The London School of Economics and Political Science


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A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, March 2012
Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis argues that American exceptionalism is a necessary, but insufficient, way of reading U.S. foreign policy. Exceptionalism is employed by different ideologists in different ways and in differing contexts. This thesis employs the contextualist methodology of Quentin Skinner to challenge proleptic, static understandings of American exceptionalism and, in doing so, uncovers American grand strategy as a keenly contested ideological battleground. In each constituent case study, the thesis identifies the ideological innovators of American strategic policy and the key moments of ideological innovation, and examines why ideological innovations became conventional, or not.

The analysis proceeds with an introduction to the composition of grand strategy, continues with an examination of Quentin Skinner’s version of Cambridge School contextual analysis, and then places Skinnerian contextualism within the broader framework of International Relations theory. This analysis illustrates the methodological advantage of Skinnerian contextualism, which allows the reconstruction of the context in which past generations of ideological innovators operated and conceived of the world and the place of the United States within it. This specific type of analysis demonstrates ideological innovation in practice at four pivotal moments in American foreign policy: first, the emergence of containment as the cornerstone of the Truman Doctrine at the outset of the Cold War; second, détente and the supposed injection of realism into American foreign policy; third, President Clinton’s strategy of enlargement and the place of American exceptionalism in the aftermath of the Cold War; and, fourth, the Bush Doctrine and the interaction between American exceptionalism and neoconservatism.

The thesis concludes by stressing the particularities of historical context, having demonstrated that, although exceptionalism has rarely been the only causal dynamic of American grand strategy, it has consistently provided the context with which innovating ideologists have been required to engage in order to create their own version of grand strategy.
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Acknowledgements

Writing a doctoral thesis is a long and arduous project and would not have been possible, in my case, without a great deal of intellectual and moral support. I would like, therefore, to extend my thanks to everyone who has helped me along the way. I want to thank my parents, Gerald and Lynne Woolfson. Without years of their love, support, and counsel none of this would have been possible. I dedicate this thesis to them with my love. My love also goes to Hannah Lloyd, who is probably more familiar with this thesis than she might like! For all of her support, patience, and love I am tremendously appreciative.

I would especially like to thank my supervisors Mick Cox and George Lawson, who have provided fantastic mentorship and feedback throughout the process. They have also been a source of great encouragement through what have, at times, been challenging moments. The International Relations department at the LSE has been incredibly supportive as a whole and for that I am extremely grateful; special thanks must go to Martina Langer. I would also like to acknowledge the late Fred Halliday: he not only provided the support for my starting doctoral research in the first place but also patiently critiqued my early research proposals; I learnt an incredible amount with his remote guidance, doing archival research for him whilst in Washington.

The Economic and Social Research Council have fully funded my research and I offer my deepest thanks for that support. My thanks must go also to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University for a fantastic year spent as a visiting fellow. They were incredibly welcoming and provided a remarkable range of resources to help me manage the practicalities of an unforgettably harsh New England winter. My year in America proved to be a considerable turning point for my research. That is in large part due to David Armitage’s tutelage in intellectual history, and I owe him a great debt of gratitude. The same is true of the guidance I received from the late Ernest May. It was a privilege to have been part of what proved to be his final graduate seminar series. I can’t imagine meeting a more humane and erudite person and I’m sad that I won’t be able to send him the finished thesis. I hope he would approve. David Armitage and Peter Bol’s graduate seminar series “Methods in Intellectual History” proved a fertile and
rigorous test bed for much of my work and my thanks goes out to all my fellow attendees for their incisive comments.

I also want to thank Georg Brun, Peter Collmer, Christa Wirth, Philipp Michelus, Olivier Senn, and Jason Rockett, all of whom took the time to carefully read and comment on my work.

Quentin Skinner has been extremely generous with his time and far more amenable to dialogue than I could have hoped for. I would also like to thank Duncan Bell and Richard Serjeantson for sharing their own experiences: they have both been more helpful than they perhaps realise.

I want to thank my friends Adam Wise, Daniel Brown, Daniel Blum, Toby Glyn, James Noyes, and Benjamin Webb for years of comradeship and distraction, and for reminding me that there is life outside the PhD – but I want to reassure them that being thanked doesn’t mean that they now have to read the thesis.
Chapter 1. The Cambridge School and the Discourse of Exceptionalism in U.S. Grand Strategy

Rationale and hypothesis

The central argument made in this thesis is that American exceptionalism is a necessary yet insufficient way of understanding American grand strategy. It is insufficient because it has always been a source of ideological contestation, employed in different ways, by different people, and in different contexts, to support and enable different grand strategic projects. This thesis applies the contextualism of Quentin Skinner to recreate and examine the contested discourse of American exceptionalism at four critical junctures and will illustrate the way in which these ideological struggles shaped grand strategy by enabling ideological innovation whilst at the same time also limiting the degree of possible transformation. In doing so, this thesis will show how this debate about the nature of America and its place in the world, which has imbued American political life at least since the Declaration of Independence, has had a far more flexible meaning than previous scholarship suggests, but it will also show that the political actors who created grand strategy were to a significant extent bound by the ideological conventions of their predecessors.

This chapter serves three primary functions. First, it will set out the rationale and hypothesis for the thesis. Second, it will explicate the notion of grand strategy as an ideologically contested space in the United States. Third, it will introduce the methodological approach of Cambridge School contextualism.

Three faulty assumptions are made in the academic analysis of the role of exceptionalism in American foreign policy: (1) that American grand strategy is only sometimes ideological (this thesis will argue that it is always underpinned by ideology); (2) that exceptionalism has meant the same thing over time; and (3) that exceptionalism is used as a rationale for the same kinds of political project or for the same political ends.
Richard Hofstadter claims that Americans do not embrace ideologies because America is an ideology. Here, Hofstadter argues that a set of beliefs that epitomise American values and the American way of life frame every American policy decision and, Hofstadter argues implicitly, that these beliefs exist at a very fundamental, yet tacit, level that transcends most party political debate. He suggests that, whilst Americans are not necessarily able to consciously articulate an ideology or acknowledge that they embrace an ideology, they are imbued with the ideology of America: that is to say that, by virtue of being American, they derive part of their own personal identity, and thereby their tacit beliefs, from this overarching societal dynamic. These tacit beliefs are clustered around the ill-defined idea that the United States is an extraordinary nation with a special role to play in human history and is in some sense distinct both in characteristics and behaviour from other states. The nature of America’s difference from other states and how this should be expressed in terms of international conduct has nonetheless legitimised a wide range of different strategic approaches from unilateralism to periods of national disillusionment, self-condemnation, and isolationism.

In its most benign form, ideology simply refers to a body of thought, “a language of politics defined by its conventions and employed by a number of writers.” In this thesis, American exceptionalism is treated as just this: a language of politics about America’s place in the world. This thesis treats American exceptionalism as ‘para-ideological’, the crystallisation of a loose language of politics that explains the world and the American role therein. Whilst exceptionalism might not be shown to have the coherence of a formal ideology it can be shown to underpin political discourse in the United States. In recreating that contested discourse of exceptionalism the thesis challenges the notion that American exceptionalism has

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trans-historical homogeneity of meaning or that it has been codified as a means towards one single definable strategic end.

On the sole occasion where he explicitly defines ideological argument, Quentin Skinner describes it as argument "intertwined with claims to social power."⁴ This is a less benign use of the term, suggesting a rhetorical strategy aimed at achieving some sort of distortion. What distinguishes Skinner’s account of ideology from other critical accounts is that, unlike Marxist or feminist accounts, which do share Skinner’s understanding that an ideology is intertwined with social power, Skinner’s conception has no a priori sense of ascribing who might be trying to exercise that power or why.⁵

In an area of scholarship that has been dominated by diplomatic historians on one disciplinary wing and realists on the other,⁶ the examination of exceptionalism and American foreign policy has neglected to treat American grand strategy as intellectual history. Where American exceptionalism has been treated as a discrete ideology its treatment has tended to either be temporally limited or it has been considered a largely static concept, not subject to political contestation.⁷ Unable to find easy lines of causation between ideology and policy, diplomatic historians who have focused on the period after 1945 have been wary of sustained examinations of American exceptionalism. When scholars have attempted to tackle American ideology they have rarely dealt directly with exceptionalism, instead creating new ideological tropes or focusing on other avenues, as in the

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⁶ See Chapter 2 for a thorough examination of existing International Relations scholarship.
case of early studies drawing on the Marxist link between ideology and political economy. The profusion of analytic categories, stemming from debate over what exactly America’s ‘core values’ were, has occluded the study of American grand strategy as an expression of how the Washington elite viewed America as an exceptional nation, how this shaped their sense of American purpose in the world, and how this changed over time.

The two most in-depth attempts to grapple explicitly with exceptionalism and the foreign policy of the U.S. – by Michael Hunt and historian Anders Stephanson – exhibit another type of methodological mistake: a teleological approach. This approach has merits: for example, it acknowledges commonalities in thought and calls attention to humanity’s preoccupation with certain seemingly eternal thoughts. However, the approach relies on the assumption that an idea remains constant despite dissimilarities in its context. This approach encourages a kind of Platonic view of thoughts, as if they somehow predated their contexts and merely manifested, regardless of social forces or situational context. In the case of the Cold War, the debate has largely focused on the orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist debate, in which the scholar’s historiographic bias has deployed the material to suit a given argument.

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12 The key text which inspired the Cold War revisionist school was William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland, Ohio; New York: World Publishing Co., 1959) and, although this is an astonishing work, his sense of an American Weltanschauung which was based on exceptionalist and expansionist principles did not account for ideological change or contestation over time, rooted as it was in a critique of American capitalism. For other revisionists see Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945–1971* (New York: Wiley, 1972); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
13 The first of the post-revisionist texts was John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Ernest May, “The
Similar ‘raiding’ of history has occurred within the field of International Relations. “Realist theorists know in advance what ‘threats’ look like, liberals know what ‘joint gains’ look like, and constructivists know what an ‘ideational consensus’ looks like.” They then apply these abstract concepts to the historical material up to the early post-Second World War period in order to see whether their preferred decision-making input is present. The problem is that the early postwar period, like virtually any other historical period, offers sufficient evidence to support all of these claims and others. As a point of logic this could be valid, except that these claims, derived often from the same evidence, are often contradictory. “Thus, each approach concentrates on the evidence that supports its own position, downplaying the extent to which ‘threats’, ‘gains’, ‘consensus’, and individuals’ perceptions of these factors were still forming.” By effectively starting with the political meanings from the end of the period under investigation, in which the Cold War is over, scholars have subconsciously read stability into the earlier historical period, whereas political scientists purposefully impose theoretical constructs. Even the term early Cold War proleptically implies future bipolarity. This fact leads to an underestimation of the diversity of options that existed at the time, the variety of proposals and plans that were advanced, and the historical contingency of the term Cold War, whose meaning changed over time.

**Grand strategy in the United States**

Realists have historically raised the prescription of a realignment of policy along realist lines at key foreign-policy junctures, most notably during the Vietnam War and the more recent Operation Iraqi Freedom. The underlying suggestion of

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14. This thesis distinguishes between ‘International Relations’ the academic discipline (sometimes abbreviated ‘IR’) and ‘international relations’, political relations at the international level.
17. Ibid., 231.
18. A term of central importance to Quentin Skinner’s contextualist methodology. For further discussion of this term see the discussion of Skinner’s knowledge claims for his methodology in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
their claims is that the pursuit of ‘the national interest’ is unique to realism and that realist ‘national interest’ stands in contrast to other, more ideological, foreign-policy goals. From a realist vantage point the United States is simply one nation amongst many in an anarchic international system based upon power. Perhaps most prominently, neorealism casts the international distribution of capabilities as the key constraint on foreign policy. They argue that states define their interests “in terms of power,” pursuing “aims that [have] some materially identifiable benefit . . . for society as a whole.” In this light, major wars appear as sudden manifestations of underlying shifts in the distribution of power. This thesis suggests that such materialist analyses are insufficient on two grounds. First, since material incentives are indeterminate and the distribution of power often ambiguous, agents can interpret identical material changes in any number of ways. Second, the same intersubjective understandings which guide interpretations of material shifts can also constitute varying state interests.

In fact, realism’s competitors are equally concerned with the pursuit of the ‘national interest’ but disagree about the nature and extent of the objectives which compromise ‘the national interest’. “The main debates surrounding U.S. foreign policy are best understood as disputes within the conceptual space of ‘the national interest’ rather than between it and alternative strategic philosophies.” The point of such observations is not to attempt to critique the efficacy of any one approach to grand strategy but to move the discourse away from an exclusive bond between realism and the ‘national interest’. As Aletta Norval contends, “Ideology has always been conceived of in contrast to some order of truth or knowledge from


23 For a more detailed analysis of realist and constructivist approaches to American grand strategy see Chapter 2.
which it would be possible to discern its misleading and false character." This thesis contends that all notions of ‘national interest’ are inherently ideological and require treatment as such and, furthermore, that existing approaches to the ideology of American exceptionalism have failed to incorporate the methodological advances within the study of the history of ideas and have underestimated ideological contestation as a result.

One major contribution of critical international relations has been to problematise the modern state as the starting point for analysis. Recent scholarship has built on this approach to illustrate how the construction of the modern state and the construction of modern modes of knowledge have operated in tandem to recast the nature of security. The effect has been to demonstrate that concerns about identity have never been absent from theories of international relations, particularly security issues. Michael Williams remarks that “[t]he apparent absence of a concern with identity in conceptions of security needs to be understood in fact as an historical legacy of a conscious attempt to exclude identity concerns from the political realm.” The roots of realism’s conception of an objective national interest lie in the “liberal sensibility, in an attempt to construct a material and objective foundation for political practice,” even though that process is predicated on liberal faith in the power of science to subdue political conflict.

Some security scholars have noted the absence of identity from previous debate. Because they have seen identity as compatible with neorealism they have attempted to add identity as an intervening variable in order to strengthen

28 Ibid., 205.
29 Ibid., 206.
neorealist arguments. However, security scholars with a more critical perspective suggest that identity’s absence from early debate cannot be glossed over too easily. Lapid exhorts that we must examine “the historical context and scholarly practices that have rendered [identity concerns] incompatible in the first place.”

The absence of identity in theories of security can be conceptualised as a result of the realisation that “theories about the world, and about security were integral elements in the political practices constituting that world.” Thus, both U.S. grand strategy and a contextualist, historical approach (the method of inquiry) are fundamentally intertwined as part of a broader critical approach to security studies.

It is important to understand what the terms strategy and its wide-ranging derivative grand strategy have meant at various historical points. The term strategy has been subject to considerable misuse; it is imprecise in common parlance, and its meaning has changed over time. Carl von Clausewitz, who still serves as the central referent for strategic studies, defined tactics as “the theory of the use of military forces in combat” and strategy as “the theory of the use of combats for the object of the War.” Although Clausewitz provided useful definitions, his vision was unsurprisingly narrowly confined by the type of military campaigns of his time. Clausewitz’s definition could not adequately describe the wars of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, which were altered by the conception and execution of ‘total war’, or the mobilisation of the fully available resources and population of the state.

It was Basil Liddell Hart who provided the conceptual and genealogical leap in the analysis of strategic thought. He observed that “the role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.”\(^{36}\) We can usefully take Hart’s notion of grand strategy as the highest level of national strategy. But Hart went farther in his suggestion that “the object in war is to obtain a better peace – even if only from your own point of view. . . . [I]t is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.”\(^{37}\) His most important conclusion following from this suggestion that the key task facing national decision-makers was defining the shape of a “better peace” was that grand strategy was concerned with much more than just supervision of battles:

Fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure . . . . It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use to avoid damage to the future state of peace.\(^{38}\)

Writing in the mid-1960s, Alastair Buchan refined Hart’s concept of grand strategy for the Cold War by making the political concerns of strategy far more explicit. “The real content of strategy is concerned not merely with war and battles but with the application of the maintenance of force so that it contributes most effectively to the achievement of political objectives.”\(^{39}\) This emphasises the extension of grand strategy to peace as well as wartime.\(^{40}\) In so doing this definition allowed for the notion that nations might pursue fundamental interests that do not require the actual use of military force for their realisation.

Both Hart and Buchan recognised that military victory alone was not the key concern of grand strategy. If it left the nation weaker and vulnerable, success in war alone could not meet the requirements of effective strategy. Hart noted:

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 351; emphasis added.
\(^{38}\) Ibid., 322.
It is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. This is the truth underlying Clausewitz’s definition of war as a ‘continuation of policy by other means’ – the prolongation of that policy through the war into the subsequent peace must always be borne in mind.\textsuperscript{41} Hart seemed to suggest that grand strategy is fundamentally about the creation of an idealised vision of the world.\textsuperscript{42} Paul Kennedy went further, linking the notion of an idealised strategic goal to the effective marshalling of the totality of the nation’s resources:

The crux of grand strategy lies . . . in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all the elements [of national power], both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is, wartime and peacetime) best interests.\textsuperscript{43} By 1914 the U.S. Department of War was already distinguishing between national strategy, which was analogous to grand strategy, and more basic military strategy. National strategy was defined as “the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives,”\textsuperscript{44} whereas military strategy was defined quite separately as “the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.”\textsuperscript{45} Subsequently, however, the 2004 edition of the dictionary defined strategy more parsimoniously as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theatre, national, and/or multinational objectives.”\textsuperscript{46} The distinction between peacetime and wartime is absent from the 2004 edition, as is the notion of distinct military coercive power; and, most importantly, the objectives of the strategy seem almost to have been relegated to an afterthought.

\textsuperscript{41} Hart, \textit{Strategy}, 351.  
\textsuperscript{43} Paul M. Kennedy, \textit{Grand Strategies in War and Peace} (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), 5.  
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 121.  
Notwithstanding this, it would be misleading to suggest that grand strategy has ever been a precise science. According to Clausewitz, the nature of its complexity rendered it an art that operates at political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels, which interact to advance the primary aim.\(^{47}\) Paul Kennedy shared Clausewitz’s sense of complexity:

> Given all the independent variables that come into play, grand strategy can never be exact or foreordained. It relies, rather, upon the constant and intelligent reassessment of the polity’s ends and means; it relies upon wisdom and judgement, those two intangibles which Clausewitz and Hart . . . esteemed the most.\(^{48}\)

None of this suggests that strategy must be explicitly named as such in order to be achieved. The temptation to look for strategic declarations solely in formal declamatory documents is strong; however, political groups or individuals often have a strategy even when they do not acknowledge having one. Equally, strategies need not be the creation of a single mind. Perhaps the best example of such ad hoc strategy, explored in depth later in this thesis, was Bill Clinton’s strategy of enlargement.\(^{49}\) Strobe Talbott recalled a conversation with Clinton in 1994 in which Clinton expressed his conviction that “Roosevelt and Truman had gotten along fine without grand strategies. They’d just made it up as they went along, and he didn’t see why he couldn’t do the same.”\(^{50}\)

This thesis argues that grand strategy is the cumulative expression of ideology, a shared language of politics, including policy ideas that political actors use and reshape. Even if Clinton thought he was improvising his grand strategy on a pragmatic basis, his administration *did* articulate a central idea, ‘democratic enlargement’, around which a national security strategy was created. As this thesis will examine in Chapter 6, this ideological imprimatur was strongly asserted across apparently disconnected policies. In other words, a grand strategy may well follow a quasi-logic with assumptions so strong, so familiar, and so tacit that it is mistaken for common sense.

\(^{47}\) Clausewitz, *On War*.
\(^{49}\) See Chapter 6.
Clausewitz’s definition conveys better than any other what Americans meant by strategy from the inception of the republic until the First World War.\(^{51}\) Indeed, on the battlefield the U.S. notion of strategy was tightly focused on the favourable disposition of troops. Such a narrow definition of strategy, limited to military affairs, meant that military strategists gave little consideration to their actions’ non-military consequences. Some strategic theorists suggest that America has never really moved beyond this limited and technocratic type of strategy. For example, Edward Luttwak stated in his analysis of American strategic thought of the 1960s and 1970s that the American intellectual tradition entails a ‘national style’ that includes characteristics antithetical to the very idea of strategic thought:

As a nation, Americans are pragmatic problem-solvers rather than systematic or long-range thinkers. Our whole experience tells us that it is best to narrow down complicated matters so as to isolate the practical problem at hand, and then to get on with finding a solution. Strategy by contrast is the one practical pursuit that requires a contrary method: to connect the diverse issues into a systematic pattern of things; then to craft plans – often long range – for dealing with the whole.\(^{52}\)

Luttwak echoed the earlier critique of Hans Morgenthau, who railed against the American \textit{Weltanschauung}, a liberal refusal to recognise the political realm. In Morgenthau’s view, the result was not only unfounded confidence in human abilities but a trivialisation of life, “trivial optimism for which life dissolves into a series of little hurdles which, one after the other, increasing skill cannot fail to overcome.”\(^{53}\) Morgenthau was not alone in this critique of America; some current scholars have also suggested that this problem-solving approach is irreconcilable with truly strategic thinking and as a result most of what passes for strategic debate in the United States does not meet the most basic definition of linking military power to political purpose.\(^{54}\) Luttwak picked up on Morgenthau’s line of reasoning and suggested the result was that so-called U.S. strategic debates such as those in the 1970s and 1980s over the Strategic Defence Initiative or SALT II actually had very little to do with strategy. American defence debates tended to

\(^{51}\) Weigley, \textit{The American Way of War}, 15.
“narrow down complicated matters so as to isolate the practical problem at hand.” Colin Gray took the analysis further, suggesting that “each activity is assessed on its own terms as if it had meaning in and of itself.” The point is that “each problem has tended to be treated sui generis – or on its own merits.” Russell Weigley suggested that the effect of limited American thinking about strategy and inconsistent involvement in international affairs meant that an American grand strategy for the employment of force or the threat of force to attain political ends, beyond the confines of wartime military strategy calculated to lead to military victory, did not emerge until after the Second World War.

This thesis argues that once a discrete American grand strategy did emerge in the wake of the Second World War, it expanded well beyond the confines of Clausewitz and toward Hart’s more fully developed definition:

A true grand strategy was now to do with peace as much as (perhaps even more than) war. It was about the integration of policies that should operate for decades, or even for centuries. It did not cease at war’s end, nor commence at its beginning.

Luttwak offered an important corrective. He suggested that few nations have ever possessed a “thought-out grand strategy” that anchored their foreign policies. Nevertheless, grand strategy does have interpretive value because it represents more than just the identification of long-term national goals and the selection of means to obtain those ends. Such a blueprint is not deterministic of specific policies. Instead, it provides a touchstone by which policymakers chart their action in response to events:

Both the operational environment (the world as it really is) and the psychological environment (the world as seen by conditioned and fallible human beings) – do not require that certain policies be adopted

58 Weigley, The American Way of War.
but open and foreclose upon ranges of policy possibilities – which societies and their governments may pursue or not as circumstance and mood take them.\textsuperscript{61}

Paul Kennedy describes this sense of grand strategy as intrinsically ideological:

It is because of the essentially political nature of grand strategy – What are this nation’s larger aims in the world, and how best can they be secured? – that there has to be such a heavy focus upon the issue of reconciling ends and means. . . . The real task for the polity in question is to ensure that, in wartime, the non-military aspects are not totally neglected . . . and that, in peacetime, the military aspects are not totally neglected. . . . [I]f the wartime task of balancing ends and means also exists in the peacetime execution of a nation’s grand strategy, there is the additional problem that politically it may be harder to achieve, year after year, since the conditions of peace conduce to turning the polity’s attention to other priorities and activities.\textsuperscript{62}

The maintenance of this kind of grand strategy, requiring both wartime and peacetime marshalling of the state’s military and civilian activities – entailing the necessary management of both complexity of activity and political apathy – requires a strong ideological basis. Hunt posits an ideological basis for grand strategy “that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality.”\textsuperscript{63}

With this distinction in mind, this thesis suggests that exceptionalism in the United States is shared by individuals from differing, sometimes opposing, political perspectives. Anders Stephanson has put such a model into practice, suggesting how the concept of manifest destiny, which became a poetici
erally rallying call, mobilised American exceptionalism as an ideological guiding principle:

Manifest destiny did not “cause” President Polk to go to war against Mexico. No particular policy followed from this discourse as such: though certainly conducive to expansionism, it was not a strategic doctrine. . . . [M]anifest destiny is of signal importance in the way the United States came to understand itself in the world and still does: . . . [T]his understanding has determinate effects. [Manifest destiny]

\textsuperscript{61} Gray, Geopolitics, 6.
\textsuperscript{62} Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace, 168–9.
\textsuperscript{63} Michael H. Hunt, The World Transformed: 1945 to the Present (Boston, Mass.: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2004), 222.
This thesis agrees with Stephanson’s assessment that exceptionalism was not a strategic doctrine in its own right but disagrees with the implication that the ‘common sense’ of American exceptionalism has had a temporally consistent meaning. This section has suggested that grand strategy is a twentieth-century phenomena, stemming from unprecedented ‘total wars’. Rather than just being concerned with the fighting of battles, grand strategy concerns itself with the achievement of an idealised ‘peace time’ world.

**Methodology: Cambridge School contextualism**

This thesis will employ Quentin Skinner's Cambridge School contextualism to overcome the proleptic misreading of history that is shared by political scientists and those who have attempted historical surveys of exceptionalism. The standard focus on ‘manifest destiny’ and the seeming inevitability of American expansionist impulses that have spilled from much of the work examining the role of exceptionalism in American grand strategy can be problematised, thereby yielding a more nuanced recreation of the debate about America’s role in the world and the American strategic posture.

Skinner’s main concern and theoretical contribution is the recreation of authorial intention relating to the creation of texts. Skinner suggests that his approach to texts “enables us to characterise what their authors were doing in writing them.”

Works of political theory cannot be treated as timeless contributions to a universal philosophical debate, nor can their meanings simply be read off as determined by

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64 Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*, xiv.


the economic and social context in which they were written. He argues that in order to grasp an utterance’s meaning one must first situate it within the linguistic and intellectual context in which it arose and upon which the authors sought to have some effect. As a result, for contextualists it is dangerous to strip texts from their idea environments; doing so can result in a distortion or loss of a text’s meaning.\(^{67}\) By concentrating on conceptual change and language’s constitutive role in shaping a society’s normative architecture, we can reach a more sophisticated understanding of language with respect to the reproduction of social norms and conventions and consequently in the process of historical change.

Skinner has interrogated language’s role in moulding and determining action and the part that political principles play in the process. He approaches the problematic relationship between speech and praxis by switching the direction of causation. Whatever an agent’s motive for adopting a certain course of action, that agent must be able to justify it through reference to existing linguistic conventions or political vocabularies.\(^{68}\) A society’s normative parameters are established and reproduced through the intersubjective meanings attached to such terms. However, these concepts are somewhat unstable; their sense and reference are open to challenge, manipulation, and, ultimately, transformation. The essence of conceptual change thus lies in the malleable relationship between sense and reference over time. How this change occurs is necessarily political because it involves conflict over meaning and action. From this argument it follows that, once a set of principles has been employed, it establishes the parameters for action, opening up some channels and closing others. Therefore, the choice of legitimation vocabulary entails a form of path dependency.\(^{69}\)

This thesis will demonstrate this point by examining the role of linguistic intelligibility and communication in the legitimation of political and social action. It can be shown that the constitutive role of language in shaping the normative architecture of society is open to challenge, that the parameters are far from fixed, but at the same time it can also be shown that there are intrinsic limits to what can be achieved practically.

\(^{68}\) Skinner, “Some Problems in the Analysis of Thought and Action,” 110.  
The Cambridge School in practice: the methodology of contextualism

Skinner’s work builds on the approach from Wittgenstein\textsuperscript{70} that language is an intersubjectively shared multiplicity of tools for various purposes but one in which only some elements are open to subjective criticism and change. According to this theory, language is so deeply woven into human action that it provides the grounds on which criticism and change take place.\textsuperscript{71}

A Skinnerian methodology revolves around three processes: (1) interpretation of historical texts; (2) survey of ideology formation and change; and (3) analysis of the relation between ideology and the political action it represents.\textsuperscript{72} Skinner’s procedure comprises five steps that answer five questions:

(1) In writing a text, what was an author doing in relation to other available texts that make up the ideological context? (2) In writing a text, what was an author doing in relation to available and problematic political action that makes up the practical context? (3) How are ideologies to be identified and their formation, criticism, and change to be surveyed and explained? (4) What is the relation between political ideology and political action which best explains the diffusion of certain ideologies and what effect does this have on political behaviour? (5) What forms of political thought and action are involved in disseminating and conventionalizing ideological change?\textsuperscript{73}

Step one. Drawing on the speech-act theory of John L. Austin,\textsuperscript{74} John Searle,\textsuperscript{75} and Herbert P. Grice,\textsuperscript{76} Skinner argued that if speaking and writing are viewed pragmatically as linguistic activities, they can be seen to comprise two kinds of action: locutionary (propositional) and, more importantly, illocutionary (linguistic). To fully understand a text’s historical meaning, one must understand

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} Skinner, \textit{Visions of Politics}, I, 156–7.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Tully, “The Pen is a Mighty Sword,” 7. Tully has undertaken the most systematic attempt to extract Skinner’s actual method from his body of work and this section of the thesis is based on Tully’s interpretation of Skinner’s methodology.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Tully, “The Pen is a Mighty Sword,” 7–8.
\item \textsuperscript{74} J. L. Austin, \textit{How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); Skinner, “Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts.”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
not only its illocutionary meaning but also the author’s point (argument). To determine locutionary meaning, one must situate the text within its linguistic or ideological context. The context refers to the collection of texts that were written or used during the same period, that addressed the same or similar issues, and that shared a number of conventions. Skinner used the term convention heuristically to refer to relevant linguistic commonplaces uniting a number of texts: shared vocabulary, principles, and assumptions; and criteria for testing knowledge claims, problems, and conceptual distinctions. This technique allows the researcher to understand the extent to which authors accepted, endorsed, questioned, repudiated, and ignored the prevailing assumptions and conventions of political debate. Skinner called this the manipulation of the conventions of available ideology.

According to Skinner, this form of explanation is an element of a text’s historical meaning, equivalent to the author’s intentions in writing the text. In addition, this form of explanation is noncausal because it recharacterises the linguistic action in terms of its ideological point, not in terms of an independently specifiable condition. In short, the explanation is an intention inherent in performing the linguistic action, not an intention that precedes performing the action. Step one also enables the researcher to ascertain the novelty (nonconventionality) of the text under study. This kind of understanding of a text is unavailable to those who employ a solely textualist approach or to contextualists who ignore the linguistic context.

**Step two.** The second step is concerned with examining what the author was doing in manipulating the ideological conventions. Where the first question asks about the character of a text as an ideological manoeuvre, the second question is concerned with the character of the ideological manoeuvre as a political stratagem. In order to do this the text is placed within its practical context – that is, the political activity to which the text is a response and which the author is

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81 Tully, “The Pen is a Mighty Sword,” 9.
trying to change. As Skinner puts it, the political theorist is responding to the political problems of the age. “I take it that political life itself sets the main problems for the political theorist, causing a certain range of issues to appear problematic and a corresponding range of questions to become the leading subjects of debate.”

In step two the analyst compares how the ideology’s conventions render the relevant political action and how the manipulation of these conventions in the given text redescribes the political action. This new characterisation will be the key to the text’s political point. As with step one, the fact that a text makes a political point within a practical context does not necessarily mean that the author wrote the text in order to make that point.

Step three. The next stage is the study of ideologies themselves. In step three, less canonical texts of the period are surveyed to identify the constitutive and regulative conventions of the reigning ideologies and their interrelations before they are employed as benchmarks to judge the conventional and unconventional aspects (and so, the ideological moves) of the major texts. Where those following Hegel interpret the classic texts as expressing an age’s consciousness or assumptions, Skinner’s project demonstrates that great texts are usually a poor guide to conventional wisdom; instead, they are expressions of ideological contestation.

Step four. Where step two is meant to illuminate the relation between political thought and action in the case of an individual text, step four replicates this in the case of an ideology. Any political vocabulary will contain a number of terms that are intersubjectively normative: in other words, they simultaneously describe and evaluate. The terms are intersubjective in that not only the criteria for their application (sense) and their reference but also their evaluative dimension is a property of the words as commonly used, not something the conventional

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83 Tully, “The Pen is a Mighty Sword,” 11–12.
84 Ibid.
individual user bestows on them. The evaluative dimension is known as the speech-act potential.\textsuperscript{85}

Within any society’s vocabulary the class of such descriptive/evaluative terms is extremely large, as can be seen in the uses of terms such as democracy, dictatorship, inefficient, irrational, objective, rational, and tolerant.\textsuperscript{86} It follows that political vocabulary in standard use describes and evaluates political action. Skinner suggests that by manipulating this set of terms a society establishes and alters its moral identity.\textsuperscript{87} Using these terms in the conventional way legitimates customary practice. Manipulating the conventions of a prevailing ideology involves changing the conventions governing the sense, reference, or speech-act potential of some of these normative terms. Altering the sense, reference, or evaluative force of an ideology’s terms recharacterises or re-evaluates the political situation they represent, legitimising a new range of activity or beliefs and delegitimising the status quo. As a result political theories can be seen as contemporaneous legitimation crises caused by shifting political relations, not as a result of any choice or intention of the theorists but because the language in which they are written characterises political relations.\textsuperscript{88}

The second aspect of this step is the examination of an ideology’s constrictive and productive effects on the conduct that the ideology legitimates. The use of conventions dictating the prevailing normative vocabulary cannot be manipulated indefinitely and so cannot be employed to legitimate wildly divergent practice.\textsuperscript{89} Skinner states:

\begin{quote}
Thus the problem facing an agent who wishes to legitimate what he is doing at the same time as gaining what he wants cannot simply be the instrumental problem of tailoring his normative language in order to fit his projects. It must in part be the problem of tailoring his projects in order to fit the available normative language.\textsuperscript{90}
\end{quote}

The constraint is both political and ideological. An attempt to stretch ideological conventions requires a justification and this takes the form of grounding the

\textsuperscript{85} Skinner, “Some Problems in the Analysis of Thought and Action,” 112.
\textsuperscript{86} Tully, “The Pen is a Mighty Sword,” 13.
\textsuperscript{87} Skinner, “Some Problems in the Analysis of Thought and Action,” 112.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 110–13.
\textsuperscript{89} Tully, “The Pen is a Mighty Sword,” 14.
\textsuperscript{90} Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 1: xii–xiii.
change in terms of what is already accepted as ‘common sense’. In other words, an ideologist changes one part of an ideology by retaining and bolstering another part of it.\textsuperscript{91} Even if an ideological innovator does not believe in the beliefs they are expressing, they are to some extent required to conform with the established ideological context they wish to challenge. As Skinner puts it, “[e]very revolutionary is to this extent obliged to march backwards into battle.”\textsuperscript{92}

\textit{Step five.} The last step is to explain how ideological change becomes a conventional part of the social fabric, or not. This is partly a function of how well the innovation fits with other available schools of thought. Equally, the ability of ideologues to control the medium of ideological propagations, such as academia, religious institutions, and the media are key, although this does not automatically lead to a corresponding change in practice.\textsuperscript{93}

\textbf{The Cambridge School and American grand strategy}

At first glance, the policy documents that constituted American grand strategy do not seem to be substantial candidates for intellectual history. However, this thesis examines the complex, tension-ridden interface between political thought and public policy.\textsuperscript{94} The various Cold War and post-Cold War grand strategy documents and the world they envisioned were not the products of political philosophers but nonetheless shared a language of politics. This language of politics was contested and at critical junctures underwent a process of ideological innovation.

What Skinner’s process of contextualism is able to reveal is that innovating ideologists are less concerned with logical coherence or philosophical rigour than they are with conceptual and practical political change. These ideological innovators can be revealed to draw upon and shift existing discourse and present their policies as the only viable solution to a set of self-defined political problems. In other words, these ideologies were far from steadfast and instead were forced to evolve to suit a specific set of situational and relational political problems; moreover, these ideological innovators purposefully played with the conventions

\textsuperscript{91} Skinner, “Some Problems in the Analysis of Thought and Action,” 117.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 112.
\textsuperscript{93} Tully, “The Pen is a Mighty Sword,” 15–16.
of ideology to legitimate and enact political change. However, as the later case studies illustrate, their efforts to put such ambitious political visions into practice usually faced difficult hurdles in conforming to the conventional parameters of ideological discourse. Thus, this thesis is an exercise in the reconstruction of the languages through which past generations conceived of the world and their relationship to it.
Chapter 2. Quentin Skinner’s Contextualism and International Relations

This chapter maps Quentin Skinner’s form of contextualism onto the broader framework of International Relations scholarship. Having traced the methodological steps necessary for Skinnerian contextualism in the previous chapter, this chapter proceeds to examine how realist and liberal schools of thought in International Relations theory have approached the study of ideology and grand strategy. The chapter lays out how both of these schools engage with American foreign policy and suggests that they occlude certain approaches to the study of the history of ideas and ideology. The chapter then further examines the contributions made possible by Skinnerian contextualism by examining it in contrast with Gramscian approaches and via a close discussion of the knowledge claims which Skinner makes for his methodology. In conclusion, this chapter suggests Skinnerian contextualism is able to achieve a type of analysis that other approaches either cannot or which they attempt in problematic ways. It refines this claim by placing Skinnerian contextualism within the broader framework of constructivist approaches to International Relations.

Realism

Classical realist writers of the early postwar period, such as Walter Lippmann and George Kennan, understood that ideological factors had a profound impact on the grand strategies of nations. There is little in Kennan’s writing that offers a systematic explanation of his approach to international politics or of his political philosophy in general, however, textual analysis of what he did write goes some way in revealing his underlying conservative suspicion of ideology. Kennan was far from alone in pointing to the impact of liberal and idealistic political culture precisely to condemn its impact on American foreign policy. Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr took similarly disapproving stances to that of Kennan the

95 See Chapter 4 for a full assessment of both Lippmann’s and Kennan’s thought.
alienated American intellectual. However, whilst historically rich in its analysis and concerned with keeping the debate of ‘ideas’ as part of the political sphere, classical realism’s forms of analysis were skewed by its approach as an “‘error theory’ of U.S. foreign policy.” In other words, the normative, prescriptive element of classical realism compromised elements of its analytic ability.

The over-emphasis on one form of anarchy (international) by realist scholars obscured the observation that the American republic’s founding fathers were equally as concerned with domestic anarchy between the states and specifically sought to avoid the interstate anarchy of Europe in creating the union. On such a view, any variant of realism “is insightful but radically incomplete.”

The methodological rigour and systemic focus injected into realism by, most prominently, Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin, gave neorealism a very different, positivist character to that of the classical texts of E. H. Carr, Kennan and Morgenthau. This thesis is not trying to artificially impose uniformity between classical realist thought, which did concern itself with both ideology and the study of history, and Neorealism. Neorealism emphasises international pressures by pointing to the international distribution of power, and suggests that strategic change is shaped by material or structural pressures at the international

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level.\textsuperscript{104} The neorealist point of view is that the anarchic international system, in which war is always a possibility, means that states are forced to rely upon their own material capabilities in a game of survival. As a result, international pressures are the primary cause of the strategic behaviour of individual states.\textsuperscript{105} Neorealists do not deny that states have their own historical and ideological legacies but they do suggest that these domestic differences tend to be obliterated by the pressure of international competition, and that states tend to eventually act in the same manner, paying close attention to their relative position in the international system and trying to promote their own power and security, as a result becoming undifferentiated.\textsuperscript{106}

Waltz himself has argued that a truly international theory cannot pretend to explain foreign policy or grand strategy; it can only explain international outcomes.\textsuperscript{107} It remains unclear, even to some realists, how one can have a theory of international outcomes without making certain assumptions about the behaviour of individual states.\textsuperscript{108} However, when Waltz argues that states balance each other this is not simply a prediction about outcomes: it is also a prediction about foreign-policy behaviour, whether intentional or otherwise. It is possible, then, to sketch a realist explanation of changes in grand strategic ideas as rational adjustments by states to changing international conditions. However, for a neorealist the causal arrow would run from international conditions to strategic behaviour, with ideas having little or no effect.\textsuperscript{109} Here, contemporary neorealists split between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ varieties. For offensive realists the competitive nature of the international system induces states to expand their


relative power wherever possible. The ‘tragedy’ of the security dilemma, to which Mearsheimer refers, is the uncertainty of intention of other states, which leads individual states to assume the worst and maximise the greatest possible margin of safety over others. Thus powerful states act as though they seek dominion, even if they only seek survival. Following from this, the only crucial difference between states and the best guide to their grand strategy is their relative power.

Offensive realists argue that rising states adopt more expansive grand strategies because they possess the power to do so, or, as Robert Gilpin puts it, “the redistribution of wealth and power toward a particular state in the international system tends to stimulate the state to demand a larger bundle of welfare and security objectives.”

The alternative strain, defensive realism, emphasises threats to national security, rather than the international distribution of power, as the primary motivating force in grand strategic behaviour. What both offensive and defensive realists share is the starting point of international conditions. Unlike their offensive cousins, however, defensive realist do not believe that capabilities specify intentions and instead they argue that there is a plurality of interests and intentions compatible with any given set of capabilities. For defensive realists the danger and uncertainty of the international system does not lead states to adopt worst-case scenarios but encourages judgements based upon the reasonable probability of threats.

The difference between the two strands matters within the bounds of this thesis because for defensive realists the specific interests and intentions of particular

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111 Ibid.
states cannot be left out of the analysis. In other words, defensive realism leaves a great deal of explanatory power to domestic level factors.  

Picking up on this, Alexander Wendt has argued that realism’s weakness is its “growing reliance on social factors to do their explanatory work [tacitly].” Causally, as Wendt suggests, “to get from anarchy and material forces to power politics and war neo-realists have been forced to make additional, ad hoc assumptions about the social structure of the international system” and its actors. As a result these ad hoc assumptions may be partly successful in producing explanatory power, but only because “the crucial causal work is done by social, not material, factors.” This, in turn, undercuts the systemic underpinning of neorealism.

In recent years there has been a sustained trend for realists to insert cultural, domestic-level, intervening variables when explaining foreign policy. Randall Schweller has suggested that this new neoclassical realism represents the “only game in town for [the] next and current generation of realists.” His claim is disputable, as there have been attempts to reinvigorate classical realism; nonetheless, a wide array of next-generation realists belong to the neoclassical realist school.

117 Ibid., 80.
118 Ibid.
120 Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), is the prime example. His attempt to fuse classical realism with ancient Greek notions of tragedy is flawed because these Greek ideals are portrayed as timeless values which remain unchanging explanatory concepts. This is a notion of ideational rigidity this thesis seeks to challenge.
These scholars take their moniker from Gideon Rose’s polemic which described their attempt to synthesise the wide-ranging insights of classical realism with the structural imperatives of neorealism in a theory which:

explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level.122

In other words, neoclassical realists still privilege material structural factors but try to take into account historical and ideological domestic factors.123 As one recent defender of neoclassical realism admitted:

For structural realists to make use of domestic politics and ideas, they have to serve the purposes of validating the central premises of structural realism: anarchy is a real force, not totally constraining, but one that cannot be ignored without severe consequences. This is in fact what neoclassical realism does. If it did anything less, we could not distinguish it from liberalism and, in many instances, constructivism.124

Neoclassical realism manages to sneak into structural analysis – hitherto only concerned with the anarchical nature of the system and the distribution of relative capabilities – a number of additional variables, chiefly the domestic politics of the state or the perceptions of the decision-making elite, or both.125 Neoclassical realists thus claim to achieve a synthesis between the rich insights of classical realists and the theoretical parsimony of their neorealist forebears.

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123 Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism.”
125 The actual intervening variable varies considerably from scholar to scholar. For Wohlforth it is misperception, for Zakaria domestic politics; for Layne it is ideology and for Dueck domestic politics and strategic culture.
Contra Waltz, neoclassical realists are putting forward a theory of foreign policy. Contra Waltz’s systemic view, a unit-based theory of foreign policy seeks to account not for similarity but for differences between states in their behaviour and “explains why different states or the same state at different historical moments, have different intentions, goals and preferences towards the outside world.” This thesis would support this goal but expresses concern with the ability of neoclassical realism to achieve it in the face of its inherent contradictions. Furthermore, neoclassical realism shares the same approach to history as neorealism, which this thesis is trying to move beyond.

Neoclassical realism suffers from the same theoretical indeterminacy as defensive realism. Quite apart from the fact that neoclassical realism is so all-encompassing that it is hard to falsify, some have claimed that it has borrowed from so many International Relations theories that it is hard to say what is uniquely realist about it. This thesis suggests that the ultimate privilege accorded to systemic factors over the long term makes neoclassical realism essentially a variant of neorealism:

For neoclassical realism to be confirmed, it is not enough to point to the influence of intervening variables such as domestic politics or misperception, or both, in order to account for behaviour that is anomalous from a systemic point of view. One must also show the system reasserting itself and emerging victorious in the end.

Thus neoclassical realism is unable to escape from the straightjacket of its own logic and deliver a theory of foreign policy, since it “cannot explain convincingly why states act differently starting from the premise that all states will have to act in the same way in the end.”

This thesis is not arguing that neo and neoclassical realism are ahistorical, as that is not the case, however, it is concerned with rectifying the type of historical analysis which systemic theories of international relations use. Neorealism does

127 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
131 Ibid., 60.
utilise history and can explain systemic change over time, but the type of history which both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism share is that which provides a grand narrative that can establish universalist propositions, and, as Lawson and Hobson suggest, this is “history without historicism.” This type of history produces what it is required to produce: lessons and rules that can inform policy-makers and support research hypotheses.

This type of historical inquiry is shared by but has not been confined to the ‘neo-neo’ schools of International Relations scholarship. It has also permeated the work of some prominent members of the post-revisionist school of diplomatic history and its study of American grand strategy, despite their associated claim to a more dispassionate assessment of the sources. When viewed from a perspective which privileges ideology, neorealism and some post-revisionist diplomatic historians have effectively served to remove the study of ideology from the history of policymaking by making ‘national security’ or the ‘national interest’ into a seemingly neutral explanatory device.

Despite John Lewis Gaddis having repudiated neorealism in the 1990s, neorealism’s logic is still evident in his more recent work, where he states that “[w]hen a power vacuum separates great powers . . . they are unlikely to fill it without bumping up against and bruising each other’s interests.” There is also a problem with the way Gaddis deploys his variant of realist logic on occasions where the U.S. committed actions that violated its proclaimed principles: in other words, Gaddis uses systemic pressure as an explanatory ‘escape clause’. As a result, the combination of neorealism and moralism he deploys is incoherent.

Melvyn Leffler shares Gaddis’s indeterminacy; for Leffler, American foreign

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133 Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics.*
136 Ibid.
138 Gaddis occupies a similar position of centrality within the field of American Cold War Diplomatic History (even if only in a negative sense for some scholars) as Kenneth Waltz does within International Relations.
139 Gaddis, *We Now Know,* 11.
140 Ibid., 157.
policy is a product of the interaction of external threats and internal core values. The problem with both Gaddis’s and Leffler’s essentially neoclassical realist framework is that, while they recognise the significance of the domestic sphere to explaining American foreign policy in principle, they neglect to develop that insight in a systematic fashion. Leffler does talk about the ‘core values’ which U.S. policy makers sought to defend – democracy, the free market, the American way of life – but there is little discussion of the meaning of these values or how they came to dominate the view of the U.S. government. They are accepted in a unproblematic way and are treated as static and unchanging; a retrospective ideological coherence is applied. Further, these ideas are transmitted into grand strategy as the desire to simply protect these values by the maintenance of a balance of power favourable to the U.S. So, whilst ostensibly including the internal processes in the explanatory framework, Leffler actually reduces them to considerations of policy-makers about how to respond to external ‘threats’ in order to create a favourable balance of power.

What this reflects is that, for the two leading post-revisionist diplomatic historians, the core values that the U.S. sought to defend were both self-evident and universal – a hostility to authoritarianism and a benevolent Wilsonian desire to spread democracy and capitalism which are traduced to a consensual banality. This approach ostensibly gives more credence to ideological factors; however, it stumbles when actually doing so. ‘Core values’ becomes an umbrella term for all ideas or interests of policy-makers without providing guidance as to how they are to be identified. The implicit logic is that systemic causes are primary but occasionally domestic factors interfere, and that is usually where systemic explanations fail to provide satisfactory answers.

