Negotiating Peace Agreements

Elite Bargaining and Ethnic Conflict Regulation

in Northern Ireland and Israel–Palestine

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Submitted for the PhD. Degree
University of London
London School of Economics and Political Science
2004
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Abstract

This thesis argues that negotiated peace agreements to regulate ethnic conflicts need to be understood as a process of within-bloc as well as between-bloc elite bargaining. The proposition advanced here is that the nature of the agreement depends upon the dynamics within each respective ethnic bloc. The theoretical framework of the thesis entails a shift in the conceptual paradigm for viewing ethnic blocs as unitary actors. Rather than viewing ethnic blocs as unitary actors (like nation-states), it argues that in the fluid dynamics of divided societies ethnic blocs consist of an area in which there is a constellation of factions that seek to exercise a monopoly of legitimate power and compete for control over the bloc’s population. The nature of within-bloc competition shapes elite incentives and preferences in negotiating an inter-ethnic bargain. The nature of the bargain, whether a comprehensive maximal peace agreement or a limited minimal pact, is influenced by three important variables concerning the nature of ethnic blocs: (1) the configuration of within-bloc competition; (2) the tradition of elite accommodation; and (3) exogenous influence or dependence.

Efforts towards the regulation of ethnic conflicts by negotiation between the respective conflict blocs are inclined to focus on minimal bargains to resolve threats to the leadership of the negotiating elites from within their ethnic bloc rather than comprehensive conflict regulation. The fractious nature of ethnic blocs dominates elite incentives to achieve inter-ethnic peace. The typology of three organisational dimensions which influence elite bargaining outcomes advanced in the thesis – ethnic-bloc configuration, elite accommodation, and external resource dependence – is established to highlight the effect of institutional, structural, and procedural ethnic-bloc dynamics on the respective elites negotiating positions and on the nature of the agreement reached.

The typology is applied to four negotiated peace agreements reached in the Israeli–Palestinian and Northern Ireland cases. Subsequent chapters provide an analysis of the internal ethnic bloc determinants and factional competition on inter-ethnic elite bargaining. By considering the factors that led to minimal and maximal agreements, the study illustrates the transformative potential of inter-ethnic elite negotiation and the influence of institutional innovation on the nature of the agreement reached.
Acknowledgements

In the gestation of this research I have accumulated many debts and been the beneficiary of much kindness. The government department at LSE was the homeport for this thesis. I am indebted to my supervisor Brendan O’Leary for his direction, advice and support, and my surrogate supervisor Paul Mitchell who selflessly assisted at the eleventh hour; Rodney Barker, Claire Bird, and Bill Kissane graciously gave of their time. The School of Political Sciences at Haifa University provided a spoke port while carrying out research in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. I am grateful to Naila and Butrus Abu Manneh, Howard Frant, Zack Levey and Ami Pedahzur, and Paul Gunning from the Irish Embassy for looking after me. Yvonne Murphy and all the staff in the Northern Ireland Political Collection at the Linen Hall Library in Belfast, the staff of the Institute of Contemporary British History, the PRO, the National Archives of Ireland, PRONI, PASSIA, and the archivists at UCD made research not a pleasure but a passion. The department of Government at Dartmouth College provided the hub port for research and writing. I am grateful for the collegiality of the department, to Nelson Kasfir who fostered me and to Elizabeth Bloodgood, Kathy Donald, Douglas Edlin, Roger Masters, Anne Sa’adah, Dirk Vandewalle, and Lisa Wallace for their time and tolerance. The research has been sponsored directly by the Atlantic Foundation for which I am very grateful, and indirectly by teaching opportunities at LSE, SOAS and Dartmouth where I was lucky enough to teach students who taught me.

I am grateful to Elizabeth Bloodgood, Douglas Edlin, Asya El Meehy, Pinhas Inbari, Nelson Kasfir, Bill Kissane, Zack Levey, Martin Lodge, Riad Malki, Paul Mitchell, Clive Jones, Brendan O’Leary, Niall O’Murchu, Elinoar Shavit, Khalil Shikaki, Christianne Wohlforth, and those who prefer not to be named, for reading drafts and separate chapters and providing invaluable comments.

The debts incurred extend to those individuals, civil servants, diplomats, politicians, policy-makers, academics, journalists, paramilitaries, militarists, and those who wear more than one of those titles, who subjected themselves to my many questions and gave of their time, their sources and contacts often on numerous occasions and over
many rounds of tea, milky and minty. It was from their patience, attention to detail and
diligence I learned most.

I am indebted to the clans who have put me up and put up with me. I thank the
Abu Manneh family in Haifa and Oxford, the Bloodgood-Ames in Boston, the Dannielles
in Ashdod, the Deanes in Dublin, the Deeb in Dubai, the Edlins and Kasfirs in Hanover,
the Flynns in London, the Lodges in Berlin, and the Siakantarlis family in Athens, for
sharing Shabbat, Ramadan, Eid, Christmas, Thanksgiving, New Year, and Easter with
me.

I am grateful to my family for their support. Mel senior sponsored everything
from frocks to furniture, fillings to flights, foremost his transatlantic trip to deliver an
invaluable hug. Bridget enforced the importance of factions and affiliation. Mel junior
taught me what to tackle, what to hand off and how best to sidestep. Kelly and Mel made
me laugh, and dulce de leche. Grace always makes me smile.

My friends are my fortune. Insoluble debts are to those who salvaged me with
honesty and humour. Some are consciously mentioned twice. Elizabeth Bloodgood,
Heather Burroughs, Doug Edlin for reminding me ‘this is not a sentence’, Jeremy
Freeman, Juliana Fuzesi, Anita Kirkpatrick, Eleanor Lewis, Yvonne Murphy, Olivia
Nunez, Ana Pascoa and Peter Wren, all proved to be ‘thousandth men’.

This thesis is dedicated to Mary Jo Deane (née Devine) for her kitchen table
tutorials and life lessons.
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<td>Anglo-Irish Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>DFLP</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<td>DSD</td>
<td>Downing Street Declaration</td>
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<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
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<td>FAFO</td>
<td>Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Sciences</td>
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<td>Fateh</td>
<td>Palestinian National Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>GFA</td>
<td>Good Friday Agreement</td>
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<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Islamic Resistance Movement, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Council</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>New Ireland Forum</td>
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<td>NIO</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Religious Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDFLP</td>
<td>Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF-GC</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
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<td>PNC</td>
<td>Palestinian National Council</td>
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<td>PNRF</td>
<td>Palestinian National Front</td>
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<td>PUP</td>
<td>Progressive Unionist Party</td>
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<td>RUC</td>
<td>Royal Ulster Constabulary</td>
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<td>SDLP</td>
<td>Social Democratic and Labour Party</td>
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<td>SF</td>
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<td>Teachta Dala</td>
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<td>UAC</td>
<td>United Arab Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Ulster Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDR</td>
<td>Ulster Defence Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKUP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Unionist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>Unified National Command</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>UPO</td>
<td>United Palestinian Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UULF</td>
<td>United Ulster Loyalist Front</td>
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<td>UUP</td>
<td>Ulster Unionist Party</td>
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1 Introduction

1.1 The argument

Donald Horowitz asserts in *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*:

In short, a principal limitation on interethnic cooperation is the configuration of intraethnic competition, both present and anticipated. Theories of accommodation that rest on elite initiative must include variables related to group structure and competition, for these constrain the opportunities for interethnic relations. (Horowitz 2000: 574)

Following Horowitz, this thesis begins with the notion that ‘a principal limitation on inter-ethnic co-operation is the configuration of intra-ethnic competition’. It considers the nature of inter-ethnic co-operation and whether incumbent ethnic-bloc elites coalesce over limited and exclusive minimal security bargains or comprehensive inclusive agreements. The study attempts to contribute to the understanding of the configuration of intra-ethnic competition and the incentives for elite co-operation between conflicting ethnic groups.

The propositions advanced give rise to the following hypothesis, which will be examined within the subsequent case studies:

- *Contrary to the literature on negotiated settlements,*¹ inter-ethnic Agreements are determined by the influence of intra-ethnic factional competition on ethnic-bloc elite incentives. The nature of the agreement reached, whether it is exclusive and
limited or inclusive and comprehensive, is dependent upon the influence of within-bloc factional competition on the incentives of the incumbent ethnic-bloc elites.

Based on the assumption that ethnic-blocs are not unitary, but rather a constellation of factions engaged in an effort to gain authority over the bloc, the incentives for incumbent ethnic bloc elites to negotiate inter-ethnic agreement are subject to a degree of competition which is affected by the degree of leadership autonomy they possess. Assessing the dynamics of factional elite competition within blocs provides greater insights into the origins of incumbent elite incentives and the influence of within-bloc factional constraints on leadership autonomy. Moreover, the rationale behind the nature of the agreement or inter-ethnic bargain reached is illuminated by the incumbent ethnic-bloc elite incentives. Whether agreements take the form of inclusive, comprehensive peace settlements or exclusive security driven pacts is determined by within-bloc competition, otherwise described as factionalism. Within-bloc competition is illustrated by three dynamics: the configuration of the ethnic bloc, the nature of elite accommodation, and external resource dependence. These three dynamics influence incumbent bloc elite preferences and ultimately shape the comprehensiveness of the Agreement reached. The exclusive or inclusive nature of the agreement reached is a condition of the influence of within-bloc competition on ethnic bloc elite preferences.
1.2 Case selection

The thesis examines four cases of negotiated peace agreements between ethnic conflict groups, which illustrate the impacts of intra-ethnic bloc elite competition. Two cases are taken from two different periods in the conflict in Northern Ireland between nationalists and unionists and their (externally recognised) respective ethnic-bloc elite representatives: the British and Irish governments in the first case, and the various factional elite leaders and guarantors in the second case. Similarly, two cases are taken from two different periods in the conflict in Israel/Palestine, between Israelis and Palestinians and their (externally recognised) respective ethnic-bloc elite representatives, the Israeli and Egyptian governments in the first instance, and the Israeli government and the PLO leadership in the second case.

The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 in the Northern Ireland case is an example of a maximal comprehensive agreement, in which core conflict concerns are addressed in sum or in part, whereas the other three agreements, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, the Camp David Accords of 1978, and the Oslo Accords of 1993, are exclusive minimal bargains, in which the signatories prioritise arrangements of co-operative containment (O’Duffy 1996: 285) that minimise shared threats or exclude a ‘common foe’ (see Diehl and Goretz 2000: 247, Rabushka and Shepsle 1972: 80–92). The assessment of four cases over time controls specific time-sensitive influences and the comparative nature of the cases counters concerns about geographic specificity. The minimal nature of the Oslo Accord in the Israeli–Palestinian case discounts the idea that exclusive minimal bargains are always incremental arrangements that create by virtue of their existence the means for
negotiating an inclusive comprehensive agreement. While the existence of a limited exclusive bargain can often create subsequent inter-ethnic co-operation, and increase the probability of inter-ethnic blocs coalescing over time, the failure of the Oslo negotiations to create a maximal comprehensive agreement, advancing from the Camp David Agreements, suggests that minimal bargains need not necessarily evolve into maximal or comprehensive bargains. In short, comprehensive, inclusive maximal agreements do not necessarily follow from limited or exclusive minimal bargains.

Complementary circumstances and intervening factors impact the nature of subsequent agreements. It is the case that negotiating bloc elites 'bargain in the shadow of the future' and negotiated agreements are bargaining outcomes which affect the history, institutions, and resources of the respective blocs. However, it is also the case that bargaining occurs in the shadow of bloc members' opinions and under the constant threat posed by insurgent factional elites seeking to replace the negotiators (Lupia and Strom 2003: 4). Agreements are not solely a series of incremental minimal bargains towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement. Despite the best efforts of elites to maintain their leadership positions, within-bloc elite competition alters the identity of the incumbent elite by open competition, electing new leaders or assassinating or deposing existing leaders.

The examination of the negotiated agreement cases addressed here indicates that subsequent negotiations and bargains borrow heavily from previously negotiated elements and features, and often include the 'scratched out clauses' of former bargains creating palimpsest like agreements. The exact nature of the deal reached depends upon deliberate decisions made by the negotiating bloc elites in the particular political context.
A series of minimal bargains may serve as confidence-building measures, and elicit a degree of familiarity and trust between ethnic-bloc elites, enabling greater inter-ethnic co-operation and co-ordination over time by establishing stable rivalries (Diehl and Goertz 2000: 110, Maoz and Mor 2002: 51). But these factors are not sufficient to explain why the minimal bargains are agreed. The scope of policy learning, established rivalries, and path dependence between incumbent ethnic bloc elites, while influential, are not the determining factors for the emergence of a subsequent comprehensive maximal bargain that addresses more than peripheral concerns. The nature of the agreement reached is mitigated not only by the intensity of inter-ethnic co-operation or conflict but also by intra-ethnic determinants, namely the configuration of the respective ethnic blocs, traditional elite accommodation, and the external resource dependence of the respective bloc elites.

1.3 Methodology

The original basis of this comparative research emanates from extensive Public Records Office research on the nature of the foundational agreements negotiated in each of the chosen conflict cases (Ragin 1987). The documented archival sources on Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiations from 1920 illustrated historical precedents for the subtleties of inter-ethnic elite bargaining and intra-ethnic bloc determinants on the respective British and Irish elite negotiators. The nature of the negotiations over Palestine in 1921 and later the demise of British-mandated Palestine and the emergence of the UN Partition Plan of
1947 accentuated the influence of Israeli (Jewish) and Palestinian (Arab) factions on British elite decision-making and exposed the comparative importance of the nuances of factions within groups and factors otherwise obscured by the interests of Empire and international dynamics.

The focus on factions borrows from political anthropology, while the consideration of within-bloc competition is framed by the comparative politics literature, in particular the work on political parties, coalition building, consociational theory and questions of power sharing in the regulation of ethnic conflicts. Studies on the nature of ethnic cleavage, divided societies as well as territories, enduring rivalries, negotiated settlements, and third-party intervention drawn from security studies and international relations complemented the core literature on ethnic conflict.

The case oriented qualitative approach adopted here, faces the 'many variables, small N' problem, and the difficult task of isolating and systematically vary a single variable with a limited set of evidence, while addressing any number of explanatory variables (Lijphart 1971: 685). The remedy to this methodological difficulty is theoretical reductionism, minimising the number of variables under scrutiny by applying a fixed and limited analytical approach.

The methodological foundation of this study on how within-bloc or intra-ethnic competition configures between-bloc or inter-ethnic elite bargaining and the nature of the bargain reached is the first-hand investigation of the formal and informal positions, power and motivations of the elite involved by way of systematic, detailed personal interviews (Putnam 1976). This investigation incorporates eighty independent interviews at first hand (second and third interviews of the same subjects are not double-counted).
with politicians, negotiators, government officials, decision-makers, factional and ethnic-bloc leaders, civil servants, agreement drafters, NGO leaders, journalists, and experts in each of the cases studied and from an array of intra-ethnic groupings. These interviews were conducted in London, Dublin, Leitrim, Belfast, Berlin, Wilton Park, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Gaza City, Ramallah, Jenin, Alfula, Durah, Boston, Hanover NH, and Halki. The first round of initial interviews was in-depth and semi-structured in form, and the interviewees often made themselves available for a second and third less formal, more open interview. The majority of the interviews were recorded. Because of the sensitive nature of the information or the position of the interviewees, certain interviews were either not recorded or are recorded but are unattributable. In cases where the identity of a particular interviewee was not or could not be provided for reasons of security and the nature of his or her position, dialogue with two or more interviewees provided triangulation. In order to increase the reliability of the information gathered and mitigate the influence of retrospective assessment and defective and partial memories, it was verified by one other independent source and, when possible, confirmed by elites from members of the opposing negotiating bloc. Interview material was corroborated, where possible by primary documents of public record and, on occasion, by drafts of particular ethnic-bloc negotiating positions and drafts of agreements in the possession of the interviewee and revealed to the interviewer.

The information obtained from these interviews represents an important and original contribution to the understanding of the configuration of intra-ethnic competition and how it shapes the negotiation of inter-ethnic agreements. The interviews often provide a first-hand account of the motivations of the negotiators and ethnic-bloc leaders
as well as the interests of the hidden hand of the faction leaders. The material obtained and the analysis that follows provide insight into the mechanisms that contribute to inter-ethnic elite bargaining as well as the internal ethnic-bloc determinants. It is clear from this research that between-bloc bargaining is influenced by within-bloc competition. This research and analysis provide persuasive support for the central conclusion of this thesis:

- **that the configuration of intra-ethnic bloc competition, elite accommodation, and dependence on external resources influence factional imperatives, shape elite incentives in negotiating inter-ethnic bargains, and determine the nature of the agreement reached, whether limited and exclusive or maximal and comprehensive.**

1.4 Colluding to exclude: the nature of inter-ethnic agreements

Negotiating peace agreements involves ‘cumbersome, tedious and sometimes devious rituals of compromise’ (Bailey 1969: xiii). This thesis argues that negotiated peace agreements to regulate ethnic conflicts need to be understood as a process of intra-ethnic as well as inter-ethnic elite bargaining. Long described as insoluble due to the irreconcilable ethno-national principles that pervade in each case, the Israeli–Palestinian and Northern Irish conflicts can be viewed as enduring rivalries (Diehl and Goertz 2000: 15) with established institutionalised parameters of conflict and segmented political competition (Lustick 1993: 43). These protracted ethnic conflicts (Azar 1990) have often, as a result of enduring rivalries, been perceived as a conflict of ‘solidary [sic]
groups’ or unitary actors (Barry 1975b: 502, Lijphart 1977: 31). When ethnic blocs are considered to be homogenous and insular, they are perceived to behave as unitary actors. In keeping with the unitary actor assumption in much of political science relating to nation-states and political parties, ethnic blocs are often treated as unified bargaining actors. Ethnic-conflict literature argues that in deeply divided societies and territories, conflicts are most successfully regulated by agreement between the conflicting ethnic groups or blocs as opposed to imposed external third-party agreements (Kreisberg 1997, Lake and Rothchild 1995: 21). As a result explanations for reaching agreement have generally been attributed to macro-conflict considerations, such as changing global dynamics, the end of the Cold War (Jacoby and Salsby 2002), the New World Order (Philips 2001, Stern and Druckman 2000). Settlements are successfully reached because of internecine stalemates and ripeness (Zartman 2001: 10, 2000a: 225), balance of power dynamics, the divisibility of stakes (Pillar 1983: 24), and mediation (Walter 1997: 348, 2002: 15).

When such thinking is applied to ethnic conflict regulation, if negotiations are successful, the peace agreements negotiated by the incumbent leaders of each group are seen to be reached between ethnic blocs, implicitly equating the motivations presumed to be held by the bloc with those of the negotiating elite or leadership. The dominant assumption that ethnic blocs are cohesive unitary actors means that leadership motivations which reflect those of the entire bloc are inferred when inter-ethnic cooperation leads to an agreement. In sum, the decisive capacity of the negotiating elites is ascribed to the unity or cohesion of the bloc and limited competition within it. The fractious nature of the blocs is concealed by the achievement of reaching agreement.
The characteristics of that agreement, whether minimal and security-oriented, based on co-operative containment, the regulation of a common foe and shared threat, or maximal and comprehensive, based on the regulation of the conflict, are therefore rarely linked to the nature of the negotiating actors and bargain signatories. Instead, variations in the nature of peace agreements, ranging from minimal security bargains defined here as pacts limited to mutual security agreements (Sisk 1996: 81) to comprehensive conflict settlements addressing core conflict concerns, are attributed to macro-conflict considerations, such as changing global dynamics, the end of the Cold War, the New World Order (Philips 2001, Stern and Druckman 2000), 'ripeness' and mutually detrimental impasse or 'hurting stalemate' (Zartmann 2000a, 2000b, 2001).

The creation of a mutually hurting stalemate is said to provide a 'window of opportunity' for negotiation and third party intervention. Conflict 'ripeness' heralds an optimal time for mediators to engage parties to the conflict in dialogue and negotiation. Zartman asserts that conflicts cannot be mediated 'any old time', and ripeness is a necessary (but insufficient) condition for initiating negotiations (Zartman 2000b: 8). When parties to the conflict perceive themselves to be in a 'no win' situation and the costs of conflict are mutually unstainable the hurting stalemate is reached and the partiesto the conflict ripe for negotiation and mediation with the assistance of a third party.

The theory of ripeness provides a frame of reference for assessing negotiations (Kleiboer 1994: 109). It does not, however, address two important elements required to apply the notion of ripeness to negotiation initiatives. Ripeness theory omits a suitable measure for assessing stalemate thresholds above which parties are more likely to
negotiate. It also fails to account for ‘greenhouse effects’, the influence of mechanisms or environments conducive to generating the prerequisite ‘hurting stalemate’ and eventual ‘ripeness’. While Zartman observes that in protracted ethnic conflicts the mutually hurting stalemate can signal a (perseverance) ‘win’ for the non-state challenger, it does little to identify the prerequisites for ripeness and impedes Zartman’s larger scheme (Zartman 2000b: 9). Acknowledging the importance of agency in negotiating conflict, Zartman alludes to the significance of factions and within-group splits but explains that factional activity is either provoked and perturbed by the ‘timing’ of talks and stages of negotiation.

In Committing to Peace Walter argues that the two most important factors in convincing combatants to sign and critically implement peace bargains are third party security guarantees and power-sharing pacts (Walter 1997: 348, 2002: 15). The omission of credible commitments or guarantees constitutes a disincentive for negotiating elites and limits the scope of agreement as elites bargain in the shadow of the future. Walter observes:

Contrary to common expectations, combatants do not have the greatest difficulty resolving underlying conflicts of interest and reaching bargains. They have the greatest difficulty implementing the resulting terms. In short, the conditions that encourage groups to initiate negotiations and sign settlements do not appear sufficient to bring peace (Walter 2002: 5).

However, it is also the case that bargaining occurs in the shadow of ethnic bloc members’ opinions and under the constant threat posed by insurgent factional elites seeking to replace the negotiators. The existence of limited minimal agreements, however, suggests
that the preferences of elites are shaped by the dynamics within ethnic blocs as well as inter-ethnic conflicts (Kalyvas 2001: 103, O'Duffy 1996, Wilkinson 2000: 10). Within-bloc dynamics impact upon the nature of the agreement reached, suggesting that it is factional elites rather than ethnic ‘groups’ that initiate negotiations. Where public support is the linchpin of leadership power (Lupia and Strom 2003: 8), incumbent elites share the desire to maintain and gain legitimacy for their position (Barker 2001: 4, Silverson 1998: 3). Equally, ethnic bloc elite leaders have incentives to limit the number of issues that might threaten their position, often resulting in a minimal and limited security bargain motivated by the exclusion of the common foe (Diehl and Goetz 2000: 285). Minimal security pacts describe inter-ethnic bloc elite bargains agreed between ethnic bloc incumbent elites who collude to exclude a shared threat or common foe. Defined as any factional group treated as an enemy, both incumbent bloc elites seek to contain and/or exclude from the established ‘enduring rivalry’ (Diehl and Goertz 2000: 247).

The new institutional arrangements created in a minimal security bargain are less a means of resolving inter-ethnic conflict than mechanisms to elicit the continued support of the bloc while simultaneously signalling strategic considerations to exogenous custodians or third parties by the signatories of the bargain or executive agreement (Martin 2003: 2). Minimal security bargains are not solely or primarily conflict regulation mechanisms but rather tactical arrangements among ethnic bloc leaders linking a shared security concern be it military or political, to create a durable non-permanent security regime (Buzan and Waever 2003: 491). The aim of the minimal security bargain often involves ‘papering over, rather than settling core disputes’ (Higley and Burton
The shared threat of a common foe can often, though not always, entice ethnic bloc leaders to coalesce and reach an accommodation or mutually beneficial bargain with the incumbent leadership of the opposing ethnic bloc. Shared threats create the common interest to bargain, without which there is nothing to bargain for and without conflict, nothing to bargain about (Ikle 1987: 2). A minimal bargain constitutes a limited and exclusive security pact. It is often driven by a shared threat from a common foe, which is of mutual concern to the negotiating elites. An inclusive, maximal bargain represents a comprehensive peace pact addressing in sum or in part core conflict concerns. An exclusive minimal bargain, for example, may involve a co-ordination pact between ethnic-bloc elites allying against a common threat or foe emanating from within either ethnic-bloc (Fearon 1998: 269). When ethnic blocs are viewed as oligopolies and inter-ethnic bloc agreements as elite bargains or security pacts, the Camp David Agreement of 1977, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and the Oslo Accords of 1993 can in turn be viewed as concordats reached by ethnic bloc incumbent elites, binding on their bloc at the expense of their within-bloc factional competitors (Lijphart 1985: 90).

Conversely, comprehensive inter-ethnic bargains tend to be inclusive pacts, with factional representatives usually in the guise of political parties, willing to participate in bargaining (if not always to commit to the bargain). Comprehensive security bargains tend to incorporate incumbent as well as insurgent intra-bloc factional elites and tend to address core conflict concerns. Furthermore, inclusive comprehensive agreements contain elements of an agreed inter-ethnic arrangement, externally endorsed and constituting a distinct political accommodation viewed from the longue durée or long term. The Camp David Accords, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and the Oslo Accords are
defined here as limited or minimal exclusive security bargains, forged to address a common foe. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998, however, is described as an inclusive, comprehensive maximal bargain.

In distinguishing between minimal or limited security pacts and comprehensive bargains, the study attempts to address why it is that 'the conditions that encourage groups to initiate negotiations and sign settlements do not appear sufficient to bring peace' (Walter 2002: 5, 1997: 336). Walter and others examine the constraints restricting bargain implementation rather than consider the nature of the bargain created and associated incentives and constraints. The capacity of incumbent leaders to represent their ethnic blocs in negotiations is taken for granted (Lijphart 1977: 25, 31, Nordlinger 1972: 118). The proposition advanced here is that the nature of the agreement reached needs to be understood as a process of intra-ethnic as well as inter-ethnic elite bargaining and depends upon the dynamic within each ethnic bloc. The decision to negotiate, the incentive to reach agreement and the type of agreement reached depend on the nature of the within-bloc political constraints placed on ethnic bloc factional leaders.

The consideration of intra-bloc competition between competing elites integrates the literature on consociational theory and research on consociational parties as well as the study of coalition bargaining, the role of factions and that of elites, incorporating studies on enduring rivalries, security and peacemaking.

In applying these literatures to the material on ethnic conflict regulation and negotiated settlements, the study addresses the way in which an inter-ethnic accommodation or bargain is configured by existing and anticipated intra-ethnic competition (Horowitz 2000: 574).
Accounts of the agreements reached in negotiations in the Israeli–Palestinian and Northern Ireland conflicts have yet to be explained in these terms. The Agreements in the Northern Ireland case, namely the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, are linked indirectly to a process of peace. The Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Oslo Accords of 1993 in the Israeli–Palestinian case are also causally linked to a process of peace. Previous accounts omit the influence of elite incentives on the agreements reached, the exclusive or inclusive nature of the bargain, and whether the bargain reached attempts to address the core conflict concerns or seeks only to collude in order to exclude and secure a moderate, limited pact.

1.5 The puzzles

Approaching inter-ethnic peace agreements without consideration of elite incentives and the way they are shaped leads to a series of interesting puzzles. In the Northern Irish case, for example, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was a security-driven bargain limited and exclusive in nature. Numerous questions arise as a result of this pact (Horowitz 1990: 452). What led the British and Irish governments, as the dominant factional elites representing British Unionism and Irish Nationalism, to converge on the final bargain when this outcome deviated substantially from the options considered at the outset of the negotiations? Why was the Irish government, as the representative of the Nationalist bloc, agreeable to committing itself to greater responsibility for Northern Ireland without a concomitant increase in power? In the later 1998 Good Friday
Agreement, the paradox was that an inclusive comprehensive agreement was reached despite the contradictory end goals of the negotiating ethnic-bloc elites. Why would competing factional elites with divergent ambitions agree to an inclusive and comprehensive bargain?

In the Israeli and Palestinian case, the two substantive peace agreements suggest further puzzles. The Camp David Agreement of 1978 was an exclusive limited bargain between Israel representing the Israeli ethnic bloc and Egypt, in this instance, representing the Palestinians and therefore the Arab bloc. The Agreement alluded to the prospects of a more comprehensive agreement addressing the Palestinian question and for peace in the Middle East. The difficulty lies in the willingness of the leadership of the Israeli bloc, committed to a greater Israel and territorial Israeli expansion, to relinquish land to Egypt. Why did the ethnic-bloc elites agree to a partial pact that failed to accede to the articulated goals of either bloc? In the later Oslo Accords of 1993, between the PLO leadership and the Israeli government, what accounts for the willingness of the leaders of the respective ethnic blocs to agree to a partial, limited security pact in secret negotiations in the midst of a comprehensive initiative with international sponsors to address the core conflict concerns?

The puzzles arise from a prior consideration of the nature of the agreements reached without explicit attention to the motivations of the leadership of the respective ethnic blocs and their desire for agreement. This thesis argues that the degree of ethnic bloc cohesion and uniformity, as well as the influence of within-bloc dynamics (Mitchell 1995), shapes the preferences of the elites and crucially the nature of the agreement made. Exclusive security pacts described as essential, minimal, and limited bargains can
be negotiated by incumbent elites representing blocs that contain intense internal factional competition. This type of exclusive bargain limited to security may be agreed upon in order to contain an intra-ethnic leadership challenge from a factional elite within a bloc that seeks to escalate inter-ethnic conflict. The threat of an insurgent or challenger to the equilibrium of the existing conflict regime or ‘status quo’ impacts upon the traditional rivalries (Maoz and Mor 2002: 71) between the incumbent elites of both ethnic blocs and creates a shared incentive for the leaders to negotiate an exclusive inter-ethnic minimal bargain in order to secure their respective positions in light of the mutual threat. The existence of limited minimal agreements, however, suggests that the preferences of elites are shaped by intra-ethnic as well as inter-ethnic conflicts.

Bloc elites have incentives to agree to a minimal bargain that controls intra-ethnic insurgents who constitute a common foe. The ability and incentives of bloc elites to reach exclusive and limited rather than comprehensive agreements compel investigation into the features that shape inter-elite bargaining. When negotiated inter-ethnic agreements are viewed as the product of bargaining between leaders of fractious rather than unitary ethnic blocs, it is possible to clarify the fundamental aspects of factional within-bloc influences on inter-ethnic bargaining.

Distinguishing between the incumbent elite or leadership and the insurgent factional elites of the ethnic bloc reveals the complexity obscured by the misleading perception of the bloc as a unitary actor. The thesis advanced here is that ethnic blocs are not unitary actors but a constellation of factions. An ethnic bloc includes: the incumbent factional elite leadership, elite factional challengers, and the demotic, united in the bloc by virtue of any number of shared racial, ethnic, historical, linguistic, religious, cultural,
national or territorial ties (Connor 1994, Smith 1983). Ethnic-bloc categories are described as 'social phenomena, which exist only where there is a convergence of views and understandings among “the X” of what is and what is not a reasonable claim to “x-ness”' (Ruane and Todd 2003: 6). The bloc is created by the members’ tacit agreement to pursue a common articulated goal. The nature of the declared goal of the ethnic bloc may be liberation, unity, reunification, self-determination, or a similar aim to which the majority aspire (Kelly 1968: 62). Ethnic blocs share an alleged ascriptive identity or concord on par with Renan’s description of the nation as ‘a daily plebiscite’. Ethnic blocs as such are fractious and subject to episodic change.

It is a group’s mutual antagonism to an opposing ethnic bloc that is perceived as threatening the realisation of its particular bloc goal and which forms the important feature of inter-ethnic animosity. The ‘other’ bloc is equally shaped by an array of associations as well as a broadly agreed goal that challenges and conflicts with the aspirations of the first bloc. The existence of a dominant ethnic cleavage broadly defined (Connor 1994: 73–6, 207, Brubaker 2002: 169), and conflicting aspirations that threaten the ability of each bloc to fulfil its respective goals, unifies each bloc against the other. Within-bloc cohesion and between-bloc opposition are perceived as resistant to change and able to survive quite radical social and political change (Ruane and Todd 2003: 17). The apparent cohesion within ethnic blocs in times of conflict is often mistaken for political homogeneity (see Lijphart 1977: 25, Nordlinger 1972: 118). The inter-ethnic conflict can obscure the degree of division within blocs and the existence of divergent preferences around which factional elites evolve and form the basis of challenges to the incumbent bloc leaders (Enloe 1977: 150). Factional elites share the broad aspirations of
the bloc and tend to co-operate with the incumbent bloc leaders under certain conflict conditions usually in order to compete more effectively with the opposing ethnic group (Cook 2002: xi).

1.6 Pernicious factions: the role of within-bloc dynamics

A faction refers to any group within the ethnic bloc that seeks to exert authority over it (Rose 1964: 36). Blocs may contain factions that reflect ideological, religious or political movements, or parties that preserve separate identities within the bloc community. The political effectiveness of a faction within the bloc is a function of the ruling factions potential for control and for unity (Dahl 1958: 465). The term faction, while broad, focuses attention on the inner dynamics of ethnic blocs, providing a unit of analysis that allows for functional equivalence as factions form an appropriate application in the analysis of within-bloc dynamics (Sartori 1970: 1034).

Factions provide the opportunity to study the interaction and competition within and among political parties, segments, cliques, networks, patron–client dyads, and paramilitary organisations, as well as the consideration of strategic decision-making by self-promoting leaders in stages of conflict and transition (Brumfiel and Fox 1994: 6). Addressing the role of factions provides for greater understanding of how within-bloc dynamics shape leaders’ perceptions and decision-making (Kelman 1970). While incumbent elite motivation is a necessary condition for initiating and engaging in inter-ethnic bargaining (Nordlinger 1972: 118), leadership or incumbent elite intentions are
variables rather than constants (Horowitz 2000). Fractional competition is also an important force for social transformation (Brumfiel and Fox 1994: 3) all the more significant when ethnic blocs are perceived as social phenomena (Ruane and Todd 2003: 7) in the ever-changeable dynamics of divided societies and territories. In ethnic blocs in which there is a constellation of factions that seek to exercise a monopoly of legitimate power and compete for control over the bloc’s population, the nature of intra-bloc competition shapes leadership incentives and preferences in negotiating an inter-ethnic bargain.

The purpose of this study is to consider the constraints on what Horowitz describes as the ‘latitude of leadership’, or elite autonomy, namely the influence of institutional and structural mechanisms on the exercise of leadership autonomy. It considers how and in what way intra-bloc dynamics influence incumbent factional preferences and shape subsequent inter-ethnic bargains as exclusive or inclusive. Borrowing from Lupia and Strom, bargaining is defined as:

a process by which actors engage in communication for the purpose of finding a mutually beneficial agreement. Bargaining is required to reach such agreement, if there exist individual benefits that can only be achieved through collective action, if there are multiple ways of distributing the benefits associated with such actions and no actor can simply impose a collective arrangement upon another. (Lupia and Strom 2003: 5)

Individual benefits mean parties to the bargain can accomplish more working together than they would otherwise. It follows that bargainers have incentives to adapt their behaviour because of transaction costs by structuring agreements in particular ways:
‘When uncertainty and the threat of opportunism generate large transaction costs, [bargaining elites] have an incentive to seek restrictive arrangements’ (Lupia and Strom 2003: 13). Some bargains or settlements therefore seek at best to ‘tame’ and contain rather than resolve conflict. Minimal or limited inter-ethnic bargains tend not to be “principle driven” making ethnic bloc leaders vulnerable to the charge of striking ‘heretic bargains’ (Higley and Burton 1998: 99). Such bargains can result in the apparent or actual abandonment of core ethnic bloc commitments (communalities) and co-operation and generate a challenge to the dominant elite within the bloc, arising from a shift in the leadership’s policy over the bloc’s shared aspiration or goal, for example. Inter-ethnic bargains can exacerbate both ‘schismatic factionalism’ which refers to divisions between well-defined and cohesive elements within the ethnic bloc such as political parties, and ‘pervasive factionalism’, which involves a partial failure of otherwise cohesive elements within the incumbent elite (Siegel and Beals 1960a: 109).

In ethnic blocs power and authority is confined to a small group, a controlling or elite faction which arrogates power to itself (Lenczoski 1975: 1). If all incumbents have rivals, ethnic blocs are a configuration of factions defined as any group within the bloc that seeks to exert authority over it (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 16, Rose 1964: 36), with a ruling elite who ‘to some degree exercise power and influence over other [factional] actors’ (Dahl 1958: 465). Factional dominance is not permanently fixed; leaders can continue to lead only so long as they have followers (Barry 1975a: 396). Disaffection within the established elites can result in the emergence of an insurgent counter elite faction challenging the incumbent leadership (Enloe 1977: 152). Within-bloc competition for dominance of a particular ethnic group can alter the traditional
between-bloc rivalry. On occasion, the emergence of a ‘common foe’ (the PLO, Sinn Féin or Hamas), constituting a political threat to the leadership of its own bloc and a military and therefore political threat to the leadership of the opposing ethnic bloc, creates a common concern and shared security threat ‘between otherwise rivals’ (Diehl and Goertz 2000: 247).

1.6.1 Within-bloc dynamics

To reiterate, the nature of within-bloc factionalism or competition influences inter-bloc bargaining. In intra-ethnic competition the three crucial dynamics mentioned above, become transparent. These are: the configuration of the ethnic bloc (Horowitz 2000: 574), the tradition of elite accommodation (Nordlinger 1972: 60) and external resource dependence (Burton 1990, Carment 1993, Herman 1996, Rubin 1981). Factional dynamics are analysed using the variables that relate to the nature of ethnic bloc structure and competition. The value of the variables is their illustration of the institutional and procedural ways in which within-bloc competition influences the decision-making and bargaining positions of the incumbent bloc elite. While one or more of the variables may dominate the factional nature of competition within a bloc at any given time their influence translates into motives for explaining incumbent elites’ decision-making (Nordlinger 1972: 54) and why it is they decide to ‘do things differently’.
1.6.2 The configuration of the ethnic bloc

First, the configuration of the ethnic bloc, the constellation of factional actors within the bloc, considers the institutional procedural nature of the ethnic bloc. The configuration of the bloc refers to the internal, structural nature of the ethnic group insofar as it has an incumbent elite or 'leadership' involved in negotiations. Whether the bloc is made up of a series of political parties, paramilitary or quasi-political organisations, or whether it is embodied in the guise of a charismatic leader or 'warrior gangs' (Enzensberger 1994: 22) shapes the configuration of the ethnic bloc. Any within-bloc elite challenge of the incumbent faction elite manifests itself differently, depending on the procedural institutional structure of the bloc and the mode of competition within the bloc. If the ethnic bloc is broadly defined, the parameters for within-bloc competition are numerous. For example, the emergence of pan Arab nationalism or pan-Arab movement led to the creation of a pan-Arab bloc advocating the political union of Arab states in the 1950s and led by the leaders of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi regimes. The bloc was short-lived, the parameters of the bloc were multifarious and numerous with little tangible consensus. Made up of factional elites of state regimes, these leaders vied for supremacy as the representative leader of pan-Arabism, but they failed to speak with one voice. Unable to seize the monopoly of power in the bloc for any substantial amount of time, pan-Arabism dissolved long before the competing regime leaders relinquished their claims over its authority (Mufti 1996). Pan-Arabism was a tool of legitimacy used by competing regime elites in the Middle East. The Egyptian leadership, for example, asserted its position to
speak for the Palestinians during the Camp David negotiations on the basis of its pan-Arab credentials.

If the ethnic bloc consists of factional units of political parties, the nature of competition will differ from an ethnic bloc composed of political and paramilitary elements. If, for example, the ethnic bloc elite represents a democratic state government, the bloc instituted will be different from one in which the ethnic bloc elite represents a body of disenfranchised armed men without a recognised territory. In divided societies, blocs tend to contain a number of functionally distinct elite factional actors. The propensity for inter-ethnic violence often endemic in unresolved ethnic conflicts signals the existence of paramilitary factional elites often in tandem with political elites. The nature of intra-bloc competition is sometimes shaped by the existence of factional elites with force of arms. In these situations, relationships between factional elites tend to be instituted differently as incumbent elites engage in ongoing competition over the monopoly of force.

The configuration of the ethnic bloc influences the autonomy of the bloc leadership. The institutional structure of the bloc shapes the internal power structure, ‘the mode of interaction’, or the way in which incumbent elites accommodate intra-bloc threats and challenges (Scharpf 1997: 43). The configuration of the ethnic bloc is influenced by the nature of its composite elements whether political parties, revolutionary movements or otherwise. The composition of the bloc influences the centralised or decentralised nature of the bloc and the structure of elite dominance (Nordlinger 1972: 73). Whether or not the bloc comprises political parties, paramilitary groups or revolutionary movements, in turn, influences the nature of elite accommodation and
whether it is centralised [resulting in pervasive factionalism] within the incumbent leadership, or decentralised resulting in open competition between schismatic factions within the bloc.

1.6.3 Elite accommodation

The 'tradition of elite accommodation' referred to in the consociational literature here addresses the pattern of institutional competition within the ethnic bloc. It considers the way in which incumbent ethnic bloc leaders contain factional challengers and orient their position to maintain dominance over shared preferences or 'values' that elicit consensus among the ethnic group members (Nordlinger 1972: 60, Scharpf 1997: 43). Elite accommodation signifies the potential shift in the support of the people in the bloc for the leadership. If the bloc is traditionally decentralised with schismatic factionalism, for example, where the incumbent bloc elite forms the leadership of a single-party majority government and is challenged by a faction (in party politics this faction would be described as an opposition party) conventionally opposed to the governing elite's preferences, this challenge is less likely to undermine the leadership of the bloc than if the challenge were to emerge newly from within the governing political party itself. Equally, if the incumbent ethnic-bloc elite leads a revolutionary political movement and operates a 'catch-all' policy of accommodating dissent within a broad coalition, and finds it cannot include the current factional insurgents within the consensus, then the threat to the autonomy of the leadership increases. The failure of the incumbent elite to co-opt the
emerging dissenters suggests that a shift in the internal power structure has occurred within the bloc and the tradition of elite accommodation (Nordlinger 1972: 60). Any change in the mechanisms of elite accommodation alters the path dependence of ethnic bloc competition and the way in which the bloc is oriented (Higley and Burton 1998: 114, Ruane and Todd 2003).

Any fissure in the support of the bloc factions for the incumbent elite can threaten the leadership position and increase the salience of the threat of both schismatic factional (or opposition party) challenges from rival elites within the bloc and pervasive factional challenges from within the incumbent elite (or governing party). The consequences of the change in the traditional nature of elite accommodation, altering the operational code of *do ut des* or ‘give that you may be given’, can affect the incumbent elite’s monopoly over shared bloc values and allow room for insurgent factions to compete over core principles, the consensus generating values and guiding or binding principles of the ethnic bloc (Mansfield 1964: 934). For example, if the bloc’s common articulated aspiration refers to reunification of the national territory as a secular nation-state, and if the orientation of factional bloc elites has shifted from secular to religious, the failure of the incumbent secular elite to incorporate and reflect this change would threaten its monopoly over ethnic bloc representation in inter-ethnic bargaining. The monopoly over the consensus values of the bloc forms an important part of the latitude of the incumbent elite leadership.

The ideological proximity or distance of the schismatic faction is significant in anticipating what if any accommodation can be found between the incumbent elite and the insurgent faction. Whether the faction adheres to the *Weltanschauung* model of
politics in which the group seeks to ‘make the world conform to their basic philosophy or world-view’ (Lipset 1959: 93) alters the ethnic bloc regime dynamic. Factional adherents of the Weltanschauung model are not likely to be integrated into the bloc leadership. Where factionalism is ideologically driven within bloc, the challenge of the insurgents is less perceived as a competition for resources but rather an ideological belief in the truth of the world view of the faction and the inherent error in the preferences of the incumbent elite (Lipset 1959: 94).

The threat to the incumbent elite monopoly has consequences for the negotiating behaviour of the ethnic-bloc leadership. Negotiation with the opposing ethnic bloc can increase the vulnerability of the bloc leadership, as co-operation with ‘the enemy’ can invite one’s own destruction (Putnam 1993: 26). The incumbent elite’s autonomy, its flexibility to act without fear of strong within-bloc censure is influenced by the traditional nature of within-bloc elite accommodation of the bloc. If the orientation of the bloc’s preferences has shifted and public support for the incumbent elite has weakened then its leadership position may be threatened. The threat may become explicit if the bloc’s tradition of elite accommodation falters. For example, if the tradition of elite accommodation within the bloc is one of co-option (internalising elite challengers within the institutional structures of the leadership elite) and it is found that this mechanism is no longer effective, thereby making schismatic factions pervasive then the possibilities of elite accommodation have been fundamentally altered. When the incumbent elite can no longer accommodate the factional challengers internally, then the emergence of open competition within the bloc emerges, creates schismatic factions and constrains the previously dominant elite’s autonomy. To minimise this threat, the incumbent elite’s
position shifts to address the changing preferences exhibited by the challenging factional challengers or ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ (Kasfir 1979: 372) within the bloc. The nature of these preferences is often expressed by a countervailing and often centrifugal tendency in the bloc.

In both instances, the incumbent ethnic-bloc elites’ negotiating position is shaped by the change in support or position of the bloc it represents and the orientation of the bloc in terms of the leadership and its autonomy and monopoly over bloc power, voice and control. To a large degree, the vulnerability of the leadership to these intense factional challenges and shifting internal dynamics is influenced by its dependence on external resources, the third factor central to this analysis.
1.6.4 External resource dependence

Today, I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.

Yasser Arafat, PLO Chairman, UN General Assembly Address,

Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?

Danny Morrison executive member address, 77th Sinn Féin Ard Fheis, 31 October 1981 (NIPC P940)

The third factor is the incumbent elite’s dependence on external resources for leadership monopoly and autonomy within the bloc. External resources can be material, financial or status-oriented. The role of third parties or actors can be coercive or non-coercive, exogenous actors can become guarantors for negotiated inter-ethnic bargains and can be experienced positively or negatively. The role of exogenous third parties varies (Bercovitch 1984, 1986: 155). In some inter-ethnic bargains, third parties exercise authoritative decision-making whereas in others influence can be mild (Burton 1990: 188, Osler Hampson 2001: 387). The role of third parties or external actors can be decisive for the incumbent ethnic bloc elites and for other third-party protagonists (Mandel and Tomlin 1991:43, Wagner 2000: 482). Inter-ethnic elite bargains may form part of a nested game between competing parties exogenous to the conflict with a vested interest in particular conflict outcomes or bargains (Tsebelis 1990a: 164).

The 1974 and 1981 speeches cited above, advocating a tactical change in strategy by both the PLO and Sinn Féin in their respective conflicts suggest otherwise. Perceived as political spoilers, Sinn Féin and the PLO were politico-paramilitary anti-regime organisations seeking to rupture the existing political parameters of their conflicts. The publicised policy shift of these particular political entrepreneurs towards partial political
engagement in tandem with paramilitary activity illustrated a desire by the PLO and Sinn Féin to engage the existing inter-ethnic conflict regime both by foul and fair means. The policy shift advocating the use of negotiation and a degree of political participation, threatened the monopoly held by other ethnic bloc actors over ‘fair means’. The appeals made by Yasser Arafat to the United Nations General Assembly and Danny Morrison to the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis represented tactical shifts, advocating a dual strategy for both the PLO and Sinn Féin in their respective conflicts.

The appeals addressed distinct audiences. The PLO leadership’s dual strategy was directed towards the international community at the UN, while Sinn Féin appealed to its organisation members. Both audiences were selected as the custodians of the respective leaderships’ positions. The PLO leadership’s legitimacy emanated as much from states sympathetic to the Palestinian situation as it did from displaced and dispersed Palestinians often described as refugees first and Palestinians second. Support from a majority of Irish Republicans for the dual political and paramilitary strategy was equally indispensable to the Sinn Féin leadership.

Ethnic-bloc elites may be externally constrained from achieving or supporting a particular bargain, or conversely, within-bloc factional elites may be encouraged by way of legitimacy, a great power ‘arming a favoured faction’, or by financial incentives to agree to a particular bargain (Osler Hampson 2001: 389). When ethnic bloc leaders are dependent upon one or more exogenous actors for support, the probability of an imposed bargain increases (Burton 1990: 196). Recognition and sustained support from external actors may maintain the position of the bloc leadership. Recognition of insurgent factional elites, by exogenous sponsors or actors, however, can also escalate the threat of
the challenge to the incumbent elite and constrain its autonomy. Conceptions of leadership status can be decisive in factional challenges because recognition of a degree of status parity is required prior to inter-ethnic bargaining (O’Duffy and Githens-Mazer 2002: 120). If the incumbent elite is recognised as the legitimate representative of the bloc, then the leadership is predisposed to negotiate for and on behalf of the bloc, reasserting its inter- and intra-ethnic monopoly position.

Ethnic-bloc dependence on external resources can mitigate within-bloc conflict; if, for example, an external resource is only made available or indeed made conditional upon a bloc consensus. Such resources can entice intra-ethnic consolidation and cohesion. Equally, exogenous actors can represent a shared threat to the bargaining intentions of the incumbent bloc elites, and encourage the negotiation of an exclusive bargain without the imposition of the influential third party, rather than an inclusive bargain to which the third party would be privy.

The Oslo Accord of 1993 exemplifies this situation where external or third parties represented a shared threat to the bargaining intentions of the incumbent elite blocs in numerous ways. First, the declining support of the leadership of the Arab regimes for the PLO leadership and their increasing sponsorship of the insurgent Hamas faction threatened the incumbent position of the PLO. Secondly, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators agreed to a minimal bargain under the auspices of exogenous actors acting as neutral facilitators, specifically the Norwegian non-governmental organisation FAFO, with the assistance of the Norwegian and Swedish governments. Rather than arrive at an inclusive, comprehensive bargain under the auspices of the United States government acting as facilitator for negotiations in Washington taking place concurrently, the Oslo
signatories exploited the existence of numerous exogenous actors. The twin-track diplomacy dynamic was conducive for the leaders of the blocs to prioritise their factional elite preferences of a minimal exclusive bargain over a comprehensive agreement addressing core conflict concerns.

Combined, these three fundamental within-bloc dynamics affect the respective incumbent elites’ bargaining positions, preferences, incentives and leadership autonomy, influencing the ‘collude to exclude’ or ‘core conflict concerns’ nature of the agreement negotiated.

1.7 Colluding to exclude or considering core conflict concerns?

The nature of the agreements reached between ethnic bloc leaders can be defined as limited exclusive pacts where leaders collude to exclude a shared threat or common foe, or comprehensive inclusive agreements that address core conflict concerns. The conflict regulating agreement reached is dependent upon the autonomy of the incumbent bloc elite. This thesis provides an account in factional terms of the negotiated agreements reached in the Israeli–Palestinian and Northern Ireland conflicts. The Agreements in the Northern Ireland case, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, are linked to a process of peace. The Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Oslo Accords of 1993 in the Israeli–Palestinian case are also understood as features of a negotiated process of peace. The nature of the agreements reached whether exclusive and limited security pacts or comprehensive attempts to address the core
elements of conflict are dependent upon the influence of within-bloc dynamics on the incentives of the incumbent elite.

In the Northern Irish case, for example, the security-driven Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was an exclusive, limited bargain. Numerous questions arise as a result of this pact. What, for example, led the British and Irish governments\(^\text{14}\) to converge on the final minimal security bargain and deviate from the more substantive political options considered at the outset of the negotiations? An elite incentive and factional dynamic explanation argues that the elite accommodation within the Irish ethnic-bloc had altered. The escalating electoral support of Sinn Féin within Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic challenged the existing mechanisms of elite accommodation within the Irish ethnic bloc while exacerbating the military and political challenge of Sinn Féin to the British ethnic-bloc elite’s dominance. Sinn Féin became a stalking horse politically for both the British and Irish ethnic-bloc elites and an escalating security threat for the incumbent British elite (government). The creation of a common foe provided the impetus for negotiation. By the time the negotiations were concluded, electoral support for Sinn Féin, no longer an imminent political threat, eased the incentive for a more substantive arrangement and the bargain reached attempted to limit the military security threat posed by Sinn Féin.

Why was the Irish Government (the incumbent ethnic-bloc elite) content to adopt greater responsibility for Northern Ireland without the correlative power? The electoral success of Sinn Féin altered the configuration of the Irish ethnic bloc, previously an anti-system faction. The adoption of electoral mechanisms and partial participation threatened the factional dominance of the moderate SDLP in the Northern Ireland
political arena as well as altering the nature of elite accommodation in the Republic. The Irish government, in agreeing to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, gained greater security responsibilities without proportional rights in Northern Ireland in a bid to limit the permanent reconfiguration of the Irish ethnic bloc.

The paradox of the later 1998 Good Friday Agreement was the nature of the comprehensive, inclusive peace agreement, notwithstanding the competing end goals of the ethnic-bloc elites. Why would competing ethnic-bloc factions, incumbents and (some) insurgents, agree to an inclusive maximal bargain when they have divergent ambitions? An elite incentive and factional dynamic explanation argues that the nature of the Good Friday Agreement as a comprehensive, inclusive, maximal bargain maintained the consensus values of each respective bloc. The consensus value of each bloc refers to the nature of the ethnic-bloc’s collective aspiration: a united Ireland for (Irish) Nationalists and remaining within the United Kingdom for (British) Unionists. The Agreement recognised both conflicting aspirations while addressing the pressing concerns of the respective Nationalist, Republican, Unionist and Loyalist factional elites. The consociational power-sharing nature of the comprehensive bargain allowed the factional elites within Northern Ireland to access power while maintaining their respective factional positions.

The comprehensive nature of the Good Friday Agreement was facilitated by the consensus and convergence between the British and Irish governments as the incumbent ethnic-bloc elites. Their willingness to act as Agreement guarantors to facilitate the institutional and structural features of a framework for accommodating the various
factional elites within Northern Ireland to negotiate a power-sharing consociational arrangement was imperative to the comprehensive nature of the agreement.

In the Israeli and Palestinian case, the two substantive and partial agreements raise additional questions. The Camp David Accords of 1978 constituted two bargains. Both were exclusive and limited. The expressed aim of the Accords set out the parameters for peace in the Middle East. The Accords were two-part bargains. Only the initial bargain addressing the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt was fulfilled. The bargain alluding to the prospects of a more comprehensive agreement was never implemented.

The paradox lies in the willingness of an Israeli ethnic-bloc elite committed to Israeli expansion to relinquish land. Why did the ethnic-bloc elites agree to a two-part partial pact that failed to accede to the goals of either bloc? An elite incentive explanation argues that the configuration of the Israeli bloc altered and the incumbent governing elite of the Likud (Unity) party emerged amid an ideological cleavage within the Israeli ethnic-bloc regarding land and the aspiration for Eretz Y’Israel or the greater Israel (Lustick 1993). Dependent on the US government for external resources, however, the incumbent elite complied with external pressure to negotiate a partial bargain, relinquishing the non-sacred land of Sinai while maintaining control over the Gaza Strip for security reasons and the sacred land of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria).

The Camp David Accords were an exclusive partial agreement. Israeli recognition of the incumbent Egyptian government as the representative leadership of the Arab ethnic bloc provided the Israeli incumbent elite with the opportunity to diminish the sense of threat perceived by the Israeli bloc while establishing a negotiating precedent
and securing recognition from an Arab state (Lieberfeld 1999: 73). The Accords simultaneously endorsed the legitimacy of the Egyptian government to the exclusion of competing factional elites, such as the PLO, which threatened the traditional elite accommodation of the pan-Arab ethnic bloc. The high external resource dependence of the respective incumbent ethnic elites on the US government assisted in the exclusion of the Soviet Union from negotiations.

In the later Oslo Accord of 1993, what accounts for the willingness of the incumbent ethnic-bloc elites to agree to a partial pact reached in secret negotiations despite the initial comprehensive initiative to address the core conflict concerns? An elite incentive and factional dynamic explanation argues that the configuration of the Palestinian bloc, previously a schismatic faction of the Arab bloc, had altered due to the emergence of Hamas. The mechanisms of elite accommodation within the Palestinian bloc, unable to adapt to the religious orientation of the bloc’s followers and the schismatic challenge of Hamas, threatened the monopoly of the secular PLO leadership elite. The elite’s dependence on material external resources, financial support from third-party sponsors and exogenous legitimacy created the incentive for the PLO leadership to reach a minimal limited pact with the incumbent Israeli elite.

The bargain was based on the Israeli (governing) elite’s recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, achieving the desired PLO legitimacy. The Israeli leadership’s incentives for reaching a partial pact arose from the common inter-elite threat posed by Hamas. Intra-ethnic motivations include the changing nature of the Israeli ethnic-bloc’s configuration with the arrival of the Soviet Jewish Aliyah, creating new factional elites and a shift in the traditional consociational accommodation
mechanisms of the Israeli bloc with the elemental radicalisation in response to the Intifada. The external resource dependence of Israel on the international community and on the USA, in particular, was influential. The escalation of inter-ethnic violence and the Israeli leadership’s security response to the Intifada were criticised internationally. The exclusive, partial pact at Oslo provided an alternative to the comprehensive multilateral peace negotiations in Washington. The limited Oslo bargain also addressed the important concerns of the incumbent Israeli elite without the necessary compromise of a comprehensive settlement of core conflict concerns.

