The Hegemony of Urbanisation:

Questioning the Production of Space by the State in Beijing’s Green Belts

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The London School of Economics and Political Science

A thesis submitted to the Department of Geography and Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, June 2017
Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis aims to investigate the state question in the context of China’s urban change, with Beijing’s green belts as the study site. Formerly places where the socialist-modernist vision would be realised, the green belts have been made central to the state-led and land-based urban accumulation strategies during the last two decades of urban metamorphosis. By interrogating the power dynamics associated with the green belts under change, this thesis illustrates the agency and agents of the urban metamorphosis and uncovers the territorial logic of the state as it adopts various governmental techniques to accumulate capital and sustain legitimacy in and by urban space. Drawing on a series of ethnographic data and archival records collected from fieldwork between 2014 and 2015, this thesis presents four main arguments. First, there is a gap between the form and the content of the green belts, with the former crystallising the Chinese national ethos of modernity in an ideologically driven way, while the latter is shaped by dynamic politico-economic conditions. Second, the green belts have since the 1990s been rendered an exceptional space for state-led urban accumulation, through a mechanism which I label “landed ecology,” whereby land-oriented manoeuvres combat the ecological concern. Third, the agency of the state lies in social and spatial processes where an urban-oriented territorial logic prompts the state’s actions; this logic is compelling, for it constitutes some prime territory-based governmental techniques that internalise vigorous social relations and processes. Fourth, the local villagers are also involved, but in a de-politicised way; they are turned into hegemonic subjects by the state with new governmental techniques, and this reshaping undermines their political potential to seek the right to difference. Building on these arguments, this thesis concludes that the state’s land businesses are not a purely economic project but rather a total project: these actions are indeed inscribed in the Party-state’s consistent concern to work miracles and sustain its legitimacy, which requires a hegemony of urbanisation to be established with ideological resources, ecological masks and the social fabric as a whole.
Acknowledgement

This thesis, like every other thesis, has gone through a long journey before its conclusion. It would have been impossible for me to finish, or even start, this thesis if I did not receive cordial help and invaluable supports from so many people. The story started more than five years ago, when I just finished my master course and was confused by the urban reality in China. At that moment, I encountered Dr Hyun Bang Shin and the Department of Geography and Environment at the LSE, which enabled me to start this journey and tackle my confusion in an “unrestrained” way. I want to start my acknowledgements by saying thanks to Hyun, my main supervisor, who opened the door, shared the knowledge, conducted training on critical thinking and academic writing, set up the high standard, encouraged different ways of thinking and provided pastoral care at the same time. I am extremely grateful to all the help and supports from you, which makes this journey not only inspiring, intellectually, but also joyful, emotionally.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAUPD</td>
<td>Beijing Academy of Urban Planning and Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLGCGB</td>
<td>Beijing Leading Group of Constructing the Green Belt Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLGCRUC</td>
<td>Beijing Leading Group of Constructing the Rural-Urban Continuum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMBA</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal Bureau of Afforestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMBL</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal Bureau of Landscaping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMBLA</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal Bureau of Landscaping and Afforestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMBLRA</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal Bureau of Land and Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMC</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal Committee of Communist Party of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMCDR</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMCUP</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMFB</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal Financial Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMG</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMPC</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal Party Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMPSB</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMRUCO</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal Rural-Urban-Continuum Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOCOG</td>
<td>The Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAUPD</td>
<td>The China Academy of Urban Planning and Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central Business District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCBCPN</td>
<td>Compilation Committee of Beijing Chronicle of Place Names</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCPNCD</td>
<td>Compilation Committee of the Chronicle of Place Names in Chaoyang District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCSFB</td>
<td>Compilation Committee of the Chronicle of State Farms in Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDG</td>
<td>Chaoyang District Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGCO</td>
<td>Capital Greening Committee Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COFCO</td>
<td>China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVC</td>
<td>Dahongmen Village Collective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>floor-area ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDG</td>
<td>Fengtai District Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBJM</td>
<td>green belt joint meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic products</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRCRM</td>
<td>land reservation cost review meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRJM</td>
<td>land reservation joint meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLR</td>
<td>Ministry of Land and Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBSPRC</td>
<td>National Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDRC</td>
<td>National Development and Reform Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People’s Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODHRP</td>
<td>Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>People’s Bank of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAIC</td>
<td>Sunhe Corporation of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEZ</td>
<td>Special Economic Zones</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>Southern Metropolis Daily</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>state-owned enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>The State Planning Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STG</td>
<td>Sunhe Township Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVE</td>
<td>Town and Village Enterprise</td>
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Glossary

Notes on Romanisation of Chinese terms: this thesis follows pinyin system to Romanise Chinese terms and characters. When referring to a term originally in Chinese, I present its English translation first and then introduce its original spelling in Chinese together with its pinyin representation. Chinese characters and pinyin signals are put in a bracket, in the style as follows: “English translation (Chinese characters; pinyin signals).” Here, in this glossary, these terms are listed in a different way for convenience: Pinyin signals are put at the beginning to enable the alphabetical ordering, and they are followed by Chinese Characters and then English translations.

Notes on Romanisation of Chinese names: the names of authors who are Chinese are presented in the Chinese custom, that is, the surname is put first, followed by the given name (for example, 张静 is presented as Zhang Jing); exceptions apply to those Chinese authors who mainly publish in English journals (for example, 吴缚龙 is presented as Fulong Wu).

Anzhi 安置: relocation
Baogong tou 包工头: “contractor” of land and construction projects
Beijingshi lü huá geli diqu jianshe lingdao xiaozu 北京市绿化隔离地区建设领导小组: Beijing Leading Group of Constructing the Green Belt Area
Beijingshi xinfangban 北京市信访办: BMG Office of Letters and Visits
Beijing yuanzi 北京院子: Beijing Courtyards
Caifu chengbao 财富城堡: Palais de Fortune
Chaiqian 拆迁: demolition
Chaiqian gongsi 拆迁公司: demolition companies
Chaoying ganmei 超英赶美: surpass Great Britain and then catch up with the United States
Chexian gaishi 撤县改市: abolish county and establish city
Chexian shequ 撤县设区: re-draw suburban counties as urban districts
Chengshi jingying 城市经营: city management
Chengshi kaifa 城市开发: the exploitation (rather than development) of the urban space

Chengxiang jiehebu 城乡结合部: rural-urban continuum

Chengxiang yitihua 城乡一体化: rural-urban integration

Chengzhongcun 城中村: urban villages (or “villages in the city”)

Dadi yuanlinhua 大地园林化: gardening the earth

Dayuejin 大跃进: Great Leap Forward Movement

DiDi (or DiDi Chuxing) 滴滴: A mobile app for taxi hailing

DiDi Hitch 滴滴顺风车: A hitchhiking service provided by Didi

Difang 地方: localities

Difang ti 地方体: local social body

Diji shi 地级市: prefecture level cities

Diwang 地王: Land Kings

Dingzhuang 钉桩: nailed piles

Dingzihu 钉子户: nail household

Dongfang bali 东方巴黎: Paris of the East

Dongyuan 动员: mobilisation

Ershi hao wen 二十号文: No.20 policy scheme

Fangnu 房奴: slaves of houses

Fangquan 放权: decentralisation

Feishoudu gongneng 非首都功能: non-core functions

Fensan jituanshi 分散集团式: dispersed clustering

Fenzao chifan 分灶吃饭: having dinners in separate kitchens

Fushengji chengshi 副省级城市: sub-provincial level cities

Gaige kaifang 改革开放: Reform and Opening Up

Guangshuo zeichirou, bukan zeiaida 光说贼吃肉, 不看贼挨打: “You only claim that the thieves can eat meat; you paid no attention to the thieves when they were getting a violent beating”

Guihua renshi 规划人士: planning persons

Guojia tiaojie shichang, shichang yindao qiye 国家调节市场, 市场引导企业: the state regulates the market while the market guides enterprises
Guopi minban 国批民办: approved by the state and then operated by the private sector

Guowuyuan zhufang zhidu gaige lingdao xiaozu 国务院住房制度改革领导小组: State Council’s Leading Group of Housing Institution Reform

Guoyou danwei 国有单位: SOEs and work units

Hefa buheli 合法不合理: legal yet unreasonable

Hongweibing 红卫兵: Red Guards

Huanjian 还建: returned-building

Huiyi 会议: Meeting

Jiben luxian 基本路线: The basic line

Jiceng 基层: grassroots

Jicha dizu 级差地租: differential rents

Jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi 家庭联产承包责任制: the household contract responsibility

Jianren jandi jianjingji 减人减地减经济: to control the increase of land use and decrease the population even at the expense of economic decline

Jiaoye gongyuan 郊野公园: country parks

Jinbiao sai tizhi 锦标赛体制: tournament system

Jinrong jie 金融街: Financial Street

Jingxihua guanli 细化管理: fine management

Kaifa chouzi 开发筹资: financing through developing (the space)

Kangying jianyuan 康菅家园: Kangying Homestead

Kouzi 口子: gaps that can escape the central orders

Kuai 块: horizontal network of local (municipal) governments

Liangpiao 粮票: grain tickets

Liudong renkou 流动人口: floating population

Loumian dijia 楼面地价: average land price (per square metre) of the construction area

Lühua gelidai (or Lü’ge) 绿化隔离带: green belt

Lü’ge dahui 绿隔大会: green belt joint meeting

Lü’ge diqu 绿隔地区: the green belt area
Lü ‘se pingzhang 绿色屏障: green barriers
Meili zhongguo 美丽中国: Beautiful China
Mu 亩: 666.7 square metre
Muchan 亩产: yield per mu
Nanfang tanhua 南方谈话: Southern Talk
Neicheng 内城: inner city
Nongcun jiti 农村集体: rural collectives
Paimai 拍卖: auctions
Pao xiangmu 跑项目: run for projects
Penghuqu gaizao (or Penggai) 棚户区改造: shanty areas transformation
Ping’an Yueqing 平安乐清: Peaceful Yueqing
Qihao wen 七号文: No.7 policy scheme
Qianhui yuanji 迁回原籍: return to their rural places of origin
Qin erzi 亲儿子: biological son
Qunzhong luxian 群众路线: mass line
Renmin gongshe 人民公社: People’s Commune
Renmin Ribao 人民日报: The People’s Daily
Renyou duoda dan, diyou duoda chan 人有多大胆, 地有多大产: the yield from the soil can be superfluous if we are bold enough
Sige xiandai hua 四个现代化: four modernisations
Siheyuan 四合院: traditional courtyards
Sipang lühua 四旁绿化: Four-sides greening
Shanglou 上楼: relocated to storied buildings
Shangmian qiantiao xian, xiamian yigen zhen 上面千条线, 下面一根针: a thousand threads in only one needle
Shangpin fang 商品房: commodity housing
Shangshan xiaxiang 上山下乡: go up to the mountain and down to the countryside
Shi 市: city
Shiguanxian 市管县: cities administering counties
Shiqu zhongxin diqu 市区中心地区: the central area of the city proper
Shizhang ban 市长班: training courses for mayors

Shoushan zhiqu 首善之区: the first good area

Shouzhang 首长: principals

Sunhe zutuan 孙河组团: Sunhe Land Group

tesi teban 特事特办: special issues, special treatments

Tiao 条: vertical organisation of state work units

Tiaotiao weizhu, tiaokuai jiehe 条条为主, 条块结合: based on bars, supported by blocks

Tudi caizheng 土地财政: land finance

Tuchu chengben lianshenhui 土储成本联审会: land reservation cost review meeting

Tuchu lianxihui 土储联席会: land reservation joint meeting

Tudi chubai 土地储备: land reservation system

Tudi shiyong quan youchang youxianqi churang zhidu 土地使用权有偿有限期出让制度: transferring a certain period of land use rights with payments

Tudi zhengli chubai 土地整理储备: land consolidation and reservation

Wapian jingji 瓦片经济: tiles economy

Wanquan chengshihua 完全城市化: complete urbanisation

Wanren susong 万人诉讼: Litigation issued by ten thousand people together

Weizhang Jianzhu 违章建筑: illegal buildings

Wenge 文革: Cultural Revolution

Xiafang laodong 下放劳动: labour in remote area

Xianji shi 县级市: county level cities

Xiaojinku 小金库: small treasuries

Xiaoazhen fengge 小镇风格: township genre

Xieyi churang 协议出让: close-door negotiations

Yicun yice 一村一策: one village, one policy

Yigang weigang 以钢为纲: take steel as the key link

Yiji kaifa 一级开发: primary exploitation

Yitiaolong fuwu 一条龙服务: all-in-one service package

Yuanlinhua 园林化: gardened
Yundong 运动: campaigns
Yundongshi zhili 运动式治理: the campaign-style governance
Zang luan cha 脏乱差: dirty, messy and disappointed
Zaofan daodi zhandoudui 造反到底战斗队: Combat Team of Determined Rebellion
Zhaijidi tengtui 宅基地腾退: homestead vacating
Zhanyi 战役: battles
Zhao-pai-gua 招拍挂: auction, tendering or listing
Zhixia shi 直辖市: Provincial level cities
Zhongdian cun 重点村: key villages
Zhongdian gongcheng daidong 重点工程带动: key projects driven
Zhuti 主体: subjects
Zhuangong 转工: welfare provision
Zhanju 转居: hukou upgrading
Zichou zijin 自筹资: self-raised funding
Zijian 自建: self-building
Zimu cheng 子母城: mother-child city network
Zonghe kaifa gongsi 综合开发公司: comprehensive exploitation companies
Zong zhihuibu 总指挥部: General Headquarter
Zouzi pai 走资派: capitalist roaders
Zuidaode zhengzhi 最大的政治: the paramount political issue
Zuo jiafa 做加法: do additions
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 The state of ruins

I started my PhD research in 2012, but it might be better to see the year 2010, when I encountered Tianzhu Village in Beijing, as the starting point of my reflections on China’s urban metamorphosis. My own field note from the 2010 visit says:

Tianzhu Village lies along Wenyu River, several kilometres from Beijing Capital International Airport. You must encounter it every time you travel from the city centre to the airport. But you would never notice it: Tianzhu and the two ends of the Airport Expressway are indeed not in the same world, even though they are only a few centimetres from each other on the map. While urban elites are busy flying here and there, the villagers suffer significant social and spatial changes but only as a small community […] When reaching Tianzhu today, we saw that most buildings in the village have gone, turned into endless ruins. Only a few dozen courtyards, out of thousands, are standing in their original places. Their impatient owners are awaiting further negotiations with the local government. The paved country road is buried under ruins. Its meanderings, nonetheless, do bear many once vivid signs of everyday life as it used to be: children’s gloves, dishes, parts of tables and chairs, even glass balls. If you were stuck in such a scene of wholesale demolition, witnessing the collection of abandoned bricks as the only human activity amid silent ruins, then you might agree with my imaginative reaction: it is a mirror of doomsday. (Excerpted from Suspended Tianzhu, a field note written on 11 December 2010)

Looking back on that scene from the present, the moment of encountering Tianzhu in 2010 was much more than a local event. A year before I came upon the village, Tang Fuzhen, a woman from a village in suburban Chengdu (the biggest city in South-Western China), set herself on fire to resist forced eviction (Cohen 2010, SMD 2009). Two weeks after my visit to Tianzhu, Qian Yunhui was killed in a “traffic accident” in Yueqing,
Zhejiang Province. At the time of his death, Qian was the head of a local village collective and had been leading his people in the fight against compulsory evictions and unfair compensation for more than five years (Jiang 2010). It prompted intense debate at the national level; many people wondered if the accident had been genuine. Among the debates, Ai Weiwei, a Chinese artist of international prestige, produced a documentary film in China entitled Ping’an Yueqing (平安乐清, Peaceful Yueqing) (Ai 2012) to satirize the role of the local government in this tragedy – and was detained for nearly three months by the authorities in consequence. Similarly, large-scale land-based hostilities were also witnessed in Wukan in 2011. This is a village at the southern coast of Guangdong Province whose land, space and clan politics are fundamentally affected by the urban changes in the Pearl River Delta (He and Xue 2014), repeating a pattern found nearly everywhere else in China, all resulting in a state of ruin.

Such tragedies are not alone. They vividly represent both the geographical reach and socio-spatial effects of China’s urban process1 in the last few decades: from east to west, from north to south, no single city or town in China can claim to be untouched by this process. All of a sudden, terms such as “land finance” (土地财政, tudi caizheng), “urban villages” (城中村, chengzhongcun), “the rural-urban continuum” (城乡结合部, chengxiang jiehebu), together with “nail households” (钉子户, dingzihu)2 have begun to be hotly debated topics across the country. These terms have not only been prominent in both government policies and academic discussions but are also dominating the mass media and daily chats. However, few of these debates or chats could help me understand why the urban process was unfolding in this specific way in China, with villages in the rural-urban continuum in the teeth of the storm, and the local people (villagers and migrant workers) suffering the most. It is this simple and straightforward question that urged me to continue my investigations, the outcome of which is the PhD research project consolidated in this thesis. The encounter with Tianzhu Village is narrated here as the starting point because it sparked my enthusiasm, however chaotically at first, to explore

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1 Instead of using the popular term “urbanisation,” I prefer to adopt “urban process” as an alternative. The theoretical concern for doing so is to be presented in Section 1.4 in this chapter.
2 “Nail household” is an analogical term in Chinese. It refers to households which refuse to move when forced evictions are planned and/or conducted – their bodies and houses are just like nails stuck in the soil. Other terms mentioned here are discussed in more detail in the empirical chapters.
the causal mechanism underlying ordinary people’s sufferings in China’s urban process. Tianzhu Village hence set up this project, even though it did not end up as my field site.³

The primary aim of this thesis is to investigate the state question in China’s urban process and Beijing’s green belts are the field site. While details of my field site and experience are to be illustrated in the next section, here I want to present the rationale underlying the whole project. It is widely observed that the Communist Party of China (hereafter CPC) and its party-state regime have in the course of speculative urbanisation been promoting large-scale and urban-oriented accumulations of capital through their land businesses (Hsing 2010, Lin 2009, Shin 2014a). Nonetheless, the inside of such a state-led, urban-oriented and land-based accumulation is still a black box: what are the concerns of the state that propel its actions? Who are its agents and where lies its agency? What social/power relations are reproduced in this process? What governmental techniques have been invented or restructured? Instead of focusing on the phenomenon of capital accumulation per se, I hope to answer these questions by considering the changing nature and form of the state. After all, it is often argued that this process is “state-led,” but it is not yet clear what this state is, how it operates, and how it is constituted. I aim to show that through the lens of the state we can ascertain the links between the urban-oriented accumulation and changing ecological settings, on the one hand, and, on the other, the critical roles of social history, the socialist legacy and dynamic ideologies in this process.

Some methodological innovations are needed to investigate the above questions. For one thing, previous studies have generally drawn conclusions from policy texts and official statistics (with a few exceptions, such as Hsing 2010); but the reliability of such information is suspicious and its relevance is exaggerated (see reflections in Zhou and Ma 2003). There are gaps between discourses written on paper and situations in daily life. An anthropological framework with micro-level information is hence needed to move beyond this methodological trap and locate the state in the lived space. More importantly, reflections on methods can also help to deal with a long-lasting myth that sees the state as a political singularity and solid entity dominating society. Further discussions will be indicated below in this chapter and in Chapter 2, while, for the

³ Tianzhu is in fact a “rural district” (equivalent to a township in the rural-urban continuum) that administers several villages. The village that I encountered in 2010 is one of the villages under its administration. For more detailed information on the selection of field sites, see Chapter 3.
purposes of this introduction, it is enough to recall that power is a relational construct but with material effects while the state is by no means able to monopolise and “store” power (Allen 2003, Foucault 1980, 1991, Harvey 1996, Lefebvre 1976, Massey 1999). Since space and time are critical in mediating the presence and effects of power (Allen 2003, 11), it can be inferred that a proper definition of the state must entail its spatial dimension and contexts – and in my case, China’s urban-oriented and land-based accumulation is able to provide an appropriate starting point.

Before introducing details, it might also be worth some further discussion on the title of this first section: “the state of ruins.” This metaphor, for me, can be interpreted in two interconnected directions. On the one hand, it refers to the feeling of being situated in a state of ruins where “all that is solid melts into air” (cf. Berman 1983) – including built environments in the city, in the country and in the continuum in between. Everyday life and lived space are now subject to be transformed, if not displaced, by (re-) producing new urban space for state-led land businesses. On the other, the metaphor also indicates the status quo of the state – that is, the state as an entity becomes increasingly obscure because its body (the bureaucracy) is also subject to consistent reshaping. As shown in the next section, and also in Chapter 2, the bureaucracy is split in both horizontal and vertical directions by internal collusion and collision; and this renders awkward the popular habit of identifying the bureaucracy with the state. The interconnection between the two states of ruins yields two implications: first, that the state should be foregrounded in order to understand the deforming of everyday life in the urban space; second, that the urban process simultaneously reshapes the state. Here emerge dialectics between the state and urban space that underline the theoretical and methodological concerns of the thesis (see Sections 1.3 and 1.4 for details).

This chapter mainly serves as a platform from which to introduce the whole thesis. In the next section (Section 1.2), I introduce my field site and experience in Beijing to give a compact description of the case I am working on (and why I chose it). Section 1.3 then summarises the literature on the state issue in China urban studies. It reveals that the state question is a critical point of entry into urban issues but there are gaps in conceptualising the Chinese state. Section 1.4 presents the theoretical framework of this thesis, giving a relational and spatial account of the state. It is suggested that a Gramscian reading of Henri Lefebvre can help clarify the changing forms and effects of the Chinese state in
the urban process. Section 1.5 introduces the structure of the thesis by illustrating the key concerns of each chapter.

1.2 The urban metamorphosis in Beijing

The state-led and urban-oriented accumulation is no stranger in the urban experience of Beijing, as shown in the case of Tianzhu (described at the outset of this chapter). Indeed, Beijing has been one of the few Chinese cities where the land revenues equal nearly half the total of fiscal revenues. In 2015, for example, Beijing earned 221.74 billion Yuan (GBP £23.07 billion)4 in its land businesses, while its fiscal revenues totalled 472.39 billion Yuan (GBP £49.13 billion) (BMFB 2016, Ye 2016b). What makes Beijing unique is not the scale of accumulation *per se*, but the political and ecological milieu where state actions are negotiated, colluded in and conducted. The story in Beijing, moreover, could be classed as a “metamorphosis” because both the reference horizon and the coordinates of action regarding the urban space were fundamentally transformed – or, to use Ulrich Beck’s words (2016, 6), “the ‘metaphysics’ of the world is changing” (this term will be further defined in Chapter 2). In this section, the green belts around Beijing are illustrated together with my field experience there. They are recognised as the city’s new frontier for running land businesses. The aim is to demonstrate why their political and ecological setting is worth empirical examination and how they can contribute to understanding the state.

Deforming Beijing under Xi Jinping

In February 2014, the month before I arrived to begin fieldwork in Beijing, Xi Jinping, President of China, inspected the capital. He issued some instructions that at once affected the work plans of Beijing Municipal Government (hereafter BMG) in both the implementing of its spatial administration and the promotion of its land businesses. The key point announced by Xi was that Beijing was too massive and crowded to be a proper “capital.” Non-core functions (非首都功能, *feishoudu gongneng*) and industries should, he said, be relocated elsewhere to make Beijing “the first good area” (*shoushan*...
This was the second time that Xi had signalled his concern over urban space and urban planning, the first one being in 2013, in the “Central Conference on Urbanisation Work”. In the Conference Communiqué, the Central Committee of the CPC (with Xi Jinping as the head) declared that China must be *urbanised to modernise* itself because “urbanisation offers tools to resolve agricultural problems, increase domestic demand and accelerate the upward transition of China’s industry” (CPC 2014). Xi’s instructions at once produced substantial socio-spatial and politico-economic effects, most of which were beyond doubt not as positive as he would have anticipated.

During the fieldwork when I was interviewing municipal officials to learn about the urban change of Beijing, they repeatedly reminded me of Xi’s inspection and its meaning. Some of them shared with me what they had been told in internal meetings about putting these instructions into action. The most powerful response to Xi came from Mr Guo Jinlong, then Party Secretary of Beijing (i.e., the No.1 leader of the city). An urban planner told me that he heard Mr Guo vow to “do nothing in the next three years but to control the increase of land use and to decrease the urban population, even at the expense of economic decline” (减人减地减经济, *jianren jiandi jianjingji*) (Interview with an urban planner in Beijing Academy of Urban Planning and Design, BAUPD, 19 September 2014). At first glance, the claim is at odds with the requirements of the Central Conference on Urbanisation Work, which encourages cities to achieve socio-economic development *through* urbanisation. It seems that Xi Jinping’s words put Beijing on a new track that diverged from the existing urbanisation process. Why? Before I could figure out any clue to the meaning of this contradiction, its socio-spatial effects shocked me and reminded me of the state of ruin that I had seen several years before in Tianzhu.

For example, 20 million square metres of so-called “illegal buildings” (违章建筑, *weizhang jianzhu*) in Beijing were demolished in the single year of 2014 (Interview with a professor of urban planning at Tsinghua University, 4 December 2014). All the morning markets (147 in total) in the city proper were to be removed because their stall-holders were mostly “low-end” migrants (Interview with official in Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning, BMCUP, 23 October 2014). Furthermore, 220 wholesale centres in the city’s suburbs were forcibly closed down or permanently
relocated in other cities nearby (Beijing-Business-Today 2014, Wei 2016). In addition, several thousand enterprises gradually shut down or were relocated to Hebei Province (Wang 2015a, Jia 2016). For officials in the BMG, the purpose of these decisions was to control the size of Beijing’s population – this is also the key concern of Xi Jinping. By the summer of 2014, “a work programme for the strict control of population size was issued, the clear objective of such control was determined and the responsibility on each district was figured out” (Wang 2014). Secondary measures were also taken, such as the rigid requirements for migrant workers who wanted to enrol their children in the public schools; these measures in turn induced increasing discontent, petitions, conflicts (and even suicides) across the city.

The expelling of migrant workers and the removal of the (low-end) built environment mark only one aspect of the urbanisation story in Beijing. There is another, more critical, aspect that was also put under threat from Xi’s inspection. In this second aspect of the story, the subject of my thesis – the green belt – stands out. One year after Xi’s visit, the BMG issued a document entitled the “Three-Year Action Plan for the Construction of Beijing’s Rural-Urban Continuum (2015-2017)” (BMG 2015). The main objective given in this plan is that the population in the city’s rural-urban continuum should be half a million fewer by the end of 2017 while the green space in the continuum should at the same time be increased by 35.8 thousand mu (亩; 1 mu = 666.7 m²). For this aim, it continues, the townships and villages in the first green belt should follow the approach of “complete urbanisation” (完全城市化, wanquan chengshihua) and those in the second belt should adopt “rural-urban integration” (城乡一体化, chengxiang yithhua) as the method. The spatial restructuring was to be achieved, the BMG suggests, with policies like the “transformation of shanty areas” (棚户区改造, penghuqu gaizao, or penggai), “land consolidation and reservation” (土地储备, tudi chubei), “driving of key projects” (重点工程带动, zhongdian gongcheng daidong) and “vacating of homesteads” (宅基地腾退, zhaijidi tengtui).

These terms will be interpreted and illustrated in more detail in subsequent empirical chapters; the point I want to stress here is that Xi’s instructions were met by the BMG in a complex way. Some of his intentions were followed (such as the demolition of illegal buildings and morning markets to “make the first good area”) but others were directed
towards different goals – for example, land businesses. Decreasing the population size in the rural-urban continuum by expelling migrant workers, for instance, was indeed practised to legitimise the BMG’s wholesale demolition of townships there so that land revenues could be generated from the vacated space. On top of this, making green space (i.e., planting trees on the vacated land plots) was seized upon as another pretext so that the BMG could increase the scale of land businesses in a process described by Xi as “making the first good area.” This is a moment in the politico-economic and ecological repertoire when state-led and urban-oriented accumulation was conducted. Here we can see the highest orders given by the President; we can also see the interpretation of these orders by local officials who are concerned about both political pressures and economic benefits. In the course of conveying and implementing these instructions, action plans were put in place to relocate non-core functions and population, to green the vacated spaces and to collect revenues from the expansion of land businesses by the end.

This is not the first moment in the repertoire to reveal itself, nor the last. The repeated presence of these moments not only questions such illusory dichotomies as those of state/capital or central/local, but also sheds light on theoretical discussions on the state-led and urban-oriented accumulation in China. For one thing, it is through these moments that we can recognise the agents and agency of the state who lead the accumulation. More importantly, the moments also reveal the spatial strategies of the state in running land businesses. The BMG’s (2015) Three-Year Action Plan, for instance, shows some salient clues to the strategies. Two terms in particular stand out: the “rural-urban continuum” (城乡结合部, chengxiang jiehebu) in the title; and the two “green belts” (绿化隔离带, lühua gelidai) illustrating the strategies of spatial restructuring. What does it mean when the BMG defines the space around the core urban area as a “rural-urban continuum”? Why is this continuum articulated with “green belts,” a familiar concept in Britain, especially for Londoners? In the end, what roles did these discourses play in the state-led and urban-oriented accumulation? To answer these questions, it may be of help to say a little more here about “green belts” in Beijing.

Green belts as the new urban frontier

The idea of green belts was imported to Beijing from Britain and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereafter USSR) in the 1950s, which was seen at that time as
a promising ecological goal of its socialist transition (Beijing Archives 1958). Indeed, it arrived in Beijing at the height of a socialist-utopian campaign named the “Great Leap Forward” (大跃进, dayuejin). This was a period when the Chinese people were mobilised by Mao Zedong to “surpass Great Britain and then catch up with the United States” (超英赶美, chaoying ganmei). Among many targets of this campaign, “gardening the earth” (大地园林化, dadi yuanlinhua) was set as a socio-ecological goal (Chen 1996, CPC 1958). In this way, Sir Ebenezer Howard’s (1902) modernist vision of urban spaces and Mao’s (1958a) revolutionary-romantic vision of China blended with each other. The British-born planning canon was therefore embedded in the planning principles of Beijing, which in turn produced a view of the landscape that merged the revolutionary and the romantic (Zhao 2016; for details, see Chapter 4).

In the practice of urban planning, a green belt was included in Beijing’s first Master Plan (1958). For Chen Gan, then director of Master Plan Office in Beijing Municipal Bureau of Urban Planning and Administration, the decentralised city layout (with a green belt separating the city centre from suburban settlements) was seen as a flexible toolkit for promoting long-term urban development in a well-planned way (Chen 1996, 13-17; originally written in 1959). This was indeed a pragmatic compromise between the revolutionary-romantic master plan and the actual needs of urban development. Ever since the same ethos has underlain the conduct of Beijing’s planning officials, though the green belt at its inception was often treated as merely imaginary. Chen Gan admitted in a letter of 1967 that suburban vegetable plots (around 153.33 square kilometres) had covered most of the designated green belt (Chen 1996, 37-38)\(^5\). The green belt had not generated a romantic landscape of open countryside but had been filled on purpose, with rural communities, peasants and cultivated fields. Nonetheless, key ideas in the 1958 Master Plan (both its revolutionary-romantic nature and its pragmatic ethos) were inherited and have persisted for the past nearly sixty years. In all the master plans for

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\(^5\) In an editor’s note attached to this document in Chen (1996, 34), it is implied that the letter was written during the Cultural Revolution (文革, wenge) when Chen Gan was “flattened” and placed under house arrest by Red Guards (红卫兵, hongweibing). The letter was written between 5 January and 1 July in 1967, and was sent to the “Combat Team of Determined Rebellion” (造反到底战斗队, zaofan daodi zhandoudui) on 1 July 1967. While it is certain that this letter was composed at the order of the Red Guards, the editors comment that it does justice to Chen Gan’s thinking and outlook at the time.
Beijing (1958, 1982, 1992, and 2004), the green belt(s)\(^6\) consistently played a crucial role in conceptually delimiting the city proper (see Table 1.1), at least on paper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.1 The area and ratio of Beijing’s green belt(s) in its master plans</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City proper area (km(^2))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green belt area (km(^2))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green belt ratio (%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data of the 1958, 1982 and 1992 Master Plan are from Yang (2009); data of the 2004 Master Plan is extracted from BAUPD (2013).

Nevertheless, there is an opposing force constantly eroding the green belts. Since the 1990s, the socialist vision of urban landscapes has gradually been subordinated to a logic of capital accumulation in the urban process. Rising land and housing prices, rather than ecological and environmental features, now characterise green belts, making them sites of land business opportunities (Zhao 2016; for details, see Chapter 5). To facilitate such businesses of the state, hundreds of rural communities in the designated green belts have been demolished, and hundreds of thousands of residents relocated (BMBLR 2011a, BAUPD 2013, CDG 2010). Increasingly, the original villages are deformed from lived spaces to vacant sites, while green belts have been maintaining their status as figurative elements of the master plan.

To make the first green belt, 79 units were designated, and even more for the second one\(^7\) (BAUPD 2013). The scale of these units varies according to local historical conditions: in some districts (such as Haidian and Chaoyang), specific works are by and large conducted by township governments; but in certain districts (such as Fengtai) it is village collectives that are charged with greening projects\(^8\). Instead of going delving into details,

\(^6\) Only one green belt is set forth in the first three master plans (1958, 1982, and 1992). The second green belt was proposed in 2003 and then included in the 2004 Master Plan. For details, see Chapter 5.

\(^7\) Only a small part of the second green belt is included within the city proper, about 10 townships (BAUPD 2013); the other part of this belt is outside the city proper and official data on it are scarce. The present research is concerning only with the units that are inside the city proper.

\(^8\) There are five levels in the administrative hierarchy in China: (1) province (or provincial-level city), (2) city that has districts (i.e., the prefectural level), (3) county (rural) or district (urban), (4) town/township (rural) or street office (urban), and (5) village collective (rural) or community (urban). Of these, the first four levels are recognised as official administrative levels (state agents) while the fifth level is defined as
we may imagine a typical community that is involved in the green project (see Figure 1.1). Whether a township or a village is concerned, two shared characteristics can be recognised from this conceptual diagram. First, the administrative boundary of each unit is not identical to that of the green belt. In other words, any unit may have part of its territory inside the green belt and the rest outside. Second, the imaginary green belt is not in fact a continuous circle. While the master plans of Beijing all tend to portray the green belt(s) as a continuous circle, the regulatory detailed urban plan does not. And this latter plan is a legally-binding instruction for the urban construction works. Indeed, the planned (imaginary) green belt in each unit is registered as one or more land plots which are not necessarily adjacent to each other (see the hatched area in Figure 1.1).

![Figure 1.1](image)

**Figure 1.1** A conceptual diagram of the spatial pattern of a typical community involved in the green belt project in Beijing

*Source:* produced by author, with assistance from Doyoung Oh.

The imaginary green belts were deployed quite straightforwardly in land businesses. The state first declared that more green spaces were needed for the benefit of the people in having grassroots autonomy (see Ma 2005, and Zhang and Zhao 1998 for more details). Here, the township government is at the fourth level; it administers villages and other communities.
the city; however, they could not be afforded. To raise enough money for the greening project, some land plots had first to be leased out. Since the original community was very likely to occupy the best location in a given place, retaining the greatest accessibility and the best ecological setting (see the round dots in Figure 1.1), the state would make more money by vacating land there and leasing it to property developers. With this in mind, original communities were soon being demolished on a large scale and the local residents were being relocated. The local residents would be allocated flats in their resettlement community (the square dot in Figure 1.1); their original dwellings would be demolished to create space for the construction of luxury buildings (villas) along the river. As for the planned green space, no one would care about it once the land and housing transactions were finalised.

Research questions and the main hypothesis

The above story of Beijing’s green belts attracted me because it offers an appropriate platform from which to examine the nature and agency of a state running land businesses. In the name of the green belts, the socialist past and a fictitious ecology are merged in order to consolidate business opportunities and increase the expected profits. It is hence worth further enquiry *why* and *how* this can happen. As discussed at the outset of this chapter, my research aims to shine light into the black box of China’s state-led and land-based urban accumulation strategy. Instead of using a broad-brush approach to depict its effects on the ground, I want to probe this mechanism to identify its agents and agency, to uncover the logic of the state underlying this mechanism and to record the various governmental techniques that are invented or reconfigured in this process. The case of green belts is a perfect starting point, as well as an empirical foundation, for my examinations. By connecting theoretical concerns and empirical observations, I will tackle the following questions in this thesis:

First, why was the green belt, as an idea, imported to China in the 1950s? If there were links between this idea and the socialist-utopian ideal of the country, then why is it still on the master urban plan when socialism has long been a dead letter? Second, how are the green belts produced, in practice? How and how far are they articulated more with the state-led, urban-oriented and land-based accumulation strategy than with ecological concerns? Third, what logic of the state can be recognised in reconciling the ecological
discourse and the land businesses? How and how far is the logic capable of coordinating various state agents and power dynamics in everyday practice? Fourth, why is there so little civic protest under the large-scale demolitions and displacement? Where can we identify the (potential) subjects of collective action who will fight for social and spatial justice?

Drawing on the above questions, my main hypothesis is that the state-led and land-based urban accumulation is not a purely economic project but rather a total project. Totality here is not used in the philosophical sense, as the refusal of fragmentation and the search for rational/universal coherence (see Lefebvre 2003b, 63-68); instead, we should be aware that this project has involved everyone in the country, with their memories, desires, relationships and life as a whole. There is a widely shared expectation of urbanisation and modernisation – not only among the state actors but the non-state actors too – and this supplies an ideological foundation for the whole population to consent to and agree on the rewriting of (urban) built environments. While coercion is not ruled out, it plays a supplementary role in maintaining consensus. Consent is protected by the armour of coercion: this is how Gramsci (1971, 263) defines hegemony and the state. In this sense, I would label the urban story that is going on in China “the hegemony of urbanisation.”

This specific setting questions popular notions of the boundary between the state and society and between the state and the market. In the case of the green belts, as is shown below, the boundaries were simply drawn as material effects of governmental techniques. It is with a renewed repertoire of techniques and with their effects, plus the consistent consensus of the population, that the Party-state manages to reproduce the “socialist” relations and to sustain its regime in and through the urban space.

1.3 China urban studies and the state at large

In The Great Urban Transformation, an acclaimed monograph studying the process and politics of the state-led and urban-oriented accumulation in China, You-Tien Hsing (2010) investigates both the land-centred process of accumulation and the consolidation of urban-based local state power. Using “accumulation” and “territorialisation” as key words, Hsing constructs a territory-oriented framework to clarify China’s ongoing urban change. She argues that it is the urbanised local state that determines the new territorial
order. Hsing’s observations on “the urbanisation of the local state” through the “interconnected physical, territorial, and ideological construction of urbanism” (ibid., 10) mark a huge step in the field of China urban studies. As Fulong Wu (2012, 527) comments in his review, “this book is path-breaking among studies of Chinese cities” since it not only moves beyond the popular “institutionalism” in dealing with the land issue but also “brings the role of social actors into the understanding of power and territorial changes.” For me, this book was a milestone, and is acknowledged here as the starting point of my investigation, because it shows vividly why and how the state matters in China’s urban change.

There had been plenty of discussions on the relations between the state, space and capital in China urban studies before Hsing’s book (for example, see Chan 1992, Ma 2006, Ma and Wu 2005, Whyte and Parish 1985). Nevertheless, the nature, form and agency of the state is in the previous literature always obscure. In the 1990s, for instance, there was a steady belief that urban transition should be taken as a complete negation of centrally-planned socialist urbanism dominated by work units (this view can be seen in Wu 1995, and Zhu 2002). Hence the role of the state was generally overlooked because scholars believed that it was going to be restructured, if not replaced, by the “quadruple forces of globalisation, marketisation, deregulation, and decentralisation” (Ma 2007, 555). Yet this popular view was later dropped and then revised in the 2000s when the co-existence of such “quadruple forces” and the resilience of the neo-authoritarian party-state was gradually admitted (Chen 2008, Jiang, Waley, and Gonzalez 2016a, b, Ma 2002, 2007, Shin 2009, 2014a, 2016, Wu 2002, 2003, 2016). It was accepted that the Party and its regime had never retreated from the socio-spatial dynamics of China’s urban change but had engaged in it even more through both the socialist legacy and the newly emerging urban-oriented institutions.

Recognising the role of the state in the urban change induces three different schools of thought about the party-state and its regime9. The first, which is the most popular, follows Bob Jessop and his neo-Gramscian state and regulation theory. For example, Wu (2002) upholds Jessop’s approach to “the governance regime” and declares that the pillars of

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9 The review of the literature here aims to illustrate the point at which I start my own research, and it is hence concise in size. A more comprehensive review of the literature on China urban studies is the theme of Chapter 2.
socialist urban governance have been removed and replaced by a horizontal territorial system. In this new system, entrepreneurial endeavours are promoted to such an extent that urban entrepreneurialism and the “post-socialist entrepreneurial city” (Wu 2003) become dominant state strategies for urban development. This view is more systematically developed by Wu, Xu, and Yeh (2007), who combine the logic of the market, the state in action and the new space to paint a complete picture of urban development in China. The key argument is that state-led extensive industrialisation in China has been replaced by urban-based intensive urbanisation, and the decentralisation of the state in this process has induced stronger regulatory power – making itself both the builder of and an actor in the market (ibid., 11). Lin and Ho (2005) also adopt Jessop’s strategic-relational framework and register both gaps between the state’s intentions and the actual outcomes and the local state’s pervasive illegal activities in land businesses. They hence advocate that the state in China is better seen as an institutional ensemble, in the sense that power dynamics, complexity and heterogeneity are giving rise to “many states” with distinctive forces and interests (ibid., 411, 431).

The second strand of understanding the party-state in the urban change is oriented around the concept of neoliberalism. In the 2000s, when the forceful state intervention was recognised, some researchers were so confused that they appealed to the then emerging academic discourse of neoliberalism in Western literature. It is argued that, in gradualist market-oriented reforms, the state changes the direction of its interventions “from redistribution to supporting the market” (Wu 2007, 18) and hence illustrates the features of “roll-out” neoliberalism (cf. Peck and Tickell 2002). This argument of China’s “neoliberal urbanisation” has been applied to empirical studies of urban redevelopment. Shenjing He and Fulong Wu (2009), for example, assert that the market operations are optimised mainly to “[maximise] the interests of the state-led regime of accumulation” (ibid., 296-98). For this reason, neoliberal shifts in China are “hidden and moderate rather than straightforward” (ibid.), since the needs of the market and the state are balanced and “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics” (cf. Harvey 2005a) is proposed. However, it is not long before researchers recognise the potential traps of applying the framework of neoliberalism directly to China.

Fulong Wu (2008, 2010), for instance, reflects on his previous acceptance of the term “neoliberalism.” He declares that the market re-orientation in China is “an outcome of
indigenous changes” (Wu 2008, 1095), inherent in “a societal modernisation project” (Wu 2010, 621) that has long been consistent with the Party’s constitutional agenda; and hence China is not a neoliberal state but is instead “on a course of neoliberalism” (ibid., 620). Carolyn Cartier’s (2011a) critique goes even further. After revealing two popular myths – of decentralisation and of the triumph of the market – she asks us to note the process in which “neoliberalism as marketisation prevails alongside political neo-conservatism” (ibid., 1117). For her, it is through this process that the restructuring and continued presence of the Party-state allows a meeting between “late capitalism” and “late socialism” (ibid.). Methodologically, the prevailing use of neoliberal discourse is risky because it may induce the problem of making an “empirical match” – that is, “reporting selective evidence that mirrors trans-Atlantic neoliberal conditions rather than [making] an analysis of complex political economic realities” (ibid., 1119). This problem has loomed large in the field of China urban studies despite Cartier’s reminders (for example, see Lim 2014, Lin 2014, Lin et al. 2015; see also Section 2.4 for more details).

Following Jennifer Robinson’s (2011) résumé of the critical role of local contingencies and political dynamics in the journey of urban neoliberalism, Cartier (2011a) claims that the focus of urban studies in China should be changed to social and political dynamics by examining the state, the people and the polity in general. In this claim, the complicated political economic realities, rather than the selective evidence that complies with Western theory, are brought to the fore – and they also define the third strand of exploring the Party-state and its regime in China, with You-Tien Hsing’s work (discussed at the outset of the section) as representative. Hsing’s reflections on the party-state regime start from 2006 when, on the one hand, township leaders are studied as “power brokers” (Hsing 2006a) and, on the other, conflicts and negotiations between the municipal governments and work units (as a socialist legacy) are examined (Hsing 2006b). Concerned with the operation of territorial power in the urban change, Hsing conceptualises power as a process in a Foucauldian sense; and the state is defined more as a set of multi-layered territorial processes than a solid entity (Hsing 2006a, 104). With this approach, she not only reveals the ambiguous space between the state and the peasantry deployed by township leaders for land projects and benefits, but also identifies the politics of urban land development where intra-state competition is intensified and the territorial power of municipal leaders is consolidated.
These observations in the end help Hsing (2010) to establish the theoretical framework that she terms “the urbanisation of the local state” in China’s urban change. As discussed above, this framework was acclaimed mainly because she successfully puts the agents and agency of the state-led and land-based urban accumulation under empirical analysis. Theoretically, this marks a promising direction through which global phenomena (for instance, time-space compression, uneven development and neoliberalism) could be contextualised with adequate attention to socio-historical conditions and local political dynamics. A further question we may ask ourselves is whether Hsing’s framework does more than the previous two perspectives, in the sense that she identifies the dynamics of the party-state in the urban change in a way that the other two cannot achieve. The answer to such a question is quite clear. In the applications of the neo-Gramscian state and regulation theory (the first direction), there is a consistent tendency to take the state as an institutional entity, even when internal fissures in this entity have been recognised (see Lin and Ho 2005). The state is registered as a self-evident body which proposes strategies, builds markets and runs land businesses (in both legal and illegal channels). In reality, Hsing claims, the state is more like a set of territorial processes than a consolidated entity, whose agents and agencies are diffused in a dynamic way. As regards the second strand of discussions, where contested attempts to use neoliberalism are foregrounded, we already see the problems of making an “empirical match” in which local conditions are overlooked and silenced by the ambition to endorse theoretical fits. It is with these comparisons that we can conclude that Hsing’s framework better reflects the complexities of the nature, agency and processes of the state in the urban change.

While Hsing (2010, 10) tends to take urbanisation as “an active spatial force shaping the power process of the local state,” however, her framework is not without flaws. Three traps can be recognised that diminish the analytical power of this framework. First, she accepts the dichotomy between the state and society with limited reflections. If the state is better defined as a set of territorial processes – a point I concur with – then how can we draw a line between the state and society in the dynamic intersection of such processes? As Ferguson and Gupta (2002) have reminded us, these illusory images of the state’s verticality (being above society) and encompassment (with its localities/territories) are effects of the routine practices of its bureaucracy; and hence the dichotomy between state and society should be abandoned if we aim to understand power and the state. Second, Hsing also adopts the neo-Gramscian approach when discussing the politics of scale and
in so doing upholds the dichotomy between central and local. It is for this reason that she talks more about the urbanisation of the local state and less about the agents of the state at the central level. This emphasis ignores the nature of the scale as a social construction (MacKinnon 2011), on the one hand, and precludes further attempts to explore the role of the Party-state as a whole on the other. Third, Hsing’s framework is also flawed by the problematic spatial topology that she adopts. After reducing the space into a single-dimensional concept – as territoriality (Hsing 2010, 23) – she goes on to divide the metropolitan region into three areas: the urban core, the urban fringe and the rural fringe, each with its distinctive structure of territorial power. However, this formalist topology is made at the expense of obscuring power, agency and dynamics of urbanisation as an active spatial force in urban politics. The inherently rigid and firmly stable spatial setting, even if it is, as she claims, “temporally contingent” and “by no means exhaustive” (ibid., 24), induces her to overlook the dynamic nature of the urbanising space where no core or fringe can be clearly seen – as the present thesis shows through Beijing’s green belts.

More reflections on the literature are found in Chapter 2’s full report on the issue of the Chinese state in the urban metamorphosis. For present purposes, it is more appropriate to discuss what implications can be drawn from previous studies, as the starting point for an empirical investigation of Beijing’s green belts. First and foremost, the state matters. Three strands of the literature on the Party-state fundamentally share a recognition of the state’s significant role in China’s urban change, where urban space and land businesses are foregrounded. Yet the second implication is that the state has not been properly represented. Some tend to define the state as a solid entity while others see the agents of the state solely from the perspective of elite competition (albeit located in a setting of territorial process). In addition, there is in Hsing’s framework a gap between the state’s territorial processes and its governance techniques, and this requires a new conceptualisation of the state in which it is not abstractly distinguished from society. Last and most important, a new spatial ontology should also be erected, where the state is to be examined by attending to its spatial dynamics in terms of the making and restructuring of state space in the urban change. Only when the state is located and conceptualised spatially can we resolve the problem of its conceptualisation and bring the state back into focus for academic assessment.
1.4 The hegemony of urbanisation: a relational framework

The theoretical framework adopted in this thesis consists of three keywords: space, state, and hegemony. I accept an anti-essentialist and relational definition of (urban) space (Lefebvre 1991, 2003b, Massey 2005): space is “the sphere of the continuous production and reconfiguration of heterogeneity in all its forms” (Massey 2005, 61); and it has no form, meaning, or finality of itself, because it is “a medium, environment and means, an instrument and intermediary” (Lefebvre 2003b, 73). Doreen Massey and Henri Lefebvre both agree that it is social practices, the stories-so-far, and the stories to tell that matter most in such a relational sphere. Following their conclusions, I want to investigate the Chinese state – its nature and agency – in the great urban transformation. Since the conceptualisation of space is updated, it becomes necessary to renew the definition of the state as well. Instead of locating the state as a solid entity in absolute space and time, I want to adopt Foucauldian and Lefebvrian interpretations of the state (Foucault 1980, 1982, 2000b, 2009, Harvey 2009, Lefebvre 1976, 2003a, Ong 2006) and explore various relations and practices underlying its abstract and non-material form. Such reflections in the end lead me to the term hegemony because the conduct of the state is to some extent omnipresent and at the same time is endorsed by the consensus of the people (Ekers and Loftus 2008, Gramsci 1971, Kipfer 2002, Laclau and Mouffe 2001).

For geographers, space is a keyword. Instead of taking it as a fixed container, many recent discussions and reflections have liberated space from phenomenological and structuralist myths (Massey 2005) and integrated it into the politico-economic analyses of state and capital (Harvey 1996, 2009, Lefebvre 1991, 2003b). What is shared in these reflections is that space plays a constitutive role in the social process. Or, to put it in another way, space and social phenomena are co-constitutive of each other and “it is the spatial within time-space (in terms of sphere of multiplicity and mutual opacity) that entails the constitution of the social and the political” (Massey 2005, 154-55). A new perspective from which to look at space and society is hence erected. It in turn enables us to reflect on the urban phenomenon, especially in China where the urban population reached 768 million in 2015 (NBSPRC 2016). To start with, we need to clear the ground by clarifying some conceptual overlaps between city/urbanisation, urban phenomena and the urban process.
In the traditional view, where the city was identified as a “clearly defined” and “definitive object,” (Lefebvre 2003b, 16) urbanisation was by and large seen as subordinate to the process of industrialisation – “a simple superstructure of the mode of production” (ibid., 139). However, the dominant phenomenon is now changing. For Lefebvre, there emerges a transformation of the “predominant problematic” of the whole society: the industrial one is replaced by the urban one, and this is labelled by him the “urban revolution” (ibid., 5). Identifying this situation, he goes on to argue, the aim of urban studies should no longer be “to generate a science of the city”; instead, it is crucial to understand the overall process and its term (i.e., goal and direction) (ibid., 16). For this aim, he lays an epistemological foundation by distinguishing three layers/fields: the rural, the industrial and the urban (ibid., 28). These fields are not social phenomena per se but indicate such issues as the “sensations and perceptions, spaces and times, images and concepts, language and rationality, theories and social practices” (ibid., 28). With this framework, we can figure out why the urban is “unseen” (ibid., 29) and “unrecognised” (ibid., 31): it is because our reference point in seeing the city and the urban is still defined and regulated by industrial norms. This is, I concur with Lefebvre, the starting point from which to renew our perspective and to reconceptualise the urban.

Space is a medium and intermediary for social practices, as discussed at the outset of this section, and urban space is not an exception. Lefebvre goes even further; he declares that “the urban is pure form,” which “has no specific content, but is a centre of attraction and life” (ibid., 118-19). The urban is formally an abstraction, but it is made concrete by social relations and practices – a concrete abstraction, indeed. This is the definition of the urban (phenomenon) I uphold in the present research, and it supplies me resources to reflect upon other terms in registering the urban dynamics, such as the “urban process” (Harvey 1978). In his original use, David Harvey takes this term to describe the process through which the material-physical infrastructure for production, circulation, exchange and consumption is created (ibid., 114). What he is concerned about is not the spatial mechanism per se; instead, by exploring the urban, he aims to recognise the spatial aspect of the general law of capitalist accumulation and hence to contextualise the conditions of class struggles. The state, he admits, does not take a leading role in this narrative (ibid., 116). But this is not what I understand by using the term urban process. With resources from Lefebvre, I define the urban process as a process through which political, economic, and social contents are filled into an urban form. And here, instead of focusing on the
law of accumulation or the condition of the class struggle, the urban story in China requires us to pay more attention to the state, to its influences on the social relations and practices that are associated with the urban space. The state is a nodal point in seeing the urban; to some extent, the urban process is also a state process.

In China’s urban process, the urban space has been placed at the centre of the logic of the state, and vice versa. Here, it becomes a challenge to answer such questions as “who is the state?” or “where is the state?” Though the logic of the state can be captured, its practices, agents and effects are all diffused and hence difficult, if not impossible, to envelop. For Harvey (2009, 261), the difficulty is first structured by a reification that “locates the state as an entity in absolute space and time, to the exclusion of any other kind of spatio-temporality.” He then endorses Philip Abrams’s (2006) claim to “abandon the state as a material object of study” and declares that our primary task as social theorists “is to demystify that fetish [of the state]” and to reveal “the nature of the conflictual social relations and material social practice that lie behind the production of this state-idea” (Harvey 2009, 261-62). We note two implications in studying the state from Harvey’s proposal. First, the material forms of the state can be retained only to the extent that they are admitted as a fetish object of processes and relations. Second, spatio-temporal processes and practices of the state are crucial in its definition, for it is like a place formation inherent in “the dialectical unity of absolute, relative and relational spatio-temporalities” (ibid., 261-62).

In a Foucauldian interpretation of the state, Timothy Mitchell (2006, 170) also suggests that the phenomenon of the state “arises from techniques that enable mundane material practices to take on the appearance of an abstract, non-material form.” The effect of the state, for him, is an abstraction that is immanent in “a non-material totality that seems to exist apart from the material world of society” (ibid., 181); it is an abstraction in much the same way as exchange value being the effect of capital. A further step of such idea enables Mitchell to reflect on the retreat in Foucault’s (1991) account of the modern state. Foucault (1991, 2009) appeals only to a distinction between ideology and practice to elaborate the process through which disciplinary power is structured territorially and institutionally into a state. The antidote, for Mitchell, lies in the fact that the frontier of such state effects is located in temporal, spatial and functional practices of drawing the line between state and society, between state and economy, as well as between “abstract
and concrete, ideal and material, representation and reality, and subjective and objective” (Mitchell 2006, 185). It is these mundane social processes, in the end, that can and should be recognised as the state. If Harvey’s reminder is also integrated, then we might conclude that the state should be depicted by the social and spatio-temporal processes and practices that make it seem like a state with abstract and non-material forms. Here, the state is immaterial but at the same time real. It is an unsettled ensemble of those dynamic socio-spatial and politico-economic processes.

The best strategy for investigating the state, according to Harvey (2009, 264, 272), is to start from different moments when material effects of the state are present in absolute, relative and relational space-time. In this thesis, I take Beijing’s green belts, the new urban frontier of the city, to illustrate the process of state-led accumulation and the dynamics of the state’s manoeuvres in erecting and consolidating its hegemony – the hegemony of urbanisation. This term is inspired by the Gramscian reading of Lefebvre from Stephan Kipfer (2002). With both thinkers’ intellectual legacies, Kipfer recognises critical affinities between them. They first share the theoretical orientation, where Marx is “a point of departure, not destination” (ibid., 123). Furthermore, they both foreground everyday life and differences in their analyses of “the contingent process through which capitalist totality is constructed” – a process that is labelled hegemony (ibid., 126). There are, of course, gaps between the two theorists, but they are exactly the reason why we should conduct the reading of either one from the other. While Gramsci (1971) gives insightful interpretations of the dynamic relations and obscure boundaries between the state and civil society, his concern with the spatial and the urban is rather implicit. Lefebvre conversely brings the urban question to the fore and “urbanises the analysis of hegemony” (Kipfer 2002, 118). Since the urban is a pure form that centralises all kinds of creations (Lefebvre 2003b, 116-17), it also serves “in the establishment of a ‘system’,” which is in turn deployed by the hegemony (Lefebvre 1991, 11).

The articulation between space, state and hegemony supplies a relational framework for me to examine the urban dynamic in China. Instead of appealing to popular theories and terms, I want to explore the logic of the Chinese state in and through the urban space and to make clear how and how far the state-led and land based urban accumulation has been achieved. This is a research project that requires adequate information on matters of everyday life. Only here can I recognise the microphysics of power relations between the
state and the non-state actors. Both the agency and agents of the state can be seen in this way because it is in daily life that “the concrete becomes abstract and the abstract concrete” (Lefebvre 1976, 89). It is also possible to bridge the gaps between territorial processes and governmental techniques and depict vividly the Party-state’s survival in and through its hegemony of urbanisation.

1.5 Thesis structure

Chapter 2 describes China’s urban condition and some current interpretations of this condition. It starts by discussing why and how 1994 should be set as the starting point of China’s urban metamorphosis, when the Party and its regime finally recognised the value of the land resources in Chinese cities. To understand this metamorphosis, it then discusses two problematic dichotomies in previous studies: one is between the state and the market and the other is between the central and the local. It concludes that both dichotomies are trapped by seeing the state as a solid entity rather than a set of dynamic processes. In the course of critically engaging with the literature, this chapter also questions the current model of knowledge production in the field of China urban studies.

Chapter 3 illustrates the research methods used in this project. It starts by discussing why and how we could take space as method in doing ethnography – through a framework entitled “the dialectics of encounter” following a relational spatial ontology. The field sites are then introduced, with both their socio-economic condition and the politico-economic and socio-spatial processes that they internalise. In addition, some critical moments of encounter in the field are narrated, which clearly show how and how far the dialectics of encounter helped me to collect the ethnographic data that are appropriate for discussions in this thesis. This chapter also illustrates some of the methods for data analysis used here.