**Liberalism**

Liberalism starts with a different sense of the “state of nature” metaphor to realists, which seems to owe more to Locke than to Hobbes, where far more

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142 Ibid.
cooperation is possible in the anarchic international system. Starting in the 1970s, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye re-engaged with liberalism as a response to realism. What this work and those it inspired shared was a recognition that, over the course of several hundred years, state behaviour no longer resembled its Westphalian ‘ideal type’.

Neorealist and neoliberal international relations theorists, though pursuing different arguments, are underpinned by a similar, though not identical, set of assumptions. Neoliberals distanced themselves from the classical liberalist framework, adopted some of neorealism’s theoretical rigour in the late 1970s, and took hold of some neorealist assumptions in order to restore integrity to liberal ideals. The core similarities between the two schools stem from the three basic tenants that were taken from neorealism. First, states are ‘rational egoists’; second, it is the prospect of conflict that dictates relations between states; and, third, the states are the primary actors in international relations. It was from this common basis that Robert Keohane sought to challenge neorealism, albeit from a common ontological, epistemological, and methodological basis.

In the neoliberal conception states still pursue survival as an objective and are rational actors; however, their survival is more broadly defined than simply the maximisation of power. This shifts some of the causal weight for state behaviour away from structural conditions towards domestic political institutions. In addition, the liberal conception of actor rationality suggests that states might be willing to forego competition in favour of greater gain if they can reduce the fear that other states might forego international agreements through international

148 Ibid.
150 Ibid.; Keohane, After Hegemony.
Corollaries to this are the ideas of republican liberalism, a resurrection of Kantian observations that democracies tend not to fight each other. It was Michael Doyle who expanded these claims to suggest that the nature of the domestic political system had an impact upon the international behaviour of states. Republican liberalism goes further and stresses that democracies hold common moral values which lead to what Kant suggested was a “pacific union” – not a formal peace treaty, but rather a zone of peace based on the communality of the moral system shared by democracies.

The neoliberal analysis of U.S. grand strategy after the Cold War, in both an analytic and a prescriptive sense, has been concerned with the promotion of an ‘Americanised’ international order characterised by the spread of democracy and ‘free market’ capitalism but based upon strong multilateral organisations. However, the most historically orientated example of this viewpoint is found in the work of G. John Ikenberry. In a title which plays on Keohane’s *After Hegemony*, Ikenberry suggested that after the Second World War America, as victor, sought to transform the international system through the establishment of international organisations. The shared grounding with realists in the notion of


155 Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*.


158 Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

power is key. America was able to pursue this project based upon material hegemonic capability. However, what distinguishes Ikenberry’s position from that of neorealism was the emphasis he placed upon the character of American democracy:

It was the exercise of strategic restraint – made good by an open polity and binding institutions – more than the direct and instrumental exercise of hegemonic domination that ensured a cooperative and stable postwar order.  

There are striking similarities between Ikenberry’s account of American postwar grand strategy and the narrative of American history from some ‘orthodox’ diplomatic historians who dominated the historiography of the Cold War until the 1960s. In such accounts, the United States entered the war in order to build a peace based on democracy and prosperity for all under the Atlantic Charter. The Charter represented a combination of American ideals and the principles of Wilsonian internationalism. Once victory had been achieved, postwar arrangements were to be institutionalised through new collective security organisations designed to maintain the peace. The orthodox accounts are imbued with a normative commitment to the virtuous nature of American policies and there is a marked absence of overt methodological commitments or reflection.

This thesis does not rigidly impose a taxonomic link between the schools of International Relations theory and particular waves of diplomatic history; the two do not map onto each other neatly enough to do so. Nonetheless, there is heuristic purpose in the partial overlay pursued in this chapter. Both neoliberalism and

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162 This thesis does not mean to suggest simple historical ‘progression’ between orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist accounts of U.S. diplomatic history. Even the supposed post-revisionism of Gaddis’s *We Now Know* has strong similarities with the implicit narrative of orthodoxy, even if Gaddis suggests his ‘new’ approach is methodologically superior.


neorealism share a particular approach to history that seeks to construct a grand narrative for the purposes of theory building or testing.\textsuperscript{165}

Such an approach to history occludes the study of ideology as social practice. As a result it precludes studies that seek to understand how American policy-makers viewed their place in the world and how such views were contested or reproduced over time. Neorealism may yield insight into the “endogenous logic of relations of force,” but it is too reductionist to yield insight into “social epistemology.”\textsuperscript{166} This thesis contends that texts do not yield meaning in a straightforward fashion and the idea of fundamentally timeless concepts such as ‘international anarchy’ or ‘the balance of power’ based upon stable vocabularies is useful for little other than theory creation and testing. In its place this thesis adopts “a willingness to emphasise the local and the contingent, a desire to underline the extent to which our own concepts and attitude have been shaped by particular historical circumstances.”\textsuperscript{167} As a result this theory avoids the transplanting of concepts and viewpoints across time and between different historical actors and in so doing avoids the imposition of a retrospective “mythology of coherence”\textsuperscript{168} into understandings of American exceptionalism at different points in time.

**Neo-Gramscian\textsuperscript{169} International Relations**

Robert Cox is credited with having introduced International Relations scholars to the work of the Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci.\textsuperscript{170} Not only did Cox offer an alternative to the ‘neo-neo’ dominance within International Relations but he suggested a new conception of hegemony at the international level. This thesis explores Gramscian thought because it provides an alternative way of theorising about ideology at both the domestic and international level and, like Skinnerian

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\textsuperscript{165} For an account of the use of history in International Relations theory see George Lawson, “The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations*, (2010), 4–8.


\textsuperscript{168} Lawson, “The Eternal Divide?” 14.

\textsuperscript{169} This thesis differentiates between ‘Gramscian’ theories about the state at a domestic level and ‘Neo-gramscian’ theories in International Relations, which are explicitly concerned with international hegemony.

contextualism, it is focused on conceptual change and conflict (albeit with some important differences). In short, it seeks “to explain the way in which dominant ideas about world order help to sustain particular patterns of relations among material forces, ideas and institutions at a global level.”¹⁷¹ The appeal of Gramsci to International Relations scholars is that:

[H]is work provides an ontological and epistemological foundation upon which to construct a non-deterministic yet structurally grounded explanation of change . . . By insisting on the transformative capacity of human beings, Gramsci’s radical embrace of human subjectivity provides IR scholars with one way of avoiding a deterministic and ahistorical structuralism.¹⁷²

However, the utility of exploring Gramsci for this thesis is that his reconfiguration of the concept of base and superstructure and avoidance of a teleological, deterministic reading of Marx did not engage in economic reductionism. Instead his theories were concerned with culture, identity, and hegemony.¹⁷³ Via Gramsci, Cox brought this idea of ‘hegemony’ into International Relations theory, specifically problematising the conception of power. As a result, hegemony at a global level cannot simply be equated with military force or economic might. Cox reasserted Gramsci’s insight that the power of a ruling class was exercised not simply by coercion but also through the capacity to gain the consent of the people, to make the questioning of certain key ideas beyond consideration and instead accepted as ‘common sense’.¹⁷⁴ Although Cox meant to deploy Gramsci at an international level to describe hegemonic world order, this thesis is more interested in Cox’s critique of International Relations theory and more concerned with Gramsci’s own work, rather than Cox’s international reformulation of it.¹⁷⁵ Gramsci’s ‘war of position’ has some conceptual similarity to Skinner’s model of

¹⁷⁵ There has been heated debate about whether Cox (and those who rely on him for their understanding of Gramsci) misinterpreted Gramsci; see Germain and Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci,” and the response, Mark Rupert, “(Re-)Engaging Gramsci: A Response to Germain and Kenny,” Review of International Studies, 24, no. 3 (1998): 427–34.
ideological innovation in that it required intellectuals\textsuperscript{176} (similar to Skinner’s ‘innovating ideologists’) to start the war of position by basing their arguments in the ‘common sense’ of hegemony.\textsuperscript{177}

Cox picked up on these features to develop a historical approach capable of recognising historical change and contestation. In so doing he made the point that critical theories challenge the problem-solving theories such as neorealism and neoliberalism by calling into question the fixed order that such theories take as their starting point.\textsuperscript{178} While class struggle or other factors can be placed within such an approach, they become simply “one analytical lens, not a privileged one”\textsuperscript{179} and it “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and whether they might be in the process of changing.”\textsuperscript{180}

Neo-Gramscian thought is often associated with studies of International Political Economy and has examined the assertion of American (economic) hegemony through international institutions.\textsuperscript{181} Such an approach differs from this thesis’s concentration on the domestic level and focus on grand strategy. However, a number of scholars of American foreign policy have been inspired by Gramscian approaches.\textsuperscript{182} These studies are largely polarised, with the majority focusing on

\begin{itemize}
\item Gramsci’s differentiation between ‘traditional’ and ‘organic’ intellectuals is beyond the scope of this thesis but in this context it refers to those intellectuals who seek counter hegemony.
\item Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 129.
\end{itemize}
the earlier periods of what became known as the Cold War and the rest on the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. In other words, they focus almost exclusively on moments of American assertion of hegemony. Most of these Gramscian studies examine the interaction between state and civil society in functionally creating hegemonies and counter hegemonies, and, as a result, there is an underlying materialist bias to these studies, rather than a sustained focus on the content of the ideologies.

This thesis has more in common with the ideologically orientated studies which have taken the Gramscian notion of ‘common sense’ amongst the civil–military American elite as a starting point and have then sought to disentangle what ‘common sense’ meant at that particular moment. It shares a commitment to the Gramscian discovery of norms and practice, which can be seen as consistent with Skinnerian ideology and practical context. Equally, in adopting Skinnerian contextualism this thesis shares with Gramscians the notion of historically specific conceptions of the world as responses to specific problems. Where this thesis overlaps empirically with the Gramscian scholarship, particularly in its analysis of the Bush Doctrine, there is considerable congruence. However, this

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183 These studies focus on the interaction between government and extra and quasi-governmental groups such as think tanks and the Congress for Cultural Freedom.
184 Bridoux, “Postwar Reconstruction”; Lucas, Freedom’s War; “Beyond Freedom, Beyond Control”; Parmar, “Mobilizing America for an Internationalist Foreign Policy”; “Anglo-American Elites in the Interwar Years”; “To Relate Knowledge and Action”; Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy; Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture; Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?
185 For example, Egan, “Globalization and the Invasion of Iraq,” 192, uses the term ‘neoliberalism’ simply as a representation of class-based agency rather than a term in need of further analysis.
186 Dodge, “The Sardinian, the Texan and the Tikriti”; “Coming Face to Face with Bloody Reality”; “The Ideological Roots of Failure”.
thesis focuses primarily on ideological contestation and change, which is similar to (but not synonymous with) the ‘war of position’ in Gramscian terms. The difference is that this thesis is concerned with an intra-elite form of ideological contestation, not the seeds of proletarian revolution of which the ‘war of position’ was an integral part.

This difference is not surprising. Where Gramsci was motivated by activism, Skinner is concerned with perfecting historical method, and pursues a different project as a result. This is an important difference between the Gramscian approach and Skinnerian contextualism. Gramscian analysis engages with history to ‘shed light on’ the present condition; it is based on a “philosophy of praxis.” In Cox’s famous phrase, “[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose.” Cox’s statement does not just reveal what he perceived as deficiencies within then-dominant approaches in International Relations theory; it also reveals the core of the Gramscian project. As Gramsci elucidated his own commitment to the ‘philosophy of praxis’:

The real philosopher is, and cannot be other than, the politician, the active man who modifies the environment, understanding by environment the ensemble of relations which each of us enters to take part in. If one’s own individuality means to acquire consciousness of these relations and to modify one’s own personality means to modify the ensemble of these relations.

As a result, Gramscian analysis of hegemony and ‘common sense’ is concerned with disrupting the translation and transmission of political and philosophical ideas for mass consumption. This translates into the Gramscian scholarship of American strategic thought. For instance, Dodge is concerned with “the influence that Neo-Liberalism and its cousin Neo-Conservatism had on the Common Sense

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188 See Chapter 1 of this thesis for an explication of Skinner’s methodology and this chapter for analysis of his knowledge claims.
189 Gramsci used the term “The philosophy of praxis”; see Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 319.
190 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 128.
191 Some studies of Gramsci have suggested that his use of the term ‘philosophy of praxis’ was simply intended to disguise his references to Marxism; this thesis does not share such a limited interpretation. See Sue Golding, Gramsci’s Democratic Theory: Contributions to a Post-Liberal Democracy (Toronto, Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 145 [note 3].
192 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 352; emphasis added.
decision-making of American government *functionaries on the ground* in Baghdad.”

Margaret Leslie’s and Joseph Femia’s critiques of Skinner reveal much of the difference between his project and Gramsci’s. In attacking contextualism they suggest that ‘anachronistic’ readings and strained analogies may, in the hands of gifted thinkers such as Gramsci, prove to be politically persuasive. In his study of Machiavelli, Gramsci suggested that the Communist Party was a modern *Principe*, making use of what he interpreted to be Machiavelli’s notion of an all-powerful *Principe*. By substituting ‘party’ for *Principe*, Gramsci was able to adapt his reading of Machiavelli’s argument to his own (very different) context. Gramsci’s use of Machiavelli would, by Skinner’s judgement, be anachronistic, but for Gramsci as a political actor it served a very specific purpose. Skinner grants no such licence to scholars of political thought and his riposte to Gramsci, Leslie, and Femia would probably be that Gramsci’s notion of ‘political party’ was simply not available to Machiavelli. In Skinner’s terminology, Gramsci would be categorised as an ‘innovating ideologist’.

This thesis is not advocating a ‘philosophy of praxis’; instead, it is concerned with archaeological reconstruction of how human collectivities organise and constitute themselves and how they construct and impose an understanding of that process. As one reviewer woefully commented of Skinner, “if theoretical manoeuvres are political in that they are directed at an ‘audience to be moved,’ in what direction is Skinner’s audience encouraged to move?” Skinner provides no such answer. In contrast, for Gramsci scholarship and activism remain...

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193 Dodge, “Coming Face to Face with Bloody Reality,” 258; emphasis added.
195 Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 147–8. (Gramsci’s exact term is “totalitarian” parties but his usage seems to suggest he is referring to the Communist party. It does not seem to be disparaging and the translators say they have translated it as meaning ‘global’ elsewhere); see footnote 33, 147.
196 The term is from Michel Foucault’s *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. and ed. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock Publications, 1972); although sharing some of Foucault’s early insight, Skinner’s project ultimately follows a different path. See later in this chapter for an assessment of Skinner’s knowledge claims and where this positions him in the post-positivist spectrum.
indivisible and the very idea of political neutrality is impossible.gramscian thought would deny skinner the epistemic privilege of even attempting to reduce the impact of contemporary subjectivity, regardless of his method.

quentin skinner’s project and the linguistic turn

the inability to establish direct causation between ‘culture’ and ‘behaviour’ – ‘once so easily lined up on either side of the great cartesian divide’ has directed more critical scholars dealing with culture and ideology to the concept of discourse. as stated by r. b. j. walker, terms such as discourse are “used to suggest a more complex and mutually constitutive interplay of phenomena” (consciousness and matter). they:

stress the way seemingly abstract ideas and seemingly concrete processes converge in texts and institutions. . . . Those now working with culture are now likely to refer to “cultural practices” . . . that are embodied in all forms of social activity.

walker points to language’s role in the construction of social life, the ‘linguistic turn’ long ignored by the positivist mainstream of academic international relations.

post-structuralists, some feminists, and many constructivists have seized on the possibilities that such an approach offers. the rise of critical theory and post-positivist orientations in the field of international relations has manifested

198 femia, “an historicist critique,” 169–70.
200 r. b. j. walker, “the concept of culture in the theory of international relations,” in culture and international relations, ed. jongsuk chay (new york: praeger, 1990), 5.
201 ibid.
202 see emanuel adler, “seizing the middle ground: constructivism in world politics,” european journal of international relations, 3, no. 3 (1997): 319–63; daniel m. green, constructivism and comparative politics (armonk, n.y.: m. e. sharpe, 2002); ted hopf, “the promise of constructivism in international relations theory,” international security, 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200; audie klotz and cecelia lynch, strategies for research in constructivist international relations (armonk, n.y.: m. e. sharpe, 2007).
203 meant in this instance in the sense of the critical theory of the frankfurt school and its heirs. for an overview see david held, introduction to critical theory: horkheimer to habermas (berkeley, Calif.: university of california press, 1980), and for critical theory in international relations see richard wyn jones, critical theory and world politics (boulder, Colo.: lynne rienner publishers, 2001).
204 see chris brown, international relations theory: new normative approaches (new york; london: columbia university press, 1992) for an overview of the projects of critical theory and post-positivism and their relationship to international relations theory; see also richard price and
in various ways, but many scholars have taken an interest in the language of international politics as the discipline of international relations takes its own linguistic turn. Reflecting varying epistemological commitments, these theories have been inspired by different traditions, such as the universal pragmatics of Habermas, the ordinary language analysis of Wittgenstein and Austin, and the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer.

Nonetheless, it often seems that scholars of international relations have remained oblivious to the methodological revolution that has taken place since the 1960s within the study of the history of political thought. This revolution has been spearheaded by Quentin Skinner, John Dunn, and J. G. A. Pocock, the so-called Cambridge School. Although the Cambridge School remains controversial and its members are not as unified in their approach as their sobriquet suggests, they do share the notion that consideration of a text’s linguistic context is necessary and perhaps sufficient for understanding that text. The methodological battle that their work has triggered has resulted in improved approaches to recovering the meaning of texts.


Ibid.; For a useful discussion of the meaning of ‘context’ and historical contextualism in particular, see Stephanie Lawson, “Political Studies and the Contextual Turn: A Methodological/Normative Critique,” *Political Studies*, 56 (2008), 588–92.

Given the ‘fifty years’ rift\textsuperscript{213} between International Relations and the discipline of history, it is not surprising that the field of International Relations has overlooked the Cambridge School, divided as they are by a common language. As the history of diplomatic archives moved from the margins, the field of international relations became more theoretical and positivistic. The two disciplines’ methods and aspirations increasingly diverged. This had not always been the case. From Thucydides to Ranke, the main concern of historical writing had been topics that would become the locus of study for international relations: war and peace, diplomacy and law, sovereignty and the state. As David Armitage notes, the separation of the disciplines has occurred within the last fifty years or so.\textsuperscript{214} The result within international relations has been the emergence of two forms of ahistoricism, “history as scripture and as butterfly.”\textsuperscript{215} Positivists have tended to pursue the scripture approach, in which history becomes “a predetermined site for the empirical verification of abstract claims.”\textsuperscript{216} In pursuing the butterfly approach, post-positivists have reduced historical inquiry to the identification of “contingent hiccups,” the identification of which is instrumental in uncovering “power–knowledge nexuses.”\textsuperscript{217} Barry Buzan and Richard Little went further in identifying in International Relations “the prevalence of a-historical, even anti historical, attitudes in formulating the concept of an international system” to explain why “International Relations has failed as an intellectual project” and can be rescued only by a return to history.\textsuperscript{218}

It is strange, then, that as a discipline International Relations has not been more responsive to the critique of intellectual history which the disparate members of the Cambridge School started in the 1960s. They were responding to the same types of concern that Buzan and Little would identify as undermining the field of International Relations forty years later. The Cambridge School thinkers did not conceptualise intellectual history as distinct from political theory, which would

\textsuperscript{214} Armitage, “Fifty Years’ Rift.”
\textsuperscript{215} Lawson, “The Eternal Divide?” 3.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 2–3.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., 5–6.
have allowed political theorists to continue in their anachronism. In particular, Skinner’s work is not just of methodological interest. His brand of contextualism comes close to reconstituting historical inquiry as social theory and thus requires detailed examination.

For Skinner, the central problem remains that we cannot interpret historical authors as discussing issues of contemporary relevance but must attempt to understand their work as a response to their own, historically specific, concerns. Of central importance is what Skinner identified as the ‘mythologies’ often present in the study of political thought.219 The first mythology of doctrines consists of interpreting authors as if their writings were an attempt to expound a complete doctrine on a subject, a doctrine that subsequent generations would easily recognise. For Skinner the effects were twofold: an overestimation of the significance of what might be “scattered or incidental remarks” and a risk of attributing doctrines to authors without considering whether they would have or could have expressed an opinion on the relevant subjects.220 Skinner’s position is based on the presupposition that to understand an author’s position is to understand it as a response to a particular debate. The mythology of doctrines is based on the false assumption that such debates are perennial. Skinner’s project thus turns on the historical specificity of the concerns of the authors under examination.

The second mythology is that of prolepsis, which elides historical specificity. Prolepsis in the Skinnerian sense is the description of past texts in terms of their subsequent influence. In Skinnerian terminology this is the texts’ significance, which Skinner contrasts with the meaning or author’s intention. The effect of such an approach is that “no place is left for the analysis of what its author may have intended or meant.”221 Thus, authorial intention is historically specific, and actual intention depends on the particular possible intentions available to the author. Apart from being philosophically untenable, the neglect of historical specificity leads to two types of parochialism: the assumption that past authors were responding to what we now regard as canonical authors; and “conceptualiz[ing]

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221 Ibid., 72.
an argument in such a way that its alien elements dissolve into a misleading familiarity.”

Skinner seems caught in a ‘catch-22’: his theory implies that any attempt to bring a past text into the context of the present will dissolve its specificity, rendering its meaning unrecoverable. Aware of these contradictions, Skinner states that “we must learn to do our thinking for ourselves” and that the “philosophical, even moral, value” of past texts lies in their distance from the present, the very way in which they demonstrate the contingency of present ways of framing political questions. The scholar’s concern thus becomes to uncover past political thought in its unfamiliarity. That is, the scholar can retrieve a specific conception that can be contrasted with other temporally specific conceptions. Thus, the process of retrieval is not just of historical significance but also “of immediate philosophical relevance.”

By extending Austin’s speech-act theory to account for the difference between a speech act and a text production, Skinner created a method that allows one to recover past political thought without reducing it to familiarity. Skinner’s famous dictum that political texts are attempts to “do things with words” focuses his interest in Austin on the distinction between locution and illocution. Skinner’s key insight is that locution and illocution are conceptually separable but independent: “[t]here can be no doubt that the meaning of utterances helps to limit the range of illocutionary forces they can bear.” Skinner sees authorial intention and conventions as intimately connected. For Skinner, the central issue is “the relationship between the linguistic dimension of illocutionary force and the capacity of speakers to exploit that dimension.”

Here Skinner usefully deviates from Austin. Derrida’s critique of Austin elucidates the nature of the difference. Like Skinner, Derrida praises Austin’s speech-act theory for seemingly avoiding construing language in terms of the

222 Ibid., 74, 76.
225 Ibid., II, 195.
226 Ibid., I, 103.
227 Ibid., I, 114.
228 Ibid., I, 105.
communication of transparently accessible meaning. Derrida rejects the idea that the meaning in which readers are interested is transparently accessible in the text. He finds fault with Austin’s examination of failed performances. According to Derrida, Austin is aware that the failure of a speech act is a permanent possibility, that “all conventional acts are exposed to failure.” Derrida’s key criticism is that Austin fails to acknowledge that this permanent possibility is in fact necessary; something that prevents language’s proper operation is not something outside of language but is inherent in the way language functions.

This condition of both success and failure lies in what Derrida calls ‘iterability’. As Austin emphasises, to carry illocutionary force a speech act must occur according to certain conventions; it must repeat certain ritualistic forms (e.g., ‘I promise,’ ‘I name this ship’). However, the iterability of utterances that allows their conventional functioning is a general property that also allows them to be repeated in circumstances in which they do not perform the associated illocutionary act, notably when they are performed theatrically or ironically or just in a different context. Austin excludes such language uses, but they depend on precisely the same iterability as successful ‘serious’ use of language.

Derrida emphasises that for Austin it is the speaker’s intention that ultimately ensures an utterance’s ‘seriousness’. However, if this intention is to overcome the aporias of conventionality, it must be separate from convention. Thus, Austin fails to account for meaning that does not depend on some foundational, transparently accessible meaning. If intentions are to exclude the failure that is a necessary possibility of language use, they must be fully present in either the speaker or the text.

Thus, for Skinner’s theory of language to accomplish what he wants, he cannot depend on this form of intentionality. For those interested in historical texts, the author is never present, and to assume the presence of meaning in a text absent its context condemns us to Skinner’s vision of parochialism. Leaving aside

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230 Ibid., 100.
231 Ibid., 101.
232 Ibid., 103.
233 Ibid., 106.
objections one might hold with respect to the philosophical basis of intentionality, such an approach is unavailable to Skinner because he is interested in interpreting texts when the author is not present and therefore the author’s mental state at the time of writing is unrecoverable. Thus, Skinner emphasises intention in writing (which exists to the extent that it is manifested by the produced text) rather than the motive for writing (which may be separate from the text and inaccessible).\textsuperscript{234}

Skinner’s alternative to causal explanation is explanation by redescription. Rather than explaining an action by saying why it was done, redescription attempts to convey an action’s meaning or, as Skinner puts it, “[w]hat an illocutionary redescription will characteristically explain about a social action will be its point.”\textsuperscript{235} Redescribing an utterance identifies what it is. On that basis, Skinner positions redescription before causal explanation: we need to know an act’s type before we can explain why the act was performed. Redescription does not point to anything separate from the utterance, whereas a causal explanation must identify something separate that caused the utterance. If describing an utterance is a form of redescription, then the identified intention will not be some property of an author separate from a text but a property manifested by the text. The sort of meaning at issue here is social meaning, a property of a text within its social context.\textsuperscript{236} The redescriptions with which we can acceptably explain an utterance are limited by the meanings available to the utterance’s author. These meanings are a matter of the language employed by the speaker and their audience.

Skinner refers to a pervasive ideological context and discusses a cultural lexicon.\textsuperscript{237} This lexicon consists of the words available to us, their interrelationships, the circumstances in which we legimately apply them, and the evaluative forces they can be made to bear.\textsuperscript{238} By way of example, he considers Marcel Duchamp’s ‘ready-mades’ and whether they can be considered works of art. Skinner suggests that the debate centres on the meaning of the term art, whether ready-mades fall within the category of art (are objects not deliberately

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{235} Ibid., I, 137.
\textsuperscript{236} Ibid., I, 135.
\textsuperscript{237} Skinner, “Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts,”; Skinner, “Hermeneutics and the Role of History,”.
\textsuperscript{238} Skinner, \textit{Visions of Politics}, I, 163–9.
\end{footnotesize}
created as art, still art?), the relation of art to other concepts (can an object be both useful and a work of art?), and art’s value.\textsuperscript{239} In this sense a context is a complex structure of words and possible practices.

Although Skinner has suggested that his methodology is fundamentally about understanding authorial intentionality, this is necessarily linked to understanding atemporally specific cultural lexicon. The lexicon can be conceptually distinguished from particular discursive acts that employ it, but can be accessed only through such discursive acts. Therefore, understanding authorial intentions in the Skinnerian sense becomes a matter of extracting from the text conceptual structures that evince the existence of the intentions.

In his response to Saul Kripke, Thomas Kuhn goes some way in addressing how we might achieve this goal via his consideration of the concept of ‘paradigm’\textsuperscript{240}. Kripke argued that a term’s referent is determined by the term’s history, the causal chain connecting users of the term to the object to which it refers.\textsuperscript{241} Kuhn adds that the causal chain cannot be given for individual terms without reference to other terms.\textsuperscript{242} Terms are introduced into a pre-existing vocabulary by reference to terms already in that vocabulary. Kuhn gives examples of terms that are introduced as part of a group of interrelated terms, such as acceleration, force, and mass.\textsuperscript{243} Such groupings are relevant to terms common to political thought, such as democracy, rights, or liberty, which do not generally deal with objects that can be given an ostensive definition.

Kuhn’s point is that this holism produces quasi-analytic statements which must be accepted as a precondition of using the terms involved with other members of the linguistic community.\textsuperscript{244} Studying the history of these terms allows us to identify these quasi-analytic statements and thus recover the structure of the vocabularies they constitute, their causal relation with the world, and the internal relations between concepts. Studying the arguments presented and accepted by past authors

\textsuperscript{239} Ibid., I, 163–4.
\textsuperscript{242} Kuhn, The Road Since Structure, 43–4.
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., 67.
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., 304.
with a view to the presuppositions that underlie these arguments allows us to delineate the context within which they worked. This would enable the Skinnerian project of recovering past theories and the structure that makes them unfamiliar because such theories bear associations and presuppositions alien to our way of thinking.

Thus, understanding past political thought depends on understanding what is unfamiliar in the vocabulary of past political writing. The focus on a historically specific context allows Skinner to isolate and retrieve political thought from a particular period. The virtue is that it disrupts a teleological sense of political thought. As expressed by Skinner, an awareness of the contingency of political values:

> can help liberate us from the grip of any one hegemonic account of those values and how they should be interpreted and understood. Equipped with a broader sense of possibility, we can stand back from the intellectual commitments we have inherited and ask ourselves in a new spirit of enquiry what we should think of them.\(^{245}\)

In some sense, Skinner’s project continues E. H. Carr’s view of history as a social process.\(^{246}\) In that view, historians immerse themselves in ‘‘knowledge cultures’, modes of thinking and reasoning practices which emerged in specific contexts and which help to translate historical materials into social facts.”\(^{247}\)

One of Skinner’s central concerns is investigating language’s role in shaping political actions, in particular political principles (in this thesis, American exceptionalism). Political realists and scholars with other perspectives have argued that professed political principles play little role in shaping political action, that expedient justification obscures real motives, so principles remain epiphenomenal. For them the object of study must be material power and interests (military or economic, depending on their persuasion). At the other extreme lies the assumption that political agents act in accordance with sincere beliefs. The direction of causality is thus clear, and the analyst is tasked with grasping the

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\(^{247}\) Lawson, “The Eternal Divide?” 9.
professed principles and matching them with the behaviour of the actor being investigated. Neither extreme is satisfactory.

Skinner’s theory appeals largely because it reverses the direction of causation between speech and action.²⁴⁸ Whatever a political agent’s motive for adopting a particular action, the agent must justify it through reference to existing language conventions. In turn, this will affect what the agent is able to articulate and act on. Deviating too far from these lexical parameters would jeopardise political legitimacy because it would involve the relinquishing of intelligibility. This is of particular relevance in assessing what Skinner terms ‘untoward’ behaviour, which violates the conventions of the time. According to Skinner, the task of the ‘innovative ideologist’ is to legitimate untoward social actions by manipulating the meaning and application of concepts in order to modify political behaviour.²⁴⁹

By examining the intersubjective meanings of ‘evaluative-descriptive’ terms such as freedom, patriotism, and security, which describe and normatively evaluate an action, we can glimpse the establishment and reproduction of a society’s normative parameters. However, these concepts are unstable and open to challenge, manipulation, and transformation. As stated by Duncan Bell:

> The essence of conceptual change thus lies in the malleable relationship between sense and reference through time and across space. How this change occurs is necessarily political since it involves conflict over meaning and action.²⁵⁰

**Skinnerian contextualism and constructivism**

The point of utilising Skinnerian contextualism is not to become mired in the history-versus-theory debate or to artificially claim that emphasising the role of language is alien to the field of international relations. Instead, this approach allows a focus on the role of history and conceptual change and illuminates “how political legitimacy is embedded in the set of political vocabularies available at a given time.”²⁵¹ As Lawson puts it, “moments in time take on relatively stable, ²⁴⁸ Duncan S. A. Bell, “Language, Legitimacy, and the Project of Critique,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27, no. 3 (2002), 5.
²⁵¹ Ibid., 327.
meaningful shapes drawn from the interaction between particular events and the repertoires of meaning brought to bear on the historical meaning.”

This thesis builds upon the research agenda of constructivist international relations and suggests that Skinnerian contextualism is a good methodological fit with constructivist theories. Constructivism is “best understood as a metatheoretical commitment” and in International Relations that commitment is “about human consciousness and its role in international life.” Specifically, a constructivist approach asserts that:

(a) human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; (b) the most important ideational factors are widely shared or “intersubjective” beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and (c) these shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors.

Thus it makes the epistemological claim that meaning and hence knowledge is socially constructed, because concepts are the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Furthermore, this knowledge is socially constructed. Concepts are part of language and language cannot be reduced to something subjective or objective:

It is not subjective, since it exists independently of us to the extent that language is always more than its individual usages and prior to them. It is not objective, since it does not exist independently of our minds and our usage (language exists and changes through our use). It is intersubjective.

These features make constructivism different from realism and liberalism; equally, constructivist analyses use an ideational ontology, so it is not a theory of

258 Ibid.
politics but rather a social theory that makes claims about the nature of social life and about social change. As a result it does not, on its own, produce specific predictions about political outcomes that could be tested in social scientific research.\(^{259}\)

The constructivist umbrella covers a wide variety of commitments and approaches. Alexander Wendt’s ‘systemic’ constructivism has focused on the interaction between states in the international system.\(^{260}\) Martha Finnemore has focused on the norms of international society and their effect on state identities and interests.\(^{261}\) In the sub-genre defining book edited by Peter Katzenstein, a variety of arguments suggest that culture, norms, and identity matter in constructing national security.\(^{262}\)

Ted Hopf suggests that there is actually a split within constructivism between ‘conventional’ and ‘critical’ versions.\(^{263}\) Whilst they share a rejection of ‘mainstream’ IR, critical constructivists owe much to post-modern and post-structural approaches, primarily the assumption that actor and observer cannot be separated.\(^{264}\) The key issues for conventional constructivists are norms and identity; for critical constructivists, power and discourse. The suggestion is that conventional constructivists operate between the ‘mainstream’ of International Relations and critical theory.\(^{265}\) Conventional constructivists differ from rationalists in their ontology because they emphasise a social ontology: “they emphasize how ideational or normative structures constitute agents and their interests.”\(^{266}\) In this configuration, conventional constructivism complements

\(^{259}\) Finnemore and Sikkink, “Taking Stock,” 393.


\(^{263}\) As Hopf notes in ibid., 181 (footnote 29), Jesperson et al., (“Norms, Identity, and Culture,” 46 [notes 41 and 42]) seek to differentiate themselves from the “radical constructivist” position of Richard Ashley, David Campbell, and R. B. J Walker.


\(^{265}\) Ibid., 171–200.

rationalism with sociological perspectives but does not diverge substantially on issues of epistemology or methodology. Thus, whilst the commitment of conventional constructivists to social ontology differs significantly from the mainstream of International Relations scholarship, they use positivist epistemology.

In contrast, others have elaborated on critical epistemological positions available to constructivists, stating that “the new generation of critical theorists (in the 1990s) has been labelled ‘constructivists’ because of their characteristic concern with the social construction of world politics.”267 As Price and Reus-Smit suggest, the most important difference between conventional (or ‘modernist’ in their terminology) and critical (‘postmodernist’ in their terms) constructivism is analytical, “the former concentrating on the sociolinguistic construction of subjects and objects in world politics and the latter focusing on the relationship between power and knowledge.”268

What emerges is that, although constructivism has become mainstream in International Relations over the past decade, an ordered and consistent methodological framework or object of study is rare.269 As a result, the treatment of American grand strategy by constructivist scholars has been strongly contested.270 So, whilst they may have agreed on the importance of collective understandings of foreign policy, Jackson and Nexon made an important critical refutation of Legro’s conventional constructivist account of ideational change in American grand strategy. They suggested that he implicitly relied on “functionalist reasoning”271 and, furthermore, they contended that he could not adequately explain the ideational shift from unilateralism to internationalism in U.S. grand strategy: “[I]t is not simply the ‘availability’ of a better heterodoxy that explains American internationalism, but the concrete ways in which the

267 Price and Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons?” 266.
268 Ibid., 268.
diffusion of specific ideas altered extant political and ideological networks to make them ripe for transformation."

This thesis is sympathetic to Jackson and Nexon’s point. Legro repeated his own problematic failure to adequately explain ideational change and the question of where new ideas came from is one he admits that his theoretical position cannot explain. This thesis deploys Skinnerian contextualism because whilst it rectifies Legro’s position by providing an account of ideological change it does so without Jackson’s attempt to imbue concepts themselves with agency, “as alternate logics of identity are simply swept away.”

In important respects this thesis also departs from structural versions of constructivist research in international relations and the traditional history of political thought. First, unlike many constructivist studies, it seeks to engage with interests and ideas at a domestic, rather than international, level. This is an attempt to “bring society back into social constructivism . . . the society within states rather than the society between them.” As Deniz Kandiyoti observes: “[t]he question of what and who constitutes the West, or any Other, often has less to do with the outside world than with the class, religious or ethnic cleavages within the nation itself.”

Second, this thesis will treat exceptionalism as a form of ideology. The texts dealt with are not on the whole explicit political theory, although some are. Historians

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272 Ibid., 18.
275 Ibid., 182.
276 Jackson, “Whose Identity?” 175, 186.
278 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, xiv.
of political thought have usually treated the history of the state’s ideas as the history of the *polis*, ‘the self-contained, firmly bounded, sovereign and integrated community’. However, a series of authors have applied Cambridge School contextualism to international political theory, various strands of ideology, and more contemporary periods, thereby expanding the temporal scope and focus of such study. On the whole, the texts examined in this thesis do not deal with self-conscious political theory – at least, not in the traditional sense. However, grand strategy is necessarily an expression of a worldview and, in the case of the objects of this thesis, how the United States engages with the world and to what end.

Although it is difficult to *neatly* place Quentin Skinner within the taxonomy of International Relations theory, this thesis argues that his approach is consistent with constructivist thought. As Chris Brown has suggested, “many and various are the positions which hold that there is something fundamentally suspect about the thought of modernity.” Skinner perhaps sits in an isolated corner of the range of post-positivist thought. It is unlikely that he would consider himself a post-modernist or post-structuralist, but, nonetheless, he does raise the type of doubts about the “‘Iron cage’ of reason” which are characteristic of post-positivist approaches. Crucially, Skinner makes considerably stronger epistemological claims than many post-structuralists. So, as the last section concluded, whilst Skinner might agree with Derrida that contexts in their entirety cannot be retrieved, for him there is a relevant context outside the text which can be *plausibly* described.

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283 Ibid., 197.
Although Skinner himself claimed that his notion of context seemed to leave “the traditional figure of the author in extremely poor health . . . mere precipitates of their context,” such a conclusion is excessive. Context of the Skinnerian kind is precisely what provides the possibility for authors to act. Skinner is making the claim that authors are acting when delivering their utterances into an existing context and thus that the illocutionary force of an utterance will reveal “what the author was doing in issuing it.” For both Skinner and constructivists, “the fact that history is ‘interpretation dependent’ does not mean it is unknowable, only that the test of historical knowledge must be plausibility not infallibility.”

This thesis suggests that such knowledge claims are consistent with constructivist thought. Perhaps the only way to study what Anthony Gidden termed “structuration” is diachronically. As expressed by Christian Reus-Smit, “[y]ou have to cut into a social order at a particular time, identify the agents and social structures, and then trace how they condition one another over time.” Although Skinner’s own corpus of work seems to deny the utility of studying concepts over long periods, Melvin Richter has suggested using the Cambridge School contextualism to examine the different meanings and usages of political concepts over time, his aim being to trace breaks in the use of particular concepts in order to determine how particular canons or tropes are reproduced and reworked over time.

Reus-Smit makes the point that the constructivist philosophy of history is essentially Skinnerian, even if it departs from Skinner’s approach with regard to comparative case studies and macro-history. Crucially for both Skinner and constructivists, history is “a knowable realm of human experience, about the role of ideas in constituting that experience and about the appropriate methods for

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286 Ibid., I, 118.
287 Ibid., I, 98.
290 Reus-Smit, “Reading History Through Constructivist Eyes,” 397.
292 Ibid.
interpreting the constitutive role of ideas.” Contra Ranke, such an approach is apparent as far back as Carr’s assertion that the “belief in [a] hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy.” According to Carr, a fact “is like a sack – it won’t stand up until you’ve put something in it.”

With social history, “the presence of ambiguity and the virtuosity of the interpretative act are at a premium.” Reus-Smit indicates that the constructivist position with regard to history’s ‘knowability’ is both ontological and epistemological: history comprises an infinite array of facts that can be put together in a variety of ways and that depend on interpretation. Skinner applies similar logic in asserting that if, like Derrida, an interpretation has to be certain rather than merely plausible, then the intention with which a text was written and what the author meant can never be retrieved. Skinner’s point is that such a position “is insisting on too stringent an account of what it means to have reasons for our beliefs.”

Skinner emphasises hermeneutic interpretation over causal explanation. His preoccupation with the relationship between text and context does not imply a causal or determinative role for context. The social context is relevant only insofar as it conditions the interpreter’s understanding of what constitutes the range of conventionally recognisable meanings within a particular society.

Skinner’s approach is relevant to this thesis largely because this study presupposes the necessity of discussing the social and political context within which change takes place when studying change in a political concept such as American exceptionalism. For Skinner, such study should include the agent’s intention, the meaning of statements, their force, and their effects on listeners and readers.

293 Reus-Smit, “Reading History Through Constructivist Eyes,” 400.
295 Ibid., 11.
297 Reus-Smit, 403–4.
298 Skinner, “Meaning and Context,” 64.
300 Ibid.
This thesis recognises that it does not fully meet Skinner’s methodological demands; it is arguable how many Skinnerian inspired studies actually do, and Quentin Skinner’s own research, whilst extensive, is not exhaustive. The intentions of authors, the force of their statements, and their statements’ effects on others are requirements far too strict for a comparative study of four different time periods covering over half a century. Within its limited strictures no thesis could provide a comprehensive study of contextual factors. However, this thesis also contends that a less than comprehensive contextual survey is still intellectually illuminating and contextualism need not be exhaustive. Unlike the work of Skinner himself, this thesis also attempts to recreate the context at four historically separate juncures.

It is important to note that the use of Skinnerian contextualism leads to a fundamentally different understanding of American exceptionalism to the existing scholarship. This difference manifests empirically but also theoretically, in the explication of how exceptionalism is inculcated into American grand strategy. Although conventional treatments of exceptionalism have differed in their conclusions, they have repeated the same methodological mistake. This mistake is evident in Hunt’s suggestion that:

Because of a remarkable cultural stability, Americans have felt no urgent need to take their foreign-policy ideology out for major overhaul or replacement but have instead enjoyed the luxury of being able able by and large to take it for granted…Americans could afford to leave their ideology implicit and informal.

This thesis fundamentally challenges the suggestion that American exceptionalism has meant the same thing in different epochs. Instead the

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301 This thesis was inspired by Duncan S. A. Bell’s *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007). Whilst owing his methodology to Skinner, Bell necessarily sketches the context rather than exhaustively surveying the primary documents, a task beyond a single volume and, as Skinner’s own corpus suggests, perhaps even a single lifetime.


304 Even attempts to grapple with changes in meaning of American exceptionalism limit the frequency and scope of ideological change and do not seek to explain the changes, rather to explore the effects of the change. See, McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State* for a study
research seeks to recreate the different meanings of exceptionalism at different points in time. So whilst the thesis agrees with existing scholarship that American exceptionalism is fundamentally a debate concerned with the perception of the Republic as a different type of state, it does not seek to impose a temporally consistent understanding of this debate for the sake of analytic parsimony. Instead it brings to life a bitterly contested debate over America’s fundamental nature and purpose, even over the half century under study here. The research employs a deliberately ecumenical understanding of exceptionalism, which strays beyond overt invocation of American purpose. As the texts reveal, many actors have not been conspicuous in their appeals to exceptionalism, indeed the belief in American exceptionalism has often been implicit within specific debates about foreign policy issues and interventions.

Americans are not unique in regarding their nation as exemplary. Many nations lay some claim to superiority. In the twentieth century only the Soviet Union rivalled the United States in its claim to prophetic messianism and historical transcendence. Originating in the Puritan vision of the New World “city on a hill,” the idea of American exceptionalism was contested in tandem with notions of continental expansion and, in the twentieth century, global power. The pervasiveness of the idea makes American exceptionalism the para-ideological umbrella for such related concepts as manifest destiny, the American dream, and a new world order. Other recurring ideas of the same root include the protection and extension of the ideal and practice of democracy and the moral responsibility such a project entailed. American exceptionalism is para-ideological because it is a set of related language that explains the world and the role of the United States therein but it lacks the coherence of a formal ideology and has not been codified as a means toward a single, definable political end.

which splits American foreign policy as having been influenced by either the “old testament” (exemplative) or “new testament” (proselytizing and crusading) understandings of exceptionalism. Holsti, “Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy.”


This study explores how American political elites viewed their country’s place in the world and the meaning of this para-ideology at key points in American strategic policy. The aim is not to provide a new theory of American exceptionalism or expose beliefs in American exceptionalism as true or false. Instead, it is to show how various conceptions of American exceptionalism arose amid the competitive context of political argument and, in turn, manifested in a conceptual ordering of the world that became ingrained in grand strategy at four critical junctures in American history.

This chapter examines how political leaders of the United States have understood the world of international relations. It explores thought about the place of the United States in the world through the lens of American political experience from the founding of the republic until the cessation of hostilities in 1945, and examines how American domestic and foreign policy developed in tandem over time. It goes on to suggest that the foundation of the republic was a process that was inherently informed by international politics and, equally, as American foreign policy developed it was informed by these founding principles.

The first statements of National Security Council Report 68 (hereafter NSC-68), the codifying document of America’s Cold War experience, indicate the importance of such an exploration. Underscoring the primacy of America’s founding principles, NSC-68 includes a section near the start titled “The Fundamental Purpose of the United States.” According to NSC-68, the Constitution’s preamble states this purpose: “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” This aspect of NSC-68 makes explicit an often-overlooked fact about an element of continuity in American political thought and in thought about the international system: America’s purpose was defined in terms of perfection of the Union.

308 Although it does indicate some notable points of ideological innovation, this chapter is not intended as a substantive contextual study: it is not possible to achieve this in a compressed form for such a long period of time. Instead it is a review of the ideas, debate, and points of continuity and discontinuity over an extended period in order to frame the following chapters. The historical detail comes from a variety of sources cited in the text but the narrative comes principally from Oscar Handlin and Lilian Handlin, Liberty in America, 1600 to the Present (New York: Harper & Row, 1986); David C. Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate over International Relations, 1789–1941, American Political Thought (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2009); George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776, The Oxford History of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Quinn, US Foreign Policy in Context; Wood, The Idea of America.


310 Ibid., 9.
This chapter starts at the point when the former British colonists had to codify their states’ relationships with one another and with the rest of the world. Questions regarding states’ relationships would ultimately be resolved with the creation of the Union, a project that was justified in part by arguments pointing to international relations. The nascent United States faced a series of immediate challenges in its relationship with the international system – most notably, how to manage relations with its former colonial master, how to react to revolutionary fervour in France, and how to pursue American neutrality amid a global war centred on Franco-British enmity.

From the outset, the Founding Fathers were concerned with a number of central questions which were initially focused on the nature of relations between the constituent states. The primary issues were concerned with the nature of interstate relations, the conditions under which war occurred, and the concept of interference in the affairs of other states.\(^{311}\)

Although most of these questions explicitly related to the young country’s domestic character, the answers they generated also informed the American view of the international system. The questions would be continually debated and challenged. Although not always consciously orientated toward America’s international relations, many of the domestic questions would spill into American foreign policy.\(^{312}\)

In the respect that it was absorbed with these issues, the United States was unusual as, from the outset, it was absorbed at the domestic level with answering these questions as part of the process of establishing federal union. However, this thesis is not making an argument suggesting that America was or was not exceptional. It is concerned, rather, with how political actors in America interpreted, contested, and ultimately redefined for successive generations what their shared belief in American exceptionalism meant.

The debates over the Constitution in 1787 and 1788 raised a number of questions which were as pertinent to relations between nations as they were to those

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\(^{311}\) Hendrickson, *Union, Nation, or Empire*, ix–x; see also Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 49–55, for the interrelation of domestic and international concerns.