In divided societies, the initiative to engage with if not within the political parameters of the disputes altered the configuration of these two conflicts and the positioning of all the conflict protagonists. The partial encroachment of the PLO and Sinn Fein into the political sphere of conflict influenced the ideological distance between the other conflict protagonists or actors (Sartori 1976: 121) and in so doing shifted pre-existing conflict rivalries. In adapting their strategies, the PLO and Sinn Fein provide the conflicts’ protagonists with an incentive to negotiate what often became cumbersome, ever tedious and occasionally devious bargains of compromise. While prepared to ‘employ all means’ to achieve the PLO’s objective ‘to liberate all Palestinian territory’, Arafat also wanted to participate in the proposed negotiations towards an agreed Middle East.16 Similarly, in the speech to its Republican membership, the Sinn Fein leadership was ready to forgo its traditional policy of abstentionism, advocating instead a dual-policy of electoralism with militarism to achieve its objectives (Feeney 2002: 303). Within-bloc factional changes altered existing between-bloc rivalries and with them incumbent bloc elites incentives.
Chapter 2 will consider the nature of ethnic blocs, arguing that retaining the unitary actor assumption impedes the ability of conflict analysts to consider the significance of within-bloc determinants on conflict regulating accommodations. Furthermore, it assesses the characteristics of ethnic blocs, whether they predominantly consist of elites from political parties, paramilitaries, revolutionary or other segmental groups. The nature of incumbent and insurgent elites is considered in order to chart the impact of ethnic-bloc elite incentives and the role of factions within and beyond the bloc. Three influential dynamics of within-bloc competition, namely (1) the configuration of the ethnic bloc; (2) elite accommodation, the way in which competition is managed within the group; and (3) external resource dependence or the influence of third party on intra-ethnic bloc dynamics are considered.

Chapter 3 considers the Camp David Accords of 1978 as an exclusive limited inter-ethnic elite bargain, masquerading as a comprehensive peace agreement accommodating peace in the Middle East. In this case the Egyptian and Israeli governments secured their immediate national security objectives, culminating in the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, the Israeli government securing a negotiating precedent and a diminished sense of threat. Both negotiating elites extracted desired outcomes to endorse their domestic bloc positions by coalescing to the detriment of a common foe, in this case the PLO. For the Egyptian elite, as self-proclaimed leader of the pan-Arab bloc, the PLO constituted a schismatic faction, threatening the Egyptian governing elite’s domestic Egyptian and broader regional interests and autonomy. For the Israeli incumbent elite, the inclusion of the Egyptian government as the recognised co-signatories of an adequate and limited ‘cold peace’, at the expense of the PLO,
excluded a common foe. The incumbent Israeli leadership accommodated potential elite insurgents in an eclectic coalition government mitigating schematic factional challenges. Finally, the case illustrates the nested nature of ethnic conflict settlements. The influence of leadership dependence on external resources in examining the role of the United States as sole sponsor of the Camp David Accords rather than act as co-sponsor with the Soviet Union as initially proposed.

Chapter 4 examines the Oslo Accords of 1993 as an inter-ethnic elite minimal bargain to exclude the common threat from Hamas. The case illustrates the security features of an exclusive bargain between incumbent ethnic bloc elites seeking to neutralise the challenge from a common threat or common foe for both the PLO and Israeli government. The Oslo Accords illuminate the shift in the configuration of the Israeli ethnic bloc towards increasingly schismatic factional challenges and open competition in the midst of increasing inter-ethnic violence. Similarly, the configuration of the Palestinian ethnic bloc had shifted. Where once factional challenges were accommodated internally the emergence of the insurgent elite Hamas provoked a shift towards schismatic factionalism and threatened the autonomy of the PLO leadership. Furthermore, the Oslo case study considers the influence of external resource legitimacy and the role of multiple third parties.

Chapter 5 analyses the Anglo Irish Agreement of 1985 as an exclusive inter-ethnic elite minimal bargain. The insurgent threat of Sinn Féin to the structural predominance of Nationalists as opposed to Republicans within the Irish ethnic bloc altered the mode of elite accommodation from solely schismatic open competition towards a pervasive factionalism of the Irish bloc. The creation of the New Ireland
Forum incorporated all Irish political parties with the exclusion of Sinn Féin and attempted to limit the changes to the configuration of the ethnic bloc provoked by its challenge. The British and Irish governments inter-ethnic bargaining attempted to undermine the shared electoral threat posed by Sinn Féin and the combined electoral and military threat posed by Republicanism. The chapter illustrates the position adopted by the representative governing elites of the ethnic blocs and illuminates the factional constraints that shaped the incentives of the elites and the nature of the final bargain.

Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 as an inter-ethnic elite comprehensive bargain notwithstanding the competing end goals of the incumbent ethnic-bloc elites. The chapter illustrates that in negotiating the nature of the Good Friday Agreement the ethnic bloc factional elites (both incumbent and insurgent) bargained while adhering to the consensus values of each respective bloc. The chapter examines how the inclusive nature of the Good Friday Agreement was facilitated by the consensus and convergence between the British and Irish governments as the representative incumbent ethnic-bloc elites. The willingness of the governments to act as Agreement guarantors to facilitate the institutional and structural features of a framework for accommodating the various factional elites within Northern Ireland to negotiate a power sharing consociational arrangement was imperative to the comprehensive nature of the agreement.

Chapter 7 concludes the study with a consideration of the nature of the ethnic bloc and the significance of factionalism on within-bloc conflicts and inter-ethnic elite preferences. It addresses the prescriptive considerations of viewing ethnic blocs as a constellation of factional elites and negotiated inter-ethnic peace agreements as inclusive
and exclusive bargains. Adapting the lens that comparativists use to study political parties, intra-party dynamics and coalition building to assist conflict regulation theorists and practitioners illuminates the nature of ethnic blocs as institutions. To examine the nature of ethnic blocs, students of conflict regulation are required to trespass across disciplines and use all necessary conceptual tools to explain and illuminate, in the best possible manner, the way in which within-bloc factional dynamics impact upon incumbent elite incentives and explain how and why they commit to a particular peace preference.
2 Elite incentives and the role of factions

2.1 Introduction

This chapter considers the configuration of within-bloc competition and the influence of factions on ethnic-bloc elite preferences. The importance of factions and factional behaviour arises from the advocacy of elite-based formulas for regulating ethnic conflict by negotiated inter-ethnic elite settlement (Lijphart 1977, 1985). Elite-driven conflict regulation perspectives tend to adhere to three suppositions: a prerequisite ethnic-bloc leadership exercising a high degree of leadership latitude or 'autonomy' in decision-making (Lijphart 1965, 1977; see Horowitz 1985, 2000: 574), the assumption of a stable, fixed and constant leadership, and the functioning of an ethnic bloc as a unitary actor. This study argues that ethnic blocs are configured differently and function as oligopolies with a controlling or elite faction which arrogates power to itself (Leczoeski 1975: 1). The incumbent oligarchs vie with challengers to maintain their position. Viewed in this way, ethnic blocs are a constellation of factions described as groups within the bloc that seek to exert authority over it (Rose 1964: 36), with a ruling elite who 'to some degree exercise power and influence over other [factional] actors' (Dahl 1958: 465). Measuring the degree of latitude exercised by incumbent ethnic-bloc elites is made possible only by considering the nature of constraints imposed by within-bloc challenges.

The fractiousness of an ethnic bloc illustrates the parameters of the particular bloc. Far from distinct unitary actors with fixed surrounds, ethnic blocs are built on
institutionalised relationships and based on a shared consensus over the recognition of an ‘in group’ (Brubaker 2002: 167, Ruane and Todd 2003: 7) subject to episodic shifts. In divided societies, the ‘other’ bloc is equally shaped by association and a broadly agreed goal that challenges and conflicts with the aspirations of the ‘out’ group. ‘The self-and-other aggregative definitional dimension of “us” versus “them” and with “them” versus “them” is close enough in awareness and contractive experience to be called a consciousness’ (Grove 2001: 358, Spira 2004: 255). While it is agreed that ethnic blocs broadly conform to an amalgamation of ethnic and national sentiment, the debate over the notion of the institutional manifestations of the ethnie and the nation has generated as many descriptive terms for ethnic groups as there are ethnonational or ethnopolitical groups (Brass 1991).

The nature of the definitive ethnic bloc is contested. What or who constitutes the people (Jennings 1956: 56) is complicated by the ‘imagined’ (Anderson 1991) or the self-differentiating nature of the nation (Connor 1994: 42). Similarly, ethnicity may be perpetuated by intervening factors with little to do with its emergence (Comaroff 1998), postulating continuity between the ethnic and national dimension (Conversi 2004: 3). As Spira asserts:

Ethnic identity and modern nationalism have tended to arise out of specific types of frequently negative interactions between the leadership of centralizing states and elites from non-dominant ethnic groups, especially but not exclusively on the peripheries of their resident states (Spira 2004: 249).
Throughout this work the term ethnic bloc is synonymous with ethnonational or ethnopolitical. Definitional ambiguities result from the often dynamic nature of ethnic blocs. The institutional nature of the bloc privileges certain behaviours and can shape the expectations and preferences of political actors (Luebbert 1986: 29–44). The apparent cohesion of blocs created by the dominant ethnic cleavage tends to be perceived as political homogeneity (Lijphart 1977: 25, Nordlinger 1972: 118), obscuring, in turn, the divergent within-bloc preferences around which insurgent factions form. This thesis argues that within-bloc competition or factionalism has an inherent dynamism grounded in the malleability of ethnic blocs and the nature of competitive strategising.

Acknowledging the fractious and dynamic nature of ethnic blocs, the power afforded to political entrepreneurs vying to represent ethnic blocs in divided societies as well as divided territories is often elusive. The way in which ethnic blocs are instituted can hinder examination of the locus of power which resides within patterns of factional accommodation concealing (often) diverse elite preferences. The ability of elites to exert power within the often-ambiguous parameters of an ethnic bloc is influenced by three factors. The way in which the bloc is configured impacts upon the autonomy of the incumbent elite. Whether factional actors are more likely to be political parties, revolutionaries or paramilitaries acting within a democratic state or a national movement influences the autonomy of the bloc leadership. Moreover, the way factional elites are accommodated is influential. If factional competition within the bloc is untempered (Cox and Rosenbluth 1996: 260), and competition within the bloc is open, with schismatic factional elites challenging the incumbent recognised bloc leadership by election, then within-bloc dynamics are transparent. If competition is closed, with challenges
accommodated internally, leading to the creation of coalitions, dynamics tend to be concealed. The nature of accommodation, whether broadly open or broadly closed, influences the monopoly of power wielded by the incumbent ethnic bloc elite (Siegel and Beals 1960). Finally, the dependence of the incumbent and insurgent elites on exogenous or external resources influences the strategies (Bloomfield 1997) available to the factional elites and the competitive dynamic of the bloc.

The nature of ethnic-bloc (1) configuration and (2) accommodation as well as (3) the dependence of rival within-bloc factional elites (incumbent and insurgent) on external resources influences the bloc leadership’s incentives in negotiating inter-ethnic agreements. Elite incentives, shaped by the need to maintain a monopoly over the bloc consensus or ideology to sustain the legitimacy of the leadership and its capacity to mobilise the bloc, are considered in the light of factional impediments and accommodating leadership strategies. These three dynamics are considered in order to illustrate the way in which within-bloc competition configures inter-ethnic elite bargaining and the nature of agreements reached. Combined and considered, these three dynamics – the configuration of the ethnic bloc, the pattern of elite accommodation within the bloc, whether it is schismatic and open or pervasive and the dependence of the bloc elites on external resources – prompt the need for appropriate elite incentives as a necessary condition for initiating and engaging in inter-ethnic bargaining.
A ruling elite is a controlling group less than a majority in size that is not a pure artifact of
democratic rules. It is a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly prevail in
cases of differences in preference on key political issues. (Dahl 1958: 465)

Insurgent and challenging factional elites are political entrepreneurs. By virtue of their
authoritative position, elites are able to affect political outcomes regularly and
substantially by advocating ‘ideas with hegemonic potential’ in the political arena of the
ethnic bloc and in so doing ‘shape the cognitions and values of the incumbent elites and
masses’ (Lustick 1993: 123). Their aim is to (re)define, for their own purposes, the
allowable boundaries and the appropriate stakes of political competition. The capacity
for insurgent elites in divided societies to reorient the already flexible boundaries of an
ethnic bloc is greater than would be the case in societies free of violent inter-ethnic
conflict with strong unmalleable institutions establishing the parameters of political
competition as givens, permitting decision-making, bargaining and other forms of
political activity to proceed ‘normally’ (Lustick 1993: 43).

Defined as those ‘who get most of what there is to get’ (Lasswell 1958: 13). The
role of elites in democratic transitions is well documented (Higley and Burton 1998). As
are efforts to examine the influence of mass action on elite and regime types and
transitions (Perthes 2004: 3). Sisk, reviewing the empirical evidence from South Africa
and Northern Ireland asserts that ‘the elite-mass dichotomy is too simplified and that
pivotal players are mobilized mid-level elites’ (Sisk 1996: 84). Perthes refers to these
elites as ‘the political relevant elite’ to describe a powerful stratum that can influence the
decision making of incumbent elites (Perthes 2004: 3). The notion of the politically relevant elite (PRE) is helpful in distinguishing between temporary elites, namely those who gain a position of political relevance but do not necessarily maintain elite status and more politically influential functional segments such as elements of government, administration or the military. In keeping with Sartori's observation pertaining to the significance of political parties and party systems, not all elites are 'relevant' (1970).

In divided societies, the parameters of political competition are influenced by the dynamic nature of the PRE defined here as factions and subject to episodic change. The ability of incumbent bloc elites to withstand challenges is influenced by the configuration of the bloc. The structure of the bloc is only partially considered in conflict regulation literature that emphasises the role of incumbent bloc elites and autonomous leaderships in negotiating conflict regulating agreements (Lijphart 1999 et al.). The nature of the ethnic bloc regime is, however, instrumental in determining the autonomy and authority afforded to the bloc leadership.

A structurally centralised bloc is one in which the bloc leadership dominates or monopolises the bloc institutionally. The configuration of an ethnic bloc, for example, is structurally predisposed to centralisation and a distinct elite monopoly if modelled on the Westminster system with a plurality electoral system. Conversely, a multi-party ethnic bloc with proportional representation allows a structurally less centralised system. An institutionally decentralised bloc tends to have numerous sources of legitimacy manifested in groups and actors or factions. The 'leadership latitude' (Horowitz 2000: 57), or monopoly of authority attributed to the incumbent elite, can become more difficult to discern in an institutionally decentralised bloc. The pattern of elite accommodation
within an ethnic bloc is determined by whether the bloc can be described as structurally centralised or decentralised.

The traditional pattern of accommodation used to co-opt or accommodate factional challengers to the incumbent elite’s authority is influenced by the existing configuration of the bloc. If the bloc is described as centralised then accommodating challengers by way of coalition or co-option enables the leadership to absorb (Tsebelis 2002: 12) the factional challengers, so that factional competition is pervasive rather than schismatic. Successful absorption or co-option of a factional challenge can result in the independent or distinct openly competitive faction reverting to the position of a tendency. A newly modified or ‘tamed’ tendency may maintain a niche monopoly although it no longer poses a threat or a challenge to the leadership. Centralisation of this kind is common in ethnic blocs with longstanding dominant incumbent elites and is often found in liberation movements (Irvin 1999: 20). The bloc elite might be instituted as a liberation movement, for example, and operate a ‘catch-all’ policy of accommodating dissent within a broad coalition. But where it finds it cannot include a present or current factional challenge within the bloc consensus, it must either change its pattern of accommodation or anticipate a weakening of its authority. If the ethnic bloc is a hybrid of political actors with militaristic affiliates, as is often the case in ethnic conflict blocs, the elite and the challenging factions may be inclined to suffer from both schismatic and pervasive factionalism and employ various means of both open competition and internal accommodation mechanisms in tandem.

The monopoly of leadership authority is revealed by the mechanisms used within the bloc whether structurally centralised or decentralised. Two means of maintaining the
leadership are available to the incumbents. The first one is open competition, characterised by the absence of attempts to centralise and co-ordinate or co-opt factions. When a bloc adopts open competition mechanisms, the challengers or factions to the incumbent elite compete for votes (in the case of electoral politics) or members and affiliates (in the case of liberation movements). The mechanism of internal accommodation is characterised by the existence of patterns of co-ordination of the elites across different factions. There is usually an absence of (imminent) electoral competition and attempts to ‘poach’ members. These two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, suggesting a degree of ambiguity. Should an elite choose to engage in internal accommodation when it conventionally adheres to open competition to allay a factional threat, the change in mechanism informs the nature of the threat and the extent of the factional challenge. Within-bloc competition is usually assessed by way of elections. The incumbent elite will have the monopoly of leadership authority if there are limited challenges to its authority. In ethnic-blocs in which the leadership is elected, a vote of no confidence would constitute a threat to the monopoly of the incumbent elite’s authority.

In short, the factional challenge manifests itself differently, depending on whether the bloc is structurally centralised or decentralised and shapes the pattern of accommodation or ‘the mode of interaction’ (Scharpf 1997: 43), namely the way preferences are formulated within the bloc. If the bloc leadership, for example, is a single party majority government and is challenged by an opposition faction traditionally opposed to its preferences, this challenge is less likely to undermine the bloc leadership than if the challenge came from within the governing elite (or party) itself.
A centralised structure may refer to the nature of the political institutions, whereby the system and its electoral mechanisms centralise the bloc. In cases of ethnic conflict where within-bloc competition openly manifests itself in electoral party competition, factional (party) challenges lend themselves more readily to examination (Mitchell 1995:773). Within-bloc open party competition is further influenced by the hierarchy of intra-bloc cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:6). The 'hierarchy of cleavages' may alter from region to region and and may be socio-economic, class or ideologically oriented. Moreover, the influence of bloc configuration on inter-ethnic conflict has been addressed in relation to policy concerns and the way in which within-bloc elites engineer frictions and tensions in the wider conflict environment (Fearon and Laitin 1996: 730). The ramifications of these findings, while important for examining the influence of intra-ethnic party divisions over policy preferences, go further, and highlight the importance of within-bloc constraints on incumbent elites' decision-making and illustrate the significance of the configuration of the ethnic bloc on elite decision-making.

Similar conflicts over policy preferences in ethnic blocs configured by non-party political factions would not be so readily visible, but would nevertheless play an important if undisclosed role in the decision-making of the bloc leadership. The importance of factional concerns has been addressed in the literature on party politics and coalition building. Where elections determine the identity of the governing elite, electoral competition becomes the focus of elites (Mayhew 1974:20, Mitchell 2001: 2) albeit to ridicule or delegitimise the elections as a mechanism of appeasement. Usually, the transparency provided by the (often) open schismatic factional competition between distinct political parties creates patterns of elite accommodation within the party system.
as they would within an ethnic bloc. Within-bloc factional coalitions form in a similar manner to those formulated in factional or consociational parties common in some party systems. In the case of Japan defined as a factionalised predominant party system, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominates Japanese politics (Lieserson 1968: 70). In this case, political party factions are described as *imprimatur* having the sanction of the party and therefore mainstream or non-mainstream without party sanction (Cox and Rosenbluth 1996: 268).7

The transformation of a standard form of consociationalism between segmental parties to consociationalism within a single (consociational) party assists in assessing within-bloc dynamics. Power sharing within a party, as compared to power-sharing between parties, can be analysed with the help of the concept of the consociational party (Bogaards 2002: 10). A consociational party is described as one made up of separate organisational entities that function as a unity (usually) in the context of multi-party elections. The alliance party describes a consociational party made up of separate organisational entities that function as a unity in the context of comparative multi-party elections and skilled at vote-pooling (Horowitz 1991). Conversely, the 'congress model' party consisting of factions and/or subnational party organisations representing ethnoplural constituencies and operates within a multi-party system, the congress party model is more a system than a party (Kothari 1964, Lijphart 1996) modelled on the Indian Congress Party and characterised by a system of consensus that has assumed dominance. The congress party model illustrates schismatic factionalism, whereas the alliance party model suggests more pervasive factionalism. There is a plurality in the form of factions, internal competition is sustained and factions from outside the
consensus are absorbed making it a ‘continuing accommodation of interests’ performed
by way of ‘conciliation machinery’ (Kothari 1964: 1168, Bogaards 2002: 8). The study
of consociational intra-party dynamics illustrates the significance of within-bloc factional
dynamics and provides a model to adapt to ethnic bloc factional segments.

The Israeli case proves valuable as the ethnic bloc (broadly) corresponds with the
political party system. Israel’s low electoral threshold of 1.5 per cent allows for the
inclusion of an array of perspectives, voice is given to single issue preferences and there
are often one-man list parties (Hirschman 1970). Israel is described as having a
consociational party system (Lijphart 1985: 61, Lijphart 1999, Arian 1999, Hazan
1999b). In considering the effective number of parties (to influence the creation of a
cabinet (Taagepera 2002)) within the Israeli system, the nature of factional
accommodation among party elites is important for assessing the flexible legitimacy of
the bloc leadership. As a result factionalised and coalition parties tend to be counted as
‘one and half parties in terms of effectiveness’; the same description is provided for
closely aligned parties (Lijphart et al. 1999: 33). The nature of elite accommodation and
the degree of party factionalisation is addressed when considering the effective numbers
of parties in a party system. As Lijphart argues:

a three party system in which all three parties are completely independent entities is more
fragmented than a three party system (with the same party sizes) in which one of the
parties is highly factionalised. Conversely, a three-party system in which all three parties
are completely independent entities is more fragmented than when two of the parties are
closely and perpetually allied with each other. (Lijphart et al. 1999: 33)
In the same manner, changes in the instituted pattern of factional accommodation (whether broadly schismatic or pervasive) within the ethnic bloc reflect the degree of leadership latitude or autonomy. In the case of Israeli political parties, the description of party effectiveness is reflected in the ideological placement or positioning of the parties. A shift in the traditional nature and direction of elite accommodation in ethnic blocs, whether from schismatic to pervasive or pervasive to schismatic, charts the ideological diversity (distance or proximity) of insurgent factional elites to the incumbent leadership.

Insurgent challenges to the leadership become more explicit when ideological diversity within the bloc is great (Sartori 1999: 14). Assessing the ideological proximity of the ethnic bloc to the incumbent elite provides a gauge as to whether the tendency within the bloc membership is centrifugal or centripetal. For example, the emergence of the Hamas faction within the Palestinian bloc threatened the traditional pattern of pervasive factional competition within the bloc. Unable to co-opt the religious and ideologically distinct Hamas elite into the secular and ideologically proximate factions within the ‘catch-all’ PLO, the pattern of factional competition within the Palestinian bloc became more schismatic. Open competition between the PLO leadership and Hamas created a new pattern of factional competition based on divergent ideological preferences. The monopoly of ideology held by the PLO leadership was challenged and traditional modes of accommodating such challenges were ineffectual. Open competition between schismatic factions within the Palestinian bloc threatened the incumbent regime.
2.3 Ideology

Elite assertions to the monopoly of legitimacy and authority within a bloc include claims on the monopoly of ideology. Defining the ethnic bloc as a coalition of groups united in minimal consensus regarding a shared ethnic goal or aspiration highlights the importance of within-bloc dynamics. Ethnic preferences are deemed to be intense and non-negotiable (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972: 66). Party leaders are vulnerable to outflanking by rival ethnic parties claiming to be the ‘authentic voice’ of the bloc (Wilkinson 2000: 3). It requires that the incumbent elite can guarantee its autonomy when challenges to existing orthodoxy in bloc ideology or identity occur. The ability of the leadership to maintain and secure an ideological or value consensus is vital in order to counter any schismatic factional challenge to its elite autonomy (Putnam 1993).

Ethnic bloc ideology forms the basis for bloc consensus. Competing over bloc ideology threatens the cohesion of the bloc’s core resource. Maintaining the monopoly over ideology constrains the ability of the bloc leadership to negotiate comprehensive agreements with the opposing bloc’s leadership. In comprehensive peace settlements, bloc incumbents effectively adopt the policy that ‘their competitions will no longer be driven by principles’ (Higley and Burton 1998: 100).

A high degree of leadership autonomy is required in order to reach inter-ethnic bloc agreements as the features of the bargain may constitute a shift that challenges bloc ideology and threatens the minimal consensus aspiration that forms the basis of bloc cohesion. Maintaining the monopoly of ideology is important for ensuring the continued
existence of elite authority as ethnic-bloc actors 'attribute far deeper meaning to the historical battles that define collective identities than to the transient conflicts of daily politics' (Katzenstein 1996: 8). Comprehensive settlements can be more readily achieved when elites are 'relatively free to strike heretical bargains ... and avoid backlashes' (Grzymala-Busse 2001: 88, Higley and Burton 1998: 100). Any challenge to the leadership's advocacy of the legitimate ethnic bloc ideology threatens the authority of the incumbent elite and heightens within-bloc conflict (Lindholm-Schulz 1999: 73). The failure of the leadership to co-opt ideological dissenters (usually schismatic factions (parties) as opposed to pervasive factions) suggests a shift has occurred in the pattern of accommodation within the bloc.

The ideological proximity or distance of the schismatic faction is significant in anticipating what if any accommodation can be found between the incumbent elite and the insurgent faction. Whether the faction adheres to the Weltanschauung model of politics, in which the group seeks to 'make the world conform to their basic philosophy or world-view' (Lipset 1959: 92–4) alters the ethnic bloc regime dynamic. Factional adherents of the Weltanschauung model are not likely to be integrated into the bloc leadership. Within-bloc competition is not perceived as a competition for resources but rather an ideological belief in the truth of the preferences of the faction and the inherent error in the world view of the incumbent elite (Lipset 1959: 93). In the Palestinian bloc, the emergence of Hamas is a case in point. In this instance patterns of elite accommodation or integration fail to transcend the ideological cleavage.

The autonomy or 'leadership latitiude' of the incumbent ethnic bloc leadership, (Horowitz, 2000: 574) is related to the degree of freedom it has from the constraints
imposed by the institutional and structural features of the bloc and from associated within-bloc factional conflict. Moreover, this thesis argues inter-ethnic bargaining is driven towards enhancing the internal bloc status of the bloc elite. Intra-ethnic factional imperatives influence (Wolfers 1962: 103) and drive inter-ethnic bargaining, shape the conduct of the ethnic-bloc elites, and the nature of the elite bargain.

The existence of intra-ethnic competitive conflict is perceived to have an ambivalent effect on the overall regulation of the ethnic conflict. The literature reveals that violent conflict within ethnic blocs reduces inter-ethnic conflict (Horowitz 2000: 598). Ethnic conflict actors are perceived to have only a determined amount of resources and violent conflict within the bloc reduces the capability for inter-ethnic violence (Coser 1956). This affords greater significance to the nature of intra-ethnic conflict.

If conflict within the bloc is violent, it deflects the attention and resources of the bloc from engaging in violent conflict with the opposing ethnic bloc. If, however, conflict within the bloc is a consequence of schismatic factionalism that is open factionalism between ethnic bloc elites, usually over dominance of the bloc and with political power imperatives, it can exacerbate ideological distance between the elites, within the bloc and result in a bloc wide directional shift towards centrifugal competition (Sartori 1977: 121, Lijphart 1977: 165). As a result, violence threatens the bloc leadership’s authority, alters the leadership’s transaction costs (those of making, monitoring and enforcing agreement between leaders), and changes inter-bloc incentives, often exacerbating existing inter-ethnic tensions. The relationship between inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts is complicated as noted in the following excerpt:
[1] Inter-ethnic conflict may be reduced by arrangements that emphasise intra-ethnic conflict instead. Intra-ethnic conflict is usually (though not always) less dangerous and violent than inter-ethnic conflict. If intra-ethnic conflict becomes more salient, this may reduce the energy available for conflict with other groups ... Some sub-ethnic conflict, however, is conducive to a species of intra-ethnic party competition that tends to exacerbate inter-ethnic conflict. (Horowitz 2000: 598)

The susceptibility of ethnic elites to within-bloc conflict, however, runs contrary to the assumption that ethnic-blocs are unitary actors. Ethnic groupings have been described as coalitions based on sub-ethnic ties often with niche monopolies (Olzak 2002). The proposition advanced here is that ethnic-blocs are a configuration of factions rather than unitary actors and are only occasionally coalitions. The incentives for bloc leaderships to negotiate inter-ethnic agreements are subject to the degree and direction of competition within the bloc, whether or not elite competition adheres to traditional pervasive factionalism among imprimatur factional elites or whether open competition between schismatic non-mainstream factions influences the ‘leadership latitude’ or autonomy they possess.
2.4 Legitimacy

The preferences of leadership elites, when attempting to regulate ethno-national conflict, are weighed by their motivation for asserting or securing their authority within their respective ethnic-blocs.\textsuperscript{10} The focus on leadership autonomy in the literature highlights the importance of – usually self-designated – bloc leaders who are able to represent and negotiate for the bloc while having the power to implement any decision made. The leadership is deemed to have the \textit{de facto} monopoly of ‘legitimate concern’ or power within a bloc. Autonomy does not characterise ethnic-bloc leaderships. It is the pursuit of leadership autonomy through legitimacy, the desire for greater leadership latitude affording power and prestige and the impact of certain institutional factors in this pursuit that characterises ethnic-bloc leaderships.

The claim for legitimacy usually ‘involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are most appropriate’ (Lipset 1959: 86). The claim for legitimacy among leaderships refers to the activity of gaining authority and greater autonomy. The greater the degree of legitimacy or support achieved, the greater the leadership autonomy. Contemporary considerations of ‘new civil wars’ (Kalyvas 2001: 101) attribute the declining importance of ideology in legitimating the position of protagonists and competing factions arguing instead that there is no longer any need to legitimise actions of factions viewed as ‘warrior gangs’ (Enzensberger 1994: 22-30). Protracted ethnic conflict and attempts to regulate it, however, can lead to challenges to the autonomy of an incumbent leadership if it is
perceived as unable to defend or protect the bloc it represents or if a challenging faction has a greater capacity.

Conversely, negotiated inter-ethnic bargains can sometimes increase and endorse the legitimacy of the elite if it is apparent the leadership is able to defend, protect and advance the position of the bloc. The nature of the bargain or agreement reached is influenced by the desire to create input-oriented and/or output-oriented legitimacy arguments. Whether the elite is primarily concerned with generating the means of executing good government and instituting the necessary structures and procedures or whether the elites is preoccupied with securing its legitimacy by creating elite power enabling and action enabling features of government (Scharpf 2003: 3).

Legitimising actions often have unintended consequences and in inter-ethnic bloc agreements are no exception. Consensual inter-bloc elite agreements which alter the parameters of the existing conflict dynamic can, however, also result in factional shifts. Resulting changes in inter-bloc conflict dynamics can threaten incumbent elite autonomy, making it vulnerable to new factional challenges emerging from the new conflict dispensation. In short, the incentives for the incumbent elites centre on maintaining the leadership authority position while minimising and marginalising the constraints on leadership autonomy most commonly manifest as factional threats.

The traditional patterns of elite accommodation in the bloc influence the degree to which the incumbent bloc elite or leadership can make decisions and gain the acceptance and compliance of its support base. Within-bloc support can depend upon the leaders’ strategies and policies. The ability of the incumbent elite to gain or maintain support for a policy or agreement is based on the ability of disaffected bloc members to shift their
support from the leadership to that of a challenging faction. A fixed support base refers to the inability of dissenters to alter their affiliation or support.¹¹

The configuration of the bloc, the extent to which a consensus exists over shared preferences or ‘values’ among the ethnic group members (Scharpf 1997: 43) is important because it signifies a potential shift in the support of the masses or people (demotic) in the bloc. Any change in bloc support for the leadership threatens its position and escalates the threat of a factional challenge. Divisions or splits within the bloc may occur less because of leadership loss of previously maintained unity and more because of prevailing factions and pre-existing divisions become schismatic and open competition within the bloc ensues (Rose 1964: 45). An example of this is illustrated in the Irish case where the existing configuration of the predominantly nationalist Irish bloc was altered by encroaching Irish Republicanism in the guise of the Sinn Fein party. The incumbent Irish government and leadership of the bloc feared that the ‘underbidding’ or moderation of Republicans made manifest in the changing policies of Sinn Fein combined with the increasing radicalisation of the Nationalist electorate provoked by continuing alienation of Catholics in Northern Ireland was encroaching on the support of the Northern Ireland nationalist party the SDLP. As Garret FitzGerald observes:

The hunger strikes tempted Sinn Fein into the political field with the success of the H block candidates and they thought they could in fact win a majority of the nationalist community vote in NI, while continuing the campaign of violence and thereby gain a new credibility that might force the British hand, perhaps even to raising things to civil war level in NI with a mandate from the majority of nationalists. That was our fear, the whole forum and Anglo Irish negotiation was designed to block that and focus nationalist loyalty sufficient to pull opinion back, that worked.¹²
The fear of a centrifugal shift to republicanism mobilised the Irish government to work with SDLP. Ideologically, the SDLP was closer to the existing parties within the Irish political system advocating a United Ireland by consensual means.

This approach was closely paralleled by that of the moderately nationalist Fine Gael party in governing coalition with the Labour party of Ireland. In a bid to address the open challenge posed by Sinn Féin, the broadly nationalist parties agreed to convene a New Ireland Forum. The objective of this forum being: ‘to reverse a trend within the nationalist community towards SF dominance’¹³ and ‘to establish a working consensus over the parameters of a New Ireland and the negotiating terms acceptable to the majority’¹⁴ of the party elites. Consensus was delayed, hedged and modified by the most ideologically Republican of the entire Forum’s parties, Fianna Fail. The Fianna Fail party attempted to maximise the benefits of the Forum by challenging the positions of the moderately nationalist parties while simultaneously securing its position as a moderate choice for Republican bloc members otherwise predisposed to support Sinn Féin. The two-level game played by Fianna Fail, the main opposition challenger to the incumbent government – affiliating with the moderately nationalist parties while simultaneously reasserting its Republican credentials – resulted in schismatic division as a pervasive and prevailing faction within the party, the conservative and moderately nationalist faction of Fianna Fail, seized the opportunity to challenge the Fianna Fail leadership openly and create a new political party known as the Progressive Democrats.¹⁵

The potential for ethnic bloc members to shift support from the incumbent elite’s ‘constituency’ to that of a challenging faction, and the ability of the leadership to appeal to their supporters, are a measure of the maintenance of the leadership’s bloc authority.
Popular support for the incumbent elite is associated with two interrelated factors: intra-ethnic outbidding and bloc mobilisation. Intra-ethnic outbidding refers to the nature of intra-ethnic factional competition and the ability of factional elites to 'outbid' one another in order to exploit shifting bloc membership values and constituencies (Mitchell 1995). Intra-ethnic outbidding occurs explicitly in schismatic factional competition when two or more factional elites (often political parties) compete for bloc support. When outbidding occurs, each factional elite promotes increasingly extreme positions, which in turn alter the leadership's incentives towards inter-ethnic bargaining and negotiation (Kaufman 1996: 109). 'Outbidding' prevails when leaderships and elites have political (and ideological) space to shift within the ethno-national bloc (Horowitz 2000: 359).

The power to outbid within-bloc rivals relies on an elastic bloc, where bloc loyalties are liable to shift, usually in response to mobilisation. Mobilising the bloc can alter its configuration and alter the fixed nature of bloc support. In response, the incumbent bloc elite threatened by changes in the tendency of the bloc to alter the shared consensus can attempt to outbid its immediate within-bloc rivals in order to restrict challenges to the existing bloc order (Gagnon 1996). In this study, bidding is used to assist in qualifying the centrifugal nature of competition among factions within blocs and the effect of underbidding or centripetal competition in arriving at inter-ethnic agreements.
2.5 Mobilisation

The second feature of elite accommodation is mobilisation (Grove 2001: 361). Elements of schismatic factionalism, centrifugal competition and outbidding arise during a period of ethnic mobilisation within a protracted conflict. Two types of mobilisation can arise and are not mutually exclusive, and they may be exhibited at different phases within the same conflict. The 'classical model' develops when the position of the incumbent elite is more extreme than that of the average ethnic-bloc member, creating incentives for the elites to modify and moderate positions.

The second model develops when the position of the individual is more extreme than the position of the incumbent ethnic-bloc elite (Meadwell 1993: 241). In the second case, leadership moderation increases disaffection among factional challengers, creates elasticity, and weakens the autonomy of the incumbent elite, reorienting the monopoly of within-bloc power. The threat to the leadership may result in an attempt to accommodate the disaffected members and cadres who may be inclined to support factional challengers. The mobilisation crisis may prompt an initiative to accommodate pervasive factional elite challengers in a forum where grievances can be aired internally, thereby modifying dissent and censoring open competition.

The process of mobilisation illustrates the leadership constraints shared by actors in each ethnic bloc that are built into a system of ethnic conflict regulation. When support for the leadership is relatively fixed, less incentive exists to engage in within-bloc accommodation when factional challenges are made. The capacity for both mobilisation models to exist within the ethnic-bloc dynamic at different times constrains leadership
autonomy and creates a ‘follow me, I’m right behind you’ dynamic between elites and the members of the bloc.¹⁶

A change in the orientation of the bloc influences the incumbent elite’s monopoly power and allows factional elites to compete for authority over the bloc. The mechanisms of electoral outbidding and bloc mobilisation constrain the status of the incumbent elite and impact their autonomy. The impact of shifting bloc support on the bloc leaders’ negotiating preferences reveals the ethnic-bloc as diverse and segmented. The vulnerability of the leadership to these dynamics is influenced by its capacity to mobilise external resources, the ability of external actors or resources to mobilise the bloc and the dependence of the bloc elites on external actors. The third influential factor on elite bargaining incentives deals with elite dependence on external resources. Prevalent in maintaining the autonomy and authority of the leadership is the ability to regulate the impact of fluctuating legitimacy. The legitimacy afforded to incumbents by external and international actors is subject to the interests of the external actors and the effects on elite incentives.

External recognition can guarantee the incumbent elite authority and status when it is the sole financial benefactor of the relationship of external sponsor within the bloc (Bercovitch 1986, Pechota 1971). This third influential factor of external resource dependence can be decisive when intra-factional elites compete for recognition and external actors seek to influence the dynamics of the bloc by favouring elite challengers (formally, financially or otherwise) over the incumbent. The utility of external actor recognition can be variable and often unpredictable. The incentives of external actors are often unclear. They may ascribe legitimacy to elite challengers to promote regime
change within the ethnic bloc, usurp the influence of the bloc leadership or acquiesce to the demands of its own domestic constituency and factional challenges. This can create vicious circles of political distrust and coercion (Putnam 1993). External recognition for pervasive factional challengers can exacerbate divisions, altering the pattern of elite accommodation – from pervasive to schismatic – within the bloc and create schismatic or open competition when insurgents have access to resources prejudicing their abilities to challenge the existing regime and to constrain its autonomy (Byman et al. 2001).

When ethnic bloc leaders rely on one or more external actors the likelihood of an imposed inter-ethnic bargain is said to increase, particularly when one or more external actors are prepared to act as co-sponsors and guarantors for the bargain reached (Walter 2002: 26). External co-sponsors can therefore influence elite incentives to reach agreement and shape the nature of the agreement reached. Conflict regulation efforts have, however, increasingly emphasised the role of the bloc elite or autonomous leaders in negotiating agreements for the regulation of ethnic conflict, advocating consociationalism as a device both in terms of process and institutional structure for regulating inter-ethnic conflict.

Consociationalism and power sharing inter-bloc accommodations can provide for a consensus agreement between the incumbent elites of the respective ethnic blocs while including the insurgent elites within the divided ethnic blocs. Inter-ethnic grand coalitions have been addressed in the consociational literature (Lijphart 1968, 1977, 1997). Inter-ethnic-bloc patterns of accommodation that appeal to the demands made at the ethnic-bloc or group level, such as consociationalism or power sharing, often require the need for external actors as guarantors or co-sponsors. The consociational literature
addresses the instruments and mechanisms of power sharing between conflict groups. Consociational bargains or power-sharing arrangements provide for a consensus agreement between the incumbent elites of the divided ethnic blocs as well as a device in terms of process and institutional structure for regulating inter-ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, in the negotiation of inter-ethnic agreements, as well as in consociational arrangements, the freedom of incumbent bloc leaders to negotiate and enter into agreements is taken for granted, assuming the following contingencies:

that political elites enjoy a high degree of freedom of choice, and that they may resort to consociational methods of decision-making as a result of the rational recognition of the centrifugal tendencies inherent in plural societies and a deliberate effort to counter act these dangers. (Lijphart 1977: 165)

Defined as an association of communities, consociation is the outcome of a bargain or pact between representative political leaders of ethnic or religious groups in deeply divided societies (Lustick 1979: 328, O’Leary 1998: 2). Based on four criteria, consociationalism requires cross community representation in the executive by way of grand coalition, concurrent representation across blocs and pluralitarian levels of support. Conventionally outlined, consociationalism requires: (1) the participation of representatives of all significant groups; (2) the proportionality principle to serve as the basic standard of political representation; (3) a high degree of community autonomy or self-government; and (4) minority veto rights to protect their interests (Lijphart 1997: 495). The central factor for successful power sharing requires co-operation among elites capable of accommodating divergent interests and factional demands with the ability to
transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival ethno-national blocs. The capacity of the incumbent bloc leadership, in turn, depends on its commitment to the maintenance of the regime and to the maintenance of existing modes of accommodation while recognising the ‘perils of political fragmentation’ (Lijphart 1969: 216). Within consociationalism, a critical role is attributed to incumbent ethnic bloc leaders. The final feature of conventional consociationalism is the representation of community autonomy and minority veto rights.

The pattern of inter-ethnic accommodation is matched in the quasi-consociational features adopted within ethnic blocs in order to alleviate factionalism. Evidence of this may be found in Israel, where the Israeli political system and its party system have been described as functioning on quasi-consociational grounds. Based on four criteria, this form of quasi-consociational arrangement (within rather than between groups) regulates open competition and creates pervasive factions as it requires the participation of all significant subgroup representatives within the bloc elite or leadership to enable power sharing between aspiring elites, becoming an elite coalition of the respective subgroup leaders within the bloc (Lijphart 1997: 495). The proportionality principle of consociationalism serves as the basic standard of political representation between groups and is adapted in internal or in-group consociational attempts to the representation of factions within the institutions and structures of the ethnic bloc. The ‘umbrella’ institutions of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation function on this basis.

Within ethnic blocs, the autonomy of subgroups exists in their niche (religious, ideological, cultural) or geographical monopolies; the difficulties with autonomy and factionalism arise when the groups attempt to challenge the elite and dominate the ethnic
bloc. Successful power-sharing within blocs necessitates the capacity of the incumbent bloc elite to accommodate divergent interests and factional challenges (Lijphart 1969: 216). Similarly, the internal organisational aspects influencing conflict regulation have been addressed in the study of corporatism (Lehmbruch 1993). It has been argued that corporatist arrangements in Western Europe were less successful in states that lacked monopolistic trade unions (Scharpf 1997: 235).

In negotiated conflict regulation, ethnic bloc leaders initiate the bargain or arrangement reached, suggesting that ‘it is within the confines of the political elites that many of [the] explanatory variables are presumably to be found’ (Nordlinger 1972: 40). The ethnic-bloc leadership, however, often ‘has limited freedom to choose its own path’ (Horowitz 2000: 574). Analysing within-bloc relations identifies the mechanisms that mitigate elite autonomy and create intra-ethnic conflict. The dynamics that influence and mobilise ethnic bloc challenges to the incumbent elite induce intra-ethnic factionalism (Gagnon 1996). The incentives for incumbent bloc leaderships to negotiate inter-ethnic agreements are subject to the degree of within-bloc competition conditioning the degree of leadership autonomy they possess. Assessing the dynamics of factions within blocs provides greater insights into the nature of elite or leadership autonomy. The examination of factions is motivated by this literature on consociationalism, coalition formation and party competition.
2.6 Factions

If leaders are the central actors and decision-makers in negotiated bargains then it follows that any influence on their performance from factionalism is in turn likely to influence the nature of the agreement or bargain reached. Factionalism refers to conflict within a bloc which ‘leads to the increasing abandonment of co-operative activities’ (Siegel and Beals 1960a: 399). Ethnic blocs hinge on co-operative activities and broad consensus. Any deviation in the tentative concordat that constitutes the bloc alters the nature of the bloc regime. Within-bloc conflicts escalate when factional elites crave a particular seat of power or compete to be the provider of benefits for the bloc membership. If all incumbents have rivals, ethnic blocs are a constellation of factions defined as any group within the bloc that seeks to exert authority over it (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 16, Rose 1964: 36), with a ruling elite who ‘to some degree exercise power and influence over other [factional] actors’ (Dahl 1958: 465). Factional dominance is not permanently fixed; leaders can continue to lead only so long as they have followers (Barry 1975: 396). Disaffection within the established elites can result in the emergence of an insurgent schismatic counter elite faction openly challenging the incumbent leadership (Enloe 1977: 152). The ramifications of intra competition for dominance of a particular ethnic group can alter the traditional inter-bloc rivalry and the nature of the inter-ethnic conflict.

The way in which ethnic blocs cultivate their common interests and manage internal conflicts influences the effectiveness of the bloc leaders’ ability to lead. As is the case with the formation of coalition governments, internal bloc competition and conflict constrains the degree of elite autonomy in negotiating inter-ethnic conflict-regulating
frameworks as the leaders bargaining inter-ethnic agreements have incentives to adapt transaction costs (Scharpf 1997: 117) by structuring the agreements in particular ways: ‘When uncertainty and the threat of [within bloc elite] opportunism generate large transaction costs’ leaders have an incentive to seek restrictive agreements or limited bargains (Lupia and Strom 2003: 13, Maor 1998: 11). Therefore, the nature of the ethnic-bloc dynamic in divided societies means that any inter-bloc bargaining presents controversy.

The focus on factions is based not only on the coalition structure of ethnic blocs but also on the characteristics of ethnic-bloc actors. These within-bloc actors, while distinct, tend to share the same objective of within-bloc power. Although tactics may differ, the goal of the faction and the object of a factional challenge involves gaining or regaining leadership and predominance within the bloc. As parties constitute an essential part of the institutional machinery and policy-making process in a state, so within-bloc factions seek to control bloc organisation and to shape and dictate the policy of the ethnic bloc (Zariski 1960: 38).

In the party literature in which a political party may be defined as ‘a large-scale organisation whose purpose is to control the personnel and policies of the government’, factions have been defined as ‘an element inside a party whose purpose is to control the personnel and policies of the party’ (Ranney and Kendall 1956). In cases of inter-ethnic conflict, bloc participants can be both factions and parties, in ethnic bloc regime dynamics, political parties tend to represent elite accommodation where open competition is prevalent and factional autonomy is greatest. Open competition suggests a decentralised ethnic bloc where schismatic factionalism between distinct groups exists as
the means of factional competition within the bloc. In blocs where elite accommodation is instigated openly, there tends to be a substantial degree of distance between the ideology and preferences of the incumbent elite and those of its challengers. Blocs centrally organised with peak association and rigid hierarchy tend to exhibit more pervasive factionalism, and institute internal accommodatory mechanisms sanctioning ‘imprimatur’ factions. In blocs with internal accommodatory mechanisms there tends to be greater ideological proximity between factions and a traditional pattern of internal elite accommodation. To accommodate these characteristics, ethnic bloc actors’ factions are broadly described as any organisational unit of political competition that seeks to gain authority over the bloc (Rose 1964: 37, Lawson, 1979: 1170) and more specifically referred to as schismatic or pervasive.

These distinctions allow for the inclusion of political parties while providing a scope in which to reveal the significance of intra-party cleavages and cadres. Similarly, the non-‘governing’ or insurgent, as opposed to incumbent, factional actors within national liberation movements (some with quasi-political or militaristic features) are included. The use of a factional analysis allows comparison between the often diverse configurations of actors in the respective ethnic blocs, allowing for the inclusion of political parties, liberation movements and other organisations, equating factional elites with one another.

In inter-ethnic bloc negotiation, the incumbent representative bloc elite initiatives may differ in their bargaining preferences; nevertheless the between-bloc leaders are driven by a shared desire to maintain and enhance the primacy of their leadership positions within their respective ethnic-blocs. This requires an examination of the
features and characteristics of within-bloc dynamics and the role of factions, namely, a self-conscious organisation whose membership or affiliation maintains a measure of discipline, operating socially with a degree of persistence over time. The features outlined distinguish factions from loosely connected tendencies and provide an analysis of the determinants of ethnic bloc structure and the social, religious, or ideological composition of the faction (Zaiski 1960: 43). The social or membership composition of the faction refers to the perception of factions as niche monopolies based on geographical or sub-ethnic ties combined with peak associational, institutional, and organisational arrangements with a large degree of autonomy (Hobsbawm 1990: 12).

Factions operate within the associational, institutional and organisational features of the ethnic blocs. The three dynamics of bloc configuration, traditions of elite accommodation and the role of external resource dependence exercise influence over ethnic bloc elite incentives in inter-ethnic bargaining.

Just as the unitary actor theory has long been upheld in coalition theory, although in the reality of a coalition it is not realistic (Timmermans 2003: 11), the notion of ethnic blocs as unitary actors constrains the ability of students of ethnic conflict to consider the dynamics that shape and influence the incentives of ethnic bloc leaders to bargain for minimal and limited or maximal and comprehensive bargains. Nordlinger’s study of the structural predominance of elites and Horowitz’s assertion that the consideration of elite mechanisms requires an assessment of the variables related to group structure and competition (as well as Zartman’s ‘theory of timing’ and associated features of mutually hurting stalemate and ripeness described above), as incentives for elite cooperation (Horowitz 2000: 574). This study advocates the analysis of factional dynamics
as a means of considering the imperative for examining elite incentives to reach minimal and limited or maximal and comprehensive bargains in the regulation of ethnic conflict.
Colluding to exclude the PLO: the 1978 Camp David Accords

Introduction

The Camp David Accords of 1978 between Egypt and Israel (and facilitated by the United States) exemplify an inter-ethnic elite bargain. The Accords consist of two distinct and independent documents agreed in tandem and paradoxically nested one within the other (Tsebelis 1990a, 1990b). For political reasons, the two agreements could not have been agreed independently although they have no bearing on each other in terms of implementation. The first document charts a Framework for Peace in the Middle East and invites other parties to the Middle East conflict to ‘adhere to it’.¹ The second document is a concise and exacting Framework for a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel and functions as a bilateral security pact. The Camp David Accords were less of an Agreement to initiate peace (Princen 1991: 57) than an accommodation defined as ‘some form of agreement reached with terms, but does not entail that they take a particular form’ (Barry 1975a: 396).

The readily agreed document that provoked the Accords was the Framework for Peace between Egypt and Israel. Israel’s agreement to withdraw from the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula acquired after the 1967 war was rewarded with the promise of complete Egyptian recognition of Israel and the establishment of full diplomatic relations. Egypt agreed to recognise Israel and, as the first Arab State to do so, created a precedent for other states to follow suit; in return, Egypt’s territorial integrity was restored with the
return of Sinai. The agreement or rather this part of what became known as the Camp David Accords has been maintained for 25 years. Agreed within six years of the last of three wars fought between Egypt and Israel, the bilateral pact between Egypt and Israel provided Egypt with increased economic and military aid from the United States, allowing the return of Sinai from Israel. The agreement provided recognition for Israel, creating a negotiation precedent, the maintenance of the West Bank and a diminished sense of threat. The difficulties arose concerning the second document, the Framework for Peace in the Middle East.

The Framework for Peace in the Middle East was a residual document, a compromise and face-saving arrangement, agreed after failed attempts to renew the inconclusive multilateral Geneva Conference of 1973 (Aruri 2003: 55). The Agreement was necessary to deflect criticism from Egypt for agreeing to what was in essence a bilateral agreement with Israel. The Agreement also allowed an American unilateral peacemaking and regional advantage over its rival superpower, the Soviet Union. Signing two agreements allowed Egypt to assert its role as Arab world leader and to encourage other Arab states to participate in the framework for a comprehensive peace agreement. The criticism unleashed on Egypt after the Accords were signed in September 1978 would undoubtedly have been greater internationally had the Agreement only been a single minimal, bilateral security pact with Israel, the signing of the bilateral agreement was delayed until March 1979.

The Framework for a Middle East peace was meant to address core conflict concerns, in particular the problem of Palestine, and provided legitimacy to the Egyptian initiative. The Framework for Middle East peace also appeased heightened American
concerns over its regional influence in light of escalating instability in both Iran and Afghanistan and allowed Israel to begin a process of normalisation in the Middle East. The aspirational framework for a comprehensive peace provided a pragmatic exclusive and partial Egyptian–Israeli security proposal.

The Accords were signed on the same day 17 September 1978, under the auspices of the United States government and reflect the outcome of 13 days spent at the presidential Camp David retreat by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to redress 30 years of hostility. The negotiations were unprecedented and the first of this kind of the era and the personalities of the participants later dominated accounts of the negotiations and were perceived to dominate outcomes.

The Camp David environment created a negotiating precedent; the respective negotiators were secluded from external distractions; meetings were held late at night and while the Egyptians and Israelis met formally twice during their time at Camp David, the role of the American facilitators was to shuttle between the two groups drafting and amending proposals. The negotiations were held in a news blackout and the impetus to reach agreement was reinforced by American President Jimmy Carter.

Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizmann, Israel’s foreign and defence ministers respectively, were instrumental in persuading Prime Minister Begin to agree (provisional on the endorsement of the Israeli Knesset) to the removal of the Israeli Yamit settlement at Rafah in Sinai (Maoz and Maor 2002: 158) as part of a complete Israeli withdrawal from the peninsula and to recognise the ‘legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’ without reference to the word ‘national’ (Dayan 1981, Sayigh 1979). The Egyptian elite, however, functioned differently. The resignation of Ismail Fahmy, the Egyptian deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, in 1977 is attributed to the decision by President Sadat to make an unprecedented visit to Jerusalem and the Israeli Knesset in order to initiate a public dialogue with Israel which was previously unthinkable to the Arab States (Volkan 1997: 30). The subsequent resignation of the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Muhammad Kamel, and the Egyptian delegation's principal legal advisor, Nabil al-Arabi, on the day the Camp David Accords were signed, was attributed to both men being unable to bear responsibility for President Sadat's concessions to Israel (Kamel 1986: 363). The diversity between the modes of interaction within each negotiating team is illustrative of the distinct dynamics within each grouping the Egyptian (as the incumbent bloc elite for Pan Arabism and the Palestinians in particular) and Israeli (Dayan 1981, Fahmy 1983). The Accords were received in equal measure as a negotiating failure and success.

The Egyptian resignations arose from the Framework for Peace for the Middle East Agreement and the willingness of Egyptian President Sadat to withdraw from Arab consensus and negotiate with Israel. President Sadat's strategy was rewarded with Israel's recognition of the Egyptian government as the representative leadership of the Arab ethno-national bloc and endorsing the legitimacy of the Egyptian government to the exclusion of competing factional elites, such as the PLO. Egypt's increasing alignment with American policy and access to American resources endorsed the legitimacy of Sadat as leader, and Egypt as acceptable representative of the Arab world, in the eyes of the rest of the world.

The decision of the Israeli, Likud-led government to relinquish land won in battle conflicts with party ideology and its aspirations for Eretz Yisrael and threatened to
jeopardise the party’s recent success. The 1967 war had reactivated the temporal concept of Zionism and with it the pre-Independence debate on the ‘desirable boundaries’ of the Jewish state (Lustick 1993: 26, Seliktar 1988: 31). The astute choice of Israeli Prime Minister Begin to recruit Moshe Dayan (the general responsible for winning Sinai and ideologically affiliated with the Labour opposition party) to act as Foreign Minister attempted to fix Israeli support for relinquishing Sinai in favour of securing Israel’s position concerning the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas by virtue of the second Framework for Middle East peace proposals. Equally influenced by dependence on external resources, Israel hoped that by complying with the negotiations, it would ensure American security guarantees to diminish its strategic vulnerability after the territorial loss of Sinai.

The Accords are best understood as a means for managing a mutual threat posed by the PLO as well as territorial and regional security concerns. The mutual recognition advanced in exchange for additional security guarantees provided and endorsed by the United States increased the negotiating elites’ preferences for the bargain (Maoz and Mor 2002: 217). The influence of factions and the three operative variables on the motivations of the negotiating elites will be considered in this chapter. An examination of the constraints within which these motivations are manifest and the substantive dependence on external resources asserts that the Camp David Accords were driven by elite priorities.

The chapter will first consider the architecture of the Agreement. The institutional and functional ramifications will be compared along with the bargaining positions of the negotiating elites. Secondly, the nature of the Camp David bargain will
be assessed with particular reference to the nested nature of the Agreement and the exclusion and influence of the PLO. Finally, the composition of the ethnic bloc, the tradition of elite accommodation and resource dependence of the respective bloc elites will be considered and the influence of these factions on the nature of the Camp David Accords assessed.