Chapter 4 narrates the genealogy of Beijing’s green belt to explore the rationales and ethos of planning practices, on the one hand, and their interconnections with China’s changing politico-economic conditions, on the other. It recognises that the green belt was a product of the articulation between modernity, urban space and the national ethos of the Chinese. While the Maoist utopian vision of a socialist China withered away, the
national ethos has continued to the present. This continuity may explain why the green belt as a form still stays in the city’s master plan; equally important, however, it also reveals that a separation lies between the form and the content of the green belt. While its form is consistent, its content is subject to the needs of the changing political economy.

Chapter 5 examines Beijing Municipal Government’s manoeuvres in the green belt area since the 1990s and the logic underlying them. It reveals that the green belt project was turned into a technology for zoning the city when Beijing was preparing to bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. In the name of making green space, priority was in the event given to golf courses and other land businesses. Instead of “ecological land” where raw nature is reconciled with urban needs, the green belt area was in fact turned into a “landed ecology” where land businesses ravage the ecological concerns. In addition, it finds that the arrival of the global financial crisis further intensified the ecological approach of exploiting the land and accumulating capital.

Chapter 6 aims to identify the secret of the state in urban space. Drawing on theoretical discussions on governmental techniques and the territorial logic of the state, this chapter critically examines certain activities of the state in its pursuit of immense land revenues in the green belt. With observations on the daily life of both state and non-state actors, it identifies that the agency of the state lies in various social and spatial processes, where state effects are prompted and where pre-emptive boundaries are redrawn to consolidate the urban-oriented territorial logic. The integration of the spatialised authorities and the motivated local-scalar agency is also recognised here; in the end it provokes a new governmental technique, which I term “surveillance by accumulation.”

Chapter 7 depicts the way in which villagers in the green belts are implicated in the urban change, a process which has by and large reshaped the subjectivities of the villagers. This reveals a renewed technique on the part of governance which avoids potential sources of antagonism by incorporating villagers in self-government as the subjects. With policies such as employing the national ethos as official discourse and giving generous financial treatment, the state successfully assuages both the villagers’ yearning for an “urban-modern” lifestyle and their discontents in the course of land exploitation. In the end, the villagers are turned into de-politicised subjects whose political potential to seek the right to difference is seriously undermined. There are also residues produced by the hegemony,
though, and it is these issues rather than any illusory claim on class alliance that may help to renew the counter-hegemonic agenda.

The thesis concludes in Chapter 8 by highlighting the theme of this whole project: “the hegemony of urbanisation.” It summarises the key findings in my empirical discussions by considering the form and content of the green belts, on the one hand, and the nature and agency of the state, on the other. In addition, it lists what contribution the present research has made and what issues seem to be worth further study in the future.
Chapter 2 The state in the urban metamorphosis

2.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to give a comprehensive review of the changing nature and form of the state in the context of China’s urban metamorphosis since 1979. It was briefly introduced in Chapter 1 that previous studies have generated numerous insights into the dynamics of the urban political economy in general and the role of the state in urban-oriented accumulation projects in particular. This chapter elaborates in depth the issue of the state in China urban studies. As I approached this topic, I realised that a review of this issue cannot be isolated from a simultaneous review of the urban process in China – since the state and space are indeed articulated with each other to result in the urban metamorphosis. This reveals a new historical-geographical conjuncture, where the urban space rests at the centre of the dynamic political economy, land provides a new bonanza for state interests and various state agents take the stage in the pursuit of power and capital.

Let me start by explaining why I chose “metamorphosis” instead of some other, more popular term, such as “transition” or “transformation,” to refer to the urban process of China in the past few decades. Laurence Ma (2002) makes an insightful distinction between transition and transformation when he discusses “urban transformation in China, 1949-2000.” For Ma, transition is a term that “assumes a process of change toward a preconceived and fixed target,” while transformation manages to “avoid the implication of the inevitability of ‘transition’” (ibid., 1546). With such a distinction, he goes on to claim that the disintegration of socialism in China does not mean that its move towards Western capitalism is immediate. On the contrary, it is now in “a prolonged process of change with unpredictable consequences” (ibid., 1546) – a situation that could be labelled transformation. Ma’s reflections occurred in an era when researchers in urban studies in China were struggling to recognise an underlying logic in the urban change, which in the end led only to the concentration on four themes: globalisation, marketisation,
deregulation and decentralisation (Ma 2007), all of which assumed a preconceived and fixed target, that is, Western capitalism.

The significance of Ma’s distinction finds an echo in Ulrich Beck, writing from a totally different perspective. In his last book, Beck (2016, 6) concludes his life-long observation of the modern world by the verdict “the metamorphosis of the world means that the ‘metaphysics’ of the world is changing.” Beck makes his own distinction here, between transformation and metamorphosis: while he takes the former to mean “an evolutionary path” such as Chinese economic reform (the only case he draws on), the latter means much more than a path (ibid., 5). Drawing on an etymological analysis of the term, Beck defines metamorphosis as “a complete transformation into a different type, a different reality, [and] a different mode of being in the world, seeing the world and doing politics” (ibid., 6). Or, to put it another way, it refers to an “epochal change of worldviews” (ibid., 5), where we can find “a surprising, but understandable… transformation of the reference horizon and the coordinates of action” (ibid., 17). To some extent, we can even claim this concept foregrounds “the mode of changing the nature of human beings” (ibid., 20). Though they interpret transformation differently, what Ma and Beck share is the common awareness of the epistemological trap of seeing all changes as steps in an evolutionary and teleological path: some changes can be so huge that their consequences are unpredictable and their metaphysics trans-configured.

Of course, Beck’s concern with a cosmopolitised reality is not directly related to the theme of my thesis, nor his call for a “scientific revolution” from the methodological nationalism to the methodological cosmopolitanism in the metamorphosis of the world10 (ibid., 18-20). However, if we integrate Beck’s insights with Ma’s reflections, we could recognise a new direction, which may help to understand China’s urban process better. My proposition goes as follows: since 1979, China has been witnessing an ongoing urban metamorphosis – its evolutionary path is not teleological or pre-determined (the trap avoided by both Ma and Beck) but its effects are so far-reaching that the urban space, the national ethos and the nature of the Party-state regime are all fundamentally changed (under Beck’s inspiration). Instead of focusing on industrial policies or industrial parks,

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10 Personally, I agree with his proposal and believe it must be rewarding when put into such practices as comparative urbanism. But since my key concern in this thesis is the state question in China, I would leave this issue (and task) aside for investigations and discussions in the future.
the Chinese state in 1994 finally confirmed the huge rents inherent in the urban space; and this action not only restructured the regime but also sustained its legitimacy in the next two decades and to the present day. Though socialism\textsuperscript{11} was disintegrated, the Party-state managed to reproduce its “socialist” power relations in an urban way. Such an urban metamorphosis points to an epochal change of worldview, as Beck illustrates, where both the reference horizon and the coordinates of action are totally transformed by the new “metaphysics.”

With this concern, I first illustrate in Section 2.2 why and how an urban metamorphosis was induced. The policy changes initiated by Deng Xiaoping in his “Reform and Opening Up” (改革开放, \textit{gaige kaifang}) since the late 1970s had \textit{totally} implicated the urban space in 1994 – an effect which has been further intensified ever since. Drawing on this recognition, I go on to review the literature in urban studies of China. Here, in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, two key concerns in previous studies are summarised and reflected upon. The first concern (see Section 2.3) is on the central-local relations. By examining the changes in territorial and fiscal institutions in China since the 1980s, I recognise that the central and the local\textsuperscript{12} are integrated in a dynamic territorial system, which neither can dominate for long since its nature is fluid in itself. The second concern (see Section 2.4) refers to relations between the state and the market. Instead of appealing to the popular dichotomy between the two, I identify the cunning of the state: although it makes use of the market to reproduce social relations, the state consolidates the dichotomy between itself and the market via such discourses as the “socialist market economy” (Section 2.4). This is a governmental technique that is not properly registered in the literature, which pays too much attention to the improper urban vocabulary (such as \textit{neoliberalism}). This chapter finishes with a summary in Section 2.5.

\textsuperscript{11} Drawing on insightful distinction of Laclau and Mouffe (2001, 118-19) between the subject position and its agent, I want to distinguish two interpretations of socialism here: on the one hand, socialism is a Marxian ideology and practice that advocates the social ownership of the means of production – this is the subject position that Communist Party of China (CPC) claims to occupy; on the other hand, socialism refers to the specific organisation of social relations under the socialist mode of production, and in this the CPC and its regime occupy the centre. In this chapter and the empirical chapters that follow, I want to elaborate that it is the first socialism – as an ideology and practice – that has disintegrated, while the second socialism – CPC and its regime – has been sustained and consolidated through the production of urban space.

\textsuperscript{12} The term “local” here refers to state agents that are not affiliated to the central government. It is hence an abstract category that contains the whole government body (except the central agents) from the province to the township level. This is a quite popular term among Chinese scholars in social sciences, who are taking “central-local dichotomy” as a default setting in their discussions on the behaviour of the state. For details, see Section 2.3.
2.2 Urban metamorphosis in China: A prelude

What triggered the urban metamorphosis in China was not the change of state policies on land and housing per se, but was instead the terminal crises in the socialist mode of production and accumulation that were gradually uncovered by the end of the 1970s (Wu 1997, 654). These crises were inherent in a Stalinist growth strategy adopted in the Maoist era, which had followed an “industrialisation-biased Soviet approach” (Chan 1992, 300). While the heavy industries were mostly based in cities, in order to minimise the costs of capital accumulation the urban space was generally overlooked. The tactics to achieve this aim included the de facto wage freeze, an urban rationing system, under-provision of services and under-investment in housing and other non-productive forms of consumptions (Chan 1992, 290-91, Whyte and Parish 1985, Wu 1997). A high rate of industrialisation thus accompanied a low rate of urbanisation (Kirkby 1985, Ma 2002). When the land and housing market gradually established itself in the 1980s (Wu 1997, 1999), the shortage of investment in the urban built environment yielded huge rent gaps which in turn preconditioned the articulation of state and capital, leading to the urban metamorphosis.

To understand the articulation, which Harvey (2005a) calls “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics,” we should look first at two speeches given by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Worried about the moribund state of the socialist mode of production, Deng reminded his hearers that “the economic issue is indeed a paramount political issue” and that “the so-called politics is but four modernisations13;” after all, he declared, “all political problems could only be resolved at the economic level” (Deng 1979a). One month later, Deng developed these ideas, claiming that “socialist countries can develop their market economies as well” (Deng 1979b) – the first time ever in the history of the People’s Republic of China (since 1949) that a “market” had been invoked without being attached to capitalism. Deng’s words reveal a fundamental rupture. After some twenty years’ attention to the class struggle alone, the Party leaders proposed to shift their focus to

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13 This term in Chinese is 四个现代化 (sìge xiàndài hua), which originated from Mao Zedong (1957)’s vision that China should be built into a socialist country with modern industry, agriculture, science and culture. Zhou Enlai, then Prime Minister, further developed this term in 1963 and defined this “four modernisations” as a set of progresses in agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology (The People's Daily 1963). For more details, see discussions in Chapter 4.
economic matters (as the new paramount political issue) so as to sustain the Party-state regime under the label of “socialism.”

This new attitude towards a market was further developed by Deng’s successors, such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, two General Secretaries of CPC in the 1980s appointed by Deng Xiaoping. In Hu’s 1982 Report to the 12th CPC Congress, market and a market mechanism were put on the Party’s agenda, though they were still seen then as supplementary to the planned economy (Hu 1982). After this initiation, a further step was taken in 1984, when the Party issued a new document coordinated by Hu and Zhao on Deng’s instruction, for a complete reform of the economic institutions in the country (CPC 1984). Here, for the first time, the traditional idea of the contrast between a planned economy and a commodity economy was abandoned; it was replaced by a new view that the socialist economy should be a “planned commodity economy drawing on public ownership of the means of production” (ibid.). This new view was further developed by Zhao Ziyang in his 1987 Report to the 13th CPC Congress, where the ethos of the new economic institution was summarised as “the state regulates the market while the market guides enterprises” (国家调节市场, 市场引导企业, guojia tiaojie shichang, shichang yindao qiye) (Zhao 1987). However, this mechanism, as Harvey (2005a) reminds us, not only facilitates the rise of market power but also induces a reconstitution of social classes through its openness to systematic corruption and rent seeking – which defines the social and political origin of the social upheaval in 1989 and leads to the June Fourth Incident (Wang 2009, 25-29).

In the aftermath of that tragic massacre, “the secret history of the mutual entanglement of neoliberalism and neo-authoritarianism” (Wang 2009, 32) was not reversed but instead consolidated on an unparalleled scale. After a short period of recession, Deng Xiaoping embarked upon a Southern Tour in the spring of 1992 to show his endorsement of “Reform and Opening Up.” In the famous Southern Talk (南方谈话, nanfang tanhua), Deng (1992) reiterated his belief that “there can only be a dead end if we do not insist on socialism, do not facilitate reform and opening up, do not develop our economy, do not improve the living conditions of our people. The basic line [基本路线, jiben luxian]"^{14}

^{14}“Basic line” is the principal agenda set by CPC in the 1980s. It goes as follow: “we should put the economic construction work at the centre, adhere to four basic principles (i.e., the socialist road, the people’s democratic dictatorship, the leadership of CPC, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong
should be upheld for one century and no one should attempt to shake it at all.” As for the debates on socialism and capitalism and on a planned and market economy, Deng says, “a market economy does not equal capitalism. There is a market in socialist countries as well. Both plan and market are measures for developing our economy.” This talk marks a further confirmation of Deng’s speeches on the market issue in 1979 and it encouraged the Party’s proposal a few months later, in October 1992, to establish a “socialist market economy” (Jiang 1992).

In the gradual evolution of the Party’s market-oriented ethos, we can see both its efforts to transform the reference horizon and the coordinates of action – two key issues illustrated by Beck in his account of metamorphosis – and its consistent reliance on “the political legacy of the old state and its method of ideological rule” (Wang 2009, 30). These two simultaneous endeavours in combination not only paved the way for the new politico-economic condition of the country but also foregrounds the urban space in the changing political economy – this is the mechanism via which the urban metamorphosis in China was conditioned and induced. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, the Party’s view of the urban built environment was still imprisoned by the Maoist myth that it meant non-productive consumption. The only difference was that its attitude changed towards people’s living conditions: “the Central Committee of our Party is seriously concerned about the improvement of living conditions. To speed up the construction of urban residential units and to solve the housing shortage quickly is a major concern, which is critical for developing productions, for improving people’s lives and for producing a better political situation that is both stable and solid” (State Council 1978).

In the name of the people’s living conditions, then, market measures all through the 1980s were increasingly incorporated as new methods for developing urban residential units. The State Construction Committee (1980) declared that public housing in cities was a great asset to the state (rather than a heavy burden) (see also Wang and Murie 1998). This is an echo of Deng Xiaoping’s instruction that “in most developed countries the construction industry is one of the three pillars for the national economy. Urban constructions can make money, increase national revenues and promote capital

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Thought), adhere to Reform and Opening Up, rely on ourselves and work hard to build our country into a prosperous, democratic and civilized socialist-modernised country” (Zhao 1987).
accumulation...Urban residents should be able to buy their own houses” (Deng 1980). Following this instruction, the State Council encouraged work units and state-owned enterprises to build houses for their own members funded by themselves (自筹资金, zichou zijin) and not the state. The distribution of state grants was abolished in the same year (1980) and construction projects were all required to seek bank loans from the state-owned China Construction Bank (State Council 1980a). Meanwhile, urban residents were encouraged by state subsidies to purchase state-owned houses (BMPC 2004c, 253).

The commercialisation of urban housing was further accelerated in the Party’s proposal for the Seventh Five-Year-Plan where the housing issue was marked as the promising direction in which to “free the purchasing power of urban residents” (CPC 1985). Such pilot policies then gave way to the founding of State Council’s Leading Group of Housing Institution Reform (国务院住房制度改革领导小组, guowuyuan zhufang zhidu gaige lingdao xiaozu) in January 1986, which in turn facilitated the spread of the “comprehensive development companies” (综合开发公司, zonghe kaifa gongsi) and their booming real estate projects in every Chinese city – for the development of the so-called “commodity housing” (商品房, shangpin fang) (State Council 1984, 1987, State Planning Commission 1987). In 1992, together with the Party’s announcement of its “socialist market economy,” the real estate industry was finally recognised as a new pillar of the national economy (State Council 1992).

But real estate could never have boomed if socialist land institutions had not changed to allow it. Simply put, urban land in the Maoist era was used without any form of charge. In February 1954, the then Government Administration Council (later renamed as the State Council) issued an ordinance to abolish the system of land use fees as a whole: “charging fees or rents does not mean an increase of state incomes; on the contrary, it only leads to the increasing costs of productions for enterprises and the expansion of state budget. It is also an additional, yet unnecessary, procedure that make formalities more cumbersome” (cf. BMPC 2004a, 137-38). This was in an era when the socialist transformation of relations and means of production was advancing quickly, resulting in

15 Since these companies are mainly seeking and exploiting rent gaps inherent in the urban space in the course of their “development” projects, I believe it makes more sense to translate their title as the “exploitation company” instead of the “development company.” This idea also applies to other discourses such as “城市开发” (chengshi kaifa) – the exploitation (rather than development) of the urban space.
1956 in a new economic structure that was dominated by the state (32.2%) and the collective (53.4%) sectors (Hu 1991, 382-83; for details, see Chapter 4). Charging state-owned enterprises fees for using state-owned land did indeed make little sense. The institution of using land without charge lasted until the late 1970s, after which the opening-up policy attracted a good number of foreign “capitalists.” In 1980, the State Council (1980b) issued an interim provision and required that land use fees must be applied to the Sino-foreign joint ventures. The inflow of foreign capital at this time hence tore a hole in the seemingly indestructible land system established in the Maoist era (Wang 2008).

This hole was especially significant in Shenzhen, the newly born city adjacent to Hong Kong. When the officials in Shenzhen grew anxious because they had no money to invest in their infrastructures, Hong Kong merchants reminded them “these land plots we are now standing on are like gold; you guys are begging for food while you have in your hands a golden rice bowl” (Wang 2008). This metaphor at once stimulated Shenzhen to explore potential ways for reforming its land system – as a Special Economic Zone set up by Deng Xiaoping, it was endowed with a degree of autonomy in both its administration and legislation (Ong 2006). In December 1986, Shenzhen officials reported to Wang Xianjin, the first Director of the National Bureau of Land Administration, that “the system of commodity economy is not complete if there is no land market” (Wang 2008). After a year’s debates and discussions, the leaders of the Party gradually arrived at a consensus on Shenzhen’s argument – as the precondition of the first auction of land use rights in Shenzhen in December 1987, which was also the first instance in the history of the People’s Republic of China (ibid.). In 1988, a revision of the Constitutional Law of China deleted the article that banned the action of land leasing (NPC 1988). A further interim provision was issued two years later by the State Council (1990), to regulate and encourage the leasing and transferring of the use rights of urban land, all of which was state-owned.

Yet the socialist land system still held sway in people’s minds. After more than three decades of using land as public property, very few people would see it as a source of wealth, nor ever set out to engage with the making of a land market (Wang 2008). The National Bureau of Land Resources was also worried about this situation, who in turn decided to hold training courses for mayors (市长班, shizhang ban) to inform them of the
potential value of land resources in their territory (ibid.). At the same time, the accumulation of capital in the world around them greatly helped. Inspired by Deng Xiaoping’s tour and talk in southern China, a new fever of investment in the urban built environment was at once induced in 1992, which witnessed 2,800 cases of land leasing all over the country; the leased area reached 21,890 hectares and brought in a total revenue of 52.5 billion Yuan. These were respectively 4.5 times, 20.5 times and 45.4 times higher than their equivalents in the previous year (Huang 2008). Beijing leased out 210 hectares of land in the first half of 1993 alone – 2.4 times more than the annual amount in 1992 (Zhang 2001a, 248) (Figure 2.1 shows the situation in Shanghai). Both central and local officials were eventually persuaded, by this evidence, to believe in the potential of land resources to be “a golden rice bowl.”

![Figure 2.1](image.png)

**Figure 2.1** The growth of infrastructure and housing investments in Shanghai (1978-1996)

*Source:* Wu (1999, 1765). *Notes:* while this figure uses data from Shanghai, it is also representative of the trend throughout the country. At the national level, the annual growth of real-estate development was 117% in 1992 and 164% in 1993 (ibid., 1757); the rapid rise from 1992 to 1996 (1993 and 1994 in particular) is shown by two yellow triangles – they are a vivid signal of the final stage of consolidating an urban metamorphosis that would dominate China’s urban political economy from the 1990s to the present.

Following the lengthy debates, the Party’s developed market-oriented ethos was finally confirmed in the Report of the 14th Congress in 1992 (Jiang 1992). A further resolution of the Party was issued in 1993, explaining how to build the socialist market economy in practice (CPC 1993). In this second document, the Party claimed:
Besides developing the real estate market, […] the state must also *monopolise* the primary urban land market. A system of “transferring a certain period of land use rights with payments” [*土地使用权有偿有限期出让制度, tudi shiyong quan youchang youxianqi churang zhidu*] should be erected. And land for commercial uses should be transferred through public tender or auction rather than via the method of close-door negotiations. […] At the same time, we also need to speed up to reform the urban housing system so as to stabilise the price level of land plots for residential uses and to boost *commercialisation* and construction of houses. (CPC 1993; emphases added)

The above two keywords, monopolisation and commercialisation, indicate that the state and capital were now closely entangled in and through the urban space. With the information from the Hong Kong merchants, as well as their own observations on the potential of the “land fever” in 1992-1993 to appeal to many interests, state officials realised the significance of shifting the focus from running Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs) and industrial parks to “developing” the urban space as a whole. No longer was their emerging determination forbidden anymore; instead, the Central Committee of the Party recognised the desire of land rent collection and changed its attitudes toward the urban space and land. This explains why the state monopolisation of urban land and the commercialisation of houses were foregrounded in the new agenda of building a socialist market economy. In the new light of the Party’s Report (1992) and its Resolution (1993), the urban metamorphosis was finally brought to the fore in 1994, signalled by a law, a decision and a national conference.

On 5 July 1994, the National People’s Congress (1994) passed a new law, the *Urban Real Estate Management Act*, which aimed at regulating actions such as obtaining the right to use land for real estate projects, the development of real estate projects, transacting real estate deals and implementing real estate management (ibid.). This law is important because it is the first national law in the People’s Republic of China to focus mainly on the commercialisation and exploitation of urban land and housing. In this way, the state finally managed to establish a solid legal system to guarantee *both* its monopoly in the production of urban space and specific measures to maximise its own interests in its exercise of monopolistic power in the market. Two weeks later, on 18 July in this
same year, the State Council (1994) issued a decision to “deepen the reform of the urban housing system” and to implement the 1993 Resolution of the Party (CPC 1993) discussed above. It may be summarised as follows: the socialist housing system is now to be dismantled and at the same time commercialised; no state grant will be issued to facilitate housing construction, for houses are rendered commodities in the “socialist market economy” (State Council 1994). While some urban researchers intend to take 1998 as the starting point of the housing reform in China (Chen, Chen, and Liu 2008, Wu 2005), the year saw only an expansion of this 1994 decision in the context of the Asian Financial Crisis (State Council 1998, Tencent News 2017).

A further measure instituted by the Party to favour the new businesses of urban space was a national conference held a month later, at the end of August in 1994. Although the transfer of land use rights had been legalised for several years (since 1988, when the Constitutional Law was amended) and in fact often implemented in the midst of the “land fever” of 1992-1993 (Wu 1995), it was still a new thing in China and many officials were worried about the changing political atmosphere. Together with the above announcements of a new law and a State Council decision, the Party leaders met to discuss the reform of the land use system. In the National Working Conference, the then Deputy Prime Minister Zou Jiahua declared that it was a qualitative leap from a socialist knowledge to a socialist practice in shifting the focus from the use value to the exchange value of land resources (Zou 1994, 5). This argument worked like a political guarantee to assure government officials that land leasing was now not only permitted but indeed encouraged. Mr Zou also praised Shanghai, for earning more than 10 billion Yuan in 1992 and Guangdong, for obtaining 20.5 billion Yuan in land revenues in 1992 and 1993 (ibid., 6). Those who attended this meeting were also addressed by Jiang Zemin, the then President of China, and Li Peng, the then Prime Minister, the day after Zou’s speech (Zhao 1994). President Jiang confirmed that the land market must be established and administered well and that differential rents (级差地租; jicha dizu) for land should be adequately exploited by the state – this is not a violation of Marxist principles, said President Jiang, but rather a significant development of them (Zhao 1994, Wang 2008).

Here, a fundamental metamorphosis can be discerned if we reflect on the Party’s reference horizon and its coordinates of action. China’s low rate of urbanisation during the Maoist era, together with its ideological claim of egalitarianism, used sometimes to
be taken by some Western urban scholars as a promising alternative to the capitalist mode of urban transition (Murphey 1975). Though such a view was later revealed to be a product of the “Western susceptibility to agrarian utopian and oriental fantasy” (Kirkby 1985, 18; see Chapter 4), it does help to be aware that the ethos of the Party was irrelevant to the market spirit at the time. Its reference horizon was for a long time regulated by the Marxist-Leninist doctrines, in which land was not commodity but a part of the means of production; its coordinates of action were hence defined by ambitions of industrialisation, rather than running businesses to exploit land resources. But at this point, after the above series of policy changes since the late 1970s, the Party argued that it had developed the Marxist-Leninist doctrines by creatively attending to China’s local conditions. To make land transactions possible, the rights to use land were separated from state ownership and this, the Party claimed, marked a huge progress for Marxist universal truth insofar as the differential rents were exploited by the state. Such changes in the reference horizon and coordinates of action made possible the rapidly increasing scale of land businesses after 1994, a period that witnessed the consolidation of urban metamorphosis in China (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below).

![Figure 2.2 Land lease fees collected from property developers in China, 1997-2015](image)

**Figure 2.2** Land lease fees collected from property developers in China, 1997-2015

*Sources:* drawn by author; 1997-2004 data are from National Bureau of Statistics (2005), and 2005-2015 data are from National Bureau of Statistics (2016). *Notes:* (1) though the data in 1994-1996 are not available, this figure is still clear enough to show the scale of the state’s land businesses in the last two decades; (2) these data only indicate the amount of money paid by property developers, which is lower than the total income of the state from transferring land use rights; for the latter, a recent
estimation is that the state has earned more than 30 trillion Yuan from 1999 to 2016 (Ye 2016a); (3) 2009 marks the point when revenues became much larger, as discussed in Chapter 5.

![Figure 2.3](image)

**Figure 2.3** The ratio of land lease fees compared to municipal budgetary revenues

*Source:* Su and Tao (2017, 243) *Notes:* (1) this figure was drawn with data from all Chinese cities, at the municipal level; while municipal incomes from land leasing are not included as their budgetary revenues (and are extra-budgetary), they are now quite critical for all municipal governments since the average ratio across all cities is around 40% after 2003 (until now). (2) Originally it was required that land lease fees should be divided between the central and the local with the former obtaining 40% and the latter 60%, but this ordinance was suspended in 1994; all revenues have been acquired by the local since then (Zhou 2012, 228-29, see also Jiang, Liu, and Li 2010).

The question of the state is the key question that I explore in this thesis. For our purposes at present, it is already clear that the state and capital were finally and firmly articulating with each other in the above historical-geographical juncture. By 1994, both the reference horizon and the coordinates of action of the party-state had been completely transformed; as will be seen later, these transformations were all related to the changing nature of urban space and were to be further intensified *in* and *by* the urban space. This articulation between state and capital in the urban space reminds me of the famous saying in Medieval cities in Europe: “city air makes you free” (Pirenne 2014). In China, this saying could be rewritten: “the urban space makes capital free” – an apt phrase to summarise those policy changes from the late 1970s to 1994 in the prelude to the urban metamorphosis.

Though the urban metamorphosis had already become apparent by 1994, it is problematic to take this year as the vertex of China’s urban process. In contrast, when comparing Figure 2.1 with Figure 2.2, it turns out that the rapid growth of investments in the urban
built environment in the 1990s is a horn for the urban metamorphosis in China – the highest point in Figure 2.1 is the starting point in Figure 2.2, which marks the lowest. The new pattern of urban political economy may be said to have started in 1994, with no one at the time able to forecast where it would lead, for its evolutionary path was neither pre-determined nor teleological. Tremendous effects are now being revealed via the fundamental changes in the urban space, the national ethos and the nature and form of the regime. If we look backwards from the present, the changes may imply that the state’s shift of focus on the urban space is of political significance, because they represent its decisive direction concerning its own successful reproduction of the “socialist” relations in an urban way. This is the way in which the Party-state regime managed to restructure itself and to sustain its legitimacy, which accordingly consolidates the metamorphosis of state in the urban process.

The restructuring of the state in the urban process is the topic of the next two sections. This is indeed a topic that was touched upon by some pioneer urban researchers in the 1990s (for example, see Chan 1994, Wu 1995). But it was concealed when a new urban vocabulary from the Western context was imported and took a dominant position – such as the quadruple themes summarised by Laurence Ma (2007) and discussed at the outset. With such influence, two popular dichotomies were gradually erected in China urban studies, which have ever since influenced the agenda of academic discussions on the structuring of the state. One is between the central and the local and the other is of the state and the market. In the sections to come, these two dichotomies are reviewed in turn to see what we can learn from them and to identify gaps that will need further work before the urban metamorphosis in China can be properly registered.

2.3 Territorial dynamics: Beyond the central-local dichotomy

While it is maintained by some researchers that the course of urban metamorphosis has still left the system of political control in China intact (Ma 2002, 1563), there are also

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16 Though the two figures are drawn out with two different datasets and based on distinctive geographical areas (one is of Shanghai and the other is at the national level), they are comparative for two reasons: first, land lease payments collected from property developers are taken as a part of the investments in urban built environment, statistically, in China; second, Shanghai is a leading city of the national economy, whose economic pattern and development trend mark a harbinger of the whole country – and its figure in 1990s represents the conditions of many Chinese cities in the 2000s.
many changes in this system that are equally significant. For example, decentralisation is taken by many to be the fundamental mechanism for promoting the national economy in general (Oi 1995) and of producing the urban built environment in particular (Wu 1997). It is because of this new trend, they argue, that the local regimes in China manages to cultivate both the motivations and the capacity to develop the local economy and to trade in the urban built environment. What I want to highlight here, however, is a double refutation of such arguments: first, the behaviour pattern of the local state is not autonomous but is bound to the changing Party ethos and related policies – albeit in an era labelled by many as that of “decentralisation.” Second, the central does not control the local, either, since they each have their own, diverse, agencies; the interactions between them turn their relationship into a dynamic process which can in no way be reduced to abstract terms. In this section, I will review various institutional changes of the government in the last three decades. The intention is to show that both territorial and fiscal institutions have been fundamentally transformed to foreground the municipal governments as new, principal, state agents in running their urban businesses. This is a territorial dynamic established by the central and the local together – in the context of the urban metamorphosis – and can thus reject the popular discourse of central-local dichotomy.

The territorialisation of municipalities

Those who investigate territorial dynamics in contemporary China find that the most critical change has been the transition from a vertical territorial logic to an urban-oriented territorial-scalar system. In the Maoist era, a vertical territorial system was established and maintained together with the socialist growth strategy. Under the vertical logic, it was the state-owned enterprises (hereafter SOEs) and other type of work units that played a dominant role in arranging the centralised process of production as well as the fragmented process of labour reproduction (Wu 1995, 1997). In this system, the central-local connection is reduced to a contracting link: it is the allocation of materials from central commanders on the one hand and the obedient turning in of products by the local on the other. A department called the National Administration Bureau for Material

17 In Chinese, this vertical territorial logic is described as “based on bars, supported by blocks” (条条为主, 条块结合, tiaotiao weizhu, tiaokuai jiehe) where bars refer to the vertical hierarchy of production and consumption, and blocks indicate localities where such state activities take place.
Management (later renamed the Ministry of Material Management) was established in 1961 (CPC 1961) to achieve the “three vertical managements” of human resources, financial revenues and material allocation (Zhou 2012, 27). This indeed marks the final consolidation of the vertical territorial logic.

However, the vertical logic soon saw great conflicts when the economic reform was unveiled after the late 1970s. A new logic gradually emerged in the 1980s, where the vertical organisation of state work units (条, tiao) was replaced by the horizontal network of local (municipal) governments (块, kuai). In contrast to the socialist strategy of exerting direct influences over the aspects of production and consumption, a new quasi-principal-agent relationship was erected between the central and the local (Zhou 2012, 46). The central government required the local government to boost economic growth and share financial revenues, without giving any direction how it was to do these things. In addition, the local realised that it could bargain with the central if it could meet the expectations of the latter (such as the increase of GDP and fiscal revenues). Both of them now had clear expectation of each other in terms of power and revenue sharing and could draw unequivocal boundaries regarding their rights, responsibilities and other interests.

But such a change of territorial logics was not achieved spontaneously; instead, various collisions, collusions, tactics and manoeuvres manifested themselves in the dynamic urban political economy. These interactions were clearly registered in previous studies on the issue of “the territorialisation of the municipality” in the context of both socialist territorial legacies and the urbanising territorial-scalar politics (Hsing 2006b, 2010). After more than three decades’ occupation of the urban land for free, in the 1980s the state work units became primary landlords in Chinese cities. For instance, in Shanghai, 58.8% of the urban land was owned by work units in 1982 whereas only 11.2% belonged to the municipal government (Wu 1995, 162). The new policy on land issue, however, soon designated the municipalities as de jure agent of the state ownership of land – who were then ambitious to run the urban businesses by cooperating with the de facto landlords. It is in this way that by the mid-1980s “comprehensive development” projects had begun all over China. Nevertheless, the work units still maintained privileged development rights over their land, at a time when the municipalities were accumulating both territorial and financial power. To assert their territorial authority, municipal leaders
implemented various “city projects” and eventually beat the work units in terms of political, organisational and moral capacity in these “intra-state competitions” (Hsing 2006b, 2010). It is here that the issue of land development became a new site of urban politics, in which the power of the municipalities to govern was being consolidated in practice (Hsing 2006b, 577).

Institutional changes of this kind lead to a new pattern of territorial-scalar politics, and they also induce further changes to the body of the government. The vertical hierarchies in the planned economy, such as the Ministry of Material Management, have to be abolished since they can play only a peripheral role, if any, after the new territorial logic. This illustrates an accurate context of the businesses run by Tianjin Municipal Commerce Bureau described by Jane Duckett (1996, 1998, 2001) – it is only a local branch of the vertical hierarchy allocating production materials and final products (commodities) in a planned economy. This Bureau ran its businesses not only to “adapt to marketisation,” but also in response to the “pressures to cut the state administration” (Duckett 1996, 185-86). Rather than taking such businesses as a signal of the “entrepreneurial state” in China, as Duckett tends to do, it is more accurate to locate such phenomena among the changing territorial logics of China’s urban metamorphosis: the state is increasingly urban but not entrepreneurial (see also Section 2.4).

Following this same territorial logic, the criteria of a “city” have also been changing since the 1980s, together with some other, supplementary, territorial adjustments to foreground the key role of the city in running the urban businesses. Li Zhang and Simon Zhao (1998, 332-35) introduce a detailed account of the changing official criteria for designating a “city” in China (in 1953, 1963, 1983, 1986 and 1993). They recognised that industrial outputs was included in the criteria in 1983 and then gross domestic products (hereafter GDP) in the 1986 criteria (ibid., 333-34). In the end, the mechanism that I want to label “economic determinism” was established in 1993, at which point economic measures were consolidated as the primary concern in recognising any city.19

18 There are four categories of city (市, shi) in China (Ma 2005, 483): (1) Provincial level cities (直辖市, zhixia shi), including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing; (2) sub-provincial level cities (副省级城市, fushengji chengshi; 15 in total in 1999), a half-level lower than zhixiashi, yet a half-level higher than dijishi; (3) prefecture level cities (地级市, diji shi; 256 in total in 2001); (4) county level cities (县级市, xianji shi; 393 in 2001).
19 For example, the gross outputs of a city were required to be more than three billion Yuan, in which industrial outputs should count for more than 80%. In addition, a city’s GDP had to be over 2.5 billion
City status is critical in China because it is associated with various political and economic privileges. Inspired by the desire to stimulate regional development by relying on the big cities (Ma 2002, 1561), the State Council proposed three sets of territorial updates since 1981: to abolish county and establish city (撤县改市, chexian gai shi), to make the cities administering counties (市管县, shiguanshan) and to re-draw suburban counties as urban districts (撤县设区, chexian shequ) (ibid., see also Zhao 1981). These changes have generated both territorial and politico-economic effects. By 1989, 30% of the counties in China were under the administration of cities (increased from 133 in 1977 to 711 in 1989) and 90% of all cities (at the prefectural level or above) acquired one or more counties as subordinated hinterland (Zhang and Zhao 1998, 338). Cities not only seize a higher rank in the hierarchy but also obtain plenty of business opportunities such as acquiring land and gathering fiscal revenues from the subordinate counties. In addition, these territorial strategies also enable Party leaders to continue directing local behaviours by stimulating competitions in the form of tournaments (锦标赛体制, jinbiao sai tizhi) – a powerful technique which had been used since the 1950s (Zhou 2012). Now, the prize in the system is not political or ideological rewards (as they used to be in the 1950s) but is the city status – this indeed echoes a change in the regime’s rationale from a socialist-utopian dream to de-politicised pragmatism (for details, see Chapter 4).

City is no longer a geographical or demographical concept anymore. It has become a politico-economic bargaining chip between the central and the local, which makes a new focus for restructuring the territorial-scalar politics. As Cartier (2005, 26-30) aptly comments, this demonstrates that the urban level is now foregrounded in the rescaling process of the state. On this foundation we can gradually recognise other forms of interactions between the central and the local, such as the emergence of the city-regions in China (Huang, Li, and Hay 2016, Ma 2005, Xu 2008) and, accordingly, jumping scales for repositioning the city at the regional, national and international level (Shin 2014b, Xu and Yeh 2005). Such new relations between the central and the local vividly show us that municipal governments are now made into the principal state agent for urban businesses, replacing the state work units which used to control the vertical territorial logic in the

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Yuan out of which output values from the tertiary sector should exceed that from the agricultural sector. For details, see Zhang and Zhao (1998).
Maoist era. Furthermore, to consolidate the power of the municipal agents, this newly erected urban-oriented territorial-scalar system also requires other institutional transitions, such as changes to fiscal institutions and the emergence of a new political milieu for land commodification.

**Fiscal institutions as a territorial strategy**

There is a widely accepted myth in China urban studies that sees the 1994 fiscal reform as a turning point in central-local relations when the trend of decentralisation was erected and sustained (for example, see Wu 1995). Some go even further to claim that this trend gives a solid evidence for the presence of a neoliberalising process in China (He and Wu 2009, 285-86). This is a perfect obverse of the fact, however. The introduction of a tax-sharing system in China in 1994 indeed marks the central government’s ambitions to re-centralise its power of economic management power after the long decline in the 1980s (Zhang 1999, 130). Though the central share of the fiscal revenue rose from 22.02% in 1993 to 55.7% in 1994 (ibid., 134), it was not achieved without compromises. Such interactions between the central and the local, rather than the simplified theme of decentralisation, deserve more reflections in order to register territorial dynamics within the urban metamorphosis. This sub-section illustrates that several rounds of both fiscal decentralisation and recentralisation have appeared in turn since the 1950s; and drawing on the historical observation I want to propose an alternative argument that fiscal arrangements are by nature territorial. That is to say, changes in fiscal institutions illustrate the same process of territorial-scalar dynamics: they are neither centralised nor decentralised but are always compromises for addressing politico-economic concerns.

It was noted above that China adopted the Stalinist growth strategy in the Maoist era. To facilitate its industrialisation-biased development path, a centralised fiscal system was also erected in the 1950s. Though there was a (nominal) tax-sharing system, most taxes were collected centrally; indeed, the central government seized 80% of fiscal revenues and 75% of fiscal responsibilities (Zhou 2012, 21). Mao and other central leaders soon realised that such a highly centralised system failed to mobilise the local incentives for boosting industrial development (Mao 1956) and followed it by a first round of decentralisation (放权, fangquan) from 1958 to 1960. The SOEs directly under the central government were reduced from 9,300 in 1957 to 1,200 in 1958, a reduction by 88%,
mostly from transferring them to the control of local governments. Meanwhile, the fiscal revenues collected by the central government dropped to 20% of the total (Zhou 2012, 23). At this time, Mao Zedong launched his Great Leap Forward Movement and called on people to catch up with Great Britain in 15 years (see Chapter 4 for more details). The rearrangement of the centralised fiscal institutions played a critical role in encouraging all local state agents to participate in the tournament competitive system, of which the central leaders took firm charge by means of political control, media propaganda and the assignment of resources (ibid., 23-26). All this activity took place in the socialist planned economy, where no market for allocating resources existed and hence it is better to interpret this phenomenon as a change in the way that state agents shared their economic-fiscal responsibilities, while the political system consistently remained totalitarian.

Mao’s Great Leap Forward Movement finished in 1961, after the suffering brought by the Great Famine and the death of 36 million people (Yang 2012). Then a new Party resolution was issued in 1961, claiming that “the national economy was like a chessboard, on which both the central and the local should share one and the same account book” (CPC 1961). The fiscal institution was recentralised, through which most of the economic activities and management power were relocated to the agents of the central state (Zhou 2012, 27). But the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) arrived soon after. For the purpose of seizing power from the “capitalist roaders” (走資派, zouzi pai), Mao and his followers reduced and merged 90 departments of the State Council into only 27 in 1970, which at once induced a decline of central control (ibid., 29). The transfer of SOEs from state agents to local agents happened again in this period (affecting 9,000 out of 10,533) with plenty of financial resources directed to local small industries. The effects soon emerged: in 1975, the output value of local enterprises (at the county level or below) amounted to 49% of the total national output values (ibid., 27-32), which set the stage for the booming of town and village enterprises (TVEs) in the 1980s. To accommodate such a political economic trend, a contracting system of fiscal responsibilities was also implemented, which paved the way for the birth of a lump sum responsibility system in the coming decade (ibid., 34).

Fiscal contracts were established in the 1980s between the central government and each province, which were described by the officials as “having dinners in separate kitchens”
(分灶吃饭; *fenzao chifan*). They set up the ratio of local financial revenues to pay to the central government each year. For example, Beijing was required to submit 50% of its fiscal revenues annually to the central government, while Shanghai had to submit 10.5 billion Yuan, regardless of the growth or decline of taxes and revenues (Zhou 2012, 33-38). Such a bottom-up contracting system played a crucial role in stimulating regional competition and economic growth in China in the 1980s (Li and Zhou 2005, Maskin, Qian, and Xu 2000, Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1995). It is only from this perspective that we can understand the rapidly increased motivation of local state agents to develop TVEs (Oi 1992, 1995) and running other enterprises in the city (Duckett 1996, 2001).

The 1994 fiscal reform, however, terminated the central-local negotiation over the share of fiscal revenues to be paid by each province. Instead, the central government commanded localities to share their revenues in a renewed two-track institution (separating the national taxation and the local taxation systems). This more than doubled at a stroke the average ratio (at national level) of local revenues to be submitted to the central government (Zhang 1999, Zhou 2012), as noted at the outset of this sub-section.

Other effects of this institutional change soon emerged in the second half of the 1990s. First of all, the local state agents lost their interests in developing the TVEs because the value-added tax (VAT) became a tax to be shared between central (75%) and local (25%). VAT had been a main channel for local state agents to extract revenues from their TVEs – but after the 1994 fiscal reform it was no longer valid (Zhou 2012, 10). Such a decline of TVEs requires our further reflections on, and even refutation of, the popular theories such as Oi’s local state corporatism and Duckett’s entrepreneurial state: both stem from the observation of a decentralised fiscal arrangement in the 1980s – but in the 1994 reform this was completely reversed. Second, while the ratio of centrally-collected revenues in the budget significantly increased, it does not imply that central spending was rising at the same rate. On the contrary, a large portion of the central revenues were redistributed to the local through a “transfer payment mechanism,” which was another outcome of the 1994 fiscal reform (Zhang 1999). In many cities and counties in middle and western China, it was estimated, more than 50% of local government expenditures were covered by the central transfer payment (Zhou 2012). This transfer payment was not guaranteed or evenly distributed to every locality; instead, the amount obtained depended on its ability to “run for projects” (跑项目, *pao xiangmu*). This may explain
why every city in China has its Beijing Office and why many local officials go every day to visit the Ministry of Finance and National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) – to run for projects (Qu 2012). A new “project system” of governance was thus established with the fiscal institution of the transfer payment (ibid.) and this in turn shows in what sense fiscal institutions are by nature territorial. Was the Party-state regime, then, decentralised after 1994? The answer is certainly not, and the reality lies in the opposite.

The political milieu for land commodification

It is proposed in Section 2.2 that the urban metamorphosis was eventually consolidated in 1994. Actually, it is not a coincidence that the fiscal reform was promoted in the same year in 1994; rather, the institutional changes of China’s fiscal system mark a critical juncture in the urban metamorphosis in general and in land commodification in particular. Mao Zedong changed the fiscal arrangements to stimulate local state agents in the socialist-utopian tournaments, while the 1980s witnessed a trend of decentralisation to facilitate local competition for economic growth – both indicate the territorial power inherent in fiscal institutions. Only with this logic can we recognise that the 1994 fiscal reform marks the starting point of a process whereby the Party’s market-oriented ethos totally enveloped the urban space and then required local state agents to shift their focus accordingly to urban/land businesses. After the 1992-1993 “land fever”, the local also realised the potential benefits from space and land, and a new territorial collusion was generated between the central and the local, endorsed by the 1994 fiscal reform. Its result is unquestionably significant and familiar in urban studies in China: the boom in state-led, urban-oriented and land-based accumulation projects has occupied the whole country ever since.

The pre-history of China’s land commodification was illustrated in the last section. What should be recapped here is that at first the land lease fees were divided, in legal provisions, between the central and the local (State Council 1990), the former taking around 30% and the latter 70%. But this provision was suspended in 1994 for two reasons: the first was to motivate local state agents to collect as much in land revenues as possible (Zhou 2012, 229) and the second to minimise the local resistance to the fiscal reform, since local authorities can build a “secondary financial channel” from their land resources (Sun 2006). While land-related taxes were proposed and included in the new budgetary system
after 1994 (e.g., land value-gaining tax and securities trading stamp tax), land lease fees were excluded from the state budget and reserved for the local state agents as their extra-budgetary revenues (Zhou 2012, 218). What happened thereafter is quite familiar by now (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Since then, “land finance” (土地财政, tudi caizheng) has dominated the rationale and behaviour of local state agents (Hsing 2010, Lin 2009, Zhou 2012). Indeed, a recent estimation is that the local authorities earned more than 30 trillion Yuan from 1999 to 2016 (Ye 2016a); more than two-thirds of this was collected between 2011 and 2016 (21.55 trillion in total) (Liu 2017).

This land story becomes even more interesting if we investigate the details of the political milieu where land is taken as the object of both contest and collusion between the central and the local. Hsing (2010, 212) justly observes that the intra-state power is indeed “re-aligned along land interests” in the course of what she labels “the urbanisation of the local state.” However, this is only one side of the story. Hsing belittles the other side, which is equally critical in territorial dynamics: between the central and the local. The second side can be best illustrated through the changing political milieu of land commodification. When Fulong Wu (1995, 1997) explores the comprehensive development projects conducted by the municipal governments, he is shocked by the fact that preference in land leasing is always given to closed-door negotiations (协议出让, xieyi churang) above auctions (拍卖, paimai). Many researchers in China urban studies at the time tended to see such phenomena as a symptom of China’s immature land market and to call for more marketisation measures (Ho and Lin 2003, Zhou 2004, Zhu 2000). Nevertheless, the key issue in this regard is not the maturity of the land market, but territorial-scalar politics and its effects on the everyday practice of state agents. It is gradually made plain that closed-door negotiation is a rational choice for the local state agents – with it, not only can they maintain autonomy in the production of urban space, but they can also get monetary revenues and hidden personal benefits (instead of sharing them with the central government) (Wu 1997, 660, Wu, Xu, and Yeh 2007, 6-8).

In the light of the 1998 Land Management Act, the State Council issued a series of land regulations so as to change its weak position in the process of land commodification. The first significant regulation was announced on 30 May 2001; it was claimed that the lack of transparency in land businesses enabled some local state agents and departments to
earn most revenues at the expense of central government (State Council 2001). As a response, auction and tendering were to be “vigorously promoted” as the principal method for leasing land. In addition, the State Council continued, the total area of construction land plots should be controlled, in order to “apply the fundamental role of market in allocating land resources” – that is, to render the price “reasonably” high. For this aim, the local government was encouraged to try out a land reservation system (land bank) to exercise its monopolisation of the local land supply. Following the State Council’s announcement, two consequent ordinances were released by the Ministry of Land and Resources (hereafter MLR) in 2002 (No.11) and 2004 (No.71); they were so significant in affecting the land and housing market that the media at the time labelled the pair China’s new “land revolution” (Hsing 2010, 48, MLR 2002, 2004).

The local responses were anything but obedience to the centre. In Beijing, for example, the Municipal Government issued a local regulation the month after the No.11 Ordinance. It illustrates some kouzi (口子; i.e., loopholes for evading central orders) (BMG 2002b), such as projects in green belts, in small towns, for redeveloping old and dilapidated areas and for developing high-tech industries. In the end, as Hsing (2010, 52-53) describes, most urban projects can be categorised among these kouzi if they obtain an endorsement from municipal or district officials. From 2002 to 2004, in Beijing, one hundred million square metres of land were leased out, all in the name of these kouzi (Yin 2004) – rendering central announcements and ordinances literally useless. Such kouzi were widespread all over the country: taking different forms following the local conditions. All are aimed at exploiting loopholes that can get frustrate the central ambition to intervene in the land business. Confronted by this situation, the MLR issued a No.71 Ordinance in 2004 as a further measure to implement the State Council’s regulation of 2001. At the beginning of this document, MLR admitted that “local leaders and cadres still tend to violate regulations and intervene in the leasing of land use rights” (MLR 2004). Hence, 31 August 2004 was set as the deadline for local governments to deal with their “historical issues” (i.e., various kouzi), after which no locality was permitted to conduct closed-door negotiations. No excuse was to be tolerated and the major local leaders would be held accountable, the MLR warned (ibid.).

The central government has been satisfied with the effects of such ordinances. An official from the MLR later declared in a news report that the total area of the land plots leased
out through tendering, auction or quotation reached 66.5 thousand hectares (665 million square metres) in 2006, which were nine times more than that in 2001; and the open market actions brought the state 549 billion Yuan as land revenues in 2006, 10.2 times higher than the registered revenues in 2001 (Liu 2007). These ordinances and their effects indeed paved the way for the forthcoming boom of the land market and local state revenues from land – as shown at the outset of this sub-section (more details on this process are presented in Chapter 5 for they are articulated with the rising role of Beijing’s green belts as an accumulation strategy). They confirmed once again the dialectical relationship between the central and the local – each of them has its own, diverse, agencies but their interactions form a dynamic process that cannot be reduced to any abstract term, even the popular narrative of “decentralisation.” While municipal governments have been transformed into new, principal, state agents in running urban/land businesses, their behaviour patterns are still bound to both the Party ethos and the Party leaders’ “will to power” (i.e., to sustain and consolidate the regime by reproducing the relations of production in an urban way).

Cartier (2011a) aptly points out that scalar relations are indeed a territorial mirror of the political economy. Three cases of China’s territorial dynamics have been illustrated here, namely, the territorialisation of municipalities, fiscal institutions as a territorial strategy, and the political milieu for land commodification. They can all help to demonstrate that territorial and fiscal institutions are together transformed in the urban metamorphosis by the central and the local. While neither of them can control the territorial dynamics, it is equally important to recognise that they do in fact rely on each other to achieve identical politico-economic goals. It is the ways through which different state agents collide and collude with each other – that is, the micro mechanisms of power relations in everyday life – that are worth our further investigations. Such issues are not untouched by previous research, yet gaps are still manifest; and this gap is one that I hope to bridge in this thesis by looking at Beijing’s green belts.

In Hsing’s comprehensive and insightful account of Chinese urban builders (2006b, 2010), for example, the agency of the local state in the “interconnected physical, territorial and ideological construction of urbanism” (2010, 10) is well registered. However, while she notes “the city and the local state are mutually constitutive” (ibid., 212), she says less about the Party and its central leaders who have been promoting the
urban metamorphosis and empowering the municipal governments to be principal agents of urban businesses. In another study, George Lin and Samuel Ho (2005) aptly illustrate gaps between the intentions of central government and the outcomes in land development at the local level. This recognition leads them to the argument that there are “many states” in China (ibid., 411, 431), whose shared power dynamics, complexity and heterogeneity should be examined in empirical investigations. However, the issue I have with this argument is that it tends to define the state(s) with its (their) institutional forms and capacities at the cost of actual dynamic politico-economic processes. To register the territorial dynamics, I would conclude, the popular narrative of decentralisation needs to be dropped and the focus should be shifted to the microphysics of power relations in the everyday life.

2.4 The Limit of neoliberalism: State and market in the urban metamorphosis

“…to allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society.” (Polanyi 1957, 73, cited in Harvey 2005a, 167)

The Party’s changing ethos from the Marxist-Leninist doctrines to the market-oriented was illustrated above in Section 2.2. It was proposed there that a new attitude towards the market was initiated by Deng Xiaoping in his 1979 speeches and developed in a series of the Party documents in the 1980s. After Deng’s Southern Tour/Talk in 1992, the term “socialist market economy” was finally inscribed in the Party’s agenda, which requires the state to regulate the market and the market to guide enterprises. In the prelude to China’s urban metamorphosis, both the reference horizon and the coordinates of action of the Party were fundamentally revised and this in turn set the basis for the articulation between state and capital. In such a historical-geographical juncture, academic attention was directed also to the articulation between the state and capital, soon giving rise to two popular misunderstandings. The first genre is to take the formation of a market society as a normative and promising direction for a country, which calls for a series of policy
changes to comply with the expectation. The second genre emerges from reflections on the first, when some researchers recognise that such market fetishism joints the trend to neoliberalisation – a global phenomenon that is shaping the spirit of our times. However, they abandon the obligations in investigating local and historical conditions carefully and only search and register those “selective evidence that mirrors trans-Atlantic neoliberal conditions” (Cartier 2011b, 1119).

In this section, I will reflect on both genres of misunderstanding and illustrate that the making of a market mechanism in the urban process induces the demolition of society in a unique way. Indeed, here lies a cunning ploy of the state in which double tactics are deployed: on the one hand, the market is utilised under the state’s control for its politico-economic ambitions; on the other, discourses such as the “socialist market economy” produces a dichotomy between the state and market, which then renders the state’s many governmental techniques invisible and frees them from critical scrutiny. The market is not the new emperor (according to the reminder from Haila 2007) – the emperor is still the old one but he now wears a new mask called “market” for his own survival. This is the reason why we also have to drop the dichotomy between the state and the market.

“City management” in the “entrepreneurial state”

In light of the Party’s newly erected market-oriented ethos, the academic trend of market fetishism has been significant since the 1990s. Drawing on dogmas from neo-classical economics, this market fetishism generates a dichotomy between the state and the market and claims that the transition from a state-dominated economic system to a marketised one marks the inevitable and promising future of China (Nee 1989, 1996). This argument perfectly summarises the dominant imaginations of the country in the 1990s, which were indeed neoliberal at first. The import of the marketisation discourse soon conceals the topography of power: instead of examining the rationale (and cunning) of the Party-state in deploying its market discourses, many researchers focus only on the aspects that are not “marketised” enough and then ask for further measures to be taken to construct this promising “market society.” The field of urban studies is not exempt from the marketisation myth; instead, the myth becomes a point of departure when some researchers claim that China’s land market is not “perfect” and hence should be further consolidated in the socialist market economy (Zhao 2002, Zhou 2004, Zhu 2000). Yet,
this flawed “conventional wisdom” of market fetishism was terminated before long by a series of debates between Anne Haila (2007, 2009) and Jieming Zhu (2009), after which no serious scholar in this field could go on blindly following the “marketisation” thesis.

The puzzles in the state-market relationship in China have not, however, been resolved. Two further narratives in China urban studies became dominant. The first narrative was a claim that the state has changed itself in an entrepreneurial way in the formation of a market society (Duckett 1996, 2001, Wu 2002, 2003). The second was a call from some native scholar-officials, who declared that the city should be run as a business (Qiu 2001a, b, 2002, 2003, 2004, Zhao 2001, 2002). Immediately, the reverberations of these two interrelated narratives induced far-reaching effects, both within and outside academia. However, they do little to promote our understanding of the articulation of state and capital in the urban metamorphosis – instead, they complicate it further.

During her fieldwork in the city of Tianjin in the early 1990s, Duckett (1996, 2001) observed the adaptation to the marketisation process of the municipal bureaux as they set up businesses in the emerging market. Since the local state agents have been increasingly independent, profit-seeking, risk-taking and economically productive, Duckett (1996, 182) urges us to accept her view that the Chinese state itself is becoming entrepreneurial. In addition, she continues, the state is not rent-seeking because corporations established by the municipal bureaux are operated in the market and do involve risk. “The onus would be on critics to demonstrate that the entrepreneurial state is squeezing out private or state enterprise by monopolising particular markets” (ibid., 191), says Duckett. This is the point where the fatal flaw reveals itself: paying no attention to the local conditions, Duckett draws a boundary between the state and market and at the same time selectively ignores the newly foregrounded urban metamorphosis in which the local state agents are designated as the de jure owners of all urban land together with the monopoly power in the land market (Shin 2009). The reason why her research is mentioned again is that such a narrative of the “entrepreneurial state” gained its power in urban studies of China in an era when what Duckett observed had already disappeared: since the vertical territorial system was withering away soon after her field observations, the municipal bureaux were transformed (and some were abolished) while their corporations were forbidden to run businesses anymore (State Council 1995).
The use of such vocabulary items as “entrepreneurial” in urban studies has two origins, Bob Jessop and David Harvey – both geographically from the Anglophone world, and both historically compiling their views in the post-Fordist era. For Jessop (1997, 40), the key to an entrepreneurial regime is “a specific articulation of government and governance mechanisms [being] able to regularise functional and territorial aspects of the imagined economy in question.” For Harvey (1989b), the new focus of urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism is an effect of the changing political economy of the advanced capitalist world. Under the “flexible accumulation,” urban governments are required to change the method of governance and to reorganise urban space by forming coalitions and alliances through public-private partnerships. Those cases observed by Duckett in Tianjin, however, have nothing to do with either. We simply cannot claim that the trading companies, tourist companies and property development companies set up by the Tianjin Municipal Commerce Bureau (Duckett 2001, 26) are related to the rise of the imagined economy or its governance; nor are they involved in organising urban space.