\(^{312}\) See Chapter 4 for an example of the recurrence of the “slavery/freedom” binary applied to the international system.
between the American states. However, the travails of the Union and its states have received little recognition in either diplomatic history or the literature on international relations. Scholars often overlook that the authors of the Constitution of the United States were motivated to perfect the Union largely by the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation in matters of defence and foreign policy.\footnote{For an examination of this scholarly lacuna see Emily S. Rosenberg, “A Call to Revolution: A Roundtable on Early U.S. Foreign Relations: Introduction,” \textit{Diplomatic History}, 22, no. 1 (1998): 63–70; Peter S. Onuf, “A Declaration of Independence for Diplomatic Historians,” \textit{Diplomatic History}, 22, no. 1 (1998): 71–83.}

Equally, the United States was in part conceived as a product of international relations. The nation did not exist as a legal entity until the European powers recognised its independence in the treaties that comprised the Peace of Paris. Therefore, 3 September 1783 rather than 4 July 1776 is this chapter’s starting point. U.S. activity on the world stage evinced that the United States had achieved nationhood. John Jay wrote in \textit{The Federalist}:\footnote{John Jay, “Federalist No. 2 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence,” in \textit{The Federalist Papers}, ed. Isaac Kramnick (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 92.}

\begin{quote}
As a nation we have made peace and war. As a nation we have vanquished our common enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign states.\footnote{James Madison et al., \textit{The Federalist Papers}, ed. Isaac Kramnick (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987).}
\end{quote}

The first twenty-nine of the eighty-five \textit{Federalist} papers comprise an extended argument for ratifying the Constitution on foreign policy grounds.\footnote{James Madison et al., \textit{The Federalist Papers}, ed. Isaac Kramnick (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987).} Between 1776 and 1787 there was concern that the states would be incapable of forming or maintaining a union and that they could expect the wars and other conflicts that were the common experience of neighbouring peoples. The fear was that a state system might develop in North America. The dynamic of U.S. politics from 1789 to 1861 involved the occurrence, approximately every ten years, of a monumental sectional crisis averted only through an unexpected turn of events or inspired statesmanship. Because disunion was understood as a virtual synonym for war, the threat of force remained a constant. In other words:

\begin{quote}
‘Union’ was not the belated outcome of the Revolution, but rather \textit{its central and defining problem from the very outset}. American
constitutionalism was shaped by the Revolutionaries’ experience in successive world systems.316

Thus, this chapter eschews the oft-repeated claim that the “Anguishing dilemmas of security that tormented European Nations did not touch America for nearly 150 years.”317 From the American Revolution to the Civil War and beyond, the same security problems that preoccupied European statesmen were a concern for Americans. American domestic politics was filled with internationalist language. American doctrines emerged on the balance of power,318 the equality of states, and defence against aggression.319 The problem of anarchy within the states was central to the architecture of the early Union.320 The Civil War’s continental scale illustrates that this was a well-founded concern and that conflicts within the Union were equal to those of continental Europe.

Against the backdrop of Gordon Wood’s influential view that constitutional innovation was only tangentially concerned with problems of interstate relations and the international context,321 this chapter argues that, whilst the domestic model of a perfectible Union is crucial to understanding the intellectual lineage of U.S. foreign policy, the “Philadelphian System” which emerged was equally concerned with the other three threats to security.322 The point is that, by placing the formation of the Union within an international context, it is possible to understand American federalism as a contribution to international constitutional thought:323 “Federalism was not just a domestic order but a potential world system . . . set free from the mercantilism and monarchy of empires past.”324

A Union of states emerged; then, after considerable debate, a bipartisan policy of detachment from European rivalries and, ultimately, a spheres-of-influence

316 Onuf, “A Declaration of Independence for Diplomatic Historians,” 72; emphasis added.
319 Ibid., 211.
322 Deudney, Bounding Power, 161–89.
324 Rosenberg, “A Call to Revolution,” 64.
demarcation of global authority which would eventually take the form of the Monroe Doctrine. At the core of the intellectual debate was “the Unionist Paradigm,” which was primarily concerned with the predicaments of free states in union, a state of affairs that should be familiar to scholars of international relations. Central to the unionist paradigm was the belief that Americans had to create and perpetuate a form of political association by which republican governments that were committed to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” could join together in a workable federal system in order to escape the anarchy of states on the one hand and the despotism of centralised empire on the other. Americans nevertheless sought to safeguard two positive values with which anarchy and despotism were closely identified: respectively, the liberty of states and the preservation of peace across a territory of imperial dimensions.

Within this context the founders can be seen as having sought institutions that would enable the Union to prevail over the forces that threatened it while limiting the Union’s power. Achieving this balance was America’s central problem.

When the old Union died in 1861, a more entrenched sense of U.S. nationalism emerged. Before then “the two words ‘United States’ were generally used as a plural noun: ‘the United States’ are a republic.’ After 1865 the United States became a singular noun. The loose union of states became a nation.”

The Constitution, the Union, and the balance of power

The founders of the United States regarded the wars that had afflicted North America before independence as a consequence of British rule. Ties to the imperial centre, they argued, had dragged them into European power rivalries. Independence from Britain partly represented the potential for freedom from these rivalries, but achieving this freedom would require keeping disparate states

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328 Quinn, U.S. Foreign Policy in Context, 36.
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and fellow federalists warned that rejecting the proposed Union in favour of separate confederacies would result in conflict and replicate or create a more unstable situation than that in Europe. Hamilton observed, “to look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties, situated in the same neighbourhood[,] would be to disregard the uniform course of human events.”

Throughout *The Federalist* the arguments reveal concerns with intra-state anarchy. However, Hamilton and Madison, *The Federalist*’s primary authors, were also sceptical about the possibility of peaceful cooperation between nations in the absence of higher authority. They knew that the remedy for this required the possibility of more concentrated power, creating a terrible trade-off for free government. Hamilton noted:

> Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. To be more safe they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.

It was the observation of the European experience that informed the views of the founding fathers. Hamilton argued that relying on reason to guarantee peace was dangerous. He stated that there was “nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations,” despite the complexity of the European alliance system that had been formed with “a view to establishing the equilibrium of power and peace of that part of the world.” Hamilton wrote:

> they were scarcely formed before they were broken, giving an instructive lesson to mankind about how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith and which oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate interest and passion.

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332 Hamilton, “Federalist No. 6,” 104.
333 Ibid.
334 Ibid.
In an important sense “the Philadelphian System” was a conscious ‘other’ to the European state system, an acknowledgement of but, nonetheless, a rejection of European models of balance of power. The founding fathers were animated by the complex logic of republican thought on security, which can best be encapsulated by the paradox that “individual security requires the bounding (i.e. control) of power but power itself is bounding (i.e. involves ever more extensive capabilities).”

This central insight into the core argument linking the domestic creation of the Union and the thought of the founding fathers on international relations has not been fully appreciated by either realist or liberal analysis.

This system had important differences with the idealised conception of the Westphalian system. First, there was a different distribution of sovereignty. The Westphalian hierarchical state limited union to fleeting alliances, as Hamilton noted in the preceding quote. Second, both orders had different forms of separation of power. In Europe it was material and geographic, while in the Philadelphian system it was a formalised constitutional arrangement between the three arms of government, which shared power rather than creating autonomous institutions, requiring concurrent approval between them. In other words, the strength of the union reinforced the division of power in America. Third, the balance of power in Europe and America had different roles. In Europe, within states, balance of power was quashed by absolute monarchy and between states anarchy reigned. In America the ‘balancer’, the armed people, remained dormant. Finally, the American political identity remained both capitalist and republican, contrasting with the entrenched hybrid of feudalism and capitalism in Europe and an aristocratic warlike tradition which asserted itself in international politics.

For Hamilton, the other key ‘European factor’ in the shaping of the republic was her strategic position. Hamilton argued that disunion would ruin American interests, whereas secure union would offer the United States unique

336 The term “Philadelphian System” and its difference from the Westphalian System are characterized by Deudney, Bounding Power, 179.
337 Ibid., 180–81.
opportunities, especially given the country’s geographical advantages.\textsuperscript{338} He wrote:

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union, . . . we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity are too much disproportioned in strength, to be able to give us dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security.\textsuperscript{339}

The Jeffersonian vision for the future of the nation was based on the idea of fashioning a union of perfect republics. The nature of the world within which the American republics existed made such a union a necessity. Whilst trade and relations with the rest of the world were necessary, they also threatened to corrupt the republics. Both the balance of power between them and the future of their conjoined shape and, in turn, how they would conduct themselves on the international stage depended on the structure of the union. Jefferson and his contemporaries did not appear to make the same distinction between domestic and international that contemporary scholars use.

Whilst the union between the American republic states eliminated anarchy between them, it was not able to eliminate the threat from foreign powers, particularly those who were not inclined to recognise the Union. There was a persistent fear of the attempted reassertion of European imperial dominion,\textsuperscript{340} not to mention bitter division between the political elites on how America should position herself with regard to her former colonial master, how to respond to the French Revolution, and what position to take in ongoing Franco-British conflict.

It is important to note that this conscious formation of American identity in opposition to Europe’s balance-of-power system is key to the discourse of American exceptionalism.\textsuperscript{341} As early as the 1660s, Puritan ideas of divine providence and exceptionalism had started to dissipate. The exceptionalist impulse had taken a different tack with the Declaration of Independence, centred

\textsuperscript{339} Hamilton, “Federalist No. 8,” 117.
\textsuperscript{340} Frederick W. Marks, \textit{Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution} (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1986).
\textsuperscript{341} Hendrickson, \textit{Union, Nation, or Empire}, 69.
on denouncing tyrannical rule and asserting the natural right of free individuals to form a civil society.\textsuperscript{342}

Rather than sharply dividing political relations into foreign and domestic realms, American republicans saw nested sets of relationships. Diplomatic relations with foreign powers were at the outer extremity, while relations between the American states took up their own sphere, differing in shape and degree but not in kind from other political relations. The challenge was to determine the degree to which the law of nations offered an appropriate framework for organising a union of republics.\textsuperscript{343} Vattel had described relations between European states,\textsuperscript{344} and he did recognise the advantages of federal alliances; however, he did not provide a clear articulation of how the sovereign diplomatic powers of that federation could be exercised.

The law of nations was not the only conceptual model available. Before 1776, the American states had simply been provinces within the British Empire. This had been seen as an extended polity organised under an informal constitution or customary framework. Therefore, under the dominion of a distant metropolis they were able to exercise a degree of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{345} For Jefferson, a stronger union between the states became a strategy for overcoming their weakness within the Atlantic states system. In the period directly preceding the Philadelphia Convention, Madison concluded that only a strong federal union could preserve republicanism in the separate states and pre-empt interstate conflict. Without such a powerful force, the American states system would mirror the European states system.\textsuperscript{346}

The domestic concern of governing a vast country is at the heart of \textit{The Federalist}. Territorial size was directly linked to the problems of republic and empire. Was vast territory compatible with a virtuous republic? Ancient Rome served as the central reference point. Since the Renaissance, Rome had been the

\textsuperscript{342} Gutfeld, \textit{American Exceptionalism}.
\textsuperscript{345} Onuf and Sadosky, \textit{Jeffersonian America}, 179.
\textsuperscript{346} Ibid., 186–7; Hendrickson, \textit{Union, Nation, or Empire}, 70–77.
favourite source of ‘lessons’ regarding the fate of states. On the strength of the Roman example, Montesquieu demonstrated in the mid-eighteenth century that republics could extend themselves by conquest, but in so doing they should not expect to reproduce their constitutional system, their true essence. The warning seemed to be that expansion would lead to a destruction of virtue. The implication that the U.S. republic might internally degenerate into an imperial tyranny, complete with militarism and depravity, was not pleasant for Americans to ponder.

Madison attempted to solve the problem by inventing a wholly indigenous American model based on the rejection of Europe and the creation of a republic of popular sovereignty. In such a republic vastness was not a problem but a boon, insurance against corruption and decline. If politically embodied at the centre in a series of institutional checks and balances, vastness would prevent any one interest group, faction, or region from dominating and thereby destroying the whole. Madison’s federal solution laid the foundation for future expansion. After the 1820s, Jacksonians would take the logic one step further and espouse the view that popular republics needed to expand to stay healthy.

Like their European contemporaries, the founders highlighted the idea of *translatio imperii*: the notion that, at any given time, a single dominant power or people advances civilisation and that historical succession is a matter of westward movement. Americans found this notion attractive because it sanctioned America’s becoming the next great embodiment of civilisation. The global circle had been completed; there was no territory farther west to be discovered, just a huge and empty territory to be transformed.

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350 See Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (New York; London: Norton, 2005); and, for a view which suggests that Jacksonianism translated into a particular type of foreign policy see Mead, *Special Providence*.
At the political level, this huge federation of states with the potential for both growth and disintegration had to confront the question of identity, what the ‘national self’ might mean, and how it would be projected. Thomas Jefferson’s vision of the exceptional Union would be emblematic of the nineteenth century. The European state that he abhorred was essentially an apparatus for war and the calculation of attendant dangers and benefits. Europeans considered it rational and legitimate to wage war for any reason short of obliterating the enemy state. The system was brutish but based on the idea that enemies were essentially equal. There was no room for any universal ideology of moral right. In contrast, Jeffersonians invested the American project with a quality of universal right. They saw the United States as embodying the interests of all humans, whose material conditions varied so widely. Their own nation hardly warranted the term nation because it exhibited none of the entrenched military establishment and consequent tax apparatus of most European nations. The external precondition for this was the continent’s relative security. For Jefferson, Americans were historically the first to be truly free, able to create a completely new society. Because the United States was the first place where humans could be free, western expansion was by definition a step toward universal liberation. Such expansion advanced what Jefferson called the ‘empire for liberty’. Defining expansion in this way suggested that any potential enemy obstructed the course of natural freedom.

Jefferson’s first address as president represented a remarkable act of ideological innovation. Making use of Washington’s farewell address and reversing his own previous political position, he successfully created consensus regarding America’s separateness from Europe, and thus justification for a policy of non-alignment. Jefferson’s presidency was “key to embedding the principle of ‘detachment’ from Europe in U.S. foreign policy thought.” Whilst commercial links with Europe were unavoidable, they were to be pursued with minimal political entanglement.

352 Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire, 54–6.
353 Ibid., 65–71.
354 Quinn, U.S. Foreign Policy in Context, 54.
355 Lawrence S. Kaplan, Entangling Alliances with None: American Foreign Policy in the Age of Jefferson (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1987), 22.
Dividing the world and the Monroe Doctrine

Although Jefferson’s shrewd crafting of consensus on foreign policy did not end turmoil in foreign affairs, the Philadelphian system of strong domestic union and neutrality towards Europe (minimising foreign influence on the United States) nevertheless remained central to U.S. grand strategy.

By the second decade of the nineteenth century that system was threatened by the possibility of ‘Old World’ involvement to suppress Latin American revolution. Equally, as secretary of state, John Quincy Adams’s twin aims had been to exclude British claims in North America whilst extending as far as possible American claims. This mix of Adams’s ideas would find expression in Monroe’s message of 1823, later known as the Monroe Doctrine:

That the American continents by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.\(^{356}\)

Adams had already established a moratorium on further colonisation; now he was extending this to any conquest of the New World or intervention in its political affairs. In effect he was moving from non-colonisation to non-intervention.\(^{357}\) Furthermore, this was raised to the status of vital interest.\(^{358}\)

It was in Adams’s conception of “two separate systems, two spheres” that American exceptionalism became apparent.\(^{359}\) The Doctrine formulated strategy so as to:

‘remove’ the United States from the broader international system and the European balance of power. The US portrayed itself as different from the European nations, who fought for their interests in an inescapable and competitive system of rival states.\(^{360}\)


\(^{358}\) Quinn, *U.S. Foreign Policy in Context*, 56.

\(^{359}\) Bemis, *John Quincy Adams*, 364.

\(^{360}\) Quinn, *U.S. Foreign Policy in Context*, 57.
The Doctrine extended this formulation to imply that, in the Americas, a new system of states was coming into existence and that this system’s members had interests that were separate from, but not in conflict with, those of European nations.\(^{361}\) As Adams expressed it,

> the political system of the United States is also extra-European . . .

For the repose of Europe, as well as of America, the European and American political systems should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as possible.\(^{362}\)

It is not clear from Monroe’s address what the logical justification was for closing the Americas to European colonisation. The phrase which seems to answer that question is “by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain.”\(^{363}\)

Whilst it seemed fairly straightforward that the U.S. should assert their “free and independent condition,” it is less clear how that assertion could be transferred to continents already widely colonised by Europe or to a future part of the U.S. that was neither a state or territory in 1823. The answer is to be found near the end of the message in a separate homily, coming after a lengthy description of domestic affairs. In this longer section, Monroe addressed the relationship between the United States, Europe, and South America, declaring solidarity with the recently independent South American republics. Monroe’s struggle consists of two binaries, democracy and the monarchical “Holly Alliance,” but also a spatial difference. Monroe made clear that the United States would not interfere with the struggle for democracy wherever it arose. He contrasted “events in that quarter of the globe . . . with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators,”\(^{364}\) with “movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers.”\(^{365}\)

Old World tyranny versus New World democracy presented interesting contradictions and hypocrisies, on the one hand advancing an ideology of equality

\(^{361}\) Ibid.
\(^{364}\) Ibid., 22.
\(^{365}\) Ibid.
and on the other practising domestic policies of inequality, including the resettlement of native Indians, the slave trade, and the doubt often expressed in the U.S. that South Americans were racially incapable of self-rule. Monroe’s hemispheric solidarity contained a measure of imperialism. By referring to South American republics as “our southern brethren,” Monroe put in place the “America/Américas” myth, a strategy of “control through sameness.” Thus this statement of protection became through interpretation and reinterpretation a strategy of control.

The Monroe Doctrine’s effect was striking in the construction of a Western Hemisphere and its relative locations of Europe and North and South America, all crucial to the formation of the ideology of exceptionalism. It was an ideology which was able to simultaneously claim radical separation from European colonialism whilst also enabling cultural, military, and economic hegemony.

**The move to world power and the duty of civilisation**

By 1900, the United States led the world in the extraction of raw materials, produced more manufactured goods and steel than any other nation, led in the production and consumption of consumer goods, and was also a leading exporter to the rest of the world. But the rise of American power on the international stage does not necessarily tell us about her foreign policy. In retrospect, the rise to imperial power by the United States at the end of the nineteenth century seems to have been almost accidental. President McKinley noted that America had proceeded without any intention to acquire the Philippines. What is apparent is that the process was not started by security concerns. America was redefining herself for a new industrialised age in which she was materially stronger. Although this chapter has shown the earlier rejection of European models of

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366 Ibid., 23.
368 Ibid.
369 Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, makes a similar argument about the discourse of ‘Western civilization’ as a mechanism for post-Second World War control and integration of West Germany.
371 Ibid.
imperialism, it seems hard to imagine America’s ‘imperial moment’ having existed without an explicit European model.

Although the enthusiasm for imperialism at the end of the century did not last long, it did leave the United States as a world power, one of a small group “directly interested in all parts of the world and whose voices must be listened to everywhere.” But in the process of increasing American international involvement, America was not simply becoming another great power. Rather, some progressives believed that, in a period of profound change, the world was coming to resemble America. World power did not automatically mean following the European model of competitive expansion; in its place could be peace, prosperity, and liberal democratic growth, although by 1900 a new world view had yet to be convincingly argued. As Ninkovich conceives it, Roosevelt’s view was that “the great statesman must be a man of imagination,” by which he meant that the old ‘common sense’ of foreign policy would have to be reinvented.

Roosevelt was still constrained by the non-entanglement consensus that had held sway the previous century. Thus he was confined in justifying what became known as the ‘Roosevelt Corollary’ in traditional terms. Nonetheless, the corollary expanded the Monroe Doctrine into its modern form. It used the supposedly ‘flexible’ Monroe Doctrine to justify intervention in Latin Americas even when European powers were not attempting to gain territory. Roosevelt did so in a reworking of Monroe’s original “southern brethren” formulation, claiming that “our interests and those of our southern neighbours are in reality identical.” Thus the corollary not only kept Europe out but also made the United States the ultimate authority in the region. For Walter LaFeber, Roosevelt’s invocation of

374 Theodore Roosevelt in ibid., 24.
375 Ibid.
the Monroe Doctrine was a key turning point, when its protective intentions were inverted into a statement of control.\textsuperscript{377} As Quinn suggests:

it was a fundamental assumption of this model for order that the prerogative of identifying and acting on the ‘common interest’ lay with the United States alone. This unarticulated but central principle of unaccountable-yet-legitimate leadership is key to understanding the ideology of American interventionism that would follow.\textsuperscript{378}

Of key interest was Roosevelt’s concept of ‘civilisation’, which was paramount in constructing the Corollary’s ‘legitimacy’. The Corollary was not made from the position of hemispheric detachment but from a universal frame of reference in which ‘civilisation’ had conferred upon the United States a police-like power. Though this was an inherently imperialist doctrine, it was prompted by hostility to the diplomacy of imperialism. Roosevelt’s thinking about international relations was dominated by a belief in a global process of civilisation that advanced great power cooperation and imperialism, in parallel with his suspicion of imperialism in the western hemisphere.\textsuperscript{379}

Roosevelt shared with other progressives his belief that a nation was truly free only if its democracy followed the American model. Theoretically free societies could vary, but in reality liberty was not viewed as allowing for different paths of development. Instead, it was taken to entail a narrow range of outcomes, all of them congruent with the economic and political model of the United States and a particular world order. In other words, “liberty for a state ought to produce something resembling liberalism within that state, for such was the meaning of ‘progress’.”\textsuperscript{380}

**Woodrow Wilson, the abandonment of hemispheric detachment and a “peace of justice”**

Not long before his inauguration Woodrow Wilson is alleged to have told a friend “It would be an irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign


\textsuperscript{378} Quinn, *U.S. Foreign Policy in Context*, 75.


\textsuperscript{380} Quinn, *U.S. Foreign Policy in Context*, 78.
affairs.” That irony was fully realised. The First World War was a watershed event in the history of U.S. foreign policy. In contrast to the limited imperial events of 1898 it marked the start of America as a world power and the end of the longstanding American pursuit of hemispheric separation. In demanding that America take a more involved interest in European affairs, it also presented an unprecedented opportunity to pursue radical reform of the ideological basis of the European and world order.

However, Wilson’s immediate response was to take shelter in tradition. In proclaiming American neutrality in the War, he declared that:

The United States must be neutral in fact as well as name during these days that are to try men’s souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.³⁸²

Neutral was meant as an assertion that the interests of the United States were fundamentally different from those of the belligerents. In legal terms, neutral rights meant a right to trade with the belligerents or anyone else; this meant that only legally defined ‘contraband’ could be seized. In other words, commerce was expected to remain neutral despite the war.³⁸³

Privately Wilson was sympathetic with Britain and believed that if she, Russia, or France dictated the postwar settlement it would not be at odds with his conception of America’s interest.³⁸⁴ Although legally correct, Wilson’s vision of neutrality was at cross-purposes with his vision of civilisation. Traditional neutrality was rooted in a narrow conception of national interest. Wilson was concerned with reconciling this selfish doctrine with America’s role in promoting civilisation. As he conceived of it, neutrality should posses a noble and universal validity. As he

³⁸³ Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire, 307.
put it “I am interested in neutrality because there is something so much greater to do than fight.”

Whilst neutral rights became the casus belli for America, Wilson had a more ideological sense of neutrality grounded in civilisational terms and the ability to mediate between the belligerents, rather than just to guarantee trade. The chance for mediation was never very good, as the belligerents shared neither a vision of postwar peace (which might have compelled them to put down arms) nor Wilson’s view of America as peacemaker. Whatever chance there was for America to make peace vanished entirely in 1917.

The experience formed Wilson’s strategic view and by the time America entered the War he had decided that the balance of power in Europe had been so critically damaged that even if it survived it could never re-establish great power security. As a liberal optimist, Wilson hoped and assumed that the balance of power would not last. He was not a misguided idealist, as he is sometimes cast. Both as an academic and politician he was thoroughly grounded in the concept of the balance of power but he did not view it as an unchanging natural law which nations ignored to their detriment. Since the balance of power was a human creation it, too, was subject to change. His view was perhaps not surprising, as there was no American tradition of raison d’état. It was a European construct which (as this chapter has already demonstrated) American foreign and domestic policy had strenuously avoided.

The other important point to tease out of Wilson’s thought was that the failure of American neutrality and the emergence of a World war meant that great power politics and, more specifically, conflict beyond trade and the maintenance of empires were now global. As a result, the geographic isolation America had enjoyed was threatened by the potential for the war to end with a single power

385 Woodrow Wilson, “Remarks to the Associated Press in New York City” (20 April 1915), http://www.archive.org/stream/americanismwoodr00unitiala#page/10/mode/2up [accessed 03/08/11].
dominating Europe.\textsuperscript{388} Wilson’s rhetoric after America entered the war introduced the concept of a global threat into American foreign-policy lexicon.

An unanticipated shift in American grand strategy reflected this new conception of the world. During the years of neutrality, American war planning had been based on the traditional idea of the threat of invasion of the Western Hemisphere. The logic of pursuing simply neutral rights “ought logically to have been a naval war”,\textsuperscript{389} instead, America sent a military force to Europe, which was met with shock by the political elites.

Wilson’s solution for postwar peace was collective security based on no less than ‘world opinion’. But this was less idealistic than it sounded; Wilson’s view of world opinion was circumscribed, ideologically conservative, and less than global in reach. “Collective security based on world public opinion . . . [was] far more limited – a new language of power that relied, as had the old, upon the sanction of force.”\textsuperscript{390}

For Wilson, America was the linchpin of world opinion. The assumption of U.S. primacy helped Wilson sustain his belief that the institutions and norms of the new world order would not clash with U.S. interests or wishes. As with his concept of the Monroe Doctrine, he conflated U.S. interests with those of other nations, this reconception of the Monroe Doctrine later serving as the basis of Wilson’s global new world order. “True freedom and independence meant the maintenance [of] a liberal, democratic capitalist order.”\textsuperscript{391} He assumed that U.S. wishes and the collective will of the free world would perennially coincide. “His approach to foreign policy was at once unilateral and universal.”\textsuperscript{392}

Wilson did not consider that the United States might find itself in conflict with the new order of international institutions and law that he had planned because he conceived of that order as a universalisation of U.S. standards. The purpose of the new system was to bring other nations into line with the United States, not vice

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{388} Ibid., 47.
\item \textsuperscript{389} Ibid., 54.
\item \textsuperscript{390} Ibid., 62.
\item \textsuperscript{391} Quinn, U.S. Foreign Policy in Context, 94.
\item \textsuperscript{392} Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 57.
\end{itemize}
versa. In making his case for the assumption of global leadership, Wilson projected a familiar sense of national destiny:

The isolation of the United States is at an end, not because we chose to go into the politics of the world, but because, by the sheer genius of this people and the growth of our power, we have become a determining factor in the history of mankind. And after you have become a determining factor you cannot remain isolated, whether you want to or not. Isolation ended by the processes of history, not by the processes of our independent choice, and the processes of history merely fulfilled the prediction of the men who founded our republic.393

Wilson’s presidency marked a turning point in U.S. foreign policy, even if it was imbued with familiar strands of thought. A more engaged global foreign policy had been likely as the country increased in economic power and military potential. The Roosevelt years had already made apparent the huge growth in U.S. power potential, but Roosevelt had remained constrained by pre-existing norms of U.S. ideology regarding separation of spheres of influence. Under Wilson, The First World War ruptured the international order and the way America conceptualised its role within it.

Following the path established by Roosevelt, the United States believed that it could increase the freedom of foreign peoples by interfering in their national affairs so as to generate the conditions needed for liberty. This belief was rooted in the now-familiar view that only certain forms of political order were compatible with progress and that the United States had a responsibility to guide other nations in their exercise of freedom. Under Wilsonian ideology, it was therefore legitimate to seek to build a cooperative system of states under American hegemony.

**From World War to Cold War**

After Wilson’s political decline the United States eschewed the level of engagement he had sought. Although the United States was firmly involved in European economic affairs, it avoided military and political alliances. Ideologically the country returned to the detached relations of Jeffersonian

consensus. Despite the passage of a series of neutrality acts aimed at avoiding the 1917 _casus belli_ that had dragged the United States into the First World War, the country ultimately did not stay out of the Second World War.394

Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) combined, not always logically, a deeply rooted Wilsonian disposition with Theodore Roosevelt’s geopolitical nuance. Thus, FDR’s new version of Wilson’s League of Nations included Theodore’s idea of a concert of great powers exerting peaceful influence and vigilantly supervising their respective regions, or ‘four policemen’. The massive antifascist alliance of the Second World War would be transformed, when the criminal aggressors had been vanquished, into a stable order of cooperation and mutual interest, headed by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and perhaps also a reconstituted China.395

FDR’s vision did not come to pass. Only the United States and the Soviet Union emerged stronger from the war. The resultant change to the international system was unprecedented. Before the war it had been based on a number of great powers; by 1945 only the United States and Soviet Union really rivalled each other in material or ideological terms. Domestically the war had changed the views of U.S. leaders. The decision to reject Wilson’s legacy in favour of defensive isolation now looked like a colossal error. “It had allowed a war that might have been contained in size by early American commitment to engulf half the world before dragging the United States in anyway.”396

The noninterventionists had been wrong in deeming U.S. intervention unnecessary, but they had anticipated the complications that would ensue once the United States permanently committed to a world order. Their predictions of U.S. totalitarianism proved unfounded, but they were correct in believing that the old republic would vanish with the war and a new United States would take its place.

The nascent Truman administration struggled with America’s limited experience in Great Power politics. Within a few years, the United States moved from robust wartime cooperation with the Soviets to _NSC-68_’s comprehensive diagnosis of the

394 Quinn, _U.S. Foreign Policy in Context_, 114.
395 Ninkovich, _Modernity and Power_, 123.
396 Quinn, _U.S. Foreign Policy in Context_, 116.
nature of the Soviet threat and a programme of response. The nature of the
diagnosis showed just how far U.S. international thought had travelled, as the
threat from the Soviet Union was suddenly believed to endanger freedom at a
global level.

**Conclusion**

Unlike the words *imperialism*, *nationalism*, and *internationalism*, which did not
come into widespread use until the nineteenth century, the terms, *empire*, *nation*,
and *Union* have signified important categories of American political discourse
since 1776. In the words of Meining, these political terms are “an essential
generalised shorthand for elusive formations that are continuously under
construction and alteration.” The tension among imperialism, nationalism, and
internationalism has been a significant feature of American political discourse.
The debate continues regarding who Americans are and how that question should
inform domestic and international policy.

Some traditional accounts of U.S. diplomatic history have stressed the adherence
to “Continental Americanism” by American statesmen until the 1890s, keeping
America out of great power international politics. It is an account which still
maintains some influence and in that narrative the United States moved from
isolationism to internationalism only in the twentieth century. Such an account
is wrong to dismiss the significance of internationalist currents between the
republic’s founding and 1914. As this chapter has demonstrated, the international
environment was a concern so fundamental that it conditioned the formation of
the Union and the image of the Union remained linked to the perturbations of
internationalist thought in the United States.

The sense that the breakdown of European and world order in the aftermath of the
First World War had returned the U.S. to its original predicament was part of the
U.S. internationalist sensibility. In 1918 Horace Kallen, a member of Wilson’s

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397 Hendrickson, *Union, Nation, or Empire*, 4.
398 D. W. Meining, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*
400 Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the
‘Inquiry’, stated that America’s independent states in 1776 “were in precisely the same position and confronted precisely the same problems, in principle, as the present states and governments of the world.”401 That is not to say that many voices wanted a world society amongst ‘the civilised powers’. U.S. internationalism would have to clear a new path between the need for a union among peace-loving nations and the totalising of a world state. In response to the exigencies of America’s new world role in the twentieth century, the unionist paradigm was neither abandoned nor uncritically accepted but was modified and restated to fit the new circumstances.

This chapter outlined the development of the theory and practice of U.S. international political thought from the founding of the republic to the end of the Second World War. It showed that questions of international politics and the U.S. experience of Union were interdependent and examined how this experience influenced America’s international stance. In short, there is an intimate relationship between how Americans have viewed the republic and how they have attempted to fashion foreign policy.

The last section of the chapter has examined how themes of twentieth-century internationalism had far deeper roots in U.S. political thought than is sometimes suggested. The distinctive American Union always had an internationalist dimension because it was constructed on a federative principle according to which a genuine federation was neither an empire nor simply a civic society but an assemblage of societies large enough to provide security for all while preserving the individuality and independence of each. It occupied a moderate place between anarchy and tyranny.

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Chapter 4. Exceptionalism and Containment, 1946–1950

Starting in early 1947, American grand strategy underwent a reorientation on a global scale. The twenty-minute delivery of the Truman Doctrine made public what Washington political insiders had known for at least a year: a new grand strategy of containment had replaced Rooseveltian internationalism. This change heralded the onset of the Cold War and marked the first move in an ideological reordering of American grand strategy around the policy of containment, which would find final expression in NSC-68. 402

President Truman was nevertheless critical of the emergent popular notion 403 that American policy had suddenly shifted in 1947 or that his doctrine had resulted from a sudden intensification of rivalry with the Soviet Union. 404 Rather, Truman contested that, politically, events had been leading in that direction since his April 1945 talks with Molotov. 405 This chapter explores Truman’s contention that the strategic change of the Truman Doctrine in fact manifested in the context of prior ideological contestation.

Using Truman’s timeline of containment, this chapter will examine discourse about the structure of the postwar international system and America’s role within that system. The chapter will investigate the development of this discourse and the genre of U.S. international political thought across media such as speeches, newspaper articles, policy papers, and books by public intellectuals and

policymakers who formed a small elite.\(^{406}\) The chapter will show the degree to which the Truman Doctrine and *NSC-68* were fundamental ideological innovations in U.S. foreign policy that can be understood only by placing them within the context of contemporary discourse. These innovations can then be understood as illocutionary, political acts.

The chapter’s analysis will be based on a Skinnerian contextualist approach. This analysis will show that containment was predicated on a number of assumptions based, in part, on an innovative reworking of the writings of a series of high-profile intellectuals and policymakers such as Walter Lippmann, Henry Luce, and George Kennan. This chapter examines these individuals because they significantly contributed to a debate conducted both in public and in private by remarkably few participants. The chapter will employ a contextualist methodology, providing detailed portraits of individual thinkers as well an analysis of significant shifts in the language of politics that shaped the contours of American exceptionalism.

The chapter will refer to American ‘international political thought’. That phrase is deliberately expansive, encompassing the complex of self-consciously articulated languages employed to envisage, interrogate, and potentially answer the questions raised by American involvement in international affairs. Political discourse rarely comprises a systematic, consistent body of doctrine. As Raymond Geuss observed, political theories are often, in practice, “historically congealed kinds of rhetorical appeal which make use of quasi-propositional fragments.”\(^{407}\)

In the language of Quentin Skinner, this chapter will suggest that the architects of the policy of containment were ‘innovating ideologists’ who manipulated discourse in order to serve specific political strategies. For the sake of clarity, the innovating ideologists in this chapter include Truman himself, as well as Paul Nitze, who chaired the NSC study group which produced *NSC-68*, and Dean Acheson, who was a key figure in the conception and drafting of the Truman

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Doctrine. According to Skinner, “It is in large part by rhetorical manipulation . . .
that any society succeeds in establishing, upholding, questioning or altering its
moral identity.”

Within the historiography, containment has been characterised as “the American
effort, by military, political and economic means[,] to resist communist expansion
throughout the world.” After the publication of Kennan’s memoirs began in the
late 1960s, the scholarly debate centred around what Kennan had meant by
‘containment’ and the degree to which American grand strategy applied his vision
of containment.

In the late 1960s, Kennan protested that the press had unjustly elevated
containment to the status of a doctrine. However, until the late 1980s,
‘containment’ remained the pre-eminent description of early Cold War U.S.
strategy among historians and policymakers. The historical debate remained
preoccupied with questions of the Cold War’s origins and, ultimately, of
responsibility. Amongst historians the term containment was used
indiscriminately by orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist scholars,
often without attempts at definition or to analyse its linguistic innovation as a
form of political innovation and new conceptual ordering of the world.

408 Skinner, Visions of Politics, I, 148, 149.
409 Barton J. Bernstein, “Containment,” in Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of
410 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950 (London.: Hutchinson, 1968); George F. Kennan,
412 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1992 (New York: McGraw Hill,
413 Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State
414 For examples and discussion of each school see Chapter 2 of this thesis. As discussed in that
chapter, the debate between the orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist historians was primarily
about the issue of blame for the start of the Cold War. Orthodox historians blamed the Soviet
Union, revisionists blamed American expansion. The revisionist stance was split between the
‘soft’ revisionism of those such as Walter Lippmann (The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign
Policy [New York: Harper, 1947]), who suggested that there had been an American failure of
democracy, and ‘hard’ revisionist critiques which were largely (but not exclusively) associated
with the ‘New Left’ and included those of Gabriel Kolko (The Politics of War: The World and
United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945 [New York: Random House, 1968]) and Williams (The
Tragedy of American Diplomacy). These accounts emphasized the need for continuous American
expansion both political but, more fundamentally for them, economic. For an analysis of the
debate see Robert James Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1973). Post-revisionism has included a number of different
commitments, united by an attempt to bring more critical subtlety to the argument and for some
Some revisionist scholars did attempt to grapple with containment but did so within the same positivist paradigm as those preceding them. Chief amongst these was John Lewis Gaddis in his seminal book, *Strategies of Containment*, whose stated aim was to “‘reinterpret’ U.S. national security from a ‘strategic perspective’ by focusing on the ‘central preoccupation of postwar national security policy’ – the idea of containment.” Yet he limited his discussion of containment’s formation under Truman to the shift in military strategy after the drafting of NSC-68, effectively ignoring containment’s ideological origins and illocutionary significance.

Gaddis allowed for the idea that a more aggressive policy was outlined within the strategy of containment. However, his argument was fundamentally proleptic: he reasoned *ex post facto* that because containment never amounted in practice to more than ‘balancing’ it had never been seriously considered as an all-encompassing *global* grand strategy. Relying heavily on Kennan’s writing for his interpretation, Gaddis suggested that containment was the most coherent strategy devised for dealing with the Soviets during the Cold War. That claim may well have been true from Truman’s perspective but Gaddis committed two errors: he overestimated the direct relevance of Kennan’s work to policymaking, and he bestowed upon Kennan’s early writing more coherence than it could possibly have had before the existence of his later work. In fact, Kennan himself was acutely aware of and acknowledged his limited influence, and that many individuals within the Truman administration held a strategic vision different from his own and lobbied vigorously for Eastern Europe’s unconditional surrender. Kennan’s voice was far from the most influential, even if we concede that some of his analysis was later appropriated.

Although the scholarship of early Cold War American grand strategy has significantly advanced since *Strategies of Containment*, this scholarship has

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largely repeated Gaddis’s mistake: it has applied retrospectively defined analytical frameworks in order to categorise American grand strategy in both the late 1940s and early 1950s. Despite the recent trend toward recognising competing ideas for waging the Cold War, many contemporary scholars have consciously structured their work around a unitary, hegemonic pattern in a quest for a historical order that could not have existed at the time. In other words, containment, rollback, liberation, and other characterisations of American grand strategy became tools for imposing order on a past that included competing and chaotic visions of international political order.

Skinner’s alternative approach demands that political texts must be understood according to their authors’ intentions, otherwise it would be impossible to determine what was genuinely distinctive about an individual work, and the interpreter would not notice that an author was declining to employ a conventionally accepted argument. According to Skinner, political ideas should not be dismissed as mere rationalisations of political action; prevailing ideas can determine political behaviour. Prevailing political assumptions and inherited concepts thus limit the kind of opposition that ‘innovating ideologists’ are able to marshal.

This chapter will place the early Cold War American grand strategy of containment within a contextual framework to examine the Truman Doctrine as an act of ideological innovation. Apart from an examination of the historiography of containment, already considered above, the chapter will explore the ideological context via wartime and postwar discourse. These strands include the triumphant heralding of the ‘American century’ by Luce, publisher of three of the most influential postwar magazines; the writings of Lippmann, the period’s pre-eminent political commentator, who merged his early critique of American moralism with a realist defence of postwar cosmopolitanism; Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric of freedom, which provided ideological tropes used by containment; and


See Chapter 1 for a discussion of contextualist methodology and Chapter 2 for an extended analysis of the Skinnerian project.
Kennan’s “Long Telegram”\(^{419}\) to the U.S. State Department and his article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” written under the pseudonym ‘X’ and commonly referred to as the “X article.”\(^{420}\) Both the “long telegram” and the “X article” outlined a vision of containment and, more importantly, a vision of an intransigent enemy, which the Truman Doctrine utilised in its act of ideological innovation.

Finally, the chapter will analyse the speech that announced the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68, which both anchored and extended this ideological stance. It will show the degree to which these documents represented both continuity with the discourse of U.S. international political thought and ideological novelty.

**Step one of contextual analysis: what was the author doing in writing a text in relation to other available texts that made up the ideological context?**

This section provides a sketch of the ‘available’ texts in the period before the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and also before the writing of NSC-68. These were the two key texts, which this chapter contends were ideologically innovative, and their innovative ideological reinterpretation of the world allowed an expansive version of containment to be pursued. This chapter makes no claim to contextual completeness, which is a task that is beyond the scope of a study which aims to survey a number of periods. However, the texts and authors under survey were chosen because they were so widely read at the time and, in the case of Luce, their opinions dispersed over a broad range of publications. As a result this chapter suggests that they were representative of major strands of ‘conventional’ American thought.

Melvyn Leffler asserts that:

> At the time of Roosevelt’s death American officials did *not* regard the Soviet Union as an enemy and were *not* frightened by Soviet military prowess. Soviet power paled next to that of the United States. . . . [The


Soviets had] no capacity to attack American territory and had no ability to inflict damage on the American economy. Nevertheless, the emergence of the concept of Cold War as a discrete taxonomy was intrinsically ideological, based on FDR’s theme of freedom via the Atlantic Charter combined with a “presupposition that no settlement or ‘peace’ in the traditional sense . . . was possible.” Whether or not the Cold War was, from the outset, a U.S. project is of coincidental significance to this thesis. The point is that the Cold War quickly became defined in ideological terms. In the West the ideology at stake was U.S.-style liberal capitalism, combined with a proselytising interpretation of America’s exceptional role in the world.

New approaches of differing philosophical commitments, in the fields of both International Relations and diplomatic history, have sought to bring ideology back into the narrative of U.S. foreign policy. Scott Lucas makes the important point that orthodox Cold War narratives have not normally allowed the possibility that a U.S. ideology was at play in the Cold War and present ‘Americanisation’ as a one-way process in which foreign peoples welcomed the commodities and values of liberal democracy. In other words, U.S. Cold War ideology was so successful that it sanitised the history it was creating.

This is not to suggest that there was no ideological context during the pre-1945 period; indeed, this section is engaged with recreating that context. The U.S. identification of Germany and Japan as the primary enemies during the Second World War had promoted the Grand Alliance and the associated rehabilitation of the Soviet Union in the United States. The extension of Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union in 1941 went hand in hand with Roosevelt’s desire to seek Soviet support.

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423 See Hogan, *A Cross of Iron; Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy; Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy; Leffler, Preponderance of Power*.

424 Lucas, “Beyond Freedom, Beyond Control.”

425 This is not to deny the existence of the voice of dissent. In fact, as this chapter suggests, both Lippmann and Kennan were amongst those who expressed differing viewpoints at this point in time. Even more radical critiques of America would emerge from the ‘New Left’ in the 1960s and 1970s. This thesis is in part an examination of how some voices of dissent, on both sides of the political spectrum, became co-opted into ideological uniformity.
for a postwar order compatible with liberal democracy. Although Roosevelt’s personal political skill kept the Grand Alliance alive during the Second World War, peaceful coexistence would ultimately prove incompatible with American national identity; for the second time in a generation, an American president would fail in his attempt to achieve his vision for a postwar new world order.

The Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms had established a wartime discourse largely in line with American liberal democratic values, including free trade, collective security against belligerents, and other ideals loosely inherited from Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms (from want, from fear, of speech, and of worship) resonated not just with Americans but with the constituents of the nascent United Nations, whose declaration committed its members to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

The wartime strategy of unconditional surrender reassured Stalin, who distrusted his allies and suspected that the Atlantic Charter was largely directed at the Soviet Union. Unconditional surrender was a trope appropriated from Civil War general Ulysses Grant and fitted with America’s history of comprehensively exterminating foreign enemies, as during the American Indian Wars associated with domestic expansion westward, the Mexican–American War (1846–8), and the hunting down of Filipinos.

The New York Times military correspondent Hanson Baldwin later called unconditional surrender one of the great mistakes of the Second World War. Although it allowed Roosevelt to maintain the Grand Alliance with minimal U.S. casualties, unconditional surrender encouraged Germany and Japan to extend the war as long as possible and, according to Baldwin, enabled the Soviets to extend their campaign across Europe. This chapter goes further by suggesting that the notion of unconditional surrender contributed to containment’s uncompromising character.

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429 Ibid.
The wartime discourse of the Grand Alliance remained in place through the 1945 Yalta Conference, which kept alive Roosevelt’s vision of a postwar order overseen by four enforcers: the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and nationalist China. Stalin signed on to the Yalta Declaration and its vision of ‘liberated’ Europe, pledging to support the UN. Roosevelt triumphantly declared that the Yalta Declaration had eliminated “spheres of influence and balances of power and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries – and have failed.” Yalta would represent “the best the Big Three could do to hold their alliance together, and it was not enough,” Lloyd Gardner states. Effectively, Europe was ideologically and materially partitioned before the Cold War began in earnest.

The myth of U.S. universalism precluded America’s accommodating an extended Soviet sphere of influence. Many Americans believed that the United States was God’s chosen nation, obligated to assume world leadership and spread its way of life. Before intervention in the Second World War, Luce reaffirmed America’s national identity in his 1940 bestseller American Century. Much as John O’Sullivan had trumpeted Manifest Destiny during the Mexican–American War, a century later Luce, with no greater subtlety, called on the United States to “exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit.” Truman employed a similar trope after the war: “[n]ow this great Republic – the greatest in history, the greatest the sun has ever shone upon – is charged with leadership in the world for the welfare of the whole world as well as our own welfare.”

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431 Lloyd C. Gardner, Spheres of Influence: The Partition of Europe, from Munich to Yalta (London: John Murray, 1993), 237.
434 Luce, The American Century, 23.
Henry Luce’s “American century”

The antecedent of Truman’s grandiose evocation of the Republic’s mission was evident in Luce’s writings. Born to missionary parents in China, Luce had risen to prominence as publisher of *Time*, *Life*, *Fortune*, and the documentary series *March of Time*. With a worldview shaped by strong Protestant belief and fervent faith in America’s God-ordained global mission, Luce became one of America’s most influential private citizens, and he relentlessly lobbied for greater U.S. intervention in foreign affairs. As a Republican insider, Luce received unprecedented access to confidential material. *Life’s* popular appeal during the Second World War cemented his position. More concerned with foreign affairs than with the daily operation of his publications, Luce claimed responsibility as editor-in-chief for all of his magazines’ contents.

Luce’s magazines had considerable cultural importance after the Second World War, which Luce had foreseen as precipitating U.S. global hegemony. *The American Century* dominated the 17 February 1941 issue of *Life*. In a groundbreaking editorial, Luce argued that Americans must reconcile themselves to the burdens of America’s being the world’s most powerful country. As he saw it, Americans were unable to face this fact either practically or morally. The twentieth century had become the American century; therefore, Americans were obligated to:

> accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full import of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit.\(^{440}\)

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\(^{436}\) Luce’s “American Century” was a call to action rather than an analysis of the preceding four decades. In Luce, “The American Century,” 26, he wrote about the “golden opportunity handed to us on the proverbial silver platter . . . . we bungled it in the 1920s and in the confusions of the 1930s we killed it.”


\(^{439}\) Brinkley, *The Publisher*, 303.

\(^{440}\) Luce, *American Century*, 7.
Luce took issue with fellow interventionists who emphasised an Anglo-American postwar partnership.\footnote{Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, 176.} He argued that the United States would be the senior partner by virtue of a generation of economic ascendency. Luce saw isolationists as shirking America’s economic and political responsibility on a global scale.\footnote{Luce, American Century, 24.} Many of Luce’s justifications for expansionism were unexceptional insofar as they revived nineteenth-century Manifest Destiny arguments that the United States share its political institutions and liberties with the world.