3.2 The architecture of the Agreement

It's been more than 2,000 years since there was peace between Egypt and a free Jewish nation. If our present expectations are realized, this year we shall see such peace again

President Jimmy Carter address to Congress September 18th 1978

The Camp David Agreement was a partial pact. The Agreement formed the basis of a separate, bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel within a framework for a comprehensive settlement of the ‘Arab–Israeli’ conflict in all its aspects, including its root cause, the problem of Palestine (Sayigh 1979: 3). Of the two agreements, ‘the Framework for Peace in the Middle East’ alludes to a comprehensive pact; it is not a peace agreement per se. The framework formed only the procedural basis for peace, establishing principles that would serve as the foundation for negotiations to be conducted later to conclude a peace treaty with Egypt and autonomy for Palestinians. The Agreement was made conditional on the approval of Israel’s Knesset and upon the ratification of Egypt’s parliament. Peace negotiations with Egypt would be conducted and finalised prior to discussions on the Palestinian issue.
The Agreement involved a total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over this territory. In turn, Sinai would be demilitarised under the supervision of United Nations forces, also responsible for ensuring the free passage of shipping through the Gulf of Elat.6 The Israeli objective centred on proceeding towards a normalisation of relations with Egypt. This ‘Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel’7 was the most substantive agreement. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 was accepted and applied to the resolution of dispute between Israel and Egypt. A timescale for implementation of the Agreement was established. Interim withdrawal of Israeli forces would begin between three and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty; Israeli forces would withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish8 to an agreed point. A deadline of two to three years was agreed in order to allow the withdrawal of Israel’s armed forces from Sinai, an exercise of Egyptian sovereignty to the internationally recognised border between Egypt and mandated Palestine. Sinai would be demilitarised with only the United Nations forces stationed in part of the area in Sinai to ensure freedom of passage for shipping through the Strait of Tiran. Access required by Israel was provided by Egypt. The Yamit Israeli settlement in Sinai (a sticking point in the negotiation) would be vacated and both States would recognise their shared border and demilitarised zone. The bilateral feature of the Camp David Accords was transparent and specific.

The Camp David Accord was a two-part minimal bargain. The second part of the Accord consisted of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David. The broader Middle East framework established Israeli-Egyptian and American-agreed

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guidelines for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours on the basis of UN Resolution 242. The appropriate framework for achieving 'a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict' required the involvement of 'all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict'. The framework proposes a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other neighbours prepared to negotiate with Israel on this basis. This framework included the possibility that the representatives of the Palestinian people along with Egypt, Israel and Jordan 'participat[ing] in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects'.

The Framework for Middle East Agreed Peace reached between Egypt and Israel proposed establishing a 'self-governing' authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to replace the existing Israeli military government regime. Authority or self-rule for the Palestinians in these areas would be determined by Egypt, Israel, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian people (the term Palestinian people was explained in a side letter from President Carter to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin as being understood by Israel to mean Palestinian Arabs). The self-governing authority in the Palestinian areas would exercise the powers conferred upon it for a five-year transition period after which time the final status of the West Bank and Gaza would be determined in relation to 'its neighbours'. The powers of the self-governing authority however were not detailed. The responsibilities and powers of Palestinian self-rule would be decided during anticipated negotiations among the parties by consensus. Each interested party (Egypt, Israel and Jordan) had the right of veto on the powers of the proposed self-
governing authority with the exclusion of Palestinian representatives should they participate.

The participation of Palestinian representatives was not mandatory, nor did Egypt or Jordan have to agree to host Palestinians in their delegation. Moreover, the Framework Agreement was drafted without Jordanian consultation and while Jordan’s role was anticipated by the other parties (Egypt, Israel and the USA), it had not been confirmed; Jordan’s inclusion without consent antagonised King Hussein of Jordan and created greater Jordanian antipathy towards Egypt. While the Jordanians were included without consent, the Palestinians likewise could be excluded without consent. Any proposals made by Palestinian members of a delegation (Egyptian, Jordanian) would have to be sanctioned first by its host delegation. Representatives of the Palestinian people would, by virtue of their association with one or more of the states, be required to make proposals through the state with which they were affiliated. Independent Palestinian participation of the people or the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza would be forthcoming in the negotiations for Palestinian ‘self-government’. The participation of the Palestinians attending any negotiations would be by proxy (Sayigh 1979: 8). Should the Palestinians refuse to be represented in this way and as a means of ensuring the implementation of the provisions relating to the West Bank and Gaza ‘in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’, Egypt was prepared to assume the Arab role emanating from the provisions, following consultation with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people.9

The proposal by President Sadat to represent the Palestinian people contradicted the agreed position of the PLO and the leaders within the West Bank and Gaza to the
Camp David proposals. Egypt’s attempt to vouch for the Palestinians flouted the agreed position of the Arab states reached in 1973 at the Arab Summit Conference in Algiers where (with the exception of Jordan), all of the Arab states committed themselves ‘to restor[ing] the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine as will be decided by the PLO’. The subsequent Rabat Arab League Summit in 1974, on this occasion with Jordanian support, confirmed the commitment to restore the national rights of the Palestinian people ‘in accordance with the resolutions that will be accepted by the PLO’. Egypt’s Camp David position to serve as the representative for Palestinian concerns constituted a challenge to the PLO and an attempt to alter the configuration of the Arab, and specifically the Palestinian, bloc. Furthermore, Egypt’s willingness to advocate initiatives for and on behalf of the Palestinians increased polarisation within the Arab bloc.

The Camp David framework proposals for the West Bank and Gaza, while appearing to postpone all decisions until negotiations occurred, nevertheless secured important Israeli concerns. The Israeli military presence in the West Bank and Gaza would persist, although the army would withdraw from the large Palestinian population centres and redeploy elsewhere in the territories in order to maintain Israel’s security interests. Both the anticipated five-year interim self-rule schedule as well as the plan for determining the future of the Palestinian areas in relation to their neighbours established certain precedents. It allowed a previously condemned Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza for five years.

Described as a peace agreement the Accord framework however, omitted core conflict concerns. A series of contentious issues excluded from the framework document
were addressed in a series of letters, stating the position of each negotiating party. The issue of Jerusalem featured not in the framework for peace but rather in the series of position letters between Egypt’s President Sadat, Israel’s Prime Minister Begin and US President Carter. Notwithstanding pressure from Begin to amend the American position on Jerusalem, President Carter reaffirmed the United States’ position on the status of Jerusalem with reference to US policy statements made in 1967 and 1969. In President Carter’s letter, the statements were alluded to rather than repeated. President Sadat’s letter referred to the position of Arab Jerusalem as an integral part of the West Bank and suggested the essential functions of the city should be undivided. The negotiating parties were unable to reach explicit agreement and the issue was consigned to a series of letters; as such, the question of Jerusalem does not form part of the proposed negotiations regarding self-government in the West Bank and Gaza.

The issue of Israeli settlements was one of the most explicitly divisive features of the negotiations at Camp David and subsequently for the Israeli elite (Weizmann 1981: 369). An Israeli assurance was given that ‘during the agreed period of negotiations for the conclusion of the peace treaty, no new settlements [would] be established by the Government of Israel in Sinai, in the Gaza District, and in the area of Judea and Samaria’ [the West Bank]. The ambiguity arose concerning the statement ‘during the agreed period of the negotiations’. It was not clear whether Begin referred to the three-month period prior to the negotiations on which a separate Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty was scheduled as was his intention or whether President Carter’s interpretation of a halt in settlement activity applied to the duration of the negotiations for the period of the planned self-governing authority in the territories (Sharon 1989: 406).
Advocates of the Accords heralded the merits of the framework (Eban 1978: 346). The priority placed on the foundation of all negotiations on the basis of UN Resolution 242 was an important feature of the Accords. Were negotiations to occur the negotiators would recognise the ‘legitimate rights’ of the Palestinian people and efforts would be made to resolve the Palestinian problem.

The reference to Resolution 242, however, is selective; the Camp David Accord fails to incorporate the complete context of the Resolution, excluding the reference to the ‘inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war’ while emphasising that ‘every State in the area can live in security’. The selective application of Resolution 242 is problematic and not unexpected. When the Resolution was first drafted, the definite article ‘the’ existed in the French but not in the English translation of the phrase ‘withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict’ in the sub-paragraph of the operative paragraph one of the resolution (Sayigh R. 1979: 25). The reference to the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people caused controversy, because the tautological nature of the phrase ‘legitimate rights’ was ambiguous (Sayegh F. 1979: 28). The Resolution failed to refer to national rights and only to the more opaque term ‘rights’. Prime Minister Begin referred to the repetition of the words ‘legitimate rights’ as benign.13

The Accord also refers to the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and adopts a three-stage incremental approach in the Framework for Peace Accord. The use of the phrase ‘in all its aspects’ allowed the negotiators the leeway to advocate the final goal most desired by their constituents. The self-rule and self-government references were used by Egyptian President Sadat as synonyms for
Palestinian self-determination whereas for Prime Minister Begin self-rule referred to the administration of local government and the politics of the Palestinian inhabitants of the territories of the West Bank only.

Excluding procedural concerns, the Accord deferred agreement on the issues relating to the Framework for Peace in the Middle East. Important areas of concern were conspicuously absent from the Accord, namely, the final status of Jerusalem, the issue of settlements, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza. The nature of the Camp David bargain provided for the maintenance of that status quo. The proposed withdrawal of Israeli forces made provision for Israeli military and territorial security arrangements as well as its societal security (Buzan 1991) needs. The ideological associations with ‘Judea and Samaria’ constitute a societal security issue for Israel (Lustick 1993: 26). The willingness of Israel to allow a UN force in Sinai while prohibiting the introduction of foreign forces in the West Bank reveals the distinction between the territories and their resonance for Israel. The Sinai Peninsula, defined as a territory acquired under the auspices of war victory, was perceived as a peripheral rather than integral part of Israeli territory. Conversely, the West Bank (referred to as Judea and Samaria) is perceived as being held at the ‘metropolitan centre’ of Israel’s territorial perceptions of the territorial boundaries of the state for adherents to the theory of a Greater Israel (Lustick 1993, O’Leary et al. 2001: 65). The Gaza Strip on the other hand has an anomalous position, under Egyptian control until an Israeli raid in 1955, the Gaza Strip inhabited by Palestinian refugee camps, with limited resources was not perceived by Egypt or Israel as part of the territorial heart of either state and the outcome of the Camp David Accords illustrates this ambiguity (Roy 1995: 103).
As a result of the ideological ambiguities, the location of boundaries proposed in the Frameworks for Peace Accord is associated with the question of settlements in the West Bank and is deferred, to be addressed after the interim period. The question of the sovereignty of the West Bank and Gaza was postponed as was the final status of the West Bank. These core Israeli concerns were noted as Israeli Prime Minister Begin’s ‘three noes’: no to a Palestinian state, no to a plebiscite on the West Bank and Gaza and no negotiations with the PLO (Schindler 1995). The three outlined noes had parallels in the Arab bloc. At the Khartoum Conference in 1967, the Arab States addressed three noes to Israel: no to the recognition of Israel, no to negotiations with Israel, and no to peace with Israel.

Egypt was the first Arab state to break with the Arab consensus against recognising Israel. The Israeli–Egyptian dialogue meant that Egypt had broken with Arab League Policy prohibiting bilateral negotiations with Israel and culminating in Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem; the Israeli Knesset outlined the need for the Framework for a Middle East peace:

Any separate peace between Egypt or Israel, or between any Arab confrontation state and Israel, will not bring permanent peace built on justice in the entire region. Rather, even if peace between all the confrontation states and Israel were achieved, in the absence of a just solution to the Palestinian problem, never will there be a durable and just peace upon which the entire world insists today.15

Sadat’s appeal to the Israeli parliament the Knesset, and to the rest of the Arab world for a multilateral and comprehensive peace encapsulated the core elements of the Carter
Administration's proposals to renew the Geneva Conference first convened to implement the ceasefire after the 1973 war. The results of the 1973 war had created a new impetus for peace. In the aftermath of the war, President Sadat had attempted to renew previous ties with Syria to include Syrian President Hafez al Assad in a coalition for peace. Sadat's efforts failed and the Egyptian embassy in Damascus was bombed in protest at this proposed initiative.

In 1974 at the Palestinian Liberation Organisation National Council (PNC) meeting, the PLO adopted a new political programme. At the twelfth session of the meeting in Cairo, the PNC departed from its previous statements stating it would 'employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestine that is liberated'. The statement no longer called for the immediate elimination of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state over all of Palestine. The change in the PLO's position signalled the desire of the PLO leadership to participate in any negotiation pertaining to peace in the Middle East and the position of the Palestinians in particular. However, contrary to Sadat's Knesset speech and the Geneva Conference proposals, the subsequent Camp David Accords excluded the PLO. The next section considers the exclusive nature of the Accords.
3.3 The nested nature of the Agreement and the exclusion of the PLO

The Framework for Middle East peace was inclusive in design only. The Accord excluded the PLO in spite of preliminary American discussions with the PLO’s Fateh leadership regarding participation and a dialogue regarding the necessary concessions required from the PLO to facilitate its involvement. Instead, the proposed multilateral comprehensive Geneva Conference framework was altered and supplemented with the Camp David Accord. The change in the nature of the proposed bargain can be examined as a consequence of the constraints imposed from within-bloc dynamics as well as the nested nature of the bargain. The term ‘nested’ is borrowed from the literature on nested games and is used here to describe the multi-layered features of constraints involved in the Camp David Accord. The configuration of the ethnic blocs – the Israeli bloc, the Arab bloc (within which the Palestinian bloc was nested) – in this bargain is numerous and their external resource dependence plays an instrumental role in the Accord, framing the nature of the bargain reached. The Cold War dynamic and the role of the USA as facilitator to the Accords altered the parameters of the bargain.

The Geneva Peace Conference of 1973, initially convened to ensure a ceasefire and disengagement after the 1973 war, was heralded as an attempt to secure Arab agreement to dialogue with Israel (Eban 1978: 346). The negotiations initially orchestrated by the USA to facilitate two troop disengagements between Egypt and Israel were successful. The official objective of the Geneva Conference was for a multinational conference including Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians, the USA, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations Proposals for a Geneva Peace Conference based on
UN resolution 338 that called for the immediate opening of negotiations between Israel and the Arab States. The proposed structure of the Geneva Conference involved delegating the USA and the USSR as joint chairs of the talks (Aruri 2003: 55). The joint US–Soviet statement on the Middle East stated that the:

fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its entirety is negotiations within the framework of the Geneva peace conference specifically convened for those purposes, with participation in its work of the representatives of all the parties involved in the conflict including those of the Palestinian people.¹⁸

The reference to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the suggestion of renewed Soviet involvement was opposed by the Israeli and Egyptian governments respectively (Aruri 2003: 456, Katamidze 1989: 10). Within days, a paper formulated by Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and known as the ‘Dayan–Carter working paper’ made clear that acceptance of the joint statement was not a prerequisite for the reconvening of the conference.

Egypt’s President Sadat and King Hussein of Jordan had initially proposed an all-party Geneva Conference with a role for the PLO while rejecting formal peace with Israel as long as it retained occupied land. The joint Egyptian–Jordanian statement reaffirmed recognition of the PLO as the sole Palestinian representative and insisted that it should participate in the talks as an independent interlocutor on par with the other delegations, adding that the process should lead to the creation of an ‘independent Palestinian entity’ (Sayigh 1999: 414). Privately, President Sadat increasingly perceived an all-party Geneva Conference as an intolerably protracted if not dead-end road to peace.¹⁹
Israeli Prime Minister Begin met with President Carter in Washington in July of 1977 and established the Israeli proposals for participation. The 26 points outlined Israel's position and preferences. The Geneva Conference would be held in accordance with Resolutions 338 and 242, with accredited representatives of Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Israel proposed a series of bilateral committee meetings within the framework of multilateral Geneva talks. The issue of Israeli borders and the question of the West Bank were addressed to President Carter in private. Begin asserted that Israel was determined to maintain the West Bank and Gaza but was prepared to 'make significant withdrawal from Sinai' (Dayan 1981: 20).

The US administration's memorandum proposals for the Geneva talks referred to Israel's withdrawal from all fronts and the creation of a Palestinian entity to allow the future realisation of Palestinian self-determination. The Israelis rejected this article of the American memorandum outright; the threat of a Palestinian 'entity' to Israeli security was considered too great when considered with the territorial features of the refugee problem if the Palestinian refugees from 1948 onwards were to have territory that would be under their exclusive control. The proposal that Israel withdraw 'from all fronts' was rejected and Israeli withdrawal was understood to refer to the meaning given in UN Resolution 242, that is 'to mutually agreed, secure and recognised borders'.

The Israeli government prepared working papers and agreed to dialogue with the Palestinians. For the first time, Israel provisionally agreed to discuss issues with Palestinians independently rather than as part of a Jordanian or other delegation. In the interests of the multilateral negotiations in Geneva, Begin initially proposed to President Carter that Israel would not investigate the credentials of the Palestinians who would be
attached to the Jordanian delegation. In agreeing to consider the Geneva negotiations, Israel hoped to gain an American commitment to a long-term defence treaty in exchange for territorial concessions. Israel desired a defence treaty on par with the concrete proposal the American government had provided to NATO, as a security guarantee.²¹

The US impetus for peace encouraged the PLO to initiate communication with ‘dovish’ Israelis interested in opening a dialogue. King Hussein of Jordan renewed the idea of a Palestinian–Jordanian federation and met with the speaker of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) to consider joint concerns. The King was conscious of dialogue between the US administration and the PLO and asked for assurances that any proposed Palestinian entity not include part of Jordan’s East Bank.

PLO leader Yasser Arafat consulted with UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and the PLO opened offices in European capitals in preparation for participation in the Geneva Conference. The basis of the Geneva dialogue was UN resolution 242 and the readiness of the PLO to participate would mean that the PLO would be prepared to acquiesce and co-exist with Israel. The failure of the PLO Charter to recognise Israel or to accept UN Resolution 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiation prohibited the PLO leadership’s participation in Geneva. The PLO leadership had taken the initiative to change the PLO Charter and even held discussions in Egypt over possible amendments to the PLO Charter. The Sadat government, while being seen to acquiesce to the Palestinian leadership’s desire for involvement in the Geneva Conference, was simultaneously thwarting efforts for a united Arab delegation to Geneva.

Egypt was the exception among the Arab states as it was opposed to a united Arab delegation proposed by Syria and was prepared to start negotiations before the convening
of the Geneva Conference. Prior to the proposal of Palestinian PLO representation, President Assad of Syria had suggested that the Palestinians be represented at Geneva by the League of Arab States. The Geneva Conference was thwarted by the concerted efforts of the Israeli and Egyptian governments; the lack of Palestinian representation, Israel’s refusal to withdraw from the West Bank, and a united Arab delegation.

The Geneva initiative was usurped by a unilateral Egyptian action. President Sadat’s decision to address the Knesset in Jerusalem altered the pan-Arab consensus over Israel. The decision to visit Jerusalem constituted a tacit recognition of Israel by Egypt. The decision alienated Egypt from the rest of the Arab bloc of States and increased President Sadat’s leverage in bargaining for Egypt with Israel and the United States. Sadat’s Jerusalem initiative further undermined the prospects for a comprehensive settlement and the United States was eager to be the unilateral powerbroker. Rather than collaborate with the Soviet Union, the USA drove a sole initiative that would alienate the Soviet Union from the Middle East, enabling the USA to acquire dominance in this particular sphere of Cold War influence. The Soviet Union sponsored the Syrian and Iraqi regimes as well as the PLO. It had lost the ‘prize’ Egyptian satellite during Sadat’s Presidency. The Egyptian flirtation with Soviet support was a consequence of Israel’s 1955 raid on Gaza. Gaza had been under Egyptian control and the Gaza raid had a substantial impact on Egyptian foreign policy (Roy 1995: 95). Not only did the raid highlight Egypt’s military weaknesses to Israel, it also constituted a major domestic threat to the incumbent Egyptian regime leading Sadat to illicit military support from the Soviets.
Egypt was now trying to align itself with the United States and disassociate itself from the Soviet Union after twenty years of Soviet support. The repercussions were felt in the failure of the Geneva Conference and the makings of a comprehensive settlement. The origins of the comprehensive settlement required much greater co-operation between the respective actors than the subsequent Camp David Accord. The exclusion of the PLO from the Camp David Accords allowed a bilateral bargain between Egypt and Israel to be negotiated, while setting the procedures for future negotiations concerning the question of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, without the same degree of constraints on the bargaining elites as would have been the case with the inclusion of the PLO. The influence of the PLO in Lebanon, the question of Palestinian refugees, the issue of Jerusalem, the problem of the Israeli settlements and sovereignty of the Palestinian state were not core bargain concerns with Egypt, regardless of Sadat's rhetoric.

Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin secretly hoped for 'Sadat to blink', while Sadat unflinching arrived in Jerusalem to address the Knesset without having read the working paper proposals for the Geneva Conference. The visit to Jerusalem was paramount (Dayan 1981: 85) for the bilateral bargain and for the initiative to be one dominated by Egypt as the representative of the Arab bloc. The Sadat initiative altered the dynamic. Egypt was prepared to negotiate in advance of the Geneva Conference and was amenable to immediate proposals. The United States proceeded with the Camp David initiatives, the Geneva Conference was sidelined and the position of the Palestinian bloc, the PLO leadership and the Arab bloc had altered.
3.4 The configuration of the Arab bloc and nature of the Palestinian bloc

3.4.1 The PLO

From 1948 to 1967 the Arab states overlooked the question of Palestinian national self-determination. Sayigh observes, ‘it was to diffuse and contain irredentism that the Arab heads of state approved the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1964’ (Sayigh 1999: 666). Shortly after the first Arab Summit Conference in Cairo, the PLO was established at the Palestinian congress convened in Jerusalem. The congress met at the behest of Jordanian King Hussein, keen to curry favour with Nasser. King Hussein selected many of the 422 Palestinians invited to attend, nevertheless, the ‘entity’ or organization created exhibited institutional and functional autonomy (Sayigh 1999: 96). Adopting a Palestine National Covenant or Charter, founding documents and statutes created a parliamentary body in the name of the Palestinian National Council (PNC). Each executive committee member was allocated a ‘ministerial’ portfolio generating governing mechanisms in tandem with Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA).

Despite strong Egyptian influence, Ahmad al-Shuqayri the Nasser appointed leader of Palestinian delegation at the first Arab Summit in Cairo and the first Chairman of the PNC and ‘leader’ of the PLO, created a national institution seeking formal Arab recognition as such (Sayigh 1999: 99, Yodafat and Arnon-Ohanna 1981: 22). By 1968 Shuqayri’s attempts to generate an autonomous PLO independent of Egyptian or Jordanian state dominance (and constraint) succeeded with Fatah’s ascendency and leadership of the PLO.
As previously mentioned, by 1973 at the Arab Summit Conference in Algiers, with the exception of Jordan, all the Arab states committed themselves ‘to restore the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine as will be decided by the PLO’. The subsequent Rabat Arab Summit in 1974 with Jordanian support confirmed the commitment to restore the national rights of the Palestinian people, ‘in accordance with the resolutions that will be accepted by the PLO’. 26

At the Palestinian National Council meeting in March 1977 Anwar Sadat said:

The Palestinian people are the sole decision-maker with respect to anything that concerns its destiny and its cause. No one, whoever he may be, may exercise a trusteeship over, or impose his will upon, the Palestinian people. For a decision which does not emanate from a free will is devoid of its very essence. We in Egypt insist that the Palestinian will shall remain sovereign and independent, free from bondage or interference. We equally insist that all the decisions which have emanated from that shall be fully respected – foremost among which is the decision to designate the Palestinian Liberation Organisation as its sole legitimate representative, the defender of its rights and interests. 27

The PLO was acknowledged by the Arab state elites as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Within the Palestinian bloc, factionalism was pervasive. Factions had been institutionalised largely under the collective umbrella of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). The PLO prosed and initially sponsored by Egyptian president Nasser at the first Arab summit conference in 1964 was established and quickly dominated by Fateh, the largest faction (Becker 1984:38). With the assistance of the 1967 war and subsequent weakening of the neighbouring Arab governments, Fateh rapidly achieved the largest share of the seats in the Palestinian
National Congress. Initially ambivalent towards the PLO, the Fateh faction recognised the value of Arab legitimacy afforded to it (Sayigh 2000: 206). Institutionally, the PLO spanned the spectrum of Palestinian nationalist and predominantly secular ideology. Organisational unity was based on five principal points of agreement:

1. the liberation of Palestine;
2. the need for armed struggle to attain this goal;
3. reliance on Palestinian self-organisation;
4. co-operation with friendly Arab states; and
5. co-operation with international forces (Cobban 1992: 24).

From its formation in 1958, one of Fateh’s guiding principles was the importance of autonomy from and recognition by established (Arab) state actors in determining the form and purpose of Palestinian political institutionalisation (Sayigh 1999: 206). Challenges to the primacy of Fateh’s elite autonomy were commonplace. Moderate dissent within the PLO in the early years was largely due to the geographically decentralised nature of the organisation. The 1960s elements of such dissent had been based – and often externally sponsored – intermittently in Amman, Damascus, Beirut and Tunis. The extent of the PLO’s infrastructure in Jordan created ‘a state within a state’, leading to civil war and its subsequent expulsion from Jordan in 1970 and relocation with no less onerous albeit postponed consequences in Lebanon.
3.4.2 Elite accommodation and the nature of the support for the Palestinian bloc

Fateh aimed to co-opt and accommodate factional and leadership challenges by absorbing the challenging faction when possible into the National Council. Institutional dynamics within the PLO centred on internally accommodating challenges in order for Fateh to maintain its leadership authority.

The movement had little time, however, to re-orientate itself with the outbreak of the 1973 October war between Israel and the Arab states. The PLO leadership response involved signalling its interest as the Palestinian representative in the proposed Geneva Conference. Arafat tacitly acknowledged United Nations Resolution 242 as the basis for a comprehensive peace subject to modifications, such as the endorsement of the unequivocal right to Palestinian national self-determination rather than the existing Resolution reference to the Palestinian issue as a refugee concern. The debate concerning recognition of the Resolution led to internal PLO division. Opposing factions within the PLO established a ‘rejection front’ as they regarded the PLO leadership stance as an affront to the core principles of PLO unity. The rejectionist factions were led by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and constituted the ‘Front of Palestinian Force Rejecting Surrenderist Solutions’ (Cobban 1984: 62). The support for the opposition came from the refugee camps, the traditional supporters of Fateh, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The challenge to the leadership deliberations over acknowledging Resolution 242, led to within-bloc violence, open competition and the assassinations of alternate faction members within the PLO. The
PLO leadership's legitimacy internationally had increased, after Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly in which the PLO was awarded observer status.

As the PLO's policy of internal accommodation failed and the Fateh leadership's monopoly of legitimacy was undermined, the opposition factions of the leftist and Syrian-sponsored PFLP and later the DFLP, and the Communist (later the People's) party called for an end to the intra-factional fighting. The unstable situation in Lebanon and the beginnings of the civil war resulted in the co-operation between the factions fighting together under joint commands in Lebanon. The rejectionist front persisted as an open institutional challenge to the PLO's executive committee for the next four years and influenced the success of pervasive co-option of factions, shifting the nature of competition and the configuration of factions within the PLO.

Encouraged by the need to maintain bloc cohesion and Fateh's need to assert its dominance in March 1975, the PLO representative in London called for an end to the state of belligerency if the PLO became a partner in the negotiating process. The PLO demanded the withdrawal of Israel to the borders of the 1967 agreement as part of a peace settlement. The establishment of a Palestinian state in the areas returned by Israel, and the creation of open borders between the State of Israel and the Palestinian state, would encourage economic and cultural ties and activities. The right of Israelis to live in the Palestinian state could be agreed in exchange for the right of an equivalent number of Palestinians to live in Israel as well as the provision of joint security guarantees for the Palestinian state and for the state of Israel.28

In 1977 the PLO leadership was located in Beirut after its expulsion from Jordan. The joint Egyptian–Syrian statement calling for resumption of the Geneva Peace
Conference reaffirmed recognition of the PLO as the sole Palestinian representative and insisted that it should participate in the talks as an independent interlocutor on par with the other delegations, adding that the process should lead to the creation of an ‘independent Palestinian entity’ (Sayigh 1999: 414). Syria’s President Assad endorsed the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 ‘if that is what the Palestinians want’. The US impetus for peace encouraged the PLO to initiate negotiations with Israelis interested in opening a dialogue. King Hussein of Jordan renewed the idea of a Palestinian–Jordanian federation and met with the speaker of the Palestinian National Council. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat met with UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, and the PLO opened offices in European capitals as Arafat asserted that the PLO was prepared to participate in the Geneva Conference. The basis of the Geneva dialogue was UN Resolution 242. The readiness of the PLO to participate meant that the PLO leadership was prepared to acquiesce and co-exist with Israel. The failure of the PLO Charter to recognise Israel or to accept UN Resolution 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiation was perceived by the USA as prohibitive to the participation of the PLO leadership’s in Geneva. The leadership had, however, taken the initiative to change the PLO Charter and held discussions in Egypt regarding possible amendments to the Charter. The imperative remained self-determination for the Palestinian people and an independent Palestinian state. The nature of the state was implicitly limited to the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip and the PLO was prepared to negotiate. In so doing Fateh the PLO’s dominant leading faction attempted to limit Jordanian influence and assert itself independently.
The Geneva initiative, however, divided the PLO. The PFLP and DFLP rejected
the proposed changes to the Charter and the moderating initiatives of the leadership. The PFLP led by George Habash asserted that the international dialogue was intended to
exclude and ‘wipe out, finally’ the PLO. The PFLP promised to take the initiative and
attack Israel (Sayigh 1999: 416). Open and public divisions within the PLO emerged
between groups associated with and externally sponsored by Syria. The schisms within
the PLO were substantial and escalated the climate of distrust in the Palestinian bloc,
increasing the polarisation and configuration of the bloc while undermining the autonomy
of the leadership.

The sporadic violent intra-factional Palestinian fighting in the refugee camps in
Lebanon threatened to undermine the efforts of the PLO leadership to assert itself as a
viable negotiating partner for the Geneva Conference. The difficulties were enhanced for
Syria. President Assad’s influence in Lebanon was undermined by the intra-Palestinian
fighting. However, Syria was intent on improving relations with the PLO when it
became clear that Egypt was realigning itself with the United States.

Indirect dialogue between the PLO and the Carter administration increased
Jordan’s fears, and King Hussein sought assurances from Secretary Vance that any
Palestinian homeland should not include the East Bank of Jordan. The PLO leadership
was optimistic in June 1977 when the American administration stated ‘the need for a
homeland for the Palestinians whose exact nature should be negotiated between the
parties’ (Cobban 1984: 88, Quandt 1986: 73). Fateh informed the American President
that the PLO was willing to live in peace with Israel, in return for a US commitment to an
independent Palestinian ‘state unit entity’ associated or affiliated to Jordan (Quandt 1986:
US Secretary Cyrus Vance alluded to the possible US acceptance of a form of Palestinian state in the occupied territories after a transition period of ten years. The PLO's participation was conditional on the acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 338. The PLO leadership's concern was, however, the nature of the Palestinian issue as one of refugee status as opposed to a question of national self-determination. The Palestinians shared their proposed acceptance documents with the Egyptians and concealed their activities from Syria after Syrian President Assad suggested an Arab rejection front to include Iraq and Libya (Sayigh 1999: 414). Assad proposed that the Palestinians be represented at Geneva by the League of Arab States. The Syrian initiative was disregarded as Secretary Vance told the United Nations General Assembly on 29 September, 'we believe that the Palestinian people must be assured that they and their descendants can live with dignity and freedom, and have the opportunity for economic fulfilment and for political expression' (Sayigh 1979: 5). The US administration was providing the PLO leadership with the facility to represent the Palestinians at Geneva contrary to the Syrian proposals.

The PLO leadership initially confirmed it would accept UN Resolution 242 if modified to address more than solely the Palestinian refugee problem. The head of the PLO political department, Qaddumi, stated that the PLO would accept both the resolution and the right of Israel to exist if the Jewish state recognised Palestinian rights. The aim of the PLO centred on establishing an independent state in the occupied territories that would not pose a threat to Israel (Sayigh 1999: 422). The situation in Southern Lebanon between PLO factions of the PFLP, DFLP and Israel escalated as the diplomacy concerning Geneva advanced. The PLO leadership's conciliatory statements were
deemed to be too far beyond the acceptable list of phrases proposed by Brezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, to be credible (Rubin 2003: 81, Rubin 1981).

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union threatened to undermine the PLO leadership's initiative. The Soviet and Syrian sponsored factions within the Palestinian bloc and within the accommodatory institutional parameters of the PLO, in particular the DFLP, suggested that in light of the leadership's recognition of UN Resolution 242, the internal alignments within the PLO would change to isolate the initiative towards dialogue with Egypt and the USA by the 'centrist right'.

The overt threat to the pattern of elite accommodation from the Palestinian bloc constrained the leadership's decision to accept UN Resolution 242. The incentive to accept the Resolution had diminished as the Americans informed the PLO leadership that acceptance of the Resolution would not necessarily provide a seat at the Geneva Conference although it would ensure continued American dialogue. The Fateh-based leadership directed a special meeting of the PLO Central Council on 26 September which chose not to accept the resolution (Sayigh 1999: 422).

The initial proposals made by the USA and endorsed by Begin for the Palestinian representatives at Geneva to be unrecognised PLO members appealed to the PLO leadership. Begin initially asserted that their identities would not be too readily scrutinised. When this proposal was withdrawn, it was perceived to be a concession to the Israelis. The Fateh Central Committee in response reiterated its position that 'the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people [...] and will not accept any manoeuvre aiming at taking away or sidestepping it' (Cobban 1984: 91).
decision ruled out the option for Arafat to nominate Palestinian delegates to Geneva and required that PLO represent the Palestinian people without a proxy.

The PLO leadership had been acting under the misconception that President Sadat had been lobbying to gain PLO access to the Geneva Conference. It was not until Sadat’s speech in the Egyptian Parliament in the presence of Arafat and Qaddumi head of the political department invited as guests, that Sadat’s Egyptian initiative was accurately understood. Arafat and Qaddumi left the chamber in the middle of Sadat’s speech in protest (Rabin 2003: 81).

The Egyptian initiative split the Fateh Central Committee over whether or not to support Sadat’s initiative. The Sadat rejectionists prevailed and Arafat signed a joint communiqué with Syria’s President Assad condemning Sadat’s visit to Israel. Relations between the PLO leadership and the Egyptian government deteriorated. Sadat’s initiative resulted in a new programme of PLO partisanship in inter-state struggles when previously the PLO had aimed to balance its allegiances between the powerful Arab States. The Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in retaliation for the attack near Haifa resulted in UN resolution 425 and the call for an immediate withdrawal of Israel from south Lebanon.

Arafat later accepted the overall ceasefire in South Lebanon, the first open acceptance of the PLO leader of a ceasefire with Israel. The UN had agreed to meet with Arafat to negotiate the ceasefire and in so doing legitimated him. This decision was influenced by the escalation of violence in south Lebanon and the inability of the Carter Administration to press the Israelis to allow 700 Lebanese peacekeepers into southern Lebanon. The Palestinian National Council remained sceptical of the United States’ ability to convince the Israelis to leave Gaza and the West Bank and calculated the risk of
acquiescing to the concessions required from the United States in order to be able to participate in the negotiations at great risk to the leadership's autonomy (Cobban 1984: 90).

The PLO leadership was constrained by the changing configuration of the Palestinian bloc and the limitations imposed on its conventional policies of factional absorption or inclusive accommodation. The open challenges to the leadership from the externally sponsored (Syrian influenced) schismatic oriented factions and the elastic support it commanded from the members of the Palestinian bloc, in the refugee camps in particular. The PLO leadership had considered moderating the aspiration for a Palestinian state in all of Mandated Palestine in 1967 to national authority but decided that the change would not be supported; the 1974 Council declaration had moderately qualified the PLO's objective and signalled their desire to participate in negotiations. The changes instituted by the Fateh leadership at risk to its internal monopoly of bloc legitimacy while significant, were usurped by President Sadat's offer to represent the Palestinians under guidance from the Palestinians themselves.

The competition for the position of representative Palestinian elite represented an old threat from a new source for the PLO leadership. Jordan was recognised as the state that for a time articulated Palestinian concerns internationally by virtue of its role in the West Bank prior to 1967 and Black September when the PLO was ousted from Jordan amidst violence and killing. Jordan had subsequently recognised the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people at the Rabat conference in 1974.
The new threat for PLO legitimacy was Egyptian President Sadat. The next section considers the actor orientation of the Egyptian government in relation to the Camp David Accords.

### 3.4.3 The Egyptian government challenge

President Sadat's incentives for representing Palestinian concerns were domestic, internal, and incumbent elite and Israeli driven. The President's decision to recognise Israel without eliciting concessions from the Israeli government prior to his visit, signalled Sadat's willingness to negotiate prior to the proposed Geneva Conference without endorsing the idea of a united Arab delegation (Dayan 1981: 85). Sadat initiated contact with Israel and a series of meetings were held in Morocco on the nature of negotiations. The Egyptian President insisted that any agreement reached would need to include a resolution of the conflict with all the other Arab states and could not be presented as a bilateral agreement. President Sadat was unwilling to sign an arrangement concerning the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai, but was receptive to one addressing Sinai first. The challenge for the leadership of the Palestinian bloc came from Sadat's proposal that if King Hussein was unwilling to sign a peace agreement between the West Bank and Israel, he, Sadat, would be ready to do so in the name of the Palestinians (Dayan 1981: 163). Sadat viewed the PLO leadership as 'cabaret warriors' (Weizman 1981: 294) and a contributory cause of Egypt's economic malaise. Sadat, needful of the pressures for a prescription addressing the Palestinian problem, attempted to secure a general declaration
of principles, an accommodation perceived by Weizman, Sadat’s close friend and confidante, as ‘scarcely binding upon anyone’ (Weizman 1981: 295).33

The configuration of the Arab and Palestinian bloc, the accommodation of external elites and external resource dependence in the Arab bloc and for Egypt in particular influenced Sadat’s preferences for a trilateral arrangement with Israel and the United States rather than a multilateral conference, having cancelled a friendship treaty with its former sponsor, the Soviet Union. The President had been committed to traditional foreign policy, advocating the traditional Arab position on a comprehensive peace with Israel. Now, Sadat attempted to negotiate the return of Sinai, disassociate itself from Soviet influence, gain international supremacy over its rival Syria and mitigate the internal and Arab wide influence of the PLO, while paralleling the ‘favoured nation’ position of Israel in relation to the United States. Sadat’s incentives were driven by Arab bloc and internal Egyptian considerations.

In 1977, Sadat implemented institutional changes to the existing Nasserite single party corporatist state system in Egypt replacing it with a restricted pluralism (al-ta’addudiyya al-muqayidda) (Rosefsky Wickham 2004: 215). Sadat’s modernisation initiative changed the complicated elite clique or shillal system (Vitalis 1995: 166) in an attempt to create a multi-party system from what was the Arab Socialist Union (Hinnebusch 1985: 67). The Shillal34 resembled tendencies in party political systems elsewhere. Prevalent throughout Egyptian society, usually diffuse and generalised and unimpaired by other loyalties, the shillals were relatively fluid associations; their influence – determined by a shared position over particular issues, driven by individual goals, personal gain and career advancement – was particularly prevalent in the military
Sadat initiated changes to the informal *shillals* and more formal *Dufaa* (old boys’ network) as part of his political modernisation initiative. In addition, Sadat encouraged the formation of independent Islamic student associations (*jama’at*) to counter the socialist Nasserist organisations. The ploy succeeded and the *jama’at* rapidly overtook the left socialist students’ dominance of university politics; this in turn expanded the ideological parameters of Egyptian domestic politics (Rosefsky Wickham 2004: 217).

Sadat’s two political objectives involved maintaining the power needed to complete and sustain the changes in Egypt’s global role and economic structure, and by virtue of his De-Nasserisation programme accommodate without jeopardising the growing pressure for political freedoms. Legitimacy and monopoly of authority was imperative for Sadat in a system best defined as a presidential monarchy or authoritarian presidency. The domestic crisis and 1977 food riots influenced the need for access to external and unobtainable resources, such as the oil wells in Sinai under Israeli control (Vitalis 1995).

Sadat’s imperative was not shared by his ministers in the Egyptian delegation at Camp David, including Foreign Minister Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel who was compelled to resign once the Camp David Accord was reached (Kamel 1986: 136); Minister of State Butros Butros Ghali (later UN Secretary General), Egypt’s ambassador to the UN Abd el Majid; and Senior Foreign Ministry official Osama al-Baz.

The failure of the President to consult with his advisors and his compulsion to reveal his reserve position to the American interlocutors, to President Carter himself and his close working and personal relationship with Israeli defence minister Ezer Weizman.
undermined Egypt’s position. Sadat’s subsequent assassination on 6 October 1981 by Islamists (rather than the secular and left-leaning PLO favoured by Nasser and excluded by Sadat)36 has been attributed to his negotiation of the Camp David Accords as well as his domestic liberalisation policies (Hirst and Beeson 1981). Sadat’s increasing dependence on external resources realigned Egypt with the United States and resulted in Egypt receiving the largest US donations, second only to Israel.

Sadat’s willingness to recognise Israel and to restore Egypt’s territorial integrity influenced his decision to represent Palestinian preferences and illustrated the limits of Egypt’s advocacy for the Palestinians. Amidst the Camp David discussions, for example, the Egyptian leadership negotiated the return of Sinai and made no mention of Gaza. Despite Egypt’s role in Gaza from 1948, the Egyptians feared Israel would consider relinquishing Gaza (at this time free of Israeli settlements), rendering the Egyptians responsible for the Palestinian population (Roy 1995: 109).37 The Israeli leadership unyielding in its advocacy of its claim on the West Bank (without its necessary integration into Israel proper) was less united in their view of maintaining Gaza (Nisan 1978: 63). Control of Gaza was not mentioned in the negotiations, as Sadat sought to exclude and ultimately usurp the recognised leadership of the Palestinian people, the PLO (Weizman 1981: 296).

Israeli recognition of the incumbent Egyptian government as the representative leadership of the Arab ethnic bloc provided the Egyptian Sadat led government the opportunity to diminish the influence on domestic socio-economic trials on its legitimacy. The Accords simultaneously endorsed the regional legitimacy of the Egyptian government to the exclusion of competing factional elites, such as the PLO, which
threatened the traditional elite accommodation of the pan-Arab ethnic-bloc. The Egyptian desire to sever the influence of its Soviet benefactor led the Sadat government to acquiesce to the preferences of the United States lured by the associated benefits from allying with the United States.

3.5 The configuration and nature of the Israeli bloc

The Israeli bloc has from its inception managed two contradictory tendencies: one has been to adjust the composition of the elite to conform to a rapidly changing increasingly heterogeneous population; the other had been to inhibit any fragmentation of the Israeli elite (Lenczowski 1975: 172). The Israeli election of 1977 resulted in a Menachem Begin led right-wing minimum winning coalition government. The Likud (formerly Herut) the largest party with 44 seats was joined by the National Religious Party with 12 seats, Augdat Yisrael with four seats, Ariel Sharon a Likudnik standing on a one-man list as was Moshe Dayan with one seat each, in a 120 seats Knesset. Likud, a congressional type of consociational party of separate organisational entities that function as a unity (Bogaards 2002: 10, Lenczowski 1975: 172), being a combination of Herut and a series of smaller parties, captured 33.3 per cent of the votes. The election represented a reorientation in the Israeli electorate towards the right wing and the end of the coalition between the historically dominant Labour party and the National Religious Party. The electorate reoriented itself as coalition options shifted. Alternative groupings and party mergers undermined the conviction that the dominant party could not be dislodged, so
much so that by 1977 support for the Labour party fell to 24.6 per cent of the vote from 46.7 per cent in 1969 (Luebbert 1986: 69).

The division with the National Religious Party altered the Israeli elites' traditional mechanisms of open competition and external accommodation (oversized coalitions) as well as the Labour party’s loss of the monopoly in the debate about Zionism. After the 1967 war, an ideological division re-emerged in Israel. The war had reopened the pre-independence debate on the ‘desirable boundaries of the Jewish State’ (Seliktar 1988: 31, see also, Lustick 1993: 26). Zionism emerged outside a territorial base. In operational terms it advocated Hitnahlut – settlement, designed to secure a territorial base for the state. Eretz Yisrael (the Greater Israel) was perceived as a temporal geo-religious concept that did not coincide with international borders. The seizure of land in 1967 divided Israelis between these two essential characteristics of Zionism. The territorial imperatives of Eretz Yisrael with its borders defined in biblical terms (Lustick 1993: 26, Nisan 1978: 133, Shindler 1995), suggested the permanent acquisition and integration of the newly occupied areas of ‘Judea and Samaria’ (the West Bank) and Jerusalem into Israel. In particular, the moral and religious significance of the West Bank was substantial. Developed by the rational religious leader, Rabbis Abraham Isaac Kook, and propagated by Merkaz Herav Yeshiva and the spiritual centre of the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) who advocated settling the territories as a religious imperative, Eretz Yisrael was seen as part of a broad process of acculturation that would bring Israeli Jews ‘to see the State of Israel as naturally and necessarily coextensive with the whole Land of Israel’ (Lustick 1993: 35). For the new right in Israel settlement superseded strategic consideration. By 1977 the territorial basis of the Israeli state was more substantial than
ever, the 'dominant long term goal of Likud's foreign policy has been to turn the state of Israel into the Land of Israel' (Seliktar 1988: 31, Nisan 1978: 153).

The second characteristic of Zionism refers to the inherent Jewish nature of the state. Demographic imperatives counselled against the incorporation of one million non-Jewish Palestinians into the Jewish state. The division within Israel arose from attempts to reconcile the imperatives of expansionism and exclusivism (Luebbert 1986: 96, Sayigh 1979: 5, Schindler 1995). Israel's avoidance of the necessity to impose its rule over the million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, rather than a concession, was perceived to be a service that Israel 'should render to her own interest and destiny' (Eban 1978: 351). The state building theory implied by Likud government policies emphasised settlement, elaboration of administrative, economic and social institutions for the Israeli settlers of the territories and control rather than elimination or assimilation of the Palestinian population (Lustick 1993: 27).

The seizure of Sinai, required a substantial military presence better redeployed to the borders with Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and all the political parties made public statements of willingness to negotiate with the Egyptians concerning the status of the Sinai occupation (Shlaim 2000: 347). The Labour government's indecision over the nature of the compromise to be made split the coalition and the National Religious Party anticipated costly territorial concessions (Kieval 1983: 121). Labour Prime Minister Rabin's meeting with American President Carter in March 1977 compounded these fears. Weakened by the domestic and oil crises and his failure to negotiate anything other than an interim agreement with Sadat who viewed Rabin's domestic constraints as prohibitive
to a more substantive arrangement, Rabin’s resigned his position (Maoz and Mor 2002: 155).

Domestically, the Labour party was perceived to be too willing to consider territorial compromise. Former Foreign Minister Yigal Allon’s plan of 1967 proposed that border adjustments were a necessary prerequisite for Israeli security and long-term stability. Israeli control of the territories threatened a ‘Jewish ... Socialist ... and Democratic Israel’ (Nisan 1978: 77). Allon considered Israel’s fundamental obligation to the Arab population to be the provision of a vehicle for political expression and development (Nisan 1978: 77, Sofer 1988: 127). The adjustments needed to be linked with mutually efficient security arrangements. The Labour government had stated that ‘Israel would be prepared to concede all that is not absolutely essential to its security within the context of an overall peace settlement. It is holding most of these territories now only as a means to achieve its foremost goal- peace with all its neighbours.’

The territorial cleavage was made clear after the USA initiated Rogers Plan in 1970 called for a large-scale Israeli withdrawal from territories captured, resulting in Begin’s withdrawal as minister without portfolio from the National Unity Government (Seliktar 1988: 34). The aftermath of the 1973 war and the weakening of the Rabin government meant that by May 1977, the Israeli electorate reoriented itself towards the right wing and an electoral victory for the Likud (Unity) party halted the Labour party’s historically dominant coalition party monopoly (Hazan 1999a: 126). The election of Begin, the former leader of the Irgun Zvai Leumi (Etzel), the Military National Organisation and active paramilitary wing of the revisionist movement competing with the socialist Hagana for supremacy in 1948, reflected popular ideological mobilisation on
the part of the Israeli electorate. While famed for his 'we fight therefore we are!' statement (Begin 1993: 46), he agreed to join his adversary Ben-Gurion as minister without portfolio in the fledgling Israeli government. By 1977 Begin had also managed to mobilise the changing Israeli demographic, as increasing numbers of Sephardi Jews from North Africa, the Middle East and India supported the Likud. Conscious of the 'high degree of consensus on the need for the existence of consensus' in Israel (Arian 1971: 3) Begin chose his governing partners.

He maximised the fragmentation of the Israeli parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) and further altered the mode of interaction within the Israeli bloc; his decision to ask the former Labour party member Moshe Dayan to be foreign minister had occurred only rarely. During the negotiations for the National Unity government in 1967, Begin proposed Moshe Dayan as candidate for defence minister in the coalition government (Haber 1978: 267). In 1979 Begin's rationale for co-opting Dayan was to create an ideologically broad coalition. Moshe Dayan's father had been instrumental in the creation of Mapai and was known to be Ben-Gurion's preferred heir to the leadership of Labour. Dayan would, it was hoped, win support from the right of the Labour party, providing Begin with his much sought after and otherwise unobtainable ideologically broad coalition (Lustick 1993: 357). Dayan, along with his brother-in-law, Defence Minister Ezer Weizman, provided a counterbalance to Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon who had fielded his own separate list in the elections and won two seats.

Begin was, however, constrained by the coalition system. The normally oversized coalition won a minimum of votes in this instance, and generated a smaller decision-making body or inner cabinet circle. During Begin's tenure, two such groups emerged.
The more formalised ‘kitchen cabinet’ consisted of Begin’s ministers and the less formalised included members of the ‘fighting family’, Begin’s associates from the Irgun (Seliktar 1988: 32). Begin was nevertheless the undisputed leader of the party as he had been of Herut; as Weizman suggested, ‘everything revolves around [him] people vie with each other to guess what he’s thinking and how he will react’ (Haber 1978: 289).

The government was innovative as the first right-wing religious coalition government in Israeli history, as were its policy proposals. In particular, the plan of proposals for a negotiated agreement to enhance Israeli security and Israel’s proposals for the Geneva Conference had been drawn up by Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. They addressed the issue of the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by separating the territorial from the political. The Palestinians would be afforded ‘autonomy’ or self-rule while the territory would remain under Israeli control. The Israeli military in the West Bank and Gaza would withdraw from the main Palestinian population centres. The issue of sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza would be postponed for five years and Israel’s authority over the territories would remain until such time as all the parties to the final status discussions could agree. Palestinians would not be integrated into Israel ‘proper’ and therefore have no citizenship or integration into the Israeli body politic. Similarly, Israel’s security and territorial concerns regarding the areas were appeased without having to impose or relinquish power.

Israeli Foreign Minister, Dayan, suggested the agreement be implemented in stages conditional on the success of the early implementation. The position paper drafted by Dayan asserted that it was ‘probably not possible to reach a final peace agreement in the situation that existed’ (Dayan 1981: 11). At best, Israel desired an accord ending the
state of war and would not concede territory it was prepared to relinquish within the framework of a permanent peace treaty. Israel hoped to achieve an additional substantive achievement. In agreeing to consider the Geneva negotiations, it sought an American commitment to a long-term defence treaty. The treaty alluded to by the Carter Administration would substitute for the territory Israel would be asked to relinquish in any comprehensive settlement. During Prime Minister Begin's meeting with President Carter in Washington in July 1977, the Israeli proposals were determined. The Geneva Conference would be in accordance with Resolutions 338 and 242 and with accredited representatives of Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Israel proposed a series of bilateral committee meetings within the framework of multilateral Geneva talks. The issue of Israeli borders and the question of the West Bank were addressed to President Carter privately. Regarding the Israel–Egyptian border, Israel was prepared to 'make significant withdrawal from Sinai' (Dayan 1981: 20). The Israel–Syrian border was more problematic. Israel proposed redeployment of its forces along agreed lines within the framework of a peace settlement. The third article in the Israeli position paper referred to the issue of the West Bank. It argued that 'based on the historic rights of our nation to this land' and the need for national security, 'Israel will not transfer Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District to any foreign sovereign authority' (Dayan 1981: 20).

The final position represented a shift in Likud party policy. Prime Minister Begin while unprepared to allow the West Bank to be controlled by another sovereign power made no direct claim that the West Bank be integrated into Israel proper. The question of 'withdrawal from territory' was more difficult. Resolution 242 covered all territories, including the West Bank and the Gaza district. The plan of self-government for West
Bank autonomy was compatible with 242, including its article on withdrawal; and that was Israel’s proposal to fulfil the Resolution.

Throughout the negotiations, Begin consulted with his dual inner cabinets once the Dayan plan had been initiated. Competition within the Likud was intense—broadly divisions existed between the former Herut members and the more liberal associates. Specifically, divisions among Herut factions were also substantive and based on historical or military affiliations or around personalities, like Sharon for example. The ideological stretching within the broader coalition was made manifest when the plan was initially put forward. In particular, the proposed withdrawal from settlements and provisional autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, rejected by Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon (Sharon 1989: 400). Once assurances were given that Palestinian autonomy would be constrained, Mordachai Gur, the Chief of Staff, was the only remaining opposition to the Dayan initiative. While the formal cabinet group tended to win decisions relating to the negotiations, Begin was also known to make executive decisions.

The initiative to bypass the conventional CIA route and communicate to Sadat directly the intelligence Israel had of a Libyan assassination attempt on Sadat is a case in point. When made aware of the Libyan threat to Sadat, Begin asserted that ‘there was no harm in showing him [Sadat]’ Israel’s goodwill (Hirst and Beeson 1981: 284, Seliktar 1988: 42). Equally significant was Begin’s perseverance with the Sadat initiative despite Israeli intelligence reports that Egyptian popular opinion was not ready to accept Israel (Seliktar 1988: 42).

Furthermore, the government took the cautious step of consulting the Knesset on all positions. Advocating this mechanism meant that the incumbent elite accommodated
the opposition in all decision-making and maintained its monopoly of legitimacy. During the July 1977 negotiations at Leeds Castle, Israel sought Knesset approval for the following proposal: ‘Should a proposal for a peace treaty based upon concrete territorial compromise be submitted, Israel, in accordance with previous statements, would be ready to consider it.’ The government position was approved by 64 to 32 votes in the Knesset. This model of decision-making, in effect by committee, attempted to render inelastic or fix political and subsequently popular support for any decision made. The mechanism employed by the government instituted collective elite decision-making and the absorption of the opposition in the final outcome. When the final Camp David Accords had to be ratified by the Knesset, the Agreements were supported by 84, with 19 against and 17 abstentions. The Likud-led coalition government regulated the configuration of the Israel bloc using parliamentary mechanisms and selective appointments to secure the leadership latitude in decision-making while maintaining a substantial degree of autonomy of the incumbent elite. The ramifications of these mechanisms further influenced the pattern of accommodation and support of the bloc.

3.5.1 Elite accommodation and the support in the Israeli bloc

Israeli Prime Minister Begin advocated transparency in an attempt to secure the support of the Israeli electorate for the Likud party. Begin’s address to the American Jewish Leaders in New York on 20 September 1978 revealed that the Prime Minister had resisted all American and Egyptian pressure to proceed with negotiations regarding a
working draft referring to ‘the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war’. The phrase, with its apparent reference to UN Resolution 242, was subsequently dropped from the draft document and the final Accord.\textsuperscript{45}

The Camp David Accord provided that ‘the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government’.\textsuperscript{46} Once the agreements were signed, Begin altered his policy and appointed Yosef Burg, the Minister of the Interior and leader of the National Religious Party, as head of Israel’s negotiating team in the discussion of Palestinian autonomy for the Camp David II dialogue in 1979 (Silver 1984: 182). Burg’s position as a staunch advocate of religious Zionism constituted an authentic representation of the government’s position on Palestinian autonomy. The idea of autonomy appealed to Begin, undermining the Palestinian claim to sovereignty; it was also politically practicable. Palestinian autonomy provided a means of addressing the problematic issues associated with the question of the rights of a national minority and whether Israel should integrate the Palestinian territories further (Soffer 1998: 134). Much to the frustration of Dayan and Weizmann, the autonomy Begin wanted to implement bore little relation to that referred to in the Camp David negotiations. The appointment of Burg exacerbated the friction between Foreign Minister Dayan and the Prime Minister, resulting in Dayan’s resignation (Slater 1991: 428).\textsuperscript{47} Ezer Weizman’s resignation followed shortly afterwards, allowing Ariel Sharon and other members of the ‘fighting family’ to dominate Begin’s inner circle.

The Likud government had successfully co-opted support from Dayan to negotiate the withdrawal from the territory he had been instrumental in winning. The
Agreement necessitated a redrawing of Israel’s south-west border, so transforming the institution of state. Dayan’s appointment attempted to minimise the sense of crisis associated with the territorial change as well as any advantage it might provide for the rival Labour party (Lustick 1993: 41). However, once Sinai had been returned, Dayan’s views on the settlements were considered too moderate and with his position no longer tenable, he resigned. The appointment of Burg as Minister for the Interior to lead the negotiations on the proposed nature of Palestinian autonomy consciously antagonised Dayan as Foreign Minister and Weizman as Minister for Defence. Furthermore, Begin’s attempts to regulate Dayan’s decision-making and Weizmann’s autonomy contributed to their resignations. Israel’s dependence on external resources was not so readily regulated.
3.5.2 Israeli external resource dependence

The Nobel Peace Prize for 1978 was awarded to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel. The external legitimacy gained by the first right-wing religious Israeli coalition government to negotiate territory for security successfully increased the international and domestic support and legitimacy of the Likud elite specifically and the Israeli government more specifically. Recognition was one feature of the incumbent Israeli elite’s dependence on the United States. Carter’s timely election in tandem with that of Begin provided much needed credibility to external involvement in the negotiations (Friedlander 1983: 230). Israel’s reliance on the United States as a custodian of the Accords (Stedman 2000: 180) was more important than Begin’s opposition to the joint US–Soviet call for the renewal of the Geneva negotiations might suggest (Maoz and Mor 2002: 156). The Israeli government’s dependence on US support and Carter’s tacit recognition of the Sadat initiative proposed instead provided the Israeli leadership with the domestic autonomy it required to initiate dialogue.