Urban space is undeniably under transformation in China, as shown in Section 2.2, but this is taking place through channels other than those recorded by Duckett; and the use of improper urban vocabulary can do little to facilitate our reflections and critiques of the urban metamorphosis. With terms as such, researchers set sail to investigate institutional innovations under the market pressure – such as the development of entrepreneurial space and the boom of market-oriented land development (Wu 2003, 1680). The state has been tamed by the market, it seems, if we go one step further from such an “entrepreneurial” thinking. I would prefer to turn the matter upside down: it is not that the market tames the state, but rather that the state conscripts the market as an element of its manoeuvres in the so-called “socialist market economy.” In the consolidation of the (local) state’s monopoly power in the land market, in the gain of thirty trillion Yuan as land revenues, we should have been able to recognise the state’s cunning and inner duplicity. But not yet. This delay is crucially produced by the entrepreneurial myth; equally important is another popular discourse which arose in the literature at around the same time – on the issue of “city management.” It is more influential in policy-making than in academic discussions. However, both of these myths contribute a fair amount to instil the idea of a state-market dichotomy, even though the market is in fact only a new mask of the state for running urban/land businesses.
Shortly before the end of the twentieth century, the word “city management” (城市经营, chengshi jingying) started to be influential in urban policy making in China. It literally means in Chinese “to run a city as a business”; thus the gap between the connotations of the Chinese and English terms is academically significant. Indeed, it perhaps indicates some of the fundamental neoliberal assumptions held by scholar-officials. Qiu Baoxing and Zhao Yanjing are two leading promoters of this new model of urban policy making, both at once scholars and high-ranking officials. Qiu was Mayor of Hangzhou (the capital city of Zhejiang Province) at the turn of the century, before being promoted to Deputy Minister of Construction in 2001. Zhao was then Director of the Research Institute for Urban Planning Theory at the China Academy of Urban Planning and Design (CAUPD), and was then promoted to Deputy Chief Planner at CAUPD and Director of the Xiamen Planning Bureau (another Special Economic Zone established by Deng Xiaoping), both in 2004. Ten years later, he was appointed Vice President of the China Urban Planning Society, a prestigious position that holds both policy influences and academic power.

Running the city as a business, Qiu (2004, 15) declares, is the product of the “socialist market economy” in urban development. It refers to the method of increasing the local state’s financial capacity for and through infrastructure investments. Good conditions of infrastructure can elevate the value of land resources (Qiu 2001a, 86), and hence local governments should be reformed and decentralised into firms (Qiu 2001b, 27) and the market (the capital market in particular) should be foregrounded as the new foundation for city management (Qiu 2001a, 87, 2001b, 28, 2004, 15). Zhao Yanjing goes even further. Infected by dogmas from neo-classical economics, he declares that if the city can be run as a business it is a perfect way to allocate resources (Zhao 2002) – as long as there is “perfect competition” between various localities with clearly defined rights and authorities, as the Tiebout Model (Tiebout 1956) stipulates. Such ideas are not without their critics in academia. For example, Zhang Tingwei (2004) presents a genealogy of neo-liberalism and its critiques in Western literature and reminds Chinese planners that the method of “city management” is merely a projection of neo-liberalism in China’s urban change, which might undermine the concern for social justice.

Such warnings have in the event been completely ignored. Many, if not most, mayors in China have been convinced of the effectiveness of the concept and are loyally putting it into practice. Geng Yanbo, Mayor of Datong in Shanxi Province between 2009 and 2013,
can be taken as a typical case. Mr Geng is famous in China because he demolished half of the city and relocated 500,000 residents to create space for pseudo-ancient buildings and the (anticipated) land and tourism revenues. For Mr Geng, this was just a new and updated approach to running his urban business (Geng 2013), which, I should add here, is unique in its scale – that of the whole city. Maybe for this reason, Mr Geng recently staged at a documentary film entitled “The Chinese Mayor” (and broadcast by the BBC) (Zhou 2015), which gives a good sketch of this group of people running their “urban businesses.” Can we draw the boundary between the state and the market and between the state and capital? No, since the state is making itself a new emperor running urban businesses. Terms such as “entrepreneurialism” do help to register the mayors’ ambitions in their market actions, but they are useless if we plan to go further and make known the state’s underlying rationale, logic and cunning.

During the urban metamorphosis of the state, a bundle of state-dominated political and ideological projects are raised, as Shin (2014a) clearly illustrates; and we should move beyond such familiar terms as entrepreneurial state, entrepreneurial city and the varieties of the state-market dichotomy. Such dichotomies are rooted in an epistemological myth that obscures everyday-material practices of the state. It is through these practices that the state generates “a non-material totality that seems to exist apart from the material world of society” (Mitchell 2006, 181); this shows a technique, a cunning, which defines the state. We critical researchers must not let ourselves be entrapped by the myth. On the contrary, we should recognise the technique of drawing boundaries between the state and the market, or between the state and society and then penetrate the mechanisms in which the boundaries are consolidated. Only in this way can we “critically analyse and expose important issues of social and environmental injustice that have negatively affected the lives of a large number of the socially excluded, marginalised and disadvantaged groups” (Ma 2007, 556), which, I concur, are the moral and disciplinary obligations of all those researchers who have lasting ties to this country.

China and neoliberalism: further reflections

When we talk about relations between the state and the market, a word that cannot be avoided is neoliberalism. As a dominant concept in urban studies in the 2000s, this term has exerted a profound influence both within and beyond academia. Students of China
urban studies are no exception. Neoliberalism was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1 when the literature was briefly introduced. Drawing on the recognition of an “empirical match” (Cartier 2011b) there, I want now to give a comprehensive account of discussions on neoliberalism and China. I will highlight that its power and its limits have equally been laid bare when the concept is imported from an Anglophone context.

The rise of neoliberalism since the 1970s, for Peck and Tickell (2002), is an indicator of a new regulatory regime where deregulations are followed by active state-building. The key role of the state looms large in this process with “new technologies of government… being designed and rolled out” (ibid., 389). The most significant effect of such regulatory regime is creative destruction, according to Harvey (2007), for it is by nature a utopian project of ideological and political restructuring in order to re-establish social conditions for the ruling class. In this process, the market logic is naturalised (as a political construction) to enable accumulation by dispossession; and its four signature elements are privatisation, financialisation, management and manipulation of crises, and state redistributions (ibid.). This recognition of neoliberalism as the latest form of capitalist hegemonic domination is influential in urban studies, but it is not the only perspective. Aihwa Ong (2006, 2007), for example, says that it is not convincing to take neoliberalism as “a fixed set of attributes with predetermined outcomes” (2007, 3). And she proposes this term can be taken “as a logic of governing that migrates and is selectively taken up in diverse political contexts” (ibid., 3).

Despite the different starting points, what is shared by the two approaches is their focus on the role of the state and its governing logics/technologies. Yet this focus is overlooked when the concept comes to China urban studies. It has long been a puzzle for researchers facing a “strange combination of strong state intervention and radical market orientation” (Wu 2007, 18) – a puzzle that emerged together with the decline of market fetishism, which should not seem unexpected. But a myth soon reveals itself when we admit to being puzzled: the “strange combination” is seen as a genuine case of “the stage of ‘rolling out’ neoliberalism in which state intervention moves away from redistribution to supporting the market” (ibid., 18). After Harvey’s (2005a, 34-41) reminder that China should be taken as a strange case of neoliberalism with authoritarian centralised control, it is suggested that this control is a new invention to respond to marketisation (Wu 2008, 1093-94). The relations between state and market are worth further reflections. Indeed,
there has been a long discussion on how the market is rendered into the instrument of government – since the classic works of Adma Smith (Arrighi 2007, 41). To join in this discussion, we may need to pay more attention to the power and agency of the state in the concrete case (i.e., China’s urban process) and then interrogate the “socialist market economy” in a way that foregrounds the nature and conduct of the state – rather than to insiste on the “instrumentalist” discourse.

That said, the use of “neo-liberalism” in China urban studies is limited, entrapped in their lack of reflections on the state-market dichotomy. This belief not only deviates from the original discussions of this concept in its Anglophone context (where it is powerful in understanding politico-economic changes), but also complicates the articulation of the state and capital in the urban metamorphosis in China. George Lin (2014) follows this idea even when he sees that the dichotomy is problematic. After recognising a trap in the (Western) literature on global city regions and the neoliberal urban entrepreneurialism that privileges only global capitalism, he first admits that there must be tensions when such terms are applied in the Global South, and then jumps into the trap all the same. For, Lin (2014, 1822) states, “it is not unreasonable to argue that the Chinese practice of state power decentralization, marketization of the planned economy and promotion of competition and openness bears a certain resemblance at least in form to its Western counterpart” – after all, he continues, it is now “the era of neoliberalisation” (ibid., 1823). In a later article, Lin and his co-authors go on to claim that state power reshuffling is the political origin of land development and that it is the Chinese version of neoliberalism where land commodification plays a central role (Lin et al. 2015, 1964).

Similarly, Lim (2014) adopts the new trendy concept of “variegated neoliberalism” from Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2010) to study “the dialectical fusions of socialist policies with neoliberal logics” (Lim 2014, 223). Here he identifies a “geographically variegated neoliberalisation” in several territorial projects conducted by the Chinese state. For Lim, cross-provincial regional programs and intra-urban economic zones in China can show how and how far the discourse of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is gradually inflected by the process of neoliberalisation – with the latter performing critical socio-spatial functions in the former (ibid.). This socio-spatial dialectic, he continues, is the mechanism by which the fusions of socialism and neoliberalism give rise to some new institutional arenas (ibid., 231). However, when Lim encounters gaps between Chinese
conditions and the doctrine of criticising neoliberalism, he at once appeals to Jamie Peck and David Harvey:

“Neoliberalism […] has only ever existed in ‘impure’ form, indeed can only exist in messy hybrids. […] Ironically, neoliberalism possesses a progressive, forward-leaning dynamic by virtue of the very unattainability of its idealized destination.” (Peck 2010, 7, cited in Lim 2014, 225)

“When neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite power, then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be unrecognizable.” (Harvey 2005a, 19, cited in Lim 2014, 226)

Do we not have other items of urban vocabulary with which to make critical reflections on the urban conditions now prevailing? Why should we cut off our toes to fit improper shoes? Though it is true that Lim’s account does not fall into the trap of the dichotomy between the state and market, his narrative is still questionable because he is rather too ambitious to claim the universal validity of neoliberalisation as an analytical concept when it always produces epistemological gaps in interpreting local and historical conditions. For, cross-provincial regional programmes and intra-urban economic zones as he recognises are just by-products of the territorial dynamics discussed in the previous section. As for the “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” few scholars in this area would take it as an element in the nature of the regime (whose market-oriented ethos was illustrated at the outset); but Lim accepts it so as to highlight the ideological tension between socialism and neoliberalism. These tactics do not lead to rewards, which indeed lead his research to be away from much more critical issues, such as the underlying logic of the state to reproduce “socialist” relations in the urban metamorphosis when socialism has been disintegrated.

For Harvey (2005a, 120), Deng Xiaoping’s endorsements of a market-oriented ethos are hard to be identified “as anything other than a conjunctural accident,” since these changes in China coincide with the turn to neoliberalism in both Britain and the United States. His words have two effects: first, positively, neoliberalism is endowed here with world historical significance through this “conjunctural accident,” a point Harvey also wants to declare (ibid., 120); second, negative in its effect, is that this argument “intends to absorb
local differences by the broader pattern of capitalism’s ambition of regulatory and spatial fix,” which “ignores the diversity of urban experiences” (Robinson 2011, 1092-93). This second point shows an epistemological gap inherent in the regulationist Marxist approach; it merits more reflections before we can adopt it in China urban studies – because local contingencies and political dynamics play critical roles as well, especially in China’s urban metamorphosis, as discussed in the previous sections and in chapters to come.

I concur with many insightful comments Harvey makes on “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics,” such as: “what the Chinese had to learn […] was that the market can do little to transform an economy without a parallel shift in class relations, private property, and all the other institutional arrangements that typically ground a thriving capitalist economy” (Harvey 2005a, 121-22). Even so, however, I cannot accept its tendency to overlook the everyday, the contingencies, the specific measures and technologies that are involved in politico-economic changes and the neoliberal treatment of aspects that are not economic (capital). The exporting of such concepts to China is also problematic since they are inflected by the dichotomy between state and market. It may be critical in the Anglophone post-Fordist context that the state colludes with capital via public-private partnership in the market. However, in China, a place where all urban land is owned by the state (with municipal governments as the principal agents), where the state becomes the biggest landlord and makes huge profits by “localising” Marxist-Leninist doctrines, we cannot afford to import some concepts and then select evidence to comply with the “norm” at elsewhere. In the shadow of Chinese characteristics without socialism, it is our obligation to embark upon a search for alternative terms and concepts and also a new vocabulary to register the contingencies and political dynamics. Only with such a local, specific and well-founded concern can we go on to explore the world-wide historical significances that are extra-local and abstract (see also Robinson 2016, Waley 2012).

To conclude, I want to go back to Polanyi. The link between market mechanisms and the demolition of society, as cited at the outset of this section, applies and does not apply to China. It is applicable because a market-oriented ethos is indeed consolidated in and by the Party-state regime; but does not apply in so far as this ethos does not lead to the demolition of society. Instead, what we can see is the restructuring of society following the Party-state’s market-oriented ethos. In the practice of this ethos, the state does not alienate itself from the market; rather it ingests the market and absorbs it – making land
and housing market the frontier. This double tactic requires us to reflect on such popular narratives in previous studies as state-market relations (a dichotomy) and state rescaling (decentralisation). And more than this. The adoption of concepts originating from other contexts, such as “neoliberalism,” should be critically considered as well. Our task is not to report partial evidence for “universal” truth but to recognise local contingencies and political dynamics and the tremendous effect of these on everyday life and space.

2.5 Summary

This chapter presents a full review of the changing nature and form of the state in China. It starts from a detailed illustration of China’s urban metamorphosis since 1979, which in the end consolidated itself in 1994 after the newly established Party-ethos of the “socialist market economy.” In this metamorphosis, the regime’s reference horizon and coordinates of action were completely changed and the urban space is gradually foregrounded as a new frontier for its sustaining of legitimacy and regime. Only by recognizing this were we able to properly identify the changing relations between central and local and between the state and the market. In this chapter, the literature on these two sets of relations was critically examined in order to substantiate the claim that the central-local dichotomy and the state-market dichotomy were equally problematic. On the one hand, the changes in territorial and fiscal institutions since the 1980s were illustrated to show why and how central and local were integrated in the dynamic territorial system – in which neither prevails since it is in itself fluid. On the other, the state deploys the market as a new tactic for both legitimacy and accumulation, but it at the same time erects a dichotomy between itself and the market in such discourses as the “socialist market economy.” This is what I called double-tactics and depicted as so powerful that it makes the state’s governmental techniques invisible and free from critical scrutiny. Facing the cunning of the state, we should recognise the state’s manoeuvres in drawing boundaries and penetrate the mechanisms in which these boundaries are consolidated. Intellectual resources from other contexts can be helpful only when they are critically reflected upon keeping local differences and contingencies in mind.
Chapter 3 Research methods

3.1 Introduction

I arrived in Beijing in March 2014 to do fieldwork on its green belts. I was excited to think that I had finally managed to penetrate the “real world” where I could establish a new identity as researcher and collect research data. But I straightaway became confused: where was the field? When setting up my initial fieldwork plan, I had tried to follow the requirements of the Malinowskian tradition in ethnography. I had somehow expected field sites to be clearly bounded and fieldwork to take long enough to make local immersion possible. However, the townships and villages at the urban margin of Beijing were every so often being demolished, and green belts were nothing but imaginary, existing only in the municipal master plan. Ethnographic practices were challenged by spatial processes. Such challenges undermined the validity and legitimacy of my fieldwork plan and forced me to reflect not only on the spatiality of the field but also on the ways of doing research in general and fieldwork in particular at the urban margin.

To incorporate such methodological reflections, this chapter starts with a discussion on what it means in doing ethnography that takes space as method (Section 3.2). It shows that an absolutist spatial ontology is immanent in the predominant metaphors in the disciplinary traditions of ethnography, and that this ontology undermines the power of fieldwork to encounter and communicate with the researched. An alternative framework is proposed in this same section, entitled “the dialectics of encounter” and following a relational spatial ontology. Section 3.3 introduces my field sites in Beijing’s green belts. It presents the socio-economic conditions of the two sites I selected for doing observations. It also illustrates why the politico-economic and socio-spatial processes that they internalise should be included when portraying the field and fieldwork. Then in Section 3.4, three moments of encounter are narrated, namely, “in the meeting,” “on the street,” and “by Didi Hitch.” Such moments are meaningful in that they convey both the theoretical and the methodological concerns in this thesis: first, they illustrate how and how far we can locate and trace the state as process in daily life and space; in addition,
they are significant in terms of presenting the way to practise the dialectics of encounter in the extra-ordinary spatial setting of Beijing’s green belts. Then in Section 3.5, some methods of data analysis are introduced, with details given on making transcriptions and establishing the coding structure. This chapter then concludes with Section 3.6, which contains a summary of the above content.

3.2 Space as method

This section aims to erect a relational framework for encountering and communicating in the field, where the conceptualisation of space is renewed and then foregrounded in a new account of the “real world.” In this framework, field sites are better defined as moments in “the dialectics between flows and things” (Harvey 1996, 81). The relations between the researcher and the researched in the field should be recognised as spatiotemporal constructions as well, since they are brought to the fore only when people are thrown together. In other words, encountering and communicating are rooted in socially constructed space and time and conditioned by historical-geographical contingencies – and these two aspects together define the dialectics of encounter. To illustrate why and how such an account is critical, this section starts from two dominant spatial metaphors in doing ethnography, namely, “a conquering gaze of nowhere” and a mobile vision seeing from everywhere (Haraway 1991, 188-89). By examining their origins and limits, it shows that disciplinary traditions of ethnography tend to be trapped by an absolutist spatial ontology that abolishes the agency of space and obscures power relations. To overcome such traps, a relational spatial ontology (Harvey 1996, Massey 2005) is adopted as an alternative, so that we can recognise partial perspectives and situated knowledges. When putting this relational ontology into ethnographic practice, the dialectics of encounter become foregrounded. As emphasised in the second half of this section, such dialectics require space to be recognised as method so as to locate bodily experiences, permit contingent encounters and recapture situated knowledges.

Spatial metaphors in ethnographic practices

Arjun Appadurai (1988) aptly puts it that ethnographic practices are by nature circumstantial encounters and that “place” and “voice” can be used to summarise two key concerns of such encounters: the former refers to speaking from/of while the latter
indicates speaking for/to. However, in practice these concerns are not properly attended to because of two familiar spatial metaphors. One is the naturalist metaphor with “a conquering gaze of nowhere,” and the other is a relativist metaphor that insists on an “infinitely mobile vision” and claims to be able to “see from everywhere” (Haraway 1991, 188-89). This sub-section aims to illustrate that the two spatial metaphors share, and are trapped by, an absolutist spatial ontology that intends to abolish the agency of space and to reify things from processes.

The naturalist metaphor is firmly inscribed in the Malinowskian tradition that was widely used in ethnographic practice in the 20th century (Clifford 1997, for more details see also Clifford and Marcus 1986, Fox 1991, Gupta and Ferguson 1992). For James Clifford (1997, 20), a principal claim raised by Malinowski is that primitive villages are indeed “the locus of cultures” as well as the object of anthropological explorations (in terms of a village-dwelling-field). Although the village is later seen more as a container than an object of ethnographic practices, its naturalist setting is kept untouched as “a clearing whose deceptive transparency obscures the complex processes that go into constructing it” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, 5). A village epistemology is inscribed in this influential naturalist metaphor (Passaro 1997) and it in turn reveals two connotations. One is that a real field worker has to “work for a long time in an isolated area, with people who speak a non-European language, live in ‘a community’, preferably small, in authentic, ‘local’ dwellings” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, 13). The other connotation lies in an isomorphic account of place and culture: space is divided into natural grids (labelled “places”), and these places are then used to demarcate cultural differences with few reflections (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 6-7).

The second metaphor, which is relativist, reveals itself through James Clifford’s endeavours to incorporate literary processes as a way of rebelling against the Malinowskian tradition. Clifford (1986, 6) redefines ethnographic writings as “made-up” fictions and declares “the partiality of cultural and historical truths.” Since culture is no longer an internally coherent concept, the knowing observer as an unseen figure should, in Clifford’s view, be abolished. The dominant metaphor in doing ethnography needs to shift away from the observing eye (visual) to expressive speech (discursive) (ibid., 12). Having undermined the secure ground for cultural representations, Clifford (1997, 22-25) turns his gaze to the “moving ground”, which marks “a serious dream of mapping
without going off the earth” (ibid., 31). Further, he redefines field as a *habitus* for cosmopolitan visitors, which can be seized through *travel encounters*; as for fieldwork, it is recognised as nothing else but “a distinctive cluster of travel practices” that are conducted by cosmopolitan visitors (ibid., 64-71; emphases added). In the end, travelling becomes a new antidote to allow ethnographers to move beyond the fixity of singular locations.

In both the naturalist and the relativist metaphors, we can see a shared view of the ethnographic space: “empty, infinite, *a priori* and divisible” (cf. Smith and Katz 1993, 73-74). This shared view indicates an absolutist spatial ontology in the ethnographers’ explorations, which obscures power relations, dynamic identities and socio-spatial processes. David Harvey (2009, 134) reminds us that this absolutist ontology is rooted in the theories of Newton and Descartes, where space is seen as “a preexisting, immovable, continuous and unchanging framework” which is “empty of matter.” Methodologically, the absolutist ontology induces an alienated form of reasoning; for, when it is upheld, “parts are separated from wholes and reified as things in themselves, causes [are] separated from effects, [and] subjects separated from objects” (Levins and Lewontin 1985, cf. Harvey 1996, 61).

Under this absolutist ontology, the naturalist metaphor is turned into a framework that is both *ahistorical* and *aspatial*. On the one hand, such a view refuses to register connections such as conquest and colonialism between the field site and world history (Harvey 1996, 221-22). Rather, it consistently sets out to conduct direct observations of local communities in an “*ahistorical*, *ethno*-graphic, and *comparative*” way (Vincent 1991, 55; original emphasis). On the other, the autonomy of local communities is assumed as self-evident (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 6-7), while the socio-spatial processes in the field are reduced to nothing but fixed and singular entities. Here, the isomorphic account of place and culture pays no attention to cultural plurality and differences inherent in localities, and eventually renders ethnographic practices irrelevant to the dynamics of both space and culture.

The relativist metaphor, though it purports to see everywhere through travel encounters, leads only to the multiplication of absolute spaces, since “the subject moves but space stands still, fixed, unproduced” (Smith and Katz 1993, 76-77). This is the way through
which travelling deteriorates into total relativism to “provide the missing foundation for everything else in the social flux” (ibid.). Haraway (1991, 191) comments that the strategy of such a relativist framework is to claim to be everywhere equally while being nowhere in reality. Consequently, essentialist identities are not reflected upon but only further consolidated in travel practices: only those who can travel and shift locations are able to name places, to identify subjects, to “allocate” power, and finally to narrate encounters. Their bodies are pre-given ontological entities that are outside “the power geometry of time-space compression” (cf. Massey 1994, 148-50) but still dominating the latter. Indeed, the effects of this setting can be oppressive and even (once again) colonial (Staeheli and Lawson 1994, 97-98).

Haraway (1991, 190-95) judges that “the Western eye has fundamentally been a wandering eye.” For her, the embodiment of reflexivity is now eliminated by spatial metaphors which combine absolutist locations and reified bodies. Such warnings are highly relevant here. Although differences of style can be seen between Clifford’s cosmopolitan visitors and Malinowskian field workers, they indeed occupy similar standpoints as “the master, the Man, the One God, whose Eye produces, appropriates, and orders all difference” (ibid., 192-93). Here, spatial issues in ethnographic practices are not explicitly depicted but only implicitly fetishised. A new account of the real world is needed, as Haraway urges, to focus on partial perspectives, limited locations and situated knowledges. In the next sub-section, I will illustrate how and how far these endeavours can and should be located in a relational spatial ontology and then practised through the dialectics of encounter.

The dialectics of encounter

In living fabrics, space and time are historical and geographical realities, as Harvey (1996, 46-53) reminds us, and they are actively constructed and defined by the underlying social and political processes and relations. Instead of seeing space through metaphors, we should put substantial processes at the centre, with the attributes of these processes and their dynamic and diverse spatiotemporalities examined together (ibid., 263-64, see also Massey 2005). Hence, the ontological foundation of ethnographic practices should be changed from reified entities to “the dialectics between flows and things” (Harvey 1996, 81). With this in mind, I want to illustrate the ways in which field sites can be defined as
“moments,” which are rooted in the “real world” through the dialectics between flows and things. In this framework, relations between the researcher and the researched should also be defined as spatiotemporal constructions, for they emerge only when people are thrown together. And these two aspects (field sites and encounters) together define the dialectics of encounter.

Drawing on intellectual resources from Leibniz and Whitehead on relational thinking, Harvey (1996, Chapter 2) abandons popular appeals to ontological security (such as reductionism), and embraces processes and relations as the new ontological principle for dialectics. In Harvey’s dialectical framework, the term moment starts to occupy a significant role: it denotes not only the objects that we encounter in the world but also how these objects are maintained and integrated into the dynamic ensemble of processes (ibid., 50-55). For instance, such things as cities, landscapes, architectures and even social institutions are all moments insofar as we admit they are outcomes (reifications) of different processes and relations (ibid., 78-81).

For the argument here, it can be inferred that this approach is applicable to re-conceptualising field sites and fieldwork. This is because field sites are by no means stable entities with given and fixed boundaries; on the contrary, they are historical-geographical conjunctures that are shaped by time-space colonisation (Lefebvre 1976) and compression (Harvey 1989a). Individuals and their lives are implicated, if diversely, in these conjunctures (Gregory 1994, 414). The moment of a field site is here immanent in the global nexus. Hence, a global sense of place is needed, as Doreen Massey (1994, 2005) has long urged, where “place” is first and foremost a meeting place and the local and the global are dialectically articulated. To properly depict this moment of the field site, we should attend to processes and nodes on the one hand, and “tangible forms of material practices through which human societies perpetuate themselves” (Harvey 1996, 231) on the other.

The relational spatial ontology also offers a new perspective from which we can identify our simultaneous coexistence in the field, in ways other than the one that the absolutist account offers. As researchers, we are situated in dynamic space-time and the various processes that it internalizes once we enter the field. Our encountering with the researched is indeed a throwntogetherness (Massey 2005), which contains the dialectics
between space and place. Here, we can see not only “a history and geography of thens and theres” (space), but also “negotiating a here-and-now” (the event of place) (ibid., 140, emphases added). The situation of being thrown together, in the field, should hence be defined as an ever-shifting constellation of different trajectories and stories to tell, whose inevitable contingency cannot be fully captured but only revealed in particular moments (ibid., 151-54). Andy Merrifield (2012, 2013) also provides insightful comments on this issue. Drawing on Althusser’s late works, he redefines the encounter as “a tale of how people come together as human beings, of why collectivities are formed and how solidarity takes hold and takes shape, and also how intersectional politics shapes up urbanly” (Merrifield 2013, 33). With this reconceptualisation he goes on to argue that the encounter now defines the urban and vice versa (Merrifield 2012). Besides its rewarding use in discussing our political situation (such as the Occupy Movement), another, I would say, equally critical direction is to see the methodological significance of this concept for doing urban ethonography.

In the relational framework, encountering and communicating are both rooted in socially constructed space and time and conditioned by historical-geographical contingencies – and this defines the dialectics of encounter. No encounter is a priori, since all individuals, including researchers and the researched, are situated in dynamic space-time, affected by various processes and relations and joining dialogues that are already under way.20 It is for this reason that we should adopt the relational spatial ontology, practise the dialectics of encounter and construct an alternative approach to place and voice. Only in this way can we get rid of the essentialist notions of culture and identity, reverse the politics of otherness, write against culture and recapture situated knowledges. My practices of such a relational-spatial framework in Beijing’s green belts are further illustrated in the next two sections.

3.3 Field sites in Beijing’s green belts

Before leaving for Beijing to do fieldwork in the spring of 2014, I determined that exploring power relations in the state-led land exploitation projects should be set as the

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20 In his discussion on Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogical landscape, Folch-Serra (1990) provides a quite good summary of Bakhtin’s dialogism and the way in which it can be applied in research in Human Geography; see also Holquist (1985).
key concern of my thesis. At the time, as illustrated at the outset of this chapter, the Malinowskian tradition in urban ethnography was still enshrined in the research proposal. I believed that it was crucial to identify some clearly bounded field sites which, it was hoped, could provide a solid basis for recognising the logics, agents and tactics of land exploitation projects through local immersions. At the time, Sunhe and Dahongmen were selected as two field sites, mainly because they were both in the so-called “rural-urban continuum” upon which BMG has been focusing its attention in running its land businesses. A secondary reason to select them was that one of them (Dahongmen) is in the first green belt while the other (Sunhe) is in the second.

However, it turned out that neither of the two sites was, or could ever be, ready for my gaze. As my fieldwork unfolded I realised that the villages and townships I had chosen for local immersions could no longer accommodate me because the land was devastated, filled with endless weeds and ruined buildings – exactly what I observed in Tianzhu in 2010 (see Section 1.1). This scene further reminded me that it is the displacement of local communities and the imaginary of green belts that convey the space-time of spatial transition in Beijing. Such observation not only confirmed the needs to change the spatial ontology from the absolutist genre to a relational alternative, but also challenged my original plan of approaching and communicating with the local people.

In this section, I present details of my field sites to show the spatial constraints of doing ethnography under the absolutist spatial ontology, which in turn require a complete change in the way that we treat space in our methodology. The information presented here was collected in my two spells of fieldwork in Beijing, one from March to December, 2014 and the other between June and August, 2015. Besides the reflections on field sites included in this section, the field visits also enabled me to collect archives and official documents and to encounter state and non-state actors. The latter aspect of field activities are illustrated in detail in the next section.

Green belts and field sites: a brief description

The idea of a “green belt,” as introduced in Chapter 1, was imported to Beijing in the 1950s from Britain and the former USSR. At the time, it was seen as a promising ecological goal of the city’s socialist transition (Beijing Archives 1958). To advance this
aim, the city planned two green belts in succession between its urban core area and suburban/rural areas, the first in 1958 and the second in 2003. However, the socialist visions of urban landscape have for a long time been subordinated in the urban process to the logic of capital accumulation. In the course of developing the BMG’s land businesses, hundreds of villages in the designated green belts were demolished and hundreds of thousands of residents relocated (BMBLR 2011a, BAUPD 2013, CDG 2010). Increasingly, as original villages changed from lived spaces to vacant sites, green belts have become hardly more than a figment of the imagination in the city’s master plan, marking a hollow representation of the urban margin. More details on the genealogy of green belts will be presented in Chapter 4. For now, the information above is adequate to show the impossibility of physically sneaking into the two sites that I selected in advance. But before narrating my failed attempts and methodological reflections, I want to start with a brief description of Sunhe and Dahongmen, the two sites of fieldwork (see Figure 3.1).

**Figure 3.1** Green belts and field sites in Beijing

*Source*: BAUPD (2013). *Notes*: (1) the shallow green area is the first green belt while the dark green is the second belt; (2) Sunhe is the red point in the upper right and Dahongmen the blue at the lower centre.
Sunhe is a township\textsuperscript{21} at the north-east corner of Beijing’s urban core area and is located in the second green belt. This township covered a surface area of 34.54 square kilometres, administered 14 villages and five communities, and was populated by more than 150,000 people (STG 2015)\textsuperscript{22} before it was totally demolished. It has a significant socialist past, for this township was once a part of the state-owned Dongjiao Farm (1957-1998). When writing my research proposal, I was immediately attracted to Sunhe because I read some news reports about Beijing’s “Central Villa District” by chance: Sunhe lies at the centre of this district. I could not help asking how it was possible to build villas \textit{in} a green belt. After this puzzle, I explored further and found that some of the most expensive land plots in Beijing were located precisely in Sunhe; by the time I was finishing my research proposal in 2013, they had already been leased out by BMG to property developers. By this time, too, cases of corruption had been uncovered in Sunhe and nearly 20 officials (including its Party secretary) had been sentenced to prison. This dynamic scenario of land business and politics was hence promising for someone like me who was interested in power relations and the issue of the state in the urban process. Sunhe further stands out between the two spells of fieldwork, for President Xi Jinping visited this township in April 2015 and planted some trees – making the interconnections between state, land and ecology loom large once more.

Dahongmen was even more interesting. This village is located only a few kilometres south of Tiananmen Square – the centre of the city (and of the country). Nevertheless, Dahongmen is officially recognised as rural, and the first green belt occupies part of its territory. This village, together with the next village, Guoyuan, used to be labelled “Zhejiang village” in tribute to their long history of accommodating migrants from Zhejiang province in southern China. These migrants managed to develop large-scale and international garment businesses locally and hence attracted plenty of academic attention at the turn of this century. These stories not only nurture the very first set of urban ethnographies touching on China’s urban transformation (Ma and Xiang 1998, ...

\textsuperscript{21} There are five levels in the administrative hierarchy in China, as introduced in Chapter 1 (see Ma 2005, and Zhang and Zhao 1998 for more details). Here, Sunhe as a township is at the fourth level and it administers villages and communities (they coexist because the recent urban process has completely restructured social space and demographic pattern here); and Dahongmen Village is at the fifth level and is subordinate to Nanyuan Township.

\textsuperscript{22} This same document illustrates that there are 30,500 people who have local \textit{hukou}, while more than 120,000 people are migrant workers – the majority of whom had already left this area after the spatial transition.
Xiang 2000, Zhang 2001b) but have also continued to define the landscape to the present day. After some early pioneering adventures, garment businesses have dominated local economic activity and spatial representations. It is mainly for this reason that this region is now witnessing the continued presence of more than 300,000 people, either on visiting or staying longer (Han and Peng 2015). How can it then be green? There might, I thought, be some new types of power relations immanent in the land politics here, and hence Dahongmen was worth more investigations as well.

Spatial constraints and methodological reflections

The above expectations built into my research proposal were, however, at once crushed when I arrived in Beijing. Sunhe nor Dahongmen were so far from being intact that I would not be able to arrange a long “local dwelling,” for they had been so fundamentally implicated in the state-led land exploitation projects that their original landscapes were already wiped out and had been replaced by a waste of weeds and ruins (see discussions below). Methodologically, this challenge forced me to reflect on my research proposal – in particular on the absolutist spatial ontology that it followed. It turns out that, if the spatiality of green belts is to be reframed in a relational way, such spatial constraints can be immediately transformed into both a source of information and a set of conditions for critical moments of encounter. As introduced in the previous section, this marks the first aspect of the dialectics of encounter. Here I illustrate some details of these spatial constraints and methodological reflections, while the moments of encounter are shown in the next section.

Below is a description of the landscape in Sunhe that reveals something of the very deep impressions it made on me:

Arriving at the centre of the township, I got off the bus and then went across the road. All I could see was grassland filled with endless weeds, covering an area of more than two square kilometres. The collapsed buildings were interspersed everywhere among these crowded weeds, with collapsed walls and ruined house foundations still standing in their original places. Two narrow paths twisted and turned into the grassland, but no clues to where they might end. Looking to the north, I saw a newly built light railway, and to the south, a group of buildings
accommodating relocated villagers in Sunhe (field note on 23 December 2014; see Figure 3.2).

![Image](image-url)

**Figure 3.2** The centre of Sunhe Township

*Source:* Photo by author, 23 December 2014.

Dahongmen had similarly been left to rot:

(Around the market area) A devastated village could be seen when I got out of the taxi. The place was full of half-collapsed buildings, among which some intact bungalows were easy to spot. I wandered inside these ruins and saw a courtyard with its door open. I went in, hoping to meet the owner, but no one was there. The net curtains on its windows were intact, and the service numbers for its TV license and coal deliveries were still clearly visible on the wall. But nobody lived there (field note on 31 July 2015; see Figure 3.3).
It did not take me long to recognise that what had happened in Sunhe and Dahongmen were by no means local events but had been replicated in many other sites in Beijing’s green belts. They were encompassed by, and contributed to, the great urban transformation of the city and everywhere in the country. In an interview with a local official, I asked what was going on in the designated green belt. He replied absently: “The land is almost vacant now. Those who would like to rent can do so as they wish. But for the present, most land plots are empty. The municipal government pays us a good annual rate for them” (interview on 29 December 2014). This piece of information echoes the politico-economic mechanism of the green belts revealed in an earlier interview with the same official (this is further discussed in Chapter 5):

“The territory of this community is inside the second green belt, but we have no policy or incentive to implement it yet… It [the demolition you observed] was proposed in 2009 after the global financial crisis. The municipal government at the time was determined to boost investments through urbanisation. Our community and several others nearby were all demolished to vacate land for real estate development” (Interview on 21 November 2014, see also Figure 3.4).
These words suggest that a new perspective is required to investigate Beijing’s green belts, for they seem very different from what is laid down in the city’s master plan. The two belts mark a moment that internalises many politico-economic concerns and social processes. For example, it is linked to the global financial crisis in 2007-08 and the 4-trillion-Yuan rescue package proposed by China’s central government in the aftermath: most of the budget was invested in land exploitation projects (The Economist 2008) (see Section 5.4). This moment also internalises the process of urban expansion in China, which is crucial to producing new urban space for the local state’s projects of accumulation and territorialisation (Hsing 2010, Lin and Ho 2005, Shin 2014b). When the historical dimension is borne in mind, then green belts also clearly signal both the country’s socialist past (Chen 1996) and its present ambition to be modern (BAUPD 2013, Brumann 2006, Zhang 2006). This is what Appadurai (1991, 209) might call “the genealogies of the present”.

The moment of green belts in Beijing, together with all the processes that it internalises, is the “real world” that I am concerned about but cannot approach in devastated villages.
filled with weeds and ruins. Nor can I recognise this moment by relying on the city’s master plan, since the latter is only another process internalised at sometime in the past, which remains on paper. As Lefebvre (1991, 38-39) aptly puts it, the spatial representation in the master plan yields a particular constellation of power and knowledge through the eyes of planners who conceive the lived space as a system of verbal signs. What is upheld in the master plan is a hegemonic and absolutist code of space; this code in fact adopts the spatial ontology that underlies the Malinowskian tradition and that pushes Clifford’s travel metaphors down into relativism. As an alternative, we should admit that the green belts symbolise the historical-geographical conjuncture emerging in Beijing’s urban change. It is the disappearance of local communities and the imaginary of green belts that convey the space-time of the city’s spatial transition. Here, nowhere defines somewhere at the urban margin (as shown in Figure 3.4).

Such reflections not only confirm the need to change the spatial ontology from the absolutist genre to a relational one, but also pose some further challenges to ethnographic practices for the dialectics of encounter. For one thing, as discussed at the outset, everyday life and the lived space are now subject to be transformed, if not displaced, by (re-)producing new urban space for the state-led land businesses. In this state of ruins, it becomes increasingly difficult to set up encounters with local people who may have been displaced (or dispossessed) as an effect of the state actions. The disappearance of local communities requires new methods to engage with the field, to locate my bodily experiences and to recapture situated knowledges. More importantly, the imaginary of green belts also indicates that my investigations should not be bound to the physical boundaries of designated areas on the master plan. A more critical approach would be to follow the processes through which these areas and boundaries are drawn in everyday life, which might introduce alternative ways to achieve throwntogetherness between the researcher and the researched.

Drawing on the above reflections, I want now to show my efforts in the field to explore the spatiotemporal intermediates that might throw the researcher and the researched together. Three moments of encounter are illustrated in the following section: “in the meetings,” “on the street,” and “by Didi Hitch.” All these moments have the same ethos.
of the dialectics of encounter following the relational spatial ontology, and they embody the most critical and rewarding encounters that I had in the fieldwork.

3.4 Moments of encounter

Section 3.2 suggests that self-other relations are spatiotemporal constructions as well, for both encountering and communicating are made possible only when people are thrown together in the course of place formation. When I was doing fieldwork in the green belts, I tried several times to put the above reflections into practice. These attempts turned out to be rewarding not only in facilitating field encounters but also in establishing rapport with interviewees – both important for data collection in doing urban ethnography. I encountered 120 individuals in total, located in diverse spatio-temporal settings in the field. The conversations were of different lengths and foci but followed the same method in terms of achieving throwntogetherness. Such encounters revealed critical information about contemporary urban conditions; they also enabled me to register the temporalities of the spatial changes that were inherent in local people’s memories and expressed in in-depth interviews. In these encounters, I also got valuable clues for collecting archives, news reports and policy documents from the government as secondary sources of information.

Talking about these encounters, the first thing is to show the conditions and contingencies by focusing on how such “place” is negotiated, spatially and temporally, by both the researcher and the researched. I learnt two implications from my field experience: first, we ought to admit that both identities and rapport are concretely and contingently constituted (Haraway 1991); on top of this, that power relations are also situated and dynamic, as conditions for, rather than limits to, enabling conversations (inspired by Foucault 1980). The moments of encounter are, then, neither the means nor the ends of fieldwork – they are methods of establishing spatiotemporal intermediates for promoting throwntogetherness. When a researcher is thrown among these intermediates, it turns out, his/her tasks is not to initiate conversations but to join those that are already under way. Only in this way can we advance our reflections on such issues as place and voice. Here, I introduce three sets of spatiotemporal intermediates that were constructed in my fieldwork, with a two-fold aim: to show how encounters are made possible in daily life.
and space, and to show why they are critical in providing information for answering the key questions raised in this thesis.

First, I show how and to what extent the state officials could be approached in *meetings*[^23]. These meetings could be either personal in a café or public in a government office; however, they all occurred within the daily space of state agents who were making decisions, monitoring space, revising plans and carrying out instructions from a superior. The circumstances of meetings allowed me to recognise the conduct of the state in daily space and time. Second, I also show stories of ways to communicate with local people on the *street*. Together with the removal of the original landscapes in local communities, the lifeworld of these people has changed and turned into a “common world,” a term developed by Schutz (1967) to indicate where the interaction pattern between people is transformed in modern society. It was in such places as the gates and squares of the resettlement communities, the morning markets and other places in the streets that encounters were rendered possible. Third, the use of *Didi Hitch* is also discussed here, as another moment of encounter. This was by chance, but it proved to be an alternative way to foreground encounters that otherwise could not have been achieved. Here, identities, bodies and power relations were contingent on the process of negotiating a *here-and-now*, which in turn conditions the progress of dialogues.

**In meetings with state agents**

I should indeed not depict myself as being alien to the state agents when I talk about them. As an alumnus of Peking University, a top university in China, I have plenty of classmates and friends who after graduation became government officials. Clearly, the link between cultural elites (especially those from Peking and Tsinghua University) and the Party-state regime has been registered comprehensively in the literature (Andreas 2009); and this link in post-Mao China is reshaped but not eliminated in an era of patriotic professionalism (Hoffman 2006). To some extent, I should admit that this position also conferred on me *a priori* privileges when doing fieldwork. Before arriving in Beijing, I

[^23]: “Meeting” (会议, huìyì) in Chinese is a word that indicates a formal or quasi-formal conversation between two or more people. It conveys a sense of formality and seriousness, but this connotation is missing in its English counterpart. My use of the term here is based on its Chinese meaning. Theoretically, as is in Chapter 6, this spatio-temporal setting also plays a critical role in practising the territorial logic of the state.
had already made contact with some planning officials in the city through the alumni network. As soon as I arrived, I also managed to make friends with a group of PhD students and graduates from the School of Architecture at Tsinghua University – many of whom had been working for, or would go to work in BMCUP. With these connections, I then extended my web of relations by the popular strategy of snowballing and, by the end, had completed interviews with eight planning professionals, 18 planning officials, and 17 township officials and village cadres.

Such privileges have their own limits, however. For example, while they play a critical role in enabling me to get familiar with a circle of “planning persons” (规划人士, guihua renshi), they by no means guaranteed the density and relevance of conversations. With this concern, I illustrate some instances in my fieldwork when communications with the state agents ran smoothly and elicited valuable information for empirical analysis. A key characteristic shared by most of them took the form of meetings. Some meetings were personal, between the interviewee and me alone, while others were working conferences where decisions were made and policies were issued. It was only upon returning from the field that I realised the similar ethos in the two kinds of meetings: identities, power relations and the levels of rapport were all concrete and contingent on spatio-temporal processes, and hence they should be treated as dynamic conditions for (rather than limits to) throwntogetherness. In this regard, it is how the place formation is promoted that matters, rather than the given identities and power relations at the start of each encounter.

Because of the structural privileges mentioned earlier, I managed to attend an informal dinner with some officials in BMCUP on 1 July 2014. The dinner was a critical juncture of my entire fieldwork, for it not only facilitated further in-depth interviews but also initiated the “snowballing” as a whole. In the months that followed, I continued to contact other guests at the dinner and eventually made six interviews with three of them. Most follow-up interviews with these planning officials were held in a café on the top floor of their office building, which had a perfect view of the whole city. This spatial setting is worth further discussions. Having interviews in the café, rather than staying in an office, indicates first and foremost the interviewees’ intention to construct a casual ambience.

24 By using the term “cadre,” I am mainly referring to the individual state agent or representative of local authorities at the grassroots government (township and village collective).
for communications. In addition, talking in the café also means that no other colleagues would be present (and able to listen) – this would further increase the trusts and rapport between us in the course of our conversations. To be sure, they were doing this for me mainly because we had already had dinner together, which helped considerably to reduce the barriers of official etiquette and psycho-distances. It was in such settings that I might hear bitterly sharp critiques of the instructions from above, confusions and worries when seeing the gaps between policies and their enactment, as well as detailed illustrations of the conduct of everyday works.

To implement the snowball sampling strategy, I asked my interviewees before I left whether I could be introduced to other planning and local officials. This ploy was always rewarded. With their introductions, I managed to meet planning officials first at the district level (below the municipal level and above the township level), who not only gave me government documents and statistical data but also went on to introduce me to officials at the township and village level. I was grateful for their top-down introductions, without which it would have been next to impossible to approach the local officials, as one of them informed me in an interview:

> Let’s say, we are now only having a short conversation. Such issues [are so sensitive that they] cannot be shared too clearly. As [an official of] the grassroots government, I don’t see you as an outsider because you were introduced by Mr H. Otherwise, I would share nothing with you, as I normally do to other [researchers]. (Interview with a cadre at Dahongmen village, 12 December 2014)

A further analysis of the above quotation would suggest that both identities and power relations were transformed when I encountered the officials because of the interventions posed from their superiors. The conversations were made possible not by my interview skills but more by the power relations (and trusts) between my interviewees. This style of snowballing was later extended and it in turn preconditioned nearly all the interviews I held with state agents. Of these, five were not one-to-one but instead in the setting of a working conference. While not all of them were directly related to the two field sites I selected, they were, nonetheless, all invaluable in showing how policies and decisions were shaped, and with what examples of collusions and collisions.
For example, I was invited to audit an adjudication meeting held in Township K, a place next to Dahongmen, on 7 August 2015. This meeting was formal, intended to review a plan from the township government on how to promote its “complete urbanisation” (完全城市化, wanquan chengshihua), which was also located in the first green belt. Here I want to show a short conversation that I heard before the meeting – an episode that can help illustrate why the particular form of meeting was critical to the present fieldwork. It was about a quarter to two in the afternoon, 15 minutes before the start of the meeting. I heard two coordinators of the conference exchanging ideas on the review procedure of urbanisation plans. The township leader inquired the director of Beijing Municipal Rural-Urban-Continuum Office (BMRUCO) if the plan submitted by his neighbourhood township had been approved. The director replied that it was still pending the approval of the then Mayor, Mr Wang Anshun, and that it was BMRUCO’s expectation that all the three townships nearby (including the one mentioned here) should submit their plans together and then get the approval from the Mayor. The township leader immediately said he agreed with the proposal, yet soon shifted the focus of the conversation to his request: “(to make this possible) can we get some more quotas of residential land for demolishing and relocating four villages along the main road?” “In so doing,” he continued, “we promise that the planned green space will not be occupied any more. Indeed, this is the exact reason why our plan has been turned down repeatedly in previous submissions – and we don’t want to see this happening again.”

Here the notion of a green belts was stripped of all its ecological character and turned into something like a politico-economic bargaining chip between different state agents in the entangling of economic interests and territorial-scalar politics. Beijing’s villages and townships are now determined to run their own land businesses with excellent locations in the rural-urban continuum; and the municipal government also wants to take a share of the land revenues while at the same time it is eager to see the “upgrade” of its urban landscape. With pressures from both sides, it is no wonder that planning officials consistently shared with me their confusions, worries and sharp critiques of the gaps between their policies and the results in practice. The urban change is not a thing that can

\[25\] Beijing Municipal Rural-Urban-Continuum Office (BMRUCO) is a new municipal department, established on the basis of the General Headquarter for Building Beijing’s Green Belt (erected in 2000, see Section 1.2). But this department has no quota for hiring new staff, and hence all staff are “borrowed” from other bureaus and departments – with the planning bureau (BMCUP) contributing most.
be drawn clearly on the master plan, although many planning officials tended to believe that it could, and this is where their disquiet originates. I did not understand this either, until I was thrown together with officials who were making the real (and final) decisions – such as in the above moment when I audited the conversation in the working conference in Township K. Moreover, encounters in such meetings also confirm that both identities and power relations are contingent and situated, which should be taken as conditions for such conversations. But such issues as positioning and otherness cannot be exhausted by focusing only on these meetings with state agents, and here I turn to another set of encounters in the field, this time with the local people on the street.

Talks on the street

When I visited Peking University and asked a professor of sociology there how to go about interviewing in villages, I was told that the first point to seek was some “old trees,” normally at the entrance to the village. This professor has great prestige from her research on grassroots governments at the township and village levels in China. Yet her suggestion later proved to be off target when it comes to the fieldwork in the rural-urban continuum. As shown in the previous section, in the course of urban metamorphosis the original landscape of those villages had been removed, and the “old trees,” if there ever were, had all gone, together with the traditional courtyards (四合院, siheyuan) in the village. Hence, we can claim that the possibilities of constructing a “we-relationship” through consistent communications under the “old trees” had already withered away. This “we-relationship,” as Schutz (1967) sees it, has disintegrated even among the villagers who are making the transition from a life world to a common world – a transition where the “we-relationship” is replaced by viewing people as contemporaries who co-exist but cannot be experienced directly. To put it another way, the social landscape (the interaction pattern of villagers) is also transformed when the original settlements are demolished and villagers relocated to newly-built resettlement communities. This requires more efforts from fieldworkers to recognise what opportunities may exist of encountering and communicating in this extra-ordinary spatial setting.

In general, the local residents could be categorised into two groups: one is the relocated and the other is the displaced. For those who accepted the government’s proposal and signed the contracts (on demolition and relocation), a new and urbanised lifestyle is being
practiced in the resettlement community. But there were also some other residents, not a small proportion of the population, who refused to accept the government’s programme and are subject to displacement. Some of them are still living in the ruins of the villages as “nail households” (a term that was discussed at the outset of the thesis), while others are situated in nowhere, a situation coined by some as “the displacement of displacement” (Slater 2006). For me, the only way to approach both groups was through the routine practices of their everyday lives. Initially, I tried asking the help of local officials to introduce me to the local community – but none of them did this favour for me, basically because of the tensions in the process of demolition and relocation between these two groups of people. This not only reminded me of the power dynamics in these communities, but also forced me to try other ways of encountering local residents. After many attempts and failures, in the end I identified that it made most sense to establish encounters in the streets.

It was in the street, as well as in the places nearby (such as community squares at the intersection points of several streets and the gates of the resettlement communities along streets) that I managed to do most of my interviews with the local people. The residues of the state’s hegemonic project revealed themselves also on the street, through which more critical messages for this research were recognised. In total, I talked with 26 residents in Sunhe Township and 18 in Dahongmen Village. I also encountered and communicated with 24 “bystanders” who were not local residents but were familiar with local situations. Some discussions were semi-structured, one-to-one conversations, while others were more casual – they were neither initiated by me as the researcher nor dominated by my questions and concerns; instead, they were like “autonomous” focus groups that were inscribed in the everyday life of the researched. Furthermore, some talks not only provided me first-hand information but also directed me to explore the places that I would otherwise never have visited (because before these encounters I did not even know of their existence). Here I want to describe two episodes of field encounters on the street: the first with a nail household in Dahongmen, and the second with an “autonomous” focus group observed in Sunhe.26

26 There are many more inspiring episodes that I can share here, such as my encounter with a street hawker in the morning market in Sunhe. He told me where to find his fellow “nail households” who were living in the original village (as a status quo of the ruins) next to construction projects involving some new villa communities. But these stories are saved for later, in the empirical chapters, because of the space limitation of this chapter.
During the interviews with village cadres at Dahongmen, they frequently mentioned their anger with the “nail households” who refused to move. It was because of these crafty men, they told me, that the complete urbanisation of Dahongmen was still incomplete. I became curious about these “nail households:” why had they refuse to move and how could they survive in the ruins? Hence, I often paid visit to the “demolished” villages (see Figure 3.3 above and Figure 3.5 below).

![Figure 3.5 One “nail household” in Dahongmen](source: photo by author, 31 July 2015)

Here is an excerpt from my field notes which includes a conversation I had with the owner of the house shown in Figure 3.5; it illustrates some concerns of this group of people:

When I was going over the appearance of this house– to check what signs of being lived in it still had – the door was suddenly opened. We were both shocked to see each other and I immediately explained who I was and why I had come. Then I asked the man why he was still living here, since most villagers had been relocated to resettlement communities. “Those villagers have only use rights of
their homestead land, which cannot be sold at all.” He went on: “though I am also a villager here with rural hukou27, I still have land lease of this land plot on which the house is built. It was issued before 1949 and was admitted in the 1950s by then Mayor Peng Zhen. I am now struggling to protect the complete rights conferred by this lease.” “But the village collective would not give you what you want?” I asked, using information from the village cadres. He replied with a smile: “I am still negotiating with them. No one will tell you details of such deal. And it is even more difficult if you go to visit the ‘residents’ [local people with urban hukou].” (Excerpt of field note on 31 July 2015)

After another discussion, I managed to gather details of what he expected to gain, such as the area of resettlement apartments and the amount of money in the compensation package. He also showed me a direction where I could meet (and did encounter later) those who were residents with urban hukou and who were turning themselves into nail households as well, but for different reasons (see discussions in Chapter 7).

The second case comes from Sunhe. It was approaching sunset on a winter’s afternoon, and I had just paid a visit to “Palais de Fortune” (财富城堡, caifu chengbao), a villa community there. I spent some time in amazement at the poetic landscape, neo-classical architectures, and huge Christmas trees in this community and then thought it might be worth doing some interviews with villagers as well – people who had been relocated to make space for the “Palais de Fortune.” The distance between the “palais” and the resettlement community was much less than my expectation: only two minutes’ walk. Yet the living conditions in the two places, as shown in the conversation below, revealed huge gaps. When I arrived, a crowd of villagers was standing near the gate of the community. They were enjoying the last sunshine of the day and chatting to one another. This was a scene that resembled the vignette of the “old trees” proposed earlier, but they were no longer the same. With skills accumulated elsewhere, I tried to avoid asking direct questions, but instead inquired the way to the Great Mosque (a landmark building in this

27 Hukou (户口) is a record in the government’s household registration system. It is “one of the most important mechanisms determining entitlement to public welfare, urban services and, more broadly, full citizenship” in China (Chan and Buckingham 2008, 587). The system has been favouring urban citizens disproportionately than rural residents since the 1950s, but things are changing: now the distinction between local and non-local is more important than that between rural and urban, named by Smart and Smart (2001) as “local citizenship.”
area). Having attracted their attention, I introduced myself and asked if there was anything they might share with me on the subject of demolition and relocation. With this fuse, the crowd exploded immediately, and no more questions were needed (or indeed could have been asked):

… We have been relocated here for more than ten years, but even now we don’t have running water in our apartments. The quality of the buildings has also constantly frightened us, especially in 2008 when the earthquake hit Sichuan. Plus, when we were relocated here, the developer promised to construct supporting facilities as well, such as nursery and primary schools, which also took ten years to build. And the gas is not even fixed in this community. [Others interrupted – ] But such issues are not crucial when compared with the issue of land! Besides the unjust allocation of compensation fees, we also have nearly one thousand mu of land left vacant – no one knows its future use, nor the beneficiary at present. We only know three hundred mu are now leased to the “Palais de Fortune” to lay out a park. As to the other several hundred mu, we can see nothing but only a dozen of trees. We are distressed to see this; farmers always make their lives from the land. Though we have been relocated to multi-storey buildings (i.e., the apartment blocks, 上楼, shanglou), it still panics us seeing land abandoned. (Excerpt from field note on 17 December 2014)
Figure 3.6 “Palais de Fortune” in Sunhe and its surroundings

Source: photo by author, 17 December 2014. Notes: (a) shows the internal road of this villa community, (b) illustrates the landscape of its internal park built on land plots rented from the village and (c) is the view of the resettlement community from the gate of the villa community.

The gate of this resettlement community was henceforward used as a hub for my fieldwork, and a series of interviews and focus groups were conducted there later. Similarly, I also paid regular visits to the community square to meet some elderly people who went there every day, if there was no rain or smog, to enjoy the sunshine in winter. During my fieldwork in 2015, I realised morning markets in resettlement communities were of great importance as well; they revealed the co-existence of two totally different kinds of people. One kind was some affluent post-demolition villagers who wanted to live an organic life and hence rented plots of land in remote suburbia to plant vegetables; they sold their surplus products in the morning market as a leisure pursuit in the “healthy” and “middle-class” lifestyle. The other kind consisted of villagers who had refused to sign a contract with the local government and had become “nail households” – the only way that they could survive was to plant vegetables on the plots of land that they now occupied and sell them in the market. This case not only leads to theoretical reflections on the validity of such concepts as “class” or “the right to the city” (see Chapter 7), but also conditioned the third spatiotemporal intermediate for field encounters.
Thrown together by *DiDi Hitch*

When I was revisiting my field in the summer of 2015, a new phenomenon drew my attention. A mobile app called *DiDi* (or *DiDi Chuxing*, 滴滴出行) announced a subsidy package of one billion Yuan that May to let “everybody enjoy private car-hailing for free” (Chen 2015a). It was followed by introducing hitchhiking services in June, the month that I arrived in Beijing. By offering high subsidies, *DiDi Hitch* (滴滴顺风车) mobilises millions of private car owners to share journeys with other passengers going to similar destinations. Such pecuniary benefits were hard for an impecunious field researcher to ignore: after spending only 33 Yuan (£3.43) on my first *DiDi* Hitch journey, which was 25 kilometres long, I at once became a loyal customer.28 Indeed, with several trips using Didi services, I realised that it could be applied in a way that would help me not only to save money but also to do fieldwork; hence I saw Didi as a method.