But Luce did not specify the contours of this putative American responsibility. The republic would not have a boundless role, he admitted: “our only alternative to isolationism is not to undertake to police the whole world nor to impose democratic institutions on all mankind.”\footnote{Ibid., 36.} After all, the postwar world would still include tyrannies, and warfare would not be eliminated by America alone or some “parliament of men.”\footnote{Ibid., 30.} However, Luce offered an expansive assessment of America’s postwar role; although freedom would not reign everywhere, he expected it to flourish in most of the world:

the indivisibility of the contemporary world ... Tyrannies may require a large amount of living space, but freedom requires and will require far greater living space than Tyranny. Peace cannot endure unless it prevails over a very large part of the world. Justice will come near to losing all meaning in the minds of men unless Justice can have approximately the same fundamental meanings in many lands and among many peoples.\footnote{Ibid., 30–31.}

As Luce instructed his employees at Time, America stood for one value above all others:

If we had to choose one word out of the whole vocabulary of human experience to associate with America – surely it would not be hard to choose the word. For surely the word is Freedom ... Without Freedom, America is untranslatable ... And therefore it seems to me that we can sum up the whole of editorial attitudes and principles in one word ‘Freedom’.\footnote{Henry R. Luce, “‘The Practice of Freedom,’ Memorandum to Time Magazine Staff” (New York: Time Inc. Archives, 1943).}
Luce’s *American Century* had been inspired partly by a Lippmann essay published in *Time* two years earlier: “The American Destiny.” Luce seemed to have mined the essay’s first two paragraphs. Lippmann had written, “[t]he American spirit is troubled not by the dangers, and not by the difficulties of the age, but by indecision.”⁴⁴⁷ Luce’s editorial began in a similar manner: “We Americans are unhappy. We are not happy about ourselves in relation to America. We are nervous – or gloomy – or apathetic.”⁴⁴⁸ To Lippmann this was merely part of a sustained critique of American apathy that informed much of his early writing. In his view this apathy stemmed from the nation’s “refusal to accept the large responsibilities” that accompanied “the American Destiny,” the “opportunity, the power and the responsibilities of a very great nation at the centre of a civilised world.”⁴⁴⁹

The Luce–Lippmann thesis of historical inevitability had defenders. *New York Herald Tribune* columnist Dorothy Thompson quoted from Lippmann extensively and approvingly. She wrote, “[t]o Americanize enough of the world so that we shall have a climate favorable to our growth is indeed a call to destiny.”⁴⁵⁰ Her message could not have been more absolute in its Gibbonian invocation of the stakes: “This will be an American century or it will be the beginning of the decline and fall of the American Dream.”⁴⁵¹

Luce’s article reached millions of Americans and provoked heated controversy. Although U.S. Department of State memoranda cited the article positively,⁴⁵² there was also vigorous criticism from various groups. Leading isolationist senator Robert Taft argued that Americans could not impose their system on the world. He correctly predicted that Luce’s globalism would require a huge peacetime military establishment.⁴⁵³

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⁴⁴⁸ Luce, *American Century*, 3.
⁴⁴⁹ Lippmann, “American Destiny,” 73.
⁴⁵¹ Ibid., 51.
In the nineteenth century Alexis de Tocqueville observed that the future might see the rise of two rival great powers, Russia and the United States.454 Luce’s postwar order did allow for other great powers. However, his ‘American Century’, like Lippmann’s “America’s Destiny,” was based on the assumptions that Great Britain’s days as the world’s police officer were over and that Great Britain would not remain an equal partner to the United States.

Luce’s magazines gradually abandoned their wartime benevolence towards the Soviets, and in 1943 Luce began to regard the Soviets as the chief impediment to the American century. In a Life article of 4 September 1944 former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union William C. Bullitt predicted that Stalin, still America’s ally, would soon replace Hitler, still to be vanquished, as the great threat to Europe.455 Luce’s magazines still vacillated in their view of ‘legitimate’ Soviet actions, on several occasions likening Russia’s concern with its eastern boundaries to U.S. hegemony over Latin America. The implication was that the Soviet Union and United States were equal powers. “From the standpoint of lesser nations, . . . the Big Two were dangerous not because their foreign policies were so different, but because they were so much alike.”456

By 1946 Luce’s distrust of U.S.–Soviet cooperation had permanently hardened, and he expressed frustration with the failure of the Truman administration and larger newspapers to recognise the new rivalry. As 1946 progressed, Luce’s magazines contradicted themselves less often; individual stories combined summary and opinion more frequently and hardened their line towards the Soviet Union. His anger resulted in a Life editorial that expressed his views:

> It is time to face the truth. . . . [I]f we Americans want real peace, we will have to get used to the idea of living with this conflict. . . . We shall have to work hard and sleeplessly at the tough game of power politics and diplomacy.457

454 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: George Adlard, 1838), 414. He wrote “their starting point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.”
457 Editorial, Life, 27 May 1946, 36.
Walter Lippmann’s Cold War

Despite ever-present nationalist undercurrents, many Americans had assumed that the end of the Second World War would provide a second chance to make the world ‘safe for democracy’. Wendell Willkie’s One World (1943) pushed the internationalism of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms.458 Unsophisticated as a political tract, the book espoused a vision of human unity achieved through the common quest for freedom and justice realised through Russo-American cooperation. That fact that a million copies were sold contrasts with the fact that just after Willkie’s broadcasts accompanying publication American distrust of Russia fell to its lowest point in public opinion polls.459

The Second World War had also had a profound effect on the celebrated journalist Walter Lippmann;460 once a champion of Wilsonian views, he violently rejected the Wilsonian inheritance. Lippmann’s U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (1943) codified his new theories of international relations and was followed in 1944 by U.S. War Aims.461 The works embodied a language of power and of military preparedness, alliances, and tactics that countered Lippmann’s earlier Wilsonian views.

Lippmann relentlessly condemned his generation’s push for disarmament and collective security through the League of Nations. The central lesson of the century of total war, he argued, was that those who wished to forestall conflict could not do so by averting their attention from military problems. The aspiring peacemaker, the statesman committed to amicable relations among nations, had no option but to ready his country’s defence capabilities for seemingly inevitable strife. The constituents of a proposed foreign policy were to be determined according to a strict accounting of U.S. national interest. Of paramount

importance was the establishment of alliances potent enough to deter all aggressors in the postwar era and put into operation a settled balance of power among nations. Specifically, the wartime partnership among the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union had to be cemented so that nothing could challenge its power (i.e., any war against the partnership would be avoided as it would be unwinnable). To Lippmann such a strategy was an essential corrective to the American predilection for taking issues of defence too lightly and believing “that our unearned security was the reward of our moral superiority.” The nation had to shed the misguided habits of isolationism and reluctance to forge alliances. Henceforth, the United States must vigilantly augment its security, a valuable contribution to world peace: the “elementary means by which all foreign policy must be conducted are the armed forces of the nation, the arrangement of its strategic position, and the choice of its alliances.”

Lippmann’s arguments implied that national interest was the most important consideration, an absolute value to be vigorously defended according to the logic of realpolitik. *U.S Foreign Policy* and *U.S. War Aims* were Lippmann’s most nationalistic books. However, in light of his earlier work, notably *An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society*, his main thrust must be seen as avowedly anti-authoritarian rather than purely pro-American. Embedded within The Good Society was the rationale for a fighting creed. Lippmann theorised that totalitarianism was imbued with a primal militarism and that, as a result, the free nations were destined to become embroiled in conflict with them. As totalitarianism was synonymous with atavistic barbarism, Lippmann’s choice was clear: civilised nations either took up arms against the menace or risked annihilation. As he wrote in 1937:

> We are living in a world in which great militarized nations are bent on conquest. The democracies are potentially stronger than the dictatorships, but they are softer, more self-indulgent, and more confused. They are unwilling to face the fact that in dealing with

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463 Ibid., 47.
governments that are willing to fight, there is no form of influence which really counts unless it is backed by a willingness to fight.\textsuperscript{465} Lippmann’s contention that fascism was unquenchably expansionist would prove all too prescient, and his writings of the period invoke a historic mission for the United States as the defender of Western Civilisation.\textsuperscript{466} In 1940 he proclaimed:

To our unready and unwilling hands . . . there has been confided the task of maintaining a seat of order and of freedom – of establishing a citadel so strong in its defences that by our own example the world can eventually be redeemed and pacified and made whole again. This is the American destiny.\textsuperscript{467}

The same year he addressed a Harvard reunion, railing against the spread of “organized mechanized evil” in the world: “We here in America may soon be the last stronghold of our civilisation – the isolated and beleaguered citadel of law and of liberty, of mercy and of charity, of justice among men and of love and of good will.”\textsuperscript{468}

Both \textit{U.S. Foreign Policy} and \textit{U.S. War Aims} were notable because in them Lippmann railed against his generation’s involvement in Wilsonian collective security and disarmament. To avert war could not be done by turning away from military problems. He specifically called for the formation of a postwar grand strategy: “Our failure now to form a national policy will, though we defeat our enemies, leaves us dangerously exposed to deadly conflict at home and to unmanageable perils from abroad.”\textsuperscript{469}

The basic structure of this foreign policy was to be a measured assessment of international objectives most vital to the country’s security and well-being. Of paramount importance was the establishment of alliances strong enough to deter aggressors and to put in place a settled balance of power. The wartime alliance between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union was to be cemented, specifically as a corrective to the American for not taking seriously issues of


\textsuperscript{466} Steel, \textit{Walter Lippmann}, chapter 26, suggests that Lippmann’s international thought was vague at this point in his career. This would have made it even more appealing to those conducting ideological innovation.

\textsuperscript{467} Walter Lippmann, “America and the World,” \textit{Life}, 3 June 1940, 103.

\textsuperscript{468} Quoted in Steel, \textit{Walter Lippmann}, 383–384.

\textsuperscript{469} Lippmann, \textit{U.S. Foreign Policy}, 5.
security and believing “that our unearned security was the reward of our moral superiority.”

This was by no means intended as uncritical support for the democratic ideology underpinning the United States. Having identified totalitarianism as the arch-enemy of democracy, Lippmann conceptualised the Allies as the protectors of that virtue. Lippmann nonetheless clarified: the postwar ‘policeman’ was not to be regarded as a provider of “the good life. He should be confined to the limited task of preserving an order within which the priest and teacher and constructor can proceed.”

His endorsement of alliance among the victors was not intended to confer the task of governing the vanquished or ennobling civilisation. He explicitly was not advocating awarding the United States carte blanche to impose its own version of spiritual development worldwide. The superiority of victory was not to be confused with the salvation of humankind.

For Lippmann, Wilsonianism had entailed a sense of superiority, doctrinaire moralism, and disregard for the diversity of people and societies. Most crucially, it did not recognise America as one nation among many potential allies, partners, and adversaries. Wilson conceived of war as criminal, impinging on both rights and privacy. Lippmann wrote of the Wilsonian ideal:

> Therefore, all wars are wars to end wars, all wars are crusades which can be concluded only when all the peoples have submitted to the only true political religion. There will be peace only when all the peoples hold and observe the same self-evident principles.

Although this was written after the period under review and cannot make up the ‘context’ of this chapter, this conception is compatible with Lippmann’s earlier writing. The balance of power was effective not because all parties agreed to it in the fashion of collective security but because none could challenge it. Lippmann’s formulation of realpolitik was fused with his old critique of parochial American democracy. As much as the balance of power was couched in terms of U.S. military strength, it was also a de facto regulator of presumptive U.S.

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470 Ibid., 49.
omnipotence. Thus, after the war Lippmann supported accommodation and coexistence with the Soviet Union and hoped that the United States would conceive of the U.S.S.R. as another great power with legitimate needs, objectives, anxieties, and spheres of interest.

In his 1947 compilation of newspaper articles entitled *The Cold War* and released after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, Lippmann attacked Kennan’s ‘X article’ and the theory of containment with which he conflated it. Lippmann’s understanding of Kennan appears to be incorrect and in fact his critique was a coruscating attack on the nascent Truman Doctrine. At the practical level, it showed why containment was too costly and too unmanageable in terms of choosing reliable allies. Ultimately, containment would divert attention from America’s defence needs within the Atlantic alliance.

*The Cold War* also reflected Lippmann’s broader philosophy of politics; containment was a “strategic monstrosity” because it suggested U.S. willingness to campaign for ideological hegemony. Crusades would be launched, predicated on the immature assumption that the American worldview was incontestably correct and more morally coherent than those of the Soviets or other rivals. Lippmann counselled that the United States should forswear ideological mortal combat and confront the Soviet Union and any other world power on the basis of global political realities and intelligible policy goals. Lippmann saw his critique of U.S. foreign policy as intimately linked to America’s sense of self; the lesson of Wilson was not that international commitments should be avoided but that they should be animated by the same dispositions and values that nurtured the nation’s isolationism and parochialism.

According to Lippmann, substituting a newly interventionist and expansionist foreign policy would simply exacerbate the self-absorption of the United States as it revelled in its now-worldwide superiority. The American fundamentalist mentality for which he reprimanded Wilson must be avoided. Lippmann was concerned not only that the United States be protected from the world but also

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473 Lippmann, *Cold War*.
474 Ibid., 18.
475 Ibid., 22.
that the world be protected from the United States and that the United States be protected from itself.

Lippmann’s realism rested on a definition of the national interest that was elastic and could therefore accommodate widely divergent, at times contradictory, proposals. The elasticity allowed Lippmann to formulate policies that other realists, such as Kennan, could never share. Both were dedicated to pursuing the national interest and distrusted moralism and crusades for democracy, although more of this crept into their analyses than either of them probably would have cared to admit. Lippmann’s 1947 critique of the “X article” and Truman Doctrine showed the deep gap that had grown between him and the U.S. State Department:

The history of diplomacy is the history of relations among rival powers, which did not enjoy political intimacy, and did not respond to appeals to common purposes. Nevertheless there have been settlements. . . . For a diplomat to think that rival and unfriendly powers cannot be brought to a settlement is to forget what diplomacy is all about. 476

Ultimately, it was the language of Lippmann’s earlier wartime writing which was to be given unbounded scope in the Truman Doctrine. The title of his volume The Cold War, although not the first use of the term, seems to have been its point of entry into the popular American lexicon.477 The point of examining both Luce and Lippmann is that their views were ideologically ‘conventional’ in the sense of being commonplace. They consisted of a mix of ill-defined cosmopolitan thought, a recognition of great power ambitions in a ‘spheres of influence’ arrangement, and a sense that whilst American values (principally ‘freedom’ in Luce’s case) had triumphed over fascism they should not be the sole determinant of the postwar order.

Step two of contextual analysis: what was the author doing in producing a text in relation to available and problematic political action, which makes up the practical context?

Both Luce and Lippmann were addressing and perhaps echoing the opinions of the newly emergent group of national security bureaucrats. The Second World

476 Lippmann, Cold War, 30.
War had ushered in a profound bureaucratic revolution in the United States. The federal bureaucracy changed in two important ways. First, government agencies came to control the creation and disbursement of a significant share of the national wealth. Second, the balance of power within the federal bureaucracy decisively shifted to those agencies that concerned themselves with foreign and military affairs. In 1939 the federal government had about 800,000 civilian employees, about 10 per cent of whom worked for national security agencies; by the end of the Second World War that figure approached 4 million, of whom 75 per cent were engaged in national security activities. The last pre-mobilisation defence budget represented 1.4 per cent of the gross national product; the lowest postwar defence budget, for about eighteen months between demobilisation and Cold War remobilisation, represented 4.7 per cent of the GNP. Once postwar remobilisation was under way, defence spending rarely dipped below 8 per cent of the GNP.

One of the greatest consequences of this was the coming to power of a national security elite remarkable for its homogeneity. Nothing like it had previously existed in the United States, and there were no equivalents in other branches of government. Although the Founding Fathers had been a governing class and had thought of themselves as such, they had shown far deeper ideological cleavages than existed among members of this national security managerial class. “Never before had a self-defining, self-selecting and self-perpetuating group held power for so long in American politics.” Between 1940 and 1967 “all first- and second-level posts in the national security bureaucracy were held by fewer than four hundred individuals who rotated through a series of key postings.” In short, as early as 1940 the national security managers represented a small, durable, and exclusive club.

“Most shared the experience of having battled against parochialism and isolationism at home. Most – though not all – had been Atlantic Firsters.” In his

478 Hogan, A Cross of Iron; Leffler, Preponderance of Power.
480 Ibid., 24–5.
481 Ibid., 48.
482 Ibid.
refinement of this establishment’s homogeneity, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. identified this group’s civil societal outlets and, crucially, their bipartisan dominance. The group furnished a steady supply of always orthodox and often able people to Democratic as well as Republican administrations. . . . The community was the heart of the American Establishment. Its household deities were Henry L. Stimson and Elihu Root, . . . its front organizations, the Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie foundations and the Council on Foreign Relations, its organs the New York Times and Foreign Affairs. Its politics were predominantly Republican; but it possessed what its admirers saw as a commitment to public service and its critics as an appetite for power which impelled its members to serve Presidents of whatever political faith.484

This chapter is not intended to recapitulate the period’s numerous bureaucratic and diplomatic studies or biographical studies of this group’s individual members. Reconstructing the careers of key figures is not the same as reconstructing the history of foreign policy. Instead, the purpose of identifying this group is to reveal the importance of this small epistemic community485 that dominated the machinery of government by 1946. However, it is important to avoid the suggestion of consensus even within such a restricted group of policymakers. Sixty years after the emergence of the Cold War, it is easy to fall into post hoc rationalisation and draw a line of continuity between the Second World War U.S. military machine and the postwar national security state. There was no return to peacetime levels of relative military inactivity. The policy of containment and the emergence of NSC-68 were not inevitable. Indeed, “state making unfolded in a political context that had ideological, cultural and party dimensions.”486 It was to precisely this group that innovative ideological change had to be addressed in order for it to be inculcated into the bureaucracy of the national security state.

485 See also Parmar, “‘Mobilizing America’”; Parmar, “Anglo-American Elites”.
486 Hogan, Cross of Iron, 5.
Step three of contextual analysis: the identification of ‘containment’ as an ideological move

The continuing influence of Wilson’s rhetoric of freedom was important to the policy of containment. With America’s assumption of a global role in the First World War, Wilson recast U.S. political culture for a global stage. Wilsonians attempted to use the U.S. normative model to solve a multitude of global ‘wrongs’ and reconstruct the world order. Wilson recast U.S. norms as universal norms, casting aside all who opposed those norms. The most obvious rhetorical example was Wilson’s condemnation of German submarine warfare as “warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations.”

Wilson paved the way for total war and corresponding annihilation of the ‘enemy’. Thus, he “[f]used, firmly in the American tradition, this secular concept of reasonable conduct with a thoroughly Protestant notion of election and mission into a full-fledged ideology of U.S. exceptionalism.”

The normative shift was immense. It was evident throughout the Second World War in Roosevelt’s view that “normal practices of diplomacy . . . are of no possible use in dealing with international outlaws.”

The implication was twofold: first, the only solution to such an enemy was total annihilation; and, second, Henry Stimson’s appropriation of Abraham Lincoln’s assertion that no nation could survive half slave and half free. In these terms the Atlantic Charter and Four Freedoms represented a new formulation of U.S. ideology and offered a fundamentally new conception of the international system; freedom was no longer constrained by simple negative definition. Such logic was inherent in Roosevelt’s rhetorical expression:

Any peace with lawless aggressors, then, was a mere pax falsa, merely “another armistice.” Having formulated a maximalist notion of

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487 Woodrow Wilson, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress Requesting a Declaration of War Against Germany” (2 April 1917), [accessed 03/08/11].
488 Stephanson, “Fourteen Notes,” 77.
489 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “Orders the U.S. Navy to ‘Shoot on Sight’,” quoted in ibid, 78.
“peace” and simultaneously divested all non-western space of the traditional distinction between war and peace, Roosevelt had really declared that the United States was always already in a state of quasi-war and would so remain until, negatively, the last dictator had been eliminated and, positively, the Four Freedoms had been everywhere secured.\footnote{Stephanson, “Fourteen Notes,” 79.}

Such language featured prominently in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR) wartime rhetoric. Returning from Yalta in 1945, FDR spoke of “the assurance that neither the Nazis nor Prussian militarism could again be revived to threaten the peace and the civilisation of the world.”\footnote{Roosevelt, “Address to Congress on the Yalta Conference”.} Nonetheless, the Second World War did see genuine tripartite cooperation between the members of the Grand Alliance as well as convincing attempts to find a mutually acceptable form of postwar order. Roosevelt’s rhetorical reshaping of the political debate was clearly somewhat malleable, at least with respect to a flexible interpretation of who the ‘last dictator’ might be.

Such rhetorical commonplaces, which included the term ‘civilisation’, had been used to legitimise wartime cooperation with the Soviets. As Patrick Jackson states, “Its replacement by the more restrictive ‘Western Civilisation’ was an important part of the postwar world,”\footnote{Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 59.} intended to literally write the Soviet Union out of the ‘civilised’ world. Truman mobilised the concept of totalitarianism

\begin{quote}
as a way of making sense of what was read as Soviet intransigence and impositions: crude power moves, subversion and conspiracy . . . ‘Totalitarianism’ thus served to collapse the differences between fascism and communism.\footnote{Stephanson, “Cold War Considered,” 58.}
\end{quote}

The rhetorical use and refashioning of Wilsonian discourse paved the way for a whole range of new political norms, as well as policy legitimation, that would eventually find expression in the Truman Doctrine. Wilsonianism provided a language that could be refashioned to allow for global crusade and make the prospect of diplomatic engagement untenable.

Some dissenters continued to argue for a much more focused conception of the national interest. The ultimate misuse of their alternative visions of grand strategy

\footnote{Stephanson, “Fourteen Notes,” 79.}
\footnote{Roosevelt, “Address to Congress on the Yalta Conference”.}
\footnote{Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 59.}
\footnote{Stephanson, “Cold War Considered,” 58.}
indicates the degree to which containment was an ideological move. George Kennan, whose analysis of Soviet intentions would provide the most pervasive intellectual grounding for the Truman Doctrine, criticised the final idea of containment that Truman implemented. Those of Kennan’s writings that predate the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68 presented an alternative conception of U.S. grand strategy, a vision of containment much more in line with what would now be called a realist school of thought. The fact that Kennan’s strongly realist views existed within the contested arena of the national interest debate shows the remarkable variance in meanings used to articulate and define the national interest in the late 1940s.

Nonetheless, the Truman Doctrine would reconfigure the ideas that Kennan expressed in his “Long Telegram” and NSC-68 would draw upon the “X article.” Henry Kissinger’s assertion that “George Kennan came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history” constitutes a misinterpretation of Kennan’s position that Kennan took pains to correct. Kennan’s writing would enter the mainstream of early Cold War grand strategy, but his locutionary force, his illocutionary intention, and the perlocutionary consequences would diverge.

In February 1946, while he was Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow, Kennan sent the 8,000-word “Long Telegram” to the U.S. State Department. As previously mentioned, his article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” appeared under the pseudonym ‘X’ in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs. A gifted scholar with a subtle mind, Kennan was one of the Department’s most experienced Soviet

495 Kennan has been the subject of considerable scholarship. This thesis was in part inspired by Stephanson’s Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy, which takes a post-structuralist inspired approach to Kennan. This chapter has also made use of the following: John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York: Penguin Press, 2011); Gellman, Contending with Kennan; Robert L. Ivie, “Realism Masking Fear; George F. Kennan’s Political Rhetoric,” in Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations, ed. Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1996); Kuklick, Blind Oracles; Lukacs, George Kennan; David Allan Mayers, George Kennan and the Dilemmas of Us Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Miscamble, “Kennan through His Texts”; Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Wilson D. Miscamble, “Rejected Architect and Master Builder: George Kennan, Dean Acheson and Postwar Europe,” The Review of Politics, 58, no. 3 (1996): 437–68.
496 Henry Kissinger and Clare Boothe Luce. White House Years (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1979), 135.
497 ‘X’, “Sources of Soviet Conduct.”
specifying. The idea of containment was not new when the “X article” introduced the term *containment* to the world. Kennan’s achievement lay in his giving intelligent expression to a U.S. view of the Soviet Union that was already unfolding.

Kennan’s primary thesis in the “Long Telegram” was that U.S. policy toward the Soviets during and after the Second World War had been based on the incorrect assumption that there were no structural impediments to normal relations. Kennan asserted that Soviet foreign policy had little relationship to Western action and that the Soviet “party line is not based on any objective analysis of [the] situation beyond Russia’s borders. . . . [I]t arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities.”498 According to Kennan’s line of reasoning, the United States could not resume normal diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. because the U.S.S.R. relied on the fiction of external threat to maintain its internal legitimacy. Kennan wrote,

> At bottom of Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity . . . And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.499

Kennan’s analysis revealed his realist assessment that the Kremlin would seek ongoing Soviet expansion, taking advantage of all opportunities and exploiting every weakness and vulnerability in the West. As might be expected of this type of reasoning, he suggested that although Soviet leaders were impervious to reason, they were responsive to force.

Kennan said little about U.S. objectives, tactics, and capabilities. His analysis of Soviet policy clearly conveyed the message that Stalinist Russia was a totalitarian regime bent on expansion. Kennan’s telegram prescribed little and said little about U.S. interests other than the need to contain Soviet power.

His “Long Telegram” and other dispatches were immediately disseminated in Washington. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal was so impressed with Kennan’s analysis that he distributed copies within the administration and press. It served a more blunt but ideologically significant purpose, too: “For Forrestal,

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499 Ibid., 5–6.
Kennan’s message forever engraved the Nazi totalitarian image onto Soviet foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{500} Less than six months later, still before the Truman Doctrine was announced, the Clifford-Elsey report,\textsuperscript{501} commissioned by President Truman, effectively repeated much of the analysis of the “Long Telegram” but also started a process of toughening the American stance towards the Soviets.

Kennan’s analysis did not provide a strategy, being devoted merely to defining the Soviet threat. However, from his recognisably realist starting point, it followed that the national interest would be best served by trying to restructure the international order not through a ‘universalistic’ grand strategy but through a particularist approach geared toward balance among the great powers. Security could be maintained by balancing power, interests, and antagonisms. For Kennan, perhaps this argument’s most important corollary was that not all parts of the world were equally vital to U.S. security. Kennan purposefully oversimplified his list to “only five centers of industrial and military power in the world, which are important to us from the standpoint of national security.”\textsuperscript{502} These centres were Great Britain, Germany, central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Only one of these centres (the U.S.S.R.) was in hostile hands. America’s primary interest was to see that no others fell under such control. Kennan recognised the need for a U.S. sphere of influence in the western hemisphere. He was saying that industrial–military power was the most dangerous; therefore, keeping it under control was the highest priority. Priorities of interest had to be established because capabilities were limited.\textsuperscript{503}

Kennan’s view of international order was not devoid of optimism. Rivalries within the system could result in equilibrium. Because capabilities are finite, interests must also be limited; vital interests must be distinguished from non-essential ones. The means must be subordinated to the ends, but indiscriminate methods could corrupt the ends. As Gaddis admits, Kennan the realist still

\textsuperscript{500} Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 109.
\textsuperscript{503} Ibid., 27–30.
“insisted on using this perception of interests as a standard against which to evaluate threats, not the other way around; threats had no meaning, Kennan insisted, except with reference to and in terms of one’s concepts of interests.”

Kennan’s policymaking contemporaries, who read the “Long Telegram” and “X article,” did not appear to fully grasp his worldview. His logic was too subtle and at times too muddled to be clear. However, Secretary of State James Byrnes’ initial interpretation of Kennan’s stance was “patience and firmness” and for much of 1946 that stance became the guiding principal for policy with regard to U.S.–Soviet relations.

In Kennan’s later writings the force of his meaning of containment came through more plainly, but clearly these were not texts that were available to Kennan’s audience in the 1940s. Essentially, he had rejected universalism on the grounds “that men everywhere are . . . animated by substantially the same hopes and inspirations, that they all react substantially the same in given circumstances”; therefore, “to make national security contingent upon the worldwide diffusion of American institutions would be to exceed national capabilities, thereby endangering those institutions.”

Benefiting from Kennan’s subsequent writings, later historians have been able to impose order on his worldview. In 1946–7 Kennan’s thinking appeared confused. He accused the Soviets of being ideologically bound to expansion yet dismissed Marxism as a “fig leaf.” In the “Long Telegram” he discussed the Soviet Union’s “real” nature and intentions in terms of an absolute ideal truth, arguing that Soviet Communism’s vital principle was the destruction of all competing power, but he said nothing about immediate prospects. Whatever nuances Kennan had privately intended as America’s appropriate policy response to the Soviets, the subtlety of his analysis was overshadowed by his devastating critique.

504 Ibid., 31.
508 Stephanson, Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy, 76–8.
of Soviet ideology and ambition and his view that the U.S. strategic goal must be changing that system of government.

It is not hard to see why Kennan had been interpreted in this way. He called on the administration to create the necessary will for victory, expressing his fear that Americans lacked the discipline needed to deal with the Soviet threat. The implication was that the federal government must inform Americans of Cold War realities and reform the national character. “I cannot over-emphasise the importance of this,” he stressed.\textsuperscript{509} Although a realist, Kennan argued that success depended on the “health and vigor” of our own society because Communism, like a “malignant parasite,” fed only on the “diseased tissue”\textsuperscript{510} of degenerate societies. He continued:

Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow. . . . If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference \textit{in the face of deficiencies of our own society}, Moscow will profit.\textsuperscript{511}

Kennan was making an impassioned realist plea which ended with a conservative critique of America, as much as its main thrust had been Soviet Marxism. However, the subtlety of his analysis and his generalised pronouncement about the problems America faced in reacting to them were overlooked. For readers of the “long telegram,” reading without the context provided by the “X article” and Kennan’s later writing, it would have been easy (as Lippmann’s own misreading of Kennan suggests) to simply take away his strong rhetoric, combined with Manichean binaries.

Truman would answer Kennan’s call to counter an enemy Kennan had defined in such inflexible and expansive terms. Although Truman’s solution would not enact the limited vision of containment that Kennan had anticipated or would later claim he desired, the Truman Doctrine and \textit{NSC-68} would reflect Kennan’s conception of the Soviet threat.

\textsuperscript{509} Kennan, “The Long Telegram,” 18.
\textsuperscript{510} Ibid. (all three short quotes).
\textsuperscript{511} Ibid; emphasis added.
Step four of contextual analysis: the Truman Doctrine

Focusing on the Truman Doctrine, this section will address the question ‘What relation between political ideology and political action best explains the diffusion of certain ideologies, and what effect does this have on political behaviour?’

In less than twenty minutes Truman’s address to a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947 established the Cold War not as a military clash or even a struggle for economic supremacy but as a contest of values. Truman clearly stated his guiding principle: “I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

Soviet ruthlessness and the Soviet drive for expansion – as characterised by Kennan – began to infuse Truman’s rhetoric, lurking behind his warnings of coercion and political infiltration. Soviet ideology was to be countered by U.S. ideology, which was less systematic but dedicated to the defence of freedom and democracy. Truman’s speech presented a Manichean contrast between American life and values, which served as a beacon to the world, and their Soviet counterparts, which represented a perverted system that impoverished and enslaved its citizens.

The speech signified a transformation in U.S. foreign policy and was in a sense the endpoint of a gradual narrowing of the administration’s perceptions and options. Truman’s speech built on the ‘Iron Curtain’ rhetoric that Winston Churchill had used in his infamous Fulton speech the year before and placed Churchill’s ideological commitments and Kennan’s vision of an expansive, intractable enemy (transmitted in simplified form via the Clifford-Elsey report) within the context of U.S. policy, lifting it to the status of doctrine.

514 On the Truman Doctrine this chapter has principally referred to the following studies except where indicated: Denise M. Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 2008); Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1943–1950 (London: Praeger...
Great Britain’s decision to discontinue military and financial aid to Greece and Turkey triggered the Truman Doctrine. Truman presented Congress with a stark choice: either let Greece and Turkey, both vital to Mediterranean security, face internal and external pressures on their own, or go to their aid.

The Truman Doctrine was an attempt to convince Congress, the press, and the American people that the decision to intervene in Greece and Turkey was justified. On first reading, Truman’s speech appears unproblematic, a relatively orthodox contribution to a familiar discourse on America’s role in the world, advocating increased involvement in international affairs (in this case, economic support for two collapsing governments). Luce’s *American Century* and Lippmann’s ‘American Destiny’ seemed to have been finally realised. Truman was no longer plagued by the indecision and apathy about America’s manifest role that Luce and Lippmann had railed against in their political editorials directed at Truman and their general analyses of the U.S. condition.

However, the speech represented a more fundamental realignment of American ideological thought on grand strategy. Truman’s opening lines painted the situation in global terms, and also signalled that he was about to announce an unprecedented move away from America’s preceding foreign-policy stance, a move that required the attention of Congress and the policy elite. Truman linked the international crisis to U.S. foreign policy, which he linked, in turn, to national security. Within the space of two lines he expanded U.S. grand strategy to global proportions.

Lippmann, Luce, and Kennan had called for a foreign policy rooted in U.S. national interest rather than fundamentalist idealism. Lippmann and Luce had emphasised America’s global responsibility and Luce had written on the theme of the indivisibility of the postwar world. Truman had reinterpreted their bounded concept of American internationalism. Truman’s emphasis on national security was also a significant innovation. It allowed him to articulate a grand strategy that ostensibly was based on traditional balance-of-power thinking but that actually projected global civilisational values.

Before the Second World War the term *national security* had rarely been used. It had started to feature in foreign-policy discourse only in the late 1940s. Earlier traditions had linked *national interest* to the rise of the nation state. It is well documented that the term *interests of states* had later been imported from Europe to America.\(^{515}\) The term *national interest* had remained a dominant construct in discussions of foreign policy, and by the 1920s it had acquired strongly negative connotations.\(^{516}\) Nonetheless, the concept had informed the writings of Luce, Lippmann, and Kennan.

The phrase “national security”\(^{517}\) suggested: “a level of security midway between an individual’s ‘social security’ and the world’s ‘collective security’. Dovetailing with the emergence of the United States as a superpower, the term placed responsibility for security on the military preparedness of the nation-state.”\(^{518}\) In a 1938 article advocating a proactive national policy that would prevent rather than merely respond to trouble, Edward Mead Earle of Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study used the term *national security* as, effectively, a synonym for national preparedness.\(^{519}\)

‘National security’ provided common political ground on which internationalists of both the realist national-interest school and the collective-security school could press for the one basic goal on which they agreed, the necessity of U.S. involvement in the postwar world. The emergence of ‘national security’ is important because the concept reflects a concern with configuring an external environment compatible with U.S. domestic visions of a good society.

The Truman Doctrine was about more than American geographic expansion or even the material protection of allied territory. Truman, Acheson, and their advisors repeatedly emphasised that the Soviet Union did not have to attack the United States to undermine its security. Soviet or Communist expansion into the


\(^{517}\) Truman, “The Truman Doctrine.”

\(^{518}\) Rosenberg, “Commentary,” 3.

Eurasian land mass, and accompanying domination of its resources, would force
the United States to alter its political and economic system. In Truman’s words,
such expansion would require:

>a stringent and comprehensive system of allocation and rationing in
order to husband our smaller resources. It would require us to become
a garrison state, and to impose upon ourselves a system of centralised
regimentation unlike anything we have ever known.\(^{520}\)

Truman’s announcement of his doctrine also evoked Wilson’s universalist
rhetoric (‘making the world safe for democracy’) and the war rhetoric that FDR
had used to rally Americans against fascism. Such rhetoric had appeared in the
Atlantic Charter, the Yalta agreement, and various Truman speeches, but was now
used to justify America’s global reach\(^{521}\). The speech’s major theme was the
contrast between the “free world” and “totalitarianism,” described as “alternative
ways of life”\(^{522}\); the suggestion was no longer in line with Lippmann’s postwar
cosmopolitanism.

From the speech’s outset, Truman clearly indicated that Greece and Turkey were
inextricably part of U.S. national security but also symbolised a more fundamental
problem. He reminded his audience of the Second World War’s ‘real’ meaning:
the United States had fought that war to keep nations from imposing their way of
life on others. Thus, an analogy linked the Second World War and the Cold War.
Truman stated:

> At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must
choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a
free one.

> One way of life is based upon the will of the majority and is
distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free
elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and
religion, and freedom from political oppression.

> The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority
forcibly imposed upon the majority. . . . I believe it must be the policy

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\(^{520}\) Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program” (6
March 1952),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14424&amp;st=&amp;st1=#axzz1p2OXRSPX
[accessed 03/08/11].


\(^{522}\) Truman, “The Truman Doctrine.”
of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free people to work out their own destinies in their own way.\textsuperscript{523}

Truman had specified the ideological lens through which every American could see the central meaning of complex and difficult problems confronting the country in international affairs. He divided the world into a Manichean duality with no possible synthesis, minimising or ignoring differences within the so-called free world and within the Communist world, and he accentuated the moral and mortal conflict between the two worlds.

Tocqueville, an early observer of U.S. exceptionalism, had said of such language:

\begin{quote}
Democratic writers are perpetually coining abstract words \ldots in which they sublimate into further abstractions the abstract terms of the language. Moreover to render their mode of speech more succinct, they personify the object of these abstract terms and make it act like a real person.\textsuperscript{524}
\end{quote}

The personifications would come later, in NSC-68. For the moment, Truman stuck with abstract definition of the enemy, carefully avoiding direct reference to the Soviet Union.

Within his eighteen-minute speech, Truman used the word \textit{free} or one of its synonyms twenty-four times, \textit{totalitarian} four times, \textit{democracy} three times, and \textit{Communist} only once. With respect to his distinction between political good and evil, his language transcended the actual conditions in Greece and Turkey and exaggerated their significance. In reality, events had not been as drastic as the speech suggested. The U.S. State Department had even worded the Greek government’s request for assistance.

Truman faced a political and rhetorical problem in that neither Greece nor Turkey was a democracy. Therefore, in the sections of his speech that dealt with either country he used the word \textit{free} loosely, to mean independent. The illocutionary force paved the way for alliances with nations that made no pretence to being ‘free’.

\textsuperscript{523} Truman, “The Truman Doctrine.”

It was also difficult to define the nature of the threat to Greece and Turkey. Neither the Soviet army nor Communist troops from any other country had invaded Greece or Turkey. Therefore, Truman defined the threat to both countries using the abstract terms *militant minority*, *armed minority*, and *outside pressures*. Truman defined strategic policy in universalist terms yet justified it in ideological terms.

The speech did not have unanimous approval within the administration. Kennan objected to its ideological thrust and universal commitment. He particularly objected to the phrase ‘alternative ways of life’. He even wrote an alternative speech, which was rejected. However, the nature of the criticism of the speech attests to its success as a political, illocutionary act that created and legitimised a new strategic idea based on a revised ideological view of the world.

The notion of a smooth transition from the end of the Second World War through Kennan’s writings to the Truman Doctrine is untenable. By examining contemporary political thought, we can suggest that the Truman Doctrine represented significant ideological innovation. From an ideological perspective the speech successfully became the basis for conventional policy wisdom (and would be extended in *NSC68*).

**Step five of contextual analysis: NSC-68**

As the final step in this chapter’s contextual analysis, this section will address the forms of political thought and action that are involved in disseminating and conventionalising ideological change. The analysis will focus on *NSC-68*.

*NSC-68* was the blueprint for military purpose and strategy in which the expression of containment became pronounced. Published in spring 1950, the document was the culmination of the first formative period of domestic political and policy debate about the nature of the U.S. approach to the Cold War. *NSC-68* recapitulated many arguments outlined in earlier NSC documents but gave them greater urgency and integrated them more fully into a national security ideology. However, in domestic terms *NSC-68* and the primacy it would gain during the

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1950s marked Truman’s failure to reconcile his post-1945 ambitions to create a domestic state on “something like a peacetime basis while also safeguarding its security” with America’s forging ahead as the foremost world power. Leffler notes: “When faced with a gap between goals and capabilities, the thrust of the Truman administration’s policy was almost always to expand capabilities . . . rather than to narrow goals.”

NSC-68 epitomised such a trend. Kennan had failed to articulate a clear strategy in either the “Long Telegram” or the “X article” and then had lost his public argument with Lippmann and private argument with Paul Nitze about the shape and scope of Cold War strategy. These failures allowed the Truman administration to pursue a primarily military-orientated policy that far exceeded the political and economic basis of containment.

At first glance it is not easy to see the difference between Kennan’s conception of U.S. interests and the conception espoused in NSC-68, which proclaimed “the integrity and vitality of our free society which is founded on the dignity and worth of the individual.” Somewhat confusingly, given its stance on Leninism’s seemingly unstoppable expansionism, NSC-68 stated that a “free society relies primarily on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it.” NSC-68 appeared to rely on the balance of power to ensure that diversity. But that marked the end of any similarity to Kennan’s views. Kennan “had argued that all that was necessary to maintain the balance of power . . . was to keep centers of industrial–military capability out of hostile hands.” NSC-68 went much further: “What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now inseparably confronts the slave society with the free. . . . [A] defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.”

NSC-68’s new vision was of Wilsonian total negation of the enemy: “[T]he dynamic notion that freedom is always under threat, internally as well as

526 Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 312.
528 Ibid., 9.
529 Ibid., 11.
530 Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 89.
531 NSC-68, 12.
externally. . . [T]he very threat of arbitrary imposition on the still independent self is a form of slavery.”\textsuperscript{532} The notion that freedom was indivisible found prominent expression in \textit{NSC-68}, as did the corollary that Americans had no choice but to rethink the way they saw themselves and accept an identity as champions of freedom everywhere. \textit{NSC-68} indicated that the United States must be far more actively engaged with the world: “It is only by practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own integrity.”\textsuperscript{533} \textit{NSC-68} very effectively drew the boundaries of America’s political identity in a way that tied the survival of democracy at home to its defence abroad. Americans would have to be willing to fight to defend their way of life but would also forge global conditions under which the U.S. democratic system could prosper.

\textit{NSC-68} continued themes presented by FDR: “implacable enemy, infiltration and subversion, civilizational negation, worldwide struggle and infinite strategic needs.”\textsuperscript{534} In one sense \textit{NSC-68} did not say anything that other national security documents had not already expressed. However, it did add a sense of urgency, reduced whatever ambiguity existed in the aftermath of the Truman Doctrine, and firmly tied the concept of national security to a global vision of containment.

It was a newly conceived world of total war. The distinction between war and peace, which had vacillated in the 1930s, had given way to “permanent struggle.”\textsuperscript{535} \textit{NSC-68} implied that Americans would have to redefine their identity and reject isolationism. The document concretely spelled out the meaning of “our way of life.”\textsuperscript{536} Whereas the Truman Doctrine had merely suggested the ideological stakes, \textit{NSC-68} explicitly defined them. The rhetoric of \textit{NSC-68} marginalised domestic debate by nearly equating dissent with disloyalty and by implying that domestic debate threatened the security of the United States and the free world, of which the United States was the defender.

\textsuperscript{533} \textit{NSC-68}, 13.
\textsuperscript{534} Stephanson, “Fourteen Notes,” 17.
\textsuperscript{535} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{536} \textit{NSC-68}, 7.
Emily Rosenberg has stressed the rhetorical power of binary opposites. Through a series of dichotomies, NSC-68 extended the Truman Doctrine into an overarching metanarrative of idealised U.S. identity versus Soviet society. The primary metanarrative at work is the contrast between slave and free man, which had been a guiding vision of the republic since its inception and which Wilson had appropriated.

NSC-68 asserted that active internationalism, rather than isolationism, safeguarded American liberties against the persistent danger of the garrison state. Quoting from the Constitution, the document suggested historical continuity: its “fundamental purpose” was to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”

NSC-68 managed to “wrap departures from tradition, in tradition itself.” The strategy extended U.S. exceptionalist political discourse, including Truman’s wartime rhetoric. The notion of Manifest Destiny was apparent, but now unfettered by the traditional limits of discursive interpretation: “Even if there were no Soviet Union . . . we would face the great problem of the free society, accentuated many-fold in this industrial age, of reconciling order, security, the need for participation, with the requirement of freedom.”

NSC-68 also served to delineate the ‘enemy’ and, in the absence of a current material threat, reconfigure the world as an ideological balance of power. The document stated that the U.S.S.R. had no plans for immediate war with the United States but was directed toward military growth and already had the ability to overrun Eurasia.

In the absence of an immediate military threat, the question was not whether the United States should prepare for war but how it could prepare to prevent war while fighting an offensive Cold War. John Young and John Kent note that “NSC-68 and its rearmament strategy, like NATO, were initially designed more to create

538 NSC-68, 9.
539 Hogan, Cross of Iron, 298.
540 NSC-68, 38.
the conditions for a strong foreign policy geared to fighting the Cold War and strengthening allies, than to providing the resources for a military victory." \(^{541}\)

In formulating *NSC-68*, the national security elite responded to the public commentary conducted by commentators such as Luce and Lippmann and the private analysis of George Kennan, but all of them had envisaged a very different American century.

**Conclusion**

This chapter provided a contextual analysis of the Truman Doctrine and *NSC-68*. Both documents drew on existing discourse about America’s place in the postwar world but successfully manipulated this discourse to create a strategy of containment that went far beyond a simple defensive posture and thus represented significant ideological innovation. Nevertheless, the path to the Truman Doctrine and *NSC-68* was one of contestation and ultimately ideological novelty; it defies proleptic characterisation.

Luce had acknowledged U.S. responsibilities but had failed to delineate them and had delegitimised postwar Soviet interests. Subtleties such as Lippmann’s warning that U.S. postwar military superiority should not be confused with the salvation of humankind had been subsumed. While adopting Lippmann’s rejection of isolationism, *NSC-68* disregarded his plea that America not police the world. Perhaps most importantly, the Truman Doctrine had asserted the universality of American values, suggesting that a threat to ‘free’ nations was a threat to U.S. national security. Although Luce, Lippmann, and Kennan were clear about the need for U.S. engagement with the world, none of them fully defined the terms of that engagement or specified where it would end.

This chapter represents an attempt to reconstruct what Truman and his advisors did see and the degree to which they were constrained by and innovated in the face of the existing context. The foundational texts of the emergent American grand strategy of containment were the Truman Doctrine speech to Congress and *NSC-68*. These texts shared a set of para-ideological convictions. The political

innovation of the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68 was to universalise the mission of American exceptionalism to create a grand strategy that represented a form of global anti-Communism. It was such a durable ideological innovation that it would dominate party political foreign-policy debate in the early 1950s and the policy of containment is still a touchstone of foreign-policy debate. Even Kennan, despite his haphazard realism, declared that: “Providence . . . [had] made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.”

542 ‘X’, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 582.
Chapter 5. The Rise and Fall of Détente

The history of U.S. foreign relations has an assortment of terms that encapsulate a policy, outlook, or approach; these forms of shorthand have varied histories. In the early 1930s, appeasement first surfaced as a neutral or even positive way of describing European diplomats’ efforts to deal with Hitler. After the Second World War it became one of the pejorative labels in the foreign-policy lexicon. As discussed in Chapter 4, containment emerged as a description of the goal of U.S. policy with respect to Communist countries.

This chapter will analyse détente’s rise and fall. It will examine the extent to which détente – usually seen as America’s closest approach to a realist grand strategy – was nonetheless imbued with ideas of U.S. exceptionalism. This chapter asserts that détente was chiefly a response to domestic unrest on both the left and the right of the American political spectrum. Despite these challenges, the ideological goal of containing Soviet influence did not disappear from American grand strategy but the methods by which this goal was pursued changed significantly. Although chiefly identified with the Republican administrations of the 1970s, détente had a longer lineage, both as a diplomatic device and as a popular buzzword. In analysing the degree of ideological and political innovation that détente represented, this chapter will consider earlier conceptions of détente.

This chapter will focus primarily on the reshaping of the term détente in the Nixon administration (in which it rose to the level of grand strategy) and its eventual collapse, by which time it had become nearly synonymous with capitulation and almost as sullied as appeasement. Although U.S. usage of détente predates the Nixon administration, the Nixon administration was the first to use the term explicitly to describe its grand strategy. By the end of the Ford administration, the term was already used only in a historical sense. As outlined in Chapter 1 and applied in Chapter 3, the methodology employed in this chapter

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544 Ibid., 2 (footnote 2).
will be a form of Cambridge School contextualism. The approach’s five analytical steps will structure the chapter.

**Step one of contextual analysis: the available meanings of détente and related concepts**

This section will address the contextualist question ‘In writing a text, what was an author doing in relation to other available texts that made up the ideological context?’ In particular, the section will identify available meanings of détente and related concepts that made up the ideological context of the Cold War era.