The UN Security Resolution 242 was interpreted by the Carter administration – many of whom were involved in the Brookings Report of 1975 calling for a solution based on Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian self-determination (Aruri 2003: 56) – in such a way by President Carter as to oblige the parties to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement and not as the original text stated merely ‘an end of belligerency’. The importance of the US position lay in its interpretation of 242 and willingness to accommodate differing interpretations and issues of contention in respective side letters. ‘Only Jimmy Carter had the power to bang heads together and force ... agreement’
(Weizman 1981: 367). Israel was nevertheless dependent on American aid to finance the withdrawal from Sinai (Dayan 1981: 232).

The USA was not, however, a benign facilitator, when difficulties and possible deadlocks arose in the negotiations. President Carter used information gathered by the CIA in order to manipulate Sadat and Begin to persist with negotiations. Carter intervened forcefully, telling the representatives of both blocs that if they left the negotiations their relationship with the USA would ‘be imperilled’.

3.6 Conclusion

The nature of the peace established in the Camp David Accords perplexed President Carter as highlighted in his address before a joint session of Congress on September 18th 1978. Reflecting on the issues dividing the protagonists Carter focused on the ‘basic question’, namely ‘the nature of the peace’ outlined in the Accord. Specifically, whether peace ‘would simply mean’ the silencing of guns and ceasing of tanks, or referred instead to a full range of diplomatic, cultural and economic relations between neighbouring Middle Eastern states as ‘neighbours and as equals and friends’.

The Camp David Accords represent a minimal inter-ethnic elite bargain. The Accords consist of two distinct and independent documents ‘nested’ one within the other. The foundation of the Accord and the readily agreed document is the bilateral pact between Israel and Egypt relating to the return of the Sinai Peninsula and mutual shipping access. Less than a peace agreement and more than an accommodation between
traditional rivals, the negotiators had to choose 'between a peace agreement and the Israeli settlements in Sinai' (Weizmann 1981: 369).

The Agreement met the immediate territorial and domestic 'societal' security concerns of both the incumbent Egyptian leadership and the Likud led Israeli government. Menachem Begin’s desire to undermine the position of the PLO in exile proved the rationale for both the Egyptian withdrawal and swift invasion of Lebanon. Begin deftly managed an eclectic coalition government, with one man member parties from opposition ideological positions as influential ministers without whom Begin’s Sinai giveaway could not have been implemented. Begin’s government was the first Israeli government to return land and became the first to invade a neighbouring state. Combined the withdrawal from Egypt and subsequent invasion of Lebanon illustrates the degree of leadership autonomy exhibited by the Begin government. Constrained only by the dependence on US financial aid (Neff 1995: 120) and later US unease at the Israeli presence in Lebanon, Begin’s leadership latitude was only curtailed by Israel’s external dependence on the United States.

The bilateral pact with Egypt, creating a ‘land for peace legacy’ for the Likud party formed the basis of an end to overt Egyptian–Israeli rivalry – one of the most costly bilateral rivalries of all the dyads that have made up what is broadly described as the Arab–Israeli conflict (Maoz and Mor 2002: 173). Within-bloc patterns of accommodation changed to accommodate the new right Likud party. The Labour party while still the largest opposition party, created a precedent by agreeing to go into a national unity government with Likud once the occupation of Lebanon proved too
difficult. The inherently pervasive nature of Israeli factionalism remained a feature of the Israeli bloc dynamic.

The inherent asymmetry between the negotiating elites is not immediately transparent. For Sadat, however, the ramifications of the Camp David Accords were not as fortuitous. While Sadat desired to usurp the PLO leadership and re-assert Egypt’s previous position governing the PLO in all but name, as had been its role in the 1950s and 60s. Sadat’s willingness to recognise Israel undermined his domestic position. While territorial integrity over Sinai was an imperative Sadat could not be deemed to relinquish, the reorientation of Sadat to the West and the United States fuelled the criticisms of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and ultimately cost Sadat his life and leadership.

The security oriented nature of the agreement is explicit in the conveniently ambiguous clauses in the latter of the two agreements. In the second agreement is a residual document that proposes a Framework for Peace in the Middle East. It was imperative that the second agreement be signed in order to sustain Egyptian status and position amid criticism from Arab states for recognising Israel. The Accords were accredited with heralding the beginning of a new era of Peace in the Middle East and its signatories were awarded the Nobel Peace prize for their efforts. The nature of the domestic and internal within-bloc factional influences and constraints on their efforts were not considered. The Accords illustrate the influence of factions within blocs on the preferences of the negotiating elites. The Camp David Accords illustrate inter-ethnic elite bargaining mediated by a mutual security threat or common foe, in this instance the PLO and the existence of a strong, shared dependent external resource namely the United
States. The inter-ethno-national bloc elites are constrained by the configuration of their respective blocs, the traditional pattern of elite accommodation within the blocs and the influence of external resources and their dependence on the sponsorship of external actors as well as external region and period specific Cold War variables.
4 Colluding to exclude Hamas: the 1993 Oslo Accord

4.1 Introduction

The Israeli–Palestinian Oslo Accords of 1993 exemplify an inter-ethnic elite minimal bargain (Horowitz 2000: 574, Nordlinger 1972: 118, Tsebelis 1990: 160), a collaborative security arrangement (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995: 57), in which the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) leadership aggregated their respective positions and political legitimacy as ethnic bloc leaders to curtail the escalating influence of Hamas.

The Oslo Accords have been described as opaque (Morag 2000:200), a product of twin-track diplomacy (Agha, et al 2003, Waage 2002: 597), advancing negotiation theory and measuring ripeness (Afeste 1991, Aggestam 1999, Zartman 1995). Game theoretical explanations have been supported (Hovi 1998), as have changing global dynamics, the end of the Cold War (Jacoby and Salsby 2002) and third-party intervention by the remaining superpower (Aruri 2003, Shafir 1999). While some argue the Accords exemplified a change in Israel’s identity and cultural narrative (Barnett 1996, 1999), others have explained them as a consequence of Palestinianisation as well as organisational and ideological change within the PLO (Kelman 1997, Sayigh 1999, Schulz 1999), or the result of attitudinal and policy changes within Israeli society (Arian 1998, Ben-Yehuda 1997, Freedman 1995, Kimmerling 2003, Lieberfeld 1999). Understood as the culmination of global, regional and financial circumstances along with
encouraging political initiatives framed in an appropriate window of opportunity, explanations of the Accords also allude to the spectre of Islamic extremism as an explanation for the emergence of the 1987 Intifada or uprising (O’Balance 1998: 52). It has also been suggested that the outcome of the Oslo Agreement exemplifies situations where the conditions that encourage groups to initiate negotiations and sign settlements are insufficient to bring peace; ‘combatants do not have the greatest difficulty resolving underlying conflicts of interest and reaching bargains’ but rather in implementing the resulting terms (Walter 2002: 5).

This chapter argues that the Oslo Agreement represents a shared interest of the Israeli and Palestinian elite made manifest in a minimal bargain comprising two features, recognition and security. The first is the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and the PLO and the second is the mutual security of the State of Israel and the PLO leadership. A minimal bargain is defined as a fundamental pact or limited compromise addressing essential concerns over which the negotiating elites can agree. The Oslo Agreement, however, is often mistaken for a maximal bargain defined as an inclusive comprehensive arrangement that addresses the core causes of the conflict. The Oslo Accords were agreed by a small caucus of Palestinians and Israelis with Norwegian facilitators in contrast to the simultaneous bilateral and multilateral Middle East negotiations in Washington held under the auspices of the US administration. The secret negotiations in Oslo concluded with a minimal bargain when the Washington round of talks ‘failed’ (Nawfal 1995). After 23 months of unsuccessfully negotiating core conflict concerns in Washington, what explains the decision of the Israeli and Palestinian bloc elites to agree to a minimal or partial pact negotiated secretly in Oslo?
The success attributed to the Oslo Pact emanates from the recognition of a shared security concern. The rise of Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya), the Islamic Resistance Movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, represented a shared threat to the incumbent Israeli and Palestinian elites. The increasing potency of the Hamas faction altered the configuration of actors within the Palestinian bloc, the traditional mechanisms of elite accommodation within the bloc and the support for the leadership within the Palestinian constituency. Hamas further disrupted the Palestinian leadership’s relationship with external sponsors. Escalating violence within the West Bank and Gaza Strip was attributed to Hamas. The violence of the Intifada intensified Israeli security concerns and impacted the configuration of the Israeli bloc, the nature of elite accommodation as well as the external resource dependence of the incumbent Israeli bloc elite. As a result, the Oslo Accords were scripted to accommodate the signatories’ common interests in order to mitigate the menace of Hamas. For the Israeli government, the desire to alter the composition of the ruling Palestinian elite within the West Bank and Gaza Strip required that it recognise and repatriate the Fateh-dominated PLO leadership from exile in Tunis to the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for which the PLO leadership would assist the Israeli government’s security imperatives, by curbing the influence of Hamas and abating the violence of the Intifada (Shikaki 1998: 30).2

The Agreement reached in Oslo addressed the immediate needs of the leadership elites. It was an intricate political bargain of mutual recognition encompassing a bilateral security arrangement orchestrated to curtail the advancement of Hamas. The Oslo Agreement, defined as a minimal exclusive bargain, seeks solely to address the pressing concerns of the incumbent bloc leaders negotiating, and postpones the elements of the
maximal bargain to final status negotiations. The Agreement illustrates the transformative influence of factionalism within the respective Israeli and Palestinian ethnic blocs, the shifting nature of the constituencies of the incumbent leaders and the dependence of the decision-makers on external resources. All these factors shaped the negotiating preferences of the incumbent ethnic elites and moulded the nature of the bargain reached. The role of Hamas as a within-bloc faction within the Palestinian bloc threatened the authority and legitimacy of both Palestinian and Israeli leaderships and subsequently altered the respective strategies of the Oslo signatories. The minimal bargain reached at Oslo was premised on a collaborative security pact that served to secure the primacy and legitimacy of the PLO's Fateh leadership and contain the security concerns of the Israeli governing elite, respectively. The Oslo compromise involved the tacit support of both negotiating elites for each other's objectives in the guise of a maximal agreement. Israel would recognise the PLO leadership as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and facilitate the return of Fateh to the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The restoration of the exiled PLO leadership and containment of both the Intifāda and the threat of Hamas in a collaborative security arrangement appealed to the Accord signatories.

The Oslo Accord, otherwise known as the Declaration of Principles, was a device for mutual recognition of the incumbent Israeli and Palestinian leaders as well as a means of managing the mutually recognised shared threat posed by Hamas to the incumbent bloc leaders.

This chapter will first consider the architecture of the Agreement. The institutional and functional ramifications will be compared with the bargaining positions
of the negotiating incumbent elites. Second, the nature of the Oslo bargain will be assessed with particular reference to the factional influence of Hamas within the Palestinian ethnic bloc and the consequences of increasing violence on the legitimacy and autonomy of the Israeli incumbent bloc leadership. Finally, the configuration of the blocs, the patterns of elite accommodation and the constraints imposed by the respective constituencies of the incumbent bloc leaders; as well as the dependence on external resources of the respective bloc elites will be considered. The influence of these factional features on the minimal bargain of the Oslo outcome will be assessed.

4.2 The architecture of the Accords

The Oslo Accords, agreed on 19 August 1993, comprise four documents, three of which were letters. Taken together, these letters form an agreement of mutual recognition between the PLO and the State of Israel. The fourth document is a Declaration of Principles on interim self-government signed in Washington on 13 September 1993. In the Declaration of Principles, the PLO was recognised as the (sole) legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by the Labour-led Israeli government under Prime Minister Rabin. As an accord of mutual recognition, the Fateh leadership of the PLO under Yasser Arafat recognised the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security. The Principles declared in the Declaration refer to the resolution of conflict by peaceful means, determining differences through negotiation, renouncing terrorism, rescinding the clauses of the Palestinian covenant that contradict the Accords, as well as
halting the Intifada.\textsuperscript{4} The primacy of security is evident in that the second letter reiterates the PLO leadership role in regulating the Intifada, it outlines the PLO commitment to advocating the normalisation of life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and rejecting violence and terrorism.\textsuperscript{5} Addressed to the independent facilitator John Jorgen Holst, as opposed to the Israeli government, the letter constitutes an independent commitment by the PLO leadership to address the violence in the West Bank and Gaza and therefore is unique as there is no parallel Israeli letter or commitment to the Norwegian facilitators.

The Accord was an incremental approach towards a settlement involving a ‘gradual transition’ from occupation to self-rule. Israel would withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho within six months of signing the Declaration, and the elections to the Palestinian Council were scheduled within nine months. Negotiations on the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be initiated within two years of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho and conclude within five years.\textsuperscript{6} Civil authority and limited powers would be transferred to the Palestinians first in Gaza and Jericho and gradually to the West Bank. The Palestinian Council would maintain jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, excluding Jerusalem, with settlements and security issues deferred to permanent-status negotiations. The authority of the Palestinian Council would be extended in stages and its election held under international supervision. The discussion concerning the powers of the Council and the type and conditions of the elections and whether Jerusalem would be included were also deferred to the negotiation of the Interim Agreement.

A permanent settlement to the conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state based on UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 242 and 338 would also be
addressed in final-status negotiations. The core conflict concerns, including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, border relations, interstate co-operation, and issues of mutual interest, were postponed. The Accords determined a time-frame for subsequent negotiations. With the exception of Articles pertaining to Israeli security objectives and the election of a Palestinian Council that provides for the return of the PLO leadership to participate in the elections, all other Articles defer decisive statements to interim or final status negotiations. The intended effect of the Accord centred on addressing the Articles with an established date of implementation, namely, those Articles referring to security measures and the creation of a Palestinian interim self-government, the two core concerns of the ethnic bloc elites. The nature of the Agreement is that of a minimal bargain with a statement of intent for future negotiations.

The Declaration of Principles, despite its title, is based on expediency rather than principle (Barnett 1996: 148). Conspicuously absent from the Agreement is the implicit understanding that the PLO leadership would return to Gaza, Jericho, and eventually the West Bank from its exile in Tunis. Power and self-governing authority would be transferred to the successful candidates in the Palestinian Council elections. As the recognised and ‘legitimate’ representatives of the Palestinian people, triumphant after their return from exile, Fateh would be the likely victors in the elections. The recognition and inclusion of the dominant Fateh faction and PLO leadership was facilitated to this end. The bargain required that they be recognised and return to Gaza and the West Bank in order to curtail and contain the Intifada and the challenge posed by Hamas. The security remittance of the PLO and the Palestinian Council, once elected, would cover only the Palestinian populated areas. The responsibility for the security of Israeli
citizens, settlements, and external border concerns would remain with Israel. Security powers relating to the West Bank and Gaza would only be incrementally transferred to a substantial Palestinian police force recruited locally and from abroad (in order to integrate the exiled PLO fighters). The PLO leadership would return to the West Bank and Gaza in order to administer Palestinian security, its power instituted by the creation of an interim self-government through the Palestinian Council. All related concerns were deferred for future reflection.

The array of conflict concerns deferred to subsequent negotiations endorses the minimal bargain definition of the Oslo Accord. The nature of the term ‘accord’ as opposed to ‘agreement’ highlights this fact. The Oslo Pact is most commonly referred to as an agreement – an accord is ‘no more than a declaration of good will’. As such, the Accords are imbued with great expectations that betray their minimal and incremental nature. The ‘gradualism’ of the Accord made it favourable to the Israeli negotiators keen to proceed with addressing security concerns and postpone negotiations until ‘after the deal was already done’. The incremental nature of the Agreement was decisive for the Israeli government. The Israeli security apparatus would remain intact while the Palestinians established their own security structure. In contrast to the Camp David Agreement, military withdrawal would be ‘seen to be’ gradual. Israeli authority and security would not be compromised as the instruments of Palestinian authority were introduced. Once the PLO leadership accepted the ‘gradualism’ of Oslo the incentive for the Israeli government to persist with negotiations with the joint Jordanian-Palestinian team at Washington diminished.
The staggered nature of implementation circumvented the difficulty the Israeli government experienced in the ongoing Washington negotiations towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The Israeli government’s concern centred on the issue of authority and where the ultimate authority within the West Bank and Gaza would reside. This policy of incrementalism built into the Oslo Accords remedied the question of authority as the Israelis wanted ‘to be seen to want’ to ‘retain as much control as possible for as long as possible’ (Shlaim 2001: 509, Shlaim 1994: 32). The PLO leadership’s initial tacit acceptance of gradualism solved this problem. Once a degree of ‘gradualism’ was accepted in principle, the secret negotiations of the Oslo track took precedence over Washington, where the Israeli delegation declined from committing to the creation of a permanent state like apparatus for the Palestinians.

The issue of incrementalism was an equivocation. The objective of the Labour led government was primarily to minimise its responsibility for securing the West Bank and Gaza. When a period of transition, in keeping with gradualism was suggested the Israeli government opted instead to delegate responsibility to the PLO leadership as soon as practicable rather than initiate or supervise institutional transition and change.

The PLO leadership was driven by the desire for recognition beyond the Arab League as the legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people. As proscribed by the Israeli government prior to a change in the 1992 law, meeting with a PLO member was a criminal offence for Israelis. The offer of recognition enticed the PLO leadership, which had been described by Arafat as ‘on the verge of liquidation at the eve of the peace process’. No similar offer was forthcoming in the Washington negotiations in which PLO members were excluded and the Palestinians representatives in attendance had been
selected by the PLO and subsequently authorised by the Israelis. The incentive for the PLO leadership was plain; complying with the Oslo Accords would revive the fortunes of the PLO leadership and secure its position at the expense of Hamas, the within-bloc challengers to PLO Palestinian leadership. By agreeing to Oslo, the PLO leadership assumed responsibility for security within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, appeasing the concerns of both inter-ethnic bloc elites. The Oslo Agreement was designed to address and implement these core incumbent elite concerns.

4.3 The Intifada and the factional influence of Hamas

The threat to the Palestinian and Israeli incumbent elites’ who were party in the Oslo bargain began in earnest with the Intifada. In the 1987 Palestinian uprising, the first Intifada initiated the emergence of Hamas (Abu Amr 1994: 5, Morris 1999: 561). The Intifada began amid rising tension in Gaza after a road accident led to riots against the Israeli occupation (Shlaim 2001: 466). The unrest persisted and almost immediately the religious leaders of the long-established Islamic Muslim Brotherhood organisation published leaflets calling for a strike and demonstrations as well as an uprising against Israeli occupation. Increasingly, the pamphlets urging mobilisation were authored by a new and previously unknown group called Hamas.

The emergence of Hamas as a new schismatic faction threatened the existing PLO leadership. The origins of Hamas have been attributed partially or totally to the Intifada, the Israeli occupation, Israel itself, the Islamic resurgence after the Iranian Revolution, a
political vacuum in Gaza and the West Bank in the absence of the Fateh leadership, and the final interpretation sees Hamas as evidence of an internal Palestinian factional dispute. The factional dispute emerged over the question of Palestinian autonomy in relation to Islam and the nature of an Islamic Palestinian entity or state. The division arose over whether Palestinians would aspire to a Palestine with nation-state sovereign characteristics in keeping with the perceptions of the secular nationalist Fatah leadership. Or, whether an Islamic Palestine would form based on Shari'a law and core Islamic principles. The debate as to the sovereign and secular or Islamic and religious future of the future Palestine politicised the Islamic groups and created an anti-occupation force (Milton-Edwards 1996: 57) creating an ideological cleavage within the bloc that rendered Hamas the anti-regime and Weltanschauung model (Lipset 1959: 94) in the Palestinian bloc, unlikely to succumb to co-option or integration within the bloc leadership.

Alternatively, Hamas is perceived as a vehicle of the Muslim Brotherhood, created to mobilise support and compete with the secular nationalist groups of the PLO and as a counterweight to the threat posed by fringe Islamic groups like Islamic Jihad (Budeiri 1995: 91). Additional explanations assert that the Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘original leadership ... was burdened with the stigma of de facto collaboration with Israel since the Moslem brothers had postponed till late the liberation of Palestine’ (Rashad 1993). Legrain observes that ‘the Muslim Brotherhood had to end two decades of Islamic anti-Israeli inactivity’ (Legrain 1997: 159). The complex relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and successive Israeli governments allude to initial Israeli influence in the creation and manipulation of Hamas. A relationship arrived at on the basis of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, any attempt to usurp the leadership of the PLO even
partially could reap mutual dividends: ‘Such uncertainty allowed them to coexist and to manage operating separately but with a vision to their different objectives.’

Prior to the Intifada, the Palestinian issue languished after the PLO leadership’s defeat and expulsion from Lebanon in 1982. The 1986 Arab Summit in Amman signalled a decreasing interest in the Palestinian cause in tandem with the revival of Islam in the Occupied Territories. The mutable situation facilitated the opportunity to challenge the existing factional elites of the Palestinian bloc both secular and religious. The subsequent emergence of some new groupings was ‘artificially stimulated ... part of an Israeli strategy to pursue a policy of divide and rule aimed at eradicating an already weakened national movement’ (Milton-Edwards 1996: 8). Israel’s co-option of the Muslim Brotherhood lends credence to this argument.

Hamas arose from within the Muslim Brotherhood. The new organization was founded in two stages. In December 1987 prominent Muslim Brothers in Gaza formed The Movement of Islamic Resistance or Hamas. The initiative appeared to be the work of Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantisi (deceased) a physician from the Islamic Uliversity of Gaza and former student leaders at the University who were in responsible for security matters in the Muslim Brotherhood. Traditional hostility to any political initiative not associated with religious mobilization resulted in a clear distinction between the Islamic Resistance Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (Legrain 1997: 163).

The emergence of Hamas initially marked a centrifugal shift in the support of Palestinians within the Gaza Strip as Hamas rapidly expanded its influence to the West Bank. The shift within the Palestinian bloc towards Hamas and its effort to reorient the Palestinian strategy towards the Israeli occupation resulted in a new dispensation in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hamas elicited support from a generation of Palestinians unfamiliar with the 1967 war or Palestinian life prior to Israeli control and who were 'ripe for resistance' (Litvak 1998: 148, Hroub 2000: 38).

The new Palestinian faction advocated a national uprising against Israeli occupation. In contrast to the older order of the Muslim Brotherhood that formed the hub of Islamic opposition to the secular PLO in the West Bank and Gaza, the Hamas policy of active resistance to the occupation reoriented the Palestinian bloc and positioned the new Hamas faction between the Muslim Brotherhood and the more radical Islamic Jihad (Hroub 2000: 32). The configuration of factions and the nature of elite accommodation within the Palestinian bloc threatened the position of the PLO leadership in terms of both its autonomy and its legitimacy.

In the short time from the emergence of the Intifada to 1992, Hamas threatened the hegemony of the expelled PLO Fateh leadership and the policy of Israeli control and containment in the West Bank and Gaza. The 1987 Intifada and simultaneous emergence of Hamas as an actor within the Israeli Occupied Territories alarmed the incumbent Israeli elite as well as the PLO leadership (Ma’oz 1999: 400). By 1992, the continuing Intifada and escalation of support for Hamas had influenced the configuration of the factions, the perceptions of the Israeli and Palestinian bloc members and, as a result, the nature of elite accommodation in both blocs. The threat posed by Hamas to Israel’s military and political control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to domestic Israeli support for incumbent Israeli government policy, as well as its influence on the Fateh leadership of the PLO, respectively, provided the incentive for both to adopt and advocate new tactics to curtail the activities and influence of the mutual threat of
‘common foe’. The Oslo bargain complements the aims of both ethnic bloc leaderships in curtailing the influence of Hamas.

Hamas was instrumental in increasing the financial, military, political and psychological cost of controlling the West Bank and Gaza for Israel. The actions of Hamas and the consequences of the Intifada threatened delicately balanced political coalitions within Israel and resulted in increasing popular support in the West Bank and Gaza Strip against the Israeli occupation. Hamas was encroaching on the absent PLO leadership support within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The appeal of the new Palestinian faction was in no small measure due to its proximity to the conflict and its active response to the Israeli presence.

The ramifications of Hamas were twofold. First, by 1990, Hamas was undermining Israel’s containment policy of the Intifada and the Israeli government’s will to persist with containment. The erosion of faith in the containment policy deflated morale throughout the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and questioned the legitimacy of the control regime adopted by Israel in the West Bank and Gaza. To remedy this situation, the Israeli government sought to change its traditional unilateral security tactics, seeking instead a collaborative security partner. The unlikely candidate for the partnership was the PLO Fatah leadership.

Factionalism threatened the legitimacy of the PLO leadership exiled in Tunis. The mechanisms of patrimony that fused the Fatah leadership to its PLO supporters under occupation were placed under increasing financial, logistical and political strain in the midst of the Intifada. Hamas undermined the already waning support system of the PLO leadership by providing services, initiatives and political activity, all of which drew
support and affiliation from the PLO's traditional constituency. In order to eliminate this threat, the PLO leadership sought to reintegrate itself into the core of the Palestinian polity in the Occupied Territories. This strategy required the recognition and permission of the Israeli government. In return, the PLO's recognition of the State of Israel, which runs counter to the PLO Charter, would be sought from Fateh.

These complementary objectives, combined with successive efforts to contain and curtail Hamas, led the Israeli government and the PLO leadership to negotiate the Oslo bargain. Motivated by the successive policy failures in dealing with Hamas, a shift in interests shaped the tactics of both participants towards the Oslo pact. A broad incentive for the Israeli government involved securing the legitimacy of its armed forces and the legitimacy of the State of Israel itself as domestic dissent regarding the handling of the Intifada was matched with international criticism, all of which undermined the ability of a quasi-consociational (Lijphart 1985: 61) consensual system to govern (Arian 1999, Hazan 1999b).

The Israeli government aimed to amend its unilateral security strategy of control in the Occupied Territories. The change in policy required co-opting a security partner with a vested interest in the West Bank and Gaza. The need for an alternative collaborative security arrangement described as the 'Palestinian option' (Alpher 1995: 130) formed part of the incentive for the Israeli government to negotiate the Oslo bargain with the exiled PLO leadership. The emergence of Hamas within five years of the group's founding had unified previous enemies and enduring rivals in an inter-ethnic elite pact orchestrated to curb the success of Hamas.
4.4 The configuration of factions in the Palestinian bloc

Within the Palestinian bloc, factionalism was traditionally pervasive. The majority of factions have been institutionalised in large part under the collective umbrella of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Institutionally, the PLO spans the spectrum of Palestinian nationalist and predominantly secular ideology (Cobban 1992: 24, Sayigh 2000: 206). Challenges to the primacy of Fateh PLO leadership's elite autonomy were commonplace and moderate dissent within the factions of the PLO was largely due to the geographically decentralised nature of the organisation.

The 1979 Camp David Accords, however, had created an internationally approved frame of reference for remedying the Palestinian question, and the Fateh leadership responded by signalling its interest as the Palestinian representative in any subsequent negotiations. Opposing factions established a 'rejection front' as they regarded the PLO leadership’s stance as an affront to the core principles of PLO unity. The leadership advocated a policy of within-bloc accommodation to contain internal dissent by offering posts to factions at all levels according to quota allocation, forming a basis of power-sharing in the Palestinian Legislative Council in the absence of Palestinian-wide elections. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza after 1967 created intense associational activity in the Palestinian bloc. Associations were created in lieu of Israeli services affiliated with the PLO factions creating semi-corporatist associations (Langohr 2004: 184). The structure of the Palestinian bloc was instituted so that open competition and the creation of schismatic factions challenging the leadership would be
accommodated and the bloc support for the leadership would remain fixed. This strategy was intermittently threatened, restraining the leadership while illustrating 'the difficulties of defining, let alone maintaining a nominal majority in a movement based in a scattered exile and subject to the conflicting pressures of differing Arab hosts' (Sayigh 1999: 580).

In 1993, Hamas openly challenged the PLO leadership; its position was pivotal to the structure of the Palestinian bloc the configuration of factions for and against the leadership and the orientation of Palestinian constituency support. When the Hamas leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin Yassin (who was to be assassinated in 2004) issued the Intifada pamphlets in the name of Hamas in January 1988, the ramifications of the new faction were numerous. The ideological dimensions within the Palestinian bloc were reoriented. Hamas altered the nature of the bloc by positioning itself centrally on the Palestinian Islamic spectrum, between toleration of the occupation with the social network-based ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and the more extreme resistance and Islamic stance of groups like Islamic Jihad.

The emergence of Hamas created the greatest organisational threat to the secular Palestinian nationalism of the PLO Fateh leadership, altering the configuration of factions and pattern of elite accommodation and support of the Palestinian constituency posing a direct challenge to the monopoly of Fateh's support by Muslim Palestinian nationalists in the West Bank and Gaza (Mishal and Sela 2000: 31). Contrary to the text of the Hamas Charter of August 1988, Hamas was openly challenging Fateh leadership in Gaza.31

The ideological pan-Arab, pan-Islamic composition of Hamas excluded the conventional internal accommodation policy advocated by the leadership within the PLO structure. When the challenge of Hamas overtly threatened the leadership a policy of
accommodation was initially employed to absorb Hamas into the PLO; when this policy failed, the PLO leadership recognised the schismatic nature of Hamas and an alternative policy of open competition with Hamas was implemented.\(^{32}\)

The PLO leadership had little opportunity to curb the threat of Hamas and limited ability to ‘lead’ from the Diaspora, resulting in an increasingly disenfranchised population under occupation (Khalidi 2002: 93). Local Fateh leadership in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (constituting the next generation of Fateh\(^{33}\)) asserted itself in order to regain local support only to be imprisoned or detained by Israel. An Israeli policy of targeting the PLO groupings left a vacancy for a neutral Palestinian organisation to flourish. The Muslim Brotherhood was an unassuming internal Palestinian organisation adept at managing the demands of occupation and able to exercise a degree of autonomy courtesy of tacit Israeli acceptance. This made the Muslim Brotherhood sufficiently different to carve a niche in the existing spectrum of the Palestinian polity in the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas filled a niche.

Fateh initially overlooked the threat posed by Hamas, as it had the Muslim Brotherhood, at the beginning of the Intifada and then attempted to buttress its own position within the West Bank and Gaza, remaining at a distance both logistically and figuratively, while Hamas remained at the heart of the Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza and could create a support base. The PLO catch-all ‘supermarket of ideas’ strategy uniformly succeeded in curtailing dissent and formed the PLO leadership’s model policy response to leadership challenges.\(^{34}\) The challenge posed by Hamas to the leadership of Fateh, however, was perceived as a threat to Fateh’s secular ideology. The Hamas charter dispelled any perceived challenge to the PLO’s advocacy of a secular Palestinian
state by an Islamist-nationalist Hamas advocating an Islamic Palestinian state while also seeking to account for the new political framework within the West Bank and Gaza (Schiff and Ya’ari 1990: 587).35

Challenging Fateh’s dominance was for Hamas as much a consequence of expediency as political ambition. The Muslim Brotherhood, and later and more critically Hamas, enjoyed an electoral mandate of sorts, laying claim to the Islamist constituency by standing Islamic candidates in PLO-dominated student unions in Gaza and the West Bank throughout the 1970s and emerging as a distinct political force by the end of the decade.36

The threat of Hamas to the PLO Fateh leadership was palpable and fuelled by the Intifada. While PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat sought to impede Hamas’s role in the Intifada, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) established the local branch of what became the Unified National Command (UNC). In time the Tunis leadership succeeded in taking control of the UNC as the flotilla of the secular-nationalist (PLO) Palestinian groups (Inbari 1996: 74, Mishal and Sela 2000: 43).37 Hamas leaflets orchestrated Intifada directives on strikes, acts of solidarity, or dissent-replicated leaflets signed by the UNC.38 All were vying for the reigns of the Intifada or using the Intifada to notify the Fateh leadership of challenges to its authority (Mishal and Sela 2000: 62).39

The Fateh leadership was losing the support of content secularists to an Islamic revival politicised to personify resistance. While fragmentation of the secular-nationalists in the West Bank and Gaza had served Arafat’s purpose of preventing the potential emergence of an alternative ‘internal’ leadership, Hamas’s hold on civil society’s infrastructure in Gaza constituted an increasing threat to Fateh’s broad
Palestinian bloc. The advocacy of Islamic Palestinian nationalism coupled with Hamas’s institutional and organisational dominance as the largest opposition to Fateh hegemony threatened the leadership in Tunis. Hamas, in tandem with the release of its deferential Charter, overtly challenged the UNC in calling a general strike on 25 August 1988. In asserting control and initiating strikes, Hamas was repositioning itself as the de facto leadership. The challenge of Hamas to the PLO leadership in Tunis intensified and with it the incentive for the PLO leadership to engage in negotiations to endorse its legitimacy and realign its support base in its favour.

4.4.1 Elite accommodation and the nature of support in the Palestinian bloc

The increasing isolation of the PLO leadership in exile aimed to regain support from the Palestinian bloc. Fateh openly competed with Hamas, accusing its Islamic competitor of deserting the nationalist ranks and attempting to deviate from the ‘the commandments, the organic structure and the laws of the Palestinian family’ (Hroub 2000: 92). Fateh condemned Hamas’s actions as serving the Israeli enemy and alleged Hamas collusion with Israeli intelligence. The allegations resulted in the prompt prohibition and arrest of the Hamas leaders: Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a pivotal Hamas leader, was arrested in May 1989 and sentenced to 15 years in prison. The structure of the Hamas was, however, unlike that of its secular rival Fateh and while the arrests of the Hamas leaders frustrated the organisation, it failed to curb its threat to the incumbent PLO leadership.
Hamas challenged the PLO leadership institutionally. In the Hamas decision-making process outlined by Sheikh Yassin, ‘all decisions adopted by the majority are binding on everyone’ (Hroub 2000: 58). Conversely, the institutional structure of the PLO was formulaic, and the hegemony of Fateh resulted in over-representation of the majority faction in every institution and council of the organisation. The influence of the shifting orientation of the Palestinian bloc led PLO leader Arafat to institute structural and institutional safeguards in order to contain the Hamas challenge. The first of these safeguards was a declaration of the state.

The declaration of a Palestinian state to a closed session of the Palestinian National Council meeting on 15 November 1988 in Algiers created a new political platform. In accepting UN resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Arafat was complying with the Schultz initiative for peace made manifest in the Madrid conference and premised on an American ‘land for peace’ proposal: land for the Palestinians in return for peaceful coexistence with Israel. The US initiative attempted to curtail the Intifada while simultaneously condemning terrorism (Shlaim 2001: 466). The Algiers decision attempted to secure the primacy of the Fateh leadership by appealing to the parameters and requirements of the Schultz peace initiative. In the closed Algiers session, 85 per cent of PLO faction representatives favoured and 15 per cent opposed participation in the proposed multilateral Madrid peace talks.42

Fateh’s policy towards the proposed Madrid Middle East dialogue resulted from the increasing pressure of challenges to its leadership and constraints on its resources. The Algiers decision is defined as the ‘historic compromise’ in that it heralded a seismic
shift in the position of the PLO, tacit recognition of the state of Israel, alluded to in the statements made by the PLO in 1977 but this time with the renunciation of violence. The Algiers shift was simultaneously internal and external; in agreeing to recognise the 15 per cent Palestinian National Council division on the motion in a closed session, Arafat and the PLO leadership acknowledged the rejection of the Madrid proposal by the opposition factions of the PFLP, DFLP and by the Communist party. This initiative towards greater transparency augmented the traditional pattern of inclusive, cohesive, centralised PLO decision-making and allowed for the distance between policy decisions to be made clear. By giving voice to pervasive factions, the leadership was providing the space for the creation of an internal opposition and the illusion of consensus building (Hirschman 1970).

The inclusive institutional structure of the PLO serves as a bulwark against competition and opposition whereas Arafat’s concession to the opposition within the PLO carved a functioning opposition from the PLO rib, and in so doing, sought to distance Hamas further as an alternative religious-nationalist opposition. In addition, Arafat secured the allure of statehood in April 1989 by seeking nomination from the PLO executive committee and central council as president of the recently declared Palestinian state and successfully gained control of the PLO institutions by placing himself above them and Fateh when the occasion demanded. The Fateh leadership (and Arafat, in particular) was steeling itself against leadership challenges while attempting to co-opt secular opposition and undermine Hamas support both externally and internally by distancing Hamas from its sole ties with the PLO’s PFLP faction. The real issue of legitimacy rested in electoral or municipal support.
Electorally, PLO candidates vied with Hamas for seats in the chamber of commerce and professional associations; the PLO focused its attention on Hamas Gazan strongholds and Hamas won seats in the PLO’s traditional stronghold of Ramallah. In 1992, Hamas won 40 per cent of the popular vote in municipal elections in the West Bank and Gaza despite efforts by the PLO candidates in Nablus to create ambiguity and stand on a ticket as the ‘Muslim nationalist trend’ (Abu Amr 1994: 86). Hamas nevertheless lobbied to acquire the number of seats in the PNC commensurate with its perceived weight in Palestinian society and politics which Hamas estimated at 40–50 per cent of the total number of PNC seats. Violent clashes between Hamas and Fatah escalated in June and July of 1992 in the midst of the Israeli election.

It became apparent within the PNC and the bodies of the PLO that limited access points were available for an excluded challenger, such as Hamas, in the Palestinian polity to advocate its challenge to the leadership. This difficulty was illustrated in 1991 amidst preparations for the Washington negotiations. Hamas proposed establishing a committee that would strengthen the hand of the organisations opposed to the negotiations and minimise concessions. The ten Palestinian organisitons in the resistance movement entertained reservations concerning the Hamas initiative. The concern centred on the proposals and claimed they were an encroachment on the PLO prerogative as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians and asserted that the conditions were ripe to create an alternative to the PLO (Hroub 2000: 100). The institutional mechanisms created by the PLO leadership were in this instance successful in containing the challenge from Hamas.
Fateh attempted to secure its institutional monopoly on the PLO leadership by agreeing to continue Palestinian participation in the Washington talks after Madrid. The Palestinian representatives in Washington were ‘insiders’, a select group of professional Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza chosen by the PLO and with Israeli agreement to negotiate as part of a joint Jordanian–Palestinian negotiation. The Palestinian delegation, while unofficially representing the PLO leadership, sincerely attempted to negotiate core conflict concerns without any decision-making authority. Unknown to the Palestinian negotiators, the PLO leadership by December 1993 had begun negotiating directly with the Israeli government for which the Washington negotiations had become a ‘smokescreen’.47

The Israeli policy shift towards Hamas, however, provided Arafat with an opportunity to redeem his support in the West Bank and Gaza. Arafat and the PLO leadership became increasingly conscious of their vulnerability after the PLO chairman’s plane crash in April 1992 (Rubin And Rubin 2003: 131), and attempted to accommodate Hamas with difficulty. On 17 December 1992, as Israel expelled 413 Islamists, Hamas leaders, supporters and clerics to no-man’s land beyond the Israeli security zone in South Lebanon, Hamas publicly disputed the PLO’s authority to speak on behalf of the expellees. Nevertheless, the PLO leadership made itself indispensable as the voice of the expellees.48 An accommodation was reached as senior Hamas representatives from Jordan held discussions with Arafat in Khartoum in January 1993. The PLO’s goal centred on initiating its traditional policy of Hamas accommodation, with repeated demands for a militant political programme, and in light of their popular vote share in the municipal elections, a 40 per cent share of PNC seats (Sayigh 1999: 652). Once this
proposal was rejected by the PLO, Hamas proposed direct elections to PLO leadership institutions; this initiative was also rejected (Abu Amr 1994: 132). Hamas requested that Fateh withdraw from the Washington talks until Israel complied with UN Resolution 799 and returned the expellees (Milton-Edwards 1999: 159). Instead, there was a delayed Palestinian return to the Washington talks in protest at the Israeli failure to address the issue of the expellees. By this time, however, the Oslo negotiations had become official-level talks.

Israel’s exasperation with Hamas, exhibited in its ad hoc expulsion policy, was a short-lived political coup for the Fateh leadership. Fateh reasserted its position as the ‘only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’ as it attempted to secure the expellees’ release amid Hamas protests. Hamas was required to collaborate with Fateh to rectify the situation and was seen as co-operating with the leadership. Arafat’s position and that of the leadership was endorsed, thus increasing its waning credibility in the West Bank and Gaza as well as Oslo.

The constellation of groups forming the Palestinian bloc and the (re)orientation of support within the Palestinian constituency had altered with the emergence of Hamas and influenced the bloc elite; this in turn led Arafat to pursue contact actively with the Israelis and assert that the PLO would ultimately take complete charge of Palestinian authority in Gaza and the West Bank, policing the Occupied Territories with units from exile (Sayigh 1999: 656). To maintain his position and the primacy of Fateh and the PLO, Arafat’s return to the West Bank and Gaza was necessary.

In order to sustain its leadership position and quell the challenge of Hamas as well as Israeli legitimacy and security, the Fateh leadership returned with its exiled Fateh
fighters in order to impose a new security dispensation on the Occupied Territories. The credibility associated with this task was afforded by the recognition of the PLO leadership as the (sole) representative of the Palestinian people, facilitating the necessary bargain for negotiating the Oslo pact.

4.4.2 Palestinian external resource dependence

The PLO leadership, exiled in Tunis and facing a leadership challenge that threatened to usurp its position, depended on donations from Arab states to maintain its system of patronage within the West Bank and Gaza. The leadership’s support of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War had onerous consequences at the end of the military conflict with the forcible exodus of thousands of Palestinians from Kuwait after the Iraqi defeat. The funds directed to the PLO leadership were halved. Twenty-eight million dollars a month from Saudi Arabia were redirected to Hamas. Financial decline in the PLO by September 1990 ultimately threatened Arafat’s patronage system of control, and his inability to pay its military increased the threat of Hamas’s battalions (‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam’) as its official military apparatus (Mishal and Sela 2000).

The leadership position of the Fateh cadre within the PLO was increasingly tenuous during the 1991 Washington talks. At the same time, however, the financial hardship of the PLO leadership increased and Arafat publicly denounced the Gulf States and Iran for funding Hamas.
The PLO leadership's loss of financial control in the West Bank and Gaza escalated. The situation led to public appeals both from Palestinians within the West Bank and Gaza for greater accountability and less corruption and from Fateh's central committee to establish a Palestinian provisional government in order to spare the PLO the need to reject its key principle, namely, non-recognition of Israel. Arafat's concentration of power within and among the PLO factions went unchallenged; the threat of Hamas, coupled with a weakened military, financial and organisational base, constrained his conventional policy instruments (Rubin and Rubin 2003: 130). Arafat insisted that the Americans 'want to humiliate Yasser Arafat and eliminate him', and he repeatedly told the rest of the PLO leadership that 'eliminating him means eliminating the PLO and all of you'. Nevertheless, Arafat was not averse to dealing directly with Israel at Oslo (Sayigh 1999: 656). The financial crisis within the PLO increased and in June and July 1993 unprecedented requests urged Arafat to resign as chairperson of PLO amid perceived fears of an imminent collapse of the organisation, anticipated by Hamas preparing for its 'moment of glory' (Milton-Edwards 1999: 161).

The legitimacy of the PLO and Arafat as its leader, as well as the personification of the struggle for the Palestinian people, was weakened. The Fateh leadership was being usurped not by familiar challenges from secular factional opponents but rather by a well sponsored and supported Hamas capable of co-operation and practical agreement with the PFLP. This alliance-building proved Hamas was prepared and able to accommodate and work with the PLO factions within the West Bank and Gaza. Fateh, however, faced the challenge of Hamas that had successfully mobilised the Palestinian constituency of the Occupied Territories. As a result, the ruling Fateh elite were willing to respond to this
threat by engaging in policies that attempted to cement its incumbent position, incurring new and unforeseen costs for its constituency bloc (Gagnon 1995: 135).

4.5 The configuration of factions and the nature of the Israeli bloc

The configuration of the factions in the Israeli bloc consisted of a changing coalition of factional elites from before the inception of the Intifada in 1987 to the Oslo bargain in 1993. Institutional, political, and contextual factors have regulated and attempted to subdue factional divisions within the Israeli bloc. The configuration of factions was naturally decentralised in structure prior to the 1967 war, a traditional politics of accommodation and quasi-consociational (Hazan 1999a, Hazan 1999b). The consequential shift towards majoritarian politics emerged from the ideological division over 'state-building and state contraction' (Lustick 1993: 26), divisions between those on the left willing to return occupied land for peace and those on the right advocating the incorporation of the land occupied in advancement of the goal of Eretz Yisrael, the greater Israel. The growth in support for the right-wing Likud (unity) party resulted in an openly competitive structure with the centrally located National Religious Party (NRP) obtaining the position of power broker. The conventional alliance of the National Religious Party51 and the Labour left and its associated parties was threatened by the issue of land. The factor most influential in promoting or reversing the processes of incorporation of the territories was 'the changing level of political support within Israel for politicians favouring disengagement' (Lustick 1993: 30). The ideo-religious
cleavages within Israel became more pronounced and influenced the effectiveness of the political parties (Laakso-Taagepera, 1979, Smith 1999: 13)

Likud’s position as the largest party in 1977 with the highest number of seat share in the Knesset illustrated this change. The NRP gave Likud leader Menachem Begin the margin he required to govern (Arian 1998). The shift in factional balances was further tilted by the emergence of small right-wing settler movements and associated factional elites in response to the return of Sinai to Egypt in the Camp David Accords (Newman 1985: 35, Nisan 1978: 163). These movements included the Jewish Underground that advocated a strategy of political violence against Palestinians and parties, such as Gush Emunim. The subsequent fracturing of the NRP into nationalist religious, religious extremist, and ethnic religious (Shas) factions heralded the advent of coalition governments based on the participation of these religious parties (Lijphart et al. 1999: 31). The factionalism within the Israeli bloc (Laakso-Taagepera 1979) initially concerning issues of land and religion led to a succession of national unity governments from 1984 to 1992.

At the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987, the Likud-led national unity government failed to initiate a strategy to deal with the riots within the West Bank and Gaza.

From 1967, Israel’s occupation strategy differed from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip although the civil and military administration of the territories was combined (Van Creveld 1998: 338). This centralised approach ensured integration of information and intelligence until 1981, after which greater leeway was given to (and less information gleaned from) religious institutions, the main lobbying point for Hamas and the older Muslim Brotherhood with the installation of a civil administration (Shalev 1991: 34).
The administration of the occupation was unable to contain the Intifada, resulting in the Israeli Minister for Defence and Labour party leader Yitzhak Rabin asserting that the soldiers were insufficiently trained and prone to excess.

Previous Israeli policy towards the West Bank and Gaza was governed by political party ideological concerns. The organisational structure and primary (though not only) ideological cleavage within the Israeli bloc (Sartori 1999: 25) focused on the issue of land and the question of Eretz YisraeL After the acquisition of the territories in 1967, the Labour-led coalition government (that formed and implemented occupation strategies from 1967 to 1977) was fundamentally ambivalent about the future of the territories and initially employed an array of policies from detention to containment critically to the settlement of the West Bank. Decisive attempts to absorb or relinquish the territories were postponed by the imperatives of Israel’s coalition politics. Conversely, with the exclusion of Sinai return under the Camp David Accords of 1979, under the Likud party leaders of Begin, Sharon and Shamir, official policy adhered to the idea of Eretz YisraeL, which in keeping with right-wing Likud ideology sought to ensure the territories’ permanent absorption into Israel (Seliktar 1988: 31, Nisan 1978: 153). The greater Israel position was evident in the policy shift towards uniformity and standardisation of laws and certain policies in Gaza (Lustick 1993: 35). The Camp David Accords in 1979 proposed Palestinian autonomy within the West Bank and Gaza; to complement this, the Israeli government allowed the registration of the Muslim Brotherhood (and Complex), enabling it to gain support, the objective of which was to ‘unleash it against the PLO’.
Israel with its overt co-option policy (Byman 2002: 81) of the Palestinian Islamic opposition hoped to create a strong counterweight to the PLO in order to usurp its leadership. However, with the advent of the Intifada, the Israeli policy objective became one of ‘turning the uprising into a civil war’ (Schiff and Ya’ari 1989). In the midst of the Intifada, these two considerations, Hamas and the West Bank and Gaza, threatened Israel’s sense of security and legitimacy.

Transparent Israeli government initiatives sought to use administrative policy to regulate Palestinian dissent and serve Israeli interests. Israel’s initial policy of ignoring the Islamic organisations and subsequent tacit facilitation of the Muslim Brotherhood organisation enabled the Islamic complex to dominate Gaza’s civil society and welfare provisions to the detriment of the PLO. These two policies of ‘ignorance’, that is, overlooking the Muslim Brotherhood and later co-option including the holding of municipal elections in the Occupied Territories, were apparent throughout the period and illustrate policy selection dependence on government and elite motivation. The Israeli–Muslim Brotherhood coexistence exemplified collective co-operation, a nest of converging interests, namely, the regulation of PLO leadership power. Antipathy for the PLO formed the basis of the relationship between the Islamic complex and the Israeli government, exemplary of the joint co-operation of two competing actors to defeat a third with mutual benefit. The configuration of factions within the Israeli bloc was transparent and centralised by virtue of a mechanised national unity government coalition.
4.5.1 Patterns of elite accommodation and the nature of support in the Israeli bloc

The Intifada provoked a shift in the configuration of the Israeli bloc. At the outset of the Intifada, no uniform policy over how best to address violence in the Occupied Territories existed.\(^5\) When the violence escalated, however, the objective was outlined by Chief of Staff Eytan to ‘make the Arabs run about like drugged bugs in a bottle’ (Van Creveld 1998: 340). The excesses exhibited by the IDF and the newly imposed policies of collective punishment, curfew containment (known as environmental punishment), ‘broken bones’ and counter-insurgency exercised by an army previously adept at conventional fighting (Hunter 1991: 88) undermined the domestic political consensus holding Israel’s coalition government together. The legitimacy of the incumbent elite was threatened and ultimately undermined, bloc support decreased and the government collapsed under the strain of domestic and international criticism (1990). The opposition, unable to form a new government relented and the Knesset approved a new Likud-led government in a ‘Unity’ coalition. The Intifada and Hamas held Israeli political will hostage and necessitated consensus within the bloc.

The influence of the Intifada on the Israeli people and the crucial role played by Hamas undermined not only Israel’s containment policy in the West Bank and Gaza but also the principles of the State of Israel itself. Israel’s perception of societal security resided in the debate over the West Bank and Gaza (Barnett 1999, Buzan 1991). For Israel specifically the cultivation of an alternative Islamic leadership to the PLO assisted the administration by providing social health and welfare institutional structures and in so doing, absolved the Israeli administration of extending itself further.\(^6\)
Israel’s co-option policy of Hamas is substantiated by the Rabin plan of January 1989, in which he argued that Israeli policy could not be based singularly on the suppression of the uprising, but by two elements, a political and a security element, the objective of which involved finding a partner among the residents of the territories. Rabin’s plan was later amended by Likud party leader and Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir in his plan of the same name. Israel could not, however, conduct negotiations with the PLO (Shalev 1991: 141). Israel’s ensuing efforts to co-opt Hamas at the expense of the PLO Fateh leadership attributed status to Hamas. Its leaders were filmed with top-level Israeli officials. In May 1989, Hamas spokesman Mahmoud Zahar met with the Israeli defence minister Yitzak Rabin two weeks before the escalation of Hamas violence in the Sasportas-Sadon kidnapping. Similarly, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the cleric head of the Islamic centre and the spiritual leader of Hamas prior to his subsequent imprisonment, met with Israeli government officials to discuss the uprising and its implications (Milton-Edwards 1996: 161).

Hamas was not outlawed for another six months. In contrast to the PLO, Hamas was afforded ‘legitimacy’ and recognition by Israel in a relationship dominated by a shared antipathy towards the PLO and the secular national movement. While the PLO alleged Israeli paternity of Hamas in a bid to undermine its own authority, it has been argued that, by virtue of the relationship between occupation authorities and the people under occupation, Hamas leaders were compelled under threat of arrest to meet Israeli security and political officials (Hroub 2000: 204). The Israeli government’s Hamas strategy oscillated between ignoring, co-opting, containing or on occasion eliminating Hamas (by way of targeted assassinations). The policies were adopted to contain the
damage of the Intifada for Israel and intensify the internal Palestinian divisions in order to control the West Bank and Gaza more effectively. Israeli policy initiatives escalated as did the Intifada. International pressure and the material cost of the Intifada and Hamas soared. The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza was described as a net benefit to the Israeli economy prior to 1987. With the emergence of the Intifada, security provision became a subsequent net drain.60 By 1989 the Defence Ministry anticipated the simple military cost of fighting the Intifada as being approximately $1.8 billion by the end of 1990. The cost of the Intifada was exacerbated by the failure to implement necessary economic reform in Israel. Frequent currency devaluations, increasing inflation and need to accommodate the newly aliyah of Soviet immigrants put increasing pressure of the government to address the Intifada (Jones and Murphy 2002: 72).

An Israeli decision to withdraw from the territories anticipated additional Israeli casualties, strong external pressure and an alliance between Israeli anti-annexationists and Palestinians in an effort to overcome the political power of the Israeli right wing and make the ‘irrationality’ of the occupation politically decisive (Schiff and Ya’ari 1990: 580). The orientation of the Israeli bloc realigned accordingly. In the midst of the Washington talks, at the 1992 general election in Israel, Prime Minister Shamir’s Likud party lost to its Labour party rivals as Labour stressed that the Likud government’s settlement investment programme in the West Bank and Gaza was at the expense of the mainly Sephardic development towns. Labour’s strategy centred on preventing a tacit coalition between the factions of the settler movement Gush Emunim (perceived to have been the vanguard of the Right) and the ethnic religious party of the Sephardim Shas,
both of which had kept Likud in power. Labour also benefited from divisions between the Sephardi and Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox parties.

Labour’s approach was shaped by the assumption that the NRP – with the same number of seats as Shas – would not agree to participate in a government with secularising advocates of land return without obtaining substantial power in the foreign policy domain. The bilateral and multilateral talks in Washington had oriented Labour towards negotiation and agreement on the issues of foreign policy, such as ‘land for peace’ and rapprochement with Syria and Lebanon. All of this increased tensions between Labour and the NRP far beyond frisson at the time of their last alliance in 1977. The Labour party attempted to overcome difficulties with the NRP and turned its attentions to Shas. The Labour party ploy was assisted by Shas’ requirement to distinguish itself from the NRP. Shas, as an orthodox ethnic party, responded to Labour advances and broke the isolationist political practices of the religious non-Zionists and joined both the Labour-led government and cabinet, providing the Labour, Meretz and Arab parties with a substantive coalition (Hazan 1999a: 128, Sandler 1999).

The election reflected the ideological distance within the Israeli bloc at the time. Described as a choice between ‘Greater Israel or the State of Israel’, the election highlighted the cleavage in Israeli society regarding whether or not the West Bank and Gaza were necessarily an integral part of the Israeli State (Barnett 1999). The election was fought through national security discourse with the most important distinction between the parties being their positions on territorial compromise and national security.
Labour's campaign platform was a compromise between the goals of the leader Yitzak Rabin and former leader Shimon Peres. Rabin promised a settlement to the Palestinian problem within nine months of the election and called for immediate talks with non-PLO Palestinians and for withdrawal from populated areas of the West Bank and Gaza; rejecting Palestinian statehood (Lieberfeld 1999: 68). Shimon Peres's tendency within the Labour party had, however, called for a repeal of the ban on Israeli contacts with the PLO. The repeal was won by one vote after two private proposals, one a private members bill by Yossi Beilin and the other by Yael Dayan. The bill was passed by one vote as Uzi Baram, a Labour Knesset member, 'was late ran in and waved his hand.' The repeal of the ban allowed for Israeli officials to meet with PLO members and the possibility of an alternative channel of dialogue with the Palestinians. Labour leader Rabin, initially opposed to both the repeal of the ban and the dialogue with PLO members, consented to the Oslo initiative. The accommodation between Rabin and Peres was instrumental in the change in Labour party policy and later in the government initiatives towards the PLO.

The election also intensified tensions and sparked clashes between Hamas and Fateh in Gaza (Sayigh 1999: 635). The reorientation of the Israeli bloc to open competition and schismatic factionalism facilitated the necessary shift towards the negotiation of the Oslo bargain with the PLO leadership.
4.5.2 Israeli external resource dependence

External influences altered the perceived ideological dimension of the conflict from one of two conflicting nationalisms to a religious conflict—Jew versus Muslim.\(^{64}\) Challenging the conventional ‘clash of nationalisms’ wisdom of the conflict with one based on religious dogma afforded greater credibility to the right-wing religious factions within the Israeli polity and provided a platform to the settler movement organisations, in particular, Gush Emunim that adheres to the Eretz Yisrael principle and the continued control of the Occupied Territories.

When the Shamir Likud-led Israeli government proposed elections in Gaza and the West Bank in 1989, it in was response to the US-initiated Reagan plan in order to curry favour with the USA. Internally, Israel sought to provide the religious-nationalists (Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood) with the opportunity to poll support and usurp the PLO leadership position within the territories.

