in areas of mixed population … [in practice,] German and the regional idiom were taught.
Under the leadership of Leo Thun, the neo-absolutist government pushed forward an education and school reform (Rumpler 2010, 1134). ‘Impressed by the pace of Prussian development, the new Austrian leaders proved willing to accept parts of the Prussian model as they chartered new policies for state administration, economic development, and education’ (Cohen 1996, 23). Arguments for choosing one single language of instruction were provided by pedagogical experts (Burger 1995, 25-31). The principle of monolingualism began to affect the Austrian primary school system, undermining older forms of multi- or bilingual teaching (Bruckmüller 2007, 12). The sample of the bilingual Grosses Lesebuch der Deutsch-Slovenische Schule (1857) below shows that the trend towards monolingualism in education was not necessarily without alternative.

Figure 21. Bilingual German-Slovene Reading Book of 1857

The Fundamental State Law of 1867 ‘set out the right to elementary education in the mother-tongue, provided this was one of the languages in common use in the particular crownland or province. In addition, the constitution held fast to the principle of monolingual schooling … The imperial law on elementary schools (Reichsvolksschulgesetz) of 1869 respected the principles laid down in the constitution, while specifying that in practice it was now the educational authorities in each province who were responsible for determining which languages of instruction would be employed’ (Bruckmüller 2007, 14). The Austrian state officially divided the population into approximately ten major linguistically defined ‘nationalities’, each based on a standardised literary language, excluding the neglected Yiddish-speaking population (Stourzh 1989, 259-87). The number of Austrian high schools increased from 101 in 1851 to 432 in 1909, still dramatically overcrowded due to the rapidly
rising demand for secondary education. The state sought to expand its educational infrastructure since ‘[g]overnment statisticians viewed the increasing numbers of primary and secondary schools compared with the population and with spatial area as important measures of the growing access to advanced education’ (Cohen 1996, 63). The liberal elite’s perspective was different from the reasoning of nationalist actors who focused on ‘the number of advanced schools that taught in languages other than German as a measure of each nationality’s cultural achievements’ (ibid.).

A similar struggle arose with the expansion of higher education, ‘as part of the Thun-Exner reforms of the 1850s’ (Cohen 1996, 84). According to Leo Thun ‘the re-education of Austrian students could be achieved by means of supporting certain disciplines’, for instance ‘legal history and the simultaneous suppression of legal philosophy’, as he blamed the latter for stimulating revolutionary thinking (Aichner 2015, 300-1). Within a few years, he achieved ‘the almost entire and long-lasting removal of legal philosophy from Austrian universities’ and implemented ‘the historical school of law and the study of Roman law’ (ibid., 301). According to Thun’s conservative worldview, ‘there was some sort of spiritual connection between a nation and its historically evolved law’ (ibid.). Thun succeeded in appointing conservative-religious scholars in almost all Austrian universities and in redirecting historical studies ‘from an individualistic and mostly narrative history to an organized and institutionalized historical science’ (ibid., 302).

Within the ministry of education, the major Austrian liberal opponent of plans to establish a Czech-speaking university in Prague was suspended (Heindl 2013b, 101). The university of Prague was eventually divided into a German- and Czech-speaking faculty in 1882 (Skilling 1949). A similar conflict arose concerning the issue of German, Polish and Ruthenian language of instruction at the University of Lemberg and the Jagiellonian University, the latter being granted a bilingual status (Polish and German) in 1861. In contrast, the University of Cracow was completely ‘polonized’ in 1870, as was Lemberg Technical Academy (Surman 2012, 146). In response to the Polish dominance, Ruthenian academic societies and journals proliferated from the 1860s. As in many other cases, the first Ruthenian student association (Sich) was also founded in Vienna (ibid., 147). Another example of the institutionalisation of linguistically defined nationality difference was the foundation of the first University in Transylvania in 1872, which represented ‘a direct intervention into local scholarly life’ (Török 2016, 10). As a result, Transylvanian ‘provincial scholarship in the humanities has divided the past into Romanian, Hungarian, and Saxon compartments, which have not only marginalized each other’s presence but
ignored other ethnic and denominational histories, such as that of Jews, Armenians, Greeks, and Roma’ (ibid., 9).

The liberal MP Constantin Tomaszuk from the Bukovina, which was inhabited by a multilingual population of Ruthenian, Rumanian, Polish, Yiddish and German speakers, represented an example of remaining Austrian-liberal influence. Tomaszuk, a noble landowner, lobbied for the foundation of a German-language university in Czernowitz, which was eventually established in 1875. His argument concerning the production of an Austrian bourgeois identity is worth noting: ‘Austria’s unity rests on the common education of all those who through education have managed to raise themselves above the level of the masses. Over time, this common education, this community of ideas has produced an Austrian political nationality’ (quoted in Judson 2016, 322). At the same time, it was also essential that this new university house the first professorships in Romanian and Ukrainian literature and language (ibid.). A nationally largely indifferent youth, many shaped by family socialisation from rural and religious backgrounds, where nationality often lacked any meaning, became gradually confronted with the category of nationality through the state.

6.3.3. The Representation of Nationality in Textbooks

State practices helped to solidify a ‘more potent sense of nation’, created for instance through ‘geography textbooks which showed the boundaries and divisions of the state to the young, and promulgated novels and histories which standardized languages and created a long, and sometimes largely fictitious, lineage for states’ (Bayly 2004, 280). While this general observation identifies state practices that were feeding into the ‘statist function’ of nationalism, in the Austrian case the government explicitly avoided fostering a civic type of Austrian nationalism through civic education (Jászi 1961, 433-39). A recent analysis of samples from selected textbooks published after 1869 seems to confirm this thesis (Bruckmüller 2007). In contrast to nationalising states such as France, Prussia or the United States, Habsburg governance attempted to multinationalise its population.

The regime’s normative approach to Austrian history can be examined in reference to Leo Thun, Minister of Cultural Affairs and Education, who hired the Romantic conservative Karl Ernst Jarcke as his ‘chief ideologist’. Thun’s role was a key factor, as his style of appointing intellectuals for instigating political reforms was exceptional at the time (Rumpler 2010, 1134-35). ‘In Thun’s eyes the monarchy could thrive only with the acceptance of a particular narrative, which would counter the nationalistic claims. This included not only loyalty, cultural reciprocity and Catholicism as cornerstones, but also the
claim that the Empire is the only guarantor of cultural “progress”, an idea in which universities had the pivotal role’ (Surman 2012, 126). Thun supported the scientific work on and the publication of so-called ‘national histories’. An example is Václav Tomek’s ‘Czech’ history of Prague, which was personally commissioned by Thun. After his return from exile in 1855, László Szalay published his *History of Hungary* in six volumes. Similarly supportive in this regard was the Polish Academy of sciences. The various nationalities belonging to the so-called ‘Southern Slavs’ received official support after 1860. In 1861, Peter Kozler published a map of the Slovenian ‘language border’, which did not coincide with the provincial political boundaries. The authorities in Vienna had postponed the foundation of a ‘Southern Slavic Academy of Sciences and Arts’ in Zagreb from 1860 to 1867. In both cases, state authorities gave up resistance after the intervention of the Viennese Slavist Franz Miklosich (Rumpler 1997, 340-41).

The historians working on ‘national histories’ had to seek cooperation with Vienna. One central figure close to Thun was Joseph Helfert, who was undersecretary of state in the ministry of cultural affairs and education, a parliamentary deputy and historian. In 1853 he published his idea of an Austrian history in his *On the National History and the Contemporary State of its Practice in Austria*, and founded the *Institute for Austrian Historical Research*. In the introduction, Helfert (1853, 1-2) refers to multiple, culturally distinct tribes: ‘Austrian national history is for us the history of the entire Austrian state and the whole people, the organically intertwined parts of which consist of all those tribes, different in origin, culture, and custom, who live across the vast area of the Empire.’ He argued to keep nationality as a cultural and linguistic category separate from political and state affairs, and wrote an alternative history of the Hussite movement in 1853. This work re-interpreted central elements of Palacký’s Bohemian history, which had ‘nationalised’ the religious struggle of the Hussite movement. Although Helfert tacitly accepted Palacký’s master narrative of an ancient Czech nation, defending ‘Bohemian-Czech’ nationality, his account separated it from the supposedly erroneous Hussite movement, which it identified as causing the conflict with the Habsburgs. Similar to Leo Thun, to whom he dedicated the book, he assumed the non-antagonistic nature of culturally accommodated nationalities, kept together by the monarchy’s second ideological pillar of Catholicism.

Helfert also realised the importance of diffusing narratives and images of a common past among the population at large in order to acquire legitimacy for the monarchy. In 1859, he proposed to write an ‘Austrian history’ for the popular masses (*volksthümlich*), a project that followed the earlier trends of *Vaterländische Geschichtsschreibung*, established in
many provinces during the Metternich era (Helfert 1863, 8-9). Helfert argued that, if the emperor was allowing the population to participate in political life, it was necessary to foster among the ‘people of Austria’ a ‘patriotic sense of community’ (*patriotischen Gemeinsinn*) (Helfert 1863, 11). By reading their country’s ‘great course of history’ the Austrian people should develop trust into their future (ibid.). Helfert noted that material of an ‘Austrian history’ was rare and proposed to focus on the founding period beginning with the reign of ‘the Great Empress’ Maria Theresa and ending with ‘the war of independence’ against Napoleon (ibid., 12). Interestingly, Helfert acknowledges that his idea of attracting several writers for his project of producing a multi-volume work of ‘Austrian history’ had been inspired by the ‘German national library’ developed by Ferdinand Schmidt (ibid., 12). In the description of the project, which he sent to various historians, Helfert highlights its function and goal of an explicitly teleological representation of Austrian state formation.

Helfert’s new ‘Austrian history’ aimed to a certain extent to legitimise the contemporary territorial Austrian state, not, however, by predominantly drawing on the ‘statist function’ of nationalism as a secular ideology but in reference to God’s divine interventions (ibid., 18). Helfert argues that his federalist and multinationalist conception of Empire would be compatible and supportive of a ‘Great Austrian consciousness’. Various conservative historians in the commission viewed Helfert’s project critically. One questioned whether it was even possible to write such a huge ‘Austrian history’ if the single provincial histories were still subject to debate and could not be written during a scholar’s lifetime (ibid., 9). It is striking that Helfert himself pointed out that the era of Joseph II had been largely neglected by contemporary historiography although it was a central topic of Austrian history (ibid., 38).

It is important to note that in terms of actually taught content in schools there was a divergence in the state’s promoted ideology between the level of elementary and secondary education. Bruckmüller (2007, 23) finds evidence that ‘the Habsburg state did not suppress the [province-based or cultural] national element in the learning of history at the elementary level’, where national legends and myths were ‘part of the curriculum and were recognized as a legitimate part of pride in one’s native region.’ Although the state was relatively tolerant when it came to teaching national legends and history, for instance in the case of Bohemian Slavs and Hungarian Magyars, which were presented in a positive historical relationship to the Habsburg dynasty, ‘there was much less room for maneuver for language groups whose main center of gravity lay outside the borders of the Habsburg state (above all, the Italians)’ (ibid., 29). In secondary education, the ideological orientation of history
textbooks and curricula was more directed towards the central state. While there was still ‘a consideration of the history of individual crownlands’, there ‘was no attempt to strengthen further the national-cultural (or political) consciousness of the different nationalities’ (ibid.). Apparently, the state promoted educational autonomy and a multinationalising educational apparatus for the lower social strata, who were to remain bound to their local territories while placing ‘a watchful eye over the material provided to the future elite’ (ibid., 29).

In a 1849 draft plan for the teaching of geography and history at the lower level of high school, the educational goals were outlined as ‘a knowledgeable overview of the world and its division into political and natural units; an overview of the most important personalities and events from the history of peoples, namely of the history of Austria, and its chronological context’ (quoted in Bruckmüller 2007, 24). Several samples from contemporary Austrian geography textbooks illustrate the application and teaching of the new statistical categorisation of the population into nationalities. The respective authors of the analysed textbooks highlight explicitly that their books follow the new guidelines of the minister of education, especially his demands to use quantitative statistical data in the presentation of the population. The following sample illustrates a modern didactic method used in a task for students to calculate and visualise the relations between Austria’s distinct nationalities on a provided map.

Figure 22. How nationality was taught in school (Heusler 1858, 35)\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Aufgaben.}


The supposedly more state-centred education in upper-secondary schools can be illustrated by analysing Pütz’s \textit{Lehrbuch der Oesterreichischen Vaterlandskunde} (1851). Methodologically it is again structured into historical, geographical and statistical sections, but highlights that it discusses the ‘Austrian state’. Based on sources from the Directorate of Administrative Statistics, the author claims to present an overview of ‘the whole’ and not of

\textsuperscript{13} Translation: ‘Mark the borders of the various nationalities within your hydrotopical map [showing rivers] and highlight them with different colours. Calculate the numerical proportions of the distinct nationalities to each other! Calculate the proportion of each nationality’s number to the size of the territory it inhabits! Try to visualize the results through drawings.’
details concerning crownlands (ibid., IV). He further clarifies that his textbook follows the guidelines outlined in Thun’s draft plan by presenting statistical information ‘on the members of the state in their diversity regarding descent, language and religion’ (ibid., IV-V). The section on ‘population’ - ‘diversity of the population according to descent and language’ - is introduced by the statement that the diversity of the Austrian population is surpassed only by that of Russia. What follows is a presentation of the population, divided into the following ‘tribes’ (Stämme). First, the ‘European tribes’, including the Germans, Slavs (consisting of three main tribes: North-Western Czechs, Slovaks and Poles; South-Western Wenden, Croats, Slavonians, Serbs; Eastern Russians, Ruthenians and Bulgarians), the Rumanians (including Italians, Walachians); then the ‘Asian tribes’, the Hungarians (including the Magyars, the Cumanen and the Szekler), accompanied by the Syrian-chaldaic tribe (including Armenians and Jews), and the Indian tribe (including ‘Zigeuner’) (ibid., 111-20). This section is followed by the presentation of the Austrian population according to its ‘diversity of religion’ (ibid., 120). In another general geography textbook written by Schmidl and Warhanek (1857), the representation of Austria’s population is divided into the following categories: the Germans, the Slavs, the Italians, the Magyars, the Rumanians, the Jews and the ‘Gypsies’. The geography textbook for lower secondary schools by Retolička (1858), differentiates in the appendix on political geography three major relations between humans and their resulting social organisation: 1.) union via family, 2.) union via language, resulting in peoples and nations, and 3.) union via the state, resulting in ‘society’.

In Klun’s geography textbook for Austrian middle schools, the author notes in the preface that the ‘detailed knowledge of the fatherland increases necessarily the love for the same’ (Klun 1861, VI). He adds that statistical material will be used for the presentation of ‘culture images’ (Kulturbilder) (ibid.). A similar state-centred perspective is outlined in Schubert’s Brief Introduction of the Austrian Imperial State (1855) for elementary schools and Realschule. The introduction begins with the following passage: ‘The country which we inhabit is called Austria. Austria was in the past the Eastern border region of Germany against the Hunns and Avars, and it is today the centre of the great united and indivisible Austrian imperial state.’

Despite the heterogeneity of textbooks in the era under examination, one point of reference is the work of Anton Gindely. A university professor in contact with Helfert, he remained an influential editor of history textbooks which were translated into the different languages of the monarchy. Gindely’s general history textbook (1871, 208-17) for the third class of the upper-level Gymnasium dedicates substantial space to different ‘national
literatures’, while avoiding any ‘Austrian’, state-centred narratives. In the book’s final section on the ‘culture of modernity’, it presents Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, English, German, Polish and Russian ‘literatures’. It seems to link ‘national literatures’ to successful or at least dominant nation-state projects (as in the Polish case, which achieved statehood only in 1918), while avoiding the question of any ‘Austrian’ literature. Gindely writes that in the modern era ‘most European peoples’ celebrated a second literary revival, in Germany ‘achieved by Klopstock, Wieland, Lessing and Herder’ (ibid., 208, 213). In the preface of a reading book for middle schools from 1868, the author declares that the general aim for teachers was to ‘engage more ambitiously than before in cultivating the field of German language education in Austrian Germany’ (Vernaleken 1869, IV). The term ‘Austrian Germany’ suggests the existence of a German culture transcending the borders of the Austrian state. In a geography book of 1875, written for middle schools and for self study, the part on ‘political geography’ introduces the study of human population in two different sections, first the ‘expansion of races’, and second, ‘the mental diversity of humans’. While the first section differentiates between three biological races, the second discusses in greater detail human differentiations with reference to language, religion and culture. It follows a clear linguistic definition of the nation: ‘The entirety of humans who speak one language and share the same customs are termed a people or a nation’ (Supan 1875, 29-31).

The introduction of quantitative social scientific methods had not only led to the categorisation of the population into linguistically defined groupings within the administration, but these divisions became the framework for the presentation of the population as supposedly objectively measurable collectives in public education.

6.4. National Movements between the Cultural-Public and Political Phase

The previous sections have discussed how instead of the institution of a liberal-constitutional state, a distinct Austrian-conservative form of empire was revived. While nationalism’s ‘statist function’, which had potentially expanded the ideological base of the state, was eroded by anti-Josephist policies, the ‘populist function’ of provincial nationalisms increased its appeal, especially after 1867. With the introduction of multi-party politics on different political levels, several national movements entered a new contained ‘political’ phase. Austrian Governmental policies and reforms contributed to the growing
social base and ideological power of province-based national movements at the expense of Austrian-liberal and centralist reformers.

6.4.1. The Conservative-Liberal State and the Bourgeoisie

As the counter-revolution succeeded in consolidating a conservative-liberal alliance that included the German-speaking upper bourgeoisie, which shared the critical view on democratisation held by the conservative nobility, the emperor and large parts of the clergy, a governance of empire was revived instead of pursuing a timely introduction of representative constitutionalism. Conservative-liberal governance shaped bureaucratic processes of vernacularisation and influenced the diffusion of a culturally and linguistically defined multi-national vision of society through state practices and its expanding education system. The state facilitated the (re-)production of culturally and linguistically defined ‘national bourgeoisies’, replacing the liberal ideal of a middle-class society. As part of this process, many formerly marginal province-based nationalist intellectuals of the cultural-private phase became part of a new mainstream within cultural-public national movements, taking up the function of ‘vernacular intellectuals’, who ‘define at once a literary and a political culture in conscious opposition to the larger ecumene’ (Eisenstadt 2002, 56).

One consequence of the regime strategy of accommodating cultural and economic demands of provincial national movements was the reversal of the incentive structure of the growing urban groups in terms of linguistic assimilation. It contributed to the end of the expansionist dynamics of the German-speaking middle-class society (Deak 1967, 304):

Before 1867, embourgeoisement in Austria was generally identical with the adoption of German culture. After 1867, this changed. The German Burgertum was no longer able to absorb the rising Slavic middle class; nor did the Slavs consider assimilation a condition of economic success. There were suddenly too many Slavic businessmen, professionals, and intellectuals - often of peasant background - who were neither able nor willing to embrace German culture … In the Slavic areas of Austria it became almost mandatory for a journalist, a priest, a lawyer, a politician, and even a doctor, an engineer, or a manufacturer to remain Czech, Pole, or Slovene, for his assimilation into German would have led to social ostracism.

The development of national movements in Bohemia, Hungary, Galicia, Dalmatia, and Transylvania showed similar patterns that were conditioned by top-down regime policies and evolved through bottom-up dynamics. The examples of Dalmatia and Hungary illustrate how the previously discussed conservative-liberal state policies partially overlapped with or represented conditions for the normative goals of national movements, which were regional and delimited from the surrounding Slavic and Italian national movements. The Dalmatian regional movement’s policies drew on the institutions created by the state’s modernisation
policies (Reill 2007, 28-29), in much the same way as the Hungarian-Magyar state-nation project drew on the bureaucratic modernising reforms achieved in Hungary by the neo-absolutist government in the 1850s (Rumpler 1997, 380-82). Similarly, the Italian nation-building project drew upon state institutions created by Austrian reforms in Northern Italy, as did the Polish nation-building project in Galicia. All these examples should be examined in terms of their relationship to modernising state policies initiated by Vienna.

In 1848, the social base of most national movements in central Europe was quite limited, with the exception of the Hungarian-Magyar movement led by Kossuth. For instance, the leading nationalist newspaper in the Romanian language had only 250 subscribers (Sperber 2005, 101). At the same time the Hungarian-Magyar national movement entered a political phase, even declaring a ‘national war of independence’. While there appeared to be nationalist intellectuals and activists who in times of regime crisis would turn to claim local political rule, some even already envisioning the establishment of a future national state, ‘it was easier to dream a nation than to form one. The Italian effort failed in both 1848 and 1849 … Facing a renewed Magyar revolution, the Austrians got help from the Russians to suppress the … secessionist regime in Budapest’ (Maier 2012, 117). It was only after a new cooperative phase of Austrian liberalisation and recurrent military defeats that the Hungarian national movement achieved its quasi-autonomous state in 1867.

In the Hungarian provinces, the parliamentary elections of 1848 allowed certain occupations that counted as ‘intellectual’ to vote. Among these 40,000 so-called Honoratioren were lawyers, academics, engineers, and teachers (Halmos 2010, 939). In 1878, of the 730 members of the Hungarian ‘national casino’, 367 were bourgeois (Harmat 2010, 1058). On the other hand, the decline of Slavic-, Romanian- and German-speaking intellectuals resulted from nationalisation policies and assimilation pressures, evident in the recruitment for public positions, in the bureaucracy and educational institutions (Karady 2010, 1113). It was the young people coming from the Magyar-speaking lower nobility - the so-called gentry, representing about 5 per cent of the population - who took up increasingly bourgeois occupations or remained in respected positions as educated landowners or priests (Harmat 2010, 1075). They increasingly pushed for a more radical nationalist ‘Magyar’ politics in an internal struggle against the magnates (ibid., 1056, 1089). In the 1860s and 1870s the previously conservative-liberal alliance in Hungary began to change, reinforced by the autonomy of 1867.

In the Galician case, the Polish-speaking aristocracy maintained its privileged status and wielded significant power in Vienna. Enjoying their dominant position over the Ruthenian-
speaking and peasant population, they limited their nationalist activities to legal undertakings with a focus on language policies (Řezník 2010, 1036). The loyalist orientation of the aristocracy in Galicia was supported by the ‘quasi-constitutional’ so-called ‘Galician autonomy’ granted in the 1860s (Sugar 1999, 14). The slogan of the Galician representatives in the Austrian parliament of 1860 referred to Galicia as a ‘Polish province under Austrian sceptre’, depicting a province-based, ‘national’ self-understanding among political elites (Řezník 2010, 1036-37). This pro-Habsburg positioning of the provincial aristocracy within the framework of evolving national movements allowed them to retain their powerful position within the regional social order as leading stratum of the emerging ‘national elites’ as well as in Vienna (ibid., 107-38).

A similar process can be observed in the Bohemian case. As shown in the previous chapter on the Metternich era, the aristocracy financed and backed the activities of nationalist intellectuals in the ‘private-cultural’ founding phase. In the succeeding ‘cultural-public’ phase, they lobbied together for the establishment of national institutions, linguistic rights, federalism, and provincial autonomy. In the beginning phase as a ‘mass national movement’ in the early 1860s (Hroch 1985, 45), many aristocrats still supported autonomy claims based on ‘historical state law’ but soon began to withdraw due to growing ethno-linguistic Czech nationalism. This change enabled the Bohemian-Czech national movement to open up for bourgeois groups and created the conditions for a democratic-populist alternative (Young Czechs) to Palacký’s conservative-aristocratic Old Czechs.

The German-speaking and Magyar-speaking population enjoyed a privileged cultural status, the first having confirmed its privileged status during neo-absolutism, when after 1854 German became the ‘official’ language of the state, and the latter with the constitutional Compromise of 1867 (Sugar 1999, 17-18). Even the leading political figures of the Italian and Croatian national movements were accommodated within the monarchy’s structure, although ‘Croats’ after 1868 were increasingly under pressure to defend their ‘historic right’ against Budapest (ibid., 18-19). Other minor national movements, however, lacked such privileges. The Slovak and Ruthenian national movements in particular, which constructed themselves as ‘nations’ without historical aristocracy in contrast to the Polish national movement in Galicia and the Hungarian-Magyar national movement in the lands of the revived Kingdom of Hungary, appeared as subaltern ‘cultural’ movements, lacking political recognition (Řezník 2010, 1038).

With the constitutionalisation in 1867, the regime’s multinationalist ideology increasingly materialised in the form of competing national organisations within civil
The first wave of newly founded associations in the 1850s remained concentrated in Vienna and predominantly involved academic, commercial and cultural associations (ibid., 1038). Industrial and commercial associations such as the Industrielle Club, founded in 1875, constituted a major organisational base of the Austrian-liberal camp. It lobbied for an Austrian-statist political economy and demanded the protection of Austrian industry. It was an ‘Austrian’ alternative to the older, economic liberal Österreichisch-Ungarischer Exportverein, which was founded before the Great Depression of 1872, when the free-trade doctrine was still dominant, illustrated by the Austrian-British trade treaty of 1865 (ibid., 1046). In the provinces, it was especially the anti-liberal religious associations that became instruments for expanding nationalist organisations, contradicting the normative Habsburg vision of using Catholicism as the unifying pillar of the empire. Their impact on politics began with the liberal association law of 1867 (ibid., 1039-40), although it did not allow ‘national-political’ organisations on the state level (ibid., 1076).

6.4.2. Consequences of Conservative-Liberal Modernisation: the Bohemian Case

The societal consequences of government policies under conditions of urbanisation and economic modernisation are especially well studied in the Bohemian case. As Jeremy King (2003) has argued in his study of Budweis, between 1848 and 1871 ‘nationality’ became increasingly central in political discourse. These decades were marked by the growing inclusion of the population in public life thanks to the expansion of state infrastructures and civic organisations. King (2003, 48) describes how Czech-speaking groups in Budweis began to engage in political practices:

Elections, associations, schools, and the press ceased to exhaust the list of principal political spaces, and a bourgeois elite, together with imperial-royal officials, ceased to exhaust the list of principal political actors in town. Municipal enterprises, the census, new and less local associations, the labour market, and both shops and shopping became important arenas for contestation. So, for that matter, did many nonbourgeois - at the same time that they became political actors in their own right.

Bohemian-Czech public life began to show its vitality through a notable amount of cultural institutions and civil society associations. As a result of neo-absolutist government policies the number of Czech-speaking schools expanded rapidly, first into a dense network of elementary and later also high schools. By the end of the century, the literacy rate among Czech speakers ranked among the top few of all language groups within the Habsburg Monarchy at the end of the century (Kořalka/Crampton 1980, 510). As Cohen (1996, 47) concludes, ‘[w]hen German liberals and their allies dominated Austrian cabinets between
1867 and 1870 and then again between 1871 and 1879, they sponsored a considerable expansion of primary and secondary education that benefited nearly all of Austria's major ethnic groups in varying degrees’.