This is possible with the differentiation mentioned earlier – while some villagers refused to be relocated, there were many others who accepted the government’s arrangements for demolition and relocation. For these latter, the new challenge they faced was not to make a life in a landscape of ruins, but to find new ways of spending millions of Chinese Yuan awarded as part of their compensation package. Since luxury cars were seen by many of them as a signal of social status, their desires of consumption immediately converged with the flow of capital underlying the competition between Didi and Uber (see details below). A Didi Hitch, when it is hired, at once turns into a spatiotemporal intermediation for an encounter with a post-demolition villager; this is because the whole moment of encounter via Didi is physically conveyed through a by-product of the green belts – the vehicles purchased with compensation for being relocated. It may be helpful to start with a brief introduction to the politico-economic attributes of Didi, before showing some encounters with villagers under its auspices. In total, nine interviews took place on these journeys via Didi Hitch; most of them provided valuable messages for answering the research questions.

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28 While only 33 Yuan was paid by the customer, the driver’s remuneration can be double the amount (or even triple) due to subsidies from DiDi.
The app developer claims that Didi is “the largest one-stop, on-demand transportation platform” in the world, having more than 14 million registered drivers in China’s 400 cities, and serving around 300 million passengers in the first quarter of 2016 (DiDi-Chuxing 2016a). This app now dominates both the taxi-hailing and private car-hailing market in China, with market shares of 99% and 87% respectively. It completed 1.43 billion rides in 2015 alone (Alba 2016a) while Uber as the main competitor, after six years in operation, scored only two billion rides globally in the same year (Alba 2016b). As one of the biggest icons of the “sharing economy,” DiDi had a $36 billion valuation in mid-2016 and attracted more than $3 billion of investment globally in 2015, followed by another $7.3 billion in the first half of 2016 (China-News-Service 2016) – all coming from tycoons such as Apple.29 With the strategy of initiating price wars through huge subsidies, Didi successfully beat Uber and then obtained the latter’s China business on 1 August 2016 (Abkowitz and Carew 2016).

It was on a journey to Sunhe that I realised this frontier of capital flow could also be incorporated into my fieldwork practice. It was a sunny afternoon, 38°C and no wind. It took all my courage to walk to the tube station – a nearly impossible mission. I decided to try DiDi Hitch, yet was still dubious whether it would work at all. It did not take very long before a private car owner offered me a lift. He was in his early thirties and was driving a commercial vehicle. When we were en route to Sunhe, the driver told me that he lived in the community I wanted to visit – a resettlement community built for Sunhe residents. As for the DiDi Hitch business, he continued, it would “compensate for the petrol” when he commuted. Commuting was the keyword that made me alert. I had completed quite a few observations and interviews in this resettlement community (as shown above). However, most of the interviewees were in their middle or old age, people who did not need to work in the daytime, and this had created a clear age bias in my “data” collection. On this trip, I noticed that DiDi could be a proper spatiotemporal intermediate for doing fieldwork in the green belts, which would foreground some encounters that could not otherwise have been achieved – with young commuters, for example.

29 Apple became a strategic investor of DiDi after investing $1 billion in May 2016. It now “joins Tencent, Alibaba and other key supporters to help further develop DiDi’s mission of building a data-driven rideshare platform to serve hundreds of millions of Chinese drivers and passengers” (DiDi-Chuxing 2016b).
This idea was at once put into practice. I made myself a DiDi customer whenever necessary and possible and invited drivers to tell me what they had experienced and what they felt while contemplating the transition of their homeland in the moment of green belts. They all had a similar background: born locally in a nearby village, they commute to work every day and use DiDi Hitch for both pocket money and pastime. But their experiences of the green belts were quite diverse from each other because of fairly different positions and perspectives. For instance, I encountered a man who told me that the people in his village had got much lower compensation for relocation than other communities in Sunhe, because they were too docile to unite for negotiations (Interview with Didi Driver on 13 July 2015). This argument was soon confirmed by circumstantial evidence collected from another DiDi driver. He was from the neighbouring village and told me that to begin with he had refused to be relocated and a team of rogues had been hired to pester his family every day. One night he called three dozen of his friends and relatives and beat the team up – this action not only enabled him to get rid of the harassment but also to arrive at a final agreement in which he got more than four million Yuan as part of the compensation package for being relocated (Interview with Didi Driver on 22 July 2015). 30

In journeys made possible by DiDi, I also managed, but by chance, to encounter individuals from the other end of the repertoire of eviction. One afternoon, I met the young person who was the nephew of the former head of the second village mentioned above. He shared with me his own experience in the eviction process (fighting against villagers and exchanging injuries) because of contradictory compensation measures. He also informed me that his uncle had been punished as well. Together with dozens of other local officials, his uncle had been sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment after their corrupt conduct in the process of demolition and relocation had been the subject of repeated complaints by the villagers (Interview with Didi driver on 17 July 2015). The story from another driver then echoed these stories of corruption. His friend, a police officer in the township near Sunhe, hired a group of migrant workers and organised a demolition team for the township government, from which he earned more than two million Yuan in less

30 For more information on eviction practices and families resisting eviction in China, see Shao (2013) and Shin (2013b).
than two years (Interview with Didi driver on 16 July 2015). Such topics are all labelled sensitive in China, and inquiries via formal channels with state officials are nearly impossible (Solinger 2006). However, the DiDi Hitch, as an informal spatiotemporal intermediate, provides an opportunity for the construction of an alternative here-and-now, just there, just then.

The spatiotemporality of DiDi Hitch is worth further consideration to examine the dialectics of the encounter in an empirical and specific context. These moments of encounter via DiDi are, in the first place, confined by social processes and material practices. For instance, the initial trust from both sides (the drivers and me) in the DiDi journey, making it possible to start a conversation, is ensured in advance by our IDs and bank cards registered on the app. Money thus plays an epistemological role in these DiDi encounters. It reconciles the individual spatiotemporalities in the lifeworld with the “abstract ‘rationalised’ spatiotemporalities attributed to modernity and capitalism” (Harvey 1996, 233-34). Furthermore, these encounters via DiDi Hitch are all daily and bodily meetings between the researcher (who is short on money and is looking for interviewees) and the researched (local villagers who want to earn pocket money when commuting or to kill time after dinner). Identities, bodies, and power relations are all contingent here on the process of negotiating a here-and-now, and this in turn sets limits to the progress of a dialogue. In trips with Didi Hitch, both the researched and the researcher were curious about each other’s stories-so-far and shared many things; but conversations were by no means dominated by the latter. In this regard, I concur with the comment below, which to my mind summarises the nature of throwntogetherness precisely – and I imagine that the drivers whom I encountered might agree as well:

I may be with you in this moment, but its appearance will look different from the unique places we both occupy in it. We are both together, somehow simultaneous, yet apart. (Holquist 1985, 225)

3.5 Data analysis

The discipline of Geography has a long tradition of making itself “scientific” – with the Quantitative Revolution in the 1970s as its peak (Johnston 1997). These positivists ambitions, however, have little to do with the present study. Instead of pursuing universal
objectivities in an account of the daily life, what is concerned here is situated knowledges – as was discussed in Section 3.2 (see also Haraway 1991). Two principles should be ascertained for this aim: first, the dichotomy between research and writing is worth critical reflection, since “writing is not merely a mechanical process…but rather constitutes in part how and what we know about our research,” as a critical perspective that conceptualises the whole project (Mansvelt and Berge 2010, 333). Second, and related to the first principle, if we accept that the ultimate goal is to write a particular and partial story, then the validity and rigour of the writing account should not be assessed by the “4R” principle (reactivity, reliability, replicability and representativeness) of the positivist genre (Burawoy 1998); instead, it is the mode of reflexivity (i.e., writing oneself into the text) that matters, for “the voices of qualitative researchers do not need to hide behind the detached ‘scientific’ modes of writing” (Mansvelt and Berge 2010, 344).

Data analysis in this thesis follows these two principles. In this section, I first give a short illustration of the datasets I compiled drawing on field practices. I then introduce the methods used for classifying and coding these data, taking excerpts from the coding book as some instances. These data are then integrated into the writing practices with the assistance of such analytical methods as genealogical analysis (Foucault 2000c, 2003) and the politico-economic analysis of urbanism (Harvey 1978, Lefebvre 1976, 1991); they will be explained concisely by the end of this section.

Introducing the datasets

The five main sets of data that are used throughout this thesis are: (1) field observations and interviews; (2) government documents; (3) archives; (4) published books in Chinese; and (5) news reports. While the first set is the most important, the other four are also critical, for they provide information to clarify, interpret and sometimes question issues raised in the first set – and hence precondition the triangulation. In total, I have 72 documents containing field observations and interviews – they cannot be isolated from each other because many interviews were integrated with field observations and transcribed together – covering encounters with 120 individuals (see below). In the second set, I collected 11 bulletins of the State Council of China, 93 documents issued by the Central Committee of the CPC, and 347 central ordinances and other recent
documents that are related to the urban metamorphosis (categorised by themes such as “the reform of SOEs,” “housing reforms” “land use reforms” and “4-trillion-yuan policies”). I also collected 97 documents from BMG, 49 documents from Chaoyang District Government (CDG), 33 documents from Sunhe Township Government (STG), 24 documents from Fengtai District Government (FDG) and 37 from Dahongmen Village Collective (DVC). Regarding historical archives, I collected and transcribed 35 volumes from the Beijing Archives during my fieldwork. The fourth set of data is published books in Chinese, from which photocopies of 56 books have been made – 12 of them are the collected works of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, 18 gazetteers of Beijing and its subordinate districts and townships that are related to this research; on top of this, there are also 21 books that are either collections of municipal documents or memoirs written by former leaders. The remaining five books are urban planning textbooks used in China, dating from 1928 to 1953. Finally, the body of the fifth dataset – the news reports – is huge and is still expanding, with more than 300 pieces having been collected by the end of fieldwork.

Classifying and coding data

It was mentioned above that I had encounters with 120 individuals in the fieldwork. While some were engaged in one-to-one interviews with semi-determined structures, others were encountered more casually (such as the interviews on Didi trips). This makes it difficult to code all the interviews I conducted under a uniform system. Instead of trying to do so, I used an alternative way for the coding issue, by means of two intersecting assignment systems: one is a longitude system that takes note of the date and place of each encounter (see Table 3.1); and the other is the latitude system in which each individual I encountered is coded by the place of encounter, his or her identity and the ordinal number of this encounter among all the encounters that I had in the same place (for example, DHO-3 indicates the third village cadre I interviewed in Dahongmen, while SHV-1 was the first villager I encountered in Sunhe Village).

In the process of transcribing, I first input field documents with the longitude system (with a title on the lines of “2014.12.11 field observations in Sunhe”), and then identified and coded all the individuals that I encountered in that observation with the latitude system (KYV-1, for example, on that date). The latitude system forms part of the
“descriptive nodes” when using NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software (see Table 3.2 for an excerpt of these nodes). Using this software, I also constructed another set of nodes, called “analytical nodes,” which is more important for the analysis. This latter set was designed and revised following the research questions, thesis structure and writing plan for each chapter. These codes were crucial because they bridged the distance between my theoretical concerns and empirical observations (see Table 3.3 for a sample).

Table 3.1 The longitude system for registering encounters (sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code of date</th>
<th>Title of field document</th>
<th>Contents (linked to the latitude system)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150727-1</td>
<td>150727-1 后苇沟访谈与观察</td>
<td>Observations in Sunhe Resettlement Community; interview with HWGV-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150727-2</td>
<td>150727-2 果园观察与访谈 (临泓路)</td>
<td>Observations in Dahongmen (Linhou Road); interview with DDBS-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150728-1</td>
<td>150728-1 果园观察与访谈 (建材城周边)</td>
<td>Observations in Dahongmen (wholesale market); interviews with DHBS-5, DHBS-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150728-2</td>
<td>150728-2 果园观察与访谈 (大李窑)</td>
<td>Observations in Dahongmen (a community with nail households); interview with DHV-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150731-1</td>
<td>150731-1 大红门观察与访谈 (西里)</td>
<td>Observations in Dahongmen (the ruins of a community); interview with DHJ-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150731-2</td>
<td>150731-2 大红门观察与访谈 (凉水河、轻纺城)</td>
<td>Observations in Dahongmen (the ruins of some other demolished communities); interviews with DHJ-3, DHJ-4, DHJ-5, DHJ-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150804-2</td>
<td>150804-2 大红门观察与访谈 (锦苑小区)</td>
<td>Observations in Dahongmen (the resettlement community); interviews with DHJ-9, DHJ-10, DHJ-11, DHV-2, DHV-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by author. Notes: this list is an excerpt from the full list of transcriptions; for the full list, see Appendix A-1.

Table 3.2 A sample of the descriptive nodes (produced with NVivo)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>People encountered</th>
<th>Place of encounter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BMG</td>
<td>Bystanders</td>
<td>BMCUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>Dahongmen Residents</td>
<td>Changping District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changping DG</td>
<td>Dahongmen Villagers</td>
<td>Chaoyang District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaoyang DG</td>
<td>Local officials</td>
<td>Daxing Xihongmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective companies</td>
<td>Planning officials</td>
<td>Didi journey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fengtai DG</td>
<td>Planning professionals</td>
<td>Fengtai District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haidian DG</td>
<td>Sunhe Villagers</td>
<td>Haidian District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authorities</td>
<td>Top leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal authorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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A brief note on analysis methods

Before concluding this chapter, I want to describe how data were interpreted in the writing process. As discussed in Chapter 1, my main hypothesis is that the state-led and land-based urban accumulation examined in the present study is not a purely economic project but rather a total project, since its accomplishment is mutually dependent with the hegemony of urbanisation. To show how and how far this is the case, I employ two principal methods to examine empirical observations in Beijing’s green belts: the first is politico-economic analysis of urbanism and the second is genealogical analysis. Simply put, here I want to combine the two methods by using the first one to locate the research in the broad literature on urban space and state-capital articulation and the second one to critically examine social and historical processes that are involved. Only with both can I examine the hypothesis where capital and discourses are simultaneously playing critical roles in erecting the hegemony. The genealogical analysis is mainly used in Chapters 4 and 7, while the politico-economic analysis is the key concern of Chapters 5 and 6. But in fact, there is no clear boundary that can be drawn between these two methods, and they are frequently integrated with each other in all the chapters to follow.
3.6 Summary

Beijing’s green belts symbolise a historical-geographical conjuncture in the city’s urban change. It is the disappearance of local communities and the imagined existence of green belts that convey the space-time of Beijing’s spatial transition and define the dynamics of its urban margin. These belts hence mark a moment that internalizes a great number of politico-economic concerns and social processes. As a response to such challenges in the fieldwork, in this chapter I first proposed “the dialectics of the encounter” to replace the absolutist spatial ontology by a relational alternative and to recognise some new spatiotemporal intermediates for promoting throwntogetherness. My field sites were then examined with this framework, which was followed by a detailed illustration of three encountering moments in my fieldwork. Only with such methodological reflections, it turns out, can we adequately recognise the spatial dynamics and managed to join in the dialogues that are on the way. In this regard, no encounter is a priori since we are all situated in dynamic space-time and are affected by various processes and relations. This chapter then concluded with a concise introduction to the methods adopted for classifying, coding and analysing data.
Chapter 4 The genealogy of Beijing’s green belt

4.1 Introduction

When interviewing planning officials in Beijing, I found that few of them could elaborate when and how the green belt had been incorporated into Beijing’s master plan. Some of them told me that this belt was put in the plan a long time ago – but had no idea when this had happened (Interview with BMCUP official, 1 August 2014); another told me that 1958 marked the beginning, but soon jumped to the topic of green belt practices since 1994, ignoring the nearly forty years in between (Interview with a planner in BAUP, 16 August 2013). Being curious about the rationale and ethos underlying planning practices, I determined to explore the genealogy of the green belt in Beijing. In this chapter, the method adopted is not a “historical” one, registering the origins and linear progress of solid entities; rather, the method is what Foucault upholds (2003, 9): “playing local, discontinuous, disqualified, or non-legitimised knowledges” in the events of history – a method he called généalogie that could get rid of hierarchies of knowledge and help to register local and historical conditions properly.

With this method, I gradually realised that importing the idea of a green belt to Beijing had much to do with modernity. But this modernity is not identical to the one that was questioned by Kant (2009 [1784]) at the dawn of the Enlightenment, and later taken up by Habermas (1987a, 144): “the heroic affinity with the present.” The Chinese understanding of “modern,” as shown in Section 4.2 below, should be viewed against the backdrop of the country’s history and constitutional agenda. Two effects of modernity are inscribed in this picture simultaneously: first, it is a long-lasting national ethos of “being modern” that requires all Chinese, who are scared of lagging behind, to catch up with international (i.e., Western) standards; and the second is the delivery of Western planning theories and ideas – that has been heavily shaped by so-called “modernism” since the 1930s, through Chinese architects who had studied abroad and USSR planning experts during the Maoist era. While the idea of a green belt is a child of Western planning in general and Sir Ebenezer Howard in particular, its practice in Beijing is by
no means a duplication of the model with no changes. On the contrary, it was the critical interconnections of modernity, urban space and the Chinese national ethos that together set up Beijing’s green belt in its master plan of 1958.

As a product of the socialist-utopian vision of the country and the city in the heyday of Mao’s “Great Leap Forward Movement,” the green belt has long been maintained as the agricultural basis for supplying grains and vegetables for the “working people” in the city. When it was seen as a buffer between the city and the country in the forthcoming communist society, the content of the green belt was indeed regulated by Maoist ambitions for industrialising China. But changes soon emerged. BMG’s policy in 1994 marked the point where the green belt started to be articulated with the state’s land business and spatial ambitions, and this articulation was revised, consolidated and intensified in the two decades that followed (see Chapter 5). The content of the green belt was fundamentally transformed in the last two decades but in the master plan its form remains intact. This belt is no longer full of vegetable bases (as it was in the Maoist era), since most of the plots of land have been diverted to property development use – still, ironically enough, in the name of the green belt.

This chapter starts with a review of the modernity issue, focusing on its articulation with urban space and the national ethos (Section 4.2). This becomes the theoretical foundation for genealogical analysis of Beijing’s green belt. The three sections that follow illustrate key moments in this genealogy. Section 4.3 introduces the role of (designing) a green belt in China’s socialist-modernist vision during the 1950s, and reveals that the rationale of this conduct started from rapid industrialisation, conceiving urban space as a physical container. In Section 4.4, I shift the focus to the articulation between the green belt and the urban metamorphosis in the 1980s and 1990s. Here the green belt seems once again foregrounded as the urban frontier. Yet it was not a frontier for industrial production, but more the frontier between the state’s land businesses that boomed in this period. Section 4.5 describes the emergence of a discursive moment, when the green belt was gradually articulated with the “rural-urban continuum,” a term that was used to describe counter-urban characters and to legitimise the state’s land and urban projects. This is indeed an ideological foundation for a distinct governing regime, the power of which was to be exaggerated in the 2000s (as discussed in Chapter 5).
The basis for these sections draws on materials from the Beijing Archives, the collected works of CPC leaders, memoirs written by central and municipal leaders who were engaged in urban planning works, and the chronicles of urban construction work in Beijing since 1949. I also use government documents issued by both the central and municipal departments, as well as related first- and second-hand information extracted from interviews, internal reports, news reports and academic analyses. As a final note, this chapter sets 1999 as the endpoint of the narrative (stories thereafter are confined to Chapter 5), when there was only one imaginary green belt in Beijing.

4.2 Modernity, urban space and the Chinese national ethos

Shortly before my fieldwork, the Central Committee of the CPC held a Central Conference on Urbanisation Works in December 2013. Both President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang gave keynote speeches at the conference. “Urbanisation is a natural-historical process, a necessary process that we cannot avoid in the course of economic and social development,” said Xi (2013). And “urbanisation is the only way for modernisation,” added Li (2013), “from the law of development all over the world.” Their words on the links between urban space and modernisation recall a principle inscribed in the first modern master plan of Beijing in 1958: “Beijing is the political, cultural and educational centre of China, and we should also quickly build it into a modernised industrial base and a science and technology centre … [in order to make it] the industrialised, green and modernised capital of a great socialist country” (Beijing Archives 1958, BMCUP 1987). The ambition to be modern, it seems, has been regulating the ethos of CPC and its leaders for more than half a century – such ambitions also exert an immense effect on the practice of urban planning. This continuity urged me to explore further, not only because it promised more understanding of the resurrection of the Party-state regime when socialism has long been disintegrated, but also for it showed obscure yet robust links between modernity and green belts in Beijing. While historical materials are illustrated in the following sections, here I want first to clarify the complex patterns of interaction between three key terms – modernity, urban space and the national ethos – to prepare for the genealogical analysis.

31 The Chinese word used here is 园林化 (yuanlinhua), or “gardened,” a word that indicates the causal mechanism of the setting up of a green belt. This is to be discussed in detail in the next section.
Modernity, as an ethos in general, is a product of the Enlightenment. While Kant (2009 [1784]) held a negative perspective and, in comparing the situation of today with that of yesterday (Foucault 1987, 159), saw Enlightenment as the act of “seeking a way out.” his French contemporaries were much more optimistic and proposed a brand-new definition of today. With their solid faith in human freedom and the human capacity to reason, they believed today must be better than yesterday, being defined by and located in the linear logic of progress and development (Habermas 1987a, see also Oakes 1998, Wagner 2012). Instead of being seen as a feature of a historical period, Foucault hence suggests, modernity should be taken as an attitude that defines a specific way of thinking, feeling and acting (1987, 164). For Habermas (1987a, 144), this attitude is a teleological ethos filled with “the heroic affinity of the present.” And such an attitude indicates the origin of a “modern maelstrom” (Berman 1983) in which “all that is solid melts into air.” The maelstrom certainly has much to do with a capitalist world market that is ever-expanding (Anderson 1984); equally important, however, is to uncover and analyse an inherent manoeuvre that it practises, turning coexisting heterogeneities into a “historical queue” in which everything has its place (Massey 2005, 68-69). Doreen Massey recognises this danger and identifies that the project of modernity evolves with an ambition to change the world’s geography into a single history, to universalise the Western way of imaging space and then to conceal the topography of power by the power of topography (ibid., 61-71).

This is the metamorphosis of the Enlightenment: the confidence in human reasoning and in today is transformed into a confidence in the linear logic of progress with Western countries as the model. It in turn gives birth to a familiar view, loosely called “modernisation theory,” the core of which lies in the conversion of spatial differences into temporal sequences and the migration of the “advanced” (i.e., Western) forms of knowledge and social institutions to everywhere else (Robinson 2006). Initiated by American social scientists in the 1950s and 1960s, this stream of discourses has been globally influential (Liu and Zhao forthcoming). Its principles of rationalism are translated, albeit in a de-contextualised way, into political and social objectives (Touraine 1995, 61, cf. Oakes 1998, 15); and these objectives are then wrapped in a “spatio-temporally neutral model for processes of social development in general” (Habermas 1987b, 2-3) and delivered indiscriminately to developing countries. Two
critical components form the foundation of the “modernisation” utopia: the market economy and urbanisation – the former for promoting industrial development, and the latter as a proper way to attract and accommodate the inflow of population for industries (Logan and Fainstein 2008). In the so-called Third World, however, urbanisation soon outpaced industrial development and overburdened public services (ibid., 3), and this in turn showed up the blind confidence of American social scientists in human reasoning in general and in their modernisation theories in particular.

But the effects of modernity are more significant than this. The urban experience in the Third World uncovers two more results that are relevant here: first and foremost, the attitude of modernity is now instilled into the national ethos of other (non-Western) countries; at the same time, urban space is foregrounded for the practice of such an attitude. In *Expectations of Modernity*, James Ferguson (1999) presents a vivid account of the myth of modernisation in the African urban experience. Through ethnographic investigation of the Zambian Copperbelt, he recognises that the modernist imagination continues to shape the lives of local people even when a changing “world economy” has already destroyed both the industries and the urban space of the area. In the context of counter-urbanisation, however, the following belief is still firmly held: urbanisation is not only “a movement in space but an epochal leap in evolutionary time” (ibid., 4-5). This is what Ferguson calls “the mythology of modernisation,” the shadow of which can also be clearly seen in the speeches of the Chinese leaders cited above in this section. Industrialisation is one pillar of the mythology and urbanism is the other pillar; together they foreground urban space in the “modern maelstrom.”

A question that arises here is how to register concrete methods of reshaping urban space that are consonant with “urban modernism.” The case of Brasilia (Holston 1989) may be a good starting point. As a state-led utopian experiment in urban modernism, the making of Brasilia witnesses the cooperation of two forces: one is the world-famous modern Brazilian architects who want to establish new forms of social life and human habitat that embody the ethos of *modernity* (ibid., 31); the other is the Brazilian government which tries to govern wisely, taking *modernisation* as the dominant ideology of development (ibid., 5, 12). Between them they share the vision of “a leap into the future,” collaborating with one another and eventually using modernist architecture and planning as an efficient technique for governing a new society in Brazil. To Holston, this marks
the affinity between modernism and modernisation upheld by developmentalists (ibid., 94-97). In this case, not only is the national ethos inflected by the attitude of modernity, but also the transition of urban space, where modern architecture and the planning canon serve in mediation. Nevertheless, these inflections are made possible not directly, via colonial conquest or military force; instead, they are induced endogenously in the interactions of different social groups who want to assert their role in the course of history. Modernity is first dissociated from its modern European origins to enable a spatio-temporally neutral model (Habermas 1987b, 2-3), but it is soon re-contextualised and then integrated into local and political conditions when it arrives at the destination.

Urban space is critical for re-contextualising modernity locally and also for articulating modernism (as a technique) with modernisation (as a series of social practices). Such a conclusion, drawn from urban experiences elsewhere, should be examined in the Chinese context before it is used in the genealogical analysis of green belts in Beijing. If we start from Shanghai, the city that was labelled the “Paris of the East” (东方巴黎, dongfang bali) and led the trend of Chinese modernity in the 19th and 20th centuries (Lee 1999), we see in Ou-fan Lee’s account that the modern features of this city originated in both Western and Chinese culture. They were delivered through public facilities and urban activities such as department stores, coffee houses, dance halls and public parks (ibid., 5-7). Such a hybridity not only informs the colonial influences of everyday life and space (ibid., 8-11), but also enables the local citizens to absorb the Western cultural elements into their own modern imaginary, with inherent confidence in its Chineseness (Lee 2001, 115-17, cf. Robinson 2006, 17). This outcome, as Jennifer Robinson (2006, 17) aptly puts it, is significant in illustrating how and to what extent emergent Chinese nationalism could frame “a cosmopolitan enthusiasm for ideas from other places… without admitting the relations of cultural domination they might intend” (Robinson 2006, 17).

It may be too risky, however, to move a step further in claiming that the case of Shanghai shows an indigenous modernity that has little to do with the Western origins of the concept (ibid.). Indeed, when the Chinese were cultivating their modern imaginaries, the only direction they could follow was Western cultural elements observed in the small concession areas of Chinese cities where Europeans (and some Americans) enjoyed legal autonomy (Mann 1984b, 85). In other words, the process of instilling the attitude of modernity is endogenous only to the extent that “the heroic affinity of present” is not
attributed to the Chinese present but to the Western one. As Wang Hui (2000, 45) clearly illustrates, Chinese intellectuals since the 19th century have gradually erected two isomorphic dichotomies: “China/West” vs. “Traditional/Modern”. It was in this way that the geographical concept of the West was transformed into a temporal figure of the present – *the one and only present* (no other options) that the Chinese ought to catch up with. This is indeed the manoeuvre of modernity identified by Massey (2005), where the Western way of imaging space (and history) is universalised and where the possibility of other temporalities and other spatialities is repressed. Yet this is also the process where the Chinese national ethos of modernity is erected, *endogenously*, by the Chinese themselves.

The start of the above endogenous process was in fact quite exogenous. It was the Opium War (1839-1842), a fierce struggle between China and the UK, which finally implicated China in the “universal history” of modernity at the dawn of the world’s capitalist market (Li 2010). Below is an excerpt from Marx’s insightful comment in 1858 on this war:

> “That a giant empire, containing almost one-third of the human race, vegetating in the teeth of time, insulated by the forced exclusion of general intercourse, and thus contriving to dupe itself with delusions of Celestial perfection – that such an empire should at last be overtaken by fate on [the] occasion of a deadly duel… [And] the corruption that ate into the heart of the Celestial bureaucracy, and destroyed the bulwark of the patriarchal constitution, was, together with the opium chests, smuggled into the Empire from the English store-ships anchored at Whampoa.” (Marx 2007, 27-28)

The capitalist coercions around 1840 significantly shocked the Chinese view of the world, especially among its intellectuals, who had been so accustomed to “delusions of Celestial perfection” in Marx’s phrase. In the aftermath of these events, they started to explore both the causality of the failure and potential remedies for the distressing situation. The social and cultural traditions, as many tended to believe, should be held responsible, for they had prevented the Chinese from responding properly to the new world order. The way to move out, it followed, was to “modernise” (and hence to rescue) the nation by adopting Western science and democracy (Chen 2012, Li 2010, Wang 1998, 2000, 2009). This eventually gave rise to the isomorphic dichotomies mentioned earlier; these in turn
rewrote the ethos of the nation by incorporating the constitutional agenda that required China “to be modern” to salvage itself. It is widely accepted that Chinese society was fundamentally transformed by this spirit beginning in the 1840s. Such issues as national independence, prosperity, social justice, personal freedom and a republican and democratic regime are hence taken as concrete values that can be achieved automatically as part of the repertoire of “being modern” (Chen 2012, 5-6).

The transition of Chinese intellectuals’ view of that nation’s past and future preconditioned the rise of the Communist Party of China (CPC). To be modern, as the constitutional problem in the country, has since been inherited by each generation, successively adapted “in ways appropriate to its time” (Kuhn 2002, 24); the CPC and its socialist regime are not exempt. For Wang Hui (Wang 1998, 2000), the outbreak of the First World War warned the ambitious Chinese intellectuals that Western modernity, in contrast to the popular view, was no longer a panacea. There were increasing reflections on and critiques of European “high modernism” after seeing so many conflicts between imperialist powers and their endless invasions of Chinese territory. In this context, Marxism, “a modernist project that criticises modernity” (Wang 2000, 74), was accepted by intellectuals who wanted to make China modern yet in a form other than Capitalism (Wang 1998, 13-14). With fierce struggles initiated in the 1910s, first at the cultural and public opinion level (e.g., the New Culture Movement) and later via political and military channels (e.g., revolutionary bases in Jiangxi and Shaanxi Province), the CPC eventually seized power in 1949 – more than a century after the Opium War.

In the course of being implicated in the capitalist world market, Chinese were forced to explore an endogenous approach to being modern; the “Paris of the East” was produced in this process, as well as the growth of a Marxist Party and then its regime. This is how modernity, as an attitude, was eventually re-contextualised and instilled into the Chinese national ethos. This was in no sense the conclusion of the repertoire of modernity – it was the opening. In the examples of Zambia and Brasilia, we see that industrialisation and urbanisation are indeed two pillars of the mythology of modernisation. What about China? As a child of modernity, is the CPC able to give an alternative direction that makes China modern yet not tied to a capitalist agenda? If so, what would be the role of urban space in this alternative CPC-led modernity? After all, it is cities such as Shanghai (with its concessions for colonists in particular) that displayed the urgency of salvaging
the nation and at the same time made Chinese modern imaginaries possible. Such colonial legacies, no matter how bitter they used to be, are already part of the national history and inscribed accordingly in the Chinese national ethos. With these concerns, the next section illustrates how the green belt was conceived and born in China’s socialist-utopian experiments in the 1950s.

4.3 “Gardening the earth:” The green belt in the socialist-utopian vision

“Both the country and the city should be gardened, like a huge park. In several years, when the yield per mu [亩产,muchan] is high enough, we will not need so much arable land anymore. Then we could take one third of our land out for planting trees, another one third for growing grains, and let the remainder lie fallow.” – Mao Zedong (2013, 425; originally spoken on 30 August 1958)

The above comes from a talk which was given several weeks before the first modern urban master plan of Beijing was approved by the Central Committee of the CPC (BMCUP 1987). It was also a precursor of the Great Famine (1959-1961) in which 36 million people starved to death, mostly in the countryside (Yang 2012). Both the urban and the rural stories (tragedies) have much to do with the socialist-utopian vision of the country cherished by Mao and the Party, an immanent part of their project to make China modern. This is why we should start from modernity (as in the previous section) when exploring the genealogy of the green belt in Beijing. This green belt is more than a physical component in the city’s master plan; it is rather a symptom of modernity in China, co-produced both by the national ethos that seizes every way of catching up with Western countries and by the newly imported modernist planning principles. While the Western planning canon defines the belt’s form, it is the national ethos and related strategies (such as industrialisation) that determine its content.

The Chinese path of development in the Maoist era is underlined by the co-existence of high rates of industrialisation and accumulation and a very low level of urbanisation (Chan 1994, Kirkby 1985). It used to be taken by some as a promising alternative to the
Western model and to the increasing over-urbanisation in the Third World (see, for example, Murphey 1975). But such a beautified view is, for Kirkby (1985, 18), only a product of “Western susceptibility to agrarian utopian and oriental fantasy.” Indeed, the restriction of urbanisation is a direct outcome of the pursuit of a high rate of industrialisation – a normal “socialist” development model which can also be seen in the former USSR and other Eastern European countries (Chan 1994, 13-14). After this model, the economic development policies drew mainly on industrial development and were biased against agriculture and (urban) consumption (ibid., 52-53). Here emerges a contradiction that would torment Chinese urban planners for decades: how to control the costs and expenses of urban construction, on the one hand, and to contain the rapid industrial growth in the urban space, on the other? For a long time, their response was to economise on urbanisation costs by resisting the expansion of expenditure on non-productive consumption, such as public facilities and urban housing (ibid., 72). Issues of this kind, relating to the urban built environment, are taken as “black hole[s] in the capital circuit” since they cannot bring returns, and this view sustains the “structural tendency towards underinvestment in ‘non-productive’ areas” (Wu 1997, 649-50).

On 11 August 1954, The People’s Daily (人民日报, renmin ribao) published an editorial that was entitled “Following the guidelines of building cities with priorities” (The People's Daily 1954). As the official newspaper of the CPC, its editorial reminded the Chinese people that urban construction works in China should follow the direction of socialist development, the basis of which was the development of industries. “The construction and development of socialist cities must be subordinate to the construction and development of socialist industries; and the speed of the development of socialist cities must be determined by the speed of the development of socialist industries.” For this reason, it continued, “urban constructions must ensure priority to industrial developments and must conform to the guidelines of socialist industrialisation.” After this editorial, the principle of urban construction works was set as “serving for industries, for productions, for the working people” (Wan 1994, 3), and various regulations were passed to make sure that urban planning would act in concert with industrial constructions (ibid., 3-4, see also Hoa 2006, 30-32).

As the national capital for the new socialist country, Beijing was under greater pressure to industrialise itself, and this in turn fundamentally affected its urban space in general.
It took four drafts of this city’s urban master plan before the Central Committee of the CPC eventually approved it in September 1958. In this series of drafts, the above principle of urban construction was gradually consolidated, if not intensified. The first draft was produced in 1952-1953, showing industrial bases properly dispersed, with residential areas located between them and the urban centre (BMCUP 1987, 15-16). Then in the summer of 1953, a revised draft was drawn in light of the Soviet experience in urban construction and planning. In it the principle of building Beijing was proposed as “serving for productions, for the Central Government and for the working people last of all” (ibid., 16-19). The most critical change here was that this draft determined that, for the first time, “we should especially build our capital into a powerful industrial base and a centre for science and technology” (ibid., 19). For this aim, it further required the development of huge industrial projects in the eastern, southern, western and north-eastern suburbs, while agricultural bases were to be retained in the outer suburbs to supply vegetables, fruit and dairy produce for the working people in the city (ibid., 20) (see Figure 4.1).
(b) The master plan for the whole territory of Beijing (October 1954)

Figure 4.1 Revised Beijing master plans in October 1954

Source: BMCUP (1987, 22-23). Notes: (1) these maps were drawn up after the critiques made by the SPC in October 1954; (2) some minor revisions were made to the original draft of 1953, but the general principle were untouched: the inner-city suburbs were filled with industrial bases while the remoter ones were devoted to agricultural production, such as vegetables, fruit and livestock.

The above draft of the urban master plan, however, was turned down by the State Planning Commission (hereafter SPC), the body in charge of all construction works (industrial and urban) in China during the Maoist era. The main reasons lay in their different views of the size of the urban population (BMG proposed that it would reach five million in twenty years while the SPC insisted on four million), of the scale of land use for residential areas and transport facilities, and of the ambitious goal of making the city “a powerful industrial base” (BMCUP 1987, 21-25). On top of this, the SPC suggested that BMG should invite urban planning experts from the USSR, and this was approved by the Central Committee of the CPC. The arrival of the USSR experts in April 1955 marks the starting point of the third phase of drafting the Beijing master plan in the 1950s. To facilitate their work, the BMG decided to set up a new institution called the Capital Urban Planning Commission, the official brand name for this studio of experts (ibid., 32). After two years’ work, the new draft under the guidance of the USSR experts
was agreed by the Municipal Standing Committee in March 1957 and then submitted to the Central Committee of the CPC in June 1958 (Beijing Archives 1958, BMCUP 1987, Shen 2003, 210).

In this 1958 report to the Central Committee, the BMG claimed that their dispute with the SPC had been resolved due to a recent critical speech by Chairman Mao entitled “The Ten Major Relationships” (Mao 1956; originally spoken on 25 April 1956). In the interests of China’s defences, very few industries had been located in coastal areas (including Beijing) in the first Five-Year-Plan period (1953-1957), but in this speech Mao confirmed that both coastal and inland areas should be developed in a more balanced way (ibid., 25-26) – and this argument encouraged the BMG to make pronouncements on the nature and scale of a plan for the capital:

What kind of city shall we make Beijing into? This is indeed the premise on which to draw up the master plan. We believe that Beijing is not only the political, cultural and education centre of our mother country, but should also be built into a modernised industrial base and a centre for science and technology. The master plan is produced following this vision. Such a problem has long been debated but is now resolved. According to this premise, the scale of Beijing’s development cannot be very small. However, it would be equally problematic to have a city that was too big, and proper controls are still needed… To avoid the excessive concentration of urban population in the city proper, we plan to adopt the “mother-child city network” (子母城, zimu cheng) for a new urban layout. While the city proper is being developed, we will also build dozens of satellite towns at the same time. The population in the city proper will in the long run be controlled within five to six million people, but the total population of the whole city (including those living in its suburbs and in satellite towns) will be around ten million. (Beijing Archives 1958, see also BMCUP 1987, 195-96; originally written on 23 June 1958)
This draft is where the two effects of modernity encounter with each other through the re-organisation of urban space for industrial development. Under the socialist dogmas (from USSR experts), industrialisation was a key signal of modernisation, and hence the urban space should be deployed for promoting major industries. The ambitious goals of industrialisation and modernisation required urban space on a sufficient scale, though an increased urban scale might also lead to much more expenditures on non-productive consumption. The compromise was to set up satellite towns that can organise both production and consumption independently and hence help reduce the burden of the state from the black holes in the capital circuit. Under this rationale the BMG continues to argue that its territory should be expanded to more than ten thousand square kilometres for its long-term development (BMCUP 1987, 199-200). Furthermore, when it comes to the principles of urban design, this draft plan argues that shelterbelts of appropriate width should be erected between the industrial areas and the residential areas; and forests should be planted outside the city proper to form a strong green system together with parks and other green areas all over the city. Critical symbols of the modern planning canon are clearly inscribed here: the zoning technique, the landscape of the garden city, as well as the famous botanical analogy followed by Sir Ebenezer Howard: “a town, like a flower, or a tree, or an animal, should at each stage of its growth, possesses unity, symmetry [and] completeness” (cf. Relph 1987, 55-57, 67-69).

The imaginary forest planned outside the city proper in June 1958 indeed marks the green belt in Beijing in an embryonic form, which became mature only three months later. Such a miracle was made possible by the rapid growth of socialist-utopian ambition in the aftermath of the First-Five-Year-Plan Period (1953-1957). Enormous increases in industrial production (especially by heavy industry and related materials) make these five years stand out: from 1952 to 1957 the national industrial output witnessed an increase of 128.3% (an increase of 25.4% annually); the ratio of heavy industries in the industrial output increased from 35.5% in 1952 to 45% in 1957; the production of steel rose to 5.35 million tons in 1957, three times more than that of 1952 (Hu 1991, 387). At the same time, the rapid socialist transformation of the national economy also led to a new economic structure that was dominated by the state (32.2%) and the collective (53.4%)

32 That is, the instilling of the attitude of “being modern” into the national ethos on the one hand, and the use of urban space for practising this attitude on the other (for details, see discussions in the previous section).
sector in 1956 (ibid., 382-83). The speedy development of China’s productive forces and the fundamental transformation of its production relations encouraged the Party leaders, Mao Zedong in particular, to explore an alternative path for building the socialist society. Their ambitions were also intensified by changes of political atmosphere in the Soviet Union: Nikita Khrushchev delivered his “Secret Speech” to the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 25 February 1956, in which Stalin’s purges were denounced and the Stalinist model criticised (ibid., 390-91). For Mao Zedong and other CPC leaders, this event was a reminder that a new socialist model was needed to get rid of superstition in both Stalin and the USSR and to integrate Marxist principles with the conditions in China (ibid., 390-91). This vision, however, soon deteriorated into fanaticism on behalf of a utopian imaginary of communism.

In November 1957, Mao led a delegation of the Party on a visit to Moscow. There, he learned that the USSR proposed to catch up with and surpass the United States in 15 years; this in turn encouraged him to propose and declare that, in terms of steel production, China would catch up with and surpass the UK in 15 years as well (Hu 1991, 414). His goal was soon re-delivered to China, initiating “The Great Leap Forward Movement” (大跃进, dayuejin) in 1958. In the Second Meeting of the 8th Congress of the CPC, a new agenda was set up by the Party: “to develop our productivity at the highest speed” (ibid., 416; emphasis added), it argued, the Party should “take steel as the key link” (以钢为纲, yigang weigang). In August 1958, the Central Committee of the CPC held another meeting in Beidaihe, a seaside resort for top leaders, and there set a 100% increase in the amount of steel produced in the year 1958 (of which only four months remained). The CPC leaders also discussed the agricultural production. The target of grain to be produced was set at 350 million tons, an 89% increase on the previous year’s yield; and the decision to build the “People’s Commune” (人民公社, renmin gongshe) was finalised here as well (ibid., 418-19, Mao 2013).

On 30 August 1958, the day after the above resolution on the People’s Commune was issued, an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of CPC was held in Beidaihe (Mao 2013, 424-27). Starting from the issue of the People’s Commune, Mao Zedong gave a long speech on his own vision of communist society, in which the theme of “gardening the
earth” was first proposed. For him, the establishment of the People’s Commune, the increase in steel production, and the greening of land everywhere were all signals of how we human beings could conquer nature for the happiness of all (ibid., 427). Responding to this ambitious appeal, a new slogan spread throughout the country: “the yield from the soil can be more than we need if we are bold enough” (人有多大胆, 地有多大产, renyou duoda dan, diyou duoda chan) (Hu 1991, 417). Because the objectives set up by the central leaders were unrealistic, local totals turned out to be nothing but endless lies; yet the rationing system meant that a fixed proportion of the (fictitious) yield had be collected to supply the rapidly increasing numbers of steelworkers. At the same time, Mao’s vision of the “gardened earth” led to a huge decrease of the crop acreage (20% from 1958 to 1959) – a policy that would vacate land so as to plant trees and to garden the earth (ibid., 428). When these issues coalesced, millions of peasants in China found that their harvest was even smaller than the quota they had to turn over to the state. The Great Famine was thus inevitable, sacrificing the lives of 36 million people from 1959 to 1961, after Mao’s utopian vision of the country (Yang 2012).

The green belt in Beijing was also consolidated in the pursuit of a utopian dream of communism. Soon after the Beidaihe Conference, Beijing’s Municipal Party Committee revised its urban master plan – the one finished only three months before (in June 1958). “The establishment of communism is no longer far away,” it asserted, and “our plan should be long-sighted in order to take into consideration the needs of the communist society” (BMCUP 1987, 39-40). To be more specific, it declared that the new plan should prepare to speed up industrialisation in the city proper and in the people’s communes in the countryside, to integrate different professions in society, and to eliminate three distinctions (between the industrial sector and the agricultural sector, between the city and the country, and between manual labour and mental labour). The zoning techniques were also criticised for artificially dividing different functions and hence not helping to

33 Mao Zedong’s enthusiasm for greening China can be dated back to 1932 when he was Chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, a regime established in the Jiangxi Revolutionary Base in the 1930s (Mao, Xiang, and Zhang 1932, Mao 1934). In the 1950s, he was even more keen on greening the earth, claiming that “greening is good for every aspect [of society]” and that we should aim to “plant trees wherever we can in the next 12 years” (Mao 1955a, 1955b). This view is further developed in 1958 (Mao 1958b, and Mao 2013, 425, 528-29) and was soon upgraded into a national strategy called “Gardening over the Earth” (The People’s Daily 1959). Mao’s enthusiasm for green was inherited and carried forward by Deng Xiaoping and other CPC leaders, up to the present day (Wan 1994).
eliminate the three distinctions. As an alternative, a new urban layout of “dispersed clustering” (分散集团式, *fensan jituanshi*) was proposed (ibid., 206-207):

In the last few years, the scale of redeveloping and expanding the city proper has been huge. The urban layout should not be too concentrated, and a dispersed and clustering model is to be applied from now on. There should be green spaces between clusters: 40% of the city proper and 60% of the inner-city suburbs are to be greened. In the green spaces, we will have woods, fruit trees, flowers and lakes, as well as planting crops. We should also dot small but high-yielding fields over the city proper […] In the future, big industries will mainly be allocated to the outer suburbs, forming a nucleus for rural industrialisation and to foster the development of rural communities into new towns around the city proper. This new layout, once it is achieved, can bring great benefits for integrating different professions in the People’s Commune and for integrating the city with the country (BMCUP 1987, 207)

(a) The master plan for the city proper (September 1958)
(b) The master plan for the whole territory of Beijing (September 1958)

**Figure 4.2 Revised Beijing master plans in September 1958**

*Source:* BMCUP (1987, 41-42). *Notes:* (1) The area of the city proper was similar to that in previous plan drafts, around 640 km$^2$; but the area of the whole city expanded from 4,500 km$^2$ in 1957 to 17,300 km$^2$ in September 1958, an increase of 284% in nine months (BMCUP 1987, 199, 207); (2) As well as the expanded area, the utopian vision also generated an imaginary green belt in the urban space (see the dotted outline in the first map, 314 km$^2$ in total), as well as an ambitious canal system in this region which was famous for its extreme water shortage (see the lines around the city proper in the second map); (3) The green dot in the first map and the orange one in the second show Dahongmen and Sunhe, my two field sites, respectively.

In this utopian vision of the communist society, differences between the city and the country could be eliminated by rendering both as an integration of each other – high-yielding fields in the city and big industries in the outer suburbs – and the green space was to play a crucial role in fusing the two together into a “huge park.” This marked the *debut* of the green belt in the master plan of Beijing. Initiated in the second draft of the plan in the summer of 1953 (see Figure 4.1), this idea was developed by USSR experts in the third draft (in June 1958), and finalised here in September 1958 (see Figure 4.2 above). The green belt in reality, however, was not as green as we might learn from its counterpart in London. It was more like a buffer between the city and the country in the forthcoming communist society – and the greater part of this area was maintained as the
agricultural basis to serve the working people in the city. Though its content was regulated by the country’s ambitions in industrialising itself, its form was indeed directed by both the Maoist utopian vision of society and modernist views of urban space in the Western planning canon (Hoa 2006, 80). The firm affinity between modernisation and modernism observed by Holston in Brasilia is hence recognised here, but follow a completely different evolutionary track that eventually results in tremendous disaster.

Dahongmen and Sunhe, the field sites for this thesis, are both implicated in the above utopian vision of the city and the country. Although Dahongmen in the first map of Figure 4.2 was inside the dotted line (marking the green space), in the event it was used as a base for flammable industries and warehouses, filled with factories producing timber, wooden boxes, linoleum and metal, together with a meat processing factory and the Beijing Food Company (CCBCPN 1996, 766). As for Sunhe, it had been administered by Daxing County in Hebei Province until 1956, when it was annexed by Beijing as the latter’s new frontier; it was integrated in the newly born Heping People’s Commune in 1958 and then absorbed into the state-owned Dongjiao Farm (the Commune and the Farm were at the time two labels for this area). This lasted until 1998 when the state-owned farm was abolished and re-formed as one part of the Sanyuan Group, a state-owned enterprise (SOE). This is a company with national reputation for dairy products, and Sunhe was for a long time one of its production bases (CCCPNCD 1993, 319-21, CCCSFB 2000, 11-15, and Interview with local resident, 24 July 2015).

The link between “administrative utopianism” in USSR and high modernism is clearly revealed by James Scott (1998, Chapter 6); in exploring Niemayer’s aesthetic and cultural elements, he emphasises that “the master builders of Soviet society were rather more like Niemeyer designing Brasilia than Baron Haussmann retrofitting Paris” (p.193). In addition, the link illustrates that the “defining features of the Soviet regime and its ideological underpinnings were presented through the discourse of space and architecture” (Clark 2003, 16). Similar tracks are also identified in other socialist regions such as Czechoslovakia (Zarecor 2011) and Kazakhstan (Koch 2010, 2014, 2015). On a separate page, it should also be noted that the connection between China’s urban space and the national ethos is equally shaped by US and UK-trained architects and urban planners, like Liang Sicheng (BArch and MArch in Architecture at the University of Pennsylvania) and Chen Zhanxiang (unfinished PhD student at the University of London, supervised by Sir Patrick Abercrombie). While Liang and Chen had disputes with USSR experts in 1949-50 (Wang 2003), they actually share the same modernist visions of urban space and use identical zoning techniques (BMCUP 1987, Liang 2006, Zhao 2015). In his prefatory recommendation of the Chinese translation of The Athens Charter (an agenda set by Le Corbusier for modernist planning and architecture) in 1951, Liang Sicheng plays a crucial role in advocating the key concerns for China of the Western planning canon, such as building new towns and applying zoning techniques (Liang 2006, 41-43, Wong 2013, 2015).
To conclude, the content of the imaginary green belt here is defined by the utopian vision of making China modern, and compromised by the industrialising of the city, while its form is by and large set up by the Western (modernist) planning canon imported by USSR experts and Chinese architects trained in the US and UK. The utopian experiment is transient and the content of the belt is accordingly transformed, together with the political economy. However, the form of the belt remained untouched and, surprisingly, served the new goal even more efficiently during China’s urban metamorphosis. This is discussed in more detail in the next two sections.

4.4 Green belt as the frontier of the urban metamorphosis

In this section, I continue this elaboration of the genealogy of Beijing’s green belt by contextualising it in the urban metamorphosis (see Chapter 2). The focus here is how and how far the green belt manages to keep its form on the master plan but change its contents according to the strategy of state-led urban accumulation. If the socialist-utopian vision of making China modern induced a gap between an imaginary green belt and the concrete practices, then the 1980s saw a new gap emerging between this same belt and politico-economic ambition in producing urban space for capital accumulation. However, the discourse of modernisation, which is inherent in the form of the imaginary belt, is consistent; and this in turn becomes a powerful ideological technique for the Party-state regime not only because it legitimises the green belt project at the urban frontier but also because it reproduces the social relations for the survival of the regime. In this sense, the national ethos of modernity is continuously deployed by the Party-state as a key measure for its survival, yet in a depoliticised way (i.e., disintegrated from its Marxist affinities).

With the accumulated concern over the “three pollutions” (air, water and slag-heaps) in Beijing since the early 1970s (BMPC 2004a, 593-94, Wan 1994, 132, 152), a fundamental revision was made in April 1980 to the principle of making Beijing modern. In the “important instruction” issued by the Central Secretariat of the CPC, it was highlighted that:

Beijing is the political centre of our country, and it is also the centre for international contacts. Beijing should be built into the best city for social order,
security, the social atmosphere and morality anywhere in the country and the whole world. It should be made into the most hygienic and the most beautiful city with the cleanest environment in our country, and it should also be comparable to other cities across the world. Furthermore, Beijing should also be a first-class city with the most developed level of science, culture, technology and education in China, and is destined to be one of the most culturally developed cities in the world as well […] Economic development policies should be adjusted according to the characteristics of the Capital, and heavy industries should cease to be developed (BMCUP 1987, 75; originally issued by Central Secretariat of CPC on 21 April 1980)

Instead of seeing industrialisation as the principal indicator of modernisation, the revised vision of modern is here shifting the focus to such issues as social order, hygiene, a clean environment and cultural elements, while heavy industries are excluded from the urban-modern agenda. This is the moment when Deng Xiaoping has just seized supreme power and initiated a series of policy changes called “Reform and Opening Up” (改革开放, gaige kaifang). While the CPC still held power and claimed still to be exploring the Chinese-socialist way to be modern, there was undoubtedly a fundamental rupture between Mao’s utopian vision and Deng’s reforms. For Wang Hui (2000, 49-53), Mao’s view involved not only a modernist imagination but also a revolutionary and utopian ideal of making China modern in a different way that moves beyond the Capitalist form. But Deng’s reforming impulse inherited only the modernist imagination, while the intention to fight against capitalist modernity was dropped (ibid.). His socialism was pragmatic and de-politicised, for it aimed to make China modern through more practical (and ideologically free) methods. This rupture not only induced the gradual establishment of a “socialist market economy,” labelled by David Harvey (2005a) “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics” (see reflections in Chapter 2), but also invited a new content to fill the modernist urban form of Beijing’s green belt that was part of the new urban plan for a better environment.

After the above principle announced by the Central Secretariat of the CPC, a new urban master plan was drawn up by the BMG in December 1982. The nature of Beijing, in response to orders from the top, was no longer to be the “economic centre” and the “modern industrial base” but changed to the “political and cultural centre of our country,”
Various problems induced by industrial development are reflected on in this draft, and an alternative call was made to construct Beijing as “a modernised, highly civilised, and highly democratic socialist city” (ibid., 79-80). Regarding the environment, revised guidelines were put forward, but they still preserved the principles of “gardening the earth” and “gardening the city” from the socialist-utopian vision (ibid., 83). To implement these guidelines, the plan continued, “a green ring of pretty landscape should be set around the city proper, connecting Xiaotangshan, Qinghe, the Wenyu River, the Northern Canal, Sanhaizi and the Yongding River; as to the city proper, universal greening and four-sides greening ³⁵ should be advocated to improve the urban environment and beautify the city” (ibid., 83) Here, the green belt consolidated in 1958 is not merely maintained but developed in its imaginary form (see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3 The 1982 master plan of Beijing’s city proper

Source: BMCUP (1987, 77). Notes: (1) The setting of the city proper (i.e., its territory and boundary) is the same as in the 1950s, with an area of around 750 km² and Qinghe, Nanyuan, Dingfuzhuang and Shijingshan as four endpoints; (2) The dotted area around the city centre is the designated but still imaginary green belt (around 260 km² in area), another legacy from the 1958 plan; (3) Dahongmen is the green dot and Sunhe is the orange.

³⁵ “Four-sides greening” (四旁绿化, sipang lühua) is a term proposed by Mao Zedong (1955b, 509), which refers to his stipulation for cultivated land next to houses, communities, roads and rivers.
The content of the designated green belt, however, changed in a totally different direction. By 1992, nearly 100 square kilometres of this area had been occupied by the urban and rural constructions, which in turn cut off most of the green wedges designed to deliver fresh air to the city centre (Zhang 2001a, 250). If we get rid of its imaginary form and consider the green belt as it was in reality, then only 130 (out of 260) square kilometres of land in this area had the potential to be green (ibid.). The reason is two-fold. First, Beijing’s urban planning adopted a two-level management system (founded in 1959; BMPC 2004a, 359-61), in which each District had the authority to approve small-scale construction projects directly; some illegal cases were legalised in this way after benefits had been shared with local officials (BMCUP 1999). Second, the municipal policy intensified the situation: in 1986, BMG proposed a pilot policy to construct the green belt; it encouraged more than ten townships and villages to build villas for sale (taking up to 20% of their territory) and to green the other 80% of it. This “villa-projects” policy, however, produced only villas and no green space and was soon brought to an end (Interview on 24 October 2014). Nevertheless, the ethos underlying this policy survived and turned out to be increasingly influential thereafter; it led officials to commandeer the green belt to produce new urban space and to accumulate capital for the municipality.

In 1989, the Beijing Academy of Urban Planning and Design (BAUPD) suggested that BMG should expand the city proper by including surrounding rural communities in the urban master plan. They claimed this would strengthen the planning, construction and administration work for rural communities in the near suburbs (surrounding the inner city) (BMPC 2004b, 1041-43). In total, 34 townships and five state-owned farms in this region were affected, and their territories rearranged on the principles of “relative concentration” and “saving land use.” 1,270 natural villages were merged into 360 new villages, and more than 1,500 factories were “concentrated” (i.e., relocated) to 380 industrial parks – these measures helped the municipal government to reduce its land use by 36 square kilometres in these suburbs. In this procedure, the green belt was also re-defined as 43 green spaces (public parks, artificial forests and grasslands) that could be connected by shelterbelts along the main roads, rivers and railways – and this system was, in their eyes, good enough to be called a “green ring” of public parks (ibid.). These policies were implemented first and foremost because the BMG felt under pressure to control the expansion of urban space when the TVEs expanded and used more and more land close to the centre of the city (in breach of the 1982 urban master plan). Furthermore,
these actions were also useful for the municipal authorities, which would benefit from the leasing of state-owned urban land that had been legalised the year before.

The ethos that encouraged the production of new urban space was further strengthened in 1990, when BMG issued a new policy entitled the “Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme” (ODHRP). This policy involved 20.9 square kilometres of land and more than one million people in the inner city\(^{36}\) in only three years (Fang and Zhang 2003, 151); in so doing, it generated plenty of opportunities for BMG to sell “development rights” over the designated “dilapidated urban area” (Wu 1999, 1762, Shin 2006, 2009)\(^{37}\). The incorporation of spaces in the near suburbs (largely overlapping with the green belt) and the commercialisation of the inner city through the ODHRP revealed the two key directions of the BMG to facilitate their land businesses in the urban metamorphosis. The increasing role of the green belt for this strategy was soon registered in the 1992 edition of Beijing’s urban master plan – and BMG’s practices thereafter (see Figure 4.4).

\(^{36}\) The inner city (内城, neicheng) was defined as the area within the city wall in the 1950s, which is equivalent to the area surrounded by the Second Ring Road at present (around 60 km\(^2\)). Here, when this ODHRP project was just initiated, the term ‘inner city’ still referred to this region. But in the 1992 urban master plan, the concept of “inner city” was extended to the area surrounded by the Fourth Ring Road (around 300 km\(^2\)), and labelled “the central area of the city proper” (市区中心地区, shiqu zhongxin diqu) (BMCUP 1992).