Hamas participated in municipal elections, consistently winning move than 40 per cent of the popular vote in the leadership-dominated West Bank. Israel’s opposition co-option strategy, however, was sluggish and costly. Israel’s burden was twofold: as the cost of the occupation increased, so did international pressure and US tardiness with issuing the promised $10 billion loan guarantees to Israel with the condition that the loans not be used in the West Bank and Gaza.\(^{65}\)

Prime Minister Shamir consistently refused to follow US conditions associated with the loan guarantees, and the costs of augmenting the Palestinian PLO–Hamas, secular-religious cleavage increased (Ahmad 1994, Budeiri 1995: 90, Dolnik and

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Bhattacharjee 2002: 109, Jensen 1998: 203). Israel attempted to curtail PLO leadership resources, actively halting the flow of PLO funds in support of the Intifada. Funds destined for Hamas were overlooked (Milton Edwards 1996: 151) whereas Saudi Arabia’s $28 million a month destined for the PLO was re-routed to Hamas (Sayigh 1999: 652). The sources of funding and its redistribution were problematic. Iran’s support for Hamas, in the midst of Israel’s embroiled war with the Iranian-backed Hizbullah in South Lebanon, contributed to Israeli concerns about the increasing power of Hamas. Iran was also suspected of sponsoring the older, but smaller and more radical, Islamic Jihad, although the two Palestinian groups were independent of each other. Financial support for Hamas increased, assisted by funds destined for the PLO prior to Arafat’s ill-judged support of Saddam Hussein.

Foreign sponsorship increased Hamas’s horizons and the need for new operators, enabling the ‘palace coup’ within Hamas and the emergence of an external international leadership. The newly emerging Hamas leadership influenced the hierarchy within it. The view of the newer tier of Hamas differed from its incumbent leadership. Unknown to the Israeli government, extreme tactics were advocated by the new Hamas leadership ‘[un]aware of the exact understanding developed between their leaders and the Israeli occupation. This situation should have heralded a warning sign to Israel’. The palace coup thesis suggests that the new tier of Hamas leadership had usurped the old guard, introducing Iranian influences and finances that militarised Hamas and strengthened the Al Qassam brigade. Moving Hamas closer to Islamic Jihad in operational tactics heralded not only the increasing Islamisation of Hamas but the escalation of Israel’s security fears.
Hamas, far from being ignored or co-opted, represented a threat to the Israeli government. The divide and conquer political-strategic intelligence policy failure of Israeli intelligence services AMAN (the Israeli Intelligence unit) meant that the Shin Bet belatedly realised it was mistaken and began arresting Hamas activists. The People’s committee leaders were subsequently detained. A feature of Hamas’s horizontal separation organisation resided in the committee leaders who were the essence of the Intifada. Once the Israeli counter-insurgency policy of infiltration using the Shabak proved unsuccessful, deporting or detaining the leaders became policy.\textsuperscript{67} The violence escalated after the Al Aqsa killing of 17 Palestinians in 1990; Hamas attacks increased, signifying a shift towards more radical Islamic Jihad tactics, magnifying Israeli security fears and escalating the societal security issue as the primary concern of the Israeli electorate.

Prime Minister Shamir’s intransigence over the Madrid negotiations and US loan guarantees lost Likud the 1992 Israeli election to Labour’s Yitzak Rabin. As the violence intensified, so too did Israel’s containment policy. From 1991 onward, Israel was subject to increasing criticism for its use of assassinations, the replacement of rubber with plastic bullets, and increasing casualties in Gaza and the West Bank. The IDF’s ‘break bones’ initiative formed the basis upon which the European Union (EU) used its new trade powers to block several trade protocols with Israel. The number of settlements in the West Bank increased in order to accommodate the largest emigration of people since 1949. The Soviet Alyiah to Israel put increasing strain on Israeli housing and exposed Israel’s vulnerability to its need for US foreign aid and US loan guarantees. Specifically,
Israeli security was increasingly threatened as Hamas tactics became more radical and Israel’s counter-insurgency measures floundered under international scrutiny.

Despite the change in the Israeli government, in response to a Hamas attack, Israel expelled 413 Hamas activists in breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention; using this initiative did little to enhance Israel in international public opinion. It did, however, enhance the PLO position to the detriment of Hamas (Milton-Edwards 1996). The deportations into South Lebanon’s buffer zone enabled Hamas to create and sustain links with Hizbullah (Dolnik and Bhattacharjee 2002: 118).

Prime Minister Rabin opted for reaching a settlement with the Palestinians ‘inside’ the West Bank and Gaza in conjunction with Jordan. However, the Rabin plan was transformed to negotiate with the ‘outside’ Fateh leadership through the Oslo channel, whereby Yasser Arafat was prepared to make substantive concessions to gain not only recognition from the Israeli government but also relocation to the West Bank and Gaza as the only organisation with the military and institutional capability of exercising authority and curbing Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza (Ma’oz 1999: 415).

It has been argued that the single most important benefit of the Oslo Accords was ‘the PLO pledge to prevent terrorist attacks’ (Klein 1996: 1). Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres told the Jerusalem Report: ‘Why should we chase Hamas when the PLO can do it for us?’

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4.6 Negotiating the Oslo minimal bargain

The Oslo Peace Process is a new instrument for reaching traditional [Israeli] objectives.

Yitzhak Rabin (Savir 1998)

The Oslo Accords were composed of an inter-ethnic elite pact, a bilateral security bargain to curtail the influence of a mutual threat to the signatories. The West Bank and Gaza as well as the problem of Hamas were recognised as a threat to Israel and the PLO leadership in exile, both groups of signatories to Oslo had sought unsuccessfully to ignore, co-opt, contain and expunge the threat Hamas posed to their legitimacy as the dominant elite or ethnic bloc leadership. The delegates at the Washington multilateral negotiations attempted to broker a maximal agreement rather than a minimal inter-ethnic elite pact. The objective of the Washington talks focused on creating a peace plan for the Middle East. However, once the Fateh leadership of Yassir Arafat was amenable to unofficial secret negotiations with the Israeli government (see Beilin, Savir, Rabinovich), the Washington talks ceased to be important. The Israeli and Palestinian incumbent elites attempted to curtail the multilateral talks once it became clear that their elite objectives could be reached in a minimal inter-ethnic elite pact.69

The essence of the Oslo pact emerged at the first meeting of the Israeli academics and PLO representatives in London. At this meeting, Abu Allah, the leader of the PLO group, said he would do whatever it took to come to an agreement with the Israelis.70 At the subsequent third meeting of the Oslo channel in January 1993, the Israeli academic Yair Hirchfeld was directed by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to ascertain ‘when
Arafat would like to travel? This question so early in the 'non-negotiations' or exploratory talks illustrated the degree to which the Israelis wanted to secure a partner to assist in securing the Occupied Territories. Arafat’s return to the West Bank and Gaza was first raised by Prime Minister Rabin to Hosni Mubarak and relayed to Arafat in November 1992. The tacit agreements reached amid this third meeting involved consensus over the question of Israeli security, the regulation of the Intifada, and the return of Arafat to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The fourth meeting of the two groups was the first in which the Israeli government was officially represented by Uri Savir. This fourth unofficial meeting provoked the following response from Abu Allah, the leader of the Palestinian delegation concerning issues of security: ‘I have specific instructions from Arafat to accommodate you in every aspect in this matter’ (Savir 1998: 15). Provoked by the immediate threat of Hamas to Fateh’s dominance, Arafat was willing to provide concessions to the Israelis, relinquishing preconditions over settlements for example, in order to preserve Fateh’s leadership position. Arafat’s acceptance of the Oslo bargain was conditioned by his desire to return to the Occupied Territories (Gagnon 1995: 138).

It was the inclusion of the PLO leadership, Fateh and Arafat in particular, along with the geographical return to Gaza and the West Bank that secured the signatories to the pact and postponed the challenge of Hamas to the PLO leadership. The Israeli recognition of PLO leadership secured its legitimacy and acknowledged that which had been omitted from the Camp David Accords. Arafat revealed his position when asked the reason he had not accepted the Camp David (I) Accords of 1979, ‘for your
information, nothing was offered personally to me’ (NYRB August 1993, Amoz Elon 1996: 22–30).

The incentive for Israel to agree in Oslo rather than Washington was evident in the decision to raise the level of the Oslo negotiations after the third meeting. The Israeli recognition of a willingness on the part of the Palestinians to agree to a bargain on the basis of an interim self-governing authority without instituting the moves towards permanent statehood that added the greater impetus to the Oslo initiative.\(^74\) The Israeli desire to reach agreement advanced when the PLO leadership agreed to the exclusion of international guarantees and outside mediation at the third meeting. The exclusion of international or third-party involvement in all but the supervision of the elections to the Palestinian Council was raised later in July and caused friction in the ‘all but signed’ bargain.\(^75\) The desire to return Arafat to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while not explicit in the Declaration of Principles, was evident from the directions received by the Israeli negotiators from the Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

In the midst of negotiations regarding the implementation of the bargain, proposals were made for a transition phase prior to the Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian Council elections. The discussions involved the implementation of a trusteeship in which Israel would establish the necessary institutional and structural features to create a more secure Palestinian environment, establishing the basis of good governance prior to the return of PLO leadership. The proposals were rebuked by the Israeli government. In allocating time to generate the necessary structures for good governance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the objective of Israeli withdrawal from the Territories would be compromised. The return of Arafat ‘as soon as possible’ and prior to the elections of the
Palestinian Council within two years of the bargain being reached facilitated earlier implementation. The PLO leadership’s desire for recognition and legitimacy as the representatives of the Palestinian people as well as the return to its support base in Gaza and the West Bank was explicit after the written draft of the Declaration of Principles was presented to the Palestinians on 4 July. Crisis ensued and the Palestinians proposed changes to the document when it became clear that the Israelis, while wanting full responsibility for security, also wanted to maintain full authority over civil jurisdiction. The issues that caused deadlock in Washington, the issue of settlements and authority, had re-emerged. The collapse of the negotiations was curtailed by the Norwegian facilitators Terje Rod Larsen and Foreign Minister Holst. The Palestinians were unable to resolve themselves with the features of autonomy and the interim nature of the draft. The Israelis were advised to compromise and offer certain concessions. Accounts regarding the nature of the proffered compromises differed. Parallel talks on the question of mutual recognition were initiated. Once Israel agreed that the PLO would be recognised as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, ‘the alternative concessions the Israeli negotiators were directed to provide dissipate with the appeasement of the Palestinian negotiators.’ The desire for recognition as the legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people was based on the constraints imposed on the PLO leadership from the internal challenge of Hamas. Hamas created the leadership imperative to return to the West Bank. The final Oslo Agreement signed on the White House Lawn has two hastily handwritten amendments. Both alterations include the words ‘PLO’ and were conceded and agreed upon so late ‘that there was no time to retype them’ (Ross 2004: 120). The inclusion of
PLO in the Accords, both literally and figuratively, restored the PLO’s political hegemony (Legrain 1997: 165).

Arafat’s leadership intact, the Oslo Accords were not ratified by the Palestinian National Council (PNC). Rather than convene the PNC, and in breach of PLO practice, Arafat sought endorsement from the PLO executive committee instead. Arafat’s attempt to juggle with existing institutions was neither timely nor very successful. Two prominent members of the executive committee Mahmoud Darwish and Shafiq al-Hout resigned while others abstained from the vote. The resolution favouring the Declaration of Principles passed with one vote (Rubenberg 2003: 57). The leadership’s control over the Palestinian institutions was not as pervasive as Arafat had hoped.

While time and axiomatic world changes have altered the Israeli–Palestinian dynamic, the Oslo Accord was less about resolving differences and compromises than remedying a shared concern over the increasing influence of Hamas. The Oslo Accord was not more than the sum of its parts. Founded on the mutual recognition of the PLO leadership’s and the Israeli government’s independent failure either to correct or control the threat posed to each of them by Hamas.
4.7 Conclusion

The Oslo Accords represent a minimal elite bargain based on the mutual recognition of the Israeli government and the PLO. The inter-ethnic elite pact was influenced by the configuration of the ethnic blocs, the (re)orientation of constituency support and the nature of elite accommodation as well as the external resource dependence of the respective blocs made manifest by factionalism and the challenge Hamas posed to the leadership of Fateh within the Palestinian bloc. Oslo, however, paved the way for Arafat’s return and the establishment of Fateh dominated PLO rule within the Palestinian authority in the autonomous areas of the Territories.

The Declaration of Principles agreed in August 1993 presented Hamas with a situation similar to that of its Fateh rival after the Camp David Agreement of 1979. Hamas’s perceptions were revised, and the exclusion of Hamas from the negotiation process meant that, despite popular support, it was not privy to the Oslo arrangement. The agreement between Israel and the PLO led Hamas to believe it had become the common enemy of both camps and it viewed the new era of co-operation as a sign that both sides had agreed by way of exclusion to contain its impact in Gaza and the West Bank. The Hamas representative in Jordan, Mohammad Nazzal, asserted that the movement was preparing itself for an attack in the new era of harmony between Israel and the PLO, believing in the real possibility of Israeli and Palestinian security forces combining to combat Hamas fighters. Palestinian public opinion polls after the Oslo Accords illustrated that Arafat and the PLO leadership had maintained its position;
Hamas with 23 per cent of support in 1994 had dropped to 15 per cent by 1997 (Shikaki 1998).

The Oslo pact to exclude Hamas exacerbated an internal–external leadership division in Hamas as its external leadership sought to distance the organisation from the leadership of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA established institutional structures to exclude Hamas, endorse Fateh and encourage recognition of the PLO leadership as the leadership of the PA. Six months after the return of Arafat, Hamas relations with the PNA were ‘essentially conciliatory’, however rejectionist public discourse’ (Legain 1997: 173). The leadership of Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza initially sought, when appropriate, to denounce the Oslo Accords while communicating with the Palestinian Authority regarding related authority and security concerns.

In the case of the Israeli governing elite, Hamas became the issue of security and its regulation was a necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of the legitimacy and of the incumbent Israeli bloc leadership. Yitzak Rabin continued to oppose direct dealings with the PLO and approved the Oslo Accord draft in August 1993 after concluding that the PLO would be amenable to Israeli conditions (Shlaim 1994: 24–30). Rabin’s recognition of the PLO and acknowledgment of ‘the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’ resulted from the impact of the Intifada, which had convinced the Israeli army and security chiefs that a fundamental reordering of political relations with the Palestinian inhabitants of Gaza and the West Bank was required. Allowing them some form of separate political and juridical status had become unavoidable not only as a political strategy but also for the maintenance of societal security.
The Oslo Pact created the political space for an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, however short-lived (Barnett 1999). Israel also perceived the escalating strength of Hamas as a growing Islamist threat despite its efforts to regulate and contain it. For Israel, the secular leadership of the PLO became the most desirable interlocutor (Sayigh 1999: 659) for any bargain. Israel, initially seeing the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic opposition in Gaza and the West Bank as beneficial in the potential challenge it posed to the PLO leadership, soon opted for an exclusionist policy in order to contain Hamas.

In the case of the PLO Fateh elite, it became an issue of legitimacy that is, securing its status as the unchallenged sole representative of the Palestinian people and excluding Hamas, which appealed to the PLO leadership. Yasser Arafat had continued to endorse the freezing of settlements and the inclusion of major issues, such as Jerusalem and the refugees, in any negotiations and approved the Oslo principles after concluding that the Israelis would be amenable not only to recognising the leadership but also allowing the leadership’s return not only to Gaza but also to parts of the West Bank and the establishment of a Fateh-run security apparatus to contain the threat and leadership challenge from Hamas. For the PLO, this dilemma made the Labour-led Israeli elite the best interlocutor for any bargain.

The bargaining of the Oslo pact highlights the primacy of factional concerns motivating the PLO leadership and the Israeli Labour government to move towards mutual recognition and an inter-ethnic elite pact by way of a collaborative security bargain. The role of Hamas, while not direct in terms of participation in negotiations, was crucial in that its growth and tactics substantially altered the interests and strategy of
the pact participants. Thus, while the broader international agenda surrounding the Oslo Accords, such as the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, ripeness, third party intervention, Palestinianisation, and Islamisation, all had some impact on the different agents, it was overwhelmingly the influence of factionalism impacting upon the configuration of the respective blocs, the pattern of elite accommodation and whether within-bloc factional competition is pervasive or schismatic as well as the dependence of leaderships and their factional challengers on external actors which proved instrumental in weaving the minimal inter-ethnic elite bargain of the Oslo Accords.
5 The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement: a minimal inter-ethnic elite bargain

5.1 Introduction

The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 exemplifies a minimal exclusive inter-ethnic elite bargain (Horowitz 2000: 574, Nordlinger 1972: 118, Tsebelis 1990: 160). Co-operation between the British and Irish governments created a security policy arrangement (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995: 57) with institutional surrounds. While assessments of the Agreement are diverse (Aughey 1989, Bew, Patterson and Teague 1997, Cochrane 1993, Hadden and Boyle 1989, Kenny 1986, O'Leary and McGarry 1993, O'Leary 1987, Owen 1994, Townsend 1988) most would concur that the Agreement, whether described as a legal or a political agreement (Hadden and Boyle 1989: 14), altered the British–Irish relationship and the parameters of the Northern Ireland problem. In tandem with the Camp David and Oslo Accords the Anglo Irish Agreement was based on a shared security concern. Unlike these Accords the Anglo Irish Agreement did not suffer from great expectations. The principle of the Anglo Irish Agreement reiterated in later agreements being that ‘those who seek to achieve political objectives by violence or the threat of violence must not be allowed to succeed. Democracy and the rule of law must be resolutely protected’.

The proposition advanced here is that the Agreement was predominantly premised upon the convergence of the governments’ compatible security concerns over Northern
Ireland. The creation of a British-Irish intergovernmental consensus was sought in order to curtail both the escalating political influence of the Republican movement’s Sinn Féin (SF) party in the Island of Ireland, and Republican (IRA) violence in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. These shared incentives and security concerns generated the political motivation for the agreement, namely, to reverse the trend within Northern Ireland’s nationalist community towards support for SF simultaneously while instituting a way in which nationalist grievances could be aired. The British Government’s onus on security thwarted the greater potential afforded to the agreement, as Garret FitzGerald observes:

She [Thatcher] never emotionally understood, intellectually she grasped the idea of coping with the alienation of the [Catholic] minority, but not emotionally, as soon as the agreement was signed she reverted back to type and her interest was in security measures, so there was no will behind it.3

The preferences and the positions of both governing elites were otherwise shaped by both ‘exogenous and endogenous dynamics’ (Arthur 2000: 161). Three major factors influenced the respective ethnic groups’ preferred initiatives and bargaining positions. First, the internal structural and institutional configuration of the respective blocs (whether or not the bloc is segmented by political parties or political parties with paramilitary affiliates, or is influenced by bureaucratic dominance for example) shapes the way in which competing within-bloc elites were accommodated and the way decisions are made within the group. Secondly, the extent to which a consensus exists over shared preferences or ‘values’ among the ethnic group members and the way differences are accommodated are influential. Whether the respective blocs are predominately centralised or decentralised and whether factionalism within the bloc is
predominantly schismatic or pervasive influences the nature of elite accommodation within the bloc and illustrates the potential elasticity of support for the incumbent bloc elite or leadership. The third factor is the bloc leadership’s dependence on external resources for its leadership latitude or the monopoly of autonomy within the bloc. Combined, these fundamental elements influenced the respective governments’ bargaining positions, preferences and incentives, resulting in a minimal if novel international agreement.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement while security oriented was nevertheless innovative. It afforded authority to Irish government involvement in Northern Ireland policy-making by establishing inter-state institutions (O’Leary 1993: 1222). The degree of British and Irish state cooperation facilitated by joint membership of the European Union emphasised a shift from absolutist concepts of national sovereignty. Its aim centred on mitigating the military activity and political influence of the Republican movement represented by Sinn Féin. Legitimising Irish governmental involvement in an international agreement was intended to moderate Northern Ireland’s Nationalist-Republican minority and reorient it politically, while countering the influence of Northern Ireland’s unionist majority dominance and the spectre of its hegemonic control from the Stormont era 1921–72 (Lustick 1979, 1987, O’Leary and McGarry 1993: 108) over Northern Irish politics. The Unionists had exercised their veto capacity to oppose any Irish dimension vociferously when required to share power with Nationalists in a consociational power sharing Assembly and in so doing undermined the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973. Conversely, the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) enabled the British government to exclude Northern Irish Unionists and in so doing moderate or ‘absorb’ the influence of the veto the unionist
lobby had exercised over Northern Ireland proposals. The ideology proximity of the British Conservative Party to moderate Unionism 'absorbed' (Tsebelis 2002: 12) the 'soft' or moderate unionist position and meant that tacit agreement from the unionist parties, while important, was no longer necessary to change the status quo in Northern Ireland. In signing the Agreement, the British government sought to expedite the end of the traditional Northern Irish unionist veto on Northern Irish decision-making prevalent from the Home Rule bill of 1914, at the highest governmental level.

The Agreement made and initiated at this intergovernmental level, however, was counter-intuitive. The Irish government's agreed commitment to assist in regulating the security dynamic in Northern Ireland gained it much in the way of duties and obligations and though a concordat for consultation was established, arguably little in the way of rights. The architecture of the final Agreement differed from the larger, all-encompassing maximal comprehensive bargain that set out to address core conflict concerns, initially sought by the negotiators (FitzGerald 1991: 453). What led the British and Irish governments as the leaders of the two ethno-national blocs to converge on the final initiatives when they had deviated from the options considered at the outset of the negotiations? Why, for example, would the Irish government commit itself to responsibility for Northern Ireland without power?

This chapter offers a consequential consideration (Tsebelis 2002) of the way in which the three fundamental factors outlined, shaped and constrained the preferences of the governments as the representative leaders of the respective ethnic blocs and led to the security bargain finally reached. In so doing, it seeks to examine and explain the rationale for the minimal and seemingly counterintuitive 'responsibility without power'
of the Agreement. The rationale behind the Agreement has been explained by one of its architects in terms of national interests:

Our [Ireland's] vital national interest lies not in Irish unity, which is not a particular national interest in itself it's an aspiration not a national interest, our national interest is maintaining our security by bringing an end to the violence in Northern Ireland... What the IRA have done has been to clarify for Irish people the commonality of interest of Ireland and Britain in regard to Northern Ireland which was totally obscured before, we then moved potentially to having a common interest in whatever was the best method of instilling stability there and a positive interaction between the North and Britain and the North and here [the Republic], whatever that might be; what that was to be, was determined by the IRA.

This common interest in security resulted in an Agreement reached between two sovereign governments representing two ethnic blocs in Northern Ireland's divided society of British affiliated Unionists and Loyalists and Irish affiliated Nationalists and Republicans. The descriptive markers of unionist and Loyalist within the British bloc, and nationalist and Republican within the Irish bloc, refer to the ideological parameters within the respective blocs. The ideological proximity of Nationalists to Republicans has been broadly determined by differing views on the tactical nature of achieving the shared goal of the bloc. Republicans' traditional advocacy of the unification of Ireland by force rather than consensus contrasted with nationalist assertions of the need for an agreed unified Ireland including the unionist community in Northern Ireland. The factional actors in the Irish nationalist bloc prior to the signing of the AIA include the political parties in the Republic of Ireland (Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, the Labour Party) and the nationalist SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party) in Northern Ireland. Similarly, the term unionist and Loyalist represent the ideological distance within the British bloc.
and represent the adherence to the Union of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
loyalty to the Union and its figurehead the Queen. Both distinctions within the respective
blocs referred to the likelihood of factional actors within the bloc using violent tactics to
advance the shared goal of the bloc; over time this tactical distinction became less
pronounced as patterns of within-bloc factional accommodation oscillated between
schismatic and pervasive competition within and between Unionism and Loyalism as
well as within and between Nationalism and Republicanism. The same associational
distinctions can be made in patterns of elite accommodation between Irish Nationalists
and Republicans in the Irish ethnic-bloc.

The territory of Northern Ireland is contested and its community divided along an
ethnic British–Irish cleavage. A religious marker tends to be used to categorise the
cleavage, the British unionist and Loyalist bloc members tend to be broadly Protestant
while the Irish nationalist and Republican bloc members tend to be Catholic.

The information cues and shortcuts provided by religious distinction (Fox 2000:
20) convolute this conflict and the configuration of the respective blocs thwarting
attempts to define the conflict in binary terms (Boyle and Hadden 1994: 57, Brown and
of Ireland’s constitutional claim to Northern Ireland, officially part of the United
Kingdom, shaped the nature of British and unionist concerns over Irish nationalist and
Republican aspirations to a United Ireland. Irish nationalist concerns over unionist and
British dominance in Northern Ireland at the expense of the nationalist minority
community formed the basis of Irish nationalist concerns. Escalating inter-ethnic conflict
exacerbated by a combination of Republican and Loyalist paramilitarism and changes
within the configuration of the respective blocs altered not only the nature of the conflict within Northern Ireland but also the nature of the enduring rivalry between the British and Irish governments. The interactions between both governments were subsequently shaped by patterns of interaction framed from joint membership of the European Community (later Union) (Meehan 2000: 198). 9

First, the architecture of the Agreement, its institutional features and functional ramifications will be assessed and compared with the initial bargaining positions adopted by the governments pertaining to the maximal agreement. The second and central part of this chapter will chart the influence of the three factors on the architects of the Agreement, examining the British and the Irish bargaining elites’ incentives, preferences and the positions which precluded the signing of an all-encompassing maximal agreement. The final section considers whether or not the minimalist outcome reached contained the immediate security threat and created incentives towards future agreement.

5.2 The architecture of the Anglo-Irish Agreement

On 15 November 1985 at the Queen’s residence at Hillsborough Castle in Northern Ireland, the British and Irish governments signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Unprecedented in British–Irish intergovernmental relations, the Agreement reiterated a consensus that any change to the status of Northern Ireland would occur solely with the consent of a majority of Northern Ireland. 10 The governments agreed to expand the active sphere of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) established after the first
Anglo-Irish talks were initiated in 1980. Its broad remit was ‘concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of the island of Ireland’. The AIA moulded the Conference’s new policy domain to include political, security, legal and cross-border issues relating to Northern Ireland. To strengthen the institutional framework of the IGC against anticipated unionist and Republican opposition and to implement a co-ordinated policy, a permanent secretariat of British and Irish civil servants was established to assist the Conference. Based in Maryfield, Northern Ireland, the secretariat not only mechanised the Irish government’s newly designated right to ‘put forward views and proposals relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of the Conference’ in relation to how it would be ruled, but also ‘embedded’ the IGC and the Agreement. The newly extended IGC and secretariat formulated the institutional features of the Agreement but were not unyielding.

Institutional flexibility was also built into the Agreement. The unique and privileged right to consultation afforded to the Irish government in its role representing Northern Irish nationalist minority concerns would remain, provided Northern Ireland was directly ruled from Westminster (Fanning 1999: 4). Were government by direct rule to cease and power be devolved to Northern Ireland (as was hoped), the designated role of the Irish government would be subject to change and the AIA would collapse ‘much like a circus tent’ (Fanning 1999: 4). This device was integral to the problem-solving effectiveness of the Agreement acting as a catalyst to encourage support for devolving control to a power-sharing Assembly. Unionists opposed to institutionalised Irish participation in Northern Irish affairs could alter the status quo instituted by the Agreement by assenting to a devolved consociational (power-sharing) arrangement as
opposed to wielding their veto. With or without devolution, a review of the workings and duties of the IGC was scheduled within three years and could be initiated earlier by either government if required. All of these features enabled the Agreement to guarantee the institutional changes necessary to manage the security problem at the highest level while excluding elements that threatened this objective.

Contrary to the Sunningdale Agreement of 1974, the bilateral nature of this Agreement was deliberately exclusive in order to "fireproof" it from external threat. The Irish governing elite excluded any role for Sinn Féin in the preparatory New Ireland Forum, forged to glean consensus from within the moderate nationalist party groupings within the Irish bloc. The British governing elite excluded official participation of Northern Irish unionist parties and politicians to circumvent a repeat of the unionist rejection of any arrangement as it had previously with Sunningdale proposes. The Agreement created intergovernmental institutions that functioned to generate policy initiatives and implement processes driven by the two governments' core security concerns: namely, the destabilising nature of Republican political and military influence. Crucial to the functioning of the Council was the implementation of cross-border co-operation on security policy. The Agreement sought to institute special measures in order to improve relations between the security forces and to generate a programme of information sharing, technical co-operation and training. Intergovernmental co-operation was deemed essential to secure any nationalist acceptance of the political authority of the security forces in Northern Ireland. Similarly, initiatives to secure public confidence in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland were proposed. The considered introduction of a mixed court system within British and Irish judges in Northern Ireland
was not implemented. Priority, however, was given to extradition procedures in order to curtail Republican paramilitary cross-border activity. The socio-economic development of these border areas required financial investment and the Agreement also functioned to secure international funds to assist in this matter.

While the Articles of the Agreement sought to institute measures to curtail security threats, the preamble outlined the guiding principles upon which the Agreement was formulated. In the preamble both governments recognised their shared interest ‘in creating lasting peace and stability’ and the rights of the ‘two traditions’ defined as those who wish to maintain the status of Northern Ireland (Unionists) and those who aspire to a sovereign united Ireland achieved by peaceful means through agreement (Nationalists), to be ‘free from discrimination and intolerance’ and able to ‘participate fully in the structures and processes of government’. Article 1 of the Agreement asserts that any change in the status of Northern Ireland will be decided by consent of the majority (Hurd 2003: 303) and Article 2 states that no derogation exists from the sovereignty of either government.

The Agreement alludes to the status of Northern Ireland because of the contested claims of each government. Two Agreements had to be signed as neither government could legitimate the same copies. (In an Irish court, NI belongs to Ireland; in a British court, NI belongs to Britain.) British sovereignty over Northern Ireland and its position as an integral part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland conflicted with Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution that laid claim to Northern Ireland. The issue of both the constitutional guarantee that in ‘no event will Northern Ireland […] cease to be part […] of the United Kingdom without the consent of a majority of the
people" and the constitutional claim made by the Irish government that 'the national territory consist of the whole island of Ireland' formed the basis for negotiating the maximal Anglo-Irish bargain.

Despite intergovernmental talks, however, that initially sought to consider the 'totality of relations in these islands' (1980) and subsequent negotiations that included consideration of 'constitutional and security arrangements as well as North/South relations', a shared consensus on the constitutional or sovereign status of Northern Ireland was not achieved. The initial framework for the negotiations notwithstanding, the constitutional issue was sidelined. This attracted criticism from the Agreement's detractors who argued that in evading the constitutional issue, the Agreement had either failed to address the fundamental concerns of the conflict or conversely had surreptitiously undermined either the constitutional guarantee or constitutional claim of one or other of the two governments (O'Leary 1993: 224).

The minimal and limited nature of the Agreement left all its critics wanting. The agreement was fashioned first by the institutional structure of the respective ethnic bloc the governing elites represented. The configuration of actors within each ethnic bloc influenced its representative government's bargaining positions. The leaderships' respective preferences were shaped by the three fundamental factors mentioned previously: (1) the configuration of the ethnic bloc; (2) the pattern of elite accommodation, whether within-bloc factionalism was pervasive or schismatic; and (3) dependence on external resources. The influence of intra-group structure, factionalism and elite accommodation as well as the role of external actors on the British and Irish
blocs on both the initiatives negotiated and the formation of the final Agreement will be assessed in turn.

5.3 The configuration and intra-group structure of the British/Unionist bloc

The 1979 Westminster election resulted in a new Conservative British government altering the configuration of factional actors within the British or unionist bloc. The Conservative party majority of 43 seats allowed Margaret Thatcher a strong negotiating hand to create ‘harmony from discord’ as she claimed. While the Conservative party was predisposed towards the Northern Irish Unionists’ firm desire to remain part of the Union, it was also considered better equipped than the opposition Labour party to accept and implement the initiatives. Labour, while hostile to Irish Nationalism immediately after the Second World War, was later to support the cause of a United Ireland as its long-term goal (Guelke 1988: 101). It, however, had lost the confidence of Irish Nationalists sceptical of ‘its ability to deliver’, evidenced in the Ulster Unionist Workers Council strike against the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974. Labour’s poor record on Northern Ireland while in government was attributed to the close relationship between the Conservative party and the military. Labour’s Northern Ireland legacy, combined with its electoral defeat, meant that Labour was initially less inclined to hinder Conservative government policy on Northern Ireland although it jeopardised the bipartisan position on Northern Ireland by proposing a review of the Prevention of
Terrorism Act introduced under the previous Labour government (Cunningham 1991: 151). Less influential was the Liberal party with 11 seats (the new Social Democratic Party (SDP) was established in 1981). It endorsed the improvement of human rights and suggested initiatives to regulate the conflict which should originate from Northern Ireland with assistance from the British government if required.26

Greater influence over Northern Ireland emanated from the unionist parties. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) had won (in addition to the tacit support of a great many of Conservative party members) six seats to the more traditionalist Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP) three. The position of the secular, elitist UUP, that favoured the greater integration of Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom as contrasted with that of its rival, the more religious, mass organised, loyalist, majority rule and ‘Ulster’ independence-oriented supporters of the DUP,27 represent the two traditions of Unionism (Hume 1996: 66, Todd 1987). These two distinct traditions, while unable to develop a consensus over core principles and objectives, successfully fused to exercise the unionist veto when faced with an external threat (Cochrane 1997: 39, Todd 1987). As a result, the new Conservative government was instituted such that the greatest political opposition to proposals for Northern Ireland would emanate from within the Tory party itself, its traditional *imprimatur* pervasive unionist support base, as well as from the DUP leader Ian Paisley and his supporters known as ‘Paisleyites who were sceptical of governmental initiatives and believed that the country to which they pledged allegiance to was destined to betray them’.28 Conversely, the position of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (Nationalist SDLP) was more inclined to favour initiatives that included a role for the Irish government or executive representation for the Northern Irish nationalist minority or
both. The SDLP is part of the Westminster political dynamic, having won a seat at Westminster in 1979 was part of the open schismatic electoral competition within the British-Unionist bloc. However, it is simultaneously and more aptly ideologically proximate to the Irish ethnic bloc. This anomalous position within the British and Irish blocs is one it shares with the Republican movement’s Sinn Féin party and will be considered in the assessment of the configuration of factions within the Irish and nationalist bloc.

Of equal importance in the structure of the British bloc are the administrative and bureaucratic actors which constitute an influential and pervasive faction. Bureaucratic predominance in Northern Ireland gave primacy to an otherwise pervasive faction. The British political-administrative dimension for Northern Ireland was instituted differently from the rest of the UK. The implementation of direct rule from Westminster meant that while the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was ‘in charge of policy in Northern Ireland, no one was responsible for Northern Ireland policy’. 29 Northern Ireland policy came under the domain of the Northern Ireland Office (NIO). Unlike the Scottish and Welsh offices, the NIO was immune to the introduction in 1979 of select committee scrutiny (Wilford 1999: 137), providing it with a monopoly over policy-making and creating a tendency among its bureaucrats and those charged with the role of managing specific institutions involved with administering Northern Ireland to adhere to the bureau-shaping model (Dunleavy: 1991) of bureaucratic behaviour and as such constitute a pervasive faction within the British-Unionist bloc. The guiding principle of the bureaucrats involved in Northern Ireland is best described by one influential civil servant:
I reflect that a collective noun for people involved with NI might be that we are all members of the Sisyphus club, we are concerned with rolling that stone up the hill and having it roll down again, but having to start rolling up again. 30

The NIO only became involved in the Agreement negotiations in 1984 when the maximal bargain was moderated and the constitutional issues sidelined. Exclusion of the NIO exacerbated British bureaucratic tensions and existing cleavages between administrative units (NIO, Cabinet, Foreign and Commonwealth offices) with competing competencies (FitzGerald 2003: 181). 31 This division of administrative roles meant that while the Cabinet Office negotiated with the Irish government, the public responses to proposals or negotiations emanated instead from the Foreign Office and later from the NIO (FitzGerald 1991: 496).

While the Anglo-Irish Agreement negotiations were initiated at the highest level and included the Cabinet, Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO) Offices, the NIO was conspicuously absent from the outset of the Agreement negotiations. It was preoccupied with (the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) Jim Prior's proposals for an incremental or 'rolling' devolution Assembly for Northern Ireland that would have a scrutinising role should the desired goal of devolution fail to materialise. Rolling devolution was unpopular with all but the unionist DUP (Cunningham 1991: 147). 32

The negotiating elite of the British bloc, consisting of political and administrative actors, included Prime Minister Thatcher, changing Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland (Atkins, Prior, Hurd, King), Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong, David Goodall from the Cabinet Office (seconded from FCO), the Ambassador to Ireland Alan Goodison and later Robert Andrew and Richard Needham from the NIO. The
administrative actors involved in the negotiations were Robert Armstrong and David Goodall. The influential decision-makers were Margaret Thatcher and by 1984, Douglas Hurd as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland as well as Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe; to these three decision-makers, that David Armstrong would refer (Hurd 2003: 298). While committed to the union (Bew 1997: 45, Cunningham 1991: 176), Margaret Thatcher’s first priority was security for Northern Ireland and for ‘our boys’, referring to casualties among British soldiers. Thatcher’s predisposition for a security oriented arrangement is not retrospective. As Naughtie observes:

“Mrs. T has not taken the opportunity since the agreement was signed to do anything much about it. Unionists may take this as a sign of indifference, and be right, but the difficulty is that the argument often proceeds to the assumption that Mrs. Thatcher is embarrassed by the agreement, wants out of it and wishes she had never met Garret FitzGerald. This is untrue and always has been untrue.” When Ian Gow was Mrs. T’s eyes and ears on the backbenches, scurrying around the corridors like a minor but very sinister figure in Gormenghast, he was assuring Unionists that they need not fear: he could handle her. ... The real Mrs. Thatcher, however, is not like that. A prominent Scottish Tory, once a high office bearer, recalls meeting her in the late 70s to discuss devolution difficulties in Scotland. “I’m an English nationalist and never you forget it”, she said. ... the idea that Mrs. T has always an instinctive sympathy with Unionist was always a little misleading: there was common cause from time to time but never complete identification.”

The Prime Minister’s position on Northern Ireland was influenced by her friend and Conservative-party spokesperson on Northern Ireland, Airey Neave, who was assassinated by the IRA prior to her election in 1979. Treasury Minister Ian Gow, a staunch unionist also assassinated by the IRA in 1990, was influential, as was Enoch Powell the Ulster Unionist Party MP. Thatcher was inclined towards the unionist perspective while objecting to the Unionism advocated by the Paisleyites. Prior to her first meeting with her Irish counterpart Taoiseach Charles Haughey on 21 May 1980, at
the well known ‘teapot summit’, she asserted that the constitutional affairs of Northern Ireland were ‘a matter for the people of Northern Ireland, this government and this Parliament and no-one else’. The outcome of these preliminary Anglo-Irish discussions illustrates the influential elements of British and unionist intra-group dynamics.

The Irish Taoiseach and Fianna Fail party leader Charles Haughey had initially intended to discuss Anglo-Irish co-operation over defence and foreign policy at the ‘teapot’ summit ‘to ease British qualms about Ireland’s traditional neutrality’. This discussion, however, was problematic with Ireland’s neutral status because it was excluded from NATO membership. The potential significance of the meeting is illustrated in the decision of the editors of Magill the Irish political magazine, to defer the publication of an expose on the 1970 arms crisis which would have been detrimental to Mr. Haughey and weakened his standing. Defence and foreign policy were not considered although security concerns were acknowledged. Ireland eliminated a proposed membership in the Commonwealth, but proposed Anglo-Irish discussion as a possibility, instituting an Anglo-Irish Conference to express the unique relationship between the two governments without affecting national sovereignty. The discussions attracted intense attention as a new era in Anglo-Irish relations was heralded and speculation about the outcome of these talks for Northern Ireland increased. After the talks, the Irish Foreign Minister Brian Lenihan predicted the end of partition and the likelihood of Irish unity within ten years, enraging Northern Irish Unionists. The net effect of this comment was the total collapse of the Haughey–Thatcher relationship. At their next brief meeting on the fringe of the European summit in Luxembourg, Haughey received Thatcher’s vitriol, no minutes were taken of the meeting, and relations soured.
irretrievably (Thatcher 1995: 390). The ramifications of this were evidenced at the next Anglo-Irish summit less than a week later.

The 8 December Dublin summit was held in the midst of the first Republican prisoners’ hunger strike to regain political status for paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland. The hunger strikes focused international attention on British policy in Northern Ireland and the need to institute change. During this time the British government resumed intermittent contacts with IRA representatives much to the frustrations of the Irish incumbent leadership. This Anglo-Irish summit set the stage for a biannual Anglo-Irish Conference where by joint studies would be undertaken by both governments to embrace new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation, and measures to encourage mutual understanding. On this occasion, however, relations between the two prime ministers were strained and Thatcher’s detachment was evident in the communiqué after the meeting. The Irish communiqué implied that this Anglo-Irish initiative would consider the ‘totality of relationships between the two islands’, alluding once again to constitutional changes, whereas the British sought solely to emphasise that institutional rather than constitutional arrangements were under consideration, and Thatcher conceded that she had not involved herself sufficiently with the communiqué (Thatcher 1995: 390). The ramifications of this error were long-lasting and at the height of the later Agreement negotiations, she was particularly cautious to avoid any repetition of this mistake (FitzGerald 1991: 520). Once again, the ‘totality of relationships’ constitutional ambiguity antagonised Unionists who concluded that fundamental concessions had already been made over Northern Ireland (Hume 1996: 67). According to the Prime Minister, ‘the damage had been done, and it
was a red rag to the unionist bull' (Thatcher 1995: 390). What was not clear however, was whether Thatcher’s commitment to the union was a deep intellectual commitment or ‘a brittle thing’. 44

The initial talks that brokered Anglo-Irish dialogue illustrate the role undertaken by the respective leaders, the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister (PM). These talks, a prelude to the negotiations, highlight the scepticism of Unionists to any participatory role for Dublin in Northern Irish affairs and towards any British PM prepared to engage the Irish governing elite in discussions over Northern Ireland. Unionist scepticism, while not unique, influenced the nature of accommodation within the British bloc and particularly within the Conservative party. The talks also created unease among Northern Irish Republicans in particular, as communication between British government representatives and Republicans had begun. 45 The ramifications of the talks between agents of the British government and the configuration of the Irish bloc were significant. The Irish ethnic bloc elite viewed communication between the British government and the IRA as duplicitous. The difficulty for the Irish government involved negotiating an inter-ethnic elite bargain while conscious of the existence of British government talks with the IRA. The intermittent dialogue between the British government and the IRA altered the nature of the Irish bloc.
5.4 The configuration and intra-group structure of the Irish/Nationalist bloc

In 1979, Charles Haughey led the Fianna Fail government of two years’ duration after Jack Lynch retired from the position. Fianna Fail’s traditional Republican position made it less conducive for Fianna Fail to engage in inter-ethnic elite bargaining with a Conservative and unionist British government. All the more so when Sinn Féin emerged as a political threat to the share of popular Republican support monopolised by Fianna Fail. The main electoral opposition to Fianna Fail ‘the Republican party’46 was Fine Gael, led by Garret FitzGerald, espousing moderate nationalism (Gallagher and Marsh 2002). Fianna Fail, historically the dominant party in a changing party system based on a single transferable vote, had won a comfortable 84 seats to Fine Gael’s 43 seats in the 1977 general election.47 The Labour party with 17 seats at this election had long been the third party in Irish politics.

Prior to Irish independence, the ‘national question’ the ideological ordering of the Irish ethnic bloc, had cost Labour dearly. The party did not run candidates in the 1918 election, in which Sinn Féin the Republican party of the time won 73 of 105 seats on a platform of Irish independence and the creation of an Irish Republic. Having won the election, Sinn Féin abstained from taking its seats in Westminster. An Anglo-Irish war ensued and with it the subsequent partitioning of Ireland as an outcome of the Government of Ireland Act 1920.48 A conclusion to the Anglo-Irish war was sought with the signing of the 1921 Treaty. The Treaty succeeded in severing ‘the moderate from the extreme elements’ of the most unified party,49 Sinn Féin (Mansergh 1991: 143). The
Treaty split the party and despite a pact between the leaders of the pro- and anti-Treaty factions of Sinn Féin, illustrated the reality that ‘the nation was composed of different elements, each with its own agendas and interests’ (Kissane 2002: 149). The ensuing civil war created the framework for Irish politics; those in favour of the Treaty later became Fine Gael, and after a time, those in Sinn Féin seeing the merit of political participation formed the dominant Fianna Fail party. The two parties for a time represented the legacy of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty and the subsequent civil war.

The civil war cleavage influenced the configuration of political actors, not excluding independent TDs Labour and Sinn Féin. The cleavage has been described as one centred on the question of national legitimacy between ‘Republican moralists’ Fianna Fáil and ‘Nationalist pragmatists’ Fine Gael (Garvin 1996: 146, O’Duffy and Githens-Mazer 2002: 132). Republican moralism and nationalist pragmatism became short-hand for distinguishing elements of Irish nationalism and the parameters of the parties’ policy positions in relation to the question of Northern Ireland. Indeed, the Constitution of 1937 drafted for the most part by Fianna Fáil leader Eamon DeValera, laid out Ireland’s (aspirational, political, and legal) claim to Northern Ireland. Under the subtitle of ‘the Nation’ Article 2 defined the national territory as the whole island and Article 3 envisioned the reintegration of Northern Ireland. The claim made in Article 2 would have become a matter of contention had it not been withdrawn by Article 3 which makes the claim to Northern Ireland subject to the reintegration of the national territory. This subtle if paradoxical formula combined the ‘Republican moralism’ expressed in Article 2 with the ‘Nationalist pragmatism’ expressed in Article 3 (Farrell 1988: 66). The

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objective of the Articles centred fulfilling a designated task for Fianna Fail, namely, to ‘wean some IRA members into constitutional politics’ (Bowman 1989: 150).

Unlike its rival British and unionist bloc, the parameters of Irish bloc aspirations are codified by way of constitutional reference. The references pertaining to Northern Ireland included, under the subheading of ‘the State’, Article 15, which provided for the reintegration of subordinate legislatures, namely the Northern Irish Stormont Parliament established in 1920 (Chubb 1991: 79). Nevertheless, the provocative Articles and their interpretation became a political party concern. In 1967, the Constitutional review committee considered a new provision to replace Article 3, as it was deemed to have undermined the relationship between Northern Ireland and the (now) Republic of Ireland, North/South relations while at the same time the Fianna Fail Irish government sought a rapprochement with the Ulster unionist Northern Irish Stormont government (Kennedy 2000: 231). A similar situation arose in the 1972 inter-party commission on the constitution, which considered the implications of Irish unity and proposed deleting Article 44 of the constitution that referred to the special position of the Catholic Church in Ireland. Article 44 was odious to Northern Irish Unionists who asserted that the Irish Constitution was sectarian and the Irish state beholden to Rome. Once Article 44 was amended, advocates of constitutional reform tended to cite ‘the need to appease the northern Protestants as appropriate grounds on which to justify change’ (Bowman 1989: 323).

In concert, the Fianna Fail Taoiseach argued that Irish nationalism as expressed in the Constitution was ‘narrower and less generous’ than the original nonsectarian principles of Republicanism had promised (Lynch 1972: 611). Fine Gael, the more
moderate nationalist party, proposed to proceed with other constitutional changes in order to allay unionist fears and create a more favourable climate for negotiation. This proposal conflicted with Fianna Fáil’s position that any constitutional amendments to Articles 2 and 3 designed to meet the Unionists position should happen in the context of an immediate change in the status of Northern Ireland. The question of the timing of the changes to the constitution had become a political party issue. This intra-group division between the two major political parties constituted schismatic factional competition within the Irish bloc, constraining incumbent leaderships initiating change in the status of Northern Ireland until such time as there was consensus within the Irish bloc. However, Irish intra-group dynamics were constrained but not limited to the two dominant parties in the Dáil or indeed in the Republic. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) emerged in Northern Ireland in 1970 as an amalgamation of disparate groups within the minority nationalist community linked by its common opposition to Unionism. This secular coalition of the Catholic minority was influenced by the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association, the emergence of a Catholic middle class and increasing secularisation and modernisation, all of which changed the nature and composition of the nationalist political elite in Northern Ireland.

The SDLP advocated a pragmatic Irish nationalism. It promoted the cause of Irish unity based on the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland and was for a decade the sole voice of the Nationalists in Northern Ireland advocating a policy of participation in the representative bodies in Northern Ireland government. The SDLP’s participation was dependent on the perceived reform of the Stormont regime that by 1971 was moribund. After advocating civil disobedience and abstaining from participation prior
to the eventual demise of Stormont in 1972, the SDLP by 1974 was prepared to participate in the short lived Sunningdale Agreement (McAllister 1977: 34). The SDLP’s monopoly position representing Northern Irish Nationalists was undermined by the speech made by Danny Morrison at the Sinn Féin *Ard Fheis* (party conference) in 1981, exhibiting a tactical shift in Republican policy initiated at this time.\(^{58}\) The demise of the Stormont regime in Northern Ireland in 1972 and the emergence of direct rule from Westminster together with subsequent failed attempts at power-sharing reinforced the influence of the Republican movement among the minority community as inter-ethnic violence escalated in tandem with the British security response. Emergency British government legislation such as the Emergency Provisions and Prevention of Terrorism Acts was passed to curb spiralling violence and succeeded in further isolating the nationalist community and increasing support for the Republican movement and Sinn Féin (Donoghue 2001: 175). Public sympathy for Republican prisoners who went on hunger strikes in 1981 in order to reinstate their political prisoner status was apparent in the election of H-block candidate (as hunger strikers were known) Bobby Sands as MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone; the SDLP did not contest this by-election and the Republican and nationalist voters elected Bobby Sands to the seat prior to his death in a hunger strike. This, in turn, changed the political debate within the Republican movement and initiated a policy shift. Sinn Féin, encouraged by the success of the ‘H-block’ candidates, initiated procedures to begin contesting elections while the IRA used political violence to achieve its aim of uniting Ireland by force. The joint Republican strategy of the well-known ‘armalite and ballot box’ strategy changed the political parameters of the nationalist bloc in Northern Ireland as well as in the South.\(^{59}\) While
some argue that the republican leadership were only ‘playing to the gallery’, and that the ‘ballot paper is not equal to the armalite – it is merely an addendum to it’. The shift in Republican strategy altered the existing dynamic. By recognising that the situation had changed and the Republican struggle had evolved (Irvin 1999: 2) and was competing electorally, Sinn Féin increased support gleaned from the hunger-strike protests and began to encroach on the support of the moderate (SDLP), creating a centrifugal pull in the politics of the nationalist bloc (Mitchell 1999: 103), with associated reactive consequences for elite accommodation within the Irish bloc.

The ramifications of this Republican shift were also felt in the Irish Republic as Sinn Féin threatened the Republican credentials and consequently the vote share of Fianna Fail traditionally described as ‘the Republican party’. The Irish general election in June 1981 was influenced by the instability in Northern Ireland. Nine H-block candidates gained 40,000 first-preference votes and eventually won two seats (Geraghty 1998: 98). Fianna Fail won 78 seats but the form of the government remained uncertain. Fine Gael and Labour with 80 seats established a minority coalition government which would require the support of the six independents. The new governing elite led by Fine Gael’s Garret FitzGerald began a constitutional crusade with a review of Articles 2 and 3 to reduce the pressures arising from the unionist fears and ‘siege mentality’ and facilitate dialogue between Unionists and Nationalists. The new Irish government initiative was introduced amid increased conflict in Northern Ireland as the Thatcher government refused to grant political status to hunger strikers despite ongoing deaths in prison. The attack on the British embassy in Dublin in July 1981 led FitzGerald to write to Thatcher, impressing upon her that the Northern situation now threatened Irish security.
Domestically, FitzGerald initiated an Irish administrative review on Northern Ireland to be held at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in Dublin. The Taoiseach was more inclined to rely on the bureaucratic assistance of the DFA, the Department of Justice, and the Attorney General’s office in contrast to his predecessor’s preference for the Taoiseach’s Office. This preference created a degree of internal dissent within the Taoiseach’s office and a degree of pervasive bureaucratic-administrative factionalism within the Irish bloc that FitzGerald chose to ignore. 64

The constitutional review and initiative proposed by the new government as well as alteration in the administrative actor constellation established a new agenda for the Anglo-Irish talks. The next Anglo-Irish summit in November 1981 convened a month after the hunger strikes that had resulted in the deaths of ten prisoners. At this summit, the governments received reports on the joint studies previously undertaken. All but the joint security study was published. FitzGerald and his coalition Tánaiste 65 Labour party leader, Michael O’Leary, used the opportunity to inform Thatcher of the coalition’s commitment to (and the Labour party’s support for) the constitutional crusade and the creation of a pluralist (not secularised as Mrs Thatcher suggested) Irish state (FitzGerald 1991: 381, Thatcher 1995: 393). The summit also reiterated the principle of consent over Northern Ireland, otherwise known as the constitutional guarantee that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would have to be sanctioned by its people. For the British the essential advantage of the agreement was Irish government recognition that consent ‘was the key to the constitutional position of the [N]orth’ (Hurd 2003: 303).

The Irish government, aware of the ongoing dialogue between the British government and the IRA, attempted to curtail the communications by arresting
Republicans engaged in negotiations with agents of the British elites. It was suggested that the Irish attempted to ‘wreck the talks’ by initiating the arrests. The Irish government did attempt to curtail the covert and disingenuous British government–IRA communication: ‘we were told things that were not true and each week we were told things that were not true, we knew what was happening [...] we refused to give safe conducts to these fellows’. The Irish-British summit meeting endorsing the principle of consent and increased co-operation over extradition procedures provided for inter-governmental progress. However, the merits of the summit and subsequent initiatives to ease extradition procedures between Ireland and the UK were offset by internal structural constraints within the Irish bloc, exacerbated by the Irish economy.

The coalition government announced harsh economic measures to remedy Ireland’s budget deficit (Gallagher and Marsh 2002: 30). In January 1982, the government was defeated by a vote of no confidence as independent Teachta Dála (TDs) were unable to endorse the government’s fiscal proposals. At the ensuing election in February, Fine Gael’s vote share increased yet Fianna Fáil, despite lacking two seats, was able to establish a minority government with the support of an independent and a member of the small and previously unimportant ‘soft’ Republican Workers party (Mansergh in Hannon and Gallagher 1996: 95). Northern Ireland advances were constrained by the return of the Haughey-Thatcher dynamic as Anglo-Irish relations ‘cooled to freezing’ (Thatcher 1995: 395). The organisational structure of the Irish bloc influenced the inter-ethnic elite dynamic as relations changed with changes in personnel representing the Irish bloc.
5.5 Actor configuration and within-bloc dynamics

The White Paper on Northern Ireland proposing 'rolling devolution' by Secretary of State Jim Prior had all references to relations with Ireland removed on the instruction of the Prime Minister.69 The exclusion of the Irish dimension, Thatcher claimed, was also an attempt to minimise unionist objections (Thatcher 1995: 396).70 Nevertheless, the Prime Minister’s reluctance to allow Cabinet approval for the Bill was matched with Ian Gow (her permanent private secretary) lobbying the parliamentary Conservative party and those who advocated an integrationist unionist stance on Northern Ireland against the devolution bill (Howe 1995: 414). Pervasive factionalism thwarted the Prime Minister’s leadership latitude. The Bill was rejected by Ulster Unionists and backbench Conservative MPs, twenty of whom voted against it, arguing that the Assembly was a prelude to Irish reunification and as a result three junior government ministers resigned.71 The Labour party abstained from voting. Minimising the schismatic competition and illustrating the primacy of internal Conservative party and unionist division over Northern Ireland policy. The Bill was passed with 137 votes in favour of the government and 29 opposed. Thatcher’s rationale for amending the Irish dimension, undermining the Bill, and allowing Gow to lobby Conservative Unionists – already keen to integrate Northern Ireland into the UK and maintain direct rule – against the success of the Bill, illustrates the influence of pervasive factionalism within the Tory party and the leadership autonomy within the British bloc. Thatcher’s trust in Ian Gow contrasted with her appointment of Jim Prior (the main detractor of her economic policies) to Northern
Ireland in order to punish him for dissent and 'get him out of her hair' (Guelke 1989: 95, Howe 1995: 413). Equally, the devolution White Paper also illustrated within-bloc dynamics on the Irish side.

The Irish government's response to the White Paper in light of the exclusion of the Irish dimension was predictably negative. While the Fine Gael opposition welcomed the potential for an executive power-sharing dimension in the rolling devolution proposal, Haughey's criticism that it was unworkable was mirrored by the SDLP who wanted a guarantee of executive power-sharing. It was argued that the SDLP rejected the proposals because it 'could not afford to seem less nationalist that the Dublin government' (FitzGerald 1991: 408). Centrifugal forces constrained the SDLP, concerned that schismatic factional threats from Sinn Féin would escalate if Sinn Féin could assert the SDLP were more compromising than the Irish government.

The White Paper on Northern Ireland was published within days of the Falklands crisis, frustrating Anglo-Irish relations further. The Irish Fianna Fail government was initially hesitant about endorsing European sanctions against Argentina, and after the British sinking of the Belgrano warship, unilaterally withdrew its support for sanctions (although this act was not within its powers) and called for a meeting of the UN Security Council on which it served, eventually withdrawing its support when European sanctions were renewed (FitzGerald 1991: 409, Kenny 1986: 38). The Irish government's policy stance on the Falklands renewed Thatcher's 'coolness towards Haughey' and thwarted any opportunity for Anglo-Irish progress in Northern Ireland (Howe 1995: 413). The inter-ethnic configuration of actors by this time was not conducive to dialogue and a shift in the leadership of the Irish bloc from Fianna Fail to the more moderately nationalist
Fine Gael was preferable to the British bloc leadership. The shift began with the Northern Ireland Assembly elections held in October 1982.