Nolte (2007, 87-88) notes how ‘out of touch’ the old elites of the Bohemian-Czech national movement had become with their potential new social base. Palacký, the preeminent leader of the Bohemian-Czech national movement, established a new alliance in 1861, with the ‘party of conservative great landowners, at that time the only powerful political force favoring greater autonomy for the historic Czech lands’ (Garver 1978, 46). This would change radically in the decades to come. In 1862, two originally German-speaking bourgeois students, Friedrich Tirsch/Miroslav Tyrš and Heinrich Fügner/Jindřich Fügner, founded the Sokol, a Czech-nationalist gymnastic association (Nolte 2007, 89-90; 91). The aim was to organise the Czech-speaking petite bourgeoisie as the social base of the national movement (Rumpler 1997, 385). In response to growing nationalist Bohemian-Czech activities, the Swabian German historian Constantin Höfler, who came to Prague in 1851, founded the ‘Association for the history of the Germans in Bohemia’. This responsive dynamic was stimulated by the increasingly evident decline of Austrian(-German) liberalism under the conditions of urbanisation. It was followed by the foundation of the Deutsche Turnverband and the Deutsche Sängerbund (Rumpler 1997, 385).

These examples illustrate a new trend among the Bohemian bourgeoisie, which can be described as an increasing degree of civic organisation along linguistic lines. It exemplifies a larger process taking place in the context of constitutionalisation and citizen emancipation. Determined by the conditions created by the previous Metternich regime and conservative-liberal modernisation after 1848/49, in Austria it took a distinctive multinational form, contributing to linguistically structured bourgeoisies in the provinces. Despite widespread indifference to ‘ideological’ politics and the category of nationality, as well as variations in terms of social milieu, the social base of national movements expanded substantially. An indicator was Palacký’s successful campaign of collecting donations for the construction of the Czech national theatre in Prague, which received significant support from Czech-speaking lower social strata.

The ‘national’ developments taking place in Vienna, ‘Inner Austria’ and Tyrol followed a similar pattern as in Prague and Bohemia. Cole and Heiss (2007, 46-53), for instance, analyse the respective dynamics of nationalisation and political collective identity formation on various levels, which largely correspond to divergent social bases. In the specific case of Tyrol, the potentially constructed collective identities and reinforced subjectivities can be
differentiated according to three sociopolitical realms: the traditionalist neo-corporate local sphere, the provincial regional level, and the liberal bourgeois (either Austrian-German or Italian) state-centred context. In the period under consideration, the authors have identified the intensification of 1.) rural-conservative (religious) identity, 2.) urban liberal, German-speaking ‘Austrian’, and 3.) the new alternative of linguistically national ‘Italian’. These collective identities reflected different articulations of antagonisms: rural-conservative religious vs. urban-liberal secular, and Austrian(-German) vs. Italian. The same politico-ideological debates that took place in Vienna were similarly reflected in the discussions among German-speaking bourgeois liberals in the provinces, who became increasingly alienated by the growing linguistic divisions among the bourgeoisie.

6.4.3. A Contained Political Phase of National Movements

When national movements broadened their social base in the 1860s, some entering a political phase, Vienna reinforced its government responses based on ‘home rule and cultural liberty’ (Sugar 1999, 19-20). The previous sections showed by what means the Vienna government accommodated nationalism and ultimately succeeded in preventing national movements from becoming state-subverting. The regime’s multinationalism appealed to the populist function of nationalism, most visible in the emperor’s role as ‘father of his peoples’. Concerning the rural strata, the regime attempted to reinforce a Catholic, religious revival. One long-term consequence was the erosion of the state’s ideological power as these policies began to feed into the populist nationalism of emergent national parties, which were frequently allied with provincial, religious actors.

The oscillation of national movements between the ‘cultural-public’ and openly ‘political phase’ corresponded with their changing relationship to the conservative-liberal regime, the Austrian state, and to other national movements. A double-sided process took place under the conditions of political liberalisation between 1848/49 and 1879, which transformed Austria’s entire political landscape. The decline of the Austrian-liberal camp and the erosion of its state project on the one hand, and the gradual incorporation of supposedly ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ elements into particularistic ideologies of province- or region-based national movements on the other. This ideological trend was accompanied by transformations in social structure, contributing to the growth of the social base of provincial national movements. As town-dwellers faced peasant migrants from the surrounding countryside, new conditions were created for further divisions among the urban population.
These transformations altered the structure of the political landscape. Whereas liberal centralists had previously sought emancipation in opposition to the conservative aristocracy or clergy, now the conservative political centre (Vienna) found itself increasingly at odds with the national movements. The accommodation of cultural national demands under neo-absolutism, and of political liberal demands since 1867, created the conditions for growing appeals to the populist function of nationalism. The democratic and populist transition of Bohemian-Czech nationalism, for instance, eventually led to the symbolic exclusion of the aristocracy from the supposedly democratic ancient Czech nation (Rak 1994, 46-50). This is illustrated by the fact that, after 1876, Palacký’s politics, characterised by conservatism and elitism, became increasingly perceived as anachronistic by a new generation of nationalists, the so-called Young Czechs. While the alliance between Palacký’s National Party and conservative landowners endured, with the broadening of education and liberalisation, Palacký’s politics lost popularity. ‘In contrast to the Young Czechs and ultimately all Czech parties but his own and the more conservative Catholics, he opposed establishing not only universal manhood suffrage but political parties in the modern sense of the word and any sort of multi-party system’ (Garver 1978, 47). Palacký remained a conservative, anti-liberal Bohemian-Czech nationalist.

While from an ‘Austrian’ perspective the ‘Hungarian Question’ and the ‘Italian Question’ were largely resolved in 1867 and 1871, one by voice, the other by exit, the so-called ‘Slavic Question’ (Leersen 2006, 154), which was itself divided into a Bohemian-Czech, a Galician Polish/Ruthenian, and a South-Slavic Question, became a central issue in Austrian politics. The Polish Question ceased to be a source of problems for the government during that period thanks to the durable conservative Polish alliance in Habsburg Galicia. However, for the growing consciousness of Jewish/Yiddish and Ruthenian identities, the legal framework implied increasing assimilation pressures as well as ‘unofficial discrimination’ in public life (Kuhn 2009, 124). The result was that many Jewish families sent their children to German-speaking schools (‘Germanization’), while some originally German-speaking families decided to ‘polonize’ (Shanes 2012, 29-40). The ‘Slavic issue’ became even more complicated with Prussian-led German national unification under Bismarck in 1871, the rise of Russian influence in the Balkans, and the Austrian administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina after the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

Many of the province-based national movements ultimately began to articulate opposition to the political centre of Vienna, which fed into the populist function of their nationalism. These ideological developments were soon translated into electoral results. In
his study of Austrian elections, Rottenbacher (2001, 384) has identified a transformation of Austrian political culture. While in 1861 elections were widely celebrated as festive events for the citizens (although the electorate still represented only a minority of the population), this gradually gave way in the late 1860s and 1870s to an explicitly antagonistic understanding of political struggle. While in 1867 reforms towards a more inclusive political citizenship constituted a central issue of political debate in Vienna, the debates of electoral assemblies in the province of Bohemia, for example, were dominated by the question of ‘centralism or federalism’. Crucial for the facilitation of this transformation process on the level of electoral districts was the replacement of single ‘unitary committees’ by competing ‘political committees’ (ibid., 393).

Paradoxically, this process of political polarisation and concentration of political parties was accompanied by an increase in the number of people who did not vote. Electoral behaviour can be conceived of not as a reflection of genuine material interests, nor as an enforced persuasion of an indifferent mass by agitators, but as a consequence of political participation, shaped by organisational and ideological integration processes that were facilitated by state authorities and supra-local central committees (Rottenbacher 2001, 386). The election of 1861 was celebrated as a festive, harmonious event of society and was supported in that form by speeches held by several important figures, often dedicated to the Habsburg monarch and his family. After 1867, new features of modern party politics emerged in Bohemian and Austrian provinces, such as the selection of representative candidates and the requirement of ‘party discipline’. In 1861, for example, the Bohemian Národny listy had to nominate two candidates (from two confessions) in the fully Slavic-speaking but bi-confessional district of ‘Neustadtl, Bystritz, ob Pernstein, Saar’, who ultimately received only 6 votes out of 133 electoral delegates. Anton Straka, who was nominated from a Catholic town, gained 45 votes of electoral delegates. He became the nominee of the Národny listy in the 1867 elections, garnered 92 of 131 electoral delegates in the first round and 113 of 124 in the second. The confessional divide was no longer of significance (ibid., 388).

A similar example of the integrating national camps, this time among a German-speaking constituency, is provided by the case of the aristocrat Franz Thun, who was elected in the Bohemian electoral district of ‘Tetschen, Bensen, Böhmisch Kamitz’ in 1861 with 105 of 121 votes of the electoral delegates. In his campaign before the January elections of 1867, his constituency frequently protested against Thun for having predominantly voted for the ‘Czechs’ in the Bohemian parliament. Thun countered this criticism on one occasion
with an argument that this was about the ‘Rights of the Bohemian Crown’ and that the electoral delegates had no idea of high politics. In the elections he received only 32 of 123 votes, while the candidate of the pro-constitutionalist ‘Comité Taschek’ garnered 91 votes (ibid., 389-90). In Moravia, a similar polarisation had taken place, with the candidate of the Moravské Orlice (Czech national party in Moravia) winning 21 out of 31 mandates of the rural municipalities. Nine municipalities saw the election of pro-constitutionalists, while the one remaining mandate went to an independent Slavic local. It is striking that, of the 21 mandates won in 1867, only 9 had been won by Národní Listy candidates in 1861; 7 went to moderate Slavic honoratioren and 4 to independent locals. A similar polarisation process occurred among German-speakers, for instance in the city of Leitmeritz close to the so-called ‘language border’ in the 1867 elections. The German-speaking ‘national’ groups campaigned with the aim to prove that no ‘Slavic’ national minority existed within the city, its constitutionalist-centralist candidate ultimately winning 528 votes, while the Czech-federalist candidate gained only 26 votes (ibid., 391). In the September elections of 1871, the Moravian rural municipalities already saw the emergence of a two-party system (ibid., 393).

In cities like Pilsen, Jičín, Königgrätz and Pardubitz, the elections of 1867 were accompanied by intense conflicts concerning the language used in schools. In Pilsen, where the Czech national party won a majority, all schools from elementary school to upper-secondary school exclusively used the Czech language. In Jičín, German-language education remained only in Jewish schools (Rottenbacher 2001, 391-2). What had started as festive marches of young enthusiasts longing for entertainment and joy, as urban bourgeois celebrations with a waving of national flags and singing of patriotic songs in the national language, had by the 1870s turned into highly contentious struggles for political mandates, bureaucratic posts and schools. During the 1860s and 1870s, nationality had become a category of political integration (ibid., 420). The editorial headquarters of party newspapers also became key venues for political organisation (ibid., 423), a pattern that had already been noted earlier in the case of Kossuth. As a result of this transition of national movements from the cultural-public phase to the contained political phase in the 1860s and 1870s, many increased their organisational capacities, their ideological power, and their social base.

6.5. Conclusion: Nationality as the Hinge between State and Society
In the period under consideration, the diffusion of standardised written vernaculars can be partly attributed to the requirements of the modernising state and its market-driven economy. While in the previous Metternich era the government’s nationality policy focused primarily on supporting newly founded cultural institutions, in the decades after 1848 nationality became related to practices of state agencies. The massive expansion of the education system enabled the state to enforce ideological codification and to remove linguistically reproduced ‘horizontal cultural cleavages’ (Gellner 1983, 8,11). In Vienna, Galician peasant delegates demanded the introduction of public education in the vernacular (Rosdolsky 1976, 216). Further, they demanded ‘that the province of Galicia should become divided into two districts - that is to say that the Ruthenian district should be based in Lemberg, and the Polish either in Tarnow or [in] Crakow’. In a similar instance, the Slovene delegate Sterzin demanded peasant emancipation and ‘the introduction of the provincial language into the bureaucracy’ (Rosdolsky 1976, 223). These cases illustrate that peasant delegates perceived their constituency’s participation in a literate culture as empowering, and that they argued for it to be linked to a territorially bounded public education system and administration.

While after 1848/49 most ‘small nation’ national movements in their cultural-public phase defended a ‘non-political’ stance of cultural accommodation, this eventually changed with the achievement of Hungarian political autonomy in 1867. The position of provincial national movements towards political liberalism and representative democracy became re-interpreted, initiating a new contained political phase. In 1868, for instance, Czech nationalist intellectuals discarded Pan-Slavism and expressed political demands on the basis of ‘the Deák model’ (Taylor 1990, 154). In his speech in the Bohemian Diet on 22 August 1868, a ‘Czech’ representative refers to ‘the political Bohemian Nation … as being an autonomous entity on the basis of state law’ (quoted in Drabek 2003, 165-6). In Galicia, where the Vienna government granted the Polish national movement ‘Galician autonomy’, the enforcement of cultural and linguistic ‘Polonization’ triggered growing opposition from Ruthenian-, German- and Yiddish-speakers.

The so-called ‘liberal federalists’, who dominated Austrian politics in Vienna between 1860 and 1865, were more or less simple provincial politicians in contrast to the leading figures of the Hungarian-Magyar national movement. The latter included, for example, the highly educated and gifted political speaker Antal Szécsen and the ideologist József Eötvös, who was able to articulate the Hungarian-Magyar particularist political demands within a coherent liberal theoretical framework (Rumpler 2010, 1138). In contrast, the moderate
Austrian liberal Schmerling, while a gifted politician, lacked intellectual qualities. Surprisingly, even the parliament of 1867, which was dominated by Austrian liberals, was characterised by a striking absence of talented politicians and intellectuals (ibid., 1139). The perception of security and inevitable social progress, seemingly confirmed by technological progress and architectural splendour, concealed the lack of Austrian politicians who were capable of articulating and promoting an Austrian-liberal state project (Rumpler 2010, 1141). Friedrich Wieser (1905, 30-1) observed that, after the constitution had been granted, most young intellectuals and talented students lost their interest in politics.

The contrast between the anti-intellectual atmosphere in Vienna and the growing nationalist influence in provincial capitals is illustrated by a brief comparison of newspapers. In Budapest, the nationalist Pesti Hirlap strengthened its function as the central organ of the Hungarian-Magyar national movement, despite the military defeat of the independence movement, which had been led by the paper’s founding editor Kossuth (Harmat 2010, 1083). The Austrian bourgeois newspapers such as the Neue Freie Presse or the Wiener Zeitung remained conservative-liberal and distanced from critical intellectual debates or agitation for a particular state project. Similarly, the growing Vienna-centred Austrian capitalist class, represented by influential figures from old aristocratic (e.g. Schwarzenberg, Auersberg) and wealthy upper-bourgeois families (e.g. Rothschild, Schoeller), showed no interest in joining the struggle for an ‘Austrian’ state project (Rumpler 2010, 1137).

The Austrian-liberal camp was forced to accept that the Hungarian-Magyar delegates would not comply with an Austrian parliament in Vienna. At the same time, the Hungarian-Magyar movement had an interest in establishing an alliance with the Austrian liberal camp in order to counter growing Slavic opposition. In the camp of the remaining nationalist factions ‘were assembled the Czech, Croatian, Serbian, Ruthenian, Romanian, and Italian politicians, who, no matter what their social program and political ideology, favored small provincial autonomies’ (Deak 1990, 50). While the Hungarian-Magyar movement achieved the establishment of a quasi-autonomous state in 1867 and the Italian national movement achieved its goal of national unification in 1871, the Austrian-German centralist camp rapidly declined and eventually regressed into a cultural-public phase.

The constellation unfolding in the Austrian empire after 1848/49 reflected a similar pattern as in the Swiss case of 1847, albeit with the opposite outcome. The regime responded to liberalisation and democratisation pressures first with an attempt to establish a neo-absolutist regime, and subsequently with constitutionalisation, accompanied by the
accommodation of national movements on the provincial and municipal level, enhancing cultural and political autonomies. In the Hungarian case, the Habsburg emperor adopted a strategy of combining *voice* and *exit*, offering political autonomy within a dual monarchy in 1867. In the Austrian half, the regime adopted a nationality policy of restricted *voice* within the framework of a constitutional state, which enhanced liberties without yet touching the sovereignty of the monarch. The regime largely declined to deal with ‘the people’ or to articulate a reason of state (Sugar 1999, 44-45). Ideologically, this transformed nationalism’s relationship with the central state, undermining its statist function. The regime’s religious and multinational policies empowered religious and nationalist actors on the provincial level.
7. NATIONALITY AS A CATEGORY OF STATE PRACTICE AND POLICY IN MASS POLITICISATION (1879-1914)

This chapter explores how, in the context of democratisation, changing forms of politics have contributed to a rise in appeals to the ‘populist function’ of nationalism. It argues that a general crisis of liberalism set the stage for a period of state extension and policies that deployed the category of nationality. In the context of mass politics, leaders of national parties drew increasingly on anti-status quo ideology and linguistically defined social bases, engaging in oppositional politics that targeted the imperial centre and its associated ‘cosmopolitan elites’. At the same time, the ‘statist function’ of nationalism continued to legitimise the imperial state to some extent.

The first section discusses changes in the domain of international politics, military competition, and socioeconomic trends. The second section examines Austria’s nationality policy that largely followed the principle of ‘national autonomy’ as opposed to the liberal-constitutional tradition and the Magyarization policy in Hungary. The third section discusses political dynamics after the electoral defeat of Austrian liberals in 1879, which, in the wake of economic recession, fed perceptions of crisis. The fourth section explores the impact of government policy and democratisation on state- and nation-building. The processes involved in the ascent of populist nationalism were shaped by a dynamic between bureaucratic governmental policies ‘from above’, aiming at the inclusion of the population at large, and the growth of heterogeneous popular demands ‘from below’, articulated by new political actors.

7.1. Austria during the First Wave of Democratisation

The erosion of the European order of 1815 had involved the intensification of imperial rivalry. While processes of national reconstitution of state-society relations, typical of the prior epoch, in which regimes had fostered systems of direct rule, were continued, this new era was characterised by power politics, with pressure on the Austrian government to defend the monarchy’s status as a Great Power. Lacking the political will to engage in militarisation, the regime began to engage in democratisation and the building of a welfare state. The consequences included sustained economic growth, the rapid expansion of the urban bourgeoisie, and the growth of a dense network of civil associations.
7.1.1. Imperialism as a Challenge to the European Order

The patterns of international politics after 1879 shared major similarities with the inter-state struggles that had marked the ‘first age of global imperialism’ between 1760 and 1815 (Bayly 1998). The acceleration of global competition triggered responses by regimes who were aware of the period’s transformative potential (Maier 2012, 160). The British government backed British corporations with an interventionist foreign policy when competing states introduced new tariff systems. ‘Fearing rivals’ military power and the loss of economic access, the British state annexed new territory and initiated military interventions in hopes of regaining some advantage, ensuring economic inputs, and keeping rivals at their heels’ (Go 2011, 214). Similarly, the emergence of the United States as an imperial power was driven by growing pressures in the wake of ‘the economic crisis of 1893 and the related search for new markets and materials, and an increasingly capable American state poised for global greatness after emerging from the Civil War as a unified, powerful nation’ (ibid., 220).

As inter-state rivalry intensified, the remnants of the European order of 1815 gave way to the formation of two antagonistic groupings of states. ‘One, headed by Britain and France (with tacit American support), was orientated towards maintaining free-trade imperialism. The other, headed by Germany, was concerned with expanding its territorial possessions and challenging British financial hegemony’ (Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 32). Although the Congress of Berlin (1878) supposedly settled Austria’s ‘Eastern’ and ‘South Slav’ question by recognising Austria’s right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, a new type of geopolitics was on the rise. A crucial role was played by Prussia-Germany, which had defeated Austria in 1866 and France in 1870, and had now begun a naval race against Britain. After ‘Bismarck’s careful and consistent foreign policy was replaced after 1890 by the more ambitious, global strategy of Kaiser Wilhelm II’ (Bayly 2004, 459), Germany’s imperialism began to harm the dominance of Britain (Bridge 2002, 18-19):

[F]or a decade after 1887 the Mediterranean Agreements between Austria-Hungary, Great Britain and Italy had seen Russian influence virtually expelled from the Balkans altogether … By 1907, this was ceasing to be the case: the Anglo-Russian Convention of 31 August 1907 at last gave the British security in India … Cooperation with Italy was problematical in a different way … The tension between them was exacerbated after the turn of the century, as Italian irredentism spread from the parties of the Left to the nationalist Right, and as a naval race developed between the two allies in the Adriatic. These developments undermined Austria’s position, distancing it from Britain and Italy.

At the same time, domestic political developments in Russia contributed to a rise of Russian imperialism, especially after 1905, when a semi-parliamentary regime was established. From spring 1906 onwards, ‘a public outcry against Austria-Hungary’s bullying
of Serbia in the “Pig War” was followed by a sustained press campaign against Russia’s cooperation with Austria-Hungary over Macedonian reforms’ (ibid., 21). In February 1908, the Russian press excoriated Austria’s Balkan railway project as an imperialist extension of its influence in the Near East (ibid., 21-22). It was indeed Austria itself that engaged in imperialist foreign policy, with its troops occupying Bosnia since 1879 as part of its peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire. It triggered a major popular revolt that ‘was given force by religious solidarity’ as both Muslims and Orthodox Christians were inimical to the prospect of being ruled by the Catholic Habsburgs (Bayly 2004, 363). The occupation lasted until 1908, when Austria officially incorporated Bosnia.

*Map 5. Habsburg Territories, 1814 - 1914 [Roman 2003, 660]*

Although the Austrian liberal camp fiercely attacked the emperor’s foreign policy in the Balkans, these events soon became perceived as successful, especially after Austria secured alliances with the king of Serbia (1881), the Hohenzollern king of Romania (1883), and managed to capitalise on anti-Russian sentiment in Bulgaria (Bridge 2002, 16). It gave the impression that ‘the whole Balkans seemed to have passed into the Austro-Hungarian camp’ (ibid.). In the following three decades, the situation gradually regressed. Sources from Russian archives indicate that Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky ‘was planning all along, unbeknown to [Austrian Foreign Minister] Aehrental, to enhance Russia’s influence both in
Turkey and the Balkan states by promoting a conference in which Austria-Hungary would be arraigned before Europe for violating the Treaty of Berlin’ (ibid., 23).

What ultimately caused the collapse of the Entente was the political response of the Tsar and Izovolsky to popular indignation that the Austrian annexation of Bosnia provoked in Russia. They decided to support the protests of Turkey and Serbian territorial demands (Bridge 2002, 23). Although the crisis of 1908/9 was eventually overcome, it erased the last remnants of the 1815 order. In 1912 and 1913 Aehrenthal’s successor Leopold Berchtold attempted to restore the European Concert in the face of the upcoming war in the Balkans, a policy which failed. This experience changed Berchtold’s attitude and he adapted to the methods of militarised diplomacy (ibid., 27). This shift in foreign policy doctrine was complemented by the restoration of Conrad Hötzendorf, who saw international politics in ‘Social Darwinist terms’, as Chief of the General Staff (ibid., 26). When in 1914, in response to the assassinations of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo, Austria confronted Serbia militarily, Berchtold admitted that military success would mean ‘the complete renunciation by Russia of all influence in the Balkans’ (quoted in Bridge 2002, 31). This implies that the Austrian government was aware of the likelihood of a head-on confrontation with Russia.

The most obvious deficiency in the Habsburg foreign policy was that of realism. As Maier (2012, 148) has noted, the world ‘had been transformed - not by revolution, but by strong leaders, realists who believed in railroads, property, economic development, and national power, and the inevitability of conflict and competition’. The consolidation of the newly unified German and Italian nation-states at its borders forced Austria to once more reconfigure its own variant of political modernisation. It was especially the technological revolution in communication that gave new impetus to the importance of ideological power, amplifying the popular sense of inter-state conflict. ‘The globe was newly linked by telegraphic communication, and this allowed governments, interest groups, and radicals to concert their action at a world level. Between 1900 and 1909 the volume of press traffic on the telegraphs trebled’ (Bayly 2004, 461). Due to the expansion and tremendous acceleration of communication, the number of people with access to public discourse exploded. One consequence was that the realm of political affairs, which had been previously restricted to dynastic rulers and a privileged group of elites, now reached the masses.

It therefore appears particularly interesting to consider how growing international rivalry intersected with domestic politics. While expanding states such as Germany and dominant
states such as Britain and France gave priority to foreign policy, the impact of international conflict on domestic politics was a primary concern for the declining Habsburg Empire. In 1899, ‘the French and Russians, impressed by the turbulence of the Badeni era, had thought it politic to modify the terms of their alliance to guard against a German attempt to expand towards the Adriatic if the Dual Monarchy should break up. And there was evidence of an equally sceptical view of the Monarchy’s future in Berlin, where, at the height of the Hungarian crisis in 1905-6, Chancellor Bülow saw fit to circulate secretly to all German missions abroad an explicit disavowal of any such expansionist ambitions in the event of the dissolution of the monarchy’ (Bridge 2002, 13). With no reliable ally left except the new German state, Vienna felt increasingly disturbed by the growing anti-Austrian agitation of Serbia, which enjoyed support from Russia and France in its promotion of pan-Slavic ideology. The publication of Robert Seton-Watson’s book *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy* (1911) illustrates how Austrian ‘national questions’ became a matter of international concern (Wolff 2014, 381).

7.1.2. Industrialisation, State Expansion, and Military Professionalization

In the context of inter-state rivalry, state capacities of coercive power remained key factors for regimes. Such capacities could be divided broadly into institutionalised coercive resources for international affairs (army, navy) and also for domestic forces (army, police). Although law served the function of regulating social relations both internationally and domestically, it had to be institutionally enforced by the army and the police (Neocleous 2014, 35). As state apparatuses had expanded, warfare had become more expensive in terms of resources and professionalised, rendering wars potentially quicker. Austria remained reluctant to invest and thus stood in stark contrast to the militarisation of most other contemporary states such as Prussia, France, Britain and Italy (Kronenbitter 2003, 145-9 and Stevenson 1996, 136-40). This is a further indicator of the regime’s preoccupation with domestic affairs and its withdrawal from Great Power politics.
Although the army was modernised under high command, formally under the control of the chief executive, Austria refrained from adopting the model of nationalising military states. The Austrian army’s point of reference in terms of political identification and loyalty was not the central state but remained the dynasty (Leonhard/Hirschhausen 2011, 81). The organisation of the army was strengthened under the formal command of the emperor, and remained largely isolated from divisions in civil society. Its conservative character and the sense of belonging it inspired in reference to the dynasty contributed to its cohesion in the early years of WWI (Rauchensteiner 1993). As Istvan Deák (1990) has argued in his seminal study Beyond Nationalism, due to its insulation as a professionalised component of the state’s military linguistic or territorial markers of nationality, the Austrian officer corps remained undivided. A contributory factor was certainly the dominant role played by the German language, which remained the official language of the imperial army even though multiple languages were recognised in practice. The army law of 1868 decreed the proportional multi-linguistic composition of troops, which took their oath in up to ten different languages (Leonhard/Hirschhausen 2011, 82). By 1895, of 102 infantry regiments, forty-eight were commanded in two or three languages. Nevertheless, by 1900, the proportion of German-speaking officers was still above 55 per cent, although officers were required to speak the second language of the regiment if spoken by at least 20 per cent of the troops (ibid.). After the implementation of universal conscription, there appears to have been an increase in both popular demands and state efforts to introduce new standards,
regulating the humane treatment of soldiers. The violation of these norms became a frequent subject of criticism expressed in parliamentary debates (Hämmerle 2010). The low quota of conscripts in comparison to other European states indicates enduring organizational deficiencies. Between 1900 and 1910, the number of men who failed to appear even for the procedure of assessing individuals for conscription increased significantly, especially in Galicia, Dalmatia and Hungary (Leonhard/Hirschhausen 2011, 84-85).