\(^{37}\) The ambitions of the BMG in redeveloping the inner city are not new. This task was included in the four drafts of the urban master plan in the 1950s (BMCUP 1987, 25-27, 36-37, 57), mainly for a political reason – as a spatial signal of the new regime (Dong 2006, 30-31). However, this task has been delayed because of its huge cost, which cannot be offset against returns for capital accumulation (ibid., 38-39). It was not until the mid-1980s that the BMG realised that redevelopment could be a good business rather than a costly political task (ibid., 49-71).
Figure 4.4 The 1992 master plan of Beijing’s city proper

Source: Dong (2006, 72). Notes: (1) The city proper was expanding quickly between 1982 and 1992 – mainly to the east. It now covers 1,040 km² in total, including Sunhe and many other townships in the near suburbs which used to be beyond the city proper. (2) The green blocks around the urban centre are drawn out, though not obviously, in the shape of a ring, and they mark the 43 green spaces that redefine Beijing’s green belt. (3) Dahongmen is the blue dot which lies in the green belt, while Sunhe is the orange dot.

This plan was drawn up in a complex political context: the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, the Asian Games in 1990, the 14th Congress of the CPC in 1992, and also the imminent failure of China’s first application for the Summer Olympic Games in 1993. At this juncture, the nature of Beijing changed correspondingly, from the “political and cultural centre of China” to a “modern and international city” (BMCUP 1992, Zhang 2001a, 274-75). The Chinese national ethos of modernity was once again registered by the planning language, but it was deployed in a depoliticised sense – only the modernist imaginations being adopted – and then transformed into a yearning to be “international”:

In 2010, the level of social development in Beijing and its comprehensive economic and technological strength should catch up with, and surpass in certain aspects, the corresponding levels of the capital of a medium-level developed country. By this time, the adjustment of urban population, industries, and layout should have finished. In addition, the modernisation of the urban infrastructure
should have greatly advanced, the urban environment should be clean and beautiful, and the historical and traditional built environment should have been inherited and even carried forward – all these matters are necessary in laying the foundation for building Beijing into a *first-class modern and international city* by the middle of the 21st century. (BMCUP 1992; emphases added)

With regard to the urban layout, some new changes contributed to making this plan outstanding. First, the city proper witnessed a rapid expansion – 290 square kilometres larger than in the 1982 master plan (see Figure 4.4). In addition to the inner city, the “dispersed clusters” in the near suburbs, the green belt in between, as well as some other localities in the near suburbs were all incorporated in the city proper. Second, the BMG set out to build 14 satellite towns in the outer suburban districts which were expected to accommodate one million people displaced from the city centre (as both a legacy of the socialist-utopian vision of the city and a supportive policy for the ODHRP). Third, the principle of constructing the city proper was changed from being “new-area-development oriented” to “equally attending to both the redevelopment of old and dilapidated areas and the development of new areas” (BMCUP 1992). For the old and dilapidated areas, the focus was “the adjustment of land use” (i.e., evacuating the local households to produce new urban spaces such as CBD and Financial Street 38); as regards new areas of development, spatial priority was given to dispersed clusters (the built-up areas outside the green belt but within the city proper) rather than to the inner city (ibid.). Fourth, and most relevant here, the land use and functions of the rural area within the city proper (i.e., in the green belt) were also to change: the green space in each township, the BMG says, should not be less than 60% of its territory – “mainly for planting trees, but also for the appropriate development of parks and recreation-related facilities to speed up the pace of construction” (ibid.). On top of this, the administrative system in this area was to be adjusted if such townships and/or villages did not own arable land any longer after the expansion of urban constructions – that is, the organisational structure should change from rural to urban (ibid.).

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38 On the planning and construction process of CBD in Beijing, see Ke (2016); on the huge scale of demolition for building Financial Street (*jīn róng jiē*), see Fang and Zhang (2003, 151, Table 2).
Instead of laying the foundation for making Beijing a “modern and international city,” these measures indeed paved the way for making the green belt the new frontier of the city’s urban metamorphosis. This 1992 master plan of Beijing was approved by the State Council in 1993, the same year that the Party issued its decision to further promote the “socialist market economy” (CPC 1993). The State Council’s official reply said that “this plan not only conforms to the Party ethos established in the 14th Congress of CPC but also fits the specific situation of Beijing, and it hence should play a guiding role for constructing and developing the capital from now on” (State Council 1993). The ethos of making a socialist market economy was immediately practised and then intensified by the BMG – in the green belt. On 20 January 1994, it approved a request for “greening the designated green belt in the city proper” (BMG 1994):

[…] in the course of economic development and urban constructions, we should also earnestly insist on the “dispersed clustering” layout of the capital-Beijing, consciously maintain and develop the green area on the designated green land in the city proper, so as to ensure adequate green space, on the one hand, and to create conditions for building Beijing into […] a first-class modernised and international city, on the other.

“To make the belt really green, to uphold the planned urban layout, to reverse the deterioration in the ecology and environment, and to transform the dirty, messy and disappointing situation of the rural-urban continuum,” the BMG (1994) continues, “we should gradually adjust land use in this area – by planting trees in places currently occupied by grain and vegetable growers and TVEs – so as to produce more than 140 square kilometres of green land by the end of this century.” In the new conditions of building a socialist market economy, “residential real estate development can be integrated with both the greening work and the redevelopment of old villages” (ibid.) Residents in these rural communities will be endowed with urban hukou after the demolition of their dwellings and the relocation of themselves; but their labour should be allocated to local TVEs (affiliated to township or village collectives) rather than SOEs. To sustain the provision of their social welfare, such facilities as those for sports and recreation can be built by the township and village collectives in the green space, but they were not allowed to cover more than 3% of the total area. The key principle was quite simple: “financing through developing (the space)” (开发筹资, kaifa chouzi) and
“approved by the state and then operated by the private sector” (国批民办, guopi minban) (BMG 1994, see also BMCUP 1999).

Figure 4.5 The detailed layout of Beijing’s green belt in 1994

Source: BAUPD (2014a). Notes: (1) The dark blue line is the boundary of the city proper of Beijing and the shaded area bounded by a purple line is the designated green belt; (2) There are in total 79 local units (i.e., townships, street offices, village collectives and state-owned farms) that are involved in this policy and labelled part of the “the green belt area,” a majority of which are located in Chaoyang District (in pinkish-yellow on the right) and Fengtai District (in green at the bottom); (3) Dahongmen is the blue dot in lower centre; Sunhe is marked as an orange dot in the upper right corner.

This principle could have worked well, in theory, if the central government had not issued a document in 1997 forbidding the occupation of arable land in any circumstances from April 1997 to April 1998 (CPC 1997) (see discussions in Chapter 2). Since this concern of protecting arable land was incorporated in the revised edition of the Land Management Law in 1998 (MLR 2006), BMG’s land businesses in the green belt – planting trees on the arable land first and then using these trees as a pretext for property development – had to be temporarily suspended (BMCUP 1999). But before this, 17 localities39 were already selected as the pilot units of the 1994 policy, which extended over 95.23 square

39 The term “localities,” and “units” below, indicate the township governments or village collectives; see Section 6.5 for further discussions on these scalar settings.
kilometres, more than one third of the green belt area (绿隔地区, lì ‘ge diqu)\textsuperscript{40}. By April 1997, six units out of 17 had carried out land expropriation procedures, and 11.16 square kilometres of land had been approved for building business properties. Five out of these six units witnessed the progress of residential real estate development, the total area of which was 1.33 million square metres (BMCUP 1999). When BMCUP started to inspect greening work in the green belt area, they were profoundly shocked: from 1993 to 1999, the area of green space had increased by 12.1 square kilometres (from 30 to 42.1), but meanwhile the area occupied by various construction projects had increased from 80 square kilometres to 118.29 square kilometres – a rise of 47.86%. At the same time, the area of farmland and vegetable growers had been reduced from 130 square kilometres (1993) to 61.82 square kilometres (1999), a decline of 52.45% (BMCUP 1999).

In the case of Beijing’s green belt, the utopian vision of “gardening the earth” is once again foregrounded, not for its original purpose, but for new aims in building the “socialist market economy” in China in the course of an urban metamorphosis. In this new scene, Mao’s socialist-utopian idea has in the end been distorted into a technique to nurture the state’s land businesses. In the Maoist era the belt did not retain its own territoriality, when it was only filled with agricultural and vegetable growers, supporting the labour of industrialisation. It is not until the 1990s that the belt was finally endowed with territoriality when the BMG began “to think about and act upon specific problems in particular locales” (cf. Rose 1999, 2). This is the historical-geographical juncture of sovereignty and territoriality integrating with each other in the green belt. Targeting certain territories (for land revenues) and populations (for removing the unappreciated rural-urban continuum), BMG conscripted the green belt in its new ways of governing. To depict this scene better, the next section shifts the focus to the link between the green belt and the changing connotations of the “rural-urban continuum” – it is with this consideration that the idea of the green belt is finally occupying a pivotal role in the hegemony of urbanisation in Beijing.

\textsuperscript{40} The green belt is not isomorphic with Beijing’s territorial system; indeed, only a part of the territories of the relevant townships and village collectives is categorised as in the green belt, while the other part is outside the belt. Hence, BMG distinguishes “the green belt” (绿隔, lì ‘ge) from “the green belt area” (绿隔地区, lì ‘ge diqu). All the coloured areas in Figure 4.5 are identified as “the green belt area,” but only a part of each is inside “the green belt.” In practice, these townships and village collectives are encouraged to operate their land businesses (so long as they get the BMG’s approval) after they have finished the greening tasks within their territory; and it is very likely that local agents will attend only to the profitable businesses and ignore the greening projects.
4.5 Green belt and the rural-urban continuum: A new articulation

In early December 1995, snow had just fallen on Beijing and the temperature was minus ten centigrade. Amidst the freezing cold of winter, some ninety thousand rural migrants living in the city’s southern suburbs were undergoing a life-shattering event. Under pressure from a government campaign targeted specifically at them, these people, mostly petty entrepreneurs and traders from rural Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province, were suddenly forced to abandon their homes and leave the city… A once lively migrant community with a flourishing private economy suddenly resembled the bombed-out remnants of a war zone. (Zhang 2001b, 1)

Since the 1980s, the state’s control of migration in China has gradually relaxed and many cities have observed the rural-urban continuum (mainly referring to the edge of the city proper) being occupied by a rapidly increasing “floating population” (流动人口, liudong renkou). Zhang Li’s ethnographic account of Zhejiang Village (i.e., Dahongmen Area; see discussions in Chapter 3) vividly shows the tensions between the late socialist regime and the inflows of migrant workers even after the gradual decaying of the “invisible walls” (cf. Chan 1994). While these narratives give many insightful clues to understanding the discursive making of a rural-urban continuum in the Chinese metropolis, what they lack is a spatial perspective that can incorporate the state’s spatial ambition and the modernist planning genre as well. Here, in this section, I draw on discussions in previous sections to elaborate how and how far the green belt and the rural-urban continuum have gradually become interconnected as two isomorphic narratives – for the state’s political/economic goal and eventually for erecting the hegemony of urbanisation. This is the final task of the present chapter.

The relationship between the rural and the urban is a classic topic in both Marx and Engels’ works. While Marx is mainly concerned about the role of the city in the changing division of labour (Lefebvre 2016a, Chapter 2), Engels gives more discussion to the issue of the urban form (ibid., Chapter 1 and 4). From The Condition of the Working Class in
England to The Housing Question, Engels gradually consolidated a belief about the urban space: “the urban space and its contrasts, its liberties and fatalities, is a repressive space: the space of ‘social crime’” (Lefebvre 2016a, 9). In Engels’ later critique of Dühring – who claims that the separation between the town and country is “a permanent structure of societies” (ibid., 100) – he appeals to Fourier’s utopia. For the latter, such separation is indeed part of the capitalist division of labour; it is the tendency of “overturning the socioeconomic relations that constitute the armature of bourgeois society” (ibid., 102). And hence “the city will disappear. It must disappear…[as the condition of] ‘the abolition of the capitalist mode of production’” (ibid., 103). The solution to the urban problems, for Engels, is not “keeping the large modern cities,” but “an equitable distribution of the population throughout the country” (ibid., 103). Here, Engels offers a vision of his anti-urbanism in the struggle with capitalism. It has, however, very little to do with China’s urban practice either in or after the Maoist era, because Chinese people’s comprehension of the city and the rural-urban separation has long been determined by their own modern imaginary.

It has been discussed in Section 4.3 above that the restriction of urbanisation coexisted with a high rate of industrialisation in the Maoist era, and this underlined the (un-)changing urban space at the time. While a great number of factories were put in both the city proper and the near suburbs, the urban space per se was not expanding on the same scale in order to control non-productive consumption (including the investments in the urban built environment). It was this same rationale that facilitated the debut of the green belt in Beijing’s urban master plan in 1958 – not only to conform to the utopian vision of a communist society, but also to serve, in practice, as an agricultural basis for industrial production. Under this utopian agenda, the distinctions between city and country, between industry and agriculture and between manual labour and mental labour were all set to be eliminated (as was upheld in Marxist writings – by Engels, for example). However, these differences only intensified further when Mao Zedong and the CPC

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41 There were some measures in the Maoist era that aimed to decentralise the population. In the 1960s, the state “encouraged” tens of millions of people to return to their rural places of origin (迁回原籍, qianhui yuanji; early 1960s), to “go up to the mountain and down to the countryside” (上山下乡, shangshan xiaxiang; middle and late 1960s) and to labour in remote areas (下放劳动, xiafang laodong). But such policies were all temporary and most of them were abolished in less than a decade. Furthermore, they were proposed not to satisfy Engel’s doctrine but more because of the specific situations faced by the Chinese (and their leaders) at the time, such as the Great Famine (1959-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). For details, see Chan (1994), and Kirkby (1985).
adopted, with only minor changes, the Soviet development strategy of prioritising heavy industries (Chan 1994, 52). The concept “rural-urban continuum” was in this context attached to the imaginary green belt, for they were indeed the same area that surrounded the city proper and was filled with agricultural holdings.

Chen Gan, then director of the Master Plan Office in Beijing’s Urban Planning and Administration Bureau (the predecessor of the BMCUP) in the 1950s, once reminded his readers that “the urban expansion [even temporarily under control] has been generating a number of problems”; on top of this, “these problems will perplex us for a fairly long historical period” because “our rural areas are vast and less-developed” and much more work is needed to resolve rising contradictions in this rural-urban continuum (Chen 1996, 55; originally written in 1967). Under the socialist-utopian vision, he claimed to treat both the urban and the rural equally to promote integration between them. However, this claim was soon crushed by the rupture between Deng’s and Mao’s views of modernity discussed in Section 4.4. While the modernist imagination was inherited in Deng’s account, the ideological insistence on the elimination of the three distinctions was deleted from the Party ethos once and for all. Though Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening Up” policy was initiated in the countryside by implementing a system of “household contract responsibility” (家庭联产承包责任制, jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi), his final goal was to secure a grain supply and to consolidate the regime rather than to eliminate the rural-urban distinction. Indeed, the huge inequality between the city and the country regarding living standards and income soon generated a huge number of internal migrant workers.

For most of these migrants, the only place they could afford to live in was the so called “rural-urban continuum,” which used to be filled with agricultural producers (and, in the case of Beijing, an imaginary green belt also). Dahongmen is just one of many areas that are involved in the urban change at the edge of Beijing’s city proper. Once supplying thousands of tons of vegetables for urban residents, the villagers in this area saw a rapid loss of their arable land in the 1980s and 1990s to large-scale construction, legal and illegal, blossoming everywhere (Orchard Village 2011). A decisive force that gave impetus to such a huge scale of landscape change was the inflow of Zhejiang merchants in the early and middle 1980s, who found that Dahongmen was not only well placed for gourmet business (Liu 2008, 16-18) but was also subject to less government regulation,
since it was classed as a rural community (Zhang 2001b, 64). From 1985 to 1995, the population of migrant workers living in this area increased from nearly 5,000 to 90,000 – as was shown in the quotation heading this section. The rapidly rising non-local population not only generated plenty of business opportunities for the local communities (Orchard Village 2011), but also, in the opposite direction, intensified the concerns over social order, for example, or security, political stability or a healthy environment – the same keywords used for illustrating the nature of Beijing in both the 1982 and 1992 master plans.

Spatial measures were soon taken in response to these concerns; yet all of them were foregrounded through a discursive moment: the rural-urban continuum used by Chen Gan as a neutral word was made into a term that had inherently negative attributes – “dirty, messy and disappointed” (脏乱差, zang luan cha). Dahongmen is a typical case of this transformation. Since the public facilities and social services were significantly lagging behind the rise in the population, crimes in this area began sharply to increase. But instead of reflecting on their own misconduct, the Central Government and BMG shifted the limelight to the inflow of migrants to the area. On 25 September 1995, Li Peng the then Prime Minister, made the following announcement: “the situation in Zhejiang Village and the like is now out of control. We cannot wait for its further deterioration; otherwise, the security of our capital city will be heavily challenged” (Orchard Village 2011, 97). This was directly behind the “bombed-out remnants of a war zone” observed by Zhang Li (2001b, 161). What Zhang does not register, however, is that this story was going on at the same time as the progress of the green belt policy issued in 1994 (see Section 4.4). To put it another way, the fate of Dahongmen had already been inscribed in the city’s master plan since it was one of the 17 pilot units in implementing the green belt policy. This is why a spatial perspective is urgently needed for a full understanding of the story.

The changing representations of the rural-urban continuum from 1967 to 1995 indeed present transformed articulations between space and people’s everyday lives. Although the continuum used to be acknowledged as concrete space where people lived and planted vegetables for industrial workers, it is now seen more as an abstract space that is to be absorbed in the state’s spatial ambitions and land businesses. This discursive transition is made in four stages. First, the influx of migrants from other places in China
is not accommodated well with respect to local public services, and this paves the way for a stigma on the whole area; second, the influence of the stigma is intensified when political concerns for social order, security and stability are included; third, the intensified stigma soon reminds government officials, central and municipal, of the gap between their modernist spatial imagination of Beijing as “a modern and international city” and the fact that it is increasingly occupied by migrant workers living informally; fourth, this gap then encourages them to further appeal to the modernist planning language, which proposes and has maintained the green belt in the urban master plan since 1958. In this chain of logic, the state’s disgust with the migrant workers, originating from its modernist imagination, is eventually turned into a spatial ambition to set out a green belt (not for the sake of greenness but as a smokescreen for operating land businesses) in the rural-urban continuum. A new technique of governance is hence induced at the ideological level, which is immediately rendered the first pillar for the hegemony of urbanisation.

In the articulation of the rural-urban continuum and the green belt, a new, rational, landscape of urbanisation is erected through the discursive moment. From this the state consolidates its legitimacy to conduct measures of accumulation and surveillance. Urbanisation/land projects are increasingly justified by these counter-urban characters in the rural-urban continuum; it is because such areas are so dirty, messy and unsafe that urban-oriented (accumulation) projects justify being promoted to make the space “modern,” “beautiful” and “liveable.” The rural-urban continuum is hence not only physically dynamic (floating) but also ideologically significant. Such a discursive moment furthermore implies far-reaching politico-economic effects through what Aihwa Ong (Ong 2006) calls “zoning technology.” Beginning from the stigma of the rural-urban continuum, more policies are then issued to “resolve” such gaps by modernist imaginations. And as we will see in Chapter 5, most of these policies are underlined by the increasing concern to appropriate soaring rents in the booming land and housing market. In this way a distinct governing regime is established in a landscape of normalised rule, which results in a zoning technology for calculating choices (ibid., 100-03).
4.6 Summary

The genealogy of Beijing’s green belt is narrated in this chapter to explore the rationales and ethos of planning practices, on the one hand, and their interconnections with China’s changing politico-economic condition, on the other. As an idea raised by the Western planning canon, the “green belt” was inserted in Beijing’s master plan but not in a direct and neutral way. In contrast, it was the critical interconnection of modernity, urban space and the national ethos together that adopted this belt in the 1958 plan, where the socialist-utopian vision of the country played a critical role. In this situation, a separation between the form and the content of the green belt was also induced: while its form had been laid down by the Western (modernist) planning canon through USSR experts and US- and UK-trained Chinese architects, the content of the green belt is more regulated by the concrete and dynamic politico-economic requirements of the Chinese planners. In the Maoist era, it was filled with those who provided grain and vegetables for the city at a time when industrialisation was the supreme goal for making China modern.

Since the 1980s, the national ethos of modernity has been reinterpreted by Deng Xiaoping in a depoliticised way; and this condition aggravated the tensions between the rural-urban continuum (and the migrant workers that it accommodates) and the modernist ambitions to make Beijing an “international” city. In this discursive moment, the green belt set up in 1958 is once again foregrounded – but only for capital accumulation and for surveillance in the day of the “socialist market economy.” The green belt, I hence argue, is a pure urban form. It marks a critical spatial configuration that re-contextualises modernity locally and firmly articulates modernism (as a technique) with modernisation (as social practices), whose counterparts have already been registered elsewhere – in Brasilia and Zambia, for example.
Chapter 5 The production of green belts as landed ecology

5.1 Introduction

China’s urban metamorphosis had been consolidated by 1994, as shown in Chapter 2, when a new Party ethos favouring a socialist market economy heralded a notable historical-geographical juncture. At the time, urban space was firmly placed at the centre of the dynamic political economy, and the use of land gave state agents new opportunities to foreground themselves for the sake of capital and power in an urban metamorphosis. For Beijing, the year 1994 also witnessed the first stage of the creation of a green belt, an idea that was endowed territoriality and spreading widely in its extent and political effects. This chapter explores the series of policy changes of and in the green belt, to identify how and how far this ecological project was quickly transformed into a zoning technology. Furthermore, the green belt area was also perverted to a “landed ecology”, which preconditioned the Chinese manoeuvres of spatial fix in response to the financial crisis in 2008. With the green belt project as a zoning technology and the green belt area as a landed ecology, tremendous revenues were reaped from selling off land plots in designated green space. Thus the “green belt” was consolidated in the transition of Beijing during the last two decades as a crucial channel for state-led and land-based strategies of accumulation. The significance of this story goes beyond Beijing, for it vividly presents local strategies and tactics for sustaining a regime in a quintessentially urban way.

The story in this chapter starts from the early 2000s, when the BMG’s green belt project was resumed. It is recognised here that Beijing’s second bid for the Olympic Games, especially its slogan of pursuing “Green Olympics” in the bidding process, endowed the green belt project with legitimacy and political urgency. As an exception, the project was treated as a zoning technology for building an “exceptional space” of accumulation and surveillance (cf. Ong 2006, 100-03). Its effects were soon registered in the practices of
the BMG and in various localities in the green belt area, who promoted land business by consolidating the power effects of this zoning technology and by expanding its territorial coverage. In this historical-geographical conjuncture, the spatiality of the green belt was also transformed. Instead of “ecological land” where nature is reconciled with the urban process, the area was turned into a “landed ecology” where land-oriented manoeuvres and tactics had ravaged and replaced raw nature. As a floating and contingent urban form, Beijing’s green belt is now in the process of *becoming real* through dynamic articulation with an urban political economy that is subject to change; and the birth of such landed ecology is only a recent incident in the process.

The green belt as a landed ecology did not accomplish its full potential in facilitating the state’s land business, for the climax only arrived together with the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Faced with the consequent huge decline in exports, the Chinese government produced a rescue package that financed the national economy through land resources instead of manufacture. Local state agents borrowed money from state-owned banks for their land businesses, promising to pay them back with their income from land leasing. The amount was so huge that we can trace in it a logic for binding up the state, capital and urban space together. In Beijing, the spatialised pattern of the green belt project was totally endorsed by local political dynamics – thus creating a pivotal role for the green belt in this new scene of national and world history. In China’s green belts, we can see the *urban reality* which is portrayed by Lefebvre (2003b, 14) as a historical process of implosion-explosion. This reality was poorly understood in the era of Lefebvre (ibid., 36-37); but now, such effects as landed ecology and the triumph of land finance reveal the way to observe urban reality through the lens of green belts. In this *urban* story, the boundary between state and capital is obscure, for the so-called “socialist regime” now plays the key role of rescuing the capitalist (world) system by producing, allocating and accumulating capital *in and through* the urban space.

Section 5.2 explores how and how far the green belt project was gradually consolidated as a zoning technology, which in turn made possible the boom of the BMG’s land businesses. After recognising the role of bidding for the 2008 Olympic Games, Section 5.3 shifts the focus to the body/spatiality of the green belt. The argument is that a “landed ecology” was born in Beijing’s green belts, where signs of nature had replaced raw nature. Such a politico-economic mechanism was soon articulated with the needs of spatial fix
after the 2007-2008 financial crisis; Section 5.4 describes how the potential of green belts to produce space and accumulate capital was finally and fully exploited by the BMG – this was the climax in the repertoire of urban metamorphosis. Section 5.5 consists of statistical data and spatial representations of BMG’s land businesses from 2010 to 2016, strengthening a more intuitive understanding of both their scale and the spatial pattern that emerged. This chapter then concludes with a summary.

5.2 In the name of “Green Olympics”

In this section, I illustrate that the political urgency of building a green and modern Beijing to prepare for the 2008 Olympic Games opened the door to a distinct governing regime, one that stood out in the landscape of normalised rule (cf. Ong 2006, 103). The key concern of the BMG, at first, was to keep its promise to the International Olympic Committee to provide an ecological environment (where the areas of green space mark some key indicators) by mobilising localities in the green belt. Hence, various state land policies were revised locally, and township and village autonomies in the land business were boosted significantly. This is how, from the late 1990s onwards, the green belt project was consolidated as a zoning technology. No local measure would be forbidden as long as it helped to increase the measurable activity in the green spaces – thus, many village or township collectives laid out golf courses in the near suburbia. Furthermore, the creation of “exceptional spaces” also encountered the Party’s intention to consolidate its monopolistic power in the land market – which at first misfired to an extent. But after something of a struggle in scalar politics, the BMG reluctantly revised its land-leasing methods and established a land reservation system, the effects of which would soon be dramatically amplified in the urban metamorphosis.

Deploying green belts in the state of exception

On 7 April 1999, Liu Qi, then mayor of Beijing, and Wu Shaozu, former president of the Chinese Olympic Committee, together submitted a formal report to the International Olympic Committee (hereafter IOC) in which Beijing expressed its determination to bid for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad in 2008 (Xinhua News Agency 2001). In a later meeting of BMG officials to allocate resources for the bid, Jia Qinglin, then Party Secretary of Beijing (the No.1 leader), reminded his audience of the bid’s significance.
This was not only “a historical opportunity to accelerate Beijing’s development in the new century and to move Beijing forward to a modern and international metropolis,” but also “a perfect approach to show our achievements in the capital’s modernisation process and to augment the international reputation of the city” (Beijing Youth Daily 2000). At this meeting, two key tasks were highlighted to prepare for the bidding: to provide a “hard environment” of high quality, including the stadiums and the ecological environment; and to ensure that a “soft environment” prevailed, stressing the quality of services in businesses, tourism, public transportation and other “window industries” as well as a high level of social security (ibid.)

The keyword underlying Beijing’s bidding in general and Jia’s speech in particular was modernity. As elaborated in Chapter 4, a rupture in the late 1970s had emerged between Mao’s utopian vision of modern and Deng’s pragmatic and de-politicised revisions. In the urban-modern agenda, the heavy industries were excluded and the focus shifted to such issues as social order, hygiene, a clean environment and cultural elements. Between the 1982 and 1992 Beijing master plans, the ideal of the city changed from being the “political and cultural centre of China” to becoming a “modern and international city” (BMCUP 1992, Zhang 2001a, 274-75). The revision clearly signals the changing focus of the Chinese national ethos. After the end of socialism, this ethos of modernity was trans-configured into a yearning to be international; and the bidding for Olympic Games (and other mega events) was simply a concrete way of embodying this ethos and consolidating the Party-state regime (see also Shin 2012).

The ecological environment and green space were the focus, the critical moment, in such practices. Simply put, in Beijing’s first bid for the Olympic Games in 1993, its level of pollution had dissatisfied inspectors from the IOC, indeed partly explaining this earlier failure (China Internet Information Centre 2001)42. Now that the municipal government realised the importance of the environment in international assessments, represented by IOC’s preferences and inscribed in the 1996 edition of The Olympic Charter (IOC 1996), every effort was at once made in Beijing to come up to these expectations:

42 The air pollution issue was, of course, not the only factor that led Beijing’s bid in 1993 to fail. A more critical factor was the issue of human rights, since it was barely four years after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. Human rights disputes induced geopolitical pressures and both of these affected the whole lobbying campaign (Luo and Huang 2013, Riding 1993, Tyler 1993).
As to the issue of environment, plenty of efforts have been conducted since 1993. We have issued many measures to tackle the pollution produced by industrialisation and economic development. While more efforts are needed, substantial progress has already been recognised... By the end of next year [2002], we will see a green belt surrounding Beijing, of more than 100 million square meters. (BOCOG 2001; my emphases)

The Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) indeed stressed the role of the ecological environment to such an extent that a “Green Olympics” was ranked the most important initiative (Green Olympics, Sci-Tech Olympics, and Humanistic Olympics). This slogan was first announced locally in June 1999 (Jing 2001) and then introduced to the IOC officially on 13 December 2000 (Xinhua News Agency 2001). In the light of this slogan, Beijing issued a “Sustainable Development Plan” and promised to invest more than $12.2 billion in the period between 1998 and 2007 to tackle the environment issue. In addition, the BMG formalised its promises in March 2002, eight months after winning the bid to host the Games in six years’ time. In its Beijing Olympic Action Plan (BOCOG 2002), the BMG and the organising committee promised to increase the green coverage rate to 45% of the urban area and more than 50% of the whole city. To this end, more than 100,000 hectares of the mountain area would be greened; and trees would cover another 23,000 hectares of land alongside the rivers and main roads. Moreover, and even more relevant to this thesis, the BMG promised that trees would cover 12,500 hectares of land in the green belt area. With all these projects, BMG concluded, three green barriers (绿色屏障, lüse pingzhang) could by 2008 surround the city to protect both its air quality and the health of athletes (BOCOG 2002, Section 3.2). Such practices and promises of environmental regeneration finally convinced the IOC inspectors in their 2001 field trip (IOC 2001, 62).

That a “state of exception” and alternative sovereignty structures and territorial strategies are induced by mega events is recognised in the recent literature on urban studies (see, for example, Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013). In Agamben’s interpretation (2005), such a state of exception is merely a non-place, an ambiguous and uncertain zone, between public law and political fact and between the juridical order and normal life. He refutes Carl Schmitt’s view that, in a state of exception, “the sovereign stands outside of the
The International Olympic Committee, as the “revolutionary organisation,” plays a critical role in practising the sort of “sovereign dictatorship” that lies beyond state authority. Its concerns over environmental issues and sustainable development (IOC 1996) were at once intermediated by China’s national ethos of modernity and inscribed into local policies – so as to resolve air and water pollution problems by planting more trees. In Beijing, as noted above, the imaginary green belt had been drawn in the urban master plan more than four decades before but had hardly begun to be implemented since then. A pilot programme in 1994 had run for less than three years when a new central policy was issued that suspended it (see Chapter 4). However, the IOC’s concerns for the environment endowed the green belt project once more with legitimacy and political urgency. The greening work was so urgent that state policies were locally revised and localities in the green belt were commandeered forthwith by the BMG to comply with the IOC’s expectations. Next I turn to BMG’s policies and practices in the 2000s to illustrate how and how far the conforming process consolidated the green belt project as a zoning technology and brought its booming land businesses of to the fore in the urban metamorphosis.

Consolidating and diffusing the zoning technology

When discussing BMG’s 1994 pilot programme “on greening the designated green belt in the city proper” (BMG 1994) in Chapter 4, I concluded that this was the first time the green belt area had been endowed territorially since 1958. As a specific locale with newly recognised spatial and politico-economic significance, this area was made the first item

normally valid juridical order, and yet belongs to it, for it is he who is responsible for deciding whether the constitution can be suspended in toto” (Schmitt 1985, 7, cited in Agamben 2005, 35). Instead, Agamben locates the state of exception in the biopolitical machine: it is the separation of the “force of law” from the law, where the norm is in force but is not applied while the acts that acquire force have no legal form (2005, 38). As “a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations…are deactivated” (ibid., 50), the state of exception indeed paves the way for a force of law without law (hence, one that can be written as “force-of-law”). This “force-of-law” “can be claimed both by the state authority (which acts as a commissarial dictatorship) and by a revolutionary organisation (which acts as a sovereign dictatorship)” (ibid., 38-39).
in the local urban agenda. The integration of sovereignty and territoriality in the area was significant, for it made the green belt capable of acting as a zoning technology. This means a technology that generates *exceptional space*, allowing variegated governance and the local and exclusive application of political privilege (see Ong 2006, Chapter 4). Ong’s initial application of the term is related to the case of Special Economic Zones (SEZs, see Chapter 2) established by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s. These zones played a key role in legitimising a capitalist transformation “without jeopardising the political legitimacy and order of the socialist regime” (Ong 2006, 102), illustrating the creation of a distinct governing regime as an island in a landscape of normalised rule (ibid., 103).

In her framework, Ong’s primary concern is to portray post-Mao state strategies in China in the production of new spaces of exception, supporting the theme of “neoliberalism as exception.” Jennifer Robinson (2011, 1094) acutely notes that this Deleuzian approach is so concerned to analyse neoliberalism into its various techniques that it has to ignore local politics and their outcomes, just as its regulationist Marxist counterpart does. For my argument here, I concur with Robinson’s critique yet at the same time admit the value of Ong’s recognition of the use of exceptionality in governing practices. Put another way, these tactics are empirically observable in the urban political economy, but it is not necessary to attach the technology to “neoliberalism.” For example, in the BMG’s pilot programme in 1994, those localities in the green belt were authorised to conduct their own property development projects, which could be practised together with private developments, so as to cover the cost of the greening work. Moreover, after their relocation the rural population living in this area were endowed with urban *hukou*, which was treated as a privilege in terms of fully enjoying state-sponsored social welfare from then on (BMG 1994). These privileges marked a zoning technology generated by the BMG to mobilise these localities and advance the green belt project. It became so significant that the whole 1990s project was later referred to as the “No.7 policy scheme” (*七号文, qihao wen*) by both BMG officials and village cadres, that is, being the seventh document from the BMG in 1994 announcing exclusive privileges for the green belt project.

Although the BMG suspended the No.7 policy scheme after the central government’s ban on occupying arable land (CPC 1997), the new “Green Olympics” initiative gave a substantial and legitimised pretext for resuming the green belt project. Five months after
submitting the formal report to the IOC, another regular Office Meeting for Mayor and Deputy Mayors was held on 29 September 1999 (BMG 1999). At this meeting, the BMG decided to establish a new agent entitled the “Beijing Leading Group for Constructing the Green Belt Area” (北京市绿化隔离地区建设领导小组, Beijingshi lühua geli diqu jianshe lingdao xiaozu; hereafter BLGCGB), which was to take charge of all issues related to the green belt project. On 2 March 2000, the BLGCGB held its first formal meeting, headed by then Mayor Liu Qi (BMG 2000b), to establish its General Headquarters (总指挥部, zong zhihuibu)43. Describing political action in such military terms has two implications. First, it reveals a common governing tool of the Party-state, who sought their power via military means and has been consistently taking similar (discursive) measures since 1949. Second, this deployment also indicates the urgent need to build the green belt in a new state of exception: the commander of the General Headquarters was the person who chaired Beijing’s Organizing Committee for the 2008 Olympic Games (BMG 2000b).

This meeting also witnessed a claim made by Mayor Liu: that 60 square kilometres of greening work previously planned for the next ten years would be finished within three years. Hence, “a fierce battle [was] needed immediately”, in the next nine months, to meet the annual goal of greening 20 square kilometres” (BMG 2000b). Furthermore, since it was a huge challenge, Mayor Liu continued, “our cadres are encouraged to break through the traditional doctrines and regulations and figure out special measures for such a special task; with these measures new institutions can be erected” (BMG 2000b). Just after the establishment of the BLGCGB and its General Headquarters, the BMG issued two important documents – one labelled No.12 (BMG 2000a) and the other No.20 (BMG 2000d) – both aiming to tackle the issue of laying out a green belt. While No.12 gave a rough framework for the new policies, more details were included in No.20, which contained the implementing regulations. Like the No.7 policy scheme (see above), this new set of policies for the green belt is often referred to by its number (二十号文, ershi hao wen). There are rather significant differences between these two schemes regarding the degree of zoning technology that they include. While the No.7 scheme marked the

43 “General Headquarters” in Chinese is a military term, referring to a site on the front lines of wartime command. Using military words is common in China’s official documents; other popular terms include “mobilisation” (动员, dongyuan), “battles” (战役, zhanyi), “campaigns” (运动, yundong) – the last term is discussed in Chapter 6.
point when the green belt project was first deployed as a zoning technology for land businesses, the No.20 scheme comprehensively upgraded this mechanism. Using “Green Olympics” as the new pretext in “the state of exception,” the BMG determined not only to consolidate suspended green belt projects (as zoning technology) but also intended to diffuse both the power effects and the territorial extent of such projects.

Dozens of documents were released by the BMG from 2000 to 2001 to institutionalise and systematise their ambitions for the green belt. Some were so far-reaching that no boundary could be drawn between the green belt project and the land businesses. The first moment of consolidation and diffusion manoeuvres was a scalar one – to get rid of the central government’s ban on occupying arable land. In May 2000, the Ministry of Land and Resources of China established a Coordination Liaison Group for Constructing Beijing’s Green Belt and issued a document entitled “Instructions on the implementation of Beijing’s green belt project” (Chai 2002, 6). Its special institutional arrangement lifted the central ban on the BMG by setting up two exceptions. First, the use of arable land in the green belt for planting trees could be registered as an internal adjustment to the agricultural structure, hence exempted and permitted this use. Second, occupying arable land to construct resettlement housing for local villagers could also be allowed, insofar as the original settlement was to be demolished and greened (ibid., 6-7). Such exceptions were then formalised in a local ordinance issued by the BMG (2001b) and employed as a new institutional foundation for directing the move of the green belt project to a zoning technology.

After the exceptional revision of the state’s land policies in the green belt area, the BMG set up a new and distinct governing regime for the green belt area, justifying Ong’s perception of SEZs as an island in a landscape of normalised rule. The two principles underlying this regime were “special issues, special treatments” (特事特办, teshi teban) and the “all-in-one service package” (一条龙服务, yitiaolong fuwu) (BMG 2000a, BLGCGB 2000a, b). Since “it [was] challenging to achieve the goal of greening 60 square kilometres in only three years” (BMG 2000b), as the BMG claimed, the previous urban plan should be adjusted properly to fully respect opinions in the localities so as to accelerate the greening process (BMG 2000a). On top of this, the related land, housing, and administration policies were all subject to revision to clear the way for the green belt.
For the work of greening, municipal subsidies were provided to township or village collectives. They were paid a lump sum of 5,000 Yuan per mu for planting and 120 Yuan per mu annually for maintenance. Besides public green space (5,954 hectares) and sheltered green space (4,146 hectares), localities could develop green-based industrial parks (2,420 hectares altogether) where 65% of the total area should be green, with the remainder at the discretion of each locality. This would allow townships and village collectives to obtain enough from the green belt project to meet the costs of greening and ultimately provide welfare for the local population (CGCO 2001). Even in public and sheltered green spaces, the BMG also allowed the locality to run green-based industries on 3-5% of the total area. In the name of green belt, spatial exceptions were produced and deployed. These opportunities were then absorbed by localities which produced such spaces as golf courses with little or nothing to do with the ecological concerns raised under “Green Olympics” (see the next section for more details).

The building of new villages for relocation was closely related to the consolidation of land resources. Original settlements in the green belt area (mostly in the form of courtyard buildings) were to be demolished, with villagers relocated in newly built multi-storey buildings. This was for BMG a quick way to “urbanise” its dirty, untidy “rural-urban continuum” and to make the city modern and international (BMG 2000a, see also discussions in Chapter 5). But BMG had no intention of subsidising these projects, and hence each locality had to pay its own costs. The BMG compromised by relaxing local regulations on land and housing development and promoting cooperative housing; thus townships and village collectives could cooperate with the private property developers and enjoy interest-free bank loans. In addition, some places in the green belt area were also permitted to build commodity houses for sale, so as to generate enough profit to cover the financial gaps in all the related tasks\(^{44}\). But here emerged an issue to do with

\(^{44}\) A 1:0.5 ratio was set by the BMG to limit the extent of local property business: the locality was used to building one-unit relocation houses, but it can now build only half unit commodity houses. Yet an evaluation conducted by BAUPD (2013) shows that the ratio was in fact reversed: one unit of a relocation house was in most cases matched with rather more than two units of commodity housing.
land use: according to the *Urban Real Estate Management Act* (NPC 1994), only houses built on state-owned urban land have deeds and are eligible for transactions in the market. To get rid of this limit, BMG decided to expropriate local land first without paying compensation to any localities.\(^{45}\) It then donated part of that land to the rural localities to build houses for relocating the newly homeless, whilst leasing the other plots to private developers to build commodity houses (the leasing fees were to be returned to localities in order to build urban infrastructure).

Many other policies were being revised in exceptional spaces of this kind under the rationale of “special issues, special treatments.” For instance, on 5 June 2000 the household registration system in the green belt area was frozen (BMPSB 2000); and no change of *hukou* status, such as migration from another place or the division of local households, was permitted until 2004. This policy was proposed to minimise the state’s burden in relocating local villagers, and it clearly illustrates the *totality* of the green belt, which touched every aspect of society and was by no means a purely ecological issue.

An even more far-reaching practice has been the implementation of the “all-in-one service package.” Since the Olympic bidding rendered the green belt project politically urgent, the green light had shone everywhere in the bureaucracy to accelerate and “further accelerate” related practices in the exceptional space thus created (BLGCGB 2000a, b, BMG 2001a). It was stressed repeatedly that the procedure should be simplified and its efficiency improved; some once-compulsory documents in the approval process were now exempted (such as feasibility study reports), and all formalities had to adopt the “all-in-one” style. Such a distinct governing regime induces tremendous power effects. As an exceptional island outside the continent of normalised rule, the zoning technology attached to the green belt project not only enabled localities in this area to conduct land and housing businesses more efficiently but also rendered other places increasingly covetous and encouraged them to seek every means to be involved. Before long, Huaxiang, Nanyuan, Sijiqing, Lugouqiao and Changying, among many other...

\(^{45}\) Most of the land inside the green belt area is categorised as “rural,” and is owned collectively by the villagers living there (NPC 2004). Hence, legally, the BMG has no right to engage with local land issues until it has expropriated the land plots and re-categorised them as “urban” land. But here, under the No.20 policy scheme, only the construction land (the homesteads) in these villages was expropriated, and the arable land was not included. For the latter it was necessary to plant trees with an annual subsidy of only 120 Yuan per mu. The aim was to limit the financial burden on the BMG, but this also induced significant social effects. Because the change of *hukou* status was linked to the expropriation of arable land (the means of production for the villagers), they now cannot get urban *hukou* under the No.20 policy scheme. This is a key source of social unrest in the green belt area (see Chapter 8).
places that used to be (partly) outside the green belt area, became wholly included in the project and then started to enjoy the associated political and economic privileges (BLGCGB 2000c, d, e, f, 2001a).

In the end, the No.20 policy scheme consolidated the green belt project as a zoning technology and played a critical role in diffusing both its power effects and territorial extent. The integration of territoriality and sovereignty in the green belt area was hence strengthened under the aegis of the “Green Olympics,” for the state of exception paved the way for growing local manoeuvres to promote land businesses. This historical-geographical conjuncture also saw the transformation of the spatiality of the green belt. Besides the increase of green spaces in statistical numbers (not a trustworthy indication), this area also witnessed a spurt in the growth of “green industries,” such as golf courses, as well as a stronger role for the BMG in monopolising land resources through the newly established land reservation system. It is here that we can see the birth of landed ecology.

5.3 The birth of landed ecology

On 3 July 2008, a month before the opening ceremony of XXIX Olympic Games in 2008, a press conference was held in the Beijing Olympic News Centre, chaired by the News Spokeswoman of Beijing Municipal Bureau of Landscape Architecture and Greening. It was announced in the conference that all the undertakings on “Green Olympics” made by the BOCOG in 2001 had been achieved (Xinhua News Agency 2008). All three “green barriers” to the city, including 12,600 hectares of green space in the green belt area, had been established by the end of 2007, which at once set a record greening rate for Beijing (51.6% of its territory). With these new green spaces, the spokeswoman continued, the ecological environment of the city had been improved significantly and a new urban landscape of “mountain-forest-garden integration” had come into being (ibid.). Her argument was strongly supported by official data on the green belt project (see Table 5.1). From 2000 to 2007, 89 square kilometres of land (8,905 hectares) in the original green belt were greened. Furthermore, the BMG also proposed a second green belt in

46 The ethos underlying the second green belt was “implementing the idea of ‘Green Olympics’ and building an ecological city” (BMG 2003). The inner edge of the second belt was set as the outer boundary of the first belt and the “urban clusters” in the near suburbia, while its outer edge was one kilometre outside the 6th Ring Road, involving an area of 1,650 square kilometres. For the “Green Olympics,” the BMG decided to increase the green space by 412 square kilometres by planting trees on the cultivated land – so
2003 (see Figure 5.1), outside the first one, to accelerate the greening and to reinforce the fulfilment of its promises to the IOC (BMG 2003, Lai 2003). In this second green belt, another green space, also covering 89 square kilometres (8,886 hectares), was created between 2003 and 2007.

**Table 5.1** Official statistics on the increase of green space in green belts (2000-2007) (in hectares; 100 hectares = 1 km²)

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<td>The 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; green belt</td>
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<td>2,000</td>
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<td>1,333</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>8,886</td>
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*Sources:* the number for 2000 is from the BLGCGB (2000b), for 2001 is from the BLGCGB (2001b), for 2002 is from the BMBL (2003); those for 2003 come from the BMBA (2004), for 2004 from the BMBA (2005), for 2005 from the BMCP (2005) and the BMBA (2005) respectively, for 2006 are from the BMBLA (2007a), and for 2007 are from the BMBLA (2007b). *Notes:* (1) The second green belt was proposed in March 2003 (BMG 2003), and was hence surveyed some time later. (2) The area of increased green space in the second green belt in 2005 is not available from official documents. the number used here is instead the area planned by the BMBF at the beginning of 2005.

that the overall greening rate of this area could rise to 50%. While the greening works were following similar principles in the No.20 policy scheme, the key difference lay in the fact that no demolition or relocation work was involved in the second belt. Meanwhile, the cultivated land plots on which trees would be planted were not to be expropriated as well – they were but an “internal structural adjustment in the rural sector” and only their maintenance costs could be subsidised by the BMG. However, this plan was soon revised in 2004, because the State Council warned the BMG that no excuse (including that of the green belt) could be used for occupying “fundamental arable land,” and the goal of the green space was hence reduced from 412 to 163 square kilometres thereafter (Zhang 2007, see discussions below).
Figure 5.1 The locations of two green belts in Beijing

Source: BAUPD (2013). Notes: (1) The areas marked by green and burgundy are both officially seen as the first green belt; the green areas are in the original master plan and the burgundy ones were added in practice in the early 2000s. (2) The whole area coloured sky-blue represents the second green belt confirmed in 2003, but only a small part of it has materialised (see footnote 46).

The first pillar: removing nature

It seems that BMG and BOCOG quite successfully kept their promises, at least on paper. But in my view the above numbers and the conduct of the BMG are worth further and critical examination. I want to illustrate two aspects: the nature of the conduct *per se*, and the manoeuvres that were found acceptable in the name of the green belt. As discussed above, the Ministry of Land and Resources set up two spatial exceptions for the BMG so that the latter could occupy arable land for the green belt project. BMG frankly admitted that much of greening work depended on the “internal adjustment of the agricultural structure,” such as 2,666 hectares designated in 2000 and 2,333 hectares in 2001 (BLGCGB 2000b, 2001b). With regard to 2002, the challenge kept pace with ambition: 1,666 hectares of new green space in this year were created by demolishing more than two million square metres of building (BMBA 2003). Both the occupation of arable land for planting trees and the demolition of the original rural residences, indeed, mark the annihilation in the urban process of concrete and everyday places in favour of the alternative abstract space. *Once lived* and *perceived* vegetable bases in the socialist era
were turned into *conceived* indicators of green space to comply with the sovereign dictatorship from afar (i.e., the IOC). Villagers’ lives, memories, social relations as well as dwelling places were all transformed by the planners and other state agents into an abstract and rationalised verbal system, following the latter’s bird-eye perceptions from on high. In such a new urban-oriented verbal system, *modern* and *international* have been foregrounded; and a strong hostility has been generated towards traditions, agricultural production, the rural lifestyle and the spatiality of the rural-urban continuum.

The green belt project uncovers the “all-in-one” ambition of the BMG to consolidate and upgrade its territory by disposing of both agricultural activities and a rural-style population in an *urban* way. In the relations between the city and the countryside, Maoist anti-urbanism gives way to a growing urban centrality. Paradoxically, the subordination of the country to the city is achieved by fetishizing nature, in the name of green belt; and this moment echoes the concept of “blind field” from Lefebvre:

> Depending on the metaphor used, we can say that this phase is a *blank* (a *void*) or a dark moment (a “black box”), or that it designates a *blind field*. During the critical phase, nature appears as one of the key problems. Industrialisation and urbanisation, together or in competition, ravage nature…. Theoretically, nature is shrinking, but the signs of nature and the natural are multiplying, replacing and supplanting real “nature.” (Lefebvre 2003b, 26-27; original emphases)

The multiplication and triumph of the signs of nature, for the BMG, showed the best way to clear the obscure place-cum-practice in the *blind field* that they called the rural-urban continuum, to structure the ever-expanding urban space in a modern genre that would resemble its international counterparts, to raise the green indicators that are highlighted in international standards, and to enact the Chinese national ethos of modernity through its interpretation of the Western-industrial version of the urban (under the label of “urbanism”). Unlike the lives of 36 million people that the socialist-modernist utopia cost (see Chapter 4), this time the cost is the everyday lives and lived space of residents in the rural-urban continuum (including both local people and migrant workers). Added to this cost are the alternative possibilities they might have realized in the urban change – such possibilities are nullified by the hegemonic verbal system and the forced greening/relocation activities (see Chapter 7 for further discussion).
This recognition indeed marks the first pillar holding up the “landed ecology”. The landed ecology is first and foremost the moment of removal: after the imported Western-industrial representations of the urban, and the endogenous ambitions to be modern, it is the ecological staples of “nature” and “green belt” that stand out. The fetishizing of nature demands its own territory and hence does not hesitate to remove the original landscape and residents. With the problematic verbal system, the signs of nature ravage the nature in itself and pave the way for further, anti-ecological, manoeuvres, and those signs per se are in fact hardly more than fictions. Yang and Zhou (2007) adopt three successive TM Landsat images of Beijing, in 1992, 2002 and 2005, to explore the outcome and effect of the green belt project (see Figure 5.2). They recognise that the first green belt failed to separate the outer urban clusters from the city centre – the official goal of the green belt inscribed in the urban master plan since 1958. They also note that, in contrast to the admirable statistics announced in the press conference in 2008, “there was no obvious change” in the acreage of trees in the second green belt (ibid., 292).

![Comparison between land cover of Beijing in 1992 and 2005](image)

**Figure 5.2** Comparison between land cover of Beijing in 1992 and 2005

*Source:* Yang and Zhou (2007, 293). *Notes:* (1) Colours on the maps, as introduced by Yang and Zhou (2007, 293), represent the following land cover classes: “red (built-up), dark green (tree canopy), bright green (herbaceous), orange (agricultural land), blue (water surface), grey (bare land),” while “the area covered by the first greenbelt was delineated with a light blue coloured line.” (2) The city centre witnessed an increase of green space, but this was not significant in the first and the second green belts – the ratio of land covered by trees in the two belts increased only by 7% and that covered by green plants declined by 6% from 1992 to 2005, after the large-scale green belt project of the early 2000s. (3) The only new and significant green space appearing in the first green belt (marked by a
green dot on the second map) is the “Olympic Green,” where the Olympic Village, the National Sports Stadium (“The Bird’s Nest”) and many other Olympic-related facilities were located.

Other official data confirm this observation. By 2005, 82.85 square kilometres of land (8,285 hectares) in the green belt area had been officially delineated with “nailed piles” (钉桩, dingzhuang) as green space (BMCUP 2010b). Nonetheless, not all of them were ready for public use. In a later report (BAUPD 2013), planning officials announced that 59 “country parks” (郊野公园, jiaoye gongyuan) had been created between 2007 and 2011, covering an area of 3,027 hectares (30.27 square kilometres) in the green belt area, forming “a ring of country park[land]” that was open to the public. Even so, another 52.58 square kilometres of land in this area could not be opened up – why was this? This same planning report frankly admitted that “the standard of greening work is fairly low, and the low-quality green space is not ready for public use; in some localities, we even observe that green spaces have been destroyed to accommodate illegal buildings” (BAUPD 2013). To tell the truth, the reason is fairly simple. The cost of the greening was to be covered by property development, but few developers were benevolent enough to conserve the green space and invest their profits in its upkeep. In the end, only houses were built and sold, and the planned green space remained on paper (Interview with two BMCUP officials on 27 November and 13 December 2014, see also Figure 5.3).

![Figure 5.3](image.jpg)

Figure 5.3 A plot of the “green space” in Dahongmen that is not open to public

*Source: Photo by author, 29 December 2014.*
The second pillar: promoting land businesses

The large-scale removal of raw nature has produced only fictitious signs of nature in the green belt area – this is the first pillar of the landed ecology. But it is not the whole of the covert rationale for the agents involved in the project. To understand the mechanism better, we also need to investigate their land-based and anti-ecological manoeuvres, which form the second pillar supporting today’s landed ecology. Here I briefly show two cases illustrating this issue: the first is the golf courses created by local authorities, and the second is the increasing rhetoric of the BMG to promote land businesses in the green belt project. It is noted above that 3%-5% of the greened space was ceded to localities for the development of green-based industries (to reward their greening work). On 15 June 2000, the first five “green-industry projects,” all of which were golf courses, were jointly reviewed and approved by the General Headquarters of the BLGCGB (BLGCGB 2000a); and they covered 80 to 90 hectares each. In total, 41 projects were approved in the green belt area between 2000 and 2012, of which 23 were for games and sports (by and large, golf courses), five for leisure and vacation (as resorts), six for ecological tourism, and seven for business apartments (BAUPD 2013). Under this green mask, the number of golf courses in Beijing after 2004 increased from 20 to 70 (Du 2011) – even though 2004 was also the year when the State Council (2004a) halted the construction of new golf courses all over the country. A recent survey reveals that 32.2% of all golf courses in Beijing may be found in the green belt area (Chen 2015b), which is a clear signal of the birth of landed ecology.
The BMG was even more ambitious than the localities in the green belt project. The first step in running its land business was the production in May 2000 of a master plan for the whole green belt area (BMCUP 2000b). “Spatial sciences” such as urban planning played a crucial role in “projecting the [state-dominated] abstraction onto the level of the lived” (Lefebvre 1991, 362, cf. Gregory 1994, 404). The story of the green belts reveals that such projections came together with significant effects of power and induced the expropriation of rural land without recompense for urban use. Indeed, most land plots in the green belt area were formerly classed as “rural” and were owned by local village collectives (NPC 2004). However, the increasing needs of urban infrastructure in the urban change required the BMG to devise new places to install related facilities, and they turned their gaze to the green belt area. In the master plan, four types of land use were designed to occupy most of the land in the area. Besides a nominal green space (125.22
square kilometre, 51.8%), the plan also highlighted construction land for urbanising local populations (32.96 square kilometre, 13.6%), land occupied by urban work units (including SOEs, 27.69 square kilometres, 11.5%) and land for building urban infrastructure (42.85 square kilometres, 17.7%). While the second type endorsed the land manoeuvres of the localities in the green belt, the fourth type indeed legitimised BMG’s expropriation of rural land without paying compensation of any kind – because, it was argued, it was for the “public good” (Interview with Dahongmen village cadre, 12 December 2014) (see Figure 5.5).

**Figure 5.5** The free occupation of land for urban infrastructure

*Source: BAUPD (2014a). Note: The green belt area in the city proper is in light green, and the land plots in purple were commandeered by the BMG for the location of urban infrastructure, amounting to 42.85 square kilometres in total.*

The land business of BMG in the green belt extended further than this and was heavily affected by simultaneous changes of national land policy. As shown in Chapter 2, by 1994 both the reference horizon and the coordinates of action of the Party-state had been fundamentally transformed. The state’s monopolisation of urban land and the commercialisation of houses were put at the top of their agenda, defining the urban metamorphosis in contemporary China. In practice, however, specific land institutions
were not established at once. It was only in 1998, after the second revision of the Land Management Act (NPC 1998), when the state underlined its ethos in the use of land resources. The statement by the State Council in 2000 clarified this ethos: “we should insist on the simultaneous exploitation and saving of land resources, with saving coming first, so as to locate exploitation in the protection and protection in the exploitation” (State Council 2000). From this statement, we can see there are indeed two, rather contradictory, principles in using land resources: first, the state’s land benefits should be maximised by using its monopolistic position and power in the land market; second, land resources should at the same time be protected, since they are critical for food security and have strategic significance.

Both principles at once substantially reshaped the BMG’s general conduct and its practices, in particular in the green belt project, in the early 2000s. Following the first principle, the BMG set up a “land reservation system” on 31 January 2002 (BMG 2002a) to promote and consolidate the monopolistic power of the state in the booming land market. Here, the BMG claimed that the land supply must be controlled to “fully realise the value of land assets as well as improve the efficiency of land use.” This aim entails a centralised and unified management and supply system, which should be dominated by the BMG; it should draw up annual plans for land supply, to build and administer a physical land market, and to reserve land plots for transactions “by using the market mechanism” (BMG 2002a). However, in practice, the BMG made it plain that construction land in the green belt area was not included in the newly established reservation system (and land market). The rationale for this was revealed seven months later. On 6 August 2002, the General Headquarters of the BLGCGB declared that the remaining construction land in the green belt area had been allocated to the “Green Belt Infrastructure Development and Construction Company,” an enterprise established by the BMG in 2000 (BLGCGB 2002). While the advertised goal was to enable this company to provide adequate urban infrastructure for the green belt area – an aim mostly unfulfilled (BAUPD 2013) – its real concern was with the rising land interests: 243.22 hectares of construction land plots, all of huge potential value, were occupied overnight by this BMG-owned company (BLGCGB 2002).