When the elections for the Assembly (outlined in the Bill passed in the Northern Ireland Act) were held in October, its criticism of the proposals notwithstanding, the SDLP was compelled by centrifugal constraints to participate in the elections but on an 'abstentionist' platform, responding to Sinn Féin's decision to its first elections also on an abstentionist platform. The SDLP's resulting 18 per cent share of the vote was a decrease in support of 4.9 per cent from the previous 1975 elections. Despite the SDLP's position as the third largest party after the UUP with 29.7 per cent of the vote and the DUP with a 23 per cent vote share. Sinn Féin gleaned 10 per cent of the vote share from previous non-voters as well as encroaching on the traditionally Republican leaning or 'green' tendency among supporters of the SDLP described as a party with inherent *imprimatur* factions (Cox and Rosenbluth 1996: 268, Evans and Tonge 2000: 7). This altered the configuration of actors within the Northern Irish political arena with ramifications for both ethnic blocs. The increased participation of Republican voters and a shift in Northern Ireland nationalist consensus was influential in the degree of support afforded to the Irish bloc elite, suggesting an elastic support base. The way this influenced elite accommodation mechanisms in the respective elite blocs will be considered in the next section.
5.6 Elite accommodation and the nature of support in the Irish bloc

The multiparty nature of the Irish political system provided greater elasticity in support for the governing elite. After the Northern Assembly elections in November 1982, Fianna Fáil’s minority government in the Republic, suffered a vote of no confidence and Ireland returned a Fine Gael (achieving its highest ever vote share) and Labour (under the new leadership of Dick Spring) majority coalition government. The shift in the configuration of the Irish leadership elite improved relations between the British and Irish governments. As Thatcher observed, the return of Garret FitzGerald as Taoiseach ‘provided us with an opportunity to improve the climate of Anglo-Irish relations with a view to pressing the south for more action on security’ (Thatcher 1995: 395). Irish within-bloc tensions were exacerbated by increasing support for Sinn Féin, which had progressed at the expense of the ‘Nationalist pragmatists’ of the SDLP. The objective of the third Irish government in eighteen months involved re-orienting the core configuration of Irish actors to a consensus over Northern Ireland. Consequently, in January 1983, a strategy meeting between the government and Fianna Fáil convened to consolidate nationalist opinion.

The ramifications of within-bloc competition for dominance of the Irish bloc altered the traditional inter-bloc rivalry and the nature of the inter-ethnic conflict. The threat posed by Sinn Féin altered the Irish government’s enduring rivalry and inter-ethnic bloc dynamic with the incumbent British elite. FitzGerald had initially hoped to assuage the fears of the Unionists and incorporate them within any negotiation. However, the threat of an increasingly elastic northern Irish nationalist minority supporting and
endorsing Sinn Féin electorally, altered the latitude of the Irish government to propose including Ulster Unionists in negotiations. The preferences of the incumbent Irish elite were firstly to maintain their primacy and regulate and ‘ward off’ (Nordlinger 1971: 118) the encroaching influence of Republicanism creating centrifugal competition within the Irish bloc. The fear that Sinn Féin would threaten and usurp the position of the moderately nationalist SDLP party as the leading nationalist party in Northern Ireland constrained the ability of the incumbent Irish elite to initiate inclusive negotiations. The latitude of the Irish bloc leadership was further curtailed by the threat Sinn Féin posed no only to the SDLP and ‘satellite’ nationalist representatives in Northern Ireland but also to the potential it posed to cause political instability in the Republic (Moloney 2002: 267). The fear of Sinn Féin destabilising the politics of the Dail, the source of the leadership’s legitimacy, was a more imminent fear than the desire to appeal to the concerns of Unionists.78

The strategy meeting between the government and the (now) leading opposition party Fianna Fail, led to the creation of the New Ireland Forum (NIF). The objective of the forum centred on generating a consensus over the nature and intent of Irish nationalism (Hume 1979: 309). Consequently, the forum was open to the participation of ‘all democratic parties which reject violence and which have members elected or appointed to either house of the Oireachtas [Dail or Seanad] or the northern Irish assembly’.79 Only nationalist parties attended the Forum officially although Unionists made unofficial representations. Sinn Féin’s endorsement of political violence excluded it from the Forum. The NIF took priority over any constitutional reform initiative, as Fianna Fail’s support would not be forthcoming if the government pursued a general
constitutional reform without consultation (English 2003: 240, FitzGerald 1991: 380). The mechanism of the NIF exemplified the need to increase cohesion and accommodation within the bloc while consolidating the nationalist position and generating consensus over the guiding principles or values of the bloc. This was particularly significant after the previous intensely adversarial party politics. The forum recognised the political significance of the SDLP and northern Nationalists as an inherent component of Irish politics (Feeney 2002: 314). Its goal was to establish the framework for an agreed Irish negotiating position in Anglo-Irish discussion.

The Irish government's objective was to be able to negotiate towards and defend an Anglo-Irish Agreement which, while not providing for a united Ireland, would nevertheless accord with the objectives upon which all Irish nationalist parties had agreed.80 The forum included the pragmatic nationalist positions of Fine Gael, Labour, the SDLP, and the 'Republican moralist' position advocated by Fianna Fail, which feared Sinn Féin would poach the Republican vote, should Fianna Fail neglect Republican attitudes.81 At the 1985 Fianna Fail Ard Fheis (annual party conference) a proposal was put forward that when in government the party render Sinn Fein illegal.

"Republicanism is perhaps the most discussed topic within the ranks of this party. After all, FF is the strongest most vital Republican voice in Ireland... DeValera declared the IRA to be an illegal organization on June 18 1936... As history often repeats itself, I suggest that when Charles J. Haughey T.D. becomes Taoiseach next year he takes similar action against Sinn Fein'.82

A consensus over the set of principles for the Irish bloc elite and a series of models or options was required. Initially, the forum began a study on the economic consequences
of the conflict. The economic report attempted to quantify the human loss and economic costs of violence and political instability in the North. The report illustrated that the Northern Irish situation resulted in the Irish government spending four times the amount of the British government on security per capita, extolling an additional strain on Ireland’s already precarious economic situation and emphasising the need to secure a political solution.

Three ‘plus’ models for a new Ireland were presented in the final New Ireland Forum report; a unitary state model, a model of confederation, and a joint authority model as well as the forum’s expressed willingness to discuss alternative models ‘which may contribute to political development’. The way in which the forum arrived at these formulations is illustrative of intra-ethnic bloc mechanisms and the way in which blocs converge towards shared values. For example, the united Ireland model was given greater emphasis towards the end of the forum talks. Its inclusion, at the behest of Fianna Fail, delayed the publication of the forum report for four months to arrive at consensus over the text. The aim of deferring the outcome of the Forum was a ploy by Fianna Fail leader Charles Haughey to undermine the autonomy of the incumbent Fine Gael–Labour coalition in their negotiations with the British government while endorsing Fianna Fail’s own Republican credentials to intra-party assuage fears of Sinn Féin’s appeal to traditionally Fianna Fail supporters.

As a result of the Irish within-bloc competition over the nature of the Forum report, the proposal for joint British-Irish authority emerged as a model for joint sovereignty. Predictably, the constitutional ramifications of joint ‘sovereignty’ were onerous; the terminology was dropped after prime ministerial meetings on the fringes of
European summits in Stuttgart in June and November 1983 revealed that the term sovereignty antagonised the Prime Minister and was unpalatable.\textsuperscript{86}

Charles Haughey coined the new term 'joint authority'\textsuperscript{87} after the Taoiseach had suggested that sovereignty wouldn’t be acceptable. The Taoiseach argues that Fine Gael’s first preference was also joint authority though the government had to be seen not to endorse this option initially in order to allow Fianna Fail to possess and propose this option.\textsuperscript{88} Haughey, as leader of Fianna Fail, looked for the inclusion of a unitary state model to counter the confederal proposals perceived to be the first preference model of Fine Gael. While the Taoiseach had previously proposed confederation in 1979, the first preference of the national pragmatists was a model based on principles best implemented by joint authority. The joint authority model for Northern Ireland was novel. It represented a shift in Irish nationalist perceptions of Northern Ireland by advocating an approach that included British participation in rather than demanding its exclusion from Northern Ireland (Arthur 2000: 198).

The within-bloc divisions over the proposed models illustrated the different orientations within the Irish bloc. Prior to publication, Fianna Fail submitted an expanded draft to the chapter on the unitary state model (FitzGerald 1991: 490). Reservations also provided concerning the overtly nationalist interpretation of the conflict’s origins as outlined in the report and an eleventh hour request by Haughey to insist that any changes to the status of Northern Ireland be dependent upon the majority consent of ‘the Irish people north and south’. These examples illustrate the schismatic factionalism that stalled the publication of a report intended to centralise and align nationalist consensus in the Irish bloc. Publication of the report was ambitiously
anticipated to coincide with the general election in the UK in June 1983. This election reaffirmed the forum’s objective of curbing northern Irish Republicanism as Sinn Féin secured 13.4 per cent of the vote, and sent Sinn Féin party leader Gerry Adams to Westminster. The forum debate also influenced Irish political and policy debate domestically by convening in the midst of a referendum on abortion; it represented a period of Irish national, cultural and political revisionism. Despite Fianna Fáil’s efforts to undermine the forum once its report was published, Haughey’s decision as party leader to endorse only the unitary state model without consulting Fianna Fáil colleagues exacerbated dissent within the party, generating open competition and the schism resulting in the creation of the Progressive Democratic party from the anti-Haughey faction within Fianna Fáil (Collins 2000: 153). Haughey’s attempt to play a two level game resulted in the division of Fianna Fáil and a new configuration of the Irish bloc. The Irish coalition government’s attempt to consolidate nationalist opinion did not in excluding Sinn Féin’s influence. If anything it managed only to delay the inevitable inclusion of Sinn Féin’s participation in the Irish body politic; it did, however, change the pervasive factionalism within Fianna Fáil to an open competition changing the Irish ethnic bloc dynamic.

The inter-ethnic ramifications of the forum were equally interesting. Proceeding to the publication of the report and amid the forum negotiations, the initiative succeeded in motivating the British government to consider new Northern Ireland proposals. The way the forum influenced the actor orientation of the British is addressed in the following section.
5.7 Elite accommodation and the nature of support in the British bloc

The June 1983 general election secured the Conservative government’s position while simultaneously introducing Sinn Féin into the British configuration of political actors after the Republican party won a seat in Westminster (from which it abstained). In November 1983, the Taoiseach had introduced the notion of ‘joint sovereignty’ to the British Prime Minister as a means of minimising shared security concerns and mitigating the alienation felt by the northern nationalist community. While the notion of shared sovereignty was anathema to Thatcher, the meeting in the midst of the European Summit at Stuttgart heightened British interest in negotiations. This interest was compounded by escalating Republican violence, culminating in the killing of Protestant churchgoers in Armagh in November and the subsequent withdrawal of the UUP from the Northern Ireland Assembly, protesting the ‘failure of the British government’ to change its security policy (Bew and Gillespie 1993: 175). The London Harrods bombing in December 1983 killed six, one an American tourist, and as both governments considered proscribing Sinn Féin, it focused increasing attention on the British need, if not for joint sovereignty, for greater Irish assistance to contain the security situation.

Thatcher desired an Anglo-Irish arrangement limited to security but nevertheless feared that the consensus sought within Irish nationalism by way of the New Ireland Forum would ‘attract international respectability for moves to weaken the union’ (Thatcher 1995: 395). The forum proposals were incorporated with the initial finding of the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament’s Haagerup Report on
Northern Ireland. The Haagerup Report, unlike the previous Martin Report that focused solely on social and economic issues, was political in nature and led Thatcher to instruct her officials in the Cabinet and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices to ‘do something’ prior to its publication and the impounding criticism of it by unionists and members of her own party (Goodman 2000: 124). A series of areas for negotiation were initially proposed secretly to the Irish government.

Four areas were considered for negotiation: (1) constitutional questions; (2) security arrangements with a joint-security commission, (3) North-South relationships, and (4) a ‘security band’ at the border with free access and movement for the military and police. The Irish government was agreeable to the first three but immediately rejected the fourth joint-border security zone proposal as untenable. After a series of secret talks between the major British and Irish officials (Armstrong and Goodhall, Nally and Lillis), Thatcher was prepared to seek British cabinet approval for Anglo-Irish negotiations. Assuaging pro-unionist cabinet members’ fears, Thatcher argued that inaction was a greater threat than negotiating with the Irish government, on the grounds that greater cross-border security was needed and required a political role for the Irish government to secure co-operation (Howe 1995: 417).

The cabinet and the government were pressed not only by the looming European elections in June but also by the pervasive unionist faction within the Conservative party and the broader bloc, who were keen to discuss security issues and convince the Irish government to commit to greater security engagement. The political involvement of the Irish government was agreeable by way of ‘institutional consultation’, described broadly as a concordat of understanding between both governments over issues of mutual
The Irish government, however, proposed that for a greater political role it would consider calling a referendum to the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution. Provoked by an informal discussion with the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Jim Prior, the Irish proposals were well received by the Cabinet Office while the Foreign and Commonwealth Office considered the constitutional amendment with scepticism and the Northern Ireland Office was incredulous. Nevertheless, negotiations towards a maximal agreement in which ‘joint authority’, the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, and the commensurate British concessions proceeded throughout the first four months of official negotiations from March 1984 during the Fontainebleau European Summit and the European parliamentary elections in June.

The elections to the European Parliament provided Sinn Féin with the opportunity to buttress its support. For Unionists, the elections were seen as a means of countering the influence not only of Sinn Féin but also of the New Ireland Forum and the European Haagerup report findings. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in particular sought to mobilise support to counter the position of what it described as a ‘weak-kneed British government’. The DUP viewed the election as a confrontation between ‘militant Republicanism and traditional unionism’. The outcome of the elections eased fears as Sinn Féin gained 37 per cent of the nationalist vote share, a loss of 6 per cent on the general election the previous year (Moloney 2002: 240). Sinn Féin’s electoral containment evidenced in the election results stymied the discussion over Articles 2 and 3. After insisting that no arrangement with the political periphery could be reached without an amendment to Articles 2 and 3, the British by July had retreated from their concern. The Irish government, however, proposed that for a greater political role it would consider calling a referendum to the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution. Provoked by an informal discussion with the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Jim Prior, the Irish proposals were well received by the Cabinet Office while the Foreign and Commonwealth Office considered the constitutional amendment with scepticism and the Northern Ireland Office was incredulous. Nevertheless, negotiations towards a maximal agreement in which ‘joint authority’, the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, and the commensurate British concessions proceeded throughout the first four months of official negotiations from March 1984 during the Fontainebleau European Summit and the European parliamentary elections in June.

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previous position. The Prime Minister asserted that while the proposed constitutional amendments were desirable it was 'clear the Irish would expect a great deal in return' and she doubted the ability of FitzGerald’s government to deliver a favourable referendum result (Thatcher 1995: 399). Much to the horror of other negotiators British and Irish alike, the Prime Minister proposed at this time (and at regular intervals) that the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic be redrawn in order to ease security concerns more effectively (Thatcher 1995: 399).97

Of primary concern for the British negotiators was the monopolistic maintenance of British sovereignty over Northern Ireland. And whereas amending the Irish constitution would first assuage Unionists fears, it was perceived it would do so at a cost to British sovereignty.98 The cost of this comprehensive bargain was deemed too great for the British to reciprocate Irish involvement to the degree any amendment of Articles 2 and 3 would demanded. However, the shift in the British position was not a consequence of overt within-bloc tensions as the House of Commons debate on the New Ireland Forum report in July illustrates.99 The first major debate on Northern Ireland since 1974 focused on the proposals outlined in the Forum and the counter-suggestions published in response by the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)100 that sought to carve a substantive role for the Northern Ireland Assembly (Arthur 2000: 215, Cochrane 1997: 7). The stormy relationship between Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Jim Prior and the Prime Minister while significant (Prior would communicate without authorisation with the Irish negotiating team see FitzGerald 1991: 494–530),101 was terminated with his resignation in September and the introduction of Douglas Hurd as Secretary of State.
Within the British-Unionist bloc, within-bloc divisions between the unionist parties of the UUP and DUP were to be expected. Of substantial consequence was the hostility of the NIO towards any sovereignty/constitutional initiative. The NIO were aggravated by their early exclusion from the framing of the negotiations, and as the NIO’s influence limited the likelihood for an all encompassing Agreement diminished. Irish attempts to rejuvenate the maximal constitutional arrangements in July 1984 failed to re-engage the British side. Between July and September, the NIO attempted to redirect negotiations towards a minimal security arrangement. The IRA bombing of the Conservative party conference on 12 October hardened the Prime Minister’s resolve towards a minimal bargain. By November 1984, Anglo-Irish relations floundered and the internal divisions between the Cabinet and NIO became evident. The British-Irish Association of parliamentarians and academics published the Kilbrandon Report, which proposed ‘co-operative devolution’ and a five-member executive committee to govern Northern Ireland, including three Northern Irish politicians, the secretary of state, and the Irish minister for foreign affairs. But all three parties in the existing Assembly rejected the proposal (Owen 1994: 13, Whyte 1990: 239). This position ran counter to that of the NIO which advocated either a power-sharing assembly in Northern Ireland or an Irish government role in Northern Ireland but not both (FitzGerald 1991: 515).

The negotiations at the Chequers Anglo-Irish summit on 14 November were a consequence of the minimal bargain outcome. The British government’s preference for security with political parameters gained prevalence; this reorientation was a consequence of the Brighton bombing after which a Cabinet vote was held regarding whether or not Anglo-Irish negotiations would continue at all, coupled with the greater
influence exerted by the NIO with the Douglas Hurd appointment as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Under this new dispensation, the British government, on the amendment of Articles 2 and 3, would concede a right to the Irish government 'to contribute to the consideration of the British government on a range of policy matters including security as a means of strengthening the confidence of the minority community' (FitzGerald 1991: 515).

However, a Joint Security Commission was proposed as an alternative without any constitutional amendment. The British viewed the Joint Security Commission as the minimal means of codifying and formally instituting the existing Irish practice of assisting the British with security information. The benefits of such an arrangement were the minimal compromise required. It was 'not a concession to codify and institute an already existing right'. Far from being a stumbling block, Articles 2 and 3 were deemed to be 'not of value', or if so then 'solely for the Foreign Office' or too costly to include in the negotiation. Once Articles 2 and 3 were sidelined, a unilateral bargaining position was created for the British to be able to offer and withhold concessions at will and in such action limited the scope of any agreement to a minimal bargain.

The ramifications of the November Chequers meeting were not to be found in the discussions or in the communiqué but rather in the press conferences afterward. The spectre of the New Ireland Forum arose six months after it had reported and when asked about the possible form of any agreement in terms of the forum’s models, to each one in turn Thatcher responded with a forthright 'out', including joint authority. Thatcher’s ‘out, out, out’ response, while in the short term, giving solace to Ulster Unionists, the unionists within her own party and the NIO, undermined her negotiating partner, the Irish
government and FitzGerald personally. Thatcher’s stance as leader of the British-Unionist ethnic bloc represented the majority opinion pervasive within the Conservative party, as well as the consensus opinion of the Northern Irish unionist parties.

The effects of the statement on the orientation of the Irish bloc were substantial. The Taoiseach was unaware of his British counterpart’s abrasive response and his subsequent press statement was flawed. On return to the Dáil, seizing the opportunity to undermine the governing coalition, the opposition Fianna Fail party and its leader Charles Haughey in particular criticised the Taoiseach’s negotiating style, initiatives and proposals, all of which were undermined. Garret FitzGerald’s position in relation to his co-negotiator Thatcher was ridiculed.\textsuperscript{106} The Irish incumbent elite’s position was marginalised, its ‘leadership latitude’ weakened and the options for a maximal agreement thwarted. The British Prime Minister content with a collaborative security arrangement with the Irish government resolved to maintain the broad consensus within the British bloc having succumbed to pressure by the NIO to avoid any schismatic faction provoking action ‘to upset the Unionists or the security forces ... a dangerous recipe for inaction’ (FitzGerald 2003: 181). The initiative to renew negotiations meant a reliable external actor or third party was required to renew the position of the incumbent Irish bloc elite.
5.8 Irish external resource dependence

The external influence of the European Community had been inherent if not directly obvious throughout the negotiations (Meehan 2000: 207). Anglo-Irish meetings were dependent on European Council meetings and provided the opportunity for the Irish and British to meet and discuss Northern Ireland regularly. Irish perceptions of joint sovereignty and joint authority emanated from the European Commission, which was favoured by the Irish as a model for the Anglo-Irish Conference. The British preferred the term Anglo-Irish Conference to the terms commission and council because of the European associations with the term. The associative, structural and parliamentary interest of the European Union in the guise of the Haagerup Report had been influential and beneficial for the Irish bloc.

Ireland turned to the second major beneficial external influence, namely, the United States. American involvement in Anglo-Irish relations had been sporadic and, since independence, rare. The Carter administration and Congress in 1977 had broken with precedent by urging an agreement between the conflicting parties promising financial assistance if a resolution could be found (MacGinty 1997: 32). While the Irish government had failed to co-opt American assistance in the midst of the earlier Republican prisoners’ hunger strike, it had gained American support for the NIF proposals which were outlined by the Taoiseach in Haughey’s address to the US Congress on 15 March 1983. At the time of President Reagan’s visit to Ireland in June 1984, the President fielded questions concerning whether the Irish government desired the British removal from Northern Ireland; Henry Kissinger was informed that if the
British left, American intervention would be required to maintain security and stability (McKittrick and McVae 2000: 113).108

The Anglo-US special relationship between President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher was important in assisting the Irish in the aftermath of the ‘out, out, out’ crisis. After the Chequer’s Summit, President Reagan reiterated his endorsement of the NIF (Guelke 1989: 147). Much to Thatcher’s surprise, President Reagan informally raised the issue of Northern Ireland and the Anglo-Irish negotiations with her at Camp David in December 1984 and required the Prime Minister to return to the issue on her visit to the America in February 1985. For the first time, Secretary of State George Schultz included Ireland and the status of the negotiations on the agenda of topics to be discussed at a British-US conference on 20 February, marking an end to the US non-interventionist approach to Northern Ireland. An additional incentive of financial aid by way of an international fund for Northern Ireland was also proposed.109

The Irish government sought to maximise US assistance and at the parameters of the European Council meeting in December renewed discussions with the British on the basis of a series of confidence-building measures. For example, Ireland was by now better able to sign the Convention on the suppression of terrorism to assist extradition in light of recent Irish Supreme Court decisions and considered the reintroduction of the Garda task force on the border.110 The Irish negotiators proposed an agreement on a statement of common principles on issues, such as mixed courts, an unarmed police force, changes to the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) security forces, along with associated unilateral measures without which the nationalist minority community could not counter the influence of the Republicans. Amendments to the non-jury or ‘Diplock’
court system were proposed and a mixed court system suggested (Jackson 2001: 166). These proposals were received negatively by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Hailsham, formerly Quintin Hogg) of whom Thatcher was wary. In February 1985, the British proposed a package that primarily involved the expansion of the Anglo-Irish Conference established in 1981 and assistance by a joint secretariat. The basis for this initiative was a moderate security agreement with institutionalised and continued political involvement for the Irish government; these proposals were motivated by the Prime Minister’s desire not to ‘stand pat’ as she allegedly told President Reagan (FitzGerald 1991: 531).

The mutual British-Irish dependence on the European Council meetings as a forum for discussing Anglo-Irish relations was once again made at the Milan Council in June 1985. Shared tensions over the ascendancy of Sinn Féin were lessened after the local May elections in Northern Ireland whereby the SDLP maintained a 6 per cent advantage over their Republican rivals. Nevertheless, FitzGerald sought to secure more confidence-building measures in a bid to placate Nationalists’ concerns.

5.9 British external resource dependence

British external concerns and vulnerability to external criticism were plentiful in the midst of the 1981 hunger strikes. The international response in favour of Republicanism exacerbated security fears. Irish Republicans renewed their links with Libya, an important external resource for them. Libyan sponsorship strengthened the IRA’s military supplies and capacity (Moloney 2002: 15). The British government was
conscious of international perceptions of the conflict and anticipated an international response to the conclusion of the New Ireland Forum. This, in tandem with the discussions in the midst of the European Haagerup study early in 1983, provoked a British initiative.

The British deemed the institutional parameters of European organisation beneficial with European meetings providing the opportunity to manage European and Anglo-Irish affairs. The same institutional parameters when proposed by the Irish as models for the Anglo-Irish Commission, were met with far more hesitance by the British government was more hesitant. The European Commission model was favoured by the Irish for the Anglo-Irish Conference. Indeed, as already mentioned, the term Anglo-Irish Conference was itself a compromise favoured over ‘commission’ and ‘council’ because of their association with European institutions. The associative, structural and later financial role of Europe in the guise of ‘exceptional’ European funding of ECU 100 million for Belfast and a rural development programme had been imperative (Goodman 2000: 125). It was the parliamentary interest of the European institutions in the form of the Haagerup Report that had been most influential in formulating a British initiative.

American involvement from the British perspective was deemed either to be frustrating or unimportant. Despite the influence wielded by the US in encouraging the British government’s first secretary of State for Northern Ireland to meet with the Irish foreign minister in the US to initiate an Anglo-Irish dialogue, the British rejected this suggestion and yet had after this offer initiated the short-lived Atkins Plan to improve dialogue. At the same time, the US imposed a suspension on arms sales to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the northern Irish police force; this implicit critique of
British government policing policy in Northern Ireland reverberated in Westminster (Guelke 1996, Guelke 1989: 144–7). However, American influence was greatest after the McBride principles established a code of conduct for American firms operating in Northern Ireland relating to fair employment and equal representation rules in the midst of the Democratic Party’s Presidential platform in 1984 that the American influence was greatest. The British government recognised the influence of the US government in curbing the channel of funds from Republican sympathisers via the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) to Northern Ireland. The seizure of seven tons of guns and ammunition originating in Boston in September 1984 had focused British attention and security concerns on the US, which agreed to a bilateral treaty to assistance in extradition procedures (Guelke 1986: 134). The Anglo-American relationship while deemed peripheral by the British decision-makers was nevertheless influential; Margaret Thatcher when asked why she had signed the AIA and later disowned it, replied ‘It was the pressure from the Americans that made me sign that agreement’ (Fanning 1999: 4). The American role is recognised as significant; President Reagan made Anglo-Irish relations a feature of the Anglo-US special relationship in 1984, at a time when even a minimal bargain appeared unsalvageable.
5.10 Security, opportunity, and the making of the minimal bargain

The coalescence of these three factors – the configuration of the ethnic blocs, the tradition of elite accommodation, whether factionalism is pervasive and schismatic and external resource dependence – influenced the ethno-national elites differently.

The British negotiators’ immediate constraints emanated from the configuration of the British-Unionist bloc. Institutional competition within the British administrative bloc shaped the changes in the British bargaining position. The role of external and international responses to the NIF and the Haagerup report as well as US governmental interests were influential in generating the initial British proposals. However, by the summer of 1985, Anglo-American relations were a secondary British concern to the emerging combined unionist lobby against the Anglo-Irish initiative.

In August, a joint unionist working party was formed in response to mounting concern over the negotiations. The Unionists, on the basis of information received from sympathetic cabinet sources were provoked to lobby the British government against any agreement that failed to include the end of the Irish constitutional claim. The Unionists refused the offer of a Privy Council briefing on the grounds that if information were received on this basis they feared it would inhibit UUP criticism of the eventual agreement and prompted by constituency concerns did not want to have the facility to contest any final agreement curbed. Molyneaux, the leader of the UUP and DUP leader Ian Paisley had anticipated a change in the Irish constitutional claim to Northern Ireland.

As it became clear that the comprehensive bargain was not forthcoming and a more limited Agreement though one curbing the unionist veto was likely, the unionist
leaderships of both parties wrote to the Prime Minister stating their shared desire to contribute to the process of British-Irish discussions and co-operation. At a subsequent meeting of the Unionists, the Prime Minister and Secretary of State Douglas Hurd, the Unionists impressed upon the government the need to encourage the Irish government to abandon its territorial claim on Northern Ireland. The unionist leaders were equally concerned that the British constitutional guarantee would be undermined by any Anglo-Irish arrangement and rejected government assurances to the contrary. The elastic support for the governing elite from the unionist factions of the British bloc became evident as a United Ulster Loyalist Front (UULF) was established and confrontations arose between loyalists of the Protestant Orange Order and the RUC in Northern Ireland in the midst of the July marching season. Rather than curtailing security fears the unionist street actions fuelled them. It was at the British cabinet meeting on 25 July that the agreement for the minimalist approach was finally established for the British government (Howe 2003).

The minimalist arrangement was deemed as having the greatest likelihood of success because unionist opposition was considered containable. Despite unionist calls for an amendment to Articles 2 and 3, a request adhering to the initial maximal bargain, it was in British government interests simultaneously to curtail and contain unionist reactions with a minimal arrangement rather than opt for a maximal bargain. The comprehensive bargain would require a perceptual shift in British perceptions of sovereignty previously unmoved despite twelve years of European Community membership. The contrariness of this position was such that, with Articles 2 and 3 intact, the question of any derogation of British sovereignty was limited as the Irish government
would not maintain a claim to a territory over which it had any perceived joint sovereignty. The maximal bargain would relinquish the constitutional claim for a substantial Irish presence in Northern Ireland affairs while the British government sought to maintain autonomy over core decision-making in Northern Ireland and simultaneously gain security co-operation and assistance in dealing with the growing support of the Republican movement while creating an environment in which the unionist veto could be contained. British preferences were not assuaged either by the unionists’ or the Irish government’s impetus for a maximal bargain.120

The minimalist agreement was finalised prior to Douglas Hurd’s replacement in September 1985, after which the British actor constellation altered as Tom King became Secretary of State. More hesitant than his predecessor, King postponed the final drafting of the Agreement at the eleventh hour. Within two weeks of his appointment, influenced by Ian Gow, King wrote to the Prime Minister with serious reservations regarding the minimal Agreement (Howe 1995: 426). The reservations expressed were premised on fears that the Unionists would respond by wielding their veto and jeopardise the vulnerable security position of Northern Ireland as evidenced by the rioting of the summer and Loyalist violence against police.

Once signed, the combined unionist rejection of the Agreement by way of the ‘Ulster says no’ campaign, and the march of 100,000 people in Belfast on 23 November illustrated the momentum behind unionist attempts to exercise its veto. In Westminster after a two-day debate, the Agreement was passed by 473 votes in favour and 47 opposed. Fifteen Ulster unionist MPs resigned their seats in protest of the Agreement, prompting by-elections throughout Northern Ireland. The protests against the Agreement
lasted for over one year, with unionist calls for days of strike action, a campaign of civil disobedience, a rent and rate strike and the disruption of local government. Meanwhile threats to RUC members from loyalists escalated and a group called the ‘Ulster Resistance’ was created with an implicit warning of a repeat of the violence seen in the Republic of Ireland after the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974.\textsuperscript{121} The threat of violence was in a bid to counter the threat posed by the Agreement of a united Ireland.\textsuperscript{122}

Nevertheless, the British government refused to suspend the Agreement (Owen 1994: 89). Despite the strikes and civil protest, the strength of the Unionists was limited and they were unable to destroy the Agreement as they had done previously in 1974. The security features of the Agreement were not adopted comprehensively. Irish proposals for two-tier policing to reduce nationalist alienation were overlooked. The introduction of mixed courts was considered but not fulfilled. Republican violence persisted although the procedural tensions of extradition from the Republic to Northern Ireland eased and efforts at extradition failed.\textsuperscript{123} The Anglo-Irish Agreement from the British perspective was an incremental shift described as ‘an untouchable agreement in the right direction’ (Whyte 1990: 237).\textsuperscript{124} While the external resources were influential, the institutional organisation of the British bloc in tandem with the unionist factions exhibited the greatest influence on mediating the nature of the bargain.

The Irish negotiators on election hoped to create a nationalist consensus within the immediate configuration of the Irish bloc by creating the New Ireland Forum. The forum attempted to create institutional cohesion while excluding Sinn Féin in an effort to re-adjust the actor orientation of the Irish bloc. Fianna Fail’s critique of all but the united Ireland model in the forum’s findings weakened the ability of the Irish negotiators to
make a compelling case for the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the constitution. Despite assurances that the Irish government could succeed in passing a referendum (required for any constitutional change), the ambiguity of Fianna Fail’s position created uncertainty. Once signed, Fianna Fail’s rejection of the Agreement in the Dáil endorsed these fears and divided Fianna Fail, as some members argued the Agreement should have been supported. The issue split the party and resulted in the creation of the Progressive Democrats. Haughey’s critique of the Agreement resulted in a Republican endorsement of him as a ‘genuine Nationalist’ (Moloney 2002: 268).\textsuperscript{125} The Agreement was passed in the Dáil by 88 favourable votes to 75 unfavourable ones. In addition, Labour party senator Mary Robinson resigned due to the lack of transparency and consultation for Unionists during the negotiations while SDLP assembly member Pascal O’Hare resigned because (it was claimed) the Agreement undermined any opportunity for a united Ireland.

The Irish negotiators’ dependence on American and European support was substantial. The appeal of the NIF to a sympathetic Irish-American audience produced dividends and used the American initiative after the ill-fated summit at Chequers renewed the possibility of a minimal agreement. The actor orientation within the Irish bloc was of overriding concern to the Irish negotiators.

Curtailing the reorientation of the nationalist bloc towards Republicanism was part of the Irish elite’s objective. The swift escalation in Sinn Féin’s support had been hindered by the local elections of 1985 and the results of the by-elections created as Unionists resigned in protest against the Agreement helped to illustrate that Sinn Féin’s support was slowing with 6.6 per cent of the vote.\textsuperscript{126} The success of the Irish government’s Anglo-Irish initiative in curtailing the advance of Sinn Féin over the SDLP
was contested. It has been argued that the Anglo-Irish Agreement had a minimal effect on the decision-making of Sinn Féin or on its subsequent policy shift, to end abstention when contesting elections in the Republic (Feeney 2002: 330). It is agreed that the Republican response to the Agreement, that it ‘copperfastened partition’ was muted in comparison to the unionist street protests and strikes. Conversely, it has been argued that the Anglo-Irish Agreement succeeded in rejuvenating the SDLP, creating a stalemate in the competition between the two nationalist parties in Northern Ireland (Moloney 2002: 241). As well as encouraging the Sinn Féin leadership to participate in the Dáil, this policy change created a schism within the Republican movement, a split within Sinn Féin, and the creation of Republican Sinn Féin which sought to maintain the policy of abstention. The changing nature of the movement leads some to suggest the Agreement was influential. Indeed, prior to the finalising of the Agreement, the SDLP leader John Hume announced he would talk with the leaders of Sinn Féin. Criticised for this initiative by unionists, these discussions were instrumental over the moderation of the Republican movement in the long term.

The limited implementation of the Agreement in terms of the criminal justice review and the failure of the British government to consider the mixed courts proposed, however, coupled with criticism from the opposition undermined the Irish government. The governing coalition lost a referendum on a constitutional amendment to allow divorce; this vulnerability was exploited by Haughey’s campaign to highlight the Agreement’s failure, described as the ‘best friend the opponents of the agreement ever had’. Haughey’s opposition to the Agreement, heightened by his fears of Sinn Féin’s participation in Irish politics at the expense of Fianna Fail, contributed to Fine Gael’s
losing the 1987 election to a minority Fianna Fail government. Poor implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement on the mixed courts as well as codes of conduct for the police had undermined the features of the Agreement that sought to limit the alienation of the nationalist community. However, many of the measures successfully implemented were not attributed to the Agreement for fear of escalating unionist responses (FitzGerald 1992: 474). Implementation of the Agreement was incremental, piecemeal and insufficiently tangible in the short term to sustain the electoral chances of the Irish government that negotiated it. This in part explains the Irish government’s concession to responsibility without power.

5.11 Conclusion

They [the IRA] created a community of interest and the Irish and British policies therefore have had the same interest and Irish and British policy have had the same objective visibly and clearly from 1972 onwards. Analysis of how we reach that objective has diverged at times, but the purpose is the same and that is the huge achievement of the IRA

The configuration of the ethnic blocs and the traditional pattern of accommodation within each bloc, along with external actors and resources influenced the nature of the minimal bargain. From the Irish government’s perspective the concession to duties without rights agreed upon in the minimal bargain was significant in that it codified Ireland’s shared security concerns with the British government over Northern Ireland and legitimated an existing practice of co-operation. In addition, the concession created the opportunity
for the Irish government to attempt curtailing the influence of the Republican movement while reducing the alienation of the Northern Irish nationalist minority. Moreover, the Irish government aimed to alter the configuration of actors within its own bloc and the orientation of its electorate. The government's attempt to dispense with opaque perceptions of Irish nationalism clarified the position of Republicanism and heralded a stage of revisionism. From an Irish perspective it can be argued that the Anglo-Irish Agreement was a crucial incremental step towards British and international recognition of an Irish role and Irish status in Northern Ireland (O'Duffy and Githens-Mazer 2002: 141).

From the British government's perspective, the Irish government's willingness to concede to a limited bargain enabled it to curtail the Republican movement electoral and military advancement. The bilateral agreement with the Irish government reined in the veto of the Unionists and initiated greater authority over Northern Ireland as a result. The Agreement renewed Britain's international persona after a decade of criticism over its policy in Northern Ireland. These important features formed the basic equation upon which the agreement was formed. The issue of consent was based in international law and the British government acknowledged the legitimacy of the Irish dimension on Northern Ireland, while the Irish government acknowledged the union in return for cross-border involvement and allaying the alienation of the nationalist minority. While Britain gained assistance with the Northern Ireland problem, Ireland acquired leverage in the Northern Ireland conflict in the context of an acknowledged partnership between two sovereign governments.
The minimal nature of the bargain agreed was influenced by the three crucial factors and in turn influenced the Northern Ireland conflict and the prospects for its regulation. The bargain sought to contain the Republican movement, undermine the unionist veto, and minimise the alienation of the nationalist minority. While the Agreement resolved to achieve these objectives by way of a minimal bargain, it formed an incremental step towards additional initiatives and agreements which were to include elements of the maximal bargain discussed during this negotiation. As has been argued in this chapter the mechanisms for manufacturing the maximal bargain were constrained by the three factors previously outlined. By attempting to regulate the influence of one or more of the actors by way of a minimal bargain, the influence of these factors helped shape and facilitate a more comprehensive bargain later.
6 The 1998 Good Friday Agreement: a comprehensive inter-ethnic elite pact

6.1 Introduction

The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) signed in Belfast on 10 April 1998 has as many names as it has possible outcomes. The Agreement is also known as the Belfast Agreement, the British-Irish Agreement and, officially, as the Agreement reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations. Equally, assessments of the Agreement have been numerous (Ruane and Todd 1999, Hazelton 2000, Horowitz 2002, McGarry 2001, O'Leary 2001, 2000, 1998, Wilford, 2001).

The bargain provides two competing consequences. In recognising and legitimising the aspirations of the two ethnic blocs or traditions of Unionism and Nationalism in Northern Ireland, the long-term outcome of the Agreement is not fixed. Northern Ireland could integrate either into the Republic to create a united Ireland or secure the maintenance of its current position within the United Kingdom. The Agreement makes no provision for an independent Northern Ireland or for that matter for increasing integration.1 Crucially, the decision as to which of these potential conclusions is achieved resides not with the incumbent bloc elites but (by virtue of a referendum) with a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. In addition to addressing security concerns and the problem of political violence in Northern Ireland, the Agreement recognised the two blocs' societal security concerns and the conflicting aspirations of the
two traditions in Northern Ireland. These aspirations, while not realised, would be institutionally safeguarded. Any future decision or constitutional conclusion over the status of Northern Ireland would reside not with the elites but rather with the people.

The originality of the Agreement stems from the intricate political bargain derived from these diametrically conflicting aspirations that nevertheless incline the factional bloc elites towards institutions and mechanisms of mutual dependence (O’Leary 1998: 2, Wilson 2001: 2). Paradoxically, this Agreement was reached despite the participants’ contradictory end goals. Why would competing ethnic bloc elites with diverging ambitions agree to an inclusive maximum bargain? The Agreement addressed the pressing needs of the bloc elites while acknowledging the diverse aspirations of Northern Ireland’s two traditions of Unionism and Nationalism. The Agreement appealed to the majority of the factional elites because it promised imminent access to power and alluded to the possibility of realisable aspirations in the future.

This chapter considers the way in which the three analytic factors influenced the final maximal bargain. The configuration of the ethnic blocs, the innovative pattern of elite accommodation and the role of external resource dependence of the elites shaped, outlined and constrained elite factional preferences, resulting in a maximal pact. The maximal nature of the Agreement illustrates ‘the transformative potential of inter-ethnic elite negotiation’ (Ruane and Todd 1999: ix), and the influence of institutional innovation on the three fundamental factors of ethnic bloc configuration, pattern of elite accommodation and external resource dependence.

First, the architecture of the Agreement, its institutional features, and functional ramifications will be assessed and compared with the bargaining positions adopted by the
elites. The second part of the chapter will chart the influence of the three factors on the architecture of the Agreement, examining the elites' incentives, preferences, and the positions that ultimately led to the signing of an all-encompassing Agreement. The chapter addresses the way the Agreement reached provides an example of the influence of a series of hereditary security bargains.

6.2 The architecture of the Agreement

The Agreement has been described as a three-tiered arrangement with internal consociational or power-sharing characteristics, North–South or all Ireland features, as well as British–Irish and East–West elements (O'Leary 1998). The Agreement gained elite and later demotic endorsement as ‘people not politicians had the last word' by referenda in Northern Ireland whereby 71 per cent were in favour and in the Republic of Ireland 94 per cent favoured the Agreement.

The successful approval is attributed to the appeal of the Agreement ethos, defined by some of its architects as the ‘peace dynamic'. From its inception, the Agreement was driven by the peace dividend. Defined as a state of security or order free from fear, the peace dividend provided a governmental incentive to engage the factional elites in exploratory discussions. The first principle of the peace dynamic addresses the concerns of identity politics in Northern Ireland and the equality of difference. In the Agreement, both traditions in Northern Ireland are ascribed parity; their differences and rights are recognised, safeguarded, institutionally reflected and reviewed. The
negotiators proposed the appointment of numerous commissions to consider equality, policing, human rights and a review of justice and security. Similarly, the Agreement accommodated the pressing needs of the within-bloc elites and factions while instituting mechanisms to address conflicting aspirations.

The configuration of the Agreement reflects these objectives. A composite of earlier minimal bargains it replicated and combined many of their ‘scratched out clauses’ into an all-encompassing Agreement based on three tiers or strands.

The internal or Northern Ireland tier parallels features of the short-lived 1973 Sunningdale Agreement; the subsequent all-Ireland or North–South tier inherits features initially outlined in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, while the concluding British–Irish or East–West tier alludes to elements of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. Elements of intervening intergovernmental initiatives to encourage negotiations, such as the Downing Street Declaration of 1993 and the Framework Documents of 1995, are included in order to create an innovative, multi-layered, all-encompassing arrangement.

The Agreement was led in the first instance by the British and Irish governments. Known as strand three of the GFA, the British–Irish tier of the Agreement reflects the intergovernmental relationship and features of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, discussed in detail in the previous chapter. The minimal bargain reached between the governments as leaders of the British and Irish ethno-national blocs was manifest in the GFA as the governments agreed to consider ‘the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands.’ In keeping with the AIA, bilateral co-operation in the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference was renewed and replaced the institutions established by the AIA. Elements of the AIA remained, such as the constitutional statement that
‘there would be no derogation from the sovereignty of either government.’ Some argue that the Good Friday Agreement is the fulfilment of the previous 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement (O’Leary 1998:2). Whereas the AIA had created a moderate but palpable degree of mutual dependence between the British and Irish governments, the GFA broadened this dynamic to create mutual exchanges and dependency between the governments. Intergovernmental relations are outlined in strand three of the Agreement.

Strand three established a British-Irish Council of the two sovereign governments including the devolved governments (of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) with powers to meet, delegate functions, and consider common policies. The structure of the British-Irish Council emulates the European Council and contains broadly similar features of the long-standing Scandinavian Nordic Council (Fanning 1999:1). It provided a forum for increased intergovernmental co-operation and attempted to reassure Unionists that the end of the union was not imminent. Avid Unionists feared that the Agreement’s repeal of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 was a ‘stepping stone’ towards Irish unification.

For Unionists, the British-Irish tier forms a counterweight against the influence of the North–South or ‘all-Ireland tier’ of institutions. The North–South Ministerial Council of members from the Irish and Northern Irish executives was formed to address shared, all-Ireland, cross-border and European Union (EU) concerns with the capacity to implement island-wide changes. The all-Ireland tier was analogous to the Council of Ireland proposed in the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and the Sunningdale Agreement’s Council of Ireland of 1974, both anathema to Unionists. In order to ease Unionists’ concerns and enable an all-Ireland implementation of the Council’s decisions,
an amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution was required. The constitutional amendment was initially proposed in discussions held amid the Sunningdale negotiations in 1973 and the AIA of 1985 and was finally realised in the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The primacy of the consent issue could no longer be contested by Unionists.

The purpose of the North–South Ministerial Council was twofold. The all-Ireland element recognised Northern nationalist affinity with the Republic and hoped to improve unionist perceptions of a permanent all-Ireland political component. Wary of the all-Ireland tier, Unionists argued for the British-Irish Council to take precedence over the North–South Ministerial Council (Fanning 1999: 4, O'Leary 2001: 55, 1999: 12). However, the governmental decision to maintain the two distinct strands was instrumental in creating innovative confederal mechanisms (O'Leary 1999: 12) in the second and third tiers of the Agreement (Sisk 2003: 143).

Strand one, the internal or Northern Ireland tier of the Agreement, revisits features of previous power-sharing arrangements. The Sunningdale initiative of 1973 failed because of the strength of the unionist veto and the ensuing protests and strikes. The collapse of Sunningdale has haunted all subsequent power-sharing proposals and explains, by virtue of policy learning, the existence of the overarching institutions created in the intergovernmental strands or tiers.

The features of the Northern Ireland or internal strand are consociational (Lijphart 1969: 207, O'Leary 1998, 1999). Defined as an association of communities, consociation is the outcome of a bargain or pact between political leaders of ethnic or religious groups
in deeply divided societies (Lustick 1979: 328, O'Leary 1999: 2). Based on four criteria, consociationalism requires:

1. the participation of representatives of all significant groups in the government in order to enable cross-community executive power-sharing;
2. the proportionality principle to serve as the basic standard of political representation;
3. a high degree of community autonomy or self-government; and
4. minority veto rights to protect their interests (Lijphart 1997: 495).

The central factor for successful power sharing requires co-operation among elites capable of accommodating divergent interests and factional demands with the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival ethno-national blocs. The capacity of the elite, in turn, depends on their commitment to the system maintenance and recognising the 'perils of political fragmentation' (Lijphart 1969: 216).

Unlike previous arrangements, the Good Friday Agreement engaged the spectrum of political actors in Northern Ireland. The Agreement includes within-bloc factional elites and political actors previously excluded from negotiations because of their Republican or Loyalist paramilitary affiliations. Sinn Féin, the Progressive unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party were allowed to participate subject to criteria outlined in the interim Downing Street Declaration of 1993 (O'Duffy 1995: 767). The consociational feature of the Agreement principally required the inclusion of elite representatives from the majority of the competing groups. While problematic, the
inclusive nature of the dynamic was maintained, although at intervals factional elites were either excluded or left in protest only to renew their involvement later.

The incentive for factional elites to remain involved in the negotiations was to seize the opportunity to participate in a Northern Irish power-sharing executive Assembly, with a dual premiership jointly elected by way of a parallel consent mechanism. A consummate example of the way in which mechanisms can be instituted to regulate factional elites was the parallel consent mechanism devised to encourage Unionists and Nationalists to nominate a candidate from their tradition or bloc acceptable to a majority of the other bloc’s elite (O’Leary 1999: 4). The aim of parallel majority voting and similar devices involves creating elite co-operation and making it routine. Consociational features of power-sharing, proportionality, autonomy and veto necessitate proportional representation in electoral systems and can create procedural incentives, such as access to ministerial positions by virtue of the d'Hondt allocation formula, whereby parties have the right to nominate ministers according to their respective strength in seats (O’Leary 1999: 4). All of these features create incentives to induce factional elites to participate in the arrangement. The same mechanisms, however, may not convince supporters that elite accommodation is acceptable.

As the Sunningdale Agreement illustrates, the discretion of the elites is constrained by mass support and the degree of mobilisation of the bloc membership, in sum the elasticity of the bloc membership influenced the monopoly of autonomy of the leadership. Mobilisation of the bloc against the bloc leadership renders any bargain vulnerable to the influence of the populace (Tsebelis 1990: 159). The inclusive, comprehensive and multilayered nature of the Agreement was designed to minimise this
problem. The Agreement included not only an array of within-bloc factional elites but also facets of previous limited bargains, creating a tiered agreement in order not to succumb to previous agreement perils. The numbering of the strands reflecting their political magnitude, with strand three dependent upon the success of strand one. If strand one succeeds democratic institutions in Northern Ireland will succeed, if however strand one fails or stalls then strand three will resume as central to the governance of Northern Ireland (Fanning 1999: 5)

The Agreement was premised upon recognising and incorporating features of the three crucial factors that had previously influenced the positions and negotiating preferences of the ethnic bloc elites as well as the minimal or maximal nature of the agreements reached. A pioneering feature of the Agreement is the attempt to create a comprehensive bargain, with its attempts to encompass, and in so doing, attempts to regulate, the three dynamics within its parameters. The inclusive nature of the agreement is influenced by the configuration of the ethnic blocs, the traditional accommodation of elites in each bloc and the nature of external resource dependence.
6.3 The configuration of actors and intra-group structure of the British bloc

The 1997 Westminster general election altered the configuration of the British-unionist bloc and returned a ‘new’ Labour party to power after eighteen years in opposition, creating a new impetus for revisiting issues related to Northern Ireland. The previous government’s initiatives had electoral consequences for the Northern Ireland parties. By way of an electoral pact between both parties, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) won ten seats and the Democratic unionist Party (DUP) won two. A further unionist seat was won by the United Kingdom unionist Party (UKUP); formerly members of the UUP, the UKUP opposed participating in negotiations involving the leadership of the Republican movement, Sinn Féin. The nationalist won three seats. Sinn Féin retrieved a seat it had lost to the SDLP in 1992 and acquired a second seat previously won by the unionist DUP. Sinn Féin’s electoral support increased despite its abstentionist policy at Westminster.

Less than a year after winning the general election with a resounding 418 seats in Westminster, Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair had overseen the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. He later described it as ‘a brave undertaking and a vast one […] Only in the first flush of a new Government could we have contemplated it.’ The new Prime Minister had greater leadership autonomy and was unencumbered by the tentative majority of his Conservative predecessor John Major who, by the end of his tenure, was beholden to Unionists for parliamentary support. Consequently, as unionist influence at Westminster began to wane, unrestricted by centrifugal competition to which the Conservative party was bound, the incumbent Labour leadership used its autonomy to
initiate an inter-ethnic bargain with the British-Unionist bloc’s enduring rival, the incumbent Irish bloc elite, the Irish government.

Endowed with a parliamentary majority and an array of party advisors, the new Labour government altered the political and administrative features of the British bloc. The Prime Minister appointed Marjorie (Mo) Mowlam as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Much to the envy of her predecessors, Dr Mowlam swiftly succeeded in winning favour with the media and many of people of Northern Ireland. The Secretary of State, with Paul Murphy as junior minister, Bill Geoffreys from the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and Jonathan Stephen and Jonathan Sawyer from the Cabinet Office, were responsible for negotiating with the Irish government. The Prime Minister also selected his chief of staff and political appointee Jonathan Powell to the small negotiating team, a position heretofore filled in British-Irish negotiations by the incumbent cabinet secretary (Richard Wilson). While important, these innovations in government, however, were not implemented in time to create the Agreement anew. The result of torturous discussion and negotiations, which preceded the Labour government’s initiative, the Agreement was initially shaped under the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major in the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.

For its part, the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) also shaped the actor configuration of the British bloc by regulating the influence of Unionism within the bloc. After rejecting and lobbying against the AIA, the unionist leadership of the UUP and DUP finally relented in the face of continued governmental support for the AIA and an increase in within-bloc schismatic factional competition between unionist factions, despite the maintenance of the joint electoral pact (Cochrane 1997: 174). The cost of
unionist intransigence became clear after the 1987 general election. The UUP lost a substantial share of the overall vote and two seats, one of which was Enoch Powell’s, a friend and ally of Prime Minister Thatcher, who lost his seat to the SDLP.

Nineteen months after the AIA was signed, the unionist party leaders met with the then Secretary of State Tom King for ‘talks about talks’ (Bew and Gillespie 1999: 209, Bloomfield 1997: 104). In 1988, Unionists established a joint-party policy think tank in order to draft alternative proposals to the AIA. The first proposed broadening the remit of the AIA to include the rest of the United Kingdom and rid Northern Ireland of its exclusivity. A subsequent proposal for a devolved Assembly elected by plurality was described as ‘a grandiose county council without executive powers’ (Cochrane 1997: 245). Tom King, however, was preoccupied with an escalation in the British government’s tactics for curtailing Republican paramilitary activity (English 2003: 253). The IRA bombing in Enniskillen on Remembrance Day in 1987 heightened British security concerns (Geraghty 1998: 214). As well as allegations of British security force collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries amid the Loughall and Gibraltar operations (Bolton 1990), the Milltown cemetery attack, and the subsequent lynching of two soldiers (English 2003: 258). At the same time, two initiatives were made by Republicans: Sinn Féin addressed a secret letter to the British government questioning its intent and the reply received outlined the British government’s interests in Northern Ireland. The second initiative involved IRA plans to assassinate Mr King. Amid these events, the Secretary of State was unmoved by unionist proposals to abolish the AIA (Moloney 2002: 250).
Within-bloc factional divisions became evident as unionist relations with the Conservative government soured and by 1989, unionist Members of Parliament (MPs) ceased communication with junior minister Brian Mawhinney, even on constituency issues. The open competition between the Conservative party and the unionist parties illustrated the lack of consensus within the British-Unionist bloc and the failure of traditional elite accommodatory mechanisms of inclusive co-operation among members of the Conservative and unionist parties. The combined unionist leadership of the UUP and the DUP were prepared to consider proposals made prior to the AIA, but called for the suspension of the AIA as a precursor to further discussions. The desire of leaders Molyneaux (UUP) and Paisley (DUP) to participate in discussions was plain. Both parties refused to participate in the three-year AIA review, but did, however, join with the SDLP, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and Brian Mawhinney in a failed attempt to design a formula for inter-party discussions, initiated by the German lawyer Eberhard Spiecker at Duisburg. The unionist elite leaders were agreed on a commitment to negotiate an alternative to the AIA.

The position of Unionists within the configuration of the British-Unionist bloc had altered as they elevated their Anti-Agreement tactic into a principle and ‘marched into a cul de sac’. The unionist proposals included a suspension of the IGC meetings and the secretariat at Maryfield. The unionist parties aimed to renew their leadership standing; it was at the British government’s discretion whether to honour the unionist proposals. Not until March 1991, when the IGC and the secretariat were suspended in order to allow discussions to begin, were the Unionists leaders’ terms addressed and they were allowed to march out of their cul de sac ‘with drums beating and pipes playing’.
Their self-respect, if not their veto preserved, they were ‘allowed to come out honourably’⁴⁰. The unionist elites’ response to the AIA illustrates the decline of collective unionist influence as a regulator or constraining force on British government policy over Northern Ireland.

The appointment of Peter Brooke to the position of Secretary of State in July 1989 enabled the Unionists to reorient their position. Despite Margaret Thatcher’s desire to manage rather than innovate in Northern Ireland, Brooke’s first hundred days in office involved meeting with the leaders of all political parties, excluding Sinn Féin (Bloomfield 1997: 96). After consultation with the parties, Peter Brooke asserted that subject to an end to violence, negotiations with Sinn Féin could not be ruled out.¹¹ Unlike his predecessors, the new Secretary of State advocated consultation and consensual interdepartmental decision-making over Northern Ireland. Brooke was assisted by Richard Needham, Undersecretary of State for Northern Ireland, civil servants Ian Burns, Michael Lullock, Oliver Letwin and Andy Wood, as well as Ken Bloomfield in the NIO and Oliver Miles former ambassador to Libya, as diplomatic advisor.²²

British-Irish intergovernmental relations improved as an inquiry was established to address the issue of British security collusion with loyalist paramilitaries. In January 1990, in a speech in Bangor, Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State called for the parties in Northern Ireland to negotiate and proposed devolving ‘some degree of political power, authority and responsibility to Northern Ireland’.²³ Brooke also authorised the resumption of covert communications with Irish Republicans: Sinn Féin renewed contacts with the British government through British intelligence officer Michael Oakley.²⁴
The Secretary of State’s pivotal speech on Northern Ireland was delivered to the fruit importers of Great Britain. Known as the Whitbread speech, Peter Brooke stated that the British government had no ‘selfish strategic or economic interest’ in Northern Ireland. The statement later referred to as the ‘neutrality’ speech represented a formal shift in the British government’s Northern Ireland policy. The delivery of the speech outside Northern Ireland resulted in a delay in the unionist party leaders’ response. The speech in effect was a public response to the questions posed in the secret exchange between the Sinn Féin leadership and the British Government (Moloney 2002: 276). The importance of the statement was endorsed shortly afterward with a shift in British actor constellation. Long despised by Republicans because of her response to the 1981 hunger strike, Margaret Thatcher’s resignation altered the British government dynamic. It heralded a change in Conservative party leader and Prime Minister, as well as the public change in established British policy towards Northern Ireland as expressed in Peter Brooke’s statement necessarily altered the configuration of the British bloc and the landscape of Anglo-Irish political relations. Fruitful advances were made in the brief period between the appointment of John Major as Prime Minister, in which British government leadership autonomy was greatest and the subsequent 1992 general election.