Although the army experienced tremendous growth in terms of public profile, illustrated by the spread of veteran associations and the public representations of military heroes throughout the monarchy (Cole 2007, 36-61), the regime itself undermined the army’s potential function to promote statist nationalism. Universal conscription, which had been introduced in 1868, forced millions of male subjects into training by the state and rendered the army ‘central to the relationship between citizen/subject and state/monarch’ (Cole 2014, 108). As the Austrian state began to organise the inclusion of subjects collectively, this was also reflected in a new approach to veteran associations. Previously, state institutions had done little ‘to encourage a closer union of veterans and … there was in fact a common feeling in the 1860s and 1870s that veterans were not getting proper acknowledgement for their patriotic activities’ (ibid., 155). Despite the state’s attempt to centralise the organisation of veteran associations, it appears that the ambiguity of ‘nationalities’ towards the state was projected onto the population by the state itself.

The position of the central state is illustrated by the case of a planned military intervention in Hungary, when in 1905 a political crisis arose between Vienna and Budapest, following the electoral victory of the Kossuth-inspired ‘Party of Independence and ’48’. Peball and Rothenberg’s (1969) meticulous study of plans developed by the Austrian high command to intervene militarily shows that in October 1905 the corps commanders in Pressburg/Bratislava, Budapest, Kaschau, Temesvár, Hermannstadt/Sibiu and Zagreb/Agram received classified documents to be opened in the case of telegraphic order by the ministry of war (ibid., 85). In the operations office of the General Staff, experts had developed plans for a military operation to restore Vienna’s authority in Hungary, referred to as the ‘military solution of the Hungarian question’ (ibid., 87). This plan paid close attention to calculations concerning imperial loyalty, which was differentiated in reference to linguistically defined nationalities (ibid., 99). While the documents identified the Hungarian Honvéd as generally hostile, it declared certain Magyar-speaking segments in the army as potentially ‘unreliable’ (unverlässlich). The same fear of disloyalty was expressed towards some minority nationalities and civil servants, who supposedly believed
in advantages offered by an autonomous Hungary (ibid., 99-100). Those units with at least 70 per cent Magyar-speaking soldiers were referred to as ‘unreliable’ those between 70 and 20 per cent as questionable, and those comprising less than 20 per cent were identified as loyal (ibid., 103). Pressures on the emperor grew as Bohemian-Czech and Austrian Social Democrats began to demand universal suffrage and launched protests in Autumn 1905, followed by riots in Hungary. In 1906, the emperor annulled the Hungarian constitution and dissolved the parliament by force, but refrained from ordering a military intervention (Rumpler 1997, 517). Finally, an arrangement was accepted that included cooperation with the Independence Party, which in the following elections celebrated a complete victory and formed a new government under Géza Fejérváry.

Although Austria did not engage in the overseas imperialism of other European powers, the growing importance of naval power did not pass unnoticed. ‘The determination to be the leading naval power of the Adriatic in the face of rising Italian competition became a strategic imperative’ (Basset 2015, 393). Similar to the stagnation in military spending, the ambitious naval programme in Trieste ‘fell victim to the annual feuding over naval budgets between the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments. The Hungarians saw little value to the Hungarian taxpayer in supporting a programme of ship construction which took place in Trieste, a key city of the Austrian part of the Empire’ (ibid., 394). Nevertheless, in 1909 a programme to build a new generation of battleships was successfully launched and by 1914 Austria possessed a greater naval force than its Italian rival, as well as an additional naval air arm that had been established in 1910 (ibid., 395). Growing inter-state rivalry led Austria to expand its intelligence activities and a ‘web of agents and consulates began to cover Serbia in the closing years of the 1890s … In 1902, the Italian intelligence machinery which had been directed against France for many years began to assume a started to orientate itself more aggressively towards the Dual Monarchy. Irredentist propaganda was stepped up in Trieste and Trento, ably supported by the Italian Consul in the Austrian harbour city, Galli … From 1900 until 1907, a spate of spy trials fascinated the Viennese public’ (Basset 2015, 399). After the two Balkan Wars, Austrian intelligence was aware of militarisation among neighbouring states and the anti-Austrian policies taking shape in Italy, Serbia and Russia (ibid., 399-400).

Although coercive power remained important for regimes, new techniques of law enforcement and policing transformed to some extent the exercising of this power on the domestic level. Beside growing professionalisation, which had contributed to the institutionalisation of ‘the police’ as a major coercive pillar of the state, the massive
expansion of state agencies after 1880 allowed for more nuanced forms of policing and bureaucratic regulation, avoiding violent confrontations. Neocleous (2014, 11) notes that modern forms of police power became functionally integrated within the state and were ‘exercised by a range of agencies of policing situated throughout the state and the institutions for administering civil society’. For instance, while in the era of Maria Theresa the army had exercised census practices, these were now carried out by specialised administrative personnel.

**Austrian Capitalism and Industrialisation**

Across Europe, the effects of industrialisation, a socio-economic transformation process that changed the quality of capitalism and stimulated state expansion, became visible after the 1870s. ‘The site of this ever-accelerating innovation process was, first of all, the sphere of industrial production, yet it soon also influenced agriculture … and transportation, communications … and with some delay also different administrative services, which soon grew disproportionately within an overall division of labor’ (Kocka 2016, 97-8). Although vast areas of Central and South Eastern Europe became integrated into the capitalist, economic system, it is important to note that distinct regions assumed diverging positions within centre-periphery relations in the monarchy. The monarchy’s capitalist core remained the metropolis of Vienna, complemented by rising provincial capitals. The inequalities of economic development were successfully tackled by means of public investments. The effects became visible in the continual expansion of mass education, contributing to a new scale of social mobility, especially for rural youth. At the turn of the century, the low literacy rates in rural areas began to catch up with the rates of the urban centres. The census data of 1910 showed that the average literacy rate of the population above the age of eleven reached 83,5 per cent in the Austrian half, which was comparable to the 85 per cent of the French population at the time (Judson 2016, 335). Austria’s regional disparities were reflected in the 58 per cent in Galicia and the Bukovina, compared to the 67 per cent of Dalmatia and Istria, and the 90 per cent in the central Austrian provinces (ibid.).

Austrian banks emulated the Prussian pattern and invested strategically in industrial enterprises. The Credit-Anstalt and the Wiener Bankverein, for instance, kept huge shares in the iron, steel, coal, engineering, textile, paper and glass industries. The Vienna Länder Bank and the Anglo Österreichische Bank invested in the emerging electrical and chemical industries (Berend 2013, 161-62). Although Vienna remained the finance capital, provincial cities increased their shares significantly. ‘In 1890, the capital assets of the Viennese banks
were nine times larger than those of Prague; by 1913, they were four times larger’ (Berend 2013, 176). After the depression of the 1870s, the government responded with interventionist policies. Measures were the provision of loans for small- and medium-sized enterprises via the provincial branches of the national bank, public subsidies to save major textile and machine factories from bankruptcy, and the establishment of the Länderbank (1880) and the Postsparkasse (1883), which reduced the cost of banking and transfers (Rumpler 1997, 467). On the basis of proposals from the Rothschild banking house and the president of the bourse chamber, the Vienna stock exchange was reformed and speculations restricted. With the introduction of the telephone in 1881/82, the establishment of provincial bourses in Budapest and Prague, and the foundation of a stock exchange for agricultural products in 1895, finance capitalism began to flourish once again (ibid., 467-8).

This era of economic growth was characterised by capital flows, the European free trade system, the gold standard, and the international construction of railroads (Berend 2013, 337). Industrialisation in western European countries increased demands for raw materials and food, creating ‘a genuine trade boom’ that was expedited by capital flow to less developed countries (ibid., 338). By the turn of the century, Austria’s centre exported capital and its peripheral regions began to feel the impact of industrialisation (ibid., 156-7). Galicia, for example, increased its share in the world’s oil production from 1.2 per cent in 1900 to 5 per cent in 1909, making the Habsburg Empire Europe’s third-largest oil producer. Between 1881 and 1913, Bosnia achieved an annual industrial growth rate of 12.4 per cent, leaving neighbouring Serbia and Bulgaria far behind (ibid., 357).

Following the German decision to introduce agrarian and industrial tariffs, the Habsburg monarchy introduced similar protective measures in 1880, 1882 and 1887. Although Austrian industrial and agrarian representatives supported these developments, it turned out that the effects of protectionism favoured above all Hungarian agrarian interests. Between 1905 and 1910, the price of wheat increased by 50 per cent, the price of bread by 28 per cent, that of meat between 30 and 40 per cent, and the price of butter by 26 per cent. As a result, protests of workers demanding higher salaries reached their peak in the electoral year 1911 (Rumpler 1997, 479). Protectionism also affected foreign policy, such as a customs war against Romania in 1882, when the latter responded with sanctions against Austrian industry (ibid., 479-80). The so-called ‘Petroleum War’ referred to the bitter dispute between ‘two of the world’s most powerful corporate entities … the Standard Oil Trust, and the second-largest country by population in Europe, Austria-Hungary’ (Frank 2009, 16-17). After Austria-Hungary had become the world’s third-largest oil-producer following the
United States and Russia, and as the high freight costs on its railroads rendered Austrian refiners uncompetitive, the government implemented protectionist regulations against French and US-American corporations in 1910. While in the French case the Austrian government soon backed down, the conflict between Austria and the United States continued for two years (ibid., 37).

This turn towards interventionist economic policy is further reflected in the re-socialisation of railway lines. It began in 1879 with the nationalisation of the Kronprinz-Rudolf-Bahn in Austria, followed by the Theißbahn in Hungary. In 1884, a general directorate of the Austrian railways was established, to which the provincial directorates were subordinate. An important aspect of this policy was the state-led expansion of railway infrastructure in less developed provinces, which was not attractive for private investors. Projects were initiated in Dalmatia, Istria, Bohemia and Galicia. The construction of the Transversalbahn created a direct connection between Galicia and the Austrian centre for the first time. The construction of the Arlbergbahn enabled Hungarian corn producers to export to Western European markets. The regulation of Danube traffic throughout Hungary paved the way for Austrian trade to obtain affordable transportation to Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. This opening for trade was officially accepted by the Hungarian parliament in 1888 and had taken effect by 1896 (Rumpler 1997, 468).

By providing capital and infrastructure, Austrian state policy supported industrialisation, which gained pace in its geographical core as well as in its northern provinces. The modernisation of furnaces and the provision of cheap transportation contributed to the development of a metal industry. Bohemian ore became a valuable source, and metalworking companies, such as the factory run by Emil Škoda in Pilsen, flourished. Škoda’s success was linked to the emergent Austrian arms industry, which he also supplied besides machinery. The growing Bohemian industry stimulated innovation and a higher degree of organisation in the metal industry of the Alpine lands, especially in Styria and Upper Austria. In the city of Steyr a successful arms factory was established, whose founder had previously travelled to the United States to familiarise himself with recent technological advancements. The production of iron ore in Styria remained dominant, providing 64 per cent of the monarchy’s production in 1913 (Rumpler 1997, 469-70). Technological innovations contributed to the development of a successful automotive industry, especially in Moravia and Vienna. Similar successes of pioneering entrepreneurs were achieved in the areas of electricity, engineering and construction. It was only in the emergent petrochemical industry that Austria continued to lag far behind Germany (ibid., 471).
Austria became the world’s third-largest sugar producer, its sugar industry concentrated in the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia (Berend 2013, 213). The second leading industrial branch of the Austrian-Bohemian provinces became beer production. ‘In Lower Austria and Bohemia, some one thousand large modern breweries produced 20 million hectoliters of beer by 1913. Beer exports, though only 10 per cent of the value of sugar exports, were nonetheless important for Austrian-Bohemian industrialization. Food processing produced 11 percent of industrial production in 1865, but its output increased threefold by 1880. It employed a third of the industrial labor force ... and it produced 35 percent of Austria-Bohemia’s industrial output’ (ibid., 213). Although both Switzerland and Austria had set out on the industrialisation journey with a focus on modern food production and built their first hydroelectric power stations in 1886, their models soon diverged (ibid., 226). While Switzerland ‘embraced the achievements of the second Industrial Revolution and developed modern chemical, engineering, and electric industries’, Austria ‘returned to the British model ... and developed its textile, iron-steel, and engineering industries’ (Berend 2013, 213).

Figure 24. Industrial Production in Austria, 1880-1913 (Komlos estimate; millions of Crowns, 1913 prices) [Komlos 1983, 146]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production 1880</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production 1897</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>600.84</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1154.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>701.19</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1243.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>741.71</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>1249.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>821.10</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1206.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>864.79</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1242.72</td>
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<td>1885</td>
<td>742.55</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1297.77</td>
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<td>1886</td>
<td>777.19</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>1283.90</td>
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<td>1887</td>
<td>840.99</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1377.71</td>
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<td>1888</td>
<td>869.66</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1374.27</td>
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<td>901.58</td>
<td>1906</td>
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<td>1890</td>
<td>944.15</td>
<td>1907</td>
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<td>1682.10</td>
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<td>1892</td>
<td>984.43</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1708.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>1019.83</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1642.37</td>
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<td>1894</td>
<td>1096.78</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1711.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>1118.89</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>1814.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>1094.50</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1773.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During this era, Austrian growth rates exceeded those of most other European economies. ‘From about 1895 on sustained growth was taking place even in such peripheral territories as Galicia, Bukovina, and Transylvania; and incomes throughout the empire as a whole were converging’ (Sutter Fichtner 1997, 70). Similarly, Good (1994, 5) concludes
that ‘between 1870 and 1910, much of Central and Eastern Europe began to catch up with the more developed states of Western Europe even as it lost ground to the USA’. Within its territory, the Habsburg state successfully modernised and created an integrative domestic economy, marked by a centre-periphery structure that corresponded to the dynamics of capitalism and the division of labour.

7.1.3. Population Trends

Between 1879 and 1914, socioeconomic transformations contributed to urbanisation and substantial demographic growth. This accelerating urbanisation was triggered by – amongst other factors – an agrarian crisis. Between 1870 and 1910, the agricultural sector had an annual growth rate of about 2.5 per cent and accounted for 53.1 per cent of the total labour force employed in 1910, compared to 22.6 per cent in industry (Blum 1978, 419). The modernisation of the agrarian economy, driven by rising demands from sugar refineries, beer breweries and mass consumption, appeared to be problematic. The mechanisation of agriculture, accompanied by tariffs intended to keep agrarian prices artificially high, turned out to be profitable for great landowners. In Austria, the great landowning class comprised 1,000 families, dominated by the royal family and the aristocracy. In Hungary, the agrarian economy and politics were dominated by only some 100 magnate families, supplemented by a landowning gentry class of some 4,000 to 5,000 families (Rumpler 1997, 473). Middle- and large-scale farmers were predominantly based in Upper- and Lower Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Carinthia and Carniola, accounting for 20 to 28 per cent of the respective populations. Small-scale farmers were represented especially in Galicia, the Bukovina, the Littoral and Dalmatia, as well as in the Bohemian lands (ibid.). For these smaller farms, market volatilities and industrialisation led to increasing proletarianisation and forced migration after 1879. Within twenty years, 2.2 million people had left the monarchy, and by 1910, one fifth of the entire population had migrated within the empire (ibid., 474). Beside migration into middle-sized towns and cities, the principal targets were Vienna, which expanded to 2.2 million inhabitants, and Trieste, which saw an influx of migrants from Carniola, Littoral, Styria, Carinthia and Dalmatia (ibid.).

Figure 25. Urbanisation in the Monarchy: Proportion of the Population Living in Towns and Villages with Fewer than 2,000 Inhabitants [Rumpler 1997, 474]
A similar trend can be observed in Hungary, where in 1910 almost a quarter of the population lived in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants. Through the impact of urbanisation and the Compromise of 1867 Budapest turned from a provincial town into a metropolitan city. Although the impact of urbanisation was less felt in the provincial towns of Hungary, which could not compete with the larger cities of the Austrian half of the Empire, here too a number of modern cities developed such as Pressburg, Kolozsvár, Temesvár and Arad (Varga 2016, 43).

Between 1850 and 1910, the monarchy’s population grew by 61.5 per cent from 17,534,950 to 28,324,940 (Blum 1978, 418). Alongside economic modernisation and increasing productivity in agriculture, it was also the state’s promotion of vaccinations, new medical knowledge and hygiene norms that contributed to population growth. Between 1868/71 and 1909/12, life expectancy in Austria’s central provinces increased by almost 11 years (Fassmann 2010, 168). This rise in life expectancy was followed by a decline in the birth rate about two decades later, estimated to have decreased from 5.2 children per woman in 1880/90 to 5.0 in 1890/1900, and to 4.5 in 1900/10 (ibid., 169). Rising life expectancy and a constant high fertility rate resulted in population growth.

Figure 26. Demographic Trends, 1850-1899 [Mitchell 2007]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 27. Mid-year Population Estimates (in thousands) [Mitchell 2007]
Under the conditions of a restructuring economy, the consequence was a rise in domestic migration, legally supported by the constitution of 1867, which introduced a new freedom of movement. In the census of 1910, 9.4 million inhabitants of Cisleithania declared that they had migrated from their place of birth to another district. The main targets of domestic migration were the central Austrian provinces, with migrants coming predominantly from Bohemia, Silesia and Galicia, as well as from Styria (ibid., 173-74).

Figure 28. Internal Migration [Fassmann 2010, 164]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population 1900</th>
<th>Population 1910</th>
<th>Change in population</th>
<th>Net-migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>7,315,939</td>
<td>8,025,675</td>
<td>709,736</td>
<td>-6.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukovina</td>
<td>730,195</td>
<td>800,098</td>
<td>69,903</td>
<td>-4.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalmatia</td>
<td>593,784</td>
<td>645,666</td>
<td>51,882</td>
<td>-5.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silesia</td>
<td>680,422</td>
<td>756,949</td>
<td>76,527</td>
<td>-2.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Littoral</td>
<td>756,546</td>
<td>893,797</td>
<td>137,251</td>
<td>4.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moravia</td>
<td>2,437,706</td>
<td>2,622,271</td>
<td>184,565</td>
<td>-3.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carniola</td>
<td>508,150</td>
<td>525,995</td>
<td>17,845</td>
<td>-6.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohemia</td>
<td>6,318,697</td>
<td>6,769,548</td>
<td>450,851</td>
<td>-2.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>129,237</td>
<td>145,408</td>
<td>16,171</td>
<td>2.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>192,763</td>
<td>214,737</td>
<td>21,974</td>
<td>2.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrol</td>
<td>852,712</td>
<td>946,613</td>
<td>93,901</td>
<td>2.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Austria</td>
<td>3,100,493</td>
<td>3,531,814</td>
<td>431,321</td>
<td>4.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>367,324</td>
<td>396,200</td>
<td>28,876</td>
<td>-0.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styria</td>
<td>1,356,494</td>
<td>1,444,157</td>
<td>87,663</td>
<td>-1.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Austria</td>
<td>810,246</td>
<td>853,006</td>
<td>42,760</td>
<td>-4.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,150,708</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,571,934</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,421,226</strong></td>
<td><strong>-2.5 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These patterns of migration contributed to the changing composition of the urban population in terms of subcultures and class districts. Both dimensions frequently intersected with linguistic divisions. As the growth rate of the rural population was higher than that of cities, in many cases traditional urban bourgeois majorities became minorities, such as German-speakers in Prague or Polish-speakers in Lemberg (Nolte 2009, 30). Beside the so-called ‘old bourgeoisie’, a new lower bourgeois stratum emerged that absorbed qualified employees from various sectors of production. This trend became especially
visible in Brno/Brünn, Prague and Budapest primarily, and then Vienna (Banik-Schweitzer 2010, 222). Here, the sectors of finance and banking, public administration, commerce and trade remained central for the Viennese bourgeoisie. This hints at the distinct conditions under which migrants had to find jobs, especially as the requirements of social capital, education and language skills varied significantly between the bourgeois labour market in Vienna, its expanding working-class suburbs, and other cities with industrial labour. Generally, social mobility only became possible from the second generation onwards due to the requirement of skills taught in schools (ibid., 222-3).

Although the quantitative data available on the bourgeoisie is limited, a number of indicators point to ‘objective’ criteria. On the basis of insurance data from 1900, Bruckmüller and Stekl (1995, 175) conclude that between 3.4 and 7.7 per cent of the Austrian population can be described as economically bourgeois. A different calculation applies to Vienna, where in 1890 about 10 per cent of all apartments had more than five rooms, and 47 per cent had between 3 and 5 rooms. For the lower social classes the remaining 43 per cent were categorised as ‘small and smallest’ flats (ibid., 176). According to the data from the census of 1910, 6.6 per cent of households employed a servant or service personnel (ibid.). One indicator for the growth of a highly educated bourgeoisie is the rising number of university students, and in its last years, Imperial Austria’s enrolled students had reached the highest proportion in the world (Stimmer 1997, 619). While in Britain there were 8.2 students per 10,000 inhabitants, and in the German Empire there were 13.1 students, in the Austrian half of the monarchy there were 14.7 students per 10,000 inhabitants, with an overrepresentation of engineers (7.3%) and law students (8.5%), as compared to Germany (3.4% and 3.8%) (ibid.).

These bourgeois segments played an important role in the spread of civic organisations, which included welfare associations, gymnastic clubs, singing and literary societies, and reading clubs (Berend 2013, 95). Austria’s modern class structure became increasingly reflected in organisations such as trade unions, peasant cooperatives and workers’ parties. The liberal ‘association law’ facilitated the rapid growth of associational life, which began to include lower social strata. The number of registered associations increased from 5,200 in 1868 to 8,000 in 1870, to 15,000 in 1880, to more than 30,000 in 1890, to about 60,000 in 1900, and finally to more than 103,000 in 1910 (Hye 1998, 199). Between 1880 and 1910, the number of associations increased in relation to the population more than fourfold. It is important to note that in the same period the number of sport clubs, many serving as vehicles of political mobilisation, had expanded by 40 times, from 35 to 1,374 (ibid., 202).
A similarly massive expansion can be noted in the case of educational and commercial associations (ibid., 203).

Figure 29. Expansion of Associations in Lower Austria, 1880-1910 [Hye 1998, 203]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>2,169,032</td>
<td>2,462,557</td>
<td>2,856,701</td>
<td>3,264,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association</td>
<td>2,762</td>
<td>6,249</td>
<td>13,367</td>
<td>19,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People/Association</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The spread of political and civil associations was accompanied by the heyday of Austrian journalism. Newspapers published by Moriz Szeps, an entrepreneur of the second generation, such as the *Neue Wiener Tagblatt* and the *Neue Fremdenblatt*, reached a circulation of 35,000 to 50,000 copies, at a time when the *New York Times* only managed 35,000 copies (Rumpler 2006, 7). By 1890, various national associations had registered more than 1,800 periodicals and newspapers (Davies 1997, 781). A positive factor was that in Europe there had been no major war for more than four decades. Taken together, these noted patterns in state extension, urbanisation, bourgeois expansion and growing levels of association, including the working class, suggest that, after 1880, political actors found favourable conditions for increasing their intellectual and organisational capacities.

7.2. Nationality as a Category of Institutional State Practice and Policy

This section argues that, after 1879, the previous liberal-constitutional ideal of enhancing ‘individual freedom’ was gradually replaced by an approach that radically increased the degree of collective organisation. While the constitution of 1867 had a liberal character in terms of individual rights, the succeeding era became marked by an increasingly collectivist approach of the state, visible in its response to the ‘social question’ as well as to the ‘national question’. The Austrian economist and politician Albert Schäffle argued that the government must intervene in economic affairs and promote social policies (Rumpler 1997, 481-82). Joseph Maria Baernreither, a leading parliamentarian, and Eugen Philippovich, the central figure of the Viennese Fabians, elaborated the idea of a modern ‘welfare state’. Vogelsang’s social conservative idea of ‘social partnership’ (ibid., 482) was a further source of influence. In 1898, workers achieved institutionalised representation in the form of a permanent ‘Labour Council’ (ibid., 484). In response to the ‘national question’, Vienna responded in its governance with a differentiation between ‘state citizenship’ (*Staatsbürgerschaft*) and ‘national citizenship’ (*Volksbürgerschaft*).
In Hungary the regime response to the crisis of liberalism diverged fundamentally from Vienna’s multinationalist approach. Budapest reinforced a centralist-individualist Hungarian state doctrine as it had been previously expressed in the Law of 1868: ‘all Hungarian citizens [are part of] a nation in the political sense, the one and indivisible Hungarian nation, in which every citizen of the fatherland is a member who enjoys equal rights, regardless of the national group to which he belongs’ (Hoensch 1996, 28). It was in this era, marked by the crisis of liberalism, that governments in Vienna and in Budapest replaced individualist-liberal with collectivist policies. While governments in Vienna pursued policies that recognised multiple national groups as legally equal, Budapest promoted the projected collectivity of Magyar-speakers as the official nation of Hungary.

7.2.1. The Imperial Census

The new ‘organised’ spirit of governance required new bureaucratic tools to ‘manage’ the population, of which one was the census. Beginning with the decennial census of 1880, the Austrian state professionalised the acquisition of statistical knowledge about its population. The Ministry of the Interior kept records of the steady increase in its activities in its library and archive, which ‘were buying periodicals on political economy, Germany’s administration, Hungarian law, Prussian constitutional law, statistics, as well as the official governmental publications on Cisleithania’ (Deak 2015, 201). The extended arm of the state was not only evident in new public services but also in the construction of new public buildings in cities and towns. The shift from ‘restricted liberal’ to ‘organised modernity’, and its impact on a new form of governance, contributed to the development of Austrian social sciences, illustrated by the work of Otto Bauer. In the first volume of the Austro-Marxist journal Der Kampf, Bauer published his essay on ‘The social structure of the Austrian nationalities’ in which he examined data from the Austrian census of 1900 (Hanisch/Urbanitsch 2006, 93).

The decennial census played a key role in the production of organised knowledge about the population and shaped institutionalised practices that determined the relationship between state and citizen. Avoiding static concepts such as ‘mother tongue’ or ‘nationality’, the Austrian census referred to the people’s colloquial language (Umgangssprache). Although legally the state left the determination of the reported language to individuals, in practice data collection happened within the framework of the family. This inevitably attributed ‘the male head of a household’ an important role, although he might report a different language for his wife, which could also change from one census to another (Judson 2016, 310). Similar to confessional regulations, it was generally the father’s recorded
linguistic affiliation that determined that of his children. In his recent study, Göderle (2016, 12) explores the social construction of ‘nationality’, with a focus on the imperial census as a scientific and administrative practice. The procedure of the Austrian census in 1881 illustrates that the category of ‘colloquial language’ was not intended by the government to denote what would later become an ethnic or biological conception of nationality. In 1880, the Ministry of the Interior formulated the question as follows (quoted in Göderle 2016, 225):

For every person, that language has to be indicated which serves as his/her usual means of communication, but in any case only one of the following languages, namely German, Bohemian-Moravian-Slovak, Polish, Ruthenian, Slovene, Serbian-Croat, Italian-Ladin, Romanian, Magyar (the latter only in the Bukovina).