Furthermore, the establishment of a “land reservation system” did not automatically induce land leasing methods to change from closed-door negotiations to market-based
methods, as the central leaders had expected. The preference for closed-door negotiations, as briefly introduced in Chapter 2, prevails in the political milieu when state agents, being re-aligned along land interests, compete and collide with one another to commodify land (Hsing 2010, 212). Indeed, this local state agents’ preference for close-door negotiation is a rational choice in view of the certain scalar relationship between the central and the local. In Beijing, the green belt project was deployed to justify the BMG’s reluctance to adopt market-based methods for its land leasing. On 28 June 2002, the BMG issued a document promoting market-based methods in the land market (BMG 2002b), as the local response endorsing the State Council’s requirements (2001). In this document, the BMG declared that the sale of all land plots for profit must be transacted via the newly established Beijing Land Market; all closed-door negotiation were forbidden, excepting these four categories: land plots related to the green belt project, in small suburban towns, for ODHRP issues, and for high-tech industries. From June to October 2002, the BMG leased out nearly 90 million square metres in land plots via closed-door negotiations in just four months, all legitimised under the four exceptions, while the total area of all land plots leased out in Beijing from 1992 to 2002 had been only 98.11 million square metres (Yu 2004). In the 2003 inspection of the national land market, the Ministry of Land and Resources recognised that 98% of the land plots in Beijing were still leased following closed-door negotiations, of which 50% were illegal (ibid.).

Further documents from the central government were issued in 2003 and 2004 to combat tactics of this kind. 31 August 2004 was set by the MLR (2004) as the deadline for all municipalities to deal with their local and historical issues (i.e., to remove their various exceptions). In the process of scalar contestation, the central government adopted the second principle noted above (of protecting arable land for food security) as a political weapon to end the exception status granted to the BMG. To be more specific, the special institutional arrangement made between the BMG and the MLR in 2000 (two exceptions to allow arable land to be occupied) was withdrawn by the latter, which declared that the occupation of fundamental arable land to plant trees could not be tolerated (MLR 2003a, b, State Council 2004b). Immediately, this policy not only instigated a sharp decline of the area of green spaces in the first green belt, which had decreased from 1,333 hectares in 2003 to 533 hectares in 2004, but also led to a drastic reduction of the planned green space in the second green belt (from 412 to 163 square kilometres). Furthermore, the change of central policies in the end also abolished the institutional foundation, for the
BMG, of consolidating the green belt project as a zoning technology for legitimising its negotiation-based land business. But this was not the end of the story. Ethos and principles on the land issue and the related scalar and institutional dynamics were set to spotlight the still solid articulation of the green belt project and the state’s land businesses after the 2007-2008 financial crisis.

Before moving on to talk about the post-crisis situation, it may be helpful first to summarise discussions so far. As a zoning technology, the green belt project was consolidated and diffused in the name of “Green Olympics” – this is the conclusion reached by the previous section. And in this section, I identify two significant effects that such technology has induced. On the one hand, the project shows an “all-in-one” ambition of BMG to consolidate and upgrade its territory in an urban way, yet the only result was the fetishism of nature and the removal of the lived space and everyday lives of the local people. On the other, after ravaging nature, the signs of nature paved the way for anti-ecological and land-oriented manoeuvres of BMG and related localities in the green belt area for promoting their land businesses. These two effects indeed marked two pillars for the birth of landed ecology. Instead of an “ecological land” where the nature per se is reconciled with the urban process, the area is made into a “landed ecology” where land-oriented manoeuvres and tactics have demolished and then replaced nature. This transformed spatiality of the green belt confirms the thesis of the pure urban form shown in Chapter 4: as a floating and contingent urban form, the green belt only becomes real through dynamic articulations with an urban political economy that is subject to change. And now, both the fetishizing of nature and the rise of urban-landed centrality in the green belt area indicate clearly the extent of China’s ongoing urban metamorphosis – the peak of which is still to come.

5.4 Of landed ecology and the spatial fix: Green belts after 2008

After the scalar collisions from 2003 to 2004 illustrated above, the green belt project entered an era of hibernation, waiting for new opportunities to revive its power as a zoning technology. From 2005 to 2007, the general concern of the BMG was to consolidate its land institutions after the central instructions. The method of supplying state-owned construction land was revised and all exceptions removed; and the land reservation system was chosen as the primary channel for the state’s land business
Meanwhile, a reform of the municipal government’s investment system gave the land supply plan a fundamental role in adjusting and regulating investments on fixed assets (BMG 2005b), which mark the rising significance of land and urban space in the whole economy (see also Lin 2009). To smooth the state’s expropriation of rural land (as a principal source of land supply), the BMG also largely revised the relocation policy for local villagers, leading to a new scheme that gave the latter more benefits (BMBLR 2007). These policy changes were not proposed for dealing with the impending financial crisis, but they played a crucial role in the post-crisis scenario: their effects were swiftly increased when the articulation of the green belts and the state’s land business was re-confirmed to meet the urgent need for a “spatial fix” (cf. Harvey 2003).

The year 2010 was a turning point in the scale of the state’s land business in China. For one thing, land lease payments collected nationally in 2008 and 2009 amounted to 599.56 billion and 602.37 billion Yuan respectively; but this number rose steeply to 999.99 billion in 2010, which indicated an increase of 66.01% in only twelve months (see Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2). After 2010, the state’s land revenues further augmented, taking the land lease fees obtained by the state to over one trillion (1,000 billion) Yuan every year since 2011. In this section, I want to investigate why and how 2009 set the foundation for reshaping the state’s land business by considering the case of Beijing’s green belts. My finding is that while green belts as a zoning technology and landed ecology have maintained their huge potential to fulfil the ambitions of the state in producing space and accumulating capital, the trigger in their doing so was the 2007-2008 financial crisis and, accordingly, the increasing need for a spatial fix in the post-crisis situation. This is how the landed ecology and spatial fix were firmly articulated.

**Local responses to the global financial crisis**

Three weeks after the closing ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games, on 15 September, Lehman Brothers collapsed. The bankruptcy of this American bank marked a peak in the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the result of which was “the worst recession in 80 years” (The Economist 2013). Several years’ reflections on the causes of this crash gradually uncovered the underlying logic (ibid.): the “saving glut” in Asia (China in particular) had lowered global interest rates and motivated capital “to hunt for riskier assets that offered
higher returns”. Meanwhile, the regulators in the Anglophone world relaxed their controls on such “financial innovations” as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), which appeared to be relatively safe and provided higher returns only because their risks were hidden by financiers. This is “a very geographical crisis” (French, Leyshon, and Thrift 2009) that has witnessed long and far-reaching effects on the global economy; the local response to this crisis in China presents us with more details. On 5 November 2008, the then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao convened a State Council Executive Meeting. Possible measures were discussed to expand the domestic demand and to promote a “steady and moderately rapid growth” of the national economy (State Council 2008a). A final resolution of this meeting declared that “flexible and prudent” macroeconomic policies were needed to respond to this financial crisis, including a positive fiscal policy and a moderately loose monetary policy – which induced the birth of a rescue package (The Economist 2008).

Ten concrete measures were announced at this meeting, mostly focusing on the stimulation of domestic consumption and greater government expenditure on mega projects and infrastructure. To this end, the State Council determined to invest *four trillion Yuan* by 2010: 1.18 trillion was to be provided by the central authority, and the remainder by the local (SCPO 2008). Soon after, three supporting documents were announced describing how and where the four trillion Yuan was to be spent. The first document was on increasing the broad measure of money supply (M2), the annual target of which in 2009 was set at 17%, so as to relax the monetary policy of the People’s Bank of China (i.e., the central bank)47 (State Council 2008b). Second, the consumption of commodity housing was encouraged to a much greater extent by various credit offers and tax deductions; and building social housing was also used as a way of increasing government expenditure, whereby the construction of 1.3 million affordable flats was set as an annual goal from 2009 to 2011 (State Council 2008c). Third, local investment and financing platforms were advocated (mostly with expected land revenues as the pledged securities for repayment) and syndicated loans from a group of banks were promoted;

47 Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of China’s central bank, claimed at the G20 summit in London (2 April 2009) that such “prompt, decisive and effective policy measures, [demonstrated China’s] superior system advantage when it comes to making vital policy decisions” (The Economist 2009). This meeting witnessed that China’s rescue package was extended to global scale, resulting in “a $5tn (£3tn) fiscal expansion, an extra $1.1tn of resources to help the International Monetary Fund and other global institutions boost jobs and growth, and to reform of the banks” (Elliott 2011).
the underlying rationale is to boost the financing capacities of local governments so that they could ensure adequate funding (2.82 trillion Yuan) to implement the whole rescue (stimulus) package (PBC 2009).

This rescue package did save the Chinese economy, but only on paper. In the first half of 2009, while China’s exports decreased by 21.4%, investments in fixed assets saw a 33.5% increase, a rise in the broad measure of money supply (M2) of 28.46%, and new bank loans reaching 7.73 trillion from January to July 2009. They altogether induced a 7.1% increase in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country (People's Daily Online 2009). A closer look at such numbers, however, can tell us an entirely different story. Together with the vast expansion of the money supply and government expenditure, the method of economic growth in China also saw a sea change. In the post-crisis situation, local governments started to play a much more critical role by engaging in the financialisation of land resources. Borrowing money from state-owned banks (operating via local investment vehicles and using land resources as collateral), local governments not only ran land businesses to earn revenue but also promoted property development to collect tax (Yin 2014). The balance of local government debts (hereafter local debts) in China at the end of 2008 was 3.2 trillion Yuan. It rose to 10.7 trillion in 2010 (an increase of 234.38%) and 17.89 trillion by June 2013 (an increase of 459.06%) (ibid.). A substantial part of local debts was used to prepare for the land businesses; local governments promised to repay the sums with their revenues from land leasing – a logic that binds together the state, capital and the urban space.

To some extent, we can even claim that the national economy of China has been spatialised, founded on the financialisation of (state-owned) land resources in the process of urbanisation. This is how the spatial fix worked in China after 2008, in a different genre from the one recognised by David Harvey (1981, 2003). While Harvey sought to highlight the significance of “fix” in sustaining the capitalist system, his attention to the “spatial” issue is somewhat obscure. Space is not merely a container; it can be a critical part of the local conditions in increasing liquidity, boosting government expenditure, practising zoning technologies, legitimising large-scale demolition and displacement and state profits from reserving land plots. Harvey’s framework does not endow space with agency, but the story from China tells us that this agency is the real nodal point in the conduct of spatial fix locally. Without space, the spatial fix can have nowhere to anchor
itself. This is indeed the underlying logic why the national economy of China has been spatialised: the economy was directed by the post-crisis scenario to rescue the Party’s regime and world capitalism as a whole and was rooted in the financialisation of (state-owned) land resources in the process of urbanisation. Such arguments can be vividly demonstrated with more empirical evidence from the green belts in the post-crisis era, where the articulation of the landed ecology and spatial fix is solid and is maintained in the name of “urban-rural integration.”

The revival of green belts through “urban-rural integration”

On 25 December 2008, the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC issued its “Opinions on taking the lead to form a new pattern of urban-rural integration [城乡一体化, chengxiang yitihua] in developing economy and society” (BMC 2008). The city was to upgrade from “moderately developed” to “highly developed,” the BMC’s resolution claimed, with its hosting of the Summer Olympic Games as the signal and the turning point. At this stage, the “reform and development of the rural area must be further accelerated, and the rural-urban dual structure must be abandoned” (ibid.). A “two-wheel driven” strategy was set at the top of the agenda, referring to the promotion of urbanisation in the rural-urban continuum and nearby suburbs on the one hand, and new village construction in the remote suburbs on the other. While the two wheels were listed as equal, the focus was, without any doubt, on the first. Indeed, “the rural-urban continuum is an area with the greatest vitality for development, yet facing the most prominent contradictions between population, resources and environment; and it hence is the area with the most urgent need to boost urban-rural integration” (ibid.). As the pilots in “comprehensive reform,” the localities in this continuum were encouraged by the BMC and BMG to vigorously explore their reform measures and to stimulate institutional innovation – including, but not limited to, green belt policies, land use policies, relocation policies, social welfare policies and public administration methods (ibid.). If we read these arguments only literally, then it may seem that the elimination of differences between the city and the country is at hand and the Maoist utopia of building a communist society (see Chapter 4) is waiting for us. The reality is the opposite, however, requiring further reading of the specific measures implemented and their shocking effects.
Two principal “institutional innovations” were evident in the new policy scheme of “urban-rural integration,” both related to the green belts. The first was called “one village, one policy” (一村一策, yicun yice) and was originally proposed in May 2008 as a revised policy to stimulate the demolition of the remaining villages and townships in the green belt area (BMG 2008). “The case-by-case method is the important principle in boosting projects for the green belt,” the BMG claimed, “and the conditions of each village should be adequately attended to, by the District Governments, in proposals of demolition and relocation works” (ibid.). This policy was indeed, to my mind, the final stage of the zoning technology discussed above. It proposed to completely abandon normal formalities and administrative measures so as to adapt to each village’s condition – all for the politico-economic goal of removing obstacles to the running of land businesses in the “rural-urban continuum.”

The diffusion of zoning technology exerted a much stronger influence when it was joined by a revised arrangement of the land reservation system. The mechanism of this system is quite simple: The BMG should conduct “primary exploitation” (一级开发, yiji kaifa) of land plots – vacating them by removing the original landscapes and residents and making them ready for property development – and then lease these plots out to property developers in the Beijing Land Market. Just before the onset of the global financial crisis, a minor change was made to this system (MLR, MOF, and PBC 2007): work in the primary exploitation, previously contracted to property developers (BMBLR 2006), was to be taken over by the municipal government and reserved for the land consolidation and reservation centre, a public institution affiliated to the municipal departments of land and resources. Banks identified this change as a clear signal of the state’s endorsement of primary exploitation, which significantly reduced the associated risk (Shi 2009, Shin 2016). Business opportunities motivated these banks, mostly state-owned, to advance money to municipal agents to run land business. While the “one village, one policy” scheme cleared obstacles to policy and erected the political foundation of BMG’s post-crisis scenario, the revision of the land reservation system at the same time laid the financial foundation for such manoeuvres. In the light of urban-rural integration, the repertoire of the urban metamorphosis was ready to reach its climax.
On 21 April 2009, the BMG announced that it planned to invest 113 billion Yuan in 2009 in its land reservation system in order to fulfil its local responsibility for implementing the national rescue package (Liu 2009). The annual goal was to increase its reservation of land plots by 4,700 hectares and to finish the primary exploitation of 3,600 hectares of plots (BMBLR 2009). This project was too big to finish unless it was anchored in the discourse of urban-rural integration – and this is how the BMG managed to attain its annual goal. In Chaoyang, for example, 3,500 hectares of rural land was involved in a land reservation plan, all in the name of integration, covering one-third of the rural area in this district and involving the relocation of 100,000 local people and the demolition of their houses (Chen 2009). By the end of 2009, the BMG had managed to secure a reservation of 9,600 hectares of land plots in total, twice its annual goal and 6.25 times the number in 2008 (1,534.6 hectares) (BMCUP 2010c). The scale can be better identified by the following illustration: the area of land reserved by the BMG in the single year of 2009 was 6.11% of the whole territory of Greater London. Here, it becomes evident why 2010 marks the turning point in the state’s land business (as shown in Figure 2.2): by 2010 all these land plots had been well prepared for transactions – and this phenomenon was repeated all over the nation.

But the BMG was not yet content with this scale of endeavour; the “rural-urban continuum” was employed yet again as a discourse to legitimise the BMG’s expansion of the land business. At this discursive moment, as shown in Chapter 4, the rural-urban continuum was redefined in an entirely negative pattern as the “dirty, messy and disappointing” (脏乱差, zang luan cha) zone. While the 1990s saw the complete removal of “Zhejiang Village” as the frontier of the urban-modern ambition of the state, now the post-crisis scenario simply expanded the removal in larger areas. On 21 July 2009, the BMG announced a list of 50 “key villages” (重点村, zhongdian cun) as areas which were so dirty, messy and disappointing that their improvement had to be “supervised and monitored directly by the municipal government” (Beijing Daily 2009). The total area of the villages was 85.3 square kilometres, which accommodated 214,000 local residents (i.e., with Beijing hukou) and more than one million “floating people” (that is, without Beijing hukou) (BLGCRUC 2012). Among these 50 villages, 38 were within the city proper, 12 were along the city boundary and 26 were in the green belt area (see Figure 5.6) (BMCUP 2010b).
Figure 5.6 “Key villages” in the green belt area

Source: BMCUP (2010b, 4). Note: The areas in mottled colours are all localities in the first green belt, while the 26 red dots mark “key villages” that overlap the green belt project; the point in green is Dahongmen, one of my field sites, which was also involved in this “key village” project.

The BMG officially launched its land project in the 50 “key villages” on 26 February 2010 and had mostly completed the work in the next two years. Using 124 billion Yuan borrowed from state-owned banks, together with 45.9 billion Yuan that were self-raised48, the BMG had emptied the 50 villages by 2012. In this process, 25.3 million square metres of rural courtyard houses were demolished, and villagers were relocated to resettlement communities (6.25 million square metres in total). It enabled the primary exploitation of 4,500 hectares of land plots, out of which 1,690 hectares were deployed by the BMG “to balance construction funds and to improve the urban function” (BLGCRUC 2012) – that is to say, leasing land out to property developers. All demolition and construction works included in the “key village” project were labelled urgent and were eligible to enjoy “special treatment” and an “all-in-one service package.” Zoning technologies discussed at the outset were further diffused here, even though this was not for Olympic Games but

48 “Self-raised funding” (自筹资金, zichou zijin) refers to money deployed by the BMG through channels other than bank loans, which could include profits from BMG-owned SOEs, local government bonds issued by the BMG and the interest and profits earned from land and other businesses.
for the BMG’s spatial fix manoeuvres in its post-crisis scenario. Here, the overlapping of the “key village” project with the landed ecology and the complete diffusion of the zoning technology together reveal two interwoven spatial fix approaches and also signal the revival of green belts in a new scene of national and world history.

5.5 The triumph of land finance

From 2010 to 2016, the BMG leased out 1,113 land plots through the open market for land, covering an area of 10,627 hectares in total; it also supplied another 17,854 hectares of land in other ways (see Table 5.2). Land business brought in revenue of 1,010.47 billion Yuan (1.01 trillion) (Ye 2016b); and, according to the estimate of the BMCUP (2012), 60% of this amount can be seen as net profits to the state which had reached about 600 billion Yuan in the previous seven years. A substantial part of this land, with a total area of 13,122 hectares, was newly expropriated and “developed” through BMG’s land reservation system (from 2010 to 2015). Many land plots reserved by the BMG in this way were located in the rural-urban continuum in general and in the green belts in particular. An annual breakdown is presented in Table 5.2 below, where we can see clearly both the sheer scale of the BMG’s land businesses in the 2010s and the significant role of the green belts in this historical-geographical conjuncture through the mechanism that I define as “landed ecology.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total area supplied</th>
<th>Total area reserved</th>
<th>Total area leased</th>
<th>Total revenues</th>
<th>Revenue in green belts</th>
<th>Ratio of green belt revenues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6,489</td>
<td>4,101</td>
<td>2,991.06</td>
<td>164.03</td>
<td>20.80</td>
<td>17.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5,735</td>
<td>2,741</td>
<td>1,965.05</td>
<td>105.69</td>
<td>30.35</td>
<td>34.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4,115</td>
<td>2,755</td>
<td>1,328.06</td>
<td>64.79</td>
<td>38.85</td>
<td>29.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4,610</td>
<td>1,973</td>
<td>2,082.39</td>
<td>182.18</td>
<td>54.42</td>
<td>23.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3,161</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>192.19</td>
<td>24.68</td>
<td>34.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>925.42</td>
<td>221.74</td>
<td>55.99</td>
<td>42.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>79.85</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>11.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28,481</td>
<td>13,122</td>
<td>10,627</td>
<td>1,010.47</td>
<td>231.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Data for “total area supplied” and “total area reserved” are from annual work summaries of BMBLR (2011b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016), except the number of total area supplied in 2016, which is from Ting (2017). Data on “total area leased” and “total revenues” are from Ye (2016b),
except the number of “total revenues” in 2016, which is from Yang (2016). Numbers on “revenue in green belts” and “ratio in all revenues” are calculated with data from BMBLR website, with all land transactions in open land market from 2010 to 2016: http://www.bjgtj.gov.cn/col/col3489/index.html (last accessed on 3 March 2017).

Notes: (1) “Total area supplied” refers to the total area of state-owned construction land supplied in a single year, including that through the open market and that allocated in other ways (such as closed-door negotiation and allocation for free). (2) “Total area reserved” refers to the total area of land plots that were reserved by the BMG through its land consolidation and reservation centre (BLCRC) in a certain year, the mechanism of which was introduced above. (3) “Total area leased” refers to the total area of land plots that were supplied in the open market through auction, tendering or listing (招拍挂, zhao-pai-gua), and “total revenues” refers to the land revenues of the BMG from such transactions in the open market. (4) “Revenues in green belts” are calculated by locating each deal on the street/township level to see if it is in the green belt area and then summing up all revenues collected from all the deals in this area; “ratio in all revenues” refers to the ratio of “revenues in green belts” in the “total revenues” in a certain year, and it hence shows the crucial role of green belts in BMG’s land business. (5) Generally, there are four kinds of use of land plots: residential, commercial, industrial, and urban infrastructure; to simplify operations here, I concentrate on the land plots for residential and commercial use in the spatial analysis of BMG’s land business in the green belts (last two columns).

In the previous seven years, the BMG had obtained 231.23 billion Yuan altogether from land in the green belt area, accounting for 22.88% of all the revenues in its land business. To be more specific, the green belt area contributed 14.57% of the area of land plots leased out for residential use and 13.06% of the plots for commercial use. For land lease fees, the plots in the green belt area helped the BMG to collect 28.94% of its revenues in the category of residential land; this ratio turns into 25.86% when it comes to the category of commercial land. In some years (such as 2015), the ratio of land revenues collected in the green belt area could reach more than 40% of the overall revenues in the city. In this way, the green belt area has indeed been rendered the frontier of Beijing’s urban process and metamorphosis. The potential of the belts to embody the state’s ambitions to produce space and accumulate capital are finally and fully achieved here, at the time of the financial crisis with its need to find a spatial fix, which is turned out to be rooted in the consistent mechanisms of zoning technology and landed ecology.

A spatial analysis of the specific land plots being traded from 2010 to 2016 may present more vivid evidence. Figures 5.7 and 5.8, below, delineate geographical patterns of land plots leased out in Beijing (from 2010 to 2016). Figure 5.7 illustrates the geographical distribution of residential land plots and commercial land plots between 2010 and 2016, where the depth of colour corresponds to the total area of land leased in a specific locality.
(street or township) – the more the deeper. In the green belt area, we see that residential land plots are primarily located in the eastern half, while commercial ones are generally in the western half. In Figure 5.8, the focus shifts to the spatial pattern of total land leasing fees collected by BMG, still using streets and townships as the unit of analysis. Here, the deeper the colour of a locality, the more land revenues it has contributed to the BMG in this seven-year period. In the green belt area, residential land plots in the north-eastern part (including Sunhe) contribute plenty of revenues, while commercial land plots in the south-western part (in Fengtai District, close to Dahongmen) are equally important for the BMG’s land revenues. On these maps, simply put, ecological clues of the green belt are missing; we see only its potential for generating revenues from the land business – and the BMG has unfailingly exploited such potential.
Figure 5.7 Spatial analysis of the total area of leased land plots in Beijing (2010-2016)

Source: drawn by author; data for drawing maps collected from the BMBLR website, which includes all transactions in land via auction, tendering or listing. URL: http://www.bjgtj.gov.cn/col/col3489/index.html; last accessed on 3 March 2017. Note: the above maps show the geographical distribution of leased residential land plots (figure a) and commercial land plots (figure b), where the depth of colour indicates the total area of land plots leased out in each locality (street/township) from 2010 to 2017; the unit of spatial analysis is the street/township, the lowest level in the hierarchy of China.
Figure 5.8 Spatial analysis of land leasing fees in Beijing (2010-2016)

*Source:* drawn by author; data for drawing maps gathered from the BMBLR website, which includes all transactions in the land market via auction, tendering or listing. URL: [http://www.bjgtj.gov.cn/col/col3489/index.html](http://www.bjgtj.gov.cn/col/col3489/index.html); last accessed on 3 March 2017. *Note:* the two maps here depict the spatial pattern of land lease fees collected by the BMG, (a) presenting this pattern for residential land plots and (b) presenting it for commercial land plots; here the depth of colour indicates the amount of money collected in each locality (street/township); the unit of spatial analysis is the street/township, the lowest level in the hierarchy of China.
5.6 Summary

The logic underlying the BMG’s manoeuvres in the green belt area is now clearer. The green belt project was reactivated in a state of exception in the city’s second bid for the Olympic Games, and it was directed by the fetishizing of nature where signs of nature take the place of nature *per se* and pave the way for anti-ecological conduct. In such a process, exceptionalities are invented and attached to imaginary green belts, and this in turn renders the latter an *exceptional space* for spatial and politico-economic concerns. In the name of the green belt, nature has been by and large removed, giving way to fictitious signs of nature in the green belt area; meanwhile, the localities in the green belts, together with BMG, have fully adopted the project as a zoning technology to run golf courses, to occupy land for accommodating infrastructure and to legitimise the large-scale yet grey land businesses. Instead of “ecological land” where the nature is reconciled with the urban process, the green belt area is transformed into a “landed ecology” where land-oriented manoeuvres combat the ecological concern. The global financial crisis in the end intensifies the dilemmas and completely transforms green belts into BMG’s local mechanism for producing space and accumulating capital. The last section gives some visual illustrations of the triumph of land finance in Beijing; more examinations on this urban process is required to record urban conditions in contemporary China. This task is to be addressed in Chapters 6 and 7 with ethnographic information collected from Sunhe and Dahongmen, the two field sites where I conducted participant observations and held in-depth interviews.
Chapter 6 “Land kings” and the territorial logic of the state

6.1 Introduction

The state’s land business, as discussed in Chapter 5, is not a purely economic project. Indeed, it is a totalising project in the sense that the state’s successful production of urban spaces and the erection of a hegemony of urbanisation are conditional on related social, spatial and political processes. To understand land business as a totalising project, we should investigate specific cases – this is the method of dialectical materialism used by Lefebvre (2009). For the concerns of the present chapter, I have chosen the rise of “Land Kings” (地王, diwang as specific cases by which to explore both the agency and agents of the state in land transactions. “Land King” is a metaphor that has recently emerged in China’s mass media. It personifies the particular plot of land that is highest in its total price, average price or transaction premiums in a given city. It is relevant to discussions on the green belt because both Sunhe and Dahongmen, my two field sites, have immense potential in crowning “land kings.” This is a marked effect of the landed ecology discussed in Chapter 5; but still more details are required to register the microphysics of power relations underlying both landed ecology and “land kings.”

Tracing the process of crowning “land kings” in my field sites allows me to recognise the “conflictual social relations and material social practices that lie behind the production of [a] state-idea” (Harvey 2009, 261-62). As an unsettled ensemble of dynamic socio-spatial and politico-economic processes, the state is immaterial but real in the sense that it has a new territorial logic which has gradually begun to dominate the urban process in China. This can be labelled an urban-oriented territorial logic, where municipal governments become the principal state agents for running land businesses and where the state’s conduct towards its people is manifest in a range of territory-based techniques. This is a logic that marks a spatial mechanism of the microphysics of power in a historical bloc (see Section 6.2); and in this urban process, the state restructures
territory to fulfil its double goal of surveillance and accumulation. In this urban moment, “land kings” are better taken as a product that comes to birth through various effects of the state in absolute, relative and relational space-time, and hence the territorial logic of the state is immanent in the stories of “land kings” and vice versa.

Further examination of such specific stories reveals that the dialectics of change and consistency are of great value in understanding the survival of the Party-state regime at the intersection of late capitalism and post-socialism. On the one hand, it is recognised that its campaign-style governance was inherited under totally different politico-economic conditions. On the other, its ideology of cohesion defining the territorial logic is completely changed and the state’s campaigns are initiated not for the sake of the communist utopia but instead for that of the land businesses. We are now in an era when an urban metamorphosis has been rewriting the ethos of the Party and its regime, with the ultimate goal of sustaining its authority by working miracles in and through the urban space. With this rationale, the agency, relations and interactions of state agents are all restructured to turn heterogeneous spatio-temporalities into a homogeneous whole. Furthermore, discontents and compromises between these agents are not prohibited but deployed as concrete measures to motivate them in working for the identical goal of the land business. The logic of the state is omnipresent, with the result that even the territorial autonomy of the localities and the moral claim of villagers are now fully incorporated as further elements in the crowning of “land kings.”

This chapter starts from some theoretical reflections on the territorial logic of the state (Section 6.2). It is first conceptualised by drawing on the gap between Foucault’s (2009) governmental techniques and Lefebvre’s (2003a) concept of state space and is then contextualised in China by linking this logic with the nature of the state and its campaign-style governance (Feng 2011, Tang 2007). The focus then shifts to my field observations in Sunhe and Dahongmen (Section 6.3), where since 2012 numerous “land kings” have been crowned. Besides detailed illustrations on the procedure and benefits of crowning “land kings” in these places, I also introduce various agents of the state who are involved in such business. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 move on to further explore the power dynamics related to “land kings.” In Section 6.4, three “joint meetings” are discussed; they not only illustrate how and how far the authorities are spatialised in the urban moment, but also pave the way for examining the microphysics of the actions of the state that are dynamic
by nature. Section 6.5 shifts the focus to the scalar agency of localities in the territorial logic, which clear the ground for the state’s land businesses by incorporating their own interests. Interactions between various state/scalar agents lead to the birth of a new governmental technique that I call \textit{surveillance by accumulation}. The chapter then concludes with a summary.

\section*{6.2 Decoding the territorial logic of the state}

“Is not the secret of the state, hidden because it is so obvious, to be found in space? … [The state officials] seem to administer, to manage and to organise a natural space. In practice, however, they substitute another space for it, one that is first economic and social, and then political. They believe they are obeying something in their heads – a representation (of the country, etc.). In fact, they are establishing an order – their own.” (Lefebvre 2003a, 87; original emphasis)

In his 1977-78 Lectures at the Collège de France, entitled \textit{Security, Territory and Population}, Foucault (2009) investigates the governmentality of the state for the first time. By illustrating the history of changes of governmental reasons, he uncovers a genealogy of the modern state (ibid., 354), the core of which lies in the transition from \textit{sovereignty} to \textit{government}. For him, the former is “essentially defined by its territoriality, by the surface it occupies” and the latter mainly focuses on “the mass of the population, with its volume, its density, with the territory that it covers only in a sense as one of its components” (Foucault 2000b, 221). The changing focus from territory to population is, for Foucault, the underlying mechanism that defines the modern state; and such recognition in turn generates a new channel to link (micro-level) bio-power with the (macro) technology of security (Foucault 2009, 1, 358). I accept Foucault’s insightful analyses of changing governmental reasons and techniques. However, territory in his framework is only fixed and solid and hence is at odds with the spatial reality, as he himself also sensed in his interview with the editors of \textit{Hérodote} (Foucault 1980).

For Harvey (2009, 161), Foucault fails to give tangible meaning to the way space (as well as territory) is “fundamental to the exercise of power,” and thus overlooks the
material grounding for his own spatial metaphors. Such a trap can also be observed in You-Tien Hsing’s (2010) territoriality-oriented framework for explaining China’s urban transformation. It is, beyond doubt, an outstanding approach to examining intra-state competition, collective actions and the urban process in general. However, its analytical power is limited by the view of territory as merely a physical container for sovereignty. Defining territoriality as “spatial strategies to consolidate power in a given place and time” (ibid., 8), Hsing treats the local state as the holder of territorial authority which promotes urban projects to consolidate this authority. Furthermore, she identifies a “civic territoriality” to illustrate the contention between the state and society, in which social actors make use of newly recognised territorial strategies to question the territorial logic of the local state (ibid., 14). This is indeed another form of the dichotomy between the state and society, a point reflected upon above (Section 1.3). The question that arises is: if the state is defined as a set of territorial processes, then how can we draw the line between the state and society when such processes dynamically intersect? Indeed, such issues as discontents, moral claims and “relative territorial autonomy” are better seen as part and parcel of the territorial logic of the state than labelled “civic territoriality.” Such reflection requires a renewed perspective to understand territory and the territorial logic of the state, and this re-conceptualisation is the primary concern of this section.

State space and territorial logic

The above question depends on a limited vision of state space, which is seen as only a physical thing that can be retained. Indeed, there are three moments of state space that are critical to understanding both the nature and power of the state (Lefebvre 2003a). In addition to physical space that is mapped, modified and transformed for “the division of labour within a territory” (ibid., 84), there are two other moments that are more critical for the rationalisation of society and the survival of the state. First, social space is, for Lefebvre, like an edifice of institutions, laws and conventions – it is a social architecture with political monumentality, which renders the state a “concrete abstraction”⁴⁹; and, he continues, “each state is a social space, symbolised by the pyramid and the circle of

⁴⁹ “Concrete abstraction” is the pillar for Lefebvre’s interpretation and deployment of dialectical materialism. It refers to the idea that the whole exists only concretely, while the abstraction (in terms of systems, structures, or theories) is an abbreviation of the concrete. This term enables him to articulate the abstract and the concrete in a different way from the dogmatist Marxists who focus on “concrete totality,” and it in turn preconditions his heterodox and dynamic theorisation of space, state and everyday life (see Robinson 2016 for a concise review).
circles” (ibid., 84-85). There is also a mental space, defined as “the representation of the state that people construct,” which is crucial in consolidating the social consensus for erecting the social space (ibid., 85). This framework derives from his famous “spatial triad” (Lefebvre 1991) and it gives a new platform from which to examine the territorial logic of the state.

The territorial logic is first and foremost “an ideology of cohesion” (Lefebvre 1976, 17). As a term that is in opposition to dialectics, “logic” indicates the search for coherence and the ambition to achieve homogeneity. The aim of logic “is to make [state space]…organised according to a rationality of the identical and the repetitive that allows the state to introduce its presence, control and surveillance in the most isolated corners” (Lefebvre 2003a, 86). Furthermore, the territorial logic also requires such homogeneous space to be in a fractured form, as parcels and lots, in order to provide the physical basis for transactions. In so doing, these equivalent, exchangeable and interchangeable features of space can be confirmed as pre-conditions for the actions of buying and selling (ibid., 86-87). The homogeneous whole and the fragmented parts, we might wonder, are hard to be reconciled when referring to the same space. Actually, the two characteristics of space are produced in two different yet interconnected realms. The first is the realm of the state; it is oriented around the conduct of surveillance, aiming to maintain order through homogeneous space (ibid., 90). The second is that of commodity, which focuses mainly on accumulation and hence needs equivalent and fractured spaces for speculation (ibid., 88). These two realms are articulated with each other to the extent that the desires of accumulation and speculation can be satisfied only when order is maintained and surveillance ensured. In the process of such articulations, the role of the state looms large.

Here, “as capital investment expands, the task of ensuring the conditions for the reproduction of the relations of domination is left to the state” (Lefebvre 2003a, 94). This is the conjuncture where surveillance and accumulation articulate each other – endorsed by the state in a spatial way. Indeed, the state actions are by no means bound to those institutional and administrative measures; they are also promoted “in a more indirect but no less effective way by making use of space,” which is the state’s privileged instrument (ibid., 92). Three rationales of the state in organising space are disclosed by Lefebvre: to redistribute population, to hierarchize places (in line with power relations) and to control the whole system (ibid., 94). He also elaborates three dimensions of (analysing) the
state’s regulatory conduct: the ideological, the practical and the tactical-strategic, all aiming to regulate and perpetuate relations of dominance (ibid., 95-96). In addition to the familiar link between territory and sovereignty (as held by Foucault and Hsing), the state plays a critical role in spatially reproducing the relations of domination, which are vital for capital accumulation. Here lies the reason why Lefebvre claims that “space becomes the seat of power” (Lefebvre 1976, 83) – both terms defined in the broad sense. Indeed, a territorial logic of the state emerges here: following an ideology of cohesion, the state deploys and restructures its territory (and the resources and specific objects attached to it) for the double goal of surveillance and accumulation.

The concept of territory, as Harvey (2009, 174) summarises, is integrated “into the dialectics of absolute, relative and relational modes of approach to space and time.” This is a lesson we can learn from Lefebvre for understanding China’s urban process spatially. Only by attending to “the terrain of complementary spatio-temporalities” (ibid., 194), can we register accurately the intersection of territory, surveillance and accumulation. Here, the role of territory as the coordinate of the governing mechanism is not replaced by the new focus on population; instead, the state’s conduct on the population is by and large exerted with its territorial techniques and directed by the double goal of surveillance and accumulation. In addition, the search for coherence and homogeneity is, by its nature, a process with the aim of establishing “a rationality of the identical and the repetitive” (Lefebvre 2003a, 86) in socio-spatial relations. There is no need to separate a territorial authority from “civic territoriality,” for the latter is but a tactic of the state – which knows well that its territory is more a process than a mere container and hence deploys discontents to practise its own territorial logic.

**The territorial logic of state campaigns**

After recognising territory as a fluid and dynamic terrain for politico-economic concerns, the next task for this section is to elaborate how and how far the framework can be applied to understanding the nature and agency of the Chinese state. As discussed in Chapter 4, the national ethos of modernity paved the way for the rise of the CPC and the birth of its regime. To render China modern, yet not in the capitalist sense of the term, typified the primary rationale of the Chinese intellectuals who accepted Marxism after realising the crisis of Western modernity (the First World War) and the success of the October
Revolution (Wang 1998, 13-14); for Wang Hui, this is indeed “a type of modern anticapitalist modernisation theory” (ibid., 14). This close link between the rationale of the Party and the national ethos of modernity produced a sense of historical mission which in turn endowed the Party-state regime with a “revolutionary-enlightening” power (Feng 2011, 74). In the light of the historical mission, such slogans as the *Great Leap Forward* and *Gardening the Earth* were repeatedly asserted. These discourses of modernity were soon turned into state campaigns, where institutions, common procedures and the normal division of labour were all broken down in order to mobilise the social, political and economic resources in a “revolutionary” way (ibid., 73-74).

Together with the ideological propaganda, this political mobilisation was primarily conducted with a top-down decomposition of pressures to principals (首长, shouzhang) at each level of the bureaucracy (Feng 2011, 84, Tang 2007). This fact is rooted in the nature of the regime’s authority. In a Weberian interpretation, Feng Shizheng (2011) suggests that the authority of the Party-state regime should be classified as charismatic rather than traditional or legal-rational. This suggests that the power of the state is conferred by the people mainly because they admire the extraordinary charisma of the state – and hence their relationship is a paternalist one (ibid., 78, see also Weber 1978, 1111-57). This term has two connotations: first, a charismatic hero gains and retains authority “solely by proving his powers in practice” and he must work miracles to supply wellbeing to his followers (Weber 1978, 1114); second, a charismatic authority is revolutionary in nature in the sense that it “knows no abstract laws and regulations and no formal adjudication” yet it “transforms all values and breaks all traditional and rational norms” (ibid., 1115). Here, in the case of China, the at once unstable and revolutionary nature of charismatic authority is assumed by the principals at each level of the bureaucracy. These are the persons who take on the obligation to work miracles and are given the ability and resources to do so and to sustain their authority (Feng 2011, 83-85). This is a (non-)institutional foundation for state campaigns, such as those mobilised by Mao Zedong in the 1950s which led to the death of 36 million people. Tragedies of this kind exhausted the initial legitimacy and demanded the working of new miracles; this underlines the rupture between Mao’s utopia and Deng’s reforms in the late 1970s – and the later urban metamorphosis which is still in process (see Chapter 2).
All these campaigns, without exception, were mobilised politically and practised through non-institutionalised, non-normalised and non-professional channels. Such features are defined by some Chinese sociologists as “campaign-style governance” (运动式治理, yundongshi zhili) (Feng 2011, Tang 2007); from this as a starting point one may explore the state as a concrete abstraction in general and its territorial logic in particular. For me, such a campaign-style governance is simply a concrete form of “the state of exception” illustrated by Agamben (2005). As the non-place which is devoid of law, this mechanism paves the way for a “force-of-law” by deactivating legal determinations and then deploying forces that have no legal form. Here, as Agamben reminds, the “force-of-law” can be claimed not only by a revolutionary organisation but also by the state authority itself (ibid., 38-39). However, there is also a third situation, which Agamben overlooks: when the agent which declares the “force-of-law” can be the one placed between a revolutionary organisation and a state authority – such as the CPC and its regime. Its charismatic authority is established on the promise of carrying out social transformations and of supplying rapidly increasing social well-being – both promises require extraordinary measures to be taken, which are the opposite of the identical and the repetitive measures that comply with the rationality of bureaucracy. Hence, the CPC had to restructure, if not destroy, the normal state rationality in order to work its miracles and sustain its charismatic authority – this is part of the underlying rationale of the successive state campaigns.

Such a campaign-style governance is oriented around and conducted with a territorial logic. It always follows an ideology of cohesion – albeit unlike its bureaucratic routinized counterpart – and deploys and restructures territory for the double goal of surveillance and accumulation. In the Maoist era, a utopian vision of the Communist society was the predominant ideology of cohesion; it was inflected by a Stalinist growth strategy and was directed to overwhelmingly emphasizing the development of (heavy) industry (Chan 1994, Kirkby 1985). The familiar slogan of “Gardening the Earth” and the proposing of green belts in the urban master plan of Beijing, for example, are better approached as ecological measures to promote the pace of industrialisation – but both were practised in a campaign style and regulated by vertical territorial logic (see Chapter 4). Here, it was the SOEs and other state work units (danwei) that played a critical role in (industrial) production and (labour) reproduction, while the whole bureaucracy was motivated by the effort of central leaders to support their local SOEs better (Zhou 2009). Spatially, all
these danwei (including the SOEs) were allocated land at no charge, in a process implemented by the bureaucracy through a mechanism called “collaborative site-selection” (Wan 1994, 49-50) which turned these danwei at once into “socialist landlords” (Hsing 2006b). It is here, in these relatively autonomous danwei, that the state accomplished its double goal of surveillance and accumulation: the former was achieved via a danwei-based household registration system and social welfare provision while the latter made its way through industrial production and labour reproduction – both in the danwei territory (Lu 2006). This vertical territorial logic was established through the campaigning-style governance; and it erected political, economic and social foundations for further campaigns, which before long induced the deadly crises of the socialist mode of production and accumulation.

The Maoist utopia has gone, together with the once thriving revolutionary allure of the CPC and its regime. However, the campaign-style governance and its firm articulation with the territorial logic have not ended, though practised in a different channel today. Simply put, the ideology of cohesion has been revised, in the sense that the revolutionary and utopian ideals are all deleted while its modernist imagination and “performance-based legitimacy” (Yang and Zhao 2013) have been retained. In this pragmatic and depoliticised version of “socialism” (Wang 2000, 2009), development is defined as not only an important element of well-being but also “the paramount political issue” (最大的政治, zuidade zhengzhi) (Deng 2004, 379-80). This definition holds, to the extent that this is the new anchor of the Party-state for sustaining authority and consolidating legitimacy. Urban space is shown to be playing a pivotal role in the metamorphosis and here the new miracles are mostly achieved spatially, after the CPC’s declaration that it had “creatively” developed the Marxist-Leninist doctrines by shifting the focus of land resources from use value to the exchange value (Zou 1994). This change marked the rise of a new, urban-oriented, territorial logic, in which the municipal governments gain attention as the principal state agents for running urban businesses, replacing the SOEs in the socialist growth strategy. Nevertheless, this new territorial logic is also erected through campaign-style governance. It cannot be erected without the territorialisation of municipalities, the change of fiscal institutions and the vigorous advocacy of land commodification (see Chapter 2), all of which were nothing but new campaigns initiated by the state.
After Foucault’s (2009, 21) definition of the milieu as both a field and a “target of intervention for power,” I want to sweep the above discussion into the transition from the industrial milieu to the urban milieu. The core of performance-based legitimacy in China has changed from industrial production to the production of space; the form of urban space has been restructured into equivalent and exchangeable parcels and lots for transactions; but the style of governance is unchanged and its effects continue. What is retained is that the state’s actions upon the population are exerted with territorial techniques in pursuit of the double goal of surveillance and accumulation – and these techniques are inflected by the campaign style. The territorial logic of the state marks the spatial mechanism of power microphysics in a certain historical bloc. It shows how space is “fundamental to the exercise of power” (Harvey 2009, 161), a point Foucault overlooks because he downplays both space and the state (Foucault 2000b, 220-21). Using this framework, we can go further and examine which are the dominant agency and specific agents in reorganising the (state) space, in introducing both the presence and control of the state, in implementing surveillance in even the most far-flung corners and in promoting state-led and urban-oriented accumulation strategy. In addition, we can also recognise how and how far the socialist relations of power and production are being reproduced in an urban way, supported by various territorial and scalar techniques. I want now to examine the framework empirically with observations from two field sites, where the crowning of “land kings” reveals vividly complementary spatio-temporalities of the territory in urbanising China, rendering the territorial logic of the state intensified and visible.

6.3 Crowning “land kings” in Sunhe and Dahongmen

Sunhe and Dahongmen, as my two field sites, have already been mentioned several times. This section focuses on their transformation since 2009, aiming to convey vividly both the extent of the urban metamorphosis and the fundamental role of the state in stimulating the process. As a township in the second green belt, Sunhe was involved in the BMG’s land business through the land reservation system (土地储备, tudi chubei), because “no policy has been proposed for the second green belt per se” (Interview with BMCUP Official on 1 August 2014). It was the advent of the financial crisis and a rescue package that permitted the expansion of land reserves and legitimised the exceptional treatment
of land in Sunhe. Dahongmen, the other fieldwork site, lies in the first green belt. Despite being a pilot unit for the No.7 policy scheme (BMG 1994) of building the green belt through property development, it managed to give only a “dirty, messy and disappointing” impression for nearly two decades up to 2009, when it was included in the “key village” project. Apart from being the objects of two different policy schemes, the outcomes of land projects in these two places are distinct. Sunhe transformed its original landscapes instantly and then witnessed the successful crowning of a “land king” (i.e., one of the most expensive land plots in Beijing), while Dahongmen has still not contributed any land revenue to the BMG, even though most of its villagers were relocated several years ago. Here I trace the two processes in more detail to further examine empirically the territorial logic of the state.

On 15 July 2009, the demolition work began in Sunhe Township, after the flow of 100 billion Yuan obtained by the BMG through its land reservation centre. Most of this sum was spent in Chaoyang, Sunhe being one of the seven townships in this district that were affected (see Section 5.4). The very first step of such business was to demolish the original villages and vacate all the land plots associated with them. Sunhe as an entity at once melted into air: all 3,582 courtyards in its nine subordinate villages were removed, covering a total area of 1.65 million square metres; meanwhile, 364 non-residential constructions were also demolished as well, vacating another 1.96 million square metres (STG 2015). A township official estimated that they had to pay around 9,500 Yuan per square metre for demolishing the courtyards and 2,000 Yuan for the non-residential constructions (Interview with Sunhe township official, 21 November 2014). The total costs of compensation and relocation were about 20 billion Yuan, all covered by the 100-billion-Yuan bank loan (Interview with BMBLR official, 30 October 2014). Here, the role of the Beijing Land Consolidation and Reservation Centre also becomes apparent. This is an institution affiliated with BMBLR; as agent of the BMG in operating bank loans for land projects, it also monopolises the primary exploitation of plots of land for construction – that is, the construction of urban infrastructure for newly vacated land plots and the preparation of these for transactions. This centre is also responsible for drafting and submitting application documents to other departments of the BMG to fulfill

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50 Sunhe Township had 14 subordinate villages; nine of these were involved in the land project in 2009 and the other five were awaiting the start of demolition and relocation work, according to an interview given on 21 November 2014.
the legal requirements in the process of land expropriation. After such preparations, the land plots in Sunhe were soon ready for transactions (ibid.).

BMCUP and its detailed urban plan were also involved in this story. The point is made earlier (see Chapter 4) that urban planning as a spatial science plays a pivotal role in projecting the state-dominated abstraction onto the inhabited space (Lefebvre 1991). In the Sunhe case, such a role vividly manifests itself, as admitted by a planning official:

We [the Chaoyang Branch of the BMCUP] have done a lot for the “Sunhe Land Group” (孙河组团, Sunhe zutuan). We had plenty to do in proposing, reviewing and approving its detailed urban plan. In this plan, we clearly determined its positioning (in the property market) and the operating strategy to maximise land revenues. We also organised international bidding for the conceptual plan of the land group, which attracted quite a big crowd of property developers, consulting firms and design studios. In their proposals, not only the built environment *per se* was examined, but also their vision of this whole area, as well as the financial details of various property development projects. We are a principal coordinator in all such work and lay the foundation for its success. (Interview with BMCUP official, 13 December 2014; see Figure 6.1)
The winning conceptual plan was produced by Longfor Properties (龙湖地产), a leading property developer in China, together with Woods Bagot, a Perth and London-based architectural studio. It is mainly because of this win that Longfor proactively bid for the very first land plot in Sunhe Land Group, since they were clear about the future vision of the area and confident of making a profit even though the price of the land was high and the urban infrastructure was imperfect (Interview with BMCUP official, 13 December 2014). With just some minor revisions to the plan drafted by Longfor and Woods Bagot, Sunhe Land Group was given the ecological and environmental-friendly status of “township style” (小镇风格, xiaozhen fengge) in its officially-confirmed regulatory detailed plan. It has a high ratio of green space and very low density, both fitting the developers’ need to build villas (Interview with BMCUP official, 13 December 2014; see Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2 The official detailed plan of Sunhe Land Group

Source: BAUPD (2011). Notes: (1) both the shape and the area of the central water space have been revised from the winning conceptual plan in Figure 6.1; (2) the letter marked on each land plot is also the one used in the land auctions since 2012 (see Table 6.1 below for details).

The detailed plan of Sunhe Land Group was finalised in 2011 and was followed by further guidelines in the urban design for Sunhe at the micro level. The latter were proposed by the BMCUP to implement its “fine management” (精细化管理, jingxihua guanli) of this area, via the regulation of such issues as public space, open space, building heights, façades and the skyline of the “land group” (Interview with BMBLR official, 30 October 2014). Both the guidelines and detailed plan were approved by the BMG in the second half of 2011; and the basic urban infrastructure necessary for its property projects were finished at about the same time. This means that the primary exploitation of land resources here was drawing to an end: it concluded by making the final land transactions in the open market (ibid.). Achieving deals is important, since all the money that had been spent – such as that for compensating and relocating villagers, and for building infrastructure – had been supported by bank loans and would need to be repaid in two or three years (ibid). Sunhe Land Group started to generate revenue little more than three
years after the demolition. On 26 September 2012, its first land plot was leased to Longfor Properties, which paid a total of 1.47 billion Yuan, an average cost of 20,158 Yuan per square metre. It was followed by four other plots leased in 2013, the prices of which all averaged above 20,000 Yuan per square metre. Another two land plots were leased out in 2015, marking a considerable rise in the average price – it reached 52,000 Yuan per square metre by September 2015 (nearly 2.5 times the average in 2013) (Sohu News 2015, Song and Kong 2015; for details, see Table 7.1).

From 2012 to 2015, the BMG and the district government managed to recover most of what they had spent on the land projects in Sunhe (17.82 billion Yuan, out of around 20 billion) by leasing out slightly less than 50% of the land plots to property developers. This means that all the other plots (more than half) can bring the state a net profit once their transactions are concluded. The prospect of profiting from land plots in Sunhe is promising, not only because of the rapid increase in land prices (see Table 6.1), but also because of the area’s reputation in the city’s property market after crowning some “land kings.” Plot H/I/J stood out as the first “land king” here (see Figure 6.2). It was crowned with an average price reaching 48,444 Yuan per square metre in 2013 at a time when the average price of housing in Beijing was only 38,212 Yuan (Fang.com 2013). The China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), a state-owned firm with a wide business scope (including property development), was “master” of this “crowning ceremony” for the “land king” (Netease.com 2013). This transaction was followed by a two-year-long downturn of the land and property market in Beijing (Interview on 13 December 2014). On 2 September 2015, however, when the market had recovered, Plots C, D and E in Sunhe Land Group (see Figure 6.2) were leased out at an average price of 53,830 Yuan per square metre and a total price of 6.48 billion Yuan. The numbers not only indicated a 167% increase of land price in Sunhe from 2012 to 2015 but also crowned a new “land king,” with a price that was among the top three in the history of the Beijing land market (Song and Kong 2015). It should be noted that this plot was also leased to SOEs. The Beijing Capital Development Co., Ltd (Shokai), a BMG-owned property developer, was joined by the China Poly Group (Poly) – another SOE, founded by the People’s Liberation Army (hereafter PLA) (Poly 2015).
### Table 6.1 A list of land transactions in Sunhe Land Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transaction Date</th>
<th>Plot Code</th>
<th>Plot Area</th>
<th>Plot FAR</th>
<th>Revenues (Yuan)</th>
<th>Ave. price (Yuan/m²)</th>
<th>Property Developer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 Sep 2012</td>
<td>Plot A</td>
<td>6.71 ha</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.47 billion</td>
<td>20,158</td>
<td>Longfor (龙湖)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jan 2013</td>
<td>Plot W</td>
<td>6.02 ha</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.85 billion</td>
<td>29,469</td>
<td>Thaihot (泰禾)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Feb 2013</td>
<td>Plot F</td>
<td>2.92 ha</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.06 billion</td>
<td>25,980</td>
<td>Shokai (首开)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Feb 2013</td>
<td>Plot G</td>
<td>4.57 ha</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.66 billion</td>
<td>26,357</td>
<td>Shokai (首开)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Jul 2013</td>
<td>Plots H/I/J</td>
<td>6.97 ha</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.69 billion</td>
<td>48,444</td>
<td>COFCO (中粮)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Sep 2015</td>
<td>Plots C/D/E</td>
<td>9.52 ha</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.48 billion</td>
<td>53,830</td>
<td>Poly &amp; Shokai (保利+首开)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 Sep 2015</td>
<td>Plot K</td>
<td>6.85 ha</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.9 billion</td>
<td>52,600</td>
<td>Maoyuan (懋源)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** (1) the data on auction time, plot code, revenues, average price and property developers are from Song and Kong (2015), except for those of Plot K, which are extracted from Sohu News (2015); (2) the data on plot area and plot FAR are from the detailed plan of Sunhe Land Group (BAUPD 2011).

**Notes:** (1) the code for each plot, marked in Figure6.2, clarifies the locations and spatial configurations of these land plots as well as the whole land group. (2) The *plot area* listed here refers only to the area of land that is available for running property development, although there are also other land plots that property developers (have to) buy as a part of the state’s conditions in concluding land transactions. (3) The “*plot FAR*” is the floor-area ratio for a land plot, which is crucial in determining what kinds of house can be built; and it is clear that plots in Sunhe are endowed with a very low FAR, which is only suitable for building villas and other low-density (luxury) houses. (4) The column headed “*revenues*” illustrates the total amount earned by the state in each transaction, where the number is often higher than the official statistics for the reason narrated in Note 2, above. For example, Maoyuan paid 2.94 billion for plot K in Sunhe; however, it had to pay another 0.96 billion at the same time so that the state could erect social housing somewhere else, which is recognized as part of the package (Sohu News 2015). (5) “*Average price*” in the above table indicates the average land price (per square metre) of the construction area (楼面地价, *loumian dijia*) paid by developers; it is calculated by dividing the total leasing fees by the total construction area of the final products (houses) in square metres.

SOEs also played a key role but of an opposite kind in the land stories of Dahongmen, my other observation site. Instead of crowning “land kings,” they ended by preventing the state from earning any land revenue at all, through a quite complex historical-geographical interaction:

The land in Dahongmen, as we just described, has a messy layout and a complex pattern of ownerships. Because its location was remote several decades ago, a lot
of small-scale SOEs and work units (国有单位, guoyou danwei) were allocated there. The land plots that they occupied were expropriated by the state, but those surrounding them were still collectively-owned rural land. The master urban plan did not cover such villages as Dahongmen in the rural-urban continuum until very recently and this is why I say its layout was messy. Now, this village has been included in the “key village project,” because we are really eager to occupy more land plots and increase our land revenues; but those SOEs and Danwei units have turned into obstacles, since we cannot remove or relocate them. (Interview with BMCUP official on 27 November 2014)

When showing the articulation between green belts and the rural-urban continuum in Chapter 4, we discussed the influence on Dahongmen of both the ambition to be a modern/urban locality and the need to safeguard the security/surveillance concerns of the municipal government in the mid-1990s. After the order issued by the then Prime Minister, residential compounds accommodating migrant workers were demolished in 1995, which led to the appearance of “bombed-out remnants of a war zone” (Zhang 2001b, 1). But the above quotation indicates that other parts of Dahongmen, especially the land plots occupied by SOEs (a socialist legacy), were not touched in the 1995 battle and have become barriers obstructing BMG’s “key village project” since 2010.

We can understand this process better by analysing the sequence of three detailed plans since the 1990s. As a pilot unit of the No.7 policy scheme, Dahongmen produced its first detailed plan in 1996, together with the Fengtai Branch of the BMCUP, in which the principles of constructing the first green belt were incorporated (BMCUP 1996). This has never developed beyond a paper exercise, because it ignores local conditions that are critical in practice (Interview with Dahongmen cadre, 12 December 2014). It is for this reason that the second detailed plan was hammered out in 2000 in the midst of the fierce battle to host the “Green Olympics” (see Chapter 5). On 14 July 2000, the BMCUP approved this plan and stipulated such details as the area of land for each function, the floor-area-ratio of the relocated community and the total construction area (BMCUP 2000a). With this plan, Dahongmen Village Collective (hereafter DVC) built a community of commodity houses (to sell) in the early 2000s, in order to earn enough money to demolish the original village and to relocate its villagers – as the pre-condition for the land business of the BMG. However, the state policies on land transactions and
relocating villagers were revised in 2004. “Our cost-benefit analysis was carried out in advance by following the previous policies and hence the revenues were no longer enough to cover the costs after these policy changes,” a cadre from the village collective told me, “and this is the reason why the second plan could not be continued after 2004” (Interview on 6 August 2015).

The demolition and relocation works were restored in 2010, the year when the BMG proposed its new land project packages in the “key villages.” As discussed in Chapter 5, such a scheme is remarkable for its capacity to serve as a zoning technology – state policies were filtered and selectively applied to conform to a village’s condition – under the scheme of “one village, one policy.” Dahongmen benefited considerably from its exceptionalities:

Mr Liu Qi, then Party Sectary of Beijing (No.1 leader), told us to hunt for loophole in the official documents and policies. “You are allowed to use any of those loopholes as long as they can solve your problems,” this was a direct instruction from him. In other words, we were now able to seek special treatment if we dealt with the obstacles that had once been too hard to overcome. We can formulate our own policy, though it is monitored by the district government; we have to negotiate with each other on detail. (Interview with Dahongmen cadre, 12 December 2014).