Like many other terms of diplomacy, détente is a French word. It derives from the Latin *de* and *tendere* and originally had a meaning akin to ‘unstretch’. Originally applied to the release of a bowstring, détente eventually came to mean a release of tension between rival states.\(^{545}\) Within the context of the Cold War, the concept of détente, if not use of the term, can be traced back to early critics of containment. Walter Lippmann’s powerful critique of both George Kennan’s “X article” and the Truman Doctrine rejected global containment as a bankrupt policy that would lead to an unmanageable gap between expansive interests and finite resources.\(^{546}\)

America used its policy toward Europe as a guide\(^{547}\) for its policy toward the rest of the world. As a result the United States would be forced to respond to Soviet initiatives at her own (America’s) strategically weakest locations around the world. U.S. interests were not equally significant in all conflicts, and U.S. power was too limited to meet the demands of a policy that did not differentiate between central and peripheral interests.\(^{548}\) In squandering U.S. political, military, and economic resources, global containment would frustrate the United States long before it frustrated Soviet aggression. Lippmann accepted the division of the international system into Eastern and Western blocs and suggested that the United

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\(^{546}\) Lippmann, *Cold War*.


States negotiate a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union to regulate and thus limit its expansion.\textsuperscript{549}

Although Lippmann’s detailed critique of the “X article” failed to include an alternative vision of the international system (and America’s proper role within that system), twenty years later Lippmann’s vision of the potential for living alongside an adversarial power started to come into U.S. policy. Even in the 1950s, it planted the seeds for the possibility of a less costly way of containing Soviet influence than the global commitment of NSC-68. In Lippmann’s conception of national security,

\begin{quote}
A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a way.\textsuperscript{550}
\end{quote}

While rejecting the Truman Doctrine’s universalist orientation, Lippmann unabashedly advocated an internationalist line for U.S. foreign policy. In the realm of policymaking, a statesman’s ultimate challenge was to articulate and pursue a foreign policy sustainable within the limits and possibilities of the domestic consensus. In his Harvard University doctoral dissertation, Henry Kissinger underscored this position when he described the ability to form consensus around it as “the acid test of a policy.”\textsuperscript{551}

Along with Lippmann, former Vice-President Henry Wallace was a prominent critic of containment because encircling the Soviet Union would destabilise U.S.–Soviet relations and increase the chances of war.\textsuperscript{552} A third branch of criticism of containment emerged during the 1952 presidential campaign, when vice-presidential nominee Richard Nixon attacked containment as acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe and proposed instead a strategy of liberation or rollback.\textsuperscript{553} John Foster Dulles, who would become President Eisenhower’s most important foreign-policy advisor, had been equally critical of containment. Although Lippmann, Wallace, and some Republicans criticised containment on

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{550} Lippmann, \textit{U.S. Foreign Policy}, 51.
\textsuperscript{551} Henry Kissinger, \textit{A World Restored} (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), 326.
\end{flushright}
substantially different grounds, together they laid the foundation for détente. Each asserted that containment was unsustainable: Lippmann because it was unfeasible, Wallace because it was unstable, and the Republicans because it was inadequate. Lippmann and Wallace recommended that the United States accept the status quo in Europe; the Republicans advocated rollback.

Détente also had domestic roots in the New Look Doctrine that Dulles presented in his 1954 “massive retaliation” speech. Eisenhower shared Lippmann’s concerns about the gap between limited U.S. resources and expansive global interests. He took this gap into account in developing both his strategic doctrine and his diplomatic strategy. As viewed by the Eisenhower administration, this was not simply a means of containing Soviet influence but also a means of transforming the Soviet system in a way that containment had failed to do.

In response to Truman’s mobilisation posture, Dulles favoured a comprehensive strategy of deterrence. For reasons of cost, ease, and political persuasion, Dulles emphasised the strategic deterrent of massive retaliatory power. The press immediately seized on the slogan ‘massive retaliation’ and “portrayed it as a formula for turning every border skirmish into a nuclear showdown.” Attempts to clarify the meaning of the “massive retaliation” address could not overcome its contradictory logic. Critics quickly attacked the doctrine on the basis of military effectiveness, cost, and ability to be implemented, while Maxwell Taylor (Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff) suggested that more emphasis should be placed on the ability to stop crisis escalation.

The New Look Doctrine offered a vision of a postwar world in which the United States could impose its notion of strategic stability on the Soviet Union, thereby ensuring international order on the basis of U.S. technological superiority. This
vision would find clear articulation in détente. Dulles’s speech and U.S. overreliance on nuclear weapons provided no answer to the challenge of local aggression. To many strategic analysts, the existence of nuclear weapons demanded development of a strategic doctrine and of the ability to conduct limited wars along the periphery. Dulles’s speech focused attention on the problems of limited war and initiated an animated public debate.559

Henry Kissinger wrote an article on the problems of defending “gray-areas."560 The article’s policy prescriptions strikingly resemble Nixon Doctrine proposals of a quarter-century later. Kissinger argued that stable indigenous governments were prerequisites of effective local action by the United States. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Kissinger did not challenge the political assumptions then governing U.S. strategy. Although he extensively explored the prerequisites of limited war in terms of U.S. doctrine and capability, he did not question the political framework itself, the prevailing bipolar, zero-sum image of the international system.

Although the Nixon administration was the first to use the word détente, texts of earlier presidential administrations referred to advanced forms of cooperation. During the period of relative calm after the Cuban missile crisis, European powers pressed the superpowers to reduce U.S.–Soviet tensions. French president Charles de Gaulle visited Moscow and sent diplomats to Eastern European capitals. During the same period561 West Germany started to modify its hard-line policy toward Communist countries. This pursuit of Ostpolitik (dynamic Eastern policy) was initially cautious, but after Willy Brandt became chancellor in 1969 Bonn forcefully moved toward normalising relations with the East, recognising East Germany and the postwar status quo beyond the Elbe.562

Even while he explored avenues for cooperation in the East, President Johnson did not use the term détente, speaking instead of “building bridges” between West and East. He first used that phrase in 1964, and it soon became his regular formulation for policy toward the Soviet bloc. The Johnson administration could not avoid the use of the word détente altogether, however. It appeared in a 1967 NATO document after, in December 1966, the Belgian foreign minister, Pierre Harmel, advocated a NATO initiative to assess the alliance’s future in the wake of French withdrawal from NATO’s military command. In 1967 NATO formally adopted the initiative, which embraced the intention to “further a détente in East–West relations.” NATO stated:

The relaxation of tensions is not the final goal but is part of a long-term process to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

Given détente’s European origins it is not surprising that some of the constitutive and regulative conventions of pre-Nixonian détente are visible in the declamatory texts of Konrad Adenauer. In the early 1960s, seizing on West German public opinion, Adenauer declared himself “the peace chancellor.” He would provide some of the contextual architecture that Nixon and Kissinger would later adapt for their own form of détente. Adenauer was attempting to counter what he saw as the empty materialism of East–West rivalry and the threat of nuclear conflict. Seeking to connect his political activities to a deeper reservoir of religious belief, he hoped to reawaken public interest in a ‘Christian’ vision of a simple, devout life free of military tensions and centralised institutions.

The immediate threat to Adenauer’s bourgeois utopian vision was that “The epoch in which we live is characterised by the contradiction between communism and

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563 And in so doing he denied the impression that de Gaulle was driving U.S. policy.
566 Ibid.
Adenauer wanted to foster pan-European unity, to erase the inheritance of half a century of continental war. Instead of pressuring Moscow, West Germany and its allies had to stabilise the balance of power.

Adenauer was early in his awareness of the Sino-Soviet split and that the potential for a new balance of power could lead to peace. In 1962 and 1963 he and de Gaulle discussed exploiting that split. Their analysis of the split led to both de Gaulle’s asking China to pressure the Soviets into a softer foreign-policy line and Adenauer’s appeals for a U.S.–Soviet agreement on arms control and reduced tensions in Central Europe. Paris and Bonn worked to present a united Western front in negotiations. Adenauer also floated the idea of a ten-year freeze in military action around Central Europe. With the promise of no threats to one another for a decade, the great powers would experiment with arms control, trade concessions, and expanded human contacts.

There was a key difference between Adenauer’s and the then U.S. president John F. Kennedy’s thoughts on détente. Adenauer sought international stability primarily in the interests of an Ostpolitik that would improve long-term conditions in the two Germanys and perhaps foster reunification. In contrast, Kennedy spoke vaguely of a “new frontier” which hinted at universal freedoms. Kennedy did not fully embrace Adenauer’s vision and, at a policy (if not strategic) level, he accepted the existing state of affairs in Europe; their shared concern was simply over the avoidance of military conflict.

As much as détente was a response to the practical emergence of Ostpolitik in Europe and its discourse, it was also an ideological response to prolonged domestic debate questioning the very nature of American ideology. In the 1960s and 1970s the United States experienced profound social change with fundamental critiques from both the Left and the Right challenging many ideological assumptions underlying the Cold War.

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570 Ibid.
American sociologist Daniel Bell, the author of *The End of Ideology* (1960) was among the most widely read and influential thinkers who challenged the American ideological assumptions which had underpinned the start of the Cold War.\(^{573}\) His central insight was that:

> [Out] of all this history, one simple fact emerges: for the radical intelligentsia, the old ideologies have lost their “truth” and their power to persuade.

Few serious minds believe any longer that one can set down “blueprints” and through “social engineering” bring about a new utopia of social harmony. At the same time, the older “counter-beliefs” have lost their intellectual force as well. Few “classic liberals” insist that the State should play no role in the economy, and few serious conservatives . . . believe that the Welfare State is the “road to serfdom”. . . . [T]here is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues . . . In that sense, too, the ideological age has ended.\(^{574}\)

It was a challenging critique because it asserted that no ideologies were any longer relevant. Bell’s central insight was that socialism had come to a dead end and that liberal capitalism was now more focused on restraining domestic pressure for international change, rather than enabling that change to happen. In a sense he was stating a defence of the status quo. In a world in which nuclear stalemate was accepted, there was little left to debate in the established language of international politics.\(^{575}\) It raised the question of exactly what was left for America to ‘contain’ and by implication suggested an inward focus for American society to rediscover its utopian impetus. As Bell put it, the old Cold War ideology, “which once was a road to action, has come to a dead end.”\(^{576}\)

In his 1958 book *The Affluent Society*, John Kenneth Galbraith had made a similar critique of American ideology.\(^{577}\) Galbraith provided much of the lexicon for the flipside to U.S. exceptionalism. Whilst economic growth during the Eisenhower administration had been remarkable, Galbraith objected to the inequitable

\(^{573}\) Bell acknowledged an intellectual debt to Albert Camus: see Malcolm Waters, *Daniel Bell* (London: Routledge, 1996), 78. Waters suggests that Bell’s polemical title became a popular cultural shorthand.


distribution of the nation’s wealth and criticized national policy as blind to economic inequality.

The arguments of Galbraith, Harrington, and Bell were not entirely new. However, what was new was that these arguments occurred at the height of American economic and international political hegemony.

Galbraith stated:

We can no longer afford the notion that foreign policy is a dance, an intricate minuet, which some people, peculiarly endowed with skill, experience, or a penchant for fast foot-work can do with unique proficiency. . . . I would hope that our foreign policy would soon become the subject of the same kind of social and political debate that focused the conflicting attitudes towards the New and Fair deals. 578

Neither Bell or Galbraith were directly critiquing foreign policy but their work did attack the ideological core of postwar America and provided a powerful new lexicon for criticising the status quo’s shortcomings. Their writing made clear that not only was it no longer clear exactly what America was defending (either ideologically or materially) but it was becoming apparent that the ideological ‘necessity’ of containment was having a detrimental economic impact on the very society it was meant to protect.

Not all critics of U.S. stagnation were on the political Left. Eisenhower’s domestic and foreign policy evoked the wrath of so-called new conservatives such as William F. Buckley, Jr. and Barry Goldwater. Their voices made it difficult for Republicans to point to conservative support in favour of preserving the status quo. 579

Buckley, one of this new breed of conservatives, called for a stronger defence of U.S. ideals. Instead of affirming enduring moral principles vested in the dignity of the individual, Cold War discourse focused exclusively on technocratic methods and means without inherent value. Denouncing theories of development and democratisation closely connected with U.S. foreign policy, Buckley stated “Our preoccupation these days . . . is not so much with the kind of society democracy

brings forth in a given political situation, as with democracy itself.” Democracy, he continued, “has no program. It cannot say to its supporters: do thus, and ye shall arrive at the promised land.”

In his 1961 book *Up from Liberalism*, Buckley explicitly attacked *The Affluent Society*. Nonetheless, the two texts are close in terms of sentiment. Both were critiques of U.S. society during the Cold War and the type of thought that had created that society. In a sense, Buckley was echoing Bell and Galbraith’s fear that the ideological core of America no longer matched its material prosperity.

Another powerful critic on the right was Barry Goldwater, a U.S. senator from Arizona. Although he lost the presidential election, Goldwater inspired the ‘New Right’ movement at about the same time that the ‘New Left’ began to emerge. His 1960 book *The Conscience of a Conservative* reinvigorated American conservatism and added weight to criticism of perceived American decline. Goldwater spoke of “victory” in the Cold War as the result of superior U.S. capabilities. “Peace,” he stated:

> is a proper goal for American policy – as long as it is understood that peace is not all we seek. . . . A tolerable peace . . . must follow victory over Communism. We have been fourteen years trying to bury that unpleasant fact. It cannot be buried and any foreign policy that ignores it will lead to our extinction as a nation.

Much like Buckley, Goldwater wanted a renewed “moral” purpose in American society. He focused his efforts on creating a more muscular, offensive U.S. foreign policy supported by reawakened patriotism at home. Calls for “victory” against Communism provided an organising mission that Goldwater thought was missing from current Western leadership. He explained, “If our objective is victory over Communism, we must achieve superiority in all of the weapons – military, as well as political and economic – that may be useful in reaching that goal.”

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583 Ibid., 110–11.
As a senator, Goldwater had concentrated on defence policy and there was a degree of ideological continuity in his espousal of American exceptionalism in his race for the Republican presidential candidacy. The U.S. government would use overwhelming strength to protect its interests and otherwise avoid entanglements that stifled creativity and hindered independent action. Goldwater wanted Washington to lead at home and abroad without becoming needlessly encumbered in complex arrangements with allies or adversaries. In contrast to Bell’s argument about the effects of American prosperity, Goldwater argued that America’s military muscle and growing prosperity should serve as a beacon of freedom, not a restricting arm of the administration. In other words, he was espousing total victory over the Soviets. When asked in an interview whether disarmament negotiations were possible with the Soviets, he responded, “I don’t think negotiations are possible . . . If you mean what you say, Mr. Khruschev, put up or shut up – as we Western poker players say.”

It was in this context that Nixon came to power. As Melvin Small has noted, 1968 was “the foreign policy election of the twentieth century.” He faced the challenge of seizing the initiative from the Europeans before Ostpolitik wrested the political initiative from America’s hand. More significantly, America was in the midst of domestic ideological turmoil. Profound critiques from both the left and the right linked her domestic situation, her state of ideological torpor, to her foreign policy. Nixon and Kissinger’s challenge was to transform the ideological discourse of American grand strategy. Nixon’s response was to attempt to move from “an era of confrontation” to “an era of negotiation.”

Step two of contextual analysis: Nixon’s and Kissinger’s use of the word détente in relation to the practical context

Step two of Skinnerian contextual analysis addresses the question ‘In producing a text, what was the author doing in relation to available and problematic political action that made up the practical context?’ It is important to understand Nixon’s

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and Kissinger’s use of the term détente in relation to the available practical political context.

Before the Nixon administration, presidential administrations had sometimes indicated a sense of moving toward limited U.S.–Soviet cooperation. However, their dominant foreign-policy arguments had focused on means of containment rather than serious challenges to containment; they had assumed that containment was legitimate and viable.

The Vietnam War caused significant changes in U.S. foreign-policy discourse. First, the war cast doubt on the efficacy of U.S. military intervention, which failed to bring political success in Vietnam and proved costly in terms of lives and resources. Second, aspects of the conflict challenged the morality of the U.S. exceptionalism that had sustained the policy of containment. Third, the war destroyed the U.S. bipartisan consensus on foreign policy, which had largely been in place since Eisenhower outmanoeuvred the remaining Republican isolationists and cemented the foreign-policy consensus started under Truman.

The defence of freedom, capitalism, and liberal democracy – which the political elite had seen as a duty on the grounds of both self-interest and ideology – had resulted in a policy of undifferentiated globalism that proved disastrous in Vietnam. Equally, the Sino-Soviet split and the Soviet Union’s problematic attempts to maintain cohesion in Eastern Europe reduced the perceived power of America’s adversaries. The confidence and sense of purpose so evident in the earlier post-Second World War period had given way to demoralisation and disarray. The spectre of U.S. decline reared its head.

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By the time Nixon was elected president in 1968 there was an opportunity to remould U.S. foreign policy. This chapter has already noted some attempts by previous presidents to craft a U.S.–Soviet relationship of competitive confrontation combined with mutual restraint. The adversarial elements remained dominant. Events had severely circumscribed presidents’ freedom to move toward U.S.–Soviet détente.

As a foreign-policy hard-liner, Nixon had more room to manoeuvre than other presidents, unfettered by the possibility of political attacks for being soft on Communism. In addition, because of the Vietnam War, the conservatives in Congress and the executive branch were on the defensive, and liberals were all too aware of the costs of continued superpower competition.

Nixon’s and Kissinger’s conception of détente was less revolutionary than generally believed in terms of adjusting U.S. objectives. Their conception was genuinely revolutionary, however, in terms of how these objectives were to be achieved. Nixon did not abandon long-term concerns about the Soviet threat to U.S. security or give up on the goal of containment. In the past, containment had depended on U.S. power and Soviet caution. Instead, the aim was now to make containment depend on Soviet self-restraint or ‘self-containment’. 591

Early in his career Nixon had reservations about détente. As late as 1967 he maintained that “Our goal is different from theirs. We seek peace as an end in itself. They seek victory, with peace being at this time a means towards that end.” 592 In office Nixon endorsed the idea of détente but initially avoided using the word. 593 When Nixon entered the White House in January 1969, détente was still a largely European concept, 594 but whereas Europeans conceived of détente in European terms, as de Gaulle’s initiatives and Ostpolitik suggested, Nixon’s and Kissinger’s use of the term was global in conception. 595 In addition, Nixon and Kissinger had doubts regarding the European meaning of détente. Kissinger wrote:

593 Litwak, Détente, 64.
In times of rising tension, the Europeans feared American rigidity; in times of relaxing tension, they dreaded a U.S.–Soviet condominium. They urged us to be firm, then offered their mediation to break the resulting deadlock. They insisted that we consult with them before we did anything, but they wanted the freedom and autonomy to pursue their own détente diplomacy without restraint. If we were perceived to block détente, we would lose the support of our West European allies, who would then speed up their own contacts with the East, with no coordinated strategy.\(^{596}\)

The apparent solution was for the United States to accept détente in theory while assuming leadership on détente and steering policy in the direction U.S. officials thought best. Kissinger explained: “We came to the conclusion that we could best hold the Alliance together by accepting the principle of détente, but establishing clear criteria to determine its course.”\(^{597}\)

Nixon heralded U.S. leadership on détente when he announced in 1971 that he would travel to China to reopen U.S.–China relations. Whatever its strategic importance, the act had the effect of dwarfing European measures while opening the way to improved relations between Washington and Moscow. By February 1972 Nixon was in Moscow signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and announcing the twelve ‘Moscow Principles’ that would form the basis for U.S.–Soviet relations during the period of détente. In Washington the summit meeting was seen as having broad implications.\(^{598}\)

Nixon’s rhetoric of strength disguised the situation’s novelty. Presidential foreign-policy reports to Congress stressed that negotiation with adversaries was only one prong of a three-pronged approach. The United States would maintain its military strength while encouraging its allies to share more of the burdens and responsibilities of Western security. The means of U.S. foreign policy substantially shifted, and a reduction in military spending provided a substantial ‘peace dividend’ over and above that which resulted from reduced involvement in Vietnam. Self-reliance was replaced by reliance on others. The Soviet Union was being relied on to exercise self-restraint, which would allow the United States to

\(^{596}\) Kissinger and Luce, *White House Years*, 94.

\(^{597}\) Ibid., 404; Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 733–7.

engage in “the orderly devolution of American power to incipient regional powers.”

Of these ideas, reliance on allies was least innovative. The notion of a division of labour in which U.S. allies would provide the local defence components of containment, backed by U.S. strategic power, had been a prominent theme of Eisenhower’s administration, which had been concerned with minimising the economic costs of military containment. The Nixon–Kissinger approach was similarly concerned with the cheap maintenance of containment.

The encouragement of Soviet self-restraint was the innovative component of Nixon’s détente. Unrestrained superpower competition had become too expensive militarily and too divisive domestically. Instead of opting out of the competition, the Nixon administration attempted to co-opt the U.S.S.R as a willing partner in regulating that competition. The more the military dimension was regulated, the easier it would be for the United States to successfully compete diplomatically and politically, hence the early emphasis on strategic arms control. Nixon hoped that strategic arms control would provide long-term stability to U.S.–Soviet relations.

The second element of the regulatory process was to establish a code of conduct for operations in the Third World, a superpower agreement to refrain from attempts to obtain a unilateral advantage. It was recognised in Washington that such an agreement was unenforceable. Therefore, the third element of the U.S. strategy was designed to ensure that the U.S.S.R. followed the rules. This was known as linkage. Positive inducements (such as trade) and negative sanctions could encourage Soviet self-restraint.

If this approach succeeded, the Soviet Union would not take advantage of U.S. military retrenchment and the United States would maintain containment by proxy. For the strategy to succeed, however, several conditions had to be met. First, smaller nations must be able and willing to comply with the Nixon–Kissinger grand strategy and replace U.S. commitment and power. Second, the

\[\text{Litwak, } Détente, 54.\]

\[\text{Froman, } The Development of the Idea of } Détente, 56; Garthoff, } Détente, 215, 216; Del Pero, \]

\[\text{The Eccentric Realist, 121; Litwak, } Détente, 29.}\]

\[\text{Garthoff, } Détente, 35, 36; Litwak, } Détente, 89–91.\]
Soviet Union must be prepared to go along with the strategy as intended. Third, the Nixon administration must be able to establish and maintain a consensus in favour of détente.

In large part, Nixon’s conception and articulation of détente were governed by the conventions of containment, but they also represented careful manipulation of traditional conventions of U.S. foreign policy. Détente’s ultimate downfall shows the limits of twisting and stretching an ideology. The Nixon administration failed to develop a domestic base sufficiently robust to sustain the détente policy, especially after its initial architects had disappeared from the scene.

**Step three of contextual analysis: Nixonian détente as an ideological move**

The third step of Skinnerian contextual analysis involves identifying an ideology and surveying how it formed, how it was criticised, and how it changed. It is concerned with identifying how and when the constitutive and regulative conventions of détente were manipulated by Nixon and Kissinger. This section will apply step three to the ideology of Nixonian détente.

Even as he formalised the policy of détente, Nixon eschewed the label itself. During his first term as president he rarely used the word. Nevertheless, Nixonian détente represented an ideological move even if the move was less of an ideological shift from containment. Where President Johnson had favoured the phrase “building bridges”, Nixon came to prefer “structure of peace”. The Nixon volumes of *Public Papers of the Presidents* contain no index entry for détente.602 In contrast, the volumes for Gerald Ford’s presidency have numerous index entries for the term.603 It was not until the signing of a series of bilateral agreements in May 1972 that U.S. government officials labelled U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union as détente.

When de Gaulle gave the term fresh currency in the late 1950s, détente was used to describe the first step of a process that was to lead through entente to

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cooperation and security between Eastern and Western Europe. For de Gaulle, détente was to result in the restoration of political independence to continental Europe. In Germany, which adapted its own form of détente in the form of Ostpolitik, American détente came to stand for abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine, which emphasised national reunification, in favour of opportunities to engage in diplomatic and economic relations with Eastern Europe. In all three cases, détente was used to increase the room for domestic political manoeuvre.

The cautious, uninspired Nixon campaign for the presidency in 1968 gave little indication that the new administration’s foreign policy would co-opt, or be constrained by, any of the decade’s ideological fervour. Nonetheless, Nixon believed that the United States was likely to win the East–West competition. He contended that the “American Revolution . . . is the way of the future” and that the “people of this earth, including those in the Soviet Union, will inevitably demand and obtain more and more freedom.” At the same time, he concluded that the West should not consider itself invincible.

Echoing both the New Left and the New Right, Nixon maintained that the danger confronting the United States was not a superior Communist system but internal disintegration. In language strikingly similar to President Kennedy’s, Nixon stated:

> History is full of examples of civilizations with superior ideas which have gone to defeat because their adversaries had more will to win, more raw strength physically, mentally and emotionally, to throw into the critical battles.

He also remarked, “We know from history that great nations have become corrupt, soft, and decadent under the influence of prosperity.” The latter quote in particular appeared to be a reworking of both Bell and Goldwater, but

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605 Hofmann, _The Emergence of Détente in Europe_, 152; Froman, _The Development of the Idea of Détente_, 33.
606 Bell, _The Diplomacy of Détente_, 15.
608 Ibid., 46.
609 Ibid., 25.
611 Nixon, _The Challenges We Face_, 7.
refashioned with the echo of decadent decline from Gibbon’s *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.612

Nixon lamented the relative decline in U.S. resources: “Every well has a bottom. . . . There is an inevitable limit to what we can do.”613 However, he was less concerned about the quantity of available resources than about the will and determination necessary to use those resources effectively. “Weary with war, disheartened with allies, disillusioned with aid, dismayed at domestic crises, many Americans are heeding the call of the new isolationism.”614

As evidenced in the article “Asia after Vietnam,” Nixon linked domestic political and ideological change with foreign policy.615 Although the article displayed much familiar Cold War rhetoric, it was a harbinger of two of Nixon’s most important foreign-policy initiatives, the Nixon Doctrine as a formula for politico-military retrenchment and the opening of U.S.–China relations. Nixon discerned that American attitudes had changed. Having severely strained the United States, the Vietnam War had prompted the social and political debate discussed above; it had shattered the foreign-policy consensus that had supported two decades of U.S. globalism. According to Nixon, the United States could not continue to police the world because it did not have a sufficiently robust political consensus to use its resources effectively. He stated:

If another friendly country should be faced with an externally supported communist insurrection – whether in Asia, or in Africa or even Latin America – there is serious question whether the American public or the American Congress would now support unilateral American intervention, even at the request of the host government.616

Given that the U.S. experience of the Vietnam War portended a decline in U.S. activism, Nixon pointed to nascent regionalism as a more indirect channel for U.S. influence. As in the Nixon Doctrine, he contended that the United States should offer direct military assistance only when doing so would significantly affect the political outcome and serve U.S. interests:

612 See Chapter 3 for earlier rhetorical comparisons between Roman decadence and possible fates for the Union.
613 Nixon, *The Challenges We Face*, 143.
615 Ibid.
616 Ibid., 124.
If the initial response to a threatened aggression . . . can be made by lesser powers in the immediate area and thus within the path of aggression, . . . the world is spared the consequences of great power action. . . . Only if the buffer proves insufficient does the great power become involved, and then in terms that make victory more attainable and the enterprise more palatable. 617

Nixon’s early concept of détente focused not only on changing Soviet foreign policy but on the value of U.S.–Soviet coexistence. Although Nixon was sceptical about negotiations, he considered them necessary:

The alternative – to have no negotiations – would mean, obviously, that we would lessen our chances of achieving agreements with the Communists – slim as these chances might be. And that might mean, in turn, heading into an armed clash which could destroy civilisation as we know it. 618

The dichotomy between ‘the sword of annihilation’ and negotiations laid the foundation for the value that Nixon attributed, as president, to the process and results of negotiation. Although limited as a tool of transformation, negotiations facilitated efforts by the United States and Soviet Union to manage their competitive relationship. The less effective détente proved as a means of transformation the more valuable it became as an expression of U.S.–Soviet coexistence.

These documents echo some early ideas of European Ostpolitik, encapsulating the drawback from superpower conflict and the threat of nuclear exchange as well as relative regional independence in handling conflict. However, Nixon primarily referred to crisis management rather than longer-term structural change in international affairs of the type Adenauer had desired. Nixon also echoed Goldwater’s rhetoric. The New Right’s demands necessitated the reminder that ‘victory’ remained the strategic ‘end’.

However, this did not represent a radical philosophical break with familiar tropes of America’s global role. Nixon was not acknowledging revolutionary independence in Vietnam, the Congo, or other points of Cold War conflict – independence that might have appealed to Galbraith. Nor was it clear how Nixon’s criteria for foreign intervention would be judged in practice. These

617 Ibid., 114–15.
618 Nixon, The Challenges We Face, 83.
criteria showed prescience regarding the U.S. use of peripheral interventionist force, but nonetheless Nixon’s article “Asia After Vietnam” and, later, the Nixon Doctrine itself were strategically incoherent in that they failed to differentiate the categories and levels of possible threat. The criteria were not specific enough to facilitate actual choices for or against intervention. Nevertheless, the article served a domestic purpose in reaffirming the validity of U.S. overseas commitments.

“Asia After Vietnam” anticipated the Nixon administration’s ground-breaking China initiative. While advocating a change in U.S. policy in order to “come urgently to grips with the reality of China,” Nixon continued to regard the People’s Republic of China as an implacable revolutionary power. In Nixon’s eyes, a true U.S.-Sino rapprochement would require evidence of China’s transformation from a revolutionary power into a status-quo-orientated power. At first glance, this approach fully accords with the era’s prevailing view that the United States could impose stability on China. However, the familiar anti-Communist rhetoric belied a subtle shift toward a more flexible and pragmatic approach to U.S. relations with China.

Nixon forcefully argued that developing a strong indigenous regional security system in Asia would best limit Chinese expansionism and thereby accelerate China’s transformation into a rational, status-quo-orientated power:

The primary restraint on China’s Asian ambitions should be exercised by the Asian nations in the path of those ambitions, backed by the ultimate power of the United States. This is sound strategically, sound psychologically and sound in terms of the dynamics of Asian development. Only as the nations of non-communist Asia become so strong – economically, politically and militarily – that they will no longer furnish tempting targets for Chinese aggression, will the leaders in Peking be persuaded to turn their energies inwards rather than outward. And that will be the time when the dialogue with mainland China can begin.

Unsurprisingly, such language leads to the question of whether the Nixon administration had embraced a new image of the international system or merely sought new instruments with which to achieve, in the post-Vietnam War period, U.S. foreign policy’s familiar ends of containment and orderly change.

620 Ibid., 121, 123.
Step four of contextual analysis: détente and the alteration of political vocabulary

Skinner’s fourth step of contextual analysis addresses the question ‘What relation between political ideology and political action best explains the diffusion of certain ideologies, and what effect does this have on political behaviour?’ Skinner posited that any political vocabulary contains a number of intersubjectively normative terms. Such terms not only describe but also evaluate. A term’s evaluative dimension is called its speech-act potential, which may be positive or negative. According to Skinner, a society establishes and alters its moral identity by manipulating intersubjectively normative terms. Using these terms in a conventional way legitimates existing practice. Using them in a way that changes their meaning or speech-act potential challenges prevailing ideology.621 Skinner stated:

The problem facing an agent who wishes to legitimate what he is doing at the same time as gaining what he wants cannot simply be the instrumental problem of tailoring his normative language in order to fit his projects. It must in part be the problem of tailoring his projects in order to fit the available normative language.622

The constraint has ideological and political aspects. When attempting to ‘stretch’ an ideological convention, an author usually grounds the change in that which is already accepted. An ideologist changes one aspect of an ideology by maintaining another aspect. The prevailing ideology limits the extent to which the author can legitimate particular political conduct. As a result, even if an ideological innovator does not believe in what they are espousing they are, to some extent, required to act in conformity with the established ideology within which they situate themselves.623

This perhaps explains the ideological failure of détente to become ‘conventional’ in the way that containment did. It is important to note that this is different to evaluating whether détente was successful in its own strategic terms. Successive administrations failed to articulate a coherent, consistent concept of détente around which the American public could rally. The lack of coherence is partly

622 Ibid.
623 Ibid.
explained by tension between the U.S. goal of transforming aspects of the Soviet Union and the U.S. interest in U.S.–Soviet coexistence. Transformation goals ranged from modifying Soviet foreign policy to changing the nature of the Soviet system. These goals were based on the American belief that the United States could not live with the Soviet Union as it was. However, there was never consensus as to whether the Soviet Union had to change fundamentally or only with respect to particular behaviour.624

The U.S. interest in U.S.–Soviet coexistence was based on the beliefs that the United States and the Soviet Union could maintain a stable, productive relationship without a fundamental Soviet transformation and that the superpowers’ shared interests (particularly in avoiding nuclear war) outweighed their competing interests. This did not mean that current Soviet policies were acceptable; it meant that they need only be moderated rather than fundamentally transformed. There never was a consensus as to how to balance the need to moderate Soviet policies against the need for cooperation.

John Lewis Gaddis suggested that the goal of transformation is often associated with containment and the value of coexistence with détente. In his view this binary was incorrect because at times containment also required coexistence: “The idea of containment has taken on not only a life of its own, but several lives; . . . different people – indeed, different administrations – have understood it to stand for very different things over the years.”625

For example, within the context of a divided Europe, containment was understood to entail both the recognition of spheres of influence and an effort to modify them – that is, both an acceptance of the status quo and a means of revising it. In addition, U.S. foreign policy has usually been a mix of containment and détente rather than a stark choice between the two:626 at the peak of Cold War containment U.S. administrations sought to relax U.S.–Soviet tensions, and at the height of détente they sought to contain Soviet influence.

624 Litwak, Détente, 40, 102, 153; Garthoff, Détente, 39.
Détente and containment significantly differed, however, with respect to the role of negotiations in U.S. foreign policy:

“Orthodox” containment, as it was articulated during the first decade or so following the Second World War, placed very little emphasis on negotiations between Washington and Moscow. The U.S.S.R. was considered to be virtually impermeable; the purpose of containment was to erect a barrier (what an earlier generation called a cordon sanitaire) behind which the Soviet state might evolve in more benign directions.627

Unlike containment, détente suggested both a process and a state of relations in which the United States and Soviet Union realised the value of coexistence. Détente was grounded in the belief that the two nations must cooperate in order to prevent competition from precipitating crises, which could escalate into war. It did not imply an absence of conflict, but suggested that the two nations’ shared interests were more important than their competing interests.

To understand and evaluate Nixonian détente it is necessary to understand the normative vocabulary of Nixon and his more scholarly advisor Kissinger. Kissinger considered coexistence – the pursuit of stability and the prevention of nuclear war – a moral imperative that transcended the gap between revolutionary and legitimate regimes. He suggested that nuclear vulnerability provided an incentive for the two types of regimes to reach a modus vivendi,628 which could not be based solely on good faith or the balance of power. Good faith placed too much reliance on self-restraint, and the balance of power was too amorphous to be reliable. Nuclear parity was an incentive, not a substitute, for accommodation.

Nuclear parity in particular created an incentive for the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on the parameters of legitimate international behaviour. Although détente required the United States to recognise the Soviet Union as a strategic equal, the Nixon administration did not consider the Soviet concept of international behaviour to be equally legitimate.629 Thus, while the discourse of

628 Litwak, Détente, 63.
629 Litwak, Détente, 90; Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War (New York; London: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 43.
détente emphasised the equality of the superpowers, the Nixon administration sought to maintain a U.S. position of *primus inter pares*.

By means of linkage the United States would encourage the Soviets to adopt its concept of legitimate international behaviour. Progress in one area would have a positive effect on other areas. However, if détente comprised a complex web of interrelated agreements and understandings, the Soviets would be careful not to jeopardise their gains. This theory of linkage was based on the assumptions that the United States had a clear conception of a lack of self-restraint and was willing to sacrifice détente if the Soviets were not able to exercise self-restraint. Claims that this theory represented a form of realpolitik rather than an ideological reorganisation of the world were undercut by the fact that the Nixon and Ford administrations constantly redrew the line for their definition of ‘lack of self-restraint’, thereby preventing Soviet challenges from destroying détente.

After détente failed to prevent the Middle East War of October 1973, Nixon and Kissinger remoulded it. They retreated from the idea that détente would prevent crises and suggested instead that it would help *manage* crises. Nixon stated:

> We both [the U.S. and the Soviets] now realize that we cannot allow our differences in the Mideast to jeopardize even greater interests that we have, for example, in continuing détente in Europe, in continuing negotiations which can lead to a limitation of nuclear arms and eventually reducing the burden of nuclear arms, and in continuing in other ways that can contribute to peace of the world. As a matter of fact, I would suggest that with all the criticism of détente, that without détente, we might have had a major conflict in the Middle East. With détente, we avoided it.\(^{630}\)

Kissinger added: “If the Soviet Union and we can work cooperatively, first toward establishing the cease-fire and then toward promoting a durable settlement in the Middle East, then the détente will have proved itself.”\(^{631}\)

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As the rationale for détente weakened, the Nixon administration became almost desperate in its support for it. Presenting a stark choice between détente and Armageddon, Nixon asked:

Do we want to go back to a period when the United States and the Soviet Union, the two great superpowers, stood in confrontation against each other and risk a runaway nuclear arms race and also crises in Berlin, in the Mideast, even in Southeast Asia or other places of the world, or do we want to continue on a path in which we recognize our differences but try to recognize also the fact that we must either live together or we will all die together?632

In the aftermath of the Middle East War, the Nixon administration’s conceptual and normative vocabulary shifted. The administration increasingly emphasised the role of détente as a step not necessarily toward a better world but away from a worse one. In doing so, the administration de-emphasised the goal of transformation and underscored the value of U.S.–Soviet coexistence. The administration stressed the importance of negotiations in the face of continued confrontation and equated détente with peace, and peace with morality. As Kissinger would often repeat, preventing war was moral in and of itself because “in the nuclear age we are obliged to recognize that the issue of war and peace also involves human lives and that attainment of peace is a profound moral concern.”633

Kissinger declared peace “a moral imperative.”634 In the aftermath of the Middle East War, Kissinger’s realism gave way to the view that peace was the ultimate objective, one to which all other priorities should be subjugated.

When Ford became president in August 1974, he pledged to continue Nixon’s foreign policy and retained Kissinger as his chief foreign-policy advisor. Although U.S.–Soviet relations remained a priority, domestic concerns dominated the agenda. As the Ford administration continued, the concept and lexicon of détente became more confused. Ford acknowledged:

I wish there were one simple English word to substitute for détente. Unfortunately, there isn’t. [Détente] means movement away from the

634 Ibid., 282.
constant crisis and dangerous confrontations that have characterized relations with the Soviet Union. . . . It represents our best efforts to cool the cold war, which on occasion became too hot for comfort. To me, détente means a fervent desire for peace — but not peace at any price. It means the preservation of fundamental American principles not their sacrifice. . . . Détente means moderate and restrained behaviour between two super powers — not a licence to fish in troubled waters. It means mutual respect and reciprocity — not unilateral concessions or one-sided agreements.635

Ford’s foreign-policy vision was a world away from Goldwater’s emphasis on ‘victory’ as America’s strategic goal, an emphasis that Nixon had assiduously incorporated in 1967. The Ford administration failed to indicate clearly whether détente was a means to an end or an end in itself. However, détente increasingly looked like an ideological end. Kissinger stated:

The United States believes that the policy of relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union is essential for our two countries and for the peace of the world. We have seen no viable alternative to the policy of relaxation of tensions except rhetoric. We will therefore pursue it.636

Ford concurred: “It would be very unwise for a President — me or anyone else — to abandon détente. I think détente is in the best interest of this country. It is in the best interest of world stability, world peace.”637

By the time of the 1976 presidential campaign the Ford administration had stretched the lexicon of détente too far; détente was attacked from both the Right and the Left. Ronald Reagan focused on détente’s failure to stem the Soviet military build-up and restrain what he perceived as Soviet aggression.638 His critique was possible because détente had strayed too far from containment. On the Left, Henry Jackson and Jimmy Carter criticised détente’s amorality and its failure to take into account the Soviet Union’s violations of human rights and subjugation of Eastern Europe. Both sets of criticism focused on the Ford

administration’s valuing détente as an expression of U.S.–Soviet coexistence despite its failure to transform fundamental elements of Soviet domestic or foreign policy.

Ford continued to defend détente as the least worst alternative:

For a period of 25 years or thereabouts, we had a policy in this country . . . of a cold war. . . . Obviously that policy didn’t prevent war, and it didn’t prevent [the Soviets] from increasing their capability. It seems to me that a policy of negotiation is infinitely better than confrontation, and I think we can point to some success in that regard.639

As Ford narrowed détente to an alternative to the Cold War, there was little left to the notion of legitimate international behaviour. Kissinger’s initial concept of détente was based on mutual self-restraint. In three years, détente evolved from a policy designed to overcome tensions to a policy of easing tensions when a crisis arose, from the first step toward a community with shared interests to a phenomenon relevant only to adversaries. Instead of replacing confrontation, negotiation would coexist with confrontation. Indeed, continued confrontation necessitated negotiation. To Kissinger, “the reality of competition” illustrated the “necessity of coexistence.”640 In 1969 Kissinger advocated linkage as a way of avoiding “the danger that the Soviets will use talks on arms as a safety valve on intransigence elsewhere.”641 In 1976 he declared:

> Limitation of strategic arms is therefore a permanent and global problem that cannot be subordinated to the day-to-day changes in Soviet American relations . . . we should not play with the strategic arms limitation negotiations . . . we will not use it lightly for bargaining purposes in other areas.642

Thus, the Ford administration considered strategic arms limitation not merely an arms agreement but a process that embodied the quest for an achievement of peace. This formulation confused functional arrangements with a convergence of

641 Kissinger and Luce, White House Years, 136.
principles. Agreement on an array of technical issues did not necessarily mean that the Soviets agreed to U.S. concepts of legitimate behaviour,⁶⁴³ but by the end of its term the Ford administration suggested that détente was arms control and arms control was peace.

Step five of contextual analysis: détente’s decline

Step five of Skinnerian contextual analysis addresses the question ‘What forms of political thought and action are involved in disseminating and conventionalising ideological change?’ This section will make the case that détente failed to become conventional.

The extent to which Kissinger and the presidents he served actually believed that war was likely in the absence of détente remains unknown. However, at each crisis with the Soviet Union they suggested that the United States could either continue arms-control negotiations or allow increased instability that might lead to war. This simplistic dichotomy between détente and war was based on the assumption that the Soviet Union was far more cavalier about crises than the United States. That assumption conflicted with Kissinger’s earlier belief that both superpowers recognised the danger of nuclear war. It also was inconsistent with Kissinger’s understanding that deterrence, not just détente, played a role in guaranteeing peace.

When others suggested alternative approaches Kissinger raised the spectre of instability and war, thereby subjugating all other interests to the cause of peace. As an academic, Kissinger rejected peace at any price; as a statesman, he was unwilling to risk sacrificing hard-won achievements of détente.

During the 1976 presidential campaign conservatives criticised détente for not moderating Soviet involvement in the Third World, while liberals criticised it for not improving the lives of Soviet and Eastern European peoples.⁶⁴⁴ Both conservatives and liberals recognised the benefits of cooperation and valued balanced, verifiable arms-control agreements, but both had expectations, partly due to the administration’s statements, that détente would accomplish more.

⁶⁴³ Litwak, Détente, 92.
Ultimately, the contradictions within détente resulted in its failure to satisfy these expectations.

By 1976 détente was a controversial term and Kissinger a controversial figure. Both the Right and the Left criticised détente as too narrow. Ultimately, Nixon and Kissinger failed to build the political consensus needed for their ideologically innovative form of détente to become embedded. Initially they accomplished movement toward such consensus, partly through oversell and partly through spectacle. Détente’s rhetoric changed from somewhat cautious to somewhat hyperbolic. Suggestions that the ‘era of confrontation’ was giving way to the ‘era of negotiation’, as well as references to a ‘new structure of peace’, created unrealistic expectations.

Détente never achieved ideological consistency. Dan Caldwell has suggested that Nixon and Kissinger failed to relate détente to important American beliefs and values. Stretched by the changes in ideological discourse on both the Left and Right during the 1960s, détente ultimately became too broad in its meaning. For a nation steeped in anti-Communism for twenty-five years, détente was a radical change for some on the Right but not radical enough for many on the Left.

Critics of the policy of détente had two advantages that had been denied to critics of previous administrations’ Cold War policies. First, their arguments touched a debate started by Bell and Galbraith about the nature of American ideology. Second, the challenge to executive dominance initiated by liberals had led to the revival of Congress as a power centre from which it was possible to campaign against administration policy. Critics of détente had both incentive and opportunity to mobilise opposition against the Nixon–Kissinger policy. In addition, events (particularly Watergate) undermined the power and prestige of the presidency and facilitated the challenge to détente.

Since 1976 the neoconservative Committee on the Present Danger, composed of a group of dissident national-security managers, had successfully equated opposition to SALT 2 with opposition to the Carter administration and the

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remnants of détente. In her much-noted 1979 essay “Dictators and Double Standards,” Committee member Jeane Kirkpatrick asserted that liberals such as Carter had no monopoly on morality or idealism. She stated: “Liberal idealism need not be identical with masochism, and need not be incompatible with the defence of freedom and the national interests.” The Committee is often said to have been a breeding ground for neoconservatism, but Kirkpatrick’s rhetoric harked back to earlier tropes of containment and an older discourse of U.S. exceptionalism.

Carter’s foreign policy – especially détente – collapsed during the final days of 1979. In response to revolutionary turbulence in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and installed a puppet government. Détente’s opponents charged Carter, as well as Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger before him, with naiveté, and as a result Carter lurched to the Right. The Carter Doctrine would later declare that if the Soviets went beyond Afghanistan toward the Persian Gulf the United States would use military force against them. Up to that point, no Cold War doctrine had explicitly threatened war against the Soviets. The Carter Doctrine would mark détente’s collapse into complete self-contradiction and incoherence.

Ronald Reagan, who defeated Carter in the 1980 presidential election, sealed détente’s fate as an overt policy and system of beliefs about the international system. In part, this was based on the following rhetoric of the Committee on the Present Danger:

The two superpowers have utterly opposing conceptions of world order. The United States, true to its traditions and ideals, sees a world moving toward peaceful unity and cooperation within a regime of law. The Soviet Union, for ideological as well as geopolitical reasons, sees a world riven by conflict and destined to be ruled exclusively by Marxism–Leninism. . . . The Soviet Union, driven both by deep-

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648 Del Pero, The Eccentric Realist, 128.
649 In fact the CPD was composed of a broader coalition than just neoconservatives. See Justin Vaïsse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 149.
rooted Russian imperial impulses and by Communist ideology, insists on pursuing an expansionist course. In its endless, probing quest, it attempts to take advantage of every opportunity to enlarge its influence. And military strength is more than ever the foundation for its underlying policy.  

It recalled the Manichean rhetoric of the 1950s. The Committee’s recommendation to pursue ‘peace through strength’ was based on the assumption that the United States had significant influence over Soviet policy and that the Soviets’ defence efforts reflected a view of the United States as weak. According to Eugene Rostow, Reagan’s first director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, détente was not “a reality but an aspiration,” a “figment of political imagination.”

Critics of détente accused advocates of arms control of blurring means and ends and losing sight of the framework in which agreements were negotiated. Pursuing arms control for its own sake obscured the fact that the U.S.–Soviet relationship was still fundamentally competitive. The attack on arms control was part of a larger critique of the “decade of neglect” associated with détente. According to this critique, during the presidencies of Nixon, Ford, and Carter the United States had failed to compete militarily with the Soviets and to cultivate a consensus as to the appropriate U.S. role in world affairs. Critics of détente contended that Americans had a tendency, in light of the Vietnam War, to equate U.S. power with evil and to see the quest for influence abroad as inherently wrong.

Conclusion

Critics of détente urged the United States to address its military, economic, and political weaknesses and deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. They wanted Americans to demonstrate to the Soviets that the United States was prepared to pursue unilaterally what it could not achieve in negotiations. Deterrence, not diplomacy, would ensure security. Strength, not summits, would bring peace.

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652 Ibid.
This chapter argues that détente emerged in the context of profound domestic disenchantment with the ideological status quo in America. Nixon and Kissinger had hoped to manage the domestic backlash to the Vietnam War and address some of the ideological challenges from both the Left and the Right that had challenged the old foreign-policy consensus.655

As this chapter has demonstrated, the result was that, throughout its turbulent history, détente exhibited a tension between the goal of transforming aspects of the Soviet Union (effectively a continuation of containment) and the goal of perpetuating U.S.–Soviet coexistence.656 Although this grand strategy was ideologically innovative it not only failed to situate itself within the conventions of American exceptionalism but was also overt in its attempts to stress its own lack of ideology. In other words, détente was ideologically incoherent and was never able to explain the connections between issues, the hierarchy of interests, and the link between means and ends. As a result it was impossible to achieve solid public support for détente, in part because Nixon, Kissinger, and Carter conveyed contradictory messages about the meaning of the term détente and its strategic objectives, and ultimately this tension would prove unsustainable.