In the context of the state’s direct engagement with its subjects, the category of *Umgangssprache* was initially a utilitarian concept intended to support the expansion of public services. From the viewpoint of bureaucrats, state agencies and scholars, the meaning of ‘nationality’ for those counted was not of interest. In the 1880s, the role of Counting Commissioners and the decentralised compilation of census data were critically questioned by Austrian bureaucrats hoping to improve the scientific reliability of the census. Another critique concerned the so-called ‘list counting’, which referred to the practice of collecting data through one form per household and not (as scientists had recommended) through one form per individual (ibid., 153).

For the census of 1890, these scientific debates had contributed to a number of reforms. Although the practice of ‘list counting’ was upheld, a new centralised method seemed to resolve the noted issues. The manual transfer of data by the central authorities in Vienna from collective ‘household lists’ to ‘individual counting cards’ seemingly achieved the individualisation of data. These cards, which contained information on individuals, were subsequently counted by new machines, which fully mechanised the counting process for the first time in continental Europe. The counting machine, which was built according to a model developed in the United States, made the categorisation of the population by nationality seemingly objective (ibid., 154-5). While in the 1850s and 1860s experts had still discussed the critical role of applied concepts, biases and the persons involved in data collection, the 1880s and 1890s saw a growing scientific focus on centralised data processing and the production of statistics.

The categorisation of the population in reference to ‘colloquial language’ served increasingly as a seemingly objective foundation for decisions of the judiciary concerning language questions and ‘national minority rights’ (Göderle 2016, 266). As the Cameralist
legacy of the Josephist era had finally lost its impact in the field of administrative sciences, the previously state-centred approach was replaced by one that shifted the identification of culturally distinct ‘national subjects’ into the focus of statistics and social science research (ibid., 152). The development of the discipline of administrative statistics in Austria since the 1870s involved anthropology and ethnography, and adopted major positivist premises from the natural sciences (ibid., 257-58). A product of this development is the following map, which refers to the classified population in the monarchy as ‘races’.

Map 6. A ‘Historical Atlas’ visualising the Distribution of ‘Nationalities’ in Austria-Hungary [Shepherd 1911]

In the Hungarian half of the empire, the administration applied the same categories for classifying the inhabitants as in the Austrian half. Individuals had to declare one language as their spoken language, which the state authorities in turn used as indicator to determine nationality; ‘the statistical office then put these answers into larger categories (Saxon, Swabian, and Yiddish, for instance, all fell into the category “German”’)’ (Varga 2016, 11).

The Hungarian Nationality Law of 1868 was in principle as liberal as the Austrian constitutional law of 1867, both recognising national minorities. However, in contrast to the Austrian half, where the absence of a numerically dominant nationality provided space for a multi-national state doctrine, in Hungary the rise of collectivism in the 1880s and 1890s was reflected in a state doctrine of Magyarization (magyar állameszme) (ibid., 1). In this context, changes in the census data were used by the government as an indicator of linguistic assimilation.
Figure 30. Classification of the population of Hungary by spoken language, 1880-1900 (excluding Croatia-Slavonia and Fiume) [Varga 2016, 10]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1900</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population</strong></td>
<td>13,728,622</td>
<td>16,683,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>According to census</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magyar</td>
<td>6,397,651</td>
<td>8,586,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>1,866,212</td>
<td>1,978,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>1,858,017</td>
<td>1,991,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>2,411,447</td>
<td>2,784,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusyn</td>
<td>355,265</td>
<td>423,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>181,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian</td>
<td>628,575</td>
<td>434,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>211,454</td>
<td>303,375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1850, Magyar-speakers accounted for 41.5% of the population inhabiting the territory of the historical kingdom of Hungary. By 1890 their share has reached 48.6%, with Jews making up 6.1% of all Magyar speakers, which represented 63.8% of Hungary’s Jewish population (Kovács 1994, 19). Jews became an important factor for tipping the balance in favour of a slight Magyar-speaking majority in 1900. Many Jewish citizens became incorporated into the Magyar-speaking bourgeois society, especially once they were granted the opportunity of social upward mobility through education. The two tables below illustrate that many Jews joined the professions by studying law and medicine.

Figure 31. Religious Affiliation of Students at the University of Budapest, Faculty of Law, 1826-1910 [Kovács 1004, 18]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1826</th>
<th>1853</th>
<th>1863</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>1,794</td>
<td>1,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvinist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>1,097</td>
<td>1,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>144</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>1,336</td>
<td>1,780</td>
<td>3,687</td>
<td>3,915</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 32. Religious Affiliation of Students at the University of Budapest, Faculty of Medicine, 1890 [Kovács 1004, 19]
The linguistic assimilation of Jews in Budapest was similar to the dominant assimilationist position within the Jewish community in fin de siecle Vienna. It serves as an example of acculturation and national realignments in urban contexts.

### 7.2.2. The Institutionalisation of Nationality in Administration and the Electoral System

In the context of the expanding welfare state, ministries welcomed the influx of quantitative data categorising the population, for use in education, the electoral system, and the army, for example. As people could select only one single language on the census form, bilingual individuals were forced to choose one language over another. In states such as France and Britain, where the category of ‘nationality’ by and large referred simply to state membership, ‘languages of communication’ other than English, such as in central and north Wales, or French, for instance in Brittany or the Vendée, remained an issue of language practice, not of ‘nationality’. In contrast, the Austrian state defined language issues as ‘national’ ones, and gradually institutionalised nationality difference in public domains.

#### Electoral Reforms and Nationality

This period was marked by a number of electoral reforms that extended the franchise and changed electoral districts, often taking into account linguistic differences. Major reforms of electoral regulations took place in Bohemia in 1890, in Lower Austria in 1896, in Carniola in 1898, in Carinthia and Vorarlberg in 1902, in Moravia in 1905, in Gorica, Gradiska and again in Lower Austria in 1907 (Ucakar 1985, 278). Generally, the 1890s were marked by efforts to introduce a fifth electoral class of commoners in provincial parliaments, which was intended to expand the franchise to include all adult male citizens from the age of 24. However, the emperor repeatedly rejected these ideas. In Lower Austria and Gorica, the fifth curia was finally introduced in 1907, following the example of Carinthia and Vorarlberg in 1902, of Styria in 1904, and of Moravia in 1905. Istria, Trieste and Carniola followed suit in 1908, Upper Austria and Salzburg in 1909, the Bukovina in

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvinist</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The linguistic assimilation of Jews in Budapest was similar to the dominant assimilationist position within the Jewish community in fin de siecle Vienna. It serves as an example of acculturation and national realignments in urban contexts.
1910 and Tyrol and Galicia in 1914 (Melik 2000, 1331). Following the Moravian Compromise of 1905, a general electoral class of commoners was introduced in 1906, accounting for 20 mandates that were nationally divided into 14 representing the Czech-speaking population and 6 for the German-speaking subjects (Ucakar 1985, 278).

On the provincial level, the electorate was gradually separated in terms of voters’ linguistic affiliation. An early example was the electoral reform in Gorica in 1866, which divided the important curia of great landowners into a ‘Slovene’ and an ‘Italian’ district. The law defined the electoral division territorially and avoided the term ‘nationality’. The law also reduced the required income in the poorer ‘Slovene’ electoral district by 50 per cent in comparison to the richer ‘Italian’ district. The result was a reduction of seats for ‘Italian-speakers’, shrinking the ‘Italian-speaking’ majority in the diet from 14 to 7 seats (Melik 2000, 1129-1330). This electoral reform in Gorica served as a model for the territorial adjustment of electoral districts in Tyrol, Istria and Styria. In 1902, for instance, the electoral districts of the new class of commoners in Tyrol were similarly drawn on the basis of the linguistic affiliations of the population (ibid., 1334-1335).

When in the 1883 Bohemian elections the constitutionalist camp lost its majority against the federalist conservatives, the new configuration of the Bohemian government mirrored that of Taaffe’s coalition in Vienna. It immediately began to explore electoral reforms and František Rieger from the Bohemian autonomists proposed the establishment of new electoral districts and divided electoral bodies based on the 1881 census. While the so-called ‘German-liberal’ opposition attacked these reform proposals, the majority speaker of the federalist-conservatives, the aristocrat Clam-Martinic, defended them. As the Bohemian federalists did not recognise German as the official language of the state, German liberals withdrew their collaboration in the reform commission (Urbanitsch 2000, 2031). In 1890, the urban and rural curiae in Bohemia were eventually divided into German- and Czech-speaking electoral districts (King 2003, 81-82). These developments on the provincial level were significant, as they represented a counter-trend to the Austrian parliament, which by 1914 ‘was no longer partitioned into electoral bodies’ (King 2011, 35).

The segregation of the electorate was eventually institutionalised on the personal, non-territorial level, by means of so-called ‘national cadastres’. In 1905, for instance, as part of the Moravian Compromise, the administration introduced a voter registration system based on linguistic affiliation. The new electoral law of November 1905 introduced a separate ‘Czech’ and ‘German’ electorate, both with fixed numbers of delegates. There were now the curia of the great landowners, the curia of the cities, trade and commercial chambers, the
rural municipalities and of delegates of the so-called general class (Ulbrich 1909, 163). The ratio between ‘Czech’ and ‘German’ delegates in the curia of cities was 20 to 20, in the curia of rural municipalities 39 to 14, and in the general curia 14 to 6 (Melik 2000, 1335). In each municipality, the voters had to register in nationally separate electoral cadastres. In the first step, the local administration registered voters according to their ‘known personal circumstances’ (ibid.). Subsequently, voters were allowed to apply for a modification of their registered nationality in the electoral list of their municipality. Should a voter hold a nationality that was neither ‘Czech’ nor ‘German’, they were supposed to register on the list of that nationality which represented the majority in the municipality (ibid.). Another novelty of the Moravian Compromise was the constitution of three separate curiae by the members of the provincial parliament to facilitate the parliamentary vote. The first curia was that of the great landowners. The second and the third were those of the ‘Czech’ and the ‘German’ variants, each comprising delegates from the cities, the rural municipalities, the general class and the commercial chambers. Delegates who had failed to register on one of the two national lists were not allowed to vote (ibid., 1336).

A similar scheme of personal national registration was introduced in the Bukovina in 1910. The administrative setup was more complex due to the linguistic diversity of its population. The electoral law declared that, of the 28 seats of the municipalities, 10 were reserved for the Romanian delegates, 10 for the Ruthenian, 7 for the German and one for the Polish representative. From the 18 seats reserved for the general electoral class of the commons, 6 were reserved for Rumanian delegates, 6 for Ruthenian, 5 for German and one for the Pole. As the state officially recognised only these four nationalities, the Hungarian-speaking voters were supposed to register on the list of those with Romanian nationality, the so-called Lippowaner on the Ruthenian list, and the others into the majority nationality of their municipality (Melik 2000, 1336-1337). Unlike in Moravia, in the Bukovina even the curia of great landowners and clergy were ‘nationally’ divided, translating a confessional division into a national-linguistic gap. Although the diet had agreed on a resolution that recognised the status of Jews as a distinct nationality with the right to constitute a separate ‘national curia’ in 1909, the government rejected such claims and forbade any legal recognition of a Jewish nationality (ibid., 1337-38).

In Galicia a similar scheme was introduced in February 1914, sanctioned by Vienna in July. It institutionally segregated Polish and Ruthenian voters as well as their respective delegates into separate bodies. Interestingly, it adopted partly the territorial principle of national separation in terms of redrawn electoral districts, and partly the personal principle,
including ‘Polish’, ‘Ruthenian’, and ‘mixed’ electoral districts. The ‘nationality’ of an individual was automatically registered by the administration on the basis of the census data. If someone disagreed, he was able to file a complaint. Although the collective representation of the Jewish population was taken into consideration in the specific structure of minority representation in the ‘general electoral districts’ of the city curia, the legal text avoids mentioning the Jewish population by name (ibid., 1339).

Although the Austrian citizenship law of the 1867 constitution had by large followed the Josephist tradition ‘and granted legal equality irrespective of ethnic identity’, by the turn of the century tendencies towards ‘a politics of recognition that legally acknowledged the existence and the relevance of ethnically defined collectives within the Austrian citizenry’ (Gammerl 2009, 529) were becoming apparent. These were reflected in the so-called Moravian Compromise of 1905, which separated ‘Czech’ and ‘German’ electorates and guaranteed each of them a certain degree of collective autonomy (ibid.). This shift brought about a contradiction within the structural pattern of Austrian representative political institutions. While democratisation on the level of political citizenship took place as a transformation process ‘from corporate to individual representation’ (Bader-Zaar 1998, 295-339), following the liberal principles of 1848 and 1867, the post-liberal regime engaged in a process of ‘collectivisation’ of constitutional rights. This shift in constitutional and legal interpretations can be described as moving from the liberal conception of the ‘free individual’ to a collectivist notion of ‘national autonomy’.

In Hungary, the Nationalities Law of 1868 maintained Magyar as the official public language of the state and guaranteed the use of other spoken languages in schools and the local administration (Sked 1989, 208-12). The text emphasized that all ‘citizens were equal before the law’ and that ‘all were entitled to express their nationality culturally while accepting the requirements and integrity of the Hungarian political nation’ (Cornwall 2006, 182). Despite this initially liberal constitutional law, which explicitly recognised Croatia as a ‘political nation’ and considered the cultural recognition of non-Magyar nationalities in proper Hungary, policies turned increasingly illiberal.

In contrast to the evolution of the Austrian half of the monarchy into a federalised multinational state, the Hungarian government promoted a unitary centralist state doctrine. The respective programme of ‘national integration’ neglected nationality difference, culturally as well as politically, and was strictly opposed to granting autonomy for historic-territorial entities, with the exception of Croatia (Gerö 1995, 204). The political autonomy of Hungary enabled Budapest to promote ‘an effective internal integration in terms of administration,
legislation, and economy’ (Varga 2016, 9). It was the application of the liberal-centralist idea of government, ‘which held that local privileges were feudal and backward institutions, but believed in the idea of unity’ (ibid.). Although the Hungarian government used different methods to silence the non-Magyar opposition, in the context of growing political crisis, nationalist actors such as Romanian and Slovak parties found growing opportunities to express their demands for ‘cultural’ rights (Zsuppán 2002, 106-9)

**Nationality in Administration and the Judiciary**

Austria’s federative structure, which had its roots in the patent of 26 February 1861 and the constitutional law of 21 December 1867, granted to provincial diets parliamentary competency in many domains that were not clearly defined as the competency of the Austrian parliament. This concerned issues of provincial culture, confessional affairs and secondary education, although in core domains such as municipality law and primary education the fundamental legal regulations were established by the Austrian parliament (Ulbrich 1909, 164). As this left many domains partly in the hands of Vienna and the provincial authorities, conflicts were inevitable. The House of Lords voted in favour of a regulation that introduced a conflict resolution mechanism based on the right of initiative on the part of the Austrian parliament and the subsequent decision by the emperor (ibid., 165). This was rejected by the House of Delegates on the grounds that it would create a situation in which either the emperor could accept the formulated position of the imperial council or, if he rejected this, could fill the gap in constitutional law through a decree (ibid.). The result was an ambiguous and complex legal situation in which political parties continually claimed to enhance provincial autonomy, although legally, provincial diets, as bodies of provincial self-administration, would only be allowed to co-decide in limited areas with the imperial legislation of the state (ibid.). While the constitution allowed direct communication between the provincial diet with the central government and the emperor, it strictly forbade communication with other provinces (ibid., 165-66).

The first major administrative reform of the Taaffe government was that concerning the Bohemian language ordinances of April 1880, which elevated Czech to the ‘external bureaucratic language’ for the whole of Bohemia, while German remained the ‘inner bureaucratic language’. During the ongoing reform debate in the Bohemian Diet in October 1884, the conservative majority leader Leo Thun expressed his belief that a political resolution for the national division of the populace could be found once there was an agreement on the political individuality of Bohemia (Urban 2000, 2032). In 1886, the
federalist majority leader Karl Schwarzenberg rejected demands by the constitutionalist opposition to repeal the language ordinances of 1880. In December 1889, Minister-Präsident Taaffe invited several leading Bohemian politicians to Vienna, neglecting, however, the Young Czechs, in an attempt to arrange a Bohemian Compromise between federalist conservatives and constitutionalists. The modification of provincial law and the language ordinances of 1880 were intended to establish separate ‘German’ and bilingual electoral, administrative and juridical entities (ibid., 2037). Although the emperor sanctioned the national separation of the Bohemian Landeskulturat in March 1891, the other aspects of the reforms remained at the centre of fierce political struggles (ibid, 2039).

Similar to its Bohemian counterpart, the Tyroleon Landeskulturat, established in 1884, comprised one section of the German-speaking areas of the province, based in Innsbruck, and a second section for South Tyrol based in Trent (Gumplowicz 1907, 470).

In an edited volume on language policies in imperial Austria, a group of scholars identify a general trend towards monolingualism in the domains of the administration, the judiciary and in education (Rindler Schjerve 2003). Although the correlation between multinationalising policy and actual linguistic practices varies in the three domains, a general pattern emerges. In the domain of the judiciary a case study of Trieste indicates a process of linguistically defined multinationalisation, illustrated by a substantial rise in the number of documents written in Slovene, as many as those in German since the 1890s, and complementing the traditionally dominant Italian language (Rindler Schjerve/Vetter 2007, 63). Another example is illustrated by Fellerer’s (2003, 164) study of Galicia, where ‘language laws until 1848 explicitly obliged officials to be proficient in a language or learn a language other than their mother tongue; in the case of Galicia basically Polish and/or Ruthenian apart from German’. After 1866 the German language was banned from the provincial administration, only to be used for correspondence with imperial authorities in Vienna and for the publication of laws (ibid., 153). By the 1870s bi- or trilingualism had disappeared from legal discourse (ibid., 164). From 1866 onwards, all laws in the Galician Diet were passed in Polish and subsequently translated into Ruthenian/Ukrainian and German. Similarly, the Reichsgesetzblatt was translated from German into Polish and Ruthenian. Between 1870 and 1914, even special editions in ‘Polish’ (Dziennik Prawa Państwa) and ‘Ukrainian’ (Viestnyk zakonov derzhavnych) were published. “‘Ukrainian” designated the new written language based on the local vernacular rather than the traditional mixture of Church Slavonic, Galician Ukrainian and Polish’ (ibid., 154).
In 1900, the new Koerber government sought to restore a functioning parliament in Vienna via political structural reforms, restricting the competencies of the provinces. The background was that ‘[b]y the twentieth century politicians and administrative reformers began to reconsider the 1850s and 1860s and Austria’s own peculiar state-building process’ (Deak 2015, 235). Koerber published his much-debated Study for a Reform of the Domestic Administration (1904), in which he proposed decentralisation ‘by shifting administrative power and responsibility from the Land and the central offices in Vienna to the district and superdistrict offices of the county’ (Deak 2015, 238). Koerber proposed to centralise the bureaucracy ‘by taking away duties, responsibilities and power from autonomous offices and instead give them to their counterparts in the central administration’, with the goal ‘to foster a local and regional democracy that was cleansed of national and mass political parties and which would focus itself toward policy’ (ibid., 238). The reduction in the competences of provincial diets was intended to stimulate the growth of an autonomous political culture on the municipal level that was supportive of the central authorities. The reform ‘would have increased the number of district prefects in Cisleithania from 342 to 749 … Public power would be further “decentralized” by grouping four or five districts under a county’, which were to be reintroduced, essentially removing ‘crownland politics from any power to make decisions on local matters’ (Deak 2015, 240). As Koerber’s reform plan attacked provincial autonomies, it triggered massive opposition (ibid., 242):

Polish aristocrats wanted to preserve their influence in the governor’s office in Galicia; Czech national politicians and German conservatives hoped to expand the scope of provincial autonomy from Bohemia to Styria; the Christian Socials in Vienna looked to preserve their power base in Vienna and thus jealously guarded the special political concessions to charter cities. Liberals worked to maintain local self-government in the smaller towns.

The Czech daily Narodní Listy accused Koerber of exaggerating the scope of Austria’s political structural problems. ‘That the Young Czech Party’s political power base rested in the sinecures within Bohemia and Moravia’s autonomous administration was left unmentioned. Słowo Polskie, in Lemberg/Lwów more brazenly stated that Poles, for reasons of national interest, should resist Koerber’s plan to unify the administration and reduce the administrative purview of the autonomous authorities’ (ibid.). Koerber became politically isolated and the emperor accepted his resignation on 31 December 1904.

In his opening speech to the Austrian parliament on June 19, 1907, the emperor stated that, in the context of democratisation, what was urgently needed was ‘a quickened decision-making process’ and the adaptation of ‘the state administrative apparatus to the increasing demands’ (quoted in Deak 2015, 246). In 1911 a ‘Commission for the Promotion
of Administrative Reform’ was established. Its chair, Erwin von Schwarzenau, declared that the Commission’s work aimed at the rebuilding of the Austrian state into what he referred to as ‘a welfare state’. In July 1913 Schwarzenau presented his reform proposals, which aimed to shift the ‘decision-making abilities toward the point of direct contact of the state bureaucracy with the general populace: the district prefect … Schwarzenau hoped to promulgate all aspects of the reform by administrative ordinance - not by going through parliament or the various crownland diets’ (ibid., 255). The reform attempt fell victim to WWI.

7.2.3. Schooling Policy and Nationality

The 1880s saw the foundation of Czech, German, Italian and Slovene-speaking nationalist school associations, which engaged in a competition ‘for children’ (Judson 2016, 302). From a political perspective, it is important to note that the Austrian ministry of education did not counter this dynamic of nationalist competition. The goal of nationalist school associations was to organise the establishment of private national primary schools in mixed-language territories by collecting funds and at least forty school-aged children in order to legally claim their transformation into public schools. If this was achieved, the money would be used to establish a new national private school (Burger 1995, 90-91). The following section investigates the dynamics of multinationalisation in education from the perspective of the Austrian government and closes with a brief summary of the diverging policy in Hungary.

Primary Education

On 26 April 1880, the conservative MP Alois Liechtenstein presented the following three points of critique against the established school system: Austrian primary schooling was too expensive; it did not fulfil its basic educational function due to the ‘declining influence of religion’; and it did not satisfy the ‘legitimate and inexpensive demands of all nationalities in Austria to achieve linguistic equality’ (Burger 1995, 85-6). The last claim was complemented by a detailed reform proposal to create a multinational education system. In 1883, the government eventually managed to push through parliament an education reform that corresponded to Catholic demands. Head teachers were required to hire only teachers who shared the religious confession of the majority of the pupils (ibid., 86). On 4 May 1881, the Old Czech Karl Adámek criticised in a parliamentary session the absence of Czech-speaking primary schools in many German-majority cities, where the recent census indicated an increase in Czech-speakers. The cities he named included
Reichenberg/Liberec, Leitmeritz/ Litoměřice, Neuern/Nýrsko, Krumau/Krumlov, Trautenau/Trutnov, Theresienstadt/Terežín, Brüx/Most, Teplitz/Teplice and Saaz/Zatec (ibid., 92). In these cities, ‘national associations’ collected money for the foundation of national minority schools with a Czech-speaking curriculum, which was supported by major government actors. In 1884 it was reported by the authorities that they planned to finance several newly founded Czech-speaking schools in predominantly German-speaking municipalities. These schools had been founded privately by the Bohemian-Czech association Ústřední matice školská, which had now run out of money (ibid., 93). In a parliamentary session on 18 March 1884, the Austrian liberal Eduard Herbst criticised how quickly the private elementary schools of the Matice školská had gained the status of public schools in German majority municipalities. While Herbst suggested that the activities of Czech nationalists were supported by the government, the minister of education replied that everything was in line with Bohemian legislation (ibid., 98).

In 1884, a German-majority municipality brought a contentious case to the Administrative Court, which decided in favour of the establishment of Czech-speaking national minority schools in accordance with Article 19, paragraph 3, declaring the constitutional right of parents to an education for their children in the language of their nationality (Schmitz 2000, 1468). This ruling linked the ‘liberal’ constitutional right to his/her ‘national language’ to the collective rights of public primary schooling, as outlined in paragraph 59 of the Reichsvolksschulgesetz (ibid.). The liberal constitutional right of non-discrimination had turned into the legal trigger for a multinational transformation of the primary school system, facilitated by the invention of the monolingual ‘nationalities school’. In order to defend the parents’ right to free choice the central authorities annulled some registration lists for the school year 1885/86 (Burger 1995, 94). In 1885, the Czech-speaking ‘minority school’ in Olmütz/Olomouc began to offer German language classes as non-obligatory courses. A year later, the same was introduced by the Czech-speaking minority school in Reichenau/Liberec. And a similar situation occurred in Trieste, where German was introduced as a subject (ibid., 112-13).

In 1890 negotiations began for a Bohemian Compromise and Bohemian-Czech delegates demanded a higher degree of political autonomy in reference to historical arguments concerning Bohemian State Law (Burger 1995, 107). After German-Bohemian MPs had withdrawn their demand for an administrative-territorial separation of German-speaking areas, Bohemian-Czech MPs agreed to a provincial law establishing two nationally separated sections of school authority. Rieger, the speaker of the Old Czech Party, argued
that in the future the province should take up the financing of national minority schools. German-Bohemian MPs rejected the proposal arguing that German-speakers were already making a much larger contribution to the budget. Minister of Education Gautsch intervened with the argument that often the members of the local Czech-speaking minority were unable to finance these schools, which were a constitutional right. The minister further requested that the term ‘mother tongue’, proposed by the committee of the Bohemian Parliament, be replaced by the term *Umgangssprache* (everyday language), as the former was not an officially recognised legal term (ibid., 108). Before a compromise could be ratified, the minister proceeded without modifications and sent the Bohemian Education Law to Francis Joseph on 30 April 1890. While the national division of the school authority was accepted by the Bohemian parliament and sanctioned by the emperor, the legal clarification of procedures guiding the establishment and financing of national minority schools failed due to Young Czech opposition, which was supported by Czech-speaking teachers (Havránek 1991, 248).

In Lower Austria and Vienna, which were inhabited by a predominantly German-speaking population, demands for ‘Czech’ minority schools were generally rejected. By 1900, there were some 103,000 officially registered migrants from Bohemia who had moved to Lower Austria and Vienna. Some began to organise their demands for education in Czech through the Komenský School Association. In November 1882, the Association received its license from the ministry of education to run a Czech-speaking private school in Vienna. Although this decision was initially vetoed by the Lower Austrian educational authorities it enjoyed support from influential figures such as the rector of the University of Vienna, Friedrich Maaßen, who argued that Vienna was the cosmopolitan capital of the empire (Burger 1995, 115). On 20 June, students began to launch protests against the rector and were joined by 63 professors, leading Maaßen to resign. The government did not transform the Komenský School into a public institution. Approximately 77 per cent of children from Czech-speaking families continued to go to German-speaking schools (ibid., 116).