Four months after the BMG’s official launch of its land project in these “key villages,” on 1 July 2010, the latest detailed plan of Dahongmen was approved by the BMCUP (2010a). In this plan, the green space was reduced from 152.75 hectares (in the 2000 plan) to 92.3 hectares, which is a vivid reminder of the exceptional treatment for a village in the green belt (making more space for running their land business). Motivated by these exceptionalities, the DVC managed to relocate its villagers swiftly. “It started on 1 August 2010,” a villager told me, “and it was advancing fast. By 20 September, which was said to be the last day of the preferential period, around 95% of all villagers who had local rural hukou had signed agreements with the village collective and moved out” (Interview with a Dahongmen villager on 31 July 2015). The collective could do nothing to local people having urban hukou, however. The presence of urban residents in this village is, as shown above, a residue of the socialist past. For more than half a century,
the SOEs and state-owned units had expanded their territories not only for industrial production but also for housing staff and workers in the same place; this was indeed a normal arrangement in the socialist era as part of the welfare provision from the state (see, for example, Lu 2006). While some SOEs collapsed in the 1990s, there were still some units, affiliated to the PLA, the municipal, or central government departments, which remained in this area (Interviews with Dahongmen residents, 31 July and 6 August 2015). Most former employees of these units are still living in the state-owned houses allocated to them decades ago. This is, literally, a socialist legacy (see Figure 6.3).

**Figure 6.3** The complex pattern of land ownerships in Dahongmen (partial view)

*Source: BAUPD (2015). Notes: (1) this map is a screenshot of the online map, the electronic version of which cannot be downloaded or exported; the screenshot was produced with the permission of a BMCUP official; (2) the map covers a part of Dahongmen Village and is a representative illustration of the global situation in this part of the country; (3) land plots within yellow ovals are collectively owned rural land; plots marked by green stars are state-owned urban land – the boundary is obscure.*

The challenge faced by the DVC is two-fold: it has to deal with the *danwei* units on the one hand and to negotiate with local residents who have urban *hukou* and live in the *danwei* dormitories on the other. Neither aspect had been resolved by the end of my fieldwork, because these units are more powerful in the present bureaucracy and even the BMG can do little in the negotiations (Interview with BMCUP officials, 27 November and 8 December 2014). In addition, the compensation standard set for the
urban residents was much lower than that for the villagers: only the latter qualify for membership of this village collective and can share the benefits from the urbanisation project. Many urban residents are hence making themselves “nail households,” a term explained at the outset of this thesis (for more details, see Chapter 7). By the end of June 2013, according to a report from the DVC (2013), only 129 urban households out of 784 had signed the agreements on demolition and relocation.

This is a huge obstacle to DVC because their houses are all integral to land plots that are planned for transactions. The BMG lays down that a land plot cannot be listed on the land market until its original residents are all entirely relocated (Interview with BMCUP official, 1 August 2014). Yet, in Dahongmen, the deadline for repaying bank loans (5.3 billion Yuan) was approaching – and no land revenue could be generated at all if urban residents went on refusing to be relocated (DVC 2013). For this reason, the DVC appealed once again to the “one village, one policy” scheme and suggested that land plots prepared for other purposes – such as urban infrastructure and the green belt – could be leased out first since they could be made up for later by plots that, it was hoped, were no longer occupied by urban households (ibid.) (see Figure 6.4). This is a breach of the detailed plan, yet the negotiations finished smoothly. In December 2014, the BMCUP agreed to exchange two plots of green space by another two that were occupied by “nail households,” allowing the lease of these “clean” plots first (Interview with DVC cadre, 29 December 2014).
DVC’s land ambitions were further intensified in 2015 when its three neighbourhood villages crowned three “land kings” in a row in less than two months. In the afternoon of 31 August, one land plot in Shiliuzhuang Village was leased out at a total price of 5.025 billion Yuan, whose average price was 60,000 Yuan per square metre (Wang 2015b). This village is just one kilometre east of Dahongmen, with a less attractive location than the latter, but it finished the demolition and relocation works and concluded the land transaction by the highest average price ever. Two months later, on 30 October 2015, plot A in the Huaifang-Xingong Land Group was leased out at a total price of 8.595 billion Yuan; then, on 2 November 2015, plot B in the same cluster was rented at a cost of 8.34 billion Yuan. Huaifang and Xingong are two other villages next to Dahongmen, but located less favourably, as Shiliuzhuang is; yet these two land plots have maintained ever since their position as the second and third most expensive land plots in the land market of Beijing (Chen 2016, Lei 2015). These land plots in Dahongmen seem likely to
bring in even more revenue than the newly crowned “land kings” – as long as their socialist legacy can be successfully removed. In the summer of 2016, however, when I last went through Dahongmen, this had not happened.

Crowning the “land kings” is a complex process that must be pursued by the simultaneous action of various state agents, including the land reservation agency, urban planning authority, socialist landlords, township governments and village collectives. This is the first impression we gain from the land stories in Sunhe and Dahongmen. I next look at the power dynamics between the state agents, to understand how and how far they are all included in the encompassing territorial logic of the state. Section 6.4 focuses on the internal power dynamics between municipal departments, which is most vividly revealed through various meetings where land businesses are prepared and manoeuvred; Section 6.5 mainly considers the scalar agency of township governments and village collectives, through which a new governmental technique is invented which I designate “surveillance by accumulation.”

6.4 Spatialised authorities in the urban moment

The task of this section concerns how and how far the practices of surveillance and accumulation are accomplished through territorial techniques, which themselves are regulated by a new ideology of cohesion towards the (spatialised) charismatic authority. By using the term spatialised, I am not claiming that the role of the BMCUP in the urban governance occupies the foreground; instead, what I want to illustrate is that the Party-state regime restructures its agency and agents in a spatial way, letting BMCUP and its activities – such as setting up the urban plan, boosting land revenues and giving spatial permission whenever it is needed to remove the socialist past – occupy only a fraction of the whole process. Indeed, what emerges is the state’s urban-oriented territorial logic: with a new ideology that aims to sustain its legitimacy by dominating and commercialising the urban space, the state deploys a campaign-style governance via various “joint meetings.” On the one hand, in so doing it consequently overlooks the routine needs of the bureaucracy, while on the other it coordinates these state agents around the identical rationale. These meetings also have theoretical meaning in the sense that they vividly reveal the processes through which the state “contributes actively to the
production or reproduction of social relations” (Lefebvre 1976, 56); they hence enable us
to examine the microphysics of the state’s conduct in a way that transcends a single
institutionalising/institutionalised bureaucracy.

There are three kinds of meeting that may be recognised as nodal points in the state’s
process of producing its landed ecology – in particular, for crowning the “land kings” in
Sunhe and Dahongmen. These three kinds are: “land reservation joint meetings” (土地联
席会, tuchu lianxihui; LRJM), “green belt joint meetings” (绿隔大会, lvge dahui; GBJM) and
“land reservation cost review meetings” (土地成本联审会, tuchu chengben lianshenhui; or LRCRJM). Sunhe, for example, was involved in the state’s land business
through the first kind, LRJM, which is convened by BMBLR. Its aim is to jointly (with
all related municipal departments) examine and approve the detailed plan of each land
reservation project (Interview with BMBLR official, 30 October 2014). The background
of the Sunhe land project is the 4-trillion-Yuan rescue package initiated in 2009, a
BMBLR official told me: “Sunhe was part of the Wenyu River Ecological Corridor but
had not been properly developed. They made demands [to be developed] and then the
rescue package arrived just in time” (Interview on 30 October 2014). Furthermore, “such
land projects for the rescue package are eligible for special treatment and for ‘all-in-one
approval services.’ In this way, 70% of all the projects proposed by Chaoyang District
were pre-approved by June 2009, with 100 billion Yuan already in place” (Chen 2009).

How is such special treatment put into practice? Further examination reveals that the land
reservation joint meeting plays a pivotal role in coordinating the state agents and their
interactions:

BMCUP delineated some land groups in that area and Sunhe, in the best location,
was one of the biggest. Endorsed by the planning department, this project was
also the soonest implemented. Its primary exploitation started in 2009, initiated
in a land reservation joint meeting (LRJM) presided over by a deputy mayor.
After its approval, it was the land consolidation and reservation centre (BLCRC)
that proposed the construction plan (for its demolition) and the land supply plan
(for the transaction) and collaborated with the township government to demolish
buildings that were within the delineated area. The project was concluded by
supplying land through a trading platform affiliated to the BLCRC (Interview with BMBLR official, 30 October 2014).

Our demolition here is negotiation-based, which means negotiations between the township government and its subordinate village collectives. Demolition can be initiated when both agree that it is [a] proper [business]. We do not have a permit for demolition. (Me: Why not?) It is too laborious and much more expensive to go through that legal procedure. Since it is a land reservation matter, we can enjoy some exceptionalities [e.g. to be able to demolish without legal documents] (Interview with Sunhe township official, 21 November 2014).

Such information indicates clearly how it became possible to completely demolish Sunhe in only nine months after the State Council issued its 4-trillion-Yuan rescue package (on 5 November 2008). Two inferences can be drawn from this Sunhe story. On the one hand, in the new urban-oriented politico-economic conditions the regime inherits the campaign-style governance and political mobilisation. All the episodes of the land story in Sunhe, from the central proposal of a rescue package to the municipal meeting for land reservation and the local practice of demolition, are outside the normal administrative procedures and are highlighted as different exceptionalities. In this way, the abnormal becomes a new normal and the extraordinary a new ordinary – just as they did in the Maoist era. On the other hand, the exceptionalities are all directed not to a communist utopia but to the land business, in an era when the urban metamorphosis has been rewriting the ethos of the party and its regime. The ultimate goal of the party is to consolidate authority by working miracles in and through urban space. In Sunhe, these miracles have been confirmed in the successful crowning of numerous “land kings” (see Table 6.1 in Section 6.3), and are in fact endorsed by such territorial techniques as the delineation of the land groups and the permission to demolish original communities without legal sanction.

The land story in Dahongmen has long been articulated with the green belt issue since it was already one of the pilot units in the 1990s. In drafting its three detailed plans (see Section 6.3), the role of green belt joint meetings (GBJM) looms large. These meetings are convened by the BMCUP and irregularly bring together municipal departments, with bureaus such as those for land resources, finance, development and reform,
environmental protection, transportation, landscaping and afforestation. The aim is to examine and approve detailed plans of implementation units (township or village collective) for conducting green belt projects (Interview with a BAUDP planner on 24 October 2014 and with a BMCUP official on 24 November 2014). The starting point of the procedure was the detailed plan drawn up by the BAUDP; it ended at one such meeting, where it was approved and the approval signed by Chen Gang, then Deputy Mayor in charge of urban planning issues. This procedure is important not only because it is a legal requirement but also because a detailed plan signed by the mayor can be turned into a “planning permit” for localities (see Figure 6.5):

![Figure 6.5 The planning permit for Dahongmen village](source: photo by author with permission, 12 December 2014; originally from the BMCUP (2010a)).

This permit is essential. It is common sense that ordinary people or companies need security when they apply for a bank loan. But those villages in the green belt area have nothing valuable enough to be used as a security pledge – even their land plots have yet to be demolished for exploitation. This is where the planning permit can be used: it is recognised by banks as a kind of valid pledge, which assures a bank loan for the village and hence allows the work of demolition and relocation to begin (Interview with BMCUP official, 24 November 2014)
Besides its role as a valid pledge, this planning permit also means official endorsement of the locality’s property business:

A primary concern of the planning permit is to supply quotas to the locality for building houses for relocation. Quotas are calculated with their population data, actually a simple question of arithmetic. The per capita quota of relocation houses is regulated by the No.20 policy scheme (50 square metres per person), while the floor-area ratio (FAR) has to be lower than 2.8, which is another legal norm. Using these data on population and FAR, we can calculate the area of construction land that is required to relocate all the villagers […] The remaining land in this village will then be expropriated by the state (for land business) or will be turned into green space with the collective ownership untouched. (Interview with BMCUP official, 27 November 2014)

In Dahongmen, which was included in the “key village project” in 2010, this planning permit was issued without any formalities by the green belt joint meeting (GBJM):

As a “key village,” Dahongmen did not follow the standard procedure of “one village, one policy.” It obtained a planning permit by going directly to the green belt joint meeting; after this meeting, the permit was signed by the deputy mayor and was valid for its use. This is a special treatment for key villages and it can facilitate the whole project with extraordinary speed. (Interview with BMCUP official, 22 December 2014)

It seems that the BMCUP and its agents become the de facto spatial coordinators for the state’s land business. But this is only a partial truth. “In these projects, we planners can play a very limited role,” an official of BMCUP complained to me, “for the final programme is only an outcome of the competition between different interest groups. We can only draw maps based on this outcome, and cannot exert even the slightest influence on the process or any of its component parts. As for the green belt joint meeting, it is hardly more than a frill because we are not able to veto any plan at all” (Interview on 27 November 2014). Here we see an inherent contradiction between on the one hand the planners’ search for coherence and homogeneity, after a rationale of keeping things identical and repetitive, and, on the other, the politico-economic process between other
state agents, who are also engaged in the land business and who are responding to the call from the principals (such as the Party secretary) for exceptionalities. This contradiction is vividly revealed in Dahongmen. In the previous section it was shown how Liu Qi, then Party Sectary of Beijing, publicly encouraged cadres in Dahongmen to hunt for loopholes in the official documents and policies to solve their local problems. In the end:

All they (the cadres in Dahongmen) care about is to improve the floor-area ratio and to ask for more land plots. They always claim that if we do not revise the detailed plan and give more quotas, then their accounts cannot be balanced. We did make plenty of revisions for them, which only resulted in more construction land and less green space. Even so, their account is still not balanced. (Interview with planner in BAUPD, 24 October 2014)

The planners’ difficulties are intensified in their interactions with other municipal departments and, ultimately, the leading cadres of the BMG.

For us, the land reservation centre is really annoying. They often got into a situation where the scale of their demolition was so huge they could not get enough funding to repay their bank loans on time. Their next step was to visit us and ask for the detailed plan to be revised. We had no choice but to do what they asked since the stability of municipal financial situation hinges on it. They are indeed more evil than village collectives. (Interview with BAUPD planner on 25 November 2014)

Moreover, a planning official informed me that they faced even more challenges in their daily work. The ‘key village project’ offered so many privileges that other villages in the green belt area which were not included as key villages were all asking for equal treatment. Even those which had finished their greening work were also coming to ask for preferential policies (Interview with BMCUP official, 27 November 2014). For this reason, a village official revealed, “I heard many departments of the BMG were not happy about Mr Liu Qi and his ‘key village project.’ They said such projects destroyed normal arrangements for both the green belt project and the ODHRP” (Interview with a
cadre at Dahongmen, 12 December 2014). In this way, some planners ended up with a feeling of nihilism:

Obeying leading cadres, doing what we are required to do – as long as they are lawful and will not entrap us in mistakes. This is all we worry about. You can imagine us as a pair of hands that is attached to a body. We do not have our own head; we do not need to think about problems; we do not need to have or express any preference. If, unfortunately, you want to preserve your own head, you want to object to the will of leaders, then you will find your ideas result in nothing but headaches for you. (Interview with an official of BMCUP, 13 December 2014)

In light of such situation, it seems more proper to define planning officials and urban planners as a group of cartographers rather than as spatial coordinators for the state’s land business. The only obligation on them is to draw up, examine and approve the detailed urban plan which is already defined in advance by the dynamic urban political economy, in general, and by the principal’s will and the preferences of related interest groups, in particular. Planners do not have the power to veto; like “a pair of hands that is attached to a body” (ibid.), they do not have agency of their own. It is here that we can best see China’s “thriving planning” as depicted by Fulong Wu (2015), who suggests that “urban planning survived market-oriented reform and became the ‘phoenix rising from the ashes’” (ibid., 190). The discussion above imply that the growing role of urban planning has very little to do with the conduct of planners; it is inscribed into the urban-oriented territorial logic and induced by the consistent pressure of the charismatic authority to enable it to work the spatial miracles. In the case of Dahongmen, the agents without agency have a key role by figuring out specific territorial techniques (such as issuing planning permits as loan collaterals and issuing quotas for the property businesses of village collectives). Here, however, we are still not clear who dominates the body that BMCUP is attached to and where its agency lies.

These questions can be better answered by examining the third kind of joint meeting mentioned at the outset, namely, the land reservation cost review meeting (LRCRM). Indeed, both Dahongmen and Sunhe were affected by a meeting of this kind because it marks the ultimately important juncture in most of the state’s land projects after 2009. The major concern of such meetings is to examine all the costs involved in a single land
project for its primary exploitation (see Section 5.4) and to verify what items can be justified as project cost and what should be excluded (Interview with BMCUP official, 27 November 2014). Cost is the key term since it attaches to plenty of the social and spatial processes in the state’s land business:

The amount of money for initiating land projects is huge, with such issues as demolition compensation, building relocation houses, financial support for the collective-owned industries, expropriation fees, interest on bank loan and other financial costs – more than a dozen items in total. All of these are included as costs of primary exploitation and then become part of the price of the land plot. Total costs plus some profits – “making additions” (做加法, zuo jiafa) – these are the core concerns of land projects and they determine the starting prices at auctions in the open market. (Interview with BMCUP official, 24 November 2014)

Final profits (transaction premiums) are divided between the central (20%), the municipal (40%) and the district (40%) governments, leaving nothing for the localities whose land plots are expropriated (Interview with BMCUP official, 1 August 2014). For this reason, localities deploy various tactics to send in false accounts and increase the total cost to leave a margin which could be kept locally as their revenue (Interview with BMCUP official, 27 November 2014). In the end, the total cost of transforming a single village can reach more than 10 billion Yuan, equalling the annual fiscal revenue for the district (Interview with BMCUP official, 24 November 2014). This is the reason why mayors are not happy and require the Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform (BMCDR) to join the land reservation cost review meeting and monitor the total cost of every land project (Interview with BMCUP official, 27 November 2014). It is here, at this moment, that we can see the reign of spatialised authority – where the agency of the state manifests itself in its urban-oriented territorial logic.

To understand the “spatialised” authorities, we should go back to revisit the definition of the charismatic authority and the rupture of Deng’s reform and Mao’s utopia. It was discussed in Section 6.2 above that the CPC regime has to consistently work miracles to endorse its extraordinary charisma, on which its charismatic authority is founded. The deadly crises of Mao’s utopia, however, eliminated its revolutionary allure and hence forced the party leaders to identify alternative channels for working miracles to sustain
its authority. With modernist imagination, Deng Xiaoping (2004, 379-80) defined development as “the paramount political issue” in his pragmatic and de-politicised version of “socialism,” which in turn regulated the “performance-based legitimacy” (Yang and Zhao 2013) of the party and its regime. The issue of legitimacy occupies the centre of the party leaders’ mind and is practised via precisely the same method as in the Maoist era, that is, through a top-down decomposition of pressures on the principals at each level of the bureaucracy. However, before long, party leaders and the state agents had realised the tremendous exchange values inherent in the resource of urban land and they soon restructured the reference horizon and the coordinates of action – which defined the urban metamorphosis discussed in Chapter 2. It is here that the authorities are spatialised: pressure from the will of the central leaders to “develop” and the soaring land-based interests are articulated with each other in encouraging all principals at every level of the bureaucracy to produce urban space. This explains why the principals of the BMG are so concerned about their land revenues that they require the BMCDR to examine the total costs of every land project.

In a recent empirical study, some Chinese economists recognise a strong and positive correlation between urban land businesses and the career concerns of city leaders (Wang, Zhang, and Zhou 2016, 4-5), where “a one-standard-deviation increase in the leader’s career-concern intensity leads to 11 km extra outward urban expansion, which is a 41% increase relative to the sample average.” Such observations are of great value in figuring out the puzzle that has confused many planners: why did the then Party Sectary, Mr Liu Qi, encourage those village cadres to hunt for loopholes in official policies at the cost of violating planning regulations over and again? The answer to such a riddle lies in the spatialised authorities: a charismatic authority will “transform all values and break all traditional and rational norms” (Weber 1978, 1115) under the consistent pressure to work spatial miracles (i.e., land businesses) in the urban moment. What is at stake, accordingly, is not drawing up a beautiful urban master plan but to deploy all its agents and resources to serve the paramount political issue spatially. Therefore, urban planners are involved in land projects – but they can play only a limited role:

Perhaps it is improper to say that the BMCUP has been treated unfairly. They have indeed been spoiled by the BMG since they can play the role of a “contractor” of land and construction projects (包工头, baogong tou). In addition, they have
the professional skills in drawing maps and blueprints that the principals also need. As regards the BMCDR, it has been the biological son (亲儿子, qin erzi) of BMG since the 1950s, when it was called the “Beijing Municipal Commission of Planning” – it planned everything, from economic development to the location of a single factory; after all, that was in the era of the “planned economy.” (Interview with a professor in Urban Planning, 3 July 2015)

A critical point with which to wrap up the above discussion is that the state conducts itself less through formal institutions than in terms of endless state effects. In investigating the state, as Lefebvre (1976, 56) aptly reminds us, a single institutionalising or institutionalised bureaucracy has no meaning; instead, we should focus more on the concrete processes through which the state “contributes actively to the production or reproduction of social relations.” In the present case, the form of meetings has a critical role in practising the urban-oriented territorial logic of the state. As a socialist legacy – with its form inherited from the “collaborative site-selection” (see Wan 1994, 49-50) – it continues its original function of letting principals exert their will by ignoring the routine work arrangements of the bureaucracy while at the same time coordinating state agents around the very same rationale (i.e., the principal’s will). By means of these meetings, it is possible to motivate the whole bureaucracy to conduct extraordinary measures in a way that is incompatible with the latter’s rationale of the identical and repetitive. In the end, both the relation of domination and of production are reproduced in a dynamic urban political economy through the various territorial techniques discussed above – all of which are oriented around the land business of the state and conducted through various meetings as the nodal points. This is how the new territorial logic manifests itself with an unchanged form of conduct (i.e., meetings) in the newly born urban milieu of China.

6.5 The scalar agency of motivated localities

Township governments and village collectives – both of which are often referred to as localities (地方, difang) or grassroots (基层, jiceng) – also play a pivotal role in the urban-oriented territorial logic of the state. In an interview with an official in a street office next to Dahongmen, I was told about a metaphor that perfectly sums up their tasks: “a
thousand threads in only one needle” (上面千条线，下面一根针; shangmian qiantiao xian, xiamian yigen zhen) (Interview on 13 December 2014). As the only needle, localities are the specific executors to clear the ground for the state’s land business – which depends on demolishing the communities and relocating the local residents. This is a point that is not properly registered in Hsing’s (2010) framework, in which the role of village collectives as “the only needle” for the conduct of the state is mainly overlooked in order to foreground her arguments on “village corporatism” as a “relative territorial autonomy” and as a kind of “civic territoriality.” In this section, I will continue to discuss the observations from Sunhe and Dahongmen with regard to their scalar agencies – how and how far on the one hand they are paving the way for the state’s land projects and on the other incorporating their own interests in the state’s business. What I want to stress is that their actions (though seem to be “relatively autonomous” at first glance) are part and parcel of the territorial logic of the state in practice, where both the origin and sources of their scalar agencies lie.

The nature of localities as an agent of the state (and its territorial logic) is inscribed in Chinese social history, which is hence worth a brief revisit as the starting point. Since the 19th century, Prasenjit Duara claims (1988), there had been a state-making process which defined all Chinese regimes. Before that, the traditional socio-political structure of Chinese society was underlined by “intersections of the Imperial state and the agrarian economy” with the class of gentry (as literati and landlords) as buffer between them (Skocpol 1979, 72, see also Fei 1953). The rising state-making process, however, tried to turn the rural communities into a well-defined and solid territory that would contribute routine revenues directly to the state (Duara 1988). Archival research by historians reveals that as the state learned to extract revenues more efficiently, it did so at the cost of destroying the traditional socio-political structure (and the class of gentry in particular), labelled state involution by Duara (1988). When the process continued to the Maoist era, it was articulated with a process of “agricultural collectivisation” in order to deliver harvests that would support urban industrialisation (Kuhn 2002, 101-12) (see Section 4.3). After the great famine killed 36 million people, the socialist experiment was suspended and newly-born rural collectives (农村集体, nongcun jiti) were gradually formalised as local agents of the state: this is summarised by Philip Kuhn (ibid.) as “the bureaucratisation of rural collectives.”
Such a process of bureaucratisation, for Zhang Jing (2000), eliminates the consistency between local authorities and the interests of local society: the former is no longer empowered by the local social body (地方体, difang ti) but by upper-level state agents in the bureaucracy. For this reason, “the agency of grassroots collectives is deployed [more] to serve upper-level state agents than to consolidate the local political basis – this renders them, eventually, independent and authoritarian power groups” (ibid., 42). In other words, the conferring of power to rural collectives marks “a formalisation of the grassroots cadres’ vested interests rather than the empowerment of the local people” (ibid., 44). This is an unsatisfactory result of the state-making process, Zhang comments, which induces the separation between the (symbolic) state authority and the de facto operation of rural collectives on the one hand, and, on the other, increasing conflicts between the collectives and the villagers (ibid., 42-44). In the reform era ushered in by Deng Xiaoping, the vested interests of the grassroots cadres were consolidated through organisational and financial procedures: the establishment of (collective-owned) companies illustrates the former and the use and disposal of public assets (especially land) for personal benefits exemplifies the latter (ibid., 49-86). Both kinds of conduct, as we will see below, are significant in the local practices of land business in Sunhe and Dahongmen; they are not subject to remedies from the BMG but are instead deployed by this body as convenient techniques in paving the way for crowning “land kings.”

The rural collectives, as the single needle, clear the ground for the state’s land business through four interconnected moments, namely, demolition (拆迁, chaiqian), relocation (安置, anzhi), hukou upgrading (转居, zhuangju) and welfare provision (转工, zhuanggong). No matter which “project” or “meeting” was relied upon, every locality implicated in the territorial logic had its obligations and interests incorporated in these four moments. Sunhe and Dahongmen are no exception. Both the prompt demolition (with no legal documents) in Sunhe and the reluctant responses of local residents who had urban hukou in Dahongmen have already been introduced in earlier sections. Here I want to give some more details to illustrate the articulation between these local practices and the territorial logic of the state – in a way that is not bound to the sequence of command and obedience. Indeed, the first moment, demolition, is initiated not locally but in the meetings discussed above. While it is the BAUPD that drafts detailed local plans, such plans mainly draw on
the data and materials provided by the localities: “the village cadres want to ask for more quotas; they hence exaggerate their population by colluding with the superior bureaus of public security, which in turn are rewarded by flats in the relocation communities. We have no energy or responsibility to inspect the numbers; the only choice is to accept them” (Interview with BMCUP official, 27 November 2014).

In this way, the desires of localities are firmly linked with the territorial logic of the state through urban planners and the detailed planning. This marks the conjuncture where the scalar agency is activated and is to be deployed for the demolition moment. In Sunhe, the task of demolition was conducted by the demolition office of the township government, subordinate village collectives and various demolition companies (拆迁公司, chaiqian gongsì). Here, the staff of the demolition office were temporarily deployed from other departments of the township government and were supposed to collaborate with the village cadres to explain details of the compensation scheme (Interview with an official in Sunhe Township, 22 July 2015). In return, they were allowed to use 1.8% of the total budget for the demolition, about 18 million Yuan, to cover daily expenses. Yet, “the demolition office did not work well at that time. It relied too much on demolition companies and said very little to the villagers. This behaviour created misunderstandings and contradictions in the end” (ibid), for the so-called demolition companies, it turned out, were mainly hiring local rogues to lower the compensation fees for the villagers (Interview with a Sunhe villager on 22 July 2015; for details, see Chapter 7). The role of localities is vividly revealed here: to foreground the land businesses of the state, they became the coordinators of their own demolition and employed both legal and illegal measures to vacate the original communities.

Of course, “what makes [power] accepted,” as Foucault (2000e, 120) reminds us, “is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.” Therefore, relocation, the second moment, is more critical in clearing ground for land businesses. To “provide resettlement housing now becomes a precondition of demolition work and a villager becomes eligible to buy 50 square metres at a special price” (Interview with a BMCUP official on 1 August 2014). In Sunhe, the site of its resettlement community was chosen in 2009, around the same time as the original
communities were being demolished. Buildings were constructed step by step and were completely finished in 2013 (Interview with BMBLR official, 30 October 2014). These houses bore certificates of title in the category of “affordable housing,” which means that they can be sold by villagers five years later, when the villagers had made up the payment of their land use fees (3% of the total price) (Interview with an official in BMCUP, 13 December 2014). It is equally important to note that these resettlement communities were mostly constructed by the localities themselves:

It is a requirement that these communities should only be built by development companies that are affiliated to local collectives. Their construction can be contracted out, but the collective-owned companies must coordinate all the related activities. This is because we are worried that property developers from elsewhere may in the end be unwilling to allocate houses to villagers and it is hard for us to monitor the procedure. (Interview with BMCUP official, 13 December 2014)

In Dahongmen, its village collective was restructured into an investment management company called Jiahe Jiuyuan (嘉合久源) since all the villagers there had been upgraded to urban hukou. A branch of Jiahe Jiuyuan, named Xinhonghai (新鸿海), was its property development agent. This company was in charge of the construction work for rehousing the Dahongmen villagers and all of its operation costs were covered by land reservation investments (2% of the total amount) (Interview with Dahongmen cadre on 12 December 2014). In Sunhe, similarly, the developer of its resettlement community was the Sunhe Corporation of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (SCAIC), the economic agent of the township government; and the specific work was all contracted to a private company, whose boss was known to have paid more than 53 million Yuan bribes to the then Party Secretary of Sunhe for these business opportunities (Wang 2016). All the related costs, such as the compensation fees for villagers, construction costs for resettlement buildings, operating costs of collective-owned companies, profits of developers and various contractors, are calculated into the starting price at land auctions (interview with BMCUP official, 24 November 2014). Bribes paid to officials were indeed extra costs that would eventually be passed on to the project budget and it is not improper to say that these bribes also contributed to the soaring land prices in Beijing.
Stories of this kind provide specific examples of the way in which the localities manage their obligation to clear the ground for the state as a business opportunity for themselves. Their tactics are not limited to constructing relocation communities per se, but are diffused through nearly every action by the local bodies. This can be further illustrated by the third and the fourth moments, namely, hukou upgrading and welfare provision. The BMG’s (2004) regulations required that those who expropriated land for construction projects should also be responsible for settling issues of relocation and placement. However, the land reservation centre was neither willing nor able to finish such tasks and hence the burdens all devolved on the local bodies (Interview with Sunhe official on 21 November 2014 and with a DVC cadre on 12 December 2014). After relocating villagers to resettlement communities (see the second moment), the next step is always to place them – socially and occupationally – in a better position. On the one hand, the hukou status is upgraded from rural to urban, which means that they can start to enjoy urban (privileged) social welfare. On the other, since the means of production (i.e., arable land) has been expropriated for other uses, villagers are subject to a change of occupation. The two measures require ample investments from the locality: hukou upgrading needs a lump sum make-up payment of social welfare fees for the villagers who were not entitled to grade before; and new occupations were in the end replaced by giving monthly allowances to the villagers. The money needed for both tasks would have to be covered by the localities:

We only received fees of 400,000 Yuan per mu (亩) in compensation for arable land expropriation, but it was all spent on upgrading the hukou status of villagers. In the end we got nothing. (Interview with cadre in Dahongmen, 12 December 2014)

In 2013-2014, the payment of social welfare fees and monthly allowances amounted to 350,000 Yuan for each individual who could work; paying the pensions of the elderly brought this amount to 700,000 Yuan; and allowances for the sick or disabled reached up to 1.77 million Yuan per person. (Sunhe Township Government 2014)
This provides, however, more a window into the business empires of the local authorities than a eulogy of their care for local people’s welfare. The point is that the connection between businesses and welfare is erected through land. To ensure that localities can take charge – so as to maintain social stability – the BMG permitted the allocation of 50 square metres of “industrial land” to each individual who had the ability to work and authorised each locality to operate autonomous businesses there. The size of the labour force in Sunhe (with local rural hukou) was about 12,000 and it hence gained a quota of 600,000 square metres in its property businesses (Interview with a Sunhe official, 24 December 2014). “With this quota, we plan to run projects by using bank loans or by collaborating with other property developers. We can obtain regular rents from the daily operation of these projects and then use the revenues to provide welfare for villagers” (ibid.). Two specific projects were then thought up: one was called “Sunhe Big Mall,” on five hectares of land, and aiming to erect commercial estates of 100,000 square metres; the other was called the “Sunhe International Business Park,” covering 43 hectares in total, with 500,000 square metres of high-end office buildings (STG 2015) (see Figure 6.6).

Figure 6.6 The conceptual plan of Sunhe International Business Park

Source: BAUPD (2014b).
Detailed plans of these projects had been examined carefully by the BMCUP. By the time of my interview in 2014, the BMCUP was waiting for further details from Sunhe Township Government on its business proposal (and a list of potential partners), so as to determine the final regulations on plot area and floor-area ratio: “it must be a feasible business proposal; otherwise the spatial plan cannot be permitted” (Interview with a BMCUP official, 13 December 2014). This is where the planner’s role as a cartographer is once again revealed – deeply rooted in both the urban political economy and scalar dynamics. We can also see better the manoeuvring of the localities, which are in fact drawing on an imaginary patron-client network (i.e., playing the role as a client for the villagers, who run businesses, create revenue and provide welfare) to consolidate their own authoritarian power for property businesses. In the end, “these collectives are turned into land and property development companies which could never go bankrupt, because all the benefits are maintained as their own, while the losses and risks are borne by the BMG, in the name of protecting farmers’ interests” (Interview with a BAUPD planner, 19 September 2014).

The land business of Dahongmen Village Collective operates with similar concerns, though in a different, more marketised, form. While Sunhe is running a land business of its own – to seek partners, apply for bank loans and draft conceptual and detailed plans – labelled “self-building” (自建, zijian) style, Dahongmen adopts the style of “returned-building” (还建, huanjian). Simply put, all they need do is to clear the ground and wait for the conclusion of land transactions: “if a property developer succeeds in the bidding process, then it has to return one out of, say, every three land plots to the village collective. Put another way, it has to pay lease fees for all those land plots, but at the same time return one of them to DVC without charge – this is a condition set up in advance and companies have to accept it if they want to take part in the bidding process” (Interview with BMCUP officials, 8 December 2014). Localities and their property businesses are endorsed by the BMG in a “marketised” way, which tells us how and how far their scalar agencies are inscribed as part and parcel of the state’s urban-oriented territorial logic.

The manoeuvring described above is what Hsing (2010) calls “village corporatism,” which is for her a “self-initiated strategy against a local state’s land appropriation” (ibid., 143). This view, however, has to be critically reflected upon, if not refuted, because it
goes against the evidence in Sunhe and Dahongmen. As active executors of the territorial logic of the state (“the only needle”), the localities are playing a key role in mediating the surveillance of the state “in the most isolated corners” (Lefebvre 2003a, 86). In this dynamic urban milieu, a new governmental technique emerges, which could be called *surveillance by accumulation*. This technique starts with the localities’ role as agents of the state, who have obligation to take part in demolition and relocation so as to keep “social stability.” To enable their delivery of the (limited) social welfare, BMG allocates resources and exceptional forms of treatment (land quotas in particular) to localities; the latter hence consolidate their scalar agencies and meanwhile acquire a sturdy institutional foundation on which to establish their own business empires. In the name of villagers’ interests, the territorial logic of the state is consolidated. It is a population-oriented and territory-based technique, which shows clearly how space is “fundamental to the exercise of power” (cf. Harvey 2009, 161). In addition, we see that scalar relations are by nature a territorial mirror of the dynamic political economy, as Cartier (2011a) aptly recalls. The exclusive authority and power of those localities are not *a priori* but are induced in the process of redrawing boundaries – such as normal/abnormal and legal/illegal – in a scalar way.

**6.6 Summary**

The secret of the state can only be found in space. This argument from Lefebvre (2003a) is the theoretical foundation for all arguments made in this chapter. Drawing on the recognition of a territorial logic of the state, as well as its significant role in sustaining the Party and its regime in China, I have illustrated the success and failure of crowning “land kings” in Sunhe and Dahongmen and explored both dominant agency and concrete agents of the state in its land projects. The agency of the state lies in various social and spatial processes, where the state effects are prompted and where pre-emptive boundaries are frequently redrawn according to the needs of the urban-oriented territorial logic. As to that institutionalised bureaucracy, it makes sense for understanding the state only to the extent that it is involved in the territorial logic as the agent that has no agency of its own. In China, the changing situation for the charismatic authority in the urban moment induces consistent pressures to work spatial miracles (so as to sustain itself spatially). And this is the underlying mechanism why the bureaucracy is mobilised to conduct
extraordinary measure in a way that does not comply with their own rationality through joint meetings. Power of spatialised authorities is further augmented by incorporating the scalar agency of localities as “the only needle” in rendering local and heterogeneous spatio-temporalities into the homogeneous whole. Through four interconnected moments, the localities not only manage to lay the ground for land businesses of the state but also incorporate their own interests and autonomy in the territorial logic. This mechanism is the way in which the Party manages to reproduce social relations and survive its regime. Such territorial logic is compelling not because state agents have a priori and exclusive power, but only for it constitutes the territory-based techniques by internalising vigorous social relations and processes in a spatial, and encompassing, way. At this point, we can confirm the political foundation of the state in erecting its new hegemony – in the name of urbanisation.
Chapter 7 Hegemonic subjects and counter-hegemonic residues

7.1 Introduction

The social suffering in the urban process has been a long-standing concern. Indeed, it was the major impulse behind this PhD project in the first place (see Chapter 1). This “default setting” not only defined my research proposal and fieldwork arrangement, but had also shaped the structure of this final empirical chapter after my return from the first spell of fieldwork in early 2015. Infected with ideas from the literature about contentious politics in general and China’s “property rights activism” in particular, I tried very hard to recognise the clues in my field observations that endorsed my proposed arguments on spatial antagonism, on the rights to the city and also on (the lack of) social justice. This attempt was stifled: instead of large-scale discontents or social movements, what I saw in the field was by and large a peaceful acceptance of the state’s proposals and, even more surprisingly, the happiness of the displaced people, meeting that of the state, when the desire for urbanisation was satisfied. The subject was in question. This question laid a new foundation for further discussions on social suffering and on the territorial logic of the state. This logic is so encompassing that it not only regulates the state’s conduct but also deeply affects and directs the conduct of those acted upon. Therefore, a different perspective is required to analyse the actions of the non-state actors – such as their moral claims, which are previously named as “civic territorialities” (Hsing 2010) or “property rights activism” (Lee 2008, see Shin 2013b for the critique). This perspective presents the final juncture of the hegemony of urbanisation in China and indicates a promising direction from which to revitalise the counter-hegemony agenda.

Adopting an anti-essentialist perspective, this chapter discusses the experience of those acted upon, the non-state actors who are involved in the urban change. I first recognise that “consent” plays a pivotal role, because withholding it may lead to a crisis of authority in which “leading” has to give way to “dominating” – that is, the exercising of coercive
power alone (Gramsci 1971, 275-76); this is the exact mechanism that leads Gramsci to define the state as “hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (ibid., 263). In the case of Beijing, the national ethos of modernity is critical: as a widely shared common concern among non-state actors, it illuminates everyday experience and consolidates the hegemony of urbanisation. Apart from ideological manoeuvres, the state also shares (limited) economic benefit with the villagers, and this allows the former to absorb the yearning of the latter for an “urban-modern” lifestyle together with their discontents on land exploitation. This turns villagers into de-politicised subjects, whose potential to claim the right to difference is largely eliminated. The state’s conduct is not accepted without resistance. However, my further examination reveals that such discontents and resistance activities are part and parcel of the territorial logic of the state, since both sides of its repertoire deploy the same coordinate – money – in framing the resisters’ attitudes and behaviours. The resisters thus become obedient by nature, and it is vain to rely solely on them to recognise the chance to be antagonistic. We need alternative methods to renew our counter-hegemonic agenda, and, as it happens, the residues of resistance are not rare, “in the realm where social exclusion meets spatial marginality” (Merrifield 2015).

The above arguments were developed through three stories of non-state actors at my field sites. The first narrative (Section 7.2) concerns the new “members of the gentry” produced by displacement. It depicts how and how far the governmental techniques were renewed in the urban process to eliminate antagonism among local villagers; and this is how consent among villagers was built to shore up the state’s concern over land businesses. With regard to the remaining discontents and resistances of local residents, in the second narrative I identify their subtle affinities with the territorial logic of the state (Section 7.3), which in the end turn their antagonism into obedience. The third story (Section 7.4) is about the potential for antagonism in the hegemonic logic, which is generated by the hegemony and shares the same desire to search for differences; it could, and should, be organised and united in our counter-hegemonic agenda. This chapter finishes with a summary of the discussion.
I met Lao Kang on a sunny winter day in 2014. In his late sixties, Lao Kang sat amongst his coevals in the central square of Kangying Homestead (康营家园, Kangying jianyuan). As a relocation community built for Sunhe villagers caught up in the land business (see Section 6.5), Kangying Homestead covers an area of 79.3 hectares (STG 2014) and includes 970,000 square metres of relocation houses (Field note on 24 July 2015). Lao Kang and all those present in the central square each owned more than three flats in this community. I had no idea at all how wealthy they were until having a series of interviews with Lao Kang, who shouted at me when I was visiting this square for the first time. “What are you doing?” He asked, “believe it or not, I will arrest you if you dare to do anything wrong!” Then he burst out laughing, joined by his cronies (Field note on 21 November 2014; see Figure 7.1). I then realised that this was the way he always speaks: to attract people's attention, for one thing, and to highlight his authority, for another. It signalled his willingness to talk to me, and hence enabled me to join smoothly in the ongoing dialogue.

Figure 7.1 The central square at Kangying Homestead community

Source: photo by author, 21 November 2014
Besides the above meeting, I was given three long interviews with Lao Kang, lasting nearly five hours in total. These gradually unfolded both his life history and local social history before me. Here, I primarily focus on his experience of demolition and relocation issues. Before the demolition in 2009, Lao Kang had a courtyard house of more than 400 square metres; it was wholly used for rented flats, some twenty in total (Interview with Lao Kang on 11 December 2014). These flats in the two-storey house were carefully decorated and came with adequate facilities; there was even a garage for parking vehicles (Interview with Lao Kang on 23 December 2014). When the demolition works were initiated in 2009, Lao Kang was quite sure that the villagers would not accept the compensation package without a struggle. Nevertheless, it turned out that most of them signed up to the demolition and relocation overnight because of intimidation from the village cadres and the staff of the demolition company. He had no other choice, under such pressure, than to agree, but he negotiated the amount of compensation. He was at first offered 2.3 million Yuan, but was not satisfied. He went to the demolition office and claimed that the area of his houses should be measured again. Without any further measurement, the demolition company then offered 2.6 million Yuan – but on condition that it should split the additional amount with him. After further bargaining, Lao Kang finally received 2.52 million Yuan for his 400-square-metre courtyard – a little above 6,000 Yuan per square metre (Interviews with Lao Kang, 11 and 23 December 2014).

As noted in Section 6.5, every villager subject to land expropriation in the green belt area was eligible to purchase 50 square metres of relocation housing at a discount. This principle was also practised in Sunhe and to some extent determined Lao Kang’s actions. Eight people were registered in his family hukou; besides his children and grandchildren, Lao Kang also invited his sister before the demolition to register her hukou with his house (Interview on 11 December 2014). From this they got a quota of 400 square metres (i.e., 50 square metres times eight people) for their relocation houses. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, the boundary between the formal/normal and the informal/abnormal in China is always subject to change. In Sunhe, the quota for a single child was doubled (100 square metres) in case s/he should need another house in the future upon marriage (Interview with cadre in a village next to Sunhe, 11 December 2014). The Kang family was thus eligible to buy 450 square metres in total. But this was not the end of his compensation package. Since the resettlement flats varied in size and rarely fitted the quota totals exactly, it was another common practice in housing allocation to allow the
total areas to exceed the given quotas “a little bit” (Interview with township official on 29 December 2014). In the end, Lao Kang and his family obtained five flats, covering a total area of nearly 600 square metres. The price he had to pay for his flats was 1.86 million Yuan, or 73.7% of the compensation fees; and the average price was 3,000 Yuan per square metre, around one-tenth of the market price of flats of the same quality in the area (Interview with Lao Kang on 11 December 2014).

In this way the peasant Lao Kang was turned into the multimillionaire Lao Kang through the state’s land businesses: the compensation fees paid to him and the construction costs of his resettlement flats were both to be covered by the land revenues in Sunhe, as shown in Chapter 6. Lao Kang is not a unique case. Indeed, after 2009 most of his contemporaries in Sunhe and in the rural-urban continuum in general obtained more than they had ever owned before, when the pressures of the financial crisis were transmuted into the state’s rising enthusiasm for land businesses. A local cadre showed me a summary of the demolitions in a village next to Sunhe (Interview on 21 November 2014). It showed that the average area of the courtyards (eligible for compensation) in this village was 369 square metres and the level of compensation was 6,500 Yuan per square metre. To put it in another way, every household in the village – and in many other similar communities – could make 2.4 million Yuan in cash from displacement and afterwards could buy four or five flats in relocation communities, just as Lao Kang did. And more than this. “If you have connections with village cadres, or if you yourself were a village cadre,” other villagers living in the Kangying Homestead told me, “you could plant houses on the arable land, say, five mu, and then obtain compensation at the same rate as other people had for their homesteads. You could earn dozens of millions by the end!” (Interview on 23 December 2014).

Are they displaced? Yes. Is this place going through a process of gentrification? Maybe. Who are those new “members of the gentry”? The displaced villagers themselves. Here,

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31 It was discussed in Section 6.3 that the average cost of demolishing a square metre of courtyard is 9,500 Yuan (Interview with Sunhe official, 21 November 2014). The number shown here is significantly (32%) lower. It may be inferred that the missing amount fell into the hands of corrupt officials and rogues.

32 The term “gentry” is used here in a particular sense; it refers to the population who are earning huge wealth in the urban process and who are enjoying this transition of social status. It has nothing to do with the traditional understanding of Chinese gentries in the imperialist era.
the subjects\textsuperscript{53} are thrown into question; it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to draw a clear line between state and non-state actors, since governmental techniques have evolved to the extent that the happiness and desires of local villagers are fully tied up in the state’s land businesses. Villagers are turned by this into new subjects who govern themselves with the same territorial logic of the state. This situation echoes Gramsci’s (1971) emphasis on the role of consent in the political practices of the state, whose main concern should not be to exert coercion but rather to educate its population and to request and sustain consent and consensus (ibid., 258-63) – after all, losing this consensus defines a crisis in the state’s authority (ibid., 275-76). To delineate the dynamics, we cannot rely on traditional understandings of space and subjects, which are by and large essentialist – such as the Heideggerian interpretations of place as the “genius loci” or “the locale of the truth of being” (cited in Harvey 2009, 180-94), and the conservative elements of militant particularism (solidarities, loyalties and rigid identities) in working-class political actions, as recognised by Harvey (1996, Chapter 1).

Instead, we should adopt an anti-essentialist framework as an alternative way to explore space and subject in the urban process and hence figure out “a space for the politics of our time” (cf. Massey 1999, 279). Holding a belief of the radical openness of space, Doreen Massey points out that such a concept is better defined as the sphere in which multiple trajectories interact with each other and erect subjects and objects through their interrelations (ibid., 283). Not only space, but also identities are “relationally constructed as part of the process of politics” (ibid., 288). This is a nodal point of non-essentialist politics, heralding plural and radical openness for the future, in which space is foregrounded as a new and dynamic foundation. Space matters, not because it generates a closed and solid system for power relations, but because it pre-conditions difference, multiplicity and openness. It hence paves the way for recognising, on the one hand, how forms of power are constituted spatially and, on the other, what different politics could be imagined spatially in the future (Massey 1999, 291-92, 2005, 154-55). This is an approach that could help us to understand better the production of a class of gentry through the displacement in Sunhe, which is a new moment in the hegemonic/territorial logic of the state.

\textsuperscript{53} The term “subject” is used in a Foucauldian sense, indicating the process, as well as the outcome of this process, in which individuals are implicated in power relations and have no chance to escape. See Foucault (2000d) for further discussions.
The production of “gentry” is a spatial process. Its origin lies in the urban metamorphosis in general and BMG’s land businesses in particular, and its effects consist of both soaring land revenues for the state and great wealth for the local villagers. It hence presents a perfect instance to show how and how far space and subjects are mutually constitutive of each other, as Massey suggests (1999, 2005). Together with the transformations of everyday life and inhabited space, the bodies and subjectivities of the villagers are also transformed. Their consciousness, identity and discourse are also redefined and absorbed by the state’s hegemonic logic. Here, the incorporation of villagers into the state’s logic is first and foremost an ideological manoeuvre, in the sense that the state cannot manage to establish its hegemony without educating the population and maintaining the latter’s consent. In my fieldwork, two pivotal resources are recognised whereby the state requests and sustains the consensus of local villagers. The first is the national ethos of modernity and the second is the increasing inclusiveness in the demolition and relocation policies. While the national ethos has long been a critical resource when the Party-state needs to work miracles, changing state policies mark the renewal of governmental techniques and hence set a new scene of urban metamorphosis in China – both are necessary for creating displaced-new gentry such as Lao Kang.

The connection between the national ethos of modernity and the story of Lao Kang and his contemporaries was first built by the discursive transition of the rural-urban continuum in the 1990s. It was shown in Section 4.5 that the relaxed control of migration in China led to the occupation of the rural-urban continuum by a so-called “floating population.” This was also the case for Sunhe and Dahongmen before their demolition. In an interview with a village cadre (next to Sunhe), I was told that most of their income was generated through the “tiles economy” (瓦片经济, wapian jingji): that is, building as many rental flats as possible in the courtyards and leasing them out to migrant workers (Interview on 11 December 2014) (see also Hsing 2010, Tian 2008, Wang, Wang, and Wu 2009 for a similar mechanism in southern China). In this special socio-economic situation, he continued:

The inflowing of huge numbers of migrant workers put great pressure on our infrastructure – environmental hygiene, electricity and water, and maintaining public order. It was common all over the rural-urban continuum to find criminal
activities spreading. Hence, we were lucky that our old village got demolished and villagers relocated. Villagers nearby, which are still waiting for demolition, always tell us how envious they are (Interview with village cadre on 11 December 2014).

Such words were confirmed by numerous online petitions from villagers who had not been displaced yet:

Shaziying and four villages nearby were also included in the original demolition plan but left untouched. The infrastructure here has broken down and the buildings are dirty and untidy. We envy the people in the villages who have already been relocated to Kangying Homestead. We were really looking forward to being displaced, hoping day after day for years and years. Now, however, we are disappointed. Our hope has gone from a mix of yearning and anxiety to despair (An anonymous post from New Chaoyang Forum 2015).

This attitude is quite a familiar one, since it is one and the same as that in the address by Li Peng, the then Prime Minister, who ordered the demolition in Dahongmen in 1995 (see Section 4.5). This discourse was accepted by the villagers, who felt the negative impacts in their daily lives but did not take the single step forward of asking why; instead of discerning the origin of all such effects in the misconduct of the state, they were subordinating themselves to the official discourse. Since their built environment in reality was indeed dirty and messy, it was also their wish to transform it. But the only way they had worked out for doing this was the modernist spatial imagination of urban space that defines the master plan of Beijing and enables the state’s land businesses to flourish in the rural-urban continuum. Both state agents and villagers advocated that “urbanisation is the only way towards modernisation” (Li 2013) – and this marks the moment when the national ethos is turned into an ideological consensus. This situation echoes Shin’s (2014a) recognition of the widely shared belief that the “city makes life happier,” which articulates through the national ethos the techniques of the state and the desires of villagers, and which turns out to be the ideological foundation for the state’s land business. Here, the displaced villagers are transformed spatially, and they are prepared for performing their role as the “new gentry.”
But forming knowledge and telling the “truth” is merely the first aspect of the state’s hegemonic logic in the production of a new class of gentry. To make the consensus solid enough to endorse the expanding land business, it is equally important to share the interests and bind together the state and non-state actors who share the benefits. Here, in the Sunhe case, such tactics are practised through increasingly inclusive policies of demolition and relocation. Previously, demolition and relocation were seen by the state as the biggest obstacle in grabbing land revenues, who tried every means to minimise the costs (and to maximise profits) (Chen 2008, 2012, Guo 2005, Shi 2007, 2014, Shin 2006, 2009). A sharp contrast hence emerges between the earlier minimisation of compensatory fees and today’s generous provision of them, accompanied by housing to relocate to. The difference allows us to assess the extent to which the governmental techniques are evolving together with the state’s ambition to run land businesses. To illustrate, I want to describe how such displaced people suffered before 2009, which contrasts painfully with the accumulated wealth of those who were displaced thereafter.

The Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme (ODHRP) in the 1990s was a significant case in Beijing, where around one million inner city residents were relocated to the outer suburbs, very seldom paid compensation and offered extremely poor living conditions. In the story narrated by Guo Yukuan (2005), a household with a courtyard house (covering a total area of 400 square metres) at Niubabao Hutong in Xicheng District received of only 31,218 Yuan in compensation while the market value of the property (which accrued to the state) was nine million Yuan – nearly 300 times higher. Furthermore, this household and many like it were relocated from the city centre to a remote suburban area some twenty kilometres away, so as to make space for the state’s land business at the city centre (Shin 2006). To further reduce the cost of relocating these people, the BMG even adjusted the boundaries of its administrative units: labelling the localities which used to be the far suburbs as near suburbs enabled the area of each relocation house to be 30% less (Interview with an official at Heyi Street, 13 December 2014). Such decisions led to endless discontent and blame, leading on 27 December 1999 to a famous lawsuit mounted by 10,357 displaced residents acting together (万人诉讼, wanren susong) (Guo and Shen 2012, Shi 2007).

Things are completely different now. Maybe because of the above litigation and the like, the BMG and its principals became increasingly concerned about the reaction of people
who were due to be displaced. In an official announcement promoting “urban-rural integration” (BMC 2008) (see Section 5.4), the BMG and Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC jointly declare that the villagers are subjects (主体, zhuti) in promoting the reform and development of rural areas in Beijing, and that their role as such must be fully deployed in all related works. In February 2010, the month when the “key village project” was launched, Mr Liu Qi, then the Party Secretary for Beijing, again confirmed that the villagers’ role as subjects should be recognised to speed up the transformation of the rural-urban continuum (Tang 2010). In the process of making villagers into subjects lies the state’s cunning method of replenishing governmental techniques for running the land business more efficiently.

Lao Kang, and the new “members of the gentry” like him who were produced through displacement, is as much implicated in the state’s land businesses as a chess piece on the chessboard. They are all, certainly, much wealthier than their predecessors in the 1990s, living in high-quality resettlement flats that are less than a kilometre away from their original dwellings (see Figure 7.2 below), earning millions of Yuan and even able to buy luxury cars (see Section 3.4). Nevertheless, their treatment by the state is better defined as the costs of replenishing its governmental techniques, and are in any case covered by the soaring revenues in the land market. This is a logic where the happiness and desires of the local villagers are fully incorporated – hence it is hegemonic and induces the villagers’ governance of self. People such as Lao Kang, who at first had no other choice, in the event wholeheartedly embraced and benefited from the same logic of the state:

Villagers are quite happy to be relocated (上楼, shanglou). Indeed, urbanisation is the only opportunity for them to gain so much wealth overnight. They can now earn more than many generations in their families could have accumulated. In this situation, their [only] struggle is to ask for even more. (Interview with BMCUP official, 1 August 2014)
Figure 7.2 An overview of resettlement communities in Sunhe and Dahongmen

Source: photos by author; (a) was taken on 23 December 2014 and (b) on 4 August 2015. Notes: (1) Figure (a) is a street view of Kangying Homestead for relocating Sunhe villagers, and Figure (b) shows the façade of buildings in Jinyuan Community, a resettlement community for all Dahongmen villagers. (2) The figures demonstrate that even as housing provided for the welfare of local villagers the quality of the built environment in these communities was not compromised; this is the reason why house prices here are not significantly lower than those of commodity houses in the same region.

7.3 The obedient resistors

Villagers in the rural-urban continuum are simultaneously infected by the national ethos of modernity and persuaded by the overnight flood of wealth and hence become hegemonic subjects who govern themselves according to the territorial logic of the state. This recognition in the previous section does not deny the emergence of unrest in the process of demolition and relocation – such activities will be critically examined in this section. Here, instead of limiting discussion to the popular discourse of “rightful resistance” (O’Brien and Li 2006) in China, I want to draw on critiques of the illusory dichotomy between domination and resistance (Foucault 1980, 2000b, d, Pile and Keith 1997) to develop recent reflections on the activism over property rights in the urban change (Lee 2007, 2008, Perry 2008, Shin 2013b). My aim is to demonstrate that these discontents and resistance activities are part and parcel of the territorial logic of the state, since the attitudes and behaviours of the repertoire framed by both sides deploy the same coordinate – money. Those who resist are hence obedient by nature, being defined by the
hegemonic logic just as Lao Kang was in the previous section; and it is vain to focus only on such manoeuvres to recognise the counter-hegemonic potential.

Among the nine villages that have been demolished in Sunhe, Houweigou is exceptional. The land story in Houweigou can be dated as far back as 1992, unlike the other eight villages that were involved in the state’s land business in 2009. In 1992, nearly half of Houweigou was taken over for the construction of the Airport Expressway, and all the villagers were relocated to the other half where a “new village” was built (Interview with HWG-5 and HWG-6 on 23 December 2014). In 2002, to make space for more trees to be planted along the Airport Expressway, in preparation for the “Green Olympics” (see Section 5.2), 135 households in Houweigou were relocated once again. Each household received only 490,000 Yuan in compensation (2,100 Yuan per square metre) and had to pay 220,000 Yuan for a resettlement flat (Interview with HWG-7 and HWG-8, 24 December 2014). This was before housing prices in Beijing had begun to rocket upwards. Another villager told me that the average housing price was less than 3,000 Yuan per square metre in 2002, and even lower in Sunhe, but his neighbours such as HWG-7 and HWG-8 dared not spend most of their compensation money on new housing (Interview with HWG-6, 23 December 2014). HWG-8 defended herself immediately:

My daughter was then still in middle school, with high school and university to come, all of which would need money. I had no other choice than to buy one flat and save the rest of the money. Now, my daughter has grown up, but she still has to live with us because we do not have a second flat (Interview with HWG-8, 24 December 2014).