655 Del Pero, *The Eccentric Realist*, 149.

For over forty years the Cold War was the primary organising principle of U.S. grand strategy. As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, the discourse of U.S. exceptionalism was a powerful ideological and lexical constraint on the Cold War period’s two most noteworthy strategic policies, containment and détente. This chapter will examine the contested meaning of U.S. exceptionalism in the ‘new world order’ in the 1990s and the effect of that struggle on U.S. grand strategy in the period bookmarked by the end of the Cold War and the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. This period has been subject to a particular kind of proleptic reading which has discounted the presidencies of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton as a simple interregnum between the end of the Cold War and the tumultuous – in terms of grand strategy – presidency of George W. Bush.657

Viewing this period in such a way suggests that the Clinton presidency was a period without significant ideological contest – in the words of Jeremy Suri, “the absence of effective grand strategy in the 1990s contributed to the crises of the early twenty-first century.”658 Instead, this chapter seeks to recreate the debate about America’s role in the world after the Cold War. In 1989 Francis Fukuyama suggested that ideological contest and therefore the march of history had effectively resolved itself.659 For Fukuyama Western-style democracy and


capitalism were ascendant, but neither his original essay nor the expanded book provided a vision of what America’s role in the world should be now that it had reached such a triumphant ideological position.\footnote{See Danny Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis (London: Routledge, 2011), 88–90.} Fukuyama was in fact a supporter of American "primacy."\footnote{There were a wide range of figures in favour of the grand strategy characterized in the mid-1990s as "primacy": see B. R. Posen and A. L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security 21, no. 3 (1997): 32–44. One grouping was Dick Cheney and his coterie of neoconservative advisors who wrote Defense Planning Guidance. The original document has only recently been declassified but is still so heavily redacted that it needs to be augmented by contemporaneous newspaper reports, themselves based on leaked documents. See U.S. Department of Defense "Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994–1999" (18 February 1992), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/mukevault/ebb245/doc03_full.pdf [accessed 08/09/11]. See also Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1991); Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1996). There were differing conceptions of why primacy mattered in Samuel P. Huntington, “The U.S. – Decline or Renewal?,” Foreign Affairs, 67 (1988): 76–96; Samuel P. Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” International Security, 17, no. 4 (1993): 68–83; William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 75, no. 4 (1996): 18–32; James Kurth, “America’s Grand Strategy: A Pattern of History,” The National Interest (1996), 3–19.} However, during the 1990s, whilst "The End of History" was widely cited, it was also widely misinterpreted (seventeen years after the essay was written Fukuyama claimed that it had also been misinterpreted by fellow neoconservatives).\footnote{It was only at the point of his public spilt with neoconservatism in 2006 that Fukuyama conveniently clarified the ambiguity inherent in the End of History by suggesting that he intended his analysis to be descriptive of the ideologies of 'modernity' and not universally prescriptive. See Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads (New Haven, Conn.: London: Yale University Press, 2006), 53–5.} Robert Kagan summarised what was perhaps the most important misinterpretation of Fukuyama – indeed, what he characterised as the mistake of that era: “The mistake of the 1990s was the hope that democracy was inevitable.”\footnote{Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Knopf, 2008), 99.} In other words, after the Cold War, “If the triumph of democracy was a fait accompli, what role did America have in consolidating its advance?”\footnote{Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy, 89.} This chapter is an attempt to partially reconstruct that debate and see how Clinton tailored his vision of American exceptionalism to create and justify a grand strategy that articulated a role for America in the post-Cold War world.

President Clinton was the first U.S. president to enter office without the burden of a strategic environment dominated by the Cold War. No other modern U.S. president inherited a stronger, safer international position. The major threats that had haunted U.S. policy for nearly fifty years had either disappeared or were rapidly receding, leaving the United States the sole superpower. In 1992 the most
seemingly intractable problems facing the U.S. were domestic, and Clinton’s first presidential campaign reflected his lack of interest and experience in foreign affairs. Clinton’s predecessor, George H. W. Bush, had been perceived as both prioritising foreign affairs over domestic affairs and having been ‘punished’ by voters for being out of touch with domestic affairs. Clinton’s grand strategy presents an interesting case because the end of the Cold War could have been expected to result in significant changes to the prevailing normative vocabulary of U.S. grand strategy.

When the Cold War ended the United States was presented with an unprecedented opportunity to recast its grand strategy. Two years after the collapse of the Soviet Union President Clinton captured something of the optimism of the moment in a speech to the UN General Assembly in 1993:

> It is clear that we live at a turning point in human history. Immense and promising changes seem to wash over us every day. The cold war is over. The world is no longer divided into two armed and angry camps. Dozens of new democracies have been born. It is a moment of miracles.665

However, this rhetorical optimism was accompanied by the considerable challenge of redefining America’s strategic priorities, not to mention a more profound sense of her identity in an international environment which had radically changed. The United States had been victorious in the sense that the end of the Cold War had bought much of the world into alignment with her ideological orientation, but at the same time she was faced with a lack of purpose. It was by no means clear to what end her considerable resources would now be directed. Paul Kennedy suggested in 1993 that “the relief that the Soviet Union is no longer an ‘enemy’ is overshadowed by uncertainties about the United States’ proper world role.”666 Ronald Asmus probed the irony of the situation further:

> The paradoxical impact of the end of the Cold War is that it simultaneously vindicated American purpose and past policies and forced a rethinking of the assumptions that guided U.S. foreign policy


for nearly half a century. While liberating the United States from its overriding concern with the Soviet threat, the end of the Cold War also compelled Americans to again confront core issues concerning definitions of our national interests and our role in the world. Many assessments of Clinton’s foreign policy have accentuated his administration’s sacrifice of policy coherence to the needs of competing domestic agendas. As William Hyland put it, “In the absence of an overall perspective, most issues were bound to degenerate into tactical manipulations, some successful some not.” This chapter is not intended to add to the scorecard assessments of the perceived success or failure of Clinton’s grand strategy. Instead, it will examine both persistence and change with respect to American ideological tropes, in so far as they informed grand strategy during the post-Cold War period, especially during Bill Clinton’s presidency.

The late 1980s and early 1990s were intellectually fertile periods for prognosticators of grand strategy. The debate about American power and strategy had gathered fresh momentum in the late 1980s as academics, politicians, policy-makers, and public intellectuals entered the fray, even before the Berlin Wall had fallen. As a result Clinton came to power in the midst of an ideologically rich debate, from the economic and military decline of the United States forecast by Paul Kennedy to the re-emergence of Daniel Bell, refuting his 1975 declaration of the end of American exceptionalism. This was,

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670 This chapter will engage in more detail with a number of thinkers who presented very different visions of the international environment and America’s place within it.
however, a debate about more than just American grand strategy and the re-emergence of prophets of U.S. decline. It was concerned with what John Lewis Gaddis would characterise as the “geology” of the international system, the “tectonic” shifts of history rather than the surface events of geopolitics. Even if many commentators agreed that the events occurring at the end of the twentieth century constituted a fundamental transformation, their conceptions of the new world were at considerable variance. Francis Fukuyama’s vision was a world in which ideological struggle was coming to an end, the “end of history” in his grandiose conception, and with it the emergence of the possibility of perpetual peace among liberal democracies. It was a picture that contrasted dramatically with Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations,” which was a much more pessimistic (and is still a controversial) vision of a fragmented world, premised on Western decline and exhorting the necessary abandonment of Western universalist pretensions.

This chapter will focus primarily on Clinton’s strategy of “engagement and enlargement” and is intended to elucidate the ways in which his administration envisaged “the new world order” and America’s place within it. Like previous chapters, it will employ a form of Cambridge School contextualism that involves five analytical steps.

675 Fukuyama, The End of History.
676 In this view Fukuyama was echoed by John E. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989) and Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.; Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1993).
680 An extended examination of the concept of ‘new world order’ as an animating utopian vision for Anglo-American politicians can be found in Andrew J. Williams, Failed Imagination? The Anglo-American New World Order from Wilson to Bush (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007).
Step one of contextual analysis: the ideological context of the Clinton presidency

The first step of Skinnerian contextual analysis addresses the question ‘In writing a text, what was an author doing in relation to other available texts that made up the ideological context?’ An ideology is a language of politics defined by its conventions and employed by a number of writers. Methodologically, this encompasses not only lexical choices but also principles, assumptions, and criteria for testing knowledge-claims. This section will examine the strategy of engagement and enlargement in terms of that strategy’s ideological context. Specifically, it will explore the pronouncements of George H. W. Bush as well as the post-Cold War debate about America’s place in the world. In short, this section will examine the ideological context of the Clinton presidency.

In November 1990 George H. W. Bush declared that the Cold War was over. He heralded a new era premised on a “new world order.” It was not immediately clear what Bush meant by his concept. The speech emphasised several major points: ‘order’, ‘peace’, ‘democracy’, and ‘free trade’. Some scholars have suggested that international stability and the defeat of aggression were its only real concerns. Despite these analyses, Bush was equally as concerned with freedom and democracy:

> Today is freedom’s moment... The possibility now exists for the creation of a true community of nations built on shared interests and ideals – a true community, a world where free governments and free markets meet the rising desire of the people to meet their own destiny.

As the last section of the address stated emphatically, Bush’s objectives were completed by a commitment to the creation of free markets and free trade.

Brent Scowcroft elaborated on Bush’s vision:

The Soviet Union was standing alongside us, not only in the United Nations, but also in condemning and taking action against Iraqi aggression . . . If the attack on Kuwait marked the end of forty-odd years of such superpower confrontation, what vistas might open up? The Security Council could then perform the role envisioned for it by the UN framers. The United States and the Soviet Union could, in most cases, stand together against unprovoked interstate aggression . . . From that point forward we tried to operate in a manner that would help establish a pattern for the future.684

It was a conception that might have evoked Walter Lippmann’s sympathies, based as it was on multilateral cooperation but underpinned by American global leadership. Scowcroft continued:

Our foundation was the premise that the United States henceforth would be obligated to lead the world community to an unprecedented degree, as demonstrated by the Iraqi crisis, and that we should attempt to pursue our national interests, wherever possible, within a framework of concert with our friends and the international community.685

Bush believed that the post-Cold War era was comparable to the periods immediately after the two world wars. For the third time in a century, history seemed to be at a crossroads from which the road map could be redrawn.686

The fluidity that had marked the two post-world-war periods had congealed into an American consensus for isolationism in 1919–21 and for internationalism in 1945–7. In the early 1990s Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Ambassador to the UN (who now formed part of a small group of neoconservatives who no longer advocated democratic crusades after the Cold War),687 articulated the challenge: the objective of foreign policy was to enable the United States to become a “normal country in normal times.”688

685 Ibid.
The issue at stake was precisely what ‘normalcy’ was supposed to look like. It was clear that it wasn’t simply a case of ‘back to the future’, the return of great power politics, as John Mearsheimer predicted.689 Bush faced a myriad of options. Would the United States return to the 1920s and turn its back on the world’s troubles? More plausibly, would it return to the 1940s and make fresh international commitments? If the United States was the only remaining superpower, how should it use its power? Would it reorder the world in its own image? In October 1992 a TIME magazine editorial asked, “Is the U.S. in an irreversible decline as the world’s premier power?”690 Paul Kennedy predicted that U.S. power would significantly wane in the post-Cold War world.691 Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara urged immediate 50 per cent defence cuts.692 For Kennedy the logical corollary was to reinvest the ‘peace dividend’ in the American social and economic infrastructure and in so doing tackle the reality of decline.693

James Chace urged a responsible ‘new internationalism’ rooted in international economic and financial institutions designed to safeguard the dollar and global free trade.694 His voice was joined by those who called variously for American leaders to promote international democracy, maximise world order (with the U.S. acting as international policeman, to resurrect Carter’s ‘global community’ ideas of his early presidency), or defend Western culture and values against new nationalisms and revived Islam.695

691 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; Fraser Cameron, U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff? (London; New York: Routledge, 2002).
694 Chace, The Consequences of the Peace.
Bush administration officials were aware of the opportunity they had to recast American foreign policy and their response was the concept of the new world order, outlined to Congress during the 1990s Gulf War:

We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment . . . Out of these troubled times . . . a new world order can emerge . . . Today, that new world order is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known, a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the weak. 696

The Gulf War allowed the new world order concept to be developed and executed. Prior to the conflict Bush had certainly used similar language, suggesting that it was time to move “beyond containment to a new policy for the 1990s” 697 and that Washington’s aim was “ultimately to welcome the Soviet Union back into the world order”, 698 he referred to an “extraordinary new world,” 699 but his language at that point was ambiguous and was not attached to an explicit broader vision of what that “extraordinary new world” should look like. Bush coined his use of the term during an August fishing trip with Brent Scowcroft where they discussed the unfolding Gulf crisis. 700 Bush’s 11 September address to Congress did give his vision greater coherence but it was not until a year later at the United Nations that Bush laid out the specific goals of the new world order. It would, he said, be “characterized by the rule of law rather than the resort to force, the cooperative settlement of disputes rather than anarchy and bloodshed, and an unstinting belief in human rights”. 701

698 Ibid.
700 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 353–5, 400.
701 George H. W. Bush, “Address to the 46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City” (23 September 1991),
However, in Europe, as elsewhere, the United States was still the linchpin in a security system resting on U.S. treaty commitments to defend America’s Atlantic allies. On both sides of the Atlantic there was little sentiment in favour of complete U.S. disengagement. Bush’s rhetoric reflected continued American hegemony far more than his new world order concept suggested. In the Iraq war America had acted with an international coalition and with the blessing of the UN, but it seemed that the administration was willing to act unilaterally if the coalition or UN objected. So, whilst the new world order contained some echoes of Woodrow Wilson, it was certainly not a crusade for global democracy or renewed multilateralism. Instead it represented an adaptation of Pax Americana to a world in which America had to recognise that it did not have undisputed sway. Bush did suggest that the UN would be the forum for the development and maintenance of the new world order, that it would “offer friendship and leadership” whilst establishing “a Pax Universalis built upon shared responsibility and aspirations.” Yet in his 1991 State of the Union Address it was very clear that Bush’s new world order would be dominated and defined by the U.S. His speech made clear that “American leadership is indispensable” and he reaffirmed America’s manifest destiny:

[We] know why the hopes of humanity turn to us. We are Americans; we have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. And when we do, freedom works . . . If we can selflessly confront the evil for the sake of good in a land so far away, then surely we can make this land all that it should be. If anyone tells you that America’s best days are behind her, they’re looking the wrong way . . . We have within our reach the promise of a renewed America. We can find meaning and reward by serving some higher purpose than ourselves, a shining purpose, the illumination of a Thousand Points of Light.

Bush’s conception of the new world order relied heavily on American leadership and strength with the unmistakeable animating principle of missionary


702 John Dumbrell, American Foreign Policy: Carter to Clinton (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 163.

703 Bush, “Address to the 46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City”.

exceptionalism. Bush still assumed the universal applicability of traditional American values:

I feel strongly about the role the United States should play in the new world before us. We have the political and economic influence and strength to pursue our own goals, but as the leading democracy and beacon of liberty, and given our blessings of freedom, of resources and of geography, we have a disproportionate responsibility to use that power in pursuit of common good. We also have an obligation to lead . . . The United States is mostly perceived as benign, without territorial ambitions, uncomfortable with exercising our considerable power.

The U.S. was not going to cede power to the collective will of the UN but would define its own priorities, preferably, but not necessarily, with the support of the international community. As Bush and Scowcroft put it, “we opposed allowing the UN to organize and run a war. It was important to reach out to the rest of the world, but even more important to keep the strings of control tightly in our own hands.”

James Petras and Morris Morley described the new world order as an attempt to recreate “a world of uncontested U.S. power, in the process of subordinating the ambitions of competitor allies to American interest.” They were correct to pick up the embodiment of themes from the early days of containment and preponderant power. Bush was concerned, much like Truman, with countering domestic isolationist threats and, whilst he favoured American hegemony, preferably maintained multilaterally, he took a limited view of American security interests. American primacy meant that the U.S. could prohibit state-to-state

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705 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 566.
706 Ibid., 491.
709 Even if it was not his preferred form of grand strategy, George H. W. Bush seemed to err towards what Christopher Layne called “minimal realism” (compared to “maximal realism,”
aggression by rogue dictators, as had happened in the Gulf War (and in contrast to the regime change of his son’s presidency). The Cold War lasted almost until the end of the first Bush administration – he left office barely a year after Boris Yeltsin dissolved the Soviet Union – and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the administration thus carried the prudence of the Cold War into the new world, such that it didn’t seem very new at all.

At the same time as the emergence of the new world order concept, at the Department of Defense Dick Cheney ordered two teams to prepare studies of post-Cold War American grand strategy. One team was headed by General Colin Powell, then chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The other, the now notorious ‘Team B’, was headed by Paul Wolfowitz and included Lewis Libby and Cheney’s chief of staff, Eric Edelman, who would become key figures in the next Bush presidency. Cheney preferred the Team B version and the president was due to make public at least some of the ideas at a major address in August 1990. The plans were interrupted by the invasion of Kuwait and, overshadowed by these events, the president’s speech attracted no unusual recognition.

Cheney’s ‘Team B’ report finally came to light in 1992 as Defense Planning Guidance for 1994–1999. It portrayed a very threatening international environment and, in response, advocated the maintenance of Cold War levels of military readiness. However, there was a paradox at the core of the report. On the one hand it admitted that the United States “no longer faces either a global threat or a hostile non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests,” while on the other it was hectoring in its insistence that the United States must take up a new vital mission:


Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavour to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.\(^\text{713}\)

In short, this would be a new world order based on “convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.”\(^\text{714}\) The United States would also have to deal with regional conflicts and instability in a way that would encourage democracy.\(^\text{715}\) Equally, the document suggested that the Bush administration’s *ad hoc* coalition formed during the Gulf War represented the preferred ideal type of limited multilateralism for the U.S. “ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the immediate crisis, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished.”\(^\text{716}\) This aimed at outright hegemony for the U.S. When it was leaked to *The New York Times* there was an outcry against an apparently open-ended commitment to competition and coercion, especially as the document indicated Germany and Japan amongst the most likely competitors.\(^\text{717}\)

In the political turmoil Cheney and Wolfowitz distanced themselves from the document. The revised version, *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy*,\(^\text{718}\) no longer made such open-ended commitments to deter the emergence of a rival power to the U.S. and removed Germany and Japan as competitors. In its place was the broader task to “deter or defeat attack from whatever source.”\(^\text{719}\) Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby believed that he had managed to preserve the original draft’s emphasis on maintaining U.S. preponderance through the use of euphemisms.\(^\text{720}\) This suggestion that the final, toned-down version

\(^{713}\) Ibid.
\(^{714}\) Ibid.
\(^{716}\) Tyler, “Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan.”
\(^{717}\) Ibid.
\(^{719}\) Ibid., 8.
veiled firmer strategic commitments was affirmed by Wolfowitz, who commented on the final draft: “What is published, while I admit some of the corners are rounded off on it, reflects my views.”

Both documents were underpinned by a strong belief in American exceptionalism and by a return of the neoconservative critiques of détente, primarily that America must resist the return of multipolarity and find a renewed ideological purpose. Multipolarity was seen by these neoconservatives as the cause of uncontrollable security dilemmas in the form of arms races. In other words, they turned the logic of realism on its head, ascribing the idea of a global balance of power with responsibility for a litany of offences. As the Regional Defense Strategy put it:

> It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one against another in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance. As in the past, such struggles might eventually force the United States at much higher cost to protect its interests and counter the potential developments of a new global threat.

This was not simply a structural argument: it was an argument very specifically in favour of American unipolarity. As Ben Wattenberg put it “A unipolar world is a good thing, if America is the Uni.” The neoconservative ideological commitment was expressed at the time by Joshua Muravchik, who called for making the promotion of democracy the “centre-piece” of America’s post-Cold War foreign policy, as he put it:

> In both China and the Soviet Union the old structures are crumbling, and democracy is a possible outcome. For our nation, this is the opportunity of a lifetime. Our failure to exert every possible effort to secure this outcome would be unforgivable.

Muravchik provided an element of linkage between the neoconservatives and Clinton. Largely because of his disgust that President H. W. Bush did little to

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725 Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 221.
726 Ibid., 227.
promote democracy in China and had chosen not to remove Saddam Hussein from power Muravchik would go on to support Clinton\textsuperscript{727} and, indeed, helped him to draft a foreign-policy address in 1992 (although he would ultimately become a supporter of President George W. Bush). Although Clinton was not a neoconservative he did share with them an overt emphasis on democracy promotion. However, there was a significant ideological gulf between the neoconservative vision of polyarchy and Clintontian democratic enlargement.\textsuperscript{728}

The timing of the two Cheney-sponsored papers is important to emphasise because the neoconservative grand strategy floated in *Defense Policy Guidance for 1994–1999* represented a possible policy direction in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{729} The first President Bush did not pursue such a far-reaching conception of American grand strategy and unrestrained democracy promotion, even if elements of American hegemony were present in his conception of the new world order. Instead, as the first Bush presidency fizzled out the United States adopted a new strategy based on the fear that the country might have to fight two regional wars simultaneously – most probably in Korea and the Persian Gulf. The strategy called for sequential engagement of the Korean and Gulf threats and was blurry enough to satisfy both hawks and doves. In a move that reflected budgetary constraints rather than visionary grand strategy, U.S. armed forces were reduced to a “Base Force.”\textsuperscript{730}

As events unfolded, the 1992 presidential election did not substantially engage with the issue of foreign policy. The phrase drafted by Clinton’s campaign team – “it’s the economy, stupid!”\textsuperscript{731} – was partially intended to turn his inexperience in

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  \item \textsuperscript{727} Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 80–82; Cooper, *Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy*, 50.
  \item \textsuperscript{728} This the thesis goes on to explore in the next chapter, the neoconservative understanding of democracy.
  \item \textsuperscript{729} However, this was not the genesis of this brand of neoconservative grand strategy. Criticisms based upon very similar logic had been levelled at the policy of détente by neoconservatives in the 1970s.
  \item \textsuperscript{731} The phrase was extremely widely used by the Clinton campaign and parodied by others. Its first use is hard to determine and may have preceded Clinton. Its origins seem to have been with Clinton’s campaign manager James Carville, who reportedly had the phrase written above his campaign desk. See Michael Kelley, “The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats – Clinton and Bush Compete to Be Champion of Change; Democrat Fights Perceptions of Bush Gain,” *New York Times*, 31 October 1992.
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foreign policy compared to the incumbent president to his advantage. It became fashionable to mock Bush’s ‘new world order’, which critics called the “new world disorder.” Some saw Bush’s vision as too timid, placing too much emphasis on maintaining stability rather than promoting values. Leading realists considered it premature to dismiss the perennial struggle for power, although Henry Kissinger acknowledged that the American public could not be won over to policies based on an “apparent moral neutrality.” Kissinger argued that centuries of the balance of power could not be brushed aside in favour of a new system that defied definition.

By Election Day in November 1992 there was no clear consensus regarding the direction of foreign policy. As late as January 1993, as Clinton was replacing Bush as president, Bush elaborated criteria for military intervention which still favoured international engagement, albeit a more selective engagement which recognised the constraints imposed by public opinion and limited resources. Under those criteria military intervention could be pursued if:

- the stakes warranted the use of force, force could be effective, no other policies were likely to prove effective, the application of force could be limited in scope and time, and the potential benefits justified the potential cost and sacrifice.

According to H. W. Brands this represented the reality of the new world order: that in fact the “1990s produced a crisis in American thinking about the world.” Likewise, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright also maintained that

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736 Ibid.
articulating America’s role for the 1990s was the fundamental problem that Clinton faced throughout his presidency.739

A number of critics rushed to define this intellectual void. In the summer of 1989 Francis Fukuyama’s article “The End of History” appeared in the neoconservative quarterly *The National Interest*.740 It sparked intense debate in Washington after parts of the article appeared in *The Washington Post, The New York Times, TIME magazine,* and a host of international publications.741 Fukuyama heralded the end of the Cold War by declaring the victory of the liberal West over the Communist East. He characterised the Cold War as an epic battle between two ideologies to determine the direction of man’s evolution through the course of modernity. The West’s victory was ‘the end of history’, at least history as understood as the process of social and political evolution driven by a dialectical clash of ideologies. After two centuries of violent competition, liberal democracy had triumphed over hereditary monarchy, fascism and, ultimately, Communism. Furthering his argument, Fukuyama suggested: “While earlier forms of government were characterised by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was ultimately free from such fundamental internal contradictions.”742

The victory of liberal democracy, which also encompassed the triumph of capitalism, was, in part, based upon the innate human thymotic struggle for recognition, which Fukuyama asserted only liberal democracy could satisfy.744 This was a thesis that melded easily with American exceptionalism, where America was the liberal democracy *par excellence* and the beacon for universal thymotic expression.745 Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to characterise Fukuyama as an uncritical cheerleader. In his original article he suggested that the

740 Fukuyama, “The End of History?”
742 Fukuyama, *The End of History*, xi.
743 The greek term *thymos* had originally been associated with the quest for empire and glory but Fukuyama associated its usage with human dignity and human rights: ibid., 162–91.
“common marketization” of the world would not lead to the universal realisation
of thymos but rather its suppression:

The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition . . . will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems . . . I can feel in myself and see in others
around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed.  

Despite his own sense of nostalgia for ‘history’, an underappreciated nuance to his
writing, Fukuyama’s work served to offer support for a conception of history
which was embedded in Western, and especially American, culture. In that sense
his argument was illustrative of a trend of American optimism prevalent in the
late 1980s that contrasted with the ‘declinist’ trend of the 1970s to the mid-
1980s which had been spurred by the Vietnam War, the oil crisis of 1973 and the
trade deficit with Japan.  

His original article was prescient in both expressing the American sense of triumph and acting as a guide, or so it appeared, to the radical global changes occurring.

Fukuyama’s extension of his original essay in 1992 endorsed a number of
important intellectual concepts which became “the lingua franca of contemporary
international relations.” Fukuyama was important because he sought to define
what liberalism stood for in the absence of its Communist antithesis. Fukuyama
suggested that the world would be divided into an expanding ‘post-historical’
realm of liberal democracies and a contracting ‘historical’ realm of authoritarian
states, almost exclusively in the developing world. This is a recognisable form of
the democratic peace, the claim that liberal democracies do not go to war against
one another, and thus a liberal democratic world would be a peaceful one.  

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747 See also John Lukacs, The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age (New
748 Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers was an influential text but by no means
isolated; see Huntington, “The U.S. – Decline or Renewal?”, for a comprehensive analysis of
declinist writing in the late 1980s. For a later appraisal of declinist writing see Bruce Cumings,
749 See Bruce Cumings, “The End of History or the Return of Liberal Crisis?” Current History, 98,
750 James L. Richardson, “The ‘End of History’?” in Contending Images of World Politics, ed.
751 Gregory Bruce Smith, “The ‘End of History’ or a Portal to the Future: Does Anything Lie
Beyond Late Modernity?” in After History? Francis Fukuyama and His Critics, ed. Timothy
752 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace.
was an image of a prevailing international order as Washington wished it to appear: essentially benign, so long as the American model continued to win greater acceptance. The merging of ‘the end of history’ with the democratic peace allowed a distinctive ordering of the world split between a liberal core, the zone of democratic peace, and a violent Hobbesian periphery “mired in history.” Those who did not conform with the prevailing norms were presented as culturally and historically backward, without norms worthy of preservation. In the main these zones would “maintain parallel but separate existences,” but in this world intervention by liberal democracies was justified both in terms of maintaining order but more in terms of dealing with widespread human rights violations. In practice, this type of intervention would ultimately be selective.

Rekindling long-neglected Wilsonian strands, the Clinton administration would use such thinking to justify its policy principle that, to preserve world peace, democracy had to be promoted. The reasoning was clear: “By promoting democracy abroad, the United States can help bring into being for the first time in history a world composed mainly of stable democracies.” Others were less optimistic. Robert Kaplan saw the post-Cold War arena as the setting for “coming anarchy.” He envisioned a future in which small nations would break down a midst dysfunctional environments. The global environment would create numerous problems, including ethnic, religious, and tribal conflicts such as those that occurred in Sierra Leone (which inspired him to write the article), Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia. For Kaplan, the threat of anarchy posed problems to the great powers and international institutions. What was the case in West Africa at the time of writing would, in Kaplan’s view, spread further as environmental problems generated migration and this, in turn, would become a principal national security issue for the United States in the next century. His rhetorically powerful

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754 Fukuyama, The End of History, 276.
759 Ibid.
analysis of neo-Malthusian themes paralleled U.S. media coverage of Africa at the time.\textsuperscript{760}

Samuel Huntington shared Kaplan’s pessimistic view of the post-Cold War world; he rejected Fukuyama’s assumptions of universality and invoked a sense of the ‘West’ as being in decline and in need of defence. However, he argued that the world was headed not toward anarchy but toward a ‘clash of civilisations’, amongst the Western, Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-American and “possibly African.” Societies. For Huntington the end of the Cold War signalled the collapse of ideological identification as a central feature of international relations. As technology weakened the role of the nation-state as a political community and enhanced cultural and religious identity, Huntington believed that both the cohesion within and the tension between civilisational groups would increase.\textsuperscript{761} The main conflicts Huntington forecast were those on ‘Fault-lines’ between civilisations.\textsuperscript{762} Although he did acknowledge the potential for conflict within civilisations, he made the assumption that these would be less intense and less likely to spread.\textsuperscript{763}

Whereas Fukuyama envisioned a post-Cold War world of integration, Kaplan and Huntington predicted disintegration.\textsuperscript{764} Huntington’s suggested response was for the West to abandon any notion of embodying universal values and focus instead on cohesion, protecting its own interests and restraining itself from undue interference in other civilisations. In other words, unlike Fukuyama, Huntington was both descriptive and prescriptive. In the context of American grand strategy Huntington made the observation that the United States has always defined itself in antithesis to someone; in the post-Cold War environment he therefore asked “How will we know who we are if we don’t know who we are against?”\textsuperscript{765} Equally, he suggested that a certain degree of world order would be maintained by “Core-states” within civilisations. These were the most powerful and culturally

\textsuperscript{761} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{762} Huntington, \textit{The Clash of Civilizations}, 252–4.  
\textsuperscript{763} Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” 38.  
\textsuperscript{764} Ibid., 49.  
\textsuperscript{765} Ibid., 37.
central states within a civilisation and it is a description very reminiscent of great powers within a classical realist analysis.\(^{766}\)

Writing in the middle of Clinton’s presidency, John Ikenberry contended that views such as Kaplan’s and Huntington’s were off the mark. For Ikenberry the common assumption that the international environment would disintegrate after the Soviet Union’s collapse was fundamentally wrong. In his view, the world order created after the Second World War was thriving in the form of international organisations created in the 1940s, such as the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, NATO, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). According to Ikenberry, this world order was more robust than during its Cold War years\(^ {767}\) and thus his argument seemed to support an inexorable movement towards Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ and to repudiate Huntington.\(^ {768}\)

Though the Clinton administration were by no means wholehearted in their support for Fukuyama – they seem to have avoided using his ‘End of History’ phrasing – they did seem to accept his core argument that they were living through a period that left “the ideal of democracy – if not always its practice – as the sole surviving form of government.”\(^ {769}\)

**Step two of contextual analysis: Clinton’s ideological manoeuvre as a political manoeuvre**

Step two of Skinnerian contextual analysis addresses the question ‘In producing a text, what was the author doing in relation to available and problematic political action that made up the practical context?’ In this section, the analysis will focus on Clinton’s ideological manoeuvre as a political manoeuvre. The section will place the strategy of engagement and enlargement within its practical political context (i.e., the political activity that authors addressed and to which the strategy responded).

\(^{766}\) Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 156.


\(^{768}\) Ibid.

Bill Clinton had defeated George H. W. Bush in the 1992 presidential election largely by focusing on the nation’s troubled domestic agenda. Clinton’s campaign had gone further; by focusing on domestic economic renewal they had managed to make Bush’s foreign-policy strength into a weakness as he was forced to engage with domestic policy. Despite this, Governor Clinton’s campaign foreign-policy speeches had been hard to separate conceptually from those of his opponent.

During the campaign two speeches in particular, the “New Covenant for National Security” speech and his speech to the Foreign Policy Association, codified Clinton’s foreign-policy position. It was his “New Covenant for National Security” speech which first laid out his position on foreign affairs and suggested a necessity to transcend the barrier between foreign and domestic policies. In April 1992 his speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York began to assert some of the concerns which would preoccupy his presidency. Most importantly, he prioritised assistance to newly independent states with the strident exceptionalist call to action: “History is calling upon our nation to decide anew whether we will lead or defer; whether we will engage or abstain; whether we will shape a new era or instead be shaped by it.” He suggested that Bush had failed to “offer a compelling rationale for America’s continued engagement in the world.” Nonetheless it was apparent to commentators at the time that there was little space between the foreign policy of the president and his opponent.

During the debate with Bush in St Louis, Clinton outlined his version of the ‘democratic peace’. “We ought to be promoting democratic impulses around the world. Democracies are our partners. They don’t go to war with each other.” In the speech Clinton attacked his rival for his timidity in the face of the Tiananmen

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772 Ibid., 9.
Square massacre and also promised to consider lifting the arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims. He noted that the U.S. “can’t get involved in the quagmire of Bosnia.”

When Clinton entered office there were more U.S. troops deployed in more nations than had been the case for any new commander in chief since Truman. As of January 1993 U.S. Marines were in Somalia, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard had undertaken a quarantine of Haiti, and the U.S. Air Force had just bombed radar stations in Iraq and was preparing for an airlift to Bosnia.

Clinton argued that, for the first time in his lifetime, it was consistently possible to advocate freedom, democracy, and human rights. His inaugural address described his concept of the new world order:

Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the Cold War assumes new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom.

... Our hopes, our hearts and our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America’s cause.

This reflected stronger internationalism than had been present in Clinton’s campaign pronouncements. Like John F. Kennedy’s pronouncements, which had a similar ring, Clinton’s pronouncements were not easy to translate into policies. It was not clear at what risk and price Clinton would champion democracy. Clinton’s foreign-policy inclinations were extremely cautious; he was not prepared to sacrifice his presidency on the alter of idealism. In the first eight months of his presidency he made only four major foreign-policy speeches and all of them stressed continuity with his predecessor. All of these speeches stressed

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775 Ibid.
Clinton’s commitment to multilateralism and a desire to pursue policies that stabilised the fractured international environment.

The president received considerable criticism from House Republicans that summer for over-reliance on the UN in Somalia, lack of action in Haiti, and a mercurial Bosnian policy. As Brent Scowcroft suggested, Clinton was pursuing a “peripatetic foreign policy at prey to the whims of the latest balance of forces.”

Sensitive to the suggestion that he was disinterested in foreign affairs, it was in the midst of this context that Clinton organised the so-called “Kennan sweepstakes,” a competition to come up with a phrase that would encapsulate the grand strategy of the administration.

The phrase decided upon was “democratic enlargement”; it was explicit about the possibilities opened by the end of the Cold War and avoided the negativity of “End of History” or “Clash of civilizations”. Crucially, it also articulated a goal, although it was so distant that success or failure could not be measured in a meaningful or, more to the point, a politically damaging sense.

In September 1993 Clinton’s National Security Advisor Anthony Lake explained to an audience at Johns Hopkins University that the United States would transform its grand strategy “From containment to enlargement.”

“Throughout the Cold War,” Lake explained:

we contained a threat to market democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us. The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement – enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.

Lake clarified the four kinds of action which would underpin the strategy:


780 Ibid., 114–15; Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier, America between the Wars, 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 65–72.
781 Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”
782 Ibid.
(1) “We should strengthen the community of major market democracies – including our own – which constitutes the core from enlargement is proceeding.”

(2) “We should help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible in states of special significance and opportunity.”

(3) “We must counter aggression – and support the liberalization – of states hostile to democracy and markets.”

(4) “We need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.”

The speech was a self-conscious invocation of Wilson in which Lake railed against the “neo-know-nothings” who believed that America could retreat from responsibility. Markets and democracies were Lakes’s solution to all foreign-policy problems, but the strategy of enlargement rejected the expansionist view that the United States was duty-bound to promote democracy and human rights everywhere. Both self-interest and the common good were served by the mix of principle and pragmatism:

The expansion of market-based economics abroad helps expand our exports and create American jobs, while it also improves living conditions and fuels demands for political liberalization abroad. The addition of new democracies makes us more secure because democracies tend not to wage war on each other or sponsor terrorism.

Clinton echoed the speech the following week at the UN, echoing the enlargement strategy and developing his vision of the effects of globalisation:

We cannot solve every problem . . . but we must and will serve as a fulcrum for change and a pivot point for peace. In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies.

The intellectual wellspring of the Clinton policy flowed mainly from Lake, Madeline Albright, and Strobe Talbott. Several core ideas bound this group. They shared an aversion to pure power politics and, in their view, a balance of power

783 Ibid.
784 Ibid.
785 Ibid.
786 Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City.”
and traditional geopolitics were ill-suited to the new era and were no longer sufficient reasons to spend U.S. resources.\footnote{Hyland, \textit{Clinton’s World}, 21.} They agreed that the use of force should not be limited to the defence of vital interests but should extend to disinterested intervention in the name of moral principles when the will and conscience of the international community was breached. Force should be discreet and carefully applied. Finally, they believed that the test of a valid foreign policy was whether it would receive domestic and international support.\footnote{Ibid.}

However, there were also important differences between them. Lake and Talbott were determined to define limits on the use of U.S. power, whereas Albright believed the problem was how to legitimise the exercise of power. She argued that international support legitimised actions, and whilst Talbott and Lake did not disagree, they were less hawkish. All three attributed great importance to the UN; Albright said that the UN would be central to Clinton’s new internationalism and that history would record the end of the Cold War as the beginning of a new era for the UN. She went so far as to say that ‘state building operations’ would be “another dimension of collective security.”\footnote{Madeleine K. Albright, “Building a Collective Security System: Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East and On International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC” (3 May 1993), http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no19.html [accessed 15/08/11].}

Observers of the Washington scene reported a struggle between Lake and Warren Christopher (then Secretary of State) to define the President’s approach to foreign policy. Lake pushed the ‘strategy of enlargement’ with a globalist, moralist, and interventionist thrust. Christopher privately supported a strategy of active engagement which was less ambitious and based on the premise, as one of Christopher’s swiftly disavowed aides recognised, that “We [America] simply don’t have the leverage, we don’t have the influence, we don’t have the inclination to use military force.”\footnote{Daniel Williams and John N. Goshko, “Administration Rushes to ‘Clarify’ Policy Remarks,” \textit{Washington Post}, 27 May 1993.} While he was forced to reassert American leadership, Christopher had wanted America to have a limited focus on certain
key geographic regions such as Russia, Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{791}

**Step three of contextual analysis: the strategy of engagement and enlargement as an ideological move**

Step three of Skinnerian contextual analysis focuses on how ideologies are identified and how they form, are criticised, and change. This section will analyse the strategy of engagement and enlargement as an ideological move – that is, the degree to which the strategy was conventional and the nature of any ideological innovation. The analysis will demarcate the point at which ideological reinforcement or change was attempted.

Lake characterised the Clinton administration’s overall strategy as pragmatic neo-Wilsonianism. For the United States the choice was either isolation or a new doctrine of internationalism: not Wilson’s crusading idealism, but a practical application of his principles of democracy.\textsuperscript{792} According to Lake, Wilson’s core beliefs – spreading democracy to other nations, adhering to principles, and stressing the need for engagement – were more vital than ever. Americans could not fully embrace power politics as represented by Theodore Roosevelt’s doctrine, but they could rally around Wilson’s “deeper resonance”, allowing the United States to lead the world in the name of principle.\textsuperscript{793} Wilson had understood, Lake argued, that what occurred within nations fundamentally affected what occurred between them. Therefore, the “character of foreign regimes” would shape U.S. security.\textsuperscript{794}

Strobe Talbott reinforced Lake’s Wilsonian vision. He asserted that other nations’ internal affairs were no longer off-limits. Humanitarian intervention was gaining acceptance. Americans wanted U.S. foreign policy to be rooted in “idealpolitik as well as realpolitik.”\textsuperscript{795} Lake agreed that overwhelming violations of human rights

\textsuperscript{792} Chollet and Goldgeier, *America between the Wars*, 69.
\textsuperscript{793} Ibid.
might require the use of force. Rectifying human-rights abuses was a completely new rationale for U.S. military intervention.

Joseph Nye of Harvard University, who later served in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense under Clinton, wrote about the new liberal dispensation in foreign policy. According to Nye, the evolution of transnational communications, economic integration, and interdependence were making more relevant a “liberal conception of a world society of peoples, as well as states and of order resting on values and institutions as well as military power.” Liberal views once regarded as utopian now seemed less far-fetched. Nye wrote that the idea of a UN force that would preserve international order was “an idea worth detailed practical examination” in the aftermath of the Cold War and Gulf War.

Some outside policy groups reinforced the administration’s thinking. The Progressive Policy Institute, a creation of the Democratic Party, strongly advocated putting commercial diplomacy at the centre of America’s new security strategy. For example, trade policies and other leverage could be used to encourage political and economic change in China. Other recommendations included encouraging and aiding democratic forces abroad that were struggling to hold free elections; revamping foreign aid by shifting from country-by-country assistance to broader goals; replacing the Cold War military establishment with more mobile and more flexible forces capable of rapid deployment to regional trouble spots; and reinvigorating the institutions of collective security.

All of these musings were converted into Lake’s Johns Hopkins’s speech on 21 September 1993. He declared that the purpose of U.S. power was to preserve and promote democracies. The strategy of enlarging democracies would replace the strategy of containment. Lake argued that America’s security mission was to promote democracy and market economies. Democracies did not fight each other,

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797 Nye, “What New World Order?” 89.
798 Ibid., 92–3.
800 Ibid., 318.
he asserted. Lake insisted that the United States should not only help
democracies but support the liberalisation of nations hostile to democracy.
‘Backlash’ states, such as Iran and Iraq, would have to be isolated. Lake
weakened his case by adding the caveat that the United States would “at times
need to befriend and even defend undemocratic states for ‘mutually beneficial
reasons.”

Throughout spring 1994 the White House considered a number of draft proposals
for a national-security strategy as it tried to reconcile the different perspectives of
the State Department, the Pentagon, and other government departments. In July
1994 the administration issued President Clinton’s first comprehensive strategy
document, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.* As
the title suggests, the president chose to straddle the issue in the hope that, over
time, seemingly opposing viewpoints could be reconciled. From then on, the
formulations and general objectives outlined in the strategy documents that the
administration annually sent to Congress changed little and may be assumed to
reflect the continuity of Clinton’s basic outlook on foreign policy.

Neo-Wilsonianism was appealing to a nation exhausted by the Cold War, but
Wilsonianism was a utopian island in a world dominated by new, virulent
nationalism, religious fanaticism, the disintegration of empires, the demise of
ideology, regional wars, and superpower disarray.

In some senses it is hard to reconcile the ideological impetus of the strategy of
engagement and enlargement with the realities of Clinton’s foreign policy. It is
important to remember that whilst Clinton tried to situate his grand strategy
within the larger democratic, exceptionalist tradition, he was not prepared to
engage in “reckless crusades” to expand the realm of international freedom.
Whilst he accepted that America had a special destiny, this did not mean it could
or would force its ideals on other nations. “Our actions” abroad, he suggested, had
“always to be tempered with prudence and common sense.” After all, he

801 Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”
802 Ibid.
804 William J. Clinton, “American Foreign Policy and the Democratic Ideal, Institute of World
Affairs, Milwaukee” (1 October 1992), in “President-Elect Clinton’s Foreign Policy Statements
continued, there were “some countries and some cultures” that were “many steps away from democratic institutions.” The speech heavily indicated that democracy promotion was not a moral duty to override all other goals but one objective that would help guarantee America’s place in the globalised world.

Talbott reinforced these points. Whilst his argument criticised isolationists for not comprehending why the support of democracy in certain countries was in America’s interest, he was also careful to distinguish between a policy driven by ideals and Clinton’s, which was guided by enlightened self-interest. He concluded that support for democracy was “not an absolute imperative.”

This showed the nature and, perhaps more importantly, the limits of Clinton’s ideological innovation. He was prepared to refashion American exceptionalism, to adopt the Wilsonian crusade of democracy promotion, but only insofar as it would bolster America and, in particular, American trade. His vision cominged domestic and foreign policy.

The once bright line between domestic and foreign policy is blurring. If I could do anything to change the speech patterns of those of us in public life, I would almost like to stop hearing people talk about foreign and domestic policy and, instead start discussing economic policy, security policy, environmental policy – you name it.

Therefore, the focus of U.S. substantive foreign policy was to be on the North American–European–Japanese core and the international economic regimes, institutions, and arrangements designed to foster trade. This was necessary because the assumption that U.S. economic recovery and long-term prosperity were inextricably intertwined with global economic growth, especially of the democratic capitalist core, was at the heart of the Clinton administration’s strategic assessment and response. The domestic and the foreign were co-constitutive. This political–economic nexus was considered the essence of U.S. security policy in an international system in which there were no plausible challengers to U.S. security as traditionally conceived.

805 Ibid.
806 Ibid.
When the Clinton administration engaged beyond the democratic capitalist core, however, its international strategy lost clarity. The geostrategic areas of greatest concern were Russia, the remnants of the former Soviet Union, and China. Economic engagement was part of Clinton’s approach, but the perilous state of the economies and political institutions of Russia and Central Europe precluded their rapid incorporation into the core. Insofar as Russia and China had been the foci of containment, Cold War residua now demanded attention. Not surprisingly, the approach to enlargement in Russia and China was weighted toward more traditional political and strategic issues of arms control, nonproliferation, and shoring up the teetering presidency of Boris Yeltsin.809

With respect to Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea810 the administration adopted the language and instrumentality of containment, not the modalities of economic engagement. For example, U.S.–Iraqi relations remained frozen in economic sanctions and a low-intensity air war of attrition. In the Middle East Clinton personally engaged in intense diplomatic efforts with regard to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. For more than twenty years his predecessors had worked the same agenda, and his efforts toward resolving the conflict also failed.

In its original conception of foreign-policy strategy, the Clinton administration considered humanitarian intervention a tertiary priority. However, the complex political and humanitarian disaster of Balkan disintegration remained a top priority throughout Clinton’s presidency and led to NATO’s first military action. U.S. policy was anything but strategic in conception and implementation. Initially, the administration attempted to disengage through a policy of sceptical support for European and UN diplomacy and peacekeeping in Bosnia during 1993–4. By the late summer of 1995 that policy failed, as Serbs overran what was supposed to be a UN-protected safe area. Only after the Clinton administration led a UN-sanctioned NATO air campaign did the following occur: a ceasefire; negotiations near Dayton, Ohio in November; and, finally, a NATO-based peacekeeping force, under UN mandate, on the ground.811

809 Talbott, The Russia Hand.
811 Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, 82–8.
Nonetheless, the Balkan Wars persisted with the Kosovan conflict. The Clinton administration rejected European appeals to seek UN Security Council legitimisation of military action in Kosovo. Instead Clinton pushed for and received authorisation for NATO air strikes against Serbia, which would last three months.

Despite its early reluctance, the Clinton administration ultimately enlarged the U.S. presence in the Balkans. The UN Security Council sanctioned the U.S.-led NATO intervention in Bosnia but not the Kosovo intervention. Throughout the 1990s the Clinton administration had repeated its commitment to engagement and enlargement through multilateralism in order to construct a liberal international order. However, Operation Allied Force, although justified with the moral imperatives of humanitarian intervention by a willing NATO coalition, was essentially a U.S.-led intervention against a sovereign state acting without Security Council authorisation. This was not altogether surprising, as Lake had explicitly refused to privilege multilateralism, though he had hoped “that the habits of multilateralism may one day enable the rule of law to play a more civilizing role in the conduct of nations, as envisioned by the founders of the United Nations.”