In the areas inhabited by a significant Slovene-speaking population, in Lower Styria, Carinthia, Crain and the Littoral, the previous ‘liberal’ primary school reform of 1869 resulted in a rise of German-speaking schools, although the traditional practices of multilingualism were partially maintained within the framework of so-called *Utraquismus*. This model was characterised by the practice of using Slovene in the lower classes and improving German language skills in order to switch to German in the upper classes (Burger
The Slovene-speaking clergy attacked this model, arguing that it facilitated linguistic assimilation. The relationship between Austrian state-oriented Slovene-speakers, many of whom were willing to be assimilated linguistically as part of the liberal-secular Austrian bourgeoisie, and the conservative-clerical Slovene national movement grew increasingly hostile (ibid.). In a session of the Austrian parliament in 1882, MP Josef Vošnjak complained that the only Slovene textbook in Carinthia would in fact be a Slovene-German book, written in Slovene only until page 36. He argued that the Slovene literary language was much older than the German language, which he described as being of lesser value (ibid., 120). This antagonistic discourse, which had been introduced previously by the second generation of nationalist intellectuals, had by the 1880s reached the level of parliamentary debate.

By 1894, the government had implemented several multinationalising reforms that fostered monolingualism. In Crain, which had a Slovene-speaking population of more than 90 per cent, of 312 primary schools there were 277 with Slovene, 27 with German and only 8 with German-Slovene as the language of instruction. In Styria, where Slovene-speakers accounted for one third of the population, out of 820 primary schools, 568 were German, 212 Slovene and only 40 utraquistisch. In Istria, with about 15 per cent Slovene-speakers, of 153 primary schools, 62 were Italian, 53 Serbo-Croat, 23 Slovenian and 15 utraquistisch. In Trieste there were 29 Italian, 11 Slovenian and 3 German primary schools. It was only in Carinthia that Utraquismus remained a dominant school form in Slovene-speaking regions with 82 schools (Burger 1995, 124).

Figure 33. Public Elementary Schools by Language of Instruction [Burger 1995, 247]
Although under the preceding government the number of Ruthenian primary schools in Galicia had increased, this trend was gradually reversed in favour of Polish-speaking schools (Burger 1995, 125). In 1880, the Imperial Court made two important decisions concerning language policy in Galicia. The first concerned Ruthenians living in Lemberg, who attended an initially Ruthenian-speaking Greek-Catholic primary school that had been transformed into a Polish-speaking school back in 1867. In January 1880 the imperial court agreed that the situation represented a breach of the Ruthenian right to ‘the protection and cultivation of their nationality and language’. The ministry of education responded with a justification of Polish domination by referring to Galician provincial autonomy in education. This argument was again rejected by the Imperial Court, which argued that constitutional law was above provincial law and therefore overrode Galician semi-autonomy (ibid., 126). It argued in contrast to the ministry that the imperial elementary school law of 1869 defined primary schooling as a competency of the state. This ruling was ignored by the Galician authorities, who enjoyed the backing of the government (ibid., 127).

A similar complaint was filed by German-speaking Jews in Brody, who claimed their ‘national minority rights’ against the provincial administration’s practice of forcing all children to attend Polish-speaking schools. The first response was a provincial decree that proposed the establishment of two more Polish-speaking primary schools in case more schools were needed. The municipality of Brody lodged a complaint with the ministry of education, demanding the right to education in the children’s ‘national language’ of German (Burger 1995, 127). The ministry’s director argued that in Galicia there were only two
officially recognised ‘traditional provincial languages’ (landesüblich), Polish and Ruthenian. In July 1880, the Imperial Court confirmed the complaint of the Brody municipality against the regulation of the ministry. The Imperial Court ruled that the ministry was wrong to neglect the right of German-speaking Jews in Brody to choose the language of instruction (ibid., 128). A year later, the minister of education declared that its implementation was dependent on the semi-autonomous provincial authorities (ibid., 128). Only five years later, a Ruthenian public school was established in Lemberg. In the case of Brody, there was only one private Jewish school, funded by the Jewish religious community and providing instruction in German and Polish.

**Secondary and Higher Education**

In secondary education, the Taaffe government initiated a dynamic in which many of the publicly funded German-, Italian- and Polish-speaking schools were transformed into ‘national’ middle schools that introduced Czech, Ruthenian, Romanian, Serbo-Croat or Slovene as the language of instruction (Burger 1995, 131). In 1894 and 1895 the highest administrative court in Vienna ruled in favour of the principle of ‘national autonomy’. In the case of Slovene- and Czech-speaking provinces, however, it rejected such demands from Czech-speaking representatives in Lower Austria and Vienna, despite the fact that the census of 1890 had indicated that Czech-speakers accounted for 5.5 per cent of the Viennese population (ibid., 152). The Administrative Court argued that Czech was not a ‘traditional provincial language’ and that national minority protection was a right of individuals and not to be claimed by associations. In 1894, the Bohemian Governor Franz Thun warned the minister of education that the establishment of two economically autonomous national school systems would lead to ‘a kind of national diaspora’ (ibid., 154). The minister of education Stanislaw Madeyski responded that educational affairs were a matter of provincial autonomy. In the case of Moravia, this provided room for negotiation in the Moravian parliament, which reached a consensus to introduce a bilingual education system, making it obligatory to teach children in the second provincial language, thus ignoring the narrow interpretation of Article 19, paragraph 3, which in principle forbid the mandatory teaching of both languages (ibid., 156). The minister was able to reach an agreement in the ministerial council for Moravian middle schools, excluding Staatsgymnasien, where the second provincial language could be taught as a ‘relatively mandatory subject’ (ibid., 157).
In contrast to the successful negotiations in Moravia, the middle school reform in mixed, German-Slovenian-speaking areas triggered a political crisis and the government was dissolved. Already the Taaffe government had promised the establishment of Slovene-only classes in the high school of Cilli/Celje. While this was neglected and there were only mixed German-Slovene parallel classes in Marburg/Maribor, some delegates demanded the immediate introduction of Slovene-speaking parallel classes in Cilli. The government proposed the establishment of a new independent high school for the lower classes with German and Slovene as the languages of instruction. In response, the German liberal camp fiercely criticised public spending for this undertaking, and launched a press campaign arguing that such a government policy would undermine the status of the German-speaking bourgeoisie (Rumpler 1997, 508-9). The finance commission decided by 19 to 15 votes in favour of Slovene parallel classes, overriding the opposition of liberals, German-nationals, Christian Socials and Italians (Burger 1995, 159). As a result of this conflict, the coalition government, which had at that point included liberals, collapsed in June 1895. In September of the same year a new government was formed under Kasimir Badeni, the former governor of Galicia. In a step towards reconciliation with the previously excluded Czech nationalist camp, the government ended the state of emergency in Prague after two years, granted amnesty to eleven radical Czech nationalists, and promised concessions to the Young Czechs (ibid., 161).

Unlike primary schooling, secondary education appeared to be more favourable for compromise. Several high schools were established, for instance, with German-Slovene, Polish-Ruthenian and Italian-Serbo-Croat as the languages of instruction (Burger 1995, 230-31). The regulation of a ‘relatively mandatory’ language of instruction served as a vehicle to overcome the problematic Article 19, paragraph 3, and led to a model that was similar to Utraquismus. In 1909 and 1910 this model was introduced in several state high schools in the Littoral, Tyrol, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Galicia, the Bukovina and Dalmatia (ibid., 224). Due to growing tensions between rival nationalist MPs, who referred to Article 19 in their claims to monolingual education, however, a general Austrian educational reform in favour of mandatory bilingual education failed (ibid., 228-29).

Government policy was driven by a changing interpretation of Article 19 and contributed to the institutional segregation of children and students in terms of ‘nationality’. Despite reforms in secondary education that targeted social diversification, it remained largely reserved for male students. In the case of Austria’s German, Polish, Italian, and Czech-speaking populations, separate ‘national’ educational apparatuses had evolved,
ranging from kindergartens to primary schools, to middle schools, high schools and to some extent universities. Even in cases of less articulate ‘nationalities’, almost complete ‘national education’ systems materialised, teaching in Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbo-Croat or Slovene. In the case of vernaculars that were not officially recognised, only few enjoyed the right to establish schools, such as Albanian-speakers. Ladin-speakers or Yiddish-speakers were confronted with linguistic assimilation. The successful Moravian Compromise of 1905 served as a model for reforms in other provinces such as in the Bukovina in 1910, which recognised the collective rights of Romanian, Ruthenian, Polish, German and Jewish nationalities. The category of ‘Jewish nationality’, however, was removed in response to a complaint from the Austrian government. The remaining four nationalities were granted collective rights within the electoral system, the administrative system and the educational system, to be managed through a national cadastre (Stourzh 1985, 238-39). In Galicia, the negotiations for a compromise appeared more difficult, and the authorities decided to use the language data from the census as an indicator of nationality.

**Magyarization Policy in Hungary**

The crisis of liberalism provides the context for an illiberal turn in Hungarian educational policies. The education laws of 1879 and 1907 bypassed the liberal Nationalities Law of 1868 and enforced Magyar as the language of instruction in all public schools. The Hungarian state doctrine of so-called Magyarization, meaning national integration through linguistic assimilation, represented a consensus among Hungarian liberals and nationalists (Hewitson 2006, 331):

In this respect, the intransigent declaration of Deszö Bánffy, the prime minister between 1890 and 1895, that ‘without chauvinism it is impossible to found the unitary state’ differed little from that of his moderate liberal successor, Kálmán Széll, who proclaimed that the only ‘categorical imperative [was] the Magyar state-idea ... which every citizen should acknowledge ... and subject himself unconditionally to ... The supremacy and the hegemony of the Magyars is fully justified’.

Although Serbian and Romanian confessional schools could legally escape this regulation, government policy turned out to be quite effective and the share of non-Magyar primary schools declined within the following two decades from 47% to 14% (Cornwall 2006, 182). In contrast to the policy of the government in Vienna, the policy of Magyarization linked linguistic assimilation to belonging to and de facto protection by the Hungarian state.

The cultural dimension of national integration, as distinct from the political dimension, had its own dynamics, which was visible in the growing societal incorporation of Jews,
Slovak and German speakers into the Magyar-speaking bourgeoisie. Around 1880 the majority of the rural population in Hungary, especially Slovak and Romanian speakers, was monolingual, whereas German-speakers were often bilingual. Between 1880 and 1910 the number of Slovak, German and Romanian speakers who spoke Hungarian as second language increased significantly (Putkammer 2003). Almost 400,000 originally German-speakers shifted to speaking Magyar as first language. The same pattern affected the decline of Slovak speakers. ‘Next to emigration, this is one of the mayor explanations for the stagnating absolute numbers of Germans and Slovaks, during the second half of the century up to 1910, a period in which meanwhile the whole population of Hungary increased by one half’ (van der Plank 2012, 386).

7.2.4. Nationality in Textbooks

The so-called Kronprinzenwerk, initiated by the government in 1883 under the patronage of Crown Prince Rudolf, was the most renowned project to publish a collection intended to present the ‘natural’ diversity of the monarchy. Between 1885 and 1902, 24 volumes were published in German and Hungarian language editions, with 4,529 illustrations and 587 texts (Göderle 2016, 263). Its articles and illustrations, which included people, landscapes and buildings, reified cultural differences between provinces and fostered an essentialist, ethno-nationalist ideology (Bendix 2003, 149-166). In the preface the book was described as a contribution to ethnography, which provides insights into ‘the merits and peculiarities of the particular ethnographic groups’ (1887, quoted in Göderle, 261-2):

Those nationalities which feel segregated from the other segments of the people on the basis of language, tradition and partly diverging historical development, will appreciate the fact that their individuality finds due respect and hence recognition in the scientific literature of the monarchy.

The promotion of an ethno-cultural conception of nationality after 1880 is further reflected in official textbooks. In primary schools, history was generally taught via the narration of episodes associated with myths. ‘This occurred in a series of stages, which were intended to build up a sense of identification with the crownland, the Habsburg Monarchy as a whole, the dynasty, and also with the national culture pertaining to each language group’ (Bruckmüller 2007, 29). In line with the government’s politics of recognition, ‘the imperial Austrian state appears to have been reasonably, even surprisingly, tolerant with regard to the learning of national myths’ such as ‘Libuše, the ancient Slavs’ (ibid.). At the level of secondary education, the content of history classes tended to avoid the reproduction of explicitly nationalistic ideology.
In order to evaluate the ideological content that was taught to the young Austrian bourgeoisie, samples from two secondary textbooks will be analysed. The civics and geography textbook ÖSTERREICHISCHE VATERLANDSKUNDE (Austrian Fatherland Education) (Sieger et al. 1912), which was written in German for the final class of middle school, represents a good example of a scientifically informed presentation of the population. It opens with a clear statement regarding its goals (ibid., 1):

"Everyone loves his fatherland; the well educated, however, should understand the polity to which he belongs as a citizen. He should know how his state has emerged and grown, conditioned by geography, nature and the composition of the population, and which tasks arise from its geographical location and historical development for the present and future."

This reading of the development of the state identifies only external factors determining its development. There is neither a patriotic master narrative nor a reference to popular will; nor does it refer to civilizational or human achievements associated with the state. In the first paragraph, no name is even given for the state.

Chapter five discusses the ‘Population of the Monarchy’ in three distinct sections: number, composition and changes of the population; national and confessional structure; education and commerce. The section on ‘national and confessional structure’ draws on a table that presents the statistical classification of the population. Although the textbook notes that the statistical data from the census tends to underrepresent national minorities and that almost all provinces were linguistically mixed, it also emphasises that ‘language borders’ were generally easy to identify (ibid., 33). Most of the ‘Germans’, the text continues, live in a cohesive area that borders with the German Empire. The text refers to the Galician Jews as a nation that was not recognised in the census. Initially speaking a Germanic vernacular, the text continues, many of them had opted for German and, later, for Polish, nationality. In the Sudetenland many Jews opted for German or Czech nationality (ibid., 34). Next, the textbook discusses the ‘Czechoslavs’, comprising ‘Czechs’, ‘Moravians’ and ‘Slovaks’. Then it introduces the ‘Ruthenians’, who are divided into ‘Small Russians’ and ‘Ukrainians’. Further, it discusses the ‘South Slavs’, comprising ‘Serbs’ and ‘Croats’. It does not define the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a distinct nationality, arguing that it shared the Serbo-Croat language (ibid., 34). According to the textbook, religious differences did not count as signifiers of nationality.

A second sample includes the Deutsches Lehrbuch (Prosch/Wiedenhofer 1896), which is a reader comprising a compilation of texts for upper secondary school. Its content is structured into 100 different sections, the first nine comprising texts by Herder, representing ‘the new German literature’. Other authors represented by multiple texts include Goethe,
Schiller, August Wilhelm Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel and Ernst Moritz Arndt. The reader closes with some texts by ‘Austrians’ such as Anastasius Grün and Franz Grillparzer. This collection clearly represents a ‘German national’ literary canon. This by no means representative evaluation is supported by Bruckmüller (2007, 18), who argues that in contemporary German-language textbooks there was ‘a clear effort when teaching literature to offer examples from the wider German cultural sphere ... to indicate the existence of a common cultural heritage that is self-evidently shared with other Germans.’

A similar dominance of nationalist ideological content can be found in contemporary Slavic language textbooks. In a third-year reader, written in the Czech language by Jan Štastný and Josef Sokol (1889), there is a section on ‘countries, fatherland, nation’ (zeme, vlast, národ), which teaches, among others, the famous nationalist phrase: ‘He who is at home in Bohemia is called a Czech [kdo v Čechách domovem jest, jemenuje se Čech]’ (Bruckmüller 2007, 18). While ‘Czech’ is linguistically defined as “our” spoken and written language’, ‘nation’ is described as a people with a common origin and language. The stories presented in the reader ‘relate entirely to the lands of the Bohemian crown’ and contain much Czech national mythology (ibid., 18-19). The content in the fourth-year reader is similar, again discussing the history of the monarchy but placing the province of Bohemia in its centre, accompanied by the areas inhabited by Slavic-speaking populations, especially Slovene-speakers, and to a minor degree also Slovak-speakers. ‘The historical section of this volume affirms the sense of belonging to the Czech nation before treating an early history of Bohemia in detail’ (ibid., 19).

These samples suggest that nationalist ideological content was reproduced in officially licensed textbooks. Against the background of the state’s nationality policy, this can be grasped as an aspect of the regime’s multinationalising governance. Although it apparently made its mark on contemporary textbooks, the Austrian literary scene was of course more diverse. Although ethno-linguistic nationalisms were on the rise in the domain of literature, a strand propagating the revival of the Enlightened Austrian state idea was also emerging. Drawing on the common civilizational space under Habsburg rule, intellectuals and writers engaged in the presentation of an ‘Austrian human’, frequently defined in opposition to militaristic Prussian-Germans (Haider 1998, 171). A prominent example is Hugo von Hofmannsthal, who propagated the strengthening of cultural Austrianess in 1915: ‘Our fate is tougher, our mission more unique: ancient European soil was inherited by us, to which we are the successor of two Roman Empires, that is our burden, which we have to carry, whether we wish so or not: holy and fateful is the soil of the homeland!’ (quoted in Haider
1998, 172). Such appeals to Austrian statist nationalism played no major role in official ideology before WWI.

### 7.3. Nationality in Politics

This section examines how party ideologies were formed within the framework of categories established by the state. In the context of democratisation, the state’s nationality policy turned out to have unintended consequences. It can be viewed from a conservative perspective as an instrument intended to accommodate the continuation of a Metternichan governance of empire, a politics of recognition, and multiculturalism. The fragmentation of the bourgeoisie turned out to undermine the formation of political actors on the imperial state level. Under conditions of mass politics, the regime strategy of avoiding a ‘politics of representation’ and reducing nationality to a legal and administrative issue, failed to prevent spreading articulations of ‘national conflicts’, which were feeding into a crisis of the political system and contributed to a surge of populist nationalisms.

#### 7.3.1. Political Opportunity Structure: The Crisis of Liberalism

The first factor involved in the rise of nationalist politics was the radically transformed political opportunity structure. Although parties became the organisational platform of political representation, the emperor remained a central figure as the dynastic political ‘key’ (Wolf 2007, 210-15). When Europe was hit by an economic crisis in the early 1870s, this contributed to an ideological decline of liberalism. Although ‘[m]aterially, European society was better off … psychologically, Europeans were seriously disturbed’ (Davies 1997, 781). In Austria, the ‘Black Friday’ of 9 May 1873 triggered a deflation crisis that called economic liberal premises into question (Wehler 1995, 100-5). Due to the accelerated internal migration to cities, perceptions of growing economic and linguistic competition increased. The crisis of liberalism and its rationalist assumptions triggered a vigorous intellectual response, most famously expressed in the legacy of fin de siecle Vienna (Rumpler 2010, 1142-55). Among the young Austrian bourgeoisie, who found themselves in the twilight of a state in crisis that was unable to overcome its institutional stasis, and a notoriously conservative societal culture, an increasingly negative sociopolitical outlook began to spread.

In Hungary the previously dominant liberal orientation of the bourgeoisie gave similarly way to new illiberal forms, culminating in the rise of neoconservatism. ‘In the view of neoconservatives, liberal capitalism had a devastating effect on Hungarian society, more so
than in Western Europe, because, as they argued, Hungary was “not yet ripe” for a liberal transformation’ (Kovács 1994, 26). Under these conditions, new political streams gained influence on the Hungarian left and the Magyar-nationalist right, marked by opposition to liberal modernisation, which was associated with free trade, finance capitalism and cosmopolitanism.

Under the slogan ‘reconciliation and dialogue’, Minister-Präsident Taaffe convinced the Czech nationalist camp to return to the Austrian parliament after twelve years of ‘obstruction’ and appointed the ‘moderate nationalist’ Alois Pražák from Moravia as Landesminister (Rumpler 1997, 486). As Bohemian-Czech and Galician-Polish nationalist factions joined Taaffe’s coalition, their political influence grew significantly. Austrian-German figures left the Taaffe cabinet in 1880, after Czech nationalists had forced the liberal Minister of Justice and Education Karl Stremayr to relinquish the resort of education (Burger 1995, 85). The influence of Bohemian Czech nationalists within the government grew, illustrated most visibly by the ‘national’ partition of the University of Prague in 1882, and this antagonised the Bohemian German-speaking population as well as large parts of the opposition in the Vienna parliament (Sutter 1980, 210). Taaffe’s coalition further included the Polish Club, the large-scale landowners under the leadership of Count Hohenwart, and the German, Slovene and Italian ‘clerical conservatives’ (ibid.). Taaffe described himself as the ‘Emperor’s minister’, in symbolic contrast to the Bürgerministerium of the post-1848 era.

The transition to mass politics represented an existential challenge for parties associated with Austrian liberalism. The previously governing bloc of the progressive German Left (Deutsche Linke) was initially convinced that Taaffe’s heterogeneous coalition would soon collapse. However, it was not the government but the ‘German Left’, the ‘Club of the Left’ (Klub der Linken), as well as the Austrian Constitutionalists that disintegrated into small parties (Sutter 1980, 211). Somewhat unexpectedly, the conservative-clerical, Slavic-nationalist alliance succeeded in pushing Austrian liberals and the German Left to the margins. The anti-democratic and ultimately anti-populist stance of the Austrian liberals contributed to their inability to broaden the party’s social base (Reinalter 1993, 50). The Austrian liberal movement was unable to transform from a system of committees of local notables to that of organised party politics (Kwan 2013, 22). The liberals’ failure to establish a recruitment system and to develop an inclusive political project, visible in their growing anti-clericalism and elitism, opened up space for the populism of the Christian Socials. At the end of Taaffe’s first legislation period in 1885, the Austrian-liberal leader
Eduard Herbst noted a new antagonistic kind of mass politics (quoted in Rumpler 1997, 487):

What scares us old Austrians is the question whether it will be possible to fully do away with the fatal consequences caused by the manifestation of increasingly sharp and irreconcilable antagonisms of nations, races, confessions and occupational classes of society … Finally we see how the increasingly blasé attitudes of the young, something not sufficiently deplored, promotes opposition to the Austrian unitary state idea, because our younger generation grows up under the dominant impression that the national struggle is undermining all other ideas.

With the ascent of ethnic and racist types of nationalism, the Austrian liberal camp further fragmented and ultimately dissolved as an organic political stream (Reinalter 1993, 47). In his study of liberalism in Salzburg, Haas (1981, 113) observed a shift from universalist Austrian liberalism to particularistic German nationalism. When the famous Austrian liberal leader Eduard Herbst died in 1892, only a few dozen attended his funeral (Hanisch/Urbanitsch 2006, 59).

### 7.3.2. The Supply Side: Modern Mass Parties

The decline of elitist-aristocratic factional politics and its replacement by mass politics found its expression in the foundation of new mass parties. The previous dualistic system, which had been based on two loose blocs, was replaced by a multi-party system. As the transition towards organised mass politics was accompanied by a crisis of Austrian liberalism, it provided space for the ascendancy of anti-liberal ideologies, reflected in the incorporation of ethnicist conceptions of nationality. Unlike the preceding actors of the political elite, the new mass parties engaged in the articulation of collective identities, moving towards a politics of representation.

**Political Catholicism and Austria’s First Populist Party**

In the 1890s, the Christian Social Party became Austria’s first populist party, drawing ideologically on political Catholicism and anti-Semitism. The revival of Catholicism after 1880 was linked to a critique of liberalism. Austrian liberals were increasingly confronted with the argument that liberalism entailed ‘societal Atomisation, the political expression of materialism and a commercial mentality, the promoter of democracy and despotism of the masses’ (quoted in Haider 1998, 109). Already Taaffe’s coalition was initially based upon an alliance of clerical conservatives, unified by demands to restore the authority of the Church (Sutter 1980, 210-11). The surge of religion in the late nineteenth century was accompanied by a ‘reformulation of doctrine’ (Bayly 2004, 325). Religious revivalists constructed a dichotomy between the corruption of the materialist, secular present and the
imaginary of a harmonious, religious past. The Catholic Church responded with a reform of its doctrine and institutions. Further, ‘the Orthodox churches of Greece and the Slavonic lands began to respond to pressures of liberal intellectuals and foreign Christian churches by establishing clearer forms of liturgy and doctrine’ (ibid., 343).

In Austria, the collapse of the Josephist state church in 1848 had opened up space for new religious dynamics (Berchtold 1967, 48). It was especially bourgeois groups such as artisans, schoolmasters, tradesmen, government clerks and educated women who propagated Catholic Orthodoxy in an increasingly hostile world marked by insecurities (Bayly 2004, 334). The intellectual Karl Vogelsang was invited to Austria by Leo Thun in 1873 to write for the conservative journal Vaterland. Building on Christian-Romantic philosophy, Vogelsang developed the idea of ‘social partnership’, offering a way to overcome the conflict between capital and labour. In contrast to socialism and liberalism, defined as political centralist ideologies, he promoted Austrian federalism on the basis of Christian philosophy (Rumpler 1997, 482). Vogelsang’s ideas provided the foundation of the first programme of the Catholic political movement in June 1883. An informal fusion of the Catholic Conservatives led by Prince Alois Liechtenstein and Vogelsang’s Christian Social Association culminated in Karl Lueger’s leadership of a larger Catholic movement, the so-called ‘United Christians’, with its mission proclaimed at the second Austrian Catholic Day in 1889 (Berchtold 1967, 49).

The Austrian Christian Socials were a ‘non-Liberal bourgeois’ (Boyer 1981, 418) anti-Semitic party, although its anti-Semitism ‘became a mere subsidiary issue, directed more against Social Democrats than against the Jewish community as such’ (ibid., 403). This points to the fact that the key political frontier in German-speaking Austrian politics was increasingly constructed between centre-left and centre-right, Social Democracy and Christian Socials. The party’s decision in favour of Vogelsang’s ‘social’ stream alienated aristocratic and conservative clerical circles, opening up space in which to appeal to the lower bourgeois and rural strata. In 1895, Minister-Präsident Hohenwart, the Polish Minister Madeyski and the Cardinal of Prague Schönborn launched an attack and sent a pamphlet to the Pope, arguing that the Christian Socials were instrumentalising economic inequalities (Fuchs 1949, 55). Their pamphlet noted that Christian Socials symbolically divided the clergy into a ‘rich, high clergy’, supposedly loyal to the elites and the government, and a ‘poor lower clergy’, presented as loyal to the common masses and the Christian Socials (ibid., 56). Pope Leo XIII officially accepted the programme of the Christian Social Party, which celebrated a major victory in the Vienna elections of 1895. In
the Austrian general elections of 1897, it confirmed its rise in Vienna and Lower Austria, as well as in the cities of Graz, Trieste and Lemberg.

In the era of state extension, Karl Lueger successfully implemented a distinct version of the welfare state on the municipal level, which became referred to as ‘communal socialism’ (Maderthaner 2010, 526). His administration modernised Viennese infrastructure, including gas, water, electricity, and the electrification of tramways. Vienna was territorially expanded and the administration secured a number of public green spaces in order to uphold the quality of life (Fuchs 1949, 62-63). By means of populist politics, Lueger achieved the ideological representation of an otherwise heterogeneous and fragmented petite bourgeoisie, characterised by growing but diffuse fears (Boyer 1981, 446). He articulated a national collective identity that united the ‘old and ‘new’ lower bourgeoisie, inhabiting the ‘father city’ of Vienna and supposedly seeking protection from immigrants and Jewish-led finance capitalism (Maderthaner 2010, 525). The notion that his anti-Semitism was primarily based on non-ethnic divisions is illustrated by a parliamentary speech of 1890 (Lueger, quoted in Fuchs 1949, 60):

Are maybe the Christian people responsible for the fact that the profits on capital and land are entirely in the hands of the Jews? … Are the Christians responsible for the fact that more than fifty per cent of lawyers in Vienna and the biggest proportion of the medical doctors are Jews? We are not responsible at all, but taken together this must have produced anti-Semitism, as indeed it has done.