The British government, by virtue of the Brooke statement, had changed the nature of its advocacy over Northern Ireland. While still the recognised and legitimate leader of the British bloc and guarantor of the union, the British government statement had altered its relationship with the Northern Irish unionist parties: ‘[T]o Unionists, in short, Brooke represented both sponsor and betrayer, simultaneously on their side as British ruler and in opposition to them as partner with the enemy, a complicated view
exacerbated by the internal train of their attempts to present a united front to him (Bloomfield 1997: 104).

The British government, while not ‘neutral’, now had the leadership latitude to choose rather than be obliged to stand as proxy representatives for unionist factional elites as the fear of a centrifugal shift towards unionist positions were curtailed. The government was no longer beholden to the unionist veto constraining its Northern Ireland policy. The intra-group configuration of the British bloc had altered. Equally, in the interim period between the AIA and the Good Friday Agreement the configuration and intra-group structure of the Irish bloc underwent changes, which are considered in the next section.

The Good Friday Agreement is unlike the AIA. It is an inclusivist, comprehensive bargain, and it attempts to; consider core conflict concerns, attain at best a settlement or, at least a transition to settlement to the problem of Northern Ireland’s divided society. The merits of this type of agreement is that it becomes the motivator and dynamic for implementation and it is a continual bargain, that is, a marriage-like pact, as the parties to the Agreement commit themselves to maintaining the arrangement for better or worse.
6.4 The configuration and intra-group structure of the Irish bloc

Akin to its British counterpart, the Irish coalition government responsible for the Good Friday Agreement had not been in government a year prior to the Good Friday Agreement. The Fianna Fail coalition with the Progressive Democratic Party was reached after the 1997 election in which Sinn Féin won its first Dáil seat. The new Irish government had defeated a ‘rainbow coalition’ of Fine Gael, Labour and the Democratic Left, created after the collapse of the 1992 Fianna Fail-Labour government.

The 1997 government was led by Tánaiste Bertie Ahern. Charles Haughey’s preferred successor in 1992, Ahern waited until 1994 to become party leader and inherited the mantle of the ‘pan-Nationalist bloc’ leader. Pan-nationalism by this time included Sinn Féin, as the consequences of the Ballot Box and Armalite policy had been instituted and Sinn Féin were increasingly perceived as being less unequivocal Republicans than the hard Nationalists courtesy of a change in Sinn Féin policy in 1987. Unlike the political ‘merry-go-round’ experienced in the Republic of Ireland the configuration of the Northern Nationalists and Republicans remained relatively constant. Changes referred to policy rather than individual factional elite changes. The AIA had been influential in a shift in Sinn Féin leadership policy (Moloney 2002: 267). The Agreement also imposed a change in Fianna Fail party policy. Prior to the 1987, election Charles Haughey had advocated a renegotiation of the AIA if elected. Fianna Fail subsequently won 81 of the 166 seats in the Dáil. As a minority government under pressure from the Fine Gael opposition, it was reluctant to renegotiate the Anglo-Irish Agreement and instead resolved to recognise Ireland’s international agreements and
participate with the British government in the IGC and the Maryfield secretariat.\textsuperscript{27} The animosity between Charles Haughey and Prime Minister Thatcher notwithstanding, the government ‘drew a line under the Agreement and worked it’ (Mansergh 1995).\textsuperscript{28} Fianna Fail’s Northern Ireland position was shaped and determined by Martin Mansergh, an appointed special advisor to the Taoiseach and all subsequent Fianna Fail Taoisigh. Mansergh was influential in changing the policy of ‘condemnation and exclusivity’ towards Sinn Féin, establishing principles of self-determination and consent that would be amenable to Republicans (Rafter 2003). Mansergh was also responsible for coordinating the Irish government’s response to a Sinn Féin leadership discussion document on the future of Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{29} The document originated from discussions between Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Féin, and Father Alex Reid, a Catholic priest and mediator from Belfast. The Reid–Adams discussions and subsequent document signalled a shift in the position of Sinn Féin leadership. Fr. Reid had previously communicated with Haughey while opposition leader in 1986. Fianna Fail’s return to government allowed for the subsequent step in the Reid–Adams initiative. The document they formulated was endorsed by the Redemptorist religious order in Ireland and outlined features for discussion, a political settlement and, crucially, the Sinn Féin leadership’s terms for a Republican ceasefire (Maloney 2002: 269).

The Catholic Church as an influential external or third party endorsed what became known as the Reid–Adams proposals for an all-nationalist bloc, including Fianna Fail and Sinn Féin in the first instance. The proposal resembled an inclusive as opposed to exclusive New Ireland Forum to agree on a common policy over Northern Ireland, aimed at encouraging militarist Republicans to consider an ‘alternative method’ to armed
struggle (Maloney 2002: 270).\textsuperscript{30} Paradoxically perceived as both an ‘abandonment of the principles of the AIA’ and a ‘paralleling of the features of the AIA’, the Reid–Adams proposals allowed supporters and decriers of the previous Agreement to claim victory.\textsuperscript{31} However, the new Republican initiative was potentially perilous for Gerry Adams as the incumbent Sinn Féin leader. Both the series of questions addressed to the then British Secretary of State Tom King and the Reid proposals to the Taoiseach were the enterprise of Gerry Adams. If revealed, they would be politically damaging to his leadership of Sinn Féin.

Similarly, for the Taoiseach to communicate with Sinn Féin as the recognised leadership of the Republican movement was equally precarious. As a result of his association with the Arms Trial in 1970 (Kelly 1999), Haughey was disinclined to meet with Gerry Adams.\textsuperscript{32} Instead, the SDLP leader John Hume was suggested as an appropriate surrogate. Hume’s credibility conveyed legitimacy to the initiative later known as the Hume-Adams dialogue.\textsuperscript{33} The dialogue altered the traditional schismatic competition between the SDLP and Sinn Féin as the leaders of both parties discussed the goals of Northern Irish Nationalism.\textsuperscript{34} Unknown to the SDLP leader, he served not solely as a dialogue partner with Adams and Reid but also as a proxy for the Fianna Fail government. Previous tentative discussions between Hume and Adams had been held in secret whereas the new dialogue between the two leaders of Northern Irish Nationalism and Republicanism was deliberately public. The SDLP provided an air of ‘constitutional’ nationalist credibility to Sinn Féin. The incremental shift in Sinn Féin’s policy began with a change of leadership in 1981 and was secured when the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis overturned the policy of abstention to the Dail in 1986. When the Northern Irish party
elites met in Duisburg in October 1988 to discuss devolution proposals, the elites were aware that while Sinn Féin was excluded, Father Alex Reid attended to present the view of its leadership (Maloney 2002: 281).

The new Northern Nationalist-Republican dialogue temporarily raised expectations, which were subsequently constrained with the escalation of IRA violence. The weapons acquired by the militarists within the Republican movement from Libya\(^35\) had escalated the level of conflict and intensified the issue of security. As Sinn Féin began its political charm offensive, the militarists in the Republican movement began what was described as their ‘Tet Offensive’.\(^36\) The violence escalated with the Enniskillen bombing on Remembrance Day in 1987 and was followed by a substantial seizure of IRA weapons by the Irish police. The violence escalated in tandem with the ‘dirty war’, as the question of British security collusion with loyalists was raised in the midst of allegations of an RUC ‘shoot to kill’ policy. The incidents of March 1988 (Loughgall, Gibraltar, Milltown Cemetery), along with the first IRA bomb in Britain since the AIA, curtailed any notion of a pan-Nationalist initiative. With no end to violence in sight, the impetus for public dialogue diminished. The SDLP and the Irish government independently concluded public pan-Nationalist dialogue (Mansergh 1995: 153).\(^37\) Without an IRA ceasefire, the dialogue undeservedly ascribed greater political legitimacy to Sinn Féin. Ending the discourse publicly would, it was argued, create a renewed impetus for the Sinn Féin leadership to rein in Republican militarists. The rationale was not altruistic; the respective leaders of constitutional Nationalism and the SDLP, in particular, were conscious that their willingness to afford credibility to the Sinn Féin leadership would impact their own status.
The SDLP leader John Hume was subject to criticism from the party for engaging in dialogue with Sinn Féin. Divisions arose with members of the SDLP who were opposed to discussions with Sinn Féin amid ongoing Republican violence (Murray 1998: 175). The sceptics within the SDLP feared Sinn Féin would accrue legitimacy, status and votes at the expense of the SDLP (Mitchell, O'Leary and Evans 2001:725), leaving it in the unenviable position of 'the prodigal son's brother'. From its inception, the SDLP has been an amalgamation of imprimatur factions and a coalition of positions, of 'reds and greens' represented by members of the leadership (Tonge and Evans 2001). The transparency of the Hume–Adams dialogue created contradictory bloc membership perceptions of the party. It was viewed as simultaneously lacking unanimity when compared with the cohesive front presented by the joint UUP/DUP unionist leadership but nevertheless managed to 'negotiate as a monolith'.

These internal pervasive factional dynamics of the respective Northern Irish parties only became evident in 1991 as the preliminary discussions for the Secretary of State’s proposed series of inter-party talks commenced. The structure of the discussions, later forming the basis for the Good Friday Agreement, was divided into three areas or strands of negotiation: strand one was concerned with internal Northern Ireland governance, strand two with Northern Irish and Republic of Ireland relations, and strand three with the British–Irish relationship. Unionists were averse to any Irish government role in Northern Irish affairs and attempted to regulate its influence with preconditions. As the sole Northern nationalist party in the process, the SDLP successfully curtailed unionist preconditions which attempted to exclude the Irish government from strand one of the discussions. The SDLP argued that the unionist proposals to include Dublin after
the internal strand one features of the discussions were agreed would resuscitate the unionist veto and thwart progress on the second strand. The SDLP and the Dublin government responded by threatening to withdraw from the discussions in July of 1990.

The Brooke talks attempted to initiate negotiations between the constitutional parties and review relations within Northern Ireland, relations between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic and relations between the UK as a whole and the Republic of Ireland (Guelke 1995: 120). The Brooke initiative was, however, undermined by an Irish constitutional question. The Irish Supreme Court held that Article 1 of the AIA was not in conflict with Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution. Justice Barrington asserted that Articles 2 and 3 were not ‘aspirational’ but rather constitutionally imperative. The decision was made in response to a legal action taken by two members of the UUP (Owen 1994: 129). The subsequent refusal of the Supreme Court to extradite two Republicans to Northern Ireland succeeded only in antagonising existing unionist and British government grievances with the Irish government. Eventually, a series of deadlines were choreographed in order to mediate conflicting preconditions, and the Brooke initiative was announced in March 1991.

The Irish government’s involvement gained impetus in June 1991 in discussions over the North–South dimension, strand two. The Taoiseach engaged the assistance of Dermot Nally who had led the Irish negotiations over the AIA as well as Noel Dorr and Sean O’Huiginn from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). In the midst of deadlock, Irish Foreign Minister Gerry Collins suggested the governments threaten to impose an agreement on the Northern Ireland parties should they fail to resolve the difficulties over strand two. The proposal altered the agency of the governments
attributing a new role in the process. As the governments of the respective states within which the ethnic blocs affiliated, the role of the governments had previously been as representatives of the respective blocs.

The threat to impose an agreement on the factional elite representatives of the blocs within Northern Ireland fashioned a new role for the governments as custodians or the blocs as well as guarantor of any agreement creating governmental distance from the blocs' representatives. The new relationship forged between the governments altered the nature of the enduring rivalry (Diehl and Goetz 2003: 19) previously characterised as the clashing of the state representatives over the shared protracted conflict. The document outlining the ultimatum contained the words 'after long discussion with our Irish colleagues'. The phrase implied a degree of intergovernmental co-operation antagonistic to Unionists. They responded by undermining the position of Peter Brooke and protesting directly to the Prime Minister. Bypassing the Secretary of State and accessing the Prime Minister temporarily weakened the thrust of the initiative and set a precedent for prime ministerial involvement in Northern Irish negotiations.42

In the course of efforts to restore the Brooke initiative, however, the Irish government received a draft summary of renewed discussions between the leaders of the SDLP and Sinn Féin. The document was reviewed by Irish civil servants and advisors, and Taoiseach Charles Haughey proposed the ‘Draft 2’ document to British Prime Minister John Major at the Anglo-Irish summit in December 1991. The document established the draft terms of a joint declaration of government intent on the future of Northern Ireland.
The configuration of the Irish bloc changed in February 1992 when Charles Haughey resigned as Taoiseach and Fianna Fail leader amid allegations of phone tapping (Collins 2000: 220–5). The change in the Fianna Fail leadership was welcomed. Unencumbered by a history associated with Republicanism, his successor, Albert Reynolds, was better able to engage in dialogue with Sinn Féin. However, as the configuration of the Irish bloc incumbent leader changed so too did the leadership of the British bloc.
6.5 Elite accommodation and the nature of support in the British bloc

Conservative Prime Minister Major’s willingness to address personally the concerns of the combined unionist leadership over the wording of the Brooke and Collins ultimatum increased as the Conservative party’s share of Westminster seats declined. In the 1992 election, the Conservative party secured a 21-seat majority, leaving the government vulnerable to votes of no confidence. Consequently, the centrifugal shift on the Conservatives led Major’s British government to reorient its position to accommodate unionist concerns. The election also served to reconfigure the Northern Ireland segment of the Nationalist-Republican bloc of Sinn Féin and the SDLP, as Sinn Féin lost the West Belfast seat to the SDLP. The post-election cabinet reshuffle replaced Peter Brooke with the security-oriented Attorney General Patrick Mayhew as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The Brooke initiative was resurrected and renamed the Brooke/Mayhew initiative and the IGC was suspended at the behest of unionist party leaders in order to allow renewed talks. The British administration remained the same with Robin Butler the cabinet secretary responsible for dealing and negotiating with Irish civil servants. Patrick Mayhew relied principally on John Semple, Jonathan Stevens, David Hill, John Chilcot), and in particular, Northern Ireland civil servant John McConnell during his role as Secretary of State.43

Amid increasing violence in Northern Ireland, the Brooke/Mayhew initiative continued apace on strands two and three, despite deadlock on strand one. Meetings convened in London and Belfast amid the leaking of position papers and documents that repeatedly threatened to end the initiative.
In September 1992, the proposals for the draft strand one documents were leaked prior to the parties’ scheduled meeting in Dublin. Rather than meet in Dublin to discuss Northern Irish concerns, the DUP withdrew from the discussions, reiterating its call for an Irish constitutional amendment on Articles 2 and 3. The UUP leadership conceded to Mayhew’s requests to involve itself in the Dublin discussion, keen to curtail SDLP proposals to adopt an EU model for strand one. The division over the Dublin meeting distinguished the unionist party leadership of the UUP and the DUP emphasising the divided and open competition between the two unionist parties.\textsuperscript{44} The unionist pact, however, resumed after the Dublin conference and both parties collaborated and withdrew from the discussions in November, bringing the process to a halt. After the inter-party talks ceased, the British government addressed Republican concerns overtly but indirectly.

In December of 1992, the Secretary of State gave a speech alluding to the removal of soldier foot patrols and the possibility of discussion with Sinn Féin if there were a cessation of IRA violence. The speech was regarded as ‘the most significant recognition of the case of traditional Irish nationalism’ (Keatinge 1992: 84).\textsuperscript{45} By April 1993, the British government initiated contact with the IRA in a document establishing parameters of its position (Moloney 2002: 406).\textsuperscript{46} The IRA response to the British government (mirrored in a communication to the Taoiseach) deviated from the Reid–Adams initiative and reiterated previous IRA Army Council claims for a definitive date for British withdrawal from Northern Ireland (Mallie and McKittrick 1996: 174).\textsuperscript{47}

The two governments were wooing the Republican movement while Sinn Féin and the IRA Army Council were advocating conflicting positions regarding the issue of
British withdrawal. Conversely, the unionist elites’ abilities were constrained. The British government’s attention had been directed towards escalating violence and increasing schismatic competition between loyalist paramilitaries. It became evident that mainstream unionist concerns had been marginalised.

Unionist influence decreased after the inter-party dialogue ceased. The Secretary of State’s assertion that the government’s role on Northern Ireland’s position within the UK was ‘neutral’ was, for many, a reiteration of the Brooke speech. Nevertheless, it exacerbated unionist fears. The magnitude of the unionist role in the British bloc was endorsed when Prime Minister John Major, ‘holding on by his fingernails’ to a fractious Conservative party, relied on unionist support for his survival in a vote of no confidence over the Maastricht Treaty in July 1993. The Unionists buttressed the government in return for concessions, including a Northern Ireland select committee, and the government’s commitment to the consent principle. The reorientation of the unionist party elites and its support for the government were to be short lived. British government communication with Republicans was revealed and later confirmed by Sinn Féin in 1993 and promptly denied by the Secretary of State. The explanation for the Republican link was attributed to ‘an agent or official […] making suggestions without authority’. In September 1993, Hume and Adams revealed they had concluded their discussions and forwarded their proposals to the Irish government as John Hume revealed in the House of Commons. The British government was now vulnerable to backbench Conservative criticism from the Conservative faction and lobbyist group called Friends of the Union, making it increasingly susceptible to pervasive factionalism within the party and shifting parliamentary support. Unable to sustain a government with the support of the opposition
alone the Government realigned itself with its unionist supporters predominantly from the UUP. The centrifugal pressure on the Government had increased and the latitude of the government to advocate its new role as part bloc representative part custodian of the process curtailed.

In the midst of preparing the final drafts of the Joint or Downing Street Declaration between the two governments, and immediately prior to the summit, a new document was presented which ‘intended to change the whole thrust of the initiative’. Described as a ‘Unionist document inspired by unionist susceptibilities,’ it emerged as the Prime Minister consulted with UUP leader James Molyneaux over proposals for the joint declaration. The ‘Blueprint’ document threatened the integrity of the intergovernmental initiative. This first new document as opposed to a position or response paper initiated by the British government and drafted by the NIO, it was however proposed by the Prime Minister’s private secretary, Roderic Lyne. The British perceived the document as providing a ‘useful negotiating device in helping to focus the long and tortuous negotiations [...] and move them forward towards a conclusion’.

The document enraged the Irish government negotiators, undermining the work of the previous six months of intensive negotiation. The Irish negotiators rejected the proposal outright. At a subsequent meeting of the Prime Minister and Taoiseach, after a colourful exchange that threatened the genesis of the British-Irish initiative, the Unionist-inspired British Blueprint document was finally marginalised. The document and its timing were onerous; it signalled the modification of the Prime Minister’s policy position in response to his increasing dependence on unionist support (Cochrane1997: 304).
The British Blueprint document was symptomatic of the government's vulnerability to centrifugal forces within the British-Unionist bloc and its elastic parliamentary support as well as a bureaucratic administration sympathetic to unionist perspectives. The government did not seek to 'run a different policy from that of the NIO – which would have been counter-productive and out of keeping with the collegiate style of the Major government and the very close personal relationship between John Major and Paddy Mayhew'. John Major's collegiate style assisted by his history as party whip, failed to abate the rebelling and fractured Conservative parliamentary party as backbenchers and others continued to threaten the government's survival by way of a campaign of leaking documents relating to Northern Ireland.

The objective of the Declaration had been inclusive, its goal to draw the anti-system parties in particular Sinn Féin into the constitutional politics; Republican leaders were not convinced of British intentions (Adams 1997: 36, English 2003: 272).

The governments' Joint Framework Documents of February 1995, drafted after the successful signing of the Downing Street Declaration (DSD), and information concerning the first IRA ceasefire, were also leaked. Unionist sympathisers within the Conservative party became increasingly proactive after the DSD was signed as few had anticipated the possibility of an IRA ceasefire. The 'tendentious' leak of the Framework Documents attributed to Viscount Cranborne, a member of the Cabinet subcommittee on Northern Ireland, further damaged the fragile status of the Major government. Additional Intergovernmental initiatives for all party negotiations were already complicated by the DUP boycott of any negotiations involving Sinn Féin irrespective of IRA and other paramilitary ceasefire activities. The failure of John Major's claim to
cherish Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom’ to induce the DUP to participate was attributed to the Framework document’s appeal to ‘the head rather than the heart’.63

Following the Framework Document leak, in March the Secretary of State unilaterally revealed conditions for paramilitary-affiliated parties to enter into the proposed negotiations.64 The conditions required a willingness to disarm, an agreed means of disarming and the relinquishment of some weapons as a prelude to entering into negotiations. Mayhew’s decision to disclose the issue of ‘decommissioning’ was a result of Unionist, parliamentary and Cabinet constraints; the so-called Washington conditions were ‘issued under strong instructions from [the] Cabinet’.65 Only two members of the Cabinet, however, were advocates of pursuing the Northern Ireland initiative towards multi-party negotiations. The ability of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State to act on the proposals and initiate the resumption of talks in Northern Ireland was constrained by the orientation of Conservative and unionist factional elites and an elastic support base; as a result, leadership proposals on Northern Ireland were ‘gravely handicapped by numbers’.66 Unlike the change in the nature of traditional elite accommodation within the British-Unionist bloc, which arise from a series of often subtle pervasive shifts, alterations in the nature of elite accommodation in the Irish bloc are more transparent.
6.6 Elite accommodation and the nature of the Irish bloc

The 1992 Irish general election produced the first Fianna Fail–Labour party coalition government led by Fianna Fail’s Albert Reynolds with 68 seats and Labour leader and Tánaiste Dick Spring with 33 seats. This amounted to Labour’s strongest electoral endorsement ever. Fianna Fail’s coalition experience had been solely with the Progressive Democrats and it was unaccustomed to sharing power gracefully (Girvin 1993: 4). The Labour party had negotiated the AIA in coalition with Fine Gael and was well versed in British-Irish intergovernmental negotiations. The strong Labour representation in the Dáil, as well as Dick Spring’s proposition, made prior to the election, of rotating the position of Taoiseach, all marked changes of political parameters (Collins 1992: 180).

Administratively, the introduction of party programme managers altered the relationship between civil servants and politicians. Fianna Fail selected former civil servants whereas Labour’s programme managers were appointed from within the party. The new government retained Martin Mansergh, Sean O’Huiggin, Sean Donlon, Tim Dalton and Dermot Nally. Labour introduced Fergus Finlay as programme manager for the DFA. The programme manager system altered relations between politicians and civil servants as well as improving relations inter-departmentally, negating previous animosity between the Taoiseach’s office and the DFA. The distinguishing feature of this government was the versatility exhibited by the junior coalition partner. After the eventual collapse of the Reynolds government, the Labour party leadership countered the
tendency for its ‘rainbow’ coalition partners to reorient government policy regarding Northern Ireland. ⁷⁰

Once the coalition agreed in January 1993, the Taoiseach addressed the issue of resuming the Brooke/Mayhew initiative with Prime Minister Major. ⁷¹ The first complexity for the Labour coalition members arose when confronted with the ‘profound changes in the fifteen years out of office’. ⁷² The renewed government dialogue with Republicans suggested that the central ethos behind the AIA had been a stratagem, a strengthening of constitutional nationalism to marginalise extreme nationalism contrived to leave ‘paramilitaries to wither on the vine’. ⁷³ The Labour party’s difficulty with the AIA had been its exclusion of Unionism and the subsequent fears it engendered for Unionists. In 1988, in New York, the Labour leader’s call for a suspension and amendment of the AIA to include Unionists had been poorly received, although it formed the basis of the subsequent dialogue. ⁷⁴ Having adhered to the spirit of the AIA in opposition, in government it was revealed that the policy advocated aimed to achieve the opposite of the prescribed objective of the AIA. The aim was to reorient Republicanism in the Irish bloc and ‘place paramilitaries in the fold’. ⁷⁵

The process was orchestrated so that the separate initiatives of Hume–Adams, the British Government with Republicans, the Irish government and Hume–Adams, British-Irish discussions, and the multi-party dialogue process could all be synchronised. In March 1993, Tánaiste Dick Spring called for the resumption of the Brooke/Mayhew dialogue. The Hume–Adams discourse was promptly revealed after John Hume agreed to endorse the subsequent Hume–Adams document, hesitating on a paragraph pressing for a timeframe for British withdrawal. The inclusion of the Army Council inspired
paragraph persuaded their unofficial suspension of military actions in Britain (Moloney 2002: 411). The Irish government delivered the proposals, vacillating over the same phrase on withdrawal of the British government. The British government, in turn, rejected it on the nature of the wording on the issue of consent and the basis of the date for British withdrawal. John Hume’s subsequent statement in the House of Commons summarised elements of the proposals for the House and appealed for reconsideration by both governments. In so doing, Hume challenged not only the British leadership but also the Irish government, posing a challenge to the leader of the pan-Nationalist block and the SDLP partner. Both governments reverted to drafting a Joint Declaration ‘weaving [the] logic of words around the contested area of consent’. 76

Unionists and Loyalists, fearing a threat to their constitutional position as the initiatives were revealed, reacted to the Hume–Adams initiative differently. The Hume–Adams dialogue and revelation of British government communication channels with Republicans were met with an escalation in Loyalist paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland. The IRA retaliated and a wave of atrocities ensued amid ongoing intergovernmental dialogue and discussion over the best way to address the issue of consent and constitutional questions.77 To allay unionist fears, the Irish government initiated dialogue with the unionist community through the auspices of Cardinal Robin Eames and Roy Magee in order to reiterate the primacy of the ‘peace initiative as an end in itself’ rather than solely a question of political accommodation. The Irish government’s initiative appealing to and including unionist concerns contrasted with the government’s position in relation to the AIA. The outcome of this dialogue was fruitful
and important elements of concern to Unionists were subsequently added 'verbatim' to Articles 6–8 of the DSD.78

Unperturbed by the introduction of the British Blueprint Document immediately prior to the signing of the Downing Street Declaration, the Irish government was preoccupied with securing Republican endorsement for the Declaration. The Republican movement chose to postpone and reflect on the DSD rather than to adopt a hostile approach to the Irish government and reveal the earlier controversial June drafting of the Hume–Adams document that both the Irish government and the SDLP had ascribed to and endorsed albeit hesitantly. Publishing the document would have undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the pan-Nationalist bloc. The Republican leadership decided, though, that both ‘the carrots and sticks’ alluded to by the governments were viable. The counter threats against Republicans, should they reject the document, were credible, as were promises of an end to Section 31 and the 18-year ban on Sinn Féin by broadcast media. Instead, the Republican movement opted for ‘a period of reflection’.79

The ideological incentives of the DSD aimed to control the positions of Unionists and Republicans. It attempted to initiate a process of allowing balanced constitutional changes concerning Northern Ireland and provide the opportunity for a contained Republican strategy. The declaration was an incremental step towards achieving these features.80 Once signed, the UUP and the cross-party select committee on Northern Ireland accepted the DSD it had lobbied for in the midst of the Maastricht vote was granted. The DUP rejected the DSD quietly, contrasting with their response to the AIA. The discrete rejection of the DSD by the DUP was attributed to the recognition and inclusion of core unionist concerns and susceptibilities in the DSD. In this instance
Unionists were openly consulted and required assurances were considered and added to the Joint Declaration.81 The Irish government provided the much desired US visa for Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams in order to encourage the reorientation of Republicanism and demonstrate to ‘hard line Republicans that international battles need not necessarily be won by British diplomacy’.82 The visa paid dividends. In August 1994, after secret meetings with the Secretary of State, the IRA announced ‘a complete cessation of military activities’ because the ‘provos were coming in’.83 One week after the ceasefire was declared, the pan-Nationalist leaders Albert Reynolds, John Hume, and Gerry Adams shook hands in front of Leinster House in Dublin. The symbolism of the three leaders representing the core elements of Irish Nationalism and the peripheral Irish Republicanism represented the realignment of the Irish and nationalist ethnic bloc towards the centre. The Fianna Fail–Labour coalition government had succeeded in reorienting the Irish bloc and regulating Republicanism.

The bloc elite consensus has altered though the issue of bloc support became problematic arising from disaffected Republicans. The latitude of the leadership was threatened from within after a series of unilateral initiatives by Fianna Fail the dominant partner in the governing coalition threatened the future of the government. The appointment of an Attorney General and the failure to extradite a paedophile priest to Northern Ireland resulted in the Labour party withdrawing its support from the coalition government and Albert Reynolds was forced to resign. For the first time a new ‘rainbow’ coalition was formed from Fine Gael, Labour, and the Democratic Left without going to the people.84
John Bruton, the leader of Fine Gael, became Taoiseach and Dick Spring retained his position as Tánaiste. This ‘rainbow’ coalition was oriented differently from its predecessor. The Northern Ireland administrative team lost Martin Mansergh who had identified himself with Fianna Fail, gaining Paddy Teahon in the Taoiseach’s office. Labour retained Fergus Finlay, but his visibility in the demise of the previous government minimised his role.

The change in incumbent leadership became clear in the aftermath of the Framework documents. The Joint Framework documents drew on the elements of the Joint Declaration and previous institutional arrangements to maximise the impetus generated by the ceasefires and created a programme for multi-party dialogue. The Framework Documents in turn formed the basis for the Good Friday Agreement. The first defined the features for democratic, accountable government in Northern Ireland based on a legislative Assembly elected by proportional representation and included a series of committees to address rights and other issues. The second intergovernmental document defined the objectives of both governments. The document outlined a three-tiered institutional mechanism paralleling the proposals outlined in the Brooke/Mayhew initiative as well as incorporating mechanisms to manage Constitutional and consensus concerns. The proposed inter-party talks aimed to agree on the issues outlined in the documents being legislated in the Dáil and at Westminster.

The difficulty in the Irish bloc arose in Washington concerning the issue of decommissioning outlined in the Secretary of State Patrick Mayhew’s preconditions for parties to enter the multi-party dialogue. Pressed by the divisive dynamics and heavily constrained influences imposed upon the British Government generally and on Prime
Minister Major and Northern Irish Secretary Mayhew in particular, the decommissioning statement was a necessary statement, designed to appease frustrated conservative unionists.

I had very strong instructions from the cabinet I wasn't allowed to go to Washington and make it up as I went along. We said there had to be prior decommissioning; well of course I moved off that twice. I think because we received a lot of flack. With hindsight would it have been easier to recognise that from the beginning? You can never recreate these episodes, I would never have carried my party if we had said, "marvelous there is a ceasefire, they are not going to have to give up any of their weapons they are just going to come straight in". We would never have carried it... [without] the support of the labour party. But if you have a very small majority you can't govern, even if we wanted to, you can't remain in office with the support of the opposition. When you've got an inflamed and furious back bench saying you're giving it all away. But I am not saying we wanted to, Washington three represented what we thought was right. 87

The preconditions were considered arduous and troubling by Irish civil servants. Conversely, the Taoiseach John Bruton favoured the preconditions with 'excessive enthusiasm without reflecting on its implications'. 88 The delicate issue of decommissioning was revealed publicly and became the focal point of concern for the Northern Irish parties, in particular for Sinn Féin and the unionist parties; after the issue was revealed publicly, the process floundered. 89 The orientation of the Irish government was influenced by the change in Irish coalition government and resulted in a temperamental and philosophical change from the pan-Nationalist leadership of Fianna Fáil Albert Reynolds to the more hesitant traditional and 'Unionist' viewpoint of Fine Gael leader John Bruton. 90 The responsibility of bridging the ideological difference between the two governments was placed on Labour leader Dick Spring. The need to moderate the particular ideological stances in both governments in order to maintain a constant position fell to the consistent element of the Irish bloc leadership. 91
governments, tensions arose although they were more acutely felt in the Bruton coalition because of additional divisions between political leadership (Bruton) and civil servants (Sean O’Huiiggin), the resulting schism motivated the British government to wonder ‘who to call, the Taoiseach’s office or the DFA’. 92

Ambiguity in governmental decision-making complicated the role of the Irish government to stand as representative and custodian for the nationalist parties in the process. The change of Irish government majority coalition partner from the inheritors of Irish Nationalism Fianna Fail to the pragmatic nationalist Fine Gael leadership anchored by a staunchly traditionalist John Bruton was problematic. The role of the Labour coalition partner to chart a course between both positions in order to maintain a continuity in orientation in relation to Northern Ireland was arduous and led to a greater Irish dependence on the collaborative influence of external actors to assist in managing the issue of decommissioning and driving the process forward for the remainder of the Dáil. 93 The leadership latitude of the incumbent bloc elite altered with the change in government and the hindering of existing policy preferences in the midst of negotiations.

6.7 Irish external resource dependence

The Bruton–Spring coalition government’s difficulty regarding decommissioning was shared by the British government and the Northern Ireland parties. Along with the respective Irish and Northern Irish Churches, the US government had played an instrumental role from the outset of the Northern Ireland initiatives. In tandem with the
EU, the US government provided support for economic reconstruction in Northern Ireland and convened a Forum for Peace and Reconciliation after the joint ceasefires. The Irish government’s dependence on and successful engagement of the Clinton administration via the US Ambassador to Ireland Jean Kennedy Smith over the US visa for the Sinn Féin leader and a subsequent visa for IRA veteran Joe Cahill to endorse the IRA ceasefire had been vital for advancing the process (Coogan 1995: 372, O’Clery 1995: 87). The Republican Movement, conscious of the benefits to be gleaned from American legitimacy and sponsorship of the movement’s new ‘totally unarmed struggle’ or ‘tactical use of armed struggle’, sought to capitalise on links with the US (MacGinty 1997: 34). The creation of the fundraising group Friends of Sinn Féin assisted in legitimising the political elite of the Republican movement and particularly the political process.

The rationale behind the incumbent Irish bloc elite to encourage the recognition of Sinn Féin by allocation of the US visas was to commit Sinn Féin to an inclusive Irish bloc consensus and minimise schismatic factionalism within the Irish bloc. The benefits of tacit US legitimacy afforded to the Sinn Féin leadership would come at the expense of conforming to negotiating an end to violence. Sinn Féin’s recognition as the legitimate representative of Irish Republicanism would require the leadership of the party to adhere to the constraints imposed by participatory politics including the tacit recognition of the state’s monopoly of force. The Irish government hoped that the internal accommodation of Sinn Féin would minimise schismatic factionalism and regulate Republicanism (Duignan 1995: 147). The timing of US recognition was deemed vital. A previous offer of direct American diplomatic assistance in the guise of a US peace envoy to the Fianna
Fail-Labour coalition was declined. The utility of the external actor or peace envoy to reinvigorate the process, however, was recognised and realised in the person of Senator George Mitchell.96 A commission chaired by Senator Mitchell was established and received submissions on decommissioning from the Northern Irish parties (Mitchell 1999). The Commission published its report, favouring parallel decommissioning. The proposals envisaged parties adhering to an all encompassing schedule or map. All-party dialogue could begin and the decommissioning of weapons could occur in tandem with the negotiations. It also obliged party adherence to six principles involving the use of exclusively peaceful and democratic means, renouncing the use of force and agreeing to abide by the terms of any all-party agreement reached. The advocacy of George Mitchell detracted from decommissioning and facilitated a multi-party talks process and was an important element in maintaining the legitimacy and credibility of the Irish bloc elite.97

Subsequent pressure to elect parties to a Northern Ireland Forum delayed progress. After the forum elections, Senator Mitchell agreed to preside over the Northern Ireland Talks process. Mitchell’s chairing role was an attempt to dissuade sceptical Republicans that the initiative was solely a means of achieving an IRA ceasefire without addressing the core concerns of the conflict. The US envoy added an additional failsafe, guaranteeing a degree of impartiality elusive to governments constrained by having to deliver their respective bloc parties to the negotiations. The US peace envoy provision, however, was unable to redeem the process from procedural delays or end the IRA ceasefire. The Canary Wharf bomb ended the IRA ceasefire and excluded Sinn Féin from the talks forum scheduled for June 1996. Despite US assistance, disarrayed the Irish bloc elite limped towards a 1997 election.98
6.8 British external resource dependence

While the British government’s internal dependencies on unionist parliamentary support took priority and were seconded by the Major government’s constraints, some of which were external, influenced by the EU, the influence of the Clinton administration altered British government perceptions of the special Anglo-US relationship.99 The British government, however, had gained from a change in popular American perceptions of the British role in the conflict after signing the Joint Declaration (O’Clery 1995: 189). The Mitchell Commission assisted the British government in overcoming its own internal constraints concerning the issue of decommissioning and provided the basis for a future benign American involvement in the process. Far from the trilateral relationship between the British-Irish and American governments most desired by the British government,100 the collective involvement of the British-Irish-US relationship became increasingly significant. The resumption of IRA violence and the domestic weakening of Major’s government meant that the role of Senator Mitchell and the American government role became more influential over time.
6.9 The making of the Agreement

The maximal bargaining for the agreement was enabled by the existence of the previous incremental bargains inching towards an overall Agreement. The security bargain of the AIA addressed the core security concerns of the governments and allowed greater intergovernmental involvement while containing the influence of Sinn Féin and the Unionists. Core concerns regarding the issue of consent and constitution were addressed in the Joint Declaration while the institutional constructs in the Brooke/Mayhew initiative became the framework for the Good Friday Agreement.

The landslide victory of the Labour party in the UK and the return of Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats to government in Ireland reoriented the British and Irish blocs. The elections increased the autonomy of the respective government bloc leaderships and with it an increased willingness to innovate the process unencumbered by factional elite determinants. Equally significant was the increasing desire of the within-bloc factional elites to participate in all-party negotiations. The UUP led by David Trimble was prepared to engage with and restrain the march of Sinn Féin as the leadership and elite decision-making changes within had reinvigorated the party and its supporters. The introduction of 'a tactical period of quiet' by Republicans in the month leading up to the elections created the expectation of a second IRA ceasefire. As a result of alluding to the likelihood of a reduction in paramiliarism, Sinn Féin made increasing electoral gains in Northern Ireland and the general election in the Republic. Critically, Sinn Féin became the 'the only all-Ireland party'. The implicit threat posed to the parties within the Irish National bloc north and south was now explicit. The political rise
of Sinn Féin created sufficient enticement to Republicans to persist with the alternative to armed struggle. The SDLP sought the renewal of all-party dialogue and perceived its role as ‘saving parties from themselves and the consequences of their own positions’. The DUP’s goal was to exclude Sinn Féin from negotiations and failing that, refrained from any potential discussions concerning Northern Ireland’s future. The anomalous role of the Alliance party, defined as belonging to neither ethnic bloc in Northern Ireland though commonly associated with the unionist bloc, wanted to broker a Northern Ireland without reference or preference to sectarian politics or an arrangement to share power between the respective ethnic blocs, perceived by many to be little more than institutionalised sectarianism prohibiting social transformation away from ethnic markers (Taylor 2001:46).

The two new governments were predisposed to initiating a process of multi-party negotiations under the auspices and with the assistance of the Clinton administration. The governments first issued proposals on decommissioning, reiterating the Mitchell principles and announcing the introduction of an Independent Commission on Decommissioning. After a joint SDLP–Sinn Féin statement reiterating the need for a negotiated process, the IRA declared a renewed ceasefire, easing the process towards negotiation. Subsequent joint government documents to facilitate negotiations, however, were only warmly received by the parties (Mitchell 1999: 109). The ‘negotiations became more difficult once the violence had stopped’. The ideological proximity within the respective ethnic blocs altered the room for negotiation and compromise as the factional elites attempted to carve out niches within ever-decreasing
ideological distinctions and centripetal tendencies, however, temporary, defined the new
direction of competition within blocs.

The Republican murder of Loyalist paramilitary leader Bill Wright in prison led
Loyalist prisoners to withdraw their support for the negotiations, constraining the
leadership latitude of their political representatives, namely, the PUP and the UDP to
negotiate. Secretary of State Marjorie Mowlam visited the prisoners in order to gain
their support amid reprisal attacks between Republicans and Loyalists. Sinn Féin was
subsequently suspended from the talks as a consequence of IRA violence. Its suspension
allowed the DUP to end its boycott of the talks. The end of Sinn Féin's short suspension
was marked by George Mitchell's imposition of a negotiation deadline for the parties to
end the 'Swan Lake like maneuverings of the talks'.

In creating a deadline and a multiparty requirement, the onus of decision-making
shifted from the sole preserve of the governments to include the Northern Irish parties.
The governments' negotiations concerning strands two and three were partly driven by
the readiness of the Irish government to 'over-negotiate' on the all-Ireland features of
strand two. Concessions were made in some measure to placate unionist concerns
regarding the nature of the cross-border bodies under negotiation. The Irish government
accommodated the all-Ireland features of the Agreement. The two sections in strand
three relating to the transformation of British-Irish relations are disparate as a result of the
unionist pressure (Fanning 1999: 1). Rather than viewing the moderation of the Irish
dynamic as appeasement to unionist concerns, the Irish government viewed the all-
Ireland features of the Agreement as a tacit recognition of existing and inevitable facts, as
unofficial concordats of association already existed.
The parameters of the intergovernmental bargain had been broadly achieved in previous agreements and the role of the governments in the first strand of negotiations shifted from leading their respective British and Irish blocs to assisting the factional elites to negotiate for themselves. Like Virgil guiding Dante through the inferno, on Good Friday the governments facilitated and no longer overtly (though often covertly) drove decision-making in the internal strand one Northern Ireland focused negotiations.\textsuperscript{114} The parties negotiated between themselves but were provoked by government position papers inherited from individual party proposals.\textsuperscript{115} The final institutional features of the strand one track were agreed upon by the parties with able assistance by George Mitchell.

Not all parties contributed, however. Of the ten parties in the negotiations, the core of the framing of the internal institutional mechanisms came from the parties occupying the political middle ground, namely, the SDLP, UUP, the Alliance party and the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition party in particular responsible for the equality elements of the Agreement.\textsuperscript{116} Sinn Féin was conspicuously absent and abstained from actively negotiating on an Assembly they were prepared to accept but not prepared to contribute to creating.\textsuperscript{117} The DUP excluded itself from the negotiations as it refused to participate in negotiations with Sinn Féin. The smaller parties initiated policy papers on the broader confidence-building features of the Agreement, issues of restorative justice, the question of ‘the missing’, conflict survivors and victims.\textsuperscript{118} The Loyalist parties of the PUP and the UDP were concerned with and assisted with the question of decommissioning and prisoner release.

The institutional features of the internal strand were agreed upon between the leadership of the two majority parties in their respective nationalist and unionist
groupings. Fears of factional splits and scepticism resulted in the SDLP initiating proposals and document drafts and forwarding them to the UUP for scrutiny. The procedure is described as follows: ‘David [Trimble] declined to take the paper in case accepting it gave it currency. He complained that the language was all function and responsibility and not enough power. But for us that was great it meant he was interested and wasn’t saying no’.\textsuperscript{119}

The creation of a joint office for the dual premiership of one leader from each ethno-national bloc arose after the SDLP deputy leader and the UUP leader arrived together at the funerals of the cross-community victims of paramilitary violence.

The idea of joint office came about with the funerals in Pointzpass when Seamus [Mallon] and David [Trimble] went together and real image of leadership emerged. Especially when Seamus introduced David and gave his arm, it internally bound the wounds of the community and begged the question, ‘why not joint office?’\textsuperscript{120}

The joint leadership exhibited by the SDLP and the UUP as well as the popular support received as a result, changed the nature of the First and Deputy First Minister office from one with distinct roles (of executive and co-ordination for the First Minister and External Relations for the Deputy First Minister) to a jointly shared office with shared responsibilities. The joint office initiative illustrates the efforts made to match and mould institutional mechanisms to the specificities of the Northern Ireland conflict (Sisk 2003: 147).

As with the governments negotiating the minimal security oriented bargains before them, the parties were constrained by within-bloc factional elite challengers. The nature of the arrangements reached illustrates the constraints imposed on their autonomy
by an elastic bloc membership subject to shifting its support and realignment fears or factional challengers 'outbidding' incumbent bloc elite representatives. The procedural mechanisms of parallel consent and weighted majority voting and the nature of the threshold were negotiated with intra- as opposed to inter-group considerations in mind. The negotiating parties were preoccupied with the ramifications of specific quota and voting procedures for their particular party rather than their ethnic group, as factional competition and intra-group dynamics dominated concerns.121

Once the governments had addressed the consent and constitutional concerns that had plagued previous agreements, the points of division altered. The two critical features of the Agreement were arms decommissioning and early release of paramilitary prisoners.122 The leadership elites of the parties participating in the negotiations were increasingly vulnerable to internal dissent and division. The UUP’s collegiate leadership arrangement attempted to minimise internal division (Cochrane 1997). It was, nonetheless, the most potentially fractious party in the negotiations with *imprimatur* factions. Prior to agreeing on the final draft of the Good Friday Agreement a member of the UUP team, Jeffrey Donaldson walked out of the negotiations.123 This episode illustrated the division within the UUP, and the centrifugal tendency within the party membership. Although open competition and schismatic factionalism did not divide the party, the schism within the party made the leadership latitude of the party leadership increasingly fragile. Still, the UUP leader and the Agreement were endorsed by a 72 per cent majority of the ruling and institutionally decisive Ulster Unionist Council.

The issue of decommissioning threatened the cohesion of the Republican movement prior to the Agreement. The issue arose as Sinn Féin responded to the
Mitchell Principles; the decommissioning proposal document issued jointly by the
governments in 1997 led to open competition within the Republican movement and a
division within Sinn Féin. Those opposed to the Mitchell principles and advocates of
militarism reorganised in opposition to the Sinn Féin leadership and, while small,
threatened to attract disaffected Republicans displeased with the Good Friday
Agreement.124 The proposal to release paramilitary prisoners as a feature of the dividend
for Republicans prepared to adhere to the Agreement insured against dissent for Sinn
Féin and the loyalist PUP and UDP parties. At the subsequent Sinn Féin special Ard
Fheis in May 1998, convened to endorse the Agreement, the presence of four released
Republican prisoners as a show of their support for the Agreement endorsed the peace
dividend and the Agreement was carried by 94.6 per cent majority (Moloney 2002: 481).
The issue of policing reform pressed by the nationalist bloc was divisive for the SDLP
initially and subsequently a lingering concern for Sinn Féin (McGarry and O’Leary
1999).125

The factional elites were also influenced by the external actors, in particular, the
roles of US President Clinton and Senator Mitchell (Mitchell 1999: 178). The
accessibility of the President to the party leaders and the two governments’ increased the
legitimacy of the process and the respective ethnic bloc elites within and beyond their
own parties created a degree of kudos ‘on a very small stage with a very limited cast’
(MacGinty 1997: 41).126 Third party ‘engagement’ in the process was consistent and
intimate, illustrated in the account of the final hours of the negotiation provided by
George Mitchell:
At 8.15 on Friday Morning (3.15am in Washington), I received a telephone call from President Clinton. “What are you doing up so late?” I asked. “I can’t sleep I want to know what’s happening. I want to help”.127

In tandem with the international, intermediate broker position adopted by the United States government, the effect of parallel processes elsewhere was influential. President Clinton’s role as facilitator the Oslo process in Israel–Palestine (Beilin 22004: 37) and the role of US Congress passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act to assist in the South African process (Guelke 1999: 138), helped set the atmosphere for the party elites, the aspirations for external recognition, and the lure of Nobel Peace Prizes.128

6.10 Conclusion

The counter-intuitive outcome of the GFA institutional arrangements and co-operation despite conflicting overall concerns can be explained by the incremental nature of the maximal bargain attempting to address core conflict concerns. The Agreement set the parameters for future discussions, borrowing from previous Agreements and modifying previously unsuccessful elements. The Agreement is a product of a series of arrangements, understandings and agreements reached prior to the signing of the multiparty talks. The GFA unlike the previous Agreements considered, seeks to embed the three fundamental dynamics – the configuration of the respective ethnic blocs, the tradition of elite accommodation and external resource dependence – into the functioning
of the GFA in order to constrain or regulate more effectively the effect these dynamics have on factional elites and the regulation of the conflict.

The Good Friday Agreement is formed and functions differently from the previous AIA as an inclusive, maximal agreement. Its aim is not solely a security arrangement but more an effort to address the essential features of the conflict. As such, it is not a minimal outcome. In addition, the configuration of the ethnic blocs is similar but sufficiently different to warrant greater examination. The AIA was an intergovernmental bargain. The Good Friday Agreement is also an intergovernmental agreement with multilevel tiers of negotiations and arrangements. To add to the complexity, the British and Irish governments are proxy representatives and custodians for their within-bloc factional elites. The role of factional elite competition is implicit in the nature of the exclusive and limited AIA and becomes explicit or transparent in the GFA; the inclusive nature of this agreement is such that factional elites are included and participate in the negotiations specifically but not only in the first tier or strand, and as such are active factional elites of their respective blocs within Northern Ireland.

The inclusive nature of this agreement highlights the importance of the way in which ethnic blocs are configured and the way incumbent bloc elites accommodate challengers. These within-bloc elites are made transparent and required to engage in a consensus of sorts, obliging them to negotiate and represent their distinct factional interests within their own institutional tier. This situation arises by virtue of the previous minimal bargain arranged between the governments.

The proposition may be made that an inclusive, comprehensive maximal bargain can seek to integrate mechanisms to manage the influence of the configuration of the
blocs on incumbent elites' monopoly of autonomy within their respective blocs, and the way in which schismatic factionalism is accommodated. It can be argued that in this instance the fundamental problem of the within-bloc elite accommodation is modified by the overt participation on a distinct and separate track of negotiation.
7 Conclusion

7.1 The significance of within-bloc factionalism

This thesis argues that ethnic groups function as oligopolistic markets. Existing and anticipated within-bloc factional elite competition influences inter-ethnic bargaining and shapes the minimal or comprehensive nature of the bargain reached. This classification challenges conventional descriptions of inter-ethnic blocs as unitary actors. It counters traditional elite-driven conflict regulation perspectives of fixed and functioning ethnic-bloc elites and argues that ethnic blocs are not monoliths but rather more complex configurations. Rather than cohesive unitary actors, ethnic blocs are instead described as amalgams, clusters of associations that possess their own interests (Barak 2002, McAllister 1983). These 'ethnic entrepreneurs' or factional elites compete to gain the monopoly of legitimacy within the ethnic bloc in order to promote and realise their own preferences (Kasfir 1979: 372). It has been argued that the perils of political fragmentation and unleashing within-bloc dynamics into the field of negotiated peace agreements are necessary evils. The residual hope is that viewing negotiated peace agreements as a process of intra- as well as inter-ethnic bargaining provides for a better understanding of what motivates incumbent factional leaders to arrive at particular agreements and what prescriptive recommendations follow for conflict regulation theorists and practitioners. The study of within-bloc factional competition addressing the configuration of ethnic blocs, the pattern of elite accommodation, and external resource
dependence, stoops not to folly but to conquer the understanding of what influences ethnic elite incentives in negotiating inter-ethnic agreements (Goldsmith 1911: 11, 219). \(^1\)

Following Lake and Rothchild:

In formulating political strategies, ethnic leaders anticipate the consequences of their within group-choices for relations with other groups and, in turn, incorporate the effects of their between group-choices into plans for dealing with their ethnic kin. These intergroup and intragroup interactions are intimately and necessarily integrated. Together, the choices made in these two arenas can combine to create a vicious circle that threatens to pull multiethnic societies into violence. (Lake and Rothchild 1998: 7)

The course of inter-ethnic negotiations never did run smooth (Gellner 1983: 58). Acknowledging intra-ethnic competition and the fractious and dynamic nature of ethnic blocs creates greater transparency. This, in turn, provides for the recognition of ethnic blocs as institutionalised social relationships. At the behest of Horowitz (1985, 2000: 574) a greater consideration of the factional constraints imposed on bloc elite autonomy and the nature of within-bloc accommodations (Lijphart et al. 1999) illustrates the importance of elite-based mechanisms employed to maintain the leadership latitude or autonomy of an incumbent bloc elite. Within-bloc considerations reveal how elites compete for the monopoly of ideology, legitimacy and mobilisation of the bloc in a divided society where ethnic cleavages create vertical conflict and undermine any centralised notion of a state monopoly of violence (Gellner 1981: 753). Divided societies in divided territories with pervasive ethnic conflict tend to be weakly institutionalised political systems, where political legitimacy is low and an incumbent leader's ability to
preside over a bloc 'depends on how well he wields patron-client networks' (Bienen and Van De Walle 1991: 7, Snyder 1998: 64). The elites' quest for identification and often explicit recognition as the bloc leadership is inextricably linked to legitimacy (Horowitz 2002: 195). Legitimacy, in turn, is used to secure latitude or autonomy (Horowitz 2000: 574). Legitimation occurs 'first within blocs and only secondly between them', suggesting that legitimation is a 'private game' (Barker 2001: 31, 68). The desire of elites to maintain the monopoly of legitimacy within their respective blocs provides a greater understanding of why it is that 'the conditions that encourage groups to initiate negotiations and sign settlements do not appear sufficient to bring peace' (Walter 1997: 336). The orientation of legitimacy sought, whether elites seek the means to better represent 'the general will of the people' or the 'tyranny of the majority' shapes the nature of the agreement reached. The legitimacy preference of the elite is shaped in turn by within-bloc determinants. The prescriptive consequences of legitimacy preferences in shaping the nature of agreements are considered below. In sum, the failure to examine the ceaseless competition, bargaining and coercion within an ethnic bloc and the influence of within-bloc dynamics limits and constrains conflict regulation theories (Barak 2002: 621).
7.2 Argument

Analysis of (1) the configuration of the ethnic bloc, (2) traditional mechanisms of within-bloc competition and (3) external resource dependence predisposes protagonists, analysts and policy-makers to consider the ways in which intra-ethnic bargaining, like coalition bargaining between political parties, tends to occur ‘in the shadow of the future’ (Lupia and Strom 2003). The incentive for an incumbent bloc elite to reach a minimal security bargain with an enduring inter-ethnic rival shapes inter- and intra-ethnic bloc dynamics. The importance of external resources and third parties as custodians, guarantors or occasional spoilers of bargains (MacGinty and Darby 2002: 106, Stedman 2003: 104), once recognised, can assist in creating viable expectations as to whether negotiated agreements are signed as a means of addressing core conflict concerns and eliciting inter-ethnic peace, or rather inter-ethnic accommodations and co-operative containment (O’Duffy 1996: 285) mechanisms that seek to address a ‘common foe’ or mutual threat. These attempts to curtail schismatic and open within-bloc competition, or pervasive and closed factionalism that threatens to undermine the incumbent bloc leadership’s legitimacy, are readily confused with comprehensive, credible peace agreements in tandem with associated peace dividend expectations. Recognising the influence of these factional dynamics on elite incentives in negotiating inter-ethnic bloc accommodations contributes to the literature on elite-driven conflict regulation perspectives. The cases considered in this study illustrate the role of intra-factional dynamics on elite incentives, and the way in which negotiated agreements are framed.
7.3 Empirical cases considered

The four cases selected have produced a ‘high volume of research and commentary’ usually as single case studies (Darby and MacGinty 2003: 2). This research charts the role of within-bloc competition in both the Northern Ireland and Israeli–Palestinian cases over two consecutive and decisive negotiated Agreements with the latter Agreements forming the basis of simultaneous peace processes.

First the Camp David Accords and later the Oslo Accords allude to comprehensive peace but go no further than establishing bilateral security regimes consciously excluding a shared threat. In the Camp David Accords, the shared Egyptian and Israeli threat was the PLO. Attempts at a comprehensive peace arrangement addressing the problem of peace in the Middle East were initiated at the Geneva Conference. Preferring to exclude grand, inclusive negotiations, the signatories opted instead to contain the parameters of the negotiations to minimal security oriented concerns.

The ‘cold peace’ that followed from Camp David between Egypt and Israel reflected the functional nature of the bilateral security bargain between the two states and the limitations imposed on the prospects or potential for a comprehensive inclusive peace. The PLO had strengthened its position between the 1973 war and the Camp David bargain. Increasing recognition of the PLO was perceived to have aggravated deadlock in the political process (Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna 1981). Egyptian president Sadat referred to ‘the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’, in his speech to the Israeli
Knesset, excluding any reference to the PLO. The Arab states’ joint recognition of the PLO was undermined by the signing of the Camp David Accords, which ‘addressed’ the Palestinian problem without any reference to the PLO. The PLO responded by adopting a dual approach: a military strategy aimed at undermining the Geneva and Camp David process and deterring potential participants and a political strategy of moderation and readiness to participate in future negotiations.

The PLO imposed a symbolic political boycott on the Sadat regime, and began assassinating PLO members prepared to communicate or ‘collaborate’ in peace talks or negotiations. PLO military activities were directed first against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, later against Egypt and Israel, the goal being to reassert the legitimacy of the incumbent leadership and curtail challenges to its position weakened by the Egyptian–Israeli bargain. Once the Accords were signed, the PLO leadership maintained its office in Cairo, escalating PLO opposition fears that Arafat was playing a double game. Attempting to initiate a role for the leadership, Arafat met a US representative and stated that the PLO were ready to end the armed struggle and recognise Israel de facto if an independent Palestinian state with a corridor between the West Bank and Gaza would be established (Sayigh 1997: 441). Egypt’s claim to represent the Palestinians, yet, in the bargaining omitted any mention of Gaza for fear the Israelis might acquiesce and return Gaza, with its substantive Palestinian refugee population and problems to Egyptian control. Both states were happy to equivocate over core Palestinian concerns in favour of their core security preferences. As custodian to the Agreement, the US, inclined to advocate an Israeli preference competed, with the USSR which was sympathetic to the Arab states, to facilitate broker an accommodation. Unrelenting in its initial commitment
to create an inclusive agreement, the US appeased PLO concerns with the Vienna talks where Arafat was engaged in sterile negotiations with the Austrian chancellor and Willy Brandt (Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna 1981: 10). The only part of the Camp David Accords implemented was the Egyptian–Israeli bilateral agreement. Efforts to address the core conflict concerns of the Palestinian question were overlooked. However, Arafat rejected the Camp David (1) Accords of 1979, not because of the failure to address the Palestinian question but rather because ‘nothing was offered personally to me’ (Amoz Elon 1996: 22–30).