By the end of the 1990s the strategy of engagement and enlargement had lost its focus. Although NATO, the very institutionalisation of the liberal democratic core, had enlarged to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, its internal balance, mission, and purpose had become problematic. During the interventions in the Balkan Wars, especially in Kosovo, the radical asymmetry between U.S. and European military capabilities had become obvious. In addition, there were accumulating instances of U.S. impatience with European multilateral diplomacy in the Balkans and the International Criminal Court. Thus, there were fissures within the democratic capitalist core of the post-Cold War world.

The Battle of Mogadishu, the prolonged and brutal struggle in the Balkans, the collapse of negotiations in the Middle East, the failure to contain ‘backlash’ nations, and, by the end of Clinton’s second term, the emergence of an al Qaeda capable of bombing the World Trade Center all indicated that much of the world

812 Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”
was far less receptive to U.S. ideas of market economics and liberal democracy than the first post-Cold War administration had assumed.

The Clinton administration had come into power with significant intellectual baggage. This was not a hangover of 1960s radical chic, but a more traditional liberal critique of U.S. policy: the nation had been too preoccupied with power; its foreign policy had not reflected Americans’ ideals; the nation had failed to support human rights abroad; too often it had acted unilaterally in support of a national interest that was too narrowly defined.

The administration had come to power vowing that it would not simply refine or remake Bush’s new world order. Instead it would create its own grand strategy. However, although the president and his advisors were comfortable with moments of Wilsonian-inspired rhetoric and were determined to pursue Wilsonian goals, Clinton himself was more of a centrist. His preoccupation with domestic politics overshadowed his interest in foreign affairs:

His advisors mistook this as a green light to pursue their own policy predilections. When their views clashed with reality, they needed Clinton’s firm support, but Clinton was not inclined to take political risks for policies he never fully embraced.

Step four of contextual analysis: the strategy of engagement and enlargement and the alteration of political vocabulary

Step four of Skinnerian contextual analysis centres on the relation between political ideology and political action. This sections starts from Skinner’s observation that political vocabulary contains intersubjectively normative terms which simultaneously describe and evaluate. Skinner argued that a society establishes and alters its moral identity by manipulating normative terms. He noted a tension between political actors’ desire to tailor their normative language to fit their projects and the reality that projects must be altered to fit the available normative language.

813 From the outset of his election campaign Clinton was criticised for supposedly being a 1960s radical. Bernard von Bothmer, *Framing the Sixties: The Use and Abuse of a Decade from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush* (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010), 158–65.


American jubilation at the Cold War’s conclusion masked significant unresolved strategic and rhetorical problems. Since the mid-1940s a particular conception of American exceptionalism incorporating the concept of ‘national security’ (explored in Chapter 4) had served as a profoundly unifying concept. Yoking foreign policy, military decisions, and domestic affairs, this nationalistic concept blended moralism and pragmatism.

Neither President Clinton nor President Bush employed an unmodified Cold War rhetorical paradigm to explain U.S. grand strategy, but nor did they completely abandon Cold War rhetoric. Cold War political vocabulary enabled both presidents to anchor their political projects. Clinton’s rhetoric of a democratic world order perpetuated some Cold War themes. The vocabulary and constructions in which this rhetoric was embedded had strong overtones of national insecurity and vulnerability.

Efforts to move away from Cold War premises characterised Clinton’s rhetorical model, which represented an attempt to redefine the basis of U.S. national security, principally by linking U.S. domestic policy (especially economic policy) to foreign-policy concerns. However, in detailing the changes confronting the United States after the Cold War Clinton resorted to the familiar trope of war metaphors, which he used most frequently when describing weapons of mass destruction and the outlaw nations, terrorists, and organised criminals who sought to acquire them. He often bracketed his arguments with the reminder that the United States was the “indispensable nation” and thereby reinforced the premises of U.S. global interests and U.S. exceptionalism. Clinton did not attempt to completely supplant Cold War discourse, but the Cold War provided more context than rationale for his action:

The fact is America remains the indispensable nation. There are times when America and only America can make a difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and fear. Of course, we can’t take on all the world’s burden. We cannot become its policemen. But where our interests and values demand it and where we can make a difference, America must act and lead.816

In the post-Cold War environment, with no predictable adversary, no familiar structure of conflict, and few external constraints, the challenge was to build a new foundation from which to articulate a foreign policy, especially a policy that most voters would tolerate if not embrace. Clinton and many members of his diverse audience shared an interest in minimising foreign-policy costs and promoting domestic prosperity. Clinton had come to office by downplaying foreign affairs, emphasising instead the need for a new domestic agenda after decades of national obsession with Cold War needs. He had promised to “focus like a laser beam” on the economy if elected.\(^{817}\) His plan for promoting a healthier economy and retiring the national debt involved downsizing the military and reshaping it for new types of conflict.\(^{818}\) In a campaign address, he emphasised the need for aligning foreign and domestic policy:

> Throughout this campaign I have called for a new strategy for American engagement: to revamp our Cold War military forces to meet our nation’s changing security needs; encourage the consolidation and spread of democracy abroad; and restore America’s economic leadership at home and abroad. . . . [W]e are in a position to do more with less than at any time in our recent history. During the Cold War, we spent trillions to protect freedom where it was threatened. In this post-Cold War era, the West can spend a fraction of that amount to nurture democracy where it never before existed. America’s challenge in this era is not to bear every burden, but to tip the balance. . . . [M]ost important, none of this will be possible unless we restore America’s economic strength.\(^{819}\)

The Cold War had led administrations to subordinate domestic concerns to an international agenda. Reversing that approach, Clinton promised to make domestic prosperity the driving influence on his foreign policy. In an echo of Paul Kennedy, domestic economic renewal became inextricably linked to America’s continued exceptionalist mission and in turn to the spread of democracy.

Lake, Clinton, Christopher, and Albright coordinated a set of addresses that explained democratic enlargement as the logical post-Cold War successor to


\(^{819}\) Clinton, “Speech to the Foreign Policy Association, 13.
containment. Eight speeches presented within six weeks offered an extraordinary opportunity to examine the self-conscious launch of a unified foreign-policy frame. It is possible to examine these speeches, as they were explicitly issued by the administration as coordinated texts delivering a single grand strategy.

Certainly, aspects of democratic enlargement had twentieth-century antecedents. For example, Wilson’s foreign policy had focused on expanding U.S. influence and ideas. Eisenhower’s New Look programme had been aimed at reducing defence costs while maintaining the military strength and flexibility needed to deter aggressive forces and promote peace. Eisenhower’s administration had argued that it was economically necessary for free nations to share the burdens of defence costs. The New Look’s rhetorical and strategic success had depended on the credible assertion of an ongoing U.S. prerogative to act and retaliate where, when, and how America thought best. The United States had asserted the right to choose among and reconfigure foreign-policy means, uncoupling U.S. military capacity from commitments to use that capacity in any particular case. Like Clinton, George H.W. Bush had faced the ill-defined threats of the post-Cold War period and a concomitant lack of American interest in foreign policy. In response, the Bush administration, too, had urged global integration of market democracies and experimented with various rhetorical devices to make its case.

Despite historical antecedents, the eight speeches that showcased democratic enlargement suggested that it was a new approach for new times. Borrowing from John F. Kennedy, the Clinton administration rhetorically declared the beginning


of an era so unique that it rendered the past obsolete. Clinton told the UN General
Assembly, “It is clear that we live at a turning point in human history. Immense
and promising changes seem to wash over us every day. The Cold War is
over.” Albright suggested that the moment was similar in magnitude to 1918
and 1945. The current time was “a moment of immense democratic and
entrepreneurial opportunity” in which “the momentum of the Cold War no
longer propels us in our daily actions.” Americans “need a new lens and even a
new vocabulary . . . We must fashion new policies that reflect the immense
changes that have come with the end of the Cold War.”

The Clinton administration argued for a world actively shaped through selective
U.S. engagement. In words that would be strikingly echoed by Robert Kaplan,
Albright forcefully warned that the United States should not withdraw into a post-
Cold War foxhole that would consign the rest of the world to “rot in its own
anarchy.” Christopher, too, advocated global involvement: “The new world we
seek will not emerge on its own. We must shape the transformation that is under
way in a time of great fluidity.” Lake opined:

America’s core concepts – democracy and market economics – are
more broadly accepted than ever . . . This victory of freedom is
practical, not ideological: Billions of people on every continent are
simply concluding, based on decades of their own hard experience,
that democracy and markets are the most productive and liberating
ways to organise their lives. . . . Our leadership is sought and
respected in every corner of the world.

While the administration’s discourse provided the grounds for continuing U.S.
global leadership, Clinton also explicitly stated that the United States would not
retreat from the position it had achieved at the end of the Second World War. For
Clinton, the United States occupied a ‘unique position’ in international politics in
the age of globalisation. He declared “There are times when only America can
make the difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression,

823 Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.”
825 Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”
826 Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.”
829 Christopher, “The strategic priorities of American foreign policy.”
830 Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”
between hope and fear. . . [W]e must act and lead.” Clinton’s use of the phrase “indispensable nation” in the speech was by now a familiar refrain which reasserted America’s providential role in the world, linking to American exceptionalism.

Clinton devoted considerable energy to making the case that the United States should continue its providential mission. The case for leadership by the United States was contained in two overarching and at times overlapping claims. First, continuing the U.S. role as world leader venerated and emulated the legacy of transitional leadership that American generations had shown in the past, especially after the Second World War. Second, the United States needed to lead so that it could shape a better future for itself and the international community. Leadership by the United States was necessary to provide the proper direction for change, and it was imperative to immediately chart the path because of the opportunity’s fleeting nature. Both claims served to promote America’s commitment to intervention and reaffirmed its position as global leader.

Clinton skilfully used and reshaped the rhetoric of America’s exceptionalist mission to support his ideological programme. He publicly stated that a continuance of U.S. global leadership was the proper response to “the third great moment of decision in the 20th century, the third great transition period in U.S. foreign affairs.” For Clinton, uncertainty about America’s future place in the world resembled the uncertainty that had followed each world war:

Twice before in this century, history has asked the United States and the other great powers to provide leadership for a world ravaged by war. After World War I, that call went unanswered. The United States was too unwilling. The great powers turned inward, as violent, totalitarian powers emerged. We raised trade barriers. We sought to humiliate rather than rehabilitate the vanquished. And the result was instability, then depression, and ultimately a Second World War.

By causally linking the rise of totalitarianism, economic depression, and America’s historical unwillingness to play a global leadership role Clinton forcefully made the case for continued involvement in world affairs. This

832 Clinton, “Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration.”
833 Ibid.
rhetorical call was attached to specific policy decisions. In 1993 Clinton convinced sceptical Republicans in the U.S. Senate to support a financial stabilisation package for Russia. Clinton would later recall that Bob Dole “came around on the argument that we didn’t want to foul up the post-Cold War era the way the victors in World War I had done. Their short-sightedness contributed mightily to World War II.”  

Clinton’s second important historical analogy invoked an idealised vision of U.S. action in the wake of the Second World War:

> When World War II was won, profound uncertainty clouded the future. Europe and Japan were buried in rubble. Their peoples were weary. People did not know what to expect or what would happen. But because of the vision of the people who were our predecessors here in the United States, . . . the path that was followed after World War I was abandoned and instead the world was embraced with optimism and hope.  

Although Clinton’s recollection of the attitudes of postwar American policymakers was selective at best and misleading at worst, he invoked a particularised historical vision that the post-Cold War transition should ‘benefit’ from U.S. leadership and, most importantly, stability.

Although historical analogy provided stability for the strategy of engagement and enlargement, the ideological innovativeness of the strategy became apparent as it looked to the future. For Clinton, U.S. leadership was vital to shape the present and future environment toward U.S. national interests. Leadership by the United States was urgently needed because the forces of globalisation were transforming the global landscape. “Change is upon us,” Clinton stated. “We can do nothing about that.” If the United States did not proactively manage change across the globe, its global position would be compromised. Clinton saw Americans as properly “shapers of events, not observers of it.” If they failed to act, “the moment

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Clinton’s words revealed three important beliefs. First, the United States must commit to global leadership so that the international environment could be moulded to the country’s benefit. Second, if the United States did not shape the future in its image the country would lose its influence on the world’s direction and, over the long term, experience decline. Third, the United States had only a short time in which to shape globalism and must, therefore, seize the moment. This last belief contradicted a central tenet of U.S. exceptionalism, the belief that the United States had the perennial ability to escape the deterioration that other great powers eventually experienced. Traditionally, U.S. presidents, including George H. W. Bush, had upheld that tenet. Clinton was different in that he saw America’s position as a temporary result of human agency; depending on circumstances, the United States could lose its power.

Clinton admitted as much in his first inaugural address. He stated that, despite the end of the Cold War, America was just as vulnerable as other countries:

> Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the cold war assumes new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom but threatened still by ancient hatreds and new plagues. Raised in unrivaled prosperity, we inherit an economy that is still the world’s strongest but is weakened by business failures, stagnant wages, increasing inequality, and deep divisions among our own people.⁸³⁸

During his presidency, Clinton refashioned the notion of U.S. exceptionalism. Although he would continue traditional advocacy of U.S. intervention, with echoes of declinism and even Huntington, Clinton knew that U.S. primacy might not last. By continuing to lead and construct the international landscape in a way that promoted U.S. interests, America could obtain some security even if it lost some power. The future of the globalised international community could be drawn in America’s image.

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⁸³⁸ Clinton, “Inaugural Address,”
Clinton’s logic extended further, in more familiar ways. The United States must shape the changes brought by globalisation not only for its own security but also for the world’s. Clinton stated:

Change is inevitable but the particular change is not. And we have to make some decisions to seize the opportunities and meet the challenges before us. To put it another way, the train of globalization cannot be reversed, but it has more than one possible destination. If we want America to be on the right track, if we want other people to stay on the right track and have the opportunity to enjoy peace and prosperity, we have no choice but to try and lead the train.839

Clinton saw the age of globalisation as unruly. In his view, leadership by the United States acted as a counterweight to the unpredictable state of the international environment. Using the mission of exceptionalism to justify continued U.S. engagement and leadership, Clinton simultaneously highlighted the limits of U.S. leadership. This was an important ideological innovation, a significant departure from traditional exceptionalist discourse.

Apart from his unprecedented acknowledgement of temporal limits to U.S. power, Clinton saw U.S. leadership as limited by the amount of power the United States actually had and the extent to which it could make leadership commitments. Clinton stated “We can’t take on all the world’s burden. . . . We cannot become its policeman.”840 The implication was that America’s power to lead was great but the international community needed to share the burden of leadership.

Acceptance of this point constituted acceptance of at least partial decline from America’s Cold War position. Clinton was making a strategic commitment markedly different from that of his Cold War predecessors. John F. Kennedy had claimed that the United States would be a leader that would “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”841 Unlike Kennedy, Clinton had no clearly defined enemy to oppose; moreover, George H. W. Bush’s failure to be re-elected

partly reflected the American public’s limited appetite for international engagement. The United States would have to pick and choose its battles. Although Clinton still intended to pursue America’s exceptionalist mission, it would be in tandem with a recalibration of America’s organisational and regional relationships.

In Clinton’s construction of the post-Cold War world, multidimensional interdependence and globalisation were the dominant constitutive dynamics of an emergent global system. In that worldview, traditional security concerns persisted; however, insofar as economic forces of globalisation grew in importance, security was redefined in terms of trade and economics. From Clinton’s perspective, the proper strategic response to this new world was engagement. Because the economic forces of globalisation derived from America’s most fundamental values and strengths, the United States should embrace interdependence and globalisation. Globalisation, then, would become both an instrument and an end of U.S. foreign and national-security policy. Insofar as U.S. strategy was based on engaging the forces of globalisation and strengthening the institutions for regulating and fostering liberal globalisation, the sphere of democratic capitalism would be expanded and U.S. strategic interests advanced.

With respect to Clinton’s reworking of exceptionalist discourse, the tension between multilateralism and unilateralism indicated the extent to which the administration’s early involvement in multilateral UN peacekeeping operations had evaporated after the Battle of Mogadishu. U.S. withdrawal from Somalia was soon followed by new doctrine regarding U.S. approval of or involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. Presidential Decision Directive 25 seemed to ensure that few, if any, multilateral peacekeeping operations would include U.S. involvement without a priori agreement to U.S. command and control. The

842 G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Liberal Grand Strategy,” in American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), suggests that a grander ‘American project’ throughout the post-Second World War period was the building of exactly this type of order. This thesis has depicted less consistent U.S. ambitions over that period of time but would agree with Ikenberry’s model in the specific context of the Clinton Presidency.


844 Ibid.
United States would not support UN missions that “impinge directly on the national security interests of America or its allies.”

America’s refusal to support decisive multilateral intervention in Rwanda and her vacillating response to European and UN operations in Bosnia were consistent with this stance. When decisive international action came to the Balkans in 1995 and to Kosovo in 1999 it was in the form of U.S.-led and U.S.-implemented air wars. Indeed, in the latter campaign the Clinton administration explicitly rejected trying to obtain UN Security Council authorisation. Instead, the administration prepared for what was essentially U.S. action by gaining a priori NATO approval for the United States to act without UN authorisation. Clinton seemed unconcerned that the resulting intervention was regarded as a violation of the UN Charter with respect to the use of force.

In sum, from the outset the Clinton administration showed strategic drift. Early on, Lake explicitly refused to adopt a rigidly multilateralist posture. In the same speech in which he laid out the fundamentals of the Clinton administration’s strategy of engagement and enlargement, he concluded:

> For any official with responsibilities for our security policies, only one overriding factor can determine whether the U.S. should act multilaterally or unilaterally, and that is America’s interests. We should act multilaterally where doing so advances our interests – and we should act unilaterally when that will serve our purpose. The simple question in each instance is this: What works best?

Step five of contextual analysis: “enlargement,” the new world order?

Step five of Skinnerian contextual analysis focuses on the question “What forms of political thought and action are involved in disseminating and

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846 After the NATO action began, the Russian Federation’s representative on the Security Council proposed a resolution to declare the NATO action unlawful. The proposed resolution was supported by three states, including Russia and China. See Louis Henkin, “Kosovo and the Law of ‘Humanitarian Intervention’,” *The American Journal of International Law*, 93, no. 4 (1999): 825–6.

847 Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”
conventionalizing ideological change?” Such analysis illuminates how some ideological change becomes conventional, woven into ways of acting.

From the outset Clinton and his team sought a more open system of international relations in which the United States would lead through consensus, markets, and institutions, in place of Bush’s new world order, which they perceived as having “failed to articulate clear goals.” Their approach to foreign policy was liberal and internationalist. The United States would be less imposing militarily, but it would exert greater political, economic, and cultural influence abroad. Nye’s phrase “soft power” captured Clinton’s approach.

When Clinton entered office an elderly George Kennan urged the new president, via Strobe Talbott, to avoid “oversimplification” and develop a “thoughtful paragraph or more” explaining U.S. interests, aims, and challenges. Tony Lake hoped that his September 1993 speech would do just that and have an effect similar to that of Kennan’s “Long Telegram.” Despite critics who accuse Clinton of strategic drift and inconsistency at a policy level, this chapter has argued that the Clinton administration successfully harnessed wide-ranging debate about America’s purpose into a rebooted ideological narrative which informed their grand strategy.

From the outset, Clinton incorporated some of the arguments of declinists such as Paul Kennedy, who emphasised the need for American economic regeneration. Clinton’s foreign policy was rooted in a number of interlinked assumptions: first, “foreign and domestic policy are two sides of the same coin,” and, second, “If we’re not strong at home we can’t be strong abroad. If we can’t compete in the global economy, we’ll pay for it at home.” The innovative aspect was the Clinton administration’s linkage of American domestic renewal with the economics of the global market and in turn with democracy promotion. As this

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848 Tully, “The Pen is a Mighty Sword,” 7–8.
851 George Kennan, quoted in Chollet and Goldgeier, America between the Wars, 13.
chapter has demonstrated, the administration repeatedly highlighted what they perceived as the positive link between capitalism and democracy. Support for market democracy was Lake’s solution to most foreign-policy problems. His view was based on democratic peace theory. According to Lake, support of markets and democracies served both self-interest and the common good; it was both high principle and basic pragmatism. His “From Containment to Enlargement” speech framed the administration’s foreign policy. Indeed, “what Clinton liked best about Lake’s enlargement policy was the way it was inextricably linked to economic renewal with its emphasis on making sure the United States remained the number one exporter.”

There was more to it than the simple self-interest of market-access. As Cox suggests:

In some larger sense they really did think that over time democracy could not function without the market, or the market without democracy . . . and free enterprise the only secure foundation upon which to construct and sustain democracy . . . It was no accident that Clinton and his advisers persistently coupled the two words together and employed the term ‘market democracy’ to more fully describe the policy of enlargement.

Despite many inconsistencies in policy over the next seven years, Lake’s speech roughly characterised the aims of Clinton’s international activities. The administration attempted to use economic incentives and promises of public respectability to encourage democratic reform overseas.

America’s hesitation in the former Yugoslavia was exemplative of the problems with Clinton’s grand strategy. As articulated by Lake and his successors, the strategy of enlargement suggested preferences for market economies and for democracies. However, it did not identify the key priorities in pursuing those ends. Were the Balkans more important to U.S. interests than North Korea or Iraq? Was stopping genocide more important than nurturing productive, stable relations with regional leaders? Enlargement promised much without giving any sense of trade-offs and sacrifices, even though those are the tough decisions that should be at the core of any strategy.

854 This was a naïve assumption. Even champions of capitalism saw the link between the two as complex and opaque at best: see Irwin Stelzer, “A Question of Linkage: Capitalism, Prosperity, Democracy,” The National Interest (1994), 29–35.


The Clinton administration never thought systematically about the ‘hard-power’ capabilities it would need to pursue its ends. Clinton’s sophisticated understanding of international political economy distracted him from thinking seriously about when, where, and how the United States would deploy its military. How would the United States integrate military capabilities into plans for enlargement? Under what conditions would the nation send U.S. forces abroad? Which threats would leaders emphasise in military procurement and planning? As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, these questions were all central topics of debate during the Cold War, but disappeared from the policy process during the Clinton years.

**Conclusion**

The language of the Clinton administration promised a great deal with very little sacrifice and Clinton’s reworking of U.S. exceptionalism promised a great deal under U.S. stewardship. While hinting at multilateral burden sharing and setting ill-defined limits to U.S. intervention, this reworking suggested that selective engagement would entail little cost. Lake’s 1993 speech had suggested that the United States could enlarge the landscape of democracy without hard military choices.

For John Ikenberry, however, Clinton’s grand strategy was less innovative than it might appear. He suggests that two orders were built in the 1940s. One was the Cold War order that emerged from America’s struggle with the Soviet Union and ended with the Soviet Union’s collapse. The other was the U.S.-led international order that was built inside the bipolar system in the shadow of the Cold War. The second order was the Western liberal order, reinforced by the Cold War. However, it is less obvious that this liberal democratic agenda represented a grand strategy rather than a collection of values shared between allies.

This chapter has suggested something distinct: that the Clinton grand strategy went much further than Ikenberry’s conception of Western structural integration. Clinton’s strategy envisaged a democratic peace led by exceptionalist America

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and predicated on the triad of domestic economic renewal, the spread of market economics, and democracy promotion beyond the confines of the ‘West’. The Clinton administration made a number of ideological issues conventional parts of American foreign policy. First, the administration renewed the commitment to American global involvement and reshaped it for the post-Cold War world. Second, they gave renewed centrality to economic issues in U.S. foreign policy. Whilst these had always been an issue, the Clinton administration gave them particular ideological prominence, putting them on a par with traditional security interests. The promotion of market economics became a significant part of American grand strategy, intimately tied to democracy promotion and also at the heart of the regeneration of American exceptionalism. For better or worse, the third legacy Clinton bequeathed to the post-Cold War environment was the confused ‘Clinton doctrine’ of humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion, both of which would take on a new life under Clinton’s presidential successor.

Chapter 7. The Bush Doctrine and the Neoconservative Moment

As the previous chapter demonstrated, the early post-Cold War era was one of strategic ambiguity, but not because either George H. W. Bush or Bill Clinton avoided strategic articulation. Both presidents had pursued strategic policy very different from containment.861 The phrases new world order, enlargement, and beyond containment came to be used as expressions of fact, as having come to pass, rather than being seen as attempts to fashion a successor to containment.

Under President Clinton there was a strong rearticulation of American purpose which did lead to recognisable grand strategy, albeit without the strictures of neatly ordered adversaries or a rival ideology. Nonetheless, American thought about the use of force remained undisciplined throughout the Clinton presidency. U.S. interests and the threats to them were numerous and diffuse, and the Clinton administration did not consider them in uniform terms.

This chapter will examine continuity and change in U.S. ideological tropes during the presidency of George W. Bush, the post-Second World War president with perhaps the most controversial foreign policy since that of the Vietnam War. It will focus primarily on Bush’s grand strategy after 11 September 2001.862 In the wake of a hotly disputed presidential election,863 Bush came to power as the champion of compassionate conservatism at home. He was more concerned with establishing his domestic authority than with foreign policy. His foreign-policy campaign message had been largely realist and based on the promise that he would pursue “distinctly American internationalism,”864 by which he meant not only being more “humble” in recognising the limits of how far he could change the international system but also a form of unilateralism that was distinct from the

862 Hereafter ‘9/11’.
presidencies of both Clinton and his father. George W. Bush expressly criticised Clinton as a serial intervener and resolutely stated that he would steer clear of nation-building. Indeed, “before 9/11 Bush struck his neocon and hardline conservative supporters as a half-hearted unipolarist.” This is not to suggest that American primacy was not already apparent in Bush’s pre-9/11 foreign policy and, as the next section makes clear, there were strands of both realism and American primacy even before 9/11, reflecting the two strands of Bush’s foreign-policy advisors. Nonetheless, 9/11 did have a transformative effect and not only settled the orientation of the president’s strategic thinking but also shifted the intellectual and political locus of grand strategy creation towards neoconservatism and its stronghold within the Pentagon.

Bush’s grand strategy after 9/11 is sometimes confusingly characterised as “Wilsonianism with boots,” the suggestion being that it was primarily concerned with democracy promotion and a strong degree of ideological continuity with previous dominant understandings of American exceptionalism. This chapter disagrees with this suggestion of ideological continuity and seeks

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868 As Dodge suggests, “The Neoconservative approach of key advisors in Washington was certainly a factor in providing the moral justification for the deployment of force . . . Neo-Liberalism, with its long developed policy proscriptions for the reform of errant states and societies came to dominate both tactics and strategy on the ground in Baghdad.” See Dodge, “Coming Face to Face with Bloody Reality,” 260.
870 This chapter does not suggest that neoconservatism was a new ideology. It had been in part a response to the rise of the ‘new left’ in the 1960s but had also found cohesion stemming from its criticism of détente in the 1970s. See Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy, 25, 38, 100–115; Vaisse, Neoconservatism, 110–14.
871 For differing interpretations of whether the Bush doctrine represented continuity or change in U.S. foreign policy, see John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” Foreign
to reconstruct the strategic arguments after 9/11. In doing so, it suggests that the neoconservatives who flourished in the wake of that attack saw that moment in time as an opportunity for a profound reworking of American exceptionalism. They were engaged in an ideological project concerned not with democracy promotion, in the liberal sense that Bill Clinton had envisaged, but rather with a “‘new birth’ of the confidence we used to have in ourselves and in ‘America the beautiful’.”

In other words, they were concerned with what they perceived as a decades-long domestic crisis in America and its resolution through both the creation of an international order predicated on the maintenance of American hegemony and their perception that “A liberal democracy that could fight a short and decisive war every generation or so to defend its own liberty and independence would be far healthier and more satisfied.”

This was an ideologically innovative grand strategy the aim of which was a very particular conception of domestic regeneration, predicated on the export of a minimal form of democracy, which helped sustain a particular international environment.

This chapter will analyse the Bush Doctrine and the ways in which it envisaged ‘the new world order’ and America’s place within it. Like the previous chapter, this chapter will employ a form of Cambridge School contextualism and the method’s five analytical steps will structure the chapter.

**Step one of contextual analysis: the Bush Doctrine’s ideological and linguistic context**

The first step is concerned with examining the ideological and linguistic context of the Bush Doctrine in order to understand the point of his administration’s grand strategy. An ideology employs a language of politics defined by its conventions.
and usually employed by a number of writers. Methodologically, this encompasses not just the use of specific lexical choices but also principles, assumptions, and criteria for testing knowledge-claims. In short, this is meant as an examination of the ideological context of the Bush presidency. This section will pay particular attention to the differing pre-9/11 stance of Governor, then President, Bush and the post-9/11 Bush Doctrine.

Bush’s foreign-policy positions during the 2000 presidential campaign flowed from criticisms of Clinton during his presidency and from advice that Bush received from his team of foreign-policy experts. Bush argued for increased military spending and for the transformation and modernisation of America’s armed forces. He criticised the “open-ended deployments and unclear military missions” of the Clinton era and promised to be much more careful about considering the consequences of sending U.S. forces abroad. He also called for limited cuts in America’s military presence overseas, suggesting that, for example, U.S. peacekeepers in Bosnia could be brought home.

In many ways, Clinton’s grand strategy had continued the traditional Wilsonian approach of building a world order based on the rule of law. During his October 2000 presidential debates with Al Gore, Bush underscored his scepticism regarding “nation-building missions.” He indicated that, if he had been president, he would not have intervened in Haiti or Somalia. Bush called for clear criteria for the use of force based on “vital national interests” rather than humanitarian objectives. He stated: “I would be guarded in my approach. I don’t think we can be all things to all people in the world. I think we’ve got to be very careful when we commit our troops.” This chimed with his earlier ‘Distinctly American Internationalism’ speech.

875 The self-styled ‘Vulcans’ led by Condoleezza Rice. Rice was not a neoconservative herself but of the neoconservative Vulcans most had come from the mid-echelons of George H. W. Bush’s administration and included some of the authors of the infamous “Defense Planning Guidance” document. For the details of the composition of this group and the shift of influence within it, see Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 234–60.
877 Ibid.
878 Ibid.
In the defense of our nation, a president must be a clear-eyed realist. There are limits to the smiles and scowls of diplomacy. Armies and missiles are not stopped by stiff notes of condemnation. They are held in check by strength and purpose and the promise of swift punishment.\(^{880}\)

In contrast to this apparent realism, later in the speech Bush set in motion an important dynamic of his nascent foreign-policy thinking. He made explicit the centrality of ideology to the creation of grand strategy:

Some have tried to pose a choice between *American* ideals and *American interests* – between who we are and how we act. But the choice is false. America, by decision and destiny, promotes political freedom – and gains the most when democracy advances . . . I will address these responsibilities . . . To each, I bring the same approach: A distinctly American internationalism. Idealism, without illusions. Confidence, without conceit. Realism, in the service of American ideals.\(^{881}\)

That Bush was a naïf in terms of foreign policy during his presidential campaign was not surprising: so too had Clinton been during his candidature. Nonetheless, Clinton had expressed his views with a degree of eloquence and coherence which the Texan governor did not match. This made deciphering Bush’s worldview difficult, largely because there were elements of realism but also of idealism. The philosophy was unremarkable in terms of what it posited as the goals of American international engagement: security, prosperity, freedom, and the advancement of democracy. What was distinctive was that it suggested that these goals should be pursued through the unilateral exercise of American power.\(^{882}\)

At the same time Governor Bush began to narrow his conception of the national interest, in contrast to Al Gore’s inheritance of an effectively Clintonesque foreign-policy platform. In the first presidential debate, when questioned about the appropriate use of force, Bush replied:

Well, if it’s in our vital national interest, and that means whether our territory is threatened or people could be harmed, whether or not . . . our alliances are threatened, whether or not our friends in the Middle East are threatened. That would be a time to seriously consider the use of force . . . I don’t think we can be all things to all people in the world. I think we’ve got to be very careful when we commit our

\(^{880}\) Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism.”

\(^{881}\) Ibid.

\(^{882}\) Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 36.
troops. The vice president and I have a disagreement about the use of troops. He believes in nation-building. I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders . . . I believe we’ve overextended in too many places. And therefore I want to rebuild the military power.\textsuperscript{883}

Whilst Bush seemed to present himself as a realist and urged the prudent application of force only when a narrow set of vital interests were challenged, his final sentence was paradoxical. If he intended to reduce nation-building missions, why did he also advocate the shoring-up of military power? It was a theme which was asserted more vigorously in Bush’s inaugural address in January 2001:

\begin{quote}
We will build our defenses beyond challenge, less weakness invite challenge . . . The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, \textit{shaping a balance of power that favors freedom}.\textsuperscript{884}
\end{quote}

This last phrase reappeared in the 2002 \textit{National Security Strategy of the United States},\textsuperscript{885} and the earlier usage in the inaugural address does not seem to have attracted as much scholarly attention. The superficial effect of the phrase was to suggest both affiliation with a realist strategic approach and continuity with American democracy promotion of supposedly universalist values; however, “the term does not really describe a ‘balance of power’ at all. Rather it is superficially Realist-sounding terminology for a decidedly liberal notion: the coalition of all major powers in furtherance of some notional common good.”\textsuperscript{886} However, the very concept of ‘shaping’ a balance of power suggested American primacy in an international order with shared values – in other words, not a balance of power at all.

Despite the uneasy mixture of elements of realism and elements of profound idealism, Bush’s rhetoric in the presidential debates and during his pre-9/11 presidency suggested a grand strategy that was more modest in terms of actual intervention than that of his predecessor. Condoleezza Rice, who was his principal

\begin{footnotes}
\item[883] Bush, “[First] Presidential Debate in Boston.”
\item[884] George W. Bush, “Inaugural Address” (20 January 2001), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25853#axzz1okBzCLf0 [accessed 05/03/10]; emphasis added.
\end{footnotes}
foreign-policy advisor at the time, reinforced this sense at the time, putting forward a more straightforwardly realist worldview for the Bush campaign. She echoed Bush’s more prominent campaign rhetoric when she suggested that the primary foreign-policy goal should be the promotion of “national interests” above all else. The rationale was that liberal humanitarian concerns would be of lower priority than considerations of U.S. national interest. Bush stated in the third presidential debate: “When it comes to foreign policy, that’ll be my guiding question: is it in our nation’s interests?”

Bush’s initial foreign-policy pronouncements and appointments reflected a split in Republican thought about U.S. foreign policy. At the time commentators usually expressed the split as between the ‘multilateralist’ position of Secretary of State Colin Powell and the ‘unilateralist’ position of Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney. It is hard to understand the Bush speeches during the 2000 election as unfettered support for neoconservatism. That is certainly not how Bush was perceived by William Kristol and other prominent members of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Kristol felt “moderately unhappy” about the Bush/Cheney ticket throughout the election. Although Paul Wolfowitz had contributed to some of Bush’s campaign speeches, Kristol suggested “I wouldn’t say that if you read Wolfowitz’s Planning Guidance from 1992, and read most Bush campaign speeches and his statements in the debates, you would say, ‘Hey, Bush has really adopted Wolfowitz’s worldview’.” Speaking about Rice, Kristol asserted that “She was skeptical about a lot of these claims that the U.S. really had to shape a new world order . . . she was much more, I think, kind of a cautious realist than she is today.”

In a frequently quoted panegyric from 2001, Charles Krauthammer told his readers that

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891 Ibid.
An unprecedentedly dominant United States . . . is in the unique position of being able to fashion its own foreign policy. . . . [T]he first task of the new administration is precisely to reassert American freedom of action.  

For Krauthammer, U.S. unipolarity was a given, as it had equally been under Clinton. What the foreign-policy debate during the election of 2000 and the early months of the Bush presidency centred on was not whether the United States would engage in the world but how.

Krauthammer’s brand of unilateralism found a home in the PNAC, formed in 1997 to advance neoconservatism. The choice of their name seems less than accidental, echoing Henry Luce’s “American Century” fifty years earlier. Ronald Reagan was their hero and Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton were cast as opponents of U.S. hegemony. The PNAC advocated substantial increases in U.S. military spending, aggressive pursuit of U.S. interests, and support for U.S. hegemony. Reagan “Championed American exceptionalism when it was deeply unfashionable,” wrote the PNAC’s two founders, who suggested in the same article that the United States should seek to overturn dictators and that “The purpose was not Wilsonian idealistic whimsy . . . Support for American principles around the world can be sustained only by the continuing exertion of American influence.” George H. W. Bush joined Clinton as a subject of attack from the PNAC: “Republicans have spent the past few years attacking Clinton for his handling of Iraq, the Balkans, Haiti and Somalia,” Kagan said, “Yet every one of these was an unexploded Bush bomblet.” Bush’s greatest sin, in the view of PNAC, had been his failure to remove Saddam Hussein.

The signatories to the PNAC’s statement of principles represented a broad cross section of neo-conservatives, many of whom had held national security positions under either Reagan or George H. W. Bush. The group included Dick

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895 Ibid., 27–8.
Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld (Secretaries of Defense under the elder Bush and Gerald Ford respectively).

As early as 1997, individuals who became key figures in the Bush administration – Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, John Bolton, Douglas Feith, and ‘Scooter’ Libby – had signed on to the vision of U.S. primacy laid out by William Kristol in “Project for a New American Century.”

The objectives were:

1. We need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;

2. We need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;

3. We need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad.

4. We need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.

Some scholars have explicitly attempted to locate the birth of neoconservatism’s unipolarity in the 1990s with the PNAC. Yet the goal of achieving American predominance did not originate during the presidency of George H. W. Bush.

It is important to examine the evolution of neoconservative thought to elucidate its complex relationship with the American liberal ideology in response to which neoconservatism was formed, otherwise neoconservative beliefs about foreign policy are open to misinterpretation. Neoconservatism emerged as a response to the rise of the ‘New Left’ in late 1960s and early 1970s America. It was a specific response to the loss of authority which neoconservatives believed the state had suffered at the hands of limitless demands for democratisation from the

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898 William Kristol, “Project for a New American Century” (3 June 1997), http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm [accessed 05/03/10].
899 Ibid.
900 Dorrien, Imperial Designs, 1.
Left. As Joshua Muravchik described it, “The left drove us from the Democratic Party, stole the ‘liberal’ label, and successfully affixed to us the name ‘neoconservative’.”¹⁰⁰² The point of tracing these roots is that it reveals neoconservatism not as ‘liberal conservatism’ but as a school of thought which is “is in fact ferociously predatory on liberal values – both in domestic and global politics.”¹⁰⁰³ In other words, neoconservatives are not the heirs of Wilson, and were not resorting to power politics to pursue a liberal agenda with the intention of deepening the normative fabric of global liberal order. In fact:

neoconservative attachments to liberalism are predicated on an atavistic conservative philosophy which is at the service of values – authority, hierarchy, elitism, nationalism, community, sacrifice – that are inimical to the transformative mechanisms of liberal governance and the progressive discourse of democracy and human rights.¹⁰⁰⁴

Instead, neoconservatives envisage democracy promotion as the establishment, by force, of a set of institutions and electoral mechanisms designed to transform the ‘deficient’ political culture of the targeted states and to manufacture consent from above for “an externally imposed neoliberal-political-economic infrastructure.”¹⁰⁰⁵ Democracy promotion here is “an identity conferring strategy of statecraft designed to make the international system safe for American hegemony in a world that is and will always be characterized by war, violence and geopolitical rivalry.”¹⁰⁰⁶ The type of ‘democracy’ promoted by neoconservatism is polyarchic, based on competing elites battling for the votes of a largely passive electorate.¹⁰⁰⁷ The ‘top down’ basis of polyarchic democracy explains why it has not been successful when exported to other countries. Polyarchic democracy delegitimises the bottom-up struggle of civil society, removing the transformative potential of democracy and lacking legitimacy in the eyes of the people who are meant to be the beneficiaries.

This distinction with Wilsonianism is key, because this type of understanding of neoconservatism and what neoconservatives mean by ‘democracy promotion’

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¹⁰⁰⁴ Ibid.
¹⁰⁰⁵ Drolet, “A Liberalism Betrayed?” 100.
¹⁰⁰⁶ Ibid.
fundamentally alters any recreation of the Bush Doctrine as an ideological intervention in the discourse of exceptionalism.

Neoconservatism had been a significant element in foreign-policy debate since the Nixon–Kissinger era of détente, but scholars of that era have overlooked its relevance because that era’s neoconservatives did not strongly influence foreign policy. It was in neoconservative critiques of détente that the ideological antecedents of the Bush Doctrine have their roots. Henry Jackson launched a multi-faceted attack on détente in which his most important points were, first, that détente downplayed the importance of human rights within the Soviet Union; and, second, that peace and security “depend not on a balance of power, but on a certain imbalance of power favourable to the defenders of peace – in which the strength of the peace keeper is greater than that of the peace upsetter.” This was a premise which resurfaced in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance and 1993 Regional Defense Strategy. The assumption was that stability was a product not of a constructed global balance of power but of the presence of a militarily preponderant power capable of halting the ambitions of both regional and global aggressors. Jackson’s ideas found considerable support in the pages of Commentary. Theodore Draper questioned whether it was actually the case “that the danger of war arises if one nation becomes infinitely more powerful than others?” Norman Podhoretz worried that the opening to China would allow America to “rely on the China card as an excuse for failing to build up our own power.” This latter view was still echoed by Paul Wolfowitz twenty years after Podhoretz.

George W. Bush’s administration included neoconservative policymakers, but the foreign-policy elite had included neoconservatives for at least several decades, as

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908 This has in part been rectified: see Cooper, *Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy*, 38–9.

Justin Vaïsse has identified the mid-1990s as the beginning of the third age of neoconservatism. During this period, neoconservatives became a mainstream, albeit weak, part of the Republican party.\footnote{Vaïsse, \textit{Neoconservatism}, 220–21.} Some third-age neoconservatives saw the promotion of democracy as inextricably linked to the containment of Communism and therefore saw a reduced role for U.S. involvement in post-Cold War international affairs.\footnote{In fact the Fall 1990 issue of \textit{The National Interest} was devoted to the debate between the two camps, and the books in the previous footnote, as well as Wattenberg’s essay in the following footnote, were expanded from essays in that issue.} However, many third-age neoconservatives rejected this view as dangerously close to the type of realpolitik that had led to détente.\footnote{Ben J. Wattenberg, “Neo-Manifest Destinarianism,” in \textit{America’s Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy}, ed. Owen Harries (San Francisco, Calif.: ICS Press, 1991), 107–13.} Ben Wattenberg spoke for them when he asked “Doesn’t the spread of democracy enhance our national interest? . . . As the last superpower we should try to shape evolution.”\footnote{Wattenberg, \textit{The First Universal Nation}.} Elsewhere, Wattenberg referred to the United States as the “first universal nation.”\footnote{Muravchik, \textit{Exporting Democracy}, 8.} For this group of neoconservatives the Cold War had been primarily ideological; the defence of American democracy had been containment’s central tenet. Similarly, in his 1991 book \textit{Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny}, Joshua Muravchik suggested that the way to create a “favorable environment” for the United States was to encourage the proliferation of democratic regimes because democratic peace theory had confirmed that the more democratic the world, the more peaceful.\footnote{Muravchik, \textit{Exporting Democracy}, 8.}

Muravchik followed with *The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism*. Both books asserted that the United States had a special responsibility. The nation would betray its universalist values if it did not intervene, especially in the Balkans, to enforce respect for human rights, defend democracy, and shape the world in its own image. In his 1999 tract *Tyranny's Ally*, David Wurmser pushed to the limit the idea of betrayal of U.S. values and complicity with dictatorial regimes. If the United States had the means to overthrow a tyrant – in this case, Saddam Hussein – and did not do so, it was an ally of tyranny.

The immediate post-Cold War context of U.S. grand strategy was the debate about the new world order. The Clinton years had failed to decisively answer what America’s role in that order would be, and the debate still raged at the end of the 1990s. Charles Krauthammer spent most of the 1990s attacking Clinton, yet he enthused “America bestrides the world like a colossus.” Krauthammer expected this ‘unipolar moment’ of U.S. hegemony to last for at least a generation, although he warned that the laws of history, especially with respect to international politics, “cannot be defied forever.”

Krauthammer differed from other neoconservatives in recommending that the United States use military intervention to spread democracy only when vital U.S. interests were at stake. By his measure, U.S. military intervention in the Balkans had not met this criterion, whereas other neoconservatives had clamoured for such intervention in Bosnia and then Kosovo. For Krauthammer, it was fine to declare, as President George W. Bush had done, that the United States was prepared to put an end to tyranny everywhere, but the nation should act on that

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923 Muravchik, *The Imperative of American Leadership*.
926 Ibid.
intention only “where it counts”: in Krauthammer’s example, in Afghanistan and Iraq but not in Liberia or Burma.\textsuperscript{929}

In January 2000 Krauthammer espoused four strategic responsibilities for the next administration: (1) deter and disarm rogue nations that acquired weapons of mass destruction (WMD); (2) contain China; (3) guard against a revanchist Russia; and (4) maintain order as the ultimate guarantor of world stability. The United States was “the balancer of last resort in the world.”\textsuperscript{930} The nation required enormous resources to maintain its vast military might and must be ready at all times to put down rogue nations that no other country could subdue.

In the 1990s Congress increasingly wished to exploit the ‘peace dividend’, whereas Cheney (then Secretary of Defense) and Wolfowitz (then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy) worried about cuts to the military and sought to define a military strategy for the post-Cold War period. In March 1992 the draft strategy \textit{Defense Planning Guidance} was leaked to the press. This document had significant input from a wide range of neoconservative thinkers\textsuperscript{931} and stated that the United States should maintain clear military superiority in order to discourage any other nation from challenging U.S. world leadership. Although the document never became policy and the administration attempted to distance itself from the document, later versions showed only slightly more multilateral language. Cheney authorised a mildly modified version entitled \textit{Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy}, in which strongly asserted hegemony nonetheless remained a prominent theme.\textsuperscript{932}

\textit{Defense Planning Guidance} and \textit{Defense Strategy for the 1990s} laid the groundwork for the neoconservative approach to the post-Cold War era. The goal was to prevent the emergence of a new rival comparable to the Soviet Union. To that end, the United States would seek to prevent any other nation from dominating any region. Cheney wrote, “Together with our allies, we must preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating regions critical to our

\textsuperscript{929} Krauthammer, \textit{Democratic Realism}, 16, 19.
\textsuperscript{931} See Chapter 6 of this thesis for the full details of the background to ‘DPG’; for the full list of contributors see Vaïsse, \textit{Neoconservatism}, 224.
interests and otherwise work to build an international environment conducive to our values,” a “peaceful democratic order in which nations are able to pursue their legitimate interests without fear of military domination.” According to Cheney, the United States could not depend solely on collective approaches to international security. The nation would have to maintain the forces necessary to act alone. Furthermore, “history suggests that effective multilateral action is most likely to come about in response to U.S. leadership, not as an alternative to it.”

In short, whenever the international community was divided the United States would have to take the lead and its allies eventually would follow, more often in the form of ad hoc coalitions than through the UN.

In the late 1990s Barry Posen and Andrew Ross sketched the four alternative approaches to U.S. grand strategy which had the most support at the time: neo-isolationism, selective engagement focused on maintaining peace, multilateralism, and maintenance of U.S. primacy. A small band proposed the neo-isolationist approach, but most of them avoided the term isolationism. Earl Ravenal and Patrick Buchanan preferred the term disengagement, and Doug Bandow used benign detachment. Only Eric Nordlinger embraced the term isolationism.

Proponents of neo-isolationism advocated drastic reductions in the military budget. The version of realism that underlay neo-isolationism had a very limited strategic imperative at its core, based on the assumption that no country had the power to threaten U.S. sovereignty.

Proponents of selective engagement focused on maintaining peace among the nations with the most military and industrial power. During the 1990s only China, Russia, Japan, and the European Union seemed capable of altering the international order. According to advocates of peace-focused selective engagement, the United States should concern itself with regional conflicts only if

933 Ibid., 2, 4.
934 Ibid., 6.
935 Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions.”
936 A similar taxonomy was used in Väisse, Neoconservatism, 226.
937 Ravenal, “The Case for Adjustment”; Buchanan, “America First and Second, and Third.”
938 Bandow, “Keeping the Troops and the Money at Home.”
939 Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured.
they threatened the global equilibrium. Although this strategy would require a substantial military budget, expenditures would be less than during the Cold War. The greatest challenge to those who advocated this strategy was ‘mission creep’ – the danger that the strategy would become one of primacy.941

Advocates of multilateralism (cooperative security) believed that peace was effectively indivisible.942 Therefore, the United States had a significant national interest in world peace and would act collectively through international institutions as much as possible.943 Proponents of this view saw all nations as interdependent. At the root of this interdependent world was a chain of logic which connected the security of the U.S. and its more traditional allies to a host of distant troubles; thus those distant troubles could not be ignored by the U.S.944

Proponents of a strategy centred on U.S. primacy focused on preventing the rise of a peer power and maintaining U.S. hegemony by convincing other powers of the purity of America’s intentions. As set forth in Defense Planning Guidance, in this strategy the United States would seek to prevent the rise of challengers by promoting international law, democracy, and free-market economics and preventing the emergence of regional hegemons.