Another example is the following statement from a speech given by Lueger in 1899:14

The influence on the masses, in our country, is in the hands of the Jews, the greater part of the press is in their hands, by far the largest part of all capital and, in particular, high finance, is in Jewish hands, and in this respect the Jews operate a terrorism of a kind that could hardly be worse. For us, in Austria, it is a matter of liberating Christian people from the hegemony of Jewry.

The publicly celebrated conflict with the emperor after Lueger’s victory in the Vienna elections in 1895 did not harm his popularity, but fed into his anti-establishment populism, making his appointment as mayor in 1897 inevitable. It illustrates how aggressive his politics had become, in which he targeted ideological opponents as enemies (Fuchs 1949, 61).

One feature of Christian Social ideology was its universalist approach to contemporary problems, proposing to resolve all societal problems within a harmonious Christian order. Lueger supported plans for trialism, to achieve a new balance between German, Slavic and Hungarian speaking populations and their dominant political actors (Fuchs 1949, 61-2). The pragmatic approach to the so-called ‘national problem’ found its expression in the

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programme of the 1905 convention, which advocated a province-based federative solution to the question of national autonomy (Berchtold 1967, 54). The resolution defined the never-ending indulgence of the Austrian government towards Hungarian nationalist demands, which it associated with a ‘Judeo-Magyar clique’, as the root cause of the monarchy’s instability (ibid., 172-73). Its programme of 1907 reflected that of a genuinely ‘Austrian’ party, which had developed a substantial support base across Cisleithania and called for the re-establishment of Vienna as the political centre of the monarchy (ibid., 174-75). The death of Karl Lueger in 1910 left the party without leadership.

Social Democracy: From Enlightenment Project to Multiculturalism

When the Austrian workers movement gained momentum in 1877, the government responded with repression, forcing the leader of the radical faction, Johann Most, to flee to London (Berchtold 1967, 18). In spring 1879, Kautsky pushed for the formation of a reformist party, writing an open letter in which he argued that ‘[w]e in Austria need a political revolution before we can think of a social one’ (quoted in Berchtold 1967, 18). Similar to events in Vienna, in Styria the radical wing gained influence. In October 1882 a general convention was organised where Kautsky presented a reformist programme. Between 1882 and 1884, the government once again reinforced repression against trade unions, stirring riots. In 1886, Viktor Adler, who had previously left the German-national movement due to anti-Semitism, joined the Social Democratic movement and succeeded within three years in establishing a unified party. In September 1888, a formal agreement was reached with Czech-speaking social democrats in Brno, followed by the official founding convention of the Austrian Social Democratic Party in Hainfeld with 110 delegates from 13 provinces.

When nationalist conflicts began to dominate political debates during the Badeni-Crisis of 1897, Victor Adler proclaimed the party’s following three goals: First, the fight against ‘the dominance of stupidity and priests’ (Verdummung und Verpfaffung); second, pressing for solidarity between nations; third, to keep the focus on workers’ rights (ibid., 25). Against the rising tide of nationalist strife, which dominated the government’s agenda, the Social Democratic Party declared its opposition to all nationalist forces: ‘No solidarity of interest with the chauvinistic parties’ (quoted in Berchtold 1967, 26). Anti-clericalism represented a major pillar of Austrian Social Democratic discourse. With the religious populism of the Christian Social centre-right and the anti-clericalism of Social Democracy, Liberals and
German-nationalists, the Catholic/anti-clerical frontier fed Austrian politics with emotions and animosities (Boyer 1995, 208).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Austrian Left broke with the civilizational, state-centred conception of nationhood and shifted towards an ethnoculturalist stance. The following comparative analysis of the conceptions of nationality in Kautsky’s ‘The modern nationality’ (1887), Renner’s ‘State and Nation’ (1899), and Bauer’s The Question of Nationality and Social Democracy (1907/1924) illustrates how Renner and Bauer attempted to work with the categories that were created by the state. In his treatise ‘The Modern Nationality’ (1887), Karl Kautsky outlined a classically liberal-left approach to nation and modernisation from an economic-rationalist perspective. First, he recognised the utility of ‘the national idea’ as an ideological tool for agitation (Kautsky 2009, 56). In a second step, he sought to shed light on the origins of nations, which he identified as being linked to three modern conditions. First, the emergence of market-driven economies and the division of labour; second, the dynamics of military struggles and the resulting focus on the defence of the central state’s capital city and territory; third, the central role of written language for the development of a literate mass culture, which he associated with the requirements of trade and production. These conditions made the bourgeoisie the major bearer of the ‘national idea’ (ibid., 57-59). His concept of linguistic nationality, which he viewed as a category of contingent, bourgeois literary culture, is rooted in the Enlightenment paradigm of civilizational progress. ‘The classical form of the modern state is the nation-state’ (ibid., 59). ‘Already today, if one wants to be “educated”, in order to participate fully in the modern economic and intellectual life, one needs to understand, or better speak, beside his mother tongue at least a second language, a world language. This requirement will increase steadily. Next to the world languages the national languages will decline towards a status, similar to the one of today’s dialects in comparison to literary language’ (ibid., 60).

In contrast to Kautsky, Karl Renner begins his work State and Nation (1899) with the deconstruction of the nation-state paradigm. While he viewed the state as a ‘sovereign entity’, representing the sovereignty of the ‘collective will’ that rules over a territory, he defines the nation as a cultural community of individuals (Renner 2005, 29-30). Renner proposes a model of ‘national cultural autonomy’: If nations were organised like religious communities, they would become inward-looking and focus on themselves. He recommends the organisation of national communities according to the density of their settlement (ibid., 30-31):
The co-nationals inhabiting a parish or district would form a national community [Gemeinde], i.e. a corporation under public and private law with the power to issue decrees and levy taxes ... A territorially and culturally affiliated number of communities would form a national canton [Kreis] with corporate rights. The totality of the cantons would form the nation ... a legal entity under public and private law.

Renner proposes a politics of recognition, suggesting that the translation of nationalist demands into sober legal questions would de-politicise nationality: ‘He who seeks to solve the nationalities question must focus on the nations! They must be liberated from political constellations, from the necessity of political barter’ (ibid., 31).

Otto Bauer’s book *The Question of Nationality and Social Democracy* was published in 1907, and in a second edition in 1924. Bauer criticised theorists like Kautsky who argue that all nations are in principle the same, even if they use different languages. According to Bauer, such a view was adopted ‘from the bourgeois Enlightenment philosophy of humanity’, and can be found in many cosmopolitan ideas, even in some versions of socialism (Bauer 1924, 128). He argues these writers commit the error of viewing language in utilitarian terms, which ‘is based on the atomistic-individualistic conception of society, in which society appears as merely the sum of externally united individuals, and the nation therefore appears as merely the sum of those people united by external means, namely by language’ (Bauer 2000, 112). He argues that the individual is the product of the nation: ‘For us, however ... the nation is not a sum of individuals who enter into a relationship through a common language; rather, the individual is himself a product of the nation’ (ibid.). Bauer notes that Kautsky contested his definition: ‘The modern nation, Kautsky argues, must be understood not as a community of fate, culture, and character, but as a community of language’ (ibid.). Bauer responds to Kautsky’s criticism by highlighting cultural and historical factors in the development of nations: ‘[O]ne manifestation of this overall cultural differentiation is found in the sphere of language: after several centuries the vernaculars of the tribes, which once spoke a common language, have become distinctly differentiated’ (Bauer 2000, 13). Bauer further argues that ‘[t]he phonetic content of the vocabulary of each community of language reflects the way of life, the professional activity, and the social structure of by-gone generations’ (ibid., 15).

Austrian Social Democracy remained torn between the ethno-culturalist paradigm and its state-centred roots in the Enlightenment tradition. In response to nationalist conflicts in parliament, the party published its ‘Brünner Nationalities Programme’ (1899), offering a compromise that accommodated both Austrian-German and Bohemian-Czech demands. The declaration took as its starting point the premise that the ‘continuation of the national
conflict is one of those means which enables the ruling classes to secure its rule and to prevent any powerful articulation of the true interests of the people’ (Berchtold 1967, 144). It defined the national and language question as a matter of ‘cultural demands’, which were to be satisfied beyond bureaucratic centralism and feudal provincialisms (ibid., 144-45). By the turn of the century, the party was confronted with rising intra-party divisions along ethno-linguistic and provincial lines. This was part of a general trend towards provincialisation in Austrian politics. The Czecho-Slav Social Democratic Workers’ Party, founded in 1878, initially represented one section within the Austrian Social Democratic Party. In 1893, it expanded its autonomy before further federalisation was rejected in 1897. Although the Social Democrats celebrated their first major electoral success in general elections with 89 seats in 1907, their influence remained weak due to their division into five national sections. Otto Bauer warned his Czech-speaking comrades against ‘itinerant preachers of separatism’ and convinced the International Congress in Copenhagen to take a public stand. Kautsky ridiculed growing Czech-nationalist sentiments, stimulating Czech opposition to the Second International (Bollinger 2010, 55-64). The Czech Social Democratic Workers’ Party in Austria was eventually founded in May 1911 (Berchtold 1967, 28).

Nationalist Parties

At the turn of the century, nationalism entered an ‘ethnic and ‘racist’ phase, which was related to the theory of social Darwinism. One indicator of this development was the general anxiety that arose in the US and Great Britain after 1900 concerning the ‘awakening of race consciousness’ (Mazower 2013, 165). Their intellectual elites not only blamed ‘agitators’, but also developed academic responses such as the US-American Journal of Race Development in 1910, the year before the Universal Races Congress in London (ibid.). In Austria, Julius Krickl first formulated a new German nationalist stream in 1868, which resonated among university students in cities like Vienna, Salzburg and Graz (Fuchs 1949, 169). Its larger social base drew upon the petite bourgeoisie and artisanry, who feared economic decline (Haas 1981, 118-19). While liberals and the progressive left identified the central state as the vehicle for Austrian modernisation, the ‘young nationals’ began to propagate an anti-Austrian, ethnic German nationalism, illustrated by the declaration of the Young Germans in 1871 (quoted in Rumpler 1997, 452): ‘One political idea must be the guiding one within the state. In Austria, it cannot be the German, Czech, Polish, Slovenian and Welsh [Italian] at the same time. But neither can it be the so-called specifically Austrian
idea, because it lacks the indispensable foundation of the Austrian nation’. For the ‘Young Germans’ ethnic nationality had become linked to claims for exercising state power. The majority of Austria’s German-speaking population remained generally indifferent towards nationality, with some exceptions in linguistically mixed areas in Bohemia (Fuchs 1949, 171).

The first formation of a German nationalist party took place in 1885, under the leadership of the Carinthian secondary school teacher Otto Steinwender. He convinced some liberals to join the ‘German Club’, establishing a German national faction in parliament. Steinwender (1885, 8) argued that Austria’s German-speaking population was in imminent danger of becoming a politically oppressed minority as Slavs conquered the state. By the 1890s, the Alldeutsch movement had spread the narrative that ‘the Germans’ were a race independent from the Austrian state (Haider 1998, 150). The Vienna-born Georg Schönerer (1842-1921) was the leading figure of the radical alldeutsch movement, having been ‘infected’ by German nationalist and anti-Semitic ideology in student fraternities. Similar to Steinwender, who was a senior member in the student fraternity Silesia, Schönerer was active in the German national Libertas Vienna, as well as an honorary member of the Germania Innsbruck and the Teutonia Vienna. He played an important role in the separation of German nationalist student fraternities from conservative ones (Wladika 2005, 95-245). In 1885, Schönerer (1886, 98) gave a speech in which he distinguished his movement from the Christian Socials:

We now, gentlemen, view the Jews not as a question of religion; as such it must be certainly located in the middle ages. We instead say that the Jewish Question of the present and future is a question of race, tradition and culture; which is also how the Jews themselves understand the question … that the Jews want to form a very particular tribe [Stamm] for themselves, and confirms to us that they belong to an alien race, to a foreign nation.

In a statement of 1887 he expressed his opposition to voluntaristic liberal conceptions of nationality: ‘… the German-national-minded, which means those who are of the opinion that the Jew is always the Jew and remains so, and by using the German language, will not become a German’ (quoted in Haider 1998, 144). He frequently associated ‘the Jews’ with liberal cosmopolitanism, illustrated by the following statement: ‘[T]he Jewish influence has a de-nationalising effect and manipulates public opinion in the press’ (Schönerer 1892, 3-4).

For Czech nationalism, the period was marked by a political transformation. While the Old Czech movement was rather elitist and aristocratic, the new generation of the Young Czechs defined their politics as democratic. One of the political figures of the new nationalist generation was Tomáš Masaryk. He was born in South Moravia in 1850 as the
son of a German-speaking mother who married a Czech-speaker. Although from a poor family, Masaryk attended the elite Academic Gymnasium in Vienna before studying philosophy and classical philology at the University of Vienna. When in 1882 the government decided to split the University of Prague into German- and Czech-speaking faculties, Masaryk was appointed professor of philosophy in the Czech faculty. In 1891 he was elected to the Austrian parliament for the Young Czech Party. He resigned in 1893. In 1900, he founded the moderate Czech Popular Party (or Realist Party), which never gained significant support. In 1907 he re-entered Parliament with the support of the Social Democrats (Ersoy et al., 2010, 199). After the outbreak of WWI, Masaryk played a crucial role in the organisation of anti-Austrian Czech militias, before serving as the first president of Czechoslovakia.

Masaryk refined the Herderian topos of Slavic humanism by adding ‘a contemporary version of the Christian transcendental anchorage … [H]e understood Czech history as an evolution of moral and religious ideals which found its best expression in the fifteenth century “Czech Reformation” (Hussitism)’ (Ersoy et al. 2010, 201). His treatise ‘The Czech Question’ (1895) constructed a narrative that articulated all major civilizational achievements such as the Enlightenment, Josephinism and liberalism as products of Czech spiritual exceptionalism. ‘In a sense, the German, English, and French Enlightenment was a development and elaboration of the leading ideas of the Czech Reformation’ (Masaryk in ibid., 203). ‘The Czech movement … was basically progressive, enlightened, and free-thinking in the true sense of the word. Josephinism was the official expression for this ideology in the Austrian lands. Dobrovský, the leading figure of our revival, was himself a Josephinist as well as a Freemason’ (ibid., 204). Even in regard to the contemporary ‘social question’, Masaryk attempts to construct a linkage to the imagined ‘Czech nation’ across time: ‘But the social problem of our nation leads us back to the fifteenth century, for it was then that we first attempted to solve it and we did a poor job’ (ibid., 207).

Karel Kramář was an influential leader of the Young Czech Party who participated in the negotiations of the Bohemian Compromise and served as the Vice-President of the Austrian Parliament. He was a staunch supporter of the so-called Neo-Slavic movement, which promoted Slavic dominance in Austria through an alliance of Slavic nations (ÔBL 1969, 202-4). Unlike the ‘Austro-Slavic’ outlook of the Old Czechs, there was a tendency in the Young Czech movement to follow Havlíček’s Czech particularism, illustrated by his statement ‘Čech, né Slovan’, ‘Czech, not Slav’ (quoted in Bauer 1924, 447). The Young
Czech’s initial success in the parliamentary elections of 1891 was soon overshadowed by substantial losses.

Inspired by older Austro-Slavic ideas, Stjepan Radić, a Croatian-national intellectual, explored a vision of a future Austrian federation in his ‘Slavic Politics in the Habsburg Monarchy’ (1902). He outlined an anti-Hungarian reform plan that rested on two principles, which were both largely in line with the programme of the Austrian Christian Socials. First, the monarchy should be transformed into a federation of five states, in which nationalities enjoyed equal status: the ‘Alpine’ Austrian, the Hungarian, the Galician, the Croatian and the Czech units (Ersoy et al. 2010, 306). National minorities without their own federal units should be granted representation in local parliaments, and the Austrian parliament had the task of monitoring minority rights. Second, economic and military affairs should be partially centralised, drawing on a corporatist economic model inspired by Vogelsang (ibid., 304). Radić drew on Herder’s notion of Slavic traditions of peacefulness, which would contribute to Austria’s success as a bridge between the materialistic and individualistic ‘West’ and the fanatic and despotic ‘East’. Austria would declare its neutrality and become ‘the gigantic Switzerland of the three continents’ (Radić 1902, in Ersoy et al. 2010, 308).

As in Croatia, in Galicia too there was only little anti-Austrian sentiment. Aleksander Świętochowski, for instance, belonged to a group of Polish nationalist intellectuals who opposed religious spiritualism and propagated the modernisation of Polish society. Świętochowski’s ‘Political directives’ (1882) presents a positivistic vision of modernisation: ‘The well-being of all peoples, as we see it, is not dependent strictly on the nation’s strength and political sovereignty, but on its ability to participate in the universal civilization and to develop its own. We all know about nations that are entirely independent but at the same time half-dead, retarded in their progress, and by no means leading a joyous life’ (Świętochowski in Ersoy et al. 2010, 88). When Polish nationalism gained pace in the 1890s, many socialist figures tended to shift ideologically towards the Polish-nationalist camp. One example of this stream on the national Left is Józef Piłsudski, who published his treatise ‘On patriotism’ in 1902. His socialism was ‘characterized by a strong conviction about the necessity of restoring Polish independence’.

The essayist Ivan Cankar propagated a Slovene nationalism within the framework of a future, ‘federal Yugoslav republic’. Born in Ljubljana/Laibach into a broken and poor family, Cankar pursued technical studies and Slavic studies at the University of Vienna. In the elections of 1907, Cankar ran for the Slovenian Social Democrats and soon advocated an anti-Austrian, Slovenian nationalism, which landed him in prison. The lecture for which
he was detained was titled ‘The Slovenes and the Yugoslavs’ (1913), in which he paints a picture of Austria as an authoritarian force: ‘When the guns announced the grand Yugoslav night, our darling official Austria was reminded of the Yugoslav problem … First, it imprisoned some people in Carniola, Styria, and Dalmatia for high treason, then had several Serbian students beaten at the Vienna Graben, and finally declared paper war on Serbia and Montenegro’ (Cankar, in Ersoy et al. 2010, 245). He continues, ‘[f]or official Austria … the Yugoslavs are simply stumbling blocks on its way … so it obstructs their political, economic and cultural development wherever possible and as much as possible. Indeed, it is a bit strange that the state should hate a large part of its own citizens’ (ibid., 246).

The rise of ethnic and racial conceptions of nationality is reflected in the research of the Serbian social scientist Jovan Cvijić, who would later work as a Balkan expert for the Paris Peace Conference. Born in Loznica in West Serbia, he studied geography and geology at the University of Vienna between 1889 and 1893. During many years of fieldwork, he studied the ‘ethno geography’ and ‘ethno-psychology’ of the Balkans and became the first professor of Ethnology at Belgrade University. In his treatise ‘On National Work’ (O nacionalnom radu, 1907), he argued that parts of the Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman Empire represented Serbian ‘ethnic territory’: ‘Serbia is located in a central position in the ethnographical area of the Serbian nation, large parts of which lie in Austria-Hungary and Turkey … On account of our ethnographical position and importance, we are therefore a threat to Austria-Hungary’ (Cvijić, in Ersoy et al. 2010, 230). This section shows that although anti-Austrian sentiments among intellectuals were marginal before 1914, some had begun to link supposedly objective ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial facts’, which were expressed in reference to nationality, to political claims.

7.3.3. The Demand Side: Election Results

In the context of the crisis of liberalism and franchise extensions, the Austrian general elections between 1880 and 1911 serve as an indicator of political choices. This section will argue that the core of bourgeois support for liberalism found other political directions and fed into the rise of nationalist parties. The Austrian general elections of 1879 resulted in a political landslide, in which the liberal Constitutional Party lost 49 seats, while conservative parties celebrated a major victory. The Conservatives won 57 seats, the same number as the Polish Club. With the 54 seats of the Czech Club, the newly formed conservative-nationalist coalition gained more than 168 seats. The Liberal Club and the Progressive Club accounted together for more than 145 seats of the opposition (Sutter 1980, 210).
Taafe succeeded in organising a majority thanks to a number of legal amendments in 1879 and 1880 (Redlich 1928, 368). The coalition parties were led by the conservative leaders Clam-Martinic and Hohenwart, the Czech leader Rieger, and the Polish leader Grocholski, bringing together the anti-centralist interests of the landed nobility and province-based nationalists (ibid., 370). Significant elements of the German-speaking intelligentsia began to distance themselves from the preceding Austrian liberal generation, and to either reinterpret the tradition of ‘1848’ towards Radetzky’s and Grillparzer’s Habsburg conservatism, or the new German nationalism (Rumpler 1997, 454). Both movements distanced themselves from Austrian liberalism and its centralist/individualist model of state/society. The end of the liberal era resulted in growing fears of political and cultural decline among German-speaking bourgeois segments, reinforced by the perception of growing ‘Slavic’ self-consciousness. The fear of a Slavic bloc, dominating parliament, was one of the reasons for Austrian-liberal opposition to the occupation of Bosnia (Sutter 1980, 208).

The electoral reform of 1882 expanded suffrage to include the petite bourgeoisie and contributed to the formation of a multi-party system by reducing the tax requirement for suffrage from 10 to 5 Gulden. Together with progressive social policy, electoral reforms were to prevent the reorientation of artisans and small commerce to Liberals (Drobesch 2006, 1119-20). Many petit bourgeois groups joined neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives but instead supported new nationalist parties (Burger 1995, 84-5). Various bourgeois elements, including the old and the petite bourgeoisie, had begun to perceive liberalism and its affiliated ideas, norms and programmes as the causes of contemporary problems rather than as their solution. The electoral reform of 1882 had expanded the electorate in the cities by 34 per cent and that of rural municipalities by 26 per cent. This changed ‘national’ majorities in Bohemian chambers of trade that had been traditionally dominated by German speakers, for instance in Prague, Pilsen and Budweis. Franchise extensions put the Austrian liberal camp under pressure (Rumpler 1997, 489). In this context, the first step towards the establishment of a ‘German national’ political movement took place in 1882, with the foundation of the Deutschnationale Verein.
After the Liberals’ electoral defeat of 1885, both its political elites and social base re-orientated towards two new strands on the right, and subsequently, also towards a new reformist strand on the left (Rumpler 1997, 490-91). While the parliamentary faction of the German-Austrian Club continued to propagate the idea of an Austro-Hungarian monarchic state, the German Club adopted a German ethno-nationalist current. It was only in the 1890s that a new Sozialpolitische Partei was founded as a ‘social’ party of the liberal Left (Reinalter 1993, 47). This was too little, too late. Their ‘conception of an individualist, bourgeois society was predicated on peace, economic growth and a secular education creating a homogenous body of law-abiding, economically independent citizens … Yet the promise of a universal Bürgertum had not naturally evolved following the instalment of a comprehensive legal framework, universal education and capitalist economic freedom’ (Kwan 2013, 134-35). Liberals became ideologically even more radical, excluding rural and newly urban groups by intensifying their attacks on religious values.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, two decades after the end of the liberal era, it was still common for conservatives, clericals and nationalists to blame cosmopolitan, Austrian liberals for all types of contemporary problems, supposedly caused by the erosion of religious and national values (Malfer 2000, 37). However, in contrast to Prussia-Germany, in Austria, the establishment of an alliance between clerical conservative streams failed due to the rise of multiple populist nationalist parties, dividing the political actors on the right and on the left (Ucakar 1985, 186).

The general elections of 1891 were the last to take place under the regulation of four curiae, following the electoral reform of 1873 and its modification in 1882. It was for the last time that the great landowners were the dominant social class represented in parliament,
accounting for 139 of 353 MPs. Second came members of the bourgeoisie with 47 lawyers and solicitors, 43 teachers and professors, as well as 29 bureaucrats. Despite the old classification of the electorate, the trend towards nationalisation was already evident in the results.

Figure 36. Factions and Seats in the Austrian Parliament, 1891 [Ucakar 1985, 231]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German Liberals</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Clericals</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Socials</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German-Völkische (German nationalists)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Czechs</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Czechs</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohemian Feudal Great Landowners</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Parties</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenians</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal National Italians</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Clerical Italians</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenians</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>353</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Taaffe era was followed by the rise of anti-liberal mass parties (Berchtold 1967, 11-12). Facing pressures from provincial nationalists both within the government and from the opposition, the Badeni government took steps towards an electoral reform that added a fifth electoral group of ‘commons’ without a tax requirement, with 72 seats in the House of Delegates. Badeni’s electoral reform of 1896, which significantly changed the Schmerling system, extended the franchise and enhanced the representation of ‘national parties’, visible in the general elections of 1897. The remaining Liberals suffered a devastating defeat against Christian Socials, Social Democrats and German Nationalists. The continued differentiation of the political landscape was illustrated by the participation of 56 parties and the expansion of seats from 353 to 425. The Badeni reform had decreased the proportion of MPs representing a German-speaking constituency from two-thirds in 1873 to about 50 per cent. The success of the nationalist Young Czech Party, which achieved 63 mandates, was consequential as the elitist Old Czech Party finally lost its influence on the state level (Ucakar 1985, 271).

Figure 37. Factions and seats in the Austrian Parliament, 1897 [Ucakar 1985, 271]
On the basis of the data provided by the tables on factions in parliament, two interrelated trends become apparent: first, an ideological differentiation of the party system, which dissolved larger ‘blocs’ on the left and the right into largely monolingual, national and nationalist parties; and second, a tendency of strengthening party formation on the ethno-nationalist ‘right’, and a decline of the progressive, rather universalist or internationalist ‘left’. The elections of 1901 generally confirmed the results from 1897 and the continual multinational fragmentation of the political landscape.

Figure 38. Factions and seats in the Austrian Parliament, 1901 [Ucakar 1985, 276]
The general elections of 1907 were the first to proceed according to the new electoral law, which introduced free and equal, direct male suffrage. The extension of the franchise was accompanied by the expansion of seats from 425 to 516. A rising political camp represented the Agrarians, who in 1907 accounted for 273 delegates in total as the Freie agrarische Vereinigung on the state and provincial level. They represented Bohemian and Moravian conservative agrarian interests and supported protectionist economic policies. They remained distanced to the economic liberal principles of a capitalist market economy and were supporters of the Austrian central state. Even when Young Czech MPs obstructed the Austrian parliament, the Bohemian Agrarians, who counted 30 MPs in Vienna, backed the government in explicit opposition to Czech nationalist MPs (Drobesch 2006, 1076).

Figure 39. Factions and seats in the Austrian Parliament, 1907 [Ucakar 1985, 362]
The last general elections of 1911 were followed by labour riots, crushed by police intervention. Although several of the protesters died, the Social Democrats continued their reformist politics, weakened by the separation of its Czech-speaking wing in 1911 (Ucakar 1985, 364). The Austrian election results between 1880 and 1911 indicate the growing, if volatile, electoral success of nationalist parties and a general trend towards the multinational fragmentation of the party system. Its consequence was a weakening of the ‘Austrian’ centre-left and centre-right parties, which had the potential to develop their organisational network across Cisleithania.