The later Oslo Accords were also formulated on the basis of co-operative containment of a shared threat. In this instance, the PLO and the Israeli government shared the common foe, with the emergence of the Islamic Hamas movement in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza. The escalating violence of the Intifada had repercussions for factional competition within and between the Israeli and Palestinian blocs. The initiative for thorough, comprehensive peace negotiations in Washington, under the auspices of the United States government, was curtailed as the incumbent elites’ preference for a bilateral secret arrangement became increasingly tangible. Hamas, as the common foe of both the PLO and the Labour-led Israeli government, was the motivation behind the Oslo negotiations. The PLO representatives consoled themselves with the thought that the Israeli incentive to negotiate was not solely security: ‘I am sure you won’t decide that the entire West Bank is a security area’ (Savir 1998: 33). The PLO leadership was losing its legitimacy among Palestinians, for civil society leaders and notables within the West Bank and Gaza, known as ‘insiders’, as well as for the Islamic Hamas movement. The Palestinian bloc within the Occupied Territories was
mobilised behind either the ‘insiders’, the secular Palestinian elite, or behind Hamas, the religious organisation that gleaned substantial support at universities in the Occupied Territories; the Hamas appeal was that ‘whereas the PLO fill their pockets, the Islamists fill their brains and hearts’.5

Factionalism dominated PLO leadership preferences during the twin-track secret negotiations in Oslo. After months of deliberation and tacit agreement on the return of the PLO leader Yasser Arafat to the West Bank and the creation of a Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian negotiators had a list of 25 recognition guidelines for Israel:

I don’t know what they [the recommendations] were, but basically we [Israelis] should acknowledge that everything that we had done has been a crime, these were 25 points to really get them [Israelis] at their throats, they [the recommendations] were all kinds of bullshit, [formulated] in a way to antagonise.6

The bargaining over the Palestinian recognition points threatened to put the negotiations all but at an end. When it was feared and threatened that Israel would withdraw from the negotiations, the Palestinians moved on 23 of the 25 points. The two final outstanding issues were deemed to be irresolvable. The Israeli negotiators anticipated an end to the negotiations without achieving an agreement:

Then something very peculiar happened and that was when we [Israeli party to the negotiations] had marching orders [from Israel] over where to give in and where not. The Palestinians made difficulties. We didn’t move too much ahead and then suddenly they [the Norwegian facilitators] tell us ‘Abu Allah is writing his ceremonial speech!’ There was silence. That was the end of our [Israeli]
concessions we never gave in [on] what we could have... because we were angry, really angry. 7

The PLO leadership’s desire to return to its support base before it found its power usurped is symptomatic of the excluded position of the PLO and its preparedness to negotiate with the ‘enemy’. In addition, the lure of Israeli recognition and associated external sponsorship, along with the dividends of external recognition influencing the PLO leadership’s need for greater ‘latitude’ and legitimacy took primacy over core conflict concerns. Declining external resources as well as internal legitimacy problems influenced the PLO leadership’s choice. Increasingly schismatic factionalism rendered the Israeli government the dominant bargaining partner and maintenance of the core conflict considerations were if anything a secondary initiative for the negotiating parties.

Yossi Beilin’s account of the initial plans for the signing of the Joint Declaration of Principles provides an insight into the way in which a minimal pact morphed into more than the sum of its parts. Originally, plans were made for the agreement to be signed in Washington with Shimon Peres of Israel and Faisal Husseini the leader of the Palestinian delegation at the Washington talks that had ended abruptly and in failure. It was initially believed that ‘it was too much for Rabin and the Israeli public to have an event with Arafat... Israel was not ready to see Arafat celebrated at the White House’ (Ross 2004: 119). As Beilin observes, ‘[t]he signature of Peres and Abu Mazen on a five-year interim agreement with many question marks would definitely have been interesting and unusual, but it would not have amazed the world’ (Beilin 2004: 37). The Oslo Accord much like its predecessor the Camp David Accord was not more than the sum of its parts.
In both instances, letters of mutual recognition formed the basis of these Accords, upon which the tentative assertions toward peace were added as something of an afterthought without a fixed schedule or implementation guidelines. In both the Camp David and Oslo Accords, prescriptive peace proposals are postponed. Conversely, in comprehensive peace agreements that attempt to address core conflict concerns, detailed, comprehensive and thorough documents, with (provisional) dates for implementation are negotiated and signed (de Varennes 2003: 151).  

The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was far from an ‘all-singing, all-dancing final constitutional settlement’. Instead, it established a bilateral security regime consciously excluding a shared threat, while also addressing pervasive factionalism within the respective British and Irish blocs. In addition, intergovernmental co-operation was institutionalised at Maryfield providing a mechanism hitherto unworkable: ‘Rather than working towards changing the status quo, the imperative was to make the status quo work with new structures North and South.’ The Agreement was framed by a recurrent British ‘argument of what the hell will happen if we don’t do something’ and an Irish position of ‘something must be done’, as well as a feeling that ‘it doesn’t really matter what you agree about as long as you agree on something’. Combined, these concerns resulted in limited inter-ethnic elite accommodation of core British security concerns and specific Irish constitutional changes with an eye toward future within-bloc competition.

The Irish bloc’s proposal for a New Ireland Forum originated as a ‘Nationalist Council’ initiated by SDLP leader John Hume. The Taoiseach stole the clothes of the SDLP-proposed Council and created an inclusive forum to include all the Irish political parties, providing a vehicle for the inclusion of unionist parties, however unlikely, while
successfully excluding Sinn Féin from the Forum. The Irish government’s objective in agreeing to the bargain was to illustrate that ‘it was possible to get results from politics rather than violence, the objective was to get them [Sinn Féin] to realise that they had to think in terms of ballot box and not the armalite’. The British government’s preference for greater security was accompanied by the need to contain the influence of Ulster Unionism. Even some Unionists felt that they would be forced by the British government to *thole* some unpalatable consequences (Aughey 1989: 51). The exclusive and partial nature of the Agreement suffered, however, in implementation. The creation of a new security regime in tandem with extensive Irish government commitments to co-ordination and co-operation with the British government over cross-border issues created a bilateral security regime with institutional (Maryfield) surrounds, and enabled by British government deference towards the US and gentle American massaging of the British Prime Minister. The core purpose of the agreement – namely to encourage the Republican movement to rethink its armalite and ballot box strategy – paid dividends. While the intergovernmental and exclusive nature of the Agreement negated any illusion of an inter-ethnic comprehensive peace, the path dependent concordat elements of intergovernment collaboration instituted links, which would later prove instrumental in the creation of a comprehensive bargain.

The Good Friday or Belfast Agreement attempted ‘conflict transformation’ by addressing core conflict concerns (Ledarach 1997). The ‘remarkably comprehensive’ (MacGinty and Darby 2002: 1) double annexation of two agreements, one addressing the multi-party concord dealing with constitutional issues, the second with British-Irish interstate dimensions (Hadfield 2001: 84), sets the Agreement apart from the other cases
considered. Much like a wedding cake, the three-tiered feature of the inclusive overall agreement provides a tier for all protagonists and participants to share in prompt and practical peace incentives readily and immediately available. A penultimate, bridging tier addresses pending peace issues and associated concerns. Finally, a top tier associated with permanent peace, its consumption delayed until peace could be prescribed (or christened).

The distinctive nature of the agreement reached, while not without its hurdles, represents the most thorough attempt at conflict regulation of all the cases studied. Rather than address security, law and order policing or control the Good Friday Agreement addressed profound issues which had been ‘lumbering and slumbering on for seventy years’. The Good Friday Agreement adopted institutional mechanisms from the EU (Guelke 2001: 258, Walker 2001: 133), to improve the ‘socialising effect’ of the agreement on the elites and their constituents (Taylor 1996: 76). Guarantees, defined as the hallmark of the agreement, were made with the leaders of states as well as with ethnic or religious communities; the Agreement increased the perceived value of collaboration (Horowitz 2002: 196, O’Leary 2001: 49). The role of state custodians and guarantors mitigates the conventional dynamics of horizontal communication among elites rather than vertical accommodation between elites and bloc membership in power-sharing agreements (Fisher and Keashley 1991, Tsebelis 1990: 159). Initiating the Agreement and framing it in this way circumvented the tendency for consociations to lead to inaction over controversial issues when ruling elites lack the ‘political will’, capacity or leadership latitude to remedy problems (Lijphart 1969: 215). The Good Friday Agreement mobilised bloc memberships as well as elites with plebiscites on the Agreement in
Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland attempting to create ‘sufficient consensus’ and making implementation failure costly for political party leaders (MacGinty and Darby 2001: 167, Mitchell 2001: 30). Neither wholly domestic nor solely international, the agreement is constructed to address the challenges ethnic conflict poses for conventional perceptions of state sovereignty (Ruane and Todd 1999: 63).

7.4 Prescriptive potential

The Good Friday Agreement reflects many of the features of modern divided societies, and the accommodations required to address them. Like the Good Friday settlement, modern conflict regulation agreements tend to be multi-party rather than bilateral with associated veto consequences regulated by ‘sufficient consensus’ within institutions modelled to facilitate transition and long-term peace objectives (Darby 2003: 251).21

Replicating all the facets of the Good Friday Agreement in order to regulate other conflicts is unlikely. The configuration of actors, proposals and preferences in the Northern Ireland case, combined with the hidden hand of previous historical accommodations and inter-ethnic bargains (Lijphart 1977) conducive to the Good Friday Agreement suggests the nature of the bargain, or terms of settlement are tailored to match the particular problems of Northern Ireland (Rothchild 2002: 117, Sisk 2003: 148). Other elements flatter the form of the Belfast Agreement, for example the absence of ‘winner-takes-all mentality’ among the majority ethnic bloc (Lijphart 2002: 108) elsewhere allude
to some of the specific, non-transferable elements of the Northern Ireland bargain as a cure-all for divided societies elsewhere (Horowitz 2002: 220).

Despite the specificities of the Northern Ireland case, and ongoing implementation problems with the Agreement, resulting in a protracted peace process, the Good Friday Agreement has nevertheless been promoted as a promising blueprint for conflict regulation. In the same vein the South African National Peace Accord of 1991 and the subsequent Agreement for Reconciliation and Peace of 1994 heralded the transition from Apartheid toward a new South Africa (Harvey 2001). In this case transformation required the weaving together of existing ethnic cleavages while instituting cross cutting cleavages to benefit issue based political parties. The sectarian nature of the Apartheid system negated a power-sharing arrangement based on ethnic bloc representation in tandem with that adopted in Northern Ireland. The 1993 interim constitution rejected a post-apartheid ethnically based power-sharing system, opting instead for the building blocs of the political system to be built anew. Consequentely, integrative power-sharing mechanisms to sustain the transition toward a united non racial democratic South Africa were adopted (Sisk 2003: 139) to accommodate the core conflict concerns central to the South African case.

The Good Friday Agreement has altered Northern Ireland’s divided society with credible attempts to address core conflict concerns. The Northern Ireland conflict is transformed, the change manifest in a marked reduction in violence, with (some) protagonists resolved to ‘take the war to the classroom’. Advocating politics as the continuation of war by other means suggests substantive conflict transformation, the problems of faithful implementation not withstanding (Scharpf 1997: 116). The
persistent problems associated with the Good Friday Agreement, foremost the issue of paramilitary weapons\textsuperscript{24} amplify the role of political actors and the way in which they interpret their situation (Ruane and Todd 2001: 923). The Belfast initiative also suggests that sustainable political institutions be forged to contain conflict and sustain elite commitment.

Critically, the Good Friday Agreement’s institutional arrangements, rules and principles are associated with a concept of sovereignty tailored to address the most pressing issues in the Northern Ireland conflict. The novelty of this bargain is the way in which it addresses some of the conventional constraints sovereignty imposes on the management of ethnic conflict. Regulating longstanding ‘sons of the soil’ wars typically involving conflict over land (Fearon 2004: 275) is often hindered by competing sovereignty claims over (divided) territories and (contested) borders. The comprehensive nature of the Good Friday Agreement provides a modern and previously multilateral intergovernmental regime solution to the sovereignty issue.

The Solomon’s baby like sovereignty dilemma was created by the international nation-state norm. The traditional Westphalian view of sovereignty forms the locus of the realist view of the international system and is based on the principles of territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures. In the Northern Ireland case these core elements of sovereignty are mediated by the institutional and procedural features of the Good Friday Agreement. Rather than view sovereignty as an absolute, the Agreement creates mechanisms for the mediation of the conflict created out of the necessity for sovereignty.

Following Krasner:
The term sovereignty has been commonly used in at least four different ways: domestic sovereignty, referring to the organization of public authority within a state and to the level of effective control exercised by those holding authority; interdependence sovereignty, referring to the ability of public authorities to control transborder movements; international legal sovereignty, referring to the mutual recognition of states or other entities; and Westphalian sovereignty, referring to the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configurations. These four meanings of sovereignty are not logically coupled, nor have they covaried in practice (Krasner 1999: 9).

Westphalian and international legal sovereignty exclusively refer to issues of authority, while interdependence and domestic sovereignty refer to uses of control. These distinctions parallel the different types of legitimacy sought by elites. The novelty of the Good Friday Agreement lies in its re-writing of the absolutist notion of sovereignty. The Agreement recognised that a political entity’s control over transborder movements, its domestic authority and control, international recognition and the autonomy of domestic structures do not always go hand in hand, and that the rules of sovereignty can be ‘traded’ (O’Duffy and Githens Mazer 2002: 125). While formal British and Irish co-sovereignty has not been established through the Agreement (O’Leary 1998: 3) it sets in place a double protection for the Nationalist and Unionist communities. The Agreement establishes credible governmental guarantees by way of a consensual concordat, to institute an intergovernmental policy network over Northern Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement recognises that much like nation-states and ethnic blocs the notion of sovereignty is not a black box.

Consequently, the broader application of the Good Friday Agreement findings for the regulation of similar cases and contemporary peace agreements (Darby and
MacGinty 2003: 245) lies in a greater understanding of the utility of within-bloc dynamics or what Madison describes as 'the evils of factions', addressed in this study.

### 7.5 Implications

The three variables of ethnic-bloc configuration, patterns of elite accommodation, and external resource dependence, explain bloc elites' incentives to reach minimal or comprehensive agreements. Suggesting that bargaining in the shadow of the future combines two elements of legitimacy, input and output-oriented legitimacy. Scharpf observes;

> Trust in institutional arrangements that are thought to ensure that governing processes are generally responsive to the manifest preferences of the governed (input legitimacy, 'government by the people') and/or that the policies adopted will generally represent effective solutions to common problems of the governed 'output legitimacy' government for the people. Taken together these two types of arguments constitute the core notions of democratic legitimacy (Scharpf 2003: 5).

Borrowing from Scharpf this suggests that agreements vary not only in the relative emphasis they place on structures and procedures supporting input-oriented and output-oriented legitimacy arguments, but within the context of output-oriented considerations, they also vary in the relative emphasis placed on power constraining versus action-enabling features (Scharpf 2003: 3). It follows, that the nature of the agreement reached or the 'modality of compromise' is dependent upon legitimacy (Krasner 1999: 26). The degree of elite compliance reflects bargaining preferences and incentives shaped by the
factors determining their legitimacy. Scharpf argues that input and output oriented legitimacy arguments can be assessed at three levels: specific policy processes, characteristics of government and characteristics of the regime. Similarly, inter-ethnic elite bargains can be assessed by examining the configuration of the respective ethnic blocs, the pattern of elite accommodation and the dependence on external resources. The nature of factional bargaining relates to input oriented legitimacy common in all the cases considered. In the Camp David and Oslo Accords mutual recognition was desired for the signatories in securing greater within-bloc leadership latitude. Output-oriented legitimacy tends to relate to the notion of good governance associated in this instance with the post bargain and agreement implementation environment. It refers to 'the future present', the incumbent bloc elites consider when bargaining (Lupia and Strom 2003). Inclusive comprehensive and credible Agreement models require incumbent elite and bloc endorsement, where the bloc memberships are often formally mobilised by referenda or plebiscite. In inclusive agreements a sufficient consensus between ethnic blocs is sought for collective output-oriented legitimacy, and is more readily applicable to bargains that require implementation to address core conflict concerns than minimal and limited security pacts.

In structural terms the minimal security oriented or maximal comprehensive nature of the inter-ethnic bargain reached needs to be understood as a joint-decision process, with negotiations an example of an extreme form of the multiple-veto constellation (Tsebelis 2002). From this perspective classifying an agreement as a minimal or security oriented pact in which incumbent bloc elites 'collude to exclude' a common foe, the style of the negotiation and the nature of the bargain would be 'bloody-
minded' and as Scharpf observes; 'one should expect a low capacity for effective action and frequent blockages' (Scharpf 2003: 12, 1997). Alternatively, when inter-ethnic bloc elite interactions are characterized by considerable commitment of negotiators to address core conflict concerns, mediation by meddling is limited, and credible guarantees are instituted to create an inclusive bargain.

Acknowledging the complex nature of sovereignty, legitimacy and ethnic blocs allows for: the delegation or pooling of sovereignty, the differing functions of input and output oriented legitimacy and the determining influences of factional within bloc dynamics on ethnic bloc elites. Between-bloc mobilisation and consensus is notoriously difficult to achieve when assumed that ethnic blocs are homogenous, all the more so when fractious ethnic blocs are recognised. In order to succeed, the outcome of the bargain and its implementation should be better, the transaction costs fewer, than would have been the case had the negotiations failed. Disaffection among ethnic-bloc elites once a comprehensive agreement has been signed and prior to implementation is reflected in the within-bloc controversies, ideological or otherwise as to whether better outcomes could have been achieved (Lindholm-Schulz, 1999, MacIntyre 2001: 202, Scharpf 1997: 189). The ramifications for the implementation of any comprehensive collaborative between-bloc agreement while protected by the authority structure provided by the guarantors or external guardians are once again dependent on the internal bloc dynamics of political accountability and conditions of elite accommodation and external resource dependence. Divisions within the Republican movement and the Ulster Unionist Party since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement reflect not only the pervasiveness of factionalism but also the comprehensive nature of the bargain reached. The Good Friday
Agreement is complex and exhaustive in character, with symmetry and parity of esteem afforded to the bargaining elite and devilish in detail. Conversely the Oslo Accords highlight a disparity of power, a lack of credible guarantees and textual ambiguity over all but security-oriented facets of the agreement. The Camp David Accords and Oslo Accords along with the Anglo-Irish Agreement are examples of security-oriented bargains with increasingly complex institutional surrounds; the Good Friday Agreement has transformed the Northern Ireland conflict and created a protracted peace. This thesis argues that within bloc factional induced incentives can assist with viable expectations as to whether the nature of inter-ethnic elite compromises are made to achieve a comprehensive, inclusive and credible maximal bargain or a co-operative containment arrangement that may over time result in a more credible peace arrived at piecemeal. The incremental nature of some bargains, in this case the Anglo-Irish Agreement illustrates that the nature of the Agreement reached is dependent upon within bloc factional dynamics. In attempting to address Walter’s question as to why it is that the conditions that encourage groups to initiate negotiations are not always conducive to implementing peace, this study examined the impact within bloc factional dynamics have on shaping elite incentives and the nature of the agreement reached whether security oriented and minimal or comprehensive and addressing core conflict concerns. The convenient ambiguity of security pacts saciate the incumbent elites need to maintain their monopoly of control or address schismatic fractionalism within their ethnic blocs, allowing them sufficient means to address a mutual threat with their enduring inter-ethnic bloc. Returning to Horowitz’s assertion ‘a principle limitation on interethnic cooperation is the configuration of intraethnic competition’, power prescribes the pursuit of peace.
## Interviews

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<td>Dempsey, Judy</td>
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<td>Wednesday 8 March 2000</td>
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<td>Thursday 12 February 2004</td>
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<td>Hirchfeld, Yair</td>
<td>Prof. Haifa University, Israeli Oslo Negotiator Haifa</td>
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<td>Inbari, Pinchas</td>
<td>Author Palestinians between Terrorism and Statehood, NGO leader and analyst Tel Aviv</td>
<td>Wednesday 11 August 1999</td>
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<td>Karim Qais Abdul</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine DFLP-PB Ramallah</td>
<td>Saturday 1 August 1999</td>
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<td>Friday 10 October 2003</td>
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<td>UUP, Glengall St Belfast</td>
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<td>McIntyre, Anthony &amp; Alex</td>
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<td>Wednesday 1 October 2003</td>
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<td>Israeli Academic, Haifa University</td>
<td>Sunday 5 September 1999</td>
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<td>Leader Republican Sinn Fein, Dublin and Roscommon</td>
<td>Monday 8 November 1998, Tuesday 17 November 1998</td>
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<td>Sunday 1 August 1999</td>
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<td>Rabah, Jamil</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Palestinian NGO JMCC East Jerusalem</td>
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<td>Reynolds, Albert</td>
<td>Former Taoiseach Leinster House Dublin</td>
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<td>Tuesday 16 September 2003</td>
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<td>Zoghbia, Hanan</td>
<td>Second Secretary Libyan Foreign Liaison Committee, Halki Greece</td>
<td>Friday 7 September 2001</td>
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Bibliography


Hazan, R. (1999b) Israel and the consociational model: religion and class in the Israeli party system, from consociationalism to consensualism to majoritarianism, in K.R. Luther and K. Deuschower (eds), Party Elites in Divided Societies. London: Routledge/ECPR.


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Notes

1 Introduction

2 See Fearon 1996, Lupia and Strom 2003 for more on ‘bargaining in the shadow of the future’.
4 Barry criticises Lijphart’s advocacy of solidary actor position.
5 The term ‘divided societies’ refers to an ethnic cleavage within a given political entity, the existence of divided territories in tandem with divided societies illustrates the contested nature of the territory within which the (often) numerous societies reside. I thank Brendan O’Leary for drawing my attention to this point.
13 The Sinn Fein leadership were aware of the PLO chairman’s address to the UN General Assembly though whether or not the similarity between the two speeches was conscious or merely a case of significant coincidence (see Jung 1960, 1968) is unclear. Interview 1 October 2004.
14 The governments are described in this bargaining instance as the incumbent ethnic bloc elite representatives. The British government asserted itself as representing the interests of the unionist bloc. In much the same way as the Egyptian government asserted itself as representing the interests of the Palestinian bloc in the Camp David agreements. While controversial in light of the subsequent ‘Ulster says no’ campaign, nevertheless the British government has sufficient autonomy to assert its legitimacy in this manner.
16 The Political Programme adopted at the 12th session of the Palestinian National Council on 8 June 1974 in Cairo came in the midst of the Helsinki Conference on East-West security relations and during the Geneva process to address the concerns of actors involved in the Middle East. For the full Palestinian programme see Abdal Hadi 1997: Vol. 1, p. 225.

2 Elite incentives and the role of factions

1 Ruane and Todd (2003) argue otherwise, suggesting that ethnic blocs are relatively fixed and not so easily subject to change.
2 Ruane and Todd (2003) argue otherwise, suggesting that ethnic blocs are relatively fixed and not so easily subject to change.
4 Institutional mechanisms for managing within bloc conflict extend beyond the political parameters to securing the autonomy of the elite by administering ‘civil administration’. Civil administration refers to a broad array of sanctions available to one elite and tacitly accepted by the elite of the opposing ethnic bloc. The sanctions are available to the leadership by virtue of their status and their monopoly of violence and allow for militarised elites to assert their leadership against internal challenge to maintain their monopoly.
5 Within bloc cleavages between Gaza and the West Bank in the Israeli-Palestinian case are clear. Equally significant is the religious cleavage between Northern and Southern West Bank. The southern region is more religious with political ramifications than the West Bank north of Al Quds (Jerusalem).
7 The rivalry between mainstream and non-mainstream factions reached its peak in 1979 when the LDP failed to coordinate on a candidate for the prime ministership. The PM Ohira retained sufficient support and eventually won but several months later the non-mainstream factions abstained themselves during a vote of no confidence, bringing down the government. Ohira decided to dissolve the Diet rather than relinquish his position to a non-mainstream opponent and called an election in June 1980.
8 The threshold does not apply to racist parties such as the Kach party excluded from the Israeli Knesset parliament and associated with the extreme right organisation Eyal to which the assassin of Yitzak Rabin, Yigal Amin, was associated.
9 I am grateful to Paul Mitchell for pointing out that ethnic blocs are only ‘sometimes coalitions’. 339
Leadership phenomena can be distinguished from other power phenomena where power relations occur among members of the same bloc and these relations are based on bloc members' perceptions that the elite may, with reference to the bloc's activities, 'legitimately' prescribe behaviour patterns for them to follow (see Paige 1972: 7).

See Tshebelis (1990a: chapter 6), for a summary of the elite theorists and pluralist school approaches to the interaction between elite and mass relations in political decision-making.

Interview, Garret FitzGerald 26 July 1995.

Interview, Garret FitzGerald, 10 November 1998.

Interviews, Ruairi Ó Bhadháigh 8 and 17 November 1998.

Interview, Dermot Nally, 9 November 1998.

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Interview, Dermot Nally, 9 November 1998.

See Tsebelis (1990a: chapter 6), for a summary of the elite theorists and pluralist school approaches to the interaction between elite and mass relations in political decision-making.
22 On 13 September the US department of state explained officially that the status of the Palestinians must be settled in a comprehensive Arab–Israeli peace agreement. ‘The issue cannot be ignored if others are to be solved ... to be lasting, a peace agreement must be supported by all of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinians. This means that the Palestinians must be involved in the peacemaking process. Their representatives will have to be at Geneva for the Palestinian question to be solved.’ See Quandt 1986: 102.

23 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999.

24 Egypt’s association with the Soviet Union began in earnest in 1955 after the Israel’s Gaza incursion and after the 1956 collision of Israel, France and Britain over Suez.


29 Time magazine interview with Assad, 24 January 1977.

30 Interview, Abdul Karim Qais, 1 August 1999.

31 The outbreak of a brief border war between Egypt and Libya, 21–24 July 1977 increased Syria’s concern over the shift in Egyptian foreign policy.

32 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999.

33 Interview, Confidential Source, 12 February 2004.

34 The term Shillal is often referred to as Shilla.

35 Weizman had a close personal relationship with Sadat and Vice President Mubarak. Weizman forged such a strong working relationship with the Egyptian negotiators that after Sadat’s assassination he was a conduit during the Israel-Egyptian ‘cold peace’ even in a non-political capacity during his time as President.

36 Sadat’s negotiation with Israel had already resulted in the assassination of his close friend Youssef El Sibai in Nicosia, Cyprus in February 1978. The assassination resulted in an international incident when Egyptian Special Forces landed in Larnaka Cyprus to thwart the escape of the assassins. See Kamel 1986: 124.

37 The settlers from Yamit were relocated in Gaza and formed the basis of the current settlements. Interview, 12 February 2004.

38 Moshe Dayan hoped to redeem his position after the 1974 inquiry into the conduct of the Israeli government during the 1973 war. Dayan and Meir’s resignation resulted in the resignation of the 1974 government after one month and one day.

39 In 1961 the Herut party won 14 per cent of the vote (Luebbert 1986: 79).

40 Begin had been part of the National Unity Government representing the Herut faction of the Gahal party. Gahal was renamed Likud.

41 Begin advocated Dayan as minister in 1967: ‘We ourselves have some good candidates for this post. But we prefer a man from another party, as we want a national coalition, one that can lead the nation to war. And apart from that, Dayan is the right man in the right place.’ See Haber (1978: 267).

42 Interview, Boston, Thursday, 12 February 2004.

43 The Israeli electoral system adheres to a closed list system providing a modicum of control for the party leader (see Lijphart 1999). Sharon’s creation of a separate list created open competition and a challenge to the party leadership at this time.

44 Interview, Confidential Source, 12 February 2004.

45 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999.

46 See the Framework West Bank and Gaza, section A, 1 (a) of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, 17 September 1978.

47 Interview, Confidential Source, 12 February 2004.

4 Hamas, elite necessity and the Oslo bargain: the 1993 Oslo Accord as an inter-ethnic elite pact

1 The Accord defers discussion concerning core conflict issues to a series of interim agreements and final-status negotiations.

2 Interview, Khalil Shikaki, 3 August 1999.

3 The Declaration of Principles on interim self-government provided a Palestinian interim self-governing authority, including an elected Council for the Palestinian people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a transitional period not to exceed five years.
Immediately after his return from the White House signing of the Accords Arafat declared, ‘the Intifada continues’, a call was made simultaneously for a strike in East Jerusalem.

Letter 2 of the PLO and Israel Letters of Mutual Recognition signed 9 September 1993.

The withdrawal began on 4 May 1994 and the permanent status talks began 4 May 1996.

UNSCR 242 of 22 November 1967 has been repeatedly referred to as the principal agreed basis for the solution to the Middle East conflict. Declared after the 1967 war, it calls for ‘withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict to clear and recognised boundaries’.

UNSCR 338 of 22 October 1973 ended the 1973 Yom Kippur war and called upon the parties to ceasefire and implement UNSCR 242.

The Articles pertaining to issues of Security and the creation of the interim self governing authority are Articles 3, 4, 5, 8, 13, 14 and Annex I and II of the Accords.

The creation of a police force of Palestinians from ‘inside’ the West Bank and Gaza and ‘outside’, namely expelled PLO fighters returning from Tunis, was an important regulatory device. See Gordon Peake, Policing Peace: Learning from Experiences in the Palestinian Authority and Kosovo, MESA paper, 24 November 2002, Tucson, Arizona.

The younger generation of Palestinians born after the 1967 war and referred to as the Takbir.

Islamic Jihad translates as the marriage of Islam and the gun; a splinter group from the Muslim Brotherhood prior to Hamas Islamic Jihad was more radical and militaristic than Hamas purported to be.


The PLO was established in 1964 and was quickly dominated by Fateh, the largest faction which, with the assistance of the 1967 war and subsequent weakening of the neighbouring Arab governments, rapidly achieved the largest share of the seats in the Palestinian National Congress. Initially ambivalent towards the PLO, Fateh recognised the value of Arab legitimacy afforded to it.

The Muslim Brotherhood represented the Pan-Islamic dimension of the Palestinian bloc; it became a weaker counter to the pan-Arab secular nationalism monopolised by the PLO, and as such was excluded from the PLO umbrella and often disregarded. The secular nature of the PLO from its formation in 1958 became one of Fateh’s guiding principles; that and autonomy from and recognition by established (Arab) state actors in determining the form and purpose of Palestinian political institutionalisation (Sayigh 2000: 206).

The PLO departments were increasingly staffed with Fateh members, establishing Fateh’s dominance in PLO institutions.

However, Article 25 of the Hamas charter states the following: ‘Hamas reassures its [the nationalist movement’s] members and victors that [it] is a moral and jihadic movement … hates opportunism and does … not go after material gain nor personal fame, nor reward of people’. Article 27 continues, ‘[T]he Palestinian Liberation Organisation is closest of the close to the Islamic Resistance movement, in that it is the father, the brother, the relative, or friend … Our nation is one, plight is one, destiny is one, and our enemy is the same … See Maqdsi 1993: 130.

The ensuing conflict led to within bloc fighting and the adoption of a dual policy for dealing with dissent. PLO departments were increasingly staffed with Fateh members, establishing Fateh’s dominance in PLO institutions.

However, Article 25 of the Hamas charter states the following: ‘Hamas reassures its [the nationalist movement’s] members and victors that [it] is a moral and jihadic movement … hates opportunism and does … not go after material gain nor personal fame, nor reward of people’. Article 27 continues, ‘[T]he Palestinian Liberation Organisation is closest of the close to the Islamic Resistance movement, in that it is the father, the brother, the relative, or friend … Our nation is one, plight is one, destiny is one, and our enemy is the same … See Maqdsi 1993: 130.

Interview, 13 July 1999.

The Fateh Tamzin or youth movement led by Marwan Barghoutti until his arrest in 2001.

Interview, Khalid Amyreh, 13 July 1999.

Ibid. Despite its Islamic origins, Hamas sought to minimise ideological distance between itself and the PLO factions. Hamas shared an ideological proximity to Fateh (excluding its secular stance). Affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas formed the hub of civic life in Gaza, filling the vacuum created amid Israeli suppression of the PLO and large-scale detentions of PLO affiliated Palestinians.
36 The Israeli policy of excluding the PLO was bolstered by the 1979 Israeli decision at Camp David and prompted by the search for alternatives to the PLO (Sayigh 1999: 629), to allow official registration of the Islamic complex while refusing permission for a secular university (MER 1993: 181). The Muslim Brotherhood established an Israeli authorised Islamic University founded with PLO assistance. In 1985-86, the PLO leadership attempted to gain control of the university by blocking payments from the higher education council which it dominated, and when that policy failed, established a branch of al-Azhar University.

37 Inbari argues that the DFLP established the UNC, Mishal and Sela omit the pervasive factional control of the DFLP and attribute the creation of the UNC to Fateh directly.

38 In a worrying development for the Tunis leadership often by the UNC 'inside' the West Bank and Gaza and in defiance of the leadership in Tunis. Alternatively, pamphlets were signed by the UNC with the PLO signature first signalling a Tunis led directive.

39 The leaflet war escalated the degree to which pamphlets morphed into one another and secular Tunis leadership pamphlets cited Koranic verses with the same frequency of Hamas, as Fateh sought to retain its monopoly over ideology. Namely, the ability to manipulate the image of one's own organisation and that of the challenger not only in the minds of the other Arab elites (Walt 1990: 149) but also to the occupants of the West Bank and Gaza and was deemed a crucial source of power.

40 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999

41 Unlike the PLO factions within the West Bank and Gaza (known as those 'inside'), removing the leaders did not decapitate Hamas (Khalidi 2002: 93). When more than 250 Hamas leaders were interned, a complete leadership replacement was established (Sayigh 1999). In contrast to the centralised structure of the bureaucratised PLO, when the initial Hamas leadership of Sheikh Yassin and six others increased, the overall leadership of Hamas was entrusted to a decentralised majlis shura or consultative council from both inside the West Bank and Gaza and from Amman and Damascus (Abu-Amr 1993: 14).

42 Interview, Nabil Awaid, 4 August 1999.

43 Interview, Karim Qais Abdul, 1 August 1999

44 In August 1989, Arafat established two new posts, Fateh commander in chief and chairperson of the central committee, the votes for which were conducted separately from the election of the new central committee. Arafat was duly recorded as having been selected with a unanimous ovation to hold both posts (Sayigh 1999: 632-3).

45 Interview, Khalid Amyreh, 13 July 1999.


47 Interview, Hadr, Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999.

48 The leadership attempted to endorse the perception domestically and internationally that it was indispensable to the resolution of this and every crisis; see Guelke (1999: 38).

49 Arafat pleaded with the US via the local Palestinian negotiators in Washington to curtail the funding of Hamas but to no avail.

50 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999.

51 The National Religious Party contained the land of Israel movement and advocated the maintenance of occupied land.

52 Gush Emunim is 'the bloc of the faithful'.

53 In the initial year of the uprising, the Israeli Defence Force's (IDF) response was characterised by confusion, bewilderment and an inability to act decisively (Hroub 2000: 201).

54 Interview Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999; Interview Yoav Tsiddon-Chatto 15 September 1999.

55 When the conflict escalated, Israel initially initiated legal proceedings against shopowners who adhered to strikes initiated by the Intifada's United National Command (UNC) of Palestinian groups.

56 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999.

57 For an analysis of changing Israeli initiatives prior to Camp David, see also Ryan 1983.

58 The kidnapping involved two Hamas operatives wearing skullcaps and offering two hitchhiking IDF soldiers a lift when they were subsequently killed and buried. It was the first example of a tactical shift for Hamas and the first armed assault of which Hamas was accused Interview Graham Usher 15 July 1999.

59 The document arrived at was the 'Outline for Advancement of Negotiations between Likud and the PLO'.

60 In 1986, $35 million was collected in permits and fees and travel taxes at the Jordan River bridges. The Bank of Israel reported that in the first year the Intifada cost Israel $650 million in export losses, reduced business sector production by 1.5 per cent, reduced Israel's trade surplus with the territories, and produced $180 million in nationally motivated arson Sayigh 1999.

61 Labour won 44 of the 120 parliamentary seats in the elections, Meretz with 12 seats and Shas with 6 seats. The 2-seat majority of the coalition was strengthened by the co-operation of the two Arab parties with a total of 5 parliamentary seats.

62 The territorial question in Israeli politics accounts in part for the uncodified nature of the Israeli constitution. Territoriality and the issue of how best to refer to God euphemistically referred to as 'the Rock' in Israeli documentation and the persistence of Israel's basic laws as the legal template of the state exemplify this division.

63 Interview, Salim Tamari, 14 September 1999.
This clash of religious approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict overlooks the large Christian Palestinian population.

The loan guarantees were required to assist in the accommodation of the newly arriving Soviet Jewish Alyiah.

Instead, a network of collaborators was established Hamas countered with lynching and public executions of collaborators.

Immediately prior to the signing of the Oslo II Accords, September 1995.

Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999.

66 Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999.

Instead, a network of collaborators was established Hamas countered with lynching and public executions of collaborators.

Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999.

Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999.

Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999.

Abu Allah, the leader of the Palestinian Oslo 'delegation' said, 'I see you have placed great emphasis on security, that is acceptable to the chairman [Arafat].' See Savir 1998: 37.

Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999.

Alyiah 3 September and Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999.

Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999.

Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999.

Interview, Martin Kramer 5 September 1999.

Interview, Ron Pandac, 6 September 1999.

Interview, Martin Sherman 5 September 1999; see also Savir 1998: 38.

Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999.

Interview, Martin Kramer 5 September 1999.

Interview, Martin Kramer 5 September 1999.

5 The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement: a minimal inter-ethnic elite bargain

The term security includes the military and political security situation within Northern Ireland as well as the political security or maintenance of the ethnic group elites positions.

Interview, Garret FitzGerald, 11 November 1998.

All interviews, Ray Bassett, Dermot Nally, Garret FitzGerald, November 9-11 1998.

Ibid.

Interview, Garret FitzGerald, 11 November 1998.

Interview, Garret FitzGerald, 11 November 1998.

The Progressive Democratic Party emerged from the Fianna Fail party after the signing of the AIA when Charles Haughey the incumbent leaders of Fianna Fail was rivalled for the party leadership by Des O'Malley.

Interview, 11 November 1998.

The principle of consent had been agreed upon by both governments in the Sunningdale Agreement of 1974. This was the first time the issue of consent had been agreed upon in an international intergovernmental agreement as opposed to a joint communiqué.

Article 2, Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985, Cmd. paper no 9657.

Article 2 (b) Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985.

Interview, Ray Bassett, 10 November 1998.

Interviews, Ray Bassett 10, November, Garret FitzGerald 11 November, and Fergus Finlay 18 November 1998.

Institute of Contemporary British History Witness Seminar archive of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 11 June 1997.

The wording 'a majority of the people' as opposed to 'the majority of the people' was crucial. Interview November 1998.

19 Interview, Dermot Nally, 9 November 1998.

The options were either power-sharing or an Irish government role in Northern Ireland but not both, see FitzGerald 1992: 516.

Mrs Thatcher quoted St Francis of Assisi on her election. See Dail debates Vol. 23, Column 1063, 29 May 1980.

Article 2 Bunreacht na hEireann, 1937 prior to amendment.

Interview, Dermot Nally, 9 November 1998.

25 Interview, confidential source.

26 Liberal Party, 1979, election manifesto: 'The real fight is for Britain'.

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See Fionnuala O'Connor, Argument Alarms Loyalists, *Irish Times* 13 March 1980, Loyalist members of the UDA believed that their existence would be used to bolster the contention that the Northern Ireland majority no longer determined to remain in the UK.

The unionist fear of deception emanated from Unionists experience of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1938 which attempted to remedy among other outstanding 1921 Treaty issues the question of Irish deep water ports for use by the British navy. Interview Douglas Hurd, 19 August 2003.

Interview, Peter Brooke 11 June 1999.

Interview, Douglas Hurd 19 August 2003.


Interview, Garret Fitzgerald, 11 November 1999.

All interviews, November 1998.

Interim draft of 1967 Constitutional Committee's report, submitted from the final report, the suggested amendment to Article 3 was 'The Irish nation hereby proclaims its firm will that its territory be re-united in harmony and brotherly affection between all Irishmen.' See Bowman (1989: 325).

The Constitution read as follows: Article 44.1.2 *The state recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens.*

The failure of the Stormont government to hold an inquiry into deaths caused by the security forces amidst violence and riots in July 1971 resulted in a change in SDLP policy from wishing to reform Stormont to rejection of the regime. This policy shift was in keeping with the increasing radicalisation of Nationalists as the violence increased and Westminster Government was called to intervene and abolish the Stormont regime.

Interview, Ruairí O'Bradaigh, 17 November 1998.

Fin Fein remained an abstentionist party only occasionally (1954) participating in elections. When asked to distinguish between Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, Barry Desmond TD replied, 'Them that know don't need to ask, and them that don't know don't need to know.'

Interview, David Andrews, 30 May 1998.

In addition, Article 29 recognised the principles of international law and rules of conduct, advocating a more pragmatic nationalist reading of the Constitution.

The passing of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, also known as the fourth Home Rule Act or Better Government of Ireland Act or 'Partition Act', was facilitated by Sinn Fein's policy of abstention from Westminster.


TD is the abbreviation of Teachta Dála and describes a member of the Dáil.

Interview, Ruairí Ó Bradaigh, 17 November 1998.

Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, Dublin, November 1981.

Seamus Mallon, 'No Bowing to the Armalite', *Furnight*, No. 190 January 1983 p.4

The term H-Block refers to the shape of the Long Kesh prison where the Republican prisoners were on hunger strike.

Tánaiste is the deputising Taoiseach usually responsible for foreign affairs in a coalition government.

The Garda or Irish Police force had withdrawn the Taskforce because it was seen as ineffectual; it was, however, perceived to be important to British security perceptions.

The results of the 1983 election not discussed thus far include: the Conservative party returned with 367 seats, Labour with 209 and the Liberals with 23 seats.

The Garda or Irish Police force had withdrawn the Taskforce because it was seen as ineffectual; it was, however, perceived to be important to British security perceptions.

‘Stand pat’ is traditionally used to refer to conservative Republicans in American history, as distinguished from progressive or incendiary Republicans.

Support for Irish Republicans spread across the Middle East. In Iran posters of Bobby Sands could be found in the streets of Tehran as the Ayatollah Khomeni and the newly established elites of the Iranian revolution made the most of Bobby Sands’s martyrdom; see Linenhall Library Troubled Images exhibition, Belfast. Similarly, in Israel, members of the PLO incarcerated in Israeli prisons went on hunger strike in sympathy with Republicans. Interview, 4 August 1999.

Interview confidential source.


The (Humphrey) Atkins plan was a half-hearted attempt by the Secretary of State to encourage the four main constitutional parties to a new constitutional conference; the UUP declined as did the initiative.


Belfast Newsletter, 2 November 1985, p. 22; see FitzGerald 1991: 563.


Belfast Newsletter, 20 October 1986.

Bureaucratic errors on both the British and the Irish sides resulted in suspects being arrested, released, and rearrested (Owens 1990: 68).

Interview, Douglas Hurd, 19 August 2003.


The by-elections because of their nature were not all contested by Nationalists, fringe or vulnerable unionist seats only were challenged. This needs to be taken into account when considering the drop in Sinn Fein support.

Interview, Ruairi O'Bradaigh 17 November 1998.

Belfast Telegraph, 13 October 1986.

Interviews, Dermot Nally November 9, Garret FitzGerald November 10 and Dick Spring 19 November 1998.

Garrett FitzGerald Interview 10 November 1998.

The Irish Foreign Minister would contact the Secretary of State to inform him of happening in Northern Ireland of which the Secretary of State was often unaware. Interviews, Dublin, 9, 10 and 19 November 1998; London, 19 August 2003.

6 The 1998 Good Friday Agreement: a comprehensive inter-ethnic elite pact

In this instance the unsaid is as significant as the said and the implicit consequences of equal significance to the explicit terms. See Iver B. Neumann The Double Arrival of Russia in International Society International Studies Association, New Orleans 2002.


Interviews, Mark Durkan 17 May 2000; Dermot Nally 9 November 1998.

The discussions prior to the Agreement were organised in three strands, and the term is used in the agreement to discern the differing elements and institutions created.

Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Strand Three, British-Irish Council No. 1.

O’Leary argues that the representatives of the Isle of Man and the Channel islands were not consulted in this regard. See O’Leary 1998.


The Democratic unionist Party (DUP) refused to participate in negotiations with Sinn Fein because of its associations with Republican paramilitaries. The DUP regularly refer to Sinn Fein as ‘Sinn Fein/IRA’.

The d'Hondt formula rule means that parties get the right to nominate ministers according to their respective strength in seats – no vote of confidence is required by the Assembly. It also means that parties get to choose, in order of their strength, their preferred ministers. See O’Leary (1998) and O’Leary (1999), Fordham Journal of International Law 22 1628–67.

The UKUP advocated greater integration of Northern Ireland within the union, opposed negotiating with Sinn Fein, and subsequently the Good Friday Agreement. The party later split creating the Northern Ireland unionist Party. It is currently a one-man party led by Robert McCartney MP.

14 See endnote no. 110 below for cross community support for Dr. Mowlam’s efforts in Northern Ireland. Interviews
with previous Secretaries of State corroborate that Mo Mowlam managed to endear herself to the majority of the people
if not a minority of politicians Interview Patrick Mayhew June 9 1999.
15 This proposal followed at the same time as the Campaign for a Devolved Parliament which proposed joint
community responsibility in Northern Ireland in its proposition document A Better Deal Together, 1986. See Linnenhall
Library NIPC P4586.
17 Interviews, PArtick Mayhew 9 June and Peter Brooke 11 June 1999.
18 Interview, Peter Brooke, 11 June 1999.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Interview Peter Brooke 11 June 1999
22 The experience of Oliver Miles in Libya was to prove helpful at a time when the Republican movement had gained
military backing from the Libyan Ghadaffi regime.
24 This communication had suffered amid the heightened security problems in 1987, this back channel was described in
Freudian error as the ‘back passage’.
25 The phrase ‘selfish strategic or economic interest’ consciously avoids the use of a comma after the word selfish; this
is, however, often misinterpreted as a grammatical error when in fact it asserts that any selfish interests Britain may
have are strategic or economic. The desire to maintain the union in the interests of British as opposed to Northern Irish
Unionists might constitute a selfish interest.
26 Interview, Ruairi O’Bradaigh 17 November 1998.
27 Interview, Garret FitzGerald 11 November 1998.
28 Interview, Dermot Nally 9 November 1998.
29 Interview, unattributable.
30 Ibid.
31 Interview, Fergus Finlay, 18 November 1998.
32 The 1970 Arms Trial involved an investigation into the misappropriation of £100,000 of government funds to aid the
Republican movement militarily. Mr. Haughey was acquitted of all charges.
34 NIPC BBC interview transcription of Gerry Adams and John Hume, Linnenhall Library, P1717.
35 Interviews unattributable.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Interview, Carmel Hanna, 2 October 2003.
39 Interview, Mark Durkan, 17 May 2000.
40 Interview, Peter Brooke, 11 June 1999.
41 Interview, David Andrews 30 May 1998.
42 Interviews Peter Brooke 11 June 1999; unattributable. Peter Brooke’s position as Secretary of State was undermined
after his appearance singing on an Irish television programme was ridiculed as it coincided with an IRA bombing.
Brooke tendered his resignation over the incident which was declined by Prime Minister Major.
43 Interview, Patrick Mayhew, 9 June 1999.
44 Referring to the unionist divisions over the Dublin meeting it was noted ‘better that they disagree, one positive and
one negative than none of them positive’. Interviews Dermont Nally, 9 November 1998.
46 See the Observer, 28 November 1993.
47 Interview, Danny Morrison, 1 October 2003.
48 The emergence of groups such as the Red Hand Commandos increased fears of loyalist factionalism and violence.
49 Interviews, John Kennedy, John Clarke, 10 March 1999.
50 Interviews, Dermot Nally, 9 November 1998.
51 Interview, Peter Brooke 9 June 1999. Relations between the government and the DUP declined as leader Ian Paisley
was removed from the House after heckling the Secretary of State.
53 Interview, Albert Reynolds 27 July 1995.
55 Interview unattributable.
56 Interview unattributable.
57 The Irish negotiators told their British counterparts, ‘take it off the table or we will finish this, there is just no more
talking’. Interviews, unattributable.
58 The Irish attributed the document to Roderic Lyne’s own psychology. Described as ‘a real nuisance, who evidently
had the ear of the Prime Minister’ and ‘barked for his master’ as well as ‘a very arrogant young man who was in a

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hurry, he had advised Mrs Thatcher on the Rhodesia transition in her negotiations with Robert Mugabe and had done a
long stint in the Colonial office. There was a sense in which he probably felt we were getting used to the typewriter
and the Irish they produce literary characters alright but they have no sense in the practical sense of the meaning of
words, immensely condescending. Lyne was respected by British actors and described as a 'tough egg'. Interviews,
unattributable. When the blueprint document was presented to the leader of the Irish delegation he proposed his British
counterparts 'take it to the Israelis or someone'. Interviews unattributable.
39 Interview unattributable.
41 Interviews, unattributable.
43 Interview, John Chilcot 20 July 1995.
44 The conditions applied to Loyalist and Republican parties affiliated with paramilitaries, namely, the Progressive
unionist Party (PUP) associated with the UVF, the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) associated with the UDA, and Sinn
Fein associated with the IRA.
45 Interviews, Peter Brooke 9 June 1999; interview unattributable.
46 Interview, Peter Brooke 9 June 1999.
48 Dermot Gallagher, Tim Dalton, Daithi O‘Ceallaigh, Paddy Teahan, Sean O Huigin, Sean Donlon shift departments,
suggesting greater cohesion than before.
49 Information corroborated all interviews 29 January 1999.
50 Interview, unattributable.
51 Interview, Albert Reynolds 25 July 1995. 'I stated straight that we’d try and do something about this and we both
agreed we’d address Northern Ireland and the violence that had been going on for 25 years [...] we were determined
that it wouldn’t go on for another generation of Irish [...] I initiated it at this level'.
52 Interview, Dick Spring 19 November 1998.
53 Interview, Fergus Finlay, 18 November 1998.
54 Interview, Ruairi O’Bhradaigh 17 November 1998.
55 Interview, Fergus Finlay, 18 November 1998.
56 Interview, unattributable.
57 The violence emanated from and directed by the UDA’s C Company led by Johnny Adair.
58 Interview, unattributable.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Interview unattributable ‘Unionists had come along and said, “Can you add this?” and we said “Sure, fine,” and in it
goes. There are paragraphs there that are pure unionist drafting.’
63 Interview, Emily O’Reilly, 12 November 1998.
64 The substantial share of Labour seats resulted in the possibility of a coalition without the Progressive Democrats.
The Democratic Left, ideologically closer to the Labour party, was selected as a coalition partner instead and
subsequently merged with the Labour party.
65 For a summary of the Framework Documents see Fortnight Magazine, March 1995, p. 4.
66 The question of paramilitary weapons had been raised during the time of the previous government when Albert
67 Interview, Peter Brooke 9 June 1999.
68 Interviews, Ruairi O’Braidaigh 18 and 19 November 1998 Interviews unattributable.
69 The Republican position on decommissioning was outlined in a position document to the De Chastalin commission
Building a Permanent Peace: Submission to the International Body 1996.
70 The comment is attributed to David Trimble, the leader of the UUP.
71 Interviews, Ruairi O’Bhrodaigh 18 and 19 November 1998, unattributable.
72 Interview, Garret FitzGerald 10 November 1998
74 Irish Republican Army TUAS document 1994, Linenhall Library NIPC P7184.
75 The Friends of Ireland arrangement was made amid strict US Department of Justice constraints to financial
transparency.
76 Reynolds had not been in favour of peace envoy and ‘told Clinton why it’s not going to work – put it on the shelf and
I’ll get back to you when it is more feasible’. Interview, Albert Reynolds 25 July 1995.
77 Interview, Emily O’Reilly 12 November 1998.
78 Interview, unattributable.
79 Interview, John Chilcot 20 July 1995.
80 Interview, John Chilcot 0 July 1995.
81 Interview, David Andrews 31 July 1995.

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102 Gerry Adams speech to Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, Dublin 2000.

103 Interview, Mark Durkan 17 May 2000.


105 The US engagement was immediate after the IRA killed two RUC officers in May 1997; Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams was told in person of President Clinton’s ire.

106 IRA renewed its ceasefire, 27 July 1997, and was authorised to enter the talks process in August.

107 Interview, unattributable.

108 Wright was murdered by an INLA prisoner in the Maze prison.


110 Interview, David Ervine 8 March 2000.

111 Interview, Mark Durkan 17 May 2000.

112 The ‘Irish conceded to its brevity on the grounds that the mechanisms were a political reality regardless of whether in the document or not.’ Interview, 24 May 2000.

113 Interview, Garret FitzGerald, 10 November 1998.

114 Though a flurry of faxes from No. 10 assisted Unionists in the decision over which procedural mechanisms should be adopted, No. 10 was averse to the parallel majority voting procedure.

115 Interview, Mark Durkan, 17 May 2000.

116 Interview, Garret FitzGerald, 10 November 1998.

117 It has been suggested that Sinn Fein’s position paper for strand one was nothing more than a photocopy of the SDLP submission, the SDLP emblem allegedly visible on the copied submission to George Mitchell. Interview, 2 October 2003.

118 Interview, Garret FitzGerald, 10 November 1998.

119 Interview, Mark Durkan, 17 May 2000.

120 The two politicians met and commiserated with the families of the victims from both sides of the community after the Pontzpass killings. See also Seamus Mallon interview for BBC-Brook Lapping Productions Broadcast BBC2 June-July 2001. Materials held at Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London Ref: GB0099

121 Interview, Steven King 31 July 2000.

122 There were numerous areas of concern which persisted including policing, parades, criminal justice reform and an array of conflict-related issues such as Bloody Sunday, flags and symbols, punishment beatings, security collusion.

123 Interview, Steven King 31 July 2000.

124 Interview, Ruairi O’Bradaigh 17 November 1999.

125 Interview, Douglas Hurd, 1 October 2003.

126 Interview, Peter Brooke, 11 June 1999.

127 See George Mitchell Making Peace 1999 p. 178

128 Interview, Emily O’Reilly, 12 November 1998.

7 Conclusion

1 See Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield and She Stoops to Conquer, pp. 67 and 219.

2 Sa’id Hamami the PLO representative in London was assassinated for allegedly negotiating with Israel. Interview, 11 August 1999.

3 Interview, Khalil Shikaki, 12 February 2004.

4 Interview, Yair Hirschfeld 6 September and Ron Pundac 9 September 1999.

5 Interview, Khalid Amyreh, 13 July 1999.

6 Interviews unattributable.

7 Ibid.

8 The 2004 United Nations Annan Plan for a comprehensive settlement to the conflict in Cyprus is over 9,000 pp. and has been drafted no less than five times.

9 British civil servant, ICBH, Witness Seminar, 26 April 1995, Institute of Historical Research, Senate House, London.


12 Interview, Dermot Nally, 9 November 1998.

13 Interview, Dermot Nally, 9 November 1998.

14 Hume had called FitzGerald when the latter was busy writing a speech for an American audience; his wife took the call and Hume briefly outlined the idea he had for the Council. FitzGerald’s wife informed him of the Hume proposal and FitzGerald quickly amended his speech to include the Council idea, making it more inclusive. Interview, 10 November 1998.
In 2003, attempts to regulate ethnic conflict and create a power-sharing arrangement in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) adopted a multi-party, multi-factional arrangement where the President would share power with four major coalition parties and an embryonic veto for the minority parties.

The 1998 Lizarra Agreement relating to the Basque conflict makes direct reference to the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process in Northern Ireland. Signed by Basque trade unions and social movement the Lizarra 'agreement' sets out the position of its signatories advocating an inclusive peace agreement for the Basque country on par with that of the Good Friday Agreement, at only four pages, it is in effect a summary of the Good Friday agreement rather than a peace agreement.

Predatory parties describe the way Sinn Fein and the DUP have usurped the position of the SDLP and the UUP respectively as the dominant parties in the respective blocs. Participation in the Assembly refers initiatives by dominant parties to exclude others. Policing refers to all-party participation in local police boards in Northern Ireland. Parachute regiment, refers to the Bloody Sunday inquiry and issues of collusion and the Dirty War in Northern Ireland. Prisoner releases address the problem of former paramilitaries and prisoners released on licence; it also refers to the question of those on the run (OTRs) and the question of amnesty. Punishment beatings refer to persistent within bloc violence and the problem of persistent low-intensity conflict.

The significance of the special position of the Republic’s government over Northern Irish policy is illustrated in the Irish government’s response to the British government’s decision to withdraw power from Stormont and implement direct rule without Irish government consultation in 2000.

Between 1988 and 1998, 38 formal peace agreements have been signed; see Darby and MacGinty (2003).

Tsebelis agrees that his work on veto players and nested game marries well with Scharpf’s actor-centered institutionalist analysis. Communication with Tsebelis August 2003.

Corroborated interviews.