President Clinton had seemed to opt for multilateralism at the beginning of his first term but then had shifted to a mix of selective engagement and primacy.945 The administration of the second President Bush made its distrust of nation-building and humanitarian intervention abundantly clear. The George W. Bush foreign-policy team wanted U.S. national-security policy to focus on great-power politics and concrete national interests. The administration’s emphasis on the selective use of force, the balancing of strategic commitments and military

capability, and the avoidance of international social engineering was especially visible in the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001,946 which prioritised homeland security and deterrence.947 The administration did not embrace a policy of rolling back rogue nations and, as in the case of Iraq, took no aggressive action against them. In 1999 Richard Haass articulated the then-dominance of foreign-policy pragmatism when he wrote, “Order is more fundamental than justice.”948 Bush appointees such as Powell, Rice, and Haass were openly sceptical of any sort of crusading idealism in foreign affairs.949

**Step two of contextual analysis: Bush’s ideological manoeuvre as a political manoeuvre**

The second step is concerned with identifying Bush’s ideological manoeuvre as a political manoeuvre. This step seeks to place the Bush Doctrine in its practical political context – that is, the practical political activity that the authors were addressing and to which the strategy was a response.

As the previous section showed, before 9/11 Bush had laid out his vision of American values but the administration did not have a coherent grand strategy; “ABC” or “anything but Clinton”950 was the guiding mantra and Bush’s foreign policy was cast in the broadest terms: the administration supported freedom, free trade, and a strong defence.

At the start of Bush’s presidency the administration had no clear criteria for investing political capital in foreign affairs. In the first eight months of Bush’s presidency the White House indicated that it did not wish to continue business as usual with North Korea and in the Middle East but failed to provide a good alternative, creating a policy vacuum and receiving criticism from all sides.951

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947 Ibid., 6.
Bush had pitched his foreign policy and defence principles in terms of strong values, but he had also called for a humble tone and attitude. In his inaugural address of January 2001 he stated: “We will seek defenses beyond challenges, we will confront weapons of mass destruction [and] shape a balance of power that favors freedom.” He also stated, however: “We will show purpose without arrogance.”952 The latter theme had often appeared in Bush’s campaign speeches, in which Bush had spoken of “power exercised without swagger and influence displayed without bluster.”953 By spring 2000 such words were largely forgotten: America’s European allies were already complaining of feeling “bullied”954 and Democrats picked up on this refrain, calling Bush “unilateralist.”955

The events of 9/11 marked a clear shift in Bush’s strategy and linguistic constructions. Within hours of learning of the attacks on the World Trade Center, Bush declared to his aides, “We’re at war.”956 Given how little information he had at that point, his conclusion seemed rushed. Later the same day, as he was flying above the burning Pentagon, Bush said, “That’s the 21st-century war you have just witnessed.”957

The differences that had divided the United States from its allies before 9/11 gave way to widespread solidarity and support. A 13 September editorial in the Left-leaning French newspaper Le Monde declared, “Nous sommes tous Américains” (“We are all Americans now”).958 Bush and his advisors interpreted the international outpouring of sympathy as a mark that, as much as other countries might dislike specific U.S. policies, they understood that the United States was a just and beneficent power.959 It was an unusual interpretation; international support was perhaps best symbolised by the first invocation of article 5 of the

952 Bush, “Inaugural Address.”
953 Bush, “A Period of Consequences.”
957 Ibid., 128.
959 Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, 79.
North Atlantic treaty, to come to the defence of fellow members under attack, not to give blessing to *ad hoc*, U.S.-led intervention.

In his 9/11 Oval Office address Bush declared “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them,”960 and yet he had not yet decided what concrete action to take and which countries to tackle first.961 In his 14 September speech in the National Cathedral he reached out to Muslim Americans, and even liberal commentators expressed amazement at his “Islamophilia.”962 Apparently, Bush realised that impugning or implicating Islam might lead to a “clash of civilizations.” Instead, he placed 9/11 within a larger ideological context: “Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear; to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.”963 In so doing Bush depicted the conflict as not between competing interests or perspectives but between good and evil. On 16 September he went so far as to call the war on terrorism a “crusade.”964 By presenting the conflict in terms of moral absolutes, Bush indicated what would be the overall thrust of U.S. foreign policy, even if specific objectives remained as yet unclear.

Bush was quick to draw up specific responses to 9/11, and by 16 September he gave Rice a point-by-point “war plan.”965 He endorsed the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as proposed by its director, George Tenet, and approved domestic surveillance, urging the Pentagon to support the CIA in order to “hit with all military options.”966 He also ordered a specific ultimatum to the Taliban: to relinquish Osama Bin Laden or face military action.967 The next day,

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967 Ibid.
he reconsidered military action in Iraq and discussed the issue with the full National Security Council. Bush knew that Wolfowitz favoured removing Saddam Hussein, but nonetheless stated “We have to be patient about Iraq.”

Before 9/11, many critics in the United States and Europe had called Bush’s foreign policy “unnerving unilateralism.” After the attacks, some thought he had suddenly converted to multilateralism. On 19 September Bush prophetically commented, “Two years from now only the Brits may be with us.” In reality, both before and after 9/11, Bush’s idea of international cooperation was a coalition of like-minded nations pursuing specific values and interests. As expressed by Rumsfeld, “The mission must determine the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission.”

Despite the UN resolution condemning the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and NATO’s invocation of Article 5, the United States largely rejected offers of help from its allies, with the notable exceptions of the United Kingdom and Australia with respect to waging the Afghanistan War.

Within three weeks the Bush presidency had turned from a domestic focus to a focus on a global war against terrorism. In December 2001 Bush announced that the United States was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. The White House blocked international efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. In addition, throughout 2002 the Bush administration intensified its campaign to block the International Criminal Court from having jurisdiction over U.S. citizens.

When Bush spoke at the Citadel on 11 December 2001 he stated that “a few evil men” intended to use WMD to threaten civilisation. “Our military has a new and essential mission,” he said. “For states that support terror, it’s not enough

970 George W. Bush, quoted in Woodward, Bush at War, 106.
973 Ibid.
that the consequences be costly – they must be devastating." In his State of the Union address in January 2002 he made clear the fundamental political reordering that his emerging doctrine would advance. He used the speech to reset the boundaries of U.S. grand strategy. Conceptually and linguistically, Bush moved the target from the sponsors of terrorism to the sponsors of the next weapons of terrorism. The new strategy became preventing these weapons from coming into terrorist hands, and the idea of pre-emption flowed from the idea of prevention.

This was a critical turning point and, after the Taliban refused to hand over Bin Laden, the Bush administration launched military action in Afghanistan. This step indicated a more aggressive approach to counterterrorism than under Clinton, but it had broad public support, congressional backing, and extensive international support. Given that the Taliban had supported the orchestrators of the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history and then refused to hand them over, the U.S. response was predictable.

Within the United States the war in Afghanistan was initially viewed as a major success after the swift transfer of control to the International Security Assistance Force in December 2001. The war did not trigger immediate public debate over the basic outlines of U.S. grand strategy. However, the question remained: How will overall U.S. national-security policy be reshaped in response to 9/11? The available options were basically the same as they had been since the end of the Cold War. The United States could completely disengage from its alliances and military deployments overseas; deepen its commitment to multilateralism; prioritise its vital interests, playing down democracy promotion; or adopt an aggressive form of U.S. primacy. As Bush’s Citadel and State of the Union speeches made clear, Bush saw the conflict with a personal moral clarity and he translated that purpose into strategy. America’s military posture would now be offensive.

974 Ibid.
Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union Address caused major controversy. In it, he named the three countries that he regarded as forming an “axis of evil” that was “threatening the peace of the world”: Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Some European commentators dismissed Bush’s moral stance as evidence of his “relative ignorance” of the outside world. Originally, Bush’s speechwriter, David Frum, wrote “axis of hatred”, not “axis of evil”, and it seems unlikely that Bush or his advisors anticipated that “axis of evil” would become the speech’s hallmark. After all, Bush regularly used the word *evil*. Nor was the meaning of ‘axis’ clear. To Frum, the term drew an analogy between the former threat of the Second World War Axis powers (Japan, Nazi Germany, and fascist Italy) and the current threat of the anti-American nations of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea; it was not intended to suggest homogeneity of issues. However, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer asserted that Bush had intended “no comparison” to the Axis powers of the Second World War. According to Fleischer, the use of the term *axis* was more “rhetorical than historical.” Bush seldom repeated the phrase “axis of evil”, as the press focus on it had obscured the speech’s actual declaration of strategy: “I will not wait on events. . . . I will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”

The scale of Bush’s political act was substantial; in the second part of the address, he tried to recast the entire economic and domestic debate in terms of the new national-security environment. Bush linked the war on terrorism to what he termed “economic security” and ended the address with talk of values, extolling the volunteerism and self-sacrifice that people had demonstrated in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks as showing “what a new culture of responsibility could look like.” Bush added to his “new culture of responsibility” seven global and “non-negotiable demands of human dignity,” including respect for women and religious

979 Hassner, “The United States,” 38.
981 Ibid., 235.
984 Ibid.
985 Ibid.
tolerance. With a rhetorical flourish worthy of his idol, Abraham Lincoln, Bush announced his political programme: “Steadfast in our purpose, we now press on. We have known freedom’s price, we have shown freedom’s power [and] we will see freedom’s victory.”

**Step three of contextual analysis: the Bush Doctrine as an ideological move**

Step three of Skinnerian contextual analysis involves identifying ideologies and examining how they form, are criticised, and change. In this chapter, step three will consist of an analysis of the Bush Doctrine as an ideological move, discussing the degree to which Bush’s international strategy was conventional and the nature of its ideological innovation, if any. The analysis will identify the point at which ideological reinforcement or change was attempted and the political reasons for the attempt.

The Bush Doctrine took some time to take definitive form and as a result Krauthammer was hasty in characterising the Bush Doctrine as “soft unilateralism.” After 9/11, the Bush administration determined that U.S. strategy should not distinguish between terrorists and the nations that harboured them. Still later, the administration saw U.S. strategy as focused on pre-emptive war or regime change. Ultimately, the Bush Doctrine was based on using U.S. power to promote a specific form of democracy in the Middle East in order to bring stability to the region.

This section will examine Krauthammer’s assertion that the “The Bush doctrine is, essentially a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy” and, in doing so, will extract the underlying elements of the Bush Doctrine and identify it as an ideological move.

The Bush Doctrine’s first ostensible pillar was the belief that democratic regimes do not seek war. Therefore, promoting democracy could potentially bring about international stability. In 2002 Bush stated “Free societies do not intimidate

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986 Ibid.
987 Ibid.
989 Vaisse, *Neoconservatism*, 244.
through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder.”

The next year he similarly stated “The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder.”

John Mearsheimer described the neoconservative Bush Doctrine as “Wilsonianism with teeth” because “the theory has an idealist strand and a power strand: Wilsonianism provides the idealism, an emphasis on military power provides the teeth.”

The belief that the spread of liberal values and democratic institutions abroad advanced America’s economic and security interests had a long pedigree and had last been prominent during the Clinton presidency. However, as this chapter has already asserted, the link between Wilsonianism and neoconservatism is inaccurate and gives an incorrect sense of neoconservative foreign-policy aims. Whilst neoconservatives repeatedly and forcefully called for democracy promotion, their vision of democracy was polyarchic. At heart neoconservatism was a domestic critique of American democracy’s ‘betrayal’ by liberalism in the 1960s. The neoconservative response was in part to adopt a Schumpeterian model of polyarchic democracy and repackage what was essentially an authoritarian European model of government “in order to make it palatable to an American audience.”

Ronald Reagan, however, fused this notion

995 Seymour Martin Lipset and Jason M. Lakin (The Democratic Century [Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004], 19–20) state that “this is a minimalist definition of democracy inspired by Joseph Schumpeter’s classic elitist conception of democracy.”
of the promotion of an authoritarian form of democracy abroad with the American
exceptionalist tradition.\textsuperscript{997}

In its embrace with neoconservatism, the Bush Doctrine encompassed a particular
and novel notion of polyarchic democracy and emphasised its promotion in U.S.
exceptionalist discourse. This gave comments such as Krauthammer’s a particular
meaning: “With the decline of communism, the advancement of democracy
should become the touchstone of a new ideological American foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{998}
Although neoconservatives such as Francis Fukuyama had seemed to assume a
steady and irreversible march toward democracy in the early 1990s, Bush was
much more proactive about the spread of democracy. In suggesting that the mere
existence of antipathetic regimes threatened the United States, the Bush Doctrine
echoed \textit{NSC-68}.

The Iraq War illustrated Bush’s line of reasoning. If the Middle East became
democratic, America’s security problem in the region, terrorism, and the
proliferation of WMD would ultimately stop. Hence, it was essential to transform
the Middle East. Regime change in Iraq would start a chain reaction. Bush stated:
“A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of
freedom for other nations in the region.”\textsuperscript{999}

In his preface to the 2002 \textit{Strategy of the United States of America}, Bush espoused
the universal applicability of American values:

\begin{quote}
The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and
totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom
– and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom,
democracy, and free enterprise. . . . [The] values of freedom are right
and true for every person, in every society.\textsuperscript{1000}
\end{quote}

The belief in a universal desire for freedom was not new to U.S. grand strategy or
to President Bush. In his inaugural address Bush had stated “Democratic faith is
more than the creed of our country, it is the inborn hope of our humanity, an ideal

\textsuperscript{997} Drolet, \textit{American Neoconservatism}, 138–9; William I. Robinson, \textit{Promoting Polyarchy:}
56, 76–7, 91–8, 328.
\textsuperscript{998} Charles Krauthammer, “Universal Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World,” \textit{The National
Interest} (1989/1990), 47.
\textsuperscript{999} Bush, “Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute Dinner”.
\textsuperscript{1000} George W. Bush, Preface to White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States,”
3.
we carry, . . . a trust we bear and pass along.”1001 After 9/11, Bush became more certain of America’s proselytising role and it translated into his rhetoric: “Liberty and justice . . . are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere.”1002 Although Bush was at pains to avoid cultural imperialism, he vowed to “stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance.”1003 The language makes clear that Bush regarded these values as universal. Therefore, in his view Americans were not imposing their values but helping other peoples realise their thymotic impulse. Neoconservativism was not concerned with spreading ‘universal values’ for their own sake but in order to guarantee U.S. security.

The view that the spread of democracy must be a feature of U.S. grand strategy had not been so forcefully expressed since NSC-68. Bush lamented his belief that “sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East”1004 had allowed authoritarian regimes to survive and ultimately given rise to terrorism:

Some who call themselves realists question whether the spread of democracy in the Middle East should be any concern of ours. But the realists in this case have lost contact with a fundamental reality: America has always been less secure when freedom is in retreat; America is always more secure when freedom is on the march.1005

The purpose of the spread of ‘democracy’ could not be any clearer; the Bush Doctrine was based on the notion that the United States was the sole superpower and should seek to preserve its hegemony indefinitely and this was in part based upon the spread of a particular version of democracy. In a West Point speech of June 2002 Bush stated “America has and intends to keep, military strength beyond

1001 Bush, “Inaugural Address.”
1003 Ibid.
challenge – thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”

The National Security Strategy built upon this conception of hegemonic stability. The strategy declared that Americans “must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge,” and also stated that “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States.”

Third-age neoconservatives viewed U.S. omnipotence and leadership as a prerequisite for an orderly, peaceful world. William Kristol and Robert Kagan stated “American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order.” In other words, a preponderance of American power was viewed by neoconservatives as beneficial to both the United States and the rest of the world and, according to Robert Jervis, a commitment to U.S. primacy was the unifying theme of all elements of the Bush Doctrine. As this chapter has shown, this theme was present in neoconservative thought long before Bush became president; his innovation was to fuse American preponderance with a specific form of democracy promotion in a mutually reinforcing pattern and to do so within exceptionalist discourse.

In advocating U.S. hegemony, neoconservatives expressed their antipathy to traditional balance-of-power politics. They viewed a U.S.-led hegemonic order as superior to a balance-of-power order. Whereas many realists view a balance of power as a prescription for peace, neoconservatives view it as an unnecessary hindrance to U.S. interests.

1008 Ibid., 30.
Mearsheimer argues that the underlying logic of neoconservatism is “bandwagoning.”

According to this logic, weaker nations join forces with a more powerful one rather than attempt to check its power. In this view, American power is a force for democratisation that will be universally supported by nations able to provide support. As expressed by Michael Williams, “Bandwagoning, in this sense, is seen as a moral–political process as well as a military–strategic calculation.”

The Bush Doctrine was committed to using preemptive military force when necessary. This aspect of the doctrine was one of the most controversial. Most of the voluminous literature on the subject argues for or against pre-emption. It does not examine why the Bush administration elevated pre-emption (which had always been an option for the United States) to doctrinal status after 9/11. As Jonathan Renshon comments, “The core of this issue is why this policy, and why now?” A related question is “Why did the Bush administration define preemption as it did?”

The Bush administration did not need a formal definition of pre-emption to drive home the point that the nexus between WMD, rogue nations, and terrorists posed the greatest threat to U.S. national security. As the Clinton administration had done, the Bush administration could have reserved pre-emption for rogue nations without highlighting that policy. The Bush administration also could have reserved pre-emption for rare situations in which inaction posed a credible risk of large, irreversible harm and other policy tools offered a poor prospect of success.

In fact, pre-emption fitted with neoconservative ideology. Pre-emption in the Bush Doctrine can be viewed as an exercise in compelling rogue nations to

behave in accordance with U.S. policy objectives and thus in furthering American security interests. By highlighting pre-emption, the administration explicitly warned rogue nations of the consequences of pursuing WMD and ties to terrorism. Secretary of State Powell stated that the purpose of pre-emption was “putting the leaders of [some] countries on notice that the potential costs of their opportunism had just gone way up.”

Launching the war in Iraq was central to this use of pre-emption. The war would give credibility to the threat of pre-emptive action against other nations believed to have WMD. For military and political reasons, the United States could not use force against Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. The invasion of Iraq signalled a new American will commensurate with the nation’s renewed military capacity. In the late 1990s many in Washington, including those within the Bush administration, believed that U.S. credibility had significantly weakened since the end of the Cold War despite the country’s political and military dominance. After 9/11, issuing threats and making limited use of military power was perceived to merely continue the Clinton administration’s policies. The preservation of U.S. primacy required both actual and perceived military strength. Thus, the logic of primacy lay behind the Bush Doctrine’s formulation of pre-emption. In addition to promoting deterrence, pre-emption reflected the neoconservative worldview.

The Bush Doctrine was clearly unilateralist. A commitment to pre-emption and to maintaining a unipolar international system is unilateralist to the core. It is extremely difficult to obtain a consensus on the pre-emptive use of force. Indeed, the UN Security Council would not authorise U.S. military action against Iraq. Neoconservatives had criticised not only President Clinton’s failure to remove Saddam Hussein from power but also his multilateral approach to foreign policy. According to neoconservatives, a nation with primacy has the option of acting unilaterally.

The Bush Doctrine did not treat international cooperation as inherently desirable. The Bush administration disregarded the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto

Protocol, and other treaties, and apparently shared neorealist scepticism that international institutions and treaties could reliably deliver security.\footnote{Gerard Alexander, “International Relations Theory Meets World Politics: The Neoconservative Vs. Realism Debate,” in Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism, ed. Stanley Allen Renshon and Peter Suedfeld (New York; London: Routledge, 2007), 53.} The Bush administration’s view of international cooperation was by no means ideologically innovative; it was consistent with much U.S. foreign-policy history. As expressed by John Lewis Gaddis, a ‘unilateralist turn’ after the Cold War and 9/11 “reflects a return to an old position not the emergence of a new one.”\footnote{Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience, 26.}

The neoconservative position was most distinctive with respect to the implications of U.S. primacy. To many neoconservatives, U.S. primacy signified a responsibility to intervene in humanitarian crises, especially genocide. Compared to liberal-institutionalists, neoconservatives tended to be quicker to endorse forceful intervention (if possible, multilateral intervention), especially when international institutions seemed ineffective.\footnote{William Kristol and Vance Serchuk, “End the Genocide Now,” Washington Post, 22 September 2004, A31.}

This section has identified the ideological components of the Bush Doctrine and demonstrated its roots in neoconservative thought. The doctrine included a strong ideological vein of nationalism. Indeed, neoconservatism appeals to what Walter Lippmann identified as the “persistent evangel in Americanism.”\footnote{Walter Lippmann, U.S. War Aims (London: Hamilton, 1944), 40.} This evangelism appears in Bush’s contention that the United States represents the “single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.”\footnote{George W. Bush, Preface to White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States,” 3.} In this view, promotion of democracy is inextricably linked to U.S. identity. Bush stated as much in his speech at the 2004 Republican National Convention: “Our nation’s founding commitment is still our deepest commitment: In our world, and here at home, we will extend the frontiers of freedom.”\footnote{George W. Bush, “Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in New York City” (2 September 2004), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=72727&st=&st1=#axzz1okBzCLf0 [accessed 05/03/11].} Bush insisted that “the United States is the beacon for freedom in the world” and that he
had “a responsibility to promote freedom that is as solemn as the responsibility [to protect] the American people, because the two go hand in hand.”

Step four: the Bush Doctrine and the alteration of political vocabulary

Step four of Skinnerian contextual analysis addresses the question ‘What relation between political ideology and political action best explains the diffusion of certain ideologies, and what effect does this have on political behaviour?’ As discussed in previous chapters, political vocabulary includes normative terms that may be altered to advance a political agenda.

In his preface to the 2002 National Security Strategy Bush specified three goals of his administration: “We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.” In comparison, the three goals that the Clinton administration put forth in the 1999 National Security Strategy were “To enhance America’s security. To bolster America’s economic prosperity. To promote democracy and human rights abroad.” Whereas the Bush objectives involved defending, preserving, and extending peace, the Clinton objectives were based on the premise of peace. Unlike the Bush administration, the Clinton administration did not explicitly call for cooperation amongst great powers. The Bush administration’s language of “encouraging” democratic societies “on every continent” was considerably more forceful than the Clinton administration’s language of “promoting” democracy and human rights “abroad.”

In an innovative move that was surely a response to 9/11, the Bush document equated terrorists with tyrants as sources of danger. The document noted that U.S. strategy in the past had concentrated on defence against tyrants. The Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence had assumed a threat from identifiable regimes operating from identifiable territories. The threat of terrorism could not be similarly located. The events of 9/11 had shown that terrorists could inflict a

1025 George W. Bush, quoted in Woodward, Bush at War, 89.
1028 Ibid.
level of destruction that only nations wielding conventional military power had previously achieved. The document stated “Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice.” For the Bush administration, terrorists and tyrants were comparable in their ability to inflict mass destruction. The logic of the document suggests that this was why the option of pre-emption had to be added to those of containment and deterrence. However, the final section suggested that deterrence was also an implicit strategic consideration in the Bush Doctrine.

In the 2002 National Security Strategy the White House was careful to specify a legal basis for pre-emption: international law recognised that “nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.” The administration argued that terrorism, rogue nations, and WMD required a new response, the use of preventive force. Deterrence and containment had sufficed during the Cold War, but they were unsuitable against enemies without territory or people to defend:

Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first. . . . Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action. . . . [T]he United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

Although the document repeatedly referred to “preemption” it actually made a case for preventive action, which is very different with regard to imminence. If the United States took action against a hostile nation that had just pointed missiles at it and was clearly about to attack, the U.S. action would be pre-emptive. In contrast, if the United States took action against a nation that was considered hostile, was building its military, and might or might not direct force against the

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1030 Ibid., 19.
1031 Ibid.
United States at some future date, the U.S. action would be preventive. The threshold for preventive action is much higher than for pre-emptive action.\textsuperscript{1033}

The Bush \textit{National Security Strategy}, however, conflated pre-emption and prevention:

Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat – most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.\textsuperscript{1034}

The document indicated that pre-emptive action did not require imminent threat. Instead of being defined in terms of imminence (i.e., specificity and certainty), threat was defined mainly in terms of potential, the adversary’s capabilities, and its hostile attitude. The Bush \textit{National Security and Strategy} stated:

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. . . . The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.\textsuperscript{1035}

The Bush Doctrine reset the theoretical baseline for pre-emptive military action but did not offer clear criteria for actually engaging in such action.\textsuperscript{1036} Although both ‘preemption’ and ‘prevention’ appeared throughout the document, they were not used interchangeably. In the course of the document, ‘preemption’ was gradually detached from the justificatory context of international law and normalised. This was an unusual step to take. In the past, the United States had sometimes strongly considered or even used pre-emptive action. For example, in 1994 the Clinton administration had considered pre-emptive strikes against North Korea’s uranium-enrichment facilities,\textsuperscript{1037} and in 1998 it had struck what it believed to be a chemical weapons plant in Sudan. However, no administration


\textsuperscript{1035} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1036} Daalder and Lindsay, \textit{America Unbound}, 125.

before the Bush presidency had publicly highlighted pre-emption. Through The National Security Strategy and presidential speeches, the administration presented pre-emption as a crucial strategic option in the ‘war on terror’. Despite this, Elainne Bunn suggested that “Pre-emption is not a new option. U.S. officials have contemplated preemptive military actions against WMD several times, usually without taking action. What is new is open discussion of pre-emption.”1038 In fact, from its earliest days the United States had been loathe to strike the first blow or be seen as an aggressor. Pre-emption had always been an option but previously only in the most circumscribed situations.

Publication of The National Security Strategy coincided with the Bush administration’s campaign to secure public and congressional support for a war against Iraq. Iraq became the Bush Doctrine’s first test case. The administration explicitly portrayed Iraq as an imminent threat. Bush stated:

We have experienced the horror of September 11. We have seen that those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing – in fact they would be eager – to use biological, or chemical, or a nuclear weapon. Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.1039

Such language was familiar to readers of national-security documents but was now used to support a novel strategic posture. With regard to the policy of pre-emption, neoconservatives employed imprecise language which increased the range of the policy’s potential threat. Undersecretary of State Bolton said that he hoped “the outcome in Iraq” would “cause other states in the region and indeed around the world to look at the consequences of pursuing WMD and draw the appropriate lesson that such pursuits are not in the long term national interest.”1040

Pre-emption required hegemony. In his preface to The National Security Strategy Bush referred to “a balance of power that favors human freedom,” which was an

oxymoron, and the forsaking of “unilateral advantage,”

but the document’s main thrust was clear: “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hope of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States.”

Bush’s foreign-policy approach was more proactive than Clinton’s. According to the Clinton administration, because movement toward democracy and market economics had become irreversible the United States need engage with the rest of the world only to expedite this movement. The Bush administration rejected that view and reshaped the discourse of national security so that pre-emption became simply another overt tool of preponderance.

**Step five of contextual analysis: a neoconservative future?**

The final concluding step is an explanation of how ideological change comes to be woven into ways of acting, how it comes to be convention or, indeed, how it fails to become conventional. This is a step with which the neoconservatives themselves would be acutely concerned because ideological struggle is the most important component of “the key question, who owns the future?”

Certainly, the two-term presidency of George W. Bush can be viewed as the victorious culmination of nearly forty years of neoconservative ideological and grand strategic struggle.

The revised conception of pre-emption presented in the 2002 *National Security Strategy* recalled the transition advocated at the end of the Cold War from a ‘threats based’ to a ‘capabilities based’ approach to national security.

Whereas a threats-based approach focuses on specific military threats posed by a clearly identifiable enemy, a capabilities-based approach focuses on developing the resources needed to “defeat any conceivable type of attack mounted by any

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1042 Ibid., 33.
1043 Bush, “Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York.”
1045 Jaffé, The Development of the Base Force.
imaginary adversary at any point in time.”\textsuperscript{1046} This was an unprecedented strategic posture to adopt, based purely on a novel ideological conception of the world. The two strategy documents that codified and elaborated this approach – the 1992 draft \textit{Defense Planning Guidance} and the less strident \textit{Defense Strategy for the 1990s} – can be seen as statements of neoconservative ideological intent.

The draft \textit{Defense Planning Guidance} declared an unadulterated preventive posture, stating that the first “objective” of U.S. policy was to “prevent the re-emergence of a new rival . . . that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.”\textsuperscript{1047} The strategy that emerged was centred on competitors’ capabilities and aspirations, on potential rather than imminent threats to the United States.

This line of logic extended to the 2002 \textit{National Security Strategy}, and the Bush Doctrine was predicated on a similar construal of the post-Cold War security environment and its implications for security policy. The key theme of the 2002 \textit{National Security Strategy} was a radically new security environment which presented both new danger and also an opportunity for “translating this moment of influence” so that America could continue “defending and preserving the peace.”\textsuperscript{1048} This themes suggested a particualr logic of world order: national-security policy should preserve U.S. pre-eminence, which would enable a just peace.

\textbf{Conclusion}

As this chapter has demonstrated, a refashioned vision of American exceptionalism lay at the heart of the Bush Doctrine. Read proleptically (or perhaps, put more simply, with the ‘benefit’ of hindsight) it is very easy to misread exactly what the ideological and strategic revolution of the second Bush presidency meant. As this chapter has shown, a great many commentators confuse the true nature of neoconservatism and with it the Bush Doctrine because they misinterpret the nature of democracy within neoconservative thought. It is an easy mistake to make, as so much neoconservative writing emphasises the spread of

\textsuperscript{1047} Tyler, “Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan.”
democracy; indeed, neoconservatism “thrives on this muddled [American] ideological terrain.”

However, the problem with such readings is that it overstates the line of continuity between neoconservative thought and more familiar Wilsonian democracy. When read contextually or ‘forward’ from its roots in the late 1960s, neoconservatism’s concern with American liberal thought and antipathy towards realism becomes much clearer and provides a very different understanding of the ideological importance of the Bush Doctrine.

Writing in 1996, William Kristol and Robert Kagan observed “Without a broad, sustaining foreign-policy vision, the American people will be inclined to withdraw from the world.” For neoconservatives the creation of such a vision or ‘purpose’ was at the heart of their ideological project; as Michael Williams puts it, “the inability to formulate a socially compelling vision of the national interest is a mark of degeneration.” Neoconservatism had been formed in response to a perceived nihilism in America. The project of neoconservatism thus becomes an end in itself and its perpetuation a constant necessity to stave off domestic nihilism. At the core of neoconservatism’s ‘future-orientated conservatism’ was a form of American nationalism which completely transcended the barrier between the domestic and the international. It required not just backward-looking examinations of past glories but a commitment to ideals, to “the meaning of the nation in a heroic sense capable of mobilizing individuals to virtuous action.”

This particular sense of purpose is strikingly apparent in the linguistic differences between the 1999 and 2002 iterations of the U.S. National Security Strategy. Whilst the language of the former is largely technocratic, the language of the latter is redolently valiant and sees national interest become indivisible from national greatness. Within this framework an ill-defined ‘war against terror’ potentially limitless in scope and the perpetual possibility of conflict unleashed by an explicit commitment to pre-emption make sense as animating principles for the reinvigoration of republican virtue. Indeed, “neoconservatism can only sustain itself by cultivating a level of limited but endemic conflict in the international system and nurturing its support base in the name of an expansive foreign

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1051 Williams, “What Is the National Interest?” 310.
1052 Ibid., 317.
The perhaps inevitable corollary of this “theatrical micromilitarism” is that there is a lacuna at the heart of the neoconservative’s foreign policy agenda . . . it had very little to contribute once Iraq had been occupied . . . the intervention was not perceived . . . or sold to the American electorate as an extended exercise in either state building or military occupation. Instead it was to be a limited exercise in regime change and then state reform.

Despite this hollow core, the success of neoconservatism was its ability to circumscribe its arguments within the familiar language of American exceptionalism. Whilst this thesis does not agree, some commentators suggest that the Bush Doctrine’s success will be its lack of innovation and, conversely, its ability to bring together perennial strands in American grand strategy. To return to where this chapter started, the profusion of commentators who see neoconservatism as a form of ‘hard’ Wilsonianism goes a long way in demonstrating neoconservatism’s ideological success during the Bush years and the way in which it seemed to represent a recognisable strand of American ideology. This chapter has argued the contrary. Whilst neoconservatism has not disappeared from public debate it is no longer as powerful an ideological force as it was during the George W. Bush presidency. Nonetheless neoconservatism has survived and mutated during its periods in the wilderness and it remains to be seen whether it will reassert itself.

1054 Ibid., 205.
1055 Dodge, “Coming Face to Face with Bloody Reality,” 261, 263.

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Chapter 8. Conclusion

The central argument made in this thesis is that American exceptionalism is a necessary yet insufficient way of reading American grand strategy. Insufficient, because it has always been a source of ideological contestation, employed in different ways, by different people, and in different contexts to support and enable different grand strategic projects. The thesis argues that grand strategy is inherently ideological and that its focus is the creation of an idealised utopian vision upon which the resources of the state can be deployed to that ideological end. The lexical choices asserted in the titles of grand strategies often reflect this – the ‘containment’ of Communism and the ‘enlargement’ of democracy are unusual linguistic devices, bestowing physical manifestations and geographical reach upon ultimately abstract political ideas.

It is not always clear what constitutes a presidential doctrine and, apart from the Truman Doctrine, few have explicitly been given a title. The aim of this thesis has been the recreation of ideological debate, which this thesis has already suggested usually lacks analytic rigour and is often expressed in fragments. As Raymond Geuss conceives of it, such discourse is composed of “historically congealed kinds of rhetorical appeal, which make use of quasi-propositional fragments.”1057 As a result the thesis has taken a deliberately expansive approach to the texts that express American grand strategy at any particular historical juncture.

As the methodological commitments of contextualism indicate, the thesis has argued that it is not possible to compose a temporally stable grand narrative of American foreign policy, and nor is it possible to impose a “mythology of coherence”1058 upon American exceptionalism, for American exceptionalism does not have static meaning. The aim has not been to provide a new singular meaning of American exceptionalism – this thesis’s epistemological commitment would make such a goal fruitless – and nor has the thesis attempted to suggest whether America has ever been exceptional or not.

The thesis has, however, necessarily been as concerned with elements of ideological continuity as it has with ideological innovation. The most pronounced

continuity in debate about American exceptionalism and how America should assert itself internationally has been the interplay of domestic and international concerns. Equally, the possibility that foreign policy might have a material and moral impact on the nature of the Union has been a longstanding element of exceptionalist debate.

The thesis has posited a view of ideology as social practice and the resulting individual case studies have illustrated both ideological continuity and change. The key issue has been trying to recreate the authorial intention of the innovating ideologists, what they were trying to do. To overcome the “mythology of coherence” and, equally, to emphasise elements of ideological continuity, this thesis has recreated the ideological context at four critical junctures in American foreign policy in order to demonstrate the way in which four presidents and their key advisors – “ideological innovators,” in Quentin Skinner’s lexicon – have attempted ideological innovation and dominance through the articulation of grand strategy which necessitated a refashioning of American exceptionalism.

The research has shown that the process of ideological innovation involves the manipulation of existing politico-moral concepts to legitimate a particular course of action. In being forced to use existing conceptual and linguistic devices, however, limits are placed upon innovating ideologists in terms of what they can articulate intelligibly. This is what Skinner means when he suggests that “every revolutionary is to this extent obliged to march backwards into battle.” The effect of this, however, is that even revolutionary texts can have an intrinsic appearance of familiarity, which can prove illusory. This thesis has recreated four of these ‘backward marches’.

The first of these ‘re-creations’, in Chapter 4, centres around the ideological context which led to the strategy of containment. The chapter illustrated that Truman, Acheson, and Nitze were the central ideological innovators at that point, albeit buttressed for the first time in American history by a narrow, circumscribed national-security elite. The Truman Doctrine represented a rejection of differing realist and cosmopolitan versions of potential postwar American internationalism.

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1059 Skinner, Visions of Politics, I, 149.
which had been put forward by Walter Lippmann, Henry Luce, and George Kennan. All three of their visions moved away from pre-war American isolationism, whilst stressing American exceptionalism. Truman and Acheson’s main ideological innovation was to create a grand strategy which put at its very centre a Manichean binary between ‘freedom’ and ‘slavery’. It produced a new conception of American exceptionalism in which not only did America have a global responsibility to defend freedom *everywhere* but any challenge to that freedom was now perceived as a threat to the national security of the United States. It not only universalised American values but left the legacy of a grand strategy which was motivated by the defence of an idea rather than concrete material goals.

The way in which Truman and Acheson effected their ideological innovation is of considerable importance to this thesis. Their strategic revolution is a paradigmatic example of Skinner’s model of ideological innovation. As Michael Hogan noted about *NSC-68*, it managed to “wrap departures from tradition, in tradition itself.”¹⁰⁶¹ Chapter Four illustrated the way in which both the Truman Doctrine and *NSC-68* leveraged a diverse range of existing language, lexical constructs, and texts in order to give legitimacy to texts that actually marked a significant departure from the existing conventions of American exceptionalism. Both the Truman Doctrine and *NSC-68* employed the conventions of the Wilsonian rhetoric of freedom and Rooseveltian wartime rhetoric to invoke a global mission. Yet, at the same time, normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were presented as being completely untenable.

The successes of the ideological innovation of Truman, Acheson and Nitze can be seen by the degree to which the ideas of the Truman Doctrine were encapsulated in, and actually extended even further by, *NSC-68*, one of the foundational texts of the early Cold War. The underlying aim of that document was “to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society,”¹⁰⁶² but it conflated the preservation of a domestic regime with ideological hegemony. The legacy was massive military buildup and the continued reference, even in contemporary foreign-policy debate, to the policy of containment.

¹⁰⁶² *NSC-68*; emphasis added.
Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon were less successful in their attempt at ideological innovation. Chapter 5 not only examined the nature of their project but also suggested why détente failed to become an enduring part of the foreign-policy lexicon. Détente was conceived as a response to domestic attacks from both the Left and the Right of the political spectrum. These attacks had, in part, been caused by the idea that a pervasive sense of American domestic malaise was caused by the crusading Vietnam War. Writers such as Daniel Bell and Kenneth Galbraith suggested that the existing ideological debate in America, which had underpinned the undifferentiated globalism of containment, was simply no longer socially adequate for American social realities. In fact, Bell asserted that American ideology had become more concerned with restraining domestic pressure for international change. Kissinger’s response was to adopt European-style realism as America’s grand strategy. Chapter 5 suggests that, even whilst he was promoting realism, Kissinger’s approach to détente was more ideological than realist. Whilst both Nixon and Kissinger pointed to America’s limited capabilities, the global reach of détente re-evoked America’s limitless strategic expectations. The emphasis which détente placed upon interdependence was undercut by Kissinger’s determination to defend American credibility. The point is that this form of détente was actually not realist at all but an attempt by Nixon and Kissinger to maintain bipolarity and the containment of Communism. Far from the retrenchment that might have been expected of a realist grand strategy, Kissinger pursued ongoing globalism and engagement. It was an ideological grand strategy which continued with the premise of American exceptionalism and bipolarity whilst, paradoxically, publicly trying to purge itself of ideological taint. In the pursuit of Soviet ‘self-restraint’ Kissinger was actually engaged in a profoundly ideological goal. To get the Soviet Union to abandon revolutionary projects and to accept the legitimacy of an American-dominated international system was perhaps even more ideologically ambitious than the logic of containment. Ironically, whilst détente was innovative, Kissinger’s own attempts to strip the strategy of its overt ideological components sowed the seeds of its destruction. Détente failed to become a conventional part of the strategic lexicon because, by consciously distancing détente from ideology, Kissinger pushed the supporting logic of his policy far beyond the governing conventions of American exceptionalism. The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) ultimately killed off
détente by suggesting that it had fostered moral equivalence between America and the Soviet Union (it had not). Nonetheless, the CPD’s criticism, combined with neoconservative aversion to realism, led Ronald Reagan’s presidential platform to openly oppose détente.

The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity to reshape American exceptionalism. Whilst the Clinton administration did not bring about major ideological reorientation, it did articulate a largely coherent grand strategy. Although America was in a position of unmatched military and economic strength after the fall of the Berlin Wall it was unclear what the ‘new world order’, as the first Bush president called it, would look like. Clinton came into power in the midst of intellectual argument surrounding the shape of the new world order. On the one hand, Paul Kennedy typified arguments that warned that America was at the zenith of an imperial moment and needed to bolster its economic base to ward off almost inevitable imperial decline. On the other, Francis Fukuyama was the acceptable face of neoconservative thought which both descriptively and prescriptively pointed towards American ideological and material hegemony. Fukuyama was vague enough about American purpose at ‘the end of history’ that even non-neoconservatives were able to accept at least part of his vision of America’s ideological pervasiveness. The identification of the misreading of Fukuyama in the 1990s and the conflation of his ideas with the apparent inevitability of the spread of democracy only serves to highlight the type of historical knowledge which contextualism facilitates.

Clinton’s major ideological innovation was ‘democratic enlargement’ and, although he repeatedly invoked the “inexorable logic of globalization,” his sense of the ‘inexorable logic’ was closer to Fukuyama than Samuel Huntington’s

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dystopia. Despite this relative optimism regarding the meaning of American hegemony, the Clinton administration’s view of how American preponderant power should be deployed differed from that of the neoconservatives whose draft *Defense Planning Guidance*\textsuperscript{1064} blueprint had been leaked to the press in the early 1990s. This thesis suggests that the strategy of enlargement was a sustained ideological articulation of American exceptionalism. It filled the void of post-Cold War American purpose which Fukuyama had left to be answered by his ideological brethren who had been in place at the Department of Defense. Whilst the strategy of enlargement maintained a Wilsonian commitment to the support of democracy and the maintenance of liberal international institutions, its explicit commitment to democratic enlargement was via the economic elements of foreign policy. Clinton was less consistent in the exercise of military intervention and was well aware that it was American hegemony that allowed him to pursue an *a la carte* approach to multilateralism.

In terms of the success of Clinton’s ideological refashioning of grand strategy, he bequeathed an unusual mix of legacies. Democratic enlargement fitted quite easily within the conventions of exceptionalist discourse, and it did not prove terribly difficult for the Clinton administration, wounded by the criticisms of inaction in Rwanda, to later attach a form of liberal hawkishness to their grand strategy. Although it would be unwise to overstate the place of intervention and, in particular, unilateral intervention in Clinton’s grand strategy, it is a point of significant continuity with the presidency of George W. Bush.

Despite George W. Bush’s having attacked Clinton’s record on foreign policy during the campaign, and his ‘anything but Clinton’ mantra once in power, the ideological success of Clinton’s grand strategy was shown in Bush’s continuing with much of it until 9/11. Apart from a sustained critique of Clinton’s interventions for lacking a strategic rationale and a narrowing of what constituted the national interest, there was significant cross-over between the two administrations. As presidential candidate and early in his presidency, George W. Bush often displayed contradictory elements of both realism and neoconservatism which frustrated attempts to conveniently pigeonhole his early grand strategic

designs, even if his key advisors were at pains to stress Bush’s realist approach. Bush’s limited conception of the national interest was reaffirmed by the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review*[^1065] which prioritised domestic security and deterrence, had no real policy of rolling back rogue states, and took no aggressive action against Iraq. Nonetheless, if Bush’s ‘balance of power that favors freedom’ seemed incomprehensible when first enunciated in his 2001 inaugural address, by the time it was repeated in the 2002 *National Security Strategy*[^1066] the meaning seemed much clearer. 9/11 facilitated two significant changes: first, as Gary Dorrien put it, “George W. Bush fully joined his own administration,”[^1067] which ended the balancing between neoconservatives and realists in the administration; second, it allowed a radical change in the normative parameters of American exceptionalism. The attacks of 9/11 became the focus of the Bush administration and made a neoconservative ideological revolution much easier. However, it is important not to overestimate the degree of ideological innovation that the Bush Doctrine represented. For instance, in the wake of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 considerable focus was placed on the appearance of ‘pre-emption’ in the 2002 *National Security Strategy* and the degree of novelty this represented. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine was a policy of preventive intervention in the Americas. This was echoed again prior to the United States’ entry into the Second World War by Roosevelt’s justification of anticipatory self-defence against German ships: “When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.”[^1068] Pre-emption was certainly a good fit with neoconservatism in terms of compelling ‘rogue states’ to behave in accordance with American policy objectives; however, it was by no means a novel concept.

In examining neconservatism from its inception rather than proleptically, the thesis showed that a Skinnerian reading of the Bush Doctrine yields a different sense of the ideological innovation that it represented. First, neoconservatism had primarily been motivated by a sense of disgust with American nihilism and


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cultural relativism in the 1960s and 1970s and thus the primary neoconservative goal was a domestic one, willing the recreation of republican virtue in America. From a neoconservative perspective, 9/11, and more specifically the identification of an enemy, was precisely the kind of event that would give normative substance to America and prevent cultural disintegration. From that perspective Bush’s call to arms “In the new world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action”¹⁰⁶⁹ had both an international and domestic connotation. Second, the elements of democracy promotion had been a later addition to neoconservatism during the Reagan administration, when the defence of human rights had been fused with the promotion of narrow, polyarchic democracies. The type of democracy neoconservatives wished to export was elitist and its purpose was largely connected to facilitating an international environment dominated by the hegemony of the United States. As a result, proleptic readings of the Bush Doctrine have overemphasised the links between neoconservatism and Wilsonianism. Indeed, the success of neoconservatism in becoming ideologically ‘conventional’ was in large part because it expressed its innovations within the acceptable discursive parameters of exceptionalist debate. As Robert Kaplan expressed rather crudely, America had to “Speak Victorian, think Pagan.”¹⁰⁷⁰

In his second inaugural address Bush made the bold ideological assertion that “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.”¹⁰⁷¹ It was a remarkable recreation of the logic of NSC-68 and, perhaps most importantly of all, Bush demonstrated the ‘conventionality’ of such an ideological understanding of U.S. security interests by stating “We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion.”¹⁰⁷²

All of the individual studies in the thesis have illustrated the degree to which the normative architecture of American grand strategy has been continually re-formed and challenged. The point is that political actors need to gain control of the

¹⁰⁷² Ibid; emphasis added.
dominant languages structuring political discourse within their society. It remains to be seen how correct President Bush was in asserting that his ideological vision had become “common sense.” An op-ed in the New York Times declared triumphantly in the wake of Barack Obama’s inaugural address: “In about 20 minutes, he swept away eight years of President George Bush’s false choices and failed policies and promised to recommit to America’s most cherished ideals.”

Certainly, the expectations of those hoping for wholesale ideological change from President Obama have not yet been fulfilled. While President Obama has stopped using many of the more controversial linguistic constructions of the Bush administration, such as “the war on terror,” there are striking points of continuity between Obama and George W. Bush which are not just limited to inherited military campaigns. Obama has continued with the pre-emptive use of force, which is the strategic doctrine behind the use of preventive drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. He has also demonstrated a willingness to pursue selective unilateralism, notably in the operation against Osama Bin Laden. This has been unequivocally clarified in his justification for intervention in Libya, and, although that action had the backing of the UN Security Council, Obama declared “I’ve made it clear that I will never hesitate to use our military swiftly, decisively, and unilaterally when necessary to defend our people, our homeland, our allies, and our core interests.”

Whilst it seems unlikely that Barack Obama shares with Bush the underlying ideological commitments of neoconservatism, he will certainly be constrained to some extent by the ideological discourse that preceded him. He is yet to make a well-defined ideological contribution to American grand strategy of his own.

1073 Ibid.
This thesis has used a theory of social life and social change to contribute to the process of revealing a far richer American political tradition within the arena of foreign-policy thought than either diplomatic history or positivist theories of International Relations allow. The history of grand strategy in America has not simply been limited to rational calculation of policy and political dealing but has been one of continual ideological contest. The thesis has attempted to strip itself of the ‘benefit’ of hindsight in order to understand how and why successive generations of political actors have sought to refashion America’s role anew in the world. America’s strategic posture has not been the only thing at stake: so too has been the reproduction of the animating principles of the Republic.
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