Figure 40. Factions and seats in the Austrian Parliament, 1911 [Ucakar 1985, 363]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian Socials and Centre Club</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats (national clubs)</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German National Association (German People’s Party and German Agrarians)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Progressive Union</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Radical Union</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All-Germans (Schönerians)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohemian Agrarians</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohemian Club (Young Czechs)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic National Club (Bohemian Clericals)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohemian Nationalists</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Club</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish People’s Party</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenian Club</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Slavs and Slovenians</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Club</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>516</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to Cisleithania also in Hungary the growing electoral success of nationalist parties, especially of the Hungarian-Magyar opposition, challenged the status quo. ‘Unlike
the “old” conservatives, whose opposition to the 1867 liberals was founded not on a general rejection of a liberal transformation ... neoconservatives repudiated the entire process of liberal transformation’ (Kovács 1994, 26). This new nationalist opposition adopted the view that the primary vehicle of modernisation was the nationalising state. The societal fragmentations and cleavages that were caused by liberal capitalism, unchecked freedoms and competition were to be overcome through state extension and ‘a new regimentation of society’ (Kovács 1994, 31).

For the non-Magyar-speaking population the dualist political structure set the conditions for a lack of representation, which is reflected in the elections results of the Hungarian parliament. With the exception of Croatia-Slavonia, which enjoyed a special constitutional status, the previously non-Hungarian territories such as Transylvania or Saxon entities were gradually integrated into ‘proper Hungary’. Consequently, the Croatian Sabor in Zagreb was the only remaining provincial representative assembly. Although dominated by the so-called Serb-Croat Coalition that was unified by the demand for full Croatian autonomy and Trialism it remained contained by Budapest (Pleterski 2002, 124-25).

Figure 41. Seats in the Hungarian Parliament 1905, 1906, 1910 [Zsuppán 2002, 104]
One response to the crisis of liberalism was the foundation of the Catholic People’s Party in 1895 (Kovács 1994, 26). Numerous critics of political and economic liberalism, coming from camps across the political spectrum, articulated the narrative that ‘liberal reform had destroyed the old fabric of social solidarity without replacing it with an alternate “social organism”’ (ibid., 27). There followed a governmental change towards etatism and a reinforced state doctrine of national integration. In his program speech in January 1895, Prime Minister Dezső Bánffy ‘proudly called himself a chauvinist, set up a special department to analyze the “nationality question” and ordered the lord lieutnants to keep an eye on the local non-Magyar national activists’ (Varga 2016, 15). He expressed his conviction that this problem was merely an outcome ‘of some Russia- and Romania-backed troublemakers’ and ‘could be solved by isolating them’ (ibid.). Although the rise of illiberal Magyar nationalism, besides manipulations and gerrymandering, explains the rise of the Independence Party, there was also continuity. All Hungarian governments since
1895 promoted Magyarization and transformative infrastructure projects such as one launched in northeast Hungary and one in Transylvania.

7.3.4. Civic Associations Linking Supply and Demand

This section shows how political actors began to organise social life within civil society. The respective associations, which enjoyed certain freedoms due to their formally ‘non-political’ legal status, claimed to represent ‘moral’ issues of nation, class and confession (Hye 2006, 148). At university, Austrian patriotic student associations dissolved and were gradually replaced by German nationalist associations (Drobesch 2006, 1099). Teachers from Austrian secondary schools remained initially organised in the Imperial Association of Austrian Middle School Teachers (*Reichsverband der österreichischen Mittelschullehrer*, 1905). In 1911 the latter included 22 regional branches, comprising fourteen German, one Czech, one Polish, one Italian, one Slovene, two Ruthenian, one Serbo-Croat and one Romanian association, counting 8.000 members. In the wake of the escalating tensions between Czech and German nationalists this ‘Austrian’ association was eventually replaced by nationalist variants (Drobesch 2006, 1097). Similar to the differentiation process among political parties, civil society became increasingly segregated along linguistic lines.

**Christian Social Associations**

In the 1880s, the emergent Christian Social movement began to establish links with artisan associations. Using its network of affiliated associations and clubs, it spread its anti-liberal and anti-Semitic ideology among the Viennese and Lower Austrian bourgeoisie (Hye 2006, 193). This focus on the representation of economic interests was reflected in the foundation of the *Christlich-soziale Verein* (1887) in Vienna, which lobbied for commercial reforms. It represented the organisational nucleus of the Christian Social movement, which drew on *mittelständischen* anti-capitalism and anti-Semitism. It was opposed to the liberal *Freie Gewerkschaften*, which propagated industrialism and rejected state intervention (Drobesch 2006, 1109). The protagonists of this association became the leading cadres of the Christian Social Party, including Karl Vogelsang and Karl Lueger. After small commerce lost influence with the electoral reform of 1907, Lueger initiated the foundation of the German-Austrian Commercial Association in 1908. With these two formally ‘non-political’ associations, the party targeted the German-speaking commercial bourgeoisie, propagating ‘commercial protectionism’ (Drobesch 2006, 1110).

Beside its focus on the commercial middle class, the Catholic movement began to appeal to German-speaking workers through the *Christlichsoziale Arbeiterverein*, founded
by Leopold Kunschak in 1892. It was complemented by various other regional Catholic workers associations, which were organised in 1902 within the Imperial Union of non-political associations of Christian Workers of Austria (Reichsverband der nichtpolitischen Vereinigungen christlicher Arbeiter Österreichs). Similar to the Christian Labour Union of Austria (Christlicher Gewerkschaftsverband Österreichs, 1909) these workers’ associations gained only limited influence within the party but enhanced the capacity of the Christian Socials for their ‘cultural mission’ to protect Austria as a Catholic state and society (ibid., 1115).

At the third Austrian Catholic Day 1889, demands for an ideological struggle against liberalism were formulated and materialised in the foundation of the Österreichischer Verein christlicher Gelehrter und Freunde der Wissenschaft. Its president, Joseph Helfert, established three different sections that were intended to produce publications in the fields of the historical, societal and legal sciences (Drobesch 2006, 1107). The aim was to struggle ideologically against materialism and anti-clericalism among liberals and socialists. In 1891 the Cartellverband was founded as the Catholic association of university students. The Catholic Teacher’s Association for Austria was founded in 1893, followed by the Club of the Christian Press, and the Club of Catholic Writers two years later. In the 1890s, Christian Social associations penetrated all domains of social life including entertainment, sports associations and provident societies (Hye 2006, 195). The movement’s comprehensive approach to political struggle was further reflected in Karl Lueger’s slogan at the sixth Austrian Catholic Day, when proclaiming the ‘Christian Social conquest of the University’ (Drobesch 2006, 1108). In 1907, Raimund Fürlinger published a guide that explained how to establish and run ‘non-political’ clubs for the working class. The author notes that such workers’ associations were necessary to ‘defend the highest goods of humanity - religion, family and freedom’ (Hye 2006, 195). In the provinces, the Christian Social movement began to establish agrarian associations, most famously the Bauernbünde (Drobesch 2006, 1116). Around 1900, the Catholic organisations in the provinces were at times able to mobilise against anti-clerical forces such as German nationalists and Austrian liberals across Cisleithania (ibid., 1116-17).

After 1910, as a result of national separation, the capacity of the Catholic movement on the Austrian state level ceded substantially. Eventually, the Czech, Slovenian, Croat and Italian dioceses declined to support a common ‘Austrian’ Catholic movement (Drobesch 2006, 1117). This multinational segregation process is also reflected in the abandonment of the traditional ‘Austrian Catholic Day’, in which representatives of all provinces and
linguistic groups participated. It took place for the last time in 1910, before it was replaced by separate ‘national Catholic days’ (ibid., 1098). A new German nationalist strand of Catholicism was reflected in the foundation of the Ostmark - Bund deutscher Österreicher in 1909 (ibid.). The common denominator of the new Catholic nationalist movements was an anti-Austrian-liberal position (ibid., 1100). In many provinces, new conservative Catholic parties were being founded that focussed exclusively on the province and the respective regional vernacular under the rubric of nationality. They began to establish officially non-political Catholic associations in order to increase their organisational capacity for elections. In 1894, the ‘Christian Social Party for Bohemia and Moravia’ was founded. Affiliated organisations included the ‘Catholic Association of Czech Farmers in Moravia, Silesia and Lower Austria’, a corresponding Christian Social Youth Organisation, the gymnastics association ‘Orel’ and the ‘Labour Union of the Christian-Social Workers in the Kingdom of Bohemia’ that counted 76,140 members in 1907 (ibid., 1118). In the southern provinces, a Slovenian Catholic Party was founded, the All-Slovenian People’s Party (Vseslovenska ljudska stranka, 1909), which had connections with the Cooperative Union (Zadružna zveza, 1900), the South-Slav Trade Association (Jugoslovanska strokovna zveza, 1909), and the Slovene-Catholic Workers Association, which counted 43,229 members in 1911. A similar network of Catholic political parties and affiliated civil society associations developed in the Polish-speaking areas (ibid., 1118).

The process of ‘national’ differentiation, with largely monolingual associations as its result, reached a next stage in which associations were incorporated into larger ‘national unions’. This is illustrated by the case of the Christian Social movement, which established organisational networks within the German-speaking areas of the monarchy. In the case of Czech-speaking areas, the Catholic Journeymen Club (Jednota katolických tovaryšů) and the Jednota sv. Methodieje were founded as exclusively Czech-speaking associations (Drobesch 2006, 1111). The ‘Slovene Christian-Social Association’, the ‘Slovene Workers Building Cooperative’ (Slovensko delavsko stavbeno društvo) and ‘Trade Association’ (Gospodarska zveza) were founded as non-political associations of the Slovene-speaking Christian Social movement (ibid.). In the case of the Polish-speaking areas, the Association of Catholic Labour Unions (Zwiazek stowarzyszeń robotniczych katolickich) was founded in 1897, followed by the Catholic National Party, after the Christian People’s Party (Stronnictwo Chrześciańsko-Ludowe) had been founded a year earlier (ibid., 1112).

Social Democratic Associations
A similar process of national differentiation can be observed in the case of the Social Democratic movement, whose capacity to establish affiliated associations across Cisleithania superseded that of the Christian Socials. One reason for its successful appeal to larger social strata was its agenda of franchise extension. In 1888/89 this denominator contributed to cohesion among its various national branches, in mutual opposition to the anti-democratic forces of the great landowners, the Church and the military (Hanisch/Urbanitsch 2006, 87). The limitations of Austrian parliamentarism forced Social Democrats to focus on aspects of political struggle outside of party politics (Ardelt 1994, 54-74). Through a web of legally non-political social democratic associations, organising leisure activities, gymnastics, adult education, children’s day-care, and cultural activities, the party aimed at increasing its organisational capacity beyond linguistic divisions (Drobesch 2006, 1124). The goal was to create a social democratic sociological milieu by forging and spreading an anti-bourgeois and anti-Catholic worldview. Its educational association of the ‘Free School’, which agitated for agnostic education, counted 17,000 members in 1914 (ibid., 1125).

Although the majority of the movement’s intellectual cadres were German-speaking, the German-language publications of its Bohemian associations frequently carried advertisements for Czech-speaking groups. The libraries of the Bohemian party organisation, which was run in German, possessed numerous books and publications written in the Czech language. Even the pubs in which Bohemian Social Democratic workers met usually subscribed to publications in both languages (Bahm 1998, 26, Fn.18). Until the late 1880s, legislation prevented the organisation of workers associations at the state level. The reforms of the Taaffe government supported the rapid expansion of workers associations that were officially ‘non-political’ (Drobesch 2006, 1120). It was only at the turn of the century that the establishment of workers associations at the Austrian state level was legalised. In 1893, the Imperial Labour Union Commission was centralised with the aim to promote the development of ‘organised capitalism’ (Hanisch/Urbanitsch 2006, 90).

The gradual decline of multilingual practices coincided with a massive surge in societal organisation in the 1890s. The election year of 1897 illustrated the mobilising capacity of the Austrian Social Democratic Workers’ Party in Bohemia, where it won almost 40 per cent of the fifth curia, while the Young Czechs garnered the remaining 60 per cent (Bahm 1998, 23). In the same year, the attempt to overcome the German-Czech antagonism via the centralisation of the Labour Union and the Austrian Left failed. The nationalist conflict reached the Labour Union and subsequently also the Social Democratic Party. It culminated
in the nationalist struggle of Czech-speaking Union activists in Prague 1897, after the Austrian Social Democratic Labour Association had rejected a proposal of reorganisation on the basis of ‘national’ divisions. This conflict triggered the erosion of the ‘Imperial Labour Union Commission’, which comprised 51 central and 78 provincial clubs with more than 482,279 members in 1908, its last year of existence (Drobesch 2006, 1120-21).

Most of its previous Czech-speaking clubs had joined the autonomous ‘Czechoslovak Labour Union’, which counted 103,000 members in 1913. This multinational fragmentation of the Austrian Left was followed by an internal fragmentation of Czech-speaking workers with the newly founded ‘Political Club of Catholic Workers’ and the nationalist-social Česká obec dělnická. The latter increased its members from 7,700 in 1902 to 77,000 in 1913 (ibid., 1121). Similar to the Czech-speaking Social Democratic sports association Dělnické tělocvičné jednoty, such associations were founded by Italian Social Democrats in Trieste, and by Slovene, Polish and Ruthenian Social Democrats in their respective provinces (ibid., 1125). In contrast to the increasingly nationalistic stance of Polish, Ruthenian and Jewish social democratic parties, which began to develop ties with co-nationals outside the monarchy, the Slovene example under Etbin Kristan and its Italian counterpart based in Trieste under Angelo Vivante, focused on the reformation of the state (Hanisch/Urbanitsch 2006, 90).

The noted ‘national’ segregation process is illustrated by the case of Wenzel Holek, who was born in 1860 into a Czech-speaking family in northern Bohemia. In the early years of his life he spoke both Czech and German regularly, including with his friends. Engaged in the Social Democratic Workers’ movement, Holek was initially a member of various German- and Czech-speaking Social Democratic associations and clubs in Bohemia such as the Ústí nad Labem, the Czech workers’ club Polaban, the German-dominated Arbeiterbildungsverein, the Czech educational association Svornost and the German-Bohemian Social Democratic Party (Bahm 1998, 25). The Austrian Social Democratic movement traditionally had an intrinsically ‘German’ language dimension, ‘rooted in German concepts of education (Bildung) and the emancipatory ideals of 1848’ (ibid.). By the turn of the century, Wenzel had become assimilated into a German-speaking societal culture. Although Wenzel’s son Heinrich grew up within a German-speaking family, for Heinrich ‘a Czech national identity was much more a self-evident and seemingly primordial fact’, illustrated by his passion for Czech nationalist literature (ibid., 31).

**Nationalist Associations**
The German national movement was not able to develop close associational networks. Its social base was heterogeneous, including small commerce, petit bourgeois and agrarian elements. This was also true of the radical nationalist associations of various other ‘nationalities’, which rarely, as in the case of nationalist school associations or the Czech-nationalist Sokol gymnastics movement, garnered a mass following. Ideologically and programmatically these often internally contested nationalist camps were very diverse, reaching from German-Austrian, Great-German to alldeutsch-racist in the German case, from Austro-Slavic, Austro-federalist to all-Slavic anti-Habsburg in the Slavic case, and from national-liberal to irredentist nationalism in the Italian case (Drobesch 2006, 1126).

German nationalists viewed the officially ‘non-political’ German School Association as the more important organisation than the marginal alldeutsch movement (Hye 2006, 191-92). German nationalist associations remained distanced to workers, before initiating efforts to approach factory workers in response to newly founded Czech-speaking labour associations. The ‘Imperial League of German Workers Germania for Bohemia and Moravia’ was founded in 1899, followed by the ‘Association of German private employees’ (Verband deutscher Privatbeamter) and the ‘German-Austrian teachers’ Union’ (ibid., 1126). A new ideological approach that combined German nationalist with socialist ideas aimed at the opening towards German-speaking labour by attacking liberalism and capitalism. The national and social programme was propagated by the ‘German Workers’ Union Germania’ (1900). In 1908, the union of the ‘Central Commission of German Employee Associations’ was established, appealing to railway workers, miners, textile and rural workers from the Bohemian lands, who perceived Czech-speakers as competitors. From this movement emerged the German Workers’ Party, which was a radical right-wing party. Similarly, the Czech National Social Party promoted a programme of ‘national socialism’ (Drobesch 2006, 1127-28).

The restructuring of Austria’s political landscape after 1879 paved the way for the development of ‘Jewish’ civil associations. After the erosion of the Austrian liberal camp and the rise of anti-Semitism, many Jews noticed that they had previously forgotten about their Jewishness (Hanisch/Urbanitsch 2006, 59). Some found a new political home in the Austrian Social Democratic Workers’ Party led by Victor Adler (ibid., 86-87), others in Slavic nationalist parties (Drobesch 2006, 1084), or in Galicia, in Socialist or newly founded Jewish nationalist parties (Shanes 2012, 291-92). Although many Jewish Austrians initially identified with the liberal ideal of a German-speaking middle-class society, their alienation contributed to their engagement in nationalist associations. Some Jewish
nationalists founded associations to organise ‘Jewish’ national life collectively (ibid., 167-82).

Paradoxically, it was often politicians who founded officially ‘non-political’ associations. The German School Association was established by leading functionaries of the Klub der Deutschen Fortschrittpartei, and the second largest association, Südmark, was founded by MPs of German nationalist parties. The Bohemian-Czech Ústrední Matice školská was founded by the leader of the Old Czech Party František Rieger, and the Italian nationalist school association Pro Patria was founded by the irredentist mayor of Rovereto, Augusto Sartorelli (Drobesch 2006, 1101-3). Although the Ministry of the Interior clarified that such educational associations were not legally allowed to engage in activities of a ‘political nature’, only a few extremist organisations were banned. The Imperial Court tended to decide in favour of nationalist associations and against the arguments of the Ministry, which interpreted many of their activities as anti-patriotic agitation and as undermining the state (ibid., 1103-4).

7.4. Nation-Building Processes in the Era of State Extension

In the late nineteenth century industrialisation and urbanisation contributed to a ‘process of disembedding of individuals from the social contexts in which they had grown up’ (Wagner 1993, 58). In the wake of the crisis of liberalism, this ‘created widespread uncertainty among those who were disembedded about their individual fate and about their place in society’ (ibid.). Responses were marked by ‘organised practices’, where ‘decision-making about collective arrangements was made in and between the organisations by leaders’ (ibid., 68). Although state extension generally increased political legitimacy on the basis of what Huntington (1991, 16) called ‘national democracy’, it seemed to have undermined the Habsburg monarchy’s ideological base. The particular pattern of Austrian political modernisation had two interrelated consequences in this respect. Its federalist political structure and dynastic government system contributed to a growing fiscal crisis. Second, the regime’s politics of recognition set the conditions for a political crisis, which was fed by political cultural and ideological factors, identified as provincialisation and populist nationalism.

7.4.1. Bureaucratic Rule and Provincialising Political Structures

The inclusion of the population by means of massive state extension set the parameters for collective involvement in literary culture, commerce, military and politics. The
following statement of the Minister of Trade (1900-5) illustrates Austrian neo-corporatism in the post-liberal era (quoted in Tálos/Kittel 1996, 25):

The negotiations will be of particular value, if they are led in the spirit from which had arisen the Joint Labor Board and if they succeed, far off the playgrounds of party slogans, in considering evenly and - with that - in uniting the legitimate interests of all factors in domestic production. Propositions and desires for the improvement of social conditions that are agreed upon by representatives of the entrepreneurs and the workers ... will, by their own weight, influence efficiently the legislative and administrative apparatus.

Austria’s political system was characterised by the growing participation of the population on the state level of the parliament, as well as on the local level of ‘autonomous administrations’ (Hye 1998, 196). ‘[T]he era is known as a transitional one, from municipal government as the administration of property to the administration of services’, as the government assigned ever more tasks to municipalities such as the carrying out of the census, the administration of elections, and an increasing number of ‘statistical-administrative matters’ (King 2011, 100-1). Population growth and internal migration from rural peripheries to urban centres contributed to new social demands, making regime response difficult but more important.

Taaffe explained that Austrian government functioned differently from that of other states, arguing that the ‘diversity of Austria’s constitutive parts required a softened engagement’, and that ‘Austria was in truth a continual compromise’ (quoted in Rumpler 1997, 487). The dual-track administrative system, ‘which featured the imperial administration sharing executive power and jurisdictions with politically controlled autonomous bureaucracies of the cities and provinces, made for a constant political struggle’ (Deak 2015, 187). Austrian federalism implied that ‘[e]lected representatives who sat on two councils, crownland executive boards, and in the parliament hoped to preserve their own autonomy and make their basis of power stronger and more vibrant, but could only do so with the help of the central state’ (Deak 2015, 209).

Lindström (2008 10-11) identifies the roots of the regime’s lack of ‘political leadership’ in the intensification of ‘bureaucratic rule’, drawing predominantly on rational and legal authority. Consequently, ‘the bureaucracy was increasingly enmeshed in parliamentary politics, often negotiating with political parties, nationalist groups, and power brokers to keep government functioning while parliament itself was not’ (Deak 2015, 216). The interrelated consequences of ‘bureaucratic rule’ were the regime’s lack of political leadership, growing fiscal problems, and forms of provincialisation. A correlation becomes apparent between democratisation, growing expenses on the local and provincial level, and
local forms of nation-building. In the 1850s and 1860s, fiscal problems had been addressed through administrative state reforms that ‘intended autonomous municipalities, crownlands, and the parliament to create institutions and manage funds that shared the financial burden of administering the state’ (ibid., 211). Welfare state expansion after 1879 represented a regime strategy to institutionally absorb popular discontent. Confronted with expanding electorates, ‘crownlands set up special funds to pay for all kinds of new programs and institutions for the public good: sanatoriums, orphanages, care of the poor, public buildings and roads, public health and inoculation programs, promotion and improvement of crownland agriculture, and - drawing the largest share of any crownland’s budget - public education’ (ibid. 228). Between 1862 and 1905, the expenditures of the provinces increased twenty times (ibid.):

The percentage that the crownlands spent on the maintenance of their own administrative apparatus fell from 28 percent of the total expenditure in 1862 (that included the salaries for an ever-increasing number of bureaucrats) to only 4 per cent by 1904. In the same year, however, the crownlands spent over 41 percent of their income on public education and the promotion of crownland ‘Kultur’.

In 1910, the public expenditures of the Bukovina exceeded its budget by 46 per cent, that of Moravia exceeded it by 35 per cent, and Bohemia and Galicia exceeded their budget by 23 per cent each (ibid.). Austria’s ill-designed fiscal system illustrates the failure to modernise the state structurally.

The case of Bohemia illustrates how ‘national conflict’ contributed to economic and political crises. When the Minister-Präsident proposed a reform in Bohemia to end the obstruction of the German-speaking MPs in the diet, the Bohemian-Czech ministers Fiedler and Prášek resigned in October 1908, leading to the fall of the government. In December 1910 and January 1911, new negotiations to resolve the conflict failed. While some German-Bohemian politicians proposed the political, administrative and economic division of Bohemia into homogenous ‘Czech’ and ‘German’ districts, bringing the principle of ‘national autonomy’ to its conclusion, this was fiercely rejected by Bohemian-Czech nationalists, defending the unity of their ‘historical kingdom’ (ibid., 202-3). In June 1912, negotiations to resolve the Bohemian obstruction were quite advanced, before the conflict escalated again due to the question of the official language of administration in Prague. The Austrian government pushed for the suspension of the Bohemian constitution, which was decreed by the Emperor in July 1913. Karl Stürgkh, who had become Minister-Präsident in 1911, responded to the crisis of parliamentarism with an authoritarian course, deepening the confrontation between ‘Vienna’ and various nationalist parties. On 26 July 1913, the emperor closed down the diet because Bohemia was bankrupt (Albrecht 2002, 86). This
political crisis culminated in a state crisis on 16 March 1914 when Stürgkh proclaimed the closure of the Austrian parliament.

Although the regime promoted state extension and devolution to gain legitimacy, it exacerbated Austria’s ambiguity towards the model of national democracy. By expanding social welfare and channelling new services to citizens on the level of provinces and municipalities, the government empowered nationalist actors who enjoyed growing degrees of autonomy and resources. Although the central state recruited increasingly from the expanding bourgeoisie, the political influence of the landed nobility increased. The Moravian Compromise of 1905, for instance, established three houses in the diet, ‘representing the aristocracy, the Germans and the Czechs’, which strengthened the position of aristocratic and middle-class elites (ibid., 86). In parliament, most of the seats in the House of Lords, ‘which had veto power over actions of the lower house, were reserved for noblemen’, which were also significantly represented in the House of Delegates (Blum 1978, 420). Further, the undemocratic nature of the municipal franchise backed right-wing parties.

Being in charge of public welfare on the local level, nationalist actors could translate their articulations of ‘national interests’ into materialised gains for the population, seemingly confirming their antagonistic framing of centre-periphery relations. Industrialisation, population growth and urbanisation led to new economic sectors and new resources for collective identities. ‘Accordingly, traditional rhetoric, public policy, constitutional rules, and sources of taxation - in short, the means of articulation with their existing content - become less relevant, making the constituents of existing blocs available for recruitment’ (Leon et al. 2015, 30). The ascending nationalist frame of conflicts can be explained in the context of democratisation, when the competition for convincing articulations of contemporary problems increased radically. Political actors attempted to ‘forge unity in diversity’ through practices that reinforced identifications with signifiers such as ‘confession’, ‘class’ or ‘nation’ (ibid., 27). The domains in which political articulatory practices took place were manifold, ranging from meetings of sport clubs to parliamentary speeches or the publication of party programmes. ‘It is frequently the incessant “suturing” activity of parties in cultural, parliamentary, and non-parliamentary arenas that “holds” class, religious, sexual, and ethnic formations together and refashions them as constitutive elements of hegemony’ (ibid.). Austria’s political crisis was essentially about the politics of representation in the post-liberal era, something that became articulated in public discourse as ‘national conflicts’.
‘National’ representations of collective interests were consequential, as the traditional political actors of the Austrian state, usually conservative bureaucrats, were not able to engage in this political game. Although the two ‘Austrian parties’, at centre-left and centre-right, were ready to engage in a politics of representation, they lacked a party apparatus and adequate political system on the state-level. Since the 1890s, many of the previously province-based nationalisms had become increasingly ethno-linguistic. In Bohemia, for instance, a break was perceptible between the conservative Old Czechs and the radical Young Czechs. A similar shift took place within the spectrum of German-speaking parties, as Schönerer’s *Alldeutsch* movement propagated a racial definition of the nation. The dissolution of the ‘Young Slovene’ liberal faction in the 1880s, which in the 1870s had still declined to support the conservative Hohenwart Club, which was joined by Catholic-conservative Slovene nationalist MPs, illustrates how little space was left for liberal actors (Judson 2016, 300). Despite the growing capacities of nationalist parties, they were unable to form inclusive societal coalitions. With the introduction of universal male suffrage the societal differentiation of the Slavic population, for instance, was reflected in the level of political representation (Höbelt 2009, 111).