These resettlement houses were not built by the BMG or the township government, but by a property developer called the Beijing Fortune Garden Real Estate Development Company. It was an era when closed-door negotiations for land were still not forbidden, and Sunhe township government agreed to supply land for this developer to build its proposed villa community, so long as the latter agreed to build resettlement houses for the 135 relocated households (Interview with HWG-10 on 19 October 2014; Interview with BMBLR official, 30 October 2014). In the course of building the villa community, which was named “Palais de Fortune” (see Figure 3.6 in Chapter 3), it turned out that the estimated number of land plots had been too low. This is why the remaining 210
households in Houweigou were relocated between 2006 and 2008 (Interview with HWG-5 and HWG-6, 23 December 2014). In this relocation the Houweigou villagers realised that the level of compensation was not uniform but depended on the bargaining power of each household: some got 4,000 Yuan per square metre, others got 5,000 Yuan, and the best bargain was 6,500 Yuan (Interview with HWG-4 and HWG-6 on 23 December 2014). Even so, the second cohort of displaced villagers earned more in compensation fees (210 households, gaining an average of 1.6 million Yuan) than the first cohort (135 households, gaining an average of 0.5 million Yuan), and this explains why only the first cohort united in continued petitions and sit-in protests (Interview with HWG-5 and HWG-6, 23 December 2014).

This group of people labelled themselves the “135 hu” (literally, the “135 households”) and in the past ten years they have delivered many petitions (Interview with HWG-7 on 27 July 2015). The head of this group was a retired engineer from a nearby SOE, who had married a local villager decades ago. To finance the collective activities, each household donated 600 Yuan, and the funding was managed by five representatives. Their petitions, however, turned out to produce only endless prevarications by various BMG departments. “We have been to the BMG Office of Letters and Visits [北京市信访办, shi xinfangban] six times, and their response has always been that the demolition was “legal yet unreasonable” [合法不合理, hefa buhe li]. This was the only answer we received, before we were driven away from the office” (Interview with HWG-8, 24 December 2014). These disappointed people then went even further: hiring more than 30 buses, they went directly to the city hall and from there to the State Council to stage a sit-in and call for fair treatment (Interview with Lao Kang, 11 December 2014). These actions were fruitless. Even worse, they soon realised that their representatives had been bribed by Sunhe’s township government; in return the representatives prevented any further activities by the group (Interview with HWG-7 and HWG-8, 24 December 2014):

After all, no one who got proper compensation or some other benefit would join these actions. If I was in their position, I would not join either. With money in hand, I can offer you a cup of water when you come to invite me [to join the group] but no way would I be a member […] The only thing I cared about in the
petitions and sit-ins was to get more money. What else matters in my life? (Interview with HWG-8, 24 December 2014)

This quotation not only reveals the submissive nature of the resisters but also challenges us to critically reflect on the dichotomy between resistance and domination. The villagers are conducting petitions and sit-in protests for their own benefit, not for socio-spatial justice in general. Their involvement in such appeals was determined only by the amount of compensation they had received, and their primary concern was to ask for more. In this situation, nobody can be seen as antagonistic – even within the group of “135 hu” – because their demands were so easy to meet that the state could without effort dissolve the antagonism. This story echoes an insightful comment from Foucault (1980, 142), who argues that “there are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised.” Here, in the case of Houweiougou, the villagers’ discontents and resistances open up more possibilities for the state to expand the effects of its power, which endorse their renewed governmental techniques and ultimately legitimise their land businesses.

It is governance and domination that are foregrounded in the terrain of resistance. Hence, the illusory dichotomy between domination and resistance should be abandoned, as Steve Pile (1997, 23) once reminded us: “the map of resistance is not simply the underside of the map of domination – if only because each is a lie to the other, and each gives the lie to the other.” It may be more persuasive to hear the story in Dahongmen’s urban change, where urban residents became nail households. As discussed in Section 6.3, 655 households in Dahongmen, out of 784 in total who had urban hukou, refused to move when the state urgently needed the land they occupied for its land businesses. The reason for their refusal was quite straightforward:

Have you ever heard of a situation where two policies for demolition and relocation were proposed for the same locality? We have. One policy must apply to villagers and one to urban residents. Why? Because the households with rural hukou hold fewer people and take up more space, while those with urban hukou hold more people in a smaller space. To reduce the compensation fees, the government decided to relocate the villagers individually (assigning 50 square
metres per person) and to relocate urban residents according to the area of their original dwelling.\textsuperscript{54} (Interview with Dahongmen cadre, 12 December 2014)

The sharp contrast between the two different policies on demolition and relocation for local people at once induced the physical resistance of the urban residents – who refused to move:

Why is there a difference between the standards for relocating villagers and for us (urban residents)? I have a former classmate, with rural hukou, who used to live next door. Her family of five received 250 square metres when her house was demolished; we can only get 30 square metres. Why? What law can be found to justify the discrimination? 90\% of the people who remain here are urban residents. We are all nail households now (Interview with DHJ-1, 12 December 2014).

I have been working at a grain depot nearby (a state owned work unit) for nearly forty years. I do not want to move because the compensation is unreasonable and I cannot afford the fees for relocation. Villagers can get compensation for their whole courtyard house, some hundred square metres, but we can only be compensated for the registered area of our dormitory (12 square metres). Even if the standard paid for one square metre is the same (8,000 Yuan), what we can get is a fraction of the benefit paid to the villagers. My son is still working with a zero-hours contract; no house, no car, and no wife. I thought we could earn ample wealth by the demolition, but we can only stay here as nail households in reality. (Interview with DHJ-6, 31 July 2015)

I sympathized with such sentiments from the nail households in Dahongmen, until I encountered a cadre there who told me more about the complex history of rural-urban relations in Dahongmen. He was responding to my account of the urban residents’ feeling of relative deprivation, going back to the different levels of compensation:

\textsuperscript{54} The relocation policy for urban residents in Dahongmen was different from other places in Beijing. In many villages, the area of relocation housing for urban residents was also calculated individually (though a little less than for the villagers): 30 square metres per person (Interview with BMCUP official, 8 December 2014). But in Dahongmen, the area of relocation housing was strictly calculated via the area of the original dwelling. The formula for compensation fees is: (registered dormitory area+30 m\textsuperscript{2}) * 8,000 Yuan/m\textsuperscript{2}; the cost of buying an 80-square-metre relocation flat is: (registered dormitory area+30 m\textsuperscript{2}) * 3,800 Yuan/m\textsuperscript{2} + 330,000 Yuan (DVC 2010).
If you must speak this way, then we should take into consideration our memories. You are too young to know much about grain coupons [粮票, liangpiao]. Coupons were compulsory in the planned economy for buying every daily need – since they defined the amount you could purchase. When I was young, I envied those who had urban hukou. Only they had coupons for meat, flour and cloth, allocated by the state; we peasants could only get them by exchanging our grain […] You were living with much higher standard in the past, from the 1950s to the 1970s. You were enjoying your privileges and superiority because you were “the big brother.” When the demolition comes, why don’t you remind yourself of the past? You only claim that the thieves can eat meat; you paid no attention to the thieves when they were getting a violent beating (光说贼吃肉, 不看贼挨打; guangshuo zeichirou, bukan zeiaida). (Interview with a Dahongmen cadre, 29 December 2014)

Figure 7.3 The demolished buildings in Dahongmen

Source: photo by author, 31 July 2015. Note: the two-storey buildings are the original dwellings of villagers, already being demolished, and the one-storey bungalows on the left are the dormitories of urban residents.
I was not convinced by the cadre’s tirade *per se*. Instead, by comparing these two attitudes from urban residents and villagers I recognised some hints of *class reconstitution*; and this issue is the nodal point by which we can better understand nail households. In the socialist mode of production when *danwei* units dominated the territorial logic of the state (see discussions in Section 6.2), the workers with urban *hukou* were “the big brother”. But now, since the urban space is foregrounded in the state’s renewed territorial logic, *danwei* units and their staff have by and large been abandoned – they can no longer sustain the state’s authority and have been replaced by those who might contribute to the state’s thriving land businesses. Townships and villages in the green belts are included in the new land-based interest group because they own land resources that are scarce in the urban metamorphosis. The fundamental changes of the politico-economic structure have hence induced class reconstitution as a by-product.

“We workers are called the proletariat. Chairman Mao said we were the ruling class who should lead everything. But it turns out that we are the real ‘proletariat’ in the end who have nothing” (Interview with DHJ-6, 31 July 2015). Yet “the villagers are not the proletariat any more. Their land gives them significant wealth as a result of the socialist redistribution in the 1950s. But do they have any right to claim the newly rising land benefits? Is it reasonable to distribute collective benefits to those individuals in the first place?” (Interview with planner, BIUP-4, on 24 October 2014).

The grievances of the urban residents in Dahongmen were generated by this class reconstitution. They were complaining and resisting because they had lost their socialist privileges while the neighbouring villagers, formerly the oppressed, were now receiving exclusive new privileges. Neither kind of privilege has anything to do with the concern for social justice. They are defined by, and inscribed in, the territorial logic of the state, while this logic itself is dynamic and is subject to changes in the political economy. Urban residents who turned themselves into nail households are hence not fighting against the hegemonic logic. They were simply claiming to be included in this logic and to continue the privileges they had enjoyed in the socialist past. In this sense, their bodies and physical acts of resistance are merely a strategy to add to their wealth. In this situation, as Harvey says (2005b, 63), “the body becomes an accumulation strategy”:

> It is only when daily life has been rendered totally open to the circulation of capital and when political subjects have [a] vision almost entirely circumscribed
by embeddedness in that circulation that capitalism can function with affective meanings and legitimacy as its support.

The resistance of the urban residents in Dahongmen submitted to these values and this ethos in the hegemony of the state, just like that of their rural counterparts in Houweigou. It is for this reason that their actions should not be categorised as counter-hegemonic. Instead, the state is renewing its governing techniques through such discontents. For example, the occupation of green space for land businesses is permissible, since the nail households were frustrating the state’s plan for supplying land – even if such occupation was a breach of the detailed urban plan, which theoretically should have been legally binding (see Section 6.3). Furthermore, since resistance is by nature self-interested, it is something of a challenge to form any kind of counter-hegemonic “collective will,” and this in turn renders the political subjects appreciably far from consolidation. Laclau and Mouffe (2001, 67) are right to point out that political subjects are not classes but “collective wills,” which are induced by the politico-ideological articulation of dispersed and fragmented historical forces. In the case of Dahongmen (as well as Houweigou), however, we can see only the fragmented historical forces, not their articulation. This makes the governance of the state much easier. With money as a shared coordinate in framing the attitudes and behaviours of state and non-state actors, discontent can be painlessly transformed into a terrain of domination – this had already been revealed in Houweigou and was being expected by the urban residents of Dahongmen.

The submissive nature of these resisters can also be manifested through their ambiguous attitude to property rights. In Houweigou, villagers always complained to me that they hated the deeds of their original dwellings. In the 1992 relocation, each household had been given a new and uniform courtyard 225 square metres in size, and a deed of the courtyard showing its site and area. The deeds were the official recognition of the property rights, but they soon became a curse rather than a blessing for villagers in their second round of relocation: “the deeds entrapped us. They recorded clearly that a courtyard was 225 metres square. It was impossible to expand the areas so as to ask for a higher compensation fee. Villagers elsewhere did not get deeds, and with the claimed bigger areas they received much more compensation in the end” (Interview with HWG-6, 23 December 2014). As regards the urban residents in Dahongmen, who were mostly public tenants with no legal title, their primary concern was to wait for their previous
Danwei to declare the abandoning of ownership when the houses were demolished: “it is said that we residents can obtain legal ownership five years after our danwei abandoning [our houses]. In my case three years have already elapsed and I only need to wait for another two years.” (Interview with DHJ-1, 12 December 2014).

Though various rights discourses were employed in these cases, it would be too quick to conclude that such “rightful resistance” serves as “critiques within the hegemony” (Scott 1990, 106, cited in O’Brien and Li 2006, 5). For, as this section reminds us, the discourses and their users form a necessary part of the hegemony – rather than a critique of it. Shin’s (2013b, 1168) examination of a Guangzhou case also shows that the awareness of rights “rests largely on the right to subsistence or economic security,” and has little to do with claiming rights against the state. For this reason, it is risky to argue that a quiet “rights revolution” is taking shape in China, as Ching Kwan Lee (2008) remarks. Instead of limiting our discussions to such an illusion, it is more promising to register it, together with class reconstitution and domination-resistance dialectics, as one of the “spatial technologies of power configurations” (Pile 1997, 30); and we can then move beyond them to locate our counter-hegemonic agenda in contingent encounters, negotiations and residues, in those relational fabrics of social practices that are essential for running politics.

7.4 The counter-hegemonic residues

I concur with Lefebvre (2016b, 299) that “every system leaves a residue that escapes it, resists it, and from where an effective (practical) resistance can take off.” Here, residue refers to the element that is deposited by totalising systems yet maintains the potential to explode them: “it is nothing by itself. It is not ‘operational.’ And yet it is decisive” (ibid., 301-02). This is what Lefebvre labels “a method of residues,” and it forms the theoretical foundation for this section on the (potential) counter-hegemonic residues in the hegemony of urbanisation. Drawing on the anti-essentialist perspective discussed in Section 7.2, I want to show here that the antagonistic residues are by nature contingent, but this is the condition of – rather than a challenge to – their political significance. Two interconnected issues will be elaborated in detail: one concerns what kinds of element could be recognised as residues, and the other how we can organise and reunite them for
the pursuit of a counter-hegemonic agenda. In the first issue, “residues” refers to all actions and desires that search for difference – they are the negation of the spatial technologies of the state, or, in Lefebvre’s words (2016b, 321), the “negation of what the being was that delivered itself.” As regards the second question, I want to bring in both Andy Merrifield’s illustrations (2013) on the role of encounters and Laclau and Mouffe’s reminder (2001) of the dislocations between a subject’s position and its agents. Instead of drawing on such empty signifiers as “the right to the city” (Merrifield 2013, 25-26) or the “working class” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 118-19), I would define both the subjects and places of struggle in a more dynamic way: the residues encounter each other relationally, which in turn shapes and reshapes the subjectivities and centralities of antagonism.

To follow the discussions here in a more straightforward way, I begin, as a reference point, the occasion when Xi Jinping, President of China, visited Sunhe and planted trees. This was not only an encounter between Xi and Sunhe, but is also a swerve that reveals many other residues simultaneously and hence “creates time and space” (cf. Merrifield 2013, 56) for our counter-hegemonic agenda. Some residues were local and haunted the vicinity, while others had come from afar (non-local) and were internally related to the former. All of them were irreducible yearnings and were vividly presented through Xi’s visit on 3 April 2015 (see Figure 7.4). Why Sunhe, of all townships and villages? I put this question to all the local cadres and villagers I met in the second spell of fieldwork. The first residue emerged from their answers. A township official explained to me why Sunhe had been selected: “the General Office of the Central Committee of CPC chose a site in Haidian district to begin with. It had already been constructed and looked quite good and green. But President Xi was not satisfied – ‘it is not close enough to our people,’ he said. So the General Office put us forward as an alternative” (Interview with Sunhe township official, 22 July 2015). According to an official report, this story “reflects the noble style of our leader, resisting formalism, paying attention to reality, as well as joining the people and practising the mass line [群众路线, qunzhong luxian]” (The General Office of Central Committee of CPC 2015). In practice, however, villagers had much to bear:

We simply could not get in there! It was surrounded by ranks of armed policemen. The night before Xi Jinping came, at around 11.30 pm, officials from township
government knocked at my door and warned me that I was strictly forbidden to open the back windows of my flat because they faced the site where Xi would go to plant trees. The next morning, I found that even my door had been sealed by the local police! (Interview with SHV-4, 13 July 2015)

![Figure 7.4 Xi Jinping visited Sunhe and planted trees on 3 April 2015](source)

*Source:* Xinhua News (2015). *Note:* Xi Jinping is fourth from the left.

Furthermore, the land plot where Xi planted trees was included in the 43-hectare Sunhe International Business Park. It had been the central market of Sunhe and had been vacated after Xi’s order that “non-core functions” should be eliminated to make Beijing “the first good area” (see Section 1.2). After the demolition it was left untouched because its detailed business plan had not been approved by BMCUP (see Section 6.5) (Interview with Sunhe township official, 22 July 2015). Here, one can see the cracks between the official discourse and what actually happened. While fissures *per se* are objects of the totalising system to reabsorb, the latter’s failure to do so may induce a “negative capacity” of the former to transcend their contexts and to resist contradictions (Merrifield 2015). This is how a counter-hegemonic residue comes into being.
There was another residue present at the moment of Xi’s visit, only five hundred metres away. This residue was revealed by Lao Tang, a street hawker in Kangying Homestead who was selling vegetables when I met him on my way to have breakfast (see Figure 7.5). Lao Tang was a villager who did not accept the government’s programme and refused to sign an agreement to relocate, but the state agents had forced him to leave his original dwelling. After complaining about the various drawbacks of living in a high-rise building, he said he preferred his original courtyard, but he could not go back now. For “they are dismantling old courtyards only to make way for building the luxury ‘Beijing Courtyards’ [北京院子, Beijing yuanzi; the name of a villa community in Sunhe Land Group]” (Interviews with Lao Tang, 15 and 16 July 2015).

![Figure 7.5 A glimpse of street hawkers in Sunhe Homestead](source: photo by author, 13 July 2015. Note: The other side of the bridge is where Xi planted trees.)

Curious about his experience of forced demolition, I asked him to tell me more about the details of this process. Lao Tang delivered his account slowly, yet powerfully:

My family was among the 20 households in the village who refused to move and stayed there. Five households out of the 20 were evicted by force last summer, including mine. This happened on 15 July 2014, exactly a year ago. That morning,
I went as usual to the market and went back home at around noon when the sun got too hot. I did not expect to find some of the demolition team stopping me half-way. They kept me for half an hour before letting me go back. I thought nothing would happen to my houses because my wife was at home. But when I arrived, the houses were already razed to the ground. My brother tried to stop them, but only got a fractured jaw fighting with the demolition team (Interview with Lao Tang, 16 July 2015).

Afterwards, the Tang family were forced to move to Kangying Homestead, where they were given a rented flat in the transition. The township government then expected him to negotiate and sign the relocation agreement (just as Lao Kang had done; see Section 7.2), but Lao Tang refused:

These five courtyards were demolished because they stood on a road planned to go from the tube station to “Beijing Courtyards.” The road was built only for a community, but at the cost of our lives. It is a business activity, not for the public interest! […] Now I continue to make my living by cultivating vegetable on a plot next to the original dwelling. I go there every day: I get up at 3.30 am, and visit my land to pick the vegetables and then come to this market at around 5.30 am. Only there can I feel a sense of belonging – it is still my home. If you are curious, you could visit it (Interview with Lao Tang, 16 July 2015).

With detailed instruction from Lao Tang, I went there that afternoon and was surprised to find that more than a dozen of the villagers’ courtyards were still standing (see Figure 7.6), next to the most expensive “land kings.” The three cameras in the picture stood out; they were installed not by the state but by the households themselves and hence, to some extent, were remaking “the eye of power” (cf. Foucault 1980). It was a strategy to resist the manoeuvres of the state (such as a sneak raid) in de-territorialising the homestead, which represents the villagers’ ambition to re-territorialise their home. Here, their bodies are being used not (only) for accumulating wealth but rather in the search for a different way of life, a way that is not provided by the hegemonic logic of the state. This determination to search for difference defines the residue, which is nothing by itself, nor operational, but yet decisive (cf. Lefebvre 2016b, see also Merrifield 2013). What Xi Jinping did not know, and would never have been able to know, is that all these stories
were enacted five hundred metres away from the site where he planted trees. This shows how short the physical distance can be in daily life between the system and the residues.

**Figure 7.6** The antagonistic cameras around a nail household in Sunhe


Admittedly, the reason that such houses and cameras were not demolished lies in the fact that the land they occupied was not immediately required for the state’s logic – the remaining 15 households were by and large located in the area planned for an artificial lake, which is a business strategy to endow this landscape with an ecological and environmental-friendly look. A township official also told me that the “nail households” were consistently being monitored, and officials were still trying to figure out a method of resolving the problem in an “economic” way (Interview on 22 July 2015). In other words, the efficiency of the antagonistic cameras is as limited as the clemency of the state and of capital. Nonetheless, being contingent does not abolish the political significance of the residue. It does indeed tell us the internal frontier within society that limits the establishment of objectivities (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, xiii-xiv); it defines antagonism that is external to, but not beyond, society and hence renders possible “the negation of a given order” (ibid., 125-26).
Geographical proximity is not a necessary condition for this negation, however. Residues from afar can also join local contestations, as long as they are included in the system that generates them and induces their desire to search for difference. Indeed, the political practices and subjects should be recognised in a relational way, as “cutting across different spatialities and positionalities,” since they are, or could be, internally related (Ekers and Loftus 2008, 708). In this way, we could identify other residues from afar, which were immanent in the moment of Xi’s planting trees and are internally related to the residues in Sunhe. For example, we can recognise a residue in the accumulated discontent with the soaring price of houses. This is a residue from those who want a place to live in but cannot afford it (Zhao 2017). While Lao Kang and his fellow villagers are now included in the group of new wealthy (see Section 7.2), their wealth was generated by following the process which also produced the new poor. This latter group consists not only of migrant workers who were driven away from Sunhe and other communities in the rural-urban continuum during demolition, but also of young university graduates whose annual salary is too low to purchase even a square metre of housing in Beijing.55 Millions of the new poor are now living in Beijing; in rejecting the order to join the hegemony of urbanisation they share with Lao Tang the same subject position, since they bear the heaviest burdens in the state’s urban-oriented and land-based accumulation strategy. Some of them are slaves of their houses (房奴, fangnu) and some others do not even reach slave status. What will happen if they, or at least some of them, realise they might have lived in a different way if such hegemony had never existed?

There are numerous other perspectives from which to recognise residues. For example, in the light of Xi’s order to make Beijing “the first good area,” a new state campaign was initiated in the first half of 2017 (BMG 2017a, 2017b): the BMG promised that 40 million square metres of “illegal buildings” would be demolished by the end of 2017, and 100 famous Hutong would be remedied, to the extent that all windows and doors overlooking the streets that were not in the original construction plan would be bricked up. For example, Sanlitun, the most famous street of bars in Beijing, has lost a number of bars...
during the campaign (see Figure 7.7). This perfectly encapsulates how and how far the lived space has been colonised by the conceived one (i.e., a modernist imagination of the urban space), and its negative effects on the everyday life are yet to be fully discovered. I cannot here elaborate on all the residues one by one; the point I want to make is that the seemingly powerful hegemony of urbanisation has already induced countless residues to rise against it.

![Figure 7.7 A building that was under “remedying” in Sanlitun, 16 March 2017 Source: Zha (2017).](image)

### 7.5 Summary

This chapter critically examines the daily experience of non-state actors in the urban process. Drawing on an anti-essentialist framework of space and subjects, it recognises that local villagers are mostly incorporated in the hegemonic logic of the state through the national ethos of modernity, on the one hand, and generous financial treatment by the state, on the other. These villagers are hence rendered the *subjects* who are now purportedly governing themselves. Furthermore, even those who are taking part in resistance do not escape this logic. They are not claiming a different way of life but only
concerned about the amount of compensation they receive. This outlook can be easily deployed by the state for the purpose of governance: with money as the shared coordinate in framing the attitudes and behaviours of both state and non-state actors, discontent is simply another label for the terrain of domination. Only here, after recognising the traps for the politics of emancipation, can we move on to bring *residues* to the fore as an alternative method. This term refers to the element deposited by the totalising system which yet carries the potential to blast it. In Beijing, we can see residues in such issues as the discontent with soaring housing prices, the expelled migrant workers and their lack of shelters, as well as the state campaigns to demolish “illegal buildings.” They maintain the potentials to join some local villagers (very few in number) who do not want to accept the state’s agenda and have embarked on a search for their different way of life, such as Lao Tang in Sunhe. Our obligation is to figure out the new counter-hegemonic agenda in the daily life and to connect and unite these antagonistic actions, emotions and desires through encounters. This defines, in Harvey’s (1996, 260) words, the *cogredience* “in which multiple processes flow together to construct a single consistent, coherent, though multifaceted time-space system.”
Chapter 8 Conclusion

In this thesis, I demonstrate that making the green belts has been critical for both state-led and land-based urban accumulation and the re-configuration of the state itself. Green belts in Beijing are first and foremost an ideological product of the national ethos of modernity. When the country entered the era of urban metamorphosis, these belts were absorbed as landed ecology in the urban periphery (or what this thesis refers to as rural-urban continuum) to promote capital accumulation via land exploitation. Furthermore, making green belts incorporated moments like territorial reorganisation, scalar collusion and de-/re-subjectivation of the population, all contributing to the renewal of the state’s techniques for governance in line with its territorial logic. In this regard, green belts in Beijing have been foregrounded as a new spatial strategy in the urban process: they are on the one hand at the frontier in producing urban space and on the other a critical hub for reproducing social relations to sustain the Party-state regime. It turns out that the state’s land businesses are not a purely economic project; instead, they are a total project, requiring the hegemony of urbanisation to be established before the project could be completed. Capital accumulation is facilitated by the state not through formal institutions but with state effects that condition a new pattern of urban political economy. The state is here reshaped into (and should be defined as) a process that erects and consolidates the hegemony of urbanisation.

I concur with Harvey’s (2009, 130-31) reminder that geographical knowledge should be contextualised and examined in past and present “social orders” and “processes of social and ecological change” for a better understanding – one that acknowledges its historical significances (quite often in a negative sense). In this thesis, I apply such epistemology by historicising the geography of China’s urban process, on the one hand, and spatialising this history, on the other. The green belts in Beijing and their articulation with the socio-historical and politico-economic processes are at the fore here. It is recognised that the dynamic space and society of Beijing (and China) present themselves as a whole in the green belts. There are issues such as the rocketing prices of land and housing, the state’s
ambitions regarding land businesses, and the ecological and social tools to grab revenues from land resources. We can also recognise here the dynamic power relationship between President Xi Jinping and the BMG officials, the changing techniques of governance, the rising significance of state-owned-enterprises in the booming real estate market, and the scalar collusion between the BMG and the local authorities. As regards social and spatial effects, we could list here the large-scale relocation of villagers (with local *hukou*) and the expelling of migrant workers (without local *hukou*) in the course of “upgrading” the landscape for more profitable operations (such as golf courses and villa communities). Here, too, social consensus is achieved through the widely shared national ethos of modernity; this explains why only limited antagonism can be discerned. I have eventually realised, with such information, why, how, and how far the lived spaces in the rural-urban continuum have been deformed into vacant sites under the banner of the green belt.

The theoretical foundation for advancing the above arguments on the green belt issue lies in Lefebvre’s theories on space and state. In *The Survival of Capitalism*, Lefebvre (1976) poses a critical question that has stimulated my interest in exploring the black box of the state-led and land-based urban accumulation in urbanising China: “how had capitalism, which seemed mortally wounded, been able to survive?” (ibid., 48). Here, his critical use of Marx’s thoughts and his adequate distance from the structuralists give me intellectual resources not only to understand the distinction between logics and dialectics (and then the dialectical relations between the abstract and the concrete), but also to pay adequate attention to the role of the urban and the everyday in preconditioning various strategies of the state to constitute its (never completed) *totality*. Furthermore, his detailed analyses of space, urban phenomena, urban form and urban strategy (Lefebvre 1991, 2003b) lead me to conceptualise the green belts under urbanisation in a relational and anti-essentialist way. His application of the spatial triad in analysing the “state space” (Lefebvre 2003a), in addition, prepared me to recognise the Chinese state’s “territorial logic:” it plays a pivotal role in coordinating ideological resources, political institutions, ecological masks and the social fabric – so as to erect a total project where “socialist” power relations are reproduced through the production of new urban space.

While Lefebvre foregrounds the questions of both power and ideology when discussing space and the state, he pays more attention to the “global level” of the social fabric, such as the relations of domination and the rise of a new totality, than to the micro processes
or mechanisms where power and knowledge are articulated in reshaping the daily life of ordinary people. Here lies a juncture at which Foucault’s theories on power, subject and governmental techniques may be introduced as they are in my analyses of the green belts. As shown in Chapter 1, the Foucauldian interpretation of the state recalls to us the “state effects”, rather than its institutional forms, in drawing various boundaries, producing discourses, inducing pleasures and reshaping the mundane social processes (Foucault 2000a, 2009, Mitchell 2006). This reminder enables me to reflect on (and move beyond) popular dichotomies like state/market, state/society, and central/local, which in the end helps me to recognise the urban milieu that shows the state’s territorial logic, the scalar agency of motivated localities and the obedient resisters in the course of displacement. It is in building on this recognition that I start to frame the whole story of the green belts as the “historic bloc” in the Gramscian sense, where an urban-oriented social order is erected and consolidated through renewed institutions, social relations and consistent ideas (e.g., the national ethos of modernity). This bloc marks, in the end, “the hegemony of urbanisation.”

In the following sections, I revisit and summarise stories I have encountered in Beijing’s green belts to further delineate what lessons we can learn from these stories to understand China’s urban process and work out more global urban studies (Sections 8.1 and 8.2). In Section 8.3, I make further reflections on the nature and the role of the state and respond to wider understandings on the state issue at both theoretical and empirical levels. This is an attempt to contextualise my research in the discussions of state theory and conduct. Section 8.4 briefly wraps up key contributions of the present research, while an agenda for future research is provided in Section 8.5 – as the concluding remarks of this thesis.

8.1 The invisible green belts in Beijing

While the idea of the green belt is a child of the Western planning canon in general and Sir Ebenezer Howard in particular, its practice in Beijing is by no means a duplication of the model without changes. It is the critical interconnections of modernity, urban space

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56 It was introduced in Chapter 5 that there was only one green belt in Beijing until 2003, when the second belt was proposed to prepare for the bidding of 2008 Olympic Games. Here, I adopt “green belt” (a singular form) to refer to both this idea and its practices prior to 2003. The plural form of this term (“green belts”) is used when talking about related state policies and practices after 2003.
and the Chinese national ethos together that erected a green belt in the 1958 master plan for Beijing. Furthermore (see Chapter 4), while the role of the green belt has consistently been significant in the city’s master plans, it has been modified by changing political and economic concerns at different times. But there is always a separation, a gap, between the form and the content of the green belt. In the 1950s, when a socialist-utopian vision was spreading over China, this gap can be registered as between the Western (modernist) planning canon and the industrial ambition. But later, when the urban metamorphosis was intensified by the new Party ethos (of a “socialist market economy”) proposed in 1993, the gap was still there yet indicative of something else: the concern to industrialise was gone, replaced by the state’s ambition to produce a new urban space for land-related interests and also to reshape Beijing into a “modern and international city.” Following these urban-oriented concerns, the inherited form of the green belt was integrated into a discursive moment. That was the moment when the connotations of the term “rural-urban continuum” were reshaped in a completely negative way: declaring the urban frontier to be a “dirty, messy and disappointing” region, the state legitimised its urban accumulation strategy – which it claimed to be able to make here “modern,” “beautiful” and “liveable.”

In this way, we can define the green belt as a pure urban form, resembling Lefebvre’s (2003b) and Merrifield’s (2013) notion of the urban as a pure form that is waiting to be filled through encounters and swerves – rather than a given form that has its own a priori shape and definition (ibid., 58). While the form of the green belt is set up by the Western (modernist) planning canon, its content is always subject to change, following the politico-economic dynamics. The green belt is floating and contingent upon the dynamic politico-economic conditions, and is hence consistently in the process of becoming real. Its articulations with the urban political economy were changing, yet they were always inflected by the Chinese national ethos of modernity. It is these articulations that defined the contents of the green belt, produced the gaps between its content and its form, erected the historical-geographical juncture where sovereignty and territoriality were integrated, and in the end paved the way for making an efficient zoning technology out of the green belt, serving both accumulation and surveillance.

The green belt was not endowed with territoriality until the 1990s, when the BMG was stimulated by the Party’s new ethos of the socialist market economy and started to deploy the green belt as a powerful method of its governance. From 1994 to 2016, within 23
years, this newly devised method gained prominence as a primary approach both for governing the urban process in general and for running land businesses in particular. Chapter 5 investigates the production of the green belts as a landed ecology in this period. It reveals that this ecological project was transformed into a zoning technology when the city was preparing to bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. The political urgency under the “state of exception” (Agamben 2005) enabled a distinct governing regime for making green space and running land business simultaneously in the green belt area – like an island in a landscape of normal rule (Ong 2006). The green belt area then turned into an “exceptional space”: state policies were exceptionally revised and normal procedures suspended to give related state projects the green light. In the end, this ecological project resulted only in the fetishism of nature and the loss for the local people of the lived space and the normality of their daily lives. After nature had been devastated, fictitious signs of nature enabled the un-ecological land-oriented manoeuvres of the BMG and kindred localities in the green belt area to promote their land businesses. This was the mechanism which gave birth to the landed ecology; and it was to play a more significant role after 2008 when China’s national economy was violently affected by the global financial crisis.

The advent of the global financial crisis required a “spatial fix” with some urgency. To respond to this crisis, China’s central government proposed a rescue package of four trillion Yuan in total. It turned out that a large portion of this was invested in the urban built environment, based on the financialisation of land resources and the spatialisation of the national economy as a whole, in which space (such as the green belts in Beijing) played a major part. Space was no longer simply a physical container of social practices; it became a key part of the local dynamics in increasing liquidity, boosting government expenditure, practising zoning technologies, legitimising large-scale demolition and displacement and reserving land plots for the state to profit from. This is the moment, the juncture, that triggered the BMG’s full exploitation of the potential of the green belts in producing space and accumulating capital through land businesses. In the green belts, I gradually realised, a solid articulation of the landed ecology and the spatial fix had been under erection since 2008. Through various institutional innovations, the BMG managed to earn in only seven years (2010-2016) more than one trillion Yuan in revenue from its land businesses (a substantial portion was located in the green belt area), in the course of what it termed “urban-rural integration.” This is a most recent triumph of the green belts, which are indeed implicated in a new scene of national and world history.
To summarise, the green belts in Beijing have been absorbed by the state’s endeavour to seize land revenues and to facilitate the urban accumulation, and they have hence become the new urban frontier. Lefebvre (1991, 85) once recalled that “the state and each of its constituent institutions call for spaces,” which “they can then organise according to their specific requirement.” Such spaces are what he later termed “state space” (cf. Lefebvre 2003a), and the green belts in Beijing can also be put in this category. The label “green belt” and its use as an ecological mask uncover the interconnections between ecological discourses and political-economic concerns in the urban process, resulting in significant social and spatial transformations of the city. This is the process in which the green belts are given a pure urban form that is with centrality. As “a place of encounter, assembly, simultaneity” (Lefebvre 2003b, 118-19), the green belts reveal the startling gaps between the official discourse and the actual politico-economic concerns and hence bring the state (as a process) and its effects to the fore for further examination – even though these green belts per se have been imaginary, and hence invisible, since the 1950s.

8.2 The urban process, the state process

The story of Beijing’s green belts signals a perceptible moment in the ongoing urban process in China. It was introduced at the outset of this work that the urban process refers to the process through which political, economic, and social content is filled into an urban form (see Section 1.4). In the moment of the green belts, where the role of the state is beyond question fundamental, we can investigate the state’s influence on various social relations and practices that are associated with the urban space. To some extent, we can conclude that the whole urban process is one and the same process of the state. It is through this urban process that the Party-state manages to implement the new ethos of the “socialist market economy,” to deploy discursive resources from the socialist era in a de-politicised way, to run its urban and land businesses behind an ecological mask, to financialise these land resources and spatialise the national economy and at the same time declare it is a new attempt to localise Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Eventually, it is through the urban process that the state succeeds in erecting a new hegemony – the hegemony of urbanisation – and hence to sustain its regime long after socialism has disintegrated. In this way, being urban defines the Chinese state at present, which has no socialism but
only “Chinese characteristics.” This is one of my conclusions on the nature and agency of the Chinese state, a lesson I painfully accept as someone who has embodied socialist principles and the Party-state legitimacy through earlier education.

Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the articulation between the urban space and the state by using “the hegemony of urbanisation” as the analytical framework. Empirical studies confirm that the secret of the state could be found nowhere but in space (Lefebvre 2003a). To understand such a mechanism better, I explore the territorial logic of the state and the campaign-style governance associated with this logic. The territorial logic shows the way in which the state deploys and restructures its territory for the double goal of surveillance and accumulation that follows an ideology of cohesion. This logic is shaped (and hence becoming concrete) by its integration with local and socio-historical conditions, the most significant one of which is a campaign-style governance that is rooted in the charismatic nature of the Party-state’s authority. With these two analytical concepts, I examined the process of crowning “Land Kings” (i.e., the most expensive land plots in a city) in my two field sites (Sunhe and Dahongmen) in Chapter 6. It turns out that the authorities are spatialised in the urban process because their legitimacy is conditioned on the ability to working spatial miracles. With the consistent campaign-style governance, leading cadres motivate the whole bureaucracy to enact extraordinary measures to promote the state’s land businesses, which are defined as “the paramount political issue” (Deng 2004, 379-80) in the urban change. This observation also enables me to realise that the state should not be understood through institutions per se; instead, it is the specific processes where the state engages with social dynamics – such as meetings for facilitating the green belt projects in Beijing – that best reveal its agency.

The territorial autonomy of localities and the moral claim of villagers are incorporated in the omnipresent logic of the state as another two conditions in crowning “land kings.” As active executors of the territorial logic of the state, the localities play a critical role in introducing the presence, control and surveillance of the state even “in the most isolated corners” (Lefebvre 2003a, 86). A new governmental technique emerges here, which I label surveillance by accumulation. In the name of villagers’ interests, those localities negotiated with the BMG and captured enough resources to run their own land businesses – and then shared a small portion of the benefits with the dispossessed villagers. Yet even this small portion was attractive enough to completely transform the subjectivities of the
villagers. Chapter 7 examines these socio-political dynamics by shifting the focus to the villagers. It shows how and how far they were stripped off the potential to be antagonistic and changed instead into “hegemonic subjects.” Two conditions stand out in this process. The first one is the widely shared national ethos of modernity in China, which generates yearnings in ordinary people for a “modern-urban” life and also enables the state to make over such yearnings into ideological resources, bearing the society’s consensus in favour of its land projects. The second condition is the change of state policies in the practices of demolition and relocation, which have become increasingly inclusive and enabled the implicated households to make a fortune overnight. The hegemony of urbanisation is in this way erected and steadily consolidated in the urban process.

Furthermore, even those who organised or participated in collective actions are subsumed in the territorial logic of the state. My observations and interviews in the field reveal that such activities are frequently infected by the state’s logic in that both sides deploy the same coordinate – money – to frame their attitudes and behaviours. To some extent, we could even declare that the resisters are so obedient that they are making their very bodies the new accumulation strategy. This makes the governance of the state much easier, since discontents can be effortlessly transformed into a terrain of domination through money. The popular dichotomy between domination and resistance is challenged, because it is at best a spatial technology of power configurations (Pile 1997, 30) while at worst a pure illusion. New approaches to the counter-hegemonic project are needed, and they should take residues as a nodal point. Instead of being addicted to essentialist notions of subjects and places of resistance, it is more rewarding to recognise and incorporate antagonistic elements “in the realm where social exclusion meets spatial marginality” (Merrifield 2015). They are generated in the hegemony and share a common search for “the negation of a given order” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 125-26). This “looser common desire to live differently” (Merrifield 2013, 68) should be put at the centre of the counter-hegemonic agenda, because politics is indeed a process of shaping political subjects:

Promoting a residue, showing its essence… against the power that crushes it and demonstrates it by trying to crush it, is a rebellion. Gathering the residues is a revolutionary thought, an action-thought. (Lefebvre 2016b, 302)
8.3 Re-evaluating the Chinese state

The urban metamorphosis of the Chinese state, as summarised above, invites us to further evaluate and interrogate the nature and the role of the state – by linking it to a broader discussion of state theory, on the one hand, and wider understandings of the conduct of the state, on the other. To place my findings (e.g., “the hegemony of urbanisation”) in the literature more subtly, I discuss three topics in this section as further reflections. First, with regard to the role of the public and the private sector in generating land value and advancing property development, the green belt stories remind us that the state is not free from speculation of its own, since under specific conditions the market can be rendered a state apparatus. Second, the state has multiple roles, and this multiplicity provides a platform for conversation between the green belt stories and the normative parameters of the state. By questioning its roles such as facilitating economic growth and improving social welfare, we can further contextualise and interrogate the logic of the state. Third, the institutional forms of the state are not the only perspective from which to examine its conduct; the stories narrated in this thesis stimulate us to attend more to processes in which policy schemes are selectively proposed and fast decisions informally made. Here, the state’s autonomy is relative and dynamic, rooted in local and historical conditions that are subject to urban change. I elaborate further on these three topics below.

Anne Haila (2007) once reflected on a widely shared myth in China urban studies at the time when she was writing, which she labelled “the market as the new Emperor.” Her scepticism was not only timely but also influential; subsequent researchers became more cautious in acclaiming the market transition or appealing to the discourse of property rights (see Section 2.4). What she did not offer in her article, however, is a similar crucial exploration of the nature and the role of the state in the urban process. With a “European welfare-state point of view” (Haila 2017, 503), she is less critical in examining the role of the state under public land ownership (Singapore and Hong Kong) as the “property states” (Haila 2000, 2015). Likewise, she has also been reluctant to admit the huge gap in China between socialist claims and the CPC’s new market ethos (Haila 2007, 7, 13). Stories in Beijing’s green belts, as this thesis illustrates, remind us that the market is not the new Emperor because it is rendered as a new apparatus of the state. Still in the name of developing Marxist principles (Zhao 1994, Zou 1994), the Party changed its reference horizon and coordinates of action and before long established a state-monopolised land
market (see Sections 2.3 and 5.3). The state’s land businesses have since been expanded, also endorsed by ideological resources (see Chapter 4), ecological masks (see Chapter 5) and institutional changes (see Chapter 6). The sheer scale of the state’s land revenues in a spatialised national economy (see Section 5.5) shows vividly how and how far an urban metamorphosis of the Chinese state is unfolding.

The speculation of the state in generating and capturing land value is also registered in many other investigations of China’s urban change (see, for example, Chen 2012, Hsing 2006a, b, 2010, Lin and Ho 2005, Shi 2014, Shin 2013a, Wu, Xu, and Yeh 2007). In this gradually uncovered urban/state repertoire, the discourse of “public land ownership” has little, if anything, to do with the “welfare state” setting, since various state agents have reserved most revenues for sustaining the regime (see Chapters 5 and 6) while the costs are generally borne by ordinary people in their daily life (see Section 7.4). Such tactics of the state, however, signal no exceptional pattern for China’s urban political economy, because they are also widely seen in many other countries and contexts, covering both the global south and north. In India, for instance, Michael Goldman (2011) identifies in Bangalore’s world-city making project that land speculation by dispossessing local residents on the urban periphery defines “the main business of government today” (ibid., 555). Stories in China and India also find their echoes in city-making projects in the global north. From urban redevelopment policies in the neoliberal conditions of Chicago (Ashton, Doussard, and Weber 2016, Weber 2002, 2010, 2015) to the financialisation of public land in the UK (Christophers 2017), it has been recognised that the (local) state and its tools and techniques play a pivotal role in enabling the local embeddedness of global capital and promoting the financialisation of urban (space) production (Halbert and Attuyer 2016). In this sense, the stories here of China’s green belts contribute to the “ongoing critical historical-geographical literature” (Christophers 2017, 82) on the state and land – for more global urban studies.

Besides land speculation, the state is also playing many other roles in the urban process. This marks the second issue to be discussed here: how to locate the exploitative role of the state in its normative and multiple parameters. In the context of Chinese academia, we may identify two directions from which to answer this question, both with substantial politico-economic effects. Drawing on theories from Migdal (1988) and Zysman (1983), some Chinese political scientists in the early 1990s claimed that “state capacity” should
be seen as a prerequisite for national prosperity, the core of which is the capacity of a central government to implement its will (Wang and Hu 1993). Such a view is indeed rooted in the dichotomies between state/society (see the reflections in Sections 1.3 and 6.2) and between central/local (see Section 2.3). It was representative of the new trend at the time among Chinese intellectuals of advocating neo-authoritarianism to speed up the marketisation and “modernisation” of this country (Cartier 2011b, 1117, Wang 2009, 32). This discourse of state capacity soon endorsed the Central Government’s decision to recentralise fiscal arrangements in the 1994 Tax Reform, which in turn guaranteed the financial resources to subsidise the privatisation of public housing in the late 1990s and the establishment of the state-monopolised land market by 2004 (see Section 2.3). The normative parameters of the state were deployed here to justify its extractive conduct; it is on the extension of this argument that a recent acclaim of “land finance” lies.

While the mechanism and negative effects of land finance have been shown in detail in this thesis, such a model is not without supporters in academia. Zhao Yanjing, for example, shares the ethos of the “state capacity” school of thought and argues in recent papers (Zhao 2011, 2013, 2014) that land finance is the kernel of China’s economic miracle, for three reasons. First, land revenues make it possible for the state to subsidise industrial development (through tax reduction and infrastructure provision). Second, land finance is by nature a financing model that expands the local state’s credits and makes possible its primitive accumulation of capital. Third, land revenue is a precursor of improvements in urban infrastructure and public services, and this then induces the consistent increase of housing prices and feeds into higher land revenues for the state. The multiple roles of the state are foregrounded in the “economic” model of land finance, all derived from the land revenues captured in the urban process. Even if the above two discussions (on “state capacity” and “land finance” respectively) have different concerns – one focuses on the central capacity and the other the local land finance model – they are both limited by the confusion of state capacity and state power. Li Qiang (1998) introduces Michael Mann’s (1984a, 1986) distinction between two types of state power (despotic and infrastructural) and suggests that it has been a long-lasting tradition of the Chinese state to be quite strong in its despotic power (range) yet weak in infrastructural power (capacity). The crisis of state capacity in the 1990s, he continues, originates from a gap between the changing state functions in the reform era and the socialist-totalist regime with forceful despotic power. Yet, Li reminds us here that the claims of increasing
state capacity to exercise its multiple roles still seems to accompany the retention of despotic power rather than strengthening the more needed infrastructural one.

I want to move a step further to interrogate the infrastructural power of the state as well. In the account of land finance model discussed above, urban infrastructure building and public services provision are certainly incorporated. The actions of the state are accepted as among its self-evident positive roles, with no critical reflection made upon why and how they are so and who benefits the most. The welfare of the population, for Foucault (2000b, 2009), defines accurately the target of power when it intervenes, which to work effectively has to induce pleasure and produce discourse. From this point of view, the infrastructural power indeed masks the *de facto* core of “governmentality” – a new art of government in his definition. This inference has two further implications for reflecting on the state-centric arguments on economic and social development in and beyond China. On the one hand, it is important in discussions to understand the subject of (state) power, so as to recognise who/what the state is claimed to be and where its agency lies, before endowing it with a tangible form. On the other hand, to register the effects of power, we should also attend empirically to the daily conduct of the state’s agents in contextualising abstract policies and ethos. Keeping these two points in mind, I have investigated China’s urban process and recognised a *territorial logic* in the Party-state regime. The multiple roles of the state are merely components of this logic for sustaining the state’s legitimacy through dominating and commercialising the urban space. In this way, the normative and multiple parameters of the state are dependent upon its exploitative role in the land-based urban accumulation.

The lack of attention to the state’s territorial logic in the above state-centric arguments is worth further discussion, because it is related to the state’s autonomy and institutional forms – the third issue mentioned at the outset. Simply put, after the Second World War the state was downplayed as a “dry and dusty” concept in the social sciences, until the 1980s, when dominant structural-functionalist views were overcome (Skocpol 1985, 4). People then started to accept that the state has its autonomy and should be brought back within the socio-political analysis (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985, Skocpol 1979). Drawing on intellectual resources from such neo-Marxists as Antonio Gramsci and Nicos Poulantzas, state theorists (the Neo-Gramscian approach in particular) take state power as a set of form-determined social relations (Jessop 1990, 206) and propose
to examine both the formal and substantive aspects of the state from a strategic-relational standpoint (ibid., 246). This approach, even when claimed as “relational,” however, is still bound to the state’s institutional form. The “institutional ensemble” is an anchor of analyses and the material political form is always upheld to validate the offer of structural privileges to specific state strategies (ibid., 270). The adherence to an institutional form sets a limit to an approach that was determined to make the thinking of the state non-essentialist (Smith 2013, Chapter 5); and a similar myth also underlies the above claims on behalf of “state capacity” and “land finance” in China, where the state’s form is taken as a priori and its multiple roles (in social and economic development) as self-evident.

This myth is indeed a fetish of the institutional form of the state, and it does not provide a proper perspective from which to observe the Chinese state in its urban metamorphosis. Besides the urban-oriented territorial logic and the campaign-style governance identified in this thesis (which are both irrelevant to the institutional form of the state), the recent literature also finds the rise of “bargained authoritarianism” (Lee and Zhang 2013) in China, indicating a new mechanism of depoliticising social unrest through manoeuvring and bargaining between state agents and non-state actors. In mechanisms as such, what matters most is not the institutional form that is engaged/adopted but rather the processes whereby policy schemes are selectively proposed and fast decisions informally made. Here, the consistent concern to sustain legitimacy by working spatial miracles constantly renders the abnormal a new normal and the extraordinary a new ordinary. And this is a characteristic also shared by cities in India, which cannot plan themselves because the informalised Indian planning regime has brought “a state of deregulation, ambiguity, and exception” (Roy 2009, 76). If we move beyond the fetish of the institutional forms (and the dichotomy between formal/informal), then these observations can lead us more to rethink the nature, agency and process of the state than to simply conclude the “territorial impossibility of governance” (ibid., 76).

In her critique of Bergsonism, Massey (2005, 20-30) rescues space from its long-term use as a representation of fluid and dynamic reality and redefines it as “the dimension of a multiplicity of durations” that is “constantly becoming” (ibid., 24). When we talk about the state, is it possible to adopt a similar view and subordinate the form of the state to the dynamic urban/state process? After all, the conduct of the state is revealed more through its effects in lived experiences than in the formal institutions of its bureaucracy. These
effects are produced in mundane social processes, which are unsettled yet tangible and which seem promising to register and define the state in its fluidity and becoming. In this sense, my own attitude towards the state is neither pessimistic nor optimistic. Since the state is always changing and changed by social processes, we are able to accumulate, through critical ideas and also political actions, those processes that might reshape the state towards a new condition where its exploitative role is not the core anymore and where people’s rights to difference are respected and defended. Here, I concur with Lu Xun (2006 [1927]), a great Chinese writer, who once said: “despair is as absurd as hope.”

8.4 Contributions of the present research

Near the end of *The Urban Revolution*, Lefebvre (2003b) starts to talk about the urban strategy, which indicates his ambition to devolve the task “into a strategy of knowledge and a political strategy without any separation taking place” (2003b, 141). He lists some urban strategies of his time, such as the urban guerrilla activity in North America and Latin America (ibid., 145-46). As regards Asia, Lefebvre reminded his readers, “it is the totality of their [large Asian cities’] relations with the countryside that needs to be examined” (ibid., 147). He also talks about three possible urban strategies in the socialist countries: (1) the domination of the official urbanism; (2) “the absorption of political society into civil society” through the urban; and (3) the legalisation of the urban problematic (ibid., 147). At the end of this discussion, however, he admits that “we don’t have the information” to “choose among these three strategies,” and that “the only ones authorised to choose are those willing to take the risks and assume the responsibilities” (ibid., 147-48). 47 years have passed since Lefebvre made this claim. I think now that it is time to take the risks; and the contribution of this thesis, if any, lies exactly in taking risks and making the choice.

China, as a (once) socialist country in Asia, marks a case of the two intersecting sets of urban strategies mentioned above (the Asian and the socialist). The meaning of the green belts is even more significant because it has both genealogical links with the socialist ideologies of the 1950s and spatial connections (overlapping) with the urban frontier (locally labelled “the rural-urban continuum”). Hence, with the green belts as my object of study, I am able to examine the “socialist” urban strategies on the one hand and register
the spatiality of the urban process in the Asian countries on the other. The final findings are rewarding. Since details of the findings have been summarised earlier in this chapter, here I mainly focus on the contributions it might make to the urban studies. To start with, the present research recognises that China is already involved in its “urban age”: instead of using this term in its stereotypical sense (see critiques in Brenner and Schmid 2014), I am adopting it here to illustrate that the urban problematic has become predominant in China (see also Shin 2014a). It is not subordinate to the industrialisation thesis; instead, it defines both the politico-economic dynamic and the daily life of ordinary people in this country. This is the most critical connotation of the term “the hegemony of urbanisation.”

In addition, the present research also manages to make sense of the black box of state-led and land-based urban accumulation. The state is eager to urge its land businesses forward. The reason lies in the fact that the regime’s authority is by nature charismatic and so it has consistently to work miracles to supply wellbeing to the population. The Maoist utopia could count as one attempt to do this; it continues to the present even now that the socialist utopian project has withered away. In Deng Xiaoping’s de-politicised version of “socialism,” development is “the paramount political issue” (Deng 2004) and urban space is turned into a pivotal platform from which to work (spatial) miracles. After the renewed territorial logic, the leading cadres of the Party domesticated the bureaucracy and the dynamic scalar relations outside the bureaucracy; all of them were mobilised for the identical politico-economic concern of generating land revenues. Even more, the ordinary people and their lives have now been incorporated in the logic of the state as well, as subjects who are governing themselves. In this process, we can recognise two of the socialist urban strategies posited by Lefebvre: after the legalisation of the urban problematic, “official urbanism” occupies the dominant position – and it is with this mechanism that the “socialist” regime and social relations are sustained even if socialism in China has long been a myth.

The survival of the “socialist” regime and the nature and agency of the Chinese state are two kernel, yet largely untouched, questions in China urban studies. This thesis attempts to tackle them; if it has succeeded, it could refresh our understanding of the state and the urban in this country. Furthermore, it also puts to researchers and actors a sharp question for the politics of emancipation out of China: what do they mean when they use the word “socialism”? Is this term per se adequate to justify any kind of practice from a regime
with this term in its title? In China, for example, socialism as we understand it is found nowadays only on paper (propaganda documents). Is socialism still a valid term in the vocabulary of progressive politics? If so, how can the “miracle” in China be explained? If not, where can we find the alternative? This puzzle needs further reflections and China (with its urban experience) becomes a potential method for such enterprises.

The present research also induces reflection on popular analytical frameworks in China urban studies. It was introduced in Chapter 2 that two dichotomies occupy the central position in the literature: one is between the state and the market and the other is between central and local government. Empirical discussions suggest that both dichotomies are problematic because the state is by and large a process. It has no rigid boundary and the effects that it generates can be omnipresent. In the urban process, it is identified that the market has been tamed by the state and can in a relational sense be identified (as least to some extent) as a new state apparatus. It is also revealed in this thesis that scalar relations are dynamic and are by nature a territorial mirror of the dynamic political economy. It is hence no longer proper to draw a rigid boundary between the central and the local – a more important task is to register the processes by which such boundaries are drawn and redrawn in a scalar way. This thesis also questions the view that there is a clear boundary between state and society. It was made clear at the outset (and empirically examined later) that the state should be delineated via social and spatio-temporal processes and practices that makes it seeming like a state with an abstract and non-material form. Therefore, the state is immaterial but is at the same time real. It is an unsettled ensemble of the dynamic socio-spatial and politico-economic processes, where “society” as another set of relations and practices is shaping, and being shaped by, the state.

8.5 An agenda for future research

A colleague of mine the other day commented that I was here “doing Beijing but arguing about China.” I do not accept this critique because the logic and processes I recognise in Beijing’s green belts can also be observed in other Chinese cities (though may be located in different forms and projects). The urban metamorphosis is after all a phenomenon that is unfolding at the national level. However, his comment does raise some methodological
issues that are worth pursuing. Let me move on from this point to illustrate the potential agenda for future research that may be generated by this research.

The empirical information used in the present research is by and large from Beijing, the capital of China. While this choice of case was helpful in collecting data, it was also risky – I wondered, for example, how to generalise the observations and persuade others to accept them. This challenge made it clear that a comparative study in two directions is needed. The first direction is to compare Beijing with other cities in China, especially those that are off the map (i.e., not among the first- or second-tier cities that have national significance). The object of the comparison might be the politico-economic dynamics of the identical state-led and land-based urban accumulation strategy. Since there are scalar variations, as well as different articulation junctures between the urban political economy and the local socio-historical conditions, such comparisons could offer a promising route leading to valid generalisations which would have to be based on “the experiences of a much wider range of cities” (Robinson 2002, 532, see also Waley 2012). And the second direction is to compare the experiences of green belts. The idea of the green belt, though originating in the UK, has been exported to many cities all over the world (Mace 2017, Tang, Wong, and Lee 2007). Comparisons between these cases would contribute to our understanding of socio-historical processes in which planning discourses/practices were articulated with the local political economy. They might in turn shed more lights on the situation of Beijing – this is one way to think through cities from elsewhere and learn how to move beyond methodological nationalism and contemplate cities in a global sense.

Besides the above methodological reflections, this research may also illuminate further theoretical and empirical investigations of the state and the urban in China. For example, there is a consistently strong sentiment (or “disgust”) regarding big cities in the official urbanism in China (such as the instruction from Xi Jinping in Section 1.2). Here emerges a paradox: how is it possible on the one hand to foreground a urban problematic and establish the hegemony of urbanisation and on the other to exert strict control and expel population from big cities? The antinomic relations between the urban process and this anti-urbanism sentiment evidently require more exploration.

Another possible direction for future research is to look at the spatiality of the urban process. The point was raised from time to time in this thesis that the “rural-urban
continuum” is widely recognised, by both state actors and non-state actors, as the urban frontier. It hence marks the most important part of the urban(ising) space where concepts of both the urban and the rural are reshaped. Instead of appealing to the Western urban vocabulary (such as *suburbia* and the process of suburbanisation), I believe that further empirical studies of this dynamic spatiality in Chinese terms are urgently needed – they could register the urban process spatially and accurately and at the same time contribute to replenish the urban vocabulary from China. Local expressions of the spatiality of urban process are not used to proclaim the particularity of Chinese stories; they are promising ways of exploring new approaches that would permit dialogue between different stories of the urban change. Such terms, which have not so far been registered in the literature, have the potential instead of conforming to the disciplinary tradition, could transform it, leading to a better understanding of urban transformation in the Global South and beyond.

To conclude this thesis, I want to quote a comment from Lefebvre. It not only conveys the nature of the city and the urban space but also encourages me to continue my research on the urban change – so as to figure out a way to fight for the many to reach a better urban life through the “urban revolution”:

> The city writes itself on its walls and in its streets. But that writing is never completed. The book never ends and contains many blank or torn pages. It is nothing but a draft, more a collection of scratches than writing. (Lefebvre 2003b, 121)
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