On the municipal level, majoritarian electoral systems favoured the nationalisation of politics. Nationalist parties promoted the nationalisation of municipalities, ‘in German and Czech senses simultaneously’, but also in the Polish, Ukrainian, Italian, and Slovene cases (King 2011, 109). ‘Contributing to this trend was the fact that the rules of the municipal political game favored national actors considerably, Habsburg actors to some degree, and others not at all’ (ibid.). Whereas in linguistically homogeneous municipalities, ‘nationalization of the ethnic sort that came to prevail in Austria generally meant that only one national movement fielded candidates’, in bilingual municipalities, ‘the parties within each national system frequently formed an electoral coalition’ (ibid., 105). Although imperial authorities frequently instructed municipal administrations to steer clear of nationalist discrimination, in practice, political leaders ‘hired clerks, police officers, inspectors, engineers, public health officials, janitors, and other workers on the basis of national loyalties’ and ‘discriminated in awarding charity, public contracts, and business licenses’ (ibid., 107). The Prague municipality, for instance, decided ‘to make all street signs monolingually Czech and to declare the Czech names official proper nouns whose use was required even in the German language’ (King 2011, 106). Nationalist competition began to penetrate all realms of social life including local associations, the labour market, and shopping (King 2003, 48). For instance, the ‘German-bourgeois’ brewery *Budweiser*
Bürgerbräu, which had been founded in 1795 and exported to Germany and the United States, became challenged by Czech-speaking brewers, who founded an alternative ‘Czech-national’ beer in 1895, the Budějovický Budvar.

The multinational and provincial fragmentation of political culture was also reflected in the evolution of Austrian military culture. The state’s attempt to exercise control over veteran associations triggered an oppositional response, articulated by nationalist actors as from below opposition against top-down ‘German’ centralisation. The links of veteran associations to the state made them targets for oppositional groups (Cole 2014, 311):

In certain instances, military culture sharpened national antagonisms, particularly between Italians and Slavs (Slovenes and Croats) in Trieste and Istria, and also between Germans and Czechs in Bohemia. Yet, elsewhere, military culture functioned as a dividing line within national groups ... because there were both pro- and anti-military constituencies - loyalists and antimilitarists - among Czechs ('old veterans' against Sokols) and Germans (Christian Socials versus Social Democrats) too.

Nationalist obstruction of parliaments and the regime’s retreat to bureaucratic rule, undermining political leadership and a politics of representation, were ultimately of mutual reinforcement. Bureaucratic rule advanced the conditions in which nationalist actors could express opposition to the status quo, feeding the crisis of parliamentarism. The lack of political leadership is illustrated by the fact that while Taaffe was Minister-Präsident for 14 years (1879-1893), the following 23 years saw twelve governments, headed by eleven different leaders.15 It is telling that Karl Stuergkh, who governed from 1911, came from the camp of the great landowners and suspended the Austrian parliament in 1914, before the Social Democrat Friedrich Adler assassinated him in 1916. Bureaucratic rule thwarted the empowerment of a potentially dominant political actor and maintained Austria’s traditional government system with the emperor as the political key figure.

7.4.2. The Articulation of National Questions Between Reaffirmation of Empire and Separatist Opposition

Austrian parliamentarism was suffering from a crisis that can be analysed in reference to mechanisms of representation. The sections above have identified both structural and cultural political factors. Ideologically, it was the ‘populist function’ of nationalism and corresponding articulations of antagonisms that undermined the legitimacy of the political centre, associated with the status quo. Nationalism is a phenomenon of political modernisation, which is in its ‘statist function’ often latent and forgotten, while appearing

15 Alfred August Windisch-Graetz (1893-95), Erich Kielmansegg (1895), Kasimir Felix Badeni (1895-97), Franz Thun and Hohenstein (1898-99), Manfred Clary Aldringen (1899), Ernst Koerber (1900-05), Paul Gautsch Frankenthurn (1905-06 and 1911), Konrad Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst (1906), Max Wladimir Beck (1906-1908), Richard Bienerth-Schmerling (1908-1911), Karl Stuergkh (1911-1916).
noisy or aggressive in its ‘populist function’, which becomes visible in moments of conflict, feeding affective feelings of belonging. Under the noted structural and cultural political conditions, the development of an Austrian statist political actor appeared difficult. ‘The specific Austrian lack of any kind of nationalism linked with the concept of Austria became a significant factor for the development of a specific Austrian political culture. And the secularized version of anti-Semitism became an important part of that peculiar political culture based on non-Austrian identities’ (Pelinka 2001, 66). The lack of statist Austrian nationalism provided space for various ethnic nationalisms that appealed to the populist function of nationalism.

After the end of the Taaffe era, the so-called ‘Bohemian Question’ began to dominate Austrian politics and ‘national questions’ served as catalysts for anti-status quo populism. The Badeni crisis of 1897 led to the suspension of the government in June before it was reconvened in September. During the summer, Czech and German nationalist camps engaged in campaigns to mobilise their supporters (Albrecht 2002, 81-82):

Demonstrations, economic boycotts and street violence were common throughout the remainder of 1897. Efforts to pass … the joint budget in the autumn of 1897 failed because of continued parliamentary obstruction, which escalated to the point of violence in November … Demonstrators in Vienna called upon Badeni to resign, which he did in late November. In response, the Czech public initiated its own counter-demonstrations in Prague and other cities in Bohemia, which led to the imposition of martial law in Prague in December.

These polarising events had three major effects on Austrian society. First, the Austrian parliament lost much of its legitimacy. Second, economic boycotts damaged traditional commercial relationships between Czechs and Germans and led to a climate of social pressure and hostility (ibid., 82). A third consequence was the radicalisation of both national camps, contributing ‘to an increase in the strength and number of overtly nationalist parties’ as well as the radicalisation of ‘both their tactics and their demands’ (ibid., 83). In the context of the Badeni crisis, German-nationalist actors translated expressions of ethno-German solidarity across provincial divisions into political programmes, illustrated by the Pfingstprogramm (1899). It was supported by German nationalist opposition parties Deutsche Volkspartei, Deutsche Fortschrittspartei, Vereinigung der verfassungstreuen Großgrundbesitzer, Christlich-sociale Vereinigung and the Freie deutsche Vereinigung (Bruckmüller 2004, 799-800). In contrast to ‘Austrian’ parties such as Social Democrats and Christian Socials they demanded privileges for ‘Germans’. This was fed by perceptions of decline among the German-speaking bourgeoisie, especially visible in Prague where the
German-speaking population was reduced to a minority of less than 10 per cent (Cohen 2006, 18).

Strikingly, Austrian liberals still served as the targets for conservative and nationalist actors, supposedly representing the cosmopolitan elites of the status quo, who disrespected the historical rights of provinces and the autonomy of nations. The caricature below, published in a Czech nationalist periodical, depicts the Austrian Liberal leader Eduard Herbst as a man without human eyes, who disrespectfully steps on, and seemingly tries to dominate, the royal lion, which apparently represents the Kingdom of Bohemia as a proud, strong and independent political body.

Figure 42. A Caricature of the Austrian Liberal Leader Eduard Herbst [Krejčík 1881]

Students in particular staged protests for ‘national causes’. The establishment of the student fraternity Corps Austria by predominantly German-speaking students of the University of Prague in 1861 had been motivated by Austrian patriotism. In 1881 its members were attacked by Czech nationalist students (Nolte 2007, 95). This event, subsequently termed the ‘Kuchelbader battle’, illustrates a shift towards illiberal ideologies and practices. The increasingly radicalised and sometimes even violent atmosphere is illustrated by recurring street fights among students in Vienna, Graz and several cities in Moravia and Bohemia. ‘National conflicts’ in the Bohemian lands, such as in the context of the Prague Jubilee Exhibition in 1891, provided nationalist political actors with a platform from which to dominate political debates (Kořalka/Crampton 1980, 508). Although the Young Czech party ‘displaced the Old Czechs overnight in the diet and in parliamentary elections of 1891’, it was challenged itself ‘a decade later by Agrarians and radical National
Socialists’ (Judson 2016, 300). In her study of representations of Joseph II in Bohemia, Wingfield identifies a reinterpretation of the emperor which corresponds to the ascendancy of nationalist ideology. While in 1800 Joseph II was presented as the ‘people’s emperor’ and an ‘imperial humanitarian’, by 1900 he was presented as a promoter of ‘Germanisation’ (Wingfield 2007, 66, 81).

The growing organisational and intellectual capacities of the Bohemian-Czech national movement were reflected in the mobilisation of the masses by the gymnastics associations of the Sokol movement (Rumpler 1997, 488). Its ethno-linguistic conception of nationhood is interesting insofar as the organisation’s founders were German-speaking ‘converts’. A competing German ethno-nationalist Deutscher Turnerbund was founded in Bohemia in 1889, followed by a new Social Democratic association, the ‘German Workers Gymnastics and Sports Association’ (1893). By around 1910, the Sokol movement already had 120,000 members, which implies that, despite its exclusivist nationalist ideology, it had become the backbone of the national movement (Nolte 2007, 95).

Figure 43. The Sokol Gymnastics Festival in Prague 1912 [Rumpler 1997, 488]

In the 1890s, a number of Slovene-nationalist MPs began to argue that linguistic assimilation to German had caused the economic decline of Slovene-speakers (Rumpler 1997, 488). In the context of the Cilli ‘school crisis’ of 1895, a radical nationalist discourse entered parliamentary debates. The Slovene MP Michael Vošnjak, for instance, presented two major arguments in his speeches. The first was a historical argument, claiming that Cilli was in fact the city of Celeja, the capital of an ancient Slavic state. The second line of reasoning focused on the low social background of Slovene-speakers. The introduction of Slovene-speaking classes in Cilli would enable Slovene-speaking children of peasant background to attend secondary school (Burger 1995, 161). Local priests complained that the insufficient level of education in the Slovene language affected religious education (ibid., 122-3). Similar to other provincial national movements, its growing ideological strength was related to the political articulation of intersecting linguistic, liberal/clerical and
centre/periphery divisions. It illustrates how province-based political and religious actors interwove anti-liberal ideological streams, forging a synthesis of nationalist and religious ideology in order to enlarge their social base.

The 1890s saw the formation of a Jewish national movement when ‘peasant followers of the charismatic priest and newspaper publisher Stanisław Stojalowski’ began to challenge ‘the local political authority of conservative Jewish political leaders who traditionally backed the powerful Polish Club’ (Judson 2016, 300). The crisis of liberalism had weakened the secular-liberal Jewish intelligentsia with its centre in Vienna, who had for a long time identified with the Austrian state idea (Bruckmüller 1995, 194-95). As political space opened up for religious and populist ideological configurations, the Zionist movement adapted accordingly. At a conference in 1891 the formation of the ‘Jewish National Party of Galicia’ was officially initiated, declaring autonomy from the influential secular Jewish intelligentsia and bourgeoisie in Vienna. In 1892, the Polish-speaking paper Przysłój was published to replace the Vienna-based Selbst-Emanzipation, edited by Nathan Birnbaum. As leftist parties began to appeal to lower Jewish strata, Birnbaum responded by calling for Zionist agitation among Jewish workers by means of ‘Yiddish-language propaganda’ and by emphasising ‘the advantage Zionists enjoyed in their ability to tap into Jewish religious rhetoric in a way that the anti-clerical socialists could not’ (Shanes 2012, 108). Activists began to organise events in synagogues rather than in meeting halls and held speeches in Yiddish instead of in Polish or German. The campaigns of the 1907 elections brought the question of Jewish recognition as a nationality into the Austrian parliament. All social classes – men and women, old and young, secular and religious – joined in Zionist rallies, which reflected a new inclusive quality of populist nationalism. There were, for instance, women’s rallies with some 600 participants, led by female speakers, although they had not acquired the right to vote (ibid., 246).

Figure 44. Rally for Nathan Birnbaum in 1907 [Shanes 2012, 241]
The case of the Jewish National Party illustrates how participatory politics had contributed to rising national sentiments across classes. One result of three months of campaigning was that a large majority of Galician Jewish men participated in the elections, ‘and of those who voted for Jews, over half of them went for the Jewish nationalists’ (Shanes 2012, 276-77). Populist nationalism created an ideological link between Jewish subjects with perceived ‘Jewish leaders’, whether they were members of the Jewish National Party, the Polish Social Democratic Party or the Polish Club. That the centre/periphery antagonism intersected with the liberal/nationalist division became visible when Zionists in the Bukovina celebrated the Diet’s official recognition of ‘Jewish nationality’ and German-speaking Jews in Vienna intervened by ‘persuading the national parliament to overturn the decision’ (ibid., 278). What was crucial for the construction of a ‘political’ Jewish national identity was the growing capacity of the Zionist movement, which expressed existing divisions through the frame of ‘national antagonism’, appealing to its populist function.

In May 1903, the Viennese newspaper Die Zeit published an editorial under the heading ‘The Southern Slavic Question’, which expressed a political issue that caught the attention of the government in the following years (Pleterski 2002, 119). Höbelt (2009, 135) argues that Vienna overestimated South Slavic nationalism, which he describes as ‘a very temporary phenomenon’. This is supported by Bridge’s (2002, 17) observation that ‘the elimination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand came as a relief to elements in Serbia who had feared that he might some day attempt to resolve the Monarchy’s South Slav problem by a
structural reform’. During World War I many Slavic-speaking prisoners of war described in their letters how they felt forsaken by the Austrian state (Rachamimov 2002, 194). Similarly indicative is the fact that Czech- and Serbo-Croatian-speaking regiments turned out to be ‘veritable collectors of Gold Medals for Bravery’ in the war (Rauchensteiner 2014, 942).

Many of the problems concerning ‘national questions’ were caused by the regime’s politics of collective recognition. The Austrian government reinforced a multi-nationalist approach to include the populace institutionally, seeking modernisation while maintaining the supranational framework of the dynastic state. Literature on the dynastic aspects of symbolism and representation in the late Habsburg Empire (Unowsky 2005, Wingfield 2007, Cole/Unowsky 2007, Leonard/Hirschhausen 2011, 30-35) provides evidence that the monarchy continued to expand ‘forms of monarchical self-representation and dynastic political rituals’ (Cole 2012, 110). Under conditions of their expanding capacities, national movements ‘sought to appropriate imperial symbols and the rhetoric of dynastic loyalty so as to bolster their claims to hegemony in a particular region’ (ibid.).

A recent study of Hungarian nation-building efforts through the construction of monuments during the 1890s shows that the nationalising state used dynastic and religious symbols as ideological sources, although within the framework of Magyarization (Varga 2016). The presentation of Emperor Francis Joseph as ‘second Prince Árpád’ and of Empress Elisabeth as Hungarian Queen (Erzsébet Királyné) illustrates that far from being ideologically fixed, supposedly supranational imperial symbols were incorporated into Hungarian-Magyar nationalist discourse (Freifeld 2000, 184 and Freifeld 2007, 139). The imperial court itself contributed to the synthesis of dynastic and national narratives in order to expand its legitimacy. For instance, genealogists of the court argued that Empress Elisabeth belonged to the family of the fourteenth-century Hungarian national saint Holy Elisabeth (Leonhard/Hirschhausen 2011, 33). This narrative fitted into the Hungarian myth of its medieval foundation as a Christian Kingdom by St. Stephen.

For the government in Budapest, the millennial celebration of 1896 was a historic opportunity to design a coherent narrative of the Magyar nation, drawing on the founding myth of Prince Árpád. This national hero supposedly led the Magyar tribes from Asia to the Carpathian Basin in the 890s, where he succeeded in defeating the Germanic and Slavic populations. The national myth of the Magyar conquest (honfoglalás) provided the base for the millennial celebrations that were organised by the Hungarian government in 1896. ‘The scale of these festivities was grandiose; they certainly reached millions of Hungarian citizens’ (Varga 2016, 2). The respective Christian-Magyar synthesis presented the Magyars
as the leading Christian nation. The ambiguity of the synthesis between universalist religion and ethnic nationalism made it an ideologically powerful construct (ibid., 27):

In a historical narrative...St. Stephen was considered the representative of universal and pro-Western values, with Hungary’s multiethnicity playing a relevant role. This reading was canonized by mostly Western Hungarian, Catholic, pro-Habsburg intellectuals. In contrast, Prince Árpád represented the ethnic Magyar nation that was born in the East and always strove for independence, a topos often used by Calvinist, mostly Transylvanian or Eastern Hungarian, intellectuals.

The historian Kálmán Thaly was appointed to organise the nation-wide construction of monuments, representing the pre-Christian, Magyar founding myth. ‘Decorated with images of Prince Árpád, his Magyar warriors, and their totemic bird, the turul, the seven millennial monuments made the already invented but so far only written tradition of Árpád tangible’ (ibid., 3). These monuments served as vehicles for the state to transmit a uniform message, transforming a grand narrative into a naturalised myth.

Although the post-liberal era saw appeals to dynastic loyalties as well as a surge of universalist political emancipation movements including Social Democratic, Christian Social and Women’s movements, the conditions created by state policy stimulated antagonistic mass politics on the basis of ethnic nationalisms. The contingent and contested articulations of ethnic nationalism eventually began to haunt the monarchy’s domestic and foreign policy in the form of seemingly state-subverting national movements.

7.5. Conclusion

In the period after 1879, the regime engaged in the recognition and promotion of the collective organisation of ‘nationalities’, presuming that this would contribute to the cohesion of imperial state and society. In the Austrian half of the monarchy, the liberalisation of associational law and the promotion of collective interest associations in civil society became the pivot of government policy, aiming at the inclusion of oppositional and anti-statist forces into the ‘macrocosmos of the state’ (Drobesch 2006, 1129). An unintended consequence was the transformative impact it had on the political landscape, which became restructured by empowered nationalist political actors at the cross-section of municipal self-government, provincial societies and state agencies.

When Austria’s political system entered a crisis in the early twentieth century, conflicts between ‘nationalities’, which had become perceived as primordial ethnic groups, were commonly identified as the cause of problems. The role of the state in the making of these contemporary conditions was generally disregarded. The post-liberal regime created the political opportunity structure that enabled province-based nationalist actors to capitalise on
Austria’s transformation into a constitutional state. New political parties expanded into the ‘political’ and ‘non-political’ spaces that were opened up by the regime and developed nationalistic ideologies within the categorical parameters shaped by the state and the state-sponsored social sciences. The regime’s politics of recognition ultimately reinforced societal processes of segregation on the institutional and structural level, in terms of social interaction on the societal level, as well as in terms of politico-ideological identifications. It set the conditions for antagonistic articulations of ‘national’ collective identities, key to the populist function of nationalism in inspiring an emotional response within mass politics.

While internationally the maintainence of Austro-Hungarian Dualism secured the Empire’s status as a cornerstone of the European balance of power, domestically it created the conditions for politically isolating the non-Magyar counter-elites in the Hungarian provinces from the imperial centre (Varga 2016, 16). Representatives of the Slovak, Romanian and Serbian national minorities found themselves in a political system that left them disempowered, neglected by Vienna, and oppressed and persecuted by Budapest. In contrast to the multi-national state project of the Austrian half, the nationalist Hungarian government promoted national integration through Magyarization.
8. CONCLUSION

This study has elucidated how, from the mid-eighteenth to the early twentieth century, nationalism emerged as a component of political modernisation. It has further examined how nationalism became ‘instrumental’ to different modes of governance and to the activities of political and cultural elites as well as counter-elites. Although the category of civic nationality is itself a product of state-building, explaining the statist function of nationalism, the transition from aristocratic factionalism to participatory politics was accompanied by growing appeals to the populist function of nationalism. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it became a major ideological source for the discursive construction of ‘the people’ as a collective identity in mass politics, while still affecting the legitimacy of states on the basis of its statist function.

The key finding of this study is that shifts in government policy, themselves related to the structural changes associated with state modernisation, shaped the way in which conceptions of the national - whether civic or ethnic, elitist or populist, cultural or political - developed in the Habsburg Empire. This in turn had implications for political integration and disintegration. Chapters 3 and 4 show that political and cultural actors adopted their discourses and repertoires to the categorical parameters that were created in the process of Josephist state-building, itself part of a transnational European process. In the eighteenth century, efforts of state- and (proto)nation-building were related to warfare and the competition between fiscal-military states. One priority for the state besides military affairs was to build its educational apparatus. This is illustrated by the Josephist focus on weakening the Catholic Church and on transferring resources and ideologically effective educational functions from religious institutions to the state.

Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that the category of nationality and the ideological form of nationalism were subsequently shaped by the contingent reconfigurations of the modernising state, determined by regime responses to crises. Chapter 7 observes the increasing competition between concepts and forms of nationalism as ideology, politics and movement. With democratisation and the emergence of organised mass politics, political actors increasingly appealed to the populist function of nationalism, legitimising oppositional politics. From the perspective of the regime, these new forms of nationalism increased popular pressures and affected the legitimacy of the multinational state.

Although the Habsburg state-building developed a clear and unchallenged political centre, building a dense network of institutions penetrating the provincial hinterlands from the respective provincial capital cities, it failed to develop a common sense of supra-
regional nationhood. Instead, state expansion supported processes of national differentiation within the political landscape and civil society. Compared to states such as Britain, Germany and France, which succeeded in promoting a sense of supra-regional nationhood, the issue can be framed as a dilemma of ‘cultural’ and ‘civic’ aspects of nation-building throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century.

While in the first Josephist phase the regime aimed at a civic construction of nationhood and conceptualised nationality as a political category related to the entire state, the succeeding Metternich regime sought to transform nationality into a non-political cultural category in order to forestall nationalism. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the conservative-liberal regime was torn between democratisation on the basis of liberal and constitutional principles, directed at the emancipation of the individual subject as citizen, and a politics of recognition that favoured nationalist actors, engaging in the representation of ‘nations’ as collective subjects. The analyses of school textbooks show that shifts in the state’s approach to society were reflected in the content transmitted via schooling. Besides supporting the thesis of Oscar Jászi, who argued that the Habsburg Empire failed to provide a uniform ‘civic education’ (Jászi 1961, 433-39), this study showed that this was determined by political factors.

Despite the rise of ‘collectivist’ parties, whether defined in religious, ethno-nationalist or class terms, they continued to focus their politics on the multinational state. Under conditions of a massively expanding state apparatus that raised the degree of infrastructural rule and societal organisation to a previously unimaginable level, there was simply no alternative to the Habsburg state. Before WWI, all major political actors assumed that the monarchy would continue to exist, including the major Hungarian parties, which tended to recognise the advantages of shared status as a Great Power (Zsuppán 2002, 107). At the same time, the ascent of ethno-linguistic and racist nationalisms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century diffused the image of ancient nations, which was drawn on by various political actors in their struggle for power, frequently engaging in oppositional politics.

This research has revealed that this was neither an inevitable outcome of linguistic or ethnic pre-conditions nor of rigid groupings within the populace, nor of structural modernisation processes as such. Instead, it has identified a number of regime responses, of regime transformations and governmental policies in the context of state modernisation as a key explanatory factor.
The political settlement of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise 1867 created the conditions for a political opportunity structure in which nationalist actors on the sub-state level articulated asymmetric relationships between national groups, reflected in the elevated status of the Magyars ‘above’ the other ten recognised nationalities of the empire. Dualism provided the Hungarian nationalist camp with a semi-independent state structure, while the German-speaking ‘old Austrians’ in Vienna were in an ambiguous situation within a system of perceived ‘dominant’ and ‘subordinate’ nationalities (Cornwall 2006, 174). In the Austrian half, the decline of the ‘Austro-German’ state project gave space for new forms of ‘cooperative federalism’ (Osterkamp 2016, 134), which provided ‘voice’ and therefore loyalty with the state beyond ethno-linguistic forms. While the character of ‘national conflicts’ in Cisleithania concerned mostly tactical manoeuvres between nationalist actors, who all acknowledged the imperial state as their common polity, the assimilationist state project in Hungary denied non-Magyar groups ‘voice’ and thereby increased the impetus towards ‘exit’. The result was a ‘three-cornered conflict’, between the imperial government, the Hungarian nationalist government in Budapest, and the non-Magyar national groups, especially in the provinces of Transylvania, Croatia and Slavonia (Jelavich/Jelavich 1986, 237).

The study further showed that the regime’s approach to nationality and its interpretation of nationalism was linked to the Empire’s position within the international system. The Josephist regime viewed nationalism as a source of ideological power for the state in its military competition against rivals. Metternich attempted to prevent nationalism from becoming an ideological force in international relations. In the early twentieth century the so-called ‘South Slav Question’ became an important issue for the polity’s self-identification. Initially the issue of transborder nationalisms was ‘played’ by the nationalist Hungarian government during the 1890s in an attempt to construct the perception of a foreign threat, linking the Serbian-Croatian and Romanian speaking minorities to the interests of neighbouring states at a time when these nationalist actors were marginalised (Varga 2016, 17):

The majority of Czech national activists were rather ignorant of Slovak issues until 1907. Ukrainian or Russian support was even more fragile. Even the Hungarian Romanian national activists had to temporarily give up their hopes for help from the Bucharest government in the 1890s...The Serbian government also had to limit its support of the Hungarian Serbians, as the kings of the Obrenović dynasty followed a pro-Habsburg foreign policy until their removal in 1903.

The Balkan Wars initiated a new phase of power politics, conditioned by the retreat of the Ottoman Empire and the growing space for Russia, Austria and Germany to project their
power. By the late nineteenth century ‘the industrial and agricultural expansion of the United States and the military expansion of Russia in Asia were causing various European observers to worry about a twentieth-century world order’ (Kennedy 1988, 195). One effect of rising neomercantilism, which had replaced the idea of a global free-trading system, was that ‘there was a much greater tendency than earlier to argue that changing economic power would lead to political and territorial changes as well’ (ibid.). With the annexation and incorporation of Bosnia into the Habsburg Empire and Germany’s growing ambitions as challenger to Great Britain, the German-Austrian axis represented a shift in the European balance of power. Although policies of imperial expansion were driven by the idea that ‘the state’s security can be safeguarded only through expansion’, the consequence was that the respective policies challenged the status quo and contributed to growing threat perceptions and enmities between states (Snyder 1991, 1).

In the context of power politics, the support of national minorities became an instrument for states to project power. Beginning in 1905 the attention of the European public was increasingly drawn on the situation of national minorities in the Habsburg Monarchy, which was reinforced with the Cernova massacre of 1907, when the police killed a number of Slovak-speaking demonstrators in a village close to Ruzomberok (Varga 2016, 17). Public campaigning and external support for ‘national causes’ became tools of competing states to serve their interests. For the Habsburg Empire, the articulation of domestic legal issues as international affairs represented a perceived attack on its sovereignty, determining the regime’s interpretation of the ‘South Slav Question’ as an existential threat rather than a temporary phenomenon.

The conclusion we can draw from this study is that, although a politics of collective recognition (‘voice’) can produce ‘loyalty’, it also tends to expand the power base of nationalist actors. Besides the illiberal consequences for individuals who do not identify with or oppose the ascribed nationality, it undermines the capacity of the regime to engage in a unifying politics of representation on the state-level. A key difference as compared to ‘nation-states’ is that in late imperial Austria there was no longer any party that, as a political and ideological force, conceived of itself as the key shaper of state policies and values. From the perspective of the populace, there was simply no party or political camp left that articulated and potentially represented the common interest of ‘the state’ and its ‘people’.
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